

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	re: C-P-L Item. NATO Enlargement (13 pages)	06/06/2015	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MsMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([NATO Enlargement and Lake])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/06/1996]

2015-0770-M

rs1245

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 June 96 19:56

FROM Schmidt, John R.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT C-P-L Item: NATO Enlargement [~~SECRET~~]

TO Baker, Jane E.
 Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Dohse, Fred J.
 Friedrich, M. K.
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Harmon, Joyce A.
 Joshi, M. Kay
 Kessinger, Jodi
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Sens, Andrew D.
 Veit, Katherine M.
 Wetzell, M. Jeanne
 Wiley, Mary C.

CARBON_COPY Blacker, Coit D.
 Fried, Daniel
 Schmidt, John R.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0770-M (1.01)
 12/1/2017 KBH

TEXT_BODY

For Tony Lake from the Troika:

We put this item on the agenda in order to give Secretary Christopher the opportunity to debrief you and Secretary Perry on the Berlin Ministerial, and particularly, on the session with Primakov. We are mindful of Sandy Berger's admonition (in a note to Dan and Chip) that we not rush to accept a "Norway" status for new NATO members. Still, we are cautiously encouraged by the non-confrontational tone adopted by Primakov and his continuing movement away from uncompromising opposition to enlargement toward conditional acceptance (even if the conditions are not acceptable). We also are relatively upbeat about the possibility of reengaging on building a NATO-Russia relationship. We should plan on taking advantage of this early in the fall, while taking care not to say or do anything right now.

THIS SETS THE STAGE FOR YOU TO SHARE WITH CHRISTOPHER AND PERRY, ON A VERY CLOSE HOLD BASIS, THE ATTACHED TROIKA PAPER SETTING OUT A GAME PLAN ON NATO ENLARGEMENT THAT WOULD TAKE US THROUGH A JUNE 1997

NATO SUMMIT. This paper addresses all the key questions that need to be answered and links the enlargement process to our parallel efforts at building a NATO-Russia relationship and reaching agreement on an ESDI within NATO, all these strands hopefully coming together at the summit. By presenting this NSC paper, you would be following a hallowed tradition of the White House guiding interagency treatment of the enlargement issue. If we do not put our paper on the table now, the State Department is sure to step in quickly to fill the current vacuum.

We are mindful of the possibility of leaks in the run-up to the Russian election, but note that previous Troika papers on enlargement have never suffered such a fate. Nonetheless, you should encourage Christopher and Perry to be both discreet and exclusive in their distribution of the paper. You should note that we are proposing to begin serious interagency discussion of the future of enlargement in mid-July, following the second round of the Russian election, with a view toward having a robust position by early September.

[[JUNE97JS.DOC : 4916 in JUNE97JS.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

6 June 96 18:45

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

JUNE97JS.DOC

~~SECRET~~ 6/5/96

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 1.6, X6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATO Enlargement Game Plan: June 96 to June 97

In December, NATO launched phase two of the enlargement process, involving intensive individualized dialogues with aspiring members aimed at helping them prepare for possible membership. Foreign ministers agreed that phase two should run through 1996 and be reviewed at the December 1996 NAC Ministerial, at which time NATO will decide on next steps. Allies will face two basic choices: either to continue phase two or to move toward accession talks. A decision to move forward could involve foreign ministers inviting one or more aspiring members to begin accession talks, converting the December NAC into a summit for the same purpose, or having ministers call for

a NATO summit in the first half of 1997 to perform this function.

The Berlin NAC Ministerial

The decision to have phase two run throughout 1996, and thereby to ensure that the June 1996 NAC in Berlin would not move forward on enlargement, was designed to balance two competing sets of interests.

On the one hand, we did not want enlargement to play an unduly large role in the Russian presidential election scheduled for June

16, with a run-off likely in the first half of July. On the other

hand, we wanted to maintain momentum toward enlargement and convey

this sense to Central and Eastern European (CEE) states and NATO allies. Phase two itself and the prospect of a major decision at the

December NAC were designed to serve this purpose.

Consistent with this, the Berlin NAC Ministerial emphasized internal

NATO adaptation while breaking no new ground on enlargement.

With

Berlin now past, and the Russian election looming on the near horizon, we need to begin thinking seriously about how we intend to

move forward on enlargement. Once we make these decisions, we will

then need to consider how we handle the build-up to the December NAC

and how we pursue its aftermath.

December NAC Ministerial

CEE Expectations. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) states now

accept our conceptual underpinnings for European security, namely,

the integrationist rather than anti-Russian rationale for NATO enlargement. They are enthusiastically participating in phase two and

have shown patience about the timing of enlargement decisions in large part because they expect a major decision on enlargement in December. (Christopher was explicit in his Prague speech that the

December NAC would decide next steps.) If such a decision does not

emerge from the December NAC, they would be deeply alarmed that

Russian opposition to enlargement was in fact decisive. NATO's failure to move forward would undermine the position of the pro-Western political forces in CEE states, damage our ability to use the prospect of integration with the West to encourage continued reforms, and boost regional advocates of a statist/nationalist "third way."

