

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 140				
Document ID: 9300536				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: v

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300536  
RECEIVED: 12 FEB 93 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: WAYNE

DOC DATE: 12 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MITTERRAND PHONE CALL ON MONDAY

ACTION: OBE PER EXEC SEC

DUE DATE: 16 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
EXECSEC  
HOLL  
PATTERSON  
WAYNE

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBINARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB      CLOSED BY: NSASK      DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 93021214 FOR DECISION  
X 93021511 OBE PER EXEC SEC

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: AB LOG # 586  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG DA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
ExecSec	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Staff Director	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
<del>Staff Director</del>	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>NFA</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

12 FEB 93 9:47

**A = Action**    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:                    VP                    McLarty                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: IF APPROVES, I CAN TALK TO MARSHA HALE ABOUT POSSIBLE TIMES. W

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

12 FEB 93 10:21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0536

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 12, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: TONY WAYNE *TW*

SUBJECT: Possible Mitterrand Phone Call on Monday or Tuesday

Before leaving for Moscow, Jenonne said that the President was disappointed that he was not able to talk with Mitterrand on Wednesday because of the French President's trip to Vietnam and Cambodia. She asked me to look into the possibilities of the two talking after Mitterrand's return. I did not have to look far. Admiral DeLussy, Mitterrand's deputy military advisor, says that Mitterrand would like to talk with the President and suggests February 15 or 16 (Monday or Tuesday). (Mitterrand returns from Indochina very late Friday evening. DeLussy recommends that the call wait until early next week if that is convenient for us as Mitterrand can use the weekend to rest from his voyage. Mitterrand is still in a somewhat weakened state of health.)

DeLussy says Mitterrand was pleased with the message from the President and the fact that we had tried to call. Initial French public and private reaction to our Bosnia proposals has also been positive. When the two talk, Mitterrand may want to mention his trip to Vietnam and Cambodia as well as Bosnia. We will prepare appropriate points. (DeLussy also asked about dates for Mitterrand's visit here, stressing that Mitterrand very much wants to come before March 15. Jean Levy, Mitterrand's deputy diplomatic advisor, called with the same message, just before leaving with Mitterrand for Vietnam.)

Could we please identify a possible time (or two) for the phone conversation? I will then try to work out with the Elysee.

Concurrences by: Jane Holt *JH*, Tork *T* Patterson (substance)

RECOMMENDATION

That we identify a time early next week for the President and Mitterrand to talk.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: KBYNARA, Date: 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

*Wayne*  
*Tony's working on it now*  
*Make sure it happens tonight !!!*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Feb-1993 14:46 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wilma G. Hall  
(HALL)

SUBJECT: RE: Possible Mitterrand-Clinton Phone Call

Mr. Lake asks that you "Please do a memo for President recommending."

Thanks very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Earl A. Wayne	( WAYNE )
CC: M. Brooke Darby	( DARBY )
CC: Allison M. Wright	( WRIGHT )
CC: Mary C. Emery	( EMERY )
CC: Cathy Millison	( MILLISON )
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	( HILLIARD )
CC: Wendy E. Gray	( GRAY )
CC: Torkel Patterson	( PATTERSON )
CC: Betty A. Marshall	( MARSHALL )
CC: Jane E. Holl	( HOLL )
CC: Records	( RECORDS )
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	( CICIO )
CC: Dona F. Proctor	( PROCTOR )
CC: Mary C. Emery	( EMERY )
CC: Michael W. Punke	( PUNKE )
CC: William H. Itoh	( ITOH )
CC: Nancy Soderberg	( SODERBERG )
CC: Records	( RECORDS )

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 140				
Document ID: 9300557				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Telephone Call to President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pages)</del>	<del>02/12/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (1 page)</del>	<del>02/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. cable</del>	<del>President Clinton to President Mitterrand (4 pages)</del>	<del>02/11/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 140

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9300557

2015-0774-M  
rs1284

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300557  
RECEIVED: 12 FEB 93 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 12 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR PRES TELCALL TO PM MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 15 OR 16 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 16 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
WALKER  
WAYNE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE

Z 93021218 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION

002 PRESIDENT

Z 93021221 FOR INFORMATION

002

X 93021708 NOTED BY PRES

2/12 8 PM  
cc: SB

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: [Signature] LOG # 0557  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>[Signature]</u> DepExecSec	<u>T</u>		<u>A</u>
ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>VS</u>	<u>A</u>
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WA 2/12</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

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cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

12 FEB 93 7:21

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Diskette requested 2/12 clw

T  
A  
B

A.

**PHOTOCOPY  
PRESERVATION**

2/15-10 to

Basic structure of U-O in but  
but only avail structure -

Also must review poss of  $\Delta$  of U-O  
cell be v. useful

prob. need ten X $\Delta$  Self/Croat  
cell "unify zone" occupied by 2 gyps.

in contemplated return of  
ten members have lost - but  
at least get back 2/3 of lost  
guilt - that's reason - gives  
homogeneity for in law now

now Muslim have only isolated  
pro-cities -

Muslim need to know from. will  
be within unified  $\Delta$  - can give  
that answer to Pres -  
o all proposal acceptable - Q is  
with  $\Delta$  -

France vs good operation in advantage  
to be gained -


- v. diff. - in one tells on truth -  
- Cent. of struggle, hatred -

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1993 FEB 12 P9: 41

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Francois Mitterrand of France

DATE: February 15 or 16, 1993

PURPOSE: To discuss his perspectives on Bosnia and thoughts on our approach now that he has returned from Indochina.

SECURE OR OPEN: Secure

INTERPRETER: To be provided.

PHONE NUMBER: Signal has it.

CONTACT PERSON: Tony Wayne, 395 - 5646

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIMES: To Be Determined

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: The Yugoslav Crisis: Initial French reaction to our ideas has been positive. Mitterrand's aides say he would like to talk with you since he was unavailable last Wednesday. French partnership will be essential in managing the situation. Paris has put the most troops on the ground (4400) as well as taking a leading role in diplomacy and on humanitarian issues. Mitterrand has been skeptical about using force to find an overall solution, but is reportedly far from confident that the Vance/Owen process will yield results, given the "tribal" nature of the conflict. The French public is more supportive of using force. This has led to electoral jockeying with the opposition and revealed divisions among ministers.

The recent threat to French UNPROFOR soldiers in Croat-Serb fighting sparked the dispatch of a French carrier battle group to the Adriatic. Mitterrand and his advisors are

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**PER E.O. 13526**  
 2015-0774-M (1.01)  
 12/1/2017 KBH

reportedly exasperated, feeling French troops are exposed and not getting sufficient support from France's allies. Before agreeing to renewal of the UNPROFOR presence in Croatia (and keeping their 2,100 troops in place), the French are insisting on: 1) clearly defined political objectives which are agreed by the parties on the ground; and 2) actions to assure the security, credibility and effectiveness of UNPROFOR troops, including the authority to use force. The Serbs and Croats have just agreed to engage in talks in New York.

Mitterrand favors "sealing off" Macedonia from the rest of the conflict. France has worked closely with Greece on the name issue and first promoted the idea of arbitrating a new name as part of UN entry for Macedonia. On Kosovo, Mitterrand believes that we should limit ourselves to providing diplomatic support for Serbia and Albania to work things out. The French have sought an active U.S. role in the crisis, including a commitment of troops on the ground. They agree that NATO participation is needed, with three caveats: 1) protecting France's status outside NATO's integrated command; 2) assuring the UN's overall political authority; and 3) allotting decision-making priority for those states with forces in place.

Trip to Vietnam and Cambodia: Mitterrand has just returned from the first visit by a French leader to Indochina since the mid-60's and the first visit ever to an independent Vietnam. He took over 300 business leaders to Hanoi, announced new aid, and publicly called for the U.S. to lift its trade embargo against Vietnam. (The French particularly want us to stop blocking IMF assistance to Vietnam.) Mitterrand also called on Vietnam to improve its human rights record.

French Politics and a Mitterrand Visit: Mitterrand wants to visit in advance of France's late March parliamentary elections, which the center-right opposition is expected to win handily. Mitterrand hopes a visit here will underscore his international role and establish a relationship with you before a conservative Prime Minister is named. Mitterrand's term lasts until 1995, and he will in all likelihood continue to maintain the lead (though somewhat diminished) in

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French external policy even with a non-Socialist government.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Your Message to Mitterrand

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND :

- It is a pleasure to talk with you. Welcome home. I know it is a long journey to and from Indochina. *State visit trip - Monocars & systent,*
- I hope you have had time to consider our ideas on the Bosnia crisis. I am very much looking forward to your thoughts.
- Partnership between the United States and France will be essential in finding solutions. We deeply appreciate the leadership France has already shown on the Yugoslav crisis.
- Ambassador Bartholomew had good talks in Moscow, and we look forward to bringing the Russians along with us -- which I think you agree is very important.
- But I really want to hear your thoughts.

VIETNAM -- IF RAISED

- I appreciate your concern about our trade embargo against Vietnam. I am reviewing our policy to see what we can do.
- However, I will still seek the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs as a pre-condition of improved relations.

MITTERRAND VISIT -- IF RAISED

- I look forward to seeing you soon. I know you would like to visit before March 15.
- We are working to identify possible dates. It is taking longer than I would like. But I am sure that you remember how hectic your first days in office were, especially trying to get the domestic agenda moving forward rapidly.

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

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PER E.O. 13526  
2015 - 0774 - M (1.02)  
12/1/2017 KBH

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 110234Z FEB 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND  
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE BEEN INTENSIVELY CONSIDERING OUR APPROACH  
TO THE TRAGIC SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE JANUARY 20.  
I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF OUR CONCLUSIONS AND SEEK YOUR  
REACTION. GIVEN FRANCE'S VITAL ROLE IN EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS  
CRISIS, I HAD HOPED WE COULD TALK IMMEDIATELY, BUT YOUR TRIP TO  
VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA MADE THAT IMPRACTICAL. I NEVERTHELESS LOOK  
FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU ON YOUR RETURN TO PARIS. WE  
APPRECIATE THE LEADERSHIP FRANCE HAS DEMONSTRATED IN DEALING WITH  
THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT FRANCO-U.S. COOPERATION  
WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN FINDING SOLUTIONS AND MAKING THEM WORK.

OUR POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA, LIKE THAT OF FRANCE, IS DRIVEN BY THE  
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THEIR  
HOMES AND BRUTALIZED. THE DANGER TO STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE  
BALKANS. AND THE ADVANCING DESTRUCTION OF A NEW UN MEMBER. WE ARE  
GIVING SERIOUS AND URGENT ATTENTION TO WAYS OF STRENGTHENING THE UN  
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT IN BOSNIA -- I KNOW FRANCE HAS BEEN IN

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PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-m (1.03)  
12/1/2017 KBH

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

THE FOREFRONT IN THIS EFFORT. AS I BELIEVE YOU ALSO AGREE, WE SEE THIS CONFLICT AS A TEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO ETHNIC CLEANSING.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, LED BY CYRUS VANCE AND DAVID OWEN, TO ARRIVE AT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BRING PEACE TO BOSNIA. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT VANCE-OWEN PLAN NEEDS TO BE MODIFIED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. AS A U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THIS EFFORT, I AM NAMING REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW, OUR FORMER AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON, SPAIN AND NATO AND ONE OF OUR TOP DIPLOMATS, AS MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PEACE TALKS. I HOPE THIS WILL BE A VISIBLE AND PUBLIC SIGN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO BRINGING PEACE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND WILL BE MORE DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HE WILL SHORTLY BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT.

WHILE WE WANT THE UN AND THE EC TO REMAIN IN THE LEAD IN THIS PROCESS, AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW WILL SHARE OUR THINKING WITH FORMER SECRETARY VANCE AND LORD OWEN AND WILL WORK WITH THEM TO HELP BRING THE PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT THAT IS FAIR AND WORKABLE.

IN OUR REVIEW OF THE SITUATION, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A SETTLEMENT THAT IS NOT FAIR WILL NOT COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES AND THEREFORE WILL NOT BE WORKABLE. WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO PAY THE PRICE OF RENEWED CONFLICT AND CRISIS. IN THAT CASE, GIVEN YOUR HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE ON THIS CONFLICT, I BELIEVE YOU WILL ALSO AGREE THAT ALL PARTIES MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE WAY TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT IS THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE. WE ARE TELLING THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THAT NO ONE CAN HOPE TO EMERGE WITH THEIR POSITIONS INTACT.

IF THE TALKS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL, WE MUST RAISE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COST OF AGGRESSION AND ETHNIC CLEANSING TO THOSE WHO PRACTICE IT. THIS INCLUDES ENSURING THAT ALL UN RESOLUTIONS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE STRICTLY ENFORCED. I KNOW THAT FRANCE AND

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THE UNITED STATES AGREE THAT ENFORCING THE NO-FLY-ZONE OVER BOSNIA MUST BE PART OF OUR EFFORT TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IT WILL ALSO ADD CREDIBILITY TO OUR OTHER MOVES. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT I HAVE REITERATED PRESIDENT BUSH'S WARNING TO BELGRADE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPREADING THE WAR TO KOSOVO. WE ALSO AGREE WITH FRANCE THAT WORK MUST BE ACCELERATED ON A WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL AND THAT WE MUST GUARANTEE THAT HUMANITARIAN AID WILL REACH ALL THOSE WHO ARE IN NEED. WE HOPE TO HAVE SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS IN THIS AREA TO OFFER SOON. AND WE WELCOME YOUR VIEWS IN THIS REGARD.

CERTAINLY. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST STAND BEHIND ANY AGREEMENT REACHED TO HELP ENSURE ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO PLAY ITS PART. IF A VIABLE AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED THAT THE PARTIES ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT AS THE BEST AVAILABLE. THE U. S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN WITH THE UN, NATO AND OTHERS IN IMPLEMENTING IT, INCLUDING POSSIBLE U. S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION. IN THIS REGARD, WE SEE NATO AS POSSESSING UNIQUE ASSETS TO BRING TO BEAR ON THIS SITUATION. PARTICULARLY IN PLANNING FOR THIS OPERATION. WE HOPE YOU WILL JOIN US IN ASKING NATO TO BEGIN THE NECESSARY PLANNING. I WANT TO UNDERSCORE THAT WE DO NOT ENVISION A NATO-ONLY OPERATION. WE WILL WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION BY RUSSIA AND OTHERS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WANT TO OFFER MY APPRECIATION FOR THE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION WHICH FRENCH TROOPS ARE MAKING TODAY ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA. I AM FULLY AWARE OF YOUR CONCERN FOR THEIR WELL-BEING. THEIR SAFETY AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OTHER UNPROFOR TROOPS HAS BEEN AND WILL REMAIN CENTRAL IN OUR DELIBERATIONS.

I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THESE STEPS WILL MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS SOON AND, OF COURSE, TO ARRANGING AN EARLY MEETING WITH YOU.

SINCERELY,

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0051

NNNN

<MSGID> M0220828

~~SECRET~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0557

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 12, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: TONY WAYNE *(TW)*

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to French President  
Mitterrand

As you requested, attached is a proposal for the President to talk with President Mitterrand early next week about Bosnia.

Concurrences by: Jane Holt *(JH)*, Torkel Patterson *(TP)* (Draft)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached telephone call proposal to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Message to Mitterrand

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBYNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

SB/TL 2/12  
I HAVE TALKED TO  
MANISHA TO SEE IF  
THIS IS POSSIBLE.  
SHE SAYS WE MAY  
HAVE A WINDOW  
AT 1030 MONDAY 2/15.  
NS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 140				
Document ID: 9300594				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with French President Francois Mitterrand on February 15, 1993 (3 pages)	02/15/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 140

### FOLDER TITLE:

9300594

2015-0774-M  
rs1285

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: WAYNE  
WALKER

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCON

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 15 FEB

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 18 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
SIGLER  
WALKER  
WAYNE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 9300594

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 93021614 FOR DECISION  
X 93021809 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY:   AH   LOG #   0594    
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM   PBS   NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG   JB   A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<del>3</del> 1		<del>A</del> A
ExecSec		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	WA 2/17	A N
NSC Secretariat	3		

16 FEB 93 12: 24

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 15, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH  
THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER  
FROM: TONY WAYNE  
SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on February 15, 1993, between the President and President Mitterrand.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.04)  
12/1/2017 KBH

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Francois Mitterrand on February 15, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Francois Mitterrand of France  
Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet  
Notetaker: Tony Wayne

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 15, 1993, 10:08am - 10:20 am  
Oval Office

President Mitterrand: Hello, Francois Mitterrand here. (U)

The President: Mr. President? (U)

President Mitterrand: Is that President Clinton? (U)

The President: Yes, it's me. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good morning. I am very happy to hear you. I am at your disposal to discuss whatever you like. (U)

The President: Thank you. I know you just had a long journey to and from Indochina. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it was a very interesting trip. It allowed me to raise consciousness so one could see the changes going on in Vietnam. Cambodia was very interesting, but there is no assurance that the war will end soon. The leader there is very picturesque and interesting. I hope we will have the opportunity to discuss this at length sometime. (U)

The President: Yes, I would like to speak with you briefly about the situation in Bosnia. I sent you a message last week, but we could not speak. It is essential that the United States and France work together closely in finding solutions. We deeply appreciate the leadership which France has shown in this crisis. Ambassador Bartholomew, whom I have asked to work on this full time, just returned from Moscow where he had good talks. We think it is important to bring the Russians along, which I think you agree is important. But I wanted to hear your thoughts on our position and where we go from here. (U)

President Mitterrand: You informed me of you principle points: the basic structure of the Vance-Owen plan is fine, but you would make adjustments. I agree that is not the best possible plan,

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but it is the only one available. I want to add that we must review the possibilities for changing the plan, which I agree could be helpful. I also think there might need to be exchange between Croatian and Serbian territory. According to my talks with the two presidents that might be possible. It may be necessary to unify or link the zones which both control. Also, the plan does not contemplate returning the territory which the Moslems have lost and continue to lose. But at least the plan lets them recuperate 20% of the territory lost. I think that is reasonable. It will allow the Moslems to have a homogeneous territory -- a joint territory which they do not have now. We cannot forget that this does not exist or pretend that it does. Now, they only have isolated points, mainly cities. So we must encourage all parties to talk, to negotiate about this. The Moslems need to know that Bosnia will remain a unified state. I think we could give assurances to President Izetbegovic of Bosnia on this. Of course, if we broke Bosnia into ten different (independent) provinces that would be unacceptable. So your proposal and thoughts accepting in general the Vance-Owen plan with a few changes is acceptable. The question is what changes to make to the plan. (S)

The President: Thank you very much for your thoughts. I'd like to have a chance to confer with Ambassador Bartholomew after his contacts and consultations and then I'll be back in touch with you with some specific changes. In the meantime, we will proceed along the lines discussed. The U.S. is prepared to play its part in enforcement of a plan. We will encourage the Bosnians to negotiate in good faith and ask our friends to encourage Serbia and Croatia to do the same. I am delighted that you think we are moving in the right direction. (S)

President Mitterrand: I resisted considerable pressure here from people who wanted France to undertake a ground operation. I see no advantage in that for anyone. (S)

The President: I agree. (S)

President Mitterrand: It is a difficult situation there as no one tells the truth. The three communities have been through centuries of struggle and hatred. You cannot trust what they say. (S)

The President: I agree, but we need to try to contain the conflict and to stop the bloodshed. (S)

President Mitterrand: Your objectives are the same as ours, and I appreciate your willingness to be involved in the solution. (S)

The President: I am eager to have an early meeting with you. My people are trying to identify some dates. I look forward to having the opportunity to meet with you soon. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. There are important issues which we could work on together. I too look forward to an early meeting. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: Good-bye, au revoir. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 143				
Document ID: 9301535				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>From Anthony Lake re. Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>03/17/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re. Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>03/17/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 143

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9301535

2015-0774-M  
rs1286

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301535  
RECEIVED: 16 MAR 93 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 17 MAR 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 17 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 19 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
WAYNE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJWD DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-17

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 93031709 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
002 PRESIDENT	Z 93031713 FOR INFORMATION
002	X 93031816 NOTED BY PRES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	930317		FUERTH, L

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1535  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Staff Director	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
APNSA	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WA 3/17</u>	<u>PO</u> <u>PODESTA</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:  
*Telephone call to President Mitterrand*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:            3/17

*E & Sec's Office to desk*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1535

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
3/17/93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1993

93 MAR 17 P 1:40

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: March 17, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 2:30 - 2:45 pm  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *RL*

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.05)  
12/1/2017 KBH

I. PURPOSE

To gain Mitterrand's impressions from his meetings with Yeltsin and to confer on steps to aid Russia; to discuss the Bosnia situation.

