Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: February 26 Special NAC Ministerial-Interventions by Ministers and SYG Woerner (23 pages)	03/03/1993	P1/b(1)
~~002. cable~~	~~re: Letter from the Secretary to NATO Fonmins (4 pages)~~	~~06/06/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
003. cable	re: NATO: June 6 Permreps Lunch Details Athens Ministerial Agenda (7 pages)	06/08/1993	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: NATO SYG Manfred Woerner Discusses the NATO Summit (4 pages)	08/06/1993	P1/b(1)
~~005. cable~~	~~re: Russia Will Not Oppose Poland in NATO (4 pages)~~	~~08/25/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~006. cable~~	~~re: "NATO-Mania" Greets Senator Lugar in Poland (7 pages)~~	~~08/27/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~007. cable~~	~~re: The Yeltsin Visit: Remembering the Past, Looking to the Future (5 pages)~~	~~09/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
008. cable	re: Woerner on Expanding NATO Membership (2 pages)	09/03/1993	P1/b(1)
~~009. cable~~	~~re: Early Visegrad Four Membership in NATO: Russia's Likely Response (3 pages)~~	~~09/07/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~010. cable~~	~~re: NATO Expansion and the FSU (3 pages)~~	~~09/10/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~011. cable~~	~~re: Kozyrev on Possible NATO Expansion (2 pages)~~	~~09/13/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~012. cable~~	~~re: NATO: Ambassador Hunter's 9/16 Lunch with French Permrep Blot (4 pages)~~	~~09/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/03/1993-10/29/1993]

2015-0791-M
rs1262

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~013. cable~~	~~re: Christopher-Kozyrev Meeting on September 13 (9 pages)~~	~~09/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
014. cable	re: Talbott/Burns Delegation: Meetings at NATO (10 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1)
~~015. cable~~	~~re: Secretary Christopher's Lunch with NATO SYG Woerner and German FM Kinkel (7 pages)~~	~~10/08/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~016. cable~~	~~re: The NATO Summit and the Eastern Question Corrected Copy (Passing Inst) (4 pages)~~	~~10/16/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~017. cable~~	~~re: A/S Oxman Briefs Visegrad Four on Partnership for Peace (PIP) (6 pages)~~	~~10/29/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025

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Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.02)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA0901 1572046-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
LINE3: O 062043Z JUN 93 ZFF4
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 062043Z JUN 93
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO: USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000
SUBJ: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO NATO FONMINS

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 170901
EXDIS, USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE. BRUSSELS INFO FOR USEC
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO NATO FONMINS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN PREPARATION FOR THE JUNE 10-11 NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN ATHENS, EMBASSIES SHOULD AT OOB MONDAY DELIVER AT SENIOR POLITICAL LEVELS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO HOST COUNTRY FOREIGN MINISTERS. THERE WILL BE NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. USNATO SHOULD DELIVER A COPY TO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER. ALL ACTIXN ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOTE DIRECTIONS PARTICULARIZING THE LETTER FOR SPECIFIC RECIPIENTS AND ADJUST THE TEXT ACCORDINGLY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR (INSERT FIRST NAME),

OUR NATO MEETINGS THIS WEEK IN ATHENS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN. I LOOK FORWARD TO USING OUR DISCUSSIONS TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING NATO AND THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEW POST-COLD-WAR

EUROPE. AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WILL BE MAINTAINING AND PROJECTING ALLIANCE UNITY, EVEN AS WE GRAPPLE WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

WE HAVE ALL SEEN MANFRED WOERNER'S (FOR WOERNER: "YOUR") EXCELLENT MESSAGE SETTING OUT HIS (FOR WOERNER: "YOUR") THOUGHTS ON THE MAIN ISSUES BEFORE US IN ATHENS. I AGREE WITH HIS (FOR WOERNER: "YOUR") ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS, AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE THE SORTS OF DECISIONS HE PREFIGURES (FOR WOERNER: "YOU PREFIGURED"). I WANTED TO

SHARE WITH YOU IN ADVANCE MY OWN THOUGHTS ON OUR UPCOMING MEETINGS.

THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CONTINUES TO SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE MEANS TO BRING A JUST. DURABLE PEACE TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT. THE JOINT ACTION FROGRAM (FOR FRANCE SPAIN, AND UK: "THAT WE WORKED OUT TOGETHER") IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THAT PROCESS. THE JUNE 10 NAC WILL ALLOW US TO MAKE FULL USE OF NATO AS A FORUM FOR FRANK AND OPEN CONSULTATIONS IN PURSUIT OF THOSE GOALS.

THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO FOCUS ON SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON THOSE MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT. NATO COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AMONG THOSE WHOSE INTRANSIGENCE HAS FRUSTRATED EFFORTS FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT. IN OUR PUBLIC REMARKS, WE SHOULD ALL HIGHLIGHT OUR MEETING AS A CLEAR SHOW OF COMMON RESOLVE.

WITH REGARD TO ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC STEPS, I BELIEVE NATO SHOULD CONSIDER A POSSIBLE AIR ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE "SAFE AREAS" RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE UN. THIS MIGHT BE BASED ON APPROPRIATE EXTENSIONS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS THAT WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED FOR NO-FLY-ZONE ENFORCEMENT. THIS COULD PROVIDE SPECIFIC CONTENT TO THE PLEDGE MADE AT LAST DECEMBER'S NAC THAT. IF REQUESTED BY THE UN, NATO "WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES" IF UNPROFOR OR OTHER UN PERSONNEL WERE THREATENED OR HARMED. IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES WORK WITH THEIR APPROFRIATE UN COUNTERFARTS. THIS SHOULD BE A MATTER OF FRIORITY. AS A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT TO NATIONS THAT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO EXPANDED UNPROFOR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND NEED THIS ASSISTANCE.

WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THE OVERRIDING NEED FOR A POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT, BASED ON A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO IN GOOD FAITH BY ALL PARTIES. CREDIBLE PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT WILL BE FUNDAMENTAL TO ITS SUCCESS. WE CAN AND SHOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PROCESS NEXT WEEK BY RECONFIRMING NATO'S READINESS TO TAKE ON THAT JOB ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO HOLD TOUGHER MEASURES IN RESERVE.

TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON BELGRADE AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS, WE SHOULD USE OUR NACC MEETING TO PRESS OUR EASTERN FARTNERS FOR EVEN STRICTER AND MORE ROBUST ENFORCEMENT OF UN SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA. CSCE, EC, AND WEU SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN THE REGION SHOULD BE STRONGLY ENDORSED. THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVIDED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO RIPARIAN STATES TO THIS END. AND WE ENCOURAGE EFFORTS BY OTHERS TO DO SO AS WELL. WE MUST ALSO PRESS SERBIA TO SEAL THE BORDER WITH BOSNIA, AND ALLIES SHOULD LEND SUPFORT TO MEASURES TO THIS END.

WE MUST ALSO ADVANCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THIS CONFLICT FROM SPILLING OVER. IN PARTICULAR, WE MUST ALL DO OUR SHARE TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY THE CSCE MONITOR PRESENCE IN KOSOVO. I PLAN TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE AND SECRETARY GENERAL WHEN I SEE THEM NEXT WEEK IN VIENNA.

IN THIS CONNECTION, IT REMAINS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERYONE IN THE REGION UNDERSTAND THAT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD UNDERSCORE THIS. WE WILL SUPPORT AN INCREASE IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE THERE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN SKOPJE. THE US IS CONSIDERING A CONTRIBUTION TO THIS EFFORT. WE SUPPORT THE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF THE NORDIC BATTALION IN MACEDONIA.

THE URGENCY OF TAKING THESE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE TERRIBLE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA CONVINCES ME THAT WE MUST PRESS AHEAD NOW, AS ALLIES AND PARTNERS. TO HELF STOP ANY FUTURE SUCH CONFLICT BEFORE IT STARTS. WE NEED TO DEVELOP INSTRUMENTS TO DEAL MORE QUICKLY AND CREATIVELY WITH OTHER CRISES FED BY ETHNIC AND NATIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE FORMER COMMUNIST WORLD. SURELY THIS IS ONE LESSON FROM HISTORY ON WHICH WE CAN ALL AGREE. THUS, OUR NAC AND NACC MEETINGS MUST SUPPORT CSCE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS AND ALLEVIATE TENSIONS BEFORE THEY EXPLODE. WHILE MAINTAINING NATO'S CAPACITIES FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, WE MUST ALSO GIVE STRONG ADDED

IMPETUS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES, AND PARTICULARLY TO COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING WITH OUR NACC PARTNERS. MOVING RAPIDLY INTO JOINT PLANNING, TRAINING, AND EXERCISING FOR EVENTUAL COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP WE CAN TAKE NOW TO MEET THE SECURITY NEEDS OF OUR EASTERN PARTNERS. NATO SHOULD MOVE AHEAD MORE ENERGETICALLY ON ALL ASPECTS OF ITS OUTREACH PROGRAM. WITH PEACEKEEPING OUR TOP PRIORITY.

WE SHOULD ALSO USE OUR NAC MEETING TO DISCUSS HOW WE AS AN ALLIANCE AND AS INDIVIDUAL ALLIES CAN BEST DEAL WITH THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. CONTINUING TENSIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. WE NEED TO CONSULT ON STEPS WE ARE TAKING TO MEET WHAT IS POTENTIALLY A GRAVE SECURITY PROBLEM THAT EXTENDS WELL BEYOND THE TWO STATES IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED. INTENSIFIED PARTNERSHIP IN THE NACC FOR ALL OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WILL BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THIS EFFORT. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS WHAT WE ARE EACH DOING BILATERALLY TO SECURE UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START AND ACCESSION TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE, AND TO DISCOURAGE UNREALISTIC UKRAINIAN PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ACTION BY THE UKRAINIAN RADA.

AS WE INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS AT NATO OUTREACH, WE NEED TO

BE CLEAR ABOUT OUR OBJECTIVES. WHILE WE SHOULD KEEP OPEN THE PERSPECTIVE OF EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OPENING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE EXPANSION WOULD SERVE A GOOD PURPOSE AT THIS TIME. RAISING THIS POSSIBILITY FOR SPECIFIC COUNTRIES CAN ONLY IMPLY A LESS FAVORED POSITION FOR OTHERS. EVENTUAL EXPANSION OF NATO, TO WHICH THE U.S. IS OPEN IN PRINCIPLE, NEEDS DELIBERATE STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. LET US NOT FORCE THE PACE, AND LET US AVOID RAISING PUBLIC EXFECTATIONS THAT CANNOT BE MET.

A FINAL POINT: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. WE WELCOME THE RECENT IMPORTANT STEPS FORWARD IN THE MAASTRICHT PROCESS AND THE IMPETUS THIS WILL GIVE TO THE EMERGENCE OF A MORE EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMMON SECURITY. OUR ATHENS MEETING WILL BE THE FIRST REGULAR NAC MINISTERIAL SINCE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION MOVED TO BRUSSELS; WE WOULD WELCOME DISCUSSION OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEU AND OTHER EUROPEAN SECURITY

INSTITUTIONS.

WE WILL THUS HAVE MUCH TO ADDRESS NEXT WEEK IN ATHENS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SETTING FORTH MY VIEWS IN SOMEWHAT FULLER DETAIL AND TO HEARING YOUR OWN THOUGHTS ON THE WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN TO US AS TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERS. (FOR EC FOREIGN MINISTERS EXCEPT GREECE AND LUXEMBOURG: "I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU JUNE 9 IN LUXEMBOURG.") (FOR GREECE: "I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU JUNE 9 IN LUXEMBOURG AND TO OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS.") (FOR LUXEMBOURG: "I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU JUNE 9 WITH YOUR EC COLLEAGUES AND TO OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS." (FOR TURKEY: "I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS.")

SINCERELY,

WARREN CHRISTOPHER

END TEXT CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0901
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 0901
TOR: 930606220300 M0428243
DIST:
PRT: SIT WALKER
SIT: LOWENKRON SUM SUM2 VAX WITKOWSKY

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003. cable	re: NATO: June 6 Permreps Lunch Details Athens Ministerial Agenda (7 pages)	06/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/03/1993-10/29/1993]

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004. cable	re: NATO SYG Manfred Woerner Discusses the NATO Summit (4 pages)	08/06/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/03/1993-10/29/1993]

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Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.05)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHWRA2390 2371621-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
LINE3: O 251616Z AUG 93 ZFF4
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
OSRI: RUEHWR
DTG: 251616Z AUG 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3401
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0614
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0046
INFO: RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 0590
RUFHBP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 0670
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0476
RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8593
RUFHBL/USOFFICE BERLIN 0485
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7189
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 9936
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 9587
RUFHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1136
RUFHNK/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 1162
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0361
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 6601
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3269
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0172
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0010
RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2357
RUFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0836
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0088
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0134
RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA 0276
RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 9486
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0046
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0668
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1369
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1363
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 1502
SUBJ: RUSSIA WILL NOT OPPOSE POLAND IN NATO
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 12390
DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/EEA - RJOHNSON
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PL
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WILL NOT OPPOSE POLAND IN NATO
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
---
2. WALESA AND YELTSIN WILL ANNOUNCE AUGUST 25 THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT OPPOSE POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. RUSSIAN ACQUIESCENCE ON THE ISSUE OPENS IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES WE SHOULD EXPLOIT QUICKLY. WE URGE WASHINGTON RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THROUGH A STATEMENT AND PERHAPS HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PHLS ON REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

YELTSIN'S INITIATIVE
---
3. FOREIGN MINISTER SKUBISZEWSKI BROKE THE NEWS TO VISITING SENATOR LUGAR AND CHARGE AT LUNCH
N AUGUST 25.
SKUBISZEWSKI SAID THAT THE FINAL YELTSIN-WALESA COMMUNIQUE WOULD INCLUDE THIS PARAGRAPH:

> "THE PRESIDENTS HAVE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF THE INTENTION OF POLAND TO ACCEDE TO NATO. PRESIDENT LECH WALESA EXPLAINED THE WELL-KNOWN POSITION OF POLAND IN THAT MATTER, WHICH MET WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S UNDERSTANDING. IN PERSPECTIVE, SUCH A DECISION BY SOVEREIGN POLAND AIMING AT ALL-EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE INTEREST OF ANY STATE, ALSO INCLUDING RUSSIA." (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION PROVIDED BY SKUBISZEWSKI)

4. SKUBISZEWSKI TOLD SENATOR LUGAR HE BROUGHT UP POLISH NATO MEMBERSHIP WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV IN TALKS FOLLOWING YELTSIN'S ARRIVAL AUGUST 24. KOZYREV TOLD SKUBISZEWSKI THAT RUSSIA WOULD OPPOSE ANY MOVE BY THE COUNTRIES BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA TO JOIN NATO, AS SUCH A MOVE WOULD ISOLATE RUSSIA. WHEN SKUBISZEWSKI REJOINED THAT POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WOULDN'T NECESSARILY ISOLATE RUSSIA, KOZYREV MAINTAINED THAT IT WOULD "SEPARATE" RUSSIA FROM THE WEST. HOWEVER, SKUBISZEWSKI SAID YELTSIN GOT PERSONALLY INVOLVED AND TOLD WALESA AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING THAT RUSSIA IN FACT WOULD NOT OPPOSE POLAND'S JOINING NATO.
5. YELTSIN'S NEXT STOP IS PRAGUE. SKUBISZEWSKI SAID HE HAD REPORTED THESE DISCUSSIONS TO HIS CZECH COUNTERPART.
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 WARSAW 12390
DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/EEA - RJOHNSON
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PL
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WILL NOT OPPOSE POLAND IN NATO
(COMMENT: IT SEEMS A DISTINCT OSSIBILITY WE CAN EXPECT A SIMILAR ANNOUNCEMENT FROM PRAGUE DURING THE YELTSIN VISIT THERE. END COMMENT)
6. SKUBISZEWSKI TOLD SENATOR LUGAR THAT POLAND NOW LOOKS TO THE U.S. TO RECOGNIZE THE ANNOUNCEMENT'S SIGNIFICANCE, SINCE PRESUMED RUSSIAN HOSTILITY TO POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A MAJOR CAUSE FOR U.S. RELUCTANCE TO PRESS THE ISSUE.

WALESA'S HINT
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7. PRESIDENT WALESA HINTED TO SENATOR LUGAR AND CHARGE AUGUST 24 THAT SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING. SENATOR LUGAR TOLD WALESA ONE OF THE STUMBLING BLOCKS TO POLISH NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS THE EFFECT IT MIGHT HAVE ON STRENGTHENING YELTSIN'S HARDLINE OPPOSITION. WALESA REPLIED HE IS A PRACTICAL POLITICIAN IN APPROACHING THE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT RUSSIA IS NO LONGER IN A POSITION TO KEEP HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE RESULTANT SECURITY VACUUM SHOULD BE FILLED. "I WILL CONVINCE PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT POLAND IN NATO WILL BE SAFER FOR RUSSIA," HE SAID, "THAN A CONTINUING VACUUM." HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED POLAND'S ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO WITH UKRAINE, AND THAT UKRAINE WOULD ALSO NOT OPPOSE POLISH ACCESSION TO NATO. "WE ARE NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION WITH THE EAST," WALESA ASSERTED. "WE SEEK ONLY TO GUARANTEE POLISH SECURITY."
8. WALESA VENTURED THAT POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WOULD HAVE SOME "SORE POINTS" FOR THE RUSSIANS. BUT HE SAID HE IS CONFIDENT POLAND ALONG WITH THE U.S. AND ITS NATO ALLIES COULD AGREE TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR RUSSIA TO ACCEPT POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY IN NATO.

COMMENT: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
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9. MANY OF OUR POLISH INTERLOCUTORS SUGGEST THAT WALESA WOULD BE HAPPY TO AGREE TO A COMMITMENT NOT TO MEDDLE IN RUSSIA'S AFFAIRS WITH THE OTHER FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS IN EXCHANGE FOR RUSSIA'S ACQUIESCENCE ON NATMPUM SKUBISZEWSKI, HOWEVER, GAVE US NO REASON TO SUSPECT THAT SUCH A DEAL TOOK PLACE BETWEEN WALESA AND YELTSIN.
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 WARSAW 12390
DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
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ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PL
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WILL NOT OPPOSE POLAND IN NATO
10. RUSSIAN ACQUIESCENCE TO POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO OPENS IMPORTANT NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY MANY MORE OBSTACLES ON THE ROAD TO POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO -- THE COSTS TO NATO, INTEROPERABILITY OF POLISH FORCES, AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NATO DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURES CHIEF AMONG THEM. BUT NO OBSTACLE HAS LOOMED LARGER THAN THE IMPACT ON RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES, A POINT WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE TO THE POLES IN DAMPENING THEIR ARDOR FOR RAPID ASSIMILATION INTO NATO.
11. NOW THAT THOSE SENSITIVITIES ARE APPARENTLY NO LONGER A FACTOR, THE POLES EXPECT, RIGHTLY, THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY LOOK TO US, AS NATO'S DRIVING FORCE, TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NATO IS NOW CLOSER ON THE POLISH HORIZON. THEY WILL CONSIDER OUR RESPONSE AS A

MEASURE OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO POLAND'S ULTIMATE
INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST.

ACTION REQUEST
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12. WE URGE THE DEPARTMENT MOVE QUICKLY TO EXPLOIT THE NEW SITUATION BY PUBLICLY RECOGNIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WALESA-YELTSIN ANNOUNCEMENT, BOTH WITH A DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AND WITH A COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE IN HIGH LEVEL TALKS WITH THE POLES ON THE IMPLICATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT RUSSIA'S ACQUIESCENCE PRESENTS. THE BWG MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR GARMISCH NEXT MONTH, WHICH DAS VERSHBOW WILL ATTEND, SEEM AN IDEAL EARLY OPPORTUNITY.
HORNBLOW
BT
#2390
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 2390
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TOR: 930825123407 M0570850
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<^TOR>930825123611 M0570853

DIST:
SIT: FRIED GOTTEMOELLER HARRIS LOWENKRON VAX WITKOWSKY

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.06)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 271628Z AUG 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
OSRI: RUEHWR
DTG: 271628Z AUG 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3499
INFO: RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0057
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0678
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1387
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1380
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 1523
SUBJ: "NATO-MANIA" GREETS SENATOR LUGAR IN POLAND
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 WARSAW 12545
DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/EEA - JOHNSON
USNATO PLEASE DELIVER TO CODEL LUGAR
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, OREP, PL
SUBJECT: "NATO-MANIA" GREETS SENATOR LUGAR IN POLAND
REF: WARSAW 12390
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. A CHORUS OF POLISH LEADERS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM EXPRESSED ENTHUSIASTIC AND NEARLY UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR ACCELERATED POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO DURING SENATOR LUGAR'S AUGUST 22-26 VISIT TO WARSAW. WALESA, SUCHOCKA, THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS, AND A RANGE OF COMMENTATORS AND ACADEMICS WARMLY ENCOURAGED THE SENATOR'S EFFORTS TO PUT THE POLISH MEMBERSHIP QUESTION ON THIS WINTER'S NATO SUMMIT AGENDA. YELTSIN'S SURPRISE ACQUIESCENCE ON POLAND IN NATO DURING THE LUGAR VISIT (REFTEL) FIRED THE POLES' ZEAL FURTHER. THE SENATOR PLEDGED TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN STIMULATING DISCUSSION ON NATO'S MISSION AND MEMBERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

A SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE
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3. SENATOR LUGAR TRAVELLED TO WARSAW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ASPEN INSTITUTE'S CONFERENCE ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. FOLLOWING SENATOR LUGAR'S OPEN FORUM SPEECH ON NATO IN THE DEPARTMENT IN EARLY AUGUST, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD APPROACHED THE SENATOR TO OFFER HIM MEETINGS WITH SENIOR GOVERNMENT FIGURES, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS, TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE DURING HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE. WE ALSO ORGANIZED A RANGE OF MEETINGS WITH POLISH GOVERNMENT SECURITY EXPERTS, INDAPENDENT ACADEMICS AND COMMENTATORS. SENATOR LUGAR'S AIDE KEN MYERS ACCOMPANIED HIM TO ALL OF HIS MEETINGS.

4. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH THE POLES, THE SENATOR STRESSED HIS INTEREST IN HEARING POLISH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NATO MEMBERSHIP. HE TOLD ALL OF HIS INTERLOCUTORS THAT HIS AIM WAS TO ASSIST THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF NATO'S MISSION AND MEMBERSHIP, WHICH HE SAID NEEDED TO BE REFORMED IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA. HE CITED THE WEST'S FAILURE TO MANAGE BOSNIA EFFECTIVELY AS AN INDICATION OF THE NEED FOR CHANGE. HE SAID HE WOULD WORK TO INCLUDE THE QUESTION OF EXTENDING MEMBERSHIP TO POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC ON THE NATO SUMMIT'S AGENDA THIS WINTER.

5. LUGAR'S INTERLOCUTORS ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY STRESSED THAT POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS CRUCIAL TO POLAND'S FUTURE SECURITY AND IN THE WEST'S INTERESTS. IN GENEAL THEY UNDERSCORED THE DANGERS OF A SECURITY VACUUM BETWEEN NATO'S BORDERS AND RUSSIA; POLAND'S WESTERN HERITAGE AND ORIENTATION; ITS BROAD SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP; AND ITS POTENTIAL RELIAYILITY AS A PARTNER TO THE U.S. ON EUROPEAN AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. BRIEF SUMMARIES OF THE SENATOR'S MEETINGS FOLLOW.

WALESA: WE CAN'T BE ALONE

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6. THE PRESIDENT WARMLY THANKED THE SENATOR FOR HIS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO FOCUS THE QUESTION OF EXPANDED NATO

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MEMBERSHIP. HE EMPHASIZED THAT POLISH SECURITY REQUIRES A CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE AND A RAPID ASSIMILATION OF POLAND UNDER THE NATO "SECURITY UMBRELLA." HE SAID THE DEMISE OF THE COLD WAR HAD LEFT A VACUUM THAT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS FOR STATES IN THE REGION. WITHOUT POLAND IN NATO, WALESA MUSED, HE COULD EASILY IMAGINE A SITUATION IN WHICH RUSSIAN INSTABILITY COULD PROMPT NEW RUSSIAN MOVES AGAINST POLAND. HE SAID THAT IF NATO HAD ACCEPTED WALESA'S PROPOSAL FOR ASSOCIATE POLISH, CZECH AND HUNGARIAN ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP IN HIS "NATO-BIS" PROPOSAL OF EARLY 1992, IT COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE CZECH-SLOVAK SPLIT, AND

WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A NEW STRUCTURE THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN WILLING TO INTERVENE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

7. WALESA SAID THE U.S. WOULD HAVE THE DECISIVE VOICE ON POLISH MEMBERSHIP IF/WHEN THE ISSUE IS DISCUSSED AT NATO, AND HE URGED THAT THE U.S. TAKE UP THE POLISH CAUSE WITH ITS NATO ALLIES. "WE WON A GREAT WAR FOR THE WEST," WALESA SAID, "WITHOUT EVER FIRING A SHOT WHEN WE CONVINCED THE RUSSIANS TO LEAVE OUR TERRITORY...YOU COULD SAY WE WON A KILOGRAM OF GOLD FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE WEST, AND NOW THE WEST IS DROPPING IT ON THEIR FEET!" HE SAID WESTERN FAILURE TO EMBRACE POLAND WOULD MEAN "A TRAGEDY FOR OUR REVOLUTION; IT COULD END IN DISASTER."

8. WHILE HE ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF WESTERN SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN REFORMS, WALESA SAID IT IS IMPORTANT TO FORTIFY AND STRENGTHEN THOSE NATIONS CLOSER TO THE WEST FIRST TO AVOID THE PROSPECT OF RENEWED RUSSIAN HEGEMONISM. "AN ARMED AND STRONG RUSSIA IS A DANGEROUS RUSSIA," HE SAID. WALESA SAID RUSSIA WOULD NOT BE READY TO JOIN THE WEST FOR ANOTHER 50 TO 100 YEARS; POLAND IS READY NOW.

SUCHOCKA: BROKEN PROMISE?

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9. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD SENATOR LUGAR THAT NATO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER HAD TOLD HER IN FEBRUARY THAT POLAND WAS "FIRST ON THE LIST" OF NEW NATO MEMBERS. "BUT SOME WEEKS LATER," SHE SAID, "THE SITUATION SEEMED TO CHANGE" AND NATO LOST HEART. SHE WARNED THAT EUROPE SEEMED ON THE WAY TO A "NEW PARTITION" IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR. "IF THE WEST DOESN'T COME IN TO HELP US VERY SOON, WE WILL BE IN TROUBLE," SUCHOCKA SAID. "SURELY THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE DANGER OF A SECURITY VACUUM IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD."

ONYSZKIEWICZ: TREAT US LIKE GREECE

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10. SENATOR LUGAR NOTED IN HIS MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE POLISH MILITARY'S INTEROPERABILITY WITH NATO STRUCTURES. ONYSZKIEWICZ ADMITTED THAT POLAND HAS YEARS TO GO BEFORE IT CAN MATCH STANDARDS IN THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN MILITARY. BUT HE ALSO SAID THERE IS ALREADY A PRECEDENT FOR ADMITTING NATIONS TO NATO WITH UNDERDEVELOPED MILITARIES, LIKE PORTUGAL, GREECE AND SPAIN. HE ADMITTED POLAND STILL HAS TO DEVELOP FULL CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE POLISH MILITARY, BUT HE BLAMED THE DELAY AT LEAST PARTIALLY ON POLAND'S CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY ON WHETHER THE MILITARY SHOULD REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER OR TO THE PRESIDENT.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 WARSAW 12545

DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
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SUBJECT: "NATO-MANIA" GREETS SENATOR LUGAR IN POLAND

SKUBISZEWSKI: ADMIT US NOW

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11. SENATOR LUGAR MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SKUBISZEWSKI IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE YELTSIN-WALESA COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING YELTSIN'S ACQUIESCENCE ON POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HE SAID THAT THE WEST'S PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT IN COUNSELING HESITATION ON EXPANDING NATO EASTWARD HAD VANISHED. HE SAID POLAND NOW LOOKS TO THE U.S. TO MOVE ENERGETICALLY TO BRING POLAND IN.

GEREMEK: WIDE SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

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12. DEMOCRATIC UNION (UD) LEADER AND FORMER SEJM FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION CHAIRMAN BRONISLAW GEREMEK TOLD SENATOR LUGAR THAT THE GENERAL REACTION AMONG POLES TO THE CONCEPT OF JOINING NATO IS POSITIVE. NO POLITICAL PARTY, NOT EVEN THE POST-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE (SLD), HAS REJECTED THE IDEA OF JOINING NATO, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME GROUPS WITHIN SOCIETY WHICH OPPOSE IT. IN GENERAL, POLES ARE PLAGUED BY A FEELING OF INSECURITY, BOTH MILITARY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC. ALL POLES WOULD VIEW NATO'S ACCEPTANCE OF A U.S. PROPOSAL TO ADMIT POLAND AS A PROMISING SIGN FOR POLAND'S FUTURE. IN TODAY'S STILL-WEAK DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN POLAND, JOINING NATO, WITH ITS CLEAR DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY, WOULD BE A STIMULATING CHALLENGE FOR POLAND, AND WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT POLAND'S FUTURE LIES IN ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST. NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD ALSO CONFIRM THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE FALL OF COMMUNISM, AND HELP MARGINALIZE POST-COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.

13. GEREMEK SUGGESTED RUSSIA MIGHT VIEW POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IN TERMS OF ITS "NUMBER-ONE" SECURITY ISSUE -- THE UKRAINE. IF POLAND -- BUT NOT UKRAINE -- JOINS NATO, GEREMEK MUSED, THE RUSSIANS "WILL KNOW THAT THE UKRAINE REMAINS IN THE RUSSIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE." MAINTAINING UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE, HOWEVER, IS ONE OF POLAND'S KEY FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, BECAUSE IT GUARANTEES THAT RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM WILL NOT REAPPEAR. GEREMEK ADDED THAT HIS PARTY HOPES TO CONVINCE VOTERS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THAT A VOTE FOR THE LEFT WOULD PUT POLISH NATO MEMBERSHIP AT RISK; UNFORTUNATELY, VOTERS ARE MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY THAN IN NATO.

KWASNIEWSKI: UNDECIDED

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14. SENATOR LUGAR MET SLD LEADER ALEKSANDER KWASNIEWSKI, THE MOST LIKELY OPPONENT OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, IF SUCH OPPOSITION MATERIALIZES IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENT. KWASNIEWSKI SAID THE SLD IS "STILL THINKING" ITS POSITION CONCERNING EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP. THE FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES FOR AN SLD-LED GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ECONOMIC. SLD'S MAJOR GOALS ARE TO INTEGRATE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE INTO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, AND TO INCREASE TRADE WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. ON SECURITY ISSUES, KWASNIEWSKI SEES THE CONFERENCE ON

COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A USEFUL FRAMEWORK. PERHAPS AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE CSCE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT, OR PERHAPS A REDEFINED NATO WITH AN EMPHASIS ON RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES WOULD BE A SUITABLE GUARANTOR OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. FOR NOW, THERE IS "NO CLEAR

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 WARSAW 12545

DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
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PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
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TAGS: PREL, NATO, OREP, PL
SUBJECT: "NATO-MANIA" GREETS SENATOR LUGAR IN POLAND ANSWER."

MILEWSKI: STEPS TO ENHANCE U.S.-POLISH COOPERATION

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15. SENATOR LUGAR MET WITH PRESIDENT WALESA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JERZY MILEWSKI, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE YELTSIN-WALESA ANNOUNCEMENT. MILEWSKI STRESSED THE NEED TO BUILD IMMEDIATELY ON YELTSIN'S DECLARATION ON POSSIBLE POLISH NATO MEMBERSHIP. NOW THAT THE ISSUE OF POTENTIAL RUSSIAN OPPOSITION HAS BEEN REMOVED, HE SAID, THE MEMBERSHIP ISSUE -- WITH U.S. LEADERSHIP -- SHOULD MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY. MILEWSKI NOTED THAT SOME IN NATO HAVE USED RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES AS A "PRETEXT" TO AVOID THE ISSUE OF EXPANDED MEMBERSHIP. THE POLES ARE READY TO HAVE THEIR APPLICATION JUDGED ON ITS MERITS, HE SAID.

16. MILEWSKI REPEATEDLY ASKED SENATOR LUGAR WHAT CONCRETE STEPS POLAND SHOULD TAKE TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF JOINING NATO. HE EMPHASIZED THAT POLAND IS EAGER TO EXPAND MILITARY CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AND NATO. MILEWSKI SUGGESTED A VISIBLE GESTURE OF ENHANCED COOPERATION, SUCH AS SENDING A WING OF F-16S TO POLAND FOR A FEW WEEKS.

17. MILEWSKI EXPOUNDED ON PROBLEMS IN THE UKRAINE, NOTING THAT UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE WAS UNDER SERIOUS THREAT. HE ASKED SENATOR LUGAR TO CONTACT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ANTHONY LAKE TO SEE IF MR. LAKE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN "UNOFFICIAL, PRIVATE" MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH MILEWSKI AND UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ANTON BUTEYKO TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE. MILEWSKI SAID THAT THE POLES COULD PERSUADE UKRAINE "TO GET RID OF ITS ROCKETS" IF THE WEST OFFERS "THE PROPER SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. SOMETHING MORE MUST BE DONE IF YOU CARE ABOUT THE FATE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE," HE CONCLUDED.

ACADEMICS: SUSPICIOUS OF A "DEAL"

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18. POLISH ACADEMICS AT A ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION WITH THE SENATOR CLEARLY WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WALESA-YELTSIN AGREEMENT. WHILE GREETING IT AS AN HISTORIC EVENT AND A DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE POLES' INITIAL STATEMENTS INDICATED FEARS THAT A BARGAIN MIGHT BE STRUCK BETWEEN

THE U.S. AND RUSSIA TO THE DETRIMENT OF POLISH INTERESTS. ALL PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED MISGIVINGS AT THE PROSPECT OF DRAWING A NEW LINE THROUGH "GREATER EUROPE THAT MIGHT GIVE RUSSIA A FREE HAND OVER POLAND'S EASTERN NEIGHBORS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE GO-AHEAD ON NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY." ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND THE BALTICS TO POLAND'S LONG-TERM SECURITY. THE FACT THAT SENATOR LUGAR AND CHARGE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO THESE CONCERNS INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOW-UP COMMUNICATION FROM THE WEST CLARIFYING U.S. AND NATO'S INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

COMMENT: EXPECTATIONS RISING

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19. SENATOR LUGAR'S VISIT AND ITS COINCIDENCE WITH THE YELTSIN ANNOUNCEMENT HAVE PROPELLED POLISH HOPES AND

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 WARSAW 12545

DEPT PASS NSC FOR FRIED
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PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
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TAGS: PREL, NATO, OREP, PL
SUBJECT: "NATO-MANIA" GREETS SENATOR LUGAR IN POLAND
EXPECTATIONS ON NATO MEMBERSHIP TO NEW HIGHS. THIS PRESENTS RISKS AND DANGERS TO THE U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH POLAND. IF THE U.S STILL WANTS TO GO SLOW ON EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP EASTWARD, AND THAT IS AN ISSUE WE WILL ADDRESS SEPTEL, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY YELTSIN'S DECLARATION DOESN'T LESSEN OBSTACLES TO POLISH MEMBERSHIP.
END COMMENT.
20. CODEL LUGAR DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS CABLE.
HORNBLOW
BT
#2545
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05
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SSN: 2545
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DIST:

SIT: FRIED KUPCHAN VAX WITKOWSKY

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.07)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHWRA2734 2441618-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 011611Z SEP 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
OSRI: RUEHWR
DTG: 011611Z SEP 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3621
INFO: RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 1546
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1404
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1397
SUBJ: THE YELTSIN VISIT: REMEMBERING THE PAST,
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 WARSAW 12734
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECIN, PL, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN VISIT: REMEMBERING THE PAST,
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
REFS: (A) WARSAW 12390 (B) WARSAW 12535
(C) WARSAW 11280
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. YELTSIN'S SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT ON POLISH ADMISSION TO NATO STOLE THE SHOW OF A SUMMIT WHICH HAD FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. A WALESA CONFIDANT CONFIRMS THAT WALESA PERSUADED YELTSIN ON NATO OVER TOUGH OPPOSITION FROM KOZYREV AND GRACHEV. YELTSIN ADDRESSED THE "NEGATIVE LEGACY OF THE PAST" BY SUCH GESTURES AS VISITING THE MONUMENT TO KATYN VICTIMS, ANNOUNCING AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM POLAND, RELEASING SOVIET POLITBURO RECORDS DEALING WITH THE MARTIAL LAW ERA, AND STRESSING RUSSIA'S RESPECT FOR POLISH SOVEREIGNTY. A TOTAL OF SEVEN AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED. MOST IMPORTANT AMONG THEM WAS A USD 3 BILLION NATURAL GAS PIPELINE DEAL (REF B). PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD RESOLVING A FISHING DISPUTE INVOLVING THE OKHOTSK SEA. ALTHOUGH A TRADE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE ON THE VALUATION OF MUTUAL DEBTS. APART FROM ENTHUSIASM STEMMING FROM THE NATO ANNOUNCEMENT, POLISH APPROVAL OF YELTSIN'S EFFORTS WAS TINGED BY APPREHENSIONS ABOUT HIS HOLD ON POWER AND FEARS THAT A "NEW ERA" IN RELATIONS MAY BE SHORT-LIVED. END SUMMARY.

NATO STATEMENT STEALS THE SHOW

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3. YELTSIN'S SURPRISE AVOWAL THAT POLAND'S ENTRY INTO NATO WOULD NOT "CONFLICT" WITH RUSSIA'S INTERESTS OVERSHADOWED THE PLANNED ECONOMIC FOCUS OF THE SUMMIT. WIDELY REPORTED IN POLAND ONLY DAYS BEFORE YELTSIN'S ARRIVAL WERE FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV'S REMARKS THAT "SEEKING SECURITY BY JOINING OR REVIVING SOMETHING REMINISCENT OF THE WARSAW PACT...SMELLS OF MOTHBALLS." KOZYREV ADDED THAT EXPANDED NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD ONLY SERVE TO STRENGTHEN "REACTIONARY REVANCHIST FORCES IN RUSSIA."

4. DURING A MEETING WITH SENATOR LUGAR ON AUGUST 26, PRESIDENT WALESA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JERZY MILEWSKI, SAID THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR THE NATO ANNOUNCEMENT CAME FROM WALESA WHO PRESSED YELTSIN "HARD" ON THE ISSUE DURING THEIR AUGUST 24 MEETING. MILEWSKI NOTED THAT KOZYREV AND RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV OPPOSED THE IDEA "TO THE END."

WALESA FORCES THE ISSUE

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5. A PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZEN WITH CLOSE TIES TO WALESA'S INNER CIRCLE CONFIRMED THE ABOVE AND ADDED THE FOLLOWING BASED ON CONTACT WITH AN EYEWITNESS TO THE EVENTS: OVER DINNER AND DRNKS ON AUGUST 24, WALESA FAIRLY EASILY PERSUADED YELTSIN TO GO ALONG WITH A STATEMENT INDICATING THAT RUSSIA HAD NO OBJECTION TO POLAND JOINING NATO. AT THE SAME TIME, FOREIGN MINISTER SKUBISZEWSZKI WAS RAISING THE ISSUE WITH KOZYREV AND GETTING NOWHERE.

