Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 152				
Document ID: 9304887				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Jenonne Walker to Anthony Lake re: NATO Summit (2 pages)	06/30/1993	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 152

FOLDER TITLE:
9304887

2015-0772-M
rs1330

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9304887
RECEIVED: 30 JUN 93 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 30 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 03 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93071408	FOR DECISION
001		X	93071408	NOTED BY LAKE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/30/83

Kristie Kenny

Per our telcon.
Note that the attachment is only an advance copy faxed to me by EUR - you might want to hold this package until the official version arrives

Jeanne

Rec'd 7/1 9:08am — JWR 7/1

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4887

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WES. A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	✓	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	✓ 7/12	N
NSC Secretariat	4		N
Wiemo Have 4 cy pls			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

CC: WI✓, NS✓ KAK✓

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/30/93

Kristie Kenny

Per our telcon.
Note that the attachment is only an advance copy faxed to me by EUR - you might want to hold this package until the official version arrives

Jamie

Rec'd 7/1 7:00am

National Security Council
The White House

JWR 7/1

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4887

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WES. A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	NAW	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	~~Natl Sec Adviser~~ has seen	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	7/12	N
NSC Secretariat	4		N
Wiena Have 4 cy pls			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

CC: WI, NS, KAK

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4887

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 30, 1993

ACTION

Nat Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: NATO Summit

NATO plans to discuss Summit timing and venue July 7; we need a position before then.

My Summit Planning Group seemed to agree that we should have back-to-back NATO and NACC Summits (one day each), then polish off the President's commitment to semi-annual EC Summits by a working dinner the second evening. The three summits would thus entail two full working days in Brussels.

let's discuss

State's formal recommendation, however, only notes that proposals for a NACC summit are "in the air". EUR in fact shares the preference of other allies to exclude the Central and Eastern Europeans.

All my staff agrees that would be a mistake:

-- One, perhaps the, key message of the Summit should be NATO's relevance to Europe's new security problems. Excluding the countries most likely to have those problems will exacerbate NATO's image as a Cold War relic.

-- Washington agencies are developing some interesting ideas on the new democracies' relationship with NATO, on which we would hope to get Summit agreement. But for the allies to announce any such ideas at a Western-only meeting makes the easterners seem (and feel) objects rather than partners.

-- EUR's hope--not spelled out in the attached memo--is that NATO alone would make proposals about relations with the new democracies, which the latter would accept at a subsequent Summit e.g. six months later. Do we really want a second Presidential trip to Europe for a NACC Summit? Or to host (and pay for) a second Summit here?

necessary?

-- Some allies will resist bold ideas for deeper NATO links with the new democracies. The imminence of a NACC Summit will help us get at least some agreements; putting one off for six months -- or to the indefinite future -- will help them delay meaningful decisions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.01)

You should know that most NATO Perm Reps, in their initial Summit discussion, wanted to keep it NATO-only and not include NACC. EUR says the Russians have suggested they don't want NACC included, but would like Yeltsin only to be invited. Thus the easterners will be excluded unless we propose including them, and soon.

I do not understand why State thinks that significant restructuring of its proposed schedule would be necessary if the President decides to proceed from Brussels to Moscow instead of Oxford (or from Oxford to Moscow, for that matter). I also think a working dinner would suffice for the EC Summit, thus leaving the full second day in Brussels for the NACC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve back-to-back NATO/NACC Summits of one day each in Brussels on November 29-30.

let's discuss

Approve ___ Disapprove ___ Approve with different dates ___

That you approve scheduling a working dinner with the EC Council and Commission Presidents the evening of the President's second day in Brussels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Incoming from State

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The NATO Summit: Timing and Venue

We are committed to holding a NATO Summit before the end of the year. Initial discussions with Allies indicate a preference for holding the meeting in late November or early December, in Brussels. We also strongly recommend that the venue be Brussels, for both practical and substantive reasons. This would fit in well with a series of other meetings in Europe in November-December requiring the participation of the President and/or Secretary of State, including a possible U.S./EC Summit in that timeframe. Proposals for a NACC Summit are also in the air, as a follow-on to the NATO Summit where strengthening ties to the East will be a core theme. Although support for the idea is limited, it may grow.

Attached is a notional schedule for the President's travel to Europe in conjunction with the NATO Summit. Our proposal is designed to minimize the demands on the President's time. Given the uncertainties surrounding timing of a U.S./Russia Summit, we have decided not to factor that in at this stage. Were such a Summit to materialize as part of this trip, significant restructuring of the schedule would be required. The first step in preparing the NATO Summit is to nail down the date. Secretary General Woerner would like to settle this by July 7, if possible.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

DRAFT

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E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0172-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DRAFT

9/2

THE NATO SUMMIT: TIMING AND VENUE

The NATO Summit must fit into a matrix of possible meetings in Europe in November-December that will involve the President and/or Secretary of State. In addition to the NATO Summit, already on tap are a CSCE Ministerial in Rome (November 30-December 1), a NACC Ministerial in Brussels (December 3), and a possible U.S./EC Summit (date and place to be determined). NATO defense ministers are already scheduled to meet December 9-10, and an EC Summit is set for December 10-11.

The NATO Summit should be held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. It would replace the Fall MAC Ministerial, which is traditionally held there.

We believe the NATO Summit should be a one-day meeting. The London (1990) and Rome (1991) NATO Summits were two-day affairs, but Summits at NATO Headquarters in Brussels are quicker, with fewer ceremonial trappings.

The President has stated his intention to visit Russia but no details have been agreed. The 1990 U.S./EC Declaration calls for another U.S./EC Summit this year, which the EC expects will be held this time in Europe. The Belgians, as EC Presidency, want to hold it in Brussels. The U.S./EC Summit should therefore be grouped with the NATO Summit in order to save the President repetitive travel to Europe. If agreement emerges to hold a NACC Summit immediately after the NATO meeting, we propose that the NACC and EC events be held the same day, with the NACC Summit starting in the morning and the President then meeting the Belgian Prime Minister and Commission President Delors in the late afternoon, and over a working dinner.

Finally, we understand that the President may wish to visit London in the course of the trip and receive an honorary degree from Oxford University.

We need to work out a sequence of meetings that minimizes demands on the President's time, while maximizing our ability to use each event to build on the achievements of the others. The following notional schedule best meets these criteria:

NATO Summit, Brussels	November 29
U.S./EC Summit, Brussels	November 30 (morning)
London/Oxford and return	November 30/December 1

(Note: Secretary Christopher travels to Rome after the U.S./EC Summit for the CSCE Ministerial November 30 (afternoon) through December 1, and the NACC Ministerial in Brussels which could be re-scheduled to December 2. If there is a NACC Summit during the morning of November 30 and a U.S./EC Summit the same afternoon and evening, the Secretary would travel to Rome for the second day of the CSCE Ministerial only, December 1).

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 163				
Document ID: 9307242				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Daniel Fried to Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger re: The Visegrad Four and NATO Expansion (2 pages)	09/23/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 163

FOLDER TITLE:
9307242

2015-0772-M
rs1331

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307242
RECEIVED: 23 SEP 93 12

TO: LAKE
BERGER

FROM: FRIED
WALKER

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
CZECH REPUBLIC
SLOVENIA
HUNGARY
POLAND

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: VISEGRAD FOUR & NATO EXPANSION

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 27 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 30 Sep BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93092320	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	93093016	NOTED BY LAKE

TL—
& now, hopefully, have two well defined options, from State and Defense, both of those positions have evolved. I will review those papers tomorrow and recommend how we should proceed. (My instinct, not having yet read the new papers, is that this is ready for a Principals meeting/ decision)

(SRB)

(Not to be cynical, but it is interesting that U.S. positions, as described herein, come out pretty close to Jeremiah's view)

Rec'd 9/24 7:25am

JWL 9/24

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 7242

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (WH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
W DepExecSec	1	WA	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	SRB	
APNSA	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk		ASK 9/30	N
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

25 SEP 93 8:13

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 23, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE AND SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: DANIEL FRIED

SUBJECT: The Visegrad Four and NATO Expansion

On September 14-22, PDUSD Walt Slocombe led an interagency group for bilateral security talks with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. State PDAS Sandy Vershbow and I were with him. Due to accident of timing, our talks took on the character of pre-NATO Summit consultations with the V-4. Although we could not present a USG position about Summit issues and said so, our interlocutors were very pleased to have had an early chance to make their views known before Washington set its policies. We heard a good deal from thom about NATO, NATO expansion and the uncertain security situation in their part of the world.

Much of what we heard was consistent from country to country: all the V-4 pressed for continued U.S. political and military presence in Europe; all hoped NATO would remain a viable, "hard" security organization; all sought NATO membership and hoped the Summit would send a clear message that this was now contemplated.

Beyond this, the V-4 countries' points to us varied:

-- Hungary pushed hardest for a forward-leaning Summit message on NATO, including explicit differentiation for the V-4 (or three) and associate membership. Deputy FM Martonyi and PM Antall's foreign policy advisor Kodolanyi argued that Russia had already fallen off reform and foreign policy moderation, and that the West was naive (this was before Yeltsin's move against Parliament); that Serbia remained a present threat to regional security and; that Poland's elections demonstrated reformers' vulnerability throughout the region. Steady movement toward NATO membership would have a salutory internal political as well as security impact in the region, and the Hungarians made clear that they were hoping for a forward-looking Summit message that would play domestically in time for their spring elections.

-- The Czech Republic was the most relaxed, befitting PM Klaus's economic priorities, Prague's luxury of having no common border with the NIS or former Yugoslavia, and the Czechs' relative political stability. Deputy FM Sasha Vondra urged NATO to send a clear, positive signal in January that: NATO was open to new

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0777-M (1.02)

members; membership would require general adherence to democratic values, market economic reform and foreign policy consistency with CSCE principles and; given those three general criteria, the process was an open one. Vondra and others stressed that no new lines be drawn in Europe; they urged that Slovakia not be left behind (or given the "Waldheim treatment" because of Meciar).

-- Poland's message was similar to Hungary's but restrained in presentation (partly, Deputy Defense Minister Grudzinski told me privately, because it was clear which way the elections would go and Poland did not feel it could push too hard). The Poles did not stress an immediate Russian or other threat, but argued that their security vulnerabilities were a function of the unsettled regional situation generally. They wanted NATO to extend its security zone to the V-4 ("step-by-step") and to offer the Russians some sort of special partnership status as compensation (i.e., they wanted differentiation but avoided calling for it too overtly). They argued they were not "rushing the process" and simply hoped the Summit would mark the first step. It was clear the Poles would be satisfied with something closer to the Czech position, even if their objectives were similar to Hungary's.

-- Slovakia was the most defensive and uncertain. President Kovac and PM Meciar seemed less concerned with the details of the NATO membership process than with not being left out of whatever was offered to their Visegrad partners. The Slovaks also seemed less concerned with Russia (and Ukraine) than with Hungary and possible Hungarian ambitions vis a vis the border areas with their significant Hungarian ethnic populations. It was also clear that the prospect of NATO membership (and equality within the V-4) was a very strong incentive to reformist behavior.

In response, we outlined USG thinking, noting that the key decisions had yet to be made within the USG and the alliance. We noted that NATO should not be seen as a charitable organization that gave unilateral (or, worse, empty) security guarantees; that it was no "rich uncle from America" that would hand out goodies to local military establishments; and that in the process of thinking through NATO's role in post-cold war Europe, we should do nothing to exacerbate the sort of regional tensions NATO had been designed to cope with. We also stressed the importance of moving beyond the policy debate over principles to practical cooperation, especially in peacekeeping.

In sum, a clear and credible statement of intent to expand NATO to new democracies in the East probably will satisfy most of the V-4. The Hungarians will regret not having more but will live with it; the Poles may not expect (or even want) as much after their election; the Czechs will be pleased that a process is underway and the Slovaks will be relieved not to have been dropped. A "clear and credible" message will require NATO and its members put up the resources to make peacekeeping and other forms of practical cooperation a continuing reality; it will **not** require enshrining explicit differentiation.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 168				
Document ID: 9308072				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: The NATO Summit and Europe's East~~ (2 pages)	~~10/19/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2
~~001b. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: The NATO Summit and Europe's East~~ [incomplete copy] (1 page)	~~10/19/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 168

FOLDER TITLE:
9308072

2015-0772-M
rs1332

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9308072
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 93 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT & EUROPE EAST

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 21 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9308072

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93101821	FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	93101911	FOR DECISION
002		X	93102010	NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT

10/18 Rec'd 8:15pm JR 10/18

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8072

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~PSK~~ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec			
ExecSec			
Staff Director	1	~~Ken~~	
D/APNSA	2	cy provided	
APNSA	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/19	D
NSC Secretariat	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

revised

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

8072

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10.19.93

October 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA
TODD STERN

SUBJECT: NSC Memos for Meeting with Secretary Christopher

In anticipation of your 1:30 pm meeting today with Secretary Christopher, Tony has submitted three related memos, which we attach.

"Proposed Trip to Europe..."

This is a decision memo on the itinerary of your January trip. The principal decision point involves the second part of the trip (January 12-15). Both options begin with visits to Moscow and Kiev. **Option (1)** -- favored by Secretary Christopher and Strobe Talbott -- would follow with visits to Kazakhstan and Belarus. This option would be designed, above all to make major strides in the direction of denuclearizing the former Soviet Union. **Option (2)** -- favored by Tony -- would continue with a visit to Oslo to meet with Nordic and Baltic countries. This option would be designed to give recognition to the emerging shape of a new Europe, since this group of countries includes NATO members, neutrals and former Soviet republics.

We have circulated this memo to the Vice President, Mack, Roy, George, Gergen and Gearan.

The Nato Summit and Europe's East

This is a decision memo seeking your approval of a Principals' Committee recommendation regarding NATO's engagement with new and aspiring democracies in eastern Europe. In a nutshell, the Committee recommends that the NATO Summit issue a statement of principle to the effect that NATO's membership would grow to embrace new democracies in Europe's east without fixing a timetable or laying down specific criteria for NATO membership. Tony's memo also recommends a "Partnership for Peace" open to all European states that would help provide a vehicle for the evolutionary movement toward full NATO membership.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

Meeting with Christopher on His Trip to Hungary and FSU

This memo reviews the itinerary for Christopher's upcoming eight-day trip. The only decision points are (i) that Christopher would like to announce your visit to Russia in January when he is in Moscow -- Tony expresses reservations about this; and (2) that Christopher would like to announce your invitation to Kravchuk to visit Washington this autumn, assuming Kravchuk assures him of adequate progress on nuclear issues -- Tony appears to have no opposition on this point.

OK

OK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 072
10.19.93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93 OCT 19 AM : 04

October 19, 1993

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.03)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: The NATO Summit and Europe's East

The Principals Committee today reached agreement on recommendations for handling NATO's engagement with new and aspiring democracies in Europe's east at the January 10 Summit. We would like your blessing so Chris and Les can present our position on their trips later this week.

We believe that the Summit should make a statement of principle that NATO's membership will grow to include new democracies in Europe's east, without setting criteria by which applicants are to be judged or a timetable. The statement of principle will itself be a significant step beyond anything NATO has said before and will be seen as a victory for pro-Western forces in Central Europe (albeit not everything they might like). All your advisors agree that doing anything at this stage to indicate that NATO's border will move closer to Russia and Ukraine without at the same time including those two states would have major negative consequences within both. That could, inter alia, make the Central Europeans less secure.

The Summit should also, however, call for a qualitatively different engagement between NATO and eastern militaries that would begin immediately. We would propose a "Partnership for Peace" open to all European states willing and able to participate in a Planning Cell at SHAPE and appropriate political and military bodies at NATO headquarters, as well as in partnership activities that could range from joint air-sea rescue teams, corps of engineer-type projects to clean up the environmental mess left in Central Europe by departing Soviet soldiers, and military exercises to enable eastern forces to operate with those of NATO should national capitals choose to engage in some European contingency (e.g., a possible peacekeeping operation for ex-Yugoslavia). Active participants in the Partnership would receive a commitment to consult with NATO if they felt their security threatened, but no security guarantee.

The Partnership would be an evolution of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the umbrella for NATO's current series of seminars and conferences with eastern militaries) but open as well to European neutrals. In practice only the Central

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Europeans, Russia and Ukraine have the resources for active participation, and most activities would take place in Central Europe. So there would be de facto "differentiation" among European states, but by a process of self-selection rather than by NATO's drawing a new dividing line in Europe.

We would describe NATO membership as an evolutionary process, with the Partnership an important first stage in the development of mutual commitment and habits of cooperation that can lay the groundwork for full membership. Thus while the Partnership stands on its own merits, participation in it also will provide the first step toward full NATO membership. Its creation therefore will give credibility to the Summit's statement in principle about expansion.

You also should know that we are preparing a strategy for your trip as a whole, beginning with a major speech in which you would articulate a broad concept of security in post Cold War Europe, including the economic transformation of the new democracies, democracy-building and preventive diplomacy as well as military security, and the appropriate American role across this spectrum. Our proposals for the NATO Summit itself will include concrete steps toward better responsibility-sharing between America and Western Europe and for adapting NATO's command structure to new circumstances. We will recommend that you call on the European Community while in Brussels, and meet with leaders of the Visegrad states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics) in one of their capitals before going on to Moscow and other NIS states.

In preliminary discussions, key allies have been very positive about our Summit ideas but we so far have spoken in general terms about the Partnership for Peace and the need somehow to address the membership issue. Now that we have Principals agreement on both those subjects, we should move rapidly to firm up allied consensus and to begin telling both Central Europeans, and Ukrainians and Russians, the broad outlines of our thinking. If you agree, Chris would write his counterparts immediately, then he and Les can explain our thinking during their travels this week to Western Europe and the NIS.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the approach on the Partnership for Peace and NATO membership expansion outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8072

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: The NATO Summit and Europe's East

Here is the decision memo for the President you requested at today's PC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1,04)

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: The NATO Summit and Europe's East

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Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 171				
Document ID: 9308663				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Jenonne Walker to Anthony Lake re: NATO and U.S. Influence (3~~ pages)	~~11/03/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 171

FOLDER TITLE:
9308663

2015-0772-M
rs1333

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9308663
RECEIVED: 04 NOV 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 04 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO & US INFLUENCE

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 08 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0777-M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93110515	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	93110907	NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

Rec'd 11/5 4:22 pm JWR 11/6

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8663

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (M) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec (Amy)	1	M	A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	SR	
APNSA	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	JB	D
NSC Secretariat	5		N

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 NOV 93 21 13

CC: NS ✓

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec has DOSC

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (11/6) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec (amw)	1		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4		D
NSC Secretariat	5		N

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 NOV 93 23 15

CC: NS ✓

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec has Disc.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: NATO and U.S. Influence

I think Sam Nunn was closer to being right than you last Sunday evening about the importance of NATO's mission vs. the number of U.S. troops in Europe.

The issue is not black and white. All European governments, and all parties that have serious chance of coming to power, want a substantial U.S. troop presence in Europe for a variety of reasons and still are willing to "pay" something in terms of U.S. influence on their economic, foreign, and security policies to keep it. But far less than when they thought they needed American military protection of their own countries. (For similar reasons, we too are giving higher priority to trade issues than during the Cold War.)

Troubles we have had concluding the Uruguay Round are one example of this. If other EC members persuade France to cave, European desire not to jeopardize the Atlantic security relationship will have been one part of their motive. But far less than during previous economic differences. Concern about the economic consequences of a UR collapse and of the effect on intra-EC relations are much more potent motives for compromise.

A similar change is taking place within NATO itself, and has been for years. When MBFR was getting underway Washington decided on a proposal, sent an interagency team to Europe, and got European agreement in three weeks. The history of NATO's CFE position was Washington's proposing and the EC members' opposing -- and prevailing. When the Bush Administration laid down the law on what the EC-WEU relationship could not be, lest NATO be harmed, the Maastricht Treaty did every single thing we had "forbidden".

Degree of influence from any one source almost always is impossible to measure and, as noted above, European desire to keep a robust American military presence still provides some. But as the military threat to NATO territory has declined, so has the weight of influence provided by their desire to keep our troops. It will not entirely disappear. But if we want it to be the potent leverage on European economic and other policies you appear to believe it still is, Europeans will have to think that

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.05)

those troops have a mission that is important to their security.

That mission obviously does not necessarily mean going to war in Bosnia. Indeed Europeans might well oppose keeping troops on their soil that might drag them into wars they thought rash or unwise. But it must be something more than insurance against the least likely military contingency. It can include having troops well positioned to defend Europe's oil supplies. But "buying influence" with troops also will mean demonstrating their utility to European contingencies -- a Bosnia-like relief effort, or a peace implementation, or a preventive deployment should new situations warrant. No one issue is make-or-break (except possibly implementing a Bosnian agreement, since the U.S. proposed NATO take on that mission). But a perception that U.S. forces in Europe have no mission with regard to present European instabilities will erode the influence those forces give us.

Something similar will be true of the Partnership. The fact of operating together should itself pay big dividends -- making East Europeans feel they have an operating partnership with NATO and, at least as important, gradually making them think of each other as partners rather than potential adversaries. French and German soldiers didn't have to go to war together to become allies. But French and German soldiers were planning and exercising together to meet a common threat. If we are to move NATO's engagement with eastern militaries out of seminar rooms, their planning and exercising together will have to be based on scenarios. And the more jobs of common concern they actually do together, the more the "partnership" feeling will take hold.

Those jobs can include joint search and rescue or air space management teams or corps of engineer-type units cleaning up the environmental mess on former Soviet bases. But such missions alone do not sustain individual armies, much less multilateral groupings, for long. To make the Partnership vital, some of the exercise scenarios will have to be war/conflict ones -- the kinds of contingencies for which states raise and maintain armies. If Partnership states never actually need to fight together, hallelujah. But if "peacekeeping" needs (in the broadest sense of the term) do arise and they consistently stand aside, people will question why tax money should be spent preparing them to operate together.

In short, the President's commitment to keeping 100,000 troops in Europe is a Good Thing, especially now when so many fear disengagement/disinterest of America in general and the Clinton Administration in particular. But that alone will not deliver the kind of influence on European economic and other policies you seem to think. The harder test for the U.S. troop presence, or the Partnership, will be our willingness to use either if the need arises (and of course skill in combining prudence with forcefulness in doing so).

Did I say that? I meant to give forgotten that.

Did I make that point?

Finally, however many troops we keep in Europe and however we use them, the military link will give us less influence than during the Cold War. West Europeans need us less; contributing to

stability to their east is important to them, but less so than defending their own territory. Thus while preserving NATO we also need to focus on other ways to sustain US influence. Since the real threats to European security stem less from military aggression than from economic, ethnic, and other tensions within states, that means broadening our security engagement to include political and economic tools (otherwise known as enlargement of democracies and market economies) as well as intensifying US-EC cooperation, our role in the CSCE's human rights monitoring/conflict prevention/crisis management efforts, etc.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4012				
Document ID: 9400151				
Row: 47	Section: 1	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Meeting with Belarusian Prime Minister Kebich (4 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001b. paper~~	~~re: Meeting with Belarusian Opposition Leaders (2 pages)~~	~~01/00/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/11/2018
001c. paper	re: Meeting with Belarusian Supremem Soviet Chairman Shushkevich (5 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	re: Trilateral Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin... (3 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001e. paper~~	~~re: Expanded Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on~~ Security Issues (6 pages)	~~01/00/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/11/2018
~~001f. paper~~	~~re: Borispol Meeting with Ukrainian President Kravchuk (5 pages)~~	~~01/00/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/11/2018
001g. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
001h. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)
001i. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)
001j. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)
~~001k. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Trade Issues for Your Trip to Brussels~~ (1 page)	~~01/07/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL
~~001l. list~~	~~re: Deployed Troop Strength (1 page)~~	~~01/00/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL

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9400151

2015-0772-M
rs1334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001m. report	re: Meeting with President Otto Stich of Switzerland (3 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
001n. talking points	re: Talking Points for Previewing Visit to Moscow (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
001o. report	re: U.S. Funding of NATO Budgets (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
001p. report	re: The NATO Summit and Bosnia (2 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001q. chart~~	~~re: Trend in Bosnian Serb Shelling of Sarajevo (1 page)~~	~~01/00/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL
001r. report	re: Possible Problems (2 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)
001s. memo	Strobe Talbott to Tony Lake re: Kozyrev's "European Security Plan" (4 pages)	01/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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RECORD ID: 9400151
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 94 13

TO: LAKE

CHRON FILE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADDL MATERIAL FOR NATO SUMMIT

ACTION: OBE / ORIGINALS RETURNED DUE DATE: 11 JAN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	01010214	OBE / ORIGINALS RETURNED
001	LAKE	Z	94011010	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94110517	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Meeting with Belarusian Prime Minister Kebich (4 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 4012

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2015-0772-M
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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PER E.O. 13526
2014-0905-M (1.22)
5/11/2018 VZ

MEETING WITH
BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS

CONTEXT OF MEETING

The term "opposition" is loosely applied to Belarusian political factions and organizations falling outside the orbit of the conservative forces that control both the parliament and Council of Ministers. The opposition comprises a range of political movements, including radical reformers, centrists, nationalists, independent labor, women's groups, the intelligentsia and others. In this brief drop-by, you will be meeting with [individuals still TBD].

Although they constitute a small minority in parliament, the opposition and independents have thus far been able to defeat no-confidence measures against Chairman Shushkevich. (Ironically, they themselves often criticize the Chairman's political compromises.) Most of their venom, though, is reserved for parliamentary conservatives and the Kebich government, whose resignation they now call for. An opposition-sponsored petition drive in 1992 demanding new legislative elections was summarily quashed by the parliamentary majority. Instead, conservatives pushed through a non-binding resolution to hold elections in March 1994. Leading opposition groups have formed a fragile coalition to keep this commitment alive and in the public eye, but the parliament recently recessed without taking action to schedule these elections.

Your main goal in this meeting is to show that the U.S. is behind the reformers, no matter how outnumbered they may be. Sharing the spotlight with opposition leaders promotes our goal of supporting economic and political reform in Belarus. The opposition feels threatened by the powerful conservative majority in parliament and the government, and fears a de facto government policy of seeking virtual reunification with Russia. They will feel great reassurance from our embrace. They will want to hear how U.S. policy promotes the cause of reform and independence in Belarus; will likely criticize government influence over the press; and will call on U.S. support for introduction of a Belarusian national currency.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Assure support for economic reform.**
- **Endorse early elections as a positive democratic step.**
- **Stress importance of protecting and promoting human rights.**
- **Reaffirm U.S. support for Belarus's sovereignty and independence.**

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CORE POINTS

- o Hang in there: Admire your tenacity in fighting for your political beliefs against stiff opposition. Have great sympathy from my own political experience. Know you won't quit because future is on your side.

- o Reform: Centerpiece of U.S. policy in Belarus and all NIS is support for democratic and economic reform. Most U.S. assistance programs promote private enterprise, farming, commerce, defense conversion, food, health.

  -- Have told government officials repeatedly that full development of relations depends on reform. U.S. can only help reform on margins; success dependent on Belarusians themselves.

  -- Key to future prosperity lies not in financial assistance, but in **investment**.

- o Non-nuclear status: Have appreciated action by Belarusian parliament to be first of Lisbon protocol signatories to both ratify START and accede to NPT. Historic commitment to non-nuclear future, goals of non-proliferation.

- o Elections: We support early elections as promotion of democracy. Disappointed when Supreme Soviet disallowed a petition drive for elections in 1992. Hoped March 1994 elections would have been agreed by now.

  -- Received your letter on electoral assistance. Interesting ideas; want to help establish strong democratic basis here.

- o Human rights: Respect for human rights cornerstone of U.S. relations. Endorse call for legal reform, less government interference in mass media.

- o Sovereignty: U.S. firm believer in Belarus' sovereignty, independence. Encouraged Yeltsin to respect rights of neighbors. Urged your government to sign up now to PFP.

  -- Will do best to promote Belarus' independence and prosperity, but ultimate choice belongs to the people.

TRILATERAL STATEMENT AND ANNEX ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE

- **Statement provides for:**
  - -- Transfer of all nuclear weapons in Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement; Ukraine to continue deactivating all SS-19 and SS-24 missiles by removing warheads;
  - -- Prompt Russian compensation to Ukraine for the highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the nuclear weapons; Ukraine will receive compensation simultaneously with the transfer of weapons to Russia;
  - -- Security assurances from U.S., Russia and United Kingdom to Ukraine on its accession the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
  - -- U.S. commitment to assist safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear forces (at least $175 million).
  - -- Ukrainian recommitment to ratify START and accede to the NPT at the earliest possible date.

- **Annex provides for, within ten months:**
  - -- Transfer to Russia of at least 200 warheads from SS-19 (old) and SS-24 (new) missiles for dismantlement;
  - -- Provision to Ukraine of fuel assemblies containing 100 tons of low-enriched uranium (to begin the process of compensation);
  - -- An advance payment by the United States to Russia of $60 million against the HEU contract to help defer costs of transporting and disassembling warheads and to produce fuel assemblies.

- **Three confidential side letters will also be exchanged:**

  [These letters and their contents should not be publicly discussed.]
  - -- A Yeltsin letter to Presidents Kravchuk and Clinton will confirm that Russia will compensate Ukraine for the value of the highly enriched uranium in the tactical nuclear warheads removed from Ukraine in 1991 and 1992;
  - -- A Kravchuk letter to Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton will confirm that Ukraine will transfer all of its nuclear warheads to Russia within twenty-eight and one-half months of January 14, 1994;
  - -- A Clinton letter will recognize the commitments confirmed in the letters from Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin.

These letters record the most difficult demands of the Russian and Ukrainian parties, over which their bilateral negotiations broke down in September. Russia wanted a timetable for the final transfer of warheads from Ukraine. Ukraine wanted a promise of compensation for tactical nuclear weapons. The United States brokered resolution of these issues in the trilateral negotiations.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	re: Meeting with Belarusian Supremem Soviet Chairman Shushkevich (5 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: Trilateral Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin... (3 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 4012

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON
Press Conference Following Yeltsin Bilateral
January 14, 1993

Nine months ago, President Yeltsin and I met in Vancouver, where we laid the foundation for a new partnership between the United States and Russia. We have just concluded an excellent and very productive summit meeting, in which we took important steps to strengthen that partnership.

Throughout our discussions, I reaffirmed the strong support of the United States for Russia's transition to a market economy. I informed President Yeltsin that the U.S. has committed to specific projects all of the $1.6 billion package of assistance I announced in Vancouver and expended almost 70 percent of the funds. The President and I also discussed the additional $2.5 billion in assistance for Russia and the other new independent states that my Administration proposed in Tokyo in April, and which our Congress fully funded in September.

President Yeltsin gave me strong assurance of his intention to continue the reform process. He and I discussed a number of ways in which the United States and the international community can help promote reform and to cushion the social hardships it has brought for many Russians.

As a concrete expression of our commitment to Russian reform, the United States has established a new Fund for Large Enterprises to promote private sector development here. That Fund will be chaired by former Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal. I also have asked Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown to lead a Presidential trade mission to Russia in March.

We also issued today a joint statement on human rights in which we express our resolve to combat discrimination and all forms of intolerance, including anti-Semitism.

Today I also described the results of the successful NATO summit this week, and President Yeltsin assured me of Russia's intention to be a full and active participant in the Partnership for Peace.

We also took several historic steps to ensure that the fear of nuclear confrontation will remain a relic of the past. First, Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk and I signed an agreement that commits Ukraine to eliminate over 1,500 nuclear warheads. Second, President Yeltsin and I agreed that as of May 30, the nuclear missiles of Russia and the U.S. will no longer be targeted against any country. And third, we signed an agreement to work closely together in regions where proliferation risks are greatest, including the Korean peninsula and the Middle East.

We also agreed the sovereignty and independence of Russia's neighbors must be respected. In that respect, I expressed my strong hope that Russia's negotiations with Estonia and Latvia will lead to the withdrawal of Russian troops in early 1994.

Let me close by noting that President Yeltsin and I have agreed to meet in Naples at the G-7 Summit in July. And I am very pleased that he has accepted my invitation to make a state visit to the U.S. next autumn. I look forward to those meetings.

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2014-0905-M (1.28)
5/11/2018 VC

**EXPANDED MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
ON SECURITY ISSUES**

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Denuclearization, nonproliferation cooperation and momentum in our joint arms control efforts are the three main themes that will define your meeting with President Yeltsin on security issues. The major push for the denuclearization of Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine that you have undertaken in your first year in office has been a success. Together with Yeltsin, you can celebrate the fact that Kazakhstan and Belarus which have ratified START and agreed to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. You and Yeltsin, together with Ukrainian President Kravchuk will also have signed a trilateral agreement resolving the outstanding issues preventing Ukrainian denuclearization. Having addressed these issues in your trilateral meeting with the two Presidents, remaining bilateral security issues will be addressed in an abbreviated session immediately to follow.

After denuclearization, the second summit security theme is the advance in nonproliferation cooperation since Vancouver. There, you and Yeltsin agreed to pursue Russian adherence to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). As Russia showed itself to be a responsible nonproliferation partner, the United States expanded the scope of potential space cooperation to include not only the agreement to grant Russia access to the commercial space launch market, but also large-scale efforts like the international Space Station -- a favorite Yeltsin project.

This successful cooperation will expand beyond this summit as you talk to Yeltsin about new partnership initiatives, including cooperation in negotiating an international ban on fissile material production and on a new export control regime to replace COCOM. At Vancouver, Yeltsin sought an end to COCOM, which we and our allies have now agreed to phase out by March 31, 1994. At this meeting, we will ask Yeltsin to confirm his part of the bargain by agreeing to a joint statement that commits Russia to implement effective export controls, join in the COCOM follow-on regime and end arms trade with rogue states such as Iran. This will help to persuade our COCOM partners to replace COCOM with an effective follow-on that will both promote exports and serve nonproliferation goals. Russia has also been generally supportive of regional nonproliferation initiatives (Middle East, South Asia), but we need to secure their continued support for our efforts with North Korea. We also continue to be very concerned about Russian arms sales to Iran.

Maintaining the momentum of our joint arms control efforts is the third theme, stemming from a combination of bureaucratic frustration on some issues and progress on others. In Vancouver and Tokyo, in the Vice President's meetings with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and other high-level meetings, we have consistently pressed Yeltsin and the Russian leadership to ensure that the shutdown -- to which Yeltsin is personally committed -- of Russia's offensive chemical and biological weapons programs actually occurs. In the run-up to this Summit, we have made significant progress on these issues. However, each side needs to build confidence in the other. For example, you might hear from Yeltsin tomorrow that his experts believe a U.S. biological weapons program exists. You should respond that we have nothing to hide and want to handle this issue in total openness and reciprocity.

We can also point to recent progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We want to continue our successful bilateral cooperation on the CTB while we coordinate positions among the P-5, in anticipation of the formal opening of CTB negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) later in January. We also want to take note of the encouraging Russian response to our recent proposal to admit the former Soviet republics to the ABM Treaty and to put to rest a persistent problem in ABM Treaty implementation -- demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missile defenses.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Note great progress made on denuclearization, nonproliferation, arms control issues.**
  - **Votes by Belarus, Kazakhstan to ratify START, accede to Non-Proliferation Treaty. Trilateral agreement just signed with Ukraine.**
  - **Final signing of contract for purchase of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from nuclear weapons.**
  - **Russia's agreement to adhere to guidelines of Missile Technology Control Regime.**
  - **Progress toward Comprehensive Test Ban, reaffirmation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.**
- **Stress importance of moving ahead with implementation of existing arms control agreements: START I & II, CW, BW, ABM.**
  - **Welcome recent progress on CW, BW, stress willingness to work issues.**
- **Advance future security agenda.**
  - **Welcome Russian support for our initiative on fissile materials.**

-- **Enlist Russian support to address urgent regional proliferation threats (e.g., North Korea, Iran).**

-- **Seek agreement on future cooperation in export controls, including the follow-on regime to COCOM.**

-- **Express our willingness to work with Russians on CTBT talks and unconditional and indefinite extension of NPT in 1995.**

CORE POINTS

Great Progress Made Since Vancouver:

o In no field have the results of our cooperation and partnership been more dramatic than in the area of arms control and nonproliferation.

-- Successful agreement on Missile Technology Control Regime underpins broad scope of future space cooperation, including Space Station partnership.

-- U.S. supports full Russian membership in MTCR.

-- Have gone long way toward mutual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine. Votes in Belarus, Kazakhstan to ratify START and accede to NPT extremely positive.

-- Cooperation on safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear arms has advanced to include broad scope of cooperation e.g., in defense conversion.

Ukraine

o **Good Example of Cooperation**: Trilateral agreement example of how, if we work together and make some tough decisions, we can make a real contribution to global security.

o **HEU**: Glad will be signing today contract for purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia. You and I have been wanting to do since Vancouver. Worth at least $12 billion dollars to Russia over 20-year life of contract. True "swords into plowshares" initiative -- very positive.

Momentum of Arms Control

o **Need to finish old business**: Maintain momentum of very successful U.S.-Russian arms control process.

o **START I Implementation**: Important to proceed as rapidly as possible with full implementation of agreements already concluded.

-- Resolution of Ukrainian problem should clear the way for full implementation of START I.

- **START II Ratification**: We look forward to ratification of START II once the Ukrainian problem is behind us.

  -- How do you plan to proceed with the new Russian parliament?

  [If Russians press for early START II implementation:] We are willing to consider it, but we should finish START I reductions first.

- **Biological Weapons**: Apart from denuclearization issues, we must face some old business related to biological weapons.

  -- In previous meetings, have discussed the Russian biological weapons program. Appreciate your personal commitment to end the offensive biological weapons program inherited from the Soviet Union.

  -- We have reason to believe that illegal work continues in Russia despite your efforts. Have given your side a report summarizing our concerns.

  -- We want to work with you on this issue in spirit of openness and reciprocity.

- **Chemical Weapons**: Glad we have accelerated progress on CW issues. U.S. and Russia have largest CW stockpiles.

  -- U.S. and Russia will lead way on early ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). U.S. seeking Senate ratification by July; hope Russian Parliament can do same.

  -- Need your personal involvement to conclude Bilateral Destruction Agreement. New Russian proposals not consistent with CWC.

- **Also have to pursue forward-looking security agenda:**

- **Fissile Materials**: Already broad agreement on potential for progress. Should agree on goals of capping, reducing worldwide stocks of fissile materials usable in weapons.

  -- Appreciate support for multilateral convention banning production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

  -- Welcome willingness to place materials under international safeguards. Propose bilateral expert talks in parallel.

  -- Welcome Gore-Chernomyrdin working groups on shutting down plutonium production reactors and nuclear material control and accounting.

- **Regional Threats**: Welcome close coordination on North Korea, Middle East, Iraq, South Asia. Urge Russian restraint in arms sales, especially with Iran, China.

  -- Yeltsin agreed at Vancouver to curtail sale of all but small arms to Iran. Have not seen evidence yet: sales of Russian arms to Iran - have totalled about $500 million since Vancouver.

  -- Remain concerned about broad Chinese access to Russian military technology; urge restraint on exports.

- **Export Controls**: Note great progress since Vancouver toward replacing COCOM. Urge Russian commitment to export controls so can be original member of follow-on regime.

  -- Joint Russian-American statement confirms Russia's readiness to (1) end arms trade with Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea; (2) join in COCOM follow-on regime; (3) cooperate in establishing export control regime.

  -- Gains from membership in COCOM follow-on regime far outweigh economic rewards of destabilizing sales to Iran, China, other countries of proliferation concern.

- **NPT**: We will need to work closely to secure the agreement of those countries still straddling the fence to the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.

- **Comprehensive Test Ban**: Pleased with the cooperation we have developed in realizing our common objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Also welcome your decision to continue the testing moratorium despite the recent Chinese test.

  -- We want to continue our bilateral cooperation on CTB issues, as well a coordinate our positions among the P-5, in anticipation of the formal opening of CTB negotiations later this month.

- **Strategic Disengagement**: Have proceeded with welcome first step, joint detargeting. Now have to move to fuller strategic disengagement.

  -- Experts will be meeting as early as late January to discuss joint measures such as notifying exercises of strategic forces. Important for building confidence, building strategic stability.

- **ABM Treaty**: Pleased with progress made in technical talks on the recent U.S. proposals to multilateralize the ABM Treaty and create demarcation between "theater" and "strategic" missile defenses. Thanks for positive letter to Secretary Christopher -- basis to move forward.

[If Yeltsin raises the GPS (Global Protection System):]

-- We wanted to finish our Bottom-Up Review before we talked to you about our follow-on to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Now the review is finished, let's get our experts together to talk about this.

UNCLASSIFIED with
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Ukrainian President Kravchuk

Attached at Tab I is a package for your meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. The memo covers both a brief initital one-on-one session with Kravchuk, as well as the expanded bilateral meeting that will follow. At Tab II is background information; Tab III is biographical information.

Attachments
Tab I Meeting Package
Tab II Background Information
Tab III Biographical Information

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~~SECRET~~ attachment

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0905-M (1.47)
5/11/2018 VC

BORISPOL MEETING WITH
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Your one-hour airport meeting with Kravchuk will focus on two issues: the trilateral nuclear deal and our wish for broader economic relations with Ukraine. This will be your first meeting with Kravchuk and it comes at a time when we need to build closer and better overall relations with Ukraine. After the meeting, you and Kravchuk will make press statements concerning these issues and your trilateral meeting with Yeltsin in Moscow on Friday.

Since you announced the trilateral agreement to eliminate Ukrainian nuclear weapons on Monday evening, President Kravchuk has faced sharp criticism in Kiev from leading parliamentarians. Dmytro Pavlychko, the Chairman of the Rada's Foreign Affairs Committee and a proponent of a nuclear Ukraine, was especially blunt: "Kravchuk can't go against the parliamentary resolution (conditionally ratifying START I). If he does, we will go back into session and begin to throw him out." Despite this sentiment, Ambassador Miller believes Kravchuk will be able to manage the issue in the Rada.

This reaction, while expected, will have had two days to build when you arrive at Borispol Airport. Your meeting with Kravchuk will do much for his political standing by underlining U.S. confidence in his leadership. It will also provide him with the political cover that he will need to travel to Moscow on Friday for the meeting with President Yeltsin at which you will sign the trilateral agreement.

Kravchuk has asked that the stopover be orchestrated to convey that you and he are continuing to consult on the nuclear accord. He does not want to give the impression that he will sign a done deal put together in Moscow and Washington. Maintaining this appearance was made more difficult by Moscow's precipitous announcement of the accord on Monday morning, which led to our own announcement (and Kiev's) later that day. Nevertheless, it will be important to treat the meeting as one of substance, where you and Kravchuk will do a final review of the agreement prior to Moscow.

One of the most important aspects of the trilateral agreement is that it clearly establishes the Ukrainian government's commitment to a non-nuclear future and frees us to pursue a broader agenda of economic, political and defense cooperation. We have expanded military-to-military contacts. Secretary Aspin visited Kiev last summer to tell the Ukrainians their security would be better served by the development of a close relationship with the conventional forces of the NATO alliance than by the isolation that would be imposed by a decision to "go nuclear." This new

defense cooperation relationship provides a strong basis for Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace. You should encourage Kravchuk to participate in PFP.

Economic assistance and reform prospects will be the second major issue for your discussions. We have told the Ukrainians that we are ready to embark on an intensive exchange on how we can help their crisis-ridden economy. Ukraine is in hyperinflation (at 60 percent per month) and the energy sector has been depending on the country's strategic reserves to generate heat and electricity. At one point before Christmas less than two weeks' supply of fuel was left to keep the power plants running. Many plants, schools and offices have had to close down because of the energy crisis.

You can tell Kravchuk that we will deliver substantial bilateral aid in 1994 ($155 million) and that we would be willing to double that level should Ukraine undertake fundamental reforms. You can also commit to starting our enterprise fund, a key Ukraine wish, and indicate we will roll out the red carpet for his senior economic delegation in late January.

Your central message, however, is to let Kravchuk know that continued inaction on reform will exacerbate Ukraine's severe economic problems and forestall international support. Making a commitment to economic reform will be every bit as difficult as the courageous leap forward he's just taken on nuclear issues and is as important for Ukraine's future.

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Congratulate Kravchuk for his courage and leadership on the trilateral nuclear deal and indicate our interest in helping him sell it at home.**

- **Commit to building a new economic relationship: increased U.S. assistance in response to a new Ukrainian economic reform effort.**

- **Commit to Kravchuk's official visit to Washington in late February/early March.**

CORE POINTS

- I came here to thank you personally for your courage and statesmanship on nuclear deal. It's a giant step forward for Ukraine, U.S. and world.

- Very pleased to meet you for first time and to be in Ukraine for first time.

- Understand you've just had a birthday (60).

- New start to better U.S.-Ukraine relations.

  - Want to build up economic relations too.

o We'll see each other on Friday. Also look forward to your official visit to Washington in February or March.

Security Relations

o Trilateral Agreement

-- Your decision to negotiate and sign the trilateral agreement that will eliminate nuclear weapons from Ukraine is an act of supreme leadership.

-- Your commitment to this decision opens the way for close cooperation between our two countries.

-- Cooperation not only with the United States, but also our allies in Europe, will help your independence and sovereignty to thrive. It will also benefit your economy and security. I welcome this future.

-- On Friday, you and I will join President Yeltsin in signing the historic trilateral agreement. Will be a key event signalling the close of the Cold War era.

o Implementation

-- To implement this agreement, we will continue to participate with you and Russia in the trilateral process that has become so successful.

-- Indeed, I am aware that our negotiators should return quickly to the table to work out the details of the compensation arrangements for the tactical nuclear weapons that were removed from your territory in 1991 and 1992.

- These details, as I understand, are to be completed by April.

-- Would like to propose that we begin discussions on this issue at an early date. We should confer with our Russian colleagues and arrange to begin talks by mid-February. I will be ready to name a negotiator shortly.

o Partnership for Peace

-- We will work closely with you so that Ukraine can fulfill its promise as one of the most important countries in the heart of Europe. As we heal the divisions of the Cold War, you can one of the chief contributors to Europe's cohesion.

-- We spoke briefly yesterday of the Partnership for Peace. The robust defense cooperation and military-to-military contacts that we developed over the past year are a strong basis for your participation in the Partnership.

-- This head start will enable you to show real leadership in working with us to define and build the partnership. We welcome such a role for Ukraine. I hope you will agree to join us on this important venture.

o Nunn-Lugar Program

-- Before we turn to the future, I would like to touch on one more subject from the past: the safe and secure dismantlement of the strategic offensive forces in Ukraine.

-- We have now put in place a series of agreements so that we can work together to eliminate these dangerous weapons -- this is a real step forward.

-- With at least $175 million in Nunn-Lugar funds, we will be able to assist you over time in the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear systems.

-- I am glad that we are now extending these activities to include a broader range of projects in defense conversion.

o **Key Points on Building New Economic Relationship**

-- I'm anxious to move economics to center of our relationship.

-- Know economic situation a major concern for you. I want to be helpful.

-- If you decide to make major economic reform effort, U.S. and West will be with you.

-- Would like to hear your views on economic situation and your future reform plans.

o U.S. Advice

-- Without commitment to reform and new efforts, your economic woes will continue. Reform long-term process but will pay off for you.

-- We need give both our governments clear signal to improve them.

-- Let me suggest the following as steps we should take. We can discuss further when you come to Washington.

1) We'll welcome your economic delegation in Washington January 23-25. Use visit to chart future course of relations.

2) As Secretary Christopher told you in October, I can commit to $155 million in economic assistance this year.

   - This is a floor - could substantially increase, even double, if your reforms advance.

   - Without reform, our aid won't be effective.

3) I've decided to commit to an Enterprise Fund for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

   - Will start at $40 million in 1994, but can build from there.

4) We should focus on expanding private trade and investment -- best way to support you long-term.

o Building International Support for Ukraine

-- If you decide to commit to an economic reform program, the U.S. will help to secure greater international support, as we've done for Russia.

-- I believe the only solution to your inflation and industrial paralysis is to begin a reform drive.

-- If you go forward, you could receive $3-3.5 billion from the IMF and World Bank in the first year alone.

-- In addition, we are exploring within the G-7 a possible program with the IMF to supply credits to the new independent states to help you pay for energy imports. This is preliminary and I would like to keep this private for now.

TRILATERAL STATEMENT AND ANNEX ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE

- **Statement provides for:**
  - -- Transfer of all nuclear weapons in Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement; Ukraine to continue deactivating all SS-19 and SS-24 missiles by removing warheads;
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These letters record the most difficult demands of the Russian and Ukrainian parties, over which their bilateral negotiations broke down in September. Russia wanted a timetable for the final transfer of warheads from Ukraine. Ukraine wanted a promise of compensation for tactical nuclear weapons. The United States brokered resolution of these issues in the trilateral negotiations.

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001g. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 4012

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2015-0772-M
rs1334

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001i. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001j. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)

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2015-0772-M
rs1334

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT

TO

KIEV, UKRAINE

January 12, 1994

EVENT: Ukrainian Bilateral Meeting

DATE: Wednesday, January 12, 1994

TIME: 8:00 pm - 10:15 pm

LOCATION: VIP House, Kiev Airport

ATTENDEES:

Initial Bilateral

United States	Ukraine
The President	Pres. Leonid Kravchuk
Sec. Christopher	For. Min. Anatoly Zlenko
Tony Lake	NSA Anton Butenko
Rose Gottemoeller, notetaker	notetaker tba

Participants added for Expanded Meeting

Mack McLarty	COS Mykola Khomenko
David Gergen	Acting PM Yefin Zhvialskiy
Leon Fuerth	Dept. PM Shmarov
Frank Wisner	DM. Radetskiy
Strobe Talbott	Dept. FM Boris Tarasiuk
Michael Ryan	For. Aff. Adv. Taranenko
Amb. Bill Miller	SS Chr. Evhen Marchuk
Nick Burns	Cab. Min. Dotsenko

PRESS: POOL SPRAY AT BEGINNING OF SMALL BILATERAL MEETING
OPEN PRESS FOR THE PRESS STATEMENTS

SCENARIO: **Arrival Ceremony:** Upon arrival Ukrainian Chief of Protocol George Chernyavskiy and Ambassador Bill Miller will proceed to Air Force One to greet THE PRESIDENT (introduced by Amb. Raiser). Chernyavskiy and Ambassador Miller leave AF1; THE PRESIDENT then proceeds to the tarmac where he is greeted by President Kravchuk. Bread and salt tradition: As part of local tradition, several women will offer THE PRESIDENT bread and salt. THE PRESIDENT breaks off a small piece of bread, dips it in the salt, and eats it. Receiving Line: THE PRESIDENT is introduced to the participants listed above. The US participants, led by Amb. Raiser after the bread and salt tradition, follow the President down the receiving line. US participants proceed directly to VIP Lounge while THE PRESIDENT and Pres. Kravchuk

continue to a reviewing point to listen to 40 second versions of each country's national anthem.

Small Bilateral: At 8:10 pm THE PRESIDENT and Pres. Kravchuk join the small meeting participants in the VIP meeting room for a brief photo opportunity. There is then opportunity for a thirty minute bilateral meeting in that room. Whisper interpreters will be used. NOTE: During this time, expanded meeting participants will mingle informally in the upstairs lounge.