II. BACKGROUND

You and Mitterrand agreed to talk after his March 16 visit to Moscow. Mitterrand's staff indicates that he would also like to discuss Bosnia.

Russia: You will want to seek Mitterrand's impressions of Yeltsin's political position, his state of mind, and his plans to solve his greatest political problem -- the threat to his powers and, ultimately, his Presidency from the center/right Congress. It will be particularly interesting to know if Yeltsin raised the possibility of Presidential rule with Mitterrand, and if he asked for Mitterrand's support should he decide to pursue that course (as he hinted at in his conversation with Helmut Kohl).

Mitterrand will also almost certainly make a pitch for you to agree to a G-7 Head of State summit on Russia before the Tokyo meeting in July. Mitterrand told the press he would argue for a meeting as early as April and that a G-7 summit on Russia in June or July would be too late. We want to avoid a summit that would take place in Vancouver directly following your April 3-4 summit as it would detract from your first official meeting with Yeltsin. We also want to avoid an early G-7 summit that promised much but did not deliver what Yeltsin clearly needs -- concrete, sizeable and visible economic support. We thus recommend that you parry Mitterrand's suggestion with another idea: that the G-7 continue to treat aid to Russia as the highest priority and that we work intensively at the Ministerial level to produce a multilateral package of assistance by May. You may want to refer to your earlier suggestion that the G-7 Finance and Foreign ministers meet in April. *(Mitterrand would prefer that it be a summit; this may be related to the fact that by April, the Foreign + Finance Ministers will be from another party.)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2

Bosnia: Mitterrand met with Milosevic in Paris on Thursday, first one-on-one and then with Vance and Owen. The three of them pressured Milosevic to use his influence on Bosnia's Serbs to bring the Vance/Owen talks to successful closure. Mitterrand warned of further isolation and offered the benefit of lifting sanctions, if Serbia contributed to a negotiated solution. Milosevic was difficult to move, although he did agree by the end of the Paris meetings to weigh in with Karadzic and urge the Bosnian Serb leader to renew serious negotiations in New York. The French, however, are not sure if Milosevic will exert any pressure on Karadzic to show flexibility in negotiations. Mitterrand may also have discussed Bosnia with Yeltsin and may share a sense of what kind of a role Russia is willing to play.

The New York talks are set to resume this week. The Bosnian government has signaled willingness to sign on to the Vance/Owen plan with some conditions, which will be subject to discussion in New York. We expect the Serbs will continue to stonewall on the territorial proposals, while trying to consolidate additional military gains in Eastern Bosnia.

Meanwhile, the airdrop operation continues. The Russians and Germans continue to work on the terms of their participation. We are considering ways that will permit the Turks to take a more active role as well. The French are contemplating an air drop operation of their own and are reportedly talking with the Germans about participating. The French also continue to resist our suggested arrangements for NATO's role in implementing any Bosnia agreement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.06)  
12/1/2017 KBH

SITUATION IN MOSCOW

- I am anxious to hear about your meeting with Yeltsin. How do you assess his political position after his defeat by the Congress of People's Deputies?
- What is his state of mind as he faces this enormous challenge to his rule?
- Did he indicate what his own next move would be? He talked to Helmut Kohl about the possibility of implementing Presidential rule. Did he mention that to you, or did he discuss any other option?

G-7 PLAN FOR RUSSIA

- I continue to believe, as I told you last week, that the G-7 must continue to be intensively engaged in producing a package of economic assistance that would support Yeltsin's reform government as soon as possible.
- Our countries agreed at the Hong Kong meeting to pursue that objective as our highest priority. We now need to assure that our governments work effectively together to produce a substantial package by late April.
- I suggest that, in addition to experts meetings, we ask our Foreign and Finance Ministers to become involved personally and to have them meet by mid-April to decide on the broad outlines of a package.
- I am concerned that an early Heads of State summit is premature. We need to do the hard work first to prepare a package and to make sure that it will be concrete, relevant to Yeltsin's needs, and substantial.
- I saw the Head of the Constitutional Court, Mr. Zorkin, yesterday. He warned specifically about meetings that produced rhetoric and not deeds.
- Let's focus on what we are each prepared to do on a G-7 package first, before agreeing on a G-7 summit. I think that will be the easiest way to bring along the Japanese and to assure they make a substantial financial contribution.

BOSNIA

- I am delighted with the reports of what you said to Milosevic. Vance and Owen have told our people that you made very clear that the world holds him largely responsible

for Bosnian Serb aggression and expects him to do his utmost to get it stopped.

- I also understand that Moscow has been putting considerable pressure on Milosevic.
- We hope talks will resume in New York this week. There is no guarantee that Bosnian President Izetbegovic will reach agreement with Vance/Owen, but it is possible.
- If that happens -- if Bosnians do everything the world has asked of them -- and Serbian aggression continues, we will have to think hard about our reaction.
- What was your impression of Milosevic's willingness to exert maximum pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to compromise?
- One thing that has kept me from recommending stronger action against Serbian aggression so far has been a concern not to hurt Yeltsin at home. What do you think Russian domestic politics would bear in terms of stronger action if the Bosnians sign onto an agreement but continue to be attacked on the ground by the Bosnian Serbs?
- What is your own view of how we should act in that circumstance?
- IF ASKED: NATO'S ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING A BOSNIAN ACCORD: We should not let this turn into an architectural debate. We need a structure that will give us, the other participants, and the parties in Bosnia confidence that the implementation of any peace agreement will be effective.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1535

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *(fw)* AND TOBY GATI *TG*  
FROM: TONY WAYNE *(tw)* AND NICK BURNS *NB*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with President  
Francois Mitterrand on March 17, 1993 at 2:30 pm

As requested, attached is a memo and talking points for the President's use his telephone discussion with French President Mitterrand. As of Tuesday evening, Mitterrand's office had not confirmed that he would be available at the 2:30 pm EST. Our embassy will try to confirm his availability tomorrow morning.

Concurrence by: Jane Holt *(jw)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBYNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 143				
Document ID: 9301584				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France on March 17, 1993 (3 pages)	03/17/1993	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 143

### FOLDER TITLE:

9301584

2015-0774-M

rs1287

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301584  
RECEIVED: 17 MAR 93 17

TO: ITOH

FROM: WAYNE

DOC DATE: 17 MAR 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE  
TELCON

RUSSIA

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES CALL TO MITTERRAND 17 MARCH

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 20 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EMERY  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
HILLIARD  
SIGLER  
WALKER  
WAYNE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-17

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 93032012 FOR DECISION  
X 93032208 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 1584  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG HA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>100</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Will</u>	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>HA</u> <u>3/19</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

19 MAR 93 5:31

cc: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1584

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: TONY WAYNE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France on March 17, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Francois Mitterrand on March 17, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.07)  
12/1/2017 K3M

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France on  
March 17, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Mitterrand  
Interpreter: Marcel Couquet  
Notetaker: Tony Wayne

DATE, TIME: March 17, 1993, 3:31-3:52 pm, EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Mitterrand: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: Very well thank you. I called you as we agreed in Washington. This gives me the opportunity to thank you for your welcome, but I also wanted to talk to you about what I saw in Russia and about my meeting with Vance, Owen, and Milosevic. May I start with Russia? I had a long meeting with Yeltsin, and I found the situation in great disorder and a situation of conflict between the President and the Congress. This conflict between the two parts of the government must come to a resolution. I think this will happen in April. The assets that Yeltsin has, are, of course, in jeopardy. And he displayed anxiety when he said that I should insist on a meeting of the seven (G-7). When we talked before, we agreed that the Japanese would oppose such a meeting, and you agreed that if not the seven, then the powers which would aid Russia: Germany, France, the United States, and some other countries should meet. President Yeltsin and I would like this meeting to take place in April or as soon as possible. If not, it will be too late and the events we can't control will take place -- not that we are in control now. You will meet with the Russian President in Vancouver. The proposal that President Yeltsin made is that after the meeting in Canada, say two days after, or within the following week, we meet in Vancouver or some other city in Canada, either the sixth or seventh of April. The only objective would be to establish what kind of assistance we could make available to Russia. I know that Japan is opposed to this, and the English aren't enthusiastic. But Chancellor Kohl was insistent that we act. If we don't do so urgently, the world will place on our shoulders the responsibility for the events that happen. I know your government wants a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and finance. I would be against this because it would not be useful. In terms of political will, these type

of meetings often fail. I have just repeated the anguish of President Yeltsin, and what he thinks should be done. The minds there are not very relaxed. (Ø)

The President: Mr. President, let me say first of all, thank you for the first-hand report from Russia. Like you, I am very interested in doing something. What concerns me about a meeting of heads of state is whether we can have specific and concrete responses to the problems of Russia. I have been working hard to develop a broad and specific package of assistance ready for my meeting with President Yeltsin. I strongly feel that if we are all going to meet with President Yeltsin, we should have a specific idea of what we are going to propose. This is important with Japan -- if we go ahead without preparing, it will reduce the likelihood of Japan providing help even though it has the resources and is in the best position to help. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I know that the Japanese will not do anything on their own until they have an answer on the islands, and, if they do not have that, then we must force them to follow us and do it. We must take the initiative and go ahead. (Ø)

The President: Well, have you talked to anyone else? Is Chancellor Kohl willing to do this? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I talked to Chancellor Kohl four days ago, and he insisted we do all we can to help Yeltsin. He didn't say exactly how. He will talk with me tomorrow. I think we have a period of fifteen days to pull a package together, and I have given you some food for thought. We can talk again after you have thought about it. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I would like to think about it. I will be back in touch. (U)

President Mitterrand: On to the second item, Yugoslavia. I feel the Vance-Owen plan is making progress. Milosevic has now insisted that Bosnian-Serbs contribute to the solution. We met for five hours with him, and this is what Vance and Owen also thought after our talks. Since then, Bosnian President Izetbegovic has accepted to negotiate, and Karadzic is getting ready to come to New York. I think there is only one possibility: do everything we can to bring success to the Vance-Owen effort. It costs us the least and is the only guarantee of peace. If it fails there is nothing else. If the plan works, we must make sure there are enough UN forces present to make sure combat does not start again. I had the feeling in Russia that the Russians will not do much. Today, UN commander Morrillon is still in besieged Srebrenica. I will share with you something that is not yet publicized. France will put at the disposal of the UN, helicopters to distribute food and goods to the city and to help guarantee safe passage of the humanitarian convoy. In order for us to believe that the Bosnian Serbs are going to help end the conflict, they are going to have to stop the siege of Srebrenica. If you and the United States will do what is necessary to push for the success of the Vance-Owen plan, then it

will be successful. That is what I wanted to tell you as we had agreed in Washington. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Thank you very much. I will be back in touch with you about Russia. But about Bosnia, I appreciate very much the effort you made with Milosevic. We have encouraged Izetbegovic to negotiate with flexibility and reach agreement. I know Karadzic is coming to New York, but I am skeptical that he will negotiate in good faith. We will continue to push Izetbegovic, but if the Bosnians agree to Vance-Owen and if the Serbs continue to resist, we must think about what our reaction should be. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Of course I agree with you on the reaction, but I also don't trust Milosevic's good faith. I think we will have to place him in a circumstance in which he will feel he has to agree. (Ø)

The President: I agree. Meanwhile, I thank you for your helicopters and what you will be doing there. I will discuss what you have said about Russia and will be back in touch with you. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Very well. Have a nice day, Mr. President and see you soon. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 147				
Document ID: 9302536				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. note</del>	<del>re: [POTUS Note from Conversation with President Mitterrand] (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/20/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. memo</del>	<del>From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/17/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/17/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001d. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management.  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 147

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9302536

2015-0774-M  
rs1288

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302536  
RECEIVED: 17-APR-93-13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 17 APR 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE  
TELCALL

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE RE BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA ON  
19 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 21 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE LOGREF: 9302534 9302535

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
WALKER  
WAYNE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 93041720 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
Z 93041720 FOR INFORMATION  
X 93042110 NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: WJA LOG # 2536  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WJA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
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APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>approved JWR</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JB 4/17</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
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A = Action     I = Information     D = Dispatch     R = Retain     N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

17 APR 93 7:01

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

2536

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



DATE: 4/20

NOTE FOR:

*Tony/Sandy*

*copies distributed  
FW*

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you for your:

Information


Action

*material call*



Thank you.

**JOHN D. PODESTA**  
Assistant to the President  
and Staff Secretary  
(x2702)



cc:

*4/21  
P/S notes  
filed w/ RM  
FW*

# Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: 4-20

TIME: 10<sup>16</sup>  
incoming/outgoing

WITH: Mitchell

SUBJECT: Boonin

— Distributed by NATO decision  
to ask Turks to participate  
Psychiatrist + history error. Know  
hard to A. Brown decision to  
keep Turk ATF in news & actually  
use, give more info - Based on 1 cent  
of history, not know. Decis.

— factually want to employ  
FOLLOW UP: Turk ATF, via news decision  
to use French ATF.

— OK new sanctions, in ready for  
ground troops. Next to right decision -  
Serbs - Munir + Croat - Munir pub.  
Boonin artificial creation.

# Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
incoming/outgoing

WITH: Mittelman p. 2

SUBJECT: \_\_\_\_\_

- How to think about it
- try to preserve U-2 legacy or some other -
- as for bombing, more reserved - cautious.
- Serbia strong & courageous. Bombing may in fact be dead.
- impact when comes to thinking

FOLLOW UP: helping them or helping them help themselves

- Talked to AF & Aeron -
- successful on per level -
- Know, Slovakia call
- Ben Klumbein the Miller - history is still alive among them

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 4/19  
+ 4/20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2536

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1993

93 APR 19 A7:39

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

DATE: April 20, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 10:10 a.m. EST  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

HAS SEEN  
JUR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0774-M (1.09)  
12/1/2017 K3H

I. PURPOSE

To discuss next steps on the situation in Bosnia and to share our views on aid to Russia.

II. BACKGROUND

Domestic Politics: So far, Mitterrand and his new conservative government are working without evident friction on foreign (or domestic) policy. But, it is clear that we need to deal with both Mitterrand and the new government to win France's cooperation.

Bosnia: The French remain potentially our most important European partner in any initiative to stem the crisis. Mitterrand asked to talk with you urgently about the deteriorating situation in Bosnia. There are signs that he may favor beefing up the French presence in Bosnia as part of a solution, while new Prime Minister Balladur has been more hesitant on that possibility. We have no hints that Mitterrand has any specific proposals to offer, however. As of Friday, the French government was very uncertain about how to respond to the current crisis, and like most others trying to keep up with events on the ground. The French are firmly committed to tougher sanctions. But the government is divided whether to try to use allied air strikes or the threat of them to stem the Serbian offensive (with the Chief of Staff floating the idea and the Foreign Ministry opposing it). The French remain opposed to lifting the arms embargo, citing possible danger to French troops on the ground. The French remain worried about the exposed position of their troops and the limited UN mandate under which they must operate.

No-Fly Zone: The French are also very worried about Turkish participation in enforcement of the No-Fly Zone. They believe that Turkish participation could revive old animosities and cause the conflict to spill into Kosovo, Macedonia and elsewhere. We are told that Mitterrand will raise this with you and seek support for delaying employment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2536

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1993

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of Turkish planes in No-fly enforcement. (Some French diplomats have even said they might have to withdraw their planes, if the Turks were to join the operation now, as planned.) Our position is that it is good for the Turks to join the rest of the allies in a UN-authorized operation and that the point is precisely that we are working together to overcome old animosities. We have a stake in Turkey's actions elsewhere - especially regarding Iraq and Azerbaijan, and should not treat them like second-class members of NATO.

Russia: The French are fully supportive of the multilateral aid package worked out in Tokyo, but they were not forthcoming on new bilateral aid. Prime Minister Balladur has cited the budget deficit in indicating that France cannot give more now. We should, however, push the French to come along on the privatization fund, the denuclearization fund and the G-7 office in Moscow. You should also raise with Mitterrand the need to work together to provide the Russians access to the commercial space market. France has expressed support for this idea, but very much wants to preserve its (and the EC's) share of the world launch market and worries that we will cut a deal with the Russians at Europe's expense. We do, in fact, want the Europeans to join us in allowing the Russians a fair share of the market. U.S. and European officials will meet later this month to discuss this issue.

Attachments

Tab A      Talking Points

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

-- We have not talked since before your elections. I hope you are doing well.

BOSNIA

- The fall of Srebrenica will put this conflict on a different footing and, consequently, our handling of it.
- The latest Serbian aggression, coming just after the Bosnian government made major concessions to sign the Vance/Owen plan, is especially abhorrent and intolerable.
- Do you see any realistic possibility that even the tighter sanctions we both are supporting alone will induce the Serbs to negotiate seriously and reach a fair agreement in time to save the remaining Bosnian-held territory?
- If not, what would you propose? Do you still disagree with us about lifting the arms embargo so the Bosnians can better defend themselves? If so, how would you propose defending them?
- My advisors and I are wrestling with these same questions. I wish I could tell you we had found a perfect answer. All options have major disadvantages. But that includes the option of standing by while ethnic cleansing continues to succeed and the Bosnian Muslims are driven into a Palestinian-like remnant in the heart of Europe.
- I value your thoughts and advice as a contribution to our own deliberations. Let's stay in touch, both through our advisors and publicly.
- It's my hope that we can find an agreed course.

