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Original OA/ID Number: 166				
Document ID: 9307812				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President Clinton (3 pages)	10/04/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
001b. letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to President Clinton [untranslated copy] (4 pages)	10/04/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Antall and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 166

FOLDER TITLE:

9307812

2015-0778-M

rs1249

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 93
SOURCE REF: 9323297

KEYWORDS: HUNGARY
HS

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE COVER MEMO RE LTR FM PM ANTALL

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 13 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 2 OF 2

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM/NARA, Date 5/11/2018
2015-0718-M



ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

.001 STATE
002

Z 93100913 PENDING STATE RECOMS
X 94030114 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

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 PRS ACTIONS PENDING WITH STATE PART 1: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE

07 Feb 1994
 PAGE

DUE DATE	TO SUBJECT STAFF OFFICER KEYWORDS	FROM	CREATE DATE STATUS DOC DATE	NSC RECORD ID
13 Oct 1993 OVERDUE	PRESIDENT LTR TO PRES FM PM ANTALL OF HUNGARY RE DESIRE TO BE INCLUDED IN NATO CONFIGURATION STATE HS NATO REFERENCES: 9323297 XR 9324032	ANTALL, JOZSEF HUNGARY	09 Oct 1993 D 08 Oct 1993	9307812
			<i>transmitted to NSC under 932 4032 on 10/18/93</i>	
			<i>pb remove from state list completed</i>	
16 Oct 1993 OVERDUE	PRESIDENT LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE COCOM STATE COCOM HS REFERENCES: 9323688	MAJOR, JOHN GREAT BRITAIN INTL TRADE	13 Oct 1993 D 13 Oct 1993	9307832
			<i>ON HOLD</i>	
21 Oct 1993 OVERDUE	PRESIDENT LTR TO PRES FM PRES JAGAN OF GUYANA RE DEBT CROSSHATCH 107322 WITHDRAWN STATE CARIBBEAN HS REFERENCES: 9323586	JAGAN, CHEDDI GUYANA	15 Oct 1993 D 10 Sep 1993	9308004
			<i>Killed by NSC - Sandy Berger. WH send its own channels. PLS. remove from state list.</i>	
			<i>completed</i>	
13 Nov 1993 OVERDUE	PRESIDENT LTR TO PRES FM PRES WALESA OF POLAND URGING SUPPORT OF SKUBISZEWSKI NOMINATION FOR POSITION OF JUDGE OF INTL COURT OF JUSTICE AT HAGUE STATE HS POLAND REFERENCES: 9326271	WALESA, LECH LEGAL ISSUES	10 Nov 1993 D 09 Nov 1993	9308856
			<i>OBE'd. Please re-election to place in 11/10. Please remove from state list.</i>	
25 Nov 1993 OVERDUE	PRESIDENT LTR TO PRES FM CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY RE RUSSIAN SPACE STATION PROJECT STATE GERMANY RUSSIA REFERENCES: 9326908	KOHL, HELMUT HS SPACE PROGRAMS	19 Nov 1993 D 11 Nov 1993	9309108
			<i>Transmitted back to NSC 11/26/93. PLS. remove from state list.</i>	
25 Nov 1993 OVERDUE	PRESIDENT LTR TO PRES FM PM RASMUSSEN OF DENMARK RE CONGRATULATIONS ON NAFTA STATE DENMARK NAFTA REFERENCES: 9326910 XR 9328072	RASMUSSEN, POUL N HS	19 Nov 1993 D 18 Nov 1993	9309110
			<i>transmitted to NSC under 932 8072</i>	
06 Dec 1993 OVERDUE	UNTRANSLATED UNTRANSLATED REMARKS FM PRES KIM YOUNG SAM STATE	KIM YOUNG SAM	30 Nov 1993 D 24 Nov 1993	9309369

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S/S 9323297

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



October 8, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Itoh
 Executive Secretary
 National Security Council Staff
 The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
 Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Clinton from Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on October 8, 1993. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Charles W. Alexander
 for

Chief, S/S-IRM/RMD
 Information Resources Management Section
 Records Management Division
 Executive Secretariat
 647-2991

7812

*The Prime Minister
of the Republic of Hungary.*

The Honorable
William Jefferson Clinton
President of the
United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

I am sending this letter to you in the hours of the Moscow clashes, after the repeated firm statements of my government in favor of the Russian reform process and of President Yeltsin.

Not only in Russia do tensions and crises characterize democratic transitions but in most of the former Soviet countries as well. The Balkan crisis is still unresolved in spite of all efforts. With the Iron Curtain gone, a new situation has emerged, seriously threatening our region during the transition period and claiming new responses to our security needs. At the same time, in several countries of East Central Europe democratic establishments are well advanced in creating working market economies.

It is evident that in the forthcoming months much will depend on the policies and concrete steps of the developed democracies, including those of your Government, Mr. President.

The forthcoming NATO summit in January will undertake an important mission in redefining the role of the organization in Europe. As the single effective military-security alliance, NATO cannot avoid the task of investigating the means to improve our region's security. This task needs a more determined willingness to share responsibilities. The most evident way is to extend the alliance to the democratically most mature states of the region, and at the same time to create cooperative mechanisms to satisfy the security needs of those countries as well which are not yet mature enough for more intensive cooperation.

