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Original OA/ID Number: 154				
Document ID: 9305216				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Charles Kupchan and Barry Lowenkron to Anthony Lake re: NACC Summit (3 pages)	07/16/1993	P1/L(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 154

FOLDER TITLE:

9305216

2015-0755-M

rs1303

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: KUPCHAN
LOWENKRON
WALKER

DOC DATE: 15 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NACC SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 19 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KUPCHAN
LOWENKRON
NSC CHRON
WALKER

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9305216

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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001 LAKE
001

Z 93071908 FOR INFORMATION
X 93080408 NOTED BY LAKE

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Rec'd 7/16 2:57pm
JWR
7/16

National Security Council
The White House

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MMMB

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DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>MM</u>	<u>I</u>
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>cy provided</u>	_____
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>Pls provide cy to SANDY BERGER</u>			
<u>" " " " Wiame Haas</u>			

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cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

cc: NS, WI, KAK ✓

16 JUL 95 11 30

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

execsec has done

Rec'd 7/16 2:57pm
JWR
7/16

National Security Council
The White House

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MMB

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
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APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	_____
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West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
	<u>Pls provide cy to SANDY BERGER</u>		
	<u>" " " " Wiener Hall</u>		

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COMMENTS:

CC: NS, WIV, KAK ✓

16 JUL 95 11 30

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 16, 1993

*SRB/
JW - let's
discuss.
R*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: CHARLES KUPCHAN AND BARRY LOWENKRON

SUBJECT: NACC Summit

Issue: Whether to hold a NACC summit immediately following the NATO summit planned for early December.

PROS:

- The central theme of the NATO summit will be NATO's adaptation and its relevance to security problems in the East. NACC is the principal symbol and instrument of NATO's eastward evolution; to have a NATO summit without a NACC summit would undercut the central message we are trying to send.
- We need not only to develop a host of new programs in the East, but also to demonstrate that NATO countries see the states of CEE and the NIS as partners, not objects, in a new security relationship. We cannot have it both ways -- that is, declare NATO's adaptation to Europe's new security landscape and announce major initiatives toward the East, but do it in a Western "club" of 16. If we do want to unveil major initiatives (e.g., a NACC Charter, joint peacekeeping exercises, a peacekeeping training center in the East, establishment of a NACC Military Coordinating Committee), we need to do it with our partners to the East.
- Bold initiatives are bound to touch neuralgic chords among some of our allies. A NACC summit would put pressure on them to address these issues now; it would combat the inertia and procrastination that have already constrained NATO's adaptation. Without the driving force provided by a NACC summit, a NATO gathering might only commission studies to be completed in anticipation of some future NACC meeting.
- A NACC summit would be strongly supported by the new democracies in the East. Their enthusiasm would provide a further source of momentum behind our efforts to gain support for a robust package of initiatives among key NATO allies.

- If many of our key allies in NATO remain opposed to public discussion of NATO enlargement, strengthening NACC and its concrete functions in the East represents the most realistic way of dealing with security problems in CEE and the NIS. If we are not prepared to move ahead on expansion (a question that needs further study), then a NACC summit is essential to demonstrate that the body is evolving into a meaningful security structure.
- The President's trip to Europe represents an important opportunity for him to exercise international leadership. Although a NATO summit offers a good platform for Presidential leadership, a first-ever NACC summit at which the President unveils a bold package of initiatives will cut an even sharper image.
- As a rule, NACC ministerials follow immediately upon NATO-NAC ministerials. Before the decision to hold a NATO summit, the December NAC-NACC ministerials were going to be held back-to-back in Brussels. If we decide only on a NATO summit, we would either have to cancel the NACC ministerial or have it take place after the NATO summit leaders leave Brussels. Either option only reinforces the perception among states in the East that their security concerns are being neglected and are of low priority. Either option also sends a powerful signal to our critics in Congress and in the press that NATO is carrying on "business as usual."
- State/Eur proposes that the NATO summit announce a NACC summit to be held next spring. The President, however, is already committed to a CSCE summit in Budapest next fall (the endgame of the next CSCE Review Conference). To plan on a NACC summit in 1994 would commit him to two multilateral security summits within six months.
- If the President decides to go to Moscow after the NATO summit without having seen CEE leaders at a NACC summit, he will have reaffirmed our links to our European allies and advanced our partnership with Russia, but bypassed the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
- A NACC summit would not place a heavy additional burden on the President's schedule. Assuming one day for the NATO summit, the following day for the NACC summit, and that evening for the EC summit, a NACC summit would add one-half days to the President's time in Brussels.

CONS:

- Our West European allies are looking to us to reaffirm the strength of the transatlantic link as embodied in NATO. A NACC summit would blur and divert attention from that central message.
- The proposals we are fleshing out for giving concrete meaning to our programs in the East need a great deal of

work and close consultations with our key allies. In light of this burden, State/Eur believes we should lay out our ideas in broad terms at a NATO summit and use the first half of 1994 to refine them and rally support for them in preparation for a substantive NACC summit later next year.

- A NACC summit could raise expectations in the East that we are prepared to tackle the NATO expansion issue. CEE states in particular would be disappointed and disillusioned should we then fail to do so.
- If NATO summit results are more modest than we would like, a NACC summit could fuel rather than dispel the perception that NATO members are serious about their engagement in the East.

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Document ID: 9307094				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. memocon	re: Luncheon with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi of Italy (6 pages)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 162

FOLDER TITLE:

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2015-0755-M

rs1304

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ITALY

MEMCON

PERSONS: CIAMPI, CARLO A

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES 17 LUNCHEON W/ ITALIAN PM CIAMPI

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 23 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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WALKER

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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X 93092311 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
X 93092311 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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National Security Council
The White House

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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
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22 SEP 93 7:27

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 23 SEP 93

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES 17 LUNCHEON W/ ITALIAN PM CIAMPI
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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2015-0755-17

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 23, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
September 17 Luncheon with Italian Prime
Minister Carlo Ciampi (C)

Attached for the information of the Secretary of State is the
Memorandum of Conversation from the President's September 17
luncheon with Prime Minister Ciampi. (C)

for *Yusuf A. Kenney*
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi
of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Stephen Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Reginald Bartholomew, Ambassador-designate
to Italy
Jenonne Walker, NSC (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley, Interpreter

Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi
Antonio Maccanico, Vice Minister, Secretary
of the Cabinet
Boris Biancheri, Ambassador to the U.S.
Ferdinando Salleo, Director General for
Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Sergio Vento, Diplomatic Adviser to the
President of the Council of Ministers
Francesco Alfonso, Head of the Office of the
President of the Council of Ministers
Paolo Peluffo, Head of the Press Office of
the President of the Council of Ministers
Silvio Fagiolo, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy of Italy
Leonardo Viscounti de Modrone, Advisor for
for Protocol Affairs
Isabella Randone, Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 17, 1993, 12:20 - 1:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room

(Following introductory pleasantries, e.g. about earlier uses of
the dining room, mystery novels by Margaret Truman and Elliot
Roosevelt, and anecdotes from the Israeli-PLO signing ceremony
the preceding Monday.) (U)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0755-M (1.02-)
12/1/2017 KBH

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Prime Minister Ciampi: Monday's ceremony was an emotional event in Italy. I think it was the first time in history that all television channels carried the same program live. (U)

The President: It was an extraordinary day for us, too. Later that afternoon I had a meeting with leaders of the American Jewish and Arab communities, and they were all very emotional, even hugging each other. We challenged them to go to the Gaza and develop joint projects for its development. (S)

We cannot have ultimate peace until Israel sees the process through, including with Syria and Lebanon. But it will be hard for Rabin to deal with Syria until the people of Israel are comfortable with his agreement with the PLO. So we must work hard to make the agreement popular with the people of Israel. That means trying to figure out how to keep lots of balls in the air at the same time; that won't be easy. (S)

Part of Rabin's sober demeanor on Monday was genuine, but part was because he did not want the Israeli public to see him as too happy about this agreement. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: This agreement is only the beginning. Italy will do its best, working bilaterally and with the EC, to influence the Arabs. We need tight coordination of our efforts in this delicate situation to avoid duplicating each other's efforts. (S)

The President: That is very important. We need the energy of all our European allies that have good relations with Syria, to encourage it to give us a little time and support the agreement. (S)

Mr. Salleo: We are thinking of meeting soon with the Syrians. We will see if we can use traditional channels to be helpful. At the same time, if there is any way we can help with Gulf States or other Mediterranean states, we will be very interested in doing so, through the EC or bilaterally. (S)

Secretary Christopher: As soon as possible, we need some kind of donors conference. Our present thinking is that the Multilateral Group which already is under formation might be a good vehicle. I believe the EC has two or three members on the Steering Group. I hope that the meeting of Foreign and Finance Ministers planned during the UNGA can discuss this. We also need a substantive structure, so potential donors will know that they will be giving to something efficient and their money will not be wasted. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: I agree, and the World Bank's recent work on infrastructure can be very helpful. I also agree that we need to avoid duplication. Having some money early may be more important than having large amounts. Another problem is that the Palestinians are not a state, so we need a trust fund. (S)

The President: If Italy is going to be seeing Syria, any encouragement you can give them to exercise restraint over both

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violence and rhetoric would be very helpful so we can try to get this going. Arafat has told me twice that he does not want this to be exclusive between Israel and the PLO and forget the Syrian-Israeli problem. We and Israel have assured him we want to go forward, but Israel needs a breathing space. I understand the pressure on Syria, but there are degrees in which they can express their displeasure. (Ø)

Mr. Salleso: We had a strong message from Qadhafi. He wants sanctions at least not to be hardened and suggests that he might oppose the agreement if they are. That sounds like bluff, but. . . Monday morning we will encourage Iran not to oppose the agreement. (Ø)

The Vice President: They already have. (Ø)

Mr. Salleso: Yes, but there are different ways of creating trouble. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ciampi: It is amazing what can happen after so many years. For the United States, this is a moment of great success and prestige, and hope for peace in the world in areas where it always was considered impossible. (Ø)

Secretary Christopher: Can we talk about the GATT negotiations? I am very concerned about the French desire to reopen the Blair House Accords. That could make agreement impossible by December 15. Do you see any way to avoid that? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ciampi: I believe that the EC's Jumbo Council next Monday may add some further interpretation. There are problems about agriculture, but I do not want to reopen the Blair House Agreement. In the EC there always is the possibility of a veto, but Italy has made it clear that this is not its position. (Ø)

Mr. Kantor: Thank you. That is tremendously helpful. There was great momentum in Tokyo, and we don't want to lose that. I understand how difficult agriculture is for the EC. I hope the Community's negotiators would be given flexibility to deal with this without reopening the Blair House Agreement. Yesterday, the Cairns Group indicated that if Blair House is re-opened, they would pull out of the Uruguay Round. That would be a disaster. If the Italian Government can help at the EC meeting on the 20th, we stand ready to address MTA and textiles. Some progress was made on September 11 on the questions we all had on textiles. So we welcome your position and hope you will use as much influence as you can. Sir Leon Brittan and I are in agreement that if we can continue the positive momentum, we can resolve other issues. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ciampi: We must not have a failure because of the widespread negative results on trade and on old relationships between the United States and Europe. That is why I want positive results before December 15. We understand the French

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position but are not going to take a position that implies agreement with it. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: U.S. farmers feel very strongly that they got the wrong end of the bargain at Blair House. French farmers feel the same way. If Blair House is reopened, American farmers will want more. We need to reduce subsidies. Twenty-one percent was a hard-fought issue. When you talk about reinterpreting agreements, if you mean altering agreements on subsidies, we would have a big problem. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: I understand and agree. (S)

The President: One of the most important things we can do for each other is to promote growth. To do it before the end of the year would be a nice Christmas present. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: Another sensitive US-European issue is 301. I wonder if the US can reconsider this. I am afraid that sooner or later in Europe there will be a movement toward creating something similar. (S)

Mr. Kantor: 301 only has been used nine times ever. The threat is a reality, and I know it has been a matter of concern to Europeans. There is sentiment in our Congress for an even stronger measure. We have to deal with that all the time. (S)

To the degree that there is success in the Uruguay Round and we can go on to issues like competitiveness, the environment, to the extent that we can satisfy Congress that we are creating jobs in America and global growth, there will be less Congressional pressure to use 301 or even create a stronger measure. We have our own concerns about communications and broadcast laws. It is a matter of building confidence in each other, ensuring understanding of each other's interests, willingness to be flexible. During the last few months, we have been able to do that in a fairly constructive way. (S)

There is some 301-like mechanism in the Uruguay Round text now. So an agreement would be somewhat helpful in this area. (S)

Ambassador Biancheri: In our relations, economics are becoming more and more important. We need some way of settling trade disputes between two close partners, between whom major conflicts are unlikely. Once the Uruguay Round is concluded, some agreed way of settling disputes would be positive. (S)

The President: This is a big issue with the EC, too. (S)

Ambassador Biancheri: It is very important to have a special economic relationship as well as the special security relationship we have had. (S)

The President: Do you have alternative suggestions for how this thing can be resolved? (S)

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Ambassador Biancheri: Preventing disputes from emerging is a very effective way of showing special partnership. The Prime Minister mentioned 301. It incites the West Europeans to do something similar. We can find a way of settling disputes between two partners whose disputes are likely to be minor, perhaps on a temporary basis. (X)

Mr. Kantor: What you indicate is appropriate for discussion. We have a Free Trade Agreement with Canada. Even so, there are disputes, and we use a dispute settlement mechanism, and it works moderately well. In the Uruguay Round draft there is a dispute settlement mechanism better than the current one under GATT. So if we succeed in the Uruguay Round, it will be positive for this problem. That does not mean we should not look at something else between close allies, to have an early warning mechanism. The enormous trade between us means there always will be disputes. But I think we can find a mechanism to handle them. (X)

Mr. Salleo: And to give the Atlantic partnership an economic dimension. That could be one of the subjects of the Trans-Atlantic Summit in early January. (X)

The President: I think we should explore this because the better off countries can only grow by expanding trade. The problem for the U.S. and Western Europe is creating jobs, and that stems from our inability to create global growth. That can only come from agreement by the wealthy countries. China can grow 14% a year, but it doesn't help growth elsewhere. (X)

Secretary Christopher: Let me talk for a moment about Russia in connection with NATO enlargement. It will be important to make Russia relatively comfortable. The way to do that is to talk to them early, and enable them to be part of the process. That does not mean they should join now, but we should establish criteria that they could hope to meet. (X)

Prime Minister Ciampi: We must look at enlargement in a positive way. For Russia there is the G-7. At Tokyo we decided to use the same formula at Naples. Perhaps we can continue evolution on this point. I agree completely we would have to offset the danger of enlargement. We must not make relations with Russia more difficult. (X)

Secretary Christopher: I agree that the G-7 is the right analogy. If Russia seems in the second from the last position, they will object. But it is not holy writ that the G-7 must always be only seven. (X)

Prime Minister Ciampi: It is a question of time. The question is the right moment. Italy will become President of the G-7 in January. I do not know if the time is ripe for Russian membership. I hope that after the NATO Summit in January it will be a good time to broach in a very delicate way this problem. Italy is not against enlargement. The problem is to ensure Russian confidence. The Polish elections this weekend will be a factor. (X)

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The Vice President: When President Chernomyrdin was here we entered into a new space relationship that affects Italy. I want to express appreciation for Italy's positive reaction. In the next phase of developing our relationship with Russia we will remain keenly sensitive to Italian interests. (S)

Mr. Lake: On NATO enlargement. It is important that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe not only see hope in the long run, but also practical short-run payoff. So we are looking for immediate measures to improve NACC. (S)

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7094

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1993

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Luncheon with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi of Italy, September 17

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the President's luncheon with Prime Minister Ciampi. We suggest that the Memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to Marc Grossman.

And that the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBYNARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 162				
Document ID: 9307108				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. memcon	re. Meeting with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi of Italy (3 pages)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 162

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9307108

2015-0755-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ITALY

MEMCON

PERSONS: CIAMPI, CARLO A

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES & ITALIAN PM CIAMPI

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 23 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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9/23

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DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBNARA*, Date *12/1/2017*
2015-0755-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
001
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Z 93092308 FOR DECISION
X 93092311 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
X 93092311 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

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National Security Council
The White House

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ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<i>WA</i>	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<i>WA 9/23</i>	<u>TF</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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22 SEP 53 7:24

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec's office has dispatch.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9307108
DATE 23 SEP 93

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES & ITALIAN PM CIAMPI
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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2015-0755-M

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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7108

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 23, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
September 17 Meeting with Italian Prime
Minister Carlo Ciampi (2)

Attached for the information of the Secretary of State is the
Memorandum of Conversation from the President's September 17
meeting with Prime Minister Ciampi. (2)

for private attorney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *K&A* NARA, Date *12/1/2017*
2015-0755-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi
of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Reginald Bartholomew, Ambassador-designate
to Italy
Charles Kupchan, NSC (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley, Interpreter

Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi
Antonio Maccanico, Vice Minister, Secretary
of the Cabinet
Boris Biancheri, Ambassador to the U.S.
Ferdinando Salleo, Director General for
Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Isabella Randone, Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 17, 1993, 11:15am - 12:15pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I am delighted to see you. (U)

Prime Minister Ciampi: Italy is experiencing an important recovery, though we still face crucial challenges. Parliament has approved a new electoral law. Both Italians and foreigners are regaining confidence about Italy's economy. The issue of a new bond has demonstrated renewed confidence in our economic situation. (S)

The President: This sounds very impressive. (U)

Prime Minister Ciampi: We need to manage carefully our economy and build confidence in the market. Elections will take place in the spring. It is hard to say what the result will be. There will be some political fragmentation, but the new government might not look all that different from the current one. (S)

The President: When we met in Tokyo I was impressed with what you are doing. The world needs a stable, strong Italy. You should be proud of your accomplishments. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0755-M (1.03)
12/1/2017 KBM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prime Minister Ciampi: Economic reform needs to continue. We have put together our budget for the fall with no previous discussions with the political parties. This is new for Italy. We need to reduce interest rates and cut the deficit -- by both cutting expenditures and increasing taxes. We must also increase the efficiency of the government. (S)

The President: In what areas did you cut the budget? (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: We have focused on pensions and health care. (S)

The President: All advanced countries have systems with little control over health care costs and pensions. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: My program and your program are quite similar. (S)

The Vice President: Our countries also have outdated centralized bureaucracies. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: The central government should give direction to policy, but delegate responsibility for implementation. It is also important to get control over the budget. In the past, the Italian Parliament did not have a good system for shaping the budget. (S)

The President: We are excited by the changes occurring in Italy and happy to see public support for these changes. You have succeeded in providing a sense of stability. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: If you look at our Treasury Bills, you will see interest rates dropping and investors willing to go more long term. This occurred only through the market -- there was no intervention. There is simply much more confidence in the economy now. (S)

The President: We keep hoping low interest rates will lead to investment and growth. But there is a significant lag time caused by large debt. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: In mid-1992, the exchange rate of the lira was not competitive and there was uncertainty about the lira. Now our exchange rate is competitive. Interest rates are dropping. Costs are holding more steady. Trade unions have agreed that wage increases should be pegged to inflation -- and not rise more quickly. (S)

The President: I am delighted to be sending Reg Bartholomew to Rome. He is one of our best diplomats. He is happy to be going to Rome and happy to be leaving Bosnia. I am hopeful that the latest developments will lead to a breakthrough. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: Yes. Welcome developments that have taken place. Italy is close to Bosnia. Italians have been

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shocked by the irrationality of events there. We very much look forward to welcoming Mr. Bartholomew to Italy. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew: Italy has been outstanding in helping with Bosnia: full support for naval and air operations and a major contributor to humanitarian efforts. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We are near the end game. The parties are edging closer together. We must encourage the parties and help implement an agreement. (S)

The President: The Bosnian government is ready to accept a partition. We need to get them more territory. And we need to ensure that a peacekeeping force addresses a doable mission. We must be concerned about fairness to the Muslims and about creating a settlement that is enforceable. We are hopeful about the situation. (S)

Turning to Somalia, we began our conversation in Tokyo. Since then, Aideed has asked for mediators. We need to find a political solution, but not one that sends a signal that war lords should shoot at our forces to achieve their objectives. I am, by the way, very sorry about the two Italians killed yesterday. The challenge is how to find a political solution that stops the violence and that can allow UN forces to leave -- but without sending the wrong signal. I welcome your thoughts. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: In Tokyo, I stated that our political approach was insufficient. We must now send a message to correct this. Based on our experience in Bosnia, the UN should appoint a negotiator to deal with the Somali clans. If we do this, it sends the message that diplomacy is more important than force. Our main goal should be to make a contribution to rebuilding the political and administrative infrastructure. A negotiator, efforts to restore political infrastructure, and actions to build local government outside Mogadishu could serve as the embryo for a new situation. We should have in mind a clear approach that can be used elsewhere. Italians are very concerned about this. What are our goals? It is difficult to find answers. Italy wants to contribute -- but Parliament is resisting. (S)

The President: So is our Congress. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We need to move Aideed out of the country while the process moves forward. This is key to diplomatic progress. This would not be incarceration, but residence in a third country. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: Yes. He should not be involved in the situation. But we cannot let him become a hero. (S)

Secretary Christopher: Yes, we must avoid that. It should not become a "David and Goliath" situation. (S)

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Mr. Lake: In the long term, we need to build political structures from the bottom up. In the short term, we need to get Aided out. We must keep up the military pressure. We must wed political and military initiatives. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: What's important for my government is that the political/diplomatic approach become more apparent. We must give more prominence to the diplomatic solution. This will help the situation in Italy. (S)

Mr. Salles: Our redeployment is continuing. We are slowly pacifying new areas. NGOs are helping with agricultural development and are providing food. (S)

The President: We will continue to press forward on these issues. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We are preparing for the NATO Summit. We are considering possible enlargement of NATO, including identifying criteria for membership. The Alliance must thrust eastward. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: What is important in the long term is the common civilization embodied in NATO. The conditions that gave rise to NATO are gone. But NATO is still in existence. It must adapt to the new situation. Relations between the United States and Europe are key to both. What unites us is very evident: a common culture and values. But it is difficult to know what Europe will be in ten years. Germany will expand its influence naturally. The political geography will be very different. NATO can strengthen the Alliance -- which goes well beyond military matters. (S)

The President: An agreement within NATO to take action in Bosnia will set an important precedent and facilitate the peace process. The U.S. cannot signal a withdrawal from Europe. I did not like the message sent by U.S.-European differences over Bosnia. NATO looking eastward will help explain the need for NATO to our domestic electorates. I believe that the U.S. must lead, but we must do so by reasoning with our allies and reaching a common position. (S)

Because of our economic problems, a peculiar isolationist strain is emerging in the U.S. arguing that we should stay away from Bosnia, Somalia, GATT and NAFTA. But we have learned hard lessons from the 1920s and '30s. Others in the U.S. say that we should go it alone and lead through unilateral actions. But this will hurt NATO, the UN and other institutions. The challenge is for me to sell to our people and to Congress the need for our engagement in the world. The U.S. will lead, but through a partnership. This is a very big challenge. We need a common position at the NATO Summit. UNGA will be important. I will be speaking to the world, but also to Americans. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We must manage NATO expansion in a way that does not isolate Russia. (S)

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5

The President: Just like we needed to be careful about intervention in Bosnia so as to avoid creating problems in Russia. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: Yes, NATO enlargement should not threaten Russia. (S)

The President: We are concerned about challenges to Yeltsin. The Russian Prime Minister was here. We will undertake new initiatives on space, the environment and nuclear clean-up. We must bolster the reformers. (S)

Prime Minister Ciampi: We must give economic support in special areas. Foreign trade is badly needed. (S)

The Vice President: We are concentrating on the energy sector. The Prime Minister is trying to get reform back on track. (S)

The President: If all countries could focus on the energy sector, they would get large gains. The problem is overcoming political obstacles in Russia. (S)

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7108

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1993

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *W*
FROM: CHARLES KUPCHAN *K*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
Meeting with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi of
Italy, September 17

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the President's meeting with Prime Minister Ciampi. We suggest that the Memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to Marc Grossman.

And that the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNNARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

SEE
Case Number: 2015-0778-M; 2015-0755-M

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 166				
Document ID: 9307812				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: v

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Case Number: 2006-0215-F; 2015-0755-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 183				
Document ID: 9400568				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Original OA/ID Number: 468				
Document ID: 9400629				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: v

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Madeline Albright to POTUS et al. re. PFP and Central and Eastern Europe (6 pages)	01/26/1994	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 468

FOLDER TITLE:

9400629

2015-0755-M

rs1306

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: ALBRIGHT, M

DOC DATE: 26 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST
HUNGARY

CZECH REPUBLIC
POLAND

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PFP & CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: NFAR PER FRIED

DUE DATE: 31 JAN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NSA NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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001 FRIED
001

Z 94021515 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 94021515 NFAR PER FRIED

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: ALBRIGHT, M

DOC DATE: 26 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST
HUNGARY

CZECH REPUBLIC
POLAND

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PFP & CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: _____ DUE DATE: 31 JAN 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF: _____

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0629
STAFF
ADVISE
TODAY MAKE
SABON SERISE

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

January 26, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT *MKA*

SUBJECT: PFP AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

First, thank you for the pleasure and privilege of heading this very special Presidential Mission. For someone who has spent her life studying the area, it was incredible to meet the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister of every country in such a compact period.

Second, in addition to the reporting cables, I wanted to transmit to you some thoughts and conclusions from this reimmersion in my area of special expertise.

Generally speaking, there is little question in my mind that it would be hard to find another part of the world that is so unabashedly pro-American. There is, however, a lingering sense of disappointment and apprehension.

The disappointment comes from the fact that the leaders, as well as large segments of the population, believed that they would be absorbed more easily into the West. Especially in Poland, any number of times we heard that actually only East Germany had become part of the West; the others were relegated to various Western European institutional waiting rooms.

The apprehension comes from their fear that we are naive about the Russians, and that we are willing to sacrifice their security to preserve our relations with Russia. They are concerned about the Zhirinovskiy factor and throw in Munich and Yalta for good measure.

What follows are the reactions we found among the Visegrad countries I visited (accompanied by General Shalikashvili) and the second group of countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Slovenia) I visited with the inter-agency team, as well as some specific policy recommendations.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0755-M (1.04)
12/1/2017 KBN

I. Reaction to PFP

As you are aware from your meetings in Prague, there are different degrees of enthusiasm about PFP within the Visegrad group:

- Slovakia is the most enthusiastic not only about PFP, but also about V-4; they see it as their way to piggyback into NATO, for which they would be at the end of the line if they were not in this grouping.
- Hungarians and Czechs are the next most enthusiastic, although the Czechs are less interested in V-4 because of Prime Minister Klaus' determination not to have his country lumped together with the "beggars" of the region.
- The Hungarian Foreign Minister warned about appeasement but was afraid to be too negative lest it harm Hungary's chances for early membership in NATO; he was also concerned about his own standing within the new Boross government.
- The Poles were the least enthusiastic, with Walesa warning about the Russian bear and Olechowski covering his bets by saying that he was pleased that the "direct and material interest in the security of the region" message was so clear, but also publicly complaining that there were no criteria and no timelines. (He did say that his political future was dependent on how well and how rapidly PFP worked and how successful he was in appearing to fight against a perceived Western sell-out.)
- The Poles also pointed out that if no obvious fruits materialized from PFP, then they might have to look for "other arrangements." (It was unclear what they meant, but perhaps they were referring to non-aggression pacts with Russia and Germany.)
- All were concerned about how Ukraine fits into the picture and understood the danger of leaving it out. Ultimately, all said they understood the need to avoid, in the near term, "new artificial dividing lines in Europe." But down the road, they want themselves in NATO and the Russians out. (Have we dealt with the realistic possibility that Moscow will qualify before the others do?)

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Non Visegrad Countries

The non V-4 were all enthusiastic. Each country's leaders pointed out that they were strategically important to NATO, either as a bridge to another part of the region, or a pivot point for all Western hopes. Each country put in a sales pitch for the next Presidential visit to be on their soil, explaining that Tirana, Bucharest, etc. was the ideal place and would be symbolic because of its location or World War II anniversary, local uprising, etc. These countries did not ask about criteria or timelines; they were just glad to be part of the thinking about ultimate NATO membership.

- Romania sees itself as the most important country in the region (described by one of the ministers as the Poland of the non V-4 countries in terms of strategic importance) and the one that has the most to offer militarily and geographically.

- Bulgaria also believes it is strategically important and sees itself as a link between Russia and the Balkans.

- Albania emphasized the strategic importance of its Adriatic coastline and stressed its total devotion to the West.

- Slovenia was enthusiastic but hurt. Like others, the Slovenes went to great pains to explain that they were wrongly classified by the West: Slovenia should not be referred to as a Balkan democracy; it should not be called a part of the former Yugoslavia; and it should have been invited to Prague -- even though the formation of Visegrad pre-dated its recognition as a country, it had more of a right to be there than Slovakia.

II. Attitudes in the Region

Security Issues

With various nuances, it became clear that the V-4 saw different threats to their security than the other countries. For the V-4, the main danger is chaos in Russia; for the others, spill-over from the former Yugoslavia. Hungary straddled, fearing both threats. Albania also linked fear of Russia and the former Yugoslavia, saying we should be aware of the danger of a Russian-Serb alliance that allows Russia to achieve an Adriatic warm-water port as a result.

Whether the fear is Russia or spill-over, it is not so much concern of an armed invasion but of the chaos created by instability. All cited disruptions of their respective economies, either because of loss of markets, or in the case of the Balkans, the effects of sanctions, or the influx of refugees from their own or some other ethnic group.

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All the countries discussed the internal security threat coming from dissatisfied minorities: the Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania and Croatia; Serbs in Krajina; Turks in Bulgaria. (The Bulgarian Prime Minister told me that he was particularly concerned that the Turkish minority would learn the wrong lessons from the creation of a fundamentalist Muslim state in Bosnia, and therefore had to be watched more carefully.) The Albanians were concerned about Kosovo and Macedonia.

While all understood that PFP did not offer automatic security guarantees, they were interested in the consultation clause. They will be watching how rapidly follow-up concrete steps will be taken. Even though we made clear that PFP required "shared responsibilities," the non V-4 especially let us know that they might need financial assistance to take part. They all spoke about the importance of their respective bilateral military programs with us. (The Defense Ministers in each country were ready to start discussing specifics.)

Economic Situation

We did not spend a great deal of time talking about economics specifically, but it was clear that the transition to market economies continues to cause widespread economic pain. All except the Czechs spoke about the need to pay greater attention to social problems. After Prague, when we were able to discuss economic initiatives of PRD-36, all were receptive to additional programs. While understanding the importance of regional projects, they are still more interested in country-specific initiatives.

Political Situation

A striking similarity in all the countries we visited was the strain between the President and the Prime Minister. Division of power is difficult enough in many sophisticated democracies. It clearly causes significant problems in these new democracies, where there is a competition not only for power but also for personal popularity. This is especially true in this region, where many are attracted to a strong hand at the top.

At the risk of generalization, it is fair to say that the center coalitions are having trouble staying together. If the economic situation deteriorates and there are more problems associated with minorities, extremes to the right and the left will grow in power and influence. The potential for a Zhirinovskiy or Pawlak factor exists in all these countries. (Perhaps this is unfair to Pawlak, who is going to some lengths to show that he is more like Suchocka than she herself would have been.)

SECRET

III. Conclusion

PFP turned out to be considerably more effective than most critics predicted. We did manage to square the circle by harmonizing three seemingly competing objectives: to revitalize NATO, to avoid antagonizing Russia by feeding nationalist tendencies, and to calm growing fears in Central and Eastern Europe.

But without sustained attention to the very real anxieties in Central and Eastern Europe -- many of which could spark genuine instability -- PFP will have done little more than postpone major dilemmas in the region. If not resolved successfully, such dilemmas could affect in significant ways our vital interest in the security and stability of the European continent. (The need for active, American-led follow-up is particularly evident from the subsequent foot-dragging on implementing PFP we are getting from our allies in Brussels.)

IV. Recommendations

1. Pay more attention to the area. I understand that some reorganization is in the works and I applaud that. It is important to think in a broad way, and especially to integrate assistance as described in PRD-36 -- a process that will require considerable inter-agency coordination. Most of all, we must ensure that our program has substance, not just form.
2. Follow up with concrete steps on PFP as rapidly as possible. Major steps at the beginning are not required, but we must show genuine movement. For example, an effective follow-up would be an early military exercise in which a NATO member participates. Having CEE countries exercising together simply won't do this trick.
3. Keep up bilateral military and economic relationships. These are the ties that permit each country to feel that we are paying it particular attention.
4. Stress regional cooperation on a variety of issues, but understand that it really goes against the tide. Each country resents being put in an artificial group and wants to be "special."

~~SECRET~~

5. Be more careful about the language we use. As pointed out by Prime Minister V. Klaus, the term "national boundaries" is interpreted in that part of the world as ethnic national boundaries; we should refer to the principle that "existing state boundaries" cannot be altered by military force. Never refer to Slovenia as a Balkan democracy or as part of the former Yugoslavia.

6. Although presumably membership in NATO is quite a ways down the line, begin to think about the likely line up of who and when. An example of the problem was pointed out to us in Bucharest. It would be taken very badly if Hungary got in before Romania. Be clear about the fact that our timetable is invariably slower than theirs. This mismatch in perceptions is a problem that must be managed as we go along.

7. Occasionally ask their leaders for advice rather than just telling them the result of our own thinking. Remember that for the most part the leaders do think of themselves as Western and believe that they just were stuck on the wrong side of an artificial dividing line.

8. Think about a Presidential visit to a non V-4 country during one of the POTUS trips to Europe this year. We can get an enormous amount of mileage from these trips. Even though a commitment seems to have been made to go to Warsaw and Budapest, it will set back relations in other areas if there is not an accompanying visit to a non V-4 capital. The trick is which one to pick.

9. Receive more Heads of State or Prime Ministers at the White House in the course of the year. (The previously mentioned strain between the Presidents and Prime Ministers is reflected in POTUS treatment at the White House. For example, Havel was received and Klaus was not.)

10. Define more clearly "direct and material interest." I was often asked to explain why the security and stability of the CEE region is of direct and material interest to the United States and NATO. One possible formulation is this: We have gone to war twice in this century to defend our enduring vital interest in the security and stability of Europe; we know that Europe cannot be stable and secure if one part of Europe slips into anarchy or chaos; therefore, Central and Eastern Europe is so important because it directly affects our vital interest in Europe in general, and NATO allies in particular.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re. NATO Expansion (1 page)	10/04/1993	P1/b(1) KBI 7/13/2018
001b. paper	re. Moving Toward NATO Expansion (4 pages)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1) KBI 7/13/2018
001c. paper	re. NATO Expansion-Views of Richard Schifter (3 pages)	10/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBI 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9408093
RECEIVED: 04 OCT 94 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 07 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KSM/NARA, Date: 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 94101214 NOTED BY LAKE

rec'd 10/5 12:35pm

National Security Council
The White House

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


October 4, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: NATO Expansion



Attached is a paper that Dan Fried and I put together in an effort to elaborate the NSC staff position going into the interagency review of NATO expansion. Nick Burns has cleared. We would like to get together in the next few days to discuss it with you, preferably before the next IWG meeting on Friday.

Dick Schifter believes we should take a more cautious approach. As his attached paper indicates, he feels that, while we should begin discussions within NATO, we should defer the decision to admit any country and focus instead on intensifying military cooperation within Partnership for Peace. He also recommends priorities for spending the President's \$100 million that go beyond the scope of our paper.

Dick's concerns are not fundamentally at odds with the approach we recommend. While we believe there is an urgent need to define the road that leads from PFP to NATO membership, we agree it would be premature for the Alliance to make any decisions on specific candidates or a precise timetable. At the same time, we would argue that the debate over NATO expansion a year ago was not driven by fear of a reactionary turn in Russia, but out of a desire to provide the underpinnings for an expanded democratic community in Central and Eastern Europe -- a challenge that remains despite the relative calm that has returned to Russia since last October. Dick is of the view that this challenge can be best addressed by economic measures rather than NATO membership.

Concurrences by: ^{*NB*} Nicholas Burns, ^{*RS*} Richard Schifter and Daniel _{*DF*} Fried

Attachments

- Tab A Moving Toward NATO Expansion
- Tab B NATO Expansion: Views of Richard Schifter

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0755-M (1.05)
12/1/2017 KBH

October 4, 1994

Moving Toward NATO Expansion

We have two months to (a) refine USG thinking about our basic goals and rationale for NATO expansion; (b) conduct initial consultations with the Allies (and, subsequently, with the Russians, Ukrainians and CEEs); and (c) based on (a) and (b), prepare an initiative for the December NATO Ministerial that would kick off a formal process within the Alliance to define an agreed policy framework for NATO expansion. Holbrooke's much heralded IWG is off to a slow and acrimonious start. We should develop a consensus among ourselves about USG direction and tactics, based on our work to date and our thinking post-Yeltsin Summit, the better to help lead State, OSD and JCS. A summary of where NSC staff members stand* and unresolved issues follows:

I. Agreed elements

Objectives.

- Develop an integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but going beyond NATO expansion.
- In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including the more advanced CEEs, with the prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.
- In parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia (and something similar between NATO and Ukraine). This could take the form of a Treaty (an alliance with the Alliance) or of associate membership.
- New members would acquire all the rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and would commit to eventual full integration in NATO's military structures, but there would be a flexibility on operational issues such as stationing of foreign forces.
- NATO expansion should take place in coordination with enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable.