Expanded Bilateral: At 8:50 pm THE PRESIDENT and small bilateral participants proceed upstairs at to join the remaining officials for the expanded bilateral meeting in the Second Floor Lounge. Ukrainian appetizers will be provided. This meeting will last until 9:15 pm. At the conclusion of the meeting, THE PRESIDENT will proceed to brief for the press statements.

Press Statements: At 9:30 pm THE PRESIDENT and Pres. Kravchuk proceed to the main terminal for a twenty-five minute press availability. President Kravchuk will open with a three minute statement; THE PRESIDENT will follow with a three minute statement. There is opportunity for a small number of questions to be taken from the press.

Departure Ceremony: At 10:00 pm Protocol Chief Chernyavskiy escorts THE PRESIDENT and Pres. Kravchuk past the honor guard, where they pause to listen to abbreviated anthems. The receiving line is repeated, then THE PRESIDENT bids farewell to Pres. Kravchuk at the foot of the stairs before boarding AF1 for a 10:15 departure.

IMPORTANT NOTE: IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE SCHEDULED TIMES. THE PRESS CORPS WILL REMAIN BEHIND TO FILE BUT HAVE A VERY TIGHT DEADLINE TO MEET FOR EVENING NEWS/NEWSPAPER PRODUCTION.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0087

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1994

94 JAN 7 P7:19

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Trade Issues for Your Trip to Brussels

At Tab A is a good memorandum from Ambassador Kantor concerning trade issues that might arise during your visit to Brussels. It focuses particularly on the consolidation of the achievements of the Uruguay Round, the next generation of multilateral trade issues and the potential for trade policy coordination vis-a-vis Japan and China. Additional trade issues on the U.S.-EU agenda include the following:

Government Procurement/Telecommunications: As you recall, in 1993, we resolved for two years the dispute over the EU's discriminatory government procurement practices in the area of heavy electrical equipment. However, the EU continues to discriminate in the procurement of telecommunications equipment. We have told the EU that we must resolve this issue prior to April 15 to assure the successful completion of a GATT Government Procurement Agreement.

Unresolved Uruguay Round Issues: The Uruguay Round deferred a number of issues, including the completion of a Multilateral Steel Agreement (MSA) and the multilateralization of the U.S.-EU Aircraft Agreement. In addition, we agreed to continue talking about the liberalization of maritime services and basic telecommunications services.

Audio-Visual Issues: With the exclusion of the EU audio-visual sector from the Uruguay Round, we face a number of serious market access barriers. Most prominent are the Broadcast Directive which limits foreign programming to 50% of broadcast time; French implementation of the Directive which limits foreign programming to 40%; and restrictive Spanish film quotas and dubbing license rules.

Energy Charter: After more than 2 years of negotiation, the U.S., EU, Eastern Europe and the NIS have yet to produce an agreement on energy trade and investment. Now, the EU is threatening to sign an agreement without the U.S. unless the U.S. concedes on various key points.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.16)

Attachment
Tab A Incoming from Ambassador Kantor

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8840

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

94 JAN 10 P9:18

Recd 1-11-94 10:00 a.m.

January 10, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Overseas Troop Strength

You asked us to find out how many military personnel are deployed overseas and their location. Tab A describes and graphically depicts the Areas of Responsibility of the U.S. military Commander-in-Chiefs. Tab B breaks out both U.S. military personnel deployed or afloat by the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and personnel permanently stationed overseas by region or country.

Attachments
Tab A CINCs Areas of Responsibility
Tab B Deployed Troop Strength

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

TAB A

Military Commander-in-Chiefs
Areas of Responsibility (AORs)

U.S. Atlantic Command

Atlantic Ocean west of 17 degrees East
Caribbean Sea
Pacific Ocean east of 92 degrees West
Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees West and est of 100 degrees East
Greenland & other islands (except UK and Ireland) in water areas

U.S. Southern Command

Central and South America
Panama Canal and Panama Canal area

U.S. Central Command

Egypt
Sudan
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Kenya
Somalia
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
United Arab Emirates
Gulf of Oman
Republic of Yemen
Bahrain
Iran
Iraq
Afghanistan
Eritrea
Pakistan
Qatar
Oman
Gulf of Aden
Red Sea


U.S. European Command

Europe, including Poland
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Romania
former Yugoslavia
Albania
United Kingdom
Ireland
Mediterranean Sea and its islands
Mediterranean littoral, excluding Egypt
Sudan
Kenya
Eritrea
Somalia
Djibouti

U.S. Pacific Command

Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees West
Alaska and the Aleutian Islands
Bering Sea
Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees West and east of 100 degrees East
Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees (excluding Gulfs of Aden & Oman)
Japan
Republic of Korea
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
People's Republic of China
Mongolia
Southeast Asia
Southern Asian landmass to the western border of India
Madagascar
Other islands in all assigned water areas

COMMANDERS' AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



BY ITSELF THIS MAP IS UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

ENCLOSURE 1

DEPLOYED TROOP STRENGTH (U)

MILITARY PERSONNEL AFLOAT OR DEPLOYED OUTSIDE US ~~(S)~~

	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	TOTAL
European Command	1,456	3,061	3,766	2,068	10,351
Central Command	13,571	8,313	5,154	2,304	29,342
Southern Command	2,970		397	178	3,545
Pacific Command	1,125	8,792	1,039	721	11,677
Atlantic Command	228	3,748	2	818	4,796
Total	19,350	23,914	10,358	6,089	59,711

MILITARY PERSONNEL PERMANENTLY STATIONED OVERSEAS (U)

	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	TOTAL
Okinawa/Japan		18,954	15,649	22,476	57,079
Pacific (incl. Hawaii)	30,786	7,377	18,568		56,731
Korea	25,315		9,804	118	35,237
Diego Garcia		809		103	912
Atl/Carib		6,459	1,474	760	8,693
Europe	92,862	12,222	48,207	995	154,286
Persian Gulf	783	632	269	110	1,794
South/Cen Am	7,955	701	2,379	212	11,247
Africa	548	47	56		651
Total	158,249	47,201	96,406	24,774	326,630

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.17)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001m. report	re: Meeting with President Otto Stich of Switzerland (3 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 4012

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2015-0772-M
rs1334

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
0151

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Additional Material for the NATO Summit

Since we prepared your Summit briefing book, NATO Secretary General Woerner has told us he plans to ask you to brief the working dinner Monday evening January 10 on Russia and your forthcoming visit there. Suggested talking points are at Tab A.

At Tab B are three "fireproofing" papers, to prepare you for problems that might arise: (1) Allied complaints about shortfalls in the U.S. share of NATO's infrastructure fund; (2) developments in Bosnia, and initiatives that French officials may raise on the margins of the Summit; and (3) other problems that some Allies may raise.

Attachments
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B "Fireproofing" Papers

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/16/2019
2015-0772-M

~~SECRET~~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001n. talking points	re: Talking Points for Previewing Visit to Moscow (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001o. report	re: U.S. Funding of NATO Budgets (1 page)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001p. report	re: The NATO Summit and Bosnia (2 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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
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Trend in Bosnian Serb Shelling of Sarajevo



*Our chart is based on UN reporting of daily shell impacts on Sarajevo. These data, however, are not complete; in periods of light military activity, the UN frequently reports only that the city was "relatively quiet" rather than providing specific shell counts.

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0172-M
05126116 KDE (1.22)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001r. report	re: Possible Problems (2 pages)	01/00/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001s. memo	Strobe Talbott to Tony Lake re: Kozyrev's "European Security Plan" (4 pages)	01/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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9400151

2015-0772-M
rs1334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

GENEVA MISSION REMARKS
President William J. Clinton
January 16, 1994

Thank you, Ambassador Spiegel. It is a great pleasure to be in Switzerland. We've been on the road a lot this week, I can't think of a better place than Geneva to end my first visit as President to Europe. You are truly fortunate to be serving at this wonderful post.

I came to Europe because we have reached a moment of opportunity; a chance to build a new trans-Atlantic security based not on Europe's old divisions but on a new integration of democracy, market economies and security cooperation. Looking back on the last several days, I think we have helped advance that goal.

We worked with the European Union to help expand our cooperation on trade and economic growth.

With NATO, we established a new Partnership for Peace to bring our former Soviet bloc adversaries into closer military cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance.

We strengthened our ties with the Visegrad nations, whose security is so important to the United States.

We signed an historic trilateral agreement that commits Ukraine to eliminate its nuclear warheads -- an agreement that will reduce nuclear threats for that region and the entire world.

And we have sent a clear message to Russians of all ages and across the political spectrum: stay the course of democratic and market reform and America will stand with you.

Last evening I met with President Stich to talk about all these developments and about the strong ties between Switzerland and the United States.

Because Geneva is an international crossroads and a respected setting for diplomacy, those of you who serve here work on a wide range of challenges far beyond your role in dealing with UN agencies based here. My meeting today with Syria's President Asad is an example, and I am hopeful that meeting can help lead to new progress toward a durable peace in the Middle East.

During my short stay here, I have seen why this Mission has such a good reputation -- it's because you've earned it. Your skills are worthy of this grand city of diplomats. Your nation appreciates your work -- and so does your President.

Thank you all again for your hard work and for everything you have done to help make this visit a success.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 481				
Document ID: 9408299				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. paper~~	~~re: Moving Toward NATO Expansion (5 pages)~~	~~10/12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 481

FOLDER TITLE:
9408299

2015-0772-M
rs1335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9408299
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 94 16

TO: CHRISTOPHER, W
PERRY, W

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 14 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NSC STAFF PAPER RE NATO EXPANSION

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO W/ ATTACHMENT DUE DATE: 15 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY MBN DATE 10/15 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN CLOSED BY: NSMBN DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94101416	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94101509	LAKE SGD MEMO W/ ATTACHMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941014	CHRISTOPHER, W	
002	941014	PERRY, W	
002	941014	ALBRIGHT, M	
002	941014	SHALIKASHVILI, J	

Recd 10/14 1:29p

National Security Council
The White House

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Sens	1	AOS	
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Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	DPS 10/14	D
NSC Secretariat	5		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

13 OCT 14 03 16

Exec Sec Office has diskette 7428

National Security Council
The White House

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Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	DPS 10/14	D
NSC Secretariat	5		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9408299
DATE 14 OCT 94

SUBJECT: NSC STAFF PAPER RE NATO EXPANSION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. WILLIAM J. PERRY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT U.S. MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS VIA USUN/W - ATTN: D. SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
GENERAL JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E873 PENTAGON DEPT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 9/10/2019

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 8299

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion ~~(S)~~

I recommend that you review and circulate to selected senior persons on your staffs the paper on NATO Expansion prepared by NSC staff attached at Tab A. The paper was prepared to contribute to interagency deliberation and consultations with our Allies and others on this matter in coming weeks. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.75)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

MOVING TOWARD NATO EXPANSION

We have less than two months to (a) refine USG thinking about our basic goals and rationale for NATO expansion; (b) conduct initial consultations with the Allies (and, subsequently, with the Russians, Ukrainians and CEEs); and (c) based on (a) and (b), prepare an initiative for the December NATO Ministerial that would kick off a formal process within the Alliance to define an agreed policy framework for NATO expansion. The following is a summary of NSC views on USG direction and tactics, based on interagency work to date and our own thinking post-Yeltsin Summit:

I. Policy Framework

Objectives

-- Develop an integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but going beyond NATO expansion.

-- In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including the major CEEs who live up to our precepts, with the prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.

-- In parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia. This could take the form of a Treaty (an "alliance with the Alliance"). It should include a mechanism for consulting with Russia on NATO or NATO-led military operations as in ex-Yugoslavia, but without giving Russians a veto over NATO decisions.

-- Possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine and Baltic States should be maintained; we should not consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence.

-- New members would acquire all the rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and would commit to eventual full integration in NATO's military structures; but full integration would not be required at the outset and there would be flexibility on operational issues such as stationing of foreign forces.

-- NATO expansion should take place in coordination with the enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable.

~~SECRET~~

Rationale

-- To project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE, we need to create a perspective that Partnership for Peace will lead to Alliance membership for some PFP members.

-- To make clear expansion is not seen as directed against any country, process must be developed in parallel with long-term strategy vis-à-vis Russia that includes intensified partnership with NATO and development of other institutions (CSCE, G-8).

-- Expansion process will be evolutionary and linked to a continued, robust PFP as mechanism both for preparing new members and for deepening relations with countries not likely to attain membership or, at least, not among the first group to join.

-- "Insurance policy"/"strategic hedge" rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated. On contrary, possibility of membership in the long term for a democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly, as the President and Yeltsin agreed (*pace* Volker Rühe).

Criteria

-- Avoid explicit checklist (e.g. military requirements); stick to "precepts" -- democracy, market economy, responsible/good-neighborly security policies.

-- On military side, general goal should be interoperability with NATO forces, with precise standard to be refined as PFP evolves.

-- Standardization with NATO forces should be longer-term objective, but need not be attained at time of accession.

Timing

-- For own planning purposes, should anticipate earliest explicit NATO decision on new members to be taken no sooner than first half of second Clinton term.

-- But we should avoid proposing specific timetable at this stage, or identifying which countries are likely to be included or excluded from the first group.

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-- During interim:

o Use PFP (reinforced by U.S. bilateral security assistance) to deepen relations with all partners, potential members and others, and to promote interoperability. (Issue for decision: how to set priorities for use of $30 million in FY95 and the expected $100 million in FY96 for PFP support, and to meet the President's commitment of $10 million for the Baltic Battalion in FY95.)

o Watch for progress vis-à-vis "precepts."

o Begin to establish the functional building blocks of the future enhanced relationships between NATO and Russia; consult with Moscow on best way to institutionalize this relationship.

o Keep the membership door open for Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to "tilt" in favor of the Visegrad countries), while stressing that all candidates must satisfy the same precepts.

o Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, both internally and with them (e.g. pace of military integration, forward deployment, "German solutions" such as temporary restrictions on stationed forces deployment on new CEE members' territory).

II. Fall Strategy

(Notional) Objectives at NAC Ministerial.

-- Statement of "precepts" for potential new members.

-- Affirmation that, in the context of these precepts, PFP is the path to membership, as well as an important mechanism for cooperation in its own right.

-- Tasking by Ministers to NAC to initiate a formal review to establish Alliance policy framework for expansion, including political/security rationale, military requirements, role of PFP, evolution of relations with countries who do not seek or obtain membership.

~~SECRET~~

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-- Statement of new, more ambitious goals for expanded NATO relationship with Russia in addition to PFP (implicitly foreshadowing "alliance with the Alliance" as alternative to membership track).

-- Announcement of ambitious PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (including broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike.

-- At CSCE Summit, seek adoption of U.S. initiatives to strengthen CSCE as mechanism for conflict prevention and crisis management as a key element of broader strategy of building an inclusive European security system in which Russia plays a major role.

Outline of discussions.

o Road map:

1) Consultations with UK, Germany, France (mid-to-late October)

2) Unreinforced brainstorming session at NATO (late October)

3) Interagency team to London, Paris, Bonn and other key allied capitals (Rome, The Hague -- October-November)

4) Reinforced NAC to prepare for Ministerial (mid-November)

5) Interagency team to Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw and other CEE (Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Baltics and, possibly, Bratislava and Sofia -- late November)

6) NAC/NACC Ministerials (December 1-2): NAC issues communique or declaration on NATO expansion; NATO decision briefed to partners at NACC.

7) CSCE Summit in Budapest (December 5-6): Adoption of U.S. initiatives to strengthen CSCE.

8) Bilaterals with Russians, Ukrainians, CEEs on margins of NACC and CSCE, *and/or* dispatch high-level briefing team to Moscow, Kiev and CEE capitals as we did after NATO Summit.

~~SECRET~~

9 Themes

-- With Allies: seek consensus on above objectives; discuss military implications (building upon October 7 OSD/JCS briefing).

-- With Russia: continue dialogue on rationale for NATO expansion, compatibility with goal of inclusive European security system; lay groundwork for development of special relationship/alliance with the Alliance; consult on agenda for strengthened CSCE.

-- With CEEs, Baltics, Ukraine: outline way ahead; lay down precepts; review military implications (e.g. extent of integration NATO will require -- drawing on OSD/JCS briefing); make clear candidates and timetable are still open questions; stress need for them to support positive parallel track for Russia.

AV/DF:NATOMOV3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 8299

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB, RICHARD SCHIFTER RL, ALEXANDER VERSHBOW DF/jn

FROM: DANIEL FRIED DF

SUBJECT: Circulating the NATO Expansion Paper

You told Sandy Vershbow that you wanted to circulate under your signature our staff paper on NATO Expansion. A cover memo to your principal counterparts is attached for your signature at Tab I; the paper is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to your principal counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Principal Counterparts
Tab A NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 9/16/2019
2015-0772-F

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Document ID: 9409955				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~From Samuel Berger re. Meeting with the Vice President on Russia~~ and NATO Expansion (3 pages)	~~12/21/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2
001b. talking points	re: [Meeting Notes in Russian with English Transcriptions] (11 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:
9409955

2015-0772-M
rs1336

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECORD ID: 9409955
RECEIVED: 21 DEC 94 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO AP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ VP ON RUSSIA & NATO EXPANSION ON 21 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 24 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VE NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94122117	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	94122118	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95012512	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941221		VICE PRESIDENT
002	941221		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
002	941221		STEPHANOPOULOS, G

Rec'd 12/21
2:55 PM

National Security Council
The White House

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Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	12/21	& PODESTA
NSC Secretariat	4		

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cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 94 DEC 21 P4:43

MEETING WITH

THE VICE PRESIDENT ON RUSSIA AND NATO EXPANSION

DATE: December 21, 1994

LOCATION: Study in Residence

TIME: 5:45 - 6:15 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To have the Vice President brief you on his discussions with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin in Moscow on NATO expansion and to discuss our next steps on this issue.

II. BACKGROUND

The purpose of this meeting is to hear a detailed briefing from the Vice President on his discussions last week in Moscow with Boris Yeltsin and Victor Chernomyrdin on NATO expansion. Following his briefing, I recommend that you discuss briefly with the Vice President, Secretaries Christopher and Perry and others present our next steps in engaging the Russians on this issue.

The Vice President held a series of important meetings last week in Moscow on our overall relationship with Russia and specifically on NATO expansion. The most important was his meeting with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin in Yeltsin's hospital room on Friday, December 16. The Vice President succeeded in convincing Yeltsin that the Russians had misunderstood the NATO decision on December 1 to proceed with the process of NATO expansion in 1995. In the course of his conversation with Yeltsin, it became clear that Yeltsin had mistakenly interpreted the NAC communique to mean that NATO would make a decision in 1995 on the timetable of expansion. Yeltsin was especially angry because this appeared to him to contradict the assurances you had given him during your September summit meeting. Kozyrev's refusal to sign the PFP documents in Brussels and Yeltsin's hardline speech in Budapest were a direct result of this misunderstanding.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.26)

Yeltsin told the Vice President that he is now prepared to put the misunderstanding behind us and to get on with the good relationship we have established during the last two years. We will send to you shortly a letter to Yeltsin reaffirming the major points the Vice President raised with him and suggesting a way forward for our discussions with the Russians. The Russians have agreed that Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev should meet in mid-January to engage in the first of a series of discussions on NATO expansion and other major issues in our relationship. Eventually, we will need to widen these discussions to include other NATO allies.

These meetings will challenge us to develop by January a refined strategy to begin discussions with the Russians which could extend beyond your first term in office. In sum, we will need to conduct a detailed discussion with the Russians on three crucial issues: the NATO expansion process; developing the U.S.-Russia relationship; and developing and deepening Russia's relationship with NATO. All three of these issues will be important to convincing the Russians to accept our long-term interest in expanding NATO to the East.

You need not have a long discussion of these issues during the meeting today. But you should know that we will begin to develop them in a small circle within the Administration in order to prepare Secretary Christopher for his January discussions.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Christopher
Secretary Perry
Samuel Berger
Strobe Talbott
Leon Fuerth
Nicholas Burns

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Briefing followed by discussion

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. talking points	re: [Meeting Notes in Russian with English Transcriptions] (11 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 484

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9409955

2015-0772-M
rs1336

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 21, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Memorandum for President's Meeting with the Vice President on Nato Expansion

Attached is a memorandum for the President covering his meeting with the Vice President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 9/16/2019
2015-0772-m

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 484				
Document ID: 9409967				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. paper~~	~~re. Building Europe's New Security Architecture (6 pages)~~	~~12/22/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:
9409967

2015-0772-M
rs1337

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9409967
RECEIVED: 22 DEC 94 13

TO: LAKE
BERGER

FROM: FRIED
SCHIFTER
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 22 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
CSBM
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - NATO EXPANSION & RUSSIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 26 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
NSC CHRON ✓

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94122715	FOR DECISION
001	VERSHBOW	Z	94122807	FOR FURTHER ACTION
001		X	95062307	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

National Security Council
The White House

reed 12/23 9am

9967

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9967

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG OPS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	ADS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			12/26
Berger	2	NL	Verbatim/
Lake	X		Burns
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
NSC Secretariat			
Talbott/Burns	4		see note

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette 6/97

SANDY/NICK - why not circulate this /DFJ

ER

IRNS, RICHARD

NATO Expansion and

oscow and our have revised our ATO expansion. We group of senior re for the The preparatory work ill be reviewed and

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~ 9967

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE AND SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, NICHOLAS BURNS, RICHARD SCHIFTER AND DANIEL FRIED /DFJ

SUBJECT: European Security Architecture, NATO Expansion and Russia

In the wake of the Vice President's trip to Moscow and our December 21 discussion with the President, we have revised our NSC conceptual paper on how to proceed with NATO expansion. We would like to circulate this paper to a small group of senior officials at State, OSD, JCS and OVP to prepare for the Christopher-Kozyrev meeting in mid-January. The preparatory work of Dick Holbrooke's small interagency group will be reviewed and managed by regular Deputies meetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our paper on European Security Architecture for senior and restricted interagency distribution.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Building Europe's New Security Architecture

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By NR NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

BUILDING EUROPE'S NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

We need to maintain U.S. leadership in defining the way ahead on NATO expansion and other elements of our European security agenda. We need to (a) integrate USG thinking about next steps in the NATO expansion process with our Russian and other European equities; (b) plan consultations with the Russians (especially the Christopher-Kozyrev meeting in January), Allies, CEEs and Ukrainians; and (c) based on the above, set objectives for year-end 1995 when the NATO study is due and beyond. The outline below summarizes NSC staff views on USG direction and tactics, based on interagency work (including Strobe Talbott's senior interagency process) and our own thinking following the NAC Ministerial and CSCE Summit and the Vice President's Moscow trip. Principal developments since the last iteration of this paper include the NAC communiqué and Russia's stiff reaction to it, but also hints from the Russian Government of interest in a formalized treaty relationship with NATO.

I. Policy Framework

Objectives

-- An integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but broader than NATO expansion.

-- In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including at first one or more CEEs who live up to our precepts, with the credible prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.

-- In close parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia -- possibly in the form of a Treaty ("alliance with the Alliance") or Charter. It could include a commitment on consulting with Russia on NATO or NATO-led military operations as in ex-Yugoslavia, but without giving Russians a veto or right of prior consultations over NATO decisions. The Treaty/Charter could establish an institutional framework for consultations in 16+1 format (possibly modeled after the SCC) and could also include negative security assurances.

-- Possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine, Baltic and southern tier States (i.e., Romania) should be maintained; we should not consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence. This said, we should not emphasize this point in public or privately within NATO at this time, given Russian sensitivities. And looking to the near and medium term, we will need to develop a Ukraine strategy in parallel with the deepening of the NATO-Russia relationship.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2018
2015-0777-M (1.28)

-- New NATO members will acquire all rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and will be expected to commit to full integration in NATO's military structures. NATO military authorities to undertake detailed planning for defense of new members. *At the end of the day, there might be flexibility on operational issues (such as stationing of foreign forces, forward deployment), but we do not need to decide this now, nor should we offer assurances to the Russians in this regard prematurely.*

-- Expansion needs to take place in a way that does not dilute NATO's military effectiveness for either core self-defense missions or new peacekeeping and other non-Article V missions. At the same time, expansion should not be governed primarily by technical military criteria. When they join, new members should be on a "credible path" toward making a positive contribution to the common defense.

-- NATO expansion should take place in coordination with the enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable. Nor should EU membership automatically entitle NATO membership: as a general rule, there should be no full WEU members who are not also members of NATO.

Rationale, Principles

-- NATO expansion intended to project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE. Stability in Central Europe will be a net plus for all countries, NATO members and non-members alike.

-- To ensure emerging European security architecture can include Russia, *expansion process should proceed in close parallel in substance and pace with deepening Russia-NATO partnership*, leading toward formalized relationship in tandem with a strong U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship and development of other multilateral institutions in which Russians will participate (strengthened OSCE, G-8, Contact Group).

-- Expansion process to be evolutionary and transparent. Consultations with principal interested parties before announcement of decisions or major forward steps. Expansion linked to a continued, robust PFP as mechanism both for preparing new members and deepening ties with countries not seeking or likely to attain membership or not among the first group to join.

-- "Insurance policy"/"strategic hedge" rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) should not be emphasized in public diplomacy, with focus instead on goal of building inclusive European security architecture in which a democratic Russia will be a major partner.

within PFP from exercises to joint peacekeeping and other operations. Implement PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike (*Must decide on priorities for use of $30 million in FY95 and the expected $100 million in FY96 for PFP support, and to meet the President's commitment of $10 million for the Baltic Battalion in FY95.*)

- With CEEs: Consultations with selected CEE countries in rough parallel with Russia consultations. In 1995 consultations, keep expectations realistic -- be clear about timing; elicit their thinking about achievable next steps for 1996 to help shape our own and Allied thinking. Stress need for progress and caution against backsliding vis-à-vis precepts. Keep membership door open for all -- e.g., Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to draw a line at the Visegrad countries) -- while stressing that all candidates must satisfy the same precepts. *Be careful not to move ahead in our thinking or rhetoric on NATO expansion beyond the CEE countries' variable and uncertain state of political maturity.*

- With Russia: Starting with Christopher-Kozyrev meeting, hold increasingly serious, frank dialogue about NATO expansion, enhanced NATO-Russia relationship, including possible Treaty/Charter; convey assurances about timing of NATO decisions. Elicit Russian thinking about next steps in 1996 as our own thinking evolves. Insist on end to public charges from Russians. *As long as Russians do likewise, avoid use of challenging public language (e.g., no Russian veto), but be careful not to allow Russians to confuse serious dialogue with right of joint decisions or veto.*

- With Allies: Generate deeper Allied consensus on expansion, working bilaterally at high levels when necessary and using the 1995 NAC study. Move beyond U.S. identification with expansion issue. Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, including requirements for aspirant nations. Explore military options for NATO integration with first CEEs, e.g., pace of military integration, forward deployment, resources, defense planning, military doctrine, standardization, and command and force structure. Ensure progress by spring Ministerial to support interim consultations with Partners.

- o Within Quad: In addition to above, explore possible "German 2+4 solution" for CEEs (e.g. temporary and/or conditional restrictions on deployment of stationed forces on new CEE members' territory) but do not broach these with full Alliance or with Russians prematurely.

- o Within OSCE: Press our agenda, strengthening organization along lines we have suggested. Increase its role and visibility within NIS as well as CEE. In study of new "security model" for the 21st century, express openness to Russian ideas for putting OSCE on a legal basis and for further streamlining of decision-making; resist proposals that would elevate OSCE above NATO.

- o With Congress and with U.S., West European, CEE and NIS Publics: Greatly increase Administration visibility on issue through op-ed pieces, speeches, USIS outreach, and expand information activities by NATO to match U.S. efforts. Need special, focused public information effort on NATO/PFP in Russia. Maintain consistent message before all audiences.

II. Winter/Spring Strategy

Objectives at Christopher-Kozyrev Meeting

-- Affirm understanding about public discretion and private openness.

-- Explore both sides' thinking: Russia-NATO Treaty/Charter, principle of parallelism between NATO expansion, Russia-NATO relationship, and robust U.S.-Russian bilateral relations.

-- Reassure Russians about timing of expansion decisions (no expansion in 1995, sensitivity to Russian elections in 1995-96).

-- Reject joint decision-making about NATO expansion.

-- Press for early Russian decision to complete PFP implementation documents and to sign NATO-Russia memorandum of understanding.

-- Make clear that development of Russia's relationship with NATO must evolve in step with expansion process and cannot get out ahead of NATO's relations with CEE countries: perceptions of a U.S.-Russia condominium would set back the progress we have made with the CEEs, and would not be in Moscow's interest either.

-- Suggest willingness at proper time to discuss military aspects of expansion (e.g. understandings about stationed forces, nuclear deployments, etc.), but not at this early stage of intra-Alliance study.

Outline of discussions/public outreach

1) Speech by Secretary of State or higher Administration official (January). Op-ed pieces starting in January and throughout the year.

2) Consultations with key Allies, Quad and, subsequently, with other allies (January, prior to and after Christopher-Kozyrev meeting).

3) Christopher-Kozyrev meeting (mid-January), with follow-up consultations at senior official level over following months.

4) Discussions with selected CEEs, Ukraine, Baltics: beginning in January in Washington and capitals via Embassies, and visits in both directions. Parallel public outreach efforts with CEE/NIS.

5) Interagency team to Quad capitals before spring NAC Ministerial.

6) Reinforced NAC to prepare for spring Ministerial.

Maximum Year-end 1995 Objectives

-- Deeper Allied, U.S. public/Congressional consensus on expansion on basis of our thinking and the NAC study.

-- Realistic CEE, Ukrainian, Baltic expectations and greater degree of confidence in process.

-- Russian understanding if not acceptance of package combining NATO expansion and parallel Russia-NATO relationship.

-- More robust and visible PFP, following year of exercises.

-- Enhanced U.S. bilateral military programs with partners, based on Warsaw Initiative $100M.

-- Broad consensus among Allies (and as much consensus as possible among CEEs, Russia) about 1996 next steps, e.g., implementation of study and greater differentiation among Partners.

DF/AV/NB:NATO1222

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 584				
Document ID: 9504076				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Daniel Fried to Anthony Lake re: CEEs and Our European Security~~ Policy (2 pages)	~~05/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 584

FOLDER TITLE:
9504076

2015-0772-M
rs1338

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9504076
RECEIVED: 26 MAY 95 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: FRIED

DOC DATE: 26 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CEE
NATO

CENTRAL EUROPE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CEE & US EUROPEAN POLICY

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 30 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON ✓

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M 6

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95053018	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95061414	NOTED BY LAKE

rec'd 5/31 6:15am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4076

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/13	N
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4076

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 27, 1995

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL FRIED DF

SUBJECT: CEEs and Our European Security Policy

I recently returned from a week in Central Europe where I attended a Rand Conference on European integration held in Budapest and participated in Bilateral Military working groups with Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Principal impressions include the following:

-- Our policy on European security is having a positive impact on Czech, Hungarian and to lesser degree Polish domestic politics. Anticipation of NATO and EU membership has crystallized a pro-Western consensus across the political spectra in all three countries, in particular moving the ex-communist parties in power in Hungary and Poland to the political center. Even in Slovakia, where Prime Minister Meciar's authoritarian and statist style could derail reform, foreign and security policy remains generally pro-Western. PM Klaus of the Czech Republic returned from Washington far more supportive of NATO than previously and confident in the U.S. commitment to CEE.

-- CEE governments accept the logic of our dual track (Russia-NATO/NATO enlargement) policy and appreciated our achievement at the Moscow summit. They were delighted by our support for Ukraine and were impressed by Kuchma's support for gradual NATO enlargement. By contrast, they believe Belarusian sovereignty has crumbled (more for lack of conviction than Russian machinations) to the detriment of CEE security. The CEEs generally assume Russian reforms will fail and that Moscow's pressure on them will increase. CEE governments make their case for NATO membership based on integration into the West rather than in anti-Russian terms. Nevertheless, we can expect them to press for more rapid movement on NATO enlargement than the NATO traffic can bear.

-- CEE militaries regard PFP and NATO as crucial points of orientation in the post-1989 world. The Czech Chief of

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.29)

the General Staff told me that NATO-via-PFP was a pivot around which the Czech military had reset its priorities. Our bilateral military programs are developing well; our $100 million Warsaw Initiative elicited enthusiasm.

-- While growing, CEE confidence remains vulnerable; they worry about the U.S. domestic debate and the Administration's commitment to the policy. Michael Mandelbaum attended the Rand Conference and spooked the CEEs by arguing that NATO enlargement is not only a bad idea, but that the President is not seriously committed to it. I rebutted him but other U.S. participants at the Conference -- including those who support our policy -- agreed that the Administration needs to be more visible on the public eye in espousing its European security policy. *In fact, Sandy Vershbow, Chip Blacker and I are working with State on a public affairs strategy and will work with Danvers on a Congressional strategy; we will approach you with specific ideas as needed.*

Concurrences by: John Schmidt, John Beyrle, Bill Danvers

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 589				
Document ID: 9504630				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Coit Blacker et al. to Anthony Lake re. Troika Meeting on European Security/NATO Enlargement... (2 pages)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: NATO Enlargement: Roadmap for 1996 (2 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: NATO Enlargement: Road Map for 1996, NSC Staff Views (4 pages)	05/22/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 589

FOLDER TITLE:
9504630

2015-0772-M
rs1339

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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RECORD ID: 9504630
RECEIVED: 16 JUN 95 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: BLACKER
FRIED
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 16 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
CSCE
EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY
EU
ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LAKE MTG ON EUROPEAN SECURITY & NATO ENLARGEMENT ON 19 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 20 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKER
DANVERS
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NSC CHRON
SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
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By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95061618	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95061910	NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

rec'd 6/17 9am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4630

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (NSC) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg		Copy	
Berger		Copy	
Lake	2		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3	MC 6/19	A
Records Mgt.			N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Mtg on European Security/ NATO Enlargement 6/19

Exec Sec Office has diskette 11/10

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4650

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (WH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg		Copy	
Berger		Copy	
Lake	2		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3	MC 6/19	A
Records Mgt.			N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Mtg on European Security / NATO Enlargement 6/19

Exec Sec Office has diskette MC

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4630

1996 debates. Compromise? Old-dynamic process

June 16, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: COIT BLACKER, DANIEL FRIED, ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DF

SUBJECT: Troika Meeting on European Security/NATO Enlargement, Monday, June 19 at 4:00 pm

We want to use this meeting to:

-- Review our substantive strategy on European security/NATO enlargement for 1996.

Tab A contains a Troika paper and a reader-friendly outline derived from it that spell out our thinking. We have shared the paper informally with Strobe and Holbrooke; no reaction yet. Our plan consists of a go-slow-and-quiet strategy for the first half of 1996 and significant steps after the Russian elections, potentially leading to a NATO offer at the December 1996 NAC (or an early 1997 NATO Summit) to start accession negotiations during 1997 with some prospective NATO members. We tie decisions on the "who and when" to a process of internal NATO review and consultation with partners rather than to a preset timeframe. We do not address what the U.S. might or might not say between the Russian elections and our own about the "who and when," there is no need to make a decision on that point now. **We want your approval of/comments on our strategy papers, which we then will work through the interagency process. We should hold a Deputies Committee meeting soon to set our course through into the fall.**

Also on substance, in the wake of Noordwijk, NATO is beginning to assemble ideas on a framework document for the NATO-Russia relationship. State has drafted an initial objectives/content paper to serve as the basis for Allied discussions. The State draft will be discussed at a NATO brainstorming session in the next few weeks, followed by a NATO-Russia brainstorming session before the NATO summer break. Work on the framework document will begin in September, with the goal of finishing it in time for the December NAC, as agreed in Noordwijk. The framework document will not be a formal agreement, but rather the principles and goals on which a future agreement would be based.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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Nevertheless, one challenge at the December NAC will be to package its modest steps on NATO enlargement to maintain the principle of parallelism and keep CEE confidence at an acceptable level.

-- Discuss a public strategy.

The Administration needs to be more visible. State (EUR), which had taken responsibility for our European security public affairs strategy, has not been active yet, though they are putting together a fall plan which sounds good on paper if very ambitious (summarized at Tab B). To get the Administration's views in print (and to stimulate State), the Troika has drafted an op-ed piece on European security/NATO enlargement for early placement (Tab C). It could go out either under your signature or under our three names. **We want your approval of/changes to the op-ed text and a decision about placement and authorship.**

We will continue to work with State and DoD on consulting the Hill on European Security and NATO enlargement issues. This will include consultations and hearings with key members. We may from time to time ask you to call or meet with members to discuss these issues.

Concurrences by: Bill Danvers, John Schmidt /DF

Attachments
Tab A Troika Paper and Outline on 1996 Gameplan on NATO
Tab B Outline of Fall 1995 Public Relations Strategy
Tab C Troika Draft Op-ed Piece

~~SECRET~~ June 13, 1995

NATO ENLARGEMENT: ROADMAP FOR 1996

I. From the December 1995 NAC to mid-1996: The "Half Step"

-- **Fall 1995.** In the fall, NATO will present the results of the "How and Why" Study to PFP partners as a group and subsequently hold one round of individualized consultations with interested partners in capitals.

-- **December 1995 NAC - Refining military requirements.** Beyond confirming that the enlargement process remains on track, the NAC should:

a) confirm that implementation of PFP commitments -- including political commitments re democracy and civilian control of the military -- remains a key factor in decisions about NATO enlargement;

b) commit NATO to refine the precepts contained in the "How and Why"" Study to note military requirements for new members, setting the spring 1996 NAC as a target;

c) call for continued, individualized NATO-plus-Partner consultations, within an expanded PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP), to discuss how Partners can meet NATO military requirements as these emerge;

d) agree to involve interested Partners in the CJTF as a new, pre-accession dimension to PFP.

-- **Finessing the spring 1996 NAC - Setting Military Requirements.** This NAC will take place just before the Russian elections. The NAC should:

a) finalize the refined list of military requirements for new NATO members, taking into account internal NATO deliberations and, where deemed appropriate, results of consultations with key, interested Partners; and

b) authorize NATO to consult with Partner countries aspiring to NATO membership on the remaining political issues that need to be resolved.

II. From mid-1996: Leading to the "Big Step"

-- **Summer/fall 1996 - The Pre-accession Phase.** Following the spring 1996 NAC, we will be ready to move to pre-accession talks. NATO should:

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By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2015
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a) Invite prospective NATO members to state their willingness to meet NATO military requirements, as adopted at the spring NAC, and to submit Membership Implementation Plans (MIPs) on how they will do so;

b) Set the December 1996 NAC as a target date for the first Partner submission of MIPs;

c) Offer continued NATO bilateral (16+1) consultations with Partners to help them draw up MIPs;

d) Point out to individual Partners aspiring to NATO membership any remaining political/democratization issues that need to be resolved.

-- **The December 1996 NAC - Invitation to Accession talks.**

a) The December, 1996 is the earliest point at which NATO could offer some prospective members to begin accession talks.

Alternatively, the December NAC could mandate NATO to study MIPs and set an early 1997 Summit or spring 1997 NAC as a target for the first invitations for accession talks.

b) Accession talks could begin in spring 1997 with a target completion date of the fall '97/spring '98 NAC.

c) Assuming a further year for ratification, the first post-Cold War new NATO members could accede at the end of 1998, possibly in time for a ceremony on April 4, 1999, the 50th Anniversary of the Washington Treaty.

In naming countries with which accession negotiations would begin, we could also announce an "Accession Pool" consisting of PFP Partners who are also presumptive EU members by virtue of having signed Europe Agreements with the EU. Doing so would: a) soften the blow for those CEEs who don't make the first cut by making clear they are prime contenders for the second or third cut; and, b) give the French and other West Europeans some tie between EU and NATO membership.

III. The Parallel Russia Track.

By December 1995 we hope to have concluded a framework NATO-Russia understanding. We could negotiate this text with signature timed to NATO's invitation to selected partners to begin accession talks.

~~SECRET~~ May 22, 1995

NATO ENLARGEMENT: ROAD MAP FOR 1996

NSC Staff Views

We have thus far avoided the "who" and "when" of NATO enlargement. The current timeline established by the December 1994 NAC Ministerial includes: 1) completion of the NATO enlargement study (presumably this summer); 2) its presentation to PFP partners before the December 1995 NAC; and 3) decision on next steps in the process by Ministers at the December NAC. The U.S. has not settled on a specific strategy for the December NAC or for 1996. The April 3 Deputies Committee meeting, however, did task the IWG to produce a paper proposing a "half step" that could be taken on enlargement during the first half of 1996, short of decisions on the "who" and "when." Deputies also agreed that we should avoid any steps that would limit our freedom of action in the second half of 1996.

We need to begin considering now, before the Partner briefings begin, what our mid-term tactics will be. We have managed the process with the Allies, CEE governments and the Russians as well as we have because we have kept well ahead of the curve. This paper considers a road map leading from the December 1995 NAC to an eventual decision by a subsequent NAC Ministerial or Summit (in late 1996 or early 1997) to invite one or more prospective members to begin accession talks.

In addressing the "who" and "when," we need to balance competing interests in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. On the one hand, we need to maintain the momentum, preserving the credibility of the enlargement process with the CEE countries as well as domestically. On the other hand, without becoming hostage to Russian domestic politics, we need to move forward in a manner and at a pace that will not cause irreparable damage to our relations with Russia or to prospects for reform in that country.

I. From the December 1995 NAC to mid-1996: The "Half Step"

While some allies wish to move more slowly, this paper assumes that the 1994 December NAC commitments will be met and the NATO study will have been presented to interested PFP partners prior to the December 1995 NAC. At that time, Foreign Ministers will clearly need to comment on the results of the presentation exercise and articulate next steps in the enlargement process. This is not the time for decisions on the "who" and "when" -- the Allies will not be ready, the CEE states are not expecting it (not even the Poles) and the Russians would feel betrayed -- but the NAC should lay additional groundwork for those future decisions.

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By VR NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0772-M (1.32)

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The December NAC's half step proceeds logically from the substance and purpose of the presentations to partners. Beyond setting out the Alliance's conceptual rationale for enlargement, the presentations will outline more clearly what steps partners will need to take and what standards they need to meet to enhance their prospects for NATO membership. This presupposes a subsequent interval of indeterminate length during which those partners interested in membership endeavor to do what is necessary to enhance their prospects, thus leading logically to more active differentiation prior to a NATO decision to single out the first cut of prospective new members.

Current PFP commitments the baseline: As the enlargement study makes clear, prospective members will need to demonstrate their interest and qualifications in part by striving to fully implement their PFP commitments. The December 1995 NAC could stress this condition and indicate that NATO will follow the progress of prospective members in implementing PFP commitments throughout 1996 before deciding on possible further steps at the December 1996 NAC or at a NATO Summit in early 1997.

Adding a pre-accession dimension to PFP: Chapter 5 of the enlargement study makes clear that, in addition to active PFP implementation, prospective members will need to undertake a number of fundamental political and military commitments in order to qualify for NATO membership. The study addresses the military aspects in fairly general terms, however, and further work within the Alliance will be needed during the first half of 1996 to define the specific military requirements for extending security guarantees to new members. In parallel with this internal work, the Alliance could use the PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP) as the framework for bilateral consultations with prospective members aimed at promoting increased interoperability with NATO forces and integration in the NATO defense system, to include civilian oversight of the defense planning process. This would entail a decision at the December 1995 NAC to broaden the focus of the PARP to include all armed forces of partners, not just those dedicated to peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. In tandem, the Alliance could involve partners in the planning, staffing and implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force concept as a new activity of PFP. These steps would give more substance to the claim that PFP is the mechanism to prepare partners' militaries for NATO membership.

Moving to a formal pre-accession phase: As Alliance thinking crystallizes on the specific military requirements of enlargement -- both for NATO and for prospective members -- we will want to conduct an additional series of briefings and consultations with partners to mark the end of the study phase and the transition to

a formal pre-accession phase. To maintain the credibility of the process in the eyes of the CEE countries, these briefings should take place in the summer of 1996, shortly after the spring NAC in Berlin (and after the Russian presidential elections). The Alliance would still not have crossed the threshold to the "who" and "when," but would invite all prospective members to state their willingness to meet the defense requirements and to submit whatever plans are required to implement them. The Allies would ask that the implementation plans be submitted by the December 1996 NAC, and they would offer to conduct additional bilateral (16+1) consultations during the fall aimed at achieving a common understanding of the accession requirements for each prospective member. While these consultations would be offered to all PFP members (thereby deferring any formal differentiation), some countries would not likely engage, and the consultations themselves would be part of a process of self-differentiation separating the early entrants from the pack.

Finessing the spring 1996 NAC: As noted above, we would want to schedule the follow-on briefings and initiation of the formal pre-accession phase to occur after the spring 1996 NAC in Berlin, which will take place just 2-3 weeks before the Russian Presidential elections. While Ministers at the Berlin meeting will need to discuss the next steps in the enlargement process and arrive at an internal understanding, they will want to avoid taking any formal decisions or sending public signals that could be exploited by hardline anti-Western forces in the Russian election debate. This will be a formidable challenge, given the tendency for NATO's internal deliberations to leak.

II. From mid-1996: Leading to the "Big Step"

The pre-accession process described above would then take up most of the second half of 1996. The fall would be a time of intense reflection within the Alliance regarding the "who" and "when." The December 1996 NAC could -- but would not be committed to -- invite some prospective members to begin accession talks. Alternatively, it could continue the review and monitor the process until the spring of 1997, when a special NATO Summit could be convened to take the decision to begin talks with prospective members. In either case, the accession talks could begin during the spring of 1997, with a target completion date of the fall 1997 or spring 1998 NAC. Assuming a further year for ratification, the first stage of enlargement could be completed as early as the end of 1998.

The sketch set out above avoids setting a specific commitment for reaching the "who" and "when" of NATO enlargement and ties these decisions instead to an ongoing process of internal NATO review

and consultations with partners. That process would remain based on the requirement that prospective members meet specific performance criteria agreed to by the Alliance and presented to PFP partners as conditions for possible membership. The time intervals set out in the road map, moreover, are reasonable, given the need to refine Alliance thinking on the defense requirements during the first half of 1996. Six months from mid-1996 for submission of a formal plan for implementing NATO defense requirements, and a full year to assess PFP implementation, seem reasonable given what is being asked, and should be saleable to CEE countries and domestic NATO audiences. Deepening the PFP Planning and Review Process will give substance to our claim that PFP is the "best path" to NATO membership while enhancing military links with all PFP members. The deliberate nature of the review process should diminish reasonable Russian concerns, particularly as Moscow faces the June 1996 presidential elections.

This plan would be implemented in parallel with negotiation of a more formal NATO-Russian relationship. Deputies set the internal objective of a NATO understanding with Russia by the time of the December 1995 NAC on the general outlines of a future NATO-Russian relationship. Russian agreement at the Moscow Summit to participate in PFP should make it possible to meet this deadline. This would leave a full year between the December 1995 and 1996 NACs to negotiate a formal agreement with Moscow. It may be appropriate to sign that agreement at the time NATO decides to begin accession talks with the first set of new members, rather than waiting until those states are formally admitted to the Alliance, since the beginning of accession talks will represent the "crossing of the Rubicon" for the enlargement process.

European Security/NATO Enlargement

Notional Outline of Fall 1995 Public Relations Strategy

-- **Presidential Address** in fall on NATO enlargement and European security (State/EUR recommendation).

-- **Create Interagency Op-Ed Action Team** to draft and coordinate responses to opposing Op-Ed pieces.

-- **Arrange major city speaking visits** by Administration officials to speak before Committees on Foreign Relations and World Affairs Councils.

-- **Conduct Town Meetings** such as the one Strobe Talbott and Dick Holbrooke are scheduled to hold in Milwaukee in September.

-- **Arrange talk radio appearances** on phone-in shows in the run-up to the NATO presentations to partners, centering on cities with large central and eastern European constituencies.

-- **Set up Academic Associates Programs** involving outreach to member universities of the Association of Professional Schools on International Affairs.

-- **Establish a Military Associates Program** that would bring together a cadre of retired military officers to act as public advocates of our European security policy.

-- **Work with Atlantic Council** to set up a domestic outreach program on NATO enlargement.

-- **Establish informal Executive/Legislative Branch Roundtables** bringing Hill staffers together with DAS/Officer Director-level executive branch officials.

-- **Set-up Senior Bipartisan Informal Group** hosted by Secretary Christopher bringing together former senior foreign policy and defense officials with selected former Senators and Congressmen for briefings on NATO enlargement and other European security issues.

-- **Periodically brief and enlist support of former Presidents.**

-- **Enlist U.S. Ambassadors to NATO and selected PFP countries** to brief Congress and meet with ethnic American constituencies.

-- **Arrange domestic tour by Brussels-based PFP Ambassadors** to speak to U.S. audiences on PFP and their aspirations for NATO membership.

-- **Arrange pundit tour of selected NATO/CEE capitals** by editorial writers of major U.S. dailies.

-- **Prepare a pamphlet on European security architecture** that describes the cornerstones of our policy, including the rationale for NATO enlargement and establishment of a NATO-Russia relationship.

DRAFT OP-ED ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Thoughtfully and steadily, President Clinton is building a trans-Atlantic security system for the new century. After two World Wars and the Cold War, America has its best chance in generations to consolidate and extend democracy, security and free market prosperity. The President's plan calls for a growing, evolving NATO, a strong link between NATO and a democratizing Russia, a broadly-based Partnership for Peace, and a dynamic Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Within this open-ended network, Russia can participate fully in Europe's political, economic and social affairs and the democracies of Central Europe can rejoin the Western community.

Against this vision stand two sets of critics. "Neo-Cold Warriors" endorse U.S. engagement and rightly appreciate the need to support Central Europe's democracies. But, eager to pronounce as a dismal failure Russia's ongoing effort to shed its communist past, they demand the immediate, if selective, expansion of NATO. They would force Russia into hostile isolation and thoughtlessly leave those countries deemed not yet ready for prime time in a political no-man's land in a newly-divided Europe. Others, deeply ambivalent about the role of American power in the post-Cold War world, are hostile to the idea of NATO's expansion under any conditions and would consign all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to geopolitical limbo by locking in the lines of 1945. We can do better.

First, we must resist the temptation to declare Russia's experiment with political and economic reform a failure. The Administration is clear-eyed about Russia's historical burden but recognizes that country's enormous accomplishments since the lowering of the hammer and sickle nearly four years ago.

Comparing Russia after communism to Germany in the interwar period is facile but misleading. We forget that the Germans who founded the Weimar Republic in 1919 did so with great optimism about their, and their country's, future. We confuse the end of the story with the beginning. History is not fate. In supporting Russian reform, encouraging Moscow's full participation in the political and economic life of Europe and clearing the way for a NATO-Russia security relationship, we hold open the door for Russian membership in Europe's community of states for the first time since 1917.

Second, we must not abandon Central Europe. Many of these countries are Western by conviction and by deed. Their democratic revolutions brought down the Berlin Wall and helped to end the Cold War. Their free-market transformation since 1989 has astounded the world. Some pundits, echoing Neville

Chamberlain at Munich, insinuate that these are far-away countries of which we know little and care less.