Hungary is pleased to perceive the gaining of force of opinions which in the light of recent developments in the Balkans and Russia have called for an expansion of NATO to the East. In my view this extension of the scope of activities of the alliance is inevitable; any postponement of this step would merely favor the forces opposing the system of values of Western democracies. Strengthening the role of NATO in the region does not go counter to the interests of the democratic forces in Russia. On the contrary, it would result in consolidating their positions and, as I stated in my letter addressed to President Yeltsin in September 14 as well, would reinforce the security of Russia. The integration of the Central European region would inhibit external challenges already in the short run and would have a beneficial impact on the stability of the whole Europe by rendering new tensions and conflicts avoidable.

We understand the concerns of some NATO member states of the possible dangers arising from the extension of the organization. Nevertheless, the conservation of the present situation, loaded with uncertainties, would pose a considerably greater threat not only to the security of the European region but also the entire system of relations within the Atlantic Alliance.

The Hungarian Government is determined to accelerate the NATO integration of the country so that membership be attained as soon as possible. All responsible political forces of Hungary as well as public opinion support these aspirations.

Hungary is committed to the cause of European integration, and wishes to attain a membership in the European Communities. We anticipate that our Association Agreement with the Community can come into force in the near future. My Government considers the Transatlantic idea equal to and intimately related with European integration. This government, by its consistent behavior during the Kuwaiti, Balkan and Russian crises, has proved unequivocally that it is a reliable partner and will meet all obligations in the future as well.

We highly appreciate the activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, but cannot consider it as an alternative to our integration into NATO. My Government studies the possibilities of our NATO membership together with the Visegrád countries, which are unambiguously committed to democracy, and with regard to the complexities of the region. Our admission would open up new prospects for other countries of the region, at the same time determining the conditions of joining the security community of the democratic powers.

Hungary is a state with a stable and balanced foreign policy and an economy capable of progress. Our admission would mean no political, financial or - in the long run - military burden to the Organization. My Government consistently espouses democratic values, human and minority rights. We insist that problems related to the protection of human and minority rights of the region can only be solved through bilateral negotiations and in the fora of the CSCE and the Council of Europe.

Dear Mr. President,

I trust that in the light of the above thoughts and arguments we have good reason to hope that the NATO summit will take a favorable decision concerning the acceleration of our integration.

The American support of Hungary's NATO membership would prove to be a determining factor in the bilateral relations between Hungary and the United States of America, thus creating the long-term framework of our security policy.

Sincerely,

József Antall
/signed/

Budapest, 1993. október 4.

*A Magyar Köztársaság
Miniszterelnöke*

Tisztelt Elnök Úr!

A moszkvai összecsapások óráiban fordulok levélben Önhöz azután, hogy kormányom ismételten és határozottan kiállt az oroszországi reformfolyamat, és az azt megszemélyesítő Jelcin elnök mellett.

Feszültség, válságok jellemzik az akadozó átalakulást nemcsak Oroszországban, hanem az egykori Szovjetunió utódállamainak többségében. A balkáni válságot minden erőfeszítés ellenére sem sikerült ezidáig rendezni. A "vasfüggöny" leomlása új helyzetet teremtett, az átmeneti időszakban térségünk veszélyeztetetté vált, biztonságának szavatolása újszerű megoldásokat igényel. Ugyanakkor Kelet-Közép-Európa több államában már a demokratikus berendezkedés a meghatározó, s előrehaladtak a működőképes piacgazdaság teljes meghonosításában.

Nyilvánvaló, hogy az előttünk álló hónapokban nagyon sok függ a fejlett demokráciák, így az Ön kormánya lépéseitől, magatartásától.

Tiszteletre méltó
Bill Clinton úr,
az Amerikai Egyesült Államok elnöke
Fehér Ház
WASHINGTON

Januárban kerül sor a NATO csúcserkekezletére, amely kiemelkedően fontos feladat elvégzésére vállalkozik, újra fogalmazza a szervezet európai szerepét. Egyetlen valóban hatékony katonai - biztonságpolitikai szervezatként a NATO nem kerülheti el, hogy megvizsgálja, hogyan segítheti elő térségünk biztonságának erősítését. Ezt csak növekvő szerepvállalással lehet elvégezni. A legcélravezetőbb módszer a szövetség kiterjesztése a térség erre érett államaira, gondolva egyúttal a tagságra még nem érett államok biztonsági igényeit kielégítő együttműködési megoldások kialakítására is.

Magyarország örömmel tapasztalja, hogy a balkáni és az oroszországi fejlemények fényében teret nyertek a NATO kelet felé történő kiterjesztését sürgető vélemények. A szövetség tevékenységi határainak kiszélesítése véleményem szerint elkerülhetetlen, e lépés halogatása csak a nyugati demokráciák értékrendjével szemben álló erőknek lenne előnyös. A NATO térségbeli szerepének erősödése nem lehet ellentétes az oroszországi demokratikus erők érdekeivel. Éppen ellenkezőleg, pozícióik megszilárdítását eredményezné, ahogyan Jelcin elnökhöz intézett, szeptember 14-i levelemben írtam, Oroszország biztonságát is erősítené. A közép-európai térség integrálása már rövid távon elijesztené a külső kihívásokat, jótékonyan hatna Európa egészének stabilitására, elkerülhetővé tenné az újabb konfliktusokat, kényszerhelyzeteket.

