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Folder Title: PC0037 PC Meeting on NATO Summit, October 18, 1993				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on the NATO Summit (2 pages)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Nicholas Burns to Anthony Lake re: Thoughts on the NATO Summit for PC Meeting on October 18 (3 pages)	10/16/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	re: NATO Expansion: Now Is Not the Time (6 pages)	10/08/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002c. cable	re: Russia, NATO and the Two January Summits (7 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002d. cable	re: Yeltsin: NATO Expansion (3 pages)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
003a. memo	To: Leon Fuerth, et al; From: William Itoh; Re: Principals Committee Meeting on the NATO Summit (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on the NATO Summit (1 page)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	re: Partnership for Peace (4 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	re: NATO Expansion (2 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003e. paper	re: Phased NATO Expansion: Draft Declaration Language (2 pages)	10/00/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
003f. paper	re: Strawman Summit Declaration: Section on ESDI and Force Structure (2 pages)	08/25/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
003g. paper	re: Embedded CJTF Concept (1 page) [partial]	08/20/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

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FOLDER TITLE:

PC0037 PC Meeting on NATO Summit, October 18, 1993

2015-0768-M
rs1319

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Oct-1993 16:54 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION: NOW IS NOT THE TIME

<DIST>
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BEYRLE BLEICKEN BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER HOLL KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX
WALKER

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE

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RUEHMO

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081359Z OCT 93

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8455

INFO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3199

RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 3242

RUEHRSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 5519

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 3250

RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1320

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>

NATO EXPANSION: NOW IS NOT THE TIME

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 031886

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR PICKERING

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, RS, US

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION: NOW IS NOT THE TIME

REF: MOSCOW 31060

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

2. LAST WEEK I URGED THAT THE EVER-EXPANDING PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA NOT BE ENDANGERED BY HASTY DECISIONS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST (REFTEL ~~SECRET~~ EVENTS IN MOSCOW SINCE THEN)

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PER E.O. 13526

17-2015-0768.M (1.03)
11/14/2017

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HAVE ONLY REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ANY OF THE FORMER WARSAW PACT STATES (INCLUDING RUSSIA).

3. A NATO POLICY WHICH ENVISIONS EXPANSION INTO CENTRAL OR EASTERN EUROPE -- EVEN IF COINED IN "AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE" TERMINOLOGY -- WOULD BE UNIVERSALLY INTERPRETED IN MOSCOW AS DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA AND RUSSIA ALONE. NOT ONLY WOULD THIS BE USED EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE PRO-REFORMERS IN UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, BUT IT COULD WELL ENCOURAGE THE VERY SORT OF RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICIES IT IS MEANT TO GUARD AGAINST. RECOGNIZING AND REACTING TO RUSSIA'S VERY DEFINITE SIGNALS IS NOT GIVING MOSCOW A DROIT DE REGARD OVER ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS, BUT SIMPLY SMART DIPLOMACY.

4. BEFORE WE PROCEED WITH ANY STEPS TOWARD BRINGING RUSSIA ITSELF MORE CLOSELY INTO THE NATO FOLD, WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL WE SEE THE RESULTS OF THE DECEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS TAKEN SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD OVERCOMING HIS ENTRENCHED PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION. BUT RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY REMAINS A FRAGILE ENTITY; WE AND OUR NATO ALLIES SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH JEOPARDIZES THE PRO-REFORM MOVEMENT. NOR SHOULD WE COUNT ON ITS ULTIMATE TRIUMPH. NATO EXPANSION CAN AND SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE FATE OF THE ALLIANCE'S FORMER NEMESIS BECOMES MORE CLEAR. IN THE MEANTIME, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR GOAL IS RUSSIA'S EVENTUAL REINTEGRATION INTO EUROPE AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

NATO EXPANSION AND RUSSIA'S POLITICAL CRISIS

5. IN A TELEGRAM SENT LAST WEEK (REFTEL), I URGED THAT WASHINGTON CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JANUARY NATO SUMMIT AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOSCOW SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN. I SUGGESTED THAT ANY OFFER OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP TO FORMER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT WHICH EXCLUDED RUSSIA COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, I CAUTIONED AGAINST ENDANGERING THE EVER-EXPANDING PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA BY MAKING HASTY DECISIONS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST. INSTEAD, I ENDORSED THE POLICY OF "PROGRESSIVE ENGAGEMENT" PROPOSED BY USNATO, IN WHICH ANY INTERESTED EASTERN STATE COULD TAKE PART AND WHOSE GOAL WAS INCREASED SECURITY FOR ALL EUROPEAN STATES.

6. EVENTS IN MOSCOW SINCE THEN HAVE ONLY REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON QUESTIONS OF EXPANDED ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S RESPONSE TO LAST SUNDAY'S ARMED UPRISING WAS DECISIVE AND APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL; HIS SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS HAVE BEEN STRAIGHT FORWARD AND

AIMED AT SOLIDIFYING THE PRO-REFORMERS' GRASP ON POWER. BECAUSE WESTERN ACTIONS COUNT HERE (IF ONLY AMONG THE POLITICAL ELITE), WE SHOULD ACT CAREFULLY ON ISSUES WHICH ARE SURE TO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND SECURITY POLICY.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL EQUATIONS .

7. NATO'S MUCH-PUBLICIZED CONSIDERATION OF EARLY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 031886

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR PICKERING

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, RS, US

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION: NOW IS NOT THE TIME EXPANSION INTO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE HAS ATTRACTED THE CLOSE ATTENTION OF RUSSIA'S POLICY-MAKERS. FROM PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON DOWN, PROPOSALS TO OFFER ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP TO POLAND, HUNGARY AND OTHER EX-WARSAW PACT STATES ARE UNIVERSALLY SEEN AS DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA AND RUSSIA ALONE. EVEN WHEN THE QUESTION IS COINED IN "AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE" TERMINOLOGY, RUSSIANS UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECURITY THREAT WARSAW AND BUDAPEST ENVISION COMES FROM MOSCOW, NOT FROM KIEV OR MINSK OR THE BALTICS. NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE PROTEST, MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO INTERPRET ANY EASTWARD EXPANSION OF NATO (WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE RUSSIA) AS A RENEWAL OF CONTAINMENT AND A REAFFIRMATION OF THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

8. SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS AT EVERE AIMED AT A NATO SUMMIT ANNOUNCEMENT IN FAVOR OF ALLIANCE EXPANSION ARE SURE TO BECOME PUBLIC; THEY ALREADY HAVE. THUS, THE ANTI-RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION WILL PLAY A PART IN THE UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IF IT APPEARS THAT STATES OTHER THAN RUSSIA WILL BE OFFERED NATO MEMBERSHIP. NATO'S SEEMING MISTRUST OF RUSSIA WOULD THEN BE USED AGAINST PRO-REFORM AND PRO-WESTERN CANDIDATES.

AND NATIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS

9. MOREOVER, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT -- WHICH HAS JUST HELPED YELTSIN PUT DOWN A MAJOR CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE COUNTRY -- WILL LIKELY SEEK INCREASED ATTENTION TO ITS PERCEIVED MILITARY NEEDS AND BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO MAKE ITS DEMANDS STICK. FACED WITH NATO'S EXPANSION ONTO TERRITORY JUST VACATED BY THE FORMER SOVIET ARMY, RUSSIA'S MILITARY LEADERS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INSIST ON NEW DEPLOYMENTS AND INCREASED FUNDING AIMED AT COUNTERING A RENEWED POTENTIAL THREAT FROM THE WEST.

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10. PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS JUST ALREADY CALLED FOR QUICK ACTION ON RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE. GIVING THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT RENEWED REASON TO CARP ABOUT NATO AS THE MILITARY DOCTRINE IS FINALIZED IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS RIGHT NOW. AND WITH THE RUSSIANS ALREADY SEEKING "RELIEF" FROM CFE FLANK LIMITS, ARE WE READY TO THROW THE ENTIRE CONVENTIONAL FORCES TREATY INTO QUESTION? THAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT OF CONFRONTING RUSSIA WITH SUCH A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN EUROPE'S BALANCE OF POWER. MOVING NATO EASTWARD WITHOUT INCLUDING RUSSIA COULD WELL ENCOURAGE THE PRECISE RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY RESPONSE IT IS MEANT TO GUARD AGAINST.

11. RECOGNIZING THAT RUSSIAN LEADERS -- UP TO AND INCLUDING PRESIDENT YELTSIN -- HAVE SENT VERY STRONG AND VERY CLEAR SIGNALS ABOUT HOW THEY ARE LIKELY TO REACT TO NATO EXPANSION INTO THE EAST DOES NOT MEAN WE HAVE GIVEN THE RUSSIANS A VETO OVER ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS. RATHER, WE ARE SIMPLY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT RUSSIA REMAINS A MAJOR PLAYER IN EUROPEAN SECURITY DECISION-MAKING. RUSSIA'S INITIAL FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE DEPTH OF U.S. CONCERN ABOUT MISSILE TECHNOLOGY SALES TO INDIA WAS THEIR MISTAKE; IGNORING MOSCOW'S SIGNALS ON NATO EXPANSION WOULD BE EQUALLY UNWISE.

RUSSIA FIRST? NOT YET, BUT MAYBE BY JANUARY

12. IN HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGES ON THE SUBJECT, MOSCOW HAS CONSISTENTLY PROPOSED THAT ANY OFFER OF CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH NATO SHOULD BE MADE TO RUSSIA FIRST. NATO SHOULD, HOWEVER, AVOID ANY FINAL DECISIONS ABOUT RUSSIA'S FUTURE RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE UNTIL AFTER THE DECEMBER 11-12 PARLIAMENTARY BALLOT. IN FACT, GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ANY DISCUSSIONS ALONG THESE LINES WILL QUICKLY BECOME PUBLIC, I RECOMMEND AGAINST ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION EXCEPT IN VERY LIMITED-PARTICIPATION MEETINGS UNTIL WE ARE SATISFIED THAT DECEMBER'S ELECTIONS WILL KEEP

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 031886

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR PICKERING

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, RS, US

SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION: NOW IS NOT THE TIME

RUSSIA ON A REFORMIST, DEMOCRATIC TRACK.

13. ASSUMING THIS BECOMES CLEAR, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO ENDORSE YELTSIN'S PRO-REFORM EFFORTS AND COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY THROUGH SOME SORT OF SIGNAL FROM

NATO. FIRST, AS PROPOSED BY USNATO AND

ENDORSED REFTEL, WE SHOULD SEEK "PROGRESSIVE

ENGAGEMENT" WITH NATO FOR THOSE EASTERN STATES WHICH

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ARE BOTH INTERESTED AND ABLE TO TAKE PART. THIS WOULD NOT INVOLVE FORMAL NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR EITHER RUSSIA OR ITS FORMER WARSAW PACT ALLIES. BUT IT WOULD ENSURE THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT BE TREATED EITHER BETTER OR WORSE THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, POLAND, HUNGARY OR THE CZECH REPUBLIC.

14. NEXT -- AND HERE I DO PUT RUSSIA ABOVE OTHER NACC MEMBERS -- WE SHOULD CONSIDER INVITING PRESIDENT YELTSIN (AND ONLY PRESIDENT YELTSIN) TO BRUSSELS TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH NATO LEADERS. SUCH AN INVITATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AT EVERE BEFORE THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS, AND SHOULD ONLY BE RAISED AFTERWARDS IF THE BALLOTING MEETS CSCE STANDARDS. AS I ENVISION IT, YELTSIN NEED NOT BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SUMMIT PROPER, BUT RATHER WOULD HAVE A PRIVATE SESSION WITH NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AFTER THE FORMAL CONCLUSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S BUSINESS.

15. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE ALLIES CANNOT AGREE ACTUALLY TO INVITE YELTSIN TO BRUSSELS, I RECOMMEND THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON COME STRAIGHT TO MOSCOW FROM THE NATO SUMMIT. HE SHOULD CARRY A STRONG MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES. SUCH A GESTURE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IF THE NATO SUMMIT TAKES ANY DECISIONS WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY, BUT WITHOUT HAVING INVOLVED MOSCOW IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

16. FINALLY, I RENEW REFTTEL'S PROPOSAL THAT WE AGGRESSIVELY SUPPORT RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO FINALIZE A PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. SUCH A STAND WOULD REASSURE YELTSIN AND MOSCOW'S WESTERNIZERS THAT WE ACTIVELY SEEK AND ULTIMATELY ENVISION RUSSIA'S EVENTUALLY JOINING "THE WEST" IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS. PRESIDENT CLINTON COULD USE HIS BRUSSELS MEETINGS WITH EC OFFICIALS TO REITERATE THIS POINT.

CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS

17. AS I DEPART MOSCOW FOR A BRIEF VISIT TO THE U.S., IT APPEARS -- AND I EMPHASIZE THAT MUCH REMAINS UNCLEAR IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PAST WEEK'S EVENTS -- THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS TAKEN SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD CONSOLIDATING THE REFORM PROCESS. THE SIGHT OF TANKS FIRING ON THE RUSSIAN "WHITE HOUSE" UNDERLINES THE FACT THAT RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY REMAINS A FRAGILE ENTITY. WE AND OUR NATO ALLIES SHOULD NEITHER DO ANYTHING WHICH JEOPARDIZES RUSSIA'S PRO-REFORM MOVEMENT, NOR CAN WE COUNT ON ITS ULTIMATE TRIUMPH. AND WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY CENTRAL TO OUR OBJECTIVES THROUGHOUT THE NEWLY-INDEPENDENT STATES THAT RUSSIA CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE WEST REMAINS OPEN TO RUSSIA'S REINTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN AND WORLD

COMMUNITIES OF RESPONSIBLE AND OPEN SOCIETIES.
18. AMBASSADOR PICKERING APPROVED THIS TELEGRAM
BEFORE DEPARTING POST. COLLINS

BT

#1886

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SECTION: 01 OF 03

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FOR: GOTTEMOELLER@A1@OEOB

FOR: BURNS@A1@OEOB

FOR: BLEICKEN@A1@OEOB

FOR: BEYRLE@A1@OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Sep-1993 21:57 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EURSD@A1@OEOB
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
KUPCHAN@A1@OEOB
GOTTEMOELLER@A1@OEOB
BURNS@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RUSSIA, NATO AND THE TWO JANUARY SUMMITS

<DIST>
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC>
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7638

INFO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3030

RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 3066

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 3079

RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY MINSK 5347

RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1140

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>

RUSSIA, NATO AND THE TWO JANUARY SUMMITS

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 031060

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S, D, P AND T

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR S/NIS, EUR, EUR/ISCA AND EUR/RPM

S/S PASS NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTORS BURNS AND WALKER

S/S ALSO PASS OSD (ALLISON) AND JCS (MCCAFFREY)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, US

SUBJECT: RUSSIA, NATO AND THE TWO JANUARY SUMMITS

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V2 2015-0768-M (1.04)

11/14/2017

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REFS: (A) USNATO 3678 (NOTAL)

(B) USNATO 3820 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

2. FOLLOWING PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S WARSAW STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY IF POLAND SOUGHT TO JOIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS AND SOME OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS HAVE TENDED TO EQUATE A SUCCESSFUL NATO SUMMIT WITH THE OFFER OR PROMISE OF EVENTUAL ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP TO ONE OR MORE OF THE FORMER WARSAW PACT STATES.