But World War II and the Cold War show that the United States ignores Central Europe at its own peril: that there is no security for America, or for Europe, without security at Europe's heart. The Central European countries do have problems, some serious. The answer is to offer them the chance to join the Western family of democracies if reforms continue, just as the Atlantic community after 1945 took in ex-Nazi Germany, ex-fascist Italy and post-Franco Spain.

NATO is key. Gradually and openly extending NATO membership to some of Europe's new democracies will give this country committed new allies. NATO has taken in new members in the past, including Turkey, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain. Now, as then, expansion will buttress stability and enhance security. NATO, and only NATO, will make the decisions about the Alliance's new members in light of its overall security interests.

Extending security guarantees is serious business. "Why die for Warsaw?" some will ask. The answer is straight forward: if we plan for our security, no one will have to die." Wars start because an aggressor does not fear effective response. "What about the costs?" There will be some and prospective new members must consider them. But starting now, when there is no Soviet army poised to attack, the costs and military challenges can be managed best and the worst prevented. "Why enlarge NATO if Russia is no threat?" NATO was always more than just a Cold War alliance defending against Moscow. It is also the foremost alliance of the world's democracies and enlarging the community of democratic states serves everyone's interest.

"Why can't Central Europe rely on the European Union for its security?" EU and NATO enlargement are two sides of the same coin. EU membership without NATO could commit the United States to the defense of a country that had no reciprocal obligations to share the burden. "Are the Central Europeans ready for NATO membership?" Maybe not yet, but NATO's first new members in over a decade will be as democratic and stable at accession as were many of their predecessors. Let the Central Europeans test their readiness against clear standards, uniformly applied.

In Moscow President Clinton told President Yeltsin that NATO was no threat to Russia; that NATO enlargement would increase Russia's security by stabilizing democracy to Russia's west; and that NATO stood ready to launch a new and substantial partnership with Moscow, but not at Central Europe's or NATO's expense. Yeltsin, who last December walked away from partnership with NATO because of misplaced fears about enlargement, came back. Last

month Russia reengaged with NATO, with NATO enlargement still on track.

President Clinton and like-minded leaders in both political parties want to complete the liberation and integration of Europe that was cut short 50 years ago. Analogies to the late 1930s are false; in today's Europe, there are no Hitlers, Stalins or Mussolinis manipulating the levers of power. Perhaps the better analogy is the early 1920s. Now, as then, a postwar Europe -- disoriented, full of hope and fear -- awaits firm leadership. If we turn away today as we did at that earlier time, we court disaster and invite future sacrifice. The choice is a stark one. Almost five decades ago the American people made the right choice, helping to put in place a sturdy and lasting peace. May those advantaged by the vision they evinced then -- their children and their children's children -- demonstrate equal resolve.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: West European Attitudes Toward NATO~~ Enlargement (2 pages)	~~07/00/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. memo~~	~~Lake to POTUS re: European Security/NATO Enlargement Progress~~ Report (4 pages)	~~07/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001c. memo~~	~~Lake to POTUS re: West European Attitudes Toward NATO~~ Enlargement (2 pages)	~~07/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~002a. memo~~	~~Lake to POTUS re: West European Attitudes Toward NATO~~ Enlargement (2 pages)	~~07/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001b] (4 pages)~~	~~07/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~002c. memo~~	~~Lake to POTUS re: European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement~~ (2 pages)	~~07/00/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~002d. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001b] (4 pages)~~	~~07/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9505436
RECEIVED: 14 JUL 95 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TWD NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 18 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95071421	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95071708	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95071817	NOTED BY PRESIDENT
003	LAKE	Z	95072519	ADD-ON / FWD TO PRES FOR INFO
004	PRESIDENT	Z	95072717	FOR INFORMATION
004		X	95073117	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950717		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950717		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004	950727		VICE PRESIDENT
004	950727		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

Rec'd 7/15
1255

National Security Council
The White House

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Record 7/26

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COMMENTS: Please revise as indicated. Thanks PB

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5:30pm

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Schmidt	4		FEA

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cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes — Send back to John Schmidt

Log # 5436

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) FM: SB TO: VR Date: 7/15

We need to think harder about how to avoid an increasingly probable break either with CEE or Russians in 2d half of '96. Could have a "Poland crisis" or a "Russian crisis" in middle of campaign.

2) FM: _____ TO: _____ Date: _____

3) FM: _____ TO: _____ Date: _____

National Security Council
The White House

→ For Sandy Kelshbow

Please do a short memo to PDUS on what Europeans think about this approach. →

Pete

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cc:

COMMENTS: Please staff to Kelshbow for response to the President's question.

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NEW Document should be 5436 Add on 1. Please return this document w/ new package. Thanks NSC/RM

~~SECRET~~ 5436 Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: West European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement

In response to a recent memorandum on European security and NATO enlargement, you asked about current West European attitudes toward the process. In a word, West European views are not yet crystallized.

Conceptually, our European allies support NATO enlargement, largely for the same reasons we have advanced. ~~They view enlargement as part of the process of ending the artificial division of the continent caused by the Cold War and integrating the nations of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and other democracies of the former Soviet bloc firmly into Europe~~. A number of allies, including Germany and the UK, differ with us in wanting to exclude Russia a priori from membership. The British and Germans also believe that enlarging NATO to include the Baltic states will always be too sensitive because of Russian objections. We believe that ~~although early Baltic admission is not in the cards~~, eventual Baltic membership should not be excluded, lest we consign them to a Russian sphere of influence.

~~Through a series of "Europe Agreements," the European Union has designated most of the CEEs as future EU members.~~ West Europeans see NATO and EU enlargement as part of the same general process of integration. Germany and others have intermittently suggested, ~~as did Senator Nunn in a recent speech~~, that EU and NATO enlargement should occur in lock-step, thus effectively delaying NATO's taking in new members for 5-10 years or more. Other West Europeans, such as the UK and France, concerned about the budgetary and economic burden of ~~moving to incorporate CEE countries~~ rapidly ~~into the~~ EU, are coming to ~~see a somewhat~~ favor a relatively faster-paced NATO enlargement ~~than would be the case if the EU and NATO expanded in tandem~~ as a way of addressing CEE concerns over the short term. ~~In Warsaw recently, Kohl denied wanting to hold up NATO expansion until the EU had taken in new members.~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.34)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Our European allies also share our concerns over Russian attitudes toward NATO enlargement and, if anything, have been inclined to favor a slower pace in moving forward than we do. Kohl in Warsaw suggested that NATO enlargement could occur in this century but later backed off, ~~saying this was just a "personal vision."~~ This spring, a number of allies suggested delaying the presentation of the NATO enlargement study to interested partners ~~until early next year despite an existing and very public Alliance commitment to make the presentations prior to the December NAC ministerial.~~ These allies ~~were primarily motivated by a desire~~ wanted to ensure NATO does not address the "who" and "when" questions before the June 1996 Russian presidential election. We argued successfully that NATO had to keep to its commitment while agreeing NATO needed to get through the Russian election before moving forward on "who" and "when." ~~Nonetheless, the incident demonstrated how sensitive the West Europeans are to the Russian angle; we expect West European apprehension may grow as Russian pressure increases.~~

Our European allies ~~completely~~ share our views on the need ~~to craft~~ for a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship, ~~and will be very supportive in this effort~~. If Moscow ~~decides to~~ resorts to ~~to the Soviet-style~~ divisive tactics ~~of yesteryear~~, however, and ~~begins to~~ adds a threatening element to its anticipated campaign in Western Europe against enlargement, then we will ~~no doubt~~ have to work ~~firmly but carefully with allies~~ hard to keep ~~them~~ our allies on board. ~~Moscow may, however, pursue a more subtle and perhaps more effective approach aimed at finding and exploiting allied differences over the timing and fact of expansion.~~

We should ~~strive to~~ enlist our allies ~~in our own efforts to turn Russian thinking around, by urging them~~ to join with us in ~~intensifying our dialogue with the Russian elite and~~ challenging outdated Russian views of NATO. ~~If we were to succeed in~~ By doing so, ~~enlisting our allies in such an effort,~~ we would give them an additional stake in the process and help ensure ~~that we maintain~~ allied solidarity as we move the enlargement process forward.

~~To address arguments from Nunn and others about burdensharing and the timing of NATO expansion, we also should press our allies to keep up the pace on EU enlargement. Without accepting a rigid linkage between EU and NATO enlargement, we should accept Nunn's~~ Senator's ~~point about the complementary aspects of both institutions' expansion but reverse his conclusion that the slowest pace must govern the entire process.~~

Attachment
Tab A July 17 Memorandum on NATO Enlargement

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7/18/95 5436

I THINK WE NEED TO DISCUSS HOW THE EUROPEANS FEEL ABOUT THIS AND WHAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO DO

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PLEASE STAFF

95 JUL 17 A8:36

July 17, 1995

I think we need to discuss how the Europeans feel about this and what they are likely to do Re

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: European Security/NATO Enlargement Progress Report

We are moving ahead on the study phase of NATO enlargement and are poised to make progress with Moscow on the NATO-Russian relationship. However, hardening Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, unease among some West Europeans and still-uncertain Congressional support pose a challenge to our policy. We will need to intensify our diplomatic and domestic activity this fall.

NATO Enlargement State-of-Play. The NATO study on enlargement's "how and why" is nearing completion and should be ready for presentation to interested partners this fall. In the run-up to the May Noordwijk NAC Ministerial, some Allies reacted to Russian criticisms of enlargement by suggesting that the Alliance slow the process. We successfully insisted NATO stick to the timetable agreed last year; Allies agreed that presentations will be completed well before the December NAC ministerial.

The study lays out in impressive detail principles to guide the integration of new members into NATO military structures and the political standards that aspirants need to meet. It identifies the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a proving ground for Partners to demonstrate their interest in and eligibility for NATO membership as well as end in itself for partners not joining NATO. The study should reassure the Russians on stationing of nuclear and major conventional forces on new members' territory: NATO reserves the right to do so but sees no reason to undertake such deployments at present, particularly with respect to its nuclear posture.

As agreed at Noordwijk, Allies will consider next steps at the December NAC ministerial. No decisions have been taken either on enlargement's "who" and "when" or when to consider these crucial steps. The first half of 1996 will likely be taken up with refinement of the military aspects of enlargement and follow-on consultations with PFP partners on membership requirements. This deliberate pace is intended to reassure Russia that there will be

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

no "hasty" enlargement and to deprive Russian nationalists of ammunition in advance of the June 1996 presidential election.

Establishing a NATO-Russia Relationship. In the meantime, in the wake of Russian agreement at Noordwijk to participate in PFP, NATO is pressing ahead with plans to develop a formalized NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with enlargement. Allies have agreed to negotiate a basic framework document with the Russians in time for the December ministerial. This would be the basis for a formal agreement, to be concluded later, establishing permanent NATO-Russian consultative bodies.

CEE Hopes and Anxieties. The prospect of security and integration into the West through NATO membership has strengthened reform throughout the region and boosted confidence the United States will remain in Europe. CEE governments appreciated your letter following the VE-Day Summit reaffirming our policy. They recognize that NATO, as it brings in new members, needs to formalize a constructive relationship with Russia. They are willing to wait for the first decisions on enlargement's "who" and "when" until after the Russian Presidential election, but expect decisions in 1996. Delay much beyond that point could bring on a crisis of confidence; some worry the West will slow or back away from its declared strategy in the face of strong Russian objections.

Intensifying Russian Opposition. Despite Yeltsin's agreement in May to join PFP and launch a "beyond PFP" process with NATO, opposition to NATO enlargement appears to be hardening across the political spectrum among the Russian political elite. Key Yeltsin advisors and members of the Duma argue that NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation are incompatible and are attacking Kozyrev for acquiescing in the West's agenda. Yeltsin has reportedly approved a set of "theses" by European Institute chief Karaganov laying out a strategy for delaying and possibly derailing NATO enlargement, including by sowing divisions within the Alliance and appealing to opponents in publics and parliaments. Yeltsin's national security advisor Ryurikov has reportedly set up a Kremlin committee to take charge of the issue from the foreign ministry.

Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is unlikely to yield in the near or medium term to some kind of grudging endorsement; Russia's opposition is deep and profound. For the period ahead, the Russian leadership will do its level best to derail our policy, given its conviction that any eastward expansion of NATO is at root antithetical to Russia's long-term interests. At the extreme, this could force us at some point during the second half of 1996 or the first half of 1997 to choose, at least implicitly, between the CEE and Russian legs of our current policy. Our

current policy -- the gradual and transparent enlargement of NATO coupled with the development of a substantial NATO-Russia relationship -- offers the best hope for avoiding this unpalatable choice, though we may nonetheless have to face it.

We thus should respond to the current Russian opposition by: a) steadiness in pursuit of gradual and transparent NATO enlargement, which may cause the Russians to reassess the efficacy of blanket opposition; and b) continued efforts to build a substantial NATO-Russia partnership that is of genuine value to Moscow (and NATO) in dealing with issues like nonproliferation and crisis management so that the Russians have a stake in remaining engaged by the time NATO takes in new members.

We do not seek Russian endorsement of NATO's enlargement in any case but simply a muted reaction in a context of broader cooperation. A key question is whether the Russians have learned lessons from earlier Soviet campaigns on European security issues (West German NATO membership, INF deployments). Strident campaigns only resulted in self-isolation until Moscow came around to accept the reality. (The immediate consequence, however, was a severe downturn in bilateral relations.)

Domestic Responses to Enlargement. European security/NATO enlargement has not yet emerged as a major domestic issue in the U.S. Congressional support is broad but thin. Euro-pundits have been active on both sides; some pressing for rapid enlargement, many urging a "go slow" or "no go" approach. Senator Nunn has argued that NATO enlargement should follow EU enlargement -- probably 15 years away; he suggested that a faster pace would pose unacceptable risks of alienating Russia. Others have raised questions about enlargement's costs. (Given the modest short-term military threat, these are likely to be manageable. We will work to get rough cost estimates from Defense and State.)

The Road Ahead. We need to proceed on several fronts at once:

-- **Domestically.** We need to be much more active both in explaining and in advocating our policy to Congress and the public. This fall we should launch high-level Congressional consultations, make our case in op-eds (Strobe Talbott has prepared a strong article for the *New York Review of Books*) and engage in more public speaking. ***We may ask you to weigh in with Congressional leaders and to make a European security speech.***

-- **NATO-Russia.** Our top priority is to craft a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship with results visible through the Duma elections this fall and the Presidential elections next summer. At the same time, we need to

intensify our dialogue with the Russian elite, to challenge their outdated view of NATO, to convince them that our "parallel" strategy is designed to include, not isolate Russia and to apprise them of the probable costs to the bilateral relationship of any overt attempt to sabotage our policy. We also should launch an outreach program to the interested Russian public.

-- **NATO Enlargement, CEE.** We will have to demonstrate steady progress in the enlargement process and in our bilateral military relations with key CEE countries, using 1996 to give aspirants the opportunity to implement reforms we believe necessary. This will carry us naturally into the fall of 1996.

The December 1996 NAC will be the first occasion on which NATO could decide to invite one or more partners to begin accession talks. Alternatively, we could propose at some point in the second half of 1996 a spring 1997 NATO summit as the venue for the first "who" and "when" decisions. This should take place in parallel with comparable moves between NATO and Russia.

~~SECRET~~ 5436 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DAN FRIED/COIT BLACKER

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement

After reading our memo on NATO enlargement, the President asked for our views on how the Europeans feel about NATO enlargement and what they are likely to do. Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President answering his questions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A July 17 Memorandum on NATO Enlargement

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7/31/95

5436 Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

95 JUL 27 P8:56

July 27, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: West European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement

In response to a recent memorandum on European security and NATO enlargement, you asked about current West European attitudes toward the process. In a word, West European views are not yet crystallized.

Conceptually, our European allies support NATO enlargement, largely for the same reasons we have advanced. A number of allies, however, including Germany and the UK, differ with us in wanting to exclude Russia a priori from membership. The British and Germans also believe that enlarging NATO to include the Baltic states will always be too sensitive because of Russian objections. We believe that eventual Baltic membership should not be excluded, lest we consign them to a Russian sphere of influence.

West Europeans see NATO and EU enlargement as part of the same general process of integration. Germany and others have intermittently suggested that EU and NATO enlargement should occur in lock-step, thus effectively delaying NATO's taking in new members for 5-10 years or more. Other West Europeans, such as the UK and France, concerned about the budgetary and economic burden of rapid EU expansion, are coming to favor a relatively faster-paced NATO enlargement as a way of addressing CEE concerns over the short term.

Our European allies also share our concerns over Russian attitudes toward NATO enlargement and, if anything, have been inclined to favor a slower pace in moving forward than we do. Kohl in Warsaw suggested that NATO enlargement could occur in this century but later backed off. This spring, a number of allies suggested delaying the presentation of the NATO enlargement study to interested partners until early next year, despite a public commitment to the contrary. These allies wanted to ensure NATO does not address the "who" and "when" questions before the June 1996 Russian presidential election. We argued

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 4/10/15
2015-0072-m (1.36)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

successfully that NATO had to keep to its commitment while agreeing NATO needed to get through the Russian election before moving forward on "who" and "when."

Our European allies share our views on the need for a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship. If Moscow resorts to divisive tactics, however, and adds a threatening element to its anticipated campaign in Western Europe against enlargement, then we will have to work hard to keep our allies on board.

We should enlist our allies to join with us in challenging outdated Russian views of NATO. By doing so, we would give them an additional stake in the process and help ensure allied solidarity as we move the enlargement process forward.

Attachment
Tab A July 17 Memorandum on NATO Enlargement

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5436

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL FRIED/COIT BLACKER

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT/STEPHEN PIFER

SUBJECT: NATO Enlargement Progress Report

Attached at Tab A is a proposed information memorandum to the President detailing the current state of play on NATO enlargement and discussing prospects for the future. The memo focuses in particular on the ramifications of strengthening Russian opposition to the enlargement process.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Information memorandum to the President.

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9505436
RECEIVED: 14 JUL 95 19

TO: LAKE

FROM: SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW
FRIED

DOC DATE: 20 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADD ON RE EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TWD NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 18 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95071421	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95071708	FOR INFORMATION
003	LAKE	Z	95072519	ADD-ON / FWD TO PRES FOR INFO
003		X	96010515	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950717		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950717		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~ 5436 Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 27, 1995 SUSPENSE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: West European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement

In response to a recent memorandum on European security and NATO enlargement, you asked about current West European attitudes toward the process. In a word, West European views are not yet crystallized.

Conceptually, our European allies support NATO enlargement, largely for the same reasons we have advanced. A number of allies, however, including Germany and the UK, differ with us in wanting to exclude Russia a priori from membership. The British and Germans also believe that enlarging NATO to include the Baltic states will always be too sensitive because of Russian objections. We believe that eventual Baltic membership should not be excluded, lest we consign them to a Russian sphere of influence.

West Europeans see NATO and EU enlargement as part of the same general process of integration. Germany and others have intermittently suggested that EU and NATO enlargement should occur in lock-step, thus effectively delaying NATO's taking in new members for 5-10 years or more. Other West Europeans, such as the UK and France, concerned about the budgetary and economic burden of rapid EU expansion, are coming to favor a relatively faster-paced NATO enlargement as a way of addressing CEE concerns over the short term.

Our European allies also share our concerns over Russian attitudes toward NATO enlargement and, if anything, have been inclined to favor a slower pace in moving forward than we do. Kohl in Warsaw suggested that NATO enlargement could occur in this century but later backed off. This spring, a number of allies suggested delaying the presentation of the NATO enlargement study to interested partners until early next year, despite a public commitment to the contrary. These allies wanted to ensure NATO does not address the "who" and "when" questions before the June 1996 Russian presidential election. We argued

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

successfully that NATO had to keep to its commitment while agreeing NATO needed to get through the Russian election before moving forward on "who" and "when."

Our European allies share our views on the need for a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship. If Moscow resorts to divisive tactics, however, and adds a threatening element to its anticipated campaign in Western Europe against enlargement, then we will have to work hard to keep our allies on board.

We should enlist our allies to join with us in challenging outdated Russian views of NATO. By doing so, we would give them an additional stake in the process and help ensure allied solidarity as we move the enlargement process forward.

Attachment
Tab A July 17 Memorandum on NATO Enlargement

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7/18/95 5436

I THINK WE NEED TO DISCUSS HOW THE EUROPEANS FEEL ABOUT THIS AND WHAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DO

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PLEASE STAFF

July 17, 1995 95 JUL 17 A8:36

I think we must discuss how the Europeans feel about this and what they are willing to do Re

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: European Security/NATO Enlargement Progress Report

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The study lays out in impressive detail principles to guide the integration of new members into NATO military structures and the political standards that aspirants need to meet. It identifies the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a proving ground for Partners to demonstrate their interest in and eligibility for NATO membership as well as end in itself for partners not joining NATO. The study should reassure the Russians on stationing of nuclear and major conventional forces on new members' territory: NATO reserves the right to do so but sees no reason to undertake such deployments at present, particularly with respect to its nuclear posture.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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current policy -- the gradual and transparent enlargement of NATO coupled with the development of a substantial NATO-Russia relationship -- offers the best hope for avoiding this unpalatable choice, though we may nonetheless have to face it.

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The Road Ahead. We need to proceed on several fronts at once:

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~~SECRET~~

5436 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

SUSPENSE

July 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DAN FRIED/COIT BLACKER

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement

After reading our memo on NATO enlargement, the President asked for our views on how the Europeans feel about NATO enlargement and what they are likely to do. Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President answering his questions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A July 17 Memorandum on NATO Enlargement

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: European Attitudes Toward NATO Enlargement

In response to a recent memorandum on European security and NATO enlargement, you asked about current West European attitudes toward the process.

At the level of general principle, our European allies support NATO enlargement and largely for the same reasons we have advanced. They view enlargement as part of the process of ending the artificial division of the continent caused by the Cold War and integrating the nations of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and other democracies of the former Soviet bloc firmly into Europe. A number of allies, however, including Germany and the UK, differ with us in wanting to exclude Russia a priori from membership. The British also believe that enlarging NATO to include the Baltic states will always be too sensitive due to Russian objections; we believe Baltic membership should not be excluded, lest we consign them to a Russian sphere of influence.

Through a series of "Europe Agreements," our major allies have designated most of the CEEs as future EU members; they see NATO and EU enlargement as part of the same general process of integration (indeed, the two institutions are linked, as EU members can join the West European Union, whose strong declaratory security guarantees would in practice be backed up by NATO). Germany has suggested, as did Senator Nunn in a recent speech, that EU and NATO enlargement should occur in lock-step, thus effectively delaying NATO's taking in new members for 5-10 years or more. Other West Europeans, such as the UK and France, concerned about the budgetary and economic burden of moving to incorporate CEE countries rapidly into the EU, are coming to see a somewhat faster-paced NATO enlargement as a way of satisfying CEE ambitions over the short term. In Warsaw recently, Kohl denied wanting to hold up NATO expansion until the EU had taken in new members.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Our European allies also share our concerns over Russian attitudes toward enlargement and, if anything, have been inclined to favor a somewhat slower pace in moving forward. In fact, only a handful of allies, including Germany and Canada, are serious about seeing the first new NATO members admitted during this decade. This spring, a number of allies suggested delaying the presentation of the NATO enlargement study to interested partners until early next year despite an existing--and very public--Alliance commitment to make the presentations this year prior to the fall NAC ministerial. These allies were primarily motivated by a desire to ensure that NATO does not address the "who" and "when" questions before the June 1996 Russian presidential election. We argued successfully that NATO had to keep to its commitment while agreeing that NATO needed to get through the Russian election before moving forward on "who" and "when." Nonetheless, the incident demonstrated how sensitive the West Europeans are to the Russian angle; we expect West European apprehension may grow as Russian pressure increases.

Our European allies completely share our views on the need to craft a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship and will be very supportive in this effort. If Moscow decides to resort to the Soviet-style divisive tactics of yesteryear, however, and begins to add a threatening element to its anticipated campaign in Western Europe against enlargement, then we will no doubt have to work firmly but carefully with allies to keep them on board, much as we did during the Soviet campaigns against INF deployments in the early 1980s and West German NATO membership 25 years earlier.

Rather than approach the problem as purely negative, we should strive to enlist our allies in our own proposed efforts to turn Russian thinking around, by urging them to join with us in intensifying our dialogue with the Russian elite and challenging outdated Russian views of NATO. If we were to succeed in enlisting our allies in such an effort, we would give them an additional stake in the process and help ensure that we maintain allied solidarity as we move the enlargement process forward.

To address arguments from Nunn and others about burdensharing and NATO enlargement giving the EU an easy excuse for delay, we also should press our Allies to keep up the pace on EU enlargement. Without accepting a rigid linkage between EU and NATO enlargement, we should accept Nunn's point about the complementary aspects of both institutions' expansion but reverse his conclusion that the slowest pace must govern the entire process.

Attachment
Tab A July 17 Memorandum on NATO Enlargement

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7/18/95 5436

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PLEASE STAFF

July 17, 1995 95 JUL 17 A8:36

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: European Security/NATO Enlargement Progress Report

We are moving ahead on the study phase of NATO enlargement and are poised to make progress with Moscow on the NATO-Russian relationship. However, hardening Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, unease among some West Europeans and still-uncertain Congressional support pose a challenge to our policy. We will need to intensify our diplomatic and domestic activity this fall.

NATO Enlargement State-of-Play. The NATO study on enlargement's "how and why" is nearing completion and should be ready for presentation to interested partners this fall. In the run-up to the May Noordwijk NAC Ministerial, some Allies reacted to Russian criticisms of enlargement by suggesting that the Alliance slow the process. We successfully insisted NATO stick to the timetable agreed last year; Allies agreed that presentations will be completed well before the December NAC ministerial.

The study lays out in impressive detail principles to guide the integration of new members into NATO military structures and the political standards that aspirants need to meet. It identifies the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a proving ground for Partners to demonstrate their interest in and eligibility for NATO membership as well as end in itself for partners not joining NATO. The study should reassure the Russians on stationing of nuclear and major conventional forces on new members' territory: NATO reserves the right to do so but sees no reason to undertake such deployments at present, particularly with respect to its nuclear posture.

As agreed at Noordwijk, Allies will consider next steps at the December NAC ministerial. No decisions have been taken either on enlargement's "who" and "when" or when to consider these crucial steps. The first half of 1996 will likely be taken up with refinement of the military aspects of enlargement and follow-on consultations with PFP partners on membership requirements. This deliberate pace is intended to reassure Russia that there will be

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-M (1,40)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

no "hasty" enlargement and to deprive Russian nationalists of ammunition in advance of the June 1996 presidential election.

Establishing a NATO-Russia Relationship. In the meantime, in the wake of Russian agreement at Noordwijk to participate in PFP, NATO is pressing ahead with plans to develop a formalized NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with enlargement. Allies have agreed to negotiate a basic framework document with the Russians in time for the December ministerial. This would be the basis for a formal agreement, to be concluded later, establishing permanent NATO-Russian consultative bodies.

CEE Hopes and Anxieties. The prospect of security and integration into the West through NATO membership has strengthened reform throughout the region and boosted confidence the United States will remain in Europe. CEE governments appreciated your letter following the VE-Day Summit reaffirming our policy. They recognize that NATO, as it brings in new members, needs to formalize a constructive relationship with Russia. They are willing to wait for the first decisions on enlargement's "who" and "when" until after the Russian Presidential election, but expect decisions in 1996. Delay much beyond that point could bring on a crisis of confidence; some worry the West will slow or back away from its declared strategy in the face of strong Russian objections.

Intensifying Russian Opposition. Despite Yeltsin's agreement in May to join PFP and launch a "beyond PFP" process with NATO, opposition to NATO enlargement appears to be hardening across the political spectrum among the Russian political elite. Key Yeltsin advisors and members of the Duma argue that NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation are incompatible and are attacking Kozyrev for acquiescing in the West's agenda. Yeltsin has reportedly approved a set of "theses" by European Institute chief Karaganov laying out a strategy for delaying and possibly derailing NATO enlargement, including by sowing divisions within the Alliance and appealing to opponents in publics and parliaments. Yeltsin's national security advisor Ryurikov has reportedly set up a Kremlin committee to take charge of the issue from the foreign ministry.

Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is unlikely to yield in the near or medium term to some kind of grudging endorsement; Russia's opposition is deep and profound. For the period ahead, the Russian leadership will do its level best to derail our policy, given its conviction that any eastward expansion of NATO is at root antithetical to Russia's long-term interests. At the extreme, this could force us at some point during the second half of 1996 or the first half of 1997 to choose, at least implicitly, between the CEE and Russian legs of our current policy. Our

current policy -- the gradual and transparent enlargement of NATO coupled with the development of a substantial NATO-Russia relationship -- offers the best hope for avoiding this unpalatable choice, though we may nonetheless have to face it.

We thus should respond to the current Russian opposition by: a) steadiness in pursuit of gradual and transparent NATO enlargement, which may cause the Russians to reassess the efficacy of blanket opposition; and b) continued efforts to build a substantial NATO-Russia partnership that is of genuine value to Moscow (and NATO) in dealing with issues like nonproliferation and crisis management so that the Russians have a stake in remaining engaged by the time NATO takes in new members.

We do not seek Russian endorsement of NATO's enlargement in any case but simply a muted reaction in a context of broader cooperation. A key question is whether the Russians have learned lessons from earlier Soviet campaigns on European security issues (West German NATO membership, INF deployments). Strident campaigns only resulted in self-isolation until Moscow came around to accept the reality. (The immediate consequence, however, was a severe downturn in bilateral relations.)

Domestic Responses to Enlargement. European security/NATO enlargement has not yet emerged as a major domestic issue in the U.S. Congressional support is broad but thin. Euro-pundits have been active on both sides; some pressing for rapid enlargement, many urging a "go slow" or "no go" approach. Senator Nunn has argued that NATO enlargement should follow EU enlargement -- probably 15 years away; he suggested that a faster pace would pose unacceptable risks of alienating Russia. Others have raised questions about enlargement's costs. (Given the modest short-term military threat, these are likely to be manageable. We will work to get rough cost estimates from Defense and State.)

The Road Ahead. We need to proceed on several fronts at once:

-- **Domestically.** We need to be much more active both in explaining and in advocating our policy to Congress and the public. This fall we should launch high-level Congressional consultations, make our case in op-eds (Strobe Talbott has prepared a strong article for the *New York Review of Books*) and engage in more public speaking. ***We may ask you to weigh in with Congressional leaders and to make a European security speech.***

-- **NATO-Russia.** Our top priority is to craft a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship with results visible through the Duma elections this fall and the Presidential elections next summer. At the same time, we need to

intensify our dialogue with the Russian elite, to challenge their outdated view of NATO, to convince them that our "parallel" strategy is designed to include, not isolate Russia and to apprise them of the probable costs to the bilateral relationship of any overt attempt to sabotage our policy. We also should launch an outreach program to the interested Russian public.

-- **NATO Enlargement, CEE.** We will have to demonstrate steady progress in the enlargement process and in our bilateral military relations with key CEE countries, using 1996 to give aspirants the opportunity to implement reforms we believe necessary. This will carry us naturally into the fall of 1996.

The December 1996 NAC will be the first occasion on which NATO could decide to invite one or more partners to begin accession talks. Alternatively, we could propose at some point in the second half of 1996 a spring 1997 NATO summit as the venue for the first "who" and "when" decisions. This should take place in parallel with comparable moves between NATO and Russia.

~~SECRET~~

5436

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 17, 1995

SUSPENSE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL FRIED/COIT BLACKER

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT/STEPHEN PIFER

SUBJECT: NATO Enlargement Progress Report

Attached at Tab A is a proposed information memorandum to the President detailing the current state of play on NATO enlargement and discussing prospects for the future. The memo focuses in particular on the ramifications of strengthening Russian opposition to the enlargement process.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Information memorandum to the President.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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SUBJECT: European Security/NATO Enlargement Progress Report

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/16/2019
2015-0772-M (1.41)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 606				
Document ID: 9507225				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: The NATO Enlargement Study (1 page)~~	~~10/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2
~~001b. memo~~	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: The NATO Enlargement Study (1 page)	10/02/1995	P1/b(1) √2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 606

FOLDER TITLE:
9507225

2015-0772-M
rs1341

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9507225
RECEIVED: 29 SEP 95 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 02 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO ENLARGEMENT STUDY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 03 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		SCHMIDT
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092920	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95100220	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95100418	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951002		VICE PRESIDENT
002	951002		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

recd 9/29
6pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7225

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~9/26~~ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens		✓	
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		NOTE
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/2	STERN
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Per TL's request at 29 Sept. Sr. Directors' meeting

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

Log # 7225

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) SB to [redacted] Date _____

DC scheduled for Monday
on NATO enlargement/
Russia: next steps

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

Log # 7225

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) SB to [illegible] Date _____

DC scheduled for Monday on NATO enlargement / Russia: next steps

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10-4-95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

October 2, 1995

95 OCT 2 P8:20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: The NATO Enlargement Study

The NATO enlargement study was approved by the Alliance on September 20 and initially presented to Partnership for Peace (PFP) members in Brussels on September 28. Individual briefings for interested partners will follow during the month of October. The December NAC Ministerial will assess the results and decide on next steps.

As agreed by NATO Foreign Ministers at the December 1994 NAC Ministerial, the enlargement study sets out the "why" and "how" of enlargement. The study takes no position on the "who" and "when" questions, stating only that enlargement will occur as the result of a "gradual, deliberate and transparent process."

In addressing the "why" question, the study stresses that enlargement will help ensure the success of democratic reforms, promote good-neighborly relations, increase stability and security in Europe and contribute to European integration. In addressing the "how" question, the study lays out a number of political and military steps that interested partners must take to qualify for consideration for membership.

Among the key political steps cited are a demonstrated commitment to democracy and market economic reform, civilian control over the military, and fair treatment for ethnic minorities. On the military side, the study calls on interested partners to deepen their participation in PFP, including through joint defense planning, and to strive to meet minimum NATO operational standards, including interoperability of command, control and communications and major weapons systems.

The study discusses NATO relations with Russia in some detail, making clear the desire of the Alliance to establish an enhanced substantive relationship, beginning with agreement by the December NAC on a framework document for relations. The study also discusses the two basing issues of most concern to the Russians, stressing that NATO sees no present need to alter existing deployments of nuclear weapons, and no *a priori* reason to station NATO conventional forces on the territory of new members, while reserving the right to do both.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WC NARA, Date 7/19/2014
2015-0772-M (1,42)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7225

September 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: The NATO Enlargement Study

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President on the NATO Enlargement Study.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Joshi, M. Kay

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Joshi, M. Kay
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Feeley, John F.; Schmidt, John R.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: RE: Pkg 7225 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Monday, October 02, 1995 11:20AM

Delete "implicitly"

From: Joshi, M. Kay
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: Pkg 7225 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Monday, October 02, 1995 11:05 AM

<<Attached File: 7225PRE.DOC>>

Mr. Lake has made an edit to the last sentence of the memorandum to the President (attached). Please let this office know ASAP if this reads properly.

Thanks.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 1/10/2019
2015-0777-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7225

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.43)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 616				
Document ID: 9508554				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~John Schmidt to Anthony Lake re: [Problems on NATO Enlargement]~~ (3 pages)	~~11/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 616

FOLDER TITLE:
9508554

2015-0772-M
rs1342

RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9508554
RECEIVED: 27 NOV 95 18

TO: LAKE

FROM: SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 27 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GERMANS CAUSING PROBLEMS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 30 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		SCHMIDT
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95112908	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95122108	NOTED BY LAKE

rec'd 11/28
5:30pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8554

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (RRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~ne~~ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	DVB	
Lake	3	CY	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

Rec'd 11/2
5:30pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8554

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	DNB	
Lake	3	CY	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8554

November 28 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

Nat! Sec Advisor has seen

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Germans Causing Problems on NATO Enlargement

Chancellor Kohl remains nervous about the impact of NATO enlargement on Russia. You may recall that he had earlier wanted to postpone presentation of the enlargement study to partners until after the December Duma elections. Now, he has apparently instructed his NATO delegation to seek to downplay the enlargement issue in the NAC communiqué.

As you know, we have crafted a position that advances our policy while taking due account of Russian concerns. Our proposed "second phase," beginning a process of intensive bilateral consultations between NATO and interested partners leading to eventual enlargement, was designed to satisfy CEE nations that NATO was not "shuffling its feet in the corner." At the same time, our proposal that the second phase consume all or most of 1996 and that any interested partner could participate was designed to defuse the issue to the extent possible in the run-up to the Russian presidential elections as well as give time for the CEEs to resolve remaining issues related to enlargement.

During communiqué drafting at NATO, the Germans have been pressing to omit any reference to a "second phase," to minimize to a marked degree what is said about enlargement in the communiqué, and to consign the enlargement section to a much later stage in the communiqué text. Instead, they want the communiqué to lead off with and focus on NATO-Russia relations. This German position is serving as a lightning rod for other delegations, including the French, who share German nervousness about the pace of enlargement.

If the Germans do not soften their position over the next few days, we believe the President should raise the issue with Kohl when they meet on December 2. In the meantime, we recommend that

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1.6, X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.44)

you call Bitterlich to prepare the ground. Suggested talking points follow:

Talking Points

- We are very concerned about the position your NATO delegation is taking on NATO enlargement in drafting the NAC ministerial communiqué.

- They appear to be under instructions to downplay the enlargement issue.

- We believe this would be a serious mistake. Our approach is to advance, carefully but steadily, our agreed policy, balancing the desire of CEE states for rapid movement toward enlargement and Russian concerns.

- This is the motivation behind our proposal that the upcoming NAC ministerial launch a "second phase" in the enlargement process, consisting of intensive bilateral consultations between NATO and interested partners, which would last through "all or most" of 1996 and be reviewed at the December 1996 NAC. Any interested partner could take part in these bilateral consultations.

- This proposal would defer "who and when" decisions until at least the December 1996 NAC, while giving NATO the flexibility to decide at the December 1996 NAC to continue the "second phase" or to take decisions on "who" and "when."

- If we purposefully downplay enlargement at next Tuesday's NAC, however, we will create great concern and alarm in Central and Eastern Europe, which could be destabilizing.

- We will also send a strong signal to Moscow that they can effectively use pressure to slow or halt the pace of NATO enlargement.

- This will only encourage them to maintain their pressure rather than coming to grips with enlargement.

- While I understand your concerns about the Russians, we believe it is essential that we maintain our steady course toward eventual enlargement and not let them define the issue as a zero-sum proposition.

- As President Clinton told former Secretary General Claes in October, "NATO cannot be seen to be shuffling its feet in the corner."

- The President is prepared to raise this issue directly with Chancellor Kohl if necessary.

- I urge you to use your influence to change the instructions to your delegation to one of support for our balanced approach.

Concurrences by: Dan Fried, Steve Pifer

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1109				
Document ID: 9604351				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~John Schmidt to Anthony Lake re: Your Meeting with NATO~~ Secretary General Javier Solana (4 pages)	~~06/21/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1109

FOLDER TITLE:
9604351

2015-0772-M
rs1343

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604351
RECEIVED: 21 JUN 96 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 21 JUN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO ANSA

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR LAKE 24 JUN MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN SOLANA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 25 JUN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		SCHMIDT
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By JL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96062119	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	96062516	NOTED BY LAKE

rcvd 6/22
11am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4351

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DPS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	8		
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	6/24	N
Records Mgt.	4		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

4351

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 21, 1996

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, June 24, 4:00 p.m.

Solana is making his second visit to the U.S. since becoming NATO Secretary General. He has been doing an outstanding job, fully vindicating our decision to support him for the post. His presence gives us the opportunity to compare notes on the IFOR mission at its half-way point and to look down the road ahead on NATO enlargement and adaptation in the aftermath of the Berlin ministerial. On the look ahead, you may want to preview some of the ideas set out in the Troika paper.

IFOR

The IFOR mission continues to progress smoothly as it consolidates its successful accomplishments of the first six months and prepares to support elections in September. **You should again congratulate Solana on a successful operation and ask him what he believes will be the toughest challenges over the next three months.** Regarding elections, IFOR reports that it is providing substantial support to the OSCE, including security, logistics, staff and communications. **You should ask Solana what support IFOR will provide to ensure a secure environment during elections.** IFOR has enhanced its patrols, particularly in the area of Pale, in an effort to inhibit Karadzic's activities and movement. **You should ask Solana how the operation is progressing and review our policy regarding IFOR's role in detaining indicted war criminals. In addition, you should update Solana on our ongoing efforts to pressure Milosevic to remove Karadzic from power.**

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6, X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By V2 NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2016-0112-M (1.45)

NATO Enlargement

Solana has been one of our strongest supporters on NATO enlargement. Sensing early on that we would press for a NATO summit in the spring of 1997, he has been traveling through Central and Eastern Europe "predicting" that NATO would begin accession talks next year with the first group of aspiring members. This has served to reassure Poland and the others and taken the heat off of us. It has also helped to condition expectations within the Alliance that enlargement will happen according to this timetable. **You should thank him for his help, which has been invaluable.**

While making clear that we have yet to take a formal decision, **you should tell Solana that we have the sense that the December NAC ministerial should announce the convening of a spring 1997 NATO summit to announce the beginning of accession talks with the first group of new members.** December won't be the main event, but can't be a non-event, as the French might wish.

You should also suggest to Solana that the run-up to the December NAC will provide us with another opportunity to get discussions going with the Russians on building a NATO-Russia relationship. With Yeltsin newly reelected, Lebed not opposed, and Primakov appearing increasingly disposed to discuss the terms rather than the fact of enlargement, the Russians may be more receptive, particularly if we raise the issue in the context of a decision by key allies to go forward with a spring 1997 summit.

You should make clear to Solana that, in preparing for a summit, it will be equally important for the Alliance to decide what to do about those aspiring members who are not chosen. Among the ideas we are considering to address the continuing security concerns of the Baltic states (and others) are summit announcements that the first group chosen will not be the last; that the next group will be drawn from aspiring members not included in the first, and that the phase two process of intensive consultations will be institutionalized as part of PFP. We will have to think hard about how to word these decisions, to avoid forcing a moment of truth on Baltic NATO membership while also avoiding a tacit write-off of Baltic security under Russian pressure.

You might want to ask Solana for his views about the likely attitude of other allies regarding a spring 1997 summit. Although the Germans seemed most nervous about this a few months, they seem to be mollified by Primakov's changing tack and the prospect of Yeltsin's reelection. The French, however, have recently been giving out negative signals about moving in December to call for a spring 1997 summit. At last week's

Permreps Lunch, the French Ambassador baldly stated that NATO adaptation would have to come first. Our suspicion is that the French would not want to take the heat from the Poles and others for delaying enlargement and simply want to ensure maximum leverage for adaptation. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to hear what Solana thinks about this, while soliciting his continued active support.

NATO Adaptation

Our own view is that NATO enlargement and adaptation (implementing CJTF and building an ESDI within NATO) should ideally come together at the same moment in time. We would like to see both processes finished by a spring 1997 summit so that France could use the occasion to announce it is reentering the integrated military structure under the pretext of joining the "new NATO." **You should try this idea out on Solana to see if he appreciates its political beauty.**

On a more practical level, the Berlin agreement on ESDI principles papered over some potentially troubling differences in approach. We agreed to the dual-hatting of appropriate personnel from within the NATO command structure to assume specifically European responsibilities, but insist that they take their orders from SACEUR and the NAC until and unless they are called on to undertake specific WEU-led missions. Even in those circumstances we would insist on continuing NATO monitoring of NATO assets. We also agreed that the WEU could make requests to NATO for generic planning on possible WEU-led missions. These, essentially, are the only roles we foresee for the WEU. The French, on the other hand, have shown disturbing signs that they favor a more extensive WEU role vis-à-vis the European defense identity, and may even seek a system whereby the WEU has automatic claim on NATO assets.

Whether these concerns are justified should emerge in the months ahead as the NATO Military Committee tackles the command structure aspects of ESDI--the dual-hatting--and NATO political military bodies address the liaison with the WEU. **You should emphasize to Solana that we did not agree to an ESDI within NATO as a means of building up a separate WEU apparatus.** This means that the essential WEU role vis-à-vis ESDI will be to request planning and borrow assets. While the WEU can exercise day-to-day political control over WEU-led operations involving NATO assets--with appropriate NATO oversight--it cannot exercise an intrusive function over the NATO command structure.

In making these points, you should ask Solana whether he sees problems with the French on these issues down the road and, if so, how he would propose addressing them.

Concurrence by: Daniel Fried DF

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1121				
Document ID: 9606193				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. letter~~	~~President Clinton to President Yeltsin (3 pages)~~	~~09/00/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1121

FOLDER TITLE:
9606193

2015-0772-M
rs1344

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606193
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 96 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: FORT
PIFER

DOC DATE: 12 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS:

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO & RUSSIA

ACTION: SYSTEM ACTION NOT SENT FORWARD DUE DATE: 16 SEP 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	97071112	SYSTEM ACTION NOT SENT FORWARD

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National Security Council

DATE: 24 Feb 1997

Memorandum for: FORT

From: NSC/S CREATE DATE: 960912

Subject: NATO & RUSSIA

Log #9606193 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

___ Action completed, file attached.

___ Action still pending, copy attached.

___ Action transferred to _____.

___ Action sent forward, copy attached.

___ Cannot find, will continue to check.

___ System action not sent forward, copy attached.

* Log Number not used.

___ Other: OBEP _____.

Please return to Secretariat, Room 379 OEOB.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dear Boris:

It was very good to talk to you last Sunday, and to know that you are in good spirits. As I told you, our thoughts and best wishes are with you in the weeks ahead. I look forward to your rapid recovery, so that we may begin to discuss in depth how to reach our shared goal of an undivided, democratic Europe. In the meantime, I wanted to explain to you my thinking on the new relationship between NATO and Russia, and how it should fit into European security structures.

First and foremost, I should stress that Russia has an essential part to play in creating these new structures. For that reason, I propose that we agree on principles for a NATO-Russia Charter, to define the character of our new relationship. This Charter would establish permanent, formal mechanisms for consultation, cooperation and action by NATO and Russia in the political and military spheres. The Charter would confirm our mutual commitment to a broad and deep partnership that is crucial to stability and peace in Europe, and to our own national interests.

If you agree that such a Charter would provide a valid basis and context for building our partnership, I would suggest that we ask our most trusted advisors to engage in discrete and intensive dialogue on its contents. We together have a historic opportunity, and a great responsibility - to assure that Europe..... ~~As we head into the busy fall diplomatic season, I want to share my thoughts about our shared goal of creating an integrated, prosperous and democratic Europe free of divisions.~~ The security and well-being of both our great nations depends ~~vitally~~ on our working together toward that goal. Together, you and I have already taken great strides to ensure that the new Europe taking shape is ready to face the challenges of the future.

I believe the process which Yevgeniy Primakov and Warren Christopher launched at Jakarta offers some promise. Judging from the Jakarta meeting and the discussion between Strobe Talbott and Georgiy Mamedov in Ottawa recently, it seems to me that both sides are trying to define the issues as well as the way ahead. As I see it, we have engaged in a process of trying

Reason:
Declassify on:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-m (1.47)

to take full and proper account of Russia's political and security interests in Europe as new European security structures evolve and as NATO expands, and your side has accepted that NATO's present functions, future adaptation, and expansion need not present a fundamental contradiction with Russian political and security interests. The task on which you, we, and some of the principal European powers have engaged is to begin to define how the new relationship between Russia and NATO might function.

Shortly, I will be making a public announcement reaffirming my determination to convene a series of summits early next year, including a NATO Summit to complete the Alliance's internal adaptation, to issue the first invitations to Central and East European countries to begin accession talks with the Alliance, to strengthen the Partnership for Peace, and to give all Partners a stronger voice by creating an Atlantic Partnership Council. At the same time, I believe we must also take important steps to create an even more robust NATO-Russia partnership.

As you know, Warren Christopher gave a speech in Stuttgart on September 6 touching upon these issues. He began to lay the foundations in public for developing a NATO-Russia Charter which would highlight Russia's prominent role in the new European security architecture. This agreement would frame the NATO-Russia relationship in the context of the sweeping changes in Europe, Russia, and NATO itself following the Cold War. The Charter, consistent with OSCE Principles, would reaffirm the indivisibility of security in Europe, emphasize that NATO and Russia no longer regard each other as potential adversaries, and recognize that nuclear weapons are weapons of last resort. The development of such a relationship would form a central element of an undivided Europe. And, as I have often assured you, I wanted to make sure there were no surprises.

In that spirit, we need to continue our dialogue on how we might strengthen the emerging NATO-Russia partnership. This relationship would continue to be founded firmly on a mutual commitment to extensive consultations and joint action across a wide range of issues. It would allow us to consult and act together in times of crisis, and institutionalize the splendid cooperation of our armed forces in Bosnia.

The consolidation of a NATO-Russia partnership along the lines I have sketched out will be one of my Administration's most important goals over the next few months. I hope that by the December 1996 meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Council we will have made substantial progress and will be able to cap our achievements at a series of summits in early 1997.

Boris, you and I have discussed many times that we must develop a multifaceted approach to Europe's new security challenges and build an architecture in which the EU, OSCE, WEU, and other institutions continue to play important roles. It is vital that we continue to work together to ensure that the dividing lines of the past are replaced by an interlocking network of institutions and arrangements that enhance the security of all.

I once again would like to wish you a speedy recovery and look forward to talking with you shortly.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1121				
Document ID: 9606262				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Daniel Fried to Anthony Lake re: Baltic States... (3 pages)~~	~~09/17/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1121

FOLDER TITLE:
9606262

2015-0772-M
rs1345

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606262
RECEIVED: 16 SEP 96 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: FRIED

DOC DATE: 17 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BALTIC STATES NATO

PERSONS: TALBOTT, S

SUBJECT: BALTIC STATES - BALTIC ACTION PLAN & NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 19 SEP 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FORT
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By____NARA, Date_____

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9606262

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96091718	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	96092508	NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 9/17 7pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6262

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Ye NO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	copy		
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	AW	
Lake	3	✓	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	re 9/23	A
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

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National Security Council
The White House

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6262

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 17, 1996

Nat! Sec Advisor has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

NOTED

FROM: DANIEL FRIED

SUBJECT: Baltic States: "Baltic Action Plan" and NATO Enlargement

I went last week with an Interagency team to the Baltic capitals to discuss European security and our new Baltic Action Plan (first outlined by Strobe Talbott to Baltic Ambassadors in early September). We had frank, sometimes intense talks with the Presidents, PMs and Foreign Ministers of Estonia and Latvia and the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. The issue was the challenge of Baltic integration with the West, given Russian pressure, West European hesitation, and the fact that the Balts -- as we told them -- are unlikely to be included in the first group of new NATO members to be named next year.

The Balts were aware that they are unlikely to be in the first tranche of new NATO members and accepted this as the starting point of discussions. They were concerned that NATO enlargement not leave them isolated from the West, vulnerable to political pressure from Moscow and, especially in the case of Lithuania, facing domestic bitterness at having been abandoned by the West. All the governments had suggestions, some well-prepared, on creative ways to design NATO enlargement that would address their concerns if they are not in the first group.