Megértjük a NATO-tagállamok némelyikének aggodalmait a szervezet kiszélesítéséből fakadó lehetséges nehézségekkel kapcsolatban, de a jelenlegi, bizonytalanságokkal terhes helyzet fenntartása lényegesen nagyobb veszélyt jelentene nemcsak az európai térség biztonságára, hanem az Atlanti Szövetségen belüli kapcsolatrendszerre nézve is.

A magyar kormány határozott célja az ország NATO-integrációjának felgyorsítása, hogy mielőbb elérhessük a tagságot. A magyar politikai élet valamennyi mérvadó tényezője és az ország közvéleménye is azonosul ezzel.

Magyarország elkötelezett híve az európai integrációnak, az Európai Közösségek tagja kíván lenni. Számítunk arra, hogy rövid időn belül hatályba lép Társulási Szerződésünk a Közösségekkel. Kormányom a transzatlanti gondolatot az európai integrációval egyenértékűnek, azzal szorosan összefüggőnek tekinti. A kuvaiti, a balkáni és az oroszországi válság során tanúsított következetes magatartásával egyértelműen bizonyította, hogy megbízható partner, kötelezettségeinek a jövőben is eleget tesz.

Nagyra becsüljük az Észak-Atlanti Együttműködési Tanács tevékenységét, de azt nem tekinthetjük a NATO-ba történő integrálódásunk alternatívájának. Kormányom NATO-csatlakozásunkat a térség összefüggéseiben, a demokrácia mellett már egyértelműen hitet tett visegrádi államokkal együtt vizsgálja. Felvételünk a régió többi országa előtt is távlatokat nyitna, meghatározva egyben a demokratikus hatalmak biztonsági közösségébe történő bekerülés feltételeit.

Magyarország stabil, kiegyensúlyozott külpolitikát folytató, fejlődőképes gazdasággal rendelkező állam. Felvétele sem politikai, sem pénzügyi, sem hosszútávú katonai szempontból nem jelentene teherterelt a szövetség számára. Kormányom következetesen kiáll a demokratikus értékek, az emberi és kisebbségi jogok védelmében. A térségben ez utóbbi téren meglévő gondok orvoslását kétoldalú tárgyalások útján, illetve az EBEÉ és az Európa Tanács fórumain szorgalmazza.

Tisztelt Elnök Úr!

A fentebb kifejtett gondolatok és érvek tükrében nem alaptalan az a reményem, hogy a NATO csúcstalálkozóján kedvező döntés születik integrációnk felgyorsításáról. Magyarország NATO-csatlakozásának amerikai támogatása kétoldalú kapcsolataink fontos tartalmi összetevőjévé válhatna, megteremtve a Magyarország és az Amerikai Egyesült Államok közötti biztonságpolitikai együttműködés elmélyítésének hosszú távra szóló kereteit.

Tisztelettel:

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, sweeping initial 'A' followed by 'ntall' and a final flourish.

Antall József

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Original OA/ID Number: 169				
Document ID: 9308334				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary to President Clinton (7 pages)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
001b. letter	[Duplicate of 001a] (5 pages)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
001c. letter	Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary to President Clinton [untranslated copy] (5 pages)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Antall and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 169

FOLDER TITLE:

9308334

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9308334
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 93 14

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 24 NOV 93
SOURCE REF: 9324606

KEYWORDS: HUNGARY
HS

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE RESPONSE TO LTR FM PM ANTALL

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DUE DATE: 01 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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DOC 3 OF 3

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 5/11/2018
2015-0778-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001
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Z 93102614 PENDING STATE RECOMS
Z 93112917 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE
X 94080216 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

*The Prime Minister
of the Republic of Hungary*

8334

October 19, 1993

The Honorable
Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Allow me to share with you some of my thoughts on the serious questions posed by the events of the last few weeks and likely to determine world politics in the longer term.

I trust you will not misunderstand my turning to you once again in a letter about the problems of our region. I know there are important tasks awaiting solution in many different parts of the world. I am aware of Hungary's order of magnitude, which naturally affects the scope for the assertion of our interests and point of view. But it may be of use to know the impartial, analytically motivated position taken by an experienced government closely acquainted with the problems of this region, and to convey this also constitutes a duty to ourselves and our people.

I

At present, the most important question for us, as I stated in my letter of October 4, is how the system of relations develops between the Visegrád Group and NATO. The topicality of this is also underlined by the NATO summit meeting in January 1994. I consider it vitally necessary that preparations for the Visegrád Group's accession to NATO

should take place as soon as possible according to a set plan. I remain convinced that this would also assist the reform forces in Russia, as I mentioned in my letter of September 14 to President Yeltsin.

The political, security, legal and military stages must be determined, of course, according to the timetable for accession. The most pressing task for us is to find the requisite guarantee for the security of our region. In no sense can Central and Eastern Europe be allowed to become a "no-man's land". I do not think I need to specify the geographical and geopolitical significance of our region, which is shown, for instance, by the activity of the AWACS planes in Hungary's air space.