3. IN RESPONSE, SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICIALS HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THEIR PREFERENCE THAT ANY NATO EXPANSION TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A REDEFINITION OF THE ALLIANCE'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRULY EFFECTIVE PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE. RUSSIA, WE ARE TOLD, WILL NOT PREVENT ANY STATE FROM EXERCISING ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION. BUT MOSCOW WILL KEEP A KEEN EYE OUT FOR ANY SIGNS THAT NATO IS SEEKING THE RE-CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA OR OTHERWISE ENCOURAGING THE REDIVISION OF EUROPE INTO EASTERN AND WESTERN BLOCS. MOSCOW HAS ALSO SIGNALLED ITS CONTINUED BELIEF THAT ANY OFFER OF ASSOCIATION WITH NATO SHOULD, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, APPLY TO RUSSIA. IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT RUSSIAN DOMESTIC STRUGGLE AND YELTSIN'S CALL FOR DECEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, THIS ISSUE IS LIKELY TO BE SEIZED UPON BY ONE OR BOTH SIDES IN AN EFFORT TO SECURE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE -- ALL THE MORE SO IF RUSSIA IS TREATED "WORSE" THAN ITS FORMER WARSAW PACT ALLIES.

4. GIVEN THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HISTORIC FIRST VISIT TO EUROPE WILL INCLUDE NOT ONLY A NATO SUMMIT, BUT ALSO THE FIRST MOSCOW SUMMIT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE OVERSHADOWED -- EVEN THREATENED -- BY DECISIONS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION THAT ARE DRIVEN BY "AN ACCELERATION OF HISTORY" THAT HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH QUESTIONS OF REAL SECURITY. THUS, WE FULLY ENDORSE THE APPROACH SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR HUNTER, IN WHICH ALLIANCE EXPANSION IS NOT CONSIDERED IN EITHER/OR TERMS. RATHER, AS BOTH USNATO AND SACEUR HAVE PROPOSED, WE SHOULD SEEK "PROGRESSIVE ENGAGEMENT" WITH NATO FOR THOSE EASTERN STATES WHICH ARE BOTH INTERESTED AND ABLE TO TAKE PART. THE GOAL OF ANY SUCH PROGRAM WOULD NOT BE SIMPLY TO SOLVE AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL NEED, BUT TO INCREASE EVERYONE'S LEVEL OF SECURITY -- EUROPE'S, THE ALLIANCE'S AND ABOVE ALL AMERICA'S.

5. WHATEVER APPROACH TO THE ISSUE WE ULTIMATELY ADOPT, WE WILL NEED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE RUSSIANS AS U.S. AND NATO PLANNING DEVELOPS. END

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

WHY NATO EXPANSION NOW?

6. PLANNING IS ALREADY WELL UNDERWAY FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HISTORIC FIRST TRIP TO EUROPE. AS WE UNDERSTAND THE LIKELY SCHEDULE, THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRAVELS WILL QUITE NATURALLY BE A NATO SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS. THE ALLIANCE REMAINS THE CORNERSTONE OF U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED TO ENSURE THAT NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AGREE ON A FUTURE DIRECTION FOR THE ALLIANCE THAT MAINTAINS AND STRENGTHENS THE CRUCIAL TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK BETWEEN AMERICA AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 031060

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S, D, P AND T

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR S/NIS, EUR, EUR/ISCA AND EUR/RPM

S/S PASS NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTORS BURNS AND WALKER

S/S ALSO PASS OSD (ALLISON) AND JCS (MCCAFFREY)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, US

SUBJECT: RUSSIA, NATO AND THE TWO JANUARY SUMMITS

7. BUT FOLLOWING PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S WARSAW

STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT SEEK TO STOP POLAND FROM JOINING

THE ALLIANCE, THE IDEA OF HAVING NATO EXPANSION SERVE AS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE BRUSSELS SUMMIT HAS INCREASINGLY COME TO THE FORE. DISCUSSIONS AT EVERE, IN NATO AND NACC CAPITALS, IN ACADEMIC JOURNALS, AND IN THE OP-ED PAGES OF SERIOUS U.S. AND EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS HAVE MORE AND MORE BEGUN TO EQUATE A SUCCESSFUL NATO SUMMIT WITH SOME SORT OF OFFER OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP (IMMEDIATE OR EVENTUAL) FOR SOME OR ALL OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR (POLAND, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC), ALONG WITH PERHAPS OTHER EX-WARSAW PACT STATES OR FORMER NEUTRALS. A KEY THEME UNDERLYING THIS DISCUSSION -- PUBLIC AND PRIVATE -- SEEMS TO BE THAT THE NEWLY-ENLARGED NATO WOULD FOCUS ON DEFENDING ITS MEMBERS AGAINST THE THREAT OF RESURGENT RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM.

8. WE BELIEVE THESE CALLS FOR EARLY NATO EXPANSION ARE PREMATURE AND -- AS EXPLAINED BELOW -- POTENTIALLY HARMFUL. AS AMBASSADOR HUNTER AND USNATO HAVE POINTED OUT (REFTELS), WE FACE AN "ACCELERATION OF HISTORY," IN WHICH AMERICA AND ITS NATO ALLIES ARE BEING ASKED TO MAKE HASTY DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF BASIC EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES. BUT IF WE READ USNATO'S ANALYSIS CORRECTLY, PROTECTING U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS DOES NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE THE EARLY EXPANSION OF THE ALLIANCE. ON THE CONTRARY, BRINGING NEW MEMBERS ON

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BOARD TOO QUICKLY COULD ACTUALLY WEAKEN THE ALLIANCE'S MILITARY STRUCTURE (I.E. NONE OF THE EX-WARSAW PACT STATES IS UP TO NATO STANDARDS), AS WELL AS CALL INTO QUESTION U.S. COMMITMENT UNDER ARTICLE FIVE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (I.E. A BRUISING SENATE BATTLE OVER EXTENDING NATO'S DEFENSIVE UMBRELLA EASTWARD TO STATES WHICH STILL HAVE BONES TO PICK WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS).

RUSSIAN VIEWS AND THE IMPACT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

9. RESPONDING TO THE INCREASINGLY OPEN AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS OF NATO EXPANSION (ADMITTEDLY BROUGHT ON BY YELTSIN'S OWN WARSAW STATEMENTS), SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICIALS HAVE EMPHASIZED SEVERAL KEY POINTS TO US:
- YELTSIN'S COMMITMENT TO PRESIDENT WALESZA STANDS; RUSSIA WILL NEITHER PREVENT ANY SOVEREIGN STATE FROM FREELY ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH NATO NOR DOES MOSCOW SEEK A DROIT DE REGARD OVER THE ALLIANCE'S OWN MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS;
 - THAT SAID, RUSSIA BELIEVES ANY NATO EXPANSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A REDEFINITION OF THE ALLIANCE'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AWAY FROM A FOCUS ON THE "OUTSIDE" THREAT, WHICH EVERYONE STILL UNDERSTANDS TO BE FROM THE "EAST";
 - MOSCOW HOPES ANY EXPANSION OF TIES WITH NATO (WHETHER OR NOT INVOLVING ACTUAL ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP) WOULD EITHER BE OFFERED TO RUSSIA FIRST, OR WOULD BE AS OPEN TO RUSSIA AS TO ANY OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATE;
 - WORKING THROUGH THE CSCE AND/OR THE NACC, RUSSIA SEEKS EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF A TRULY MEANINGFUL PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE, ENCOMPASSING NATO AND NON-NATO STATES, WHICH COULD EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO THE ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND NATIONALISTIC EXTREMISM WHICH IS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE; AND
 - MOSCOW WILL KEEP A KEEN EYE OUT FOR ANY SIGNS THAT NATO (EXPANDED OR NOT) IS PURSUING A POLICY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 031060
EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S, D, P AND T
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR S/NIS, EUR, EUR/ISCA AND EUR/RPM
S/S PASS NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTORS BURNS AND WALKER
S/S ALSO PASS OSD (ALLISON) AND JCS (MCCAFFREY)
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, US

SUBJECT: RUSSIA, NATO AND THE TWO JANUARY SUMMITS OF THE RE-CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA OR OTHERWISE ENCOURAGING THE REDIVISION OF EUROPE INTO EASTERN AND WESTERN BLOCS; ONE MOVE WHICH WOULD CAUSE SPECIAL CONCERN TO RUSSIA WOULD BE FOR NATO TO EXTEND ITS MEMBERSHIP RIGHT UP TO RUSSIA'S BORDERS

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(I.E. TO FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS).

10. OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT SUGGEST THAT YELTSIN, FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV ARE NOT SEEKING TO EXERCISE A VETO OVER NATO'S POLICIES. RATHER, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE STILL-EMERGING U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP, THE RUSSIANS ARE BEING FRANK WITH US ABOUT HOW THEY PERCEIVE THINGS AND HOW -- AS A SOVEREIGN NATION ITSELF -- RUSSIA WOULD INTERPRET CERTAIN ACTIONS BY NATO AND ESPECIALLY BY

THE U.S. THEY ARE DOING SO JUST AS WE HAVE BEEN FRANK WITH THEM IN RAISING QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS ABOUT MOSCOW'S POLICIES IN RUSSIA'S SO-CALLED "NEAR ABROAD." WHETHER WE AGREE WITH THESE RUSSIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATO'S INTENT IS NOT THE KEY QUESTION; RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THIS WILL BE A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AND DIFFICULT ISSUE FOR YELTSIN'S GOVERNMENT.

11. SECURITY GENERAL WOERNER'S OPINION (USNATO 3804) NOTWITHSTANDING, A NATO DECISION TO ADMIT POLAND, HUNGARY AND OTHER EX-WARSAW PACT STATES WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN RUSSIA. YELTSIN'S FOREIGN POLICY MAY NOT BE THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL ISSUE ON WHICH RUSSIAN VOTERS MAKE UP THEIR MINDS; THE ECONOMY IS. BUT YELTSIN'S ENTIRE REFORMIST PLATFORM IS BUILT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH THE "WEST" HAVE TURNED A CORNER, AND THAT THE OLD ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN PUT ASIDE. NO MATTER HOW IT WERE PUBLICLY DESCRIBED, ANY EXPANSION OF NATO TOWARD RUSSIA WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY PRO- AND ANTI-REFORMERS ALIKE AS AIMED SQUARELY AT MOSCOW. AS SUCH, IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY CALL INTO QUESTION THE VERY FOUNDATION OF YELTSIN'S POLICIES. IT COULD ALSO BECOME A DECISIVE ISSUE FOR THOSE -- SUCH AS THE MILITARY -- WHO ARE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REFORMS SO LONG AS RUSSIA'S OVERALL SECURITY IS NOT THREATENED.

12. FORTUNATELY, RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA AND POLAND MAY HELP REDEFINE THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION AWAY FROM THE QUESTION OF WHO GETS IN FIRST AND BRING IT BACK TO A DISCUSSION OF OVERALL U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE. YELTSIN'S GAMBIT AGAINST THE ANTI-REFORMERS SEEMS TO BE WORKING, WHICH MAY LESSEN FEARS IN EASTERN EUROPE OF A REASSERTION OF RUSSIAN HEGEMONY. IF -- AS MANY ANALYSTS ARGUE -- THE EAST EUROPEANS ARE PRIMARILY SEEKING PSYCHOLOGICAL GUARANTEES THAT THEY WILL NOT BE SACRIFICED TO THE DEMANDS OF RESURGENT RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM, YELTSIN'S APPARENT SUCCESS SHOULD BE REASSURING. AT THE SAME TIME, AS NOTED ABOVE, EFFORTS TO ACCELERATE FORMER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS' EARLY ENTRY INTO NATO COULD PLAY INTO RUSSIAN PRE-ELECTION POSTURING WITH YELTSIN'S OPPONENTS

USING IT TO ASSERT A NEW WESTERN CONTAINMENT POLICY -- WHICH WOULD HURT THE PRESIDENT WITH BOTH PRO-WESTERN AND NATIONALIST ELEMENTS. MOREOVER, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLISH ELECTION RESULTS IS THAT THE PARTIES LIKELY TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT ARE NOT ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN EARLY NATO MEMBERSHIP. IF THIS IS TRUE, THE DEMAND FOR QUICK ADMITTANCE OF THE VISEGRAD-FOUR INTO THE ALLIANCE MAY WELL PROVE TO HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS.

THE JANUARY SUMMITS: BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW

13. NEVERTHELESS, THE QUESTION OF NATO EXPANSION

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 031060

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S, D, P AND T

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR S/NIS, EUR, EUR/ISCA AND EUR/RPM

S/S PASS NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTORS BURNS AND WALKER

S/S ALSO PASS OSD (ALLISON) AND JCS (MCCAFFREY)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, US

SUBJECT: RUSSIA, NATO AND THE TWO JANUARY SUMMITS REMAINS ON THE TABLE AND DESERVES CONTINUED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BOTH WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ACCORDINGLY, AS WASHINGTON PREPARES THE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE JANUARY NATO SUMMIT, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE EASTERN HALF OF THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST TRIP TO EUROPE. IT WILL INCLUDE THE SECOND U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, AND A KEY GOAL WILL BE TO CEMENT THE CLINTON-YELTSIN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT DEVELOPED IN VANCOUVER, WHILE DEEPENING AND BROADENING THE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP IN SIGNIFICANT, SUBSTANTIVE AREAS, INCLUDING SECURITY.

14. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EVER-STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW SHOULD BE OVERSHADOWED -- EVEN THREATENED -- BY QUICK DECISIONS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION DRIVEN BY POLITICAL GOALS UNRELATED TO THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE U.S. AND THE ALLIANCE. GRANTING EARLY NATO MEMBERSHIP TO STATES OF THE FORMER WARSAW PACT WOULD MOST LIKELY CONVINCE THE RUSSIANS THAT EUROPE AND AMERICA WERE SEEKING TO EXCLUDE MOSCOW FROM THE BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE "WEST" WRIT LARGE. MOREOVER, NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE PROTEST THAT MOVING NATO'S BORDERS EASTWARD IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA,

MOSCOW WILL BE CONSTRAINED BY HISTORY TO SEE IT, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, AS A REEMERGENCE OF THE CONTAINMENT DOCTRINE. THIS WILL ONLY PLAY ON TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN TENDENCIES TO MISTRUST WESTERN INTENTIONS, AND LEAD TO A DEFENSIVE REACTION LIKELY TO INCREASE TENSIONS ALONG HISTORIC EAST-WEST BOUNDARIES.

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LINES. IT WILL ALSO STRENGTHEN CRITICS OF YELTSIN, WHO WILL CHARACTERIZE IF AS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE PRO-REFORMERS BEING HOODWINKED BY THE WEST.

15. ACCORDINGLY, BOTH FOR THE SAKE OF THE ALLIANCE AND TO AVOID THREATENING THE STILL-EMERGING U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP, WE FULLY ENDORSE THE SORT OF APPROACH SUGGESTED BY USNATO (REFTELS). GETTING AWAY FROM EITHER/OR QUESTIONS ABOUT NATO MEMBERSHIP, WE SHOULD SEEK "PROGRESSIVE ENGAGEMENT" WITH THE ALLIANCE FOR THOSE EASTERN STATES WHICH ARE BOTH INTERESTED AND ABLE TO TAKE PART. THIS SHOULD BE COMBINED THE A FOCUS ON TOTAL SECURITY -- INCLUDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- WHICH DRAWS ON EUROPEAN RESOURCES. SUCH A PROGRAM, AS USNATO AND SACEUR (WITH HIS "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE") HAVE PROPOSED, WOULD NOT SIMPLY BE AN ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL NEED, BUT WOULD AIM TO INCREASE EVERYONE'S LEVEL OF SECURITY -- EUROPE'S, THE ALLIANCE'S AND ABOVE ALL AMERICA'S.

16. THUS, PLANNING FOR THE TWO SUMMITS SHOULD BE CLOSELY LINKED, AND SHOULD FOCUS ON HAVING THE PRESIDENT BRING WITH HIM A POSITIVE MESSAGE FROM THE "CAPITAL OF EUROPE." THIS MESSAGE SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH AN OFFER OF INCREASED INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE AND WORD OF AGGRESSIVE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S EFFORTS TO WRAP UP A PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THIS LATTER ACTION WOULD HELP REASSUE THE RUSSIANS THAT WE SEE THEM AS EVENTUALLY JOINING THE "WEST" IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS.

