Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 140				
Document ID: 9300626				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pages)~~	~~02/10/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 140

FOLDER TITLE:
9300626

2015-0776-M
rs1437

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300626
RECEIVED: 16 FEB 93 14

TO: ITOH

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 16 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 10 FEB

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 19 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		HOLL
		SIGLER
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93030310	FOR DECISION
001		X	93030410	ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0626

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG NEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Mah	A
ExecSec	2	VS	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MB 3/3	N
NSC Secretariat	4		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

3 MAY 93 11:21

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0626

March 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, February 10, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Interpreter: Mr. Obst
Notetaker: Jane E. Holl

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.01)
7/31/2018 KBH

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 10, 1993, 2:30-2:38pm
The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr Chancellor. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm happy to hear your voice. I hope you are well, you must have a full plate of issues to deal with. I'll keep my fingers crossed for you. (U)

The President: Yes, I have a lot to do, much as you do in Germany. I'm hoping to see you soon. (U)

I have written to you today on the issue of Bosnia and I want to raise briefly with you a couple of points. First, we will be much more engaged in the search for a diplomatic solution. I am appointing NATO Ambassador Reg Bartholomew as my representative to the Vance/Owen talks. But first Reg will go to Moscow this week and talk to Yeltsin. (S)

Second, if a fair and workable settlement can be reached, the U.S. would be willing to participate with the UN, NATO and others to implement it. We're also looking for other ways to help the humanitarian effort and hope to have some specific ideas to discuss with you soon. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. (U)

The President: The UN and the EC should keep the lead. But Reg will work with them to explore ideas that can bridge the remaining gaps among the parties. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. Very well. When the letter reaches me, I will react very quickly and write back to you. (U)

The President: I have also reiterated President's Bush's warning to Belgrade about the consequences of spreading the war to Kosovo. We want to move ahead with enforcing the No-Fly Zone to give our warnings credibility. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me just say one more sentence on the principle of the thing. There are very complicated aspects in this situation and I would like to have a close personal relationship in working with you on this problem. (S)

The President: Thank you. I will need your advice and counsel. I do believe that the U.S. should be more involved and I look forward to helping bring it to a successful conclusion. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope so too. Best wishes and good day. (S)

- End of Conversation -

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 144				
Document ID: 9301937				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memcon~~	~~re: Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (6 pages)~~	~~03/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
~~001b. memcon~~	~~re: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (7 pages)~~	~~03/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
001c. memcon	re: Luncheon Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (7 pages) Partial Release - KBH 12/14/2018	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)
~~002a. memcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (6 pages)~~	~~03/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
~~002b. memcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001b] (7 pages)~~	~~03/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
002c. memcon	[Duplicate of 001c] (7 pages) Partial Release - KBH 12/14/2018	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 144

FOLDER TITLE:
9301937

2015-0776-M
rs1438

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301937
RECEIVED: 29 MAR 93 14

TO: ITOH

FROM: WAYNE
WALKER

DOC DATE: 29 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY MEMCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 01 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WAYNE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93041408	FOR DECISION
001		X	93041412	KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93042810	ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930428	GROSSMAN, M	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 1937

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (WW) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
W DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	MM 4/14	N
NSC Secretariat	3		N/R

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

12 APR 93 7:37

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Secs Office Top desk to do

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 10, 1993

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: TONY WAYNE

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tabs are three Memoranda of Conversation covering the three meetings between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl on March 26, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Restricted Meeting
Tab II Expanded Meeting
Tab III Luncheon Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

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Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.02)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jenonne Walker, Senior Director for Europe, NSC, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Dr. Peter Hartmann, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy and Economic Cooperation
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 26, 1993 10:40 - 11:55 am
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl began the private Oval Office session by encouraging the President not to pay too much attention to negative press treatment. ("You've been reading in the press for many years that I'm about to be toppled, and I'm still in power.") and comparing his meeting with the President with the Washington spring weather. No matter how many problems Germany and America face, he said, with their economies, Russia, and Bosnia, there are reasons to be optimistic. If the two do not make serious mistakes, chances of success are good. (C)

The Chancellor then offered a private view of Germany and Europe, noting that he has been in the forefront of good US-European relations and indeed sometimes is considered the American agent in Germany. Today, he said, good US-German relations are even more important than they had been thirty years ago when the division of Germany and the terrible fear of war had made things psychologically easier. People now have a different fear, and are asking whether their leaders can cope with new challenges or are drifting "like wood on the Potomac". This makes new German-American ties necessary. The military-security tie will remain important. American troops in Germany will be reduced, but so long as the numbers are sufficient to prove that "the Americans are still there," that is not a problem. Germany too is reducing its forces. It also will have to face new kinds of responsibilities in NATO and the UN. That is why Germany's Constitution will be amended, the Chancellor said, noting that "you may have heard of the coup I carried off in the last few days" to keep German crews with AWACS when enforcement of the no fly zone over Bosnia begins. He continued, however, that many

Germans have "turned lazy". German unity means that the country must assume greater international responsibilities. (C)

Turning specifically to US-German relations, the Chancellor asked for the President's personal support for closer scientific and cultural cooperation, and specifically for the US-German Academic Council. The Chancellor then continued with personal memories of World War II and early post-war years. He had been 15 years old when the war ended, the child of a not very prosperous Catholic family. His parents had opposed Hitler, and his 19 year old brother had been killed in the war. He had been active in politics since his school days and had first run for office in 1949, when he was 19 years old. (U)

So, he continued, this is Helmut Kohl speaking to you, who wants friendly relations with the President of the United States because of an emotional stake in German-American relations. He remembered the devastation of the early post-war years when he was almost starving, and early each morning American soldiers drove up to the schools with food. He and his wife met in a dancing class in school, when Kohl was wearing a suit donated by American Quaker aid and his future wife was wearing a dress donated by another American organization. The Kohls never had forgotten that, the Chancellor said, and a whole generation of Germans had a similar experience. (U)

Once when meeting Ronald Reagan, Kohl had suggested that each of them write on a piece of paper who he believed had been the greatest American president of this century. When they exchanged papers, the discovered that each had written Harry S Truman. Kohl had chosen Truman because of the Marshall Plan, which he described as important morally as materially. Germans at the time saw it as help for self help, at a time when no one wanted to help Germany because of the horrible crimes of the Nazis. That, said the Chancellor, is what we now need to do for Russia. (C)

The President thanked Chancellor Kohl for sharing his personal experiences, and noted that when he had been a student in England he had visited Germany as often as possible. At the time, he had been "almost conversational" in German and still could understand a lot. Truman had been the dominant political figure of his childhood, the President continued, in part because he came from just across the Arkansas state line in Missouri. (U)

Chancellor Kohl then asked how far by airplane Truman's house is from Washington, and suggested that on his next visit to the US he and the American President should visit it together. (U)

"I would love to do it", The President replied. (U)

The Chancellor then suggested that he and the President decide which subjects would be addressed in the private Oval Office meeting and which with the larger group, suggesting that he and the President concentrate on Russia and save the European Community and GATT for discussion with the larger group. (C)

On Russia, the Chancellor said he had the impression that Yeltsin will win the game this time. The Chancellor expressed gratitude for the things President Clinton is doing to help Yeltsin and offered to make that point to the press later. Chancellor Kohl expressed the "simple philosophy" that if we do not assist Yeltsin then he has no chance. If we do assist him he has a chance, but his survival is not certain. If he is toppled then things will be much worse and more expensive for the West, which would have to re-arm. Two days earlier the Chancellor had spoken with the Czech Prime Minister, then that evening with the Prime Minister of Poland. Both are very concerned about the situation in Russia because the whole region could change again. Kohl was putting his stake on Yeltsin even if that involves a risk. There are situations in politics when one must stand by a person. (C)

The Chancellor disagreed with Kissinger's warning against backing Yeltsin. He said he would like to remind Kissinger that he had written a famous book on Metternich, and that his position now on Yeltsin is a "Metternich" reply, when what is needed is a "Truman" reply. If we do this together and fail, he continued, we can stand up and say that at least we tried. And if we try together to come to grips with what is happening and see what can be done, it won't be very expensive. For example, he had told a group of US Senators this morning that if 30 universities in the US, UK, and Germany developed relations with 30 universities in Russia, a program of exchanges for students and teachers would not cost much and would amount to "thirty embassies" for the West in Russia. The Russians are proud people, and even those who were not communists felt themselves to be part of a superpower. They now are down and demoralized. If they feel that nobody is paying attention to their plight, there will be a very negative effect. Thus, he said, he fully supported President Clinton's statements of the past few days. (C)

Kohl recounted the story of a member of Gorbachev's staff about the scene outside the White House in Moscow during the attempted coup in August 1992, and the enormous effect on the Russian soldiers gathered there when George Bush's voice was broadcast calling for the release of Gorbachev, and Kohl's voice was broadcast too. The things Germany and the US now want to do vis a vis Russia can have a clear impact. (C)

Perhaps German and American experts should meet to try to harmonize our assistance to Russia, he continued, and divide up the work that needs to be done. But Germany has reached the maximum of what it can do. 53% of the assistance to Russia so far has come from Germany (much of it to get former Soviet troops out of eastern Germany). Nevertheless, we must do something. (C)

Senator Nunn had told the Chancellor earlier that morning that perhaps some NATO infrastructure funds could be used. The Chancellor thought the best improvement in NATO's security would come from investing in democracy and market structures in Russia. (C)

We also should support multilateral cooperation, the Chancellor continued. The G-7 meeting last year in Munich had been a disappointment because some countries "did not do a lot". Kohl had discussed this with Miyazawa in Tokyo, saying we cannot accept the present situation and Japan must show flexibility on the northern islands if it is to "act like a superpower". (C)

The President agreed that Russia cannot return the islands at this point; it would be too humiliating. (C)

The Chancellor agreed, saying Germany's attitude in 1988 and '89 had been different. Gorbachev had been in trouble economically, and Germany had assisted him, without bargaining over eastern Germany. The night the Berlin wall came down Kohl had been in Berlin. Gorbachev telephoned to ask if things were getting out of control, as they had in 1953. Today, the Chancellor said, we know that the KGB and the GDR's State Security Service had been willing to let the tanks out. That would have been a repeat of 1953. Kohl had given Gorbachev his word that things were not getting out of control. That, Kohl believed, had been the decisive moment. Now we must tell Japan that its position cannot be tolerated. (C)

The President noted that the Japanese have shown some movement in the last few days. He should have a talk with Miyazawa, he said, but had wanted to see the Chancellor first. (C)

The Chancellor encouraged him to do so, saying it is easier to get the Japanese to act multilaterally. He advised the President to ask Vice President Gore how often the Japanese have promised money to protect the rain forrest, and how little they actually have given. A multilateral approach is easier, and also face saving for Tokyo. (C)

The President said that when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev was here he said he wanted the West to provide people at all levels for extended periods, not just going to Russia to make speeches and attend seminars. They could work on a technical level without Russia's giving away its political integrity. (C)

The main thing about his own forthcoming meeting with Yeltsin, the President continued, was that after that he could announce some things the US could do. The US has not done enough and should do more. The President said he had talked to Miyazawa, Mitterrand, and Mulroney about having the G-7 announce some specific things that together might look like a lot, even though no one alone can do what Germany already has done. (C)

Then, he continued, there should be a multilateral initiative, perhaps a Foreign and Finance Ministers meeting in Tokyo about April 14, ten days before the Russian referendum. But all G-7 leaders would have to agree before the Tokyo meeting what will come out of it and how to announce it. These things together could have a big impact on Yeltsin's fortunes. (C)

There had been problems in America's delivery of the aid it had promised and then in reaching the intended recipients in Russia. There also were problems between Russia and the World Bank and IMF and about debt rescheduling. (C)

The Chancellor said he now thought we are going to manage this. His Sherpa was with him in Washington, and perhaps some American official could go to Bonn, without waiting for April 14. We must do it before that. The Chancellor then noted his desire for close cooperation with the President, not just on this issue but across the board. Peter Hartmann and his predecessor had often been in Washington, and the Chancellor and President could talk on the telephone every few days, even if there were no urgent problems. It is very important, he continued, that the President take the leadership on Russia, for all the psychological reasons the two had discussed earlier. That will be important in Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, and even affect the former Yugoslavia. (C)

Next, the Chancellor said he wanted to ask "a very primitive question:" do Americans still care about "us", or only about their own budget problems, health reform, etc? Aid to Russia may not be popular but it was important to try to make it popular. He referred again to Truman, saying that the Marshall Plan had not been popular with the American public. We must not, he said, allow the feeling to develop in Russia that they are victims. (C)

It is important that the President personally lead on this, the Chancellor said; there must be a face to politics. The Chancellor believed he had done this with Russia. German-Soviet relations had been very bad. Now the attitude in Russia has changed, and people feel "this guy has not written us off". In Western Europe people care too much about their own difficulties. That is the way it was in 1919 and 1938. Money counts, but so does psychology, and that must be tied to people. (C)

The President commented that he was having a group of Senators to dinner that evening, and had hosted members of the House of Representatives last night. All know the risk, but all are willing to take it. We have to, he said; we have no choice. It is far better to try and fail. If we do this right, then even if Yeltsin does not survive we will increase the chance of keeping democracy alive in Russia. The door will remain open to the West because we are involved. Even if Russians are mad at Yeltsin, they will know we are involved. (C)

The Chancellor said that he agreed completely. He had told Mitterrand that even if we fail, those who follow Yeltsin will have to live in the world with America, France, and Germany. Even the people in Beijing know that the world has changed. If it would be useful to the President, he said, the two of them could make that point very clear at their press conference. (C)

The President responded that the most important thing that can come out is that we are together in support of Yeltsin, not as a person but as the embodiment of our values. At the press

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

conference, they should say what Germany already has done for Russia and mention the Marshall Plan. Where, he asked, would America be today without a strong Europe? (6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.03)
7/31/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Fauver, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Economic Policy
E. Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Dieter Vogel, State Secretary and Spokesman
Horst Kohler, State Secretary, Finance Ministry
Dr. Immo Stabreit, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dr. Peter Hartmann, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy and Economic Cooperation
Dr. Johannes Ludewig, Director-General for Economic and Financial Policy
Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Coordinator for German-American Relations
Dr. Walter Neuer, Chief of Staff
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 26, 1993 11:55 am - 12:55 pm
Cabinet Room

The President: Welcome. The Chancellor and I have had a good discussion in the Oval Office. We talked mostly about the importance of helping Russia as well as a bit about Bosnia. Maybe we can talk about Russia in some more detail and look at a few other issues before we go to lunch. On the issue of the American economy, let me say that I have worked hard to present a program that will make substantial reductions in our debt over the next five years and that, at the same time, will increase our investment in new technologies and in retraining of workers. I have also notified Congress of my intention to seek extension of our fast track authority and to get a good Uruguay Round agreement, which I know you care about very much. On the economic front, we are focusing on encouraging growth. We will be doing our best to bring debt down and to keep our interest

rates down while not cutting off the economic recovery which has begun. In fact, I have asked Congress for funds to help speed up the recovery. I understand the enormous burden which Germany has assumed in bringing the east into the country and that you have even less influence than I do in bringing down interest rates. Still, I am concerned that the U.S. alone can not do it all -- encourage world growth, support Russia, solve Bosnia, open the world trading system. We need partners in these efforts. I look at the French elections and can see the dangers of letting the economy get too bad -- the people vote in protest. I had to face those who wanted protectionism in my campaign. I resisted and argued that we need a good GATT agreement and a good NAFTA package. So we must do what we can together to promote world economic growth and to liberalize trade. (C)

Second, I would like to seek your advice on what we can do with Japan. It has a massive trade surplus while in domestic recession and thus has large sums of money which could be invested. But the political system is so fractured by scandal. It leaves one uncertain of how to proceed. (C)

Finally, I'd like to discuss what we can do for the Tokyo summit. We must build on our package, on your "solidarity pact" and on the modest recovery which John Major is greeting. I really want us to come out of the summit with a good growth package and with more G-7 coordination. That coordination is going to be vital for the future. All the wealthy countries except Japan face difficulties in creating new jobs along with growth. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I want to first express my appreciation for our restricted talk, and I want to repeat my general philosophy -- German-American cooperation is more important today than it was 20-30 years ago. Thirty years ago, people were afraid of war so it was easy to point out the need to pay for security. Today, the world is open. German unification is accomplished. And that means that we must face up to our responsibilities. We have no more excuses. We are no longer a divided country. So we must face up to this reality and amend our constitution. I add here that our constitution is as it is in part because of the advice we received from British and American authorities. But, we are working on this. It is difficult, but we are trying. (C)

Second, I strongly believe that you can not have German unification without European unification. They are two sides of the same coin. As Conrad Adenaur used to say "you need the roof of European unification over all of us." Germany needs this more than others need this. We are a big country, but like the top student in the class we are respected but not liked by the others. Often the others in the class are happy if we write a bad paper. So the bottom line is that we will take the path of European unity. The alternatives are not to choose Europe or the U.S., however. We want European unity and good U.S.-European relations. We want America to be with us and American troops to stay in Germany at a level that is not just for decorative purposes. Of course, we can adjust the level to meet the needs.

But the key point is that the vast majority of the German people want American troops to stay. (C)

I think that the twelve will ratify the Maastricht treaty by the end of the year, but that even if one or two drop out the train will go ahead. And I think that most of the EFTA countries -- Sweden, Finland, Austria and others -- will join in 1995. America should not take an anti-European position. You know that much of what we are doing is in response to American advice over the years to unite more closely. We want to do this with America with us. (C)

As for GATT, let me note that in Tokyo we will have to go before 2,000 or so journalists. If we say that we are agreed that the Uruguay Round must be concluded, they will drown us out with laughter. They will look back at the two last summits where we said the same thing. We'll be naked before them. We need to do all we can to conclude the Uruguay Round quickly. At Munich, we were only a hair's breadth away from agreement. We didn't make it and then the French referendum held us up. Now it is the French parliamentary elections and in a year and a half there will be the French Presidential elections. The French are important. The agreement is bad for our farmers, but it is worse for theirs. My advice is that we start negotiating again immediately after the French government is in place. We should renew negotiations and ignore the statements made in the French campaign. If I know my friend in the Elysee, he will say its up to the Prime Minister to negotiate this. We need to try, but we should not delay. (C)

Mr. Vice President, we had a long talk in Rio about the economy and the rain forests. Those who suffer most from no GATT agreement are the third world countries. There is little possibility of helping the rain forests as long as these countries are suffering economically and if GATT is solved it will start to bring them the benefits of free trade and increased wealth. In this context, let me say that I do not think it is good to up the ante on trade. If a U.S. tank faces an EC tank there will be problems. I will try to help. I got a cable from my farmers on the way here asking me not to soften my stance, but I think we need to move to agreement. (C)

On Japan, I visited several weeks ago. The Japanese find themselves confronted with big economic problems. I visited a university in Tokyo which was founded by German Jesuits and was told that the younger generation in Japan is going through something like our "generation of '68" in Europe. This could bring changes to the Japanese lifestyle of leaving home for work at 6:00 am and not returning until 11:00 pm, even as they preserve their culture. We need to discuss these changes with the Japanese. These changing habits will be important for resolving our differences. Of course, we must get them to sit with us and discuss aid to Russia in a way that gets them to participate. Working with you, we might be helpful. I'm exaggerating a bit, but they fear the risk of being isolated and

the economic consequences of that. We need to keep this in mind for the economic summit.

A brief word on Germany: the forty years in which the country was divided left a deeper scar than I had thought. Three generations of children were subjected to communist propaganda. When I visit the eastern laender, I am greeted by 19 year old soldiers who went all through school learning that NATO and I were enemies and that the EC was a bunch of greedy capitalists. Now, we expect these same men to have accepted all of the changes. And it is a general problem because we need so many people to staff the administration. They just don't drop from the air. In 1945, my town in Germany was captured by the Americans. They had a list of all those who had been elected in the last democratic elections in our town and put the survivors back in place a week after taking over the town. But we can't do that. The last democratic elections in the GDR were in 1932. We cannot rely on that group. So the people in the administration now have no government experience. And, I must say that the west Germans are pampered children in some ways. They are very good at complaining. This is part of the reason that I say the psychology of the situation is important. Our Solidarity Pact is important for the figures agreed, but equally for the psychological message it gives. I told Secretary Bentsen a few minutes ago that 50% of economic success is psychological. It will be decisive if the people feel that we are going to put things right, that we will make it.

It is not just a question of sums of money, but we are going to put 110 million DM into the east this year. In two years, we have provided more telephones and telephone lines than during the whole period of the GDR, but the people need to understand that it takes time to get it all done. It may be hard for you to understand but in the GDR to buy a new car in 1989 one had to wait twelve years after paying a deposit and ordering it. Now they can get one in a week. Unfortunately, we also had many disagreeable people who went to the east from the west and set a bad example. But we will cope. We are trying to slim down our bureaucracy. We had many abuses in our social system. We are in the middle of a dispute over our health system in that connection. I will share our difficulties with you to show just how difficult it can be to reform a health system.

But joking aside, I'm optimistic. With the G-7, lets send the best message we can on development of the world economy. Also, regarding the Bundesbank, I think things will go in the right direction. I think we are on a good trend with interest rates. As for the European economy, the UK data suggests that they are making progress getting out of their slump. After the elections, I think the French will maintain a stable franc and increasing privatization should help the economy. We will continue on our course. We have privatized 85% of the 12,000 former state companies in the east. It is difficult but it is the right direction. I will speak for free trade. There will be no fortress Europe. When we have problems in this area, lets be sure to discuss them openly.

The President: Let me respond and then I'd like to let the Vice President speak on the environment. First, I very much appreciate your efforts to move Germany to participation in international peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. I am aware of your difficulties on the NATO AWACs and your recent decision to move ahead on that if enforcement of the No-Fly Zone is authorized. I also appreciate your participation in the air drop operation. On the Uruguay Round, I fully agree that we must make a good effort. A successful Round can be a big help to our economies. (C)

Regarding U.S. troops in Europe, I firmly believe that we should maintain our presence as long as it is wanted. Our plans are to maintain about 100,000 troops over the next five years and then we would see what the needs are. But I think that number meets the psychological needs as well as the real military needs. Of course, we will need to see what happens in Russia. (C)

I appreciate your advice on Miyazawa and the importance of their feeling isolated on Russia and other issues. I appreciate that you think that you have bigger health care problems than us, but your system looks pretty good from here. You only spend 9% of your GDP on it and we spend 14% and rising. I appreciate the fact that your short-term rates are coming down and that inflation is staying low. We have different rate problems. Your long-term rates stayed low while ours were too high and while your short-term rates are too high and ours are low. I do think that Germany and the U.S. will be the key for world growth unless we can get a recovery effort underway in Japan. (C)

On the environment, if we could successfully conclude the Uruguay Round and go back to the Rio principles, then the U.S. and Germany could do a lot to lead the effort to preserve the rain forests. We could work with the pharmaceutical companies to find solutions. But that is a conversation for another day. (C)

The Vice President: Germany has been a world leader on the environment, and Chancellor Kohl, you have been an inspiration on this. The longer-term issues will require a good deal of work between us, but there are two issues we can work on now. First, the Bio-diversity Treaty which you signed and we didn't. I favor the treaty but see problems with the language on protection of intellectual property. We are trying quietly to change that language and to facilitate technology transfer in the longer term. The UK is being helpful in this effort and I would hope that Germany could help too. Second, on the Climate Convention, our view is different than the Bush Administration. We will be meeting the goals under the convention. I know there is a debate in Germany if the goals can be met, but I want to underscore that Germany can play a critical role giving moral leadership to the world, if it complies. I know that there is discussion in the EC of the EC agreeing to the convention in a bloc. That could slow things up and create a bottleneck. I urge you to reaffirm your commitment to the convention and to look at alternatives to an EC-wide ratification. I also hope you will consider our proposed

energy tax and take a new look at the EC proposal in light of it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will take all of your concerns into consideration. I want very close cooperation between us on these issues. We would have saved a lot of money if we had applied ecological lessons to the construction of Germany. I think we need to work on the Japanese here too. For example, their use of hardwood is tremendous and growing. In Germany, we face problems of dense growth and of deforestation of the Alps. If the latter happens, it will pollute the Rhine further and undermine all of the water supply in Germany. This is an issue that stays with young people in Germany and here. I sensed this when I visited the University of California at Berkeley last year. They are interested in the future climate. In Germany, we face forests dying from acid rain. You know that forests have almost a mythological importance for us -- in our poetry and our lyrics. So I have much sympathy for this issue, and am all in favor of close cooperation. (C)

One issue that is close to me is the German-American Academic Council. I hope we can have a formal opening for the Council to give it the right kind of start. Let me explain why this is important to me. After the war, many people emigrated to the U.S. including many academics and scientists who were embittered, but they had a link to Germany. Henry Kissinger is a prime example -- he always followed the German ball club scores. Schonenfeld does the same thing with a team in Berlin. But those links are fading, and we need to plant new trees now. I went to Heidelberg university which has a long history of ties to America, but that is dying now. Thus, the goal of the German-American Council is to keep us together. However much I support European unity, the U.S.-German relationship is of existential importance to us. I would welcome your support for these efforts. (C)

The President: I will be very supportive. The Council is a wonderful idea. I will do all that I can to support it. I believe we are planning a formal announcement next month. (U)

Mr. Weidenfeld: The important thing for today is to express general support for the Council and then plan for a formal announcement next month. (U)

The President: There is no problem in expressing our support today. I am additionally sensitive to our cooperation noting that two of your scientists were on the Space Shuttle mission which we had to defer this week. We need to break for lunch shortly and I suggest that we might discuss Russia, Bosnia and non-proliferation then. But first let me ask Secretary Bentsen if he would like to add a few points. (U)

Secretary Bentsen: I would like to take up briefly some of the themes which the Chancellor raised about world growth. Germany and the U.S. are two major economic powers. Here in the U.S. we may be able to achieve 3% economic growth, but we cannot sustain

our growth without growth in Europe and growth in Europe depends in large part on Germany. I deeply appreciate our cooperation to date, and now we must work together to urge Japan to undertake its own economic stimulus. In the case where we cannot get them to undertake such a stimulus then we must realize that the U.S. cannot sustain our stimulus efforts unless Europe grows too. (C)

Chancellors Kohl: I'd like to ask Mr. Kohler to comment on the G-7 cooperation. (U)

Mr. Kohler: In Europe, we are trying to undertake a Europe-wide growth initiative. One part of the program would be increased infrastructure spending. The second part is to encourage member states to stimulate their economies. EC Finance Ministers will be working on this again in April. I agree with the earlier comments that interest rates are a key factor in European growth. The long-term German rates are low -- the best in 25 years, and I think there are good chances that the short-term rates will come down further. But it would be a mistake to put public pressure on the Bundesbank. That could be counter-productive. Recent wage increase restraint and the Solidarity Pact will help bring about a further reduction of rates, I believe. I also agree that getting Japan to undertake an effort at economic stimulation is essential for world growth. But again, we need to exert pressure confidentially, not publicly. Confidence and trust among the G-7 will be vital and a successful Uruguay Round agreement will be a key element in confidence building. Let's not put the Round off until we've implemented our growth strategies but move the Round forward at the same time. (C)

The President: I agree with that. Now why don't we adjourn to our lunch. (C)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
E. Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Dieter Vogel, State Secretary and Spokesman
Horst Kohler, State Secretary, Finance Ministry
Dr. Immo Stabreit, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dr. Peter Hartmann, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy and Economic Cooperation
Dr. Johannes Ludewig, Director-General for Economic and Financial Policy
Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Coordinator for German-American Relations
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 26, 1993 1:15 - 2:20 pm
Old Family Dinning Room

(The conversation began with joking about the fact that the only complete sets of White House China came from Presidents Reagan and Johnson. Chancellor Kohl then recounted his entry into politics and his experiences with Konrad Adenaeur.) (U)

The President: Secretary Christopher, could you give a description of your meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and our current thinking on Russia? (U)

Secretary Christopher: Kozyrev stressed the need for concrete, tangible projects, and President Clinton agrees with that approach. We are looking at agriculture, energy, and housing as key areas where we can focus our bilateral assistance. We hope that after our bilateral summit with Yeltsin and the announcement of our bilateral aid package, our friends will announce comparable bilateral assistance packages for Russia. We hope to put forward programs that really work. We also need to work on

what we can do together at the macro-level in the G-7 context. We have been trying to accommodate the Japanese. That is part of the reason that we have resisted an early summit. We did not want to upstage them, especially as they potentially have the most to contribute in some areas. I think they feel reassured right now. But we want to act quickly and not to make our actions so highly conditional that we can not help. We also need to find a way to move to help the ruble as soon as we can. At the same time, we want to keep Russia contributing constructively on Bosnia. In general, they are being helpful, even though we just had to agree to a seven day delay in enforcing the No-Fly Zone. We will want to discuss Bosnia in Vancouver. We will also discuss arms control and SALT II, especially in relation to Ukraine. But the emphasis will be on economic matters. ~~(C)~~

The President: I would like to discuss three issues in some detail and then have us set up a system to follow-up bilaterally. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, that is fine. Horst Kohler will be here the week after next, and he can follow-up. (U)

The President: First, I think it would be good if we can all say something about new bilateral aid around the time of the Vancouver summit to give a boost to Yeltsin. Second, I hope we will all be able to say something together about a multilateral effort before the April 14-15 G-7 ministerial meeting. Third, we should look at whether we can have an impact on stabilizing Russia's currency. Yeltsin and his people are agreed on the need to do that, but they do not control the Central Bank. Rather, Yeltsin's opponents or at least non-reformers do control it and are giving out money to their friends. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Bentsen: It is imperative that Yeltsin and Fyodorov get control of the Central Bank. Inflation is running at 40% a month; it's bordering on hyperinflation. It won't take much money to help stabilize the currency if the bank and money supply are under control. Probably a couple of billion dollars could help immensely. But we can't do it if the Central Bank continues to print money irresponsibly. We need that much conditionality. Also, it seems to me that we need some sort of stand-by agreement on debt while they are restructuring, and of course Germany is essential in dealing with debt. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: I agree with much of what you said. It is important to look at our starting point. The package agreed at Munich was not bad, but it was never implemented. Yeltsin brought this up when I visited him, complaining that the Munich promises were never kept. Maybe we should revisit the Munich agreements. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Bensten: Well, I think we need to focus now on what we can do quickly and concretely. For example, if we want to move in the area of oil and gas which could increase their income, we need to define property rights and to make sure Russia will live up to contracts. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kohler: Let me explain a bit about the philosophy of our approach in Munich. It was not that we should control Russian development policy. We would let them proceed with their own special genius. We agreed to provide help for self-help, with no impression that they were under our tutelage nor exaggerated expectations. That is why we need to concentrate on specific projects such as in the energy sector. And, as Secretary Bentsen said, this can only work if we control hyperinflation and if the Central Bank cooperates. Once they get rid of the current Central Bank president, we can get more courageous on an agreement with the IMF. On debt, we agree on the need to ease the debt payment burden, but we have a political problem with our companies and banks. And, we want to avoid the impression that we can solve all the problems with debt relief. It won't do that. I also agree that the international community needs to offer more assistance, more money. We are willing to participate in a debt arrangement, but we need a legal basis to do so. Ukraine and Russia need to agree to recognize the debt and how to handle it. That is why we can not now accept the U.S. idea on a debt stand down. It is not the figures but the political recognition of the debt that causes a problem for us. ~~(C)~~

The President: On the present agreement for rescheduling, how much should Russia pay back to Germany this year? (U)

Mr. Kohler: Under the G-7 agreement, Russia would repay about $3.7 billion this year, but of that probably only about $1.2 billion will really be repaid. Under the old G-7 offer, we estimate a burden on the German budget in 1993-94 of about $8 billion. But what we need first is a legal basis for rescheduling and then we can work for the best rescheduling agreement possible. ~~(C)~~

The President: If they pay one third of the $3.5 billion would that make it easier for you to reschedule quickly? And do I understand correctly that the budget burden is what you would have to pay back to creditors? (U)

Mr. Kohler: Yes, we have to pay German exporters out of our funds, but we do have a half year delay between the time a debt is declared unpayable and when we must reimburse our companies. That gives us some flexibility in allowing for slippage of debt repayment. ~~(C)~~

The President: So if the Russians made a modest payment, it could help in renegotiating their debt payments? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kohler: No, we don't need payment. The key for us is to get a legal basis, legal recognition of the debt. Then we can have a standstill on debt. ~~(C)~~

The President: Would a repayment help or not? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kohler: We need a legal basis for dealing with the old debt before we can extend any more credits. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: But certainly it would help us a bit politically if there were some repayments. (~~C~~)

Secretary Bensten: I agree that you need guarantees as to who is responsible for the debt, and we can't just give Ukraine a veto on all of this. (~~C~~)

The President: So we agree that we will talk about what we can each do and about what we can do with the G-7 for the April 14-15 meeting. We will discuss further ideas on dealing with the currency problems, and we will work more on what we can do about debt rescheduling. (~~C~~)

Secretary Christopher: And you will consider a bilateral aid package? (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, though I will have to look at what we can do bilaterally. I think we can try to have a bilateral and multilateral package ready by the end of the week of 14-15 April in order to have a political impact in Russia before the referendum. (~~C~~)

Mr. Kohler: I will be here the week of April 5, so we can work on this. (U)

The President: Good. Also, I wanted to mention an interesting idea which Senator Nunn shared with me -- to use NATO infrastructure funds to help pay for housing for Russian officers. Our Treasury people tell me that at today's exchange rates we can build an acceptable house for about $10,000. If we could use some NATO funds and funds from individual countries, maybe we could lead the way for others to join and thus have a big impact on the ground and for Yeltsin. The psychological and political impact of an aggressive effort on housing could help. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: I completely agree that we should look into it, but we should also look at Germany's bad experiences in this area. The houses will not be in Moscow but far away, and you will find a remarkable thing -- when you enter into a contract with local Russian companies for housing, there will be no infrastructure, no water, etc. You will need to include all of that in your planning. Our experiences were catastrophic. (~~C~~)

Mr. Kohler: And in relation to the low value of the ruble, we must remember that many goods are not available in Russia. If you want to build the housing relatively quickly, you may need to bring the materials in from the West which is expensive. That is why it didn't turn out to be so quick or inexpensive for us. (~~C~~)

The Chancellor: Still, let's look into the idea. (U)

The President: Yes, maybe the NATO funds could pay for the infrastructure and individual countries could pay for the housing. We are also very concerned that all the economic gain made could be wiped out with one more Chernobl. So we want to

work on nuclear safety as well as make an effort to build up the oil and gas sector. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: I agree. At Munich, we made a big effort on this issue. We were talking about $50 million for this effort to encourage safety -- training programs, etc. I am warned of another Chernobl and that it might not have been so bad if people had been better trained. But I was largely rebuffed in Munich. Only after you were elected and because of the high standing of the Vice President have we felt there was some rethinking going on. We just missed a big nuclear accident recently in Lithuania. One thing I know is that after Chernobl, the people of Eastern and Central Europe were hysterical. And this is not only a problem for Russia, Ukraine is a problem too. It would be very good if we could come back to this issue in Tokyo. (~~C~~)

The Vice President: A major part of the President's bilateral package will be aimed at nuclear safety. If a bilateral package from Germany, even one aimed just at this, could be announced, this would help. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, there is an opportunity here. This is an issue you can sell to the people, as I said in Munich and in London the year before. I'm impatient to move on this and think we can do more, especially if you help. (~~C~~)

The President: On a related topic, you know we can't force the Russians, but they could attract a lot of investment, clean up their environment and guarantee income, if they reformed the way they run their energy sector. That's where the money is -- as a famous American robber replied when asked why he robbed banks. We could begin with small steps that would bring quick gains. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: We raised this with Gorbachev when he came to London. I raised the idea of a private consortium which could repair the pipelines to the West for 30% or 40% of the profits. I also discussed this issue with the President of Khazakhstan. It would help them ecologically, it is doable, and it brings in money. (~~C~~)

President Clinton: And, they could require Western companies to do other things as part of the price of entry, for example, saving the natural gas that they now flare off. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we are in a position to find American and German companies which could work on this, for example, to work on the pipelines and keep them going in return for a portion of the profits. (~~C~~)

The President: I have just been told that they have moved the press conference to 2:30. Why don't we take a few minutes to discuss nonproliferation. We are very concerned about proliferation. You can look a few years down the road and see trouble. North Korea is defying the NPT. Iraq is still trying to break through the limits set. Iran is involved in very worrisome behavior. And, Russia is under economic pressure to

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sell its materials, technology, and know-how. We believe we need to be very vigilant, and to be effective we need a partnership with Germany. (C)

Secretary Christopher: One piece of good news is that Kozyrev told me that Moscow would not sell nuclear plants to Pakistan or Iran. (C)

The Vice President: This is very important and in the long run it could have an impact on German-American relations. When there was an accounting after the war with Iraq, many U.S. companies were embarrassed, but as you know, Germany was in a category by itself. The companies that had been willing to sell to Iraq made up a very long list. I mention this only because though we are not now in a similar situation with Iran, it is not difficult to imagine in a few years that Iran may be willing to challenge the peaceful nations of the world. When we do an accounting then, if we were to find that Germany sold dual-use technology which made it possible, that could really harm relations. Perhaps you could ask your ministers to give special attention to dual-use technology. Our information suggests that there is a big flow going from Germany to Iran. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It is not my intention to talk about things that are past. But if the Senate had published the full list of companies that had sold to Iraq, Germany would not have been the only one embarrassed. But my opinion of the German companies' sales is that it was horrible. Our problem is rooted in part in the fact that we have a very open economic system. Now we realize that people have been abusing it. The second problem is that our industries produce a huge amount of dual-use materials, in the pharmaceutical sector for example. But now we have new legislation that will help. I have instructed our people to have the closest cooperation with you EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d We have had some success, and we must note that the Israelis have their own problems which we must address. But it is not my policy to support these kind of exports, and I want to try to counter these kind of exports. Twice I have talked to the leaders of German business about this. We need to outlaw and ban the people who break the rules, I explained. I noted that the public prosecutor can not do it all. I said that if big and world famous companies were involved, we would still strictly apply the law and establish a new climate. My businessmen claim that U.S., Swiss, French, and UK companies are gaining sales at their expense. I think we need to make clear to all that this is a question of war and peace. EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d But there are problems. If we do something we must do it completely. We need a reasonable cooperation between us. EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d But please trust me. I am willing to cooperate with you. I agree that if we allow free flows into Iran, it will soon be armed to the teeth. If there is a problem contact me directly.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

The President: Good, we will work closely on this problem. Now, I think we better get ready for our press conference. ~~(C)~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93041408	FOR DECISION
002		X	93042810	ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930428	GROSSMAN, M	

National Security Council
The White House

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SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY MEMCONS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 28, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

Attached are copies of the memorandum of conversation for the President's March 26 meetings with Chancellor Kohl of Germany. Please ensure copies are provided Eyes Only for Secretary Christopher and copies are transmitted Eyes Only via NODIS channels to Ambassador Kimmitt in Bonn. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
As Stated

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.05)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jenonne Walker, Senior Director for Europe, NSC, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Dr. Peter Hartmann, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy and Economic Cooperation
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 26, 1993 10:40 - 11:55 am
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl began the private Oval Office session by encouraging the President not to pay too much attention to negative press treatment. ("You've been reading in the press for many years that I'm about to be toppled, and I'm still in power.") and comparing his meeting with the President with the Washington spring weather. No matter how many problems Germany and America face, he said, with their economies, Russia, and Bosnia, there are reasons to be optimistic. If the two do not make serious mistakes, chances of success are good. (C)

The Chancellor then offered a private view of Germany and Europe, noting that he has been in the forefront of good US-European relations and indeed sometimes is considered the American agent in Germany. Today, he said, good US-German relations are even more important than they had been thirty years ago when the division of Germany and the terrible fear of war had made things psychologically easier. People now have a different fear, and are asking whether their leaders can cope with new challenges or are drifting "like wood on the Potomac". This makes new German-American ties necessary. The military-security tie will remain important. American troops in Germany will be reduced, but so long as the numbers are sufficient to prove that "the Americans are still there," that is not a problem. Germany too is reducing its forces. It also will have to face new kinds of responsibilities in NATO and the UN. That is why Germany's Constitution will be amended, the Chancellor said, noting that "you may have heard of the coup I carried off in the last few days" to keep German crews with AWACS when enforcement of the no fly zone over Bosnia begins. He continued, however, that many

Germans have "turned lazy". German unity means that the country must assume greater international responsibilities. (C)

Turning specifically to US-German relations, the Chancellor asked for the President's personal support for closer scientific and cultural cooperation, and specifically for the US-German Academic Council. The Chancellor then continued with personal memories of World War II and early post-war years. He had been 15 years old when the war ended, the child of a not very prosperous Catholic family. His parents had opposed Hitler, and his 19 year old brother had been killed in the war. He had been active in politics since his school days and had first run for office in 1949, when he was 19 years old. (U)

So, he continued, this is Helmut Kohl speaking to you, who wants friendly relations with the President of the United States because of an emotional stake in German-American relations. He remembered the devastation of the early post-war years when he was almost starving, and early each morning American soldiers drove up to the schools with food. He and his wife met in a dancing class in school, when Kohl was wearing a suit donated by American Quaker aid and his future wife was wearing a dress donated by another American organization. The Kohls never had forgotten that, the Chancellor said, and a whole generation of Germans had a similar experience. (U)

Once when meeting Ronald Reagan, Kohl had suggested that each of them write on a piece of paper who he believed had been the greatest American president of this century. When they exchanged papers, the discovered that each had written Harry S Truman. Kohl had chosen Truman because of the Marshall Plan, which he described as important morally as materially. Germans at the time saw it as help for self help, at a time when no one wanted to help Germany because of the horrible crimes of the Nazis. That, said the Chancellor, is what we now need to do for Russia. (C)

The President thanked Chancellor Kohl for sharing his personal experiences, and noted that when he had been a student in England he had visited Germany as often as possible. At the time, he had been "almost conversational" in German and still could understand a lot. Truman had been the dominant political figure of his childhood, the President continued, in part because he came from just across the Arkansas state line in Missouri. (U)

Chancellor Kohl then asked how far by airplane Truman's house is from Washington, and suggested that on his next visit to the US he and the American President should visit it together. (U)

"I would love to do it", The President replied. (U)

The Chancellor then suggested that he and the President decide which subjects would be addressed in the private Oval Office meeting and which with the larger group, suggesting that he and the President concentrate on Russia and save the European Community and GATT for discussion with the larger group. (C)

On Russia, the Chancellor said he had the impression that Yeltsin will win the game this time. The Chancellor expressed gratitude for the things President Clinton is doing to help Yeltsin and offered to make that point to the press later. Chancellor Kohl expressed the "simple philosophy" that if we do not assist Yeltsin then he has no chance. If we do assist him he has a chance, but his survival is not certain. If he is toppled then things will be much worse and more expensive for the West, which would have to re-arm. Two days earlier the Chancellor had spoken with the Czech Prime Minister, then that evening with the Prime Minister of Poland. Both are very concerned about the situation in Russia because the whole region could change again. Kohl was putting his stake on Yeltsin even if that involves a risk. There are situations in politics when one must stand by a person. (C)

The Chancellor disagreed with Kissinger's warning against backing Yeltsin. He said he would like to remind Kissinger that he had written a famous book on Metternich, and that his position now on Yeltsin is a "Metternich" reply, when what is needed is a "Truman" reply. If we do this together and fail, he continued, we can stand up and say that at least we tried. And if we try together to come to grips with what is happening and see what can be done, it won't be very expensive. For example, he had told a group of US Senators this morning that if 30 universities in the US, UK, and Germany developed relations with 30 universities in Russia, a program of exchanges for students and teachers would not cost much and would amount to "thirty embassies" for the West in Russia. The Russians are proud people, and even those who were not communists felt themselves to be part of a superpower. They now are down and demoralized. If they feel that nobody is paying attention to their plight, there will be a very negative effect. Thus, he said, he fully supported President Clinton's statements of the past few days. (C)