Rationale

- To project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE, we need to create a perspective that Partnership for Peace will lead to membership for some PFP members.

* This paper reflects the views of Sandy Vershbow, Nick Burns and Dan Fried. Dick Schifter favors a more cautious approach; his views are attached.

- To make clear expansion is not seen as directed against any country, process must be developed in parallel with long-term strategy vis-à-vis Russia/Ukraine that includes continued partnership with NATO and development of other institutions (CSCE, G-8).
- Expansion process will be evolutionary and linked to a continued PFP as mechanism for relations with countries not obtaining membership in first group.
- "Insurance policy"/"strategic hedge" rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated. On contrary, possibility of membership in the long term for a democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly (pace Volker Rühle).

Criteria

- Avoid explicit checklist (e.g. military requirements); stick to "precepts" -- democracy, market economy, responsible/good-neighborly security policies.
- On military side, general goal of "interoperability" will be refined as PFP evolves.

Timing

- For own planning purposes, anticipate earliest explicit decision on new members no sooner than first half of second Clinton term.
- Should avoid proposing specific timetable at this stage, or identifying which countries are likely to be included or excluded from the first group.
- During interim:
 - o Use PFP (reinforced by U.S. bilateral security assistance) to deepen relations with all partners, potential members and others, and to promote interoperability.
 - o Watch for progress vis-à-vis "precepts."
 - o Begin to establish the functional building blocks of the future enhanced relationships between NATO and Russia/Ukraine; consult with Moscow and Kiev on best way to institutionalize this relationship.

- o Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, both internally and with them (e.g. pace of military integration, forward deployment, "German solutions" such as temporary restrictions on stationed forces deployment on new CEE members' territory).

II. Fall Strategy

(Notional) Objectives at NAC Ministerial.

- Statement of "precepts" for potential new members.
- Affirmation that, in the context of these precepts, PFP is the path to membership, as well as an important mechanism for cooperation in its own right.
- Tasking by Ministers to the NAC to initiate a formal review to establish an Alliance policy framework for expansion, including role of PFP, evolution of relations with countries who do not seek or obtain membership.
- Statement of new, more ambitious goals for expanded NATO relationship with Russia and Ukraine in addition to PFP (implicitly foreshadowing "alliance with the Alliance" as alternative to membership track).
- Announcement of ambitious PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (including broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike.

Outline of discussions.

- o Road map:
 - 1) Quad (mid-to-late October);
 - 2) Unreinforced brainstorming session at NATO (late October);
 - 3) Interagency team to Quad and other key allied capitals (Rome, The Hague -- early November);
 - 4) Reinforced NAC to prepare for Ministerial (mid-November);

- 5) Interagency team to Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw and other CEE (Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Baltics -- late November)
- 6) NAC and NACC Ministerials (December 1-2).
- 7) Bilaterals to explain Ministerial decisions with Russians, Ukrainians, CEE leaders on margins of NACC Ministerial and Budapest CSCE Summit (December 5-6)

o Themes

- With Allies: seek consensus on above objectives.
- With Russia/Ukraine: continue dialogue on rationale for NATO expansion, compatibility with goal of inclusive European security system; lay groundwork for development of special relationship/alliance with the Alliance.
- With CEEs: outline way ahead; lay down precepts; review military implications (e.g. extent of integration NATO will require); make clear candidates and timetable are still open questions; stress need for them to support positive parallel track for Russia/Ukraine.

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NATO Expansion

Views of Richard Schifter

I agree that we should, as promised, proceed with a discussion within NATO of the manner in which the organization may be enlarged. I recommend, however, that before this discussion is initiated, we arrive at a tentative conclusion as to what we would consider a desirable result. That does not mean that our minds are closed as we enter into an exchange of thoughts. It does mean, however, that we develop a plan of our own which we shall advocate in the course of the talks.

The decision to give serious consideration to NATO expansion was taken in light of political rather than military factors. In 1993 we had witnessed the stand-off between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament, the violent clash between Yeltsin, on one hand, and Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, on the other hand, and the substantial vote, in December 1993 for Zhirinovskiy and the Russian Communists. We thought it might be desirable to send a clear message to those who were once again dreaming of Russian expansionism that the West was prepared to defend Central and Eastern Europe. We also thought that it was necessary to reassure the governments and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe that the West was indeed prepared to defend them. We may also have been influenced by domestic pressures: from the Polish American Congress, from Henry Kissinger, from other critics who argued that what they called "another Yalta" was in the making.

Some of these political concerns seem less urgent today than they did a few months ago: (a) a take-over in Russia by advocates of territorial expansion beyond the "near abroad" seems less likely now; under these circumstances, publicity on the subject of NATO expansion will do more harm than good in Russia's domestic politics; a message which might be appropriate for delivery to expansionists who are poised to take power is inappropriate if sent to the group when it is politically weakened and would use the message in its propaganda campaign to regain political strength; (b) precisely because Yeltsin and the moderates seem to be more secure now the concern over Russian expansionism has lessened among the governments and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe; while still interested in joining NATO in the long run; their immediate preoccupation is with membership in the EU; the only CEE leaders who continue to press hard for NATO membership are Walesa and Olechowski; (c) our domestic critics should be answered with sound policy arguments, which call for the deferring of a decision on NATO membership for the CEE states.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0755-M (1.08)
12/1/2017 KBH

Let us assume for the sake of argument that we were indeed prepared to come to a conclusion in 1995 that the Visegrad Four will be admitted to NATO in 1997 or 1998. The consequences are likely to be the following: (a) Russian nationalists will argue that the West is clearly preparing for an early confrontation. (b) The governments of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states as well as the Russians will read this decision as placing the non-Visegrad CEE states beyond the NATO defense perimeter. (c) Prompt action would have to be taken to incorporate the military forces of the Visegrad states into NATO and to make concrete preparations for the defense of the new NATO borders. (d) As the Visegrad countries do not have sufficient funds to make adequate preparations for their own defense, the cost of NATO expansion will have to be borne by the present NATO members. What would that cost be and which countries are prepared to assume it? (e) In light of the recent election result in Slovakia, should that country really be taken into NATO at this time?

Given this downside of an early decision to expand NATO, and the reduced validity of political considerations for moving forward at this time, we should instead focus on purely military concerns. The following factors should be borne in mind: (a) The Russian military is not an immediate conventional threat to the CEE region. Russia's conventional military capability has declined sharply. There is no indication that this decline is now being reversed. It would take years to rebuild a Russian conventional military capability which would be a threat to the CEE countries. Such rebuilding would be obvious to us and could then elicit an appropriate response. (b) The effort at integrating those CEE military forces which we want to integrate into the NATO structure can begin now, under the umbrella of the Partnership for Peace, without sending the ostentatious signal which an announcement of early admission to NATO membership would constitute. (c) Not pressed by a 1997 or 1998 deadline, the effort at integration and interoperability could take place at a more leisurely pace under significantly reduced financial pressure. The effort which would be undertaken would be part of a comprehensive program to integrate the entire CEE region into a European Zone of Peace. (d) The effort in which we would thus engage could be related to the Partnership for Peace. It could significantly reduce the political pressure for NATO membership.

When the Partnership for Peace was first announced, there were those who thought it was little more than a charade. We have begun to create some reality through the liaison offices set up at NATO headquarters and the Partnership exercises. Our proposed allocation of \$ 100,000,000 per year for five years beginning FY 1996, with an additional \$ 30,000,000 made available in FY 1995, should provide a basis for the initial efforts to achieve interoperability.

How this money should be spent should be guided largely by military considerations. I would recommend that it be allocated only to those countries which have exhibited a desire to become members of the Western family, which can play a significant military role, and where the money expended by us could make a significant difference. I believe, therefore, that it should be allocated in FY 1995 and 1996 largely to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, with Bulgaria receiving careful consideration in light of political developments in that country. The program should focus principally on developing close working relationships between NATO and the officer corps of the selected PFP countries, including the teaching of English and extensive mil-mil exchanges. Some funds should also be allocated to the purchase of communications equipment. Clearly, the effectiveness of this program would be significantly enhanced if as many allies as possible engaged in parallel activities.

To sum up, we should enter into the NATO expansion discussions with the following desired outcomes in mind:

- I. No immediate decision on admission to NATO of any country. No effort at setting standards for accession.
- II. Without making any major announcements to that effect, agreement on the rapid intensification of efforts to develop close relationships between NATO and the officer corps of NATO and those of selected PFP countries.

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re. Moving Toward NATO Expansion (5 pages)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2013

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 13 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

RUSSIA

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 14 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

TO: LAKE

FROM: FRIED
BURNS

DOC DATE: 11 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

RUSSIA

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION

ACTION: FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE: 14 OCT 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED

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FILES: PA

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National Security Council
The White House

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Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
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NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>ADS 10/14</u>	<u>N</u>

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12 OCT 94 11:14

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) NSW TO IL Date: 10/1/16

- ① See attached comment about how the paper should be distributed in the office. Do you have?
- ② One addition to the NATO paper.

2) _____ TO _____ Date: _____

Will add the 410M BAHCo battalion to the list of special PPP initiatives. (\$100m for FY '96)

3) _____ TO _____ Date: _____

4) _____ TO _____ Date: _____

5) _____ TO _____ Date: _____

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] NSW TO TL Date: 10/1/12

- ① See attached comment about how the paper should be distributed in the region. On your line?
- ② One addition to the NATO paper.

2] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

Will add the #10M Baltic Battalion to the list of special PFP initiatives. (\$100m for FY '96)

3] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

4] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

5] _____ TO _____ Date: _____

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8265

10/14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 13, 1994

94 OCT 13 P 1 : 28

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: NATO Expansion

✓
Working Paper

During your July trip to Europe, you stated that we would begin this fall to consult with our Allies on next steps toward NATO's expansion. Attached at Tab A is a Working Paper prepared by NSC Staff on NATO expansion which we are circulating interagency to guide these discussions.

I believe the paper will be of interest to you. It reflects your recent discussions with Yeltsin and NATO leaders.

Attachment

Tab A NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBM* NARA, Date *12/1/2017*
2015-0755-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

MOVING TOWARD NATO EXPANSION

We have less than two months to (a) refine USG thinking about our basic goals and rationale for NATO expansion; (b) conduct initial consultations with the Allies (and, subsequently, with the Russians, Ukrainians and CEEs); and (c) based on (a) and (b), prepare an initiative for the December NATO Ministerial that would kick off a formal process within the Alliance to define an agreed policy framework for NATO expansion. The following is a summary of NSC views on USG direction and tactics, based on interagency work to date and our own thinking post-Yeltsin Summit:

I. Policy Framework

Objectives

- Develop an integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but going beyond NATO expansion.
- In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including the major CEEs who live up to our precepts, with the prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.
- In parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia. This could take the form of a Treaty (an "alliance with the Alliance"). It should include a mechanism for consulting with Russia on NATO or NATO-led military operations as in ex-Yugoslavia, but without giving Russians a veto over NATO decisions.
- Possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine and Baltic States should be maintained; we should not consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence.
- New members would acquire all the rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and would commit to eventual full integration in NATO's military structures; but full integration would not be required at the outset and there would be flexibility on operational issues such as stationing of foreign forces.
- NATO expansion should take place in coordination with the enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable.

WJCH
WJC
Handwritten notes

Rationale

- To project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE, we need to create a perspective that Partnership for Peace will lead to Alliance membership for some PFP members.
- To make clear expansion is not seen as directed against any country, process must be developed in parallel with long-term strategy vis-à-vis Russia that includes intensified partnership with NATO and development of other institutions (CSCE, G-8).
- Expansion process will be evolutionary and linked to a continued, robust PFP as mechanism both for preparing new members and for deepening relations with countries not likely to attain membership or, at least, not among the first group to join.
- “Insurance policy”/“strategic hedge” rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated. On contrary, possibility of membership in the long term for a democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly, as the President and Yeltsin agreed (*pace* Volker Rühle).

Criteria

- Avoid explicit checklist (e.g. military requirements); stick to “precepts” -- democracy, market economy, responsible/good-neighborly security policies.
- On military side, general goal should be interoperability with NATO forces, with precise standard to be refined as PFP evolves.
- Standardization with NATO forces should be longer-term objective, but need not be attained at time of accession.

Timing

- For own planning purposes, should anticipate earliest explicit NATO decision on new members to be taken no sooner than first half of second Clinton term.
- But we should avoid proposing specific timetable at this stage, or identifying which countries are likely to be included or excluded from the first group.

-- During interim:

- o Use PFP (reinforced by U.S. bilateral security assistance) to deepen relations with all partners, potential members and others, and to promote interoperability. (Issue for decision: how to set priorities for use of \$30 million in FY95 and the expected \$100 million in FY96 for PFP support, and to meet the President's commitment of \$10 million for the Baltic Battalion in FY'95.)
- o Watch for progress vis-à-vis "precepts."
- o Begin to establish the functional building blocks of the future enhanced relationships between NATO and Russia; consult with Moscow on best way to institutionalize this relationship.
- o } Keep the membership door open for Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to "tilt" in favor of the Visegrad countries), while stressing that all candidates must satisfy the same precepts.
- o Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, both internally and with them (e.g. pace of military integration, forward deployment, "German solutions" such as temporary restrictions on stationed forces deployment on new CEE members' territory).

II. Fall Strategy

(Notional) Objectives at NAC Ministerial.

- Statement of "precepts" for potential new members.
- Affirmation that, in the context of these precepts, PFP is the path to membership, as well as an important mechanism for cooperation in its own right.
- Tasking by Ministers to NAC to initiate a formal review to establish Alliance policy framework for expansion, including political/security rationale, military requirements, role of PFP, evolution of relations with countries who do not seek or obtain membership.


- Statement of new, more ambitious goals for expanded NATO relationship with Russia in addition to PFP (implicitly foreshadowing "alliance with the Alliance" as alternative to membership track).
- Announcement of ambitious PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (including broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike.
- At CSCE Summit, seek adoption of U.S. initiatives to strengthen CSCE as mechanism for conflict prevention and crisis management as a key element of broader strategy of building an inclusive European security system in which Russia plays a major role.

Outline of discussions.

- o Road map:
 - 1) Consultations with UK, Germany, France (mid-to-late October)
 - 2) Unreinforced brainstorming session at NATO (late October)
 - 3) Interagency team to London, Paris, Bonn and other key allied capitals (Rome, The Hague -- October-November)
 - 4) Reinforced NAC to prepare for Ministerial (mid-November)
 - 5) Interagency team to Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw and other CEE (Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Baltics and, possibly, Bratislava and Sofia -- late November)
 - 6) NAC/NACC Ministerials (December 1-2): NAC issues communique or declaration on NATO expansion; NATO decision briefed to partners at NACC.
 - 7) CSCE Summit in Budapest (December 5-6): Adoption of U.S. initiatives to strengthen CSCE.
 - 8) Bilaterals with Russians, Ukrainians, CEEs on margins of NACC and CSCE, *and/or* dispatch high-level briefing team to Moscow, Kiev and CEE capitals as we did after NATO Summit.
- o Themes

- With Allies: seek consensus on above objectives; discuss military implications (building upon October 7 OSD/JCS briefing).
- With Russia: continue dialogue on rationale for NATO expansion, compatibility with goal of inclusive European security system; lay groundwork for development of special relationship/alliance with the Alliance; consult on agenda for strengthened CSCE.
- With CEEs, Baltics, Ukraine: outline way ahead; lay down precepts; review military implications (e.g. extent of integration NATO will require -- drawing on OSD/JCS briefing); make clear candidates and timetable are still open questions; stress need for them to support positive parallel track for Russia.

AV/DF:NATOMOV3



Wolin, Neal S.

From: Fried, Daniel
To: Wolin, Neal S.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Burns, Nicholas R.; Kerrick, Donald L.; Sens, Andrew D.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: NATO Expansion Paper - ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Wednesday, October 12, 1994 2:52PM

We want to move promptly to circulate the paper interagency. Nick believes our position would be much stronger if Tony sent it to his counterparts than if we sent it.

Front office views?

Tony sends it

We send it via Will Itoh (with instruction to handle as SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS) _____

We send it directly to our counterparts _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 12, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS, ^{NB} RICHARD SCHIFTER ^{RS}
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW ^{DF} ^{FO} ^{FO}

FROM: DANIEL FRIED

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum to the President presenting NSC/Staff's working draft on NATO's expansion. We are circulating this paper interagency.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 23 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BELGIUM

MEMCON

PERSONS: DEHAENE, JEAN-LUC

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM DEHAENE OF BELGIUM

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 16 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

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DOC 2 OF 2

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The White House

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette 6/20

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's
Meeting with Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium
(U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Belgium for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with Prime Minister Dehaene

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Lunch with Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene of Belgium

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff
John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
Alan Blinken, Ambassador to Belgium
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Jean-Luc Dehaene, Prime Minister
Andre Adam, Ambassador to the U.S.
Frank Vandembroucke, Foreign Minister
Paul Maertens, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister
Johan Swinnen, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister
Frans van Daele, Director General of Political Affairs
Philippe Beke, Advisor to Foreign Minister
Moniel Delvou, Spokesperson for Prime Minister

DATE, TIME February 11, 1995 12:15 pm - 2:00 pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office/Roosevelt Room

The President: I understand you just flew in from Dallas. How long are you going to be in the States? (U)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I arrived on Tuesday, and will be going on to New York and then back to Washington. It's a quick but

intensive trip. I understand that you had Helmut Kohl here a few days ago. (U)

The President: Yes, we had a very good visit. Helmut was in good spirits, although he was a little sad about President Mitterrand's illness. (U)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Yes, he is losing a good friend. But he is also concerned about the French elections. (U)

The President: Yes. Do you think Balladur will win? (U)

Prime Minister Dehaene: As of now, I would say yes. He has the best chance. For the sake of continuity and for Europe, collaboration between Germany and France is of great importance. The personal element is also important. I think Kohl and Balladur can work together. I think Kohl also expects that Balladur will win, but you never know in an election. (C)

The Vice President: That's certainly true. (U)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Balladur has been lucky so far, but something could go wrong. This is what the newspapers are saying. (C)

Prime Minister Dehaene: One thing always happens that you least expect in politics. (U)

The Vice President: Please give us your advice on politics before you leave. (U)

The President: And please take our media with you. (U)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Maybe we should swap journalists. (U)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I don't know if we would change our press for yours. We don't like ours, but we prefer them to yours. (U)

The President: The British are the only country with a press that rivals the American press. (U)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Yes, their tabloids are even worse. (U)

The President: What do you make of the situation in Russia -- not just Chechnya, but generally? (C)

Prime Minister Dehaene: For all of us in Europe there is an element of big concern about Russia. Like you, we are all thinking about how the situation in Russia will evolve and how we

should develop the security architecture in all of Europe. To start with Russia, following Chechnya we are in a terribly uncomfortable position vis-a-vis our public opinion. What has happened in Chechnya is unacceptable, but our position is not easy to explain. We accept that Chechnya is part of Russia and that this is an internal affair. What we cannot accept is the way they have tried to solve the problem. On the other hand, we also have to remind our publics that we are convinced that Yeltsin is still the best leader that we can have in Moscow. This is a difficult situation and a difficult position to explain. Public opinion is asking for a more pronounced position and we have to remain steady in the way we react. We attach very great importance to the meeting this week to establish a role for the OSCE. Chechnya is also a test for that organization. The Hungarian President is not doing a bad job in this context. He is trying to extend the OSCE mission and increase OSCE involvement. (S)

We also have to maintain our contacts with Yeltsin on the overall security architecture in Europe. When I visited Poland and Prague in recent weeks, and when I met with the Hungarian Foreign Minister, I found that Chechnya is a big concern for all the Central European countries. For them it is also a test of how Europe and the U.S. will react. Chechnya inevitably has a relationship to discussions on NATO enlargement, as it raises the question of future Russian intervention. For us, we have a difficult position. On the one hand, we need to give them a perspective that PFP will continue and, for some countries, will end with membership in NATO. On the other hand, we have to work in parallel to clarify our position toward Russia and avoid creating the interpretation that NATO enlargement is anti-Moscow. This brings me back to OSCE. It is the basis for the security architecture in Europe. (S)

What are the latest indications that Russia is going to sign the PFP documents? They also want to go farther, and we should do so in relations between Russia and NATO. (S)

Secretary Christopher: A month ago I met with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. We discussed the status of the documents that Russia did not sign in December -- the partnership program for PFP and the side-document on relations beyond PFP. I had the impression that Russian signature is only a matter of time. Since then, Chechnya has intervened. But in my conversation with Kozyrev, we took the first steps in discussing some kind of overarching relationship between Russia and NATO. We agreed that in 1995 we should work out this relationship in parallel with the work on NATO expansion. We have a general understanding, but Chechnya has now preoccupied our thinking and our conversations with Kozyrev since Geneva. We need to push for reconciliation in

Chechnya. Given our public opinion, it will be hard to move ahead with Russia until Chechnya is resolved. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: What is your impression? Will Russia sign the document or will they ask for more before they agree to sign? (S)

Secretary Christopher: I think we reassured them that NATO is not going to take decisive action on expansion this year, and that 1995 will only be a year of study and presentation of the results of that study. They understand that we will be proceeding in a measured way. How things got so off the tracks in December, we may never know. But after my meeting with Kozyrev and the Vice President's meetings with Yeltsin in December, I think Yeltsin has been reassured. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Do I understand you correctly that the 1995 process will be on course? We have heard some echoes from the U.S. that you wanted to go faster than was agreed in December. (S)

Secretary Christopher: There has been no change in our position. The key is that the study be finalized in the fall and the briefings given so that we have an opportunity to consider the results and decide next steps. We are precisely on the course set down in the NAC communiqué. (S)

The President: Have you met with the Republican leadership yet? Some of them believe we should be going faster on NATO expansion, partly because of domestic politics and partly because of their convictions. They will point to Chechnya to argue their position. They are influenced to some extent by Walesa. He argues that we now have the opportunity to expand NATO without any consequences, but that in 5-7 years, Russia may be stronger politically and militarily, and expansion then would have dire consequences. Therefore our timetable is wrong, according to Walesa. I disagree with this. We are moving at the right speed. The Vice President in his meetings with Yeltsin and Chris in his meetings with Kozyrev agreed that we will have an evolving relationship with Russia even as we work toward the expansion of NATO. But there is pressure here from people arguing that we should take the historic opportunity now to move east. We are expanding NATO for obvious security considerations, and I hope our allies do not believe we are moving too fast. In your discussions here I hope you will say that we are moving at the right pace. In December we decided that 1995 would be a year of study of the "why and how" and that it would be better not to say this year which countries will join or on what dates. Things might change, I don't know. We could have a different

conversation in six months. But for now, we are on the right course. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I have the impression that Russia refused to sign the PFP document because it had the impression that the NAC decision meant we wanted to rush the process. It is important to stick with the timetable agreed to in December. It is important to bring Russia to... (S)

Secretary Christopher: ...to a steady course. (S)

The President: I know that Chechnya frightens people in the former Soviet bloc. But it is not clear that it will make the Russians more eager for further adventures. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: That is just what the Russian Ambassador told me before my trip to the Czech Republic. He said that I would hear in Prague that they are afraid and he said: "Why should they be afraid?" They should now see that the Russian military is not in any position to threaten them. (S)

The President: There is also the factor of Russian public opinion. Chechnya has generated a lot of opposition. This is Russia's first televised war. It is what we have dealt with since Vietnam. Anytime you are getting people killed on TV, it leads to problems. Even though we have reservations about the way Yeltsin has handled Chechnya, it is good that the Russian people have seen it all unfold. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: There is a new situation in Russia. We should also be concerned about the relationship between the politicians and the Army. I don't always have the impression that Moscow's orders are being followed by the military. This is cause for uncertainty about Russia's future. But I am certain that if Yeltsin disappears, we will not have leaders with more control over the military. This is also Kohl's analysis. We have to continue our policy of sustaining Yeltsin. For the moment, he is the best we will get. One of Yeltsin's weak points is that he has not succeeded in establishing a political party, and we should have contacts with other leaders. If there were elections in December, the real reformers won't have a party. We may end up with the same political relationships, with troops that the President can't count on, etc. One of the problems with Russia is that it still needs to learn the essential mechanisms of democracy. They seem to think they can create democracy on their own. It is different in Central Europe, where you feel that they have functioning democratic structures. These do not exist in Russia and this is an unstable factor. (S)

I am glad to hear that we have the same approach regarding NATO enlargement. It is important to have a report on the "how and why" and then a further process, in which it will be important to give some countries -- on a well-founded basis -- signs that they can go farther toward membership. It is also my impression that the Central European countries underestimated at the beginning the effects of Partnership for Peace. They are learning now that it can help in the process of harmonizing procedures. At some point, we will need to identify and go forward to a new stage, one in which not all the countries of Partnership for Peace can come into the Alliance. We can't say that all partners will have the vocation to join NATO, but our conclusion on this will have to be the result of the NATO study. (C)

Secretary Christopher: One reason to make Partnership for Peace a more tangible organization is that it is not just a conveyor belt for new members, but also needs to have an independent value. (C)

Prime Minister Dehaene: To sum it up in two words, PFP is to prepare for membership, but it is also process in its own right. (C)

The President: We had very good PFP operations in 1994. We hope that during this year we will hold even more exercises and other things that will make it into a real organization, one that will add to the security -- including the psychological security -- of all of its participants, and one that will help create the proper transition for future members. We want all the partners to say that PFP is better than they first thought it would be. (C)

Foreign Minister Vandenbroucke: I have a question. Apart from expecting Russia to sign the PFP documents and have a special dialogue with NATO, should we also come forward with ideas for a more formal relationship? (C)

Secretary Christopher: Yes, I think we should explore that. There are lots of possibilities. At one end of the spectrum is a possible treaty between NATO and Russia. At the other end of the spectrum would be a commitment to consultations. There are a lot of possibilities in between, and we need to explore them in 1995. (C)

Foreign Minister Vandenbroucke: Yes. I think we should find something in between. (U)

The Vice President: Part of the dialogue with Russia will be to assure them that the NATO expansion process will take place in the context of efforts to define a Russia-NATO relationship that is partly within Partnership for Peace but also outside its

boundaries. The third element of this simultaneous process is an effort to deepen our bilateral relationship with Russia. A sense that these three processes will go along at the same pace is important to the Russians. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: When you say "at the same time," are you saying that you do not consider Russia to be a future member of NATO? (S)

The Vice President: We don't exclude that possibility, but we agree with the Russians that this is most unlikely. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Should we say this or should we keep silent on that point? (S)

The Vice President: Russian membership is a theoretical possibility and there is little sense for us to say that, for all time, we rule out even the theoretical possibility of Russia joining NATO. To do this is not the same as investing it with any likelihood. The Russians have no such expectations, but the theoretical possibility helps them deal with what Gorbachev called the "enemy image." (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I have another question regarding NATO. Can we make progress in parallel with the second element of the NATO summit -- where we agree not only on PFP, but on Combined Joint Task Forces. This would give possibilities to Europe and the WEU to engage in certain operations. This may also be an element of concern for Russia. Until now, we have not seen sufficient progress in making CJTF more operational. I don't know your approach, but this could be of psychological importance since not all of our European partners are supportive of NATO expansion. It could be important to bring them along if we can make progress on CJTF as well as expansion. We have been clear in supporting the expansion process. We are one of the EU members who believe that we can expand the security dimension of Europe even faster than we can expand the EU (because some economic problems will be difficult to resolve before the EU can expand). So to bring all the Europeans along on expansion, we need to move ahead on CJTF. We have always stressed the need for a double approach to transatlantic relations and European integration. The case in point is our approach to the Eurocorps. Germany and France asked us to join. We obliged them only after it was clear that the Eurocorps would be tied to NATO as well as the EU. We have always been strong advocates of these two elements, but it is important that we operationalize CJTF. I am concerned that it has been stuck in technical discussions. Perhaps we need a more political approach. At some point following the military discussions, we will need a political impulse. (S)

Secretary Christopher: Do you think it would be easier to resolve CJTF after the French elections? (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Probably. (U)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Yes it will. (U)

Prime Minister Dehaene: But we should go very fast on CJTF after the French elections. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: If we succeed in settling the remaining issues on CJTF, it will be very important. It will lead to a settlement of the ideological question regarding the relationship between European defense and NATO. If there is good will on all sides, we can come to terms. Yes, it is technically complex. But we would like to see it resolved on a pragmatic basis. If you say that the WEU needs operational capabilities, then we have to be able to act without the participation of NATO but in harmony with NATO. So to put this into practice, CJTF needs to be settled. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I don't know what is your impression, but I think we need a political discussion. (S)

Secretary Christopher: If your impression is that we are dragging our feet on CJTF, that is not accurate. (S)

The Vice President: We have met resistance from France. And their elections will not completely purge them of their feelings. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We are committed to the CJTF concept. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: This is a case of France's typical problems with the NATO integrated military structure. They feel there should be a clear distinction between Article IV operations and Article V operations. Taking this into account, pragmatic solutions should be possible. (S)

The President: What about Bosnia? How do you see the situation? (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I think that the Juppe initiative should be given a chance (the Foreign Minister can elaborate since he has been more closely involved). I don't know how Karadzic evaluates the situation after his negotiations with President Carter. We have to be careful to find the right way to approach him. It is important to ensure that we work on the same basis.

We have a problem with the perceptions of our public opinion. They feel we have to intervene and clear up the situation. We have to explain that we are engaged in a process. Some of them don't like this and want us to choose one camp and intervene massively. Right now, however, we are doing peacekeeping, in between the parties. We should continue to try to settle the conflict by agreement and we should reinforce UNPROFOR so it can implement that agreement. The Foreign Minister can elaborate on the EU position. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Vandembrouke: First, I am very happy that the Alliance has found cohesion in its approach to Bosnia. We are grateful for your efforts despite the pressures of Congress and public opinion. We know it is difficult, but we are glad solidarity has been kept alive. We have questions about cohesion within the Contact Group at this stage. The Juppe initiative is worthwhile but I am cautious, as is Juppe himself. He asked the EU to endorse his idea in order to see whether his initiative could work. The summit France has proposed could be an informal one before holding a real summit of the parties. But the basic philosophy of isolating Karadzic looks like the right policy. My question is whether your Administration is on the same track. We have been told that you are looking for a way to get Karadzic into the process by defining the end result. Are you trying to get him to the point where he will not need to accept the Contact Group Plan as the starting point, but instead focuses on the end result? I am not sure this would be contradictory to the Juppe and EU approach, but it could be. So my questions are: (1) How is the cohesion of Contract Group? (2) What do you think of the Juppe initiative? (3) What is your thinking on isolating versus talking to Karadzic? (Ø)

Secretary Christopher: Nothing in Bosnia is easy. I believe we are on the same wavelength as Juppe. In fact, I phoned him at 7:30 Monday morning to make sure. For a time we did try to see if it were worthwhile to have direct contacts with Karadzic. But we are now past that stage. And we don't think it will be worthwhile dealing with him further before we have more leverage. Therefore, we support the idea of working for a meeting between Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic and trying to isolate Karadzic so as to increase the pressure on him. (Ø)

There are two areas where we have differences of nuance with the Europeans. First, I have always been cautious about summit meetings unless they are well prepared. They can overexcite public opinion and lead to disillusionment with diplomacy in general. Second is the degree of sanctions relief that we should offer Milosevic in return for cross-recognition. This is a fair subject for discussion in the Contact Group. It is more of a negotiation than a substantive issue. We are more cautious about

offering Milosevic the sun, the moon and the stars. But I think there will be unity at the Contact Group Meeting on Tuesday. We are sending an able man to join the group and represent us. We have made unity an important goal of our position. We have adjusted our position to keep the Russians on board and we know others have made compromises as well. (X)

The President: Let me make another point regarding your contacts with the Congress. If you agree that unity is important, particularly when Europeans have troops on the ground, and that we have a common interest in keeping the Russians in the process, please say this on the Hill. You know we are under enormous pressure to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. Many well-meaning people favor this. When I ask them whether they want us to put in troops if the situation collapses, however, they say no, no, no. Some of these pressures may be more image than reality, but there will probably be a serious effort to force the policy upon me. Therefore, I hope you will make your position clear. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Regarding Congress's position, another point of concern for us is the whole discussion of peacekeeping operations and the role of the United Nations. What are the chances that the process will end in a vote? (X)

The Vice President: The legislation won't pass. (X)

The President: I think we will be able to beat it. (X)

The Vice President: And we may veto it if we can't. (X)

The President: There is a general rule to be remembered in watching the new Congress. There has been a complete reversal in some ways, but things are probably the same in one respect, or so I predict. In the last Congress, we had a majority and could pass almost anything in the House, but the Senate was more closely divided and has different rules. So the Republicans could stop almost anything with a filibuster. Plus some conservative Democrats would vote with the Republicans. Now there is a Republican majority in the House, made up of the extreme right. They will be ramming through all sorts of things. But don't be alarmed until you see whether the Senate goes along. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: The peacekeeping discussion is in the House for now? (X)

The President: Yes. And the people there want to impose radical restrictions on the President's role (not just my role) in peacekeeping. In foreign policy and trade policy, there is a

group that is not so much isolationist as in favor of retrenchment. This group is made up of the most conservative Republicans and the most liberal Democrats. At the extremes, they all want to focus on our problems at home. They ask: "Why are we doing this in foreign policy? Can we afford it?" We should never put U.S. forces under foreign command, they say, and so forth. But there is also a great body of common sense in the Congress and in the country that understands we have responsibilities in this new world. We have to lead but we also need more partnerships. That is why we need to build up Partnership for Peace and cooperation with our friends in Europe. We want to let others take the initiative when they can, but have the U.S. take the initiative when we should. Our collective job in dealing with the new political realities is to make sure that the necessary corrections occur. I believe we will be okay. Not only do I have the veto (I believe I can sustain my veto even on some momentarily popular items), but I also believe the Senate will block a lot of things passed by the House. I could be wrong; we have just begun. But if you could put in a word about these issues to the Congress, it would help. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: There is certainly reason to reflect on why we do peacekeeping. But it is important that we do this together in the UN and seek a common position. We can understand the reaction after things happen, as they did to your people in Somalia and to ours in Rwanda. There are reasons to redefine the conditions for peacekeeping, but it would be bad if the biggest country acted on its own. So I am glad to hear your position. (X)

The President: Don't worry. I am hopeful that there will be a maturing of attitudes in the Congress. For now, however, be mindful that the House could pass some alarming things, but I would predict that the Senate will be more measured. And when I veto things, I believe I can sustain it. (X)

Secretary Christopher: To return to Bosnia, I would like to solicit your support for the Federation. We had a meeting in Munich where we tried to revitalize the Federation. It will be a good antidote to Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs. Right now it is like a house without furniture. We need to give it more content. We've proposed the Friends of the Federation. In our meeting with Kohl he said he wanted to do this in conjunction with other allies and not get out ahead of the others. So if you could give the Friends of the Federation a boost, it would be helpful. (X)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Regarding the Juppe proposal, I agree that we need to be sure of success before we launch a high-level meeting. On sanctions, I understand your position, but Milosevic will need a lot to agree to recognize the others. (X)

Secretary Christopher: Yes, he will need a lot at the end, but the question is where do we start out. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: I agree about the Federation. We know things in Mostar are not going very well. We need to boost the process. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Before I say a few words on Africa, I would like to hear your evaluation of the Middle East situation. We admire what you and Secretary Christopher have done, but we appear to be at a critical moment. To settle the conflict, we need to improve the economic elements. If Arafat cannot prove that he can produce economic growth and well being, he will not be able to hold on (and vice versa). (Ø)

The President: Let me say a few words and then turn it over to Secretary Christopher. There are two problems. The first that concerns me is the Israel-PLO agreement and encouraging the sides to carry through. There are lots of enemies of the peace process who are using terrorism and other means. The trauma was very strong after the latest bomb in Israel. Rabin lost one of the minor parties from his coalition, so he has less of a grip. The second big question is whether we can ever achieve an Israel-Syria agreement. This would be good for the peace process and would help in stamping out terrorism. We are trying to get things on track. Tomorrow we will be holding a meeting of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan and Israel, along with a PLO representative. It is not the best time, but we need to try to keep things on track. It will be difficult to move on the PLO deal and on Syria, but the group of leaders we have now probably has a better chance of success than any other leaders I could imagine. So we are boring ahead. (Ø)

Secretary Christopher: The President gave a good survey. I cannot pretend that the situation is not fragile. But we have been there before and we have gotten the process back on track. When we meet Sunday with the foreign ministers, we will face the mirror-image problem. From Arafat's viewpoint, the Israelis have not given him enough to manage autonomy and resist terrorism; so he argues that Israel needs to give more autonomy and more resources to fight terrorism. Rabin's argument is that Israel can't confer government powers on the Palestinians unless they can see whether the PLO is able to absorb those powers. There is a very bad situation after the last terrorist attack. The Israelis closed Gaza tighter than ever before -- to goods as well as people. We are trying to deal with all the leaders. I had to call Arafat just to get him to send someone to tomorrow's meeting; but now he has agreed to send a very senior person, his number two. We need to give Arafat a basis to be stronger in

fighting terrorism. He has taken some steps in rounding up some people from Islamic-Jihad and from Hamas. (S)

We are glad that the President has given us strong instructions to keep working. We know the consequences of failure. If Hamas took over in Gaza, it would be terrible. With regard to Syria, there has been some slippage. Assad has hardened his position and he is less keen to move on normalization. But Rabin and Assad have an underlying interest in common. Assad knows that he needs to do it this year, since 1996 is an election year. However, Assad may be questioning whether Rabin can do it with his weakened coalition. Nevertheless, we will keep at it. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandenbroucke: In our context, should we press the Israeli government to be more restrictive on settlements around Jerusalem? (S)