Allied Expectations. Some NATO allies are wary about moving forward due to their concerns about continuing Russian opposition. A few months ago, the Germans, once strong supporters of early enlargement, quietly mooted the possibility of declaring a moratorium on the process or negotiating its terms with Moscow. More recently, the French have shown signs of wavering. The British, on the other hand, have firmed up in their support for our approach, as have the Nordic NATO members.

Despite misgivings among some, most NATO allies clearly expect the U.S. to press for a major enlargement decision at the December NAC. Indeed, many allied diplomats, anticipating what they perceive to be our own likely position, now speak openly of a December NAC decision to hold a NATO summit during the first half of 1997 to invite one or more aspiring members to begin accession talks. NATO Secretary General Solana has been a strong and high-profile supporter of enlargement, broadly hinting to the Poles during his recent trip to Warsaw that an enlargement decision and initiation of accession talks will come next year.

Russian Expectations. The Russians, while still strongly opposed to NATO enlargement, are increasingly coming to understand that enlargement will proceed and are aware that we are considering a spring 1997 summit as the venue for announcing the start of accession talks. Primakov took a relatively non-confrontational approach to enlargement at the Berlin 16-plus-one meeting. He seems to be developing a second, fall-back track on enlargement which

involves
trying to negotiate the terms of enlargement rather than stopping
it
outright.

This track was clearly on display at Berlin. Russian suggestions that partial or limited CEE NATO membership (e.g., no nuclear stationing, no extension of NATO military infrastructure, no Baltic membership at all) could indicate a softening Russian stance. The Russian presidential election itself remains a major wild card. If Yeltsin is reelected, he may have more flexibility to deal with the enlargement issue than is currently the case. On the other hand, if Zyuganov wins, Russian opposition could be redoubled and take a more alarming turn.

We should not exclude the possibility, however, that the Russians, even in a second Yeltsin term, would draw a hard line against any enlargement short of one that meets Russian "conditions" that we would not find acceptable and that they would take "countermeasures," perhaps damaging other U.S. equities, if enlargement were to proceed in a manner that did not meet those "conditions." But our experience during the past two years would seem to indicate that NATO steadiness and U.S. consistency have caused Russia to rethink their unyielding opposition to enlargement.

Given current expectations, any decision on our part not to pursue a major decision on enlargement in December would be greeted with considerable surprise. Although some, both at home and abroad, would praise it as a prudent decision in the circumstances, others would brand it as a retreat in the face of Russian pressure. The Russians would regard it as a vindication of unyielding opposition, while the CEE states would fear enlargement was dead permanently. U.S. and NATO credibility would be severely damaged.

Advantages of a Spring 1997 NATO Summit

Need for a Summit. We believe a major decision on enlargement in December is appropriate and timely. While foreign ministers could use the occasion to decide themselves to invite one or more aspiring members to begin accession talks, the importance of the occasion would appear to dictate that such a decision be left to heads of government at a specially-called NATO summit.

A Spring 1997 Summit. Given our election calendar and need for advance planning, holding a NATO summit this December would not be realistic. Allies would regard it as an unjustified acceleration in the enlargement process, and we would find it difficult to bring the Alliance to full consensus on "who" and "when" that quickly in any event. A summit in the first half of 1997, by contrast, would be an appropriate event for the beginning of the President's second term.

It would also be more consistent with allied expectations and would give us more time to finalize agreement on the first group of new members, as well as to formulate and implement a strategy for dealing with the Russians and those Central and Eastern European states who are not chosen for the first phase of accession talks.

Finalizing ESDI. In addition to the above, using the December NAC Ministerial to call a NATO summit in the first half of 1997 could also have a number of other significant advantages. The French have long contended that the U.S. is pursuing enlargement at the expense of internal NATO adaptation. Last December President Chirac altered traditional French policy by calling for the building of a distinct European defense identity (ESDI) within NATO. Although this subject was a centerpiece of the Berlin Ministerial, absent a strong bureaucratic push, full development of the concept could take well into 1997 or beyond, particularly if linked to the NATO command structure review, which is not due for completion until 1998. By

making agreement on a fully developed concept a goal for a spring 1997 NATO summit, we could ensure that ESDI is completed while rebutting French concerns that enlargement is taking precedence over internal NATO reform.

An Adaptation Summit. Equally important, including agreement on ESDI as a key component of such a summit would enable NATO to bill it as an "adaptation" summit, completing the work program set out by the previous NATO summit in January 1994. Beyond satisfying French concerns, such a focus could help take some of the sting out of a decision to begin accession talks by demonstrating to Moscow that NATO has indeed been transformed from its Cold War structure and is, in fact, becoming increasingly "European" and focused on new missions such as peacekeeping and crisis management.