Kohl recounted the story of a member of Gorbachev's staff about the scene outside the White House in Moscow during the attempted coup in August 1992, and the enormous effect on the Russian soldiers gathered there when George Bush's voice was broadcast calling for the release of Gorbachev, and Kohl's voice was broadcast too. The things Germany and the US now want to do vis a vis Russia can have a clear impact. (C)

Perhaps German and American experts should meet to try to harmonize our assistance to Russia, he continued, and divide up the work that needs to be done. But Germany has reached the maximum of what it can do. 53% of the assistance to Russia so far has come from Germany (much of it to get former Soviet troops out of eastern Germany). Nevertheless, we must do something. (C)

Senator Nunn had told the Chancellor earlier that morning that perhaps some NATO infrastructure funds could be used. The Chancellor thought the best improvement in NATO's security would come from investing in democracy and market structures in Russia. (C)

We also should support multilateral cooperation, the Chancellor continued. The G-7 meeting last year in Munich had been a disappointment because some countries "did not do a lot". Kohl had discussed this with Miyazawa in Tokyo, saying we cannot accept the present situation and Japan must show flexibility on the northern islands if it is to "act like a superpower". (C)

The President agreed that Russia cannot return the islands at this point; it would be too humiliating. (C)

The Chancellor agreed, saying Germany's attitude in 1988 and '89 had been different. Gorbachev had been in trouble economically, and Germany had assisted him, without bargaining over eastern Germany. The night the Berlin wall came down Kohl had been in Berlin. Gorbachev telephoned to ask if things were getting out of control, as they had in 1953. Today, the Chancellor said, we know that the KGB and the GDR's State Security Service had been willing to let the tanks out. That would have been a repeat of 1953. Kohl had given Gorbachev his word that things were not getting out of control. That, Kohl believed, had been the decisive moment. Now we must tell Japan that its position cannot be tolerated. (C)

The President noted that the Japanese have shown some movement in the last few days. He should have a talk with Miyazawa, he said, but had wanted to see the Chancellor first. (C)

The Chancellor encouraged him to do so, saying it is easier to get the Japanese to act multilaterally. He advised the President to ask Vice President Gore how often the Japanese have promised money to protect the rain forrest, and how little they actually have given. A multilateral approach is easier, and also face saving for Tokyo. (C)

The President said that when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev was here he said he wanted the West to provide people at all levels for extended periods, not just going to Russia to make speeches and attend seminars. They could work on a technical level without Russia's giving away its political integrity. (C)

The main thing about his own forthcoming meeting with Yeltsin, the President continued, was that after that he could announce some things the US could do. The US has not done enough and should do more. The President said he had talked to Miyazawa, Mitterrand, and Mulroney about having the G-7 announce some specific things that together might look like a lot, even though no one alone can do what Germany already has done. (C)

Then, he continued, there should be a multilateral initiative, perhaps a Foreign and Finance Ministers meeting in Tokyo about April 14, ten days before the Russian referendum. But all G-7 leaders would have to agree before the Tokyo meeting what will come out of it and how to announce it. These things together could have a big impact on Yeltsin's fortunes. (C)

There had been problems in America's delivery of the aid it had promised and then in reaching the intended recipients in Russia. There also were problems between Russia and the World Bank and IMF and about debt rescheduling. (C)

The Chancellor said he now thought we are going to manage this. His Sherpa was with him in Washington, and perhaps some American official could go to Bonn, without waiting for April 14. We must do it before that. The Chancellor then noted his desire for close cooperation with the President, not just on this issue but across the board. Peter Hartmann and his predecessor had often been in Washington, and the Chancellor and President could talk on the telephone every few days, even if there were no urgent problems. It is very important, he continued, that the President take the leadership on Russia, for all the psychological reasons the two had discussed earlier. That will be important in Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, and even affect the former Yugoslavia. (C)

Next, the Chancellor said he wanted to ask "a very primitive question:" do Americans still care about "us", or only about their own budget problems, health reform, etc? Aid to Russia may not be popular but it was important to try to make it popular. He referred again to Truman, saying that the Marshall Plan had not been popular with the American public. We must not, he said, allow the feeling to develop in Russia that they are victims. (C)

It is important that the President personally lead on this, the Chancellor said; there must be a face to politics. The Chancellor believed he had done this with Russia. German-Soviet relations had been very bad. Now the attitude in Russia has changed, and people feel "this guy has not written us off". In Western Europe people care too much about their own difficulties. That is the way it was in 1919 and 1938. Money counts, but so does psychology, and that must be tied to people. (C)

The President commented that he was having a group of Senators to dinner that evening, and had hosted members of the House of Representatives last night. All know the risk, but all are willing to take it. We have to, he said; we have no choice. It is far better to try and fail. If we do this right, then even if Yeltsin does not survive we will increase the chance of keeping democracy alive in Russia. The door will remain open to the West because we are involved. Even if Russians are mad at Yeltsin, they will know we are involved. (C)

The Chancellor said that he agreed completely. He had told Mitterrand that even if we fail, those who follow Yeltsin will have to live in the world with America, France, and Germany. Even the people in Beijing know that the world has changed. If it would be useful to the President, he said, the two of them could make that point very clear at their press conference. (C)

The President responded that the most important thing that can come out is that we are together in support of Yeltsin, not as a person but as the embodiment of our values. At the press

conference, they should say what Germany already has done for Russia and mention the Marshall Plan. Where, he asked, would America be today without a strong Europe? (~~C~~)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.06)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Fauver, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Economic Policy
E. Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Dieter Vogel, State Secretary and Spokesman
Horst Kohler, State Secretary, Finance Ministry
Dr. Immo Stabreit, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dr. Peter Hartmann, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy and Economic Cooperation
Dr. Johannes Ludewig, Director-General for Economic and Financial Policy
Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Coordinator for German-American Relations
Dr. Walter Neuer, Chief of Staff
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 26, 1993 11:55 am - 12:55 pm
Cabinet Room

The President: Welcome. The Chancellor and I have had a good discussion in the Oval Office. We talked mostly about the importance of helping Russia as well as a bit about Bosnia. Maybe we can talk about Russia in some more detail and look at a few other issues before we go to lunch. On the issue of the American economy, let me say that I have worked hard to present a program that will make substantial reductions in our debt over the next five years and that, at the same time, will increase our investment in new technologies and in retraining of workers. I have also notified Congress of my intention to seek extension of our fast track authority and to get a good Uruguay Round agreement, which I know you care about very much. On the economic front, we are focusing on encouraging growth. We will be doing our best to bring debt down and to keep our interest

rates down while not cutting off the economic recovery which has begun. In fact, I have asked Congress for funds to help speed up the recovery. I understand the enormous burden which Germany has assumed in bringing the east into the country and that you have even less influence than I do in bringing down interest rates. Still, I am concerned that the U.S. alone can not do it all -- encourage world growth, support Russia, solve Bosnia, open the world trading system. We need partners in these efforts. I look at the French elections and can see the dangers of letting the economy get too bad -- the people vote in protest. I had to face those who wanted protectionism in my campaign. I resisted and argued that we need a good GATT agreement and a good NAFTA package. So we must do what we can together to promote world economic growth and to liberalize trade. (C)

Second, I would like to seek your advice on what we can do with Japan. It has a massive trade surplus while in domestic recession and thus has large sums of money which could be invested. But the political system is so fractured by scandal. It leaves one uncertain of how to proceed. (C)

Finally, I'd like to discuss what we can do for the Tokyo summit. We must build on our package, on your "solidarity pact" and on the modest recovery which John Major is greeting. I really want us to come out of the summit with a good growth package and with more G-7 coordination. That coordination is going to be vital for the future. All the wealthy countries except Japan face difficulties in creating new jobs along with growth. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I want to first express my appreciation for our restricted talk, and I want to repeat my general philosophy -- German-American cooperation is more important today than it was 20-30 years ago. Thirty years ago, people were afraid of war so it was easy to point out the need to pay for security. Today, the world is open. German unification is accomplished. And that means that we must face up to our responsibilities. We have no more excuses. We are no longer a divided country. So we must face up to this reality and amend our constitution. I add here that our constitution is as it is in part because of the advice we received from British and American authorities. But, we are working on this. It is difficult, but we are trying. (C)

Second, I strongly believe that you can not have German unification without European unification. They are two sides of the same coin. As Conrad Adenaur used to say "you need the roof of European unification over all of us." Germany needs this more than others need this. We are a big country, but like the top student in the class we are respected but not liked by the others. Often the others in the class are happy if we write a bad paper. So the bottom line is that we will take the path of European unity. The alternatives are not to choose Europe or the U.S., however. We want European unity and good U.S.-European relations. We want America to be with us and American troops to stay in Germany at a level that is not just for decorative purposes. Of course, we can adjust the level to meet the needs.

But the key point is that the vast majority of the German people want American troops to stay. (C)

I think that the twelve will ratify the Maastricht treaty by the end of the year, but that even if one or two drop out the train will go ahead. And I think that most of the EFTA countries -- Sweden, Finland, Austria and others -- will join in 1995. America should not take an anti-European position. You know that much of what we are doing is in response to American advice over the years to unite more closely. We want to do this with America with us. (C)

As for GATT, let me note that in Tokyo we will have to go before 2,000 or so journalists. If we say that we are agreed that the Uruguay Round must be concluded, they will drown us out with laughter. They will look back at the two last summits where we said the same thing. We'll be naked before them. We need to do all we can to conclude the Uruguay Round quickly. At Munich, we were only a hair's breadth away from agreement. We didn't make it and then the French referendum held us up. Now it is the French parliamentary elections and in a year and a half there will be the French Presidential elections. The French are important. The agreement is bad for our farmers, but it is worse for theirs. My advice is that we start negotiating again immediately after the French government is in place. We should renew negotiations and ignore the statements made in the French campaign. If I know my friend in the Elysee, he will say its up to the Prime Minister to negotiate this. We need to try, but we should not delay. (C)

Mr. Vice President, we had a long talk in Rio about the economy and the rain forests. Those who suffer most from no GATT agreement are the third world countries. There is little possibility of helping the rain forests as long as these countries are suffering economically and if GATT is solved it will start to bring them the benefits of free trade and increased wealth. In this context, let me say that I do not think it is good to up the ante on trade. If a U.S. tank faces an EC tank there will be problems. I will try to help. I got a cable from my farmers on the way here asking me not to soften my stance, but I think we need to move to agreement. (C)

On Japan, I visited several weeks ago. The Japanese find themselves confronted with big economic problems. I visited a university in Tokyo which was founded by German Jesuits and was told that the younger generation in Japan is going through something like our "generation of '68" in Europe. This could bring changes to the Japanese lifestyle of leaving home for work at 6:00 am and not returning until 11:00 pm, even as they preserve their culture. We need to discuss these changes with the Japanese. These changing habits will be important for resolving our differences. Of course, we must get them to sit with us and discuss aid to Russia in a way that gets them to participate. Working with you, we might be helpful. I'm exaggerating a bit, but they fear the risk of being isolated and

the economic consequences of that. We need to keep this in mind for the economic summit. (C)

A brief word on Germany: the forty years in which the country was divided left a deeper scar than I had thought. Three generations of children were subjected to communist propaganda. When I visit the eastern laender, I am greeted by 19 year old soldiers who went all through school learning that NATO and I were enemies and that the EC was a bunch of greedy capitalists. Now, we expect these same men to have accepted all of the changes. And it is a general problem because we need so many people to staff the administration. They just don't drop from the air. In 1945, my town in Germany was captured by the Americans. They had a list of all those who had been elected in the last democratic elections in our town and put the survivors back in place a week after taking over the town. But we can't do that. The last democratic elections in the GDR were in 1932. We cannot rely on that group. So the people in the administration now have no government experience. And, I must say that the west Germans are pampered children in some ways. They are very good at complaining. This is part of the reason that I say the psychology of the situation is important. Our Solidarity Pact is important for the figures agreed, but equally for the psychological message it gives. I told Secretary Bentsen a few minutes ago that 50% of economic success is psychological. It will be decisive if the people feel that we are going to put things right, that we will make it. (C)

It is not just a question of sums of money, but we are going to put 110 million DM into the east this year. In two years, we have provided more telephones and telephone lines than during the whole period of the GDR, but the people need to understand that it takes time to get it all done. It may be hard for you to understand but in the GDR to buy a new car in 1989 one had to wait twelve years after paying a deposit and ordering it. Now they can get one in a week. Unfortunately, we also had many disagreeable people who went to the east from the west and set a bad example. But we will cope. We are trying to slim down our bureaucracy. We had many abuses in our social system. We are in the middle of a dispute over our health system in that connection. I will share our difficulties with you to show just how difficult it can be to reform a health system. (C)

But joking aside, I'm optimistic. With the G-7, lets send the best message we can on development of the world economy. Also, regarding the Bundesbank, I think things will go in the right direction. I think we are on a good trend with interest rates. As for the European economy, the UK data suggests that they are making progress getting out of their slump. After the elections, I think the French will maintain a stable franc and increasing privatization should help the economy. We will continue on our course. We have privatized 85% of the 12,000 former state companies in the east. It is difficult but it is the right direction. I will speak for free trade. There will be no fortress Europe. When we have problems in this area, lets be sure to discuss them openly. (C)

The President: Let me respond and then I'd like to let the Vice President speak on the environment. First, I very much appreciate your efforts to move Germany to participation in international peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. I am aware of your difficulties on the NATO AWACs and your recent decision to move ahead on that if enforcement of the No-Fly Zone is authorized. I also appreciate your participation in the air drop operation. On the Uruguay Round, I fully agree that we must make a good effort. A successful Round can be a big help to our economies. (C)

Regarding U.S. troops in Europe, I firmly believe that we should maintain our presence as long as it is wanted. Our plans are to maintain about 100,000 troops over the next five years and then we would see what the needs are. But I think that number meets the psychological needs as well as the real military needs. Of course, we will need to see what happens in Russia. (C)

I appreciate your advice on Miyazawa and the importance of their feeling isolated on Russia and other issues. I appreciate that you think that you have bigger health care problems than us, but your system looks pretty good from here. You only spend 9% of your GDP on it and we spend 14% and rising. I appreciate the fact that your short-term rates are coming down and that inflation is staying low. We have different rate problems. Your long-term rates stayed low while ours were too high and while your short-term rates are too high and ours are low. I do think that Germany and the U.S. will be the key for world growth unless we can get a recovery effort underway in Japan. (C)

On the environment, if we could successfully conclude the Uruguay Round and go back to the Rio principles, then the U.S. and Germany could do a lot to lead the effort to preserve the rain forests. We could work with the pharmaceutical companies to find solutions. But that is a conversation for another day. (C)

The Vice President: Germany has been a world leader on the environment, and Chancellor Kohl, you have been an inspiration on this. The longer-term issues will require a good deal of work between us, but there are two issues we can work on now. First, the Bio-diversity Treaty which you signed and we didn't. I favor the treaty but see problems with the language on protection of intellectual property. We are trying quietly to change that language and to facilitate technology transfer in the longer term. The UK is being helpful in this effort and I would hope that Germany could help too. Second, on the Climate Convention, our view is different than the Bush Administration. We will be meeting the goals under the convention. I know there is a debate in Germany if the goals can be met, but I want to underscore that Germany can play a critical role giving moral leadership to the world, if it complies. I know that there is discussion in the EC of the EC agreeing to the convention in a bloc. That could slow things up and create a bottleneck. I urge you to reaffirm your commitment to the convention and to look at alternatives to an EC-wide ratification. I also hope you will consider our proposed

energy tax and take a new look at the EC proposal in light of it. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will take all of your concerns into consideration. I want very close cooperation between us on these issues. We would have saved a lot of money if we had applied ecological lessons to the construction of Germany. I think we need to work on the Japanese here too. For example, their use of hardwood is tremendous and growing. In Germany, we face problems of dense growth and of deforestation of the Alps. If the latter happens, it will pollute the Rhine further and undermine all of the water supply in Germany. This is an issue that stays with young people in Germany and here. I sensed this when I visited the University of California at Berkeley last year. They are interested in the future climate. In Germany, we face forests dying from acid rain. You know that forests have almost a mythological importance for us -- in our poetry and our lyrics. So I have much sympathy for this issue, and am all in favor of close cooperation. (Ø)

One issue that is close to me is the German-American Academic Council. I hope we can have a formal opening for the Council to give it the right kind of start. Let me explain why this is important to me. After the war, many people emigrated to the U.S. including many academics and scientists who were embittered, but they had a link to Germany. Henry Kissinger is a prime example -- he always followed the German ball club scores. Schonenfeld does the same thing with a team in Berlin. But those links are fading, and we need to plant new trees now. I went to Heidelberg university which has a long history of ties to America, but that is dying now. Thus, the goal of the German-American Council is to keep us together. However much I support European unity, the U.S.-German relationship is of existential importance to us. I would welcome your support for these efforts. (Ø)

The President: I will be very supportive. The Council is a wonderful idea. I will do all that I can to support it. I believe we are planning a formal announcement next month. (U)

Mr. Weidenfeld: The important thing for today is to express general support for the Council and then plan for a formal announcement next month. (U)

The President: There is no problem in expressing our support today. I am additionally sensitive to our cooperation noting that two of your scientists were on the Space Shuttle mission which we had to defer this week. We need to break for lunch shortly and I suggest that we might discuss Russia, Bosnia and non-proliferation then. But first let me ask Secretary Bentsen if he would like to add a few points. (U)

Secretary Bentsen: I would like to take up briefly some of the themes which the Chancellor raised about world growth. Germany and the U.S. are two major economic powers. Here in the U.S. we may be able to achieve 3% economic growth, but we cannot sustain

our growth without growth in Europe and growth in Europe depends in large part on Germany. I deeply appreciate our cooperation to date, and now we must work together to urge Japan to undertake its own economic stimulus. In the case where we cannot get them to undertake such a stimulus then we must realize that the U.S. cannot sustain our stimulus efforts unless Europe grows too. (C)

Chancellors Kohl: I'd like to ask Mr. Kohler to comment on the G-7 cooperation. (U)

Mr. Kohler: In Europe, we are trying to undertake a Europe-wide growth initiative. One part of the program would be increased infrastructure spending. The second part is to encourage member states to stimulate their economies. EC Finance Ministers will be working on this again in April. I agree with the earlier comments that interest rates are a key factor in European growth. The long-term German rates are low -- the best in 25 years, and I think there are good chances that the short-term rates will come down further. But it would be a mistake to put public pressure on the Bundesbank. That could be counter-productive. Recent wage increase restraint and the Solidarity Pact will help bring about a further reduction of rates, I believe. I also agree that getting Japan to undertake an effort at economic stimulation is essential for world growth. But again, we need to exert pressure confidentially, not publicly. Confidence and trust among the G-7 will be vital and a successful Uruguay Round agreement will be a key element in confidence building. Let's not put the Round off until we've implemented our growth strategies but move the Round forward at the same time. (C)

The President: I agree with that. Now why don't we adjourn to our lunch. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0776-M (1.07)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
E. Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Dieter Vogel, State Secretary and Spokesman
Horst Kohler, State Secretary, Finance Ministry
Dr. Immo Stabreit, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dr. Peter Hartmann, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Security Policy and Economic Cooperation
Dr. Johannes Ludewig, Director-General for Economic and Financial Policy
Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Coordinator for German-American Relations
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 26, 1993 1:15 - 2:20 pm
Old Family Dinning Room

(The conversation began with joking about the fact that the only complete sets of White House China came from Presidents Reagan and Johnson. Chancellor Kohl then recounted his entry into politics and his experiences with Konrad Adenaeur.) (U)

The President: Secretary Christopher, could you give a description of your meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and our current thinking on Russia? (U)

Secretary Christopher: Kozyrev stressed the need for concrete, tangible projects, and President Clinton agrees with that approach. We are looking at agriculture, energy, and housing as key areas where we can focus our bilateral assistance. We hope that after our bilateral summit with Yeltsin and the announcement of our bilateral aid package, our friends will announce comparable bilateral assistance packages for Russia. We hope to put forward programs that really work. We also need to work on

what we can do together at the macro-level in the G-7 context. We have been trying to accommodate the Japanese. That is part of the reason that we have resisted an early summit. We did not want to upstage them, especially as they potentially have the most to contribute in some areas. I think they feel reassured right now. But we want to act quickly and not to make our actions so highly conditional that we can not help. We also need to find a way to move to help the ruble as soon as we can. At the same time, we want to keep Russia contributing constructively on Bosnia. In general, they are being helpful, even though we just had to agree to a seven day delay in enforcing the No-Fly Zone. We will want to discuss Bosnia in Vancouver. We will also discuss arms control and SALT II, especially in relation to Ukraine. But the emphasis will be on economic matters. ~~(C)~~

The President: I would like to discuss three issues in some detail and then have us set up a system to follow-up bilaterally. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, that is fine. Horst Kohler will be here the week after next, and he can follow-up. (U)

The President: First, I think it would be good if we can all say something about new bilateral aid around the time of the Vancouver summit to give a boost to Yeltsin. Second, I hope we will all be able to say something together about a multilateral effort before the April 14-15 G-7 ministerial meeting. Third, we should look at whether we can have an impact on stabilizing Russia's currency. Yeltsin and his people are agreed on the need to do that, but they do not control the Central Bank. Rather, Yeltsin's opponents or at least non-reformers do control it and are giving out money to their friends. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Bentsen: It is imperative that Yeltsin and Fyodorov get control of the Central Bank. Inflation is running at 40% a month; it's bordering on hyperinflation. It won't take much money to help stabilize the currency if the bank and money supply are under control. Probably a couple of billion dollars could help immensely. But we can't do it if the Central Bank continues to print money irresponsibly. We need that much conditionality. Also, it seems to me that we need some sort of stand-by agreement on debt while they are restructuring, and of course Germany is essential in dealing with debt. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: I agree with much of what you said. It is important to look at our starting point. The package agreed at Munich was not bad, but it was never implemented. Yeltsin brought this up when I visited him, complaining that the Munich promises were never kept. Maybe we should revisit the Munich agreements. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Bensten: Well, I think we need to focus now on what we can do quickly and concretely. For example, if we want to move in the area of oil and gas which could increase their income, we need to define property rights and to make sure Russia will live up to contracts. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kohler: Let me explain a bit about the philosophy of our approach in Munich. It was not that we should control Russian development policy. We would let them proceed with their own special genius. We agreed to provide help for self-help, with no impression that they were under our tutelage nor exaggerated expectations. That is why we need to concentrate on specific projects such as in the energy sector. And, as Secretary Bentsen said, this can only work if we control hyperinflation and if the Central Bank cooperates. Once they get rid of the current Central Bank president, we can get more courageous on an agreement with the IMF. On debt, we agree on the need to ease the debt payment burden, but we have a political problem with our companies and banks. And, we want to avoid the impression that we can solve all the problems with debt relief. It won't do that. I also agree that the international community needs to offer more assistance, more money. We are willing to participate in a debt arrangement, but we need a legal basis to do so. Ukraine and Russia need to agree to recognize the debt and how to handle it. That is why we can not now accept the U.S. idea on a debt stand down. It is not the figures but the political recognition of the debt that causes a problem for us. ~~(C)~~

The President: On the present agreement for rescheduling, how much should Russia pay back to Germany this year? (U)

Mr. Kohler: Under the G-7 agreement, Russia would repay about $3.7 billion this year, but of that probably only about $1.2 billion will really be repaid. Under the old G-7 offer, we estimate a burden on the German budget in 1993-94 of about $8 billion. But what we need first is a legal basis for rescheduling and then we can work for the best rescheduling agreement possible. ~~(C)~~

The President: If they pay one third of the $3.5 billion would that make it easier for you to reschedule quickly? And do I understand correctly that the budget burden is what you would have to pay back to creditors? (U)

Mr. Kohler: Yes, we have to pay German exporters out of our funds, but we do have a half year delay between the time a debt is declared unpayable and when we must reimburse our companies. That gives us some flexibility in allowing for slippage of debt repayment. ~~(C)~~

The President: So if the Russians made a modest payment, it could help in renegotiating their debt payments? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kohler: No, we don't need payment. The key for us is to get a legal basis, legal recognition of the debt. Then we can have a standstill on debt. ~~(C)~~

The President: Would a repayment help or not? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kohler: We need a legal basis for dealing with the old debt before we can extend any more credits. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: But certainly it would help us a bit politically if there were some repayments. (~~C~~)

Secretary Bensten: I agree that you need guarantees as to who is responsible for the debt, and we can't just give Ukraine a veto on all of this. (~~C~~)

The President: So we agree that we will talk about what we can each do and about what we can do with the G-7 for the April 14-15 meeting. We will discuss further ideas on dealing with the currency problems, and we will work more on what we can do about debt rescheduling. (~~C~~)

Secretary Christopher: And you will consider a bilateral aid package? (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, though I will have to look at what we can do bilaterally. I think we can try to have a bilateral and multilateral package ready by the end of the week of 14-15 April in order to have a political impact in Russia before the referendum. (~~C~~)

Mr. Kohler: I will be here the week of April 5, so we can work on this. (U)

The President: Good. Also, I wanted to mention an interesting idea which Senator Nunn shared with me -- to use NATO infrastructure funds to help pay for housing for Russian officers. Our Treasury people tell me that at today's exchange rates we can build an acceptable house for about $10,000. If we could use some NATO funds and funds from individual countries, maybe we could lead the way for others to join and thus have a big impact on the ground and for Yeltsin. The psychological and political impact of an aggressive effort on housing could help. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: I completely agree that we should look into it, but we should also look at Germany's bad experiences in this area. The houses will not be in Moscow but far away, and you will find a remarkable thing -- when you enter into a contract with local Russian companies for housing, there will be no infrastructure, no water, etc. You will need to include all of that in your planning. Our experiences were catastrophic. (~~C~~)

Mr. Kohler: And in relation to the low value of the ruble, we must remember that many goods are not available in Russia. If you want to build the housing relatively quickly, you may need to bring the materials in from the West which is expensive. That is why it didn't turn out to be so quick or inexpensive for us. (~~C~~)

The Chancellor: Still, let's look into the idea. (U)

The President: Yes, maybe the NATO funds could pay for the infrastructure and individual countries could pay for the housing. We are also very concerned that all the economic gain made could be wiped out with one more Chernobl. So we want to

work on nuclear safety as well as make an effort to build up the oil and gas sector. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: I agree. At Munich, we made a big effort on this issue. We were talking about $50 million for this effort to encourage safety -- training programs, etc. I am warned of another Chernobl and that it might not have been so bad if people had been better trained. But I was largely rebuffed in Munich. Only after you were elected and because of the high standing of the Vice President have we felt there was some rethinking going on. We just missed a big nuclear accident recently in Lithuania. One thing I know is that after Chernobl, the people of Eastern and Central Europe were hysterical. And this is not only a problem for Russia, Ukraine is a problem too. It would be very good if we could come back to this issue in Tokyo. (~~C~~)

The Vice President: A major part of the President's bilateral package will be aimed at nuclear safety. If a bilateral package from Germany, even one aimed just at this, could be announced, this would help. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, there is an opportunity here. This is an issue you can sell to the people, as I said in Munich and in London the year before. I'm impatient to move on this and think we can do more, especially if you help. (~~C~~)

The President: On a related topic, you know we can't force the Russians, but they could attract a lot of investment, clean up their environment and guarantee income, if they reformed the way they run their energy sector. That's where the money is -- as a famous American robber replied when asked why he robbed banks. We could begin with small steps that would bring quick gains. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: We raised this with Gorbachev when he came to London. I raised the idea of a private consortium which could repair the pipelines to the West for 30% or 40% of the profits. I also discussed this issue with the President of Khazakhstan. It would help them ecologically, it is doable, and it brings in money. (~~C~~)

President Clinton: And, they could require Western companies to do other things as part of the price of entry, for example, saving the natural gas that they now flare off. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we are in a position to find American and German companies which could work on this, for example, to work on the pipelines and keep them going in return for a portion of the profits. (~~C~~)

The President: I have just been told that they have moved the press conference to 2:30. Why don't we take a few minutes to discuss nonproliferation. We are very concerned about proliferation. You can look a few years down the road and see trouble. North Korea is defying the NPT. Iraq is still trying to break through the limits set. Iran is involved in very worrisome behavior. And, Russia is under economic pressure to

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memcon	[Duplicate of 001c] [partial] (1 page)	03/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 144

FOLDER TITLE:
9301937

2015-0776-M
rs1438

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

sell its materials, technology, and know-how. We believe we need to be very vigilant, and to be effective we need a partnership with Germany. (C)

Secretary Christopher: One piece of good news is that Kozyrev told me that Moscow would not sell nuclear plants to Pakistan or Iran. (C)

The Vice President: This is very important and in the long run it could have an impact on German-American relations. When there was an accounting after the war with Iraq, many U.S. companies were embarrassed, but as you know, Germany was in a category by itself. The companies that had been willing to sell to Iraq made up a very long list. I mention this only because though we are not now in a similar situation with Iran, it is not difficult to imagine in a few years that Iran may be willing to challenge the peaceful nations of the world. When we do an accounting then, if we were to find that Germany sold dual-use technology which made it possible, that could really harm relations. Perhaps you could ask your ministers to give special attention to dual-use technology. Our information suggests that there is a big flow going from Germany to Iran. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It is not my intention to talk about things that are past. But if the Senate had published the full list of companies that had sold to Iraq, Germany would not have been the only one embarrassed. But my opinion of the German companies' sales is that it was horrible. Our problem is rooted in part in the fact that we have a very open economic system. Now we realize that people have been abusing it. The second problem is that our industries produce a huge amount of dual-use materials, in the pharmaceutical sector for example. But now we have new legislation that will help. I have instructed our people to have the closest cooperation with you EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d We have had some success, and we must note that the Israelis have their own problems which we must address. But it is not my policy to support these kind of exports, and I want to try to counter these kind of exports. Twice I have talked to the leaders of German business about this. We need to outlaw and ban the people who break the rules, I explained. I noted that the public prosecutor can not do it all. I said that if big and world famous companies were involved, we would still strictly apply the law and establish a new climate. My businessmen claim that U.S., Swiss, French, and UK companies are gaining sales at their expense. I think we need to make clear to all that this is a question of war and peace. EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d But there are problems. If we do something we must do it completely. We need a reasonable cooperation between us. EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d But please trust me. I am willing to cooperate with you. I agree that if we allow free flows into Iran, it will soon be armed to the teeth. If there is a problem contact me directly.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

The President: Good, we will work closely on this problem. Now, I think we better get ready for our press conference. ~~(C)~~

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 146				
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Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telecon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (4 pages)~~	~~04/12/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 146

FOLDER TITLE:
9302330

2015-0776-M
rs1439

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302330
RECEIVED: 13 APR 93 08

TO: ITOH

FROM: WAYNE
WALKER

DOC DATE: 13 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY & PRES ON 12 APR

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 16 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WAYNE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		SIGLER
		WALKER
		WAYNE

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93041411	FOR DECISION
001		X	93041411	KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2330

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Mab A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Mab	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		N
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

13 APR 95 14 41 Executive Clerk

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has diskette

Kyle:
Copy has been provided to Sit Room too for to State
THANKS!
MB

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: _____

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MESSAGE NO. _____ **CLASSIFICATION** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **PAGES** 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) | 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) | GRD FLR/WW (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION KOHL MEMCON

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	GLENN DAVIES/MAX ROBINSON		
	EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY		
	~~EYES ONLY~~		

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: TONY WAYNE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between Chancellor Kohl and the President on April 12

Attached for your approval is a memorandum of conversation of the President's April 12 telephone conversation with German Chancellor Kohl. Secretary Christopher has requested that it be sent to him in Tokyo for background for his meetings with other G-7 ministers. We suggest that the situation room dispatch it directly via State Department channels. A disc is included should you approve that course of action.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memorandum of conversation for the record and for distribution, and that a copy of it be sent by cable to Secretary Christopher in Tokyo.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0774-M (1.08)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: E. Anthony Wayne

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 12, 1993 3:33 - 3:57 pm
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello Chancellor, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent. I think we should switch to Helmut and Bill. (U)

The President: I perfectly agree. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am on vacation for a couple of days and lost twenty pounds. It clears one's head. (U)

The President: Good! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thanks again for your kind hospitality. Our time was very important in political and human terms. I don't forget about humanity. We're not just robots. I think it's good people get along and have the basis for a future relationship. That's the feeling I have. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I want to congratulate you on losing all that weight. You must tell me how you did it. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It's an old trick, but it must be done. (U)

The President: I also want to say how pleased I am on the constitutional ruling on the AWAC's issue. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I am too. (U)

The President: And, let me mention one other thing before discussing Russia. I am very sorry about the death of the German tourists in Miami. We are going to mount a major effort and

study about violence and crime in our cities. Hillary and I had a conversation over the weekend about this. There is just too much violence going on. We must address this. On behalf of both of us, let me say that we are very, very sorry. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much, Bill, for your sympathy. (U)

The President: You're welcome. Now about Russia. I had a very good meeting with Yeltsin and announced a bilateral package of about $1.6 billion based on funds our Congress has already appropriated. We're working on two things now: an expanded bilateral aid package and the package to be discussed at the Tokyo conference in a few days. Now I understand at Tokyo the IMF, World Bank, and the EBRD will announce a package as large or larger than last year's. Except, this year's plan will be more flexible and attainable for Russians because it emphasizes pre-stabilization measures as well as broader, structural assistance in the longer-term. I think it's very important for all the G-7 countries to ensure these programs are implemented quickly following each Russian reform step. As they make improvements, we need to move the programs forward. What I want to avoid most is what happened last year when much aid was promised and not very much happened. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I am in complete agreement Bill. I talked with my people. They are leaving at noon tomorrow our time, and believe we can do something that makes sense to suggest. (C)

The President: Good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: After the Tokyo summit you and I should talk again by telephone to discuss whether anything suitable can be done or about a statement we can issue before the referendum in Russia. I haven't decided what to do. (C)

The President: I think that's a very good idea, and we should talk. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: To put it to you frankly, we must think about our reaction to the referendum. They've come up with an impossible formula over there, and the impossible point in the law says that he must get the absolute majority of voters, not just those voting. We must think about what if he gets the majority of votes and not the majority of total voters. (C)

The President: I agree. I think what we'll have to do is wait and see how well Yeltsin does and devise a response on that basis. My people here say it is almost impossible for him to get a majority of all voters. He would need 70% of the 70% who vote. He might get 60% of a 50% turn-out. But if he gets a good percentage of those voting, our reaction will be important. We can portray it as a vote for reform. It is possible for us to influence how this is seen around the world. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chancellor Kohl: This is precisely what I am arriving at, Bill. All I think is that on Monday the twenty-sixth we should be in close touch. Because what will be important is our reactions. (C)

The President: I agree. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: One more point. During preliminary discussions for the ministerial meeting in Tokyo, I am told that there is an American plan calling for a G-7 office in Moscow. I think that's a good idea, and I'm in favor of a good American taking that office. I'd like to send a German deputy to that office, because ultimately Germany and the United States will make most of the aid effort, and I'd like to accomplish some good U.S.-German cooperation there. I have no illusions about the thinking of some in the EC in this regard. Quite a few of my colleagues think Russia is far away, and I'd like to tie them down and bring the EC into this. (C)

The President: Yes, that sounds pretty good. One of the things I hoped to discuss with you is whether the Japanese will participate on a generous basis. I can't do so yet because I haven't talked to the Japanese yet. I am supposed to talk to Mr. Miyazawa later tonight because of the time difference. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We've only told him that he must do more. And after the foreign minister's meeting is over, if the result is not deemed satisfactory we must talk about this. (C)

The President: Yes, I think so. In an attempt to encourage the Japanese, I am working on a second aid package about the same size as the one I announced in Vancouver. It will aim at helping on key sectors such as housing and energy. But we also have a new idea of getting the G-7 to capitalize a fund which would provide funds for privatization. We are thinking of a total of $2 billion for this fund, and we are willing to put in $500 million. The idea would be that Russia helps identify the projects, but it doesn't want to handle the money. We're going to ask the Japanese for a sizable contribution, and I have already asked Saudi Arabia to kick in money for the housing. I am also planning to ask others for money, as we discussed before. I would like to have this done so we could announce it all before the twenty-fifth so it will do Yeltsin some good. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's excellent. I think it's all very good. (C)

The President: You think the privatization fund is a good idea? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it's a very practical idea. We want simply to make sure the money is used properly and gets where it's supposed to go and keep controls on the corrupt managers. (C)

The President: Yes, we're agreed. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chancellor Kohl: That's why I think the G-7 representative in Moscow is a good idea and that it should be an American. If you find the right two smart and clever people, and not diplomats, that would be a good idea. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I think first of all that if we have an office over there and working on this project, it will be easier for me to get Congress to agree to provide the money. We would control the money flow and make sure it isn't wasted. We would give the Russians input on the projects, but then could get the G-7 involved to fund the privatization effort and be on the ground to monitor it and administer it every day. It will be more attractive to all the donor countries if we have an office there controlling the money and watching the operation. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think that's the only way to do that and defend it domestically. (C)

The President: I agree. Well then, we'll be working together on the G-7 meeting in Tokyo. And when it is over we will talk again. That will give me time to work on Mr. Miyazawa. Then, we will talk again after the referendum so we can coordinate our responses. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I agree with everything you said. My general point is that if ever I can help in any way I would like to help. I will stand by what I said at the White House. Please relay our condolences on the death of your father-in-law. (C)

The President: Oh, thank you. He had a long and good life. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How old was he? (U)

The President: Eighty-two. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Whenever a father is lost it is always a difficult thing. (U)

The President: And, it is here too. Well, I've enjoyed this conversation. I've taken all my notes with the gold Mont Blanc pen you gave me. It makes me feel like a real President. It's the nicest thing I've ever had. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: All the best then, Bill. (U)

The President: Good-bye. Have a good vacation. (U)

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 150				
Document ID: 9304146				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on June 4, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~06/04/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
9304146

2015-0776-M
rs1440

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9304146
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 93 11

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 4 JUN

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 10 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FICKLIN
		KUPCHAN
		NSC CHRON
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93060909	FOR DECISION
001		X	93060909	KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93060909	KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930608	GROSSMAN, M	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 4146

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Mark	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	JBG/9	D
NSC Secretariat	3		D

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

8 JAN 93 01 10

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has disk to file

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9304146
DATE 08 JUN 93

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 4 JUN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: ORIGINAL

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Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4146

June 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on June 4, 1993 (Ø)

Attached is a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on June 4, 1993. Please ensure that these documents are handled as NODIS documents with very limited distribution. They may be transmitted eyes only via NODIS channels to the appropriate Ambassadors and charges. (Ø)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.09)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on June 4, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
NSC Notetaker: Charles Kupchan
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 4, 1993, 9:11 am - 9:25 am, EDT
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Good morning Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Good morning. I am delighted that you called. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Actually, there is nothing in particular on my mind now. All of us have similar problems on our minds. We need more money but there is not enough in our treasure chest and we must solve it. (C)

The President: I feel good about our economic program. It has passed the House and we are now working on the Senate. We are experiencing a boom in home building and a drop in unemployment. If the economic program passes, the U.S. will enjoy better economic growth and this in turn will help Europe. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That sounds very good and that will have an effect on the economy here. I just wanted to give a note of encouragement to you. This is really the purpose, to give you a little bit of encouragement for this is my experience too. I hope we will get out of the doldrums by the end of the year and hope we will get out of the recession by the end of the year. It has a bad effect on building in Eastern Germany but I still believe we can push through on progress over there. We'll get through all this with a certain amount of patience and I just wanted to tell you that it is of great importance that you be successful in your program as it will have an effect on our economy. I also wanted to offer that we coordinate our efforts before Tokyo. If it is OK with you, our staff members could get together to form a common strategy. (C)

The President: This is very important. We must make good use of the G-7 summit and avoid just making another bland statement. I think we need to announce a broad market access program that Japan will support. We also need to forge a united G-7 approach

on aid to Russia. In particular, we need a privatization fund. We are committed to contributing 500 million dollars and we want you and others to do the same. (C)

I also want to thank you for your support on our proposal to lift the arms embargo. The Joint Action Program is an interim measure; we need to keep pushing for French and British cooperation. This plan will buy time for sanctions to work. (C)

But I want to stress that the most important topic for us is completion of the Uruguay Round. Since Yeltsin will be there, we must also have a G-7 plan for Russia. And our plan for Bosnia must be more unified and firmer than it is now. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, within the next few weeks I will send a new member of my staff to Washington to meet with some of your people and I think it will be good if he can give you the details about a shift of the French position or at least a slight shift. If we all do some more work I think that we can make some more progress before Tokyo. This same member could also talk about details for Tokyo. Once he's back in Bonn we can get back on the telephone and talk about what we think about Tokyo. I think this is your first G-7 summit and I want you to know, just as I told you in the Oval Office, that your success is my success and that we should coordinate on as much as possible. (C)

The President: I agree. I look forward to seeing your staff person. My people will be ready. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Thank you for your time and have a good weekend. (U)

The President: I will have a better weekend after speaking to you. Goodbye. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4146

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1993

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: CHARLES KUPCHAN (CK)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on June 4, 1993

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on June 4, 1993. We suggest that the Memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to Marc Grossman.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Grossman
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

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Declassify on: OADR

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

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Document ID: 9304997				
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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telcon with Jacques Delors (2 pages)	07/03/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. telcon	re: Telcon with Jacques Delors (4 pages)	07/02/1993	P1/b(1)
~~001c. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, July 2, 1993 (4 pages)~~	~~07/02/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 153

FOLDER TITLE:
9304997

2015-0776-M
rs1441

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9304997
RECEIVED: 07 JUL 93 10

TO: SODERBERG

FROM: WALSH

DOC DATE: 07 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EC
TELCALL
GERMANY

PERSONS: DELORS, JACQUES
KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCONS BTW PRES & EC PRES JACQUES DELORS & GERMAN PRES HELMUT KOHL ON 2 - 3 JUL

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 10 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALSH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		KELLY, C
		SIGLER
		WALKER
		WALSH

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SODERBERG	Z	93070716	FOR DECISION
001		X	93071408	KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	✓	A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	7/6	N/R
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

7 JUL 93 11:17

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: HELEN WALSH HW

SUBJECT: Telcons with Jacques Delors, President of the Commission of the European Communities, and Helmut Kohl, President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Attached at Tab A are Memoranda of Telephone Conversations between the President and Jacques Delors on July 2 and 3, 1993. Also attached at Tab B is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Helmut Kohl on July 2.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Telcons be filed for the record.