17. WHATEVER DIRECTION WE ULTIMATELY TAKE ON THIS ISSUE, WE MUST IMMEDIATELY ENGAGE IN FULL-SCALE CONSULTATIONS WITH MOSCOW. SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE VERY HIGH-LEVEL EXPLANATORY MESSAGES AND CONTACTS, AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT OUR POSTURE IS STILL OPEN AND REALISTIC. PICKERING

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Sep-1993 15:19 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

WITKOWSKY@A1@OEOB
EURSD@A1@OEOB
GOTTEMOELLER@A1@OEOB
BURNS@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: YELTSIN:NATO EXPANSION

<DIST>

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL WITKOWSKY

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RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 8639

RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2266

RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2902

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YELTSIN:NATO EXPANSION

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 286653

NODIS

USNATO FOR AMB HUNTER; DOD/EYES ONLY FOR ASPIN; CJCS FOR POWELL
THE FOLLOWING MOSCOW 29876, DATED 20 SEP 93, SENT ACTION SECSTATE
WASHDC, IS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 029876

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND S/NIS TALBOTT FROM
PICKERING

E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR

TAGS: PREL, RS, US, NATO

SUBJECT: YELTSIN:NATO EXPANSION

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11/14/2017

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SOLELY A QUANTITATIVE INCREASE IN NATO DO NOT REQUIRE EXTENSIVE ELABORATION. A POLICY OF NEO-CONTAINMENT OR WHAT CAN BE TAKEN FOR NEO-CONTAINMENT WILL SET BACK AND UNDERMINE PRACTICALLY EVERY USEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE LINE OF ACTION WE HAVE DEVELOPED TOWARD YELTSIN'S RUSSIA. HIS OWN ROLE, AND THAT OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER IN COORDINATING OUR FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES, WILL BE PORTRAYED AS A BETRAYAL, AND WITH SOME SUBSTANCE. U.S. ASSISTANCE, INVESTMENT AND ESPOUSAL OF DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORMS WILL BE SEEN AS SELF-SERVING PENETRATION AT BEST, AT WORST AS EFFORTS UNFAIRLY TO HOBBLE AND PARALYZE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 286653
NODIS

USNATO FOR AMB HUNTER; DOD/EYES ONLY FOR ASPIN; CJCS FOR POWELL
RUSSIA. YELTSIN'S PUBLIC SUPPORT WILL BE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED. WE COULD BE ASKING FOR REAL TROUBLE HERE.

6. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEDGER WE HAVE A SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY. WE WILL NEED TO BEGIN TO DECIDE WHAT ROLES AND FUNCTIONS AN ENLARGED NATO CAN BEST PERFORM. WE MIGHT THINK OF SEVERAL STAGES IN THE TRANSITION. WE CANNOT EASILY SET ASIDE THE CENTRAL CONCEPT OF THE ALLIANCE THAT AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL. BUT THAT CONCEPT RAISES SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS FOR MANY WITH EXPANSION. WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING IT TO SLOVAKIA, OR HUNGARY, TO SAY NOTHING OF SLOVENIA,

ALBANIA OR BULGARIA?

7. MUCH MORE POSITIVELY, WE HAVE A VIGOROUS NATO POISED TO PLAY AN INVALUABLE ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING IN EUROPE, A ROLE THAT CONTRIBUTES AS WELL TO THE POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEMAKING. EVEN MORE THAN WORKING OUT NATO'S EUROPEAN AND INDEED WORLDWIDE POLITICAL AND SECURITY FUTURE, WE NEED TO DEVELOP THE APPLICATION OF CSCE PRINCIPLES TO NATO'S ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF ASSURING A FUTURE PEACEFUL EUROPE. FINALLY, WE NEED TO EXPLORE TO WHAT THE BROADER ACTIVITIES A NEW NATO CAN CONTRIBUTE - WHETHER IT IS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY OR A REAL ASSURANCE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVATION. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF CSCE AND NATO WILL BE CRITICAL, AS WELL AS HOW AND IN WHICH WAYS THE DEVELOPING EUROPEAN COMMUNITY RELATES TO THESE ISSUES. THE HARMONIZATION OF ROLES AND ACTIVITIES AND THE DEFINITION OF THE ALLIANCE'S PLACE IN DEALING WITH SOME OR ALL OF THESE ISSUES IN CONCERT OR AT LEAST NOT IN COMPETITION WITH CSCE AND THE COMMUNITY WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR THE DAYS AHEAD.

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8. RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR CONSULTATION ARE ALSO USEFUL IN GETTING THEM TO DO SOME HARD THINKING ABOUT THEIR NEAR ABROAD NEIGHBORHOOD AND PROVIDE ANOTHER USEFUL OPENING FOR US TO EXPRESS CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL VIEWS IN THIS AREA. YELTSIN'S OFFER OF GUARANTEES TO EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO "SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS AND IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN THE REGION," WOULD PROVIDE A POTENTIALLY HELPFUL MODEL FOR DEALING WITH THE REPUBLICS OF THE FSU AND ESPECIALLY UKRAINE. IN THE LONG RUN, RUSSIA SHOULD NOT OFFER BYELORUSSIA OR UKRAINE ANY LESS IN THE WAY OF GUARANTEES OUTSIDE OF NATO THAN IT AGREES TO PROVIDE POLAND OR RUMANIA INSIDE THE ALLIANCE. A POTENTIAL ENLARGEMENT OF RUSSIAN GUARANTEES MIGHT HELP IN BRINGING THE UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE NEARER TO CLOSURE.

9. WE NEED NOW TO TURN OUR ATTENTION AND THE ATTENTION OF THE ALLIANCE TO AN ACTIVE DETERMINATION OF ITS FUTURE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS. WE SHOULD BE CONSULTING THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS CLOSELY AS WE DO SO. THE JANUARY NATO SUMMIT MIGHT WELL KICK OFF THE PROCESS AFTER CAREFUL PREPARATION WITH THE ALLIES. THE PRESIDENT COULD SET OUT HIS VISION AND CHART THE COURSE FOR THE FUTURE, ASK THE ALLIES TO WORK ON IT, ASSURE THE RUSSIANS AND NACC MEMBERS THEY WILL BE A PART OF THE PROCESS AND AT THE SAME TIME MAKE CLEAR THAT THE MEMBERSHIP QUESTION REMAINS OPEN AND READY FOR STAGED IMPLEMENTATION AS THE PROCESS PROCEEDS. WE MAY WISH IN THIS REGARD TO SEEK TO FIND WAYS TO HAVE THE VISEGRAD STATES JOIN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, ALONG WITH RUSSIA, ON A MORE FORMAL AND EXPLICIT BASIS THAN JUST THROUGH THE NACC, AS A WAY OF ADJUSTING TO THE PROCESS WHICH YELTSIN HIMSELF HELPED TO PUT IN MOTION IN WARSAW.

10. IN SUMMARY, IF WE DON'T ADDRESS SUBSTANCE BEFORE WE DECIDE ON MEMBERSHIP WE RISK SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN RUSSIA AND QUITE POSSIBLY IN THE REST OF EUROPE. WE DO NOT HAVE TO DECIDE ON MEMBERSHIP UNTIL WE HAVE DECIDED ON THE OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND PATH FOR THE TRANSITION IN THE ALLIANCE. WE HAVE WIDE-RANGING POSSIBILITIES TO DEVELOP THIS INTENSIVE EFFORT AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND A REMARKABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AT THE JANUARY NATO SUMMIT.
PICKERING UNQUOTE WHARTON

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SECTION: 01 OF 02 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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DECL: OADR

Phased NATO Expansion: Draft Declaration Language

We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to new democracies to our East. The timing and scope of such expansion will depend, in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on the readiness and ability of those states to meet the obligations and standards of membership and on respect for the security of all CSCE states.

Among the factors we would take into account in admitting new Alliance members are a firm commitment to democratic values and institutions, substantial progress towards establishment of a stable market-based economy, proven commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes and to CSCE principles, the absence of claims on the territory of others, the pursuit of responsible security policies under civilian control and transparent to publics, positive action on non-proliferation issues, and contribution to NATO objectives, including furtherance of the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and the ability to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

As an important step in the continuing adaptation of NATO to the new security environment, we propose to all CSCE states willing and able to participate a Peacekeeping Partnership within a transformed North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
[Paragraph summarizing the Partnership]

The Peacekeeping Partnership will result in an immediate qualitative change in the relationship among NATO states and others who participate in it. It will transform NACC into an operating body through which Western and Eastern militaries plan, train, and exercise together to meet the kinds of contingencies that are now most likely to arise in Europe. A regular pattern of cooperation by Allied military units with their counterparts in the Peacekeeping Partnership will provide tangible evidence of the commitment of NATO members to the security and stability of all CSCE states. This will make a key contribution to an emerging European security system that serves the legitimate interests of all CSCE members and is directed against none.

Neither the Peacekeeping Partnership nor other NACC activities are intended as substitutes for extension of NATO membership. Indeed, active cooperation in the Partnership can help lay the foundations for membership. NATO's transformation is a continuing process that cooperative programs with NACC partners will advance, although the extent of partners' participation in particular programs may vary. We also welcome participation in the Peacekeeping Partnership by CSCE states that may not aspire to become NATO members.

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In addition to establishing this Peacekeeping Partnership we foresee the extension of associate member status to states that, although not prepared in all respects for full NATO membership, demonstrate through consistent action over time their commitment to the standards we have identified as relevant to the admission of new NATO members. Allies will consult together with an Associate Member whenever, in its opinion, its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. We will also invite Associate Members to attend and express their views on a regular basis in appropriate NATO fora. We expect that a state taking this further important step into still closer partnership with NATO will develop the mutual commitment and habits of cooperation that full Alliance membership requires.

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STRAWMAN SUMMIT DECLARATION: Section on ESDI and Force Structure

The end of the Cold War has not altered the fundamental need for the Alliance to preserve the peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, NATO must continue to change to meet new challenges. Today, we decided on new steps that will enhance the Alliance's ability to respond to new contingencies and simultaneously develop its European pillar in ways that both strengthen the transatlantic security relationship and promote the goal of European Union. In this regard, the Alliance welcomes the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty which it sees as a fundamental development on the European landscape.

The Alliance supports the evolution of separable, but not separate, European defense forces capable of responding to European requirements and contributing to our common security. Such forces will be anchored within the Alliance and be supported by its command structure. While they will, as a matter of priority, be available for NATO commitments, they also will be capable of functioning apart from NATO.

All proposed use of military forces in Europe, outside NATO territory, will be the subject of consultations in the North Atlantic Council. Should NATO decide not to engage, appropriate Alliance assets may be made available to members who choose to act as members of the WEU or in other groupings.

We have today approved principles under which NATO structures and command relationships will be further adapted, resulting in more agile and mobile forces. These adaptations will preserve the integrity of the integrated military structure, while providing the flexibility to perform a range of possible new tasks.

As we organize our forces, more emphasis will be placed on the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), appropriately tailored in size, force mix, and nationality for specific contingencies. The CJTFs will draw primarily upon NATO trained and integrated forces, working under common procedures and maintained at sufficient states of readiness to be able to respond quickly and effectively. The CJTFs will also have the ability to incorporate non-integrated forces and commanders, including those of the peacekeeping partners as well as other states. The CJTFs will be organized for crisis management. When appropriate, the Combined Joint Task Forces can be used by the Western European Union and, in that capacity, will exemplify the "separable but not separate" concept.

NATO Military Authorities will report in six months on the specific steps required to implement these decisions, and we pledge to provide adequate resources to support fully the decision of this summit.

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This continuing evolution of NATO's military structures and command relationships will ensure that the Alliance is thoroughly prepared to meet the security challenges of the current environment, irrespective of their nature, location and intensity, with measured but effective responses. We are prepared to participate fully and cooperatively in this broad approach to the maintenance of peace and security and we reaffirm our long-standing support for European integration and the development of a viable European security identity.

SERPMS ID 5831

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003g. paper	re: Embedded CJTF Concept (1 page) [Partial]	08/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0037 PC Meeting on NATO Summit, October 18, 1993

2015-0768-M
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RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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EMBEDDED CJTF CONCEPT

The integrated command structure will be retained as presently configured for use in Article V defense of NATO territory. This structure is the true strength of the Alliance and provides for the common experiences of working and training together as Allies. It also can provide the nucleus in evolving to a more flexible arrangement for non-Article 5 scenarios.

- SACEUR would direct each MSC (AFNORTHWEST, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH) to predesignate from within their headquarters a command (1, 2, or 3 star general) and a staff nucleus of officers and NCO's as a standing contingency task force headquarters.
- When required by a given crisis, the CJTF would be activated and pulled from its parent command to conduct those operations deemed necessary by NATO authorities for non-Article 5 contingencies.
- The CJTF would be flexible enough to work directly for SACEUR or if the situation warranted, to work for the MSC.
- As the situation dictated, the standing CJTF would be augmented by personnel with special skills and non-NATO personnel contributing to any given peacekeeping operation.
- This CJTF would periodically conduct training together as a staff either through simulations or in regular field exercises with a peacekeeping focus.
- This CJTF model could provide the basis for separable but not separate forces of a European security and defense identity.

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Concept Presentation. SACEUR will informally discuss ESDI/CJTF ideas with FR, UK, and GE military leaders. SHAPE will continue to flesh out the idea in a close-hold group pending NATO guidance from the summit. Washington could begin exploratory discussions on issues of a political nature.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Madrid NATO Summit (1 page)	06/10/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: Madrid Summit Issues: The "Who" and the Open Door (4 pages)	06/07/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Open Door Package for Madrid Communique (1 page)	06/06/1997	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	re: Madrid Summit Issues: The "Who" and the Open Door (3 pages)	06/06/1997	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	re: Open Door Package for Madrid Communique (1 page)	06/06/1997	P1/b(1)
001f. paper	[re: A Diplomatic and Congressional Strategy for Madrid and Beyond] [incomplete copy] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001g. paper	re: Madrid Summit Issues: The "Who" and the Open Door [incomplete copy] (1 page)	06/06/1997	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	John Schmidt to Samuel Berger re: PC Meeting on Madrid Summit... (4 pages)	06/09/1997	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	06/10/1997	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: Madrid Summit Issues: The "Who" and the Open Door (4 pages)	06/07/1997	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re: Open Door Package for Madrid Communique (1 page)	06/06/1997	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	re: A Diplomatic and Congressional Strategy for Madrid and Beyond (8 pages)	06/09/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

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NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3904

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0230 PC Meeting on Madrid NATO Summit Planning, June 10, 1997

2015-0768-M
rs1321

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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responsibility for keeping Bucharest out of the first round of enlargement, especially since Kohl is scheduled to meet with Romanian President Constantinescu.

At the same time, he wants to be — and to be seen as being — part of the process. He is proud of his role in bringing about the NATO-Russian Founding Act and would like to have the “who” issue handled in a similar fashion.

Kohl remains the pivot. By working closely with and firming up Kohl, we can mitigate the danger that Chirac will succeed in rolling him as well.

Tony Blair also very much wants to be seen as part of the process. However, he is already much closer to our view on small yet has concerns about our open door strategy. Thus, he provides also a mirror image of Kohl's concerns. In the case of both Kohl and Blair, we should seek closure on this issue before Denver.

Steps to achieve our objective of bringing Germany and the UK on board should include POTUS phone calls to:

- Blair to reaffirm our position and ask for his support for both a small first round along with robust open door.
- Kohl to underscore U.S. position and signal the launch of our effort to build consensus behind our position.

While we should hardly expect Chirac to fold at this stage, a courtesy call to him would signal our seriousness both to Paris and others. (See further steps on France below).

SecState should follow-up by placing calls to her counterparts in same countries to reinforce the same message.

SecDef, as mentioned earlier, can deliver same message with counterparts at NAC-D.

SecState should deliver the same message to SYG Solana.