While unlikely to fully assuage Russian doubts about enlargement, this shift of emphasis ("the new NATO") could help pave the way for a more graceful Russian acceptance of the inevitable. Following up on the discussions with Primakov in Berlin, NATO should early in the fall begin working with the Russians on building up a NATO-Russia special relationship.

Preparations for December NAC Ministerial

Internal Preparations. Given the busy work program and high political stakes involved in moving forward on enlargement at the December NAC, internal U.S. government preparations should begin in mid-July. The goal would be to have an agreed interagency approach by the beginning of the diplomatic season in early September.

Approaching Allies. No later than the end of September, we should present our approach to key allies. As noted above, the centerpiece would be a decision that NATO announce at the December NAC its intention to hold a summit in the spring of 1997. Allies would agree that the summit will be organized around the general theme of adaptation, and announce that it will be the occasion on which allies will take the decision to invite one or more aspiring members to

begin accession talks and, as well, when they will reach final agreement on an ESDI within NATO.

Dealing with Russia. While the proposal to use the spring 1997 summit to finalize ESDI will help enlist French support for moving forward on enlargement, key allies -- and the Germans in particular -- are likely to raise their continuing concern over the impact on Russia of moving forward. The Germans will certainly press for a Russian strategy as part of any NATO decision to move forward on enlargement, and we should continue to press the Russians to develop a special and substantive relationship with the Alliance in parallel with NATO's moving forward on enlargement.

Consistent with our "no surprises" policy, we should propose to key allies that we approach the Russians in the fall to inform them in advance of our plans to move forward on enlargement at the December NAC, using the occasion to underscore our desire to build a relationship (hopefully, NATO and the Russian Embassy in Brussels will already be working on this). While we could not agree to negotiate with Moscow on the terms of enlargement, we could express our willingness to repeat in an appropriate context our earlier assurances that, in the present security environment, NATO has no intention of stationing nuclear weapons or significant forward-based multinational conventional forces on the territories of new members.

We could propose to the Russians that we aim to complete talks on institutionalizing the NATO-Russia relationship by the time of a NATO-Russia summit, which could be held immediately following the spring 1997 NATO summit. We might even consider offering a NATO-Russia summit the day after NATO leaders meet. This would have to be carefully scripted -- i.e., the Russians would have to understand in advance that the NATO summit would occur in any event and that NATO leaders would announce accession talks with selected

partners (i.e., no last-minute high-level Russian veto) -- and the timing might prove politically unworkable for the Russians. But such a pairing of summits would underscore the inclusive nature of our approach to European security.

Presidential Announcement. Once we have agreed with key allies on the way forward and made our original approach to the Russians, the President could make a major announcement of U.S. intentions, laying out the proposal for a spring 1997 NATO summit and for building a parallel NATO-Russia relationship. Whatever its timing, the substance of a Presidential statement that moves enlargement forward should be discussed in advance with key allies and the Russians.

Congressional Strategy. Any Presidential announcement should be accompanied by a round of consultations with key members of Congress designed to build support for moving forward toward the proposed summit. Although most Senators and Congressmen currently appear to support early enlargement, concerns about its cost and the wisdom of extending security guarantees to CEE states are likely to grow in the run-up to a summit. We should strive to defuse such concerns early on by using these consultations to argue that the costs will not be extraordinary. This was the conclusion reached by a recent RAND study which has been well-received by the Defense Department. We should ensure that we have a well-defined U.S. government position on costs ready for deployment during these congressional consultations.

Internal Adaptation. Work on building an ESDI within NATO should also be accelerated in the run-up to the December NAC. NATO will need to decide whether to accelerate the command structure review to ensure that it can be finalized in time for the spring 1997 summit or, if deemed appropriate, to defer this broader issue and concentrate on reaching an agreement on the policy framework for ESDI in time for the summit. In addition to setting the summit as the date for finalization of the ESDI concept, the NAC Ministerial

communiqué, should, at the very least, reflect some preliminary agreement on the structure of an ESDI within NATO.

NATO-Russia Relationship. If the Russians follow up on Primakov in Berlin and prove interested in moving forward in developing a NATO-Russia relationship, we should focus our efforts in the run-up to the December NAC on reaching agreement on a framework document for relations. Assuming the Russians are also prepared to agree to hold a NATO-Russia summit to announce agreement on a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship, the NAC Ministerial should announce this decision in tandem with announcement of the NATO summit.

Preparations for the Spring 1997 NATO Summit

Timing. Given the ambitious work program, it may be best to hold the NATO summit in lieu of the scheduled spring 1997 NAC, in late May or early June. Although some aspiring members might complain that this is too long to wait, the knowledge of a date certain for a NATO announcement to invite one or more aspiring members to begin accession talks should suffice to assuage concerns.

