Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 581				
Document ID: 9503514				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9503514
RECEIVED: 08 MAY 95 14

TO: SENS

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 08 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON TO PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE

ACTION: DOHSE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 11 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95050917	FOR DECISION
001		X	95051109	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes LOG # 3514 A/O _____

DOCLOG 1881 SYSTEM: (PRS) NSC INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
B Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			D
West Wing Desk	2		
NSC/Rm			N
			File for Record

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Special Dispatch Instructions:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's May 8 Conversation with President-elect Jacques Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with President-elect Jacques Chirac on May 8, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with President-elect Chirac

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President-elect Jacques Chirac of France
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President-elect Jacques Chirac Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow, Joyce Harmon, Kenneth Baldwin, Karen Dragone and Katherine O'Loughlin
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	May 8, 1995, 2:20 - 2:27 p.m. EDT Air Force One

The President: Hello, Jacques.

President-elect Chirac: Hello, how are you?

The President: Fine. Congratulations!

President-elect Chirac: It's so nice of you to give me a phone call. I was pleased to see Al Gore today.

The President: I'm very excited for you. I know you are very busy. I just called to congratulate you on your victory. My wife asked me to say hello and to tell you how much she enjoyed her meeting with you.

President-elect Chirac: That's very nice. I am a great admirer of hers. Send her my best wishes.

The President: We now have something in common. We both started off in third place and won. (Laughter)

President-elect Chirac: That's right. I think we are going to meet in Halifax.

The President: Yes, and again shortly after that. I'm looking forward to it.

President-elect Chirac: It was nice of you to call. I have always appreciated the way you have been so nice to me.

The President: I am very excited about working with you and looking forward to our meeting. I know you are very busy right now.

President-elect Chirac: As I said, I talked to Al Gore. He'll tell you about the Franco-American meeting we should have.

The President: I look forward to that.

President-elect Chirac: Again, send my regards to Hillary.

The President: Thank you.

President-elect Chirac: I hope to see you as soon as possible.

The President: Me too.

President-elect Chirac: Thank you. Nice of you to call. Bye-Bye.

The President: Good bye.

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 587				
Document ID: 9504484				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (4 pages)~~	~~05/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ n2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 587

FOLDER TITLE:
9504484

2015-0775-M
ke3469

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9504484
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 95 08

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 27 MAY CONVERSATION W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 15 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95061217	FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION
001		X	95061319	SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95061319	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950613	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4484

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	2		
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	6/13	
Records Mgt.	4	6/13	D*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

* ① DISPATCH TO STATE ORIGINAL SENS TO BRILL MEMO, BUT ONLY A COPY OF TAB A, PLUS DISKETTE.
② FILE COPY OF SENS MEMO & ORIG TAB A WITH CLOSEOUT.
③ INCLUDE FICKLIN IN CLOSEOUT DISTRO.

Exec Sec Office has diskette

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4484

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT.

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	2		
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	6/13	
Records Mgt.	4	6/13	*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

* ① DISPATCH TO STATE ORIGINAL SENS TO BRILL MEMO, BUT ONLY A COPY OF TAB A, PLUS DISKETTE
② FILE COPY OF SENS MEMO & ORIG TAB A WITH CLOSEOUT.
③ INCLUDE FICKLIN IN CLOSEOUT DIST

Exec Sec Office has diskette

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4484

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 20060915
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France of May 27, 1995

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Nelson Drew and Deuce Martinez

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1995: 1521-1547
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

The President: It's a great pleasure to hear you. Thanks for calling. (U)

The President: It has been a difficult couple of days. I want to extend my condolences to you for the loss of the French soldiers in Bosnia. (U)

President Chirac: We are not the only ones to have some problems here. Let me tell you how we feel. I understand that you and Warren Christopher agree to the Contact Group meeting on Monday. I had a long call with Yeltsin. He is willing to come as well. It is very important for those with troops in UNPROFOR to have this meeting. *(Switching to French)* I understand the situation is becoming seriously worse in Bosnia. At the present time they have taken over 200 hostages, 100 of which are French. Secondly, bombing of the safe areas, especially Tuzla, continues, mainly on civilians. This is a result of airstrikes decided, I must say, a bit hastily, without sufficient thought to strategy. If this situation continues we cannot stay. Naturally, we don't want to withdraw, but in order for us to remain, a number of decisions need to be made. ~~(C)~~

First, there needs to be a means for strengthening UNPROFOR. This is what we will present to the Contact Group. I take it we agree on that orientation. Second, we need a very strong diplomatic initiative, in particular mutual recognition between Bosnia and Serbia. This is the most urgent thing to establish a peaceful climate. And on that point, our hope is that the U.S. negotiator who has been acting in the name of the Contact Group can reach agreement as soon as possible. There is also the question of designating a mediator. We are in agreement on that. But to conclude, our wish is for the situation to change in the

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1,01)

following way: reinforce UNPROFOR by increasing the number and strength of its troops; acceleration in diplomatic efforts; and no further airstrikes that have not been concerted in advance. What do you think? ~~(C)~~

The President: I'm sympathetic to the very difficult situation all the troops are in. UNPROFOR is now in a dilemma. The Serbs believe they have the best of all worlds. They think they can attack safe areas and, if we respond with airstrikes, they can take hostages. I understand why the UN requested airstrikes, yet they have made UNPROFOR more vulnerable. Maybe if UNPROFOR was more clustered in Sarajevo. I understand you have some views on this. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: True, they are very vulnerable, in little groups of 10 or 20. ~~(C)~~

The President: This is something to be discussed quickly by Ministers in the Contact Group. We have to be sure we have a theory on what to do with eastern enclaves. The Bosnians say they can defend them, but our people don't think they can. I also agree it's difficult if you call in airstrikes without a strategy. Still, it is better for the Bosnian Serbs to be worried about escalation. They seem to be, because they haven't killed any of the hostages. I believe there should be no more airstrikes for now, but we shouldn't take them off the table. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree, we should not say anything publicly. But you must understand that airstrikes are not efficient. Airstrikes might kill civilians or they don't do anything. If they hit civilians, they say we are barbarians. In either case, they give the Serbs the possibility to take hostages or bomb civilians as in Tuzla. Airstrikes have to be done with this in mind, and with real thinking. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. The real problem is on the ground. When we conducted airstrikes before, we were able to get the Serbs to put weapons into collection areas. It worked for a while. But we took no steps to decommission the weapons, so they took them back. UNPROFOR is in a difficult situation if they can't defend themselves and if the weapons can be taken from their control at will. We could consider some understanding on the temporary cessation of airstrikes in return for real control over the heavy weapons by the UN. The Bosnians could defend their areas if it were not for the heavy weapons. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: It is impossible to control heavy weapons. There are not enough people in UNPROFOR, and they are peacekeepers, not ready for war when the Bosnian Serbs take them hostage. We now have horrific images in France from Serb

television showing Canadian and Ukrainian soldiers without their helmets, chained to gates. It's terrible. We cannot accept this. If we want to stay, we need to reinforce UNPROFOR capabilities. We need to change its mission, give it more weapons, consolidate the forces in less vulnerable positions, and let them defend themselves. We also need to accelerate talks calling for mutual recognition of Bosnia and Serbia. That deal is nearly done. ~~(C)~~

The President: Do you think Milosevic will do this? ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, but you are a little too worried about the embargo. The Serbs in Belgrade want to kill the embargo. I think the U.S. diplomat could easily find a solution to mutual recognition. This would be the first step toward peace. This would finish the embargo. Without this, we can't reach peace. I think Milosevic is so worried about his economy he is ready to recognize Bosnia. ~~(C)~~

The President: If you think he will deliver, then we want to work with you on this. The problem is that he comes up to the edge and then backs off. I will talk to Christopher before the Contact Group meeting. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: The meeting is Monday afternoon in the Netherlands, at the Ministerial level. They will meet first just at four, then with all five. Maybe they will agree. Yeltsin is very worried. If agreement is reached, maybe we can have a Contact Group heads of state meeting. This would send a strong message to the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am generally in agreement with what you say, if you think Milosevic will deliver. I also may call Yeltsin, since he can help in stopping Serb shelling. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I asked him to send Kozyrev and Grachev to Belgrade. I believe they are arriving right now. They may talk to Milosevic and Mladic. We will see where things stand after Monday. We cannot keep the situation as it is. It's very dangerous. Today, for the first time, I gave our troops the order to counterattack. We had to take back a bridge. I gave orders to counterattack this morning. The Serbs took French UN uniforms and attacked a French post. We had to withdraw for a while, and then I ordered the counterattack. Two people were killed. We have three Serb prisoners, and we have been having discussions to exchange them for the 200 UN peacekeepers. Everybody understands we are close to a real fire. I think we are close to a solution if we have the will. But everyone is worried. Yeltsin is close to getting involved with a common policy along with us four. ~~(C)~~

The President: We need to understand one thing: if the troops stay, they need to be better armed, and better able to defend themselves. If so, then we won't have to worry so much about the bombing and the exposure of the UN peacekeepers. The Serbs will know that the rules of engagement have changed, and that they can't just run over them. This is very important. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, we are asking for that. But we all will still have people deployed in small lots, like the observers, so we will see what happens. UNPROFOR must have weapons with which to counterattack. This is not now the case. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree fully. I will talk to Major and possibly Yeltsin. If you want to talk with me this weekend, I will be here, so you can call. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Thanks, though I don't want to bother you. Regards to Hillary. (U)

The President: Good-bye (U)

President Chirac: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 10/6/15
8615-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9504484
DATE 13 JUN 95

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 27 MAY CONVERSATION W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1 + DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4484

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 20060115
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/N

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's May 27, 1995 Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with President Chirac of France on May 27, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

Attachments
Tab I Sens-Brill Memorandum
Tab A Memcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

scl 2013-0517-M

Case Number: 2013-0517-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 589				
Document ID: 9504683				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

see 2013-0517-M

Case Number: 2013-0517-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 594				
Document ID: 9505425				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

see 2013-0517-M

Case Number: 2013-0517-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 595				
Document ID: 9505597				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

see 2013-0517-M

Case Number: 2013-0517-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 596				
Document ID: 9505670				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 596				
Document ID: 9505739				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Jaques Chirac (4 pages)~~	~~07/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 596

FOLDER TITLE:
9505739

2015-0775-M
ke3470

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9505739
RECEIVED: 24 JUL 95 17

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 26 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 27 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
GARDNER ✓
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 7/26 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95072614	FOR DECISION
001		X	95072614	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95072614	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950726	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 5739

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* Jon *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	Jon 7/26	D
Records Mgt.			with diskette

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Upd

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5739

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5739

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 26, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By YDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0754-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5739

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCDC NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER AG

SUBJECT: Telcon With French President Jacques Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac on July 24, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Jacques Chirac Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	July 24, 1995, 2:04-2:27 p.m. Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine. I wanted to talk to you about a few things. First, I wanted to extend my condolences for the loss of your brave soldiers in Sarajevo over the weekend. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, wait a minute, I prefer to have an interpreter. [*Chirac listens to consecutive translation*] (U)

The President: I continue to be outraged by Bosnian Serb behavior. It shows once again the need to send a strong deterrent message. In that regard, I want to thank you for your leadership and flexibility in dealing with the London Conference on Friday. You made it possible to send a strong and categorical message to Karadzic and Mladic. The key now is expeditious action at NATO. I had hoped we could have had a NAC decision today. It didn't happen, and now I hope tomorrow we will show clear decisiveness. We have to have a clear and firm decision on our concept of operations based on the London agreement that would permit extended air operations over a wide area and a wide variety of targets, but would be limited to that necessary to stop a Serb attack. I know you have reservations about a massive air campaign, but we must send a clear and unambiguous signal to the Bosnian Serbs. If we hesitate now, after having issued an ultimatum, it would send an opposite signal and invite disaster. Already, because the NAC didn't act today, there are stories that we are backing off again. I also believe we should stick to the

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.02)

agreement in London to change the previous dual-key arrangement by delegating the authority to General Smith to carry out air strikes. This is the normal level for effective military operations -- ground commander to air commander. This is what General Shalikashvili believes we should do. We have to convince the American people and Congress that this is normal and accords with sound military practice. I understand we had some disagreements over these points among our delegations in Brussels. But we had an agreement in London, and we can't go against it. It would be terrible to back away. I hope you can agree to move forward together and that you will help convince Boutros-Ghali to go along. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, Bill. I would like to say that there is no disagreement on the dual-key problem. There is first the question of close air support, which is called point number one. Then there is a larger question, called point number two. The decision for these two points should be taken on the ground and not with the approval of Boutros-Ghali and Akashi. In principle, I agree with that; it is what we said in London. But I did not agree to Rupert Smith, who is number two, but to Janvier, who is number one. This is a normal command system. I agree that the decision should be made without the dual-key, but this can only be by the ground commander, who is Janvier.

The third point is big air strikes. It can't be decided without a green light from the UN. This will take a long time to decide in any case; it is not a question of a few minutes, but of one to two days. We can't do air strikes without talking to the nations which have troops on the ground. It is normal to respect the wish of the other countries with troops on the ground to have Boutros-Ghali's approval. How can you ask the Ukrainians and Canadians to accept decisions made without any discussion with them? It is not possible. ~~(C)~~

Let me repeat. The decisions on points number one and two on close air support and larger air strikes at Gorazde is OK. The decision could be given to Janvier; he is the boss, not Smith. He could sub-delegate the decision to the commanders in the field. Close air support must be decided in minutes, not hours. If you have a tank coming, you need to have the sub-delegation to the field for an immediate response in an emergency. For the third phase, to do airstrikes everywhere, this should be decided by the UN. We can't avoid it out of respect for the others. You know, Bill, it won't work long for us to decide everything without the others. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. Let me make two more points. It was the threat of larger air action at the beginning of 1994 that allowed us to create safe areas and have the Serbs turn in their

weapons to collection points. This bought us one year of relative peace and tranquility, fewer deaths and one year of negotiations. Unfortunately, it didn't lead to a peace settlement. As soon as the Serbs realized that we didn't mean it, they took their weapons back, shelled Sarajevo, took Srebrenica, you know what's going on in Zepa and now Bihac. But I believe this approach still works. I was told that when the Serbs attacked your troops on the Mount Igman road, your commander threatened air strikes and they backed off. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: No, Bill, that's not right. It was during the night, and we never asked for air support. We immediately responded with artillery and gave orders to respond immediately on the Serb barracks. When we were attacked, we responded with 90 120-millimeter shells in two places. This is very important. Probably many people were injured and killed because it was heavy artillery. That's why they stopped. It is more efficient than air strikes, which never quite hit their target. ~~(C)~~

The President: On the question of the command structure, General Shalikashvili said General Janvier is responsible for all the forces -- Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia -- whereas Smith is in charge of the field of operations. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We respect Rupert Smith; he is a good officer. But he is at the wrong level. For close air support, or larger air support, you have to react quickly and Smith is too high up and too far away. The decision must be sub-delegated to the commanders in Gorazde, Sarajevo and the others. They are the only ones who can decide if air support is necessary. You can't ask in the Army for a decision except from the boss, General Janvier, who can sub-delegate. ~~(C)~~

The President: That makes a lot of sense. (U)

President Chirac: It's only for the third phase of large and heavy bombing that we need Boutros-Ghali's approval out of respect for the others on the ground. You can't ask them to take the risk without having any say. If I were a Canadian or Ukrainian, I would withdraw. We must respect them. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree we need to respect their concerns, but the Serbs will laugh, and we will be right back where we started. There will never be air strikes. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That is not true. If we want a real, general air strike, it will not be done in a few hours. It will take a few days. We will be talking about real war, a real attack, real aggression that needs preparation and the green light from the

UN. We might as well say the three of us have declared war on the Serbs. ~~(C)~~

The President: I don't think that would be the case. It is the Serbs' aggression which has caused all of this. What we are saying is that if they do this, then this is our response. If we go back to the dual-key, we will be backing off from the London agreement. We told the Serbs we would carry out air strikes. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, Bill. But think about it. If you do that, the Russians will oppose this. You can't tell them that you have the right if you don't have UN approval. If you have the UN green light, you can say you're in the logic of the UN. It is more efficient to take into account the others and have Boutros-Ghali give the green light. Boutros-Ghali will, of course, give the green light in five minutes. Then the others can't say anything. If it is just the three of us, the others would say we are operating outside the law. The Russians are angry at us; they will make difficulties. If we have their approval, the Russians won't have any excuse to attack us. ~~(C)~~

The President: I see the problem in the reverse. If we asked Boutros-Ghali, he would consult with the Russians. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: He won't decide to consult. He has the right to do this himself. I called him today. He said that, of course, if asked, he will give the green light. Then we would be in the right and not outside the law. We need discussions with the Chiefs of Staff to find a compromise. But believe me, the way to command, if we want to crush the Serbs, is to have a UN green light. It is better if we want to avoid a reaction from the Russians, Ukrainians, Canadians, even the Greeks. If we want to have air support, light or heavy, the decision should be taken on the ground by the local commanders. The green light should be given to General Janvier who then will sub-delegate to the local commander, the only one who can judge when air support is necessary. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree that makes a lot of sense. Let me discuss this with my people. Then I will be back in touch. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: When you want. If you are busy, we can talk with Tony Lake. No problem. Good-bye. ~~(C)~~

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9505739
DATE 26 JUL 95

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 599				
Document ID: 9506097				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Jaques Chirac of France (3 pages)~~	~~08/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 599

FOLDER TITLE:
9506097

2015-0775-M
ke3471

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9506097
RECEIVED: 08 AUG 95 08

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
TELCON
YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 11 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BREMNER
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
PETERS
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10106115
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY MC DATE 8/8 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95080813	FOR DECISION
001		X	95080817	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95080817	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95080817	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950808	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6097

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Jan A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			via fax
West Wing Desk	2	8/8	D-with diskette
Records Mgt.	3	MC 8/8	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 8, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10106115
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and French President Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 8, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW E. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS/SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on August 7, 1995, between the President and President Jacques Chirac.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve John Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Jacques Chirac Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine O'Loughlin, Matt Miller
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	August 7, 1995, 3:17 p.m. - 3:34 p.m. Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Chirac: Hello, this is Jacques Chirac speaking. How are you doing? (U)

The President: Fine. (U)

President Chirac: Glad to hear you. (U)

The President: I hear you are on vacation. (U)

President Chirac: Yes, one week in southern France. It is very hot. When are you going on vacation? (U)

The President: It's hot here too. Next week I am going to the mountains in Wyoming. (U)

President Chirac: I hope you have a good holiday. Please tell Hillary that as well. I am very worried about the situation in Yugoslavia. (U)

The President: Yes, may I speak for a minute on that? (U)

President Chirac: Yes, will someone translate? (U)

The President: Yes. Before the Croatians launched an all-out assault on the Krajina, we urged them to seek a political solution right up to the last minute and warned them of the dangers of wider war. Tudjman clearly had already made up his

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 6/3/14
2015-0175-M (1.03)

mind. It's not surprising after the Krajina Serb refusal to negotiate for the past four years and their intervention in Bihac. So far Serbia has shown no sign of intervening, according to our intelligence. But 100,000 new refugees and a new Serb desire for revenge make it important that we act quickly to stabilize the situation. It may be a significant moment to launch a new diplomatic initiative, with the arrival of the RRF, the new authority for NATO and the change in the situation on the ground. On the other hand, if we don't press for a settlement in the next few weeks, the situation is likely to unravel again. ~~(C)~~

We have been doing more thinking about how to use the new situation to achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia and to negotiate a peaceful resolution in Croatia. I propose that Tony Lake make a trip to Europe later this week to meet with his counterparts in Paris, London and Bonn to work out a common strategy. These talks can also address how we bring the Russians along and how each of us would work with the governments in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as with the Bosnian Serbs. We have pretty specific ideas of what we think will work, but we want to discuss them with you. We need to be together on any effort. So I hope Tony will be able to see his French counterpart in the next few days. Let's see where we go. I hope we can reach a common diplomatic effort. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, Bill, I agree completely with the necessity for new diplomatic initiatives and the trip of Tony Lake. This is very good. He will be received in Paris. I will continue in French. Mr. President, I'm a little concerned that there is a de facto agreement between the Croats and the Serbs. The purpose of the agreement is to eliminate Bosnia. Therefore, we will face a very serious situation -- the disappearance of Bosnia. In this case we will have strong reactions from the Muslim Contact Group parties. It's a very complicated country. They are savages -- all of them, the Bosnians, Croatians, and Serbs. But in this situation now, I think the Muslims will pay for all of the damages of everybody else. I'm very concerned about the reaction from the large Muslim countries -- Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. We'll see how things evolve. ~~(C)~~

Our convoys trying to go to Sarajevo are being blocked by the Muslims not the Serbs. This fact shows that there is a part of the Bosnians who are making the situation more difficult. I would also like to say that our reinforcements of heavy artillery for Mt. Igman are being blocked by the Croats at the border and the Croats know these units, once they are on Mt. Igman, can only reach Pale. In spite of that, they are blocking them. I gave orders for them to use force tomorrow. This also shows a special relationship between the Croats and Serbs. ~~(C)~~

I'm convinced the only man who fully understood the situation was Carl Bildt. I regret two things now. First, we didn't authorize him to see Karadzic. Second, the U.S. didn't give support to the Bildt package. It was a reasonable package. It would have prevented Milosevic from entering the conflict. ~~(C)~~

The President: That is one thing I want to talk to you about through Tony. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think it's urgent we have ideas now on Milosevic. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: No problem. We will be glad to talk to Tony Lake. He can come anytime. We'll exchange our views. All of the TV programs today are showing the Serbs leaving Krajina being bombed by the Croats. This is ethnic cleansing on a large scale. France, Germany and the UK have condemned it. The Croat attitude is inadmissible. They are truly savages as are the Serbs. It's not moral to support one side over the other. They are all coming out with ethnic cleansing. I think the U.S. should condemn ethnic cleansing in the Krajina Serb territory. Today, we, the great powers, are accomplices to ethnic cleansing. We'll talk about all of this with Tony. ~~(C)~~

The President: Fine. Good-bye. (U)

President Chirac: Hope you have a good holiday next week. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9506097
DATE 08 AUG 95

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: ORIG+DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 14 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Memorandums of Pres Conversations w/ Kohl / Chirac and Major re Bosnia NSC LOG # 6095 6097 6098

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS: Originals and Disks will be sent via courier.

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 619				
Document ID: 9509063				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. draft~~	~~[Draft of 001b]~~ (6 pages)	~~12/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2
~~001b. draft~~	~~Draft cable, re: Memorandum of Conversation of a Meeting between~~ the President and President Chirac in Paris (6 pages)	~~12/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2
~~001c. memcon~~	~~Memorandum of Conversation - Meeting between President Clinton~~ and President Chirac (6 pages)	~~12/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 619

FOLDER TITLE:
9509063

2015-0775-M
ke3472

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9509063
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 95 10

TO: SENS

FROM: PETERS

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES MTG W/ PRES CHIRAC

ACTION: OBE PER EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 22 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		PETERS

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/6/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PETERS	Z	95121910	PREPARE MEMO FOR SENS
002	SENS	Z	95122012	FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
002	PETERS	Z	95122116	FOR FURTHER ACTION
003	SENS	Z	95122116	FOR DECISION
003		X	95122208	OBE PER EXEC SEC

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9063

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	2		
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.	4		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9063

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	2		
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room	3	12/20 Unrue	D
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes ___

December 20, 1995

NOTE FOR NSC/S

Per instructions from Joyce Harmon memcon was to be turned into cable form to be reviewed by Andrew Sens. See attached notes.

DO NOT REMOVE NOTES FROM PACKAGE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

9063

December 20, 1995

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 20060115
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation from the President's December 14 meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France, in cable format.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be ~~filed for the record.~~ VIA transmitted to EYES ONLY, NODIS Cable to Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, and Ambassador Harriman.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

~~That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.~~

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (B)(D)
Declassify On: 12/19/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

9063

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By CCE NARA, Date 20160115
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirac

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the December 14 meeting between the President and President Jacques Chirac of France is provided eyes only for information to the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador Harriman. It must be distributed via NODIS channel.

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)(g)
Declassify On: 12/19/05

~~S E C R E T~~

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SECSTATE FOR THE SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE.
.
PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.
.
THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT CHIRAC IN PARIS, DECEMBER 14, 1995 WAS ~~DRAFTED~~ prepared BY CAROL WOLTER, OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
BEGIN TEXT:

~~PRESIDENT CHIRAC SPOKE ENGLISH.~~
.
PRESIDENT CHIRAC CONGRATULATED PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR THE PROGRESS MADE ON BOSNIA SINCE JULY AND SAID THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE A GREAT SUCCESS. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RE-ELECTION NEXT YEAR. HE THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DONE ALTHOUGH AT TIMES THE "AMERICANS STEPPED ON OUR TOES." HE ALSO THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HELPING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE TWO FRENCH PILOTS SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD SENT A STRONG MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC, WHICH WAS OF GREAT HELP.
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HE WANTED TO RAISE THREE POINTS ON BOSNIA. SARAJEVO, UNFORTUNATELY IS A REAL PROBLEM. NO ONE KNOWS EXACTLY HOW MANY SERBS LIVE THERE, PERHAPS 30,000 OR MORE. THE AGREEMENT ON SARAJEVO IS NOT SATISFACTORY. WE SHOULD DELAY DEMILITARIZING SARAJEVO, WHICH IS A POWDER KEG AND COULD EXPLODE. THE PALE SERBS ARE ANGRY AND MLADIC IS A CHARISMATIC LEADER. THIS IS NOT A MILITARY BUT A PEACE PROBLEM: I.E. ESTABLISHING A JOINT POLICE AND CITY COUNCIL ADAPTED TO THE SITUATION. THE MILITARY CANNOT HANDLE THE ISSUE AND NEITHER CAN CARL BILDT.
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REGARDING MLADIC AND KARADZIC, THE FRENCH HAD NOT DISCUSSED THAT ISSUE WHEN TRYING TO SECURE THEIR PILOTS' RELEASE. THEY HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS IT. IT HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY EASY FOR THEM TO AVOID THE ISSUE SINCE DURING THE FOUR-HOUR MEETING BETWEEN THE FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF AND MLADIC, MLADIC HAD SPOKEN NONSTOP WITHOUT ALLOWING THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO SAY A SINGLE WORD. THE FRENCH HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH MILOSEVIC EITHER. THE FRENCH WERE FREE SINCE THEY HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT ON THE ISSUE. IF THE TWO MEN WERE ARRESTED, HOWEVER, WHILE KARADZIC WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM, MLADIC WOULD BE A MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE DO NOT WANT TO HUMILIATE THE RUSSIANS.
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PRESIDENT CLINTON INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO BUILD THE RUSSIANS UP.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0115-M (1.04)

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC INDICATED THAT THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA WAS VERY BAD AND THAT THE EXTREME RIGHT WAS COMING UP. THE RUSSIANS FEEL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS BEEN HUMILIATED. THEY REMEMBER HOW PROUD THEY WERE WHEN ANDROPOV DIED AND ALL THE WORLD LEADERS ATTENDED HIS FUNERAL. THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO WAS POORLY PRESENTED IN RUSSIA. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE SEEM LESS WORRIED ABOUT A LACK OF MONEY OR SECURITY THAN ABOUT THEIR FATE WHEN THE AMERICANS DROP ATOMIC BOMBS ON THEIR CITIES. MLADIC'S ARREST WILL HUMILIATE THEM AGAIN AND HE IS A CHARISMATIC LEADER.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON RESPONDED THAT HE WAS ALSO VERY WORRIED. WHAT WE ~~WILL~~ DO WILL, OF COURSE, BE A GREATER PROBLEM FOR THE FRENCH THAN FOR THE AMERICANS. IF MLADIC AND KARADZIC GO TO A COUNTRY WHICH ADHERES TO THE WAR CRIME TRIBUNAL, THAT COUNTRY WILL TURN THEM OVER TO THE TRIBUNAL. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS SAID TO THE PRESS AND CONGRESS THAT IF THEY ARE FOUND IN A HOTEL OR WE RUN INTO THEM, THEN WE ARE BOUND TO ARREST THEM. WHILE WE DO NOT WANT THE FRENCH TROOPS TO MARCH ON PALE TO DO SO, ~~BUT~~ WE CANNOT TURN A BLIND EYE IF THEY ARE FOUND.

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REGARDING SARAJEVO AND THE SERBS, MILOSEVIC AND IZETBEGOVIC HELD A TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION YESTERDAY ON THE ISSUE. THEY AGREED TO GIVE THE SERBS IN SARAJEVO A REAL CHOICE: I.E. TO STAY OR LEAVE.

.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC INTERJECTED THAT THEY COULD NOT LEAVE IN WINTER.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON ADDED THAT MILOSEVIC HAD AGREED TO EXTEND THE IFOR MANDATE IN SARAJEVO AND THAT IZETBEGOVIC WOULD ALSO AGREE. HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HOLBROOKE HAD SAID TO IZETBEGOVIC BUT MILOSEVIC WANTED THE IFOR TO STAY LONGER. PRESIDENT CLINTON THOUGHT THAT WE COULD AGREE AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DO SO. THERE IS A LOT OF EMOTION AMONG THE SERBS. IF THEY FEEL THEY WILL BE PROTECTED AND ALLOWED TO MAKE IT THROUGH THE WINTER, THEN THE SITUATION SHOULD CALM DOWN.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID THAT AFTER DAYTON HE HAD WANTED TO REMOVE HIS TROOPS FROM SARAJEVO AND SEND THEM TO MOSTAR WITH THE REST OF THE FRENCH TROOPS. HE HAD DECIDED, HOWEVER, TO KEEP THEM IN SARAJEVO SINCE THEY KNEW SARAJEVO WELL, WERE COMFORTABLE DEALING WITH THE SERBS, AND WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE CUSTOMS AND HABITS OF THE PEOPLE. HE REALIZED THAT SOME FRENCH SOLDIERS WOULD BE KILLED BUT HE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE BAD FOR EVERYONE IF THE SITUATION EXPLODED AND INTERRUPTED THE PEACE PROCESS, ESPECIALLY IF THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO GET ITS "BOYS" OUT WITHIN A YEAR. REFUSAL BY CONGRESS TO ALLOCATE MORE THAN $600 MILLION FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WAS A PROBLEM.

.

PRESIDENT CLINTON RESPONDED THAT IT WAS THE BEST HE COULD DO FOR NOW. IF HE COULD WIN THE CURRENT BUDGET FIGHT -- AND HE THOUGHT HE COULD -- PERHAPS HE COULD GET A LITTLE MORE NEXT YEAR. $85

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MILLION COULD BE RELEASED NOW AND HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET THE $600 MILLION OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD. HE ASKED WHAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD DO.

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CHIRAC ANSWERED THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION WOULD CONTRIBUTE THE SAME AMOUNT AS THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THE LAST THIRD SHOULD COME FROM JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. CERTAIN EXPERTS ESTIMATE THAT $5 BILLION WILL BE NEEDED OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD BUT THE PARTIES DO NOT DESERVE THAT MUCH SINCE THEY DESTROYED EVERYTHING DURING THE WAR. THEY LIKE TO FIGHT BUT THEY DO NOT LIKE TO WORK. WHEN THE ROAD TO MOUNT IGMAN WAS TO BE BUILT, THE FRENCH AGREED TO BUILD 25 KMS WHILE THE OTHER SIDE WAS TO BUILD 2 KMS. THE FRENCH PAID FOR EVERYTHING. THEY BUILT THEIR 25 KMS BUT THE OTHER 2 KMS WERE NEVER COMPLETED.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT ASSUMING WE COULD GET $3 BILLION OVER 5 YEARS, SOME OF THAT MONEY SHOULD DEPEND ON THE PARTIES CARRYING OUT ECONOMIC REFORMS. THEY MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO START TRADING AGAIN SO THAT THEY WILL FEEL CONNECTED WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD AND FEEL IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GO BACK TO WAR. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD JUST COME BACK FROM A TRIP TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC INTERJECTED THAT THE PRESS REPORTS IN FRANCE ABOUT THAT TRIP HAD BEEN "BEAUTIFUL."

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PRESIDENT CLINTON CONTINUED SAYING THAT HE HAD WONDERED ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND, HAITI AND THE MIDDLE EAST. WHY DID IT SEEM THAT THE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAD THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING? HE FELT THAT IT WAS BECAUSE THEY HAD THE LOWEST UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN 14 YEARS. IN HAITI, WHILE HE FELT THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED AND ELECTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE, THERE WAS NO INFRASTRUCTURE. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, GAZA WAS VERY POOR. WE MUST DO THINGS IN BOSNIA TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE THAT WAGING WAR "WAS A STUPID WAY TO SPEND THEIR TIME."

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID THAT HE FELT THAT ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE NEXT SUMMER.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON AGREED. HE THANKED PRESIDENT CHIRAC FOR BRINGING FRANCE BACK INTO NATO. THE UNITED STATES NEEDS AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE. WE HAVE HAD DISAGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE BUT PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS ELATED WHEN PRESIDENT CHIRAC SENT THE RAPID REACTION FORCE TO BOSNIA AND WHEN HE ACTED AFTER THE EVENTS IN SREBRENICA. PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR ONLY FOLLOWED THE FRENCH LEAD. IN SPITE OF THE STRIKES, PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAS MADE THE RIGHT DECISION IN TRYING TO SOLVE FRANCE'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND HE SHOULD LET PRESIDENT CLINTON KNOW IF THERE WAS ANYTHING HE COULD SAY DURING HIS STAY IN FRANCE TO BE HELPFUL. U.S. LONG TERM INTERESTS REQUIRE A DIFFERENT PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE, BASED ON A COMMON ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY ALLOWING ALL COUNTRIES TO GROW TOGETHER. THIS WILL REQUIRE GERMANY TO COMPLETE ITS UNIFICATION AND FRANCE TO LOWER ITS UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND SPREAD THE BENEFITS

OF GROWTH.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE WORLD IF CONGRESS WERE TO DISENGAGE THE UNITED STATES FROM ASSISTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE FRENCH HAD HEARD OF SENATOR D'AMATO'S BILL. IF IT PASSED, THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WOULD ALL ATTACK IT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID HE OPPOSED THE BILL BUT THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH VOTES IN CONGRESS TO OVERRIDE HIS VETO. THE JEWISH LOBBY SUPPORTS THE BILL AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW THAT IRAN POSES A THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS A LOT OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS IRAN IN CONGRESS. PRESIDENT CLINTON IS NOW TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH SENATOR D'AMATO IN ORDER TO "LEAVE THE FACE BUT TAKE THE TEETH OUT OF THE BILL," ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT. THE CLEAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER NATIONS WOULD BE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON TO VETO THE BILL BUT IF THE VETO WERE OVERRIDDEN THE BILL WOULD BECOME LAW. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE IS TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH SENATOR D'AMATO. AFTER SPENDING THREE YEARS TRYING TO CONVINCE ARAB COUNTRIES TO STOP THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, HE IS NOW TRYING TO DISSUADE THE JEWISH LOBBY FROM SUPPORTING ANOTHER SECONDARY BOYCOTT. IF PEACE COULD BE RE-ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, IT WOULD EASE THE IRANIAN SITUATION. PERHAPS THE IRANIANS WILL CHANGE THEIR POLICY SOME DAY.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT THE ONLY INTEREST HE HAD IN THE BOSNIAN AGREEMENT WAS FOR IT TO SUCCEED AND NOT FAIL. THERE WAS ONLY ONE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT: THAT AN AMERICAN BE IN CHARGE OF THE OSCE ELECTION PROJECT.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THAT AT ALL BUT THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE. THE ELECTION PROJECT SHOULD BE LED BY CARL BILDT. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CHOOSE AN AMERICAN BECAUSE THE PROJECT WOULD BE VERY POLITICAL AND U.S. CULTURE WAS NOT THE BEST SUITED FOR THE TASK. AN AMERICAN WOULD NOT BE TRUSTED BY ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS A NEUTRAL PERSON LIKE CARL BILDT WOULD BE PREFERABLE. "IN BOSNIA ALL SERBS THINK THAT YOU WANT TO KILL THEM. THEY ARE ALL CRAZY."

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PRESIDENT CLINTON INTERJECTED THAT TODAY WE WOULD TELL THEM THAT THEY MUST BE SANE.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC ADDED THAT IF AN AMERICAN WERE IN CHARGE OF THE ELECTIONS THEY MIGHT FAIL. A NEUTRAL PERSON SHOULD BE CHOSEN TO GIVE THE PEOPLE AS MUCH CONFIDENCE AS POSSIBLE. IF THE ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA WERE TO FAIL SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE U.S. ELECTIONS, IT WOULD BE BAD FOR EVERYONE. AMERICANS ARE EFFICIENT, THEIR STRENGTH MAKES THEM POWERFUL SO THAT THEY CAN IMPOSE WHAT THEY WANT ON OTHERS, BUT THEY ARE NOT GOOD AT UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN

05 00

PSYCHOLOGY. THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS RUUD LUBBERS. PRESIDENT CHIRAC DID NOT PARTICULARLY SUPPORT LUBBERS AND HE IS PLEASED WITH THE CHOICE OF MR. SOLANA, WHO IS A FRIEND. HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS WERE CLUMSY IN THE WAY THEY HANDLED THE ISSUE. THIS LEFT A BAD FEELING AMONG THE EUROPEANS WHO ALL FELT HUMILIATED. IF PRESIDENT CLINTON ABSOLUTELY WANTS AN AMERICAN TO LEAD THE ELECTION PROJECT, PRESIDENT CHIRAC WOULD ACCEPT BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE. THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT TAKE UNNECESSARY RISKS, ESPECIALLY IF THEY WANTED TO GET THEIR "BOYS" OUT WITHIN A YEAR. IF THE ELECTIONS SHOULD SUCCEED, THE AMERICANS COULD PRESENT IT AS A SUCCESS FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON. IF THE ELECTIONS SHOULD FAIL, THE AMERICANS COULD SIMPLY SAY THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN CONDUCTED CORRECTLY. THEY COULD NOT BE BLAMED IF THEY WERE NOT IN CHARGE. WHY TAKE "A STUPID RESPONSIBILITY AND A BAD RISK?" PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID HE WANTED PRESIDENT CLINTON TO SUCCEED.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC ADDED THAT, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON KNEW, HE WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON ON A STATE VISIT FEBRUARY 1ST. PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD LET HIM KNOW IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THROUGH AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (WHO IS A PERFECT AMBASSADOR, THE BEST OF ALL AMBASSADORS BECAUSE SHE FULLY UNDERSTANDS FRENCH PSYCHOLOGY) WHAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD LIKE HIM TO SAY IN PUBLIC. PRESIDENT CHIRAC DID NOT KNOW WHETHER PRESIDENT CLINTON NEEDED OR WANTED HIS HELP.

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PRESIDENT CLINTON INTERJECTED THAT HE DID.

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PRESIDENT CHIRAC ADDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SAY ANYTHING IN PUBLIC WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE PRESS AS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS. HE IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS CONGRESS, WHICH PLEASES HIM SINCE HIS PREDECESSORS ADDRESSED CONGRESS DURING THEIR VISITS. HE WILL BE BRIEF BUT HE WANTS TO URGE CONGRESS NOT TO DISENGAGE FROM HELPING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. WOULD THIS BOTHER PRESIDENT CLINTON?

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PRESIDENT CLINTON HASTENED TO REPLY THAT IT WOULD NOT. HE IS CURRENTLY FIGHTING WITH CONGRESS FOR IDA FUNDS AND HE HAD WANTED CONGRESS TO ALLOCATE MORE FUNDS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. CONGRESS GAVE THE PENTAGON $7.5 BILLION WHICH IT HAD NOT REQUESTED! WITH THIS EXTRA MONEY FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES "COULD DO WONDERS." AT THE END OF WWI, THE UNITED STATES REVERTED TO ITS TRADITIONAL ISOLATIONISM: IT WITHDREW FROM THE WORLD AND REDUCED ITS DEFENSES. THEN WWII BROKE OUT AND THE UNITED STATES REALIZED THAT IT HAD MADE A MISTAKE. THIS LED TO THE MARSHALL PLAN, SEATO IN ASIA, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND KOREA. WITH THE END OF THE COLD WAR, THE UNITED STATES IS NOW RETURNING TO ISOLATIONISM, BUT ONLY TO 50% OF IT AND PERHAPS THE WRONG 50%. IT IS NOT LOWERING ITS DEFENSES BUT IT IS ELIMINATING ITS FOREIGN AID BUDGET. IT WANTS TO KEEP A HUGE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT BUT IT

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DOES NOT WANT IT TO DO ANYTHING. IT IS MAINTAINING STRONG DEFENSES BUT WITHDRAWING FROM THE WORLD. CERTAIN CONGRESSMEN EVEN WANT TO ELIMINATE THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, WHICH SHOULD PLEASE PRESIDENT CHIRAC. THEY ARE OPPOSED TO HAVING A COMMERCE SECRETARY PROMOTE U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD. THE CONGRESS HAS NO IDEA WHAT $1 BILLION COULD DO IN AFRICA! PRESIDENT CLINTON CANNOT EVEN GET CONGRESS TO PAY ITS BILL TO THE UNITED NATIONS. IN ALL FAIRNESS, HE ALREADY HAD DIFFICULTIES WHEN THE DEMOCRATS WERE IN THE MAJORITY. THE SITUATION THEN WAS SOMEWHAT BETTER BUT NOT MUCH. PRESIDENT CHIRAC SHOULD SPEAK TO CONGRESS AS A FRIEND. HE SHOULD TELL THEM FIRST THAT FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES WERE AND STILL ARE GOOD PARTNERS AND THAT FRANCE IS GRATEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR TAKING STEPS TO RE-ESTABLISH PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THEN, AS A FRIEND, HE MUST WARN THEM THAT THEY ARE OVERESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET IN THE WORLD AND UNDERESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE WORLD. WEAPONS WILL BE OF NO HELP IF COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CONTROL THEIR POPULATION GROWTH OR PROTECT THEIR ENVIRONMENT. PRESIDENT CHIRAC MUST SAY ALL OF THIS TO CONGRESS AS A FRIEND.

PRESIDENT CLINTON THEN STATED THAT A VERY PLEASANT STATE DINNER WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE OCCASION AND THAT PRESIDENT CHIRAC SHOULD LET HIM KNOW WHETHER HE WISHED CERTAIN BUSINESSMEN OR FRIENDS TO BE INVITED.

END TEXT
DECL: OADR

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9063

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

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Berger			
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.	4		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9063

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

December 20, 1995

NOTE FOR NSC/S

Per instructions from Joyce Harmon memcon was to be turned into cable form to be reviewed by Andrew Sens. See attached notes.

DO NOT REMOVE NOTES FROM PACKAGE.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date V1106115
2015 0175-M

December 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation from the President's December 14 meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France, in cable format.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be transmitted via EYES ONLY NODIS cable to Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and Ambassador Harriman.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (b)(d)
Declassify On: 12/21/05

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASH DC IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY NODIS
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SECSTATE FOR THE SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE.

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT CHIRAC IN PARIS, DECEMBER 14, 1995 WAS PREPARED BY CAROL WOLTER, OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

BEGIN TEXT

PRESIDENT CHIRAC CONGRATULATED PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR THE PROGRESS MADE ON BOSNIA SINCE JULY AND SAID THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE A GREAT SUCCESS. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RE-ELECTION NEXT YEAR. HE THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DONE ALTHOUGH AT TIMES THE "AMERICANS STEPPED ON OUR TOES." HE ALSO THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HELPING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE TWO FRENCH PILOTS SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD SENT A STRONG MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC, WHICH WAS OF GREAT HELP.

HE WANTED TO RAISE THREE POINTS ON BOSNIA. SARAJEVO, UNFORTUNATELY IS A REAL PROBLEM. NO ONE KNOWS EXACTLY HOW MANY SERBS LIVE THERE, PERHAPS 30,000 OR MORE. THE AGREEMENT ON SARAJEVO IS NOT SATISFACTORY. WE SHOULD DELAY DEMILITARIZING SARAJEVO, WHICH IS A POWDER KEG AND COULD EXPLODE. THE PALE SERBS ARE ANGRY AND MLADIC IS A CHARISMATIC LEADER. THIS IS NOT A MILITARY BUT A PEACE PROBLEM: I.E. ESTABLISHING A JOINT POLICE AND CITY COUNCIL ADAPTED TO THE SITUATION. THE MILITARY CANNOT HANDLE THE ISSUE AND NEITHER CAN CARL BILDT.

REGARDING MLADIC AND KARADZIC, THE FRENCH HAD NOT DISCUSSED THAT ISSUE WHEN TRYING TO SECURE THEIR PILOTS' RELEASE. THEY HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS IT. IT HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY EASY FOR THEM TO AVOID THE ISSUE SINCE DURING THE FOUR-HOUR MEETING BETWEEN THE FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF AND MLADIC, MLADIC HAD SPOKEN NONSTOP WITHOUT ALLOWING THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO SAY A SINGLE WORD. THE FRENCH HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH MILOSEVIC EITHER. THE FRENCH WERE FREE SINCE THEY HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT ON THE ISSUE. IF THE TWO MEN WERE ARRESTED, HOWEVER, WHILE KARADZIC WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM, MLADIC WOULD BE A MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE DO NOT WANT TO HUMILIATE THE RUSSIANS.

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By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
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PRESIDENT CLINTON INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO BUILD THE RUSSIANS UP.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC INDICATED THAT THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA WAS VERY BAD AND THAT THE EXTREME RIGHT WAS COMING UP. THE RUSSIANS FEEL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS BEEN HUMILIATED. THEY REMEMBER HOW PROUD THEY WERE WHEN ANDROPOV DIED AND ALL THE WORLD LEADERS ATTENDED HIS FUNERAL. THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO WAS POORLY PRESENTED IN RUSSIA. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE SEEM LESS WORRIED ABOUT A LACK OF MONEY OR SECURITY THAN ABOUT THEIR FATE WHEN THE AMERICANS DROP ATOMIC BOMBS ON THEIR CITIES. MLADIC'S ARREST WILL HUMILIATE THEM AGAIN AND HE IS A CHARISMATIC LEADER.

PRESIDENT CLINTON RESPONDED THAT HE WAS ALSO VERY WORRIED. WHAT WE DO WILL, OF COURSE, BE A GREATER PROBLEM FOR THE FRENCH THAN FOR THE AMERICANS. IF MLADIC AND KARADZIC GO TO A COUNTRY WHICH ADHERES TO THE WAR CRIME TRIBUNAL, THAT COUNTRY WILL TURN THEM OVER TO THE TRIBUNAL. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS SAID TO THE PRESS AND CONGRESS THAT IF THEY ARE FOUND IN A HOTEL OR WE RUN INTO THEM, THEN WE ARE BOUND TO ARREST THEM. WHILE WE DO NOT WANT THE FRENCH TROOPS TO MARCH ON PALE, IF THEY ARE FOUND, WE CANNOT TURN A BLIND EYE.