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include additional phone calls and/or travel to capitals if we run into trouble with specific allies.

IV. The Rollout On Capitol Hill

Solidifying Congressional support for our decision is essential both to ensure a successful ratification and as a source of additional leverage over Allies who do not necessarily share our view on the "who" and "open door."

The Congressional rollout of this decision must provide some members of the Senate with news of this decision before they hear about it from any public source. If the Senate leadership and/or the members of the SNOG hear about this decision from the media, it will exacerbate their current frustration over the flow of shared information and possibly undercut the current level of support and cooperation. Moreover, at least one round of consultations after the PC and before POTUS approval will have to be made to fill the President's pledge to Sen. Roth.

POTUS plan
to call
Roth
today

We must assume that word of our campaign will leak as soon as it is discussed with allied leaders. Thus, prior to any POTUS calls to allied heads of state, the Administration should call select members of Congress. The short list is: Sen. Lott, Sen. Daschle, Sen. Roth (as chair of the SNOG), Sen. Biden (co-chair and vocal proponent of Slovenia) and Sen. Helms (as chair of the committee of jurisdiction over NATO enlargement). It would be advisable to add Sen. Gordon Smith (chair of the subcommittee of jurisdiction), Speaker Gingrich, Majority Leader Gephardt and Chairman Gilman to the list. Of these initial calls, Berger should call the two Senate leaders; SecState, SecDef, and DepSecState could divide the others.

As quickly as possible, we should arrange a closed session briefing for the SNOG on the decision.

At the same time, it is important to give the allies time to move towards a consensus on our terms that does not leave them exposed to the criticism of having been rolled by the United States.

Therefore, we must emphasize to the Senate leaders that they are

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6/9/97 /

A Diplomatic and Congressional Strategy for Madrid — and Beyond

This paper lays out a strategy for building support for a first tranche of only three countries — Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary while pushing hard for a wide open door at Madrid. It focuses on the need to build a consensus in the Alliance and on Capital Hill, and to develop steps to cushion the blow for disappointed Partners.

I. Obtain PC and POTUS Affirmation of U.S. Position. In order to launch an effective effort to build a consensus around our position, we need a formal, final decision. The Principals should deliberate the week of June 9 on a recommendation to POTUS.

II. Reaffirm that Position with Allies at Upcoming NAC-D. Secretary of State Albright indicated our "predisposition" for three at Sintra; Secretary of Defense Cohen's intervention at NAC-D meeting next week offers an opportunity to underscore the U.S.'s position in general terms. Allies will be watching very closely to see whether our position has held firm or shifted since Sintra. Secretary of Defense Cohen can use his bilateral meetings and conversations at the margins of the NAC-D to lay out the U.S. PC- and POTUS-approved position in full along with its rationale.

III. Building a Consensus for 3 at 16 in 6 Steps. Bringing the Alliance on board requires a series of steps targeting different groups within the Alliance. It will be crucial to move quickly — and to give Allies the opportunity to move as well — in order to avoid the public impression that we are rolling them. Allies want to be seen as having contributed to a consensus and not as having merely acquiesced to a U.S. position.

Such a strategy should focus on the following five steps:

1. Solidify the Core Group. The place to start building that consensus is with core allies, especially Germany and the UK. Chancellor Kohl is the pivot and will require special handling. He seems inclined to three but also does not want to publicly oppose his close political friend French President Jacques Chirac on Romania.

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or have Germany have to take responsibility for keeping Bucharest out of the first round of enlargement, especially since Chancellor Kohl is scheduled to meet with Romanian President Constantinescu shortly before Madrid.

At the same time, Chancellor Kohl wants to be — and to be seen as being — part of the process. He is proud of his role in bringing about the NATO-Russian Founding Act and would like to have the “who” issue handled in a similar fashion. By working closely with and firming up Kohl, we can maximize the likelihood that we will be able to count on German support for our position.

UK Prime Minister Blair also very much wants to be seen as part of the process. However, he is already much closer to our view on small yet has concerns about our open door strategy. Thus, he provides also a mirror image of Kohl’s concerns. In the case of both Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Blair, we should seek closure on this issue before Denver.

Steps to achieve our objective of bringing Germany and the UK on board should include POTUS phone calls to:

— Prime Minister Blair to reaffirm our position and ask for his support for both a small first round along with robust open door.

— Chancellor Kohl to underscore U.S. position and signal the launch of our effort to build consensus behind our position.

While we should hardly expect President Chirac to acquiesce to our position at this stage, a courtesy call to him would signal our seriousness both to Paris and others. (See further steps on France below).

Secretary of State Albright should follow-up by placing calls to her counterparts in same countries to reinforce the same message.

Secretary of Defense Cohen, as mentioned earlier, can deliver same message with counterparts at NAC-D.

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Secretary of State Albright should deliver the same message to NATO Secretary General Solana.

Ambassador Hunter in Brussels should also carry this message to his June 11 meeting with Solana.

2. Firm Up Support Among Small Allies Leaning Our Way. The Northern Allies — Norway, Denmark, Netherlands — are likely to fall in behind a small group once they have confidence the U.S. will hang tough.

Secretary of State Albright or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott calling in resident Ambassadors should help lock in their support. This should be followed up by our Ambassadors in capitals.

3. Address Allies in the Middle. For Canadians and Belgium, Sintra discussion of "who" was relatively cost-free. Once it is clear that we have made a final decision, they will have to factor into their own position the consequences of being at odds with a U.S. that is determined to hold the line at three.

Again, Secretary of State Albright or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott should call in resident Ambassadors to explain the U.S. position, the reasons for it and ask them to consider supporting our position. This should also be followed up by our Ambassadors in respective country capitols.

4. Address Concerns of Southern-Tier Allies (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey). In some cases, support for Romania and Slovenia among Southern-tier Allies is firm; in other cases it is not and instead reflects a desire for greater balance in Alliance policy and attention to "the South." We must make it clear that we understand and share their concerns about potential strategic instability in the South, are committed to work with them to develop an appropriate strategy, and that eventual enlargement to countries like Romania and Slovenia can be part of such a strategy.

Secretary of State Albright and/or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott should call FMs to explain our position in favor of three while also

underscoring that that we share their desire for greater Summit-level emphasis at Madrid on NATO's interest in, and commitment to, strategy of helping to encourage long-term stability in South, specifically Southeast Europe.

In the case of Italy or Spain, we might also consider a higher-level (e.g., POTUS) phone call later in the process if necessary.

5. Handling the French: While it is not yet clear how President Chirac's electoral reversal and the advent of Prime Minister Jospin might affect the French position, we must assume that Paris will press for a larger group — and particularly for Romania. In Paris, Secretary Albright offered bilateral consultations on the Romania issue. We should confirm our desire for such consultations while implementing the other elements of our strategy. Our goal should be to bring this to closure by the time of the POTUS bilateral with Chirac in Denver. But we must also recognize that the French President may want to play this down to the wire at Madrid, which would also complicate Helmut Kohl's calculations. In particular, we should:

- demonstrate our readiness to avoid public fight over "who" with France or to portray small group invitation as French defeat.
- refuse any attempt at linkage/horse-trading with other issues such as AFSOUTH
- seek to engage French to extent possible as "co-author" of Southern initiative detailed below to give greater Alliance emphasis on Southeast Europe as means of giving Paris a "win" at Madrid.

This message should be delivered in all channels: National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to his French counterpart Levitte, Secretary of State Albright to Foreign Minister Vedrine, as well as Secretary of Defense Cohen to French Defense Minister Richard.

Additional Factors. Two final factors deserve consideration. The first is timing. We must assume that once this effort is launched, word will spread quickly within the Alliance and in the media. We

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must therefore move in a concentrated fashion so that consultations with Allies take place at different levels as close to one another as possible. We should aim at completing these calls within a 48 hour.

A second factor is back-up. We must have a plan for further follow-on action if our initial efforts run into heavy resistance. This could include additional phone calls and/or travel to capitals if we run into trouble with specific allies.

IV. The Rollout On Capitol Hill

Solidifying Congressional support for our decision is essential both to ensure a successful ratification and as a source of additional leverage over Allies who do not necessarily share our view on the "who" and "open door."

The Congressional rollout of this decision must provide some members of the Senate with news of this decision before they hear about it from any public source. If the Senate leadership and/or the members of the SNOG hear about this decision from the media, it will exacerbate their current frustration over the flow of shared information and possibly undercut the current level of support and cooperation. Moreover, POTUS will want to call Senator Roth to fulfill his pledge of consultations prior to the U.S. making a final decision on this issue.

We must assume that word of our campaign will leak as soon as it is discussed with allied leaders. Thus, prior to any POTUS calls to allied heads of state, the Administration should call select members of Congress. The short list is: Sen. Lott, Sen. Daschle, Sen. Roth (as chair of the SNOG), Sen. Biden (co-chair and vocal proponent of Slovenia) and Sen. Helms (as chair of the committee of jurisdiction over NATO enlargement). It would be advisable to add Sen. Gordon Smith (chair of the subcommittee of jurisdiction), Speaker Gingrich, Minority Leader Gephardt and Chairman Gilman to the list. Of these initial calls, National Security Advisor Berger should call the two Senate leaders; Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott could divide the others.

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As quickly as possible, we should arrange a closed session briefing for the SNOG on the decision.

At the same time, it is important to give the allies time to move towards a consensus on our terms and to do so in a fashion that does not leave them exposed to the criticism of having been rolled by the United States. Therefore, we must emphasize to the Senate leaders that they are being consulted in the utmost confidence, that we are in the midst of very delicate negotiations and that it is imperative that they treat this information as confidential lest they undercut our diplomacy.

After calls to these core leaders have been completed, follow-on calls should be made by the extended national security team to other key congressional leaders. This should be followed up by a briefing for the SNOG by a senior Administration official (e.g. Secretary of State Albright or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott).

V. The Strategy for Would-Be New Members Included in the First Tranche and Runners-Up

Partners should also hear of our decision, and the rationale for it, from us and not through the media or second-hand from other Allies. These consultations should be carried out by resident Ambassadors. They should start with would-be new members.

In the case of Romania and Slovenia, however, we should consider having the Secretary of State Albright call her counterparts to deliver the message and to underscore our desire to work with these countries to mitigate the consequences of this decision. However, Ambassadors in Bucharest and Slovenia should give their counterparts a heads-up in advance. These calls should take place immediately after consultations with Allies.

It is essential that our position for three be portrayed as driven by the principles we stand for — i.e. maintaining Alliance strength and stability, virtues which all allies and Partners support — and not what we oppose, namely a larger group for the first round. To

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preempt criticism that we are, for example, "anti-Romanian" we must emphasize the following themes in these consultations with Partners:

— we are strongly committed to an open door strategy (our commitment is perhaps stronger than anyone else in the Alliance);

— our answer is not "no" but "not yet," and that our commitment to the first not being the last.

— their handling of this issue will be seen as a test of their political maturity (and, in the case of Romania, we might add that their handling of the issue to date has not been what we would have hoped from a potential Ally);

— the U.S. has an excellent track record of delivering its commitment at each stage in the enlargement debate--and we can be trusted to continue to do so;

— they need to work with us on handling the aftermath of our irrevocable decision. That means they must not define a partial success as failure. Instead, we must collaborate in consolidating the progress already made and build on it. Countries like Romania and Slovenia are on the right track

— we want to work even more closely with those Partners who fear the negative impact of non-inclusion in the weeks ahead and after Madrid to accomplish this goal.

The Baltic states and Romania occupy a special position in this strategy. In both cases, we need specific strategies tailored to their political sensitivities in addition to our overall open door strategy. The basic elements of a reassurance strategy for the Baltic states and Northeastern Europe are either in place (e.g., the Baltic Action Plan) or in the works (e.g., the Baltic Charter).

What is now needed is a parallel strategy for the Southeastern Europe that specifically addresses Romania and Slovenia. Such a strategy must emphasize our strategic view of Romania's role, our

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desire to build a strong U.S.-Romanian Partnership and to use it as a building block in a broader strategy to build stability in Southeastern Europe and the South more generally.

We should underscore our willingness to come to the region to discuss such a strategy with Partners and to work closely with Romania's friends in the Alliance — especially France and Turkey — to develop a joint approach to continue the momentum of Romania's integration with NATO.

VI: Russia, Ukraine and the NIS: The hallmarks of our dealings with Moscow, Kiev and other NIS capitals should be transparency, clarity, firmness (especially with Moscow on the freedom-to-choose/no-exclusion, no-veto, no-discrimination issue), and emphasis on those aspects of the larger NATO-led agenda in which these countries are involved, i.e., PFP, EAPC as well as, in Russia's case, the NRPJC and, in Ukraine's, full, prompt implementation of the Charter. We should not brief Russia or Ukraine in advance on decisions on future membership that are NATO's to make but should be responsive to queries that may come from them as reporting of our decision spreads. We should refute any suggestions by anyone that our choice was dictated by Russian concerns and instead emphasize the principles regarding NATO's health and strength that determined our decision.

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MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0054 DC Meeting on NATO Summit, September 8, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3996				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO Summit (2 pages)	09/08/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. paper	re: NATO Summit Decision Check List (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: NATO Summit Concept Paper (5 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: [Peacekeeping Partnership Member Issues] (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. statement	re: Agreement on a Euro-Atlantic Partnership for Peace (3 pages)	08/26/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002e. paper	re: NACC Charter and Partnership for Peace (3 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002f. list	re: East European and CIS Forces for Peacekeeping (4 pages) [partial]	08/26/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 9/16/2016
002g. paper	re: Enlarging NATO Membership (4 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002h. paper	re: Embedded CJTF Concept (1 page) [partial]	08/20/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002i. paper	re: Strawman Summit Declaration: Section on ESDI and Force Structure (2 pages)	08/25/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002j. talking points	re: NATO Summit Talking Points (3 pages)	08/24/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002k. memo	Charles Kupchan to Samuel Berger re: DC Meeting on the NATO Summit... (2 pages)	08/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0054 DC Meeting on NATO Summit, September 8, 1993

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002l. memo	Charles Kupchan to Samuel Berger re: DC Meeting on the NATO Summit... (2 pages)	08/26/1993	P1/b(1)
003. list	Deputies Committee Meeting [Attendance List] [partial] (1 page)	09/08/1993	P3/b(3)

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FOLDER TITLE:

DC0054 DC Meeting on NATO Summit, September 8, 1993

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AGREEMENT ON A EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization invites other members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and other nations of Europe to join a Partnership for Peace.

In establishing this partnership the Alliance affirms its commitment to:

- Continue developing the community of values and purpose between the North American and European democracies;
- Respond to the task of building cooperation, democracy and security for all in Europe;
- Support United Nations and CSCE efforts in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Europe and beyond in association with the members of this partnership as may be appropriate;
- Make available in support of common North American and European interests in Europe and beyond those Alliance assets and capabilities as may be required to meet mutually agreed objectives for sustaining peace;
- Consult and develop with other partners a planning and review process that would provide a basis for the identification and evaluation of forces and capabilities that would be made available by partner states for multinational peacekeeping training and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
- Establish a Deputy Secretary General for Partnership Activities who would maintain oversight of Cooperation and Partnership activities including liaison with the UN and CSCE when and as appropriate;
- Establish a Military Cooperation Committee comprised of senior military representatives from each of the partnership nations to coordinate and provide direction and guidance relevant to partnership peacekeeping activities including and training, exercises and the development of doctrine;
- Establish with the partners a permanent peacekeeping planning cell at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe for purposes of developing doctrine and planning for peacekeeping contingency operations, including training, exercises;

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- Make provision for office facilities and other support as may be required by members of the partnership to maintain appropriate Staff presence at NATO Civil and Military Headquarters in which they may be involved;
- Develop with other partners for the approval of the NATO Military Committee and Defense Planning Committee a plan that will establish and ensure efficient and steady implementation of the military provisions of this agreement.