First Group of Invitees. The central decision will be whom to invite to begin accession talks. Currently, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are the aspiring members most frequently cited.

The Baltics lack the votes for now, the Romanians are not ready (though it is possible an acceleration of reforms may compel a second look), and the Bulgarians are not interested. Slovakia has fallen back into the pack due to authoritarian internal developments. Admitting Slovenia could eliminate the purported problem of a lack of territorial contiguity between Hungary and Alliance territory. Bringing in this fast-reforming nation would also mean that a country not formerly a member of the Warsaw Pact was included in the first group. This could help with the Russians in giving substance to our contention that enlargement is not aimed simply at former Soviet

allies, but meant to serve the broader purpose of supporting democratic and market reforms and fostering enhanced European integration. Although previously inward-looking, the Slovenes have recently expressed serious interest in pursuing NATO membership.

Timetable for Accession Talks and Ratification. The summit should also announce a timetable for completion of the accession talks and a target date for ratification by NATO member states of the treaties with new members. Based on past experience (Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain), one year may be the appropriate timespan for the accession talks and another year for treaty ratification. This timetable would bring the process almost exactly to the 50th anniversary of NATO in April 1999. The summit should set this anniversary as the target date for incorporation of the new allies.

Dealing with the Runners-Up and Also-Rans. NATO will also need to develop a strategy for dealing with those aspiring members who are likely not to be included in the first group: the Baltics and Romania. Although they are unlikely to be surprised, they are likely to be disappointed. Unless NATO makes clear that enlargement will not end with the first group, and works hard to keep the runners-up and also-rans engaged, these nations could begin to falter in their reforms (Romania) or become concerned that they are being left in a gray area or to a de facto Russian sphere of influence (the Baltics).

The NATO summit should consider initiatives in both these areas. The summit communique, should make clear that this first enlargement announcement will not be the last. We will need to determine how explicit to be with regard to according special status to those aspiring partners who did not make the first cut. In particular, we should consider whether we want to spell out explicitly the names of aspiring partners, including the Baltics, as prime candidates for

future consideration. This would bolster their confidence considerably but there would be a trade-off: swallowing NATO enlargement will be difficult enough for Moscow; giving the impression that the Baltics will be given special consideration in the next tranche could be seen as so provocative as to sour, perhaps for good, prospects for a meaningful NATO-Russia relationship.

The NATO summit should also address Ukraine, offering an enhanced relationship with the Alliance.

In order to further ensure that the runners-up remain engaged, the summit could consider announcing the institutionalization of the phase two process, in which the current intensive consultations would be continued with aspiring members in preparation for a second decision on membership a few years down the road. Phase two could be suitably renamed and subsumed under the Partnership for Peace as an enhanced PFP program. In order to ensure that the question of further enlargement is regularly addressed, the summit communique, could make clear that foreign ministers will consider the question at agreed intervals of appropriate length.

In tandem with this, we and our allies will need to implement other measures aimed at reassuring the Baltic states, reinforcing their sovereignty and building links with the West (see the State Department paper on Baltic strategy). Similar measures should be devised for Ukraine.

Internal Adaptation. As NATO moves toward final agreement on an ESDI within NATO, we should also explore with France their interest in rejoining the integrated military structure. This is a subject that has already been broached by the French themselves. What they appear to need is a pretext for characterizing their reintegration in other terms. French CHOD Douin hinted at this recently when he said that the integrated military structure was pass, and that France hoped to join a new NATO military structure. Agreement on ESDI, particularly if combined with announcement of a new NATO command structure, could meet French needs in this regard. If so, the

summit
could also announce that France was joining this newly adapted
(but
still integrated!) NATO military structure.

NATO-Russia Relationship. If the Russians agree to pursue a
NATO-Russia relationship and to announce the results at a
NATO-Russia
summit, the spring NATO summit communique, should preview this
event
(unless, of course, they are scheduled back-to-back). Should
Moscow
hold back, however, the communique, should highlight the desire of
the
Alliance to move forward with Russia to build a genuinely
substantive relationship and advertise it as the last remaining
major
piece of unfinished business in adapting NATO to the post-Cold
War
world.

Congressional Strategy. To ensure continuing congressional
support
and preempt congressional efforts to dictate the terms of our
approach to the summit, we should plan on pursuing an active
process
of consultations with the Congress beginning in the immediate
aftermath of the December NAC and leading up to the summit. In
addition to continuing to press on the cost issue, we should
begin
laying out our basic themes for the summit, including strategy
for
dealing with the runners-up and also-rans. Our goal should be to
maintain maximum bipartisan support for an historic process that
is
strongly in the interests of the United States and the democratic
community of nations.