6. THE NEXT MORNING, YELTSIN, BOWING TO STRONG OPPOSITION FROM KOZYREV AND GRACHEV, SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE STATEMENT. THERE WAS A SHARP EXCHANGE ON BOTH SIDES. WALESA ASKED YELTSIN IF HE BELIEVED POLAND WAS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. YELTSIN SAID YES. WALESA SAID THAT POLAND, AS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY, WOULD PROBABLY JOIN NATO SOONER OR LATER IF NA O MEMBERS AGREED. HE WANTED YELTSIN'S CONCURRENCE NOW IN ORDER TO PREVENT OPEN CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA IN THE FUTURE. WALESA ADDED THAT POLAND, AS A MEMBER OF NATO, COULD NOT POSSIBLY JOIN WITH ANY OF THE OTHER CIS STATES IN ACTION AGAINST RUSSIA.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 WARSAW 12734

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECIN, PL, RS

SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN VISIT: REMEMBERING THE PAST,

7. AT THAT POINT, YELTSIN AGREED TO THE DECLARATION. KOZYREV THEN PREPARED SOME LANGUAGE WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE POLES. THE PREVIOUS POLISH DRAFT WAS DISCUSSED AND ACCEPTED. THERE WAS AN IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE POLES WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN THE UKRAINE IN ANY DISPUTE INVOLVING RUSSIA EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF A MILITARY ATTACK.

8. COMMENT: THIS COMES FROM THE WALESA CAMP AND MAY BE SELF SERVING. THE QUID PRO QUO ON UKRAINE IS WIDELY RUMORED AND PLAUSIBLE, BUT UNCONFIRMED. END COMMENT.

ATMOSPHERICS: REMOVING THE "NEGATIVE LEGACY"
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9. ON PAGE ONE OF MOST WARSAW DAILIES ON AUGUST 26 -- ALONGSIDE THE HEADLINES PROCLAIMING RUSSIA'S "AGREEMENT" ON POLAND'S NATO MEMBERSHIP -- WERE LARGE PHOTOS OF YELTSIN BOWING AT THE MONUMENT TO THE KATYN VICTIMS TO KISS THE RIBBON OF THE WREATH HE HAD JUST LAID. SEVERAL PAPERS REPORTED THAT YELTSIN HAD ASKED THE FAMILIES OF KATYN VICTIMS TO FORGIVE THE CRIMES. YELTSIN ALSO PROMISED A SEARCH OF THE KATYN ARCHIVES TO IDENTIFY PERPETRATORS AND UNCOVER THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE REMAINS OF 11,000 OTHER POLISH OFFICERS NOT YET BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR.

10. YELTSIN SET HIMSELF THE TASK OF REMOVING "THE NEGATIVE LEGACY AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL SUSPICION AND MISTRUST." HE NOTED: "IT IS TIME TO BEGIN ANEW. IN RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND RUSSIA, THERE IS NO PLACE FOR HEGEMONISM AND DIKTAT." THIS GOAL WAS EVIDENT IN YELTSIN'S DECISION TO SPEED UP THE DEADLINE FOR RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM POLAND. THE LAST ONE THOUSAND RUSSIAN TROOPS WILL DEPART BEFORE OCTOBER 1 (INSTEAD OF DECEMBER 31), LEAVING ONLY ABOUT THIRTY BEHIND FOR LOGISTICAL DUTY RELATING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM EASTERN GERMANY. (NOTE: THIS APPARENTLY DEFUSES THE CONFLICT WHICH STALLED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE RUSSIAN REGIMENT FROM REMBERTOW REPORTED REF C. END NOTE.)

11. IN A GESTURE TO THE MORE RECENT PAST, YELTSIN BROUGHT WITH HIM PREVIOUSLY SECRET DOCUMENTS FROM THE "SUSLOV COMMISSION" CONCERNING SOVIET POLITBURO DELIBERATIONS PRIOR TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW. GENERAL JARUZELSKI HAS REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT MARTIAL LAW WAS A "LESSER EVIL" NECESSITATED BY THE SPECTER OF AN IMMINENT SOVIET INVASION. THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY YELTSIN INDICATE OTHERWISE: AT A DECEMBER 10, 1981 SOVIET POLITBURO MEETING (JUST PRIOR TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW), SUSLOV STATES: "IF THE (SOVIET) ARMY INVADES, IT WILL BE A CATASTROPHE. I THINK, THEN, THAT WE ALL AGREE THAT IN NO CASE SHOULD THERE BE TALK OF A MILITARY INVASION." AT THE SAME MEETING ANDROPOV ADDS: "WE CAN NOT RISK IT. WE DO NOT INTEND TO INTRODUCE THE MILITARY INTO POLAND. IT IS A CORRECT POSITION AND WE SHOULD HOLD TO IT TO THE END."

"CONTRACT OF THE CENTURY"
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12. SOMEWHAT LOST IN THE EXCITEMENT OVER THE NATO MEMBERSHIP STATEMENT WAS THE SIGNING OF WHAT PRIME MINISTER SUCHOCKA CALLED "THE CONTRACT OF THE CENTURY" -- A USD 3 BILLION DEAL TO BUILD A 675 KILOMETER PIPELINE ACROSS POLAND TO CARRY SIBERIAN NATURAL GAS TO GERMANY (SEE REF B). THE PIPELINE WILL CARRY 67 BILLION CUBIC METERS OF NATURAL GAS PER YEAR OF WHICH POLAND WILL CONSUME 14 BILLION CUBIC METERS. WORK IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN 1994. THE POLISH SEGMENT OF THE PIPELINE WILL GO FROM BIALYSTOK TO WROCLAW EN ROUTE TO FRANKFURT.

13. SEVERAL POLISH RIGHT-OF-CENTER POLITICAL GROUPS, INCLUDING FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAN OLSZEWSKI'S MOVEMENT

FOR THE REPUBLIC AND JAROSLAW KACZYNSKI'S CENTER ACCORD, HAVE DENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 WARSAW 12734
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECIN, PL, RS
SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN VISIT: REMEMBERING THE PAST, SOVEREIGNTY GROUNDS. IN ADDITION TO WHAT THEY SEE AS AN OVER-RELIANCE ON RUSSIAN GAS SUPPLIES, THEY CRITICIZE THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN STATE GAS MONOPOLY, GAZPROM, WILL BE A FIFTY PERCENT PARTNER FOR THE POLISH SEGMENT.
14. THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT, IN EFFECT, GERMANY AND THE EC WILL GUARANTEE POLISH SUPPLIES, SINCE THEY WOULD BEAR THE BRUNT OF ANY CUTOFF BY A FUTURE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. CABINET CHIEF JAN MARIA ROKITA TOLD US ON AUGUST 26 THAT THE DEAL GUARANTEES POLISH ACCESS TO SUFFICIENT GAS SUPPLIES. AS FOR FINANCING, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS POINT OUT THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE JOINT VENTURE, THE POLISH PARTNER ONLY HAS TO PUT UP FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE CONSTRUCTION COSTS, A MAJOR SAVINGS. (POLAND WOULD LIKELY HAVE TO BEAR THE ENTIRE COST OF A PIPELINE FROM THE NORTH SEA.) THE GOVERNMENT ALSO NOTES THAT THE DEAL WILL GENERATE THOUSANDS OF NEW JOBS.

TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED, BUT DEBT PROBLEM REMAINS

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15. A TRADE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED THAT GIVES BOTH PARTNERS MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS AND STRESSES RELIANCE ON MARKET PRINCIPLES. OTHER INITIATIVES MENTIONED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION INCLUDE:
-- SETTIMF UP A CLEARING SYSTEM TO STIMULATE TRADE (WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING BILATERAL TRADE PAYMENTS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES);
-- GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES FOR TRADE IN CERTAIN COMMODITIES;
-- IMPROVED TRANSPORTATION ACCESS TO KALININGRAD TO SPUR TRADE AND INVESTMENT;
-- A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MOSCOW-WARSAW HIGHWAY.
16. LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE, HOWEVER, IN THE AREA OF THE VALUATION OF MUTUAL DEBTS INHERITED FROM COMECON. JAKUB WOLASIEWICZ, DIRECTOR OF THE EAST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT MFA, TOLD US THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN AND POLISH FINANCE MINISTRIES HAVE BEEN FAR APART. THE POLES BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW OWES THEM ABOUT USD 5 BILLION. WHILE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT A NEAR-TERM SOLUTION IS IN THE OFFING, WOLASIEWICZ NOTED THAT THE SUMMIT DID SERVE TO ELEVATE THE ISSUE TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

OKHOTSK SEA FISHING DISPUTE: JOBS, JOBS, JOBS

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17. FOREIGN MINISTER SKUBISZEWSKI STRESSED THE ISSUE OF A FISHING DISPUTE IN THE OKHOTSK SEA IN HIS TALKS WITH KOZYREV. THE RUSSIAN DESK OFFICER AT MFA, MAREK BUCKO, TOLD US THAT OVER 100,000 JOBS IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY WERE AT STAKE BECAUSE RUSSIA HAD UNILATERALLY DECLARED THE OKHOTSK TO BE OVER-FISHED AND OFF-LIMITS. THE POLES WERE SATISFIED WITH LANGUAGE IN THE JOINT DECLARATION

WHICH CALLS FOR ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND "OBJECTIVE SCIENTIFIC STUDIES" RELATING TO THE OKHOTSK AND BELIEVE THAT FISHING CAN RESUME UNIMPEDED. NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE.

OTHER AGREEMENTS

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18. A NUMBER OF ROUTINE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED. SIMILAR AGREEMENTS ARE IN EFFECT WITH POLAND'S OTHER NEIGHBORS (EXCEPT, FOR THE TIME BEING, LUTHUANIA). AGREEMENTS SIGNED WERE:

-- AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

-- AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 WARSAW 12734

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECIN, PL, RS

SUBJECT: THE YELTSIN VISIT: REMEMBERING THE PAST,

-- AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN CULTURE, THE SCIENCES AND HIGHER EDUCATION

-- PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRIES

COMMENT

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19. THE MAIN RESULT OF THE SUMMIT WAS CLEARLY THE RENEWED IMPETUS IT GAVE TO POLISH EFFORTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. YELTSIN'S GESTURES OF ATONEMENT FOR THE PAST AND HIS REPEATED AFFIRMATIONS OF RESPECT FOR POLISH SOVEREIGNTY CERTAINLY RESONATED WELL. THE SYMBOLISM OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED RUSSIAN PRESIDENT COMING TO A DEMOCRATIC POLAND TO MAKE AMENDS WAS NOT LOST ON THE POLES. HOWEVER, ENTHUSIASM WAS TEMPERED BY WIDESPREAD CONCERN THAT YELTSIN'S POSITION IS INSECURE AND THAT THE PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS COULD BE REVERSED. DESPITE THE SIGNING OF A TRADE TREATY, ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION REMAINS HAMPERED BY THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE DEBT ISSUE. THE PIPELINE AGREEMENT WAS, HOWEVER, A MAJOR BOOST. HORNBLOW

BT

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

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NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

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RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 2760
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 2800
RUEHSK/AMEMASSY MINSK 4967
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0717
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 2775
SUBJ: EARLY VISEGRAD-FOUR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO:
RUSSIA'S LIKELY RESPONSE

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 028212
EXDIS
S/S-O PLEASE ALERT S/NIS (TALBOTT) UPON RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ISCA, EUR/RPM AND EUR/EE
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL, RS
SUBJECT: EARLY VISEGRAD-FOUR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO:
RUSSIA'S LIKELY RESPONSE
REFS: (A) USNATO 03591 (NOTAL)
(B) MOSCOW 28101 (NOTAL)
(C) MOSCOW 26972 (NOTAL)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE FORWARD-LEANING LANGUAGE IN THE AUGUST 25 YELTSIN-WALESA COMMUNIQUE INDICATES A SHIFT IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION ON NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR FORMER WARSAW PACT STATES, BUT DOES NOT REPRESENT A BLANKET ENDORSEMENT OF IMMEDIATE ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR POLAND AND THE OTHER VISEGRAD STATES. RUSSIA MAY BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH AN EXPANDED ALLIANCE ONCE IT BECOMES A NEW, BROADER STRUCTURE FOR ENHANCING COLLECTIVE SECURITY ACROSS EUROPE. BUT AN ENLARGED NATO THAT REMAINS A SECURITY ALLIANCE PRIMARILY AIMED AGAINST A THREAT FROM THE EAST WOULD BE A PROBLEM. MOSCOW, IN SHORT, CAN BE EXPECTED TO REACT NEGATIVELY AND TO OPPOSE ANY PROGRAM OF EXPANSION WHICH LOOKS LIKE IT IS HEADING TOWARD NEO-CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA. BEFORE ENDORSING ANY SORT OF EARLY-ENTRY INITIATIVE, WE SHOULD USE HIGH-LEVEL FORA (E.G. CHRISTOPER-KOZYREV, TALBOTT-MAMEDOV) TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE

RUSSIANS. IF WE ULTIMATELY DECIDE TO MOVE FORWARD ON EARLY ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR THE VISEGRAD STATES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A NATO REORIENTATION, WE SHOULD AVOID STATIONING NATO FORCES IN THE EX-WARSAW PACT STATES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AUGUST 25 YELTSIN-WALESA COMMUNIQUE'S TREATMENT OF PROSPECTIVE POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO HAS MOVED THE QUESTION OF ALLIANCE EXPANSION BACK ONTO THE FRONT BURNER. GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL HAS REPORTEDLY ENDORSED EARLY CONSIDERATION OF NATO EXPANSION; A RECENT MEETING OF NACC POLADS SAW A NUMBER OF EX-WARSAW PACT STATES AND FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS ADOPT A "ME TOO" POSITION (REF A). WITH A NATO SUMMIT ON THE HORIZON, EARLY ENTRY INTO THE ALLIANCE FOR AT LEAST THE VISEGRAD STATES (POLAND, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC WILL LIKELY BE A MAJOR TOPIC AT EVERE AND IN CAPITALS.

4. OUR READING OF RUSSIAN TOLERANCE LEVELS IS THAT MOSCOW WOULD OBJECT TO EARLY VISEGRAD MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, DESPITE YELTSIN'S PUBLIC ADMISSION THAT POLISH MEMBERSHIP WOULD NOT BE CONTRARY TO RUSSIAN INTERESTS (REF C). YELTSIN'S AGREEMENT TO THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE WAS FAR FROM AN RINGING CALL FOR POLAND TO JOIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IMMEDIATELY. IT WAS MUCH MORE A SIMPLE RECOGNITION OF EXTERNAL (EUROPE'S NEW POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION) AND INTERNAL (RUSSIA'S WEAKENED POSITION) REALITIES. YELTSIN ALSO SOUGHT TO EMPHASIZE RUSSIA'S OWN -- AND STILL ONGOING -- POLITICAL EVOLUTION: A DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DICTATE POLICY TO ITS DEMOCRATIC NEIGHBORS.

5. IN ADDITION, YELTSIN'S LANGUAGE SHOULD BE READ IN THE CONTEXT OF MOSCOW'S EXPECTATION THAT BOTH THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE AND NATO WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE. THUS, IF NATO BECOMES MORE A CONSTITUENT PART OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE AND LESS A MILITARY SHIELD AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE EAST, MOSCOW WILL BE MORE WILLING TO ACCEPT ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ITS FORMER ALLIES -- PROVIDED MOSCOW ALSO HAS A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY IN THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE VIA ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE NACC AND CSCE. BUT, FROM MOSCOW'S PERSPECTIVE, THAT EVOLUTION IS STILL FAR FROM COMPLETE; EARLY ADMISSION OF POLAND AND OTHER VISEGRAD STATES WOULD NOT BE SEEN AS IMPROVING THE OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION BUT AS STRENGTHENING NATO AGAINST RUSSIA.

6. FOR THI
S REASON, EVEN A DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA WOULD INSIST ON PROTECTING ITS OWN SECURITY AND AS SUCH WOULD LIKELY OBJECT TO EARLY VISEGRAD MEMBERSHIP IN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 028212

EXDIS
S/S-O PLEASE ALERT S/NIS (TALBOTT) UPON RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ISCA, EUR/RPM AND EUR/EE
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DSCL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL, RS

SUBJECT: EARLY VISEGRAD-FOUR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO:
RUSSIA'S LIKELY RESPONSE
NATO ABSENT FURTHER AND MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE. TO SECURE RUSSIAN SUPPORT -- OR AT LEAST QUIET ACQUISCENCE -- IN NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR POLAND AND THE OTHER CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES WE WOULD NEED TO ENSURE THAT NATO WAS SEEN AS A NON-EXCLUSIONARY BODY, WHOSE RAISON D'ETRE WAS NOT SIMPLY TO PROTECT ITS MEMBERS FROM POSSIBLE FUTURE RUSSIAN AGRESSION. WE ALSO NEED TO AVOID CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT ANY EXPANSION OF NATO IS AN EFFORT TO PROTECT EUROPE FROM POSSIBLE INSTABILITY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.
7. MOREOVER, IF WE DO ENDORSE ANY SORT OF EARLY-ENTRY INITIATIVE, WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF TWO LIKELY RUSSIAN "RED LINES" WHOSE CROSSING COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE NATO-RUSSIAN AND U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS:
-- NATO COMBAT FORCES SHOULD NOT/NOT BE STATIONED ON POLISH OR OTHER FORMER WARSAW PACT TERRITORY; AND
-- STATES OF THE FORMER USSR SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP UNLESS RUSSIA ITSELF IS AMONG THEM.
WHILE WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT MOSCOW SHOULD HAVE VETO POWER OVER NATO MEMBERSHIP QUESTIONS OR THE DISPOSITION OF NATO FORCES, WE BELIEVE CROSSING THESE "RED LINES" WOULD CREATE A SERIOUS FOREIGN POLICY QUAGMIRE FOR YELTSIN AND REINFORCE THE NATIONALISTS AND OTHER DOMESTIC CRITICS HERE. WE SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE MOSCOW'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WILL STAND STILL FOR ACTIONS THAT LOOK LIKE A NEW POLICY OF CONTAINMENT DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA BY THE WEST.
8. MOST OF ALL, BEFORE THE U.S. TAKES ANY POSITION ON ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR POLAND AND THE OTHER VISEGRAD STATES, WE SHOULD USE THE HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE FORA THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPER LIKELY TO MEET FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV SOON AND WITH AMBASSADOR TALBOTT TRAVELING TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK, WE SHOULD WORK THROUGH THIS QUESTION WITH THE RUSSIANS BEFORE WE MAKE ANY FINAL DECISIONS.
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 8212
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2015-0791-M (1.10)
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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SUBJ: NATO EXPANSION AND THE FSU
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NSC FOR LAKE/ITOH, CIA FOR WOOLSEY
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~~S E C R E T~~ ANKARA 11443
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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM STROBE TALBOTT
S/S PLEASE PASS MOSCOW AND KIEV
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, US, RS, UK
SUBJECT: NATO EXPANSION AND THE FSU
1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON ARRIVAL IN ANKARA (THE GATEWAY TO OUR 9-COUNTRY SWING THROUGH THE FSU), I HAVE CAUGHT UP WITH SEVERAL CABLES INDICATING THAT THE PACE OF DELIBERATIONS ON NATO EXPANSION HAS PICKED UP CONSIDERABLY AND THAT THERE IS DRAFT LANGUAGE IN THE WORKS FOR THE NATO SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE. SINCE THERE MAY BE SOME MAJOR MOVEMENT ON THIS WHOLE CLUSTER OF ISSUES IN THE COMING DAYS, I WANTED TO WEIGH IN WITH MY VIEWS. WITH A DEPARTMENT POSITION ON NATO EXPANSION NOW IN PLACE, I SEE IT AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF MY JOB TO ENSURE THAT OUR POLICIES TOWARD NATO AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ARE FULLY COORDINATED AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING. TO THAT END, WE MUST ENSURE THAT WHAT WE EVENTUALLY PROPOSE IS SEEN BY KEY COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AS ENHANCING THEIR SECURITY AND THEIR SENSE OF BELONGING IN EUROPE.
3. AT YOUR LUNCH ON MONDAY, I URGED THAT WE TAKE NO STEPS THAT COULD FUEL A CONSERVATIVE, PERHAPS EVEN AGGRESSIVE BACKLASH IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE KEY HERE IS TO PRESENT OUR EXPANSION PLAN IN A WAY THAT STRESSES EVENTUAL INCLUSION RATHER THAN NEAR-TERM EXCLUSION OF RUSSIA -- AND THAT IS SEEN TO ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY FOR ALL STATES IN THE AREA. JUST AS IMPORTANT, WE MUST BE VERY CAREFULNOT TO PULL THIS OFF IN A WAY THAT MAKES UKRAINE FEEL IT IS

BEING LEFT OUT IN THE COLD WITH ITS FURRY NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH; OTHERWISE, WE COULD INADVERTENTLY -- AND DISASTROUSLY -- GIVE HARDLINERS IN KIEV NEW ARGUMENTS FOR THEIR CASE THAT UKRAINE NEEDS A NUCLEAR DETERRENT. THESE TWO POINTS ARGUE STRONGLY THAT ANY INCLUSION OF NEW MEMBERS IN NATO BE COUPLED WITH CONCRETE STEPS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY POSITION OF THE BIG TWO OF THE FSU.

4. WHAT SPECIFICALLY THOSE STEPS MIGHT BE IS A MATTER FOR CAREFUL DELIBERATION DURING THE WEEKS AND INDEED MONTHS TO COME, AS OTHER DETAILS ARE REFINED. BUT, JUST TO GIVE YOU AN IDEA OF S/NIS INTERNAL THINKING, OUR PRELIMINARY IDEAS INCLUDE OFFERING RUSSIA AND UKRAINE A NEW CHARTER OF SOME KIND WITH NATO; ALONG WITH FRESH COMMITMENTS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, MARKET ECONOMICS, RULE OF LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTING THE COMMON VALUES OF NATO MEMBERS, THE CHARTER WOULD ALSO NEED TO HAVE A SECURITY DIMENSION. WE WOULD SUGGEST BASING IT ON THE SECURITY ASSURANCES THAT WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO PROVIDE UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN WHEN THEY FULFILL THEIR LISBON COMMITMENTS. NATO MIGHT ALSO EXCHANGE PERMANENT EMISSARIES WITH MOSCOW AND KIEV. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE MIGHT BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE AS OBSERVERS IN NATO PLANNING BODIES AND PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS. REPRESENTATIVES OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE MIGHT MEET PERIODICALLY WITH NATO COUNTERPARTS AT THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OR EVEN AT THE SUMMIT.

5. IF A SP CIAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IS TO BE MEANINGFUL, IT WOULD PROBABLY NEED TO GO BEYOND WHAT WE INTEND TO DO IN THE NACC. OTHER FSU STATES WILL WANT TO JOIN THIS PARTNERSHIP AND WE WILL NEED TO DETERMINE WHICH, IF ANY, OF THEM SHOULD BE OFFERED THAT OPPORTUNITY. THESE ARE PURELY NOTIONAL IDEAS THAT WE HAVEN'T TAKEN BEYOND OUR OWN OFFICE; I MENTION THEM HERE TO SHOW THAT WE'RE ALREADY AT WORK TRYING TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR NIS POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH, AND SUPPORTIVE OF, THE PROSPECT OF NATO EXPANSION.

6. YELTSIN'S COMMENTS IN WARSAW AND PRAGUE NOTWITHSTANDING, EMBASSY MOSCOW REPORTS THAT HE IS PREPARING A LETTER TO NATO HEADS OF STATE REFINING -- I.E., QUALIFYING -- HIS OWN VIEWS ON EXPANSION OF THE ALLIANCE. IF THE RUSSIANS' DEMARCHE TO US YESTERDAY (REFTEL) IS A GUIDE, YELTSIN WILL SEEK TIGHTER RUSSIAN COORDINATION WITH AN EXPANDED NATO AND ASSURANCES THAT NATO WILL WORK WITH HIM ON HIS OWN KEY SECURITY CONCERN: PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING IN THE FSU.

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 276879

NODIS

NSC FOR LAKE/ITOH, CIA FOR WOOLSEY

MOSCOW MAY ALSO SEEK TO JOIN NATO IN PROVIDING SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, YELTSIN'S LETTER HAS BEEN SEVERAL DAYS IN THE OFFING, FUELING SPECULATION THAT A POLICY FIGHT IS UNDERWAY IN MOSCOW AND THAT ULTIMATELY THE KREMLIN MAY EMERGE LESS BLASE ABOUT ADDING THE VISEGRAD THREE TO NATO THAN YELTSIN'S INITIAL STATEMENTS WOULD INDICATE.

7. EVEN AS WE WORK OUR OWN POSITION THROUGH OUR

GOVERNMENT, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. FOR ONE THING, WE CAN REASSURE THEM THAT WE ARE KEEPING THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS IN MIND; AND THAT, WHILE OUR POSITION IS NOT FULLY FORMED, WHATEVER IT TURNS OUT TO BE, IT WILL NOT CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THEIR INTERESTS; QUITE THE CONTRARY, IT WILL BE INTENDED TO ENHANCE SECURITY AND BOLSTER REFORM THROUGHOUT THE REGION. ALSO, BY ENGAGING THEM IN THIS KIND OF DIALOGUE, WE CAN, PERHAPS, HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON THEIR OWN INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS, MAKING IT LESS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL FLY OFF THE HANDLE AND START UTTERING EXTREME PREEMPTIVE POSITIONS OF SOME KIND. WITHOUT GIVING THEM A VETO, THIS APPROACH OFFERS THE DOUBLE BENEFIT OF COOPTING THEM INTO THE PROCESS AND AVERTING THE OBVIOUS DOWNSIDE OF SURPRISING THEM.

8. DEPENDING HOW FAR ALONG WE ARE WITHIN OUR OWN GOVERNMENT TOWARD CLOSING RANKS BEHIND A NATO-EXPANSION POSITION, YOU MAY WANT TO USE YOUR MEETING WITH KOZYREV ON MONDAY SEPTEMBER 13 TO ENGAGE HIM AT AN EARLY STAGE, PARTICULARY SINCE HE PERSONALLY HAS SO MUCH AT STAKE AS THE ARCHITECT OF YELTSIN'S WESTWARD-LEANING FOREIGN POLICY. IF THINGS ARE STILL NOT SUFFICIENTLY JELLED BY MONDAY, YOU'LL HAVE ANOTHER CRACK AT KOZYREV DURING UNGA WEEK. CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS -- AND DOWN THE ROAD WITH THE UKRAINIANS -- ARE THE BEST HEDGE AGAINST THE NATO ISSUE BECOMING DISRUPTIVE AND POTENTIALLY DAMAGING IN OUR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND KIEV AT THIS CRUCIAL AND DELICATE STAGE.

BARKLEY UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6879

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 6879
<^SSN>6879

TOR: 930910133948 M0597704
<^TOR>930910133949 M0597705

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER KUPCHAN POTTS SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.11)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
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LINE3: O 131640Z SEP 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI: RUEHMO
DTG: 131640Z SEP 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5923
INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: KOZYREV ON POSSIBLE NATO EXPANSION
TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ MOSCOW 029067
EXDIS
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RS, NATO
SUBJECT: KOZYREV ON POSSIBLE NATO EXPANSION
EASTWARD: RUSSIA FIRST
REF: MOSCOW 28212
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: DURING A 9/11 MEETING ON OTHER ISSUES (SEPTELS), AMBASSADOR PICKERING EXPLORED RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV'S CONCERNS ON PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION OF NATO TO INCLUDE POLAND AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES, AND URGED KOZYREV TO MAKE THE GOR'S VIEWS CLEAR TO WASHINGTON.
--KOZYREV CAUTIONED AGAINST EXCLUDING RUSSIA FROM ANY NATO EXPANSION TO INCLUDE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC.
--IN FACT, HE STRESSED THAT IF NATO EXPANDS, RUSSIA SHOULD BE FIRST. END SUMMARY.
3. IN A 9/11 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR PICKERING ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES (SEPTELS), FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE GOR THAT THE ISSUEOF NATO EXPANSION BE CAST IN NON-IDEOLOGICAL TERMS, AVOIDING CHARACTERIZATION OF NATO STRATEGY AS AIMED AT CONTAINING RUSSIA. THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF JOINT EFFORTS AND CHALLENGES FACING NATO AND THE EAST. IF THE ISSUE REMAINS PORTRAYED IN OLD IDEOLOGICAL TERMS, "WE WILL BE IN TROUBLE," KOZYREV SAID.
4. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE INTRODUCED TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER BEFORE HIS NATO/GENEVA ADDRESS THE CONCEPT OF "RUSSIA FIRST". HE EXPLAINED THAT RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO BE "SECOND TO NONE" IN SUPPORT OF REAL TRANSFORMATION OF NATO, ESPECIALLY REGARDING JOINT PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES. IT WILL BE MUCH BETTER, KOZYREV CAUTIONED, TO FOCUS MORE ON SUCH JOINT COOPERATION IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND AVOID

CREATING A SITUATION IN WHICH RUSSIA WOULD BE LEFT OUT OF A NEW NATO CONFIGURATION THAT INCLUDED EAST EUROPEANS.

5. AMBASSADOR PICKERING UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY KOZYREV'S VIEWS TO WASHINGTON, AND URGED KOZYREV TO MAKE HIS THOUGHTS KNOWN DIRECTLY TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER. PICKERING SAID IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID CREATING A DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION FOR RUSSIA INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY IF THE PROCESS ON THIS ISSUE CONTINUES WIHTOUT RUSSIAN INPUT. HE ADDED THAT THE USG IS AWARE OF THE CONCERNS THAT THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT AND THE RIGHT WING WOULD RAISE IF NATO STRATEGY FOCUSSED ON CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA, AND MOVED TOWARD TRANSFORMATION WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RUSSIA IN SOME WAY. AT THIS STAGE, NATO IS DISCUSSING ITS STRATEGIC FOCUS, INCLUDING SUCH CONCEPTS AS COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO SITUATIONS SUCH AS SOMALIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS THE IDEA OF NON-MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, HE STRESSED, FOR THE GOR'S VIEWS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AT THIS STAGE. PICKERING

BT

#9067

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9067

TOR: 930913143624 M0601111

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG

SIT: BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER KUPCHAN POTTS SUM SUM2 VAX WALKER

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.12)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
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RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
SUBJ: NATO: AMBASSADOR HUNTER'S 9/16 LUNCH WITH FRENCH PERMREP BLOT

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 003764
EXDIS -- MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: NATO: AMBASSADOR HUNTER'S 9/16 LUNCH WITH FRENCH PERMREP BLOT
REF: A) USNATO 3728, B) USNATO 3724
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. AT A PRIVATE LUNCH ON SEPTEMBER 16, FRENCH PERMREP BLOT PROPOSED TO AMBASSADOR HUNTER THAT ISSUES RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A BOSNIA PEACE PLAN BE WORKED BILATERALLY OR AT MOST INCLUDING THE UK. BLOT SAID THAT COMMAND AND CONTROL AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD BE NATO'S TO DECIDE, SUGGESTED THAT NATO/UN JOINT OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA WERE A NECESSITY GIVEN THE NEED FOR UN CONTROL OVER CIVILIAN AFFAIRS, AND EMPHASIZED THAT NATO ALLIES HAD TO VIEW ALL OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AS THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. BLOT DID NOT SEE A EUROPEAN TROOP CONTRIBUTION OF 25,000 AS A PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY; HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE EACH BE PREPARED TO PUT 4,000 TROOPS INTO SARAJEVO ON THE FIRST DAY OF OPERATIONS. ON OTHER ISSUES, BLOT SAID THAT DEFENSE MINISTER LEOTARD WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE TRAVEMUENDE MINISTERIAL, AND THAT FRANCE IS INCLINED TO BE FLEXIBLE REGARDING NATO EXPANSION. END SUMMARY.
PEACE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
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3. BLOT SUGGESTED TO AMBASSADOR HUNTER THAT THEIR

DEPUTIES WORK OUT THE REMAINING ISSUES ON PEACE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION. HE SAID THAT THE UK COULD BE INCLUDED IF NEED BE -- AND CANADA, AS THE OUTER LIMIT, BUT THAT INCLUSION OF MORE PARTICIPANTS WOULD SLOW THE WORK. THIS NUCLEUS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT, HE SAID, TO SELL ITS DECISIONS TO THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE.

4. ON THE AD HOC PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP, BLOT SAID FRANCE FULLY ACCEPTED THAT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HAD TO BE NATO'S TO DECIDE. WORK ON THESE MATTERS SHOULD MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY; THEY DID NOT PRESENT A POLITICAL PROBLEM TO PARIS. THE AD HOC GROUP COULD NOT MEET UNTIL OWEN AND STOLTENBERG HAD ADDRESSED THE NAC, WHICH WOULD NOT BE FOR ANOTHER COUPLE OF WEEKS. ALLIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT BEFORE THEN. BLOT HOPED THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH U.S. CONCERNS. AMBASSADOR HUNTER AGREED TO PUT THIS POSSIBLE COMPROMISE TO WASHINGTON.

5. ON THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, BLOT SAID THE FRENCH HAD A PROBLEM WITH DEFINING SACEUR'S ROLE IN TERMS OF "THE NATO MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND"-- A FORMULATION WHICH RAISED DEEP-SEATED CONCERNS ABOUT ARTICLE V OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY AND NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. BLOT SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT ONE WAY AROUND THE PROBLEM WOULD BE FOR NATO TO AGREE ON LANGUAGE WHICH DESCRIBED THE NATO MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHOUT NAMING IT AS SUCH. THIS WOULD DESCRIBE AUTHORITY PASSING FROM THE NAC TO SACEUR TO CINCSOUTH. AMBASSADOR HUNTER SUGGESTED THAT THE DESCRIPTION COULD INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WERE WITHOUT PREJUDICE BOTH TO FRANCE'S NOT BEING INCLUDED IN THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE AND TO U.S. CONCERNS THAT FRANCE NOT BYPASS THE STRUCTURE. BOTH AMBASSADORS AGREED TO REFER THIS IDEA TO CAPITALS.

6. BLOT SAID THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMMENT THDM BOSNIA IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE A NATO RATHER THAN UN OPERATION HAD CREATED CONCERN IN PARIS; THE FRENCH VIEW IS THAT THIS WOULD BE A JOINT NATO/UN OPERATION, IN A PARTICULAR SENSE. WHILE NATO WOULD HANDLE THE MILITARY TASK, THE UN WOULD BE NEEDED TO MANAGE THE CIVIL AFFAIRS STRUCTURE. AMBASSADOR HUNTER SAID HE BELIEVED THIS WAS THE CORRECT DISTINCTION.

7. BLOT THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES FROM NON-NATO PARTICIPANTS IN IMPLEMENTATION. FRANCE WOULD PREFER TO USE THE UN SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS. AMBASSADOR HUNTER SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD PREFER THE NATO RATHER THAN UN SCALE.

8. WITH REGARD TO TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS, BLOT SAID THAT PARIS WAS CONSIDERING MOVING FRANCE'S 2000 TROOPS OUT OF CROATIA AND ADDING THEM TO THE 4000 IN BOSNIA, AND ADDING 2000 NEW TROOPS AS WELL. THE UK WOULD BE LIKELY TO MATCH WITH 8000 TROOPS OF ITS OWN, LEAVING A EUROPEAN SHORTFALL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 003764

EXDIS -- MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, PREL, FR

SUBJECT: NATO: AMBASSADOR HUNTER'S 9/16 LUNCH WITH FRENCH PERMREP BLOT

OF 5-8000 (BLOT WAS APPARENTLY PRESUMING ABOUT 25,000

TROOPS FROM THE U.S.). THIS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR NATO MEMBERS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. BE PREPARED TO PUT 4000 MARINES INTO SARAJEVO ON DAY ONE AND THAT FRANCE PUT IN 4000 LEGIONNAIRES AS A "SHOCK" DEMONSTRATION OF COMMITMENT.

9. BLOT STRESSED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD TO SEE ALL OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AS ONE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, JUST AS THE SERBS DID. IF THE ALLIANCE CONFINED ITS INTERVENTION TO JUST BOSNIA, ITS WORK COULD BE UNDONE BY EVENTS IN CROATIA OR KOSOVO. THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY WHICH EMBODIED A REGIONAL SECURITY APPROACH TO PERMANENTLY ADDRESS TO THE BALKAN PROBLEM, AND ALSO WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE ALLIANCE TO DEVELOP AN EXIT STRATEGY -- WHICH IS CRITICAL TO THE OPERATION. NATO, SAID BLOT, HAD TO KNOW WHAT ITS SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WERE GOING INTO BOSNIA SO THAT IT COULD LEAVE AFTER THESE OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. BLOT SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN OVERALL STRATEGY BE DEVISED BY A SMALL GROUP AT NATO WORKING CLOSELY WITH CAPITALS.

FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER'S PARTICIPATION IN NATO MEETINGS

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10. BLOT SAID IT WAS "FINAL" THAT DEFENSE MINISTER LEOTARD WOULD NOT ATTEND THE TRAVEMUENDE MINISTERIAL. ALTHOUGH PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR HAD FAVORED LEOTARD'S PARTICIPATION, THERE WAS CONCERN THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WOULD NOT APPROVE IT. THERE IS A MOVE AFOOT TO ALLOW THE FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER'S PARTICIPATION IN NATO MEETINGS AS A MATTER OF COURSE; IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR LEOTARD TO MISS THIS MEETING RATHER THAN RISK LOSING THE LARGER POINT. AMBASSADOR HUNTER ARGUED THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD NOT BE LEFT ISOLATED AND THAT GERMAN MINISTER RUEHE IS A MAN TO CULTIVATE. AND BLOT AGREED TO RAISE THAT POINT IN PARIS NEXT WEEK.

FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION, ENLARGEMENT

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11. BLOT SAID THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL IF THE ALLIANCE IS GOING TO WORK IN THE FUTURE: MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, THIS IS THE KEY. ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, BLOT SAID THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT HAVE A POSITION UNTIL END-SEPTEMBER. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS "INCLINED TO BE INCLUSIVE," BUT MITTERRAND'S VIEWS ON THE ISSUE WERE UNKNOWN. BLOT SAID IT WAS CLEAR NATO COULD NOT BE REPRESENTED AS BEING A CLOSED SHOP. THE RUSSIAN DIMENSION REMAINED TO BE WORKED THROUGH, SINCE YELTSIN'S REMARKS IN WARSAW HAD PERHAPS BEEN "A LA VODKA." COUNTRIES THAT HAD EXTANT PROBLEMS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, SUCH AS HUNGARY, SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED UNTIL THESE WERE RESOLVED. BLOT SAID THAT NATO WAS THE ORGANIZATION TO DEAL WITH "GLOBAL PROBLEMS," WHILE THE BALLADUR PLAN WAS ONE MEANS OF ADDRESSING "REGIONAL DISPUTES." BLOT SAID THE ALLIANCE ALSO HAD TO GRAPPLE WITH THE PROBLEM THAT SOME MEMBERS WOULD HAVE IN GIVING GUARANTEES TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. COMMENT: IN A TYPICAL GALLIC ASIDE, BLOT PREDICTED THAT IF NATO WERE ENLARGED, IT WOULD ONLY BE A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE U.S. LEFT EUROPE -- THIS WAS "INEVITABLE," BECAUSE AMERICANS WOULD NOT SUPPORT COMMITMENTS TO NON-TRADITIONAL ALLIES, "EXCEPT POLAND, WHICH FOR

AMERICANS IS A SPECIAL CASE." END COMMENT.
HUNTER
BT
#3764
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 3764
<^SSN>3764

TOR: 930917141458 M0610159
<^TOR>930917141507 M0610162

DIST:

SIT: VAX

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.13)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
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LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
LINE3: O 171541Z SEP 93
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 171541Z SEP 93
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: ****
INFO: RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8602
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6561
SUBJ: CHRISTOPHER - KOZYREV MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 13
TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 284802
NODIS
CIA EO WOOLSEY
FOLLOWING STATE 284802 DTD 17 SEP SENT ACTION
ALL NATO POST COLL AMMAN BELGRADE BEIRUT CAIRO
DAMASCUS DUSHANBE KIEV MOSCOW TEL AVIV TUNIS
USUN ZAGREB ISLAMABAD RPTD FOR UR INFO.
QTE:
~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 284802
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS, SR, IS, EG, SY, TS, LE, JO, HR, GG
SUBJECT: CHRISTOPHER - KOZYREV MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 13
1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV MET SEPTEMBER 13 IN THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE FOR APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES. KOZYREV WAS IN WASHINGTON FOR THE SEPTEMBER 13 SIGNING OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE AGREEMENT. THEIR CONVERSATION BEGAN WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA. KOZYREV EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE FIGHTING BETWEEN SERBS AND CROATS IN KRAJINA, FEARING THAT IF THE SITUATION THERE GOT OUT OF CONTROL IT COULD SCUTTLE THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS ON BOSNIA. KOZYREV SAID HE FOUND THE STATE OF THE BOSNIAN NEGOTIATIONS FAR FROM HOPELESS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE SERBS OF LIFTING SANCTIONS AS SOON AS A PEACE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED.

3. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED KOZYREV ON IZETBEGOVIC'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NOTING THAT THE LATTER HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP IMPLEMENT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO PLAY A STRONG ROLE IF IN FACT AN ACCEPTABLE PEACE AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVED. KOZYREV SAID IN THIS CONTEXT THAT BOTH SERBS AND MUSLIMS WERE RAISING THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING RUSSIAN TROOPS

AROUND SARAJEVO. KOZYREV INDICATED THE RUSSIANS WERE STUDYING THIS POSSIBILITY AND THAT HE AND GENERAL GROMOV WOULD BE STOPPING IN SARAJEVO ON THE WAY BACK TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO GET A FEEL FOR THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.

4. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO ABKHAZIA. KOZYREV EXPLAINED THAT THE EXISTENCE OF ROGUE GEORGIAN "WARLORDS" POSED A THREAT TO THE CEASEFIRE AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXPAND THE CURRENT TRIPARTITE PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE RUSSIAN MILITARY WAS AGAINST FURTHER RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENTS, HOWEVER, AT LEAST PARTIALLY ON LEGAL GROUNDS. TO GET AROUND THIS PROBLEM, KOZYREV SAID HE AND GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIKVAIDZE WERE ASKING THE UNSYG TO GIVE THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE A UN MANDATE. HE SAID THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF "NEUTRAL EUROPEANS, IN THIS FORCE WOULD BE WELCOME. THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE UN WOULD PAY FOR SUCH A FORCE. KOZYREV GAVE NO CLEAR SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, THOUGH HE SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS THE ABKHAZIAN OPERATION COULD BE PUT IN THE BUDGET "ON A SPECIAL SCALE."

5. KOZYREV GAVE A BRIEF READ-OUT OF HIS RECENT TRIF TO KABUL AND THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN. INDICATING THAT A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS UNDERWAY IN TAJIKISTAN, HE ASSERTED THE NEED FOR UN OBSERVERS ON THE AFGHAN-TAJIK BORDER IN ORDER TO PREVENT CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES.

6. ON OTHER ISSUES, THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT, AS OUR THINKING DEVELOPED, WE WOULD BE IN CLOSE TOUCH AND CONSULTATION WITH THE RUSSIANS REGARDING NATO EXPANSION. HE AND KOZYREV BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WAYS OF KEEPING THE SYRIANS ENGAGED IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. KOZYREV WARNED OF UKRAINIAN BACKSLIDING ON THE AGREEMENTS RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN YALTA, AND URGED THAT THE US STAY ENGAGED ON RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN ISSUES. AS A CONCLUDING NOTE, KOZYREV FORESHADOWED IMMINENT MEASURES BY YELTSIN TO CUT RUSSIAN ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES. THE SECRETARY WAS ACCOMFANIED BY UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF, S/NIS DEPUTY KAUZLARICH, AND AN EUR/ISCA NOTETAKER. ACCOMPANYING KOZYREV WAS DEPUTY

MINISTER MAMEDOV, AMBASSADOR LUKIN, MFA DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST POSUVALYUK, POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER SIDOROVA, AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MFA NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT GUROV. END SUMMARY.

YUGOSLAVIA
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7. THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV EXCHANGED GREETINGS AND THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO THE

SITUATION IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA. REMARKING THAT ON THE ADVICE OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CHURKIN HE WOULD BE VISITING SARAJEVO ON HIS WAY BACK TO MOSCOW, KOZYREV BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN CROATS AND SERBS IN KRAJINA. IN THE LAST DAY OR SO, HE SAID, THE SITUATION HAD IMPROVED AND THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A CEASEFIRE. NONETHELESS, THE SITUATION WAS PRECARIOUS. REGARDING BOSNIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, KOZYREV SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH KARADZIC AND WITH OTHER BOSNIAN LEADERS. HERE HE WAS CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL THAT PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE.

8. KOZYREV THEN ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR A READ-OUT ON IZETBEGOVIC'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IZETBEGOVIC HAD MADE THREE MAIN POINTS DURING HIS VISIT HERE: (1) THE CONFLICT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS; (2) HE WAS PREPARED TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE; BUT (3) DIFFERENCES COULD NOT BE RECONCILED ON THE BASIS OF THE OFFERS THAT HAD BEEN MADE.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ON THIS LATTER POINT, IZETBEGOVIC WANTED THREE THINGS. FIRST, HE WANTED A CORRIDOR BROADER THAN 3 KILOMETERS TO LINK EASTERN BOSNIA (SREBRENICA) WITH CENTRAL BOSNIA. SECOND, HE NEEDED A RELIABLE OPENING TO THE SEA (PLOCE AND NEUM). AND, THIRD, HE NEEDED MORE TERRITORY AROUND BIHAC. THE SECRETARY TOLD KOZYREV THAT IT WOULD BE VERY VALUABLE IF HE COULD INFLUENCE KARADZIC TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE CORRIDOR AND BIHAC ISSUES. OWEN AND STOLTENBERG, HE SAID, WOULD NOT WANT TO CALL THE PARTIES BACK TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT SOME SIGN THAT THERE WOULD BE MOVEMENT.

10. KOZYREV AGREED THAT IT WAS REALISTIC TO GIVE THE SIDES TIME FOR BEHIND-THE-SCENE DISCUSSIONS. ALL SIDES, HE SAID, HAD BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF REAL BARGAINING. THEY WERE WERE BECOMING LESS IDEOLOGICAL AND WERE MORE AND MORE COMING TO GRIPS WITH SPECIFICS. THERE WAS DISCUSSION, FOR INSTANCE, OF THE POSSIBILITY OF WIDENING THE CORRIDOR IN ONE PLACE BUT NOT IN ANOTHER. IN SUM, HE SAID, THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA WAS NOT TOTALLY HOPELESS.

11. KOZYREV EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE SERBS OF LIFTING SANCTIONS AS SOON AS A PEACE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. SERBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SILAJDZIC HAD MADE THIS POINT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. MILOSEVIC HAD MODERATED HIS STANCE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP HIM MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. FAILURE TO LIFT SANCTIONS WOULD MEAN THAT SOME OF THE PARTIES WOULD GAIN SOMETHING FROM THE AGREEMENT WHILE OTHER PARTIES (THE SERBS) GOT NOTHING.

12. RETURNING TO THE SITUATION IN KRAJINA, KOZYREV SAID WE SHOULD NOT LET THINGS GET OUT OF CONTROL BECAUSE "THE SERBS ARE INTERCONNECTED." IT IS HARD TO

DRAW THE LINE BETWEEN SERBS IN BOSNIA AND THOSE IN KRAJINA. TROUBLE IN KRAJINA COULD SPOIL THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BOSNIA.

13. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT IZETBEGOVIC HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP IMPLEMENT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT. CALLING KOZYREV'S ATTENTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON THAT SUBJECT, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO PLAY A STRONG ROLE IF IN FACT A PEACE AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVED. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT BOTH SERBS AND MUSLIMS HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN TROOPS AROUND SARAJEVO. PEACEKEEPING WOULD BE TREMENDOUSLY DIFFICULT, BUT HE WAS TAKING GENERAL GROMOV WITH HIM TO SARAJEVO SO THAT THE LATTER COULD GET A FEEL FOR THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.

ABHKAZIA
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14. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO ABKHAZIA. KOZYREV SAID THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS GENERALLY HOLDING, BUT THE GEORGIA SIDE HAD FAILED TO GIVE A SCHEDULE (FOR TROOP

WITHDRAWAL) AND TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY PROVISIONS REQUIRING THE REMOVAL OF HEAVY WEAPONS. KOZYREV CITED IN THIS CONNECTION THE ACTIVITIES OF KOBALIA, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A

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"WARLORD" WITH ABOUT 300 ARMED MEN. KOBALIA (A SUPPORTER OF FORMER GEORGIAN PRESIDENT GAMSAKHURDIA) WAS ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT HIS FORCE WAS NONETHELESS REGARDED BY THE ABKHAZ AS GEORGIAN AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

15. KOZYREV SAID THAT IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BOTH RUSSIANS AND GEORGIANS WANTED EXPANDED FEACEKEEPING TROOPS. KOZYREV EXPLAINED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, A TRIPARTITE JOINT COMMISSION HAD BEEN FORMED TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF HEAVY WEAPONS AND TROOPS. THE CONTINGENT THAT HAD BEEN FORMED WAS TOO SMALL, HOWEVER, AND NEEDED TO BE EXPANDED. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE RUSSIAN MILITARY WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET BECAUSE THERE WAS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR NEW RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENTS. (KOZYREV EXPLAINED THAT EXISTING RUSSIAN LEGISLATION FORBIDS THE DEPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN TROOPS OUTSIDE RUSSIAN TERRITORY. PRESENT RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPERS WERE COMPRISED OF UNITS THAT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN GEORGIA BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION.)

16. KOZYREV SAID THAT IN ORDER TO GET AROUND THIS LEGAL PROBLEM IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE PEACEKEEPING

FORCE COULD BE GIVEN A UN MANDATE. THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN INTERNATIONAL -- IF NOT NATIONAL -- LEGAL BASIS FOR NEW RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENTS. KOZYREV CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME THE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE OF NEUTRAL EUROPEANS SUCH AS THE SWEDES OR NORWEGIANS (SIC). THE FORCE WOULD NOT NEED TO BE LARGE, AND THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHERS COULD HELP. KOZYREV RULED OUT, HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPATION OF ,PEOPLE LIKE THE IRANIANS."

17. STRESSING THE URGENCY OF THE ISSUE, KOZYREV INFORMED THE SECRETARY THAT HE AND GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIKVAIDZE HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE UNSYG REQUESTING A UN MANDATE FOR THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS MANDATE, KOZYREV SAID, COULD LEAD TO THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD RESULT IN TREMENDOUS CHAOS AND THE SITUATION

WOULD BE MUCH WORSE THAN BEFORE. THE ABKHAZ WILL SAY THAT EVERYTHING HAD FAILED. ACCORDING TO KOZYREV, GEORGIANS FIGHTING AMONG THEMSELVES WERE AT THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM.

18. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER UN OBSERVERS WERE PRESENT IN ABKHAZIA. KOZYREV SAID THEY WERE, BUT REPEATED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE PREPARED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING AND TO FIGHT BACK IF NECESSARY. NOTING THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED THE SENDING OF UN OBSERVERS TO GEORGIA, THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW WE WOULD PAY FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. WE COULD NOT CONTINUE, SAID THE SECRETARY, TO KEEP PUTTING THE UN DEEPER AND DEEPER INTO DEBT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A CREDIBLE METHOD OF PAYMENT.

19. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT PEACE WAS EXPENSIVE, BUT WAR WAS EVEN MORE COSTLY. THE SECRETARY AGREED BUT SAID THAT THE FUNDING QUESTION STILL HAD TO BE VVONFRONTED. HE ASKED UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF IF HE HAD ANY IDEAS. TARNOFF SAID THIS WOULD BE A REAL CHALLENGE. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR SHEVARDNADZE AND THE RUSSIANS TO LOOK FOR AN ACCOMMODATION AND TO FIND WAYS TO COOPERATE. TARNOFF ASKED WHETHER THE MANDATE HAD TO COME FROM THE UN OR WHETHER IT COULD COME FROM THE CSCE.

20. KOZYREV SAID THERE WERE ALREADY CSCE OBSERVERS IN GEORGIA; THE MANDATE HE HAD IN MIND SHOULD COME FROM THE UN. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION COULD PERHAPS BE PUT IN THE BUDGET ,ON A SPECIAL SCALE." KOZYREV REITERATED THAT THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA WAS DESPERATE -- IN SOME RESPECTS WORSE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE AT LEAST WE HAD ARAFAT WITH WHOM WE COULD DEAL. IN GEORGIA THERE WERE A MULTITUDE OF WARLOARDS, SOME OF WHOM WERE OUT OF CONTROL. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE HAD TO CONFRONT THIS PROBLEM, BUT REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT EXTEND THE UN EVER DEEPER INTO DEBT. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE CONGRESS FOR REDUCING UN ARREARAGES AND IT WOULD LOSE CREDIBILITY IF IT KEPT

AGREEING TO ESTABLISH NEW MISSIONS. DEPUTY MINISTER MAMEDOV QUIPPED THAT THE US COULD PERHAPS SAVE MONEY BY NOT EXPANDING NATO.

AFGHANISTAN/TAJIKISTAN

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21. KOZYREV THEN RAISED AFGHANISTAN, SAYING THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO KABUL. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR FURTHER EFFORTS AT CONSULTATION INVOLVING SAUDIA ARABIA, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND OTHER KEY PLAYERS. HE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN KABUL AS TRAGIC WITH PEOPLE BEING KILLED IN THE THOUSANDS. EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD LAST VISITED KABUL IN MAY, KOZYREV SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE CITY BETWEEN VISITS. HE NOTED ALSO THAT THERE WERE ALL KINDS OF ARMED GROUPS ON THE STREETS.

22. THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, KOZYREV CONTINUED, COULD PROJECT ITSELF INTO TAJIKISTAN WHERE THERE COULD BE TOTAL CHAOS INVOLVING EXPANDING AREAS OF INSTABILITY, GUN RUNNING, AND DRUG TRAFFICKING. ASSERTING THAT TAJIKISTAN DESERVES MUCH GREATER INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION, KOZYREV SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE UN OBSERVERS ON THE AFGHAN-TAJIK BORDER TO PREVENT ARMED GROUPS FROM CROSSING.

23. TURNING TO THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN, KOZYREV STATED THAT TAJIK PRESIDENT RAKHMANOV REALIZED THE NECESSITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE OPPOSITION. THIS PROCESS WOULD NOT RESULT IN "RADICAL" DEMOCRACY, BUT IT WOULD INVOLVE GRANTING A LARGER ROLE TO REGIONS AND ETHNIC GROUPS -- AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN AFGHANISTAN. REPEATING HIS CALL FOR A UN PRESENCE ON THE BORDER, KOZYREV CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS BAD BUT NOT IRREPARABLE.

NATO EXPANSION
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24. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL ASIA UNTIL HE HAD HAD A CHANCE TO TALK TO STROBE TALBOTT WHO WAS CURRENTLY TRAVELLING IN THE REGION. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE DID WANT TO FOLLOW UP ON DEPUTY MINISTER MAMEDOV'S COMMENT ON NATO EXPANSION. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT AT GREATER LENGTH WITH KOZYREV WHEN US THINKING WAS FURTHER ALONG AND WHEN HE WAS LESS PREOCCUPIED BY THE MIDDLE EAST. HE WANTED KOZYREV TO KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE US INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE RUSSIANS IN THE EARLY

STAGES OF ANY PLANNING ON THIS ISSUE. THIS WAS A QUESTION WE WOULD APPROACH TOGETHER. WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO

NECESSITY TO REACT TO A SURPRISE. THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE SECRETARY SAID, WERE NOT ANTITHETICAL IN THIS MATTER, AND THE U.S. DID NOT WANT TO SEE AN ACTION-REACTION CYCLE OF GREAT POWERS ON THIS ISSUE. KOZYREV RESPONDED THAT HE HAD SHARED SOME THOUGHTS ON THIS WITH AMBASSADOR PICKERING AND WOULD SOON BE PUBLISHING AN ARTICLE ON THE SUBJECT.

MIDDLE EAST
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25. THERE FOLLOWED A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. THE SECRETARY NOTED HIS PLEASURE THAT KOZYREV HAD BEEN ABLE TO ATTEND THE ISRAELI-PLO SIGNING CEREMONY THAT DAY AND SAID THAT KOZYREV'S SPEECH -- WHICH EMPHASIZED THAT A MAJOR STEP TOWARD PEACE HAD BEEN TAKEN BUT THAT DIFFICULT WORK LAY AHEAD -- HAD STRUCK JUST THE RIGHT NOTE. THE SECRETARY REMARKED THAT THE PARTIES COULD NOW TALK TO EACH OTHER AND HAD A STRUCTURE IN PLACE FOR TAKING FURTHER STEPS. THE SIDES HAD MADE MAJOR COMMITMENTS BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD, AND THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD EMPHASIZED THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN ARAFAT.

26. KOZYREV ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD OPEN A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO THE PLO. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE US WOULD OPEN SUCH A CHANNEL. THERE WERE, HE CONTINUED, STILL SOME LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DOING CERTAIN THINGS.

27. RUSSIAN MFA DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST POSUVALYUK INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD JUST VISITED THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING SYRIA AND LEBANON. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT A STEP WOULD BE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING DAY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN; IT WAS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE PROCESS WITH SOMETHING ON SYRIA AND LEBANON.

28. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE ON THIS. THE JORDANIAN AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE ONE WITH THE PLO: THE SIDES WOULD BE AGREEING ON AN EXPANDED AGENDA. AS

FAR AS SYRIA AND LEBANON WERE CONCERNED, THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE ISRAELIS' ASSESSMENT OF HOW RAPIDLY THEY THINK THEY CAN MOVE. POSAVALYUK SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS SOME ASSURANCES COULD BE GIVEN THE SYRIANS TO COVER A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO AVOID THE SYRIANS' FEELING THAT THEY HAD BEEN REJECTED AND LEFT OUT OF THE PROCESS.

29. KOZYREV FACETIOUSLY REMARKED THAT THEY COULD CONCLUDE A CHRISTOPHER-KOZYREV SECRET PROTOCOL.

MAMEDOV RECALLED THAT THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING TO THE SYRIANS ASSURANCES REGARDING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT POSUVALYUK WAS REFERRING TO A MORE NARROW SET OF ASSURANCES DEALING WITH A PROMISE TO START NEGOTIATIONS AND DESIGNED TO TIDE THE PARTIES OVER AN INTERIM PERIOD. MAMEDOV SAID THAT REMARKS MADE BY PERES ON CNN REGARDING A SETTLEMENT WITH THE SYRIANS HAD NOT GIVEN GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NEED PROGRESS ON THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN TRACK IN ORDER TO DIGEST THE RESULTS OF THE ISRAELI-PLO TRACK.

UKRAINE
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30. KOZYREV BRIEFLY RAISED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS. THREE AGREEMENTS, HE NOTED, HAD JUST BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, AND MAMEDOV WOULD BE EXPLORING WITH THE U.S. SIDE WHAT ROLE IT COULD PLAY. THIS WAS AN URGENT MATTER BECAUSE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS WERE TRYING TO OBSTRUCT THE AGREEMENTS. IN ADDITION, THE PHYSICAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND WAS DETERIORATING; SOME OF THE MISSILE WARHEADS WERE LEAKING. THE SITUATION COULD EASILY GET OUT OF HAND. KOZYREV ASKED THE SECRETARY TO URGE THE UKRAINIANS TO LIVE UP TO THE AGREEMENTS. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT RUSSIA WELCOMED US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE SINCE THIS WOULD DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ALSO BENEFIT RUSSIA, BUT SUCH AID SHOULD BE CONDITIONED ON UKRAINIAN FULFILLMENT OF THESE AGREEMENTS.

31. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY WAS IN TERRIBLE SHAPE AND THAT THE UKRAINIANS HAD NOT EVEN BEGUN THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC REFORM. AGREEING THAT THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY WAS EVEN WORSE THAN THE RUSSIAN, KOZYREV ENDED THE MEETING BY CONFIDING THAT YELTSIN WOULD BE TAKING SOME TOUGH DECISIONS IN THE NEXT COUPLE DAYS TO CURTAIL SOME ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES, PARTICULARLY AGRICULTURAL SUPPORTS. THIS WOULD BE SURE TO PROVOKE OPPOSITION IN THE SUPREME SOVIET, HE SAID.

CHRISTOPHER
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SUBJ: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S LUNCH WITH NATO SYG WOERNER AND GERMAN FM KINKEL, OCTOBER 5, 1993

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 309312
EXDIS, USVEINNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, GM, RS, XH
SUBJECT: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S LUNCH WITH NATO SYG WOERNER AND GERMAN FM KINKEL, OCTOBER 5, 1993

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER GERMAN FM KINKEL, AND NATO SYG WOERNER DISCUSSED BOSNIA AND NATO SUMMIT ISSUES OVER LUNCH OCTOBER 5. ON BOSNIA, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING CONGRESSIONAL RELUCTANCE HE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT, IF THE PARTIES WERE IMPLEMENTING IT IN GOOD FAITH. WOERNER SAID THE UN WOULD DEPEND ON NATO FOR IMPLEMENTATION, AND NATO COULD ACT ONLY WITH U.S. PARTICIPATION; U S. CONDITIONS FOR FARTICIPATION THUS HAD TO BE MET. WOERNER ARGUED THAT THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE, INCLUDING SACEUR, WAS NECESSARY, AND NATO SHOULD MOVE INTO BOSNIA DECISIVELY TO SHOW IT WAS DIFFERENT FROM UNPROFOR. KINKEL BRIEFED ON THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS' OCTOBER 4 DISCUSSION OF BOSNIA, AT WHICH DAVID OWEN HAD BLAMED EUROPEANS AND THE U.S. FOR FAILING TO APPLY ENOUGH PRESSURE ON THE MUSLIMS TO PRODUCE A SETTLEMENT. KINKEL SAID GERMANY WOULD NOT PRESSURE THE MUSLIMS ONE-SIDEDLY

AND SAW EYE-TO-EYE WITH THE U.S. ON BOSNIA.

3. ON NATO SUMMIT ISSUES, DISCUSSION CENTERED ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE EAST. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. HAD YET TO REACH A DECISION ON NATO EXPANSION. WE WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE FAVOR PRECIPITATE EXPANSION, BUT NATO NEEDED TO HOLD OUT A PROSPECT TO SOME EASTERN STATES THAT THEY COULD ACHIEVE FULL MEMBERSHIP. WE MIGHT SUPPORT MEMBERSHIP

CRITERIA THAT WOULD NOT BE SO DIFFICULT THAT RUSSIA OR OTHER NIS STATES COULD NEVER QUALIFY. THOUGHT COULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO EXTENDING "ARTICLE 4" COMMITMENTS TO CONSULT ABOUT SECURITY CONCERNS. BETTER USE SHOULD BE MADE OF NACC, PARTICULARLY IN PEACEKEEPING.

4. WOERNER SAID THE SUMMIT SHOULD FOCUS ON ENGAGING THE EAST, NATO'S ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING, AND REAFFIRMING AND REBALANCING THE US-EUROPEAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. HE THOUGHT A U.S.-FRENCH ,DEAL" COULD BE STRUCK IN WHICH THE U.S. WOULD AGREE TO AN EXPANDED WEU ROLE WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK AND FRANCE WOULD MOVE CLOSER TO NATO'S DEFENSE SIDE. HE SAW A RARE OFPORTUNITY TO "ANCHOR SOME EASTERN NATIONS ONCE AND FOR ALL TO THE WEST" AND FAVORED A CLEAR SUMMIT SIGNAL THAT NATO WOULD ACCEPT NEW MEMBERS, BUT HE OPPOSED SPECIFYING THE COUNTRIES TO BE ADMITTED OR A TIMELINE. HE SUPPORTED BUILDING UP THE NACC, INCLUDING THROUGH THE IDEA OF A "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE."

5. KINKEL SAID THE SUMMIT SHOULD REAFFIRM THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK, REVIEW NATO STRUCTURES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT, AND DEAL WITH THE EAST. NACC SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO MEET EASTERN SECURITY NEEDS, BUT THE SUMMIT ALSO HAD TO SEND A SIGNAL ON EXPANSION. INTERMEDIATE STEPS MIGHT BE NEEDED TO MEET EASTERN SECURITY CONCERNS. THE YELTSIN LETTER MADE CLEAR THE NEED TO BE CAREFUL AND COORDINATE POSITIONS. MFA STATE SECRETARY KASTRUP SAID THE YELTSIN LETTER'S REFERENCE TO THE "TWO-PLUS-FOUR" TREATY NWAS "FORMALLY" WRONG IN RELATING IT TO NATO EXPANSION BUT HIS POSITION HAD POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE THAT WE HAD TO TAKE SERIOUSLY. WOERNER DISAGREED AND SAID ALL ALLIES SHOULD REJECT ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TREATY AND NATO EXPANSION. END SUMMARY.

6. IN ADDITION TO THE SECRETARY, FM KINKEL, AND NATO SYG WOERNER, LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED (FOR THE GERMANS) MFA STATE SECRETARY KASTRUP AND POLITICAL DIRECTOR CHROBOG AND AMBASSADOR STABREIT; (FOR NATO) PRIVATE OFFICE DIRECTOR SCHARIOTH AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOLEY, AND SPOKESMAN JAMIE SHEA; AND (FOR THE U.S.) UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OXMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DONILON, USNATO AMBASSADOR HUNTER AND AN EUR/RPM NOTETAKER.

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
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7. THE SECRETARY OPENED DISCUSSION BY ASKING A/S OXMAN, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, TO REFORT ON CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS ON BOSNIA. OXMAN SAID CONGRESS HAD VERY SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT SENDING AN IMPLEMENTATION FORCE TO BOSNIA AND WOULD INSIST THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SEEK A RESOLUTION OF SUPPORT. EVENTS IN SOMALIA WERE HAVING A SPILLOVER EFFECT ON CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE ACTION IN BOSNIA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE EXPECTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A

PEACE SETTLEMENT, IF THE PARTIES ASKED FOR IT AND APPEARED TO BE COMPLYING WITH THE SETTLEMENT THEY HAD REACHED. THE U.S. HAD A SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY, FOR IF WE FAILED TO PARTICIPATE, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT ANY IMPLEMENTATION FORCE WOULD BE ORGANIZED.

8. WOERNER STRONGLY AGREED THAT, IF THE U.S. FAILED TO PARTICIPATE, NATO WOULD BE UNABLE TO ACT. THE UN WOULD TRY TO ENHANCE UNPROFOR, BUT LACKED THE CAPABILITIES. A CORE OF WELL-TRAINED FORCES, WHICH COULD ONLY COME FROM NATO OR THE U.S., WOULD BE NECESSARY. OXMAN SAID THAT SENATOR PELL HAD ASKED WHY THE U.S. HAD TO CONSTITUTE ABOUT HALF OF A NATO IMPLEMENTATION FORCE AND THAT OTHER SENATORS HAD ALSO FAVORED A GREATER EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION. WOERNER SAID THAT EUROPEANS ALREADY WERE ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA AND HAD BEEN TAKING CASUALTIES; A FAIR SHARING OF THE BURDEN WAS NEEDED.

9. KINKEL BRIEFED ON THE BOSNIA DISCUSSION AT THE EC MINISTERIAL MEETING OCTOBER 4. ONE CONCLUSION OF THAT DISCUSSION HAD BEEN THAT THE MUSLIMS WERE STRONGLY ORIENTED TO THE U.S., AND THE U.S. SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE ITS ATTITUDES HAD ON MUSLIM THINKING. THE MINISTERS HAD ALSO AGREED THAT, IF A NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION AROSE, EUROPE WOULD EXPECT THE U.S. TO DO WHAT IT HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IT WOULD. IN TERMS OF THE BROADER DISCUSSION AMONG EC MINISTERS, SEVERAL HOURS OF INTENSIVE DEBATE HAD NOT HAD A VERY HOPEFUL OUTCOME. OWEN AND STOLTENBERG HAD BOTH SPOKEN AND GENERALLY AGREED ON THE SITUATION, BUT OWEN HAD BEEN MORE PESSIMISTIC, BLAMING THE EUROPEANS AND THE U.S. FOR NOT PUTTING MORE PRESSURE ON IZETBEGOVIC AND

THE MUSLIMS. OWEN HAD SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS, BUT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC, SINCE ONLY GREATER PRESSURE ON THE MUSLIMS COULD LEAD TO "THE DESIRED RESULTS." GERMANY SAW EYE-TO-EYE WITH THE U.S. AND WOULD NOT PUT PRESSURE ONE-SIDEDLY ON THE MUSLIMS, BUT OTHER EUROPEANS HAD A DIFFERENT APPROACH.

10. KINKEL SAID THAT THE EC MINISTERS HAD NOT DISCUSSED CONDITIONS FOR FORMING AN IMPLEMENTATION FORCE. WOERNER REPLIED THAT SUCH CONDITIONS WERE CRUCIAL. IF THE UN DID NOT TURN TO NATO, A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED. NATO COULD NOT ACT WITHOUT THE U.S., AND THE U.S. WOULD NOT ACT UNLESS CONDITIONS WERE MET THAT ENSURED THAT THE FORCE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. A VERY CLEAR COMMAND STRUCTURE, INCLUDING SACEUR, HAD TO BE IN PLACE. IF NATO WAS TO UNDERTAKE THE IMPLEMENTATION "YOU BUY NATO,NOT HALF OF NATO." FOR ITS PART, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO AGREE THAT NATO WOULD OPERATE UNDER UN AUTHORITY. KINKEL SAID THAT, BASED ON DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE, HE THOUGHT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THESE ISSUES.

11. WOERNER SAID THAT UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI WANTED TO TURN THE WHOLE BOSNIA OPERATION OVER TO NATO, BUT NATO DID NOT WANT THE CIVIL SIDE OF THE OPERATION, WHICH THE UN WOULD HAVE TO DO. BOUTROS-GHALI AND FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT, IF THEY WANTED NATO TO IMPLEMENT A SETTLEMENT, THEY

HAD TO ACCEPT ALL OF NATO. WE SHOULD GO IN THE FRENCH DIRECTION ON THIS ISSUE ONLY ON MATTERS OF PRESENTATION, NOT ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. FRANCE HAD SAID THAT STOLTENBERG MUST HAVE A VETO OVER NATO OFERATIONS, BUT STOLTENBERG SAID HE DID NOT NEED OR WANT A VETO. IF THE FRENCH POSITION WERE ACCEPTED AND NATO OFERATIONS COULD BE APPEALED BY STOLTENBERG TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NATO WOULD END UP LIKE UNPROFOR, WITH "TWO OR THREE BANDITS ABLE TO CONTROL OUR TANKS." NATO HAD TO COME INTO BOSNIA RAPIDLY AND DECISIVELY, SO THE PARTIES WOULD SEE IT WAS DIFFERENT FROM UNPROFOR AND NATO WOULD NOT NEED TO FIGHT.

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NATO SUMMIT
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12. THE SECRETARY TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE NATO SUMMIT. THE U.S. WAS STILL DEVELOFING ITS POSITIONS BUT SAW SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES. ONE WAS HOW NATO'S "SECURITY IMPACT" COULD BE EXTENDED TO THE EAST. WE ALSO NEEDED TO CONSIDER HOW NATO EXPANSION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN A WAY THAT WOULD ENHANCE NATO'S EFFECTIVENESS. WE SHOULD MAKE

BETTER USE OF NACC AND NOT DIMINISH IT THROUGH OUR CONSIDERATION OF EXPANSION. HE SOLICITED WOERNER'S AND KINKEL'S VIEWS ON THOSE ISSUES, AND ON WHAT EFFECTS NATO ACTIONS AT THE SUMMIT MIGHT HAVE ON RUSSIA AND UKRAINE.

13. WOERNER IDENTIFIED THREE SUMMIT TOPICS: PROJECTION OF STABILITY TO THE EAST AND THE ENLARGEMENT QUESTION; THE ROLE OF NATO IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING, ON WHICH THE SUMMIT NEEDED TO STATE NATO'S POSSIBILITIES AND ITS LIMITATIONS; AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, REAFFIRMING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND "REBALANCING" THE U.S./EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. WOERNER SAW A CHANCE FOR A US/FRENCH "DEAL" FOR THE SUMMIT: THE U.S. WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON A WEU ROLE WITHIN NATO (WITH SOME "DIVISION OF LABOR"), AS SUGGESTED IN THE U.S. IDEA OF "SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE" FORCES. IN RETURN, FRANCE WOULD COME CLOSER TO THE DEFENSE SIDE OF NATO. THIS MIGHT BE HARD AS LONG AS MITTERRAND WAS ON THE SCENE; LEOTARD AND JUPPE WANTED TO MOVE CLOSER TO NATO BUT DID NOT WANT TO QUARREL WITH MITTERRAND. BUT IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE WERE ABLE TO AGREE, A FOURTH SUMMIT TOPIC MIGHT BE REVISIONS TO NATO STRUCTURES (JOINT MEETINGS OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS MIGHT BE ARRANGED TO ALLOW FRENCH DEFENSE PARTICIPATION, AND FRANCE MIGHT JOIN THE DPC EXCEPT WHEN IT WAS ADDRESSING ISSUES RELATING ONLY TO INTEGRATED FORCES). SUCH CHANGES WOULD DEPEND ON DECISIONS MADE ON NATO STRUCTURES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

14. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RAISED THE EXPANSION ISSUE. NOTING NATO'S NEED TO ENGAGE NOT ONLY THE CEE STATES, BUT ALSO THE NIS STATES IN A WAY THAT DID NOT DIMINISH THEIR INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING WITH NATO. WE NEEDED TO HOLD OUT A PROSPECT TO SOME EASTERN STATES THAT THEY COULD ACHIEVE FULL MEMBERSHIP. THIS WAS A VERY CHALLENGING PROBLEM. YELTSIN'S COMMENTS IN WARSAW AND PRAGUE HAD

SINCE BEEN WALKED BACK BY THE RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY. THE U.S. THOUGHT THE NACC HAD A "MORE THAN RHETORICAL" ROLE TO PLAY IN PEACEKEEPING THAT STILL NEEDED TO BE DEFINED.

15. WOERNER PROPOSED A THREE-TRACK APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH YELTSIN'S LETTER AND RUSSIAN INTEREST IN "PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES." FIRST, NATO SHOULD DEVELOP A SECURITY PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND OTHER STATES. SECOND, THE NACC SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED. THIRD, NATO SHOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT IT WILL BE READY. IN A PROCESS OVER AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME, TO ACCEPT NEW MEMBERS, BUT NATO SHOULD NOT SPECIFY WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ACCEPTED. WOERNER STRESSED THAT NATO COULD

NOT ACCEPT NEW MEMBERS NOW OR OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR THAT PURPOSE. THERE WERE TOO MANY PROBLEMS (EFFECTS IN RUSSIA AND ON NATO'S OWN DECISIONMAKING PROCESS INSTABILITY IN THE EASTERN COUNTRIES) FOR QUICK DECISIONS. MORE TIME WAS NEEDED, SO A PROCESS SHOULD BE INITIATED WITHOUT SETTING DEADLINES. FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE ASKED TO START THINKING ABOUT "AFFILIATION" OF EASTERN STATES WITH NATO; THE WORDS "MEMBERSHIP" AND "TRANSITIONAL" SHOULD NOT BE USED. AS THIS THINKING PROGRESSED, NATO SHOULD BUILD UP THE NACC, INCLUDING THROUGH THE U.S. IDEA OF A "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" BY WHICH NATO WOULD COOPERATE ON PEACEKEEPING WITH EASTERN STATES WILLING TO PARTICIPATE.

16. KINKEL SAID HE SAW THREE AIMS FOR THE NATO SUMMIT. FIRST, IT SHOULD REAFFIRM THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. SECOND, IT SHOULD REVIEW NATO'S STRUCTURES FOR DEALING WITH THREE NEW TASKS -- PREVENTION OF CONFLICTS (E.G., KOSOVO, MACEDONIA), PEACEKEEPING, AND PEACEMAKING. THIRD, IT SHOULD ADDRESS THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE CEE AND NIS STATES, WHICH FELT THEY HAD SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS. NACC SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED AS AN INSTRUMENT TO MEET THEIR NEEDS. THE SUMMIT SHOULD ALSO SEND A SIGNAL ON EXPANSION, ON CONDITION THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS EUROPEANS WERE READY TO CONTEMFLATE EXTENSION OF SECURITY GUARANTEES TO NEW COUNTRIES AND THAT EXPANSION WOULD NOT CREATE NEW RIFTS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. THE YELTSIN LETTER SHOWED THAT WE NEEDED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN THIS AREA AND CLOSELY COORDINATE OUR POSITIONS.

17. KINKEL ADDED THAT EUROPEANS NEEDED TO RECOGNIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE SECURITY NEEDS, BUT ALSO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THE EAST MUST BE SATISFIED. THEIR ECONOMIC GROWTH WOULD DEPEND ON THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE EC. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE EASTERN STATES JOINING NATO BEFORE THEY JOINED THE EC, IF NEW RIFTS COULD BE AVOIDED AND THE U.S. AGREED. REMARKING THAT GERMANY HAD HEARD DIFFERENT VIEWS FROM WASHINGTON ON THIS ISSUE, KINKEL ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WANTED NATO TO EXPAND.

18. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE USG HAD NOT REACHED A FINAL DECISION YET. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE U.S. WAS LOOKING POSITIVELY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANSION, BUT WOULD NOT FAVOR PRECIPITATE EXPANSION. THE SUMMIT MIGHT STATE CRITERIA BUT SHOULD NOT DESIGNATE WHICH COUNTRIES

WOULD MEET THEM. IT WAS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT THAT RUSSIA AND UKRAINE BE INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS. THE CRITERIA SHOULD GIVE THEM A PROSPECT OF NATO MEMBERSHIF IN THE FUTURE, ALTHOUGH NOT NOW OR IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

WOERNER ASKED TO CONFIRM WHETHER SUCH A PROSPECT WOULD ALSO APPLY TO RUSSIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THE CRITERIA SHOULD NOT BE SO DIFFICULT THAT RUSSIA COULD NEVER QUALIFY. WE NEEDED TO CONSULT WITH THEM AND SEEK THEIR VIEWS. NATO MUST AVOID LETTING NATO EXPANSION RECREATE A BIPOLAR WORLD.

19. WOERNER SAID THAT WE HAD A RARE HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY THAT MIGHT NOT QUICKLY RETURN. THE TASK WAS "TO ANCHOR SOME OF THESE NATIONS ONCE AND FOR ALL TO THE WEST." THIS SHOULD BE DONE FOR THE INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL SECURITY OF THOSE COUNTRIES. THEY NEEDED TO BE SEEN AS PART OF THE WEST. NATO HAD TO GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO EXPAND, WITHOUT FORMALLY EXCLUDING RUSSIA, WHICH SHOULD BE TREATED AS A PARTNER BUT NOT GIVEN A VETO. WE SHOULD SET THE PROCESS IN MOTION, WITHOUT SPECIFYING NOW WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO ENTER OR WHEN.

20. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHICH NATIONS NATO SHOULD CO-OPT. WOERNER SAID THAT, OVER THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS, NATO SHOULD CONSIDER THREE GROUPS OF COUNTRIES. FIRST WOULD COME THE VISEGRAD STATES. THEN WOULD COME BULGARIA AND ROMANIA, IF THEY DEVELOPED AS STABLE DEMOCRACIES, AND PERHAPS ALBANIA. THE THIRD CATEGORY, ABOUT WHICH WOERNER WAS UNSURE, WAS THE BALTICS AND UKRAINE. IF NATO EXPANSION CROSSED INTO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, IT WOULD GO STRAIGHT AGAINST RUSSIAN FEELING AND EMOTION. RUSSIANS STILL REGARDED UKRAINE AS PART OF THE HOMELAND AND HAD NOT GIVEN UP ON THE BALTICS. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CROSSING THAT THRESHOLD COULD LEAD TO A NEGATIVE REACTION.