Stressing our commitment to Baltic security and integration with the West, we said that: (a) the U.S. will ensure, as the President told the Baltic Presidents in June, that NATO's door will remain open; (b) we must in the meantime "create facts" of integration politically, economically and through military cooperation -- working bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally through NATO/PFP; and (c) we must try to stabilize Baltic-Russia relations, both by encouraging pragmatic Baltic approaches and by encouraging Moscow to ease its rhetoric and political pressure.

The Baltic Action Plan (BAP) suggested specific ways to do this. We discussed negotiating a U.S.-Baltic Charter (raised earlier by Talbott) to give high-level endorsement of our efforts. Finally,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 9/17/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/16/2015
2015-0772-M (1,48)

we noted that the BAP and the Charter constituted a path forward and not, as the Balts feared, an alternative to NATO membership. The Balts accepted our conceptual approach and wanted to move forward and discuss details of options for NATO enlargement. The Swedes, with whom I met in Stockholm to follow up on the President's discussions in August with PM Persson, expressed support for our approach and want to cooperate with us.

The Way Forward

I will work through the Baltic IWG on specific elements of the BAP. Some issues may need top-level engagement at some point:

- **NATO Enlargement and the "also rans."** Our current position holds that NATO membership is open to all European democracies and that no differentiation take place between Partners except for those beginning accession negotiations with NATO. The Baltics consider this inadequate -- a verbal screen behind which NATO enlargement would simply stop with the first tranche. The Estonians and Lithuanians, separately, suggested intermediate arrangements to group together those Partners who are actively seeking NATO membership and making progress toward it -- called "Atlantic Partnerships" or "Partnership for Security." These Partners-Plus could have intensified relations with NATO, e.g., through regional CJTFs or NATO regional commands.

  Concrete steps to beef up relations between some Partners and NATO may be doable. There are drawbacks to formalized arrangements, however: efforts to more explicitly identify the Baltics as potential future NATO members could complicate our delicate dialogue with Moscow on NATO-Russia. We should consider when and how to apply our "no veto" principle. Some Allies are reluctant to consider enlargement at all beyond the first group (though we overcame initial Allied reluctance to accept NATO enlargement at all). Also, while a "Partners Plus" category could help with the Baltics and perhaps Romania, some may argue that it would degrade PFP's value for Central Asian and Caucasus states.

  The "non-Deputies" group should insist on an strong "also rans" strategy as we prepare for the December NAC and the Summit. We could explore less institutionalized versions of the Estonian/Lithuanian proposals and should consider how the Christopher-proposed "Atlantic Partnership Council" -- a label he used in his September 6 speech without supporting detail -- could fit. **Our objective is to design the first tranche of enlargement in a way that maintains the integrity of our position that there will be further tranches -- that locks the door open.**

- **Russia.** The BAP recommends that we put the Baltics on our high-level agenda with Moscow, urging the Russians to ease up on the pressure and encouraging the Baltics to take pragmatic approaches toward Moscow. The Estonians and Latvians, having the greatest problems with Moscow, stressed their interest in improving ties but noted the difficulty of doing so in the face of Russian public and political pressure. (The Estonian PM told our Ambassador confidentially that he wants a far-reaching compromise with Moscow on the border treaty -- breaking the linkage Tallinn has so far insisted upon between the border treaty and Russian recognition of the Treaty of Tartu of 1920 establishing Estonian statehood -- but is concerned that Russian rhetoric will spin-up Estonian opinion and tie his hands.)

  Tom Pickering and our Ambassadors in Estonia and Latvia recommend that we encourage the Russians to take up Estonian and Latvian interest in PM-level meetings; **I am recommending through Strobe's staff that he raise the issue with Mamedov on September 20.** In the longer term, we must be prepared, as the BAP says, to call Moscow to account, possibly including in public, should their anti-Baltic rhetoric or actions increase significantly.

- **Resources.** We have graduated Estonia from SEED assistance and are preparing to do so with Latvia. We need to maintain some "post-graduate" assistance programs, e.g., democratic institution building, crime fighting and security programs. The BaltBat is a significant success, representing also a successful intra-Western coordination effort. The Balts want to expand the program, e.g., by creating a Baltic Brigade, and the Swedes expressed some interest in the idea. The Vice President publicly promised $5 million in FY96 for the BaltBat but we will reach less than $2 million. **Support in FY97 of $3-4 million for BaltBat or an expanded program would have a considerable impact.**

- **Baltic Charter.** I will work with State to prepare a draft and work out language with the Baltic states. The Baltic leaders expressed interest in the concept (especially when convinced it would not be an alternative to NATO) but requested Presidential-level signing. We pointed out that this could not even be discussed until after November and was unlikely to occur until well into 1997. This timing -- closer to but not at the NATO Summit -- seemed right to them.

Concurrences by: Alexander Vershbow, Ki Fort /DF

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1124				
Document ID: 9606710				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Daniel Fried et al. to Anthony Lake re: Your Meeting with the Trioka~~ on NATO Enlargement Issues... (3 pages)	~~10/04/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

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2015-0772-M
rs1346

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606710
RECEIVED: 04 OCT 96 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: FRIED
VERSHBOW
PIFER

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO RUSSIA
ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LAKE MTG W/ TROIKA RE NATO ENLARGEMENT ISSUES ON 7 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 08 OCT 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
FRIED
NSC CHRON
PIFER
VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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6710

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 4, 1996

Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen.
NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL FRIED, ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AND STEVE PIFER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Troika on NATO Enlargement Issues, October 7, 1996 at 5:30pm

Pieces of our European security/NATO enlargement policy are in motion (e.g., NATO-Russia dialogue, countries not likely to be in the first group, Baltic issues, POTUS speech). We believe that senior-level review soon is important to maintain policy consistency. (The flap over Perry's public handling of Baltic issues is cautionary.) We still recommend a Deputies meeting -- restricted and off-line if Strobe insists -- leading to a PC.

NATO-Russia Framework. Strobe is having his framework paper reworked to incorporate comments from Mamedov. Strobe plans for Jim Collins, who will travel with Perry to Moscow October 16-18, to hand the latest draft to Mamedov at that time (Steve may also accompany). We may want a DC to review the paper in advance.

Non-First Tranche Countries the Problem. Beyond process, we want to discuss the issue of countries that may not be in the first group; your early guidance would be useful. One aspect is how to enlarge NATO to the first group -- frequently though not formally considered to include the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and perhaps Slovenia -- while ensuring that the others do not become so discouraged and embittered that our overall objectives of European integration are not damaged. A second, equal aspect is how we can keep Russia inside the emerging European security community and on the NATO-Russia track and not inadvertently discourage the non-Russian NIS.

The "non-first tranche" group varies widely, including (a) countries not currently interested in NATO membership (e.g., Ukraine, Bulgaria, Belarus, the Nordics), (b) countries whose lack of democratic or other development makes them ineligible at this time (e.g., Slovakia, Belarus, Albania, many of the non-European NIS), (c) countries whose performance against our criteria is currently subject to discussion (e.g., Romania) and (d) the Baltic states.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/4/06

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0777-M (1.49)

The issue of the Baltic states is the most acute because of a strong presumption among Allied governments and within our own that they will not be in the first group -- a presumption based not on their lack of interest or readiness, no matter what Perry said about their military incapacity, but because of Russian objections. In short, the "non-first tranche" problem is where "no new lines," "no veto" and our Russia equities intersect.

Possible Answers and Options. There is consensus within the interagency process that enlargement should be accompanied by a significant deepening of PFP for all interested partners, e.g., by expanding the scope of PFP exercises to include peace enforcement, broadening the PFP defense planning process to more closely resemble that of the Allies, linking partners to the new CJTF structures, partner representation at regional commands, and/or opening NATO offices in some partner capitals. Consensus is also emerging that the Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) announced by Christopher in Stuttgart should simply be a fold-in of NACC with PFP -- giving PFP an institutional identity and multilateral forum it now lacks. Finally, consensus exists that the intensified dialogues between NATO and interested Partners (aspiring members plus others, such as the Nordics, Ukraine and other countries that may declare an interest in an intensified dialogue) will continue. These initiatives will help but may not be sufficient.

One question on which significant differences exist is whether NATO should establish some sort of more exclusive group within PFP to include non-first-tranche countries interested in membership or otherwise committed to deepening their ties to NATO. The NSC staff paper attached at Tab A discusses possible variants of this option -- basically giving the intensified dialogues higher profile and a title, e.g., "Atlantic Accords." A related issue is which partners should get an "Atlantic Accord."

Conceptually, the idea is loosely related to one possible EU model of enlargement -- a common starting line for all prospective entrants with actual accession based on readiness. Crudely put, the upside is that "Atlantic Accords," combined with the other steps noted above, would take care of Baltic and possibly Romanian and Ukrainian concerns by identifying them more explicitly as future prospective NATO members and/or enhanced partners. Assuming that the "Atlantic Accords" are not all inclusive or self-selecting, a downside is the effect of such pre-designation on Russia and the NATO-Russia track before Moscow has fully absorbed the reality of NATO's first enlargement. Another downside might be the effect on Partners not able to contemplate NATO membership for a long time, if ever (Caucasus, Central Asian states).

A second option on which differences exist is for NATO to agree to date-certain reviews of the intensified dialogue (or "Atlantic Accord") participants to decide whether to commence accession negotiations with one or more of them. The upside is locking in NATO's rhetorical commitment to keep enlargement an open process; the downside is, again, Russian reaction to the prospect of being faced with date-certain NATO decisions about Baltic membership.

Attachment
Tab A Troika Options Paper

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 27, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE - SANDY BERGER - NANCY SODERBERG - DON BAER

FROM: ANTONY BLINKEN - JULIA MOFFETT } AJB

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS FOR POTUS IN OCTOBER

As we head into October, we've tried to identify foreign policy issues/events that POTUS could spot light -- as opposed to those that the course of events may require him to contend with (e.g. the Middle East; the debates...) They are:

1. NATO Enlargement Speech. The goal is to highlight the President's leadership on NATO enlargement and to announce next steps: allied agreement to hold a spring/summer summit and the President's intent to welcome the first new members into NATO during his second term/by 1999. The speech also would underscore our determination to build a strong NATO-Russia relationship. Pifer, Vershbow and Fried agree that the speech can go forward before President Yeltsin's operation (now expected for late November.) With TL's approval, we will resubmit immediately a scheduling proposal for this speech. POTUS Participation: speech. Timing: Tbd. Location: ideally, in Milwaukee, Cleveland, Chicago or Detroit.

2. Highlight VOA International "Most Wanted" Program. In August, VOA began broadcasting "International Crime Alert," a program that identifies major international fugitives -- terrorists, criminals, drug traffickers -- wanted by the USG, soliciting information and offering rewards. The weekly segments go out over VOA radio (50 languages; 100 million listeners) and on the Internet (or should we say the "InterGet.") VOA has been planning a joint announcement with DOJ within the next two weeks. The President's participation would highlight his determination to use the most modern tools in the fight against terror, crime and drugs. There might be added resonance given Fox Broadcasting's decision to bring back the television program "America's Most Wanted" after its cancellation prompted strong protests from viewers, the nation's governors and police organizations (see attached article.) And the first suspect featured on the program is expected to be apprehended imminently (details to follow.) POTUS Participation: Possibilities include: (i) build weekly radio address around initiative; (ii) tape spot for VOA that could be played at Justice/USIA press conference; (iii) have President call up home page on computer; (iv) build into crime speech/event or key to arrest of suspect. Timing: Tbd. Location: Tbd. Note: This also would be a good event for the V.P.

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By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2015
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3. Send Off International Religious Freedom Committee. This month, the President approved proposed members for the Secretary of State's new Special Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad. The Committee is to report to the Administration on religious persecution and intolerance, resolution of religious conflict and the role religious groups play in resolving/mediating conflict. Its seventeen members include representatives of the most populous religious groups in the U.S. A first meeting could be convened as early as mid-October. Presidential participation (which would be widely reported in specialty media) would highlight the importance he attaches to this issue and to this committee -- which religious groups throughout the U.S. had been urging the Administration to create. POTUS Participation: Drop-by first meeting of Committee. In the alternative, have McCurry mention it in briefing and issue written statement. Timing: mid to late October for drop-by; anytime for briefing/written statement. Location: White House.

We look forward to your views on these ideas.

Attachment

Date: 09/25/96 Time: 15:23
AFox Brings Back 'America's Most Wanted' After Big Public Campaign

LOS ANGELES (AP) Deluged with letters from thousands of irate fans, the FBI and 37 governors, Fox will bring back the popular crime-fighting television show ''America's Most Wanted.''

The network, which announced in May the final episode would air Sept. 21, said Tuesday that it has ordered ''multiple episodes'' of the show as a ''backup series, with a fresh, new look.''

The program, which aired Saturday nights, is expected to rejoin the prime-time lineup later this season, Fox said. The network gave no specific date or time slot, and did not say what the ''fresh, new look'' would entail. John Walsh will remain as host.

In an unsigned statement the FBI told Fox the show ''empowered millions of Americans to safely and constructively combat crime.''

The show re-enacts crimes and asks viewers to call in if they have any information about the suspect or the crime.

Peter Roth, who formally became president of Fox Entertainment on Tuesday, called the public outpouring ''enormous.''

''Never before has a television program made such a clear and significant impact on people's lives. Quite simply, people have told us that this program made them feel safer,'' Roth said in a statement.

The news about ''America's Most Wanted'' was part of a Fox announcement about changes in its fall schedule.

The network also said it's ordering new episodes of the game show ''Big Deal'' but that ''Lush Life,'' a sitcom starring Lori Petty and Karyn Parsons, will have its final broadcast on Monday.

Fox also said the sitcom ''Party Girl'' will go on hiatus and be re-launched later this season.

APNP-09-25-96 1534EDT

The TV Column

Stay of Execution For 'Most Wanted'

By John Carmody
Washington Post Staff Writer

The just-canceled "America's Most Wanted" will return to the prime-time schedule as a mid-season backup series "with a fresh new look," Fox Broadcasting announced yesterday.

Since the network announced the cancellation earlier this year, there has been an outpouring of support for the anti-crime series, which has been credited with helping law enforcement agencies capture some 430 fugitives and recover 20 missing children since it began in 1988. The show has reportedly received about 7,000 letters from viewers, most of the nation's governors and police organizations protesting the cancellation.

There had been talk that Peter Roth, Fox Entertainment's new president and a fan of the show, might overrule the decision of his predecessor, John Matoian.

Yesterday, on his first official day on the job, Roth did just that, ordering "multiple episodes" of the series.

The Washington-produced, hour-long show ended an eight-year run on the network Saturday night with an episode featuring its creator and host, John Walsh, talking for the first time on the program about his son's murder in 1981, the event that motivated him eventually to begin the show.

That "finale" averaged a 5.5 national rating and a 10 percent audience share, finishing 85th among 91 series aired on the four big networks.

Nonetheless, Roth said in a statement yesterday, "there has been an enormous outpouring from law enforcement agencies, government officials—including governors of 37 states—and viewers asking us to keep [the show] on the air. Never before has a television program made such a clear and significant impact on people's lives. We are extremely proud of John Walsh and of the show's accomplishments and we are delighted to continue its good work on Fox."

Roth told Fox executives in Washington that no decision had been made regarding the production site of "America's Most Wanted" when it returns. Internal network talk is that it could move from the Channel 5 studios, where it's been since 1988, to California. At its peak the show employed 70 in Washington; at the time of its cancellation, 50 were working on the series.

Roth further established that a firm new hand is on the tiller at Fox by dropping two failing Monday night sitcoms and issuing a small vote of confidence for the game show "Big Deal," Fox's underpowered Sunday night competition for "60 Minutes."

United States Information Agency — International Crime Alert

International Crime Alert is a cooperative effort of the United States Information Agency and U.S. Government law enforcement agencies. Its purposes are to inform our readers about dangerous criminals that may be in their countries and to provide information on how to report the whereabouts of these lawbreakers to proper authorities.

Alert for Peter Paul ZINK

Alert for Marc David RICH

Alert for Carlos Remigio CARDOEN

Alert for Dario GARCES-VELEZ

Alert for Michael FINNEY and Charles HILL


Alert for Gaith Rashad PHARAON

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security

International Crime Alert

WANTED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PETER PAUL ZINK



DESCRIPTION: Peter Paul Zink is a U.S. citizen born in Castro Valley, California, on November 5th, 1955. He is one-hundred eighty centimeters in height and weighs ninety kilograms. He has brown hair and brown eyes, and a scar on his left knee. He suffers from a sleep disorder and uses a prescription drug called ritilin.

Zink reportedly continues to traffic in illegal drugs and is often in the company of prostitutes. He speaks Spanish poorly and with an American accent. He has been known to use the names "John Potts" and "Mark Potts." Zink should be considered armed and dangerous.

CASE DETAILS: Kenosha County, Wisconsin, January 27th, 1987. Thomas Chase, a cocaine addict and drug pusher, knocks on the door of factory worker Mark Stauss. Opening fire with a handgun, he shouts: "This is payment for Peter Zink."

Stauss was shot twice and struggled with his assailant for several minutes before the eyes of his terrified wife and children. Chase was later arrested and charged with first-degree attempted murder.

The man who ordered that murder attempt is an international fugitive. Peter Paul Zink is charged with selling more than one-million dollars' worth of cocaine in the Racine, Wisconsin, area in 1986

and 1987. He is also wanted for illegal possession of a firearm and conspiracy to commit murder. Zink ordered the murder attempt to prevent Stauss from testifying against Zink and his associates in narcotics trafficking.

Released on bond while awaiting trial, Zink failed to appear in court in March 1988. He is now believed to be in Guatemala working as a tour guide and deck hand.

If you have information concerning Peter Paul Zink, you should contact the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. The U.S. guarantees that all reports will be investigated and all information will be kept confidential. If appropriate, the U.S. is prepared to protect informants by relocating them.



BACK TO INTERNATIONAL CRIME ALERT PAGE

International Crime Alert

WANTED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CARLOS REMIGIO CARDOEN



DESCRIPTION: Carlos Remigio Cardoen is a white male, born in Santa Cruz, Chile, on May 1, 1942. He is 180 centimeters in height, weighs 77 kilograms, and has brown-grey hair and brown eyes. He wears reading glasses and business attire. He speaks English and Spanish.

Cardoen is a Chilean citizen living in Chile. In recent years, he is believed to have visited Cuba, Mexico, Russia, Britain, Spain, Greece, and Belgium. He travels on a Chilean passport.

CASE DETAILS: Cluster bombs are metal cannisters containing up to two-hundred-forty small "bomblets." The bomblets are packed with high explosives and shrapnel. Dropped from aircraft, they cover a wide area with deadly metal fragments, some of which are powerful enough to pierce armor plate. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used cluster bombs with terrible effect.

A major supplier of these deadly minitions is now an international fugitive. Carlos Remigio Cardoen sold over one-hundred-fifty million dollars worth of cluster bombs to the Saddam Hussein regime during the 1980's. The bombs were manufactured in Chile with zirconium that was obtained illegally in the U. S. A U. S. arrest warrant issued on May 27, 1993, charges Cardoen with illegally exporting zirconium and U. S.-made parts and molds for bomb fuses through his U. S. based company.

The U. S. is seeking Cardoen's extradition to the United States. If you have information

concerning Cardoen, you should contact the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. The U. S. will pay a reward for information that leads to Cardoen's arrest The U.S. guarantees that all reports will be investigated and all information will be kept confidential.



BACK TO INTERNATIONAL CRIME ALERT PAGE

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1128				
Document ID: 9607342				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Steve Pifer to Anthony Lake re: NATO Enlargement, NATO-Russia and START (3 pages)	11/06/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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OA/Box Number: 1128

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RECORD ID: 9607342
RECEIVED: 05 NOV 96 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: PIFER

DOC DATE: 06 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
RUSSIA
START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO ENLARGEMENT NATO RUSSIA & START

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 08 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By IR NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9607342

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96110613	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	96111210	NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

Rec'd 11/6 3:04pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7342

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (C) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	copy		
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	AW	NOTE
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	DPS 11/11	N/R
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: P, K, Lev

COMMENTS:

'96 NOV 6 PM 1:37

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

Log # 7342

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To PZ Date 11/6

I think this is generally a sound approach.

@

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

National Security Council
The White House

3:04 pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7342

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (C) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	copy		
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	AW	NOTE
Lake	3	Nat Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	DPS 11/11	N/R
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: P. Keer

COMMENTS:

'96 NOV 6 PM 1:37

Exec Sec Office has diskette

Log # 7393

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To PZ Date 11/6

I think this is generally a sound approach.

@

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7342

November 6, 1996

Good memo

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: NATO Enlargement, NATO-Russia and START

Secretary Perry has suggested moving on four issues to create a more positive context for Duma ratification of START II: NATO nuclear deployments, NATO infrastructure, START III and CFE. A grand bargain among these issues would be complex and pose certain risks. We should instead look at ways to disaggregate this package and move quickly on specific pieces.

START. START II may not be doable in the near term. In any event, the immediate window for Duma ratification may close in March for some time. Thereafter the noise over NATO enlargement will likely make it impossible for the Duma to ratify, probably for the rest of 1997. Our goal thus should be to secure Duma ratification in the first two months of 1997.

The principal Russian concern about START II appears to be that, given their tight finances, START II would leave Russia in 2003 with 2,200-2,500 warheads as opposed to 3,500 for the U.S. Such a gap would be politically untenable in Moscow -- more so, it appears, than the gap that is likely in the absence of START II.

We should make the Russians an offer on START II in early December, conditioned on Russian commitment to a hard push for Duma ratification in January. The offer should comprise two elements:

-- U.S. readiness to reduce the START II aggregate from 3,500 to 3,000 (this would eliminate half the gap facing Moscow and underscore our seriousness about further reductions).

-- U.S. commitment to negotiate further cuts in START III (as endorsed now by Secretary Perry), with a reduction schedule that would supersede the START II schedule and would attain START III levels by 2003-2007.

When making this offer, we should tell the Russians that we would not be prepared to open other elements of START II and that, if the Duma did not ratify the Treaty in early 1997, we could not guarantee our offer would remain on the table later.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/05/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.50)

~~SECRET~~

OSD suggests a fairly detailed, 10 or 15-point START III framework agreement. This is interesting, and, if for no other reason than to be ready for START III negotiations whenever they occur, there is merit in deciding where we stand. But it is difficult to see how we could conclude such an agreement in time for use to push START II through the Duma in January-February, and there is a real danger that a detailed START III framework proposal would lead Russia to lose interest in START II altogether.

In the wake of last week's failure in Geneva, ABM/TMD demarcation poses a complication. Ideally, we could secure agreement on "part two" as well as "part one" in the next couple of months, but that is highly problematic. We must, therefore, hold firm to last April's agreement between the President and Yeltsin: once "part one" was completed, Russia would secure Duma ratification of START II, though the Russians said they would exchange instruments of ratification only when "part two" was complete. If "part two" takes time to finish, we are better off if the Duma has completed its action on START II and the decision to exchange instruments of ratification is with the Russian executive branch.

NATO Nuclear Deployments. The Russians regard the Enlargement Study language on nuclear deployments on the territory of new NATO members as too caveated. If we can come up with a more direct formulation, it could be incorporated into one of the communiqués to be issued by the December NATO ministerials.

We should not negotiate this language with the Russians but should share the text with them prior to public release. Our message should be that this is the best NATO can/will do and that the Russian government should use the language to defuse the nuclear aspect of the NATO enlargement debate at home.

OSD has broached a U.S.-Russia freeze on new nuclear deployment sites. This is an intriguing idea -- it resolves the nuclear deployment issue outside of a NATO context and supports consolidation of the Russian stockpile. We need, however, to study the full implications of the idea -- including on NATO's flexibility to deploy nuclear weapons in a crisis. Working out such an arrangement with the Russians -- and the preparatory work with Allies -- would, in any event, take time. Thus, NATO should proceed with a statement on deployment policy independent of any decision on a nuclear storage site freeze.

NATO Infrastructure. The answer to the infrastructure issue is murky, in part because the Russians are not clear what they mean by the term. Some infrastructure on the territory of new members (e.g., NATO command and control, airspace management, host nation support) is essential. On the other hand, neither we nor any

other Ally advocates heavy investments in infrastructure development, much less forward-basing of troops and equipment. We should address infrastructure with the Russians in two ways:

-- First, brief the Russians on the infrastructure that NATO is likely to place on the territory of new members (this will make clear there is little to Moscow's worst fear -- infrastructure capable of permanently stationing major ground units and/or tactical air).

-- Second, steer the Russians toward CFE adaptation as a means to address their concerns regarding the conventional forces of an enlarged Alliance.

CFE. CFE adaptation has the potential to address, in a legally-binding manner, some key Russian concerns about NATO enlargement (large amounts of NATO equipment on the eastern border of an enlarged Alliance). However, given the complexities of the issues and the need for agreement at 30, adaptation will not be resolved by the NATO summit. A more realistic goal would be resolution by the time the first new member enters NATO (1999); we might reflect this goal in the NAC or summit communiqué.

Disaggregation. Breaking this complex set of issues into manageable bits offers the best prospect of success. Offering START moves to break START II free ahead of the intensification of the NATO enlargement debate would counter a Russian tactic of seeking, in return for ratification, concessions on enlargement that would undermine our broader European security strategy.

In the ideal case, by spring 1997, START II would have been ratified (before the Duma becomes truly seized with enlargement), the Russian government would have a basis to proclaim "victory" on NATO nuclear deployments and contain that part of the NATO debate, and the Russians would have a better understanding of what infrastructure will and will not be placed on the territory of new members. CFE states would be engaged in a negotiation on the basis of terms of reference agreed at Lisbon.

This would not guarantee Russian acquiescence in NATO enlargement or Moscow's pursuit of a NATO-Russia relationship. But it would increase the odds and offers the greatest prospect for getting START II done and off the board. And it is more likely to succeed at advancing our goals than a more complex approach that attempts trade-offs among the pieces of the NATO-START-CFE-Russia puzzle but which risks undercutting our equities in each.

Concurrences by: SP for Bob Bell, Sandy Vershbow, Dan Fried

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1599				
Document ID: 9700639				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Relations with Russia (3 pages)~~	~~01/31/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1599

FOLDER TITLE:
9700639

2015-0772-M
rs1348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700639
RECEIVED: 30 JAN 97 20

TO: BERGER

FROM: PIFER

DOC DATE: 31 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
ECONOMICS
NATO
START

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS
CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON RELATIONS W/ RUSSIA RE NATO / STRATEGIC ARMS / ECONOMICS & YELTSIN - CHIRAC RELATIONS

ACTION: SEE 9700715 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 03 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF: 9700715

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97013112	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001	PIFER	Z	97020320	FOR FURTHER ACTION
002	BERGER	Z	97020320	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97020514	SEE 9700715 FOR FINAL ACTION

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0639

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	2/5	A
Records Mgt.	2		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: SEE 0715 FILE

'97 FEB 5 PM 12:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 1/31 1PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0659

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Kerrick	Copy		Dave
Steinberg	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	Kate 1/31
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.			
Pfeiffer	4		see note

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

'97 JAN 31 PM12:22

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0639
Re-do

January 31, 1997



2/4
⇒ Steve —
Let's start again. 2 page update.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Relations with Russia

The memorandum to the President at Tab I outlines the results of the Tuesday Principals Committee meeting on Russia.

Concurrence by: SP for Sandy Vershbow, Bob Bell, Carlos Pascual, Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1/31/07

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Relations with Russia

Buzz of Activity. You have seen Strobe and Leon's report on their talks in Moscow. Principals met last week to discuss next steps in managing the NATO-Russia relationship and our bilateral agenda in the likely bumpy period ahead.

The next step is the Vice President's February 5-8 meeting with Chernomyrdin (you will meet him on February 7). Madeleine plans to visit Moscow February 20-21 and may see Yeltsin. On the NATO-Russia track, Solana will meet Primakov again on February 23.

NATO-Russia. Principals reaffirmed that we will continue to urge the Russians to work with us on a NATO-Russia charter -- a politically, *not* legally, binding document -- to be signed at the highest level. The charter would *inter alia* lay out a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, where possible, joint decision-making and action by the Alliance and Russia.

It will be important to help Yeltsin be able to say that he has defended Russia's interests. In response to Primakov's raising the "theoretical" possibility of Russia joining NATO, Principals agreed to language for a charter that would reiterate your position that the Alliance is open to all of Europe's emerging democracies. They also agreed to take up a Primakov suggestion that NATO's transformation be a topic for NATO-Russia consultation (albeit with no Russian veto), so that the Russians can say that their views are being taken into account in shaping the missions and strategy of the "new NATO."

The adaptation of the CFE Treaty offers a legally-binding way to address some Russian concerns about the military implications of enlargement. We are working with NATO to develop a position to table soon that will, among other things, reduce NATO's ceiling on treaty-limited equipment and set reciprocal limits on forces in the central region that will severely constrain any build-up on the territory of new NATO members.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/16/2019
2015-0772-M (1.52)

Strategic Arms Control. A "guidelines" package setting out goals for a START III negotiation could help Yeltsin secure Duma ratification of START II. We have separately sent you a recommendation on what we believe the Vice President should float with Chernomyrdin. Our goal to have the START III guidelines (including a limit of 2000-2500 strategic warheads) completed by your meeting with Yeltsin, though Principals strongly recommend that you not formalize the guidelines with Yeltsin absent his commitment to push publicly for START II ratification.

The Russians have also stressed the importance of reaffirmation and non-circumvention of the ABM Treaty for START II ratification. We will pursue this issue at both the technical and political levels to see whether we can get the Russians to agree to a solution that extracts us from the dead-end we currently find ourselves in over ABM/TMD demarcation.

Economics. Principals underscored that Russia will continue to face economic stagnation unless it creates an environment that stimulates investment and growth. The current stalemate stems from a lack of a serious growth strategy and weak economic leadership. When the Vice President meets with Chernomyrdin, we will lay out a specific agenda on laws and policies to get beyond vague and unfilled commitments to "promote investment." We will also offer several billion in investment finance and support for membership in international economic fora, but neither will move forward if Russia does not engage in structural reforms.

We need to come to grips with graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik. This is very important symbolically to Moscow; Dan Tarullo will coordinate with others to develop a recommendation. This will take some political capital with the Hill, but we will be asking Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin to do heavy lifting with the Duma on START II, economics and acquiescing in NATO enlargement.

Yeltsin-Chirac. Chirac found Yeltsin frail but intellectually strong, covering 30 issues over three hours of talks without notes. Yeltsin told Chirac that, while Russia would remain hostile to enlargement, he was prepared to conclude a NATO-Russia deal if there is a good one. Unfortunately, Yeltsin put down markers on what such a deal would look like that cross our red-lines, including: a legally-binding agreement, a Russian veto on NATO actions outside of NATO territory, and a ban on NATO conventional forces on the territory of new Alliance members. According to the French, Yeltsin pushed the idea of a "Quint" summit, to be held as early as mid-March.

Mamedov Comments. Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov began pre-GCC consultations on Monday. He brought no flexibility on arms control issues and reiterated that START II ratification could

not go forward -- even with START III guidelines and a resolution on ABM/TMD demarcation -- until the NATO-Russia relationship is worked out. He suggested this might be accomplished at a NATO-Russia summit on the margins of the Denver meeting of the Eight but was not particularly optimistic.

Outlook. We have good approaches on NATO-Russia and economic interaction and, I believe, we will soon have forward-leaning proposals on START and CFE. We will be able to make clear to the Russians that the door is open -- both to a strong relationship with NATO and to re-energizing our bilateral agenda.

Whether the Russians choose to walk through this door will require that they make some hard decisions and decide to say "yes." They may instead conclude that acquiescing in enlargement would be too painful domestically, that NATO's commitment to enlargement in July may not be firm, and that they can always pick up the pieces and come to terms with us after Madrid. Chernomyrdin's visit offers a key test as to which route the Russians will choose.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1600				
Document ID: 9700715				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: The United States, NATO and Russia on~~ the Eve of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (2 pages)	~~02/04/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: The United States, NATO and Russia on~~ the Eve of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (2 pages)	~~02/04/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700715

2015-0772-M
rs1349

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700715
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 97 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: PIFER

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO TO PRES RE US / NATO / RUSSIA ON EVE OF GCC

ACTION: OBE PER EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 07 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF: 9700639

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97020511	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97020707	OBE PER EXEC SEC

Record 2/5/97
12:05 pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0715

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
~~Denise~~ Brown	1	MB 2-5	
Kerrick	2	(K)	
Steinberg	3	KS → for REDO w/ 25 EDITS	
Berger		~~DA 2/7~~ Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TMM 2.6	N
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Redo of pkg 0639 ~~(Copy attached)~~

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0715

February 4, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on the U.S., NATO and Russia on the Eve of GCC

The memorandum to the President at Tab I describes where we are on key U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russia issues on the eve of the Vice President's meeting with Chernomyrdin.

Concurrence by: SP for Sandy Vershbow, Bob Bell, Carlos Pascual, Dan Fried, Bill Wise

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 2/04/07

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date
2015-0772-M (1,54)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: The United States, NATO and Russia on the Eve of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission

Overview. The Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will use part of their talks to prepare for your meeting with Yeltsin. Chernomyrdin's approach should give us a sense of the course Moscow will pursue over the next six months: whether to work with us for progress on a range of issues or to stonewall, linking other major issues to satisfaction on NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia while not moving off of maximalist positions. The Vice President will have points on NATO-Russia, START and economic issues that underscore our readiness to engage.

NATO-Russia. The Vice President will lay out our vision for a NATO-Russia relationship, including a charter that could be signed at the highest level and a mechanism for consultation and, where possible, joint decision-making and action. We are working with NATO on a position for the CFE adaptation negotiation that will reduce NATO equipment ceilings and set limits that will severely constrain any build-up on the territory of new NATO members and, reciprocally, on territories to their east.

START. As you approved, the Vice President will outline some guidelines for a START III negotiation, including a limit of 2000-2500 strategic warheads. He will make clear that you would not be prepared to formalize these guidelines with Yeltsin absent his commitment to press for Duma ratification of START II.

Economics. Russia will continue to face economic stagnation unless it creates an environment that stimulates investment and growth. The Vice President will lay out a specific agenda on laws and policies to get beyond vague commitments to "promote investment." We will offer several billion in investment finance and ideas for moving forward on Russia's membership in international economic organizations such as WTO, OECD, and APEC -- but progress will depend on Russia pursuing structural reforms.

The Russian Approach? There are some signs that the Russians believe linking other issues to NATO enlargement and pursuing a

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/04/07

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

hard-nosed approach may be the way to strike a better deal. Yeltsin told Chirac on Sunday that, while Russia remains hostile to enlargement, he is prepared to conclude a NATO-Russia deal if it is a good one. Unfortunately, he also put down markers that cross our red-lines, including: a legally-binding NATO-Russia agreement, a Russian veto on NATO operations outside of NATO territory, and a complete ban on NATO conventional forces on the territory of new Alliance members.

Subsequent public comments by Yeltsin Chief-of-Staff Chubays at Davos and Chernomyrdin to the Washington Post do not help. They repeated demands on NATO-Russia that we cannot accommodate. Moreover, they may have the effect of reducing their maneuvering room at home with regard to an ultimate deal.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov began pre-GCC consultations on Monday. He brought no flexibility on arms control issues and only a touch on NATO-Russia. He said START II ratification could not go forward until the NATO-Russia question is solved. Mamedov initially outlined a problematic calendar which deferred a NATO-Russia agreement until the Denver G-7/Eight summit. This is a very bad idea: in addition to extending the NATO-Russia negotiation to the eve of the Madrid NATO summit, it could set us up for failure on our home turf. In my meeting with Mamedov today, he showed some additional flexibility on dates and a willingness to begin to engage on specifics, not in theology. I stressed to him the critical importance of your meeting with Yeltsin: if you and Yeltsin successfully define the outline of a NATO-Russia deal, we could consider ideas such as a Quint summit; if not, we will lower our sights while reiterating that enlargement will proceed with or without a deal. You will want to underscore to Chernomyrdin on Friday the importance that you attach to the upcoming meeting with Yeltsin.

Outlook. The Vice President has good material and will be able to make clear that the door is open, both to a strong NATO-Russia relationship and to re-energizing our bilateral agenda -- our "preferred future." But he will also note some consequences of a Russian failure to engage: self-isolation instead of integration and specific disadvantages (e.g., absent START II, the U.S. will stay at START I levels; Russia will have a hard time maintaining that) -- without forcing enlargement off track.

Whether the Russians choose to walk through the door will require that they make some hard decisions and say "yes." They may instead conclude that acquiescing in enlargement would be too painful domestically, that NATO's commitment to enlargement in July may not be firm, and that they can always pick up the pieces and come to terms with us after Madrid. Chernomyrdin's visit offers a key test as to which route the Russians will choose.

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 0715

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.55)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: The United States, NATO and Russia on the Eve of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission

Overview. The Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will use part of their talks to prepare for your meeting with Yeltsin. Chernomyrdin's approach should give us a sense of the course Moscow will pursue over the next six months: whether to work with us for progress on a range of issues or to stonewall, linking other major issues to satisfaction on NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia while not moving off of maximalist positions. The Vice President will have points on NATO-Russia, START and economic issues that underscore our readiness to engage.

NATO-Russia. The Vice President will lay out our vision for a NATO-Russia relationship, including a charter that could be signed at the highest level and a mechanism for consultation and, where possible, joint decision-making and action. We are working with NATO on a position for the CFE adaptation negotiation that will reduce NATO equipment ceilings and set limits that will severely constrain any build-up on the territory of new NATO members and, reciprocally, on territories to their east.

START. As you approved, the Vice President will outline some guidelines for a START III negotiation, including a limit of 2000-2500 strategic warheads. He will make clear that you would not be prepared to formalize these guidelines with Yeltsin absent his commitment to press for Duma ratification of START II.

Economics. Russia will continue to face economic stagnation unless it creates an environment that stimulates investment and growth. The Vice President will lay out a specific agenda on laws and policies to get beyond vague commitments to "promote investment." We will offer several billion in investment finance and ~~support for~~ membership in international economic ~~fora~~ -- but ~~neither will move~~ ~~if~~ Russia ~~does not~~ pursue structural reforms.

Ideas for moving forward on Russia's progress will depend on

organizations such as WTO, OECD and APEC

The Russian Approach? There are some signs that the Russians believe linking other issues to NATO enlargement and pursuing a

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/04/07

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

hard-nosed approach may be the way to strike a better deal. Yeltsin told Chirac on Sunday that, while Russia remains hostile to enlargement, he is prepared to conclude a NATO-Russia deal if it is a good one. Unfortunately, he also put down markers that cross our red-lines, including: a legally-binding NATO-Russia agreement, a Russian veto on NATO operations outside of NATO territory, and a complete ban on NATO conventional forces on the territory of new Alliance members.

Subsequent public comments by Yeltsin Chief-of-Staff Chubays at Davos and Chernomyrdin to the Washington Post do not help. They repeated demands on NATO-Russia that we cannot accommodate. Moreover, they may have the effect of reducing their maneuvering room at home with regard to an ultimate deal.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov began pre-GCC consultations on Monday. He brought no flexibility on arms control issues and only a touch on NATO-Russia. He said START II ratification could not go forward until the NATO-Russia question is solved. Mamedov ~~also~~ outlined a calendar ~~which is difficult.~~ ~~He sees~~ a NATO-Russia agreement ~~concluded on the margins of~~ the Denver G-7/Eight summit. This is a very bad idea: in addition to extending the NATO-Russia negotiation to the eve of the Madrid NATO summit, it could set us up for failure on our home turf.

~~We instead will~~ stress to ~~the Russians~~ the critical importance of your meeting with Yeltsin: if you and Yeltsin successfully define the outline of a NATO-Russia deal, we could consider ideas such as a Quint summit; if not, we will lower our sights while reiterating that enlargement will proceed with or without a deal. You will want to underscore to Chernomyrdin on Friday the importance that you attach to the upcoming meeting with Yeltsin.

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Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1600				
Document ID: 9700773				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. talking points~~	~~re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Prime Minister~~ Chernomyrdin (5 pages)	~~02/07/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. talking points~~	~~re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Prime Minister~~ Chernomyrdin (10 pages)	~~02/07/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001c. memo~~	~~From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor~~ Chernomyrdin (3 pages)	~~02/06/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001d. talking points~~	~~re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Prime Minister~~ Chernomyrdin (3 pages)	~~02/06/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
001e. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	01/31/1997	P1/b(1)
001f. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	10/29/1996	P1/b(1)
001g. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	11/14/1996	P1/b(1)
001h. report	re: Biography (1 page)	07/03/1996	P1/b(1)
~~001i. memo~~	~~From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor~~ Chernomyrdin (3 pages)	~~02/07/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001j. talking points~~	~~re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian Prime Minister~~ Chernomyrdin (3 pages)	~~02/07/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001k. memo~~	~~From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor~~ Chernomyrdin [incomplete copy] (2 pages)	~~02/07/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700773

2015-0772-M
rs1350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700773
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 97 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 06 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
ECONOMICS
AP
NATO

PERSONS: CHERNOMYRDIN, VICTOR

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFO / TALKING POINTS FOR PRES MTG W/ PM CHERNOMYRDIN 7 FEB 97

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 08 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BELL
FORT
FRIED
NSC CHRON
PIFER
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97020612	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97020622	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97021013	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970206		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970206		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

rcvd 2/6/97
3:25pm

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
~~Berse~~ Brown	8		
Kerrick	copy ✓	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Steinberg	2		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 2.6	D Stern
Records Mgt →	4	TMA 2.7	N
	5		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Mtg w/ Russian PM Chernomyrdin

'97 FEB 6 PM 12:39

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 2-7-97 0773 Card 1 of 10

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN

- DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU IN WASHINGTON AGAIN. AL TELLS ME YOU ARE HAVING EXCELLENT MEETINGS.

- LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING BORIS IN MARCH. CRITICAL EVENT; HE AND I MUST DECIDE HOW TO REENERGIZE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP AND BUILD COMMON FUTURE.

- Have good ideas → START, Econ, (CFE?)
  NATO - Dec't -
- See Albright - Primakov - Yeltsin -
  (Clear-up misunderstandings)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Card 2 of 10

- CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO MARCH MEETING. PLEASE CONVEY THAT TO BORIS. HAVE FORTHCOMING IDEAS ON START, ECONOMICS. ALSO CRUCIAL WE DEFINE NATO-RUSSIA IN MARCH; IF WE DON'T CRACK THE PROBLEM THEN, VERY DIFFICULT TO ORCHESTRATE FOLLOWING MONTHS, WITH CONFIDENCE IN SUCCESS, IN WAY THAT WILL WORK FOR BORIS.

- GOOD RELATIONSHIP YOU AND AL HAVE DEVELOPED VERY VALUABLE IN KEEPING RELATIONS ON TRACK. INTERESTED IN YOUR REPORT, PARTICULARLY ON PREPARING ISSUES FOR MARCH MEETING.

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By FC NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0772-M (1.56)

~~SECRET~~ Card 3 of 10

- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT TO CONTINUE WORK WITH PRIMAKOV IN TWO WEEKS. PLEASED SHE WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE BORIS.

(CHERNOMYRDIN AND THE VICE PRESIDENT REVIEW RESULTS.)

ARMS CONTROL: START II/III; ABM/TMD DEMARCATION

- HOPE START II INTO FORCE THIS SPRING, MOVE ON TO START III. OUR START III GUIDELINES MEAN FURTHER REDUCTIONS, AIM TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT COSTS AND TIME-FRAME OF REDUCTIONS; WE CAST THIS WITH VIEW TO HELP WITH DUMA.

- will to NATO — will help.
- ABM/TMD — close to agreement

- NATO — Yeltsin, want Pact. Tie guilt Russ. Central role in new sec. system.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Card 4 of 10

- UNDERSTAND INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OVER NATO, BUT LINKING START TO NATO NOT IN OUR INTERESTS. URGE YOU TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY WITH BORIS; WE HAVE EXCEPTIONAL CHANCE TO REDUCE DANGERS, BURDENS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- ON ABM/TMD DEMARCATION, HAVE COME VERY FAR IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES; SHOULD NOT WASTE OPPORTUNITY TO FINISH WORK -- IDEALLY WOULD CONCLUDE AGREEMENT FOR MARCH MEETING.

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~ Card 5 of 10

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND NATO-RUSSIA

- KNOW YOU HAVE ADDRESSED NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND WILL LIKELY RETURN TO IT. WE'VE TABLED FORTHCOMING IDEAS.

- PREPARED TO WORK HARD WITH YOU, NOW AND IN FUTURE, TO REACH AGREEMENT ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP THAT PROVIDES RUSSIA CENTRAL ROLE IN NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

- WANT TO FORMALIZE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP; COULD SIGN CHARTER AT NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT LATE THIS SPRING -- BEFORE MADRID. ENVISAGE FAR-REACHING, INDEED UNPRECEDENTED, RELATIONSHIP.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Card 6 of 10

- ALLIANCE DESIRE TO HAVE STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND REACH SOLUTION THAT ALLOWS YOU TO SAY YOU HAVE PROTECTED RUSSIA'S MAIN INTERESTS.

- BUT MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY: NATO ENLARGEMENT DOES NOT DEPEND ON SUCCESS IN NATO-RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS; IT WILL PROCEED. MISTAKE TO FREEZE RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND THE WEST UNTIL NATO-RUSSIA DEAL COMPLETE, OR TO HOPE THAT THIS WILL FORESTALL ENLARGEMENT; THAT WAY LEADS TO SELF-ISOLATION.

→ want to be able to say you have protected Russ. main interests.

Yeltsin → Russ. prospective relations part of —

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

Card 7 of 10

- MY POLICY SEEKS FREE AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE, COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC, PROSPEROUS NATIONS; NEW NATO PART OF THAT EFFORT. RUSSIA SHOULD BE PART, AS WELL. PLEASE CONVEY THIS TO BORIS.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

- EXCELLENT YOU AND AL HAD THOROUGH REVIEW OF CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN RUSSIA, NEXT STEPS TO MOBILIZE INVESTMENT.

- BORIS ASKED ME TO WORK HARD ON THIS ISSUE WHEN WE SPOKE LAST JULY AND I HAVE; ENCOURAGED BUSINESSES TO LOOK AT RUSSIA, INCREASED OUR FINANCING FOR INVESTMENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Card 8 of 10

- READY TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO HELP, INCLUDING REFORM OF TAX, LEGAL SYSTEMS, PROMOTE RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC "CLUBS."

- BUT THESE EFFORTS SUPPOSE RUSSIA ALSO READY -- TO MAKE TOUGH DECISIONS, ENACT TAX AND COMMERCIAL LAWS, TO SEEK MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS.

- IN MARCH MEETING WITH BORIS, WOULD LIKE TO ANNOUNCE NEW INVESTMENT INITIATIVE; PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE $4 BILLION IN INVESTMENT FINANCE. BUT NEED RUSSIAN COMMITMENT ON REFORM TO BE CREDIBLE. HOPE YOU WILL GET BACK TO AL ON THIS.

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

(IF RAISED -- QUINT SUMMIT)

- HAVE TO BE FRANK; VERY DIFFICULT FOR US. BIG PROBLEMS WITH ALLIES EXCLUDED; COULD COMPLICATE SOLUTION ON NATO-RUSSIA.

- BUT HAVE NOT CLOSED DOOR. DECIDE AFTER BORIS AND I MEET. IF WE CAN AGREE ON PATH FORWARD, QUINT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

(IF RAISED -- LINKING ALL ISSUES TO NATO-RUSSIA)

- THIS LINKAGE NOT IN ANYONE'S INTERESTS.

- FEAR THIS COULD BE FORMULA FOR STALEMATE. COULD BLOCK FURTHER START CUTS, WHICH ARE IN BOTH SIDES' INTERESTS, AND DELAY EXPANSION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, WHICH IS KEY TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RUSSIA.

3

· Know they had good discussions on key U.S.-Russian issues, as well as what we must do to forge a strong relationship between NATO and Russia.

5

· I'm looking forward to meeting again with President Yeltsin. We have accomplished a lot together over the last four years; expect to build on that to further advance the security and prosperity of our two peoples.

###

National Security Council
The White House

3:25pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0773

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
~~Bonse~~ Brown	8		
Kerrick	copy ✓	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Steinberg	2		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 2.6	D Sten
Records Mgt	→ 4	TMA 2.7	N
	→ 5		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Mtg w/ Russian PM Chernomyrdin

'97 FEB 6 PM 12:39

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1 of 1)

~~SECRET~~ **THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN** 2-7-97 0773 Card 1 of 10

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN

- DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU IN WASHINGTON AGAIN. AL TELLS ME YOU ARE HAVING EXCELLENT MEETINGS.

- LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING BORIS IN MARCH. CRITICAL EVENT; HE AND I MUST DECIDE HOW TO REENERGIZE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP AND BUILD COMMON FUTURE.

- Have good ideas → State, Econ, (CFE?) WHTO - Cent -
- See Albright - Primakov - Zotov - (Chem-VP Nuclear Weapons)

~~SECRET~~

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(CHERNOMYRDIN AND THE VICE PRESIDENT REVIEW RESULTS.)

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- will to ~~NATO~~ — will help.
- ABM/TMDs - close to agreement

- NATO-Russ. want relat. but guilt Russ. central role in new sec. system.

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~~SECRET~~ Card 5 of 10

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND NATO-RUSSIA

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PHOTOCOPY WJC HAND ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT WAS SEEN
2-7-97
0773

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 6, 1997

97 FEB 5 PM 4:44

MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN
DATE: February 7, 1997
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:15-2:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

The meeting provides an opportunity for the Vice President and Chernomyrdin to review their talks. We suggest you reiterate the importance of the meeting you will have with Yeltsin and stress that we are ready to engage with forthcoming ideas, although there are some lines we can't cross.

II. BACKGROUND

Presidential Meeting. Chernomyrdin suggested to the Vice President that you meet with Yeltsin in Europe (Chernomyrdin feels it should not be in Moscow) in the second half of March (March 20-21 is open on your schedule). Chernomyrdin is bringing you a letter from Yeltsin. You should underscore the importance of the March meeting -- the *key* event on the calendar. We want that meeting to produce the contours of the solution on NATO-Russia and other issues and set the tone for all that follows (indeed, our agreement to consider a Quint summit is contingent on success in March). If we don't crack NATO-Russia in your meeting with Yeltsin, you will get cornered into a potential unsuccessful "Quint."

Priorities. The Russians have indicated that Yeltsin's core agenda for March parallels ours: arms control, NATO-Russia and economics. You should reiterate to Chernomyrdin that, as the Vice President told him, we have forthcoming ideas in each of these areas. The door to Russian integration in Europe and a reenergized bilateral relationship is open -- the decision to walk through, or not, is Russia's.

Arms Control. The Vice President will have described our proposed guidelines for START III (including a limit of 2000-2500 warheads), making clear we could finalize these with Russian commitment to pursue Duma approval this spring.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 02/01/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0077-M (1.58)

~~SECRET~~

You should urge Chernomyrdin not to lose this chance to address Russian concerns over START II reduction costs and timetable; you should also underscore our interest in breaking the stalemate in ABM/TMD demarcation talks.