Approve Well ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Telcons with Jacques Delors
Tab B Telcon with Helmut Kohl

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telcon with Jacques Delors (2 pages)	07/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 153

FOLDER TITLE:
9304997

2015-0776-M
rs1441

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. telcon	re: Telcon with Jacques Delors (4 pages)	07/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 153

FOLDER TITLE:
9304997

2015-0776-M
rs1441

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.12)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on July 2, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Interpreter: Erica Konuk
Notetaker: Helen Walsh

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 2, 1993, 2:10 p.m. - 2:31 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President telephoned Chancellor Kohl concerning the upcoming G-7 Summit in Tokyo. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm doing well. It's nice to hear your voice. I am looking forward to seeing you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I'm looking forward to that meeting with you next week. I just want to tell you that I just visited my old school yesterday, where I started school 57 years ago when I was 6 years old. The schoolchildren and parents were there. Now, there are children there from nine different countries. I told them that tonight I was having a call from our friend President Clinton, and told them I would forward their regards to you. These 400 children were very enthusiastic. So I have done my duty. (U)

The President: Thank you. I wish we could go to see them together some day. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: You have to come to visit me at home in Germany. I'd like that. (U)

The President: Would love that. Before we start to talk about the G-7, I want to thank you so much for the resolution you put forward to the EC on Bosnia. So many Muslims are looking to us. It was important even though our position did not prevail. Lets talk about the G-7 meeting. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Tokyo. (U)

The President: Yes, Tokyo. Here people are already saying that because of the political problems in Japan and other problems that this will just be another photo-op. But I am convinced that we can have a good message. We have great resources and talented people and lots of will to change and grow this economy. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I think it is important and decisive that we don't go there in spirit of pessimism, but issue a positive message. (U)

The President: I couldn't agree more. I hope that together you and I can keep it upbeat. I'm going to do public appearances around Japan saying that these political changes can be good for the Japanese and for the rest of the world. We're continuing to make progress on reducing our deficit. I notice that the Bundesbank reduced their interest rate by another 1/2 point and our interest rates have come down too. Both of those things are good news we can build on perhaps. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: The night before last -- and it was this that the Bundesbank reacted to -- the Federal German Parliament reduced its budget deficit by 22 billion DM. (U)

The President: That's very good. Let me ask you about two issues coming up. I'm very concerned that we are going to lose an important opportunity to put the Uruguay Round back on track. I remember what you told our press about G-7 credibility because every time we meet we say we're going to do something and we never do. I'm told that our negotiators in Toronto are close to the needed breakthrough on market access for manufactured goods. Obviously this would be something very important if we could announce an agreement at Tokyo. The U.S. has been flexible in accommodating EC interests, including textiles. I was wondering if you could talk to President Delors and Commissioner Brittan about reaching an agreement before the Summit. It seems to me that... I know that President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Balladur are saying they don't want to make any agreement unless we reopen the Blair House agreement. But I think the EC does not hold that position, and we can assure the French that the manufacturing agreement would not take effect unless there is a whole GATT agreement. What do you think about that Helmut? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: At this point, at this hour, no one can tell what we can achieve in Tokyo. But on the other hand, GATT is not an agenda item. But we are going to have a chance because we will be sitting together. We will have meetings, have breaks and can talk to our people to try to get some movement in this matter. The French are themselves saying that they want a global approach. That means that if we talk agriculture, we have to talk about the others. I believe we should discuss and seek movement, and not start by saying nothing is moving. Everyone will expect that. (C)

The President: I don't think we should say that either. Are you saying that there is no chance of an agreement in Toronto before the Summit? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: No, not what I intended. That is a misunderstanding. No, we should try. We should definitely try. But also there take a chance to discuss together, to forge the iron while it is hot, as we say in Germany. The more we can do beforehand, the better. (C)

The President: If somehow you could convey that to the European negotiators, I think that would be a good thing. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will do that. (U)

The President: I want to ask you about another issue. We've been trying to get support for the privatization program for Russia. We think its imperative for Yeltsin's sake that we announce this in Tokyo. Yeltsin is very sensitive about the fact that two years ago Gorbachev went to the Summit and came back without anything, and it hurt him at home when he did so. We have reduced the size of this privatization fund to $500 million and we have secured agreement from the Russians that our people will be able to work in a way that the money is properly spent on privatization. At the present time, Japan and the U.S. have contributed about $245 million of the $500 million goal, and with all the other countries contributions are still $80-90 million short of reaching the goal. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I think we do not need to discuss this any further. I told my sherpa that we are going to contribute. But I also told him that he should urge the other Europeans mercilessly that they should contribute. But let me make this clear, we will help. (C)

The President: Let me say that after I talk with you I will call Delors, and I think I can get them to increase their contribution. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I believe we will reach this goal. Unfortunately, it is a little like bargaining for a carpet in Marrakesh. (C)

The President: I feel sort of like a carpet seller today. I will call him. If you can call too, then we will reach our goal. I think it is important that we .. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We will reach that. It simply has to work. (U)

The President: What about you? How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I've had a good week. First, the budget reductions and now Bundesbank interest cut. Everything is taking a positive turn. The problem is that we lived beyond our means and now have to reduce spending. It doesn't really hurt. The old Federal Republic of Germany is doing better than ever, we're making slow progress in the new states, and the business cycle is picking up. What we need is patience and that's just what the people don't have. The problem today is that democracy grew in an era where the media situation is difficult and the media is pushing policies and politics. (C)

The President: Agree. I'm glad you're doing well. We've had a good two weeks, too. I look forward to seeing you in Tokyo. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 160				
Document ID: 9306693				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on September 7, 1993 (4 pages)~~	~~09/07/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 160

FOLDER TITLE:
9306693

2015-0776-M
rs1442

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9306693
RECEIVED: 07 SEP 93 13

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 13 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 7 SEP

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 10 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY KA DATE 9/13 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93090909	FOR DECISION
002		X	93091320	ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930913	GROSSMAN, M	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JM LOG # 6623

URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: DOC LOG A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		A
ExecSec	2		
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	ASK 9/13	D
NSC Secretariat	4		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other Hilliard

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

execsec has dupl

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9306693
DATE 13 SEP 93

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 7 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 13, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on September 7 (Ø)

Attached for the information of the Secretary of State is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl on September 7, 1993. (Ø)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.13)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on September 7, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Jane Holl and Neil Bleicken

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 7, 1993, 12:24 - 12:51 EDT
The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Hello? (U)

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine Helmut, it's nice to hear your voice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: And I'm very pleased to hear your voice. I think you are very busy like me. We have the budget today and many things we should say, so if you don't have any protesters, I can send you some to the United States. (C)

The President: Well, I have plenty of protesters on my own but if you want to send some of yours over I'll take them. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We perhaps could start an international group of them. (U)

The President: How about an exchange program? I hope you had a good vacation this summer. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I'm fine, thank you, and I'm quite convinced we can make many good things happen this autumn. I wanted to talk to you on GATT. I have had very intense discussions with the French on it. I've always made clear to them that the first priority is the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round especially with the system of international recession. It is also urgently needed because of the economic situation in the industrialized nations, the United States and Germany, and also because of the underdeveloped countries. (C)

The situation in France is tied up not so much in GATT but with domestic interests. Next year they have Presidential elections and the leaders must place themselves in good positions. In

relation to parliamentary elections last year a very strong polarization has occurred. (C)

German farmers are in a bad position, but French farmers are worse. I want to be frank with you about what I'm trying to do. It will be difficult. I want a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, but if possible I want to avoid a situation where France pursues an isolated policy -- a very difficult policy. My French colleagues realize they can't raise the ante indefinitely. I want a successful Round. We will discuss it in the Community and discuss the degree to which our Common Agricultural Policy is in line with Blair House. That must be decided within the EC. My people are very, very busy on this matter and for me the psychological importance is to keep them going. A very sensitive issue is whether we pay attention to the psychological issue. (C)

The President: From our point of view, the real problem with the Blair House Agreement is if it were to be reopened -- if the EC said it couldn't go along -- it is unlikely we could get a GATT agreement before my negotiating authority ends on 15 December. Our agricultural crowd wouldn't like it, and it might be pulled in the opposite direction. I know it is a problem for France, but alas it is a problem for us. We reached agreement at Blair House before I took office, and our farmers opposed the agreement at the time. I hope we can all stand by it. One other question I have concerns whether or not you believe the EC will proceed to implement a permanent corn gluten seed agreement this month? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Why, that has outlined a point we are striving for. Before your authority will expire or if we can't work it out by then or before, then it will be very difficult, and, as far as the EC is concerned, there will be a whole new thing to do on this. By the way, I think Leon Brittan will be coming to Washington next weekend. (C)

The President: Yes, I think so. Let me just say one last thing which is that I agree with you. We very much need this Uruguay Round to be successfully concluded before the end of the year. I will be very busy working here on NAFTA and health care but if you can call back and let me know personally to involve myself -- people I can contact on this -- I will and I'll welcome your suggestions on what to do to help get the agreement. I believe we need to get this done this year and perhaps you can give some good ideas of things I can do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: May I make one proposal? That I try to keep in regular contact throughout the next week to let you know how things are developing over here and if you consider it necessary you can call me. I give you my word that I will try to get this done but it will take a lot of time. I think it goes beyond trade because it affects relations between the United States of America and the European Community. (C)

The President: Sure. I think that's a good suggestion and I will look forward to hearing from you at any time on this as I am very interested in this issue. (C)

Let me ask you a couple of other things. How do you think Yeltsin is doing with all this political controversy in Russia? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It is very difficult, but in a way it's irrational. Things might go smoothly or very bad. On the other hand it could be his chances are less than 50% or it could also be said his chances are 50-50. I think we should stay our current position. Anybody that will come after him will not be as auspicious as they are now. (C)

The President: I certainly agree with that. We are about to take up the $2.5 billion assistance package and the repeal of the cold war assistance restrictions to Russia, East Europe and COCOM. If he doesn't make it, I believe that anyone who will follow him will be worse, so we ought to stay with him. (C)

Let me ask you a question about NATO. We are planning on a summit in the next few months. I am interested in your opinion on the relationship of NATO to Eastern Europe -- between NATO and the Eastern European nations that have had contact with it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Before going deeply into detail to that question, can I suggest if members of my staff could come over to the White House to meet with your staff before the summit. I'd like to have Dr. Bitterlich meet with his counterpart. I'd like the two of them to stay in contact before the definitive day for that date has been settled. As concerns the question you have put to me, I think it is necessary to find a form of a relationship as a transitional period as with Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic that satisfies security needs. I do have my doubt about the possibility of these countries joining NATO and becoming part of it. (C)

The President: My thinking along those lines is very similar to yours. I'm glad you're sending people over here to raise these issues. I think it's a good idea to send your staff people over here and we will follow up on it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. Bitterlich will contact his counterpart on your side. (C)

The President: One other question regarding Bosnia. Izetbegovic is coming here soon, in fact, tomorrow, to see us. I wanted to ask your assessment before I talked to him. I want to be supportive but I also want to take a sober view. I asked Yeltsin to pressure the Serbs. I hope we can get all three parties to agree. The prospect of air strikes has had the right affects and has improved the prospects of peace, but they are not the solution to the problem. I wanted to share my thoughts with you and ask what else you think we ought to be doing. I dread

another winter. I want to be supportive, but also to be very certain to underscore the desirability of securing a settlement soon. I want to be supportive but I want your opinion on what we can do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: But what you said in the last sentence is right. I think it's quite bitter to be as helpless as we all are. I'm quite distrustful of the leadership in Serbia, not the people, but the leadership, as I am of the leadership in Croatia. One other matter I think you need to know. That you, the United States, should not be drawn into a quagmire. It might prove helpful if you were very friendly in greeting Izetbegovic. This is the image the world will see and they will watch over there. At the same time that without exerting any pressure on him while letting him know an agreement has to be reached. It's beneficial for the Muslim world. (C)

You have brought about something which people a few years before would not have thought possible and please pass on to your staff my compliments. You are in a much more favorable position as far as the Muslim world is concerned. It is important for me that the American President is in a better position after all of this. (C)

The President: Thank you for that. I feel very grateful about the agreement in the Middle East. We hope to sign in the next few days. (C)

I also want to let you know our ambassador to Germany will be coming out in October. Dick Holbrooke is an outstanding foreign policy expert and is a long time friend of mine. I hope you will have a good relationship with him. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, if you see him before he comes to Germany please give him my regards. It is important that you have a close personal relationship with him to facilitate the dialectic between us. (C)

The President: Thank you, that's what I thought too. He's a good man, and I think you will like him. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: OK, bye-bye now. See to it that you are staying in good health. Don't forget that if you have problems, others have them too. (C)

The President: Let's keep talking about the GATT round, and if anything happens with Izetbegovic in the next few days I'll let you know. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, good-bye. (U)

The President: Thank you, good-bye Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6693

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE HOLL

SUBJECT: President's Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on September 7, 1993

Attached is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on September 7. We suggested that the memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the transmittal memo to Marc Grossman at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approved ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Your Memo to Marc Grossman
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 164				
Document ID: 9307444				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on September 21, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~09/21/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 164

FOLDER TITLE:
9307444

2015-0776-M
rs1443

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307444
RECEIVED: 29 SEP 93 13

TO: ITOH

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 29 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 21 SEP

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 02 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FICKLIN
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		SIGLER
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93093019	FOR DECISION
001		X	93100108	ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 7444

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ASK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	ASK 9/30	N
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7444

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on September 21, 1993, between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.14)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on September 21, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Interpreter: Erika Konuk
Notetaker: Jane Holl

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 21, 1993, 4:40pm-4:52pm
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut. I am calling to tell you about my telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin. I just got off the telephone with him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: What did he say? (U)

The President: The Supreme Soviet is out of control. The Communists will not permit the wishes of the people to be carried out. He said he had signed a decree ordering new elections on the 11th and 12th of December and that until then he would govern by decree. The military and internal security forces are supporting him. He promised reform would move faster now. He said there would be no bloodshed. He would proceed peacefully. He said elections would be free, and all that wished to participate would be able to. He said the opposition would pretend this had not happened and would go on acting as before. (C)

I have been told today he refused access to the television station to Khasbulatov and Rutskoy. When I asked him about this, he said no one had been forbidden to talk to the press. So, he may have pulled the plug on the White House's access to the television station. On the other hand, he promised me repeatedly that he would not resort to undemocratic means, but would continue to support democracy. (C)

So I believe I should issue a statement in support of him, while basically stating that I asked him to honor democracy, and he pledged that he would. So that's how I left it with him, and as soon as that call was over, I called you to see if you thought we should issue a statement in support. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, well, of course, nobody on our side can really tell what is happening -- every detail -- but out of all

the people that play a role there, I trust him the most, and I am convinced that if he is no longer in power, if he's removed, it will be much worse. And so far I agree that if you are prepared to issue a statement over the next few hours, our people can agree on the wording. I'll be prepared to follow a literal course...I'm immediately ready to do that--it's the right course. (C)

The President: Suppose I have my statement faxed to you; I'll do so immediately. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: To the Chancellor's office? (U)

The President: Yes, to the Chancellor's office. I will send it immediately. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Did you already make that statement? (C)

The President: I had a draft, but I wanted to alter it following my conversation with Yeltsin. I wanted it to reflect that I urged him to support the process of reform, that I understood how complex the reform process is in Russia, and that there will be a free election this fall. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I would suggest that my people contact your staff immediately when the fax is received. Then we can coordinate what we are going to say. (C)

The President: Great. All right, I'll do it right now. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We're going to proceed that way then? (U)

The President: I will send you my statement right now, and my people will call, and we can coordinate the statement. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. President, who will be in charge, what member of your staff? (C)

The President: Sandy, Mr. Berger. That's an easy name for you to remember. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: In our case it will be Mr. Bitterlich who will contact Mr. Berger right away. (C)

The President: It's almost 5 p.m. here. We have to have a statement out by 6 p.m. for the evening news. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. Bye bye. (U)

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 174				
Document ID: 9309312				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on November 29, 1993 (4 pages)~~	~~11/29/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 174

FOLDER TITLE:
9309312

2015-0776-M
rs1444

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9309312
RECEIVED: 29 NOV 93 11

TO: ITOH

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 29 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 29 NOV

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 02 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		HOLL
		SIGLER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	93120214	FOR DECISION
001		X	93120609	ITOH APPROVED RECOM

Recd 12-3
12:15pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WW LOG # 9312

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WW A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Wall	A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	ASK 12/03	R
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

12/03 1:40

Per Holl - not to be transmitted to State

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec has Disc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9312

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: President's Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany of November 29, 1993

Attached is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on November 29, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Kohl Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.15)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on November 29, 1993

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Chancellor Kohl's interpreter
Notetaker: Neil G. Bleicken

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 29, 1993; 10:27-10:50 EST
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I'm very pleased to hear your voice. We have a normal day of work here. We have the budget debate here. I called because I received and accepted an invitation to attend the Conference of American Governors. I'm planning to leave Sunday, January 30 and arrive Sunday night and on the thirty-first I have been invited to speak to the Governor's Conference. This is my timetable and I thought that maybe we can build a meeting between the two of us. (C)

The President: Yes, I think so. I should be back from my trip to Europe and the Soviet Union, I mean Russia, by then. How many days will you be here. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, actually I'm there only for the evening and the whole day. Actually, we could be there Sunday... (C)

The President: So we need to get together on the thirtieth or the thirty-first? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: I'll tell you what, I'll look at our schedule and have our people call you in the next day or so to set up a meeting. I think that will be a good thing to do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I assume that you will be there because from what the person said who is organizing the conference you will be speaking to them. (C)

The President: Yes, that's right. Normally, I also have them to dinner at the White House. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: My second point, I wanted to repeat the invitation already extended to your wife. If she wanted to gain a first hand impression of our health insurance scheme we would put together a very interesting program. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. I may want to arrange for her to come with a few members of Congress who have ideas on what we should do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We would be very glad to have them. Obviously, this invitation is extended to them also. I would like to be of help and I just need to be told how. (C)

The President: Yes, very good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: In Washington we can also talk about your visit to Germany this summer. The idea mentioned is that you should come to Germany after the G-7 meeting in Naples. (C)

The President: Yes, we had discussed that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Another point, I would like to hear your views on prospects of the NATO summit and the conclusion of the GATT round. (C)

The President: In regard to NATO, we seem to be thinking along similar lines regarding the main focus of the January 10-11 summit. The meeting of defense ministers went well and I am also encouraged by the positive reaction to our Partnership for Peace initiative from the NATO allies, the countries in Eastern Europe, and by President Yeltsin. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That sounds good. I talked to Boris Yeltsin during a stop-over after returning from China about eight days ago. All the members of my party thought it went very well -- before the NATO summit and he had reasonable solutions. (C)

The President: Good. With regard to GATT, I got your letter that you mailed on twenty-six November. I'm feeling more positive than you about the meeting between Mickey Kantor and Sir Leon Brittan. I'm hoping we can work out the issue on the agriculture. I think we can. We are also interested in one or two other issues and we will be having a meeting on them in the next few days. After meeting with Asian leaders I am optimistic about working out a deal by the fifteen December deadline. As far as Japan is concerned, if the U.S. and Europe can make a deal, Japan won't stand in the way but they won't take the initiative. If we can work out our differences Japan will go along. I'm hopeful we can. We are going to get an EC initiative on market access in the next few days and I think we can work out a deal. I may need to talk to you on the phone again once or twice about this. I think we should both focus on this in the days ahead. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well Bill. It's a done deal. We will do as you suggested. Basically, I'll be here in the office over the next few weeks. I may be out of Bonn for a few days but will be here in the country and you can reach me. It is of the utmost importance that an agreement is concluded. I completely agree that we have to put forward our maximum effort as you suggested. I hope you are doing well. (C)

The President: I'm doing very well. We've had a good two weeks here. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You must not be angry when people criticize you. You must remember my example when people have been criticizing me and criticizing me and criticizing me and you can't let it make you angry. (C)

The President: That's good. May I ask you a question about China. From the press reports you had a good trip. I'm glad President Jiang came to the United States. I had a meeting with him. You know the U.S. is buying about a third of China's exports but I have a human rights problem here with Congress. Unless China makes some progress on human rights we may not be able to maintain Most Favored Nations status. I'd like your advice. I want to be able to head off a problem with this next year. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well first, I believe they are moving forward. The leadership seems to be in a difficult period of transition. It is not clear what figure will appear after Dien Xiao Ping. They have embarked down an experimental road and I think it is pure illusion to believe one can pursue liberal market economy on the one hand and keep the same old hard political regime on the other. I believe it would be a very great mistake if we did not help them along the road to decent human rights relations and international acceptance. On human rights I was very frank. I said if the people of China wanted to become full fledged members of the international community then they had to adhere to this issue. We have to impress them on this. I have submitted a list to them and as you know they have released several prisoners over the last few days and among them are two Catholic priests who have been held captive for several years. We have similar discussions here in Germany as in the U.S. on human rights and it is an issue I think is important. On the other hand, if we isolate them and don't talk to them, that would be bad. (C)

The President: I agree with that but I'm in a bit of a difficult situation here because of our laws. We have suggested a few very limited things the Chinese could do so we can avoid a debate on the trade issue here next year. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I would like to tell you I talked to Li Peng and the Prime Minister of China on relations with the United States. I was very frank and open. I said we consider the United States to be our friends and I said the President of the United States was a personal friend of mine and I told him

expressly, we as Germans could not have good and fruitful long term relations with China if they did not improve relations with the United States. He said that it would be in China's interest to improve relations with the United States and with you as President it would be possible. (C)

The President: Well, I'll work on it. I may need your help. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If anything can be done it will be done in a discrete way. We will do what we can. (C)

The President: In the meanwhile, we'll work hard for the next two weeks on GATT. I will see you here in Washington in January. Helmut, the restaurant you like so much here in D.C., is it Filomena's? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, and if you want we can spend Sunday night there. (C)

The President: I ate there a few days ago. They said my appetite was almost as good as yours. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You take care then Bill and we'll call back then in the next few days on GATT. (C)

The President: We'll follow up on that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye, auf wiedersehen. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye, auf wiedersehen. (U)

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 176				
Document ID: 9309744				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9309744
RECEIVED: 13 DEC 93 16

TO: ITOH

FROM: KUPCHAN

DOC DATE: 13 DEC 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS:

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 12 DEC

ACTION: LOG NUMBER NOT USED DUE DATE: 16 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9309744

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	95021713	LOG NUMBER NOT USED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

National Security Council

DATE: 17 Feb 1995

Memorandum for: KUPCHAN

From: NSC/S CREATE DATE: 931213

Subject: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 12 DEC

Log #9309744 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

___ Action completed, file attached.

___ Action still pending, copy attached.

___ Action transferred to _____.

___ Action sent forward, copy attached.

___ Cannot find, will continue to check.

___ System action not sent forward, copy attached.

✓ Log Number not used. per RM- nlw 2/17/95

___ Other: _____.

Please return to Secretariat, Room 379 OEOB.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 467				
Document ID: 9400381				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on January 18, 1994 (4 pages)~~	~~01/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 467

FOLDER TITLE:
9400381

2015-0776-M
rs1445

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9400381
RECEIVED: 18 JAN 94 16

TO: ITOH

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 18 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TELCON GERMANY

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ KOHL ON 18 JAN

ACTION: SYSTEM ACTION NOT SENT FORWARD DUE DATE: 21 JAN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSBTM DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	94071218	SYSTEM ACTION NOT SENT FORWARD

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National Security Council

DATE: 22 Jun 1994

Memorandum for: HOLL

From: NSC/S CREATE DATE: 940118

Subject: KOHL MEMCON

Log #9400381 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

✓ Action completed, file attached.

___ Action still pending, copy attached.

___ Action transferred to _____.

___ Action sent forward, copy attached.

___ Cannot find, will continue to check.

✓ System action not sent forward, copy attached. ?

___ Log Number not used.

___ Other: _____.

Please return to Secretariat, Room 379 OEOB.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.16)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With Chancellor Kohl of Germany on January 18, 1994

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Interpreters: Giesle Marcuse and German interpreter

Notetaker: Anne Davis Alexander and Neil Bleicken

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 18, 1994; 4:08pm-4:30pm, EST
Oval Office

The President: Hello Helmut.

Chancellor Kohl: Hello.

The President: How are you?

Chancellor Kohl: And how are you? I hope you survived the trip alright.

The President: I survived the trip alright. Today I had my annual physical. It was harder than the trip.

Chancellor Kohl: I'm glad to hear you passed your physical. Before I talk about issues I want to discuss, I would like to express, on behalf of the Federal Government, our sympathy on behalf of the victims of the earthquake. I hope you can cope with the consequences.

The President: Thank you. I'm going out there in a day or two. I think they are making some progress. You know, California used to be the golden place but they've had all those fires and now this earthquake.

Chancellor Kohl: You do very well after this strenuous trip? And let me say that I congratulate you because I think this trip was very successful and from what I read in the press you should be satisfied. What impressions did you have from Moscow?

The President: Well, I had mixed impressions of the situation in Moscow. Mostly good, but mixed. Let me summarize for you. First, on the question of Yeltsin's government's commitment to reform, I think they want to keep going and Gaidar's resignation is not necessarily bad for that. That is, if he keeps a good team in place he can work for reform and Gaidar can be a strong

voice in parliament. He can look out for the Russian people and make it work for him.

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. I hear similar things on the situation there.

The President: On the question of foreign policy, I had a good visit with Kozyrev as well as Yeltsin and I am convinced that they will try to stay with the same line on their borders and such and will hope the nationalists will be satisfied with *****. Let me give you a positive example. I urged Yeltsin to continue the withdrawal from the Baltics and the only hold-up is the Skrunda issue. I believe you are familiar with it. The Latvians want the Russians to stay three years and withdraw within one. The Russians want to stay five years and withdraw over two years. I got Yeltsin to agree to split the difference. If you could encourage the Russians and the Latvians to go with this, I think withdrawal is good for the Baltics.

Chancellor Kohl: I will do so.

The President: The third issue is obviously the trilaterals with Ukraine over the nuclear issue. We need to work with the Russians and convince the Ukrainians it's good for them. It clearly is good.

Chancellor Kohl: What sort of impressions did you get from Kravchuk and what kind of reaction did you get from him on the election issue.

The President: Kravchuk was quite energetic and self-confident and utterly without doubt that he would prevail with the Rata. He seemed quite upbeat about it all. The other positive about the trip was that Yeltsin seemed in very good shape physically and mentally and up to the challenges ahead. There are some troubling things I want to discuss with you. The average person in Russia doesn't feel connected to the government or understand how it will come out for them. Even some of the better educated Russians feel uninvolved and disconnected. They believe Yeltsin is on the right side of history but don't feel connected to it.

Chancellor Kohl: I told him this during our last meeting and he had this air to him too. One gets the feeling he is disconnected, not that he wants that, not that it is part of his character, but there is this huge apparatus, this huge machinery around him that cuts him out.

The President: Well, I based these feelings based on conversations with other political leaders I met at the reception at the embassy, with the people I met on the street, and in the town meeting, across the spectrum.

Chancellor Kohl: I understand.

The President: I talked to him a little about what he could do to make it better. There is another thing that bothered me.

They seem to have a general idea of what they want to do but don't have a specific strategy. I think this is why some blame it on the west, that it is imposed upon them. They haven't articulated a strategy. I hope **** we can speed up all the aid we agreed to at the G-7. This will help them form a strategy. I just think they haven't thought it through the whole way. Anyway, when we meet at the G-7 in July we should discuss how they have done it in the last year and how we have done with them and what we can do to open the markets for them and Eastern Europe.

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Bill, I intend to call Boris in a few days and then when we'll meet in Washington toward the end of the month I'll be able to get you more of his impressions. then, after that, we should make good use of our time before the G-7 in July and before we meet to plan a strategy together.

The President: I agree with that. I think he believes you and I know him best and are his biggest supporters in the outside world. I would appreciate it if you would call him and get his views on the trip.

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, as we've already agreed. We have to support him as much as we can. Any possible alternative will be much worse. I see a lot of people in the west who are know-it-alls and who always know better, but who don't do anything.

The President: That's what I think. Everyone is criticizing. I get criticized for supporting him but no one has a better idea.

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, obviously. That's the same case anywhere. From here, that looks like a very good job and you don't have to worry about it any more than that.

The President: I know you have to go back to your campaigning, but I have one more thing I want you to be thinking about. I made good progress in convincing the Visegrad four and Russia about the Partnership For Peace. If Germany could host something that we could all participate in, in Germany, that might convince them that there is something for us to work for here.

Chancellor Kohl: I'll be thinking about that. Are any of the members of your staff apprised of the background of your ideas of the strategy you have in mind there.

The President: Yes...

Chancellor Kohl: In that case, it might be a good idea if one of our people got in touch with your staff...

The President: Absolutely, OK.

Chancellor Kohl: I have a better idea. My senior advisor, Mr. Bitterlich, will be in the White House tomorrow, and why doesn't he talk to your staff about this?

The President: Good. He'll see Tony Lake, right?

Chancellor Kohl: Yes.

The President: We'll talk to him then.

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. I wish you the best of times. Don't worry about anything. You are a very young man and a young President and you should take the "devil may care" attitude.

The President: Go make some votes.

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye.

The President: Bye, bye. Auf Wiedersehen.

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 480				
Document ID: 9407073				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, September 1, 1994 (3 pages)~~	~~09/01/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 480

FOLDER TITLE:
9407073

2015-0776-M
rs1446

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9407073
RECEIVED: 02 SEP 94 08

TO: ITOH

FROM: LEBOURGEOIS

DOC DATE: 02 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ KOHL

ACTION: SENS APPROVED & SGD DUE DATE: 06 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEBOURGEOIS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		LEBOURGEOIS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 9/2 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBK NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	94090216	FOR DECISION
001		X	94090216	SENS APPROVED & SGD

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	940902	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 7073

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	ADS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	9/2	D
NSC Secretariat	3		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 2, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.17)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, September 1, 1994 (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Chancellor Helmut Kohl Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse Notetakers: Julien LeBourgeois/Kevin Wooton
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	September 1, 1994; 7:55 - 8:13am Martha's Vineyard

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. I recognize your voice. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I'm on vacation, having a good time and getting a little rest. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give my regards to your wife. Where are you? (U)

The President: Martha's Vineyard, Cape Cod. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Is the water warm enough for swimming? (U)

The President: Yes, but today I am about to play some golf. There is a little rain, but I don't mind playing in the rain. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Actually, you could instead go with me on some election campaign trips to keep in shape. (U)

The President: Well, I wanted to discuss two or three things today, but first to say how sad I am about the death of Manfred Woerner. I have spoken with his wife and I know he was your friend. The U.S. did not have a better friend in Europe. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for your sympathy. The last year was a cruel one for Manfred. He was very brave. (U)

The President: Now we have a challenge to find a worthy successor. I want to consult closely with you. We have no preferred candidate now, but I would like your thinking before we indicate a preference or make a choice. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. We can agree on that. We can harmonize our action closely, in a discreet manner. Now we have to wait for all the proposals to be on the table. I think we can agree today to get into immediate contact and coordinate when that is done. (C)

The President: I thank you for the letter about illegal trade in nuclear material. I will be replying shortly. I am pleased by Germany's effort with Russia. I will discuss the issue when I meet Yeltsin. We must seek greater cooperation within the West and with the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. I think we should do more and really appreciate receiving your letter. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I have simply told my people here to keep yours informed about any steps or developments. I am willing to send someone over to coordinate with your staff in case this is needed. (C)

Yesterday I met with Yeltsin on the occasion of the final withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and discussed the matter. I tried to impress on him that it is not just one question among many others, but one that can pose a life-threatening danger. And the reputation of Russia and Yeltsin are at stake too. He sees the need for progress, and I think we will be able to get some. (C)

The President: It is good to get our experts together. We would be glad to work with someone you send, or we can send a team over to talk with your people about this. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent idea. (U)

The President: One last thing. I am very sorry Al Gore will not be able to come to the Berlin ceremony. I have asked Warren Christopher to replace him. His recent injury is very serious and he is in constant pain. He is going to Cairo to the population conference to set forth our position. We are under attack from the Vatican and, with a large Catholic population, need to make our position clear and advance our interests in this issue. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. You have my understanding on this, Bill. Please give my regards to Al Gore and wish him a speedy recovery. Things like this happen. They just can't be helped. I am happy

Warren Christopher will come. But if I may dare to make a suggestion.... Maybe he could quote from a letter from you. Your visit gave a boost to your popularity here in Europe. A message from you referring to your visit in July.... For me it is important to keep alive the expression of American-German friendship. You did an excellent job of this in July. (C)

The President: Wonderful idea. I will follow up. Well, thank you, Helmut, for taking my call. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Enjoy your holiday, Bill. I will keep my fingers crossed as you see through the things you must. If there is anything I can do to help, call me whether it's early in the morning or late at night. (U)

The President: Thank you. Is the campaign going well?

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I think so. (U)

The President: Good. That's what I hear. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: The figures are going well, but you know that I am not somebody who believes in figures but in the results at the end of the day. But in general the mood is good and friendly to me personally, especially now in the new laender [provinces] in the east. The job is hard. I still have 96 more speeches to give and you know what that is like. You start hating to hear your own voice say the same thing again and again. Well, please give my regards to your wife and family. (U)

The President: I will. Good-bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 2, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JULIEN LEBOURGEOIS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's September 1 Conversation with Chancellor Kohl

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl on September 1, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve JOS Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

Attachments
Tab I Itoh-Brill Memorandum
Tab A Memcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9407073
DATE 02 SEP 94

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ KOHL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
BRILL, K	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 481				
Document ID: 9407614				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on September 15, 1994 (2 pages)~~	~~09/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 481

FOLDER TITLE:
9407614

2015-0776-M
rs1447

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9407614
RECEIVED: 21 SEP 94 10

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 29 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
HAITI

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES TELCALL W/ KOHL

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 24 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEBOURGEOIS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		LEBOURGEOIS

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	94092207	FOR DECISION
002		X	94093008	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940929	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 7614

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* *PRS* *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	NDS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	MBW 9/29	D D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7614

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.18)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany of September 15, 1994

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: Anne Alexander, Kenneth Baldwin, Tim Atkin

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 15, 1994: 4:35-4:45PM
The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are You? (U)

The President: I'm fine, thank you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I thought a lot about you today and I am keeping my fingers crossed for you. If there is anything I can do to support you, I shall. (C)

The President: Thank you. I'm glad you called. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, Bill, if you are looking in from the outside, as I do, I feel you can't really go back without losing face. You must do it resolutely and your military people must do it skillfully and wisely. Then when it goes well, you will get support. If you do it tonight, I will make a statement tomorrow. (C)

The President: Yes it is a tremendous problem. There is very little support in the U.S. for taking action in Haiti. I think they are in an inward looking mode. Since Haiti is close-by, they are not sure what effects intervention in Haiti will have on the U.S. (C)

We have received another human rights report detailing all the rapes and abuses happening to the innocent women and children

there. As you know, the military rulers came to the U.S. last year and signed an agreement to leave that they broke. We are currently supporting hundred of thousands of refugees everyday, and if we walk away now there may be more. It is a difficult decision, not a popular one; but we can not break our word now. (C)

The U.N. has given the mandate and over 20 nations have agreed to support this. Tonight I am going to say that I have called up the Reserves; I am prepared to take action and that action is imminent. The military rulers will leave one way or another. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: As I said, if you act tonight, I will make my support public tomorrow. (C)

The President: Thank you. That would be very, very helpful. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll do that. You can rely on that. I agree, I don't think anything else will work. They won't see the light. Maybe they can't go back either. (C)

The President: I hope they can. They have one more big chance. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: To be sure, I'm all for it. That would be the best thing, but you mustn't let them lead you on, and make fun of you. (C)

The President: Nope. We have a deadline. I won't change it now. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If there's anything I can do, let me know. People will criticize you, and you know who they are, but you know you have friends, too. (C)

The President: Thank you. I know who my friends are. I was just looking at the pictures my photographer took when I was at your house in the garden. I sent them to you yesterday. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thanks and give my regards to Hillary. (U)

The President: Thank you. I will. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good bye. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. Good bye. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7614

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JULIEN LEBOURGEOIS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's September 15 Conversation with Chancellor Kohl

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl on September 15, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

Attachments
Tab I Itoh-Brill Memorandum
Tab A Memcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 484				
Document ID: 9409687				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memcon~~	~~re: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (5 pages)~~	~~12/05/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:
9409687

2015-0776-M
rs1448

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9409687
RECEIVED: 06 DEC 94 18

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 09 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY MEMCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF CONVERSATION OF MTG BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KNOL OF GERMANY ON 5 DEC

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 09 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 12/12 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	94121210	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94121210	ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941209	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9687

URGENT NOT PROOFED _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens			
Itoh	1	LE	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	12/9	D
NSC Secretariat	3	12/12	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9687

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 9, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on December 5, 1994

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. The memcon maybe sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (Ø)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.19)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Germany
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Klaus Kinkel, Foreign Minister
Joachim Bitterlich, National Secretary Adviser to Chancellor
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 5, 1994 12:55 - 1:20PM
Budapest Hungary

The President: Congratulations on the elections. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Politics is like a marathon. The first 20 kilometers are tough, but the key is to come out strong in the end. You have to want to complete the final lap. I will be talking later to Yeltsin about his statement about NATO. I will call you before Christmas to talk about other subjects in detail. (S)

This is a highly depressing event. The people here just give speeches, and the people of the world are going to wonder if we have our wits about us. We aren't doing anything about Bosnia. (S)

The President: It is very frustrating that the UN forces say they do not want us to use air power because the Serbs will take hostages, but then people are taken hostage and they say we can't use air power. Now humanitarian aid is being held up. The UN

has kept a lot of people alive, but we cannot allow the UN mission to be used against itself as is happening today. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand you are leaving Budapest this afternoon. Is the Secretary of State staying? (U)

The President: Yes, you should talk to Secretary Christopher after you have your meeting with Yeltsin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I will speak to him after the Yeltsin meeting. (U)

Foreign Minister Kinkel: If we can at least make some headway at this meeting on humanitarian aid to Bihac and on the NATO question, then we will have achieved more than could have been expected. In Brussels, Kozyrev in effect said "no" to the NATO partnership agreements. Now everyone is waiting to hear whether he will say "yes" as a result of the pressure from Clinton and Kohl. (C)

Secretary Christopher: It is unrealistic to get him to say "yes" this soon. Kozyrev said he needed a longer time for a cooling-off period. He invited me to a meeting in the near future. But I urge you to try to get his agreement since we have worked so hard on the two documents. Yet I would not want to build expectations, and I have been careful in briefing the press. I have to leave early for Syria tomorrow morning and perhaps Chancellor Kohl could call President Clinton directly about his talks with Yeltsin. (C)

The President: Yes, call me on the phone. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well, I will call you irrespective of the call I will be making to you later in the month. Given time, we will be able to bring Yeltsin around on the NATO question. But this will take a long psychological campaign. We need to present the issue in a way that he comes to see it as his own idea. (C)

The President: In part, Yeltsin has a real concern. The Russians don't understand how everything will look 10-15 years from now. There is also an immediate concern about the psychological impact on the Russian people. This will have an impact on Yeltsin's political position in Russia. He has at least to respond to that element which wants Russia to reassert itself. On specific issues, Yeltsin is pretty good, but he sometimes scares people. So we need to work on the long-term strategic issues and try to reach an understanding so that Yeltsin can respond to his domestic constituencies without sending shivers up the spines of people in Central and Eastern Europe. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me clarify my position. We have a moral obligation -- all of us, but especially Germany -- with respect to Central and Eastern Europe. These are our neighbors, Poland and the others. We have to do everything we can to understand their anxieties and fears, and to allay those fears. The European Union can, in fact, do somewhat more to address their concerns from a psychological point of view. For example, I have invited the CEE heads of government to attend the European Summit in Essen. It is naturally more important to them from the psychological point of view than the substantive. For the Hungarians, for example, it is important that they stand out as a country for which there is light at the end of the tunnel. How long it will take to traverse that tunnel is not as important. Next year they will attend the EU summit again. If the EU's internal position on economic relations with the East becomes more amenable, that will be all the better. My European colleagues only agree with us up to a point. When they pay visits to CEE countries, they are more forceful in their rhetoric than they are in reality. (C)

On the NATO issue, I do see a chance of getting a more quiet reaction from the Russians. But at the same time, we all have to try to address the fears of Yeltsin and the Russians. We want to break down the walls. This is a long-term process, but our only option is to use all the powers that we can muster to draw them into the fold. You are the President of the United States. As we have discussed before, the Russians are suffering in that they are no longer a major world power. If we try to pursue our policy and elaborate on it, they will become less skeptical. I cannot see any alternative. We can't allow ourselves to topple Yeltsin. There will be nothing to gain from that. This is not an area of policy where we will all be covered with glory. We are not going to look good for the press. People are going to say that we have made no progress and ask what we are up to. We have seen so many superbrains at work, yet at the end we risk only having rubber and debris. This will be a long and contentious process. (C)

Ukraine is another aspect of the problem. In the EU we have an enormous problem over the financial protocol. I think we will be able to achieve the goal of 85 million ECUs (in balance of payments assistance), but it is moving forward millimeter by millimeter. Here too the alternative is very simple. If we do nothing, they will collapse. (C)

Some things are not going to look very good on TV. Our policies are not very imposing or ones that make us look good. But in Germany we say about things that are difficult that "even small animals on fire produce warmth."

My most urgent request to your Administration is to help make some headway in the former Yugoslavia. The damage, politically and psychologically, could be enormous if we do not. (C)

The President: What can we do? We were making progress when we established the exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Then it became clear that the UN forces, especially the British and French, did not want NATO to do anything else. What can we do now? This is a real dilemma for the United States. At home they are writing the obituary of NATO. In response, I say this has nothing to do with NATO, that NATO is as capable as it ever was, but that the UN forces don't see NATO as helpful. Everyone is full of ambivalence. Even President Izetbegovic does not want UNPROFOR to collapse and go away. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, to withdraw UNPROFOR is not what Izetbegovic wants. We have to see plainly what lies in the background. The Bosnians will try to organize support from the Islamic world. This may not ease the immediate situation and could have serious consequences. We need to keep a close eye on that possibility. It is obviously something that would weld together the fractured Islamic world -- people like Rafsanjani, the Indonesians, the Turks, the Pakistanis and others. (C)

The President: I recall the image of Prime Minister Ciller and Prime Minister Bhutto walking down the street together. That was quite a picture. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: In the year 2000 in the Islamic world there will be 70 million people with an average age of 25. That will be a very young nation. It is something to watch. So let us try to do something while we can. Kinkel and I have been discussing this issue. Let us stay in touch and try to avoid greater dangers. It is important for us to try to raise the humanitarian flag. If Bihac actually collapses, I don't know how our people will react. We have 400,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia in Germany. This is on top of the 700,000 guest workers. The images on our TV news are a catastrophe. (C)

Anthony Lake: I have the status report on the statement being prepared for issuance by the five Contact Group leaders. The British have agreed, as has Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, although he has not yet obtained Yeltsin's approval. The French are having trouble communicating with Paris for technical reasons, so the statement may not be ready for issuance until tomorrow. It would be better if it could be issued this evening, however. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We will try to reach agreement on the statement today. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9687

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on December 5, 1994

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and Chancellor Kohl of Germany on December 5, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to Kenneth Brill.

Approve X Disapprove ___

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve X Disapprove ___

WHM
Cookie-CTOJ
12/9

Attachments
Tab I Itoh-Brill Memo
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 225				
Document ID: 9409802				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on December 13, 1994 (4 pages)~~	~~12/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 225

FOLDER TITLE:
9409802

2015-0776-M
rs1449

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9409802
RECEIVED: 13 DEC 94 15

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 14 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON PRES TELEPHONE CALL W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 13 DEC

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 16 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEBOURGEOIS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		LEBOURGEOIS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 12/14 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ITOH	Z	94121412	FOR DECISION
002		X	94121419	REED SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941214	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MR) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1	JWR	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TSK 12/14	D
NSC Secretariat			D*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: *Dispatch w/ * Disk to State.

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

diskette requested 12/13

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9802

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1	JWR	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	78K 12/14	D
NSC Secretariat			D*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: *Dispatch w/ Disk to State.

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

diskette requested 12/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9802

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's Telephone Call with German Chancellor Kohl, December 13, 1994

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may be sent to our Embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only.

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.20)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany of December 13, 1994

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Notetakers: Julien LeBourgeois, Brian Gates, Madelyn Marmol

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 13, 1994 10:34 - 10:56AM
Oval Office

The President: Helmut? How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. I'm very well thank you. We still have the budget to discuss here. The EU Summit meeting went very well. The economy is looking good. We're in for two good years, but I don't want to work. I'm fed up with it all. If I belonged to a union, I would protest at the working conditions. (U)

The President: Let's go on strike. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Unfortunately, it would be a strike against myself. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I wanted to report to you about my recent meeting with President Yeltsin. I think the dialogue will continue and we will meet again in January or February. But it will not be publicized yet. I told him it was important to keep in close and constant contact with you, and that no one in the West, certainly not you, had any interest in creating a new chasm between them and the West. He should not listen to those around him who are making him distrustful. They have influenced him to be distrustful of our purposes. My impression is that people around him are not keeping him aware of the reality of the situation. There are quite a few who aren't interested in keeping him informed or in working toward goodwill. (C)

I also told him something he didn't know at the time: that this meeting took place before the EU Summit, to which we would invite the heads of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovakia. It [the EU Summit] was a remarkable, impressive

meeting. It will be the first step to later accession of these countries to the EU, but there is no concrete date. There will be time differences in accession. Some will accede at the end of the decade and some at the beginning of the new century. This development will have an impact on their NATO status. We will have to explain this to him very carefully and not be hasty or premature in any way. (C)

The President: Do you think you did any good with him? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: My impression was not a bad one. I hinted that there are certain forces that are pitting him against us and do not want him to be friendly. He also has enormous problems domestically, especially now with the Chechnya crisis. I don't really see any way out. We will have to take the long view. (C)

The President: That's what I think. You know he really hurt me with his statement a couple of weeks ago. Some here are using that to try to force me into a different posture. They are saying: "President Clinton's policies with Russia were wrong. He was naive about Russia." (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't think you would be so naive to let that influence you. (C)

The President: No! No! I'm beating them back. I know there are forces there trying to move him away from me and you. We have to keep working with them. I think we have to keep them informed. I just said what I did to reinforce your point about the need to take the disciplined, long view. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I'm confident I am not overstating the case in saying there are only two people in a position to get any movement or some sort of headway in this matter. If we look at Bosnia, we need him with us. (C)

The President: Let's talk about Bosnia for a moment. Where do you think we are on that? Where do you think the British and the French are going with this? It is not clear to me what their goal is, except to make sure there are no more NATO airstrikes, no matter what. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: This problem lies with the UK, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. These countries have contingents of soldiers and do not want to take sides or be drawn into a fight. We talked about this in Essen at the EU Summit. They all wanted to bring all parties to the negotiating table. They talked about a possible initiative to bring about a negotiated settlement. I think that if in the near future there is no progress, then we will have to bear in mind that some

countries would withdraw their troops. If the winter is harsh, it could be a humanitarian catastrophe. If there is no peaceful, negotiated settlement, then the question of lifting the arms embargo with all its consequences will be on the table. I will keep you apprised of the situation. (C)

Obviously there are also domestic political concerns. Italy is in a critical situation; it is equally bad for Spain; John Major does not have a majority any longer; and French elections are coming up soon. It will be fairly bitter during the campaign. Now that Delors is not running, the Left has no chance at all. Chirac and Balladur will conduct a major fight. The poor health of Mitterrand is also a factor. That is the situation for the weeks and months to come. I will do my best so that the situation with the Senate does not become intolerable for you. We all heard what Bob Dole said in London. (C)

The President: We want to bring about peace in Bosnia. But our fundamental interests are to prevent the conflict from spreading and to ensure that our fundamental alliance doesn't weaken, whatever differences we have. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I must say Bill, contrary to what some people might say, I don't see a medium-or long-term weakening of the alliance. I don't share these concerns. You should not be particularly concerned. (C)

The President: In the next couple of months, I will be particularly focused on the situation here at home. It is important that I get Congress off to a good start. I will need your counsel on situations there while I concentrate on work at home. I rely on your views quite heavily. I will not be able to travel as much this year and there are problems in other parts of the world, but I want to make sure the U.S. is exercising proper leadership. I hope we can have conversations on a fairly regular basis. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I will always be there to help you. You can rely on that. Perhaps we should plan for a February or March meeting for 24 hours. I would go to Washington. (C)

The President: That would be a good idea. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: A trip without a big delegation or hullabaloo. Just to get together for a few hours. (U)

I have just one more question. What is your position on the WTO candidates? There are three, the Italian, Salinas, and the Korean. (C)

The President: I'm for Salinas. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If there is no agreement, would you favor a compromise at the end? (C)

The President: I will have to play my hand out. I don't want to weaken my support for Salinas unless I know he can't win. There is some merit to having someone from a developing country with a demonstrated commitment in the area of free trade and who has quite a bit of strength, sophistication and prestige. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I think we'll hear from you and where you stand. Warmest regards to your wife and I hope that over Christmas you have a least two or three days off. (U)

The President: I'll pass that along. I hope you have a wonderful Christmas, and say hello to your wife. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Same to you and good-bye. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9802

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JULIEN LEBOURGEOIS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's Call with German Chancellor Kohl, December 13, 1994

We have worked with the SitRoom to prepare the attached memcon.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached memcon be approved and filed for the record.

Approve JL for WI Disapprove _____

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to State.

Approve JL for WI Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Itoh-Brill Memo
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9409802
DATE 14 DEC 94

SUBJECT: MEMCON PRES TELEPHONE CALL W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 13 DEC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 564				
Document ID: 9500908				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Expanded Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (12 pages) Partial Release - KBH 12/14/2018	02/09/1995	P1/b(1)
~~001b. memcon~~	~~re: One-on-One Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (7 pages)~~	~~02/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 564

FOLDER TITLE:
9500908

2015-0776-M
rs1450

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500908
RECEIVED: 09 FEB 95 14

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY MEMCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ KOHL 9 FEB

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 13 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95021316	FOR DECISION
001		X	95021516	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95021516	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950215	STATE	

Recd 2/15 7:22am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 0908

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	3		
Sens	1/3	AOS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4/5	2/15	D
NSC Secretariat		AOS 2/15	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Doug OK

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

WWD -
Please note.
ONLY TAB A
should be
Sent to State.
NOT TAB II

PECC 915

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 0908

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	3		
Sens	1/3	AAS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	2/15	D
NSC Secretariat	5	DKB 2/15	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: WWD — Please note ONLY TAB A should be sent to State. NOT TAB II

Exec Sec Office I

Done DKB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9500908
DATE 15 FEB 95

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ KOHL 9 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET~~

0908

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Expanded Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the expanded meeting between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

0908

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0776-M (1.21)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of Treasury
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Leon Fuerth, Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Charles Redman, U.S. Ambassador to Germany
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Friedrich Bohl, Federal Minister
Dieter Vogel, State Secretary
Immo Stabreit, Ambassador
Rudolf Dolzer, Chief of Intelligence Coordination and Director General, Federal Chancellery
Joachim Bitterlich, National Security Advisor and Director General, Federal Chancellery
Andreas Fritzenkoetter, Federal Chancellery
Matei Hoffmann, Chief of Staff, Federal Chancellery
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 9, 1995, 11:30 am - 12:30 pm
Cabinet Room

The President: First tell me about the floods. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: This year we have had very crazy weather. The first few days were very cold; then it got warmer and this caused the floods. The truth is the fact that, especially in the Rhine valley, we did a lot of things earlier in the century that we would not do today. People tried to make a crooked river

straight. This made it run faster, and caused less water to be absorbed. After 1920, they thought this was the latest in scientific knowledge. Now it is seen as a mistake. The flooding was very bad in Germany, but even worse in the Netherlands. The problem is that a number of tributaries to the Rhine also overflowed their banks. Within 24 hours we had a huge flood. (U)

The President: When we were in the Oval Office we spoke a bit about our respective positions on NATO expansion. I think we agreed that the December decision to use 1995 to determine the "why and how" of NATO expansion, but not to set a timetable or identify countries, is the right approach. If there is agreement on that, we should move on to discuss Russia and Chechnya. Yeltsin is going to give a speech to the Duma on the 16th. It would be good if both of us could communicate to him before then, to urge that he signal to the world that he is seeking a political solution and an end to the violence. It would make it easier for us to support him if he did this. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: I will make a few remarks later on internal developments in Germany and about the status of European integration. I will first comment on Russia and NATO expansion. (U)

First, a basic statement: for us in Germany, NATO is essential for the future. I completely adhere to Konrad Adenauer's concept that our policy should be based on two pillars: European unity and the transatlantic link. There is no priority between them because they are of equal value. The transatlantic link means our relationship with the United States. This is why it is tremendously important that U.S. soldiers be present to a meaningful degree in Europe. As we continue to build the European house, the United States should have an apartment -- no one should push you out. ~~(C)~~

Another point is that we should broaden the transatlantic bridge. We have the military dimension, which is very necessary. But we should also strengthen economic ties and especially cultural ties -- relations between scientific communities, exchanges of students, scientists, scholars and young people. We should not limit exchanges to issues that touch our minds, but also include those that touch our hearts. This is very important. ~~(C)~~

If I understand you correctly, we are in total agreement on enlargement of NATO. We need to enlarge toward Central and Eastern Europe. They have high hopes and high anxieties. If we strive for enlargement without knowing the psychological situation, if we use harsh language, it will not work. It has always been our position that enlargement only makes sense if it

does not lead to increased hostility or enmity with the Russians. Therefore we can only do it if Russia -- and Ukraine as well -- are part of the process. (C)

With regard to Chechnya, no one knows the background of the situation. I am surprised that people in the West hail the Chechens as democratic heroes. To put it bluntly, they are gangsters. Our experts say that a large part of the Mafia in Berlin is made up of Chechens. So this is not the nice group in white hats that the press sometimes describes. (C)

We have differences at home with regard to Chechnya. But I would say that those who are striving for the dissolution of Russia will only bring about a catastrophe and destabilization with terrible consequences. We are very close to the Caucasus. There would be an immediate impact on all the Turkic peoples there, as well as on Muslims in neighboring countries like Iran. Turkey could be destabilized and then we would be at the Mediterranean. (C)

I am looking with grave concern at Algeria. My predictions are very dire. Even Francois Mitterrand, who long believed that he could somehow turn the situation around in Algeria, is now very skeptical. If Algeria falls, it will only be a matter of days before Tunisia falls. Then what would happen to Morocco? If we follow the map with our finger, we will soon reach Egypt and the powderkeg of the Middle East, including Israel. What will the Saudis do? The House of Saud believes that they can buy out the radicals. The Royal House has unfortunately never read Lenin and this is a big mistake. Lenin wrote about the capitalists buying the rope by which to hang themselves, and the same can be said for the House of Saud. (C)

If this is all true, we cannot lean back and say that Yeltsin is an autocrat, a traitor to the cause of democracy. I am not one who prays to icons in the corner. I don't know if Yeltsin will prevail. But I am sure that if we leave him in the lurch, matters will get much worse. The two of us need to do this, not because we are eminent people, but because we are people to whom Yeltsin listens. We need to talk with Yeltsin. I don't like calling him every week and spelling out for him how Russia's image is going downhill. He doesn't like it, nor does he like being portrayed as a dictator. I am not sure whether it is malice or ineptness or both on the part of the Russian military, but he has a military who cheated him. They set him up for a situation in which he could only fail. They set a trap for Yeltsin. (C)

I urged Yeltsin on the phone to stop the bombardment. At the end of the conversation, after talking to some people, he said the

bombing would stop that day. I urged him to publish that fact and he did. But after 24 hours, the bombing resumed. I am 100% certain that Yeltsin didn't lie. Someone else did this, perhaps to topple him. So we need to talk to Yeltsin. I told Chretien, who asked whether he should invite Yeltsin to the G-7, that if he didn't, it would create an even worse situation. We need to use every opportunity to talk with Yeltsin, so that he knows he will not get our support if he does not respect the rule of law and human rights. Now is the time in Chechnya to set a good example, to set up a civilian administration and restore a reasonable degree of order. I do not know if we can make him understand this, but I know that if we isolate him now and impose sanctions -- if we insult Yeltsin -- it might sound good to our parliaments, but it would not be the right course. Our task is to focus on the final goal, to maintain his confidence and trust and to tell him the truth as friends. We should all maintain our positions. ~~(C)~~

I don't know how things will develop, but we should pursue the expansion of NATO. The issue, of course, is Poland, not Hungary or the Czech Republic. But what sort of government will Poland have in a year? What will be the outcome of their presidential elections? I am told that in the Congress some people are talking of a fixed timetable. I wouldn't dream of interfering in your internal affairs, but if they ask me about setting a precise date, say, five years from now, I will say that the situation is vague even for the next 12 months. In saying this, let me say that we certainly don't want the Polish situation to be unstable. They are our closest neighbor. The German-Polish border is very special, it is the Oder-Neisse. You may recall that 12 million Germans were expelled from their homes on the Polish side and there are still four million of them alive with children and grandchildren. This causes lots of psychological problems. This is why we need to bring Poland forward. ~~(C)~~

We should stick to our policy line on NATO enlargement. Perhaps we are wrong -- that is a risk we always run in politics -- but the other risk would be greater. There will be elections in Russia -- to the parliament in 1995 and the presidency in 1996. I don't know how the democratic forces will fare, but I hope that the Prime Minister will steer a fairly calm course. He is certainly not a reformer in the proper sense, but he is adapting, step-by-step, in the right direction. What I am not sure about is his health. When he was in Germany, my doctor looked after him because there were certain problems. ~~(C)~~

Vice President Gore: Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's health problems are relatively minor. He had kidney stones. Our impression is that his commitment to reform has grown gradually but steadily. His negotiations with the IMF increased his

understanding of the need to go forward. He has been impressive on privatization. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't want to go into his health, but I don't think it is as simple as kidney stones. It is not so benign. (C)

The President: Where do you think we are in Bosnia and Croatia? We have spoken about the pressures of Congress on lifting the embargo. You know what I will do on that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we need to realize that in two months things could go badly wrong. We should look at the situation with no illusions. History plays a very powerful role in this. Let me say bluntly: one thing that must be prevented is for Tudjman and Milosevic to make a secret deal under the table to the detriment of the third party. Then we would have a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia. This remains a danger. What the Europeans are now trying to do with the United States is to make a fresh initiative before the spring. We have to do this. I am ready to throw all the weight I have against Tudjman. He is not an easy person to deal with. He is obviously a beacon of democracy [said sarcastically], but he is a fact of life. We can use our influence with him. (C)

The second point to keep at the back of our minds is the Muslims. The worst things have happened to them, not only human suffering but a catastrophe for the women and children. We now have 1.5 million Muslims living in Bosnia, with 800 million Muslims around the world watching what the U.S. and Germany do. They are also watching what Paris and London do, but they have lower expectations of those countries than of us. These problems also relate to the Middle East. So I think we should pursue our policy line, bearing all of this in mind. I am open to any proposal that promises progress. (C)

I don't believe that Washington is aware that, for Germany, the former Yugoslavia is an enormous internal problem. 700,000 guest workers came to Germany with Yugoslav passports. They were very well regarded and respected people. Yet now they are split up into three communities fighting with each other. This is a bad development. Another point not well known is that as of January of this year, we have 400,000 refugees from the war in addition to the 700,000 guest workers. So we have over one million in Germany. We have accepted two times the number of refugees than the rest of Europe. So this is not just a theoretical problem that politicians see on TV, but one our people see every day. It causes enormous internal problems, with people complaining that we are not doing enough to end the war. Incidentally, we need

Yeltsin with us on Bosnia. Without him we can forget about all of our plans. (C)

The President: We also need to keep the Muslim-Croat Federation strong. I agree that we do not want to see a back-door deal between Tudjman and Milosevic. I appreciate what you said. The Friends of the Federation might not make a big difference. But if you play a leadership role, it will help. It might not work, but we need to do all we can to head off a worsening of the situation. We need to limit the conflict. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Once again, I am open to anything you think is useful. But Europe is also the Europe of vanity. 1995 is an occasion for many to look back. They will say: "What is this? The Germans are back again?" It is difficult for our partners to accept that we are back in strength. So we need to see not Germany alone, but others joining with us in supporting the Federation. Then it will work. (C)

Anthony Lake: It occurs to me that it is specific steps like this that would help the others adjust to the fact that Germany is back. If you can handle this tactfully, it would be good. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. Lake, you know that I think we are among friends. Matters in Europe will turn for the better if Germans understand that, in making their contribution, they have to be wise and take into account the psychology of others. We were never masters of psychology. We never got an A, we were never champions in that sport. Yet psychology is what is demanded of us most right now. Adenauer told me that it was very important to salute the French flag three times and to salute the German flag only once. It does not mean that Adenauer did not hold our flag in highest esteem. But I recall the gentleman from California who was Secretary of State under Reagan (George Schultz). Adenauer's principle always gave him the shivers. He did not want to salute the French flag even once. But we all remember how he paid the price at the G-7 meeting. Within ten minutes, there was a big fight with the French over a comma in some subparagraph. It is not necessary to repeat that experience. We need to tie in the French. They have a difficult situation before the elections. Economic conditions are very divergent within Europe, so we need to bring European countries closer together. You can rely on me to be helpful, but I ask for your understanding. I am not seeking personal glory. I want to bring matters forward. We don't need a lot of publicity. When you have weathered so many storms safely, you get more thick-skinned. There is a widely published journal that is also being read in the State Department, Der Spiegel. They once described me as the last dinosaur, the last of a line of politicians. But

if I am the last dinosaur, then I need to move carefully. Dinosaurs can move things, but they need not always be at the front. (C)

With respect to Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, NATO expansion, and the status of Ukraine, these are the essential points. No matter what we do with Moscow, if we fail in Ukraine (and the former Yugoslavia) we are lost. You can count on my support. At every opportunity I will tell both sides of the Congress of this fact. I told the President earlier that for us in Germany, and in the rest of Europe, it is essential that U.S. leadership not be damaged or diminished -- and the President personifies U.S. leadership. This is essential. We cannot afford for the U.S. to take a zig-zag course, nor can you. The situation in Europe is very vague and ambiguous. That is why it is all the more important to take our next steps in the former Yugoslavia together. (C)

The President: Let me raise a couple of points briefly. First, let me thank you for moving on EU accession talks for Cyprus and the Turkish Customs Union. Second, I know we have differences on the subject but I want to speak about Iran. We believe that they are actively promoting terrorism. We need to isolate them -- not completely, but we need to be especially concerned about their military buildup and their support for terrorism. Therefore I urge you not to extend credits at less than commercial rates. The situation in the Middle East looked so hopeful a few months ago. I visited Damascus and met with Assad, but now the situation is more tenuous. Given the terrorist activities that have taken place, Rabin's coalition has been weakened. Arafat's ability to deal with the situation has been undermined. So we are at a difficult moment in the Middle East. As you said, Algeria is in trouble and it could spill over to Tunisia and perhaps Morocco. We need to be very careful how we handle that situation in the next few years. While we have our differences, we need to discuss them in an open way. I have more confidence in our relationship with Germany than with any other country. The stability of our two countries is critical. The terrorism issue will dog us for the next few years. We need to work positively on Iran and Iraq. I appreciate your support on Iraq sanctions. Therefore again I strongly recommend that you not extend government credits to Iran. Anything that increases Iran's capability to spend money on mischief should be avoided. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will gladly discuss this subject openly. There have been a few misunderstandings. But first, stability in Turkey is decisive factor for our foreign policy. In Germany, there are few people who still remember the old image in the history books in which the British Ambassador described Turkey as

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the "sick man of the Bosporus." But 1995 is not 1903. In the year 2000, Turkey will have 70 million inhabitants with an average age of 28. We must bear that in mind. If you compare Turkey to Europe, there are enormous problems, but it is still a land of the future. They have the Kurdish problems and Islamic Fundamentalism, which is challenging the legacy of Ataturk. They are not exactly champions of human rights, or at least they don't measure up to Harvard standards. But the Harvard men who specialize in human rights haven't been to Turkey and seen what is involved in policing Kurdish villages. There one finds a different culture, but a highly developed one. ~~(C)~~

In Germany we have three million Turks and they are excellent people. But when they go to German schools, there will be lots of turmoil when a young Turkish girl does not return after her summer holidays and her German friends find out that her grandfather has married her off. This is hard for German girls to understand and it illustrates the clash of cultures involved. In Frankfurt we have 18 mosques. When I meet my Turkish counterparts, I ask them how many Catholic churches there are in Anatolia. The answer is none. So both sides need to be careful in passing judgment. In Turkey, churches couldn't even ring their bells because of Islamic law. But we need to bind them in. I am pleased that the Customs Union has now been adopted. The Customs Union is a case in point. We couldn't achieve it during the German presidency of the EU, but believed that we needed to do it under the French presidency. This would look good for the French. As for Cyprus, what has been agreed is reasonable. ~~(C)~~

Regarding Iran, what I have said about fundamentalism applies to Iran and all the other countries. I never understood why, before the Iran-Iraq war, people in Washington hailed the Iraqis as champions of our cause. I never saw much difference between the two sides nor do I believe that Syria is a champion of democracy. We need to be careful. We will not do anything to support them as long as they sponsor terrorism. We have reduced economic contacts significantly. I read in Time magazine that the U.S. petroleum industry has more links to Iran than Germany. ~~(C)~~

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d

We are not trying to break out of the international coalition and adopt a go-it-alone policy. But in a free, liberal country like Germany, we have open borders and we need to be vigilant. For example, our chemical industries are selling products for civilian purposes; we have to see that they don't also serve quasi-military

purposes. We have put in a great effort with the German business community to make them more aware of the problem. I have asked the federal government to urge them not to make transactions that would serve unintended purposes. If you have concrete cases, please notify us, but do not give us general statements.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d

Secretary Christopher: Our time is almost up. I want to raise three issues just to emphasize how important they are to us. The first is North Korea. It is important to us that some contribution be made by our European allies if we are to persuade South Korea and Japan to play the main role in the denuclearization plan. ~~(C)~~

The second subject is the Middle East Development Bank. This is something on which the countries in the region are very supportive. It is important that Europe not turn its back, but give some support to the bank. ~~(C)~~

The third issue is renewal of the Nonproliferation Treaty for an indefinite period. We should not take this for granted. Some blocs are forming in favor of a shorter extension. This would have a very adverse impact. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. Secretary, on your last point, there is no divergence of views between us on the NPT. On the other two, I would invite you to meet with my staff and discuss the details since we are short of time. But one thing is very important. For a long time I have preached the same sermon within the EU. When we review the Maastricht Treaty in 1996, we need to determine what we can do to establish closer relations between Israel and the EU. I saw completely eye-to-eye with Rabin and Peres when we met on this. Both of them are aware that in the long term for the peaceful development of Israel is not desirable to have an exclusive relationship with the United States. Israel needs a second pillar, an association with the Europeans, not only in the commercial field but in the scientific field as well. This would not only be economically advantageous for Germany, but politically and morally advantageous as well. Before Hitler, we had very close relations with the Jews. If you go to the Leo Beck Institute in New York and look at the pictures on the staircase of all the Nobel Prize winners from Germany, one can see what an intellectual loss Germany has suffered. This is why we founded the German-Israeli Technological Council. ~~(C)~~

One more point on which we have been disappointed by our American friends' reaction. This is the Climate Change Conference. We have not seen any progress there. I know Vice President Gore is already beating his chest as I speak. I don't know if the Vice

President of the United States will be able to endure the humiliation, but my sincere request is that he meet with my Minister of the Environment. She is a lady who would like to meet in order to arrive at some sort of agreed wording regarding the Conference. I know the situation that you have here, Bill. Within eight days after the floods we've had a completely different mood with regard to the Climate Change Conference. People are asking us what we are doing to deal with natural catastrophes. Thinking of the election campaign, it is always good to hear the views of individuals. But when the subject of natural catastrophes comes up, people believe that we are not reacting at all. So let us agree on some wording. I have not suddenly become a member of the Green party overnight, but I am concerned. The Vice President and I met at the Rio Conference. We know that we need to make many small steps rather than big ones so please meet with the Minister of the Environment. ~~(C)~~

The Vice President: I would be happy to see her. We want to work closely with Germany both at and after the conference. We have a disagreement over whether the industrial countries could now undertake a commitment without the participation of fast-growing developing countries like India. I met this morning with 30 CEOs from the insurance industry of the U.S. and other countries, including the Munich Reinsurance Company. The insurance industry is almost panic-stricken about the implications for them of climate change. It is not only in the popular press in which the flooding was linked to global warming; the Economist also made this point. Many scientists have noted that changes in precipitation can result from climate change. After the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, a scientist friend of mine said that you can forget about public support for global warming for three years, because of the cooling effect of Pinatubo. He said the political situation has not reached the point at which it could support revolutionary ideas. But public support is building. We have a comprehensive climate change plan that the President approved. We are not in a position to move as aggressively as Germany has suggested, but we admire your leadership and we will do the most that we can. I will certainly meet with the minister. ~~(C)~~

To raise another subject, I am going to the Brussels G-7 Telecommunications Conference. I want to thank Germany for its quiet and effective support for efforts we have been making to keep the French from building new cultural barriers, such as raising quotas for television programs and films. If it helps, we can also salute the French tricolor three times. ~~(C)~~

The President: If we can defeat the French on that, I will salute their flag six times. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: This is a tough fight we are having with our French friends. No matter who is President in France, it is an issue on which they will be tough. They won't give an inch. My European colleagues who think as I do never say a word; they let me take the rap. But I am opposing the French because they are wrong and because the system there have proposed has not proved itself. We have to ask why there aren't better French and Italians firms, compared with the 1950s. Fellini produced marvelous films, yet he didn't have any government subsidies. ~~(C)~~

The Vice President: French films have gone downhill since Brigitte Bardot got older. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me raise one more thing. The Mexican crisis illustrates the importance of our G-7 meeting in Halifax. I owe Germany and others an apology because there was not enough time to consult before the IMF vote on Mexico. The situation was very dire and we had to move. I am glad the IMF voted in favor of the package. Mexico illustrates the nature of the problems we face and underscores importance of the Halifax review of international economic institutions. We haven't thought through the financial problems that are created as market economies take root in more and more countries. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: I am very grateful for your comments. Behind the scenes, there has been a lot of turmoil. I will pass along your remarks to my colleagues. Ministers of Finance are in a class by themselves. They complain that foreign ministers are always in the limelight, while they are stuck in the background. So I will give your Treasury Secretary a hint: He should send each of his colleagues a bottle of whiskey. This will be good for the next crisis. ~~(C)~~

The President: We are completely in accord on NATO, but I think we need to be sure that our public statements are in synch. The Central and East Europeans and the Russians will be reading what we say with a magnifying glass to see if there is even a millimeter of difference. ~~(C)~~

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke: I recommend that you and the Chancellor agree on three or four points. ~~(C)~~

The President: Okay. First, we are sticking with the schedule agreed for 1995, including presentations to the partners on the "why and how" this fall. Second, we have not taken any decision on what we will do in 1996, nor agreed on the list of candidates or timetable. Third, Russia-NATO discussions will continue separately and simultaneously, but there will be no Russian veto.

Fourth, we support the expansion of the EU, which is related to NATO expansion but without an exact linkage. (U)

On Chechnya I think we have the same views, isn't that right? We are concerned about what has happened, but we still support reform and democracy. Boris Yeltsin is still President. We support the territorial integrity of Russia and its neighbors. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That is right. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

TAB

II.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: One-on-One Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Joachim Bitterlich, National Security Adviser
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 9, 1995 10:50 am - 11:30 am
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for your warm welcome. I am glad we will have the opportunity for an in-depth conversation. I have a few matters to discuss in our one-on-one. But first let me just say here what I said to you in Germany. If there is anything I can do in the months ahead just ask. You may say something discreetly or publicly and I will support you because you deserve it. I have been in politics for a long time and I know there are ups and downs. When you are at the top, you will always have lots of friends. When you are down, you tend to meet fewer people. We knew that when each of us took public office. It's good when people remain human beings despite the toughness of the job. If we stop being able to do that, we should stop being politicians and open a restaurant or a bar. Then you would just need a good cook and learn how to be friendly to the customers. It wouldn't matter what you thought of those customers.

The question I wanted to raise is what is your thinking about attending the commemorations of the end of World War II on May 7, 8 and 9. Francois Mitterrand seems to be in very bad health. He has undergone chemotherapy, which as you know is very aggressive therapy. It has stopped the development of new cancer, and how long he will last we cannot say. But he has an iron will and has focused on this one date, May 8, which is both the anniversary of the end of the war and the end of his term as President. That

week will mark his last public appearance as President. On the eve, his successor will have just been chosen by the elections. My betting right now is that it will be Balladur. I don't think Francois is against that, although he would never say it publicly. In any case, he has gone over the hump, and what he says now is in the context of establishing his legacy. On May 7 there is a commemorative event in London. For the commemoration in Paris on May 8, Mitterrand wants to be the person behind it all so that he can say his public farewells formally. This is not just his farewell from office but from life. (C)

I met with Mitterrand Thursday and had a lengthy conversation with him. I didn't even think of inviting him to Germany for our commemoration on May 8th given his poor health, but Francois said he would like to come to Berlin. It was very difficult for me to say that I thought it would be risky for his health. He said that even if he had to sleep on the plane, he wanted to give the message to the German people that we should look ahead and not backwards over the past 50 years. He has a very forward-looking outlook. He is also the last leader who actually experienced the war, as a POW and as a member of the resistance. This is why I am going to reschedule everything. I had wanted to have a very solemn and inward-looking event in Berlin. But now we will have a big ceremony with speeches, and I will invite Mitterrand. The next day he wants to go on to Moscow, obviously on the condition that matters don't deteriorate further in Russia. I haven't committed to anything yet because I wanted to sound you out first. Do you plan to go to London? Or does the Vice President plan to go? (C)

The President: How do you think things will be in Russia at that time? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: About the same as they are today. (C)

The President: If I were to go to any of these events, I would have to go to Russia, or else it would be a terrible slap to Yeltsin. For my part, I would like to do it for Francois Mitterrand, I would like to be there. I will have to determine first whether I am going to Moscow. The Moscow event is a big deal for Yeltsin and he really wants us to attend. I hope things will be in a state that permits me to go. I will have to resolve the Russia question first before deciding on the other places. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If you were to ask me for my advice, what I would say is that you should at least send the Vice President if you can't go. (C)

The President: You think I should send the Vice President? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You absolutely have to or else it will be an enormous slap at the French. I would doubt that the situation in Russia would be much different then it is today; but if you go to Moscow, then you have to go to London and to Paris the next day, and then I would hope that you would come to Berlin, where you would only have to spend three hours before going on to Moscow. Again, if you don't plan to go, please send the Vice President. He too would need to go to London and Paris as well as Berlin and Moscow. (C)

The President: I haven't discussed it with him yet. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I would urge the Vice President to do London, Paris and Berlin, and that you tell Major now that he is coming. But let me again assure you I haven't made any decision. I decided to wait after my meeting with Francois to reflect on what he said. Again, I am surprised that even with his poor health, he wants to do this; but he was absolutely adamant, he wants to come to Berlin and demonstrate that France and Germany have a future in Europe. Whoever comes from America would only have to spend three hours in some hall and give a 10-minute speech. If I invite you and no one comes from Washington, things would look very askew. This is a difficult issue because I assume Boris Yeltsin will attend the ceremonies not only in London and Paris, but probably in Berlin too. Anyway, let us sleep on this question and call each other soon. Again, I only ask that if you don't go and the Vice President comes to Europe, he should also come to Berlin. Please put this proposal into your planning. My understanding is that Mitterrand will hold a ceremony at 10 o'clock in the morning on the Champs-Elysee. After that, he will hold a lunch, and my ceremony in Berlin will not begin until 4 or 5 in the afternoon, with a small reception hosted by the President. You could then overnight in Berlin or go on to Moscow the same night. (C)

With respect to Moscow I am in the same position as you. What is Yeltsin going to do? Will he put on a big military show? I would advise him not to do that. Mitterrand will not be doing anything in the way of a military exercise, nor will John Major. Moscow will stand out all the more if Yeltsin does this. It will not look good after Chechnya. So in concrete terms, please tell me whether it will be you or the Vice President. If you don't go, the Vice President should. This has nothing to do with the 50th anniversary so much as the end of Francois' term. This is the key psychological factor that's coming into play. Almost all the people I talk to see this not as just as the end of his time in office but as the end of his life. (C)

I have an experience to recount which underscores why it is so important to Mitterrand. In 1980, when I was leader of the opposition and chairman of the CDU, I had meeting in Rome and audience with the Pope scheduled. My mother was 88 and near death with cancer in the hospital. I was reluctant to go, fearing she would die while I was in Rome. But the doctor, who had read about my planned trip in the newspapers, said that my mother was a devout Catholic and that she wouldn't die until I came back and reported on my audience with the Pope. So I went to Rome, had my audience with the Pope (whom I knew when he had visited Germany as a Cardinal) and told him about my mother. We prayed together and he gave me a rosary for her. I returned home and went immediately to the hospital, told my mother about the meeting, and gave her the rosary. She was so pleased to have the rosary. As I was leaving, she called me back and said: "put the rosary in my coffin." What could I say? I said that she wasn't going to die yet. But when I went home, the hospital phoned to say that my mother had passed away. I always remember this story. (Ø)

So Mitterrand is in the same frame of mind. At one point, it appears as if he is already gone. But then he says: "Helmut, you have to go on. You are the last one who is convinced that European integration must go on." Bill, you have to see all of these psychological aspects. If Mitterrand lives until May 8, people will look at us and judge whether we have treated him appropriately. The problem is Moscow, not Paris. But please keep a visit to Paris in the back of your mind, not just as a normal anniversary, but as Francois Mitterrand's legacy. The Queen will not attend, but that is not a problem. (Ø)

Again, if you come, please come to Berlin as well. I won't be doing anything big, just a three-hour ceremony with a bit of music. I didn't want to write a letter about this. France and the United States have a specific kind of relationship with many nuances to it. It is not a question of commercial relations -- although you do have a number of problems to fight about -- but the fact that the French see themselves as a *grande nation*. That is what I tell my people. France can afford to do almost anything, whereas Germany cannot. Look at U.S. history. You have the great man Lafayette. Germany only has the diplomat Van Steuben. Very few people remember who he was. (Ø)

The President: When I went to Georgetown University, I used to walk by the oldest building on the campus, the North Building, where Lafayette was formally introduced to Washington, D.C. I would imagine what it would have been like when Lafayette was standing on that spot. Let me ask you a few other things. (Ø)

It is very important that the new Congress not undermine our ability to work together in a deliberate fashion with respect to NATO, Russia, and Bosnia. So far they have been content to make speeches and let me carry out our foreign policy. This may be smart on their part: they can just wait for me to make mistakes, but not be guilty of undermining Presidential authority. I do have some differences with them over issues that cost money. But to the extent that Congress sees the U.S. and Germany as having common policies, they will be more reluctant to interfere. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will be meeting with Congressional leaders. My first message is that I work with the President of the United States as the closest possible partner. It is not for me to interfere in U.S. internal affairs, but I must be clear that our guiding principle is that the foreign policy of the United States is that of the President and I am supporting the President. (C)

The President: Good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: This goes beyond my visit. Anything that might weaken the impression that the U.S. is playing a leadership role in the world would be bad for all of us. That's very clear. I am sorry to interrupt, but we have a very difficult situation in Europe right now. In Italy, the political situation is very confused. Spain is not very stable. France is having the problems of a preelection period, and these will continue even after the election because they are not making big gains in their economy. I don't need to explain the problems in London. John Major has a slim majority, but Margaret is trying to do everything to undermine him. The Labor Party leader has a smiling face, but he has not said what he will do. I think John Major will prevail, but he has been so pushed into a corner that he has no freedom of maneuver right now. (C)

The Belgians have been having one of their little fights over language questions. In the Netherlands there is a new team that isn't bad. They are socialists, but I admit that they are not bad. The Prime Minister, Kok, is a good man. Poland is in a very difficult political situation. One can say that it is even more so in Ukraine and in Russia. So all of a sudden, I find myself in an unenviable position. People are putting all the world's problems at my doorstep. Therefore, I have an immense interest in working with the man who occupies this office -- not only because he is a friend, but because it is the natural thing to do. I will tell this to people on the Hill. It is important that U.S. leadership continue even after the end of the Cold War. (C)

I am very concerned by the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. The situation in Algeria is absurd. French policy has failed. If

Algeria falls, Tunisia could fall too, and maybe even Morocco. Then the problem could spread to Egypt, and next we will be sitting on the powderkeg of the Middle East, including Israel. So we need to highlight all the good things to our publics, but keep working behind the scenes on these problems. (C)

The President: You should tell them that on the Hill. They are all over the place on foreign policy. So far, they have not put big pressure on me over Chechnya -- a subject on which you and I seem to be more or less on the same position. A number of Congressmen are pushing for the immediate expansion of NATO. That would be a mistake. Europe is not ready for it, and there is the question of Russia as well. The timetable that we set in December is just right. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I totally agree. (C)

The President: In addition, there is movement in the Senate to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, as if that were all there was to it. Two years ago, lifting the arms embargo might have worked. But for the U.S. to have done it unilaterally at that time or now would weaken the UN, cause strains in NATO, and make the Bosnian government's position worse. I asked Senator Dole what would happen if we lifted the arms embargo and it weakened the Bosnians. Would he want to send U.S. soldiers? He said no, no, no. Well, they can't have it both ways. This is what I have faced. If the UK, France and others are willing to continue with UNPROFOR and it is keeping people alive, then I don't think that the U.S. should lift the arms embargo unilaterally. This is an emotional issue in Washington. I lost a lot of democratic supporters over this issue. Every Jewish member of the Democratic party hears about ethnic cleansing and it makes them feel guilty; they want to do something to prevent another Holocaust. So people that I could normally count on, like Senator Levin and Senator Leiberman, are over the top on this. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will try to help. (C)

The President: It is important for them to realize that we are working together. There are lots of delicate questions. They can make their speeches, but there should be limits on what they do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will tell them this. I know that, with respect to the Muslim community, I am condemned to be their closest friend in Europe. They don't have any suspicions about me. But there are several reasons why things are going from bad to worse. The last Secretary of State of the Republican administration (Larry Eagleburger) is not well advised in this

question. He was only concerned about the Serbs, although he changed his tune later. (C)

The President: All of them do that. I will say this, however. In other areas, the Republicans are all right. They supported me on Mexico, and we don't have differences on many other parts of the world. But on Bosnia and UN peacekeeping, we will have difficulties. How is your economy? I hear that it is coming back. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Things are going pretty well. (U)

The President: Let's discuss it a bit in our larger meeting. We have problems here too. Our central bank is a bit too nervous about the rate of inflation. Our economy is open. If prices go up, imports will penetrate. Productivity is increasing throughout the developed world, so I hope that the worldwide competition for money plus the traditional reluctance of central banks to hold down inflation will not cut short our recovery. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: My thinking goes along the same lines. (U)

The President: The central bankers are fighting the last war. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I believe that 1995 will be a good year. The signs are very clear in Germany. I hope 1996 is a good year too. (U)

(At this point Chancellor Kohl presented a picture of a saxophone as a gift to the President. After thanking the Chancellor, the President led him to the Cabinet Room for the expanded meeting.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 0908

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation from the President's One-on-One and Expanded Meetings with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, February 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A are the Memoranda of Conversation of the President's meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on February 9, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign authorize Avery to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation of the expanded meeting only to the Department of State.

App. AVS Disapp _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the one-on-one be filed for the record.

Approve AVS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation of the Expanded Meeting
Tab II Memorandum of Conversation of One-on-One (for files only)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 20[illegible]
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR SECRET

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 572				
Document ID: 9502226				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (3 pages)~~	~~03/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 572

FOLDER TITLE:
9502226

2015-0776-M
rs1451

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9502226
RECEIVED: 21 MAR 95 15

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 31 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: NSC FWDS TO STATE TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 20 MAR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE DATE: 24 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
STATE		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		GARDNER
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95033116	FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION
002		X	95033119	DOHSE SGD MEMO
002	STATE	X	95033119	FOR INFORMATION

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950331	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2226

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	3/31	D
NSC Secretariat	3	3/31	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Done
Send diskette
w/ package

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
Distribution Record

Log Number 2226
Date 3-31-95

Subject: Telcon between Pres & German Chancellor Kohl

Document Classification: ☐ Top Secret ☐ Secret ☒ ~~Confidential~~ ☐ Unclassified

External Distribution:	#Cys	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By:
Executive Secretary State	1 + Disk			

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
~~OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS~~
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO:

JOHN FICKLIN
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ROOM 387
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (Ø)

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.23)
7/31/2013 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Present: Alexander Vershbow; Dan Poneman
Notetaker: Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 20, 1995; 4:35-4:50p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Helmut? Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill? I'm happy to hear you. I hope you're all right. (U)

The President: I'm fine. I hope you're well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I'm doing fine after my [knee] operation. I'm walking well again. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about the VE-Day commemorations. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: I have decided that I should go to Moscow. Yeltsin has indicated that the Moscow event is not going to be too heavy on the military aspects. He indicated to me why it is important to the Russian people and to him that I be there. The visit will also enable me to have a bilateral with Kuchma on the 10th. On the 11th, I'll fly back to Moscow to be with Yeltsin. Boris has assured me that, on Red Square, there will be a parade of World War II veterans only. I think he understands our concern about the continuing problems in Chechnya, but on balance I still feel I need to go. Unfortunately, the American ceremony on the end of the war is on May 8, the same day as your ceremony in Berlin. I have asked the Vice President to represent me there, as well as to go to London and Paris. I'm very sorry that I can't be with Francois in Paris. My advisers and I think that that I must be in Arlington, especially since I was in Europe last year for all the European events. I would be criticized for not being in Arlington. (C)

Declassify on: OADR

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I really do understand. It is imperative that you be in Arlington. If you did not attend, you would be severely criticized. Since you're not going to be in Paris, London or Berlin, it won't be difficult to explain the reason for your absence. If I had to weigh the importance of going to London, Paris and Berlin versus going to Moscow, I would say go to Moscow. As for me, I'll continue to keep an eye on what Yeltsin is actually planning to do. I am still undecided. If it's going to be a martial spectacle, then I won't participate. Things will be clearer the closer we come to the date. (C)

The President: Yeltsin tells me that there will be no uniformed combat troops or tanks taking part, just World War Two veterans who will have a chance to march and be recognized on Red Square. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will have to wait and see. It's a good idea that you're going; you're in a different situation. (C)

The President: How do you think Yeltsin is doing? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I think the situation has stabilized. But whether it has stabilized enough is an open question. You and I should have another long talk in a few days. Your visit will enable you to have a positive influence on him. We should do everything we can to have such an influence. I look forward to a longer conversation on that. (C)

The President: If you have a minute, I would also like to talk about North Korea. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, of course. (U)

The President: I'm trying to keep the negotiations on track. The negotiations have entered a difficult phase, and we need to encourage North Korea to keep to its moratorium. We need your support for the Agreed Framework and for making a financial contribution. South Korea will bear most of the $4 billion cost of the project; but this depends on whether Japan will make the big contribution it has promised. Japan, in turn, needs wide international support. Canada, Australia and New Zealand have pledged money. I'm trying to get a contribution from South Asian countries and the Gulf States too. I feel strongly about the Agreed Framework; it commits North Korea to full compliance with the IAEA safeguards. Japan cannot give unilateral assistance on political grounds. I'm trying to get as much money as possible for the agreement and hope you can help out. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Can you send me a list of who is really participating? I mean, not just participating but ready to contribute. (C)

The President: South Korea and Japan are going to contribute the vast majority. We've given North Korea fuel oil to meet their energy needs and are going to give $22 million next year. Australia has already pledged $5 million. Canada and New Zealand will contribute less. I hope to get the Arab and Persian Gulf States to contribute. I've especially asked Suharto. But many European countries are waiting for German leadership before they decide what to do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: For me it is important for domestic policy reasons to want to know concretely who is going to contribute. There are people in this country who suspect that the Japanese won't do anything. (C)

The President: I'll send you a letter with specifics. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Good, thanks. That would be very important for me. (C)

The President: We'll talk soon. Also about Russia. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER (AG)

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on March 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Kohl on March 20, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve John Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 584				
Document ID: 9504069				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (6 pages)~~	~~05/26/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 584

FOLDER TITLE:
9504069

2015-0776-M
rs1452

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9504069
RECEIVED: 26 MAY 95 10

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 02 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCALL

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL 26 MAY

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 30 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BEYRLE
		FICKLIN
		GARDNER
		NSC CHRON ✓
		PONEMAN
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY [signature] DATE 6-7-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By K8H NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9504069

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95060216	FOR SIGNATURE
001		X	95060220	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95060220	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950602	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4069

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DPS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	DPS 6/2	D *
Records Mgt.	3		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

*WWD - Please be sent to send diskette to State

COMMENTS:

2 MAY 95 5:3 US

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9504069
DATE 02 JUN 95

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL 26 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

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COPY: 1 + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

for
Andrew Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.24)
7/31/2013 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Present: Alexander Vershbow; Dan Poneman
Notetaker: Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 26, 1995, 4:35-4:55 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. Guten Abend. (U)

The President: Guten Abend to you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are you? (U)

The President: Well, and you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. Stay the course, Bill. I see you are fighting hard and doing well. (U)

The President: Yes, I think things are going pretty well. There's a movement among the isolationists in Congress to handcuff the President's authority in foreign affairs and destroy the foreign aid budget, but we managed to postpone a vote on the bill. We have a chance of defeating it and maintaining our present course. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about my trip to Moscow and my meeting with Yeltsin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. I have plenty of time, Bill. (U)

The President: I think we did the right thing to go to Moscow to express our respect for the Russian people and the magnitude of their loss during the war. The day after the commemorations I met with Yeltsin. He seemed alert and was well prepared for our

meeting. We met one-on-one for three hours. We spent about an hour on NATO issues. He is clearly concerned about NATO enlargement and its impact on the elections in Russia in 1996. He clearly hopes to run and thinks he has a chance to win. (C)

First, Boris asked me to postpone expansion until 2000. Then he stepped back and asked us to wait until a year or two after 1996. I said that I understood his problem and would be as supportive as possible, but that I can't abandon the timetable we have set forward or postpone expansion indefinitely. I then went through the timeline on the 1995 study which will focus on the "why" and the "how" of expansion rather than the "who" and the "when." (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You did not discuss a specific date, did you? (C)

The President: No, but I said that in the first months of 1996 the NATO ministers would work on processing all they had heard in response to the study on the "why" and the "how." I said that there wouldn't be any announcement of the "who" and the "when" before the 1996 elections. That would occur later in 1996. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Only one more comment. I also told him it was important that neither of us be seen as giving in to the other. We need to avoid discussion on speeding up or slowing down expansion. I made clear to him that he would be all right, but that he should stop putting so much pressure on us in public because this has a counterproductive reaction...I said we could control the timing in a way that he wouldn't be hurt by it.

Chancellor Kohl: Yes... (U)

President Clinton: Let me finish and then you can comment. At the end of our conversation, he said that he would drop Russian opposition to participation in the partnership agreements with NATO and that he would give approval just before the NAC meeting on May 30. This would enable us to move ahead with PFP and a NATO dialogue with Russia. I said that at the NAC Ministerial, we would urge that Ministers would do three things in return: first, it would reaffirm that enlargement will occur in a gradual, transparent and open way; second, it would reinvigorate PFP and enhance its importance; third, it would will launch a dialogue with Russia on an expanded NATO-Russia relationship. I think we can meet his political needs and still pursue our approach without anyone being seen to have given way. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: So, Bill. With respect to your report, I think it is excellent that you discussed this with Boris directly. Let

me tell you openly how I assess the situation. I'm very unhappy with the fact that NATO expansion has been tied to a timetable. My position is unchanged. I think that Russia and Yeltsin have no right to a veto on anyone's acceptance by NATO. But it's also a question of simple prudence that we deal with Russian concerns over their own security. To be frank, we are facing two hurdles. First, the Russian domestic political situation: there are parliamentary elections in December and terrible fights over their election law. We don't know what the outcome will be. Second, there will be presidential elections next year. It would be prudent for us not to do anything that would make things worse there. What I mean by worse is that the radicals could cause a great upheaval. At this point the question of whether Yeltsin will run is open. He asked me for my opinion about what he should do. I couldn't give him an answer because the earliest one could assess the situation would be early next year. But I told him that if he moves toward one of the extremes from the center, his chances will decrease and, in particular, his international support would decline dramatically. (C)

Bill, to be frank, I see another hurdle: the U.S. primaries. I hear with concern what Dole is saying about you. The subject [of NATO expansion] is being used to harm you. I assume that Polish groups are going to play on this even more. You know a lot more about this than I do; it is a complex group we are dealing with. In four weeks I'll be in Warsaw. My intention is to tell those in charge that it won't help to light a NATO fire and that this would only cause problems for their friends in the U.S. They need our help in the EU and, of course, they want to get into NATO. But NATO entry is not a question of months; we must be reasonable. (C)

We must therefore make the issue of timing less dramatic. Perhaps our ministers need more time to evaluate and perhaps hold another conference. I am willing to be as helpful as I can. But I have forbidden my Cabinet to continue pounding on this subject. Frankly, as for the U.S. primaries, it doesn't help us to produce hot air and get excited on this topic. I spoke to Chirac about this last week and tomorrow Major will be coming here. I also spoke to Dutch Prime Minister Kok. I think we have everyone in line and we have good cards to play. You did a great job in Moscow; but we cannot let foreign policy become a blunt instrument of domestic policy. We must be very clever and wise now. That's my position. I think we are in agreement. We'll be able to discuss this again before the summit in Halifax and at the time of that meeting. (C)

The President: Well, I'm very encouraged by all you have said. Let me tell you about the political situation here. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, of course. I have plenty of time. (U)

The President: NATO enlargement may be an important issue in the primaries. But if I can keep my position over the next six months, I won't have any opposition in the primaries. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You mean from the Democrats? (C)

The President: Correct. That means that I won't have to deal with the question in a political context until the period from August to November of next year, well after the Russian elections. (C)

My goal is for us to be seen as steady so that neither the Poles nor the Russians will make an issue out of it. We must keep the dialogue steady and deliberate so that we can get through June 1996 without any adverse consequences for Yeltsin or for us. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I totally agree with you. I will do everything so that the Europeans follow this path. (C)

The President: Great. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: So we are in agreement on the main points. If anything new comes up, we'll keep one another informed. (C)

The President: Yes, we need to keep each other informed. Both of us will be meeting with Yeltsin in Halifax. If we get through those meetings, we will be okay for a year. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. (U)

The President: Just two more points. Yeltsin and I reached agreement on closing off Russian conventional arms sales to Iran. This enables them to become members of the post-COCOM regime and will help Yeltsin to improve his prestige. With regard to the sale of light water reactors to Iran, Yeltsin believes that they cannot be used for the construction of nuclear weapons. But he was concerned about the implications of intelligence we shared with him. So we agreed that Chernomyrdin and the Vice President would continue to discuss the issue and find a solution. I think that's a step in the right direction. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: One last point we need to discuss in Halifax. I had a committee here to look at security arrangements for nuclear materials in Russia. I know this is of concern to you since there have been instances of smuggling to Germany. Yeltsin says there is no problem of security. Either he's completely unaware

of the problem or he's unwilling to admit to it. I want to follow up with him about this in Halifax. It may be too early to act, but I may need to bring you in, too. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't know whether he's pretending or whether he really believes what he says. But I think he really believes there is no problem. I don't think he has any control over this issue at all. We must keep after him, but tactfully. It is an area which touches on criminality, so it is very delicate. One doesn't know who has his finger in the pie. This is very serious, and we need to work together. Although we cannot ignore others, it is really the two of us who count most. We two need to lead. (C)

The President: I want to share with you what we know. It is Germany that is most likely to be affected given the routes out of Russia. Of course, it is very important not to embarrass Yeltsin in any way on this. We have been spending time and money with them to improve security of their sites. We think they're doing a good job at military sites, but we are still very concerned about other sites. There's no need to say more about this now, but we do need to discuss it further at Halifax. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, this is very serious. We need to make him understand all the facts. (C)

The President: In Moscow he did not seem to have all the facts. We need to make him understand the importance of this issue and work with him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I'm without illusions on this issue. We need to talk to him directly and personally. (C)

The President: Yes. I'm going to have Al Gore share with Chernomyrdin the results of our work. But you and I still need to tell Yeltsin. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: The last thing I wanted to do is to follow up on the letter I sent to you regarding the North Korea nuclear issue. We are entering a critical round in the talks. We need to convince North Korea that the KEDO project is viable. I know that a lot of people in Europe have concerns about our approach, but I honestly believe that it is the best approach and that we need the participation and leadership of Germany. We are hoping for a contribution which is more than symbolic. You know that the Australians have contributed $5 million. We hope you can manage something around that figure. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, we're going to do something. I'm going to discuss this with others in Europe. I have no problem with doing something that is more than symbolic. My problem lies in joining KEDO. We can talk about that in Halifax. (C)

The President: That's what we'll do. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: OK, friend. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: My best to your wife. Good luck. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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4069

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 30, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on May 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Kohl on May 25, 1995.

Concurrences by: Dan Poneman; John Beyrle

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve John June 7 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

See

Case Number: 2013-0517-M; 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 594				
Document ID: 9505422				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

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Document ID: 9505768				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (6 pages)~~	~~07/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 597

FOLDER TITLE:
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2015-0776-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9505768
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 95 16

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
TELCON

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 25 JUL RE BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 28 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		GARDNER
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95072620	FOR DECISION
001		X	95072720	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95072720	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950727	BRILL, K	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9505768
DATE 27 JUL 95

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 25 JUL RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____

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COPY: 1 + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5768

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

dee

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon		✓	
Dohse	1	W	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	MC 7/10	D ~~K~~
Records Mgt.	3	DMS 7/27	D

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	MC 7/10	D K
Records Mgt.	3	7/27	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: DISPATCH W/ DISK

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5768

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBHNARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.25)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 25, 1995, 3:37-4:13 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

The Chancellor: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm doing fine thanks. I wanted to follow up with you on where we go from the London Conference. (U)

The Chancellor: I'm pleased to do that. First, are you in good shape? Has the Senate voted on the embargo? (U)

The President: No, not yet. (U)

The Chancellor: Will it be today? (U)

The President: Today, perhaps tomorrow. (U)

The Chancellor: How will it come out? (U)

The President: It's hard to say. The stories out of London at first were very good from my point of view, but now they've turned cloudy and uncertain. In general my position with Congress has improved. On domestic issues I'm doing better and the polls are improving. (C)

The Chancellor: Bill, now don't you forget I made a bet on you. (C)

The President: I know it. I'll try to make good on your bet, but first we have to solve Bosnia. (C)

The Chancellor: I'm sure you'll win and please pass that to Hillary. (C)

The President: I will, thank you. Let me try to say briefly where we are. (U)

The Chancellor: Don't worry. I have plenty of time. (U)

The President: We need to clarify quickly the concept of operations including the changes needed in order for NATO to provide the sort of air support we agreed on in London. One big dispute remains at the NAC conference as we speak. (C)

The Chancellor: You mean the NATO Council? (U)

The President: Yes, that's correct. Here's the dispute. First we agreed that Admiral Lanxade...I mean General Janvier will pass to local ground commanders the power to call in air support. But the big point of disagreement lies in larger air action in response to a Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde. (C)

The Chancellor: You're talking about walking across the red line? (C)

The President: Yes. Chirac believes we should let Boutros-Ghali approve the decision for big air strikes even though in London we agreed that, if Gorazde is attacked, we could hit other targets throughout the country. This is a point of disagreement in NATO. Chirac argues that NATO attacks on military targets in other parts of the country would affect UN troops of other countries, not only those of the British and French and that Boutros-Ghali should therefore give his approval. However, in this country that would be viewed by the Congress and the press as another decision by the UN to retreat and to let the Serbs continue their actions. This would increase the [chances] that Dole's amendment will pass the Senate with enough support to override a veto. (C)

The Chancellor: How does John Major feel? (U)

The President: So far the British have supported our position at the London Conference and agreed that if Gorazde is attacked, then we would have the option to strike the Serbs anywhere. Of course, he is worried about it too but if we look into the past, the only time we bought peace was in early 1994 when the Serbs thought we would take strong action: that led to the creation of "safe areas" and collection points. As soon as it was clear that we wouldn't do this, the situation deteriorated, with the absence of progress on the political front. (C)

The Chancellor: Have you spoken with Chirac? (U)

The President: Yes, I had a long talk with him yesterday, and I may do so again today. The problem is that because he has troops and heavy artillery there and fought off an attack on the Mount Igman road over the weekend, he thinks that is enough. He thinks ground troops will turn the situation around. I don't agree this would work. It doesn't solve anything. (C)

The Chancellor: Your opinion is that if we get more troops on the ground they will get wrapped up in a general war. (C)

The President: Yes, and they are more likely to be taken hostage. I want to talk about three other things and then let you comment. We must think of how we will resolve this. First, there is, as you know, a massive offensive in Bihac involving the Croats. We have urged the Croats to limit their action to the defense of Bihac and to be disciplined and careful, since there is a risk it may spread. Should we strengthen the previous UN commitment to protect Bihac, so the war won't spread there? (C)

Second, on Russia, I assume you have talked to Yeltsin. I think I should call him. Kozyrev and Grachev indicated flexibility to us and said the right things about condemning Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas and putting pressure on Karadzic and Milosevic. I don't know if they can. I sent Yeltsin a letter last Friday and I expect a response soon. Perhaps I should call him. What are you thoughts on Yeltsin? (C)

Third, I want to get your ideas on what we can do to increase the chances of achieving a negotiated settlement. Our past strategy of working through Milosevic to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and saying no one should talk to the Serbs until they agree to the 51/49 per cent division of territory proposed by the Contact Group has not worked. Do you have any ideas on the diplomatic front? If there is no agreement soon, things are going to end very badly whether or not UNPROFOR withdraws. (C)

The Chancellor: Thank you, Bill. Let me go down the list. First of all, I think we have the possibility of influencing Tudjman. Whenever we deal with Tudjman, we must realize that he is only a mirror, a reflection of Milosevic and Karadzic. If we could deal with him alone, there would be no problem. I will check that out tomorrow and let you know. I think only two people have influence on Tudjman, just you and I, not Paris and London. They have less influence. True or not, the Croats say that Paris and London only want to support the Serbs. The only people he will listen to are you and me. I think we have to talk with him and tell him we don't want oil poured on the fire. (C)

On Russia, I spoke with Yeltsin on Friday for about an hour and said I would call back on Thursday or Friday. I think it's a good idea if you call him tomorrow or Thursday. Psychologically it would be good for him. I'm not a physician and I only heard his voice on the phone, but listening to his voice I said to him: "You had a serious blow." He didn't try to talk me out of it. He said he was feeling much better and could leave the hospital to go to a sanitarium. He wants to be in a sanitarium for two to three weeks and then take a vacation. He'd be happy to hear from you. It wouldn't be a mistake to call him, not just about Bosnia but in general. I have urged him to do something and told him that his personal reputation is at stake. I told him: "You must understand, Boris, the impression in the West that you are providing cover for the criminal policy of the Serbs." I told him that they are criminals and that they will not deviate from their criminal behavior. I told him how I view the situation between Karadzic and Milosevic and the generals, though I don't know for sure who holds power over the Bosnian Serbs. I suppose no one really knows. I told Yeltsin my opinion that Karadzic and the military leaders have burned their bridges behind them and have slipped into a bunker mentality. Karadzic is now under public accusation of being a war criminal. (C)

My Dutch friend, Wim Kok, has told me that the Bosnian Serbs have committed outrageous atrocities which have not yet reached the public. But in the next three to four weeks the details of that behavior will reach the world and the public will be influenced by that. My impression is, regarding Karadzic, that the only role he sees open for him is to increase the brutality of the war, since this would make the West more likely to withdraw. And when I say Karadzic, I always mean the military leaders as well. I think he hopes that he can keep the territory and that this will allow him to link up with Serbia proper. A Greater Serbia is the ultimate objective. If this should take place, he could then claim to be the hero that brought it about and will replace Milosevic. I wouldn't be surprised if he had Milosevic assassinated. I said that to Yeltsin. I also said that, with this kind of crowd, one shouldn't be seen with them by day or by night. He told me that the Bosnian Serbs want to buy arms from him. He has refused. I told him: "You, Boris, are the only one who can influence him [Milosevic]." I think Yeltsin needs to test Milosevic to see whether he is playing a game or means what he says. Of course, he would have less influence on Karadzic, but the two of them have not really tried very hard. (C)

So, Bill, what I did was to urge him hard, really hard. I told him it is not only a question concerning Russia, but also Boris Yeltsin. I told that I'm aware there are traditional Serb-Russian relations and Orthodox Church ties between the two countries. But I told him that that is not what matters but

rather what the world sees. He promised me two things. First, that he will think it over. And second, that he would take personal action. I will call him on Friday and remind him of this. When you speak with him, without reference to me, you should push him in that direction. I don't think he is keen to be seen in the vicinity of Karadzic. (C)

As for what we can do in diplomacy: first, I think it is totally out of the question to think we could conduct a war there and win. We would need several hundreds of thousands of troops and no one wants to make that kind of commitment. There is no domestic support for it in the West. Second, I agree with the basic concept that if you want to be successful in negotiations, you have to hold on to the "safe areas" if that is all that can be held; therefore, drawing a red line around Gorazde is not a bad idea. Now that the Rapid Reaction Force is stationed on the mountain, it is less likely that the Serbs will intervene. (C)

Third, this is the time to test Milosevic about whether he wants to be helpful or not. We must find a way to see if he is for real. This may not sound convincing, but the world's public opinion is watching. We have 400,000 refugees from there in my country. That is more than twice as many as in all of the rest of Europe. And now a new wave will be arriving. I don't know how many will come in the new wave, but I can't let them perish. None of my European colleagues wants to take them in. I admit that we should be doing more than the others because we do not have ground troops there. But it's difficult and this puts me in a bad position. These people are in terrible shape. And there is another complication: I am seeing a greater suspicion and sharper interest taking place in the Islamic world. We can't take the situation and developments seriously enough. If you want, you can talk to me on Friday night. I will be easily reachable in Austria. (C)

The President: I will give it a couple days of thought and may call you back. (U)

The Chancellor: Do you think you understood what I said? (U)

The President: Yes, quite clearly. But my situation is complicated because the British and the French say that we don't have any troops there. I couldn't under the present rules of engagement. There would be an uproar in Congress and my position is eroding in the Islamic world because they don't think I'm doing enough to lift the arms embargo. I'm concerned about what this is doing to the ability of the U.S. to promote peace in the world. (C)

The Chancellor: Bill, that's totally wrong. Don't put anyone on the ground. (C)

The President: I agree, but this gives the British and the French the excuse to oppose anything I want to do. It would only make it worse if we were there. (C)

The Chancellor: I don't think it would work. (U)

The President: No. (U)

The Chancellor: Let me recall history. Between 1941 and 1944, we had 500,000 German soldiers there. These were highly trained combat soldiers. For example, our first paratroop division: they were at Monte Cassino. You know the caliber of the troops I'm talking about. They couldn't do the job. That's what history teaches us. (C)

The President: I'm going to work on this. I may call you on Friday. (U)

The Chancellor: About 8 o'clock our time, 2 o'clock your time, would be good. Give my best to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will. Good-bye, Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5768

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 26, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER (AG)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, July 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on July 25, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve JFD Approved Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 599				
Document ID: 9506095				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (4 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1)

Partial Release - KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 599

FOLDER TITLE:
9506095

2015-0776-M
rs1454

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9506095
RECEIVED: 07 AUG 95 19

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
YUGOSLAVIA
CROATIA
TELCON
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 10 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BREMNER
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		PETERS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MC DATE 8/8 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95080813	FOR DECISION
001		X	95080817	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95080817	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95080817	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950808	BRILL, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6095

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SFM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
B6 Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			FAX copy
West Wing Desk	2	DPS 8/8	D - with diskette
Records Mgt.	3	MC 8/8	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: State wants ASAP

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6095

August 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS/SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on August 7, 1995, between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6095

August 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.26)
7/31/2018 KBH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters, Sue Bremner, Madelyn Marmol, Katherine O'Louglin, Daniel Flessas

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 7, 1995, 5:30 - 5:49 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello? (U)

The President: Hello, Bill? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are you? (U)

The President: Very well, thank you. I'm calling to talk about the situation in Yugoslavia. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, very good. (U)

The President: Before the Croatians launched their assault on the Krajina, we urged them to be careful of the dangers of a wider war. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I emphasized the same thing. (U)

The President: But I also know why they did it. I believe it's a significant moment to initiate a new diplomatic effort... ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I think so, too. (U)

The President: ...because of the changing situation on the ground, the arrival of the Rapid Reaction Force and the tougher NATO stance. On the other hand, there's more instability, so if we don't press for a settlement in the next few weeks, the situation is likely to unravel, making UNPROFOR withdrawal unavoidable. I've had a couple of long meetings today about how we can use the situation in Croatia to negotiate a peaceful situation in Bosnia and a resolution in Croatia. ~~(C)~~

Declassify on: OADR

I'd like Tony Lake to make a private trip to Europe later this week to meet with his counterparts in London, Bonn and Paris and to work out a common strategy along the lines we've been discussing here. These talks can also address how we bring the Russians along and what each of us would have to do with the governments in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as with the Bosnian Serbs. So if you think it's a good idea, I'll send him. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I think it's a good idea you have, but I would be as discreet as possible so as not to raise expectations. ~~C)~~

The President: Yes, I know. We've kept it quiet here. My concern is whether Paris will leak the story. If it gets out, we'll have to downplay it in the short run. We have some good new ideas but must downplay expectations. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. Well, I consider it very good and will do all I can to make sure our side prepares well. I think on a number of points we have a new situation which might become interesting. I consider the struggle for power among the Bosnian Serbs very important. I don't think Karadzic has the power to depose the General. If he is not able to remove Mladic, his power will be impaired. Mladic is a man of Milosevic. On Croatia, I have written a letter tonight to Tudjman that related to the French letter. I'm only telling you Bill. He'll have it handed to him tonight. I made three points. First, he has to make sure all principles of humanity are observed there. Also, with respect to refugees, he must be aware that any ethnic expulsion will have an effect on his reputation and on Croatia's reputation. I reminded him to respect the local autonomy of Serbs in Croatia. I also pointed out that he should issue a public statement regarding the Danish UN soldiers who had been abused. I then told him very, very clearly that he must be very much aware that any military actions in Eastern Slavonia would have a major impact on widening the war. ~~(C)~~

It will be important to plumb now, test now whether Milosevic will be willing to come to any talks. Boris wants Tudjman and Milosevic to come together but I don't know if he will succeed. But Bill, I must say clearly that any arrangement between Milosevic and Tudjman at the expense of the Bosnians will not find my support. I think if what I see and hear is correct, the two of us are not very far apart on these positions. I have the impression that in London and Paris, the distance to Izetbegovic and Tudjman is much greater than the distance to Belgrade and the Serbs. This is not my position but perhaps I'm mistaken. I told Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Major that I hope we'll be able

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany [partial] (1 page)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 599

FOLDER TITLE:
9506095

2015-0776-M
rs1454

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

to find a common line. I share your opinion that perhaps we have a new opportunity now. And after all, Bill, if nothing else, at least we should have tried. (~~C~~)

The President: Boy, I agree with that. I am also concerned that there is an agreement between Milosevic and Tudjman. Tudjman had discussed in the past dividing up Bosnia and we can't allow that. We have to protect the integrity of the Bosnian Muslims. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Absolutely. (~~C~~)

The President: That would be disastrous for our relations with Turkey, Egypt and others. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: And that's 800 million people, Bill. (~~C~~)

The President: By the way, Chirac said the same thing today. That's good. So, I'll send Tony Lake in a couple of days. One more thing. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Listen Bill. We should continue to talk on the phone. No problem, this can be arranged if that's not a problem. (~~C~~)

The President: I think we have to resolve this week. We need a common position by Friday. We have to have a larger Contact Group meeting perhaps with Italy and Canada to see if we can't ram this thing through. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, we can talk about this. (~~C~~)

The President: Let me just discuss briefly an issue I raised in Halifax--

EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] Anyway, the point I wanted to make is that [redacted] is the most knowledgeable senior

official in my Administration on this subject, and I was hoping he would be able to talk with you personally and discuss this in detail. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, when I get back from my vacation, I'll take care of it. I have postponed it until the end of my vacation. I will look for an opportunity for me and my staff to talk to him. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. And we'll talk about Bosnia in a couple of days. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, you can call. This time of the day is good for me. (U)

The President: OK Helmut, thank you very much. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good night. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9506095
DATE 08 AUG 95

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIG+DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0774-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 14 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Memorandums of Pres Conversations w/ Kohl / Chirac and Major re Bosnia NSC LOG # 6095 6097 6098

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS: Originals and Disks will be Sent via Courier.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018

2015-0776-M

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 605				
Document ID: 9507051				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (4 pages)~~	~~09/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 605

FOLDER TITLE:
9507051

2015-0776-M
rs1455

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9507051
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 95 08

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF PRES TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERAMANY

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 28 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95092517	FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
002		X	95092610	HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950925	BRILL, K	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9507051
DATE 25 SEP 95

SUBJECT: MEMO OF PRES TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERAMANY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

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Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Log # 7051

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) SB to [illegible] Date _____

Note that Kohl didn't press NATO point very hard on SAT.

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

National Security Council
The White House

Recd 9/25 ldm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7051

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
KB Harmon	1 | 4		A-Tol-I
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy ✓		
Berger	2		NOTE
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	9/25	D
Records Mgt.	6		D w/DISK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 9/25 lbm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7051

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
KB Harmon	1/4	9/25	A-Tab I
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy ✓		
Berger	2	ow	NOTE
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	9/25	D w/DISK
Records Mgt.	6		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

Log # 7051

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) SB to RL Date _____

Note that Kohl didn't press NATO point very hard on SAT.

RL

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7051

September 25, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission only. (C)

Joyce A. Henry for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.28)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELCON with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Karen Dragone, Mary Ann Peters, John Feeley and Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 23, 1995, 2:56 - 3:14 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello Bill. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm fine. I have lots of work. I'm quite content. (U)

The President: I think we are making significant progress in Bosnia. Many serious issues remain, but I think a settlement can be reached in the coming weeks. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: For the first time I believe, too, that it is going to work. Your people are doing a good job. (C)

The President: I believe now we can bring negotiations to a conclusion. It is essential that the Croats and Muslims work closely and constructively in the Federation. The meeting between Tudjman and Izetbegovic in Zagreb was stormy. The Bosnians are clearly worried about Tudjman's growing ambitions in western Bosnia, they are afraid this could lead the Bosnian Croats to pull out of the Federation. I understand your Ambassador, at your personal instruction, recently delivered a demarche to Tudjman on the need for military restraint. I really appreciate your stressing to Tudjman that the Federation and a strong Bosnian-Croat alliance is critical to the success of the peace process. I have warned him that our relations with Croatia could be affected if his support for the Federation is insufficient. It is very important we keep Tudjman with us. It must not blow up. We don't want to snatch defeat from the jaws

of victory. As we get closer to settlement, it is very important that we complete preparations for implementation and post-war reconstruction. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: No, we don't need that. Which one of your people is there now? Is the Assistant Secretary there? (C)

The President: There are two members of the team there now, Bob Owen and Chris Hill. Holbrooke is coming back to brief us. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Where is Holbrooke? (C)

The President: He is either in New York or on his way there. The Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are meeting in New York on Tuesday. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, on Monday, I am going to tell Bitterlich to call Holbrooke for a long talk. Then I will send someone to see Tudjman. (C)

The President: It will not be hard to find him. He is in New York. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, that is what I will do. I am going to send someone to see Tudjman, and then I will call him directly myself. (C)

The President: If there is anything else I can do, please let me know. I am pleased that NATO is moving ahead on planning for implementation with no serious differences between us and the French on need for NATO command and control of the operation. I know you do. I am concerned about Italy, given their importance to NATO operations in the Balkans. The Italians should be brought into the "inner circle" in planning for peace plan implementation. We have proposed that experts meet this week as five instead of four. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I have the least amount of problems with that! You know where the problems are. (C)

The President: Of course. Although negotiation sessions should be limited to the original Contact Group, we should also expand the circle for consultations on the peace process to include the Italians, Canadians and Spanish. I hope you will support that. I would like to raise a few other issues if you have time. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Of course I do. (U)

The President: I am pleased NATO's study on enlargement has been completed, and I want to thank you for German support that was

critical to the process. I am glad the briefings for the members of PFP will begin in the next few days. But I'm very concerned by Russian statements regarding enlargement that make clear this remains a difficult issue in Moscow. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: As you are aware there is an election campaign going on in Moscow. The elections for the Duma are in December and the Presidential elections are in June. It is a very diffused situation. Zhirinovsky's influence has abated; he does not stand a chance. But the candidacy of Lebed is ascendant, and I think Boris himself won't decide what he is going to do until February. Quite frankly, I see a major problem by things being said in Congress by a few people. Yeltsin told me he didn't have any problems with you (and he will meet with you in New York). But he is concerned that the Republicans will use the Primaries to get Polish-American votes. You must make sure that things don't degenerate to irrationality. (C)

The President: My position has been steadily improving. The more it does, the more I will be able to restrain them. I will do my best to make sure the world knows that Congress doesn't run our foreign policy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I know that. That's why you have broad support here. The 15 heads of the EU just finished meeting in Majorca and talked about that at length. The view is unanimous and clear. They want NATO enlargement, especially with a view toward Poland, which is Russia's main concern. And, of course, a problem for Russia. We need to be careful that the Russian election campaign doesn't destroy everything. All colleagues agreed to be with you...to support your steady hand, so to speak. But we do have some concern that the primaries are having some kind of impact. Do you understand? (C)

The President: Absolutely. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You have lots of support here. I can make that public. You must tell me when it would be useful. (C)

The President: Thank you. If we can solve the crisis in Bosnia it will help us all calculate what we say about Russia before the elections. We wouldn't want to promote the election of a reactionary that could make life much more difficult. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: And it is very important things be done in sequence, one after another. (C)

The President: One thing we could do to help Yeltsin would be to resolve the CFE flank problems. The Russians' initial reaction to the NATO CFE flank proposals has been encouraging. They see

problems but acknowledge it is an honest attempt to meet them half way. It is critical that Yeltsin be encouraged personally to support the proposal. Could you talk to Yeltsin and get his support? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Aren't you going to tell him yourself in a few days? (C)

The President: Absolutely. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: When will you see him? (C)

The President: Next month, October 23. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will have a long talk with you before you meet him. Is that okay? (C)

The President: Of course. You still talk with him all the time, don't you? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I certainly will in the next two weeks. (C)

The President: One last thing. I'm pleased to hear the end of the Hugo Princz case. It was a very thorny issue. I want to thank you for your efforts to solve it. If Bitterlich wants to call Holbrooke, he can call the White House Situation Room. Thank you, Helmut. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: All the best, Bill. (U)

The President: Thanks Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Don't believe everything that people say. I believe in you; and I want you to win. (U)

The President: You still made a good bet. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Regards to your wife. (U)

--End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7051

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 25, 1995

[redacted]

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~ANDREW D. SENS~~ ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS/JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on September 23, 1995, between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

That you (authorize Andrew Sens to) sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

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Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9507460				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (5 pages)	10/10/1995	P1/b(1)

Partial Release - KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 608

FOLDER TITLE:
9507460

2015-0776-M
rs1456

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9507460
RECEIVED: 11 OCT 95 11

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON
HS

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 10 OCT W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 14 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GARDNER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		GARDNER
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 10-12-95 BY HAND (W/ATTCH)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	95101218	FOR DECISION
001		X	95101220	HARMON APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95101220	HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951012	STATE	

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	MC 10/12	D
Records Mgt.	3	10/12	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	MC 10/12	D
Records Mgt.	3	10/12	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

12 OCT 95 21 25

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7460

October 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0776-M (1.29)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetakers: Anthony Gardner, Kevin Wooton, Katherine O'Loughlin, Deuce Martinez
Interpreter: Harry Obst

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1995, 6:05-6:36 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. Thank you for taking my call. It's so late there. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It doesn't matter. I'm happy to hear your voice. Are you doing well? (U)

The President: Yes. We've had a good couple of weeks with Bosnia, the Middle East peace signing and today the President of Mexico was here. They seem to be coming out of their problems. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That's what I heard about Mexico. It's about time for this to happen. (U)

The President: I have two or three points I wanted to raise with you. Let me go over them and then you can respond. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, good. (U)

The President: First, I would like to talk to you about the Middle East Development Bank. I think a regional bank is an essential foundation for peace in the Middle East. I appreciate your support for the Amman Economic Summit. It will be a major opportunity to advance such development and continue the process of economic opening begun at Casablanca last year. I believe it

is important that we are able to announce the establishment of a Middle East Development Bank at the Summit. The bank will fill a niche not now filled by other institutions. The biggest contribution will be mobilizing the private sector. It will send an important signal that the region is open for business. (C)

I was very impressed by the unanimous support for the bank expressed last week by all the regional leaders, Japan and Russia. I know you have heard from Prime Minister Gonzalez of the meeting and the private talk we had. I told him I have a strong personal interest in the bank. I'm committed to ensuring that the costs are kept down and that control is in the hands of the donors. We very much need to reach out to regional parties in their quest for peace. I know there have been differences in the perspectives on the aspects of the bank, but it's too important to let it fail. It's important to the Israelis, Palestinians, Egyptians and Jordanians. It will show the benefits of peace and encourage the Syrians to participate in the peace process. (C)

Your support on this is vital. I ask you to act to ensure EU support for the establishment of the bank at the Amman Summit. I believe that will make a big difference. To date we have not seen enough progress on the peace process. This last agreement should make investors feel secure. If the bank is established, this will send a signal that world governments are serious about long term development in the Middle East. (C)

On another subject, I wanted to thank you for your... (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Maybe we should deal with this subject before moving on. (U)

The President: Yes, I agree. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: First, it is very clear that the peace process doesn't have a chance if there is not economic support. In Europe such an initiative has been debated for a long time as a useful one to develop as a quasi-Marshall Plan for this region. I'm happy about your commitment to the issue and I think it's vital in order to achieve lasting peace in the region. It's not so much whether we are going to do something but how we do it. In Europe, and in Germany especially, there were negative experiences with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London. The experience with the bank was that it crawled along much too slowly and was not effective. I'd like to suggest that I sit down with my experts and find a compromise for an announcement in Amman and will also talk about this with the people in Brussels. Once again, the issue is not whether but

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl [partial] (1 page)	10/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 608

FOLDER TITLE:
9507460

2015-0776-M
rs1456

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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rather how we do this. I would suggest that Bitterlich talk to Tony Lake about this as well. (C)

The President: Let me say this. I understand your reservations based on your experiences with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, but I believe we can learn lessons from it and avoid them in this case. I'd be glad to consider what protections we need, but we need a quick decision so we know where we stand regarding Amman. The people in the region are looking to us. Please talk to your people and get back in touch with us as soon as possible. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: On another subject, I wanted to thank you for your continued helicopter support for UNSCOM. I know that Bill Perry discussed this with his German counterpart. I appreciate it. It's especially important given the revelations of the past two months. Thank you and I hope your support can continue. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You're welcome. (U)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The President: Yes. I'd also like to talk to you about Bosnia. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'd like to hear your views. (C)

The President: They didn't quite agree on a ceasefire, but I believe they will tomorrow. I don't know why; maybe they wanted to fight a little more for a few more inches of land, but our people expect it tomorrow. I appreciate the work of your Contact Group representative in supporting the efforts of Dick Holbrooke and his team in achieving the result. I'm encouraged by the agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serbs with the Eastern Slavonia problem. I know there is a long way to go, but that could eliminate a lot of problems. (C)

Looking ahead, I see a few problems. First, there is a possibility of problems with Tudjman and keeping the Federation together. I know you weighed in with him and I'm interested to hear your comments. The second problem is how to include the Russians in the peace implementation force. I'm prepared to be flexible, but I don't see how I could compromise on single NATO control. That is essential for Congressional support. We've seen in the past that we need central control. I'd be interested in your views on this. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: I think the second point is most important for the next six months. I really think it will only endure if the Russians are brought into the equation. The Russian elections make it more difficult. The Duma elections in December are not so important, but they will send a clear signal for the June Presidential elections. Those elections are charged with emotional content. They are a real test for the future of Russia. If Russian troops are not involved in the peace force, then it is possible that the Serbs in Belgrade will make trouble. That's one side. The other side is that you may have to do hard daily work with Congress to convince them we need clear command and control lines, which are important from the side of NATO. Let me tell you something unorthodox. When will you see Boris Yeltsin again? ~~(C)~~

The President: In New York on the 23rd of October. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Maybe you should address this issue with him directly. Ask him whether he could bring into this command and control structure someone important -- an important personal representative. I think it's important that the representative is at a high enough level that he's a personal representative of Yeltsin. It's important to prevent mistrust creeping up. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. I expect a proposal for discussions with him in New York, but it will not be easy. He's hurt if the Russians are under NATO command and we're hurt if there are two military commands. We need to bridge the gap. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Of course it will be tough, but it must be tried. I think we have to develop better ideas than have been put on the table by the military. It's important to see what type of people he puts forward -- flexible or rigid. He also has a public relations problem: if he doesn't send soldiers, he will not get good press. If you as the President of the U.S. make him a fair offer, it will be difficult for him to turn it down. When you've worked out what to do, I'd be willing to address this issue with Yeltsin before you meet. ~~(C)~~

The President: That's great. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Back to Tudjman. It's most important that when we talk to him our language be absolutely clear. That's directed at you and me because we're the ones who can influence him most if we're in concert. I'd be happy to call or meet with him. That would give me a chance to have a strong influence over him. The problem for him is that he needs to be seen coming out of this affair as victorious. It's a psychological thing. Deep in his head is buried the idea that he can get more. We have to tell him the limits of what he can expect. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. Let me do some work on the Russia issue before Boris comes and get back with you. Thank you very much. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: I have a brief question. Tony Lake has already been informed. My deputy Wolfgang Schaeuble will visit Washington on November 13 and 14. I'd be grateful if you could find a few minutes to meet with him when he visits the White House. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, Tony Lake sent me a note on this. I'll do my best to see him when he's here. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. Best wishes for the next few days. I think you did marvelously well on Bosnia and you'll be paid back for it. Don't let others scare you. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. I'm trying to make good on your bet. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Give my best to Hillary. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye, Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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FROM : NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

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Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9507460
DATE 12 OCT 95

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 10 OCT W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7460

October 11, 1995

[redacted]

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER (AG)

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on October 10, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KEM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0774-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (3 pages)~~	~~02/17/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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OA/Box Number: 1086

FOLDER TITLE:
9601062

2015-0776-M
rs1457

RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9601062
RECEIVED: 20 FEB 96 10

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 20 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES W / GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL 17 FEB

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 23 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96022017	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	96022019	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960220	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 1062

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* (PRS) *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* (WH) *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	(WH) 2/20	D
Records Mgt.	3		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Diskette included

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1062

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 20, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 3/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 2/20/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.31)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Lyle Harrison, Natalie Johnson, Peter Huggins, Alexander Vershbow, Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 17, 1996, 0850-0915 a.m. EST
Air Force One

Chancellor Kohl: Hi, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Hello, fine. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm very well, glad you're fine. You're campaigning aren't you? (U)

The President: Yes I am, but I'm stuck on an icy runway. We're trying to fly out to New Hampshire. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Better you stay down and win the elections than go up and lose. (C)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are things going? (U)

The President: They're fine. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That's my impression too. (U)

The President: You're going to Moscow, I think. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, tomorrow night. (U)

The President: How do you think Yeltsin is doing? ~~(C)~~

Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 2/20/06

Chancellor Kohl: About the outcome of the elections, I think it's still too early to say. He has a chance if he fights, if he fights reasonably, if he continues to be in favor of step-by-step reforms. His first moves were both very clever. If he does as promised and pays the overdue salaries, he will be fine. In the next week I hope he will conclude the protocol with the IMF. Then we'll see what we can do to help him. It's relatively easy. Basically, you and I are the only ones to have a very clear course. If he wins, it will be good; anybody else who might succeed him will only make things worse. The only sensible course is to support him without being too obvious or too pushy. We should just make it clear he has our trust. Moreover, what your State Department said was very smart and corresponds with my course as well. There are know-it-alls in Germany and Europe who say that we don't know what will happen so we shouldn't do anything. I don't know what will happen either, but if we don't help him, things will go wrong. (C)

The President: Yes I agree with that. It's important that we do it in a way that doesn't hurt him. If we do too much, if we're too obvious about it, it could be used against him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly, it must not be over-obvious, it must not be too pushy, but we must be aware that people look at us and what we do. I think our course is about right. I'm going to tell him he must make clear signals in the direction of pursuing reforms. I'll call you at the end of next week and tell you first-hand what happened. (C)

The President: Sorry, Helmut, we got cut off. I just wanted to say one or two things before we sign off. [Note: there was a 2-3 minute break in the conversation while the conversation was reestablished.] (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Please go ahead. (C)

The President: The first thing is that Yeltsin may pressure you on full G-8 membership. We need to discourage it now. Between the two rounds of the elections, we can figure out what to do. But we should be careful about getting committed, since we could end up with Zyuganov as president. Russia is in a weak position financially, and we would be committed to a G-8. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Precisely, I'm also only in favor of G-8 membership if Yeltsin stays, but not without Yeltsin. (C)

The President: If we said it like that in public, it might be used against him. We must be careful about what we say. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: No, no, I just told that to you. Of course I can't say that in public. (C)

The President: Also, I know that Warren Christopher spoke with you about NATO enlargement. I believe we're on the same page. We don't want to do anything to make Yeltsin's life more difficult. But if we change our position, the furor will be overwhelming on both sides, both here and in the Central and East European countries. I'm already being attacked here by Central and East European ethnic groups for not having done it already. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, my position is completely clear. I told Yeltsin a couple of days ago that we cannot, as a matter of principle, permit him to have a veto. Of course, the Poles have the right to want to join NATO, but we have to go about it in a clever way. NATO must bear in mind Russia's need for security assurances. It wouldn't be good for it to become a campaign issue either in Russia or in the United States. (C)

The President: A couple other things. Just let me say thank you for your effort and that of the rest of the EU to solve the problem in Mostar. We've got to do everything we can to see that the Federation stays together. I know we still have lots of problems in Bosnia, but as a whole, I think we've got it together. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think so too. It's difficult but we can do it if we work together. (C)

The President: Thank you. Please call me when you get back from Russia. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope you have a nice day. Thanks. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9601062
DATE 20 FEB 96

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES W / GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL 17 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + 1 disk

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 20, 1996



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on February 17, 1996.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2013
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 2/20/06

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1088				
Document ID: 9601354				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (5 pages)~~	~~02/28/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1088

FOLDER TITLE:
9601354

2015-0776-M
rs1458

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9601354
RECEIVED: 29 FEB 96 08

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 01 MAR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 04 MAR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 3/01 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96030110	FOR DECISION
001		X	96030117	DOHSE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	96030117	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960301	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 1354

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* (PRS) *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	3/1	D-with diskette
Records Mgt.	3		

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette typo

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1354

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	WP 3/1	D with diskette
Records Mgt.	3		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 1, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador only. (C)

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 02/29/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.32)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine O'Loughlin, Peter Huggins

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 28, 1996, 11:49 a.m. - 12:13 p.m.
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Hi Helmut, guten tag. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Are you going to speak German now, Bill? (U)

The President: No, no, I'm going to listen in German so I can hear it twice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me say how very pleased I am to hear your voice. Bill, as I look at how matters are going in the Republican primaries, you should be glad. I would have thought you drew up the list of the Republican candidates! (U)

The President: Well, I want them to keep changing who wins so it is a long time before it gets resolved. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Remember what I told you six months ago? I think my prediction will come true. I know you listened to me in disbelief at the time, but I think the outcome will be as I said. I'd like to tell you my impressions of my trip to Moscow. (U)

The President: Yes, please do. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Obviously, everything I tell you is filtered through my own eyes, and as we both know, the time we have until the elections is fairly long. First of all, my impression of Boris Yeltsin. When I saw him in late August of last year, he was in miserable physical condition. I saw him again at Mitterrand's funeral. And now, I saw him again a few weeks

Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 02/29/06

later. I am not a doctor, but it is truly obvious that he has lost weight, and generally speaking, he looks to be in good physical condition. All the information he requires is at his fingertips; he doesn't require notes, even in our long talks. There are a lot of stairs in the Kremlin. I walked up with him, and you can see how someone moves and what physical condition they are in. As to my discrete question whether he was in good enough shape for the campaign, he said obviously yes; I must say he has launched into a program that is quite impressive. (C)

As to the political situation, generally speaking, he has a fairly clear impression of where he stands. It's sad because I'm certain people around him tell him too many positive things about what is actually going on. I was very open in my assessment of the situation. I would say he has a chance of getting into the second round of the election, and if he gets there, he has a fair chance of winning the election. A fairly large number of people, reformers, are criticizing him. They, themselves do not stand any chance of being candidates. But I think it's a safe bet: if the vote is between him and the communist candidate in the second round, he can count on the broad support of the reformers who criticize him now. Just one example is Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg. I believe and hope this man will play an important role in the future, and I don't think we can exclude that he might want to be a candidate in a future election. He says he has severe misgivings about this matter or that, but then he says we have to do everything to make sure Yeltsin will win the election. It is the lesser-of-two-evils principle, but it is a clear statement in the direction we desire. (C)

Yeltsin himself sees that everything will depend on the question of Chechnya. He sees as important the position of the female voters, and I do think he is right. And the question is whether he will be able to come to some peaceful settlement of the conflict, as he has said in public. I was frank with him about Grachev's role, being very critical of it, and I must say his reaction was fairly interesting. He didn't deny that one could see it that way. And since there were rumors that the civilian Under Secretary of State for Defense Kokoshin, would be dismissed -- in our eyes he has a good reputation -- Yeltsin assured me this would not take place, and this man would keep his position. (C)

I think Yeltsin is also aware that something must be done in social policies. I think he's going to make use of what was achieved with the IMF on the basis of our support. So I think Bill, you and I know exactly who our counterpart is. I just left an idiotic debate in our parliament; they are stipulating conditions he would have to make, for example, on human rights. You and I are familiar with this. There is no way we are in a

position to choose who the President of Russia will be, and we do have to live with who the current president is. I am convinced nothing better can come out of it. (C)

I was clear in telling him he has no veto over NATO, as you said in public when you were over there. And, Bill, I would say in the event of his being reelected, there is a good chance for a meeting next year with the newly reelected President of the United States, Bill Clinton, together with a number of us from Europe, to meet with him and reach some sort of reasonable settlement to this issue of NATO and NATO enlargement and present to him a proposal that takes into consideration the justified security requirements of Russia. Then I see we have a genuine opportunity of reaching a settlement on that question in the second half of next year. We do have a gigantic task here with the enormous number of weapons they have massed over the years. An arsenal of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons -- biological weapons, all of these need in some way to be regulated. I was equally clear in telling him of our firm position that we would give him help for self-help purposes only if he would pursue reforms and that they not conclude any special arrangements with Iran. I explained to him that an arrangement of this nature would immediately set off alarms here in our country. I think that was the gist of what we talked about. (C)

The President: That's very encouraging. Do you have the impression there was anything we could do to help him in the elections? I have to tell you frankly that unless we can announce START II or something special in the spring...; however, if the Russian people knew how much I wanted him reelected, it might actually hurt his chances. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I do think it would help him, Bill, but we have to be very careful. I do not feel that any sort of public pressure would be helpful. When you go there in April, I do think you can do a lot of good, and I am more than ready to assist you in preparing for this visit in a discrete manner. I think we probably have the strongest influence over him, and he himself says it quite clearly. I am only saying this to you. I would not say it publicly, because people would be envious, stressful and distrustful. The basic problem we've seen everywhere is that they are increasingly showing an inferiority complex, having fallen from the exalted position of being a world power to where they presently are, which has caused a psychological reaction that was to be expected. In reality, they are deeply ashamed of the failure of the Russian soldiers and Army in Chechnya; this is just one of many examples. (C)

The President: Well, you've given us plenty to think about here. One thing I'm trying to do is minimize any disputes in other

areas that may come up between now and then, trying to be sensitive to his political needs. But it sounds to me like he is going to low-key the NATO thing in dealing with us, which I think is best for all concerned. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, Bill. It is clear. I said it to him clearly and unequivocally that we have to come to some sort of arrangement, and he has no veto. The more we stipulate any sort of radical conditions, the more difficult it will be to come down from those barricades and find reasonable arrangements. I think it is quite possible, by the end of the decade, that the Poles will be able to enter NATO. When I told this to the Polish Parliament last summer, they were enthusiastic, but now they want to be members by the end of this year, which is unrealistic. (C)

The President: We just have to be steady about it. You and I have to take the lead on this; we just have to be very steady. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, absolutely. I am not somebody who is always optimistic, but in this matter, I see a real chance, a real window of opportunity. One other thing we have to avoid is to create the impression in Moscow that if they resort to enhanced cooperation with China, this would get them out of a quandary. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I think we have to keep drawing them in, and be steady about it, but in a way to make Yeltsin look strong and not weak. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. Bill, it's actually quite simple. I don't know if we will be successful in this course, but if we do not stay the course on this, I'm absolutely sure there will be failure. (C)

The President: I agree. I hope you are coming to see me in May. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I think we agreed. (U)

The President: I think May 23rd will be the date. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Oh, I was told it would be between May 15 and 19th. (U)

The President: I'll check on it. Our people will work it out. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: As you know, we can always have another phone call. (U)

The President: Yes, I think we should talk before I go to Russia. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly, and if you feel the need, I can send Bitterlich to Washington. (U)

The President: All right. Thank you very much. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you and give my warmest regards to your wife. I will keep my fingers crossed about the election. (U)

The President: Thank you. I think it will be OK. (U)

Chancellor Kohl. Good bye. (U)

The President: Good bye. Auf weidersehn. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 29, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on February 28, 1996, between the President and Chancellor Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Dohe Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon with Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 02/28/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9601354
DATE 01 MAR 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1 + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1096				
Document ID: 9602461				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on April 12, 1996 (5 pages)~~	~~04/12/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1096

FOLDER TITLE:
9602461

2015-0776-M
rs1459

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9602461
RECEIVED: 12 APR 96 16

TO: SENS

FROM: PASCUAL
BLACKER

DOC DATE: 12 APR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 12 APR

ACTION: HARMON APPROVED RECOM 2 DUE DATE: 16 APR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKER
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96041220	FOR DECISION
001		Z	96041614	HARMON DISAPPROVED RECOM 1
001		X	96041614	HARMON APPROVED RECOM 2

recd 4/13 12:05p

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2461

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (KB) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(KB) 4/13	File for record only
Records Mgt.	4		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Recd 4/13
12:05p

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2461

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG KR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	KR 4/13	File for record only
Records Mgt.	4		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.33)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on April 12, 1996

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Notetakers: Carlos Pascual, Daniel Flessas and Elaine Florio

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 12, 1996, 9:27 a.m. - 9:48 a.m. EDT, Residence

President Clinton: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello? (U)

President Clinton: Hello Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are you Bill? (U)

President Clinton: Fine. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hope you are well. (U)

President Clinton: It has been a tough week with the loss of Ron Brown and his plane. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It was a terrible thing. He was a friend of yours, too? (U)

President Clinton: Very close, yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I thought about you and thought he was absolutely a great man. Did he have children? (U)

President Clinton: Yes, he had two children who are grown and two grandchildren. But you know we lost a lot of bright young people, too. You know, as an adult I have had more than I deserve. It is very sad to lose the young people. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I thought about your loss and especially when I read about how close the two of you are. Things seem to be looking up with the elections. You know I don't bet, but so far I am betting my money on you. (C)

President Clinton: So far that's a good bet. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You deserve it. Others win and don't deserve it, but you do. If I can discreetly do anything, let me know. (C)

President Clinton: I think your coming here May 23 is good. I hope you like the idea of going to Milwaukee together. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, we can do that. You work it out and we'll talk. (U)

President Clinton: I wanted to talk to you about two things -- about Lyons and Russia, and then a little about Bosnia, if that's okay. (C)

I want to discuss Russia's relationship with the G-7 because I think it will come up in some way when we are in Lyons. Boris pressed me on Tuesday on finalizing the G-8 in Lyons, and he seems to think that he has the green light from you and Jacques Chirac for this. Apparently he had not focused on the fact that when we are in Lyons it will be between the elections -- between the first and second elections. (C)

It is critical that we have a common view before going to Moscow next week. There appears to be no consensus now for G-8. The Japanese and the British are opposed. (C)

I would like to say what my concerns are. First of all, I want to do everything I can to support Russia through international institutions. But we will have a terrible problem if we go to G-8 and Zyuganov wins the election. It could make the mechanism unworkable. I don't want to send a political signal in Russia before the election. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, what you just said is key, really. Do you recall that the date Jacques Chirac came up with is not a good one? I have always said it was not good to have Lyons before the elections. To this day I do not understand why Paris scheduled it then. I told them time and again not to do that. (C)

When I saw Boris last, I told him precisely what you just told me. I said Boris, if you're not elected and this other guy is elected we will have a real problem. (C)

Last week I had Bitterlich speak to the French. They met but I don't know the outcome of that meeting. I told him to have the French arrange something, but not correspond to the full G-8. (C)

President Clinton: I think we need to find a way to expand Yeltsin's role, his prestige at home and show Russia more support from the West. We want to arrange to help him. We do not want to embarrass him or have a public rebuff on the G-8 that plays badly. We want to go into Lyons in a way that is positive for him. My people say he has a 50-50 chance for reelection. If we can achieve consensus before Moscow, we can pave the way and be sure there is no bad press from hostile sources. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Lyons will be held between elections. I think absolutely your security advisor, Bitterlich and Chirac's security adviser should talk discreetly on Monday or Tuesday about what to do. And if necessary, we should individually, I mean you, me and Chirac, should talk to Yeltsin in Moscow. But individually, not in a group. We have to be frank. (C)

We're doing everything we can to ensure he wins the election. Of all the candidates, he is by far the best. People here attack the Communists, or rather attack me, for going to such lengths to support him. I don't care. If the other guy is elected, things would be very grim indeed. (C)

So we should let the three get together. I told the French to charm him. (C)

President Clinton: I agree with that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: So I'll call my office and have Bitterlich talk to Lake. Your guy is Lake, right? (C)

President Clinton: Lake, yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: So I'll have Bitterlich get in touch with Lake if need be. We have to be discreet. (C)

President Clinton: We cannot afford to have Yeltsin embarrassed. That is why I want to resolve this earlier rather than later. (C)

Let me say one other thing quickly. The summit communiqué is carefully crafted to recognize the important role of nuclear power but to keep emphasis on the safety first message. I think Primakov wants this. (C)

I am concerned that Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy is lobbying Yeltsin to turn the summit into a pro-nuclear event. He goes around and tells people that Chernobyl is not dangerous and that there are plants in America that are more dangerous than Chernobyl. During his April 9 conversation with me, Yeltsin said Chernobyl is not a problem and argued against the communiqué language on Chernobyl, saying closure will harm Kuchma and Ukraine. (C)

We both know, of course, that the process outlined in the agreement is designed to make sure Ukraine is not harmed. Yeltsin's Atomic Energy Minister has fed him a completely incorrect line. Many in Russia's nuclear complex fear the Russian public will demand similar closure of 11 Chernobyl-type reactors still operating in Russia. (C)

I understand their concerns, but we can't afford to change the direction of the summit. If Yeltsin voices concerns during the Kuchma meeting, it will encourage Kuchma to turn the meeting into a pledging conference and to attempt to renegotiate the agreement he made with us. We need to turn Yeltsin around before meeting with Kuchma. (C)

Boris is not unreasonable, he just gets misinformed every now and then. I think we need to talk to him during the dinner or the morning P-8 meeting. We really need to work on that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: This seems perfectly clear. I will not be in favor of changing letter one. We invested so much money there. Moreover, I think this thing must be closed. (C)

President Clinton: You've been a strong advocate on this position. I'm trying to alert you to what the Russians are doing. You can have great influence. I think we could turn the nuclear summit into a failure if there is a backout on Chernobyl. Otherwise, this will be a huge triumph. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Don't worry. Between us, we'll manage. Boris listens to us. (C)

President Clinton: Last time we talked, it was sort of back in the box. If it's a problem, we'll have to deal with it and keep it from getting out of hand. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We'll do that in Moscow. We'll do it together. (C)

President Clinton: Well, it's great to talk with you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: To be sure, it is great talking with you. Take care of your cough. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: My regards to your wife. (U)

President Clinton: And to Hannelore as well. See you in Moscow. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

President Clinton: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 12, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER SP for

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL CP

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Kohl on April 12, 1996.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Redman in Germany. DS approve

2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Per Mr. Lake, file this memcon for the record. Do not transmit to Dept. of State.

JA 4/13/96

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/12/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the April 12 call between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent via NODIS channels to Embassy Bonn for Ambassador Redman. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/14/06

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1120				
Document ID: 9606067				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (5 pages)~~	~~09/04/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1120

FOLDER TITLE:
9606067

2015-0776-M
rs1461

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606067
RECEIVED: 10 SEP 96 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 10 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
IRAQ
TELCON
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT
YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON BW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 4 SEP

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 13 SEP 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96091012	FOR DECISION
001		X	96091015	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	96091016	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960910	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6067

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~X~~ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	~~X~~		
Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TMH 9.10	~~D~~ w/ diskette
Records Mgt.			
↳	3		D*

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: * dispatch w/ diskette

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	~~W~~		
Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TMH 9.10	~~D~~
Records Mgt.			
↳	3		D*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: * dispatch w/ diskette

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9606067
DATE 10 SEP 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON BW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 4 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: COPY + DIS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6067

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 10, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany(U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 09/10/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.35)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Brigette Richman
Notetaker: Katherine O'Loughlin, Karen Dragone, Larry Wright, Mary Ann Peters and Dan Fried

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 4, 1996, 1503 - 1532
Oval Office

The President: Hello? Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Are you already on the phone? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am good, excellent. It's late in the evening. I hope you are fighting a good campaign. I put money on you, so don't disappoint me. (U)

The President: So far your money is good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't think I will lose it. So, you are working full steam ahead. (U)

The President: Yes, we had a good convention. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I watched you on TV. (U)

The President: I have to work on it for 60 more days. I wanted to talk to you before you went to Russia; I appreciate your taking my call. First, I want to thank you for Germany's support

for our actions in Iraq. I had a very difficult conversation with Chirac. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, he told me about that. (C)

The President: He told me they would participate in the no fly zone until the election, but today they said they would fly only up to the 32nd parallel, not the 33rd. We had a difference of opinion. Chirac thought it was just election year politics. (interpreter interrupts) He thought it made no sense except for election year politics. I disagreed. We didn't know what else Saddam had planned. It was a measured response. But Chirac did say that for the next couple of months France would continue to fly with us in the no-fly zone, but today France said they would stop at the 32nd parallel. So we are starting a new round of conversations here. I don't know if you have spoken with him, but if you could, maybe we can cool things down a bit. It could help. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I am going to call him next week when I get back from visiting Yeltsin in Moscow and I think we can talk about that too. I have the impression he felt steamrolled by the U.S. I am being frank, that was my impression. Right now, domestically speaking, he is not in an easy position. Next week the prime minister submits his budget and on the basis of the figures, they will have to make enormous cuts and you know from your own experience what an unpleasant experience it will be. If I could be so bold, I'd like to give you a piece of advice. Be nice, you have to be particularly nice to them and cozy up to them, if you understand what I mean. Also, there are a lot of rumors going around Paris that they will have difficulty with the European currency, although I don't believe it. So, I am going out of my way to allay his fears on this and I shall raise the issue with them against this background when I come back. I will call you next week when I get back from Moscow, maybe Tuesday or Wednesday, if that is okay. I will tell you what I find out. (C)

The President: I admire him and I don't want to cause him any domestic problems. From what I understand, I support the things he is trying to do domestically. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: There is also another point I would like to go to, the question of NATO enlargement. I think it is very important for all of us to get an agreement on when we start negotiations proper. I will see Secretary Christopher on Friday. I am going to address this issue with the Secretary on Friday and tell him it will not serve our cause to address NATO expansion this year, but to commence the process at the beginning of the new year in a quiet and determined way, on a case-by-case

basis, without delaying the process but without undue haste. We will get no positive results if we push now. (C)

The President: I believe we have to develop a special relationship between Russia and NATO. IFOR sets a good example. I also believe we can address Russian concerns on nuclear deployments and related issues without sacrificing NATO's flexibility. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly my point, I fully support what you say. Obviously, we have to try to reach agreement with the Russians on substance. I am willing to address this issue with Yeltsin on Sunday. I will give you his response. I hope you have not misunderstood me. I am not talking about procrastinating on the issue, but I think we should be psychologically clever about it, we should avoid any undue haste. I agree we need to start right away, at the beginning of the new year and try to complete the overall process by the middle of next year. (C)

The President: We cannot let the Russians think they can keep the process from advancing, that all the details have to be worked out with them in advance; otherwise they will hold out and the talks will not advance. I think talks with the first group of potential new members should begin next spring and we should intensely work on an agreement with the Russians between now and then in hopes of getting agreement. But, if they believe by not agreeing they can delay accession talks, we will never get them to agree. We cannot let them think they have a veto. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I said today very clearly in my press conference as I finished my Ukraine visit that we would not allow anyone to get veto power over this issue. I do not know what shape Boris is in. I'll see for myself Saturday. I'll let you know; then we will have to see if he can actively pursue this course. If so, I think we should try to get in touch with him personally and that officials we send to him will work in a discreet way. And, it will be you and I, I predict, that will have to have the first round of talks with him and then bring in Major and Chirac. But it will be you and me in the first round of talks and then they can continue in official channels. I think we must make sure that he does not believe that he or the Russian government can have veto power over this. (C)

The President: Good, I look forward to that. A word about his health. I have to say I am very concerned about Yeltsin's health. We believe he is at risk of having a serious heart attack. I have offered him American medical assistance, but so far he has not taken us up on this. Has Germany offered help or

medical advice to him? Do you have any advice or ideas of what I can say to him? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I will say something on his health shortly, but I just want to clarify on NATO in regards to the timetable and general concept. I wanted to ascertain that that is what you were thinking? (C)

The President: I think we need to announce at the December NAC that accession talks with the first group of potential new members will begin in spring. It is very important that they start next year and it would be strange not to say so in December. We need to work out an agreement with Russia but if we do not say that the talks begin in the spring, we will have a lot of disillusioned people in Central Europe. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, according to what you say we are in complete agreement. I think too we should say in December that we will announce in the spring. I raise this issue because I do think there is a misunderstanding in Europe --NATO is a gossipy organization anyway. There is an impression that we want to settle the "who" business in December. It is good we see eye-to-eye on this. If this is agreeable to you Bill, I will support you formally. We will announce in December that we will begin this process in the spring. Is that agreeable? We will have discussions with the Russians in the meantime. (C)

The President: I think we have to coordinate an announcement. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, no problem. What I am looking for is that we have an exact idea about a time frame, a schedule. Now on Boris, I hear a lot of rumors, as you do. I do not think anyone has reliable information. There have been lengthy intelligence reports. What is really true is not known. I had a long telephone conversation with him on Wednesday last week and he suggested a meeting. I asked him and his wife how the operation went and it apparently went well. I asked him very frankly if he needed any help or medical assistance. I told him we are all prepared to help and he mentioned that you had offered, and he clearly said he needed no help. Then I said is it better to discuss this when we have our meeting and he was very friendly, calm and collected in his reaction and said of course, we can discuss this. And you know it is very difficult to read someone's mind over the phone. You know I greatly distrust the people surrounding him and the truth is there are people around him who have already sorted out their positions for the future. And quite a few have done so not because they are interested in the power, but the money. (C)

I had a long, frank discussion on this with President Kuchma this morning. He is greatly concerned for obvious reasons which is why it is important that you in America and we in the European Union try everything to stabilize the situation in Ukraine. I will urge my colleagues in the EU to become aware that it is very important for Central Europe, the structural stability in Ukraine and that Ukraine is stable and is able to pursue stable economic policy. My impression is, and was confirmed in conversations with Kuchma, that there are large business interests that have a say in the overall process. There are still traces of these so called military-industrial complexes that used to exist, and Lebed seems to be in close connection with these groups. It is reasonable what he has done in Chechnya, but still you have to bear this in mind. Once again, I will discuss these issues with Boris in a frank and open way and will call you when I get back. (Ø)

The President: I wish I could see him in person too. I want to help him. I do not want to cause him any embarrassment. The world needs a healthy Yeltsin. We need a healthy Yeltsin. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, you're absolutely right. Thank you. Please tell Hillary I said hello and fight. You're a young guy; you have to fight. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I look forward to hearing from you. Tell Hannelore hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fight! (U)

The President: I will. I couldn't bear it if you lost your money. Auf wiedersehn. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6067

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 10, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS (ACTING)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, September 4, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on September 4, 1996, between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve AOS _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 09/10/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1120				
Document ID: 9606074				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (4 pages)~~	~~09/10/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1120

FOLDER TITLE:
9606074

2015-0776-M
rs1460

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606074
RECEIVED: 10 SEP 96 13

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 11 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
RUSSIA
TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT
YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 10 SEP

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 13 SEP 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		PIFER
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	96091111	FOR DECISION
002		X	96091117	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960911	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6074

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	AS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TMH 9-11	D - with diskette
Records Mgt.			
↳	3	9/11	D*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: * dispatch w/ diskette

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6074

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	AS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TMH 9.11	D- w/ disk
Records Mgt.	3	9/11	D*
↳			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: * dispatch w/ diskette

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

6074

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 11, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 09/10/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.34)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Katherine O'Loughlin, Karen Dragone, Elaine Florio, Mary Ann Peters and Steve Pifer

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 10, 1996, 10:02-10:21 a.m.
Air Force One

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Hello Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I hope everything is all right with you. Are you well? (U)

The President: Yes, I am fine. I am on a plane. I am flying to Missouri. I am fine. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I called to give you a brief, concentrated version of what Boris and I talked about on Saturday. (C)

The President: Yes, fine. You talk and I will listen. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'd rather speak with the interpreter though! Can you hear me? (U)

The President: Yes, fine. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I talked with Boris for more than four hours on Saturday. He met me at the helicopter. We flew to his dacha. You know his dacha is over 140 kilometers outside of Moscow. It is in a vast forest area with a river delta. It is a beautiful

area, vast natural abundance and lots of wildlife. He is very fond of hunting and fond of staying there. We talked first for one and a half hours. We only used the German interpreter, you know my interpreter. Do you understand the importance of that? (C)

The President: Yes. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We talked in an open and frank manner. He was very much there intellectually but he is marked by his trouble. He is aware of his troubles and speaks about them in an open manner. After one and a half hours of talking, he grew tired, but did not want to interrupt. He wanted to have lunch with me. Then we traveled on his boat. We went for a one hour boat ride and he was very lively; it was very beautiful. He is very open about his physical troubles and his reactions are normal considering the importance of his upcoming operation. He knows it will not be a cakewalk. I'm not a medical person, but he told me he will have two bypasses, one on each side of the heart to relieve the burden on the aorta. Our German doctors said the surgery is not so dangerous or risky, it is the question of whether he is physically well enough to undergo surgery. Of course, he wants to get through it. He is not resigned in any way. Surgery will take place at the end of the month. He appears to have carefully considered having the surgery done in Germany or the United States. He thought it would be too difficult to sell to the Russian public. (C)

I took the liberty of conveying your regards. He was happy to hear from you. I offered medical assistance on my and your behalf. He was happy to hear that. I also discussed who will stand in for him when he undergoes surgery. He said nothing is laid out in the constitution on this. My impression was that Yeltsin believes and trusts that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will take care of everyday business; Chernomyrdin will have his full confidence and trust. He is aware of the succession issue and it is quite visible he has certain reservations about Mr. Lebed. He was equally clear that he supports Lebed's efforts in Chechnya. Many people in Moscow hold a different view. He was of the clear conviction that the war had to end, that Russia could not win that war; it would have been a shame to have let it continue. His firm intention is to put an end to the war. He understands the damage done to the standing of the army and the negative public opinion. (C)

Other issues we discussed included NATO enlargement. I told him he would have to trust in two things. That we and the Western world could not accept a veto from Russia, from whomever and that the matter has to be settled in 1997, no later. He accepted the latter point and said the longer the question remains an open,

pending one, the greater the damage would be. It is very important for him to know that while he is in the hospital, during that time, that the West will not take any action that would isolate Yeltsin. He is casting a critical eye on the U.S. political elections, but that eye is not on you, but on your competitor. Concerning NATO, I think the chances are good for us to reach an agreement with him. It will not be easy but it is doable. As we agreed last week, we should, in the coming weeks, concentrate on adapting and changing the internal structure of NATO and then start direct talks with Yeltsin next year. He has a great interest in seeing these negotiations take place at the highest level, in a discreet manner, by those with personal mandates from us. I think if we stay together, you, me, Major and Chirac, and speak to him in an open and frank manner, then we stand a chance of achieving something worthwhile. It is only after the four of us get something substantial that we turn it over to the official bureaucracy. I think this is in complete line with his personal wishes. We have to start negotiations with candidates for membership and try to set a summer date for a summit meeting of NATO. Also, in trying to stay in line with what we said last week, we, by the end of the year, have to announce the NATO meeting for late spring or early summer of 1997. In a nutshell, we can get an agreement with Yeltsin. It will not be easy, but it is doable on the condition he recovers his strength. If not, it will be a difficult period ahead. That's it in a nutshell. (Ø)

The President: That's very good news. I'm encouraged by what you say regarding Boris' state of mind and what he said about NATO. I think it is important that all of us be supportive of him during his surgery and that we do not create an impression of taking advantage of him during his convalescence. He has been a very important supportive ally. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I take it you agree to my idea of a timeframe and schedule? (Ø)

The President: Let's go over it again. We agree to announce in December a NATO meeting for the spring or summer of 1997. Is that right? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. And then we go about discreetly preparing for it. (Ø)

The President: Yes. As soon as Yeltsin is well enough, we will work out an appropriate relationship between NATO and Russia. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. My suggestion is we proceed at the highest political level as possible and establish contacts and

what the agreement should look like. Only then, once an agreement is reached, do we get bureaucracies involved. (C)

The President: Sounds good to me. I will call Boris before his surgery and reinforce what you said. I will hope and pray he comes out of it okay. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I think we stand a good chance if we stand together. (C)

The President: I agree. It's a wonderful thing that you went there. I wish I could have been there myself. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you and regards to your wife. Continue to fight as best you can. (U)

The President: You bet. I have to make your bet good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Auf Wiedersehn. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6074

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 10, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS MAP

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, September 10, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on September 10, 1996, between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany.

Concurrence by: Steve Pifer SP

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve DS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 09/10/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9606074
DATE 11 SEP 96

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 10 SEP 96
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1 + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1597				
Document ID: 9700162				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (4 pages)~~	~~01/06/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1597

FOLDER TITLE:
9700162

2015-0776-M
rs1462

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700162
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 97 14

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
TELCON
RUSSIA
HS
NATO

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 6 JAN 97

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 13 JAN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		SCHMIDT
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY JP DATE 1/13 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SENS	Z	97011018	FOR DECISION
001		X	97011312	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97011312	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970113	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0162

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT · ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	2		
Kerrick			
Soderberg	[redacted]		
Steinberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		D-with
Records Mgt.	4		diskette

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JAN 10 PM 5:09

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0162

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	2	AOP	
Kerrick			
Soderberg	[redacted]		
Steinberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	1/10/97	D-with
Records Mgt.	4		diskette

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JAN 10 PM 5:09

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0162

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 13, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Chargé only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1/9/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.36)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Katherine O'Loughlin, Peter Huggins, Lyle Harrison, Larry Wright, Marianna Papadimitrious, John Schmidt, Steve Pifer and Dan Fried

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 6, 1997, 1110 - 1133 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, hello. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's good to hear your voice. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm doing well. I have started work. I was at home for a few days over Christmas. I was thinking about a few things and wrote a few of them down. I spent lots of time in the woods. For the first time in many years, we have had a hard winter on the Rhine, lots of snow, with low temperatures of about -5 or -6 degrees centigrade. I hope soon that you will have completed setting up your new government. I hope all works out well. I have been looking at a few things for the new year, and I believe this will be a very important year for all of us, with the developments in the former Yugoslavia, for example, the question of NATO enlargement, and a number of developments in Asia that are of interest to all of us. It is a wise idea that you will embark on direct, high-level talks with the Chinese leadership. (Ø)

The purpose of my call is to give you a first-hand report on my conversation with Boris Yeltsin. Per my request, we met at a place outside of Moscow, to avoid the protocol paraphernalia in

the Kremlin. We were quite alone. It was basically a one-on-one meeting with just two notetakers and interpreters present. I wanted to give you my impressions right away. I believe Yeltsin has come through the operation well, but basically his general shape is certainly not good at all. I would like to word this very carefully. The Boris Yeltsin that was around last year from January to May, for example, was a quite different person from the Yeltsin we see today. There is virtually nothing left of his vitality, and also his tendency to show his physical strength, to overpower people with his physical presence, is diminished. As far as his mental state is concerned, he has all his faculties. He still has a very good memory. He still reacts logically and his remarks are to the point, but he is much stiffer in his performance. He is more static and he seems to have slowed down significantly. We all saw him and I believe you saw him on TV. He seems to be very rigid, his face is very mask-like. But there are no signs that he has resigned himself to his fate or become despondent. He is very determined to do his job, but won't be able to do it at the same speed as before. This may change, since he is still in a period of convalescence. He may improve over time. He also had a bad cold which may have slowed him down, but it may also be that this is the Boris Yeltsin we will continue to see. Though this may seem blunt or brutal, but we are well advised to use this new year, 1997, to the best of our ability, and he himself wants to make the best use of his time. (C)

Of all the issues we discussed, there are three of particular interest to you. They quite evidently are going to continue to improve their relations with the People's Republic of China, and he expects a visit from the President of China soon and Prime Minister Li Peng was already there. Another thing is the relationship with Iran. I asked personal questions quite specifically and he answered that they are not selling the Iranians any sort of nuclear or modern, he underlined modern, weapons technology. But for them the overriding argument is that in the neighboring republics, fundamentalism is on the rise. They are quite worried about it and want to play the Iranian card against it. On economics, it is quite evident they have made great strides against inflation, but on jobs there is still stagnation. He claims, and I don't know, I am not a judge, that he will be able in the next few weeks to pay pensions to the elderly and soldiers' pay to members of the armed forces. (C)

Regarding NATO enlargement, I put it to him quite clearly and unequivocally that he has no veto powers, but that this is something we all want to bring about together. His position was quite clear; he is against it. He thinks it is unnecessary and fraught with enormous psychological problems. He is afraid that a new cold war is imminent and that people won't understand it.

My impression is that we would be able to bring this about if we try to come to an agreement with him personally. I do not believe we will be successful if we do this through normal, official channels. This is obviously something we have to try to do anyway. (C)

What I believe, however, is that it would be desirable for us -- for you, me, Jacques Chirac and John Major -- to have direct, bilateral talks with him and formulate one line of argument that will convince him. This would be, as I see it, an agreed position and a concerted effort by all of us. We should try to put this forward as soon as possible, and if possible, engage in this kind of dialogue before we enter negotiations leading to the accession of new members. So, if we want to stick to the agreement that has been set -- namely, the date of the NATO meeting this summer (because delaying would cause great irritation in prospective members, in Poland, Hungary and others) -- we need to come up with fresh ideas of what we can do as soon as possible. Now as I understand it, you will receive him as your guest in March or April? (C)

The President: Yes, that's right. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is why I believe we should make the best possible use of our time before then. My greatest fear is that if it is handled only in official channels, we will fail. I would like to ask you who's in charge of this - Strobe Talbott? Because if he is, I ask that he come here as soon as possible before his planned visit to Moscow. I would really love to talk to him directly before that, if he is indeed the man responsible. (C)

The President: First, let me say, that I am basically encouraged by what you have said. Strobe Talbott will represent us on this issue. I understand we cannot work through the normal NATO bureaucracy. I will have Strobe talk with Bitterlich today to work this on a personal basis. I will send Strobe to Bonn before Moscow and he can represent me and Madeleine Albright. You are right, we need to have a coordinated, diplomatic effort. So I believe that if you, me, John and Jacques can come up with a united approach to present to Boris and a creative position -- one that is based on no Russian veto, no slowdown of the process, no explicit exclusion of anyone, and no compromise of NATO decision-making -- I think we will be all right. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: What I am most interested in, Bill, so as not to be misunderstood, is that Strobe Talbott come here as soon as possible, and not just when he is en route to Moscow. Because I think it would be important to have him here to have a good,

lengthy conversation about these issues, and then go back and talk to you, before going to Moscow. (C)

The President: I agree with that. He can go this week or next week. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: He can talk to Bitterlich and work out the details and then we can talk again. I believe you understood me that we need to make the best possible use of our time right now. I am not a member of the medical community or a prophet, but I think time is running out. (C)

The President: Let me say two things. I agree we have to make the most of our time and I will have Strobe come over there. The second thing is, I have had a lot of friends who have had the same operation Boris had. My father-in-law had it as well. The typical experience is that after the operation, there is a period of psychological slowness or even depression for a few months, but usually within six months people are performing at a higher level of efficiency and in a better frame of mind than a couple of years before the operation. It is too soon to draw conclusions. Boris may rebound not just physically but psychologically as well, and be better than before the operation. It is too soon to tell. We have to see how it goes. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That may well be, but unfortunately, we do not know for sure. (C)

The President: You're right, we have to make the most of every day. I'm not like you, I can only stay in office for eight years. I can't stay for 18 or 20 years. I can't keep up with Bismarck or Adenauer like you can, so I have to work hard every day and make the most of it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well, thank you. We will welcome Strobe Talbott soon. (C)

The President: Thank you. He will be there soon. Give my best to Hannelore. Bye-bye. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bye-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0162

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 9, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT JRS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on January 6, 1997.

Concurrences by: Steve Pifer SP and Dan Fried DF

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve AS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBYNARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1/9/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9700162
DATE 13 JAN 97

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIG +DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1601				
Document ID: 9700857				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl (5 pages)~~	~~02/07/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1601

FOLDER TITLE:
9700857

2015-0776-M
rs1463

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700857
RECEIVED: 10 FEB 97 12

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 7 FEB

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 13 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97021019	FOR DECISION
001		X	97021020	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
001	HARMON	Z	97021020	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	97021020	HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970210	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0857

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (Z) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1 3	[illegible]	A - Tab I
Dohse			
Kerrick	2	(V)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(E) 2/10	D W/DISK
Records Mgt.	5	e 2/10	D W/DISK

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

97 FEB 10 PM 5:21

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0857

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (12) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1 3		A-Tab I
Dohse			
Kerrick	2	(V)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(E) 2/10	D w/DISK
Records Mgt.	5	2/10	D w/DISK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 FEB 10 PM 5:21

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 10, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 2/10/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.37)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Marc Koehler, Lyle Harrison, Katherine O'Loughlin, Larry Wright, Marianna Papadimitriou, Mary Ann Peters

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 7, 1997, 9:46 - 10:13 a.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Guten tag. How are you? (U)

The President: Guten tag. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am absolutely speechless. I see your organization is streamlined since your reelection. I'm very pleased to hear your voice. I read your very good speech. I hope you are fine and in good spirits. When I look out my window, I see spring and my mood is very much like spring. You know we have enormous battles to face. We have lived way beyond our means. Now we have to fight and we have to reduce unemployment and cut spending. Well, you know all of that, this is the kind of work that has to be done. And at any rate, I'm in a good fighting spirit. (C)

Before you start, I'd like to make one point: I believe we should cooperate very closely regarding the UN Human Rights Conference on China, because I listened and read very carefully what you had to say on the subject. I believe we have to have a reasonable solution. Who is the person who sits on that particular desk in the White House? Because I would very much like to discuss that matter in a very low-key way. I'm afraid when things are discussed in official channels they sometimes get leaked. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/10/07

The President: Yes, I'm glad you mentioned that. We were very shortly about to start consulting on that with the EU. John Shattuck will be working on it at the State Department. Eric Schwartz handles it here at the White House. Maybe we ought to have Sandy Berger talk to Bitterlich about it, and they can agree on how we should handle it between our two countries. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bitterlich will be in Washington on Monday. (C)

The President: I think so. We will follow up on that. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (C)

The President: I wanted to talk to you a little about NATO-Russia issues. As you know, Chernomyrdin has been in Washington for the last couple of days, meeting with Gore, and I am going to see him today. We are going to announce that I am going to meet with Yeltsin in May. I mean March, I'm sorry, about six weeks from now. We have been working very hard to address Russia's concerns over NATO enlargement and build a strong NATO-Russia relationship. Madeleine Albright is going to Moscow later this month to continue talks as well. On specific issues, the Russians have pressed for legally binding prohibitions on forward deployments of nuclear weapons and NATO conventional forces. We have made it clear that we cannot support that, but we did indicate a willingness to repeat the so-called "three no's" on nuclear weapons in the charter -- we have no intention, no plan to do it and no reason to put nuclear weapons on territory of new members. And we also assured the Russians we can meet some of their concerns on conventional forces through CFE negotiations. (C)

There are two other potential problems out there. We have put forward a proposal for a consultative mechanism with the Russians for possible joint actions. The Russians also wanted a veto over NATO out-of-area deployments and we have made it clear that was not acceptable. (C)

Now there are two other areas where we may be able to work something out. One would be an agreement to consult on NATO adaptation in the NATO-Russia channel. The other would be charter language noting Russia is not excluded from future consideration for membership. (C)

That's a basic summary of the NATO issues. I just want to make two or three other points. It's important we keep in close touch as NATO-Russia discussions continue, and that we keep sending the same message to Moscow. This includes standing firm on our plans

to follow through with invitations to new members at the Madrid Summit in July. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much, Bill. I would like to give you my answer right away. First of all, I think there is no doubt about it, and this is certainly not a contentious issue. It is firmly Germany's position that we absolutely need to keep the date of the NATO Summit meeting just as planned. It must take place at the exact date and at no other time. (C)

Secondly, and I think that it needs to be abundantly clear to everyone, that no one has a veto regarding NATO enlargement, that this is a sovereign decision of sovereign nations. I told Boris Yeltsin this, that he has absolutely no veto at all. (C)

If you start from these two assumptions, and I am absolutely of the opinion that we need to do this, we still all of us agree we need to come to some sort of agreement with Yeltsin and the Russians. Precisely because he does not have a veto right, we need to talk to him, and we need to counter this "anti-mood" that is currently prevalent in Moscow, and I must say this "anti-mood" has increased. I do believe the psychological situation because of this has become much more difficult, which is why I think we would be well advised to try to bring about these changes in NATO together with him and in consultation with him. And again, I am absolutely sure that any possible successor to Boris Yeltsin will be immeasurably more difficult for us. I would like to make the best possible use of the time while he is in office. (C)

If I understand it correctly, his main problem is, and this is from discussions with him, that we come to some agreement on a treaty with him. For example, the idea that we conclude a treaty with him that obviously at the end will have to be ratified -- I told him quite clearly this won't work, but I believe it is a hurdle that can be overcome. The necessary thing, the thing dearest to his heart, is for him to be seen as an equal, and we must create the necessary precondition to enable him to appear like that. He must be seen internationally and at home as a man who has power, enjoys international recognition, and as one of the most important players in the world. (C)

Now no one has ever said we shouldn't hold a meeting among all of us, but obviously Madrid is the only place where NATO will be able to make a decision and where NATO will be able to make its positions clear. That is how the idea of a conference before that came up. Yeltsin mentioned it to me and to Chirac. No one thought of it as a steering committee for NATO. (C)

Prodi was just here and I reassured him of that. But let me say I am personally absolutely sure that without some sort of

gesture, and I am open to any kind of intelligent idea, but without a gesture, we will have enormous problems reaching an agreement in Madrid. Bitterlich will be in Washington and will have additional information to give to your people. Please don't misunderstand me, Bill. I am certainly not keen on another summit. I am an old hand at this and do not need prestige from it. But I see very real problems and perhaps your people should talk to Bitterlich and discuss that. After you talk to Chernomyrdin, we could talk again. I will be back in the office after Tuesday next week. (C)

The President: Let me say first of all, in general, we need to find some ways to elevate Boris' status and we need some way to let the people in Russia know we regard him as an equal, a leader of Russia, a country that matters in a very significant way. I think that there are a number of things we can do and one would be to try to adapt the CFE treaty to try to address some of his concerns. I am pleased the Allies made so much progress last week in Brussels. The U.S. adopted a number of key elements in the German approach to revising the Treaty. We will be getting back to the Allies soon with additional views on this issue, but I think this is one area where we can make a big difference for him. I have some other ideas I am working through and I'll get back to you as soon as I have them. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That would be good. (C)

The President: Now on the summit, I am not opposed to the meeting of five, but I want to defer the idea until after I get back from my meeting with Yeltsin in March. We need to know what will come out of the meeting, and be assured it will be a success. It must accelerate the process, not derail it. (C)

Helmut, there is just one other issue I want to mention briefly to you. As you know, we are having this dispute with France over NATO command. We very much want France to join the integrated military structure. However, I am not prepared in present circumstances to relinquish command over AFSOUTH, even if it means the French will not integrate -- the U.S. Navy is too important in that area. I have offered some other things to enhance European visibility in the Mediterranean along with the agreement to review the AFSOUTH in a few years time. (C)

I would like you to use your influence on Chirac to show flexibility. This is a command that has a certain resonance with our military because of what we've done, the amount of our forces there, and what we may have to do, so this is an area I just don't think I can give in on, but I'm sensitive about elevating Europe's role in NATO command structures, and very happy to try to meet Chirac's demands on other concerns. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, perhaps your people ought to make use of Bitterlich being in Washington next week, and share with him your ideas of what offers you have in mind for the French, and he will report back to me, because very obviously I have a great interest in there being no bad feelings between France and the United States. (C)

The President: Yes, I agree with you. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Is it okay to be on the phone with you again the second half of next week? (C)

The President: Absolutely. I'll talk to you then. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Give my regards to your wife and you take care of yourself. You have no election so you can relax. Enjoy yourself. (U)

The President: Yes, I cannot serve for life like you can. I'm jealous. I'll do my best. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: You couldn't possibly be jealous of me, you couldn't possibly if you knew what I meant! I think you have a very good set-up there in the United States, it takes you out of the limelight! (U)

The President: Yes, and I have a good pension! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
February 10, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~SAMUEL R. BERGER~~ DONALD L. KERRICK

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl of Germany on February 7, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Joyce Harmon to ~~transmit~~ the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 2/10/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9700857
DATE 10 FEB 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 7 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIG+DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1605				
Document ID: 9701517				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (4 pages)~~	~~03/05/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1605

FOLDER TITLE:
9701517

2015-0776-M
rs1464

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701517
RECEIVED: 05 MAR 97 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 07 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
NATO
ECONOMIC SUMMIT
TELCON
RUSSIA

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 5 MAR 97

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 08 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		NSC CHRON
		PETERS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY JMH DATE 3.7.97 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	KERRICK	Z	97030713	FOR DECISION
001		X	97030719	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
001	HARMON	Z	97030719	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	97030719	HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970307	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1517

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	2/4	3/7	A - Tab I
~~Dohse~~ Braun	1	~~3/7~~	
Kerrick	3	3/7	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room		3/7	
West Wing Desk	5		D
Records Mgt.	6	TMA 3.7	D

'97 MAR 7 PM 1:08

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 7, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is provided for the information of Secretary Albright and Deputy Secretary Talbott only. (C)

Joyce A. Harmon
Joyce Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 3/7/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.38)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Harry Obst
Notetaker: Wylma Robinson, Larry Wright, Sean Rice, Mary Ann Peters, Katherine O'Loughlin, John Schmidt

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 5, 1997, 9:35 - 9:55 a.m. EST
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I am fine, thank you. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am very good, thank you. There is lots of work. I am right in the middle of my next battle. You know we have to launch a number of reforms here, but it seems to be going well. On Sunday, we had local elections in Hesse and, in fact, in spite of the very sort of profound reforms that we have launched, we did not receive a drubbing at the polls. We have really received a quite satisfactory result for my party so we will continue. And I must say I am very pleased we shall see each other before too long. I believe we will be meeting in The Hague during the celebration of the Marshall Plan. And you know that I will be in Washington for a day in order to say a word of gratitude on behalf of the German people for the Marshall Plan. And in my speech, I would also like to pay tribute to the particular services Secretary Marshall rendered to the Germans. And in June, I will see you in Denver. I look forward to that. And I believe in a few days' time, you will go to Helsinki for a very important meeting indeed and I wish you the best of luck. (C)

The President: Thank you. I am looking forward to seeing you on all these occasions. I wanted to talk to you about Helsinki.

First, thank you for the work you and Jacques and Solana have done. And I think there is a real chance for progress there on the NATO-Russia relationship. Moscow is now talking seriously with us, but there are still problems. They are still seeking to ban NATO infrastructure on territory of new members and to eliminate the possibility of any additional countries joining after the first group. Now, if at Helsinki, Boris can agree on the main elements of the NATO package, then I want to call you back and also talk to Jacques about how we should proceed between then and Madrid. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Thank you. (U)

The President: I don't have any intention or expectation that we can announce an agreement at Helsinki, but I hope we can make enough progress in private so we can have confidence that a final agreement can be reached. Then we can discuss how to orchestrate the period between March and May to build up Yeltsin without risk of a high-profile failure. I want to make sure the central role that you and Jacques have played comes through clearly.
Now let me say about this proposed five-power meeting after Helsinki, I have not ruled it out, but only if the outcome is decided. I don't want it to be a negotiating session. We also have to take into account the strong opposition from the Italians, Canadians and others. Maybe if we can get a deal with the Russians, one idea would be to hold a NATO-Russia summit in Paris before the Madrid meeting. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Maybe that was a misunderstanding just now. You know we are not really talking about a semi-NATO meeting before Paris, a quasi-NATO meeting. Boris Yeltsin's idea was to have a meeting in a somewhat smaller circle, but not in order to take a decision at this time, but to discuss certain issues and to prepare the ground, if you like. And, Bill, as I have always understood it, this was supposed to be a tool or an instrument to help you and not something that replaces the other conferences or other efforts. If it is not necessary, one really doesn't need it. You see, in the sense that when we see that matters come to a standstill and Yeltsin submits this plan or idea, then this could be helpful to make progress in the direction that we all desire. And, for very good reasons, I do not speak about this publicly. (Ø)

The President: Well, let me say, let's discuss it after Helsinki and see where we are. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is exactly my opinion. I believe we should not in any way further complicate matters. (Ø)

The President: I agree with that. Let me raise a couple of other issues. First of all, I want to talk a minute about the Denver summit. I think we can help Yeltsin by including Russia in a G-8 in the beginning and then getting his agreement that some of the finance and economic issues, perhaps even financing for Ukraine, would require the G-7, at least at finance ministers level, to meet separately. We should give Boris a broader role -- I think it is important for working out an overall arrangement for Europe. But if we have a G-8, we have to have some provision for a separate G-7 finance meeting, to resolve finance issues on which they have different interests. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I agree, Bill. I think we should start right away with a G-8. Whether we then at the end meet as G-7 heads of state and heads of government, that is something that we will have to wait and see, and decide whether we are in a position to do that. But at the moment, I am not in a position to tell Boris that. (C)

The President: I agree. I think they understand that there are certain economic decisions we may have to take that they can't be a part of yet. The question is, can we have the finance ministers meet alone and then relay their findings back to us without having the leaders meet again. Those kinds of questions do not need to be decided yet, but we should start out with him there at G-8. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I think we are in agreement. When you meet him in three weeks' time, it is very important for him that you convey the message that he is on par with you, a partner of equal rank. And I think it is absolutely sufficient, in order to be able to do that, that we offer him a G-8 format so he can participate right from the start. And if Ukraine is on the agenda, I think we will both agree this is not an issue they can contribute to anyway because, as you already said, he is not able to contribute finances or anything like that. (C)

The President: Well, I agree. There is another issue. Before we can formalize this, we have to get everyone to agree and right now the Japanese have concerns. I think it is my responsibility to try to persuade them to get on board. And I think Hashimoto will go along if we make it clear that finance issues will be discussed separately. (C)

Let me talk to you about one other thing very briefly, with regard to NATO integration with the French. I think it would be a shame if France doesn't reintegrate into NATO, but I still cannot agree to have the United States give up AFSOUTH right now. We have put an attractive package on the table to enhance France's role and I hope you will discuss with Jacques the

alternative to a single-minded focus on command of AFSOUTH. We need them back in NATO, and we have offered an attractive package. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, today as you know your new Secretary of Defense was here and I must say I had a very good impression, we had an excellent conversation. And I assured him already of the fact that I would like to be helpful wherever I can. Now, obviously, it would be very helpful for me in working out a strategy to work with Jacques, if I may call it that, if you could perhaps discreetly send me a memo of all the points that you might think would be helpful. Let me stress that once again, I can only do something if it is done with the utmost discretion. I am more than ready to do so. (S)

The President: I understand and I will send it to you. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It would be very good if you send it to me directly, not through diplomatic or official channels. (S)

The President: I will get it to you right way. Thank you. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I just want to assure you once again; I think we should do everything to clear the ground and get this out of the way. (S)

The President: Wonderful. Thank you. I will see you soon. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. Good-bye. And my warmest greetings to your wife. (U)

The President: Good-bye. My greetings to Hannelore. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9701517
DATE 07 MAR 97

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 5 MAR 97
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 7, 1997

[redacted]

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~JOYCE HARMON~~ DONALD L. KERRICK

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on March 5, 1997. Because of the sensitivity of the Chancellor's request (on page 4) for points to be used with Chirac, we are recommending that the telcon be distributed only to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A. (authorize Joyce Harmon to)

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 3/7/07

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1622				
Document ID: 9703580				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telelphone Call with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (5 pages)~~	~~05/22/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
~~001b. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (3 pages)~~	~~05/22/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([Kohl and Tel*...])
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2015-0776-M
rs1465

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9703580
RECEIVED: 22 MAY 97 14

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 22 MAY

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 28 MAY 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		SCHMIDT

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DP DATE 6/04 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	DAVIES	Z	97060214	FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
001		X	97060408	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97060408	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970604	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MH LOG # 3580

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

MH	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
~~Harmon~~ Brown	1	6/2	
Davies	2	6/3	A
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TMA 6.4	~~D~~
Records Mgt.	3		D - with disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 2 PM 1:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MH LOG # 3580

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PRS A/O _____

MH

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
~~Harmon~~ Brown	1	MB 6/2	
Davies	2	6/6/3	A
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	TMA 6.4	D
Records Mgt.	3		D - with disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 2 PM 1:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3580

June 4, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Kohl of Germany (C)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 5/29/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.39)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Natalie Johnson, Sean Rice, Larry Wright, James Smith, John Schmidt, Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 22, 1997, 0945-1006 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Oh, so you're already on the line Bill? How are you? (U)

The President: Yes, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I have to work a lot. As I am always saying here, I'm the second biggest idiot in the country for accepting all this work. I have to find the biggest idiot to do the work. (U)

The President: I see that you announced for re-election. Now that you've gone by Adenauer, you're going to blow by Bismarck! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I see you have read too many U.S. East-coast newspapers again, and you always read the wrong ones. I have no record to set. The only goal I have is to cap European integration. I am looking forward to seeing you in Paris, also in The Hague and in Denver. It is like the old couple still courting each other after all these years. (C)

The President: And aren't you still coming here, to Washington, in June, and we are going to Filomena's? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, that's true. (U)

The President: So we are like an aging couple. We'll have three dates in four months and that's about all you can stand at our age! (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, that's very true. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine and I'm very pleased with the negotiations on the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Solana did a good job; he gave Yeltsin what he needs without compromising the status of new NATO members or NATO's military effectiveness. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I absolutely agree. (U)

The President: I know that you played a key role, and that Yeltsin places enormous importance on his relationship with you. I wanted to ask you about the summit in Madrid. Chirac asked Boris to attend; I had assumed he wouldn't -- is there any chance he will come to Madrid? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Actually, to me he said neither yes or no, but that he is going to call me. I assume he wants to talk about this. I'll call you, or rather have Bitterlich call one of the members of your staff, to discuss what he said. (C)

The President: Well, it would be a very bold move, but it would reinforce our contention that we're uniting Europe, not dividing it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is exactly what I would say, and that it would do a lot to boost his prestige. (C)

The President: I agree with that, too, and if he handles it right, it could help him at home without complicating our work. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, exactly. (C)

The President: For us, the challenge at Madrid is to make sure that the countries invited to join NATO can fulfill their obligations, so that it will still be a credible alliance and not purely political. But we also need to have a strong set of measures so that countries not invited still feel a part of the process and not left in a "gray zone" and that the Partnership for Peace still means something. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I agree. (C)

The President: I'm looking forward to The Hague, as well, and I remember what you told me about the meaning of the Marshall Plan to you personally. I think we can use this to unify Europe, Russia and North America in a way that can make sure that the 21st century doesn't turn out like the 20th did. Perhaps I can say something to reinforce what you're trying to do in Europe. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'd welcome that. Maybe I should give you my ideas on how I'd react to your visit, and I'm saying this -- as I'm sure you know -- as your friend. I wouldn't dream of giving you advice. I'll just say a few things. I think it is a great and very important thing that you plan to attend the ceremonies in The Hague. Many people in Washington may not understand that, but the way I see it, you're filling a sort of vacuum that has evolved. What we see in Europe is a certain mood that seems to be spreading -- it may be just rumors, but sometimes this sort of talk becomes political reality. (C)

The people who say these things claim that Washington doesn't appear to be that interested in European matters. They're not really accusing you, they're saying that the Administration thinks the same way as the Congress, and that both the Senate and the House don't seem to care that much. (C)

As you know, previously we had frequent visitors from both the House and Senate over here. But this steady flow seems to have stopped all of a sudden. For instance, the two Republican leaders, the candidates for President, have never come to Germany. This is something that the newspapers and people here have noticed. (C)

At the same time, people have noticed a growing interest in the United States in the Pacific Rim. This is not my opinion, because, as you know, I've always been a keen observer of the American scene, and I note a growing number of American businessmen coming to Germany and to my office. So I think -- if I may say so -- that it would be highly useful for you to pay tribute to President Roosevelt and to Marshall, and I will say this very clearly in the speech that I will give in Washington. So, if you could just mention in your speech that Americans have been in Europe and will continue to be there after the world has changed so significantly -- that with new countries to the east and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we still need a transatlantic bridge. (C)

And perhaps, as in your inaugural speech, you should use the imagery of a bridge to the 21st century, a bridge which Europe and the United States will build together. This would be very

well received over here. That image would be very effective here. (C)

Again, I'd like to reassure you, on my part, that no matter what your people tell you, it's very important that you attend the ceremony at this point in time. It is very different from any conference you may have to attend. This is a unique historical event, which has some bearing on recent history. One should also remember that two-thirds of the people in Europe today were born after the events of 50 years ago; but the rest of us still retain a living memory. I've given many speeches in recent weeks and months, constantly speaking of events after the war and what the United States did for us, and this is always very well received. I will give this week in the Bundestag what I think you would call a special State of the Nation address to commemorate the Marshall Plan. (C)

The President: Well, I think that's very good advice and I'll take it. I'm bringing five congressional leaders with me on this trip, to reinforce our common interests and reinvigorate Congressional interest in Europe. (C)

I think you may already know this, but we've finally named John Kornblum as Ambassador to Germany yesterday. We're sending a package of ambassadors up to the Hill, but with our divided government, unfortunately, the appointments process has become much more complicated. We'll get him through. I think you know John and that he's a good man. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I know well that it's certainly not your fault that Congress acts the way it does. Let me reassure you that the Ambassador is very welcome here. The important thing is that I know he has your support. He enjoys your trust and he'll have mine too. I know him well and look forward to working with him. He'll certainly be welcome here. (C)

The President: Thank you; he's a good man. Let me say that I also have to apologize to you for something a State Department spokesman said yesterday about refugees, which sounded like a criticism of Germany. We have a similar problem here in the United States with Central American refugees who came to the United States during the wars there. Unless I can change the legislation, I will have to send them back so, in our present position, we're in no position to criticize anyone, and I want you to know that I'd never permit public criticism of Germany. I think he was just restating U.S. policy. My partnership with you is as important as anything in the world to me. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I know, and I value our partnership as much as you do, and I thank you for what you said. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much for calling and I look forward to seeing you in Paris. Please convey my regards to your wife. (U)

The President: I will. Thank you, friend. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3580

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Kohl of Germany (C)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 5/29/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.4D)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Natalie Johnson, Sean Rice, Larry Wright, James Smith, John Schmidt, Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 22, 1997, 0945-1006 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office

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Chancellor Kohl: I know, and I value our partnership as much as you do, and I thank you for what you said. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3580

June 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on May 22, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation ~~of the meeting~~ be filed for the record.

Approve 6/6/3 Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 5/31/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9703580
DATE 04 JUN 97

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1629				
Document ID: 9704636				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (3 pages)~~	~~07/03/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1629

FOLDER TITLE:
9704636

2015-0776-M
rs1466

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704636
RECEIVED: 03 JUL 97 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 JUL 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 3 JUL

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 09 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHMIDT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		SCHMIDT
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	DAVIES	Z	97070512	FOR DECISION
001		X	97070514	RICE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97070514	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970704	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4636

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (R) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	1	(R) 7/4	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(R) 7/4 OC	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(R) 7/4	D
Records Mgt.	4	(R) 7/5	D w/DISK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Ben Kerrick - See note on blue slip.

97 JUL 3 PM 8:25

(R)

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Log # 46360

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm Rice To PG-Kerzeick Date 4/1/92

This looks straight forward and I do not believe it needs to go to SRB to approve. Your thoughts?

Cleared to sign ✓

Send to SRB _____

I was there.

OK

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 46360

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (R) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	1	(R) 7/4	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(R) 7/4 OC	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(R) 7/4	~~D~~
Records Mgt.	4	(R) 7/5	D w/DISK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Ben Kerrick - See note on blue slip. (R)

'97 JUL 3 PM 8:25

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 4, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Chargé only.

Edward S. Reiff
FOR: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/3/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.41)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Erica Konuk
Notetakers: Doug Mueller, Trey Whitworth, Pat O'Shaughnessy, James Smith, John Schmidt, Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 3, 1997, 1204-1214 EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes? (U)

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are you doing, Bill? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's good to hear your voice; how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I still have the flu. Must be the summer flu. I must have brought it back from the States; I know you have done it on purpose to force me to give in on the CO2 emissions. (U)

The President: No, I didn't. You could say you got it from dirty air in America, then I'd have to be even tougher. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it's because of the air conditioning. Over here, we simply don't have it. I've always had the after-effect. I look forward to meeting you Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and I do hope we'll come to agreement as soon as possible. As far as I can see, and correct me if I'm wrong, what you're going to announce is what you told me in New York. You're going to accept three and no more, right? I think we can pursue it that way, but we simply need to give a message opening up a perspective for Romania and Slovenia. (S)

The President: I agree with that. We need to send the right signal. I think we ought to say that these three are the most ready, but that we have an interest in building NATO's southern flank, and that we'll review it in 1999. Then we can send a clear signal to the individual countries that if they can keep their democracies going and stay on the path of reform, they will be excellent candidates. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we can do that in that way, but I think we should have some kind of formula which Romania and Slovenia can be comfortable with and which will address the concerns of their people. I think we can come up with some kind of language. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I think there's a way to do it, to keep the door open to Bulgaria and Austria, that doesn't create another problem for us with the Baltic states. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: But the Baltic states, we simply won't be able to include them. (C)

The President: But we don't need to drive them to distraction with insecurity now for no good reason. We need to find a way to keep them happy in the Partnership for Peace. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I do think we can find a solution there. (C)

The President: Yes, and the other thing I think is important is that the language be very forward-leaning, but that there be no formal commitment until 1999. We don't want to appear to be making one decision when we're making another. We need to preserve the integrity of this decision. Surely, we can find a way to do it; our people will just have to work on it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I'm quite confident that we'll be able to come up with common language. Tell your people, perhaps Sandy Berger, to call Joachim Bitterlich and work on some language. (C)

The President: I'll do that. We'll keep working on it. See you in a few days in Madrid. Thanks, Helmut. Bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Please give your wife my regards. (U)

The President: Just let me say one thing: when we get there, we need to find a way for Jacques to take credit for this language, so it's not a loss for him. Perhaps if you could call him, and find a way for this to be his contribution, if that helps. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll try, Bill. (U)

The President: If we can agree first, perhaps you can call Chirac and find a way for him to buy off on it. I don't want this to be a big defeat for him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Obviously. Bill, I see your point. I'll do my best, but obviously, I can't promise anything. (C)

The President: Thank you, bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9704636
DATE 04 JUL 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 3 JUL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4636

July 3, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN SCHMIDT

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on July 3, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/3/07

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1648				
Document ID: 9707223				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (4 pages)~~	~~10/21/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1648

FOLDER TITLE:
9707223

2015-0776-M
rs1467

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9707223
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 97 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: MCELDOWNEY
BANDLER

DOC DATE: 27 OCT 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
ENVIRONMENT

TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY 21 OCT 97 ON KYOTO CONF / CLIMATE CHANGE RE TO DEVELOPING - THIRD WORLD NATIONS

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM 1 ONLY DUE DATE: 29 OCT 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97102715	FOR DECISION
001		X	97110418	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM 1 ONLY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7223

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	(R) 10/27	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(D)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	D 10/27	N/R
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SAB
VJS

COMMENTS:

'97 OCT 27 AM 8:22

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7223

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 27, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl which took place on October 21, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBHNARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 10/23/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.42)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Harry Obst (interpreted from his residence)
Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Cindy Lawrence, Tony Campanella, Pat O'Shaughnessy, David Higgins, Marty Hart, James Smith, Don Bandler, Nancy McEldowney and David Sandalow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 21, 1997, 10:04 - 10:27 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, I'm doing quite well. I just had a good party congress and everything went quite well. The economic figures are looking very good. We have 11 months of elections ahead of us. Since we are idiots over here in Germany, we have 4 state elections before our national elections. But you know how it is with old military horses -- though retired to the stables, the minute we hear the bugle call, we rear our heads and are ready to trot again.

The President: I'm glad to hear you are in such good spirits. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: So how are you? (U)

Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 10/23/07

The President: I'm doing great. I just wanted to call you to see how you are doing and to see if there is anything I could do for you over the next several months to help in any way. I also have a few issues to raise with you. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: First of all, thank you for your very kind offer. Should there be a moment when I feel you could be of assistance I will get back to you. (C)

The President: I wanted to talk with you about the Kyoto conference on climate change. Since we met in Denver and especially in the last month I have been working hard, first, to get our government together on a position, and then to get support from the environmental community and the more enlightened business community. We are going to go to Kyoto with a commitment to binding limits, but there are a couple of issues to discuss: what the limits should be and who should participate in the process. (C)

First of all, on limits, I know the European position is that we should go significantly below 1990 levels by 2010, but the problem is, for the United States that it would require over a 30 percent reduction, far larger than anyone else. I believe we can do that, but not more. I was hoping that we could get a commitment for further reductions in 2005, 2010, 2015 and maybe agree to hold a conference every five years. We are working on our proposal now and have strong support from environmental groups. We are also facing bitter opposition from the auto and coal industry, as well as from the labor groups, which are a major part of my political base. We are also opposed by a majority of Republicans in Congress. But I still think we can go forward and get something done. (C)

The second related issue I wanted to mention is participation. The EU is currently opposed to any involvement in this process by developing countries, including the use of joint implementation projects whereby nations, such as Japan could work with developing countries and split the credit for it. Even if we do our part in the developed world, in three decades or so, we will be surpassed by the Chinese, Indians, and others, in carbon emissions, and the overall result would be no reduction in the concentration of gases in the atmosphere. What I am working on is an approach in which major developing countries can agree to be in a process that targets their emissions with a view to stabilizing them without hurting their growth. This would provide a mechanism by which developed

nations can work on energy conservation or renewal projects in developing countries and get credit for reducing carbon emission which would be split between developing and developed nations. Jim Wolfensohn at the World Bank is developing such a trading emissions scheme. I think they will be ready to go with it pretty soon. If the Kyoto conference rejects this, it will weaken our global approach to limit emissions; if it embraces it, it will not alleviate the responsibility of the United States, which has a lot of work to do to reduce our emissions. (C)

At any rate, I wanted to call you because I know our negotiators are working this week in Bonn, and it is important that Kyoto result in agreement rather than argument. Europe is in a somewhat better position than the United States, primarily because the United States had an unusual bit of good economic growth in the 1990s and because of certain other developments, like Great Britain moving away from coal to natural gas. As a result, Europe is in a better position than we to meet and go below 1990 targets. But, we are working to raise public awareness in the United States. I am beating back a multi-million dollar public relations campaign by the coal and oil industries, and I welcome the fight. However, I don't think we can go 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010. That would require almost a 40 percent reduction of greenhouse gases. I don't know anyone who believes we can do that, especially since Congress won't pass a gas tax. (C)

I wanted to call you and go over this because I know how deeply you care and because it is a big issue in your country. I hope we can decide in advance what should happen at Kyoto. Joint implementation of projects with developing countries is an important element and I think we can sell it to the developing countries. The Argentines agreed to support joint implementation with developed countries during my recent trip. I think we can bring other Latin American countries on board as well. In any case, I wanted to go over this with you before we say anything publicly. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much for the very interesting and comprehensive report. Thank you in particular for your frankness. This is what I think friendship is all about -- frankly discussing problems. As you said, our experts are meeting right now on this issue. Let me look into this further. Obviously, I have no interest at all in our getting into a controversy on this. I think the situation calls for respect of others' positions. I am interested in the scheme you propose

for cooperation between third world nations and developed nations. I would be very interested in getting more details on this and will then get back to you. Let me assure you that I am very well aware of the situation you face in Congress and what is feasible for you. I suppose that is a position that we all face once and a while. At any rate, I think you ought to know that even though there are differences of opinion, we want to avoid getting into a tough controversy. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. I will send you the information on the developing nations idea immediately. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, very good. (U)

The President: By the way, isn't this the 15th anniversary of your chancellorship? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That was a few days ago, I'm sort of an old ass. (U)

The President: Well, since they won't let me run again, I always pull for you so at least someone doesn't have to leave. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good, see you soon. (U)

The President: Very good. Bye-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl October 21, 1987 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 10/23/07

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1659				
Document ID: 9708430				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (6 pages)~~	~~12/11/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1659

FOLDER TITLE:
9708430

2015-0776-M
rs1468

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9708430
RECEIVED: 15 DEC 97 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 17 DEC 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
ASIA
CONGRESSIONAL
TELCON
INTL TRADE
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCOM W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 11 DEC 97

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 20 DEC 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 12/17 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 200
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97121615	FOR DECISION
001		X	97121711	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	97121711	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	971217	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8430

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	(R) 12/16 12/17	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(I) 12/16	
Steinberg		copy	
Berger		copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	~~3~~ 4	TMA 12.17	~~D with~~
Records Mgt.	5		D diskette

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB, JS } TMA 12.17

COMMENTS:

'97 DEC 15 AM 10:45

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8430

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	(R) 12/16 12/17	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(C) 12/16	
Steinberg		copy	
Berger		copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	~~3~~ 4	TMA 12.17	~~D w/th~~
Records Mgt.	5		D diskette

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB, JS } TMA 12.17

COMMENTS:

'97 DEC 16 AM 10:46

Exec Sec Office has diskette Wp2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8430

December 17, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl, December 11, 1997 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Edward S. Walker

FOR: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2013
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 12/15/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.43)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: James Smith, Marianna Papadimitriou, Jeff Rathke, Bob Ford, Peter Huggins, Tony Campanella, Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 11, 1997, 9:28-9:57 a.m. EST
Miami, Florida

Chancellor Kohl: Hello? (U)

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine, thank you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, do you have the same kind of crazy schedule before Christmas that I have? This is a crazy kind of development that happens every year the week before Christmas, people heaping appointment after appointment on my desk. But for some reason, at least we have spring weather outside. Everything seems to be topsy-turvy now, but I hope we remain the same people as we always have been. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: So, how are things: do you have a lot of trouble at home right now? (U)

The President: No, things are going well here, but I am very concerned about things in Asia. I'm also very concerned about

the neo-isolationism in our Congress, where both parties are playing games with our international responsibilities, mostly over dues to the UN and expanding our trade initiatives. Otherwise things are going quite well here. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I am trying to help you, believe me. I preach sermons and try to spread the good gospel to every Congressman and Senator I can take hold of over here. I am trying to influence them. (C)

The President: I'm making good progress in persuading them that we must stay in Bosnia. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You know, before Christmas I plan to spend a day down in Bosnia with the German contingent, the soldiers deployed there, to demonstrate our commitment. And I think we will, the two of us, stay on course and abide by the policy line we agreed upon. (C)

The President: I think we have to, because slowly it is working. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes I hope so, I sincerely hope so, but obviously we have had a lot of disappointments, as well. (C)

The President: It's taking more time, but we have to stay with it. What do you think about the agreement in Kyoto? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it is the lowest common denominator. Believe me, I am not very delighted or enchanted with the results, but under the circumstances, it is the maximum possible, and I suppose we will just have to live with it. It doesn't really make sense but we will just have to sell it to our publics in the best possible light. (C)

The President: That is what we will have to do. I think also if we take as many initiatives as quickly as possible to show we're serious, and keep working on the big developing countries, it will be shown as a very important first step. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, I think we will simply try to make the best of it, Bill. It doesn't make sense to be grumpy about it and try to change things in retrospect. And in hindsight it always looks different. (C)

The President: What do you know about Yeltsin's health? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I hear very different things about him. As yet, I don't have any source of reliable information. There are some people who say it's nothing serious but others say, yes, he has heart problems, cardiac troubles, but there is nothing substantive yet. As soon as I know, I'll call you. I saw him Sunday a week ago, and I must say, it was very cold, freezing outside. We were in the forest, as you probably know, and there was ice on the ground and it was very slippery. He was very cautious with everything, as he has been at virtually every meeting we have had recently. But he had all his wits about him; after all, we were there four hours -- our meeting lasted four hours, and what he said to us was to the point. He did have a cold: you could see and hear that. But I think we just have to wait until we have something substantiated. (C)

The President: I appreciate the fact that you raised the Iran missile issue with him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I did; I pressed him very hard on this point. I was as blunt as possible on this point and he firmly promised that he would in the next few days or weeks go public with a statement and a presidential decree where he would say that he did not like the idea at all and that he disapproved of it officially. (C)

The President: That is good news. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: But I should tell you, Bill, that I also told him I would look at the situation to see how it develops and come back to him in January to see if he actually fulfilled his promises. (C)

The President: I think that's very important. It could seriously disrupt our good relations and cause a lot of problems with Congress; it's important to follow up. (C)

Let me ask you one other thing. We had the U.S.-EU summit meeting here a few days ago and I was briefed on the EU plans for the summit on the 12th and 13th of December. I am very concerned about what you and I talked about the last time we had dinner at Filomena's -- in trying to keep Turkey tied to the West and to give them more incentives to address human rights and Cyprus and other Aegean issues. You explained to me what the difficulties were for you. (C)

As I understand it, the EU is making serious efforts to try to keep Turkey moving toward Europe while working through issues

important to Greece and other countries. I just wanted to get your assessment. With all the instability in the Middle East, I think it is important to keep Turkey anchored to the West. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, Bill, perhaps I should underline first of all, that we have been, by tradition, long-standing friends of Turkey, and we have, time and again, proved we are good friends of Turkey. I must say, during my term in office, we have had only one controversy, one quite severe fight with any U.S. administration. And that was with President Reagan's administration, with himself and his Secretary of State during the G-7 world economic meeting in Tokyo. At the time, the State Department opted for a very pro-Greece and anti-Turkey policy line, and this is why we seriously argued. At the time you could actually feel how strong the Greek lobby was in Congress. But that changed quite significantly in the Bush Administration, and I was gratified by that change. Obviously, that proved its worth later in the Gulf War when we could rely on them in fighting this monster in Iraq. (Ø)

Subsequently, I had a lot of arguments with, for example, Papandreou. He was blocking, in a sort of unfair, unbalanced way, the financial protocol which was meant to benefit Turkey at the time. I must say, I had great hopes that now that Yilmaz, the Prime Minister in Turkey, a very sensible man who studied for a time in Germany and Simitis, who also studied here and who used to be professor at a German university, that these two very sensible men would come to a sensible compromise. Unfortunately, so far, there has been no substantial progress on the road to an agreement. In Greece, you can feel the particularly terrible brand of chauvinism which is obviously related to Cyprus. On the other hand, there is a very intransigent military in Turkey: they don't want to move an inch. (Ø)

My position is very clear cut and incidentally, it is a position shared by many of our friends and partners in the EU. First of all, it is in our vital interest to get Turkey as close to the EU as possible. Obviously, we need to do everything to counter the rise of fundamentalism and to see that fundamentalism is not successful. That means, consequently, that we must avoid, at all costs, pushing the Turks into some kind of corner or onto the fringes. (Ø)

In the text which was adopted, which I supported, we very clearly stated we wanted to promote a policy designed to draw Turkey closer to the EU and to Europe. Secondly, this paper

also states equally clearly that Turkey is a candidate for accession to the European Union. I am absolutely confident this will be adopted in Luxembourg, unless Turkey demands more than that. I have to be clear that right now, it is clearly not possible to get more. (C)

From the early days of the EU, there has been a very clear charter as to how such accession of new members should unfold. We call it the principle of Copenhagen, where it was adopted. Obviously, the agenda includes, first of all, human rights, rights of minorities, then democracy and the democratic status. Each and every candidate has to fulfill these criteria. It is a bit absurd, of course, that they now seem to confuse the line that one ought not to remind each other of those principals or demand that those principals be fulfilled. (C)

Now then, there is another problem that we in Germany have, and which the Turks overlook, and that is the question of freedom of movement. Because we foresee that once you have granted Turkey full freedom of movement, which membership entails, the number of Turks living here in Germany would rise from two to three million to five to six million. It is a staggering figure and simply unacceptable to us. Actually, Yilmaz himself assured us that any membership would only be an option in the long term, meaning in this sense, more than 10 years. Now, we feel that in the meantime it is absolutely possible to come up with sort of interim solutions to bridge that transition for Turkey and make it easier for them: I am absolutely for that. Other things come into play, they have something to do with the quarrel with Greece, the problem of the border disputes in the Aegean, and so on. Actually, the best thing would be if the Turks accept what Greece seems willing to accept, that all of these disputes be settled in an international court of arbitration. (C)

There is no question we can move forward. But quite frankly, Bill, my view from here is that Ankara seems to have a different kind of approach, a sort of thinking along other lines. They are quite openly counting on the American administration and the American President forcing the EU to accept the membership of Turkey; they are banking on it. Obviously, this is nonsense. I don't believe, and I haven't believed for a moment, that this is your opinion. So tomorrow and the day after at the EU summit meeting, I will try to do everything to come to some fair solution to this problem; obviously, I want to do everything to preserve what I would call the European vocation of Turkey, this wish of Turkey, as I perceive it, to belong to Europe. (C)

The President: Well, I understand your position and I think the Turks have to understand there is no immediate prize on the horizon for them. I think it is important that they feel they are slowly going to tie themselves more tightly to the West as they work out their problems. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, if they think like that, we will be successful. (C)

The President: We will work to do our best. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. I think we should stay in the closest possible contact on this. Bill, one other thing I would like to be perfectly frank about also. A few of my colleagues in Europe are, I believe, talking with a forked tongue. During our meetings, they will say, "Obviously, you are right, this is how we have to do it, there is no other way." But once they talk to President Demirel or to Prime Minister Yilmaz, they change their tactic and say what they wish to hear. I think it is a bit of a shame. But you know how it is in politics. I don't think there are any lessons we have to learn here; we've seen that. (C)

The President: I agree with you, there is no question that the feelings are more widely held -- it is not a German issue. The main thing is we have to keep reaching out to them. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I absolutely agree. (C)

The President: Thank you, have a good day. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, all the best to you, and if we don't talk before then, Merry Christmas to you. (U)

The President: Merry Christmas, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8430

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 15, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: LAWRENCE BUTLER, ACTING

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl that took place on December 11, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

You authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 12/15/07

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9708340
RECEIVED: 10 DEC 97 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: TIERNEY, JOHN

DOC DATE: 02 DEC 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HAITI
NCO

INTL DEBT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE HAITIAN NATL DEBT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER DUE DATE: 22 DEC 97 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HOFMANN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
HOFMANN	CLARKE	DOBBINS
	DELAURENTIS	SCHWARTZ
	KYLE	SIMON
	LEE	
	RUDMAN	

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9708430
DATE 17 DEC 97

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCOM W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 11 DEC 97
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM **Date:** 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2012				
Document ID: 9800595				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (2 pages)~~	~~01/26/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
001b. telcon	re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (3 pages)	01/26/1998	~~P1/b(1)~~, P6/b(6) KBH 12/14/2018
~~001c. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~01/26/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
001d. telcon	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	01/26/1998	~~P1/b(1)~~, P6/b(6) KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2012

FOLDER TITLE:
9800595

2015-0776-M
rs1469

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9800595
RECEIVED: 27 JAN 98 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 20 JAN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 26 JAN 98

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 02 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 1/30 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98012721	FOR DECISION
001		X	98013010	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98013010	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980120	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0595

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	E 1/29	
Davies	3	C 1/30	
Kerrick	2	D 1/29	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TMA 1.30	D w/disk
Records Mgt.	5		D w/disk

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Very important per Cathy's Note. Only Tab A to State. Tab is to be filed "For Record Purposes" only.

'98 JAN 27 PM 5:27

WWD -

Only Tab A should be sent to State. Questions let me know.

Cathy Millison

0595

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Gen Kerrick -

Package has two memcons so that personal portion of conversation is not widely distributed, yet the complete memcon is retained for the record. If you choose to forward to SRB, we will REDO cover memo.

(R)

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG #: 0595

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM: (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG: (KT) A/O: _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	[illegible] 1/25	
Davies	3	C 1/30	
Kerrick	2	D 1/28	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	IMA 1/30	D w/disk
Records Mgt	5		D w/disk

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Very important per Cathy's Note. Only Tab A to State. Tab is to be filed "For Record Purposes" only.

'98 JAN 27 PM 5:27

WWD -
Only Tab A should be sent to State. Questions let me know.
Cathy Millison

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 30, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1/26/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.44)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: James Smith, David Higgins, Robert Ford and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 26, 1998, 12:53 p.m. - 1:02 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and Chancellor Kohl exchanged opening pleasantries. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I will send you a letter by fax dealing with the situation in Indonesia because I continue to consider the situation there to be very serious. You may have heard that I had people there and they've reported. I also want to get President Soeharto on the phone again. We believe it would be very important if the G-7 could react, could make a common response. I hear your people right now do not favor this, because they believe Congress would make it very difficult. But it would be very difficult for us if the situation there takes a negative turn. I'm afraid it might have an effect on Japan, and we don't need a chain reaction -- a chain reaction that might end up in the People's Republic of China. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I know your economic team is working as hard as mine to find ways to supplement the IMF program. I want our teams to work together. Please urge your team to keep in touch with Bob Rubin. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: May I make a suggestion? Because I don't think it's optimum to talk about this on the phone, I will send you by tomorrow afternoon, Washington time, a letter by fax for you personally, outlining my ideas. My heartfelt wish is it

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1/26/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

will not be left somewhere on your desk, although I know that you have much more pressing matters on your desk now, but that your people read the letter and contact my people or get back to Mr. Bitterlich. (C)

The President: I will. I will read it very carefully. I think it is a huge issue with enormous consequences. I'm prepared to do whatever I can to resolve it. I think it is important that Soeharto provide reassurance about the future, through naming a vice president who instills confidence in the markets and broadens participation in the political process. I know you're close to Soeharto, and he's been a good friend to me and the United States, but this is the best way to secure his legacy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Shall we proceed then? I will send the letter by fax. (C)

The President: Thank you. We are working very hard on Iraq and Saddam Hussein's challenge to UNSCOM inspections. We have pursued the diplomatic route carefully for months, but it hasn't seemed to work. I'm compelled to review military options. I'm aware there is a big downside to this, but I can't allow Iraq to rebuild its WMD. I may have to come back to you before long. I haven't reached a decision, but I wanted you to be aware of my current thinking. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You will get back to me before you take any action? (C)

The President: I will. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I'll keep my fingers crossed for you. I'll get back to you. When do you give the State of the Union address? (U)

The President: Tomorrow night. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Bye. (U)

The President: Bye, Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. telcon	re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany [partial] (1 page)	01/26/1998	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2012

FOLDER TITLE:
9800595

2015-0776-M
rs1469

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.45)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: James Smith, David Higgins, Robert Ford and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 26, 1998, 12:53 p.m. - 1:02 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

(b)(6)

Chancellor Kohl: I will see what I can do. The second point is, I will send you a letter by fax dealing with the situation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1/26/08

in Indonesia because I continue to consider the situation there to be very serious. You may have heard that I had people there and they've reported. I also want to get President Soeharto on the phone again. We believe it would be very important if the G-7 could react, could make a common response. I hear your people right now do not favor this, because they believe Congress would make it very difficult. But it would be very difficult for us if the situation there takes a negative turn. I'm afraid it might have an effect on Japan, and we don't need a chain reaction -- a chain reaction that might end up in the People's Republic of China. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I know your economic team is working as hard as mine to find ways to supplement the IMF program. I want our teams to work together. Please urge your team to keep in touch with Bob Rubin. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: May I make a suggestion? Because I don't think it's optimum to talk about this on the phone, I will send you by tomorrow afternoon, Washington time, a letter by fax for you personally, outlining my ideas. My heartfelt wish is it will not be left somewhere on your desk, although I know that you have much more pressing matters on your desk now, but that your people read the letter and contact my people or get back to Mr. Bitterlich. (C)

The President: I will. I will read it very carefully. I think it is a huge issue with enormous consequences. I'm prepared to do whatever I can to resolve it. I think it is important that Soeharto provide reassurance about the future, through naming a vice president who instills confidence in the markets and broadens participation in the political process. I know you're close to Soeharto, and he's been a good friend to me and the United States, but this is the best way to secure his legacy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Shall we proceed then? I will send the letter by fax. (C)

The President: Thank you. We are working very hard on Iraq and Saddam Hussein's challenge to UNSCOM inspections. We have pursued the diplomatic route carefully for months, but it hasn't seemed to work. I'm compelled to review military options. I'm aware there is a big downside to this, but I can't allow Iraq to rebuild its WMD. I may have to come back to you before long. I haven't reached a decision, but I wanted you to be aware of my current thinking. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You will get back to me before you take any action? (~~C~~)

The President: I will. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I'll keep my fingers crossed for you. I'll get back to you. When do you give the State of the Union address? (U)

The President: Tomorrow night. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Bye. (U)

The President: Bye, Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0595

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 27, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on January 26, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on January 26, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the abridged Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A ~~to~~ State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the ~~attached~~ full Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at TAB B be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Abridged Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
Tab B Full Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1/26/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0595

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0774-M (1.96)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: James Smith, David Higgins, Robert Ford and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 26, 1998, 12:53 p.m. - 1:02 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and Chancellor Kohl exchanged opening pleasantries. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I will send you a letter by fax dealing with the situation in Indonesia because I continue to consider the situation there to be very serious. You may have heard that I had people there and they've reported. I also want to get President Soeharto on the phone again. We believe it would be very important if the G-7 could react, could make a common response. I hear your people right now do not favor this, because they believe Congress would make it very difficult. But it would be very difficult for us if the situation there takes a negative turn. I'm afraid it might have an effect on Japan, and we don't need a chain reaction -- a chain reaction that might end up in the People's Republic of China. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I know your economic team is working as hard as mine to find ways to supplement the IMF program. I want our teams to work together. Please urge your team to keep in touch with Bob Rubin. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: May I make a suggestion? Because I don't think it's optimum to talk about this on the phone, I will send you by tomorrow afternoon, Washington time, a letter by fax for you personally, outlining my ideas. My heartfelt wish is it will not be left somewhere on your desk, although I know that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 1/26/08

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

you have much more pressing matters on your desk now, but that your people read the letter and contact my people or get back to Mr. Bitterlich. (C)

The President: I will. I will read it very carefully. I think it is a huge issue with enormous consequences. I'm prepared to do whatever I can to resolve it. I think it is important that Soeharto provide reassurance about the future, through naming a vice president who instills confidence in the markets and broadens participation in the political process. I know you're close to Soeharto, and he's been a good friend to me and the United States, but this is the best way to secure his legacy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Shall we proceed then? I will send the letter by fax. (C)

The President: Thank you. We are working very hard on Iraq and Saddam Hussein's challenge to UNSCOM inspections. We have pursued the diplomatic route carefully for months, but it hasn't seemed to work. I'm compelled to review military options. I'm aware there is a big downside to this, but I can't allow Iraq to rebuild its WMD. I may have to come back to you before long. I haven't reached a decision, but I wanted you to be aware of my current thinking. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You will get back to me before you take any action? (C)

The President: I will. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I'll keep my fingers crossed for you. I'll get back to you. When do you give the State of the Union address? (U)

The President: Tomorrow night. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. Bye. (U)

The President: Bye, Helmut. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. telcon	[Duplicate of 001b] [partial] (1 page)	01/26/1998	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2012

FOLDER TITLE:
9800595

2015-0776-M
rs1469

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.4.7)
7/31/2018 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT
GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL

LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE

NOTE TAKERS: JAMES SMITH, DAVID HIGGINS, ROBERT FORD, NANCY MCELDOWNEY

INTERPRETER: GISELA MARCUSE

DATE/TIME: 1253-1302 EST, 26 JANUARY 1998

(b)(6)

CHANCELLOR KOHL: I will see what I can do. The second point is, I will send you a letter by fax dealing with the situation in Indonesia, because I continue to consider the situation there to be very serious. You may have heard that I had people there, and they've reported. I also want to get President Soeharto on the phone again. But we believe it would be very important if the G-7 could react, could make a common response. I hear your people right now do not favor this, because they believe Congress would make it very difficult. But it would be very difficult for us if the situation there takes a...I'm afraid it might have an effect on Japan, and we don't need a chain reaction – a chain reaction that might end up in the People's Republic of China.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with that. I know your economic team is working as hard as mine to find ways to supplement the IMF program. I want our teams to work together. Please urge your team to keep in touch with Bob Rubin.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: May I make a suggestion? Because I don't think it's optimum to talk about this on the phone. I will send you by tomorrow afternoon Washington time a letter by fax for you personally, outlining my ideas. My heartfelt wish is it will not be left somewhere on your desk, although I know that you have much more pressing matters on your desk now, but that your people read the letter and contact my people or get back to Mr. Bitterlich.

THE PRESIDENT: I will. I will read it very carefully. I think it is a huge issue with enormous consequences. I'm prepared to do whatever I can to resolve it. I think it is important that Soeharto provide reassurance about the future, through naming a vice president who instills confidence in the markets and broadens participation in the political process. I know you're close to Soeharto, and he's been a good friend to me and the United States, but this is the best way to secure his legacy.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Shall we proceed then? I will send the letter by fax and I will also speak up in public as you suggest.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. We are working very hard on Iraq and Saddam Hussein's challenge to chemical and biological inspections. We have pursued the diplomatic route carefully for months, but it hasn't seemed to work. I'm compelled to review military options. I'm aware there is a big downside to this, but I can't allow Iraq to rebuild its WMD. I may have to come back to you before long. I haven't reached a decision, but I wanted you to...

