

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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| Original OA/ID Number: 141 | | | | |
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| Document ID: 9301066 | | | | |
| Row: 44 | Section: 1 | Shelf: 3 | Position: 2 | Stack: v |

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 001a. memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Background Information for Telephone Call to President Walesa (1 page) | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001b. talking points | re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Lech Walesa (1 page) | 03/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001c. memo | From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Call to President Lech Walesa of Poland (3 pages) | 03/03/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001d. talking points | re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Lech Walesa (1 page) | 03/03/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 002a. memo | From Anthony Lake re: Telephone Call to President Lech Walesa of Poland (3 pages) | 03/03/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 002b. talking points | re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Lech Walesa (1 page) | 03/03/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Walesa and Mem*...])
 OA/Box Number: 141

FOLDER TITLE:

9301066

2015-0780-M

rs1383

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301066
RECEIVED: 01 MAR 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: SANNER
WALKER

DOC DATE: 01 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND

TELCALL

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TELCALL FM PRES WALESA OF POLAND ON 2 OR 3 MAR

ACTION: ORIGINAL EDITS RETD TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 04 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/5/19
2015-0780-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 001 LAKE | Z 93030121 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION |
| 001 | X 96011013 ORIGINAL EDITS RETD TO NSC/RMO |
| 002 PRESIDENT | Z 93030221 FOR INFORMATION |
| 002 | X 93030410 NOTED BY PRES |

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

| <u>DOC</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u> | <u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u> |
|------------|-------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 002 | 930302 | | VICE PRESIDENT |
| 002 | 930302 | | MCLARTY, T |

March 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *hw*

FROM: BETH SANNE *BS*

SUBJECT: ~~Proposed~~ Telephone Call from President Walesa of Poland *15-1200*

THIS IS THE SAME MEMO WE WROTE DESIRING
~~The Polish Embassy has requested that President Clinton accept a call from President Walesa on Tuesday evening, March 2 or Wednesday, March 3. Walesa will be flexible on the timing of the call, depending on President Clinton's schedule.~~ *has answered to*

~~We recommend that the President accept Walesa's call. If Tuesday is inconvenient, perhaps we can propose an alternative date this week. The call would go a long way in reassuring the Poles of our continuing interest in Poland and their region, even if we do not choose Warsaw as the summit site.~~

Concurrences by: Toby *GH* Gati, Rahm Emanuel *RE*

RECOMMENDATION

Memoandum
That you sign the ~~Telephone Call Proposal~~ to the President at Tab I.

As needed is a BRIEFING Memo for the President for the WALESIA CALL.

Attachments

- Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Background Paper

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2014

205-0780-14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Walesa of Poland (C)

DATE: *TR* ~~Tuesday evening March 2, or Wednesday March 3~~

PURPOSE: *PRESIDENT WALESA HAS ASKED TO COME YOU TO*
To assure President Walesa of our continuing interest in Poland and discuss several issues Walesa would like to raise with you.

~~BACKGROUND:~~ President Walesa would like to personally follow up on the Polish proposal that the U.S.-Russian summit be held in Warsaw. He also will encourage you to appoint high-level, prominent individuals to the Presidential delegation attending the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in Warsaw in April.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open. *R2 YOUR CONVERSATION WILL PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY*

INTERPRETER: Val Chlebowski

PHONE NUMBER: To be provided by Situation Room.

CONTACT PERSON: Beth Sanner

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIMES: Open

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Background Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *RL* NARA, Date *6/5/2019*
2015-0780-14

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL ID

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE →

~~SUBJECT: Background Information for Telephone Call to President Walesa~~

I. PURPOSE (MIO*) IP1 - IP2
II. BACKGROUND

Since your conversation with President Walesa in January, the government of Poland has scored a number of major victories. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Suchocka's government coalition is weak and battle-scarred. [New and critical challenges lie ahead, from passing reform legislation to shoring up inter-coalition peace.] In a country that has had four governments and five prime ministers in three and a half years, Suchocka's recent victories in no way guarantee either success or longevity.

Walesa himself has been under attack from extremists anxious for new elections. Walesa is accused of collaborating with the secret police during his Solidarity days. While not an immediate threat, Walesa's decision to take on the accusers has ironically given this small, but vocal group, additional media coverage.

Walesa has termed the Suchocka government perhaps the best government since the fall of communism. Suchocka's ability to forge compromises and to seemingly pull major parliamentary victories out of her hat has surprised even supporters. After a year of political paralysis, [Prime Minister] Suchocka has taken the major challenges of the day (the budget, abortion, a labor-government agreement, and strikes) head on, and remarkably, has come out on the plus side. Her touch-and-go victories, however, point to the fragility of her coalition.

Our public support for Poland, both for President Walesa and Prime Minister Suchocka, can give the government a needed boost. Poland represents a model for success, particularly for economic reform, as does no other country in Eastern Europe. [It creates a demonstration effect for others in Eastern Europe, and perhaps more importantly in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.] In the current environment, where Poland feels a bit overshadowed by Western attention to Russia, our assurances will go a long way. As a part of this effort, the composition of the Presidential Delegation to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April will be of particular importance to the Poles. Smaller efforts, such as Secretary Bentsen's meeting with Finance Minister Osiatynski next week, also will help.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2014

2015-0710-M (1.01)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
LECH WALESIA

- Thank you for calling. Its nice to hear from you again.
- I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the government's recent parliamentary victory on its budget.
- I expect an equally tough fight here with the Congress over my proposed budget. I hope it turns out as well for the U.S. as it appears to have for Poland.
- I hope that you will soon reach agreement with the IMF. I understand the agreement will be reviewed this month. An agreement will open the door to a significant amount of assistance, as you know.

VENUE OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT (IF RAISED)

- I appreciate your gracious offer to host my meeting with Russian President Yeltsin.
- We are currently discussing various possible venues with the Russian government. But we have not come to a final decision at this time.

COMPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING ON APRIL 19 IN WARSAW (IF RAISED)

- I am gratified that we will be sending a delegation to this important event.
- We are currently reviewing individuals for participation in our delegation. Let me assure you that we will be sending a high-level official to lead the mission. The mission also will include prominent individuals who have been active in Polish and Jewish affairs, both in the U.S. and Poland.

NEXT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO POLAND (IF RAISED)

- We have not determined who will be the next U.S. Ambassador to Poland. But let me assure you, that we will not leave such an important Ambassadorship vacant for very long.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 6/5/09
2015-0780-W (1.02)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 2, 1993

TELEPHONE CALL TO
PRESIDENT LECH WALESA OF POLAND

DATE: March 3, 1993
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 12:00 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *RL*

I. PURPOSE

President Walesa has asked to call you to follow up personally on the Polish proposal that the U.S.-Russian summit be held in Warsaw. He will also encourage you to appoint high-level, prominent individuals to the Presidential delegation attending the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in Warsaw in April.

Your conversation will provide the opportunity to assure President Walesa of our continuing interest in Poland and to discuss several issues Walesa would like to raise with you.

II. BACKGROUND

Our public support for Poland, both for President Walesa and Prime Minister Suchocka, can give the government a needed boost. Poland represents a model for success, particularly for economic reform, as does no other country in Eastern Europe. In the current environment, where Poland feels a bit overshadowed by Western attention to Russia, our assurances will go a long way. As a part of this effort, the composition of the Presidential Delegation to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April will be of particular importance to the Poles. Smaller efforts, such as Secretary Bentsen's meeting with Finance Minister Osiatynski next week, will also help.

Since your conversation with President Walesa in January, the government of Poland has scored a number of major victories. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Suchocka's government coalition is weak and battle-scarred. In a country that has had four governments and five prime ministers in three and a half years, Suchocka's recent victories in no way guarantee either success or longevity.

Walesa himself has been under attack from extremists anxious for new elections. Walesa is accused of collaborating with the secret police during his Solidarity days. While not an immediate threat, Walesa's decision to take on the accusers has ironically given this small but vocal group additional media coverage.

Walesa has termed the Suchocka government perhaps the best government since the fall of communism. Suchocka's ability to forge compromises and to seemingly pull major parliamentary victories out of her hat has surprised even supporters. After a year of political paralysis, Suchocka has taken the major challenges of the day (the budget, abortion, a labor-government agreement, and strikes) head on, and remarkably, has come out on the plus side. Her touch-and-go victories, however, point to the fragility of her coalition.

In 1992, indicators show that Poland's economy may have hit bottom and is beginning to level off. GNP increased a modest .5 percent, with estimates for 1993 GNP growth of 1 to 2 percent, the first positive GNP growth in Eastern Europe. Industrial production is up and inflation (though still 40 percent) has continued to drop. The private sector is steadily increasing its share of output and employment, perhaps accounting for half of each.

Despite these successes, the problems facing the government are still daunting. Unemployment is 14 percent and expected to go higher, creating more challenges for the government's relations with labor. Even with the IMF's approval of the 1993 budget, the deficit remains a serious problem. Other pending issues are privatization of larger companies, which has been very slow, and reform of the banking sector, which will be assisted by funds from the Polish Stabilization Fund and the World Bank.

Politically, the Suchocka coalition government has achieved major victories on several fronts in the last month. Walesa, who normally remains out of the fray, stepped in at a number of crucial moments to back the government's proposals. The government's major victory in February was the approval of the 1993 budget bill. The government managed to keep the budget deficit within IMF guidelines and the IMF is expected to approve its agreement with Poland next week. This will trigger continuing negotiations on debt reduction within the Paris and London Club framework, and release funds for the World Bank's Financial Sector Structural Adjustment Loan and the Polish Bank Privatization Fund (the successor to the Polish Stabilization Fund).

Following the budget success, Suchocka managed to pass the long-awaited "Pact on State Enterprises," designed to forge a new working dialogue between government and labor. Earlier in February, the abortion issue was finally laid to rest by the passage of a compromise bill -- tagged the most restrictive in Europe outside of Ireland.

Resolution of these three issues (the budget, the Pact on State Enterprises, and abortion), has left Suchocka's coalition war-weary and reluctant to take on major new issues. Suchocka will have to work with her own coalition

including special decree powers for the government, privatization issues, and implementation on the pact on state enterprises. Her first major hurdle is to earn support from her coalition on a bill granting special decree powers to her government. For Suchocka, the bill may be vital to her efforts to pass important reform legislation.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
LECH WALESIA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YR NARA, Date 6/5/2015
2015-0780-M (1.04)

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 02 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND

TELCALL

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO PRES WALESA OF POLAND ON 3 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 04 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
SANNER
SIGLER
WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/5/2018
2015-0780-14

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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| 001 LAKE | Z 93030121 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION |
| 002 PRESIDENT | Z 93030221 FOR INFORMATION |
| 002 | X 93030410 NOTED BY PRES |

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

| <u>DOC</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u> | <u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u> |
|------------|-------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 002 | 930302 | | VICE PRESIDENT |
| 002 | 930302 | | MCLARTY, T |

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

03.03.93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 2, 1993

TELEPHONE CALL TO
PRESIDENT LECH WALESA OF POLAND

DATE: March 3, 1993
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 12:00 p.m.
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *RL*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2004
By *VZ* NARA, Date *6/5/2015*
2015-0780-M (1.05)

*President Walesa
wants to discuss
this with you
and you will go*

I. PURPOSE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
3

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Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
LECH WALES

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* Harp - Healon
* Holocaust Museum - 4/22

2 of talk both well
hope we can meet in person
independable in CEI
art 45 - Poland started
with support - complex
from meet-y
Get for new info letters

Yes it's possible

Two Gerchony how
been, then make -
you to meet them
show you poss -

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
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| Original OA/ID Number: 141 | | | | |
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| Document ID: 9301131 | | | | |
| Row: 44 | Section: 1 | Shelf: 3 | Position: 2 | Stack: v |

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 001. teleon | re: Teleon with Lech Walesa, President of Poland (2 pages) | 03/03/1993 | P1/b(1) v2 9/16/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Walesa and Mem*...])
OA/Box Number: 141

FOLDER TITLE:

9301131

2015-0780-M

rs1384

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 930.1131
RECEIVED: 03 MAR 93 13

TO: ITOH

FROM: SANNER

DOC DATE: 03 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND

TELCON

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES WALESA OF POLAND 3 MARCH

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 06 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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FICKLIN
SANNER
SIGLER
WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/5/2019
2015-0786-1M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
001

Z 93030415 FOR DECISION
X 93030808 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

**National Security Council
The White House**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1131

March 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *JW*

FROM: BETH SANNER *BS*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Lech Walesa, President of Poland,
March 3, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Walesa.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VZ* NARA, Date *6/5/09*
215-0780-11

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Declassify on: OADR

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1131

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Lech Walesa, President of Poland

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lech Walesa
Interpreter: Val Chlebowski
Notetaker: David Bailey, Neil Bleicken