European Security. The Vice President's February 1 letter to Chernomyrdin offered Russia a central role in European security structures in a cooperative relationship with NATO. The key elements: a NATO-Russia charter, a mechanism providing consultations and, where possible, joint decision-making and action, adaptation of the CFE Treaty to address Russian concerns about the military aspects of enlargement and NATO's position that it has no plan, intention or reason to deploy nuclear weapons in new members. The Russians have raised their anti-enlargement rhetoric, suggesting they will freeze relations without a deal on their terms, which cross our "red lines" (e.g. giving Russia a veto over NATO actions outside NATO and prohibiting NATO forces in the new member states). We can address many of their concerns (e.g. renegotiate CFE to limit forces). But Chernomyrdin should understand your resolve to proceed with enlargement on schedule; otherwise they will not get down to business.

Economic Reform. Until Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin put their political capital into enacting and implementing tax, energy and commercial laws, the Russian economy will remain stagnant and the government will continue to lurch from crisis to crisis. Chernomyrdin will have heard specific suggestions from the Vice President and Secretary Rubin on how to restructure and how we can help; you should stress the importance of reaching agreement for a package of investment measures, preferably by the March meeting.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	Russia
The President	Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
The Vice President	Ambassador Vorontsov
Erskine Bowles	Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov
Jim Steinberg	Chernomyrdin Aide Petelin
Strobe Talbott	Interpreter
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IV. PRESS PLAN

Pool spray at beginning of the meeting. The Vice President and Chernomyrdin will hold a press conference afterwards.

V. SEQUENCE

After underscoring the importance of your upcoming meeting with Yeltsin, we suggest you ask Chernomyrdin and the Vice President to comment on their work, especially in preparing on arms control, NATO-Russia and economics for March. You could then address each of these areas.

Attachments
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Points for Pool Spray
Tab C Bios

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN

- Delighted to see you in Washington again. Al tells me you are having excellent meetings.

- Look forward to meeting Boris in March. Critical event; he and I must decide how to reenergize U.S.-Russian relationship and build common future.

- Cannot overemphasize importance I attach to March meeting. Please convey that to Boris. Have forthcoming ideas on START, economics. Also crucial we define NATO-Russia in March; if we don't crack the problem then, very difficult to orchestrate following months, with confidence in success, in way that will work for Boris.

- Good relationship you and Al have developed very valuable in keeping relations on track. Interested in your report, particularly on preparing issues for March meeting.

- Secretary Albright to continue work with Primakov in two weeks. Pleased she will have opportunity to see Boris.

(Chernomyrdin and the Vice President review results.)

Arms Control: START II/III; ABM/TMD Demarcation

- Hope START II into force this spring, move on to START III. Our START III guidelines mean further reductions, aim to meet your concerns about costs and time-frame of reductions; we cast this with view to help with Duma.

- Understand internal political difficulties over NATO, but linking START to NATO not in our interests. Urge you to discuss seriously with Boris; we have exceptional chance to reduce dangers, burdens of nuclear weapons.

- On ABM/TMD demarcation, have come very far in narrowing differences; should not waste opportunity to finish work -- ideally would conclude agreement for March meeting.

European Security and NATO-Russia

- Know you have addressed NATO-Russia relationship and will likely return to it. We've tabled forthcoming ideas.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.5q)

- Prepared to work hard with you, now and in future, to reach agreement on NATO-Russia relationship that provides Russia central role in new European security system.

- Want to formalize NATO-Russia relationship; could sign charter at NATO-Russia summit late this spring -- before Madrid. Envisage far-reaching, indeed unprecedented, relationship.

- Alliance desire to have strong relationship with Russia and reach solution that allows you to say you have protected Russia's main interests.

- But must tell you frankly: NATO enlargement does not depend on success in NATO-Russia negotiations; it will proceed. Mistake to freeze Russia's relations with U.S. and the West until NATO-Russia deal complete, or to hope that this will forestall enlargement; that way leads to self-isolation.

- My policy seeks free and undivided Europe, community of democratic, prosperous nations; new NATO part of that effort. Russia should be part as well. Please convey this to Boris.

Economic Issues

- Excellent you and Al had thorough review of current economic situation in Russia, next steps to mobilize investment.

- Boris asked me to work hard on this issue when we spoke last July and I have; encouraged businesses to look at Russia, increased our financing for investment.

- Ready to redouble efforts to help, including reform of tax, legal systems, promote Russian membership in international economic "clubs."

- But these efforts suppose Russia also ready -- to make tough decisions, enact tax and commercial laws, to seek membership in international economic organizations.

- In March meeting with Boris, would like to announce new investment initiative; prepared to make available $4 billion in investment finance. But need Russian commitment on reform to be credible. Hope you will get back to Al on this.

(If raised -- Quint summit)

- Have to be frank; very difficult for us. Big problems with Allies excluded; could complicate solution on NATO-Russia.

- But have not closed door. Decide after Boris and I meet. If we can agree on path forward, Quint might be possible.

(If raised -- linking all issues to NATO-Russia)

- This linkage not in anyone's interests.

- Fear this could be formula for stalemate. Could block further START cuts, which are in both sides' interests, and delay expansion of trade and investment, which is key to economic growth in Russia.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-7-97

REVISED

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
TALKING POINTS FOR POOL SPRAY WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN
THE WHITE HOUSE
FEBRUARY 7, 1997

- Pleased to see Prime Minister Chernomyrdin again. Want to thank him, Vice President Gore and their commission for the good work they have been doing. They have made some important progress here.

- Know they had good discussions on key U.S.-Russian issues, as well as what we must do to forge a strong relationship between NATO and Russia.

- Vice President and Prime Minister helping to prepare for my upcoming meeting with President Yeltsin, which will take place in Helsinki on March 20-21. I want to thank President Ahtisaari [AH-tee-sahr-ee] of Finland for inviting us to meet there.

- I'm looking forward to meeting again with President Yeltsin. We have accomplished a lot together over the last four years; expect to build on that to further advance the security and prosperity of our two peoples.

###

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FEBRUARY 7, 1997

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- Our nations are working together on a broad agenda of common interests, including investment, the environment, cooperation in space and arms control.

- Know they had good discussions on key U.S.-Russian issues, as well as what we must do to forge a strong relationship between NATO and Russia.

- Vice President and Prime Minister helping to prepare for my upcoming meeting with President Yeltsin. As I told the Prime Minister, I'm looking forward to meeting with President Yeltsin. Together, we have a chance to make real strides on the issues before us.

###

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	01/31/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700773

2015-0772-M
rs1350

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	10/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1600

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9700773

2015-0772-M
rs1350

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. report	re: Biography (2 pages)	11/14/1996	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700773

2015-0772-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001h. report	re: Biography (1 page)	07/03/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700773

2015-0772-M
rs1350

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 6, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: KI FORT KF

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President for Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin

The memorandum at Tab I provides a briefing memo and points to be made for the President's meeting with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on February 7 at 1:15 p.m.

Concurrence by: Robert Bell, Alexander Vershbow, Daniel Fried, Leon Fuerth } KF for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Points for Pool Spray
Tab C Bios

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN
DATE: February 7, 1997
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:15-2:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

The meeting provides an opportunity for the Vice President and Chernomyrdin to review their talks. We suggest you reiterate the importance of ~~your~~ meeting with Yeltsin and stress that we are ready to engage with forthcoming ideas, although there are some lines we can't cross.

II. BACKGROUND

Presidential Meeting. Chernomyrdin suggested to the Vice President that you meet with Yeltsin in Europe (Chernomyrdin feels it should not be in Moscow) in the second half of March (March 20-21 is open on your schedule). Chernomyrdin is bringing you a letter from Yeltsin. You should underscore the importance of the March meeting -- the *key* event on the calendar. We want that meeting to produce the contours of the solution on NATO-Russia and other issues and set the tone for all that follows (indeed, our agreement to consider a Quint summit is contingent on success in March).

Priorities. The Russians have indicated that Yeltsin's core agenda for March parallels ours: arms control, NATO-Russia and economics. You should reiterate to Chernomyrdin that, as the Vice President told him, we have forthcoming ideas in each of these areas. The door to Russian integration in Europe and a reenergized bilateral relationship is open -- the decision to walk through, or not, is Russia's.

Arms Control. The Vice President will have described our proposed guidelines for START III (including a limit of 2000-2500 warheads), making clear we could finalize these with Russian commitment to pursue Duma approval this spring. You should urge Chernomyrdin not to lose this chance to address Russian concerns over START II reduction costs and timetable; you should also underscore our interest in breaking the stalemate in ABM/TMD demarcation talks.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2009
2015-0772-M (1.64)

European Security. The Vice President's February 1 letter to Chernomyrdin offered Russia a central role in European security structures in a cooperative relationship with NATO. The key elements: a NATO-Russia charter, a mechanism providing consultations and, where possible, joint decision-making and action, adaptation of the CFE Treaty to address Russian concerns about the military aspects of enlargement and NATO's position that it has no plan, intention or reason to deploy nuclear weapons in new members. The Russians have raised their anti-enlargement rhetoric, suggesting they will freeze relations without a deal on their terms, which cross ~~mast~~ of our "red lines." Chernomyrdin should understand your resolve to proceed with enlargement on schedule.

Economic Reform. Until Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin put their political capital into enacting and implementing tax, energy and commercial laws, the Russian economy will remain stagnant and the government will continue to lurch from crisis to crisis. Chernomyrdin will have heard specific suggestions from the Vice President and Secretary Rubin on how to restructure and how we can help; you should stress the importance of reaching agreement for a package of investment measures, preferably by the March meeting.

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IV. PRESS PLAN

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After underscoring the importance of your upcoming meeting with Yeltsin, we suggest you ask Chernomyrdin and the Vice President to comment on their work, especially in preparing on arms control, NATO-Russia and economics for March. You could then address each of these areas.

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Tab B Points for Pool Spray

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- Good relationship you and Al have developed very valuable in keeping relations on track. Interested in your report, particularly on preparing issues for March meeting.

- Secretary Albright to continue work with Primakov in two weeks. Pleased she will have opportunity to see Boris.

(Chernomyrdin and the Vice President review results.)

Arms Control: START II/III; ABM/TMD Demarcation

- ~~Want~~ Use START II into force this spring, move on to START III. Our START III guidelines mean further reductions, aim to meet your concerns about costs and time-frame of reductions; we cast this with view to help with Duma.

- START II ratification and commitment to begin START III in both our best interests. But could be especially useful for you as Russia works at economic, military restructuring.

- Understand internal political difficulties over NATO, but linking START to NATO not in our interests. Urge you to discuss seriously with Boris; we have exceptional chance to reduce dangers, burdens of nuclear weapons.

- On ABM/TMD demarcation, have come very far in narrowing differences; should not waste opportunity to finish work -- ideally would conclude agreement for March meeting.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.65)

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- Want to formalize NATO-Russia relationship; could sign charter at NATO-Russia summit late this spring -- even before Madrid. Envisage far-reaching, indeed unprecedented, relationship.

- NATO pledge that it has no plan, no intention and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons in new members; willingness to formalize consultative mechanism; readiness to adapt CFE Treaty in way that constrains destabilizing concentrations of forces -- all evidence of Alliance desire to have strong relationship with Russia and reach solution that allows you to say you have protected Russia's main interests.

- But must tell you frankly: NATO enlargement does not depend on success in NATO-Russia negotiations; it will proceed. Mistake to freeze Russia's relations with the West until NATO-Russia deal complete, or to hope that this will forestall enlargement; that way leads to self-isolation.

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- Boris asked me to work hard on this issue when we spoke last July and I have; encouraged businesses to look at Russia, increased our financing for investment.

- But reaction from investors uniform: won't risk Russian market until investment climate improves.

- Ready to redouble efforts to help, including reform of tax, legal systems, promote Russian membership in international economic "clubs."

- But these efforts suppose Russia also ready -- to make tough decisions, enact tax and commercial laws, to seek membership in international economic organizations.

- In March meeting with Boris, would like to announce new investment initiative; prepared to make available $4 billion in investment finance. But need Russian commitment on reform to be credible. Hope you will get back to Al on this.

~~(Time permitting -- Russian relations with neighbors)~~

- Want to see Russia develop strong, positive relations with neighbors. See that in all parties' interests.

- In this vein, hope you will look at issue of Russian-Estonian border treaty. We pushed Estonia hard to drop reference to Tartu Treaty, which we knew was big problem for you. They have; may now be opportunity to conclude treaty to put relations with ~~Estonia and Latvia~~ on constructive track.

(If raised -- Quint summit)

- Have to be frank; very difficult for us. Big problems with Allies excluded; could complicate solution on NATO-Russia.

- But have not closed door. Decide ~~only~~ after Boris and I meet. If we can agree on path forward, Quint might be possible.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VI NARA, Date 9/10/2019
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Tab B Points for Pool Spray

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Document ID: 9700910				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Foreign Policy Team on Russia (4 pages)	02/11/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Foreign Policy Team on Russia [incomplete copy] (3 pages)	02/11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1601

FOLDER TITLE:
9700910

2015-0772-M
rs1351

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RECORD ID: 9700910
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 97 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG W/ FORN POLICY TEAM ON RUSSIA FOR 12 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 14 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PIFER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9700910

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97021114	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97021121	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97022018	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 0910

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	I
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	2/13	N
Records Mgt.	3		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: SRB, JS, PEB, JAH, JRD, DLK, SKP, ARV, RGB, DF, DKT, FUERTH ✓

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

0910

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # ~~2011~~ 3

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Kerrick	copy ✓		
Steinberg	2	A	
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	2/11	D STEB
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Foreign Policy Team Mtg 2/12

'97 FEB 11 PM 1:21

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 2-12-97 0910

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'97 FEB 11 PM8:40

February 11, 1997

MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY TEAM ON RUSSIA

DATE: February 12, 1997
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 3:30-4:30 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss preparations for your March summit with Yeltsin.

II. BACKGROUND

Overview. In the aftermath of the Vice President's talks with Chernomyrdin and the announcement of your March summit with Yeltsin, it is the right time to take stock on key U.S.- and NATO-Russia issues. This may be your last chance to talk to Madeleine before she departs on Saturday: her February 20 talks in Moscow will be critical to preparing a successful summit in Helsinki. The Foreign Policy Team does not now need new guidance on START or European security issues, and we have substantial agreement with the Russians on an economics package focused on investment. However, you may wish to task work on Russian graduation from Jackson-Vanik and an assessment of options to integrate Russia into a full G-8.

I plan the following scenario for the meeting:

(1) I will set the context with a brief overview of where we are on the three main baskets for your March summit with Yeltsin -- START, economics, European security -- and review the calendar through July and where we are with the French and Germans.

(2) The Vice President can share observations from his discussions with Chernomyrdin on these issues.

(3) Madeleine can preview her February 20 talks.

(4) We return to the three baskets and address each.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/10/07

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.67)

At the appropriate moment (e.g., when we discuss the three baskets) you should underscore the importance you attach to preparations for the summit. We want a success and define it in large measure as reaching a general understanding on the elements of a NATO-Russia accord that will allow Yeltsin to acquiesce in enlargement without holding back on issues of interest to us, such as START.

Because there are "red lines" we cannot cross in granting Russia veto power over NATO decisions, it will be important to have forward-leaning ideas in Helsinki that make clear to Yeltsin our interest in moving on U.S.-Russian issues and in defining a European security system that offers Russia an important place. In this regard, you might praise General Ralston (Shali and Cohen will be testifying on the Hill) for the fast work the Chiefs did on the 2,000-2,500 warhead figure for START III; that is the kind of agile work that we will need in coming weeks.

START. The Vice President outlined our START III guidelines to Chernomyrdin. While he did not react, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov later said that our ideas were serious; the Russians will respond to Madeleine in Moscow, but the Duma would not ratify START II before July. The action for Madeleine next week is to get a considered Russian reaction and probe whether the Russians envisage any scenario allowing for Duma ratification this spring.

Questions to consider in the longer term: whether we should go forward with START III guidelines absent a Russian commitment to push early Duma ratification of START II and what steps we might take beyond the guidelines to advance START II. You have asked about commencing START III negotiations; there are some good reasons not to take that step, but you should air the issue.

Economics. The Vice President and Chernomyrdin agreed on a three-part economics agenda for Helsinki: Russian policy and legal steps to stimulate investment; U.S. investment financing; and U.S. support to accelerate Russian membership in international economic fora. Madeleine will give the Russians a draft joint statement on economic issues that you and Yeltsin might release in Helsinki. This is our best vehicle to secure Yeltsin's commitment to reforms that Russia needs to take to grow out of its current economic malaise.

Two **questions** to consider: first, should you be in position in Helsinki to tell Yeltsin we will push **Russian graduation from Jackson-Vanik** by the end of 1997? (This will require

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

work with the Hill and Jewish community.) Second, you should ask Dan Tarullo and Treasury to pursue the idea explored by the Vice President with Chernomyrdin of bringing Russia into a G-8 by removing financial and macroeconomic issues from the leaders' meetings (i.e., finance ministers continue to meet at seven) as something we might offer closer to Denver.

European Security. The Russians will continue a multitrack approach: anti-enlargement rhetoric, probing for Allied differences and tough negotiating. Our framework remains: formalizing the NATO-Russia relationship (e.g., a charter); a strong consultative mechanism; adapting the CFE Treaty; and other changes to show this is a new NATO. Madeleine will review this in Moscow -- "blitzing" Primakov with detail -- while maintaining our "red lines," e.g., no delay, no veto.

The Russians are focusing now on NATO conventional forces and new infrastructure on the territory of new members. They seek bans, which we cannot accept, we can accept tight (though reciprocal) CFE limits that indirectly constrain stationed equipment on the territory of new members. We cannot fully satisfy the Russians on NATO infrastructure, which will be needed to support reinforcement in times of crisis. A second issue is how to deal with the Russian desire for a say over NATO out-of-area operations; given that most such operations will be under a UNSC or OSCE mandate -- in which the Russians would have a say -- there may be a way partially to address this, but there can be no direct veto over NATO decisions.

Getting European security issues right remains a tough challenge. There are tensions, e.g., between our desire to settle NATO-Russia early (even by Helsinki) and a Russian effort to draw out the negotiations and extract maximum concessions while fighting hard to delay or derail enlargement. Kohl and Chirac have been firmed up on going forward in July, but will get soft if there is no Russian deal and will press you to join them in a "Quint" summit that only makes conceivable sense if we are assured it will succeed. In light of Madeleine's talks in Moscow, we want to develop a **scenario to bring Yeltsin to "yes" on NATO-Russia by Helsinki.** That will require your engagement in the summit run-up, by phone and correspondence.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
Bill Richardson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations (if confirmed)
Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff to the President
Sandy Berger, Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dan Tarullo, Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense
George Tenet, Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jim Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Staff Director
Jim Collins, Ambassador for the New Independent States
John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Steve Pifer, Senior Director for Russian Affairs, NSC
Sandy Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC
Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy, NSC
Carlos Pascual, Director for Russian Affairs, NSC

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.


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0910
~~20118~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 11, 1997



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: February 12 Foreign Policy Team Meeting on U.S./NATO-Russia

The memorandum to the President at Tab I sets the scene for the February 12 Foreign Policy Team meeting on U.S.- and NATO-Russia relations. While Dan Tarullo has cleared this memorandum, he feels very strongly that creating a G-8 will require stripping all macroeconomic and financial issues from G-8 summits, potentially setting the leaders up for criticism for not addressing these issues.

We are separately sending you a suggested script for your use in the meeting.

Concurrence by: SP for Sandy Vershbow, Bob Bell, Dan Fried, Dan Tarullo, Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-5772-M

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/10/07

~~SECRET~~

(preparations for

At the appropriate moment (e.g., when we discuss the three baskets) you should underscore the importance you attach to the summit. ~~It is the key event on the calendar.~~ We want a success and define it in large measure as reaching a general understanding on the elements of a NATO-Russia accord that will allow Yeltsin to acquiesce in enlargement without holding back on issues of interest to us, such as START.

Because there are "red lines" we cannot cross in granting Russia veto power over NATO decisions will be.

It ~~thus~~ will be important to have forward-leaning ideas in Helsinki that make clear to Yeltsin our interest in moving on U.S.-Russian issues and in defining a European security system that offers Russia an important place. In this regard, you might praise General Ralston (Shali and Cohen testifying on the Hill) for the fast work the Chiefs did on the 2,000-2,500 warhead figure for START III; that is the kind of agile work that we will need in coming weeks.

START. The Vice President outlined our START III guidelines to Chernomyrdin. While he did not react, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov later said that our ideas were serious; the Russians will respond to Madeleine in Moscow, but the Duma would not ratify START II before July. The action for Madeleine next week is to get a considered Russian reaction and probe whether the Russians envisage any scenario allowing for Duma ratification this spring.

Questions to consider in the longer term: whether we could go forward with START III guidelines absent a Russian commitment to push early Duma ratification of START II and what steps we might take beyond the guidelines to advance START II, ~~including~~ commencing START III negotiations; (You have asked about

sh ✓

there are some good reasons not to take that step, but you should air the issue.

Economics. The Vice President and Chernomyrdin agreed on a three-part economics agenda for Helsinki: Russian policy and legal steps to stimulate investment; U.S. investment financing; and U.S. support to accelerate Russian membership in international economic fora. Madeleine will give the Russians a draft joint statement on economic issues that you and Yeltsin might release in Helsinki. This is our best vehicle to secure Yeltsin's commitment to reforms that Russia needs to take to grow out of its current economic malaise.

Two **questions** to consider: first, should you be in position in Helsinki to tell Yeltsin we will push **Russian graduation from Jackson-Vanik** by the end of 1997? (This will require work with the Hill and Jewish community.) Second, you should ask Dan Tarullo and Treasury to pursue the idea explored by the Vice President with Chernomyrdin of bringing Russia into a G-8 by removing financial and macroeconomic

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/16/2019
2015-0772-M (1.69)

issues from the leaders' meetings (i.e., finance ministers continue to meet at seven) as something we might offer closer to Denver.

European Security. The Russians will continue a multitrack approach: anti-enlargement rhetoric, probing for Allied differences and tough negotiating. Our framework remains: formalizing the NATO-Russia relationship (e.g., a charter); a strong consultative mechanism; adapting the CFE Treaty; and other changes to show this is a new NATO. Madeleine will review this in Moscow -- "blitzing" Primakov with detail -- while maintaining our "red lines," e.g., no delay, no veto

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which we cannot accept;

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Chancellor Kohl and Chirac have been firmed up on going forward in July, but they will get soft if there is no Russia deal and will press you to join them in a "Quint" summit that only makes conceivable sense if we are assured it will succeed

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Dan Tarullo, Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State

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John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense
George Tenet, Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jim Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Staff Director
Jim Collins, Ambassador for the New Independent States
John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Steve Pifer, Senior Director for Russian Affairs, NSC
Sandy Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC
Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy, NSC
Carlos Pascual, Director for Russian Affairs, NSC

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

~~SECRET~~

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1603				
Document ID: 9701172				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Update on Preparations for Helsinki (2~~ pages)	~~02/26/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR
~~001b. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Update on Preparations for Helsinki~~ [incomplete copy] (1 page)	~~02/26/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1603

FOLDER TITLE:
9701172

2015-0772-M
rs1352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701172
RECEIVED: 24 FEB 97 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 26 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
START
EU
NATO
ECONOMICS

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON PREPARATIONS FOR HELSINKI

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 27 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		TARULLO
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97022522	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97022708	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97030318	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970226		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970226		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 2/25/97 4:15pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1172

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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~~Dohse~~ Brown	1	MB 2/25	
Kerrick	2	(C) 2/25	
Steinberg	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger	4		as edited
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	TMA 2·26	~~D~~ Stern
Records Mgt.	6	TMA 2·27	N
	7	TMA 3·3	N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 FEB 25 PM 1:38

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

Log # 1172

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Sorry - Rich is a good friend.
My only question concerns the G- & part-
ners Tonello & Rubin really on board with
this approach?

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING ~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

97 FEB 28 AM 8:45

February 26, 1997

INFORMATION

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2/27/97

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Update on Preparations for Helsinki

Russians Getting Down to Work. As you saw in Madeleine's night note, her talks with Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin and Primakov went well. The Russians made clear the importance that they attach to the U.S.-Russia relationship and to the Helsinki summit.

Euro-security. The Russians said they will continue to oppose NATO enlargement but also indicated a readiness to work on a NATO-Russia relationship. Yeltsin told Madeleine: "We consider enlargement ... a big mistake. ... But I understand your position and that you cannot now pull back and reverse it. We need to come to agreement on NATO."

Primakov's discussion with Madeleine was a serious and non-polemical exchange on the issues in a NATO-Russia charter. He approached his February 23 meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana in a similar vein, falling off of some earlier absolute Russian positions and telling Solana that Moscow wants as much progress as possible on NATO-Russia prior to Helsinki.

Tough issues remain with the Russians, e.g., how to handle the issue of military "infrastructure" on the territory of new NATO members. Even with the best of intentions, these may frustrate early agreement. The Russians will continue to look for opportunities to slow or block enlargement, but by engaging seriously on NATO-Russia, Moscow appears to have crossed a threshold.

We have begun preparing a draft NATO-Russia charter, which we intend to put into play when Strobe takes a team back to Moscow late next week. The Allies want progress, and many would prefer a U.S. lead over ideas such as the proposed "Quint," which is unpopular with many Allies and Central Europeans. But some -- especially the French -- may object to a draft charter that shows too obvious a U.S.-Russian imprimatur. Solana has agreed to provide political cover by taking our text as his own and working it in parallel with the Russians.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 2/24/07

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.71)

START and ABM/TMD. On START III guidelines, the Russians accept the 2,000-2,500 ceiling and other elements of our proposal; but they continue to insist on a five-year extension of the START II reductions period. Still, we may be getting into the same ball park. We plan for Lynn Davis and Bob Bell to take a team to Moscow early next week to try to hammer out agreed guidelines.

The Russians want a "joint instruction" from you and Yeltsin at Helsinki and a START III framework agreement at Denver. We want to be more ambitious and intend to push hard to conclude the START III guidelines for release in Helsinki.

ABM/TMD demarcation remains a tough nut to crack. The Russians continue to insist on a technical solution (e.g., limits on TMD interceptor velocity) that would be difficult for the Chiefs and put us in trouble on the Hill. We may need you to press Yeltsin for a political solution to extract us from the current impasse.

Economics. Madeleine gave Chernomyrdin and Primakov a draft joint statement encapsulating three elements: Russian commitment to policy and legal steps to create a more attractive investment climate; U.S. commitment to make available financing to support investment in Russia; and U.S. support for accelerated Russian membership in international economic fora. The initial Russian reaction was positive; Larry Summers will be in Moscow in two weeks and, we hope, will finalize the text for Helsinki.

Other Issues. We have talked to the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and will shortly touch base on the Hill regarding Russian graduation from Jackson-Vanik. While the NCSJ has reservations, we hope to work this so that you can tell Yeltsin in Helsinki that we intend to secure graduation by the end of the year. Dan Tarullo and Bob Rubin are looking at ways to make Denver approximate a "full" Eight -- e.g., Yeltsin arrives at the beginning, stays to the end and joins the others at a single press conference that releases one communiqué -- while preserving a mechanism at seven to address financial/macroeconomic issues.

In Sum. The atmospherics in Moscow last week were good, and there is the possibility of some agreements for Helsinki. But much uncertainty remains about the degree of their flexibility. We may know more after your phone call to Yeltsin later this week.

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 1172

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 25, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President: Update on Helsinki Preparations

The memorandum to the President at Tab I updates him on the preparations for his summit meeting with Yeltsin in Helsinki.

Concurrence by: (SP for Bob Bell, Sandy Vershbow, Dan Fried, Dan Tarullo)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
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In Sum. The atmospherics in Moscow last week were good, and ~~we can see the way to some key agreements for Helsinki. But much intensive work will be needed in the run-up. We may have to ask you to do some of it in~~ a phone call to Yeltsin later this week.

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We may know more after your

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By VL NARA, Date 5/16/2019
2015-0772-M (1.73)

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1603				
Document ID: 9701245				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Ki Fort to Samuel Berger re: Your Informal Meeting on NATO-Russia~~ Charter... (3 pages)	~~02/27/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √Z

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1603

FOLDER TITLE:
9701245

2015-0772-M
rs1353

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701245
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 97 09

TO: BERGER

FROM: FORT
PIFER

DOC DATE: 27 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
UN
RUSSIA
ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFO FOR BERGER MTG ON NATO - RUSSIA CHARTER 28 FEB 97

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 01 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FORT
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		VERSHBOW
		WITKOWSKY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97022809	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97030318	NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 2/27 3:45pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1245

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1	TMA	
Dohse			
Kerrick	Copy		
Steinberg	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 2.28	N
Records Mgt	4	TMA 3.3	N
	5		

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 FEB 27 PM 3:40

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~SECRET~~

1245

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 27, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

NOTED

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: KI FORT KF

SUBJECT: Your Informal Meeting on NATO-Russia Charter, February 28, 2:30-4:00 p.m.

Purpose. This informal meeting is to discuss and approve the text of the draft NATO-Russia Charter. The text has been worked in a small IWG including NSC staff, State, OSD and JCS.

The Plan. You will recall that our plan is to provide the draft to NATO Secretary General Solana so that Strobe and Solana can work separately next week with the Russians on the text. Strobe will be in Moscow March 6 and will pass the results of his work to Solana, who will continue the discussion on March 9. Solana can then introduce the draft Charter at NATO as a product of NATO-Russia -- rather than U.S.-Russia -- deliberations.

Strobe will travel to Moscow via Paris (where he will meet separately with the French and Germans) and Brussels (where he will see Solana). You might ask Madeleine and/or Strobe to comment on what steps will be necessary to control the drafting process, but also keep the Allies -- especially the French -- on board.

Contents. You should note that the Charter text draws from last fall's USG Charter elements paper, the work of the responsible NATO committee, and the Russian non-papers given to Solana by Primakov last Sunday. NATO in turn has worked out more detailed elements -- which dovetail nicely with the Russian papers -- and which we have largely incorporated into our text.

You might note that our **draft reflects a good-faith effort to address the concerns of all parties -- the U.S., Allies and Russia -- without compromising Alliance integrity or fundamental U.S. national interests.** Our intent is to produce a document that the Allies can accept and that the Russians will sign.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 02/26/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.75)

Elements of the Charter. You should then briefly walk through the sections of the Charter.

- ***The Preamble*** gives the context -- the historic change in the European security situation -- that allows NATO and Russia to forge a new relationship. In the Preamble, as throughout the document, we have tried to strike a balance between statements related to NATO's transformation and "parallel" statements reflecting Russia's change. The Preamble notes that the Charter embodies a **political commitment at the highest level** to create the NATO-Russia partnership.

- ***Section II lists the Principles*** to which the Alliance and Russia commit in pursuing their shared goal of a stable, undivided Europe. These Principles are consistent with previous commitments, such as the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter.

  Both Preamble and Principles sections draw heavily from the Russian and NATO texts, in a conscious effort to be as forthcoming as possible with respect to language.

- ***Section III identifies a NATO-Russia Joint Council as the basic mechanism for consultation and decision-making*** and explains how the Joint Council will be set up and function and what activities fall under its purview. It makes clear that there can be joint decisions, but no veto by either Russia or NATO of the other's decisions.

- ***Section IV then elaborates on the specific areas of "mutual interest"*** for consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. This is a broad menu, but we are not prejudging which items may become subject to joint action/joint decision-making; rather, it will be strictly case-by-case.

- ***Section V describes the military dimensions of the NATO-Russia partnership,*** including references to CFE adaptation and nuclear issues, concrete ideas for expanded military-to-military cooperation, and the notion of a NATO-Russia military unit. **We are not addressing specific CFE proposals (which would be inappropriate in a document not including the other 13 CFE states-parties from CEE and the FSU) nor infrastructure.** On infrastructure constraints we will say "no," and urge the Russians to focus on transparency measures instead.

Discussion. You may wish first to ask Strobe to describe in more detail the various elements of the Charter, pointing out which represent Russian *desiderata*. You should then open the general

discussion -- **it is worth recalling the President's guidance that we be creative and forthcoming in fleshing out the details of the Charter.** Although Principals' senior staffs will have worked through the entire draft, we expect that there will still be some **points of contention,** among them:

- JSC and OSD do not favor a Russian co-chair for the Joint Council (i.e., "consultative mechanism"), preferring only the NATO Secretary General;

- JSC and OSD do not want to refer to a "Secretariat" or identify any specific administrative structure to support the Joint Council;

- JSC, and possibly OSD, does not want to raise the idea of a "joint military unit," preferring to speak only of a concept.

Conclusion. In summing up, **you should confirm that all Principals are comfortable with the draft text of the Charter (as amended per the discussion) and understand that Strobe will present the draft, as amended, to the Russians** in Moscow next week. We expect that this draft will be the document from which we will continue to work, with the Russians and with Allies, until Helsinki.

Concurrences by: Alexander Vershbow kfr Daniel Fried, wjc Anne Witkowsky kfr

Attachment
Tab A Draft of NATO-Russia Charter

CHARTER OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Section I. -- Preamble -- Building a New Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation commit themselves to seize the unprecedented opportunity before them to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic Community based on the principles of democracy, integration and cooperative security. NATO and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to NATO and Russia, intend to develop, on the basis of equality and transparency, a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

Their shared goal is to overcome the vestiges of earlier confrontation and to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation in order to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. This Charter sets forth the goals of consultations, cooperation, and joint action that will constitute the core of this partnership. By concluding this document, we pledge to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples.

By making this binding commitment at the highest political level, we mark the beginning of a new, fundamentally different relationship between NATO, its members and Russia. In doing so, we acknowledge the extent of the changes that have swept Europe since the end of the Cold War.

NATO has undertaken a historic transformation -- a process that will continue. In 1990, the Alliance declared that it no longer considered the Soviet Union an adversary; a year later, it revised the strategic doctrine governing its actions to reflect this basic shift in orientation. NATO no longer sees an external threat and is instead adapting to assume new roles and missions -- such as the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia -- to address new security challenges. NATO accordingly has radically reduced and continues to restructure its conventional and nuclear forces to reflect this. NATO has strengthened its political functions and focused on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the UN and the OSCE in close association with other countries and international organizations. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with all interested European countries through the Partnership for Peace and the Altantic Partnership Council. Its members will continue to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security challenges and the goal of cooperation among all European states in meeting those challenges.

Five years after its emergence as an independent and democratic state, Russia continues its own dramatic political and economic transformation. Russia no longer regards NATO as an adversary and no longer sees an external threat. Russia accordingly has revised its military doctrine and is reducing and restructuring its conventional and nuclear forces. Russia is adapting to new roles and missions, such as the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

These changes in NATO, in Russia and in the European security environment make possible a fundamentally different relationship between the NATO and Russia -- one of strategic partnership. NATO and Russia are committed to building an increasingly closer and more cooperative relationship. We agree that the development of this strategic partnership is a reciprocal and open-ended process, without predefined limits, which can make a significant and lasting contribution to the development of a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.

Section II. Commitment to Shared Principles

We affirm in this Charter our shared commitment to pursue and defend together the further development of a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. We are convinced of the importance of giving practical meaning to the concept of the indivisibility of security among all the states in the Euro-Atlantic Community. NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security, inside or outside existing alliances. To help achieve this goal, we shall act together in strengthening and modernizing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has an essential role to play in European peace and security. In strengthening the OSCE, we will through our actions together prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE's model for the pursuit of cooperative security in the 21st century, NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation and coordination among all member-states of the OSCE. Our objective is the creation in Europe of a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any nation, achieved through a transparent process that itself strengthens mutual confidence and openness. The challenges we face on the threshold of a new century require us to find cooperative solutions to common problems.

NATO and Russia recognize that our shared task of strengthening security for the benefit of all countries requires addressing challenges beyond those of earlier eras. This Charter signals a new era in Europe, an era without divisions or the confrontations of past years. But it also is concluded in an era in which we face new threats. Aggressive nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, persistent abuse of human rights and unresolved territorial disputes all pose a threat to our common peace, prosperity and stability.

Our common effort to meet these and other challenges to peace and security, to which we commit ourselves through this Charter, will be built upon the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all parties to this agreement and for all the nations of the Euro-Atlantic Community. Our agreement today shall not contradict in any way the central role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security; nor does it contradict the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its region and a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

We reaffirm our commitment to act to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent OSCE documents, and other basic documents adopted by mutual consent. Building upon the concepts embodied in these documents, NATO and Russia agree that their relationship will also be guided by a shared commitment to the following principles:

- development, on the basis of equality, of relations that are aimed at strengthening mutual trust and openness;

- acknowledgment of the vital role democracy, political pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;

- respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, including the inviolability of borders;

- the right of all states in Europe freely to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve;

- fulfillment in good faith of obligations agreed under international law, treaties and international agreements;

- prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;
- indivisibility of security affecting every state in the OSCE area;
- refraining from the threat or use of force for the purposes of aggression, intimidation, change of existing borders;
- transparency in creating and implementing defense policy and military doctrine.

Section III. Mechanism for Consultation and Decision-Making: (The NATO-Russia Joint Council)

To foster further development of their relationship and to provide the means to address Europe's future security challenges together, NATO and Russia agree to create the NATO-Russia Joint Council, hereinafter referred to as the Joint Council. The central objective of this Joint Council will be to build the spirit and substance of cooperation and common action between the parties. Our goal will be to build levels of trust and unity of purpose and habits of consensus and cooperation between NATO and Russia. When disagreements do arise, we will approach them in the spirit of pragmatism and tolerance which befits the partnership we are seeking to build, and settle them by peaceful means within the framework of political consultations which the parties intend to develop at all levels.

The Joint Council will provide a mechanism for NATO and Russia to consult, coordinate and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, act jointly to address security issues of common/shared concern. NATO and Russia agree that they will pursue these principal goals:

- to encourage mutual confidence-building and long-term cooperation between NATO and Russia;
- to reduce and resolve any differences that might arise between them;
- to develop as broad and regular a pattern of cooperation as possible;
- to seek to coordinate decision-making and promote joint action, to the extent possible, on decisions that affect the legitimate interests of either party.

Our shared objective is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. We expect that over time, as we further build the relationship,

additional opportunities for joint action may emerge. We understand that our agreement to seek opportunities for joint action does not infringe upon or restrict the rights of either party to independent decision-making and action, consistent with its other international obligations. Nor does this agreement in any way provide either party with a right of veto over the actions of the other.

In the event that the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the signatories of this agreement is threatened, NATO and Russia shall immediately consult with each other within the Joint Council.

The Joint Council, and related activities to support its purposes, will be built upon the principles of reciprocal responsibilities and transparency. In the course of their consultations and cooperation, NATO and Russia pledge to inform each other fully regarding the respective challenges they face and the measures they intend to take, of their own accord, to address them.

To accomplish these goals, NATO and Russia agree that the Joint Council will meet at a variety of levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the desires of both parties. Sessions of the Joint Council will include defense officials as warranted by the subjects under discussion. NATO and Russia agree that the Joint Council will meet at the ministerial level at least twice annually, in conjunction with the semi-annual ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council, and at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council at least monthly. Regular meetings at the level of political advisors will also be held, as well as joint meetings between other NATO bodies and Russian representatives, as mutually deemed appropriate. The Joint Council may also meet at the level of Heads of State and Government, including on the occasion of NATO Summits.

The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. The parties direct the NATO Secretary General and the Russian Foreign Minister to work out detailed, mutually-satisfactory arrangements for the routine operations of the Joint Council; these arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the Joint Council, which will be held no later than (DATE).

The Joint Council will be the principal tool of consultation between the parties in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting the stability of peace throughout the region. Either NATO or Russia may convene the Joint Council at its discretion. To support the work of this Joint Council, the NATO and Russia will establish permanent liaison structures between them. These will include:

- the exchange of permanent political representatives of ambassadorial rank, accredited with the Office of the NATO Secretary General and with the Office of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, respectively;

- the exchange of permanent senior military representatives, accredited with the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee and with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, respectively.

This Council will be chaired [jointly] by the NATO Secretary-General and [the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.] The parties also agree to establish a Joint Secretariat to prepare for meetings and to support the work of the Joint Council.

The Joint Council will include as one of its components a joint military council. This body will meet not less than twice each year, on the occasion of the semi-annual meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defense Staffs, and at least monthly at the level of military representatives in NATO's Military Committee and their appropriate Russian counterparts.

The Joint Council will strive to engage in three distinct activities:

- pursuing the broadest possible range of consultations on the topics listed below and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;

- on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives in which the parties would agree to speak or act in parallel;

- making joint decisions and taking joint action as agreed after consultation.

Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, shall be fully consistent with the UN Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.

Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the states covered, NATO and Russia also agree to work to promote expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Russian Federal Assembly.

Section IV. Areas for Consultation and Cooperation

In building this strategic partnership, NATO and Russia agree to focus on specific areas of mutual interest. NATO and Russia commit themselves to explore the broadest possible degree of consultation and cooperation, in particular in the following areas:

- expanding Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace and the Atlantic Partnership Council;

- preventing, managing and settling conflicts;

- practicing preventive diplomacy and crisis management;

- undertaking joint peacekeeping and other military activities, including Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) missions in support of the UN or OSCE, as outlined below;

- consulting on NATO and Russia's changing roles in assuring European security, including on one another's evolving doctrine;

- combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including by pursuing counter-proliferation measures, combating nuclear trafficking, and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control fields;

- exploring possible cooperation, in the area of Theater Missile Defense;

- striving for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size, roles and missions of their conventional forces;

- intensifying regular exchanges on nuclear weapons issues, including their doctrine, strategy and force posture, as outlined below;

- coordinating a program/policy of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below;

- exchanging information on defense policy, strategy and budgets;

- developing initiatives for conversion of defense industries;

- pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through Russian association with the NATO Conference of NATO Armaments Directors;

- developing mutually-agreed cooperative projects in the economic, environmental and scientific fields;

- conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;

- combating the twin scourges of terrorism and drug trafficking;

- enhancing nuclear safety.

NATO and Russia commit to work together within the OSCE to establish further the political foundations of cooperative security among states and peoples throughout the OSCE region. They agree to strengthen and support the OSCE's special role in conflict prevention and crisis management, establishing additional means to maintain peace and security in Europe.

SECTION V: Military Dimension

V. A) Promoting Mutual Military Transparency, Restraint and Confidence

As part of this broader effort to build a new relationship and reinforce security within Europe, the members of NATO and Russia commit to observe and to implement fully their arms control obligations regarding conventional armed forces in Europe. They agree to meet fully their obligations arising under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and related agreements. They agree to work together in Vienna with the other states-parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to more accurately reflect Europe's changed strategic landscape since the Treaty was first negotiated, with the objective of concluding as soon as possible a framework agreement on adaptation and the adaptation agreement itself by the first quarter of 1999.

The members of NATO and Russia acknowledge their common responsibility to achieve greater stability and security in Europe. They pledge to strive for greater transparency, predictability, and mutual confidence with regard to the size and roles of their land and air forces. In particular, the members of NATO and Russia agree that they will work together with the other states-parties to ensure that CFE adaptation shall continue to preclude any potentially destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe. They will take steps to ensure that, as the security environment in Europe continues to evolve, the military threat to any state will not increase.

To that end, the members of NATO and Russia agree to work together with the other states-parties to adapt and enhance the CFE Treaty's viability and effectiveness, and to comply fully with and to strengthen the Vienna Document's measures to build confidence and security. They remain committed to using the tools of arms control and confidence-building to replace military confrontation with a pattern of security relations based on peaceful cooperation.

NATO and Russia agree to intensify regular exchanges on nuclear weapons issues, including on the status of their respective unilateral initiatives involving restraint in the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, to ensure continued stability and predictability. As a first step, the parties agree to conduct reciprocal exchanges on their nuclear doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture. The exchanges will include discussions of the process by which each party makes decisions concerning nuclear issues and the manner in which they have changed their force posture in light of Europe's new strategic landscape.

The members of NATO reaffirm their position that NATO has no intention, no plans and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any new member state nor does it foresee any future need to do so. The members of NATO also affirm that NATO [will not][has no intention, no plan and no reason to] maintain storage sites for nuclear weapons on the territory of [any new member states][NATO member states that were not members of NATO on January 1, 1997]. [The Russian Federation affirms that

it [will not][has no intention, no plan and no reason] to maintain storage sites for nuclear weapons on the territory of states that were once part of the Soviet Union or members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and were not part of the Russian Federation as of January 1, 1997.]

V. B) Expanding Cooperation Between Military Establishments

NATO and Russia agree to reinforce the expanded political-military consultations and cooperation through the Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its members and of Russia. They pledge to implement a program of significantly expanded military-to-military engagement and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels, including through a strengthened Partnership for Peace. Consistent with the tenets of the Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercise and training involving NATO and Russian forces.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Joint Council, NATO and Russia agree to establish military liaison missions, led by general officers, in major NATO and Russian commands. This initiative is fully consistent with our shared objective of promoting enhanced Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace. As a first stage, NATO and Russia have agreed that Russia will establish permanent military liaison missions at NATO headquarters in Brussels, at SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium and at SACLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. In turn, NATO has agreed to establish a mission in Moscow to conduct liaison activities with the Russian General Staff [, the individual services of the Russian armed forces] and the Ministry of Defense.

NATO and Russia also agree to explore in greater detail creation of additional liaison missions in military commands below the major command level.

To further promote their strategic partnership and ensure it is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO and Russia direct their respective military authorities to explore

[, as a priority, the development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative would exploit the positive lessons gleaned from the current Bosnian experience and relate these to NATO's implementation of the CJTF concept. Once developed, this concept would serve as a basis for the joint council's consideration of the capabilities, preparations and resources needed for joint NATO-Russia operations, possibly leading to the eventual creation of a joint NATO-Russia military unit.]

[a joint NATO-Russia concept that would build upon the positive experience gained from the current Bosnian experience and seek to nurture the increased spirit of cooperation that characterizes the current state of our military relations. Once a concept is approved, the Joint Council will explore organizational models, which include but are not limited to NATO's CJTF concept, and address size, level of participation, training and exercise requirements.]

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 3225				
Document ID: 9701567				
Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re. Helsinki Preparations (2 pages)~~	~~03/08/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3225

FOLDER TITLE:
9701567

2015-0772-M
rs1354

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701567
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 97 14

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA NATO
START

PERSONS: TALBOTT, S

SUBJECT: HELSINKI PREPERATIONS / UPDATE ON STATUS OF SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR YELTSIN SUMMIT RE MAR 5 - 6 TALBOTT TALKS IN MOSCOW

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 11 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF: 9701136 9701452

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date
2015-0872-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97030716	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97030813	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97031110	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970308		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970308		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 3/7/97 6:19p

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B Harmon			
~~Boise~~ Brown	1	NB 3/7	
Kerrick	2		
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Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SKP, PB, SRB, JS, JAH, JJD, DLK

COMMENTS: ✓ ja 3/11

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Berger
COS

'97 MAR 7 PM 4:16

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~ SECRET THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 3-10-97 1567

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Helsinki Preparations

Overview. Strobe and an interagency team spent Wednesday and Thursday in Moscow preparing for your meeting with Yeltsin. The good news: the signs from Primakov and Yeltsin aides Chubays and Ryurikov indicate they want a productive summit. The bad news: the disconnect between the political level and the Russian experts, who yielded little on key arms control issues. Primakov must get his experts in sync before he comes to Washington for talks on March 15-17, on the eve of your departure for Helsinki.

NATO-Russia. Although Yeltsin delivered a hard message on NATO in his "State of the Federation" address, Primakov and Ryurikov made clear that Yeltsin wants a deal -- albeit one that he can portray as protecting Russian concerns about enlargement. NATO Secretary General Solana will visit Moscow on Sunday and table a draft NATO-Russia document. Its substance should underscore to the Russians the seriousness of the Alliance's effort to engage.

While agreeing that adapting the CFE Treaty can meet part of Russia's worries about enlargement's military implications, Russian experts rejected NATO's adaptation proposal as "totally unacceptable." In addition, Primakov and Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov said they need something in a NATO-Russia charter on NATO's not permanently stationing forces on the territory of new members. This is very tricky: we have to protect military flexibility and avoid creating a second-class status for new members, but we may be able to offer some assurances.

Several dogs notably did not bark. The Russians did not press for a legally-binding document or a veto over NATO activities. And there was no push for a Quint summit; indeed, Primakov seemed ready to entertain the idea of a NATO-Russia summit in late May as the next big event after you see Yeltsin in Helsinki.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0772-M (1.77)

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 3/07/07

SECRET

Our team tabled a draft joint statement on European security for possible release in Helsinki. If the Russians like what they see in Solana's NATO-Russia charter, you and Yeltsin could use the Helsinki statement to call for accelerated efforts to conclude the NATO-Russia charter and a May NATO-Russia summit to sign it.

ABM/TMD. Our objective for Helsinki remains a joint statement on ABM/TMD demarcation, which the Russians say is a prerequisite for START II ratification. The Russian experts gave us no cause for encouragement, but Mamedov was much more positive, and Primakov told Strobe at the end that we were close to a deal. This deal would mean the Russians' abandoning their insistence on a ban on testing TMD interceptors above a certain velocity without prior agreement. Strobe's team left a revised draft statement with our attempt at language that Mamedov suggested could clinch the deal. We will see what Primakov brings to Washington; hopefully, it will be "yes"; we are at the limit of what the JCS can support.

START. We continue to press hard for a Helsinki joint statement that would set out guidelines for further nuclear arms cuts, including a START III limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads. The Russian experts want to pocket this and our willingness to extend the START II reductions period while asking for more, including reopening several contentious issues that were settled after protracted negotiations in START I and START II. Strobe hit Primakov and Ryurikov hard on this backpedaling, noting that it was hardly the way to reward the Pentagon's flexibility on 2,000-2,500 and a START II time extension. Late Thursday, Primakov professed surprise over these obstacles and vowed to engage personally. We will see what he brings to Washington.

Economics. Two weeks ago, Madeleine gave the Russians a draft joint statement recording Russian agreement to take steps to create a more attractive investment climate and our steps to support investment in Russia and Russian entry into international economic fora. The Russians have passed over a counterdraft, which is in the ball park. Larry Summers will visit Moscow March 14-15 and will try to close the text.

Primakov Visit. Primakov undertook to engage personally on the START and ABM/TMD issues and agreed that he and Madeleine should use their upcoming meeting to try to resolve as many questions as possible. Yeltsin's speech reflected the importance he attaches to Helsinki. That should translate into pressure on Primakov and his team for movement to close the joint statements or at least narrow them to one or two key questions for you and Yeltsin.

Cautious optimism remains the watchword: we see the way forward, but time is short and we still face tough negotiating -- perhaps including in your own March 17 meeting with Primakov.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 7, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: STEVE PIFER

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on Helsinki Preparations

The memorandum at Tab I advises the President of the status of substantive preparations for the Yeltsin summit in light of the March 5-6 talks by Strobe and his interagency team in Moscow.