Secretary Christopher: Yes. This is a goad to Arafat. Settlements have always been a troublesome factor, and we are seeing it again. But on a more positive note, if we look at the Middle East situation as a whole, there has been so much progress since the Administration began. Israel has normalized its relations with so many Arab countries and now Israelis can travel back and forth to them. (S)

The President: Thanks for your help in promoting normalization between Israel and Tunisia. (S)

Secretary Christopher: There has been real progress through normalization and we cannot let it slip backwards. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: This is very important. If we let things slip, Islamic fundamentalists will come in. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandenbroucke: Can Arafat do more in fighting terrorism? (S)

Secretary Christopher: Yes. If the Israelis ease up enough to give him the confidence to do it. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandenbroucke: This is not a tactical question? (S)

Secretary Christopher: It's a question of confidence. (U)

The President: What do you want to tell us about Africa? (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: We are strongly involved in Central Africa, particularly in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. We have to be aware that the tensions in Burundi have the potential of leading

to a repetition of the tragedy in Rwanda. Even though the leaders in Burundi are trying to organize collaboration between the Tutsis and Hutus, it is clear that both sides are under enormous pressure. The Hutu majority is being pressed by Hutu refugees from Rwanda, who are now living in the camps in Zaire. There is a whole organization from the former Rwandan government that is going to the camps and organizing a mini-state. This is putting big pressure on Hutu extremists in Burundi. (X)

The present government is under some pressure from Tutsi extremists. There has been a succession of incidents that reinforce the pressure. So to avoid a repetition of what happened in Rwanda, a number of countries need to help prevent the situation from getting out of control. (X)

Second, let me describe the situation in Rwanda. We have put enormous pressure on the government that is in place now and have a more solid basis on which to resume a dialogue with the Hutu majority. We can't say that we have succeeded thus far, because both sides are still refusing to reestablish a dialogue and to come to an agreement as was set forward in Arusha. The situation for the moment in Rwanda is consolidating itself step-by-step, but in a bad way. The Hutus are organizing themselves among the refugees in Zaire, while the Tutsis dominate the government in Kigali. There has been no movement partly because the organizations have impeded it and partly because the situation doesn't encourage people to return to Rwanda. We are supporting the Conference in Bujumbura in order to encourage refugees to return. But given the Rwandan government's approach to refugee return, the tensions could persist for the long term and we could have a repetition of what happened before. So the situation is very destabilizing. (C)

Finally, the situation in Zaire. I had the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister in Paris (he was there for so-called health reasons, and came to Belgium). Prime Minister Kengo's intentions are good but his real impact on what happens is small. He has appointed a new governor of the Central Bank, but there is so much counterfeit money, and it is clear that the President is playing in that game. Secondly, no one is controlling the army. Kengo said he might carry out an operation to replace the currency with a new one. He also spoke of establishing a new army, but in terms that were not realistic. Meanwhile the President is pushing for elections in July, yet they can't be held in present conditions. So we have a very destabilized situation in all three countries. In Rwanda and Zaire we have governments that have no impact on the reality of the situation. We need to follow things very closely. I am pleased that we can consult closely with the U.S. We need to keep this up in order to see what we can do. My biggest concern is Burundi, where the

situation is very unstable. It would be bad for our image if Burundi became a repetition of Rwanda, and we had failed to agree on measures to prevent it. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: The question is whether we can do anything in a preventive way with respect to Burundi. The extremists are gaining ground in political parties and public opinion. This is not just a question of a few troublemakers. If we had more observers, perhaps we could do better. But we need to talk as soon as possible to the OAU. Perhaps we could finance more observers. The situation is very urgent. (S)

Samuel Berger: The President today broadcast a message that will be widely disseminated in Burundi. It calls on the moderate factions to moderate their behavior. And it calls for reconciliation. Our Ambassador there is very much an activist. He has been working tremendously hard because we share your assessment of the risks of the situation. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Regarding Zaire, should we stay passive or be more active? We explain to them that they are not going in the right direction. So far I have been cautious, believing it is better to stay passive. But should we do a joint demarche? Should we talk to them about the date of the elections, or stay silent? (S)

Secretary Christopher: We would take on a lot of responsibility if we were to try to convince them to postpone the elections. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: But on the other hand, if we let the President do what he wants, he will force elections in July, yet the internal organization won't allow these to be serious elections. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: But he will win them! (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I don't know how they will vote. In some parts of the country, there will be no voting at all -- they don't have the infrastructure or communications. (S)

Secretary Christopher: What is your assessment of Kengo? (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: He is trying to get the situation under control but he doesn't have the ability. He sees where the problems are, but lacks the instruments to go against the President. It is positive that he put a new governor into the National Bank, someone who is not just his man but has the confidence of the IMF and World Bank. That was difficult and it took him nine months to do it, but he achieved it. Now he says

he wants to change the currency. I told him that it made no sense to do it if it were not in agreement with the IMF and World Bank. To replace a currency with a new one and stop counterfeiting, one needs the IMF to know what levels of money to release and to provide other help. I will meet with the IMF and World Bank in Washington to see how they approach the situation. But much preparation is needed beforehand. The same applies to the Army. It has too many people and no one knows who is paying them. Kengo said he was going to send them out to build roads and build a new army. I asked him how he was going to do this. His intentions are good but he has no idea how to do things. (S)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: Let me offer an anecdote to illustrate. To organize elections, one needs to conduct a national census and take other steps. Yet the Zairian parliament cannot pass an election law because it cannot even decide who the co-chairmen of the committee to draft the law should be. There is a lack of consensus within the elite, and you cannot move things through the parliament. So my question is whether or not we should intervene, urge them to work together and find consensus, or should we stand aside? Until now, I have preferred to be cautious, but there are real problems: First is President Mobutu, and the second is infighting within the elite. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: In short, it is a mess. (S)

Secretary Christopher: But the situation is more hopeful than it has been for some time. We will try to push for delay in the elections through our Ambassador without taking on responsibility. We have railed against Mobutu for as long as I can remember, with no success. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: I just ask that we stay in close contact. (S)

The Vice President: We should also talk with one another about the implications of efforts to prevent further deterioration in Africa caused by uncontrolled population growth, environmental destruction, sales of dangerous weapons, etc. These forces are combining to destabilize countries to a point that it is, as the Prime Minister said, a mess. And it is happening all over. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: Yes, from Somalia to Zaire. (S)

The Vice President: From Sierra Leone to West Africa. (S)

Prime Minister Dehaene: There is a whole gray zone where there are no governments, where it is not clear who is in charge. We have to recognize that we failed in Somalia to change the

dynamic. The whole of Central Africa must be one of the big concerns of our foreign policy (Ø)

If I might ask about two other problems in which we are involved either directly or indirectly: On Haiti, we appreciate your words of thanks. Do you think we can meet the timetable for shifting responsibility to the UN? And what is going to happen in Mexico? (Ø)

The President: We are on track in Haiti. There are problems from day to day, but the operation has gone very well. We are so far on schedule to turn things over to the UN by the end of March. We expect that the total force will be 6,000 troops, of which the U.S. will make up roughly half. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dehaene: You will stay as part of the UN force? (Ø)

The President: Very much so, as part of the UN force, we will be roughly half the total. We will stay through the election and inauguration of the next President early next year. I feel very good about the situation. We've had only one death and it was kind of a fluke (when soldiers stopped a truck at a barricade). The situation is not free of difficulties. Mr. Berger just made a big speech describing how remarkable things are. Tony Lake is there this weekend. There are still some political problems in establishing a civilian government and determining who runs the police. But on balance, things have gone much better than expected. (Ø)

Samuel Berger: We have to keep in mind that Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere and one of the poorest countries in the world. So our expectations cannot be excessive. President Aristide described it well when he said that "we have helped them make the transition from misery to poverty with dignity." This provides a good perspective on the situation. Aristide has done everything we expected in reaching out. Reconciliation has become his watchword. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dehaene: The important thing in Haiti, as compared with Somalia, is that when we went there, we knew what was the process we wanted to put on track. In Somalia, we didn't know this. (Ø)

The President: I learned from Somalia that, unless a humanitarian crisis is caused by a natural disaster, then politics are involved; it is naive to assume that we can go in to stop people from starving without dealing with the underlying political problems, as we did in Somalia. We went in honestly with a limited humanitarian mission, but we had to stay and we

had inadequate resources to deal with the political situation. In Haiti, we had the privilege of time (since the military dictators did not leave) to plan for a year and to work through every last aspect. We probably won't have that luxury again, but we need to prepare as we did. In Rwanda we went in and out with a strictly humanitarian mission and did not pretend to seek to have an impact on the political situation. In Somalia, we joined a UN mission that had not been thought through. This explains the opposition in the U.S. to UN peacekeeping operations. People were affected by seeing our soldiers dragged through the streets. But we have learned from our mistakes. (X)

In Mexico, the situation is much better, but we are not out of the woods yet. The fundamental problem is that Mexico probably expanded its economy too optimistically, especially after NAFTA. They ran up a lot of short-term debt, and couldn't pay when it came due. They were bound to have a devaluation, yet they tried to maintain a fixed exchange rate. The international financial markets probably over-corrected, running the risk that all fledgling market democracies could have been damaged. There were big drops in Argentina and Brazil, and even in Central Europe, after the peso collapsed. There were even troubles in India. People thought they should put their money some place safe. I thought it necessary that there be rapid action. I was glad the IMF came through, especially after it became clear that we would not get our loan guarantees through Congress. There are still problems. Some of the Mexican banks are still shaky, having too many delinquent loans. But we are working hard with them, and I think they will make it. We couldn't wait any longer to act. I regret that the consultations before the IMF vote were inadequate, but the situation was touch-and-go, with daily auctions forcing the peso down. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: In Europe there was some displeasure about the lack of consultations, but we agreed that something needed to be done. I have broader concerns. This was a subject that was on the G-7 agenda. Open financial markets with capital flowing without control can lead to concentrations in one country even if the economic fundamentals there don't justify it, and therefore cause disequilibrium. The G-7 should set as a priority to determine what structures can be put into place to deal with this. With the global economy, we almost have a "casino economy," in which a limited number of guys can concentrate capital at the drop of a hat, with the problem further reinforced by computers. (This is using the information superhighway in the wrong way, to reinforce dangerous capital movements.) We have the GATT and now the WTO to look at how to regulate the situation. Just as we sought to deal with environmental issues at the Rio summit and we will deal with social issues at the Copenhagen summit, we need to decide what kinds of regulations

are needed for the world economy to match what we have in our national economies. Capital movements are an urgent issue. We need to see what we can do, since failure to act could threaten the global economy. You are right that if you had not acted in Mexico, there could have been a domino effect. But we need to go further in dealing with a situation in which deregulation has gone too far. (X)

The President: You are right. I don't have the answer and am hesitant to comment. But if we want a world dominated by mature and developing market economies, we also need a world central bank. The IMF and World Bank are not up to dealing with situations like Mexico. If we hadn't had resources set aside to deal with runs on our own currency, we couldn't have done what we did in Mexico. The opinion polls were 81 to 15 against what I did, but I did it. I can understand why the polls were against. If the issue were still in the Congress, they would still be debating it and Mexico would have gone down the tubes. I don't have an answer, but we need institutional mechanisms which permit market movements but which have some checks on stability. It is like trying to turn an aircraft carrier around on a dime. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: None of the individual states have the means to prevent destabilizing capital movements. (X)

The President: If we there were a repeat of the Mexico situation in Argentina and Brazil, we couldn't help. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: In the end, the globalization of the economy is a good thing. But if we don't organize ourselves well, there could be catastrophic reactions. (X)

The President: This is a big challenge. There are pressures on the social contract even in developed countries. Less skilled workers are not getting raises, and inequality is increasing in Western countries. Currency movements only exaggerate that effect. It puts at risk people's sense of belonging, which is dependent on the sense of being rewarded for their work. So the G-7 is very important. If you have any specific suggestions, I would be eager to hear them. I don't want to make a mistake, to undermine the good aspects of the world economy in trying to improve it. But even the U.S. can only handle one Mexican crisis. (X)

Prime Minister Dehaene: The pressure of capital movements on the stability of currencies can have social consequences that are very far-reaching. So we need to avoid exacerbating the relationships between the haves and have-nots, including within our own societies. (X)

The President: We need to wrap up. I want to thank you for your support for the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I hope you will help with others. (C)

Foreign Minister Vandembroucke: One thing that is restraining us in this discussion is that we need to find some way to ensure that non-member countries don't escape regulation as well. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium, February 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium on February 11, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *John* Disapprove _____
23Feb

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

Reed 9:30 am 2/22

National Security Council
The White House

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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001b. memcon	re: The President's Working Lunch with Wim Kok, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (12 pages)	02/28/1995	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: *Andy / Fred*
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation of the President's
Meetings with Prime Minister Wim Kok of the
Netherlands (U)

The attached Memoranda of Conversation from the meetings between the President and Prime Minister Wim Kok of the Netherlands are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassy in the Netherlands for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (U)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Memcon of Oval Office Meeting with PM Kok
- Tab B Memcon of Working Lunch with PM Kok

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Wim Kok, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Terry Dornbush, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Wim Kok, Prime Minister
Hans van Mierlo, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, Ambassador to the U.S.
Joop Merckelbach, Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of General Affairs
Joris Vos, Director General for Political Affairs

DATE, TIME February 28, 1995, 10:25 - 10:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I liked the Dutch questions (during the photo op). (U)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: This is because yesterday we had a talk with Dole and he said something about peacekeeping. (U)

The President: Dole has had his view, for the past two years, that the U.S. should unilaterally lift the arms embargo -- never mind whether it collapses UNPROFOR and never mind if our analysis is that the Serbs could win because of the time it would take to get heavy artillery to the Bosnian forces. Unilateral lift doesn't work. Coordinated multilateral lift might have worked when we thought of it in February 1993. But that was a lifetime ago, and I am not sure it would work now tactically. One problem I have with the Congress is that a lot of my supporters disagree with me on this for particular reasons. For example, all the Jewish Senators see this as more or less the same as the

Holocaust, and they feel guilty that they are not doing anything to stop the Serbs. So I lose 3 or 4 votes to Dole every time from that group. It is almost egocentric for the Congress to believe that, in a situation in which the U.S. is not sending troops -- and no one is arguing for us to enter the war on the side of the government -- the U.S. should take the decision to collapse UNPROFOR, with adverse military results. So I have fought them off. Even before there was a Republican majority, there was a big majority to lift the embargo in the House. I warded it off in the Senate by just enough votes because of my personal relationships with the majority. I don't think that they can get a veto-proof majority in the Senate now. (C)

Prime Minister Kok: There has been a lot of change here in Washington. (U)

The President: That is why I wanted you to talk with Members of Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Kok: In our meeting with Dole, he was very straight with us on the one hand. But on the other hand the way he reacted give us the impression that his position on lift was not as firm as we expected. This was not clear in his words however, which were very direct. He also indicated that there might be others in the Senate who would change their position, such as Lugar. (C)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I had the feeling that he assumed that there was a possibility of a change in his position, but he wouldn't say so publicly in order to keep the pressure on. (U)

The President: Dole believes that it is good politics with the ethnic communities to be perceived as having an aggressive policy. He also has a Croatian-American staffer who urges him on. If we lift the embargo, we need to think of the next step. It's easy if we have no responsibility, with no one on the ground. But what is next? If we lifted the embargo unilaterally and collapsed UNPROFOR, and the Bosnians started to lose, the U.S. would have to come in with air power. We would have caused the collapse of Bosnia unless we sent in air power and eventually manpower. (C)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I asked Dole what he thought about lift in the situation we would have in April, which will be a chaotic month in the former Yugoslavia: Croatia will be sending away UNPROFOR and there will be a reconsideration of the monitors along the border between Bosnia and Serbia; there could be an end to the foreign troop presence if we add lift to the equation. I asked how Dole could imagine that the combination of these factors would have anything but a chaotic effect. Dole didn't

respond. I have the feeling that he was more open to the new facts that I mentioned than he wished to show. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: In addition to former Yugoslavia, the other element behind the journalists' questions was your commitment to the UN in general. That is an important thing, in our view. The world situation has changed so rapidly. The Soviet Union is gone. The whole question of defining our enemy has changed. Our old strategy was based on U.S. military power against that of the Soviet Union. Now we have to define positive goals for NATO and in other areas. We have to decide how we can contribute to organizing a world in which partnership is the key element. We will be speaking in the U.S., especially with the Republicans, among whom we see isolationism gaining ground. There are certainly grounds to criticize the way some UN operations are handled, but generally the UN is of key importance. It would be a dramatic mistake if the U.S. (or other players) stepped back from their responsibility. That is the key point -- in this, the U.S. must show leadership. It is up to the U.S. to play the key role in the process. We need a dialogue between Europe and the U.S. to make that clear. In a world of universal values, this is what is needed. (S)

The President: I agree. It was interesting that the Republican leadership was more outward-looking at the early stages of the Mexican crisis. But the rank and file are more isolationist and politics is involved. You know I believe in the UN, in peacekeeping and in the U.S. being outward-looking. I believe this as much as I believe that the sun rises in the morning and the moon rises in the evening. There is a lack of experience among the new members of Congress. It is helpful when people like you talk with them, even if it seems as if they are not listening. It is important for them to hear you reaffirm the historic role of the U.S. This works to our advantage. In a month, I will go to Haiti and observe the hand-off of the U.S. command to a UN force. The UN, of course, will remain there until the elections have been carried out. We are looking for opportunities to highlight for the Congress the benefits of peacekeeping and to reinforce that impression. It is interesting that the American people are isolationist in general, but not in particular. If you ask them for more foreign aid, they will say no. But if you ask people whether the UN should deal with a specific problem, people will say yes. So the people don't support the Republican line one inch past the point of simple rhetoric. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I don't think that any President could put into practice those words. If Dole were in this office, he couldn't do what he says. (S)

The President: Most of what he is doing is an attempt to have it both ways politically. Republicans will say don't do X, and then when I do it, they will not have to share the blame. There may be one or two points of real difference. I think we will have a serious confrontation in April over lifting the arms embargo, particularly if the Contact Group has fallen apart. But I think we will win that battle. (Ø)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We are really concerned about that. Our troops are in Srebrenica and are the most vulnerable peacekeepers in Bosnia. They would have to fight their way out against the Muslims and the Serbs. That is not our only reason for opposing lift. We also believe that it would restart the war and, in combination with the other factors I mentioned ... (Ø)

The President: Our military people believe that lift would lead to further losses for the Bosnians. (Ø)

Secretary Christopher: The Contact Group has been pressing for acceptance of its map, but that strategy has almost played itself out. We tried to get leverage against the Bosnian Serbs, but our leverage has run out. Our latest effort with Milosevic was risky and was always a long shot. But it didn't work. It is important not to abandon the Contact Group, but we will have to refocus on preventing an outbreak of war in Croatia and preserving the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia. On the latter, things are going pretty well except in Bihac. There is a lot to do in creating a containment strategy. We need to do more to get Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR. If there is an outbreak of war in Croatia, it will spread to Bosnia and there will be no way to prevent a wider conflict. So we need to prevent UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. With all of this, we have a tough, tough road ahead on Capitol Hill. Some people there have stopped thinking about Bosnia and will vote for lift automatically. A lot of them want to do what I call "lift and pray." They don't want to put in any resources or trainers, and certainly not any troops. They want to get an emotional sense of relief by lifting the arms embargo. That's the attitude that we need to fight.

(Ø)

The President: I have a real problem on lift. The Democrats in the Senate, who are by and large Jewish, see a special historical burden. They feel we cannot walk away from the Muslims. Barbara Boxer, Carl Levin would never vote against me on anything else.

(Ø)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: This is a new factor that I was not aware of. (Ø)

The President: This is a reversal of the situation of Ronald Reagan, when Congress disagreed with him, but he pursued his foreign policy anyway. Unless we have a special problem, especially in the Senate, we would normally have protection against efforts to override a veto. But my normal supporters are not with me on this. (X)

Secretary Christopher: I guess the supporters of lift are very numerous. Not a single Democrat would fail to vote for lift. It will take a lot of effort to stop it. (X)

The President: People say the arms embargo is not fair, that Serbia gives the Bosnian Serbs all the weapons they want. (X)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We should talk to them. We are protecting the Bosnians against the Serbs. Lifting the embargo would leave them without protection. The minute the embargo is lifted, the enclaves we are protecting will be handed over to the Serbs. Therefore, we need to talk with the supporters of lift and convince them we are on their side. (X)

The President: Please do all you can. Your time is better spent with the Senators. The House behaves like a herd. (X)

Secretary Christopher: I can almost persuade Senator Levin; he is on the edge. (X)

Anthony Lake: In January, we spent a lot of time sending teams, especially military teams, to Capitol Hill to discuss lift. Our aim was to make clear that they will be responsible if they lift the arms embargo. The issue has not moved forward because Dole realizes that he has to overcome skepticism in the Senate. In the House, on the other hand, Gingrich is playing a game. He will get a lift resolution through, let the President veto it, and then not try to override the veto, but allow it to be sustained. (X)

The President: They want to take a position without taking responsibility. (X)

Anthony Lake: We want to keep the emphasis on responsibility, responsibility, responsibility. (X)

Prime Minister Kok: We will make a special investment in contacts with Senators. I see it as very important. (X)

The President: Tell them you have soldiers on the ground protecting lives. If the embargo is lifted, you will leave. Tell them that your commanders say that if the embargo is lifted, the Bosnians will lose. When I came into office, I wanted to

lift the embargo very badly, and I believe that if we had done it early, we would have achieved a peace settlement. But given where we are now, we need to look at the evidence, including what it will do to our allies. Secretary Christopher is right. The Congress is very frustrated and just wants to do something. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I am very happy with your clear position. We should look for opportunities to influence those parts of Congress that are influenceable. We will ask our parliamentarians to come, and I understand we need to do it rather soon. (S)

The President: You shouldn't underestimate the capacity of the freshmen Congressmen to learn, especially in the area of foreign affairs, where we may get more leeway in how they vote. You should look at all the places where the Netherlands have business investments in the U.S., and see whether your Ambassador can invite those Congressmen to a briefing -- not to tie this issue to your business interests, but to keep that in the back of their minds. (S)

Ambassador Jacobovits: That's exactly what we are doing -- in areas where we have large business interests and where there are large numbers of Americans of Dutch origin. We have received interesting reactions. Some of them don't know anything and have never been abroad. Some of them toe the line, while others are more open to our arguments. (S)

Secretary Christopher: That's great. You're ahead of us. There are 11 new Republican Senators and you should talk to all of them. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: My Minister of Defense will visit for a week. He should invest some time in briefings for the Congress, presenting the facts and the realities of the situation. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: They don't know a lot of the aspects of the problem. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Our Defense Minister could be especially effective. (S)

Anthony Lake: He should emphasize to the Congressmen that they will be tremendously responsible for their own votes. The whole world is watching, especially those with troops on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, and there is a need for responsibility. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Lifting the embargo could provoke an immediate U.S. action to help evacuate UNPROFOR. That could be an argument to use with them as well. (S)

Secretary Christopher: Yes, lift could Americanize the whole process. We would have a responsibility to evacuate the peacekeepers. We would set in train events that put the Bosnians at risk. That is what the freshmen Congressmen have to face up to. (S)

The President: A lot of them are living in a time warp. Two years ago, the Bosnians came here and asked for a lifting of the arms embargo and that was all. They didn't want more. But the situation now is very different. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: What is your assessment of the Russians' position toward the problems in the former Yugoslavia? (S)

The President: The Russians are occupied with other matters. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We are deeply disappointed by what Kozyrev did with Milosevic. He undercut the Contact Group badly. The bottom line is that the Russians are under so much pressure in the Duma that they are trying to curry favor with the military. So their foreign policy may be even less independent than previously. We are trying to persuade Milosevic to do something positive. Instead, the Russians have shown them that he has an ally among the nationalists in the Duma. But we need to keep the Contact Group alive. We cannot expect as much from it, but we should not abandon it. We won't get the Russians to put sufficient pressure on the Serbs, but we need to preserve the NATO coalition. We need to work to prevent an outbreak of war in Croatia and the resumption of the war in Bosnia. The Russian situation raises larger questions. Chechnya has impaired Moscow's ability to be adventurous, but it also has made Russian diplomacy less effective. The Russians have less maneuvering room. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Do we have any instruments to stop what they are doing in Chechnya? In the European Council, we don't know exactly what to do. Gaydar told me that we should not use the words "economic sanctions", because that would bring the whole Russian population -- which is now critical of Yeltsin -- against us. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: But Gaydar said that we should be as tough as possible in our political language, that we should

send delegations, the Red Cross, Amnesty International -- perhaps these steps will influence the situation for the better. In fact, what language will be useful? The Russians are not terrified by political language. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We need to make clear in a subtle way that participation in the G-7 and other fora will not stay on an upward path if they don't handle Chechnya more effectively. (S)

The President: This is what we have done. I have talked to Yeltsin, as has Helmut Kohl. Yeltsin is in a very dicey situation, we know that. But I pushed him hard to let the OSCE people in, to press for a political solution, and to downplay the military aspects. I am hoping that he will settle this crisis before the World War II celebration in May. We are trying to back them off as much as we can. There is a lot of opposition to what he is doing in Russia. But I agree that it could slip the other way if they thought we were threatening sanctions. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: But we should not reward them either. The May 9 anniversary is instrumental. If we decide to go to Moscow, it should be combined with a strong push to change the situation in Chechnya. They want to hold military parades, yet this would be unacceptable under the present circumstances. They should be told that a closer relationship to the G-7 would have to be forgotten. We need to see steps before May 9, rather than threatening economic sanctions. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Are you going to the May 9 anniversary? (S)

The President: I have not made a final decision. It's a difficult decision. I want to continue to support democracy in Russia and movement toward reform. The World War II anniversary is a big deal for Yeltsin. We don't want to be seen as failing to acknowledge the magnitude of Russian losses during the war. This argues for attending. But we have sought to make the most of it with regard to affecting Chechnya. (S)

Anthony Lake: Beyond how we deal with Chechnya, the fundamental issue in Russia is whether Yeltsin can repair his base with the reformers. If he doesn't, he has no political base. So we are walking a tightrope on how to use the May 9 event. We need to be firm about Chechnya. But how we say it should not give the nationalists a hammer with which to beat Yeltsin. It would only make it harder for Yeltsin to win back reformers like Gaydar. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Yes, Yeltsin is a hostage. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: A distinction should be made between the clear language that we use with Yeltsin in private and what we say in public. (S)

The President: I have told him as plainly as I can that his whole legacy -- everything he has stood for and symbolized -- is at risk unless Chechnya is resolved. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: You are right in referring to the Russians' World War II experience. It is the only thing they have. All the rest of their history is full of shame. Their victory in World War II is the only positive thing they can show the world. Therefore, we need to give them as much room as we can. 22 million Russians died. They feel that they were the real martyrs in the war -- the West got all the glamour, and they got all the misery. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: But my view is that public opinion in the Netherlands would not understand our presence, with military troops marching by, as long as Chechnya is still going on. So we need to take into account the Russian psychology on the one hand, but also our own domestic psychology on the other. We need to find a way to be there in May in a better context than is now the case. The Russians should be asked to understand that. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Yes, this is correct. (S)

The President: We will keep working on it. I have a good relationship with Yeltsin. So far we have managed to work through most issues. I believe we have an understanding on a timetable for NATO expansion, but Russian politics are so dicey. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: What is your view about NATO expansion? (S)

The President: I think we have a good approach in which we will have a study and a report to Partners during 1995 on the "how" and "why." We will not get to the "when" and "who" until next year. Everything is being calculated with account for the NATO-Russia relationship. The Russians are still in a state of agitation and Chechnya has not done anything for their position in that regard. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Should we move to our expanded meeting? I wanted to ask you about the Energy Charter. (S)

The President: The only other things I wanted to raise here were the helicopters. When do you expect to make a decision? (S)

Prime Minister Kok: We are very close to a decision. We have reached a decision with most of the concerned Cabinet members and will have a decision probably in the second half of March. There are really two options, as I told you in our phone call earlier. We are deciding on the basis of three factors: the first is quality and price and the way the helicopters can be used to meet our military and operational requirements; the second is the whole framework of compensation for employment -- the qualitative and quantitative package of structural and incidental elements; the third factor is how it relates to European cooperation and our relations with other European countries. On the second point, until now the total compensation package of the French-German helicopter has been better than that of the U.S. That cannot be denied, although there are other elements to be considered as well. So we are still undecided. (S)

The President: I think that McDonnell-Douglas will make a better offer. We have spoken with them and received word back that they will improve their offer. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: We had a meeting last week with all the Cabinet ministers concerned. I believe we can decide on the basis of an objective analysis of the packages. Compensation is not the only question, but it will play a role. We have requested that the U.S. firm reconsider the composition of its package, both the size and the qualitative make-up. It will really be a help if that package was reconsidered. (S)

The President: I have been informed, as I said, that they will improve the compensation package. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Let me add one small remark. We are in the run-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. It will be very hard to get somewhere on European integration. We are doing our utmost to get our foreign policy thinking in line and to get strategic and commercial procedures established at the European level. From a purely foreign policy point of view, there have to be strong arguments not to go European on the helicopter purchase. In the present context of European integration, it would be strange to buy American. People already know we do a lot of business with the U.S., and our military is more Anglo-Saxon-oriented than in other countries. But buying American would create a strange attitude unless the arguments are strong enough. We need to show what is good for the Netherlands. (S)

The President: I understand your position, but you have to consider the flip side as well. It would be of enormous help to me in my argument against the isolationists to be able to show that we have all kinds of relations with other countries and that

we can't have commercial relations without doing our share internationally. There are a lot of new Congressmen who have never thought about these questions. Their instinct is to follow the isolationist route. So don't discount what help it will have in fighting isolationism here.

Anthony Lake: There is also specific application in support of NATO. Interoperability is a serious question. It is harder for us to argue that we should stick with NATO, that NATO is the way for us to engage in the world, if we don't have interoperable systems. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I see your point. (S)

The President: And I see yours! (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: It might be helpful, however, if I could provide another perspective. We have very weak arguments because the openness of the defense market is one-sided. The American market is one-sided. You wouldn't be able to buy Netherlands frigates in the future, even though they are very good, as good as the Apache Helicopters. We know we have the best frigates, but countries won't buy them because of their own domestic situations. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: I see your point and I take your point. The message here is that partnership, cooperation -- NATO cooperation -- are important. But as head of a new government, I also have to emphasize good neighborliness, good cooperation with Germany and good cooperation with my Benelux partners. If we want good neighbors, people say we should buy European. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Ten minutes before this meeting, Foreign Minister Kinkel was on the line on this very subject, urging us to buy European. (S)

Anthony Lake: We only have ten minutes left for our expanded meeting. (U)

The President: I suggest we go directly to lunch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Working Lunch with Wim Kok,
Prime Minister of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Togo West, Secretary of the Army
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Terry Dornbush, U.S. Ambassador to the
Netherlands
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for
European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Wim Kok, Prime Minister
Hans van Mierlo, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, Ambassador to
the U.S.
Joop Merckelbach, Deputy Secretary General,
Ministry of General Affairs
Joris Vos, Director General for Political
Affairs
Jaap van der Ploeg, Deputy General Director
of the Netherlands Government Information
Service
Ed Craanen, Director, Western Hemisphere
Department
Jan-Meinte Postma, Deputy Director of Trade
Policy Affairs, Ministry of Economic
Affairs

DATE, TIME February 28, 1995, 12:00 noon - 1:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: White House Family Dining Room

The President: We're having quite a debate with the Congress
over peacekeeping. (✓)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Senator Dole told us that the U.S. pays more than other countries, but I pointed out that the Europeans pay 38%. To reduce the U.S. share from 31% to 25% would have a serious impact on all the other countries. They would naturally want to reduce their contributions as well. This is a matter of great concern. As we discussed this morning, U.S. leadership is very important and leadership cannot be defined in dollars alone. When the enemy was clear during the Cold War, leadership was as clear as the evil we faced, but now the evil has changed. Instead of the Russian threat, we have the threat of chaos. This chaos makes U.S. leadership even more important than during the Cold War. I can't see any other body playing the role of the UN. Therefore, we need the visible hand of the United States playing a leading role within the UN. This has nothing to do with our own interests as in the Cold War, when we accepted the U.S. as our leader. Now there are global interests. The U.S. position will be decisive for the future of the UN. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We need to distinguish between two things. First of all, in the Contract with America, the Republicans argue that U.S. voluntary contributions to peacekeeping should be subtracted from our UN assessment. Doing this would reduce our assessment from 31% to zero, and it would bring peacekeeping to an end. We are fighting that. We made some headway in the House and changed it from the total cost to the incremental cost of our voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, we are depending on the Senate to correct this. (S)

This proposal needs to be distinguished from reducing the U.S. assessment. The 31% that we pay now is too high and needs to be reduced, at least gradually. Reducing our figure to 25% will not have as devastating an impact as the Republican proposal regarding our voluntary contributions. If we agreed to the latter, other nations with large voluntary contributions would also seek to have theirs deducted and no peacekeeping left. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I'm afraid of a decline in support for peacekeeping generally. (S)

The President: Does all of Europe pay 38%? (U)

Prime Minister Kok: 38% is the EU's contribution. (U)

The President: So the EU and the U.S. together contribute almost 70%. (U)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: To say that the U.S. is paying too much and Europe not paying enough is not true. Dole didn't know the figures. I can understand Congress's feelings about the UN bureaucracy, and it certainly can be improved. But the global

impact if the U.S. cuts its contribution would be terrible. Every state has its problems. Everyone's parliament is asking why they should pay for forces to fight on the other side of the world. But if we start to give in, we will lose the whole framework. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: There are three elements in the discussion. First, in Europe and the U.S., we hear criticism of the UN bureaucracy, and this is justified. We must reform it or our public opinion will punish us (the same applies with regard to reforming the EU and other institutions). The second point is the question of whether there is a fair balance between what different countries pay. Here we need to clear up the misunderstanding. While the U.S. says it pays too much in nominal and relative terms, the facts need to be clearly understood. Otherwise, everyone will want to reduce. The third point is one that is especially important when isolationism is spreading -- and not just in the United States. Those who say that there is no enemy and that we can do less -- who ask why are we paying for the UN and what are we getting in return -- run the risk of falling into a selfish, nationalistic approach. It will be dangerous if this approach gets the upper hand. We have to clear up the misunderstandings about the financial questions. The times ask for more action, not less. I believe we share the same view from our discussion this morning. We need to educate the newly elected Senators and Congressmen. (S)

Anthony Lake: Let me make one specific point. Reducing our assessment to 25% is a matter of law. This has to happen by 1996. (S)

The President: Reducing to 25% was the only way we could get Congress to pay back our arrears. We were the biggest debtor to the UN when I took office. (S)

Anthony Lake: Reducing our assessment and reforming the UN are crucial to winning the larger fight. I also would like to say that I don't believe the enemy today is chaos, nor do I believe it is a good argument to say that the UN is our barrier against chaos. There is still evil out there in the world. As we try to spread democracy, democratic ideas are under assault by extremists, terrorists and other groups. Moreover, there are trends like environmental decay and low levels of development. The struggle against these is similar to the earlier struggle against fascism and communism. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: I agree, there is still the evil of war and other kinds of evil everywhere. (U)

The Vice President: Let me try to bridge the two ways of describing the current situation. During World War II, the enemy wasn't the Germans, but the way of thinking that took root in Germany and led to evil consequences. The true enemy was the way of thinking represented by Nazism. Similarly, today's evils are rooted in ways of thinking that produce evil consequences. When developments like environmental decay, population explosion, the arms race and local wars all coincide, it looks like chaos that is not susceptible to remedy. The lesson is the contrast between what we did after World War II and what we did after World War I. After the Second World War, we unified Europe, spread democracy and provided the basis for the strategy of integration that we ought to pursue with even more vigor now. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: For 40 years, we armed ourselves against a war that never took place. Today we are not armed against the other kinds of war present in all corners of the globe. We are lagging behind our response to the Cold War. During the Cold War, we in Europe didn't develop a common responsibility for foreign policy and security, but left it to the Americans. This was very easy. We were able to suppress our antagonisms for 40 years, but these are now visible again. The U.S. for a long time accepted social problems at home because of the need to fight against the larger evil abroad. Now that evil is gone, or has taken on new form. All parts of the world are now paying the bills of the Cold War. We won the Cold War, but we were not prepared for what came next. (S)

The President: There is nothing we could do about the cut in the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25%, if we wanted to get Congress to pay our arrears. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Peacekeeping activities will have to be reduced. It is an illusion to believe that others will increase their contributions to offset the U.S. reduction. (S)

The President: This is especially true if the European share is also too high. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: No, we don't think our share is too high. We are not complaining. But if the U.S. reduces its contribution, there will be cause to follow the U.S. example. (S)

Anthony Lake: Negotiations are underway in New York on formulas that can get us to 25% without reducing operations. We hope these negotiations will lead to an equitable result. (S)

Secretary Christopher: If I can come back to the central point, our total assessment could be wiped out if we don't deal with the

Republican legislation. I am less pessimistic about the UN's ability to adjust to a 25% U.S. contribution. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Reducing money for peacekeeping operations is one thing, reducing overall operations is another. If the U.S. goes below 25%, it would have a very adverse impact. I understand why you are doing it, but it is very serious. (S)