DATE, TIME: March 3, 1993, 11:55am-12:06pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Walesa: The President of Poland says hello to the President of the United States of America. I'm so glad we can talk after such a short time. This bodes well for the future context. I hope that it will not be long before we meet in person. I know you are interested in the problems in Eastern Europe and spend a lot of time on it. There are great changes and Poland started them, but Poland needs support. They get very complicated. I would be very happy if we could talk these things over. I know that on April 4 you are going to meet President Yeltsin. This is a great event for Russia, Eastern Europe, and the world. The meeting will be greatly appreciated in Europe and in Poland, where it all started. It would underline all that happened. There is no more Warsaw Pact and COMECON. Poland is the symbol of a new beginning in which the United States played a part. It is good to schedule a meeting and we count on it very much. (C)

The President: Thank you. I hope you are feeling better. You sound terrific. I hope you feel as good as you sound. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the government's recent parliamentary victory on its budget. I may need you and your Prime Minister to come here and help me pass my budget through Congress. I understand that you will soon reach agreement with the IMF and that the agreement will be reviewed this month. I'm impressed by the standard Poland has set. Poland has set the standard in dealing with the IMF that the world will have to meet. The U.S. supports you on this. (C)

I, too, am eager to meet with you. One opportunity may be on April 22 for the dedication of the Holocaust memorial. I also know that April 19 is the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. We are currently reviewing individuals for participation in our delegation. We will be sending a very distinguished delegation. This is a very important occasion, not only for Poland, but the whole world. I don't know if you can leave your country but we could meet in Washington on or around April 22. Is that a possibility? (C)

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2019
2015-0760-W (1.07)

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President Walesa: Yes, this is a possibility. It will give me great pleasure to help you pass your budget through Congress. We would still like to play host to you and President Yeltsin. There are reform problems in post-communist countries which are complicated. Germany is closing its borders and sending asylum seekers back. Russia and Ukraine are complicated and need American help. The Yugoslavia example can be repeated anywhere. I would be happy if we could speak in April. Reform in Poland is well but that is not so in other countries and we should see what can be done. We'll participate in the Ghetto celebrations both here and perhaps there. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say that I am very anxious to be supportive of you. We want no more "Yugoslavias." I appreciate your offer to host my meeting with Russian President Yeltsin. We are currently discussing various possible venues with the Russian government, but we have not yet come to a final decision. But we will be able to visit in late April on or around the twenty-second. I am looking forward to that. I am committed to your success. I welcome the meeting, and please call me any time on the telephone when you want to have a conversation, when you want to talk. ~~(C)~~

President Walesa: I thank you very much. I hope we will stay in touch. I believe our reforms will lend a special touch to your meeting with President Yeltsin. ~~(C)~~

The President: That's a good point. I will bring that to the attention of those who will be arranging the meeting. ~~(C)~~

President Walesa: Thank you very much and I wish all the best to the United States of America. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 001a. paper | re: Poland Political Overview (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001b. talking points | re: Poland Political Overview (2 pages) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001c. paper | re: Polish Foreign Policy (2 pages) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001d. talking points | re: Polish Foreign Policy (2 pages) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001e. report | re: Poland: Military Contacts/Security Assistance (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001f. talking points | re: Military Contacts/Security Assistance (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001g. paper | re: Poland: Defense Issues/Arms Sales (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001h. talking points | re: Defense Arms Issues (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001i. paper | re: Poland: Vancouver Summit Debrief (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |
| 001j. talking points | re: Poland: Summit Debrief (1 page) | 04/00/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9302347
RECEIVED: 13 APR 93 14

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 12 APR 93
SOURCE REF: 9307567

KEYWORDS: POLAND

AP

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ POLISH PRES WALESA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 16 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN

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FILES: PA

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/09
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001 KUPCHAN
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002 KUPCHAN
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Z 93041314 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
X 95092009 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO
Z 93041514 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 93080608 NOTED BY PRES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302347
RECEIVED: 13 APR 93 14

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 12 APR 93
SOURCE REF: 9307567

KEYWORDS: POLAND

AP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ POLISH PRES WALESZA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 16 APR 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KUPCHAN

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


April 12, 1993

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(DECL:OADR)

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with Polish President
Lech Walesa

Attached are background papers/talking points and press
questions and answers for the President's meeting with Polish
President Lech Walesa on April 21.


for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 4/5/09
2015-0780-W

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POLAND - POLITICAL OVERVIEW

The July 10, 1992 election of Hanna Suchocka, Poland's third Prime Minister that year and fifth PM since the Communists lost power in August 1989, was accompanied by hopes that she could end a long period of political paralysis. Essential reform legislation had been stalled since before the October 1991 parliamentary elections that sent 29 widely-differing parties (none with more than 13 percent of the vote) to the Sejm. PM Jan Olszewski's confrontational approach with other parties in parliament and with President Walesa hastened the fall of his embattled, minority coalition government.

The Suchocka government resolved to act promptly on important legislation such as a 1993 budget, limits on wage and benefit indexation, and a mass privatization bill. Adopting a differentiated approach -- negotiate legitimate demands, but hang tough on political protests -- Suchocka surmounted waves of strikes in August and December. She nevertheless retained sufficient credibility with Solidarity to reach agreement in February 1993 on an important reform, the "Pact on State Enterprises," a complex package of legislation designed to regularize the means by which state-owned enterprises are restructured and to guarantee unions and employers a voice in that process. That same month, PM Suchocka turned the vote on her rigorous, anti-inflationary 1993 budget into a vote of confidence in her government. She thereby stared down parliamentary opponents who had earlier vowed to bring her government down on the budget vote. That budget made possible an IMF standby agreement for Poland.

Suchocka's minority government embraces the left and right ends of the Solidarity-origin political spectrum, and the PM has shown great skill in reconciling the different parties' views. But coalition dynamics will prove a constant challenge for Suchocka. The government lost some important votes -- notably, the initial version of its mass privatization bill -- in part because of intra-coalition frictions, and Suchocka has encountered party resistance to her efforts to replace some ministers she deems ineffective. Missteps will be exploited by the parliamentary opposition, part of which aims to force new elections before 1995, when the current term expires.

Always a controversial and mercurial figure, Walesa has nevertheless worked well with Suchocka on key issues, terming her "the best PM yet." He has periodically raised the notion of (constitutionally permissible) "presidential government," in which a cabinet of his appointing would exercise power in the event of political gridlock. All the same, though embittered former allies now loudly warn of a Walesa "dictatorship," his track record is clear: at every key moment, Walesa has always sided with and defended democracy.

Suchocka's government is guardedly optimistic that Poland has reached the bottom of the recession that has accompanied economic transformation. An economic turnaround, the government hopes, will strengthen and expand public support for essential next steps in reform.

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TALKING POINTS
POLAND - POLITICAL OVERVIEW

GENERAL

- It is important for the future of reform across the post-Communist world that there be examples to point to of countries that have successfully made that difficult political and economic transition, and might serve as a model for others.
- For that reason, I have made Poland my destination on my first trip abroad as Vice President. No country has gone further in its reforms than Poland.
- We see Poland as a valued partner.
- I want to reiterate that the U.S. will continue to support Poland's efforts to consolidate and build on the successes it has already achieved.
 - The wide range of friends Poland enjoys among both Democrats and Republicans, in Congress and the White House, ensures this.
- The U.S. feels a special attachment to Poland. As we stood with you under the worst times, we will stand with you now.
- I would value your views on the reform process that Poland began: what you might have done differently; what steps are next on the agenda; what advice you would give to other countries undertaking this transformation.
- I would be interested in how you assess the progress of reform in some of Poland's neighbors.

WITH PM SUCHOCKA

- o What are the next steps your government is taking to advance the reform agenda?
- o Are you counting on Solidarity's parliamentary support on future key votes?
- o Some opposition parties have declared their intention to bring your government down and force new elections. What are their chances of achieving this?
- o What lessons have you learned about managing a nine-party, minority coalition government?

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2019
2015-0710-M (1.09)

WITH PRESIDENT WALESIA

- o Later this week you will meet with President Clinton in Washington. What message should I bring him from Poland in preparation for that meeting?
- o Last month you said there were "too many words, and too little action" in Poland's political life. As President, how do you see your role in advancing reform? Where does that leave the Prime Minister?
 - Where does Solidarity, the trade union you once led, fit into reform?

(If asked) Radio Free Europe

- o President Clinton and I appreciate your concern about continuing RFE broadcasts to Poland. The President has decided to consolidate U.S. international broadcasting under one umbrella, as a response to the collapse of communism in Europe and in order to cut the budget. This will not happen for at least three years, and I assure you that U.S. broadcasting to Poland will continue into the foreseeable future.

THE POLISH ECONOMIC SCENE

Regional Economic Relations

Poland's goal is membership in the EC. Roughly half its trade is with the EC, while the US accounts for about 5%. The GOP signed and is implementing the trade section of an Association Agreement with the EC. The agreement envisions, but does not guarantee, EC membership; creates a free trade area over 10 years, although barriers to key exports - coal, steel, textiles, and agriculture - remain; enhances political dialogue; and increases economic cooperation and assistance. Poland also has signed a free trade agreement with the other Visegrad states (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia), which became effective March 1, and a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA).

Economic Performance

Poland's economy improved slightly in 1992 and most expect continued improvement in 1993. In 1992 GDP grew between .5% and 2%, the first increase since 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Industrial output was up 2% over 1991, but overall output was held down as agriculture production fell 20%, due in large part to a severe drought. Poland ran a small trade surplus in 1992, as exports increased.

There are problem areas. Unemployment is 14% and increasing. Inflation, although continuing to drop, is about 40%. Few state enterprises are profitable. The fiscal deficit remains worrisome. The problem is on the revenue side. The GOP has done a solid job controlling expenditures.

On March 8 the IMF board approved a 12-month, \$667 million stand-by arrangement. Poland had been out of compliance with the IMF since August 1991. The agreement will facilitate additional IBRD lending, completion of the second tranche of official debt relief under the Paris Club in April 1994, and agreement with commercial creditors in the London Club.

Reform

Poland has made significant progress on stabilizing the currency, freeing most prices, removing barriers to trade, and establishing the legal structure for a market economy. The private sector now accounts for about half of output and employment. The zloty is convertible and since October 1991 has been devalued by a crawling peg in line with inflation. Little progress has been made privatizing large enterprises, however, and the banking and financial sectors are inadequate.

After a year of political paralysis, PM Suchocka is addressing key impediments to further reform: mass privatization of large firms; labor's involvement in privatization; and bank reform. On March 17 the Sejm defeated the government's privatization plan. The GOP resubmitted the bill with minor modifications. The bank plan involves cleaning up loan portfolios of the major banks, reorganizing viable industrial debtors in return for debt relief, and privatization of major banks.

TALKING POINTS
POLISH ECONOMIC SCENE

- I appreciate that the transition to a market economy has been difficult and the Polish people have borne a heavy burden.
- However, there is a sense of optimism about your economic prospects. The strong measures you took four years ago are producing results.
- I am glad that you are back on track with the IMF. That is key to your reform efforts.
- I recognize that you must continue to develop new export markets. We will continue to work to remove barriers to your exports and will encourage others to do the same so long as our products are not discriminated against.
- You have proposed aggressive plans to deal with privatization of large enterprises and to reform the banking sector. These should have positive effects on your budget and further improve the investment climate.

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POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

Poland has traditionally seen itself as a Western nation that looks east. With the installation of the first Solidarity-origin government in 1989, Poland began to re-establish that orientation. Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski has served every Polish government since the Communists lost power, and is the longest serving Foreign Minister in Eastern Europe. He, Walesa and Suchocka are in fundamental agreement on Poland's foreign policy approach.

Germany

Skubiszewski has achieved notable success in overcoming historic enmities and building good relations with Germany. The two countries signed a comprehensive friendship treaty on economic and other matters in June 1991. Poland has encountered problems with Germany concerning refugees: Poland does not want refugees refused by Germany to be sent back to Poland; the countries are currently negotiating a solution.

Visegrad

Poland has also sought to strengthen ties with its East European neighbors. Warsaw is a consistent advocate of the Visegrad process, begun when the leaders of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia signed a declaration at the 1991 Visegrad, Hungary, summit pledging cooperation on matters of common concern. The current Czech government believes that Visegrad could become a "club of the poor," and may have outlived its utility to Prague. The U.S., however, has encouraged Visegrad and commended the partners on their successful cooperation.

NIS

Warsaw has adopted a rigorously evenhanded approach in its relations with the NIS: pursue the best possible relations with each country, but do not permit good relations with one country to be directed against any other. Warsaw does not want to be drawn into disputes between any of the republics, especially Russia and Ukraine. Warsaw is also concerned that worsening conditions to the east could generate a flood of refugees, and Poland's engagement with its eastern neighbors is partly inspired by a desire to avert that chaos. Poland would like to play a facilitative role in delivering assistance to the NIS.

Poland recognizes the need to pursue cooperative relations with Moscow. The advent of Gorbachev's and, later, Yeltsin's leadership provided opportunities to change the quality of Polish-Russian relations and work to overcome historical enmities. Yeltsin is to pay a state visit to Warsaw in June, repaying Walesa's state visit to Moscow in May 1992.