Concurrence by: Bob Bell

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VT NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-m

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 3/07/07

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1608				
Document ID: 9701810				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Pre-Brief on Helsinki Summit with Russian President Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/18/1997	P1/b(1) √2
001b. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Pre-Brief on Helsinki Summit with Russian President Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/18/1997	P1/b(1) √2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1608

FOLDER TITLE:
9701810

2015-0772-M
rs1355

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701810
RECEIVED: 17 MAR 97 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 18 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
START
EU
AP
NATO
ECONOMICS

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFO FOR PRES PRE BRIEF MTG W/ WH & NATL SECURITY STAFF 18 MAR RE UPCOMING HELSINKI SUMMIT W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 20 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0072-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9701810

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97031721	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97031809	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97032619	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970318		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970318		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 3/18
8:10Am

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1810

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

'97 MAR 17 PM 9:40

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Kerrick	Copy	done	
Steinberg	2		F
Berger			Redo ASAP
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	Stern 3/18	D
Records Mgt.	4	TMM 3.26	N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3-18-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1810

'97 MAR 18 AM8:05

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1997

PRE-BRIEF ON
HELSINKI SUMMIT WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: March 18, 1997
LOCATION: The Residence
TIME: 2:15-3:15 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss how to approach the Helsinki summit issues with Yeltsin in light of this weekend's talks with Primakov.

II. BACKGROUND

Based on your guidance over the last two months, we have made constructive proposals to the Russians in each of the three key areas.

- We opened the door for progress on European security by offering Moscow a genuine NATO-Russia relationship and coming out with declarations of NATO policy and a CFE adaptation proposal which should have the effect to alleviate Russian worries about the military implications of enlargement, without crossing the "red line" of Russian veto over NATO decisions.

- We proposed to adress Russian concerns about the cost and pace of START II implementation by guidelines that include a reduction in START III to 2,000-2,500 warheads and extending the START II deadlines.

- We have mobilized financing to support investment in Russia and are ready to support accelerated Russian membership in key international economic institutions.

The question is whether the Russians will meet us half-way. Yeltsin has staked out a tough public line. Yet, Primakov seemed to have orders to set the stage for a successful summit. I believe that is likely, although real issues remain for you and Yeltsin to tackle.

The Scene. I plan to open by setting the scene, outlining the structure of the summit, and walking through our goals

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 3/17/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-m (1.79)

on European security, arms control and economics. Madeleine will then provide her perspective.

European Security. The joint statement on European security is agreed, though we do not exclude that Yeltsin will push in Helsinki for stronger language regarding no NATO forces on the territory of new members (we cannot go further than the carefully crafted NATO language of March 14). You will want to pin down his commitment to finalize a NATO-Russia relationship and to avoid inflammatory anti-NATO rhetoric before deciding on whether to seek agreement on late May as the target date for a NATO-Russia summit. Strobe will describe how you might approach NATO-Russia with Yeltsin.

START and ABM/TMD. We have prepared a joint statement on future nuclear arms reductions, though the timing issues related to extending START II deadlines remain open for Helsinki. But, as you know, the joint statement on ABM/TMD demarcation has come undone. You told Primakov it would be hard to imagine a START statement without the companion piece on ABM/TMD that will allow Duma ratification of START II to go forward. Bob Bell will discuss how to deal with these issues with Yeltsin.

Economics. We are near closure on a joint statement on investment and Russia's entry into international economic fora. The sticking points are the timing of Russian entry into WTO and treatment of a G-8 at Denver. Larry Summers and Dan Tarullo will outline how you might handle these.

Public Themes. Time permitting, we might discuss our public line in the Helsinki run-up, particularly given Yeltsin's tough rhetoric. We do not want a war of words but should consider how to modulate our spin. Madeleine and I are doing a press briefing this morning.

Finnish Bilateral Events. We will brief you on the plane on the bilateral portion of the Helsinki visit.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Albright
Erskine Bowles
Sandy Berger
Dan Tarullo
Strobe Talbott
Larry Summers
Donald L. Kerrick
Jim Steinberg
Jim Collins
Leon Fuerth
LTG Myers
Jan Lodal
Steve Pifer
Bob Bell
Antony Blinken
Sandy Vershbow
Carlos Pascual

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 17, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Papers for the President's Pre-Brief on Helsinki

The memorandum to the President at Tab A sets the stage for his Tuesday pre-brief on the Helsinki summit. A script for your use in guiding the meeting is attached at Tab B.

Concurrences by: Bob Bell, Sandy Vershbow, Dan Fried SP for

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

That you draw on the script at Tab B.

Attachments
Tab A Memorandum to the President
Tab B Berger Script for Pre-Brief

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1810

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRE-BRIEF ON
HELSINKI SUMMIT WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

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TIME: 2:15-3:15 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

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- We opened the door for progress on European security by offering Moscow a ~~robust~~ NATO-Russia relationship and coming out with declarations of NATO policy and a CFE adaptation proposal ~~designed~~ to alleviate Russian worries about the military implications of enlargement, without crossing the "red line" into Russia over NATO decision

- We proposed to ~~satisfy~~ address Russian concerns about the cost and pace of START II implementation by guidelines that include a reduction in START III to 2,000-2,500 warheads and extending the START II deadlines.

- We have mobilized financing to support investment in Russia and are ready to support accelerated Russian membership in key international economic institutions.

The question is whether the Russians will meet us half-way. Yeltsin has staked out a tough public line, ~~although that could well be posturing for his domestic constituency.~~ Primakov seemed to have orders to set the stage for a successful summit, though real issues remain for you and Yeltsin to tackle. I believe that is likely, although

The Scene. I plan to open by setting the scene, outlining the structure of the summit, and walking through our goals on European security, arms control and economics. Madeleine can then provide her perspective.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 3/17/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.80)

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hard to imagine

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The Vice President
Secretary Albright
Erskine Bowles
Sandy Berger
Dan Tarullo
Strobe Talbott
Larry Summers
Donald L. Kerrick
Jim Steinberg
Jim Collins
Leon Fuerth
LTG Myers
Jan Lodal
Steve Pifer
Bob Bell
Antony Blinken
Sandy Vershbow
Carlos Pascual

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1613				
Document ID: 9702588				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~John Schmidt to Samuel Berger re: Inviting Partners to Madrid~~ (2 pages)	~~04/15/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1613

FOLDER TITLE:
9702588

2015-0772-M
rs1356

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9702588
RECEIVED: 15 APR 97 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW
PIFER

DOC DATE: 15 APR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INVITING PARTNERS TO MADRID

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/COMMENT DUE DATE: 21 APR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON ✓
		PIFER
		SCHMIDT
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97041515	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97042215	NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 4/16/97 5:15pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2588

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DPS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Davies	Copy		
Kerrick	Copy		
Steinberg	2		
Berger		R	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	4/21	
Records Mgt.	4		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: ARV, SKP, DF

COMMENTS:

'97 APR 15 PM 3:23

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2588

April 15, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/STEVE PIFER/DANIEL FRIED

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Inviting Partners to Madrid

SANDY / STEVE / DAN — I have strong views on this, which are counter to Secy's statement ① Did NSC clear and if so, whom?

The question of whether to invite Partnership for Peace (PFP) members to Madrid is shaping up as one of the more complex issues we will face in the run-up to the summit. SYG Solana raised it with you during your April 10 meeting, and it will be the subject of a special Ambassadors-only discussion at NATO on April 21. The question is closely connected to our larger runners-up strategy, including the question of when and where to inaugurate the Atlantic Partnership Council (APC), the status of the APC vis-à-vis the NATO-Russia Joint Council, as well as possible decisions on post-Madrid travel by the President to CEE countries.

② I would like to meet asap on this entire scenario

In her February 18 speech to the NAC, Secretary Albright said that "all of our partners should be invited to the summit in Madrid. Because the summit will help shape the future of Europe, all of Europe should be represented." Initially, we envisaged inviting Partners, including Russia, to the second day of Madrid so that NATO enlargement decisions, PFP enhancements, and the NATO-Russia Charter signing could take place in one venue -- the "super summit." When the Russians made clear they would not attend Madrid at all, we split off the NATO-Russia summit, but sought to keep Partners on track for a Madrid invitation. We did not want Russian failure to participate at Madrid to constitute a *de facto* veto on other Partners' participation or prevent an all-European event in the spirit of Madeleine's NAC statement.

③ In the meantime, please check w/ me before agreeing to any of this.

With respect to the more specific question of the APC, our position until now has been that NATO should establish the APC at the Sintra NAC ministerial with all Partners participating and seek to have a follow-on APC summit at Madrid. This is not a perfect solution. Russia's absence from Madrid would be very visible; indeed, it would overshadow everything else and become "the story" for the second day of the summit. Moreover, if the inaugural Sintra APC Ministerial needed to formally call for an

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/15/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/16/2019
2015-0772-M (1.81)

APC summit at Madrid, this would put the Russians in a position to veto the idea. Alternatively, we could have NATO stage the Madrid gathering as an informal ad hoc meeting without the APC label.

No Partners at Madrid? Another possibility, favored by Solana and probably by France and Germany as well, would be to announce the creation of the APC at Madrid but defer the first meeting (presumably at ministerial level) until a later date. This was the procedure used in establishing the NACC, which was announced at the Rome NATO summit and followed by an inaugural ministerial-level meeting a month later. Some allies favor this idea because they believe establishment of the APC is a summit-level decision and should be announced at Madrid. Others also see it as a way of finessing the Russian problem: if there is no Partner gathering at Madrid, then the problem of Russian non-attendance does not arise. Strobe reportedly favors this option for this reason.

Solving the Russian non-attendance problem by keeping all Partners from Madrid raises other problems, however. Partners will be extremely unhappy if NATO holds a summit with Yeltsin but, in response to Russian pressure, fails to invite Partners to Madrid. This would send a bad signal to Partners (especially runners-up) and get our enlargement ratification efforts off to a very sour start. It would also contradict the spirit of Madeleine's NAC statement that all of Europe should be present at an event that will shape the continent's future. Moreover, the comparison to the NACC is not entirely valid in that Partners have had three years of involvement with NATO through PFP and are participating directly in developing the APC's terms of reference -- entitling them to be "present at the creation."

The way out may be to structure an informal NATO-plus-Partners event the second day in Madrid -- without an APC label that would spotlight Yeltsin's absence. We (the Troika) would like to discuss this with you and Jim when you have a moment.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1616				
Document ID: 9702852				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: NATO Issues in the Run-Up to Madrid (6 pages)	04/24/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. list	re: Timelines on Madrid Summit Issues (3 pages)	04/24/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Key Issues in the Run-Up to the Madrid Summit (9 pages)	04/24/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1616

FOLDER TITLE:
9702852

2015-0772-M
rs1357

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW
FRIED

DOC DATE: 24 APR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPAIN
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SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STRATEGY & TIMELINES IN RUN-UP TO MADRID SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 30 APR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
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		SCHMIDT
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97042420	FOR INFORMATION
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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
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Davies			
Kerrick	Copy		
Steinberg	2		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		P
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 24, 1997



Natl Sec Advisor has seen

NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL FRIED/STEVEN PIFER

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Strategy and Timelines in the Run-Up to Madrid

Attached at Tab A is a strategy paper with proposed timelines for managing the key issues in the run-up to the Madrid summit. We have also put the key events into a chronology from now until the end of the year. This is attached at Tab B. Finally, we are attaching at Tab C the key issues paper currently being discussed by Deputies in a restricted setting. This paper poses the key questions we need to answer between now and Madrid, with proposed answers. It is essentially a more detailed version of the strategy paper at Tab A. The next restricted Deputies meeting is on Friday, April 25, just prior to the departure of Strobe Talbott (with Sandy Vershbow and Ki Fort) for Brussels and Moscow.

Concurrences by: Anne Witkowsky

Attachments
Tab A Strategy Paper: NATO Issues in the Run-Up to Madrid
Tab B Chronology: Timelines on Madrid Summit Issues
Tab C Deputies Paper: Key Issues in the Run-Up to the Madrid Summit

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NATO Issues in the Run-Up to Madrid

The U.S. and NATO will need to make decisions on a whole range of summit-related issues between now and Madrid. On the enlargement track, we will need to develop positions and seek allied agreement on whom to include in the first group, what to do about aspiring NATO members not included in the first group, and when to inaugurate the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), including the related question of Partner involvement in Madrid. We will also need to begin focusing on the accession process, which begins following Madrid.

On the NATO-Russia track, NATO is seeking to finalize the charter and schedule a NATO-Russia summit before the end of May. Major issues remain unresolved, however, and we will need to consider what actions to take if the process begins to bog down. NATO is also working on a NATO-Ukraine document, though this has been complicated by Kiev's back-pedaling on the CFE flank agreement. On the internal adaptation track, we need to consider whether to go forward in finalizing ESDI and the command structure review now that AFSOUTH will remain unresolved until after the French elections.

Selecting the First Group

There are five candidates currently under serious consideration for inclusion in the first group. There is virtual consensus for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Romania and Slovenia have their supporters (led by France and Italy) but are much more controversial choices. We should adopt a "small group" strategy for the first group. This would give us greater flexibility in a subsequent enlargement tranche and make it easier to secure allied agreement to a strong open door commitment, which is critical for the Baltic states.

SLB- 1st we need to develop a list of "consideration" - somewhat less - numerical than "criteria") so that the Ukraine & the 3 will fall of the face list and move before to the 1st tranche

agree

Timelines. We should aim at reaching an internal U.S. decision on the "who" by the week preceding the May 29-30 Sintra NAC ministerial. This will then guide our subsequent deliberations with key allies and within NATO. Just prior to Sintra we should hold a preliminary discussion on the "who" with key allies including Italy. Any Sintra discussion of the issue should not get too far into decisions on names but discuss the relative merits of a small versus large group.

Following Sintra, SYG Solana will begin consultations with allies seeking to build consensus on the "who." We should use early June to continue our own discussions with key allies. Solana wants to hold a formal but highly restricted NAC discussion on the "who" on June 20. We believe we should aim at a subsequent

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"informal" decision at a special NAC meeting late in the week preceding Madrid. Solana would then inform interested Partner governments over the weekend, with the formal heads of state and government decision to follow in Madrid on July 8.

Dealing with the Runners-Up

As noted above, adopting a "small group" strategy should help our efforts to produce a robust runners-up package at Madrid. Our goal is to obtain a firm NATO commitment to a second and possibly subsequent tranches, continuation of the intensified dialogue process and a mechanism for regular review of candidacies. Equally important, we want to reassure the runners-up by maximizing participation in cooperative activities through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and PFP enhancements, and by holding an informal event with NATO leaders and Partners -- e.g., a working luncheon -- on the second day of Madrid (the advantage of an informal gathering, as opposed to an EAPC summit, is that it minimizes the possibility that Yeltsin's likely non-appearance will become the story of the day). Beyond Madrid, we should seek further opportunities to bolster the Baltics and Romania and/or Slovenia, if they are not included in the first group.

Timelines. In preparations for Sintra, we should work to produce a strong commitment in the ministerial communiqué to develop a strong runners-up package for Madrid. This is an issue we should raise with key allies in the context of discussions on the "who" in the immediate run-up to Sintra and continuing through June in preparations for Madrid.

To reassure the Baltics, we could announce in Madrid that we will host a U.S.-Baltic summit in Washington later in the year (September/October). We could also announce our intention to begin negotiating a U.S.-Baltic charter for possible signature in the fall. If Partners are invited to Madrid, we should also consider scheduling a brief meeting between the President and Baltic leaders (in lieu of a Nordic-Baltic summit in Copenhagen).

If Romania and/or Slovenia are not included in the first group, the President should reassure his counterparts (at Madrid if they are present) that we consider them strong candidates for a second tranche. This is a message Secretary Albright could repeat in a trip to the region immediately following Madrid. President Constantinescu should also be invited to Washington for a fall meeting with the President.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)/PFP Enhancements

NATO and PFP members are nearing completion of work on the EAPC mandate. Our aim is to nail down the terms of reference at Sintra, including assuring that the mandate of the EAPC is as

robust as that of the NATO-Russia Joint Council. The key remaining question is whether to inaugurate the EAPC at Sintra, Madrid or at some later date.

Since the Russians have said Yeltsin will not go to Madrid, we have supported a Sintra venue in order to maximize prospects for Russian participation in the formal launching of the EAPC. Some allies support announcing the EAPC at Madrid and holding the inaugural meeting at a later date. We still prefer a Sintra launch date for the EAPC, as well an informal Partner gathering at Madrid (not under EAPC auspices), which would provide for limited Partner participation on the second day of a summit heavily devoted to their interests. NATO is also nearing completion of work on a robust set of PFP enhancements. These too should be approved at Sintra and sent to Madrid for welcoming by NATO leaders.

Timelines. In consultation with Partners, NATO should aim for agreement by mid-May on holding the inaugural EAPC meeting at Sintra (the NACC ministerial could reconstitute itself as the EAPC). At Sintra, NATO ministers would give final approval to the EAPC and invite Partners to an informal gathering on July 9, perhaps organized around a working luncheon. The inaugural EAPC meeting, meanwhile, would take place on the second day of Sintra. The PFP enhancement package would be approved at Sintra and welcomed by heads of state and government in Madrid.

NATO-Russia

Although Yeltsin has expressed interest in attending a NATO-Russia summit in Paris on May 27, considerable differences remain on military issues in Section V of the proposed NATO-Russia charter. Specifically, the Russians continue to seek a ban on new stationing, a sufficiency rule (imposing group limits on alliances), and a ban/constraints on military infrastructure, all of which cross our red lines. The first two positions are major obstacles to progress in the Vienna CFE negotiations as well. Unless agreement on the charter can be reached by about May 10, it will be impossible to follow through with a late May summit. Prospects for such agreement are complicated by the convalescence of Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, who is not scheduled to meet again with NATO SYG Solana until May 6. Although productive negotiations between A/SYG von Moltke and Russian Deputy FM Afanasyevsky are continuing, we should heighten our own involvement aimed at ensuring success for the May 6 meeting.

If insufficient progress is made to justify a late May summit, we should consider a meeting about the time of the Denver Summit of the Eight as a fall-back timeframe albeit at a different location. The politics and logistics of Denver, however, rule out a NATO-Russia event on the margins of that venue, and even a day or so before or after at another location would pose

complications (e.g., how close do we want to get to Madrid?). The alternative is postponing efforts to reach agreement until after Madrid. In any event, it is critical that we say nothing in the next three weeks to suggest to the Russians anything other than that, if they miss May 27, the next likely time for a NATO-Russia summit is post-Madrid, probably not until the autumn.

Timelines. During the week of April 28, Deputy Secretary Talbott, followed by Secretary Albright, will travel to Moscow in an effort to help resolve remaining differences over the charter. The President should be prepared to phone or write Yeltsin after the May 6 Solana-Primakov meeting if serious differences still remain. If the May 6 meeting produces agreement on the charter, we should seek immediate NATO agreement to schedule a NATO-Russia summit in Paris on May 27.

If serious differences remain, however, we will need to assess the situation and determine whether to aim at a NATO-Russia summit around the time of Denver, to continue negotiations on the charter, or to defer attempts to reach agreement until after Madrid, presumably sometime in September.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

Despite an ambitious NATO proposal designed to accelerate CFE adaptation negotiations and produce consensus on a framework agreement, the Russians continue to echo positions that are at least a year old, including an Alliance sufficiency rule and ban on new stationing. These two positions will prove to be our major (though not only) stumbling blocks. The Russians also want to eliminate the flank zone, which threatens to unravel the not-yet-approved flank agreement and to draw the many thorny flank-related issues into the adaptation talks. If we resolve the major NATO-Russia charter Section V issues, we will have made major strides toward closing on a framework agreement.

Timelines. We need to continue to work CFE issues in Vienna and bilaterally. If a NATO-Russia charter can be agreed in time to permit a late May ministerial, we can accelerate work in Vienna to complete a 30-nation CFE framework document before Madrid. If a NATO-Russia charter is not achieved because of differences over Section V issues, the same issues will plague the CFE talks. Beyond Madrid, we expect that a full CFE adaptation agreement will take at least until 1998-99.

NATO-Ukraine

NATO is preparing the text of a NATO-Ukraine document that would institutionalize an enhanced partnership with Kiev. We would like to bring this to closure quickly -- ideally, it would be initialed prior to a NATO-Russia signing, to avoid a situation in which the Ukrainians seek to assimilate large portions of the

NATO-Ukraine 1st could complicate completing NATO-Russia.

Russia document. Ukraine's back-pedaling on the CFE flank agreement, however, has led us to take a position (a minority view within the Alliance) that NATO not provide a draft to the Ukrainians until Kiev agrees to support the flank agreement. Ukrainian acceptance of the flank agreement could open the way to a fairly rapid negotiation of a NATO-Ukraine document.

Timelines. NATO is now preparing the text of the draft document. SYG Solana is due to visit Kiev on May 7, which would be a good time to present the draft or discuss a draft that had been provided to the Ukrainians a few days before -- all assuming that the CFE flank question has been resolved. President Kuchma visits Washington May 15-16; if the Ukrainians do not come around on CFE, we will have to decide whether to continue to hold up the NATO-Ukraine dialogue in the run-up to that visit.

A NATO-Ukraine document would need to be completed the following week in order to precede a possible NATO-Russia summit on May 27. The Ukrainians believe that Kuchma has an invitation to come to Madrid to sign the document.] ?

Internal Adaptation

At the committee level, NATO is nearing completion of work on ESDI, including terms of reference for the Deputy SACEUR and coordination mechanisms for transferring NATO assets to the WEU. NATO CHODs, meanwhile, are considering recommendations on the numbers, types and locations of headquarters in the context of the current command structure review. The French elections scheduled for the end of May and beginning of June mean that the AFSOUTH issue will not be resolved before the Sintra ministerial. NATO should move ahead to finalize work on ESDI and approve the results to date of the command structure review regardless of the state of play on AFSOUTH; this will make clear that we support ESDI with or without French integration. At the same time, we should work hard with France after their elections to resolve the AFSOUTH issue and pave the way for a French announcement on integration at Madrid. If France decides not to reintegrate, we will need to consider whether they should retain their voting rights in the Military Committee, but this should be deferred until after Madrid to avoid a pre-summit backlash.

Should anything happen on this prior to NAC/D on June 12.

Timelines. We should press to accelerate work in the NATO PCG if necessary in order to ensure that all outstanding ESDI documents are approved in the run-up to Sintra. Sintra should take note of these documents as well as progress in the command structure review and forward them to Madrid for final approval by heads of state and government. Since the April 22 CHODs meeting did not produce final agreement on the command structure, CHODs should meet again prior to Sintra (or the NAC/D) to try to resolve outstanding differences. In communiqué drafting for the Madrid summit, we should ensure that ESDI and the command structure

review are highlighted as examples of NATO's internal adaptation in meeting the new challenges of the post-Cold War world. In the meantime, we should resume our contacts with the French immediately after the June 1 election aimed at resolving the AFSOUTH dispute by mid-June, in order to permit a French announcement on reintegration in the run-up to or at the Madrid summit, to include an appropriate ceremony.

Other issues.

Should Madrid include Foreign + Defense Ministers?
CHODs? - could help this ~~crabbly~~
cued.s.l.fy.

Senate Observer Group to Madrid? POTUS meeting with observer Group prior to Madrid.

Travel of Senior Officials before/after Madrid?

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Timelines on Madrid Summit Issues

Late April	Von Moltke-Afanasyevsky negotiations on NATO-Russia charter continue.
Week of April 28	Deputy Secretary Talbott travels to Moscow, followed by Secretary Albright, to bridge remaining differences on NATO-Russia.
May 6	Solana-Primakov meeting on NATO-Russia to produce agreed charter text.
May 7	Solana in Kiev. Possible discussion of NATO-Ukraine document (if CFE back on track).
May 6-May 10	Possible POTUS phone call/letter to Yeltsin if no final agreement on charter. Other last-minute diplomacy.
May 10	Drop dead date for decision on May 27 NATO-Russia summit.
Early-mid May	NATO begins Sintra communiqué drafting. U.S. introduces runners-up strategy for Madrid, including firm commitment to second tranche, continuation of intensified dialogues, regular review of candidacies. Preparations for NATO-Russia summit also begin (if agreement reached).
Mid-May	NATO SLG approves EAPC terms of reference, including agreement to inaugurate EAPC at Sintra. Agreement to send PFP enhancement package to Sintra for approval.
Mid-May	NATO PCG finishes work on ESDI documents, forwards to Sintra for approval.
May 15-16	Kuchma in Washington for meetings with Vice President and President, including discussion of NATO-Ukraine relationship.
Week of May 19	Internal U.S. decision on "who."
Week of May 19	Preliminary discussions on "who" and runners-up strategy with key allies.

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Week of May 19	Last period to finalize NATO-Ukraine document prior to possible May 27 NATO-Russia summit.
May 27	Possible NATO-Russia summit in Paris to sign NATO-Russia charter.
May 29-30	Sintra NAC Ministerial: Informal discussions on the "who." NATO makes commitment to approve robust runners-up package at Madrid. NATO ministers approve EAPC terms of reference, inaugural EAPC meeting is held on May 30 in lieu of NACC. Decision taken to invite Partners to informal meeting on the second day of Madrid. Ministers note ESDI package, refer to Madrid for final approval.
Early June	U.S.-France bilateral discussions resume following June 1 second round of French elections, aimed at producing final AFSOUTH agreement.
Early-mid June	Solana launches consultations with allies on the "who." Communiqué drafting begins for Madrid summit. U.S. presses for robust runners-up package.
June 6	NATO CHODs meeting in Brussels: CHODs finalize agreement on number, types and locations of NATO headquarters as part of command structure review.
June 12-13	NAC/D Ministerial in Brussels: Defense Ministers note CHODs agreement on command structure and refer to Madrid for final approval.
Mid-June	Possible U.S.-French agreement on AFSOUTH. French announce intention to join integrated military structure.
Mid-Late June	Possible 30-nation CFE framework agreement.
June 20	Instructed NAC discussion the "who."
June 20-22	Denver Summit of the Eight. Possible NATO-Russia summit just before or after Denver if NATO-Russia charter not finished in time for May 27 summit. (Staging this in the Denver timeframe at another venue would be very difficult.)

Week of June 30	Instructed "informal" NAC decision on the "who."
July 4-5	Solana informs NATO membership candidates of likely Madrid summit decision on the "who."
July 8-9	Madrid Summit: NATO announces first group invited to begin accession talks, approves robust runners-up package. Informal meeting with Partners on second day; possible POTUS meeting with Baltics. Possible signing of NATO-Ukraine document. Heads of state and government welcome establishment of EAPC and PFP enhancement package. Summit approves ESDI package and results of command structure review, provides mandate for implementation. Spain (and hopefully France) welcomed into integrated military structure.
July 10	President's Visit to Copenhagen. President repeats pledge to keep door open to Baltic NATO membership, possibly announces fall Baltic summit and/or negotiation of U.S.-Baltic charter.
Mid-July	Trip to Romania and/or Slovenia by Secretary Albright (if not included in first group).
Late July	NATO begins accessions talks with invitees.
Fall	Visit by Romanian President Constantinescu.
Fall	U.S.-Baltic summit in Washington to sign U.S.-Baltic charter.
December	NATO signs accession protocols with invitees at NAC ministerial.

KEY ISSUES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MADRID SUMMIT

SELECTING THE FIRST GROUP

Should the U.S. make a preliminary decision on whom to support prior to Sintra or wait until after the NAC ministerial?

SYG Solana intends to begin consultations with allies at Sintra. To shape final selections, we should make our own preliminary decision on whom to support no later than Sintra and possibly one or two weeks before.

Do we agree that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary should be in the first group?

Support for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary is likely to be unanimous within the Alliance or very close to it. Implicit U.S. support for all three has been strong from the outset. There is no reason to change our position at this point These nations deserve our support based on their strong progress in implementing political and market economic reforms, in working to compose their differences with their neighbors, and in reshaping and reforming their military forces to meet NATO interoperability standards and provide for civilian control. By the time of Madrid, we will need to agree on the primary political and military considerations underpinning this decision so that we can make a convincing case to the American people and to the Senate.

Should NATO restrict itself to a very small first group, or go beyond these three and support inclusion of Slovenia and/or Romania?

Judged solely on its democratic and market economic reforms, Slovenia can make a good case now for membership. Including Slovenia would ensure inclusion of one non-former-Warsaw Pact nation, provide contiguity between NATO territory and Hungary, and encourage other former Yugoslav states to improve their behavior. Although Romania has made dramatic progress politically, economically and in the region during the past year, judged solely on merit Bucharest is not yet ready, at least when compared to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Although current signs are hopeful, the Romanians have a considerable way to go in implementing market reforms.

Other factors must also be weighed in judging whether to support Slovenia or Romania -- the impact on the Baltics first and foremost. Although we want the Baltics to continue to aspire to NATO membership, at this stage there is no consensus among allies that they could actually become members in the face of Russian sensitivities and given their purported "indefensibility." The larger the first group, the more difficult it will be to maintain the credibility of subsequent tranches of enlargement. Conversely, a small first group will create a large set of plausible candidates for subsequent tranches, thereby reassuring the Balts that the first will not be the last.

Keeping the first group small should also make Senate ratification of the first group easier. While it is true that Italy supports Slovenia and France strongly supports Romania, the two

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could cancel each other out; we hope to channel French support for Romania into more general support for enlargement beyond the first group.

SYG Solana will begin informal consultations with allies on whom to include in the first group beginning at Sintra. When should we undertake our own consultations with allies? In the run-up to Sintra? Following Sintra? With key allies only?

We have already had informal exchanges of views with most allies, without tipping our hand. As soon as we have made an initial decision, we should consult with key allies just prior to Sintra in an effort to minimize controversy there. Since Italian support for Slovenia will be a key factor, as well as a possible counterweight to French support for Romania, we should consider including Italy in these consultations. We could use the Solana process backed up by bilateral consultations in capitals to engage other allies, leading to a final "confidential" NATO decision on whom to invite sometime during the week prior to Madrid.

DEALING WITH THE RUNNERS-UP

Enlargement Process

What is the minimum NATO commitment we can accept at Madrid on the "open door?"

At the December NAC ministerial we tried and failed to secure an explicit NATO pledge that the first group of invitees would not be the last. The best we could do was a restatement of traditional Alliance policy that NATO remains open to new members. We did not push as hard as we might have in order to save our political capital on this issue for Madrid. One way to maximize prospects for winning consensus on a strong statement would be to minimize the number of nations included in the first group. This will help counter the concerns of those, such as the UK, who fear that explicitly committing the Alliance to a second tranche could put unacceptable pressure on NATO to include the Baltics in that tranche..

Since the credible prospect of a second tranche is critical, we should be prepared to push much harder in the run-up to Madrid for an explicit commitment, going beyond the December NAC's weak "open door" language. Instead, we should insist at a minimum on language that creates strong expectations of a second tranche. If not an explicit pledge, it should be a statement such as "we expect NATO to take in additional members in the future" that makes it clear further enlargement will take place.

When do we need to nail down allied agreement to continue the intensified dialogue process for aspiring NATO members following Madrid? At Sintra? At Madrid?

Success at Sintra in securing a NATO commitment to continue the intensified dialogue process following Madrid would give an early signal to aspiring members, such as the Baltics, who are unlikely to be included in the first group, that NATO intends to maintain an active membership process alongside the Atlantic Partnership Council. On the other hand, we need to make sure we do not jeopardize prospects for a strong commitment at Madrid by trying and failing at Sintra, where the tactical situation could be much different. For that reason, we may want to accept more general language at Sintra while making clear we will want an explicit

commitment at Madrid. The December NAC communiqué handled the issue by stating that following Madrid, NATO would "remain ready to pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO membership." At Sintra we could seek a commitment to have Madrid elaborate on the nature of such consultations.

Should we seek a NATO commitment to conduct regular reviews of the intensified dialogues? Should NATO hold the first review by the time of the April 1999 summit?

Whether or not we secure a strong NATO commitment-in-principle at Madrid to a second and subsequent tranches, aspiring members will be concerned if NATO establishes no formal mechanism for considering additional countries' candidacies. Therefore, we should consider pressing for a NATO commitment to conduct regular reviews of the results of the intensified dialogue process, perhaps once a year beginning with the fall 1998 NAC ministerial. If we go down this road, however, we would need to be clear that there is no automatic commitment to issue additional invitations at each annual review.

Baltic States

What particular steps should we take bilaterally to reassure the Baltic states? Begin negotiation of the U.S.-Baltic Charter before Madrid? High-level meetings (U.S.-Baltic or Nordic-Baltic summit after Madrid or in fall; cabinet-level visits to Baltics after Madrid)?

Although Baltic disappointment at not being included in the first group would be somewhat mitigated by strong open door language, continuation of an intensified dialogue process and agreement to a review mechanism, there are several things we could do bilaterally to further soften the blow and keep the Baltics firmly committed to European integration and the resolution of regional problems.

With the President committed to visiting Copenhagen after Madrid, we need to consider whether to include a U.S.-Baltic or Nordic-Baltic summit as part of that visit or hold such a meeting later in the year. Holding it immediately after Madrid would help soften Baltic disappointment and focus public attention on our commitment to Baltic security and integration into Europe. On the other hand, it would heighten Moscow's discomfort over enlargement. Holding a Baltic event later in the year would reduce the latter concern, and the venue could be Washington. If partners are invited to Madrid, the President could meet with Baltic leaders there, reducing pressure for a Nordic-Baltic regional event in Copenhagen.

Our Baltic Action Plan already commits us to negotiate a U.S.-Baltic Charter, and the Baltic countries -- after some hesitation -- are eager to pursue the idea to help manage the domestic disappointment that will accompany their non-selection at Madrid. As part of our public response at Madrid, we could announce our intention to begin negotiating the Charter and to sign it at an appropriate venue later in the year (the Baltics want a Presidential-level event). Alternatively, if we decide to hold a Nordic-Baltic summit immediately following Madrid, we could state our intentions there.

Romania/Slovenia

What special steps should we take with Romania and/or Slovenia if they are not included in the first group?

We will also need a strategy for addressing Romanian concerns if Romania is not included in the first group. We should consider making some reassuring public statements about prospects for eventual Romanian membership, perhaps reinforced by an early Secretary Albright visit to Bucharest, e.g., immediately after Madrid. This would be reinforced if we secured a NATO commitment to an early reconsideration of Romania's candidacy -- e.g. before the 1999 50th-anniversary Summit. We should also follow through with an early invitation to President Constantinescu to visit Washington in the fall. There may also be other ways to deepen our bilateral security ties, such as by upgrading our Bilateral Working Group (BWG) program. Although Slovenian disappointment at not being included may not be as acute, we will also want to reassure the Slovenes publicly and privately that they remain strong candidates for a second tranche.

Atlantic Partnership Council (APC)

Are there any controversial issues remaining on terms of reference for the APC? How do we ensure equality with the NATO-Russia Joint Council?

The NATO SLG and SLG Plus (which includes Partners) is making steady progress toward approving terms of reference for the APC (likely to be renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). There appears to be widespread support for a broad mandate for the APC, covering a full range of European security issues, with direct responsibility for implementing PFP enhancements and other aspects of the PFP; the APC would also serve as the consultative mechanism for states participating in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. This mandate, and an active high-level APC meeting schedule comparable to that for the NATO-Russia Joint Council, should ensure that this critical Partner mechanism proceeds on a roughly equivalent basis with the NATO-Russia body. We should be prepared to weigh in strongly at NATO and in capitals if major opposition to the current concept for the APC begins to emerge.

When should NATO approve establishment of the APC? When and Where should the first APC meeting take place?

Decisions to establish major new NATO bodies such as the APC are generally taken at NATO summits and some allies thus argue that the APC should be approved at Madrid rather than Sintra. But we have supported approving the APC at Sintra (and holding the inaugural meeting there) so that the Partners who have participated in drafting the terms of reference for the APC can be part of the decision to establish the new forum. This would also increase the likelihood of Russian participation. The Russians have said they will not come to Madrid. If the APC announcement and inaugural event is delayed until Madrid, Russian non-participation will be spotlighted. This initial boycott could make it politically difficult for them to join the APC at a later date. For these reasons, we should support establishment of the APC at Sintra.

As noted above, holding the inaugural APC meeting at Sintra would help ensure Russian participation, while keeping development of the APC in synch with the NATO-Russia track. Under this scenario, the scheduled NACC ministerial could reconstitute itself as the APC. Holding the first APC at Madrid, by contrast, could ensure Russian non-participation. One other possibility, discussed below, would be to announce establishment of the APC at Madrid but schedule the first meeting at a later date. This would avoid the problem of a Russian boycott at Madrid, but could be seen by the CEE countries as suggesting that NATO has given precedence to relations with Russia at the expense of their concerns.

If, as is likely, the Russians decline to attend an APC meeting at Madrid, should we still seek to have interested Partners invited to Madrid for an informal meeting of Allied and interested partner leaders?

If NATO were to hold a formal APC Summit at Madrid, Russian non-attendance could emerge as the big story. On the other hand, it would be difficult for NATO to hold an "adaptation" summit in which Partner issues played such a prominent role without inviting Partners to attend. Keeping Partners from Madrid would be even harder to justify should a separate NATO-Russia summit be held. This would also require backtracking on the position taken by Secretary Albright during her February 18 NAC intervention, when she stated clearly that "all of our Partners should be invited to the summit in Madrid. Because the summit will help shape the future of Europe, all of Europe should be represented."

These considerations argue in favor of inviting Partners to attend the summit. (Indeed, on April 21, the NAC decided Partners would be invited to Madrid, with level and format to be determined.) Perhaps the best way to minimize the non-participation of Russia would be to bill the second day of the summit as an informal gathering of Partners without an APC label (a "family photo" and working lunch, rather than a formal session with set-piece speeches), at which NATO leaders would brief them first-hand on the Summit decisions. Alternatively, we could decide to limit summit participation to the 16. This would emphasize the core character and composition of NATO as it moves to enlarge, while avoiding the possibility that one or more runners-up might use a Partner event to complain about being overlooked. The burden would fall to the U.S., however, to explain this change of plans to the CEE countries.

PFP Enhancements

Are PFP enhancements on track? Is any extra effort required to maximize Partner involvement in CJTF?

In addition to the "open door" and APC, PFP enhancements are a key means of reassuring the runners-up by increasing their involvement on the military side of NATO in a way that begins to approach that of NATO members. There is currently strong support within the SLG for establishing PFP staff elements (PSEs) at NATO strategic, regional and sub-regional headquarters where appropriate and as resources permit. At the regional level, this could involve Partners directly in CJTF planning, doctrine development and operations. We should ensure that Sintra and Madrid endorse prompt implementation of the PSE concept proposals.

NATO-RUSSIA

What is our "drop-dead" date for reaching agreement on a NATO-Russia charter in order to schedule a NATO-Russia summit for late May? What should the U.S. do to help ensure a successful result prior to such date?

In order to give sufficient time for summit preparations, agreement on the charter will need to be reached by some time in early May. The NSC Executive Secretariat has suggested May 10 as the likely cut-off date for a May 27 summit meeting in Paris. Chirac has reportedly told Yeltsin that May 10 is the cut-off date for the French. We need to make certain that the Russians understand this time constraint and that we will not agree to the date for a NATO-Russia summit until the text of the charter is fully agreed. Although von Moltke and Afanasyevskiy are continuing negotiations on the charter, Solana and Primakov are not scheduled to meet until May 6, which is already close to our deadline. We should try to use the late April visits of Deputy Secretary Talbott and Secretary Albright to Moscow to clear away the major remaining obstacles. If necessary, we should be prepared to step in with a Presidential phone call to Yeltsin to underscore the gravity of the situation.

How should we handle Russian pressure for a "fourth no" on nuclear storage sites and other nuclear "infrastructure"?

Our position is that nuclear storage sites are effectively covered by the "three no's." Any broader restraint on dual-capable infrastructure is unacceptable. NATO should continue to make this argument and resist including anything beyond a reference to the "three no's" in the charter. In the endgame, however, we may need to be prepared to exchange letters explaining that nuclear storage sites are covered by the "three no's," while rejecting any broader application of the "three no's" to dual-capable infrastructure.

What is our response if the Russians refuse to give up demands for bans on "infrastructure," conventional stationing, etc.? How do we manage a breakdown?

As noted above, we will have until early May to determine how serious the Russians are in their infrastructure demands. Since our current language on the key Section V issues already represents the limits of our ability to compromise, our key aim between now and then will be to convince the Russians that these positions reflect our bottom lines, and that we can only reach agreement on that basis. If we are unable to bridge the gap by our drop-dead date, we can best limit the damage by making clear publicly and to the Russians that we continue to desire to reach agreement on a charter and are prepared to continue working to that end, while making clear why we can go no further on infrastructure issues.

Assuming the drop-dead date cannot be met for a late-May summit, would we want to press to close the NATO-Russia charter prior to Denver or Madrid, or aim for the fall?

One way to avoid perception of a breakdown would be to continue the negotiating process without hiatus and address the question of when to schedule a NATO-Russia summit whenever it arises. While some may believe that the days preceding the Denver Summit of the Eight

could serve as a fallback timeframe, the politics and logistics would preclude any kind of a NATO-Russia event on the margins of Denver. Although less salable to the Russians, the days just prior to Madrid might be a better fallback (with the NATO-Russia event presumably at another location). The far stronger likelihood, however, is that if we fail to have a NATO-Russia event in late May to sign the NATO-Russia document, such a meeting would have to be deferred until after Madrid, and probably until next fall, given the summer schedule (a point we should probably ensure that the Russians understand).

While we may modulate the intensity with which we pursue a NATO-Russia document depending on the Russian negotiating stance and the approach to CFE adaptation, we should make clear that we remain committed to establishing a NATO-Russia relationship and do not want to see Russia isolated or marginalized.

NATO-UKRAINE

Given Ukrainian wavering on the CFE flank agreement, when should we plan on finalizing and signing the NATO-Ukraine document?

While continuing to work on a NATO-Ukraine document, we have taken a strong position with Allies that a draft document should not be presented to the Ukrainians now as leverage to force Ukraine to ratify the CFE flank agreement. We should for the time being continue to draw this linkage and be prepared to put the process on hold if Ukraine declines to cooperate on CFE, though we may want to review this position in the run-up to the mid-May Kuchma visit. On the other hand, if Ukraine reacts positively on CFE we should strive to conclude the NATO-Ukraine document prior to Sintra and arrange to have it signed at Madrid.

ACCESSION TALKS AND RELATIONS WITH INVITEES

Should we continue to seek completion of accession talks by the December NAC?

We have a strong interest in providing as much time as possible for the accession ratification process. Completing accession talks by the December NAC ministerial would give us 15 months to secure ratification prior to the April 1999 50th-anniversary NATO summit, and eight months before the 105th Congress recesses for the 1998 elections. Since the accession negotiating process is straightforward, it should be possible to meet the December NAC target.

Should we press for a single instrument of ratification covering all invitees so that parliaments must vote on the invitees as a block? Or must we/should we pursue separate accession protocols for each invitee?

On the one previous occasion when NATO brought in more than one new member -- Greece and Turkey -- it was accomplished through a single instrument of ratification. In current circumstances, we should also press for a single instrument of ratification. This will help avoid the very divisive possibility that one or more NATO parliaments might vote to ratify NATO membership for only some of the invitees.

Should we seek informal agreement of invitees to NATO force goals through a DPQ-style process in tandem with accession talks?

NATO clearly has an interest in bringing new members into the DPQ force goals process as quickly as possible. It will be extremely useful, when the ratification process begins in early 1998, to have provisional commitments by the new members that will demonstrate that they intend to make a serious military contribution to the Alliance. Thus, rather than delaying this effort until new members are actually taken in, we should establish an informal process to begin integrating them into the NATO military structure. This could be done through informal NATO-plus-1 meetings with the appropriate NATO bodies, including the Defense Review Committee (DRC), which develops force goals for existing allies through the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) process. Partners anticipating a Madrid invitation expect a detailed, substantive set of discussions as part of the accession negotiations; this is the ideal time to elicit commitments on military, personnel security and other relevant issues.

Should invitees be granted special consultative arrangements with the 16 during accession talks? Or only during the ratification process (after signature of the accession protocols)?

There is probably no need to establish special consultative arrangements with invitees during accession talks, since the envisioned period is short and we will want to ensure that they are fully engaged in that process; informal consultations on NAC business could be held, as necessary, to give the invitees a sense of "belonging to the club" without appearing to preempt parliamentary prerogatives to approve their admission. During the 16-month ratification period, however, we should aim at establishing a more regular consultative process.

What could be the elements of such special arrangements? An informal, *ad hoc* mechanism? Observer seats at the NAC, SPC or Political Committee? Or should there be ad hoc 16+3 (or 4 or 5) meetings to pursue dialogue short of observer status?

We will need to devise a mechanism that presages NATO membership, but does not appear to preempt parliamentary ratification processes. Non-voting observer status in the NAC, SPC and Political Committee could be considered appropriate given that signature of the accession protocols will confirm the commitment of the invitees to the principles of the Washington treaty. We will need to be sure that security clearance issues have been worked out before invitees can attend classified meetings. On the other hand, if observer status is deemed to go too far toward preempting ratification, a more acceptable option might be to have weekly or bimonthly NAC and Political Committee "NATO plus" sessions with invitees. This would establish a closer relationship than that enjoyed by any other Partner (including Russia) while not treating ratification as a fait accompli

INTERNAL ADAPTATION

Should we press to finalize work on ESDI, including D/SACEUR and NATO-WEU coordination at the May/June NAC and NAC(D) ministerials? At Madrid?

Work on the D/SACEUR terms of reference and on NATO-WEU coordination issues will be ready for ministerial consideration by Sintra. We should aim to have ministers refer the agreed

documents to Madrid for final approval by heads of state and government, even though the AFSOUTH issue will not be resolved until after the French elections. This will make clear that we are ready to proceed with ESDI with or without the French.

Should we press for finalization of the NATO command structure review (identification of numbers, types and locations of headquarters) at the May/June NAC and NAC(D) ministerials? At Madrid?

NATO CHODs failed to reach agreement on the numbers, types and locations of headquarters in the new structure during their April 22 meeting. CHODs should be encouraged to meet again to try to resolve differences in time for Sintra (or the NAC/D), so that leaders can approve the package at Madrid. Completing this phase of the command structure review does not require a French decision on reintegration. It is understood that, should France integrate, some adjustment may be required in the location of one of the sub-regional headquarters. The distribution of flags is not part of this phase of the review and will not be addressed until after Madrid, by which time French intentions will be known.

If France does not integrate, what should our position be on French participation in the Military Committee and related bodies? Should we address this issue prior to Madrid or defer until later?

Although the UK CHOD has already told his French counterpart that France may have to relinquish its voting seat on the Military Committee if it does not integrate, this is likely to be a minority position within the Alliance. Rather than object in the MC and elsewhere to French participation per se, we should probably adopt an issue-oriented approach to the situation, seeking to insulate France from participating in decision-making on issues, such as defense planning, where its forces are not engaged. The situation may be more difficult on broader ESDI questions, where the French are likely to press to remain players. However, given that France would have no forces dedicated to ESDI activities (and hence no command slots) they are unlikely to be able to play a significant role in the practical work of ESDI. Given the French elections, no French decision on integration will take place until June. If Paris does decide against reintegration, we should defer raising the participation question until after the summit in order to avoid possible French retaliation at Madrid.

Should NATO set a target date and/or parameters for review of the Strategic Concept? At Sintra? At Madrid? When should the review begin? Immediately after Madrid? In early 1988, following the accession talks and implementation of other summit decisions?

Although the Strategic Concept was written and approved in 1991, when the end of the Cold War was clearly in sight, NATO and the European security environment have significantly evolved since then. While much of the Strategic Concept remains valid, a NATO decision to update it to reflect these changes would help buttress our contention that a new NATO has truly emerged from the ashes of the Cold War. An announcement at Madrid would be in keeping with the overall adaptation theme of the summit. The review could begin in the fall or, if the press of accession business was deemed to great, early in 1998. In either case, we should aim at having leaders approve the updated Strategic Concept at the 50th-anniversary summit in 1999.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: The NATO-Russia "Founding Act" (2 pages)	05/15/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: The NATO-Russia "Founding Act" (2 pages)	05/15/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: The NATO-Russia "Founding Act" (2 pages)	05/15/1997	P1/b(1)

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RECORD ID: 9703347
RECEIVED: 14 MAY 97 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 15 MAY 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO - RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 20 MAY 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97051509	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97051513	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97052806	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970515		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970515		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

Rec'd 5/15 7:57

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Bruce Harmon	1	MB 5/15	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(10) copy	
Steinberg	3		
Berger			
Situation Room		5/15	
West Wing Desk	4	for Stern	
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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National Security Council
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5347
5-14-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

'97 MAY 15 PM 6:31

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: The NATO-Russia "Founding Act"

The "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" agreed by Solana and Primakov is a balanced, substantive document that preserves the integrity and institutional prerogatives of the Alliance while laying a basis for a robust NATO-Russia relationship -- provided that Russia wishes to exploit its full potential. It preserves in full NATO's capacity for independent decisions and actions; at the same time, by creating a permanent NATO-Russia forum, it assures Russia a place at the European table and gives Yeltsin political cover in dealing with his domestic critics.

Contents. The Act has five parts, beginning with a preamble that notes that NATO and Russia do not consider one another adversaries and describes the transformations of NATO and Russia. The Act then consists of four sections.

Section I lays out the principles governing the relationship, e.g., restatement of the norms of international conduct in accord with the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act, including commitments such as respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and peaceful resolution of disputes.

Section II creates the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council that will serve as the forum for consultation and coordination between NATO and Russia. The Council will meet regularly at different levels, including at heads of state and government and twice annually at the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister level.

Through the Joint Council, NATO and Russia will: consult on political and security topics; develop joint initiatives based on these consultations; and if there is consensus between NATO and Russia, make joint decisions and take joint action on a case-by-case basis. The document makes explicitly clear (¶17) that neither NATO nor Russia has a right of veto over the other's actions. The rights to independent decision-making and action

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.85)

are preserved, so both are free to act in the absence of consensus.

Section III describes the areas for consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, among them: conflict prevention, joint operations including peacekeeping, information exchange on strategy and defense, arms control, proliferation, theater missile defense and armaments cooperation.

Section IV on the military dimension of the relationship was the most contentious part of the document and potentially the most controversial. The key provisions of Section IV are reiterations of unilateral NATO statements of December 10, 1996 on nuclear weapons deployments and March 14, 1997 on conventional forces stationing. With respect to nuclear deployment, the Act restates NATO's "three no's" ("no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members") and observes that this also applies to nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of new members.

On the conventional force side, the document repeats NATO's March 14 statement that "in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO will carry out its collective defense missions by ensuring interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing." It notes that NATO will have to rely on infrastructure commensurate with those tasks (without distinguishing between "Warsaw Pact" and other infrastructure) and further states that reinforcement may take place "in the event of defense against a threat of aggression" as well as to support peacekeeping. This language, the most difficult to agree, protects NATO's prerogatives while giving the Russians assurances against an offensive military buildup. The text of this section does not prejudice NATO's position in Vienna in the thirty-nation CFE adaptation negotiations.