Anthony Lake: We just ask that our friends understand that this is only one front in a larger fight. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: That was the sense we had in our meeting with Dole. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: It is all relative. (S)

The President: We have a year to fight this out. A lot of what is going on now is early scrimmaging. This is different from Bosnia where we will face a battle in the spring. We have six or seven months to go in the fight on peacekeeping. What other questions do you want to discuss? (S)

Prime Minister Kok: The Energy Charter worries me. I had hoped that the U.S. would be in a position to participate before June. But we were told yesterday that the U.S. sees difficulties with the Charter on issues like national treatment. (S)

The Vice President: Our position is that the draft of the Energy Charter is one that we cannot join. But we do want to participate in drafting a new treaty. This is not a new position. We have problems with the way the Charter came out. (S)

Ambassador Dornbush: Ambassador Kantor said the same thing yesterday. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: I don't know all the details, but here is my political attitude. Might it be possible for the U.S. to accept, participate, and ratify the Energy Charter Treaty in combination with an additional agreement? We can't expect other countries to withdraw from participating in the Charter. If the U.S. needs additional elements, let us be as concrete as possible. Our representative, Ambassador Rutten, should visit Washington. This visit could be helpful in seeing whether there is a way out. I don't want to discuss the technicalities here. (S)

The President: I will follow up. (U)

Ambassador Jacobovits: Would it be possible for the U.S. to sign but not submit the Charter to Congress until the second treaty,

in which your problems would be solved, could be submitted as well? Then you could ratify both at the same time. (S)

The Vice President and Secretary Christopher: We can't do that.
(U)

Prime Minister Kok: Let's follow up later. (U)

The President: I wanted to ask you about money laundering and drug trafficking in the Caribbean. You know we are concerned about the problems in Aruba and Curacao. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: This is a very important issue. We share your concern about the vulnerability of the region to drug trafficking. We all know the facts and have been working hard on the problem. We have, for example, agreements with our partners in the region regarding Coast Guard efforts to prevent the drug trade and to fight the increasing criminality. There has been some bad news, however: the parliament of the Netherlands Antilles took a decision last week that they would not be prepared to cooperate in the present circumstances since it could have a negative effect on their internal autonomy. Our response is that we don't accept this argument. Yesterday the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles mentioned the possibility of a compromise, so we need to move forward in a diplomatic way. Aruba said it is fully ready to participate. More can and will be done. We have good cooperation with the U.S., although it is narrow in scope. Your diplomatic presence might be important.
(S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Our Coast Guard efforts could be affected by budget cutting at home. It will be important for U.S. cooperation to continue in a visible way. A continuing U.S. presence is vital. We also ask that you pay attention to Suriname, a country which is an important factor in the drug trade. Suriname is going to the IMF. We will establish a major investment fund to contribute to its economic recovery. We ask the U.S., in connection with the fight against drugs, to give more attention to Suriname. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We are reviewing the activities of Coast Guards worldwide in order to determine how they can be more effective. But we will take account of your concerns. On drugs, we want to see if there is a way we can be more helpful. (S)

The President: We will try to be helpful on Suriname. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We discussed this in detail yesterday with Assistant Secretary Watson. (S)

The President: Let me just mention the extension of the non-proliferation treaty. We need help from all hands to secure an unlimited extension. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We want to work with our special friends. A ten-year extension would just bring the problem back again in a short time. We need an indefinite extension. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We worked with Suriname on this question. (S)

The President: What about Indonesia? (U)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We have tried. (U)

Joris Vos: They are exceedingly tough. (S)

The President: We have good relations with Indonesia, but we are not doing well on the NPT question. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We need to try to persuade Israel to join the NPT, but I am not optimistic. Israel's position will be decisive for a lot of other countries. (S)

The Vice President: If Iran and Iraq stop their nuclear programs, it will be a lot easier for Israel. (S)

Secretary Christopher: If Egypt agrees to a timetable, it would help with the rest of the Arab world. It will be bad if the peace process became frayed over this issue. I will shortly be going to the region again and perhaps I can help encourage them to reach the right conclusion. It should not be seen as an all-or-nothing question. (S)

The President: We are working very hard on the NPT. If we can get Egypt on board, it will move other countries. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: Is Indonesia a real problem? (S)

Joris Vos: They have the typical "have-not" position, and they are very tough. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: We will try again with Indonesia. We have some new opportunities with respect to a State visit. They may be more prepared to agree now than they were in August. (S)

The President: What about the post-COCOM regime? (S)

Prime Minister Kok: We have been making progress. (S)

Secretary Christopher: What's holding it up is the need to wait for the Russians to come in. This is deadlocked over the question of Iran. The Vice President has been very active on this issue. (S)

The Vice President: The Russians took an important step forward in providing information on Iran for discussion. We believe it could help resolve this piece of the problem. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: What do you think of the Willy Claes affair? Will it have an impact? (S)

The President: I don't have an answer. (S)

Secretary Christopher: At the present time we should be fully supportive. He has been an excellent Secretary General and a vital force for the Alliance. You may have more details than we do, but he has to have the benefit of the doubt. What is your perception? (S)

Prime Minister Kok: We are closer to Belgium. The difficult question is to arrive at the facts. We are reluctant to say anything despite the fact that some Dutch politicians have called on Claes to step down temporarily. I don't agree. The facts will show what he should do. In the meantime, we should not indicate that he doesn't have our confidence. (S)

The President: This country has never been brought to a halt by the discovery of one item that was bad in someone's life. We are going through this with our nominee for Surgeon General. If there is something disqualifying, then he should quit. Otherwise, he should stay. I am inclined to support him. We have been through this for two years. The Administration has developed a hardy attitude. We shouldn't overdo it in the case of Claes. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Speaking confidentially, this scandal could reach the point where Claes himself concludes that he can no longer function. Another possibility is that his action could prove to have been really improper. But we shouldn't make it impossible for him to do his job now. (S)

The President: I am with you on that. (S)

Anthony Lake: We need to be precise in speaking about our confidence in his doing his job as Secretary General, and not get into the domestic affair. (S)

The Vice President: I saw Claes yesterday, and he was in good spirits. We had a lengthy meeting and then a meeting with the 16

Allies. He ran the gauntlet of the press." There is a feeding frenzy in the Belgian press that rivals our own. He took me aside privately and said, "Look, I am okay. There is nothing else in the story." If the only thing that comes out is his lack of candor about what was offered and not accepted, then he will likely survive. I agree we should stand by him. (S)

The President: We should be guided by the facts. Otherwise, we should uphold the institution of Secretary General. (S)

Anthony Lake: We should not be the ones who judge the facts. We support him as NATO Secretary General. As far as the Belgian political situation is concerned, we will see what happens. This is the stance we should maintain publicly. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Yes, that is the right line to take in public. But among ourselves we need to be clear that some new facts could impair his ability to lead the Alliance. (S)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: The question is not whether he accepted money, but whether he could have forgotten what happened. There is a question about how things were reported to the three people involved in his party. But we have to await his comments. He initially said that he knew nothing, but later said he had begun to remember. There is a question of his dealing with the truth. (S)

The President: How long ago was this affair? (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Four or five years ago. Speaking of all of these positions, the head of the World Trade Organization will need to be solved. The lack of leadership is embarrassing. We discussed this yesterday with others in the Administration. I don't want to take much time here, but we can't understand your position on Ruggiero vs. Salinas. Sometimes we hear that the arguments are not political or personal, but regional and geopolitical. Can you explain what your position is? (S)

The President: We are simply for someone else. We are not against Ruggiero. (U)

The Vice President: The reasons are not regional, geopolitical, or... (S)

The President: You've heard all the arguments already. (S)

Secretary Christopher: Did you discuss this with Mickey Kantor? Our concern is that the choice should be made not just by 51%, but by a strong consensus. It is significant that Ruggiero has not gained more than 45% to 49% despite an extraordinary amount

of arm-twisting. So far none of the candidates has got a dominant percentage. But we agree that we need to conclude this so that the institution can get off to a good start. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kok: We are not going to solve it this afternoon.
(U)

The President: The thing that I like about Salinas is that he is a highly esteemed head of state from a developing country that is committed to market economics. A big problem is how countries like Mexico can be kept on course. After the Mexican crisis, we risk seeing a similar problem in Brazil, Argentina and Central Europe. How are we going to keep great segments of the globe open to trade and not become mercantilist again? I had hoped that the ideal candidate could symbolize the future we are trying to build. That is why we were interested in Salinas from the beginning. This is why I have spent so much time with APEC -- to stop those countries from being mercantilistic. That is the substance of our position. Are there other subjects you want to talk about? (Ø)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: There is very little time left, but we have not discussed European security architecture. It is too big to tackle in a few minutes. (Ø)

The President: We are very interested in the subject, obviously!
(U)

Prime Minister Kok: You have well prepared the schedule for NATO enlargement, taking into account the strategic events that will occur during 1995 and 1996, including the Russian presidential elections. How do we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement is not a threat but a contribution to stability? They certainly do not have the final say over enlargement, but we need to reassure them. In Western Europe we need work out the content of European pillar of defense in preparation for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference -- how we develop a European defense identity without harming the transatlantic partnership. The Netherlands is very much in favor of European cooperation in defense, but not at the expense of the transatlantic partnership. We are convinced Europeans, recognizing the need for the parallel development of EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. We need to show that we can do this on the basis of continued strong transatlantic cooperation. We need U.S. leadership. There will be political tensions as we tackle a number of strategic questions in connection with the IGC regarding how the security architecture will become more concrete. (Ø)

The President: We have supported the integration of Europe and the strengthening of the EU, including the security dimension.

We see it as evolving in parallel with cooperation in defining NATO's new role. On NATO enlargement, we have made the same arguments to Yeltsin. The Vice President met with him in his hospital room in December. He said that we don't seek to undermine Russian security and that we need a parallel enhancement of relations between NATO and Russia as we expand NATO, so that expansion is not seen as undermining Russian security. It will be difficult, but at least in principle I think Russia can be bought off. We promised them that there will be no surprises, that everything will be done in the open. We don't pretend it will be easy. The Russians are still uneasy, but if we make the most of Partnership for Peace and show good faith in dealing with Russia, then we can make progress on the timetable we have set. (C)

Secretary Christopher: The Prime Minister made a good point that we need to recall. We sometimes have a U.S.-centric view. But we need to remember that 1996 is also a year of a major conference that will define the future of the European Union. (C)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: We are preparing a report now. (C)

The President: Our thinking is that we need to use this unique moment in history to support continued integration of Europe as much as possible. There has never been a time since the emergence of the nation-state when Europe was not divided in some way. We now have a chance to write a new chapter in the history of the world and, in so doing, to change the chemistry of how things will develop in other parts of the world for the next 30-40 years. I never understood the reluctance in the U.S. toward European unity before I came into office. I believe we should be cheering from the sidelines. (C)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: You have done more than you think. The U.S. didn't oppose a European defense at the beginning. George Kennan and John F. Kennedy proposed it, but the Europeans rejected it. We need to make room in the Alliance for European defense as a way of reinforcing the Alliance. To save the Alliance we need to change it and make room for Europe. (C)

The President: There are a lot of hard questions that we have not worked through today, such as Bosnia. Bosnia is a frustrating problem. Is it a European problem? Or is it for the UN to solve? Is NATO the answer? Are European troops threatened? Congress sees the U.S. as a fourth independent entity. (C)

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke: I would like to suggest that, based on the elegant comments by the Prime Minister and the

Foreign Minister, American leadership on Europe is more recognized in the Hague than in Washington. It would be helpful if you could make these points in meetings with the Congress. The President has made four trips to Europe in the past year. You have supported us in the Alliance, and you need to help us convince the chattering classes that we are on the right track. On NATO enlargement, the Russians are getting used to it. Our plans for 1995 are in place. The President's meeting with Chancellor Kohl put us on the same line with Germany. (X)

The President: Any contacts that you can make with the Congress are a plus. (X)

Anthony Lake: Let me raise one last item, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Any contribution you could make would be helpful in convincing Japan that there is international cover for its contributions. (X)

The President: Politics in Japan are very uncertain. We have had four Japanese Prime Ministers in the two years I have been in office. Things were in good shape until the earthquake. They are very sensitive to being seen as if they are the bank. There is strength in numbers here even if you can't provide a lot of money. The Japanese need psychological support in order to do what they privately want to do. (X)

Prime Minister Kok: We've have responded positively to your letter and will provide support ... (X)

Foreign Minister van Mierlo: ... on a commercial basis. (X)

Joris Vos: We will also join the preparatory committee. (X)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation from the President's One-on-One and Expanded Meetings with Prime Minister Wim Kok of the Netherlands, February 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A and B are the Memoranda of Conversation of the President's meetings with Prime Minister Wim Kok of the Netherlands on February 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memoranda of Conversation to the Department of State.

Approve *JWR for TL* Disapprove _____

That the attached Memoranda of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *JWR for TL* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memcon of Oval Office Meeting with PM Kok
- Tab B Memcon of Working Lunch with PM Kok

Case Number: 2015-0755-M

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001. memcon	re. Meeting with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes (6 pages)	03/07/1993	P17b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 20 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

MEMCON

PERSONS: CLAES, WILLY

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN CLAES

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 18 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002
002 STATE

Z 95031717 FOR DECISION
X 95032014 DOHSE SGD MEMO
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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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002 950320 BRILL, K

National Security Council
The White House

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Thank.


Exec Sec Office has diskette up

March 20, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's
Meeting with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes
(U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and NATO Secretary General Willy Claes is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Belgium for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with NATO SYG Willy Claes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
William Perry, Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff
John Kornblum, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hunter, U.S. Ambassador to NATO
BG Donald Kerrick, NSC Staff, (Notetaker)

Willy Claes, NATO Secretary General
Klaus Scharioth, Director SYG Private Office
Jamie Shea, Press Spokesman
James Foley, Deputy Director, Private Office

DATE, TIME March 7, 1995, 12:00-12:30pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

SYG Claes: Thank you for sending the Vice President to Brussels. He provided a lot of information on dealing with the Russians.
(U)

The President: We are working very hard with the Russians on NATO expansion and other issues, and I believe we're making good progress. (✓)

SYG Claes: We will finalize the expansion study by the end of the summer, so we can start getting the information to all the interested partners. It is a complicated study with many political and military issues. We plan to report to the Ministers in December. Then we will be facing a serious problem, Mr. President. It is not wise to start the second phase immediately. It is preferable to take the Russian elections into account before attacking the "who" and the "when." My solution is to start individual tours, discussions with the candidates, to

see who is ready to fulfill the conditions--and when. At some point we will decide to take in countries A, B and C, but then the question will be how we avoid creating the feeling that those nations who are not taken in belong to the Russian zone. We must maintain strong relations with those who are knocking on our door by developing the Partnership for Peace. The young democracies are facing a lot of problems, especially in the defense area. In the Communist days, they had no civilian defense experts. PFP is helping consolidate the young democracies. (S)

The second question is what to do with Russia. One thing is clear, the more Yeltsin speaks against enlargement, the more knocks there are on our door. We should keep to the pace decided in December. We are ready to implement the documents with Russia that Kozyrev came to sign in December. Consensus, Mr. President, is building within NATO on parallel approaches: expansion and cooperation with Russia. We will have an important brainstorming session at the end of the month. A lot depends on the results of your planned letter to Yeltsin and the reply Yeltsin sends to you. (S)

The President: We have tried to persuade them, as Vice President Gore may have told you, that we need to develop a parallel relationship between NATO and Russia as we move toward expansion. We will need to be deliberate and open as we work through it. I believe it can be done. There are upheavals in Russia and these are of increasing concern. But if Russia wants to elevate its status and build working relations with NATO, we are prepared to do our part. (S)

SYG Claes: If you have no objections, we can go on with our brainstorming on what to do with those not in the first list of new members. What should we do with them? (S)

The President: The first question is, are there countries who want to be in PFP but not in NATO? (U)

SYG Claes: Yes, of course. (U)

The President: So we are really dealing with three groups. Those in PFP who don't want to be NATO members; those who want to be members but won't, at least in the short run; and those who will become members. We will have to find ways to develop objective criteria that do not cause countries to drift back into the Russian sphere of influence. (S)

SYG Claes: There is some risk in speaking about criteria. It could suggest there is automaticity if they are fulfilled. Membership will be a political decision, although there are lots of conditions to be fulfilled. We will face another difficulty

in the Alliance in developing the text of the study. The French will ask that new members be given a choice of different formulas for the integrated military structure: the French model, the Spanish model and full integration. From the Russian viewpoint, the French model is the interesting one, since they participate in the political side, but not in the military structure. There is no doubt the Visegrad countries favor joining the integrated military structure. But France will oblige us to present different options. This will be one of the difficult issues going before the Council in December. (S)

Secretary Christopher: Do you think the French elections will make any difference? (S)

SYG Claes: I am not sure how the elections will turn out. I believe we have a better chance of dealing with Balladur than we do with Chirac. Plus, Kohl and Balladur have a good understanding. So, that would be our best solution. But the results of the election are unknown. (S)

President Clinton: At any rate, I generally agree with the way you're going. The site visits will be very important. (Looking at Secretary Christopher) What do you think about discussing the "who and when" after the Russian elections? (S)

Secretary Christopher: That's when it will happen, but I wouldn't make the direct connection. There will be lots of steps we will need to take after December. We see this as a protracted discussion. Look at the case of Slovakia, which may not be ready for membership. Many in our Congress are red hot about expansion, but when they look at what it means, the process will not pick up speed. (S)

President Clinton: The Russian situation may be determined by developments beyond our reach. We have all invested a great deal to preserve the best possible relations with Russia. The Vice President visited Yeltsin in the hospital because it was important that we not have a misunderstanding. We have done all we reasonably can do to preserve a constructive attitude and deepen our relations. If NATO leaders support the development of an appropriate relationship with the Russians and keep working with them to define what it is, we can pull this off. Let's go back to Slovakia. Those countries who want PFP, but not NATO membership, will be our best friends in the expansion process. Those that get in will be very happy. We will have the most difficulty with those in the gray area, who do not get in at the beginning. We need to tell them we will be proceeding country by country and try to avoid a political tug-of-war between West and East. If there are enough countries who don't want to join, we may be able to limit the adverse reaction. This will take

careful country-by-country management. I believe we are doing it about right. (S)

SYG Claes: We will face sensitive moments, especially in regard to the Baltic States. The recent elections in Estonia show us that already. (S)

Vice President Gore: I am concerned about that and will be going there in a few days. (S)

Secretary Christopher: I see those elections as part of a trend that has swept across all of Central Europe. The harsh pro-reform people lose public support. The key is not to let the new leaders pull back too far. When Chernomyrdin took over, there were dire predictions that didn't come to pass. (S)

Vice President Gore: Mr. President, one of the most pleasant surprises during my visit to Brussels was the opportunity to see how important the PFP is to partners. I didn't fully appreciate how important it is to those countries. We haven't gotten full credit for the success of PFP. For that middle group of countries, the more we can enhance PFP, the better they will feel when they don't get into NATO at the start. The degree by which the simultaneous process proceeds with Russia will be an important factor in determining the nature of the new lines drawn. If there is not sufficient progress, those on the other side of the line will feel abandoned. With progress, the line will be a softer one. (S)

Mr. Lake: Mr. President, I want to go back to the question of implicitly agreeing that nothing will happen until after the Russian election. It would be extremely dangerous to agree on a working assumption that we are not revealing. If it were revealed, it would say, in a way, that the Russians have a veto, that we are putting the Russia track ahead of expansion. The consequences would be to destroy the psychological progress we have made in Central and Eastern Europe. Besides the Russians, other European states are having elections. If they sense our priorities, they will have free rein to exploit the situation, and it would exacerbate the domestic politics of NATO expansion. (S)

The Vice President: We should never use the Russian elections as a reference date. It is not part of our decision-making process. The first place I encountered it was in Brussels.

SYG Claes: I am not suggesting it. But if we took a decision on the "who and when" in December, it would play into the hands of Russian nationalists and communists. We have enough work to do

after December, even with respect to candidate number one. We are not giving the Russians a veto right or droit de regard. (S)

The President: That's the way to do it. (S)

Secretary Perry: I would like to expand on three points. We must accelerate development of the NATO-Russia relationship. In my judgment, we should focus not on a treaty, but on something like a standing consultative committee; it is important to move quickly. Second, We must have a robust PFP. Third, we must not link it to the Russian elections. It is important to reemphasize those points. The process will move slowly of its own accord and we don't need to slow it down. (S)

SYG Claes: The PFP agreement negotiated with Russia is more than we have signed with any other Partner. It takes into account the size of Russia and its military capability. The second document is more important, the so-called "broad and enhanced dialogue." We can do a lot with this. It has the potential of becoming a consultative mechanism with Russia once it is implemented. Are there plans for a Russia-U.S. Summit? (S)

The President: We are working on that now and will let you know soon. (S)

Secretary Christopher: We had an interesting discussion yesterday about how Chechnya had cast a dark shadow over our relationship with Russia. We need progress there to make NATO members more comfortable. We received good news today that the Russians will accept OSCE monitors. On the Russia-NATO documents, there is no need for a signing ceremony. I hope to be able to get the Russians to sign when I meet with Kozyrev in a few weeks. (S)

SYG Claes: Ambassador Churkin can just come sign them in my office. But Kozyrev wants to come to NATO, to show he's part of the Western family. (S)

Secretary Christopher: He will first have to sign a performance bond (laughter). (S)

Mr. Lake: We have only a few minutes left. We need to hear the Secretary General's views on Bosnia and Croatia. What is the state of play on planning? (S)

SYG Claes: I have been trying to sell Congress on NATO. I wanted you to know that the atmosphere on the Hill with respect to Bosnia is different than it was three months ago. They are much more reasonable. It is quite remarkable. (S)

The President: Some are beginning to consider the consequences of the actions they are calling for. (Ø)

SYG Claes: At NATO, we have prepared several scenarios for UNPROFOR withdrawal. We do not support withdrawal from the political point of view. A lot depends on the attitude of Tudjman. I still believe Tudjman is bluffing. It is still possible to obtain a new mandate, although we'll have to give it different clothes with a new name. I learned this in three different meetings with the Croatian Ambassador in Brussels. I don't think Tudjman wants to risk a military confrontation with the Serbs. It is not clear what his exact price will be, but if he is ready to reconsider, it will have to be on the basis of some defensible formula. If not, we are in serious trouble. (S)

From a military perspective, it will be difficult to withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia and keep it in Bosnia. Tudjman knows this and is pushing from a strong position. Our position is clear. We are ready if we cannot convince Tudjman. If we are obliged to leave Croatia we will need a containment strategy. Our military authorities have promised a containment strategy by the week of March 20. I do not know the details yet. (S)

Another point: I feel personally squeezed between the Council and the military authorities. The military authorities have developed 1000 pages of scenarios. They say that UNPROFOR withdrawal will be the most complicated operation since World War II, and that we need to start prepositioning. The NAC said OK to laying communications lines. The military authorities are now pressing for Step Two of propositioning, which we can't do without sending U.S. and UK experts. It will take eight weeks between the completion of Step Two and the beginning of withdrawal. Imagine what could happen in eight weeks if everything is exploding. The Council doesn't want to give the wrong signal and encourage those who want UNPROFOR out. I understand the political arguments, but the military authorities are getting nervous. If things go wrong, people will say NATO cannot do its job. Council approval of Op Plan 40104 may be required on March 15. After March 15, it will be difficult to slow debate on Step Two because of the pressure from the military authorities. From the military view, you can be proud of what the military, especially the U.S., has done. My answer is that we are ready, but I hope the withdrawal can be stopped.

The President: We are determined to do that. It sounds like you are on top of all this.

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 15, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DONALD KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, March 7, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes on March 7, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *John* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9502048
DATE 20 MAR 95

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN CLAES
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KSM Date: 12/1/2017
2015-0755-17

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9502048

REFERRAL

DATE: 20 MAR 95

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: BRILL, K

SOURCE: SENS

DATE: 20 MAR 95

SUBJ: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN CLAES

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 21 MAR 95

COMMENT:

FOR



JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

See ↴

Case Number: 2006-0215-F; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 575				
Document ID: 9502650				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: v

SEE ↓
Case Number: 2015-0779-M; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 585				
Document ID: 9504241				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: v

See ↓
Case Number: 2015-0783-M; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 610				
Document ID: 9507726				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: v

566
Case Number: 2015-0773-M; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 610				
Document ID: 9507764				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: v

SEE ↴
Case Number: 2015-0781-M; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 615				
Document ID: 9508490				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: v

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1111				
Document ID: 9604716				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: The President's Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov of Russia (3 pages)	07/09/1996	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1111

FOLDER TITLE:

9604716

2015-0755-M

rs1312

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604716
RECEIVED: 09 JUL 96 12

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 11 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA AP
MEMCON

PERSONS: MAMEDOV, GEORGIY

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOMIN MAMEDOV ON 9 JUL 96

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 12 JUL 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKER
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PIFER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS
002

Z 96071019 FOR DECISION
X 96071116 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960711 STATE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4716
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LA 7/11 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Harmon</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
<u>Dohse</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>Sens</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>NSC</u>	_____
<u>Soderberg</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>Berger</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>Lake</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>Situation Room</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>West Wing Desk</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>LA 7/11</u>	<u>[D]</u>
<u>Records Mgt.</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>[E] 7/11</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


4716

July 11, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov

The attached memorandum of conversation of the July 9, 1996 meeting between the President and Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov is provided "EYES ONLY" for the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. We request no further dissemination.



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4716

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Deputy Foreign
Minister Georgiy Mamedov of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff to the President
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Deputy National Security
Advisor
Leon Fuerth, National Security Advisor to the
Vice President
Steve Pifer, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Russia

Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Yuliy Vorontsov, Ambassador
Sergey Zamyatin, Special Assistant to the
Deputy Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME July 9, 1996, 10:05-10:20 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Welcome. It's good to see you. (U)

Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov: Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate your taking the time to meet with me. I appreciate it as a token of your feeling for the Russian people and the Russian president. I am privileged to give you his letter (hands over letter in folder). I hope that it's not a problem that it comes in a red folder. (e)

My president sends his best regards. He has already thanked you in the phone call and expressed appreciation for your stance during our election. It struck the right balance, showing no bias but giving us confidence. It was a big contribution for us. Had the president lost, we realize it might have cost you five percent in your own election. (e)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0755-M(1.13)
12/1/2017 KBN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This triumph of democracy gives President Yeltsin a renewed mandate. We want to move forward and reinvigorate the partnership with you and the United States, looking toward the 21st century. Looking toward your election, you know where President Yeltsin's sympathies lie here. We will act accordingly. (S)

Our election was a democratic triumph, but now we must deliver on the promises made. You understand as a politician. First, this means building a sound economic base. I want to stress to you and the Vice President that the Vice President's visit to Moscow comes at a perfect time. There is a unique window of opportunity to raise the role of our economic interaction. We know we must do a lot, such as fighting corruption, to attract investment. (S)

We also look forward to addressing traditional business. Foreign Minister Primakov looks forward to discussing with Secretary Christopher in Djakarta issues such as ABM, CTBT and NATO. We have already done some work with Strobe. We propose no pause in the relationship between now and the U.S. election. (S)

The President: First, thank you for your personal role in keeping the relationship on track. I appreciate what you've done, and I appreciate the letter from your president. Among his most ardent supporters are those sitting in this room. (S)

The Vice President is coming to Moscow this weekend, and I am pleased that President Yeltsin has reappointed Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to form a new government. We will try to be specific on what is needed to take the economic relationship forward. If you do so, I'll get personally involved in pushing investment. This is important: if we can build economic ties between our countries as opposed to just managing foreign policy problems, then 20, 30, 40 years from now our people will be working together. (S)

As to what will be helpful between now and November, it is simply making practical achievements on our agenda: START II entry into force, a comprehensive test ban treaty. We also need to continue our dialogue on NATO. There will be other issues as well. We will have a better feel over the next month regarding the Middle East peace process. I am encouraged by President Yeltsin's message. What we need is an aggressive and specific agenda. We must keep moving forward. (S)

I know that you see Ambassador Pickering. We keep him fully involved and are glad that you see him and have a good working relationship with him. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I am excited about the prospects before us. We are thinking about what to do over the next four years if the election goes well. Chris, do you want to add anything? (S)

Secretary Christopher: Mr. President, the next election we face is September 14 in Bosnia. We need to make sure that it happens in a free and fair way. (S)

The President: I am very worried about Bosnia. It could come apart. That would be bad for me here but, more importantly, it would be bad for Bosnia and for the region. We don't want to get in a position where IFOR and Russia have to maintain an occupation of Bosnia for an indefinite period. Between now and November, START II, CTBT and Bosnia will be the most important questions. We just need to keep working together. (S)

Mr. Berger: I'm sorry to interrupt, but Yuriy will understand the demands on the President's time. (S)

Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov: Yes, thank you very much for receiving me, Mr. President. (S)

The President: Thank you for coming by. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 10, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: COIT D. BLACKER *ADB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister
Georgiy Mamedov of Russia

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President
and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov on July 9, 1996.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I transmitting
the Memorandum of Conversation "EYES ONLY" to Secretary
Christopher and Deputy Secretary Talbott only, with no further
dissemination.

Approve *ADS* Disapprove _____

2. That you approve filing the attached Memorandum of
Conversation for the record.

Approve *ADS* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Sens-Burns Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9604716
DATE 11 JUL 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOMIN MAMEDOV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIG+DISK

*DISK SENT
TO STAFF
OFFICER*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 12/1/2017

2015-0755-7

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1128				
Document ID: 9607333				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Lake Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (21 pages)	11/01/1996	P1/b(1) <i>Partial Release - KBH 7/13/2018</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1128

FOLDER TITLE:

9607333

2015-0755-M

rs1313

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607333
RECEIVED: 05 NOV 96 08

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
MEMCON

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW LAKE & PRES CHIRAC ON 1 NOV

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 08 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW ✓

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY RB

DATE

11/9

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001
002

Z 96110813 FOR DECISION
X 96110913 LAKE APPROVED RECOMS
X 96110913 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 961108 BURNS, W

Rec'd 6:15 pm 11/8

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7333
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG u A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	<u>3 copy ✓</u>	<u>ASS</u>	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy ✓</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Lake	<u>2</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(D) 11/8</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(D) 11/9</u>	<u>D + P.S.K</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'96 NOV 8 PM 12:29

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

Rec'd 6:15 pm 11/8

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7333

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG u AVO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	<u>3 copy ✓</u>	<u>MS</u>	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy ✓</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Lake	<u>2</u>	Nati Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(D) 11/8</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(D) 11/9</u>	<u>D + P.S.K</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 8, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between Anthony Lake
and President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between Anthony Lake and
President Jacques Chirac of France is provided for the
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris for the
Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(S)~~



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 11/07/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By K81/NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Lake Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: French President Jacques Chirac
Jean-David Levitte, Diplomatic Counselor to President Chirac
Bernard Emie, Deputy Diplomatic Counselor to President Chirac
VADM Jean-Luc Delaunay, Military Advisor

U.S.

Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Pamela Harriman, Ambassador to France
Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 1, 1996, 12:00 - 2:40 p.m., Elysee Palace, Paris

President Chirac: I understand that you have just had a meeting with Jean-David Levitte and Admiral Delaunay. I wanted this opportunity to review a number of issues. First, I would like to discuss one that is especially topical, Zaire. I received the three Presidents of the three neighboring countries yesterday. I am monitoring developments in Zaire closely and in conjunction with Mobutu. I am very worried. Zaire is the central pillar of the African order. If Zaire explodes, there will be enormous destabilization throughout Africa. There will be internal battles that are extremely severe because there is no figure in Zaire with sufficient political authority to impose himself even on part of the country. There will be a huge number of refugees who will leave in every direction and destabilize neighboring states. Therefore, there is a real danger. The only man who can control the situation is Mobutu. He is slightly better, but he will not be able to return to the country before the end of the year -- or December 15 at the earliest. His health has improved

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markedly, but it is hard to control events from Lausanne. The only solution I can see is an international conference of the five concerned states under the UN or OAU. For now, Rwanda opposes such a meeting. Many other leaders in the region say it is necessary, but it is difficult to implement. How can we achieve this goal? Only President Museveni of Uganda could influence Rwanda. Museveni is an intelligent but perverse man with an extraordinary capability to say yes to everyone but then never to deliver. The key lies in the fact that the only leader with sway over Museveni is Qadhafi. Therefore, we are in a tricky situation. If we don't want to commit ourselves massively (and no one wants to do that) and we want to avoid a humanitarian disaster that is of unprecedented in the history of Africa since the time of slave trade, then we have to force Museveni to intervene. The only way to do this is to contact Qadhafi. I know that this is not easy. (C)

Anthony Lake: Not for us. (C)

President Chirac: We need to weigh the pros and cons. (C)

Anthony Lake: First, before I reply, let me extend President Clinton's personal regards. I was struck by the fact that if the President is reelected next Tuesday, then he and you will have the longest mandates of any western leader. This offers immense opportunities. In our talks today, we will discuss some of our tactical differences. But the direction that you have taken French foreign policy -- coming closer to NATO and strengthening the partnership with the United States -- as well as the nature of your personal relationship with President Clinton create huge opportunities to remake Europe and to work together on problems like Zaire and Rwanda. President Clinton is very excited by this. The specific questions in the short term reflect some real tactical differences, but they take place in a very encouraging strategic context. (C)

President Chirac: I know one should never say anything before an election, but I pray every day that President Clinton will be reelected and also that the House of Representatives will be retaken by the Democrats. I also hope that the President will be elected with as big a majority as possible. The greater the margin, the greater his authority, and I hope he will have greater authority. President Clinton is a man who is very open, intelligent and capable, with a remarkable woman at his side. This is an essential point for us: we can talk and discuss issues with him, which has not always been the case with the U.S. Administration. So I pray every day, not just because of our friendship -- although I do have a genuine feeling of friendship for the Clintons. (C)

Anthony Lake: That friendship and our common strategic interests create opportunities to get things done. On Zaire, the situation does threaten an immense human tragedy. There is also the possibility of the worst possible events with Burundi and Rwanda, namely, a regional war between the Tutsis and Hutus, not just within each country, and with the region's governments lining up on each side of the conflict. Uganda and Zaire are almost at war through Rwanda. One of the terrible spin-offs of the situation will be the loss of control of the government in Kinshasa over North and South Kivu. (C)

President Chirac: There were antigovernment riots in Kinshasa last night. (C)

Anthony Lake: It would be a triple tragedy if the Zairian government were dismembered. This is perhaps why Zaire will not send its best troops to Kivu, since it needs to keep an eye on Saba. I am glad you are in touch with Mobutu. I agree that we cannot solve the crisis without him. The intelligence about movement of refugees is very disturbing, as is the word of increased fighting around Goma and Bukavu. We've supported the idea of a Great Lakes conference under the UN and OAU, but the interim step that we should take is to find a way to get Rwanda and Zaire to sit down and resolve the specific disputes between them immediately. If we can get Rwanda and Zaire to meet, we will implicitly involve Uganda as well. In this regard, we do have some influence with Museveni. (C)

President Chirac: No one but Qadhafi has influence over him. (C)

Anthony Lake: You do have some influence with Museveni if you come up with something that is in his interest. He needs us to some degree with respect to Sudan, and we do have more influence with Meles. He has some influence with Museveni. Our influence is small, but we should use it and not only play the Qadhafi card. (C)

President Chirac: I didn't say that we should only play the Qadhafi card. But my question was whether we can play the Qadhafi card. Of course, we should play other cards too in order of priority. I am not happy about the idea of involving Qadhafi in this, but my question is: Can we play the Qadhafi card at all? (C)

Anthony Lake: He tends to be a wild card. This is a perfect case in which our two governments need to work together, along with the Belgians, to get something done. There will be a meeting in Nairobi early next week. Kagame said that he will go or send his president, and we do have some influence with him.