In turn, the States joining with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in this Partnership for Peace declare their intention to further unite East and West in the service of a Europe whole and free and reaffirm:

their conviction that the protection of fundamental freedoms and the promotion of human rights is the first responsibility of government, and that democracy is the only system of government capable of safeguarding freedom, justice and peace;

the international obligations undertaken as a result of joining this Partnership for Peace, including the provisions of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE agreements;

that our security is indivisible, that the security of every participating state is inseparably linked to that of all others, and that the preservation of democratic societies and their freedom from coercion or intimidation are of direct concern to all signatories. Accordingly, we will;

- Refrain from the threat or use of force against the security, territorial integrity, or political independence of any state;
- Respect existing borders, internal and external, with any changes to be made only by peaceful and consensual means;
- Seek to resolve questions related to national minorities in a democratic political framework, free from intimidation, coercion or force;
- Refrain from the stationing of military forces on the territory of any other state, except at the request of that state;
- Settle disputes by peaceful means, making full use of CSCE mechanisms for conflict prevention and mediation among states.

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- Consult together and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its members, whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened;
- Maintain an effective civilian-controlled Defense Ministry, defense planning system and defense budget available and open to public scrutiny;
- Establish permanent delegations at the Headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for purposes of coordinating and participating in partnership activities;
- Develop as appropriate, individually and collectively, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military capabilities to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the CSCE or the United Nations;
- Establish cooperative military relations with the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the purpose of joint training and readiness in order to undertake peacekeeping missions. Including:
 - participation in joint planning with NATO for peacekeeping and related activities;
 - providing facilities and other support for peacekeeping exercises and training;
 - assignment of Staff personnel to participate in planning and evaluation activities at NATO military headquarters as may be appropriate; and, over the longer term,
 - development, over the longer term, of a force structure that can meet NATO standards, is interoperable with Alliance forces, and ready to participate in multinational peacekeeping exercises and operations as may be required.

This Partnership for Peace is established on the conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can only be achieved through partnership and cooperation. The partners pledge to play a full part making the best use of the resources and institutions available to them to support the process of democracy and reform, and to prevent conflict.

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08/26/93

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. paper	re: Embedded CJTF Concept (1 page) [partial]	08/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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DC0054 DC Meeting on NATO Summit, September 8, 1993

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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EMBEDDED CJTF CONCEPT

The integrated command structure will be retained as presently configured for use in Article V defense of NATO territory. This structure is the true strength of the Alliance and provides for the common experiences of working and training together as Allies. It also can provide the nucleus in evolving to a more flexible arrangement for non-Article 5 scenarios.

- SACEUR would direct each MSC (AFNORTHWEST, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH) to predesignate from within their headquarters a command (1, 2, or 3 star general) and a staff nucleus of officers and NCO's as a standing contingency task force headquarters.
- When required by a given crisis, the CJTF would be activated and pulled from its parent command to conduct those operations deemed necessary by NATO authorities for non-Article 5 contingencies.
- The CJTF would be flexible enough to work directly for SACEUR or if the situation warranted, to work for the MSC.
- As the situation dictated, the standing CJTF would be augmented by personnel with special skills and non-NATO personnel contributing to any given peacekeeping operation.
- This CJTF would periodically conduct training together as a staff either through simulations or in regular field exercises with a peacekeeping focus.
- This CJTF model could provide the basis for separable but not separate forces of a European security and defense identity.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Concept Presentation. SACEUR will informally discuss ESDI/CJTF ideas with FR, UK, and GE military leaders. SHAPE will continue to flesh out the idea in a close-hold group pending NATO guidance from the summit. Washington could begin exploratory discussions on issues of a political nature.

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VZ 2015-0768-M (1.53)
10/29/2019

STRAWMAN SUMMIT DECLARATION: Section on ESDI and Force Structure

The end of the Cold War has not altered the fundamental need for the Alliance to preserve the peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, NATO must continue to change to meet new challenges. Today, we decided on new steps that will enhance the Alliance's ability to respond to new contingencies and simultaneously develop its European pillar in ways that both strengthen the transatlantic security relationship and promote the goal of European Union. In this regard, the Alliance welcomes the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty which it sees as a fundamental development on the European landscape.

The Alliance supports the evolution of separable, but not separate, European defense forces capable of responding to European requirements and contributing to our common security. Such forces will be anchored within the Alliance and be supported by its command structure. While they will, as a matter of priority, be available for NATO commitments, they also will be capable of functioning apart from NATO.

All proposed use of military forces in Europe, outside NATO territory, will be the subject of consultations in the North Atlantic Council. Should NATO decide not to engage, appropriate Alliance assets may be made available to members who choose to act as members of the WEU or in other groupings.

We have today approved principles under which NATO structures and command relationships will be further adapted, resulting in more agile and mobile forces. These adaptations will preserve the integrity of the integrated military structure, while providing the flexibility to perform a range of possible new tasks.

As we organize our forces, more emphasis will be placed on the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), appropriately tailored in size, force mix, and nationality for specific contingencies. The CJTFs will draw primarily upon NATO trained and integrated forces, working under common procedures and maintained at sufficient states of readiness to be able to respond quickly and effectively. The CJTFs will also have the ability to incorporate non-integrated forces and commanders, including those of the peacekeeping partners as well as other states. The CJTFs will be organized for crisis management. When appropriate, the Combined Joint Task Forces can be used by the Western European Union and, in that capacity, will exemplify the "separable but not separate" concept.

NATO Military Authorities will report in six months on the specific steps required to implement these decisions, and we pledge to provide adequate resources to support fully the decision of this summit.

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This continuing evolution of NATO's military structures and command relationships will ensure that the Alliance is thoroughly prepared to meet the security challenges of the current environment, irrespective of their nature, location and intensity, with measured but effective responses. We are prepared to participate fully and cooperatively in this broad approach to the maintenance of peace and security and we reaffirm our long-standing support for European integration and the development of a viable European security identity.

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August 24, 1993

NATO Summit Talking Points

- o The NATO Summit must send a clear, unambiguous message that the Alliance remains at the core of European security, and of U.S. engagement in Europe.
- o The crisis in former Yugoslavia has confirmed that a vital, evolving NATO is essential to meet post-Cold-War security challenges.
- o Building on the agenda that Secretary Christopher outlined in Athens, our Summit work in Washington has centered on three themes:
 - strengthening and making more operational NATO's outreach to the East through NACC,
 - enhancing NATO peacekeeping capabilities, and
 - considering how NATO's relationship to a European Security and Defense Identity can best be developed.
- o We have also looked at further reform to NATO force structures, improved NATO-UN and NATO-CSCE coordination, and non-proliferation.
- o Enhancing the security of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is clearly the priority issue for the Summit.
 - We must ensure that other worthy Summit initiatives do not cloud the central message: NATO is acting to increase the security of the East.

A Closer Partnership with the East

- [o We continue to believe that opening a debate now on possible eventual expansion of NATO membership would not be helpful. That would only raise the anxiety level of countries like Russia and Ukraine, which would find themselves at the end of the queue. Instead, NACC should be energized and transformed to more fully meet Eastern interests and address some of their immediate security concerns.]

*Pending
Deputies/
Principles
decision*

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- o NACC has succeeded in its original purpose of extending NATO's hand of friendship to the East. We need to keep up the momentum. The Summit should qualitatively enhance this relationship, taking decisions that transform NACC into an institution capable of joint action in peacekeeping and crisis management.
- o The mission that NATO must embrace -- as the essential core for significant military action in Europe-- is to deal with the real security risks in the East through active participation in a peacekeeping partnership with NACC member states. Such a partnership could establish the essential foundation for continent-wide peace, democracy, and economic progress.
- o This closer partnership should be reflected, inter alia, in adoption of a program of joint peacekeeping exercises, development on common peacekeeping standards and procedures, establishment of dedicated facilities at NATO and SHAPE for NACC partners, and further evolution of NACC structures.

Prevention of Future Bosnias

- o We hope that, by the time of the Summit, NATO will be helping to implement a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Bosnia that NATO's threat -- or, if necessary, use -- of force helped bring about.
- o This would confirm that NATO has left the "old out-of-area" debate behind and developed the capabilities and political consensus to provide military support, with active participation by Eastern partners, for the international community's efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.
- o The Summit should decide on principles for further adaptation of NATO's force structure, retaining the integrated military structure as presently configured for Article 5 contingencies, but also providing the nucleus for evolving to a more flexible arrangement for non-Article 5 scenarios. The summit should consider the formation of Combined Joint Task Forces, appropriately tailored in size, force mix, and nationality for specific European contingencies. CJTFs could include NACC peacekeeping partners as well as ~~non-NATO members~~, and when appropriate could be used by the WEU. *Other states*

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- o The Summit should also reaffirm NATO's support for CSCE in its new conflict-prevention and crisis-management roles, improve NATO-CSCE communications, and make NATO resources and expertise more readily available to CSCE missions as appropriate.

Rebalancing Internal Responsibilities

- o The Maastricht Treaty will be ratified this fall. The Summit should welcome that development and reaffirm NATO support for the goal of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
- o The Summit should also set in motion a rebalancing of responsibilities between the U.S. and Europe in crisis management, with changes to NATO's political and military structures designed to accommodate a "separable but not separate" ESDI capable of both NATO and non-NATO missions.
 - Non-NATO ESDI missions should be undertaken on the basis of consultations within NATO. NATO assets could be used for such missions on the basis of agreement within the Alliance.
 - The changes needed to implement the "separable but not separate" concept must not undermine NATO's integrated military structure.
 - It will be important for European members of the Alliance to back up the development of an effective ESDI with the necessary resource commitments.
 - The Description of the CJTF concept at Tab 3 may also be used in allied consultations about Summit planning. Those wishing to do so, however, should check with JCS staff members of the IWG to ensure that consultations by Washington officials complement rather than complicate those being undertaken by SACEUR with military leaders of key allies.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: A Strategy for NATO's Transformation and Expansion (9 pages)	09/14/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002a. paper	re: NATO Expansion (6 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. list	re: Effects of Expanding Membership on NATO Military Activities (1 page)	09/13/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002c. statement	re: Strawman Summit Declaration (2 pages)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. list	re: DC Meeting Wednesday, September 15, 1993 [partial] (1 page)	09/15/1993	P3/b(3)

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FOLDER TITLE:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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A STRATEGY FOR NATO'S TRANSFORMATION AND EXPANSION

Providing American Leadership for NATO and Europe

The NATO Summit is an opportunity for the President to articulate a vision for the American role in Europe in the post-Cold War era, and to lead a fundamental transformation of NATO. Such direction is sorely needed and would be welcomed in Europe and on Capitol Hill. In addition to making NATO look relevant to emerging problems, we should use the Summit to establish a context linking the evolving roles of the U.S. and NATO in managing security affairs with our overall goals in Europe.

Our goals in Europe are to ensure the successful transition to democracy and economic development in the East and to support the deepening and broadening of political and economic integration to prevent the return of dangerous nationalisms and conflicts throughout the continent. These have not changed with the end of the Cold War. What has changed is the very real prospect of success in both goals. Yet there is also the growing possibility of failure.

Twice before when such opportunities presented themselves in Europe, the United States sought to avoid responsibility. But then threats to our vital interests required our return to Europe and to assume a leadership role. We confront a similar historical moment.

The fundamental task for the President is to develop a rationale for why Americans still need to play a major role in Europe's evolution, beyond support for reform in Russia. The answer is that American leadership will be required both to build democracy and to prevent the dangers of revived nationalism. Fortunately, the costs to Americans will not be large if undertaken today, and certainly not as large as those of the past. Unfortunately, the public case will be difficult to make, and the means will require fundamentally altered institutional arrangements in Europe.

What's At Stake?

Why the urgency for a fundamental transformation of NATO? Western-oriented reformers in Central and Eastern Europe, unable to show many concrete benefits from embracing democracy and free markets, are in danger of losing control of key governments in the months ahead to former communists or nationalist extremists. This could over time lead to backsliding and new conflicts in the region. The ensuing political and economic instability and refugee flows from the center of Europe would threaten reform in Russia and the NIS and even undermine the social cohesion of our West European allies. Indeed, if NATO does not take steps to address these

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risks more effectively, pressures could arise in Germany for greater independence in maintaining its security or even a complete re-nationalization of its defense policy.

If the Summit skirts the questions of transforming and expanding NATO, disillusionment with the West and the process of democratic reform will deepen in many CEE states. Coupled with growing trade barriers and new obstacles to EC membership, NATO would send another signal that the West really wants an arms-length relationship with the East, not Europe whole and free. Interest in NACC would diminish further because it would tend to confirm that this body is a permanent second-class status rather than a way station to full integration.

An Alternative Approach to the Summit

Thus far, our approach to the NATO Summit has consisted of three elements to demonstrate NATO continuing relevance, notwithstanding events in Bosnia: 1) give NATO, through the NACC or other "outreach" arrangements, new capabilities for joint action with NACC partners to address certain security problems in the East, with a focus on peacekeeping; 2) make adjustments in political and military structures that recognize the EC government's desire for greater autonomy and the U.S. taxpayers' desire to see Europeans bear more of the burden; and 3) adapt NATO's military instruments to take into account both these steps and new security challenges emanating from outside Europe.

What could be developed further is our vision for NATO's long-term future and the context on the U.S. role noted above. Moreover, our efforts need to recognize more explicitly that we are turning to NATO to promote our goals in Europe because of the current limitations of other institutions. The EC and CSCE would be better positioned to promote democracy and cooperation in Europe than a Cold War "collective defense organization." But neither is today capable of fulfilling that role.

Our long-range vision for Europe involves strongly supporting the development of these institutions. But today, NATO must assume a critical role in providing all European countries a means of working cooperatively on security, thereby giving support to those building democracy in the East. At the same time, NATO must continue as an important hedge against failure.

What is necessary for NATO to play this critical role? An incremental approach would focus on the NACC, and a "NACC Charter" which would "transform the NACC into an operational organization in its own right--a new all-European concord--encompassing a peacekeeping partnership with the countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."

A more fundamental transformation would be for NATO now to commit to expansion. The NATO Summit would announce a clear

path or general criteria for membership, which would include standards for all states. These would be couched in a way that does not a priori exclude Russia, Ukraine, or other NIS. Other bilateral programs, as well as NACC activities and possibly new NATO arrangements with Russia and Ukraine, would be designed to take away the sense that NATO expansion was directed against them.

Outlined below is an approach to the Summit that would initiate the transformation of NATO and define a new vision for Europe and America. The vision is bold, but it is one with built-in safeguards and pauses. There is risk in trying to transform NATO, but there is also risk of NATO losing credibility if it does not move more forcefully to address the Eastern security problem. Articulation of such a strategy would go a long way to answering how we hope to avoid future Bosnias. It would also fireproof us against the charge that we are not doing enough to save democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

Articulating Our Vision for NATO

We would start by articulating a new vision for NATO and America's role in Europe in a series of speeches by the Secretaries of State and Defense and other senior Administration officials. A Presidential address later in the fall might amplify our vision of America's future role in Europe and push Summit deliberations in the right direction. The recasting of NATO would have the following elements.

NATO's core purposes for the next decade are to:

- **Help build democracy in Europe and insure stability by preventing a return to nationalism and conflict in Western and Eastern Europe.**
 - These are America's historic goals, and ones that remain relevant in the post Cold War, for democracy in Eastern Europe is fragile, reform in Russia could fail, and Germany could turn away from West.
 - Just as it was difficult for NATO members Greece and Turkey to go to war with one another, NATO membership would bring CEE's problems into the NATO family where there would be great pressures and new leverage to solve them peacefully. So too, NATO activities have kept the Spanish military busy and out of politics.
- **Maintain trans-Atlantic security and political links.**
 - NATO remains the premier vehicle for our involvement in European security affairs and hence our ability to protect our vital interests there.
 - We play a pivotal role in European stability. Our military might, committed to NATO, accounts for part of

this. However, we also function as an "outside" source of political leadership and a buffer in tensions among our often competitive European Allies, suspicious of each others' intentions.