The requisite legal form, as in the case of the EC, would be association, which could be followed by regular membership. Resolution of the questions of military technology, such as ensuring arms compatibility, would clearly take quite a long time. We think not only that this long-term, strategic objective should be maintained, but that the NATO summit in January should act accordingly and implement this programme.

We are aware that various arguments and counter-arguments have been advanced in this respect, with references, on more than one occasion, to the tensions existing between the individual countries of this region. I consider the plan outlined an appropriate approach to resolving the questions at issue precisely because it would oblige these countries to cooperate and maintain balanced relations with each other.

While we deem the attainment of membership absolutely necessary, we understand the difficult position facing Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the consequently cautious tone of statements. We also take the view that he as a man personifies the Russian reformers, and we have invariably been among the first to take a position of support for the political line he represents, not only now, but also at the time of the coup on August 19, 1991. I take the view nonetheless that the policy of subordinating, in a sense, the

integration of the Central and Eastern European region to a presumed higher purpose can be pursued at the most until the Russian elections planned for December.

The problem of politically and constitutionally uncontrolled armies can also be sensed clearly in the Eastern half of Europe. I had occasion to draw attention to this at the Paris Summit in November 1990. It can be established that the army in the Commonwealth of Independent States now constitutes a "state within a state" which has just proved loyal to President Boris Yeltsin in a grave situation. They clearly have the nuclear weapons and elite troops in their hands, and this, apart from its strong bearing on domestic politics, coincides for the time being with the security interests of the world. The army in Russia has never exercised a military dictatorship, as it has in so many other countries. Its requisite method of ensuring a balance against the power of the Church or the Party was always to keep the political elite in its hands. Yet there remains a danger of the leaders of the army failing to abandon in the future their imperial ideas and the objective of restoring all or most of the former Soviet Union.

Among the several regions where the process and endeavors just outlined can be seen clearly is the Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Georgia, having become independent without joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, are in the end being obliged to accede by the outbreaks of war, the economic collapse and the incitement of minorities, as happened once before in 1922.

These phenomena again prove how extremely urgent it is to interpret the Russian power objectives clearly and measure them in the short and long term. Should NATO and the Western European Union fail to integrate in a considered and planned way the region lying between NATO and Russia, leaving it without guarantees, as a "no-man's land" in a security vacuum, a very pessimistic scenario indeed can be prepared for the future. In agreeing with President Boris Yeltsin, seeking to bolster his position and supporting his efforts at reform, we also perceive clearly the previously mentioned

imperial outlook of the CIS/Russian Army. So we would consider apposite at the same time the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, non-aggression treaty etc. settling in a satisfactory way the security-policy relationship between NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Let us not forget either that if the integration of Central and Eastern Europe should not happen, Turkey will be unable to undertake a role of historical importance, which it could fulfil in conjunction with NATO or in accord with European intentions, as a counter-balance to pan-Islamic, fundamentalist /Shiite/, and, should occasion arise, Russian imperial endeavors.

II

Let me say a few words about the situation in the former Yugoslavia and its successor states. Unfortunately, the world failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation in time. In fact, the handling of the problem was completely neglected in 1990-91, precisely because of the events taking place in Russia. The grave consequences of this neglect must now be borne.

It would be highly dangerous in this situation if the UN forces were withdrawn from the Balkan. The desirable development would rather be for NATO to take over peace-keeping, which would also reduce greatly the danger of the conflict spreading. I am aware that arguments are advanced for retaining a "Greater Serbia" as a strong military power. But the clear decisions cannot be long delayed; the current system of sanctions is inducing the culprits to take ever more irrational steps /for instance closure of the Danube to shipping/, while weighing extremely severely on the innocent Albanian and Hungarian minorities and on the neighboring countries.

It can hardly be doubted that Russian/CIS-Serbian military cooperation has already emerged, and may expand further so as to become decisive to the situation and future not only in Central Europe but in the Mediterranean

as well. Unfortunately, we are witnessing many efforts that are reminiscent of the period before 1917, but cannot in any way be reconciled with the present composition and character of NATO and the European Community.

It is worth saying something separately about the aggressor and the procedure that should be taken against it. The Gulf War provided a good example of a principled and consistent intervention, on Kuwait's behalf and against Iraq. But this principle has not been applied so consistently in the case of former Yugoslavia, where the borders of the successor states recognized as independent have not been guaranteed. Understandable though it may be, the situation that has emerged could create a very dangerous precedent for the future, since it is currently making the aggressors /or would-be aggressors/ cynical and self-confident.

III

We naturally rate the Israeli-Palestinian agreement as a great success that provides hope of reconciliation in the Middle East. But in this case as well we should not forget that the former Soviet Union abandoned, in the region concerned, a "revolutionary" role which had contributed to maintaining tension in the Middle East in the previous decades. If this situation remains permanent and its effect does not return in different frameworks, there is a chance of the peace process continuing.

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I do not wish to turn on this occasion to other dangers, the economic crisis, the social tensions that are capable, with the help of demagogy, of reversing the course of events in the countries of this region or diverting them in undesirable directions. There are signs of this, for instance, in the results of the Lithuanian and Polish general elections. Nor should it be forgotten that a full change of system, a change of the political elite,

has not really occurred yet in several countries in the region. Reference can only be made at present in the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary to a government unconnected with the communist parties and formed by democratic parties. If these domestic problems connect up with the foreign policy endeavors outlined above, without there being Atlantic and European integration of the region, we can begin to outline the gravest of pictures for the future.

Mr. President,

I am convinced that we have the means in these months and years not only to create but to save parliamentary democracy and the free-market system in this region of ours. In a multipolar world, the various regions must be handled together and at once. There may be certain priorities for short, transitional periods, but it is always highly dangerous to concentrate only on one issue. Regrettably there have been many examples of that in past decades.

It would be a tragedy if we were unable to utilize the great turn of events of the years 1989 and 1990, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the demise of world communism, achieved by the joint efforts of the Western world and the countries concerned. A lengthy and protracted economic and social crisis in the region, coupled with a threat to its security, would not only be fatal in its effects on us here, but pose a grave danger to the integrating of Western Europe and the Atlantic Community as a whole.

I consider, Mr. President, that it is useful and justified, during the cultivation of the existing regular and manifold relations between our countries, for us to share with each other the opinions we have formed on the various questions in the world. Such a presentation provides an opportunity for us to demonstrate the justification behind the value criteria and interests we advance, so enabling them to be better known and considered.

In this letter I have discussed global, international problems, but it is understandable, perhaps, that I have examined them from the angle of an East Central European country surrounded by great-power interests. I hope I have managed to shed light on the dangers now threatening this region, which are of a kind that we have faced a good many times in our stormy and often tragic history.

Trusting in your understanding and support, please accept, Mr. President, the expressions of my sincerest esteem.

Yours truly,

/József Antall/

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTALL, JOZSEF

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HUNGARY
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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BAKER JANE
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S/S 9324606

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 26, 1993

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. William Itoh
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT:

Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Clinton from Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on October 25, 1993. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Farlee Wood

Chief, S/S-IRM/RMD
Information Resources Management Section
Records Management Division
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

9324606

8334

*The Prime Minister
of the Republic of Hungary*

non-official translation

*The Honorable
Mr. William J. Clinton,
President of the United States of America*

Washington DC

Budapest, October 19, 1993

Dear Mr President,

Allow me to share with you some of my thoughts on the serious questions posed by the events of the last few weeks and likely to determine world politics in the longer term.

I trust you will not misunderstand my turning to you once again in a letter about the problems of our region. I know there are important tasks awaiting solution in many different parts of the world. I am aware of Hungary's order of magnitude, which naturally affects the scope for the assertion of our interests and point of view. But it may be of use to know the impartial, analytically motivated position taken by an experienced government closely acquainted with the problems of this region, and to convey this also constitutes a duty to ourselves and our people.

I

At present, the most important question for us, as I stated in my letter of October 4, is how the system of relations develops between the Visegrád Group and NATO. The topicality of this is also underlined by the NATO summit meeting in January 1994. I consider it vitally necessary that preparations for the Visegrád Group's accession to NATO should take place as soon as possible according to a set plan. I remain convinced that this would also assist the reform forces in Russia, as I mentioned in my letter of September 14 to President Yeltsin.

The political, security, legal and military stages must be determined, of course, according to the timetable for accession. The most pressing task for us is to find the requisite guarantee for the security of our region. In no sense can Central and Eastern Europe be allowed to become a "no-man's land". I do not think I need to specify the geographical and geopolitical significance of our region, which is shown, for instance, by the activity of the AWACS planes in Hungary's air space.

The requisite legal form, as in the case of the EC, would be association, which could be followed by regular membership. Resolution of the questions of military technology, such as ensuring arms compatibility, would clearly take quite a long time. We think not only that this long-term, strategic objective should be maintained, but that the NATO summit in January should act accordingly and implement this programme.

We are aware that various arguments and counter-arguments have been advanced in this respect, with references, on more than one occasion, to the tensions existing between the individual countries of this region. I consider the plan outlined an appropriate approach to resolving the questions at issue precisely because it would oblige these countries to cooperate and maintain balanced relations with each other.

While we deem the attainment of membership absolutely necessary, we understand the difficult position facing Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the consequently cautious tone of statements. We also take the view that he as a man personifies the Russian reformers, and we have invariably been among the first to take a position of support for the political line he represents, not only now, but also at the time of the coup on August 19, 1991. I take the view nonetheless that the policy of subordinating, in a sense, the integration of the Central and Eastern European region to a presumed higher purpose can be pursued at the most until the Russian elections planned for December.

The problem of politically and constitutionally uncontrolled armies can also be sensed clearly in the Eastern half of Europe. I had occasion to draw attention to this at the Paris Summit in November 1990. It can be established that the army in the Commonwealth of Independent States now constitutes a "state within a state" which has just proved loyal to President Boris Yeltsin in a grave situation. They clearly have the nuclear weapons and elite troops in their hands, and this, apart from its strong bearing on domestic politics, coincides for the time being with the security interests of the world. The army in Russia has never exercised a military dictatorship, as it has in so many other countries. Its requisite method of ensuring a balance against the power of the Church or the Party was always to keep the political elite in its hands. Yet there remains a danger of the leaders of the army failing to abandon in the future their imperial ideas and the objective of restoring all or most of the former Soviet Union.

Among the several regions where the process and endeavours just outlined can be seen clearly is the Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Georgia, having become independent without joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, are in the end being obliged to accede by the outbreaks of war, the economic collapse and the incitement of minorities, as happened once before in 1922.