We need to get Kengo to go as well. We, along with the Belgians, could help resolve the humanitarian crisis if we can get them to agree on a few things. This would leave us in a better situation than two weeks ago and help preserve the integrity of Zaire. We need a cease-fire, and we need to convince Rwanda (along with Uganda) not to offer more assistance to the Tutsis in Zaire. We need to get Zaire to agree that it will treat the Tutsis as Zairian citizens and not subject them to more ethnic cleansing. We need to get Zaire also to agree not to help the Hutu rebels operating against Rwanda. Most importantly, if we can reach an agreement on a plan that refugees can go back into Rwanda rather than being driven deeper into Zaire (which would simply create permanent Lebanization in the region), we would be in a better situation than when the camps were the source of the trouble. It is important that UNHCR is moving toward such a position. Therefore, let us work together over the coming days to secure a Zaire-Rwanda agreement, leading to a UN-OAU conference on the whole future of the Great Lakes region. It is very urgent. If we don't succeed, the refugees will move deeper into Zaire. The NGOs are already withdrawing their personnel and this could hit Zaire. (C)

President Chirac: There is now a huge international outcry. All the journalists are going down there. Ten French journalists are trapped just a kilometer from the combat zone, and we must study a military operation to get them out. (C)

Anthony Lake: That would be very difficult. (C)

President Chirac: Everything you have said is very logical. But we are not dealing with a country of logic, but with Africa. It is a fascinating place, but they do not operate under the same logic as we do. I admire Kengo. He is a good civil servant, but he can't make any commitments. No one obeys him. His decisions are without consequence. I asked Mobutu to give strong support to Kengo, but in Africa, you cannot delegate power; either you have it or you don't. The only legitimate person in Zaire is Mobutu. (C)

Regarding the first question, I know that region and the country. I am 100 percent for the process that you outlined, but I am afraid it won't be very effective. We are in a world full of passion, in which reactions are based on ethnic feelings rather than politics. The ties between the leaders are not well establish because of the ethnic factor. When you are not familiar with the tribal origins in Africa, you can't have an objective understanding of the situation. I persist in saying that the key to a solution is in the hands of Qadhafi. With all necessary discretion, we should force Qadhafi to exert influence. Naturally, we have no intention of taking such an initiative if

it is not on the basis of agreement with the United States, even informally. I am worried about seeing 100,000 refugees moving toward Gabon, the Congo and beyond. This will mean that France will have to look after the situation of those two countries. It will cost us a lot. We have automatic defense agreements, and I would have to apply them. So my question is, do we seek an informal contact with Qadhafi? If I do this, we will need to offer something in return. I don't need an answer today. You also have your own ways of intervening with Qadhafi. Again, I will not act alone, but I think that this is the only way a solution will be effective. The problem is that the Belgians don't know Africa anymore. They have washed their hands of Africa. Among other western countries, only France is reasonably familiar with Africa, and we have stayed engaged. Let me know your reaction. (C)

Anthony Lake: We will need to think about this. We have had similar problems in dealing with Mobutu. But because the Rwanda and Burundi situation is so important, we did reach out to him, since it was in our interests. (C)

President Chirac: We would have been better off if we had engaged all along with Mobutu. (C)

Anthony Lake: We disagree, as you know. (C)

President Chirac: It is all the fault of the Belgians. (C)

Anthony Lake: The question is what price do you pay with Qadhafi. (C)

President Chirac: Qadhafi, I know, is worse for you than Mobutu. (C)

Anthony Lake: That is right. Libya was involved in the murder of American -- and French -- citizens. There is nothing wrong in urging him to do the right thing with Museveni as long as he does not expect a quid pro quo from the United States in terms of our legislation enacted because of his refusal to abide by UNSC resolutions. (C)

President Chirac: I know that Qadhafi is a very sensitive issue for the United States. I don't want to take any initiative that would be opposed by the U.S. For some time, we have believe that we should try to integrate Qadhafi. The fundamentalist penetration into Libya from Sudan is worrying. We would prefer Qadhafi's government over a fundamentalist government in Libya. Moreover, Qadhafi has aged. There are Americans still working in Libya. They will tell you that today's Qadhafi is not the bad boy of recent years. We do need to resolve the issue of Pan Am

103, but we could convey a strong message: when Pan Am 103 is resolved, we will judge him on his good work, he could demonstrate that today by imposing a solution on Museveni. Again, we would not want to take such an initiative if it exposed us to criticism. We would need to do it discreetly. (C)

Anthony Lake: We have been very clear. We would welcome Qadhafi's integration once he has resolved Pan Am 103. Our strategic view is the same. We hope we can move forward, and we will contemplate what you said. We should not publicize this idea in the meantime. (C)

President Chirac: On Africa, more generally, we have studied the African Crisis Response Force as proposed by Mr. Christopher. Let me say one thing. I have publicly condemned the irresponsible declarations of Minister Godfrain. I was very upset by those stupid statements. You can allow my statement to be made public: It was stupid, irresponsible and I condemn it. I told him that without using any diplomatic language. What I just said is not confidential, and you can tell anyone I said it, including the press. (C)

The ACRF as initially presented was badly received by the Africans. The President of Mali was the first to react. He said that no Chief of State would accept sending a single soldier if it were outside the control of the OAU or UN. There was clearly a misunderstanding that the U.S. wanted a force outside the OAU or UN. When he flew here after the proposal was first made, I told him that he had misunderstood. I explained to him that the aim was to prevent crises, which was inconceivable without the UN or OAU's authority. Make no mistake, in my view the UN is the most important, because the OAU is filled with rivalries, whereas the UN is respected in the region. I think the ACRF is an excellent idea and a necessary step, but the entire international community should participate in the technical and financial makeup of the force. If it is not under UN command, it will never exist. (C)

In this respect, you have to be careful with our African friends. Please explain to George Moose that Africans are not African-Americans. There is no link at all. Practically all Africans are very kind people. They never say no, but always say yes. If you are not used to speaking with them, you go away without knowing that their yes has no value. Africans have a different way of talking. Westerners cannot understand this after just two hours of talking with African leaders. So be careful in how you set up the ACRF. Almost all the heads of state and government could join if you get it right. (C)

Anthony Lake: You reminded me of the time when I worked in Africa. I had an African friend, and we were both working for a ministry in Kenya. The government did not pay my colleague's salary, and I lent him the money out of pocket. When I asked him if he would repay me, he said yes, I will send it to you. But I waited and waited and finally when I asked him, he explained that his gratitude to me went far beyond mere financial considerations. So that is what "yes" meant. (C)

President Chirac: That is Africa. (C)

Anthony Lake: We have gone beyond this point with African countries. Several of them have agreed to the proposal and have offered to provide troops. You are absolutely right that we need to put this in the UN context. Any use of the force would have to be authorized by the UN Security Council. The command arrangements would need to be adjusted to the contingency. In building the force, I have the impression that the OAU is not willing or able to do this; they are not capable of NATO-style operations in Africa. We must always be clear this will be under UN authority. (C)

President Chirac: I believe it is a good idea, but it will be difficult to implement. (C)

Anthony Lake: I hope we can work together and establish a concept based on your proposal at the Biarritz summit. We should merge that proposal with our concept so that we can together put the idea into practice. It would be more effective if this were a common U.S.-French enterprise. (C)

President Chirac: The next subject on my list is the G-7, where everything is fine. The same applies to CTBT. (C)

Anthony Lake: Thanks again for your leadership at Lyons on terrorism. (C)

President Chirac: When it comes to terrorism, we will always be supportive of you, and there will be no limit to our support. The CTBT negotiations went well. (C)

Anthony Lake: If only Qadhafi could deliver India. (C)

President Chirac: We very seriously look forward to your response on Qadhafi. If you say no, we will not act. On Bosnia, there are no particular problems. As far as post-IFOR is concerned, we will take a joint position. (C)

Anthony Lake: This will be a difficult decision for President Clinton. (C)

President Chirac: It will be difficult for us too. We will take the same decision as President Clinton does. (C)

Anthony Lake: We will try to address this as quickly as possible. (C)

President Chirac: Our position is simple. If the U.S. leaves, we leave as well. If the U.S. stays, we will stay -- and in the same proportion. (C)

Anthony Lake: There will be problems next year; we are dealing with Bosnia. (C)

President Chirac: They have been fighting for centuries and won't stop. A word regarding China. I am not sure we are always treating China with the necessary respect. There is a group of high-level Chinese historians who are completing a dictionary of humiliations of the past 150 years. We need to keep in mind that they are the oldest living civilization in the world. They were at the peak of art and science when we were all climbing in the trees. And this fact has left its trace. For fifty years we tried to profit from China's weakness and systematically humiliated China. Now for the first time they believe they can become masters of the world. I know Chinese civilization well. They will make us pay a heavy price in 20-30 years if we are not careful now. They will become the leading economic power and then the world's leading power, so we have to be careful for our grandchildren's sake. (C)

For example, every year we perform a ridiculous exercise in Geneva. We introduce a motion to condemn human rights violations in China at the UN Human Rights Commission, where a majority of countries reject it. This proves globally the wisdom of the United Nations. We both look stupid and ridiculous. We recognize that there are human rights problems, and we certainly accept the universal value of human rights. But for 2,500 to 5,000 years the Chinese have been affected by Confucianism under which the question is "how does man serve society," rather than society serving man. Therefore, we need to find the right way to present the issue. When we were fighting each other as savages, in China they had the first judges. I believe we should move from a strategy of confrontation that is a dead end to a strategy of discussion. I tried last year but didn't succeed. Let us work with them so that we can agree on a common approach. (C)

Anthony Lake: I agree. This is one reason why the President sent me to China earlier this year. My purpose was not to bargain on each issue, but to give them our strategic perspective. I explained that it was not only a question of

friendship but that it was in our interest in seeing a strong China that is a full partner. We want an agreement with China in the WTO so that it not only plays by the rules but joins the international community in developing those rules. They do have a sense of wounded pride that is palpable, as you said. Human rights is a real problem, and we need to keep talking with them. We don't enjoy the process in the UN Human Rights Commission and would prefer not to have to deal with these issues publicly. We should talk with the Chinese on actions that they could take on human rights so that we wouldn't have to act in Geneva. If we could get the Chinese to take some actions, maybe we could avoid these confrontations. (C)

President Chirac: They are ready to discuss the issue because the UN procedure humiliates them. They would prefer a means of compromise, although not at any price. According to the Amnesty report, 1,100 people were killed in the Tiananmen events. Eight days earlier, 5,000 people were killed by the police in Pakistan, but this was not on TV, so there was no problem with public opinion. In contrast, every problem with China is on TV. The question is where do you draw the line.

Anthony Lake: We also have human rights discussions with Pakistan. (C)

President Chirac: Yes, but those are more discreet. (C)

Anthony Lake: The fact that the Chinese don't like the UN process suggests that we should try to get something in return before dropping it. (C)

President Chirac: I would like to talk about the Middle East, since things are often distorted by the press. Today there is no confidence in the Middle East. Where there is no trust, things come to a halt. Everywhere I went, I paid tribute to the work done by the United States since Camp David. But now there is a problem: rightly or wrongly, the Arabs believe that the United States is too close to Israel, so they have difficulties in accepting certain things. The reasonable ideas put forward by Israel and the United States will not be accepted by the Palestinians. However, the same things, if proposed by the United States, Israel and Europe together, will be acceptable. I am not criticizing U.S. leadership in the peace process or impugning it. The problem is that it is not sufficient now that Israel has become what it has. Who is Netanyahu? My personal relationship is better than that with Peres and Begin, but I don't know whether Netanyahu is still committed to the idea of a greater Israel, or whether he is ready to deal and make peace. Is he a leader or a follower? No one knows the answer. (C)

An example of these mixed signals came when I was speaking with President Asad. He is not much cleaner with respect to terrorism than Qadhafi, although we still have relations with him for reasons of Realpolitik. Asad said that if they returned the Golan Heights, everything would be negotiable. I discussed this with Weizmann and Netanyahu. Weizmann has greater moral authority and is keen to engage. Weizmann said that there is no other solution but to return the Golan but that this meant renegotiating the security arrangements that had been agreed at the Wye Plantation. David Levy seemed to accept this. Netanyahu first said that he could understand this; with renegotiation of all the security arrangements, then there was no reason he couldn't return the Golan Heights. That was on Wednesday. On Thursday, however, Netanyahu decided to authorize oil exploration in the Golan. I went to Cairo and met with Mubarak. He was very angry. He asked whether this was a provocation or just stupidity. When I received Netanyahu a month ago, he arrived at 12:30 and we spoke until 4 o'clock. I told him that the whole business with the tunnel was stupid and that there would be serious consequences for the region. He rejected this. When the meeting was over at 4 o'clock, we got the first press reports on the killings on the West Bank. Either this was a deliberate provocation or we are dealing with a man who is not capable of directing Israeli policy. I believe that Netanyahu will be obliged to divorce himself either from the peace process or from his coalition. If he sticks with the coalition, it will be a catastrophe. (C)

Anthony Lake: There was an interesting column by Tom Friedman of the New York Times. His point was that if the talks were concluded on Hebron soon -- and Arafat and the Israeli negotiators are very close to coming to a solution on the military issues -- then this would force Netanyahu to choose. He is prepared to make concessions. This would not end the coalition but would split the religious parties from the others. Arafat has it in his hands to help define who Netanyahu is. It is important that Arafat seizes the opportunity of a Hebron deal. (C)

President Chirac: On Hebron, Netanyahu and Weizmann need to tell Arafat that if he doesn't sign tomorrow, we will not have an agreement for a year. When I left Israel, the last thing Arafat said to me was that he could not accede to any form of blackmail. If Netanyahu thinks he can stop everything, it won't stop the violence or terrorism. The Israeli position is excessive. How many Israelis live in Hebron? There are 20 people who sleep there and a few hundred who work there. What Israel needs for protection is to respect the agreements already reached. When Israelis increase the pressure on the Arabs, we need to ask what they are after. They must realize that turning Arafat away means

turning away the only man who can deliver. Maybe a Hebron agreement will move things forward, but there is no guarantee. Once it is signed, Netanyahu could create yet another problem. (C)

Anthony Lake: The agreement must be one that enables him to survive politically and physically. Let me make two other points. We agree that there was a loss of trust between the Israelis and Palestinians. Weizmann has done some good work. Part of the problem was helping Netanyahu figure out how to talk to the Palestinians. When they came to Washington, President Clinton encouraged Netanyahu to get the tone right in his discussions with Arafat. It is getting better, but there need to be some agreements. As in Africa, it is essential that we work better together on the Middle East. I will discuss with Jean-David ways that we can consult that we have not done before. Your letter to the President was helpful. The two of you can make sure we work together. Our people should speak regularly. (C)

President Chirac: Let me say that I do not seek any glory in the Middle East. We've only received hard knocks over my trip. The French government is very unpopular in France right now, since we are making a considerable effort to improve the economic situation. France has the second largest Jewish community outside Israel and the United States. These are not farmers, but journalists and other influential people. I took only criticism, and it would be easier for me to say that we won't concern ourselves with the Middle East: but we are next door, it is in the Mediterranean. If the situation blows up it will be very bothersome for us. We have 4-1/2 million Arabs in France. Many of them are refugees, and if we can promote peace, it will be better than war. When I was in Israel, they surrounded me with big security people carrying guns, yet when I went to Ramallah, there were no security guards and no guns -- just people with olive branches. I wasn't in an armored vehicle and managed to open the window and everybody was happy. (C)

During our talks, Netanyahu told me that Asad had just made a major troop movements into Lebanon, moving troops out of Beirut. He told me that according to their information, he was going to swoop out of Syria. I asked whether they were making fun of me. Did he want me to believe that Asad was going to push into the Golan Heights in 24 hours without any time for Israel to react? Either this was a provocation or incompetence but this represents a real problem. Who is really afraid of being attacked? Certainly not Israel. Israel could be in Damascus in 24 hours. The risk is for Asad to be attacked by Israel or in Lebanon. What is the situation today? There are 800 people in the St. George's Hotel, another 400 in another hotel. Two Israeli

rockets could kill 2,000 Syrians. That is the real danger in Beirut. [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) The troop movements may look like Asad was going after the Golan, but that couldn't be the case. (C)

Anthony Lake: Some people around him have created elegant scenarios about how Syria could hold Israeli units hostage. This is not real. But two times we have had to go to both sides to share intelligence in order to show that these were defensive moves. We have helped calm them down. After going to the Israelis, we went to the Syrians and told them that Israel's actions were defensive. Yes, half of the problem is the mistrust between the sides. We hope we have helped to defuse the tensions. (C)

President Chirac: One word on the Helms-Burton and D'Amato-Kennedy legislation. I know it was not President Clinton's idea, but we have an EU position that is very firm. You need to know that the EU will not show any weakness on this issue. I recently met with the Secretary General of the OAS. He said that their position is unanimous -- the same as that of the EU. Therefore, let us be careful. We will see what happens after your elections. If a French company is the target of these laws, I don't know what the EU will do, but I will have to react first in a most brutal way. It will be a *casus belli*. You can't organize the world and then do what you please when it suits you. When I discussed this with Bill Clinton, it clearly bothered him. I am sure that if he wins the election and regains Democratic control of the House, we will resolve this. (C)

Anthony Lake: I owe you a frank explanation. Both pieces of legislation reflect strong consensus in both parties in the Congress and in American public opinion. After the shutdown of the plane by the Cubans, the President also was supportive. There is no real prospect of the legislation changing. We don't like the fact that we are on a collision course with the government of France or the EU. On Helms-Burton, there is a way out. Stuart Eizenstat recently came to Paris and stressed that we share a common objective on Cuba, namely, the restoration of democracy. I understand that it is your objective as well, even though I also know of your repugnance for our legislation. Under the legislation, there is a question of bringing suits against foreign firms. The President has suspended such action until January. The more that Europeans can do, either through governments, companies or NGOs, the more it will help. (C)

For example, European governments have suspended negotiations between the EU and Cuba on a cooperation agreement. If the EU were to say that before those talks can resume, there should be progress toward democratization, that would be helpful. With

respect to European companies, if they took an approach along the lines that we took in South Africa -- e.g., only investing in companies in Cuba that have fair labor practices -- that would also help. In short, any actions by the Europeans that push Cuba toward democracy will help the President decide about further suspensions under Helms-Burton. We know that there is a problem since, from the European point of view, it is difficult to be seen as acting in response to our law. Therefore, such actions need to be disconnected from the law. But let me repeat that any measures European governments and companies can take to promote democratization in Cuba will help the President. He would not say that the Europeans have taken the steps because of our law, but would just welcome the actions when making his decision on whether to suspend the effect of Helms-Burton another time. (C)

President Chirac: The laws once enacted are now there. If they don't threaten France's interests, that is okay. Regarding democracy in Cuba, I am naturally in favor of this. Nobody mentioned Cuba before, but since the law passed, there has been a ground swell of sympathy for Cuba in Europe, Latin America and Africa. (I can't say about Asia because I haven't checked.) I don't think that this legislation was the best tactic. I have no sympathy for Castro, and I agree that we should make gestures that could make life easier for President Clinton, but this was a clumsy initiative that runs counter to U.S. interests. I will be glad to try to break the logjam for Bill Clinton. However, if French companies are subject to lawsuits in the United States threatening their interests, it will lead to an extremely violent French reaction. (C)

Anthony Lake: I understand. (C)

Ambassador Harriman: There are no French companies in Cuba. (C)

Anthony Lake: There are few European firms with interests in Cuba. (C)

President Chirac: You are talking about Cuba and democracy. You should listen to what the Latin Americans are saying -- not necessarily to you, because they are afraid, but to others. They think it is better not to keep the banana producers in slavery, and they are right. Similarly, why are U.S. companies staying in Libya under a Canadian hat? Why doesn't what goes for Cuba go for Libya? But I agree we need a way out. I know the President won't escalate the problem, and I am all in favor of facilitating a solution. (C)

Let's talk about NATO. Let me tell you what I think. First, France is not the demandeur. We can reenter a reformed NATO, and that would be good. If not, it would not be a problem for us

either. The problem of reentering NATO will be with French public opinion. Our public has become used to not being the in NATO military structure, and there would be unanimity against this step among the political class. That reaction doesn't bother me, but there are problems with respect to NATO reform. I had wanted the position of SACEUR to rotate between Europe and the United States. That proposal was refused, so I gave up on that plan. Then I said that if the two strategic commanders were Americans, then the two regional commanders should be Europeans. All the other problems I am sure can be solved. But for the two regional commanders, we face the problem of CINCSOUTH. The United States says that it is impossible to have a European Commander because of the Sixth Fleet, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Greece and Turkey, etc. I understand all that, but I say in response that we will not reenter NATO if the Southern Commander is not European. Without that, I cannot say that there is a European identity within the framework of NATO. Regarding the Sixth Fleet, it could be directly answerable to SACEUR. On nuclear weapons, I am sure a technical solution can be found. (C)

U.S. interests certainly exist in the Mediterranean, but they are not superior to European interests. I don't want this subject turned into an issue of confrontation. If we can find an accord, that would be good. If not, we should not make it into a crisis. I repeat that we are not the demandeurs. If the answer is no, I won't be displeased. We will avoid a further crisis in France, and I will not lose another 10 points in the opinion polls (if our ratings went any lower, we would strike oil). You may say that polls don't matter, that one can lose in the polls and win the next election, but let's not exaggerate that point. There are major efforts that we still have to make on the economic and social front, and I am not looking for additional worries with public opinion. NATO is in our general interest. We will rejoin but not if the Southern Command is not European. (C)

Regarding enlargement, I am in favor, but in conditions that are acceptable to Russia. I don't want to give the Russians a veto, but we have humiliated them too much. The situation in Russia is very dangerous. One day there will be dangerous nationalist backlash. A pact between NATO and Russia is quite possible. This will permit us to have NATO enlargement without any problems while respecting the Russian position. Then we can begin the NATO enlargement process -- identifying the countries that will join first and starting negotiations. One observation with respect to the first group is that is unfortunate that we have not included Romania; we support Romania. (C)

The next question is when will we decide all of this. We want to leave the new U.S. administration some time to consult and then

reach agreement on a schedule. I would propose that the NATO Summit be delayed until July. This would allow time to prepare things with serenity. Regarding the Summit, I propose a two-day meeting. On the first day, the 16 would meet and, if agreed, approve the reforms of the Alliance. The next morning we would sign a NATO-Russia agreement, and in the afternoon we would have a small celebration party with the other partners in connection with a decision on NATO enlargement. We have to make all the countries happy. (C)

Anthony Lake: This would not just be a little party but a historic one. Let me tell you that we have a real problem on the Southern Command. We had a good discussion on this this morning with Jean-David and his colleagues. We need to begin by looking at the stakes. You have made a courageous and wise decision regarding the potential full integration of France into NATO military structures. For our part, the President reversed previous U.S. policy in supporting a European defense identity within NATO as part of his view, and our common vision, of a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and at peace. France's potential role, your decision to come closer to NATO and Francophone-U.S. relations -- as well as your personal relationship with President Clinton -- are all essential to that vision. It is extremely important that we work this issue through. (C)

As you said, we have survived in the past with a NATO in which France was not integrated. We can proceed with NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relations without French integration, but it would be better to do so with it. At next year's Summit, which I like to call a Super Summit, we could have NATO enlargement, a new NATO adapted to the new era and a NATO-Russia agreement. This would be of huge, historic significance, on the order of 1815. That should be our objective. We have been working toward a European role within NATO which could, in specific terms, turn over NATO resources to the Europeans in cases in which Europeans might be acting without the United States (although we hope that would not be the case in most situations). We should do it, however, in a way that is militarily sound. What makes NATO effective is its military capabilities. The command structure needs to be militarily sound as well. (C)

Second, this should be done in a way that ties the United States as closely as possible to Europe. There is a tension: as we support a greater European defense identity, we have to be able to tell our public and Congress that this is being done in a way that does not weaken our links to Europe. The President's greatest concern is not just the threats that exist in the Mediterranean, but the fact that without the command of AFSOUTH, we could not have sold our participation in Bosnia. For us to

give up AFSOUTH would be perceived as the beginning of strategic retreat from the new NATO. So I plead with you, Mr. President, to work together with us to find a package of other changes in the NATO command structure, together with the larger changes we have supported so far, that will allow you to sell to your public opinion -- with our help -- the fact that France is taking a central role in a new NATO. But we should not do this at the expense of steps that would be damaging in building the new NATO. There are a lot of other billets. We could also go back to three regional commands, although I know that raises German concerns. We want to work with you on that package. If we can agree on a package through serious private talks, reached in a way that is consistent with the interests of other Allies, it would be worthwhile. We can try to control our government and not claim a success or victory for the United States, but a success for all Allies, especially France. This would be because it would be following through on your decision, which we have already applauded, and it would be an historic step toward a Super Summit. (C)

Regarding the timing of the summit, we would like to do it a bit earlier, but we can look at July. On NATO enlargement, we have made no decisions on who should be in the first group. Therefore, we have not made any decision on Romania and this can still be discussed. I have insisted that there be no meetings within the U.S. government to make such decisions, given the transparency of our government. We don't need any stories on a premature American choice. (C)

One important point with respect to our dealings with the Russians: we need to convey how genuinely and deeply we want to work with them on an understanding for the 1997 Summit. But if we give them the impression that there will not be NATO enlargement until such arrangements are worked out, that will give them every reason not to reach an understanding with us. If they believe that by delaying the NATO-Russia understanding, they can delay NATO enlargement, the whole thing could crash. So we are doing everything we can to push forward on the NATO-Russia track, as we proceed prudently on NATO enlargement, but we must stress that these are parallel tracks. Otherwise, the Russians could take negative steps that would reinforce the nationalists. (C)

President Chirac: On that last point, I think that to the extent that we know who is in charge in Russia, they are ready for an accord. The advantages would be considerable for Moscow. The Russian people are convinced that nuclear weapons are going to come down on their towns. It is one of the reasons that fuels nationalist critics of their government -- that they are not

protecting the people against American bombs. That is really how Russian people see it. (C)

Anthony Lake: We have our own critics who feel that way as well about the Russians. (C)

President Chirac: The Russian government -- Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin -- has an interest in reaching a rapid agreement with NATO. Their interests in this are stronger than their interests in accepting NATO enlargement. I don't think it is in their interest to delay NATO enlargement by delaying the NATO-Russia agreement, but that is a logical analysis. It is necessary for Chernomyrdin and Boris Nikolayevich to convince the Russian people that there is no danger and that their government has taken the necessary steps to remove any threats. So, the NATO-Russia agreement is more important politically to Russia than it is to us, but we need to present it to them politely. (C)

Regarding the Southern Command, I understand your position -- if I were in the United States, I would adopt the same position. What is important in a command system is who is in charge. You said that President Clinton has already accepted the principle of a European defense identity and that this is a real change in U.S. policy. This is true, but it remains a change in words, not in reality. That is a U.S. problem; I would do the same if I were in your shoes. I am prepared to adopt anything that you propose, but not enter the system if there is not a real change. This is not worth a crisis between us. I will assume a low profile. NATO has worked well without France for many years and this will continue. We have all kinds of military agreements and this is not a problem. We are working together in Bosnia without any problem because we have various military ties. But I repeat, France is ready to discuss returning to NATO if there is a real change, and that means a change in the command structure. If this is not possible, it will not pose any difficulties for France; we just will not rejoin. (C)

I suggested July rather than the spring for the Summit because it would give us more time to work. There will be a new U.S. Congress, and I have every confidence in Bill Clinton's realism. He is a wise man, and we can discuss this. If we wait until the beginning of the next Administration and everything is running smoothly, if the noise of the election has passed, I am sure that the imagination of our military and diplomats will lead to solutions. But this needs time. I also suggested that the meeting take place in Europe. Note that I did not say in France, but rather I think Brussels would be a good venue. Let there be no ambiguity on this. (C)

Anthony Lake: I prefer ambiguity and have great affection for Paris. We can wait on this. Regarding your previous points, let me say that this is not an election issue. (C)

President Chirac: I know that, but elections do create tensions. (C)

Anthony Lake: This is mostly an issue about our long-term position in NATO. It will affect debates on future crises and when we are pushing NATO enlargement through the Congress. That will lead to a debate, particularly since there will be costs. At that time, it will become more of an issue. But we do not need to wait until the new Administration to discuss this. Our position is clear. We should try to come to grips with this problem in a quiet way. It will be a focus of discussion at the December NAC Ministerial, and the more progress we can make before then, the easier it will be to defuse the issue. On the other hand, the more it is seen as a public issue, a zero-sum question in which there are winners and losers, we will have defeated our own purpose of finding a package that you can sell as justifying French integration into NATO. We will keep working with Jean-David on a process for coming to grips with this issue. (C)

On your larger point that NATO can survive without French integration, I agree that we can have a summit and a new Europe with just NATO enlargement and a NATO-Russia agreement, but that would be sad. We have an historic opportunity that could be based on the decisions of you and President Clinton. These are not only words. We have put forward some specific ways in which Europeans could act within NATO, including the CJTF proposal. We have already put on the table an increased European role for the Deputy SACEUR. So, some pieces of the package are on the table, and we can discuss other pieces -- for example, more billets within the regional commands -- as part of a determined effort to come up with a package that will enable us to seize the full opportunity. President Clinton has asked us to keep working at this. (C)

President Chirac: I agree that we should work along these lines. I am not sure that we can do it, but I repeat, let's not make it into a crisis. (C)

The last thing I wanted to discuss is this dreadful business with Boutros-Ghali. I would like to return to the origins of the problem. One day about a year ago, Bill Clinton called me and said there was a problem with Boutros-Ghali and that we need to find a solution. He asked whether we could help. In that conversation President Clinton said (without making any commitment, of course) that perhaps we could leave Boutros-Ghali

in place for another two years. I suggested another 2-1/2 years, that this was a compromise that we might be able to sell. I then put the phone down and the next day, Madeleine Albright made her famous statement declaring "out with Boutros-Ghali." She said that he had one year to pack his bags. That statement shocked people. It was very clumsy. This campaign will go down in the annals of history as the most counterproductive diplomatic campaign ever. This problem is one that we could have solved quietly, yet U.S. diplomacy got everyone's back up. (C)

We need to find a way out. The immense majority of UN members will vote for Boutros-Ghali. There are two ways out of this situation. One is an agreement, which is still possible without a loss of face for anyone, to prolong Boutros-Ghali's term. The second is a U.S. veto, which would not help the U.S. image in the world. There is also an important question of procedure. After your elections, the U.S. representative at the UN has said that the Security Council needs to meet immediately to vote on Boutros-Ghali. I believe that is a horrendous trap, it will be the summit of diplomatic stupidity if the Security Council meets immediately for the United States to veto Boutros-Ghali's extension. Then we will need to elect a new man. There is no acceptable candidate presented or even imagined. France will veto any candidate that is not perfectly Francophone since the United Nations is a bilingual institution according to its own statutes. All the names presented so far are objectionable in this regard. This is both dangerous and a bad process. (C)

The alternative would be not to vote right away, to allow three or four weeks for those concerned to discuss this situation. The United States would probably not want to veto before talking to Mubarak and two or three other leaders at the presidential level, at least by phone. Or if the President wants to bring Mubarak, me and others to Washington for a couple of hours, I am ready. I suggest you wait a few weeks, even if there is still no agreement. There will be plenty of time for U.S. veto. (C)

What is the way out? Boutros-Ghali is not happy. He did not expect that the U.S. would take such a firm stance. I had warned him of the problem, recalling that when I was in Washington three years ago, when I was still mayor of Paris, and I met with Senator Dole just after seeing President Clinton, I had an experience that underlined Boutros-Ghali's problems. I was received in Dole's office by a young lady who told me that there was a governor still meeting with Dole and that I would need to wait a few minutes. In chatting with her, she said "Ah, you support Boutros-Ghali; you should know that whatever happens, we will have his skin." I knew then that Boutros-Ghali was in trouble. But he told me that he thought it was not serious and that he had the best possible relations with the Americans. Then

your position hit him over the head. The best solution is a two-year extension. This could be negotiable. But to throw him out after one more year could cause worse damage for the U.S. image. You cannot be the nation that runs everything in the world. You cannot take decisions sole on the basis of domestic considerations. Personality issues have a considerable impact on your image. When I met with the head of the OAS, the only time he got agitated was when we were discussing this matter. No one outside of the United States can understand your position. If you use your veto -- and this is up to President Clinton alone -- it should not be done in a hurried fashion. Allow some time to inform Mubarak and others. There could be nothing worse than for Madeleine Albright to call an immediate meeting of the Security Council and an immediate veto. (C)

Anthony Lake: This is not just Madeleine Albright's position but that of the U.S. Government. The President said in his speech to the UN that our position was firm. The problem is a bit different than you describe, although I agree it is a terrible issue. We are between a rock and a hard place. The rock is the fact that our position is very unpopular, although we have received more encouragement from some other governments in recent weeks. (C)

President Chirac: Beware of what they are not telling you. (C)

Anthony Lake: The hard place is not strictly domestic politics. You are correct in describing Dole's view of Boutros-Ghali. He doesn't like him even though the President does like Boutros personally. The hard place is the fact that we are committed to the UN, yet we are in a position of being in arrears on our financial contributions. In our Congress, the UN is not at all popular, even though it is more popular with the American public. Spending money is not popular in general and particular on the UN. So we must be able to convince our Congress that the UN is worth investing in. And this means that it must be in the process of reform. While the Secretary General has done some good things and is a good diplomat, he has not thrown himself into UN reform. Therefore a change in leadership is necessary. (C)

Regarding the history of this matter, you will recall that Secretary Christopher went to Boutros-Ghali and explained that we had come to our position with some regret and that we would prefer to resolve the matter with dignity. We offered him a one-year extension, but he rejected it. It was not Madeleine Albright's press conference, but a New York Times article what unfortunately put the issue into the public debate. We would have preferred a private approach for all the reasons you have suggested. Where we are now is a position that will remain in

effect after the elections. It is not only Boutros-Ghali but foreign policy in general that did not come up in our elections. I am happy about this, since it means our foreign policy is strong enough not to offer any opportunities for the Republicans to run with. Regarding the timing, I will report what you say, but we need to work urgently to find a successor -- for the sake of the United Nations. I suggest we remain in close contact and work this issue through in the coming weeks. I will report to the President what you said. (C)

President Chirac: I am not personally involved. I just wanted to say that you have made a mistake. If you were willing to compromise, it would be better. Although I don't think we can find a compromise based on fewer than 2-1/2 years. If the issue ends up with a U.S. veto, it should not come without warning. This would not be in the U.S. interest. Bill Clinton should explain to those who are concerned, Mubarak, the Irish Prime Minister as EU President, and maybe others, what his objections are. But France will veto anyone who is not perfectly totally Francophone. Boutros-Ghali's Deputy, Kofi Annan, is an excellent Ghanaian, but he does not have the stature of a Secretary General, and he speaks French only poorly. (C)

Anthony Lake: Il parle mieux que moi. (C)

President Chirac: But he is not a Francophone. There may be one out there, but we can't have someone who is not capable of holding the job. (C)

Anthony Lake: We need to consult on possible names. (C)

President Chirac: As long as they are Francophone, just as Boutros-Ghali is. (C)

Anthony Lake: We have a lot of work to do, but this is the President's policy and not just Madeleine Albright's. (C)

President Chirac: I only said that she had made it into a personal affair and was very clumsy indeed. (C)

Anthony Lake: One might wish that our objective realities would change after November 5 but they won't. Let us stay in touch on this. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

November 7, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR *Anthony Lake*
~~ANDREW D. SENS~~

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from Lake's Meeting
with President Jacques Chirac of France on
November 1, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation which took
place on November 1, 1996, between Anthony Lake and President
Jacques Chirac of France.

RECOMMENDATION

authorize Andrew Sens to

That you *you approved* sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Conversation to the Department of State. *Yes* *No*

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 08 NOV 96

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW LAKE & PRES CHIRAC ON 1 NOV
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Report on Talbott/Fuerth Mission... (2 pages)	01/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
001b. report	Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth to POTUS and VPOTUS (5 pages)	01/24/1997	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
FRANCE

NATO

PERSONS: LEVITTE, JEAN-DAVID

SUBJECT: RPT ON TALBOTT / FUERTH MISSION & BERGER LEVITTE TALKS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 29 JAN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BERGER

LOGREF: 9700255 9700337

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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VICE PRESIDENT
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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'97 JAN 25 PM5:26

January 25, 1997

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1-27-97

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Report on Talbott/Fuerth Mission and Berger-Levitte Talks

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0755-M (1.15)
12/1/2017 KBH

Looks like - Plunk

Talbott/Fuerth Mission

Strobe and Leon returned from Moscow cautiously optimistic that Russia may finally be prepared to make progress in bilateral and NATO-Russia relations in the run-up to the Madrid NATO Summit in July.

The Russians did not use the talks to derail or delay NATO enlargement, which they now appear to accept as inevitable. This reflects, in large measure, Yeltsin's support for Chernomyrdin's firm control of the policy process, although Yeltsin's continued absence is troublesome. Far more than others in the Russian government (notably Primakov and Rodionov), they are focused on ways to reassure their own public in the face of NATO's eastward expansion.

In particular, the Russians are looking for "deliverables" on the security and diplomatic fronts that they can use at home to declare victory. In the security area, Strobe and Leon outlined our ideas on crafting a meaningful NATO-Russia consultative relationship, on modifying the CFE agreement and in other areas - ideas that may meet the Russians' domestic needs but which still protect and advance our interests and those of our allies and friends. On the diplomatic front, the Russians need to be seen playing a central, decisive role in shaping Europe's future. The Russians place primary importance on your summit with Yeltsin in March, where a final NATO-Russia deal, if there is one to be had, will be shaped. However, the Russians repeated their need for a "Big Five" meeting in Europe before Madrid; Strobe and Leon agreed only to revisit the question following your March meeting.

On the bilateral side, our team returned with a sense there may be steps we can take to encourage Moscow to push for START II ratification and commence START III discussions. At the same

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Classified by: Samuel R. Berger
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: X5, X6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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time, Strobe and Leon were concerned that Russia's improved control over inflation has not been matched by progress in promoting growth and investment. This will be at the top of the agenda in the upcoming Gore-Chernomyrdin discussions.

In order to keep up the momentum, we will be holding a Principals meeting this Tuesday to refine the ideas that Strobe and Leon tested on their trip. I will follow that up with a memo to you with any recommendations or decisions that are appropriate. In addition, we all believe it would be useful for you to call Chirac and Kohl this week to share the results of the trip and our current thinking. This will be especially useful with Chirac, who is to visit Moscow at the end of the week.

Berger-Levitte Talks

Shali and I held constructive talks last Friday with my French counterpart, Jean-David Levitte. The talks went a long way to establish an effective, respectful and warm channel of communication between Levitte and me. On one hand, there appeared to be greater convergence in our views about not postponing the Madrid Summit (contrasting with Strobe's recent encounter with Chirac on this subject).

On the other hand, there was no real movement in the French approach to their reintegration into NATO. They continue to define the "solution" in terms of AFSOUTH, rather than respond to a number of broader ideas that we put forward to highlight increased European (and French) leadership within NATO. I will continue to maintain my dialogue with Levitte, who is probably best positioned to move Chirac on this subject.