(If Raised)

- We think that the Turks should not be prevented from participating in No-Fly enforcement operations.
- General Shalikashvili told the NAC that he would need all the aircraft that had been offered in order to meet the 24-hour operational requirements.

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1.10)  
12/1/2017 KRM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- I think, therefore, that it would be a serious mistake to deny the SACEUR the resources he needs to carry out the operation.
- We also send the wrong signal to the Turks, especially at a time when we need their forbearance in the Caucasus and their cooperation in Northern Iraq.

RUSSIA

- We think the Tokyo conference was a major success, and will give a boost to Yeltsin before April 25.
- The \$28 billion IMF/World Bank/EBRD program was well-received by Kozyrev and Federov and could make a real difference. We need to keep the International Financial Institutions focussed on implementing it this year.
- I am also very pleased that the Japanese have stepped up to an active role in assistance to Russia. We need to continue to encourage Miyazawa to do even more as the G-7 summit approaches.
- The G-7 has much work to do in order to make the July Tokyo Summit successful on aid to Russia.
- We put forward three ideas at last week's Tokyo meeting on which we would like to reach agreement by July:
- First, I would urge you to consider seriously our proposal for a Special G-7 Privatization Fund. We are ready to commit \$500 million, and would ask the other G-7 countries to help us reach the \$2 billion figure by July. We would then plan to ask the World Bank and EBRD for another \$2 billion to reach a total \$4 billion fund.
- Yeltsin and Federov consider this fund to be a major priority as it will help them cushion the consequences of privatization of major state firms.
- Second, we also hope the G-7 will agree to a major Denuclearization Fund. We have already committed \$1.2 billion to this effort, but other countries have to step forward in order to give Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan the impetus to accelerate the dismantling and destruction of weapons.
- Third, we propose establishing a small G-7 office in Moscow to monitor the effective implementation of these efforts and our other programs through the International Financial Institutions.
- Kohl and Miyazawa both think this is a good idea. I hope France will support an agreement at the July summit to establish the office. Its creation would certainly help to assure that we meet our commitments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Fourth, I hope we can work together on providing the Russians access to the commercial space market.
- At Vancouver, President Yeltsin linked such access to his ability to scale back a contract involving transfer of missile-related technology to India.
- I realize that this issue touches on important commercial interests for both of us, but it also offers a means of showing our support for Russia and of preventing proliferation of Russian missile technology.
- We are prepared to provide Russia access to the launch market, but we cannot do it on our own. U.S. and European specialists will be meeting soon to discuss the issue. I hope that France will join us in bearing this burden.
- Finally, we should be in touch right after the April 25 referendum to coordinate correspondence. If France, the U.S., Germany and others send the same signals, we can have an impact.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2536

April 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *JW*

FROM: TONY WAYNE

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President  
Mitterrand

Attached is a briefing memo and talking points for the President's phone conversation with President Mitterrand on Monday April 19.

Concurrences by: Nick Burns, Jane Holl, Elisa Harris + Dana Perino *for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Approve *JW* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KSM* NARA, Date *12/1/2017*  
*2015-0774-M*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

- We have not talked since before your elections. I hope you are doing well.

BOSNIA

- I spoke with John Major yesterday on the deteriorating situation on the ground and the consequences for our handling of the crisis.

(If Raised)

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# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 147				
Document ID: 9302625				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France (4 pages)</del>	<del>04/20/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBH 7/13/2018</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 147

### FOLDER TITLE:

9302625

2015-0774-M  
rs1290

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302625  
RECEIVED: 20-APR-93 13

TO: ITOH

FROM: WAYNE  
WALKER

DOC DATE: 22 APR 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCON

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 20 APR

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 23 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
SIGLER  
WALKER  
WAYNE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
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2015-0774-M

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RECORD ID: 9302625

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH

Z 93042708 FOR DECISION

001

X 93051210 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council  
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

RECEIVED

COMMENTS:  
26 APR 95 11 59

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2625

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 22, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILL ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *JW*

FROM: TONY WAYNE *TW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Francois Mitterrand of France on April 20, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *Will* *fu* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBY* NARA, Date *12/1/2017*  
2015-0774-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0774-M (1.12)  
12/1/2017 KSH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Interpreter: Carol Wolter  
Notetaker: E. Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff

President Mitterrand  
Interpreter

DATE, TIME: April 20, 1993; 10:15 am - 10:38 am  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Mitterrand: Hello? (U)

The President: Hello, Francois. (U)

President Mitterrand: Hello, I am happy to hear from you. (U)

The President: It's nice to hear your voice too. (U)

President Mitterrand: I called yesterday because I wanted to raise a special issue regarding Bosnia. I am very disturbed by NATO's decision to ask Turkish planes to participate in the Bosnia No-Fly Zone. It is not a problem of Turkish-French relations. They are good. But I feel -- and the Prime Minister agrees -- that it would be a psychological and historical mistake to ask the Turks to help oversee Bosnian air space. I realize that since the decision is taken it is hard to change, but I feel that between the decision to put the Turkish planes in reserve and to actually use them, there is a need for reflection. Because of four centuries of history in the Balkans, it is an extraordinary decision to ask the Turks to oversee Serbs. This decision was taken by officials and not by government leaders, which is, what is needed. If we were to move to implementation, that is if we were to move beyond just holding those planes in reserve and if we actually employed them, then we would need to review whether we can continue to use French aircraft in that operation. That is the difficulty we face. As for the broader situation, we're close to you. We have requested new sanctions. Obviously, we are not ready to intervene militarily on the ground, but in the coming days we need to reach a common appreciation of what to do. The situation could become even more complex as we can see from the current fighting between the Croats and Bosnians. As I told you when we met, Bosnia is an artificial creation and now we are facing the consequences of our imprudent decision to recognize it. So, I just wanted to give

you my thoughts on this important subject. Let me add how happy I was to meet you in Washington last month and that we agreed to talk from time to time on important topics like this one. I want to add that I know that this issue about the Turkish planes is not a U.S. decision, but one that must be taken in NATO. But given the important role which you play in NATO, I wanted to raise it with you. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for calling. First, I agree that we should implement new sanctions and do so as rapidly as possible. I intend to send a representative to Europe to speak with the nations involved to make sure we are doing the best job possible with sanctions. But I don't see any realistic possibility that sanctions alone will induce the Serbs to sign or negotiate any version of Vance-Owen that we all could live with. In the last several days, there have been basically three ideas passed around about what we should do next, all of which have been debated in Europe also. We are reconsidering the question of if the Serbs continue to fight after the Muslims and Croats stop fighting, whether we should lift the arms embargo. You know the arguments for and against that. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, Yes. (Ø)

The President: The leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. Senate and others have suggested that we employ air strikes against various targets in Bosnia to deter Serb gains, and to freeze the Serbs where they are. There is now much more debate on the use of air strikes than just a week ago. Finally, there has been a lot of discussion about a suggestion Prime Minister Major made to me, although I'm not sure if the British would support it, that there should be a multilateral force to freeze the situation as it now is. That would be in a sense -- though not formally -- abandoning Vance-Owen and going in to preserve the situation on the ground as it is now. The problem is how do we get out at the end, and, if we do, the Muslims might become the aggressors because they could feel they could regain territory. All these ideas have some problems, and I want to know if you think any of these should be pursued. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Well, I'll have to think about these options. We need to try to do all we can to preserve the Vance-Owen map or something like it. We need some map or plan for the redistribution of the ethnic groups. As for active military intervention and bombings, I'm very reserved. I haven't talked in detail to the Prime Minister. I'm not sure what France's position will be, but I am very reserved. Serbia is a very hard and courageous country, which creates a problem -- bombings wouldn't end the problem and could lead to a massive war. (Ø)

The President: To be fair to the proponents of sending the multi-lateral group of soldiers, they do not want to abandon the Vance-Owen plan or process, but would only adopt this if all other means, including Vance-Owen, failed. This would only be to preserve the possibility of peace by freezing the current military situation, while negotiations continue. But I worry

about how to get out, once committed, and if we do guarantee agreements there and we do withdraw, we might find the Muslims and not the Serbs are breaching the cease fire line in a year. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, when do you think you'll send your envoy? (U)

The President: Oh, in the next couple of days. But I am not sending someone to talk at very high levels. He will want to talk through with those in charge of the sanctions effort about how we will enforce the sanctions mechanically. (C)

President Mitterrand: That will be useful. (U)

The President: Yes, I will do that soon. Have you had any new thoughts about lifting the arms embargo? Are you still against that? (C)

President Mitterrand: Well, I do think we are being unjust to the Muslims. We are not helping them militarily or in other ways. But you know that any decision of this sort has negative consequences. I need to think about it. Could I give you a response in forty-eight hours? (C)

The President: Well, thank you. We will have a meeting here within the next forty-eight hours to come up with what we think our position will be. Also, I don't think we should talk about this much in public before the Russian elections so as not to hurt Yeltsin. (C)

President Mitterrand: That will be in four days. (U)

The President: Yes, in four days. (U)

President Mitterrand: Please think about what I said on the Turkish air force, but we can talk again. Thank you very much for calling. I think we will have opportunities to discuss this again. It is not the kind of problem which will go away. So, we'll talk soon. (C)

The President: I'd like that. Let me say one brief word about Turkey. The NATO commander basically said he needed all the aircraft he could get to meet the twenty-four hour operational requirements of No-Fly Zone enforcement. And since we have been working hard with the Turks to encourage their forbearance in the Caucasus and to continue our cooperation in Northern Iraq, we thought that we shouldn't block their minimal participation in this way. I will, however, communicate your concerns to our people, and we will talk about it since you've spoken with me. (C)

President Mitterrand: I have conveyed my concerns to Major and Kohl since I think it would be a political mistake to reintroduce the Turks into that difficult area. You know what the Croats and

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Serbs call the Bosnian Muslims -- Turks. History is alive there.  
We'll talk soon. (C)

The President: Yes, in the next couple of days. We will need to coordinate our response to the Russian referendum because it is important, and we will talk on Yugoslavia. (C)

President Mitterrand: Talk to you soon. (U)

The President: Thank you and goodbye, Mr. President. (U)

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# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 147				
Document ID: 9302792				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pages)</del>	<del>05/06/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/06/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. cable</del>	<del>President Clinton to President Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001d. memo</del>	<del>Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Russia Space Launch Agreement and Jobs Issue (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/06/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001e. memo</del>	<del>Lake to POTUS re: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001f. cable</del>	<del>President Clinton to President Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001g. memo</del>	<del>Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Russia Space Launch Agreement and Jobs Issue (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001h. memo</del>	<del>Lake to POTUS re: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>05/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001i. memo</del>	<del>From Lake to POTUS re: Telephone Call with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/26/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001j. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand of France (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/26/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 147

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9302792

2015-0774-M  
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**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
 PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
 RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302792  
RECEIVED: 26-APR-93-08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCALL W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 6 MAY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 29 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSMBN

DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001 WAYNE  
001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 93042611 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
Z 93042613 FOR FURTHER ACTION  
Z 93050515 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
Z 93050612 FOR INFORMATION  
X 93050613 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

Secretariat

- for your records  
this was redone

Tony Wayne

Kyle

Can you see if you  
have this # in your  
files? I think the package  
is w/ POTUS, <sup>see</sup> Add on 2

National Security Council  
The White House

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<i>[Signature]</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>MM</u>	_____
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Exec Sec has deskette*

National Security Council  
The White House

Secretariat  
old version  
updated  
May 1/8  
JAW

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc. VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

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26 APR 95 10:46

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has deskette

National Security Council  
The White House

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG mm A/O 02

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ExecSec	<u>2</u>	<u>cy</u>	
Staff Director	<u>3</u>	<u>mm</u>	
D/APNSA	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
APNSA	<u>5</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	<u>DA 5/6</u>	<u>D TO PDS</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc. VP                      McLarty                      Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 MAY 05 10:44 AM

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec has Disc.

National Security Council  
The White House

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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>wayne</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc. VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

26 APR 93 10:46

DISPATCH INSTI

Exec S


Tony Wayne -  
Call not happening  
as you know from  
your talk w/ Will Itoh.  
Krishe

National Security Council  
The White House

2792

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 PASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG MM A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
ExecSec	1	<u>MM</u>	
SecSec	2	<u>MM</u>	
Asst Dir	3		
PNNSA	<del>4</del>		
NSA			
Information Room			
Asst Dir	4		
Secretary	5		
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Francois

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y.

Marris, Barry

at Tab I.

VP Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

Tony -  
 Per our conversation, Nancy's  
 comments are listed at Tab I.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Rose is to provide you the appropriate  
 paragraphs.

Exec Sec

Bosnia points may need updating?  
 I suppose that depends on when  
 the call is ...  
 bustie

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
 By KSM NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
 2015-0774-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1993

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

DATE: May 6, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 2:15 pm EST

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.12)  
12/1/2017 KBH

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Bosnia; to urge support for Russian access to the commercial space market and G-7 aid to Russia.

II. BACKGROUND

When you talked with Mitterrand on Saturday, you both agreed to talk after Secretary Christopher's discussions Tuesday in Paris. Mitterrand attended the funeral Tuesday of former Prime Minister Beregovoy. You sent condolences to Mitterrand and Mrs. Beregovoy. Beregovoy's suicide, after the March defeat of the Socialists and earlier press attacks on him for allegedly receiving an improper loan, has set off a wave of introspection in France.

Bosnia: Secretary Christopher was pleased with his talks in Paris on Tuesday. In public, the French talked about a "broad convergence of views" with us and said that no option was excluded. In private, while expressing doubts, the French did not flatly reject lifting the arms embargo. They did, however, pose two clear conditions for any eventual move in that direction: 1) a new UN resolution authorizing a lifting of the embargo; and 2) providing time for French troops in the former Yugoslavia to redeploy. Christopher told the French that these were difficult but not impossible conditions. (The French are also considering withdrawing their troops or combining a redeployment with the idea of creating safe havens.)

The French preference is for the Serbs to sign the Vance/Owen plan. Christopher made clear that if that happens we and the French will have to come to rapid closure on command and control for implementation of the plan. He indicated that we felt strongly about the need for unity of command under NATO, while fully respecting the political authority of the UN. The French are holding up agreement on command and control, in part, until they know how many troops we will commit to enforcement operations in Bosnia. We, on the other hand, have told the French that we will not discuss numbers until we have worked out command and

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control. In addition to differing on the possible military hierarchy for any implementation operation, we and the French differ on whether the UN Special Representative for Bosnia would have general authority over the military operation, with the French favoring granting him that authority.

Mitterrand spent a good deal of his meeting with Christopher warning about the ill effects of a simple policy of air strikes. He expressed concern for the safety of French troops and wondered if we would be willing to send U.S. troops to join them in the event of military action. On the arms embargo, he said he did not disagree in principle, but he was unsure about its efficacy.

French have been huddling today to consider their reaction to the actions of the Bosnian Serb assembly. We will update you on any French statements just before the call. We suggest that you press Mitterrand hard on the need for action. Despite their relative forthrightness among our allies, they remain hesitant to act too boldly especially out of concern for their troops.

Russia: I recommend that you also raise briefly several issues of concern with regard to Russia. We have prepared a message from you to Mitterrand (attached), which would be sent to follow-up your phone conversation. It urges Mitterrand to support sharing the burden of providing Russia access to the commercial space launch market. It also urges France to support the three initiatives announced in Tokyo -- the privatization fund, the denuclearization fund and the G-7 office.

On the space launch issue, assuring Russian access to commercial space markets will be critical to curtailing the Indian rocket motor transaction and hence to avoiding the imposition of damaging sanctions under U.S. law. France has expressed support in principle for providing Russia access to the commercial market but very much wants to preserve its (and the EC's) share of the world launch market. The Europeans worry that we will cut a deal with the Russians at Europe's expense. Given French leadership in the European space program, France's cooperation will be essential. We do want the Europeans to join us in allowing the Russians a fair share of the market. Talks between U.S. and EC experts in Brussels earlier this week did not resolve European concerns.

I am sending you a separate memorandum in response to your question on the impact of Russian access to commercial space markets on American jobs. General Dynamics argues ceding 2-3 launches a year would cost 5,000 jobs; others argue the program could result in an expanded market and an expansion of jobs in satellites and ground launch support. The bottom line is that we are addressing that issue by limiting

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Russian participation to one launch a year and working with the industries to address their concerns.

On our Russia initiatives, the French have questions about establishing a designated G-7 office. This reflects at least in part their hesitancy to institutionalize the G-7 beyond the summit process. They have also expressed concern about exactly what the privatization fund would do and how it would mesh with programs by the World Bank and others.

We have also attached a memo in response to your question on possible job losses created by opening the space launch market to Russia.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B Message to Mitterrand  
Tab C Information Memorandum on Russian Access to the Space Launch Market and U.S. Jobs

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

BOSNIA

- Secretary Christopher was very pleased with his talks in Paris with you, the Prime Minister and the Defense and Foreign Ministers.
- We see yesterday's action by the Bosnian Serb assembly as de facto rejection of the Vance-Owen plan. It is another attempt to delay, while the aggression continues.
- I am gravely disappointed. I strongly believe that we must respond quickly and firmly, and I hope that France will join us.
- I have asked Secretary Christopher to redouble his efforts to win agreement on tougher measures which we can take collectively. We must make clear to the Serbs that they are on a very costly course. To do so, we must act decisively now.
- None of the options are perfect or easy, but we think the ideas we shared about lifting the arms embargo are the best possible, if the Serbs continue to refuse to agree to the peace plan.
- (If Raised) If the Serbs do approve the Vance/Owen plan, we will need to move quickly to implement it. That means in part that France and the U.S. must work out agreement on command and control.
- We feel strongly about the need for unity of command under NATO, but of course the military operation would be under the auspices and authority of the United Nations.

RUSSIA

- The G-7 countries should all be clear about our continuing support for Yeltsin and the reform movement.
- We must push hard to implement the multilateral support we achieved in Tokyo.
- We should also act quickly to agree on the three outstanding issues from Tokyo which I want to settle before the July Summit: the Privatization Fund, the Denuclearization Fund, and a G-7 office in Moscow.
- I very much hope we can work together on providing the Russians access to the commercial space market.

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- This issue touches on important commercial interests for both of us, but it also offers a means of showing our support for Russia and of preventing proliferation of Russian missile technology:
- We need to work together to minimize any potential job loss in our domestic markets.
- We are prepared to provide Russia access to the launch market, but we cannot do it on our own. I hope that France will join us in bearing this burden.
- I will be sending you a message on these important Russian issues.