These phenomena again prove how extremely urgent it is to interpret the Russian power objectives clearly and measure them in the short and long term. Should NATO and the Western European Union fail to integrate in a considered and planned way the region lying between NATO and Russia, leaving it without guarantees, as a "no-man's land" in a security vacuum, a very pessimistic scenario indeed can be prepared for the future. In agreeing with President Boris Yeltsin, seeking to bolster his position and supporting his efforts at reform, we also perceive clearly the previously mentioned imperial outlook of the CIS/Russian army. So we would consider apposite at the same time the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, non-aggression treaty etc. settling in a satisfactory way the security-policy relationship between NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Let us not forget either that if the integration of Central and Eastern Europe should not happen, Turkey will be unable to undertake a role of historical importance, which it could fulfil in conjunction with NATO or in accord with European intentions, as a counter-balance to pan-Islamic, fundamentalist (Shiite), and should occasion arise, Russian imperial endeavours.

II

Let me say a few words about the situation in the former Yugoslavia and its successor states. Unfortunately the world failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation in time. In fact the handling of the problem was completely neglected in 1990-91, precisely because of the events taking place in Russia. The grave consequences of this neglect must now be borne.

It would be highly dangerous in this situation if the UN forces were withdrawn from the Balkan. The desirable development would rather be for NATO to take over peace-keeping, which would also reduce greatly the danger of the conflict spreading. I am aware that arguments are advanced for retaining a "Greater Serbia" as a strong military power. But the clear decisions cannot be long delayed; the current system of sanctions is inducing the culprits to take ever more irrational steps (for instance closure of the Danube to shipping), while weighing extremely severely on the innocent Albanian and Hungarian minorities and on the neighbouring countries.

It can hardly be doubted that Russian/CIS-Serbian military cooperation has already emerged, and may expand further so as to become decisive to the situation and future not only in Central Europe but in the Mediterranean as well. Unfortunately we are witnessing many efforts that are reminiscent of the period before 1917, but cannot in any way be reconciled with the present composition and character of NATO and the European Community.

It is worth saying something separately about the aggressor and the procedure that should be taken against it. The Gulf War provided a good example of a principled and consistent intervention, on Kuwait's behalf and against Iraq. But this principle has not been applied so consistently in the case of former Yugoslavia, where the borders of the successor states recognized as independent have not been guaranteed. Understandable though it may be, the situation that has emerged could create a very dangerous precedent for the future, since it is currently making the aggressors (or would-be-agressors) cynical and self-confident.

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Yours truly,

(József Antall)

*A Magyar Köztársaság
Miniszterelnöke*

Budapest, 1993. október 19.

*Öexcellenciája
William J. Clinton úrnak,
az Amerikai Egyesült Államok
elnökének*

Washington D. C.

Tisztelt Elnök Úr!

Engedje meg, hogy megosszam Önnel gondolataimat azokban a súlyos kérdésekben, amelyeket az utóbbi hetek történései vetettek fel, és amelyek hosszú távra meghatározhatják a világpolitikát.

Kérem, ne értse félre, hogy ismét levélben fordulok Önhöz térségünk problémáival kapcsolatban. Tudom, hogy a világ számos pontján vannak megoldásra váró, fontos feladatok. Tisztában vagyok Magyarország nagyságrendjével is, amely természetesen meghatározza érdekeink és álláspontunk érvényesítését. De talán hasznos lehet egy sokat tapasztalt, a térség problémáit jól ismerő kormány elfogulatlan, elemző szándékkal kialakított álláspontjának ismerete - ez saját magunkkal és népünkkel szemben is kötelességünk.

I.

Számunkra napjaink legfontosabb kérdése - mint ahogy erre október 4-ei levelemben is utaltam -, hogyan alakul a Visegrádi Csoport országai és a NATO kapcsolatrendszere. Ennek időszerűségét húzza alá a NATO 1994. januári csúcsertekezlete is. Szükségesnek és elengedhetetlennek tartom, hogy a Visegrádi Csoport NATO-hoz való csatlakozásának előkészítése meghatározott terv szerint mihamarabb megtörténjék. Változatlanul az a meggyőződésem, hogy ez az orosz reformerőket is segítené, amint erre a szeptember 14-én Jelcin elnökhöz írott levelemben utaltam.

A csatlakozás menetrendje szerint kell természetesen a politikai, biztonsági, jogi és katonai jellegű fokozatokat meghatározni. Legsürgősebb feladatunk, hogy megtaláljuk a megfelelő garanciát térségünk biztonságára. Kelet-Közép-Európa semmilyen értelemben nem válhat "senki földjévé". Nem hiszem, hogy utalnom kellene térségünk földrajzi, geopolitikai jelentőségére, amit például az AWACS-gépek Magyarország légterében folytatott tevékenysége is bizonyít.

A megfelelő jogi forma - mint az EK esetében is - a társulás lenne, amit követhetne a rendes tagság. A haditechnikai kérdések megoldása, mint például a teljes átfegyverzés, nyilvánvalóan hosszabb időt venne igénybe. Úgy véljük, hogy ezt a távlati, stratégiai célt nemcsak fenn kellene tartani, hanem a NATO januári csúcsertekezletén eszerint eljárni, és ezt a programot végrehajtani.

Tudjuk, hogy ezzel kapcsolatban különböző érvek, ellenérvek hangzanak el, nemegyszer hivatkozva az e térség egyes országai között meglévő feszültségekre. Éppen ezért úgy vélem, hogy a felvázolt terv a vitás kérdések kezelésére is alkalmas, mert ezen országokat együttműködésre, kiegyensúlyozott kapcsolattartásra kényszerítené.

Miközben feltétlenül szükségesnek tartjuk a tagság elérését, megértjük Borisz Jelcin orosz elnök nehéz helyzetét és az ebből adódó, visszafogottnak tűnő kijelentéseket. Mi is úgy ítéljük meg, hogy személy szerint ő a megtettesítője az orosz reformerőknek, és mindig az elsőik között foglaltunk állást az általa képviselt politikai irányvonal mellett, nemcsak most, hanem az 1991. augusztus 19-ei puccs idején is. Ennek ellenére úgy vélem, hogy legfeljebb a decemberre tervezett oroszországi választásokig képviselhető az a politika, amely a kialakult kritikus helyzetben mintegy alárendeli a kelet-közép-európai térség integrálását egy feltételezett magasabb érdeknek.

Jól érzékelhető Európa keleti felében a politikailag, alkotmányjogilag ellenőrizetlen hadseregek problémája is. Erre a párizsi csúcsertekezleten (1990. november) volt alkalmam rámutatni. Leszögezhetjük, hogy a hadsereg a Független Államok Közösségében ma "állam az államban", amely most lojális volt egy súlyos helyzetben Borisz Jelcin elnökhöz. Tény, hogy egyértelműen a kezükben tartják a nukleáris fegyvereket és az elit alakulatokat, és ez nemcsak belpolitikai súlyukat jelzi, hanem ez ma egybeesik a világ biztonsági érdekeivel is. Oroszországban a hadsereg sohasem gyakorolt katonai diktatúrát. Mindig a politikai elit kezében tartásával biztosították az egyensúlyt az egyházi vagy a párthatalommal szemben. Mégis fennáll annak a veszélye, hogy a jövőben a hadsereg vezetői nem mondanak le birodalmi elképzeléseikről, a korábbi Szovjetunió egészének vagy nagy részének helyreállításáról.

A fenti folyamat és törekvések, számos egyéb példa mellett, jól megfigyelhetők a Kaukázus térségében. A függetlenné vált, de a Független Államok Közösségéhez nem csatlakozott Azerbajdzsán, Grúzia - a kirobbant háborúk, a gazdasági csőd, kisebbségek felbujtása miatt - végül is csatlakozásra kényszerült, ahogy erre már egyszer 1922-ben sor került.

Ezek a jelenségek is azt bizonyítják, hogy rendkívül időszerű az orosz hatalmi törekvések világos értelmezése, a rövid és hosszú távú célok felmérése. Ha a NATO és a Nyugat-európai Unió nem integrálja átgondoltan és tervszerűen a NATO és az Oroszország között elterülő térséget, hanem garanciák nélkül, "senki földjeként", biztonsági vákuumként hagyja, akkor nagyon pesszimista forgatókönyvet készíthetünk a jövőre. Amikor egyetértünk Borisz Jelcin elnökkel, helyzetének megerősítésével, a reformtörekvések támogatásával, világosan látjuk a már említett FÁK/orosz hadsereg birodalmi szemléletét is. Ezért egyidejűleg célszerűnek tartanánk a NATO és a Független Államok Közössége közötti biztonságpolitikai viszonyt kielégítően rendező, átfogó egyezmény, meg nem támadási szerződés, stb. megkötését.

Nem feledkezhetünk meg arról sem, hogy a stratégiailag rendkívül fontos helyet elfoglaló Törökország - Kelet-Közép-Európa integrálásának elmaradása esetén - nem tudja vállalni azt a történelmi fontosságú szerepet, amit betölthetne a NATO-val együtt, illetve az európai szándékokkal összhangban a pániszlám, a fundamentalista (síta) és adott esetben az orosz birodalmi törekvésekkel szemben.

II.

Néhány szó az egykori Jugoszlávia helyzetéről, utódállamairól. Sajnos a probléma súlyosságát nem ismerte fel időben a világ. Sőt, éppen az oroszországi folyamatok miatt 1990-91-ben a probléma kezelését teljesen elhanyagolta. Ennek súlyos következményeit ma kell viselnünk.

Rendkívül veszélyes lenne, ha ebben a helyzetben a Balkánról kivonnák az ENSZ egységeket. Inkább az lenne kívánatos, ha a békefenntartást a NATO venné át. Ez nagyban csökkentené a konfliktus kiterjesztésének a veszélyét is. Tisztában vagyok azzal, hogy szólnak érvek "Nagy-Szerbia", mint erős katonai hatalom fenntartása mellett. Az egyértelmű döntések azonban nem várhatnak sokáig, a jelenlegi szankciós rendszer a felelősöket egyre irracionálisabb lépésekre készíti (például a dunai hajóforgalom elzárása), miközben a véltlen albán és magyar kisebbséget, valamint a szomszédos országokat rendkívüli mértékben sújtja.