- Maintain the military capabilities necessary to sustain basic Article V commitments for the defense of the territory of NATO member states against any potential threats and defend member's mutual security interests more globally.
- To fill the security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe thereby allaying anxieties that undermine the consolidation of democracy and free markets. Just as the U.S. extended a security guarantee to Western Europe in 1949 to safeguard their post-War recovery, NATO can now provide a similar security context for emerging CEE democracies.
- Engage Russia, Ukraine and other NIS and CEE states (through NACC and bilateral ties) in a range of cooperative security activities. Such steps will reduce the likelihood of Moscow reemerging as a threat to European stability.

-- The challenge for NATO over the next generation -- containing and coopting Russian power -- is similar to one of NATO's core purposes in the last generation -- integrating Germany as a responsible leader of the trans-Atlantic community.

-- If most of the Eastern states, including Russia, succeed in their reforms over the long term, it may seem axiomatic to work closely with them in a transformed NATO to manage Eurasian stability and address external threats to our common security. As NACC cooperation deepened, NATO could end up essentially merging with CSCE as the basic elements of a new all-European collective security system.

Near-Term: Preparing the Summit

Accepting this vision in toto would be a big leap for some of the allies. This process will have to be driven top-down. Most will be willing to show Central and East Europeans the "light at the end of the tunnel" that President Walesa and others are seeking. The longer-term notion of NATO's possible evolution into an all-European collective security organization will be a harder sell.

Even before the Yeltsin-Walesa Joint Declaration there was turmoil on this question at the top of and lower levels within key allied governments. German Defense Minister R  he has been outspoken on this question. It appears the German government will now come out in favor of at least a clear Summit statement opening the door to additional members. Indeed, the Germans may well take the lead on this. Elements of the British government, which would otherwise be satisfied with the concept of parallel

EC and NATO expansion, do favor bolder action. Some of the smaller allies, Norway and the Netherlands, appear have to have been moved by this emerging debate to favor the idea of establishing criteria for expansion. Other allies have been cautious, but this may reflect lack of guidance at the end of the European vacation season.

Wörner's Support

Most importantly, NATO Secretary General Wörner has emerged as a forceful advocate of providing the CEE states a "more concrete perspective" on the path to Alliance membership. Wörner sees Yeltsin's statement in Warsaw as a real opportunity. He will visit Washington in early October, but it now appears we need to discuss our goals with him before then. Since we will have completed preliminary bilateral consultations with key allies by late-September, we should be in a good position to map out a detailed strategy during Wörner's visit.

Engaging Germany

The strategic logic for Germany of expanding NATO's stabilizing influence eastward is compelling. Germany is on the front-line of Central European instability and presently has neither the resources nor political inclination to handle these problems unilaterally. Bonn will want an approach that does not seem to "draw new barriers" in Europe, even though Bonn would have a hard time with the notion of a NATO open to Russia. Criteria that do not exclude Russia may allay these fears.

- It was a joint German-U.S. ministerial initiative, two months before the July 1991 NATO Summit, that led to creation of the NACC--the first step in transforming NATO.
- Given the success of this effort, Secretary Christopher could approach Foreign Minister Kinkel might propose a joint declaration citing our mutual agreement that the Summit should address the expansion question and offering a provisional list of criteria that the Summit should consider.

Enlisting German support for this approach first has the attraction of certain success and would put pressure on other allies, most importantly, the French, to go with the flow. However, a more attractive, if somewhat riskier, approach would be to open parallel or joint consultations with Paris and London.

Getting the French On Board

The French are not opposed in principle to NATO expansion, but would prefer more Euro-centric approaches to dealing with instability in Central and Eastern Europe, à la Balladur. However, the Balladur plan has not received overwhelming support from the EC-12 and the conservative government in Paris is acutely aware of the EC's limits in dealing with instability in the region after the Balkan experience.

What Paris most wants from the Summit is our unequivocal support for ESDI and of WEU use of NATO infrastructure. Our implicit quid pro quo with the French could be agreement on expansion and ESDI as a package.

- This process of reconciliation could be formalized in a Joint Franco-American (Christopher-Juppé) or Quad Statement on ESDI, with expansion as a second theme. It would incorporate our political endorsement for a number of ideas that General Shali has already been working with the French military.
- We could also support elements of the Balladur Plan as important steps in building the EC and CSCE to respond to the dangers which were the motivation of the Plan.

Other Allies

Certainly, the smaller allies would lose some influence through NATO expansion. On the other hand, many of them also recognize the need to stabilize the East and the EC's failings in dealing with the Balkan crisis. As noted above, the Norwegians and the Dutch may be moving towards support for articulating criteria for expansion. The Spanish, who have benefited from NATO's democratizing influence in much the same way we hope the CEE states might, may end up being helpful on this question as well. We will have to court them as well and assure them that expansion will not come precipitously.

Engaging Russia and Ukraine

Having spurred the expansion debate, Yeltsin will be a key player in its denouement. We would want to enlist Yeltsin's support for our new NATO goals fairly early on. Moscow's subsequent official clarifications of Yeltsin's statement emphasize the need for NATO's transformation and ask to be involved in the planning of this process. Thus, we ought to make clear that Russia is included in our vision of an all-European security system, of which an expanded NATO is a part, and that our approach does not exclude them from joining at some point. Obviously, this is tricky. We can't grant the Russians or Ukrainians explicit droit de regard over NATO policy, but we do need to co-opt and avoid surprising them. Moreover, by engaging Moscow and Kiev early, we may be able to have a salutary effect on their own internal deliberations. This would reduce the risk that they will fly off the handle and start uttering extreme preemptive positions.

- We would begin with informal consultations now, building on Yeltsin's expression of Russia's "understanding" for Poland's desire to join NATO. We would explain to Moscow and Kiev the general outlines of what we are thinking and how it flows from an interest in enhancing security throughout Europe.

- In the run-up to the Summit, we and key allies could engage Moscow and Kiev in special consultations and briefings on NATO's deliberations, akin to the 2+4 process on German unification.
- At the Summit, we would announce NATO's policy on expansion in the context of enhancing the NACC's evolution into an operational organization focused upon orchestrating peacekeeping operations, including in the FSU -- thereby also addressing Yeltsin's foremost security problem.
- In addition, we might consider developing special NATO agreements with Russia and Ukraine that would include fresh commitments to principles of democracy, market economics, rule of law, and human rights, reflecting the common values of NATO members. These agreements might also include variants of the security assurances that we have already agreed to provide Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan when they fulfill their Lisbon Protocol commitments. However, concluding such agreements could undermine the message that membership is open to these two states, and exacerbate the sense that NATO expansion to the CEEs will leave them out of the collective security system we are trying to establish.

Other NACC States

To avoid alienating the NACC states, we will have to develop a mechanism for consultation with them on criteria and other elements of the Summit declaration concerning expansion. This could be accomplished through briefings and NACC meetings in Evere. At the same time, we will want to be sure that the Poles and others likely to be active on this debate are saying the right things, particularly to the Russians. Thus, we may also want to open some special bilateral channels with the Visegrad countries to coordinate our efforts.

A Fallback Approach

If we meet greater than expected resistance once we begin consultations, particularly on the question of timing, we could settle for a two-Summit approach: have the January Summit announce a general direction and commitment to expanding NATO's stabilizing influence eastward but tasking a new "Harmel Report" to address how this might be done to be reviewed at a NATO Summit in 1995. However, with strong American and German leadership, we should be able to succeed.

At the Summit

The Summit Declaration would include a general statement of NATO's mission for the post-Cold War era, drawing on the points above, and criteria that would influence members' decisions on offering membership to additional states. (See the papers prepared for the Deputies Committee for illustrative Summit declaration language and criteria.)

Our allies justifiably fear expansion means obligations to states with real security problems and loss of influence with the U.S. We could allay the former concern with a phased process to full membership. Provisional members would not have full voting rights and be entitled to article IV crisis consultations, but not article V security guarantees, for a certain period. For the Central European states this would have the advantage of holding out provisional membership in the near-term. It also leaves open the possibility of Russian and Ukrainian membership. A second phase would provide an Article V commitment, and this would be reserved for those capable of conducting collective defense, i.e. those with force structure and operational planning procedures comparable with those of NATO.

On the other hand, this approach, while soothing to our West European allies, would offer NACC partners only deepened operational cooperation on peacekeeping at the Summit. If the Summit opened the door to membership while also offering article IV consultations and the Peacekeeping Partnership to all NACC states, this would level the playing field and might reinforce the notion that full membership in NATO is open to all who can eventually succeed in meeting the criteria.

After the Summit

The criteria would make it clear just how much work must be done by both current and aspiring NATO members. A number of states, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, might meet the political and economic criteria in short order, in which case we would have to handle the delicate problem of Slovakia -- we do not want the issue of NATO membership to trigger a breakdown of the Visegrad group. However, the military criteria, e.g. ability to operate with NATO forces, modernization restructuring of force structures, would take some time. Russia might meet the military criteria sooner than others, but still need to show progress on democratic reform. Everyone knows these will be political decisions. Criteria will be interpreted as needed.

If NATO's missions were tending toward peacekeeping and limited out-of-area brushfire missions, meeting the military criteria would not necessarily require enormous foreign assistance or redirection of resources to the military in CEE countries. Rather, it could mean bringing a few units up to snuff. Activities in the NACC peacekeeping work program would serve to support this effort.

One could envision a process of phased expansion of groups of states in key regions to diminish de-stabilization. Within this phasing, the goal would be to hold out those let into NATO first as an inspiration to those states still in NACC. Our message to Ukraine would be, look at what Poland has achieved as a reward for the hard choices it made beginning in 1987, full integration into the European mainstream. Follow that example. The door remains open.

Clearly, if Russia reverts to totalitarianism or otherwise emerges as a threat to states in the region, NATO might stop its expansion at the Bug River. But here again, this need not be seen as a threat to Moscow. Rather NATO's mission would still be guardian of European democracies.

A harder question relates to suspension of new members whose democratic political reforms are reversed or even of existing members (e.g., the Greek junta in 1967) who have democratic lapses. In this new context, it might very well make sense to suspend such members to underscore that NATO is a club limited to democracies, just as Greece was suspended from the Council of Europe during the junta.

Conclusion

The strategy set out here offers a phased process, with clear firebreaks, for working with Moscow and other key European governments to lay the foundation for NATO's long-term transformation.

Drafted: S/P - SFlanagan
Cleared T - LDavis
P - PTarnoff
S/NIS - STalbott
EUR - SVershow
PA - TDonilon

9/10/93, SPEUR 4282

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13 SEP 93

EFFECTS OF EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP ON NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- Expanding membership will create new military requirements for NATO. Members will gain the right of a common defense of their territory at its borders.
- In the near term, expanding membership could reduce the effectiveness of planning and operational activities within the integrated structure as NATO teaches operating procedures and doctrine, and conducts exercises intended primarily to train CEE militaries.
- National billets within SHAPE would need to be redistributed to include CEE participation. This would require agreement on the proportions accorded CEE states and selection of jobs for which they would be qualified.
- CEE militaries would probably seek positions in other NATO staffs, requiring a thorough review of the NATO headquarters.
- Headquarters would need to be stood up in the CEE states to organize territorial defenses. NATO members would participate heavily in these staffs to teach NATO practices and ensure connectivity with existing NATO headquarters.
- Combined joint task forces will place a great premium on operational integration, which is more sophisticated than a standing territorial defense. It will take NATO several years to achieve this in practice; CEE states without experience in NATO will require further maturation.
- CEE states currently have little military capability to contribute to combined operations. CEE militaries would be assigned non-essential functions in any near term conflict; the integrated structure would seek to bring CEE forces up to NATO standards, increasing their combat force.
- NATO is transitioning to multinational formations. US forces stationed in Europe and Western European forces are already committed to Western formations. Multinationality will need to be readdressed within NATO forces to allow an East-West balance.
- Standardizing Eastern military forces will require purchase of communications systems, at a minimum. The NATO military budget would need to pay for this and probably any other equipment, siphoning funding from internal NATO needs like mobile communications for peacekeeping.
- It will take years to bring basing facilities up to Western environmental and occupational safety. NATO infrastructure funding would be required for the upgrade.
- If CEE nations reverted to anti-Western governments or were indiscriminate in their security, the technology, doctrine, and operating procedures of NATO and other sensitive information would be available to potential enemies.

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10/29/2019

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MR MARKER

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Folder Title:

DC0161 DC Meeting on NATO - Russia Relationship, January 9, 1995

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

3999

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43	4	6	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO-Russia Relationship... (2 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: January 9 NSC DC Meeting: NATO-Russia Relationship... (5 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow et al. to Samuel Berger re: DC Meeting on NATO-Russia Relationship... (4 pages)	01/07/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: January 9 NSC DC Meeting: NATO-Russia Relationship... (5 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. letter	President Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002d. cable	President Clinton to President Yeltsin (2 pages) [partial release]	01/06/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
003a. paper	re: January 9 NSC DC Meeting: NATO-Russia Relationship... (5 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	re: January 9 NSC DC Meeting: NATO-Russia Relationship... (5 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0161 DC Meeting on NATO-Russia Relationship, January 9, 1995

2015-0768-M
rs1324

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you under the impression of a positive and open conversation we had with Mr.Gore.

His visit appeared to be very timely, and not only in terms of economics. I was really very concerned about the decisions taken at the NATO December meeting. For instance, in paragraph 6 of the Communique it is clearly stated that you will have discussed among yourselves, by spring 1995, all the organizational issues of enlargement of NATO, and by December you will present the results of these deliberations to states which intend to join NATO.

Our concern was corroborated by the statement you made in Budapest that during the NATO December meeting further steps were taken in preparation for enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I proceeded from the assumption that we had agreed in Washington in a totally different way which is not to act hastily, but rather to achieve, in the first place, agreement between us on Russia's full-scale partnership with NATO, and only after that to start tackling the issues of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I reacted accordingly in Budapest.

I am pleased that Mr.Gore has tried to eliminate these serious misunderstandings.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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VZ 2015-0768-M (1.71)

1/14/2017

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First, he assured me that no negotiations are envisaged for the year 1995 on admitting new states into NATO, and only an internal study of the concept of a possible enlargement of NATO will take place.

This is acceptable to us. I hope that from now on you will personally use your authority and by practical policy "adjust" paragraph 6 of the Brussels Communiqué.

Second, we have agreed with Mr. Gore to devote the year 1995 to achieving an understanding, first and foremost with you as the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance, and then with other NATO member-states, on new relations between Russia and this Organization. Correspondingly, work will be carried out within NATO both on a possible expansion and the necessary evolution of the alliance. In other words, coordinated actions will enable us to achieve a common understanding of further strategy by the end of 1995.

In conclusion, I note with regret that you and I have once again had a breakdown in communication. I am aware that you are upset about this as much as I am, all the more so since this "skirmish" could have been easily avoided. Let us agree at last on efficient regular contacts concerning this extremely important issue.

I am pleased that the Secretary of State accepts Mr. Kozyrev's proposal that they regularly, rather than occasionally, discuss the NATO issue during their personal meetings. Let them discuss it in a preliminary manner already in January, and then meet as many times as necessary for working out proposals for us on future relations between new Russia and new NATO.

I hope that this preparatory work will be completed by our next meeting. This time I am offering you an official invitation to pay a visit to Moscow on May 9 to take part in celebration of the historic Victory Day. In addition to our participation in multilateral events we could find time for a thorough discussion, in the first place, of the NATO issue, and of other urgent issues as well.

I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties which have emerged. As I told Mr. Gore, Russia is a partner of the United States. The President of the Russian Federation personally guarantees that.