REGARDING SARAJEVO AND THE SERBS, MILOSEVIC AND IZETBEGOVIC HELD A TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION YESTERDAY ON THE ISSUE. THEY AGREED TO GIVE THE SERBS IN SARAJEVO A REAL CHOICE: I.E. TO STAY OR LEAVE.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC INTERJECTED THAT THEY COULD NOT LEAVE IN WINTER.

PRESIDENT CLINTON ADDED THAT MILOSEVIC HAD AGREED TO EXTEND THE IFOR MANDATE IN SARAJEVO AND THAT IZETBEGOVIC WOULD ALSO AGREE. HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HOLBROOKE HAD SAID TO IZETBEGOVIC BUT MILOSEVIC WANTED THE IFOR TO STAY LONGER. PRESIDENT CLINTON THOUGHT THAT WE COULD AGREE AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DO SO. THERE IS A LOT OF EMOTION AMONG THE SERBS. IF THEY FEEL THEY WILL BE PROTECTED AND ALLOWED TO MAKE IT THROUGH THE WINTER, THEN THE SITUATION SHOULD CALM DOWN.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID THAT AFTER DAYTON HE HAD WANTED TO REMOVE HIS TROOPS FROM SARAJEVO AND SEND THEM TO MOSTAR WITH THE REST OF THE FRENCH TROOPS. HE HAD DECIDED, HOWEVER, TO KEEP THEM IN SARAJEVO SINCE THEY KNEW SARAJEVO WELL, WERE COMFORTABLE DEALING WITH THE SERBS, AND WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE CUSTOMS AND HABITS OF THE PEOPLE. HE REALIZED THAT SOME FRENCH SOLDIERS WOULD BE KILLED BUT HE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE BAD FOR EVERYONE IF THE SITUATION EXPLODED AND INTERRUPTED THE PEACE PROCESS, ESPECIALLY IF THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO GET ITS "BOYS" OUT WITHIN A YEAR. REFUSAL BY CONGRESS TO ALLOCATE MORE THAN $600 MILLION FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WAS A PROBLEM.

PRESIDENT CLINTON RESPONDED THAT IT WAS THE BEST HE COULD DO FOR NOW. IF HE COULD WIN THE CURRENT BUDGET FIGHT -- AND HE THOUGHT HE COULD -- PERHAPS HE COULD GET A LITTLE MORE NEXT YEAR. $85 MILLION COULD BE RELEASED NOW AND HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET THE $600 MILLION OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD. HE ASKED WHAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD DO.

CHIRAC ANSWERED THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION WOULD CONTRIBUTE THE SAME AMOUNT AS THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THE LAST THIRD SHOULD COME FROM JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. CERTAIN EXPERTS ESTIMATE THAT $5 BILLION WILL BE NEEDED OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD BUT THE PARTIES DO NOT DESERVE THAT MUCH SINCE THEY DESTROYED EVERYTHING DURING THE WAR. THEY LIKE TO FIGHT BUT THEY DO NOT LIKE TO WORK. WHEN THE ROAD TO MOUNT IGMAN WAS TO BE BUILT, THE FRENCH AGREED TO BUILD 25 KMS WHILE THE OTHER SIDE WAS TO BUILD 2 KMS. THE FRENCH PAID FOR EVERYTHING. THEY BUILT THEIR 25 KMS BUT THE OTHER 2 KMS WERE NEVER COMPLETED.

PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT ASSUMING WE COULD GET $3 BILLION OVER 5 YEARS, SOME OF THAT MONEY SHOULD DEPEND ON THE PARTIES CARRYING OUT ECONOMIC REFORMS. THEY MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO START TRADING AGAIN SO THAT THEY WILL FEEL CONNECTED WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD AND FEEL IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GO BACK TO WAR. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD JUST COME BACK FROM A TRIP TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC INTERJECTED THAT THE PRESS REPORTS IN FRANCE ABOUT THAT TRIP HAD BEEN "BEAUTIFUL."

PRESIDENT CLINTON CONTINUED SAYING THAT HE HAD WONDERED ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND, HAITI AND THE MIDDLE EAST. WHY DID IT SEEM THAT THE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAD THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING? HE FELT THAT IT WAS BECAUSE THEY HAD THE LOWEST UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN 14 YEARS. IN HAITI, WHILE HE FELT THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED AND ELECTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE, THERE WAS NO INFRASTRUCTURE. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, GAZA WAS VERY POOR. WE MUST DO THINGS IN BOSNIA TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE THAT WAGING WAR "WAS A STUPID WAY TO SPEND THEIR TIME."

PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID THAT HE FELT THAT ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE NEXT SUMMER.

PRESIDENT CLINTON AGREED. HE THANKED PRESIDENT CHIRAC FOR BRINGING FRANCE BACK INTO NATO. THE UNITED STATES NEEDS AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE. WE HAVE HAD DISAGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE BUT PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS ELATED WHEN PRESIDENT CHIRAC SENT THE RAPID REACTION FORCE TO BOSNIA AND WHEN HE ACTED AFTER THE EVENTS IN SREBRENICA. PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR ONLY FOLLOWED THE FRENCH LEAD. IN SPITE OF THE STRIKES, PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAS MADE THE RIGHT DECISION IN TRYING TO SOLVE FRANCE'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

AND HE SHOULD LET PRESIDENT CLINTON KNOW IF THERE WAS ANYTHING HE COULD SAY DURING HIS STAY IN FRANCE TO BE HELPFUL. U.S. LONG TERM INTERESTS REQUIRE A DIFFERENT PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE, BASED ON A COMMON ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY ALLOWING ALL COUNTRIES TO GROW TOGETHER. THIS WILL REQUIRE GERMANY TO COMPLETE ITS UNIFICATION AND FRANCE TO LOWER ITS UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND SPREAD THE BENEFITS OF GROWTH.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE WORLD IF CONGRESS WERE TO DISENGAGE THE UNITED STATES FROM ASSISTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE FRENCH HAD HEARD OF SENATOR D'AMATO'S BILL. IF IT PASSED, THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WOULD ALL ATTACK IT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID HE OPPOSED THE BILL BUT THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH VOTES IN CONGRESS TO OVERRIDE HIS VETO. THE JEWISH LOBBY SUPPORTS THE BILL AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW THAT IRAN POSES A THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS A LOT OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS IRAN IN CONGRESS. PRESIDENT CLINTON IS NOW TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH SENATOR D'AMATO IN ORDER TO "LEAVE THE FACE BUT TAKE THE TEETH OUT OF THE BILL," ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT. THE CLEAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER NATIONS WOULD BE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON TO VETO THE BILL BUT IF THE VETO WERE OVERRIDDEN THE BILL WOULD BECOME LAW. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE IS TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH SENATOR D'AMATO. AFTER SPENDING THREE YEARS TRYING TO CONVINCE ARAB COUNTRIES TO STOP THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, HE IS NOW TRYING TO DISSUADE THE JEWISH LOBBY FROM SUPPORTING ANOTHER SECONDARY BOYCOTT. IF PEACE COULD BE RE-ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, IT WOULD EASE THE IRANIAN SITUATION. PERHAPS THE IRANIANS WILL CHANGE THEIR POLICY SOME DAY.

PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT THE ONLY INTEREST HE HAD IN THE BOSNIAN AGREEMENT WAS FOR IT TO SUCCEED AND NOT FAIL. THERE WAS ONLY ONE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT: THAT AN AMERICAN BE IN CHARGE OF THE OSCE ELECTION PROJECT.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THAT AT ALL BUT THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE. THE ELECTION PROJECT SHOULD BE LED BY CARL BILDT. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CHOOSE AN AMERICAN BECAUSE THE PROJECT WOULD BE VERY POLITICAL AND U.S. CULTURE WAS NOT THE BEST SUITED FOR THE TASK. AN AMERICAN WOULD NOT BE TRUSTED BY ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS A NEUTRAL PERSON LIKE CARL BILDT WOULD BE PREFERABLE. "IN BOSNIA ALL SERBS THINK THAT YOU WANT TO KILL THEM. THEY ARE ALL CRAZY."

PRESIDENT CLINTON INTERJECTED THAT TODAY WE WOULD TELL THEM THAT THEY MUST BE SANE.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC ADDED THAT IF AN AMERICAN WERE IN CHARGE OF THE ELECTIONS THEY MIGHT FAIL. A NEUTRAL PERSON SHOULD BE CHOSEN TO GIVE THE PEOPLE AS MUCH CONFIDENCE AS POSSIBLE. IF THE ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA WERE TO FAIL SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE U.S. ELECTIONS, IT WOULD BE BAD FOR EVERYONE. AMERICANS ARE EFFICIENT, THEIR STRENGTH MAKES THEM POWERFUL SO THAT THEY CAN IMPOSE WHAT THEY WANT ON OTHERS, BUT THEY ARE NOT GOOD AT UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY. THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS RUUD LUBBERS. PRESIDENT CHIRAC DID NOT PARTICULARLY SUPPORT LUBBERS AND HE IS PLEASED WITH THE CHOICE OF MR. SOLANA, WHO IS A FRIEND. HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS WERE CLUMSY IN THE WAY THEY HANDLED THE ISSUE. THIS LEFT A BAD FEELING AMONG THE EUROPEANS WHO ALL FELT HUMILIATED. IF PRESIDENT CLINTON ABSOLUTELY WANTS AN AMERICAN TO LEAD THE ELECTION PROJECT, PRESIDENT CHIRAC WOULD ACCEPT BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE. THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT TAKE UNNECESSARY RISKS, ESPECIALLY IF THEY WANTED TO GET THEIR "BOYS" OUT WITHIN A YEAR. IF THE ELECTIONS SHOULD SUCCEED, THE AMERICANS COULD PRESENT IT AS A SUCCESS FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON. IF THE ELECTIONS SHOULD FAIL, THE AMERICANS COULD SIMPLY SAY THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN CONDUCTED CORRECTLY. THEY COULD NOT BE BLAMED IF THEY WERE NOT IN CHARGE. WHY TAKE "A STUPID RESPONSIBILITY AND A BAD RISK?" PRESIDENT CHIRAC SAID HE WANTED PRESIDENT CLINTON TO SUCCEED.

PRESIDENT CLINTON RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC ADDED THAT, AS PRESIDENT CLINTON KNEW, HE WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON ON A STATE VISIT FEBRUARY 1ST. PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD LET HIM KNOW IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THROUGH AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN (WHO IS A PERFECT AMBASSADOR, THE BEST OF ALL AMBASSADORS BECAUSE SHE FULLY UNDERSTANDS FRENCH PSYCHOLOGY) WHAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD LIKE HIM TO SAY IN PUBLIC. PRESIDENT CHIRAC DID NOT KNOW WHETHER PRESIDENT CLINTON NEEDED OR WANTED HIS HELP.

PRESIDENT CLINTON INTERJECTED THAT HE DID.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC ADDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SAY ANYTHING IN PUBLIC WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE PRESS AS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS. HE IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS CONGRESS, WHICH PLEASES HIM SINCE HIS PREDECESSORS ADDRESSED CONGRESS DURING THEIR VISITS. HE WILL BE BRIEF BUT HE WANTS TO URGE CONGRESS NOT TO DISENGAGE FROM HELPING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. WOULD THIS BOTHER PRESIDENT CLINTON?

PRESIDENT CLINTON HASTENED TO REPLY THAT IT WOULD NOT. HE IS CURRENTLY FIGHTING WITH CONGRESS FOR IDA FUNDS AND HE HAD WANTED CONGRESS TO ALLOCATE MORE FUNDS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. CONGRESS GAVE THE PENTAGON $7.5 BILLION WHICH IT HAD NOT REQUESTED! WITH

THIS EXTRA MONEY FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES "COULD DO WONDERS." AT THE END OF WWI, THE UNITED STATES REVERTED TO ITS TRADITIONAL ISOLATIONISM: IT WITHDREW FROM THE WORLD AND REDUCED ITS DEFENSES. THEN WWII BROKE OUT AND THE UNITED STATES REALIZED THAT IT HAD MADE A MISTAKE. THIS LED TO THE MARSHALL PLAN, SEATO IN ASIA, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND KOREA. WITH THE END OF THE COLD WAR, THE UNITED STATES IS NOW RETURNING TO ISOLATIONISM, BUT ONLY TO 50% OF IT AND PERHAPS THE WRONG 50%. IT IS NOT LOWERING ITS DEFENSES BUT IT IS ELIMINATING ITS FOREIGN AID BUDGET. IT WANTS TO KEEP A HUGE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT BUT IT DOES NOT WANT IT TO DO ANYTHING. IT IS MAINTAINING STRONG DEFENSES BUT WITHDRAWING FROM THE WORLD. CERTAIN CONGRESSMEN EVEN WANT TO ELIMINATE THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, WHICH SHOULD PLEASE PRESIDENT CHIRAC. THEY ARE OPPOSED TO HAVING A COMMERCE SECRETARY PROMOTE U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD. THE CONGRESS HAS NO IDEA WHAT $1 BILLION COULD DO IN AFRICA! PRESIDENT CLINTON CANNOT EVEN GET CONGRESS TO PAY ITS BILL TO THE UNITED NATIONS. IN ALL FAIRNESS, HE ALREADY HAD DIFFICULTIES WHEN THE DEMOCRATS WERE IN THE MAJORITY. THE SITUATION THEN WAS SOMEWHAT BETTER BUT NOT MUCH. PRESIDENT CHIRAC SHOULD SPEAK TO CONGRESS AS A FRIEND. HE SHOULD TELL THEM FIRST THAT FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES WERE AND STILL ARE GOOD PARTNERS AND THAT FRANCE IS GRATEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR TAKING STEPS TO RE-ESTABLISH PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THEN, AS A FRIEND, HE MUST WARN THEM THAT THEY ARE OVERESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET IN THE WORLD AND UNDERESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE WORLD. WEAPONS WILL BE OF NO HELP IF COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CONTROL THEIR POPULATION GROWTH OR PROTECT THEIR ENVIRONMENT. PRESIDENT CHIRAC MUST SAY ALL OF THIS TO CONGRESS AS A FRIEND.

PRESIDENT CLINTON THEN STATED THAT A VERY PLEASANT STATE DINNER WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE OCCASION AND THAT PRESIDENT CHIRAC SHOULD LET HIM KNOW WHETHER HE WISHED CERTAIN BUSINESSMEN OR FRIENDS TO BE INVITED.

END TEXT

9063

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Meeting between President Clinton and President Chirac

Paris, December 14, 1995

[The meeting was friendly.] President Chirac spoke English.

President Chirac congratulated President Clinton for the progress made on Bosnia since July and said the negotiations were a great success. He hoped that it would contribute to President Clinton's re-election next year. He thanked the President for what the United States had done although at times the "Americans stepped on our toes." He also thanked the President for helping to secure the release of the two French pilots saying that the US had sent a strong message to President Milosevic, which was of great help.

He wanted to raise three points on Bosnia. Sarajevo, unfortunately is a real problem. No one knows exactly how many Serbs live there, perhaps 30 000 or more. The agreement on Sarajevo is not satisfactory. We should delay demilitarizing Sarajevo, which is a powder keg and could explode. The Pale Serbs are angry and Mladic is a charismatic leader. This is not a military but a peace problem: i.e. establishing a joint police and city council adapted to the situation. The military cannot handle the issue and neither can Carl Bildt.

Regarding Mladic and Karadzic, the French had not discussed that issue when trying to secure their pilots' release. They had refused to discuss it. It had been especially easy for them to avoid the issue since during the four-hour meeting between the French Chief of Staff and Mladic, Mladic had spoken nonstop without allowing the Chief of Staff to say a single word. The French had not discussed the issue with Milosevic either. The French were free since they had made no commitment on the issue. If the two men were arrested, however, while Karadzic would not be a problem, Mladic would be a major problem with the Russians. We do not want to humiliate the Russians.

President Clinton interjected that he was trying to build the Russians up.

President Chirac indicated that the situation in Russia was very bad and that the extreme right was coming up. The Russians feel that President Yeltsin has been humiliated. They remember how proud they were when Andropov died and all the world leaders attended his funeral. The enlargement of NATO was poorly presented in Russia. The Russian people seem less worried about a lack of money or security than about their fate when the Americans drop atomic bombs on their cities. Mladic's arrest will humiliate them again and he is a charismatic leader.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
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President Clinton responded that he was also very worried. What we will do will, of course, be a greater problem for the French than for the Americans. If Mladic and Karadzic go to a country which adheres to the War Crime Tribunal, that country will turn them over to the Tribunal. President Clinton has said to the press and Congress that we have no intention of going out of our way to arrest them. If they are found in a hotel or we run into them, then we are bound to arrest them. We could not make the environment safe for the humanitarian effort and similar activities if we went all out to arrest them. We do not want the French troops to march on Pale to do so, but we cannot turn a blind eye if they are found.

Regarding Sarajevo and the Serbs, Milosevic and Izetbegovic held a two-hour discussion yesterday on the issue. They agreed to give the Serbs in Sarajevo a real choice: i.e. to stay or leave.

President Chirac interjected that they could not leave in winter.

President Clinton added that Milosevic had agreed to extend the IFOR mandate in Sarajevo and that Izetbegovic would also agree. He did not know exactly what Holbrooke had said to Izetbegovic but Milosevic wanted the IFOR to stay longer. President Clinton thought that we could agree and that it was important to do so. There is a lot of emotion among the Serbs. If they feel they will be protected and allowed to make it through the winter, then the situation should calm down.

President Chirac said that after Dayton he had wanted to remove his troops from Sarajevo and send them to Mostar with the rest of the French troops. He had decided, however, to keep them in Sarajevo since they knew Sarajevo well, were comfortable dealing with the Serbs, and were familiar with the customs and habits of the people. He realized that some French soldiers would be killed but he felt that it would be bad for everyone if the situation exploded and interrupted the peace process, especially if the United States wanted to get its "boys" out within a year. Refusal by Congress to allocate more than $600 million for economic reconstruction over a five-year period was a problem.

President Clinton responded that it was the best he could do for now. If he could win the current budget fight--and he thought he could--perhaps he could get a little more next year. $85 million could be released now and he might be able to get the $600 million over a three-year period. He asked what the Europeans would do.

Chirac answered that the European Union would contribute the same amount as the United States and that the last third should come from Japan and other countries. Certain experts estimate that $5 billion will be needed over a five-year period but the parties do not deserve that much since they destroyed everything during the war. They like to fight but they do not

like to work. When the road to Mount Igman was to be built, the French agreed to build 25 kms while the other side was to build 2 kms. The French paid for everything. They built their 25 kms but the other 2 kms were never completed.

President Clinton said that assuming we could get $3 billion over 5 years, some of that money should depend on the parties carrying out economic reforms. They must be encouraged to start trading again so that they will feel connected with the rest of the world and feel it impossible to go back to war. He added that he had just come back from a trip to Northern Ireland.

President Chirac interjected that the press reports in France about that trip had been "beautiful."

President Clinton continued saying that he had wondered about the difference between Northern Ireland, Haiti, and the Middle East. Why did it seem that the peace in Northern Ireland had the best chance of succeeding? He felt that it was because they had the lowest unemployment rate in 14 years. In Haiti, while he felt that we would succeed and elections would take place, there was no infrastructure. In the Middle East, Gaza was very poor. We must do things in Bosnia to convince the people that waging war "was a stupid way to spend their time."

President Chirac said that he felt that Israel and Syria would reach an agreement before next summer.

President Clinton agreed. He thanked President Chirac for bringing France back into NATO. The United States needs an equal partnership with Europe. We have had disagreements with France but President Clinton was elated when President Chirac sent the Rapid Reaction Force to Bosnia and when he acted after the events in Srebrenica. Prime Minister John Major only followed the French lead. In spite of the strikes, President Chirac has made the right decision in trying to solve France's economic problems and he should let President Clinton know if there was anything he could say during his stay in France to be helpful. US long term interests require a different partnership with Europe, based on a common economic philosophy allowing all countries to grow together. This will require Germany to complete its unification and France to lower its unemployment rate and spread the benefits of growth.

President Chirac responded that that was what he was trying to accomplish. He added that it would be dangerous for the world if Congress were to disengage the United States from assisting developing countries. The French had heard of Senator D'Amato's bill. If it passed, the members of the European Union would all attack it in the context of the World Trade Organisation.

President Clinton said he opposed the bill but that there were enough votes in Congress to override his veto. The Jewish lobby, which is very powerful, supports the bill and the

American people know that Iran poses a threat to their security. Consequently, there is a lot of hostility towards Iran in Congress. President Clinton is now trying to reach an agreement with Senator D'Amato in order to "leave the face but take the teeth out of the bill," especially in connection with the secondary boycott. The clean position vis-a-vis other nations would be for President Clinton to veto the bill but if the veto were overridden the bill would become law. The President therefore is trying to reach an agreement with Senator D'Amato. After spending three years trying to convince Arab countries to stop the secondary boycott of Israel, he is now trying to dissuade the Jewish lobby from supporting another secondary boycott. If peace could be re-established between Israel and Syria, it would ease the Iranian situation. Perhaps the Iranians will change their policy some day.

President Clinton said that the only interest he had in the Bosnian agreement was for it to succeed and not fail. There was only one difference of opinion between France and the United States in connection with the reconstruction effort: that an American be in charge of the OSCE election project.

President Chirac said that he was not opposed to that at all but that it would be a mistake. The election project should be led by Carl Bildt. It would be a mistake to choose an American because the project would be very political and US culture was not the best suited for the task. An American would not be trusted by all the parties involved and for successful elections a neutral person like Carl Bildt would be preferable. "In Bosnia all Serbs think that you want to kill them. They are all crazy."

President Clinton interjected that today we would tell them that they must be sane.

President Chirac added that if an American were in charge of the elections they might fail. A neutral person should be chosen to give the people as much confidence as possible. If the elections in Bosnia were to fail six months before the US elections, it would be bad for everyone. Americans are efficient, their strength makes them powerful so that they can impose what they want on others, but they are not good at understanding European psychology. The latest example of this is Ruud Lubbers. President Chirac did not particularly support Lubbers and he is pleased with the choice of Mr. Solana, who is a friend. However, the Americans were clumsy in the way they handled the issue. This left a bad feeling among the Europeans who all felt humiliated. If President Clinton absolutely wants an American to lead the election project, President Chirac would accept but it would be a mistake. The Americans should not take unnecessary risks, especially if they wanted to get their "boys" out within a year. If the elections should succeed, the Americans could present it as a success for President Clinton. If the elections should fail, the Americans could simply say that they had not been conducted correctly. They

could not be blamed if they were not in charge. Why take "a stupid responsibility and a bad risk?" President Chirac said he wanted President Clinton to succeed.

President Clinton responded that he would consider this.

President Chirac added that, as President Clinton knew, he would be in Washington on a State Visit February 1st. President Clinton should let him know in the next few days through Ambassador Harriman (who is a perfect ambassador, the best of all ambassadors because she fully understands French psychology) what President Clinton would like him to say in public. President Chirac did not know whether President Clinton needed or wanted his help.

President Clinton interjected that he did.

President Chirac added that he did not want to say anything in public which could be interpreted by the press as a difference between the two leaders. He is scheduled to address Congress, which pleases him since his predecessors addressed Congress during their visits. He will be brief but he wants to urge Congress not to disengage from helping developing countries in the world. Would this bother President Clinton?

President Clinton hastened to reply that it would not. He is currently fighting with Congress for IDA funds and he had wanted Congress to allocate more funds for foreign assistance. Congress gave the Pentagon $7.5 billion which it had not requested! With this extra money for foreign assistance the United States "could do wonders." At the end of WWI, the United States reverted to its traditional isolationism: it withdrew from the world and reduced its defenses. Then WWII broke out and the United States realized that it had made a mistake. This led to the Marshall Plan, SEATO in Asia, the struggle against Communism, and Korea. With the end of the Cold War, the United States is now returning to isolationism, but only to 50% of it and perhaps the wrong 50%. It is not lowering its defenses but it is eliminating its foreign aid budget. It wants to keep a huge defense establishment but it does not want it to do anything. It is maintaining strong defenses but withdrawing from the world. Certain Congressmen even want to eliminate the Commerce Department, which should please President Chirac. They are opposed to having a Commerce Secretary promote US business abroad. The Congress has no idea what $1 billion could do in Africa! President Clinton cannot even get Congress to pay its bill to the United Nations. In all fairness, he already had difficulties when the Democrats were in the majority. The situation then was somewhat better but not much. President Chirac should speak to Congress as a friend. He should tell them first that France and the United States were and still are good partners and that France is grateful to the United States for taking steps to re-establish peace in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Then, as a friend, he must warn them that they are overestimating the

impact of the US defense budget in the world and underestimating the impact of US development assistance in the world. Weapons will be of no help if countries do not have the resources to control their population growth or protect their environment. President Chirac must say all of this to Congress as a friend.

President Clinton then stated that a very pleasant state dinner was scheduled for the occasion and that President Chirac should let him know whether he wished certain businessmen or friends to be invited. Gregory Peck and his wife have been invited.

[The meeting was then concluded.]

Prepared by Carol Wolter, Office of Language Services, 647-0130.

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

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~~001b. memcon~~	~~Plenary Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (8 pages)~~	~~02/01/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001c. draft~~	~~[Draft of 001b] (8 pages)~~	~~02/01/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 1 FEB

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 08 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 16/06/15
2015-0175-M

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001		X	96021210	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	96021210	SENS SGD MEMO

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SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 1 FEB
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February 10, 1996

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 20100115
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation Between the President and President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memoranda of Conversation between the President and President Chirac are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memoranda of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 02/09/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Pamela Harriman, Ambassador to France
Alexander Vershbow, NSC Staff, Notetaker

President Jacques Chirac
Herve de Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador to the U.S.
Jean-David Levitte, Senior Diplomatic Adviser to the President

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 1, 1996
Oval Office, 3:25-4:07 p.m.

The President: (After praising Chirac's remarks to the Congress on foreign assistance) We have tried to show the Congress how it can be done within the budget. Foreign assistance provides one of the best returns on our investment. (U)

President Chirac: Next year or the year after, the total development assistance budget of the United States will be the same as that of France. We also have deficits and other difficult problems, but we have made foreign assistance a priority. (U)

The President: The whole U.S. foreign assistance budget was too small even before the cuts by the Congress. You've helped us on the Hill. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Let me thank you very much for the impressive opening ceremony. We had beautiful weather and I just heard from

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By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0775-M (1.07)

Paris that the TV coverage was fantastic -- better than ever. (U)

The Vice President: Is that important for you in France? (Laughter) (U)

President Chirac: Yes! Since I am not used to good TV coverage, I very much appreciate it. (U)

The President: We wanted this visit to have a good impact for you. (U)

President Chirac: Let me say a few words on the next G-7 Summit. Preparations for the social G-7 meeting at Lille between our ministers of economy, finance and social affairs are going very well. Robert Reich and his French counterpart are fully engaged and agree completely on what should be the agenda and conclusions of the meeting. The Moscow nuclear summit also is moving ahead and I think it will have good results. There is one problem, but I think Russia will make the decision to accede to the Vienna Convention (on Nuclear Liability). ~~(C)~~

Turning to the summit meeting in Lyon, I think we should discuss four issues. First, the European economy is declining; this is happening mainly in Germany but also in France. The situation is of the same type that occurred in Japan. One of the reasons is the low level of the dollar. When you did a revaluation against the yen, this was a great help to the Japanese economy. If Americans understood that the decline of the Japanese economy was not in their interest, then the same should apply to Europe. The value of the dollar is rising now, but not enough. It is in your interest to push the dollar to a level comparable to the European currencies or a little higher. If not, European economies will continue to decline and this will not help your trade situation. Perhaps we can discuss this at the G-7, namely, better management of financial policies among the main countries. ~~(C)~~

The second issue for Lyon is how to improve the efficiency of our development assistance budget. We cannot disengage from assistance to the developing countries after many of them have made good efforts toward democracy and market economies -- steps that have had difficult political consequences for them. In this context, with your agreement I have invited to lunch at Lyon Mr. Wolfensohn, Mr. Camdessus, and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. I want to be sure that there is no doubt about your agreement to this. ~~(C)~~

The President: As long as they are just coming for a lunch, it is okay. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, we just have in mind a lunch, for about an hour. We cannot have the seven richest countries in the world get together and just ignore the poor countries. This would be very bad for our image. We don't have to decide things; we can just work out an agenda for the future. But this would be good for the standing of the G-7 countries. One decision should be taken, if possible: solving the problem of the IDA. This is one of the main issues in economic development. All countries but the United States have agreed on replenishment of the IDA's funds. If the United States cannot contribute, the Europeans may agree do it themselves, but we would be much happier if the U.S. were to join again. The two greatest measures undertaken after World War II were the Marshall Plan and the IDA. Today, the IDA is an absolute necessity. We need to find a solution. ~~(C)~~

The third issue for Lyon is how to do a better job in fighting against drugs, narcotics, organized crime, and terrorism. There are many countries, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where drugs can be produced easily and where the chemical industries are also a problem. We need to be more effective in fighting the spread of drugs and perhaps should combine our efforts. In Europe, the real problem is Holland. Holland today is a country where all the Mafias come together, it is the main platform for the transport and export of drugs. Dutch policies make it much more difficult for the European countries to fight these problems. Helmut Kohl is very angry but we have not succeeded in pressuring the Dutch to solve the problem. In short, we should work at the G-7 on your proposal to be more effective in this area. ~~(C)~~

Fourth is the Middle East. Perhaps we should talk about this later. Things seem to be going well and I am optimistic. We are ready to support the security of the border between Lebanon and Israel -- through the UN, the EU, or alone -- but we will never accept that this security can be provided by Syria. I had long talks with Vice President Khaddam and with Asad and made clear that we will never accept Syrian dominance. There is no reason to accept such a solution. ~~(C)~~

The last problem for the G-7 is how to deal with Russia. The summit will take place between the two ballots of the Russian presidential election. By February 15th, Boris Yeltsin will be a candidate since he has no serious health problem, although he does have real political problems. No one today can say whether he will succeed, but our interest definitely lies in the success of Boris Yeltsin. He is the only one who believes in democracy, who wants peace and is honest. We have to help him as much as possible. The second ballot will be difficult for Yeltsin, but he probably will make it to the second ballot. If so, we need to give him real help in order to show Russian public opinion --

which accuses us of humiliating Russia -- that we have concern for him. If Yeltsin is on the second ballot, we should invite him for the whole G-7 summit. If he is not a candidate, then we will have to try something else. In any event, we don't need to decide until after the first ballot on how we will receive him in Lyon. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me respond to each of your points. First, I agree we should not decide on the role of the Russians at Lyon until we see the results of the first ballot. I think we have a chance to help Russia at the Moscow Nuclear summit. Your announcement on ending nuclear testing and your commitment to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will really help. Russia has been moving in the right direction on nuclear issues. If we can put together something that shows we are making real progress toward a CTB -- for example, by mentioning it in our speeches in Moscow -- it could turn the summit into a real plus for him. Of course, there are still serious problems with China and India on the CTB. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Do you know anything about India? Are they really going to conduct a nuclear test? ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: We believe they will not do so at the present time. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That is my feeling as well. (U)

The Vice President: The scandal in the opposition party diminishes the need for the Indians to test right now. ~~(C)~~

The President: I was only making the point that we need do all we can to achieve a broad-based CTB. The Nuclear Safety summit is an opportunity to build up Yeltsin at the same time. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: It is an opportunity also to work on Chernobyl, since Ukrainian President Kuchma is coming to Moscow. (U)

The President: We are very pleased about that. Turning to crime and drugs, I fully agree on the need to focus the G-7 on these issues. We just appointed General McCaffrey, presently SOUTHCOM Commander, as the new chief of our anti-drug program. He will be working very hard and we want to cooperate with you and the other partners. ~~(C)~~

On development assistance, in terms of the lunch with the leaders of the financial institutions, our people will work out the details. But you should understand that I have given two major speeches on IDA. One was at the IMF annual meeting. (U)

Anthony Lake: The other was to a key domestic audience. (U)

The President: I have made the case on why IDA is so important, but the House of Representatives killed it. I will check with Speaker Gingrich on how much headway you made today with your speech. I believe it is awful that we cannot contribute to IDA. I keep saying that we must keep IDA going. ~~(C)~~

On the value of the dollar, we are trying to get its value up. It is presently too low, and this is not rational. It rose to a small extent and we will keep at it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: The dollar is still too low. ~~(C)~~

The President: But the way to increase its value is to work more closely to coordinate our economic strategies. When I took office in January 1993, in tandem with Secretary Christopher and former Treasury Secretary Bentsen, we tried to set up a system in which we could coordinate the economic policies of the U.S., Japan and Europe. I put forward the idea that the U.S. would reduce its deficit and lower its interest rates, thereby sparking growth in that way, and this should drive the dollar up and increase exports. For its part, Germany was to lower the rates of the Bundesbank and accelerate economic growth; other Europeans would do the same. Japan was supposed to invest more public funds, given that it had a zero interest rate and a budget surplus. What happened, however, was that contractionary forces coming into play in Japan immediately afterwards. Their exports declined, financial institutions collapsed, and the political system fell apart. In three years I have had to deal with five different Japanese Prime Ministers. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Now there is a good one. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, he is very tough, so we need to try again. My point is that the Japanese could not sustain their part of the bargain. Germany began to move cautiously, but they were held back by the burden of integrating East Germany. Things in France were on hold until you were elected. So our efforts in 1993 to coordinate economic policies did not work out as well as we had hoped. ~~(C)~~

I still believe that the only way to get good growth is by coordinating our strategies. The only difference between us is probably on the need for comprehensive coordination. We cannot just control exchange rates without commitments to coordinate growth targets at certain rates of inflation. We know that we cannot grow much if the European economy is flat and the Japanese economy is declining. Japanese has now lost the capacity to grow

from trade and needs to change its policy. The challenge for the EU is how to coordinate all central bank policies. So it is not just a question of the dollar's value but coordination of all the central bank policies to maximize growth with minimum inflation. I hope we can agree that without coordination, we will not get the growth that we want? I think that with the new Japanese Prime Minister, your election and the passage of time in Germany -- plus a UK economy that is doing all right -- we might be able to do what we had hoped to do in 1993. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree with you completely. This is an issue we can cover at the G-7. (U)

The President: We should do that. (U)

President Chirac: Let me turn to the evolution of the NATO Alliance. I won't take long. I think that we will be able to find an agreement without many difficulties. The Germans, French and British agree on what should be the new Alliance. What I said to the Congress was agreed to by the Germans and British -- we are very close in our views. Previously, we have talked about two pillars. I was one of those who invented that concept, but it was probably not a good idea. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister de Charette: The idea of two pillars was a U.S. invention! (U)

President Chirac: It is true that it was first mentioned by John Kennedy, but that was in a different time period. Moreover, even Kennedy could have said some silly things. My point is that two pillars can lead to misunderstandings, just as the enlargement of NATO has led to a big misunderstanding on the part of the Russians. There is nothing worse in diplomacy than a misunderstanding. The problem is how to find a system -- a single system -- that can work in the event that the U.S. does send troops and also if the U.S. does not send troops, because you think it's not worth it. That is the main problem: How can the Alliance work in both situations? If Europeans believe it is necessary to send troops for such a project, and the U.S. does not think so, how can the system work? Europe should have a kind of identity within the Alliance and also take on more of the burden; there is no reason why the U.S. pays more than the Europeans. ~~(C)~~

I believe we can find a solution. I am not worried. We have made a big change, taken a big step, and we are ready to discuss everything. There are no taboos. Some in France are angry with me, but that is no matter; the way is clear and we are ready to discuss everything in the political and military field. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am encouraged by the direction your deliberations are taking. We have never opposed the development of a greater European security identity. I think it can be done within the framework of the Alliance, if we maintain a common structure for planning and execution, if we are in on the planning so we know what is going on. Your general direction is good. Your willingness to become more actively involved in NATO is very positive. Let us keep working through the issues. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think NATO can work very well, as we are seeing in Bosnia today. Of course, it could go badly as we saw in Bosnia a year and half ago. Two or three times, NATO sent planes to drop bombs but the result was 200 or 300 hostages being taken. We have to make the necessary reforms to the Alliance to make it work well. ~~(C)~~

The President: One thing that we need to avoid is another situation in which people who are members of the UN and NATO are operating on the basis of contradictory mandates. Bosnia was unusual in this respect. But if we look at what has happened since then, the planning for IFOR and the ways things are going on the ground -- with the French, British and all the other forces working with us -- it shows how well we can do. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: A word on Bosnia. I am a little worried about the future. We will have to withdraw our troops in a year, but I am not sure the peace will be maintained after we leave. All of the parties are crazy people and want to fight. Today, perhaps the one group that wants to fight the most is the Bosnians. Izetbegovic is not happy with the results of Dayton. A few hours ago, there was an incident in which Bosnian troops went into a prohibited area and we had to send 20 or 30 planes to force their withdrawal. I am worried about what will happen after withdrawal. If they start fighting again, we shall lose face -- which will have serious political consequences for us. ~~(C)~~

The best way not to avoid, but to decrease the risks is to refrain from sending weapons to the Bosnians. I think that those who need the peace most are the Serbs. They want an economic and political situation which gives priority to economic development. Serbian public opinion has criticized Milosevic and the other apparatchiki a lot. They believe that the country has a certain amount of wealth, yet people are starving. So public opinion among the Serbs is for peace and they want to deal with other problems. In that situation, a policy of sending arms to the Bosnians is very dangerous. I am worried about that. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am also worried about what will happen after we leave. I believe we are dealing with a situation in which the leaders made peace in short order, but the attitudes of the

people will take a longer time to adjust. There are a lot of guns in the country. The Dayton Agreement provides for a 5:2:2 ratio of arms between the parties based on 5 for Serbia, 2 for Croatia and 2 for Bosnia. Within Bosnia the Federation gets two-thirds and the Bosnian-Serbs one-third. The agreement provides for a period of arms control talks which they could bring things down to even lower levels, but failing that they are permitted to arm up to the 5:2:2 ratio. To secure approval of all the parties, especially the Muslims, to the peace agreement, we had to give assurances that we would oversee the process of equipping and training them. In order to get the Senate's approval, we had to reaffirm that commitment. ~~(C)~~

The last time we discussed this with the other parties, we had the impression that they would prefer that the U.S. oversee this effort rather than leaving the Bosnians free to buy arms from the Iranians or other radical states. That is why we continue to look to third parties to take the lead, while trying to avoid an arms explosion. We hope that arms control can lower the ceilings even further. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: They will buy arms from the Iranians even if you send weapons. ~~(C)~~

The President: We are not selling, but trying to oversee the program. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: I will tell President Izetbegovic that if they buy from Iran, they will get zero from the West. We want to avoid a disequilibrium because that would lead to a new war. We are trying to help the Bosnians to defend themselves, not to take the offensive. We have exactly the same goal as you, to create a period after one year in which peace will be maintained. Another way in which to ensure this is to bring the benefits of peace to the people and then telling them that there will be no more reconstruction aid if they restart the conflict. In short, we have two levers: there will be no U.S. equipping and training if they receive arms from others; and there will be no international financing of reconstruction if they take offensive action. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: My feeling -- and maybe I am wrong -- is that the danger today is not from the Serbs but from the Bosnians. The Serbs have no interest in war and their public opinion wouldn't accept it. The leaders don't want war anymore but the situation is completely different with the Bosnians. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: I don't want to contradict you, Mr. President, but even if what you say may be true for Belgrade, the Bosnian Serbs are waiting to go back to war. That is why we cannot leave a disequilibrium. ~~(C)~~

The President: President Milosevic is trying to help, but there are many other problems. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake: The danger is that if we do not get the equilibrium right, any new Muslim-Serb war could bring the Croats back into the war. The Muslims were successful last year only because of Croatian support. The Croatians have their own agenda. I would also note that our intelligence shows that Iranian shipments of arms have stopped, so our policy seems to be working. ~~(C)~~

The Vice President: Milosevic speaks of the Bosnian Serbs as you did, as crazy people wanting another fight. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister de Charette: I would still maintain that we are having fewer problems with the Bosnian Serbs than with Izetbegovic. ~~(C)~~

The President: That may be true on the ground. You may have a different experience, since your forces are operating in a different sector than ours. But we are also very worried about the Croats. There is the problem of Mostar, although things in Eastern Slavonia seem to be going all right. I will just say that we don't want to violate the letter of the Dayton Agreement. We have to honor the agreement. Anything that we do to demilitarize the situation will be positive. We will tell Milosevic that he could help. The 5:2:2 ratio gives Serbia a big advantage. If he agreed to serious disarmament, he would still maintain a quantitative and qualitative edge, but would lower the ceilings for all the other parties and avoid some of the problems you have cited. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake: We only have half an hour to go. I suggest we adjourn to the Cabinet room to continue the discussion with our advisers present. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Plenary Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
William Perry, Secretary of Defense
Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff to the President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Laura Tyson, Chairman, Council on Economic Advisors
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Pamela Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to France
Alexander Vershbow, NSC Staff, Notetaker

President Jacques Chirac
Herve de Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Charles Millon, Minister of Defense
Yves Galland, Deputy Minister for Finance and International Trade
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador to U.S.
Jean-David Levitte, Senior Diplomatic Advisor to the President
Catherine Colonna, Presidential Spokeswoman
Bernard Emie, Diplomatic Advisor to the President
Jacques Blot, Deputy General Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Alain Rouquie, Under Secretary for American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Pierre Landau, Under Secretary for External Economic Relations, Ministry of Economy and Finance

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 1, 1996, 4:10 - 4:45 p.m.
Cabinet Room

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 02/06/06

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2015-0775-F (1.08)

The President: We have already discussed a significant number of issues -- the G-7, Bosnia, and NATO. What other issues would you like to discuss? (U)

President Chirac: Mr. President, let me first thank you again along with my colleagues for the way you have received us here. There are a number of areas of common interest we would like to discuss. If you agree, we might begin with the Middle East peace process. Things seem to have gotten off to a good start in the discussions between Israel and Syria. I would like to hear your thoughts and those of Secretary Christopher on the discussions, in particular on an issue of great importance to us, the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

The President: I would like to call on Secretary Christopher to give you an update on the talks at Wye but first let me make a few general remarks. The progress in the talks continues to be good. The conference on aid to the Palestinians gave a boost to the process and I thank you for your support. Things are also going well with the Jordanians. We are at a moment when the attitudes of Syria and Israel seem to be more open to a genuine agreement than I have seen in three years. There are still many issues to be resolved, but progress is being made. ~~(C)~~

On Lebanon, I have always assumed that we will not get an agreement that assures the independent future of Lebanon until we have an Israeli-Syrian agreement, one that would undermine the basis for Syria to play a dominant role in Lebanon. You mentioned this in the Oval office. I have always felt that the United States has a real obligation not to sacrifice Lebanon in the peace process. We have no intention of doing that, nor has anyone asked us to do that. We will not undermine Lebanon's sovereignty. But again, I continue to assume that we cannot solve Lebanon on a satisfactory basis until we solve the Israeli-Syrian problem. Chris? ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: The death of Rabin opened a new chapter in the peace process. I think President Asad has now recognized that the Israelis have been taking risks for peace and that he will not always have a willing negotiating partner in Israel. Since the assassination, Asad has become more willing to engage in comprehensive negotiations than he has in the past. We suggested the three-way talks at the Wye conference center and have conducted 12 days of negotiations thus far. I have attended on four occasions during these talks. They are making good progress, first in developing close relations among the negotiators, and second in developing a conceptual framework for an agreement of the kind that we have never had before -- i.e. one that explains the meaning of true peace between Israel and Syria, and what would be the elements of a peaceful and

comprehensive solution. The initial talks have focused on the most neuralgic issue, namely, security. There has been some progress but, in all candor, the going is slow given the suspicion between the two countries. Even if we wanted to accelerate the talks, they would not produce an immediate or dramatic result. But there have been no setbacks thus far. ~~(C)~~

These talks have implications for the decision by Peres on whether to hold early elections or wait until the end of October. Whatever the Israeli decision, we will do our best to keep the talks on track. I think we have a fair chance of achieving an agreement in 1996, whether the elections are held early or in October. ~~(C)~~

To underscore the President's point, when we have made progress on the Syrian track, there could be progress on the Lebanon track. But we firmly uphold UNSC Resolution 245, which affirms the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

I told your foreign minister this morning that we would be happy to give him special briefings on the negotiations, particularly with respect to Lebanon, given your longstanding involvement and because France could be helpful at the right moment. I noted your statement that security for the Lebanese-Israeli border should not be entrusted to Syrian troops. We agree that this should be handled by a Lebanese force. ~~(C)~~

In conclusion, we value your help -- not just financially, but the influence with Lebanon that you can bring to bear at the right moment. We will establish a special channel to your foreign ministry. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me add one additional point. France has a special relationship with Lebanon and a special concern about Lebanon. We appreciate that. I am sure you are aware that there are also large numbers of Lebanese-Americans who would not understand if we concluded a peace agreement by walking away from Lebanon. As a practical matter, we need to remove the strategic justification for Syrian involvement in Lebanon by achieving an Israeli-Syrian agreement that restores Lebanon's integrity in a practical way. You can have direct influence. You should remind Asad that if he can help achieve region-wide reconciliation -- including normal relations, trade, and regional water agreements (which is the vision of Prime Minister Peres) -- Syria will benefit enormously. But this will only happen if he cuts the flow of terrorists into Lebanon and ends the training programs in the Bekaa valley. In short, you should tell Asad that he should leave Lebanon to the Lebanese. This will lead to greater security and prosperity for Syria as well. As you will be seeing Asad soon, this message could have a big impact. In sum, we

won't get a solution in Lebanon without an Israeli-Syrian agreement. Anything you can do to help make Asad believe there are benefits at the end of the road would be a good thing. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Naturally, there is no way of dealing with the Lebanon problem without first resolving the Syrian problem by achieving an agreement between Israel and Syria. Parenthetically, however, I would like to make one point. I do not think the Syrians will want to be the first to sign. When an agreement is completely finished with Israel, they will then ask Israel to make an agreement with Lebanon first. They will want Lebanon to sign first and then they will sign. ~~(C)~~

I think it is an important point, one that Syria and Israel both understand, that it would be a serious mistake to allow border security between Lebanon and Israel to be entrusted to Syrian forces. I have had several talks with Peres on this. Peres used to say that, when you have an agreement with Syria, then you have a real guarantee: look at the Golan Heights, where there have been no border incidents. I replied to Peres that Syria did not need to provoke any border incidents on the Golan, but they could produce them on the Lebanon-Israel border. Syria has sent people to South Lebanon that it does not want on its own territory. Syria will never be able to guarantee the security of Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

Asad may see his current policy as a good way of maintaining pressure on Israel, but the Lebanese army today is completely capable of guaranteeing its own border. Lebanon has no interest in problems with Israel but just wants to make money and rebuild its economy. Its army needs some additional equipment, and Europe and perhaps the United States should be prepared to help. But France is perfectly prepared to guarantee the security of Lebanon via the Lebanese army in the framework of the UN, the EU, or any other arrangement. The opposite situation (prolonging the Syrian guarantee) could bring about the immediate resumption of the war in Lebanon. The Christians would not accept it, nor would the Sunni-Muslims or, probably, the Shiites. This is why the Syrians are not especially insistent on that point. I am telling you this because I had difficulty persuading Peres. He said that the American proposal was for the Syrian army to guarantee the Lebanese-Israeli border. I believe that that would be an historic blunder. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: It is fundamentally important in any Syrian-Israeli agreement that Syria be required to give up its support for Hizbollah and other terrorist groups in South Lebanon. The negotiations have contributed to restraint by Hizbollah (perhaps on signal from Syria). Syria obviously has great influence over Hizbollah and the Israelis will insist that

Syria end its support as well as promising a better situation along the Lebanese-Israeli border. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Naturally. If there are other subjects that you would like to raise let me know, but perhaps I could say a few words on Algeria. (U)

The President: Yes, I wanted to hear your comments on Algeria. (U)

President Chirac: I had the occasion a year ago to say that the FIS -- the extremists in Algeria -- had no chance of getting anywhere and that the important thing was not to help them. Why did I say that? In fact, the Algerians are not extremists. They are Sunni-Muslims, moderates, and Malachites. If they threw themselves into the arms of the FIS for a moment, it was not a reflection of a move toward fundamentalism, but a protest against a corrupt and incompetent regime. The regime had made the country destitute. President Zeroual was then elected, clearly in a democratic way. The problem he faces is whether he will be able to assert his independence vis-a-vis the army. He is being very adroit, but he cannot forget the fact that his predecessor was killed by the army. Zeroual is in danger every day. That is why he hardened his position on the Polisario, which stopped business and cost Algeria and Morocco considerable amounts of money. ~~(C)~~

If Zeroual achieves his aim -- that is, free elections in the next nine months -- he will have a democratic majority that will exclude the FIS and produce a stable government. Therefore, I am thoroughly optimistic. The danger now is not from extremism but from the army. The question is the extent to which Zeroual, with a new legislature, will withdraw power from the army in step-by-step fashion. So I am optimistic, but we need to practice very subtle diplomacy in dealing with these kinds of people. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me ask you about another issue. We have cooperated successfully on a number of issues, such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi and Haiti. We are approaching the point at which the UN mandate in Haiti will expire. The UN will seek an extension and I believe that Canada will take the lead in the extension period. The work that we have done so far in the justice sector has been very important. France contributed 100 gendarmes, and the work they have done is very important. I am concerned that there could be greater chaos in the months ahead because of a lack of the necessary infrastructure. Therefore, I would like to urge that you do what you can to continue working with us in Haiti, especially in the justice sector. There is still a likelihood of great success in Haiti. We are about to witness the first-ever peaceful transfer of power. Investment,

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The President: But it was an emotional boon to him, in any case. (Laughter.) ~~(C)~~

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The President: We have been very concerned about this legislation as well. I have worked very hard on the Hill in an effort to get it rewritten. I am trying to ensure that, if passed, it would give me maximum flexibility to avoid taking actions that would be destructive to our relations. We are working to fend off an amendment in the House on Libya. But I have to tell you that this Congress, with the support of both parties, will vote overwhelmingly to enact this legislation. They have more than enough votes to override my veto, given the strong conviction in this country that Iran is the main promoter of terrorism. If the UN Security Council voted to tighten sanctions, then we could head off the legislation. That is why I wrote to you on the issue on oil-related equipment. In this country, while people support greater involvement with Israel and the Middle East peace process, there is a very strongly held view that the Iranians are the biggest threat to stability in the world, given their relentless promotion of terrorism. I believe we absolutely have to take stronger action in the UN on Libya as well. ~~(C)~~

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the fact that the UN will not take stronger action against Iran. So please understand the situation that I face. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: We have ameliorated the legislation as much as we can. We will work with your ambassador and the British ambassador to achieve the best possible result. They understand the political situation here. We will work to maximize the flexibility in the enforcement provisions of the legislation in the event a bill requiring sanctions is passed. Our only choice is to work with the sponsors of the legislation, since we would not win if we tried to defeat the bill. ~~(C)~~

The President: Sometimes the proponents of a bill like this are willing to give me more flexibility at the end of the day. They have the best of all worlds: they get to make their political statement, but they leave me flexibility on implementation. ~~(S)~~

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0702

February 9, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation from the President's Meetings with President Jacques Chirac of France, February 1, 1996

Attached at Tab A are the Memoranda of Conversation of the President's meetings with President Jacques Chirac of France on February 1, 1996.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memoranda of Conversation of the meetings to the Department of State.