Aligha kétséges, hogy már kialakult az orosz/FÁK-szerb katonai együttműködés, amely még tovább bővíülhet, és meghatározhatja nemcsak Közép-Európa, hanem a Földközi-tenger térségének helyzetét, jövőjét is. Sajnos számos olyan törekvésnek vagyunk tanúi, amelyek az 1917 előtti időkre emlékeztetnek, de amelyek ma semmiképpen sem egyeztethetők össze a NATO és az Európai Közösség jelenlegi összetételével, jellegével.

Külön érdemes szólni az agresszorról, és a vele szemben követendő eljárásról. Jó példája volt az elvszerű és következetes fellépésnek az Öböl-háború, Kuvait érdekében és Irak ellenében. De ez az elv már nem érvényesült ilyen következetesen a volt Jugoszlávia esetében, ahol az önállónak elismert utódállamok határait nem biztosították. Ha érthető is a kialakult helyzet, rendkívül veszélyes precedenst teremthet a jövőre nézve, hiszen az agresszorokat cinikussá és magabiztossá teszi.

III.

Természetesen nagy sikernek értékeljük az izraeli-palesztin megállapodást, amely reményt nyújt a közel-keleti megbékélésre. Ez esetben sem feledkezhetünk meg azonban arról, hogy az egykori Szovjetunió a jelzett térségben feladta "forradalmi" szerepét, ami a korábbi évtizedekben hozzájárult a közel-keleti feszültség fenntartásához. Ha ez a helyzet tartósan fennmarad és befolyása nem érvényesül más keretek között, akkor remény van a békefolyamat folytatására.

IV.

Most nem kívánok kitérni más veszélyekre, a gazdasági válságra, a szociális feszültségekre, amelyek alkalmasak arra, hogy a demagógia segítségével visszafordítsák, vagy a kívánatostól eltérő irányba tereljék országainkat. Erre utalnak például a litván és a lengyel választások eredményei. De azt sem szabad elfelejtenünk, hogy a térség több országában nem is került igazán sor a teljes rendszerváltozásra, a politikai elit cseréjére. Jelenleg a kommunista pártokhoz nem kötődő, demokratikus pártok által alakított kormányról csak Csehországban és Magyarországon beszélhetünk. Ha ezek a belső problémák összekapcsolódnak a fentebb említett külpolitikai törekvésekkel - a térség atlanti és európai integrálódása nélkül -, a legsúlyosabb jövőképet vázolhatjuk fel.

Tisztelt Elnök Úr!

Meggyőződésem, hogy ezekben a hónapokban és években mő-dunkban áll térségünkben a parlamentáris demokráciát, a szabad piac-gazdaságok rendszerét nemcsak megteremteni, hanem megmenteni is. Multipoláris világunkban együtt és egyszerre kell kezelni a különböző térségeket. Lehetnek rövid, átmeneti időre szóló prioritások, de mindig igen nagy veszélyt jelent, ha csupán egy kérdést tartunk szem előtt. Saj-nos erre vonatkozóan az elmúlt évtizedek számos példával szolgálnak.


Tragikus lenne, ha nem tudnánk kihasználni az 1989-90-es esztendőök hatalmas fordulatát, a Szovjetunió felbomlását, a világkom-munizmus megszűntét, amit a nyugati világ és országaink közös erőfeszítésével értünk el. Térségünk hosszú és elhúzódó gazdasági-társadalmi válsága és biztonsági veszélyeztetettsége nemcsak reánk lenne végzetes hatással, hanem az integrálódó Nyugat-Európa és az Atlanti Közösség egészére is súlyos veszélyt jelentene.

Elnök Úr! Úgy vélem, célszerű és indokolt az országaink kö-zött meglévő rendszeres és sokirányú kapcsolat ápolása során megosz-tanunk egymással a világ különféle kérdéseiről alkotott véleményünket. Ezek ismertetése alkalmat ad arra, hogy bizonyíthassuk az általunk hangoztatott értékek és érdekek jogosságát, lehetővé téve azok jobb megismerését és átgondolását.

Levelemben globális, nemzetközi problémákról szóltam, de talán érthető, ha mindezeket a nagyhatalmi érdekek között meghúzódó kelet-közép-európai ország szemszögéből vizsgáltam. Remélem, hogy sikerült rávilágítanom azokra a veszélyekre, amelyek térségünket most fenyegetik, és amelyekkel viharos és sokszor tragikus történelmünk során már jó néhányszor szembesülni kényszerültünk.

Bízva megértő támogatásában, kérem, Elnök Úr, fogadja őszinte nagybecsülésem kifejezését.

Köszöni:



(Antall József)

10/10/93

18:21

8

Delivered to Robert's S/S

9324606 CC:MG

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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FSU

OCTOBER 1993

DATE/TIME SENT:	DATE/TIME RECEIVED:
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FROM: ROSS WILSON S/S
Name Office

TO: MARC GROSSMAN S/S
Name Office

FAX #: _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Letter to the President from Hungarian President
Prime Minister Antall.

Number of pages to follow: 10

REMARKS: Please put the attached letter received by the
Secretary in Budapest into the system and provide to
the NSC. You'd have to judge whether this requires a
response. (I'm skeptical.) Regards.

~~CLASSIFIED~~