The Politics. The document contains carefully crafted language and caveats that protect NATO positions (e.g., "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons -- but not an absolute commitment, in case future circumstances change). We can expect Yeltsin to drop these caveats in his public comments; since he is trying to make the best possible case to his domestic critics that he has agreed to a document that safeguards Russia's interests. We do not want to make Yeltsin's political task at home more difficult but in an appropriate way will need to correct egregious misinterpretations in order to keep the record straight here.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 14, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER/DAN FRIED/MARY ANN PETERS

FROM: KI FORT

SUBJECT: NATO-Russia Founding Act

The memorandum for the President at Tab I describes the contents of the NATO-Russia Founding Act as agreed today by Foreign Minister Primakov and Secretary General Solana.

Concurrences by: Anne Witkowsky, Robert Bell

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

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By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.86)

INFORMATION

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Contents. The Act has five parts, beginning with a preamble that notes that NATO and Russia do not consider one another adversaries and describes the transformations of NATO and Russia. The Act then consists of four sections.

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Through the Joint Council, NATO and Russia will: consult on political and security topics; develop joint initiatives based on these consultations; and if there is consensus, make joint decisions and take joint action on a case-by-case basis. The document makes explicitly clear that neither NATO nor Russia has a right of veto over the other's actions. The rights to independent decision-making and action are preserved, so both are free to act in the absence of consensus.

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Section III describes the areas for consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, among them: conflict prevention, joint operations including peacekeeping, information exchange on strategy and defense, arms control, ~~and~~ proliferation.

Section IV on the military dimension of the relationship was the most contentious part of the document and potentially the most controversial. ~~Moscow may publicly and erroneously characterize the provisions as creating categorical barriers to NATO's stationing of nuclear weapons in new member states or utilizing the new states' existing military infrastructure to support NATO activities.~~ The key provisions of Section IV are reiterations of unilateral NATO statements of December 10, 1996 on nuclear weapons deployments and March 14, 1997 on conventional forces stationing. The Act restates NATO's "three no's" ("no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members") and observes that this also applies to nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of new members.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0771-M (1.87)

Section III describes the areas for consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, among them: conflict prevention, joint operations including peacekeeping, information exchange on strategy and defense, arms control and proliferation.

Section IV on the military dimension of the relationship was the most contentious part of the document and potentially the most controversial. Moscow may publicly and erroneously characterize the provisions as creating categorical barriers to NATO's stationing of nuclear weapons in new member states or utilizing the new states' existing military infrastructure to support NATO activities. The key provisions of Section IV are reiterations of unilateral NATO statements of December 10, 1996 on nuclear weapons deployments and March 14, 1997 on conventional forces stationing. The Act restates NATO's "three no's" ("no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members") and observes that this also applies to nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of new members.

The document repeats NATO's March 14 statement that "in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO will carry out its collective defense missions by ensuring interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing." It notes that NATO will have to rely on infrastructure commensurate with those tasks (without distinguishing between "Warsaw Pact" and other infrastructure) and further states that reinforcement may take place "in the event of defense against a threat of aggression" as well as to support peacekeeping. This language, the most difficult to agree, protects NATO's prerogatives while giving the Russians assurances against an offensive military buildup. The text of this section does not prejudice NATO's position in Vienna in the thirty-nation CFE adaptation negotiations.

The Politics. The document contains carefully crafted language and caveats that protect NATO positions (e.g., "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons -- but not an absolute commitment, in case future circumstances change). We can expect Yeltsin to drop these caveats in his public comments; that is understandable, since he is trying to make the best possible case to his domestic critics that he has agreed to a document that safeguards Russia's interests. We do not want to make Yeltsin's political task at home more difficult but must bear in mind the need to correct egregious misinterpretations in order to keep the record straight here.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1622				
Document ID: 9703616				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9703616
RECEIVED: 24 MAY 97 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COSTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 30 MAY 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97052414	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97053113	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97060415	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	970524		VICE PRESIDENT
001	970524		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
002	970530		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970530		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 5/24/97 2:48pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3616

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
TP Harmon			
Davies			
Kerrick	1		
Steinberg			
Berger	2		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	OK 5/30	Taken
Records Mgt	→ 4	TMA 6.3	N
	→ 5	TMA 6.4	N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 3616
6-2-97

'97 MAY 30 PM 8:34

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 30, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Costs of NATO Enlargement

At the briefing on the European trip, you asked about costs of NATO enlargement. Last February, you submitted to the Congress a detailed cost study of NATO enlargement (the executive summary of which is attached).

In this report, DoD estimated what a notional, initial round of NATO enlargement could cost and what portion of those costs might be for the United States, other current members and new members. We assumed that:

- A small group of four, nonspecified Central European countries would join NATO in the first tranche of enlargement.

- NATO's existing strategic concept would serve as the foundation for meeting the defense requirements that result from enlargement.

- In the existing strategic environment, there would be no need to station or permanently forward-deploy substantial NATO forces on the territories of new members. There would be regular training and other cooperation between the forces of current and new members on their territory.

- Costs gradually leading to a mature collective defense capability are incurred over 13 years, from 1997 through 2009.

- Standard NATO cost-sharing rules would be applied for new defense arrangements -- i.e., individual NATO nations pay for the maintenance and modernization of their own national forces while costs for infrastructure are shared where they qualify for common funding.

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Based on these assumptions, DoD estimated that the total costs associated with enlargement from 1997-2009 will be about $2.1 to $2.7 billion per year, or a total of about $27 to $35 billion, divided among the three categories described above as follows:

- **"New member costs for military restructuring"**: about $800 million-$1 billion per year, or a total of $10-13 billion from 1997-2009. *New members would bear responsibility for these costs, most of which they would have to incur with or without NATO membership.*

- **"NATO regional reinforcement capabilities"**: about $600-800 million per year, or a total $8-10 billion from 1997-2009. *Current NATO Allies would bear most of these costs, as the U.S. already has the needed force-projection capability. Allies have already committed to improve their forces in this regard as part of NATO decisions not related to enlargement.*

- **"Direct enlargement costs"**: average $700 to $900 million per year, or a total of $9-12 billion from 1997-2009. *The U.S. share of these costs would be about $150-200 million per year, starting in 1999, the year of new members' accession.*

Allied reaction to our estimates has been generally favorable, though some Allies are concerned by our assertion that they will have to bear costs associated with needed improvements in force projection/reinforcement capability. Prospective new members have welcomed the study, expressed overall agreement with its assumptions, and stated their willingness to bear their share of the costs.

Attachment
Tab A Executive Summary of the Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement

Report to the Congress
On the Enlargement of NATO:
Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications
February, 1997

Executive Summary

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has declared its intent again to admit new members. At a summit in Madrid this coming July, NATO's 16 heads of state and government plan to invite specific states from among the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to start accession talks to join the Alliance. President Clinton and NATO have stressed their support for admitting the first new members by 1999 as part of a broad strategy to foster a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. This report, submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 1048 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act, describes the rationale, benefits, costs and other considerations related to NATO's enlargement.

This report also reflects the administration's commitment to work closely and in a bipartisan manner with Congress as it pursues this policy. Adding new members to NATO requires ratification by the United States Senate and requires both chambers of Congress to approve the resources needed to implement this initiative. If the security guarantees that will be extended to the new members are to be meaningful, they must represent an expression of informed national will. It is therefore essential that NATO enlargement proceed with the active participation and support of the American people and their representatives of both parties in Congress.

The major conclusions of this report include:

NATO enlargement contributes to the broader goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. NATO enlargement is one part of a much broader, post-Cold War strategy to help create a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements: support for German unification; assistance to foster reforms in Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states; negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and the evolution and strengthening of European security and economic institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. NATO enlargement is also part of a much broader series of steps to adapt NATO to the post-Cold War security environment, including adaptation of NATO strategy, strategic concept, command arrangements and force posture, and its willingness to carry out new missions beyond NATO's territory, as it has in Bosnia. As part of this broad series of steps, NATO enlargement aims to help the United States and Europe erase outdated Cold War lines and strengthen shared security into the next century.

Enlargement will yield benefits for the United States, NATO and Europe. Adding Central and East European states to the Alliance will: foster democratic reforms and stability throughout Europe; give NATO a stronger collective defense capability; improve relations among the region's states; improve burden-sharing within NATO; improve general security that will benefit Russian security and the security of other former Soviet states by improving general European stability; create a better environment for trade, investment and economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe; and help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United States in political, economic and security affairs. As President Clinton has said, in this way, "NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish."

NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free. The United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations, and NATO members must provide the capability to back them up. Enlargement will not, however, require a change in NATO's military doctrine, which has already shifted from positional defense against an identified enemy to a capacity for flexible deployment to areas of need. Because the United States already has the world's pre-eminent deployment capability, and substantial forces forward deployed in Europe, there will be no need for additional U.S. forces. Current European NATO members are already investing in improved capabilities to operate beyond their border, and Central European states, including likely new members, are likewise investing in modernizing and restructuring their forces. These efforts have already begun and would continue whether or not NATO adds members.

Costs to the United States will be modest. The Department of Defense has estimated both the direct enlargement costs (e.g., for interoperability between the forces of current and new members and for extending NATO's integrated command, communications and air defense surveillance systems) and the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing and new members which will also contribute to carrying out NATO's missions in an enlarged alliance. The direct enlargement costs are estimated to average $700-900 million annually, for a total of around $9-12 billion between 1997 and 2009, the date by which new NATO members are anticipated to have reached a "mature capability" as discussed later in this report. The U.S. share of these costs, chiefly for our share of the NATO budgets for direct enlargement costs, would largely be incurred in the ten years following formal accession in 1999, and would average about $150-200 million annually during that period. The estimated costs for new members associated with restructuring their forces are estimated to be about $800 million-$1 billion annually, while those for improvements of our NATO Allies' regional reinforcement capabilities are estimated at $600-800 million annually -- respectively $10-13 billion and $8-10 billion over 1997-2009. These costs, in accordance with long-standing NATO financial principles, would be borne by those nations. The United States would share in these costs only to the extent the U.S., with Congressional approval, may chose to continue or expand the current modest assistance being provided to the military modernization of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

There are greater costs and risks to *not* enlarging NATO on the current schedule. The security of Europe has been a vital interest of the United States throughout this century, and it remains so, including for the new democracies to the east. If we fail to seize this historical opportunity to help integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively with our European partners, old and new, through NATO. Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger than national defense. A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing in the region and would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe. NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while the U.S. would be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership and withdrawing from its responsibilities in Europe and the world.

The United States and NATO are committed to constructive relations with Russia. The United States and its NATO Allies are committed to building a strategic partnership with a democratic Russia; indeed, that effort and NATO enlargement are both part of the same enterprise of building a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe. While many Russian leaders have expressed opposition to NATO enlargement, this initiative can serve Russia's own long-term security interests by fostering stability to its west. The United States and NATO already have worked with Russia on specific tasks, including the peace process and military operation in Bosnia. Parallel to NATO enlargement, the United States and NATO have proposed a series of initiatives, including a NATO-Russia Charter and a permanent consultative mechanism, in order to ensure that Russia plays an active part in efforts to build a new Europe even as NATO enlargement proceeds.

In summary, the addition of new members to NATO will strengthen the Alliance, contribute to a stronger and more peaceful Europe and benefit American security interests. It is one of the President's highest priorities for American foreign policy.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3616

May 24, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: DANIEL FRIED DF AND ALEXANDER VERSHBOW /DF/a

SUBJECT: Costs of NATO Enlargement

At last Friday's pre-brief on the European trip, the President asked about the costs of NATO enlargement. Tab I contains your memorandum to the President providing detail.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Executive Summary of the Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1624				
Document ID: 9703958				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Deciding Which Countries to Support for NATO Membership at the Madrid Summit (3 pages)	06/09/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Deciding Which Countries to Support for NATO Membership at the Madrid Summit (3 pages)	06/09/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1624

FOLDER TITLE:
9703958

2015-0772-M
rs1359

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9703958
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 97 13

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHMIDT
VERSHBOW
FRIED

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECIDING WHICH COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AT MADRID SUMMIT

ACTION: OBE PER STEINBERG DUE DATE: 14 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SCHMIDT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97060921	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
001		X	97061108	OBE PER STEINBERG

National Security Council
The White House

Recvd 6/10/97 12pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3959

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (12) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
~~Harmon~~ Brown	1	BBE 6/10	
Davies		✓	
Kerrick	copy		
Steinberg	2	OBE	per JS
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(12) 6/10	N
Records Mgt.	4		2

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 9 PM 6:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Record 6/10/97 12pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3959

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (12) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon (Blum)	1	HB 6/10	
Davies		✓	
Kerrick	copy		
Steinberg	2	OBE	per JS
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(12) 6/10	N
Records Mgt.	4		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 9 PM 6:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3958

June 9, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DAN FRIED/STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT JRS

SUBJECT: Deciding Which Countries to Support for NATO Membership at the Madrid Summit

Attached at Tab I is your action memorandum to the President seeking his approval for our supporting a small group consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit. Since Ambassador Hunter is scheduled to convey our official views to Secretary General Solana on Wednesday, we suggest that you try to schedule a few minutes with the President immediately after the Principals Committee meeting to convey the results of meeting and seek his approval for the recommendations set out in the attached memorandum. State will have a guidance cable prepared to send out once they receive word from us that the President is on board.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/9/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Deciding Which Countries to Support for NATO Membership at the Madrid Summit

Purpose

To decide whom the United States should support for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at Madrid.

Background

Principals met on June 10 to make a formal recommendation to you on whom the United States should support for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit. Our Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Robert Hunter, is scheduled to meet privately with Secretary General Solana on June 11 to present our official view. With the Summit now less than a month a way and many Allies urging a larger Madrid group than we believe wise, Principals believe we need to clearly establish the U.S. bottom line and begin prompt and active lobbying with allies to build consensus around our position. As always, U.S. leadership is the key.

In their meeting, Principals noted that in the immediate run-up to the Sintra NAC ministerial we had already adopted, on an informal and provisional basis, a "small group" approach. Consistent with this, you have yourself articulated U.S. arguments in favor of a small group in recent meetings with Chirac, Blair and Kohl. Although at Sintra a majority of Allies expressed support for Romania and Slovenia in addition to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Principals believe this support was soft and could be overcome, particularly if Madrid settled on a strong open-door package making clear that the first new members will not be the last and that there definitely will be a second enlargement decision.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2014
2015-0772-M (1.88)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Principals agreed that only Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had fully demonstrated the necessary progress on military, political, economic and social reform to be suitable invitees at this time.

They recognized the arguments in favor of Slovenia and Romania but concluded that, assuming we take a strong stance on the open door, our interests are best served by a membership invitation only where the case for the country in question is very strong. On that standard, Romania does not meet the test because, for all of its impressive progress in the last year, there is a long way to go before it reaches the level of development on economic, political and perhaps military reform of the other three. Given that the most dramatic features of Romania's reforms are only months old (vice years for other CEE candidates), a further period of consolidation is necessary to give confidence in the permanence of the reforms.

While Slovenia's democratic and economic performance generally matches that of the three, its military development lags and its ability to make a political contribution to the Alliance is relatively untested. In reaching a conclusion about Slovenia, Principals relied heavily on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there is no military necessity for an assured land link to Hungary from the point of view of Article V commitments.

While the Principals arrived at their conclusion primarily based on country-specific reasons, they recognized that there are also strong general advantages to limiting invitations to the three strongest candidates:

- A limited initial group will underscore that the enlargement process is careful and cautious -- a message that is important to Congress.

- The danger of dilution of the Alliance's military effectiveness will be diminished if only a limited number of countries need to be assimilated into NATO's structures at one time.

- A decision that leaves plausible, relatively non-controversial -- if less well-developed -- candidacies for later rounds underscores the reality that there will be later rounds, and could increase other Allies' support for a robust open-door package at Madrid.

- Given that all Allies favor at least the three, whereas support for the other two is distributed among differing subgroups of countries, a consensus on the three should be easier to achieve as well as "deeper" than a consensus at

higher numbers which could leave the damaging impression of deal-making, political compromise or log-rolling.

Based on the above reasoning, Principals recommend that you approve our supporting a small group consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit and authorize Ambassador Hunter to inform Secretary General Solana of our decision at their June 11 meeting. At the same time, we would intend to begin pursuing an active diplomatic and congressional effort aimed at securing allied and congressional support for our position, while informing candidate countries of our views to give them time to prepare for Madrid.

We recommend that you make phone calls to Kohl, Blair and Chirac in the next few days to underscore the firmness of our position and the need to avoid public displays of disunity on this issue in the run-up to Madrid. Chirac will be the most difficult -- after his election setback, he will be all the more determined to score a "French" victory over the Americans regarding Romania's candidacy. Kohl will need to be persuaded to take a more active part in convincing Chirac that a small group of three is better for the long-term credibility of the Alliance and that a strong open-door package will be sufficient to reassure the Romanians. Your bilaterals at Denver should be the target for bringing the issue to closure, although it is possible Chirac will take it down to the wire at Madrid.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our supporting a small group consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Deciding Which Countries to Support for NATO Membership at the Madrid Summit

Purpose

To decide whom the ~~U.S.~~ United States should support for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at Madrid.

Background

Principals met earlier today (~~July~~ June 10) to make a formal recommendation to you on whom the ~~U.S.~~ United States should support for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit. Our Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Robert Hunter, is scheduled to meet privately with Secretary General Solana tomorrow (~~July~~ June 11) to present our official view. With the Summit now less than a month a way and many Allies urging a larger Madrid group than we believe wise, Principals believe we need to clearly establish the U.S. bottom line and begin prompt and active lobbying with allies to build consensus around our position. As always, U.S. leadership is the key.

In their meeting, Principals noted that in the immediate run-up to the Sintra NAC ministerial we had already adopted, on an informal and provisional basis, a "small group" approach. Consistent with this, you have yourself articulated U.S. arguments in favor of a small group in recent meetings with Chirac, Blair and Kohl. Although at Sintra a majority of Allies expressed support for Romania and Slovenia in addition to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Principals believe this support was soft and could be overcome, particularly if Madrid settled on a strong open-door package making clear that the first new members will not be the last and that there definitely will be a second enlargement decision.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/9/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 5/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.90)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Principals agreed that only Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had fully demonstrated the necessary progress on military, political, economic and social reform to be suitable invitees at this time.

They recognized the arguments in favor of Slovenia and Romania but concluded that, assuming we take a strong stance on the open door, our interests are best served by a membership invitation only where the case for the country in question is very strong. On that standard, Romania does not meet the test because, for all of its impressive progress in the last year, there is a long way to go before it reaches the level of development on economic, political and perhaps military reform of the other three. Given that the most dramatic features of Romania's reforms are only months old (vice years for other CEE candidates), a further period of consolidation is necessary to give confidence in the permanence of the reforms.

While Slovenia's democratic and economic performance generally matches that of the three, its military development lags and its ability to make a political contribution to the Alliance is relatively untested. In reaching a conclusion about Slovenia, Principals relied heavily on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there is no military necessity for an assured land link to Hungary from the point of view of Article V commitments.

While the Principals arrived at their conclusion primarily based on country-specific reasons, they recognized that there are also strong general advantages to limiting invitations to the three strongest candidates:

- A limited initial group will underscore that the enlargement process is careful and cautious – a message that is important to Congress.

- The danger of dilution of the Alliance's military effectiveness will be diminished if only a limited number of countries need to be assimilated into NATO's structures at one time.

- A decision that leaves plausible, relatively non-controversial – if less well-developed – candidacies for later rounds underscores the reality that there will be later rounds, and could increase other Allies' support for a robust open-door package at Madrid.

- Given that all Allies favor at least the three, whereas support for the other two is distributed among differing subgroups of countries, a consensus on the three should be easier to achieve as well as "deeper" than a consensus at higher numbers which could leave the damaging impression of deal-making, political compromise or log-rolling.

Based on the above reasoning, Principals recommend that you approve our supporting a small group consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit and authorize Ambassador Hunter ~~Be~~ to inform Secretary General Solana of our decision at their ~~July~~ June 11 meeting. At the same time, we would intend to begin pursuing an active diplomatic and congressional effort aimed at securing allied and congressional support for our position, while informing candidate countries of our views to give them time to prepare for Madrid.

We recommend that you make phone calls to Kohl, Blair and Chirac in the next few days to underscore the firmness of our position and the need to avoid public displays of disunity on this issue in the run-up to Madrid. Chirac will be the most difficult -- after his election setback, he will be all the more determined to score a "French" victory over the Americans regarding Romania's candidacy. Kohl will need to be persuaded to take a more active part in convincing Chirac that a small group of three is better for the long-term credibility of the Alliance and that a strong open-door package will be sufficient to reassure the Romanians. Your bilaterals at Denver should be the target for bringing the issue to closure, although it is possible Chirac will take it down to the wire at Madrid.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our supporting a small group consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. talking points	re: Points to be Made in Meeting with Senate NATO Observer Group (8 pages)	06/11/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Senate NATO Observer Group (SNOG) (3 pages)	06/10/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. talking points	re: Points to be Made in Meeting with Senate NATO Observer Group (4 pages)	06/10/1997	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Senate NATO Observer Group (SNOG) (3 pages)	06/10/1997	P1/b(1)
001e. talking points	re: Points to be Made in Meeting with Senate NATO Observer Group (2 pages)	06/10/1997	P1/b(1)

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RECORD ID: 9704000
RECEIVED: 10 JUN 97 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 10 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
AP

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFO / TALKING POINTS FOR PRES 11 JUN MTG W/ SENATE NATO OBSERVER GRP - SNOG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 16 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97061019	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97061110	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	97061411	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970610		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970610		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/11/97

INTRODUCTION

- THANKS FOR MEETING ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. WANT TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT WITH YOU. COMMITTED TO CONSULTING CLOSELY AS WE PREPARE FOR MADRID.

- WE ARE ON THRESHOLD OF TRULY HISTORIC DECISIONS THAT WILL PREPARE EUROPE TO MEET CHALLENGES OF 21ST CENTURY. WANT YOUR VIEWS ON ONGOING BASIS.

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~~SECRET~~ Card 2 of 15

- AT MADRID, WILL LAUNCH NEW SECURITY SYSTEM FOR EUROPE THAT IS PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC AND UNDIVIDED.

- OUR LEADING ROLE OVER PAST 3-4 YEARS HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY STRONG BIPARTISAN SPIRIT THAT HAS UNDERPINNED OUR EFFORTS TO ADAPT AND ENLARGE NATO TO NEW CHALLENGES.

NATO-RUSSIA

- SIGNATURE IN PARIS OF NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT TWO WEEKS AGO DEMONSTRATES THAT WE CAN BUILD NEW, EXPANDING NATO WHILE DEVELOPING LONG-TERM PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA.

- NATO-RUSSIA DID NOT AND WILL NOT IN ANY WAY DILUTE NATO OR LIMIT ITS FREEDOM OF ACTION.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2015-0772-M (1.92)

~~SECRET~~ Card 3 of 15

NATO ENLARGEMENT: WHY

- NOW WE ARE LOOKING AHEAD TO MADRID NATO SUMMIT WHERE KEY ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE.

- NATO ENLARGEMENT IS VERY MUCH IN U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS:

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- ADMITTING NEW DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WILL STRENGTHEN NATO'S ABILITY TO MEET NEW CHALLENGES: AS WE HAVE SEEN IN BOSNIA, NATO IS STILL NEEDED AFTER COLD WAR, AND OUR NEW PARTNERS ARE READY TO SHARE BURDENS OF DEALING WITH TODAY'S SECURITY RISKS.

- NATO ENLARGEMENT, ALONG WITH ENLARGEMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION, WILL HELP SECURE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN CEE COUNTRIES, DOING FOR EUROPE'S EAST WHAT MARSHALL PLAN AND CREATION OF NATO DID 50 YEARS AGO FOR WESTERN EUROPE.

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- ENLARGEMENT WILL ENCOURAGE PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY; ALREADY HAPPENING (HUNGARY-ROMANIA, ROMANIA-UKRAINE, POLAND-LITHUANIA).

- AND ENLARGEMENT WILL ERASE THE ILLEGITIMATE LINE THAT STALIN DREW ACROSS EUROPE, ENABLING US TO BRING CONTINENT TOGETHER FOR FIRST TIME IN HISTORY.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: WHO

- DURING PAST WEEKS, WE HAVE BEEN FOCUSING ATTENTION ON CRITICAL QUESTIONS OF WHO TO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN FIRST GROUP INVITED TO BEGIN ACCESSION TALKS, AND HOW TO FORGE CLOSER LINKS WITH PARTNERS NOT YET READY TO JOIN NATO AS FULL MEMBERS.

- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT HAD PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH NATO COLLEAGUES AT SINTRA NAC MINISTERIAL. I DISCUSSED WITH BLAIR, CHIRAC AND KOHL.

~~SECRET~~ Card 7 of 15

- FIVE SERIOUS CANDIDATES HAVE EMERGED IN ALLIANCE DELIBERATIONS: POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA. HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO EACH AND TO MERITS OF SMALLER OR LARGER GROUP. WANT TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS.

- LET ME FIRST TELL YOU WHY WE ARE INCLINED TOWARD A SMALLER FIRST GROUP, COMBINED WITH A FORWARD-LEANING POSTURE ON FUTURE ENLARGEMENT (THE "OPEN DOOR").

- WE BELIEVE FIRST GROUP SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES. THIS WILL ENSURE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ALLIANCE AS WE EMBARK ON WHAT WILL BE STEADY, DELIBERATE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT.

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- EACH COUNTRY INVITED TO JOIN NATO MUST HAVE AN ESTABLISHED TRACK RECORD OF REFORM. SINCE NATO MEMBERSHIP IRREVERSIBLE, WE MUST BE CONFIDENT NEW MEMBERS ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS THAT ALLIANCE REPRESENTS AND IS PLEDGED TO DEFEND.

- ALSO NEED TO KEEP IN MIND BASIC CRITERION CONTAINED IN NATO TREATY ITSELF: THAT NEW MEMBERS MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO COMMON SECURITY OF NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. SINCE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT MOST SOLEMN SECURITY GUARANTEES, WE WANT COUNTRIES WHO WILL BE 'PRODUCERS" AND NOT "CONSUMERS" OF SECURITY.

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~~SECRET~~ Card 9 of 15

- IN ADDITION, SMALL GROUP WOULD BE EASIER FOR NATO TO ABSORB MILITARILY. THIS IS VIEW OF OUR MILITARY LEADERSHIP, WHICH I SHARE.

- A SMALLER GROUP WILL ALSO HELP KEEP DOWN COSTS. RECALL THAT COST ESTIMATES IN OUR FEBRUARY ENLARGEMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS BASED ON 4 RATHER THAN 3 NEW MEMBERS; COSTS WILL GO UP WITH 5.

- BECAUSE OF OUR INCLINATION TOWARD A SMALL FIRST GROUP, WE FEEL ESPECIALLY STRONGLY ABOUT NEED FOR A STRONG AND CREDIBLE "OPEN DOOR" POLICY AT MADRID.

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- COUNTRIES NOT SELECTED AT MADRID NEED TO HEAR UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE FIRST SHALL NOT BE THE LAST, AND THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING CONSIGNED TO "GRAY ZONE."

- WE WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT OPEN-DOOR PLEDGE IS ACCOMPANIED BY PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THOSE NOT SELECTED IN FIRST GROUP CAN CONTINUE TO PREPARE FOR MEMBERSHIP.

- THIS WILL INCLUDE CONTINUATION OF SPECIAL DIALOGUES ON MEMBERSHIP ISSUES, TOGETHER WITH ENHANCEMENTS TO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND NEW EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL.

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- THAT SUMS UP OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING. INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR VIEWS, INCLUDING ON MERITS OF PARTICULAR CANDIDATES.

FOLLOW-UP POINTS

- RIGHT NOW, THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO THAT POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY ARE CLEARLY STRONGEST CANDIDATES. OPINIONS DIFFER ON WHETHER ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA COME CLOSE TO THE LEVEL OF THESE THREE.

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~~SECRET~~ Card 12 of 15

- ROMANIA HAS MADE GREAT STRIDES IN RECENT MONTHS BUT NOT YET CONSOLIDATED POLITICAL AND MARKET ECONOMIC REFORMS. SINCE ADMISSION TO NATO IS IRREVERSIBLE STEP, NEED TO BE MORE CONFIDENT REFORMS ARE IRREVERSIBLE.

- SLOVENIA IS CLOSER CALL. KNOW SOME HERE SUPPORT SLOVENIA WITH GOOD REASONS. BUT IT LAGS BEHIND OTHERS MILITARILY AND IS STILL SOMEWHAT INWARD-LOOKING POLITICALLY.

- NOT CONVINCED SLOVENIA TODAY WOULD MAKE SUFFICIENT MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE, AND BELIEVE IT NEEDS TO DISPLAY STRONGER INTEREST IN STABILITY OF WIDER REGION.

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~~SECRET~~ Card 13 of 15

- JOINT CHIEFS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO ADMIT SLOVENIA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A "LAND BRIDGE" TO HUNGARY IN ORDER TO DEFEND HUNGARY WHEN IT BECOMES A MEMBER.

- BOTH COUNTRIES ON RIGHT TRACK, HOWEVER, AND ARE CLEARLY STRONG CANDIDATES FOR SECOND ENLARGEMENT DECISION. THIS IS ONE REASON WHY WE WILL SEEK STRONG "OPEN-DOOR" COMMITMENT AT MADRID.

- STRONG OPEN-DOOR PLEDGE WILL ALSO REASSURE OTHER ASPIRING MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY BALTIC STATES, THEY ARE NOT BEING CONSIGNED TO A "GRAY ZONE."

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NEXT STEPS

- WITH MADRID LESS THAN A MONTH AWAY, NATO SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA WANTS TO KNOW OUR FINAL DECISION ON "WHO," POSSIBLY EVEN THIS WEEK. WE ALSO NEED TO BEGIN INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES AIMED AT BUILDING A CONSENSUS.

- THIS DISCUSSION WILL BE INVALUABLE TO ME IN WEIGHING FINAL U.S. POSITION.

- HAVE ASKED MADELEINE, BILL COHEN AND SANDY BERGER TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS WE APPROACH MADRID, AND AFTER.

- COUNTING ON YOU AND YOUR OTHER COLLEAGUES IN SENATE FOR CONTINUED BIPARTISAN SUPPORT.

~~SECRET~~

- APPRECIATE YOUR PLANS TO SEND GROUP AS PART OF MY DELEGATION TO MADRID. LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE.

National Security Council
The White House

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COMMENTS: Senate NATO Observer Group (SNOG)

'97 JUN 10 PM 6:35

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1997

MEETING WITH

SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP (SNOG)

DATE: June 11, 1997

LOCATION: Yellow Oval Room

TIME: 6:30-7:15 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/11/97

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Encourage continued bipartisan support for NATO enlargement.**
- **Consult with the SNOG on whom to support for inclusion in the first group to be invited to join NATO at the Madrid Summit.**
- **Indicate our current strong preference for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and commitment to a robust "open door" policy on future enlargement.**
- **Emphasize our desire to continue close consultations with the Congress as the NATO enlargement process proceeds.**

CONTEXT OF MEETING

You have agreed to meet with the Senate NATO Observer Group (SNOG) to discuss which countries to support at Madrid for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks. The meeting is both timely and urgent: we need your final decision on the "who" this week so that we can begin the intensive diplomatic work needed to forge an Alliance consensus around the U.S. position.

Secretary Albright conveyed our "predisposition" in favor of a small group at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting at Sintra on May 29, and you laid out our arguments in your meetings with Chirac, Blair and Kohl. With Madrid less than a month away, however, Secretary General Solana is now seeking more definitive national positions. Bob Hunter will meet with Solana later this week, and Bill Cohen will want to lay out U.S. views at his meetings with NATO defense ministers on Thursday and Friday. Thus, your discussion with the SNOG gives us the opportunity to foreshadow our own thinking on the "who" while giving the Senators the opportunity to inform your decision in advance of the upcoming Alliance meetings.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/10/07

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.93)

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The SNOG is a very diverse group of 28 Senators, combining strong supporters of enlargement with undecideds and critics of various types. The issue cuts across party lines. Some critics and undecideds (e.g., Kerrey, Moynihan, Wellstone, Warner) worry about enlargement's impact on Russia and arms control and do not accept our integrationist rationale. Others (Stevens, Snowe, Dorgan and others) have concerns about cost and dilution of NATO's effectiveness. Hutchison's criticism combines cost, dilution and worries about intra-CEE rivalries. The strongest supporters include Lott, Roth, Biden, Lieberman, Mikulski, Coats and Hagel. Biden and Roth support four (the usual three plus Slovenia); Coats supports five (adding Romania). Since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, concerns about cost and burdensharing have taken on greater weight.

The SNOG's diversity of views allows us to define a strong middle ground for our policy. You should also note that we welcome the SNOG's intention to send a small group to Madrid and are factoring the group into our trip planning. The SNOG has met with Secretary Albright, Strobe Talbott and Ambassador Hunter.

AGENDA

We recommend that you open up with about 5-10 minutes of remarks, briefly articulating the rationale for NATO enlargement (the "why"), and then discussing our approach to the "who" and our commitment to a robust "open door" policy. You may then want to turn to Secretary Albright and Deputy Defense Secretary White for brief remarks. After that, you should ask Senators for their views.

BACKGROUND

At our meeting on Tuesday, Principals reaffirmed their recommendation to you that we support a small group of three candidates at Madrid: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. All agreed that, once we settle on a position, we need to stick with it and not be drawn into log-rolling with the French and other allies over Romania or Slovenia. Our optimum goal should be to come to closure by the time of your bilaterals with key allies at Denver -- while recognizing that Chirac may choose to play this down to the wire at Madrid.

We believe that many members of the NATO Observer Group who support enlargement share our preference for three, but will want to hear our reasoning (and be assured that we are genuinely consulting with them before making final decisions). In our view, the first group should be restricted to the strongest candidates in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness

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of the Alliance. Costs also argue in favor of keeping the first group small. On political, economic and military grounds, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are far ahead of the other candidates. Although France, Italy and a number of other allies (and possibly some members of the Observer Group) support Romania and Slovenia, we do not believe they are ready. Romania has made a great deal of progress in recent months but has not yet consolidated their political and market economic reforms, while Slovenia is still politically inward looking and has little to offer NATO militarily.

At the same time, however, both countries could be strong candidates for a second enlargement decision if they continue current progress. It is also possible that Austria, and perhaps Sweden and Finland, may seek membership in the not-too-distant future. This is one important reason why we are seeking a strong open-door commitment at Madrid. Such a commitment will also help reassure the Baltics that they are not being consigned to a "grey zone" and keep them on a Westernizing course. It will also help us keep our options open for the future.

The talking points set out our case for a "small group" approach and a strong open-door package for Madrid. We also include several questions and answers on hard questions Observer Group members might raise, including the costs of enlargement and the risks of "dilution" of the Alliance posed most recently in Henry Kissinger's op-ed piece on the NATO-Russia relationship. Some Senators may also complain about the Administration's lack of forthcomingness in sharing information with the SNOG on developments within NATO on enlargement (the subject of a sharp letter from Senator Lott). State has since worked out arrangements which appear to have satisfied the Senators (see tab C).

Attachments
Tab A Points to Be Made
Tab B Qs and As
Tab C Albright letter to Senator Roth

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POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP

Introduction

- Thanks for meeting on such short notice. Want to discuss preparations for NATO Summit with you. Committed to consulting closely as we prepare for Madrid.
- We are on threshold of truly historic decisions that will prepare Europe to meet challenges of 21st Century. Want your views on ongoing basis.
- At Madrid, will launch new security system for Europe that is peaceful, democratic and undivided.
- Our leading role over past 3-4 years has been enhanced by strong bipartisan spirit that has underpinned our efforts to adapt and enlarge NATO to new challenges.

NATO-Russia

- Signature in Paris of NATO-Russia Founding Act two weeks ago demonstrates that we can build new, expanding NATO while developing long-term partnership with Russia.
- NATO-Russia did not and will not in any way dilute NATO or limit its freedom of action.

NATO enlargement: Why

- Now we are looking ahead to Madrid NATO Summit where key Alliance decisions on NATO enlargement will take place.
- NATO enlargement is very much in U.S. national interests:
  - Admitting new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe will strengthen NATO's ability to meet new challenges: as we have seen in Bosnia, NATO is still needed after Cold War, and our new partners are ready to share burdens of dealing with today's security risks.
  - NATO enlargement, along with enlargement of European Union, will help secure democratic reforms in CEE countries, doing for Europe's East what Marshall Plan and creation of NATO did 50 years ago for Western Europe.
  - Enlargement will encourage prospective members to settle their differences peacefully; already happening (Hungary-Romania, Romania-Ukraine, Poland-Lithuania).

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VJ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.94)

- And enlargement will erase the illegitimate line that Stalin drew across Europe, enabling us to bring continent together for first time in history.

NATO enlargement: Who

- During past weeks, we have been focusing attention on critical questions of who to support for inclusion in first group invited to begin accession talks, and how to forge closer links with Partners not yet ready to join NATO as full members.

- Secretary Albright had preliminary exchange of views with NATO colleagues at Sintra NAC ministerial. I discussed with Blair, Chirac and Kohl.

- Five serious candidates have emerged in Alliance deliberations: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Have given careful consideration to each and to merits of smaller or larger group. Want to hear your views.

- Let me first tell you why we are inclined toward a smaller first group, combined with a forward-leaning posture on future enlargement (the "open door").

- We believe first group should be limited to the strongest candidates. This will ensure credibility and effectiveness of Alliance as we embark on what will be steady, deliberate process of enlargement.

- Each country invited to join NATO must have an established track record of reform. Since NATO membership irreversible, we must be confident new members are firmly committed to values and institutions that Alliance represents and is pledged to defend.

- Also need to keep in mind basic criterion contained in NATO Treaty itself: that new members must be able to contribute to common security of North Atlantic area. Since we are talking about most solemn security guarantees, we want countries who will be 'producers" and not "consumers" of security.

- In addition, small group would be easier for NATO to absorb militarily. This is view of our military leadership, which I share.

- A smaller group will also help keep down costs. Recall that cost estimates in our February enlargement report to Congress based on 4 rather than 3 new members; costs will go up with 5.

- Because of our inclination toward a small first group, we feel especially strongly about need for a strong and credible "open door" policy at Madrid.

- Countries not selected at Madrid need to hear unequivocally that the first shall not be the last, and that they are not being consigned to "gray zone."

- We will work to ensure that open-door pledge is accompanied by process through which those not selected in first group can continue to prepare for membership.

- This will include continuation of special dialogues on membership issues, together with enhancements to Partnership for Peace and new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

- That sums up our preliminary thinking. Interested in hearing your views, including on merits of particular candidates.

Follow-up points

- Right now, there is general agreement within NATO that Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary are clearly strongest candidates. Opinions differ on whether Romania and Slovenia come close to the level of these three.

- Romania has made great strides in recent months but not yet consolidated political and market economic reforms. Since admission to NATO is irreversible step, need to be more confident reforms are irreversible.

- Slovenia is closer call. Know some here support Slovenia with good reasons. But it lags behind others militarily and is still somewhat inward-looking politically.

- Not convinced Slovenia today would make sufficient military contribution to Alliance, and believe it needs to display stronger interest in stability of wider region.

- Joint Chiefs have concluded that it is not essential to admit Slovenia in order to provide a "land bridge" to Hungary in order to defend Hungary when it becomes a member.

- Both countries on right track, however, and are clearly strong candidates for second enlargement decision. This is one reason why we will seek strong "open-door" commitment at Madrid.

- Strong open-door pledge will also reassure other aspiring members, particularly Baltic states, they are not being consigned to a "gray zone."

Next Steps

- With Madrid less than a month away, NATO Secretary General Solana wants to know our final decision on "who," possibly even this week. We also need to begin intensive discussions with allies aimed at building a consensus.

- This discussion will be invaluable to me in weighing final U.S. position.

- Have asked Madeleine, Bill Cohen and Sandy Berger to keep you informed of developments as we approach Madrid, and after.

- Counting on you and your other colleagues in Senate for continued bipartisan support.

- Appreciate your plans to send group as part of my delegation to Madrid. Look forward to seeing you there.

Questions and Answers

Kissinger Claim in WP Op-Ed that NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia a veto over NATO decisions.

- Kissinger simply got it wrong.
- The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council established by the Founding Act sets up a consultative mechanism between NATO and Russia. It does not take the place of the NAC -- which remains supreme decision-making body of Alliance.
- The Act does foresee the possibility of joint decision-making but only in specific situations where the two sides agree to act together.
- The Act specifically states that "provisions of this document do not provide NATO or Russia, at any stage, with a right of veto the actions of the other."
- We and NATO took great pains to ensure that the Act fully preserves NATO's freedom of action.
- Our policy has been guided by determination to ensure that NATO even as it takes on new missions and new members remains a strong military alliance whose number-one task is collective defense of its members.
- Although Founding Act gives Russia no veto, it is our intent to bring Russia into consultative relationship with NATO that will prevent Russia from becoming isolated and enhance overall European integration.

Concern that the costs of enlargement will be higher than set out in the report to Congress on enlargement we produced last February.

- We stand by our cost estimates.
- Our study assumed that, given the current low threat level, there is no need to station substantial NATO forces on the territory of new members.
- Much of the costs of enlargement will be borne by new members themselves and by our allies, who need to upgrade their force projection capabilities with or without enlargement.
- Most of the money the United States will need to spend will be for NATO common funding for communications and other upgrades to help ensure interoperability between NATO and new members.

- Our estimate, based on normal NATO cost-sharing rules, is that this will cost us about $150-200 million per year, or about one tenth of one percent of our defense budget.

Suggestion that enlargement may dilute NATO and rob it of its effectiveness.

- We are convinced that adding Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary will strengthen NATO and enhance European security. They have already pitched in with IFOR in Bosnia, with troops and bases.

- Will not only strengthen military capabilities of Alliance, but solidify reforms in these countries and ensure their permanent integration into Western community.

- At same time, need to beware of bringing in countries who have not yet consolidated reform or demonstrated ability to contribute to Alliance militarily or politically.

- This is why we do not favor including Romania and Slovenia in first group, while acknowledging they could be strong candidates for membership down the road.

Details on our open door package.

- We want NATO to make an explicit commitment at Madrid to take in additional new members in the future.

- We also want to continue the membership dialogues that now exist between aspiring members and NATO in order to help runners-up continue to prepare for possible membership.

- We also want NATO review the candidacies of aspiring members.

- Strengthened Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership council will be added mechanisms for deepening these countries' interaction with the Alliance.

Information Sharing with SNOG

- Regret delay in working out arrangements for sharing information on developments within Alliance on enlargement.

- Understand you will be receiving weekly summaries of diplomatic reporting and frequent briefings for you and your staff.

- Trust this will be satisfactory.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Roth:

Thank you for your letter of May 22 expressing your interest in quickly establishing a useful and timely flow of information between the Executive Branch and the Senate NATO Observer Group. I agree that this is an important priority.

Let me note at the outset that I am very pleased that members of the Observer Group will join us at Madrid. The NATO Summit will be an historic event, and the participation of the Observer Group will help to demonstrate the early, active, and bipartisan participation of Congress in this important decision. Your suggestion that we arrange to publicize the Group's presence at the Summit is in both our interests, and we will work with you to do so in an appropriate manner. In the coming days, we will provide you with additional details about suggestions for your itinerary and role at Madrid.

Your letter constructively frames a number of questions regarding the flow of information between the Administration and the Observer Group. I would like to outline my thoughts on steps the Administration intends to take to ensure that you, Senator Biden and the other members of the Senate NATO Observer Group can play a meaningful and effective role as enlargement talks progress within the Alliance.

I intend to continue to seek your early counsel in the development of the main elements of the United States positions regarding policy issues directly related to NATO enlargement. It was useful to be able to solicit the Group's initial input at our May 14 meeting on such

The Honorable
William V. Roth, Jr.,
United States Senate.

questions as how many states to invite for NATO membership. I look forward to continuing to receive views from Senators in the Group. As always, senior Administration officials will be available to the Group to discuss the basic issues and questions facing the Executive Branch. Of course, the final decision on U.S. positions remains with the President.

In Washington, we would plan to continue our regular and detailed briefings on the process of NATO enlargement. The Administration's NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, as well as other offices, will be available to address specific requests and questions as they arise.

Consistent with the established process of providing written information on arms control negotiations to the Senate and House Arms Control Observer Groups, we will prepare and regularly transmit classified written summaries on the process of NATO enlargement. The documents will summarize the relevant issues related to NATO's enlargement, and will draw on incoming reporting cables from NATO meetings and other materials, as appropriate. With regard to your request that we provide information on CFE adaptation, I agree this issue is relevant and am glad to provide summaries on this area as it relates to NATO enlargement as long as we can agree on a consolidated process that satisfies the needs of your Observer Group as well as the Arms Control Observer Group.

The written summaries will be deposited weekly through Madrid, and thereafter, depending on the flow of incoming information, on a regular and periodic basis in S-407 of the Capitol. These materials will be available for use by you, other members of the NATO Observer Group, and, as your staff requested, nine appropriately cleared staff members who are associated with the two leadership offices, your office and Senator Biden's, and the majority and minority staffs of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees.

I encourage and welcome travel by members of the Group to Brussels during the coming months to meet with both U.S. and other negotiators in informal settings as talks involving NATO enlargement proceed. These meetings will

allow you the opportunity to gain a full and timely sense of the on-going negotiations and discussions in an environment conducive to the free exchange of ideas.

This combination of written and verbal briefings and on-site visits will enable you and the other members of the Observer Group to receive a detailed flow of information on what is happening in the actual process both before and after Madrid, and in a manner consistent with that established for the Arms Control Observer Groups. This will provide you the opportunity to gain a full sense of the various substantive issues before negotiation decisions are finalized.

I know you will understand that as we share information with the Observer Group, we also must take steps to protect the integrity of the diplomatic process. As a result, and consistent with the basic practices followed during the last three Aministrations regarding the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, negotiating texts or individual cables will not be provided. I am confident that, as with the Arms Control Observer Group, we can establish a mutually satisfying and beneficial relationship based on other information as I have described.

The first written summaries will be delivered to the Senate on June 6. I am aware that you had hoped to have this process established by June 1. I want to assure you and the other members of the Observer Group that the Administration has taken this request very seriously and has moved as quickly as possible. With the initiation of these weekly summaries, it is my hope that we can now focus on the important substantive work that both our branches of government must address.

We share a crucial constitutional responsibility in the evolution of NATO and the relationship of the United States to this invaluable alliance. The contacts outlined above will ensure the close involvement of the Senate NATO Observer Group in the enlargement process. I hope you will feel free to share this letter with other members of the NATO Observer Group.

Once again, I salute you, Senator Biden, Majority Leader Lott, and Minority Leader Daschle for the leadership you have displayed in establishing this Observer Group. I personally look forward to your participation and to furthering our strong working relationship in the coming weeks. This improved consultative process between the Administration and the Senate can help us develop positions that enjoy broad, bipartisan support with the American people and their representatives in Congress.

Sincerely,

Madeleine Albright

Madeleine K. Albright

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4000 REDO

June 10, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DAN FRIED/STEVE PIFER

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Senato NATO Observer Group (SNOG)

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding briefing material for his meeting with the Senate NATO Observer Group on June 11, 1997.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Qs and As

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/10/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

~~SECRET~~ 4000

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP (SNOG)
DATE: June 11, 1997
LOCATION: Yellow Oval Room
TIME: ~~4:15-5:15 p.m.~~ 6:30 - 7:15 pm

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Consult with the SNOG on whom to support for inclusion in the first group to be invited to join NATO at the Madrid Summit.
- ~~Outline~~ Indicate our current strong preference for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and commitment to a robust "open door" policy on future enlargement.
- Encourage continued bipartisan support for NATO enlargement.
- Emphasize our desire to continue close consultations with the Congress as the NATO enlargement process proceeds.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

You have agreed to ~~brief~~ meet with the Senate NATO Observer Group (SNOG) on ~~our thinking regarding~~ whom to support at the Madrid Summit for inclusion in the first group invited to begin accession talks. The SNOG is a very diverse group of 28 Senators, combining strong supporters with undecideds and critics of various types. The issue cuts across party lines.

Some critics and undecideds (e.g., Kerrey, Moynihan, Wellstone, Warner) worry about enlargement's impact on Russia and arms control and do not accept our integrationist rationale. Others (Stevens, Snowe, Dorgan and others) have concerns about cost and dilution of NATO's effectiveness. Hutchison's criticism combines cost, dilution and worries about intra-CEE rivalries. The strongest supporters include Lott, Roth, Biden, Lieberman, Mikulski, Coats and Hagel. Biden and Roth support four (the usual three plus Slovenia). Coats supports five (four plus Romania). Since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act,

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-M (1.95)

concerns about cost and burdensharing have taken on greater weight.

The SNOG's diversity of views allows us to define a strong middle ground for our policy. You should also note that we welcome the SNOG's intention to send a small group to Madrid and are factoring the group into our trip planning. The SNOG has met with Albright, Talbott and ~~Hunter~~ Ambassador.

AGENDA

We recommend that you open up with about ~~10~~ 5 minutes of remarks, discussing our approach to the "who" question and our commitment to a robust "open door" policy. You may then want to turn to Secretary Albright and Deputy Defense Secretary White for brief remarks. After that, you should ask Senators for their views.

briefly articulating the rationale for NATO ("why") and mea

BACKGROUND

At their meeting on June 10, and subject to the results of this meeting, Principals decided to recommend to you that we support a small group for NATO membership at Madrid consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Secretary Albright previewed our preliminary preference for a "small group" approach at the Sintra NAC ministerial, and you have articulated U.S. arguments in favor of a small group in recent meetings with Chirac, Blair and Kohl.

Most members of the NATO Observer Group who support enlargement share our preference for three, but will want to hear our reasoning (and be assured that we are genuinely consulting before making final decisions). In our view, the first group should be restricted to the strongest candidates in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance. Costs also argue in favor of keeping the first group small. On political, economic and military grounds, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are far ahead of the other candidates. Although France, Italy and a number of other allies (and possibly some members of the Observer Group) support Romania and Slovenia, we do not believe they are ready. Romania has made a great deal of progress in recent months but has not yet consolidated their political and market economic reforms, while Slovenia is still politically inward looking and has little to offer NATO militarily.

do we know that?

[need to set up timing context for POTUS: leaned at Sintra; must give Solana views before Pm week; thus both soliciting their views and foreshadowing ours]

At the same time, however, both countries could be strong candidates for a second enlargement decision if they continue current progress. It is also possible that Austria, and perhaps Sweden and Finland, may seek membership in the not-too-distant future. This is one important reason why we are seeking a strong open-door commitment at Madrid. Such a commitment will also help

reassure the Baltics that they are not being consigned to a "grey zone" and keep them on a Westernizing course. It will also help us keep our options open for the future.

The talking points we have prepared set out our case for a "small group" approach and strong open-door package for Madrid. We also include several questions and answers on hard questions Observer Group members might raise, including the costs of enlargement and the risks of "dilution" of the Alliance posed most recently in Henry Kissinger's op-ed piece on the NATO-Russia relationship.