I will be waiting for your reciprocal ideas.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 29, 1994

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. cable	President Clinton to President Yeltsin (2 pages) [partial release]	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0161 DC Meeting on NATO-Russia Relationship, January 9, 1995

2015-0768-M

rs1324

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL DTG:060319Z JAN 95

FM: WHITE HOUSE

TO: O 13526 3:3(b)(6)

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AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE READ YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 29 WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE. THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING US. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AND YOUR VIEWS ON HOW THE PROCESS SHOULD GO FORWARD ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MY THINKING AND PLANNING. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE.

YOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN MOSCOW UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE THAT YOU AND I ATTACH TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE. LET ME STRESS THAT WHAT I TOLD YOU IN WASHINGTON REGARDING NATO EXPANSION - AND WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED IN YOUR MEETING LAST MONTH - STILL STANDS. NATO WILL NOT EXPAND IN 1995 AND THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS IN 1995 ON ADMITTING NEW STATES TO NATO. AS THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD YOU, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT MY GOVERNMENT AND I HAVE TOLD YOU AND WHAT NATO DECIDED IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1.

YOU RAISED PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE IN YOUR LETTER. THAT PARAGRAPH CALLS FOR A STUDY THAT WILL CLARIFY WITHIN NATO THE RATIONALE AND THE PROCESS FOR EXPANSION. THE STUDY WILL ALSO FOCUS ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. NATO HAS DECIDED TO PRESENT THE RESULTS OF THESE DELIBERATIONS TO INTERESTED PARTNERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS. FOR MY PART, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL DECIDE TO BE AMONG THE FIRST TO HEAR THIS BRIEFING.

YOU ARE CORRECT IN RECALLING THAT, AT OUR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE PROCESSES FOR EXPANDING NATO AND BUILDING A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA SHOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL. THESE ARE BOTH ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BUILD A STABLE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATO NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL, NOT SEQUENTIALLY. HOWEVER, THE DECISION ON EXPANSION MUST BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE ALONE.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS ON THIS MATTER. YOUR LETTER CORRECTLY WARNS AGAINST THE DANGER OF

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VZ 2015-0768-M (1.72)

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MISCOMMUNICATION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A PROMPT AND CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO – OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ON ANY ITEM ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA – IS THE SUREST WAY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER WILL COME TO GENEVA PREPARED TO EXPLORE THESE ISSUES IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. I HOPE THAT ANDREI KOZYREV WILL LIKEWISE BE READY FOR A FRANK GIVE AND TAKE ON RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING ON RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, AS THE PROCESS OF EXPANSION UNFOLDS. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE GENEVA MEETING CAN FORM PART OF WHAT YOU HAVE CALLED "EFFICIENT, REGULAR CONTACTS" ON THIS AND OTHER CRITICAL SUBJECTS.

BORIS, I ALSO WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU MY VIEWS ABOUT THE ON-GOING TRAGEDY ON CHECHNYA. YOU HAVE HEARD NUMEROUS REPORTS ABOUT THE OFFICIAL AMERICAN POSITION. I WANTED YOU TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME WHERE I STAND WITH REGARD TO THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

I UNDERSTAND THE DILEMMA THAT YOU FACE. WE HAVE STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO STATE, OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RUSSIA. WE HAVE SAID THAT CHECHNYA IS PART OF RUSSIA AND THAT WE OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS BY FORCE, WHETHER BY MEANS OF AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ONE STATE AGAINST ANOTHER OR BY MEANS OF ARMED SECESSIONISM.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE DEEPLY DISTRESSED OVER THE GROWING COST IN HUMAN LIFE, INCLUDING AMONG CIVILIANS, INCURRED BY THE ATTEMPT AT A MILITARY SOLUTION. WHILE THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN OUR VIEW THAT CHECHNYA IS AN INTERNAL RUSSIAN MATTER, THERE IS ALSO NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THAT VIEW AND OUR HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL RESOLVE THE MATTER IN A FASHION CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, NOTABLY THOSE ENSHRINED IN THE OSCE DOCUMENT THAT WE AGREED TO IN BUDAPEST A LITTLE OVER A MONTH AGO. IN THIS SENSE, I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THE CHECHNYA CRISIS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I KNOW THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS PROPOSED TO YOU USE OF THE MECHANISMS OF THE OSCE AS A POSSIBLE MEANS TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE A REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION AND I HOPE RUSSIA WILL CHOOSE TO WORK WITH THE OSCE ON THIS BASIS. IN GENERAL, BORIS, I JUST WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT WE WILL ENCOURAGE ANY EFFORT TO FIND A LASTING END TO THE BLOODSHED AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE DISPUTE. I KNOW THAT THESE MUST BE DIFFICULT DAYS FOR YOU AND I THUS STAND READY TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DETAIL IF YOU WISH.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO MOSCOW IN MAY. I WILL BE GETTING BACK TO YOU SHORTLY ON THIS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

FROM:

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Folder Title: DC0180 DC Meeting on NATO Expansion and NATO-Russia Relations, March 8, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4000				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO Expansion... (3 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow et al. to Samuel Berger re: DC Meeting on NATO Expansion... (4 pages)	03/02/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on NATO Expansion and NATO-Russia Relationship (1 page)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: Status of NATO-Russia Process (2 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002d. letter	President Clinton to President Yeltsin (3 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002e. note	re: Annex to Clinton-Yeltsin Letter (2 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002f. letter	re: Possible Content of Letter from the Russian Side (2 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002g. talking points	re: Elements of a Russian Reply (1 page)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002h. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO-Russia Relationship... (2 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)
002i. paper	re: January 9 NSC DC Meeting: NATO-Russia Relationship... (5 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0180 DC Meeting on NATO Expansion and NATO-Russia Relations, March 8, 1995

2015-0768-M
rs1325

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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STATUS OF NATO-RUSSIA PROCESS

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12 2015-0768-m (1.78)
11/14/2017

Issues for Decision

- Whether to recommend to the President that he sign the attached letter to President Yeltsin on NATO expansion.
- Whether to approve and send the attached comments on the Russian-drafted elements for a Yeltsin-to-Clinton response.

Background and Status

During Russian DFM Mamedov's visit last week, we advanced our dialogue on NATO expansion and European security, following up on the Secretary's Geneva meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Specifically, we discussed our proposed letter from the President to Yeltsin. Mamedov indicated the letter's substance and tone would have the right impact in Moscow.

Mamedov said Yeltsin's response would likely contain Moscow's recommended elements for a NATO-Russia arrangement during the transitional period between the admission of NATO's first new member(s) and Russia's joining the Alliance (sic); these might include:

- a NATO-Russia Standing Consultative Commission, as suggested by Secretary of Defense Perry in Munich;
- certain "guarantees" during the transitional period; the guarantees would include no nuclear weapons on the soil of new members, no stationing of Alliance troops on the soil of new members, and no restrictions on Russian arms sales to new or prospective members; and,
- an explicit statement that Russia was not excluded from eventual NATO membership.

Mamedov argued that such a NATO-Russian agreement should be finalized by the end of 1995.

Regarding the "guarantees," we urged the Russians not to send a Yeltsin response which sought to put any conditions on NATO expansion; we suggested their response should focus only on Russia's relationship with NATO. Mamedov left with us some draft elements of such a Yeltsin-Clinton response and asked for our early, private comments.

Clinton-to-Yeltsin Letter

We believe that Deputies should decide to move forward with the Clinton-to-Yeltsin letter. We have vetted its key elements within the Alliance and with the Russians. The letter should

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- 2 -

now go to the President for early signature and transmission to Moscow. Even if there is some delay regarding the next item, our letter should move forward.

Elements of Yeltsin-to-Clinton Response

We have also prepared the comments on the Russian response, which we believe should be delivered to Mamedov simultaneously with the Clinton-to-Yeltsin letter. Our comments downplay any suggestion that the Alliance would ever formally commit itself not to station nuclear weapons or NATO forces on the territory of new members. As a practical matter, there is broad recognition that Moscow will need something in this regard and that the Alliance will almost certainly decide that forward deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of new members is not required. However, the principle that NATO has the right to do so in response to a changed military environment is vital to the credibility of our Article V commitments. An interagency group has been established to develop options for balancing the substantive considerations and to examine tactics and timing.

Our comments also avoid any commitment to reaching a NATO-Russian arrangement by the end of 1995; such a pledge could break the parallelism between the NATO expansion process and the evolution of the NATO-Russia relationship. Our suggestions also include language which better describes how NATO will contribute to European security in the future. We also include and a tick regarding the need to move forward on the two documents which Kozyrev failed to approve December 1 in Brussels.

We should recognize, however, that the two most problematic elements Mamedov described to us (e.g. no nukes, no stationed forces) are likely to remain in the Russian response, whatever we suggest. These two points are almost certain to be the key Russian desiderata as we proceed, and our receiving a letter which includes them in no way commits us to supporting the Russian position. The very fact that the Russians have moved from "no way, no how" on NATO expansion to these suggestions is a major step forward, as will be Russian agreement to the IPP and non-PFP documents.

Thus, we believe that Deputies should agree to transmit our comments on the Russian draft elements along with the President's letter. The original reason for this exchange of letters was to secure Russian agreement to the two NATO-Russia documents; if we get that the letters will have served our purpose. At the same time, if Yeltsin's letter contains problematic elements, we will need to be prepared with talking points for the Allies to explain that Yeltsin's points simply represent Russian views and do not have our endorsement.

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Tab. A 3

DEAR BORIS:

WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS GIVEN ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON HIS MEETINGS WITH ANDREI KOZYREV IN GENEVA. THEIR DISCUSSIONS DEMONSTRATED THE WISDOM OF OUR DECISION TO INTENSIFY OUR WORK TOGETHER ON THE MOST IMPORTANT AND CHALLENGING ISSUES FACING US IN THE COMING YEARS.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR OFFERS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A MORE PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC AND STABLE EUROPE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL ITS CITIZENS. WHILE WE WANT TO PRESERVE AND BUILD UPON THE VERY CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-RUSSIAN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, WE BOTH AGREE THAT ONE OF THE CENTRAL GOALS OF THIS PROCESS MUST BE THE CREATION OF AN INCLUSIVE SYSTEM OF SECURITY FOR THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION. WE WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO HELP BUILD POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS THAT WILL CREATE AN INCLUSIVE AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON LAST SEPTEMBER, MY APPROACH IS TO BUILD A BROAD STRUCTURE OF SECURITY, STABILITY AND SHARED VALUES ON THE FOUNDATIONS ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN EUROPE. WE SHOULD USE THE STRENGTHS OF INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE OSCE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO. EACH HAS EVOLVED GREATLY DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW REALITIES IN EUROPE. WORKING TOGETHER, WE SHOULD NOW ENSURE THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED STATES.

AS YOU KNOW, NATO HAS ALREADY CHANGED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR. NATO IS AND WILL REMAIN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE OF NATIONS WHO SHARE A COMMON COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW. BUT THE CONCEPT OF CONTAINMENT OF ANY NATION HAS DISAPPEARED FROM NATO'S STRATEGY. AS EARLY AS JULY 1990 AT THE LONDON SUMMIT, NATO DECLARED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSIDERED WARSAW PACT STATES AS ADVERSARIES. NATO'S NEW STRATEGY REFLECTS THE PROFOUND CHANGES THAT ARE TAKING PLACE. BY THE END OF 1991, NATO DECLARED THAT THE MOST LIKELY RISKS TO SECURITY NOW ARISE AS A RESULT OF INSTABILITIES STEMMING FROM ETHNIC AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND EMERGING DANGERS SUCH AS THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. } No

NATO HAS RESTRUCTURED ITS MILITARY FORCES ACCORDINGLY. THE FORMER CONCENTRATIONS OF HEAVY FORCES IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY LIGHTER AND MORE FLEXIBLE FORCES BETTER ABLE TO RESPOND TO A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SECURITY CHALLENGES. THESE FORCES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES.

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REFLECTING THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ALLIANCE HAS ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONAL LINKS TO ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES THROUGH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL. AT THE JANUARY 1994 NATO SUMMIT, ALLIED LEADERS ADOPTED SEVERAL NEW INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO ADVANCE FURTHER THE ALLIANCE'S ADAPTATION TO MEETING THESE NEW CHALLENGES. THESE INITIATIVES ARE STILL BEING IMPLEMENTED.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THERE IS CONSENSUS WITHIN NATO THAT THE PROJECTION OF STABILITY IN EUROPE COULD BE FURTHERED THROUGH ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS IN THE ALLIANCE FROM THE RANKS OF DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ACTIVE IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. NATO HAS BEGUN A PROCESS OF INTERNAL STUDY ON THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS. AS YOU KNOW, WE WILL PRESENT THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY INDIVIDUALLY TO PARTNER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING RUSSIA, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF NATO MINISTERS IN 1995. AS YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN SEPTEMBER, RUSSIA IS NOT EXCLUDED FROM ELIGIBILITY TO JOIN NATO. LET ME STRESS AGAIN, HOWEVER, THAT NATO WILL MAKE NO DECISIONS THIS YEAR TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS. (X)

WE AND OUR ALLIES ALSO AGREED THAT AS THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES IN EUROPE PROCEEDS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DEFINE THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO IN PARALLEL TO OUR STUDY OF NATO'S OWN DEVELOPMENT. WE SUGGESTED TO OUR ALLIES THAT, DURING 1995, NATO SHOULD ENGAGE RUSSIA IN A DISCUSSION OF THE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. OUR ALLIES HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THIS EFFORT. OUR AIM WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT RUSSIA'S OWN RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE DEVELOPS IN HARMONY WITH NATO'S EVOLUTION. BOTH ELEMENTS ARE CRITICAL TO STABILITY IN EUROPE.

I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL WISH TO CONSULT WITH OTHER NATO MEMBERS AS WELL ON THESE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY HOW TO DEVELOP AND REGULARIZE YOUR CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO. WE ARE OPEN TO YOUR IDEAS OF HOW TO MAKE THE RELATIONSHIP EFFECTIVE.

BORIS, AS I SAID IN A RECENT SPEECH IN CLEVELAND, RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO NATO. WE SHOULD WORK TO DEVELOP CLOSER TIES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO AND TO DEFINE A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP IN THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND OF THE MEMORANDUM ON ENHANCED CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS. IN LIGHT OF CHECHNYA, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU REAFFIRM RUSSIA'S STRONG INTEREST IN INTEGRATING WITH THE WEST AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE BUILDING OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER BASED ON A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY,

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW AS EMBODIED IN OSCE PRINCIPLES. MOVING FORWARD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT FOR PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WOULD SEND EUROPE A STRONG AND IMPORTANT SIGNAL.

I ALSO KNOW THAT THE LEGACY OF SOVIET RULE HAS LED MANY IN RUSSIA TO DISTRUST NATO AND VIEW IT AS A RELIC OF THE COLD WAR. TO HELP ADDRESS THIS, I AM ENCLOSING WITH THIS LETTER A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE STEPS NATO HAS TAKEN SINCE 1990 IN THE EVOLUTION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, IN THE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE USEFUL IN HELPING YOU TO RESPOND TO LINGERING MISTRUST AND MISIMPRESSIONS IN YOUR COUNTRY.

BORIS, WE HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO, TOGETHER AND WITH OTHERS, IN BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE A GOOD START. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU ON THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

WJC

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Annex to Clinton-Yeltsin Letter

Already in July 1990 new goals for the Alliance were set forth in the London Summit Declaration. NATO declared that it no longer considered Moscow "the enemy" and announced a new program of cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Just as importantly, NATO called for a restructuring of its military forces and a reorientation of its strategy. This Declaration also established the first ties between NATO and the countries of the then-existent Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Then, in June 1991 in Copenhagen, NATO foreign ministers issued a statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." NATO declared that "We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free." This objective has guided NATO's policies ever since. It remains the foundation of NATO's current efforts to project security throughout Europe.