21. THE SECRETARY ASKED ABOUT POSSIBLE "NORTHERN" CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP. WOERNER SAID HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH SWEDEN, FINLAND, AND AUSTRIA JOINING NATO IF THEY WANTED TO. HE AGREED WITH KINKEL THAT IN PRINCIPLE STATES COULD JOIN NATO BEFORE JOINING THE EC. BUT IF A STATE DID JOIN THE EC AND WEU, THEN THERE WAS A CERTAIN LOGIC IN ITS ALSO JOINING NATO, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO DENY IT NATO MEMBERSHIP. TAKING IN THESE THREE STATES WOULD NOT UPSET THE RUSSIANS.

22. KINKEL SAID THE ISSUE OF HOW THE EC AND WEU RELATED TO NATO WOULD PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE IN EUROPEAN THINKING ON ENLARGEMENT. ABOVE ALL, THE BALTICS AND HUNGARY HAD GREAT SECURITY NEEDS. HIS VISITS TO THOSE COUNTRIES PERSUADED HIM THAT THOSE COUNTRIES FELT "PHYSICAL FEAR." IF NATO COULD NOT GIVE THEM MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY GUARANTEES, THERE HAD NEED TO BE SOME INTERMEDIATE STEPS, OR THINGS MIGHT DEVELOP IN AN UNFLEASANT WAY.

23. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT NATO'S APPROACH TO EXPANSION SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE BALTICS, BUT SOMETHING LESS THAN ARTICLE 5 SECURITY GUARANTEES WAS NEEDED. CONSIDERATION OF ARTICLE 4 COMMITMENTS TO CONSULTATION MIGHT MERIT

ATTENTION, AS THE BALTS NEEDED REASSURANCE THEY COULD NOT BE OVERRUN WITHOUT NATO BEING SOMEHOW INVOLVED. WOERNER SAID THE BALTIC STATES AND UKRAINE WERE RIGHT TO FEEL FEAR OF RUSSIA, BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE WEST WOULD BE READY TO GIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES AND, IF NECESSARY, TO FIGHT TO DEFEND THEM.

24. OXMAN ASKED HOW GERMANY UNDERSTOOD THE SECTION OF THE YELTSIN LETTER THAT RELATED THE GERMAN UNIFICATION TREATY TO NATO EXPANSION. KASTRUP SAID THAT, FORMALLY, YELTSIN WAS WRONG. GERMANY HAD BEEN ABLE TO COMMIT ONLY ITSELF IN THAT TREATY WHICH BARRED FOREIGN TROOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE SOIL OF THE FORMER GDR. KASTRUP THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT THE "BASIC PHILOSOPHY" OF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN THAT NATO WOULD NOT EXPAND TO THE EAST - NO ONE HAD BEEN THINKING THEN OF POLAND JOINING NATO. SO POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY, YELTSIN HAD A POINT THAT WE HAD TO TAKE SERIOUSLY. YELTSIN THOUGHT THE WEST HAD COMMITTED ITSELF NOT TO EXTEND NATO BEYOND ITS 1990 LIMITS.

25. WOERNER DISAGREED, SAYING THE CLAUSE IN QUESTION APPLIED ONLY AS LONG AS RUSSIAN TROOPS WERE IN GERMANY. AFTER THAT, GERMAN TROOPS -- WHICH COULD BE NATO TROOPS -- COULD BE IN EASTERN GERMANY. TO THE DEGREE YELTSIN WAS TALKING ABOUT FOREIGN TROOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NO ONE WANTED TO PUT FOREIGN FORCES OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POLAND. KASTRUP ASKED WHETHER NATO ADMISSION OF POLAND WOULD NOT IMPLY THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES THERE. WOERNER SAID IT WOULD NOT. NORWAY, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A NATO MEMBER THAT NEVER HAD AGREED TO A PEACETIME FOREIGN TROOP PRESENCE. WOERNER SAID HE HOPED THAT ALL ALLIES WOULD STRONGLY REJECT THE IDEA THAT THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AGREEMENT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH NATO EXPANSION. KINKEL SAID THE YELTSIN LETTER ON NATO EXPANSION WAS THE "FIRST OR SECOND SACRIFICE" YELTSIN HAD HAD TO MAKE TO THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES SO THAT THEY WOULD ACT AS THEY HAD IN THE PAST FEW DAYS IN MOSCOW. HE URGED CAUTION IN DEALING WITH THE EXPANSION ISSUE. THE LUNCHEON CONCLUDED, WITH THE SECRETARY AND KINKEL MOVING TO THEIR BILATERAL MEETING (SEPTEL). CHRISTOPHER
BT
#9312
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9312

TOR: 931008161411 M0651309

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER

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PER E.O. 13526
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KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA6751 2892135-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 162135Z OCT 93 ZFF5
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 162135Z OCT 93
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: ****
INFO: RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9430
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8151
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2628
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3132
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8048
SUBJ: THE NATO SUMMIT AND THE EASTERN QUESTION
C O R R E C T E D COPY (PASSING INST)
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 316751
NODIS
FOLLOWING USNATO 04194 DTD 16 OCT 93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE.
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USNATO 004194
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STATE FOR TARNOFF/OXMAN/TALBOTT; OSD FOR WISNER/SLOCOMBE;
NSC FOR WALKER:JCS FOR MCCAFFREY
MOSCOW FOR PICKERING
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, MCAP, DPC
SUBJECT: THE NATO SUMMIT AND THE EASTERN QUESTION
C O R R E C T E D COPY (PASSING INST)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN ASSESSING ISSUES FOR THE NATO SUMMIT, WHAT IS DONE TO PROJECT STABILITY TO THE EAST WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT. WE JUDGE THAT THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE VEHICLE. IT MUST BE PROMOTED EFFECTIVELY, NOT PRESENTED AS A CONSOLATION PRIZE. TO AVOID ISOLATING STATES LIKE RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, THE PEACE PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE OPEN TO ALL -- WHO WILL THEN SELF-SELECT -- AND ALSO BE LINKED TO THE NACC, WHICH HAS STRONG SUPPORT FROM BOTH NATO AND COOPERATION PARTNERS. EXPANSION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN TERMS OF BOLD BUT GENERAL PRINCIPLES; IT WILL BE HARD TO GAIN SUFFICIENT ALLIED SUPPORT FOR SUMMIT DECISIONS THAT FORETELL WHO WILL BE ADMITTED TO MEMBERSHIP. BUT IF THAT IS THE CHOSEN COURSE (E.G., CRITRIA-SETTING OR CREATING AN ASSOCIATE STATUS), SELLING THIS COURSE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO BEGIN NOW. IN ANY EVENT, IT IS CRITICAL THAT TIMING ON IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL NATO MEMBERS NOT GET OUT AHEAD OF CREATING A BASIC GEOSTRATEGIC STRUCTURE THAT EFFECTIVELY ACCOUNTS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. IT IS DOUBTFUL

THAT THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BETWEEN NOW AND JANUARY 10, ESPECIALLY WITH UNCERTAINTY IN RUSSIA. END SUMMARY.

PEACE PARTNERSHIP AND NACC

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3. AS WE HAVE FOLLOWED DEBATE HERE ABOUT WHAT NATO SHOULD DO IN THE EAST, WE HAVE BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IS A BIG WINNER -- PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT WE DO NOT REPRESENT IT AS A CONSOLATION PRIZE FOR COUNTRIES THAT DON'T GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NATO MEMBERSHIP. THE PARTNERSHIP GOES TO THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM OF ENGAGING COUNTRIES IN WESTERN SECURITY POLICY AND PRACTICE, AND SOMETHING LIKE IT WOULD BE NEEDED EVEN IF EASTERN COUNTRIES WERE PERMITTED INTO NATO NOW.

4. BUT WHO SHOULD TAKE PART? IN OUR JUDGMENT, A KEY VIRTUE OF THE PEACE PARTNERSHIP LIES IN ITS BEING PRESENTED AS INCLUSIVE. IT THUS DEALS WITH THE CENTRAL SECURITY CONUNDRUM THAT ALSO DOMINATES THE ENLARGEMENT QUESTION: HOW TO BUILD UP CEE COUNTRIES AS POTENTIAL SECURITY PARTNERS WITHOUT SIGNALLING TO THE RUSSIANS, THE UKRAINIANS, AND THE BALTICS THAT THEY ARE NOW AND PERHAPS FOREVER OUTSIDE THE WESTERN SECURITY CLUB. OF COURSE, NOT ALL THE NACC COUNTRIES WILL SHOW UP AT SHAPE; THEY WILL SELF-SELECT BY WHAT THEY DO -- INDEED, BY WHAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO DO TO MEET THE FUNCTIONAL DEMANDS OF THE PEACE PARTNERSHIP. BUT TO IMPOSE ARBITRARY STANDARDS OR SOME A PRIORI REVIEW PROCESS WILL DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THAT NATO IS REACHING OUT TO THE EAST AND -- IF ENLARGEMENT IS DELAYED -- THAT SOMETHING TANGIBLE AND POLITICALLY USEFUL IS STILL BEING DONE.

5. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO THE QUESTION WHETHER THE PEACE PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE LINKED TO NACC OR SHOULD SOMEHOW BE INDEPENDENT. THIS SEEMS TO US TO BE A NON-ISSUE, IN THE SENSE THAT NOTHING IS LOST BY GIVING NACC A BOOST. IT IS CLEAR TO US HERE -- FROM VIRTUALLY EVERY CONVERSATION WITH EVERY NATO ALLY AND COOPERATION PARTNER -- THAT THE CHALLENGE IS TO MAKE NACC INTO SOMETHING REAL BY GIVING IT TEETH THROUGH INITIATIVES SUCH AS PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE RATHER THAN TO KILL IT OFF. THE PARTNERS WANT A STRONGER NACC TO ENHANCE THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIES TO NATO. THIS IS TRUE EVEN OF CEE COUNTRIES THAT ALSO WANT TO JOIN NATO. (SEE SEPTEL FOR MISSION'S FULL ASSESSMENT OF NACC.)

6. THERE CAN ALSO BE NO DOUBT THAT THE GUTS OF THE ALLIANCE, NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE, ARE IN NATO ITSELF, BASED ON THE NAC, COLLECTIVE DEFENSE PLANNING, AND ON THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURES. LINKING THE PEACE

PARTNERSHIP TO THE NACC IS A USEFUL POLITICAL DEVICE -- AND WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH -- BUT IT IN NO WAY PRESAGES TURNING NATO INTO CSCE. NO ONE AT NATO SEES THIS AS A RISK DERIVING FROM A STRONGER NACC.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

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7. A CLEAR PERSPECTIVE HAS ALSO BEEN EMERGING ON ENLARGEMENT. IT COALESCES AROUND FOUR IDEAS, ALTHOUGH REACHING CLOSURE EVEN ON THESE WILL NOT BE STRAIGHT-FORWARD:

-- NATO IS AND MUST BE ENGAGED IN THE EAST, FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL AND TO MEET THE CORE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN HEARTLAND;
-- THE ENLARGEMENT ISSUE IS CLEARLY ON THE TABLE AND MUST BE DEALT WITH AT THE SUMMIT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE GROUNDED IN REASSERTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO'S WESTERN ASSOCIATIONS;
-- NATO IS OPEN TO NEW MEMBERS (ARTICLE 10). ENLARGEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE AT SOME POINT, WITH THE KEY QUESTIONS BEING WHO, HOW, AND WHEN;
-- EXPANSION, WHEN IT COMES, SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM CORE ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE NOR REDUCE THE SECURITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES (READ BALTICS, UKRAINE, EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA).

8. GOING BEYOND THESE POINTS FOR THE SUMMIT WILL PROVOKE INTENSE DEBATE, AND WE NEED TO THINK WHETHER THE GAME IS WORTH THE CANDLE: THE WORST THING WOULD BE TO REACH FOR SOMETHING, DESIGNED TO MEET THE POLITICAL DESIRES OF SOME CEE COUNTRIES, AND THEN BE REBUFFED.

9. THERE IS A GENERAL VIEW HERE THAT SETTING CRITERIA -- WHICH ARE ANYTHING MORE THAN BROMIDES -- IDENTIFIES CANDIDATES AND THUS SHOWS WHO WILL AND WHO WILL NOT BE MEMBERS. THE SAME IS LIKELY TO BE THE VIEW OF "ASSOCIATION" IN ANY FORM, ALTHOUGH THIS CANNOT BE TOLD FOR SURE BECAUSE THE IDEA HAS NOT BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED. (WOERNER HAS FLOATED THE IDEA, BUT HE DOESN'T SEEM TO HAVE THOUGHT FURTHER THAN A VAGUE GENERALITY; THE BRITISH HAVE TRIED SOME WORD-SMITHING -- E.G., "AFFILIATION" -- BUT THIS SEEMS TO BE AN EFFORT TO LIMIT A CONCEPT THEY SUSPECT THEY CANNOT KILL OUTRIGHT).

10. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN BEST PRODUCE A SUCCESS AT THE NATO SUMMIT, WHILE BALANCING THE CONTENDING EQUITIES, BY ADOPTING THE FOUR GENERAL FORMULATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 7, AND BY COUPLING THEM WITH A STRONG PEACE PARTNERSHIP THAT IS LINKED TO AN INVIGORATED NACC -- INCLUDING "ARTICLE 4"-TYPE PRACTICES. IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT TWO STEPS ARE CRITICAL:

O IF THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO GO FURTHER -- EVEN TO INCLUDE CRITERIA SETTING OR AN ASSOCIATE STATUS THAT WILL ALSO PERMIT DIVISION INTO "WINNERS AND LOSERS," WE HAD BETTER START MAKING THAT CLEAR SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, WITH A FULL-BLOWN STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS AT THE SUMMIT;
O THE POINT AT WHICH WE MUST CLEARLY AND DECISIVELY SORT OUT THE RUSSIAN/UKRAINIAN DIMENSION -- AS PART OF CREATING SECURITY PATTERNS THAT WILL DOMINATE THE CONTINENT FOR A GENERATION OR MORE -- IS LINKED TO THE PACE OF EXPANSION. IF WE START SORTING OUT SHEEP AND GOATS ON JANUARY 11 -- THAT IS, IF MOSCOW, KIEV, ETC., CAN FIGURE OUT THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO JOIN THE CLUB -- THEN WE HAD BETTER HAVE RELATIONS WITH THE HAVE-NOTS (AND ESPECIALLY RUSSIA) IN HAND AT THE SAME TIME. THIS DOESN'T MEAN "MANAGING" OR PLACE-HOLDING, BUT COMPLETION OF THE BASIC GEO-STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK. THIS PROBABLY CANNOT BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND JANUARY 10 -- ESPECIALLY BECAUSE THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS

INCAPABLE OF MAKING DECISIONS THAT IT CAN
CONFIDENTLY PROJECT AS SETTLED RUSSIAN POLICY FOR
THE YEARS AHEAD.

11. FOR US, THEREFORE, THE ISSUE OF ENLARGEMENT PACING COMES DOWN TO A SINGLE PROPOSITION: HOW MUCH THE POLITICAL SYMBOL OF PROMISES OF MEMBERSHIP (OR CRITERIA/ASSOCIATION THAT PRESAGES MEMBERSHIP) IS NEEDED POLITICALLY TO UNDERPIN INTERNAL REFORM IN KEY CEE COUNTRIES, AS OPPOSED TO ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 316751
NODIS
INITIATIVES LIKE PEACE PARTNERSHIP -- AND WHAT RISKS WE ARE PREPARED TO RUN TO PROVIDE THAT PARTICULAR SYMBOL.
HUNTER
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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SSN: 6751
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SIT: BELL BLEICKEN FILE KUPCHAN SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL WITKOWSKY

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.17)
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 291634Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
OSRI: RUEHUP
DTG: 291634Z OCT 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7721
INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: A/S OXMAN BRIEFS VISEGRAD FOUR ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (P4P)
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BUDAPEST 11648
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, HU, CZ, SL, PO
SUBJECT: A/S OXMAN BRIEFS VISEGRAD FOUR ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (P4P)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. AT THE INVITATION OF A/S STEPHEN OXMAN, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR MET IN BUDAPEST OCTOBER 21 TO DISCUSS U.S. PROPOSALS FOR THE NATO SUMMIT. WHILE THE INITIAL REACTION TO THE "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" CONCEPT WAS COOL, DURING A FOLLOW-ON WORKING DINNER AT THE RESIDENCE, THE CLIMATE AND THE REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY. BOTH THE HUNGARIANS AND CZECHS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT THE U.S. PROPOSALS. THE POLES ALSO SIGNALLED THEIR SUPPORT, THOUGH DFM ANDRZEJ ANANICZ CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR FURTHER STEPS ON DIFFERENTIATION. THE SLOVAKS, WHO APPARENTLY HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MEETING, WERE GENERALLY SILENT.
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3. DOWNBEAT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE TRAVEMUNDE NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE HAD CONFUSED MANY PARTICIPANTS. CZECH FIRST DEPUTY FM ALEXANDR VONDRA EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT CONFLICTING SIGNALS EMERGING FROM THE DPC. (THIS WAS ALSO THE FOCUS OF A QUESTION AT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON). ALL MEMBERS, HOWEVER, INDICATED THEIR STRONG INTEREST IN A CONTINUING U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE, AND THE POLES ASSURED THE U.S. THAT THE NEW POLISH COALITION GOVERNMENT HAS VOWED TO CONTINUE ITS COMMITMENT TO NATO. END SUMMARY.

BRIEFING THE VISEGRAD FOUR

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4. FOLLOWING SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST OCTOBER 21, IN WHICH HE FIRST PUBLICLY OUTLINED THE U.S. PROPOSALS FOR NATO EXPANSION, A/S STEPHEN OXMAN BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS FROM THE VISEGRAD FOUR ON DETAILS OF THE U.S.PROPOSALS. HUNGARIAN FM GEZA JESZENSZKY HOSTED THE MEETING, WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (KUM). OTHER KUM PARTICIPANTS: ADMINISTRATIVE STATE SECRETARY JANOS MARTONYI, DEPUTY STATE SECRETARY IVAN BABA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE SECURITY POLICY AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION DEPARTMENT GABOR BRODI, AND GABOR FOLDVARY OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT. (JESZENSZKY AND BABA LEFT THE MEETING EARLY BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS).

5. OTHER PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED: FROM THE POLISH MFA, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRZEJ ANANICZ AND DIRECTOR OF SECURITY POLICY ANDRZEJ TOWPIK; FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDR VONDRA AND JIRI SCHNEIDER, HEAD OF POLICY PLANNING; FROM SLOVAKIA, AMBASSADOR MILAN TANCAR, MFA GENERAL DIRECTOR, AND DEPUTY STATE SECRETARY JULIUS HAUSER. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR AND CZECH AND SLOVAK CHARGES ALSO ATTENDED. U.S. ATTENDEES INCLUDED AMBASSADOR THOMAS, S/P MEMBER CHARLES GATI, EUR/EE DIRECTOR TERRY SNELL, EUR SPECIAL ASSISTANT NANCY MCELDOWNEY AND EMBASSY POLMILOFF (NOTETAKER).

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U.S CONVINCED THAT NATO MUST EVOLVE

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6. OXMAN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT U.S. THINKING ON THE QUESTION OF NATO EXPANSION HAS UNDERGONE A MAJOR EVOLUTION IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS. THE U.S. NOW BELIEVES THAT NATO MUST DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION AT THE JANUARY SUMMIT, WHILE KEEPING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING NATO'S POLITICAL COHESIVENESS AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. IS PROPOSING A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH. FIRST, NATO SHOULD SIGNAL THAT THE DOOR TO EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IS OPEN, BY INVITING NACC MEMBERS AND OTHER NATIONS OF EUROPE TO JOIN A "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" (P4P). THE P4P WOULD DEMONSTRATE NATO'S WILLINGNESS TO DEVELOP NEW

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: A/S OXMAN BRIEFS VISEGRAD FOUR ON PARTNERSHIP SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE NATIONS TO THE EAST AND ESTABLISH A PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING MEANINGFUL DEFENSE COOPERATION ACTIVITIES.

7. AS THE OTHER PILLARS OF ITS PROPOSAL, THE U.S. IS ALSO CALLING ON NATO TO DEVELOP A COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE APPROACH THAT WOULD ALLOW NATO ASSETS TO BE DRAWN TOGETHER SELECTIVELY FOR SPECIFIC, NON-TRADITIONAL OPERATIONS; AND WE WILL URGE THE SUMMIT TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO ADVANCE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI) TO REINFORCE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS WELL AS THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.

WHILE DETAILS OF ALL THREE PROPOSALS ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT, OXMAN SAID, INTITIAL REACTION FROM THE ALLIES HAS BEEN FAVORABLE.

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P4P: MOVING TOWARD MEMBERSHIP

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8. THE U.S. IS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF MEMBERSHIP "CRITERIA" OR A TIMETABLE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP, OXMAN STRESSED, FOR WE WANT TO AVOID CREATING A NEW BLOC SYSTEM THAT WOULD ONLY CREATE SECOND-CLASS STATES. NOR DO WE WANT TO THREATEN THE REFORM EFFORT IN RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES IN THE REGION. INSTEAD, THE U.S. HAS OPTED FOR A CONCEPT THAT WOULD BE INCLUSIVE RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATORY, AND THAT WOULD ADDRESS NATO'S NEW MISSIONS. THE HEART OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL IS THE P4P, WHICH WOULD BE DEVELOPED AS A NACC ACTIVITY, OPEN TO ALL NACC MEMBERS AS WELL AS OTHER CSCE MEMBERS.

9. THE U.S. CONCEPT ENVISIONS THE CREATION OF A JOINT PLANNING CELL AT SHAPE HEADQUARTERS THAT WOULD INITIALLY PLAN FOR JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES IN THE AREAS OF PEACEKEEPING, SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT. COUNTRIES THAT WISH TO PARTICIPATE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A COMMITMENT OF PERSONNEL AND SOME RESOURCES, BUT THE IDEA IS TO MAKE THE BURDEN AS LIGHT AS POSSIBLE. BY WORKING TOGETHER WITH NATO MEMBERS AT SHAPE ON JOINT PLANNING EFFORTS, NACC MEMBERS WOULD LEARN HOW COOPERATION WORKS, AND THEY COULD MOVE GRADUALLY TOWARDS INTEROPERABILITY.

NO SECURITY GUARANTEES...BUT A COMMITMENT TO CONSULT

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10. WHILE THIS CONCEPT WOULD NOT GIVE THE EXPLICIT GUARANTEES THAT SOME NACC MEMBERS WERE HOPING FOR, NATO WOULD EXTEND THE PROVISIONS FOR CONSULTATION UNDER ARTICLE IV TO PARTICIPATING MEMBERS. OXMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARTICLE IV IS NOT A SECURITY GUARANTEE, BUT IT DOES PUT PARTICIPATING MEMBERS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH NATO MEMBERS.

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SELF-SELECTION THE KEY

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11. WE DO NOT EXPECT ALL NACC COUNTRIES TO RESPOND WITH AN EQUAL DEGREE OF INTEREST, OXMAN EMPHASIZED, BUT THOSE WHO PARTICIPATE MOST ACTIVELY WOULD SIGNAL THEIR INTEREST IN, AND COMMITMENT TO, THE IDEA OF COOPERATION AND EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP. THE RECORD ON COOPERATION COULD THEN BECOME A FACTOR IN CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE MEMBERSHIP.

THE RESPONSE: INITIAL CONCERNS

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12. FOLLOWING HIS PRESENTATION, OXMAN OPENED THE FLOOR TO QUESTIONS. INITIAL RESPONSES SUGGESTED THE STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SOME PARTICIPANTS FELT OVER THE LACK OF DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE VISEGRAD GROUP AND WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE THE LESS ADVANCED STATES TO

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, HU, CZ, SL, PO
SUBJECT: A/S OXMAN BRIEFS VISEGRAD FOUR ON PARTNERSHIP
THE EAST.
13. CZECH FIRST DFM VONDRA LED OFF BY NOTING HIS DISAPPOINTMENT OVER EARLY PRESS REPORTS OF DEFENSE SECRETARY ASPIN'S REMARKS AT TRAVEMUNDE, WHICH SUGGESTED BILATERAL TREATIES WITH NATO, WITH NATO MEMBERSHIP A LONG WAY OFF, IF AT ALL. OXMAN EXPLAINED THAT THE PFP IS INTENDED TO BE A WORK PROGRAM RATHER THAN A FORMAL TREATY ARRANGEMENT. UNDER THIS PROGRAM, PARTICIPANTS WOULD ESTABLISH A REPRESENTATION AT SHAPE, AND WOULD MAKE THEIR OWN DECISION AS TO WHAT KIND OF FORCES THEY WOULD COMMIT TO THE PROGRAM.
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14. THE POLES FOCUSED THEIR COMMENTS ON ISSUES OF DIFFERENTIATION AND THE ROLE OF RUSSIA. IF NATO OPENED ITS BOUNDARIES TO INCLUDE RUSSIA, DFM ANANICZ ARGUED, THEN NATO WOULD LOSE ITS PURPOSE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM ANDRZEJ TOWPIK ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS TO FORM A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA, OXMAN SAID THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONCEPT. THE U.S. HAS THUS REJECTED IT IN FAVOR OF THE INCLUSIVE APPROACH REPRESENTED BY THE P4P.
15. HUNGARY'S MARTONYI AND POLAND'S TOWPIK BOTH INQUIRED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DECISIONMAKING AND CONSULTATION UNDER THE PFP. THE U.S. IS GENERALLY OPPOSED TO CREATING NEW STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS, OXMAN REPLIED, POINTING OUT THAT NATO HAS IN ITS HISTORY HAD A SUCCESS IN DEVELOPING HABITS OF COOPERATION WITHOUT RESORTING TO ADDITIONAL FORMAL MECHANISMS.

CONCERN OVER FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPE
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16. VONDRA THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF U.S. INTENTIONS FOR A FUTURE ROLE IN EUROPE. THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, AND THERE COULD BE A FEAR THAT THE U.S. MIGHT SEE THE P4P AS A WAY OF GETTING OUT OF EUROPE. NOT SO, SAID OXMAN, REMINDING THE GROUP THAT THE U.S. IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING 100,000 TROOPS IN EUROPE.
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DIFFERENTIATION, STILL A KEY ISSUE FOR THE FOUR
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17. HUNGARY'S MARTONYI AGAIN RAISED THE DIFFERENTIATION ISSUE, ASKING IF THE U.S. FORESEES ANY KIND OF DIFFERENTIATION THROUGH THE P4P. AFTER ALL, HE SAID, THERE IS A DIFFERENTIATION--IN GEOGRAPHY, AND IN THE RELATIVE STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS OF DIFFERENT NACC MEMBERS. OXMAN REAFFIRMED THE IDEA OF SELF-SELECTION, NOTING OUR EXPECTATIONS THAT THE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS WOULD EVENTUALLY SEPARATE OUT THOSE WHO WERE BOTH READY FOR AND COMMITTED TO THE

RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP. EACH COUNTRY WILL HAVE TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISION AS TO JUST HOW FAR IT IS WILLING TO GO, HE STRESSED.

OVER DINNER, A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

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18. RESUMING THE CONVERSATION OVER DINNER AT THE AMBASSADOR'S, OXMAN REITERATED THE BASIC POINTS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL, STRESSING THE ADVANTAGES TO THE PARTNERS WHO COMMIT TO THE P4P. IN RESPONSE TO A COMMENT FROM ANANICZ THAT THE CONSULTATION PROPOSED UNDER ARTICLE IV WOULD REPRESENT NO REAL CHANGE FOR CURRENT NACC MEMBERS, OXMAN REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE P4P IS NOT PERFECT, IT WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD FOR NATO, FOR IT WOULD SIGNAL NATO'S OWN COMMITMENT TO P4P PARTNERS' CONCERNS.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BUDAPEST 11648
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
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TAGS: PREL$ MARR, NATO, HU, CZ, SL, PO
SUBJECT: A/S OXMAN BRIEFS VISEGRAD FOUR ON PARTNERSHIP

19. AS OXMAN CONTINUED HIS EXPLANATIONS, VISEGRAD MEMBERS BECAME NOTICEABLY MORE RECEPTIVE TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS. VONDRA COMMENTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATING TO CEE PUBLICS THE IDEA THAT THE PFP ACTUALLY DOES REPRESENT SOMETHING NEW, AND HE THANKED THE A/S FOR GIVING THE FOUR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE PROPOSALS. ANANICZ THEN REITERATED POLAND'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE EURO-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, NOTING IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY CHARLES GATI THAT THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO NATO. HUNGARY ALSO REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE EURO-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, MARTONYI ADDED, AND HUNGARY WOULD SUPPORT THE P4P. MARTONYI ALSO EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE FOR THE U.S. EFFORTS TO CONSULT WITH THE VISEGRAD GROUP.

COMMENT

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20. WHILE VISEGRAD MEMBERS HAD CLEARLY HOPED FOR MORE FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S VISIT IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC CONDITIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP--AND INDEED HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE BY THE LIKES OF GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER RUHE AND SOME WEU OFFICIALS THAT SUCH CONDITIONS WERE IN FACT BEING FORMULATED, THE EFFORTS OF THE A/S TO DEAL FRANKLY AND OPENLY WITH THEIR QUESTIONS EVIDENTLY HAS BUOYED THEIR CONFIDENCE AND ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROPOSAL. HUNGARIAN ATTENDEE GABOR BRODI SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT THE HUNGARIANS NOW FEEL MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THE REASONING BEHIND THE U.S. POSITION, AND THEY NOW UNDERSTAND THAT THE PFP APPROACH IS THE ONLY WAY TO GO. ACCORDING TO BRODI, OTHER VISEGRAD MEMBERS ALSO EXPRESSED A SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. IDEAS IN OFF-THE-RECORD CONVERSATIONS. THE HUNGARIANS ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROPOSALS,,;?49$8 -$$3$, AND IN PARTICULAR WILL BE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO INTEGRATE

POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION UNDER THE U.S.
PROPOSAL. END COMMENT.
THOMAS
BT
#1648
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
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SSN: 1648
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~~002. cable~~	~~re: Secretary's Letter on NATO Summit and Lithuania's Position on NATO Membership (3 pages)~~	~~01/05/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~003. cable~~	~~re: Amb. Albright's Meeting with Polish FM (2 pages)~~	~~01/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~004. cable~~	~~re: Polish Statement Accepting PFP Participation (2 pages)~~	~~01/10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~005. cable~~	~~re: Russian Concerns About PFP (4 pages)~~	~~04/26/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
006. cable	re: NATO: May 30 Permreps Lunch-The NATO/Russia Relationship [part 1] (4 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: NATO: May 30 Permreps Lunch-The NATO/Russia Relationship [part 2] (3 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: NATO: May 30 Permreps Lunch-The NATO/Russia Relationship [part 3] (4 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)
~~009. cable~~	~~re: Meeting of Defense Ministers Meeting with Cooperation Partners, 25 May 1994 (6 pages)~~	~~06/02/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
010. cable	~~re: Meeting with Russia Foreign Minister Kozyrev, June 10, 1994, Istanbul, Turkey (6 pages)~~	~~06/16/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
011. cable	re: NACC Istanbul Ministerial-June 10, Morning Session (12 pages)	06/16/1994	P1/b(1)
~~012. cable~~	~~re: New Polish Ambassador Urges Polish Membership in NATO to Acting Secretary (3 pages)~~	~~06/22/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025

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013. cable	re: NATO: Russia Signs PFP Framework Document (6 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)
~~014. cable~~	~~re: Under Secretary Davis July 20-21 Paris Discussions… (6 pages)~~	~~07/25/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~015. cable~~	~~re: Ambassador Holbrooke's Meeting with Foreign Minister Zieleniec (2 pages)~~	~~08/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
016. cable	re: U/S Tarnoff's Paris Visit: Discussions on Haiti, NATO EU… [10 U.S.C. 424] (6 pages)	09/19/1994	~~P1/b(1),~~ P3/b(3) KBH 11/6/2025
~~017. cable~~	~~re: British Thinking on NATO Expansion (2 pages)~~	~~09/19/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~018. cable~~	~~re: French Thinking on NATO Expansion (1 page)~~	~~10/14/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~019. cable~~	~~re: NATO: Ambassador Churkin Zeroes in on NATO (4 pages)~~	~~11/14/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~020. cable~~	~~re: British Discuss NATO Expansion with A/S Holbrooke (4 pages)~~	~~10/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
021. cable	re: Russia Fails to Approve IPP and NATO-Russia Relationship… (7 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
~~022. cable~~	~~re: Secretary's Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski (8 pages)~~	~~12/04/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~023. cable~~	~~re: Secretary's Meeting Central European/Baltic Foreign Ministers (3 pages)~~	~~12/04/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025
~~024. cable~~	~~re: December 15 Talbott-Ryurikov Meeting on NATO, Chechnya (5 pages)~~	~~12/16/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/6/2025

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.18)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE3: O 041733Z JAN 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
OSRI: RUEHWR
DTG: 041733Z JAN 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6862
INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0195
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 9664
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0776
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0689
SUBJ: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON PRAGUE SUMMIT
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000121
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
DEPT FOR EUR - OXMAN AND EUR/EEA - JOHNSON
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT
NSC FOR ITOH/WALKER/FRIED
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), PREL, NATO, PL, EZ
SUBJECT: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON PRAGUE SUMMIT
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI PHONED THE AMBASSADOR JANUARY 4 AND URGED THAT NATO EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGE PFP NOT AS "A ROAD" BUT AS "THE ROAD" TO NATO MEMBERSHIP. OLECHOWSKI ALSO URGED THAT WHILE IN PRAGUE, PRESIDENT CLINTON PUBLICLY AVOW THAT CENTRAL EUROPE IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS. TO DEMONSTRATE VISEGRAD SOLIDARITY, OLECHOWSKI ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE VENUE FOR THE JANUARY 12 PRAGUE SUMMIT LUNCHEON BE MOVED FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE TO THE PRAGUE CASTLE. OLECHOWSKI CLAIMED SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSAL FROM ALL FOUR VISEGRAD STATES. THIS DEVIATES FROM THE CONCEPT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON AS HOST OF THE REGIONAL EVENT, AND WE TOLD FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAT THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD PROBABLY NOT AGREE TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THE LUNCHEON AT THIS LATE STAGE. END SUMMARY.

"THE VANISHING POINT"

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3. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRZEJ OLECHOWSKI PHONED THE AMBASSADOR JANUARY 4 AND NOTED THAT WHILE WALESA WOULD LIKE TO ENDORSE PFP DURING THE PRAGUE SUMMIT, THE END RESULT OF PARTICIPATION AS THE DEFINITIVE ROAD TO NATO MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE CLEARER. OLECHOWSKI SAID POLISH

LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE "VANISHING POINT," WHICH OLECHOWSKI DESCRIBED AS A LACK OF A COMMITMENT BY NATO THAT POLAND WILL ULTIMATELY "GET ANYTHING" FROM PFP. OLECHOWSKI SAID HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR CRITERIA OR SCHEDULES. POLAND SIMPLY WANTS TO SEE ASSURANCES FROM NATO, IN WRITING, THAT PFP IS NOT "A WAY" TO MEMBERSHIP, BUT "THE WAY."

"ICH BIN EIN VISEGRADER"

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4. OLECHOWSKI ALSO REQUESTED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON UNAMBIGUOUSLY STATE IN PRAGUE THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS CENTRAL EUROPE TO BE IMPORTANT TO U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS. "WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR A STRONG MESSAGE THAT CENTRAL EUROPE IS NEAR AND DEAR TO AMERICA'S HEART," OLECHOWSKI STATED.

PRAGUE CASTLE AS VENUE FOR JAN. 12 SUMMIT LUNCHEON

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5. OLECHOWSKI INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT ALL FOUR VISEGRAD STATES REQUEST A CHANGE IN VENUE FOR THE JANUARY 12 SUMMIT LUNCHEON FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE TO THE PRAGUE CASTLE. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT LUBOS DOBROVSKY, PRESIDENT HAVEL'S CHIEF OF STAFF WHO IS VISITING WARSAW, HAD ENDORSED THE CHANGE. OLECHOWSKI DESCRIBED THE SLOVAK AND HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENTS AS "HAPPY" WITH THE IDEA. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRZEJ ANANICZ LATER TOLD US THAT OTHER VISEGRAD STATES HAD AGREED TO LET OLECHOWSKI SPEAK FOR ALL OF THEM IN REQUESTING A CHANGE IN VENUE.

6. OLECHOWSKI NOTED THAT THE PRAGUE CASTLE AS VENUE FOR THE LUNCHEON WOULD ALLOW THE "REGIONAL HOSTS" THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOINTLY WELCOME PRESIDENT CLINTON. THE CASTLE VENUE WOULD CREATE MORE OF A MEDIA EVENT AND WOULD DEMONSTRATE VISEGRAD SOLIDARITY, HE SAID.

COMMENT

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7. WE BELIEVE ADDRESSING OLECHOWSKI'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS AT THE SUMMIT WOULD HELP THE POLISH GOVERNMENT GENERATE POLISH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PFP. A LUNCHEON AT THE CASTLE, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONFLICTS WITH THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON AS HOST OF THE REGIONAL GATHERING, A FACT WHICH WE MADE CLEAR TO FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS LATER IN THE DAY. WE TOLD THEM IT IS UNLIKELY THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSAW 000121

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
DEPT FOR EUR - OXMAN AND EUR/EEA - JOHNSON
USUN FOR AVBASSADOR ALBRIGHT
NSC FOR ITOH/WALKER/FRIED
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), PREL, NATO, PL, EZ
SUBJECT: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON PRAGUE SUMMIT
IN THE ARRANGEMENTS AT THIS LATE STAGE.
REY
BT
#0121

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0121
<^SSN>0121

TOR: 940104124831 M0809329
<^TOR>940104124729 M0809328

DIST:

PRT: ITOH KENNEY SODERBERG
SIT: FILE FRIED KUPCHAN VAX WALKER

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.19)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 051543Z JAN 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
OSRI: RUEHVL
DTG: 051543Z JAN 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3181
INFO: RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 1139
RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0371
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0506
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0179
RUSNSTA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHCP/USDAO COPENHAGEN
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1512
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1511
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0647
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0783
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S LETTER ON NATO SUMMIT AND LITHUANIA'S
- POSITION ON NATO MEMBERSHIP
TEXT:

********** INCOMPLETE MESSAGE **********

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 000025
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, LH
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER ON NATO SUMMIT AND LITHUANIA'S
- POSITION ON NATO MEMBERSHIP
REF: STATE 00018 (NOTAL)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER GYLYS WELCOMED THE VIEWS ON THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR THE NEW EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES THAT WERE EXPRESSED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER. GYLYS NOTED THAT THE PFP'S EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NATO MEMBERSHIP IS ACCEPTABLE TO LITHUANIA, GIVEN THE CURRENT WIDE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN NATO STANDARDS AND THE STANDARDS OF THE NEWLY-CREATED LITHUANIAN MILITARY. AT THE SAME TIME, GYLYS AND OTHER SENIOR GOL LEADERS NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALIENATING RUSSIA FROM THE PROCESS OF BUILDING SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE. DESPITE THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS, GOL LEADERS SEE A GOOD CHANCE THAT RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS LITHUANIA WILL NOT TURN FOR THE WORSE, AT LEAST FOR NOW. PRESIDENT BRAZAUSKAS' JANUARY 4 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT LITHUANIA WAS FORMALLY APPLYING FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP INCLUDED A STATEMENT EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT ALL EUROPEA COUNTRIES WILL FIND A PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY

STRUCTURES. BRAZAUSKAS' STATEMENT ALSO NOTED THAT LITHUANIA SEES NATO MEMBERSHIP AS A GRADUAL PROCESS FLOWING OUT OF THE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WHICH THE PFP WILL FOSTER. END SUMMARY.