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2792

MESSAGE TO FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO BE SENT VIA HEAD OF GOVERNMENT CHANNELS WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND TO THE CHARGE IN PARIS

DEAR FRANCOIS:

IT WAS GOOD TO TALK WITH YOU THIS WEEK. AS I NOTED, I WANT TO SHARE IN MORE DEPTH SOME THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE SHOULD GO NOW ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA AND ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE CAN DO TOGETHER TO HELP RUSSIA GAIN ACCESS TO THE SPACE LAUNCH MARKET.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES CAN PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE IN PROVIDING THE RUSSIANS ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE MARKET GIVEN OUR WORLD LEADERSHIP IN THIS FIELD. AT VANCOUVER, PRESIDENT YELTSIN LINKED ACCESS TO HIS ABILITY TO SCALE BACK A CONTRACT INVOLVING THE TRANSFER OF MISSILE-RELATED TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA AND TO OBSERVE MTCR GUIDELINES IN THE FUTURE. I REALIZE THAT THIS ISSUE TOUCHES ON IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND COULD AFFECT JOBS AT HOME FOR BOTH OF US. BUT IT ALSO OFFERS A MEANS OF SHOWING OUR SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA AND OF HELPING TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF RUSSIAN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, WHICH I KNOW IS AS HIGH PRIORITY FOR YOU AS IT IS FOR ME. WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE LAUNCH MARKET, BUT WE CANNOT DO IT ON OUR OWN. WE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH FRANCE AND EUROPE IN THIS EFFORT. I WOULD LIKE TO SEEK YOUR PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH COOPERATION. I HOPE THAT FRANCE WILL JOIN US IN BEARING THIS BURDEN.

MORE GENERALLY, THE G-7 AND OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CLEAR ABOUT OUR SUPPORT FOR YELTSIN AND THE REFORM MOVEMENT. NOW THAT YELTSIN HAS WON THE REFERENDUM AND IS REINVIGORATING THE REFORM PROCESS, WE MUST WORK QUICKLY TO IMPLEMENT THE MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA WHICH WE ACHIEVED IN TOKYO. WE SHOULD ARGUE FOR THE FASTEST POSSIBLE ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON THEIR PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA. WE SHOULD ALSO ACT QUICKLY TO AGREE ON THE THREE OUTSTANDING ISSUES FROM TOKYO WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE BEFORE WE MEET IN JULY AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT: A DENUCLEARIZATION FUND, A PRIVATIZATION FUND, AND A G-7 OFFICE IN MOSCOW.

FRANCE'S INTEREST AND EXPERTISE WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE DENUCLEARIZATION FUND, TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTING \$1.2 BILLION. YELTSIN SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED SUPPORT FOR PRIVATIZATION AS A TOP PRIORITY WHEN I SAW HIM IN VANCOUVER. WE ARE READY TO PUT \$500 MILLION TOWARD THE EFFORT TO PRIVATIZE THE LARGEST STATE ENTERPRISES IF OUR G-7 PARTNERS JOIN US. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT FRANCE CAN CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE TARGET OF \$2 BILLION FROM THE G-7. AS WE'VE DISCUSSED BEFORE, LAST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT PROVIDING TANGIBLE ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IS NOT EASY. IMPLEMENTATION IS NOT AUTOMATIC BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS AND OTHER BOTTLENECKS IN THE SYSTEM. THAT IS WHY I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT WE NEED TO HAVE A G-7 OFFICE IN MOSCOW. IT WOULD HAVE A LIMITED MANDATE -- IMPROVING TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPPORT BY REMOVING OBSTACLES AND BOTTLENECKS IN RUSSIA. THE

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-0774-M (1.14)  
12/1/2017 KBH

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OFFICE WOULD NOT MAKE POLICY OR DESIGN PROJECTS. BUT IT WOULD HELP TO ASSURE THAT OUR AID RESOURCES YIELD RESULTS FOR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THUS THAT WE CAN JUSTIFY OUR CONTRIBUTIONS AT HOME. I WOULD SEE THIS AS A TEMPORARY OFFICE WITH ONLY A FEW STAFF MEMBERS. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU CAN SUPPORT THIS PROJECT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR COMMON WORK ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA AND THE OTHER PRESSING TOPICS WE FACE TOGETHER.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1993

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0774-M (1.15)

12/1/2017 KBW

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S.-Russia Space Launch Agreement and Jobs Issue

In response to your question about the effect on American jobs of the U.S.-Russian commercial launch agreement now entering negotiation, you should know that the U.S. negotiating position has been formulated to take this issue into account.

U.S. launch vehicle manufacturers do not oppose some market access by the Russians. What they strongly oppose is unconstrained Russian access to the market on the grounds that the Russians would submit arbitrarily low nonmarket bids that would undermine U.S. competitiveness. U.S. manufacturers were made wary by the 1988 U.S.-Chinese space launch agreement under which the Chinese typically offered launches at approximately 50 percent of normal market prices. The U.S. market position has also been undercut by European launchers, which are heavily subsidized.

These are among the reasons that General Dynamics (GD), a key U.S. firm, has stated that it will be forced to exit the commercial launch business if a combined quota of two to three launches per year is given to Russia and China. GD asserts that the loss of these launches to the nonmarket economies will cost roughly 5,000 U.S. job opportunities. Another factor that will potentially affect General Dynamic's future, however, is a series of launch failures that it has recently experienced.

The U.S. position for the space launch negotiations has been carefully constructed to take account of the concerns of the U.S. launch industry. The U.S.-Russian agreement would contain safeguards to prevent disruption of the commercial launch market, including a quota acceptable to the U.S. launch industry.

In the near term, the key issue for U.S. launch providers is maintaining their share of the existing market in launches of geosynchronous (GEO) satellites, which are large, high-value telecommunications satellites. U.S. negotiators have been instructed to offer the Russians the right to bid on no more than nine GEO launches over the seven-year life of the proposed agreement, or just over 1 launch per year. The agencies most protective of the U.S. industry -- Commerce, Transportation, Treasury -- agreed to this number on the understanding that it

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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would be part of a combined quota with the Chinese, who under their 1988 agreement have the right to bid for 1.5 GEO launches per year. (In initial talks with European space officials earlier this week, the Europeans seemed to be prepared to live with the general U.S. position on the number of launches to be available to Russian industry as long as we held fast to that number. But they were very concerned with Russian price-undercutting. The Europeans urged us not to enter into a final agreement with Russia before consulting again with them, but they would not commit to work with us to share the burden of granting Russia access to the launch market.)

You should also know that U.S. satellite manufacturers and other aerospace companies outside the launch industry welcome the prospect of greater Russian access to the launch market. These firms maintain that competition from cheaper Russian launch providers will unleash a boom in those areas of the industry where the United States is the strongest -- satellites and ground launch support. According to this view, the United States might experience a net gain in jobs from the launch agreement. These sectors of the industry argue that General Dynamic's future will be determined by the extent to which it can reverse its current record of launch failures, not by competition from Russian launch vehicles.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 5, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: TOBY GATI <sup>TIG</sup> AND DANIEL ~~FOLEMAN~~ <sup>FOLEMAN</sup>

FROM: TONY WAYNE <sup>WAYNE</sup> AND ROSE GOTTEMOELLER <sup>GG</sup>

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Francois Mitterrand

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his use in his telephone call to President Mitterrand on May 6. We have also included a message to Mitterrand on aid to Russia and providing Russia access to the commercial space launch market, which we propose to send as a follow-up to the call. At Tab C is an information memo to the President in response to his questions about the effect on American jobs of granting Russia access to the launch market.

Concurrences by: Janel <sup>Holl</sup>, Nick <sup>Burns</sup>, Elisa <sup>Harris</sup>, Barry Lowenkron, Helen <sup>Walsh</sup>, Robert <sup>Fauver</sup>

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Message to Mitterrand
- Tab C Information Memo on the U.S.-Russia Space Agreement and the Jobs Issue

May 5, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: TOBY GATI AND DANIEL PONEMAN

FROM: TONY WAYNE AND ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Francois Mitterrand

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his use in his telephone call to President Mitterrand on May 6. We have also included a message to Mitterrand on aid to Russia and providing Russia access to the commercial space launch market, which we propose to send as a follow-up to the call. At Tab C is an information memo to the President in response to his questions about the effect of job-related effect of granting Russia access to the launch market.

Concurrences by: Jane Holl, Nick Burns, Elisa Harris, Barry Lowenkron

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Message to Mitterrand
- Tab C Information Memo on the U.S.-Russia Space Agreement and the Jobs Issue

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBYNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.14)  
12/1/2017 KBN

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

DATE: May 6, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 2:15 pm EST

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Bosnia; to urge support for G-7 aid to Russia and Russian access to the commercial space market.

II. BACKGROUND

When you talked with Mitterrand on Saturday, you both agreed to talk after Secretary Christopher's discussions Tuesday in Paris. You may remember that Mitterrand was at the hospital where former Prime Minister Beregovoy, had been taken after shooting himself in the head. Mitterrand attended the funeral Tuesday. You sent condolences to Mitterrand and Mrs. Beregovoy. Beregovoy's suicide, after the March defeat of the Socialists and earlier press attacks on him for allegedly receiving an improper loan, has set off a wave of introspection in France.

Bosnia: Secretary Christopher was pleased with his talks in Paris. In public, the French talked about a "broad convergence of views" with us and said that no option was excluded. In private, while expressing doubts, the French did not flatly reject lifting the arms embargo. They did, however, pose two clear conditions for any eventual move in that direction: 1) a new UN resolution authorizing a lifting of the embargo; and 2) providing time for French troops in the former Yugoslavia to redeploy. Secretary Christopher indicated that these were difficult but not impossible conditions. The clear French preference is for the Serbs to sign the Vance/Owen plan. Christopher made clear that if that happens we and the French will have to come to rapid closure on command and control for implementation of the plan. He indicated that we felt strongly about the need for unity of command under NATO, while fully respecting the political authority of the UN.

The French are holding up agreement on command and control, in part, until they know how many troops we will commit to enforcement operations in Bosnia. We, on the other hand, have told the French that we will not discuss numbers until we have worked out command and control. In addition to

differing on the possible military hierarchy for any implementation operation, we and the French differ on whether the a UN Special Representative for Bosnia would have general authority over the military operation, with the French favoring granting him that authority.

Mitterrand spent a good deal of his meeting with Christopher warning about the ill effects of a simple policy of air strikes. He expressed concern for the safety of French troops and wondered if we would be willing to send U.S. troops to join them in the event of military action. On the arms embargo, he said he did not disagree in principle, but he was unsure about its efficacy. We will give you an update on the deliberations of the Bosnian Serb parliament before your phone call.

Russia: If you have time, you might briefly raise Russia. We have prepared a message from you to Mitterrand (attached) which is aimed at securing his support for our three initiatives -- the privatization fund, the denuclearization fund and the G-7 office. It also urges France to work with us to share the burden of providing Russia access to the commercial space launch market. In this connection, we have attached a memo in response to your question on possible job losses created by opening the space launch market to Russia.

On our Russia initiatives, the French have questions about establishing a designated G-7 office. This reflects at least in part their hesitancy to institutionalize the G-7 beyond the summit process. They have also expressed concern about exactly what the privatization fund would do and how it would mesh with programs by the World Bank and others. On the space launch issue, France has expressed support in principle for providing Russia access to the commercial market, but very much wants to preserve its (and the EC's) share of the world launch market and worries that we will cut a deal with the Russians at Europe's expense. Given French leadership in the European space program, France's cooperation will be essential. We do, in fact, want the Europeans to join us in allowing the Russians a fair share of the market. However, talks between U.S. and EC experts in Brussels earlier this week did not go well.

Attachment

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Message to Mitterrand
- Tab C Information Memorandum on Russian Access to the Space Launch Market and U.S. Jobs

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MESSAGE TO FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO BE SENT VIA HEAD OF GOVERNMENT CHANNELS WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND TO THE CHARGE IN PARIS

DEAR FRANCOIS:

IT WAS GOOD TO TALK WITH YOU THIS WEEK. AS I NOTED, I WANT TO SHARE IN MORE DEPTH SOME THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE SHOULD GO NOW ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA AND ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE CAN DO TOGETHER TO HELP RUSSIA GAIN ACCESS TO THE SPACE LAUNCH MARKET.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES CAN PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE IN PROVIDING THE RUSSIANS ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE MARKET GIVEN OUR WORLD LEADERSHIP IN THIS FIELD. AT VANCOUVER, PRESIDENT YELTSIN LINKED ACCESS TO HIS ABILITY TO SCALE BACK A CONTRACT INVOLVING THE TRANSFER OF MISSILE-RELATED TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA AND TO OBSERVE MTCR GUIDELINES IN THE FUTURE. I REALIZE THAT THIS ISSUE TOUCHES ON IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND COULD AFFECT JOBS AT HOME FOR BOTH OF US. BUT IT ALSO OFFERS A MEANS OF SHOWING OUR SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA AND OF HELPING TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF RUSSIAN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, WHICH I KNOW IS AS HIGH PRIORITY FOR YOU AS IT IS FOR ME. WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE LAUNCH MARKET, BUT WE CANNOT DO IT ON OUR OWN. WE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH FRANCE AND EUROPE IN THIS EFFORT. I WOULD LIKE TO SEEK YOUR PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH COOPERATION. I HOPE THAT FRANCE WILL JOIN US IN BEARING THIS BURDEN.

MORE GENERALLY, THE G-7 AND OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CLEAR ABOUT OUR SUPPORT FOR YELTSIN AND THE REFORM MOVEMENT. LIKE YOU, WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM IN RUSSIA. NOW, WE MUST WORK HARD TO IMPLEMENT THE MULTILATERAL SUPPORT WE ACHIEVED IN TOKYO. WE SHOULD ARGUE FOR THE FASTEST POSSIBLE ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON THEIR PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA. WE SHOULD ALSO ACT QUICKLY TO AGREE ON THE THREE OUTSTANDING ISSUES FROM TOKYO WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE BEFORE WE MEET IN JULY AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT: A DENUCLEARIZATION FUND, A PRIVATIZATION FUND, AND A G-7 OFFICE IN MOSCOW.

FRANCE'S INTEREST AND EXPERTISE WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE DENUCLEARIZATION FUND, TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTING \$1.2 BILLION. YELTSIN SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED SUPPORT FOR PRIVATIZATION AS A TOP PRIORITY WHEN I SAW HIM IN VANCOUVER. WE ARE READY TO PUT \$500 MILLION TOWARD THE EFFORT TO PRIVATIZE THE LARGEST STATE ENTERPRISES IF OUR G-7 PARTNERS JOIN US. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT FRANCE CAN CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE TARGET OF \$2 BILLION FROM THE G-7. AS WE'VE DISCUSSED BEFORE, LAST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT PROVIDING TANGIBLE ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IS NOT EASY. IMPLEMENTATION IS NOT AUTOMATIC BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS AND OTHER BOTTLENECKS IN THE SYSTEM. THAT'S WHY I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT WE NEED TO HAVE A G-7 OFFICE IN MOSCOW. IT WOULD HAVE A LIMITED MANDATE -- IMPROVING TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPPORT BY REMOVING OBSTACLES AND BOTTLENECKS IN RUSSIA. THE

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PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.17)  
12/1/2017 KBN

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OFFICE WOULD NOT MAKE POLICY OR DESIGN PROJECTS. BUT IT WOULD HELP TO ASSURE THAT OUR AID RESOURCES YIELD RESULTS FOR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THUS THAT WE CAN JUSTIFY OUR CONTRIBUTIONS AT HOME. I WOULD SEE THIS AS A TEMPORARY OFFICE WITH ONLY A FEW STAFF MEMBERS. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU CAN SUPPORT THIS PROJECT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR COMMON WORK ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA AND THE OTHER PRESSING TOPICS WE FACE TOGETHER.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

CONFIDENTIAL

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S.-Russia Space Launch Agreement and Jobs Issue

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.18)  
12/1/2017 KBH

In response to the question that you posed about the possible loss of American jobs associated with the U.S.-Russian commercial launch agreement now entering negotiation, I thought that you should know that the U.S. negotiating position has been formulated to take this issue into account:

U.S. launch vehicle manufacturers do not oppose some market access by the Russians. What they strongly oppose is unconstrained Russian access to the market on the grounds that the Russians would submit arbitrarily low nonmarket bids that would undermine U.S. competitiveness. The U.S. manufacturers were made wary by the 1988 U.S.-Chinese space launch agreement under which the Chinese typically offered launches at approximately 50 percent of normal market prices. The U.S. market position has also been undercut by European launchers, which are heavily subsidized.

These are among the reasons that General Dynamics (GD), a key U.S. firm, has stated that it will be forced to exit the commercial launch business if a combined quota of two to three launches per year is given to Russia and China. GD asserts that the loss of these launches to the nonmarket economies will cost roughly 5,000 U.S. job opportunities.

The U.S. position for the space launch negotiations has been carefully constructed to take account of the concerns of the U.S. launch industry. The U.S.-Russian agreement would contain safeguards to prevent disruption of the commercial launch market, including a quota acceptable to the U.S. industry. The launch vehicle manufacturers have stated that they would be willing to see nonmarket economies bid for no more than 1.5 launches per year of geosynchronous (GEO) satellites, the large, high-value telecommunications satellites that have thus far been the heart of the commercial launch industry. The European consortium Arianespace currently garners 50-60 percent of this market.

U.S. negotiators have been instructed to offer the Russians no more than nine GEO launches over the seven-year life of the proposed agreement, which is well within the industry's "threshold of pain" of 1.5 per year. Additional launches for the

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
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

Russians will emerge from the new market for launches of low earth orbit (LEO) telecommunications satellites.

You should also know that U.S. satellite manufacturers and other aerospace companies outside the launch industry welcome the prospect of greater Russian access to the launch market. These firms maintain that competition from cheaper Russian launch providers will unleash a boom in those areas of the industry where the United States is the strongest -- satellites and ground launch support. According to this view, General Dynamic's future will be determined by the extent to which it can reverse its current record of launch failures, not by competition from Russian launch vehicles.

May 5, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

Thereseugh: Tobi Gati and Dawn Penness  
FROM: TONY WAYNE *John Rose Gosttemeller*

SUBJECT: Proposed Telephone to President Francois Mitterrand

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his use in telephoning President Mitterrand ~~mid-day today~~ *on May 6.*

Concurrences by: Jane Holl, Nick Burns, Elisa Harris, Barry Lowenkron

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B *Message to Mitterrand*
- Tab C *Informational Memo on U.S.-Russia Space Agreement and <sup>the</sup> Jobs Issue*

*We have also included ~~the~~ follow-up message to Mitterrand on and to Russia and the Space Launch*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

DATE: May 5, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: ~~1:15 pm EST~~  
*3:30*  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015 - 0774-M (1.19)  
12/1/2017 MBW

I. PURPOSE

*discuss developments in*  
To ~~hear Mitterrand's~~ thoughts on Bosnia; to urge support for G-7 aid to Russia and Russian access to the commercial space market.

II. BACKGROUND

*of his close & long time associate, former P.M.S.*  
When you talked with <sup>*with him*</sup> Mitterrand on Saturday, you both agreed to talk again after Secretary Christopher's discussions Tuesday in Paris. ~~Note that when you talked with Mitterrand Saturday he was at the hospital where former Prime Minister Beregovoy had been taken after shooting himself in the head. Beregovoy, a close and long-time associate of Mitterrand, was dead on arrival at the hospital.~~ Mitterrand attended the funeral yesterday. You sent condolences to Mitterrand and to Mrs. Beregovoy. His suicide, after the stunning defeat of the Socialists last month and earlier press attacks on Beregovoy for allegedly receiving an improper loan, has set off a wave of introspection in France.