During that 1992 visit, the two Presidents signed agreements on Russian troop withdrawals from Poland, thus removing a thorny issue from the bilateral relationship. The agreements allow 6000 support troops to remain in Poland until the end of 1993, to facilitate the transit of Russian troops from the former

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By FL NARA, Date 6/5/2014
2015-0780-W (1.10)

East Germany. The last Russian combat troops left Poland slightly ahead of the agreed-upon November 15, 1992 deadline.

Polish-Soviet trade imploded with the January 1991 introduction of hard currency/world market price trade terms. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which had accounted for one fifth of all Polish exports, further disrupted trade ties, now conducted on barter terms in many cases. Warsaw and Moscow disagree over their degree of mutual indebtedness. Issues include the rate of the "transferable rouble" in which the debt was measured, and the terms under which Poland acquires Russian natural gas.

In all its relations with Russia, Poland watches closely for signs of "imperial thinking" in Moscow. A number of Russian political figures -- including some close to Yeltsin -- have objected to Poland's aspirations for NATO membership, to its independent ties to former Soviet republics, or even to its cooperation with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; proof, to Warsaw, that "imperial thinking" is not yet dead.

Polish leaders across a broad spectrum support Ukraine's independence, seeing in a free Ukraine the most effective counterweight to such "imperial thinking." Ukraine is a key focus of Poland's eastern policy, and Ukraine in turn has courted its other neighbors to the West as a potential counterweight to its perceived threat from Russia. Warsaw is concerned that some Western nations treat Ukraine as a factor of relations with Russia, rather than an independent entity deserving separate treatment.

Baltics

Following Lithuania's independence in 1991, Poland raised some concerns about the treatment of ethnic Poles living in Lithuania (9% of the population). During the August 1991 Soviet coup attempt, some local leaders supported the coup. As a result, the GOL suspended four local governing councils, two of which were in Polish-dominated areas. The Polish minority appealed to Warsaw, which tried to take an evenhanded approach to the situation. In February, new District representatives were elected in free elections. Last year Poland and Lithuania signed an agreement that inter alia pledges respect for the minorities in each country, and the vocal Polish minority seems to have quieted down. With the election of Brazauskas, Warsaw is hopeful that relations will continue to improve. Poland's relations with Latvia and Estonia are far less problematic.

UN, CSCE

Poland wants to be seen as a player on the international scene, and seeks full integration in Western economic and security institutions, especially NATO and the EC. Poland is also active in the UN and CSCE, and has contributed personnel and materiel to UN peacekeeping efforts, including in former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. It has played a useful role as the U.S. protecting power in Iraq and has sought bilateral agreements, particularly in economic areas, with many countries.

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TALKING POINTS
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

General

- Poland's constructive and responsible approach to relations with its neighbors and other partners is commendable.
- We appreciate the active role you play in the UN and CSCE, particularly your contributions to peacekeeping efforts.

Germany

- What can you tell me about your talks with Germany on the refugee issue?

Visegrad

- We support Visegrad (VEE-sheh-grad) as a valuable initiative in regional coordination and a potential model for other countries undergoing political and economic transformation. We do not see it as a "poor man's club," but as a stepping stone toward your integration into European and transatlantic institutions.
- What are the focal points of the Visegrad agenda at present?
- How has the split of Czechoslovakia affected Visegrad?

NIS

- How do you see events developing to Poland's east? What would be a realistic best-case scenario from Poland's point of view? What would a worst-case scenario be, and how would Poland be affected?
- Do you see any likelihood that Yeltsin, in order to refute attacks by opponents on his alleged foreign policy "weakness," might choose to demonstrate his "toughness" on Eastern Europe?
- In undertaking its transition to democracy and a market economy, Poland started with advantages -- the Solidarity movement, a lively entrepreneurial spirit, extensive exposure to the free market democracies in the West -- which its neighbors to the east do not share, and even with this, the transition has not been easy for Poland.
- What advantages do the former Soviet republics have that might help them with their reforms? What can other countries -- Poland, the U.S. -- do to help maximize those advantages?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(DECL:OADR)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2015
2015-0740-111 (1.11)

TALKING POINTS
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

-2-

- President Yeltsin and the Congress of Peoples' Deputies are now locked in a struggle to determine how quickly and deeply reforms will continue in Russia and who will set their course. In your view, is a strong President a necessity to lead a post-Communist country to democracy and a free market economy?
- I would be interested in your personal assessment of Yeltsin, whom you supported during the August 1991 coup attempt, and whom you met with last May in Moscow.
- I would be interested in hearing where Ukraine fits in Poland's foreign policy, and where you think Warsaw fits in Kiev's thinking.
- Poland was the first country to recognize independent Ukraine. I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on how Ukraine's leaders hope to bring about reform; where Ukraine fits in Poland's foreign policy, and where you think Warsaw fits in Kiev's thinking; whether ethnic questions complicate the bilateral relationship.

Baltics

- The U.S. commends Poland's efforts to seek a good working relationship with Lithuania.
- How do you see your relations with the new leadership in Lithuania?
- What is happening with the Polish minority in Lithuania?

Protecting Power

- The U.S. greatly appreciates Poland's role as protecting power in Iraq.

POLAND: TRADE AND INVESTMENT ISSUES

Commercial relations with Poland are generally good. The US accounts for about 5% of Poland's trade. The GOP is interested in a Bush Administration statement that at some point we would consider negotiating a free trade with Poland, Hungary, Czech, and Slovakia. There are two outstanding trade disputes.

Poland's implementation of the trade in goods section of its Association Agreement with the EC has placed certain U.S. exporters at an unfair disadvantage relative to EC firms. Key products affected include computers and components, medical equipment, and agriculture products. Since May 1992 we have attempted to negotiate a temporary tariff suspension for certain products until a permanent solution could be worked out by negotiating bound tariffs at a reasonable level in the context of Poland's GATT reaccession talks.

We have not reached agreement. Poland risks loss of benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), since we cannot grant GSP to a country whose preferences to another developed country injure U.S. trade. On March 10, following a series of negotiations, the GOP moved unilaterally, saying the issue would have to be resolved in GATT reaccession talks but that the GOP would implement a few temporary measures we had discussed: quotas for computers and chips; reducing tariffs on a few other products; and are considering quotas for certain agriculture products. The GOP refused further bilateral discussion of temporary tariff reductions on over 100 other items. We asked for modifications in size and coverage of the quotas and offered to continue reaccession talks shortly. The GOP has not implemented all measures they indicated they would. We understand implementation is still being discussed.

Poland does not provide adequate protection for intellectual property: particular concerns are protection of software and audio and visual recordings and anti-piracy measures. We have held eight rounds of talks over two years to resolve this issue. The lack of protection has prevented us from implementing our Business and Economic Treaty. U.S. industry has requested Poland be designated a priority foreign country under Special 301: Poland is now on the priority watch list.

The Sejm is considering a copyright bill which, while not as strong as we would like, is an improvement. We and industry believe rapid passage followed by close monitoring of its implementation is the best approach to gain an adequate level of protection. A patent law is in effect.

Foreign investment had been disappointing, approximately \$1.2 billion, but seems to be improving. Problems reflect an ambiguous investment climate and the inability of the GOP, afraid to be seen as selling off the country on the cheap, to take decisions. Italy is the largest foreign investor, primarily in the auto and steel industries, while Germany is third. The U.S. is second with about \$500 million invested and commitments of about \$800 million. Significant investors are Coca Cola, GM, Westinghouse, Marriott, and International Paper. Ford and ASARCO are considering large investments.

TALKING POINTS
POLAND: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Tariff Dispute

- We support your integration into West Europe and the EC. However, US firms cannot be unfairly disadvantaged.
- Implementation of your Association Agreement has impacted negatively on key US exports, because US firms pay significantly higher tariffs than EC firms.
- We need to resolve this issue before it further complicates our bilateral relationship and threatens your benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
- I urge you to implement all temporary measures we have discussed over the past year as fast as possible. A permanent solution can be negotiated in GATT reaccession talks.
- However, we cannot accept bound tariffs at unreasonably high levels. This would not benefit either of us.

Intellectual Property

- Protection of intellectual property is a key element of a positive trade regime and investment climate.
- I urge you to pass your copyright bill and vigorously enforce its measures against piracy.
- This should allow us to implement our Business and Economic Treaty. It will also significantly improve the investment climate.
- As long as this matter remains unresolved Poland is vulnerable to trade sanctions by the US under our trade laws.

Investment

- It appears that investors are taking a more positive view of Poland. This is essential to development of the private sector.
- It is essential that all foreign investors be treated fairly and without discrimination.

Free Trade Agreement

- We have not yet considered whether to negotiate additional free trade agreements. Our first priorities are the NAFTA and Uruguay Round.

POLISH STABILIZATION FUND (PSF)

As part of a comprehensive enterprise and financial sector restructuring program, the GOP is implementing a plan to recapitalize and private its banking sector. The program would be supported by a \$450 million IBRD loan, GOP budgetary resources, and resources reallocated from the PSF, which passed out of existence at the end of 1992, having achieved its immediate purpose. A principle objective of the program is to resolve the problem of bad debts held by Poland's nine "commercial" banks which affect the viability and market-based performance of the banks and enterprises alike.

The key element of the program is a Chapter 11-like operation during which banks and debtors attempt to restructure the bad debt of enterprises which the banks perceive as viable. This may include: rescheduling of interest and/or repayment terms; debt cancellation; debt/equity swaps; recapitalization of the banks through issuance of long-term government securities. To be eligible for recapitalization the banks must: segregate bad loans; establish work-out departments to manage those bad loans; and present an acceptable action plan to the GOP to deal with the bad loan portfolio.

The GOP proposed reallocating PSF resources to this in 1992 when it became apparent that the PSF had served its purpose. With the endorsement of the GOP plan from the IMF and IBRD, the USG took the initiative to convince other donors to reallocate PSF resources to a new fund - the Polish Bank Privatization Fund (PBPF) - which the GOP may draw upon (subject to compliance with its IMF arrangement and implementation of the IBRD's FSAL, among other conditions) to service principle and interest on the government securities issued to recapitalize the banks after a bank has been privatized. Prior to privatization, these costs will be met by the GOP.

A statement of support for developing new uses for the PSF in its current form (grants and loans) was included in the communique of the G-7 Munich Summit last July. Subsequent to several approaches at the G-7 deputies level, a conference of the 18 participants in the PSF was held in Warsaw on November 25, 1992. President Bush wrote his counterparts in donor governments urging their support for the conference. Following this and subsequent meetings, the donors created the PBPF to support the GOP's bank reform plan.

There currently are \$675 million committed to Poland's bank reform program. \$455 million has been or will be contributed to the PBPF. \$120 million (\$100 million from France and \$20 million from Austria) have been given directly to the GOP. The major undecided donor is Germany (\$240 million), which contends that its contribution, a short term concessional line of credit, is not suitable for bank reform. Germany is still discussing uses for its share with the GOP. Canada (\$25 million) provided its contribution to the GOP for other projects. Other donors - Denmark (\$8.3 million) and Turkey (\$.8 million) - are in discussion with the GOP. Spain and Luxembourg have decided not to contribute.

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TALKING POINTS
POLISH STABILIZATION FUND

- Your bank reform plan should significantly strengthen your banking system and assist privatization of banks and the restructured enterprises.
- I am pleased that the USG was able to work with you and the participants in the stabilization fund to convert the fund to support bank reform.
- How are your discussions with the Germans coming along?
- Are there ways we can be helpful?

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U.S. ASSISTANCE TO POLAND

Since 1990, the U.S. has provided over \$4 billion in assistance to Poland, making it the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Central and Eastern Europe. This includes \$2.4 billion in debt reduction and a debt for environment swap in which the Polish government will deposit the local currency equivalent of \$367 million in outstanding loans to the U.S. into the Polish Ecofund to carry out environmental projects. The U.S. also contributed \$200 million as the lead donor to the \$1 billion Polish Currency Stabilization Fund and took the lead last year in converting that fund to a program for restructuring the Polish financial sector. Additionally, the U.S. has contributed over \$100 million in food and feed grain assistance.

Under the Support for East European Democracy, or SEED Act, the U.S. has provided over \$550 million in grant technical assistance, training and other activities to support the Poland's transition to democracy and a market economy. The Polish American Enterprise Fund, which has received nearly \$200 million of a projected \$250 million in USG capitalization, supports small and medium-sized Polish businesses through loans, equity capital and technical assistance. Its innovative "loan windows" program alone has approved over 1,700 small loans to private entrepreneurs via 13 regional banks.

Other key SEED activities include supplying U.S. Treasury, S.E.C. and A.I.D. advisors to assist in restructuring the banking and financial sectors, as well as in mass and sectoral privatization through the Ministry of Privatization and other ministries. \$30 million in SEED funds have gone to reduce environmental pollution in Krakow through installation of emission controls and adoption of energy efficiency techniques. Other environmental assistance is delivered through advisors and training at the national, local and firm levels. A.I.D. is completing work on a \$25 million Housing Investment Guarantee Program for Poland which, in cooperation with the World Bank and EBRD, will promote housing construction and mortgage banking.

The U.S. assistance program has been the quickest and most responsive of all Western donors. With the benefit of three years' experience, the U.S. now provides assistance based on a targetted strategy that reflects the priorities of the Polish Government while preserving the flexibility to make course corrections as new needs and new priorities arise.

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TALKING POINTS
ASSISTANCE TO POLAND

- The U.S. is committed to helping Poland through its difficult transition to democracy and a market economy. Your success is important to us.
- The revolutionary changes farther east make your success even more crucial. Russians and others need to see from your example that the transition from communism to free market democracy can be made successfully and peacefully.
- We know how difficult this transition is. We admire the courage and persistence of the Polish people and their government. Only you can ensure that these efforts succeed, but you can count on our help.
- With over \$4 billion dollars since 1990, Poland is the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Eastern Europe.
- Much of our support goes directly to the Polish people. The Polish American Enterprise Fund, for example, provides loans, capital, and other assistance directly to entrepreneurs in the new Polish private sector.
- We also provide a great deal of help to your Government in privatization, the financial sector, and many other areas. We want to be sure that all our programs are worked out in consultation with you and your Government.
- The U.S. is implementing a \$25 million housing guarantee program in Poland. Poland has also received a \$200 million loan from the World Bank.
- I know that the U.S. is working on a major program to reduce the level of air pollution in Krakow and has provided a great deal of technical assistance, but I am committed to seeing us do more in this area.
- I would welcome your views on the U.S. assistance effort and what we could do to improve it.

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POLISH ENVIRONMENTAL FUND

The Polish Environmental Fund (Ecofund) was launched in June 1991 in conjunction with the Poland's Paris Club debt reduction agreement. The GOP implemented the fund on January 1, 1992. As part of its bilateral agreement with Poland implementing the Paris Club agreement, the U.S. agreed to write off an additional 20% of Poland's debt, half of which would be used to establish an environmental fund. The U.S. contribution is \$367 million over 17 years.

Treasury Secretary Brady (March 1991) and Secretary of State Baker (June 1991) wrote to G-7 counterparts urging them to agree to additional debt reduction/debt swaps to support environment. To date, only the US has made a firm commitment to the fund. Other countries, notably Germany and the Nordic countries, have had serious discussions with the GOP, but this interest has waned.

The French had indicated interest in participating, but apparently saw the fund as a commercial mechanism to promote sale of French products. The GOP turned down a French offer which tied participation to contracts with French firms.

The EBRD has agreed to provide technical assistance in prioritizing projects to fund. The GOP has also expressed its hope that the Bank will be a co-financer of fund projects. To date, the EBRD has identified one \$100 million project to co-finance.

Current GOP thinking is that the Fund's resources would be for grant assistance to fund up to 30% of environmental projects focussing on transboundary pollution and biological diversity protection. The fund might also cofinance projects developed by a joint U.S.-Japan environmental initiative or the multilateral Environmental Action Program for CEE.

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TALKING POINTS
POLISH ECOFUND

- I believe this fund has the potential to help address pressing environmental concerns in Poland and the region.
- It is disappointing other donors did not participate in the fund. However, it seems that the Lucerne Environmental Action Program and the joint U.S.-Japan environmental initiative for Eastern Europe offer good potential for multilateral cooperation.

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POLAND: MILITARY CONTACTS/SECURITY ASSISTANCE

In recent years our military and security cooperation with Poland has expanded dramatically. In addition to the NATO/GDM and NACC programs in which Poland participates as a liaison partner, we have provided assistance to Poland bilaterally in a number of areas:

The U.S. has initiated a program of expanded military-to-military contacts with Poland. A U.S. military liaison team is now in Warsaw to coordinate a growing schedule of military exchanges, visits and seminars. These are conducted both in Poland and at facilities in Germany and the U.S. The teams are based at the Polish Defense Ministry but are subordinate to our Ambassador.

Contact activities are aimed at assisting the Polish military to make further progress in reorienting its mission to become an efficient servant of democratic society under civilian control. We have not engaged in discussions of combat-related topics, nor are we prepared to conduct joint exercises, except for possible multilateral peacekeeping exercises within the NACC framework.

Security Assistance

Poland will receive \$600,000 in International Military Education & Training (IMET) funding for this year, which will enable 32 Polish military and defense ministry personnel to take part in DOD courses of instruction in the U.S. We anticipate requesting similar levels of IMET assistance for FY-94.

Poland has not received any additional security assistance, such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or Economic Support Funds (ESF). However, we have held discussions with the Poles on the possibility of donating four used C130B transports to Poland under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. If the Poles wish to pursue this transaction, we anticipate proposing to Congress to reprogram \$250,000 in FY-93 FMF funding for costs associated with the donation.

Poland would be responsible for maintenance, training and spare parts costs of approximately \$10 million in the first two years of operating the aircraft and several million dollars a year thereafter. We are not confident that the Poles will want to pursue this deal under these terms. A U.S. Air Force briefing team will travel to Poland in mid-April to explain the cost figures to the Polish government.

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TALKING POINTS
MILITARY CONTACTS/SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security Assistance

- I am pleased that a growing number of personnel from the Polish military and defense ministry have been able to take advantage of the courses offered through our International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in the U.S.
- We are hopeful that our expanding program of military-to-military contacts, including the establishment of a U.S. military liaison team in Warsaw, can help Poland address some of its needs.
- We also hope that our Bilateral Working Group on Defense Matters can serve as a forum for discussion of Poland's needs and concerns in this area as well as possible areas in which the U.S. can provide advice and assistance.

C130's (IF ASKED)

- I understand that our Department of Defense has discussed with your government the possibility of transferring four used C-130B transport aircraft to Poland.
- I am told that a briefing team from our Air Force will visit Poland this month to explain to you the costs that would be associated with such a transfer. I gather that those costs could be considerable.
- If -- after discussing the costs involved -- Poland is interested in pursuing this transaction, our State Department will need to notify our Congress, which will need to give its approval.
- Because of the legal necessity of notifying Congress before a transfer can be announced, and given that we have not yet provided you with a full explanation of the cost of maintaining these planes and training personnel to fly and repair them, we are not in a position to announce publicly this proposal during my visit.

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POLAND: DEFENSE ISSUES/ARMS SALES

Poland sees its security as being closely linked to NATO and the West as a whole. While it does not face any immediate external threats, Poland is concerned about potential instability in the NIS and is wary -- in a broad historical sense based on centuries of invasion and occupation by its neighbors -- of possible future security threats from Russia and (to a lesser extent) Germany.

Since 1990, Poland's civilian governments have worked to reform their military, subordinate it to civilian control, and reshape it to better reflect current realities. Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz, a former Solidarity leader who worked closely with Walesa, has done much to modernize and reorient Poland's defense posture and organization.

Poland's defense industries are largely antiquated and ill-equipped to compete on the world market. They remain important, however, as a source of employment and foreign exchange. We have held lengthy discussions with the Poles on the need to refrain from arms sales to "pariah regimes" and countries in regions of instability. Poland has in general maintained a good record of controlling its arms exports and avoiding possibly destabilizing arms sales. Given tremendous domestic pressures to keep the arms industries operating, however, this issue remains a potential irritant in our relations with Poland (further details below).

Poland is interested in acquiring advanced Western weaponry, such as F-16 fighters. It does not have the money for such purchases, nor is there money in our security assistance budget to pay for them. We have informed the Poles (and other countries in the region) that, for both policy and financial considerations, we are not prepared to sell advanced weapons systems to CEE countries. We are loath to encourage regional arms races and believe CEE countries must focus first on economic reform and restructuring. Poland is eligible for both commercial U.S defense and government-to-government sales and we have licensed several transactions already. We are prepared to consider requests for items other than sophisticated weapons systems.

NATO Membership

Poland would like to become a full member of NATO as soon as possible. Our position is that we may at some time in the future wish to consider enlarging NATO, but we do not believe the time is ripe for considering the issue now. We understand Poland's security concerns and have encouraged the Poles to take full advantage of the benefits of their partnership with NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

T-72 Sale to Iran

Poland has signed a contract to sell 150 T-72 tanks to Iran. Warsaw contends that the sale, essential to keep a large factory afloat, represents a one-time effort to which we did not strongly object when first apprised of it in 1991 (we strongly dispute that interpretation).

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TALKING POINTS
DEFENSE-ARMS ISSUES

NATO Membership

- Expansion of NATO membership is not part of the current agenda but rather is an issue that the Allies may need to address at some point in the future.
- I would encourage Poland to take full advantage of the opportunities for dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as well as NATO's Group on Defense Matters (GDM).

T-72 Sale to Iran

- The United States recognizes arms sales as a legitimate activity of sovereign nations for both domestic economic and foreign policy reasons.
- I am compelled to point out, however, that we consider the sale of the T-72 tanks to Iran as completely inconsistent with the evolving and desirable security relationship between our two countries. I would note that no NATO member has sold tanks to the current Iranian regime.
- Iran has given no indication that it will abandon its aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction or renounce its support of state-sponsored terrorism. The sale of these tanks would have the effect of rewarding Iran's unacceptable behavior and contributing to Iran's ability to threaten its neighbors.
- You can be certain that those in Congress concerned about Iranian rearmament will be very displeased when they learn of the sale, as they surely will, and will make that displeasure known to Poland.
- I urge you to reconsider the decision to move ahead with this tank sale to Iran.

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POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS

Jews have lived in Poland since the 9-10th centuries. The first large immigration occurred in the 11th century, when Jews sought refuge in Poland following pogroms in Western Europe. Since that time Jews in Poland have experienced both acceptance and rejection, gaining political and administrative privileges, assimilating to some degree, contributing to Poland's social, cultural, political and economic life yet suffering through pogroms and other anti-semitic backlashes.

When Poland was partitioned in 1795 among Russia, Austria and Prussia, the rights of Jews varied among the empires. During this time, however, Roman Catholic Poles looked to their Church not only for spiritual refuge but as the keeper of the idea of Polish nationalism: to be Polish, then, was to be Catholic. With the re-emergence of the Polish Republic in 1918, the 3 million Jews in the country (10% of the population) received the same legal rights as other citizens, including religious tolerance; nevertheless, discrimination existed. The interwar period saw a revival in Jewish political, social and cultural life, although the growth of industry and of a Polish middle class reduced opportunities for traditional Jewish business.

Poles are very sensitive to accusations that they are somehow complicit in the Holocaust, and are quick to point to many examples of Poles assisting and hiding Jews during the war. Millions of Poles also suffered and died at the hands of Nazis.

The 1946 pogrom in Kielce triggered the emigration of many of Poland's surviving Jews, which numbered about 40,000; most who remained tried to blend in as much as possible, some becoming Party members. Nevertheless, the small remaining Jewish population served as useful scapegoats for Poland's communist leaders. In March 1968, the Interior Minister, for his own political purposes, launched a brutal anti-semitic campaign against "Zionist traitors." The March events drove some to emigration, but also were a catalyst in the political education of some leading Solidarity activists.

Since the fall of communism in 1989, the Polish government has attempted to improve Polish-Jewish relations. In March 1991 President Walesa created a Presidential Council on Polish-Jewish Relations comprised of leading Polish Catholic and Jewish intellectuals. Walesa, who himself has been criticized for making anti-semitic remarks, has publicly condemned anti-semitism. In 1992 the Polish government established a "Remembrance Foundation" to work with other governments to preserve and protect Jewish sites in Poland.

But problems remain. The 1989 sermon by Cardinal Glemp, castigating U.S. Jewish demonstrators at Auschwitz who protested a Catholic convent on the camp's property, caused a furor that prompted an anti-defamation suit in the U.S. against Glemp in 1991 and a retraction--but not a full apology--by Glemp; the suit was later dropped. The convent controversy has now been resolved. Glemp has tried to redeem himself on this by permitting an increase in the Catholic-Jewish dialogue, including Jewish religious instruction for seminarians.

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U.S.-POLAND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

Environmental programs are designed to assist with economic restructuring and reduce threats to human health through three objectives:

- support reform of environment and economic policies, prices, legislation and regulations;
- improve efficiency and effectiveness of public sector environmental investments; and
- support expansion of the role of the private sector in the environment.

Under the SEED Act of 1989, EPA is completing a 3 year, \$5 million program of air monitoring and water quality enhancement initiatives in Krakow. The air monitoring capability is being integrated with the World Bank's air quality improvement project for Upper Silesia.

Administrative strengthening activities for the Ministry of Environment (MOSZNL) are emphasizing improved internal organization, information systems, and human resources. EPA is also supporting the establishment of an Environmental Training Center to provide enforcement training and environmental impact training, courses developed by EPA and other partners. EPA officials from Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), PA are also cooperating with regional authorities in Krakow.

EPA has also supported projects with the Greater Mazurian Lakes Foundation to help complete the wastewater treatment facility at Gizycko, to reduce the environmental impacts of tourism, and to help develop institutional capabilities among local environmental managers.

U.S. universities, non-governmental organizations, and the World Environment Center are aiding Poland with information dissemination and education, working with Polish NGOs, the private sector, and volunteers at the local and regional levels.

The Department of Energy is leading several efforts aimed at reducing air pollution in Krakow and improving energy efficiency, including installation of an U.S.-produced pollution control system at the Skawina power station near Krakow, and projects with the city of Krakow to reduce or eliminate emissions from 1300 boiler houses that provide industrial, residential, and commercial heat, plus 200,000 small coal furnaces used for home heating.

DOE has also supported technical assistance, training, and low cost equipment to improve energy efficiency in industries and refineries, including a demand management planning and demonstration program with the Polish Power Grid and Poland's largest distribution company. The total value of DOE's multi-year effort is about \$35 million.

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TALKING POINTS
U.S.-POLAND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

- I am particularly impressed with the wide range of activities aimed at improving the quality of the environment in Poland. From governmental regulations to waste-water treatment facilities to energy efficiency measures, U.S.-Polish cooperation has produced some real success stories.
- The partnership between U.S. and Polish government agencies, local authorities throughout Poland, non-governmental organizations, and especially the private sector, is critically important. With some successes already growing out of these partnerships, I hope we will continue to address the formidable environmental challenges still present.
- U.S. cooperative efforts will continue to support reform of environmental policies and regulations in Poland, improved efficiency and effectiveness of public sector environmental investments, and an expanded role for the private sector in environmental remediation efforts.

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Poland: Vancouver Summit Debrief

At the Vancouver summit, President Clinton engaged Boris Yeltsin directly in the most important foreign policy problem of his Presidency -- the ongoing transformation of Russia and its implications for the national security of the United States. The summit produced a feeling that after decades of confrontation and several years of uncertainty and probing, the two countries have now crossed a threshold of cooperation and partnership.

Looming in the background at Vancouver were the Russian domestic political crisis and the April 25 plebiscite. President Yeltsin indicated to President Clinton that he intended to wage a vigorous campaign in the run-up to the April 25 vote and that he was encouraged by the size and reaction of the crowds that had gathered at campaign stops in route to Vancouver.

The summit discussion was dominated by economics. President Clinton signalled a broad and sustained American commitment to the support of democracy and market economic reform in Russia, despite the budgetary stringencies that we confront. We and the Russians agreed on a \$1.6 billion package of comprehensive economic measures intended to improve the lives of the Russian people and serve as an investment in our future relationship with Russia. The core package of assistance consists of monies already appropriated by Congress and immediately deliverable. President Yeltsin reacted as enthusiastically in private as in public to the package, saying that it was practical and substantial and stood a good chance of success.

In addition to this package, the President held out to Yeltsin the prospect of even more substantial support, on both the bilateral and multilateral (G-7) tracks over the next few months. By phasing our support in this fashion, we have indicated that we expect the Russians to take the economic stabilization steps that will be essential if our support is to be effective.

While economics held center stage at Vancouver, the two leaders also discussed the full range of security and international issues. President Clinton raised the issue of Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltics and expressed concern over certain actions of Russian troops in the new independent states. On one of the more difficult issues addressed by the two presidents -- that of Bosnia -- the Russians reaffirmed their support for the Vance/Owen process, but made clear that this was a tough political issue domestically. The Russians shared our view that getting the Bosnian Serbs to come soon to agreement with the other parties was an urgent priority. They stated that, notwithstanding the recent Bosnian Serb statements, they would continue efforts to convince the Bosnian Serbs to come quickly to an agreement, to cease hostilities, and to stop ethnic cleansing.

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TALKING POINTS
POLAND: SUMMIT DEBRIEF

- The Vancouver summit underscored the importance of supporting Russian reform.
- If the forces of reform prevail, there will be benefits for all of us. If they fail, there will be costs and dangers. There could be a renewal of the arms race, threats posed by nuclear stockpiles, a loss of potential markets, and a change in the whole tone of U.S.-Russian relations.
- That is why my Administration is giving such priority to support for Russian reform -- even at a time of considerable budgetary stringency in the U.S.
- That is why I chose to make my first trip abroad since taking office to Vancouver for a meeting with Boris Yeltsin.
- The summit at Vancouver was extraordinary. There was a feeling that after decades of confrontation and several years of uncertainty and probing, our two countries have now crossed a threshold.
- President Yeltsin and I not only established a solid personal relationship -- we agreed to take a series of mutually reinforcing steps that are intended to carry Russia through its current crisis.
- The package of economic measures agreed at the summit was quite comprehensive. It is meant to get at some of the areas of particular importance to both the U.S. and the Russians, particularly at the grassroots level.
- Our core package of assistance consists of monies already appropriated by Congress and immediately deliverable. We have consulted extensively with Congress and we have gained strong bipartisan support.
- President Yeltsin reacted enthusiastically in private as he did in public to the package. He told me that the package is practical and substantial and stands a good chance of success. He was able to discuss in detail the specifics of the package.
- But we should emphasize that this remarkable joint venture is not a bilateral, U.S.-Russian enterprise. It involves the international community as a whole. The vocabulary of the summit featured the word "multilateral."
- The effort should by no means be limited to the G-7. President Yeltsin and I discussed our hope to reach well beyond the G-7 in the weeks and months and years to come.
- I emphasized the importance of completing Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states and underscored that Russia will be held responsible for the behavior of its troops beyond its borders.

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U.S.-POLISH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

U.S.-Polish S&T cooperation takes place under an umbrella S&T agreement signed by then-Vice President Bush in September 1987. The Agreement was renewed in September 1992, for an additional term of five years. The Joint Fund established under the Agreement provides grants for cooperative research by U.S. and Polish counterpart scientists, continuing a strong collaborative tradition in the fields of basic sciences, energy, environment, public health and agriculture.

More than \$5 million and its equivalent in Polish zloties has been dedicated to cooperative research since 1987 in this program, which is based on the principles of mutual contributions and mutual benefits. The U.S. contribution in 1993 was \$1.75 million, matched by an equivalent amount in Polish zloties.

A sampling of projects financed by the U.S.-Polish Joint Fund includes medical research in muscular dystrophy, genetic and other agricultural research on rye germplasm, information exchange and other collaboration on the applicability of U.S. clean coal technology to Polish industrial plants, research on the use of non-CFC refrigerants in heatpumps, and transportation research to improve fracture resistance in railroad wheels and rails.

Recognizing the need to move the results of basic and applied research to the marketplace, the U.S.-Polish Joint Fund sponsored a new initiative in 1992, in cooperation with the U.S. Business-Higher Education Forum, the Department of Commerce, the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research (KBN), the IRIS-Poland Project and the Association of University Related Research Parks, and the technical universities that hosted events in three Polish cities.

The initiative was designed to focus on the processes of technology commercialization, to harness the indigenous talents of government and university researchers and the technologies resulting from their research toward product development and overall economic development in Poland. A number of speakers with expertise in high-tech start-ups, high technology manufacturing, venture capital, and intellectual property protection conducted a series of conferences and workshops in Warsaw, Krakow, and Gdansk. These three events generated a series of recommendations to the Polish government, and fostered an interchange of information not only among the U.S. speakers and audience, but most importantly among the business, education and government sectors in Poland.

The next meeting of the U.S.-Polish Joint Commission will take place in Warsaw in June 1993, and follow-up to the Technology Commercialization Initiative will be considered with the goal that such efforts can serve as engines to bring together the various academic, regulatory, and entrepreneurial players critical to fostering development from technology, and thereby provide an economic foundation for supporting the science infrastructure that produces technological innovation and economic development.

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TALKING POINTS
U.S.-POLISH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

- We are very pleased with our cooperation on the U.S.-Polish Joint Fund, also known as the Maria Sklodowska (skwo-DOFF-ska) Curie Fund. It is important to maintain the cooperative ties built up between U.S. and Polish scientists.
- The opportunities for collaboration under this program produce benefits to both the United States and Poland, by combining to our mutual benefit the unique talents of scientists from both sides.
- With the significant reorganization of the Polish science sector over the last several years, we are gratified that the Maria Sklodowska (skwo-DOFF-ska) Curie Fund continues to be an important focus of scientific cooperation between Poland and the United States.
- We are also convinced of the need to translate technical assets into economic and other benefits, and are glad we have been able to work together in identifying how to accomplish that.

TRIANGULAR TRADE

The GOP continues to raise triangular trade, Western purchase of agricultural and other goods for the NIS assistance program. We have urged others to support this, but are constrained legally in what we can do. For example, there are restrictions on purchasing agriculture goods overseas for use in assistance programs. In addition, there would be domestic opposition if we were to make purchases from foreign firms rather than US firms. The Russians have made little or no use of existing EC and Japanese schemes: only \$82 million has been drawn against credits of approximately \$1 billion. We also have explored purchase of services in CEE and provision of technical assistance to NIS by CEE.

The GOP had proposed that we support a \$20 million project to build housing in Russia for FSU troops. The rationale was to ensure Russian troop withdrawal schedules are met. The Poles will probably raise this again in light of our promise to construct 450 housing units in Russia. We have already received over 40 expressions of interest from US firms in this project. The GOP is interested in providing work for its unemployed construction workers. Moscow has not been enthusiastic about Polish involvement.

Another possibility the GOP may raise is utilization of Polish labor in maintaining gas pipelines in Russia. Poland was involved in construction and maintenance of gas fields and pipelines in Russia. Russia has been paying for these services with natural gas, but recently suggested terminating the arrangement. The GOP wants to continue this arrangement to conserve hard currency and avoid increased expenditures.

UNCLASSIFIED

TALKING POINTS (If asked)
TRIANGULAR TRADE

- We will continue to look into where it may be possible to utilize goods or services from Poland, including housing construction, in our assistance projects for the NIS.
- However, given the constraints on our involvement in this type of operation, I cannot be too optimistic.
- So far, the NIS has not taken advantage of triangular opportunities available to it.

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS GUIDANCE: POLAND

Question: Have U.S.-Polish relations changed with your Administration?

Answer:

-- No, our relations continue to be excellent, drawn from deep roots. U.S.-Polish ties go back more than two centuries, to the founding of the United States.

-- The U.S.-Polish relationship is a partnership based on cooperation and mutual respect. Poland and the United States share similar views on many important subjects concerning the vast changes in Europe and the world.

-- I want to affirm my Administration's strong commitment to Poland's ongoing transition to a free market democracy. As the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to attempt this bold experiment, Poland is a model for other emerging democracies in the region.

Question: What did you discuss with President Walesa?

Answer:

-- We discussed our relations and how we can further strengthen our already close relationship. We also discussed Poland's economic reform program. I understand that it has not been an easy transition for the Poles. I applaud their efforts, which have been remarkable so far.

-- I told President Walesa (vah-WEN-sah) that the U.S. is pleased that Poland has signed an agreement with the IMF, which will bring additional resources and know-how to help resolve Poland's economic problems.

PRESS GUIDANCE: POLAND

-2-

- We also discussed improving the investment climate in Poland. This is essential to attract the capital necessary to rebuild the economy, create new jobs, and build an even more vibrant private sector that will lead to an increasing standard of living for all.

- Poland is a good place to do business, for both the Poles and U.S. investors. More and more American and Polish firms are making solid profits here every day.

- President Walesa and I also spoke about the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and the lessons we can learn from that tragic period of history.

Question: What is the status of U.S. assistance to Poland?

Answer:

- Poland is the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in East-Central Europe. Through our support for Polish debt relief, the Polish Stabilization Fund and other measures, we believe our assistance has made a difference. Poland can count on our continued support.

Question: Will U.S. assistance to Poland be decreased by an increase in assistance to Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union?

Answer:

- Assistance to the successor states of the former Soviet Union will not come at the expense of Poland or any other country in this region. We believe that Poland's success is important not only for the Polish people, but also for Russia, Ukraine and others who are just beginning to reform.

Question: Will Poland become a member of NATO?

Answer:

-- Poland is an active member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and plays an important role in that institution. The ongoing security dialogue in NACC is enhancing a climate of trust throughout Europe, and its cooperation on such matters as peacekeeping can help address common security issues. Expansion of NATO membership is not part of the current agenda but rather is an issue that the Allies may need to address at some point in the future.

Question: What is the U.S. doing to assist Poland militarily?

Answer:

-- We have an active program of military-to-military contacts, including a U.S. military liaison team in Warsaw. In addition, several dozen Polish officers and defense ministry officials are being trained in the U.S. this year under our International Military Education and Training Program. At the policy level, we have established a bilateral working group on defense matters that meets twice a year to discuss security issues of mutual concern.

Question: Is the U.S. planning to give Poland C-130 air force transports?

Answer:

-- We have held preliminary discussions with the Polish government on the possibility of transferring some excess transport aircraft to Poland. We will be discussing this further later this month. No final decision has been made by either side.