Attachment

Tab A Trip Report from Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth

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Friday, January 24, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: STROBE TALBOTT and LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Next Steps with Russia

Working the Problem in Moscow. Three days of intensive discussions with the Russian leadership have clarified our sense of how you both can use your upcoming encounters with Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin to achieve a breakthrough in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russia relations before the Alliance invites new members to join at the Madrid Summit in July.

Achieving your goal of reconciling the enlargement of NATO with the integration of Russia will be difficult. It will depend in large measure on the Russians' being able to meet us halfway. It will require keeping our Allies steady on the timetable for Madrid, come what may on the Russia track. Yeltsin's uncertain health is a troublesome and unpredictable factor. Nonetheless, we return home from our mission somewhat more optimistic about the prospects for success.

You asked us to probe the Russians' bottom line, to make sure they understand what we can and can't do, and to engage in joint brainstorming on possible solutions to the tough issues that are stymieing Russia's advance and hindering our efforts to help them along the way. Our discussions with Chernomyrdin, Presidential Chief of Staff Chubais, Foreign Minister Primakov and Defense Minister Rodionov were in that spirit. We were accompanied by a team from the NSC, State, the Pentagon, Treasury and ACDA. Our colleagues engaged in detailed, focused, non-polemical working sessions with their counterparts in the Russian government.*

Our conclusion is that, after three years of fighting the problem of NATO, the Russians may finally be prepared to join us in solving it. That is partly because they seem to have realized that despite their opposition to enlargement and their best efforts to derail

* We are providing copies of this memorandum to Secretaries Albright and Cohen, whose counterparts, Primakov and Rodionov, are eager to pick up where Chris and Bill Perry left off in December. Secretary Albright tentatively plans to meet with Primakov in about three weeks. That meeting will build on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in setting the stage for the Presidential meeting in March.

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the process, Madrid is a fixed point on the horizon — and on the calendar — and they must navigate accordingly.

From the Russians' perspective, what will happen in Madrid remains a thoroughly ugly fact. It frightens and angers them. But they are no longer devoting quite so much energy to trying to talk us out of enlargement, or to split us from our Allies. Nor are they quite so baldly threatening to restart the Cold War in retaliation for enlargement. Instead, they seem willing to accept the proposition that preserving strong U.S.-Russian ties and building a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship are of transcendent importance. They are groping for a way to insulate those relationships from what they see as the negatives of enlargement, particularly the fallout and backlash on their own home front.

The Russians also seem to accept, in its broadest form, our concept of a solution — the one we discussed in the Cabinet Room on January 16 when you gave us our guidance for this trip. They indicate that they're now willing to use the next couple of months to work out — first bilaterally, then on a NATO-Russia basis — a cluster of understandings on European security arrangements, political relations, arms control and economic cooperation that will address Russia's legitimate military concerns and also serve to anchor a reforming Russia in the community of democracies.

The devil, however, is not just in the details — it's in the fundamentals. Several of Yeltsin's advisers, including both Primakov and Rodionov, want to ban NATO from being able to move *any* troops or equipment (not to mention nukes) into Central Europe, and they want to write that ban into a legally binding agreement requiring parliamentary ratification. We feel we had some success in impressing upon them the absolute impossibility of those proposals. But we've got hard slogging ahead of us on both those points, and numerous other ones beside.

We suspect that if final decisions were in Primakov's and Rodionov's hands, we would not succeed in coming to closure on a NATO-Russia deal between now and July (or perhaps ever); we'd spend the next six months haggling, in vain, over the juridical status and the small print of the deal. But fortunately, Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin are now directly engaged on these issues. (While Yeltsin's engagement is severely limited for medical reasons, Chernomyrdin confirmed that he has a mandate to work the entire agenda.) The Russian President and Prime Minister don't care so much about the details. What they do care about — and we heard this quite explicitly from Chernomyrdin himself as well as from Chubais — is that they be able credibly to claim to their own people this spring that they have defended Russia's security and honor in the face of a looming development that their domestic political adversaries will characterize as a defeat and a humiliation. NATO enlargement presents Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin — two politicians who have had to struggle for survival against single-digit ratings — with a specter that is ostensibly military but that is really political: as the NATO Summit in Madrid draws closer, Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy will accuse the

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President and Prime Minister of having allowed the armor and missiles of a potential enemy to move within striking distance of the Motherland.[†]

To cope with this problem, the Russians are looking for counterbalancing facts. Specifically, they are hoping for favorable developments in the following areas:

European Security. The Russians seek a set of understandings that they can point to as, cumulatively, more positive than NATO enlargement is, from their standpoint, negative. They need, in other words, to be able to change the subject in their domestic debate. When their opponents say, "What about NATO enlargement? How could you let this happen?" Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin need to be able to say, "Look at what we've accomplished in the following half dozen ways so that Russia is safer and more influential."

Our challenge is to hammer out with them measures — and here the devil *is* in the details — that give them something they can declare as a victory but that also protect and advance our interests, along with those of our Allies and those of the Central Europeans and the non-Russian former Soviet republics, whose independence and democratic aspirations are, for us, nothing less than a sacred trust. We outlined to the Russians our ideas about how to craft a positive NATO-Russia relationship; we have come home with some specific thoughts on how we might move forward in CFE and elsewhere, and we will be pressing ahead to refine these in coming days.

The Diplomatic Spotlight. The Russian leaders say they need — and Yeltsin personally needs — to be perceived as playing a central, decisive role in resolving the larger question of Europe's future.

This is where summitry comes in, both bilateral and multilateral. Virtually everyone we saw made the point that Russia attaches unique importance to its relations with the U.S.; indeed, that Russia's relations with the U.S. are more important than its relations with any other country or with NATO as a whole.

That's good. It translates into leverage. It means that, for all our differences, we and the Russians agree that the crucial meeting in the busy, suspenseful months ahead is the one in March with you, Mr. President. If there is to be a NATO-Russia deal, its main ingredients will have to be cooked there.

But they say they need more than that. They need a diplomatic spectacular — a Big Five — along the lines of what Kohl and Chirac are pushing. We believe that you adopted exactly the right position on that subject when we met January 16: we register

[†] One of the more interesting comments we heard (and there were plenty!) came from Chubais, the boldest and most pro-Western reformer at the top of the Kremlin hierarchy. When asked why, in contrast to Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov, Lebed — the most popular figure in Russian politics — was taking a milder, or at least more ambivalent position on NATO enlargement, Chubais said: "Precisely because Lebed is so popular, he can afford to be more relaxed." Translation: Yeltsin is not popular enough to be relaxed on this subject.

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our doubts, but we don't slam the door on the possibility. We revisit the question after we see how the March meeting goes.

In parallel with our efforts to get the Euro-security question right, we have the opportunity to push forward on some key bilateral issues, including START and our economic interaction. We should not take these steps as "compensation" for Russia's tacit acceptance of enlargement. Progress on strategic arms control and economics is important in its own right. At the same time, such progress, if we can achieve it, can contribute to a more positive Russian mindset.

START. Maintaining a START II force will further strain the Russian economy. Moreover, currently anticipated levels of nuclear weaponry connote to the Russians (and to others) a level of warfighting potential inconsistent with the realities and policies of the post-Cold War era.

We return from Moscow with a sense that there may be steps we can take to increase the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin government's readiness to push for START II ratification and get on with START III. We will be working hard on this set of issues in the run-up to the GCC.

Economic Engagement and Integration. With tremendous effort and great political courage, the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin team has gotten inflation under control and done a good job of managing macroeconomics far better than we might have reasonably imagined three years ago. They now fully recognize that Russia's fate depends on investment and economic growth.

Unfortunately, the judgment of the experts on our team is that there's neither a quarterback nor a gameplan for economic growth. Chernomyrdin appears to have been consumed by the task of organizing and securing political support for financial discipline by fighting the day-to-day battles of making ends meet in Russia's revenue-starved budget. Neither he nor any member of his team appears to be leading the way toward growth. We should not underestimate Chernomyrdin, but it is not clear that he realizes the gravity of the problem. On this subject (as on others), we believe he will listen to you, Mr. Vice President, more attentively than to anyone else.

We also believe we must intensify our attempt to provide a psychological setting that rewards Russian progress to date and enhances Yeltsin's and Chernomyrdin's stature in the eyes of the world community. This means stepping up efforts to help guide the Russians into world organizations such as the WTO, and it includes the extremely potent symbolic step of Russia's permanent graduation from Jackson-Vanik.

Your very willingness to keep engaging Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin on economics is an important stimulus that should help them to rise above the short-term political exigencies of their budgetary battles and to formulate a vision for growth that will lock in Russia's economic prosperity.

Next Steps. We have laid out here an ambitious and complicated agenda. It faces numerous obstacles, many deeply embedded on the Russian side. While somewhat more hopeful than we were a week ago, we must recognize that in the end, we may not

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be able to get to "yes" with the Russians. Yeltsin's health and the disorganization that was once again so apparent to us in his government may preclude the breakthroughs we're looking for. But we should still do all we can to work the problem; we must satisfy ourselves and our Allies that we've made every effort.

Our team will be working hard in the coming days to make sure that you have at your disposal the widest array of options.[‡] We are not prejudging what use you should make of the measures and initiatives that we'll be putting before you. Those judgments should await the GCC.

But your own personal involvement in the period immediately ahead will be crucial. For example, Mr. President, we urge that you be in direct contact with Chirac, Kohl and Major to keep them in lock-step with us on the diplomatic calendar and to press them to press their own bureaucracies to be more imaginative in CFE.

We suggest that you, Mr. Vice President, write a letter to Chernomyrdin as quickly as possible, laying out in broad terms a summary of the whole set of proposals we've made to date, together with our argumentation for each and our overall strategic vision. That will give him a chance to ponder our current position in our terms rather than seeing it refracted through his own bureaucracy (which includes a number of figures — some of whom we dealt with this week — who don't particularly want to get to "yes"). Then, depending on Chernomyrdin's posture when he comes to Washington, we can decide whether, in what combination, and in what sequence to employ the ideas we refined in Moscow this week and the options that we'll be generating through our own interagency process.

[‡] We will have separate reports on security, arms-control and economic issues ready for you at the beginning of the week.

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001. memo	re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin... (7 pages)	02/07/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
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TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: CHERNOMYRDIN, VICTOR

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PM CHERNOMYRDIN 7 FEB

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 11 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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Z 97021019 FOR DECISION
X 97021120 KERRICK APPROVED RECOMS
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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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002 970211 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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National Security Council
The White House

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 11, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin (C)

Attached is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin for the information of the Secretary of State. It should also be disseminated on an EYES ONLY basis, and no lower than the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. It may also be transmitted to our embassy in Moscow EYES ONLY for the Ambassador. (C)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 02/07/07

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin: March Summit, GCC Results, European Security, START, Economics

PARTICIPANTS:	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Russia</u>
	The President	Prime Minister
	The Vice President	Chernomyrdin
	Erskine Bowles	Ambassador Vorontsov
	Jim Steinberg	Deputy Foreign Minister
	Strobe Talbott	Mamedov
	Leon Fuerth	Chernomyrdin Aide Petelin
	Jim Collins	
	Steve Pifer	

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 7, 1997, 1:25-2:20 p.m.
The Oval Office

(After the President greeted the Prime Minister and his party, there were three pool sprays -- for remarks by the President and Prime Minister, see February 7 press release. The meeting began once the press cleared the room at 1:45 p.m.)

The President: I hope you are having a good visit. (U)

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin: Yes. (U)

The President: I am really looking forward to my meeting with Boris. I think we have some really helpful ideas -- on START, economics and CFE. I know Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov will meet, so we are going to be spending a lot of time preparing for the March meeting. It would be helpful if you gave me an update. (✓)

The Vice President: Mr. President, Viktor Stepanovich will want to give you his summary. If I may, I think we made tremendous progress on a package on economic issues that you and President Yeltsin can announce in March. We are doubling our investment assistance to facilitate a flow of investment into Russia. The

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Classified by: Joyce A. Harmon
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/07/07

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Russians will be taking steps to remove impediments to investment. Our experts will meet. (C)

If things go well, we will have something on START. We had a good discussion, and our experts will continue to discuss this. I believe START III guidelines may help to resolve the START II ratification problem. We presented our ideas on ABM/TMD demarcation and hope for progress there. (C)

We will discuss NATO-Russia questions at our next meeting. We have a package: a charter, changes to the CFE Treaty, our commitment on no nuclear weapons in countries that may join NATO -- no intent, reason or plan to deploy. These ideas, we believe, are forthcoming, and we will have more detailed discussions. (C)

But you will be pleased with the Commission's results. We are moving forward in all eight committees; in each area, we have made dramatic progress. Viktor Stepanovich solved the problem on the space station, and Dan Goldin is smiling now. (C)

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin: I can only add to what Al said. This is the Commission's eighth session. We have worked three years now. There are concrete results. As I mentioned yesterday, we have come to know each other and understand each other. Now we can go out and make decisions. Nothing else will produce success, and I think we will be successful -- on a host of issues not just the space issue. (C)

We are cooperating on investment in Russia, particularly in the agricultural sector. In terms of what we did today in the health sector, this is fantastic. Much awaits us in the future. We are looking at a lot of issues; look, for example, at what we introduced on the environmental focus on production facilities. If we did not have good relations, we could not accomplish much. But our contacts have a lot of meaning. Our colleagues meet and solve problems. (C)

The Vice President: In the last year, diphtheria cases in Russia are down 70 percent, in part as a result of the work of the health committee. There are hundreds of examples. (C)

The President: It is interesting to me that other nations see this Commission and ask for commissions as well. There is no example like it in the history of diplomacy -- systematic diplomacy with everything on the table. (C)

The Vice President: Unfortunately for me, there are many examples now! (laughter) (C)

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The President: This is a tribute to the Vice President and you. There is a lot of trust by people in those with whom they have worked, in part because of your honesty. This is a gift to our successors. It is an amazing thing. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin: In our relations, there are a lot of novel ideas. And now there is a lot of pressure -- we have commissions with China and France. I told Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin that we need another Chernomyrdin! (laughter) (Ø)

The President: You could spend all of your time working with people from other countries. You would then be able to do nothing for your own people. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: I am very satisfied with our Commission. It has now been working for three years. The President of the United States is starting a new term, and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is starting his second term. I think there are good prospects for relations between us. (Ø)

I know what people expect, not just a good Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission but preparations for the summit. The process is starting with this Commission. Then there will be your summit. The Europeans then expect a "Big Five" -- whether or not that occurs will be your decision. But this is all part of a process, and it is a very important process. The question is what will the United States decide. (Ø)

I believe we are doing a responsible job for our two countries. We have raised issues of security to a high level. Today we are concerned. We are not talking about confrontation with the West, although some are trying to stoke the fires into confrontation. We do not like NATO enlargement to the east. It concerns the Russian people internally; it is of greatest concern. (Ø)

But there are other important issues: economic, creating a new system, reform and the economy. We are reforming the roots of the economy, the very way people live. People are not accustomed to doing this or that, but we are in the middle of a creation. People are sitting on the fence; they are not quite over the threshold. And the opposition will take advantage of anything. The opposition would like to change the whole regime. Any guy who wants to get up and calls to throw everyone out. The Communists are still there. (Ø)

But I am convinced that the process is almost at the point where it cannot be reversed. We need four more years. We cannot explain to people; they simply get bollixed up. So we say we have expressed our concerns and have problems. (Ø)

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Three years ago, who could have believed us when we said we could get macroeconomic stability, reduce inflation and make the ruble convertible? We have brought inflation down by a factor of 47 in our country. Seventy percent of domestic production now comes from stock companies and individual and small businessmen. People who took ownership are now beginning to understand how to manage it. As for private ownership, all were used to collective ownership. At first they did not know what to do. Now, after three years, there is a lot of movement, more than in any other country. That is why when people start talking radically about these concerns, it gets people excited. I do not want to exaggerate, but there is some internal danger. We have to come to decisions. (S)

The President: I will do everything I can to minimize that risk. I understand what the problem with START II is and how important it is to accelerate START III and get a timetable. I hope I will have a proposal for Boris. No one wanted an agreement that would have Russia spend a lot of money and build new missiles. (S)

As for NATO enlargement, we will keep working to see what we can do to reassure the people of Russia and to ensure Russia a leadership role in European security. I hear you. (S)

I also believe that you have made remarkable progress over the last three years. We will work hard to make this continue. Is there anything else you have? (S)

The Vice President: He and I need to get into the details and address his concerns. I wish we had time to go through every outcome; I can get more done in one day in the Commission than in six weeks at my desk. We set goals and review results six months later. I have picked up Viktor's technique (slams fist on table) and say do it! (S)

The President: You could make money as a political consultant!
(S)

The Prime Minister: Perhaps when they throw me out of office, then I can be a consultant! Regarding START, we will task Mamedov and Talbott to start working up some ideas, but right now the whole thing is linked up with NATO. There are 23 Duma representatives here and an anti-NATO group in the Duma. We have to find some solutions. (S)

For the Madrid summit, they talk about extending invitations to new members but not yet accepting them in; the decision to take them in takes another two years. Is that right? All seem to think that in Madrid you will take in some three or four members, but that is not correct -- you will only extend invitations? (S)

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The President: Right, and they will be in in 1999. (S)

The Prime Minister: It is important to get that message out. The work of Albright, Talbott, Mamedov and Primakov is very important. We should get a START III accord, look at the levels and make sure that the ABM Treaty review is taken care of. All these issues have to be worked. There is still time to discuss them today. (S)

The Vice President: And on the plane to Chicago tomorrow. Mayor Daley will show us the city. (U)

The Prime Minister: I have never been to Chicago. (U)

Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov: The city of Al Capone. (S)

The President: And of Hillary! (laughter) (S)

The Prime Minister: Our economic discussion was very important. Secretary Rubin was there. (S)

The Vice President: And Larry Summers will go to Moscow about the time that Madeleine is there. (S)

The Prime Minister: You have made a very important proposal. That is what we need -- a push, an impulse. I have one more issue. I have a letter from Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin (hands over letter). On the G-7, he hopes that, since you are the chair, we can solve the problem and make it an Eight. We have got to cross the "t's" and dot the "i's" on this. But if nothing changes in the G-7, we'll still have the same. (S)

The Vice President: I might make a suggestion. Perhaps in our economic talks in the Commission, we could talk about economic decision-making and see if we can get at some of the problems that have prevented the Seven from becoming the Eight. (S)

The President: In Helsinki I want to make progress on all issues. We have proposals on economics, START, on preserving a leadership role for Russia in Europe, on adapting CFE. I think it is important that we make progress on all of these issues, including NATO-Russia. I want to emphasize what you said. If we issue invitations, it will take two years to work through and comply with the requirements. That is why the entry date is two years down the road. When we meet in Helsinki, the question will be: are they making progress on START, CFE, etc.? Russians will ask whether Russia is recognized as having a leadership role. The answers we need to these are "yes." (S)

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6

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The Vice President: On changing the Seven to an Eight, we need to resolve the NATO-Russia issue, so that the atmospheric at Denver are right. If we get the right atmospheric, it will be easier to resolve this (Seven to Eight) question at Denver. (S)

The Prime Minister: As we prepare for the March meeting, we will keep working in parallel on the NATO relationship. We are asking questions on legally binding and so on. The whole complex of issues are to be addressed. (S)

The Vice President: NATO is not the only issue. (S)

The Prime Minister: But everywhere we go, there will be an intersection with NATO. Still, we need to do START II and the economic issues. (S)

The President: Look at START II. If we can come forward with a concept showing we understand why people are reluctant to ratify START II without knowing what comes next and then come forward with a really good proposal, it seems to me that that will be evidence you can give the Duma to show that we do not have an anti-Russia tendency, that we want a community of democracies in which Russia plays a leading role. I am looking forward to March and am happy to come to Helsinki. Unfortunately, it will still be dark then -- only about eight hours of light. (S)

The Prime Minister: Now there is only six hours of light and 18 of darkness. I would like to raise one more issue, that is a proposal from Boris Nikolayevich that we look to hold a discussion of the Eight in Moscow in 1998 on the energy issue, which is a world-class problem. Such a session on energy -- it is a very timely issue, no less important than the nuclear issue last year. Of course, I am an energy man. (S)

The Vice President: The answer: natural gas! (laughter) (S)

The President: I am open to that. (S)

The Vice President: We had one difference in our negotiations. When we discovered the difference, we noted that in the United States tailors have an expression: "measure twice, cut once." The equivalent Russian saying is: "measure seven times, cut once." Viktor Stepanovich got frustrated a bit and complained that some of his people were saying "measure seven times, then measure some more." (laughter) (S)

The Prime Minister: Thank you. Good-bye, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

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7

-- End of Conversation --

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0840

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 10, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD L. KERRICK

FROM: STEVE PIFER ^{SP}

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of conversation of the
February 7 meeting between the President, the Vice President and
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth ^{SP for}

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the Harmon-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting
the memorandum of conversation to Secretary Albright, Deputy
Secretary Talbott and Charge Tefft in Moscow.

Approve Disapprove

2. That the attached memorandum of conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Harmon-Burns Memorandum

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 2/07/07

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SUBJECT: PRES / PRES YELTSIN JOINT STATEMENTS

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National Security Council
The White House

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MEMORANDUM OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

Key/Don

YOU WERE CALLED BY- YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Bob Dalton

OF (Organization)

DOS

PLEASE PHONE FTS AUTOVON

647-1660

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Was in Helsinki Fri. w/ Fred
I had an arrangement re
photos of (2) docs signed by the
2 pgs. - Russians want them
now... pls. call -

RECEIVED BY DATE TIME
342

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

YOU WERE CALLED BY- YOU WERE VISITED BY-

OF (Organization)

PLEASE PHONE FTS AUTOVON

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Bob Dalton
5420

RECEIVED BY DATE TIME

National Security Council
The White House

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>Ⓟ 3/24</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓟ 3/24</u>	<u>D</u>

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MEMORANDUM OF CALL

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(Organization)

PLEASE PHONE FTS AUTOVON

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE
Bob Dalton

RECEIVED BY DATE TIME

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MEMORANDUM OF CALL

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TO *Key Don*

YOU WERE CALLED BY YOU WERE VISITED BY

Bob Dalton

OF (Organization) *DOS*

PLEASE PHONE FTS AUTOVON

647-1660

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE
*Was in Helsinki Fri. w/ Fred
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photos of (2) docs signed by the
2 pgs - Russians want them
now - pls. call -*

RECEIVED BY DATE TIME
342

50383-111 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 OPTIONAL FORM 383 (Rev. 1-64)
U.S. G.P.O.: 1964-300-891/00003 Prescribed by GSA

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

President Clinton and President Yeltsin discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. They stressed the commitment of the United States and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the Convention.

The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the United States be a party when the Convention enters into force in April of this year, and is strongly urging prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

Mindful of their special role and responsibility in the matter of chemical disarmament, the United States and Russia understand that their participation in the Convention is important to its effective implementation and universality.


The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in chemical disarmament.

The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



Helsinki

March 21, 1997

JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision-making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.


President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



Helsinki

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT ON U.S.-RUSSIA ECONOMIC INITIATIVE

President Clinton and President Yeltsin have committed to a joint initiative to stimulate investment and growth in Russia, deepen U.S.-Russian economic ties and accelerate Russia's integration with global markets. In so doing, the Presidents underscored the vital importance of bold measures to complete Russia's historic transformation to a market economy. This transformation is in the mutual interest of the United States and Russia -- to meet the aspirations of the Russian people for a more secure and prosperous future, and to encourage trade, investment and new jobs in both countries. Both Presidents affirmed their commitment to achieve the vast potential of U.S.-Russian economic cooperation.

The Presidents discussed recent economic developments in their countries and objectives for the future. The process of unprecedented transformation of Russia into a democratic nation that respects private ownership and the principles of a free market is continuing. In the past five years, a once non-existent private sector has emerged to produce 70 percent of Russia's national income and employ 55 percent of the Russian workforce. With basic market structures now formed, markets, not the state, increasingly allocate resources and drive prices and business decisions. Private banks, capital markets and commodity exchanges are emerging as the new institutions underpinning Russian economics. Inflation has been sharply reduced, and Russia has begun to enter international capital markets. Taking into account these changes, the United States and Russia will consider problems connected with the regulation of trade between the two countries, take steps to increase access to each other's markets, and establish the appropriate conditions to extend Most Favored Nation status to Russia on a permanent and unconditional basis.

President Yeltsin outlined Russia's plans to enact and implement a new legal regime that convincingly demonstrates Russia's commitment to attracting foreign and domestic investment. His highest economic priority is a tax regime that both meets the revenue needs of the Russian government and stimulates legitimate business, including actions on the value-added tax, excise tax, and both corporate and individual income taxes. Russia will act to pass a new tax administration law that

clarifies authorities, responsibilities, fines and the ability to resolve disputes. In the energy sector, measures will be taken to pass legislation that brings into full force Russia's Production Sharing Agreement law and provides the authority to develop PSA fields. New efforts will be made to ratify the U.S.-Russia bilateral investment treaty. The Presidents committed to deepen cooperation to fight economic crime. President Yeltsin highlighted his plans to consolidate the rule of law and to strengthen Russian legislation aimed in particular at combating money laundering and organized crime. President Yeltsin stressed the importance of the quick adoption of a new criminal procedure code. He will pursue the substantial completion of this agenda by the end of 1997. Further, the Presidents committed to work together to meet the challenge of attracting investment in order to utilize the vast human and natural resources that Russia possesses.

President Clinton stated that U.S. Government agencies will maximize support under their programs to finance American investment in Russia. U.S. efforts will include intensified efforts for project finance, political risk insurance and investment funds through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; expanding financing for transactions involving equipment exports through the Export-Import Bank that will result in capital investments in the Russian economy; and additional investments through the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund.

The Presidents applauded plans announced by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to launch a regional investment initiative that will attract resources to key regions, including the Russian Far East, to demonstrate the impact of joint efforts on policy reform and investment finance and to create new channels of commercial cooperation between regions in both countries. The United States and Russia recognize that Russian action on its economic agenda is key to building investor confidence and creating the demand needed to translate American financing into real investments in Russia. Toward this end, President Clinton is seeking additional funding in 1998 to expand U.S.-Russian economic cooperation, with a focus on tackling barriers to investment and doubling exchange programs between Americans and Russians, including the introduction of a new program to forge long-lasting connections between young, highly qualified individuals likely to emerge as influential leaders in future U.S. and Russian societies. The Presidents looked forward to the work of the joint Capital Markets Forum, which will bring together public and private sector participants to support the rapid development of Russia's capital markets.


Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin affirmed that cooperation to integrate Russia's economy into the global economic system

represents one of their most important priorities. The United States and Russia will intensify their efforts to accelerate Russia's integration into the international economic community. The Presidents set as a target that both sides would undertake best efforts for Russia, on commercial conditions generally applicable to newly acceding members, to join the World Trade Organization in 1998, and to join the Paris Club in 1997 assuming agreement on conditions of membership. Together, the United States and Russia will define tasks which need to be accomplished and set targets for their completion in order to achieve this objective. They also count on making considerable progress toward Russia's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The Presidents agreed that Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin should broaden and intensify the work of the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation. The Presidents welcomed the Commission's efforts to move beyond cooperation between federal governments to foster regional and local ties between the peoples of their countries. They noted the Commission's important achievements in the fields of trade and investment, energy, environment, health, defense conversion, agriculture, space, and science and technology. They recognized the Commission's leadership role in carrying forward bilateral relations into the twenty-first century.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin expect that as the century turns, their joint initiative will result in a strategic economic partnership between the United States and Russia that will decisively strengthen bilateral ties and positively shape changes in the world economy. They look forward to a prosperous and market-oriented Russia as a full partner in the premier organizations that will define economic and trade relations for the twenty-first century. This will allow Russia to take its place among the community of nations contributing to a new international economic order where open markets and free trade foster global prosperity and the well-being of American and Russian citizens alike.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



Helsinki

March 21, 1997

**JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY**

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

-- The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

-- Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

-- Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

-- Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

-- The scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States-Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty -- the obligation not to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode -- the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence-building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems are:

- The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.
- The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.
- The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.
- The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher-velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

William J. Clinton

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Yeltsin

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

**JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS
IN NUCLEAR FORCES**

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

- Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.
- Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and

organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

- Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.
- Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.


The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.


The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



Helsinki

March 21, 1997

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9702023

REFERRAL

DATE: 24 MAR 97

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

BOB DALTON / 5420 MAIN STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

SOURCE: UNKNOWN

DATE: 21 MAR 97

SUBJ: PRES / PRES YELTSIN JOINT STATEMENTS

REQUIRED ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:



FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9702023
DATE 21 MAR 97

SUBJECT: PRES / PRES YELTSIN JOINT STATEMENTS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>ORIGINAL+1</u>	

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBV Date: 12/1/2017
2015 - 0755 - M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Ste ↓
Case Number: 2006-1363-F; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1629				
Document ID: 9704655				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

SEE ↓
Case Number: 2015-0781-M; 2015-0755-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1631				
Document ID: 9704913				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1633				
Document ID: 9705135				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to President Clinton (2 pages)	06/26/1997	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
001b. letter	President Clinton to Prime Minister Drnovsek (2 pages)	06/00/1997	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1633

FOLDER TITLE:

9705135

2015-0755-M
rs1316

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9705135
RECEIVED: 23 JUL 97 17

TO: DAVIES

FROM: BURNS, W

DOC DATE: 05 AUG 97
SOURCE REF: 9712660

KEYWORDS: SLOVENIA
HS

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM DR DRNOVSEK RE NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: NO REPLY NECESSARY PER FLANAGAN DUE DATE: 04 AUG 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FLANAGAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSHNARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9705135

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 FRIED
002
002 BRADEN
002

Z 97072317 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
Z 97080607 RECD STATE COMMENTS
Z 97080607 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 97081409 NO REPLY NECESSARY PER FLANAGAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9705135
RECEIVED: 23 JUL 97 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: DRNOVEK, JANEZ

DOC DATE: 26 JUN 97
SOURCE REF: 9712660

KEYWORDS: SLOVAK REPUBLIC
HS

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES DRNOVESK OF REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA LTR RE NATO EXPANSION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER

DUE DATE: 04 AUG 97 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FRIED

Flanagan

FOR CONCURRENCE

MCELDOWNEY
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO

BOUCHARD
COVEY
FEELEY
FORT
MALLEY
MILLISON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

No further action recommended. President wrote to Drnovsek in June and saw him in Madrid. (See enclosures)

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KBM/NARA, Date 12/11/2017
2015-0755-M

Classification

5135

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9712660

DATE August 5, 1997

FOR: Mr. Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: _____
FROM: EUR/NCE - Brad Freden
DATE: 8/1/97
SUBJECT: 9712660 - Ltr to President from Dr. Janez Drnovsek

WH Referral Dated: 7/11/97
NSC ID# (if any): _____

_____ The attached item was sent directly to Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- _____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- _____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: OBE - POTUS spoke with Drnovsek in Madrid.

Charles G. Jackson, Jr.
Office of the
Executive Secretary

Dr. Janez Drnovsek

Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia

5135

9712660

Ljubljana, June 26, 1997

Dear Mr. President,

I should like to thank you, first of all, for your valued letter which I received on June 17 of this year in which you acknowledge, on the one hand, the great progress the Republic of Slovenia has made these years in various areas, including good economic results, while on the other hand, you confirm your decision to give support to three countries only, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, in their accession talks for the first round of NATO enlargement at the approaching NATO summit meeting in Madrid.

You can rest assured, Mr. President, that we respect your decision and appreciate your endeavours for the successful development of NATO, as well as for the strengthening of stability in Europe. Allow me to reiterate that Slovenia's accession to NATO would enhance stability, democracy and better relations among nations, particularly in the southeastern part of Europe, and this fact has also been acknowledged by many European NATO member states.

I am sure you are aware that the great majority of European NATO member states, as well as Canada, have given support to the Republic of Slovenia for its early accession to the enlarged NATO. They recognize that the Republic of Slovenia is capable of meeting the objective criteria set for accession and of bearing its own share of the cost involved in the NATO accession process. I believe that in the event the USA supported now, prior to the Madrid meeting, the candidacy of the Republic of Slovenia for the first round of enlargement, such a decision would not meet with any disapproval or other reservations on the part of NATO member states; it would rather create a realistic possibility for reaching a compromise solution. Apart from that, Slovenia's entry into NATO would dissipate any thoughts about NATO enlargement being directed against Russia and the former Warsaw Pact.

If I may, Mr. President, I should also like to stress the fact that along with the considerable support expressed by European NATO member states, Slovenia also enjoys the support of a large number of USA senators and congressmen, as I was able to ascertain during my several meetings with various representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives. I have gained the impression that they consider the Republic of Slovenia a serious candidate for the first round of NATO enlargement and that such a decision would not create any problems for the ratification of the future treaty.

The President
The White House
Washington D.C.

As you would certainly know, many senators and congressmen recognize that the Republic of Slovenia has made, along with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the greatest progress in various areas, and they, as I mentioned, support its candidacy for the first round of NATO enlargement. Let me note that this position on the inclusion of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted and confirmed by the Senate in the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, and that 81 senators cast their votes in favor of it. Similar support was given to our country by the House of Representatives, where this Act received the votes of 353 members of Congress. Last but not least, five senators (Mr. Roth, Mr. Lott, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Lieberman) in their recent letter stated expressly their determination to support the candidacy of the Republic of Slovenia for the first round of NATO enlargement, and a day later, i.e. on June 11, several other senators joined them as well. All of this reinforces my conviction that the Republic of Slovenia has wide enough support in the USA, and especially in the Senate and Congress, that its inclusion in the first round of NATO enlargement would be met with approval.

Even though you have already stated your decision to support only three NATO membership candidates for the first round of enlargement, I think, Mr. President, that with your valuable assistance a compromise solution incorporating the Republic of Slovenia into the above mentioned group of candidates for an enlarged NATO could still be found prior to the Madrid meeting, and it is my firm belief that such a decision would be welcomed by your European partners and Canada as well. I am aware that such a solution predominantly depends on the USA and on you personally, and the Republic of Slovenia, which considers the USA a friendly and a partner country, would highly appreciate and treasure it.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that even though we have only a few days left until the NATO summit meeting in Madrid, it is still possible to find a solution that will be acceptable and satisfactory to all parties concerned.

In the assurance of receiving your understanding, I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jozef Duvnjak". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

PHOTOCOPY
MISC. HANDWRITING

Dr. Janez Drnovsek

Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia

5135

S/S 9712660



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 11, 1997

Memorandum for: Mr. Glyn T. Davies
 Executive Secretary
 National Security Council Staff
 - The White House

Subject: Alerting NSCS on Presidential Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Clinton from
Slovenian President Janez Drnovsek

which is transmitted for your information. This correspondence was received in the
Records Management Division of the Executive Secretariat on 7/11/97.

A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Chief, S/S-RMD
Records Management Division
Executive Secretariat
(202) 647-0053

JUL 14 10:24

June '97 letter

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciated the opportunity to consider your letter concerning Slovenia and NATO enlargement. As I said during our meeting in New York, I greatly value the enormous progress Slovenia has made under your capable and wise leadership. I also am very much aware of and respect your country's deep-felt wish to be one of the countries invited to begin accession talks at the NATO Summit meeting in Madrid next month.

My decision to support three countries to begin NATO accession talks this year was taken after careful consideration. Let me make clear that my decision is not a rejection of Slovenia's NATO aspirations nor of Slovenia. Slovenia is on the right track and I remain deeply impressed by your new country's achievements: Slovenia's strong and stable democracy, Slovenia's recent progress in deepening cooperation with European institutions and with its neighbors, Slovenia's increasing willingness to extend security to Europe's troubled countries such as Albania and Bosnia, and Slovenia's commitment to provide appropriate resources to its military.

These factors, and my confidence in the Slovenian people's determination to continue on a reformist, democratic course, reinforce my commitment to work with you to support Slovenia's progress toward the goal we share -- Slovenia's increasingly close integration with the western community of nations and its institutions, including NATO.

NATO enlargement is a process, not a one-time event, and our commitment to maintain the momentum of NATO enlargement is unshakable. Beginning with my first NATO summit meeting in January 1994, the United States has urged that NATO "enlarge steadily, deliberately and openly," and I continue to be a committed advocate for a new NATO that will be the strong foundation of security for a united and peaceful European continent, embracing all of Europe's democracies. Maintaining an open door to future enlargement is an absolutely essential element of our approach, and I am determined to see that this commitment is reflected in the decisions we make in Madrid.

I look forward to working together to strengthen U.S.-Slovenian dialogue and partnership, and to advance Slovenia's integration into western institutions, including NATO. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Janez Drnovsek
Prime Minister of the Republic
of Slovenia
Ljubljana

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1633				
Document ID: 9705153				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: The President's Working Lunch with President Roman Herzog of Germany (10 pages)	07/24/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. memcon	re: The President's Working Lunch with President Roman Herzog of Germany (10 pages)	07/24/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1633

FOLDER TITLE:

9705153

2015-0755-M

rs1317

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 29 JUL 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
EUROPE EAST
ROMANIA

MEMCON
NATO
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS: HERZOG, ROMAN

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & GERMAN PRES HERZOG ON 24 JUL 97

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 30 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY



DATE

7/29

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DAVIES
001
002

Z 97072814 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
X 97072911 DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
X 97072911 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970729 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5153
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (RBS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>K</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 7/28/28</u>	_____
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>G 7/29</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(R) 7/28</u>	<u>(OK)</u>
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUL 28 AM 11:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

DLK -
 Recommend you
 sign. (R)

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5153
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>h</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>Ⓜ 7/28 w/224</u>	_____
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>G 7/29</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓜ 7/28</u>	<u>OK</u>
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

97 JUL 28 AM 11:18

*DLK -
Recommend you
sign. Ⓜ*

Exec Sec Office has diskette U

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


5153

July 29, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and German President Herzog on July 24, 1997 (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the working lunch between the President and President Herzog is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to the Embassy in Bonn for the Chargé d'Affaires only. (C)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 7/25/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Working Lunch with President Roman Herzog of Germany (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vice President
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
J.D. Bindenagel, Chargé, Embassy Bonn
John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Roman Herzog, President
Matthias Wissmann, Minister of Transportation
Dr. Werner Hoyer, Minister of State
Wilhelm Staudacher, State Secretary
Jürgen Chrobog, Ambassador to the United States
Professor Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Coordinator of German American Cooperation
Dr. Christoph von Rohr, Executive Director, New Germany Länder Industrial Investment Council
Johanna Quandt, BMW Executive
Steffi Graff, Tennis Professional

DATE, TIME July 24, 1997, 12:30-1:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: State Dining Room, The White House

The President: I know many people spent time in Germany as Fulbright scholars. I knew Senator Fulbright very well, and I know how his program changed the lives of the participants. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1,5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 7/24/07

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0755-m (1.20)
12/1/2017 KBH

President Herzog: We were discussing on the way to lunch the many new opportunities in the world for communication. But nothing can replace personal contacts between people. We need to adapt our systems of education so that German universities become more attractive again for American students. This will be the subject of my next important speech. (U)

The President: I will support you on that. We will do what we can to support exchanges. It was on a foreign exchange program that I met Strobe Talbott 29 years ago. We studied in England together. For almost 30 years, my mother felt that he had been more successful than me as a result of the experience. (U)

President Herzog: Mothers often underestimate the prospects of their sons. (U)

The President: She just thought it was better that he was writing books than entering politics. The Vice President here has had the best of both worlds in this regard. (U)

President Herzog: I would like to return to our previous discussion and ask for your impressions about your visit to Central and Eastern Europe. (U)

The President: My overwhelming impression from my stops in Warsaw and Bucharest -- as well as previous visits to Budapest and Prague -- is that the people in the region are still in love with their freedom. They want to be accepted by the West and its institutions. I think it was a good thing that we decided to extend NATO membership to Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary. It would not have been a good thing if we had offered membership to five countries. In Poland I was met with a big crowd and lots of enthusiasm. As for Romania, the conclusion I draw is that we did the right thing in not inviting them to join NATO just yet. Their per capita income is less than one-half of Poland's. To meet their military responsibilities in NATO, they would need to spend five or six percent of their GDP. They should not do that at this point. (U)

It was right for me to visit Bucharest. There were over 100,000 people in the streets. I suggest that you or Chancellor Kohl visit Romania as well. We all need to organize a sustained effort to support their reform program. President Constantinescu is very impressive. His whole team is under 40 years old, with lots of experience in Western Europe or the United States. They are very committed to reforms. They know that reforms initially lead to a down turn in the economy. They had hoped that an invitation to NATO would help convince the public not to lose heart. Romania is very important, as is

Slovenia. We should offer them the chance to join NATO in two years if they keep going in the direction they are now pursuing. We need to help keep their spirits up. Romanians are a very emotional people. The level of intensity and passion in the streets was amazing. I am very hopeful about the overall situation. That part of Europe looks good to me. (C)

President Herzog: I agree with much of what you just said. I have the same impression about the situation. The Romanian people are optimistic. They are willing to work hard. The best thing we can do is to help them economically and give them the feeling that they belong to the West and will be included in our community. The issue is very much psychological. For Germany, of course, this will be an enormous task. Each individual East European country expects us to help them. We will continue to do everything we can, and we are not seeking German domination. It is important that the United States realize that we are not turning our backs on the Western Alliance, but that it is in our interest to support Eastern Europe as part of the fulfillment of our obligations to the Alliance. I don't think you, as President, misunderstand this, but there have been some questions raised about Germany shifting its attention away from Western Europe to the East. We belong to the West. We want to help these countries find their way back into the West European community, since this is in our common interest. (C)

The President: Germany has done more than its fair share in this regard. You have borne the heavy cost of integrating Eastern Germany and you have been very generous in your approach to Russia, when other countries were more skeptical about the prospects for reform there. People used to make fun of Chancellor Kohl and me, claiming we were too close to Boris Yeltsin. We said that he was the only Russian president we had and that he had stood up for freedom. I feel very grateful for German leadership in absorbing the enormous burden of Bosnian refugees. I am trying to persuade the Congress to do more in terms of non-military investments around the world. Lots of our Congressmen have a different view, arguing that we should not be spending more on foreign aid. Some of these are frankly isolationist -- they argue that the Cold War is over and we should forget about our world role. Therefore, we have an ongoing debate aimed at changing the attitudes of the American people and Congress. Small amounts of money can have a huge impact in helping people in Poland and the rest of Central Europe, and in maintaining our partnership in support of peace in Bosnia. You may meet with some people here who say that Europe should take on more responsibility and even take over the effort in Bosnia. But you can say that Germany has done its part to keep the world going in the right direction. (C)

President Herzog: I am very happy that you see it that way. Germany is a prosperous country and will continue to do what it can to help others. The Bosnian refugees represent a problem of enormous proportions. Solving the problem of their return is a major challenge. We are trying to handle this in a careful and humane way. The question boils down to one of financial costs. We could use the same money that we are paying to assist the refugees in Germany to help them build new houses and return home. (Ø)

The President: One of the biggest problems in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement is the question of refugee return and resettlement. I agree that it would be less expensive to help them build houses and go home. If we wait several more years to do this, it will be almost impossible to send the refugees home. We are now working on an agreement, with which I believe Congress will go along, to permit 300,000-400,000 refugees from Central American countries -- Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala -- to settle permanently in the United States. They left 10-15 years ago with the intention of returning. Yet now they have put down roots, had children, married American citizens, so we need to resettle them here. (Ø)

President Herzog: That is indeed the problem. In the future we will have similar waves of refugees from other conflicts. Therefore, we need to return the refugees from Bosnia so that we can be in a position to assist the future refugees. Since 1945, Germany has seen repeated waves of refugees -- from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is important to return refugees and, in the case of the Bosnia refugees, to do so in time to make way for the next wave. (Ø)

The President: Are you in favor of NATO forces taking more aggressive action against people who are resisting refugee returns? (Ø)

President Herzog: That is a very difficult question. The situation varies from one place to another within Bosnia. It is my personal conviction that, if rules are established, we should make sure that they are implemented. But you cannot compare the situation in one place in the former Yugoslavia with that in another. We will need to do a very specific analysis. (Ø)

Minister Wissmann: We have tried to get help to the people of Bosnia by sending new railway cars to Sarajevo. Five months later, however, these new cars have not been put into service. The leaders in Pale want 50 percent and we have been in continuing negotiations. This is just the case of railway cars, and not refugees. The question is whether these kinds of problems can be resolved without force. (Ø)

President Herzog: These are not new problems for the people there. Over the centuries, they have established ways of behavior and it is difficult for us to fully understand the situation. I wouldn't dare to make a general assessment. (✓)

The President: Much of the problem relates to the leadership of each of the ethnic groups today. A fair reading of history shows that they lived peacefully together for many of the last thousand years. In the last few decades, they lived peacefully together in and around Sarajevo. It was only a few years ago that they started shooting each other. This is a sobering fact as we consider how to handle our own people. Our country is becoming more diverse daily. Our culture is becoming very different, with different ethnic and racial blends. It is a great challenge for democracies. We cannot lead the world if we cannot keep our own people together. We need to show that we can live in harmony among many ethnic groups. In five years, our largest state, California, will have no majority race. Today, that is true only in Hawaii. Six major cities have schools in which there are children from over 100 ethnic backgrounds, and soon that will apply to twelve cities. We need to move away from the situation in Bosnia, the Middle East and Northern Ireland, where people are robbing the young generation of their future because their parents and grandparents will not give up their old hatreds. This is largely a question of leadership. (✓)

President Herzog: For decades in Germany, we have had schools where the majority of students are not Germans. So far we have managed to deal with the situation with flexibility. Our state schools have received more teachers to help to deal with minorities. So far this system has worked well in integrating these children, especially when they enter schools at a young age. It is much harder to integrate foreigners who enter the schools when they are 12, 13 or 14 years old; these people are having trouble finding jobs. We have made an effort to ensure that all children who want to receive an education enter schools by age six. Our only real problems are with Turkish families. Among the Turks, some youths are not fully integrated. There are also some problems between the Turks and Kurds. On the whole, the Turkish residents have achieved a lot and have been successful in starting businesses. They are very creative and industrious people; they even work on weekends. We have limited flexibility because we don't have a strong central government in Germany. I don't know if this is a similar problem in the United States. (✓)

The President: So far we have been able to take in successive waves of immigrants going back to the end of the last century. There has never been a real multi-ethnic democracy anywhere else

in the world. In Russia they have many different groups, but they do not live together, rather in separate enclaves. I think the United States will make it, but this is an extraordinary challenge. With respect to the Turks, what do you think is the best way to handle their aspirations for integration into Europe? (Ø)

President Herzog: Recently the leaders of several Christian countries said that Turkey could never be a member of the European Union because it is an Islamic country. I personally think that is wrong. I believe that we should take in any country that does not mix politics and religion. If the Turkey of Ataturk were to disappear, I would have a problem. But the criterion that the European Union has applied has been that a country should resolve problems of national minorities before it can join the EU. Also, I would not like to see a country joining us around the table in Brussels that has not yet gotten rid of torture. But I think that Turkey should be included in the EU in the future, if it meets our conditions. (Ø)

This will be a very hard question. It relates to the East-West situation and affects peoples all the way down to the Black Sea. Whenever I talk to Presidents from Central Asia or the Caucasus, within three minutes they are taking out their maps and talking about problems of railroads, natural gas pipelines. Each one has his own special interest. The most difficult question for Turkey is how to deal with the Kurdish issue. If you go from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, there you find the Russians; on the other side, you find the Bulgarians and the Romanians who want their share of the economic opportunities. I'm not only interested in Europe; I have traveled a lot in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions and I am very aware of how, in historical terms, a lot of difficulties affecting Europe have originated in those regions. To change the subject, I would like to ask you about the situation in Ukraine. I have a feeling that, no matter how you look at the question, Ukraine is pivotal to the European situation. (Ø)

The President: I agree with your assessment of the importance of Ukraine. If one looks at Ukraine and Turkey, both countries with 60 million people, one can see that they have great strategic importance in their neighborhood. Turkey has an impact not only on Central Asia and Europe, but on the Middle East and on the whole question of the future of Islam. What happens in Turkey will affect how the Muslim region will regard itself in the future. One reason why the United States bends over backwards to help Turkey is because it is our hope that the hundreds of millions of people in the other Islamic countries can find a way to work with the rest of us on the basis of mutually acceptable norms. (Ø)

With respect to Ukraine, I like President Kuchma very much. He knows how to get things done. But he also has lots of problems. The problems that we might face are less than one-hundredth as bad as the problems that Kuchma faces every single day. My concern is that in Ukraine there could be a victory of the old guard because the country is so close to Russia and because there is an ethnic problem, with the large number of Russians within Ukraine. In Poland, Walesa lost to Kwasniewski, a former communist, yet no one seriously worried about Poland going back to communism. But there is a chance of this happening in Ukraine. A reversal in the elections could bring back the old communists. This would be somewhat ironic, if Russia were still a vibrant democracy. It could stimulate renewed nationalism in Russia -- not Yeltsin, but the leaders who may be in power 30 years from now. For these reasons, it was very important for Kuchma to have an agreement with NATO. Germany was very supportive in achieving that. If I could return to my point about Romania, all former communist countries have to go down before they go up. You know this very well from your experience with Eastern Germany. Poland is now a different place than it was three years ago. It has really turned the corner, but I am very worried about Ukraine. (S)

The Vice President: Kuchma has appointed a very good new Prime Minister. The two of them are personally close, they come from the same region, and they are both committed to reform. But Kuchma has a terrible parliament, led by the Speaker Moroz. I once told Kuchma jokingly that we would trade our Speaker for Moroz. (S)

The President: I wouldn't agree with that exchange. (S)

The Vice President: That is one of the few issues on which the President and I disagree. (S)

Samuel Berger: Moroz probably wouldn't accept the deal. (S)

The Vice President: The outcome of the next Ukrainian elections in two years will be very critical. (S)

The President: The parliamentary elections are next year. (S)

The Vice President: That's right, and the next presidential election is in two years. I believe that they have a fighting chance to gain enough momentum to escape the gravitational pull of the past. (S)

The President: I believe this too. Ukraine is a great country, but its economy was so fully integrated into the former Soviet Union that they have a long way to go. (S)

The Vice President: They have a big crime problem. The privatization process has gone much slower than it should. They still have too much of their economy in government hands. (S)

President Herzog: In spite of all of this, I am not resigned to the possibility that Ukraine will go the same way as Belarus. (S)

The President: I agree. Unlike Belarus, there is a strong underlying impulse for independence in Ukraine, and they have an economic potential that Belarus lacks. (S)

The Vice President: Ukraine's relations with Poland will be very important. (S)

President Herzog: You are quite right. This is the second place that will determine the fate of Europe. (S)

Minister Hoyer: Was Poland open to you on this question? (S)

The President: Very much. They want to do all they can for Ukraine. They feel the problem and have a big interest in helping their neighbor retain its independence. They were very supportive of completing the NATO-Ukraine agreement before NATO enlargement began, so that there would be an equilibrium. (S)

Strobe Talbott: Poles also want to preserve Ukraine's unity as well as its independence. They are aware of the ethnic split between the Ukrainians and Russians and would not want to be left with a smaller Ukraine run by ultra-nationalists. (S)

The Vice President: They are forming a joint Polish-Ukrainian military force that can serve as a bridge between an expanded NATO and Ukraine. (S)

The President: When I was in Madrid, it was unfortunate that the differences among the allies on NATO expansion became so public. We may bear some responsibility for this, perhaps. The way that Chancellor Kohl handled it at the meeting was the decisive thing in bringing us to a common position. I did not want the meeting to look like a confrontation between the United States and France. The issues were more complicated than that. We are very worried about the stability and independence of the Baltic states, as are Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Chancellor Kohl said what he did in the right way. This led to the right decision on expansion, one that admitted three while calling for an aggressive development of our relationship with Slovenia and Romania. (S)

Strobe Talbott: I should mention that it was Foreign Minister Kinkel who proposed the reference to the Baltic states in the communique. That was very helpful. (S)

President Herzog: Thank you very much. I must say that I have long known what Chancellor Kohl can do. (S)

The President: Some people think that I now have a method of running in like a bull dog and knocking down the door, and then letting Chancellor Kohl clean things up. (S)

The Vice President: I would like to raise one delicate issue before we leave. Your visit here is seen as very significant because it underscores our common desire to give forward momentum to our bilateral relationship. In that spirit, it would be wise for me to mention a problem that must be dealt with by both countries in a wise manner. We need to coordinate our approaches to Iran. This issue has the potential to generate a lot of bad feelings and disagreements. We believe that it is important to hold firm to actions and policies that encourage change within Iran. There is a power struggle going on between Khatemi and Khamenei on how to divide up authority between them. But it is clear that foreign policy will remain under Khamenei. It is only through unified Western determination that we will have a chance to bring about a change in Iranian behavior. This issue will be very important to U.S.-German relations. (S)

President Herzog: Thank you. It is not I who decides our policy on this issue. (S)

The President: One final word. In the years since I have been President, the relationship between the United States and Germany has been absolutely fundamental to our ability to achieve our common objectives. This is especially the case in the way we supported democracy in Russia, efforts to get the Russian troops out of Baltic states, arms control agreements and many other things. Our partnership was crucial to the success that we have achieved in Bosnia. Chancellor Kohl has helped me worked through my relations with France and other West European countries. I know that one of the reasons that you came was to intensify the interest of Americans in more personal contacts with Germany. These contacts are fairly extensive on the private side, but I would like to be helpful in getting more members of Congress to visit Germany. I want to compliment you for including Steffi Graff in your delegation. This will intensify interest among younger people in the German-American relationship. We need to appeal to the young people. (S)

There have been a series of issues on which the U.S. and Europe have been on different sides. Our only disagreement with

Germany was over the handling of climate change at the Denver Summit. This was very painful for me. I would do anything for Chancellor Kohl -- even jump off this building -- since he has done so much for the United States. I know there is a feeling in the European press that the United States has decided to go off on its own. They cite the way that we handled NATO expansion and climate change, together with the fact that our Congress does not want to pay all of our UN dues. The French have fed this feeling of U.S. arrogance. All that I can tell you is that I have supported a strong European Union, a European defense identity within NATO, and the expansion of the European Union. On occasions there will be differences, but I have no interest in trying to use the fact that, at the moment, we are doing well economically. I have to deal with an isolationist Congress, but my goal is not to throw our weight around. I favor partnership. Our biggest success in Europe is represented by what has happened in Russia. This is the result of the U.S.-German partnership. It would not have happened if one or the other of us had not been engaged. Therefore, I invite you to treat us as friends with whom you can be honest and not to see us as a country that is trying to be both isolationist and arrogant at the same time. I regret how some of the issues played out, but please understand that I see our future in continued partnership, shared responsibility and shared decisionmaking. I am very thrilled to support the larger human mission of your trip. (Ø)

President Herzog: I am very grateful for your remarks. I personally never doubted that you felt that way. Of course, there are misunderstandings that are played up by the media. This happens from time to time. I think that both sides would be well advised to coordinate their public statements and to take into account the sensibilities of the other side. But the fundamental position is that both of us want the same things. To achieve our common goals, we need more contacts. There is a problem with our parliaments, they are not visiting each other regularly and we should work against this. But the decisive thing is our young people. If we get a 60 year-old parliamentarian to work for the transatlantic relationship, this will be useful for another ten years. If we persuade a 30 year-old to do so, this will be beneficial for the next 40 years. In this regard I should note that Steffi Graff is not yet 30 years old. Please rest assured that as long as I am President, I will be working toward these ends. After all, I grew up in the American zone in occupied Germany. (Ø)

The President: John Kornblum will be coming to Bonn soon, just as soon as he receives Senate confirmation. We also want to get our new embassy built in Berlin. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

July 25, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and President Herzog of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
working lunch between the President and German President Herzog
on July 24, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be
filed for the record.

Approve g769 Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and German President Herzog on July 24, 1997 (e)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the working lunch
between the President and President Herzog is provided for the
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) level. It may also be sent to the Embassy in Bonn for the
Chargé d'Affaires only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Working Lunch with President Roman Herzog of Germany (x)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Vice President
 Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
 Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Leon Fuerth, ~~National Security Advisor for the Vice President~~ Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
 J.D. Bindenagel, Charge, Embassy Bonn
 John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
 Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
 Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Roman Herzog, President
 Matthias Wissmann, Minister of Transportation
 Dr. Werner Hoyer, Minister of State
 Wilhelm Staudacher, State Secretary
 Jürgen Chrobog, Ambassador to the United States
 Professor Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Coordinator of German American Cooperation
 Dr. Christoph von Rohr, Executive Director, New Germany Länder Industrial Investment Council
 Johanna Quandt, BMW Executive
 Steffi Graff, Tennis Professional

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 24, 1997 12:30-1:30 p.m.
State Dining Room, The White House

The President: I know many people spent time in Germany as Fulbright scholars. I knew Senator Fulbright very well and I know how his program changed the lives of the participants. (U)

Classified by: Glyn T. Davis

President Herzog: We were discussing on the way to lunch the many new opportunities in the world for communication. But nothing can replace personal contacts between people. We need to adapt our systems of education so that German universities become more attractive again for American students. This will be the subject of my next important speech. (U)

The President: I will support you on that. We will do what we can to support exchanges. It was on a foreign exchange program that I met Strobe Talbott 29 years ago. We studied in England together. For almost 30 years, my mother felt that he had been more successful than me as a result of the experience. (U)

President Herzog: Mothers often underestimate the prospects of their sons. (U)

The President: She just thought it was better that he was writing books than entering politics. The Vice President here has had the best of both worlds in this regard. (U)

President Herzog: I would like to return to our previous discussion and ask for your impressions about your visit to Central and Eastern Europe. (U)

The President: My overwhelming impression from my stops in Warsaw and Bucharest -- as well as previous visits to Budapest and Prague -- is that the people in the region are still in love with their freedom. They want to be accepted by the West and its institutions. I think it was a good thing that we decided to extend NATO membership to Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary. It would not have been a good thing if we had offered membership to five countries. In Poland I was met with a big crowd and lots of enthusiasm. As for Romania, the conclusion I draw is that we did the right thing in not inviting them to join NATO just yet. Their per capita income is less than one-half of Poland's. To meet their military responsibilities in NATO, they would need to spend five or six percent of their GDP. They should not do that at this point.

(c)

It was right for me to visit Bucharest. There were over 100,000 people in the streets. I suggest that you or Chancellor Kohl visit Romania as well. We all need to organize a sustained effort to support their reform program. President Constantinescu is very impressive. His whole team is under 40 years old, with lots of experience in Western Europe or the United States. They are very committed to reforms. They know that reforms initially lead to a down turn in the economy. They had hoped that an invitation to NATO would help convince the public not to lose heart. Romania is very important, as is

Slovenia. We should offer them the chance to join NATO in two years if they keep going in the direction they are now pursuing. We need to help keep their spirits up. Romanians are a very emotional people. The level of intensity and passion in the streets was amazing. I am very hopeful about the overall situation. That part of Europe looks good to me. (✓)

President Herzog: I agree with much of what you just said. I have the same impression about the situation. The Romanian people are optimistic. They are willing to work hard. The best thing we can do is to help them economically and give them the feeling that they belong to the West and will be included in our community. The issue is very much psychological. For Germany, of course, this will be an enormous task. Each individual East European country expects us to help them. We will continue to do everything we can, and we are not seeking German domination. It is important that the United States realize that we are not turning our backs on the Western Alliance, but that it is in our interest to support Eastern Europe as part of the fulfillment of our obligations to the Alliance. I don't think you, as President, misunderstand this, but there have been some questions raised about Germany shifting its attention away from Western Europe to the East. We belong to the West. We want to help these countries find their way back into the West European community, since this is in our common interest. (✓)

The President: Germany has done more than its fair share in this regard. You have borne the heavy cost of integrating Eastern Germany and you have been very generous in your approach to Russia, when other countries were more skeptical about the prospects for reform there. People used to make fun of Chancellor Kohl and me, claiming we were too close to Boris Yeltsin. We said that he was the only Russian president we had and that he had stood up for freedom. I feel very grateful for German leadership in absorbing the enormous burden of Bosnian refugees. I am trying to persuade the Congress to do more in terms of non-military investments around the world. Lots of our Congressmen have a different view, arguing that we should not be spending more on foreign aid. Some of these are frankly isolationist (✓) they argue that the Cold War is over and we should forget about our world role. Therefore, we have an ongoing debate aimed at changing the attitudes of the American people and Congress. Small amounts of money can have a huge impact in helping people in Poland and the rest of Central Europe, and in maintaining our partnership in support of peace in Bosnia. You may meet with some people here who say that Europe should take on more responsibility and even take over the effort in Bosnia. But you can say that Germany has done its part to keep the world going in the right direction. (✓)

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The President: Much of the problem relates to the leadership of each of the ethnic groups today. A fair reading of history shows that they lived peacefully together for many of the last thousand years. In the last few decades, they lived peacefully together in and around Sarajevo. It was only a few years ago that they started shooting each other. This is a sobering fact as we consider how to handle our own people. Our country is becoming more diverse daily. Our culture is becoming very different, with different ethnic and racial blends. It is a great challenge for democracies. We cannot lead the world if we cannot keep our own people together. We need to show that we can live in harmony among many ethnic groups. In five years, our largest state, California, will have no majority race. Today, that is true only in Hawaii. Six major cities have schools in which there are children from over 100 ethnic backgrounds, and soon that will apply to twelve cities. We need to move away from the situation in Bosnia, the Middle East, and Northern Ireland, where people are robbing the young generation of their future because their parents and grandparents will not give up their old hatreds. This is largely a question of leadership. (✓)

President Herzog: For decades in Germany, we have had schools where the majority of students are not Germans. So far we have managed to deal with the situation with flexibility. Our state schools have received more teachers to help to deal with minorities. So far this system has worked well in integrating these children, especially when they enter schools at a young age. It is much harder to integrate foreigners who enter the schools when they are 12, 13 or 14 years old; these people are having trouble finding jobs. We have made an effort to ensure that all children who want to receive an education enter schools by age six. Our only real problems are with Turkish families. Among the Turks, some youths are not fully integrated. There are also some problems between the Turks and Kurds. On the whole, the Turkish residents have achieved a lot and have been successful in starting businesses. They are very creative and industrious people; they even work on weekends. We have limited flexibility because we don't have a strong central government in Germany. I don't know if this is a similar problem in the United States. (✓)

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This will be a very hard question. It relates to the East-West situation, and affects peoples all the way down to the Black Sea. Whenever I talk to Presidents from Central Asia or the Caucasus, within three minutes they are taking out their maps and talking about problems of railroads, natural gas pipelines. Each one has his own special interest. The most difficult question for Turkey is how to deal with the Kurdish issue. If you go from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, there you find the Russians; on the other side, you find the Bulgarians and the Romanians who want their share of the economic opportunities. I'm not only interested in Europe; I have traveled a lot in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions and I am very aware of how, in historical terms, a lot of difficulties affecting Europe have originated in those regions. To change the subject, I would like to ask you about the situation in Ukraine. I have a feeling that, no matter how you look at the question, Ukraine is pivotal to the European situation. (Ø)

The President: I agree with your assessment of the importance of Ukraine. If one looks at Ukraine and Turkey, both countries with 60 million people, one can see that they have great strategic importance in their neighborhood. Turkey has an impact not only on Central Asia and Europe, but on the Middle East and on the whole question of the future of Islam. What happens in Turkey will affect how the Muslim region will regard itself in the future. One reason why the United States bends over backwards to help Turkey is because it is our hope that the hundreds of millions of people in the other Islamic countries can find a way to work with the rest of us on the basis of mutually acceptable norms. (Ø)

With respect to Ukraine, I like President Kuchma very much. He knows how to get things done. But he also has lots of problems. The problems that we might face are less than one-hundredth as bad as the problems that Kuchma faces every single day. My concern is that in Ukraine there could be a victory of the old guard because the country is so close to Russia and because there is an ethnic problem, with the large number of Russians within Ukraine. In Poland, Walesa lost to Kwasniewski, a former communist, yet no one seriously worried about Poland going back to communism. But there is a chance of this happening in Ukraine. A reversal in the elections could bring back the old communists. This would be somewhat ironic, if Russia were still a vibrant democracy. It could stimulate renewed nationalism in Russia -- not Yeltsin, but the leaders who may be in power 30 years from now. For these reasons, it was very important for Kuchma to have an agreement with NATO. Germany was very supportive in achieving that. If I could return to my point about Romania, all former communist countries have to go down before they go up. You know this very well from your experience with Eastern Germany. Poland is now a different place than it was three years ago. It has really turned the corner, but I am very worried about Ukraine. (S)

The Vice President: Kuchma has appointed a very good new Prime Minister. The two of them are personally close, they come from the same region, and they are both committed to reform. But Kuchma has a terrible parliament, led by the Speaker Moroz. I once told Kuchma jokingly that we would trade our Speaker for Moroz. (S)

The President: I wouldn't agree with that exchange. (S)

The Vice President: That is one of the few issues on which the President and I disagree. (S)

Samuel Berger: Moroz probably wouldn't accept the deal. (S)

The Vice President: The outcome of the next Ukrainian elections in two years will be very critical. (S)

The President: The parliamentary elections are next year. (S)

The Vice President: That's right, and the next presidential election is in two years. I believe that they have a fighting chance to gain enough momentum to escape the gravitational pull of the past. (S)

The President: I believe this too. Ukraine is a great country, but its economy was so fully integrated into the former Soviet Union that they have a long way to go. (S)

The Vice President: They have a big crime problem. The privatization process has gone much slower than it should. They still have too much of their economy in government hands. (S)

President Herzog: In spite of all of this, I am not resigned to the possibility that Ukraine will go the same way as Belarus. (S)

The President: I agree. Unlike Belarus, there is a strong underlying impulse for independence in Ukraine, and they have an economic potential that Belarus lacks. (S)

The Vice President: Ukraine's relations with Poland will be very important. (S)

President Herzog: You are quite right. This is the second place that will determine the fate of Europe. (S)

Minister Hoyer: Was Poland open to you on this question? (S)

The President: Very much. They want to do all they can for Ukraine. They feel the problem and have a big interest in helping their neighbor retain its independence. They were very supportive of completing the NATO-Ukraine agreement before NATO enlargement began, so that there would be an equilibrium. (S)

Strobe Talbott: Poles also want to preserve Ukraine's unity as well as its independence. They are aware of the ethnic split between the Ukrainians and Russians and would not want to be left with a smaller Ukraine run by ultra-nationalists. (S)

The Vice President: They are forming a joint Polish-Ukrainian military force that can serve as a bridge between an expanded NATO and Ukraine. (S)

The President: When I was in Madrid, it was unfortunate that the differences among the allies on NATO expansion became so public. We may bear some responsibility for this, perhaps. The way that Chancellor Kohl handled it at the meeting was the decisive thing in bringing us to a common position. I did not want the meeting to look like a confrontation between the United States and France. The issues were more complicated than that. We are very worried about the stability and independence of the Baltic states, as are Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Chancellor Kohl said what he did in the right way. This led to the right decision on expansion, one that admitted three while calling for an aggressive development of our relationship with Slovenia and Romania. (S)

Strobe Talbott: I should mention that it was Foreign Minister Kinkel who proposed the reference to the Baltic states in the communique. That was very helpful. (Ø)

President Herzog: Thank you very much. I must say that I have long known what Chancellor Kohl can do. (Ø)

The President: Some people think that I now have a method of running in like a bull dog and knocking down the door, and then letting Chancellor Kohl clean things up. (Ø)

The Vice President: I would like to raise one delicate issue before we leave. Your visit here is seen as very significant because it underscores our common desire to give forward momentum to our bilateral relationship. In that spirit, it would be wise for me to mention a problem that must be dealt with by both countries in a wise manner. We need to coordinate our approaches to Iran. This issue has the potential to generate a lot of bad feelings and disagreements. We believe that it is important to hold firm to actions and policies that encourage change within Iran. There is a power struggle going on between Khatemi and Khamenei on how to divide up authority between them. But it is clear that foreign policy will remain under Khamenei. It is only through unified Western determination that we will have a chance to bring about a change in Iranian behavior. This issue will be very important to U.S.-German relations. (Ø)

President Herzog: Thank you. It is not I who decides our policy on this issue. (Ø)

The President: One final word. In the years since I have been President, the relationship between the United States and Germany has been absolutely fundamental to our ability to achieve our common objectives. This is especially the case in the way we supported democracy in Russia, efforts to get the Russian troops out of Baltic states, arms control agreements, and many other things. Our partnership was crucial to the success that we have achieved in Bosnia. Chancellor Kohl has helped me worked through my relations with France and other West European countries. I know that one of the reasons that you came was to intensify the interest of Americans in more personal contacts with Germany. These contacts are fairly extensive on the private side, but I would like to be helpful in getting more members of Congress to visit Germany. I want to compliment you for including Steffi Graff in your delegation. This will intensify interest among younger people in the German-American relationship. We need to appeal to the young people. (Ø)

There have been a series of issues on which the U.S. and Europe have been on different sides. Our only disagreement with

Germany was over the handling of climate change at the Denver Summit. This was very painful for me. I would do anything for Chancellor Kohl (even jump off this building) since he has done so much for the United States. I know there is a feeling in the European press that the United States has decided to go off on its own. They cite the way that we handled NATO expansion and climate change, together with the fact that our Congress does not want to pay all of our UN dues. The French have fed this feeling of U.S. arrogance. All that I can tell you is that I have supported a strong European Union, a European defense identity within NATO, and the expansion of the European Union. On occasions there will be differences, but I have no interest in trying to use the fact that, at the moment, we are doing well economically. I have to deal with an isolationist Congress, but my goal is not to throw our weight around. I favor partnership. Our biggest success in Europe is represented by what has happened in Russia. This is the result of the U.S.-German partnership. It would not have happened if one or the other of us had not been engaged. Therefore, I invite you to treat us as friends with whom you can be honest and not to see us as a country that is trying to be both isolationist and arrogant at the same time. I regret how some of the issues played out, but please understand that I see our future in continued partnership, shared responsibility, and shared decisionmaking. I am very thrilled to support the larger human mission of your trip. (✓)

President Herzog: I am very grateful for your remarks. I personally never doubted that you felt that way. Of course, there are misunderstandings that are played up by the media. This happens from time to time. I think that both sides would be well advised to coordinate their public statements and to take into account the sensibilities of the other side. But the fundamental position is that both of us want the same things. To achieve our common goals, we need more contacts. There is a problem with our parliaments, they are not visiting each other regularly and we should work against this. But the decisive thing is our young people. If we get a 60 year-old parliamentarian to work for the transatlantic relationship, this will be useful for another ten years. If we persuade a 30 year-old to do so, this will be beneficial for the next 40 years. In this regard I should note that Steffi Graff is not yet 30 years old. Please rest assured that as long as I am President, I will be working toward these ends. After all, I grew up in the American zone in occupied Germany. (✓)

The President: John Kornblum will be coming to Bonn soon, just as soon as he receives Senate confirmation. We also want to get our new embassy built in Berlin. (✓)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9705153
DATE 29 JUL 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & GERMAN PRES HERZOG ON 24 JUL 97
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9708124
RECEIVED: 01 DEC 97 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER
HILLEY, J

DOC DATE: 17 DEC 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
CONGRESSIONAL

EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STRATEGY FOR COMPLETING RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 06 DEC 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FLANAGAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9708124

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001 HILLEY, J
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 97120221 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
Z 97121121 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 97121712 FOR DECISION
X 98010615 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

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002 971217


VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

12/3
12/9
10am

8124

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG W A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	1	(P) 12/2	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	2	(D) 12/2 See Note	_____
Steinberg	3		_____
Berger	4		_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	5	TMA 12-17	Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen D Stem
Records Mgt.	6	(P) 12/31	N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: ~~DAB, SYF, AB, NEM, MER, SRB, JS,~~
~~MDH, ZMA, DEK, OTD, EAR~~

COMMENTS:

97DEC 20 6:20

Exec Sec Office has diskette ups _____

Log # 8124

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fr (2) To 803 Date 12/2

This paper comes from a mtg where we decided to place our kind-of event within a larger strategy... It does not take into account that while we seek a full court press in the zone, MKA, and the POTUS will see India/PAC for 10 days or so.

(10)

Fr _____ To _____ Date _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12/30/97

December 29, 1997

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached Berger/Hilley memo seeks your approval of a NATO enlargement strategy for early 1998.

John Podesta and Sylvia believe the strategy is sound, but think the specific scheduling proposals should be hashed out in the scheduling process to ensure coordination with other plans.

Rahm believes if the enlargement effort is likely to be successful, it should be a top priority for early 1998 to give you what the Chemical Weapons Treaty gave you in 1997 -- an early win.

Approve (subject to scheduling)

Disapprove

Discuss

Sean Maloney 

Copied
Berger
Hilley
Bowles

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

'97 DEC 17 PM5:09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12/30/97

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY *John Hilley*

SUBJECT: Strategy for Completing Ratification of NATO
Enlargement

Purpose

We are close to completing one of the most important transatlantic security initiatives since the Cold War: the enlargement of NATO. With a concerted effort by you and your national security team, a successful Senate vote could occur by mid-March. That outcome will boost the ratification efforts in other NATO states, send a strong signal of continuing U.S. commitment to Europe, reaffirm American leadership abroad, and build momentum for other administration initiatives. This memorandum describes the status of the process and proposes a strategy for your involvement in the final push for ratification. If you approve the strategy, we will work closely with your schedulers to determine which events will fit on your calendar.

BackgroundStatus of the Process

The individual protocols of accession, which will amend the Washington Treaty of 1949 to add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, were signed by Secretary Albright and her counterparts at the NAC Ministerial on December 16. NATO Ministers also approved studies on the military requirements and costs of enlargement. As we informed Congress -- to its relief -- these studies project lower costs than our earlier estimates.

The protocols must now be ratified by all 16 member states, including a two-thirds vote in our Senate. We expect all 16 allies, plus the three new states, to ratify by NATO's fiftieth anniversary in April, 1999.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The U.S. ratification effort is proceeding well. The Senate launched its process of advice and consent on October 7 with a set of hearings that generally were positive. Senators Lott and Helms, along with other key members in both parties, are now solidly in favor. The Senate NATO Observer Group, which has met with you and other key officials here and in Madrid, has been an important vehicle for building Senate understanding and support. Senate concerns over cost, Russia, and other issues have abated somewhat.

Despite these positive signs, we now must wage an energetic, visible effort to ensure that ratification succeeds. Many supporters, particularly Democrats, remain lukewarm. Clear signs of your personal commitment will be essential to nail down the necessary votes. Even if we have the needed two-thirds votes, we will face difficult battles over reservations on such issues as cost, Russia, NATO cohesion, war powers, and future rounds of enlargement. We must also address questions about the relationship between enlargement and post-SFOR, particularly as they relate to burdensharing and our continued commitment to European stability. We will want to harness the momentum on enlargement to help meet our post-SFOR goals. A strong, early show of your involvement can strengthen our hand for those battles and minimize the time you will need to spend on this just before the vote.

Proposed Strategy

Attached is a proposed calendar for our final ratification campaign. It builds on nation-wide administration efforts that have been underway since establishment of our NATO Enlargement Ratification Office in March. Our strategy for the final months is built on three key concepts: 1) a strong push by you in your State of the Union address and in a White House event immediately thereafter; 2) an intensive effort during February by your national security team and others to lay out the case for the public; and 3) home-stretch efforts to defeat objectionable amendments and obtain the necessary two-thirds vote.

1. Presidential launch. Your December 16 press conference was extremely successful in highlighting the issue of enlargement and demonstrating your personal commitment. In particular, your announcement of our intent to host the anniversary summit in 1999 gave important focus and momentum to the ratification effort. As a next step, you should give prominent mention to NATO enlargement in your State of the Union address on

12-30-97

January 27. Then, within the following week, you would host a major White House event with your national security team, former presidents, former secretaries of state and defense, and key constituency leaders (we now have support from ethnic, veterans, business, labor, religious, and human rights groups). You would transmit the treaty amendments to the Senate that same day. This launch would establish your personal investment in this effort while sending signals of broad, bipartisan support.

2. February campaign. During February, both the administration and outside, pro-enlargement groups would undertake a series of events to build on the momentum created by the White House launch. As the attached schedule indicates, these would include: speeches by Administration principals; positive statements by visiting European leaders (not only from the three invited states, but probably also from others in the region, such as Bulgaria); endorsements by retired U.S. military leaders; op-ed articles by European and American leaders; and Administration meetings with key Senators. We expect the Foreign Relations Committee to hold additional hearings (although perhaps only one) during late February, and other committees (Armed Services, Appropriations) may hold hearings as well.

3. Final efforts. We now have a clear majority on this issue in the Foreign Relations Committee, which may report out its resolution of ratification as early as the first week in March. Floor debate could begin immediately thereafter. Our focus at that point will be to obtain, to the extent possible, a "clean" vote, free of objectionable reservations. Lobbying by administration principals, combined with active support from the coalition of supportive groups, should make it possible to achieve this goal. We also have organized an instant response capability to coordinate administration reactions to events, press stories, and events on the Hill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the strategy described in this memorandum.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Calendar

NATO Enlargement: Ratification End-Game Calendar

Week of:	Pre-1/26	1/26	2/2	2/9	2/16	2/23	3/2	3/9-3/16
Theme:	Pre-Kick-off: Build momentum	Kick-off I: Begin launch in State of Union	Kick-off II: Complete launch at WH	Nat. Security: Stress benefits to the U.S.	Taking it to the public:	Hearings:	Europe's View:	Final push & victory:
Events:	<p>12/2 - NAC/D Ministerial</p> <p>12/16 - NAC Ministerial</p> <p>12/? - Briefing for SNOG staff on ministerials, studies</p> <p>TBD - Vets mid-winter mtgs: key admin officials talk to vets mtgs in DC</p> <p>TBD - Briefings for ethnic groups</p> <p>TBD - Press year-in-review pieces: work N+ into year-in-review stories</p> <p>1/? - Review transmittal w/ key Hill staff</p> <p>1/16 - Baltic Charter signing</p> <p>1/26 - AFL-CIO Endorse: Exec. Council adopts resolution</p> <p>TBD - Finish briefing books for Congress; publish pamphlet on NATO+ for public and press</p>	<p>1/22 - Finish transmittal: IWG agreement on documents to submit to Senate</p> <p>1/26 - Congress returns</p> <p>1/27 - State of the Union: POTUS stresses NATO+</p>	<p>2/2 (T) - WH Kick-off: POTUS w/ VP, Nat Security team; former POTUSs, SecStates/Def; constituency leaders; transmit to Senate</p> <p>2/4 - Military/vets endorsements: vets/MSO groups + retired mil. leaders to stress national security stakes</p> <p>2/3 - Albright speech? (T): in or outside of DC, stressing strategic rationale</p> <p>2/2-6 - Speeches by other principals, top retired military leaders (T)</p>	<p>2/? - POTUS Budget: POTUS sends budget to Hill; narrative stresses NATO+, lays out cost</p> <p>2/6 - SecDefs op-ed? Op-ed signed by one or more former SecDefs, stress nat security</p> <p>2/10 - Coalition press event: press conference by full NATO+ coalition; each part stress why they favor (business, labor, human rights, etc.)</p> <p>2/9-13 - Coalition op-eds: articles by different segments of the coalition stressing the case for NATO+ from their perspective</p>	<p>[2/14-22 - Senate on recess]</p> <p>2/16 - Talk radio blitz: WH event with talk radio hosts and key admin. officials to make case to the public</p> <p>2/17 - Ed board conference call: MKA or other official do conference call w/ ed boards</p> <p>[Administration pamphlet on NATO+ will have been distributed nation-wide by this point]</p> <p>TBD - compilation of outreach: have summary stats on extent of admin outreach on N+</p>	<p>2/24 - SFRC hearing (T): SFRC does only hearing with MKA, Cohen, and Gen. Shelton to lay out basic rationale</p> <p>3/3-8 - POTUS op-ed? (T): states rationale and asks for Senate support</p> <p>2/24-3/6 - SASC/SAC hearings?: focus on NATO+ costs; testimony by DoD</p> <p>2/25 - House event? (T): Event with House members stating support, stressing acceptance of cost</p>	<p>3/? - CEE leaders (T): leaders from 3 invited states (incl. Polish PM Buzek) and other CEE (e.g., Bulgarian Pres. Stoyanov) likely in DC, meet with key members; endorsements by visiting CEE leaders throughout this period.</p> <p>3/2-6 - Op-eds by European leaders (T): Op-eds in key papers by Blair, Kohl, Solana, etc. on need for NATO+</p> <p>3/5 - SFRC report: SFRC approves NATO+, adopts report stressing case for NATO+</p> <p>3/6 - Coalition event: NATO+ coalition press conf. to stress united front for ratification w/o harmful reservations</p>	<p>3/10 - Cabinet to Hill: MKA, others on nat sec team go to Hill; POTUS, VPOTUS, nat sec team calls to key Senators, as needed.</p> <p>3/10 (approx) - Floor debate begins: Lott, Helms, Biden kick off floor debate; stress reasons for support. Reservations considered and modified/defeated</p> <p>Final passage: POTUS press remarks same day</p> <p>Next day news conference and follow-up events: Admin officials do press conference, For. Press Center, stressing lessons learned from NATO+ debate. Articles by key officials follow drawing "lessons."</p>
Throughout: breakfasts/mtgs w/ Senators w/ POTUS, VPOTUS, SecState, SecDef, NSA, DepSecDef, as required								

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8124

December 1, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: DONALD BANDLER/STEPHEN FLANAGAN
ANTONY BLINKEN/MARA RUDMAN/JEREMY ROSNER

SUBJECT: NATO Enlargement Ratification Strategy

We are now approaching the closing weeks in our drive to ratify the enlargement of NATO. A Senate vote could occur by mid-March. As part of Administration plans for the final efforts on ratification, we earlier forwarded you a scheduling proposal for a White House kick-off event that would follow the State of the Union.

We believe it will be helpful for both the President and his schedulers if that event is placed in the context of a broader strategy for the final push toward ratification. Such a strategy is attached in the form of a memorandum to the President.

Concurrence by: Nancy McElroy

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Calendar

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER [ⓐ]
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Strategy for Completing Ratification of NATO
Enlargement

Purpose

We are close to completing one of the most important transatlantic security initiatives since the Cold War: the enlargement of NATO. With a concerted effort by you and your national security team, a successful Senate vote could occur by mid-March. That outcome will boost the ratification efforts in other NATO states, send a strong signal of continuing U.S. commitment to Europe, reaffirm American leadership abroad, and build momentum for other administration initiatives. This memorandum describes the status of the process and proposes a strategy for your involvement in the final push for ratification. If you approve the strategy, we will work closely with your schedulers to determine which events will fit on your calendar.

Background

Status of the Process

The individual protocols of accession, which will amend the Washington Treaty of 1949 to add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, were signed by Secretary Albright and her counterparts at the NAC Ministerial on December 16. NATO Ministers also approved studies on the military requirements and costs of enlargement. As we informed Congress -- to its relief -- these studies project lower costs than our earlier estimates. ✓

The protocols must now be ratified by all 16 member states, including a two-thirds vote in our Senate. We expect all 16 allies, plus the three new states, to ratify by NATO's fiftieth anniversary in April, 1999.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Strategy for Completing Ratification of NATO
Enlargement

Purpose

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Background

Status of the Process

The individual protocols of accession, which will amend the Washington Treaty of 1949 to add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, will be signed by Secretary Albright and her counterparts at the NAC Ministerial on December 16. By then, NATO will have approved studies on the military requirements and costs of enlargement. As we informed Congress -- to its relief -- these studies project lower costs than our earlier estimates.

The protocols then must be ratified by all 16 member states, including a two-thirds vote in our Senate. We expect all 16 allies, plus the three new states, to ratify by April, 1999.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The U.S. ratification effort is proceeding well. The Senate launched its process of advice and consent on October 7 with a set of hearings that generally were positive. Senators Lott and Helms, along with other key members in both parties, are now solidly in favor. The Senate NATO Observer Group, which has met with you and other key officials here and in Madrid, has been an important vehicle for building Senate understanding and support. Senate concerns over cost, Russia, and other issues have abated somewhat.

Despite these positive signs, we now must wage an energetic, visible effort to ensure that ratification succeeds. ~~In the wake of Fast Track, we cannot afford any doubts about either our resolve or the outcome. Moreover,~~ many supporters, particularly Democrats, remain lukewarm. Clear signs of your personal commitment will be essential to nail down the necessary votes. Even if we have the needed two-thirds votes, we will face difficult battles over reservations on such issues as cost, Russia, NATO cohesion, war powers, and future rounds of enlargement. We must also address questions about the relationship between enlargement and post-SFOR, particularly as they relate to burdensharing and our continued commitment to European stability. We will want to harness the momentum we have developed on enlargement to help meet our post-SFOR goals. A strong, early show of your involvement can strengthen our hand for those battles, minimize the time you will need to spend on this just before the vote, and generally protect your foreign policy prerogatives and those of your successors.

Proposed Strategy

Attached is a proposed calendar for our final ratification campaign. It builds on nation-wide administration efforts that have been underway since establishment of our NATO Enlargement Ratification Office in March. Our strategy for the final months is built on three key concepts: 1) a strong launch by you in your State of the Union address and in a White House event immediately thereafter; 2) an intensive effort during February by your national security team and others to lay out the case for the public; and 3) home-stretch efforts to defeat objectionable amendments and obtain the necessary two-thirds vote.

1. Presidential launch. According to this strategy, you would give prominent mention to NATO enlargement in your State of the Union address on January 27. Then, within the following week, you would host a major White House event with your national

security team, former presidents, former secretaries of state and defense, and key constituency leaders (we now have support from ethnic, veterans, business, labor, religious, and human rights groups). You would transmit the treaty amendments to the Senate that same day. This launch would establish your personal investment in this effort while sending signals of broad, bipartisan support.

2. **February campaign.** During February, both the administration and outside, pro-enlargement groups would undertake a series of events to build on the momentum created by the White House launch. As the attached schedule indicates, these would include: speeches by Administration principals; positive statements by visiting European leaders (not only from the three invited states, but probably also from others in the region, such as Bulgaria); endorsements by retired U.S. military leaders; op-ed articles by European and American leaders (including one by you); and Administration meetings with key Senators. We expect the Foreign Relations Committee to hold additional hearings (although perhaps only one) during late February, and other committees (Armed Services, Appropriations) may hold hearings as well.

3. **Final efforts.** We now have a clear majority on this issue in the Foreign Relations Committee, which may report out its resolution of ratification as early as the first week in March. Floor debate could begin immediately thereafter. Our focus at that point will be to obtain, to the extent possible, a "clean" vote, free of objectionable reservations. Lobbying by administration principals, combined with active support from the coalition of supportive groups, should make it possible to achieve this goal. We also have organized an instant response capability to coordinate administration reactions to events, press stories, and events on the Hill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the strategy described in this memorandum and the attached calendar.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Calendar

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Restricted Meeting with Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy (11 pages)	05/06/1998	P1/b(1) KGH 7/13/2018
001b. memcon	re: Restricted Meeting with Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy [incomplete copy] (3 pages)	05/06/1998	P1/b(1) KGH 7/13/2018
001c. memcon	re: Restricted Meeting with Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy [incomplete copy] (5 pages)	05/06/1998	P1/b(1) KGH 7/13/2018

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803271
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 98 17

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 14 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ITALY

PERSONS: PRODI, ROMANO

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PM PRODI OF ITALY ON 6 MAY

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 12 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BANDLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>SMD 5/14</u>	<u>D</u>

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 (D)

National Security Council
The White House

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Rice	<u>113</u>	<u>Ⓟ 5/13</u>	
Davies			
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Steinberg		<u>copy</u>	
Berger		<u>copy</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TS 5/14</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>SND 5/14</u>	<u>D</u>

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COMMENTS:

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3271

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 14, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the restricted meeting between the President and Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy, is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be transmitted to our Embassy in Italy, EYES ONLY for the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission. (S)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 05/08/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSNARA, Date 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9803271
DATE 14 MAY 98

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PM PRODI OF ITALY ON 6 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Initials: KBH Date: 12/1/2017
2015-0755-M

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 11, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR

~~GLYN T. DAVIES~~ *DONALD L. KERRICK* (K)

FROM:

DONALD K. BANDLER *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation of President's
Restricted Meeting with Prime Minister Romano
Prodi of Italy, May 6, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's restricted meeting with Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy on May 6, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

authorize Glyn Davies to

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Restricted Meeting with Prime Minister
Romano Prodi of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Robert Rubin, Secretary of Treasury
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Thomas Pickering, Acting Secretary
of State
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European
Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Romano Prodi, Prime Minister
Lamberto Dini, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ferdinando Salleo, Ambassador to the
United States
Roberto Nigido, Diplomatic Advisor to the
Prime Minister
Silvio Fagiolo, Chief of Staff to the
Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 6, 1998 10:50am - 11:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Congratulations on the achievement of monetary union. I know this was a great aspiration and a great victory for you. Your country owes you a lot for the leadership that it took to get to this historic moment. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: You know the vision was really Kohl's. Europe is a complicated place and we could have a lot of problems as we saw in those final negotiations on the chairmanship of the European central bank. Kohl saw the potential for Germany going in many directions and he was the one who had the vision for European Union. With the creation of

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 05/08/08

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2015-0755-M (1.22)
12/1/2017 KBH

the monetary union all of that has been decided. It is no longer possible for Germany to split off or for Europe to come apart. (U)

The President: Yes, Kohl is a very good man and he has been there a very long time. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: I agree it has been a long time. (U)

The President: Right. By Italians standards, he has been there an eternity. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: Kohl prevailed over the tendency of Germans to want to stand alone. He had a vision for European Monetary Union and also for the other enlargement besides NATO, the enlargement of Europe to include its central European neighbors. At the moment of the decision to enlarge, it was certainly the thing to do but I must say we considerably underestimated the costs. Of course, this is what you have to do or you would never start such a project. In any case, the entrants will be about 30 percent of the population of the larger Europe, but they only have 10 percent of the income. (U)

The President: I am going to stop in Germany on my way to the Birmingham G-8. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: Yes, I understand you are going to make a great speech in Berlin. This is really very important. The Germans are disquieted with events. Symbolically it is important that you stop there and speak to them. Will you participate afterwards in the 50th anniversary of the WTO? (U)

The President: I would like to do that, but I have to hold the dates due to the legislative calendar. Now you know that this is an election year here and we only have about 60 days of Congressional work left. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: The election campaign really begins after the summer holidays, doesn't it? (U)

The President: Yes, but that is still soon. If Congress goes home now, they can all agree to attack me. Therefore, I can't be away a single day when we have the possibility here to work with Congress and achieve something. And believe me, Romano, we have things to achieve. In any case, let's start now onto our broader agenda. And tell me what you would like to discuss. For my part, I can tell you that I want to repeat that I am

thrilled by your success, by the stability and leadership that you brought to Italy. I mean not only your efforts to build our partnership, but what you are doing as well with all of Europe.
(C)

Prime Minister Prodi: I don't want to exaggerate my achievements. The spirit of our country is changing but it is going to take a long time. There has been a big change in the parties but there is a bipolarism there. We need to bring about a long-term change in our system. (C)

The fact that we got the monetary union is a big relief and a matter that gives me a great sense of satisfaction. We will be able to deliver better on our tasks and will be able to do better in evolving an effective common foreign policy, to be more active addressing the problems in the Balkans, Iraq and the Middle East, and as well as to deal with long-range problems. The biggest of these, put in general terms, is the border between the Christian and Islamic worlds. That is why we are so focused on Turkey. Despite its economic and human rights problems, it has enormous importance for our ability to live peacefully in this region over the long-term. (C)

You know we took an important initiative in putting together our mission to Albania because years had passed without an Italian foreign policy. Many years had passed without an important Italian foreign policy initiative. Now we have delivered, we are ready to take part. We are ready to tackle the problems in Bosnia with you. Even in Kosovo. (C)

We have a clear sense now of our own potential. Italy has about the same GNP as the United Kingdom and only about 10 percent less than France. With this kind of economic clout we can and need to do more. Our priorities are going to be on the southeast and the Balkans. Italy is now the first or second largest trading partner with the region. Larger than France and the United Kingdom combined. So, it is a natural for us and we have to do our duty. (C)

At the Rome Contact Group meeting, we agreed together that we wanted to increase the pressure on Milosevic. I called Yeltsin and then called you about our conversation. I told him that we have to press both of the parties. Yeltsin responded fairly but he repeated two or three times his strong opposition to sanctions. You know it is not easy to get the Contact Group to act. We are pressing on the Rugova side as well as on Milosevic. We need to stick together in the Contact Group.

Actually, I am worried about the idea of sending troops. I would do it if necessary but you know we are already in Bosnia, in Macedonia, and if we go into Kosovo we will have a presence in four of the Balkan countries. When we went into Albania, I agreed to go there and to come back out very quickly. You know, that is not easy to do. And spreading our troops over four different countries is a potential problem. (S)

I was asked by the press this morning if we will be able to deal with Russia and the Crimea on one side and Iran on the other side. You know, I thought about this and we must not permit a strong linkage between Iran and Russia. We are in a position to help Iran evolve and to develop a dynamic society with the middle class. Italy has a long tradition of relations with Iran. We ourselves prohibited investment over a period of time. Indeed, we put pressure on the French, telling them that now was not the time to invest. However, we concluded that this is the time to resume more normal relationships with Iran. As long as we continue to stress the three points on which they need to do better: terrorism, development of nontraditional arms and human rights. But it is useful to resume going to Tehran and I plan myself to go. In this mission, I am going to tackle the problems as well as try to advance the evolution in that country. All of this can connect positively to the Middle East peace process. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: I visited Tehran in March and had meetings with people including Khatami. His CNN interview and other things he has said and done indicate his spirit to build bridges to the West and especially the United States. He drew parallels between the United States and Persia. He has strong support but he also is opposed by Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards who fall under his control. In short, he needs a bit more time to allow for an official U.S.-Iran dialogue but is ready to move forward on institution-to-institution and people-to-people exchanges. He will win his battle. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: (interjecting) I am not so sure. (U)

Foreign Minister Dini: Some of the people I talked with suggested that Iran had abandoned all support to terrorism. We also discussed the Middle East peace process. The Iranians thought that Oslo was too favorable to Israel but now they are no longer opposing it. It is also important to take account of the fact that Iran is in the presidency of the Islamic conference. This is having a moderating influence. Iranian

officials traveled to Saudi Arabia. If this evolution continues Iran could actually be a source of regional stability. (S)

Vice President Gore: The problem is that the words on terrorism are not matched by reality. Khamanei controls the Revolutionary Guards. I agree that there is a good chance that Khatami will win the struggle but there is also a large risk that he won't. During the interim, we need to judge by what they do, not what they say. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: The Iranians make a distinction between terrorism and support for liberation armies. Beyond that, we have no indications of terrorism except perhaps in the Palestinian area and in fact terrorism has dwindled worldwide. Therefore, we see the support of terrorism declining and of course, we have to be cautious, but at the same time give them encouragement. (S)

The President: Your going could be positive, but a very clear message is needed. It is pivotal for the unfolding of the next 30 years if Khatami succeeds. We are mindful of his need not to go too fast on official contacts. We have a special role in dealing with terrorism, the Middle East peace process and Israel, so if you go, you have to have the right message that strengthens his hand. Secondly, under ILSA, which has caused tensions between the United States and France, we need to make a determination. We are trying to work this out so we can continue to improve relations with Iran. But there are a lot in Congress who want to be tough and there is strong support among some American voters. We need your understanding and sensitivity to modulate your desire to begin doing business with Iran. (S)

Samuel Berger: Especially over the next few weeks. (S)

The President: Yes, we have to do what the law says but continue to nurture the reform movement in Iran. If there are other deals, energy deals where there are investments in Iran, it would complicate matters greatly. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: I understand and that was exactly the reason I stopped these deals. And I stopped investment over a long period of time. Italian investment was stopped with Iran over a long period of time so we can certainly stop it for another few months. Iran is hot, you know, and so is Ukraine. If we can control and make progress with them strategically it will calm things down. (S)

Samuel Berger: If you go, it is very important to give the message the President just explained. Our understanding is that terrorism has not stopped. I'm not just talking about Hizbollah but also their assassination attempts against individuals. (e)

Prime Minister Prodi: (interjecting) Yes, I know there is internal terrorism. (e)

The Vice President: Yes, but there are also other forms of it. (e)

Samuel Berger: He needs a clear understanding that we will not be able to normalize with him unless he comes to grips with this cancer. Otherwise, he could get the impression that he is able to talk to the Italian Prime Minister, the French Prime Minister, so why should he bother to deal with these problems? (e)

The President: We don't believe he is supporting terrorism, but Khamanei and his revolutionary guards are providing arms and training to terrorists in their own country and in the Middle East. This goes to Hizbollah and beyond Hizbollah to Islamic Jihad. (e)

The Vice President: The Italian company ENI is a significant one. There are vast energy resources in the Caspian basin, in Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan and elsewhere. These countries are vulnerable to Russia from the north and to Iran from the south. If Italy and the United States cooperate now to develop a pipeline under the Caspian sea we could get a multiple pipeline result which would be the equivalent of an umbilical cord of independence. If a pipeline goes through Iran, on the other hand, we would put this prospect at risk because a north-south pipeline would slow down or end the possibility of a trans-Caspian pipe. Therefore, we need to get to work on this, and we should do it together. (e)

Foreign Minister Dini: Our company ENI is not operating alone. It operates with U.S. companies. (e)

The Vice President: But ENI is in Iran. (e)

Prime Minister Prodi: Yes, they are very frightened about being squeezed between Russia and Iran. A pipeline in fact would give them more freedom. (e)

The Vice President: A pipeline under the Caspian is the only way in the long-term. Multiple pipelines give the best guarantee of energy security. If the West allows a north-south pipeline option to be developed, the east-west one just will not get done. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: Well as I learned in economics, we need to have the highest number of suppliers as possible. So we must send oil out from Russia, from Iran and through the Caspian. (S)

The President: Okay, but I am afraid if we get a pipeline through Iran and it is built early, it will block the financing needed to build a trans-Caspian pipe. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: I agree, yes. I agree. (S)

The President: I agree also on your point about Ukraine. We need to help nurture its independence. I went there and Kuchma has been here several times. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: They don't help themselves. (S)

The President: I agree, and the elections could actually make it worse. (S)

The Vice President: It is bad. The situation is not as bad as it could have been. There is no communist majority poised to take over as was the case for Yeltsin at certain points. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: We want to build transportation networks to Ukraine and also into the Balkans. And let me turn back to Albania. We need to make decisions on how to get more help to the civilians. We have nonprofit organizations at work there rebuilding universities and some infrastructure. It is very important to give hope in Albania, hope which does not exist now. (S)

The President: Do you have a reconstruction plan? (U)

Foreign Minister Dini: Not now. I targeted the need for one. The EU will help. (S)

Samuel Berger: Unless we deal with the political issue, the relationship between Kosovo and Albania will get worse and will increase radicalization. The student movement is already attracting arms from around the region. We have to get both

parties into a negotiation on status. We have to be tough on both and make it clear to them that there can be no violations.
(C)

Prime Minister Prodi: Let's talk about the new transatlantic marketplace. Europe is in a new phase. We must have a strong link with the United States and we need to translate this into action. The only limit on us is that whatever we do has to have a connection to the WTO. I don't see any problem there. We need to give more energy to studying different possible trade projects together. Europe after the monetary union will be more self-confident -- despite the differences over the European central bank chairmanship. We have achieved all the points we set out for ourselves. (C)

We need to avoid any danger of detachment or division within the West. Blair agrees perfectly with me. We have strong support, so we can bring this up in the G-8 and at the next EU meeting. Let's get some concrete action, especially in view of the Far East financial crisis. The U.S.-European relationship should be and will be stronger and stronger. I have no sense that it is any less important. There are a number of hotspots which require management and policy efforts. (C)

Foreign Minister Dini: There will be some resistance from France on audio-visual and intellectual property rights. They are putting up a real squawk. Sir Leon Brittan has to deal with this. We are more open. We see the value, we see the strength of U.S.-European relations. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: Yes, and specific problems can be solved.
(C)

The President: We need to think about Asia. It shows that we can work together, but we need momentum of our own as well. We can't be sure of how Asia is going to evolve in the future. And indeed, many of the Asian countries and others are now outside the WTO. China and other countries are debating if they want to be part of this international system. Therefore it is important for us to develop the links with one another, just as we are working together in Latin America all the while staying within the WTO framework. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: Another important question is the Greek-Turkish problem. I find it to be almost hopeless. (C)

The President: Thanks for raising that. You know before Luxembourg, I had a long talk with Kohl. I almost begged him to reach out to Turkey. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi (interjecting) He just couldn't do it in this election year. Italy is in a position to help. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: We have supported Turkish accession into the EU but Greece and Germany are in a different situation. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: It should be enough to give Turkey the Customs Union payments it deserves. But this has been made impossible due to the Greeks. We have been trying to tell the Greeks, but they find it impossible to understand. Turkey now is owed \$700 million in cash. We are ready to follow through on that. (S)

The President: Yes, and they need the money. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: I agree. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: This will also be a sign that Europe is with Turkey. (U)

The Vice President: Turkey faces elections just as Germany does. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: And money for Turkish payments is already in our budgets so we can move forward without modifying them. But Greece continues to veto. I will be seeing Simitis soon. He is a reasonable man but he has political opposition. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: Turkey has to bring its Aegean differences with Greece to the International Court of Justice, then they would get Customs Union funds and that would help on Cyprus. We need a quid pro quo but we are not there yet. (S)

The Vice President: We appreciate your support on this and your not selling destabilizing weapons to the island. (S)

The President: You know no other European leader that I have spoken with about this believes it with the conviction that you do. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: Perhaps we are closer to the situation. The odd thing is that it is the Turkish military, which is the keeper of secularism, which is toughest on Cyprus. They won't

relax until they believe that their future lies in Europe. We have to keep working on it. I think we have some influence with the Greeks but it is hard. The Greek-American community has been outraged about Cyprus, but they don't appreciate what needs to be done to unlock the problem. (S)

You know the European Union has free movement of peoples and as you know this would not be possible if Turkey entered. But they are ready to have some limits on movement. (S)

The President: The Turkish military wants to know that the West still wants them and understands their significance. And if Iran goes the wrong way, Turkey will be even more important. After these upcoming elections, we need a formula where Greeks let go of the Customs Union money, where the Aegean jurisdiction questions get resolved and a Cyprus peace process started. But, you know, Turkey also has an irrational element. If not, why would they have gone to war over this tiny pile of rock, called Imia/Kardak. It's crazy, you have to call it by its Greek and its Turkish name. If you have advice for me after seeing Simitis, please get in touch. I believe we have possibilities here. There are big questions on the table. We have to assure that we have a process that continues to move forward in the Balkans. We have to get Turkey right, which is critical for Europe's future, and we have to continue dealing with problems that flow from extreme Islamic fundamentalism. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: Can we talk for a minute about a few bilateral problems? Italian public opinion is very sensitive in this period after the cable car accident. Any interview makes news in Italy. It is a subject of reporting hourly. (S)

The Vice President: Well, you know it is hard for us to control what is said in our own media. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: I know, it is almost impossible. (U)

The President: Our military does have some rules on this, but there are also constitutional freedoms. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: This issue can play into the renewal of your military bases. Because you have managed it well and we managed it well together, it has helped, but there are still some risks. (S)

Another question is one of mercy, Mrs. Baraldini. I know I can't ask you to do anything, but public opinion is very

sensitive to this. I know I can't interfere with your judicial system and your justice but this is a big issue. She has been in jail for 16 years. I can't ask you about something like this, I feel awkward about it, but I hope you understand why it would be difficult or impossible for us to take a firm engagement about her staying in jail if you released her to us because the rules are different in Italy. We could make a commitment that we won't ask that she be released from jail into some sort of custody program. If we could just find something... Sixteen years is a long time... Her sister died due to a terrorist incident in Chad. So it is an emotional question. She has started to repent, so it is a big question. Please understand it is important and emotional in Italy. (S)

The President: Well, let's move next door for our expanded session and join the others. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Actually, I am worried about the idea of sending troops. I would do it if necessary but you know we are already in Bosnia, in Macedonia, and if we go into Kosovo we will have a presence in four of the Balkan countries. When we went into Albania, I agreed to go there and to come back out very quickly. You know, that is not easy to do. And spreading our troops over four different countries is a potential problem. (C)

I was asked by the press this morning if we will be able to deal with Russia and the Crimea on one side and Iran on the other side. You know, I thought about this and we must not permit a strong linkage between Iran and Russia. We are in a position to help Iran evolve and to develop a dynamic society with the middle class. Italy has a long tradition of relations with Iran. We ourselves prohibited investment over a period of time. Indeed, we put pressure on the French, telling them that now was not the time to invest. However, we concluded that this is the time to resume more normal relationships with Iran. As long as we continue to stress the three points on which they need to do better: terrorism, development of nontraditional arms and human rights. But it is useful to resume going to Tehran and I plan myself to go. In this mission, I am going to tackle the problems as well as try to advance the evolution in that country. All of this can connect positively to the Middle East peace process. (C)

Foreign Minister Dini: I visited Tehran in March and had meetings with people including Khatami. His CNN interview and other things he has said and done indicate his spirit to build bridges to the West and especially the United States. He drew parallels between the United States and Persia. He has strong support but he also is opposed by Khamanei and the revolutionary guards who fall under his control. In short, he needs a bit more time to allow for an official U.S.-Iran dialogue but is ready to move forward on institution-to-institution and people-to-people exchanges. He will win his battle. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: (interjecting) I am not so sure. (U)

Foreign Minister Dini: Some of the people I talked with suggested that Iran had abandoned all support to terrorism. We also discussed the Middle East peace process. The Iranians thought that Oslo was too favorable to Israel but now they are no longer opposing it. It is also important to take account of the fact that Iran is in the presidency of the Islamic conference. This is having a moderating influence. Iranian

officials traveled to Saudi Arabia. If this evolution continues Iran could actually be a source of regional stability. (C)

Vice President Gore: The problem is that the words on terrorism are not matched by reality. Khamanei controls the revolutionary guards. I agree that there is a good chance that Khatami will win the struggle but there is also a large risk that he won't. During the interim, we need to judge by what they do, not what they say. (C)

Foreign Minister Dini: The Iranians make a distinction between terrorism and support for liberation armies. Beyond that, we have no indications of terrorism except perhaps in the Palestinian area and in fact terrorism has dwindled worldwide. Therefore, we see the support of terrorism declining and of course, we have to be cautious, but at the same time give them encouragement. (C)

The President: Your going could be positive, but a very clear message is needed. It is pivotal for the unfolding of the next 30 years if Khatami succeeds. We are mindful of his need not to go too fast on official contacts. We have a special role in dealing with terrorism, the Middle East peace process and Israel, so if you go, you have to have the right message that strengthens his hand. Secondly, under ILSA, which has caused tensions between the United States and France, we need to make a determination. We are trying to work this out so we can continue to improve relations with Iran. But there are a lot in Congress who want to be tough and there is strong support among some American voters. We need your understanding and sensitivity to modulate your desire to begin doing business with Iran. (C)

Samuel Berger: Especially over the next few weeks. (C)

The President: Yes, we have to do what the law says but continue to nurture the reform movement in Iran. If there are other deals, energy deals where there are investments in Iran, it would complicate matters greatly. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: I understand and that was exactly the reason I stopped these deals. And I stopped investment over a long period of time. Italian investment was stopped with Iran over a long period of time so we can certainly stop it for another few months. Iran is hot, you know, and so is Ukraine. If we can control and make progress with them strategically it will calm things down. (C)

Samuel Berger: If you go, it is very important to give the message the President just explained. Our understanding is that terrorism has not stopped. I'm not just talking about Hizbollah but also their assassination attempts against individuals. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: (interjecting) Yes, I know there is internal terrorism. (S)

The Vice President: Yes, but there are also other forms of it. (S)

Samuel Berger: He needs a clear understanding that we will not be able to normalize with him unless he comes to grips with this cancer. Otherwise, he could get the impression that he is able to talk to the Italian Prime Minister, the French Prime Minister, so why should he bother to deal with these problems? (S)

The President: We don't believe he is supporting terrorism, but Khamanei and his revolutionary guards are providing arms and training to terrorists in their own country and in the Middle East. This goes to Hizbollah and beyond Hizbollah to Islamic Jihad. (S)

The Vice President: The Italian company ENI is a significant one. There are vast energy resources in the Caspian basin, in Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan and elsewhere. These countries are vulnerable to Russia from the north, to Iran from the south. If Italy and the United States cooperate now to develop a pipeline under the Caspian sea we could get a multiple pipeline result which would be the equivalent of an umbilical cord of independence. If a pipeline goes through Iran, on the other hand, we would put this prospect at risk because a north-south pipeline would slow down or end the possibility of a trans-Caspian pipe. Therefore, we need to get to work on this, and we should do it together. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: Our company ENI is not operating alone. It operates with U.S. companies. (S)

The Vice President: But ENI is in Iran. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: Yes, they are very frightened about being squeezed between Russia and Iran. A pipeline in fact would give them more freedom. (S)

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the restricted meeting between the President and Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy, is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via MODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (S)

Add post passing instrux

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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The Vice President: But ENI is in Iran. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: Yes, they are very frightened about being squeezed between Russia and Iran. A pipeline in fact would give them more freedom. (C)

The Vice President: A pipeline under the Caspian is the only way in the long-term. Multiple pipelines give the best guarantee of energy security. If the West allows a north-south pipeline option to be developed, the east-west one just will not get done. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: Well as I learned in economics, we need to have the highest number of suppliers as possible. So we must send oil out from Russia, from Iran and through the Caspian. (C)

The President: Okay, but I am afraid if we get a pipeline through Iran and it is built early, it will block the financing needed to build a trans-Caspian pipe. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: I agree, yes. I agree. (C)

The President: I agree also on your point about Ukraine. We need to help nurture its independence. I went there and Kuchma has been here several times. (C)

Prime Minister Prodi: They don't help themselves. (C)

The President: I agree, and the elections could actually make it worse. (C)

The Vice President: It is bad. The situation is not ^{as} bad as it could have been. There is no communist majority poised to take over as was the case for Yeltsin at certain points. (C) ✓

Prime Minister Prodi: We want to build transportation networks to Ukraine and also into the Balkans. And let me turn back to Albania. We need to make decisions on how to get more help to the civilians. We have nonprofit organizations at work there rebuilding universities and some infrastructure. It is very important to give hope in Albania, hope which does not exist now. (C)

The President: Do you have a reconstruction plan? (U)

Foreign Minister Dini: Not now. I targeted the need for one. The EU will help. (C)

Samuel Berger: Unless we deal with the political issue, the relationship between Kosovo and Albania will get worse and will increase radicalization. The student movement is already attracting arms from around the region. We have to get both

The President: Thanks for raising that. You know before Luxembourg, I had a long talk with Kohl. I almost begged him to reach out to Turkey. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi (interjecting) He just couldn't do it in this election year. Italy is in a position to help. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: We have supported Turkish accession into the EU but Greece and Germany are in a different situation. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: It should be enough to give Turkey the Customs Union payments it deserves. But this has been made impossible due to the Greeks. We have been trying to tell the Greeks, but they find it impossible to understand. Turkey now is owed \$700 million in cash. We are ready to follow through on that. (S)

The President: Yes, and they need the money. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: I agree. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: This will also be a sign that Europe is with Turkey. (U)

The Vice President: Turkey faces elections just as Germany does. (U)

Prime Minister Prodi: And money for Turkish payments is already in our budgets so we can move forward without modifying them. But Greece continues to veto. I will be seeing Simitis soon. He is a reasonable man but he has political opposition. (S)

Foreign Minister Dini: Turkey has to bring its Aegean differences with Greece to the International Court of Justice, then they would get Customs Union funds and that would help on Cyprus. We need a quid pro quo but we are not there yet. (S)

The Vice President: We appreciate your support on this and your not selling destabilizing weapons to the island. (S)

The President: You know no other European leaders that I have spoken with about this believes it with the conviction that you do. (S)

Prime Minister Prodi: Perhaps we are closer to the situation. The odd thing is that it is the Turkish military, which is the keeper of secularism, which is toughest on Cyprus. They won't