*Paris*  
Bosnia: Secretary <sup>*in*</sup> Christopher was pleased with his talks in Paris. While expressing doubts, the French did not flatly reject lifting the arms embargo. They did, however, pose <sup>*to two*</sup> clear conditions <sup>*last line*</sup> to any eventual move in that direction: 1) a new UN resolution authorizing a lifting of the embargo; and 2) providing time for French troops in the former Yugoslavia to redeploy. Secretary Christopher indicated that these were difficult but not impossible conditions. The clear French preference is for the Serbs to sign ~~on to the~~ Vance/Owen. Christopher made clear that if that happens we and the French will have to come to rapid closure on command and control. He indicated that we felt strongly about the need for unity of command under NATO, while fully respecting the political authority of the UN.

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differing on the possible military hierarchy for any implementation operation, we and the French differ on whether the a UN Special Representative for Bosnia would have general authority over the military operation, with the French favoring granting him that authority. M


Mitterrand spent a good deal of his meeting with Christopher warning about the ill effects of a simple policy of air strikes. He expressed concern for the safety of French troops and wondered if we would be willing to send U.S. troops to join them in the event of military action. On the arms embargo, he said he did not disagree in principle, but he was unsure about its efficacy. We will give you an update on the deliberations of the Bosnian Serb parliament before your phone call.

Russia: If you have time, you might briefly raise Russia. We are preparing a message from you to Mitterrand aimed at securing his support for our three initiatives (the privatization fund, the denuclearization fund and the G-7 office) as well as urging France to work with us to share the burden of providing Russia access to the commercial space launch market. The French have questions about establishing a specific G-7 office, which reflect in part their hesitancy to institutionalize the G-7 beyond the summit process. They have also expressed concern about exactly what the privatization fund would do and how it would mesh with programs by the World Bank and others. On the space launch issue, France has expressed support in principle for providing Russia access to the commercial market, but very much wants to preserve its (and the EC's) share of the world launch market and worries that we will cut a deal with the Russians at Europe's expense. We do, in fact, want the Europeans to join us in allowing the Russians a fair share of the market. However, talks between U.S. and EC experts in Brussels earlier this week did not go well.

Attachment

Tab A      Talking Points

April 26, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: TONY WAYNE

SUBJECT: Proposed Telephone to President Francois Mitterrand

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his use in telephoning President Mitterrand mid-day today.

Concurrences by: Jane Holt and Nick Burns

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

DATE: April 26, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 11:45 am EST  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.20)  
12/1/2017 KSM

I. PURPOSE

To hear Mitterrand's thoughts on options in Bosnia; to compare notes on the Russian referendum; to urge support for G-7 aid to Russia and Russian access to the commercial space market.

II. BACKGROUND

When you talked with Mitterrand last week you asked him to think about the three main options for Western action in Bosnia and specifically asked if he had any new thoughts on lifting the arms embargo. He promised to get back to you, and you both agreed to talk after the Russian referendum. Mitterrand asked you for help in preventing Turkish aircraft from joining NATO enforcement of the Bosnia No-Fly Zone. You said that we would take a look at the issue.

Bosnia: When you talked, Mitterrand sounded open to the idea of providing arms to the Bosnian government. But French Foreign Minister Juppe (phonetic: Ju-peh) subsequently reiterated in public strong opposition to lifting the arms embargo. Juppe was more positive on the idea of air strikes on selected Bosnian Serb targets, but he noted that a new UNSC resolution would be needed for that action. Like Mitterrand, he ruled out large-scale military intervention on the ground.

Turkish participation in enforcement of the Bosnia No-Fly Zone: NATO Secretary General Woerner has been trying to work out a solution to meet French concerns and not to create a crisis with Turkey. He was to be in Paris today for meetings with the French foreign and defense ministers. He has also provided some time to find a solution as Turkish planes are now scheduled to train for their No-Fly missions until May 2. While we appreciate the serious French concerns, we also do not want to deny Turkey its right to participate in a NATO operation or to spark serious problems in Turkey by having NATO exclude Turkish planes. We suggest that the French talk directly to the Turks, as well as with Woerner, to find a solution.

Russia: The French are fully supportive of the multilateral aid package worked out in Tokyo, but they were not forthcoming on new bilateral aid. Prime Minister Balladur has cited the budget deficit in indicating that France cannot give more now. We should, however, push the French to come along on the privatization fund, the denuclearization fund and the G-7 office in Moscow. You should also raise the need to work together to provide the Russians access to the commercial space market. France has expressed support for this idea, but very much wants to preserve its (and the EC's) share of the world launch market and worries that we will cut a deal with the Russians at Europe's expense. We do, in fact, want the Europeans to join us in allowing the Russians a fair share of the market. U.S. and European officials will meet later this month to discuss this issue.

Attachment

Tab A      Talking Points

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774- M (1.21)  
12/1/2017 KSH

RUSSIA

- I am very pleased by the preliminary reports of the referendum voting in Russia.
- If the final result is as positive as we think it will be for Yeltsin, we ought to move quickly to show our support.
- I don't believe it would be wise for a common G-7 statement on the referendum (as the Japanese have suggested) -- that could look like interference.
- But we should all be clear about our continuing support for Yeltsin and the reform movement.
- I suggest that we also push hard to implement the multilateral support we achieved in Tokyo. Specifically, we should take advantage of the IMF/World Bank annual meetings this week to argue for the fastest possible IFI action on their programs with Russia.
- We should also act quickly to agree on the three outstanding issues from Tokyo which I want to settle before the July Summit:
  - We should agree to start the Privatization Fund to show immediate support for the effort to privatize the largest state enterprises. We are ready to contribute \$500 million to the fund. I hope France can also contribute to reach our \$2 billion target for the G-7.
  - I hope you will also agree to participate in the Denuclearization Fund. We are committing \$1.2 billion to this effort.
  - I still believe strongly we must establish a G-7 office in Moscow to oversee our efforts and ensure the funds are well spent.
- I also very much hope we can work together on providing the Russians access to the commercial space market.
- At Vancouver, President Yeltsin linked such access to his ability to scale back a contract involving transfer of missile-related technology to India.
- I realize that this issue touches on important commercial interests for both of us, but it also offers a means of showing our support for Russia and of preventing proliferation of Russian missile technology.

- We are prepared to provide Russia access to the launch market, but we cannot do it on our own. U.S. and European specialists will be meeting soon to discuss the issue. I hope that France will join us in bearing this burden.

BOSNIA

- The Serbs are sending mixed signals, but it is clear to us that they are not yet willing to negotiate in good faith.
- Unless we take more forceful action to pressure the Serbs to cease their aggression, we can expect more of what we have already seen in Srebrenica.
- Now that the referendum in Russia has resolved Yeltsin's future, at least for the time being, I think we have some more freedom to act, if we choose.
- The question is "what action?," as we discussed last week. I have not made any final decisions, but I look forward to your reflections on the options we discussed.
- What is the climate for action in France? I saw that the foreign minister came out publicly against lifting the arms embargo, but seemed to be entertaining the idea of selected air strikes.

TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE BOSNIA NO-FLY ZONE: IF ASKED

- I had my people review the situation after our phone conversation.
- We understand your concerns. But we also know what serious problems it would cause in Turkey -- and for other issues where Turkish cooperation is essential -- if their participation were seen to be rejected. And in principle, we believe no ally should be excluded from a NATO operation.
- I understand that NATO Secretary General Woerner was in Paris today to meet with your foreign and defense ministers on this topic.
- I am also told that we have some time to try to work this out, as the Turkish aircraft are in training until May 2.
- I appreciate your efforts to keep this issue out of the public eye. Maybe the best means to work this out would be for French and Turkish officials to discuss this directly?

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 148				
Document ID: 9303171				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. telcon</del>	<del>re. Telcon with President Mitterrand of France (3 pages)</del>	<del>05/06/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 148

### FOLDER TITLE:

9303171

2015-0774-M  
rs1291

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCON

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 6 MAY

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON  
WALKER  
WAYNE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 12/11/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 93051217 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 93051217 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930511 GROSSMAN, M

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 3171  
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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: VP    McLarty    Other Hillmark  
Sowen berg  
 Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

12 MAY 95 4:41

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9303171  
DATE 11 MAY 93

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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COPT ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KSM Date: 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: SEC. ROOM 117 6101  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3171


May 11, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's May  
6 Telephone Call with President Mitterrand of  
France (C)

Attached for the information of the Secretary of State is a  
memcon of the President's May 6 discussion with President  
Mitterrand. Please handle this via Nodis channels. You may  
dispatch a copy "eyes only" for our Charge in Paris. (S)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-m

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774 M (1.23)  
12/1/2017 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Mitterrand  
Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet  
Notetaker: E. Anthony Wayne

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 6, 1993; 2:41 pm - 2:55 pm, EDT  
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Francois. Thank you for taking the call.  
(U)

President Mitterrand: Hello. I wanted to greet you to make sure I could hear you. (U)

The President: First, let me thank you for seeing Secretary of State Christopher. He was very pleased with the meeting he had with you and with the Prime Minister and others. With the rejection of the Vance-Owen plan by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, we now have to proceed to find a way to increase pressure on them and to try to stop the total destruction of the Bosnians. As you know, the U.S. believes that the best way to do that is by our ending the arms embargo in a controlled way -- to ensure that rather than getting arms from militant Muslims, the Bosnians get them from Western and East European sources. We also have to find a way to protect French, British and Canadian soldiers there. I want to hear your thoughts on this. (S)

Second, we were reluctant to use our air power unless there is a clearly defined mission, and we know whether we could succeed in achieving our objectives. So we thought that the stand-by availability of air power to prevent the Serbs from overrunning Bosnian towns while arms go in is a good way to use air power to see if we can bring about negotiations. Once the arms are going in and being used, we wouldn't need to continue to use air power. I am very concerned that we don't get dragged in as a combatant on one side of the conflict. Our objectives should be to level the playing field and to get an agreement. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I think this is a good opinion. I think the idea is good in principle. But our government hesitates at lifting the embargo. And I can't blame them because in the days following the announcement the Serbs could take action against the Muslims to block them from receiving the arms, and the situation could become worse. The French idea which is

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now being given to the UN would be to create safe havens protecting certain cities in Bosnia with the authority to conduct air strikes to protect them. In this case, the Serbs would be forced into the offensive if they want to advance, and if they decide to do that, it will be easier vis a vis international opinion. I think this is a very seductive position. It is being discussed right now at the UN Security Council. (S)

The President: Well, I think that has some attractive aspects, but the problem is why should the Serbs care about world opinion now? They haven't cared about world opinion all along. Yesterday, the Bosnian Serbs said they didn't care what Milosevic or Karadzic think. If we have troops on the ground, they will be subject to shelling and bombing. We can bomb, but there are questions about when we would stop, and even then we are likely to have more casualties in the safe havens. We could, however, explore the mechanics, the specifics of safe havens. I hope we can let Secretary of State Christopher finish his mission to see if there is any support for lifting the arms embargo. Perhaps, we could look at the U.S. position of lifting the arms embargo plus air strikes and safe havens -- we could look at both options together. But I keep being drawn back to the arms embargo because the imposition of the embargo gave the Serbs an insurmountable military advantage. It is of concern that we are helping the Serbs -- we aren't neutral -- we're assisting the Serbs by continuing the embargo. Sanctions are hurting the Serbs, but having no impact on the Bosnian Serbs. I want to change the dynamics without getting the U.S., France or anyone else dragged into taking sides in a land war in this conflict. What do you think of that? (S)

President Mitterrand: What would you like to do Mr. President now? (U)

President Clinton: Hello, Mr. President? (U)

President Mitterrand: I hear you Mr. President. Whatever solution we envisage is bad or difficult. I will try to follow closely what is being debated at the Security Council. I am going to ask the French government to consider again what you have just told me now, tonight and tomorrow. Our representative to the Security Council has received instructions which are not favorable to lifting the arms embargo but which favor establishing safe havens. We will work tonight and tomorrow and will be in touch with you. We will keep our representatives in touch. We will call each other if necessary. I think you are right about some of the things at least, and we must review the situation and act in a few days. We will keep in touch and talk if we have to. Here I must keep in touch with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister about what we can do. At this point, the position of the government of France is against the lifting of the arms embargo. I will talk to the Prime Minister. (S)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

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The President: I hope we can work out something pretty soon. I think the Assembly rejected the plan and talked of a referendum because they want to use every day to get more territory -- they believe the West is too divided to take action. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I agree. Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (S)

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3171

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: TONY WAYNE *tw*

SUBJECT: The President's May 6 Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Francois Mitterrand of France on May 6. We propose that it be sent to State and to our charge in Paris.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the attached memorandum to Marc Grossman forwarding the Memorandum of Conversation and that the Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ *tw* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KRM/NARA*, Date *12/1/2017*  
*2015-0774-M*

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Original OA/ID Number: 163				
Document ID: 9307170				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (1 page)</del>	<del>09/22/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. memo</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (1 page)</del>	<del>09/22/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. letter</del>	<del>President Clinton to President Mitterrand (1 page)</del>	<del>09/00/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001d. memo</del>	<del>From Lake re: Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (1 page)</del>	<del>09/22/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 163

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9307170

2015-0774-M

rs1292

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
 PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
 RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: LAKE

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

RUSSIA

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO PRES MITTERRAND RE SITUATION IN RUSSIA

ACTION: OBE PER EXEC SEC

DUE DATE: 24 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
EXECSEC

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK      CLOSED BY: NSJDA      DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 93092209 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
X 93092309 OBE PER EXEC SEC

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7170  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WWS A/D

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>W</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WWS</u>	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	<u>2</u>	<u>WWS</u>	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WWS</u>	<u>WWS</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>WWS</u>	_____	<u>WWS</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: ① We need to check in the Mickey on GATT.  
 ② What's been France's rx so far?

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Ex Sec's Office had shell*

**DEAD**

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7170  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WGS A/D \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	<u>2</u>	<u>WGS</u>	_____
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West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WGS</u>	<u>WGS</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>WGS</u>	_____	<u>WGS</u>
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cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: ① We need to check in the Mickey on GATT.  
 ② What's been Francis's up so far?

WATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

iecs Office

DEAD



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7170

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his proposed telephone call to President Mitterrand of France on Wednesday, September 22.

Concurrence by: Jenonne Walker *NB for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B Presidential Statement on the Situation  
in Russia dated September 21  
Tab C Presidential Letter to Mitterrand dated  
September 21

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KEM* NARA, Date *12/1/2017*  
*2015-0774-M*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: September 22, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: TBD  
  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To review with Mitterrand the political crisis in Russia and GATT.

II. BACKGROUND

You are calling President Mitterrand to compare notes on the crisis in Moscow following Yeltsin's suspension of the legislature on September 21. Mitterrand will have received your letter overnight which reviewed your phone conversation with Yeltsin and the assurances he gave you that the December elections would be carried out in a free and fair basis. We also sent Mitterrand a copy of your public statement issued yesterday (attached at Tab B).

There has been no response yet from President Mitterrand on yesterday's events. However, Foreign Minister Juppe and Prime Minister Balladur have supported Yeltsin. Juppe said that Yeltsin has "democratic legitimacy." Balladur has said that Russia provides a good example that western Europe has failed eastern Europe and that the West must do more to stabilize those countries.

The points at Tab A ask Mitterrand for his views and urge him to make a similar statement of support for Yeltsin and the reformers.

I also recommend that you take the opportunity to raise GATT with Mitterrand. You should remind him that you remain opposed to reopening the Blair House Accord. Mickey Kantor will meet Leon Brittan in a few days. You should encourage Mitterrand to resolve this difference soon to produce a Uruguay Round agreement.

Attachments

- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Presidential Statement on the Situation in Russia dated September 21
- Tab C Presidential Letter to Mitterrand dated September 21

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.24)  
12/1/2017 KRM

POINTS TO BE MADE  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.25)  
12/1/2017 KBH

POLITICAL CRISIS IN RUSSIA

- I am calling to exchange views with you on the crisis in Russia.
- I hope you received my letter reviewing my September 21 telephone conversation with Yeltsin on his suspension of the legislature.
- As I indicated in my letter, I told Yeltsin that the U.S. will support him and other reformers. I asked him for assurances that the December elections will be free and fair and that his opponents would have access to the media.
- Yeltsin assured me that he intends to proceed in a democratic manner and that he will allow open participation in the elections. He also said he had the support of the reform community in Russia.
- Based on my conversation with Yeltsin, and our best sense of the situation on the ground, I intend to support him. I issued a public statement to this effect yesterday and would hope that you could do so as well.
- What is your assessment of the situation and Yeltsin's position?
- I would like to stay in close touch with you on this in the period ahead.

GATT:

- I watched with great interest Monday's EC Council Meeting. As you know, I am opposed to reopening the Blair House Accord.
- If "reinterpretation" or "amplification" means in fact reopening or renegotiation, I am afraid that we will not have a Uruguay Round agreement.
- The Blair House Accord was a difficult compromise. It represents the bare minimum acceptable to our farm community. If we open the door to renegotiation, I will face tremendous pressure to demand even more from the EC.
- I know that Leon Brittan will meet with Mickey Kantor in a few days. I hope this meeting will help to resolve this and other outstanding Uruguay Round issues.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 21, 1993

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

From the beginning of my Administration, I have given my full backing to the historic process of political and economic reform now underway in Russia. I remain convinced that democratic reforms and the transition to a market economy hold the best hope for a better future for the people of Russia.

The actions announced today by President Yeltsin in his address to the Russian people underscore the complexity of the reform process that he is leading. There is no question that President Yeltsin acted in response to a constitutional crisis that had reached a critical impasse and had paralyzed the political process.

As the democratically-elected leader of Russia, President Yeltsin has chosen to allow the people of Russia themselves to resolve this impasse. I believe that the path to elections for a new legislature is ultimately consistent with the democratic and reform course that he has charted.

I called President Yeltsin this afternoon to seek assurances that the difficult choices that he faces will be made in a way that ensures peace, stability and an open political process this autumn. He told me that it is of the utmost importance that the elections he has called be organized and held on a democratic and free basis.

In a democracy, people should finally decide the issues that are at the heart of political and social debate. President Yeltsin has made this choice, and I support him fully. I have confidence in the abiding wisdom of the Russian people to make the right decision regarding their own future.

###

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS ON SEPTEMBER 22.