In pursuit of this objective, the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military commands have been radically restructured. The former concentrations of heavily armored corps in the center of Europe have been replaced by lighter and more mobile forces which can be used for many purposes. These forces are not directed against any country or group of countries. Their purpose is to defend peace in Europe, either on NATO territory or -- in conjunction with the UN or the OSCE -- in areas of instability or crisis.

The concept of containment has disappeared from NATO's strategy. No country, including Russia, is any longer classified as an opponent or an enemy. These points were set forth clearly in the New Strategic Concept Alliance heads of state and government adopted at the Rome Summit in November 1991, and they have been enshrined in NATO military planning documents ever since. The New Strategic Concept Alliance made clear that crisis management would become an important mission for the Alliance, in addition to collective defense.

At the same Rome Summit, Alliance leaders created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and invited Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to join. The NACC, as it is known, has proved to be a useful vehicle for political contact and consultations, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when levels of trust were still being defined. But as the level of trust has increased, NATO has redoubled its efforts to cooperate with Russia and other states in Central and Eastern Europe, and to build closer, institutional links aimed at promoting common approaches to common problems.

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At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, Alliance leaders added even more substance to NATO's new role through adoption of a broad strategy of cooperation throughout Europe. In reaffirming the political course set by the London and Rome summits and the military redirection enshrined in the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, NATO endorsed a series of "initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been the Alliance's fundamental goal."

These initiatives included the Partnership for Peace, through which we invited Russia and other states to "join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance." The Partnership of Peace is designed to build lasting ties between Partner states such as Russia and NATO's military structures. In addition, for some countries the Partnership may serve as a foundation for a future application for full membership in the Alliance. For others it will constitute a permanent relationship which assists in supporting the security of all Partner countries.

Subsequently, when Russia signed the Partnership for Peace framework document in June 1994, Russia and NATO also agreed to develop a special program of cooperation. Negotiations were undertaken which produced both Russia's Individual Partnership Program within the Partnership for Peace and a separate document on NATO-Russian relations outside of the Partnership; these accords await final approval by the Russian Federation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

9
Tab F

LS No. 146483
JS
Russian

POSSIBLE CONTENT OF A LETTER FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE

We support the objectives and general trends of NATO's transformation and are prepared to work together with the alliance to determine the parameters of new relations as well as the scope and nature of obligations and guarantees in the area of security.

We view progress toward the new quality of relations and cooperation between Russia and NATO as a major element in the transformation of Russia's foreign policy and in the creation of a new, reliable architecture of European security.

In this context, we are prepared to participate actively in attaining the objectives of the Partnership for Peace program and in fully developing the potential of dialogue and cooperation in all areas covered by the bilateral documents between Russia and NATO.

The forthcoming period of transition in Russia-NATO relations will be marked by the continued transformation of NATO, elaboration of the architecture of European security, and determination of the parameters and nature of the political cooperation between Russia and NATO.

The practical goal of our joint work for the coming months will be the preparation, by the end of 1995, of a Russia-NATO agreement to determine the general objectives, mechanisms, and interim parameters of relations between Russia and NATO for the period of transition.

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Similarly, NATO will consider the matter of reflecting in the documents of the alliance its re-orientation to new challenges and tasks, particularly peacekeeping and joint efforts to combat the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the international drug mafia, etc.

Further matters to be considered are the nature and scope of possible mutual obligations and safeguards in the field of security, including the non-expansion of the alliance's military infrastructure, including non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of possible new members of NATO.

An important element in the new relations between Russia and NATO will be the establishment of a mechanism for regular consultations on all levels, including the creation of a permanent Russia-NATO consultative body.

Russia's membership in NATO will be considered on the same grounds as membership by any other applicant.

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ELEMENTS OF A RUSSIAN REPLY

-- We support the objectives and general trends of NATO's transformation

--We are prepared to work together with the Alliance to determine the parameters of new relations as well as the scope and nature of obligations and guarantees in the area of security.

--As the first step in developing a closer relationship between Russia and NATO, we are prepared to participate actively in the Partnership for Peace and in fully developing the potential for dialogue and cooperation in all areas covered by the additional agreement between Russia and NATO for a relationship beyond the PFP.

--Foreign Minister Kozyrev should travel to Brussels to formalize the implementation of these two agreements.

--The practical goal of our joint work should be the preparation of a Russia-NATO framework agreement that established general objectives, mechanisms, and parameters of relations between Russia and NATO.

--As the Alliance develops its approach towards possible expansion, it should indicate in its documents how it will account for the reduced security threat in Europe today. In particular, NATO should indicate the basis on which it will decide whether, or to what extent, it would station troops or nuclear weapons on the territory of potential new members of the Alliance. Russia considers it of the utmost importance that NATO take no steps that create the impression that the Alliance still regards Russia as its enemy.

--Further matters that should be considered are the nature and scope of possible mutual obligations and safeguards in the field of security.

--An important element in the new relations between Russia and NATO will be the establishment of mechanisms for regular consultations on all levels.

--Russia's potential membership in NATO will be considered on the same basis as membership by any other applicant.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO Enlargement... (3 pages)	04/04/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: May Summit Objectives: Security Architecture/NATO (3 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on NATO Enlargement and NATO-Russia Relations (1 page)	04/04/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Alexander Vershbow et al. to Samuel Berger re: DC Meeting on NATO Expansion... (4 pages)	04/03/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. agenda	{duplicate of 002a} (1 page)	04/04/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re: May Summit Objectives: Security Architecture/NATO (3 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	re: Elements of a NATO-Russia Relationship (6 pages)	04/03/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002f. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO Expansion... (3 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on NATO Enlargement... (3 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	re: May Summit Objectives: Security Architecture/NATO (3 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)

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ELEMENTS OF A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP

We have at least tacit agreement among all parties that one of our objectives is to codify in some form a more intensive relationship between the Alliance and Russia.

Options for the further development of this relationship can be divided loosely into questions about the nature, the vehicle for that relationship and the content.

Our range of options is guided by the decision to maintain rough parallelism with the NATO enlargement process.

NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP

We might define the options as a formal "legal" relationship, or an informal, "political" relationship. Both have attendant advantages and disadvantages.

A legally codified relationship enjoys the benefits of clarity and well-defined rights and obligations. It suffers from the disadvantages of rigidity, greater difficulty in adapting to changing circumstances and the inherent difficulty of defining what to include and exclude.

Under a politically oriented approach, conversely, rights and obligations are defined less precisely, but the relationship is capable of responding more readily to changing requirements and can grow organically over time. A politically-oriented approach to the NATO-Russia relationship could also facilitate negotiation, since less is at stake at each stage of the process.

In terms of content, a legalistic approach could also impose greater restraints on the relationship. Some of what Russia is likely to seek as legal guarantees -- especially with regard to stationing of troops and nuclear weapons on the territory of new Allies -- would be very difficult for NATO to give. However, it may be possible to develop political assurances that acknowledge Russian concerns without surrendering important legal rights. Moscow will also have to weigh the trade off between hard legal commitments over a narrow range and softer political understandings that give both the Alliance and Russia greater flexibility.

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Finally, there is the question of how the conception of the relationship shapes the content. Given the underlying tensions in the NATO-Russia relationship, a formal, legal approach could lead to non-constructive focus on fulfilling the letter of commitments rather than trying to move forward in a constructive spirit.

RECOMMENDATION 1: We should begin with a political approach. This will be easier to sustain politically, inherently more capable of responding to new circumstances and requirements and focussed more on cooperating than on strict fulfillment of undertakings.

FORM OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Proposals currently on the table include a NATO-Russia Treaty, some other form of "Charter" or a Joint Declaration, or some type of politically orientating statement. At their meeting of March 3, Deputies ruled out the idea of a formal NATO-Russia agreement of any sort this year. Rather, we would like to see some form of NATO-Russia statement in December on European security, pointing to agreement on developing the future relationship.

1. Treaty:

A formal treaty between the Alliance and Russia has the advantage of codifying and delimiting the relationship. It can be argued that a treaty would both satisfy Moscow's demand for "special status" vis-a-vis the Alliance, and thereby further ease Russian acceptance of NATO expansion. Early conclusion of a NATO-Russia treaty could forestall an eventual Russian demand for membership in the Alliance.

On the other hand, such a treaty will be very difficult to negotiate. Moscow could be expected to seek some form of commitment to prior consultation on the use of force or collective defense actions, or the transformation of NATO into a collective security organization or other legal commitments we could not give. It could also prove extremely difficult to ratify. Finally, parallelism between the NATO-Russia and NATO enlargement tracks suggests that a NATO-Russia treaty should not be agreed at least until the first new members are admitted to the Alliance, recently there have been signs that the Russians too do not favor a treaty approach.

2. "Charter:"

Perhaps best conceived as a "treaty-minus" approach, the primary attraction of this model is that it would not require

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formal ratification. While this might ease some negotiating problems, it would not necessarily defuse the political debate.

3. Political Declaration or Joint Statement:

The attraction of this approach will also be the drawback in Moscow's eyes: while easier to negotiate, such a relationship will be less binding. A declaration could be conceived as the end-product of a new NATO-Russia relationship, or it could be a measured step along the path to some final agreement. For example, at the March 3 DC, Deputies authorized exploring some form of NATO-Russia "understanding" this year on the direction in which the relationship will evolve. This could be valuable as a counterweight to whatever the Alliance announces as next steps in the enlargement process.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Consistent with Recommendation 1, we should begin the development of this relationship with a political declaration or Joint Statement on Principles (like the 1972 U.S.-USSR agreement on Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the USSR), leaving open the possibility of some more formal agreement in the future. Such a future document could, in fact, be labelled a "charter" as long as we carefully underscore that it is a charter only in the political, not the legal, sense. Realistically, this December is probably too early to reach such an agreement, but we may be able to agree that this is a mutual objective.

EXTENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP

1. Enhanced Consultations/Cooperation:

Theoretically, consultations could range from little more than "inform" to something analogous to a Russian "vote" or "seat at the table" in NATO. Moscow desires a binding process of consultation before the Alliance takes decisions on issues which Moscow believes affect its interests. A key principle for NATO will have to be strict reciprocity in whatever is agreed.

The still-to-be-agreed "Beyond PFP" understanding, which Kozyrev walked away from in December, already gives Moscow much of what it needs in terms of flexible, broad-ranging mechanisms to consult on all security issues. However, Moscow clearly seeks something more formal on enhanced consultations with NATO. Questions concern at what level(s) such consultations should take place; how structured and formal they should be; and the definition of what "consultation" itself means.

U.S.-EU Relationship as a Model: The U.S. relationship with the European Union provides a example of how a great power

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can interact with a major multinational institution to which it does not belong but wherein decisions are taken on matters affecting its interests. This model should not be pushed too far, as there are tremendous differences in the context and substance of the two relationships.

Our relationship with the EU is grounded in relations among friends and allies, who have an essentially cooperative relationship based on long experience as NATO allies and a fundamental commitment to market economics and democracy. Even where we have differences, they are bounded and structured, both by mechanisms such as the GATT and by the underlying desire to work together. This tradition of cooperation has created expectations and assumptions which cannot be directly transferred to the NATO-Russia relationship, with its highly confrontational history and where competition is likely to remain an important factor.

Even bearing in mind these profound differences, the U.S.-EU relationship can serve as a useful paradigm for the NATO-Russia relationship. Over time we have developed a flexible, multi-faceted relationship with the EU which tries to foster cooperation between us. When U.S. interests are engaged in EU decisions, we have the means to consult and influence the Union, and vice-versa. When we differ, we have tools for working through our problems.

Many of the U.S.-EU consultative mechanisms stem from the 1990 Trans-Atlantic Declaration. Among the elements of the U.S.-EU relationship which could serve as useful ideas for the NATO-Russia relationship are the permanent U.S. mission to the EU (which interacts with the EU officials daily); semi-annual troika consultations at the expert level on a range of some 10-12 regional and functional topics; semi-annual U.S.-EU Political Directors meetings with the EU Troika; U.S.-EU Foreign Ministers meetings which are mandated once every six months (and, in fact, meet more often on an ad hoc basis); and, semi-annual U.S.-EU Summit Meetings between the President, the EU Presidency and EU Commission President. There are also constant meetings at the ministerial and sub-cabinet levels between various USG agencies and appropriate EU commissioners and officials. These ongoing, business like contacts are perhaps more successful than the panoply of formal sessions since the former tend to be more substantive and focussed on concrete results. Once again, our objective should not be to replicate the forms of the U.S.-EU relationship, but to look at it for ideas on how a great power can interact with a multilateral institution of which it is not a member and to how to develop the mechanisms for resolving issues when they arise.

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Structural Possibilities:

- a. Regularized 16+1 consultations at ministerial level, perhaps following every NAC Ministerial.
- b. On-going 16+1 consultations at PermRep level, supplemented as necessary from capitals.
- c. Standing Consultative Committee: Moscow has reacted positively to this idea. We believe the words "standing" or "permanent" and "consult" are the main attractions for Moscow. But the SCC established under SALT is probably not a useful model. It is a relatively static operation which concentrates on the interpretation of treaty text and discussion of compliance with specific provisions. Without a NATO-Russia Treaty a NATO-Russia SCC would need a very different mandate, which would have to be defined and negotiated, rather than develop organically.
- d. Crisis Consultation Mechanism: It might be useful to include a provision to allow either NATO or Russia to call for prompt consultations in a 16+1 forum on emerging crises which affect the security interests of the parties or of Europe as a whole. This would go beyond the PFP framework which provides only for consultations in the event a Partner perceives a direct threat to its territory or interests. While the idea of crisis consultations is attractive, it could prove difficult to agree on their form and purpose as Moscow can be expected to push for maximum influence over NATO decision-making. This problem can be attenuated by insisting on strict reciprocity which will force Moscow to consider the need to limit NATO's ability to constrain Russian freedom of maneuver.

2. "Political Membership" in NATO:

The Russians floated the idea of Russia joining NATO "like France," with political participation only. This overlooks that France is a full member of NATO, with full Article V commitments and rights. France chooses to fulfill those obligations without participating in the NATO integrated military structure.

3. Russian Membership in NATO:

While Moscow recognizes that full membership in the Alliance is unlikely in the near term, it can be expected to push for explicit recognition that under certain circumstances it will

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be welcomed into the Alliance. We have told Moscow in private that we would not foreclose that option. Several Allies, particularly Germany and France, have reacted very negatively and want to declare publicly that Russia will never be allowed to join. Allies fear that any commitment not to foreclose Russian membership will be used by Moscow to push for early admission.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Full Russian membership in NATO is not a near term prospect, while the concept of "political membership" is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Alliance and France's role therein. We believe the U.S.-EU model, coupled with a label establishing an on-going "permanent" consultative function (probably at the Permrep level in a NAC+Russia formate) is the most viable and useful model. This organic model can grow with the relationship. It also avoids the problems associated with an approach which attempted to define too precisely circumstances in which NATO and Russia would have to consult and what kind of outcome of such consultations should lead to.

MILITARY RELATIONS:

This paper concentrates on developing the basic political framework of the NATO-Russia relationship, but we cannot ignore the military aspect of any such enhanced relationship. In addition to the important role the military establishment plays in shaping Moscow's security policies, the Russian military will continue to be a significant element of any European security structure. Both considerations argue for trying to engage the Russian military in a more formal relationship with NATO military authorities.

Given the vast difference in the size and capabilities of the Russian military and other Partner countries, it is clear that the Russians will want to be more than mere first among equals in the PFP framework. Moreover, Moscow will soon be the only European nuclear power outside NATO.

These considerations argue for establishing a military liason component to the NATO-Russia relationship. Among the possibilities to be explored are structured contacts between the Russian General Staff and the Military Committee or SHAPE/NATO IMS, and possibly a permanent Russian liason presence at SHAPE or NATO headquarters. Beyond the potential political benefits of establishing better military-to military ties, these could develop into a useful mechanism for planning joint operations or coordinating parallel efforts. An example might be coordinating a potential UNPROFOR extraction.

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