That the attached Memoranda of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memoranda of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 02/09/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Plenary Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
William Perry, Secretary of Defense
Michael Kanter, U.S. Trade Representative
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff to the President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Laura Tyson, Chairman, Council on Economic Advisors
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Pamela Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to France
Alexander Vershbow, NSC Staff, Notetaker

President Jacques Chirac
Herve de Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Charles Millon, Minister of Defense
Yves Galland, Deputy Minister for Finance and International Trade
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador to U.S.
Jean-David Levitte, Senior Diplomatic Advisor to the President
Catherine Colonna, Presidential Spokeswoman
Bernard Emie, Diplomatic Advisor to the President
Jacques Blot, Deputy General Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Alain Rouquie, Under Secretary for American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Pierre Landau, Under Secretary for External Economic Relations, Ministry of Economy and Finance

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 1, 1996, 4:10 - 4:45 p.m.
Cabinet Room

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 02/06/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/3/20 M
2015-0775-M (1,09)

The President: We have already discussed a significant number of issues -- the G-7, Bosnia, and NATO. What other issues would you like to discuss? (U)

President Chirac: Mr. President, let me first thank you again along with my colleagues for the way you have received us here. There are a number of areas of common interest we would like to discuss. If you agree, we might begin with the Middle East peace process. Things seem to have gotten off to a good start in the discussions between Israel and Syria. I would like to hear your thoughts and those of Secretary Christopher on the discussions, in particular on an issue of great importance to us, the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

The President: I would like to call on Secretary Christopher to give you an update on the talks at Wye but first let me make a few general remarks. The progress in the talks continues to be good. The conference on aid to the Palestinians gave a boost to the process and I thank you for your support. Things are also going well with the Jordanians. We are at a moment when the attitudes of Syria and Israel seem to be more open to a genuine agreement than I have seen in three years. There are still many issues to be resolved, but progress is being made. ~~(C)~~

On Lebanon, I have always assumed that we will not get an agreement that assures the independent future of Lebanon until we have an Israeli-Syrian agreement, one that would undermine the basis for Syria to play a dominant role in Lebanon. You mentioned this in the Oval office. I have always felt that the United States has a real obligation not to sacrifice Lebanon in the peace process. We have no intention of doing that, nor has anyone asked us to do that. We will not undermine Lebanon's sovereignty. But again, I continue to assume that we cannot solve Lebanon on a satisfactory basis until we solve the Israeli-Syrian problem. Chris? ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: The death of Rabin opened a new chapter in the peace process. I think President Asad has now recognized that the Israelis have been taking risks for peace and that he will not always have a willing negotiating partner in Israel. Since the assassination, Asad has become more willing to engage in comprehensive negotiations than he has in the past. We suggested the three-way talks at the Wye conference center and have conducted 12 days of negotiations thus far. I have attended on four occasions during these talks. They are making good progress, first in developing close relations among the negotiators, and second in developing a conceptual framework for an agreement of the kind that we have never had before -- i.e. one that explains the meaning of true peace between Israel and Syria, and what would be the elements of a peaceful and

comprehensive solution. The initial talks have focused on the most neuralgic issue, namely, security. There has been some progress but, in all candor, the going is slow given the suspicion between the two countries. Even if we wanted to accelerate the talks, they would not produce an immediate or dramatic result. But there have been no setbacks thus far. ~~(C)~~

These talks have implications for the decision by Peres on whether to hold early elections or wait until the end of October. Whatever the Israeli decision, we will do our best to keep the talks on track. I think we have a fair chance of achieving an agreement in 1996, whether the elections are held early or in October. ~~(C)~~

To underscore the President's point, when we have made progress on the Syrian track, there could be progress on the Lebanon track. But we firmly uphold UNSC Resolution 245, which affirms the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

I told your foreign minister this morning that we would be happy to give him special briefings on the negotiations, particularly with respect to Lebanon, given your longstanding involvement and because France could be helpful at the right moment. I noted your statement that security for the Lebanese-Israeli border should not be entrusted to Syrian troops. We agree that this should be handled by a Lebanese force. ~~(C)~~

In conclusion, we value your help -- not just financially, but the influence with Lebanon that you can bring to bear at the right moment. We will establish a special channel to your foreign ministry. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me add one additional point. France has a special relationship with Lebanon and a special concern about Lebanon. We appreciate that. I am sure you are aware that there are also large numbers of Lebanese-Americans who would not understand if we concluded a peace agreement by walking away from Lebanon. As a practical matter, we need to remove the strategic justification for Syrian involvement in Lebanon by achieving an Israeli-Syrian agreement that restores Lebanon's integrity in a practical way. You can have direct influence. You should remind Asad that if he can help achieve region-wide reconciliation -- including normal relations, trade, and regional water agreements (which is the vision of Prime Minister Peres) -- Syria will benefit enormously. But this will only happen if he cuts the flow of terrorists into Lebanon and ends the training programs in the Bekaa valley. In short, you should tell Asad that he should leave Lebanon to the Lebanese. This will lead to greater security and prosperity for Syria as well. As you will be seeing Asad soon, this message could have a big impact. In sum, we

won't get a solution in Lebanon without an Israeli-Syrian agreement. Anything you can do to help make Asad believe there are benefits at the end of the road would be a good thing. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Naturally, there is no way of dealing with the Lebanon problem without first resolving the Syrian problem by achieving an agreement between Israel and Syria. Parenthetically, however, I would like to make one point. I do not think the Syrians will want to be the first to sign. When an agreement is completely finished with Israel, they will then ask Israel to make an agreement with Lebanon first. They will want Lebanon to sign first and then they will sign. ~~(C)~~

I think it is an important point, one that Syria and Israel both understand, that it would be a serious mistake to allow border security between Lebanon and Israel to be entrusted to Syrian forces. I have had several talks with Peres on this. Peres used to say that, when you have an agreement with Syria, then you have a real guarantee: look at the Golan Heights, where there have been no border incidents. I replied to Peres that Syria did not need to provoke any border incidents on the Golan, but they could produce them on the Lebanon-Israel border. Syria has sent people to South Lebanon that it does not want on its own territory. Syria will never be able to guarantee the security of Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

Asad may see his current policy as a good way of maintaining pressure on Israel, but the Lebanese army today is completely capable of guaranteeing its own border. Lebanon has no interest in problems with Israel but just wants to make money and rebuild its economy. Its army needs some additional equipment, and Europe and perhaps the United States should be prepared to help. But France is perfectly prepared to guarantee the security of Lebanon via the Lebanese army in the framework of the UN, the EU, or any other arrangement. The opposite situation (prolonging the Syrian guarantee) could bring about the immediate resumption of the war in Lebanon. The Christians would not accept it, nor would the Sunni-Muslims or, probably, the Shiites. This is why the Syrians are not especially insistent on that point. I am telling you this because I had difficulty persuading Peres. He said that the American proposal was for the Syrian army to guarantee the Lebanese-Israeli border. I believe that that would be an historic blunder. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: It is fundamentally important in any Syrian-Israeli agreement that Syria be required to give up its support for Hizbollah and other terrorist groups in South Lebanon. The negotiations have contributed to restraint by Hizbollah (perhaps on signal from Syria). Syria obviously has great influence over Hizbollah and the Israelis will insist that

Syria end its support as well as promising a better situation along the Lebanese-Israeli border. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Naturally. If there are other subjects that you would like to raise let me know, but perhaps I could say a few words on Algeria. (U)

The President: Yes, I wanted to hear your comments on Algeria. (U)

President Chirac: I had the occasion a year ago to say that the FIS -- the extremists in Algeria -- had no chance of getting anywhere and that the important thing was not to help them. Why did I say that? In fact, the Algerians are not extremists. They are Sunni-Muslims, moderates, and Malachites. If they threw themselves into the arms of the FIS for a moment, it was not a reflection of a move toward fundamentalism, but a protest against a corrupt and incompetent regime. The regime had made the country destitute. President Zeroual was then elected, clearly in a democratic way. The problem he faces is whether he will be able to assert his independence vis-a-vis the army. He is being very adroit, but he cannot forget the fact that his predecessor was killed by the army. Zeroual is in danger every day. That is why he hardened his position on the Polisario, which stopped business and cost Algeria and Morocco considerable amounts of money. ~~(C)~~

If Zeroual achieves his aim -- that is, free elections in the next nine months -- he will have a democratic majority that will exclude the FIS and produce a stable government. Therefore, I am thoroughly optimistic. The danger now is not from extremism but from the army. The question is the extent to which Zeroual, with a new legislature, will withdraw power from the army in step-by-step fashion. So I am optimistic, but we need to practice very subtle diplomacy in dealing with these kinds of people. ~~(C)~~

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The President: But it was an emotional boon to him, in any case. (Laughter.) ~~(C)~~

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In short, Africa is on the right track and this is not the time to abandon Africa. The Congressional action to exclude funding for development assistance to Africa is disastrous. How can people who say they are responsible make such untoward statements? But in any case, we are ready to cooperate and we believe that this will be in the interest of the U.S., since Africa could be a huge market. ~~(C)~~

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The President: Sometimes the proponents of a bill like this are willing to give me more flexibility at the end of the day. They have the best of all worlds: they get to make their political statement, but they leave me flexibility on implementation. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1096				
Document ID: 9602460				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac (6 pages)~~	~~04/12/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1096

FOLDER TITLE:
9602460

2015-0775-M
ke3474

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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RECORD ID: 9602460
RECEIVED: 12 APR 96 16

TO: SENS

FROM: PASCUAL
BLACKER

DOC DATE: 12 APR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCALL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/20/15
2015-0175-M

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 12 APR

ACTION: HARMON APPROVED RECOM 2 DUE DATE: 16 APR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96041221	FOR DECISION
001		X	96041614	HARMON DISAPPROVED RECOM 1
001		X	96041614	HARMON APPROVED RECOM 2

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2460

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (RP) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
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Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(RP) 4/13	File for record only
Records Mgt.	4		

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	~~1~~		
Dohse			
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Soderberg	copy		
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(AP) 4/13	File for
Records Mgt.	4		record only

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Jacques Chirac Notetakers: Carlos Pascual, Daniel Flessas and Elaine Florio
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	April 12, 1996, 9:52 a.m. - 10:13 a.m. EDT, Residence

President Chirac: Hello. (U)

President Clinton: Hello, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Hello Bill. I have a few things I would like to say. I hope you don't mind an interpreter. How are you? (U)

President Clinton: Oh, I'm fine. How are you? (U)

President Chirac: Fine. (U)

President Clinton: Glad to hear that. I only have two things I want to discuss: the G-7 and President Yeltsin, and the Nuclear Summit. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I'd like to say one word about Bosnia and Lebanon. You start Bill. Glad to know everything's going well. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: We've had a bad week, very sad with the loss of Secretary Brown. (U)

President Chirac: Yes, I knew him. I met him in Lille. (U)

President Clinton: Yes, that was a couple of days before the crash. (U)

President Chirac: I met him several times. I was so shocked. It was an accident, right? ~~(C)~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0715-M (1.10)

President Clinton: Yes, there was very bad weather. We don't know yet but it was either equipment or pilot error. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: But it was an accident? ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: Yes, there was no misbehavior involved. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We're very, very sorry. He was a man of great quality. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you. Let me say what I want to talk about. I want to talk about Yeltsin's role in Lyons and Russia's relationship with the G-7. Yeltsin wants a full G-8 and he thinks you and Helmut support him. ~~(C)~~

I want to talk about the problems with this. The Japanese and the British are opposed to it. My biggest concern is if we go to Lyons and Zyuganov wins. We don't want to send a political signal in Russia that either Yeltsin or Zyuganov is acceptable in a G-8. I think that's a mistake. ~~(C)~~

My second problem is this: it is easy to forget that our finance ministers have to make real financial decisions. They meet every quarter. I hope we will do more of this. For us, it's not a big problem to have Russia in the room. But it's a real problem for the finance ministers. ~~(C)~~

The third problem is: I think other countries such as China will presume we can expand to a G-12 or even a G-14. If so, we need to think it through. Those are my concerns. ~~(C)~~

On the other hand, I think we need to fully expand Yeltsin's partnership and we need to publicly announce it in Lyons. I'm calling you because the burden is on you as host. ~~(C)~~

Japan and Britain don't support full membership. I didn't fully understand until my Treasury Secretary explained to me fully the role finance ministers play. ~~(C)~~

I now think Yeltsin has a 50-50 chance in the elections. The number of people who say they will never vote for Yeltsin is 39 percent, and the number who say they will never vote for Zyuganov is increasing to 30 percent. Yeltsin is running a good campaign and Zyuganov has made some mistakes. ~~(C)~~

So I think things are on a good track for Yeltsin, but I think G-7 could be a real trap for us. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I fully understand all the arguments you have put forward. I believe a full meeting would be a mistake. This is not what I and Helmut are proposing. (C)

There are two solutions. The first which you proposed: we could have him come earlier than usual. A second solution would be to create a political P-8 and keep the G-7 for economic issues. In any event, the problem is to support Yeltsin. (C)

I believe we should only take a final decision on the morning after the first race. If Yeltsin is well-placed, we should make a substantial gesture such as having political discussions at eight and economic discussions at seven for reasons we all understand. In any event, nothing should be decided until after the first race. (C)

President Clinton: I fully agree with all of this. I would support either way or both. But there's one other point. If that is what we do, we'll have to tell Yeltsin or Yeltsin's people before we get to Moscow or when we arrive in Moscow, so that they don't think they'll get a full G-8. Otherwise, what might happen is they'll leak it and he'll be embarrassed at Lyons. This could be a disaster. (C)

We want the Nuclear Summit and Lyons to be successful. We have to let Yeltsin know that we do not support full G-7 membership. We could say we want you in politically but not economically, but that we want to do something to expand your role. He needs to know now so he won't be embarrassed. (C)

President Chirac: I agree completely with you. I think Kohl, you and me are on the same base, and I am sure John Major will agree -- and the Italians. It should not be a problem. I suggest that the sherpas see together how we do it. (C)

President Clinton: I agree with that, but now someone has to talk to Yeltsin. (C)

President Chirac: You or I or both could call. (C)

President Clinton: Let me make a suggestion. We ought to have our national security advisors -- yours, Germany's and ours -- talk about this in the next day or so, then leave the details to the sherpas. (C)

I'd like to have the national security advisors work out how to convey this message; let them recommend how we broach this. I'll plan to have Lake talk with your people in the next day or two and determine how to do this. (C)

We will have to go through Primakov because Russia's sherpa does not carry enough weight. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I'll ask Levitte to call Lake this afternoon and call Bitterlich, and all three can talk today or tomorrow to decide how to confront Yeltsin and what to propose. We do not want to say anything officially before the first ballot. If Yeltsin is defeated, we should have the option of changing our minds. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: As long as he knows at the front end that he can not go the economic route, that's the main thing. ~~(C)~~

Another thing: I don't think this is a big problem anymore, but the Summit communiqué has been written carefully to recognize the important role of nuclear power while keeping emphasis on safety first. Yeltsin signed off on it. ~~(C)~~

Here's the problem: we had Yeltsin's support on it, but a couple of days ago he started saying it will hurt Ukraine. Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy has been giving him misinformation and keeps trying to pull Yeltsin away. He keeps saying Chernobyl is not dangerous. We need to convince Boris this is not a wise move. Primakov agrees with us, I believe. ~~(C)~~

Like I said, I think this issue will not be a problem, but I would like to be able to contact you or your advisors on this issue. We can't afford to have a meeting with Kuchma that talks about cash and not about closing Chernobyl. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree completely -- 100 percent. ~~(C)~~

I have two other things I would like to talk about. First about Bosnia. I don't know when you will withdraw your troops, but I want you to know the French and British will withdraw troops the same day you do. We will not maintain our troops when you go. It costs a lot of money and so forth. I read an article that said if America withdraws, European troops will remain. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: Yesterday I was asked about that here. It was my understanding that we would go together, but we would support you and whatever decision you made. ~~(C)~~

What is important is to make sure that the next six to eight months of IFOR are used well. Hopefully, we will try to restart the investment mission. The main thing is to have the reconstruction process well underway. We can't wait for time to pass. ~~(C)~~

The elections are on track, the donors conference is about to meet, and we are going to restart on the economic initiatives which were set back by the crash. The colleagues of those lost in the crash and those in the American business community truly want to keep the initiatives going. ~~(C)~~

I think IFOR is going well and I am proud of the level of cooperation. We need to be sure the next six months go well. ~~(C)~~

We are committing $3 million to OSCE and we will be kicking in a couple of hundred million dollars at the donors conference. I think we can pull out without the war starting again. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree completely. ~~(C)~~

I am worried about Lebanon, especially the impact of the elections. The Israeli bombings are very dangerous. They are bombing not only in the south but in the Bekaa and Beirut. Now, I hope Peres is elected again, he is the best alternative. But they are going too far, and I think it is counterproductive. If you have Peres on the telephone, tell him they shouldn't bomb them everywhere. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: I have urged him to be restrained. But I think Hizballah attacked them in northern Israel. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well not more and not less than for years. They're going too far. They're very, very firm with the Palestinians. This is a step for elections. They are bombing the Bekaa and Beirut. They need to use finesse. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: I think it has run its course. But I think you should call him and tell him what you think. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I'll do that. I think this bombing is counterproductive. ~~(C)~~

Did you hear what Yeltsin said yesterday about the stationing of nuclear weapons staying only in their original countries? ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: No, I knew that's what Yeltsin was planning to say. That's an interesting position. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Then you agree with it? ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: I think we need to talk to him in private. We don't need a public discussion on this in advance of talking to him. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: OK. Give my best regards to Hillary. I saw her. She was absolutely beautiful. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you, I will. She's your biggest fan, you know. I'll see you soon Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Good-bye. (U)


President Clinton: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2460

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 12, 1996



ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 20061115
2014-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER SP for

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL CP

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac on April 12, 1996.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Harriman in Paris.

2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Per Mr. Lake, file this memcon for the record. Do not transmit to Dept of State

4/13/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/12/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 6/16/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac (U)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the April 12 call between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent via NODIS channels to Embassy Paris for Ambassador Harriman. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/12/06

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Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9603682				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (4 pages)~~	~~05/27/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1104

FOLDER TITLE:
9603682

2015-0775-M
ke3475

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9603682
RECEIVED: 27 MAY 96 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 27 MAY 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES PHONE CALL W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 30 MAY 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JOSHI LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10106115
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 5/28 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	96052807	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	960527	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

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Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	2		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	KA 5/27	D--ND
Records Mgt.	3		D other copies to be made to staff

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: ~~[redacted]~~ SRB, NES

KA 5/27

COMMENTS: WWD- Please put SRB, NES Copies in sealed envelope, NO other copies to be made. EYES ONLY

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National Security Council
The White House

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Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	(WW) 5/27	~~D~~--NC
Records Mgt.	3		D other cop to be mar to staff

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Actio

cc: ~~NES~~ SRB, NES

(WW) 5/27

COMMENTS: WWD- Please put SRB, NES Copies in sealed envelope, no other copies to be made EYES ONLY

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– KYLE

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 27, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Telephone Call with President Chirac of France ~~(S)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of a telephone call between the President and President Chirac on May 27, 1996, is provided eyes only for the Secretary of State. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 05/27/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Chirac of France regarding the United Nations ~~(S)~~
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Jacques Chirac Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet Notetaker: Richard Clarke
DATE, TIME, AND PLACE:	May 27, 1996, 10:08 - 10:36 a.m. Oval Office

President Chirac: I have a cold. That is why my voice sounds like this. How is Hillary? (U)

The President: Good, thanks. I want to thank you for what you did for us in the Central African Republic, getting our people out. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: That's finished now. They are back in their barracks. Everything is OK. You know, many countries have this problem of not paying their troops. The IMF imposes such strict guidelines on them that they can't pay. We had this problem in Guinea 3-4 months ago. Today the CAR. Tomorrow who knows? They are 3, 6, sometimes 12 months behind in their pay. All it takes is one guy with character and you have a revolution. That's why we were so quick to act, although we did so with the permission of the democratically elected president. ~~(S)~~

The President: I understand the problem. We should talk about it at Lyons, along with other things. I'm looking forward to it. ~~(S)~~

Yeltsin is doing well, I think. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: The President of Uzbekistan (he hates Russia) told me he doesn't know what the outcome of the vote will be, but he knows who will be the next president...Yeltsin. ~~(S)~~

The President: The election in Israel looks close. ~~(S)~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.11)

President Chirac: It is dangerous. It could be a catastrophe. ~~(S)~~

The President: The debate may have helped Peres a few points. What he needs is to get out the Arab vote. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Yes, that is key. ~~(S)~~

The President: I am calling you about the UN. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Then let us use the translator, if there is a serious problem to discuss. ~~(S)~~

U.S. Translator: I am on the line. (U)

(Hereafter Chirac's conversation was in French.)

The President: I have spent a lot of time on the UN. I have tried to get the Congress to appropriate the money we owe the UN, and I have had some success. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Yes, you have. ~~(S)~~

The President: But I believe that we have to have a new Secretary General for the 21st century. I like Boutros-Ghali personally, but I am concerned about the future if he were re-elected. He told us explicitly five years ago that he only wanted one term. He has not done enough to reform the UN. My ability to get Congressional support for the UN will be virtually ended if he is re-elected. Boutros is a ligthning rod with the Congress and will be a big issue in our election if he gets re-elected. ~~(S)~~

I haven't talked to anyone else about this, not Major or Kohl (who was just here). We have raised this with no one but you and Boutros. ~~(S)~~

Boutros may be unwilling to step down; I think he does not want to be the first Secretary General not to have a second term. He may force us to veto him. ~~(S)~~

I could go along with a one-year extension, until his 75th birthday, but I'm not enthusiastic about that idea. ~~(S)~~

I am hoping to work with you on this. Maybe we can find a candidate we can support together. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

President Chirac: Two observations. First, I know Boutros very well, but my position on this issue has nothing to do with my friendship for him. We need a good Secretary General. ~~(S)~~

Second, I think he has been a good Secretary General. The Iraq deal was the latest example. ~~(S)~~

I know the Republicans oppose him. I sensed that when I met with Dole in the Congress. ~~(S)~~

I don't want to create a problem for your re-election. Couldn't we put this issue off until after November? ~~(S)~~

There is a concrete problem. Developing countries -- almost all of Europe strongly, the Asians, including the Chinese, most Latin American countries want him. This could be a problem for the United States. ~~(S)~~

There is also no other candidate. Maybe Dole has a candidate? ~~(S)~~

The President: It's not just Dole. The Democrats in Congress oppose him. Senior people in my Administration oppose him. We can work it out now or we can have a bruising fight. We also think that there are other countries that do not support him. ~~(S)~~

As to waiting until after November, this is not about our election. Moreover, if we do nothing, key decisions will be made. He will be re-elected by default. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Other countries will have the impression that the United States is imposing its choice. And the United States has a bad reputation at the UN for not paying its bills. There will be a strong reaction. ~~(S)~~

The President: I'm not trying to impose a candidate. I don't have one. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Speaking as a friend, I must tell you there has been a feeling developing around the world for two or three years about the United States imposing its will. It's not good. This initiative will only make things worse. Your domestic advantage will be offset by international costs. ~~(S)~~

The President: I don't have choice. I could never defend a five-year extension for Boutros. We would never get the support we need to pay our arears to the UN. One year is a possible compromise. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I have no desire to dominate the UN. I just want to be able to get us to pay our fair share. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: I understand your dilema. But there will be a bad result after the fact. Couldn't you just say you were staying independent on this issue because you haven't paid your dues? You will win re-election overwhelmingly anyway. ~~(S)~~

The President: Put aside my election. The problem is that we'll continue to have trouble supporting the UN if Boutros-Ghali is still there. But, we do not have to agree on this now. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: OK. Let me think about it. We can talk at our next meeting. ~~(S)~~

The President: As I said, I haven't talked to anyone about this, and I would ask you not to. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Agreed. I do not have aides or even a translator here. ~~(S)~~

The President: Good. Well, good-bye then. (U)

President Chirac: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0075-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9603682
DATE 27 MAY 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES PHONE CALL W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

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Case Number: 2015-0775-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1110				
Document ID: 9604547				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. draft~~	~~[Draft of 001b] (10 pages)~~	~~06/27/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2
~~001b. memcon~~	~~Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (10 pages)~~	~~06/27/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1110

FOLDER TITLE:
9604547

2015-0775-M
ke3476

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604547
RECEIVED: 01 JUL 96 08

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 02 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
MEMCON
ECONOMIC SUMMIT

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 27 JUN MTG W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE AT LYON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 04 JUL 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 20160615
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY [signature] DATE 7-2-96 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96070112	FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
001		X	96070211	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	96070211	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960702	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	2	AES	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(MP) 7/2	D
Records Mgt.	4	7/2	D
			N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 20100115
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Jacques Chirac of France is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary ~~(DAS)~~ level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission ~~(DCM)~~ only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 07/01/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France ~~(C)~~

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
Pamela Harriman, Ambassador to France
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Laura Tyson, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, NEC
Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for State for Political Affairs
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Daniel Tarullo, Special Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Carol Wolter, Interpreter

Jacques Chirac, President of France
Herve de Charette, Foreign Minister
Jean Arthuis, Minister of Economy and Finance
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador to the United States
Jean-Davide Levitte, Diplomatic Adviser
Catherine Colonna, Presidential Spokesperson
Jean-Francois Cirelli, Technical Counselor
Jean-Claude Poinboeuf, Chief of Staff
Jacques Blot, MFA Deputy Secretary General
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 27, 1996, 3:10 - 4:05 p.m.
The Prefecture,
Lyons, France

President Chirac: First, I would like to express to you and your delegation a warm welcome in France. Let me repeat what I said to the press: our profound feelings of condolence and solidarity

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/29/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.12)

are with you after the bombing in Saudi Arabia. I want you to understand that this is not just diplomacy or a courteous formula but an expression from the bottom of my heart. In fact, that is why I would like to alter the proposed agenda for the Summit. I suggest we agree in principle to make the battle against terrorism the first item on our agenda. Our collaborators have agreed upon a communique, in the name of the Seven or the Eight, with a strong paragraph on terrorism. In these circumstances, however, and if you agree, we should take this out of the communique and prepare a separate statement of our two delegations that could be adopted by the Seven at tonight's dinner and published immediately afterward. This would signify that our foremost shared concern is terrorism. I would also like to propose that, in the special communique, we announce that in the coming weeks, we will have a meeting of the responsible ministers (two or three per country) to reflect further on concrete actions to strengthen the fight against terrorism. We would favor holding the meeting in Paris, but would be amenable to any city among the Eight. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think it is a very good idea to issue a statement tonight. I believe our respective staffs have agreed on a number of specific steps -- about 40 things -- to fight terrorism. Perhaps we should issue a short statement tonight and emphasize the specifics in the next two days. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake: The 40 steps focus on international crime and include terrorism as well. We could announce those steps in the separate statement and call for a meeting to consider additional steps to counter terrorism. ~~(C)~~

The President: A meeting in Paris is fine with me. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I fully agree with your proposal if I understand it correctly. We will meet at 8:00 p.m. for dinner. We obviously cannot issue any statement until the Seven have met. We should approve it and issue the statement immediately after dinner to show that combating terrorism is our priority here. We should say that there will be a ministerial-level meeting -- in fact, a task force against terrorism. At the dinner, we will speak at greater length and give our agreement to the set of measures already approved, especially the 40 American points. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake: Actually, those measures are for endorsement by the Eight. ~~(C)~~

The President: I presume the others will agree to a statement tonight. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Naturally. As soon as our two delegations are in agreement, I am sure the others will come along. ~~(C)~~

The President: I suggest our two delegations draft a statement after this meeting. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: No problem. So we agree that the first gesture of the G-7 is to make it loud and clear that we decry terrorism. Rather than having two communiques -- an economic communique on Friday and a political one on Saturday -- we will have three, with the first specifically focused on terrorism. Where do you want to begin on other topics? ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me go through my list first. The news from Russia is good. I believe Yeltsin will win and that the election will be perceived by the world as fair. Then we must determine where we go from here, and the question of NATO, of course, comes into play. ~~(C)~~

We are very pleased with the agreements reached in Berlin with respect to NATO adaptation and the changes that would permit France to establish a full partnership with the Alliance. Let me reaffirm my support for your moves in that direction. I believe we can find a way to meet our political objectives that maintains the principle of sound military planning. The Berlin understandings established the way to go. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I am very satisfied with the Berlin agreement and very appreciative of the U.S. political decision that made it possible. I say this because I know you had some problems with your military establishment. France is ready, within the Berlin framework, to reenter fully and without reservations. There are some technical problems to work out -- in Europe itself within the WEU, and in NATO in terms of restructuring the military organization. It is my feeling that there should be a Deputy SACEUR who would be a European and who would take on board the European side of the military structure. But let us leave it to the experts to think this through. We are ready, as I said, to go all the way into NATO. ~~(C)~~

Turning to NATO enlargement, let me say that we are naturally in favor, but I must repeat the need for caution. We have to be careful with the Russians in view of Yeltsin's difficulties in the face of the rising tide of nationalism. A case in point is what Lebed has been saying. There continues to be a major misunderstanding about the whole question. I believe we can easily have a NATO-Russia agreement on enlargement, but that presupposes discussing the matter with them. If we don't, there will be a strong nationalist reaction in Russia. Boris Nikolayevich could perfectly well have come to Lyons; it was not

for electoral reasons he decided not to come, but rather to respond to the nationalist wave that was coming through clearly in the campaign. He realized that he would have risked shocking his public if he had come to France because we had requested him to do so. The same thing would have applied if the G-7 would have been held in another city. We must not underestimate how much Yeltsin's absence reflects the resurgence of nationalism. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree it was a good move for Yeltsin politically not to come to Lyons, even though he would have won the election either way. Over the last three years, we have had many long conversations on NATO enlargement. The key to expanding NATO in a way that preserves NATO's integrity and is not a threat to Russia is to keep in mind three things: first, there should be no surprises -- we should have an honest, forthright, and gradual approach; second, we should make sure the Russians understand that we are not trying to increase our offensive capability against Russia; and third, we should somehow find other Bosnias -- other ways to cooperate so that there is a meaningful partnership. The joint operations that we have done through the Partnership for Peace are an example of the steps we should take so that they feel a part of a general movement toward integration of their democracy with the West. I believe we can work this out, but we first need to get past the Russian elections. Then we will have four or five months to work things out before the December meeting of the NAC. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I have no difference with you on the substance. We just need to supply a bit of diplomacy and finesse. ~~(C)~~

The President: Turning to Bosnia, I want to thank you for France's role in IFOR, which has been marvelous. There ~~is~~ are still a lot of problems: we have not had as much freedom of movement as we would like, not as many refugees have returned as we had hoped, and reconstruction has been delayed. On the other hand, we shouldn't minimize what has been done. IFOR has been a great success in calming the whole region, and we are way ahead of where we were last year. We need to focus now on what we can realistically accomplish during the rest of the year. We should try to hold the elections on time; I believe we can do so, with a lot of participation. Until we have the elections, everyone will be looking for excuses to hold back the peace process. ~~(C)~~

Second, we need to do all that we can to accelerate reconstruction. I just certified Bosnian compliance with the requirement to withdraw foreign forces so that I could free up another $70 million for reconstruction. ~~(C)~~

Third, we need to discuss how we can basically take Karadzic out of the equation. We are working with Milosevic, and I know you have done the same. They announced yesterday that Karadzic would not run for President, but there is still a real problem, and his presence casts a cloud over the process. It makes it more difficult for other Serbs, such as the leaders in Banja Luka, to emerge and take a leadership role. I would be interested in your thoughts on what to do. ~~(C)~~

Lastly, I know you believe that there will need to be some kind of presence in Bosnia after IFOR. This may prove to be the case, but what concerns me is that if we discuss this question before the Bosnian elections, it will give them an excuse to put everything off. My preference is to stay with the agenda that we have until the elections and force the Bosnian people to take more responsibility. Obviously, no one wants to do anything that would let the whole thing go to pieces. I want to do what I can to maintain our partnership. I know that the United States has responsibilities. But it would be a mistake to throw into the mix what would happen post-IFOR until we have put maximum pressure on the parties to have the elections and do the right thing. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We have exactly the same approach. The elections must take place on time, and this is what the President of the OSCE has now decided. I believe we must continue to maximize the pressure to get rid of Karadzic. But to be frank, I am not sure that Milosevic has the means to take Karadzic out of the equation. I tried to exert the maximum pressure myself by explaining to Milosevic the consequences of Karadzic remaining. But I fear he doesn't have the clout to remove him. ~~(C)~~

You are right to say that we should not spell out what will take place in the future after IFOR. But you should know that the French position -- and I understand that it is also the British position -- is that our military should remain only as long as the Americans are there. We will leave at the same time that you do. But I agree that this is not a question we need to address right away. Mr. de Charette has spoken of a plan for stabilization over the next two years. We should develop this plan with you and the British in order to find a way to maintain peace and tranquillity in the region. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister de Charette: This plan only concerns the civilian aspects. ~~(C)~~

The President: I have no objection to discussing it in a quiet and private way. But is our experience in dealing with all the parties, as President Mitterrand used to say, that there are no angels there. They need to keep moving toward fulfilling their

own responsibilities. We need to maximize the pressure to hold the elections on time and not let them think we will be there forever as a baby-sitter. At the same time, we haven't gone to all this trouble in order to let the situation go to Hell. ~~(C)~~

Should Hell be kept? ← No

President Chirac: So I think this is an area in which we have very broad agreement. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say a few words about the Middle East. Since the Israeli elections, I have attempted to do three things together with Secretary Christopher. We have been encouraging Netanyahu not to do or say anything that could make the Arabs -- and the PLO in particular -- believe that they intend to back away from the commitments of the previous government. In general, we want them to keep open as many options as possible. Netanyahu is a clever man. He has made what we view as some unfortunate commitments in order to maintain his political base. But he wants to be on the right side of history; he is a young man who is looking forward and does not want to be the last holdout. So I think there are still possibilities. ~~(C)~~

As for the Arabs, we are urging them not to do anything that would foreclose the possibility that Netanyahu could be better than they expect. They should judge him on the basis of what he does. In this regard, I was pleased by how the Arab Summit came out. It took a strong stand in support of the PLO, on withdrawal from Hebron, on no expansion of settlements, and in support of Syria's position on the Golan Heights; but it did not say these things in a way that looked like a declaration of war on Israel. Specifically with respect to Lebanon, where you have been so active, the Arabs agreed to negotiate on the question of a monitoring group. It is in our interest to make it work, and we need to work closely on follow-up. Secretary Christopher and I had a long meeting before he went to the region. The first goal is to do no harm -- to avoid reversing the progress made in the last few years. We need to find a mechanism in which the more disparate elements can go forward. I wish there was something more miraculous I could say. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I share your view, but I would add one point. My analysis is the same: it is essential that we not impugn the motives of Netanyahu or assume the worst. He is an intelligent man and wants to preserve the future. The Arab Summit was good, but the statement issued was very firm. It did not accuse Israel or judge what Netanyahu would do, but it took a firm position and reflected a strongly united position. I would say the Summit was a success for Hafez Assad, who got the other Arabs for the first time to accept that the Golan border was Lake Tiberius. This was important in symbolic terms. ~~(C)~~

I am afraid that the situation is going to lead to a strong upsurge in terrorism. Some Arab countries will see the new situation as a justification for terrorist acts. Frankly, it is not Libya or Iran that worry me (although I have had enough experience to know that Iran can be dangerous), but the other Arab countries that can use terrorism to maintain a situation that they consider advantageous. For quite a while, I was convinced that Assad wanted peace; I think that was the case until recently. But my feeling now -- although I have no evidence yet to prove it -- is that he no longer does. If Assad is no longer seeking peace, he may be tempted to permit terrorist groups to continue their activity. I don't want to indict Syria, which still has an important role to play, but the situation is becoming more dangerous. ~~(C)~~

The Israeli elections have altered the situation, at least in the mind of Netanyahu. The Syrians may believe that he will withdraw from Lebanon since the Israeli presence costs more in money and manpower than it brings Israel in security. If he withdraws, Lebanon will need to assure its security with the help of France and others. But this would put Syria on the horns of a dilemma. There would no longer be anything to justify Syria's remaining in Lebanon, and they would be pressed to disarm Hizbollah. This scenario may create a major temptation for Assad to allow terrorism to take hold again. ~~(C)~~

The President: This is one of the things we need to explore with the G-7. Secretary Christopher and I discussed this earlier, and he advanced the same argument. If the Israelis can be convinced that the Lebanese have the capacity to prevent them from being shelled by Hizbollah, he might withdraw. Netanyahu is looking for some moves he can make in the peace process, and clearly he is not prepared to withdraw from the Golan Heights. I also agree that the Syrians are reassessing their position. Assad should have moved when Rabin was still alive. He overplayed his delaying tactics. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That's the problem. Moreover, all the major terrorist organizations have their headquarters in Damascus. Assad's position with respect to the terrorists will be crucial. ~~(C)~~

The President: With respect to Africa, we appreciate your interest. I want to thank you for your help in evacuating our people from the Central African Republic and your support for our diplomatic initiatives in Burundi. I know that you are in favor of selling off some of the IMF's gold reserves to create a fund and then use the interest to help pay the debts of the developing countries. The IMF would have more money today if it had put some of its gold into income-earning investments. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: You should tell that to Helmut Kohl! ~~(C)~~

The President: I'll ask him if you will do the same. I am trying to do more with the Congress to pay off our obligations. I am very concerned that Congress has been backing away. Selling the gold reserves is a good idea -- we would just spend the interest but not the principal. I will talk to Helmut and perhaps we can work together. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I don't think this will be a problem if you can say a few words to Helmut Kohl. This will really help to replenish the African development funds. Another problem is the reconstitution of IDA. We have a problem there because the agreement reached among experts was rejected by the U.S. House of Representatives. The issue is now before the Senate, and I know that your Administration is exerting great efforts to convince the Senate to go back to the original position. I hope you succeed since it is a critical question. ~~(C)~~

We have a lot of contacts with developing nations, not only in Africa. There is a problem that you need to explain to your Congress: the responsibility and image of the United States is at risk. The OECD just published statistics showing that the United States is fourth -- after Japan, France and Germany -- in development assistance as a percentage of GDP. That's a big political problem. I tried to raise it with Dole and Gingrich when I met with them in February, but they were not interested. It will be a source of great weakness for America in the years to come, and it will undermine your image in the world as well as the values that America claims to represent. This is not a problem to be resolved at the Lyons meeting. But we do need to take a clear position on the key questions of development and issue constructive conclusions. ~~(C)~~

The President: On IDA, we got a good statement from two leading Republicans in support of our position. I am working very hard on this. I agree that we need to get more money for development assistance, but we had difficulties even with the previous Congress. We have been trying to increase our purchase of exports from the developing countries. But even if we spent twice as much in this regard, it will mainly increase the help we provide to the Latin American and Asian countries; it will do nothing for Africa. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: One word about the crisis in Africa. There is a serious problem in Guinea, but we think it will be settled in the next few days. We also have the means to regulate the situation in the Central African Republic and the other francophone countries. With respect to Liberia, I would like to

make a suggestion. I know that there is no question of the United States intervening militarily, but I would recommend that you station one naval vessel within 500 meters of the Liberian coast. If you did this, the problem would be solved. I recall that Nigeria had a conflict one month ago with Cameroon over a territorial dispute. I did not want to send in my troops, even though the president of Cameroon was asking me to do so, but I sent one ship to cruise off the coast. Lo and behold, the parties' troops went home. I think the same solution would work in Liberia. As we say, the arrival of the police is the beginning of wisdom. ~~(C)~~

It, Lo + behold

Lo + behold OK

The President: One last word regarding Helms-Burton. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: This is a ghastly question. ~~(C)~~

The President: Here's what we are trying to do. First, I don't think the bill would have passed if Castro hadn't shot down the planes. Once he did, there was no way to stop the legislation, and there was a veto-proof majority. For that reason, I decided I had to negotiate with the Congress in order to give me some flexibility if I agreed to sign the legislation. My objective is to find a way to maximize the pressure on Castro to move toward a more open society and to minimize friction with our allies. I am working as hard as I can on this. I will need to make a decision in three weeks on whether to waive part of the legislation, and I will be in touch with you as we work it through. But you know what a special issue Cuba is in the United States. This has become more pronounced now that democracy is on the upswing in Haiti, and Cuba looks more and more like the lone holdout. We were moving toward a more open relationship with Cuba, including constructive ways to resolve some of our differences, until the planes were shot down. It will take a while for that cloud to pass over. We know that everyone in Europe hates the Helms-Burton bill, but if I had not taken the position I did, we would have ended up with a harsher bill with fewer options for the President, and one that could have been passed over my veto. We need to work together to open up the Cuban regime. It is a terrible problem for us since Cuba is only 90 miles from our shores. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: This is a terrible problem. All of us in the European Union have been pushing the principle of multilateralism, notably in the World Trade Organization. One cannot work on the one hand within the WTO, and on the other hand take unilateral action. That would be a blatant contradiction. That is why the measures to be taken against European firms under Helms-Burton -- or under the D'Amato bill, which is even worse -- will force the EU countries to take automatic reprisals against U.S. firms. President Santer will say this tomorrow. For

example, if under the D'Amato bill measures were taken against the company TOTAL, there would automatically be reprisals against U.S. oil companies. This would be a very bad system. Now is not the time to raise this problem. What is important is to conclude the election campaign in the United States. But the problem must be addressed after that. We need to find a way to de-escalate. ~~(C)~~

The President: We can talk more about this Saturday night... ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: ...and after the U.S. elections. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (VA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse			
Sens	2		
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COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 2, 1996

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We are very pleased with the agreements reached in Berlin with respect to NATO adaptation and the changes that would permit France to establish a full partnership with the Alliance. Let me reaffirm my support for your moves in that direction. I believe we can find a way to meet our political objectives that maintains the principle of sound military planning. The Berlin understandings established the way to go. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I am very satisfied with the Berlin agreement and very appreciative of the U.S. political decision that made it possible. I say this because I know you had some problems with your military establishment. France is ready, within the Berlin framework, to reenter fully and without reservations. There are some technical problems to work out -- in Europe itself within the WEU, and in NATO in terms of restructuring the military organization. It is my feeling that there should be a Deputy SACEUR who would be a European and who would take on board the European side of the military structure. But let us leave it to the experts to think this through. We are ready, as I said, to go all the way into NATO. ~~(C)~~

Turning to NATO enlargement, let me say that we are naturally in favor, but I must repeat the need for caution. We have to be careful with the Russians in view of Yeltsin's difficulties in the face of the rising tide of nationalism. A case in point is what Lebed has been saying. There continues to be a major misunderstanding about the whole question. I believe we can easily have a NATO-Russia agreement on enlargement, but that presupposes discussing the matter with them. If we don't, there will be a strong nationalist reaction in Russia. Boris Nikolayevich could perfectly well have come to Lyons; it was not

for electoral reasons he decided not to come, but rather to respond to the nationalist wave that was coming through clearly in the campaign. He realized that he would have risked shocking his public if he had come to France because we had requested him to do so. The same thing would have applied if the G-7 would have been held in another city. We must not underestimate how much Yeltsin's absence reflects the resurgence of nationalism. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree it was a good move for Yeltsin politically not to come to Lyons, even though he would have won the election either way. Over the last three years, we have had many long conversations on NATO enlargement. The key to expanding NATO in a way that preserves NATO's integrity and is not a threat to Russia is to keep in mind three things: first, there should be no surprises -- we should have an honest, forthright, and gradual approach; second, we should make sure the Russians understand that we are not trying to increase our offensive capability against Russia; and third, we should somehow find other Bosnias -- other ways to cooperate so that there is a meaningful partnership. The joint operations that we have done through the Partnership for Peace are an example of the steps we should take so that they feel a part of a general movement toward integration of their democracy with the West. I believe we can work this out, but we first need to get past the Russian elections. Then we will have four or five months to work things out before the December meeting of the NAC. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I have no difference with you on the substance. We just need to supply a bit of diplomacy and finesse. ~~(C)~~

The President: Turning to Bosnia, I want to thank you for France's role in IFOR, which has been marvelous. There are still a lot of problems: we have not had as much freedom of movement as we would like, not as many refugees have returned as we had hoped, and reconstruction has been delayed. On the other hand, we shouldn't minimize what has been done. IFOR has been a great success in calming the whole region, and we are way ahead of where we were last year. We need to focus now on what we can realistically accomplish during the rest of the year. We should try to hold the elections on time; I believe we can do so, with a lot of participation. Until we have the elections, everyone will be looking for excuses to hold back the peace process. ~~(C)~~

Second, we need to do all that we can to accelerate reconstruction. I just certified Bosnian compliance with the requirement to withdraw foreign forces so that I could free up another $70 million for reconstruction. ~~(C)~~

Third, we need to discuss how we can basically take Karadzic out of the equation. We are working with Milosevic, and I know you have done the same. They announced yesterday that Karadzic would not run for President, but there is still a real problem, and his presence casts a cloud over the process. It makes it more difficult for other Serbs, such as the leaders in Banja Luka, to emerge and take a leadership role. I would be interested in your thoughts on what to do. ~~(C)~~

Lastly, I know you believe that there will need to be some kind of presence in Bosnia after IFOR. This may prove to be the case, but what concerns me is that if we discuss this question before the Bosnian elections, it will give them an excuse to put everything off. My preference is to stay with the agenda that we have until the elections and force the Bosnian people to take more responsibility. Obviously, no one wants to do anything that would let the whole thing go to pieces. I want to do what I can to maintain our partnership. I know that the United States has responsibilities. But it would be a mistake to throw into the mix what would happen post-IFOR until we have put maximum pressure on the parties to have the elections and do the right thing. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We have exactly the same approach. The elections must take place on time, and this is what the President of the OSCE has now decided. I believe we must continue to maximize the pressure to get rid of Karadzic. But to be frank, I am not sure that Milosevic has the means to take Karadzic out of the equation. I tried to exert the maximum pressure myself by explaining to Milosevic the consequences of Karadzic remaining. But I fear he doesn't have the clout to remove him. ~~(C)~~

You are right to say that we should not spell out what will take place in the future after IFOR. But you should know that the French position -- and I understand that it is also the British position -- is that our military should remain only as long as the Americans are there. We will leave at the same time that you do. But I agree that this is not a question we need to address right away. Mr. de Charette has spoken of a plan for stabilization over the next two years. We should develop this plan with you and the British in order to find a way to maintain peace and tranquillity in the region. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister de Charette: This plan only concerns the civilian aspects. ~~(C)~~

The President: I have no objection to discussing it in a quiet and private way. But it is our experience in dealing with all the parties, as President Mitterrand used to say, that there are no angels there. They need to keep moving toward fulfilling

their own responsibilities. We need to maximize the pressure to hold the elections on time and not let them think we will be there forever as a baby-sitter. At the same time, we haven't gone to all this trouble in order to let the situation go to hell. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: So I think this is an area in which we have very broad agreement. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say a few words about the Middle East. Since the Israeli elections, I have attempted to do three things together with Secretary Christopher. We have been encouraging Netanyahu not to do or say anything that could make the Arabs -- and the PLO in particular -- believe that they intend to back away from the commitments of the previous government. In general, we want them to keep open as many options as possible. Netanyahu is a clever man. He has made what we view as some unfortunate commitments in order to maintain his political base. But he wants to be on the right side of history; he is a young man who is looking forward and does not want to be the last holdout. So I think there are still possibilities. ~~(C)~~

As for the Arabs, we are urging them not to do anything that would foreclose the possibility that Netanyahu could be better than they expect. They should judge him on the basis of what he does. In this regard, I was pleased by how the Arab Summit came out. It took a strong stand in support of the PLO, on withdrawal from Hebron, on no expansion of settlements, and in support of Syria's position on the Golan Heights; but it did not say these things in a way that looked like a declaration of war on Israel. Specifically with respect to Lebanon, where you have been so active, the Arabs agreed to negotiate on the question of a monitoring group. It is in our interest to make it work, and we need to work closely on follow-up. Secretary Christopher and I had a long meeting before he went to the region. The first goal is to do no harm -- to avoid reversing the progress made in the last few years. We need to find a mechanism in which the more disparate elements can go forward. I wish there was something more miraculous I could say. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I share your view, but I would add one point. My analysis is the same: it is essential that we not impugn the motives of Netanyahu or assume the worst. He is an intelligent man and wants to preserve the future. The Arab Summit was good, but the statement issued was very firm. It did not accuse Israel or judge what Netanyahu would do, but it took a firm position and reflected a strongly united position. I would say the Summit was a success for Hafez Assad, who got the other Arabs for the first time to accept that the Golan border was Lake Tiberius. This was important in symbolic terms. ~~(C)~~

I am afraid that the situation is going to lead to a strong upsurge in terrorism. Some Arab countries will see the new situation as a justification for terrorist acts. Frankly, it is not Libya or Iran that worry me (although I have had enough experience to know that Iran can be dangerous), but the other Arab countries that can use terrorism to maintain a situation that they consider advantageous. For quite a while, I was convinced that Asad wanted peace; I think that was the case until recently. But my feeling now -- although I have no evidence yet to prove it -- is that he no longer does. If Asad is no longer seeking peace, he may be tempted to permit terrorist groups to continue their activity. I don't want to indict Syria, which still has an important role to play, but the situation is becoming more dangerous. ~~(C)~~

The Israeli elections have altered the situation, at least in the mind of Netanyahu. The Syrians may believe that he will withdraw from Lebanon since the Israeli presence costs more in money and manpower than it brings Israel in security. If he withdraws, Lebanon will need to assure its security with the help of France and others. But this would put Syria on the horns of a dilemma. There would no longer be anything to justify Syria's remaining in Lebanon, and they would be pressed to disarm Hizbollah. This scenario may create a major temptation for Asad to allow terrorism to take hold again. ~~(C)~~

The President: This is one of the things we need to explore with the G-7. Secretary Christopher and I discussed this earlier, and he advanced the same argument. If the Israelis can be convinced that the Lebanese have the capacity to prevent them from being shelled by Hizbollah, he might withdraw. Netanyahu is looking for some moves he can make in the peace process, and clearly he is not prepared to withdraw from the Golan Heights. I also agree that the Syrians are reassessing their position. Asad should have moved when Rabin was still alive. He overplayed his delaying tactics. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That's the problem. Moreover, all the major terrorist organizations have their headquarters in Damascus. Asad's position with respect to the terrorists will be crucial. ~~(C)~~

The President: With respect to Africa, we appreciate your interest. I want to thank you for your help in evacuating our people from the Central African Republic and your support for our diplomatic initiatives in Burundi. I know that you are in favor of selling off some of the IMF's gold reserves to create a fund and then use the interest to help pay the debts of the developing

countries. The IMF would have more money today if it had put some of its gold into income-earning investments. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: You should tell that to Helmut Kohl! ~~(C)~~

The President: I'll ask him if you will do the same. I am trying to do more with the Congress to pay off our obligations. I am very concerned that Congress has been backing away. Selling the gold reserves is a good idea -- we would just spend the interest but not the principal. I will talk to Helmut and perhaps we can work together. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I don't think this will be a problem if you can say a few words to Helmut Kohl. This will really help to replenish the African development funds. Another problem is the reconstitution of IDA. We have a problem there because the agreement reached among experts was rejected by the U.S. House of Representatives. The issue is now before the Senate, and I know that your Administration is exerting great efforts to convince the Senate to go back to the original position. I hope you succeed since it is a critical question. ~~(C)~~

We have a lot of contacts with developing nations, not only in Africa. There is a problem that you need to explain to your Congress: the responsibility and image of the United States is at risk. The OECD just published statistics showing that the United States is fourth -- after Japan, France and Germany -- in development assistance as a percentage of GDP. That's a big political problem. I tried to raise it with Dole and Gingrich when I met with them in February, but they were not interested. It will be a source of great weakness for America in the years to come, and it will undermine your image in the world as well as the values that America claims to represent. This is not a problem to be resolved at the Lyons meeting. But we do need to take a clear position on the key questions of development and issue constructive conclusions. ~~(C)~~

The President: On IDA, we got a good statement from two leading Republicans in support of our position. I am working very hard on this. I agree that we need to get more money for development assistance, but we had difficulties even with the previous Congress. We have been trying to increase our purchase of exports from the developing countries. But even if we spent twice as much in this regard, it will mainly increase the help we provide to the Latin American and Asian countries; it will do nothing for Africa. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: One word about the crisis in Africa. There is a serious problem in Guinea, but we think it will be settled in the next few days. We also have the means to regulate the

situation in the Central African Republic and the other francophone countries. With respect to Liberia, I would like to make a suggestion. I know that there is no question of the United States intervening militarily, but I would recommend that you station one naval vessel within 500 meters of the Liberian coast. If you did this, the problem would be solved. I recall that Nigeria had a conflict one month ago with Cameroon over a territorial dispute. I did not want to send in my troops, even though the president of Cameroon was asking me to do so, but I sent one ship to cruise off the coast. Lo and behold, the parties' troops went home. I think the same solution would work in Liberia. As we say, the arrival of the police is the beginning of wisdom. ~~(C)~~

The President: One last word regarding Helms-Burton. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: This is a ghastly question. ~~(C)~~

The President: Here's what we are trying to do. First, I don't think the bill would have passed if Castro hadn't shot down the planes. Once he did, there was no way to stop the legislation, and there was a veto-proof majority. For that reason, I decided I had to negotiate with the Congress in order to give me some flexibility if I agreed to sign the legislation. My objective is to find a way to maximize the pressure on Castro to move toward a more open society and to minimize friction with our allies. I am working as hard as I can on this. I will need to make a decision in three weeks on whether to waive part of the legislation, and I will be in touch with you as we work it through. But you know what a special issue Cuba is in the United States. This has become more pronounced now that democracy is on the upswing in Haiti, and Cuba looks more and more like the lone holdout. We were moving toward a more open relationship with Cuba, including constructive ways to resolve some of our differences, until the planes were shot down. It will take a while for that cloud to pass over. We know that everyone in Europe hates the Helms-Burton bill, but if I had not taken the position I did, we would have ended up with a harsher bill with fewer options for the President, and one that could have been passed over my veto. We need to work together to open up the Cuban regime. It is a terrible problem for us since Cuba is only 90 miles from our shores. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: This is a terrible problem. All of us in the European Union have been pushing the principle of multilateralism, notably in the World Trade Organization. One cannot work on the one hand within the WTO, and on the other hand take unilateral action. That would be a blatant contradiction. That is why the measures to be taken against European firms under Helms-Burton -- or under the D'Amato bill, which is even worse --

will force the EU countries to take automatic reprisals against U.S. firms. President Santer will say this tomorrow. For example, if under the D'Amato bill measures were taken against the company TOTAL, there would automatically be reprisals against U.S. oil companies. This would be a very bad system. Now is not the time to raise this problem. What is important is to conclude the election campaign in the United States. But the problem must be addressed after that. We need to find a way to de-escalate. ~~(C)~~

The President: We can talk more about this Saturday night... ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: ...and after the U.S. elections. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 1, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France, June 27, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation which took place on June 27, 1996, between the President and President Jacques Chirac of France.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 07/01/06

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: CDE Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9604547
DATE 02 JUL 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 27 JUN MTG W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (4 pages)~~	~~07/28/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9605240
RECEIVED: 29 JUL 96 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 29 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE 28 JUL 96

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 01 AUG 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		FICKLIN
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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 20060115
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY JMH DATE 7.29.96 BY HAND W/ATTCH

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96072914	FOR DECISION
001		X	96072915	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	96072915	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960729	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

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Dohse			
Sens	1	MS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	7/29	D
Records Mgt.	3	JMH 7:29	D w/ DISK JH

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Please deliver to Gretchen Welch Immediately

DONE BY FAX 7/29

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 29, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 01/06/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President Chirac of France ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is a copy of the President's July 28 telephone conversation with President Chirac of France. Please deliver "Eyes Only" to Secretary Christopher and transmit as a Confidential/NODIS message to our embassy in France for the Ambassador's eyes only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon of Chirac Call

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/28/02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jacques Chirac, President of France

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Daniel Flessas, Elaine Florio, Sean Rice and Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 28, 1996, 12:09 - 12:27 p.m.
Air Force One

The President: Hello Jacques, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. I am fine, thanks. Are you having a good flight? Can you hear me? (U)

The President: Yes, I hear you well. (U)

President Chirac: First of all I would like to tell you how sorry we are about the problem in Atlanta. I have the impression everything is going as well as possible now. (U)

The President: Yes, I think so, as well as possible. (U)

President Chirac: I want to tell you we have had very good cooperation so far about the plane with TWA. The French families were moved by your visit. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I was glad to see them and glad your Ambassador went with me. I believe it made things a bit better. (U)

President Chirac: First, I want to share with you my concern about the resurgence of terrorist attacks. I am not talking about what happened in Atlanta. But my fear is that growing tension in the Middle East will result in new terrorist attacks in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. We shall be meeting in Paris, that is what we decided in the G-7 meeting. I

Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 7/29/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.14)

think Janet Reno will be representing you with Peter Tarnoff. I think the seven countries will have to make a substantial effort to develop a more effective strategy against terrorism. ~~(C)~~

The President: I fully agree with that. We are seeing more and more people and radical groups at home trying to carry out terrorist attacks. That has nothing to do with the Middle East. We are dealing with that but we cannot deal with the far more sophisticated networks of international terrorist attacks without international cooperation. I am still trying to find out what happened in Saudi Arabia. It is possible that elements of more than one country are involved. I still don't know what happened with the TWA flight but it is very possible that it was a terrorist attack. We should find out in the next few days. Nevertheless, we have to work together and do what is necessary to combat the resurgence of terrorism. I am glad you are hosting the meeting in Paris. You and I need to take the lead and I will be with you all the way. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, what I am most worried about is the Middle East situation. ~~(C)~~

The President: Me too. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I had a long conversation with Netanyahu on the phone and met with Mubarak as well. Netanyahu has changed somewhat, a little, but not nearly far enough to get back on track as far as the peace process is concerned. If there is a major attack in Israel, the Israeli response will be extremely strong and could set off an escalation which will leave no one unscathed. I think we have to try to rebuild links between Netanyahu and the Arabs. My talks with Mubarak went as well as could be expected. There should be a concerted action. Firstly, of course, from the Americans, but also involving the French, given our relationship with the Arabs. Also with Mubarak, who has substantial influence as seen in the Cairo Summit. It is vital and urgent that we put together a coordinated strategy so as to rebuild links between Jews and Arabs. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with everything you said, including your analysis. I met with Netanyahu and am seeing Mubarak Tuesday here. I will pursue this with Mubarak here and I may well be talking to Netanyahu as well. We need to find a formula that will permit Netanyahu, under the constraints he faces after the campaign, to pursue the peace process in a way that keeps the lid on and prevents a huge resurgence of terrorism. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I should also like to discuss Burundi now that Major Buyoya has taken power. Now in purely legal terms this was not very appropriate. Ambassador Albright has taken a very

strong negative position but happily Tony Lake seems to have toned it down and taken a more moderate position. Buyoya is our one chance to avoid a massacre. He is a man of moderation and above all wants to avoid killing. He enjoys the respect of the Army and of moderate Tutsis and Hutus. He is our best chance. Obviously we cannot applaud the coup but I think Major Buyoya, and only he, can calm things down. I think that the world's attitude and in particular the UN must be more moderate so as not to make the situation worse. ~~(C)~~

I would like to add this, and let me be perfectly blunt in this matter. The campaign by the American diplomatic service in the UN against Boutros Boutros Ghali has had a disastrous effect on Africa altogether. Mandela has told me this. In all of my meetings with Africans, in particularly when talking about a compromise, it is clear from all of them that American diplomacy has been too tough and harsh. I would like a means of providing everyone with satisfaction. I don't want to add to the war against Buyoya. I can tell you that all Africans are concerned that even if it was a putsch, a coup d'etat, it was the only way to prevent the worst from happening. ~~(C)~~

The President: I basically agree with you. Our first obligation is to stop the slaughter. I called in my people and told them to check with our allies and moderate our tone. We can't applaud the coup but somebody has to stop the slaughter. We ought to give this a chance to stop the meaningless killings and restore calm in the country. As you can see by Tony Lake's remarks, we moved in that direction, which I think is very important. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: In any case I want to make it quite clear that you have our full support in this rather tricky period, this difficult moment, we are going through against terrorism. It is something we have suffered from as well. With respect to the Middle East issue, I don't want you to think that in the Middle East we are trying to interfere with matters that would really be an American responsibility. That is not at all our desire. What I want is to provide you with a framework, with resources, the few resources we do have, to move in a direction we both want, that is a peace process that can guarantee the security of Israel and the others. ~~(C)~~

The President: Jacques, I agree with that. It is important that we just continue to talk and work together. The meeting in Paris is very timely. I think the U.S. will be more vulnerable to terrorism, especially in the run-up to the election. Also there are people trying to kill the peace process. It is good that there will be a meeting in Paris. I will give you a report after I talk to Mubarak. We should check back in a week or so. ~~(C)~~

I am terribly sorry about the loss of French victims of the TWA crash. We have recovered 28 bodies and 25 have been returned to their families. ~~(C)~~

Again, we should talk again in the next few days after my meeting with Mubarak and after the meeting in Paris. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Just one last thing. Gregory Peck has had a minor operation in Paris and I met with him. He was extremely pleased to receive your telegram. I want to thank you on behalf of him. Pamela Harriman is taking very good care of him and his family, and my thanks go to you from Greg and Veronique. (U)

The President: Good. Send my regards. Please say hello to your wife. Also, if you see those wonderful people we met in that restaurant, tell them life hasn't been the same. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you. Send my best to Hillary. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KOE Date: 10/20/15
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9605240
DATE 29 JUL 96

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORG + DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

TIME OF TRANSMISSION: TIME OF RECEIPT:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: X IMMEDIATE
____ PRIORITY
____ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES: 6 (Including Cove

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITUATION ROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: MEMCON OF POTUS TELCON WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

NSC LOG #

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

URGENT PLEASE DELIVER TO GRETCHEN WELCH IMMEDIATELY!

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5240

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDC NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

July 29, 1996



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation from the President's July 28 conversation with French President Jacques Chirac.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve NDS Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 7/29/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1120				
Document ID: 9606042				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Chirac (4 pages)~~	~~09/02/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ R2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1120

FOLDER TITLE:
9606042

2015-0775-M
ke3478

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606042
RECEIVED: 09 SEP 96 15

TO: SENS

FROM: PETERS

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
IRAQ
TELCON
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC ON 2 SEP RE IRAQ

ACTION: SENS APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 12 SEP 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96091012	FOR DECISION
001		X	96091015	SENS APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6042

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG re A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	~~2~~		
Dohse			
Sens	1	DDS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TmH 9.10	N
Records Mgt.	3		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6042

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG re A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	~~2~~		
Dohse			
Sens	1	DDS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TmH 9.10	N
Records Mgt.	3		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Y/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6042

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 9, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 01/20/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS (ACTING)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France, September 2, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on September 2, 1996, between the President and President Chirac of France.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record. record only - no distribution

Approve NOS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 09/9/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jacques Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Ralph Sigler, Elaine Florio, Steve Brennan and Larry Wright

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 2, 1996; 1432-1455
Green Bay, Wisconsin

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Congratulations on your convention which was beautiful; it was seen here in France. How are you? (U)

The President: I am all right, I am in Green Bay, Wisconsin. (U)

President Chirac: Hillary was beautiful, and Chelsea was beautiful too. (U)

The President: Thank you. We had a great week, we have another two months to fight it through. (U)

President Chirac: There is no danger. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. (U)

President Chirac: I prefer to speak through an interpreter. (U)

The President: I know we have had some differences on this issue, but I wanted to talk to you and ask for all the support you can offer. We have no evidence to support Iraqi claims that they are withdrawing the deployments. On the contrary, his actions even suggest he is considering other attacks deeper into Kurdish territory. Our cooperation in defeating and containing Saddam since 1990 is something we are both proud of. It made a real difference in the peace and security of an area in which we

Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 9/9/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KZ NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0115-M (1.15)

both have vital interests. We know how Saddam works, he tests and then waits to see if there is a reaction. If there isn't, he just tests again. And we know the consequences get more serious each time. This is the way he has worked for years now. I am very concerned that we have to send him a strong, clear message that he can't use force and get away with it. I feel so strongly about it that, if I have to, I am prepared to go it alone to make that point. We have always been together, France and the United States. Despite our differences through the years, I hope we can have a common position on this. It would be good for both of us, and for regional peace and security, to be together on this. If you don't feel you can support this position, I hope at a minimum, you will not criticize us in public, and after a period of silence about associated strikes on air defense systems, I hope France will continue to fly in the expanded No Fly Zones. To me that is the most important thing. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, Bill, naturally, I just want to say from the outset, I am not going to be a poor friend; although I am extremely shocked by this whole affair. I fully understand that it is solely an American electoral issue. I think in fact it would be a disservice to the United States and the image of America would be impaired. You know one day we are going to have an international campaign about the genocide of the Iraqi people. We will have to contend with that. ~~(C)~~

From my side, from a political standpoint, first of all, the failure of the rapprochement of the two Kurdish factions led in fact to obvious interference by the Iranian side. It is the Iranians who are supporting Talabani, which in turn inevitably led Barzani to seek assistance from Iraq. In fact, our aerial photography shows an Iraqi battalion, which isn't all that much really. I should add by the way, we are going to be in a position of supporting Iran in its struggle to gain control of the Kurdistan region. What you have is inconsistent here, and I understand the Iranians, who have played their hand very skillfully in this matter, are extremely pleased at the idea that you will lash out at the Iraqis. This in turn, would justify and warrant their claims regarding Kurdistan, which is going to stir up the anger of the Arab world against the United States and the whole Western world. Now, you see, the Arabs don't dare to tell this to you directly, but I think it is eminently clear that is what they are thinking, even if they don't say it out loud. ~~(C)~~

Let's look at the legal side, Resolution 688 doesn't in fact prohibit military intervention by the Iraqi army on its own territory. If you look at this from the standpoint of international law, this is an Iraqi internal affair. In fact, any justification for intervention would in fact be against Iranian intervention. In fact, any intervention against the

missile batteries and air defense in the southern part of the country would make it appear that the allies are in de facto solidarity with Iran. Within the framework of the civil war taking place among the Kurds in northern Iraq, if you look at the Security Council, within the Council, no country is actually challenging allied actions because the allied actions appear to be a logical conclusion of the Gulf War. But bear in mind nonetheless, that the No Fly Zones have no legal basis whatsoever. So if you expand the southern zone and create a passage toward the west, this will make apparent the fragility of our position within the legal environment within the Security Council. The result of that would be to undermine the very legitimacy of the whole allied coalition. ~~(C)~~

This policy, which is not a foreign policy, but an electorally motivated policy, is extremely bothersome for those implicated in such an action. All the more so because we are worried about international opinion becoming more concerned about the extreme poverty of the Iraqi people. ~~(C)~~

Now having said that, I repeat that I don't want to be an unworthy or bad friend to you. So I will give you satisfaction, because I am fond of you and Hillary, but I repeat this is a mistake. If there is a military intervention, we will not be a part of that military action, but we will refrain from making any comments that will imply any distance from our position with the United States. But after your election, I think I should tell you now, I will withdraw our French aircraft. This will remain absolutely confidential, only our interpreters will be aware. But I don't want to find myself involved again in an affair of this sort. But as I said, we will refrain from any public comment that would discomfort you in any way, but only because you are in the midst of an electoral campaign. ~~(C)~~

The President: First of all, I agree this situation is complicated by the fact that one Kurdish faction wanted Saddam to do what he did. But the fact remains, that when he began massing troops, there were voices throughout the world who told him not to do this and the UN resolution states he cannot repress the people that live within Iraq's borders, clearly including the Kurds. No one has ever challenged the No Fly Zones because they were a reasonable response to specific situations in which Saddam used force. The only reason to take out the air defenses is to protect our pilots and to remind him that he can't go back to the way it used to be. If the world community wants him to go back to those ways and be able to repress his own people, then that is one thing, but that's not the way it is now, and that is not what the UN resolution says. Anyway, I respect your position, and thank you for what you said, and I appreciate the fact that we

had the chance to talk, and I appreciate the fact that you won't say anything against this. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, naturally, I won't say anything. I want to say once again, that the arguments they have given you, are purely electoral and from any other grounds, they are baseless. We must oppose Iranian expansion. It is in our interest to avoid running into Iran. The fact remains Iran will be the only winner in this and it will be extremely unpleasant if Iran overruns Kurdistan. There will be a responsibility to be faced and it is in our interest to oppose Iran and we should not sanction Iraq. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, we just have an honest disagreement on this, but I appreciate your honesty and candor in dealing with this. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Okay, Bill. I hope the best for you in the election, which I do not doubt for a minute. Be careful with Iraq, believe me, and be careful with Iran, which is going to win on this one. But I won't say anything on this, I promise you. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you, good bye. (U)

President Chirac: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1129				
Document ID: 9607514				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac (4 pages)~~	~~11/14/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1129

FOLDER TITLE:
9607514

2015-0775-M
ke3479

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607514
RECEIVED: 14 NOV 96 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
TELCON
UN
HS
ZAIRE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE 14 NOV 96

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 18 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MARTINEZ LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MARTINEZ
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY JMH DATE 11-19-96 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96111522	FOR DECISION
001		X	96111911	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	96111911	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	96111911	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	961119	BURNS, W	

Rec'd 11/15

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7514

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	D/P	A - Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	ou 11/19	Dawith
Records Mgt.	5	TMA 11-19	diskette

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'96 NOV 15 PM 7:32

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes ____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 19, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By YDE NARA, Date 20060115
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris Eyes Only for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 11/15/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetakers: Mike Sheehan, Val Martinez, Pete Huggins, Katherine O'Loughlin, Wylma Robinson and Doug Mueller

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 14, 1996; 10:28-10:37 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

President Chirac: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Hello. (U)

President Chirac: How are you, Bill? (U)

The President: Fine, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: Congratulations again to you and to Hillary. And I am glad to hear you are going for a few days' holiday. (U)

The President: Well, I am going to try. We are having a meeting in Manila for the Asian-Pacific Forum, and I am taking a couple of days off in Hawaii and in Australia, and then I have a state visit to Australia. I have never been to Australia, and I am going to Thailand, and I have never been to Thailand. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Thailand is a very nice country. You will see a very nice place. Bill, very short things to tell you. Do you mind if I give the phone to the interpreter? (U)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Chirac: I would first like to tell you that I am overjoyed with the courageous decision you have taken to commit

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 11/14/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0775-M (1.16)

to the multinational force to Zaire. And I am extremely happy with the solution you have adopted because if I understood correctly, the U.S. will take charge of security and logistics at Goma airport and the British and French plus probably some African countries will take charge of Bukavu. But I really want to point out the following two things: in the longer term, to ensure stability in the region will absolutely require holding an international conference under the aegis of the UN and the OAU with at the very least representatives of the five concerned countries. The conference must establish a longer-term peace plan. Secondly, I am very concerned regarding possible instability in Zaire, and I would like to point out to you that the only personality capable of avoiding a disaster in Zaire is Mobutu. That is what I wanted to say. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, first of all, thank you for calling me and I am very pleased we are going to do things together. I believe our people are working out the details of the operation, so it has a reasonable chance of success. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, that is very important. ~~(C)~~

The President: Tony Lake is in New York talking to people who are at the UN, and when he gets back, I will talk to him about your plan for an international conference. Obviously, we are going to need a longer-term diplomatic initiative and this is the first time I have heard about an international conference, and I am intrigued by it. I want to talk to Tony about it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We have the same position, and we have no problem. No problem at all. But the only way to reach an international conference, which is the second necessary step, is to force Rwanda, and I think you are the only one able to force Rwanda directly or through Uganda, but it is a necessity. The danger of a destabilizing Zaire is great. ~~(C)~~

Second thing, I just finished the conference on Bosnia with the three presidents and everything was perfect; there was no problem. Christopher was here this morning, there were no problems. ~~(C)~~

Third thing, regarding your letter, do you have a definite position about Boutros-Ghali? ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Is there no way to discuss it? ~~(C)~~

The President: Here's what I would like to do. What I would like to do is to have our people discuss it. I would like to not

have this conversation with you yet. We can talk in a couple of days. Yesterday, Madeleine Albright came to me with an idea as a possible resolution. I just heard about this for the first time. I don't know that we can get agreement on this, but I would like our people to get details to you and your people. I'd like you to chew on it for a couple of days. I'll be away, but I will be reachable. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, but everything would be...I will be in Japan, but everything could be done between Tony Lake and Levitte. ~~(C)~~

The President: You might not agree to it. I just heard about it yesterday, and I don't want to say something wrong. Lake and Levitte can discuss it then you get back to me. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Okay. Yes. I just received a message from Hosni Mubarak because I tried to sell him the solution of two and a half years. He just sent me a message yesterday that this is not possible and with all the African countries being in favor of Boutros-Ghali, he couldn't accept it. I am ready to talk to him again about that, and I suggest that you also talk to him because the Egyptians are a little nervous about that thing, but what I can tell you is I know very well all the people in the UN, in Africa, in Latin America and in Asia. And I can tell you it would be, I think, very bad for the American image to veto if there is another solution available. And second, there is no solution less than half a mandate, two and a half years. Even if an agreement is written giving Boutros Ghali two and a half years to put up the reforms, less wouldn't be accepted. And he has a great, great majority in the UN and honestly, it would be a bad thing for America's image. I know you have home problems, but I tell you the truth. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, I do have big home problems, and if I did that, Congress wouldn't appropriate the UN a dollar. And I would be ridiculed for changing my position after the election. It would look as if I had no conviction about it at all. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Difficult option. ~~(C)~~

The President: I don't want Boutros Boutros-Ghali to be embarrassed about this. I want him to have a graceful exit. We have an idea that might or might not fly. Let's have Tony and Levitte talk, then we can get back in touch. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Okay, that is a good thing. No problem. ~~(C)~~

The President: Of course. (U)

President Chirac: Well, I hope you will have a rest. I know it will be very short, but I hope it will be very nice few days' holiday. (U)

The President: It will be good for Hillary and me to get away from the pressure cooker here. (U)

President Chirac: Good. Give her all my love. (U)

The President: I may have to make her Ambassador to France to get you to be nice to me for the next four years. (U)

President Chirac: That would be great. I like her very much. (U)

The President: Okay. Good-bye. (U)

President Chirac: I hope you will have a quiet and agreeable rest. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: LOE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

LOG 9607514
DATE 19 NOV 96

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE 14 NOV 96
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7514

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
November 14, 1996

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/02/15
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~ANDREW D. SENS~~ ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: VAL MARTINEZ VM

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac which took place on November 14, 1996.

Concurrence by: Mike Sheehan MSI VM

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve P Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 11/14/06

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1599				
Document ID: 9700643				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Chirac (7 pages)~~	~~01/30/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1599

FOLDER TITLE:
9700643

2015-0775-M
ke3480

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700643
RECEIVED: 31 JAN 97 08

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRENCH GUIANA MEMCON

PERSONS:

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

SUBJECT: MEMCON BW PRES & CHIRAC 30 JAN

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 04 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	97013119	FOR DECISION
002		X	97020316	HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970103	STATE	

National ~~Security~~ Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0643

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/2/3		
Dohse			
Kerrick	Copy		
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TMA 2.3	D
Records Mgt.	5		D w/disk

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:
'97 JAN 31 PM 6:05

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes ____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 3, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 6/06/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission only. ~~(C)~~.

Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Joyce A. Harmon
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 1/31/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine O'Loughlin, Peter Huggins, Wylma Robinson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 30, 1997, 10:18 - 10:47 a.m.
The Oval Office

President Chirac: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Hello, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's a great pleasure to hear you. (U)

President Chirac: Great pleasure for me to hear from you, too. May I tell you, Hillary did so well on French television. The press was fantastic. She was fascinating. Did you see the film? (U)

The President: No. (U)

President Chirac: It was absolutely wonderful, beautiful. Tell her congratulations. (U)

The President: I heard it was wonderful. (U)

President Chirac: Also, let me give you my congratulations for the Inauguration day. We have seen that on the television, that was beautiful also and we really were glad for you. (U)

The President: So far everything is going well here. I wanted to talk with you before you go to Russia. ~~(C)~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2009
2015-0775-M (1.17)

President Chirac: Bill, do you mind if I get an interpreter? As you know my English is not so good. I'll give the phone to the interpreter. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think your English is quite good! Please go ahead. I wanted to talk with you before your trip to Russia because we are clearly at an important point in our efforts to integrate Russia into the rest of Europe and cement a real NATO-Russia partnership. I think it is very important that we present a united front in our discussions with the Russians as we have to date. In particular, the statements you have made to the Poles, the Hungarians and the Czechs have been very useful in that regard. ~~(C)~~

As you know, Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth were in Moscow last week for talks with Primakov and others. Chernomyrdin is coming here next week for his regular meeting with the Vice President. I will see him and then I intend to see Yeltsin in March. I wanted to review with you where we have made progress and where we have work to do after the meetings Strobe and Fuerth had with the Russians. The discussions with Primakov went well. He was especially pleased NATO had given Secretary General Solana a broad negotiating mandate. He seemed very interested in the consultative mechanism we are proposing. Still, there are differences over the approach to the charter. Primakov wants a legally binding agreement, and we argued that a politically binding agreement would do the same job while avoiding damaging parliamentary fights. On the nuclear issue, we expressed willingness to repeat our "three no's" on nuclear deployments on new members' territory: "no intention, no plan and no reason" to do so. On conventional forces, we made it clear that we couldn't agree to prohibit forward basing, but we indicated that we might be able to meet some Russian concerns through the CFE adaptation negotiations. At the meeting this week in Brussels, the NATO allies need to agree on a comprehensive proposal for adapting the CFE treaty. I think it is important that the alliance come forward with a proposal that is meaningful, ambitious and forward-leaning. Primakov mentioned two other areas where we may be able to help. One would be an agreement to consult on NATO adaptation in the NATO-Russia channel. The other would be charter language that would, at least implicitly, make clear that Russia is not excluded from future consideration for membership in NATO. ~~(C)~~

As far as Yeltsin is concerned, I expect to see him in the spring also, hopefully in March. The reports we have so far on his medical condition are fairly positive and not as grim as some of the more extreme stories. And I think it is very, very important that we keep in touch as discussions continue and that we stay on the same page and send the same message to Moscow. For me, it

means standing firm and following through on new members at the Summit. We are all concerned with appearing to jam this through on the Russians. (Interpreter asked for clarification.) We are all concerned with the appearance that we have forced this on the Russians, but it is clear from our discussions to date that when they understand that we are unified, they will accelerate discussion of the NATO-Russia relationship, which will make it clear that we are not doing this against them and their government. ~~(C)~~

Let me just say one other thing. I know you are interested in a summit of five to discuss these important decisions on NATO-Russia. I don't rule that out, but I am concerned about the impact on other allies and where they are, particularly in their political situations at home. And we would have to know such a meeting would be a success. I would like to suggest that we not make a decision until after you meet with Yeltsin and after I meet with Yeltsin in March and we compare notes. Perhaps in order to address the concerns of other allies, we will need to define a broader agenda in addition to NATO-Russia issues. So, that's what I wanted to say. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Thank you very much, Bill. Thank you very much. Quite clearly, I don't intend when I see Mr. Yeltsin to speak any language other than the language of solidarity, because that is what we have to say to him. On Sunday, what I intend to say to Mr. Yeltsin is the following: first, expansion of NATO will be taking place on the basis of the current calendar -- commitments have been made now regarding the three, four or five countries that are likely to join in the first wave of new members. Secondly, expansion of NATO is in no sense a danger for Russia. We're not going back to the Alliance of the Cold War. Thirdly, Russia's interest is to commit itself if possible to negotiations so it can come up with an agreement with NATO that will make it possible to take on board its concerns; that should be quite simple to the extent that NATO is in no sense set up to be against Russia. ~~(C)~~

Regarding the question you raised, Bill, on the political or legal framework of the agreement which has to be drawn up, I don't think that this is a really fundamental aspect, and I think both of them are feasible. So that's what I want to say very clearly to Mr. Yeltsin when I meet him. And I will telephone you once I'm back in Paris the following week or Levitte will be telephoning Sandy Berger to explain how the meeting went. ~~(C)~~

But I would like to say one other word to you. First of all, on the basis of the information I have on the physical condition of Mr. Yeltsin, apparently, he is not very well. I hope you are the one with the right information. I have information that he is

not in very good health. Today, I had lunch with President Kuchma of the Ukraine; he had telephoned Yeltsin a few days ago and he wasn't very optimistic and he knows him very well. I also have similar comments from President Aliyev of Azerbaijan. Be that as it may, this is the first point: in Moscow, I think this is creating a preelectoral atmosphere. Mr. Zyuganov is in Paris today and he said two things. He met with the President of the French National Assembly, and the first thing he said is that we need to ensure that Mr. Clinton sets up a collegial system. And secondly, he said it was out of the question to accept anything regarding expansion of NATO. General Lebed, who is coming to France tomorrow, I think, is saying exactly the same thing. This is a domestic political problem. And all of those who believe that there may be a change at the head of Russia, and I hope they are wrong, are becoming demagogical and hedging their bets. ~~(C)~~

Secondly, if we can't reach an agreement with Russia -- I personally believe we will be able to reach one, but we will have to be diplomatic about it -- but if we don't reach an agreement, there will be very serious consequences, initially for Europe, so I do hope that we can conduct the whole business with the maximum of diplomacy. In my opinion, an agreement is not beyond our reach. I believe the agreement is possible. Having weighed the pros and cons, I think the way out in the present condition is that there should be a meeting of the five. Now this is a proposal by Germany, France and Britain, and of course, the Russians would agree. I do understand the reservations that you have regarding the reactions of the other countries, but I don't think that is very serious. It will be far more serious not to succeed in Madrid, which is to say the cards are in our hands. As you know, the problem regarding the other countries is one we are all very aware of. This is the problem Germany and France have with the European Union. Everything done within the union is by the driving force of France and Germany and the result of our efforts. Of course, the others complain that France and Germany decide everything, and whenever we don't, they all say that if we had, we would have moved forward. If we are not moving forward, they say we didn't decide. It is the same for NATO. I know we need some time to organize this. We must achieve success at Madrid, and I think we will need to take a decision immediately after your meeting with Mr. Yeltsin. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me respond to two or three points. First of all, I am pleased by what you said and the clear commitment we both share. On the meeting of the five, the main thing is to make sure we have the right substance in advance of the meeting and if we do, it could be quite helpful. On the question of the attitude of other political actors in Russia, Lebed, in his comments to us, actually is milder and more ambiguous than the Yeltsin government. When he was here, he said to us that NATO

expansion is going to occur and Russia must accept it and make the best arrangement possible. I do think we are less likely to reach agreement if we even hint that there is a possibility of slowdown in the timetable. That, I think, would give them an opening to exploit and they would try to run through it. But I think we can deal with Lebed in a positive way. That is my impression. ~~(C)~~

On the question of a treaty or legally binding agreement, the problem I see is that it would guarantee a whole round of political fights over ratification which would be particularly destructive in some countries. It could lead us to a lowest common denominator and an agreement that would wind up not satisfying anyone. If there were a higher-level political commitment signed by you and Yeltsin and the U.S. and a couple of other countries, I think it would have the impact of following through on our commitment without running the risk of a really messy ratification fight in the Duma or other political bodies around the world, including the U.S. Senate! ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Bill, I agree with you. First of all, I want to have a meeting of five but only if we are sufficiently well prepared to ensure success. Otherwise, there is no advantage to having a meeting. So I do agree with you there. But I think we can prepare it well and then be assured of having no problems in Madrid. Secondly, regarding the type of treaty, this is a political problem. I am sure we can find a phrasing or a formula sufficiently appropriate and attractive for the Russians and which would have no legal consequences. To be quite honest, I don't have a strong opinion on this. But I do want things to be very clear. I was slightly shocked during my discussions with Talbott -- I had the impression that he thought I perhaps did not support the Western point of view and that I might be having direct negotiations with the Russians. I don't know why, but that is the impression I got and I hope I was wrong. What I do want to say to you is that I will say to Mr. Yeltsin that expansion will take place and we must find correct conditions to ensure that this is not a traumatizing experience for Russia. That is how I see things at the moment. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think that is great to hear. It is what I thought you would say. I believe... ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Sorry Bill, I'm sorry to interrupt: I never said anything other than that. In fact, I have been criticized for what I have said in the French press. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, I know. In my talks with the Hungarians, the Czechs and the Poles, they are so grateful to you for holding to the July schedule. They see you as a great friend and

advocate with no ambiguity. And that is what I have always believed. As I think you understand, this is an historic point and the French leadership is crucial to the success of this enterprise. But I also believe Yeltsin trusts you and knows that you will do whatever you can do to make arrangements they can live with. We will work together with you on that. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I believe you. Now, Bill, regarding the problem with the reform of NATO as seen from the French point of view. We will talk about that when the time comes. I did want to say to you that I hope this won't be the occasion for difficulties between the U.S. and France. If we can come to an agreement, so much the better. Better in general terms because French public opinion is not in favor of it. But that is not really a problem. If we can't reach a technical agreement, I don't want a problem between us. I refuse to have arguments with you on this particular subject. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say, first of all, my impression is that Berger and Shali had a good meeting with Levitte and Douin on NATO command structure. They have agreed to continue the dialogue. I believe Levitte is coming here in a couple of weeks, and we will work very hard to work this out. I want very much to have France rejoin the integrated military structure. I believe we have gone a long way already toward building a European defense identity within NATO and developing a system for meeting European command aspirations. I want to work with you on this and not have a fight between us, but I must be guided by advice from the military about NATO effectiveness. That is why we didn't respond more positively to your specific proposal on AFSOUTH command. But we will be working on this and will find a way for your concerns and our concerns to be met. This is not a political issue for me, it is entirely the advice of my military commanders for the development of a long-term integration strategy and military and NATO effectiveness. I am committed to working something out; when Levitte comes back we will keep working on this. ~~(C)~~

I also hope at some point you and I will be able to meet, but I want to do it in a way consistent with your needs that doesn't cause problems. Whatever happens, I am not going to let this issue affect my personal relations with you or U.S.-France relations on larger issues regarding NATO. And I will keep working on this. I hope to meet you, but to do it at a time that is convenient for you. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I entirely agree with you, and I think we are on the same wavelength here. The subject does need to be looked at with calm and serenity, and it shouldn't cause problems between us. As soon as I get back from Moscow, Levitte will call

Berger, and if there is anything extraordinary or exceptional, I will call you directly. ~~(C)~~

The President: That is good. You will call me directly on that? ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: As soon as I get back from Moscow, I will have Levitte call Berger just to explain how the meeting went. And if there was something exceptional or extraordinary, then we will organize a direct phone call. ~~(C)~~

The President: Good. I will be available any time. I am always glad to hear from you. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you and good-bye. (U)

President Chirac: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 9700643

REFERRAL DATE: 03 FEB 97

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: BURNS, W

SOURCE: HARMON

DATE: 03 JAN 97

SUBJ: MEMCON BW PRES & CHIRAC 30 JAN

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 04 FEB 97

COMMENT:

FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KOE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9700643
DATE 03 JAN 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BW PRES & CHIRAC 30 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIG +DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0643

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 31, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 20100615
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Chirac on January 30, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 1/31/07

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1600				
Document ID: 9700786				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Chirac (2 pages)~~	~~02/05/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700786

2015-0775-M
ke3481

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700786
RECEIVED: 06 FEB 97 13

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 07 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE HS
TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES HARRIMAN, PAMELA

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC ON 5 FEB

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 10 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 01/01/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY TR DATE 2/7 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	KERRICK	Z	97020622	FOR DECISION
001		Z	97020716	KERRICK APPROVED RECOMS
001	HARMON	Z	97020716	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	97020718	HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970207	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0786

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/3		
Dohse			
Kerrick	2	(K)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TMA 2.7	D
Records Mgt.	5	(R) 2/7	D w/ disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

97 FEB 6 PM 6:14

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0786

February 7, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac ~~(C)~~

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac of France is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secreatary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris for the Chargé d'Affaires only. ~~(C)~~

Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 02/07/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac

Interpreter: Bill Weber
Notetakers: Cynthia Lawrence, Katherine O'Loughlin, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Trey Whitworth and Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 5, 1997, 12:12-12:16 p.m. EST
Air Force One

President Chirac: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, I am so sorry. You know we loved Pamela and we are so, so sorry. (U)

The President: I know. Winston called this morning right after she died to tell me what you're going to do. I just called to say thank you, we are so grateful. (U)

President Chirac: You know, Mr. President, Pamela was dearly loved in France. She was one of the great U.S. ambassadors and projected the perfect image of the U.S. in France. She was a friend of France. Needless to say, we will do everything necessary from our end. I have just spoken with her son. We'll do everything to pay appropriate homage to your ambassador. She will be receiving the highest decoration of the French Republic from me. It will be the first time it is awarded to any ambassador. Of course, Bernadette and I will be at the U.S. Embassy for the lying-in-state. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you so much. I know you are sending her home Saturday. Sandy Berger will fly back with her. I just called to tell you how much she cared for you and loved France.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 02/07/07

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 6/3/15
2015-0775-M (1.18)

This was a great joy for her. I can't tell you how grateful I am that you are going to give her the Legion of Honor. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I know all of that. I will meet Sandy Berger obviously and will take advantage of this opportunity to have a brief discussion with him at the embassy. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you very much, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you for calling. I appreciate it very much. And my personal condolences, if I may, because I know Pamela was a personal friend of you and your family. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, Hillary and I loved her very much. Hillary asked me to send her best and hopes to see you soon. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Thank you, again. Best wishes to Hillary. Hope to see you both soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9700786
DATE 07 FEB 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC ON 5 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Attachment

0786

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
February 6, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~SAMUEL R. BERGER~~ DONALD L. KERRICK (C) 7 FEB

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France on February 5, 1997

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac of France on February 5, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you ~~authorize~~ ~~Joyce Harman~~ to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon

UNCLASSIFIED
with ~~CONFIDENTIAL Attachment~~

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1623				
Document ID: 9703807				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac [partial] (8 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:
9703807

2015-0775-M
ke3482

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9703807
RECEIVED: 03 JUN 97 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 06 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & PRES CHIRAC ON 27 MAY AT ELYSEE PALACE

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 09 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 20160115
2015-0175-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	DAVIES	Z	97060611	FOR DECISION
001		X	97060617	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97060617	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JP Brown ~~Harmon~~	1	AB 6/4	
Davies	2	6/6 one for	A
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 6.6	D w/ dft
Records Mgt.	4	(2) 6/6	~~D~~ diskette

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 5 PM 7:32

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National Security Council
The White House

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JOB Brown ~~Harmon~~	1	AB 6/4	
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Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 6.6	D with diskette
Records Mgt.	4	(2) 6/6	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 5 PM 7:32

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 6, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques Chirac ~~(S)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and French President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to the Embassy in Paris for the Chargé d'affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/02/07

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac [partial] (8 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:
9703807

2015-0775-M
ke3482

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Donald Bandler, Chargé d'affaires
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Podesta, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Marcel Bouquet (Interpreter)

Jacques Chirac, President
Herve de Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-David Levitte, Elysee Diplomatic Advisor
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, French Ambassador to the United States
Catherine Colona, Elysee Spokesperson
Francois Delattre, Elysee Strategic Affairs Director (Notetaker)
Christopher Thiery (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1997, 9:05-9:45 a.m.
Elysee Palace

President Chirac: It's a great pleasure to receive you here. First, because it is you: you know that I have always had great admiration and friendship for you. Second, the day is interesting in and of itself. A page of history is being turned. I spoke last night with Boris Yeltsin and I found him satisfied and in good humor. I suggested that he come to Madrid, but he is very hesitant. I believe he is on the verge of saying yes, but many of his advisers, for reasons mainly of internal politics, are advising him not to go. We will need to talk to him about this today. ~~(C)~~

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 06/03/2019
2015-0075-M (1.19)

The President: I think that if he did come to Madrid in the right way, it would be a real coup for him. It would ratify our new vision of NATO's mission and how we and Russia relate to one another. It could be that his attendance would not be portrayed very well at home, even if the meeting went well. Nevertheless, I will also mention it to him. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I told him that the one who is absent loses out. I believe it would be possible to convince him to come. The first day would be a meeting of the 16 allies on NATO reform and our decisions on NATO enlargement. On the second day, Yeltsin could come to have a meeting in the morning of the new NATO-Russia group at the highest level, and then we could sign the NATO agreement with Ukraine with President Kuchma. (That part may not be the most attractive from Yeltsin's point of view.) After that, in the afternoon, we could have a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the highest level. That would look very good because it would enable the peace to take root. I am glad we see this in the same light. (~~C~~)

The President: I think we all are saying that we are trying to create a Europe for the 21st century that is democratic and united for the first time in history. It would be nice if Madrid could be packaged as an expression of the new Euro-Atlantic community. I understand the difficulties for Yeltsin, but I will discuss the subject with him as well. A lot of what we are trying to do is to affect the capacity of ordinary citizens in Russia to imagine a different future. We need to do the same for some people in Europe as well. If you think about the real security threats that we face -- ethnic and religious chaos as in Bosnia, cross-border threats like terrorism, weapons proliferation and narco-trafficking -- we need to bring in Russia if for no other reason than to prepare for the new challenges of the 21st century. The more we can get our publics thinking along these lines -- to imagine a 21st century in which we do not repeat the mistakes of this century -- the closer we will be to our goals. (~~C~~)

This is what we hope to achieve at Madrid. But I understand that this will be a huge risk for Yeltsin, whereas it would be no risk at all for us. Perhaps it can be worked out. I agree that the Ukraine part may make the Russians uncomfortable, since they don't want to see themselves on the same level as Ukraine. We might want to think about the timing of that element. Yeltsin will have to make his own calculations of how this would play out at home. Don't you agree, Strobe? (~~C~~)

Strobe Talbott: I agree. (U)

President Chirac: I agree with that. This is what I tried to explain to Boris last night. I think it is possible to change his mind. His instinct, I believe, is to come to Madrid. The problem is his advisers. I met him a week ago in Russia on my way home from China. When I explained the idea, he started by saying it was out of the question. But as we discussed it, he said that perhaps I was right, and that he would think about it. Yesterday, when I raised it again, Primakov was there and again Yeltsin's position was reserved. After some discussion, however, he said it was perhaps possible. ~~(C)~~

On NATO enlargement, I am very concerned about Romania. I see that the three countries that are most likely to be invited -- Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- are favorable toward the inclusion of Romania in the first wave. Yeltsin is indifferent. Helmet Kohl, with whom I dined a few days ago, is now in favor. I think that Romania is a fragile country. It has just done two things that are very important: first, it has started to evolve toward democracy; and second, it has reached historic agreements with Ukraine and Hungary to normalize their relations. What is quite extraordinary is that there are now Hungarian ministers in the Romanian government. Romania will be part of the southern flank of the Alliance. I would not like us to reintroduce a fracture between the North and the South in such a delicate region of Europe. Romanian public opinion knows it will take time for the country to be accepted by the EU for economic reasons. It has become an obsession for them to enter NATO. If they are not accepted, it will make very fragile the position of the Romanian government. I am saying this because it is a very serious issue. I do not see any disadvantages to bringing in Romania, but I see strongly the risks of leaving Romania out. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree that what the Romanians are doing to settle their border disputes and to take the path of reform is very impressive. We need to encourage this. Frankly, however, while we have always assumed that we would want to accept Romania sooner or later -- both for geopolitical reasons and for what the Romanians are now doing -- it could raise two problems. First, in spite of the good things that are going on, I wonder if there is enough of a track record for us to be sure that the Romanians could fulfill the essential obligations of Alliance membership. There is no question that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary could do so. Second, whatever happens to Romania, it is important to have an aggressive program for partnership and follow-up for those countries not in the first group. We cannot afford to let them believe that we are just moving the dividing line eastward and creating a new gray area. They need to have a sense that the partnership will become more vibrant and that there will be another decision on membership. ~~(C)~~

In this light, I am concerned that if we take in Romania and it is seen as marginal in terms of its qualifications, other candidates will not believe there will be a second wave. This would cause a lot of trouble around the edges, including in the Baltic states, but not only there. The main thing, is that, if we expand NATO in ways that required an investment by all of us -- and this will fall more heavily on Europe than the United States -- we need to be sure that these countries can meet the obligations we ask them to assume. I have nothing against Romania and I am encouraged by what you have said. I take seriously the larger political implications posed by Romania's history and its strategic location. My question is whether they do, in fact, have the same capacity as the other three candidates to meet the demands of NATO membership. And will the other candidates be more convinced if Romania is accepted that there will not be a second round, even though they are as qualified as Romania? Whatever we do, I hope you agree on the need to have a strategy for those not admitted but who want to be part of the united Europe and have been participating actively in the Partnership for Peace. We cannot appear to consign them to a historic purgatory. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Regarding the two reasons you have cited for your hesitation, I believe Romania can fulfill the requirements of membership; in any case, they have made a commitment to do so. Regarding the credibility of NATO enlargement, this is an important but not an essential question. Everyone knows there will be a continuing process of enlargement, whether or not Romania is in the first group. On the other hand, if Romania is not accepted, it will create a political and psychological trauma in the country after it has just made considerable efforts to support democracy and to settle its external problems. Romania now has very firm economic and financial reform policies, but they know that they will not get into the EU straightaway. Their public opinion, however, is fascinated by the idea of joining NATO. If it did not happen, it would be a genuine trauma with political consequences that would be very serious and destabilizing for the government. Romania has made progress toward a market economy, but it is very difficult and fragile. That is why I wanted to draw your attention to this issue. ~~(C)~~

The President: I will think about it seriously. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: One word on Bosnia. We are very worried. ~~(C)~~

The President: So are we. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I do not have a very good impression of what is going on. I do not know when you will decide to pull out U.S. forces. But the day that they leave, other troops will leave as

well. There are more and more arms in the region and I fear that it will turn for the worse. (C)

The President: I believe that the Dayton Peace Agreement, ratified in Paris, provides the structure for Bosnia's future. A peaceful future cannot be achieved unless we make substantially more progress between now and the middle of 1998 in terms of economic reconstruction, political reconciliation and resettlement, and unless we arrest the high-profile war criminals. Otherwise, we will have to find a way to stay longer. The problem is that we do not want to get into the position of occupying the country indefinitely. Moreover, I don't know if I could get the Republican Congress to permit us to stay beyond the middle of next year. (C)

The problem in Bosnia is that we want at least three different things right now that are inconsistent: first, we want the Dayton Agreement to be realized. Second, we want our troops to leave by mid-1998. Third, we do not want to do anything that would further complicate the problems we are having on war criminals and refugee returns. Yet, I cannot see how we can jump-start the political process without doing something about war criminals. So all of these goals are mutually inconsistent. We need to admit this. You have taken the lead, and I think the new British Prime Minister will be active as well. The Dutch will also be forthcoming. We need to put our heads together and decide what we would like to do most -- to decide what is the most important priority. (C)

President Chirac: That is right. (U)

The President: It is conceivable to me that we could draw down the lion's share of our military presence if things demonstrably improve between now and mid-1998. If we cannot do this, we will need to time our withdrawal carefully. The Bosnians might not go back to war, but the Dayton Agreement will clearly not be achieved. I have to say that I am encouraged because there seems to be a coalescing of European opinion around former Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp as the successor to Carl Bildt. If he is the one you want, that is okay with us, but we would like to have an American, Jacques Klein, as his principal deputy. We have had another one of Bildt's deputies return to join my staff, so his spot is vacant, and that could go to a European. We need to get a new team in place quickly. Every positive thing that we can accomplish day-by-day can give the people a psychological stake in peace. On war criminals, we have been working, planning and discussing the issue jointly. Pretty soon we will need a serious discussion of that issue. (C)

President Chirac: I share the same analysis as you. We agree on Westendorp; his is the first name that came up and we have agreed to it. It is perfectly legitimate that Mr. Klein work with him. (C)

(Discussion of war criminals reported separately)

The President: What do you make of the election in Iran? (C)

President Chirac: I posed that question to a number of people, including Boris Yeltsin, who took the decision in Helsinki to stop selling arms to Iran -- a promise he intends to keep. The echoes so far from Iran are positive on the whole. I do not think the election will give rise to fundamental change, but at least now the situation will not get worse. That in itself is good news. I am not an Iran expert, but I believe it was the best -- or the least worst -- result we could have hoped for. (C)

The President: There may be some basis for progress. With such a complex governing structure, however, it is hard for outsiders to assess the significance of the election. Rafsanjani will now move to an advisory council. He and the new president might together create some good, but the Ayatollah Khamenei is still in charge, together with other conservative religious leaders. It appears for now that there may be some domestic relaxation of the fundamentalist regime, but the new president, during the campaign, had to restate the party line on foreign policy, including support for terrorism. (C)

In the aftermath of the Mykonos verdict, the United States and EU have been trying to come to a more common policy. We need to establish benchmarks for evaluating Iranian behavior. It is unlikely that we will succeed if we have different policies. If we are together, we can affect how the Iranians relate to the outside world. After Mykonos, the EU took steps that are more in line with our approach. For our part, we are willing to look at the possibilities of the new regime. (C)

Let me add that all of this is complicated by our ongoing investigation of the bombing of our military personnel in Saudi Arabia at Al Khobar. There is a possibility of high-level Iranian government involvement, although we have not reached a final conclusion; it is a difficult case. The Iranians are pursuing a policy that can only bring them grief, as well as undermining our ability -- the United States and Europe together -- to achieve our shared objectives in the Middle East. (S)

President Chirac: I see things the same way. On the Middle East peace process, we are even more pessimistic. Things have been

going from bad to worse. Sooner or later there will be an explosion. It is now perfectly clear that the Israeli Prime Minster will not make a move. He is firmly resolved to block the peace process. My number one worry is how other Arab countries view the situation, the Palestinians in particular. A strong gesture could possibly help, such as freezing the construction of settlements at Har Homa, but I don't think that Netanyahu will do this. That is why I am very worried. ~~(C)~~

The President: (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

President Chirac: (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

I would like to raise one small personnel matter, namely the successor of the Director General of INTELSAT. We have a French candidate of good quality. He is very knowledgeable and did good

work in privatizing French telecom companies. We would like him to get the job. (~~C~~)

The President: We have no candidate and no preference. I would like to hear more about your candidate's views on telecom policy. We have all worked hard to get the global telecommunications agreement. This will be good for the entire world over the next 20 years. I have no interest other than pursuing a policy that makes the most sense for world telecommunications programs. Please give us more information. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Our candidate is at your disposal. I believe you will find him perfectly in line with your interests. (U)

The President: One more thing. I hope we can work together on Iraq. The sanctions are still in effect, including the no-fly zone. The Iraqis have been flying helicopters during the Hajj. This was, strictly speaking, in violation of the no-fly zone, even though it may have been harmless. As a result, we thought that we ought to, on the one hand, recognize the right to have humanitarian flights, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the no-fly zone. Therefore, we suggested to the Iraqis that it would be permissible to carry out humanitarian flights, but they will need to file a flight plan in advance. Because of the continuing effectiveness of the no-fly zone under UN Security Council Resolutions, we would give our explicit authorization as long as they provide an advance notice. The Saudis, Kuwaitis and British have agreed to this approach, believing it is a reasonable solution. It would give the Iraqis a legitimate right to humanitarian flights without undermining the no-fly zone. I think it is important that we work out the details so that we can all be together on this. I would not want another situation like we had last year when we were at odds in enforcing the no-fly zone. I do not need your answer today. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: I will ask my experts to study this further and get back to you. Now I must depart in order to greet the other leaders arriving at the NATO-Russia Summit. (~~C~~)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VOE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9703807
DATE 06 JUN 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & PRES CHIRAC ON 27 MAY AT ELYSEE PALACE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3807

June 5, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCE NARA, Date 20060115
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with French President Jacques Chirac, May 27, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve 6/6 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 06/02/07

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1623				
Document ID: 9703818				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (2 pages)~~	~~06/02/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓2
~~001b. draft~~	~~[Draft of 001a] (1 page)~~	~~06/02/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓2
001c. telcon	[Incomplete Telcon re: Prime Minister Chretien of Canada] (1 page)	00/00/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:
9703818

2015-0775-M
ke3483

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9703818
RECEIVED: 03 JUN 97 14

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE 2 JUNE

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 09 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10/09/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 6/05 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	DAVIES	Z	97060418	FOR DECISION
001		X	97060507	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97060507	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970604	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3818

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Tmw A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
K Braun ~~Harmon~~	1		
Davies	2	6/4	A
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(2) 6/4	D
Records Mgt.	4		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 4 PM12:24

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3818

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
K Brown ~~Harmon~~	1		
Davies	2	6/4	A
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(D) 6/4	D
Records Mgt.	4		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 4 PM12:24

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3818

June 4, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and President Chirac of France ~~(C)~~

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 6/3/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetakers: James Smith, Marc Koehler, Anthony Campanella, Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 2, 1997, 2:38-2:41 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hi Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Okay. Just called to commiserate with you. Sorry the election didn't go better. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, it doesn't change a thing on foreign policy; for the rest, we will see. Thank you very much, I'm very touched by your call. Thank you very, very much Bill. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think it makes it more likely you will be reelected when you come up again. That is my experience. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Probably. That is what French history says. On foreign policy, it won't change anything at all. In our constitution, defense and international policy are totally the responsibility of the president. Therefore, it will not change much. You are not going to have a change on foreign or defense policy. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, that's good, and I'm looking forward to seeing you in Denver. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: If we could do in Denver what we did in Lyons -- a 30-minute meeting, just the two of us, I could tell you a few things about the Denver agenda. ~~(C)~~

The President: Absolutely. ~~(C)~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0175-M (1 of 2)

President Chirac: Just 30 or 45 minutes would be enough. I know your schedule will be tight. ~~(C)~~

The President: I want to see you in Denver; let's set up a bilateral so we can visit. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Okay. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let's do it. We'll do 45 minutes and have a good meeting. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Okay, okay Bill. Very nice of you to call. I am very moved that you called. (U)

The President: I've been there, right where you are. It may be a blessing in disguise. Sooner or later, France will have to take the direction you've advocated; this might change their way of thinking. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Honestly, I guess so. To be here three years before the turn of the new century and to have a member of the communist party in the government is madness, just madness. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, either they won't implement the policies they advocate or you'll be vindicated very quickly. Well, keep your chin up, and I'll see you in Denver. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Thanks. Pass my warmest regards to your wife and to you also, because I appreciate very much your phone call. (U)

The President: Thank you, friend. See you soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetakers: James Smith, Marc Koehler, Anthony Campanella, Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 2, 1997, ~~1438-1441~~ 2:38 - 2:41 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hi Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Okay. Just called to commiserate with you. Sorry the election didn't go better. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, it doesn't change a thing on foreign policy; for the rest, we will see. Thank you very much, I'm very touched by your call. Thank you very, very much Bill. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think it makes it more likely you will be reelected when you come up again. That is my experience. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Probably. That is what French history says. On foreign policy, it won't change anything at all. In our constitution, defense and international policy are totally the responsibility of the president. Therefore, it will not change much. You are not going to have a change on foreign or defense policy. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, that's good, and I'm looking forward to seeing you in Denver. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: If we could do in Denver what we did in Lyons - a 30-minute meeting, just the two of us, I could tell you a few things about the Denver agenda. ~~(C)~~ next time

The President: Absolutely. ~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 6/3/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0175-M (1.2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister Chretien of Canada ~~(C)~~

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Chretien is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in ~~Canada~~ Ottawa for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission ~~(DCM)~~ only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 6/3/07

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. telcon	[Incomplete Telcon re: Prime Minister Chretien of Canada] (1 page)	00/00/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:
9703818

2015-0775-M
ke3483

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 3, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By YOE NARA, Date 101015
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac of France on June 3, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve 6/6/4 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 6/3/07

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VOE Date: 06/06/15
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9703818
DATE 04 JUN 97

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1624				
Document ID: 9703897				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	President's Meeting with French President Chirac [partial] (2 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1624

FOLDER TITLE:
9703897

2015-0775-M
ke3484

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9703897
RECEIVED: 05 JUN 97 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BW CHIRAC & PRES 27 MAY RE BOSNIAN WAR CRIMINALS

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 11 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW
		FICKLIN

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/05/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	STEINBERG	Z	97060610	FOR DECISION
001		X	97060915	STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97060915	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970609	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 6/6/97 1158am

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3897

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
~~Harmon~~ HP Brown	1	NB 6/6	
Davies	2/5	6 6/6/6 6/9	A
Kerrick	3	(D)	
Steinberg	4		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	(R) 6/9	
Records Mgt.	7		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: DON/Jim

Not sure we want to send this around. Albright was there, so she already has info. Do I sign?

-Glyn

'97 JUN 5 PM 7:31

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET-GREEN-LIGHT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3897

June 9, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/05/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques Chirac -- Exchange on Bosnia War Criminals (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation covers the exchange on Bosnia war criminals during the President's meeting with French President Jacques Chirac and is provided Eyes Only for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be handled only in NODIS/GREEN LIGHT channels. It is not to be given any further distribution. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET-GREEN-LIGHT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a,d)
Declassify On: 1.6x4

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	President's Meeting with French President Chirac [partial] (2 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1624

FOLDER TITLE:
9703897

2015-0775-M
ke3484

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac - Exchange on Bosnia War Criminals ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Donald Bandler, Chargé d'affaires
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Podesta, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Marcel Bouquet (Interpreter)

Jacques Chirac, President
Herve de Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-David Levitte, Elysee Diplomatic Advisor
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, French Ambassador to the United States
Catherine Colona, Elysee Spokesperson
Francois Delattre, Elysee Strategic Affairs Director (Notetaker)
Christopher Thiery (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1997, 9:05-9:45 a.m.
Elysee Palace

President Chirac: (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 06/03/2019
2015-0775-M (1.22)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The President: If you look at the level of protection Karadzic has, he obviously senses that he is not a totally free bird right now. I think it is a good idea that the five of us meet, either before or after lunch. ~~(S)~~

Samuel Berger: You would have to meet discreetly. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: We would not discuss any other matters. ~~(S)~~

The President: We would need to have a public explanation for why we were meeting. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: We can probably do this without people asking too many questions. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think this is a very important subject. ~~(C)~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date 010815
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9703897
DATE 09 JUN 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BW CHIRAC & PRES 27 MAY RE BOSNIAN WAR CRIMINALS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET-GREEN-LIGHT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 3897
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 5, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~GLYN T. DAVIES~~ JIM STEINBERG

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac -- Exchange on Bosnia War Criminals

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the exchange on Bosnia war criminals during the President's meeting with French President Jacques Chirac, May 27, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

Approve 6/9 Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve JM Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

Interim
Bill Burns that
memcon has been
prepared; if
Sec Shit wants
copy, transmit
eyes only to him;
no distribution to
Paris (Bandler was
fine)

~~SECRET-GREEN-LIGHT~~
Reason: 1.5(a,d)
Declassify On: 1.6x4

~~SECRET-GREEN LIGHT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 3897
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques Chirac -- Exchange on Bosnia War Criminals ~~(S)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation covers the exchange on Bosnia war criminals during the President's meeting with French President Jacques Chirac and is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be handled only in NODIS/GREEN LIGHT channels. It ~~may also be sent to the Embassy in Paris for the Chargé d'affaires only~~. ~~(S)~~ is not to be given any further distribution.

Eyes Only

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET-GREEN LIGHT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a,d)
Declassify On: 1.6x4

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1627				
Document ID: 9704353				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	The President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac [partial] (9 pages)	06/20/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1627

FOLDER TITLE:
9704353

2015-0775-M
ke3485

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704353
RECEIVED: 23 JUN 97 11

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 25 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
MIDDLE EAST
EU
MEMCON
NATO
UN

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 20 JUN 97

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 28 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 6/25 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9704353

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	DAVIES	Z	97062507	FOR DECISION
001		X	97062507	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97062509	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970625	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

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Rice	2	Rice 6/24	
Davies			
Kerrick	1	(E) 6/24	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 6.25	D
Records Mgt.	4		D w/disk

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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National Security Council
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Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
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cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 24 PM 6:12

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 25, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VQE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Chirac on June 20, 1997

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to the Embassy in Paris for the Chargé only. ~~(C)~~

Edward S. Reid
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/23/07

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NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1627

FOLDER TITLE:
9704353

Kara Ellis
2015-0775-M
ke3485

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Marcel Bouquet, Interpreter

President Jacques Chirac
Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador to the United States
Jean-David Levitte, Diplomatic Advisor to President Chirac
Jean-Claude Poimboeuf, Assistant to the Diplomatic Advisor (Notetaker)
Leda W. Zuckerman, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 20, 1997, 2:55-3:55 p.m.
Brown Place Hotel, Denver, Colorado

The President: Let's run through the issues, since we have little time. (U)

President Chirac: I would first like to raise the Middle East peace process. I am terribly concerned. You Americans are giving the impression of being less engaged. The Israelis are not moving. President Mubarak is trying to do his utmost, but he cannot succeed alone. Arafat is becoming more and more discouraged and also feels threatened. There is a risk that terrorism will return. Thus I don't think we can stand still. What is to be done? ~~(C)~~

At the European Summit, we took the initiative to make a general appeal to the parties, but we don't expect much to come from this. I wonder whether we might not recall what we said at Sharm el-Sheikh a few months ago, by contemplating the possibility of a

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 06/03/2019
2015-0775-M (1.23)

new union of "peace-builders" through a second meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh. I am absolutely convinced that the situation is going to explode. I have had a lot of contacts with Arab leaders, and you can feel it building up. We are at the mercy of the huge, absurd terrorists, and the very first victim will be Arafat. When he goes, the prospects for any serious discussion will decline. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The President: Let me say, first, that I agree with much of your analysis. The situation is quite dangerous. Arafat is increasingly vulnerable. (b)(1)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

We believe we need to find a way to reenergize Arafat's security cooperation and to get the Israelis to take specific, substantive, positive steps to strengthen Arafat and thus give some new integrity to the peace process. We have been very frustrated -- as frustrated as you. We want what we do to be effective, but we also don't want to lose our ability to influence Israel. We had a long meeting on this yesterday. I would like our people to do a little work in the region for a few days and then get back in touch with you. We want to restore momentum; otherwise, the situation will deteriorate. There may be things we can do. ~~(C)~~

Regarding the idea of going back to Sharm el-Sheikh, the Arabs would first want to know what Israel would do. The Israelis would want to know if the Arabs would support Arafat's position if he resumed security cooperation and took a stand against terrorism. It is entirely do-able if the Israelis will make some small moves. You're right that if we wait too long, Arafat's capacity to act will decline. As I said, we are exploring the possibilities, so give us a few days. ~~(C)~~

I would go to Sharm el-Sheikh if it could have a positive impact. But remember why we came the last time: the Arabs came and condemned terrorism -- this was astonishing. They felt they could do so since the peace process had real integrity. They even tolerated the conduct of operations in Lebanon by the Peres government that they considered outrageous, since they trusted the Israelis' motives. Now they will need to be persuaded that Netanyahu will do things he doesn't like and which show that he is committed to the peace process. ~~(C)~~

We have been wracking our brains over what to do. We are not going to withdraw from the process. We want to avoid public statements (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

President Chirac: (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The President: (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

President Chirac: (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The President: Give me a few days. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: My second subject is the Madrid NATO Summit. Do you know whether or not Yeltsin will come? ~~(C)~~

The President: He was just here and said he will not go to Madrid, nor will Primakov. But he said that someone at the level of Deputy Prime Minister would represent Russia. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Berger: He may have meant Deputy Foreign Minister level. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Albright: The Russian Ambassador to Spain may be the representative; he is a former Deputy Foreign Minister. ~~(C)~~

The President: I have been thinking about how to deal with this. I urged him to send someone of a high enough level that people didn't draw the conclusion that Yeltsin wasn't serious about what

we did in Paris. If you see him, I suggest you make that point. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I will see him on Saturday. (U)

The President: You should make the same argument. You came to Paris and captured the imagination of Europe and the United States. Everyone was happy that Europe of the 21st century was not going to be divided. Then, if you sent someone anonymous to Madrid, people would ask whether you were just kidding in Paris. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I already told him the same thing in Moscow two weeks ago. In fact, he was tempted to come, but his senior collaborators convinced him not to go for understandable domestic reasons. (~~C~~)

The President: That's right. They convinced him of the need to calm things down after all they have done with NATO. They are also trying to solve their problems with Japan, China and other countries. They don't want to give too much ammunition to the ultra-nationalists while they are working on ratification of START II. But even if they have decided that the President should not come, they should send another senior figure. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Maybe Chernomyrdin. (~~C~~)

The President: Yes, perhaps. They need to come up with someone more senior. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I will bring it up again with Yeltsin. On Madrid, we were very disappointed by the position that you took on Romania. (~~C~~)

The President: I know. (U)

President Chirac: We learned of this from the newspapers. It was an error in political and moral terms. At Madrid, we will have the opportunity to discuss this further. I have gathered that there is no room for maneuver in the U.S. position. Perhaps you would consider an idea: the three that you support would enter NATO at once, while the two others would enter two years later. If we don't do something like this, we will destabilize Romania. Naturally, I understand that Romania is very far from the United States; but it is very close to France. It is in a very difficult and unstable part of Europe. In Romania, your position will lead to a rejection of the democratic government and have the very negative implications. It will call into question their commitment to solve the question of the Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities and destabilize their democracy.

The President: The first time you discussed this with me, you were very persuasive. The position that we took was rooted in four considerations, none of which fully undermine your point. First, our military experts believe that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the most ready for membership. Second, we have a big isolationist bloc in the Congress (Madeleine Albright just got Jesse Helms to vote in favor of the UN for the first time in eleven years) and we thought that these three countries were the ones that we could best get confirmed. Third, in political and military terms, Romania has made a lot of encouraging first steps, but extending military guarantees is a grave matter, and Romania needs to do as much as the others. ~~(C)~~

Fourth, we need to think of how our decision will play out with Yeltsin, the Baltic countries and others like Ukraine who might want to get in the future. We have to keep the door open. We should take in new members as they become qualified. If we did five, there would be immediate pressure to admit the Baltics, since there would be no one else ready for the second wave. After all the work that you and I did with the Russians, our relations could deteriorate. For all these reasons, we took the position in favor of three. If we said there will get in right away and identified the next two at the same time, there would be no substantial difference than if we took five, ~~(C)~~

I ask you to consider another proposal to assure that we have good relations with Romania. Given all the ethnic problems in Bosnia, we want to reward countries who solve them peacefully. Romania is the next biggest country in the region after Poland. We therefore need to develop a vigorous open-door package at Madrid, one that shows that we will be admitting new members in the short term. ~~(C)~~

Another idea I had (which you might find off-the-wall) would be for you and me to get on a plane after Madrid and fly to Romania to meet with Romanian leaders. You could tell them that you wanted Romania admitted now; I could say that I had been influenced by the points you had made, and that we consider Romania -- if it continues to perform well -- to be among the strongest candidates for the next wave. We could send the same message to the Romanian public. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I can give your proposal some thought. Something needs to be done. ~~(C)~~

The President: I don't expect you to answer today. Think about it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, I will. In principle, I am favorable toward the idea. (C)

The President: The important thing is to keep Romania's public and its leaders committed to the path of reforms and to prepare for membership. We need to lock in some countries on the southern flank. We could send a similar message to Slovenia (although I don't have the time to go there). (C)

It's very interesting. It appears that even the Austrians are now interested in joining NATO. A significant number of nations in the Partnership for Peace are seeking membership. While the question has still to be resolved, it is possible that we could let in more than two in the second wave. So my point is that we need to find a way to send an open-door message -- especially to Romania -- that they will get in if they stay on course. I would have no problem going there with you and making that statement. (C)

President Chirac: Are you naturally excluding the possibility of having Slovenia in without Romania? (C)

The President: I'm not in favor of that -- unless something goes bad in Romania, it is the second-biggest country in the region and strategically valuable. At a minimum, Romania should be in the second round. (C)

President Chirac: But do you exclude going from three to four in the first round, adding Slovenia but not Romania? (C)

The President: I don't think we should do that. I rule that out, since it would make things worse for Romania. (C)

President Chirac: Good. That would be unacceptable to us. (C)

The President: Prime Minister Prodi may ask me about that, but that would be the same as nailing Romania. Moreover, given those who don't want to expand at all, we need to have at least two good candidates for the next time. If we keep two waiting, it will increase the pressure to do the second round in a timely fashion. (C)

President Chirac: You mentioned President Yeltsin's position. He has no difficulty with the idea of Romania joining NATO. In fact, given the idea of the open door, he would prefer Romania versus the others. So there may be some problems with Yeltsin, but not over Romania. He is against expansion, but if it has to occur, then he does not object to Romania. He knows that it is important to maintain stability in southern Europe, and he knows

that stability would be threatened by a decision not to admit Romania. (C)

The President: If we go, we will send a message not only to Romania but to Bosnia. You don't need to commit now. But it would be a way to show the partnership between out countries -- just as we worked together on another subject, bringing Russia into the Paris Club. This is a big deal for Yeltsin. We should tell Yeltsin we were glad to do it, but he should up the level of his representation at Madrid. Another area where we are working with the Russians is as co-chairmen of the Minsk Group. We could avoid a lot of headaches if we could get a deal on Nagorno-Karabakh. We have a French-U.S.-Russian framework and now we need to solve it. (C)

(Exchange on Bosnia reported separately)

President Chirac: One little detail. You know how devoted we are to Lebanon. Actually, American citizens are not allowed to travel there. Lebanon has undertaken all the measures the U.S. has requested to get the restriction lifted. I would be very grateful to you if you could lift the ban and allow Americans to travel; this ban shows a lack of confidence. (C)

The President: Secretary Albright should take note. This is a conversation I have had within my own government a half-dozen times after my previous discussions with you on Lebanon. There are a lot of Lebanese-Americans who have also raised it, since they want to travel, and who are concerned that the interests of Lebanon could be sacrificed in the Middle East peace process. There is a review going on now. Secretary Albright has to make the call under our law within the next month. The way the law works is that we have to be able to say that there is not an unreasonable risk of terrorist action. We have had bad experiences in Lebanon, but we would like to do it. We will reexamine the question now that you have raised it. (C)

President Chirac: There is no risk in going to Lebanon. It is far less risky than many other countries. Lebanon is a small country trying to restore harmony, and the process is on track. They feel that the ban on travel by Americans is a limiting factor. Flatter them but don't insult them -- that is the golden rule. (C)

The President: A question on Iraq. The UN has recently had a lot of difficulties. Ekeus just came back and said he had been completely thwarted in exercising his responsibility to inspect for weapons of mass destruction. We would be happy to see more positive developments like passage of resolution 986 permitting the sale of oil. We proposed to change the no-fly zone to allow

humanitarian flights. The UN needs to say something in light of Ekeus's report. We have proposed a UN Security Council resolution that is fairly modest. Saddam must comply with the requirement for inspections or his senior people cannot travel outside Iraq. We hope you will review the resolution and support it. I would not want to see a French veto. Ekeus is a reasonable and patient man. He feels the Iraqis stiffed him. The resolution seems fairly moderate, yet firm enough. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I don't know where the truth lies regarding Ekeus's mission. One day things look black, the next day they look white, according to Ekeus. Your draft resolution is being discussed. We have a few amendments, but we don't intend to veto it. We can't exclude all people traveling from Iraq. It will be hard to determine whether or not someone is the wife or son of a military authority. ~~(C)~~

Let me tell you that the embargo policy has never been effective and, one day or another, we will have to change it. It hasn't produced results. Saddam is eating and drinking well. The brunt of the embargo is being borne by the people of Iraq. I have always opposed the embargo because I believe it is deeply immoral. It is having no effect on Iraq's leaders, yet is sending the poorest people into poverty -- children have nothing to eat. It is a barbaric course. We cannot go on creating deplorable conditions for the most defenseless people. It hurts our moral conscience. Why did you stop before Baghdad? ~~(C)~~

The President: Please be fair. We passed 986, which allows a lot of oil to be sold. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: At long last. It took a lot of work. Another problem is that Saddam is sitting there, mad. No one talks to him, not even Tariq Aziz, because if they did, he would kill them off. He is all-powerful. ~~(C)~~

Our embargo is plunging people into misery. We are a strange people. We keep talking about morality, yet we give short shrift to moral concerns in our policy. This is a paradox. The West always think that it's right -- this is arrogant. It is true of France, Europe and the United States, but it isn't right. In any event, we will not veto the resolution, but we do have amendments. ~~(C)~~

The President: I'll see you tonight. (U)

President Chirac: We will be discussing Bosnia. I met Carl Bildt three days ago and he was very worried. Will you maintain the G-7 for financial issues? ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, until Russia can qualify. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I agree. (~~C~~)

The President: But it is important that we minimize the time spend among the seven. We don't want to embarrass Russia. (~~C~~)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4353

June 23, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By YDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between President and President Chirac of France

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and French President Chirac in Denver on June 20, 1997

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/23/07

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: CDE Date: 10/08/15
2015 0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9704353
DATE 25 JUN 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

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Case Number: 2015-0775-M

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Document ID: 9704354				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

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([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1627

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2015-0775-M
ke3486

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704354
RECEIVED: 23 JUN 97 11

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 25 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
MEMCON

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 20 JUN RE EXCHANGE ON BOSNIA & WAR CRIMINALS

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 28 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 20160115
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 6/25 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	DAVIES	Z	97062511	APPROPRIATE ACTION
001		X	97062511	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97062511	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970625	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4354

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	#2	(R) 6/24	
Davies			
Kerrick	1	(K) OK 6/24	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 4.25	D-w/h
Records Mgt.	4		D diskette

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 24 PM 6:12

Exec Sec Office has diskette no

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4354

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	~~2~~	(R) 6/24	
Davies			
Kerrick	1	(K) OK 6/24	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 4.25	~~D~~ - w/att
Records Mgt.	4		D distribute

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 24 PM 6:12

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/GREEN LIGHT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4354

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 25, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Chirac, June 20, 1997 -- Exchange on Bosnia and War Criminals

The attached Memorandum of Conversation covers the exchange on Bosnia and war criminals during the President's Denver bilateral meeting with French President Chirac and is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be handled in NODIS/GREEN LIGHT channels. It should not be distributed outside the Department. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
FOR: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET/GREEN LIGHT~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a,d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X4, X6

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	The President's Meeting with French President Jaques Chirac (3 pages)	06/20/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1627

FOLDER TITLE:
9704354

2015-0775-M
ke3486

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET/GREEN LIGHT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4354
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 23, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 20160815
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES (D) FOR AV

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between President and President Chirac of France -- Exchange on Bosnia and War Criminals

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the exchange on Bosnia and war criminals during the President meeting with French President Chirac in Denver on June 20, 1997

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET/GREEN LIGHT~~
Reason: 1.5(a,d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X4,X6

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9704354
DATE 25 JUN 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 20 JUN RE EXCHANGE ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1631				
Document ID: 9704910				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (4 pages)	07/08/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	[Incomplete draft of 001a] (4 pages)	07/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1631

FOLDER TITLE:
9704910

2015-0775-M
ke3487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704910
RECEIVED: 16 JUL 97 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 30 JUL 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & PRES CHIRAC ON 8 JUL

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 22 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By DOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY [illegible] DATE 7/30 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	STEINBERG	Z	97071622	FOR DECISION
001		Z	97073014	STEINBERG APPROVED RECOMS
002		X	97073014	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970730	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 7/17 11 AM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4910

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(R) 7/16	
Davies	2/4	CS 7/17	
Kerrick			
Steinberg	3		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	7/30	
Records Mgt.	6	(R) 7/30	No Dist Needed

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Jim. Given relative importance of this meeting and fact I was not there, want you to OK it. Glyn

'97 JUL 16 PM 7:43

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes



National Security Council
The White House

1000 7/17 11 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4910

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(R) 7/16	
Davies	~~4~~ 2/4	CS 7/17	
Kerrick			
Steinberg	3		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	7/30	~~D~~
Records Mgt.	6	(R) 7/30	~~D~~
			D No Dist Needed

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Jim. Given relative importance of this meeting and fact I was not there, want you to OK it. Glyn

'97 JUL 16 PM 7:43

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 30, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques Chirac ~~(S)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and President Jacques Chirac is provided eyes only for the Secretary of State. ~~(S)~~

FOR: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/16/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Jacques Chirac, President
Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-David Levitte, Diplomatic Advisor to President
Jacques Blot, MFA Political Director
Francois Delattre, Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to President (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 8, 1997, 4:35-5:00 p.m.
Palacio de Congresos, Madrid

President Chirac: Two words on the Middle East. I spoke with Arafat four days ago. He was very discouraged and tired. He said one thing that struck me: "The hope of peace is an idea which is dying in the minds of the people." This is true. All of a sudden he took a piece of paper from his pocket and said he would like to submit a last proposal for a compromise with which Mubarak would agree. The proposal was conveyed, and it was naturally sent to the United States immediately. I am very worried. But now it is too late. All the information we have on the situation, especially in Lebanon, is very negative. Those who want to conduct terrorism are getting stronger and stronger. ~~(C)~~

The President: Since we spoke last time, when I said we needed to get the parties together to support the peace process, we have been working hard to persuade the Israelis that time is running

Reason: 1.5. (d)
Declassify On: 7/16/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2015-0775-M (1.25)

out. We have told them that they need to take unilateral action to put Arafat in a position to deal. We have told the Israelis that if they lose Arafat, they will lose it all. I reported what you said in Denver, as well as our own assessments, that he has become weakened among the Palestinians. This is because some people will say that he tried to cooperate and was punished for it. I suggest that we stay in close touch over the next few days with your representatives and with the EU Special Envoy to see if we can make progress with Netanyahu. If we do, there is a chance that we could get everyone together and create some forward movement. We might be able to have the meeting in Sharm el-sheykh that you suggested when we were in Denver. I told the Israelis that they were putting me in a position in which I have lost all my influence with Europe and with Arafat; all I can do is veto UN resolutions while Israel blocks the peace process. If we see any movement by the Israelis, I will be in touch with you. ~~(C)~~

Recent small changes in Israel may be the only silver lining. Minister of Defense Mordechai has been allowed to issue more work permits to Palestinians. The numbers are approaching the high-water mark of the period since the Intifada. We are working to persuade the Israelis to take other steps that could get the process back on track. We need to be able to say something to Arafat about what the Israelis have done, and not just tell him to come back to the table and engage on security issues. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: What I fear is that Netanyahu has already decided to create a Greater Israel at any cost. He will live with a small Palestinian state, but it will be mere confetti. More and more, the evidence indicates he is determined to keep the bulk of the territory. He will not take into account the Oslo or Taba agreements. If this malice is in fact the case, we will see the terrible provocations. He may think that after that, he will be able to control the Palestinians by force. I hope that this is not his reasoning, but he said things to me that made my suspicions grow. If this is the case, the whole Middle East will explode. I am in constant contact with Arab leaders and they are becoming more and more pessimistic. They may not always tell you what they really think, but their pessimism is rising. ~~(C)~~

The President: If you go back twenty years, to the Camp David accords and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, you can see a fundamental difference between Likud and Labor. Likud made peace with Egypt, supports the peace agreement with Jordan, and can even contemplate peace with Syria. But Likud has a different attitude toward the Palestinians -- not only toward their territorial aspirations, but their inherent reliability. I tell Netanyahu that he needs to change by undertaking confidence-

building measures, observing the Hebron agreement, and providing safe passage for the Palestinians to Gaza by opening the airport and the port. These specific steps could be a way to ease differences over the territorial question. Let us see what happens. We have been very blunt with the Israelis. Since I had to veto two resolutions, you can do more than me to get the Arabs back into the process. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: One word on another subject. In Denver, we all decided to put pressure on Mr. de Larosiere regarding the nuclear plan for Ukraine. We all agreed to give instructions to our representatives at the EBRD. At the last meeting of the EBRD board, all the representatives pressed Mr. de Larosiere to finalize the financing for the two new nuclear plants. The one exception was the American. There is clearly a problem with someone on your side and you need to talk to him. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Steinberg: This problem was discussed at Denver in terms of whether the project meets the EBRD environmental and economic criteria. We still need to make sure that it is consistent with the general rules of the EBRD. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That is correct, but we made a political decision, which I conveyed to Mr. de Larosiere. If we do not finance these two plants, especially when the financing with the first one is almost completed, President Kuchma will seize on it as a pretext to postpone the shutdown of Chernobyl. We would bear a huge responsibility if we allowed this to happen. Mr. de Larosiere agreed, but in this case wanted the member states to guarantee the bank's investment. This has already been done. I am not against this, although my Minister of Finance will protest. I am ready to get this done, as is my government. ~~(C)~~

The President: I will get on it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We cannot leave the situation as it is. If there is no agreement on Chernobyl, we will all be criticized. ~~(C)~~

The President: We mentioned in Denver the fact that France, Russia and the United States are all co-chairs of the Minsk Group, and we issued a strong statement. This is a huge issue for the longer term. If we can resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute while you and I are getting along with Yeltsin, it will strengthen our relationship of mutual trust with the Russians. In the U.S., where there are many Armenian-Americans, we have tried to remain balanced between the Armenian and Azeri positions. The Azeris want to cooperate with Russia but also be a little bit independent. To do this, they want to have long-

term relations with Europe and the U.S. If we work hard, a year or two from now, we might have achieved a solution. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree fully. I spoke recently with Boris Yeltsin and he agreed as well. He wants to put strong, friendly pressure on Ter-Petrosyan, who is an old friend of France (I was the President of the committee supporting him while he was in prison). But today I find the Azeri leaders more reasonable. They need to be pushed a little while we look for a means to guarantee movement between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians are the harder case, but we can exert friendly pressure on them. If the three co-Presidents of the Minsk Group agree to work in the same direction, there is a good chance of success. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Berger: President Aliyev will be visiting Washington in a few weeks. We should work together in preparing for that visit. ~~(C)~~

The President: There have been good discussions between Mr. Levitte and Sandy Berger on France's participation in the NATO integrated military command. I hope we will keep talking and working on this. We will try to work it through. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I spoke with the new Prime Minister and he is quite prepared for us to continue the discussions. At home, our public is very cautious about NATO. This is an issue on which there is a consensus in France. ~~(C)~~

The President: The European Security and Defense identity is really your idea -- you deserve a lot of the credit. Since it is a French idea, you should be involved in the decisions. I will work hard to resolve this. Our big problem is that we have three huge military assets outside the U.S. -- our troops in Germany, our troops in the Far East, and the Sixth Fleet. But we will keep working to find a solution. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We will continue the discussions. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REFERRAL

ID 9704910

DATE: 30 JUL 97

MEMORANDUM FOR: BURNS, W

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: BURNS, W

SOURCE: DAVIES

DATE: 30 JUL 97

SUBJ: MEMCON BTW POTUS & PRES CHIRAC ON 8 JUL

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 31 JUL 97

COMMENT: EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VCDE Date: 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9704910
DATE 30 JUL 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & PRES CHIRAC ON 8 JUL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4910

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques Chirac ~~(C)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and President Jacques Chirac is provided ~~for the information of~~ the Secretary of State. ~~It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to the Embassy in Paris for the Chargé d'affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission. (C)~~ eyes only for the Secretary

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/16/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4910

July 16, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~GLYN T. DAVIES~~ JIM STEINBERG

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France, July 8, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

Eyes Only to the Secy of
Eyes only To the Secy of State
Shelton

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/16/07

out. ~~We have told them that they need to take unilateral action to put Arafat in a position to deal~~. We have told the Israelis that if they lose Arafat, they will lose it all. I reported what you said in Denver, as well as our own assessments, that he ~~has~~ become weakened among the Palestinians. This is because he tried to cooperate and was punished for it. I suggest that we stay in close touch over the next few days with your representatives and with the EU Special Envoy to see if we can make progress with Netanyahu. If we do, there is a chance that we could get everyone together and create some forward movement. We might be able to have the meeting in Sharm el-sheykh that you suggested when we were in Denver. I told the Israelis that they were putting me in a position in which I have lost all my influence with Europe and with Arafat; all I can do is veto UN resolutions while Israel blocks the peace process. If we see any movement by the Israelis, I will be in touch with you. ~~(C)~~

Recent small changes in Israel may be the only silver lining. Minister of Defense Mordechai has been allowed to issue more work permits to Palestinians. The numbers are approaching the high-water mark of the period since the Intifada. We are working to persuade the Israelis to take other steps that could get the process back on track. We need to be able to say something to Arafat about what the Israelis have done, and not just tell him to come back to the table and engage on security issues. ~~(C)~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.26)

Change
de Lavoisier
Name throughout

safe passage for the Palestinians to Gaza by opening the airport and the port. These specific steps could be a way to ease differences over the territorial question. Let us see what happens. We have been very blunt with the Israelis. Since I had to veto two resolutions, you can do more than me ~~to get~~ the Arabs back into the process. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: One word on another ~~subject. In~~ Denver, we all decided to put pressure on Mr. ~~De la Rosiere~~ regarding the nuclear plan for Ukraine. We all ~~agreed to~~ give instructions to our representatives at the EBRD. At the last meeting of the EBRD board, all the ~~administrators~~ pressed Mr. ~~De la Rosiere~~ to finalize the financing for the two new nuclear plants. The one exception was the American. ~~administrator.~~ There is clearly a problem with someone on your side and you need to talk to him. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Steinberg: This problem was discussed at Denver in terms of whether the project meets the criteria. ~~But~~ we still need to make sure that it is consistent with the general rules of the EBRD. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That is correct, but we made a political decision, which I conveyed to Mr. De la Rosiere. If we do not finance these two plants, especially when the financing with the first one is almost completed, President Kuchma will seize on it as a pretext to postpone the shutdown of Chernobyl. We would bear a huge responsibility if we allowed this to happen. Mr. De la Rosiere agreed, but in this case wanted the member states to guarantee the bank's investment. This has already been done. I am not against this, although my Minister of Finance will protest. I am ready to get this done, as is my government. ~~(C)~~

The President: I will get on it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We cannot leave the situation as it is. If there is no agreement on Chernobyl, we will all be criticized. ~~(C)~~

The President: We mentioned in Denver the fact that France, Russia and the United States are all co-chairs of the Minsk Group, and we issued a strong statement. This is a huge issue for the longer term. If we can resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute while you and I are getting along with Yeltsin, it will strengthen our relationship of mutual trust with the Russians. In the U.S., where there are many Armenian-Americans, we have tried to remain balanced between the Armenian and Azeri positions. The Azeris want to cooperate with Russia but also be a little bit independent. To do this, they want to have long-

term relations with Europe and the U.S. If we work hard, a year or two from now, we might have achieved a solution. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree fully. I spoke recently with Boris Yeltsin and he agreed as well. He wants to put strong, friendly pressure on Ter-Petrosyan, who is an old friend of France (I was the President of the committee supporting him while he was in prison). But today I find the Azeri leaders more reasonable. They need to be pushed a little while we look for a means to guarantee movement between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians are the harder case, but we can exert friendly pressure on them. If the three co-Presidents of the Minsk Group agree to work in the same direction, there is a good chance of success. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Berger: President Aliyev will be visiting Washington in a few weeks. We should work together in preparing for that visit. ~~(C)~~

The President: There have been good discussions between Mr. Levitte and Sandy Berger on France's participation in the ~~NATO~~ NATO integrated military command. I hope we will keep talking and working on this. We will try to work it through. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I spoke with the new Prime Minister and he is quite prepared for us to continue the discussions. At home, our public is very cautious about NATO. This is an issue on which there is a consensus in France. ~~(C)~~

The President: The European Security and Defense identity is really your idea -- you deserve a lot of the credit. Since it is a French idea, you should be involved in the decisions. I will work hard to resolve this. Our big problem is that we have three huge military assets outside the U.S. -- our troops in Germany, our troops in the Far East, and the Sixth Fleet. But we will keep working to find a solution. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We will continue the discussions. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. tclcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Chirac (7 pages)~~	~~11/15/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. draft~~	~~[Incomplete draft of 001a] (3 pages)~~	~~11/15/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9707807
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 97 13

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 18 NOV 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 15 NOV 97

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 22 NOV 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY ✓
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97111718	FOR DECISION
001		X	97111906	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97111906	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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National Security Council
The White House

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Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	TMA 11.20	D
Records Mgt.	2		D

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Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	TMA 11:20	D
Records Mgt.	2		D

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Steinberg			
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9707807
DATE 18 NOV 97

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 15 NOV 97
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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RECORD ID: 9707807
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 97 13

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 18 NOV 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 15 NOV 97

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 22 NOV 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10108115
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97111718	FOR DECISION
001		X	97111906	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97111906	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	971118	BURNS, W	

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The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(R) 11/18	
Davies	3	11/18	
Kerrick	2	(I) 11/18	
Steinberg	3	copy	
Berger	4	copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(I) 11/19	D
Records Mgt.	5		D

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Rice	1	(R) 11/18	
Davies	3	11/18	
Kerrick	2	(D) 11/18	
Steinberg	3	copy	
Berger	4	copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(D) 11/18	D
Records Mgt.	5		D

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7807

November 18, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/05/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac November 15, 1997 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 11/17/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: David Higgins, Marianna Papadimitriou, James Smith, Larry Wright, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 15, 1997, 8:25 - 8:58 p.m. EST
Malibu, California

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Bill, is that you? (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine. (U)

President Chirac: I'm in Hanoi, in Vietnam, for the Francophonie. We have a meeting with 49 countries here. (U)

The President: Well, good. (U)

President Chirac: You wanted to talk to me? (U)

The President: I did. I wanted to talk to you about Iraq. I'm glad you are in Vietnam. (U)

President Chirac: You have a very nice Ambassador; he was a prisoner here? (U)

The President: He was a prisoner for six and a half years. (U)

Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 11/17/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.27)

President Chirac: I know this. He is very well known here, and is friends with everyone. (U)

The President: Yes, they like him. He helped me to normalize relations with Vietnam. I have a lot of confidence in him. (U)

President Chirac: The evolution in Vietnam is very good. The leadership wants to reform the economy and to expand human rights. I have a very good impression of the new leadership. Bill, to talk about Iraq is complicated, and my English is a bit weak; do you mind if I give the phone to my interpreter? (U)

The President: That would be fine. (U)

President Chirac: I speak in French, you speak in English. (U)

The President: That's good. I will just go through my points, and then you can respond. (U)

President Chirac: How is Hillary? (U)

The President: She is wonderful. You know she has been in Central Asia -- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. (U)

President Chirac: It's a very nice treat for her. (U)

The President: Absolutely. She'll be home Tuesday. (U)

President Chirac: Tuesday? Give her my best regards. Ok, I'm listening. (U)

The President: Okay. Iraq's actions are a very serious challenge to the UN and the UN Security Council and, I believe, the security of the Persian Gulf. I want to make it clear that the issue is not allowing Saddam to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction. UNSCOM weapons inspectors have discovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction potential in the last six years than during the entire Gulf War. We will be dealing with the whole issue of chemical and biological weapons for years to come, so we can't afford not to find a solution now to restore the inspection regime. We support Ambassador Butler's decision to withdraw UNSCOM personnel from Iraq. Since Saddam challenged us on October 29, we have tried to work through diplomatic means to respond. Our efforts on the UNSC resolution and on the Presidential statement produced clear statements about the need for Iraq to step back. I know you've also tried

hard to persuade them, and I hope that you will do everything to convince Saddam to reverse his decision and let UNSCOM back in. ~~(C)~~

I want you to know that yesterday I announced the movement of our aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, to the region. It is a prudent measure, and I may announce further force movements as necessary. But I remain focused on diplomatic efforts. We have to stay unified and I hope we can make clear to Saddam that there is not a lot of daylight between us. ~~(C)~~

I also want to say, in response to some things I understand were in the French press about my comments yesterday, that I am well aware that the Iraqi people are suffering because of the deprivations they've endured. It is not my intention that sanctions would remain forever, but we must have compliance with the UN resolutions before they can be modified. I have some ideas on this, which Madeleine Albright will be in touch with Vedrine about. I don't think we can rule out the use of force because people all over the world are interested in how far Iraq can go with chemical and biological agents. There is a growing market for them, organized crime is interested, especially in biological and chemical weapons. That's my concern. I'm not interested in a replay of the Gulf War or a face-off. I want to restore the UNSCOM inspections, especially since we know he'll use them; he used them on the Iraqis, on the Kurds. I'm well aware that he wants us to strike him, because he thinks it would divide the coalition, but it would be a major mistake to rule out the strike option. That's all I have to say, Jacques; I would like to hear your thoughts. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Bill, thank you very much for this information. I would like to say a couple of things. First of all, I condemn without reservation the attitude of Saddam Hussein. I have a personal appreciation of the situation regarding the crisis and the cause of the crisis. But I would like to say that since we are in a crisis, France will have solidarity with the United States. If the United States decides to send, for example, a U-2, France is ready to take part in this, we will send our aircraft along in order to express its solidarity with the United States in this crisis. Even so, we are not in favor of a military strike. ~~(C)~~

The whole issue now is to get out of the crisis. UNSCOM has done good work; according to its report and according to its Chairman, it has obtained the destruction of almost the totality of nuclear and ballistic missile capacity, and has made progress

on chemical and biological weapons. Even if there is still a lot of work to be done, the progress itself is a major success for the UN and the Security Council. Today there is a crisis -- why? Let me repeat, we are in full solidarity in this crisis, but one might wonder why there is a crisis. I believe Saddam thought that whatever happens, if he were to accept the staying on of the Commission, and it said it had finally settled everything, there would still not be a lifting of the embargo. Faced with this certainty, the problem is not one of arms control, but of his very presence in Baghdad. He doesn't have a solution, an open door to get out of the crisis. And if he doesn't want both controls and embargo, he rejects controls and will start again making weapons. This is extraordinarily dangerous. ~~(C)~~

So the question is how to get Saddam Hussein to cooperate again with UNSCOM. Of course there is the stick, the military threat, but a carrot is needed as well. In other words, the day the Commission notes officially that there are no longer any dangerous weapons, the embargo should be lifted. This will lead to a higher opinion in Iraq vis-à-vis westerners, and also Arab popular opinion also will improve. Incidentally, today there is a big difference between the opinion of the Arab people and their leaders, which the leaders don't express today, and this is dangerous. ~~(C)~~

If we accept the principle of lifting the embargo on the day the Commission completes its work, the day they say all dangerous weapons have been destroyed, then we will have a door to take us out of the crisis. If the Americans feel that the sanctions will stay as long as Saddam is there, then this will lead us straight to the rearming of Iraq. If the sanctions are linked to weapons of mass destruction, then we have an exit out of the crisis. Then some countries can exert very strong pressure on Saddam Hussein, the Arab countries, the Russians and the French. I'm not sure they can have success, but it's possible. If we attempt to link the embargo to the total destruction of weapons, then the three of us can think it over, the Americans, the French, and the English -- the British, in order to work out a scenario to lead us out of the crisis, then as the second step, we can consult the Russians on this scenario. We could have two stages or even three. ~~(C)~~

In the first stage, we can have a meeting of the 21 members of the Special Commission. This meeting could take stock of the work already done, state what work is to be done, state what means need to be implemented in Iraq and identify the time

framework needed for the total elimination of weapons, assuming the full cooperation of Iraq. ~~(C)~~

In the second stage, the report of the Special Commission will be presented to the Security Council. If the Security Council approves this report, Iraq will have to be told expressly that it will have to cooperate with the Commission on the basis defined in the Commission report. In the third stage, telling Iraq expressly to obey could be accompanied by very energetic representations in Baghdad by all countries with the means to be heard in Baghdad, especially the Arab countries, Russia and France. Well, this is a proposal, which can be modified, discussed and amended. In her last talk with Vedrine, Madeleine Albright seemed to be a little open to this solution. This is the way I see it. ~~(C)~~

To conclude: in this crisis, France is in full solidarity with the United States, and will accompany American actions, but not participate in strikes. What I mean is, if you ask that our aircraft accompany the U-2, they will. Secondly, the only question we have to ask is whether the embargo is linked to weapons, or linked to the presence of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. In the first case, there is possibly a door to exit out of the crisis and disarm Iraq with the approval of Arab public opinion and leaders. In the second case, if the embargo is linked to the presence of Saddam, there is no door to take us out of the crisis. Then Saddam is going to rearm himself; this is very dangerous. This is what I wanted to say. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, let me thank you. It is obvious that you have thought a lot about this. I want to make some general observations. I'd like to give a report to Madeleine and Sandy Berger and offer them specific ideas to get back to Vedrine. This is an open line, so we have to be somewhat cautious. How we get out of this crisis counts a lot: whatever changes both sides make, we have to be clear that we are not accepting noncompliance with the UN. I believe there is a way to do that. But let me say again, I have never said that I wanted sanctions to remain for as long as Saddam is in power. Our position is he should comply with UN resolutions. Of course, some resolutions don't concern weapons, but on the other hand, not all sanctions are economic in nature, but political, so there are a lot of possibilities. I would like to discuss your conversation with our people, and I would like to feel that we could talk even if it is an inconvenient hour for us both because you and Tony Blair and I have to stay in as close contact as possible. I agree that we need to bring Yeltsin in.

We have to work out a proposal to try to get the Russians to sign onto. Also, I think with all you and I are trying to do to integrate China into the world community, and because it's one of the P-5, that we should try to get President Jiang to go in. He won't be interested in the details of it, but it shows respect on our part, and is a signal that we're trying to establish the right kind of relationship with China. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree. I gave you my feelings, and of course my feelings are known to and accepted by the French Government. I am at your disposal to talk about this again whenever you want, but I wanted you to know that we are in solidarity with you and my analysis of how we can exit out of this crisis. I am ready to talk about this at any time with you and with Tony Blair. And you are right that Boris Yeltsin has to be associated with this. In parallel, I'd like to congratulate you on your visit with Jiang Zemin. It was a beautiful success, and I welcome this, because I like China a lot, and I think Jiang Zemin is a man of culture with whom we can work. I think he appreciated the success of his visit. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. If I could just mention one thing very briefly. I want very much to build a working partnership with you and Tony Blair on a broad range of things. While, as you noted, I can't be in a position to rule out some sort of unilateral action, but my preference is to work together in a framework of a broad alliance on many things. In this vein, we have been working very hard on a proposal for a continuing presence in Bosnia. We hope to get in touch with you shortly, and I hope we can agree on a course to stay there. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Bill, for Bosnia, there have been discussions among our people, and we are exactly on the same line in feeling that it's very important. ~~(C)~~

The President: I'm glad. The only other thing is: I think you are right about Arab public opinion, but I think it is sympathetic to the people of Iraq and their situation. I think Arab leaders are also sympathetic to the people of Iraq, it's just that they don't like Saddam. I know as well that it's complicated by how slowly the Middle East Peace Process is going. The problem is our responsibility, because of our relationship with Israel, but I think it's very important these governments understand the concerns with both Iraq and Iran. Iraq hit them with Scuds in the Gulf War. Israel should understand that their failure to pursue the peace process makes it more difficult for all their friends. I know your views are

well known, and you've made it clear to Mr. Netanyahu and his Government, but it's worth pointing out that the ability of the West to deal with threats to Israeli security and the security of the region is severely compromised by their failure to go forward with the Middle East Peace Process. We need to change attitudes a bit in Jerusalem, and I am certainly willing to make the most of that in this regard. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I share this feeling. But I believe that in the relations between Israel and the Palestinians, Netanyahu is not going to move. He might, as part of some small gesture on the Gaza airport and harbor, but basically he will not change because he is held by his extremists. Perhaps on the other hand, we could move ahead on a topic that is less impassioned and more technical, and linked to security. The relationship between Israel and Syria -- there are less strong feelings there, and I think if we could make some progress, it would be something. ~~(C)~~

I would like to go back and make a point on Iraq. I think we should not put into question 986, the oil-for-food resolution, because there would be a firestorm in Arab public opinion. ~~(C)~~

The President: I fully agree. I supported 986, I don't want it to change and I want it to work better. No one wants the Iraqi people to suffer. This is one of the things Madeleine wants to talk to Vedrine about. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: No problem. We are fully at your disposal. I'm quite ready to discuss this. ~~(C)~~

The President: Great, I will be back in touch. (U)

President Chirac: Good day, and my affectionate tribute to Hillary. (U)

The President: Thank you, and please give my regards to the Vietnamese officials there. (U)

President Chirac: I will do that in five minutes time. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Chirac: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7807

November 17, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER (D) FOR

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac of France that took place on November 15, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 11/17/07

7807

President Chirac: I know this. He is very well known here, and is friends with everyone. (U)

The President: Yes, they like him. He helped me to normalize relations with Vietnam. I have a lot of confidence in him. (U)

President Chirac: The evolution in Vietnam is very good. The leadership wants to reform the economy and to expand human rights. I have a very good impression of the new leadership. Bill, to talk about Iraq is complicated, and my English is a bit weak; do you mind if I give the phone to my interpreter? (U)

The President: That would be fine. (U)

President Chirac: I speak in French, you speak in English. (U)

The President: That's good. I will just go through my points, and then you can respond. (U)

President Chirac: How is Hillary? (U)

The President: She is wonderful. You know she has been in Central Asia -- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. (U)

President Chirac: It's a very nice treat for her. (U)

The President: Absolutely. She'll be home Tuesday. (U)

President Chirac: Tuesday? Give her my best regards. Ok, I'm listening. (U)

The President: Okay. Iraq's actions are a very serious challenge to the UN and the UN Security Council and, I believe, the security of the Persian Gulf. I want to make it clear that the issue is not allowing Saddam to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction. UNSCOM weapons inspectors have discovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction potential in the last six years than during the entire Gulf War. We will be dealing with the whole issue of chemical and biological weapons for years to come, so we can't afford not to find a solution now to restore the inspection regime. We support Ambassador Butler's decision to withdraw UNSCOM personnel from Iraq. Since Saddam challenged us on October 29, we have tried to work through diplomatic means to respond. Our efforts on the UNSC resolution and on the Presidential statement produced clear statements about the need for Iraq to step back. I know you've also tried

framework needed for the total elimination of weapons, assuming the full cooperation of Iraq. ~~(C)~~

Insert blank line

In the second stage, the report of the Special Commission will be presented to the Security Council. If the Security Council approves this report, Iraq will have to be told expressly that it will have to cooperate with the Commission on the basis defined in the Commission report. In the third stage, telling Iraq expressly to obey could be accompanied by very energetic representations in Baghdad by all countries with the means to be heard in Baghdad, especially the Arab countries, Russia and France. Well, this is a proposal, which can be modified, discussed and amended. In her last talk with Vedrine, Madeleine Albright seemed to be a little open to this solution. This is the way I see it. ~~(C)~~

To conclude: in this crisis, France is in full solidarity with the United States, and will accompany American actions, but not participate in strikes. What I mean is, if you ask that our aircraft accompany the U-2, they will. Secondly, the only question we have to ask is whether the embargo is linked to weapons, or linked to the presence of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. In the first case, there is possibly a door to exit out of the crisis and disarm Iraq with the approval of Arab public opinion and leaders. In the second case, if the embargo is linked to the presence of Saddam, there is no door to take us out of the crisis. Then Saddam is going to rearm himself; this is very dangerous. This is what I wanted to say. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, let me thank you. It is obvious that you have thought a lot about this. I want to make some general observations. I'd like to give a report to Madeleine and Sandy Berger and offer them specific ideas to get back to Vedrine. This is an open line, so we have to be somewhat cautious. How we get out of this crisis counts a lot: whatever changes both sides make, we have to be clear that we are not accepting noncompliance with the UN. I believe there is a way to do that. But let me say again, I have never said that I wanted sanctions to remain for as long as Saddam is in power. Our position is he should comply with UN resolutions. Of course, some resolutions don't concern weapons, but on the other hand, not all sanctions are economic in nature, but political, so there are a lot of possibilities. I would like to discuss your conversation with our people, and I would like to feel that we could talk even if it is an inconvenient hour for us both because you and Tony Blair and I have to stay in as close contact as possible. I agree that we need to bring Yeltsin in. We have to work out a proposal to try to get the Russians to

sign onto. Also, I think with all you and I are trying to do to integrate China into the world community, and because it's one of the P-5, that we should try to get President Jiang to go in. He won't be interested in the details of it, but it shows respect on our part, and is a signal that we're trying to establish the right kind of relationship with China. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree. I gave you my feelings, and of course my feelings are known to and accepted by the French Government. I am at your disposal to talk about this again whenever you want, but I wanted you to know that we are in solidarity with you and my analysis of how we can exit out of this crisis. I am ready to talk about this at any time with you and with Tony Blair. And you are right that Boris Yeltsin has to be associated with this. In parallel, I'd like to congratulate you on your visit with Jiang Zemin. It was a beautiful success, and I welcome this, because I like China a lot, and I think Jiang Zemin is a man of culture with whom we can work. I think he appreciated the success of his visit. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. If I could just mention one thing very briefly. I want very much to build a working partnership with you and Tony Blair on a broad range of things. While, as you noted, I can't be in a position to rule out some sort of unilateral action, but my preference is to work together in a framework of a broad alliance on many things. In this vein, we have been working very hard on a proposal for a continuing presence in Bosnia. We hope to get in touch with you shortly, and I hope we can agree on a course to stay there. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Bill, for Bosnia, there have been discussions among our people, and we are exactly on the same line in feeling that it's very important. ~~(C)~~

The President: I'm glad. The only other thing is: I think you are right about Arab public opinion, but I think it is sympathetic to the people of Iraq and their situation. I think Arab leaders are also sympathetic to the people of Iraq, it's just that they don't like Saddam. I know as well that it's complicated by how slowly the Middle East Peace Process is going. The problem is our responsibility, because of our relationship with Israel, but I think it's very important these governments understand the concerns with both Iraq and Iran. Iraq hit them with Scuds in the Gulf War. Israel should understand that their failure to pursue the peace process makes it more difficult for all their friends. I know your views are well known, and you've made it clear to Mr. Netanyahu and his

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 10/05/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9707807
DATE 18 NOV 97

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 15 NOV 97
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Case Number: 2015-0775-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1660				
Document ID: 9708563				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (7 pages)~~	~~12/19/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. draft~~	~~[Incomplete draft of 001a] (1 page)~~	~~12/19/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 1660

FOLDER TITLE:
9708563

2015-0775-M
ke3489

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9708563
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 97 18

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 23 DEC 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 19 DEC 97

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 25 DEC 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By ICOE NARA, Dat 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DP DATE 12/29 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97122018	FOR DECISION
002		X	97122909	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	971223	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8563

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1/3	12/20/12/23	EDITS
Kerrick			12/22/97
Steinberg	2		w/ small edits
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	12/23	D
Records Mgt.	5		D + Disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Jim - You can act on this for Sandy
- Glyn

DEC 19 21:10

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Changes made
Tab A
Done
12/22/97

Glyn -
Do you understand Jim's comments?
Cathy

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8563

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1/3	~~12/20~~/12/23	EDITS
Kerrick			
Steinberg	2		12/22/97 w/ small edits
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	12/23	D
Records Mgt.	~~5~~		D + Disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Jim - You Changes made this for Tab A ✓ Done 12/22/97

DEC Glyn -
Do you understand Jim's Comments?
Cathy

Exe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8563

December 23, 1997

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France, December 19, 1997 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and may only go to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, eyes only. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 12/19/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Carol Wolters
Notetaker: George Chastain, Larry Wright, Marianna Papadimitriou, James Smith, Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 19, 1997, 8:55 - 9:36 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: It is a great pleasure to hear you before Christmas day. Give my best to Hillary. How is she? (U)

The President: She's great, doing well. Our daughter's here. (U)

President Chirac: Are you going away for the holidays? (U)

The President: Yes, after Christmas, for about a week. (U)

President Chirac: Where are you going? (U)

The President: The Virgin Islands. (U)

President Chirac: That is a beautiful place. I'm sure you'll have nice weather, and I hope you have a good time. (U)

The President: Are you going anywhere? (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 12/19/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.74)

President Chirac: Yes, for a week, but I don't know where exactly. (U)

The President: I'd like to talk to you about Bosnia. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: If you don't mind, I'd like to put the interpreter on line, because as you know my English is not very good. (U)

The President: Your English is just fine, but put the interpreter on line. (U)

As you have probably heard, I have committed the United States to participate in a military mission following the completion of the SFOR mission in January. I'm having pretty good results in building Congressional support, and in a couple of days, I'm going to Bosnia to visit the troops, and I'm taking a number of members of Congress with me. But there is still a lot of opposition in Congress. I hope we can all work together through NATO to come up with a plan that will allow us to have at least some modest reduction in our troop strength and will show strong support from the Europeans for the police retraining program, because that is the key in the long run in allowing NATO to withdraw its military forces. It will be especially important to develop a paramilitary force, a gendarmerie, that can back up the civil police in case of serious unrest. ~~(C)~~

The second point I wanted to raise is Turkey. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Let me respond to your first point. ~~(C)~~

The President: Very good. (U)

President Chirac: I agree we should remain in Bosnia after the month of June. Of course, I agree that this should be done according to needs expressed by NATO. That's no problem at all for France. Regarding the police mission, I'm obliged to express an idea of mine. When I was elected, I found myself facing a most unpleasant situation; what was called at that time UNPROFOR, but which in reality carried out police operations with people spread in small groups everywhere throughout the territory. The results were that the soldiers were constantly taken hostage, they were disarmed, their clothes removed, and they were humiliated. At that time, I proposed we set up a rapid response force. There were still people wounded, killed, but not humiliated, and the situation in which we had hostages

ended. If we resume a police mission, we will find ourselves in exactly the same situation. ~~(C)~~

Since the cessation of hostilities, all the parties have acquired arms again. The Bosnians have been rearmed by the Americans and Malaysians, and the Serbs have been rearmed by the Russians. What I mean is that they bought weapons. The end result is that they've all got weapons. If we want a police policy, this means we will again have to have people spread almost everywhere. So we will have hostages again, with all the same problems. I have a lot of reservations about the police mission. While I don't mind keeping on the number of soldiers necessary, I'm very much reserved regarding police operations. ~~(C)~~

The President: I'm not sure we have as big a difference as it seems. What we want is to beef up the Bosnian police forces. We want to enhance their ability to provide for their own security and law enforcement. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Of course, I agree; but this shouldn't mean troops would be spread in small groups all over the place. ~~(C)~~

The President: I want to talk a minute about Turkey, because I'm seeing Yilmaz later today. First, I want to thank you for the constructive role you played with the EU on this. I will do what I can to encourage Yilmaz to take a long-term approach and not reject a way forward on eventual EU membership. I think it's very important to keep Turkey anchored in the West, and I wondered if you have any further thoughts about it before I see Yilmaz. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, I do have ideas. Turkey is an important power, which must be anchored to Europe. If we allow Turkey to drift away, the risk of there being an evolution toward fundamentalism does exist. The fundamentalists in Turkey got quite a lot of votes in the last election. They have a single campaign argument, which is simple and effective: "They [that is the Europeans] don't want us with them because we are Muslims." This is a very strong argument. So I am in favor of anything that could anchor Turkey to Europe. ~~(C)~~

There are two problems. First of all is the German position, that one can understand. They say "We can't accept the freedom of movement of people." They already have 2 to 3 million Turks, and German public opinion is against a membership of Turkey that

would lead to the freedom of movement of people. So we have to take account of that argument. ~~(C)~~

For a long time, I've said to the Turks, who are my friends, that we have to find a solution that allows them to be in Europe but does not have the immediate consequence in terms of the freedom of movement of people. After long and difficult talks, I managed to persuade Helmut Kohl two weeks ago to support a position of being open to Turkey, provided there was no talk of the freedom of movement of people. In this context, I proposed an annual conference to include the 10 candidates, along with Cyprus and Turkey, where there would be a discussion of all European problems. This would be apart from technical issues regarding membership, which would be handled in a different way. I had almost convinced Yilmaz to accept this as an important first step, and he had virtually given me his agreement. ~~(C)~~

The second problem is Greece. The Greeks are really unbearable; they don't want to accept anything at all. They have been blocking all positive decisions of the EU regarding Turkey, using their right of veto. The EU considered regular meetings with Turkey in the framework of a cooperation agreement. Fourteen countries wanted to do so, and the Greeks used their veto. We had the association agreement, which would reduce considerably their customs tariffs and as a counterpart, there was to be financial assistance from the EU to Turkey. Well, 14 wanted to give this financial aid, which is already programmed in our finances, and the Greeks imposed a veto. ~~(C)~~

Now, Greece is a country that needs the money that is sent to it from the EU. Subsidies to Greece account for 5 percent of its GDP, which is unbelievable, but that is the way it is. They are opposed to everything, and put their veto to everything, and in particular, the participation of Turkey in the European Conference. ~~(C)~~

This didn't go down very well with Yilmaz, who said, "If this is the case, then I'm not interested in your Conference." At the Luxembourg summit, knowing that it was impossible to obtain anything from Greece, I was in a very bad mood. I made a counteroffensive against the Greeks and refused to start negotiations on the membership of Cyprus, (even though we had already decided to do so) until Cyprus is a unified country. I was supported only by Holland in my right of veto regarding the entry of Cyprus. All others were opposed, though without saying so. Of course, the Greeks were angry. ~~(C)~~

What to do now? Yilmaz should be told that I understand his reaction, but it's excessive. He should not slam the door. His interest is that Turkey be anchored to Europe, and that is ours, as well. The first step must be made. In January, the EU Presidency will be British. Yilmaz must agree to go to the Conference; going will mark this as an important first step, and testify that he is a member of the European family. Even though he is not treated as he would have wished -- like Poland and Hungary, which are official candidates -- it is still an important step. I am ready to develop with him, if you agree, arguments along those lines, because I think he trusts me. The arm of the Greeks should be broken. ~~(C)~~

Regarding the British, the Presidency must be extremely firm, and must impose our solution on the Greeks. But we won't be able to achieve this if you don't help us. I believe that American diplomacy must associate itself with European diplomacy. We must tell the Greeks that enough is enough. It is necessary for them to accept at least a first step, to lift their veto regarding the implementation of the association agreement with Turkey and to lift their veto regarding the participation of Turkey in the European Conference. ~~(C)~~

I think Yilmaz's reaction has a lot to do with facesaving. If we exert enough pressure on the Greeks, assuming that the Americans also intervene -- I think we can embark on the right path. ~~(C)~~

The President: Jacques, I agree with much of what you've said. But I also think that to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, we will have to have movement from the Turkish military. I want to share your comments with my people here and with Dick Holbrooke, who is working Cyprus, and get back to you. I'm glad that you have such determination to find an agreement. Dealing with Cyprus is key to dealing with the larger issue of Turkey's ties to Europe, and I'll follow up. ~~(C)~~

I'd like to talk for a minute about Iraq. I have very much appreciated our close cooperation and coordinated actions on Iraq over the past month. Our solidarity on this issue is essential. The return of UNSCOM inspectors last month was a positive outcome, but we both knew that the issue of full access to sites was still left unresolved. It's clear from Butler's report that the so-called "Presidential sites" are off limits. In order for UNSCOM to do its job, there must be access to sites that might have prohibited items. If we should face Iraqi obstructionism at such a site, it's important that we work in

unison and get a strong, unequivocal message from the Security Council. I believe that if he won't allow UNSCOM access, at a minimum we have to consider the indefinite suspension of sanctions reviews. I know you are opposed to the use of force, but I don't think we should rule it out, because that would send the wrong signal regarding "Presidential sites," which are so broadly defined that they could include virtually anything. They're so large that if they have reason to believe there may be weapons of mass destruction there, they should be allowed to go in and check. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I fully agree on the need for Iraq to accept opening up all the sites, including the Presidential sites, to UNSCOM inspectors. In this respect, there is no divergence. It is the application of the decisions of the UN Security Council. This morning, the French Foreign Minister met with Mr. Primakov, and they decided to exert again joint pressure on Baghdad for the opening of all sites to experts. ~~(C)~~

I have an idea. It is never good to humiliate someone when there's no need to do so. Together with UNSCOM we could send a personal representative of each of the five permanent member countries of the Security Council. I think this would be a gesture that would facilitate things for UNSCOM. If UNSCOM has access to all sites it wants to visit, then it could declare officially there is no problem anymore: no nuclear, no biological, no chemical weapons. Then, it would be necessary to say that the embargo will be lifted. In other words, we can have a policy of having a stick, but a carrot is also necessary. If Saddam Hussein has no hope of seeing the embargo lifted, then there is no interest, no reason, for him to open up those sites. ~~(C)~~

Now, regarding the humanitarian situation, it is absolutely dramatic. Last week, I went to the United Arab Emirates, to Abu Dhabi. I had a long talk with a wise man, Sheikh Zayed, the President of the UAE. I found him to be very shocked at the current situation of the Iraqi people. I think, in any case, we must increase the humanitarian exchanges of oil for medicinal drugs and milk. You can't really have an idea of the impact on Arab public opinion of the suffering of the Iraqi people. ~~(C)~~

I have a second hypothesis: if Saddam Hussein were to refuse access to Presidential sites, even with the presence of representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council, then of course reprisal measures would have to be taken. In particular, we could implement the resolution that

prevents travel of Iraqi personalities -- apart from Tariq Aziz, of course, because we should keep the possibility of taking to someone. But regarding the possibility of a military strike, I am absolutely against it. That would be the best way actually to strengthen the position of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis are in a miserable situation and are fed up with the regime of Saddam Hussein. But every time we attack them, national pride causes them to close ranks. When they thought there would be a strike two weeks ago, they spontaneously went to Presidential sites as a human shield. The diplomacy of resorting to cannons worked well in the last century, but it does not work very well in this century. ~~(C)~~

The President: You have made a couple of good suggestions, and I want to follow up. But if we agree that we must have access to the sites, we must be extremely careful not to take options off the table. I also fully agree that we need to alleviate the humanitarian situation, and I want to follow up. I know you have things to do, and I need to get off the phone. Let me take your suggestions and I'll follow up with my advisers, and I'll also give you a report back after I see Yilmaz today. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I have one word I would like to add. We shouldn't do anything before Butler goes to Baghdad on January 19. We should avoid any provocation if we want access, which I think is still possible. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you very much. I hope you have a good time in the Virgin Islands. (U)

The President: We will, good-bye. (U)

President Chirac: Have a good Christmas and happy New Year! (U)

The President: You too, Jacques. Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 19, 1997

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac that took place on December 19, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

You authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___ — Sand D; Ambo. only

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 12/19/07

prevents travel of Iraqi personalities -- apart from Tariq Aziz, of course, because we should keep the possibility of taking to someone. But regarding the possibility of a military strike, I am absolutely against it. That would be the best way actually to strengthen the position of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis are in a miserable situation and are fed up with the regime of Saddam Hussein. But every time we attack them, national pride causes them to close ranks. When they thought there would be a strike two weeks ago, they spontaneously went to Presidential sites as a human shield. The diplomacy of resorting to cannons worked well in the last century, but it does not work very well in this century. ~~(C)~~

The President: You have made a couple of good suggestions, and I want to follow up. But if we agree that we must have access to the sites, we must be extremely careful not to take options off the table. I also fully agree that we need to alleviate the humanitarian situation, and I want to follow up. I know you have things to do, and I need to get off the phone. Let me take your suggestions and I'll follow up, and I'll also give you a report back after I see Yilmaz today. ~~(C)~~ with my advisers & with my advisers.

President Chirac: I have one word I would like to add. We shouldn't do anything before Butler goes to Baghdad on January 19. We should avoid any provocation if we want access, which I think is still possible. ~~(C)~~

The President: ~~Okay~~, thanks. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you very much. I hope you have a good time in the Virgin Islands. (U)

The President: We will, good-bye. (U)

President Chirac: Have a good Christmas and happy New Year! (U)

The President: You too, Jacques. Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.38)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8563

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France, December 19, 1997 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and ~~not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level~~. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador ~~and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)~~ only. ~~(C)~~

may be only to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, eyes only

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 12/19/07

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2014				
Document ID: 9800760				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. draft~~	~~[Draft of 002b] (6 pages)~~	~~01/30/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002a. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (6 pages)~~	~~01/30/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002b. telcon~~	~~Telcon with French President Chirac (6 pages)~~	~~01/30/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 2014

FOLDER TITLE:
9800760

2015-0775-M
ke3490

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9800760
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 98 18

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 30 JAN 98

ACTION: ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 07 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10106115
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98020416	FOR DECISION
002		X	98020506	DAVIES SGD MEMO
002		X	98100815	ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980204	BURNS, W	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0760

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetakers: James Smith, Cindy Lawrence, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Joel Schrader, George Chastain and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 30, 1998, 11:59 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President and President Chirac exchanged opening pleasantries.

The President: Let me say also that I was really sorry to hear of the terrible deaths of the young people in the avalanche. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you very much, Bill. It was an accident. Do you want to talk about Iraq? If so, I would like to do it through the interpreter. ~~(C)~~

The President: Have you put your interpreter on? (U)

President Chirac: Mine is on. (U)

The President: OK. First of all, the Chairman of UNSCOM, Mr. Butler, briefed the Security Council last week and made an important point, that it is clear it is impossible for UNSCOM to do its job any more, and that is very serious. I know that Foreign Minister Vedrine and Secretary Albright agreed on this in Paris yesterday and that Madeleine had good talks with Levitte. Saddam's challenge to UNSCOM is clearly the most serious since 1991. He is trying to destroy UNSCOM in order to protect his weapons programs, and to get sanctions lifted prematurely. ~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/2/08

Classified By: Glyn T. Davies

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2015-0775-M (1 of 31)

We have pursued the diplomatic route carefully for months now. We have supported the Russian-brokered agreement from Geneva, but that has come undone. We actively sought Security Council statements and resolutions, but they have not compelled Iraqi compliance. I think we are reaching the point where the diplomatic options for obtaining Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM are becoming exhausted. I think Saddam is toying with us, hoping to deflect attention away from his efforts to conceal his weapons of mass destruction. We cannot let him succeed. ~~(C)~~

I know that your decision about whether to support military force is very difficult. It is difficult for me, as well. I am encouraged by Foreign Minister Vedrine's indication that you have not ruled out the use of force if Iraq doesn't change. ~~(C)~~

It is counterproductive for Saddam to hear others rule out force; that eases rather than increases the pressure on him. Now, I am of course aware of the downsides of military action, they are considerable, including the risk that he will throw out the inspectors. But a phony, sham UNSCOM is not better than no UNSCOM at all. We simply cannot allow Iraq to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and flout the will of the Security Council. There's too much at stake. ~~(C)~~

If it comes to that, I hope that you will support a decision to use military force. In the meantime, it is very important to retain your public position that "all options are open;" that keeps more pressure on Saddam, and that keeps whatever chance we have, however narrow, to avert this. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, Bill, I would like to express a few remarks to you. It would be in Saddam Hussein's interest to drive away UNSCOM. Military strikes thus would have two advantages for Saddam Hussein. First, they would make his people close ranks around him, and also Arab countries around him. ~~(C)~~

Second, of course, is that he would have a reason to drive away UNSCOM. And this would allow him to continue, probably not in the nuclear area, but in the bacteriological and chemical area. So I'm not sure a military strike would be a reasonable solution vis-à-vis international public opinion. A military strike cannot help but have civilian victims. And already there have been a lot of victims due to the embargo, including children with no food or medicine. If, on top of that, they are killed

by bombs, then world public opinion will end up reacting very negatively. (C)

My third reflection is that the Security Council should not be divided in this respect. So, if we could find a formula whereby we could exert maximum pressure on the Iraqis, but that could also be signed by the Russians and the Chinese, that would be the best solution. (C)

The President: But what is your proposal? How would we do that? (C)

President Chirac: I have a two-fold proposal. In order to exert real pressure on Saddam Hussein, we should not talk about material breach. The Russians won't accept it -- I talked about this with Primakov the day before yesterday -- and neither will the Chinese. If the Security Council is divided that would be a big victory for Saddam Hussein. So I think we need to find a text that doesn't use the words "material breach," but would mean the same thing. Our diplomats in New York are experts in this sort of exercise. (C)

And secondly, we should exert maximum diplomatic pressure on Saddam Hussein. The Russians did it the day before yesterday by sending a special envoy to be received by Saddam, and this was something new. I intend also to send a special envoy, but only providing that I am sure he will actually meet with Saddam himself. The envoy would tell him clearly that if he doesn't allow UNSCOM to go on doing its work, then the worst will happen. (C)

But it is also necessary to do something to allow him not to lose face completely. The idea, which is a Russian idea, is to create a new element which really doesn't change things -- this would be to add to UNSCOM personal representatives from each of the five main states of the Security Council. It doesn't change anything, but it gives him a small exit door. My last point: I hear the Iraqi parliament is to meet next Sunday and this is not a very good sign. (C)

The President: Well, let me respond. Jacques, can you hear me? (C)

President Chirac: Yes, I hear you very well. (C)

The President: Okay. First, I agree we don't need a divided Security Council, but I wish we could get a material breach

resolution. I don't think the Chinese would veto alone if the Russians go along. There is some precedent for Saddam changing course in the face of a material breach resolution; he's done it three times since 1991. We don't believe we need to have it to justify action, but if there's any way you could persuade Yeltsin to let it go, that would increase pressure on him and maximize the chances that military action will not be necessary. ~~(C)~~

Now, on the second suggestion you made, about having members of the Perm Five with the team. We have always said we don't care where team members are from. They could be from Micronesia for all we care. We just wanted them to be professional and not political. The second issue is that it's not just the composition of the teams, but also the nature of their access, because to be able to certify what he has compiled on the chemical and biological front requires a different level than the nuclear issue, because of the smaller space it takes. So access is the issue, and the integrity of the teams. I've never cared about the composition of the teams as long as they are professional and not political and free to do their job. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We are going to make the maximum effort with Saddam Hussein once again, and on the other hand, deal with our Russian friends, because I really wouldn't like the Security Council to be divided. I think China would remain on the outside even if the Russians accept. We are going to be in contact with the Russians, but if Russia were to block a material breach resolution - which was what I had been led to understand thus far - it might be possible to find words that say the same thing but are slightly different and therefore acceptable to the Russians. My last point: in order to carry out a military strike over Iraq, it would be necessary to get authority to fly over certain countries that are neighbors of Iraq. Do you think that would not be a problem? ~~(C)~~

The President: We are working on that and I think we have a good chance of working out the details. Let me comment on the resolution issue. I think the problem with a resolution that doesn't use the words "material breach," but ~~have~~ has the same meaning, is that it would leave people who vote for it free to have different interpretations. I think the greatest chance of avoiding a military confrontation is if Saddam thinks we are prepared for one and that we have the authority to do it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Except if he feels it is in his interest to have a military strike. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, I think that is something you might discourage him from thinking. One possibility here is -- I would like it if this can be avoided -- but one possibility is for you to send a clear message that he needs to find a way out of it because you've talked to me and you think I am half crazy. (C)

I am prepared to explore anything, Jacques, but I want you to know my reading of the situation. I want a successful resolution and not to delay it forever. You explore what you just talked to me about in the UN, and let's keep talking and working and stay in close touch over the next few days. (C)

President Chirac: Bill, I'm going to do three things. First of all, I'll send an envoy to tell Saddam that the risks for him are very big. Second, I will be in contact with the Russians to exert some friendly pressure on them so they can accept a very firm and strong resolution. And we shall also approach the Chinese in order to try in any case not to have any division in the Security Council. And we will see in two or three or four days' time how things will have developed. (C)

On the other hand, I think it would be a good idea to double the amount relevant to Resolution 986. We have already been accused by international public opinion because of the huge suffering of the Iraqi people and this is not proper on the part of civilized nations. This has nothing to do with the conflict. This is something that is really inhuman. (C)

The President: Jacques, I strongly support increasing 986. We have a lot of data now on the average caloric intake for the children there and we know they are not getting enough nutrition. So I'm prepared to do that regardless. On the envoy, if you send an envoy there to see him, you can't mislead him that there is some kind of compromise that is unacceptable to those of us who want UNSCOM back in an unrestrained way. He needs to understand that he is at severe risk, that this is not something he can just take on and wind up ahead on. (C)

President Chirac: Well, we are going to intervene precisely along those lines. (C)

The President; Good, we will stay in touch over the next few days. Jacques, let me thank you for what you said publicly in my hour of need. I think we'll fight through it.

President Chirac: I am pretty sure of that and let me express to you my very warm friendship. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks, friend. (U)

President Chirac: And that of the French people. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9800760
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 98 18

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 30 JAN 98

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 07 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 2/05 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98020416	FOR DECISION
002		X	98020506	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980204	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0760

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(P) 2/4	w/the
Davies	3	2/4	
Kerrick	V	(D) 2/4	
Steinberg	COM		
Berger	COM		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: WWD: DO NOT SEND TAB B TO STATE

'98 FEB 4 PM 3:17

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Needs copies of it goes to SCB

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LOG # 0760

URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG SMD AVO

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(P) 2/4	WP Done
Davies	3	2/4	
Kerrick	2		
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: WWD: DO NOT SEND TAB B TO STATE

'98 FEB 4 PM 3:17

Exec Sec Office has diskette WP

Needs copies if it goes to SCB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0760

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 4, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By IC0E NARA, Date 10108115
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac on January 30, 1998 (U)

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Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/2/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetakers: James Smith, Cindy Lawrence, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Joel Schrader, George Chastain and Nancy McEldowney

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/2/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0775-M (1.32)

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President Chirac: I am pretty sure of that and let me express to you my very warm friendship. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks, friend. (U)

President Chirac: And that of the French people. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with French President Chirac (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Chirac Interpreter: Carol Wolter Notetakers: James Smith, Cindy Lawrence, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Joel Schrader, George Chastain and Nancy McEldowney
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	January 30, 1998, 11:59 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Chirac: Hello? (U)

The President: Jacques! (U)

President Chirac: How are you, Bill? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I'm glad to hear your voice. (U)

President Chirac: It's a great pleasure for me, also. Before we talk about Iraq through an interpreter, I just wanted to tell you one thing. I heard that your polls in the U.S. have never been so high after your so excellent speech for the State of the Union. I wanted to congratulate you and I wanted to tell you that if you were a candidate in France it is not 70 percent but 99 percent no doubt. And I say 99 percent because 100 percent would be for Hillary. Please tell her the admiration of all the French people for the way she did for the last few days. She was fantastic. Everybody in France is very close to you with great admiration for Hillary. ~~(C)~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0775-M (1.33)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/2/08

The President: Jacques, I will. Let me thank you for what you said. Your public comments were very helpful. We have an unusual system. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We cannot understand it here in France. ~~(C)~~

The President: I can't talk about it, but I think I am okay now. People want us to do our jobs. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: And you do it so well. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say also that I was really sorry to hear of the terrible deaths of the young people in the avalanche. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you very much, Bill. It was an accident. Do you want to talk about Iraq? If so, I would like to do it through the interpreter. ~~(C)~~

The President: Have you put your interpreter on? (U)

President Chirac: Mine is on. (U)

The President: OK. First of all, the Chairman of UNSCOM, Mr. Butler, briefed the Security Council last week and made an important point, that it is clear it is impossible for UNSCOM to do its job any more, and that is very serious. I know that Foreign Minister Vedrine and Secretary Albright agreed on this in Paris yesterday and that Madeleine had good talks with Levitte. Saddam's challenge to UNSCOM is clearly the most serious since 1991. He is trying to destroy UNSCOM in order to protect his weapons programs, and to get sanctions lifted prematurely. ~~(C)~~

We have pursued the diplomatic route carefully for months now. We have supported the Russian-brokered agreement from Geneva, but that has come undone. We actively sought Security Council statements and resolutions, but they have not compelled Iraqi compliance. I think we are reaching the point where the diplomatic options for obtaining Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM are becoming exhausted. I think Saddam is toying with us, hoping to deflect attention away from his efforts to conceal his weapons of mass destruction. We cannot let him succeed. ~~(C)~~

I know that your decision about whether to support military force is very difficult. It is difficult for me, as well. I am

encouraged by Foreign Minister Vedrine's indication that you have not ruled out the use of force if Iraq doesn't change. (~~C~~)

It is counterproductive for Saddam to hear others rule out force; that eases rather than increases the pressure on him. Now, I am of course aware of the downsides of military action, they are considerable, including the risk that he will throw out the inspectors. But a phony, sham UNSCOM is no better than no UNSCOM at all. We simply cannot allow Iraq to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and flout the will of the Security Council. There's too much at stake. (~~C~~)

If it comes to that, I hope that you will support a decision to use military force. In the meantime, it is very important to retain your public position that "all options are open;" that keeps more pressure on Saddam, and that keeps whatever chance we have, however narrow, to avert this. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Well, Bill, I would like to express a few remarks to you. It would be in Saddam Hussein's interest to drive away UNSCOM. Military strikes thus would have two advantages for Saddam Hussein. First, they would make his people close ranks around him, and also Arab countries around him. (~~C~~)

Second, of course, is that he would have a reason to drive away UNSCOM. And this would allow him to continue, probably not in the nuclear area, but in the bacteriological and chemical area. So I'm not sure a military strike would be a reasonable solution vis-à-vis international public opinion. A military strike cannot help but have civilian victims. And already there have been a lot of victims due to the embargo, including children with no food or medicine. If, on top of that, they are killed by bombs, then world public opinion will end up reacting very negatively. (~~C~~)

My third reflection is that the Security Council should not be divided in this respect. So, if we could find a formula whereby we could exert maximum pressure on the Iraqis, but that could also be signed by the Russians and the Chinese, that would be the best solution. (~~C~~)

The President: But what is your proposal? How would we do that? (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I have a two-fold proposal. In order to exert real pressure on Saddam Hussein, we should not talk about

material breach. The Russians won't accept it -- I talked about this with Primakov the day before yesterday -- and neither will the Chinese. If the Security Council is divided that would be a big victory for Saddam Hussein. So I think we need to find a text that doesn't use the words "material breach," but would mean the same thing. Our diplomats in New York are experts in this sort of exercise. (~~C~~)

And secondly, we should exert maximum diplomatic pressure on Saddam Hussein. The Russians did it the day before yesterday by sending a special envoy to be received by Saddam, and this was something new. I intend also to send a special envoy, but only providing that I am sure he will actually meet with Saddam himself. The envoy would tell him clearly that if he doesn't allow UNSCOM to go on doing its work, then the worst will happen. (~~C~~)

But it is also necessary to do something to allow him not to lose face completely. The idea, which is a Russian idea, is to create a new element which really doesn't change things -- this would be to add to UNSCOM personal representatives from each of the five main states of the Security Council. It doesn't change anything, but it gives him a small exit door. My last point: I hear the Iraqi parliament is to meet next Sunday and this is not a very good sign. (~~C~~)

The President: Well, let me respond. Jacques, can you hear me? (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Yes, I hear you very well. (~~C~~)

The President: Okay. First, I agree we don't need a divided Security Council, but I wish we could get a material breach resolution. I don't think the Chinese would veto alone if the Russians go along. There is some precedent for Saddam changing course in the face of a material breach resolution; he's done it three times since 1991. We don't believe we need to have it to justify action, but if there's any way you could persuade Yeltsin to let it go, that would increase pressure on him and maximize the chances that military action will not be necessary. (~~C~~)

Now, on the second suggestion you made, about having members of the Perm Five with the team. We have always said we don't care where team members are from. They could be from Micronesia for all we care. We just wanted them to be professional and not political. The second issue is that it's not just the

composition of the teams, but also the nature of their access, because to be able to certify what he has complied on the chemical and biological front requires a different level than the nuclear issue, because of the smaller space it takes. So access is the issue, and the integrity of the teams. I've never cared about the composition of the teams as long as they are professional and not political and free to do their job. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: We are going to make the maximum effort with Saddam Hussein once again, and on the other hand, deal with our Russian friends, because I really wouldn't like the Security Council to be divided. I think China would remain on the outside even if the Russians accept. We are going to be in contact with the Russians, but if Russia were to block a material breach resolution - which was what I had been led to understand thus far - it might be possible to find words that say the same thing but are slightly different and therefore acceptable to the Russians. My last point: in order to carry out a military strike over Iraq, it would be necessary to get authority to fly over certain countries that are neighbors of Iraq. Do you think that would not be a problem? ~~(C)~~

The President: We are working on that and I think we have a good chance of working out the details. Let me comment on the resolution issue. I think the problem with a resolution that doesn't use the words "material breach," but has the same meaning, is that it would leave people who vote for it free to have different interpretations. I think the greatest chance of avoiding a military confrontation is if Saddam thinks we are prepared for one and that we have the authority to do it. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Except if he feels it is in his interest to have a military strike. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, I think that is something you might discourage him from thinking. One possibility here is -- I would like it if this can be avoided -- but one possibility is for you to send a clear message that he needs to find a way out of it because you've talked to me and you think I am half crazy. ~~(C)~~

I am prepared to explore anything, Jacques, but I want you to know my reading of the situation. I want a successful resolution and not to delay it forever. You explore what you just talked to me about in the UN, and let's keep talking and working and stay in close touch over the next few days. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Bill, I'm going to do three things. First of all, I'll send an envoy to tell Saddam that the risks for him are very big. Second, I will be in contact with the Russians to exert some friendly pressure on them so they can accept a very firm and strong resolution. And we shall also approach the Chinese in order to try in any case not to have any division in the Security Council. And we will see in two or three or four days' time how things will have developed. (~~C~~)

On the other hand, I think it would be a good idea to double the amount relevant to Resolution 986. We have already been accused by international public opinion because of the huge suffering of the Iraqi people and this is not proper on the part of civilized nations. This has nothing to do with the conflict. This is something that is really inhuman. (~~C~~)

The President: Jacques, I strongly support increasing 986. We have a lot of data now on the average caloric intake for the children there and we know they are not getting enough nutrition. So I'm prepared to do that regardless. On the envoy, if you send an envoy there to see him, you can't mislead him that there is some kind of compromise that is unacceptable to those of us who want UNSCOM back in an unrestrained way. He needs to understand that he is at severe risk, that this is not something he can just take on and wind up ahead on. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Well, we are going to intervene precisely along those lines. (~~C~~)

The President; Good, we will stay in touch over the next few days. Jacques, let me thank you for what you said publicly in my hour of need. I think we'll fight through it.

President Chirac: I am pretty sure of that and let me express to you my very warm friendship. (~~C~~)

The President: Thanks, friend. (U)

President Chirac: And that of the French people. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0760

February 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By COE NARA, Date 101615
2015-0775-M

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac on January 30, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac on January 30, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab B be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
Tab B Expanded Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/2/08

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: CDE Date: 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9800760
DATE 04 FEB 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON 30 JAN 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

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Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9801229				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France (5 pages)	02/19/1998	P1/b(1) √2
001b. draft	[Incomplete draft of 001a] (2 pages)	02/19/1998	P1/b(1) √2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 2017

FOLDER TITLE:
9801229

2015-0775-M
ke3491

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9801229
RECEIVED: 19 FEB 98 14

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE ~~TELCALL~~ TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 19 FEB 98

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 25 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98022014	FOR DECISION
001		X	98022308	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98022308	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980221	BURNS, W	

2/20

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1229

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (1) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1	KC 2/19 edits	
Rice			
Davies	3 & 3	G 2/20 edit	
Kerrick	2		
Steinberg	3		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 FEB 19 PM 6:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

2/20

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG #: 12-29

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM: ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG: 13 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1	KF 2/19	e-mail
Rice			
Davies	3	G 2/20	cout
Kerrick	2		
Steinberg	3		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 FEB 19 PM 6:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette - yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 21, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/19/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Chirac Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet Notetaker: James Smith, Cindy Lawrence, Jeff Rathke, Robert Ford, David Higgins, Nancy McEldowney, and Rexon Ryu
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	February 19, 1998, 9:36 - 9:58 a.m. EST Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hello? (U)

The President: Good morning, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine, thank you. (U)

President Chirac: How is Hillary? (U)

The President: She is doing great. She said to send you regards. She was pleased when I told her that you said she has the support of 100 percent of the people in France. (U)

President Chirac: That's still right. Please send her my greetings. (U)

The President: I'll do it. (U)

President Chirac: Do you mind if we speak through an interpreter? (U)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0175-M (1.34)

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 02/19/98

The President: All right. (U)

President Chirac: Okay, I'll give her the phone. (U)

The President: First, let me say that I thought your comments after your meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister on Tuesday about time running out were very helpful. It is important to keep the pressure on. I think what we are clearly working for is a principled diplomatic solution, and I am glad we worked together on the P-5 advice for Kofi Annan's trip. He can now go to Baghdad with a firm position on Iraq's requirements from the international community. The advice we agreed to protects our core principles: that UNSCOM has access everywhere and that the integrity of UNSCOM as a group of expert inspectors is protected. ~~(C)~~

I think if we stay together as Kofi takes his trip, we really have a chance to get a diplomatic solution. But, Jacques, if he can't get an acceptable agreement, we have to stand together in response. If the diplomatic string runs out, we have to seriously consider the use of military force. If we can't get a diplomatic solution, I hope that France will support the use of force. It seems to me that the key to our efforts on Presidential palaces is to get Saddam to back down. He has done it in the past when confronted with the threat of force and international backing, and he will do so again, but only if we are clear and firm, and he knows we are not bluffing. ~~(C)~~

I think, in a way, we have all been at a disadvantage in the last few weeks, because everybody has been thinking of how to please him and give him a way out. But, now we are offering him a different approach, and he should be thinking about how he can comply with the rules of the international community which he has already agreed to follow. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I still think we can hope for a diplomatic solution, Bill, and I have the feeling that Saddam Hussein is ready to accept the strict application of the resolutions at the request of Kofi Annan. So we should not really fail for reasons related to form or detail, if it is clear that inspection of all the sites as often as necessary is a necessity, and I think this is something that is not negotiable. Regarding the manner of the visits, I think we could adopt certain forms or modalities--I am talking about the residences--and this because they are sensitive to the question of security of Saddam Hussein and also a question of dignity. This doesn't put into question the

principle or modality of inspections, it means to do it politely. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with that. (U)

President Chirac: I continue to hope that on this basis Saddam Hussein will accept the conditions put forward by Kofi Annan. I wish this very strongly because a military strike has a lot of drawbacks. First of all, dead people. It is always the weakest and most vulnerable who become victims, and we will have to bear the responsibility for this, all of us. And also, Arab public opinion. According to all the information I have, they will condemn us very strongly. Finally, and this is something which is very essential, this would be the end of UNSCOM inspections. The end of UNSCOM controls would be absolutely disastrous because Saddam would be able to reconstruct whatever he wants. So, maybe a military strike could be justified, but what do we do next? Well, the reason I might understand a military strike is if Saddam were to say no to what he is asked. So long as there is still a chance, and Kofi will see this in Baghdad, so long as there is still a chance to get what we want regarding the substance, I think we should not strike. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with that. The question of what happens to UNSCOM inspections if there is a military strike is important, but they are in effect already out of business now anyway. And, the sites he put off limits are so large that he could rebuild his capability within them even if he permitted inspections in the rest of the country. As to the palaces themselves and his personal security in them, I understand that is why we have agreed to diplomatic groups to accompany the inspectors. But, keep in mind, these inspectors are not really experts on how he protects his personal security. They are experts on the chemical and biological programs going on, so they can't really threaten his security. It is not like they could go back and report to someone on how to conduct a guerilla attack on his palace. At any rate, I think you have it formulated correctly: if we can preserve the integrity of the inspectors, we can put a political arm around it to make it polite, as you say, so long as the integrity of the inspection system itself is preserved. You know, if they have operational control over what they are trying to do, the inspectors, I think that is fine. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Bill, I agree with what you just said, except regarding one point. Earlier on you said that UNSCOM and the inspectors are already out of business. I don't think this is

quite the case. Today, there are 160 members of UNSCOM controlling 300 sites of military production or storage, and they inspect them without any notice with 120 cameras. UNSCOM has dismantled Iraq's nuclear activity virtually completely and has destroyed about 500,000 liters of chemical agents and several dozens of thousands of such munitions. Now, if we were not to have any UNSCOM, which would be the result of a military strike, then Saddam would be able to start rearming himself, which, I believe, at present he is not able do. And, I also know, for example, and this is a good sign, that the experts sent by Kofi Annan to map out the topography of the sites were able to work in full security and freedom. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with part of what you said, but if he can rule some sites off limits--one of which has a land area equal to that of Washington, D.C.--he has more than enough space to restart his chemical and biological programs, which I think is the biggest threat to the region over the next 20 years. That is why there can't be any safe havens. It doesn't take that much space to do so. Look, I agree with you, the best result is to keep the inspection system and have it work over the whole country. The inspection system has worked well. So, in that sense, we have agreement. However, the inspectors still believe he retains a modest chemical and biological program within the sites not yet inspected, and he has the capacity to quickly expand within those sites. That is why I think it is important that we get to those sites. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I fully agree with you on this. Yes, I fully agree with the fact that we must obtain access to all the sites without exception, present sites and what could become future sites. Well, the only thing I am saying is that in certain special sites, which are personal residences, inspections should be carried out with a certain tact and politeness. I think Saddam would accept this. ~~(C)~~

The President: I certainly hope so. We will just have to keep working on it. As long as the key is that expertise is preserved with full access and the ability to go back and monitor, if necessary. If this is so, then I think we can get a diplomatic solution. We all have to work for this with whatever we can and hope that it will be achieved. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I fully agree with this. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you very much Jacques. We will be in touch. (U)

President Chirac: It was a great pleasure to talk to you, Bill. I would like to express my great friendship to you and give my regards to Hillary. (U)

The President: Thank you very much, Jacques. Goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you, Bill. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VDE Date: 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9801229
DATE 21 FEB 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 19 FEB 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 19, 1998

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
Q015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY McELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France on February 19, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac on February 19, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve 2/21 Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve 2/21 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 02/19/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

letterhead

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines.
September 11, 2006
By VDS NARA, Date 20100615
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/19/08

The President: All right. (U)

President Chirac: Okay, I'll give her the phone. (U)

The President: First, let me say that I thought your comments after your meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister on Tuesday about time running out were very helpful. It is important to keep the pressure on. I think what we are clearly working for is a principled diplomatic solution, and I am glad we worked together on the P-5 advice for Kofi Annan's trip. He can now go to Baghdad with a firm position on Iraq's requirements from the international community. The advice we agreed to protects our core principles: that UNSCOM has access everywhere and that the integrity of UNSCOM as a group of expert inspectors is protected. ~~(C)~~

I think if we stay together as Kofi takes his trip, we really have a chance to get a diplomatic solution. But, Jacques, if he can't get an acceptable agreement, we have to stand together in response. If the diplomatic string runs out, we have to seriously consider the use of military force. If we can't get a diplomatic solution, I hope that France will support the use of force. It seems to me that the key to our efforts on Presidential palaces is to get Saddam to back down. He has done it in the past when confronted with the threat of force and international backing, and he will do so again, but only if we are clear and firm, and he knows we are not bluffing. ~~(C)~~

I think, in a way, we have all been at a disadvantage in the last few weeks, because everybody has been thinking of how to please him and give him a way out. But, now we are offering him a different approach, and he should be thinking about how he can comply with the rules of the international community which he has already agreed to follow. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I still think we can hope for a diplomatic solution, Bill, and I have the feeling that Saddam Hussein is ready to accept the strict application of the resolutions at the request of Kofi Annan. So we should not really fail for reasons related to form or detail, if it is clear that inspection of all the sites as often as necessary is a necessity, and I think this is something that is not negotiable. Regarding the manner of the visits, I think we could adopt certain forms or modalities--I am talking about the residences--and this because they are sensitive to the question of security of Saddam Hussein and also a question of dignity. This doesn't put into question the

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2015-0775-M (1.35)

principle or modality of inspections, it means to do it politely. (~~C~~)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

President Chirac: I continue to hope that on this basis Saddam Hussein will accept the conditions put forward by Kofi Annan. I wish this very strongly because a military strike has a lot of drawbacks. First of all, dead people. It is always the weakest and most vulnerable who become victims, and we will have to bear the responsibility for this, all of us. And also, Arab public opinion. According to all the information I have, they will condemn us very strongly. Finally, and this is something which is very essential, this would be the end of UNSCOM inspections. The end of UNSCOM controls would be absolutely disastrous because Saddam would be able to reconstruct whatever he wants. So, maybe a military strike could be justified, but what do we do next? Well, the reason I might understand a military strike is if Saddam were to say no to what he is asked. So long as there is still a chance, and Kofi will see this in Baghdad, so long as there is still a chance to get what we want regarding the substance, I think we should not strike. (~~C~~)

The President: I agree with that. The question of what happens to UNSCOM inspections if there is a military strike is important, but they are in effect already out of business now anyway. And, the sites he put off limits are so large that he could rebuild his capability within them even if he permitted inspections in the rest of the country. As to the palaces themselves and his personal security in them, I understand that is why we have agreed to diplomatic groups to accompany the inspectors. But, keep in mind, these inspectors are not really experts on how he protects his personal security. They are experts on the chemical and biological programs going on, so they can't really threaten his security. It is not like they could go back and report to someone on how to conduct a guerilla attack on his palace. At any rate, I think you have it formulated correctly: if we can preserve the integrity of the inspectors, we can put a political arm around it to make it polite, as you say, so long as the integrity of the inspection system itself is preserved. You know, if they have operational control over what they are trying to do, the inspectors, I think that is fine. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Bill, I agree with what you just said, except regarding one point. Earlier on you said that UNSCOM and the inspectors are already out of business. I don't think this is

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10108115
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

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only

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/19/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/09/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
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only

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Executive Secretary

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Reason: 1.5(d)
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Case Number: 2015-0775-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (6 pages)~~	~~02/23/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. draft~~	~~[Incomplete draft of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~02/23/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9801338
RECEIVED: 23 FEB 98 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 24 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ CHIRAC 23 FEB

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 28 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	MCELDOWNEY	Z	98022418	FOR DECISION
001		X	98022418	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98022419	DAVIES SGD MEMO

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National ~~Security~~ Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Steinberg	2		
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	2/25/24	D
Records Mgt.			D

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National Security Council
The White House

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Cosgriff	1	2/23	edit
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Records Mgt.			D

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 FEB 23 PM 6:10

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 24, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France on February 23, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, eyes only. ~~(S)~~.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 2/23/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: James Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Tom Crowell, Bonnie Glick, Jeff Rathke, Nancy McEldowney and Rexon Ryu

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 23, 1998, 12:52 - 1:35 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Hi, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: I'm fine. Congratulations, because frankly you were proven correct in taking a very firm position on the Iraq affair. I think we can say publicly that what we were all trying to achieve has been achieved. Of course we have to look into the details. But the important thing is the inspection of all the presidential sites, as often as we wish and as long as we wish. I recognize that exerting pressure has proved fruitful. ~~(S)~~

The President: Thank you. I think the combined efforts of the threat of force and the diplomatic efforts you and Boris Yeltsin made, where you were firm in private, though opposed force publicly, worked out together. Now I'd like to talk to you about the proposed agreement, if you have the time. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Very good, I'm listening. ~~(C)~~

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0776-M (1.36)

The President: I have now had a chance to review this agreement and I think it is potentially adequate and quite faithful to the Perm Five position that Kofi Annan took to Baghdad. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Yes, that is also my impression. (~~S~~)

The President: Do you have a copy of the memorandum of understanding before you? (~~S~~)

President Chirac: No, I have not yet gotten a copy of the agreement. The French Ambassador to the UN in New York just telephoned me and told me of its contents, and I expect a copy very soon. (~~C~~)

The President: Let me just tell you what my concerns are, very briefly. In paragraph 4 of the agreement, the memorandum of understanding, there is language dealing with the inspection of presidential sites. It says there will be a special group to inspect them, established by the Secretary General in consultation with Mr. Butler and the Director General of IAEA and that the group will be headed by a commissioner appointed by the Secretary General. It says the group will operate under the established procedures of UNSCOM and the IAEA and specific detailed procedures to be developed, given the special nature of the presidential sites, but they will be consistent with the relevant UNSC resolutions. (~~S~~)

Now, my observation is, the commissioner should be a person with recognized technical expertise so we don't raise a question of this becoming a political rather than a technical inquiry. Also, whatever detailed procedures are adopted must still allow genuine inspections. (~~S~~)

Paragraph 5 of the memorandum is very good from my point of view. It says that the UN and the Government of Iraq agree that all other facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation are subject to existing UNSCOM procedures. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Yes, on our part, we had insisted strongly on that particular point. (~~S~~)

The President: And that's very good, because some of these sites UNSCOM had been denied access to are not presidential sites. The most important is the Ministry of Defense, probably, but there are several sites that UNSCOM has been denied access to that were not presidential sites, so that is very important. Here's why I mentioned that. The introductory part of this memo

says the Government of Iraq undertakes to accord to UNSCOM immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, but in the performance of its mandate, UNSCOM will respect Iraq's national security, sovereignty and dignity. My concern is simply this: I don't believe that language should lead to another round of negotiations with Iraq over the status of nonpresidential sites and I don't believe that Kofi working on procedures should lead to another round of negotiations. We don't need further delay here, and I hope you could support that. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Yes, I entirely agree with you. ~~(S)~~

The President: Okay. Two other issues I wanted to raise with you. First, I strongly believe that we have to avoid similar problems in the future -- we have done this twice in the last year and the United States cannot afford -- and I don't believe the international community can afford -- another incident where we have to move a carrier group into the Gulf. It is expensive, economically and politically. It would be very helpful if we could get a Security Council resolution that says if this agreement is violated it is a material breach and serious consequences will follow. That way, we don't have to do this all over again. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Was that your last point, Bill? ~~(C)~~

The President: No, my last point is simply this. I believe we need to have an early test of this. We shouldn't have a lengthy delay. All of us should encourage Kofi and Butler to move quickly and start to activate the agreement as quickly as possible. I understand Butler has problems, he can't just send people to Iraq overnight, but I think we need to test this agreement quickly. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Bill, I would like to make one or two remarks, if I may. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes. (U)

President Chirac: First of all, Saddam Hussein thought he could cheat on this. He was subjected to maximum U.S. pressure, and he had to give in. Bill, I think we can say that the whole of the international community and particularly the Arab world completely understood the sense and importance of American pressure. So from there on, Saddam Hussein, faced with all these pressures, military and political pressures, got the message that he was wrong. And thanks to Kofi Annan being

adroit in this, I think Saddam Hussein finally accepted almost everything we were trying to get. ~~(S)~~

The main point being that all sites can be visited as often as UNSCOM wants. I think this is a major victory for the United States and for the international community. We should make it known as quickly as possible that there is agreement. I am a little worried about the upsurge of negative attitude by Arab public opinion against the West. I think we should reach agreement on this very quickly. ~~(S)~~

On the various points you raised, with exception of automaticity, which I will go back to in a moment, on all the other points I quite agree with you. I don't think we could have expected to get anything better, and with this UNSCOM will be able to go about its work as it wishes to. Especially as the people who have been doing the measuring on behalf of the UN have realized that the actual surface areas of these sites are not as extensive as they originally thought. So in order to stop the negative attitude on the part of the Arab world and to prevent that from developing, it's important that the Security Council should make up its mind quickly. ~~(S)~~

Beyond this I see two problems. The first I would call the details or technicalities that may have to be improved. My view is that we should say we agree in general with the results achieved by Kofi Annan and, as far as the details are concerned, they can be sorted out as they arise. The second problem, far more important, is what you call material breach. Obviously, it is very difficult to talk about something being automatic, it is something that world public opinion has trouble accepting. But our British friends have made a proposal which I thought was very interesting. Instead of talking about material breach, they had phraseology that says the same thing but in more diplomatic terms. I think the British proposal talked about "the most serious consequences" I think it would be far easier to get agreement from the 15 Security Council members on that British phraseology, bearing in mind it means the same thing but is more diplomatic. Especially after the victory won over Saddam. ~~(S)~~

The President: The only thing that bothers me is that I simply cannot afford to do this again. Twice in the past year to get him to comply, I've had to move the U.S. Navy into the Persian Gulf. It cost a lot of money, and political and military effort as well. He has to know in no uncertain terms we can't go through this a third time, or whenever he wants to jerk the

world community around. The material breach is unambiguous, and I would have thought the Brits favored that. The next time I have to act. I am looking for something to maximize the chances there won't be a next time, to maximize deterrence, so I won't have to do anything. ~~(S)~~

Let me also say that I'm under the impression that Tony Blair agrees with us. I just talked to him and will talk to him again. The other point is the stronger language, the material breach language, would make it easier to be more flexible on the proposed package. It has an impact on the overall package. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Bill, I just picked up the British proposal made a few days ago in the Security Council, and their suggestion was to have instead of the words "material breach," the words "the most serious consequences." In the last message I sent to Saddam Hussein, making it quite clear there was nothing to negotiate and that he had to accept what he was asked to do, I indicated that whatever the wording was, "material breach" or "serious consequences," it meant exactly the same thing -- it meant he would have to comply fully, otherwise a strike would take place. But my feeling is the British wording is more diplomatic. It doesn't change reality at all -- and this point must be made perfectly clear -- it means exactly the same thing, but is a politer way to say it. ~~(S)~~

The President: Well, how would we go about saying it means the same thing? ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Simply by explaining what I just said, which is what I already said to Saddam Hussein: whatever the wording is, the meaning is exactly the same and the first thing he does out of line will lead to a military strike. It is a question of polite diplomacy or diplomatic phrasing, but the point must be made that it means exactly the same thing. ~~(S)~~

The President: Well, let me make a suggestion. Would you also discuss this with Tony Blair, and then we can talk again. Actually, let me ask you two things: one is to talk to Tony Blair and secondly, would you be willing to say what you just said publicly? ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Yes, no problem. I entirely agree I can say this publicly. I am prepared to say this alone or with the four other members of the Security Council, under any format you would prefer. ~~(S)~~

The President: I think if you say it separately it is more powerful. People view you as an independent voice on this. (S)

President Chirac: I am perfectly prepared to say this, write it, and confirm it in writing to Saddam. (S)

The President: Thank you. You talk to Tony. (C)

President Chirac: Yes, I am calling Tony right now. (C)

The President: Great and we'll get back together on this. Goodbye. (C)

President Chirac: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 10108115
2015-0775-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9801338
DATE 24 FEB 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ CHIRAC 23 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCDC NARA, Date 10/05/15
2015-0175-M

February 23, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France on February 23, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac of France on February 23, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Tab A) to State (Tab I).

Approve w/ edits Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve JKM Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 2/23/08

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 160815
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

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Eyes only

Eyes only.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 2/23/08

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WASHINGTON

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SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: James Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Tom Crowell, Bonnie Glick, Jeff Rathke, Nancy McEldowney and Rexon Ryu

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 23, 1998, 12:52 - 1:35 p.m. EST
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President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: I'm fine. Congratulations, because frankly you were proven correct in taking a very firm position on the Iraq affair. I think we can say publicly that what we were all trying to achieve has been achieved. Of course we have to look into the details. But the important thing is the inspection of all the presidential sites, as often as we wish and as long as we wish. I recognize that exerting pressure has proved fruitful. ~~(S)~~

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Declassify On: 2/23/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2015-0775-M (1.37)

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President Chirac: Yes, on our part, we had insisted strongly on that particular point. (~~S~~)

The President: And that's very good, because some of these sites UNSCOM had been denied access to are not presidential sites. The most important is the Ministry of Defense, probably, but there are several sites that UNSCOM has been denied access to that were not presidential sites, so that is very important. Here's why I mentioned that. The introductory part of this memo

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2026				
Document ID: 9802342				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (3 pages)~~	~~03/31/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ V2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 2026

FOLDER TITLE:
9802342

2015-0775-M
ke3493

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 980342
RECEIVED: 01 APR 98 09

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 02 APR 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 31 MAR CALL TO PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 07 APR 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SHS DATE 4/2 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2 Disk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	98040215	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98040215	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980402	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2342

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SUD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	(R) 4/1 4/2	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(W) 4/2	
Steinberg		copy ✓	
Berger		copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(D) 4/2	D
Records Mgt.	5		D + Disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 APR 1 AM 11:26

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2342

URGENT / NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PBS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWO A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	(E) 4/1 4/2	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(W) 4/1	
Steinberg		copy ✓	
Berger		cpy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(S) 4/2	→
Records Mgt.	5		D - Disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 APR 1 AM 11:24

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 2, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCDE NARA, Date 10108115
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Chirac of France on March 31, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
FOR: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 4/1/08

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: James Smith, Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Cynthia Lawrence, Jeffrey Rathke, Joel Schrader and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 31, 1998, 12:39 - 12:48 p.m. EST
Air Force One

The President: Hello? (U)

President Chirac: Hi, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I am great. How are you? (U)

President Chirac: Fine. It's a great pleasure to hear from you. I want to congratulate you on your African trip. Do you mind if I give the phone to the interpreter? (U)

The President: Thank you. Do it. (U)

President Chirac: I wanted to congratulate you on your trip to Africa. (U)

The President: Well, thank you. I sent you a letter about the trip, and now that I'm here, I wanted to check in with you. I've been very impressed by the leaders I have met and by the people I have seen. One thing I hoped to achieve was to change Americans' perceptions of Africa, and I think I'm doing that. I wanted to just talk to you about your own view. You know a lot more about Africa than I do, and I wanted to ask what you think

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 4/1/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.38)

about the future of the continent -- are you optimistic? Secondly, I'm on my way to Senegal -- I just left Botswana -- and I wanted to see if there's anything you recommend that I should do or say while I'm in Senegal. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: I want first to say that I'm delighted the trip is going so well. I am very much in favor of cooperation between France and the United States in Africa. On Senegal, you are going to a country that is genuinely democratic. But I think I should tell you that they are in the preparatory stages for elections, and they look as if they might be difficult. Therefore, they have to be treated with some caution. Secondly, concerning the G-7/G-8 in Birmingham, we will of course be talking about Asia but, in view of your trip, we should also talk about Africa. Your visit is itself an important aspect in relations between Africa and the West. (~~S~~)

The President: I agree with that. We need to discuss the whole debt relief issue and whether we need to do anything else on that, and some of the other issues facing the continent, especially Nigeria. There are a lot of things I'd like to discuss when we get to Birmingham. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Yes, I'm certainly in favor of such a discussion, including of course on Nigeria, with whom France entertains perfectly adequate relations. The discussion, as you know, could also bear on the world. I'm in favor of forgiving debt of the countries in difficulty whenever possible, on the basis of the Lyon terms. It would be useful to talk about that in Birmingham. Another issue you could perhaps raise in Senegal is AIDS -- it was raised in Abidjan by Africans, Europeans, and Americans -- in particular the establishment of a treatment or therapeutic fund to enable Africans with AIDS to benefit from the same facilities as can be obtained in the West. (~~S~~)

The President: That sounds good. We'll follow up on all this. When I get home in a few days, I'll write you a letter with further thoughts. We will also organize our thoughts on how to proceed in Birmingham. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Yes, I quite agree. Also, I wanted to tell you that every day on television we see wonderful photos of your trip, and in particular, some very beautiful pictures of Hillary. (U)

The President: Thank you. It is very beautiful here. (U)

President Chirac: Please be kind enough to convey to Hillary my affectionate regards. (U)

The President: I will, Jacques. Thank you very much. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you, Bill. Have a good trip in Senegal and say hello to Abdou, he's an old friend of mine. (U)

The President: I'll tell him I talked to you. (U)

President Chirac: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 10/05/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9802342
DATE 02 APR 98

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 31 MAR CARLL TO PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1 + DISK

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 1, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France on March 31, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac of France on March 31, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Tab A) to State (Tab I).

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 4/1/08

see 2009-1291-M

Case Number: 2009-1291-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2057				
Document ID: 9806153				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2059				
Document ID: 9806367				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France (5 pages)~~	~~09/13/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2
~~001b. draft~~	~~[Incomplete draft of 001a] (4 pages)~~	~~09/13/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 2059

FOLDER TITLE:
9806367

2015-0775-M
ke3494

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806367
RECEIVED: 16 SEP 98 09

TO: BERGER

FROM: GORDON
BANDLER

DOC DATE: 16 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES CHIRAC OF FRANCE ON 13 SEP

ACTION: DAVIES APPROVED RECOM 2 DUE DATE: 22 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		FICKLIN
		GORDON
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/05/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98091713	FOR DECISION
001		X	98092314	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM 2

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6367

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1	KR 9/16	
Rice	+		
Davies	2	CJ 9/16	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3 ~~3~~		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Telcon w/Chuck

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6367

September 16, 1998

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: PHILIP GORDON PG

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac on September 13, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the president and President Chirac which took place on September 13, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

File for the Record Only
✓ 9/16
Approved

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 09/16/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6367

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By KOE NARA, Date 101115
2005-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 09/16/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Joel Schrader, Elizabeth Rogers, Philip Gordon and Greg Schulte
Interpreter: Carol Wolter

DATE/TIME AND PLACE: September 13, 1998, 12:33 - 12:59 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Chirac: Hello Bill? I'm glad to hear you. (U)

The President: Hello Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, I'm very glad to hear you. It's a great pleasure. Bill, thank you for accepting my call. Do you mind if I ask my interpreter to translate? First of all, I want to tell you from the bottom of my heart of my friendship in the personal ordeal that you are going through. Nobody in Europe or France in particular understands this. If there were to be a referendum or opinion poll in France today, you would get 95 percent of the vote. The press and the media in France are unanimous in this respect and rightly feel that in the U.S. we are witnessing a dangerous drift of democracy. And I would like to tell you in this delicate moment that this won't last. I and all your friends are by your side and by the side of Hillary and your daughter. (U)

The President: Thank you so much. (U)

President Chirac: Second Bill, now we had been talking about having a meeting with your officials, and I would be very glad to go to Washington in November if you can find an opportunity for us to meet -- to have this important meeting. (U)

Classify by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 09/16/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 1/3/2019
2015-0770-M4 (1.39)

The President: You could come in November? (U)

President Chirac: Well, whenever would suit you in November, so I suggest that our officials work out a date that would suit you. (U)

The President: Thank you. Let's have our staffs work on that. I had just a couple of things I wanted to mention to you. First of all, on the personal matter, since you were kind enough to mention it, I think it is going to blow over. But if you were willing to do it, if you could put out some kind of statement saying that we have many challenges to confront together and the world wants the United States to get on with business. That would be very useful. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, this is precisely my intention. This is why I wanted to have this talk with you today. It was the occasion and opportunity to do that to the international media. And I'm going to do that within the next 30 minutes. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. Also, let me just mention a couple of other questions. I think we did the right thing on Iraq last week in the UN. Now we have information, which has already been in the French press, saying that Saddam Hussein is going to throw the UNSCOM observers out of Iraq this week. Do you think there is anything we can do about this? ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think that your information is not complete. Today, 3-4 hours ago, the ambassadors of France, China, and Russia were solemnly received by Tariq Aziz in order to express their strong wish that Iraq resume full cooperation with UNSCOM. And I got the outcome of that meeting two hours ago, and Tariq Aziz showed himself conciliatory. The Iraqi parliament is to meet tomorrow, and they will recommend the decision of breaking off cooperation. But from past experience, we have seen the parliament speak out very loudly, but it doesn't mean that Saddam Hussein will do the same thing. And the impression of the three ambassadors of France, China, and Russia is rather positive after meeting with Tariq Aziz. In my opinion, everything will depend on the meeting that is scheduled in New York next week between the ambassadors of the five permanent members and Kofi Annan. And the five ambassadors of the permanent countries and Kofi Annan should work together in order to launch the work on the comprehensive review. And I think that in front of the media, our ambassadors must be firm regarding the principle and obligation of Iraq to start immediate work with UNSCOM. But at the same time, they must adopt a presentation that will not close off the door completely, while fully respecting the resolutions of the UN so that there might be a possibility for Iraq of

finding a way of going ahead. And I think it ought to take place normally. ~~(C)~~

The President: That is very good news. I have tried to be very restrained during this period, and I am a little perplexed because we were almost at a point where we could have transferred their nuclear program from the inspection to the monitoring phase. And I have shown good faith here and, as you may know, was attacked in the American press by this man Ritter who said we weren't tough enough with Iraq. I want to defend the integrity of UNSCOM, but we need to make sure that there are no chemical or biological weapons programs going on there. I think we can work through this if he will deal in good faith. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, I think that we ought to be able to get out of this deadlock. Well, in any case we are exerting maximum pressure on Saddam Hussein to get him to understand that it is in his interest to resume normal work with UNSCOM. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks. I think it is very important because throwing them all out would be a big slap in the face of Kofi Annan and the work of the UN. I wanted to say a word on Kosovo too. There has been some movement on the negotiating track with Milosevic agreeing at least to the concept of an interim agreement, but I don't know if Milosevic is ready to return to the concept of autonomy for Kosovo if he thinks there is a chance of a military option. And I am concerned about the possibility that Rugova may not be able to convince the combatants to end the violence. It seems to me that the situation is becoming increasingly urgent as winter approaches. There are 50-100,000 refugees in the mountains who could die of freezing or starvation. And I think we have to get some sort of political solution. If we have to go in there in the winter with a humanitarian mission we could have a repeat of Bosnia. We can't do it if we're not all together. Yeltsin issued a strong statement on it. I think Milosevic has to believe that with people starving, NATO will act, even without UN approval. We have to find a way to turn up the heat a little. The British have proposed a resolution, a draft resolution, to the UN, and I don't know if the Russians will be willing to accept it, but I believe even they are concerned about this winter. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, I make the same analysis. I think that the time has come to adopt a resolution in New York. We fully support the British draft, and I think that the Russians will either vote in favor or abstain but they will not vote against. They have enough difficulties of their own for the moment, not to add a conflict with the West on the subject. I am in favor of having a resolution in New York, in fact voting for the British draft resolution. But it seems to me that there is something

else that is necessary. The Contact Group hasn't met in quite a while and I think this is a psychological error vis-à-vis the Russians in particular and also vis-à-vis the Europeans. I think that we ought to use the week of 21 September when all the foreign ministers will be in New York to have a meeting of the Contact Group there in New York. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with that. We just have to keep working on it. I just want to point out that if winter comes on, we could be in a bad situation like we were in Bosnia. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That's true. ~~(C)~~

The President: The last thing I wanted to mention briefly is Russia. I went to Russia and I talked to Yeltsin again yesterday. I think that it would be useful, if you haven't already spoken with him, for you to call him and say there has to be a credible economic program to restore the confidence of investors. That's the only way to keep the money from going right out of the country if we were to invest more. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes. I am going to do this as well, but tomorrow there is a meeting of the relevant directors of the G-7 with the Russians. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes. I know. (U)

President Chirac: But I am going to ring Yeltsin. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you Jacques, and thank you very much for this call. It means more than you could possibly know. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, you know that you have my fullest friendship and my fullest esteem, and also my affection to be shared with Hillary. And I have the fullest confidence. This is the sort of crisis that you get, a sort of McCarthy type of crisis, but the American public has proved that it is reasonable and normal. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. Yes, if they stay with me, I'll be alright. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, Bill, I think they have gone too far against you. It's really a form of lynching, and I think public opinion will stay with you, just like international opinion is with you. You have my fullest confidence and you will have your friends by your side. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks man. (U)

President Chirac: Bye-bye Bill, it was of great interest to me, and I'm going to make a comment to the press immediately. (~~C~~)

The President: Thank you so much. (U)

President Chirac: Bye-bye Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

6367

The President: You could come in November? (U)

President Chirac: Well, whenever would suit you in November, so I suggest that our officials work out a date that would suit you. (U)

The President: Thank you. Let's have our staffs work on that. I had just a couple of things I wanted to mention to you. First of all, on the personal matter, since you were kind enough to mention it, I think it is going to blow over. But if you were willing to do it, if you could put out some kind of statement saying that we have many challenges to confront together and the world wants the United States to get on with business. That would be very useful. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Well, this is precisely my intention. This is why I wanted to have this talk with you today. It was the occasion and opportunity to do that to the international media. And I'm going to do that within the next 30 minutes. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. Also, let me just mention a couple of other questions. I think we did the right thing on Iraq last week in the UN. Now we have information, which has already been in the French press, saying that Saddam Hussein is going to throw the UNSCOM observers out of Iraq this week. Do you think there is anything we can do about this? ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think that your information is not complete. Today, 3-4 hours ago, the ambassadors of France, China, and Russia were solemnly received by Tariq Aziz in order to express their strong wish that Iraq resume full cooperation with UNSCOM. And I got the outcome of that meeting two hours ago, and Tariq Aziz showed himself conciliatory. The Iraqi parliament is to meet tomorrow, and they will recommend the decision of breaking off cooperation. But from past experience, we have seen the parliament speak out very loudly, but it doesn't mean that Saddam Hussein will do the same thing. And the impression of the three ambassadors of France, China, and Russia is rather positive after meeting with Tariq Aziz. In my opinion, everything will depend on the meeting that is scheduled in New York next week between the ambassadors of the five permanent members and Kofi Annan. And the five ambassadors of the permanent countries and Kofi Annan should work together in order to launch the work on the comprehensive review. And I think that in front of the media, our ambassadors must be firm regarding the principle and obligation of Iraq to start immediate work with UNSCOM. But at the same time, they must adopt a presentation that will not close off the door completely, while fully respecting the resolutions of the UN so that there might be a possibility for Iraq of

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By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2018-0776-M (1.40)

finding a way of going ahead. And I think it ought to take place normally. (~~C~~)

The President: That is very good news. I have tried to be very restrained during this period, and I am a little perplexed because we were almost at a point where we could have transferred their nuclear program from the inspection to the monitoring phase. And I have shown good faith here and, as you may know, was attacked in the American press by this man Ritter who said we weren't tough enough with Iraq. I want to defend the integrity of UNSCOM, but we need to make sure that there are no chemical or biological weapons programs going on there. I think we can work through this if he will deal in good faith. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Yes, I think that we ought to be able to get out of this deadlock. Well, in any case we are exerting maximum pressure on Saddam Hussein to get him to understand that it is in his interest to resume normal work with UNSCOM. (~~C~~)

The President: Thanks. I think it is very important because throwing them all out would be a big slap in the face of Kofi Annan and the work of the UN. I wanted to say a word on Kosovo too. There has been some movement on the negotiating track with Milosevic agreeing at least to the concept of an interim agreement, but I don't know if Milosevic is ready to return to the concept of autonomy for Kosovo if he thinks there is a chance of a military option. And I am concerned about the possibility that Rugova may not be able to convince the combatants to end the violence. It seems to me that the situation is becoming increasingly urgent as winter approaches. There are 50-100,000 refugees in the mountains who could die of freezing or starvation. And I think we have to get some sort of political solution. If we have to go in there in the winter with a humanitarian mission we could have a repeat of Bosnia. We can't do it if we're not all together. Yeltsin issued a strong statement on it. I think Milosevic has to believe that with people starving, NATO will act, even without UN approval. We have to find a way to turn up the heat a little. The British have proposed a resolution, a draft resolution, to the UN, and I don't know if the Russians will be willing to accept it, but I believe even they are concerned about this winter. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Well, I make the same analysis. I think that the time has come to adopt a resolution in New York. We fully support the British draft, and I think that the Russians will either vote in favor or abstain but they will not vote against. They have enough difficulties of their own for the moment, not to add a conflict with the West on the subject. I am in favor of having a resolution in New York, in fact voting for the British draft resolution. But it seems to me that there is something

else that is necessary. The Contact Group hasn't met in quite a while and I think this is a psychological error vis-à-vis the Russians in particular and also vis-à-vis the Europeans. I think that we ought to use the week of 21 September when all the foreign ministers will be in New York to have a meeting of the Contact Group there in New York. (C)

The President: I agree with that. We just have to keep working on it. I just want to point out that if winter comes on, we could be in a bad situation like we were in Bosnia. (S)

President Chirac: That's true. (S)

The President: The last thing I wanted to mention briefly is Russia. I went to Russia and I talked to Yeltsin again yesterday. I think that it would be useful, if you haven't already spoken with him, for you to call him and say there has to be a credible economic program to restore the confidence of investors. That's the only way to keep the money from going right out of the country if we were to invest more. (S)

President Chirac: Yes. I am going to do this as well, but tomorrow there is a meeting of the relevant directors of the G-7 with the Russians. (S)

The President: Yes. I know. (U)

President Chirac: But I am going to ring Yeltsin. (S)