PRESS GUIDANCE: POLAND

-4-

Question: Why is the U.S. government planning to close down Radio Free Europe?

Answer:

-- I have decided to consolidate U.S. international broadcasting under one umbrella in response to the collapse of communism in Europe, and in order to achieve budgetary savings. Nevertheless, U.S. broadcasting, including the coverage of Polish domestic issues, will continue. The U.S. recognizes that broadcasting serves a useful role in the transformation to democracy of Poland and other countries of the region.

Question: If the United States wants to help Poland, why haven't you given the Poles a \$1 billion housing guarantee loan that will help create jobs and labor mobility for them

Answer:

-- Poland is implementing a \$25 million housing guarantee program with the U.S., a \$200 million loan from the World Bank, and a \$75 million loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to develop its housing market. We may consider other steps as implementation proceeds.

Question: Why is the U.S. seeking tariff breaks from Poland?

Answer:

-- Implementation of part of Poland's Association Agreement with the EC has placed U.S. exporters at an unfair disadvantage. We are attempting to find a temporary solution to the problem until we can negotiate a new bound tariff schedule at reasonable levels in the GATT.

-- This discriminatory treatment not only harms our firms, it makes competitive products more expensive for Poland to import. It also detracts from Poland's investment climate since necessary imports are more expensive.

Question: Is the U.S planning to take action against Poland because of questions about protection of intellectual property?

Answer:

-- We are concerned that standards of copyright protection are not consistent with our Business and Economic Treaty. Our industry is concerned about lack of adequate protection and has asked the USG to resolve the problem. If the problem is not solved, a trade action is possible.

-- Protection of intellectual property is today a necessary component of an effective trade regime and investment climate. It works to everyone's advantage. It encourages introduction of technology and development of domestic industry which requires technology.

Question: Is the U.S. planning a Free Trade Agreement with Poland?

Answer:

-- Our first priorities are the NAFTA and Uruguay Round. We have not yet considered whether to negotiate additional free trade agreements.

PRESS GUIDANCE: POLAND

-6-

Question: What is your view of the situation in Abkhazia?

Answer:

- I have been closely following the conflict in Abkhazia and am quite concerned about the recent escalation in fighting, both for the harm it does to Georgia's reform efforts and for its potential to further destabilize the region.

- We have discussed the situation with both President Yel'tsin and Chairman Shevardnadze, stressing the importance of cooperative efforts aimed at easing tensions.

- We strongly support the ongoing efforts of the CSCE mediation team to facilitate a resolution of this conflict.

Question: Did you discuss Bosnia? What steps is the U.S. going to take?

Answer:

- We have discussed a range of issues facing Europe and the international community.

- The United States is continuing to make every effort to encourage a negotiated settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- I would like to commend the Polish government for its participation in the UN Protection Force in Croatia and for its generosity in welcoming refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

See

Case Number: 2009-0223-M; 2015-0780-M

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| 001a. memcon | re: Meeting with President Lech Walesa of Poland (4 pages) | 04/21/1993 | P1/b(1) 9/16/2019 |
| 001b. memcon | re: Meeting with President Iliescu of Romania (1 page) | 04/21/1993 | P1/b(1) |
| 001c. memcon | re: Meeting with President Zhelev of Bulgaria (2 pages) | 04/21/1993 | P1/b(1) |

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RESTRICTION CODES

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302950
RECEIVED: 29 APR 93 18

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 29 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND
BULGARIA

ROMANIA
MEMCON

PERSONS: HWAL

ILIESCU, ION

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMCONS W/ PRES WALESA OF POLAND / PRES ILIESCU OF ROMANIA & PRES ZHELEV OF BULGARIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ITOH

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FILES: PA

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2014

2015-0780-M (

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 93042920 KENNEY SGD MEMO

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
April 29, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Memcons with Presidents Walesa,
Iliescu, and Zhelev (U)

Attached are copies of three Presidential memorandums of conversation. Request a copy of each be provided "eyes only" to Secretary Christopher and a copy of each memorandum sent via NODIS cable to the appropriate Embassy "eyes only" for the respective Ambassadors. ~~(S)~~


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandums of Conversations

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 4/5/2014
2015-0780-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Lech Walesa of Poland

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Charles Kupchan, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Lech Walesa, President of Poland
Krzysztor Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Janusz Ziolkowski, Minister of State, Office
of the President
Kasimier Dziewanowski, Ambassador to the U.S.
Mieczyslaw Wachowski, Secretary of State,
Office of the President
Zbigniew Lewicki, Interpreter

DATE, TIME April 21, 1993 2:00 - 3:00 pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Walesa: I was a leader of the revolution in Poland. But I had no idea of the eventual outcome: the overturning of Communism. Now we are faced with post-communism and the task of building structures to replace communist society. A key part of this process has to be increased reliance on regional cooperation. We need to make use of Visegrad and develop close ties with Ukraine and Belarus. After decades of Soviet domination, we are all afraid of Russia. It is important to remember that this is the first time in history that the Soviet army has withdrawn from territory peacefully. If Russia again adopts an aggressive foreign policy, that aggression will be directed toward Ukraine and Poland. The U.S. is needed to prevent this from happening. President Bush was correct in understanding the need for strong defenses. Poland cannot be left defenseless; we need to have the protection of U.S. muscle.

(C)

Poland wants freedom and peace in Europe and friendship with Russia. We can reign in Russia by gradually pushing reform from west to east. This process will require financial assistance. It will require continued privatization, the emergence of small enterprises, and the conversion of defense industry to industry that produces consumer goods. It will require increased trade with central Europe and more outside investment in the region. Most important, we need to put everything into practice.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2009
2015-0780-W (1.18)

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fishing equipment and technical know-how, not fish. The goal must be to create a Russia that is neither rich nor poor. A very poor Russia and a very rich Russia are dangerous outcomes. (C)

The President: I agree with your general outline of the situation. We want to provide assistance and develop trade with Poland and all former communist countries. The U.S. is the second largest investor in Poland, and we hope to encourage more U.S. investment. There are some outstanding trade disputes in the areas of unfair tariffs resulting from association agreements with the EC, intellectual property rights, and arms sales. But these are the types of disputes that normally arise in relations between states. The U.S. has the responsibility to support all countries that are standing up for freedom. In this respect, we support Russia. We do not believe that Russia is at present too strong. (C)

President Walesa: It is possible that the reform process in Russia will reverse. This would spoil the progress that has been made in building peace in Europe. The Russian army may become factionalized and fight among itself. It is also important to remove Russian troops from foreign territory. If you succeed in ensuring that Europe is not again faced with a threat from Russia, you will win a Nobel Prize. But firm actions are needed. Russian troops need housing so they can go home. Munitions stocks are unprotected. The Russian economy is failing. If the Polish economy fails, Russia's economy will as well. I am particularly scared about nuclear accidents. There is insufficient money for the necessary safeguards. Your responsibility in this area is large. We are also scared by the prospect of having a powerful Germany on one side and a powerful Russia on the other. (C)

The President: We have given money to help nuclear power plants become safer. We have also tried to pursue investments in Russia that enhance privatization and economic reform, strengthen the energy sector, and provide new housing. President Yeltsin wants to bring Russian troops home, but lacks houses for them. The army still controls nuclear weapons, so we have to be careful. In all respects, the U.S. must be on the side of democracy and reform. (C)

Minister Skubiczewski: President Walesa's comments are a point of reference. It is very important to build stability in the region and to foster good relations among Poland, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. We need arms control agreements. Poland supports the North Atlantic Alliance. NACC is useful in developing practical schemes of cooperation with NATO members. I would like to see Russia more involved in the international community. Russia will reemerge as a great power. Can we now take steps to affect Russian foreign policy in a way beneficial to us? We need a grand strategy of democratic transformation. There are some parallels with the Marshall Plan. We need a similarly ambitious program to help Russia. (C)

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The President: We have a three-prong strategy of assistance. First, we are trying to promote democracy in Russia and ensure that Russia pursues a peaceful foreign policy. Second, we have a strategy for promoting reform in all the republics -- whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear states. Third, we are building our relationships with countries in Central Europe so that they will serve as a source of stability throughout the region. Poles must understand that the U.S. and Poland share enduring interests. We must build on these shared interests. Your country's influence will grow in coming years. No matter what happens in Russia on Sunday, we all face important tasks and Poland has a large responsibility in the international community. (C)

President Walesa: I agree with you. But which direction will reforms in Russia come from? If Russia expands again, we are in great trouble. We must encourage them to privatize now and increase civilian production. Their whole economic and political system needs to be changed. I am afraid to turn on the radio because of what I might hear about developments in Russia. I think reform should move through Central Europe to Russia. Central European states are trying to enter Western Europe. We can use the ideas and concepts needed to achieve this goal to then help Russia. The problem is that Western Europe has not yet accepted us. The victory over communism was the biggest victory in history. But we are not capitalizing on it. (C)

The Vice President: Reform in Poland continues to be a difficult task. You have moved very quickly; you are the most advanced in the post-Communist world in terms of democracy and free markets. Poland is also a good friend of the United States. We have the opportunity to push this relationship forward and build a long-term partnership. Poland's most important contribution is in providing the ideas and concepts needed to make political and economic change happen. (C)

President Walesa: Ideas and concepts are not enough. We need to stop Russian hegemony. If the U.S. pours money into Russia, it is not enough. Russia needs an entirely new political and economic system. It therefore makes sense to concentrate on Central Europe and Ukraine. (C)

The President: You are saying we should start with the other republics and then later focus on Russia? (C)

President Walesa: Some countries in the NIS cannot benefit from assistance; they are too backward. The further west, the greater impact your aid will have. (C)

Minister Skubiczewski: Yes, we must take care of the other republics. Russia is important, but we need to support the independence and well-being of the others too. (C)

The President: We have asked all Russian troops to be withdrawn from the foreign soil. We must roll back the threat of imperialism and remnants of the communist system. I am worried

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short run the military might revolt and cause a setback in Russia. I hear your central message: Do not put all our eggs in one basket. As you know, my first appointment was to create an ambassador to oversee assistance to all republics of the NIS. We are trying to keep reform moving forward throughout the region.

~~(S)~~

President Walesa: Ukraine is a large and rich country. We must focus on Ukraine too. Reform must spread from the West. We are at a cross-roads -- a very difficult and important point. ~~(S)~~

-- End of Conversation --

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| 001b. memcon | re: Meeting with President Iliescu of Romania (1 page) | 04/21/1993 | P1/b(1) |

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 29 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND

MEMCON

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 26 JUN MTG W/ PRES WALESA OF POLAND

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 01 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FRIED
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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/5/2014
2015-0780-W

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY APB DATE 6-29-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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| 001 SENS | Z 95062912 FOR DECISION |
| 001 | X 95062916 DOHSE APPROVED RECOM |
| 002 | X 95062916 DOHSE SGD MEMO |

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DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION DISPATCH FOR INFO

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National Security Council
The White House

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| Harmon | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Dohse | <u>1</u> | <u>D</u> | _____ |
| Sens | _____ | _____ | _____ |
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| Berger | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Lake | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Situation Room | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| West Wing Desk | <u>2</u> | <u>MC 8/29</u> | <u>D</u> |
| Records Mgt. | <u>3</u> | <u>WBS 8/29</u> | <u>D</u> |
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

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| Soderberg | | | |
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| Lake | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| West Wing Desk | <u>2</u> | <u>MC 9/29</u> | <u>D</u> |
| Records Mgt. | <u>3</u> | <u>WBS 9/29</u> | <u>D</u> |
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


4968

June 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's
June 26 Meeting with President Lech Walesa (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the June 26 meeting between the President and President Lech Walesa of Poland is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Warsaw for the Ambassador only. ~~(C)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2019
2015-0780-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~with SECRET Attachment~~
Declassify on: OADR

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|--------------------------|--|------------|-------------|
| 001. memcon | re: Meeting with President of Poland Lech Walesa [partial] (6 pages) | 06/26/1995 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Walesa and Mem*...])
OA/Box Number: 591

FOLDER TITLE:

9504968

2015-0780-M

rs1387

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President of Poland Lech Walesa
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: American:

The President
Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Permanent
Representative of the United States to the
United Nations
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Daniel Fried, Senior Director for Central and
Eastern Europe, NSC (Notetaker)

Polish

President Lech Walesa
Jerzy Kozminski, Ambassador of the Republic
of Poland to the United States
Mieczyslaw Wachowski, Presidential Chief of
Staff
Robert Mroziewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister
Leszek Spalinski, Presidential Spokesman
Andrzej Zakrzewski, Secretary of State for
Political Affairs in the Presidential
Office

DATE, TIME June 26, 1995, 12:20-12:55 p.m.
AND PLACE: Foyer, Herbst Theater, War Memorial Veterans
Building, San Francisco

The President: When did you arrive in San Francisco? (U)

President Walesa: We arrived yesterday, and I had talks with
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. I expressed my gratitude to him
for all the U.N. has accomplished but also noted Poland's
apprehension about the future of the U.N. It needs to become
less bureaucratic if it is to have a future. It needs to define
its obligations and duties more clearly; if it can do this, it
can have real successes. It is hard to see hope for the world
without the U.N., but it must increase its efficiency. We cannot