CHANCELLOR KOHL: You will get back to me before you take any action?

THE PRESIDENT: I will.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Thank you. I'll keep my fingers crossed for you. I'll get back to you. When do you give the State of the Union address?

THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow night.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Very good. Bye.

THE PRESIDENT: Bye, Helmut.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9800595
DATE 20 JAN 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 26 JAN 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2014				
Document ID: 9800838				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (2 pages)~~	~~02/04/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
~~001b. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (3 pages)~~	~~02/04/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2014

FOLDER TITLE:
9800838

2015-0776-M
rs1470

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9800838
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 98 15

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 4 FEB 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 10 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON
		RICE, E

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY JP DATE 2/06 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98020513	FOR DECISION
001		X	98020606	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98020606	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980205	BURNS, W	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0838

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1 3	(E) 2/5	A-Tab I
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(E) 2/5	
Steinberg	copy		
Berger	copy		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(E) 2/5	D-with diskette
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: WWD - Only Tab A goes to State. File Tab B for record

'98 FEB 5 AM 11:16

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0838

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG IMA A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
b	Cosgriff		
	Rice	1	A-Tab I
	Davies		
	Kerrick	2	
	Steinberg		
	Berger		
	Situation Room		
	West Wing Desk	4	D-with diskette
	Records Mgt	5	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: WWD-Only Tab A goes to State. File Tab B for record

'98 FEB 5 AM 11:11

Exec Sec Office has diskette: yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0838

February 5, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on February 4, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Edward A. R.J.
FOR: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/4/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M1 (1.48)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Harry Obst
Notetakers: Nancy McEldowney, Peter Huggins, Cindy Lawrence, Tony Campanella, Joel Schrader and Robert Ford

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 4, 1998, 11:42 - 11:49 a.m. EST
Residence

The President and Chancellor Kohl exchanged opening pleasantries. (U)

The President: I wanted to call you to say how very sorry I am about the horrible accident in Italy yesterday where eight Germans were killed when one of our aircraft hit the cable of a ski lift. It's a terrible thing and I feel awful about it. I wanted to express my condolences to you and to the families. We are working with the Italian government. I will ensure that your government is kept informed of our investigation and that we take all necessary steps to ensure that it won't happen again. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Also, I am delighted to see that we have gotten it worked out for me to come to Germany to see you on May 13-14 on my way to Birmingham. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm very pleased also, and assure you that we will see to it that a wonderful program is arranged. (C)

The President: I understand there is some chance we can commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/4/08

Chancellor Kohl: Well, the thing is that it is actually on a different date. (Ø)

The President: The main thing I want to do on this trip is whatever helps you the most. Whatever helps you is what I want to do there. So let me know what I can do to best help you. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much Bill. That is most kind of you. I will notify you well in advance, in a timely fashion, and let you know what we have arranged. So let me see, that will mean you probably will arrive on Wednesday the 13th and then fly to Birmingham on the 14th on Thursday night or perhaps Friday morning. Whatever is convenient. (Ø)

The President: As I said, I want you to put together what you think will be the best possible thing for you. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I also understand you are going to host the G-7/G-8 in Cologne in 1999 and that would be great. I love Cologne. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is very, very good, and I do trust we will have a big bash for everyone. (U)

The President: It is a wonderful city. I was a young man when I first saw it and I would love to see it again. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: Thank you, Helmut. Thank you for your support. I will keep plugging away here. It will be fine. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, very good. All the best to you and please give warmest regards to Hillary from my wife. (U)

The President: I'll do it. Goodbye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

DO NOT SEND TO STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.49)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Chancellor Kohl Interpreter: Harry Obst Notetakers: Nancy McEldowney, Peter Huggins, Cindy Lawrence, Tony Campanella, Joel Schrader and Robert Ford
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	February 4, 1998, 11:42 - 11:49 a.m. EST Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill? (U)

The President: Yes, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am very pleased to note that, from the perspective over here, it looks like the mood in the United States is changing. I must say, I was very gratified to see how successful you were in delivering the State of Union address. I now have renewed confidence in the common sense of the American people. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. I have a lot of confidence in their common sense too. If we can hold off the stampede and get fair treatment, we will be just fine. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, you just have to keep steady on your course and remain steadfast. You know you can rely on your friends (Ø)

The President: Thank you for the very positive statement. I wanted to call you to say how very sorry I am about the horrible accident in Italy yesterday where eight Germans were killed when

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/4/08

one of our aircraft hit the cable of a ski lift. It's a terrible thing and I feel awful about it. I wanted to express my condolences to you and to the families. We are working with the Italian government. I will ensure that your government is kept informed of our investigation and that we take all necessary steps to ensure that it won't happen again. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Also, I am delighted to see that we have gotten it worked out for me to come to Germany to see you on May 13-14 on my way to Birmingham. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm very pleased also, and assure you that we will see to it that a wonderful program is arranged. (C)

The President: I understand there is some chance we can commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, the thing is that it is actually on a different date. (C)

The President: The main thing I want to do on this trip is whatever helps you the most. Whatever helps you is what I want to do there. So let me know what I can do to best help you. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much Bill. That is most kind of you. I will notify you well in advance, in a timely fashion, and let you know what we have arranged. So let me see, that will mean you probably will arrive on Wednesday the 13th and then fly to Birmingham on the 14th on Thursday night or perhaps Friday morning. Whatever is convenient. (C)

The President: As I said, I want you to put together what you think will be the best possible thing for you. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I also understand you are going to host the G-7/G-8 in Cologne in 1999 and that would be great. I love Cologne. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is very, very good, and I do trust we will have a big bash for everyone. (U)

The President: It is a wonderful city. I was a young man when I first saw it and I would love to see it again. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: Thank you, Helmut. Thank you for your support. I will keep plugging away here. It will be fine. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, very good. All the best to you and please give warmest regards to Hillary from my wife. (U)

The President: I'll do it. Goodbye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on February 4, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on February 4, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (At Tab B) be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
Tab B Expanded Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/4/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9800838
DATE 05 FEB 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 4 FEB 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2038				
Document ID: 9803731				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Working Lunch with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (8 pages)	05/13/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. memcon	re: Working Lunch with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (8 pages)	05/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2038

FOLDER TITLE:
9803731

2015-0776-M
rs1471

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803731
RECEIVED: 22 MAY 98 09

TO: KERRICK

FROM: BANDLER

DOC DATE: 22 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY MEMCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 13 MAY

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM 2 ONLY DUE DATE: 28 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BANDLER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		BERGER
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON
		STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	KERRICK	Z	98052510	FOR DECISION
001		X	98060215	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM 2 ONLY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3731

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 64 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1/3	KP 5/23	edits
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(W) 5/23	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TMA 5.26	N-
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: OK not to Send to Stabl? Isn't that done in that DLC mode?

'98 MAY 22 PM 7:36

Exec Sec Office has diskette (W)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 22, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD KERRICK

FROM: DONALD K. BANDLER

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on May 13, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorized Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ____ Disapprove ✓

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum of State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/21/08

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Working Lunch with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (8 pages)	05/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2038

FOLDER TITLE:
9803731

2015-0776-M
rs1471

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be transmitted to our Embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and DCM, eyes only. (C)

for Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 05/21/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It ~~must~~ may be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (C)

~~to Germany~~ to the Ambassador or DCM in Bonn or whatever our usual format is

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 05/21/08

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memcon	re: Working Lunch with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (8 pages)	05/13/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2038

FOLDER TITLE:
9803731

2015-0776-M
rs1471

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2048				
Document ID: 9804915				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (4 pages)~~	~~07/08/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018
~~001b. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~07/08/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2048

FOLDER TITLE:
9804915

2015-0776-M
rs1472

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804915
RECEIVED: 08 JUL 98 18

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 09 JUL 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ KOHL ON 8 JUL

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 14 JUL 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY TTS DATE 7/10 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSTTS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 200
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98070911	FOR DECISION
002		X	98071008	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980709	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4915

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (PD) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1 | 3	(R) 7/9 7/9	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(C) 7/9	
Steinberg		copy ✓	
Berger		copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(D) 7/9	~~D~~
Records Mgt.	5	ITS 7/10	~~D~~ + DISK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4915

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	R 7/9 7/9	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	R 7/9	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	R 7/9	D
Records Mgt.	5	ITS 7/10	D + DISK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4915

July 9, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on July 8, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

FOR: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 200
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/9/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.52)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Chancellor Kohl Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse Notetakers: David Higgins, George Chastain, Jenny McGee, Robert Ford, Tony Campanella, Doub Bagley, James Smith and Nancy McEldowney
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	July 8, 1998, 10:08-10:24 a.m. EDT Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I didn't know that you were on the line. I am pleased to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Things are going well here and I wanted to say what a wonderful time I had in Germany. Thank you again for the magnificent bible that you gave me. I have it on display in the White House and no one can believe such a beautiful gift was given to us by anyone. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It was a great visit and I owe you thanks for the very good message you brought to the people of Eisenach and the new Laender. You know I have joined the battle of the election campaign. The others are losing stamina. You will see at the end of the day that the old battle elephant is on the way and things will turn out right. (U)

The President: Obviously you are doing much better. You may even eclipse me as the comeback kid. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/08

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, there are two issues that I wanted to raise with you. The first is Russia. I think we need to cooperate in order to get things going in Russia. I very much hope the information we received of late is correct and that they are now trying to cooperate with members of Parliament to get out of their financial difficulties. My request to you is that our staffs cooperate as closely as possible. It is very important to avoid any kind of instability over there, especially financial instability and currency fluctuation, because that would, on top of everything else, have a negative effect on the situation in Ukraine. Kuchma is working very hard but the situation there is not very positive. That is the first important point that I wanted to raise. ~~(C)~~

The President: I completely agree with you. I have been getting daily briefings on the situation in Russia. Al Gore is going over to meet with Kiriyenko in about twelve days. We have got to keep working with them and support a substantial IMF benefit package. I hope that you are right about the Russian Parliament. They are going to have to do a better job working with the Yeltsin government, doing the responsible thing, otherwise they can not get enough help from the IMF. I hope they can do it because it is a very grave situation there. I am very concerned about it. I also think it is important that you and I keep in close personal touch with Yeltsin and do everything we can to persuade him to stay as engaged as he possibly can to push his reform agenda though the Russian Parliament. There is only so much that we can do unless the Russians help themselves. There is a lot of rumbling in Russia against Yeltsin. The real answer for him is to perform in a consistent manner. I think that he is well enough to do it, but we have to support him and urge him to do it. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent. So we stick to the line that we have been following so far. The second issue I would like to raise is the other trouble spot in the Balkans -- Kosovo. We have a meeting of the Contact Group in Bonn today. I am informed that it has taken a very good turn and I am very pleased about that. I would like to impress upon you how important this matter is for us. First, for the very simple reason that what is happening to the people there is a terrible thing. It is bringing out the meaner instincts of many and I fear increased radicalization on the part of the Kosovar Albanians along with a renewed wave of refugees. As you may be aware, we have taken in 350,000 refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Luckily, most have been able to return, and we are now left with 100,000. But due to recent events, we have taken

in 175,000 additional people from Kosovo and in the long run that is unacceptable here. I wanted simply to explain, so you would know why that is important for us aside from the human tragedy. It is an issue that has great domestic importance for us. (C)

The President: First of all, I understand what a terrible burden it is for you, as well as being a difficult problem on the merits. It seems to me that we have two different issues here. One is whether Milosevic is willing not only to show restraint but also have serious discussions that would result in real autonomy for Kosovo. Secondly, whether the moderate elements among the Kosovars, Rugova and the others, can prevail and prevent this liberation army from tearing the whole country apart. I think, based on what we now know, that a NATO military operation would be quite difficult, but we have to keep the option open. We need to pursue the diplomatic track as aggressively as we can and maintain maximum flexibility while at the same time being sensitive to Russia and the pressure that this puts on Yeltsin in his domestic policies and what he is trying to do. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We completely see eye-to-eye on this matter. I simply wanted to mention it to impress on you how deeply worried we are by what is going on. (C)

The President: I think that it is imperative that you and I stay together on this and try to march in lock step. Whatever we wind up doing, it is up to us to persuade Yeltsin to go along and to keep the rest of our NATO allies with us as well. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, indeed. We have to continue working on this. Perhaps your people could stay in close contact with us and talk to Bitterlich to see if there are additional measures we could take. (C)

The President: Yes, we will have to keep thinking about this. I wish I could have more productive ideas for you on this. We will be in touch with Bitterlich and keep working. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, let's do it. All my best to you and please convey my regards to your wife. (U)

The President: I will. You are about to go on vacation? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I am about to begin my vacation. But I will also take a day or two periodically to remain engaged. I

will not be directly campaigning, but will do things that might prove beneficial for my election. (C)

The President: I know that you know how to do it. Just do enough to keep the polls going in the right direction. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay, bye Bill. I will see you soon. (U)

The President: Thank you, Helmut. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9804915
DATE 09 JUL 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ KOHL ON 8 JUL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL+ DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4915
~~4914~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 9, 1998

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on July 8, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on July 8, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Due to lg # mix-up w/ EAP/ASIA - this # was changed to 4915

Vicki
RMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/9/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4915
~~4914~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.53)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: David Higgins, George Chastain, Jenny McGee, Robert Ford, Tony Campanella, Doub Bagley, James Smith and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 8, 1998, 10:08-10:24 a.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I didn't know that you were on the line. I am pleased to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Things are going well here and I wanted to say what a wonderful time I had in Germany. Thank you again for the magnificent bible that you gave me. I have it on display in the White House and no one can believe such a beautiful gift was given to us by anyone. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It was a great visit and I owe you thanks for the very good message you brought to the people of Eisenach and the new Laender. You know I have joined the battle of the election campaign. The others are losing stamina. You will see at the end of the day that the old battle elephant is on the way and things will turn out right. (U)

The President: Obviously you are doing much better. You may even eclipse me as the comeback kid. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4915
~~4914~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on July 8, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/9/08

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2054				
Document ID: 9805665				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 8	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (5 pages)~~	~~08/07/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~	KBH 12/14/2018
~~001b. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~08/07/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~	KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2054

FOLDER TITLE:
9805665

2015-0776-M
rs1473

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9805665
RECEIVED: 10 AUG 98 16

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 11 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 7 AUG 98

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 15 AUG 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BUTLER
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 8/12 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98081113	FOR DECISION
001		X	98081206	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98081206	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980811	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 51665

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1/3	8/12/8/14	
Kerrick	2	(R) 8/11	
Steinberg	1		
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	8/11	D
Records Mgt.	5		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 56065

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1 / 3	C 8/12 8/14	
Kerrick	2	(R) 8/11	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4 / 5	8/11	D / D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

'98 AUG 11 AM

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 11, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 08/07/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.5d)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Harry Obst
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Cindy Lawrence, Nick Dowling, Greg Schulte, Robert Ford, Tony Campanella, Doug Bayley, and Mariana Papadimitriou

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 7, 1998, 2:32 p.m.-2:55 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, guten tag. (U)

The President: Guten tag, I'm happy to hear your voice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am happy to hear your voice too. I thought about your problem these days and there are all kinds of things going on. (U)

The President: Things are going well with our country, but it is terrible what happened in our African embassies today. I really appreciate the assistance we received from your people. I think your embassy in Tanzania was damaged a little bit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fortunately, our embassy wasn't damaged that badly, I'm very sorry about your people and please give my condolences to the families. Do you have a clear idea of how many people got killed? (U)

The President: In Kenya there were seven Americans killed, and seven are still missing in the rubble. There were over 100

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 08/07/08

Kenyans killed, it could be in the hundreds. Now in Tanzania, there were fewer people killed and no Americans, but the spouse of an American and five Tanzanians who work in the embassy were killed. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Is there anything known about the people who did it? (U)

The President: All we have now are suspicions. Once we get in and determine what kind of bomb it was, what markings there were, how it was made, we'll have a better idea and we will know more. We have our suspicions, but we don't know anything right now for sure. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It's just terrible. (U)

The President: I'm afraid that we're going to have more such incidents like this in the years ahead with groups with criminal and terrorist elements, independent groups, and people who are not connected. I think you'll see more of it in the years ahead and we have to do better to prepare for it. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: You're right about that. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about Kosovo. The Serb security forces are suppressing Albanian militants. They are also engaged in a systematic campaign of violence and repression. We are getting close to a humanitarian disaster that I think could spark another major outpouring of refugees from the Balkans. What provoked this is that Milosevic believes he is safe from any kind of NATO reprisal. He believes NATO will only act with a Security Council resolution and he thinks Primakov has told him that Russia will block it. Now I know that Chirac strongly supports this position. Tony Blair disagrees, and of course I disagree. (C)

But I think restoring the credibility of the NATO military option is important just to convince Milosevic to stop. I believe we need to finalize planning and identify forces, and we need to make clear that NATO can and will act without a Security Council resolution if necessary. Now I know Klaus Kinkel disagrees with this and others disagree, but if we go to the UN, we will put Yeltsin in the worst possible position. (C)

The reason I say that is that if we bring a resolution to the UN and Yeltsin vetoes it, and if Russia vetoes it, it will weaken his position in the international community at the very time

Russia needs all the support it can get. Assuming Milosevic is doing terrible things at the time, at a time when Russia needs financial support from the international community, if we bring a resolution to the UN and Yeltsin instructs his ambassador to abstain, then he will be attacked at home by the ultra-nationalists. So, that's where we are. I'm very worried that we're going to have a big refugee problem this winter. There are 200,000 people who are hiding in the mountains. If they can't settle down before the winter, they may try to leave the country. If we permit Milosevic to pursue a military solution that looks like another round of ethnic cleansing, then I believe we will have another big Bosnia problem on our hands. (~~C~~)

I hate to bother you with this on your vacation and during your elections, and I know you are doing better, but I have to talk to you about it and we have to make a decision very quickly. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Unfortunately, Bill, my vacation has come to an end and in the next few days I'm more available. But now to speak to the point, I'm now going to get busy with my election campaign that is running better in my favor. I am pretty sure that I'm going to make it, but we can of course talk any time. (U)

Let me come to the topic you raised. What's going on in Kosovo is a catastrophe in two respects. And that is what the big problem is. We'll have to talk about what Milosevic is like, he is a gangster. But the other problem is even worse and may be that the radicals in Kosovo have taken control. In other words, reasoning with him becomes more and more difficult. And you are absolutely right that the suffering of the civilian population gets worse and worse as we approach winter. (~~C~~)

I can feel this worse than my European neighbors. The refugee stream is moving again in our direction, we hear a lot of fancy promises from the others, but where are the deeds? I saw the latest figures today and there is a steep increase. As far as the 350,000 that were in Bosnia are concerned, these things are moving in the right direction. 200,000 have returned, and the remainders slowly are going home, but in Kosovo we have over 100,000 and the number is going up steeply. (~~C~~)

Despite the burden this puts on my country, that doesn't change our basic attitude vis-a-vis human rights. This is a time where we need to cooperate very closely. Bitterlich told me today

that your security adviser will call him this weekend. Maybe it might be better if the two could meet somewhere in the next three days so they can talk in total secrecy and that when they are done with their talks, we'll get back on the telephone. At the same time you and I have to think what we can do to steer Yeltsin in the right direction. (C)

The President: We've either got to do that or we have got to change Chirac's mind. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, and that should be another option that we should include to reprogram Chirac, and I am for that. (C)

The President: For Yeltsin, this is a bad situation. He can't win because of the situation in Chechnya, the Slavic connection, and the political situation at home. But out of the three bad alternatives, being able to complain that NATO is doing this might be better than having to veto the resolution or having to abstain and let it pass. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly the kind of topic we need to discuss, that's why I think these two gentlemen should get together as soon as possible. (C)

The President: We will follow up and we'll talk again in a few days. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That will be just fine. We have to keep both options open. And to me, the Moscow situation with Yeltsin doesn't seem lost as far as I'm concerned. I see some hope and I think we need to provide Boris some kind of escape hatch. (C)

The President: If he knows that we would stay with the position that Kosovo would stay autonomous but not independent, the way it used to be, then we will get him out of the Chechnya problem. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is absolutely why we have to follow this line. (C)

The President: I'll have Sandy get in touch with Bitterlich. I'm glad that you're having a good vacation and that you are out there fighting. I'm telling all the experts not to count you out. You're the best politician I know. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will give them a surprise. Bye bye now. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 10, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: LAWRENCE BUTLER, ACTING

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on August 7, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl that took place on August 7, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 20[illegible]
By KBM NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 08/10/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.55)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Harry Obst
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Cindy Lawrence, Nick Dowling, Greg Schulte, Robert Ford, Tony Campanella, Doug Bayley, and Mariana Papadimitriou

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 7, 1998, 2:32 p.m.-2:55 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, guten tag. (U)

The President: Guten tag, I'm happy to hear your voice. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am happy to hear your voice too. I thought about your problem these days and there are all kinds of things going on. (U)

The President: Things are going well with our country, but it is terrible what happened in our African embassies today. I really appreciate the assistance we received from your people. I think your embassy in Tanzania was damaged a little bit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fortunately, our embassy wasn't damaged that badly, I'm very sorry about your people and please give my condolences to the families. Do you have a clear idea of how many people got killed? (U)

The President: In Kenya there were seven Americans killed, and seven are still missing in the rubble. There ~~was way~~ were over 100

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 08/07/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9805665
DATE 11 AUG 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 7 AUG 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2013
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2056				
Document ID: 9806035				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 8	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (4 pages)~~	~~08/30/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2056

FOLDER TITLE:
9806035

2015-0776-M
rs1474

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806035
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 98 12

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 01 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY HS
TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 30 AUG 98

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 05 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 9/01 BY HAND (W/ATTCH)

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98090111	FOR DECISION
001		X	98090111	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	98090111	DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980901	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6035

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1	8/31	
Kerrick	2	9/1	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TTC 9/1	D
Records Mgt.	4		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 AUG 31 PM 6:30

DAR 8/31
Appears OK
to distribute.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6035

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1	8/31	
Kerrick	2	9/1	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TTC 9/1	D
Records Mgt.	4		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 AUG 31 PM 5:38

DK 8/31
Appears OK
to distribute.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 1, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl on August 30, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 200
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 8/31/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.5b)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Doug Bayley, Cindy Lawrence, Elizabeth Rodgers

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 30, 1998, 1:43 - 2:03 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Now I can hear you. I hope you are doing well. I've been thinking about you the past couple of days. I am all for you, on your side. Wherever I can help you, I will be happy to do so. (U)

The President: Thank you. Hillary and I just got back from a little holiday. Of course, I'm going to Russia tomorrow. Tell me how you are doing. How is your campaign going? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm in the middle of the campaign. People are predicting different things, but nothing is yet decided. The problem with this campaign is that half of the people have been on vacation. Therefore, the campaign is really only starting this week. I am very content. I think I am doing very well, catching up well in the new states. I'll have to fight day and night. You know how that is, of course, but I enjoy this. I'm going to show them. I feel good about it. Fifty percent of the voters haven't decided, which means the real decisions will be made in the last two or three weeks. We used to have voters who were far more certain. It is a different generation now and they react far more rapidly, but they can go either way. In addition, it is a different national situation. People are concerned about Moscow, terrorism, Kosovo, all of those things.

Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 8/31/08

If it is okay with you, I wanted to talk about Russia. I spoke at length with Boris today. (C)

The President: Good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I have talked to him several times in the last couple of days. We've had several telephone calls. My impression is as follows. Of course, I didn't see him, but his voice sounded good and he reacted well. I think he understands that he must make it clear he is not intending to run again. And I think he understands that Chernomyrdin, from his point of view, would be the best successor. The reason being that Chernomyrdin is basically an economist. He knows a great deal about the world. He is well traveled. He knows a great many business people in the United States, Germany, and in Europe in general. Of course, we can't measure him using the standard of Harvard Business School. And I don't know if it is true, but our press is reporting that he is becoming incredibly rich. But whether it is true or not, we have to live with the people that are there. (C)

I have told Boris it is important that if he wants support from the West -- both moral support and economic support -- then they must stick with reforms, even if it slows things down a bit. I think both he and Chernomyrdin understand this. There is no way of going back, because if they try to undo things they will end up in a terrible, terrible mess. Chernomyrdin is saying that he will be able to agree with the Duma -- and he is not willing to pay any price at all. I think Chernomyrdin is clever -- he will be able to do things smartly. It is important when you meet with Chernomyrdin privately, you need to tell him that if he wants to be president -- you can be very direct, I told him the same thing very clearly -- if he wants to be president, he must be very sure of support from abroad, both moral and financial support, and he will only get this support if he moves forward and not backward. (C)

I also talked with Yeltsin about terrorism. Boris has somehow become obsessed with that. It is very important during your talk that you show him some proof. Apparently he is denying that. It is very important that you manage to persuade him. Once you are back in the country we should talk again and then you can give me some information which I will bring up with him. (C)

On the issue of Kosovo, I was very, very frank with him. I told him things from the German point of view, of course. I told him

that things were a disaster in humanitarian terms. Of course, his excuse is that Milosevic did not keep his promise, but neither did the fanatics in Kosovo. I told him he must be aware that if there is a huge disaster, everyone, including him, will be in a dreadful situation. I pointed out to him that winter is starting in a few weeks. Nobody has exact figures, but more than 100,000 are hiding in the woods. There is a potential for real disaster. And I told him very clearly that I am not willing to have Germany take in another 150,000 refugees. I am being attacked while campaigning because we took in over 300,000 from Bosnia-Herzegovina. It cost more than $15 billion. I have been standing by that decision. I said we got help after 1945 and now it is our moral duty to help others. And, of course, it is good that over 200,000 will be returning home, but we can't do this every couple of years. You must make clear to him in your conversation that if there is a disaster, we cannot stand by and watch. I see a very small chance of finding some kind of language at the level of the UN that he could not veto, that he would just complain about. I don't know if that is possible, but I'll try. Because if we have to go without the UN, we have to be able to say we tried. I think we really have to talk to him, and we have to be very firm. We must be very, very straightforward. That is what I wanted to tell you. (C)

The President: First of all, I agree with everything you said. Strobe Talbott just got back from Russia. We agree that the first priority is to get Chernomyrdin confirmed. It seems that Yeltsin really wants him to be in charge of a real government. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think so too. (C)

The President: While we know that he will have to make some accommodations, he will have to be very careful to stay with reforms and not tilt too far toward the communists. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Of course. (C)

The President: The real problem is that the Russians are taking their own money out of the country. All the money the IMF put into Russia in the first installment is gone now. Somehow we have to get some clarity in there as quickly as possible -- that they will stay with the reform program -- and get the money flowing in instead of flowing out. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, precisely. (C)

The President: The other thing I am very concerned about, that we will have to watch closely, is the search for quick money. With the right legal steps, there are opportunities in the energy sector. But aside from that, the real opportunity for quick money is through weapons sales, missile technology, scientists, and information about biological and chemical weapons development. Even if Yeltsin did not approve of such things, there will be pressure, unless we can get the hope of economic recovery back into that system. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Precisely. (~~C~~)

The President: So, I will work on this and will give you a report when it is over, convenient to your campaign schedule. On Kosovo, I think your recent remarks have been very helpful to get Yeltsin to not veto it. I know how hard this is for you, and I appreciate what you've done. I do not want to do or say anything before your election that will make it more difficult for you, but winter is coming on and there will be more refugees, so we'll have to think about it. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. (~~C~~)

The President: What I would like to do is to coordinate very closely what we do for the next three weeks or so. I am going to have a talk with Boris on Kosovo and terrorism and I think I will be able to convince him that Osama bin Ladin really did the bombings in Africa, and that our evidence is beyond question. (~~C~~)

Chancellor Kohl: Excellent. Let's do that; let's plan to talk again next weekend, Saturday or Sunday. (~~C~~)

The President: Okay. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good luck. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6035

August 31, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on August 30, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on August 30, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 8/31/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806035
DATE 01 SEP 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 30 AUG 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2058				
Document ID: 9806239				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (3 pages)	09/09/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2058

FOLDER TITLE:
9806239

2015-0776-M
rs1475

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806239
RECEIVED: 10 SEP 98 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: MCELDOWNEY
BUTLER

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW POTUS & CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 9 SEP

ACTION: DAVIES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 16 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98092208	FOR DECISION
001		X	98100605	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6239

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SNM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
KJ Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1	G 9/24	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: '98 SEP 21 PM 1:23 Telcon w/ Kahl

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6239

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SNM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
KS Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1	G 9/24	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Talcon w/ Kahl

'98 SEP 21 PM 1:29

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6239

September 21, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: LAWRENCE BUTLER, ACTING

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on September 9, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on September 9, 1998.

Concurrence by: Carlos Pascual

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve 9/24 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 9/21/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.57)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Chancellor Helmut Kohl Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse Notetakers: Anthony Campanella, Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard, Tom Crowell and Donald Bandler
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	September 9, 1998, 4:00 - 4:16 p.m. EDT Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hi Bill, glad to hear your voice. I hope you got that whole mess behind you. We need a strong American President. I can't repeat that often enough. If you think there is anything I can do, let me know. (C)

The President: Well, I think the most important thing is that if your people can get a comment to that effect to the American press. Any comment that your people can get to the American press, I think that would be helpful. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I am going to do that and I am going to say that publicly. But, you know, American journalists are lazier than German journalists. I've been saying that in speeches. The world really needs a strong President. It is the most important job in the world, especially at a time like this. If there is anything else you need, let me know. (C)

Another reason I called you is that I'm going to call Boris Yeltsin tomorrow. It's almost midnight in our country now. I just came back from campaigning and found important news. The picture as I have it before me is that Boris' advisors are apparently split into two camps. One group says he should

Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify on: 9/10/08

nominate a candidate for Prime Minister regardless of whether the Duma likes it or not, regardless if the Duma is dissolved. This would be the worst approach, driving instability and strengthening the position of the Communists. Then there is a second group arguing that he'll have to come to terms with the Duma and find a compromise. As far as I know, he's not clear what he wants. (C)

Since I'm traveling again tomorrow, perhaps Bitterlich could talk directly to his American counterpart following my call to Boris. If you agree, Bittlerlich could convey precisely what feelings I have after talking with Yeltsin. (C)

I must tell you quite frankly that I don't know what kind of candidates he has at this point. I don't quite know what is going to happen. It appears the Head of the Security Bureau, Kokoshin, who was a deputy defense minister previously, is now being discussed. There are rumors that he might be someone the Duma could agree to. (C)

Looking in from the outside, Bill, so just as an outsider, I'd say the Duma at this point does not want to be dissolved. They have tremendous privileges, and are well taken care of. And even if the Parliament is reelected, there's no guarantee that the same individuals will remain in office. I need not emphasize the whole thing is immensely important. (C)

Jacques Chirac was in Kiev recently, and you know I am expecting an assessment. Concern in Poland is also growing enormously. They are concerned about what is going on in a neighboring state and in the Baltics. All these developments I'm observing with increased attention. So I think, Bill, in coming days, regardless of our problems, and we do have problems (and we do have problems). It is a very serious and grave matter. (C)

I might add I have talked for a long time with my Japanese colleague, and it is my impression that he is a long way from doing the necessary economic reforms. I hope I am wrong, but our economic people, including the ones working in banks over there are very reserved and very cautious about saying anything positive about what is going on over there. So what is important is that key people, those with common sense, are working together. (C)

The President: Thank you. First of all, let me just say one brief word about Japan. Treasury Secretary Rubin met with his counterpart Miyazawa in Japan, and had the same impression you

had. As of today they have not made a decision to make the necessary changes. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: So your finance minister had the same impression as I do? That it is hopeless, really miserable? (C)

The President: Yes, but I think what we might be able to do in the next month or so is to go to the Japanese and say look, the world is really in trouble and the United States has to do certain things, Europe has to do certain things, and Japan has to do certain things. What if we had a grand plan such as in 1993 when they opened their markets and we got our deficits under control, and you began to ease interest rates, something like that. If they thought they were part of a multilateral plan, instead of thinking we were ordering them around, we might be able to get better results. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I have no objections, but it must be a plan that's handled discreetly and must work. If it doesn't work, things will only get worse. (C)

The President: I agree with that. Let me say one thing about Russia. I'm glad I went to Russia. It showed we still support them and we are their friends. I don't have any better information than what you gave me on who Yeltsin might choose. I asked Yeltsin to choose a government quickly and not do anything to threaten his legacy as the father of Russian democracy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (C)

The President: I think the best thing we can do and the only thing we can do is to tell them we will be energetically supportive of them when they tackle the decision head-on and take the necessary steps to survive and eventually succeed in today's economy. We have to give the reformers hope. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly my opinion and that's what I'm going to tell him tomorrow. I will hear what he has to say and will let you know tomorrow. (C)

The President: Well, give him my regards and I hope you are well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm doing well and fighting hard. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2060				
Document ID: 9806584				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (2 pages)~~	~~09/25/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2060

FOLDER TITLE:
9806584

2015-0776-M
rs1476

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806584
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 98 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: MCELDOWNEY
BANDLER

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELECOMMUNICATIONS

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 25 SEP

ACTION: DAVIES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 01 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By K8M NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98092813	FOR DECISION
001		X	98100515	DAVIES APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6584

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
K Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1	G 9/25	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Telecon w/ Kohl

'98 SEP 25 PM 5:17

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 16584

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SNP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Rice			
Davies	1	G 9/25	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Telcon w/ Kohl

98 SEP 25 PM 5:17

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6584

September 21, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on September 25, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on September 25, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve 9/25 Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 9/25/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M1 (1.58)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: David Higgins, Joel Schrader, Bob Ford, Christi McClellan, Steve Crowder, Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 25, 1998, 9:56-10:00 a.m. EDT
Air Force One

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hi, Bill. I'm happy to hear your voice. I hope you are well. You know I've been frank in letting my opinion be known. (C)

The President: You've been wonderful. I wanted to call to wish you well. I know you're coming up to the last days of the campaign and you're doing great work. I'm thinking about you. Thanks for what you said about my situation, which is getting better. I also want to thank you for your helpful statement on Kosovo. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for keeping your fingers crossed. It's a hard battle -- a close campaign, a close fight -- but I'm chancellor and it's my job to put up with these things. (C)

The President: I just wanted to tell you I'm thinking about you and thank you for sticking by me. If you need to say I called about Kosovo, that's okay, too. We've got to keep pressure on Milosevic, especially in light of the elections in Serbia and Bosnia. We've got to keep the heat on. I know you'll do that. But basically I wanted to tell you I'm thinking about you. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I totally agree with you. (C)

Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify on: 9/25/08

The President: Well, I know that you need to go back to the campaign; there are no votes on this telephone call. I just wanted to tell you I'm your friend, and thanks. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. Talk to you soon. (U)

The President: Bye, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2061				
Document ID: 9806696				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (3 pages)~~	~~09/30/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2061

FOLDER TITLE:
9806696

2015-0776-M
rs1477

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806696
RECEIVED: 30 SEP 98 13

TO: BERGER

FROM: MCELDOWNEY
BUTLER

DOC DATE: 30 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 30 SEP

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BUTLER
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98100118	FOR DECISION
001		X	98100118	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 66096

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1/3	KC 10/1	D
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick	2	D	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TC 10/1	R
Records Mgt.	5		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

'98 OCT 1 AM 9:17

COMMENTS: Kahl Talcon

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 06696

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	1/3	KC 10/1	D
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(I)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TC 10/1	R
Records Mgt.	5		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

'98 OCT 1 AM 9:12

COMMENTS: Karl Talcon

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6696

September 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: LAWRENCE BUTLER, ACTING

FROM: NANCY MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on September 30, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl on September 30, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2013
2015-0776-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/30/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.59)
7/31/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Frank Jarosinski, George Chastain, David Higgins, James Smith and Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 30, 1998, 9:35 - 9:42 a.m. EDT
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Oh, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It is a pleasure to hear you, and it is also a great pleasure to be able to talk to you after the battle is over. Life goes on, as it always has. I have been through eight battles of this kind, and I lost one. I'll just have to live with it. But, life goes on, and as you see I am in good spirits. I would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude for the great friendship and cooperation we enjoyed, I am certain we will be able to meet yet again. (U)

The President: Oh, I hope so. I wanted to tell you that I am thinking about you. You have to be proud that you reunited your country and your continent. No one in the last 50 years has been more important to the future of Europe than you have. You should be very proud of that. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I am proud of it. But you see, I think Bill, it comes down to the basics. We are all ordinary people. I have always been a great admirer of Pope John XXIII, and maybe

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/30/08

you are familiar with what he used to say to himself. I think it is a very apt, a very appropriate kind of maxim. He used to say, "John, don't take yourself so seriously." That means that one is not unique -- just an ordinary human being with all the flaws of character one has as well as the strengths. That is exactly how I see myself. I have every reason to be grateful. I've had a lot of luck in my work. I've always been supported by many of my partners and friends. I've had the fortune to find good friends in politics, such as you. I think that is a good kind of thing to look back on. I hope I will continue to be in good health. I want to use this opportunity to explore the world a little bit and to try to be of service to my country. That is my outlook on life as it is now. (U)

The President: As always, you are inspirational. Hillary and I think you are wonderful. I will always treasure our friendship and will be your friend forever. I am grateful to have worked with you and grateful that you always did the right thing, as your Cabinet just did in their decision on Kosovo. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, first of all, my message to you now is that I absolutely believe that you are going to persevere, and I think you should, because the office of President of the United States is far too important. As you know, I will do whatever I can to support you, even speaking in public. Secondly, I hope to have the opportunity, perhaps next year, to go to Washington. I have a number of appointments to fulfill and would very much love to see you, if that is possible, because I think we will remain as we always have with each other. (U)

The President: Absolutely. You just let me know when you are coming. You are always welcome here. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: In the meantime, you may be in need of some useful hints. Please feel free to call me -- we can handle it in a very low-key, discreet way. No one needs to know, and no one ought to know. Please give Hillary my love, and Hannelore sends her love. I am absolutely confident we will meet again and have an opportunity to talk. (Ø)

The President: That's great, Helmut. I hope to see you soon. It is good to hear your voice and to know that you are in good spirits. You should be, because you still have a lot to do. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0776-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2063				
Document ID: 9806931				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 11	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. telcon~~	~~re: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl (4 pages)~~	~~10/08/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 12/14/2018

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kohl and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2063

FOLDER TITLE:
9806931

2015-0776-M
rs1478

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806931
RECEIVED: 09 OCT 98 14

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 10 OCT 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY TELCALL

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 8 OCT

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 15 OCT 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDOWNEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BANDLER
		EXECSEC
		FICKLIN
		MCELDOWNEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY SWD DATE 10/13 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98101008	FOR DECISION
002		X	98101310	RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	981010	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6931

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SMD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	(R) 10/9 10/10	~~Ltr~~ done
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(D)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(D) 10/10	D
Records Mgt.	5	SMD 10/13	D

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Talcon w/ Kabul 10/8

'99 OCT 8 PM 6:14

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6931

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SMD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
b Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	(R) 10/9 10/10	~~R~~ (done)
Davies			
Kerrick	2	(D)	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	~~(D)~~ 10/10	~~D~~
Records Mgt.	5	~~SMD~~ 10/13	D

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Taken w/ Kohut 10/8

'98 OCT 9 PM 5:16

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~SECRET~~

6931

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 10, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl on October 8, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

Edward A. Zuj
for: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 10/09/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0776-M (1.6D)
7/31/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Brigitta Richmond
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Tom Crowell, Frank Jaraosinski, George Chastain, Robin Rickard, Elizabeth Rogers, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith, Nancy McEldowney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 8, 1998, 5:42 - 5:56 p.m. EDT
Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. (U)

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. I wanted to discuss two things with you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: First the business. I wanted to talk about NATO action on Kosovo. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Based on Kofi Annan's report that Milosevic is defying the international community, and Dick Holbrooke's three difficult meetings with Milosevic in the last few days, he is still refusing to comply and there are still clear violations. The foreign ministers of the Contact Group are meeting in London today, but I don't think the Russians will agree to strong

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 10/9/08

action. To avoid any chance of a terrible winter conflict, we must get a consensus now on a NATO decision to authorize force. I think it is very important to get agreement at the NATO meeting on October 10 on the Activation Order. That does not require us to use force, but it authorizes it if it becomes necessary and I don't think a further UN resolution is necessary or helpful. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The tenth is Tuesday, next Tuesday, right? (C)

The President: Yes, that's right. I know that there is a problem in Germany. Wait, wait, no, the tenth is Saturday, I guess that's a problem for you? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, a real problem. (C)

The President: Yes, first of all a constitutional problem with the Bundestag. I was hoping Germany could join with a consensus on the ACTORD at the October 10 meeting, but make it clear German participation in the limited air option would require subsequent Bundestag approval. If you could do this it would protect German legal and political interests, but let NATO move forward on the basis of solidarity. Schroeder is coming here tomorrow, and I will discuss this with him, but I wanted to discuss it with you first. I understand he will support this approach, however. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, Bill, let me start. First, I thought the decision would be taken next Tuesday. Schroeder will be in the States tomorrow. He arrives in Washington tonight. Before he left today, I had a detailed discussion with him. I think when you talk with him, you should talk with him in the vein that you and I are talking right now. In this way, we will be able to solve our problems. Our problem is the following: the current parliament still has eight days, then the new legislative period starts eight days from Monday. I know it's a crazy situation, but it's a fact. I myself will continue to be Federal Chancellor for the next 8 days and I have all the rights of the position. I would like to tell you that following your talks with Schroeder at 12 your time tomorrow, that is 6:00 p.m. our time, I will try to establish contact again with Schroeder and I will try to consider your proposal here at home tomorrow morning. Of course, it is already midnight here, in Germany. Tell your people this would be sometime around 8:00 in the morning your time. Then Bitterlich can talk to your man, and I will get my people together tomorrow and I'll see what I can do

to meet that deadline of Saturday. Because our planning so far was that the meeting was to be next Tuesday, if we now move it up, I'll have to see how I can juggle it from a parliamentary point of view. Therefore, I'll have to reflect on it. I have my majority, but I don't know what the situation will be on Schroeder's side. The situation is very difficult. Therefore, it is important that you clearly tell him what your expectations are. And I, of course, want to be helpful, because what is happening there is a catastrophe and is also shameful. I will try to find a solution and let you know before you have your meeting with Schroeder. What time is it? Twelve o'clock? (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That's 6:00 p.m. here isn't it? So, we will be able to get in touch before that. Will your Security Advisor be in? (C)

The President: Yes, Sandy Berger will be available. Bitterlich can call him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Then, let's do it that way, and if necessary, I will establish contact again. (C)

The President: Now, let me mention one other thing, personally. As you know, I feel very strongly that the United States owes you an enormous debt for the leadership you've given the world over the last several years. If you are willing to accept it, I would like to give you the Presidential Medal of Freedom, which is America's highest award. It has only been given to a few non-Americans over the last several decades. But it is very appropriate to express our gratitude for what you've done. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, you make me very happy with that. And it is going to be a special joy if you will award it to me. I want to underline that I would appreciate it if you personally will award it to me. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm happy to come. Hannelore and I can work out a date. (C)

The President: I can do it later this month or early next month, whenever it is convenient for you, but I would like to have a very nice ceremony here for you. You and Hannelore can stay with us at the White House if you like. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I will be very glad and happy to accept. I think we should talk further about the date, because I have a lot of things I must arrange right now. I'm extremely happy about this honor and look forward to seeing you again in person. (C)

The President: Thank you, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I thank you too. If I can do anything else to assist you, please let me know. I am just leaving office, I am not leaving this world. (U)

The President: I know that. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: And you and your wife should know that you have friends. (U)

The President: Oh, we do. Goodbye, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806931
DATE 10 OCT 98

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 8 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 7/31/2018
2015-0776-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET~~ 6931

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 9, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: NANCY E. MCELDOWNEY

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on October 8, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl that took place on October 8, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/21/2018
2015-0776-M

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 10/09/08