The President: Thank you Jacques, and thank you very much for this call. It means more than you could possibly know. (U)

President Chirac: Bill, you know that you have my fullest friendship and my fullest esteem, and also my affection to be shared with Hillary. And I have the fullest confidence. This is the sort of crisis that you get, a sort of McCarthy type of crisis, but the American public has proved that it is reasonable and normal. (S)

The President: Thank you. Yes, if they stay with me, I'll be alright. (S)

President Chirac: Well, Bill, I think they have gone too far against you. It's really a form of lynching, and I think public opinion will stay with you, just like international opinion is with you. You have my fullest confidence and you will have your friends by your side. (S)

The President: Thanks man. (U)

President Chirac: Bye-bye Bill, it was of great interest to me, and I'm going to make a comment to the press immediately. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you so much. (U)

President Chirac: Bye-bye Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2062				
Document ID: 9806826				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France (5 pages)~~	~~10/02/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL
~~001b. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (5 pages)~~	~~10/02/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL
~~001c. draft~~	~~[Draft of 001a] (5 pages)~~	~~10/02/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL
~~001d. draft~~	~~[Duplicate of 001c] (5 pages)~~	~~10/02/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806826
RECEIVED: 06 OCT 98 10

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 09 OCT 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRRES JACQUES CHIRAC ON 2 OCT 98

ACTION: COSGRIFF SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 12 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		GORDON
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VCE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0775-F

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DP DATE 10/9 BY HAND W/ATTCH

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98100813	FOR DECISION
002		X	98100909	COSGRIFF SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	981009	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	3	lsr (Signed)	
Rice	1	(R) 10/8	Bitme
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(R) 10/8	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	FTC 10/9	D
Records Mgt.	4		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

'98 OCT 8 AM 10:12

COMMENTS: Telcon w/Chirac

10/2 Ben Kerrick - please have this cable go to State. (R)

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	3	lk (Signed)	
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cc: Ben Kerrick - cl agree this can go to State. (R)

COMMENTS: /Clinton 10/2

Exec Sec Office has diskette LJO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 9, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/28/15
Q015-G175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/06/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Jacques Chirac Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet Notetaker: Bonnie Click, Joel Schraeder, Robert Ford, Jim Smith
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	October 2, 1998, 1:35 - 2:02 p.m. Cleveland, Ohio

The President: Hello? (U)

President Chirac: Hello Bill. (U)

The President: Hello Jacques? How are you? (U)

President Chirac: It is a great pleasure to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Thank you for your statements, we are doing better here. I wanted to speak to you about the economic crisis and Kosovo. First of all I am very concerned about the danger of financial crisis not only spreading into Latin America, but affecting growth in Europe and the U.S. because of what is happening in bank lending in both places. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: No doubt. (U)

The President: I liked your letter very much. I think we agree that the biggest danger is not inflation but deflation. We have your financial ministers and central bankers over here today. We had the G-22 meeting, and I am hoping we can get some good ideas. There are two things that need to be done. First of all we must do longer term work on the financial system itself, but even before we must have urgent action now to help on emerging

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By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M

economies and begin to rebuild countries in trouble. We have some thoughts on a package to bolster their international reserves. It should be centered on the IMF and should be spent only for economies with strong policies and of course it would not work without a quota increase. I am working very hard to pass it in Congress next week or so and I believe it will pass. (~~C~~)

I am concerned the typical IMF program might not be adequate and I am proposing an approach with three elements. First of all we need a short-term source of money for these countries from the IMF and a line of credit format that would not be permanent. It would have a sunset clause. Second, we need a coordinated set of bilateral credit lines such as our Treasury Department's stabilization fund that works parallel with the IMF mechanism. And, third, we need to get the private lenders' cooperation. Now the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors are meeting here on Saturday. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Tomorrow. (U)

The President: Right, tomorrow, and I hope they can reach agreement on this, and I understand that because of concerns from the EU and the historical German concerns about inflation this is difficult, but the real problem here is a worldwide recession. We have to limit the spread of this. Europe now has a big stake in Latin America. If you look at the exposure of European and American banks -- and they are already tightening their lending a lot -- we have a risk of a global recession. If we deal with the short-term crisis, we will buy ourselves a few months to build the long-term architecture, and, as I said, I thought your letter was quite good on that. (~~S~~)

President Chirac: Our analysis is exactly the same and I am perfectly open to a discussion on the three points you mentioned. Tomorrow the ministers of finance and government are going to meet in Washington. I perfectly agree with you on the prospects you defined. I just have one question, you have said that you thought Congress was going to complete the voting procedure for the IMF loan? (~~S~~)

The President: Yes, within a week. (U)

President Chirac: Of course that is a key element in fighting against the financial crisis. We also think that we ought to reform the IMF system. In particular, we think that some political power should be given to the steering committee that

represents all the countries, but that is a different issue altogether that we can look into at another date. I would like to say that I agree with your analysis and your proposal, which needs to be looked into in greater detail. I am also greatly concerned that the Asian crisis has only just begun, the Japanese crisis has only just begun. In addition to the monetary and bank crisis, there will be a crisis of structure and that will be difficult to handle in Japan and that is deeply anchored in the culture of that country. Nobody can say what will happen in Japan in the years to come if there are 5-6 million unemployed people in a country where according to the prevailing culture you are used to employment for life and when there is no money allocated whatsoever to unemployed people. So I am worried about Asia. Bill, I think we are on the same wavelength. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with you about that. I believe Japan could make a quick rebound if they could make the changes in their banking system and put money in the way we did with our Savings and Loans. But it is difficult to get the political system to do that. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes, but Bill the Savings and Loan system involved $200 billion. In Japan, we're talking about a trillion dollars, or five times as much. If you assume that the Japanese economy is half that of the American economy it means that the problem is ten times more complicated than the savings and loan crisis. And you have the political and technical capacity to react very quickly. That is impossible in Japan for political and cultural reasons. ~~(C)~~

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President Chirac: I would like to tell you what I think. First of all, regarding the military aspect, if we are talking about carrying out a surgical operation, we will stand by your side, but we think it would not be reasonable to decide on principle right now. On Tuesday Kofi Annan is going to report to the Security Council. We do not yet know what this report is going to contain, but the Security Council is going to discuss the report, and the next day is going to be the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels. In addition to that, we will also have the NATO report, which we don't have yet. Lastly, I don't share your opinion on Russia. You say that if we force Yeltsin to accept, he will have to face difficulties at home, and if he doesn't accept, then he will be rejected by the entire international community. I think it would be much worse if there were to be a strike without Yeltsin having a say in the matter. He would lose face, and politically it would be even worse in Russia, especially because that would put an end to the Founding Act between NATO and Russia. Today we have had contact between the two foreign ministers of France and Russia. I do not exclude the possibility whereby they would accept not to veto a resolution after Kofi Annan presents his report. In any case, we have to wait until Tuesday evening to see what we have to do. ~~(C)~~

The President: You might be right about that if Kofi is taking a firm line here, and he does have some influence with Russia. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: On the last point, if we have to go for a strike, the strike in itself does not solve any problems. If we strike, it is necessary to immediately and simultaneously engage in strong diplomatic action. ~~(C)~~

The President I agree with that. (U)

President Chirac: If not, we will simply have helped the UCK a little bit and nothing will have happened. So, this is what I would suggest. If we go for a strike, then simultaneously there

should be a meeting of the Contact Group to bring together Milosevic and Rugova for a negotiation of the agreement. It has to happen the same day, and I suggest that we do it in France which is close to Pristina and Belgrade. If the diplomatic initiative is not launched right away, then I'm afraid that the strike would have been in vain. (~~C~~)

The President: I think that you are right. Let me talk to our people and get back to you right away. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Maybe we could talk again on Tuesday night after the report of Kofi Annan is presented and before the NATO meeting. One last problem of course, we don't know what the German position is going to be. I talked to Schroeder the day before yesterday and he said agreement on the part of the German Parliament will be needed and it is not certain that there would be agreement on the part of the Germans. (~~C~~)

The President: Jacques, we got cut off but you were saying that we should talk again on Tuesday night. (U)

President Chirac: Then we will have an exchange of views on Tuesday evening around that time. (U)

The President: O.K. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you Bill. (U)

The President: I will tell Hillary that you said hello. (U)

President Chirac: Say hello to Hillary from me and Bernadette. (U)

The President: I will, goodbye friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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The President: I will tell Hillary that you said hello. (U)

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The President: I will, goodbye friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6826

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 7, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/28/15
2015-0775-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER OR

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: PHILIP GORDON PG

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac on October 2, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac which took place on October 2, 1998.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/06/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6826

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetaker: Bonnie Click, Joel Schraeder, Robert Ford, Jim Smith

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 2, 1998, ~~1335-1402~~ 1335-2102 p.m.
Cleveland, Ohio

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 200
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2017
2015-0775-M (1.46)

The President: Hello? (U)

President Chirac: Hello Bill. (U)

The President: Hello Jacques? How are you? (U)

President Chirac: It is a great pleasure to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Thank you for your statements, we are doing better here. I wanted to speak to you about the economic crisis and Kosovo. First of all I am very concerned about the danger of financial crisis not only spreading into Latin America, but affecting growth in Europe and the U.S. because of what is happening in bank lending in both places. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: No doubt. (U)

The President: I liked your letter very much. I think we agree that the biggest danger is not inflation but deflation. We have your financial ministers and central bankers over here today. We had the G-22 meeting, and I am hoping we can get some good ideas. There are two things that need to be done. First of all we must do longer term work on the financial system itself, but even before we must have urgent action now to help on emerging economies and begin to rebuild countries in trouble. We have

some thoughts on a package to bolster their international reserves. It should be centered on the IMF and should be spent only for economies with strong policies and of course it would not work without a quota increase. I am working very hard to pass it in Congress next week or so and I believe it will pass. (~~C~~)

I am concerned the typical IMF program might not be adequate and I am proposing an approach with three elements. First of all we need a short-term source of money for these countries from the IMF and a line of credit format that would not be permanent. It would have a sunset clause. Second, we need a coordinated set of bilateral credit lines such as our Treasury Department's stabilization fund that works parallel with the IMF mechanism. And, third, we need to get the private lenders' cooperation. Now the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors are meeting here on Saturday. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Tomorrow. (U)

The President: Right, tomorrow, and I hope they can reach agreement on this, and I understand that because of concerns from the EU and the historical German concerns about inflation this is difficult, but the real problem here is a worldwide recession. We have to limit the spread of this. Europe now has a big stake in Latin America. If you look at the exposure of European and American banks -- and they are already tightening their lending a lot -- we have a risk of a global recession. If we deal with the short-term crisis, we will buy ourselves a few months to build the long-term architecture, and, as I said, I thought your letter was quite good on that. (~~C~~)

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President Chirac: Of course that is a key element in fighting against the financial crisis. We also think that we ought to reform the IMF system. In particular, we think that some political power should be given to the steering committee that represents all the countries, but that is a different issue

altogether that we can look into at another date. I would like to say that I agree with your analysis and your proposal, which needs to be looked into in greater detail. I am also greatly concerned that the Asian crisis has only just begun, the Japanese crisis has only just begun. In addition to the monetary and bank crisis, there will be a crisis of structure and that will be difficult to handle in Japan and that is deeply anchored in the culture of that country. Nobody can say what will happen in Japan in the years to come if there are 5-6 million unemployed people in a country where according to the prevailing culture you are used to employment for life and when there is no money allocated whatsoever to unemployed people. So I am worried about Asia. Bill, I think we are on the same wavelength. ~~(C)~~

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-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6826

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 7, 1998

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

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Attachments
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Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/06/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetaker: Bonnie Click, Joel Schraeder, Robert Ford, Jim Smith

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 2, 1998, ~~1335-1402~~ 1335-2102 p.m.
Cleveland, Ohio

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 6/2/09
2015-0775-M (1.44)

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The President: Hello Jacques? How are you? (U)

President Chirac: It is a great pleasure to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Thank you for your statements, we are doing better here. I wanted to speak to you about the economic crisis and Kosovo. First of all I am very concerned about the danger of financial crisis not only spreading into Latin America, but affecting growth in Europe and the U.S. because of what is happening in bank lending in both places. ~~(C)~~

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/06/06
Classified by: Allyn T. Davis

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-- End of Conversation --

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDE Date: 10105/15
2015-0075-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806826
DATE 09 OCT 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ FRENCH PRRES JACQUES CHIRAC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SE 2009-1290-M

Case Number: 2009-1290-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2063				
Document ID: 9806929				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 11	Position: 1	Stack: V

see 2009-1292-M

Case Number: 2009-1292-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2068				
Document ID: 9807552				
Row: 45	Section: 6	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

see 2009-1290-M

Case Number: 2009-1290-M; 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2713				
Document ID: 9901357				
Row: 46	Section: 3	Shelf: 11	Position: 2	Stack: V

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904243				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Jacques Chirac (3 pages)~~	~~05/27/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓Z

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:
9904243

2015-0775-M
ke3496

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904243
RECEIVED: 03 JUN 99 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: GORDON
BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 03 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC ON MAY 27

ACTION: DAVIES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 09 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLINKEN
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		GORDON
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK CLOSED BY: NSDMK DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9904243

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	99060716	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
RICE	1	@ 6/5	
DAVIES	2	6 6/5	
KERRICK			
STEINBERG			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	6/5	N/R
RECORDS MGMT.	4	AMK 6/7	N/R

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

SRB JS

CC:

98 JUN 4 AM 8:13

COMMENTS: Chirac Telcall May 27

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4243

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~STAFF~~ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
RICE	1	(R) 6/5	
DAVIES	2	G 6/5	
KERRICK			
STEINBERG			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	D 6/5	N/R
RECORDS MGMT.	4	DMK 6/7	N/R

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

SRB JS

CC:

COMMENTS: Chirac Telcall May 27

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE YES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 3, 1999

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10115115
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN ASB

FROM: PHILIP GORDON PG

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac on May 27, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac.

RECOMMENDATION

That attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve SB 6/5 Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: June 3, 2009

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with President Jacques Chirac (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President President Jacques Chirac Interpreter: Carol Wolter Notetakers: Miles Murphy, Roger Merletti, James Smith and Philip Gordon
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	May 27, 1999, 10:00-10:09 a.m. EDT Yulee, Florida

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: How are you? I'm so glad to hear you. (U)

The President: It's great to hear your voice. I just wanted to check in and talk for a couple of minutes. (U)

President Chirac: With great pleasure. (U)

The President: I'll be very brief. I think the indictment of Milosevic and his colleagues in some ways makes our diplomacy more complicated, but it also gives us a chance to increase the pressure and isolation. I think it will widen the pressures we're already seeing around Milosevic in the military and the Serb public. And I think it will make some of them see that he is responsible for the destruction they are facing. On the other hand, I think there is some risk the indictment will make him even more intransigent. But I think if he wants to hang on to power, he will still have good reasons to agree to our conditions. So I think we need to stick with our strategy and keep up the pressure. I think the updated plan for KFOR that NATO has endorsed is a good thing, so I am pleased with that. I also agree with you that we have to make sure we do it in a way that the Russians and the others will be able to participate in an international force in the end. Of course, we now have, all

Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: June 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 6/3/2015
2015-0775-M (1.45)

of us, to provide additional forces and military police and gendarmes. If we stay unified and everyone stays as steadfast in their position as you have, I think we will get through this. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Yes. I am preparing a presentation for French television this evening. I shall present the decision by the international war crimes tribunal as a victory. Naturally, diplomacy will be a bit more difficult, but this clearly puts morality and law on our side, and I consider this is a good thing. In this context, we must continue on with our strategy and step up the strikes, if possible. It is not the time to change strategy, it is time to intensify our strategy. As concerns the Russians, we have to make an effort to understand and also to involve them more in this affair. American diplomats always have difficulties understanding the Russians. They are in a difficult situation and they shouldn't be caused to lose face more than they already have. Therefore, it is necessary to make an effort to make them feel involved and integrated in the final action. This is my feeling, but I am not in the least pessimistic. In any case, we cannot lose, therefore we shall win. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with that. I just wanted to check in to see if you think the same way I do. I think the Milosevic indictment is a plus and as long as we make it clear to the Russians, it will work out fine. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think so, as well. We are absolutely on the same line. ~~(C)~~

The President: Good. Alright. I will be back in touch. (U)

President Chirac: I am very pleased we are able to meet and have dinner together in Paris before the G-8, and I am still looking for just the right restaurant to take you to. (U)

The President: If it's half as good as the last one, it will be wonderful indeed. (U)

President Chirac: No, I really want to find something even better. (U)

The President: Thank you. I am looking forward to it. (U)

President Chirac: My love to Hillary, and I will see you soon. (U)

The President: Okay. Goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4072				
Document ID: 0000159				
Row: 47	Section: 1	Shelf: 11	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~Telcon with President Chirac of France (3 pages)~~	~~01/07/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 4072

FOLDER TITLE:
0000159

2015-0775-M
ke3497

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0000159
RECEIVED: 10 JAN 00 12

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 17 JAN 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TEL MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC ON 7 JAN 00

ACTION: BRADTKE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 15 JAN 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: YEE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		YEE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/08/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE 01/18 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	00011118	FOR DECISION
002		X	00011806	BRADTKE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	000117	KENNEY, K	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: JR LOG # 0159

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 17 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
SIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL	1	1/12	no edits
SARGEANT			
BRADTKE	2	1/17	
RUDMAN			
STEINBERG			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	1/17	D
RECORDS MGMT.	4		D w/ disk

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

00 JAN 11 PM 5:27

COMMENTS: Memcon Christo - TJ ANDO

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: JZ LOG # 0159

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 17 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
BIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL	1	SP 1/12	NO edits
SARGEANT			
BRADTKE	2	[illegible] 1/17	
RUDMAN			
STEINBERG			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	[illegible] 1/17	D
RECORDS MGMT.	4		D w/ disk

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

00 JAN 11 PM 5:27

COMMENTS: Memcon Chirac - 7 Jan 00

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 17, 2000

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDR NARA, Date 20160315
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: January 10, 2010

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Robin Rickard, Don Cheramie, Roger Merletti, James Smith and Hoyt Yee

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 7, 2000, 4:23-4:33 p.m., EST
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Oh, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine, thank you. (U)

President Chirac: It's very nice of you to call me back. I know you're busy, so I will be very short. First, let me say happy New Year for you and also for Hillary. And you know what I mean. The best for her. (U)

The President: Thank you. She's working hard and I think she will do okay. (U)

President Chirac: I'm sure she will win. Do you have a translator? I also wanted to congratulate you for the negotiations regarding the Middle East and, of course, to say we are entirely available if Europe or her friends can do anything to help in the process. But I called you, Mr. President, to say a few words about an issue regarding the IMF. And I know you are in a hurry, so I'll be brief. You know that Director Camdessus has given his resignation in the middle of his term of office. So therefore a new general director for the IMF will need to be appointed and, according to tradition, there should be a European. For that reason, I wanted to say France has a candidate whom you know very well -- the former Prime Minister, Mr. Fabius -- and I didn't want to begin the campaign for Mr. Fabius before I personally warned you about it. We have not

Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: 01/07/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-0775-M (1.46)

announced anything about this campaign before warning you about it. And this is the former Prime Minister of President Mitterrand, someone who is 50 years old. That is what I wanted to talk to you about. Of course, we would like the support of the United States, but basically I wanted you to know before we started campaigning for him. I thought it appropriate and the most correct thing to do. (~~C~~)

The President: First of all, Jacques, thank you for calling. This is an important choice for all of us. Obviously, the IMF needs strong leadership and obviously it should be a European. I want to work with you and the other G7 countries and I hope we can agree on a candidate. To this date, I haven't announced support for any candidate and I think I ought to consult with some of the other Europeans. But I know the former Prime Minister and I thank you for calling. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Of course, we are not asking for your reaction at this point, but I just thought it was the right thing to do before we launch the official campaign. (~~C~~)

The President: Of course. Thank you for that. Can we talk a little about the Middle East peace process? (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Yes. (U)

The President: I think, all things considered, they're going well, though there's the strain of all those years they were apart. We're making some progress, I think. But I do believe that before this whole thing can be wrapped up, there will be a role for the Europeans to both endorse it and support it, because there is a chance that within 60 days we will have an agreement between the Israelis and both the Syrians and the Palestinians. I think we are doing quite well, but I think if we hit a snag and I need you, I may call you. So, if I do call in the next few days, you will know what it's about. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: Bill, we don't want to interfere in these difficult negotiations, but we are entirely available to you. And when I say "we," I mean France as well as Europe. (~~C~~)

The President: Thank you so much. I am hopeful and will stay in touch with you about it. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you very much, Bill. Please transmit all my affection to Hillary. Tell her Bernadette and I are constantly thinking of her and have the best wishes for her success. And good luck in the Middle East. We are beside you. (~~C~~)

The President: Jacques, one more thing. If you are in touch with any of the Arab states not involved in the negotiations, any gesture they can make toward Israel will help. They're very sensitive about needing people to travel there, open offices, do something to reach out to them. (~~C~~)

President Chirac: A few days ago, there was an exchange of wishes for the new year here. I received all the Arab ambassadors and I made a speech in which I told them all the Arab countries must now help the peace process by establishing relations with Israel, and that was published by the whole Arab press. And for three days now, I have been seeing the heads of state of the Middle East to give them the same kind of advice. And Barak knows very well I have done that, because he had Minister Levy thank me for that. (~~C~~)

The President: That is wonderful. Thank you. (U)

President Chirac: We are ready to help. Anything you need. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Chirac: And thank you, Bill, for calling back. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 10, 2000

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/05/15
2015 0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN AJB

FROM: HOYT YEE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Jacques Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Chirac on January 7, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert A. Bradtke to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve RAB 1/17 Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve RAB 1/17 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for State
Tab A Telcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: January 10, 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 0000159

REFERRAL DATE: 18 JAN 00

MEMORANDUM FOR: KENNEY, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: KENNEY, K

SOURCE: BRADTKE

DATE: 17 JAN 00

SUBJ: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC ON 7 JAN 00

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 19 JAN 00

COMMENT:

FOR JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VOE Date: 10/26/15
2015-0175-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 0000159
DATE 17 JAN 00

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES CHIRAC ON 7 JAN 00
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4105				
Document ID: 0005678				
Row: 47	Section: 2	Shelf: 11	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memcon~~	~~Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (4 pages)~~	~~09/07/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~
~~001b. draft~~	~~[Draft of 001a] (4 pages)~~	~~09/07/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 4105

FOLDER TITLE:
0005678

2015-0775-M
ke3498

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0005678
RECEIVED: 08 SEP 00 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 08 SEP 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ FRENCH PRES CHIRAC

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 12 SEP 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NORLAND LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLINKEN
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	00091119	FOR DECISION
001		X	00091307	BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5628

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~RRS~~ INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWL A/O OA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL			
BASH	1	BG 9/12	
BRADTKE	2	W 9/12	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	SWL 9/12	D
RECORDS MGMT.	4		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: MemCon - Pres Clinic 7 Sep

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE ~~yes~~

LOG # 5678

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

FM BB TO RMB DATE 9/12

I recommend you approve.

FM ____ TO ____ DATE ____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5678

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (RRS) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWL A/O CO

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL			
BASH	1	BG 9/12	
BRADTKE	2	W 9/12	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	SWL 9/12	D
RECORDS MGMT.	4		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

'00 SEP 11 PM 7:17

COMMENTS: MemCon - Pres Clinic
7 Sep

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Stephen Ricchetti, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker Jacques Chirac, President Jean-Marc de la Sabliere, National Security Adviser to the President Francois Bujon de L'Estang, Ambassador to the United States Gerard Errera, Political Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs French official [TK]
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	September 7, 2000; 6:00 - 6:30 p.m. Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City

President Chirac: I wanted to talk quickly about the Middle East peace process. Can I go ahead? (U)

The President: Yes, Jacques, please go on. (U)

President Chirac: I think you have an opportunity to find a solution. There's a five-week window before the Knesset comes back. I'm convinced you can succeed. I think that in reality, Camp David was very significant. A very important meeting. And a major success because of the evolution in mentalities. Up until Camp David, in my conversation with Barak, I told him you won't make peace with the Arabs because you have not made peace in your mind. After Camp David, he told me: 'I've made peace

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/9/2010

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2019
2015-5776-M (1.47)

in my mind.' At Camp David he changed. And Arafat, too -- a bit. In fact, quite a bit. ~~(C)~~

On territory, security guarantees and refugees, it seems a solution is very close. Arafat and Barak will agree to a solution imposed by you. That's something you can do today, and it will be followed, provided it is just. You're very close. Of course, Jerusalem is the heart of the problem. But who would have thought before Camp David that we would be able to say it is the only outstanding problem. So this is a major achievement. ~~(C)~~

Now, on Jerusalem, Arafat cannot conclude a deal that is not supported by the other Arabs -- he'd be assassinated without their support. The problem is that the position on sovereignty of Barak and Arafat is out of sync because it is based on two different sovereignties. On the one hand, Israel gets total sovereignty for their piece of Jerusalem versus a lesser sovereignty for the Palestinians over the Mosque esplanade. The Arabs and Muslims cannot accept this. ~~(C)~~

So what is to be done? I have some thoughts to offer. First, I think we have to reject co-sovereignty, because the Syrians would oppose it, and then so would the Jordanians. For it to work, you have to have peace, but as long as any territory is occupied -- like Golan -- there will not be peace. ~~(C)~~

So I've discussed with both Barak and Arafat another system that would be as follows:

Over the Jewish quarter and the Jewish part of the Armenian quarter and the Wailing Wall, full Israeli sovereignty.

For the Temple Mount -- and let me say that of course no one is sure the temple is in fact below -- what about full Palestinian sovereignty down to a given depth, say 5 or 10 meters. Below that, you would have divine sovereignty. Barak was not against this idea. Arafat did not react.

The one who counts a lot is Abdullah. When I talked with him about the overall divine sovereignty concept he laughed and asked if it could be extended all the way to the White House. So I think overall divine sovereignty is not very likely.

Anyway, I think you're very close. The solution can only come from you, can only be imposed by you. We will do anything we can to help you. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: Well, first, thank you for your good words and support. I basically agree with what you've said. But it's very important that even if Arafat gets what he wants, he still needs support from two key constituencies -- those who are seen as friends of the Palestinians and Muslims. They need to validate that he did not sell out either his own cause or Islam. If these two groups stay with him, we can succeed. Barak wants to do this, he can sell it in Israel with an election or a referendum. He has two big dangers. First, on refugees, if the "right of return" is defined in such a way that it would be perceived as a threat to change the Jewish character of Israel. Second, if it is perceived that he has given up the site of Solomon's temple. For years, Israel didn't talk about this issue or let archeologists dig there because they didn't want to find the temple -- it would open up a can of worms with radical Jews. But if he gives it away, he would be seen as giving away the soul of Judaism. It's the last known place holding the arc with the covenant of the 10 Commandments. ~~(C)~~

So the Israelis need ambiguity. And that means sovereignty under ground. The Palestinians need the clarity of their sovereignty, and the certainty there won't be digs. In short, they agree on the preservation of the status quo, but they disagree on what's needed to guarantee it over time and what is needed to sell it to a larger constituency -- the Arab and Msulim world for Arafat, Israeli voters for Barak. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: This case of the Temple Mount is ambiguous. When Dayan took Jerusalem in 1967, he prohibited Jews from praying there. Just last month in Haaretz, I read a statement by the Sephardic Chief Rabbi who said Jews should not pray there because we cannot be sure the temple is there. And contrary to what Barak says, all the quiet attempts to verify it is there found no proof. So I think it is a myth. But of course, myths are important. ~~(C)~~

Arafat is prepared to commit to no digs. But he says it is impossible to give the Israelis full sovereignty over their part, but the Palestinians have only half sovereignty over theirs. This is a non-starter. We need to find a way to present both sides as equal, then there will be success. ~~(C)~~

I had lunch with Barak. He showed me the four possible solutions. In my opinion, none can work. He seemed to think number 3 would. I don't. It's acceptable for Palestinians only if the holy sites are marked. So we need a solution of equal

sovereignties. I'll try to go further in this direction, with this 'geological sovereignty' idea. ~~(C)~~

The President: It's an interesting concept. We hadn't quite looked at it that way. We were working on having what's on top be Palestinian, and the ground itself Israeli. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: That can't work. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let's think about your concept. You said Palestinian sovereignty down 5 or 10 meters. Now, we know when Solomon's temple was built, when it was destroyed, when the replacement temple was built and destroyed. So it should be possible to determine how far down we would need to go. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Berger: President Chirac, how would you articulate it? I agree equality is the key issue, but how would we express it? ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I admit that's a problem. All we can do is to keep looking for different paths. One will lead out. When I told Barak, he didn't say no. And Arafat didn't react. We need to put our specialists and lawyers on this and come up with a presentation. They've agreed in principle to share Jerusalem. That is remarkable progress. Arafat would have torn my eyes out if I had proposed that months ago. So we just have to keep going and success is possible, of this I am convinced. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5678

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 11, 2000

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 20160615
2015-0175-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ANTONY BLINKEN AJB

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the POTUS and President Chirac that took place September 7, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve SB 9/12 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Memcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/011/10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Stephen Richetti, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Jacques Chirac, President
Jean-Marc de la Sabliere, National Security Adviser to the President
Francois Bujon de L'Estang, Ambassador to the United States
Gerard Errera, Political Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs
French official [TK]

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 7, 2000; 6:00 - 6:30 p.m.
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City

President Chirac: I wanted to talk quickly about the Middle East peace process. Can I go ahead? (U)

The President: Yes, Jacques, please go on. (U)

President Chirac: I think you have an opportunity to find a solution. There's a five-week window before the Knesset comes back. I'm convinced you can succeed. I think that in reality, Camp David was very significant. A very important meeting. And a major success because of the evolution in mentalities. Up until Camp David, in my conversation with Barak, I told him you won't make peace with the Arabs because you have not made peace in your mind. After Camp David, he told me: 'I've made peace

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/9/2010

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2015-0770-M (1.48)

in my mind.' At Camp David he changed. And Arafat, too -- a bit. In fact, quite a bit. (~~C~~)

On territory, security guarantees and refugees, it seems a solution is very close. Arafat and Barak will agree to a solution imposed by you. That's something you can do today, and it will be followed, provided it is just. You're very close. Of course, Jerusalem is the heart of the problem. But who would have thought before Camp David that we would be able to say it is the only outstanding problem. So this is a major achievement. (~~C~~)

Now, on Jerusalem, Arafat cannot conclude a deal that is not supported by the other Arabs -- he'd be assassinated without their support. The problem is that the position on sovereignty of Barak and Arafat is out of sync because it is based on two different sovereignties. On the one hand, Israel gets total sovereignty for their piece of Jerusalem versus a lesser sovereignty for the Palestinians over the Mosque esplanade. The Arabs and Muslims cannot accept this. (~~C~~)

So what is to be done? I have some thoughts to offer. First, I think we have to reject co-sovereignty, because the Syrians would oppose it, and then so would the Jordanians. For it to work, you have to have peace, but as long as any territory is occupied -- like Golan -- there will not be peace. (~~C~~)

So I've discussed with both Barak and Arafat another system that would be as follows:

Over the Jewish quarter and the Jewish part of the Armenian quarter and the Wailing Wall, full Israeli sovereignty.

For the Temple Mount -- and let me say that of course no one is sure the temple is in fact below -- what about full Palestinian sovereignty <u>down to a given depth</u>, say 5 or 10 meters. Below that, you would have divine sovereignty. Barak was not against this idea. Arafat did not react.

The one who counts a lot is Abdullah. When I talked with him about the overall divine sovereignty concept he laughed and asked if it could be extended all the way to the White House. So I think overall divine sovereignty is not very likely.

Anyway, I think you're very close. The solution can only come from you, can only be imposed by you. We will do anything we can to help you. (~~C~~)

President Clinton: Well, first, thank you for your good words and support. I basically agree with what you've said. But it's very important that even if Arafat gets what he wants, he still needs support from two key constituencies -- those who are seen as friends of the Palestinians and Muslims. They need to validate that he did not sell out either his own cause or Islam. If these two groups stay with him, we can succeed. Barak wants to do this, he can sell it in Israel with an election or a referendum. He has two big dangers. First, on refugees, if the "right of return" is defined in such a way that it would be perceived as a threat to change the Jewish character of Israel. Second, if it is perceived that he has given up the site of Solomon's temple. For years, Israel didn't talk about this issue or let archeologists dig there because they didn't want to find the temple -- it would open up a can of worms with radical Jews. But if he gives it away, he would be seen as giving away the soul of Judaism. It's the last known place holding the arc with the covenant of the 10 Commandments. ~~(C)~~

So the Israelis need ambiguity. And that means sovereignty under ground. The Palestinians need the clarity of their sovereignty, and the certainty there won't be digs. In short, they agree on the preservation of the status quo, but they disagree on what's needed to guarantee it over time and what is needed to sell it to a larger constituency -- the Arab and Msulim world for Arafat, Israeli voters for Barak. ~~(C)~~

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-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0775-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4108				
Document ID: 0006324				
Row: 47	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Telcon with President Chirac of France [partial] (5 pages)	10/02/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	[Draft of 001a] [partial] (5 pages)	10/02/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 4108

FOLDER TITLE:
0006324

2015-0775-M
ke3499

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0006324
RECEIVED: 06 OCT 00 13

TO: BERGER

FROM: YEE
BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TELCON FRANCE

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMO OF POTUS TELCON W/ PRES FRANCE CHIRAC ON 2 OCT

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 10 OCT 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: YEE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLINKEN
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		YEE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VOE NARA, Date 101615
2015-0775-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	00101011	FOR DECISION
001		X	00101117	BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: KT LOG # 6324

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DL A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL	1	6Pld 10/	see edits
BASH			
BRADTKE	2	[illegible]	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	SM 10/11	D
RECORDS MGMT.	A		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Memcon w/ Chirac

'00 OCT 10 AM 10:24

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: DS LOG # 6324

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DL A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL	1	SPld 10/8	see edits
BASH			
BRADTKE	2	[illegible]	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	SM 10/11	D
RECORDS MGMT.	4		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Memcon w/ Chirac

'00 OCT 10 AM 10:20

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 6, 2000

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 10/28/15
2015-0775-M

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN (AJB)

FROM: HOYT YEE (HYB)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the POTUS and President Chirac that took place October 2, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve (BJB) 10/11 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/06/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6324

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VDE NARA, Date 10/06/15
2015-0175-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon with President Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 10/06/10

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Telcon with President Chirac of France [partial] (5 pages)	10/02/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 4108

FOLDER TITLE:
0006324

2015-0775-M
ke3499

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
French President Chirac

Interpreter: Paul Hersey
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Frank Jarosinski, Rob Williams, Don Gentile, and Hoyt Yee

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 2, 2000, 2:42-3:10 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Yes, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine, thank you. (U)

President Chirac: I'm very glad to hear you. I had very good contacts with Madeleine Albright yesterday and today, and I have just now had a long call with Putin because Madeleine Albright asked me to call him just when he arrived in India. And the second matter would be the situation in Palestine and Israel. Would you mind if we had translation? ~~(C)~~

The President: No. (U)

President Chirac: Do you want me to start with my talk with Putin? ~~(C)~~

The President: Might as well. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Putin's position is quite simple. He says first things first. That his public opinion supports Milosevic, he can't ignore it. He is saying that the best solution would be for Kostunica to accept the run-off and he is proposing offering to invite Kostunica and Milosevic to come to Moscow and he thinks if Kostunica agrees to this visit, then Milosevic will not. And then he would make an official demand that an international supervision of the elections be set up. And he also is saying that a visit by Kostunica to Moscow would have a very positive

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 10/06/10

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 06/03/2019
2015-0775-M (1.49)

effect on the Serbian army. And he feels that in such a context, if there were to be a run-off, Kostunica would not fail to be elected. Obviously, he can't force any decision on Milosevic, because Milosevic doesn't trust him anymore, and that is likely. That is my comment. And, second, because of his own public opinion. I am convinced no one, especially not Putin, is in the position to force anything on Milosevic. That said, Putin is the only one in position to safeguard passage to Belarus far from the reaches of the international community. But I honestly don't think Milosevic will obey Putin. So I do feel the hypothesis of run-off agreed to by Kostunica would be the best possibility. I understand Schroeder is of the same opinion, and I can ask him when I see him tomorrow in Dresden for the tenth anniversary of the founding of the German Republic, speak to him. Madeleine will be there, so I will take it up with him. Before I did anything, I really wanted to hear your feelings on this issue. ~~(C)~~

The President: First, I thank you for the lead you have taken in support of the democratic opposition. If the momentum can stay with the opposition, I think that so far the opposition has been right in rejecting Milosevic's call for a second round. He is just trying to buy time and maybe create a crisis, but I think the opposition might decide later to run in the elections and there has to be transparency in the electoral process. It appears to me that, if they could get organized, get the Montenegrins to vote, then Kostunica would certainly win, but I think the important thing is to try to follow the opposition's lead and not call for a second round before they do. We don't want to undercut the opposition. I think Putin clearly is in a dilemma. He knows his public opinion favors Milosevic. He knows Kostunica got a majority of the first round. I think he wants Kostunica to somehow send a clear signal that Russia won't be frozen out if he is the president. But, by asking them both to come to Russia and by not agreeing to meet with Kostunica, he didn't offer him enough to come. So, in short, I think we need to do what we can to keep the heat on, see what happens in the next few days, and see if the opposition declares its intent to run and stick with him. My guess is that if they can't keep enough energy in the street to force him out, they will agree to it, because they will win it with anything close to an honest count. And if they go through both rounds and Milosevic steals them both, their position in the world will be strengthened. But if you look at the communist countries that changed, it will happen in the streets eventually. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think we can get real control over the second round, and I think that we will have unconditional support of Putin. I think the swell in favor of Kostunica can only increase. On the other hand I would really need to have at least

major strike and perhaps a general strike, and yet the people are very poor. And they can probably afford to be on strike for a day, but two days or three days, a whole week, will cost them too much. Plus Serbian legislation provides you cannot be refunded for your medical costs if you are on strike. So it is possible for them to go on strike for a short time, but to have it last for a long time would be difficult. I really don't think in the current situation Kostunica can muster enough support in the street to change the situation. Now, obviously, he wants to have the better role in all of this, and that is understandable, but if Kostunica wants to be on the same line as Russia, he will eventually. But a trip to Moscow will not make any difference. Therefore, I do think a better or wiser solution will probably be a run-off. The question is, will Kostunica accept it. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think first of all if they have a second round and he wins, and Milosevic tries to steal it again, Kostunica's hand will be greatly strengthened. He has been very careful not to rule out a second round. I also believe that a second round would have to be plainly stolen. Putin may feel then he can take action to be helpful. But the main thing, the most important thing is, for us to look like we support the will of the Serbian people in sticking with Kostunica. He is already squabbling with Djukanovic, and we can't afford division. If there is a second round, we want the Montenegrins and the other nine percent of the opposition to vote, and we want all his people to turn out again. We don't want to pour any cold water on Kostunica. If this is the only logical choice, he will come to that conclusion very quickly, and I don't want it to look like we are pushing. Maybe we should sit tight for two to three days, see what he does. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree on this. ~~(C)~~

The President: The other thing, Jacques, we may need to talk again in a couple of days. But this is a pivotal week. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Can I maybe move on to the issue of the Middle East? I just spoke and met with Nabil Shaath, and he has been sent here by Arafat. I have to say I am concerned and worried. I thought we were ever so close to an agreement. I always said Camp David was a success and that Barak made significant steps in the right direction and that all this gave us hope that we would find a settlement by the end of October. And after my pessimistic phase as to Barak, I had become much more optimistic. I am very concerned by the fact that there was a deliberate provocation on the holy site. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1) I am very concerned, because I did feel that we were so close to an agreement under your leadership. The schedule, the calendar showed us that October was the right month to find an agreement and that there was enough time for you to establish and devise this agreement and to have it accepted. And then suddenly everything crumbles and collapses because of one initiative that Barak had to know of. Now I heard this idea of a fact-finding mission, and I think that it is necessary and I know that Arafat accepts that. I don't know what Barak thinks of that issue, but the cease-fire agreed to this morning has not been, up until now, enforced. I do think that Barak would ideally like to show his strength before he actually concludes negotiations and, given the current situation, I do think dealing with Palestinians like this would lead to failure. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say, first of all, I don't know Barak knew Sharon was going up there and if he could have stopped him. There is no question Sharon did it to scuttle the peace process, although he may not have expected it to generate the reaction and effect it did. We have been working on this very hard. I talked to both to try to get them to calm it down. I am considering having Albright call Barak and Arafat to see if they can meet in Europe today, tomorrow, or the next day. And, if its OK with you, I would like them to come to Paris, because I think your influence would be useful. It could be, if we get lucky, that this is a very somber warning to both sides, of what will come if we don't get this peace worked out. I offered them this fact-finding trilateral group once we get it calmed down. We need to get back to the larger issues here. I think that if they could come to Paris and meet with you, it would be very positive. ~~(C)~~

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President Chirac: Obviously, if that would be the case, we would be at your disposal. Please, will you say my best regards to Hillary? ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes. She is doing very well. (U)

President Chirac: Madeleine told me that she is very optimistic. (U)

The President: The presidential campaign may have some effect on that, but she has an 8-to 10-point lead. The other guy has more money, but that is always the case. (U)

President Chirac: That is good. (U)

The President: I think she can hold on. (U)

President Chirac: You tell her all our best and greetings and regards and lots of kisses. (U)

The President: Good-bye friend, and if we need to talk on Serbia, we can talk again in the next couple of days. We've just got to ride it out. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

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([Chirac])
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6324

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
French President Chirac

Interpreter: Paul Hersey
Notetakers: Sean Carver, Frank Jarosinski, Rob Williams, Don Gentile, and Hoyt Yee

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 2, 2000, 2:42-3:10 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Yes, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine, thank you. (U)

President Chirac: I'm very glad to hear you. I had very good contacts with Madeleine Albright yesterday and today, and I have just now had a long call with Putin because Madeleine Albright asked me to call him just when he arrived in India. And the second matter would be the situation in Palestine and Israel. Would you mind if we had translation? ~~(C)~~

The President: No. (U)

President Chirac: Do you want me to start with my talk with Putin? ~~(C)~~

The President: Might as well. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Putin's position is quite simple. He says first things first. That his public opinion supports Milosevic, he can't ignore it. He is saying that the best solution would be for Kostunica to accept the run-off and he is proposing offering to invite Kostunica and Milosevic to come to Moscow and he thinks if Kostunica agrees to this visit, then Milosevic will not. And then he would make an official demand that an international supervision of the elections be set up. And he also is saying that a visit by Kostunica to Moscow would have a very positive

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 10/04/10

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 06/03/2019
2015-0775-M (1.50)

effect on the Serbian army. And he feels that in such a context, if there were to be a run-off, Kostunica would not fail to be elected. Obviously, he can't force any decision on Milosevic, because Milosevic doesn't trust him anymore, and that is likely. That is my comment. And, second, because of his own public opinion. I am convinced no one, especially not Putin, is in the position to force anything on Milosevic. That said, Putin is the only one in position to safeguard passage to Belarus far from the reaches of the international community. But I honestly don't think Milosevic will obey Putin. So I do feel the hypothesis of run-off agreed to by Kostunica would be the best possibility. I understand Schroeder is of the same opinion, and I can ask him when I see him tomorrow in Dresden for the tenth anniversary of the founding of the German Republic, speak to him. Madeleine will be there, so I will take it up with him. Before I did anything, I really wanted to hear your feelings on this issue. ~~(C)~~

The President: First, I thank you for the lead you have taken in support of the democratic opposition. If the momentum can stay with the opposition, I think that so far the opposition has been right in rejecting Milosevic's call for a second round. He is just trying to buy time and maybe create a crisis, but I think the opposition might decide later to run in the elections and there has to be transparency in the electoral process. It appears to me that, if they could get organized, get the Montenegrins to vote, then Kostunica would certainly win, but I think the important thing is to try to follow the opposition's lead and not call for a second round before they do. We don't want to undercut the opposition. I think Putin clearly is in a dilemma. He knows his public opinion favors Milosevic. He knows Kostunica got a majority of the first round. I think he wants Kostunica to somehow send a clear signal that Russia won't be frozen out if he is the president. But, by asking them both to come to Russia and by not agreeing to meet with Kostunica, he didn't offer him enough to come. So, in short, I think we need to do what we can to keep the heat on, see what happens in the next few days, and see if the opposition declares its intent to run and stick with him. My guess is that if they can't keep enough energy in the street to force him out, they will agree to it, because they will win it with anything close to an honest count. And if they go through both rounds and Milosevic steals them both, their position in the world will be strengthened. But if you look at the communist countries that changed, it will happen in the streets eventually. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I think we can get real control over the second round, and I think that we will have unconditional support of Putin. I think the swell in favor of Kostunica can only increase. On the other hand I would really need to have at least

major strike and perhaps a general strike, and yet the people are very poor. And they can probably afford to be on strike for a day, but two days or three days, a whole week, will cost them too much. Plus Serbian legislation provides you cannot be refunded for your medical costs if you are on strike. So it is possible for them to go on strike for a short time, but to have it last for a long time would be difficult. I really don't think in the current situation Kostunica can muster enough support in the street to change the situation. Now, obviously, he wants to have the better role in all of this, and that is understandable, but if Kostunica wants to be on the same line as Russia, he will eventually. But a trip to Moscow will not make any difference. Therefore, I do think a better or wiser solution will probably be a run-off. The question is, will Kostunica accept it. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think first of all if they have a second round and he wins, and Milosevic tries to steal it again, Kostunica's hand will be greatly strengthened. He has been very careful not to rule out a second round. I also believe that a second round ~~will~~ plainly stolen. Putin may feel then he can take action to be helpful. But the main thing, the most important thing is, for us to look like we support the will of the Serbian people in sticking with Kostunica. He is already squabbling with Djukanovic, and we can't afford division. If there is a second round, we want the Montenegrins and the other nine percent of the opposition to vote, and we want all his people to turn out again. We don't want to pour any cold water on Kostunica. If this is the only logical choice, he will come to that conclusion very quickly, and I don't want it to look like we are pushing. Maybe we should sit tight for two to three days, see what he does. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree on this. ~~(C)~~

The President: The other thing, Jacques, we may need to talk again in a couple of days. But this is a pivotal week. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Can I maybe move on to the issue of the Middle East? I just spoke and met with Nabil Shaath, and he has been sent here by Arafat. I have to say I am concerned and worried. I thought we were ever so close to an agreement. I always said Camp David was a success and that Barak made significant steps in the right direction and that all this gave us hope that we would find a settlement by the end of October. And after my pessimistic phase as to Barak, I had become much more optimistic. I am very concerned by the fact that there was a deliberate provocation on the holy site.

(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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