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 06/05/2019
2015-0780-M (1.19)

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have Yugoslavias in other areas; the international community cannot afford to show disregard for people. But if we define the conditions for U.N. action, we can avoid such trouble in the future. Above all, the U.N. must define the conditions under which it will act and the principles that it will defend at any cost. (G)

The President: It's good to see you again. Let me start by saying how pleased we are by Poland's participation in the Partnership for Peace. I've asked Congress for funds to support the Partnership this year. I believe support in NATO is building for making the Partnership meaningful and for eventually expanding NATO itself. There are two principal elements in the question of NATO's expansion. The first is a country's participation in the Partnership for Peace. The second has to do with demonstrated civilian control over a non-political military. We look forward to moving ahead because, as you know, the United States supports Poland's integration with all the institutions of the West. (G)

President Walesa: The Partnership for Peace is a good idea, but there are problems. Moscow may have joined the Partnership, but it has a long way toward really participating fully in it. Moscow signed the Partnership for Peace documents with one hand, but its other hand is doing something else. (G)

The press recently cited a Russian general saying that if Poland were to join NATO, Russia's missiles now stationed in Kaliningrad would turn to point toward Poland. My answer to him would be that Polish scientists are capable of making Russian missiles launched against Poland hit him in the ear. The real problem is with Russia's way of thinking about the world and about Europe. The United States and President Clinton have a great historic responsibility. You have my sympathies. I would not like to be in your shoes. (G)

Still, Poland has experience in its part of the world. I'm convinced that you have just a few historical minutes left to take decisive steps. You must expand NATO in spite of Russia. Don't fear their missiles. Russia today can't pose a threat. But tomorrow it could. So you must move decisively and not wait until it is too late. NATO must make a manly decision (meska decysja). The European Union is important, maybe even more so than NATO, but it is so complicated with its economic rules that joining it will take time -- years. And we don't have years. NATO needs to make a manly decision sooner. (G)

The President: I know that some of the things the Russians say trouble you. I've been in contact with the Russians myself. I was in Moscow for the May Commemoration of the end of the Second

World War, and I made two points to Yeltsin and to the Duma Deputies with whom I met: first, I said that NATO always was a defensive alliance, not offensive; second, I said that although the Cold War was over and no USSR existed, NATO was the only organization that bound the United States to European security in the post-Cold War world. (C)

The United States is committed to NATO's expansion according to a deliberate timetable. We will not permit Russia nor anyone else to change this. Expansion will come in time; it will not be put off for years and years. (C)

Now that NATO Ministers have made a decision and adopted a timetable on NATO expansion for this year, we should stick to it. Speeding it up would worry and irritate Russia; slowing it down would worry Poland and others. I assure you that we will stay on the steady path. Everything I have ever said to you to about NATO enlargement remains true. The United States will adhere strictly to what NATO has agreed. (C)

Let me thank you for Poland's help to the United States in Iraq on behalf of the two Americans imprisoned there. They are not yet freed, but Poland has helped them anyway and we are grateful. (C).

President Walesa: Poland has always been very loyal to its Allies and to the United States on all occasions. We understand the internal limitations of the United States. We know we cannot rely solely on the United States. We must do more ourselves. But the presence of the United States in Europe, especially in the current transition period, is crucial, otherwise Europe will be lost. (C)

The President: I agree. (U).

President Walesa: NATO's expansion is crucial and the United States needs to provide the impetus for it. I've spoken to all the members of NATO and I know that all countries in it are equal. But the dollar and the Deutchmark have great voices; the United States and Germany have just a little more weight than the other members. It is important to make this process go forward. We don't need to create a danger zone in Europe. (C)

I don't want to be confrontational, but we know Russia. A democratic, reforming Russia with a market economy can be a good partner for Poland and for us all. But do not tempt Russia through uncertainty. First, lock Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic outside of Russia's sphere of influence and then Russia will turn inward. Russia's threatening noises do not bother us. We need only a manly decision: if you make it, nothing (bad)

will happen. But if you do not, Russia's demands will only increase. In that case, the United States would have to remain in Europe forever at great cost. (C)

Poland in NATO could lift America's NATO burden. We don't need a massive, military American presence, just leadership. But without NATO expansion there is a great risk. Today, Russia cannot threaten us; its rockets don't work. But tomorrow? I fear postponing decisions. This is your responsibility, Mr. President. (C)

The President: We won't postpone decisions, and we will proceed. We won't wait beyond the danger point. (C)

President Walesa: The decision on expanding NATO will have a tremendous impact on Poland. People will be euphoric; their dream of centuries will have come true. The costs today are low for securing peace in Europe for a long time. A decision could correct the mistakes of Yalta and Potsdam. You have a historic chance, Mr. President. It could be written of you that you solved that mess in Europe once and for all. If I were you, I'd make that historic decision. We don't need confrontational camps. Once the decision is made, peace and stability will follow. So will good business. Those business generals like General Motors and General Electric will follow the NATO generals. (C)

We don't want a divided Europe. Poland has done its best to help Ukraine. Of course, we tried to help Belarus, too, but we've lost Belarus for now. Still, if we helped Ukraine, Ukraine could help Belarus. You see, we have no common border with Russia, Kaliningrad aside, though Russian troops now patrol the Polish-Belarus frontier. It is too bad about Belarus. (C)

The President: I know. I was in Belarus and was disappointed in it. We won't turn away, but Belarus feels incapable of a separate economic existence. (C)

President Walesa: But Belarus would have had more of a chance if we had helped with economic support. We could help make the country independent of Russian fuel supplies. If Poland were hooked up to the West's energy network, we would help Belarus a lot and this would make a difference politically. But Russia has all its fingers on the taps. Somehow we must break this hold. Poland is developing very well, but we are still too weak; we lack the potential. We cannot help Belarus on our own. But if we cooperated with the United States, we could. We know the Eastern markets very well. (C)

The President:

(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

I appreciated your statement condemning anti-Semitism following Father Jankowski's unfortunate remarks. These primitive emotions are on the rise everywhere, including in the United States. We have more of this than we used to, and it is hard to beat it back. Perhaps one way to ease tensions concerning this question would be to help resolve the issue of Jewish communal property. I know this is a governmental and not a Presidential issue, and I know that individual restitution claims are more difficult to resolve, but it would be very well received if Poland could make progress on this issue. (C)

President Walesa: On the question of arms trade, we don't want to engage in it at all. But how will our arms plants find new production? How can we reorient our production? This is hard to do. The old communist politicians gave orders and so we have too much of this sort of capacity. But what are we to do? People want their pay and look to me to give them the possibility of work. Workers are making tanks with barrels pointed at the sky, but angry workers could lower the barrels at me if I don't watch out. Besides, other countries like Slovakia are capturing markets that we give up. So we need help. If our tank plants made bananas, we'd have plenty of customers. But they don't. We need to learn to make new things, but this costs money we don't have. So help us reconstruct our arms plants. (C)

On Father Jankowski, my views as President on anti-Semitism are well known. I've done a lot for Polish-Jewish and Polish-Israeli relations. As long as I am President, I won't allow anti-Semitism in Poland. But I cannot speak to each individual Priest or Rabbi. And I cannot speak at all to someone like Rabbi Weiss. The Polish Church, the Episcopate, reacted immediately to what Father Jankowski said, so I didn't see the need. Besides, if I made a public statement every time someone said something stupid about Jews, some people would make such statements all the time just to show me. (U)

I'm good friends with (Israeli Knesset Speaker Shewah) Weiss and Elie Wiesel. I've spoken to them about this. Maybe I didn't do enough this time. But it (Jankowski's anti-Semitic sermon) happened at Sunday Mass. The Mass was long and boring. I wasn't paying attention; nobody was. I would have gotten up and walked out if I had heard what Jankowski was supposed to have said. But I didn't. What I heard was ambiguous and could be badly interpreted if you wanted to. The trouble was that Jankowski clarified his remarks on the radio a couple of days later and

this made it worse. But he didn't say these things (on the radio) in my presence. I thought that because he was a Priest, it was enough that the Church criticized him. Anyway, I won't allow anti-Semitism in Poland. I'll do all I can to constrain it, and I'll work with my friends Weiss and Wiesel. I am a friend of the Jews. (U)

Regarding reprivatization, there is legislation now before the Parliament to deal with this question. But it is tough. Poland is poor. How are we to resolve this problem? It would be good if the Jews returned to Poland. They could come back and invest in businesses and the country would be better off. But they have their own country now. So they won't come back. Anyway, giving back property isn't as easy as it looks. The Russians confiscated Jewish property in Warsaw and on it they built the gigantic Palace of Culture. So what are we supposed to do? If Jews want their land back, what do we do with the building? We don't want it. Neither do they. But it's there. Maybe the Americans will buy it. We should find a way to compensate owners, but within our means. (C)

The President: It was good to talk to you. (U)

President Walesa: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9504968
DATE 29 JUN 95

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 26 JUN MTG W/ PRES WALESIA OF POLAND
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

SUBJECT: POTUS Meeting with Polish President Walesa

Attached at Tab I is a Sens-Brill memorandum transmitting to State the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 26 meeting between the President and Polish President Lech Walesa.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the transmittal memorandum to State and that the Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Sens-Brill Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

MIR MARKER

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| Original OA/ID Number: 615 | | | | |
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| Document ID: 9508424 | | | | |
| Row: 44 | Section: 6 | Shelf: 5 | Position: 1 | Stack: v |

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|-----------------------|--|
| 001. memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Telephone Calls to Polish President Walesa and President-elect Kwasiewski (2 pages) | 11/20/1995 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Walesa and Mem*...])
OA/Box Number: 615

FOLDER TITLE:

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2015-0780-M

rs1388

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9508424
RECEIVED: 20 NOV 95 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 20 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND

TELCALL

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

KWASNIEWSKI, ALEKSANDER

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO PRES WALESA & PRES - ELECT KWASNIEWSKI

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 23 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By R2 NARA, Date 6/5/2019
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DOC 3 OF 3

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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002 PRESIDENT
003 PRESIDENT
003

Z 95112021 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 95112021 FOR INFORMATION
Z 95112414 FOR INFORMATION
X 95112414 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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| 002 | 951120 | | WH CHIEF OF STAFF |

National Security Council
The White House

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| Harmon | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Dohse | <u>1</u> | <u>W</u> | _____ |
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| Berger | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Lake | <u>2</u> | _____ | _____ |
| Situation Room | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| West Wing Desk | <u>3</u> | <u>MC 11/20</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> |
| Records Mgt. | <u>4</u> | <u>DBS 11/24</u> | <u>N</u> |
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: TPs for PPhone calls
to Pres Waleasa + Pres elect
Kwasniewski

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

[Signature]
DBS
11/20
WSH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

November 20, 1995 NOV 20 P9:11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Telephone Calls to Polish President Walesa and President-elect Kwasniewski

Kvash nyevskie

Purpose

To convey appreciation for Lech Walesa's achievements as President as he leaves office; to urge his successor to maintain Poland's reformist course.

Background

Aleksander Kwasniewski's (kvash-NYEV-skii) narrow victory over Walesa gives Poland's ex-communist party control of the Presidency as well as Government. Kwasniewski, a young, reform-minded political leader must decide soon whether he will rise above partisanship or rely mainly on the less-reformed base of his party to the detriment of Poland's ongoing transformation.

Kwasniewski's winning electoral coalition combined old-regime nostalgics, disaffected workers and peasants but also, crucially, young, educated Poles for whom Walesa's staunch anti-communism represented the past. Kwasniewski's campaign promised reconciliation, a continuation of reforms and steadiness-in-office -- a popular contrast to Walesa's confrontational style. Kwasniewski's post-victory rhetoric has been conciliatory; his decisions to name new Foreign, Defense and Interior Ministers will prove difficult and possibly defining. He will have to chose between loud claimants from his own party and neutral or even ex-Solidarity figures whose presence in ministerial jobs would help national reconciliation and boost Kwasniewski's credibility in the West.

A call from you might cause consternation among some Polish Americans but it could have an important impact on Kwasniewski's thinking at a crucial juncture. Polish American consternation would be mitigated somewhat by a call first to President Walesa.

Your call to Walesa would urge his contribution to national reconciliation even as he prepares to resume life in opposition.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

cc: Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

By: YZ NARA, Date: 11/20/14

Chief of Staff

Declassify on: 11/20/09

PHOTOCOPY ~~WJC~~ HANDWRITING

RECOMMENDATION

That you call both Walesa and Kwasniewski, using the points at Attachments A and B.

Attachments

Tab A Points to Make to President Walesa

Tab B Points to Make to President-elect Kwasniewski

✓
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESIA

- Want to express admiration for all you have done for your country and cause of freedom.
- You accomplished great things as President. Poland is transformed, past toughest part of reforms, on way to integration with West. Wouldn't have happened without you.
- Tough election fight. You came back from behind; almost won.
- Like Churchill, you won the war and lost the election.
- America will keep working with Poland to support reforms, integration with West. As father of reborn Poland, you want what's best for nation, not just one party.
- Hope you will remain in public life, help Poland face future.
- You always were a fighter, but at height of your power you stopped calls for revenge; preserved democracy. Hope you help heal country, help Poland move forward even as you fight for ideals and keep Government honest.
- Valued our friendship; hope we remain in touch. Wish you well. ~~As President Lech Walesia says "Poland is not just a country"~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
POLISH PRESIDENT-ELECT ALEKSANDER KWASNIEWSKI

- Congratulations on victory. Tough campaign but free and fair election.
- Want to work with you; maintain close cooperation with Poland.
- Appreciated your campaign themes: democracy, free market reforms, healing communist-era divisions, pro-Western orientation, good relations with Russia, Ukraine.
- Acting on these themes is key to our working together. What counts is where you're going, not where you've been.
- Know you face major challenges: many Poles worry that your victory means old ways and old faces will return.
- Your first acts and appointments, even before becoming President, will be crucial to creating climate of trust, not partisanship, political monopoly or revenge.
- Welcome your conciliatory remarks since election. Critically important to go farther; reach out in non-partisan way -- go beyond one political camp to put fears to rest.
- U.S.-Polish cooperation growing; want to see Poland fully integrated with West, working with PFP, on road to NATO membership. We appreciate Polish offer to join IFOR in Bosnia.
- Again, congratulations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8424

November 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

SUBJECT: POTUS Telephone Calls to President Walesa and
President-elect Kwasniewski

Tab I contains a memorandum to the President providing background for his telephone calls to President Walesa and President-elect Kwasniewski.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Points to Make to President Walesa

Tab B Points to Make to President-elect Kwasniewski

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 11/20/97

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By TL NARA, Date 6/5/2019
2015-0780-W

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
POLISH PRESIDENT-ELECT ALEKSANDER KWASNIEWSKI

- Congratulations on victory. Tough campaign but free and fair election.
- Want to work with you; maintain close cooperation with Poland.
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- Acting on these themes is key to our working together. What counts is where you're going, not where you've been.
- Know you face major challenges: many Poles worry that your victory means old ways and old faces will return.
- Your first acts and appointments, even before becoming President, will be crucial to creating climate of trust, not partisanship, political monopoly or revenge.
- Welcome your conciliatory remarks since election. Critically important to go farther; reach out in non-partisan way -- go beyond one political camp to put fears to rest. ~~Welcome your conciliatory remarks since election.~~
- U.S.-Polish cooperation growing; want to see Poland fully integrated with West, working with PFP, on road to NATO membership. We appreciate Polish offer to join IFOR in Bosnia.

• *Again, congratulations.*

F5007
Case Number: 2015-0781-M; 2015-0755-M;
2015-0780-M

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| 001. memcon | re: Meeting with Former Polish President Lech Walesa (6 pages) | 06/03/1996 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019 |

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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KEYWORDS: POLAND

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SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ FORMER PRES OF POLAND / LECH WALSEA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 6/8/2019

2015-0780-m

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The White House

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


3835

June 7, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Former President
of Poland, Lech Walesa (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and former Polish President Lech Walesa is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Poland for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). (C).



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 6/4/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By vt NARA, Date 6/5/2019
2015-0780-14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Former Polish President Lech
Walesa (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Daniel Fried, Senior Director for Central and
Eastern European Affairs, NSC Staff,
Notetaker
David Johnson, Senior Director for Public
Affairs, NSC Staff
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Lech Walesa, former President of Poland
Jerzy Kozminski, Polish Ambassador to the
United States
Marek Karpinski, Walesa Spokesman
Andrzej Jaroszynski, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Notetaker
Magdalena Iwinska, Interpreter

DATE, TIME June 3, 1996, 11:00 a.m. - 11:27 a.m.
AND PLACE: Map Room, The White House

The President: Hello, Mr. Walesa. It's good to see you and good to see you looking so well. (U)

Lech Walesa: I feel pretty good. After all this travel, I'm in real American condition. You know, I've been traveling around the United States for a couple of weeks, talking to a lot of people -- students, faculty, Polish Americans -- and I must say that Americans are now very engaged in politics, very interested in it and not just interested in money as I've seen before. (U)

We've spoken about NATO enlargement and people are thinking about this in two ways: a peaceful line and a line of confrontation. Many would not want to do it if it meant confrontation. They wouldn't want to die to Eastern Europe. And I understand this. But I tell them that we don't have to have confrontation in mind as we enlarge NATO. Just the opposite: if we enlarge NATO we

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Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 6/4/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 6/5/2015
2015-0780-M (1.22)

won't have confrontation; we'll only have confrontation if we don't enlarge because if we don't enlarge than Americans would have to die, but not for Eastern Europe, not for Poland, but for their own and their own interests. (e)

I told all this to students at the University of Chicago. They were there with two professors who opposed NATO enlargement and I spoke for a long time. They supported my idea in the end -- 17 out of 20 did so. The professors were surprised. So it's clear that some Americans are opposed to enlargement and that is not easy for you, but many support it as well. (U)

The President: You know where I stand on this: we should enlarge NATO; we will have the support of the American people for this and most Europeans will support us, too. Since we first discussed this, you and I, I've persuaded most of our European allies that we should move ahead and I've stressed that there will be no veto by Russia nor by anyone else. NATO ministers are meeting now and will meet again in December. They will stay on the exact timetable that we got NATO's foreign ministers to agree to last year. Enlargement will come and we should only make clear that through enlargement we are not doing anything against any country. (e)

With respect to Poland, I have the impression that the country is still moving forward in a pro-Western way. Poland will soon join the OECD; reforms are continuing and I hope these will continue. (e)

Lech Walesa: Obviously, we will do our best to continue these reforms. But all depends really on what you in America decide. The Europeans -- France, England, the others -- will not decide this question. You will. We Europeans complain about you but look to you to decide things; we have an American complex. The Poles will support you fully. You can count on it. The Germans are both supportive (on NATO enlargement) and not supportive; they are constantly changing because they have a Russia complex. We Poles don't have a Russia complex because we've already settled our scores with them. (e)

But America decides these issues. And without a clear signal from you Europe will lose its way. That would be terrible because now, for the first time, Europe has a chance, a unique chance, for unity. Not unity of the sort Stalin and Hitler tried to create but real, democratic unity. So my plea is to create a United States of Europe. I could even be the President. But the point is that we have a historic moment to make the right decisions. As I've told you before, the question is whether we will achieve this. (e)

We won't achieve it if we make too many concessions to Russia. And you have control over this. Not the French, Germans, British nor anyone else. But you. So a manly decision awaits. We will support you if you make a clear one. Perhaps not now, but in your second term. That's what we want. (C)

The President: We understand very well what is going on. We have to enlarge NATO in a way that that does not provoke a bad reaction from Russia but does not give them a veto either. We must unify Europe politically and economically. (C)

Lech Walesa: But opportunities have been wasted before. That's because democracy has trouble making the tough decisions; democracy makes easy decisions but not difficult ones. The West lost two opportunities. One was in August 1991 after the putsch in Moscow. NATO could have enlarged then to support democracy and reform; in order to support Yeltsin, in fact, who stood for democracy. Yeltsin would have supported this had it been done in the right way. The second opportunity was in the summer of 1993 when Yeltsin visited Poland. We got him to agree -- to sign an agreement -- in which he said he did not object to Poland joining NATO. He was there with all of his generals and ministers and he agreed to this. But the West did not react and two weeks later he withdrew his offer. You could have enlarged NATO then or at least said you were going to. (C)

The third opportunity is coming soon, after the Russian elections. If Yeltsin loses -- and he has very little chance of winning in my opinion -- there will be chaos. So you should enlarge NATO to help the forces of democracy in Russia. If Yeltsin wins it might be harder to enlarge NATO because he will depend on some understanding you have reached with him. I don't know what these understandings might be but you do. You should understand that this will be a decisive moment because if you wait too long and Russia grows stronger, there will only be new conditions coming either from Russia directly or through Belarus or even Ukraine. So the election is decisive. Yeltsin has slim chances, though of course the election really will be won by the side with the better structures to count the votes, not just get votes but count the votes. (C)

The President: I think Yeltsin's chances are better than that, but we shall see. In any event, we will pursue our timetable for NATO enlargement regardless of the outcome of the election. (C)

Lech Walesa: Russia is unstable and unpredictable and unlikely to have really normal elections. I told Senator Dole what I told you about the importance of counting votes. He agreed and said that in an American primary election this year he got more votes than there were inhabitants of that electoral district. (C)

Marek Karpinski: It was a Republican primary in San Juan, Puerto Rico. (U)

Lech Walesa: One more thing: Yeltsin really can be dangerous. He has already shot at his people and at parliament. He has crossed this threshold. He has the will and the structures to carry out such action. Every other politician in Russia might have doubts and hesitations before reaching the shooting stage and might not be sure whether the structures would actually obey an order to shoot. But Yeltsin would have no such doubts. This part of the world is not like the United States where an order is an order. In Russia, orders are often just not realized. But Yeltsin has the capability to do such things. This makes him dangerous in a situation of confrontation. In a peaceful situation, of course, Yeltsin is preferable because he is a known quantity. But the situation is not necessarily peaceful in Russia. (C)

I should add that you have with you on your staff some very experienced people, people who know Russia and Poland and the whole situation. They know all this better than I. One of your best people is with us now and he has been a long-time friend of Poland (Walesa gestures to one of the U.S. participants.) He was with us through a lot and always gave good advice. He knew just what was going on and what to do; he was very helpful. I just thought I would thank him for all he has done for us for so long. (U)

Daniel Fried: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

Samuel Berger: Mr. Walesa, you said earlier that the Germans have sometimes one attitude toward NATO enlargement and sometimes another. This President, however, has had just one attitude: that NATO will enlarge. President Clinton's leadership in 1994 was crucial to enlargement getting moving at all and his leadership will continue. (C)

Lech Walesa: Yes, I know. But all this has been done in an evolutionary way. Yes, you have launched this and done a lot. The direction is clear and that is good. But the point is that this is a revolutionary situation, not evolutionary, and decisive moves are important. In 1939 we were in a decisive situation. We resisted Hitler, knowing that war would come anyway and if we waited or gave in it would just be worse. But now things are getting worse. The loss of Belarus to Russia is really a matter of concern. So we are insisting on the right decisions. Don't waste this opportunity. Of course the delays are not America's fault. The Europeans have been very slow throughout. And you think, why should we worry about Europe if the West Europeans

don't? But you must make the hard choices, even for the Europeans, because the Europeans themselves won't or can't. It is just like Yugoslavia. The Europeans could decide nothing. You had to make the decisive moves. And you did and these were right. (C)

This is the way forward. You understand what democracy requires. The Europeans just see money. Here is where decisions must be made. Make them and the Europeans will shout for a while but accept them. So we expect decisions on NATO enlargement in your next term. We are confident and you can be confident in the Poles. But we must be clear about where we are. (C)

Poland is like a ballet dancer, a beautiful dancer in a theater or a cafe. Poland has nice legs and Yeltsin is tempted. But we are far safer with someone else. Yeltsin is too crude for us. (C)

Let me turn to internal matters, things in Poland. My opponents were all educated in the United States. They had good training here and they won the election. We hope we will get educated and trained, too, and that we will win. They won a battle in the last elections. But I won, too; in fact, I won the war because democracy won in the elections. Some ask me why I did not "defend" my job even after I lost the elections. But I tell them that I couldn't be Fidel Castro. I had to respect democracy. (C)

The people who won the elections have a mandate only to continue Poland's Western course; to continue democracy and market economics. So far, they have. They have been consistent. This is good and they are capable; they are good businessmen; communism will not return to Poland. Of course if they tried to turn back there would be a revolution. We would lead that. But this won't happen. We will struggle with them, but democratically. And we will not do so in a way that interferes with Poland's economy. It is doing well and we want Poland to be stable. (C)

So, Poland will be fine. But how long will Poland keep dancing on a thin line, like a ballerina, without knowing with whom to dance? She wants NATO and the EU as her partners. Yeltsin can be very jealous. A jealous Natasha. (U)

The President: Poland will have a long dance with the right partners, a good dance. (U)

Lech Walesa: But make sure the music is the right kind. (U)

The President: Every time I see Boris Yeltsin from now on I'll be sure to think of Natasha. (U)

Lech Walesa: Jealous Natasha. (U)

The President: Sure, jealous Natasha. It has been great seeing you again and seeing you in such good spirits. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9603835
DATE 07 JUN 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ FORMER PRES OF POLAND / LECH WALSEA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 4, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Former President
Lech Walesa of Poland

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation from the President's June 3 meeting with former Polish President Lech Walesa.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ASP Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memcon

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/5/2014
2015-0780-W

See ↴
Case Number: 2015-0781-M; 2015-0755-M;
2015-0780-M

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