3. WE CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER POVILAS GYLYS ON JANUARY 5 TO DELIVER THE SECRETARY'S LETTER ON THE JANUARY 10-11 NATO SUMMIT. REFERRING TO THE PREVIOUS EVENING'S ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT BRAZAUSKAS THAT LITHUANIA HAD FORMALLY REQUESTED NATO MEMBERSHIP, GYLYS OBSERVED THAT NOW IS A TIME OF NEW CHALLENGES AND RETHINKING OF ESTABLISHED VALUES FOR LITHUANIA AND NATO.

4. AS WESTERN POLICYMAKERS PONDER NATO'S EVOLUTION OVER THE COMING YEARS, LITHUANIA WILL HAVE TO TRANSFORM ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE AND EQUIPMENT TO ENSURE COMPATIBILITY WITH NATO STANDARDS. GYLYS SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT NATO STANDARDS COULD BE RELAXED TO SOME DEGREE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROBLEMS LITHUANIA HAS WITH ITS FLEDGLING MILITARY. GYLYS SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED A "PERIOD OF CONVERGENCE," IN WHICH LITHUANIAN AND NATO STANDARDS APPROACH EACH OTHER OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THE GOL THUS WELCOMES THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONCEPT AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH BECAUSE IT PROVIDES TIME FOR THIS CONVERGENCE.

5. WITH REGARD TO LITHUANIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, GYLYS STRESSED THAT THE BRAZAUSKAS LEADERSHIP'S DECISION ON APPLYING FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT AIMED AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. GYLYS SAID THAT THE GOL HAD RECOVERED FROM ITS SHOCK FOLLOWING THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS AND WAS COUNTING ON THE CONTINUATION OF RUSSIAN REFORMS. DEPUTY LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALBINAS JANUSKAS' JANUARY 4 MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW REVEALED NO POST-ELECTION CHANGE IN RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS LITHUANIA, ACCORDING TO GYLYS.

6. SIMILARLY CAUTIOUS VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BRAZAUSKAS LEADERSHIP WITH WHOM WE DISCUSSED THE PFP AND LITHUANIA'S APPLICATION FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. JUSTAS PALECKIS, BRAZAUSKAS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR, TOLD US ON JANUARY 4 THAT THE GOL WELCOMED THE PFP, BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, HOPED THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM THE PROCESS OF SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE. "IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE UP ON RUSSIAN REFORMS, DESPITE THE RESULTS OF THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS," PALECKIS ASSERTED. GEDIMINAS KIRKILAS, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE RULING DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY, ALSO PRAISED THE PFP, BUT WARNED THAT TOO RAPID A MOVEMENT TOWARDS NATO MEMBERSHIP COULD UNDERMINE THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN RUSSIA.

7. COMMENT: BRAZAUSKAS' JANUARY 4 LETTER TO NATO GENERAL SECRETARY MANFRED WOERNER REGARDING LITHUANIA'S WISH FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP CAME AFTER MONTHS OF PRESSURE FROM THE RIGHT-WING AND CENTER OPPOSITION PARTIES CALLING ON BRAZAUSKAS TO FORMALLY COMMIT LITHUANIA TO IMMEDIATE NATO MEMBERSHIP PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 10-11 SUMMIT. THE BRAZAUSKAS LEADERSHIP CLEARLY HAS SUPPORTED CLOSER SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND WESTERN

BT
#0025
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
SSN: 0025
TOR: 940107140807 M0815544
DIST:
SIT: VAX

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.20)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0711
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0094
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0723
SUBJ: AMB. ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH POLISH FM:
GOP SEEKS PREDICTABILITY, FEARS ABANDONMENT

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ WARSAW 000312
EXDIS
FROM PRESDEL ALBRIGHT
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
FOR JCS ADM JEREMIAH
OSD FOR WISNER AND KRUZEL
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL
SUBJECT: AMB. ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH POLISH FM:
GOP SEEKS PREDICTABILITY, FEARS ABANDONMENT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SCRUBBING A SCHEDULED PLENARY SESSION WITH PRESDEL ALBRIGHT, FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI DREW AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, CJCS SHALIKASHVILI AND AMBASSADOR REY ASIDE TO AN ANTEROOM AT MFA JANUARY 7 FOR A FRANK AND PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF POLISH CONCERNS ON THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. MFA AMERICAS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LEWICKI WAS THE ONLY OTHER PARTICIPANT. THE OLECHOWSKI MEETING DIRECTLY FOLLOWED A SOMETIMES HEATED 75 MINUTE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT WALESA (SEPTEL).

3. OLECHOWSKI OBSERVED THAT POLAND HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY REBUFFED IN ITS EFFORTS TO JOIN WESTERN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS. THIS INCLUDES NOT ONLY NATO BUT THE WEU AND EU. A FEELING OF BEING SPURNED BY THE WEST IS INCREASINGLY PREVALENT IN POLAND, HE SAID, AND COULD HAVE DANGEROUS DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. FOR ONE THING, "MY JOB IS AT STAKE," HE NOTED.

4. TO TURN POLISH PUBLIC OPINION AROUND, NATO MEMBERSHIP MUST CLEARLY BE SEEN AS RESULTING FROM FULL PARTICIPATION IN PFP, OLECHOWSKI STRESSED. HE EMPLOYED A FAVORITE ANALOGY: "IF, AT THE END OF THE ROAD, WE LOOK LIKE A DUCK

AND QUACK LIKE A DUCK, WE WANT TO BE CALLED A DUCK."
THUS, CRITERIA MUST BE MADE CLEAR SO THAT POLAND CAN FACE THE FUTURE AND THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A NATO MEMBER WITH SOME PREDICTABILITY. PFP AS IT NOW STANDS IS TOO AMORPHOUS. "ALL WE SEE ARE PROMISES, PROMISES, PROMISES," HE SAID.
5. COMMENT: IT WOULD CONSIDERABLY EASE POLISH UNCERTAINTIES IF NATO EXPLICITLY DECLARED AN OPENNESS NOT SIMPLY TO "EXPANSION TO THE EAST," BUT TO "MEMBERSHIP BY EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES." PFP IN ITSELF CAN BE CONSTRUED AS AN "EXPANSION" TO THE EAST BY NATO, WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP. THUS, IF WE WANT TO CONVEY AN OPENNESS TO MEMBERSHIP, IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNAMBIGUOUSLY SAY SO.
6. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT.
REY
BT
#0312
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0312

TOR: 940108050922 M0816568

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT{C2} SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BLEICKEN FILE FRIED HOLL KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER WITKOWSKY

Cable

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TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7038
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0101
INFO: RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1836
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0410
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1854
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 2020
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 1032
SUBJ: POLISH STATEMENT ACCEPTING PFP PARTICIPATION
TEXT:

UNCLAS WARSAW 000393
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PL
SUBJECT: POLISH STATEMENT ACCEPTING PFP PARTICIPATION
REFTELS: WARSAW 350
1. FOLLOWING IS THE INFORMAL TRANSLATION TEXT OF THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ANNOUNCING POLISH PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) RELEASED ON JANUARY 10.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
"TOO SMALL A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION" WAS THE BASIC ASSESSMENT WHICH EMERGED FROM TODAY'S CABINET MEETING CONVENED TO DISCUSSED THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" PROGRAM. PRESIDENT LECH WALESA TOOK PART IN THE MEETING OF THE GOVERNMENT.
FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRZEJ OLECHOWSKI PRESENTED THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE." THE CABINET POSITIVELY EVALUATED THE NATO NATIONS' DECLARATION SPEAKING OF THE NEED FOR LASTING U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND THE OPENING OF THE ALLIANCE TO NEW MEMBERS. POLAND POSITIVELY EVALUATES THE NEWLY DEFINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.
THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE AMERICAN INITIATIVES CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR FULL PARTICIPATION IN NATO DEFENSE STRUCTURES AS FAVORABLE TO THE STATE'S INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS EXPRESSLY FORMULATED ITS RESERVATIONS ABOUT NATO'S UNDEFINED

TIMEFRAME AND UNSPECIFIED POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL
CONDITIONS FOR INTEGRATION WITH THE ALLIANCE. NATO
MEMBERSHIP REMAINS THE STRATEGIC GOAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF
POLAND.
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ACKNOWLEDGED THE "PARTNERSHIP
FOR PEACE" AS AN INITIATIVE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
AND AUTHORIZED PRIME MINISTER PAWLAK TO SUPPORT IT DURING
TOMORROW'S (SIC) SUMMIT IN PRAGUE.
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL TAKE THE FINAL DECISION ON
POLISH PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AFTER
ACQUAINTING ITSELF WITH THE INITIATIVE'S DETAILS.
END TEXT.
REY
BT
#0393
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0393

TOR: 940110113614 M0818075

DIST:

SIT: BLEICKEN FORSYTHE LEBOURGEOIS POTTS VAX
<^DIST>
SIT: FRIED HOLL KUPCHAN

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.21)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE3: O P 260152Z APR 94 ZFF4
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ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUCNGE/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
INFO: ALL NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL PRIORITY
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0000
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0000
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0000
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0000
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0000
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0000
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0000
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0000
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0000
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0000
RUDKHD/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0000
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0000
SUBJ: RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT PFP
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 109220 TOSEC 060043
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT PFP
REF: (A) MOSCOW 9651 (DTG 070928Z APR 94)
(B) MOSCOW 6075 (DTG 041320Z MAR 94)
(C) MOSCOW 9628 (DTG 070641Z APR 94)
1. (C) SUMMARY. EMBASSY MOSCOW REPORTING HAS USEFULLY HIGHLIGHTED QUESTIONS ON RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE RAISED BY PARLIAMENTARIANS, E.G., BY DUMA FOREI6N AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LUKIN (REF A), AND BY DEFENSE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YUSHENKOV, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN PISKUNOV, AND FOREI6N AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN NIKONOV (REF B). SIMILAR QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED IN OTHER CONTACTS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS BY RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS. WE ALSO NOTE DEPUTY FM CHURKIN'S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SOME DOMESTIC CRITICISMS OF PFP (REF C).
2. ANSWERS TO MANY OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS RAISED ARE PROVIDED BELOW FOR EMBASSY OFFICERS TO DRAW ON AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS OF RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN PFP

Q'S AND A'S

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3. Q: ISN'T NATO'S ESTABLISHMENT OF PFP INTENDED TO FILL THE VACUUM LEFT BY RUSSIAN RENUNCIATION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE?
- A: NATO'S INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN PFP IS AN ATTEMPT TO RESPOND CREATIVELY TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR'S DIVISION OF EUROPE IN ORDER TO BUILD TIES OF PRACTICAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH STATES THROU6HOUT EUROPE. IT IS AN INCLUSIVE PR0GRAM INTENDED TO FORESTALL THE EMERGENCE OF NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.
4. Q: DOESN'T PFP REPRESENT A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENTS ON GERMAN UNIFICATION?
- A: PFP IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON GERMAN UNIFICATION. NOTHING IN THOSE AGREEMENTS PRECLUDES, RESTRICTS, OR DISCOURAGES EFFORTS TO DEEPEN MILITARY AND POLITICAL COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES.
5. Q: WHY SHOULD RUSSIA JOIN PFP IF IT FACES NO REAL MILITARY THREAT?
- A: PFP IS AN ATTEMPT TO INCREASE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE BY INTENSIFYING PRACTICAL COOPERATION AND COMMON ACTION IN FIELDS SUCH AS PEACEKEEPING, SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS. ITS DEVELOPMENT TOOK RUSSIAN INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. RUSSIA NOT ONLY HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF EUROPE, BUT ALSO HAS THE CAPACITY TO MAKE A UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS EFFORT. MOREOVER, AS A MEMBER, RUSSIA WOULD ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO POSITIVELY AFFECT DEVELOPMENT OF PFP.
6. Q: WHY DOES PFP OFFER RUSSIA EQUALITY ONLY WITH LESSER EASTERN STATES, NOT WITH NATO MEMBERS, AND OFFER RUSSIA NO PROSPECT OF ADMISSION INTO NATO?
- A: PFP IS A MEANS FOR STATES TO DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, BUT IT DOES NOT CONFER MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. BY VIRTUE OF ITS INCLUSIVE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH, PFP DOES NOT ASSIGN PARTNER STATES TO "INNER" AND "OUTER" CIRCLES, BUT IT ALLOWS EACH OF THEM TO TAILOR ITS PARTICIPATION TO ITS OWN NEEDS AND INTERESTS AND TO PROCEED AT ITS OWN PACE INTO INTENSIFIED COOPERATION WITH NATO. IF PFP DID NOT OFFER EQUALITY OF STATUS AND OPPORTUNITY TO ALL PARTNER STATES, THOSE ASSIGNED "SECOND" CLASS" STATUS WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE.
- BECAUSE PFP CAN REFLECT RUSSIA'S UNIQUE CAPABILITIES, THE PROGRAM OF COOPERATION THAT RUSSIA DEVELOPS IS LIKELY TO BE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF OTHER PARTNERS.
- PARTICIPATION IN PFP DOES NOT GUARANTEE ENTRY INTO NATO, BUT IT IS THE BEST ROUTE TOWARD THAT END FOR STATES INTERESTED IN JOINING. NATO HEADS OF STATE STATED AT THEIR JANUARY 1994 SUMMIT MEETING THAT THEY "EXPECT AND WOULD WELCOME NATO EXPANSION THAT WOULD REACH TO DEMOCRATIC STATES TO OUR EAST, AS PART OF AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT POLITICAL AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE." NEITHER RUSSIA NOR ANY OTHER PARTNER STATE IS EITHER ASSURED ENTRY INTO NATO OR EXCLUDED FROM PURSUING THAT POSSIBILITY.
7. 0: WHY SHOULD RUSSIA JOIN PFP WHEN THE OTHER EASTERN MEMBERS ARE SAYING THAT PFP WAS CREATED TO DEFEND THEM AGAINST RUSSIA?
- A: PFP IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA OR ANY OTHER STATE. IT IS INCLUSIVE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY. IT OFFERS RUSSIA THE SAME OPPORTUNITIES THAT OTHER PARTNERS HAVE.

BY PARTICIPATING IN PFP, RUSSIA CAN NOT ONLY DEVELOP ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, BUT ALSO EXPAND ITS PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH OTHER EASTERN MEMBERS.

8. Q: WOULDN'T PFP'S REQUIREMENT OF INTEROPERABILITY WITH NATO INCREASE RUSSIA'S COSTS, REQUIRE IT TO ADAPT TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, AND OUST IT FROM TRADITIONAL MARKETS?

- . A: INTEROPERABILITY IS A NECESSARY CONCOMITANT OF NATO'S GOAL OF EXPANDING PRACTICAL COOPERATION, INCLUDING THROUGH JOINT OPERATIONS. IT IS NOT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AN ISSUE OF STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT, BUT MUCH MORE OF DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON PROCEDURES AND HABITS OF COOPERATION THAT WOULD ALLOW, E.G., NATO AND OTHER FORCES THAT ARE TRAINING, EXERCISING, OR OPERATING TOGETHER TO COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY AND WORK ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR JOINT ACTIVITY. EVEN AFTER DECADES OF WORK TOWARD INTEROPERABILITY, NATO MEMBERS DO NOT EMPLOY COMMON EQUIPMENT. IN THE PFP CONTEXT, INTEROPERABILITY WILL BE DEVELOPED INCREMENTALLY.

- PFP IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A FINANCIAL DRAIN ON ITS MEMBERS OR REQUIRE NEW WEAPONS OR EXTENSIVE CHANGES IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. NOR IS IT AN ARMS SALES OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. NATO WOULD NOT FAVOR MILITARY PROGRAMS IN THE NEW DEMOCRACIES THAT DIVERTED RESOURCES FROM THE URGENT CIVILIAN PRIORITIES OF ECONOMIC REFORM.

9. Q: SINCE MANY RUSSIANS CONTINUE TO SEE NATO AS A POTENTIAL THREAT, WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER TO LOOK FOR ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR RUSSIAN SECURITY, SUCH AS MILITARY COOPERATION IN CSCE, OR NATO AND RUSSIA JOININ6 TO GIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES TO THE STATES LYING BETWEEN THEM?

- A: PFP AND CSCE CAN EACH MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVES. ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP BY NATO AND EASTERN STATES WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE BUILDIN6 THROUGHOUT THE CSCE AREA. NATO WOULD WELCOME A STRENGTHENING OF THE ABILITY OF EUROPE'S VARIOUS INTERLOCKING INSTITUTIONS TO PERFORM THEIR RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS, AND A STRENGTHENIN6 OF RUSSIA'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

- THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO AND RUSSIA WOULD JOINTLY GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE STATES LYING BETWEEN THEM IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE STATES, WHICH RIGHTLY WANT TO BE CONSULTED AND INVOLVED IN ANY ARRANGEMENTS THAT AFFECT THEIR SECURITY.

10. Q: DOESN'T THE PFP DECISION MECHANISM ("16 PLUS 1") BASICALLY LET NATO DECIDE HOW EACH COUNTRY WILL PARTICIPATE. COULDN'T THIS CREATE UNDESIRED OBLIGATIONS FOR RUSSIA?

A: PFP WILL MEET IN VARIOUS FORMATS, DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE AT HAND. THE "16 PLUS 1" FORMAT WOULD BE USED FOR DISCUSSION OF RUSSIA'S INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM TO ENSURE THAT BOTH RUSSIA AND NATO FULLY AGREED WITH THE WORK PROGRAM THEY WERE TO UNDERTAKE TOGETHER. NATO HAS NO ABILITY IN PFP TO FORCE ANY OBLIGATION OR ACTION ON RUSSIA OR ANY OTHER PARTNER.

11. Q: HOW MUCH WILL PFP COST, AND WILL RUSSIA BE ABLE TO AFFORD IT?

- A: THE COSTS OF PFP ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE BURDENSOME IN RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE TERMS. SINCE EACH PARTNER WILL

DEVELOP ITS OWN INDIVIDUALIZED PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH NATO, IT WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE COSTS THAT IT INCURS. DIFFERENT PARTNERS MAY REACH DIFFERING CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEDICATE TO PARTNERSHIP PR0GRAMS.

12. Q: HOW WILL PFP DEVELOP IF RUSSIA DECIDES NOT TO JOIN ?

- A: NONE OF THE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE THUS FAR JOINED THE PARTNERSHIP HAS SUBMITTED A PRESENTATION DOCUMENT SETTING OUT THE PROGRAM IT WANTS TO PURSUE OR THE RESOURCES IT IS PREPARED TO DEVOTE TO PFP. WITHOUT THAT INPUT, IT IS TOO EARLY TO FORECAST EXACTLY HOW PFP WILL DEVELOP. PFP IS NOT INTENDED, HOWEVER, AS A PROGRAM AIMED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY. ONE OF ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSES IS TO AVOID RECREATING DIVISIONS IN EUROPE. IF RUSSIA DID NOT JOIN INITIALLY, THAT WOULD NOT FORECLOSE ITS JOINING AT A LATER TIME.

- SINCE PFP IS DESIGNED TO OFFER MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY AND IS ONLY NOW TAKING FORM, STATES INTERESTED IN ITS DEVELOPMENT SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE FROM THE BEGINNING. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN RUSSIA'S INTEREST TO JOIN PFP AT AN EARLY DATE, SO THAT IT CAN HELP SHAPE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM.

13. Q: WILL RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN PFP LEAD TO CONCERNS IN CHINA, JAPAN, OR OTHER NEIGHBORING ASIAN STATES?

A: NO ASIAN STATE HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PFP TO THE UNITED STATES. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THAT PFP IS A PR0GRAM AIMED AT ENHANCING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO THEIR INTERESTS.

14. Q: WOULD RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN PFP AFFECT ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CIS?

A: PFP WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL VEHICLE THROUGH WHICH RUSSIA AND OTHER CIS MEMBERS COULD COOPERATE. BY JOINING PFP, ALL PARTNERS REAFFIRM THEIR UN AND CSCE COMMMITMENTS TO, E.G., REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, TO RESPECT EXISTING BORDERS, AND TO SETTLE DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THESE ARE NOT ADDITIONS TO EXISTING RUSSIAN COMMITMENTS.

15. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

TALBOTT

BT

#9220

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9220

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: NATO: May 30 Permreps Lunch-The NATO/Russia Relationship [part 1] (4 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[01/04/1994-12/16/1994]

2015-0791-M
rs1263

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	re: NATO: May 30 Permreps Lunch-The NATO/Russia Relationship [part 2] (3 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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008. cable	re: NATO: May 30 Permreps Lunch-The NATO/Russia Relationship [part 3] (4 pages)	05/31/1994	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: OAAUZYUW RUEHNOA2177 1531629-UUUU--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
OSRI: RUEHNO
DTG: 021629Z JUN 94
ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
TO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ASD-RSA(EUR-NATO)// IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3872
INFO: RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1607
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RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS WWEQ
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1967
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1963
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 1522
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RULYSDD/USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-ATA//
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1155
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1639
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
SUBJ: MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING WITH
COOPERATION PARTNERS, 25 MAY 1994: STATEMENT
BY RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV
TEXT:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 002177
SECDEF ALSO FOR ASD(NS&CP)
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS, AND EUR/ISCA
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: NATO, MCAP, DPC, NACC, RS
SUBJECT: MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING WITH
COOPERATION PARTNERS, 25 MAY 1994: STATEMENT
BY RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV

1. NATO'S UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TEXT OF RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV'S 25 MAY STATEVENT TO THE DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING WITH COOPERATION PARTNERS FOLLOWS.
2. BEGIN TEXT.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE
"PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" PROGRAMME

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (BRUSSELS, 25TH MAY 1994)

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

FIRST OF ALL I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS SOME VIEWS ON ONE OF THE MOST VITAL PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME - THE ORGANISATION OF ESSENTIALLY NEW RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AND STABILITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, ON THE BASIS OF CONSTRUCTIVE COLLABORATION.

UNFORTUNATELY THE WORLD DID NOT BECOME MORE STABLE AFTER GLOBAL CONFRONTATION HAD CEASED: QUITE THE OPPOSITE. THE PROBABILITY OF LOCAL WARS AND ARMED CONFLICTS INCREASED. SUCH A SITUATION MAKES IT NECESSARY, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, TO ORGANISE EFFECTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS ADEQUATE FOR PRESENT CONDITIONS.

THESE FORM THE BASIS ON WHICH A STRONG GLOBAL SYSTEM OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY CAN BE CONSTRUCTED IN THE FUTURE, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OPERATING UNDER ITS AEGIS.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HAS CONSISTENTLY FAVOURED THE CREATION OF AN ESSENTIALLY NEW SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY, PRIMARILY IN EUROPE. THE OLD STRUCTURES FOR MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY WERE GEARED TO CONFRONTATION BY TWO ANTAGONISTIC BLOC SYSTEMS. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS THE INEVITABLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF VARIOUS STATES ARE COMING TO THE FORE; PREVIOUSLY THESE WERE RENDERED LESS ACUTE BY BLOC DISCIPLINE. IT HAS THEREFORE BECOME NECESSARY TO CREATE MECHANISMS WHEREBY THESE CONFLICTS CAN BE IDENTIFIED IN GOOD TIME AND PRESENTED FROM BECOMING FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MILITARY DANGER AND MILITARY THREAT.

WE MUST BE REALISTS AND HAVE REGARD TO THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY MECHANISMS FOR CONTAINMENT WHICH DEVELOPED DURING THE YEARS OF THE COLD WAR STILL EXIST IN THE WORLD AND IN EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON WE ARE CAREFULLY TRACKING THE EVOLUTION OF ONE SUCH STRUCTURE, NATO, AND THE EFFORTS OF THAT ORGANISATION TO ADAPT TO NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS; WE ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT OF OUR CO-OPERATIVE LINKS WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

THERE ARE MANY CONCEALED OBSTACLES AND DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANISING GENUINELY EQUAL BILATERAL COLLABORATION WITH

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NATO. THESE MUST BE OVERCOME BY JOINT EFFORTS.

ON THE ONE HAND, RUSSIA AND NATO ARE IN A POSITION TO

CO-OPERATE WHEN THEY ARE FACED BY COMMON THREAT, FOR EXAMPLE, EXISTING OR POSSIBLE FUTURE LOCAL CRISES AND CONFLICTS OR THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS OR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NOT YET GOT RID OF ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE AREA OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THE VIEW IN NATO IS THAT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR, POTENTIAL IS AN OBJECTIVE THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE. ACCORDING TO OUR ASSESSMENT, EVEN AFTER REORGANISATION THE MILITARY MIGHT OF NATO IS BY NO MEANS ADEQUATE TO MEET EXISTING AND REALISTICALLY FORESEEABLE THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE BLOC. YOU DO NOT CONCEAL THE FACT THAT IN THE NEW CONTEXT YOU SEE YOUR PRINCIPAL TASK AS THE PRESERVATION OF THE ALLIANCE AS THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY STRUCTURE ON THE CONTINENT.
SPECIFIC WAYS, FORMS AND METHODS FOR A TRANSITION TO COLLABORATION IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY HAVE NOT BEEN DEFINED; THIS IMPLIES A DANGER THAT THE ARMS RACE WILL TAKE A FRESH TURN.
A MECHANISM NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED FOR CO-OPERATION BY RUSSIA AND NATO IN THE EVENT OF CRISIS.
THERE IS ONE MORE VITAL FACTOR. IN OUR VIEW, WORK ON MAINTAINING STABILITY IN EUROPE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS IS CONSTANTLY INCREASING.
THE CSCE IS BEING TRANSFORMED INTO A REGIONAL ORGANISATION TO MAINTAIN MILITARY-POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOP COLLABORATION IN AN AREA EXTENDING FROM VANCOUVER TO VLADIVOSTOK, WITH APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONS.
THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY IN CSCE ACTIVITIES IS NOW SHIFTING TOWARDS THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN REACHED, STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING THE MECHANISMS THAT HAVE BEEN CREATED AND GIVING THEM THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH OTHER EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES.
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT NATO, WHILE TAKING A POSITIVE VIEW ON THE WHOLE OF CSCE ACTIVITIES AT THEIR PRESENT STAGE, THINKS THAT ESTABLISHING IT AS A VALUABLE AND EFFECTIVE AGENCY TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT WILL STILL TAKE A CONSIDERABLE TIME.
IN OUR VIEW, THESE ASSESSMENTS DO NOT EXAMINE THE DESIRE OF NATO TO USE THE HELSINKI PROCESS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AS A BASIC FACTOR IN A NEW BLOC-FREE SYSTEM OF SECURITY. ON THE PRETEXT THAT THE CSCE ESTABLISHMENT PROCESS IS STILL INCOMPLETE, IT IS REGARDED SOLELY AS AN
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ANCILLARY FACTOR, ITS MISSION BEING TO SUPPLEMENT STRUCTURES SUCH AS NATO, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO HELP

THEM IN MAINTAINING SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT.
THE IMPRESSION IS CREATED THAT IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED IN NATO THAT THERE SHOULD BE CO-OPERATION WITH THE CSCE, BUT AT TIMES ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO PRESENT THE ALLIANCE AS THE KEY ELEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY.
WHAT ARE THE VIEWS IN RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO, ON ITS TRANSFORMATION INTO A UNIVERSAL PEACEKEEPING AND STABILISING FORCE? THEY ARE OFTEN DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED.
THERE IS ONE VIEW OF NATO AS A POWERFUL FACTOR FOR STABILITY, BOTH IN EUROPE AND ALSO IN ASIA IN THE FUTURE. CONVERSELY, OTHERS TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS, IS AND WILL BE THE INSTRUMENT OF BLOC THINKING FROM THE "COLD WAR" PERIOD. IT IS ASSERTED THAT IN ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RUSSIA THE WEST IS ONLY MAKING A TRANSITION FROM A POLICY OF CONTAINMENT BY DETERRENCE TO A POLICY OF CONTAINMENT BY WAY OF DRIP-FEED COLLABORATION.
OUR POSITION IS THAT INCREASING THE ANTI-CRISIS POTENTIAL SHOULD BE ON A EUROPE-WIDE SCALE, BY SPEEDING UP THE CONVERSION OF THE CSCE INTO AN AUTHORITATIVE, FULL-BLOODED POLITICAL STRUCTURE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL (NACC) SHOULD BECOME AN INDEPENDENT BODY, BUT CLOSELY LINKED TO THE CSCE, FOR PAN-EUROPEAN MILITARY-POLITICAL COLLABORATION AND DOR THE PREVENTION AND SETTLEMENT OF CRISES AND ARMED CONFLICTS. SUBSEQUENTLY THE NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL MIGHT BECOME A MILITARY COMPONENT IN A FUTURE BLOC-FREE SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, ALONGSIDE THE CSCE POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC MECHANISM.
IN OUR OPINION, THE CSCE AND THE NACC MIGHT PROVIDE CONSTANT LEADERSHIP AND CO-ORDINATION FOR THE EFFORTS OF NATO, THE WEU, THE EU AND THE CIS TO STRENGTHEN COLLABORATION AND MUTUAL SECURITY.
IN THIS CONNECTION WE THINK THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES WITHIN THE CIS FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES, IN NO WAY CONFLICTS WITH GENERAL EUROPEAN INTERESTS.
WE REJECT AS COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED THE SUSPICIONS THAT RUSSIA IS ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE "IMPERIAL AIMS" BY FAVOURING INTEGRATION WITHIN THE CIS FRAMEWORK.
THE TASHKENT COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY (CST) IS THE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF MILITARY-POLITICAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE CIS COUNTRIES. WE DO NOT INTEND TO USE THE CST AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPE OR WITH ASIA, AND CERTAINLY NOT TO TRANSFORM IT INTO A CLOSED MILITARY BLOC. WE TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE CST
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CREATES THEOPPORTUNITY FOR ARRANGING NEW FORMS OF PARTNERSHI BETWEEN THE CIS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE CISAND THE WEU, AND THE CIS AND NATO.

RUSSIA IS REDY TO ORGANISE A REAL AND SOUNDLY BASED
STRATEGI PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO.
THE NATO "PARTNERSHIP FR PEACE" (PFP) PROGRAMME HAS ITS
ROLE TO PLAY IN HIS PROCESS, BECAUSE OBJECTIVELY THE
IDEA OF PARNERSHIP IS AIMED AT ORGANISING RELATIONSHIPS
BETEEN FORMER ENEMIES, AND PRESERVING PEACE AND
STAILITY IN EUROPE.
HOWEVER, THE PFP IS NOT A COMPEHENSIVE ANSWER TO THE
REAL QUESTIONS OF OUR TIME IT IS ONLY A FIRST STEP IN
FORMING AN ESSENTIALLY NEW STRATEGIC COMMUNITY OF ALLIES
FOR PEACE AND SECURITY.
RUSSIA IS INTERESTED IN A BROADER FORMAT OF RELATIONS
WITH NATO THAN THAT PROVIDED FOR BY THE PROGRAMME; THIS
FORMAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO THE WEIGHT AND POSITION OF
RUSSIA IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL LINKS.
WHEN RUSSIA SAYS THAT IT IS INTERESTED IN A BROADER
FORMAT OF PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO THAN THAT PROPOSED IN THE
PFP, THIS DOES NOT MEAN CLAIMING SOME KIND OF PRIVILEGED
STATUS. THE QUESTION IS PRIMARILY THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF
THE PARTNERSHIP ITSELF; BROADENING THE CONTENT OF THE
PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE A MATTER OF EQUAL INTEREST TO
STATES IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.
WITHIN ITS PRESENT FRAMEWORK, THE PFP ACTKALLY AMOUNTS TO
FAIRLY LIMITED MILITARY COLLABORATION. WE PROPOSE THAT
THE SCOPE OF THE PARTNERSHIP SHOULD NOT BE KEPT NARROW;
IT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE FORM OF FULL-SCALE COLLABORATION
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO, BOTH IN THE MILITARY FIELD AND
IN OTHER VITAL AREAS.
IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TODAY WE ARE
SUBMITTING A DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE BASIC PARAMETERS FOR
PRACTICAL PARTICIPATION BY RUSSIA IN IMPLEMENTING THE
"PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" PROGRAMME.
AT THE SAME TIME WE PROPOSE MAKING A START ON PREPARING A
LARGE-SCALE "RUSSIA-NATO" COLLABORATION PROGRAMME BASED
ON THESE PARAMETERS, AND TO SIGN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT
WHEN THE PROGRAMME IS READY.
I WILL DWELL BRIEFLY ON SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN
THE PARAMETERS. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD THE PROPOSAL IS TO
CREATE AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS ON
A WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS IN EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY
WHICH WOULD OPERATE BOTH ON A REGULAR BASIS AND IN CRISIS
SITUATIONS. WE INTEND TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH
CONSULTATIONS AT ALL LEVELS, FROM EXPERTS TO THE HIGHEST
LEVELS IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP. SUCH A
MECHANISM WOULD BE A PRACTICAL STEP TOWARDS FORMING A
LONG-TERM SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 USNATO 002177
SECDEF ALSO FOR ASD(NS&CP)
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, S/NIS, AND EUR/ISCA
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: NATO, MCAP, DPC, NACC, RS
SUBJECT: MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING WITH
COOPERATION PARTNERS, 25 MAY 1994: STATEMENT
BY RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV
EUROPE UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE CSCE.
IN THE MILITARY FIELD WE ARE READY TO DEVELOP
COLLABORATION WITH THE ALLIANCE AND WITH PARTNERS IN
SECTORS SUCH AS THE CO-ORDINATION OF JOINT MILITARY

ACTIVITIES, PEACEKEEPING, TRANSPARENCY IN MILITARY
PLANNING AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING OF PERSONEL.
WE VISUALISE OUR MILITARY COLLABORATION AS BEING QUITE
VARIED IN FORM. I HOPE THAT IT WILL INCLUDE PARTICIPATION
IN THE WORK OF THE LEADING PLANNING AGENCIES IN THE
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME, THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH
PARTNERS ON A WIDE RANGE OF PROBLEMS, AND MUCH ELSE
BESIDES.
WE PROPOSE ORGANISING PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS IN OTHER NO
LESS IMPORTANT AREAS OF COLLABORATION: DISARMAMENT AND
ARMS CONTROL, CONVERSION, NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, PRESERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, ETC.
GENTLEMEN, WE ARE FACED WITH THE TRULY HISTORIC TASK OF
BUILDING A NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORDER IN EUROPE
FREE FROM CONFRONTATION.
THE EASTERN SAGES SAY THAT A JOURNEY OF A THOUSAND MILES
BEGINS WITH THE FIRST STEP. WE MUST TAKE VIGOROUS STEPS
TOWARDS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND FULLER COLLABORATION.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.
END TEXT.
HUNTER
BT
#2177
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 05
<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 05
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000
SUBJ: -3:435-46'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, JUNE 10, 1994, ISTANBUL, TURKEY
TEXT:

********** INCOMPLETE MESSAGE **********

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 160602
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN)
SUBJECT: -3:435-46'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, JUNE 10, 1994, ISTANBUL, TURKEY
1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV TOLD THE SECRETARY JUNE 10 THAT HE IS PREPARED TO GO TO BRUSSELS BEFORE THE G-7 NAPLES SUMMIT TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND PRESENT THE RUSSIAN POSITION ON ADDITIONAL CONTACTS WITH NATO ABOVE AND BEYOND PFP. HE SAID HE DID NOT FORESEE ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. IN THE UNSC OVER A NORTH KOREA RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NORTH KOREA, BUT CHINA COULD BE A PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED MISGIVINGS OVER KOZYREV'S SUGGESTION OF TWO ADDITIONAL MINISTERIALS ON BOSNIA AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE CONTACT GROUP TO CONCLUDE ITS WORK QUICKLY. KOZYREV EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT SUPPORTING THE CANDIDACY OF THE CANADIAN PROPOSED AS CHIEF PROSECUTOR FOR THE YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL BECAUSE THE PANEL WOULD THEN BE MADE UP EXCLUSIVELY OF WESTERN JUDGES. ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, HE SUGGESTED THAT RUSSIA WAS READY FOR A MORE PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE WITH THE CSCE OVER THE CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THAT MOSCOW FAVORED A FORMULA FOR CSCE-CIS INVOLVEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE MODEL OF ABKHAZIA. HE ALSO SAID HE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP COCOM ON HIS PERSONAL AGENDA WITH THE SECRETARY. END SUMMARY.
3. THE SECRETARY MET WITH KOZYREV ON THE MARGINS OF THE

ISTANBUL NACC MINISTERIAL AT THE SECRETARY'S HOTEL SUITE. THE SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SINIS COLLINS, EUR A/S OXMAN, S/P STEINBERG, PA A/S DONILON, AMB. REDMAN, EUR/ISCA PURNELL (NOTETAKER), AND P. AFANASENKO (INTERPRETER). KOZYREV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE MINISTER G. SIDOROVA, MFA NORTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR IVANOV, A. NIKIFOROV, S. NIKOLAYEV, AND V. ZAYTSEV (INTERPRETER).

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

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4. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT HE AND KOZYREV WERE CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION THEY BEGAN OVER LUNCH. ON NATO AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP), HE NOTED THAT THE NATO PERMREPS MEET EVERY WEDNESDAY IN BRUSSELS. HE URGED KOZYREV TO PICK ONE OF THOSE WEDNESDAYS BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE MONTH TO GO TO BRUSSELS, SIGN THE PFP FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AND PRESENT RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON HOW FURTHER COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND MOSCOW MIGHT DEVELOP. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO GET PFP OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THE NAPLES G-7 SUMMIT, THE SECRETARY STRESSED. KOZYREV'S PRESENTATION COULD THEN BE OFFICIALLY DISTRIBUTED AS A "PROTOCOL," PERHAPS AS A JOINT PROTOCOL INCLUDING REMARKS BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL OR AS PART OF AN "AGREED MINUTE" THAT NATO COULD PUBLISH AS A SUMMARY OF THE DAY'S EVENTS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE SOONER THIS COULD HAPPEN THE BETTER IN ORDER TO PUT THIS ISSUE BEHIND US. (NOTE: PRIOR TO THIS MEETING, DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FM KOZYREV ON THE RUSSIAN INTEREST IN A "PROTOCOL" INDICATED THAT KOZYREV WAS USING THAT TERM TO CONVEY ITS'MEANING IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE -- I.E., A RECORD OF A MEETING OR A DISCUSSION AND NOT AN AGREEMENT. END NOTE)

5. KOZYREV CONCURRED, SAYING THAT HE HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS, WHO DID NOT SEE ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THIS APPROACH. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR CONTACT AMBASSADOR HUNTER IF HE NEEDED ANY ASSISTANCE. AMBASSADOR HUNTER WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP FACILITATE.

NORTH KOREA

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6. TURNING TO NORTH KOREA, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. IS COMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA OF A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT IMPOSES SANCTIONS TO TAKE EFFECT ON A SPECIFIED FUTURE DATE. WHAT WE DO NOT WANT, HE INDICATED, IS TO ISSUE JUST ANOTHER WARNING. TO DO THAT WOULD ONLY MAKE US APPEAR INEFFECTUAL. THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY RUSSIA COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE RESOLUTION AND SEQUENCED INTO THE PROCESS.

7. KOZYREV RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT THERE IS STILL WORK TO BE DONE IN NEW YORK ON NORTH KOREA. THERE ARE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH ONE PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC. THE SECRETARY CONCURRED. KOZYREV SAID THAT THERE IS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VAGUE STATEMENTS OF THE PAST BY THE UNSC PRESIDENT AND WHAT RUSSIA NOW HAD IN MIND. ALL OPTIONS SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE PARTIES, HE SAID, INCLUDING THE OPTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IF NORTH KOREA CONTINUES TO REJECT REASONABLE PROPOSALS, THIS WILL BE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF ITS INTENTIONS.

8. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS RUSSIAN UN PERMREP VORTONTSOV TO HAVE IN MIND SOMETHING MORE LIKE A WARNING FOR THIS RESOLUTION. THE U.S. WOULD CONSIDER SUCH AN APPROACH INEFFECTUAL. WE CAN, HOWEVER, WORK ON THIS IN NEW YORK; WE WANT A RESOLUTION. KOZYREV REPEATED HIS OBSERVATION THAT PAST UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN VAGUE AND THAT GREATER SPECIFICITY IS NEEDED. THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA ON THIS IN NEW YORK. THE PROBLEMS WOULD BE WITH OTHERS. LET US HAVE AT LEAST SOME MENTION OF SANCTIONS IN A RESOLUTION, HE CONCLUDED.
9. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE UNDERSTAND THAT CHINA DOES NOT WANT TO CONFRONT THIS ISSUE. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER CHINA WILL EXERCISE ITS VETO. IN ANY CASE, WE MUST NOT BACK DOWN IN ADVANCE. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD PRESENT THEM WITH A CLEAR RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS. IF IT IS ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, WE CAN DRAW UP A PRECISE FORMULA.
10. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THE U.S. HAS IN MIND A TWO-PHASED APPROACH. PHASE ONE IS TO USE LIMITED SANCTIONS TO TRY TO DRAW THE NORTH KOREANS INTO A DIALOGUE. PHASE TWO WOULD ENVISION INTRODUCING MORE SEVERE SANCTIONS IF THE NORTH KOREANS DO SOMETHING UNACCEPTABLE, LIKE FUELING A REACTOR. KOZYREV EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WHAT THE NORTH KOREANS ARE SAYING NOW IS "OUTRAGEOUS," SOUNDING LIKE A MILITARY THREAT AIMED AT THE SOUTH KOREANS AND JAPANESE.
BOSNIA
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11. THE SECRETARY SUMMARIZED FOR THE GROUP RUSSIA'S POSITION ON BOSNIA THAT HE AND KOZYREV HAD DISCUSSED EARLIER. KOZYREV HAD SUGGESTED DURING THE NACC LUNCHEON EARLIER THAT DAY THAT THE CONTACT GROUP BRING A PROPOSAL TO A MINISTERIAL MEETING THAT MINISTERS IN TURN COULD PRESENT TO THE PARTIES. THE MINISTERS WOULD ASK FOR THE REACTION OF THE PARTIES AND GIVE THEM A VERY SHORT DEADLINE. THE PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO BE MADE PUBLIC SO THAT PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE WHO IS REASONABLE AND WHO IS NOT. UNDER THIS APPROACH DETAILS REGARDING BRCKO COULD BE LEFT UNRESOLVED FOR THE TIME BEING IF THE CONTACT GROUP COULD NOT RESOLVE THIS MATTER.
12. KOZYREV EXPANDED ON THIS BY SAYING HE SAW TWO OPTIONS: PRESENTING THE MINISTERS AND THE PARTIES WITH A TOTAL PROPOSAL OR ONE THAT BROUGHT THEM AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. A SECOND MINISTERIAL WOULD BE HELD TO HEAR THE RESPONSE OF THE PARTIES AND BRING THEM TO A "DECISION SHOWDOWN."
13. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE IDEA OF A SECOND ADDITIONAL MINISTERIAL. VALUABLE TIME WOULD BE LOST AND THE MINISTERS THEMSELVES ARE NOT AS WELL VERSED IN THE DETAILS OF THE SITUATION AS THE CONTACT GROUP NEGOTIATORS. KOZYREV RESPONDED THAT HIS PLAN WOULD GIVE THE PUBLIC AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE WHO IS REASONABLE. THERE WOULD BE ONLY THREE OR FOUR WEEKS BETWEEN THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND THE PROCESS COULD BE COMPLETE BY THE END OF JULY.
14. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT EVERY WEEK THAT PASSES IS VALUABLE TIME LOST. HE DREW KOZYREV'S ATTENTION TO

THE RECENT HOUSE VOTE ON LIFTING THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO. A SIMILAR MEASURE COULD PASS SOON IN THE SENATE. A UNILATERAL LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO MAY DECREASE BOSNIA'S INCENTIVE TO MOVE TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, WHICH COULD COMPLICATE THE PROCESS. KOZYREV SAID HE WOULD RATHER NOT EVEN THINK OF THIS SCENARIO. ANY SUCH ACTION BY THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD GENERATE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION BY THE DUMA.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT A BETTER APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE CONTACT GROUP TO PRESENT THE MINISTERS WITH A DECISION. THE MINISTERS SHOULD NOT HAVE TO WAIT TWO TO THREE WEEKS FOR A REACTION FROM THE PARTIES. KOZYREV SAID HE WOULD TALK TO RUSSIAN NEGOTIATOR CHURKIN TO TRY TO MAKE THIS HAPPEN. BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION. THE SERBS SEND CONFUSING SIGNALS TO THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC, GIVING THEM THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT THEY AGREE TO EVERYTHING AND THE MUSLIMS AGREE TO NOTHING. KOZYREV SAID HE WANTS TO AVOID THIS. ADDING ANOTHER MINISTERIAL WILL BRING HOME TO RUSSIANS THAT THEY ARE SERIOUSLY FOCUSSING ON AND COULD BE NEAR A SOLUTION. HE CONCURRED WHEN THE SECRETARY NOTED THE NEED TO AVOID ANY SUCH FOLLOW-UP MINISTERIAL IF THE MINISTERS THEMSELVES HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT OVER A CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL.

16. THE SECRETARY SAID HE COULD SEE THE POINT OF HAVING THE PARTIES PRESENT AT THE NEXT MINISTERIAL, BUT WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO INCLUDE THEM IF THE CONTACT GROUP ITSELF IS UNDECIDED OVER THE BEST APPROACH. AS SOON AS WE START TALKING ABOUT "SUB-OPTIONS," HE ARGUED, IT SIMPLY ENCOURAGES THE PARTIES NOT TO REACH AGREEMENT. KOZYREV SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE THE CASE. POINTING TO EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT, HE SAID THAT AS OPTIONS BECOME NARROW, THOSE LEADING THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST INSIST THAT THE PARTIES MEET IN ORDER TO FORCE A REAL DECISION.

17. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ASK THE CONTACT GROUP ITSELF TO SUGGEST AN APPROACH. HE NOTED THAT IF THERE WERE INDEED A MINISTERIAL, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA WOULD FAVOR HOLDING IT PRIOR TO THE NAPLES G-7 SUMMIT. KOZYREV CONCURRED AND ADDED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE CONTACT GROUP WAS USEFUL INSOFAR AS IT HELPED TO "EXHAUST" POSSIBILITIES. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA, HOWEVER, MUST NOT ALLOW A VACUUM TO DEVELOP IN THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT.

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

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18. THE SECRETARY ASKED THAT RUSSIA SUPPORT CHRISTOPHER AMERASINGHE (A CANADIAN CITIZEN OF SRI LANKAN ORIGIN) TO BE CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE UN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. KOZYREV EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS. ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL WERE FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS COULD BE HARD ON PUBLIC OPINION IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE PORTRAYED UNFAVORABLY IN THE SERBIAN PRESS AND COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. IF HE WERE REALLY A SRI LANKAN, EDUCATED IN CANADA, THAT MIGHT BE ALL RIGHT, KOZYREV SAID. BUT A CANADIAN CITIZEN IS A WESTERN OFFICIAL.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

19. KOZYREV TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH (N-K). HE SAID THAT RUSSIA WANTS TO CRAFT A SOLUTION THERE USING THE FORMULA FOR DEALING WITH PEACEKEEPING AND NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT TAKING SHAPE IN GEORGIA. MOSCOW ENVISIONS A CLOSE LINK WITH THE CSCE, BUT SEES NO ALTERNATIVE TO DEPLOYING A CIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE. RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS COOPERATION WITH THE CSCE. BUT AS LONG AS THE DIALOGUE IS CONDUCTED ON AN "IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL," IT WILL BE HARD TO REACH AGREEMENT. KOZYREV URGED THE U.S. TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THE N-K PROBLEM AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES TO SEEK A BUSINESSLIKE SOLUTION.

20. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE CSCE MINSK GROUP APPEARS TO HAVE MADE PROGRESS RECENTLY IN ITS EFFORTS TO BROKER A CEASE-FIRE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR A RUSSIAN FORCE PRESENCE. SINIS COLLINS ADDED THAT WE UNDERSTAND WHAT THE RUSSIANS MEAN WHEN THEY REFER TO THE "ABKHAZ MODEL." IN FACT, THE PROCESS APPEARS TO BE GOING IN THAT DIRECTION. MINSK GROUP CHAIRMAN ELIARSON WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO THE REGION NEXT WEEK TOGETHER WITH RUSSIAN NEGOTIATOR KAZIMIROV AND U.S. NEGOTIATOR PRESEL TO TRY TO MAKE SOME PRACTICAL PROGRESS.

COCOM

21. KOZYREV RAISED THE ISSUE OF COCOM. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE DISCUSSIONS UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS AND RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV HAVE HELD ON THIS SUBJECT. THIS IS THE APPROPRIATE CHANNEL. KOZYREV AGREED, ADDING THAT HE HAD RAISED,THE TOPIC ONLY TO KEEP IT ON THE MINISTERS' AGENDA.

22. COMMENT: KOZYREV THROUGHOUT THESE TWO DAYS IN ISTANBUL WAS CONFIDENT AND ASSURED. HE CLEARLY SIGNALLED THAT THE PFP DEBATE AND NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE BEGAN WITH YELTSIN LAST AUGUST ARE OVER. HE USED THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE TO REINFORCE YELTSIN'S PRONOUNCEMENT THAT DEBATE IS AT AN END AND RUSSIA IS GOING TO SIGN ON. IT IS GOING TO BE IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW SEIZE THE MOMENT AND INSURE THAT NOTHING GOES AWRY IN BRUSSELS. AMB. HUNTER WILL NEED TO FOLLOW UP PROMPTLY WITH HIS RUSSIAN COUNTERPART TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM THAT CAN NOW BRING THIS PROCESS TO A CLOSE. ON KOREA, KOZYREV DID NOT TAKE US BEYOND THE PRESIDENTRS CONVERSATION WITH YELTSIN. HE CLOSED NO DOORS BUT HE LEFT THIS ISSUE ON THE TABLE. THIS MAY BE AN ISSUE WHERE HE IS NOT LOOKING TO PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN A POSITION OF TAKING A STAND BEFORE IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. IN THE END, HOWEVER, THE BOTTOM LINE WAS CONSISTENT: RUSSIA WILL ACCEPT A RESOLUTION THAT MENTIONS SANCTIONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE OPENING ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH SUGGESTS READINESS NOW TO MOVE ACTIVELY TOWARD FINDING AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA/CIS AND CSCE. WHILE THE DETAILS WILL BE TOUGH TO WORK, KOZYREV'S COMMENTS SEEM TO CONFIRM RUSSIAN SATISFACTION WITH OUR APPROACH ON GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA AND THEIR PROBING FOR A WAY TO USE A SIMILAR APPROACH TO GET AT THE N-K DEADLOCK.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0602
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0602

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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0183
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 1964
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1692
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 2027
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 2033
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 2086
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RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1673
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S INTERVENTION AT THE ISTANBUL NACC
MINISTERIAL - JUNE 10
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 002373
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
SECDEF FOR ISA (EUR-NATO POLICY)
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
VIENNA FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: NATO, NACC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S INTERVENTION AT THE ISTANBUL NACC

MINISTERIAL - JUNE 10
REF: USNATO 2360
1. PARA 2 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT THE NACC MINISTERIAL IN ISTANBUL ON JUNE 10 (SEE REFTEL REPORT) AS CARRIED IN THE JUNE 13 WIRELESS FILE.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL: FOUR YEARS AGO NATO PROPOSED TO FORMALIZE ITS EMERGING SECURITY COOPERATION WITH EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES THROUGH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL. THIS YEAR, NATO IS BUILDING ON THE NACC TO TRANSFORM ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EAST. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT NEITHER OUR INSTITUTIONS NOR OUR ASPIRATIONS WILL STOP AT THE OLD FRONTIERS OF THE COLD WAR. THE NACC REMAI I A POLITICAL FORUM WHERE NATIONS CAN COME TO DISCUSS ISSUES THAT AFFECT SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. WE SHARE A COMMON COMMITMENT TO DEEPEN COOPERATION AND WIDEN INTEGRATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE ADOPTED AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN JANUARY GIVES CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO THAT COMMITMENT. THE PARTNERSHIP WILL MAKE POSSIBLE JOINT OPERATIONS TO ADDRESS COMMON SECURITY PROBLEMS. AND IT WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR THE EVENTUAL EXPANSION OF THE ALLIANCE.
TWENTY COUNTRIES, ALL REPRESENTED HERE TODAY, HAVE JOINED THE PARTNERSHIP. IN THIS RESPECT, I AM PLEASED TO WELCOME OUR COLLEAGUES FROM FINLAND, SLOVENIA, AND SWEDEN AS PARTNERS. WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL JOIN THE PARTNERSHIP SOON.
THE PARTNERSHIP COORDINATION CELL AT MONS, THE HOME OF SHAPE, WAS INAUGURATED ON APRIL 28. FOR YEARS, NATO MEMBERS MET NEAR THAT POINT TO PLAN THE DEFENSE OF ALLIED TERRITORY. NOW WE MEET THERE WITH NEW PARTNERS, FOR A NEW PURPOSE; TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE CONTINENT. OUTSIDE THE BUILDING IN MONS STANDS A SECTION OF THE BERLIN WALL. THE SYMBOL OF EUROPE'S OLD DIVISION IS THERE TO REMIND US OF THE NEW INTEGRATION WE SEEK.
YESTERDAY, NATO MINISTERS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE THAT REITERATED TWO TENETS AT THE CORE OF THE PARTNERSHIP -- EQUALITY OF MEMBERSHIP AND FLEXIBILITY OF APPROACH. ALL MEMBERS JOIN AS EQUAL PARTNERS. NONE ENJOYS SPECIAL STATUS. AT THE SAME TIME, EACH PARTNER CAN DEVELOP WITH NATO AN INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM OF COOPERATION THAT REFLECTS ITS INTERESTS AND CAPABILITIES.
THROUGH THE PARTNERSHIP, WE WILL NOT ONLY ADDRESS COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS BUT DEMONSTRATE THE COMMITMENT AND DEVELOP THE HABITS OF COOPERATION THAT ARE THE LIFEBLOOD OF
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 002373
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
SECDEF FOR ISA (EUR-NATO POLICY)
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
VIENNA FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: NATO, NACC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S INTERVENTION AT THE ISTANBUL NACC
MINISTERIAL - JUNE 10
THE ALLIANCE.
LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO NATO'S EXPANSION. AND LET ME

REITERATE WHAT PRESIDENT CLINTON TOLD EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS IN PRAGUE LAST JANUARY: "THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER WHETHER NATO WILL TAKE ON NEW MEMBERS, BUT WHEN AND HOW WE WILL DO IT."
THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE NACC WERE MADE POSSIBLE BY THE REMARKABLE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. BUT THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE NACC WERE MADE NECESSARY BY THE URGENT SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT REMAIN. IN THE BALKANS, WE FACE THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT IN EUROPE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. WE HAVE SEEN VIOLENCE IN THE CAUCASUS AND IN CENTRAL ASIA. ELSEWHERE, TENSIONS PERSIST THAT COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT IF THEY ARE NOT RESOLVED. OUR DISCUSSIONS TODAY ON REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WILL THUS BE OF GREAT VALUE.
WITH RESPECT TO BOSNIA, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE STEPS AGREED AT THE GENEVA MINISTERIAL MEETING LAST MONTH OFFER THE BEST CHANCE FOR A RESOLUTION TO THAT HORRIBLE CONFLICT. WE MUST ALSO NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE OTHER DISPUTES, AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS, IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, ESPECIALLY IN KRAJINA, KOSOVO, AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA. THEY MUST BE RESOLVED TO AVOID A WIDER CONFLICT IN THE REGION.
IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES HAS WORKED WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO KEEP DISAGREEMENTS FROM ERUPTING INTO VIOLENCE. WHERE FIGHTING HAS BROKEN OUT, WE HAVE VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTED U.N. AND CSCE-BROKERED MEDIATION EFFORTS. WE WILL WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ENSURE THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING FORCES ARE IMPARTIAL, LIMITED IN THEIR AIMS, AND ACT IN WAYS THAT ARE COMPATIBLE WITH U.N. AND CSCE PRINCIPLES.
EUROPEAN STABILITY DEPENDS ON ALL COUNTRIES RESPECTING THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL THE STATES THAT EMERGED FROM THE SOVIET EMPIRE. NO COUNTRY SHOULD ASSERT A ROLE THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS. IN A DEMOCRATIC, UNDIVIDED EUROPE, THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE LINES OF DIVISION, AND NO MORE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.
WE MUST HOLD ALL PARTICIPATING STATES ACCOUNTABLE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH CSCE PRINCIPLES. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE THE FOUNDATION FOR A PEACEFUL, PROSPEROUS, AND DEMOCRATIC EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST STRENGTHEN THE CSCE'S CAPABILITIES IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION.
NACC CONSULTATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLEMENT CSCE AND U.N. EFFORTS BY BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 002373
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
SECDEF FOR ISA (EUR-NATO POLICY)
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
VIENNA FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: NATO, NACC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S INTERVENTION AT THE ISTANBUL NACC
HMINISTERIAL - JUNE 10
MEMBER NATIONS. THE NACC AD HOC GROUP ON PEACEKEEPING, SOON TO BE MERGED INTO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, HAS INTENSIFIED PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS, PLANNING, AND TRAINING. THE NACC HAS INCREASED COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC AREAS

OVER THE PAST YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, NEW COOPERATIVE EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY IN AIR DEFENSE, CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
THE NACC WILL MAINTAIN A DISTINCT AND COMPLEMENTARY ROLE IN DEVELOPING AND SUSTAINING SECURITY COOPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER NATIONS. AND IT WILL REMAIN THE FORUM FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NATIONS IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.
WE STILL FACE MANY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. BUT THE COLD WAR, WITH ITS 40-YEAR STRUGGLE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND TYRANNY, IS OVER. THE ROUTINE CHARACTER OF SOME OF THE TASKS IN WHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED ---- SCHEDULING JOINT EXERCISES AND CONSULTATIONS AND ALLOCATING OFFICE SPACE AND DRAFTING DOCUMENTS --- IS A SIGN OF JUST HOW FAR WE HAVE COME.
WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE NACC AND THE PARTNERSHIP HELP US ACHIEVE OUR GOAL OF A SECURE, FREE, AND FULLY INTEGRATED EUROPE, LINKED BY OPEN SOCIETIES AND OPEN MARKETS. BUT I AM CONFIDENT WE HAVE MADE AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING.
END TEXT.
HUNTER
BT
#2373
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
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SSN: 2373
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<^TOR>940616150643 M1103549

DIST:

SIT: NSC PONEMAN VAX

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.27)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: PRIORITY
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OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 220055Z JUN 94
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0000
INFO: ALL NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0000
SUBJ: NEW POLISH AMBASSADOR URGES POLISH MEMBERSHIF IN NATO TO ACTING SECRETARY

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 166385
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL, US
SUBJECT: NEW POLISH AMBASSADOR URGES POLISH MEMBERSHIF IN NATO TO ACTING SECRETARY

REF. WARSAW 8288

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. IN HIS JUNE10 PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS MEETING WITH ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT, NEW POLISH AMBASSADOR JERZY KOZMISKI ASKED FOR A "CLEAR STEP FORWARD FROM PRAGUE" ON POLISH NATO MEMBERSHIP AND FOR PROGRESS ON A BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC TREATY, GATT ACCESSION, AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PROFOSED INVESTMENT CONFERENCE. KOZMINSKI, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY OUTGOING POLISH CHARGE KOZLOWSKI, DROPFED OFF A LETTER FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON FROM PRESIDENT WALESA (REFTEL) MAKING MUCH THE SAME POINTS. THE ACT FG SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WANTS THE PRESIDENT'S WARSAW VISIT TO BE A SUCCESS AS WELL. ACCORDINGLY, WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO CONDITION EXPECTATIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAGNIFY CHANCES OF SUCCESS. HE INVITED KOZMINSKI TO RETURN FOR MORE

DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

NATO EXPANSION.
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3. FOLLOWING A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING -- HIS FIRST CALL ON THE USG AND THE PRESENTATION OF COPIES OF HIS CREDENTIALS -- NEW POLISH AMBASSADOR JERZY KOZMINSKI BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S JULY 6-7 VISIT TO WARSAW.
EXPECTATIONS, SAID THE ENVOY, ARE HIGH. FIRST, AND MOST IMPORTANT, THE POLISH PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT WANT TO SEE CONCRETE PROGRESS IN BRINGING POLAND CLOSER TO NATO; MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE REMAINS POLAND'S STRATEGIC GOAL. PRESIDENT WALESA HAS WRITTEN FRESIDENT CLINTON OUTLINING POLISH CURRENT THINKING ON THIS ISSUE AND ON THE ALLIANCE'S RELATIONSHIP TO RUSSIA. POLAND RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND RUSSIA, HE CONTINUED, BUT, AS FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI SAID AT ISTANBUL AND PRESIDENT WALESA STATED IN HIS LETTER, TIES BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA SHOULD NOT BE CLOSER THAN THOSE BETWEEN NATO AND THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROFE. ANY NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND MOSCOW MUST ONLY TAKE PLACE PARALLEL TO EXPANSION OF THE ALLIANCE TO INCLUDE THE SUCCESSFUL NEW DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, PAN-EUROFEAN LINKS MUST BE FURTHER DEVELOPED BY STRENGTHENING CSCE.

4. POLES OFTEN HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST SEES POLISH NATO MEMBERSHIP AS A FUNCTION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA, HE CONTINUED; POLAND ONLY GETS IN IF RUSSIA "GOES BAD." POLAND BELIEVES ITS MEMBERSHIP SHOULD STAND ON ITS OWN MERITS, NOT BE TIED TO NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS TO ITS EAST. FURTHERMORE, POLES REMAIN CONCERNED BY THE WEST'S ALL-TOO-FREQUENT LACK OF RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN TRANSGRESSIONS OR NEO-IMPERIALIST STATEMENTS. IT IS IMPORTANT, FOLAND, BELIEVES, THAT LIMITS BE MADE CLEAR IN ORDER TO AVOID POSSIBLY DANGEROUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE FUTURE.

5. THE ACTING SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE TOO HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL BE A RESOUNDING SUCCESS. THE PRAGUE MEETING WAS A SUCCESS AND WE LOOK TO BUILD ON THAT. IT IS IMFORTANT HOWEVER, TO ENSURE THAT EXPECTATIONS FOR THE TRIP ARE IN LINE WITH WHAT IS POSSIBLE. CRITERIA SHOULD BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAGNIFY THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS, NOT DISAPPOINTMENT.

POLAND SHOULD FORMULATE ITS SECURITY DESIDERATA IN A MANNER THAT CONFORMS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO OUR VISION AND POSE ITS QUESTIONS SO THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO SAY YES. THE DOOR TO NATO MEMBERSHIP IS OPEN TO POLAND AND THE IMPRESSION THAT NATO WILL ONLY EXPAND IF THINGS GO BAD IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IS SIMPLY WRONG. WE WANT TO DELINK NATO EXPANSION FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA BUT THERE IS A NEED FOR RUSSIA TO "INTERNAIZE" THE FACT THAT NATO WILL EXPAND -- NOT IN GROUPS, NOT AS A THREAT OR PUNISHMENT TO RUSSIA, BUT ONE NATION AT A TIME. THE INTEGRATION OF EASTERN GERMANY INTO NATO IS A POSSIBLE ANALOGY, THE ACTING SECRETARY WENT ON: THE SOVIETS INITIALLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE FORMER EAST GERMANY WOULD BECOME PART OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT OVER TIME AND WITH EFFECTIVE REASSURANCES WERE ABLE TO BRING THEMSELVES TO AGREE. RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF NATO EXPANSION WILL BE A SIMILAR PROCESS AND THE U.S. AND POLAND NEED TO WORK TOGETHER TO PREPARE THE RUSSIANS TO SEE THAT SUCH EXPANSION IS NOT A JUDGEMENT AGAINST THEM.

OTHER ISSUES:
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5. THE OTHER ISSUES POLAND WOULD LIKE TO SEE RESOLVED DURING THE VISIT RELATE TO ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, KOZMINSKI SAID. POLAND WANTS REMAINING GATT ISSUES RESOLVED IN TIME FOR THE MEETINGS IN WARSAW. IT WOULD LIKE AS WELL AT THAT TIME TO BE ABLE TO EXCHANGE RATIFICATION OF A U.S.-POLISH BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC TREATY (BET). RATIFICATION OF A BET WOULD BE A GOOD SIGNAL TO BUSINESSMEN AND THE POLISH PUBLIC THAT THE U.S. SEES POLAND AS A SUCCESSFUL AND IMPORTANT MARKET. TOLD THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE BET CAN BE COMPLETED BEFORE POLISH PARLIAMENTARY ACTION ON ACCESSION TO THE BERNE CONVENTION (SOMETHING THAT PROBABLY CANNOT BE COMPLETED IN THE SHORT TIME LEFT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT), KOZMINSKI SAID THIS IS NOT THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLISH SIDE. IT WAS AGREED TO LOOK FURTHER INTO THE LEGAL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING ANY POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS.

6. ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING THE NEW AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON. GIVEN THE NUMBER AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES NEEDING FURTHER DISCUSSION, HE INVITED KOZMINKSI TO RETURN FOR ADDITIONAL TALKS PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE.

7. COMMENT: AS IS OFTEN THE CASE POLISH EXFECTATIONS CONCERNING WHAT THEY WILL GET OUT OF THE FRESIDENT'S VISIT

ARE HIGH AND PROBABLY EXAGGERATED. KOZMINSKI AND KOZLOWSKI WERE PLEASED BY WHAT THEY HEARD AS THE ACTING SECRETARY'S PROMISE TO WORK WITH WARSAW TO GET MOSCOW TO ACCEPT THAT NATO WILL EXPAND ONE COUNTRY AT A TIME -- "SOMETHING I'VE NEVER HEARD IN WASHINGTON BEFORE," KOZLOWSKI SAID AS THEY DEPARTED, AND "SOMETHING WHICH, IF SAID IN WARSAW, WILL MAKE THE VISIT A BIG SUCCESS., THE WARNING NOT TO TO LET EXPECTATIONS GET OUT OF HAND SEEMS, AS USUAL, TO HAVE FALLEN ON DEAF EARS. MOREOVER, THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ACTING SECRETARY WAS BREAKING NEW POLICY GROUND WAS ALSO INCORRECT. TALBOTT
BT
#6385
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6385

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SIT: FRIED NSC VAX

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: NATO: Russia Signs PFP Framework Document (6 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[01/04/1994-12/16/1994]

2015-0791-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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2015-0791-m (1.29)
KBH 2/7/2025

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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 0039
SUBJ: UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS' JULY 20-21 PARIS
- DISCUSSIONS: NPT EXTENSION, FISSILE-MATERIAL
- CUTOFF, NORTH KOREA, NATO EXPANSION,
- UKRAINE, RWANDA

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 20200
GENEVA FOR CD DEL; USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, NATO, RW, NK, FR
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS' JULY 20-21 PARIS
- DISCUSSIONS: NPT EXTENSION, FISSILE-MATERIAL
- CUTOFF, NORTH KOREA, NATO EXPANSION,
- UKRAINE, RWANDA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS REVIEWED A WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES WITH SENIOR ELYSEE, MATIGNON, QUAI, AND FRENCH MOD OFFICIALS JULY 20-21. HER INTERLOCUTORS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT, FEARING THAT THE NORTH KOREA IMBROGLIO SETS A BAD PRECEDENT AND THAT SOME NATIONS MAY TRY TO HOLD NPT EXTENSION HOSTAGE TO CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT). ON REGIONAL ISSUES, SENIOR FRENCH DEFENSE OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA AND REGRET THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT PROVIDED MORE CONCRETE ASSISTANCE. THEY ALSO ANTICIPATED THAT THE NATO EXPANSION ISSUE MAY MOVE BACK ON TO THE FRONT-BURNER, AS PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONTINUES TO BE THE OBJECT OF STRUGGLES BETWEEN THE

EAST EUROPEANS WHO WANT TO USE THE INITIATIVE TO GET CLOSER TO NATO AND THE RUSSIANS WHO WANT TO PUT THE BRAKE ON THIS PROCESS. ON UKRAINE, THEY REGISTERED CONCERN AT THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT TO USE WISELY THE USD 200 MILLION FUND FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY ESTABLISHED AT THE NAPLES G-7 SUMMIT.

3. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS PROFESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ON NPT EXTENSION AND POINTED OUT THAT SOLID PROGRESS IN CTBT NEGOTIATIONS IS CENTRAL TO ADVANCING OUR BROADER NONPROLIFERATION GOALS. SHE EXPLAINED THAT U.S. POLICY AIMS AT BRINGING NORTH KOREA BACK INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NPT OBLIGATIONS AND ASSURED HER HEARERS THAT THE U.S. WOULD GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF PYONGYANG RENEGES ON ITS COMMITMENTS. DR. DAVIS URGED THAT THE GOF SUPPORT THE U.S. FISSILE-MATERIAL CUT-OFF AND SOUTH ASIA NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES AND ALERTED HER INTERLOCUTORS THAT THE U.S. MAY SOON MAKE PROPOSALS FOR CONTROLLING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES. ON RWANDA, SHE SAID THAT THE U.S. IS REVIEWING ITS PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AIRLIFT REQUESTS BUT REJECTED CHARGES THAT THE U.S. HAS DONE NOTHING, POINTING TO U.S. PROVISION OF 50 APC'S TO EQUIP UNAMIR FORCES. END SUMMARY.

NPT

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4. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS REVIEWED A BROAD RANGE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES JULY 20-21 WITH QUAI DEPUTY SECRETARIES GENERAL ALAIN DEJAMMET AND CLAUDE MARTIN, MATIGNON DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR BERNARD DE MONTFERRAND, FRENCH MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR JEAN-CLAUDE MALLET, AND ELYSEE MILITARY ADVISOR CHRISTIAN QUESNOT. PROSPECTS FOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT AT NEXT YEAR'S CONFERENCE TOPPED HER INTERLOCUTOR'S CONCERNS. DEJAMMET, IN PARTICULAR, SEEMED NERVOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT NON-NUCLEAR STATES COULD HOLD NPT EXTENSION HOSTAGE IN AN EFFORT TO FORCE CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) FIRST. HE ASO EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARAB STATES, FEARING THAT SOME MIGHT THREATEN TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NPT UNLESS ISRAEL SIGNS UP. THE POSSIBLE ATTITUDE OF EGYPT WORRIED HIM ESPECIALLY, GIVEN CAIRO'S PERFORMANCE ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 PARIS 20200

GENEVA FOR CD DEL; USVIENNA FOR UNVIE

E.O. 12356: 74/6)

0-21 PARIS

- DISCUSSIONS: NPT EXTENSION, FISSILE-MATERIAL
- CUTOFF, NORTH KOREA, NATO EXPANSION,
- UKRAINE, RWANDA

5. DR. DAVIS ASSURED DEJAMMET THAT THE U.S. OPPOSES LINKING THE NPT AND CTBT. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHE STRESSED THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A CTBT IS CENTRAL TO MAKING PROGRESS ON A WIDE-RANGE OF NONPROLIFERATION GOALS, INCLUDING NPT EXTENSION. WHILE WARNING AGAINST OVER-CONFIDENCE, DR. DAVIS REPORTED THAT ACDA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GRAHAM HAS SOUNDED OUT MANY STATES ON NPT EXTENSION AND COME AWAY OPTIMISTIC. THERE ARE SOME

STATES, HOWEVER, ON WHICH WE NEED TO FOCUS. EGYPT IS ONE OF THESE, DAVIS AGREED.

NORTH KOREA

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6. MANY OF DR. DAVIS' INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CURRENT NORTH KOREAN IMBROGLIO SETS A BAD PRECEDENT FOR THE NPT REGIME. THEY ASKED WHETHER OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD NOT SEE THAT NORTH KOREA HAS OBTAINED SPECIAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S AND BEHAVE SIMILARLY, REPORTING THAT THE INDIANS AND PAKISTANS HAVE ALREADY RAISED THE NORTH KOREAN PRECEDENT IN TALKS WITH FRANCE. FRANCE, THEY SAID, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THIS PROBLEM BE TREATED AS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY AND REFERRED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR POSSIBLE SANCTIONS.

7. DR. DAVIS POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE VOTED FOR SANCTIONS, AND, IF IT HAD, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE HAD MUCH IMPACT ON NORTH KOREA.

8. DR. DAVIS STRESSED THAT THE U.S. IS PROCEEDING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF A FREEZE IN THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. SHE NOTED THAT WE EXPECT TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA IN GENEVA SHORTLY AFTER THE FUNERAL OF KIM IL SONG. SHE REPORTED THAT THE FIRST DAY'S DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE DPRK AND THE U.S. WERE WORKMANLIKE AND WITHOUT THE USUAL SHARP RHETORIC. SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE DPRK SEEMED TO BE FOCUSING ON OBTAINING LIGHT WATER REACTOR TECHNOLOGY, AND ALSO REQUESTED SECURITY ASSURANCES, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., AND AN END TO THE TRADE EMBARGO. ALTHOUGH THE ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE DEAL COULD BE FOUND IN THE POSITIONS BEING TAKEN BY PYONGYANG, IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT WE CAN AGREE ON HOW TO SEQUENCE THEM IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY.

9. THE FRENCH DOUBTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. MALLET AT MOD PREDICTED THAT THE CURRENT CRISIS WILL BE LONG AND DRAWN-OUT. THE KOREANS, HE CLAIMED, SEE THEMSELVES AS SURROUNDED BY THE CHINESE, RUSSIANS, AND JAPANESE AND BELIEVE POSSESSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE IS ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY.

UKRAINE

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10. DR. DAVIS DISCUSSED THE G-7 SUMMIT AGREEMENT ON ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE IN HER MEETING WITH THE QUAI'S MARTIN, ALLUDING TO THE UNCERTAINTIES RAISED BY THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT KUCHMA. SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. WAS GIVING PRIORITY TO GAINING UKRAINIAN ADHERENCE TO THE NPT, POSSIBLY BY OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR. MARTIN RESPONDED THAT IT APPEARS THAT AN INFORMAL BURDENSHARING ARRANGEMENT IS EVOLVING, WITH THE U.S. TAKING THE LEAD ON MISSILE AND MILITARY NUCLEAR

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 20200

GENEVA FOR CD DEL; USVIENNA FOR UNVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, NATO, RW, NK, FR

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS' JULY 20-21 PARIS

- DISCUSSIONS: NPT EXTENSION, FISSILE-MATERIAL

- CUTOFF, NORTH KOREA, NATO EXPANSION,
- UKRAINE, RWANDA

TECHNOLOGY AND FRANCE LEADING THE EFFORT ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY. DAVIS NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND EUROPE TO BE ACTIVE IN BOTH AREAS.

11. MARTIN SAID THE USD 200 MILLION AGREED AT NAPLES FOR CLOSING DOWN A CHERNOBYL REACTOR AND COMPLETING ITS REPLACEMENT WAS DISAPPOINTING, THOUGH IT WAS A BEGINNING. HE ADDED THAT THE GOF IS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED IN JAPANESE DISINTEREST. IN HIS VIEW, THE EASY PART IS COMING UP WITH THE USD 200 MILLION; GETTING THE UKRAINIANS TO USE THE MONEY EFFICIENTLY WILL BE HARDER. HE SAID FRENCH-UKRAINIAN TALKS ON CLOSING DOWN CHERNOBYL HAD THUS FAR BEEN NEGATIVE; THE GOF IS WAITING TO SEE WHAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL DO.

12. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION ON UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY, MARTIN RETURNED PERSISTENTLY TO THE HIGH COST THE OPERATION WOULD ENTAIL, AND THE RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS WE ALL FACE IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM. DR. DAVIS UNDERLINED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORT, EVEN THOUGH FINANCIAL RESOURCES WERE LIMITED.

SOUTH ASIA NONPROLIFERATION

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13. DR. DAVIS WARNED ALL OF THE DANGERS OF PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA, REPORTING THAT THE INDIANS MAY DECIDE SOON WHETHER OR NOT TO DEPLOY THE PRITHVI MISSILE. DEPLOYMENT COULD IN TURN TRIGGER MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS BY PAKISTAN. DEJAMMET ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. IS HAVING ANY LUCK IN CONVENING THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE IT HAS PROPOSED. DR. DAVIS REPLIED THAT THE INDIANS VIEW THEIR SECURITY IN RELATIONSHIP TO CHINA AND URGED DEJAMMET AND HER OTHER INTERLOCUTORS TO HELP FIND WAYS TO CONVENE A MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE.

FISSILE-MATERIAL CUT-OFF

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14. DR. DAVIS APPEALED TO DEJAMMET FOR HELP IN CREATING A MANDATE IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) IN AUGUST FOR A FISSILE-MATERIAL CUT-OFF CONVENTION. SHE STRESSED THAT SUCH AN ACCORD IS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS IN OUR GOALS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

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15. DR. DAVIS ALSO ALERTED DEJAMMET THAT THE U.S. WILL SOON BE SHARING THOUGHTS WITH FRANCE ON A NEW REGIME WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY BAN EXPORT OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES BUT ALSO REGULATE THEIR STOCKPILING AND PRODUCTION. HE RESPONDED THAT FRANCE IS MOVING VERY MUCH IN THE SAME DIRECTION AND LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING U.S. IDEAS IN GREATER DETAIL.

RUSSIA, EAST EUROPE, AND WESTERN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

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16. ASKED TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP), MALLET RESPONDED WITH A DISQUISITION ON THE BROADER PROBLEMS OF ASSOCIATING THE EAST EUROPEANS WITH WESTERN INSTITUTIONS. PFP ITSELF, HE CONTINUED, HAS A BUILT-IN AMBIGUITY WHICH WILL "POISON" IT FOR A LONG

TIME. IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SATISFY BOTH THE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 PARIS 20200
GENEVA FOR CD DEL; USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, NATO, RW, NK, FR
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS' JULY 20-21 PARIS
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- CUTOFF, NORTH KOREA, NATO EXPANSION,
- UKRAINE, RWANDA
RUSSIANS AND EAST EUROPEANS AT THE SAME TIME. THE QUESTION, MALLET ASSERTED, IS HOW LONG THE SITUATION SHOULD BE TOLERATED. FRENCH MOD EXPERTS SAY THAT SOONER OR LATER THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (CEEC'S) IN THE EU -- AND THEREFORE IN NATO -- WILL HAVE TO BE CLARIFIED. MALLET NOTED THAT THERE ARE SOME WHO ARGUE THAT THE CEEC'S MUST BE BROUGHT INTO WESTERN INSTITUTIONS QUICKLY -- CERTAINLY BEFORE THE 1996 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THIS APPROACH, SEEING INSTEAD A GRADUAL PROCESS OVER THE COMING 10 YEARS OF INTEGRATING THE CEEC'S INTO THE EU'S ECONOMIC SPACE. INCLUSION IN NATO, HE INDICATED, WILL COME GRADUALLY AT THE END OF THIS PROCESS. UNLIKE ON NATO EXPANSION, HE ARGUED, THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO VETO WESTERN EUROPE'S GRADUAL ECONOMIC INCLUSION OF THE EAST.

17. DR, DAVIS REJECTED THE IDEA THAT RUSSIA VETOED NATO EXPANSION LAST YEAR. THE U.S DID NOT SEE THE CONTRADICTION AND BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THE WRONG MOMENT TO SEND MOSCOW A SIGNAL THAT IT WAS BEING EXCLUDED FROM WESTERN INSTITUTIONS.