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I JUST SPOKE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO LEARN FIRST HAND HIS PERSPECTIVE ON THE ACTIONS HE HAD TAKEN AND TO REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR HIM AND THE REFORM PROCESS IN RUSSIA. I SOUGHT HIS ASSURANCES THAT THE ELECTIONS HE HAS CALLED FOR DECEMBER WILL BE FREE AND FAIR, AND STRESSED THAT RESPECT FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DURING THIS PERIOD WOULD BE VITAL. I ALSO UNDERScored MY CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE \$2.5 BILLION ASSISTANCE PACKAGE THAT OUR CONGRESS WILL BE VOTING ON THIS WEEK.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN THANKED ME REPEATEDLY FOR THE EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT. HE SAID THE SUPREME SOVIET HAD BECOME A ROADBLOCK TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN A WAY THAT COULD NO LONGER BE TOLERATED. HE ASSURED ME THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE DEMOCRATIC AND FREE WITH NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ANYONE. HE AGREED WITH ME ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESS FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. HE ALSO SAID THAT ALL DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN RUSSIA WERE SUPPORTING HIM.

WE AGREED TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT WE HAD SPOKEN. I ATTACH A COPY OF A PRESS STATEMENT THAT I HAVE ISSUED.

CLEARLY, RUSSIA HAS REACHED A CRITICAL POINT IN ITS DIFFICULT PERIOD OF TRANSITION. FROM WHAT I HEARD IN OUR PHONE CONVERSATION AND BASED ON OUR BEST ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN REPRESENTS OUR BEST HOPE FOR A MORE STABLE, PROSPEROUS AND DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA. HE NEEDS ALL THE SUPPORT WE CAN GIVE HIM AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT. I HOPE YOU CAN MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF YOUR SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND THE PROCESS OF REFORM.

I HAVE SENT SIMILAR MESSAGES TO EACH OF OUR G-7 COLLEAGUES, AND LOOK FORWARD TO REMAINING IN CLOSE TOUCH OVER THE COMING DAYS.

SINCERELY,

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: September 22, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: TBD  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0774-M (1.27)  
12/1/2017 KBH

I. PURPOSE

To review with Mitterrand the political crisis in Russia and GATT.

II. BACKGROUND

You are calling President Mitterrand to compare notes on the crisis in Moscow following Yeltsin's suspension of the legislature on September 21. Mitterrand will have received your letter overnight which reviewed your phone conversation with Yeltsin and the assurances he gave you that the December elections would be carried out in a free and fair basis. We also sent Mitterrand a copy of your public statement issued yesterday (attached at Tab B).

The points at Tab A ask Mitterrand for his views and urge him to make a similar statement of support for Yeltsin and the reformers.

I also recommend that you take the opportunity to raise GATT with Mitterrand. You should remind him that you remain opposed to reopening the Blair House Accord. Mickey Kantor will meet Leon Brittan in a few days. You should encourage Mitterrand to resolve this difference soon to produce a Uruguay Round agreement.

Attachments

- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Presidential Statement on the Situation in Russia dated September 21
- Tab C Presidential Letter to Mitterrand dated September 21

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 175				
Document ID: 9309463				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake and Robert Rubin to POTUS re. Phone Calls to French Prime Minister Balladur and French President Mitterrand (3 pages)	12/02/1993	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
001b. talking points	re. Points to be Made in Phone Calls to French President Mitterrand and French Prime Minister Balladur (2 pages)	12/02/1993	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 175

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9309463

2015-0774-M  
rs1293

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE  
RUBIN, R

DOC DATE: 02 DEC 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: BALLADUR, EDOUARD

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALLS TO FRENCH PM BALLADUR & PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 06 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FROMAN  
KUPCHAN  
KYLE  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA      CLOSED BY: NSMEM      DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 93120220 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
Z 93120220 FOR INFORMATION  
X 93120707 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 931202  
002 931202

VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 9463  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG ML A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>kl</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>ML</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ML 12/2</u>	<u>D TO PODESTA</u>
NSC Secretariat			
_____			
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

1 10 03 11 13

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Exec Sec has diskette*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1993 : 47  
DEC 2 1993

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
12/2/93

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
ROBERT RUBIN *smf/RR*

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.28)  
12/1/2017 KBH

SUBJECT: Phone calls to French Prime Minister Balladur and French President Mitterrand

After several days of trade negotiations in Brussels, progress has been made in closing U.S.-EC differences on the Uruguay Round. Kantor and Brittan did not achieve an agreement, but staff-level negotiations will continue through the weekend, and there are prospects of concluding a U.S.-EC understanding when Kantor returns to Europe on Monday. Nevertheless, significant obstacles remain. Despite our willingness to make important concessions on agriculture, the French are pressing for further adjustments to Blair House to satisfy their farmers. In addition, the French have not demonstrated a willingness to compromise on audio-visual services; the issue looms as a major hurdle.

Agriculture

On agriculture, the U.S. has offered to make two key concessions on the Blair House Agreement. First, we have offered to extend the six-year "peace clause" by three years. This change extends the period during which the U.S. will refrain from using Section 301 and other trade tools to challenge the EC's agricultural policy. (The farm community appears willing to accept this because Section 301 has not been used extensively against the EC in the past, perhaps because the EC is more likely to counterretaliate.)

Second, we have offered to reduce the "frontloading" effect of the commitments to reduce subsidized exports. Under the U.S. proposal, subsidized exports will be cut in equal increments each of the 6 years of the accord, rather than cut significantly the first year and then gradually each year thereafter, as Blair House envisioned. At the end of the 6-year agreement, we will have achieved the same level of reductions provided for in Blair House. But in the first years after the agreement goes into effect, the EC and the U.S. would be allowed to export more subsidized crops than originally envisaged. This also should help the EC deal with its sizable stockpiles of food (another French request) and will ease the burden of export reductions on U.S. farmers as well.

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For its part, the EC tabled a significantly improved agricultural market access offer which increases the access U.S. farmers will have to the EC market.

**It is important to underscore to Balladur and Mitterrand that these Blair House modifications are significant, not cosmetic, and that they constitute a final offer, not an opening bid. This is the main point to make.** We have gone as far as we can go without losing the support of important parts of the U.S. farm community and Congress. Balladur and Mitterrand should understand that if they reject this offer, they risk scuttling the Round. (NOTE: The French Ambassador visited Rubin and Berger yesterday to press for additional concessions. They firmly resisted.)

#### Market Access

Kantor and Brittan made progress on market access for manufactured goods. The EC agreed to eliminate tariffs on paper, wood, toys and copper and to reduce tariffs on scientific equipment by 65%. The main outstanding areas are electronics and aluminum. The EC tabled a proposal that eliminates tariffs on some electronic products, but hardly cuts tariffs on others. USTR now is analyzing the impact of that proposal on the sectors in which the U.S. is particularly interested.

#### Audio-Visual Services

**There was no progress on audio-visual issues, where the French again are the primary problem.** We have agreed to allow the French to maintain current levels of protection, but do not want them to add new restrictions. We want to prevent restrictions on foreign programming on "new technologies" (e.g., cable, pay-per-view, satellite) and ensure that U.S. producers enjoy "national treatment" (i.e., equal treatment for EC and non-EC companies) with regard to sharing the proceeds from levies on blank tapes.

#### Dumping and Subsidies

The EC agreed to support the U.S. in seeking changes to the Dunkel Text's dumping provisions. However, there was no consensus on the treatment of research subsidies. The U.S. offered a new proposal that would "greenlight", or make immune from countervailing duty actions, all research subsidies. The EC, in turn, wants to greenlight some development subsidies, such as those used to support Airbus. (If we can reach a separate aircraft agreement that meets the EC's concerns about Airbus, the EC might agree to greenlight all research subsidies without greenlighting development subsidies generally.)

#### Differences Between Balladur and Mitterrand

Balladur takes the lead on agricultural issues, and needs to be persuaded to accept the current proposal. We understand that Mitterrand will defer to Balladur on agriculture. Mitterrand takes the lead on audio-visual and will try to stand firm on the

issue. He needs to appreciate the importance of the audio-visual industry in this country and that we cannot accept further restrictions on foreign programing.

Attachment

Tab A      Talking Points

POINTS TO BE MADE IN PHONE CALLS TO  
FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND FRENCH PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR

- For Balladur Only: Thank you for your kind letter congratulating me on the approval of NAFTA. The agreement represents a major step forward for free trade.
- For Mitterrand Only: I very much look forward to my trip to Europe next month and to seeing you in Brussels. As you know, I will be coming to France next June.
- For Both:
  - We must now concentrate our efforts on the Uruguay Round. All our economies need the boost that will be provided by a good GATT agreement.
  - Our negotiators have been working hard to bridge U.S.-EC differences. Progress has been made, but there are remaining obstacles to concluding a good agreement.
  - On the Blair House Accord, we have made major compromises to meet your concerns. These changes in the peace clause and in the pace of export reductions are not cosmetic; they entail sacrifice on our part and will be opposed by our farming community -- which has already made clear its opposition to reopening Blair House in any way.
  - In all honesty I want you to know I am not going to be able to offer anything more on agriculture. This is my bottom line. You said you needed these changes early, and we have done as you asked. But we cannot go further.
  - I am very concerned about audio-visual services. The television and film industry is our second largest exporter and employs over 5 million people. I must tell you that the Round cannot go forward without a fair outcome on audio-visual issues.
  - We are willing to allow the EC to maintain its current restrictions. But we must have 1) liberalization for new technologies; 2) elimination of subsidies; and 3) national treatment in the area of copyright revenues.
  - The U.S. has made major concessions on agriculture. I urge you to accept this offer and to reciprocate on market access and audio-visual services.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**


2015-0774-M(1.28)  
12/1/2017 KBH

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

- We must not let this opportunity slip away. A successful Round promises to increase world GDP by 5 1/4 trillion dollars over the first ten years. The increases in employment will be enormous.
  
- We must work together to bring the Round to successful conclusion in the short time that remains. Our negotiators will continue to talk in coming days. Please do not hesitate to contact me directly.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 2, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT KYLE

FROM: CHARLES KUPCHAN/MIKE FROMAN

*Jck*

SUBJECT: Presidential Calls to French Prime Minister  
Balladur and French President Mitterrand

Attached are a briefing memo and talking points for the  
President's use in his calls to Balladur and Mitterrand,  
scheduled for Friday morning, December 3, 8:30-9:30 am.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo to the President

Approve *JK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Briefing memo
- Tab A Talking Points

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 175				
Document ID: 9309517				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: v

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9309517  
RECEIVED: 03 DEC 93 14

TO: ITOH

FROM: KUPCHAN

DOC DATE: 03 DEC 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS:

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE ON 3 DEC

ACTION: LOG NUMBER NOT USED

DUE DATE: 07 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN

LOGREF: 9309518

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSMNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 95021713 LOG NUMBER NOT USED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

National Security Council

DATE: 17 Feb 1995

Memorandum for: KUPCHAN

From: NSC/S

CREATE DATE: 931203

Subject: MEMCON OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF  
FRANCE ON 3 DEC

Log #9309517 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

Action completed, file attached.

Action still pending, copy attached.

Action transferred to \_\_\_\_\_.

Action sent forward, copy attached.

Cannot find, will continue to check.

System action not sent forward, copy attached.

Log Number not used. *per RMC memo 2/17/95*

Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

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Original OA/ID Number: 469				
Document ID: 9401009				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9401009  
RECEIVED: 08 FEB 94 17

TO: ITOH

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 08 FEB 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS:

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: LOG NUMBER NOT USED DUE DATE: 11 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBANARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-17

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9401009

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 95080114 LOG NUMBER NOT USED

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National Security Council

DATE: 31 Jul 1995

Memorandum for: HOLL

From: NSC/S

CREATE DATE: 940208

Subject: TELCON W/ PRES MITTERRAND

Log #9401009 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

- Action completed, file attached.
- Action still pending, copy attached.
- Action transferred to \_\_\_\_\_.
- Action sent forward, copy attached.
- Cannot find, will continue to check.
- System action not sent forward, copy attached.
- Log Number not used.
- Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

Please return to Secretariat, Room 379 OEOB.

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Original OA/ID Number: 469				
Document ID: 9401272				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (1 page)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1) KGM 7/13/2018
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Call to President Mitterrand (1 page)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1) KGM 7/13/2018

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 469

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9401272

2015-0774-M  
rs1294

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
  
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 18 FEB 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL W/ FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND ON 18 FEB

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HOLL  
NSC CHRON  
WALKER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9401272

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002

Z 94022210 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
X 94022210 KENNEY SGD MEMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1272

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WFO AVO \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>off 1/19</u>	<u>PN</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                    McLarty                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

*Phone call to Meltzer*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CC: NS, SRB, TL

*ExecSecs Office has dispatch*

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1272  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WFO A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wan</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>BB/19</u>	<u>PN</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:  
  
Phone call to Meltzer

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:            CC: NS, SRB, TL

Exec Sec's Office has dispatched

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1994 **94 FEB 18 P 9:35**

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: February 18, 1994  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 8:45 a.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *by lake*

I. PURPOSE

To prevent any last minute hitches in U.S.-French cooperation on NATO's Sarajevo ultimatum.

II. BACKGROUND

President Mitterrand asked to talk to you Friday but your schedules did not mesh until Saturday.

Paris has been our key ally in insisting that NATO's ultimatum not be diluted. But Mitterrand reportedly wants operational decisions, perhaps even including targeting options, to be decided by national capitals rather than NATO military commanders. This stems from France's longstanding objection to NATO's integrated military command and is an issue on which we have no flexibility.

You should first hear Mitterrand out. Your talking points point him toward Mike Boorda's meeting this Sunday with the French Defense Minister and Defense Chief, as well as their American, British, Dutch, and Italian counterparts.

Attachment  
Tab A Points to be Made

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.30)  
12/1/2017 KBM

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AMERICAN  
PUBLIC STORAGE

2000 100 1000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1272

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

- I appreciate your concern that all States that might participate in air strikes be comfortable with the plans that have been developed by NATO and UN commanders.
- Franco-American cooperation has been key to bringing NATO this far. We all are impressed by your resolve and leadership. I am sure that neither of us wants to re-open NATO's decision. It could all too easily unravel.
- The reason Bill Perry invited Leotard (LAY-OH-TARD) and Lanxade (LON-SOD) to Aviano, along with the defense chiefs of the other likely participants, was to make sure that all of us whose pilots will be flying understand what would happen if strikes are necessary. I urge your people to make full use of that opportunity to express any concerns they might have.
- As you know, General Cot is co-chairman of the board that has been coming up with potential targets for different contingencies.
- And, as in any military operation, any decision about air strikes would need the agreement of the commander on the ground. In this case that means UNPROFOR and General Cot.
- In short, since last August when NATO offered air strikes if necessary to prevent strangulation of Bosnian safe havens, we never have anticipated a unilateral decision by NATO commanders about air strikes. NATO's air action over Bosnia is a partnership with the UN.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1.31)  
12/1/2017 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1272

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE R. WALKER *JW*

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to French President Mitterrand

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone call to French President Mitterrand.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 472				
Document ID: 9402872				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/14/1994</del>	<del>P1/B(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (1 page)</del>	<del>04/14/1994</del>	<del>P1/B(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/14/1994</del>	<del>P1/B(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 472

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402872

2015-0774-M  
rs1295

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9402872  
RECEIVED: 14 APR 94 10

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL  
WALKER

DOC DATE: 14 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINT FOR FELCAL W/ FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 18 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBI NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 94041915 FOR DECISION  
X 94041916 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

9-14-99

✓  
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1-32)  
12/1/2017 KBM

**Helicopter Shootdown**

- I'm calling to express my deepest regrets about the loss of French lives in the tragic incident over northern Iraq this morning.
- We are still investigating the incident and will share with you all the details as they come to hand. We have dispatched U.S. search and rescue teams to the sites of the downed helicopters.
- I hope you will convey my sincere condolences to the families of the bereaved. The people who were killed were carrying out a humanitarian mission with great courage, dedication and discipline. We need to honor them and the high purpose they were serving.
- I greatly appreciate the contribution that France has made to this operation. I hope this incident will not alter your commitment to the protection of the people of northern Iraq.
- We both need to make clear that this accident will not deter the coalition from continuing the Provide Comfort operation. Its task is vital in deterring Saddam Hussein from repressing the people of northern Iraq.

**Bosnia**

- We are very concerned about reports regarding the French unit under threat from Serb forces.
- We don't want to let the Serbs dictate terms through provocations and testing our will, but we want to avoid precipitous action that could escalate rapidly.
- We recognize that there are many UN personnel being held throughout Bosnia. We are mindful of their safety.
- I said today publicly that we have taken no military action against the Serbs for the purpose of aiding a military victory for their adversaries. The actions we have taken -- through NATO and backed up by the authority of existing UN resolutions -- are intended to get the Serbs to respect the UNPROFOR presence and to encourage them to do what they have said they wanted to do -- to engage in the negotiations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

**PHOTOCOPY**  
**WJC HANDWRITING**

- (If raised) We think the French draft resolution has merit. We will continue to work to get a strong resolution on Gorazde, but we believe that, at this point, reconvening the Geneva Conference won't do much good.
  
- (If raised) The Russians are promoting a solution for Gorazde which would involve early sanctions relief for the Serbs. This is clearly unacceptable to us -- it will be seen as rewarding aggression.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLLY

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Telephone Call with French President Francois Mitterrand

Attached at Tab I are talking points for the President to use during his telephone call with French President Francois Mitterrand.

Concurrence by: Martin Indyk

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the talking points at Tab I.

Approve PLS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
                  EW

Attachment  
Tab I Talking Points

National Security Council  
The White House

rec'd 4/14  
2:58 PM

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2872  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

*amw*

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
<i>in</i> Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>not by us</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WA 4/14</u>	<u>File</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

14 APR 94 13 36

*CC: NIS*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EXECSEC HAS DBSC

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.33)  
12/1/2017 KBM

**Helicopter Shootdown**

-- I'm calling to express my deepest regrets about the loss of French lives in the tragic incident over northern Iraq this morning.

*This is a terrible Tragedy. accident*  
-- ~~It appears to have been a terrible mistake.~~ Our F-15s and AWACs identified the helicopters as Iraqi Hind helicopters operating in the northern no-fly zone.

-- We have dispatched U.S. search and rescue teams to the sites of the downed helicopters. ~~We will provide additional details as soon as we have them.~~ *we are still investigating the incident and will share with you*

-- I hope you will convey my sincere condolences to the families of the bereaved. The people who were killed were carrying out a humanitarian mission with great courage, dedication and discipline. We need to honor them and the high purpose they were serving.

-- I greatly appreciate the contribution that France has made to this operation. I hope this incident will not alter your commitment to the protection of the people of northern Iraq.

-- We both need to make clear that this accident will not deter the coalition from continuing the Provide Comfort operation. Its task is vital in deterring Saddam Hussein from repressing the people of northern Iraq.

**Bosnia**

-- We are very concerned about reports regarding the French unit under threat from Serb forces.

-- We don't want to let the Serbs dictate terms through provocations and testing our will, but we want to avoid precipitous action that could escalate rapidly.

-- We recognize that there are many UN personnel being held throughout Bosnia. We are mindful of their safety.