Attachments
Tab A Points to Be Made
Tab B Qs and As

[need to arm him for criticism in both letter on process w/ SNOG — (see Albright response)

~~SECRET~~ 4000

POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH
SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP

INTRO

- Want to discuss preparations for NATO Summit with you. Committed to consulting closely as we prepare for Madrid.

- ~~Believe~~ We are on threshold of truly historic decisions that will prepare Europe to meet challenges of 21st Century. Want your views ~~before we make them~~. on ongoing basis.

- At Madrid, will launch new security system for Europe that is peaceful, democratic and undivided.

- ~~Will be result of hard work~~ over past 3-4 years, ~~led by~~ ~~American diplomacy~~.

- Our leading role enhanced by strong bipartisan spirit that has underpinned our efforts to adapt and enlarge NATO to new challenges.

NATO-RUSSIA

- Signature in Paris of NATO-Russia Founding Act two weeks ago demonstrates that we can build new, expanding NATO while developing long-term partnership with Russia. NATO-Russia did not and will not in any way dilute NATO or limit its freedom of action.

ENLARGEMENT: WHY

- Now we are looking ahead to Madrid NATO Summit where key Alliance on NATO enlargement will take place.

need to flesh out basic reasons (West Point, your arguments?)

- NATO enlargement will help solidify democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and complete a process of European integration cut short by Cold War.

ENLARGEMENT: WHO

- During past weeks, we have been focusing attention on critical questions of whom to support for inclusion in first group invited to begin accession talks, and how to forge closer links with Partners not yet ready to join Alliance as full members.

- Secretary Albright had preliminary exchange of views with NATO colleagues at Sintra NAC ministerial. Discussed with Blair, Chirac and Kohl.

- Five serious candidates have emerged in Alliance deliberations: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and

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2015-0772-M (1.96)

Slovenia. Have given careful consideration to each and to merits of smaller or larger group.

- Although case can be made for each, we think compelling case can be made for small group consisting of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.

- We believe first group should be limited to the strongest candidates. This will ensure credibility and effectiveness of Alliance as we embark on what will be steady, deliberate process of enlargement.

- On political, economic, military grounds, three we are coming to favor are clearly strongest candidates.

- Small group would also be easier to absorb militarily. View of our military leadership, which I share.

- A smaller group will also help keep down the costs. Recall that cost estimates put in enlargement report to Congress last February based on 4 rather than 3 new members.

- Romania and Slovenia are not quite ready for membership, particularly when compared with others.

- Romania has made great strides in recent months but not yet consolidated political and market economic reforms. Since admission to NATO is irreversible step, need to be more confident reforms are irreversible.

- Slovenia is closer call -- and know some here support Slovenia with good reasons -- but it lags behind others militarily and is still somewhat inward-looking politically.

- Both countries on right track, candidates for second enlargement decision, which is one reason why we will seek strong "open-door" commitment at Madrid.

- Strong open-door pledge will also reassure other aspiring members they are not consigned to "gray zone." Need to keep our options open for future.

- We will work to ensure at Madrid that open door is accompanied by process through which those not selected in first group can continue to prepare for membership.

o Want to hear your views. Let me first tell you why we are inclined toward smaller first tranch forward-leaning posture on future general rationale ~~Romania~~/Slovenia open to Q's then, if raised, how to respond to major arguments for S, Slovenia, Romania

Joint Chiefs have concluded that ~~Slovenia~~ it is not essential to admit Slovenia in order to provide a "land bridge" to Hungary in order to afford to admit Hungary because a member

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1627				
Document ID: 9704363				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Achieving Allied Consensus on NATO Enlargement... (4 pages)	06/23/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. statement	re: U.S. Open Door Package for Madrid Summit Declaration (1 page)	06/16/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1627

FOLDER TITLE:
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2015-0772-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9704363
RECEIVED: 23 JUN 97 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ACHIEVING ALLIED CONSENSUS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT WHETHER TO SET DATE OR NAME NAMES FOR SECOND ROUND

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 28 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BERGER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9704363

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PRESIDENT	Z	97062314	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97062606	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	970623		VICE PRESIDENT
001	970623		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
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Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	6/25	N
Records Mgt.	2		

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cc: SRB, JS, ~~[illegible]~~ RMA, TBB, DLC, GOD, EAR,

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'97 JUN 25 PM 8:30

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6-25-97

4363

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'97 JUN 23 PM2:34

June 23, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Achieving Allied Consensus on NATO Enlargement: Whether to Set a Date or Name Names for the Second Round

Our position on the countries to receive the first NATO membership invitations at Madrid has two parts that are inextricably linked: support for a small group of three representing the strongest candidates in terms of their political, economic and military reforms; and a robust "open door" package committing the Alliance to future enlargement decisions and creating a process through which other candidates can prepare for membership.

In Brussels, we have just proposed language for the Madrid Summit Declaration fleshing out our "open door" approach (Tab A). It includes: (a) the principle of the open door, a pledge to future admissions, and non-exclusion of any Partner on the basis of its geographic location; (b) post-Madrid "Atlantic Dialogues" between interested partners and NATO to discuss membership issues; and (c) continuing review of the process by NATO Foreign Ministers. This package appears to be gaining widespread Allied support -- including from the hitherto cautious Brits.

Our current open door package does not set a date for the next enlargement decisions or name the countries most likely to receive future invitations based on their current progress (e.g. Romania and Slovenia). This was based on the judgment that it was better to advance a principled open door package that avoided names and dates. We have made clear in our public statements that we expect the second round will be "soon," and we have praised the progress made by Romania and Slovenia, but not gone farther.

Given continued French support for Romania, however, and their apparent unwillingness to be seen as acceding to U.S. "diktat," we may need at some point to reconsider this judgment. The French may insist on an explicit "mention" of Romania as the price of agreeing to an initial group of three, threatening to hold the process hostage. The British, on the other hand, will strongly resist such applications

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/18/07

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0775-m (1.97)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The Options:

We must, of course, hold firm on three. To change course now could damage Senate ratification by creating the perception that we had chosen countries on the basis of log-rolling or political pressure rather than through a considered decision-making process based on the candidates' readiness. Moreover, what we would gain in Romania and Slovenia we would lose in the Baltic states and Bulgaria, which are currently fairly satisfied.

A. Naming names: The Madrid Summit Declaration could identify Romania and Slovenia, together with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as among the five countries that had made the most progress toward membership, albeit not quite ready for the first group. The formulation would need to avoid implying that these countries were guaranteed admission in the second group, since we must hedge against backsliding in their reform efforts.

Pros

- Would satisfy the Romanians and Slovenians.
- French and southern Europeans would be more likely to accept (as a quasi-"three-plus-two" solution).
- Some other Allies might welcome this as a way to bring closure to the debate.
- Consistent with our position on the three and enhances credibility of second round.
- Accurately reflects fact that Romania and Slovenia were runners up.
- Addresses issue of perceived problem of regional (north/south) balance within NATO.

Cons

- Northern European allies likely to oppose.
- Would infuriate Baltics -- who are further along in reforms than Romania -- and Bulgaria, which would not be named for the "on deck" circle.
- Would force us to confront Baltic membership issue sooner than we want and thus could generate stronger Russian reaction, without confidence of Baltic NATO entry.

- Could increase concern in the Senate from those worried about dilution of the Alliance and the seriousness of our approach to enlargement.
- Naming names creates different categories of aspirants and locks in favorites prematurely.

B. Setting a date to consider the second round, *without* naming candidates. The Madrid Summit Declaration could state that Allied leaders will review the results of the Atlantic Dialogues at their next summit in 1999 (NATO's 50th anniversary) based on recommendations by Foreign Ministers. This formula would not formally commit NATO to issue new membership invitations at that time, but it would be interpreted by many as doing so.

Pros

- Locks in open door at relatively low cost: logical to assume that 1999 Summit will consider second round in any event.
- Possible basis for early Allied consensus on "three."
- Would satisfy Romanians, Slovenians without putting as much pressure on Baltics, others as would naming names.

Cons

- Commits Alliance prematurely to timing of second group.
- May not be enough to satisfy France and could merely stimulate more demands -- thus prolonging and complicating the dispute.
- Could generate concern about dilution of NATO through continued enlargement.
- Tactically, proposing this could signal lack of confidence in our own position, weak leadership; undermine increasing number of Allies ready to back our current position.

C. Setting a date and naming names: We could, of course, combine both of the above steps. This would be even more attractive to the French (and the Romanians and Slovenes) but would compound our difficulties with the Balts, Brits, Moscow and the Senate.

Conclusion

For now, we should see how Allied thinking develops. Strobe, who believes our current position ("continuing review," no names) is best on its merits, believes that Allied opinion is shifting our

way and that the French will come around once they see they are becoming isolated. Indeed, a number of Allies have privately indicated to us their acceptance of three and their relief that we stepped in to halt a rush toward five that gained momentum simply because many European allies did not want to be seen as blocking Slovenia or Romania.

I believe that setting a date for review in 1999 will be the least the French will accept and, at best, the most the Brits can live with. "Naming names," in my view, has all of the disadvantages (excluding the Balts, and others, Senate ratification) as does "five."

Attachment
Tab A U.S. "Open Door" Language for Madrid Summit Declaration

U.S. OPEN DOOR PACKAGE FOR MADRID SUMMIT DECLARATION

We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the Alliance will continue to take in new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance looks forward to extending further invitations in the coming years, as additional nations prove willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership. In fulfillment of this pledge, NATO shall maintain an active relationship with those nations who have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations which have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but who were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership if they continue to seek it. The same factors that informed the Alliance's decisions today with respect to those invited to begin accession talks will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants. No country shall be excluded from consideration on the basis of its geographic location.

To support this process, we intend to continue and strengthen the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations who aspire to NATO membership or who otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions. To this end, these new Atlantic Dialogues will cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership. They will include regular periodic meetings with the NATO International Staff and North Atlantic Council in permanent session and with other appropriate NATO bodies. The active participation by aspiring members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace will further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.

In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO foreign ministers keep the program of the Atlantic Dialogues under continuous review and report to us as appropriate.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-M (1,98)

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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RECORD ID: 9704412
RECEIVED: 24 JUN 97 18

TO: BERGER
ET AL

FROM: BLINKEN
LEAVY

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO PUBLIC STATEMENTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT -- COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVES / THEMES / EVENTS / ROLL OUT

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 30 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLINKEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		BLINKEN
		COURTNEY
		FRIED
		LEAVY
		LUZZATTO
		NSC CHRON

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97062514	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97092417	NOTED BY BERGER

Rcvd 6/25/97 11am

National Security Council
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Rice	1	(R) 9/25	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	Copy	
Steinberg			
Berger	3	(A)	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	WS 7/29	N/R
Records Mgt.	5	(R) 9/26	N

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cc:

COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
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6/25/97 11am

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Kerrick	2	COPY	
Steinberg			
Berger	3	(R)	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	7/28	N/R
Records Mgt.	5	(R) 9/26	N

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cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 24 PM 8:44

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4412

NOTED

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

June 23, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER - SYLVIA MATHEWS - DON BAER - ANN LEWIS

CC: JAMES STEINBERG - JEREMY ROSNER - ANNE LUZZATTO

FROM: ANTONY BLINKEN - DAVID LEAVY } AJB

SUBJECT: NATO Summit -- Communications Objectives, Themes, Events, Roll Out

I. BACKGROUND

The NATO Summit in Madrid is history in the making -- and President Clinton has done more than anyone to make it.

This century, Europe has been witness to humanity's capacity for the worst, as well as for the best. And through two world wars and the Cold War, we have learned that Europe's fate and America's future are joined. Now, the main battleground for the bloodiest century in history can become a citadel for freedom, democracy and security in the new century that is about to begin -- a reflection of the ideals America has given so much to advance.

American leadership has been a key to this transformation. Four years ago, President Clinton set out his vision for a new Europe in a new century: a continent undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in history. Since then, he has been a driving force for realizing that vision by opening NATO's doors to Europe's new democracies and forging a NATO-Russia partnership. Now, the peace, prosperity and stability America helped secure for Europe's West fifty years ago through the Marshall Plan, NATO and the other great post-War institutions can be extended to Europe's East. The Madrid Summit (combined with the President's outreach to the rest of the CEE and the NIS) represents a culmination of American leadership in building this new Europe -- a capstone for the 20th century and a cornerstone for the 21st.

The opportunity and challenge before us is to show that Madrid is a defining moment for the century that is about to begin -- and for the Clinton presidency. An expanding NATO and the other elements of the President's European security strategy (EAPC, NATO-Russia; NATO-Ukraine) likely will stand as one of his lasting legacies to America's security and to Europe's freedom and democracy. But the moment risks being deficient in drama because neither the fact of NATO enlargement nor the names of the first invitees will be news.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Antony Blinken
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 6/30/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

To give Madrid the historic resonance it merits, we must marry statecraft with stagecraft. That means finding the right words to convey the import of the moment -- and the right settings in which to convey them.

II. COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVES

Our communications strategy has five broad objectives:

1. Highlight that Madrid is history in the making -- the cornerstone of a new peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe for a new century -- and that President Clinton's leadership has been key to bringing us to this point.

2. Use the focus on Madrid to emphasize how enlargement will advance U.S. security interests to build domestic support before the issue goes to the Senate for a vote.

3. Challenge those invited to join NATO to meet the responsibilities of membership.

4. Reassure those not among the first invitees that NATO's doors will remain open and that there will be a clear process leading to an early second wave.

5. Underscore the inclusive nature of the President's strategy -- outreach to Russia, Ukraine, all European democracies whether or not they aspire to NATO membership.

III. KEY EVENTS AND MESSAGE POINTS

Thursday, July 3 -- Independence Day Event (Washington)

Event

- East Room ceremony with Central European and American veterans of World War II. Alternatively, the President could make the same points in front of the same audience at his weekly radio address.

Message

The President can use our own Independence Day as a symbolic launching point for Madrid, where we will help lock in Europe's freedom and security -- and strengthen our own. We would announce endorsements of enlargement by major veterans organizations. And by inviting surviving Polish and American veterans of the Battle of the Falaise Gap -- in which a division of Free Poles and the American 90th Infantry joined forces to prevent 20 Nazi panzer divisions from escaping into the French countryside after D-Day -- we can highlight that our new NATO allies are in fact old allies who fought and sacrificed for freedom by America's side. They will add to NATO's strength. Just as they closed the Falaise Gap fifty years ago, now we are closing a wider gap that divided Europe and fulfilling the promise of their sacrifice.

Monday, July 7 -- Summit Preparatory Meetings (Madrid)

Events

- Bilateral meeting with Spanish PM Aznar
- Bilateral meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana
- **Meeting with U.S. Congressional delegation and possible public event.**
- Possible evening reception with other NATO leaders

Message

As currently scheduled, Monday will have minimal media impact -- which may be fine. If we want to generate coverage, a public event with the President, the Congressional delegation and the American community in Spain would allow the President to set the scene for the summit, highlight bipartisan support for enlargement and briefly sound the themes of the West Point speech (that new members will add to NATO's strength but that enlargement is neither cost nor risk free.)

Tuesday, July 8 -- NATO Summit Day One (Madrid)

Events

- **Statement to NAC Summit (text released to press)**
- Solana announcement of first invitees
- **Proposed Press Conference following Summit**
- **Proposed RFE address (see Wednesday)**

Message

A New Alliance: The Madrid Summit is a culmination of the President's efforts to forge a new NATO for the 21st century with new members, new missions and new partners. Enlargement will strengthen our alliance to meet new challenges, and help lock in the gains of freedom and stability in Central Europe. Coupled with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program, it will help bring together for the 21st century a continent divided for much of the 20th century.

Wednesday, July 9 -- NATO Summit Day Two (Madrid)

Events

- **NATO-Ukraine Charter signing ceremony**
- **EAPC meeting and working lunch (POTUS statement released to media)**
- **Proposed Radio Free Europe address with leaders of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic.**
- **Possible meeting with cabinet before they embark on separate travel to CEE.**
- Possible reception with all CEE leaders

Message

A New Europe: A Radio Free Europe address by the President in the presence of the leaders of the first NATO invitees or a broader group of CEE leaders will put a human face on enlargement -- and highlight how the face of Europe has changed. Just a decade ago, these nations were our Warsaw Pact adversaries. Now, as a result of our shared commitment to their freedom and security, they are our allies -- helping to keep the peace in Bosnia, settling old conflicts, strengthening the foundation for freedom and stability in Europe. Using RFE as the medium -- once the lone voice of freedom broadcast into CEE, now one of many voices of freedom broadcast from CEE (Prague) would be a powerful symbolic hook.

The EAPC meeting, the NATO-Ukraine charter and the reception with CEE leaders will emphasize the President's inclusive strategy -- the United States and NATO are building ties to all of Europe's democracies and the door to NATO will remain open.

Thursday, July 10 -- Warsaw, Poland

Event

- **Open air speech to Polish people**

Message

New Allies: For four and half decades, we challenged the people of Central and Eastern Europe to cast away the shackles of communism. Now that they have done so, we are making good on our commitment to bring them into the community of democracies. The President should emphasize that membership in that community carries with it burdens as well as benefits. NATO's first invitees must continue to strengthen their democracies, reform their economies and prepare their militaries for active membership in the alliance. As political, economic and security integration into the West liberates them from old fears, they must play their part in forging new ties with a democratizing Russia and build a Europe in which no nation that embraces democracy and open markets is left out.

Friday, July 11 -- Bucharest, Romania: Next Allies

Event

- Wreath laying at monument to martyrs of the revolution.
- Speech to Romanian parliament (or perhaps university students.)

Message

Next Allies: The President will want to reassure Romania and others nations left out of the first round of invitations that NATO's doors remain open to all those willing to meet the

responsibilities of membership. To strengthen their resolve to continue reform, he can state plainly that he has come to Bucharest not because of what the Romanian people have not done -- but because of what they have done and what he believes they will continue to do.

Saturday, July 12 -- Copenhagen

Event

- Speech to people of Copenhagen


Message

In praising an enduring ally -- Denmark -- the President can sum up a week that began the process of bringing new allies into the alliance and building a new Europe for a new century.

IV. COMMUNICATIONS ROLL OUT

There are several options for pre-trip roll out activities:

- POTUS pre-trip interview with Johnny Apple of the New York Times.
- Berger briefing with influentials, former officials (Kissinger, Scowcroft, Brzezinski etc..) with POTUS drop-by if time permits.
- Berger-Talbott columnists and pundits roundtable.
- Berger-Albright pre-trip briefing in White House briefing room.
- Vershbow-Fried briefing at foreign press center.
- Editorial board mailing (POTUS Hague and West Point speeches, Berger NATO op/ed, Albright Newsweek piece...)



Concurrences by: Dan Fried - Sandy Vershbow - Steve Pifer

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1628				
Document ID: 9704513				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704513
RECEIVED: 27 JUN 97 20

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER
BAER, D

DOC DATE: 30 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT
POLAND
SPEECHES
RUSSIA
ROMANIA
PUBLIC STATEMENTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN FOR NATO SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 03 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLINKEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLINKEN
		FRIED
		LEAVY
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97062816	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97063015	FOR DECISION
002		X	97072413	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970630		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970630		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 6/27 1245pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4513

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	1	(C) 6/28	
Davies	2	C 6/28	
Kerrick	3	(C) 6/28 w/ Edits	
Steinberg	copy		
Berger	4		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor ~~has seen~~	
West Wing Desk	5	TMA 6.28	~~D~~ Baer
Records Mgt.	6	TMA 6.30	~~D~~ Stern
	7	(C) 6/30	~~D~~ Blinken
	8	TMA 7.2	N
	9		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 27 PM 9:38

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Rec'd 6/27 1245pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4513

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	1	(R) 6/28	
Davies	2	C 6/28	
Kerrick	3	(K) 6/28 w/ Edits	
Steinberg	copy		
Berger	4		
Situation Room		~~has seen~~ Natl Sec Advisor	
West Wing Desk	5	TMA 6.28	D Baer
Records Mgt	6	TMA 6.30	D Stern
	7	(D) cc/30	D Burke
	8	TMA 7.2	N
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 27 PM 9:38

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'97 JUN 30 AM 11:45

June 30, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7-1-97

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
DON BAER

SUBJECT: Communications Plan for the NATO Summit

I. PURPOSE

To decide on the communications objectives, themes and key events to support your July 5-12 trip to Europe for the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

The NATO Summit in Madrid is history in the making -- history your leadership has helped to make.

Europe this century has been witness and host to humanity's capacity for the worst as well as the best. And through two world wars and the Cold War, we have learned that Europe's fate and America's future are joined. Now, the main battleground for the bloodiest century in history can become a citadel for freedom, democracy and security in the new century.

American leadership has been vital to this transformation. Four years ago, you set out your vision for a new Europe in a new century: a continent undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in history. Since then, your efforts have helped realize that vision by opening NATO's doors to Europe's new democracies and forging a NATO-Russia partnership. Now, the peace, prosperity and stability America helped secure for Europe's West through NATO, the Marshall Plan and the other great post-War institutions can be extended to Europe's East. The Madrid Summit represents a culmination of American leadership in building this new Europe -- a capstone for the 20th century and a cornerstone for the 21st.

An expanding NATO and the other elements of your European security strategy likely will stand as one of your lasting legacies to America's security and to Europe's freedom and democracy. But the moment risks being deficient in drama because neither the fact of NATO enlargement nor the names of the first invitees will be news.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 6/27/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To give Madrid the historic resonance it merits, which will help in the ratification debate back here, we need to find ways to make the inherent drama visible for the American people. At the same time, we have taken pains to avoid "American triumphalism" by promoting an image of allied unity (despite differing views on enlargement); and to highlight the inclusive nature of your vision for Europe (i.e. by emphasizing NATO's future invitees and new partners like Russia and Ukraine as well as the new invitees.)

III. KEY EVENTS AND MESSAGE POINTS

Thursday, July 3 -- Independence Day Event (Washington)

Event

- East Room ceremony with American veterans of World War II and representatives of major veterans organizations.

Message

Our own Independence Day is a symbolic launching point for Madrid, where we will help lock in Europe's freedom and security -- and strengthen our own. You will announce endorsements of enlargement by the American Legion and the Reserve Officers Association. By bringing in surviving Polish and American veterans of the Battle of the Falaise Gap -- in which a division of Free Poles and the American 90th Infantry joined forces to prevent 20 Nazi panzer divisions from escaping into the French countryside after D-Day -- you can highlight that our new NATO allies are in fact old allies who will add to NATO's strength. Just as they closed the Falaise Gap fifty years ago, now we are closing a wider gap that divided Europe -- and fulfilling the promise of their sacrifice.

Monday, July 7 -- Summit Preparatory Meetings (Madrid)

Events

- Arrival remarks at Madrid Airport.
- Bilats with Spanish Prime Minister Aznar and NATO Secretary General Solana.
- Meeting with U.S. Congressional delegation (pool spray).
- Possible evening reception with other NATO leaders.

Message

Your remarks at a brief arrival ceremony at the Madrid airport and in your meeting with the Congressional Observer Group will

set the scene for the summit and highlight bipartisan support for enlargement.

Tuesday, July 8 -- NATO Summit Day One (Madrid)

Events

- Statement to NAC (off camera -- text released to press).
- Solana announcement of first invitees (leaders in photo).
- Remarks to American community at embassy.

Message

A New Alliance: The Madrid Summit is a culmination of your efforts to forge a new NATO for the 21st century with new members, new missions and new partners. Enlargement will strengthen our alliance to meet new challenges, and help lock in the gains of freedom and stability in Central Europe. Coupled with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program, it will help bring together for the 21st century a continent divided for much of the 20th.

Wednesday, July 9 -- NATO Summit Day Two (Madrid)

Events

- Breakfast meeting with President Chirac (tentative).
- NATO-Ukraine Charter signing ceremony.
- EAPC meeting and lunch (off camera -- text released to press).
- Reception with all CEE leaders (brief remarks with pool).
- Press Conference

Message

A New Europe: Your opening remarks at the press conference and at a reception for CEE leaders (new invitees and non-invitees alike) will highlight the history of the moment by emphasizing how the face of Europe has changed. Just a decade ago, these nations were our Warsaw Pact adversaries. Now, as a result of our shared commitment to their freedom and security, they are our allies -- helping to keep the peace in Bosnia, settling old conflicts, strengthening the foundation for freedom and stability in Europe. We would broadcast your press conference remarks over Radio Free Europe -- once the lone voice of freedom broadcast into CEE, now one of many voices of freedom broadcast from CEE (Prague).

The EAPC meeting and the NATO-Ukraine charter will emphasize your inclusive strategy for Europe -- NATO is building ties to all of Europe's democracies and the door to NATO will remain open. Your breakfast meeting with Chirac would emphasize allied unity and put to rest stories about friction with the French over the "who".

Thursday, July 10 -- Warsaw, Poland

Event

- Open air speech to Polish people

Message

New Allies: For four and half decades, the people of Central and Eastern Europe struggled to cast off the shackles of communism. Now, we are making good on our commitment to bring them into the community of democracies. You can praise the great strides they have taken since 1989, and the peacekeeping partnerships they have already established with us in Bosnia. You should also emphasize that membership in NATO carries responsibilities. NATO's first invitees must continue to strengthen their democracies, reform their economies and prepare their militaries for membership in the alliance. As political, economic and security integration into the West liberates them from old fears, they must forge new ties with a democratizing Russia and help build a Europe in which no nation that embraces democracy and open markets is left out.

Friday, July 11 -- Bucharest, Romania: Next Allies

Event

- Wreath laying at monument to martyrs of the revolution.
- Speech to Romanian people.

Message

Next Allies: You will want to reassure Romania and other nations left out of the first round of invitations that NATO's doors remain open to all those willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. To strengthen their resolve to continue reform, you can state plainly that you have come to Bucharest not because of what the Romanian people have failed to do -- but because of what they have done and what you believe they will continue to do.

Saturday, July 12 -- Copenhagen

Event

- Speech to people of Copenhagen.

Message

In praising an enduring ally -- Denmark -- you can sum up a week that began the process of bringing new allies into the alliance and a period -- from Helsinki to Madrid -- that has helped lay the foundation for a new Europe for a new century.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the major events and messages of the trip as outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

reslg asdp

4513

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 27, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER - DON BAER

FROM: ANTONY BLINKEN - DAVID LEAVY } AJB

SUBJECT: Communications Themes and Key Events for NATO Trip

Attached is a memorandum from you to the President outlining our communications plan, key events and messages for the President's trip to Europe for the NATO Summit.

Concurrence by: Dan Fried - Sandy Vershbow - Steve Pifer via e-mail

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached communications plan to the President for his review and approval.

Attachment
Tab I Communications Plan for President's Trip to NATO Summit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Antony Blinken
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify on: 6/27/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 9/10/2015
2015-0772-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4513

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
DON BAER

SUBJECT: Communications Plan for the NATO Summit

I. PURPOSE

To decide on the communications objectives, themes and key events to support your July 5-12 trip to Europe for the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

The NATO Summit in Madrid is history in the making -- history ~~that~~ your leadership has helped to make.

This century Europe and host has been witness to humanity's capacity for the worst as well as ~~for~~ the best. And through two world wars and the Cold War, we have learned that Europe's fate and America's future are joined. Now, the main battleground for the bloodiest century in history can become a citadel for freedom, democracy and security in the new century.

American leadership has been vital to this transformation. Four years ago, you set out your vision for a new Europe in a new century: a continent undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in history. Since then, your efforts have helped realize that vision by opening NATO's doors to Europe's new democracies and forging a NATO-Russia partnership. Now, the peace, prosperity and stability America helped secure for Europe's West through NATO, the Marshall Plan and the other great post-War institutions can be extended to Europe's East. The Madrid Summit represents a culmination of American leadership in building this new Europe -- a capstone for the 20th century and a cornerstone for the 21st.

An expanding NATO and the other elements of your European security strategy likely will stand as one of your lasting legacies to America's security and to Europe's freedom and democracy. But the moment risks being deficient in drama because neither the fact of NATO enlargement nor the names of the first invitees will be news.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 6/10/2019
2015-0772-M

Tuesday, July 8 -- NATO Summit Day One (Madrid)

Events

- Statement to NAC (off camera -- text released to press).
- Solana announcement of first invitees (leaders in photo).
- Press conference or remarks to American community at embassy.

Message

A New Alliance: The Madrid Summit is a culmination of your efforts to forge a new NATO for the 21st century with new members, new missions and new partners. Enlargement will strengthen our alliance to meet new challenges, and help lock in the gains of freedom and stability in Central Europe. Coupled with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program, it will help bring together for the 21st century a continent divided for much of the 20th ~~century~~.

Wednesday, July 9 -- NATO Summit Day Two (Madrid)

Events

- Breakfast meeting with President Chirac (tentative).
- NATO-Ukraine Charter signing ceremony.
- EAPC meeting and lunch (off camera -- text released to press).
- Reception with all CEE leaders.

Message

A New Europe: Your remarks at a reception for CEE leaders (new invitees and non-invitees alike) will put a human face on enlargement -- and highlight how the face of Europe has changed. Just a decade ago, these nations were our Warsaw Pact adversaries. Now, as a result of our shared commitment to their freedom and security, they are our allies -- helping to keep the peace in Bosnia, settling old conflicts, strengthening the foundation for freedom and stability in Europe. We would broadcast or tape your remarks for Radio Free Europe -- once the lone voice of freedom broadcast into CEE, now one of many voices of freedom broadcast from CEE (Prague).

The EAPC meeting and the NATO-Ukraine charter will emphasize your inclusive strategy for Europe -- NATO is building ties to all of Europe's democracies and the door to NATO will remain open. Your breakfast meeting with Chirac will emphasize allied unity and put to rest stories about friction with the French since Denver.

Thursday, July 10 -- Warsaw, Poland

Event

- Open air speech to Polish people

Message

New Allies: For four and half decades, we challenged the people of Central and Eastern Europe to cast ~~away~~ off the shackles of communism. Now, we are making good on our commitment to bring them into the community of democracies. You can praise the great strides they have taken since 1989, and the peacekeeping partnerships they already have established with us in Bosnia. You also should emphasize that membership in NATO carries responsibilities. NATO's first invitees must continue to strengthen their democracies, reform their economies and prepare their militaries for membership in the alliance. As political, economic and security integration into the West liberates them from old fears, they must forge new ties with a democratizing Russia and build a Europe in which no nation that embraces democracy and open markets is left out.

help

Friday, July 11 -- Bucharest, Romania. Next Allies

Event

- Wreath laying at monument to martyrs of the revolution.
- Speech to Romanian people.

Message

Next Allies: You will want to reassure Romania and other nations left out of the first round of invitations that NATO's doors remain open to all those willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. To strengthen their resolve to continue reform, you can state plainly that you have come to Bucharest not because of what the Romanian people have ~~not done~~ -- but because of what they have done and what you believe they will continue to do.

Saturday, July 12 -- Copenhagen failed to do

Event

- Speech to people of Copenhagen.

Message

In praising an enduring ally -- Denmark -- you can sum up a week that began the process of bringing new allies into the alliance and a period -- from Helsinki to Madrid -- that has helped lay the foundation for a new Europe for a new century.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the major events and messages of the trip as outlined above.

add return →

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

To give Madrid the historic resonance it merits, ~~we have sought to marry statecraft with stagecraft~~. At the same time, we have taken pains to avoid "American triumphalism" by promoting an image of allied unity (despite differing views on enlargement); and to highlight the inclusive nature of your vision for Europe (i.e. by emphasizing NATO's future invitees and new partners like Russia and Ukraine as well as the new invitees.)

which will help in the ratification debate back here, we need to find ways to make the inherent drama visible for the American people

III. KEY EVENTS AND MESSAGE POINTS

Thursday, July 3 -- Independence Day Event (Washington)

Event

- East Room ceremony with American veterans of World War II and representatives of major veterans organizations.

Message

Our own Independence Day is a symbolic launching point for Madrid, where we will help lock in Europe's freedom and security -- and strengthen our own. You will announce endorsements of enlargement by the American Legion and the Reserve Officers Association. By bringing in surviving Polish and American veterans of the Battle of the Falaise Gap -- in which a division of Free Poles and the American 90th Infantry joined forces to prevent 20 Nazi panzer divisions from escaping into the French countryside after D-Day -- you can highlight that our new NATO allies are in fact old allies who will add to NATO's strength. Just as they closed the Falaise Gap fifty years ago, now we are closing a wider gap that divided Europe -- and fulfilling the promise of their sacrifice.

Monday, July 7 -- Summit Preparatory Meetings (Madrid)

Events

- Arrival remarks at Madrid Airport.
- Bilats with Spanish Prime Minister Aznar and NATO Secretary General Solana.
- Meeting with U.S. Congressional delegation.
- Possible evening reception with other NATO leaders.

Message

Your remarks at a brief arrival ceremony at the Madrid airport will set the scene for the summit and highlight bipartisan support for enlargement (given the presence of the Congressional observer group.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 9/12/2019
2015-0772-M

Tuesday, July 8 -- NATO Summit Day One (Madrid)

Events

- Statement to NAC (off camera -- text released to press).
- Solana announcement of first invitees (leaders in photo).
- Press conference or remarks to American community at embassy.

Message

A New Alliance: The Madrid Summit is a culmination of your efforts to forge a new NATO for the 21st century with new members, new missions and new partners. Enlargement will strengthen our alliance to meet new challenges, and help lock in the gains of freedom and stability in Central Europe. Coupled with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program, it will help bring together for the 21st century a continent divided for much of the 20th.

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Events

- Breakfast meeting with President Chirac (tentative).
- NATO-Ukraine Charter signing ceremony.
- EAPC meeting and lunch (off camera -- text released to press).
- Reception with all CEE leaders.

Message

A New Europe: Your remarks at a reception for CEE leaders (new invitees and non-invitees alike) will put a human face on enlargement -- and highlight how the face of Europe has changed. Just a decade ago, these nations were our Warsaw Pact adversaries. Now, as a result of our shared commitment to their freedom and security, they are our allies -- helping to keep the peace in Bosnia, settling old conflicts, strengthening the foundation for freedom and stability in Europe. We would broadcast or tape your remarks for Radio Free Europe -- once the lone voice of freedom broadcast into CEE, now one of many voices of freedom broadcast from CEE (Prague).

The EAPC meeting and the NATO-Ukraine charter will emphasize your inclusive strategy for Europe -- NATO is building ties to all of Europe's democracies and the door to NATO will remain open. Your breakfast meeting with Chirac ~~will~~ would emphasize allied unity and put to rest stories about friction with the French ~~since Denver~~ over the "who".

Thursday, July 10 -- Warsaw, Poland

Event

- Open air speech to Polish people

Message

New Allies: For four and half decades, ~~we challenged~~ struggled the people of Central and Eastern Europe to cast off the shackles of communism. Now, we are making good on our commitment to bring them into the community of democracies. You can praise the great strides they have taken since 1989, and the peacekeeping partnerships they have already established with us in Bosnia. You should also emphasize that membership in NATO carries responsibilities. NATO's first invitees must continue to strengthen their democracies, reform their economies and prepare their militaries for membership in the alliance. As political, economic and security integration into the West liberates them from old fears, they must forge new ties with a democratizing Russia and help build a Europe in which no nation that embraces democracy and open markets is left out.

Friday, July 11 -- Bucharest, Romania: Next Allies

Event

- Wreath laying at monument to martyrs of the revolution.
- Speech to Romanian people.

Message

Next Allies: You will want to reassure Romania and other nations left out of the first round of invitations that NATO's doors remain open to all those willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. To strengthen their resolve to continue reform, you can state plainly that you have come to Bucharest not because of what the Romanian people have failed to do -- but because of what they have done and what you believe they will continue to do.

Case Number: 2015-0772-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Susan Braden and Nancy McEldowney to Samuel Berger re:~~ Committee to Expand NATO Dinner... (5 pages)	~~02/09/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR
001b. report	re: U.S. Government Report [partial] (2 pages)	02/05/1998	P1/b(1) KDE 5/20/2016
001c. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/08/1997	P1/b(1)
001d. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	01/26/1998	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RECORD ID: 9800978
RECEIVED: 09 FEB 98 19

TO: BERGER

FROM: BRADEN
MCELDOWNEY
FLANAGAN

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
ANSA

EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO ENLARGEMENT DINNER 10 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 14 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FLANAGAN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BRADEN
		FLANAGAN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 9/10/2019
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Davies	1	CK 2/9	
Kerrick			
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Berger	3	**Natl Sec Advisor has seen**	
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West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 9, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STEPHEN FLANAGAN AND DONALD BANDLER

FROM: SUSAN BRADEN AND NANCY MC ELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Committee to Expand NATO Dinner IHO Polish, Czech and Hungarian Foreign Ministers, February 10, 1998, 7:00 p.m., Metropolitan Club

Overview

Foreign Ministers Kovacs of Hungary, Geremek of Poland, and Sedivy of the Czech Republic are in Washington at the invitation of Secretary Albright. The visit is part of our public diplomacy campaign for NATO enlargement. The three will have joint meetings on Capitol Hill and participate in several other public events, including Wednesday's NATO "kick-off" event with the President.

This dinner is hosted by the Committee to Expand NATO, a privately-funded advocacy group. The Committee includes a number of former officials and political activists, but the prime movers are a number of prominent Republicans (Julie Finley, Bruce Jackson, Steve Hadley, Bob Zoellick, Peter Rodman.) The Committee has sponsored similar events before, including a dinner at Mrs. Finley's home when the three foreign ministers visited in October.

The Committee's goal is to bring key Senators together with the three ministers and other enlargement supporters in a relaxed social environment. As of close of business Monday, they have eight Senators, several Congresman and a number of opinion leaders who have confirmed. **There is no formal program**, but no doubt there will be toasts and other extemporaneous remarks.

Background

State of Domestic Debate

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/9/08

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 9/10/2019
2015-0772-M (1.99)

Jeremy Rosner and other outside observers are convinced that we have the 67 votes necessary to win Senate advice and consent to ratification of the NATO enlargement protocols. However, to win by a big margin, and to keep the legislation unencumbered by various caveats or qualifications, will require more work. There are lingering concerns about costs, whether we can trust our prospective allies with our secrets and the pace and scope of a "second round." That said:

- Trent Lott told CNN in mid-January that he was confident of a positive vote.

- Staff briefings following the December NAC revealed growing support across bipartisan lines. Those members that had asked "probing questions" last fall are starting to migrate into the "solidly for" camp.

- Late February hearings (SFRC on 2/24; SSCI on 2/25) are relatively modest; many questions answered during Fall hearings.

- Though not publicly announced, Lott has made an informal commitment to an early floor vote (mid-March) meeting no opposition.

Cost/Capabilities: To the extent that members of Congress have lingering concerns, they are driven by a continuing confusion about cost and a fear that enlargement will -- over time -- undermine NATO's military capability.

- On cost, NATO's December study of the common-funded costs concluded that 1.5 billion over ten years would be necessary to integrate and defend the three new members. This number is lower than DoD's February 1997 estimate for the same category (common-funded costs) primarily because of better than expected conditions of facilities and infrastructure within new members' territory. We have endorsed this estimate and have secured commitments from allies that these costs will -- as has always been the case -- be equitably shared. The U.S. portion of common-funded budgets is 25 percent, which means that our annual share of these costs will be approximately $37 million.

- On capabilities, we are continuing to work with the old and new allies through the Defense Planning Process to ensure that national militaries are sufficient to meet the challenges and

fulfill the missions that are most likely over the coming decades. Because of our world-wide responsibilities, the U.S. is at the forefront in development of force projection capabilities. All Allies are working to meet NATO's force goals but the growing gap between our capabilities and those of our Allies is a threat to interoperability and one of NATO's long-term challenges.

Pause/Open Door: A February 4 *New York Times* Op-Ed by Sam Nunn and Brent Scowcroft called for a mandated pause in enlargement. This echoed what we had been hearing privately about a nascent effort by John Warner to legislate a delay in when the second round of enlargement might occur. In a February 9 speech before a New Atlantic Initiative conference, Madeline made clear that the Administration would oppose such legislation.

Allied Ratification: Canadian ratification on February 3 was the first formal act by any ally. Though the Norwegian parliament voted on the same day (with an overwhelming majority in favor), Oslo will require several additional weeks to prepare the instruments for deposit. All other allies are expecting votes over the course of the spring and early summer, with the exception of the Dutch who fear that parliamentary procedure will delay final action until the end of 1998. While the French have indicated that bruised feelings over the "exclusion" of Romania may result in a less than overwhelming vote, all other allies anticipate strong, favorable results. The Brits, for example, have asserted that overwhelming approval is a foregone conclusion.

The Three Candidates, And their Ministers

Poland's new government. Poland continues to lead the prospective new Allies in defense reforms. Public support for joining the Alliance - over 85 percent in most surveys -- is the highest in the region and cuts across party lines. The new government -- a coalition between the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW)-- has made it clear that Poland's top goals are to achieve NATO and EU membership, maintain a strategic partnership with the United States, and help advance democracy and reform in its eastern neighbors.

- **Polish FM Geremek** is a prominent former dissident and leader of Solidarity in the '80s. He is the highest-ranking Polish official to visit Washington since the new government took office in October.

Hungary on track. Hungary is enjoying the fruits its 1994 austerity program and, by many measures, is the leading economic reformer in the region. Its defense reforms are on track and public support for NATO membership was confirmed in a binding referendum on NATO accession, which passed by a wide margin (85 percent of those voting), in November 1997.

- **Foreign Minister Kovacs** is a highly respected foreign policy expert whose primary goal since assuming office in 1994 has been to move Hungary closer to the West. He co-drafted the government's NATO referendum and has actively sought a steady improvement in Hungarian-Romanian relations.

Czechs in political turmoil. Politics in the Czech Republic remains unsettled in the wake of the Klaus government's November 30 resignation, leaving Prague hard pressed to make substantial progress on defense reforms. Despite the current government's caretaker status, Czech officials have successfully kept the country's foreign policy focus on securing NATO membership. They have also started programs to educate the Czech public, whose support for NATO ranges from 40 to 60 percent, on NATO.

- **Foreign Minister Sedivy**, a scholar, former dissident, and elder statesman, has held his post for three months. With new elections scheduled for June, he advocates early parliamentary ratification of Czech admission to NATO.

Points to Make

Pause/Costs

- Mandated pause in enlargement is bad idea. Decisions about next steps have to be taken at highest levels based on circumstances at the time. As Secretary Albright said Monday, Administration will oppose efforts to mandate a pause.

- Cannot allow credibility of open door commitment to be undermined. The open door must stay open.

- NATO's December study of the common-funded costs concluded that $1.5 billion over ten years needed over 10 years to integrate three new members. Number lower than DoD's February 1997 estimate because of better than expected conditions of facilities and infrastructure within new members' territory.

- We have secured commitments from allies that these costs will -- as has always been the case -- be equitably shared. The U.S. portion of common-funded budgets is 25 percent, which means that our annual share of these costs will be approximately $37 million.

Three Foreign Ministers: General

- Look forward to an early Senate vote on your accession to NATO. Confident we will win, but are continuing to press hard for the strongest possible vote. Hope your meetings on Capitol Hill going well.

Poland -- Minister Geremek

- You have played a critical role in shaping Poland's democratic transformation.

- Poland has played a leading role in efforts to enlarge NATO. Appreciate your government's seriousness of purpose in preparing for enlargement and willingness to assume its share of the costs. Applaud your activism in advancing reform and cooperation in Central Europe.

- Hope we can arrange for a visit by Prime Minister Buzek soon.

Hungary - Minister Kovacs

- Referendum was risky, but worth it. Congratulations on the overwhelming vote in favor of enlargement. It sent a strong message to those who doubted Hungary's commitment.

- Appreciate your personal efforts to advance Hungarian-Romanian relations. They are a major contribution to regional harmony.

Czech Republic - Minister Sedivy

- You made many personal sacrifices to bring freedom to your country. Appreciate your steady maintenance of Czech foreign policy, despite the political turmoil at home.

Attachment
Tab A Bios of the Three Ministers
Tab B Other Dinner Participants

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	re: U.S. Government Report [partial] (2 pages)	02/05/1998	P1/b(1)

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
EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Bronislaw GEREMEK
(Phonetic: gehREHmek)

POLAND

Minister of Foreign Affairs (since October 1997)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister 3.5c



©

Anyone who is either unwilling or incapable of accepting the principle of optimism should leave politics as soon as possible. I, however, have decided to stay.

Bronislaw Geremek 3.5c

Prominent dissident and historian Bronislaw Geremek has long played an important role in the formation of Polish foreign policy as chair of the Sejm Foreign Relations Committee (since 1989) and deputy chief of the centrist Freedom Union (UW) party. 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

Activist Foreign Policy 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d Poland's foreign policy goals include achieving NATO and EU membership 1.4c, 1.4d 1.4c, 1.4d and playing the role of regional exporter of stability and reform. With the latter goal in mind, Geremek made his first trip abroad to Lithuania and Ukraine. He has also traveled to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, as well as to Italy, Belgium, and Denmark. 3.5c

Geremek has declared that joining NATO and EU "as partners and not as poor clients" is Poland's national foreign policy priority. A longtime advocate of NATO and EU accession, he acknowledges that joining the Alliance "demands intelligent, imaginative, and effective policies from Poland." Recognizing the delicacy of regional relations, Geremek has said that Poland "has good ties with Russia and is interested in . . . a good Russia-NATO relationship." He has voiced concern, however, that the NATO-Russia agreement risks giving Moscow greater influence over the future of NATO than those countries ready to join the Alliance. Geremek has said, "Our partners should clearly realize what we expect:

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

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2015-0772-M
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(2.00)

full participation under the principle of collective defense. 3.5c

Career and Personal Data 3.5c

Geremek was born on 6 March 1932 in Warsaw. He received a doctorate in history from University of Warsaw in 1960, specializing in medieval France, as well as a doctor habilitatus degree in 1972. During the early 1960s he lectured at the Sorbonne and directed the Center of Polish Culture in Paris. After returning to Poland in the mid-1960s, Geremek worked at the History Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), where he became director of the Department of Medieval Cultural History. He resigned his membership in the Polish United Workers' Party, to which he had belonged since 1950, in protest of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 3.5c

During the 1970s Geremek became increasingly involved in opposition activities. In 1976 he helped establish the Workers' Defense Committee, which organized funds to aid workers who had been persecuted for participating in labor protests. Four years later in Gdansk, he became an adviser to the Interfactory Strike Committee and its chairman, Lech Walesa; Geremek's specialty was foreign relations. In February 1981 he established Solidarity's contacts with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. He was detained when martial law was imposed in December 1981 and led a four-week hunger strike while in prison. Geremek was released after a year but was jailed again for four months in 1983. After being fired from the PAN in 1985 because of his opposition activities, he was employed officially by the Jesuits in Warsaw as a history researcher. Geremek served as cochair of the group tasked with outlining political reform during the 1989 Roundtable Talks between the Communist regime and the opposition that led to the demise of Communist rule. 3.5c

Geremek served as chairman of the Sejm's Constitution Commission from 1989 until the October 1991 parliamentary election. Then President Walesa nominated Geremek for the prime-ministership following the October 1991 parliamentary election; however, Geremek gave up efforts to form a government after just five days, citing the reluctance of center-right parties to cooperate with his Democratic Union (UD) party ally, former Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's Congress of Liberal Democrats (KLD). (The UD and the KLD joined in May 1994 to form the UW.) 3.5c

Geremek speaks excellent English, French, German and Italian, 1.4c, 1.4d His wife, Hanna, is a historian at PAN. They have two sons. 3.5c

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/08/1997	P1/b(1)

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U.S. COMMITTEE TO EXPAND NATO

1150 17TH STREET, N.W., SUITE 1250, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
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FOREIGN MINISTERS DINNER
The Metropolitan Club, 1700 H Street NW
February 10, 1998
7:00 p.m.

ATTENDING (as of 2/9/98):

Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek of Poland
Ambassador Jerzy Kozminski of Poland
Foreign Minister Lazlo Kovacs of Hungary
Ambassador Gyorgy Banlaki of Hungary
Foreign Minister Jaroslav Sedivy of The Czech Republic
Deputy Foreign Minister Karel Kovanda of The Czech Republic
Ambassador Alexandr Vondra of The Czech Republic
President Peter Stoyanov of Bulgaria
Foreign Minister Nadejda Mikhailova of Bulgaria
Ambassador Snejana Botoucharova of Bulgaria
Ambassador Mircea Geoana of Romania
Ambassador Ojars Kalnins of Latvia
Ambassador Stasys Sakalauskas of Lithuania
Ambassador Kalev Stoicescu of Estonia
Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland
Stephen Wright, Minister/Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Great Britain
William Shapcott, 1st Secretary Political, Embassy of Great Britain

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, *reception only*
Ronald Asmus, Department of State, European and Canadian Affairs
Donald Bandler, National Security Council, Director for Central & Eastern Europe
Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor
Steve Biegun, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
Donald Blinken, former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary and *Mrs. Blinken*
Avis Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria
Ian Brzezinski, Senator William Roth's staff
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor
Richard Burt, former U.S. Ambassador to Germany
Landon Butler, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
Senator Thad Cochran
Gregory Craig, Department of State, Director of Policy Planning
David Crosson, Edelman Public Relations
Jackson Diehl, *The Washington Post*

Senator Richard Durbin
Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State
Stanley Ebner, Vice President, The Boeing Company
Albert Eisele, *The Hill*
Steven Erlanger, *New York Times*
Julie Finley, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
Stephen Flanagan, National Security Council staff
Congresswoman Tillie Fowler and *Bill Klein, Legislative Director*
Daniel Fried, U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Jeffrey Gedmin, New Atlantic Initiative
Senator Rod Grams
Ambassador Marc Grossman, Asst. Sec. of State for European & Canadian Affairs
Stephen J. Hadley, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State
Mike Haltzel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
Robert Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Bruce Jackson, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO and *Nina Miller*
General George Joulwan, former SACEUR
Robert Kagan, Carnegie Institute
Robert Kimmitt, former U.S. Ambassador to Germany
Lane Kirkland, George Meany Center for Labor Studies, and *Mrs. Kirkland*
Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Representative to the United Nations
Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor
Jan Lodal, Department of Defense, Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy
Tyler Marshall, *Los Angeles Times*
Senator Mitch McConnell and *Elaine Chao*
Cameron Munter, Chief of Staff, State Dept. NATO Enlargement Ratification
Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform
Paige Reffe, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
Nicholas Rey, former U.S. Ambassador to Poland and *Lisa Rey*
Carla Robbins, *Wall Street Journal, reception only*
Peter Rodman, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
Jeremy Rosner, Assistant to the President for NATO Enlargement Ratification
Senator William Roth
James Rowe, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
Randy Scheunemann, Senator Trent Lott's staff
Senator Jeff Sessions
Senator Richard Shelby and *Annette Shelby*
Senator Gordon Smith
Congressman Gerald Solomon
Paula Stern, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
John Sweeney, President, AFL-CIO
William Taft IV, former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Pat Towell, *Congressional Quarterly*
Gregory Treverton, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
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Jenonne Walker, U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic
John P. White, former Deputy Secretary of Defense
R. James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dov Zakheim, CEO, SPC International Corporation