18. MALLET WARNED THAT THE QUESTION OF NATO EXPANSION WILL BE REOPENED IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, AS THE CONTRADICTIONS INHERENT IN PFP MAKE IT HARD FOR THAT INITIATIVE TO SATISFY ALL. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BEGIN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE SOON, HE SUGGESTED. MALLET ENDED BY ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD ACCEPT NATO EXPANSION.

19. DR. DAVIS RESPONDED THAT IT IS HARD TO PREDICT WHERE CONGRESS WILL COME OUT, SINCE IT HAS NOT REALLY BEGUN ITS INTERNAL DEBATE ON NATO EXPANSION. SHE CALLED MALLET'S ATTENTION, HOWEVER, TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT IN WARSAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE QUESTION ON NATO EXPANSION IS NOT WHETHER BUT HOW AND WHEN.

RWANDA

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20. FRENCH DEFENSE OFFICIALS SHOWED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. BOTH MALLET AT MOD AND QUESNOT AT THE ELYSEE FEARED THAT IT MAY BE TOO LATE TO PREVENT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DEATHS FROM DISEASE AND STARVATION. MALLET COMPLAINED THAT THE "BLOODY HUTU RADIOS" ARE STILL ENCOURAGING REFUGEES IN THE FRENCH ZONE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA TO FLEE INTO ZAIRE, WHICH FRANCE BELIEVES WILL COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO AID THEM.

21. MALLET THOUGHT U.S. POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH OPERATION HAD BEEN GOOD, BUT HE REGRETTED THAT

THE U.S. HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE MUCH CONCRETE HELP. QUESNOT WAS MUCH MORE OUTSPOKEN IN CRITICIZING THE ABSENCE OF U.S LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. FRANCE, HE SAID, HAD SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN SOMALIA AND HAD A RIGHT AS AN ALLY TO EXPECT SIMILAR SUPPORT IN RETURN IN RWANDA. QUESNOT IMPLIED THAT FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE POLICE TRAINERS TO A UN OPERATION IN HAITI COULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION AS A RESULT. (COMMENT: QUESNOT'S REMARKS ACCURATELY REFLECT WIDE-SPREAD DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE FRENCH MILITARY OVER THE LACK OF U.S. AIRLIFT SUPPORT IN RWANDA BUT SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS SIGNALLING A CONSIDERED GOF DECISION ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 PARIS 20200
GENEVA FOR CD DEL; USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, NATO, RW, NK, FR
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS' JULY 20-21 PARIS
- DISCUSSIONS: NPT EXTENSION, FISSILE-MATERIAL
- CUTOFF, NORTH KOREA, NATO EXPANSION,
- UKRAINE, RWANDA
TO WITHDRAW COMMITMENTS ALREADY MADE ON HAITI. QUESNOT'S ROLE IN GOF DECISION-MAKING ON HAITI IS MARGINAL AT MOST. END COMMENT.)
22. DR. DAVIS RESPONDED THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE U.S. IS UNWILLING TO HELP IN RWANDA. SHE NOTED THAT USAID DIRECTOR ATWOOD WAS IN PARIS AT THAT MOMENT FOR TALKS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND THAT THE U.S. HAS DONATED 50 APC'S TO EQUIP GHANAIAN PARTICIPANTS IN UNAMIR. SHE ADDED THAT THE U.S. IS REVIEWING ITS PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING AIRLIFT SUPPORT TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE IMPROVED.
23. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS REVIEWED THIS MESSAGE.
BOHLEN
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
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Cable

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2015-0791-M (1.30)
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CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9881
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PRAGUE 006126
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EZ, GM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DURING AN AUGUST 16 MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC DESCRIBED TO AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE THE STRONG DESIRE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO RENEW ITS FORMER PLACE AS AN ACCEPTED PART OF THE WESTERN WORLD. THIS WAS THE KEY REASON THE CZECHS SOUGHT EARLY NATO MEMBERSHIP. ZIELENIEC HOPED PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WOULD QUICKLY EVOLVE INTO A CLEAR PATH LEADING TO NATO MEMBERSHIP AND HE URGED A CONTINUED STRONG U.S. POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE.
3. ZIELENIEC NOTED THAT THE PHILOSOPHY UNDERLINING THE SUCCESS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC'S REFORMS HAS BEEN SELF-RELIANCE, I.E. THE CONVICTION THAT THE CZECHS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR FUTURE, THAT ONLY THEY COULD SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. HE SAID THIS CONVICTION CARRIES OVER INTO FOREIGN POLICY AND IS THE REASON THE CZECHF, RESIST BEING TERMED A VISEGRAD COUNTRY.
4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT THE VISEGRAD GROUP WAS FORMED WHEN THE SOVIET UNION STILL EXISTED AS A COMMON PROBLEM FOR THE REGION, BUT THE GROUPING HAD LOST ITS UTILITY WITH THE DEMISE OF THE USSR. ZIELENIEC CLAIMED THE CZECHS HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS AND STRESSED CONCRETE COOPERATION, SUCH AS IN FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, RATHER THAN FORMAL REGIONAL GROUPINGS. WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO AVOID IS SENDING A SIGNAL TO THE CZECH PEOPLE THAT THEIR FUTURE DEPENDS ON OTHERS, WHICH WOULD BE THE CASE IF PROGRESS TOWARDS INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST WERE SEEN AS DEPENDING ON LEAST-COMMON DENOMINATOR AGREEMENTS

AMONG THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES. HE ALSO FEARED VISEGRAD WOULD BE SEEN A GROUPING SEPARATING THE CEE COUNTRIES FROM EUROPE OR USED AS AN EXCUSE TO DELAY ENTRY INTO THE EU.

5. ZIELENIEC NOTED THE DANGERS FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC INHERENT IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN ISSUE. HE SAID THE CZECH GOVERNMENT SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO DEAL WITH OPEN QUESTIONS REMAINING FROM WORLD WAR II, NOT JUST THE SUDETEN ISSUE. THE CZECHS STILL DID NOT HAVE A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GERMANS. HE STATED THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD NEVER RAISED THE SUDETEN ISSUE WITH THE CZECH GOVERNMENT, BUT HAD ENCOURAGED THE SUDETEN GROUPS TO RAISE IT PUBLICLY, AND HAD ENCOURAGED THE CZECHS TO TALK DIRECTLY TO THE SUDETENS. THIS HAD UNFORTUNATE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, WHERE NO DISCUSSION OF THE EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS COULD OCCUR DURING THE COMMUNIST YEARS. HE NOTED THE CZECHS' COMPLICATED HISTORY WITH GERMANY, AND SAID THAT SOME CZECHS WERE EVEN USING THE SUDETEN ISSUE TO ARGUE THAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC NEEDED RUSSIA TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS AGAINST GERMANY.

6. ZIELENIEC REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 4 OR 5. HE SAID HE WOULD SPEAK AT THE UNGA ON OCTOBER 3 AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO GO TO WASHINGTON THE NEXT DAY.

BASORA

BT

#6126

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6126

TOR: 940818044255 M1208604

DIST:

SIT: VAX NSC

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. cable	re: U/S Tarnoff's Paris Visit: Discussions on Haiti, NATO EU… [10 U.S.C. 424] [partial] (1 page)	09/19/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

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[01/04/1994-12/16/1994]

2015-0791-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 2/7/2025
2015-0791-M (1.31)

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

SUBJ: U/S TARNOFF'S PARIS VISIT: DISCUSSIONS ON
- HAITI, NATO, EU STABILITY PACT, AEGEAN ISSUES,
- AND ALGERIA

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 25538

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, TU, GR, AG, FR
SUBJECT: U/S TARNOFF'S PARIS VISIT: DISCUSSIONS ON
- HAITI, NATO, EU STABILITY PACT, AEGEAN ISSUES,
- AND ALGERIA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. U/S TARNOFF DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN HAITI WITH SENIOR GOF INTERLOCUTORS, INCLUDING FRANCE'S REQUEST TO ATTACH A MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER TO THE MNF. ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, THE FRENCH PREFER TO FIX CRITERIA RATHER THAN DEADLINES. PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER URGED AN "ACTIVE" U.S. OBSERVER STATUS AT THE SEPTEMBER 21-22 EU STABILITY PACT BALTIC ROUNDTABLE; HE PROFESSED IGNORANCE OF U.S.-EU WORKING GROUPS.

3. ON GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, THE QUAI WORRIED THAT GREEK EFFORTS TO EXTEND THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE AEGEAN COULD TOUCH OFF A CRISIS; FRANCE AND GERMANY HOPE THEIR EU PRESIDENCIES WILL PERMIT FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE EU'S AID PACKAGE FOR ANKARA AND THE EU-TURKISH CUSTOMS UNION AGREEMENT. ON ALGERIA, THE FRENCH SUPPORT GOA EFFORTS AT DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION, BUT SAID NON-FIS OPPOSITION PARTIES SHOULD ALSO TAKE PART. FRANCE'S PRIORITIES ARE TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS IN ALGERIA, BLOCK THE CONFLICT'S EXTENSION TO FRANCE, ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE, AND PROVIDE THE GOA ECONOMIC AID. END SUMMARY.

4. IN PARIS SEPTEMBER 16-17, U/S TARNOFF MET SEPARATELY WITH ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL HUBERT VEDRINE, MATIGNON DIPLOMATIC COUNSELOR BERNARD DE MONTFERRAND, AND QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL BERTRAND DUFOURCQ. U/S TARNOFF WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AND A NOTETAKER; VEDRINE BY ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISER VIDAL; DE MONTFERRAND BY MATIGNON SECURITY ADVISER DANA; AND DUFOURCQ BY DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL DEJAMMET, FM JUPPE'S SECURITY ADVISOR RACINE, EAST EUROPE DIRECTOR POUDADE, AND AMERICAS DIRECTOR ROUQUIE.

5. THIS CABLE REPORTS U/S TARNOFF'S CONVERSATIONS ON EUROPEAN ISSUES OTHER THAN BOSNIA, AS WELL AS THOSE ON HAITI AND ALGERIA. SEPTEL REPORTS DISCUSSIONS ON BOSNIA.

HAITI
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6. TARNOFF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO VEDRINE FOR THE GOF'S SUPPORT FOR, AND EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN, MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO HAITI. TARNOFF TOLD DE MONTFERRAND THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT REGARDING FRANCE'S REQUEST TO ATTACH A MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER TO THE MNF, AND THAT WE WOULD KEEP THE GOF INFORMED. (DUFOURCQ ALSO RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH TARNOFF.)

7. ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CARTER MISSION, TARNOFF REPLIED THAT CEDRAS HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE THE FORMER U.S. PRESIDENT, EVEN THOUGH HE REFUSED TO RECEIVE A SIMILAR HIGH-RANKING ENVOY FROM UNSYG BOUTROS GHALI. WHETHER THIS SIGNALS SECOND THOUGHTS IS ANOTHER MATTER. CARTER IS CHARGED TO ASK WHETHER JUNTA LEADERS ARE READY TO LEAVE, NOT TO NEGOTIATE POLITICAL TERMS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE. DUFOURCQ APPROVED OF THIS APPROACH, CALLING CEDRAS A MASTER OF DELAYING TACTICS.

8. DUFOURCQ PROBED FOR U.S. THINKING ON THE HAND-OVER FROM THE MNF TO THE UN: WILL BOTH UN AND MNF FORCES BE IN OPERATION SIMULTANEOUSLY AT SOME POINT? HAS A TIME BEEN FIXED FOR THE TURNOVER TO THE MNF? TARNOFF REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WANTS THE HAND-OFF TO TAKE PLACE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BUT HAS NO FIXED TIMETABLE FOR DOING SO.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 25538

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, TU, GR, AG, FR
SUBJECT: U/S TARNOFF'S PARIS VISIT: DISCUSSIONS ON
- HAITI, NATO, EU STABILITY PACT, AEGEAN ISSUES,
- AND ALGERIA

MUCH DEPENDS ON EVENTS ON THE GROUND AND ON THE UN'S ABILITY TO GATHER A FORCE CAPABLE OF TAKING CHARGE.

NATO EXPANSION
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9. DE MONTFERRAND ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. IS RETHINKING NATO'S ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. TARNOFF CONFIRMED TO HIM AND TO DUFOURCQ THAT WE ARE AND SAID WE HOPE TO SHARE OUR THINKING IN THE NEAR FUTURE, FIRST WITH KEY ALLIES, THEN WITH ALL SIXTEEN. HE NOTED THAT, IN PREPARING THE UPCOMING U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT, PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S STAFF HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE EXPANSION QUESTION. IF THE RUSSIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT EXPANSION, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO OFFER THEM SOMETHING SPECIAL WHILE THIS PROCESS UNFOLDS.

10. DE MONTFERRAND SAID THAT GOF THINKING ON THIS ISSUE IS FOCUSSED ON THREE QUESTIONS:

-- SHOULD NATO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS ON THE BASIS OF STRICT CRITERIA, OR SHOULD IT RELAX CRITERIA IF EARLY MEMBERSHIP WOULD HELP REASSURE/STABILIZE A COUNTRY?

-- IS A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY APPROACH BEST?

-- WHAT IS THE CORRECT NATO-WEU SEQUENCE?

11. ACCORDING TO DE MONTFERRAND, THE GOF TENDS TO PREFER NO FIXED DEADLINES AND GRADUAL EVOLUTION BASED ON PERFORMANCE UNDER STRICT CRITERIA. FOR EU MEMBERSHIP, THE BASIC CRITERIA MUST BE (A) OBSERVANCE OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS, (B) ECONOMIC REFORM, AND (C) INTERNAL DEMOCRATIZATION. THESE CRITERIA ARE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE PRECISELY, BUT LESS SO THAN NATO CRITERIA. OF COURSE, THIS LEAVES UNRESOLVED THE NATO-WEU LINKAGE. DE MONTFERRAND AGREED WITH TARNOFF THAT NATO AND WEU CRITERIA MUST SOMEHOW BE ALIGNED.

12. IN THE TARNOFF-DUFOURCQ MEETING, DEJAMMET SAID

FRANCE AND GERMANY AGREE THAT THE CEE'S SHOULD JOIN NATO AS THEY JOIN THE EU AND WEU. GIVEN THE SECURITY GUARANTEES IMPLICIT IN WEU MEMBERSHIP, WEU MEMBERS MUST ALSO BE MEMBERS OF NATO. THIS COULD POSE A PROBLEM FOR RUSSIA, DEJAMMET NOTED: VISITING DUMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LUKIN TOLD THE FRENCH RECENTLY THAT RUSSIA IS SATISFIED WITH ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE EU BUT FEARS THAT EU/WEU/NATO EXPANSION WOULD CREATE A "CORDON SANITAIRE" ALONG THE WESTERN FRONTIERS OF THE CIS. QUAI CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR POUDADE ADDED THAT LUKIN HAD WARNED EVEN MORE STRONGLY AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE THE BALTS IN NATO.

EU STABILITY PACT
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13. DE MONTFERRAND SAID THE GOF SEES THE SITUATIONS IN BOTH THE BALTICS AND CEE STATES AS HAVING IMPROVED OVER LAST YEAR. RUSSIAN TROOPS ARE LEAVING THE BALTICS; HUNGARY IS TALKING TO ITS NEIGHBORS. HOWEVER, AS UNDERLYING CONFLICTS REMAIN, THE EU STABILITY PACT SERVES A "REAL PURPOSE" BY FORCING BILATERAL DICUSSIONS UNDER THE EU'S WATCHFUL EYE. OBSERVANCE OF "GOOD NEIGHBOR" RULES IS, IN ANY CASE, A PRECONDITION TO EVENTUAL EU -- AND PRESUMABLY NATO -- MEMBERSHIP BY THE NINE CEE ASPIRANTS. THE GOF HOPES THE U.S. WILL BE "ACTIVE" OBSERVER AT THE SEPTEMBER 21-22 BALTIC ROUNDTABLE. RUSSIA WILL PARTICIPATE "A LA CARTE," FOCUSING ON NATIONAL MINORITIES BUT REFUSING TO DISCUSS FRONTIERS.

14. FURTHER INTO THE FUTURE, DE MONTFERRAND CONTINUED, FRANCE ENVISAGES A SIMILAR "GOOD NEIGHBOR" PROCESS FOR THE POST-WAR BALKAN COUNTRIES. TARNOFF NOTED THIS IS NEEDED NOW FOR GREECE AND MACEDONIA; HE SUGGESTED A CSCE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 25538

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

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- HAITI, NATO, EU STABILITY PACT, AEGEAN ISSUES,
- AND ALGERIA

SETTING. DE MONTFERRAND AGREED, SAYING THE ONLY OBSTACLE THERE IS A LACK OF POLITICAL WILL.

EU-U.S. WORKING GROUPS
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15. BRIEFED BY TARNOFF ON U.S. HOPES FOR U.S.-EU WORKING GROUPS, DE MONTFERRAND CLAIMED HE HAD ONLY LEARNED OF THESE GROUPS DURING A/S HOLBROOKE'S PARIS VISIT TWO WEEKS EARLIER. ACCORDING TO DE MONTFERRAND, THE GOF IS NOT OPPOSED TO TALKS IN BRUSSELS ON SELECTED POLITICAL ISSUES. (EMBASSY COMMENT: WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER DE MONTFERRAND'S PROFESSED IGNORANCE OF THE WORKING GROUPS

WAS REAL OR WAS INTENDED TO MASK FRANCE'S UNEASINESS WITH THE IDEA AND/OR DIFFERENCES WITH GERMANY. END COMMENT.)

AEGEAN ISSUES

16. TARNOFF BRIEFED DUFOURCQ ON U.S. CONCERN OVER RISING GREEK-TURKISH TENSIONS. IN ATHENS AND ANKARA, HE HAD FOUND GREEK PM PAPANDREOU IN A RELATIVELY CONSTRUCTIVE MOOD. THE GREEK LEADER WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER GREATER POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF PKK ACTIVITIES ON GREEK TERRITORY AND TO EXPLORE A SETTLEMENT WITH MACEDONIA AFTER THE OCTOBER 16 ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH HE AND FM PAPOULIAS TOOK A HARD LINE TOWARD ALBANIA. HOWEVER, TURKISH PM CILLER SEEMED SKEPTICAL OF GREECE'S GOOD INTENTIONS, AND NEW FOREIGN MINISTER SOSAL HAD MADE SOME STRONG STATEMENTS BEFORE TAKING OFFICE. TARNOFF REPORTED THAT SOSAL HAD NEVERTHELESS STRESSED HIS INTENTION TO TAKE A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO HIS JOB.

17. DUFOURCQ AGREED WITH TARNOFF'S ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND NOTED THAT FRANCE IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT A GREEK EFFORT TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE AEGEAN COULD TOUCH OFF A CRISIS. HE REPORTED THAT FRANCE AND GERMANY HOPE THEIR EU PRESIDENCIES CAN HELP IMPROVE EU-TURKISH RELATIONS; THEY PARTICULARLY HOPE TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE LONG-STALLED EU AID PACKAGE FOR ANKARA AND EU-TURKISH CUSTOMS UNION AGREEMENT.

18. ASKED ABOUT TURKISH POLICY ON ACCESS TO NORTHERN IRAQ FOR OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, TARNOFF REPORTED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH MFA UNDER SECRETARY SANBERK WHO HAD MADE THE RIGHT NOISES BUT SEEMED UNINFORMED ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN THE REGION SEEM TO BE MAKING FOR NGO'S.

ALGERIA

19. DE MONTFERRAND STRESSED THAT THE GOF SUPPORTS A GOA/FIS DIALOGUE BUT IS WARY: AS WHAT THE FIS STANDS FOR IS CONTRARY TO BASIC WESTERN VALUES, THE GOF WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP THEM. HE SAID IT IS VITAL THAT NON-FIS OPPOSITION PARTIES BE PART OF NEGOTIATIONS. FRANCE'S PRIORITIES ARE TO: (A) PROTECT ITS PERSONNEL AND CITIZENS IN ALGERIA, (B) BLOCK THE CONFLICT'S EXTENSION TO FRANCE, (C) ENCOURAGE BROAD/BROAD DIALOGUE IN ALGERIA, AND (4) CONTINUE ECONOMIC AID TO THE GOA. FRANCE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED AT THE RE-OPENING OF SCHOOLS, AS MOST ALGERIANS BRAVELY DEFIED EXTREMIST THREATS.

20. IN THEIR DISCUSSION, TARNOFF AND DUFOURCQ BOTH APPROVED THE GOA'S RECENT EFFORT TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION AND AGREED IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT RESULTS. DUFOURCQ COMPLAINED THAT THE FIS KEEPS RAISING ITS ASKING PRICE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT MANY IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES SEEM PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE BLOODY REPRESSION. TARNOFF NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD

BROKEN OFF CONTACT FOR NOW WITH ANWAR HADDAM.

21. ASKED FOR FRENCH VIEWS ON THE COHESION OF ALGERIA'S

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 25538

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, TU, GR, AG, FR
SUBJECT: U/S TARNOFF'S PARIS VISIT: DISCUSSIONS ON
- HAITI, NATO, EU STABILITY PACT, AEGEAN ISSUES,
- AND ALGERIA

ARMY, DUFOURCQ OBSERVED THAT WHILE THE ARMY IS VERY OPAQUE TO OUTSIDERS, IT SEEMS TO BE HOLDING TOGETHER BETTER THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE DEEP DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN OFFICERS TRAINED IN FRANCE AND THOSE TRAINED IN RUSSIA. LACK OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IS THE SECURITY FORCES' FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM. GIVEN THE INSURGENTS' ABILITY TO DISGUISE THEMSELVES AS GOVERNMENT FORCES, THE PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW WHEN THEY OPEN THEIR DOORS WHETHER THEY ARE RECEIVING A POLICE OFFICER OR A KILLER. IN AN ASIDE, DEJAMMET COMMENTED THAT NOT ALL IS GOING THE FUNDAMENTALISTS' WAY; EGYPT'S ABILITY TO HOLD THE CAIRO POPULATION CONFERENCE WITHOUT INCIDENT IS SIGNIFICANT. "THE SITUATION THERE WILL NOT NECESSARILY CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE," HE CONCLUDED.

HARRIMAN

BT
#7904

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
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<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

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SIT: VAX NSC

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.33)
KBH 2/7/2025

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OSRI: RUEHLO
DTG: 191720Z SEP 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8061
INFO: RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
SUBJ: BRITISH THINKING ON NATO EXPANSION
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LONDON 014877

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL NATO WEU UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH THINKING ON NATO EXPANSION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THOUGH THE CABINET HAS YET TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE DEFINITIVELY, SENIOR LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE FCO, MOD AND AT NUMBER TEN ARE SAID TO SUPPORT BRINGING VISEGRAD COUNTRIES INTO NATO AS FULL MEMBERS BY THE END OF THE CENTURY AND BEFORE THEY BECOME MEMBERS OF THE EU. THERE ARE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT SLOVAKIA WHERE DEVELOPMENTS WILL BE WATCHED CLOSELY OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

3. LARGELY IN DEFERENCE TO RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES, THESE OFFICIALS FAVOR A QUIET APPROACH OF GRADUALLY ABSORBING THE VISEGRAD INTO NATO VIA PFP. ONCE WE HAVE RESOLVED THE FLANK ISSUE, THEY FAVOR DISCRETE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS TO WORK OUT A PLAN TO CREATE "NEW FACTS" AND STRUCTURES WHILE NOT ANNOUNCING OUR INTENTION. THEY ARE LEERY OF ESTABLISHING FIRM CRITERIA FOR NATO EXPANSION, FEARING THAT PRECISE GUIDELINES COULD BE USED BY THOSE NATIONS THAT WERE LEFT OUT. THEY NOTE THAT FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR NEVILLE-JONES ENCOUNTERED STIFF OPPOSITION TO PUBLIC MOVES TOWARD NATO EXPANSION IN A RECENT MEETING WITH CHURKIN. HE REPORTEDLY SAID VISIBLE MOVEMENT ON EXPANSION SO SOON AFTER RUSSIA HAD JOINED PFP WOULD BE A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR MOSCOW. THE BRITISH SUSPECT CHURKIN WAS REACTING TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BERLIN SATELLITE REMARKS WHICH APPEARED TO SUGGEST A U.S. MOVE TO TAKE VISIBLE STEPS TOWARD EXPANSION THIS FALL.

4. THE BRITISH OFFICIALS SEE THE BALTICS AND THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AS A LONG WAY OFF FROM POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP. THEY CONSIDER BALTIC EXPANSION AS FAR TOO

PROVOCATIVE FOR THE RUSSIANS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE; THEY ALSO CONSIDER THE BALTICS MILITARILY INDEFENSIBLE. THE THINKING HERE IS THAT THE BALTICS SHOULD FIRST ENTER WEU. THIS CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THEY ARE PART OF THE WEST WILL RAISE THEIR COMFORT LEVEL AND IS FAR LESS LIKELY TO GET THE RUSSIANS' DANDER UP.

5. THE BRITISH REMAIN FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO THE INCLUSION OF RUSSIA IN NATO, BELIEVING THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT THEN CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THEY WONDER WHAT BENEFITS WOULD BE GAINED BY INCLUDING RUSSIA WHICH WOULD OUTWEIGH THE COSTS ITS INCLUSION WOULD INCUR. THEY FAVOR PROVIDING MOSCOW WITH A USEFUL AND FRUITFUL ALTERNATIVE TO MEMBERSHIP VIA THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. ONE OF OUR CONTACTS REMARKED THAT THE GERMANS, WHO SEEM MOST TO SHARE THIS VIEW OF POSSIBLE RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP, HAD FLOATED THE SUGGESTION OF FURTHER DEVELOPING RUSSIAN IDEAS FOR STRENGTHENING THE CSCE THROUGH ADOPTION OF A CHARTER AND OTHER MEASURES, TO OFFER AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO NATO MEMBERSHIP AND/OR COMPENSATION FOR THE DAY WHEN SOME CEECS DO JOIN NATO. HMG IS STILL CONSIDERING THIS.

6. THE MOD HAS HAD SOME DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RAND CORPORATION REGARDING THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO EXPANSION. DEFENSE OFFICIALS ARE PREPARING A PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH THEY HOPE TO DISCUSS WITH RAND IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS. A PRELIMINARY VIEW HERE IS THAT EXPANSION NEED NOT MEAN TROOP REDEPLOYMENT OUT OF GERMANY TO POLAND. IT IS THOUGHT THAT NATO CAN MANAGE THIS PROBLEM BY DESIGNATION OF ITS ACE RAPID REACTION FORCE. CROWE
BT
#4877

NNNN
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SSN: 4877
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DIST:
SIT: LEBOURGEOIS NSC STEPHENS VAX VERSHBOW

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.34)
KBH 2/7/2025

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INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SUBJ: FRENCH THINKING ON NATO EXPANSION
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 28401

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, WEU, EUN, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH THINKING ON NATO EXPANSION

REF: (A) STATE 262133 (B) PARIS 24747 (C) PARIS 22221

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WHILE FRENCH POLICY TOWARD NATO EXPANSION HAS NOT BEEN FIRMLY FIXED, OFFICIALS OF THE BALLADUR GOVERNMENT -- SOME WITH MORE ENTHUSIASM THAN OTHERS -- INDICATE THAT FRANCE WOULD GO ALONG WITH AN EXPANSION THAT PROCEEDS IN TANDEM WITH EU ENLARGEMENT, HAS U.S. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, AND DOES NOT PROVOKE A CRISIS WITH RUSSIA. THEY REASON THAT EAST EUROPEAN STATES WILL BE REQUIRED TO JOIN THE WEU AS THEY JOIN THE EU AND BELIEVE THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP SHOULD NATURALLY FOLLOW. OUR INTERLOCUTORS MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD NOT WELCOME A MOVE TO EXPAND THE ALLIANCE BEFORE EU ENLARGEMENT QUESTIONS ARE DEALT WITH AT THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AND WOULD PREFER THAT ALLIANCE EXPANSION APPEAR AS PART OF THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

3. THE FRENCH WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT BOTH BILATERALLY AND AMONG CLOSE ALLIES ON NATO EXPANSION. IT IS NOT CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO CLOSURE ON A STRATEGY FOR THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS THIS AUTUMN. OUR INTERLOCUTORS ARE NOT CERTAIN HOW FAR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WILL BE PREPARED TO LET THE GOF GO, NOR HAVE THEIR IDEAS ON EU

ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONS FULLY FORMED. END SUMMARY.

4. PRELIMINARY SIGNALS FROM THE QUAI AND MATIGNON (REFS B-C) INDICATE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD GO ALONG WITH AN EVENTUAL EXPANSION OF THE ALLIANCE PROVIDED IT IS NOT DONE IN HASTE, HAS FIRM SUPPORT IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, AND DOES NOT PROVOKE A CRISIS IN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS SEE ALLIANCE EXPANSION LARGELY THROUGH THE PRISM OF EU ENLARGEMENT. THEY BELIEVE THAT CENTRAL/EAST EUROPEAN STATES MUST JOIN THE WEU AS PART OF THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS; RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRICAL SECURITY GUARANTEES AND THE NEED FOR U.S. BACKING; THEY FIND IT "LOGICAL" THAT NATO SHOULD EXPAND IN TANDEM WITH THE EU/WEU. IN THE FRENCH VIEW, MEMBERS SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE WEU AND NATO ONLY AS THEY SATISFY SPECIFIC CRITERIA, NOT ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE.

5. THAT SAID, THE FRENCH ARE FOLLOWING DELIBERATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON NATO'S EXPANSION WITH SOME TREPIDATION. THEY DO NOT WANT ALLIANCE EXPANSION TO GET AHEAD OF EU ENLARGEMENT AND FORCE THE PACE. FRENCH OFFICIALS INSIST THAT FURTHER EU ENLARGEMENT CANNOT BE CONTEMPLATED UNTIL THE EU HAS STREAMLINED ITS DECISIONMAKING MECHANISMS AT THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE TO ACCOMMODATE NEW MEMBERS. GOF SOURCES HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT THEY FEAR A MOVE TO EXPAND THE ALLIANCE PRIOR TO THE IGC WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE EU TO PROCEED WITH ITS OWN ENLARGEMENT IN A HASTY, ILL-CONSIDERED MANNER. THEY WOULD PREFER THAT ALLIANCE EXPANSION APPEAR AS A NATURAL STEP IN THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

6. THE FRENCH HAVE NO CAREFULLY CONSIDERED STRATEGY FOR HANDLING RUSSIA WHILE NATO (AND EU/WEU) ENLARGEMENT PROCEEDS. OUR INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESS CONCERN THAT THE EXPANSION PROCESS BE MANAGED IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT ALARM MOSCOW OR PRODUCE A CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH THERE, BUT WE DETECT NO CONSENSUS ON PRECISELY WHAT RELATIONSHIP NATO SHOULD HAVE WITH RUSSIA. SOME OF OUR CONTACTS MAINTAIN THAT NATO SHOULD HOLD OUT TO RUSSIA THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE; OTHERS BELIEVE THE WEST SHOULD FRANKLY TELL MOSCOW THAT IT WILL NEVER JOIN. THE LATTER POINT OUT THAT WEST EUROPEANS HAVE ALREADY MADE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF RUSSIAN ADHESION TO THE EU. SIGNIFICANTLY, WE HAVE DETECTED LITTLE SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF PUTTING ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 28401

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, WEU, EUN, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH THINKING ON NATO EXPANSION

RUSSIA ON A CONTRACTUAL BASIS. FRENCH RESERVATIONS

ABOUT TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE OF MOSCOW BY NATO REMAIN STRONG.

7. THE BALTICS ARE ANOTHER FLY-IN-THE-OINTMENT FOR FRANCE. GOF CONTACTS HAVE HELD OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BALTS COULD JOIN THE EU, ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE SAME TRANCHE WITH THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES AND ROMANIA/BULGARIA. OUR INTERLOCUTORS RECOGNIZE THAT THE BALTS COULD LOGICALLY EXPECT TO JOIN NATO AS THEY ADHERE TO THE EU BUT RECOGNIZE THAT INCLUDING THEM IN THE ALLIANCE WOULD RISK PROVOKING A STRONG BACKLASH IN MOSCOW.

8. U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES ARE ALSO A SOURCE OF CONCERN FOR THE FRENCH. OUR INTERLOCUTORS NOTE THAT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE DEBATE IN THE U.S. ON NATO EXPANSION AND FEAR THAT CONGRESS WOULD NOT SUPPORT NEW SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. PM BALLADUR'S SECURITY ADVISOR THIERRY DANA WARNED US RECENTLY THAT ALLIES MUST BE SURE THEY HAVE THE BACKING OF THEIR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS BEFORE PROCEEDING TOO FAR TOO FAST IN THE NATO EXPANSION DEBATE. HE POINTED OUT THAT NATO'S VERY COHESION COULD BE DESTROYED IF AN EFFORT TO EXPAND FOUNDERED ON THE OPPOSITION FROM ONE OR MORE NATIONAL LEGISLATURES.

9. CONCLUSION: WE JUDGE THAT FRANCE IS OPEN TO A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF EVENTUAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE, ALTHOUGH SOME OFFICIALS ARE MORE ENTHUSIASTIC THAN OTHERS. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO CLOSURE ON AN ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY THIS AUTUMN. OUR INTERLOCUTORS STRESS THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND -- PREOCCUPIED WITH HIS CANCER FIGHT -- HAS NOT MADE HIS VIEWS KNOWN AND COULD STILL APPLY THE BRAKES, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE HAS IN THE PAST TENDED TOWARD A GO-SLOW APPROACH TO ALL QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL/EAST EUROPEANS INTO WESTERN INSTITUTIONS. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED TO US THAT THEY LOOK FORWARD TO EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON ON THIS ISSUE BOTH BILATERALLY AND AMONG CLOSE ALLIES.

HARRIMAN

BT
#8401

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 8401

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DIST:

SIT: VAX NSC

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.35)
KBH 2/7/2025

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RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
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RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
SUBJ: NATO: AMBASSADOR CHURKIN ZEROES IN ON NATO
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 004251

EUR FOR HOLBROOKE; S/NIS FOR COLLINS

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND SCHIFTER

DOD FOR ASD/ISP(CARTER AND KRUZEL)

JCS FOR LTG CLARK

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, NACC, RS
SUBJECT: NATO: AMBASSADOR CHURKIN ZEROES IN ON NATO
EXPANSION IN COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR HUNTER

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. AMBASSADOR CHURKIN'S FIRST CALL ON AMBASSADOR HUNTER -- ON CHURKIN'S FIRST DAY IN BRUSSELS -- WAS DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO NATO EXPANSION. CHURKIN EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT RUSSIA'S "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH NATO WOULD BE "SPECIAL-MINUS:" THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE "SPECIAL"

BY VIRTUE OF BEING EXCLUDED BY THE PROCESS OF EXPANSION. IF EXPANSION WERE TREATED "IN A CLEAR-CUT WAY" BY NATO MINISTERS IN DECEMBER, THEN THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP -- AND, INDEED, ALL OF PFP -- COULD BE OUTDATED BEFORE IT GOT TRULY UNDER WAY, CHURKIN SAID. RUSSIA WOULD EXPECT TO BE TOLD THAT IT WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTNERS, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE UP UNTIL NOW. AMBASSADOR HUNTER ASSURED CHURKIN OF RUSSIA'S IMPORTANCE IN NATO'S EYES, MADE CLEAR THAT PFP WOULD REMAIN IMPORTANT EVEN WHEN NATO EXPANDED AND OUTLINED U.S. THINKING ON THE "HOW AND WHY" OF EXPANSION. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NATO ASSISTANCE TO CSCE PEACEKEEPING.

END SUMMARY
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3. ON NOVEMBER 14, NEWLY-ARRIVED RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR VITALY CHURKIN PAID A COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR HUNTER. AFTER AMBASSADOR HUNTER HAD WELCOMED CHURKIN AND EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN PFP, CHURKIN IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO RUSSIA'S "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH NATO. SOME IN MOSCOW WERE UNSURE WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP WAS "SPECIAL-PLUS" OR "SPECIAL-MINUS," HE SAID.

NATO EXPANSION
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4. CHURKIN NOTED RUSSIAN CONCERN OVER "SOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS" THAT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT PFP WAS GETTING OLD BEFORE IT HAD HAD THE CHANCE TO MATURE. IT APPEARED THAT NATO WAS PREPARING TO ENTER A NEW STAGE EVEN BEFORE THE PROGRAM OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS HAD BEEN AGREED, THUS RENDERING IT IMMEDIATELY OUTDATED. BECOMING MORE SPECIFIC, CHURKIN REFERRED TO REPORTS THAT ALLIANCE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD SOON DISCUSS EXPANDING NATO'S MEMBERSHIP -- EVEN BEFORE MINISTER KOZYREV ARRIVED FOR THE NACC, BY WHICH TIME, CHURKIN HOPED, THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP COULD BE AGREED. IF THIS DISCUSSION OF EXPANSION HAPPENED "IN A CLEAR-CUT WAY," HE SAID, IT WOULD RISK MAKING PFP IRRELEVANT.

5. AMBASSADOR HUNTER RESPONDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD -- THE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA WOULD BE "SPECIAL-PLUS." NOBODY COULD DENY THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIA, AND NATO WISHED TO DEVELOP THE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA OVER TIME, MAKING SURE IT "WAS DONE RIGHT." PFP WAS ENDURING, AMBASSADOR HUNTER CONTINUED. ONE OF PFP'S ROLES WAS TO PREPARE NEW MEMBERS TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE, BUT PFP WOULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY, AND WOULD BE CONSTANTLY DEVELOPED. THIS WOULD BE TRUE REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE ALLIANCE DID CONCERNING EXPANSION. IN SOME RESPECTS, PFP MIGHT GROW MORE IMPORTANT AS THE ALLIANCE EXPANDED, SINCE NATO WOULD WANT TO DEEPEN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THOSE COUNTRIES THAT WOULD NOT JOIN THE ALLIANCE, AT LEAST AT FIRST. EXPANSION AND PFP DID NOT COMPETE WITH ONE ANOTHER, BUT WERE COMPLEMENTARY.

6. CHURKIN ANSWERED THAT, FOR PFP AND EXPANSION TO BE NON-COMPETITIVE, THE ALLIANCE MUST STATE CLEARLY THAT ANY PARTNER THAT WISHED TO JOIN COULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO DO SO. HE ACCEPTED AMBASSADOR HUNTER'S ANSWER THAT ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 004251

EUR FOR HOLBROOKE; S/NIS FOR COLLINS

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND SCHIFTER

DOD FOR ASD/ISP(CARTER AND KRUZEL)

JCS FOR LTG CLARK

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, NACC, RS
SUBJECT: NATO: AMBASSADOR CHURKIN ZEROES IN ON NATO EXPANSION IN COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR HUNTER

THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN, HOWEVER, AND SHIFTED TACK SLIGHTLY: RUSSIA WOULD EXPECT TO BE TOLD IT WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTNERS. THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE UP UNTIL NOW, HE SAID.

7. AMBASSADOR HUNTER, NOTING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THE ALLIANCE WOULD ACCEPT NEW MEMBERS, SAID THAT THE GOAL OF EVENTUAL EXPANSION WOULD BE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE PROCESS WAS NOT EXCLUSIONARY AND NOT A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THOSE THAT DID NOT JOIN THE ALLIANCE. HE THEN OUTLINED U.S. INTENTIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, BEGINNING THIS FALL, ON THE "HOW AND WHY," RATHER THAN THE "WHO AND WHEN," OF EXPANSION. THESE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY TALKS NEXT YEAR WITH ANY/ANY PARTNER INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN BEING A NATO ALLY.

8. CHURKIN ASKED WHETHER ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS WOULD EXTEND TO OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS THE EFFECT OF EXPANSION ON "ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE." AMBASSADOR HUNTER REPLIED THAT, AS EUROPEAN SECURITY ADVANCED, CLEARLY THE FULL RANGE OF RELEVANT ISSUES WOULD BE CONSIDERED. THE OVERARCHING QUESTION, HOWEVER, WOULD ALWAYS BE HOW TO "INCREASE THE STOCK OF SECURITY IN EUROPE." CHURKIN ENDED THE DISCUSSION OF EXPANSION BY EVOKING THE DELICATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT NATO WOULD DO NOTHING THAT MIGHT INADVERTENTLY DO HARM TO IT. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT BEFORE THE 1996 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AMBASSADOR HUNTER SAID THIS WAS AN ADDED REASON FOR DIALOGUE.

OTHER ISSUES
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9. CHURKIN, REFERRING TO "A NEW ELEMENT" IN NATO THINKING, ASKED ABOUT COMMENTS MADE BY SYG CLAES IN ROME ON NATO PEACEKEEPING "IN A CSCE FORMAT." AMBASSADOR

HUNTER SAID THAT THIS WAS NOTHING NEW: THE ALLIANCE HAD OFFERED TO AID THE CSCE IN PEACEKEEPING AT THE 1992 OSLO NAC MINISTERIAL. NOTING THAT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAS BEING DISCUSSED AT THE CSCE, AMBASSADOR HUNTER MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A NATO OPERATION.

10. THE TWO AMBASSADORS AGREED ON THE VALUE OF A CONTINUING DIALOGUE.

HUNTER
BT
#4251

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 4251
<^SSN>4251

TOR: 941114160224 M1360105
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SIT: FRIED KERRICK NSC RICE SCHIFTER VAX VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

Cable

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.36)
KBH 2/7/2025

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE3: O 171656Z OCT 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
OSRI: RUEHLO
DTG: 171656Z OCT 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9458
INFO: RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
SUBJ: BRITISH DISCUSS NATO EXPANSION WITH A/S HOLBROOKE
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 016422

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, NATO, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH DISCUSS NATO EXPANSION WITH A/S HOLBROOKE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SENIOR BRITISH OFFICIALS TOLD A/S HOLBROOKE THAT BRITAIN "ACCEPTS AND WELCOMES" NATO EXPANSION, ALTHOUGH THEY BELIEVE THE PACE SHOULD NOT BE FORCED. THEY SEE POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC AS THE LEADING CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP AND BELIEVE NATO SHOULD DEVELOP WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE LIKELY NEW NATO MEMBERS, AND WITH RUSSIA, AND THOSE OTHER NATIONS UNLIKELY TO EVER BECOME MEMBERS. END SUMMARY.

3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE AND AN INTER-AGENCY TEAM COMPRISED OF S/P DIRECTOR STEINBERG, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR VERSHBOW AND DOD ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRUZEL, DISCUSSED NATO EXPANSION WITH SENIOR BRITISH OFFICIALS DURING A VISIT TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 11. IN THE MEETINGS, A/S HOLBROOKE REFERRED TO RECENT SPEECHES BY USG OFFICIALS CULMINATING IN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BERLIN SPEECH WHICH MADE CLEAR OUR CONTINUED FIRM SUPPORT FOR NATO AS WELL AS FOR ITS EXPANSION. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE LOWER THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS' EXPECTATIONS AS WE SEEK TO ENSURE THEY UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF MEMBERSHIP. NATO, HOLBROOKE SAID, WAS CREATED TO RESPOND TO THE SOVIET THREAT. NATO EXPANSION SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THREATENING TO RUSSIA; IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS CONTRIBUTING TO GREATER SECURITY IN CENTRAL

UROPE.

4. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE MALCOLM RIFKIND TOLD A/S HOLBROOKE THE BRITISH "ACCEPT AND WELCOME" THE PROSPECT OF EXPANSION AS IT IS THE NATURAL WAY TO PROVIDE FOR GREATER EUROPEAN SECURITY. MOD DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY DAVID OMAND SAID HE SAW THREE CATEGORIES OF COUNTRIES: THE POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP (FOCUSING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC), FOLLOWED IN ITS OWN CATEGORY BY RUSSIA AND THEN THOSE OTHER COUNTRIES FOR WHOM MEMBERSHIP APPEARED HIGHLY UNLIKELY. OMAND SAID A STRATEGY SHOULD BE AGREED FIRST BY THE USG, HMG, FRANCE AND GERMANY ON HOW TO APPROACH EACH OF THESE GROUPS. HE SAID THE BRITISH DO NOT SEE THE NEED TO DEVELOP CONCRETE TIME LINES OR CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP, RATHER THEY BELIEVE IT WILL APPEAR FAIRLY OBVIOUS WHEN A PARTNER NATION WAS READY TO JOIN.

5. IN A MEETING WITH ROD LYNE, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES, FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR, PAUL LEVER, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE CABINET OFFICE, AND MICHAEL JAY, FCO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, LYNE REMARKED THAT WHATEVER NATO DOES SHOULD NOT DESTABILIZE THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA. LYNE ADDED THAT EU MEMBERS COULD DO A LOT IN THIS REGARD BY BRINGING THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS INTO THE EU. HOLBROOKE ASKED WHETHER EU MEMBERSHIP FOR SOME COUNTRIES SHOULD PRECEDE NATO MEMBERSHIP. JAY SAID THAT EU MEMBERSHIP EVEN FOR THE MORE ADVANCED CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES WAS UNLIKELY BEFORE 2000. HOLBROOKE REMARKED THAT IF JAY'S TIMETABLE WAS CORRECT, THERE WILL BE INCREASING PRESSURE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. NEVILLE-JONES ADDED THAT SOME EU MEMBERS SAW NATO EXPANSION AS AN EASIER ALTERNATIVE FOR BRINGING THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS MORE INTO THE WESTERN FOLD THAN THE MORE COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE PROCESS OF EU MEMBERSHIP. SHE SAID THAT WHILE THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES APPEARED TO BE THE LOGICAL FIRST CANDIDATES FOR NATO, THE BRITISH WERE NOT YET READY TO DIFFERENTIATE WITHIN OR BETWEEN DIFFERENT GROUPS OF COUNTRIES.

6. HOLBROOKE ADDED THAT IN THE DISCUSSION OF NATO XPANSION DURING THE RECENT SUMMIT, PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD AGREED WHEN YELTSIN SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO SURPRISES AND THAT NATO SHOULD NEVER SAY PUBLICLY THAT RUSSIA COULD NOT JOIN. LYNE ADDED THAT YELTSIN HAD BEEN MUCH MORE ACCOMMODATING ON EXPANSION THAN EXPECTED DURING HIS RECENT MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. YELTSIN SEEMED MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE PACE AND THE GEOGRAPHIC REACH OF EXPANSION, WITH THE BALTICS BEING A PARTICULAR CONCERN. VERSHBOW SAID THE QUESTION OF BALTIC MEMBERSHIP WAS A SENSITIVE DOMESTIC ISSUE AND WE COULD NOT BE SEEN AS BLOCKING THEIR EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP. LYNE SAID HE COULD SEE YELTSIN AGREEING TO MEMBERSHIP FOR THE VISEGRAD STATES EARLY IN THE NEXT CENTURY WITH NO CONDITIONS. LEVER SAID NATO COULD NEITHER EGREGIOUSLY EXCLUDE MEMBERSHIP FOR RUSSIA NOR COULD WE HOLD OUT

FALSE PROSPECTS TO RUSSIA OF CONVERTING NATO INTO A CSCE-LIKE ORGANIZATION.

7. THE BRITISH WERE RELUCTANT TO SEE NATO EXPANSION BEGIN ON TOO FAST A TRACK. A/S HOLBROOKE SAID AN OVERLY CAUTIOUS APPROACH RISKED BECOMING A POLITICAL PROBLEM. HE ASKED IF HMG WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE STEPS NECESSARY FOR EXPANSION WITHIN NATO THIS YEAR AND WITH ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 016422

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, NATO, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH DISCUSS NATO EXPANSION WITH A/S HOLBROOKE

SOME PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS NEXT YEAR. LYNE ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS IN LONDON ON THE QUESTION OF TIMING. NEVILLE-JONES SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NATO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF ENLARGEMENT PRIOR TO TALKING TO PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS. LYNE NOTED THE DANGER OF ESTABLISHING TOO STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR EITHER NATO OR EU MEMBERSHIP. NEVILLE-JONES SAID NATO SHOULD AVOID AT ALL COSTS THE SETTING OF CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP.

8. RIFKIND REMARKED THAT PFP REMAINS VERY IMPORTANT AS IT WILL PLAY AN INTEGRAL ROLE IN PROVIDING LINKS TO NATO FOR THOSE COUNTRIES NOT IN THE FIRST RANK FOR MEMBERSHIP. VERSHBOW SAID SOME PFP MEMBERS WILL UNDERSTAND THAT MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS UNLIKELY. STILL, WE NEED TO SIGNAL TO THEM THAT THE PROCESS IS TAKING ON A MORE FORMAL NATURE. THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS MUST SEE THE PROSPECT FOR MEMBERSHIP. JAY ADDED THAT THE NATO EXPANSION DEBATE MIRRORED THE EU DEBATE AND THAT THE EU HOPED TO CREATE A PROCESS WHICH WOULD DETER SOME DEMANDS ABOUT SPECIFIC DATES FOR ENTRY. HOLBROOKE SAID IT WAS CRITICAL THAT WE INTEGRATE THE EU SUMMIT, THE NATO MINISTERIAL AND THE CSCE SUMMIT IF WE ARE TO MOVE ORWARD SENSIBLY TOWARD THE CREATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

9. ON NEXT STEPS, HE STRESSED THAT THERE MUST BE A VISIBLE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO DISCUSS WHAT MEMBERSHIP MEANS. PROSPECTIVE APPLICANTS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT WILL COST SOMETHING AND THAT THERE WILL BE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES AS WELL. ALL THIS WOULD SUGGEST SOME SORT OF BRIEFING OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS TO THE POLES AND OTHERS AFTER NATO FINISHES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS. A/S HOLBROOKE PROVIDED THE BRITISH WITH A BRIEFING PAPER THE PENTAGON HAD PREPARED DEALING WITH SUCH ISSUES. THE BRITISH ACCEPTED AN OFFER HE MADE TO HAVE A USG TEAM COME TO LONDON TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPTS IN GREATER DETAIL.

10. A/S HOLBROOKE HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE. CROWE
BT
#6422

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 6422
<^SSN>6422

TOR: 941017133738 M1309228
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SIT: VAX NSC

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
021. cable	re: Russia Fails to Approve IPP and NATO-Russia Relationship… (7 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables

OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[01/04/1994-12/16/1994]

2015-0791-M
rs1263

RESTRICTION CODES

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2015-0791-M (1.38)
KBM 2/7/2025

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
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RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD, ECJ5, ECJ5-J//
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
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RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH POLISH FOREIGN
MINISTER OLECHOWSKI, DECEMBER 2, 1994, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 SECTO 028008

NODIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM
SECDEF FOR ISA (EUR-NATO POLICY)

VIENNA FOR BRATISLAVA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OTRA (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PARM, PREL, PL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH POLISH FOREIGN
MINISTER OLECHOWSKI, DECEMBER 2, 1994, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DATE: DECEMBER 2, 1994

PLACE: U.S. MISSION TO NATO
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

3. PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

THE SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY LYNN DAVIS
AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER
S/P DIRECTOR JAMES STEINBERG
GENERAL DANIEL CHRISTMAN, JCS
JOHN BARKER, T STAFF
JOHN ORDWAY, USNATO (NOTETAKER)

POLAND

FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI
ANDRZEJ KRZECZUNOWICZ, AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM
STANISLAW STEBELSKI, DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
-DEPT., MFA
JANUSZ NIESYTO, MINISTER-COUNSELOR, EMBASSY IN
-BRUSSELS
WITOLD WASZCZYKOWSKI, HEAD OF NATO SECTION, MFA

4. SUMMARY: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MET THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER FOR 15 MINUTES ON THE MARGINS OF THE NACC MINISTERIAL DECEMBER 2. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS CONTINUED THE CONVERSATION FOR ANOTHER 30 MINUTES AFTER THE SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE. THE CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY FOCUSED ON POLAND'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON EXPANSION, AND NEXT STEPS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY POLAND AND THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS ALSO A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS URGED THE MINISTER TO COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A BINDING EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON ARMS SALES TO IRAN THAT WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. TO SUPPORT POLAND AS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE POST-COCOM ORGANIZATION ON DECEMBER 21. THE FOREIGN MINISTER INDICATED POLAND INTENDED TO MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT BUT RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING THIS THROUGH A UNILATERAL DOCUMENT, AND SUGGESTED THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL EARLY 1995. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR CSCE AND RELATED ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN BELARUS. END SUMMARY.

NATO ENLARGEMENT/PFP
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5. OLECHOWSKI BEGAN THE MEETING BY WELCOMING THE NAC COMMUNIQUE ISSUED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON, AND EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. EFFORT WHICH HAD BROUGHT IT ABOUT. HE SAID POLAND APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT THE WORDS OF

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 SECTO 028008

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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PRESIDENT CLINTON ARE BEING TURNED INTO FACT. HE THEN ASKED HOW THE SECRETARY SAW THE PROCESS FROM THIS POINT.

6. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THE U.S. HAD PRESSED HARD FOR THE TIMETABLE, WHICH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED ONLY WITH SOME DIFFICULTY. THE U.S. HAD SOUGHT AND OBTAINED A COMMITMENT TO AN INTERNAL DISCUSSION AND THEN AN EXTERNAL DISCUSSION WITH PARTNERS BY NEXT DECEMBER. NOW, NATO WILL BEGIN WITH THE INTERNAL DISCUSSION, WHICH THE SECRETARY PREDICTED WOULD BE INTENSE IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1995 AS THE ALLIES DEVELOPED THE WHY AND HOW OF ENLARGEMENT. THE RESULTS WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SPRING MINISTERIAL, AND THEN WITH PARTNERS.

7. THE SECRETARY ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR HUNTER'S COMMENTS, NOTING THAT HE AND THE OTHER PERMREPS WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE THIS WORK. AMBASSADOR HUNTER SAID THE ALLIANCE WOULD WRITE AN "OWNER'S MANUAL" FOR NATO, WHICH WOULD LET NATO UNDERSTAND WHAT CHANGES IT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE AND WOULD HELP GET ALLIES COMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA OF NEW ALLIES. IT WOULD ALSO TELL PARTNERS WHAT IS REQUIRED OF AN ALLY. THIS WOULD BEGIN AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS WHICH WOULD GET EVERYONE PREPARED FOR ENLARGEMENT AS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT. OLECHOWSKI ASKED WHAT POLAND SHOULD DO; AMBASSADOR HUNTER REPLIED "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE." OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT PLAND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO THIS. HE NOTED THAT THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE HAD ALLOCATED ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR PFP PARTICIPATION. AMBASSADOR HUNTER NOTED THAT THE FIRST PFP EXERCISE IN POLAND HAD BEEN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL, WELL-PREPARED AND -EXECUTED.

8. CONTINUING ON ENLARGEMENT, OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT NATO'S DECISION THE DAY BEFORE WOULD PUT SOME DISCIPLINE INTO POLAND'S INTERNAL LIFE AND MAKE NATO MEMBERSHIP "MORE CREDIBLE." ACTONS WILL HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED TOWARD THAT GOAL. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES HAD BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET, AND THAT EU ENLARGEMENT DID NOT LOOK ENCOURAGING. HE SUGGESTED THAT, UNDER U.S. LEADERSHIP, NATO ENLARGEMENT MIGHT BE EASIER.

POLISH DEVELOPMENTS
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9. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER INQUIRED ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND. OLECHOWSKI RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE LIKELY IN NOVEMBER 1995, AND A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM IN APRIL-MAY. THESE EVENTS WOULD INCITE MUCH POLITICAL DRAMA, HE PREDICTED. ASKED ABOUT THE NEW CONSTITUTION, OLECHOWSKI SAID AN ABBREVIATED CONSTITUTION WAS IN EFFECT NOW, BUT CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERTS WANTED A MORE COMPLETE VERSION WHICH WAS BEING WORKED ON IN PARLIAMENT.

10. TURNING TO THE ECONOMY, OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PROPOSED A MASS PRIVATIZATION WHICH WOULD BE CRITICAL FOR POLAND. ANOTHER PRIVATIZATION AND STARLIZATION SCHEME, ELABORATED WITH THE HELP OF THE EBRD, WOULD TAKE 40 COMPANIES PRIVATE. HE SAID THE ECONOMY WAS DOING WELL, AND THE PUBLIC MOOD WAS IMPROVING. GROWTH WOULD BE 4.7 - 5.0 PERCENT, AND INFLATION WOULD BE SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN THE YEAR ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 SECTO 028008

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OTRA (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PARM, PREL, PL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI, DECEMBER 2, 1994, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

BEFORE.

11. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THIS REPORT WAS VERY ENCOURAGING. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD A STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN POLAND, AND THE SECRETARY PROMISED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A REPORT. AT THAT POINT, THE SECRETARY AND OTHERS IN THE PARTY LEFT FOR ANOTHER MEETING.

UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS: BACK TO PFP
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12. GENERAL CHRISTMAN REMAINED BRIEFLY, AND MADE THE POINT THAT NEXT YEAR PFP WOULD HAVE TO LOOK NOT JUST AT EXERCISES, BUT AT TRAINING, SEMINARS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TRAINING CYCLE WHICH CULMINATED IN EXERCISES. THERE HAD TO BE A FOCUS ON THE ENTIRE PROCESS, NOT JUST EXERCISES. OLECHOWSKI AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT RESULTS TO DATE WERE VERY GOOD. HE MENTIONED POLISH PARTICIPATION IN UNPROFOR AND IN HAITI -- ONE RESULT OF WHICH WAS POLISH GENERALS WERE LEARNING TO SPEAK ENGLISH.

13. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS CONTINUED WITH PFP, NOTING THAT A MISTAKEN IMPRESSION HAD BEEN CREATED THAT THE U.S. WAS "GIVING

UP" ON PFP. THIS WAS INCORRECT: AMONG OTHER REASONS, PFP WAS ESSENTIAL BOTH FOR EXPANSION AND AS A CONTINUING INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK AFTER THE FIRST NEW MEMBERS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO THE ALLIANCE. SHE NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENT PACES TOWARD MEMBERSHIP, BUT THOSE WHO WERE BEHIND MUST BE PART OF THE PROCESS, WITHOUT LINES BEING DRAWN. DR. DAVIS URGED THAT POLAND MAKE THIS POINT WITH OTHER PARTNERS. SHE REITERATED THAT THE DISCUSSION ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE WAS ABOUT TO EMBARK WOULD HELP GUIDE POLAND AND OTHER PARTNERS IN PREPARING THEMSELVES FOR MEMBERSHIP. THE DECISIONS THE DAY BEFORE, SHE SAID, HAD BEEN A MAJOR STEP.

14. OLECHOWSKI AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS. HE THEN SAID THAT PFP HAD NOT YET BEGUN TO EXPLOIT THE FULL POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN PARTNERS. HE SAID THAT POLAND HAD BEEN THINKING ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE.

IRANIAN ARMS SALES
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15. DR. DAVIS RECALLED HER DISCUSSIONS IN WARSAW ON IRANIAN ARMS SALES, AND ASKED HOW THE MINISTER SAW THE SITUATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION. OLECHOWSKI SAID HE KNEW THE ISSUE HAD TO BE RESOLVED. HE SAID HE HAD SET UP AN INTERAGENCY GROUP TO DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT AND WOULD SCHEDULE AN INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETING BEFORE CHRISTMAS. HE SAID HE HOPED TO BE ABLE IN EARLY 1995 TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, HE ASKED THAT THE U.S. NOT INSIST ON A PARTICULAR FORM. POLAND REALIZED THAT ITS COMMITMENT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN A BINDING WAY. HOWEVER, THIS MIGHT BE DONE AS A UNILATERAL, BUT BINDING, COMMITMENT.

16. CONTINUING, OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES HAD PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY DEFENSE-RELATED INDUSTRIES. HE HAD
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 SECTO 028008

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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OBTAINED THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY AND OTHER AGENCIES. THE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT NO LINK COULD BE DRAWN, BUT THE DECISION THE DAY BEFORE (COMMENT: ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. END COMMENT) "MAKES LOTS OF SENSE IN THIS CONTEXT."

17. DR. DAVIS SAID THAT A MEETING OF THOSE COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN FORMING THE POST-COCOM ORGANIZATION WOULD BE HELD ON DECEMBER 21. SHE HAD HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE IN A

POSITION TO SUPPORT POLAND AS A FOUNDING MEMBER; HOWEVER, THIS WOULD REQUIRE RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT THE FOLLOWING WEEK, HE DOUBTED ENOUGH TIME REMAINED TO ACHIEVE A RESOLUTION BEFORE 21 DECEMBER. DR. DAVIS NOTED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT ASKING ANYTHING OF POLAND THAT IT HADN'T ASKED OF ALL OTHER COUNTRIES: NO COUNTRY PARTICIPATING IN F0RMING THE REGIME WAS SELLING ARMS TO IRAN. THE U.S. WAS ACTIVELY DISCUSSING THE SAME GOALS WITH THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND RUSSIA. SHE OBSERVED THAT WE HAD NOT RESOLVED THIS ISSUE WITH RUSSIA, AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP, DESPITE THE VIEWS OF OTHERS. DR. DAVIS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE IRAN ARMS SALES ISSUE WAS THE SINGLE PROBLEM IN THE EVOLVING U.S.-POLAND RELATIONSHIP AND NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED SOON.

IRAQ
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18. OLECHOWSKI ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ. DR. DAVIS SAID WE WERE NOT, DESPITE IRAQ'S RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT. IN THE U.S. VIEW, IRAQ NEEDED TO CARRY OUT ALL THE RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING CARRYING OUT PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. DESPITE INCREASING RUSSIAN AND FRENCH PRESSURE, THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. DR. DAVIS SAID WE WERE PLEASED WITH PROGRESS ON THE MONITORING REGIME, BUT MUCH STILL NEEDED TO BE DONE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE U.S. WAS CONTINUING A POSITION OF CONTAINING SADDAM HUSSEIN, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT RECENTLY SENT TO KUWAIT.

ARMS CONTROL
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19. DR. DAVIS RECALLED THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF NORDIC ARMS CONTROL WHILE IN WARSAW. OLECHOWSKI SAID THE BALL REMAINED IN THEIR COURT ON THIS ISSUE; THEY WOULD TRY TO RESPOND SOON. HE OBSERVED THAT ARMS CONTROL WAS EASIER SAID THAN DONE UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS MORE THINKING COULD BE DONE IN THIS AREA, SINCE A YEAR HAD GONE BY WITH NOTHING HAPPENING. DR. DAVIS SAID SHE HOPED CSCE WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL FRAMEWORK BUILDING ON THE CFG TREATY AS THE FOUNDATION.

20. OLECHOWSKI RESPONDED THAT DECEMBER HAD STARTED OUT VERY WELL AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL, BUT SAID HE EXPECTED THAT CSCE WOULD BE LESS THAN THEY HAD WANTED. THERE WAS, HE OBSERVED, A SHORTAGE OF IDEAS. HE WAS AFRAID THAT CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE WILL PUT A FREEZE ON

NODIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM
SECDEF FOR ISA (EUR-NATO POLICY)

VIENNA FOR BRATISLAVA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OTRA (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PARM, PREL, PL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH POLISH FOREIGN
MINISTER OLECHOWSKI, DECEMBER 2, 1994, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

ANYTHING ELSE, AND THE RUSSIANS WILL USE THIS AS AN EXCUSE TO DO NOTHING UNTIL THE LISBON MEETING IN LATE 1996. DR. DAVIS RESPONDED THAT IF WE CAN GET A FRAMEWORK, THEN WE CAN MOVE ON TO SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS.

BELARUS
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21. OLECHOWSKI NOTED THAT BELARUS HAD DECIDED TO JOIN PFP, AND SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MOVE. OTHER COUNTRIES NEEDED TO ENCOURAGE BELARUS IN THIS DIRECTION. OLECHOWSKI SAID THE BELARUSIAN LEADERS WANTED TO DEVELOP A MORE DIVERSIFIED POLICY. HE URGED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES HELP THEM WITH THIS, PARTICULARLY TO DIVERSIFY THEIR ECONOMY. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO DESIGN POLICIES TO DIVERSIFY EXPORT, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD BE HELPFUL. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE INDEPENDENT WHEN 95 PERCENT OF ONE'S FOREIGN TRADE WAS WITH ONE COUNTRY. POLAND WAS WORKING ON AN AGREEMENT ON BORDER TRADE. BORDERS, OLECHOWSKI SAID, SHOULD GENERATE INCOME, AND TRADE, AND FEAR.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#8008

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05
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SIT: SCHIFTER FRIED

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0791-M (1.39)
KBH 2/7/2025

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RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN/BALTIC FOREIGN MINISTERS

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTO 028010

VIENNA PASS BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), NATO,
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN/BALTIC FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DECEMBER 3, 1994 - CONRAD HOTEL, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

3. U.S. PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, U/S DAVIS, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT BRADTKE, PDAS KORNBLUM, SPOKESMAN MCCURRY, GENERAL CHRISTMAN (JCS), AMBASSADOR HUNTER.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN/BALTIC REPRESENTATIVES: ALBANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER STAROVA, BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER STANCHOV, CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC, ESTONIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LUIK, HUNGARIAN MFA STATE SECRETARY SOMOGYI, LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BIRKAVAS, LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER POVILAS, POLISH AMBASSADOR KRZECZUNOWICZ, ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU, SLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER KUKAN, AND SLOVENE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER GOLOB.

4. SUMMARY. IN HIS DECEMBER 3 MEETING WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND BALTIC FOREIGN MINISTERS, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER REVIEWED THE DECEMBER 1 NAC DECISIONS ON ENLARGEMENT, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHEING PFP AND NOTED THE IMPORTANT ROLE RUSSIA WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY IN EUROPE. ALL SPEAKERS ENDORSED NATO

DECISIONS ON ENLARGEMENT; SEVERAL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. LEADERSHIP THAT SECURED THIS DECISION. SEVERAL SPEAKERS CALLED FOR MORE INFORMATION FROM NATO ON ENLARGEMENT, INCLUDING EVENTUALLY CRITERIA. THE BALTIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE "PUT UP FOR GRABS" WHEN NATO ENLARGES. MOST SPEAKERS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RUSSIA HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, AND STRESSED THAT ONLY THE U.S. COULD ADEQUATELY MANAGE RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. ALL SPEAKERS EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THIS MEETING; THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED TO REPEAT SUCH MEETINGS REGULARLY. END SUMMARY.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

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5. ALL SPEAKERS SAID THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE DECEMBER 1 NAC DECISION ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. THE CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION THAT HAD RESULTED FROM U.S. LEADERSHIP. THE HUNGARIAN STATE SECRETARY AGREED, NOTING THAT NEW MEMBERS OF NATO MUST BE PROVIDERS AS WELL AS CONSUMERS OF SECURITY. HE ASKED THAT NATO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION, CLARIFICATIONS AND ADVICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO HELP HUNGARY PREPARE FOR MEMBERSHIP. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT HIS MINISTER FULLY SUPPORTED THE NATO DECISIONS. NATO HAD DEFINED THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD MEMBERSHIP.

6. NOTING THAT THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO WAS DEPENDENT ON U.S. SUPPORT, THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSED THAT THE PROSPECTIVE MEMBER STATES BE INVOLVED IN SOME WAY DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF NATO'S INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS IN EARLY 1995 IN ORDER TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE FORMULATED SUCH THAT EACH STATE WOULD BE JUDGED ON ITS OWN AND NOT COMPARED TO OTHER STATES. REGIONAL BALANCES SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

7. THE BALTIC FOREIGN MINISTERS ALL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR INTEGRATION INTO WESTERN STRUCTURES. THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT AN UNCLEAR SECURITY SITUATION PUT THE BALTIC STATES "UP FOR GRABS." HE ALSO OBJECTED TO SUGGESTIONS BY SOME EUROPEAN STATES THAT THE BALTIC STATES WERE INDEFENSIBLE. HE ASKED WHETHER BERLIN WAS DEFENSIBLE DURING THE COLD WAR. THE LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT ENLARGING NATO WOULD INCREASE SECURITY FOR EVERYONE. THE LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED THAT PFP PROVIDED EACH PARTNER ITS OWN "CORRIDOR" TO NATO. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ENLARGEMENT OF NATO WOULD BE LIMITED BUT WAS AFRAID THAT THE "GROUPING" OF SOME STATES WOULD RESULT IN NEW DIVIDING LINES IN EUROPE. HE AND THE SLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER URGED THAT NATO PROVIDE MORE EXPLICIT REQUIREMENTS FOR ENLARGEMENT. THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.

8. RESPONDING TO THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO DETAILS YET ON HOW NATO WOULD PROCEED WITH ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS, HE SUPPORTED EARLY INPUTS FROM PARTNER STATES TO NATO AND WOULD ENSURE THAT SUCH INPUTS WERE PROVIDED FOR. IN LATER STAGES, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, NATO TEAMS MIGHT VISIT THE CAPITALS OF STATES

INTERESTED IN JOINING NATO TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF MEMBERSHIP.

RUSSIA
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9. MOST SPEAKERS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF INVOLVING RUSSIA CONSTRUCTIVELY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING ESTABLISHING A VIABLE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. THE SLOVAK AND ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS SAID THAT THE U.S. MUST PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MANAGING RUSSIA'S ROLE IN EUROPE. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR AGREED, NOTING THAT THE PARTNERS COULD PLAY A HELPFUL UOLE IN CONVINCING RUSSIA TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE HUNGARIAN STATE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF RUSSIAN INTERESTS, BUT THAT RUSSIA MUST NOT HAVE A VETO IN THE PROCESS. THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE HAD TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV THAT IF THE BALTIC STATES WERE MEMBERS OF NATO, THEY WOULD FEEL MORE SECURE AND THEN WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE WITH EXTENSIVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
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10. THE BULGARIAN AND ALBANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS STRESSED THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA ON THEIR COUNTRIES. THE BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED ON NATO TO "GIVE A SIGNAL" THAT WOULD HELP THE COUNTRIES IN THE BALKAN REGION ENSURE STABILITY. HE SUGGESTED PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO IMPROVE THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE (E.G., ROADS, COMMUNICATIONS).
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#8010

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INFO: ////
SUBJ: DECEMBER 15 TALBOTT-RYURIKOV MEETING ON NATO, CHECHNYA

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 036374

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS, US
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 15 TALBOTT-RYURIKOV MEETING ON NATO, CHECHNYA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND HIS DELEGATION DECEMBER 15, PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR DMITRY RYURIKOV EXPLAINED YELTSIN'S REACTION TO THE NAC COMMUNIQUE ON NATO EXPANSION AS THAT OF A BUSINESSMAN WHO HAS JUST LEARNED THAT HIS PARTNER HAS TAKEN OUT A NEW INSURANCE POLICY IN CASE THEIR VENTURE FAILS. YELTSIN HAD TAKEN PERSONAL AFFRONT AT WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS AN UNCERTAINTY IN THE WEST -- AND PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S. -- ABOUT RUSSIA'S RELIABILITY AS A PARTNER. RYURIKOV ASSERTED THAT BASED ON AMERICAN ASSURANCES IN 1993 AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF P4P, MANY IN RUSSIA HAD DETERMINED THAT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION HAD BEEN "STOPPED." NOW, RUSSIA NEEDS "SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE", SOME WAY OF BEING INCLUDED IN DECISION-MAKING ON NATO'S FUTURE, BECAUSE IT IS "ENTITLED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE DESIGNING OF EUROPE'S NEW ARCHITECTURE. RYURIKOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD BE "TOUGHER THAN MAASTRICHT." HE AGREED WITH TALBOTT'S PROPOSAL THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD ENGAGE INTENSIVELY ON THIS ISSUE IN THE COMING MONTHS. ON CHECHNYA, RYURIKOV SAID MOSCOW CONTINUES TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT THE RUSSIAN

ARMY IS BEING PROVOKED AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE REGION IS PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS ROLE. END SUMMARY.

3. YELTSIN'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR, DMITRY RYURIKOV, MET FOR AN HOUR ON DECEMBER 15 WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, AMBASSADOR PICKERING, S/NIS SENIOR COORDINATOR COLLINS AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR BURNS. RYURIKOV OPENED THE MEETING BY ADVISING THE GROUP THAT YELTSIN HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR A BRIEF CALL IN HIS HOSPITAL ROOM THE FOLLOWING DAY, EVEN THOUGH HE IS NOT FULLY RECOVERED FROM HIS SURGERY AND REMAINS IN SOME DISCOMFORT. RYURIKOV MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS A CONSCIOUS POLITICAL DECISION BY YELTSIN TO DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE AND VITALITY OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND TO SHOW THAT THE BUDAPEST CONFRONTATION OVER NATO WAS A BUMP IN THE ROAD, NOT THE START OF A "COLD PEACE."

4. TALBOTT AGREED THAT WE NEED TO GET BEYOND BUDAPEST. HE REAFFIRMED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND HIS STRONG PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BORIS YELTSIN. NONETHELESS, PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED BY YELTSIN'S SPEECH AT BUDAPEST; HE FELT AMBUSHED, SET UP. BY GOING PUBLIC WITH AN ATTACK ON THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ON U.S. POLICY, YELTSIN HAD COMPLICATED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TASK OF PRESERVING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN REFORM AND INTEGRATION. IT WAS CLEAR WE HAD A MAJOR MISUNDERSTANDING. THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAD MISREAD THE NAC COMMUNIQUE AS A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS AWAY FROM PARTNERSHIP AND INTEGRATED EUROPE AND TOWARD NATO EXPANSION AT THE EXPENSE OF INTEGRATION. IN FACT, CLINTON HAD LIVED UP TO BOTH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF HIS SEPTEMBER COMMITMENTS TO YELTSIN; THERE WOULD BE NO RUSH NO SURPRISES AND NO EXCLUSION OF RUSSIA. 1995 WOULD BE A YEAR OF BRIEFING AND STUDY; THERE HAD BEEN NO DECISION ON TIMETABLE OR WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD BE JOINING THE ALLIANCE; RUSSIA WOULD GET THE SAME TREATMENT IN THE '95 BRIEFINGS AS ANY P4P MEMBER.

5. RYURIKOV AGREED THERE HAD BEEN A SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING. HE SAID THAT BASED ON YELTSIN'S SEPTEMBER 1993 WARNING AGAINST NATO EXPANSION, THE CREATION THAT AUTUMN OF P4P AND THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE'S ANALYSIS OF EVENTS, "WE HAD THE FEELING THE MATTER OF NATO EXPANSION HAD BEEN STOPPED." (HE TWICE CITED YEVGENY PRIMAKOV, THE HEAD OF THE SVRR, AS HAVING PROVIDED KEY ANALYSIS THAT INFLUENCED YELTSIN'S ORIGI
NAL EXPECTATIONS AND POST-BRUSSELS ANGER.)
"WHILE WE DON'T CONSIDER NATO AN ADVERSARY AND WE WANT TO ESTABLISH TIES WITH IT, WE SAW P4P AS A

KIND OF ALTERNATIVE TO NATO EXPANSION." LATER, RYURIKOV SAID, "OTHER EUROPEANS TOLD US NOT TO BLAME THEM, THE U.S. WAS RUSHING THE PACE. THEN WE HEARD PEOPLE IN THE U.S. -- NOT THE ADMINISTRATION, BUT OTHERS -- SAYING WE HAVE TO EXPAND NATO AS A HEDGE AGAINST BAD DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA. THIS REALLY UPSET YELTSIN. THE NOTION OF UNCERTAINTY REGARDING US AS A PARTNER ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 036374

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS, US
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 15 TALBOTT-RYURIKOV MEETING ON NATO, CHECHNYA

UPSET HIM. THIS DIDN'T FIT HIS CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP. IT'S A STRANGE BUSINESS VENTURE, RYURIOV CONTINUED, WHEN YOU HAVE TWO PARTNERS, BUT AT SOME STAGE ONE SAYS, 'THIS GUY IS NOT RELIABLE; I'VE GOT TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS IN CASE HE FAILS,' THIS IS WHY WE REACTED."

6. FURTHER, RYURIKOV SAID, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY HAD BEGUN TO TALK ABOUT TAKING ITS OWN PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF A FOREIGN MILITARY BLOC UP TO RUSSIA'S BORDERS -- WITH ALL THE EXPENSE AND POSTPONEMENT OF MILITARY REFORM THAT THAT WOULD REQUIRE. "WE CAN'T AFFORD THIS KIND OF REVIVAL OF THE OLD RED ARMY SPIRIT," HE SAID. NEITHER DO WE WANT A COLD PEACE. YELTSIN JUST FELT HE HAD TO MAKE CLEAR IT WAS ONE FUTURE POSSIBILITY.

7. WHAT WE NEED NOW, RYURIKOV CONTINUED, ARE PRAGMATIC STEPS SO THAT WE END UP WITH A EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE THAT INCLUDES RUSSIA. THIS SYSTEM CANNOT BE IMPOSED; RUSSIA MUST BE PART OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS -- NOT BECAUSE MOSCOW HAS A VETO -- IT DOESN'T -- BUT BECAUSE RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF ALL EUROPEANS. RYURIKOV ADMITTED THIS WOULD BE A DELICATE PROCESS -- "HARDER THAN MAASTRICHT." HE DREW THE GROUP'S ATTENTION TO SOME OF THE IDEAS IN YELTSIN'S BUDAPEST SPEECH FOR BILATERAL GUARANTEES, OR A NETWORK OF BILATERAL TREATIES WITH CROSS GUARANTEES.

8. TALBOTT STRONGLY REFUTED THE IDEA THAT THE U.S. WAS PUSHING NATO EXPANSION AS A HEDGE AGAINST RESURGENT RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM, REMINDING RYURIKOV OF ALL THE TIMES BILL CLINTON HAD STOOD BY YELTSIN IN 1993 -- DURING THE MARCH, SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER SHOWDOWNS WITH THE PARLIAMENT, AFTER THE DECEMBER 12 ELECTIONS, AND THEN AGAIN AFTER THE GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP AND THE DEPARTURE OF GAIDAR AND FYDOROOV IN EARLY 1994 -- WHEN OTHERS

IN THE WEST WERE READY TO WRITE HIM OFF. BUT YELTSIN'S HARSH COMMENTS IN BUDAPEST DID NOT MAKE IT ANY EASIER FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON TO SUPPORT HIM AGAINST THE CRITICS. BURNS UNDERSCORED THIS POINT, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF AIRING OUR DISAGREEMENTS PRIVATELY -- NOT IN PUBLIC. RYURIKOV HEARTILY AGREED WITH TALBOTT'S SUGGESTION THAT A GOOD REVIEW OF THESE ISSUES BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN JANUARY WOULD BE A CRUCIAL NEXT STEP.

CHECHNYA
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9. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING'S QUESTION, RYURIKOV SAID THE SITUATION IN CHECHNYA IS VERY SERIOUS. THE RUSSIAN ARMY HAD BEEN ORDERED TO SHOW MAXIMUM RESTRAINT, BUT THEY WERE BEING SHOT AT. THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO ALLOW ITS TROOPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S CALL FOR A WEAPONS SURRENDER, FEW HAD BEEN TURNED IN. RYURIKOV ALSO NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD SHOWN MAXIMUM "TACT" IN NOT CHARACTERIZING THE DUDAYEV REGIME AS A "CRIMINAL STRUCTURE," OR RELEASING FIGURES ABOUT DIVERTED TAX REVENUE, UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME AND POVERTY IN THE REPUBLIC HIGH ABOVE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE. HE SAID, THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT STILL WANTS TO FIND PEACE WITH A MINIMUM OF BLOODSHED, BUT THE SITUATION IS HEATING UP, AND THE "ISLAMIC FACTOR" IS INCREASING, INCLUDING (UNSPECIFIED) OUTSIDE SUPPORT. RYURIKOV THANKED THE U.S. FOR ITS "RESTRAINED AND PRINCIPLED" PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING CHECHNYA.

10. THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT.
MILES
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#6374

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 6374
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