-- I said today publicly that ~~we have taken no military action against the Serbs to try to win a military victory for their adversaries.~~ *for the sake of the purpose of aiding* The action we have taken -- through NATO ~~and~~ *to SER* backed up by the authority of existing UN resolutions -- to get the Serbs to ~~honor the UN rules~~ and to encourage them to do what they have said they wanted to do -- to engage in the negotiations.

*Respect the UNPROFOR presence*

*are intended*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.34)  
12/1/2017 KBH

**Helicopter Shootdown**

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**Bosnia**

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- (If raised) The Russians are promoting a solution for Gorazde which would involve early sanctions relief for the Serbs. This is clearly unacceptable to us -- it will be seen as rewarding aggression.

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 481				
Document ID: 9407707				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand on Haiti (1 page)</del>	<del>09/23/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 7/13/2018
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Telephone Call to French President Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>09/23/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 7/13/2018

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 481

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9407707

2015-0774-M  
rs1296

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: ROSSIN

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI  
TELCALL

FRANCE

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCALL W/ PRES MITTERRAND ON HAITI

---

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DUE DATE: 26 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSSIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 1 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: KBYNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 94092318 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001	X 95020318 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
002 PRESIDENT	Z 94092716 FOR INFORMATION
002	X 94092812 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	940927		VICE PRESIDENT
002	940927		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: JDA LOG # 7707  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED:    SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK:    DOCLOG JDA A/O   

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	<u>A</u>
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	<u>2</u>		
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Acti

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:  
 TP's for Mitterrand  
 Telcal.

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

NSC/S

For Files

NSC -  
 This is one  
 we probably  
 cannot do.  
 ADS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7707

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 23, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN *LGR*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand on Haiti

President Mitterrand asked for a call from the President to discuss Haiti. Talking points are attached. Points on Bosnia are also provided.

Concurrences by: *LGR* Richard Clarke and *LGR* Julien LeBourgeois

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand on Haiti

President Mitterrand asked for this call to discuss respective French and American positions on aspects of the Haiti situation. His national security adviser did not specify the precise issues Mitterrand would raise. Based on conversations with the French Embassy and their contacts with the Foreign Ministry we think Mitterrand may ask about disarmament of the military and the departure of the military leaders.

You in turn can urge Mitterrand to consider again having French police trainers and monitors participate in the phase I coalition force. The French are currently committed to UNMIH. They declined our previous request to come earlier in the multinational force, citing the over-extension of French forces elsewhere. With the permissive entry of multinational forces into Haiti following the September 18 agreement, the French Embassy believes there may be more flexibility in the French position than before.

Talking points are also provided on yesterday's NATO airstrike against Bosnian Serb positions near Sarajevo.

Attachment

Tab A Talking points

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0774-M (1.35)  
12/1/2017 KBH

TELEPHONE CALL TO FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERAND

- Deployment of our forces going well. Expect to have full 14,000 in place by weekend. Good cooperation from Haitian authorities.
- Have stressed to Cedras, Francois we will not tolerate police violence such as Tuesday. Will work to moderate such conduct, put 1,000 military police on ground. Tension appears to have receded but situation won't change overnight.
- Do not plan to disarm entire military. Had discussed plan to disarm some elements (not entire Haitian military) with Aristide government, but that was in context of intervention.
- We will act to reduce arms by buying back weapons from non-military persons, have strict accountability for military weapons, institute tight control of weapons permits.
- Have made clear that military leaders will step down October 15 at latest, amnesty or not.
- Believe Haitian parliament should consider amnesty, however, and will assist them to meet. No position on substance of any amnesty law.
- Agreement does not require their departure, in line with Governor's Island and UNSC resolutions -- but believe they should leave Haiti, will work toward that end, expect they will reconsider present intent to stay as time to step down nears. Important thing is they will lose all control of military, police.
- We look toward Aristide's return right after October 15. Relations excellent after initial reticence about agreement, Pentagon visit major success.
- On sanctions, have told Aristide we support keeping on all the UNSC sanctions until the military leaders step down. Will seek broader humanitarian exemptions from UN Sanctions committee, do what we must to help multinational force perform mission. Will lift some of our unilateral sanctions.
- Received your letter on participation with police trainers, monitors in multinational coalition.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- With peaceful deployment of multinational force, good environment for police monitors. Expect to bring bulk of multinational forces including police in beginning over weekend through mid-October.
- Hope you will reconsider moving police arrival to multinational phase, help us prepare for early shift to UN Mission.

(IF RAISED)

*Bosnia: The French have expressed support for yesterday's NATO air strike, which was in retaliation for a Bosnian Serb attack on a French APC serving in UNPROFOR. Two French soldiers were wounded in the attack.*

Talking points

- Air strike should come as no surprise to Bosnian Serbs.
- Their flagrant attacks on UNPROFOR and violations of exclusion zones test our common resolve, require decisive response.
- Must be prepared to respond this way again should circumstances require.
- Bosnian Serbs should see this as indication of our resolve to increase pressure until they accept peace proposal the Bosnian government has already accepted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 215				
Document ID: 9407925				
Row: 44	Section: 3	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (4 pages)	09/27/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 215

### FOLDER TITLE:

9407925

2015-0774-M  
rs1297

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9407925  
RECEIVED: 29 SEP 94 09

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 SEP 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCON

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF TELCALL W/ PRES MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
NSC CHRON  
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY *AKS* DATE 9/30 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9407925

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
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002

Z 94093013 FOR DECISION  
X 94093017 ITOH APPROVED RECOM  
Z 94093017 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 94093018 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940930 BRILL, K

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with  
President Mitterrand (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Mitterrand is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (X)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memcon with President Mitterrand

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015 - 0774 - M

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1.37)  
12/1/2017 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Notetaker: Kathi Guekel and Jennifer Haskel

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1994, 2:38 - 2:57pm  
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Mitterrand: Hello. Is it the President? (U)

The President: Yes, it's me. It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

President Mitterrand: Happy to hear from you. It's been a long time since we talked to each other. I want to focus this brief conversation on Haiti. What do you think of what's going on there? My second question is an interesting one. How's it going with Yeltsin? (U)

The President: Yes. First let me discuss Haiti briefly. Deployment of our forces is going well. We have about 15,000 in place now. So far we're having good cooperation from Haitian authorities. We have stressed to Cedras and Francois that we will not tolerate police violence such as occurred last Tuesday. We have put 1,000 military police on the ground. Tension appears to have receded, but the situation won't change overnight. We had the unfortunate incident at Cap Haitien last Saturday when our forces were fired on by local authorities and had to defend themselves. We hope that will not happen again. We've begun buying back weapons from non-military persons. I think that will help. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes. Do you think things will get back to normal in the next couple of days? (U)

The President: They're getting closer to normal. We have received good cooperation from Aristide and the military leaders. Our goal is to keep things as calm as possible. We've lifted unilateral sanctions, are restoring electricity, and restoring conditions of normal life. The next thing we have to deal with is the transfer of power on October 15th, and whether we can get amnesty through the Haitian Parliament. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes indeed. (U)

The President: So far Aristide's cooperation has been excellent. Cedras and his group have been good as well. Tensions will come if there is no agreement over amnesty. Perhaps we can work together on that. We're doing everything we can to return the country back to normal. We've begun returning Haitian refugees from Guantanamo Bay. We're training several hundred to be police officers as well. We have 28 countries working with us in the first phase to be police monitors. There's a good chance to maintain order there. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. We're waiting to send a certain number of units of Gendarmerie. (S)

The President: I received your letter on participation with police trainers and monitors in the multinational coalition saying you would participate when the UN took it over. (S)

President Mitterrand: And they're going to do that, are they not? (S)

The President: Yes. Now that we have peacefully deployed the multinational force, it's a good environment for police monitors. Most of the multinational forces, including police, will be in beginning this weekend through mid-October. We'll have to stay a couple of months. I hope you will reconsider moving your police monitors in the multinational force phase, like Canada. Canada is sending 100 police monitors to arrive as soon as Aristide returns. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will talk to the Prime Minister about this tomorrow. (S)

The President: Let's talk about Yeltsin now. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. Tell me what happened in your conversation. (S)

The President: Yes. First let me give you my general impressions, then three specific points. He clearly is in a stronger position politically and economically than when I went to Russia in January. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: Inflation is down. Incomes are beginning to rise again. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but I don't think he has a very good position in public opinion. (C)

The President: Yes, but he's in a less shaky position politically than before and he can make it into 1996. He thinks he's on an upturn now. One thing that could come of all this that concerns me, he's trying to minimize his opposition on the right by taking steps on his own to reassert Russia's status as a great power. He basically wants us to recognize his unilateral right to step in to resolve crises in the Newly Independent States, while at the same time pressuring us not to expand NATO. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but it's difficult, isn't it? (C)

The President: Yes, and one part of this I think is his long-term calculation of Russia's economic interests. For example, he wants to settle Nagorno-Karabakh in part because of Azerbaijan's oil reserves. It isn't clear to me that he really wants to reassert effective control over all the republics. But it's absolutely clear he wants to be a great power to be reckoned with, and the best way to get that recognition is to be the dominant power in his own back yard. I think the trick is to find ways we can cooperate in other forums like expanding the G-7 to G-8 politically, and close cooperation on Bosnia and other areas. We should deal with things in his own back yard in a way that gives a large role but not a controlling one. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: On Bosnia he raised again a proposal that heads of the Contact Group meet somewhere in Europe fairly soon with representatives of the parties to hammer out a solution. It seems like a high-risk approach. If we do it and the Bosnian Serbs still said no, what would we do? He pushed that on me again today. (C)

President Mitterrand: So you're not in a hurry to respond to that invitation? (C)

The President: No. Let me say that you probably know the Bosnian government suggested that lifting of the arms embargo not be implemented for four to six months. I don't think we have that much time before the situation comes apart. Sarajevo is close to being totally cut off again. (C)

President Mitterrand: I think the UN force should intervene because we announced they would and if they don't, it will undermine the prestige of the United Nations. (C)

The President: We should intervene to protect Sarajevo... (S)

President Mitterrand: Into the exclusion zone...the 20 km zone. It seems to me, seeing the same television pictures again -- people starving, shelling, killing children -- psychologically, it will have a negative impact on the image of the United Nations. (S)

The President: I agree. The problem with the Yeltsin idea is that there's a very low chance of success and a high level of embarrassment. We don't have enough leverage for Yeltsin's idea. It's better keep working to pressure the Bosnian Serbs through Serbia and monitors on the border, rather than have another meeting of heads of state. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, well good. Thank you for that background and for giving me a feel for the situation. I will call you from time to time. (S)

The President: I'm very glad to talk to you any time. Yeltsin is leaving tomorrow evening. If you have any more thoughts about what to do next in Bosnia, I'll be very glad to hear from you. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. I will surely call you. Good luck. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW 

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on September 27, 1994, between the President and President Mitterrand. We suggest that the Memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to Kenneth Brill.

Approve ADS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Itoh-Brill Memorandum

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7925  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG PRM A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>K</u> Reed	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
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Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>MBN 9/30</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>APR 9/30</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: Send disk to State w/ memcon.  
cc: NES

Exec Sec Office has diskette U/S

National Security Council  
The White House

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>MBN 9/30</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>ADS 9/30</u>	<u>D</u>
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cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: Send disk to State  
w/ memcom.

cc: nes

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 483				
Document ID: 9409379				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telecon	re: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France on November 23, 1994 (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 483

### FOLDER TITLE:

9409379

2015-0774-M

rs1298

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9409379  
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 94 19

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 25 NOV 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF PRES CONVERSATION W/ PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 26 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
KERRICK  
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

JP

DATE

11/25

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSMNARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 94112515 FOR SIGNATURE  
X 94112517 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 941125 BRILL, K

National Security Council  
The White House

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>RA 11/25</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9379

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 25, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's Conversation  
with President Mitterrand (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Mitterrand is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

  
 William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memcon with President Mitterrand

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015 - 0774 - M (1.38)  
12/1/2017 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France on  
November 23, 1994 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Francois Mitterrand  
Interpreter: Carol Wolter  
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow/Don Kerrick

DATE, TIME November 23, 1994, 3:55 - 4:00pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Francois, hello. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good evening Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: After these last elections, I find myself in the  
same position you were in after your first term. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, indeed. (U)

The President: I hope to do as well as you did. (U)

President Mitterrand: It is possible. (U)

The President: I am calling about the deteriorating situation in  
Bihac. The Bosnian Serbs, with the direct involvement of Krajina  
Serb ground forces, are on the brink of overrunning the entire  
Bihac region and occupying Bihac city itself. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I have thought about that. (U)

The President: The NATO strikes against the airfield in Croatia  
and today's attacks on surface-to-air missile sites were steps in  
the right direction, but they have not had a direct effect on the  
Serb assault on Bihac. (U)

President Mitterrand: It will be difficult to solve without more  
ground troops. (U)

The President: Let me say what my concern is. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes. (U)

The President: I'm afraid if we don't turn it around, a wider war could break out. I am concerned that if immediate action isn't taken by NATO in concert with the UN, the strategic consequences could be dramatic: A new war in Croatia could break out, since a consolidation of Serb control in Bihac would set back Tudjman's chances of ever recovering the land they've lost. The Bosnian Government may withdraw its support for the Contact Group plan and seek a military solution. That could put pressure on Milosevic to end his break with the Bosnian Serbs. Then the pressures in the U.S. and in the Islamic countries to lift the arms embargo and arm the Bosnians will become even stronger. We've proposed a range of different options at NATO for using air power to halt the Serbs' offensive, but they have all received a cool response. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes. (U)

The President: I am worried about it unraveling. We favor a demilitarized zone around the city of Bihac requiring both sides to end all military activity in the safe area, with violations punishable by air strikes just as we've done in other places. This could be done in tandem with a cease-fire throughout the Bihac region. (S)

President Mitterrand: But, the combatants must agree. (S)

The President: Yes, of course, but, I'm afraid Bihac may fall within one or two days. (S)

President Mitterrand: Or even before that. (S)

The President: The UN believes a small demilitarized zone could apparently be done with a modest redeployment of UNPROFOR troops from other areas. At any rate, I called because I hoped we could work together quickly to do something so that we can keep the negotiations alive to build a peace based on the Contact Group proposal. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I fully understand, but it is a little bit late. In any case, I will look at what you are talking about. I need a few hours to think about it, especially since the Foreign Minister is in Asia. So I will make a decision but have to wait until tomorrow morning. I feel Bihac will fall within hours. We must take that into account. There is another thing that complicates our relationship. That's lifting the arms embargo. If lifted, we would certainly take our forces out of UNPROFOR. So, all of this complicates matters. We'll have to talk again. (S)

The President: I'm happy to talk to you any time. (U)

President Mitterrand: Would you like us to contact our UN representative? (U)

The President: Yes, and Secretary Christopher talked to Juppe earlier today. (U)

President Mitterrand: I will get all the information, but I do not want to hide that the situation is very difficult. The Serbs know terrain is very difficult for us. They know we won't win the war by air strikes. It is not like a flat Iraq. I will call you back quickly. I need a few hours to consult. (S)

The President: I don't favor lifting the arms embargo. Even the Bosnian Government agreed not to lift until next spring. I also recognize that if UNPROFOR has to withdraw, NATO will have to protect the withdrawal. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, that will get us into a more classical war. So, I will think it over and call you back before it's too late in Washington. Good-bye. (S)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(e)*

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Mitterrand

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France on November 23, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Itoh-Brill Memorandum

Tab A Telcon with President Mitterrand

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 9379  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG MB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>RA 11/25</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9409379  
DATE 25 NOV 94

SUBJECT: MEMO OF PRES CONVERSATION W/ PRES MITTERRAND  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 483				
Document ID: 9409385				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Mitterrand of France on November 24, 1994 (2 pages)	11/24/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 483

### FOLDER TITLE:

9409385

2015-0774-M  
rs1299

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 25 NOV 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MEMCON

FRANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF PRES 24 NOV CONVERSATION W/ PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 29 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
KERRICK  
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 11/28 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN      CLOSED BY: NSGP      DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
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002

Z 94112810 FOR DECISION  
X 94112810 ITOH APPROVED RECOM  
X 94112810 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 941125 BRILL, K

National Security Council  
The White House

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NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D*</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

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REMARKS:

**\* SEND  
DISK  
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AS WELL.**

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diskette*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 25, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's November 24,  
Conversation with President Mitterrand (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Mitterrand is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)



William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memcon with President Mitterrand

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1.39)  
12/1/2017 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Mitterrand of France on  
November 24, 1994

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Francois Mitterrand

Interpreter: Carol Wolter  
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow/Don Kerrick

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 24, 1994, 11:52 - 11:55pm, Camp  
David

The President: Hello Francois. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good evening. I am calling as I told you  
I would yesterday. What is your thinking? (U)

The President: As you know, there has been some progress in New  
York and at NATO on establishing a demilitarized zone around  
Bihac that could be enforced by NATO air power. I understand the  
NAC is still discussing Bosnia. It is important to get a  
decision today. My military advisors tell us a small exclusion  
zone can be implemented with at most a modest increase by  
UNPROFOR. I don't see the need for NATO forces as long as NATO  
enforces with air power. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, that's more or less the stage of  
information I have. But I must say I am skeptical about a larger  
zone. The Serbs have ground troops and artillery and are not  
afraid of the planes. But there is not much else we can do, and  
I do approve of some limited measures. (C)

The President: I appreciate that. We need to do our best to  
persuade the British and the others to go forward. (U)

President Mitterrand: The zone won't change much. In reality,  
the Serbs have victory at hand. We must do what we can without  
waiting. Do you want a NATO decision today? (U)

The President: Yes, as quickly as possible. (C)

President Mitterrand: Well, I wanted to get back to you today as  
I promised yesterday. (U)

The President: I'm glad you did. (U)

President Mitterrand: We will talk again soon. Unfortunately, we will have the opportunity to talk about this again soon. (U)

The President: Yes, Good-bye. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

National Security Council  
The White House

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG PR A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>PR 11/25</u>	<u>D*</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

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*send disks*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9409385  
DATE 25 NOV 94

SUBJECT: MEMO OF PRES 24 NOV CONVERSATION W/ PRES MITTERRAND  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBH Date: 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-17

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9385

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 28, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(D)*

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Mitterrand

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France on November 24, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Itoh-Brill Memorandum

Tab A Telcon with President Mitterrand

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: KKH/NARA, Date: 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-07

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4015				
Document ID: 9410238				
Row: 47	Section: 1	Shelf: 11	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	re: Points to be Made for the Presidential Calls to Chretien, Major, and Mitterrand on U.S. Bosnia Initiative (3 pages)	02/09/1994	P17b(1) K8H 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 4015

### FOLDER TITLE:

9410238

2015-0774-M  
rs1300

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9410238  
RECEIVED: 14 JAN 01 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: NATL SECURITY COUN

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINTS FOR TELCALLS TO CHRETIEN & MITTERRAND ON BOSNIA INITIATIVE

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ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 19 JAN 01 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9410238

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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UNCLASSIFIED

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CALLS  
TO CHRETIEN, MAJOR, AND MITTERRAND ON  
U.S. BOSNIA INITIATIVE

2 a. 24  
9410238

- We share a common outrage at the most recent, blatant attack on innocent citizens in Sarajevo over the weekend.
- I believe we must act. As I said at the NATO Summit, the credibility of the Alliance is at stake.
- The NAC should authorize air strikes if the shelling of Sarajevo continues or if heavy weapons are not removed from around the city within a fixed number of days.
- We should use this tougher policy to reinvigorate the negotiations; demonstration of NATO seriousness may persuade the Serbs finally to show the flexibility necessary to get an agreement.
- I want the U.S. to become much more actively engaged in helping define a reasonable and viable settlement, [FOR MAJOR, MITTERRAND ONLY: as you have been urging] on two conditions:
  - ① First, any proposal we endorse must be based on bedrock Bosnian requirements. Of course, the Bosnians for their part must develop a realistic bottom-line based on agreements already reached in Geneva, but reflecting their concerns about the viability of the territory they would receive. We would begin by working with them to determine a realistic bottom-line that you and we could support.
  - ② Second, we have some ideas for how we could put more pressure on the Serbs if necessary.
- We were moving toward this conclusion even before the vicious attack on the Sarajevo market; that outrage only underscores the need for urgent, vigorous action.
- Secretary Christopher is telephoning your Foreign Minister to provide the main outlines of our proposed initiative. Defense Secretary Perry will also be calling his counterparts. Active Allied support and cooperation will be needed to make it succeed.
- [FOR MAJOR, MITTERRAND ONLY:] I am also sending Under Secretary Peter Tarnoff and our Special Envoy on Former Yugoslavia, Charles Redman, to Paris, London and Bonn to present and discuss with you the details of our thinking. I ask your help in ensuring that they are received at an appropriately senior level.
- If we can all agree to proceed along these lines, I am prepared to send my representatives to the Bosnian government. Their objective will be to help them define a realistic bottom line that we can jointly present to the Serbs as a reasonable basis for a settlement.

- Our hope, however, is that, faced with firm Allied resolve, the Serbs will conclude that it is in their best interest to conclude a settlement on the basis of what we have put forward.
- I cannot emphasize enough that the decision we take in response to the Sarajevo attack, as well as our success in achieving the NATO Summit demands on Srebrenica and Tuzla, will be critical to convincing the Serbs to demonstrate the flexibility necessary to reach a settlement.
- I look forward to working closely with you and earnestly hope we will have your support.

#### **Additional Points for Major**

- Before I get to the main purpose of my call, which is Bosnia, I want to make sure there is no misunderstanding between you and me.
- I know you disagreed with my judgment on issuing Gerry Adams a limited visa. It was a hard decision, and I understand your reasons for arguing against a visa.
- But please be clear that I am completely behind you and Albert Reynolds as you try to move the peace process forward. I want the U.S. to play a positive role in this.
- I am disturbed that the press here, and even more so in Britain, have seized upon the Gerry Adams issue to make doomsday predictions about the future of U.S.-UK relations.
- As I said last year when you visited us, as long as I am President the relationship between the United States and Britain will be a special and very close one.
- Comments attributed to members of my staff suggesting otherwise do not reflect my views.
- We have a lot of substantive issues to review when you come to Washington later this month.
- I will be particularly interested in hearing your impressions from your mid-February meetings in Moscow.
- We also need to use your visit to reverse some of these false and negative press impressions about whether the U.S. and the UK are still working together.
- I also want to make sure my June visit to Britain accomplishes our shared objectives of strengthening our cooperation on such issues as Partnership for Peace and stability in the Russia and the NIS.

**Additional Points for Chretien**

- I understand and share your concern for your troops on the ground. Our discussions at NATO and future decisions will certainly take into account the safety of UNPROFOR troops.
- I understand that Steve Oxman is meeting with your Foreign Minister today to discuss all of this in more detail.

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 559				
Document ID: 9500233				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Call with French President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>01/13/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)</del>	<del>01/13/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 559

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9500233

2015-0774-M  
rs1301

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
  
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500233  
RECEIVED: 11 JAN 95 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 13 JAN 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE  
RUSSIA  
MIDDLE EAST

TELCALL  
IRAQ  
SANCTIONS

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND RE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA &  
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENT BANK / IRAQ SANCTIONS

ACTION: OBE PER PODESTA

DUE DATE: 14 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER

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FILES: PA

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GARDNER  
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By K81 NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0714-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500233  
RECEIVED: 11 JAN 95 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: GARDNER  
VERSHPBOW

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE  
RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES TELCALL TO FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND RE  
CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA

ACTION: FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION DUE DATE: 14 JAN 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBANARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-M

National Security Council  
The White House

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NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>BM 4/27</u>	<u>N</u>
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cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

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*JW 3/20/95*

National Security Council  
The White House

Reed 1/12  
5:10 PM

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Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>MB</u>	_____
Lake	<u>4</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	<u>P2</u> <u>CA mg</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Phone Call to Mitterand

12 04 93 29

Exec Sec Office has diskette lys

1-13  
 Per Scheduling  
~~this will probably appear on the schedule next week.~~  
 please review  
 said

FW

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1995

95 JAN 13 P2:12

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: January 13, 1995

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1.41)

12/1/2017 KBH

I. PURPOSE

To raise the conflict in Chechnya and appropriate points regarding the Middle East Development Bank and the continuation of sanctions against Iraq.

II. BACKGROUND

Russia/Chechnya: French Foreign Minister Juppe called Kozyrev on Wednesday to express concern over the breakdown of Russia's unilateral cease-fire. Although the European Union is not yet considering imposing sanctions on Moscow, it may be considering suspending aid and has already postponed the entry into force of its Cooperation Agreement with Russia. While reaffirming USG commitment to work toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict, you should stress your opposition to economic sanctions which would further undermine the cause of reform in Russia.

Middle East Development Bank: When you visited the Middle East in October 1994, you announced that the U.S. would take the lead in establishing a Middle East Development Bank. At your personal invitation, expert representatives of 37 nations gathered in Washington on Tuesday to discuss the formation of this bank. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the PLO, Morocco, Tunisia and most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are keen advocates of the bank. However, the Europeans (led by the UK, Germany and France) are opposed, partly because we are taking the lead and partly because they don't see the need to establish a new financial structure. You should emphasize to Mitterrand the importance to the peace process of moving ahead as rapidly as possible on establishing the Bank.

093645

Sanctions on Iraq: Paris has been pressuring Bonn to distance itself from what it has termed to be the excessively harsh position of the United States. It is important that you urge Mitterrand to require Iraq to comply fully with all of the Security Council's requirements for the lifting of sanctions. The most recent report by the UN Special Commission on Iraq notes numerous deficiencies in Iraq's compliance record.

Attachment

Tab A            Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015 - 0774-M (1.42)  
12/1/2017 KBT

- Francois, best wishes for the New Year. The accession of France to the presidency of the European Union will give us additional opportunities to work together.

Russia/Chechnya

- Greatly concerned about events in Chechnya and their effect on Moscow and Yeltsin. No question: Chechnya is part of Russia and Moscow has right to deal with armed secession.
- Russia's methods are the problem. Deeply distressed over civilian deaths, but also concerned about what this crisis may say about Yeltsin's decisionmaking. Have you spoken with him?
- I wrote to Yeltsin last week urging him to end the bloodshed and work with the EU and OSCE. Vice President gave same message to Chernomyrdin on the phone. I am pleased Russia has agreed to allow OSCE to send observers to Chechnya.
- Want to do everything we can to promote a positive outcome. What are your thoughts on how we can influence Yeltsin?
- Do not believe this means the end of reform or democracy in Russia. Open debate in press and parliament has continued; healthy sign.
- We must continue to support reform. Crisis hasn't played itself out; too soon to understand all the implications. This is the wrong time to announce economic sanctions, I believe. We must remain steady and consistent. Stress evolutionary nature of change in Russia and our long-term interest in seeing it through.
- We are staying engaged. Secretary Christopher meets Kozyrev for two days of talks January 17-18 in Geneva. Will focus on Russia's concerns over NATO, but Chechnya will also be on agenda.

Middle East Development Bank

- Francois, as you know, experts from 37 countries met here at my invitation to discuss establishment of a Middle East Development Bank.

- The Bank is an important and cost-effective way of advancing regional economic integration, which is essential to supporting the regional peace we are working to achieve.
- All the regional parties -- especially Israel, Egypt, the PLO and Jordan -- want to establish the Bank. Need your support in ensuring that rapid progress is made toward this goal.

Sanctions on Iraq

- Most recent report of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) indicates serious deficiencies in Iraq's compliance with the Security Council's requirements for the lifting of sanctions, for example, return of all stolen Kuwaiti property, full accounting for Kuwaiti POWs/MIAs, a halt to Iraqi support for terrorism and to Iraq's repression of its own people. We must ensure that Iraq complies fully and demonstrates its peaceful intentions.
- Weakening sanctions against Iraq or giving Iraq impression that it is successfully splitting Western Alliance would be serious mistake. I hope I can count on your support during regular sanctions reviews in United Nations Security Council.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0233

January 11, 1995

*revise talking points*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER *AG*

SUBJECT: POTUS Telephone Call to French President Francois Mitterrand

You asked that we provide talking points for the President to call French President Francois Mitterrand.

The attached talking points raise appropriate points regarding the conflict in Chechnya and additional points, should the need arise, dealing with the Middle East Development Bank and the continuation of sanctions against Iraq.

Concurrences by: Nick Burns <sup>(Ja)</sup> and Martin Indyk <sup>(MI)</sup>

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBY/NARA, Date 12/1/2017  
2015-0774-m

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 571				
Document ID: 9501963				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1) <b>Partial Release - KBH 7/13/2018</b>
<del>001b. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand (3 pages)</del>	<del>03/16/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. talking points</del>	<del>re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand [incomplete copy] (1 page)</del>	<del>03/16/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 571

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9501963

2015-0774-M  
rs1302

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or-between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE  
TYSON, L

DOC DATE: 16 MAR 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TELCALL

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL W/ FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: OBE PER EXEC SEC

DUE DATE: 16 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9501963

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 95031617 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG  
Z 95031615 FOR INFORMATION  
X 95032915 OBE PER EXEC SEC

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1963  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>N</u>
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: OBE Per Exec Sec

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

National Security Council  
The White House

rec'd 3/16  
8PM

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 1963  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG MBN A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>MBN</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
<i>rvn</i> Lake	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	Nat Sec Advisor has seen	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>MBN 3/16</u>	<u>D</u> <u>TYSON</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

10. 7. 14

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

*revised  
TAB A  
w/TL chgs*

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] SB TO R Date:

Rather heavy phone call.  
How about Wolfersham, Paris-Moscow,  
others (if asked) including

2] \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ Date:

Bornia (Creata)  
These talking points are a  
lecture, not a conversation.

3] \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ Date:

R

4] \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ Date:

5] \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ Date:

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: Telephone Conversation with French President Francois Mitterrand (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management  
([Mitterrand and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 571

### FOLDER TITLE:

9501963

2015-0774-M  
rs1302

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
March 16, 1995

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH 5:31  
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

2015-0774-M (1.44)  
12/1/2017 KBH

DATE: TBD  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
LAURA TYSON DT

I. PURPOSE

To elaborate your reasons for nominating James Wolfensohn as president of the World Bank, discuss your participation in the French VE-day commemoration on May 8, emphasize the need for a final push on securing indefinite NPT extension, and encourage more intense preparation of the U.S.-EU Summit in mid-June.

II. BACKGROUND

You notified the G-7 leaders on Friday, March 10 of your decision to nominate James Wolfensohn as President of World Bank, and indicated that you would call to discuss the issue further. As you know, your recommendation that James Wolfensohn become President of the World Bank must be confirmed by the Board. Our Executive Director Jan Piercy put forward Wolfensohn's name to the World Bank Board on Monday and expects the vote to take place Thursday. Piercy does not expect any problem obtaining the Board's confirmation. If raised, you should firmly resist any linkage of this nomination to the WTO candidacy. You should briefly discuss with Mitterrand the reasons why you think Wolfensohn is the most qualified candidate for the job. France's unqualified support for your nomination will help ensure swift consensus by key World Bank shareholders.

If raised, the French are concerned about currency market instability, for which they blame the recent decline in the dollar. Their concern primarily reflects pressures on the French franc against the German mark and their desire to seek a global solution to an intra-European problem.

You have been invited for VE-Day commemorations in Paris on May 8. You are presently scheduled for VE ceremonies on that day at Arlington Cemetery with associated events. No final decision has been made on your participation in VE-Day commemorations in London, Paris, Berlin or Moscow.

We are at a critical point in our efforts to secure indefinite NPT extension.

EO 13526 1.4c

Some in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) are pushing for a rolling fixed-term extension and there is a danger that momentum might shift toward such a proposal. The G-7 should shore up existing support and continue to work closely together to secure a large majority in favor of indefinite extension.

The French have been skeptical about the KEDO agreement. In particular, they have reservations about joining and financing an organization in which only the three original members (U.S., South Korea and Japan) have real influence. The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry indicated last week that Paris will provide only technical, rather than financial, support. Given the stakes for our North Korea policy, you should urge Mitterrand to commit France to financial participation in the KEDO.

Although the French Foreign Ministry has been rhetorically supportive of the three working groups established at the Berlin Summit to generate concrete proposals for U.S.-EU collaboration at the next summit scheduled for mid-June, it has done the minimum necessary to follow up on the work we began with the German presidency. Personal encouragement from you may be required to rescue this exercise in closer U.S.-EU relations from failure.

Attachment  
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0774-M (1.45)  
12/1/2017 KBM

**On Nomination of James Wolfensohn:**

- Wanted to follow up on my letter about U.S. nomination of James Wolfensohn as President of World Bank. U.S. Executive Director put forward Jim's name to World Bank Board on Monday, and has asked for speedy vote.
- Hope you agree that Jim will make excellent President. He is internationally known in finance and government circles and has long been active in development issues. He's also an accomplished musician.
- I know Jim well. He is comfortable in public fora. He will be tireless and effective voice in support of IFIs at time when support for Bank is significant issue before many of our legislatures.
- Jim also has great ability to reconcile sharply divergent points of view that can emerge in discussion of complex development issues.
- Hope I can count on support of your government when the Board votes on Jim's candidacy.

(If raised):

- Shouldn't link search for new head of WTO with nomination of president of World Bank. This would only complicate both decisions and make it harder to fill either position.

**On the Recent Decline of the Dollar (If raised):**

- A strong dollar is in U.S. national interest.
- I have worked on deficit cutting and strengthening U.S. economy as basis for stronger dollar.
- Secretary Rubin knows markets well. He has been in touch with Economics Minister Alphandery.
- We have intervened in concert with our G-7 partners. Our policy is to intervene when appropriate.

**On Participation in VE-Day Celebrations:**

- Thank you for your invitation to participate in VE-Day celebrations in Paris on May 8.
- I am trying to see if my schedule can accommodate attending any -- or all -- of the VE-Day ceremonies in Europe.
- At present, I have longstanding commitment to our American veterans to participate in VE-Day commemoration ceremonies at Arlington Cemetery on May 8.
- I intend to make decision soon regarding the commemoration of our veterans and my participation in VE-Day celebrations in Europe.

**On Financial Support for KEDO:**

- Agreement with North Korea vitally important to security in Northeast Asia and global nuclear nonproliferation.
- Need your support and financial contribution to KEDO. Without broad international participation, Japan will have difficulty making "significant" financial contribution it promised. South Korea's funding of most of \$4 billion cost of this project depends on what Japan does.
- So relatively modest participation by Europeans and others exerts great leverage over whether KEDO succeeds and therefore whether we can avert the security danger arising from North Korea's nuclear program.
- We requested \$22 million from Congress to support North Korea agreement next year. Australia has already pledged \$5 million; Canada and New Zealand will make modest contributions. We are approaching other G-7 members, countries in Gulf and Southeast Asia.
- Important to demonstrate to North Korea, China and others that KEDO can succeed. Early, public commitment from France would do that, thereby strengthening our common security.

(If doubts expressed about Agreed Framework):

- Our agreement with North Korea supports both stability in East Asia and global nonproliferation. North Korea has frozen, and committed to dismantle, its existing nuclear program. The agreement also requires full compliance by North Korea with the NPT and IAEA safeguards before it gets any significant nuclear components.

**On Indefinite Extension of the NPT:**


- Indefinite extension of NPT enjoys strong support, but opponents trying to block us by pushing for rolling fixed-term extension.
- Now is time to redouble our efforts to shore up existing support for indefinite extension and prevent non-aligned from coalescing around another option. We need to continue working closely together on this.

**On Preparations for U.S.-EU Summit:**

- Not much time left before U.S.-EU Summit in mid-June. We need to increase the scope and intensity of our collaboration to ensure that Summit not simply marginalized by G-7. We need to make clear our commitment to our own administrations.
- Am particularly concerned that not enough progress being made on the three working groups set up at Berlin Summit last year. These groups offer unique opportunity to transform U.S.-EU relationship from one of consultation to coordination between equal partners.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 15, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE/LAURA TYSON  
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DAN PONEMAN  
FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER/STEVE AOKI  
SUBJECT: Telephone Call with President Mitterrand

We have prepared the attached briefing package for the President's telephone call with Mitterrand this week to discuss the President's nomination of James Wolfensohn as president of the World Bank, the recent decline in the dollar, the President's participation in the French commemoration of V-E Day on May 8, France's financial participation in the KEDO, the need for a final push on securing indefinite NPT extension and need for more intense preparations for the U.S.-EU Summit tentatively scheduled for June 17.

Concurrences by: Helen Walsh, Joe Sestak and Robert Litwak

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0774-M (1.46)  
12/1/2017 KBH

**On Nomination of James Wolfensohn:**

- Wanted to follow up on my letter about U.S. nomination of James Wolfensohn as President of World Bank. U.S. Executive Director put forward Jim's name to World Bank Board on Monday, and has asked for speedy vote.
- Hope you agree that Jim will make excellent President. He is internationally known in finance and government circles and has long been active in development issues. He's also an accomplished musician.
- I know Jim well. He is comfortable in public fora. He will be tireless and effective voice in support of IFIs at time when support for Bank is significant issue before many of our legislatures.
- Jim also has great ability to reconcile sharply divergent points of view that can emerge in discussion of complex development issues.
- Hope I can count on support of your government when the Board votes on Jim's candidacy.

(If raised):

- Shouldn't link search for new head of WTO with nomination of president of World Bank. This would only complicate both decisions and make it harder to fill either position.
- Search for new head of WTO tough problem. We need to work hard on achieving consensus.

**On the Recent Decline of the Dollar (If raised):**

- A strong dollar is in U.S. national interest.
- I have worked on deficit cutting and strengthening U.S. economy as basis for stronger dollar.
- Secretary Rubin knows markets well. He has been in touch with Economics Minister Alphandery.
- We have intervened in concert with our G-7 partners. Our policy is to intervene when appropriate.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR