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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93 MAY 15 P12:38

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5.15.93

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.23)
KBH 1/2/2025

May 15, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE has approved JWL

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin on G-7 Assistance to Russia

Russian Ambassador Vladimir Lukin and visiting Deputy Prime Minister Boris Federov delivered to me today the attached letter from Yeltsin to you on G-7 economic assistance to Russia. Federov said the letter is directed to you as a follow-up from Vancouver and the mid-April Tokyo Ministerial. He added that Yeltsin has not yet sent similar letters to your G-7 colleagues but will do so shortly. NSC staff urged Federov to assure that Yeltsin is in touch with the other G-7 leaders, especially on the issues we are promoting such as the Privatization Fund.

The thrust of the letter is an appeal for our help in producing concrete G-7 support for Russia by the July Economic Summit meeting in Tokyo. Specifically, Yeltsin commended the progress made at the Tokyo Ministerial and asked that the promises made there be translated into tangible economic assistance. The letter mentions three priority projects of interest to the Russians: a Small Business Support Fund created by the EBRD (we intend to help finance it with money from our $1.8 billion package); progress with the IMF on securing loans for Russia from the new Systemic Reform Facility (we have urged Russia and the IMF to move quickly on this); and establishment of the Privatization Fund that you have discussed with many of your G-7 colleagues.

Yeltsin's letter is not a surprise. Economic reform has become a renewed priority for Yeltsin now that he is past the April 25 referendum. He has publicly called for those who do not agree with his economic reforms to leave the government and he fired this week a prominent Deputy Prime Minister who opposed the reforms. According to Federov, Yeltsin would like to assert firm control of the Central Bank but will do so carefully and gradually to avoid a major clash with his Parliamentary opponents.

The Yeltsin letter is a strong reminder that we need to move fast to create a foundation for a successful Economic Summit in July.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Во вторых, считаю необходимым подчеркнуть, что никакие повороты и превратности внутриполитической борьбы не заставят меня отойти от демократических форм и принципов государственного правления. Не может быть и речи о "наказании" оппозиции, тем более преследовании граждан за политические убеждения. Идя на референдум, я как Президент лично гарантировал, что будут обеспечены все демократические права и свободы, включая свободу печати. Революция августа 1991 года совершалась не для того, чтобы в Россию вернулись старые порядки.

В-третьих, я намерен выполнять функции Президента России в полном объеме и на законных основаниях вплоть до проведения новых выборов. Народный мандат на это у меня есть. Что касается сроков новых выборов, затягивать с ними я не собираюсь. Но и не рассматриваю их как самоцель. Главное для меня сейчас - активизировать реформу.

В-четвертых, концентрация на внутренних, социально-экономических проблемах не означает ослабления внимания к внешней политике. На этом направлении наш курс остается прежним на интеграцию в цивилизованное сообщество, на стратегическое партнерство, а в перспективе и на союзничество с США.

Я убежден, что процветание России возможно только на основе обеспечения демократии, укрепления рыночной экономики и открытия внешнему миру. Эти принципы являются прочным фундаментом для развития партнерских отношений между Россией и США.

В заключение хочу пожелать успехов в Вашей деятельности по стабилизации и оздоровлению экономики Соединенных Штатов, осуществлению важных социально-экономических программ в интересах американского народа. Со своей стороны, выражаю готовность к продолжению плодотворного сотрудничества и диалога. Как наши двустронние дела, так и актуальные, острые международные проблемы, подобные "боснийскому кризису", настоятельно требуют от России и США тесного взаимодействия, оперативности и координации усилий.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of February 18 and especially for your kind words on my State of the Union address. I know you understand the importance of dealing honestly with domestic economic difficulties and trust you will appreciate why I have set as my first priority taking strong steps to reinvigorate the American economy.

My administration is focussing on the development of a strong Russian-American relationship, with particular emphasis on the economic opportunities open to both countries. I am committed to assisting Russia as it makes continued efforts to reform. I, too, strongly believe that an open global market in which all products, including Russian goods, can trade competitively is good for all the nations of the world.

At the same time, I am keenly aware that unless we deal with the many foreign policy challenges before us, we will be unable to create the stable environment necessary to improve the standard of living for our peoples. In this connection, Secretary Christopher will be meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev on Thursday for a thorough review of the many issues we must address together.

I know that this meeting will build a solid foundation for our own summit meeting. Secretary Christopher will have with him some

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.01]

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concrete suggestions as to the date and location of this meeting and I trust we will then be able to proceed with plans for this meeting.

I look forward to an opportunity to meet you in person and to continue building a partnership for a stable, more prosperous world.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the
Russian Federation
Moscow

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [1.02]
KBH 1/2/2025

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~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARGE COLLINS:

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CHARGE COLLINS: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON. HARD COPY TO FOLLOW.

.

BEGIN TEXT:

.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 18 AND ESPECIALLY FOR YOUR KIND WORDS ON MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS. I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING HONESTLY WITH DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND TRUST YOU WILL APPRECIATE WHY I HAVE SET AS MY FIRST PRIORITY TAKING STRONG STEPS TO REINVIGORATE THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.

.

MY ADMINISTRATION IS FOCUSSING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES OPEN TO BOTH COUNTRIES. I AM COMMITTED TO ASSISTING RUSSIA AS IT MAKES CONTINUED EFFORTS TO REFORM. I, TOO, STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT AN OPEN GLOBAL MARKET IN WHICH ALL PRODUCTS, INCLUDING RUSSIAN GOODS, CAN TRADE COMPETITIVELY IS GOOD FOR ALL THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD.

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AT THE SAME TIME, I AM KEENLY AWARE THAT UNLESS WE DEAL WITH THE MANY FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES BEFORE US, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO CREATE THE STABLE ENVIRONMENT NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE STANDARD OF LIVING FOR OUR PEOPLES. IN THIS CONNECTION, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL BE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV ON THURSDAY FOR A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE MANY ISSUES WE MUST ADDRESS TOGETHER.

I KNOW THAT THIS MEETING WILL BUILD A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR OUR OWN SUMMIT MEETING. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL HAVE WITH HIM SOME CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE DATE AND LOCATION OF THIS MEETING AND I TRUST WE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR THIS MEETING.

I LOOK FORWARD TO AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET YOU IN PERSON AND TO CONTINUE BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR A STABLE, MORE PROSPEROUS WORLD.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

HIS EXCELLENCY
BORIS YELTSIN
PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2/20/93

February 20, 1993

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.03)
KBH 1/2/2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to Russian President Yeltsin

Purpose

Reply to recent letter from President Yeltsin

Background

Attached is a letter (Tab B) that Ambassador Lukin passed to me today. In the letter President Yeltsin makes the following points:

-- Our concentration on domestic economic affairs is not a signal to Yeltsin that we care less about Russia.

-- We need to take account of domestic factors in our bilateral relations. (I am certain he means that we should appreciate how important the "domestic front" is in determining Russian policy towards Serbia.)

-- Economic cooperation is key -- not just assistance but access to world markets for Russian goods ranging from raw materials and rockets to arms sales.

-- We have a full foreign policy agenda before us and how this is handled can impact on the resolution of important domestic issues.

-- A date has to be set soon for the summit meeting. This is important to Yeltsin for political as well as personal reasons.

Attached at Tab A is a draft response to President Yeltsin for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Draft letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming letter and translation

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(1.04)
KBH 1/2/2025

February 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: TOBY T. GATI TTG

SUBJECT: Letter to Russian President Yeltsin

Attached is a letter (Tab B) that Ambassador Lukin passed to me today. It is from President Yeltsin to President Clinton. In the letter President Yeltsin makes the following points:

-- Our concentration on domestic economic affairs is not a signal to Yeltsin that we care less about Russia.

-- We need to take account of domestic factors in our bilateral relations. (I am certain he means that we should appreciate how important the "domestic front" is in determining Russian policy towards Serbia.)

-- Economic cooperation is key -- not just assistance but access to world markets for Russian goods ranging from raw materials and rockets to arms sales.

-- We have a full foreign policy agenda before us and that how this is handled can impact on the resolution of important domestic issues.

-- A date has to be set soon for the summit meeting. This is important to Yeltsin for political as well as personal reasons.

Attached at Tab A is a draft response to President Yeltsin for the President's signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I transmitting the letter to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Draft letter to President Yeltsin

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Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

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Translated from Russian

February 18, 1993
Moscow

Dear Mr. President,

It was with great interest that I read your first State of the Union address. I feel confident that your program will be supported by the American people and that it will provide a good basis for dealing with the problems facing your country and an effective US participation in international efforts to build a new democratic world order.

I thought I should write to you in order to share some of my views as to how we want to proceed in our relationship in conditions where the internal situations in Russia and in the US are certainly a priority issue both for you and for us.

With all their differences, our two countries are going through an important stage of renewal. You have boldly embarked upon a major reform of the socio-economic sphere in your country and have bluntly told the American people about the need for taking difficult but necessary decisions. You know very well that we, too, are faced with an unprecedented task, that of breaking the old system and building a new democratic Russia. This course is supported by a majority of Russians, and we will never turn away from it.

I fully agree with you that success of reform in Russia is in the national interest of the United States. But it is also true that we are no less interested in the success of your endevours. Therefore, mutual regard for the interests and assistance to each other on the "domestic front" should help assure practical realization of the plans for our two countries' renewal.

His Excellency
Mr.Bill Clinton
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.05]

A lot has been done already in terms of laying a solid economic foundation for our relations of partnership. However, there is an obvious need for developing new forms of government assistance to trade and investments, for creating a mechanism of inter-governmental cooperation on economic matters. We make no secret of the fact that we are counting on the US assistance, too, in achieving a broad intergration of Russia into the international economic system and in removing the obstacles impeding the entry of Russian products to the US and international markets. Of critical importance here is good coordination of our actions in avoiding the recurrence of protectionism and national egoism. Openness in foreign trade is in everybody's interest.

At the same time it is important to create a favorable external environment for pursuing our domestic reforms. The world is so complex that in many ways stability can only be ensured by our partnership and joint efforts. Without such collaboration one can hardly expect a lasting settlement in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and other hot spots. This is fully true of the conflicts on the territory of the former USSR as well.

New challenges of the post-confrontation period, among which are outbreaks of nationalism and separatism, regional arms rece, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems have the potential - unless we jointly find adequate responses to them - of seriously complicating the accomplishment of our domestic goals.

I am becoming more and more of the view that the difficult situation in the world and the evolution of internal processes in Russia and the United States require an early top-level review of our positions, development of a long-term and balanced agenda of Russian-US partnership, and tuning up of the mechanism of future cooperation.

I look forward to your suggestions on the dates and the venue of our working summit. I think the details could be discussed by Minister Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher at their forthcoming meeting in Geneva.

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I am confident that our new personal meeting will set the tone for the further development of Russian-US relations.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ Б.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

С большим интересом ознакомился с Вашим первым посланием "О положении страны". Убежден, что изложенная Вами программа будет поддержана американским народом и станет хорошей основой для решения стоящих перед вашей страной проблем, эффективного участия США в международных усилиях по строительству нового демократического миропорядка.

Решил написать Вам, чтобы поделиться некоторыми соображениями о том, как нам строить отношения в условиях, когда внутренняя ситуация в России и США является безусловно приоритетной и для Вас и для нас.

При всех различиях наши страны находятся на важном этапе обновления. Вы смело взяли курс на серьезное реформирование социально-экономической сферы США, прямо заявили американскому народу о необходимости принятия трудных, но нужных решений. Вы хорошо знаете, что и перед нами стоит небывалая задача: сломать старую систему и построить новую демократическую Россию. Этот курс пользуется поддержкой большинства россиян, и мы с него никогда не свернем.

Полностью согласен с Вами, что успех реформ в России отвечает национальным интересам США. Но верно и другое - мы не меньше заинтересованы в удаче ваших начинаний. Поэтому взаимный учет интересов и помощь друг другу "на внутреннем фронте" являются залогом практической реализации планов обновления наших двух стран.

Для подведения прочной экономической базы под отношения партнерства наших стран уже многое сделано. Однако очевидна необходимость в новых формах государственного содействия торговле и инвестициям, создания механизма межправительственного взаимодействия по экономическим вопросам. Мы не скрываем, что

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рассчитываем и на содействие США широкой интеграции России в международную экономическую систему, в деле снятия препятствий для выхода российской продукции на американский и международные рынки. Здесь крайне важна согласованность наших действий по недопущению рецидивов протекционизма и национального эгоизма. Внешнеэкономическая открытость отвечает интересам всех.

Одновременно важно создать для наших внутренних преобразований благоприятную внешнюю среду. Мир настолько сложен, что стабильность может быть во многом обеспечена лишь благодаря нашему партнерству и совместным усилиям. Без такого взаимодействия трудно рассчитывать на прочное урегулирование на Балканах, Ближнем Востоке, в Персидском заливе и в других горячих точках. Это в полной мере относится и к конфликтным ситуациям на территории бывшего СССР.

Новые вызовы постконфронтационного периода, среди которых вспышки национализма и сепаратизма, региональная гонка вооружений, расползание оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки могут - если мы сообща не найдем на них адекватные ответы - существенно затруднить решение наших внутренних задач.

Все больше укрепляюсь во мнении, что непростая ситуация в мире и развитие внутренних процессов в России и США требуют скорейшей сверки на высшем уровне наших позиций, выработки долгосрочной и сбалансированной повестки дня российско-американского партнерства, отладки механизма дальнейшего взаимодействия.

Ожидаю Ваших предложений по срокам и месту нашего рабочего саммита. Думаю, что его детали могут обсудить А.Козырев и У.Кристофер на их предстоящей встрече в Женеве.

Уверен, что наша новая личная встреча задаст тон дальнейшему развитию российско-американских отношений.

С уважением

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

18 февраля 1993 года
г.Москва

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 03

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~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FOR CHARGE JIM COLLINS FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TONY LAKE.

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JIM: I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON SUNDAY, MARCH 21. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW. WE HAVE ALSO INCLUDED A COPY OF THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF MARCH 20 ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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DEAR BORIS:

.

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAVE JUST ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY CONCERNING THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN RUSSIA. MY STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE HISTORIC MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND A FREE MARKET ECONOMY THAT YOU HAVE LAUNCHED. IT SPECIFIES THAT, AS RUSSIA'S ONLY DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED NATIONAL LEADER, WE SUPPORT YOU, YOUR REFORM GOVERNMENT AND REFORMERS THROUGHOUT THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

.

IN MY STATEMENT, I RECOGNIZED THAT THERE IS A POLITICAL IMPASSE IN RUSSIA, AND THAT YOU PROPOSE TO BREAK IT BY LETTING THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE DECIDE THEIR FUTURE. MY STATEMENT ALSO INDICATES THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL WORK TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR SUMMIT

MEETING IN VANCOUVER ON APRIL 3-4.

I KNOW THAT THIS WAS NOT AN EASY STEP FOR YOU TO TAKE, AND THAT IT MAY LEAD TO DIFFICULT DAYS FOR YOU AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. I HOPE THAT YOU APPRECIATE THE DEPTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY AND FREE MARKET ECONOMICS IN RUSSIA. I WAS THEREFORE ENCOURAGED BY YOUR STATEMENT THAT DEMOCRATIC AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN RUSSIA WILL BE RESPECTED, THAT ECONOMIC REFORM WILL CONTINUE, AND THAT THERE WILL BE CONTINUITY IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A GOOD IDEA FOR FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV TO VISIT WASHINGTON THIS WEEK. I PLAN TO MEET WITH HIM, AS WILL SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER, AND HIS PRESENCE HERE WILL ALLOW US TO CONSULT ABOUT EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND OUR VANCOUVER SUMMIT. I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD.

SINCERELY YOURS,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

MARCH 20, 1993

U.S. STATEMENT ON THE YELTSIN SPEECH

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE HISTORIC MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND FREE MARKETS IN RUSSIA. RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN IS THE LEADER OF THAT PROCESS. AS RUSSIA'S ONLY DEMOCRATICALLY-

ELECTED NATIONAL LEADER, HE HAS OUR SUPPORT, AS DO HIS REFORM GOVERNMENT, AND ALL REFORMERS THROUGHOUT THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN PROPOSES TO BREAK THE POLITICAL IMPASSE IN RUSSIA BY LETTING THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE DECIDE THEIR FUTURE. WE WERE ENCOURAGED TO HEAR HIM SAY THAT CIVIL LIBERTIES WILL BE RESPECTED.

.

WE ALSO WELCOME PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S ASSURANCE OF CONTINUITY IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. WE WILL WORK TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT LOOKS FORWARD TO HIS SUMMIT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN VANCOUVER ON APRIL 3-4. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK IN CONCERT WITH OUR ALLIES TO SUPPORT THOSE IN RUSSIA WHO WISH TO FURTHER REFORM.

.

WHAT MATTERS MOST IS THAT RUSSIA IS, AND MUST REMAIN, A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY MOVING TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY. THAT IS THE BASIS FOR A CONTINUED U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP, AND FOR A BETTER AND MORE PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE.

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END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0374
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<MSGID> M0292431

LETTER TO YELTSIN

Dear Boris:

I wanted you to know that I have just issued a public statement on your announcement today concerning the political crisis in Russia. My statement makes clear that the United States supports the historic movement toward democracy and a free market economy that you have launched. It specifies that, as Russia's only democratically-elected national leader, we support you, your reform government and reformers throughout the Russian Federation.

In my statement, I recognized that there is a political impasse in Russia, and that you propose to break it by letting the Russian people decide their future. My statement also indicates that the United States will work to maintain the close relations between our two countries and that I look forward to our summit meeting in Vancouver on April 3-4.

I know that this was not an easy step for you to take, and that it may lead to difficult days for you and the Russian people. I hope that you appreciate the depth of our commitment to reform and the future of democracy and free market economics in Russia. I was therefore encouraged by your statement that democratic and civil liberties in Russia will be respected, that economic reform will continue, and that there will be continuity in Russia's foreign policy.

We believe that it is a good idea for Foreign Minister Kozyrev to visit Washington this week. I plan to meet with him, as will Secretary of State Christopher, and his presence here will allow us to consult about events in Moscow and our Vancouver summit. I look forward to staying in close contact with you in the days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely yours,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.08]

Translated from Russian

March 11, 1993

Moscow

Dear Bill,

I wish to take this opportunity to convey to you my appreciation for the support that you and your administration have so consistently given to the course pursued by the Russian leadership aimed at achieving democratic change in our country. This support acquires particular importance at the time of this difficult political situation in Russia caused not only by the economic difficulties inevitable in a transformation of such scope, but also by the attempts of certain political forces to reverse the reform process.

Under the circumstances, the Russian leadership is taking vigorous steps to overcome the present crisis through peaceful, democratic means, and by taking into account the view of as many Russians as possible. At the same time, in the event there is a real threat on the part of irresponsible politicians to the state constitutional system, I, as President of Russia, will be ready to take the necessary measures to preserve the democratic gains of the Russian people and sustain the course at integrating Russia into the civilized world community. I expect Valeriy Zorkin, Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, to inform you in

His Excellency
Bill CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.09]

greater detail about the present situation in Russia when he meets with you, if such an opportunity presents itself.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that the course of reform and creation of a market economy that I have embarked upon is irreversible.

I look forward to meeting you soon and wish you every success.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«11» марта 1993 г.

№ Пр-335

г. МОСКВА

Дорогой Билл,

Пользуясь случаем, хочу обратиться к Вам со словами признательности за ту поддержку, которую Вы и Ваша администрация последовательно оказываете курсу российского руководства на осуществление демократических преобразований в нашей стране. Эта поддержка приобретает особое значение в тот момент, когда в России складывается непростая политическая ситуация, вызванная не только неизбежными при трансформациях такого масштаба экономическими трудностями, но и попытками определенных политических сил повернуть реформы вспять.

В этих условиях российское руководство предпринимает энергичные шаги, чтобы преодолеть возникший кризис мирным, демократическим путем, с учетом мнения как можно большего числа россиян. Вместе с тем, в случае возникновения реальной угрозы государственному конституционному строю со стороны безответственных деятелей, я как Президент России готов принять необходимые меры для сохранения демократических завоеваний российского народа, продолжения курса на интеграцию России в мировое цивилизованное сообщество. Рассчитываю, что более подробно о нынешнем положении в России Вам расскажет Председатель Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации В.Зорькин при встрече с Вами, если такая возможность представится.

В заключение хочу еще раз подтвердить, что взятый мною курс на реформы и создание рыночной экономики необратим.

В ожидании скорой встречи с Вами и с пожеланиями всяческих успехов.

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.ВАШИНГТОН

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.10]

Translated from Russian

March 11, 1993

Moscow

Dear Bill,

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Under the circumstances, the Russian leadership is taking vigorous steps to overcome the present crisis through peaceful, democratic means, and by taking into account the view of as many Russians as possible. At the same time, in the event there is a real threat on the part of irresponsible politicians to the state constitutional system, I, as President of Russia, will be ready to take the necessary measures to preserve the democratic gains of the Russian people and sustain the course at integrating Russia into the civilized world community. I expect Valeriy Zorkin, Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, to inform you in

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.11]

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Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«11» марта 1993 г.

№ Пр-335

г. МОСКВА

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В ожидании скорой встречи с Вами и с пожеланиями всяческих успехов.

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.ВАШИНГТОН

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[2015-0815-m-1, 1.12]

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Dear Bill,

In the wake of our meeting in Vancouver, the success of which has been guaranteed due to our mutual move with a view to translating the partner type relations between Russia and the US into the plate of practical deeds aimed at supporting reforms, I would now like to raise with you a concrete issue of utter importance for backstopping those results in the foreign policies area.

This has to do with Yougoslavia. In Canada our dialogue on this matter was both candid and productive. However, at this point in time, the Bosnian crises, muddled up as it were, gives rise to yet new circumstances which require a thorough joint study.

I wouldn't remove the blame from the Serbs, but the other parties to the conflict are also not innocent.

Who is more at fault and who is less would be risky to decide at this stage of the conflict. How can one measure the impact of Belgrad on R.Karajic? How can one relate to it the presence of Croatian troops in Bosnia and direct appeals of I.Izetbegovich for a foreign intervention?

His Excellency
William G.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.13]

At any rate, the recent moves of S.Milochevich (and it would be difficult, for instance, to challenge his positive role at the Geneva round of negotiations) are not comparable with the last spring situation when UN sanctions were introduced against Yugoslavia after their non-heeding the demands to cease combat action.

We are convinced that the currently proposed new and more stringent sanctions against Yugoslavia could draw Serbs in the corner, break the truce and provoke an escalation of the conflict.

It is essential to let political methods continue their course, to support intensive effort, which have been made these days by Russia as well in order to secure success of the process of a peaceful settlement. In our view there is a possibility that Bosnian serbs will join the Vance-Owen plan with a subsequent finalization of the map, which, by the way, was recently mentioned by the US Secretary of State.

I would also point it out, that the new sanctions would infringe upon the economic interests of Russia and our partners in European countries. We should take utmost care in weighing the concrete consequences of the sanctions, though, like I said, I count there will be no need to sanction.

Bill, I deem it essential, for our two countries to comprehensively promote the process of the peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. Acting together, as we have agreed in Vancouver, Washington and Moscow will surely reach this end. I hope that the United States will support our approach that the UN Security Council should not hasten with consideration of the issue regarding the new sanctions.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

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Его Превосходительству
Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки

г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Вслед за нашей встречей в Ванкувере, успех которой мы вместе обеспечили за счет перевода партнерских отношений России и США в русло практических дел в поддержку реформ, обращаюсь с конкретным вопросом, крайне важным для подкрепления этих итогов во внешнеполитической сфере.

Речь о Югославии. Наш диалог по этому вопросу в Канаде носил откровенный и продуктивный характер. Но теперь вокруг боснийского кризиса, из без того запутанного, опять возникают новые обстоятельства, требующие тщательного совместного анализа.

Не снимаю вины с сербов, но и другие участники конфликта не без греха. Кто виноват больше, кто меньше - решать это на данной стадии конфликта было бы очень рискованно. Как измерить степень влияния Белграда на Р.Караджича? Как соотнести с этим присутствие войск Хорватии в Боснии, прямые призывы И.Изетбеговича к международной интервенции?

В любом случае, последние действия С.Милошевича (трудно оспаривать, например, его позитивную роль на женевском раунде переговоров) несопоставимы с ситуацией весты прошлого года, когда против СРЮ были введены санкции ООН за отказ внять требованиям о прекращении военных действий.

По нашему убеждению, предлагаемые сейчас новые, гораздо более жесткие, санкции против СРЮ могут загнать сербов в угол, сорвать перемирие, спровоцировать эскалацию конфликта.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.14]

Важно дать еще поработать политическим методам, поддержать интенсивные усилия, которые предпринимаются именно в эти дни, в том числе и Россией, чтобы обеспечить успех процесса мирного урегулирования. Мы видим шанс на присоединение боснийских сербов к плану Вэнса-Оуэна с последующей доработкой карты - о такой возможности, кстати, говорил на днях и государственный секретарь США.

Упомяну и о том, что новые санкции затрагивают экономические интересы России и наших партнеров из числа европейских стран. Мы должны самым тщательным образом взвесить их конкретные последствия, хотя, повторяю, рассчитываю, что до санкций не дойдет.

Билл, считаю важным, чтобы наши две страны всемерно способствовали процессу мирного урегулирования югокризиса. Действуя сообща, как мы условились в Ванкувере, Вашингтон и Москва наверняка этого добьются. Надеюсь, что США поддержат нас в том, чтобы Совет Безопасности ООН повременил с рассмотрением вопроса о новых санкциях.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.15]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Dear Bill:

The results of the referendum have demonstrated that, despite the great difficulties our country is facing, the people of Russia support the path of deep reforms undertaken by their President. This is small wonder: having felt the taste of freedom, the people wouldn't want to return to the past.

The referendum has given an answer to the question of what road should be chosen for Russia's development. But the peak of passions accompaning this problem has not been overcome. The prospect of the Russian-American relations and the future of the world politics and economy are dependent on the outcome of this struggle. This is why right in the wake of the referendum I'm sending this urgent letter to you.

It serves my interest that the US president should have the first hands knowledge regarding what considerations the President of Russia is going to pursue in his policies. I deem this letter to you to be especially pertinent in the light of attempts of those "irreconcilable" forces to seek revenge, and recent incinuations regarding the immediate plans of the president and his government.

First and foremost, I continue to firmly adhere to the active course of reforms. I will pursue it even more vigorously. The priorities in this matter include financial stabilization and real support to the most vulnerable segments of society.

The most important task in political sphere at this point is to promptly adopt a new Constitution. The old "socialist" Constitution has by definition transformed into an impediment on the road of renovation of our country. I expect that in the very near future the draft of the new Constitution will be, for all practical purposes, brought to the political agenda of Russia.

His Excellency
William G.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Second. I find it necessary to stress the point that no ups and downs, or vicissitudes of internal political struggle, will make me forgo democratic forms and principles of state governance. There is no question of "punishing" opposition, let alone persecution of citizens for their political convictions. When heading for the referendum, I personally as president guaranteed that all democratic rights and freedoms would be secured, including the freedom of press. The August 1991 revolution didn't take place in order to bring back old rules to Russia.

Third. I Intend to fulfill the duties of the president of Russia to their full extent and on legal basis till the new elections come. I have people's mandate to do that. As to the dates for the new elections, I have no plans to drag out.

On the other hand, I don't consider elections to be an end in itself. What matters for me now is to speed up the reform.

Fourth. To be focused on the domestic, socio-economic problems doesn't mean one should pay less attention to the foreign policy. In this area our course continues to be geared toward integration into civilized community, towards strategic partnership and eventually, alliance with the United States.

I am convinced, that Russia's prosperity will only be possible if democracy is guaranteed, market relations are enhanced and we are open to the world. These principles lay firm grounds for the development of partner relations between Russia and the U.S.

In conclusion I would like to wish you success in stabilizing and improving economy of the United States, realization of important socio-economic programs which serve the interests of the American people. On my part I stand ready to continue our fruitful cooperation and dialogue. Both our bilateral matters and today's acute international problems, such as "The Bosnian Crisis" urgently call for a close interaction, effectiveness and coordination of efforts between Russia and the United States.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, April 27, 1993

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.16]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Итоги референдума показали, что, несмотря на переживаемые страной огромные трудности, россияне поддерживают взятый Президентом курс на глубокие реформы. Это не удивительно: почувствовав вкус свободы, люди не хотят возвращаться в прошлое.

Референдум ответил на вопрос о выборе пути развития России. Но накал страстей вокруг этого вопроса не снят. От исхода этой борьбы зависят перспективы российско-американских отношений, будущее мировой политики и экономики. Поэтому по горячим следам референдума обращаюсь к Вам с настоятельным письмом.

Я заинтересован в том, чтобы Президент США знал из первых рук, какими соображениями намерен руководствоваться Президент России в своей политике. Считаю обращение к Вам тем более актуальным в свете стремления "непримиримых" взять реванш и появившихся в последнее время инсинуаций относительно ближайших планов Президента и правительства.

Во-первых, - и это главное - я продолжаю твердо придерживаться активной реформаторской линии. Буду проводить ее еще более энергично. Приоритеты здесь- финансовая стабилизация и действенная поддержка наименее защищенных слоев населения.

В политической сфере сейчас главная задача - скорейшее принятие новой Конституции. Старая, "социалистическая", в своей основе превратилась в тормоз на пути обновления страны. Рассчитываю, что уже в ближайшее время проект новой Конституции будет в практическом плане поставлен в повестку дня российской политики.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Во вторых, считаю необходимым подчеркнуть, что никакие повороты и превратности внутриполитической борьбы не заставят меня отойти от демократических форм и принципов государственного правления. Не может быть и речи о "наказании" оппозиции, тем более преследовании граждан за политические убеждения. Идя на референдум, я как Президент лично гарантировал, что будут обеспечены все демократические права и свободы, включая свободу печати. Революция августа 1991 года совершалась не для того, чтобы в Россию вернулись старые порядки.

В-третьих, я намерен выполнять функции Президента России в полном объеме и на законных основаниях вплоть до проведения новых выборов. Народный мандат на это у меня есть. Что касается сроков новых выборов, затягивать с ними я не собираюсь. Но и не рассматриваю их как самоцель. Главное для меня сейчас - активизировать реформу.

В-четвертых, концентрация на внутренних, социально-экономических проблемах не означает ослабления внимания к внешней политике. На этом направлении наш курс остается прежним на интеграцию в цивилизованное сообщество, на стратегическое партнерство, а в перспективе и на союзничество с США.

Я убежден, что процветание России возможно только на основе обеспечения демократии, укрепления рыночной экономики и открытия внешнему миру. Эти принципы являются прочным фундаментом для развития партнерских отношений между Россией и США.

В заключение хочу пожелать успехов в Вашей деятельности по стабилизации и оздоровлению экономики Соединенных Штатов, осуществлению важных социально-экономических программ в интересах американского народа. Со своей стороны, выражаю готовность к продолжению плодотворного сотрудничества и диалога. Как наши двусторонние дела, так и актуальные, острые международные проблемы, подобные "боснийскому кризису", настоятельно требуют от России и США тесного взаимодействия, оперативности и координации усилий.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

IMMEDIATE

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COS: PLEASE DELIVER TO CHARGE.

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CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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DEAR BORIS:

.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 27 WHICH ELOQUENTLY SETS FORTH THE COURSE YOU INTEND TO FOLLOW IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF REFORM, TO FULL RESPECT FOR DEMOCRACY AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PARTNERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY IS MOST WELCOME.

.

I ENJOYED OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION EARLIER THIS WEEK AND WANTED TO CONGRATULATE YOU AGAIN ON THE SUPERB OUTCOME OF THE APRIL 25 REFERENDUM. AS YOU PREDICTED, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE VOTED TO CONTINUE THE POLICIES OF DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM THAT YOU HAVE INAUGURATED AND PURSUED WITH COURAGE AND DETERMINATION. CLEARLY, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ALSO VOTED FOR A LEADER IN WHOM THEY RIGHTFULLY HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.

.

BORIS. THE VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON APRIL 25 WAS ALSO YOUR PERSONAL TRIUMPH. IT VINDICATED YOUR LEADERSHIP AND OPENS THE WAY

FOR RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL IMPASSE THAT HAD IMPEDED RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN THAT CRITICAL ENDEAVOR.

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CONGRATULATIONS AGAIN ON SUNDAY'S VICTORY. THE ROAD IS NOW CLEAR FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER ON ISSUES OF VITAL INTEREST TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1993

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4.29.93
93 APR 29 P12:58

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: President Yeltsin's Post-Referendum Letter: His Message and Your Response

Purpose

To respond to President Yeltsin's letter and set out a post-Vancouver followup agenda.

Background

Vice President Gore received a letter on Wednesday from President Yeltsin to you. Ambassador Lukin handed him the letter during a meeting with a visiting Russian delegation in town to discuss space cooperation.

The referendum results gave a big boost to Yeltsin both politically and psychologically. He is back in charge, with a popular mandate from the people to continue reform policies. But because less than fifty percent of the registered voters supported new elections for the Parliament and the Presidency (questions three and four in the referendum), he has no legal authority to compel the Congress of People's Deputies to schedule new elections nor can he under the present constitution ignore the decisions of the Congress or disband it.

The Speaker of the Parliament, Ruslan Khazbulatov, has already said that people were "terrorized" by the news media to vote for Yeltsin, that there were no winners or losers in the referendum, and that its sole result is to polarize society. The Vice President, Alexandr Rutskoi, has said that because the number of people voting against the government's policies (or not voting) exceeds the number that voted for them and for Yeltsin personally, Yeltsin has not received a popular mandate to continue with reform.

At the present time, both sides are considering their options. Yeltsin may make an effort to work with CPD deputies who were leaning to the opposition, calculating that they now realize that the old structures' days are limited. He may also try to modify the present constitution to give him sufficient presidential power to act decisively on reform and schedule new elections.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

But the situation is very fluid, and real compromise is highly unlikely. At this point "compromise" is likely to be on Yeltsin's terms or no deal. This may portend the beginning of the real battle to make reform irreversible.

Yeltsin says he plans to publish a new draft constitution on April 29. Work would continue on it during the spring, and then new elections could be held sometime in the summer or early fall.

All indications are that the new Constitution will provide for a bicameral legislature and a strong president with powers to appoint and dismiss ministers as well as top military leaders without legislative approval. The president would also have the right to dissolve parliament under certain circumstances.

The important point is that any step Yeltsin takes now to radically transform the political system or to gain control of the economic levers of power will have to be done extra-constitutionally, relying on his popular mandate, rather than on any legal authority. The actions he might take could correspond to the "special rule" instituted in March. The end result Yeltsin desires is early elections, adoption of a new constitution and the return to normal democratic governance.

The response of the opposition is unclear. Khazbulatov had been saying that the legislature would take aggressive action if Yeltsin tries to bypass or disband the Parliament. In that case, the Congress of People's Deputies could reconvene and make another effort to impeach Yeltsin. After Yeltsin's victory on Sunday, this alternative sounds Kafkaesque and there are fewer and fewer supporters of such a confrontational stand on the part of the Parliament. But the current power arrangements in Russia are badly out of date and the old guard is quite out of touch with the will of the people as expressed on Sunday, so a more confrontational turn of events cannot be excluded.

Yeltsin's letter

Yeltsin is writing you to warn of the coming "struggle," and of his determination to persist against those irreconcilably opposed to reform. He intends to do several things:

1. Put forward a new Constitution and hold early elections.

2. Gain control of the Central Bank and of government credit policy to ensure financial stabilization, while at the same time protecting the most vulnerable parts of society.

His letter is also meant to reassure you that he will defend civil liberties and continue to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy. Indeed, the Foreign Ministry is taking the referendum as an expression of popular support for Yeltsin and Kozyrev's foreign policy. (You will recall that our two concerns in March, when Yeltsin announced "special rule," were that civil liberties be protected and that our cooperation with the Russians on foreign policy continue.)

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Yeltsin's description of U.S.-Russian relations in the future -- strategic partnership, alliance, cooperation, dialogue -- may mean that on particularly sensitive issues (Yugoslavia) the United States will not have to take domestic Russian concerns as much into account as we did pre-April 25. But Yugoslavia is still a neuralgic issue even for Yeltsin's supporters, many of whom will support isolation of Serbia but resist direct military actions. (You may recall that at the summit Yeltsin expressed exasperation at having to support the Serbs, most of whom are old-line communists and aligned closely with Yeltsin's communist opponents at home.)

While it is not mentioned in the letter, there is one request that Yeltsin could make directly to you once he begins economic reform in earnest. He may ask you to come forward quickly with immediate and "real support" for some kind of social safety net. During the campaign, he promised to cushion the impact of the reforms by raising pensions, student stipends and allowances for children, as well as by continuing some price subsidies. There is no money in the treasury for these programs.

If Yeltsin undertakes radical reform and if we get his support in the Security Council on Bosnia, he probably expects that we will come to his aid, as you indicated you would on the phone on Monday. Then it will be time to move forward on the G-7 Privatization Fund you proposed in Tokyo on an urgent basis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the privacy channel message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Privacy Channel Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming President Yeltsin's letter

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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PLEASE FORWARD TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA BY PRIVACY CHANNEL

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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I ENJOYED OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION EARLIER THIS WEEK AND WANTED TO CONGRATULATE YOU AGAIN ON THE SUPERB OUTCOME OF THE APRIL 25 REFERENDUM. AS YOU PREDICTED, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE VOTED TO CONTINUE THE POLICIES OF DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM THAT YOU HAVE INAUGURATED AND PURSUED WITH COURAGE AND DETERMINATION. CLEARLY, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ALSO VOTED FOR A LEADER IN WHOM THEY RIGHTFULLY HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.

BORIS, THE VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON APRIL 25 WAS ALSO YOUR PERSONAL TRIUMPH. IT VINDICATED YOUR LEADERSHIP AND OPENS THE WAY FOR RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL IMPASSE THAT HAD IMPEDED RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN THAT CRITICAL ENDEAVOR.

WE SHOULD NOW TURN TOGETHER TO DEVELOP VIGOROUSLY THE NEW DIRECTIONS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THAT WE AGREED UPON AT VANCOUVER. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE TOKYO MEETING OF FOREIGN AND FINANCE MINISTERS. WE INTEND TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND EBRD TO ASSURE THE FASTEST POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR PROGRAMS THIS YEAR. IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA TO WORK INTENSIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH THEM. AS WE LOOK TOWARD THE TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT, AND THE G-7 MEETING WITH YOU IN TOKYO, WE WILL WORK WITH OUR ALLIES TO UNDERTAKE THE $2-4 BILLION G-7 SPECIAL PRIVATIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING FUND TO ASSIST IN CONVERSION OF YOUR STATE ENTERPRISES, TO AUGMENT AMERICAN EFFORTS IN HELPING RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES TO DISMANTLE AND DESTROY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND TO ESTABLISH A G-7 OFFICE IN MOSCOW TO MONITOR THESE EFFORTS.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU OF MY CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO WORK WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS TO IMPLEMENT THESE INITIATIVES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SEVERE BUDGETARY DIFFICULTIES WE FACE IN THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, AS WE DISCUSSED AT VANCOUVER -- AND AS MINISTER FEDEROV MADE CLEAR IN TOKYO -- INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WILL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IF YOUR GOVERNMENT MOVES DECISIVELY TO REINVIGORATE THE REFORM PROCESS AND PUT IN PLACE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY THROUGH FIRM CONTROL OF THE MONEY SUPPLY TO FIGHT INFLATION. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE ASSURANCE IN YOUR LETTER THAT YOU INTEND TO GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO THESE ISSUES. I AM ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE SUCCESS OF MINISTER CHUBAYS' PRIVATIZATION EFFORT WHICH WE ARE SUPPORTING FULLY THROUGH OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. THE SUCCESS OF YOUR OWN EFFORTS IS AN INDISPENSABLE PRECONDITION TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS.

IN ADDITION, I AM EQUALLY DETERMINED THAT U.S. BILATERAL SUPPORT BE ACTIVATED QUICKLY SO THAT THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE MIGHT SEE THE BENEFITS SOON. AS YOU KNOW, WE ANNOUNCED IN TOKYO A NEW COMMITMENT OF $1.8 BILLION IN AMERICAN BILATERAL SUPPORT FOR

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.20]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RUSSIAN REFORM. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE $1.6 BILLION PROGRAM ANNOUNCED IN VANCOUVER, AND THE $2 BILLION EXIM BANK OIL AND GAS FACILITY WE HAVE SIGNED WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT.

AT VANCOUVER, YOU AND I ALSO AGREED UPON THE IMPORTANCE OF REMOVING OBSTACLES TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT ON BOTH SIDES. IMMEDIATELY UPON MY RETURN FROM THE SUMMIT, I BEGAN A DIALOGUE WITH THE BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF COLD WAR ERA LEGISLATION WHICH STILL IMPEDES U.S.-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. THE MAJORITY LEADER OF THE HOUSE, CONGRESSMAN RICHARD GEPHARDT, RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO RUSSIA CONVINCED THAT RAPID MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS WARRANTED. AS YOU KNOW, I ISSUED A STATEMENT LAST WEEK CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL OF MANY OF THESE COLD WAR LAWS AND ADDRESSING A NUMBER OF SECURITY ISSUES. I INTEND TO TAKE RAPID STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION WITH THE CONGRESS. I DO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT WILL BE ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT OF THESE ISSUES WITH THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IF YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD THUS RESOLVE THE REMAINING CASES OF INDIVIDUALS REFUSED EXIT VISAS AND IMPLEMENT NEW LEGISLATION GUARANTEEING RUSSIAN CITIZENS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EMIGRATE.

IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ADDRESS THE WELL KNOWN CONDITIONS THAT CONTINUE TO IMPEDE AMERICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA. I HOPE THAT THE NEW BILATERAL COMMISSION HEADED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN WILL PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE IN REMOVING BOTTLENECKS TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION ON BOTH SIDES IN THE PROMISING AREAS OF ENERGY AND SPACE. VICE PRESIDENT GORE WILL SOON CONTACT PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN TO INVITE HIM TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FIRST MEETING OF THEIR COMMISSION.

BORIS, I ALSO WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE OTHER ISSUES WHICH YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN OUR MEETINGS AT VANCOUVER.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. I HAVE ALREADY ASKED OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY PARTNERS TO WORK WITH US TOWARD THIS GOAL. I AM AUTHORIZING MY REPRESENTATIVES AT THE MAY 5-6 SPACE LAUNCH TALKS IN MOSCOW TO RESPOND AS POSITIVELY AS WE CAN TO YOUR CONCERNS.

I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR IN VANCOUVER THAT YOU WOULD MODIFY THE ROCKET ENGINE CONTRACT WITH INDIA. WE WILL SOON PROPOSE A FOURTH, FINAL ROUND OF MISSILE-EXPORT TALKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES CAN CONCLUDE THE AGREEMENTS NECESSARY TO MEET U.S. NONPROLIFERATION CONCERNS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND THUS AVOID THE DISRUPTIVE MEASURES THAT COULD PREVENT US FROM MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER ON A WIDE VARIETY OF SPACE COOPERATION PROJECTS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

LIKEWISE, RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) PURCHASE WILL ALSO HAVE MAJOR BENEFITS FOR BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE VISIT OF ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTER MIKHAILOV, AND HOPE THAT HE WILL COME PREPARED TO OVERCOME THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO COMPLETION OF THE SALES CONTRACT FOR HEU. WE CAN THEN ADDRESS THE ONLY OUTSTANDING MATTER -- HOW TO SHARE THE PROCEEDS OF THE HEU TRANSACTION. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR EARLY

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RESPONSE TO MY LATEST PROPOSALS. AS WE AGREED IN VANCOUVER, WE SHOULD SETTLE THIS ISSUE DURING MINISTER MIKHAILOV'S VISIT.

FINALLY, I WANTED TO RAISE WITH YOU SOME OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER NEW INDEPENDENT STATES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN STABILITY ON ITS BORDERS AND THE WELL-BEING OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA. AT THE SAME TIME, WE AGREED THAT THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UN AND CSCE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH SOLUTIONS ARE POSSIBLE AND ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU TO HELP ACHIEVE THEM.

WITH REGARD TO THE BALTIC COUNTRIES, I KNOW OF YOUR SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATUS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES AND THE WELFARE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL RETURNING TO RUSSIA FROM THE BALTICS. WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE HOUSING PROGRAM I ANNOUNCED AT VANCOUVER, TO HELP YOU ADDRESS BOTH OF THESE CONCERNS. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR FULL PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS IN THE BALTIC STATES, INCLUDING THOSE WHO ARE MEMBERS OF MINORITY COMMUNITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS ON TIMETABLES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS, I REGARD ITS SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION AS VITAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PARTNERSHIP. IF THERE IS ANY WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN DO MORE TO BE HELPFUL ON THIS ISSUE, WE STAND READY TO DO SO AT ANY TIME.

AS WE AGREED AT VANCOUVER, I BELIEVE IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT YOU AND CHAIRMAN SHEVARDNADZE MEET SOON, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS ON EITHER SIDE, TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN ABKHAZIA. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS FULLY THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA, AND THE REFORM POLICIES OF THE SHEVARDNADZE GOVERNMENT. WE HOPE VERY MUCH THAT RUSSIA AND GEORGIA MIGHT WORK TOGETHER FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE MANY PROBLEMS IN THE REGION.

I ALSO WANT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONTINUING TO WORK TOGETHER TO END THE KILLING IN BOSNIA. YOUR FIRM STATEMENT OF APRIL 27 AND YOUR DECISION TO COOPERATE IN PASSAGE OF THE NEW SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS AT A TIME OF GREAT POLITICAL SENSITIVITY DEMONSTRATED COURAGE AND STATESMANSHIP. BOTH QUALITIES WILL BE DEMANDED OF US IN THE DAYS AHEAD AS WE CONTEMPLATE NEW STEPS THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO HALT SERBIAN AGGRESSION AND OPEN THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. I PLAN SOON TO ASK SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW TO CONSULT WITH YOU AND MINISTER KOZYREV. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR MEETING WITH HIM SO THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONTACT ON THIS ISSUES. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS AND THE OTHER ISSUES I HAVE RAISED.

CONGRATULATIONS AGAIN ON SUNDAY'S VICTORY. THE ROAD IS NOW CLEAR FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER ON ISSUES OF VITAL INTEREST TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SINCERELY,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Dear Bill:

The results of the referendum have demonstrated that, despite the great difficulties our country is facing, the people of Russia support the path of deep reforms undertaken by their President. This is small wonder: having felt the taste of freedom, the people wouldn't want to return to the past.

The referendum has given an answer to the question of what road should be chosen for Russia's development. But the peak of passions accompaning this problem has not been overcome. The prospect of the Russian-American relations and the future of the world politics and economy are dependent on the outcome of this struggle. This is why right in the wake of the referendum I'm sending this urgent letter to you.

It serves my interest that the US president should have the first hands knowledge regarding what considerations the President of Russia is going to pursue in his policies. I deem this letter to you to be especially pertinent in the light of attempts of those "irreconcilable" forces to seek revenge, and recent incinuations regarding the immediate plans of the president and his government.

First and foremost, I continue to firmly adhere to the active course of reforms. I will pursue it even more vigorously. The priorities in this matter include financial stabilization and real support to the most vulnerable segments of society.

The most important task in political sphere at this point is to promptly adopt a new Constitution. The old "socialist" Constitution has by definition transformed into an impediment on the road of renovation of our country. I expect that in the very near future the draft of the new Constitution will be, for all practical purposes, brought to the political agenda of Russia.

His Excellency
William G.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.21]

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Second. I find it necessary to stress the point that no ups and downs, or vicissitudes of internal political struggle, will make me forgo democratic forms and principles of state governance. There is no question of "punishing" opposition, let alone persecution of citizens for their political convictions. When heading for the referendum, I personally as president guaranteed that all democratic rights and freedoms would be secured, including the freedom of press. The August 1991 revolution didn't take place in order to bring back old rules to Russia.

Third. I Intend to fulfill the duties of the president of Russia to their full extent and on legal basis till the new elections come. I have people's mandate to do that. As to the dates for the new elections, I have no plans to drag out.

On the other hand, I don't consider elections to be an end in itself. What matters for me now is to speed up the reform.

Fourth. To be focused on the domestic, socio-economic problems doesn't mean one should pay less attention to the foreign policy. In this area our course continues to be geared toward integration into civilized community, towards strategic partnership and eventually, alliance with the United States.

I am convinced, that Russia's prosperity will only be possible if democracy is guaranteed, market relations are enhanced and we are open to the world. These principles lay firm grounds for the development of partner relations between Russia and the U.S.

In conclusion I would like to wish you success in stabilizing and improving economy of the United States, realization of important socio-economic programs which serve the interests of the American people. On my part I stand ready to continue our fruitful cooperation and dialogue. Both our bilateral matters and today's acute international problems, such as "The Bosnian Crisis" urgently call for a close interaction, effectiveness and coordination of efforts between Russia and the United States.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, April 27, 1993

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Его Превосходительству
Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Итоги референдума показали, что, несмотря на переживаемые страной огромные трудности, россияне поддерживают взятый Президентом курс на глубокие реформы. Это не удивительно: почувствовав вкус свободы, люди не хотят возвращаться в прошлое.

Референдум ответил на вопрос о выборе пути развития России. Но накал страстей вокруг этого вопроса не снят. От исхода этой борьбы зависят перспективы российско-американских отношений, будущее мировой политики и экономики. Поэтому по горячим следам референдума обращаюсь к Вам с настоятельным письмом.

Я заинтересован в том, чтобы Президент США знал из первых рук, какими соображениями намерен руководствоваться Президент России в своей политике. Считаю обращение к Вам тем более актуальным в свете стремления "непримиримых" взять реванш и появившихся в последнее время инсинуаций относительно ближайших планов Президента и правительства.

Во-первых, - и это главное - я продолжаю твердо придерживаться активной реформаторской линии. Буду проводить ее еще более энергично. Приоритеты здесь- финансовая стабилизация и действенная поддержка наименее защищенных слоев населения.

В политической сфере сейчас главная задача - скорейшее принятие новой Конституции. Старая, "социалистическая", в своей основе превратилась в тормоз на пути обновления страны. Рассчитываю, что уже в ближайшее время проект новой Конституции будет в практическом плане поставлен в повестку дня российской политики.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.22]

The Yeltsin letter is a strong reminder that we need to move fast to create a foundation for a successful Economic Summit in July. The mid-April Tokyo Ministerial began that process. We are now preparing letters from you to your G-7 colleagues to push for agreement by the time of the Economic Summit on the three proposals we have put forward to assist Russian reform: 1) the Privatization Fund; 2) the G-7 office in Moscow; and 3) allied contributions to a Denuclearization Fund to have them bear some of the burden with our own considerable efforts in that area. We have written detailed position papers on these three issues which we will use as the basis of expert-level talks with the allies to secure their agreement by the July Summit. As you know, however, we have made little real progress with the allies to date on any of these issues. As we approach the Tokyo Summit, you will likely need to contact your G-7 colleagues to push for their agreement.

We will have a response to Yeltsin shortly but wanted to be sure you saw the letter immediately.

Attachment
Tab A Letter from President Yeltsin

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.24]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Translated from Russian

May 12, 1993
Moscow

Dear Bill,

I am pleased to note that the relations between the Russian Federation and the Group of Seven countries are reaching the level of trust which makes it possible to translate the current quality of political partnership into a full-scale cooperative strategy to support the Russian reform.

The agreements reached during the meeting of the G-7 and Russia's foreign and finance ministers in Tokyo on April 14-15 have affirmed our overall desire for precisely this kind of work.

Our interaction in implementing social and economic changes in Russia has the support of the Russian people, which was demonstrated by the results of the referendum held on April 25. Now it is critical to proceed with our programs involving concrete deeds without delay.

What is needed is that the measures announced at the April ministerial meeting begin to be vigorously executed in the form of real projects targeted at concrete addressees. This will be a tangible contribution to social and economic development of Russia.

It is desirable that the short-term focus be made on the following priority projects:

1. Establishment of a fund to support small and medium-size businesses in Russia, taking into account the funds provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Deputy Chairman of the Government B.Fedorov has already communicated our proposals in this regard.

His Excellency
Mr.William Jefferson CLINTON
President of the United
States of America

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2. Concluding an agreement with the International Monetary Fund under the new program to provide loans for systemic changes in the amount of 3 billion dollars.

3. Establishment of a special fund for privatization and structural reforms.

Russian representatives are prepared for concrete talks to agree on these and other issues involved in implementing the partnership strategy. I hope that you, too, will issue the necessary instructions and that you will keep this subject under your personal control. Concrete results achieved within the next two months will create favorable conditions for assuring success of the Tokyo summit in July and will demonstrate the real meaning of the partnership between Russia and the Group of Seven in pursuing the cause of advancing reform in Russia.

Sincerely,

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Translated from Russian

May 12, 1993
Moscow

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.25]

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Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Дорогой Билл,

С удовлетворением отмечаю, что отношения Российской Федерации с участниками "группы 7" выходят на тот уровень доверия, который позволяет перевести достигнутое качество политического партнерства в конкретную стратегию полномасштабного сотрудничества в поддержку российских реформ.

Договоренности, достигнутые на встрече министров иностранных дел и финансов "семерки" и Российской Федерации в Токио I4-I5 апреля, подтвердили наш общий настрой именно на такую работу.

Наше взаимодействие в реализации социально-экономических преобразований в России поддерживается россиянами, о чем свидетельствуют результаты референдума 25 апреля. Сейчас крайне важно без промедления приступить к осуществлению взятого нами курса на конкретные дела.

Необходимо, чтобы объявленные на апрельской встрече министров меры начали энергично реализовываться в виде реальных проектов, ориентированных на конкретных адресатов. Это будет осязаемым вкладом в социально-экономическое развитие России.

В самое ближайшее время основное внимание желательно сосредоточить на следующих приоритетных проектах:

I. Создание фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса в России с учетом выделяемых Европейским банком реконструкции и развития средств. Наши предложения на сей счет уже были направлены заместителем Председателя правительства Б.Г.Федоровым.

2. Заключение с международным валютным фондом соглашения в соответствии с новой программой по кредитованию системных преобразований в размере 3 млрд.ам.долл.

3. Создание специального фонда приватизации и структурных реформ.

Российские представители готовы к предметному согласованию этих и других вопросов реализации стратегии партнерства. Рассчитываю, что и Вы дадите необходимые поручения и будете держать эту

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г-НУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.26]

работу под Вашим личным контролем. Достижение в ближайшие два месяца конкретных результатов создаст благоприятные условия для успеха июльского саммита в Токио, на деле продемонстрирует значение партнерства России и стран "семерки" для продвижения российски реформ.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

12 мая 1993 года
г.Москва

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Translated from Russian

May 12, 1993
Moscow

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.27]

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Boris YELTSIN

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Договоренности, достигнутые на встрече министров иностранных дел и финансов "семерки" и Российской Федерации в Токио 14-15 апреля, подтвердили наш общий настрой именно на такую работу.

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Необходимо, чтобы объявленные на апрельской встрече министрами меры начали энергично реализовываться в виде реальных проектов, ориентированных на конкретных адресатов. Это будет осязаемым вкладом в социально-экономическое развитие России.

В самое ближайшее время основное внимание желательно сосредоточить на следующих приоритетных проектах:

1. Создание фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса в России с учетом выделяемых Европейским банком реконструкции и развития средств. Наши предложения на сей счет уже были направлены заместителем Председателя правительства Б.Г.Федоровым.

2. Заключение с международным валютным фондом соглашения в соответствии с новой программой по кредитованию системных преобразований в размере 3 млрд.ам.долл.

3. Создание специального фонда приватизации и структурных реформ.

Российские представители готовы к предметному согласованию этих и других вопросов реализации стратегии партнерства. Рассчитываю, что и Вы дадите необходимые поручения и будете держать эту

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г-НУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.28]

работу под Вашим личным контролем. Достижение в ближайшие два месяца конкретных результатов создаст благоприятные условия для успеха июльского саммита в Токио, на деле продемонстрирует значение партнерства России и стран "семерки" для продвижения российских реформ.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

12 мая 1993 года
г.Москва

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3550

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.29)
KBH 1/2/2025

May 18, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: TOBY T. GATI NB for

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Arrival in Moscow of Ambassador Thomas Pickering, and on G-7 Assistance to Russia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President covering a letter to President Boris Yeltsin. The letter has two purposes. First, it serves as an introduction for Yeltsin to Ambassador Tom Pickering who will present his credentials at the Kremlin on May 21. We hope that the letter will serve to make Pickering's first meeting with Yeltsin more substantive than ceremonial. We also hope that the letter will signal Yeltsin that Pickering is well regarded here and has ties to the senior levels of the Administration. Second, the letter responds to Yeltsin's May 12 letter requesting the President's support in securing G-7 support for Russia.

It would be most helpful if the letter could by signed by 4:00 p.m. on May 19 so that Ambassador Pickering can carry a signed original to Moscow and deliver it personally to Yeltsin.

Concurrences by: Robert Fauver and Rose Gottemoeller NB for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter from President Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1993

Dear Boris:

I am very pleased that you have taken the time to meet our new Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Thomas Pickering. Thank you for receiving him so soon after his arrival in Moscow.

As you come to know Ambassador Pickering, I believe you will agree with me that we are very fortunate to have him in Moscow at this important time in the history of our relationship. Ambassador Pickering is our most senior and experienced career diplomat -- this will be, in fact, his seventh Ambassadorship. Ambassador Pickering has my trust and confidence. I hope you will feel free to communicate through him with both me and Secretary Christopher on the wide range of issues before us.

I also wanted to thank you for your May 12 letter on the efforts of the G-7 countries to provide financial assistance to Russia. I agree with you that the G-7 should work closely with Russia on concrete programs to assure the success of the Tokyo Economic Summit in July. The U.S. will support you on the three issues you outlined in your letter. First, we have encouraged the proposal of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a Small Enterprise Fund. The U.S. hopes to contribute to this fund once the Congress acts on an additional $1.8 billion in assistance for Russia that we announced at the mid-April Tokyo

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.30]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Ministerial conference. Second, we also support an early IMF-Russian agreement on the new Systemic Transformation Facility. Third, as you know, we are fully behind your proposal to create a Special Privatization and Restructuring Fund.

I am writing my G-7 colleagues this week to ask for their agreement on the Privatization Fund by the time of the Tokyo Economic Summit in July. Specifically, I am requesting that the G-7 countries add to the U.S. pledge of $500 million for this fund to reach a goal of $2 billion. We would then ask the World Bank and EBRD to provide an additional $2 billion to reach our overall target of a $4 billion fund. I will also ask in my letter that the other G-7 countries agree to support the idea you and I discussed in Vancouver of a G-7 office in Moscow to monitor the effectiveness of our assistance efforts. And I will request, as well, their expanded contributions to help Russia and the other states carry out the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons. I would appreciate it if you would contact the other G-7 leaders to let them know of the importance to Russia of rapid movement on these issues by the time of the Tokyo Summit.

I agree with you that it is essential to use these next few weeks to promote further support for your reform efforts. I suggest that we stay in close touch on these and other matters.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/19

3550

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

93 MAY 19 A8:58

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Ambassador Tom Pickering and G-7 Assistance to Russia

Purpose

To introduce Ambassador Thomas Pickering to President Yeltsin at their May 21 meeting, and to respond to Yeltsin's May 12 letter to you on G-7 economic support for Russia.

Background

Ambassador to Russia, Thomas Pickering, will present his credentials to President Yeltsin on Friday, May 21. State has requested, and I support, that Pickering carry a letter from you to Yeltsin for presentation at their May 21 meeting. The letter at Tab A introduces Pickering to Yeltsin and lauds his experience and reputation as our most outstanding career diplomat. We believe that the letter will assist in making Pickering's first conversation with Yeltsin more substantive than purely cermonial. We hope also that it will signal Yeltsin that Pickering has a strong connection to the White House and should be given as much access to Yeltsin as is possible.

In addition, the letter responds to Yeltsin's most recent letter to you requesting our help in securing positive G-7 action on economic assistance to Russia at the upcoming Tokyo Economic Summit in July. This reply indicates that we fully support a concerted G-7 effort at Tokyo to agree on additional measures to support Russia, including quick action on the EBRD's Small Enterprise Fund and the IMF's Systemic Transformation Facility. The letter highlights our hope for progress on the three U.S. ideas we hope to sell to the G-7 allies by Tokyo -- the Privatization Fund, Denuclearization Fund, and the G-7 office in Moscow. It also requests that Yeltsin contact the G-7 leaders to urge action on these issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.31)
KBH 1/2/2025

Attachments
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter from President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

Translated from Russian

May 12, 1993
Moscow

Dear Bill,

I am pleased to note that the relations between the Russian Federation and the Group of Seven countries are reaching the level of trust which makes it possible to translate the current quality of political partnership into a full-scale cooperative strategy to support the Russian reform.

The agreements reached during the meeting of the G-7 and Russia's foreign and finance ministers in Tokyo on April 14-15 have affirmed our overall desire for precisely this kind of work.

Our interaction in implementing social and economic changes in Russia has the support of the Russian people, which was demonstrated by the results of the referendum held on April 25. Now it is critical to proceed with our programs involving concrete deeds without delay.

What is needed is that the measures announced at the April ministerial meeting begin to be vigorously executed in the form of real projects targeted at concrete addressees. This will be a tangible contribution to social and economic development of Russia.

It is desirable that the short-term focus be made on the following priority projects:

1. Establishment of a fund to support small and medium-size businesses in Russia, taking into account the funds provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Deputy Chairman of the Government B.Fedorov has already communicated our proposals in this regard.

His Excellency
Mr.William Jefferson CLINTON
President of the United
States of America

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.32]

2. Concluding an agreement with the International Monetary Fund under the new program to provide loans for systemic changes in the amount of 3 billion dollars.

3. Establishment of a special fund for privatization and structural reforms.

Russian representatives are prepared for concrete talks to agree on these and other issues involved in implementing the partnership strategy. I hope that you, too, will issue the necessary instructions and that you will keep this subject under your personal control. Concrete results achieved within the next two months will create favorable conditions for assuring success of the Tokyo summit in July and will demonstrate the real meaning of the partnership between Russia and the Group of Seven in pursuing the cause of advancing reform in Russia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Дорогой Билл,

С удовлетворением отмечаю, что отношения Российской Федерации с участниками "группы 7" выходят на тот уровень доверия, который позволяет перевести достигнутое качество политического партнерства в конкретную стратегию полномасштабного сотрудничества в поддержке российских реформ.

Договоренности, достигнутые на встрече министров иностранных дел и финансов "семерки" и Российской Федерации в Токио I4-I5 апреля, подтвердили наш общий настрой именно на такую работу.

Наше взаимодействие в реализации социально-экономических преобразований в России поддерживается россиянами, о чем свидетельствуют результаты референдума 25 апреля. Сейчас крайне важно без промедления приступить к осуществлению взятого нами курса на конкретные дела.

Необходимо, чтобы объявленные на апрельской встрече министрами меры начали энергично реализовываться в виде реальных проектов, ориентированных на конкретных адресатов. Это будет осязаемым вкладом в социально-экономическое развитие России.

В самое ближайшее время основное внимание желательно сосредоточить на следующих приоритетных проектах:

I. Создание фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса в России с учетом выделяемых Европейским банком реконструкции и развития средств. Наши предложения на сей счет уже были направлены заместителем Председателя правительства Б.Г.Федоровым.

2. Заключение с международным валютным фондом соглашения в соответствии с новой программой по кредитованию системных преобразований в размере 3 млрд.ам.долл.

3. Создание специального фонда приватизации и структурных реформ.

Российские представители готовы к предметному согласованию этих и других вопросов реализации стратегии партнерства. Рассчитываю, что и Вы дадите необходимые поручения и будете держать эту

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г-НУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.33]

работу под Вашим личным контролем. Достижение в ближайшие два месяца конкретных результатов создаст благоприятные условия для успеха июльского саммита в Токио, на деле продемонстрирует значение партнерства России и стран "семерки" для продвижения российских реформ.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

12 мая 1993 года
г.Москва

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER E. O. 13526

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KBH 1/2/2025

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~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY DEEPEST APPRECIATION THAT YOU AND SENIOR MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LLOYD BENTSEN. SECRETARY BENTSEN IS COMING TO MOSCOW AT MY REQUEST AND I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT HE HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN SECURING WESTERN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR RUSSIA OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. HE IS ONE OF MY COUNTRY'S MOST DISTINGUISHED STATESMEN AND ONE OF MY CLOSEST AND MOST TRUSTED ADVISORS. HE HAS MY STRONG SUPPORT AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM WILL BE HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE IN FURTHERING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY BENTSEN'S TRIP UNDERSCORES THE CONTINUED, UNWAVERING U.S. COMMITMENT TO RUSSIA'S MARKET REFORMS AND YOUR COURAGEOUS, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP.

I ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THIS VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS SEVERAL IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN, INCLUDING OUR ONGOING PREPARATIONS FOR THE TOKYO SUMMIT. THE SUMMIT IS A CHANCE FOR RUSSIA AND THE G-7 COUNTRIES TO ADVANCE OUR COOPERATION AND FOCUS ON HOW WESTERN PROGRAMS MIGHT BEST SUPPORT RUSSIAN REFORMS. I

WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR FROM SECRETARY BENTSEN YOUR PLANS TO CONTINUE WITH CURRENT REFORMS IN ORDER TO FULLY UTILIZE THE G-7 ASSISTANCE PACKAGE PLEDGED AT TOKYO IN APRIL.

I KNOW THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN RUSSIA IS ONE OF YOUR HIGHEST PRIORITIES. AMERICAN FIRMS CAN ALSO PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN SUPPORTING YOUR REFORM EFFORTS AND HELPING TO ASSURE A STRONG RUSSIA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT. THEREFORE. TO STRENGTHEN THE LEGAL. FINANCIAL, AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK THAT CAN ENCOURAGE AND NURTURE THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE WESTERN INVESTMENT. VICE PRESIDENT GORE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER ENERGY AND SPACE ISSUES WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN WHEN THEY SEE EACH OTHER IN WASHINGTON THIS MONTH.

SECRETARY BENTSEN WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU OUR EFFORTS TO SEEK G-7 AGREEMENT ON THE SPECIAL PRIVATIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING FUND AND THE G-7 SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OFFICE IN MOSCOW. I BELIEVE THESE PROGRAMS WILL STRENGTHEN NEWLY PRIVATIZED RUSSIAN FIRMS AND BETTER FACILITATE EFFECTIVE WESTERN ASSISTANCE. AS I MENTIONED IN MY LAST LETTER TO YOU. I HAVE NOW WRITTEN TO MY COLLEAGUES IN THE G-7, URGING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THESE INITIATIVES. I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE TO MAKE YOUR VIEWS KNOWN TO THEM AS WELL. SPECIFICALLY, THEY WILL NEED TO HEAR FROM YOU THAT THIS IS AMONG YOUR HIGHEST PRIORITIES, AS YOU DESCRIBED IT FOR ME AT VANCOUVER. I BELIEVE THIS EFFORT CAN HELP US ACHIEVE THE CONCRETE RESULTS AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT THAT WE BOTH DESIRE.

LET ME AGAIN EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY BENTSEN AND MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR CONTINUED STRONG LEADERSHIP.

SINCERELY,

WILLAIM J. CLINTON

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN VIA THE PRIVACY CHANNEL.

DEAR BORIS:

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY DEEPEST APPRECIATION THAT YOU AND SENIOR MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LLOYD BENTSEN. SECRETARY BENTSEN IS COMING TO MOSCOW AT MY REQUEST AND I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT HE HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN SECURING WESTERN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR RUSSIA OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. HE IS ONE OF MY COUNTRY'S MOST DISTINGUISHED STATESMEN AND ONE OF MY CLOSEST AND MOST TRUSTED ADVISORS. HE HAS MY STRONG SUPPORT AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM WILL BE HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE IN FURTHERING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY BENTSEN'S TRIP UNDERSCORES THE CONTINUED, UNWAVERING U.S. COMMITMENT TO RUSSIA'S MARKET REFORMS AND YOUR COURAGEOUS, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP.

I ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THIS VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS SEVERAL IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN, INCLUDING OUR ONGOING PREPARATIONS FOR THE TOKYO SUMMIT. THE SUMMIT IS A CHANCE FOR RUSSIA AND THE G-7 COUNTRIES TO ADVANCE OUR COOPERATION AND FOCUS ON HOW WESTERN PROGRAMS MIGHT BEST SUPPORT RUSSIAN REFORMS. I WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR FROM SECRETARY BENTSEN YOUR PLANS TO CONTINUE WITH CURRENT REFORMS IN ORDER TO FULLY UTILIZE THE G-7 ASSISTANCE PACKAGE PLEDGED AT TOKYO IN APRIL.

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LET ME AGAIN EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY BENTSEN AND MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR CONTINUED STRONG LEADERSHIP.

SINCERELY,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
[2015-0815-M-1, 1.35]

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 4035

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.36)
KBH 1/2/2025

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Economic Issues

Purpose

To provide a message for Secretary Bentsen to deliver to President Yeltsin in their June 3 meeting on our efforts to assist Russian reform.

Background

Secretary Bentsen will meet tommorow, June 4, in Moscow with President Yeltsin to review our economic relationship with Russia. The Secretary has asked for a message from you to Yeltsin briefly reviewing our efforts to promote additional G-7 assistance to Russia. The attached message at Tab A summarizes our continuing efforts to convince our G-7 allies to agree to a major new privatization fund at the Tokyo Economic Summit in July. The message also advises Yeltsin that if we are to be successful in that effort, he must communicate his own interest in this fund to the G-7 leaders.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A

Approve [signature] Disapprove _____

okay to dispatch per SRB

Attachment
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ 4035

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(1.37)
KBH 1/2/2025

June 3, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: TOBY T. GATI TG

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Economic Issues

Secretary Bentsen is in Moscow and will see President Yeltsin on June 4 to review our economic relationship and discuss in particular our efforts to produce greater G-7 support for Russia.

Secretary Bentsen has requested that the President send a message to Yeltsin on our economic relationship with Russia for delivery during their meeting tomorrow. Given the need to assure greater Russian government communication with the G-7 countries to sell the Privatization Fund and G-7 office proposals for the Tokyo summit, we believe a message is useful and needed.

We apologize for the short fuse on this message. In order to get it to Secretary Bentsen for his meeting with Yeltsin tomorrow, we will need to have it approved by COB today.

This message has drafted by Treasury (Larry Summers) and cleared by State (Strobe Talbott).

Concurrence by: Robert Fauver. NB for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

His Excellency
Mr.William J.CLINTON
President of the United States
of America
Washington

4240

Dear Bill,

Since the Vancouver summit several key areas of Russian-US partnership have seen solid accomplishments. The foreign and finance ministers' meeting in Tokyo has elaborated a plan of international assistance to economic reforms in Russia. The first, constituent, session of the Russian-US group on strategic stability turned out to be a success. Primarily because of our co-chairmanship, the Arab-Israeli negotiations have been resumed. Finally, it has been possible to break with the trend of spreading the Yugoslav crisis.

Realization of the Russian-US program of strategic partnership, on which we agreed in Vancouver, is proceeding full speed. Central to its success is coordination of efforts at all levels.

Recently, I received the new US Ambassador Mr.Pickering and I am satisfied with the conversation which we had. I believe the President of the United States made a right choice considering the extremely important timeframe in building the Russian-US partnership.

However, there is a need to compare notes as to where we are two months after Vancouver, what are the problems, what issues should be addressed in a matter of weeks.

First of all, on economy. The accelerated privatization and auctioning coupled with fighting inflation are considered by the President and his government as the main element of our economic policies. We have worked out concrete measures, aimed at stabilization of our economy, which were outlined by Russia in the IMF, and covering the period till the end of this year and beyond. This realistic and balanced economic program, jointly adopted by the government and central bank, opens the doors for a broad scale

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.38]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

cooperation between Russia and the international financial organizations.

As you know, we have a particular stake in setting up three funds comprising credits for systemic changes; privatization and structural reforms; and the fund for supporting small and medium-size businesses.

These funds have different names, but their work should be focused on one objective to back up by finance and expertise privatization in Russia. We have already set up our privatization fund, it's functional. Now, one has to engage international factors.

Thank you for your letter of May 19, which I regard as a confirmation of US administration's intention to help us in promptly wrapping up relevant agreements with the IMF, World Bank and IBRD.

I am convinced that reaching mutual understanding with the IMF and vigorous support of our efforts on behalf of the United States, in the spirit of Vancouver will set out favorable conditions for a successful Tokyo summit.

I am aware of the budget problems encountered by the United States, and of the difficulties faced by the administration while interacting with the Congress. Meanwhile, I hope you will be able to pass in Congress additional measures aimed at US assistance to Russia, which were announced in April in Tokyo.

I am going to do all I can to ensure normal, civilized environment to attract US investments and technology in Russia. What matters here is to complete, at least in key elements, formation of the legal infrastructure. I am deeply convinced that the new constitution, adoption of which has now entered its decisive stage, is called upon to guarantee favorable climate for a swift advancement of economic reforms and for unfolding widescope economic cooperation with foreign countries. I believe it is realistic to expect a prompt solution to the current constitutional crisis. The active approach of the President toward speeding up the constitutional process and the new constitution draft, promulgated by the President, have already been convincingly supported by most Federation's entities.

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In parallel, we have been working on specific practical problems having to do with effective use of the Western economic assistance. An essential element of the entire pattern of interaction comprises clear-cut coordination between governments. I agree with you that we cannot afford to delay opening in Moscow a special mission of the "seven" to address issues of multilateral assistance to Russian reforms.

I welcome your appeal to the US Congress to remove legislation belonging to the period of the Cold War and out of step with the new level of trust and partnership between our two countries, which impede the development of bilateral economic cooperation. One of the most remarkable examples in this area is Jackson-Vanik. Covering democratic Russia by this amendment is a clear anachronism, which, besides, plays into the hands of the opponents of the Russian-US rapprochement. As regards the so-called refusniks problem, I can reiterate what I have already said to ambassador Pickering that I am going to check on it personally. Relevant instructions have already been issued.

I expect that the commission headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Vice President Gore, which we set up in Vancouver, will provide a new impetus to economic cooperation between Russia and the United States. I took a decision that in accordance with Mr.Gore's invitation, V.Chernomyrdin should visit Washington on June 14-16. I hope you will find time to receive him and discuss major issues of the Russian-US cooperation.

It is imperative that the first, as it were, session of the Commission, bring about tangible results. We proceed from the assumption, that by that time there should be completed such important instruments as the implementing contract on highly enriched uranium, agreement on a large-scale credit line by the US EXIM Bank for the fuel and energy complex of Russia, the agreement on the principles of fair competition at the space services market, - as well as the agreement on Russia's participation in developing the Freedom space station.

I hope that the US administration in getting through the Congress the budget proposals for the International program of

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developing the Freedom space station, will be able to finalize its stance with regard to specific parameters of Russia's involvement in that program.

In view of the Vancouver agreements I have given instructions to clarify our approach regarding the contract with India on cryogenic missile units. We expect to resolve this problem during the consultations between our experts and to finalize the bilateral memorandum on missiles exports. But this problem is not addressed in isolation.

The time has come to translate into practice a very promising prospect which we set out for the Russian-US space cooperation. I am satisfied with the progress in wrapping up a bilateral agreement on commercial satellite launches.

I expect that you will continue your dialogue with EC partners regarding these issues, so that we all could reach compromise agreements on terms which would be acceptable to all interested sides.

I expect that the coming in early June visit of the US Secretary of Tresury L.Bentsen will be a productive one. During that visit it's necessary, in particular, to try and resolve the remaining problems having to do with those agricultural credits, which were extended by the United States to the former USSR, and subsequently rearranged for Russia.

An important mark in our economic relations would be served by entering into force of the agreement on highly enriched uranium. I am basically satisfied with the progress achieved in elaboration of an implementin contract accompanying it. I hope we shall be able to agree in near future on mutually acceptable prices.

As regards the issue of sharing profit of uranium sales with Ukraine, our vision of this problem was explained in detail in a recent letter of Minister Kozyrev to Secretary Christopher. Unfortunately, Kiev continues to delay the solution of this problem and wouldn't give answers to our proposals which have taken into account their wishes.

In this context, things are not helped by the US linkage between entering into force of the agreement on uranium and the

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settlement of Russia-Ukraine disputes related to the utilization of nuclear ammunition temporarily located on the Ukrainian territory. This linkage objectively enhances the stance of those forces in Ukraine which sabotage the search for mutually acceptable solutions to the nuclear problem in negotiations with Russia. I would like to urge you, once again, taking into account all factors to appraise usefulness of such an approach.

A few words about the overall situation in our relations with Ukraine. I welcome the US administration's interest in a stable and constructive development of relations between Russia and Ukraine and your willingness to assist in this matter. I'll be frank: you can help - both yourselves and ourselves - if you do not permit that the Ukranians entertain the illusion that the United States, under certain circumstances, could resign itself to the Ukrainian nuclear status. Any doubts in this question would be extremely dangerous. Expanding economic cooperation with Ukraine in a situation where it is not in compliance with its formally assumed obligations to accede the NonProliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state and to ratify the START-1 Treaty would be counterproductive and short-sighted. I would like you to know my position in this regard, and I am hoping for your understanding.

One more pressing issue is that of Russian's relations with the Baltic countries. They have not been easy. First, it is the rigid positions taken by some leaders of those countries, infringement on the rights of the Russian-speaking population, and making unjustified financial claims to Russia. And let me stress that where contentious issues are being dealt with on a mutually beneficial basis, relations are being normalized.

I was pleased to note your intention to continue to work toward ensuring full protection of the rights of ethnic minorities. We hope, in particular, that you administration will help us to get Latvia and Estonia to modify their citizenship laws. We could have an in-depth expert exchange of views on this problems. We are ready to provide concrete data and facts of human rights violations in those states.

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Another major problem is the absence of treaty framework for troops withdrawal and social guarantees for military retirees who stay back. We have already pulled out over half of our troops. However, this process is being delayed by the absence of relevant agreements. I hope you will look on our approach with understanding and will bear it in mind as you pursue your contacts with the Baltic states. I do appreciate your willingness to help resolve practical problems relating to troops withdrawal. Of great importance in this context is your Vancouver initiative which envisions assistance in retraining and constructing housing for the servicemen. Additional international support will be needed for this project to produce the desired results.

Now about Yugoslavia. I was pleased to learn that following a series of intensive consultations our ministers have been able to develop a program of joint actions to achieve settlement in former Yugoslavia. Keeping the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina from sliding into what seemed to be a terrible point of no return, we needed to take urgent steps. Given the urgency of the moment, your meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister was necessary and timely.

Now we, the five permanent members of the Security Council which are most deeply involved in a search for the Yugoslav settlement have a common position. Political conditions have been created allowing to stop the bloodshed, to prevent an escalation of the conflict, and activate the settlement mechanisms on the basis laid by the Vance-Owen process.

We have put an end to harmful speculations about allegedly irreconcilable differences between the US, European, and Russian approaches to the crisis in Yugoslavia. The neo-Communist opposition in Russia has been deliberately cultivating these speculations in a bid to call into question the President's principled course toward strategic partnership with the United States.

I feel particularly gratified that we remain committed to the spirit of partnership. Coordination of Russian and US approaches and actions is a key element without which it will be impossible to find a lasting and equitable solution to any serious international problem. Developing a joint position is more difficult than taking a

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unilateral decision, but today the potential for multilateral actions is much greater. The Russian side is ready to pursue closest collaboration with the US with respect to Yugoslavian affairs.

The Yugoslavian tangle should be undone as soon as possible so that we could address other crisis points which are distracting us from domestic social and economic changes. Next in line, in particular, will be Nagorno-Karabah and Tajikistan.

Bill, we talk over the phone quite often, but we also have to deal with current pressing matters. I believe that the question of implementing Vancouver decisions deserves a separate and thorough telephone conversation. I propose that we arrange such a conversation early, as soon as the US experts have studied our views.

I wish you every success in realizing your plans of America's modernization. Please convey to Hillary best wishes from myself and Naina.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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Дорогой Билли,

Со времени саммита в Ванкувере по ряду ключевых направлений российско-американского партнерства достигнуты солидные результаты. На встрече министров иностранных дел и финансов в Токио был разработан план международной поддержки экономических реформ в России. Успешно прошло первое, "учредительное" заседание российск американской группы по стратегической стабильности. В решающей степени благодаря нашему сопредседательству возобновились арабо-израильские переговоры. Наконец, удалось переломить тенденцию к разрастанию югославского кризиса.

Работа по реализации согласованной нами в Ванкувере программ российско-американского стратегического партнерства идет полным ходом. Ключ к ее успеху - плотная координация наших усилий на всех уровнях. На днях я принимал вашего нового посла Пикеринга и остался доволен состоявшейся беседой. Считаю, что Президент США сделал удачный выбор с учетом исключительно ответственного момент в строительстве российско-американского партнерства.

Однако возникает необходимость "сверить часы": определиться, где мы находимся через два месяца после Ванкувера, с какими трудностями столкнулись, на каких задачах надо сосредоточиться в ближайшие недели.

Прежде всего - об экономических делах. Ускоренную приватизацию и акционирование наряду с борьбой с инфляцией Президент и правительство рассматривают как главное направление в своей экономической политике. На период до конца текущего года и далее нами разработаны конкретные меры по стабилизации экономики, о которых Россия информировала Международный валютный фонд. Эта реалистичная и взвешенная экономическая программа, принятая совместно правительством и Центральным банком, открывает путь для широкого сотрудничества России с международными финансовыми организациями.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Г-НУ УИЛЬЯМУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г.ВАШИНГТОН

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Как вам известно, мы особенно заинтересованы в создании трех фондов - кредитования системных преобразований, приватизации и структурных реформ и фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса. Эти фонды называются по-разному, но их деятельность должна быть сфокусирована на одну задачу поддерживать, подкреплять в финансовом и экспертном отношениях приватизацию в России. Свой фонд приватизации мы уже создали, он работает. Теперь надо включить в работу международные факторы.

Благодарен Вам за письмо от 19 мая, которое расцениваю как подтверждение намерения администрации США помочь нам в беспромедлительном оформлении соответствующих соглашений с МВФ, мировым банком и ЕБРР.

Убежден, что достижение взаимопонимания с Международным валютным фондом и энергичная поддержка наших усилий со стороны США в духе ванкуверских договоренностей создают благоприятные условия для успеха токийского саммита.

Мне понятны бюджетные проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются Соединенные Штаты, трудности, испытываемые администрацией в ее взаимодействии с конгрессом. В то же время надеюсь, что Вам удастся "провести" через конгресс дополнительные меры американского содействия России, о которых было объявлено в апреле в Токио.

Намерен сделать все от меня зависящее для обеспечения нормальных, цивилизованных условий для притока американских инвестиций и технологий в Россию. Главное здесь - завершить, хотя бы в основном, формирование правовой инфраструктуры. Новая конституция процесс принятия которой сейчас вошел в решающую стадию, по моему глубокому убеждению, призвана гарантировать благоприятные условия для быстрого продвижения экономических реформ и для развертывания широкомасштабного экономического сотрудничества с внешним миром. Шансы на скорое разрешение нынешнего конституционного кризиса расцениваю как реальные. Активная деятельность Президента по ускорению конституционного процесса, обнародованный Президентом проект новой конституции уже получили убедительную поддержку большинства субъектов федерации.

Параллельно работаем над решением конкретных практических вопросов, касающихся эффективного использования западного экономического содействия. Важный элемент общей схемы взаимодействия -

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четкая межправительственная координация. Согласен с Вами, что нельзя медлить с открытием в Москве специального представительства "семерки" по вопросам многостороннего содействия российским реформам.

С удовлетворением воспринял Ваш призыв к конгрессу США устранить законы времен "холодной войны", не соответствующие новому уровню доверия и партнерства между нашими странами и мешающие развитию двустороннего экономического сотрудничества.

Одним из наиболее ярких таких примеров является поправка Джексона-Вэника. Распространение ее действия на демократическую Россию - явный анахронизм, к тому же играющий на руку противникам российско-американского сближения. Что касается проблемы так называемых отказников, могу подтвердить, как уже говорил послу Пикерингу, что я беру ее под свой личный контроль. Соответствующие поручения даны.

Рассчитываю, что созданная нами в Ванкувере комиссия во главе с премьер-министром В.С.Черномырдиным и вице-президентом А.Гором придаст дополнительный импульс экономическому взаимодействию между Россией и США. Я принял решение о том, чтобы в соответствии с приглашением А.Гора В.С.Черномырдин посетил Вашингтон I4-I6 июня. Надеюсь, что Вы сможете принять его для обсуждения основных проблем российско-американского экономического сотрудничества.

Необходимо, чтобы уже первая сессия комиссии принесла осязаемые результаты. Исходим из того, что к этому времени должна быть завершена подготовка таких важных документов, как исполнительный контракт по высокообогащенному урану, соглашение о крупной кредитной линии Эксимбанка США для топливно-энергетического комплекса России, соглашение о принципах справедливой конкуренции на рынке космических услуг, а также достигнута договоренность об участии России в проекте создания космической станции "Фридом".

Надеюсь, что администрация США в процессе проведения через конгресс проекта бюджетных расходов на международную программу создания станции "Фридом" сможет окончательно определиться по конкретным параметрам российского участия в ней.

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В свете договоренностей в Ванкувере дал поручение об уточнении нашего подхода в отношении контракта с Индией по криогенным ракетным блокам. Рассчитываем закрыть эту проблему в ходе консультаций наших экспертов и завершить работу над двусторонним меморандумом по вопросам ракетного экспорта. Но эта проблема решается не изолированно.

Пора начать реализовывать на практике намеченную нами многообещающую перспективу российско-американского космического сотрудничества. Удовлетворен ходом подготовки двустороннего соглашения по коммерческим запускам спутников. Рассчитываю, что Вы продолжите диалог по этим вопросам с партнерами по Европейскому сообществу, чтобы мы могли достичь компромиссной договоренности на приемлемых для всех заинтересованных сторон условиях.

Рассчитываю на продуктивность предстоящего в начале июня визита в Москву министра финансов США Л.Бентсена. В ходе этого визита надо, в частности, постараться закрыть остающиеся вопросы, связанные с теми сельскохозяйственными кредитами, которые были предоставлены Соединенными Штатами бывшему СССР, а затем переоформлены на Россию.

Важным событием в наших кэономических отношениях явилось бы введение в действие соглашения по высокообогащенному урану. Я в целом доволен прогрессом в выработке исполнительного контракта к нему. Надеюсь, что нам удастся в короткие сроки окончательно договориться по взаимоприемлемым ценовым параметрам.

Если же касаться вопроса о разделе с Украиной доходов от продаж урана, то наше видение проблемы было подробно изложено в недавнем письме А.В.Козырева госсекретарю У.Кристоферу. К сожалению, Киев продолжает затягивать решение данного вопроса, уходит от ответа на переданные нами учитывающие его пожелания предложения. В этой ситуации делу не способствует сохранение американской стороной увязки введения в силу соглашения по урану с урегулированием спорных вопросов между Россией и Украиной, касающихся утилизации ядерных боеприпасов, временно размещенных на украинской территории. Эта увязка объективно усиливает позиции тех сил на Украине, которые саботируют поиск взаимоприемлемых решений ядерной проблемы на переговорах с Россией. Хотел бы призвать Вас с учетом всех обстоятельств еще раз взвесить целесообразность такого подхода.

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Несколько слов об общей ситуации в наших отношениях с Украиной. Я приветствую заинтересованность администрации США в стабильном, конструктивном развитии отношений между Россией и Украиной и Вашу готовность оказать содействие в этом деле. Буду откровенен: Вы можете помочь - и нам, и себе, если не допустите появления у украинских лидеров иллюзий, будто США могли бы при определенных обстоятельствах смириться с ядерным статусом Украины. Сомнения в этом вопросе были бы чрезвычайно опасны. Расширять экономическое сотрудничество с Украиной, когда она срывает выполнение официально взятых ею на себя обязательств по присоединению к Договору о нераспространении в качестве неядерного государства и по ратификации Договора СНВ-I, было бы контрпродуктивно и недальновидно. Хочу, чтобы Вы знали о моей позиции на этот счет, и надеюсь на понимание.

Еще один актуальный вопрос - об отношениях России со странами Балтии. Они складывались непросто. Речь прежде всего идет о негибкой позиции ряда руководителей этих стран, ущемлении прав русскоязычного населения, выдвижении необоснованных финансовых требований к России. Хочу подчеркнуть, что там, где спорные вопросы решаются на взаимовыгодной основе, отношения нормализуются.

С удовлетворением отмечаю выраженное Вами намерение продолжать работать с целью обеспечения полной защиты прав человека в Балтийских государствах, в том числе прав национальных меньшинств. Надеемся, в частности, что администрация поможет нам добиться корректировки Латвией и Эстонией законодательства в области гражданства. Можно было бы провести обстоятельный экспертный обмен мнениями по этим проблема. Готовы предоставить конкретные данные о фактах нарушений прав человека в этих государствах.

Еще одна крупная проблема - отсутствие договорных рамок для вывода войск и социальных гарантий для остающихся военных пенсионеров. Мы уже вывели более половины наших войск. Однако этот процесс тормозится отсутствием соответствующих соглашений. Надеюсь, что Вы с пониманием отнесетесь к нашему подходу и будете учитывать его в Ваших контактах со странами Балтии. Признателен за готовность оказать содействие в решении практических проблем, связанных с выводом войск. Важное значение в этом плане имеет Ваша инициатива, объявленная в Ванкувере, предусматривающа

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содействие в профессиональной переподготовке и строительство жилья для военнослужащих. Требуется привлечь международную поддержку, чтобы этот проект принес желаемую отдачу.

Теперь о Югославии. С удовлетворением узнал о том, что после серии интенсивных консультаций нашим министрам удалось выработать программу совместных действий по урегулированию в бывшей Югославии. Чтобы удержать ситуацию в Боснии и Герцеговине от, казалось, необратимого срыва, требовались незамедлительные шаги. С учетом остроты момента Ваша беседа с министром иностранных дел России была нужной и своевременной.

Сейчас у нас есть общая позиция пяти членов СБ ООН, наиболее глубоко вовлеченных в поиски югославского урегулирования. Созданы политические предпосылки для того, чтобы остановить кровопролитие, предотвратить разрастание конфликта и привести в движение механизмы урегулирования на основе, заложенной процессом Вэнса-Оуэна.

Положен конец вредным спекуляциям на тему о якобы непримиримых расхождениях в подходах США, Европы и России к югокризису. Неокоммунистическая оппозиция в России целенаправленно культивировала эти спекуляции в расчете поставить под сомнение принципиальный курс Президента на стратегическое партнерство с США.

Особенно доволен тем, что мы с Вами остались верны духу партнерства. Скоординированность подходов и действий России и США - ключевой элемент, без которого невозможно прочное и справедливое решение ни одной серьезной международной проблемы. Совместную позицию выработать сложнее, чем принять одностороннее решение, однако потенциал многосторонних акций сегодня значительно выше. Российская сторона готова к продолжению самого тесного сотрудничества с США по югославским делам.

Надо быстрее развязать югославский узел, чтобы вплотную взяться за другие "кризисные точки", отвлекающие внимание от внутренних социально-экономических преобразований. На очереди, в частности, - Нагорный Карабах и Таджикистан.

Билл, мы часто связываемся по телефону, но при этом, как правило, приходится заниматься текущими "горячими" делами. Считаю, что вопрос о реализации ванкуверских решений заслуживает отдельного обстоятельного телефонного разговора. Предлагаю

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организовать такой разговор в самое ближайшее время, как только американские эксперты изучат наши соображения.

Желаю успехов в осуществлении Ваших планов модернизации Америки. Прошу передать Хиллари самые наилучшие пожелания от меня и Наины.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

3 июня 1993 года
г.Москва, Кремль

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WWING
SIT: COO FILE OLEARY-H PRIVACY-OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 180300Z JUN 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

3.3(b)(6) PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING.

AMBASSADOR: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN, MORNING OF JUNE 18.

AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK TO DELIVER LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN PERSONALLY.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING YOU IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FRIENDSHIP WE ESTABLISHED AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT AND OUR MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO BUILD THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO CONTINUING THAT PROCESS DURING OUR MEETING IN TOKYO NEXT MONTH. AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO TELL YOU OF MY DEEP CONCERN AND APPREHENSION THAT ONE OF THE KEYSTONES OF THE PARTNERSHIP WE LAID IN VANCOUVER, COOPERATION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY FIELDS, MAY NOT BE FULFILLED. YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER TO MOVE DECISIVELY TO PUT BEHIND US THE PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUSSIAN SALE OF ROCKET ENGINE TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA SO THAT WE COULD MOVE RAPIDLY INTO A NEW ERA OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AND FAIR COMPETITION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MARKETS.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [1.40]
KBH 1/2/2025

WE AGREED THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE WILLING TO FORGO THE TRANSFER OF ROCKET PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRANT RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. ON MAY 6, THE UNITED STATES SATISFIED ITS PART OF THE COMMITMENT THROUGH THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION, WITH YOUR NEGOTIATORS IN MOSCOW, OF THE ELEMENTS OF A TRANSITION AGREEMENT FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. YOU NOTED TO ME YOUR SATISFACTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT, AND I WAS CONFIDENT THAT WE WERE WELL ON THE ROAD TO RESOLVING THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ROCKET TECHNOLOGY DEAL.

IN RECENT DAYS, HOWEVER, IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT YOUR NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT READY TO RESOLVE THE ROCKET TECHNOLOGY DEAL WITH INDIA AND ARE IN FACT INTRODUCING NEW DEMANDS. INDEED, THEY HAVE DONE SO IN PUBLIC, VIOLATING THE CONFIDENTIALITY WE HAVE GIVEN THIS MATTER. THIS DEVELOPMENT GREATLY CONCERNS ME, FOR THE REQUIREMENT TO MAKE A SANCTIONS DETERMINATION UNDER U.S. LAW HAS PRECLUDED US FROM ACCEPTING FURTHER DELAY. WE HAVE NOW DETERMINED THAT TWO RUSSIAN COMPANIES, KB SALYUT AND KB ISAYEV, HAVE ENGAGED IN ACTIVITY SANCTIONABLE UNDER U.S. LAW AS A RESULT OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SALE OF ROCKET TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA.

WE MUST NOTIFY THE CONGRESS OF THE SANCTIONS ON JUNE 18. WE HAVE DONE SO ON A CLASSIFIED BASIS IN THE HOPE THAT THIS MEASURE WILL REMAIN PRIVATE AND THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK INTENSIVELY AND CONFIDENTIALLY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, WE HAVE GRANTED A TEMPORARY WAIVER OF THE SANCTIONS, TO EXPIRE ON JULY 15, WHICH WILL GIVE OUR REPRESENTATIVES ADDITIONAL TIME TO NEGOTIATE. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHOKHIN TO WASHINGTON ON JUNE 21 WITH THE AUTHORITY NECESSARY TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

AS WE DISCUSSED AT VANCOUVER, OUR TWO GREAT NATIONS SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THIS NEW ERA TO PUSH THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO, HOWEVER, IF RUSSIAN ENTERPRISES DO NOT ABIDE BY THE NONPROLIFERATION

STANDARDS AND OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES. BUT BY THE OTHER ADVANCED HIGH-TECHNOLOGY NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RUSSIA TO COMPETE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, AFTER VANCOUVER I SET IN MOTION A PROCESS TO REMOVE THE VESTIGES OF THE COLD WAR FROM OUR LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AFFECTING TRADE. I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT WORKING WITH CONGRESS. WE WILL BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THESE RESTRICTIONS THIS YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM CONCERNED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS COULD DIMINISH AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA.

FINALLY, I WANTED TO EMPHASIZE HOW MUCH BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN EURASIA CONCERNS ME. THE INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM COULD HAVE A PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON OUR EFFORTS TO STEM NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ASSURE A SAFER WORLD. THUS, I VIEW IT AS ULTIMATELY A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

GIVEN THE SERIOUS PROBLEM BEFORE US, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST BOTH BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE OUR MEETING IN TOKYO. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE DEPUTY MINISTER SHOKHIN, DURING HIS VISIT NEXT WEEK, TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER ALONG THE LINES THAT YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THESE TALKS PROCEED. I LOOK FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM AND A BROADENING OF OUR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

#1025
NNNN
<MSGID> M0450878

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 4503

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1993 93 JUN 17 P8:58

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Boris Yeltsin concerning Transfer of Rocket Technology to India

Purpose

The letter to President Yeltsin outlines the decision to sanction Russian entities involved in the transfer of rocket technology to India, describes the waiver that has been granted, and urges President Yeltsin to become personally involved in resolving the issue through negotiations.

Background

We would like to inform President Yeltsin in advance of notifying Congress on June 18 that we have been left no alternative but to sanction the Russian firms KB Salyut and KB Isayev for the sale of missile-related technology to India. Because of your detailed exchange on this issue with Yeltsin in Vancouver, we wanted to ensure that he both knows of the impasse that we have arrived at with Russian negotiators and of your wish to engage with him closely in resolving it. The letter also describes the waiver that we have granted to enable the negotiations to continue and this resolution to occur.

To arrive in Moscow in advance of the notification to Congress on Friday, this letter should be sent out this evening as a message for delivery at opening of business tomorrow. Ambassador Pickering will personally deliver it, reiterating at the same time the absolute seriousness with which we view this problem.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmittal of the message at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.41)
KBH 1/2/2025

Attachment
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN VIA THE PRIVACY CHANNEL.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING YOU IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FRIENDSHIP WE ESTABLISHED AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT AND OUR MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO BUILD THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO CONTINUING THAT PROCESS DURING OUR MEETING IN TOKYO NEXT MONTH. AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO TELL YOU OF MY DEEP CONCERN AND APPREHENSION THAT ONE OF THE KEYSTONES OF THE PARTNERSHIP WE LAID IN VANCOUVER, COOPERATION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY FIELDS, MAY NOT BE FULFILLED. YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER TO MOVE DECISIVELY TO PUT BEHIND US THE PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUSSIAN SALE OF ROCKET ENGINE TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA SO THAT WE COULD MOVE RAPIDLY INTO A NEW ERA OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AND FAIR COMPETITION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MARKETS.

WE AGREED THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE WILLING TO FORGO THE TRANSFER OF ROCKET PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRANT RUSSIA ACCESS TO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. ON MAY 6, THE UNITED STATES SATISFIED ITS PART OF THE COMMITMENT THROUGH THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION, WITH YOUR NEGOTIATORS IN MOSCOW, OF THE ELEMENTS OF A TRANSITION AGREEMENT FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY INTO THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH MARKET. YOU NOTED TO ME YOUR SATISFACTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT, AND I WAS CONFIDENT THAT WE WERE WELL ON THE ROAD TO RESOLVING THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ROCKET TECHNOLOGY DEAL.

IN RECENT DAYS, HOWEVER, IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT YOUR NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT READY TO RESOLVE THE ROCKET TECHNOLOGY DEAL WITH INDIA AND ARE IN FACT INTRODUCING NEW DEMANDS. INDEED, THEY HAVE DONE SO IN PUBLIC, VIOLATING THE CONFIDENTIALITY WE HAVE GIVEN THIS MATTER. THIS DEVELOPMENT GREATLY CONCERNS ME, FOR THE REQUIREMENT TO MAKE A SANCTIONS DETERMINATION UNDER U.S. LAW HAS PRECLUDED US FROM ACCEPTING FURTHER DELAY. WE HAVE NOW DETERMINED THAT TWO RUSSIAN COMPANIES, KB SALYUT AND KB ISAYEV, HAVE ENGAGED IN ACTIVITY SANCTIONABLE UNDER U.S. LAW AS A RESULT OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SALE OF ROCKET TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA.

WE MUST NOTIFY THE CONGRESS OF THE SANCTIONS ON JUNE 18. WE HAVE DONE SO ON A CLASSIFIED BASIS IN THE HOPE THAT THIS MEASURE WILL REMAIN PRIVATE AND THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK INTENSIVELY AND CONFIDENTIALLY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, WE HAVE GRANTED A TEMPORARY WAIVER OF THE SANCTIONS, TO EXPIRE ON JULY 15, WHICH WILL GIVE OUR REPRESENTATIVES ADDITIONAL TIME TO NEGOTIATE. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHOKHIN TO WASHINGTON ON JUNE 21 WITH THE AUTHORITY NECESSARY TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

AS WE DISCUSSED AT VANCOUVER, OUR TWO GREAT NATIONS SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THIS NEW ERA TO PUSH THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO, HOWEVER, IF RUSSIAN ENTERPRISES DO NOT ABIDE BY THE NONPROLIFERATION STANDARDS AND OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES, BUT BY THE OTHER ADVANCED HIGH-TECHNOLOGY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.42)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RUSSIA TO COMPETE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, AFTER VANCOUVER I SET IN MOTION A PROCESS TO REMOVE THE VESTIGES OF THE COLD WAR FROM OUR LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AFFECTING TRADE. I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT WORKING WITH CONGRESS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THESE RESTRICTIONS THIS YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM CONCERNED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS COULD DIMINISH AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA.

FINALLY, I WANTED TO EMPHASIZE HOW MUCH BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN EURASIA CONCERNS ME. THE INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM COULD HAVE A PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON OUR EFFORTS TO STEM NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ASSURE A SAFER WORLD. THUS, I VIEW IT AS ULTIMATELY A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

GIVEN THE SERIOUS PROBLEM BEFORE US, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST BOTH BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE OUR MEETING IN TOKYO. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE DEPUTY MINISTER SHOKHIN, DURING HIS VISIT NEXT WEEK, TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER ALONG THE LINES THAT YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THESE TALKS PROCEED. I LOOK FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM AND A BROADENING OF OUR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM CLINTON

~~SECRET~~ 4503

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: TOBY T. GATI/DANIEL PONEMAN NB

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER AND NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Transfer of Rocket Technology to India

Attached is a memorandum to the President (Tab I) and a letter to President Yeltsin (Tab A). The letter describes our deep concerns with regard to the Russian transfer of missile-related technology to India and informs Yeltsin that a sanctions determination has been made. It also describes the accompanying waiver and urges Yeltsin to become engaged in intensive negotiations to resolve the issue during the waiver period.

Concurrences by: Leon Fuerth, Elisa Harris NB/jm

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward to the President the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.43)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN VIA THE PRIVACY CHANNEL.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING YOU IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FRIENDSHIP WE ESTABLISHED AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT AND OUR MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO BUILD THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO CONTINUING THAT PROCESS DURING OUR MEETING IN TOKYO NEXT MONTH. AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO TELL YOU OF MY DEEP CONCERN AND APPREHENSION THAT ONE OF THE KEYSTONES OF THE PARTNERSHIP WE LAID IN VANCOUVER, COOPERATION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY FIELDS, MAY NOT BE FULFILLED. YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER TO MOVE DECISIVELY TO PUT BEHIND US THE PROLIFERATION CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUSSIAN SALE OF ROCKET ENGINE TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA SO THAT WE COULD MOVE RAPIDLY INTO A NEW ERA OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AND FAIR COMPETITION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MARKETS.

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AS WE DISCUSSED AT VANCOUVER, OUR TWO GREAT NATIONS SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THIS NEW ERA TO PUSH THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO, HOWEVER, IF RUSSIAN ENTERPRISES DO NOT ABIDE BY THE

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.44)
KBH 1/2/2025

NONPROLIFERATION STANDARDS AND OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES, BUT BY THE OTHER ADVANCED HIGH-TECHNOLOGY NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RUSSIA TO COMPETE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, AFTER VANCOUVER I SET IN MOTION A PROCESS TO REMOVE THE VESTIGES OF THE COLD WAR FROM OUR LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AFFECTING TRADE. I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT WORKING WITH CONGRESS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THESE RESTRICTIONS THIS YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM CONCERNED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS COULD DIMINISH AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA.

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GIVEN THE SERIOUS PROBLEM BEFORE US, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST BOTH BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE OUR MEETING IN TOKYO. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE DEPUTY MINISTER SHOKHIN, DURING HIS VISIT NEXT WEEK, TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER ALONG THE LINES THAT YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THESE TALKS PROCEED. I LOOK FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM AND A BROADENING OF OUR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM CLINTON

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 4503

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.45)
KBH 1/2/2025

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Boris Yeltsin concerning Transfer of Rocket Technology to India

Purpose

The letter to President Yeltsin outlines the decision to sanction Russian entities involved in the transfer of rocket technology to India, describes the waiver that has been granted, and urges President Yeltsin to become personally involved in resolving the issue through negotiations.

Background

We would like to inform President Yeltsin in advance of notifying Congress on June 18 that we have been left no alternative but to sanction the Russian firms KB Salyut and KB Isayev for the sale of missile-related technology to India. Because of your detailed exchange on this issue with Yeltsin in Vancouver, we wanted to ensure that he both knows of the impasse that we have arrived at with Russian negotiators and of your wish to engage with him closely in resolving it. The letter also describes the waiver that we have granted to enable the negotiations to continue and this resolution to occur.

To arrive in Moscow in advance of the notification to Congress on Friday, this letter should be sent out this evening as a message for delivery at opening of business tomorrow. Ambassador Pickering will personally deliver it, reiterating at the same time the absolute seriousness with which we view this problem.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Transalted from Russian

June 26, 1993

Dear Bill,

Our prepwork to the meeting with G-7 has entered a decisive stage. In our view, new energetic efforts are required to secure economic and political effectiveness of this forum.

I am pleased to note that in reaction to my message of may 12, 1993, steps are being taken to achieve practical agreements by the time of the summit with regard to setting up a Fund devoted to backstopping small and medium size businesses, as well as to providing resources within the frameworks of the IMF Fund for systemic changes. Things are not as good, though, with the Fund for privatization and structural reforms, as I have most recently reported to you, and with putting in place a coordinating mechanism of concrete joint programs in Russia. It is essential to announce final decisions on all these matters while in Tokyo.

Besides, it is imperative that the summit clearly endorse at the level of heads of state and government the $43 bln package which was initially agreed upon at the Tokyo April meeting of Russia's and G-7's ministers of foreign affairs and finance, and announce specific measures and timeframe to implement all of its components. It is extremely important to do, in order to provide the public in our two countries with a clear perspective of advancement in cooperation aimed at backing reforms in Russia, also with a sense of progress achieved between April and June and awareness of the prospects for the nearest future.

The President
The White House

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.46]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I would also like to dwell upon the political aspects of the Tokyo summit agenda. As far as I understand, according to tradition, the seven's leaders are intending, together with the economic declaration, to adopt a political declaration as well. Judging by reports, the latter will touch upon the key issues concerning the settlement of the Yugoslavian crisis and other conflicts elsewhere, strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of weapons of mass distruction, guaranteeing international security under contemporary curcumstances and improvement of activities of the United Nations.

All these problems are constantly on the agenda of the dialougue between Russia and G-7. Our partnership has been established and continues to grow with regard to coordinating conceptual and pragmatic approaches in order to deal with those issues. With all specific aspects of stances taken by each of our countries, we follow a common course where it really matters. Therefore, I think, it is necessary for us to find an opportunity at the Tokyo summit, too, to speak in one voice on the political problems of today's world. The optimal approach could be pursued by adopting the Tokyo political declaration on behalf of all eight states. This would also significantly attest to the fact that the interaction between our country and G-7 has been moving ahead in the recent years, and actually has acquired a new quality in its development. The MFA of Russia will be ready to join quickly in finalization of the draft of the political declaration.

I count on a constructive response from your side with respect to these proposals. I will be grateful if I could receive your reply one of these days, for we don't have much time left and one has to wrap it up with the Tokyo summit.

With best regards,

B.YELTSIN

Kremlin, Moscow
June 25, 1993

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
г-ну Уильяму Джеффсону КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Подготовка к встрече с "семеркой" в Токио вступила в решающую стадию. По нашим оценкам, необходимо дополнительно приложить энергичные усилия с тем, чтобы обеспечить экономическую и политическую результативность этого форума.

С удовлетворением отмечаю, что в ответ на мое послание от I2 мая I993 г. предпринимаются шаги с целью достижения к саммиту практических договоренностей о создании Фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса, а также о предоставлении ресурсов в рамках Фонда системных преобразований МВФ. Хуже идет дело с Фондом приватизации и структурных реформ, о чем я Вас только что проинформировал, созданием механизма координации конкретных совместных программ в России. Важно по всем этим вопросам объявить окончательные решения в Токио.

Кроме того, на саммите обязательно надо четко подтвердить на уровне глав государств и правительств "пакет" в 43 млрд. долл., предварительно согласованный на апрельской встрече в Токио министров иностранных дел и финансов России и стран "семерки", объявить о конкретных мерах, условиях и сроках осуществления всех его компонентов. Это крайне важно для того, чтобы общественность наших стран ясно видела продвижение вперед в деле сотрудничества в поддержку российских реформ, ощутила прогресс, достигнутый между апрелем и июлем, и понимала перспективы на ближайшее будущее.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.47]

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Хотел бы также затронуть и политические аспекты повестки дня токийского саммита. Как я понимаю, по традиции лидеры "семерки" планируют принять, наряду с экономической декларацией, также декларацию политическую. По сообщениям, в последней будут затронуты ключевые темы урегулирования югославского кризиса и других конфликтов в различных регионах, укрепления режима нераспространения оружия массового уничтожения, обеспечения международной безопасности в новых условиях, совершенствования деятельности Объединенных Наций.

Все эти проблемы являются предметом постоянного диалога между Россией и "семеркой", сложилось и развивается наше партнерство в согласовании концептуальных и практических подходов к их решению. При всех отдельных особенностях в позиции каждой из наших стран, в главном мы действуем в одном направлении.

Поэтому, думаю, необходимо найти возможность, чтобы и на нашей токийской встрече мы сообща высказались по политическим проблемам современного мира. Оптимальной формой было бы одобрение токийской политической декларации от имени всех восьми государств. Это явилось бы и важным свидетельством того, что взаимодействие нашей страны с "семеркой" за последние годы не стоит на месте, а получает качественное развитие. Российский МИД будет готов оперативно подключиться к доработке проекта политической декларации.

Рассчитываю на конструктивную реакцию с Вашей стороны на эти предложения, буду признателен за получение ответа в ближайшие дни: времени остается мало, и надо определяться с токийским саммитом.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
25 июня 1993 года

4882

Moscow, the Kremlin
June 10, 1993

Dear Bill!

I would like to take the opportunity of the visit to the USA of Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Academician E.M.Primakov to confirm my sincere respect for You and once again to note with pleasure the consistent and dynamic development of effective partnership between our countries.

The level of mutual openness achieved and the understanding of special importance of relations between Russia and the United State for the future of the world make it possible, as I believe, to proceed with quest for and strengthening of new forms of cooperatic in the sphere of security as well. I consider our joint efforts in prevention of mass-destruction weapons proliferation, in settlement of international conflicts, in solving global ecological problems, in combating international terrorism and illicit narcotics turnover to be especially important.

All this considered the Russian-American cooperation in such a delicate sphere as special services activity, I have no doubt, is necessary and should become one of the elements of the new world architecture, should serve to ensure firm international security. An exchange of information being established between our intelligence services, in particular on the situation in former Yugoslavia, is, in my opinion, a good confirmation of this.

Yours respectfully,
Boris Yeltsin

William Clinton,
The President of the United States of America,
The White House

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[2015-0815-m-1,1.48]

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.49]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«10» июня 1993 г.

№ Пр-854

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Пользуясь поездкой в США Директора Службы внешней разведки России академика Е.М.Примакова, хотел бы подтвердить мое искреннее уважение к Вам и еще раз с удовольствием отметить последовательное и динамичное развитие эффективного партнерства между нашими странами.

Достигнутый уровень взаимной открытости и осознание особой важности отношений между Россией и Соединенными Штатами для судеб мира позволяет, как я полагаю, продолжать поиск и укрепление новых форм сотрудничества также и в сфере безопасности. Считаю исключительно важными наши совместные усилия в предотвращении распространения оружия массового уничтожения, разрешении международных конфликтов, решении глобальных экологических проблем, борьбе с международным терроризмом и незаконным оборотом наркотиков.

С учетом всего этого российско-американское сотрудничество в такой деликатной сфере, как деятельность специальных служб, не сомневаюсь, необходимо и должно стать одним из элементов новой мировой архитектуры, служить обеспечению надежной международной безопасности. Налаживающийся между нашими разведывательными службами обмен информацией, в частности по ситуации в бывшей Югославии, является, на мой взгляд, хорошим тому подтверждением.

С уважением,

PHOTOCOPY
MISC. HANDWRITING

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г-ну УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

5500

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«16» июля 1993 г.

№ Пр-1127

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

С большим огорчением воспринял весть о непрекращающихся наводнениях на Среднем Западе США, приведших к человеческим жертвам и огромным разрушениям.

На Россию не раз обрушивались удары стихии, и мы знаем цену дружеского сочувствия и соучастия в тяжелую минуту.

Прошу передать искренние соболезнования семьям погибших.

Б.Ельцин

PHOTOCOPY
MISC. HANDWRITING

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.50]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Boris:

I would like to take the visit of my Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, as an opportunity to underscore the importance of the growing relationship between our countries' intelligence services. Their ongoing discussions on proliferation, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism serve both our countries well, as does our cooperation on so many other fronts.

I am pleased our two intelligence services have had a productive dialogue in the context of broader bilateral discussions and I hope these fruitful exchanges continue in the future. In addition, I hope our intelligence services will be able to act on Vice President Gore's proposal to deploy intelligence resources to address environmental problems.

Sincerely,

Bill

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.51]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 8/2

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

5684

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.52)
KBH 1/2/2025

93 AUG 2 A10:16

August 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin Regarding Visit of Jim Woolsey

Purpose

To send a letter to President Yeltsin supporting U.S.-Russian intelligence cooperation with CIA Director Woolsey on his trip to Moscow.

Background

Jim Woolsey will be visiting Moscow August 8-10 to discuss issues related to our ongoing intelligence relationship with Russia. We have drafted a letter (Tab A) to President Yeltsin supporting intelligence cooperation with Russia. Woolsey would like to deliver this letter to his interlocutors in Moscow to demonstrate the highest-level support in the U.S. for such cooperation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Yeltsin

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~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.53)
KBH 1/2/2025

July 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROSEMARIE FORSYTHE RCF

FROM: BETH SANNER BAS

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to President Yeltsin Requesting Meeting with Jim Woolsey

As we discussed yesterday we have drafted a Presidential letter (Tab A) to President Yeltsin regarding Jim Woolsey's visit to Moscow August 8-10. Strobe Talbott and Nick decided that we should not seek a meeting for Woolsey with President Yeltsin mainly because, as you pointed out yesterday, it would seem somewhat rude since we turned off a Presidential meeting with Woolsey's counterpart earlier this year.

Woolsey would like to deliver the attached letter to his interlocutors in Moscow thus demonstrating the highest-level support for his mission. Strobe has asked that the letter be signed by COB Tuesday so he can pass it to Jim Woolsey during a Wednesday meeting.

The letter has been cleared by Strobe Talbott and CIA.

Concurrences by: Leon Fuerth and George Tenet GT

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [1.54]

KBH 1/2/2025

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FM WHITE HOUSE

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT YOUR EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. AND NO LATER THAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OF UKRAINE DURING THE WEEK OF AUGUST 9. NO ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON THE IMPORTANT PROGRESS THAT WE ARE MAKING IN OUR JOINT EFFORT TO ADVANCE UKRAINE'S FULFILLMENT OF ITS LISBON PROTOCOL COMMITMENT TO RATIFY START AND ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE.

DURING OUR FRUITFUL MEETING IN TOKYO, YOU PROPOSED A CONSTRUCTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE IDEA: A TRIPARTITE U.S.-RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND SECURITY ISSUES. TO CARRY FORWARD THIS IDEA, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER GAVE FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV ON JULY 26 A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR A PLAN WHEREBY THE U.S., RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO COOPERATE IN DEACTIVATING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, EVEN BEFORE UKRAINE RATIFIES START AND AGREES TO ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

I WANT TO STRESS TO YOU, BORIS, THAT THIS "EARLY DEACTIVATION" PLAN

IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR UKRAINE'S COMPLETE FULFILLMENT OF ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE LISBON PROTOCOL. RATHER, I SEE IT AS A FACILITATING STEP TOWARD THE GOAL THAT WE ARE ALL DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE: THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. I ALSO WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT, IN OUR VIEW, EARLY DEACTIVATION APPLIES TO ALL THREE CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY: SS-19 AND SS-24 ICBMS AS WELL AS THE BOMBER WEAPONS. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN CLEAR ON THAT POINT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UKRAINIANS. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASPIN REITERATED IT WITH HIS UKRAINIAN COUNTERPART, MINISTER OF DEFENSE MOROZOV, WHEN THEY MET LATE LAST MONTH.

UKRAINE HAS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATION ON EARLY DEACTIVATION. SUBJECT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S APPROVAL. BECAUSE YOU AND I ARE WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE, AND BECAUSE I KNOW YOU WILL BE MEETING SHORTLY WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, I WANT TO ASK IF YOU WOULD EXPEDITE A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS HANDED TO MINISTER KOZYREV. IN THAT WAY, WE WILL BE ABLE TO SHARE THE DRAFT WITH THE UKRAINIAN SIDE AND MOVE FORWARD IN PRESSING IT WITH THEM.

IN ADDITION, I AM HOPING THAT, IN YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, YOU WILL IMPRESS UPON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY AND FULLY TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSAL.

AS THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONS WITH THE TWO LARGEST NUCLEAR ARSENALS ON EARTH, WE SHARE A HUGE RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. I WELCOME THIS COOPERATION AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING PARTNERSHIP AND AS AN INSPIRATION TO OUR FUTURE EFFORTS.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5947

August 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

SUBJECT: Letter for President Yeltsin on Early Deactivation

President Yeltsin will be meeting with President Kravchuk of Ukraine on Tuesday, August 10. Early deactivation of the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory will be a subject for their discussions. We have shared our proposal on early deactivation with the Russians in the form of a joint statement that Secretary Christopher handed over to Foreign Minister Kozyrev on September 26 in Singapore. We would now like to share it with the Ukrainians, who have agreed to the general concept but have not yet seen the draft statement. The Russian government, however, has not yet been able to complete its review process and time is growing short, especially if we are to make enough progress with the Ukrainians to allow a possible Kravchuk visit to Washington in September.

The purpose of this letter is two-fold: to ask President Yeltsin to expedite approval of the joint statement within his own government so that we can move forward with the Ukrainians, and to urge him to press Ukrainian President Kravchuk to quickly and fully implement the early deactivation concept.

Strobe Talbott and Ashton Carter have approved this letter draft.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum and letter to the President for his approval.

Alternatively, that you approve the transmission of the letter on the President's behalf.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.55)
KBH 1/2/2025

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER LETTER BELOW TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, AND NO LATER THAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OF UKRAINE DURING THE WEEK OF AUGUST 9. NO ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

AUGUST 7, 1993

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON THE IMPORTANT PROGRESS THAT WE ARE MAKING IN OUR JOINT EFFORT TO ADVANCE UKRAINE'S FULFILLMENT OF ITS LISBON PROTOCOL COMMITMENT TO RATIFY START AND ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE.

DURING OUR FRUITFUL MEETING IN TOKYO, YOU PROPOSED A CONSTRUCTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE IDEA: A TRIPARTITE U.S.-RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND SECURITY ISSUES. TO CARRY FORWARD THIS IDEA, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER GAVE FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV ON JULY 26 A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR A PLAN WHEREBY THE U.S., RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO COOPERATE IN DEACTIVATING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, EVEN BEFORE UKRAINE RATIFIES START AND AGREES TO ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

I WANT TO STRESS TO YOU, BORIS, THAT THIS "EARLY DEACTIVATION" PLAN IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR UKRAINE'S COMPLETE FULFILLMENT OF ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE LISBON PROTOCOL. RATHER, I SEE IT AS A FACILITATING STEP TOWARD THE GOAL THAT WE ARE ALL DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE: THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. I ALSO WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT, IN OUR VIEW, EARLY DEACTIVATION APPLIES TO ALL THREE CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY: SS-19 AND SS-24 ICBMS AS WELL AS THE BOMBER WEAPONS. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN CLEAR ON THAT POINT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UKRAINIANS. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASPIN REITERATED IT WITH HIS UKRAINIAN COUNTERPART, MINISTER OF DEFENSE MOROZOV, WHEN THEY MET LATE LAST MONTH.

UKRAINE HAS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATION ON EARLY DEACTIVATION, SUBJECT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S APPROVAL. BECAUSE YOU AND I ARE WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE, AND BECAUSE I KNOW YOU WILL BE MEETING SHORTLY WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, I WANT TO ASK IF YOU WOULD EXPEDITE A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS HANDED TO MINISTER KOZYREV. IN THAT WAY, WE WILL BE ABLE TO SHARE THE DRAFT WITH THE UKRAINIAN SIDE AND MOVE FORWARD IN PRESSING IT WITH THEM.

IN ADDITION, I AM HOPING THAT, IN YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, YOU WILL IMPRESS UPON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY AND FULLY TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSAL.

AS THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONS WITH THE TWO LARGEST NUCLEAR ARSENALS ON EARTH, WE SHARE A HUGE RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. I WELCOME THIS COOPERATION AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING PARTNERSHIP AND AS AN INSPIRATION TO OUR FUTURE EFFORTS.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.56]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.57)
KBH 1/2/2025

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Early Deactivation

Purpose

To ask President Yeltsin to expedite approval of the joint statement on early deactivation and to urge him to press Ukrainian President Kravchuk to quickly and fully implement the early deactivation concept.

Background

At Tokyo, President Yeltsin proposed to you the idea of a tripartite U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian agreement on nuclear and security issues. We have followed up on his proposal with a draft joint statement on early deactivation of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which Secretary Christopher shared with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev during their meeting in Singapore on July 26. We have discussed the general outlines of the proposal with the Ukrainians, but wanted to ensure that the Russian side approved of the idea before broaching it in more detail with the Ukrainian government.

Although we have been eager to maintain momentum with both parties, the Russian government has thus far been unable to complete its review of our proposal. We would like to use the occasion of a meeting on August 10 between Yeltsin and Kravchuk to press forward. In the attached letter to Yeltsin, you ask him to expedite the approval process and to urge President Kravchuk not only to accept the concept, but also to implement it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmission of this letter to President Yeltsin.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER LETTER BELOW TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, AND NO LATER THAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OF UKRAINE DURING THE WEEK OF AUGUST 9. NO ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

AUGUST 7, 1993

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON THE IMPORTANT PROGRESS THAT WE ARE MAKING IN OUR JOINT EFFORT TO ADVANCE UKRAINE'S FULFILLMENT OF ITS LISBON PROTOCOL COMMITMENT TO RATIFY START AND ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREAT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE.

DURING OUR FRUITFUL MEETING IN TOKYO, YOU PROPOSED A CONSTRUCTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE IDEA: A TRIPARTITE U.S.-RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR AND SECURITY ISSUES. TO CARRY FORWARD THIS IDEA, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER GAVE FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV ON JULY 26 A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR A PLAN WHEREBY THE U.S., RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO COOPERATE IN DEACTIVATING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, EVEN BEFORE UKRAINE RATIFIES START AND AGREES TO ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

I WANTED TO STRESS TO YOU, BORIS, THAT THIS "EARLY DEACTIVATION" PLAN IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR UKRAINE'S COMPLETE FULFILLMENT OF ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE LISBON PROTOCOL. RATHER, I SEE IT AS A FACILITATING STEP TOWARD THE GOAL THAT WE ARE ALL DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE: THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. I ALSO WANTED TO ASSURE YOU THAT, IN OUR VIEW, EARLY DEACTIVATION APPLIES TO ALL THREE CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY: SS-19 AND SS-24 ICBMS AS WELL AS THE BOMBER WEAPONS. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN QUITE CLEAR ON THAT POINT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UKRAINIANS. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASPIN REITERATED IT WITH HIS UKRAINIAN COUNTERPART, MINISTER OF DEFENSE MOROZOV, WHEN THEY MET LATE LAST MONTH.

UKRAINE HAS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATION ON EARLY DEACTIVATION, SUBJECT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S APPROVAL. BECAUSE YOU AND I ARE WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE, AND BECAUSE I KNOW YOU WILL BE MEETING SHORTLY WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, I WANTED TO ASK IF YOU WOULD EXPEDITE A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS HANDED TO MINISTER KOZYREV. IN THAT WAY, WE WILL BE ABLE TO SHARE THE DRAFT WITH THE UKRAINIAN SIDE AND MOVE FORWARD IN PRESSING IT WITH THEM.

IN ADDITION, I AM HOPING THAT, IN YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, YOU WILL IMPRESS UPON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY AND FULLY TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSAL.

AS THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONS WITH THE TWO LARGEST NUCLEAR ARSENALS ON EARTH, WE SHARE A HUGE RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. I WELCOME THIS COOPERATION AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING PARTNERSHIP AND AS AN INSPIRATION TO OUR FUTURE EFFORTS.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM CLINTON

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.58]

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

20 января 93
«____»_____19____г.
Пр-71
№_____

г. МОСКВА

Уважаемый господин Клинтон,

От имени народов дружественной России и от себя лично шлю самые теплые поздравления по случаю Вашего вступления в должность Президента Соединенных Штатов Америки.

Искренне надеюсь, что за годы Вашего президентства отношения партнерства между Россией и США получат дальнейшее устойчивое развитие, наши согласованные действия станут определяющим фактором мира, демократии и экономического прогресса во всем мире. Со своей стороны сделаем все для достижения этой жизненно важной цели.

Уверен, что Вы, господин Президент, внесете свой достойный вклад в решение насущных проблем, которые ставит перед нашими странами и всем мировым сообществом современная эпоха.

С пожеланиями успехов в Вашей ответственной деятельности на благо американского народа, на благо российско-американского партнерства.

Искренне Ваш

Б.Ельцин

PHOTOCOPY
MISC. HANDWRITING

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г.ВАШИНГТОН

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.59]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«14» января 1993 г.

№ Пр-32

г. МОСКВА

Дорогой Джордж,

Благодарю Вас за письмо по столь острому, волнующему и нас вопросу. Разделяем Вашу глубокую озабоченность развитием обстановки в Косово, ее взрывоопасным потенциалом для всего региона. Вполне согласны и с тем, что нужны динамичные совместные усилия.

Со своей стороны в наших контактах с Белградом мы постоянно в твердой форме указываем на необходимость исправления ситуации в Косово, полного соблюдения там законных прав и интересов албанцев. Об этом, в частности, шла речь в телефонном разговоре нашего министра иностранных дел А.В.Козырева с С.Милошевичем 30 декабря. Существует и вторая часть уравнения. Ведь не секрет, что проблема Косово существенно осложняется поддерживаемой Тираной линией косовских албанцев, которые по существу ведут дело к отделению от Сербии. Мы полагаем, что дополнительная работа с Приштиной и Тираной в пользу снятия максималистских требований могла бы также быть полезной.

Учитывая характер проблем в этом крае (прежде всего, это соблюдение прав нацменьшинств и прав человека), вероятно, имело бы смысл не ослаблять усилия и в рамках СБСЕ в развитие итогов встречи СМИД в Стокгольме. При этом учитывалось бы и то обстоятельство, что наблюдатели СБСЕ уже находятся в Косово.

В личном плане хотел бы сказать, что нам представляется весьма проблематичной идея осуществления военной интервенции в бывшей Югославии, тем более, что речь о ней заходит в контексте ситуации в Косово, где нет открытого конфликта. Нельзя не учитывать и того, что слишком откровенная ставка на возможность силовых методов в Косово может оказаться контрпродуктивной, быть неправильно понятой косовскими экстремистами, которые способны спровоцировать вспышку с непредсказуемыми последствиями.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ДЖОРДЖУ БУШУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.60]

Какой бы сложной ни была обстановка на территории бывшей Югославии, военная вовлеченность иностранных держав там вряд ли смогла бы приблизить урегулирование, не говоря уже о возможной дальнейшей эскалации насилия и долговременном осложнении отношений на Балканах, равно как между балканскими государствами и участвующими в такой операции странами. Даже в чисто военном смысле какого-либо ясного решения в итоге интервенции, на наш взгляд, не просматривается, в то время как возможность увязнуть в кризисном "болоте" велика. Использование силы в Европе тем более в столь неустойчивом ее регионе - самое крайнее средство.

В любом случае, подобная мера на территории бывшей Югославии должна была бы рассматриваться только в рамках решений Совета Безопасности ООН и именно "в контексте международной реакции", как справедливо подчеркивается в Вашем письме.

В настоящее время механизм Совета Безопасности мог бы быть использован для расширения международного присутствия в Косово за счет направления туда с согласия Белграда, военных наблюдателей ООН.

Другие возможности СБ следует, на наш взгляд, зарезервировать на случай критических обстоятельств.

Мы - за дальнейшие консультации по проблеме Косово, продолжение интенсивного сотрудничества в Совете Безопасности, которое уже имеется между нами, с тем, чтобы совместными усилиями не допустить появления еще одного очага конфликта на территории бывшей Югославии.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

PHOTOCOPY
MISC. HANDWRITING

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [1.61]
KBH 1/2/2025

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 100726Z SEP 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING: AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE TO SPEAK WITH YOU ON THE PHONE ON TUESDAY. I HOPE THAT WE WILL TALK AGAIN SOON AS WE AGREED. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A PERSONAL DIALOGUE WITH YOU ON THE MANY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

AS I MENTIONED ON TUESDAY, I HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE TALKED EXTENSIVELY ABOUT RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE AND RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED HIS REAFFIRMATION OF RUSSIA'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO MARKET REFORM. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN ASKED FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN ENCOURAGING THE IMF AND WORLD BANK TO ACCELERATE THEIR LENDING TO RUSSIA. AS YOU KNOW, THE U.S. WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS TO KEEP REFORM ON TRACK AND TO SUPPORT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTH INSTITUTIONS. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE IMF IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RECENT RAPID INCREASE IN RUSSIA'S INFLATION RATE, AS WELL AS PROBLEMS IN OTHER AREAS.

SINCE I WOULD LIKE THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO HELP IMPROVE YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE IMF, I HAVE ASKED THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AT THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, TO VISIT MOSCOW NEXT WEEK, SEPTEMBER 14-15, TO MEET WITH YOUR SENIOR ECONOMIC OFFICIALS AND TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN. MR. SUMMERS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS MEASURES YOUR GOVERNMENT MAY BE CONSIDERING TO FURTHER ITS COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

I WOULD HOPE VERY MUCH THAT PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN COULD MEET WITH MR. SUMMERS AND AMBASSADOR PICKERING, IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S BUSY SCHEDULE PERMITS. I BELIEVE SUCH A MEETING COULD PROVE VERY VALUABLE IN OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO SUPPORT RUSSIA'S REFORM PROGRAM.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#1660
NNNN
<MSGID> M0596421

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [1.62]
KBH 1/2/2025

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
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MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING: AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.
BEGIN TEXT:
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DEAR BORIS:
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AREAS.

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SINCERELY,

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WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#1660

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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WHITE HOUSE
3.3(b)(6)
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING: AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.
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SINCERELY,

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WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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END TEXT
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [1.63]
KBH 1/2/2025

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

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SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

364

END TEXT

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.64]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6778

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.65)
KBH 1/2/2025

September 8, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: BETH SANNER BS

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Yeltsin

Larry Summers will be visiting Moscow next week to consult privately with the Russians on their growing problems with the IMF. The visit is particularly timely given Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's request for our direct help on this matter during his visit last week.

Ambassador Pickering suggested that an introductory letter from the President would help to ensure that Larry is received by Chernomyrdin and other high-level economic leaders. Strobe and Nick agree this is an appropriate approach -- meetings with high-level officials, particularly Chernomyrdin, are essential if we are to help the Russians get back on the right track with the IFIs.

We have prepared a message from the President to President Yeltsin (Tab I) pitching a Chernomyrdin meeting. Treasury has cleared on the text of the message. We hope to have the message sent by privacy channel to Embassy Moscow today to allow preparations for Larry's visit next Tuesday and Wednesday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the privacy channel message at Tab I on behalf of the President.

Approve BC Disapprove _____

as revised

Done Wend 0230 9/10

Attachment
Tab I Message to Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

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IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE TO SPEAK WITH YOU ON THE PHONE ON TUESDAY. I HOPE THAT WE WILL TALK AGAIN SOON AS WE AGREED. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A PERSONAL DIALOGUE WITH YOU ON THE MANY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

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SINCE I WOULD LIKE THE U.S, TO CONTINUE TO HELP IMPROVE YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE IMF, I HAVE ASKED THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AT THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, TO VISIT MOSCOW NEXT WEEK, SEPTEMBER 14-15, TO MEET WITH YOUR SENIOR ECONOMIC OFFICIALS AND TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN. MR. SUMMERS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS MEASURES YOUR GOVERNMENT MAY BE CONSIDERING TO FURTHER ITS COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

I WOULD HOPE VERY MUCH THAT PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN COULD MEET WITH MR. SUMMERS AND AMBASSADOR PICKERING, IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S BUSY SCHEDULE PERMITS. I BELIEVE SUCH A MEETING COULD PROVE VERY VALUABLE IN OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO SUPPORT RUSSIA'S REFORM PROGRAM.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.66]

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AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ASAP TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE TO SPEAK WITH YOU ON THE PHONE ON TUESDAY. I HOPE THAT WE WILL TALK AGAIN SOON AS WE AGREED. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A PERSONAL DIALOGUE WITH YOU ON THE MANY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

AS I MENTIONED ON TUESDAY, I HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE TALKED EXTENSIVELY ABOUT RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE AND RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED HIS REAFFIRMATION OF RUSSIA'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO MARKET REFORM. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN ASKED FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN ENCOURAGING THE IMF AND WORLD BANK TO ACCELERATE THEIR LENDING TO RUSSIA. AS YOU KNOW, THE U.S. WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS TO KEEP REFORM ON TRACK AND TO SUPPORT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTH INSTITUTIONS. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE IMF IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RECENT RAPID INCREASE IN RUSSIA'S INFLATION RATE, AS WELL AS PROBLEMS IN OTHER AREAS.

SINCE I WOULD LIKE THE U.S, TO CONTINUE TO HELP IMPROVE YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE IMF, I HAVE ASKED THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AT THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, TO VISIT MOSCOW NEXT WEEK, SEPTEMBER 14-15, TO MEET WITH YOUR SENIOR ECONOMIC OFFICIALS AND TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN. MR. SUMMERS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS MEASURES YOUR GOVERNMENT MAY BE CONSIDERING TO FURTHER ITS COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

I WOULD HOPE VERY MUCH THAT PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN COULD MEET WITH MR. SUMMERS AND AMBASSADOR PICKERING, IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S BUSY SCHEDULE PERMITS. I BELIEVE SUCH A MEETING COULD PROVE VERY VALUABLE IN OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO SUPPORT RUSSIA'S REFORM PROGRAM. ~~I HOPE WE COULD THEN SPEAK ABOUT THESE MATTERS PERSONALLY DURING OUR NEXT TELEPHONE CALL.~~

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.67]

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Translated from Russian

September 15, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,

By way of continuing our frank exchanges on pressing international issues I would like to share with you some of my thoughts prompted, in particular, by my recent conversations with the leaders of Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia.

The present attitudes of these countries, as well as some other states of Central and Eastern Europe, are indicative of their rather clearly expressed desire to get closer to NATO, to achieve a certain form of integration with the Alliance. Of course, we expressed understanding for the sovereign right of each state to choose ways of ensuring its own security, including through participation in politico-military alliances. We are sympathetic to the less-than-nostalgic sentiments of the East Europeans about the past "cooperation" within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Our general impression is that they do have grounds for certain apprehensions about their security.

At the same time I cannot fail to express our concern over the fact that the debate about possible evolution of NATO increasingly dwells on the option of quantitative build-up of the Alliance by adding East European countries to it.

Frankly, we support a different approach, one which would lead to a truly pan-European security system, which envisions collective actions (but not under the bloc membership criterion) for the purpose of preventing and resolving crises and conflicts raging presently in Europe. Security must be indivisible and must rest on pan-European structures.

His Excellency
Mr. William J.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.68]

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The main threat to Europe now is posed not by the East-West confrontation, but by inter-ethnic conflicts of a new generation. A quantitative increase of NATO will hardly resolve the task of countering them effectively. What we need to do is build up the anti-crisis, peace-making potential encompassing the whole continent.

We understand, of course, that a possible integration of East European countries with NATO will not automatically produce a situation where the Alliance would somehow turn against Russia. We do not see NATO as a bloc opposing us. But it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space.

I would also like to call your attention to the fact that the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany signed in September 1990, particularly those of its provisions that prohibit stationing of foreign troops within the FRG's eastern lands, excludes, by its meaning, the possibility of expansion of the NATO zone to the east.

We know that at present preparations are under way for a special NATO summit meeting which will be discussing strategic aspects of the Alliance's evolution and is role in new conditions. We in Russia have an interest in constructive decisions by this summit adequate to the radical changes which have occurred in Europe and in the world. We hope that it is this prudent, unhurried approach that will prevail in making the choice of new parameters of the "East politics".

And generally, we favor a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. NATO-Russia rapprochement, including through their interaction in the peace-making area, should proceed on a faster track. The East Europeans, too, could be involved in this process.

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Over longer term one should not, perhaps, rule out our joining NATO. But for the time being, this is a theoretical proposition.

Today, I would like to suggest to you and our other NATO partners to jointly reflect about the possibilities to meet security needs of the East Europeans.

For example, we would be prepared, together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the East European states with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the region. Such guarantees could be stipulated in a political statement or cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO.

Naturally, we are open to discussion of other proposals and would welcome intensification of the Russian-German dialogue in this respect during the period prior to the upcoming NATO summit.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

В русле нашего откровенного обмена мнениями по актуальным международным вопросам хотел бы поделиться некоторыми соображениями, навеянными, в частности, моими недавними беседами с руководством Польши, Чехии и Словакии.

Речь идет о довольно-таки четко выраженном стремлении этих стран, как и ряда других государств Центральной и Восточной Европы, сблизиться с НАТО, добиться той или иной формы интеграции с альянсом. Мы, разумеется, выразили понимание суверенного права каждого государства выбирать пути обеспечения собственной безопасности, в том числе через участие в военно-политических союзах. С пониманием отнеслись и к отнюдь не ностальгическим чувствам восточноевропейцев к ушедшему в прошлое "сотрудничеству" в рамках Варшавского пакта. В целом впечатление таково, что у них есть основания для определенного беспокойства в отношении своей безопасности.

Вместе с тем не могу не высказать и нашу обеспокоенность в связи с тем, что дискуссия о возможной эволюции НАТО все чаще замыкается на вариант количественного расширения альянса за счет восточноевропейских стран.

Скажу прямо - мы являемся сторонниками иного пути, ведущего к подлинно общеевропейской системе безопасности, предполагающего коллективные (но не по критерию блоковой принадлежности) действия в целях профилактики и урегулирования кризисов и конфликтов, сотрясающих ныне Европу. Безопасность должна быть неделимой и опираться на общеевропейские структуры.

Главную угрозу Европе представляет теперь не конфронтация между Востоком и Западом, а межнациональные конфликты нового поколения. Количественное расширение НАТО вряд ли решит задачу эффективного

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.69]

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противодействия им. Необходимо наращивание антикризисного, миротворческого потенциала в масштабах всего континента.

Мы, конечно, понимаем, что возможная интеграция восточноевропейских стран с НАТО не приведет автоматически к какому-то повороту альянса против России. НАТО не рассматривается в качестве противостоящего нам блока. Но важно учитывать, как на такой шаг могло бы отреагировать наше общественное мнение. Не только оппозиция, но и умеренные круги, несомненно, восприняли бы это как своего рода неоизоляцию страны в противоположность ее естественному вхождению в евроатлантическое пространство.

Хочу обратить внимание также на то, что подписанный в сентябре 1990 года Договор об окончательном урегулировании в отношении Германии особенно его положения, запрещающие размещение иностранных войск в восточных землях ФРГ, по своему смыслу исключает возможность расширения зоны НАТО на Восток.

Знаем, что сейчас идет подготовка к специальной встрече НАТО на высшем уровне, на которой имеется в виду обсудить стратегические направления развития альянса, его роль в новых условиях. В России заинтересованы, чтобы этот "саммит" принял конструктивные решения, адекватные произошедшим в мире и в Европе радикальным переменам. Надеемся, что именно такой взвешенный, без излишней торопливости подход возобладает и при выборе ориентиров "восточной политики".

Мы вообще сторонники того, чтобы отношения между нашей страной и НАТО были на несколько градусов теплее, чем отношения альянса с Восточной Европой. Сближение России и НАТО, в том числе путем взаимодействия в сфере миротворчества, должно идти опережающими темпами. К этому процессу могли бы подключаться и восточноевропейцы.

В перспективе, наверное, нельзя исключать и нашего вступления в НАТО. Но это пока теоретический вопрос.

Сегодня же хотел бы предложить Вам, другим нашим натовским партнерам совместно порассуждать о возможностях удовлетворения потребностей восточноевропейцев в области безопасности.

Мы были бы готовы, например, вместе с НАТО официально предоставить государствам Восточной Европы гарантии безопасности с акцентом

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на обеспечение суверенитета, территориальной целостности, нерушимости границ, на поддержание мира в регионе. Такие гарантии могли бы быть закреплены в политическом заявлении или соглашении о сотрудничестве между Российской Федерацией и НАТО.

Естественно, мы открыты к обсуждению и других предложений, приветствовали бы интенсификацию российско-германского диалога на этот счет в период до предстоящего "саммита" НАТО.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

15 сентября 1993 года
Москва, Кремль

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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

The reason I am writing to you is my deep concern over the fate of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in cardinally changed military-political situation on the continent. You are well aware that Russia being a strong advocate of the goals of the Treaty has been and is making everything possible to ensure successful implementation of this historic document, regarding it as the basis of a new security system which now is taking shape in Europe.

I am not making secret of the fact, that full implementation of the Treaty costs Russia a lot in terms of great efforts, material, moral, social and at times political expense. I believe that the impact of continuous withdrawal of armed forces from Central European countries, undergoing profound military reform, lack of material base for the destruction of armaments on the implementation of the Treaty i self-evident and needs no additional clarifications. All this is complicated by a most difficult economic background.

At the same time, I believed and continue to believe, that the firm political choice made by Russia is favor of preserving the integrity of the Treaty - despite an evident incompatibility of some of its provisions with the new situation in Europe - has consolidated the European process, opened up additional possibilities for shaping principally new relations of peace, good-neighborhood and partnership. We does not call in question the Treaty balance system as such and maximum ceilings for the armaments to be reduced or stipulated by the Treaty.

Now, that the mechanism of the Treaty has started to work an full force and the reduction of armaments has become irreversible, it is high time to think jointly about how to make the Treaty face the new political realities, to rid it of remnants of the Cold War while keeping in fact everything valuable and positive for creating reliable structure of stability and security in Europe. Delay in adapting the Treaty to the goals of a "New Europe" can weaken the vitality of this document, lead to even more obvious conflict between some of its provisions and the dominating trend of European development as well as legitimate security interests of the State Parties.

Of course, there is no question about taking any urgent steps. I have rather in mind joint intellectual review of these issues with a view to achieving agreement by the end of 1995 - the time when the State parties must reach the final reduction

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.70]

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ceilings. I proceed from the assumption that such joint deliberations could in essence become a part of negotiations on harmonization of the obligations of the CSCE member states in the area of security.

At the same time there is an issue which brooks no delay. This is the issue of the flank zone limitations. As you are aware, the redistribution of obligations of the former Soviet Union among the successor-states resulted in a shift in the proportions of levels fro Russia in the "extended Central Europe" zone and the flank zone to the disadvantage of the latter. From the overall level of 6400 tanks, 11480 armored combat vehicles and 6415 pieces of artillery Russia can deploy in regular units in the flank zone in Leningrad Military District (LenMD) and the North Caucuses Military District (NCMD) not more that 700 tanks, 580 armored combat vehicles and 1280 pieces of artillery. But these two military districts cover more that half of the European part of the territory of Russia.

This disbalance contradicts the basic principle of equality in rights and obligations as well as the principle of taking into account the security interests of all State Parties. Preservation of the current structure of flank-zone limitations is leading to the situation when some can deploy troops where they want to, while others can not do it in the regions where such a deployment is vital for securing defensive capacity and solving social problems.

Principle political acuteness of this problem lies in the fact that the configuration and levels of the flank-zone limitations oblige Russia to concentrate its main contingents of its conventional forces in the Baltic region and along the border with Belarus and Ukraine. In essence this situation leads to the regeneration of balance structure of the Cold War along the West-East line. this, as I strongly believe, runs conter to the goals of the Treaty and of Europe.

As the President of Russia I am deeply concern about extremely tense situation in the Southern region. Instability in the Caucuses and adjacent regions as well as the presence of serious "non-European" risks, growth of separatism and fundamentalism demand considerable military presence of Russia in the South - in NCMD - not only from its security standpoint but also in order to prevent destabilization of the situation in the border European context. One cannot exclude such a development when Russia for the seke of peace and security will be forced to make decisions which are not in line with the flank-zone limitations. Thus we face a real threat of the destabilization of the Treaty due to the situation in the South part

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of the area of application. But our policy of principle is not to weaken but to strengthen the Treaty.

I would like to drow your attention to the fact that steps taken by Russia jointly with other states in order to alleviate the situation in the Southern flank and to prevent splashes of confrontation there reaffirm once again the archaic nature of the flank-zone limitations. I confine muself to two examples: the implementation of the Treaty concerning the Black Sea Fleet, which we signed together with the president of ukraine, and the realization of the future agreement about deployment of Russian troops in Armenia reduce to minimum Russian capabilities in the NCMD and LenMD. It turns out that the Treaty limitations lay obstacles to the steps towards strengthening stability and security in this region.

I'm convinced that this problem could be solved. Having signed the Treaty State Parties accepted the flank-zone limitation for the USSR which by far exeed the flank-zone limits for Russia. I don't see any serious political-military reasons for the preservation of these limits after fundamental changes which took place in the plst-Soviet space.

The settlement of this problem will contribute to strengthening of accord in the Russian society in favor of increased cooperation with the CSCE partners in consolidating stability and security, thus expanding the basis for future measures in arms control.

We can't let ourselfs to delay the solution of the flank problem and put it under the table. Right now it's necessary to clarify this issue in order to choose the optimal configuration of Russian defense capabilities and prepare military and social infrastructure for the troops. I believe that agreements which will fully take into account the interests of security of Russia and of course its neigbour states can be reached this year during regular session of joint consultative group on the CFE Treaty. The Russian delegation will have al the necessary powers for that.

Proceeding from close interrelation betwen the national security of each CFE Treaty State Party and security of Europe at large, I count on Your understanding and constructive cooperation of our delegations in Vienna.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

September 17, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

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Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Обратиться к Вам меня побуждает глубокая обеспокоенность за судьбу Договора об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе в условиях кардинально изменившейся военно-политической обстановки на континенте. Как Вам хорошо известно, Россия, являясь твердой сторонницей целей Договора, делала и делает все возможное для успешного осуществления этого исторического документа, рассматривая его в качестве основы формирующейся в Европе новой системы безопасности.

Не буду скрывать, что полноценное выполнение Договора дается России большим напряжением сил, ценой крупных материальных, моральных, социальных, а порой и политических издержек. Думается, что воздействие на ход осуществления Договора таких факторов, как продолжающийся вывод войск из стран Центральной Европы, проведение глубокой военной реформы, недостаточность материальной базы уничтожения техники, является очевидным и не требующим дополнительных разъяснений. И все это на фоне сложного экономического положения.

Вместе с тем считал и считаю, что твердый политический выбор, сделанный Россией в пользу сохранения целостности Договора, несмотря на очевидную нестыковку его отдельных положений с новой ситуацией в Европе, консолидировал общеевропейский процесс, открыл дополнительные возможности для формирования принципиально новых отношений мира, добрососедства и партнерства. Мы не ставим под сомнение заложенную в Договоре систему балансов как таковую

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.71]

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и вытекающие из нее максимальные уровни для наличия ограничиваемых Договором обычных вооружений и техники.

Теперь, когда механизм Договора заработал в полную силу, когда сокращение вооружений обрело необратимый характер, настало время совместно подумать над тем, как повернуть Договор лицом к новым политическим реалиям, избавить его от атрибутов холодной войны, сохранив при этом все ценное и положительное для построения прочных структур стабильности и безопасности в Европе. Затяжка с адаптацией Договора применительно к целям "новой Европы" может привести к ослаблению жизнеспособности этого документа, вступлению его отдельных положений во все более явное противоречие с доминантой общеевропейского развития и законными интересами безопасности государств-участников.

Разумеется, речь в данном случае идет не о принятии каких-то немедленных действий, а скорее о совместной интеллектуальной проработке этих вопросов с прицелом на достижение взаимопонимания к концу 1995 года - моменту выхода государств-участников на конечные уровни вооружений по Договору. Исхожу из того, что такие совместные проработки могли бы по своему содержанию стать составной частью переговоров о гармонизации обязательств государств-участников СБСЕ в области безопасности.

В то же время есть проблема, которая не терпит отлагательств. Это - фланговые ограничения Договора. Вам должно быть хорошо известно, что в результате распределения обязательств бывшего СССР между государствами-преемниками произошло смещение в пропорциях уровней для России в районе "расширения Центральной Европы" и во "фланговом районе" не в пользу последнего. В итоге из общего уровня в 6400 танков, 11480 боевых бронированных машин и 6415 артиллерийских систем Россия может разместить в регулярных частях на флангах в Ленинградсокм военном округе (ЛенВО) и Северо-Кавказском военном округе (СКВО) не более 700 танков, 580 боевых бронированных машин и 1280 артиллерийских систем. А ведь эти два округа составляют более половины Европейской части территории России.

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Такой перекос противоречит основополагающему принципу равенства прав и обязательств, а также принципу учета интересов безопасности любого государства-участника. Сохранение нынешней структуры фланговых ограничений приводит к ситуации, когда одни могут размещать войска там, где хотят, а другие не могут сделать этого там, где жизненно необходимо в интересах обеспечения обороноспособности и решения социальных проблем.

Принципиальная политическая острота проблем заключается в том, что конфигурация и уровни фланговых ограничений толкают Россию на концентрацию основных контингентов ее обычных вооруженных сил в Балтийском регионе и вдоль границ с Беларусью и Украиной. По сути дела это ведет к регенерированию балансовой структуры холодной войны по линии Запад-Восток, что, по моему глубокому убеждению, идет вразрез с целями Договора и общеевропейскими устремлениями.

Как президента России, меня не может не тревожить особо напряженная обстановка, складывающаяся на южном направлении. Нестабильность на Кавказе и в прилегающих к нему регионах, наличие серьезных внеевропейских рисков, рост сепаратизма и фундаментализма требуют весомого военного присутствия России на южных рубежах - в СКВО - не только с точки зрения обеспечения интересов национальной безопасности, но и для того, чтобы не допустить дестабилизации обстановки в более широком общеевропейском контексте. Нельзя исключать такого развития событий, при котором Россия во имя поддержания мира и безопасности будет вынуждена принимать решения, не вписывающиеся в рамки фланговых ограничений. Таким образом, налицо реальная угроза дестабилизации Договора в связи с положением в южной части района его применения. Наша же принципиальная линия заключается в том, чтобы не ослабить, а упрочить Договор.

Хотел бы обратить Ваше внимание на то, что предпринимаемые Россией совместно с другими государствами активные усилия по выправлению ситуации на Южном фланге и по недопущению здесь всплесков конфронтации еще более подчеркивают архаичность фланговых ограничений. Ограничусь лишь двумя примерами: реализация подписанного мною и президентом Украины Соглашения по Черноморскому Флоту, а также осуществление будущей договоренности о базировании

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российских войск в Армении урезают до минимума возможности России в СКВО и ЛенВО. Получается так, что договорные ограничения препятствуют шагам, укрепляющим стабильность и безопасность в этом регионе.

Убежден в том, что проблема решаема. Подписав Договор, государства-участники сочли приемлемыми фланговые ограничения для СССР, намного превышающие фланговые уровни для России. Не вижу никаких серьезных военно-политических причин в пользу сохранения этих уровней в условиях кардинальных изменений, произошедших на постсоветском пространстве.

Урегулирование этой проблемы будет способствовать укреплению согласия в российском обществе в пользу наращивания взаимодействия с партнерами в СБСЕ в области укрепления стабильности и безопасности и тем самым расширять основу для последующих мер по контролю над вооружениями.

Мы не можем позволить себе отложить решение вопроса о флангах "в долгий ящик". Уже сейчас необходима ясность для выбора оптимальной конфигурации оборонительного потенциала России и подготовки соответствующей военной и социальной инфраструктуры для обустройства войск.

Полагаю, что договоренности, в полной мере учитывающие интересы безопасности как России, так и, разумеется, сопредельных государств, могут быть достигнуты уже в текущем году на очередной сессии совместной консультативной группы по Договору об ОВСЕ. Российская делегация будет иметь для этого все необходимые полномочия.

Исходя из тесной взаимосвязи национальной безопасности каждого из государств - участников Договора об ОВСЕ с безопасностью Европы в целом, рассчитываю на Ваше понимание и конструктивное взаимодействие наших делегаций в Вене.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

" I7 " сентября I993 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

Translated from Russian

His Excellency
Mr.William J.CLINTON
President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill,

I read very carefully your message concerning the situation in the Trans-Caucasus and would like, in the spirit of candor, to share my thoughts with you.

I understand the concern felt by Washington as it follows the dangerous escalation in Abkhazia. Here, we have common approaches. Russia sees its task in helping to stop bloodshed and restore the viability of the agreements reached. We have introduced sanctions against Gudauta. Furthermore - and I ussued a special order in this regard - we are coordinating our actions with the UN and keep in touch with key partners, above all the United States.

We understand the close nature of your relations with Eduard Shevardnadze. We are aware of the urgency of the situation. Therefore, we must display maximum correctness and prudence in assessing the factors which may affect the course of the settlement. It is one thing when, in a psychologically charged atmosphere, some ~~brassed~~ biased statements are made with respect to the role of Russian troops in Georgia. And quite another, when out of this someone attempts to make far-reaching conclusions. The Russian troops which are there because of historical circumstances have played a restraining and stabilizing role from day one. This was eventually always recognized by Eduard A.Shevardnadze. In contrast, when this becomes the issue of direct involvement of Russian troops, it is a special and difficult matter.

Let me note in passing that the situation could have evolved differently, if ~~you~~ our repeated calls on the international community made by us with the Georgians to show support had been met with appropriate reaction. Nevertheless, I believe you and I have understanding on this issue and that in the future we shall work in close contact.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.72]

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As for Nagorny Karabakh, let me say that, frankly, I am really puzzled. If appears that despite regular clarifications - provided, in particular, by Minister Kozyrev in his talks with the Secretary of State and at the numerous meetings of experts, - the US side's view of Russia's policy in this area continues to be somewhat incomplete and not quite accurate. I can only repeat: we are not being prompted by some selfish motives. Our only interest is to assist in achieving an earliest and complete cease-fire in this conflict - immediately adjacent to our southern borders. We were among those who initiated the work of the Minsk Group and on more than one occasion initiated discussions of this issue in the UN Security Council and relevant resolutions. Today, too, we continue to favor an integration of Russian mediation into the international contest.

We intend to proceed together with the CSCE and the UN. But we insist on real progress toward settlement. It is not that we are leaning toward unilateral steps, the problem is that international institutions are being somewhat slow. This is why Russia has to be half a step ahead. For all that we do not intend to break away. On the contrary, we shall try to make maximum use of the potential offered by multilateral procedures, specifically, the Minsk Group. I have issued a relevant directive, and a Russian representative shall participate in the next meeting of the group.

For our part, we are counting on a stronger support by the US of Russia's steps to advance the Karabakh settlement, and a better understanding of our constructive role. We will not be able to get things going alone. However, without Russia and our leadership it will be impossible to achieve a cease-fire in the Karabakh conflict, let alone prevent its internationalization and lay the foundation for a lasting settlement.

Failure to recognize a certain special role and responsibility - especially at this time when neighbors directly appeal to us - would to ignoring facts. All the more necessary is partner solidarity and mutual support in situations when one of our two countries has to take the initiative. The Somalia situation, with all its complexity, is a good enough example of such an approach.

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These days are a decisive time to resolve conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabakyh. It is essential that US diplomacy receive a clear instruction to cooperate with Russia in such a spirit.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

September 24, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO YELTSIN ON
NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND GEORGIA
September 20, 1993

DEAR BORIS,

IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR PARTNERSHIP, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT CRISIS IN GEORGIA AND THE OPPORTUNITY WE NOW HAVE TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE CAUCASUS THAT GEORGIA'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BE MAINTAINED. I THEREFORE URGE THAT RUSSIA TAKE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC STEPS TO HALT THE CURRENT ABKHAZ OFFENSIVE AGAINST SUKHUMI, RESTORE A DURABLE CEASEFIRE, AND RESUME THE UN ENDORSED PEACE PROCESS. RECALLING THAT WE AGREED IN VANCOUVER AND TOKYO HOW IMPORTANT EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE'S CONTINUED LEADERSHIP IS FOR GEORGIA'S STABILITY AND PEACE, I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO ENSURE HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

WITH REGARD TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE FURTHER INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO END THE HUMAN SUFFERING IN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN AND ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL FOR A WIDER REGIONAL CONFLICT.

AT MY REQUEST, AMBASSADOR STROBE TALBOTT HAS JUST VISITED ANKARA, BAKU, YEREVAN AND MOSCOW FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE REGION STRENGTHEN OUR CONVICTION THAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT URGED ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT NOT TO ALLOW THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PASS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE THIS SENTIMENT.

AT THIS KEY MOMENT, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA CLOSELY COORDINATE OUR POSITIONS ON ALL CRITICAL QUESTIONS. WE MUST FOCUS OUR DIPLOMACY ON A SINGLE APPROACH THAT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE PARTIES AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE CSCE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS HAS ELABORATED SUCH A PLAN WITH THE ACTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA AND HAS BEEN ENDORSED IN TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA'S

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.73]

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MEDIATION OF A DIRECT DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF IT IS INTEGRATED IN THE CSCE PEACE PROCESS. IN THIS WAY, WE CAN AVOID POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING MILITARY INTERVENTION AND TOGETHER PROMOTE A LASTING CEASE-FIRE, SUPPLEMENTED BY CSCE MONITORS AND AN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE FUTURE OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH. THAT IS WHY THE SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING OF THE MINSK GROUP IN PARIS IS SO IMPORTANT. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT RUSSIA WILL BE FULLY REPRESENTED AT THIS MEETING. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN THE CSCE PROCESS AS THE BEST WAY TO ADVANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN RESORT NOW TO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THIS IS A TIME FOR URGENT ACTION. SO DO I. YET, WE MUST ALSO ENSURE THAT THERE IS MORE THOROUGH CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN US. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WHEN THEY MEET SEPTEMBER 29, FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER DISCUSS AN AGREED COMMON APPROACH WITHIN CSCE THAT WE CAN DEVELOP TOGETHER.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTERS OF THIS WEEK ON NATO EXPANSION AND THE CFE TREATY WHICH CONTAINED MANY IDEAS TO STUDY. I WILL HAVE A RESPONSE FOR YOU ON THEM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

SINCERELY,
BILL CLINTON.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.74)
KBH 1/3/2025

September 24, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE JB

SUBJECT: Letters From Yeltsin to the President on NATO Expansion and the CFE Flank Issue

You had expressed concern about the fact that we have not yet prepared responses to the Yeltsin letters of September 15 and 17 (attached at Tabs A and B). We wanted to assure you that these letters have not been forgotten in the maelstrom of events surrounding Yeltsin and Russia this week.

CFE Flanks. Bob Bell chaired an IWG on Wednesday that was the latest in a series of IWG's focused on how to respond to Russian demands to lift the CFE flank ceiling. The meeting Wednesday discussed the Yeltsin letter. All agencies agreed that it would be a mistake to answer it anytime soon, because a U.S. rejection of Yeltsin's proposition, arriving now, would not help Yeltsin with his military. Beyond the immediate tactical issue of the timing of our response, the IWG is in virtual agreement on the substance of our position. Specifically, agencies agree that we should work quietly with the Russians to help them understand how they can take advantage of flexibility that already exists within the Treaty (Jim Woolsey previewed this approach during his recent meetings with the Russians). Complicating matters somewhat is the fact that Yeltsin appears to have sent similar letters to the UK, French, Turks, and maybe others. Thus, we will need to coordinate our response with Allies. We intend to start this process early next week in Vienna.

NOTE: We believe that Yeltsin agreed to send the CFE letter out in order to clear his accounts with the military in advance of his September 21 action. That doesn't mean we treat it less seriously, but neither do we see this as an issue with which he is personally seized.

NATO Expansion. This letter, too, was sent to every NATO capital. As you know, we are working this issue intensively in Washington and are consulting with key Allies. The strong bias here is to run the risk of being a bit late in responding in order to ensure we have gotten it right.

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Declassify on: OADR

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As you may recall, we already acknowledged receipt of both these letters in the President's September 20 letter to Yeltsin on Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Tab C). Given the state of affairs in Moscow, it seems safe to assume that no one is immediately focused on these issues. In this light, we recommend that we send substantive responses to Yeltsin when we have agreement within the USG on what we should say. We expect that a CFE response could be ready in about 2-3 weeks, after we have consulted with the allies and engaged the Russians. The NATO response may take somewhat longer, depending on the administration's internal deliberations. In both cases, we do not believe that delaying our response for this long will harm the President's relations with Yeltsin, or disappoint him.

Concurrences by: Jenonne Walker, Robert Bell and Rose Gottemoeller VRB for JW, BB, RG

Attachments
Tab A - September 15 letter on NATO from Yeltsin
Tab B - September 17 letter on CFE from Yeltsin
Tab C - September 20 letter on Georgia and N/K to Yeltsin

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Translated from Russian

September 15, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,

By way of continuing our frank exchanges on pressing international issues I would like to share with you some of my thoughts prompted, in particular, by my recent conversations with the leaders of Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia.

The present attitudes of these countries, as well as some other states of Central and Eastern Europe, are indicative of their rather clearly expressed desire to get closer to NATO, to achieve a certain form of integration with the Alliance. Of course, we expressed understanding for the sovereign right of each state to choose ways of ensuring its own security, including through participation in politico-military alliances. We are sympathetic to the less-than-nostalgic sentiments of the East Europeans about the past "cooperation" within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Our general impression is that they do have grounds for certain apprehensions about their security.

At the same time I cannot fail to express our concern over the fact that the debate about possible evolution of NATO increasingly dwells on the option of quantitative build-up of the Alliance by adding East European countries to it.

Frankly, we support a different approach, one which would lead to a truly pan-European security system, which envisions collective actions (but not under the bloc membership criterion) for the purpose of preventing and resolving crises and conflicts raging presently in Europe. Security must be indivisible and must rest on pan-European structures.

His Excellency
Mr. William J.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.75]

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The main threat to Europe now is posed not by the East-West confrontation, but by inter-ethnic conflicts of a new generation. A quantitative increase of NATO will hardly resolve the task of countering them effectively. What we need to do is build up the anti-crisis, peace-making potential encompassing the whole continent.

We understand, of course, that a possible integration of East European countries with NATO will not automatically produce a situation where the Alliance would somehow turn against Russia. We do not see NATO as a bloc opposing us. But it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space.

I would also like to call your attention to the fact that the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany signed in September 1990, particularly those of its provisions that prohibit stationing of foreign troops within the FRG's eastern lands, excludes, by its meaning, the possibility of expansion of the NATO zone to the east.

We know that at present preparations are under way for a special NATO summit meeting which will be discussing strategic aspects of the Alliance's evolution and is role in new conditions. We in Russia have an interest in constructive decisions by this summit adequate to the radical changes which have occurred in Europe and in the world. We hope that it is this prudent, unhurried approach that will prevail in making the choice of new parameters of the "East politics".

And generally, we favor a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. NATO-Russia rapprochement, including through their interaction in the peace-making area, should proceed on a faster track. The East Europeans, too, could be involved in this process.

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Over longer term one should not, perhaps, rule out our joining NATO. But for the time being, this is a theoretical proposition.

Today, I would like to suggest to you and our other NATO partners to jointly reflect about the possibilities to meet security needs of the East Europeans.

For example, we would be prepared, together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the East European states with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the region. Such guarantees could be stipulated in a political statement or cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO.

Naturally, we are open to discussion of other proposals and would welcome intensification of the Russian-German dialogue in this respect during the period prior to the upcoming NATO summit.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

The reason I am writing to you is my deep concern over the fate of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in cardinally changed military-political situation on the continent. You are well aware that Russia being a strong advocate of the goals of the Treaty has been and is making everything possible to ensure successful implementation of this historic document, regarding it as the basis of a new security system which now is taking shape in Europe.

I am not making secret of the fact, that full implementation of the Treaty costs Russia a lot in terms of great efforts, material, moral, social and at times political expense. I believe that the impact of continuous withdrawal of armed forces from Central European countries, undergoing profound military reform, lack of material base for the destruction of armaments on the implementation of the Treaty i self-evident and needs no additional clarifications. All this is complicated by a most difficult economic background.

At the same time, I believed and continue to believe, that the firm political choice made by Russia in favor of preserving the integrity of the Treaty - despite an evident incompatibility of some of its provisions with the new situation in Europe - has consolidated the European process, opened up additional possibilities for shaping principally new relations of peace, good-neighborhood and partnership. We do not call in question the Treaty balance system as such and maximum ceilings for the armaments to be reduced or stipulated by the Treaty.

Now, that the mechanism of the Treaty has started to work an full force and the reduction of armaments has become irreversible, it is high time to think jointly about how to make the Treaty face the new political realities, to rid it of remnants of the Cold War while keeping in fact everything valuable and positive for creating reliable structure of stability and security in Europe. Delay in adapting the Treaty to the goals of a "New Europe" can weaken the vitality of this document, lead to even more obvious conflict between some of its provisions and the dominating trend of European development as well as legitimate security interests of the State Parties.

Of course, there is no question about taking any urgent steps. I have rather in mind joint intellectual review of these issues with a view to achieving agreement by the end of 1995 - the time when the State parties must reach the final reduction

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.76]

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ceilings. I proceed from the assumption that such joint deliberations could in essence become a part of negotiations on harmonization of the obligations of the CSCE member states in the area of security.

At the same time there is an issue which brooks no delay. This is the issue of the flank zone limitations. As you are aware, the redistribution of obligations of the former Soviet Union among the successor-states resulted in a shift in the proportions of levels fro Russia in the "extended Central Europe" zone and the flank zone to the disadvantage of the latter. From the overall level of 6400 tanks, 11480 armored combat vehicles and 6415 pieces of artillery Russia can deploy in regular units in the flank zone in Leningrad Military District (LenMD) and the North Caucuses Military District (NCMD) not more that 700 tanks, 580 armored combat vehicles and 1280 pieces of artillery. But these two military districts cover more that half of the European part of the territory of Russia.

This disbalance contradicts the basic principle of equality in rights and obligations as well as the principle of taking into account the security interests of all State Parties. Preservation of the current structure of flank-zone limitations is leading to the situation when some can deploy troops where they want to, while others can not do it in the regions where such a deployment is vital for securing defensive capacity and solving social problems.

Principle political acuteness of this problem lies in the fact that the configuration and levels of the flank-zone limitations oblige Russia to concentrate its main contingents of its conventional forces in the Baltic region and along the border with Belarus and Ukraine. In essence this situation leads to the regeneration of balance structure of the Cold War along the West-East line. this, as I strongly believe, runs conter to the goals of the Treaty and of Europe.

As the President of Russia I am deeply concern about extremely tense situation in the Southern region. Instability in the Caucuses and adjacent regions as well as the presence of serious "non-European" risks, growth of separatism and fundamentalism demand considerable military presence of Russia in the South - in NCMD - not only from its security standpoint but also in order to prevent destabilization of the situation in the border European context. One cannot exclude such a development when Russia for the seke of peace and security will be forced to make decisions which are not in line with the flank-zone limitations. Thus we face a real threat of the destabilization of the Treaty due to the situation in the South part

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of the area of application. But our policy of principle is not to weaken but to strengthen the Treaty.

I would like to drow your attention to the fact that steps taken by Russia jointly with other states in order to alleviate the situation in the Southern flank and to prevent splashes of confrontation there reaffirm once again the archaic nature of the flank-zone limitations. I confine muself to two examples: the implementation of the Treaty concerning the Black Sea Fleet, which we signed together with the president of ukraine, and the realization of the future agreement about deployment of Russian troops in Armenia reduce to minimum Russian capabilities in the NCMD and LenMD. It turns out that the Treaty limitations lay obstacles to the steps towards strengthening stability and security in this region.

I'm convinced that this problem could be solved. Having signed the Treaty State Parties accepted the flank-zone limitation for the USSR which by far exeed the flank-zone limits for Russia. I don't see any serious political-military reasons for the preservation of these limits after fundamental changes which took place in the ~~plst-~~ post-Soviet space.

The settlement of this problem will contribute to strengthening of accord in the Russian society in favor of increased cooperation with the CSCE partners in consolidating stability and security, thus expanding the basis for future measures in arms control.

We can't let ourselfs to delay the solution of the flank problem and put it under the table. Right now it's necessary to clarify this issue in order to choose the optimal configuration of Russian defense capabilities and prepare military and social infrastructure for the troops. I believe that agreements which will fully take into account the interests of security of Russia and of course its neigbour states can be reached this year during regular session of joint consultative group on the CFE Treaty. The Russian delegation will have all the necessary powers for that.

Proceeding from close interrelation betwen the national security of each CFE Treaty State Party and security of Europe at large, I count on Your understanding and constructive cooperation of our delegations in Vienna.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

September 17, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO YELTSIN ON
NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND GEORGIA
September 20, 1993

DEAR BORIS,

IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR PARTNERSHIP, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT CRISIS IN GEORGIA AND THE OPPORTUNITY WE NOW HAVE TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE CAUCASUS THAT GEORGIA'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BE MAINTAINED. I THEREFORE URGE THAT RUSSIA TAKE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC STEPS TO HALT THE CURRENT ABKHAZ OFFENSIVE AGAINST SUKHUMI, RESTORE A DURABLE CEASEFIRE, AND RESUME THE UN ENDORSED PEACE PROCESS. RECALLING THAT WE AGREED IN VANCOUVER AND TOKYO HOW IMPORTANT EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE'S CONTINUED LEADERSHIF IS FOR GEORGIA'S STABILITY AND PEACE, I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO ENSURE HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

WITH REGARD TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE FURTHER INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO END THE HUMAN SUFFERING IN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN AND ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL FOR A WIDER REGIONAL CONFLICT.

AT MY REQUEST, AMBASSADOR STROBE TALBOTT HAS JUST VISITED ANKARA, BAKU, YEREVAN AND MOSCOW FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE REGION STRENGTHEN OUR CONVICTION THAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL JUNCTURE. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT URGED ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT NOT TO ALLOW THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PASS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE THIS SENTIMENT.

AT THIS KEY MOMENT, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA CLOSELY COORDINATE OUR POSITIONS ON ALL CRITICAL QUESTIONS. WE MUST FOCUS OUR DIPLOMACY ON A SINGLE APPROACH THAT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE PARTIES AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE CSCE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS HAS ELABORATED SUCH A PLAN WITH THE ACTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA AND HAS BEEN ENDORSED IN TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA'S

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.77]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MEDIATION OF A DIRECT DIALOGUE AMONG THE PARTIES WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF IT IS INTEGRATED IN THE CSCE PEACE PROCESS. IN THIS WAY, WE CAN AVOID POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING MILITARY INTERVENTION AND TOGETHER PROMOTE A LASTING CEASE-FIRE, SUPPLEMENTED BY CSCE MONITORS AND AN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE FUTURE OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH. THAT IS WHY THE SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING OF THE MINSK GROUP IN PARIS IS SO IMPORTANT. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT RUSSIA WILL BE FULLY REPRESENTED AT THIS MEETING. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN THE CSCE PROCESS AS THE BEST WAY TO ADVANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN RESORT NOW TO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THIS IS A TIME FOR URGENT ACTION. SO DO I. YET, WE MUST ALSO ENSURE THAT THERE IS MORE THOROUGH CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN US. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WHEN THEY MEET SEPTEMBER 29, FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER DISCUSS AN AGREED COMMON APPROACH WITHIN CSCE THAT WE CAN DEVELOP TOGETHER.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTERS OF THIS WEEK ON NATO EXPANSION AND THE CFE TREATY WHICH CONTAINED MANY IDEAS TO STUDY. I WILL HAVE A RESPONSE FOR YOU ON THEM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

SINCERELY,
BILL CLINTON.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

7696

Translated from Russian

His Excellency
Mr. William J. CLINTON
President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your letter - I welcome your publicly adopted principled position. We highly value the political support given to Russia by the United States at a critical moment for our country. We see this as renewed confidence in our course toward democratic change and transition to market economy.

The understanding shown by the overwhelming majority of Russians for the measures to implement a phased constitutional reform and the continuing consolidation of forces around the President bear testimony to the fact that attempts to divert the country from the main course of its historical development and turn it back into the past have no support among the people and, thus, doomed to failure.

We are making persistent efforts to prevent faltering of country's financial and economic system. The pivotal principles of our economic policy for the next few months will be steady financial stabilization, privatization, and development of small and medium-size businesses.

Under the present circumstances, real help represented by the assistance package for Russia for the fiscal year 1994 is of special importance. The positive vote on this matter in the Senate is extremely timely. What needs to be done now is to complete this as soon as possible and have this bill approved. And it is in our common interests to ensure that our cooperation bear the minimum burden of

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.78]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

political linkages. We hope that the U.S. administration is making every effort to launch all the scheduled economic assistance programs as early as possible. For our part, we stand ready to do everything that is necessary so that the funds allocated be used expeditiously and most effectively.

Of no less importance would be to ensure that solidarity with our policies on the part of the United States and other leading Western democracies be translated into prompt steps to implement the Tokyo package of support of Russian reform. Based on our agreements and taking into account the firm obligations assumed by the Russian side, we are counting on a positive resolution - with the support of the U.S. administration - of the question of allocating the urgently needed IMF second tranche of STF in the amount of 1,5 billion dollars.

Minister Kozyrev has been instructed to brief you in detail on our most important priorities in the area of both bilateral and multilateral economic and credit cooperation. I look forward to hearing your suggestions after your meeting with him.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin
September 29, 1993

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю Вас за письмо и приветствую принципиальную позицию, занятую Вами публично. Мы высоко ценим политическую поддержку, оказанную России Соединенными Штатами в критический для нее период. Воспринимаем это как подтверждение доверия нашему курсу на демократические преобразования в переходе к рыночной экономике.

Понимание, с которым подавляющее большинство россиян восприняло меры по поэтапной конституционной реформе, продолжающаяся консолидация сил вокруг президента, свидетельствуют о том, что попытки увести страну с магистрального пути исторического развития, повернуть назад, в прошлое, не пользуются поддержкой народа и, следовательно, обречены на поражение.

Нами предпринимаются настойчивые усилия по недопущению сбоя в финансово-экономической системе страны. Стержневыми принципами нашей экономической политики в предстоящие месяцы являются последовательная финансовая стабилизация и приватизация, развитие малого и среднего предпринимательства.

В нынешней обстановке российским реформам особенно важно то реальное содействие, каким является пакет помощи России на 1994 финансовый год.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.79]

Положительное голосование в Сенате исключительно своевременно. Теперь надо быстрее завершить дело и утвердить этот законопроект. При этом в наших общих интересах - обеспечить, чтобы наше сотрудничество было минимально обременено политическими увязками. Рассчитываем, что администрация США предпринимает все усилия для скорейшего запуска всех намеченных программ экономического содействия. Со своей стороны готовы сделать все необходимое для того, чтобы выделяемые средства были использованы оперативно и с максимальной эффективностью.

Не менее важно, чтобы солидарность с нашим курсом США и других ведущих западных демократий нашла свое выражение в незамедлительных шагах по реализации токийского пакета поддержки российских реформ. Исходя из наших договоренностей и с учетом твердых обязательств, взятых на себя российской стороной, мы рассчитываем на положительное решение при поддержке администрации США вопроса о выделении особенно необходимой нам сейчас второй очереди системного кредита МВФ в размере 1,5 миллиарда долларов.

А.В.Козырев имеет поручение предметно информировать Вас по нашим актуальным приоритетам в сфере как двустороннего, так и многостороннего экономического и кредитного сотрудничества. Рассчитываю услышать Ваши предложения по итогам беседы с ним.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль
29 сентября 1993 года

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10-18-93

October 18, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tony is seeking your approval for a response (TAB A) to President Yeltsin's letter concerning removal of troops from Estonia and Latvia. The response encourages Yeltsin to personally meet with Presidents Meri and Ulmanis to resolve the issue.

[✓] Approve [ ] Discuss

John Podesta

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.80]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10.18.93

October 18, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tony is seeking your approval for a response (TAB A) to President Yeltsin's letter concerning removal of troops from Estonia and Latvia. The response encourages Yeltsin to personally meet with Presidents Meri and Ulmanis to resolve the issue.

[✓] Approve [ ] Discuss

John Podesta

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.81]

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.82)
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 2
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS.

.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS,

.

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR FINDING TIME TO SPEAK WITH ME BY PHONE OCTOBER 5. IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY BURDENS YOU FACED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN MOSCOW. YOUR STEADFASTNESS THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN INSPIRING. PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT I, ALONG WITH YOUR MANY OTHER FRIENDS IN THE U.S., WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOU AS YOU FACE THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD AND AS YOU PREPARE FOR THE FREE, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTORAL PROCESS IN DECEMBER THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

.

SUBSEQUENT TO OUR CONVERSATION, I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER DATED OCTOBER 6, IN WHICH YOU REVIEWED A RANGE OF ISSUES RELATING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA. I WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF OPEN DISCUSSION THAT CHARACTERIZES YOUR MESSAGE. I BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. AND

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RUSSIA HAVE SHARED OBJECTIVES ON THIS ISSUE -- THE RAPID AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN FORCES IN AN HONORABLE FASHION.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR LETTER. WHILE THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM ESTONIA AND LATVIA IS. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. A MATTER FOR THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED TO RESOLVE. IT IS ALSO AN ISSUE THAT HAS ELICITED A GREAT DEAL OF INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION. INCLUDING HERE IN THE UNITED STATES AMONG MANY SEGMENTS OF OUR POPULATION. INCLUDING THE U.S. CONGRESS. I APPRECIATE THAT THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARILY DELICATE ISSUE BOTH FOR YOU AND FOR THE ETHNIC RUSSIANS WHO LIVE IN THESE COUNTRIES.

AS YOU KNOW. FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND I DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS DURING OUR RECENT MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE. PRIOR TO THAT CONVERSATION. I HAD MET IN NEW YORK WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF ESTONIA. LATVIA AND LITHUANIA. WHERE WE DEALT WITH THE QUESTION AT SOME LENGTH. IN ALL OF THESE CONVERSATIONS. I WAS STRUCK BY THE SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL DESIRE OF ALL SIDES TO OVERCOME THE TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT HAVE SLOWED THE PACE OF YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ESTONIA AND LATVIA. AS YOU CORRECTLY NOTE. FOR RUSSIA. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL QUESTION IS SETTLED. AND YOU HAVE MADE ADMIRABLE PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUMBER OF YOUR TROOPS TO THEIR PRESENT LOW LEVEL.

I THINK I CAN FAIRLY SAY THAT PRESIDENTS MERI AND ULMANIS ARE DETERMINED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE QUICKLY AND IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WAY. I FOUND BOTH MEN TO BE PRAGMATIC AND WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU CONSTRUCTIVELY TO BRING THIS ISSUE TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. I MADE CLEAR TO THEM THE NEED FOR ESTONIA AND LATVIA TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO BROADEN THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA. I ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING FAIR CITIZENSHIP LAWS.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IT IS CLEAR THAT AT THE WORKING LEVEL. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ESTONIA AND LATVIA ARE NOT MAKING GOOD PROGRESS. THERE ARE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THIS. AS YOU NOTED IN YOUR LETTER. I BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS BOLD AND FARSIGHTED POLITICAL ACTION. AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD IN A DECISIVE AND POSITIVE FASHION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE BEST WAY TO DO SO IS FOR YOU TO ENGAGE PERSONALLY WITH THE LEADERS OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA TO SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENTS MERI AND ULMANIS WOULD REACT FAVORABLY TO AN OFFER TO MEET WITH YOU SEPARATELY IN A HIGH-LEVEL EFFORT TO AGREE ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DATE OR DATES BY WHICH THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THESE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE COMPLETED. YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH LITHUANIA HAS SHOWN THAT SETTING SUCH A DATE CAN ENERGIZE THE NEGOTIATING LEVELS TO CLEAR AWAY EXTRANEOUS ISSUES QUICKLY. THE INCENTIVE OF A DATE. COUPLED WITH THE IMPRIMATUR OF A DECISION BY THREE PRESIDENTS WOULD, I AM CONVINCED. BRING THIS LONGSTANDING ISSUE TO FINAL CLOSURE ON HONORABLE TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES.

AS YOU KNOW. SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER WILL BE VISITING MOSCOW SOON ON A TRIP TO THE REGION WHICH WILL ALSO TAKE HIM TO RIGA. WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER COUNTERPARTS FROM ALL THREE BALTIC STATES. IF YOU SEE MERIT IN THE SUGGESTION THAT I HAVE MADE, HE WOULD OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN ANY FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF OUR ASSISTANCE PACKAGE WILL MAKE POSSIBLE THE IMMEDIATE ALLOCATION OF THE ADDITIONAL $160 MILLION THAT WE HAVE EARMARKED TO PROVIDE HOUSING FOR ROUGHLY 5000 DEMOBILIZED RUSSIAN OFFICERS FROM THE BALTIC STATES WITHIN THE NEXT 18-24 MONTHS. WE WILL MEET WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN NOVEMBER TO SOLICIT THEIR ASSISTANCE ON THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

HOUSING QUESTION AS WELL.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT MY SUGGESTION IN THE SPIRIT IT IS OFFERED -- AS AN EFFORT TO HELP RESOLVE AN ISSUE THAT I BELIEVE WILL BENEFIT FROM THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION I AM PROPOSING. I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED CONSULTATIONS ON THIS AND OTHER TOPICS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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FINAL SECTION OF 2

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SECTION 1 OF 2
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS.
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NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:

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I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR FINDING TIME TO SPEAK WITH ME BY PHONE OCTOBER 5, IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY BURDENS YOU FACED IN

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1923 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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IMPLEMENTING FAIR CITIZENSHIP LAWS.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL CLINTON

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END TEXT

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO SECSTATE WASH DC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.84)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
QQQQ
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.
.
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS.
.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,
.
I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR FINDING TIME TO SPEAK WITH ME BY PHONE OCTOBER 5, IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY BURDENS YOU FACED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN MOSCOW. YOUR STEADFASTNESS THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN INSPIRING. PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT I, ALONG WITH YOUR MANY OTHER FRIENDS IN THE U.S., WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOU AS YOU FACE THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD AND AS YOU PREPARE FOR THE FREE, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTORAL PROCESS IN DECEMBER THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED.
.
SUBSEQUENT TO OUR CONVERSATION, I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER DATED OCTOBER 6, IN WHICH YOU REVIEWED A RANGE OF ISSUES RELATING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA. I WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF OPEN DISCUSSION THAT CHARACTERIZES YOUR MESSAGE. I BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE SHARED OBJECTIVES ON THIS ISSUE -- THE RAPID AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN FORCES IN AN HONORABLE FASHION.
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AS YOU KNOW, FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND I DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS DURING OUR RECENT MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE. PRIOR TO THAT CONVERSATION, I HAD MET IN NEW YORK WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA, WHERE WE DEALT WITH THE QUESTION AT SOME LENGTH. IN ALL OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, I WAS STRUCK BY THE SERIOUS AND

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PRACTICAL DESIRE OF ALL SIDES TO OVERCOME THE TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT HAVE SLOWED THE PACE OF YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ESTONIA AND LATVIA. AS YOU CORRECTLY NOTE, FOR RUSSIA, THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL QUESTION IS SETTLED, AND YOU HAVE MADE ADMIRABLE PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUMBER OF YOUR TROOPS TO THEIR PRESENT LOW LEVEL.

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I THINK I CAN FAIRLY SAY THAT PRESIDENTS MERI AND ULMANIS ARE DETERMINED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE QUICKLY AND IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WAY. I FOUND BOTH MEN TO BE PRAGMATIC AND WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU CONSTRUCTIVELY TO BRING THIS ISSUE TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. I MADE CLEAR TO THEM THE NEED FOR ESTONIA AND LATVIA TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO BROADEN THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA. I ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING FAIR CITIZENSHIP LAWS.

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IT IS CLEAR THAT AT THE WORKING LEVEL, THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ESTONIA AND LATVIA ARE NOT MAKING GOOD PROGRESS. THERE ARE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THIS, AS YOU NOTED IN YOUR LETTER. I BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS BOLD AND FARSIGHTED POLITICAL ACTION, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD IN A DECISIVE AND POSITIVE FASHION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE BEST WAY TO DO SO IS FOR YOU TO ENGAGE PERSONALLY WITH THE LEADERS OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA TO SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

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I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENTS MERI AND ULMANIS WOULD REACT FAVORABLY TO AN OFFER TO MEET WITH YOU SEPARATELY IN A HIGH-LEVEL EFFORT TO AGREE ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DATE OR DATES BY WHICH THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THESE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE COMPLETED. YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH LITHUANIA HAS SHOWN THAT SETTING SUCH A DATE CAN ENERGIZE THE NEGOTIATING LEVELS TO CLEAR AWAY EXTRANEOUS ISSUES QUICKLY. THE INCENTIVE OF A DATE, COUPLED WITH THE IMPRIMATUR OF A DECISION BY THREE PRESIDENTS WOULD, I AM CONVINCED, BRING THIS LONGSTANDING ISSUE TO FINAL CLOSURE ON HONORABLE TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES.

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AS YOU KNOW, SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER WILL BE VISITING MOSCOW SOON ON A TRIP TO THE REGION WHICH WILL ALSO TAKE HIM TO RIGA, WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER COUNTERPARTS FROM ALL THREE BALTIC STATES. IF YOU SEE MERIT IN THE SUGGESTION THAT I HAVE MADE, HE WOULD OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN ANY FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF OUR ASSISTANCE PACKAGE WILL MAKE POSSIBLE THE IMMEDIATE ALLOCATION OF THE ADDITIONAL $160 MILLION THAT WE HAVE EARMARKED TO PROVIDE HOUSING FOR ROUGHLY 5000 DEMOBILIZED RUSSIAN OFFICERS FROM THE BALTIC STATES WITHIN THE NEXT 18-24 MONTHS. WE WILL MEET WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN NOVEMBER TO SOLICIT THEIR ASSISTANCE ON THE

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HOUSING QUESTION AS WELL.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT MY SUGGESTION IN THE SPIRIT IT IS OFFERED -- AS AN EFFORT TO HELP RESOLVE AN ISSUE THAT I BELIEVE WILL BENEFIT FROM THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION I AM PROPOSING. I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED CONSULTATIONS ON THIS AND OTHER TOPICS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT
DECL: OADR

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS: 27

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR FINDING TIME TO SPEAK WITH ME BY PHONE OCTOBER 5, IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY BURDENS YOU FACED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN MOSCOW. YOUR STEADFASTNESS THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN INSPIRING. PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT I, ALONG WITH YOUR MANY OTHER FRIENDS IN THE U.S., WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOU AS YOU FACE THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD AND AS YOU PREPARE FOR THE FREE, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTORAL PROCESS IN DECEMBER THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.85]

CONCLUSION. I MADE CLEAR TO THEM THE NEED FOR ESTONIA AND LATVIA TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO BROADEN THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA. I ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING FAIR CITIZENSHIP LAWS.

IT IS CLEAR THAT AT THE WORKING LEVEL, THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ESTONIA AND LATVIA ARE NOT MAKING GOOD PROGRESS. THERE ARE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THIS, AS YOU NOTED IN YOUR LETTER. I BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS BOLD AND FARSIGHTED POLITICAL ACTION, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD IN A DECISIVE AND POSITIVE FASHION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE BEST WAY TO DO SO IS FOR YOU TO ENGAGE PERSONALLY WITH THE LEADERS OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA TO SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

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SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.86)
KBH 1/2/2025

October 15, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE NB for

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Boris Yeltsin on Baltic Troop Withdrawal

President Yeltsin sent the President a letter October 6 on the issue of Russian troop withdrawals from Estonia and Latvia. In it, he repeated many of the same arguments we heard from Kozyrev: in essence, that Russia is willing to withdraw, but the Estonians and Latvians are complicating the talks with unacceptable deadlines and conditions. In one sense, he is right: the negotiations with both countries are hopelessly mired, but of course the Russians are as much to blame as the Balts.

Nick and Strobe discussed the letter and the larger issue with Deputy FM Mamedov in Montreal last week. Mamedov agreed that one promising approach might be a response from the President that proposed high-level political involvement; specifically, meetings between Yeltsin and the Presidents of Latvia and Estonia at which a date for withdrawal would be announced. This is in keeping with our message that the Baltic Presidents and Kozyrev took away from their recent meetings with the President: "focus on setting a date."

Admittedly, this would be a big step for Yeltsin at this time, but his performance during the Japan visit -- when he departed from the MFA script to make a genuine gesture of reconciliation -- has encouraged us even more to pursue this approach. Secretary Christopher's visit to Moscow next week and subsequent meeting with the three Baltic foreign ministers in Riga gives us the opportunity to follow up with Yeltsin directly (bypassing any blockage from MFA) and, if needed, even to play a behind-the-scenes facilitative role. For this reason, we believe it is important to send the letter by early next week, in order to precede Christopher's meeting with Yeltsin on October 22. It would therefore be helpful to have the message approved for transmission by October 19.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming letter from President Yeltsin

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR FINDING TIME TO SPEAK WITH ME BY PHONE OCTOBER 5, IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY BURDENS YOU FACED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN MOSCOW. YOUR STEADFASTNESS THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN INSPIRING. PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT I, ALONG WITH YOUR MANY OTHER FRIENDS IN THE U.S., WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOU AS YOU FACE THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD AND AS YOU PREPARE FOR THE FREE, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTORAL PROCESS IN DECEMBER THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 1.87]

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SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10.18.93

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.86)
KBH 1/2/2025

93 OCT 18 A10:38

October 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin on Baltic Troop Withdrawal

Purpose

To seek your agreement to send a response to a letter from President Yeltsin on the issue of Russian troops in Estonia and Latvia.

Background

On October 6, President Yeltsin sent you a letter on the subject of Russian troop withdrawals from Estonia and Latvia. The letter appears to have been prompted by Foreign Minister Kozyrev's discussions with you and Warren Christopher on this issue. Indeed, there is little in the letter we did not hear from Kozyrev himself: in effect, that the Russians are ready to withdraw, but the Estonians and Latvians keep raising unacceptable deadlines and conditions. The Yeltsin letter implies a veiled threat to abandon the withdrawal negotiations entirely but ends on an upbeat note, with thanks for U.S. help on housing demobilized officers and to you personally for your "understanding of human rights problems" involved.

Yeltsin's letter gives you an opportunity to encourage him to make a bold gesture to put this issue behind him.

In point of fact, Russia's withdrawal talks with Estonia and Latvia are stuck in a rut, with negotiators on both sides unable to move beyond small concessions on technical points. What is needed is some high-level involvement to energize the process. In the message to Yeltsin at Tab A, you note the pragmatism and willingness to resolve this issue that was evident in your UNGA meeting with the Estonian and Latvian presidents and propose that Yeltsin capitalize on this situation by initiating meetings with them to agree on a date for withdrawal. This is the kind of bold gesture which appeals to Yeltsin; Strobe Talbott and Nick Burns previewed the approach with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and found him receptive to the idea. Sending the message now

puts Secretary Christopher in a good position to follow up with Yeltsin and Baltic leaders during his trip to the region this week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming letter from Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill,

In this dramatic and in many ways watershed hour in the history of new democratic Russia I am counting on your continued understanding of the problems that I have to face. One of those is the state of Russian-Baltic relations and, in particular, the range of issues relating to the Russian troops withdrawal from the territory of Latvia and Estonia. Judging from some of the recent statements and steps, it appears that prompt and accurate information on the status of our talks with the Baltics is not getting to all in Washington.

As we have repeatedly informed our US partners, politically to us the troop withdrawal question is settled. This is a sovereign decision, but we are mindful of the recommendations of the international community about complete and orderly troops pullout within the shortest possible time-frame. Today, the withdrawal parameters are being determined by technical factors, among which the most critical is the need to provide approariate accommodation facilities for the servicemen on the territory of the Russian Federation.

I believe you understand the implications that may ensue for my Government, if the troops withdrawal were to be carried out without any preparation, as we in Russia say, to a "vast and empty field". All the more so, given the present explosive situation.

I would like to stress that despite serious objective difficulties and the lack of relevant troops pullout agreements with Latvia and Estonia - which only complicates matters - substantial progress has been made over the past few months in terms of reducing

His Excellency
Mr. William J.CLINTON
President of the United States
of America, Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.89]

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our military presence in the Baltic countries. The last Russian soldier has already left Lithuania. There remain 4,500 men in Estonia, and a little over 17,000 in Latvia.

As our Baltic partners are proposing clearly unrealistic time-frames and conditions of completing the troops pullout, we are proceeding in accordance with our own schedule, of which the Baltic leadership are aware.

Regrettably, as the results of the latest rounds of talks with the Latvians and Estonians have demonstrated, their good will potential for finding mutually acceptable solutions is totally inadequate. We do not see any movement to accommodate us, even after the completion of the withdrawal from Lithuania.

The impression is that Riga and Tallinn have interpreted the support by some of the Western partners not quite correctly and have failed to understand that the impulse by the international community toward achieving success at the talks was addressed to both sides. Increasingly, statements are heard in Baltic countries about "an unconditional support of the Baltic positions by the West". Indeed, it appears that our partners are questioning the utility of finding negotiated solutions with Russia altogether. Apparently, this is the source of the Baltic representatives' insistence on introducing additional elements which are complicating achievement of troops withdrawal agreements.

Now, the efforts of some of our partners who have shown willingness to contribute to early troops withdrawal by allocating funds for the purpose of building houses for our officers in Russia do not go unnoticed. Additional funds provided by the United States for these purposes will certainly shorten the time-frame of the withdrawal completion.

I would also like to express my thanks for your understanding of the human rights problems, in particular, with respect to the Russian-speaking population, which you displayed recently in your meeting with Minister Kozyrev and which I know you communicated

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directly to the Baltic leaders. This issue is no less important than the troops pullout, and we need to also work on it together and in appropriate forms.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN
October 6, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1993

Dear Boris:

As you know, Secretary Christopher is arriving in Moscow late Thursday evening. He will be conducting intensive discussions on Friday with Foreign Minister Kozyrev and others in your government on a wide range of issues important to both of us. It is critically important that Secretary Christopher have an opportunity to meet face to face with you. I have asked him to deliver personally an important message in response to your letter about NATO and the future of European security.

I understand that you have a very busy day on Friday and may be travelling outside of Moscow. However, with the help of your government, Secretary Christopher would be eager to travel somewhere to meet with you. I hope your team will do everything it can to make this possible. I look forward to hearing Secretary Christopher's report on your conversation. As always, you have my warm personal regards and strongest support.

Sincerely,

Bill

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.90]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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2015-0815-M-1 (1.91)
KBH 1/2/2025

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~S E C R E T~~
QQQQ
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING YOU TODAY TO SEEK YOUR HELP. IN A VERY CONCRETE WAY. IN OUR JOINT BATTLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- SPECIFICALLY. THE BOMBING OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103 OVER SCOTLAND IN 1988. WHICH COST THE LIVES OF 270 INNOCENT PERSONS. AS YOU KNOW. LIBYA HAS FOR SOME TIME NOW BEEN HARBORING TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE WIDELY SUSPECTED OF HAVING PLANNED THIS HEINOUS CRIME. AS I SAID BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I REMAIN DETERMINED TO BRING THE PAN AM 103 BOMBERS TO JUSTICE. THIS IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT TO THE FAMILIES OF THE 270 PEOPLE WHO WERE MURDERED, BUT TO ALL OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. IT IS ALSO CENTRAL TO A GOAL I SHARE WITH YOU, MAKING THE UN A MORE EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR THE DETERRENCE OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE.

WE HAVE LOOKED CAREFULLY AT THE SUGGESTIONS FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV MADE TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO AMEND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON LIBYAN SANCTIONS. I FEAR THESE SUGGESTIONS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WOULD EITHER FATALLY WEAKEN THE RESOLUTION OR ELSE MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RESOLUTION TO GET THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

WE HAVE DRAFTED THIS RESOLUTION CAREFULLY. CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE SANCTIONS, TO BE EFFECTIVE, SHOULD HAVE A MUCH GREATER IMPACT ON LIBYA THAN ON OTHER NATIONS. WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THAT. AND I BELIEVE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT AND IMPLEMENT THE NEW SANCTIONS WITHOUT REAL COST TO THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY. I BELIEVE THE NEW RESOLUTION WILL ALSO HASTEN LIBYAN COMPLIANCE, AND BRING US CLOSER TO THE DAY LIBYA CAN RESUME NORMAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER PARTNERS.

THIS RESOLUTION DOES NOT CHANGE THE STATUS QUO IN A WAY THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS RUSSIAN INTERESTS. THE ASSETS FREEZE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER LIBYA'S INCOME, AND LIBYA WILL RETAIN ITS PRESENT ABILITY TO USE THAT INCOME TO PAY ITS DEBTS TO RUSSIA.

THIS RESOLUTION IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE MECHANISM TO FORCE PAYMENT OF LIBYAN DEBT TO RUSSIA, BUT WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH YOU, IN A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONTEXT, TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON LIBYA TO HONOR ITS OBLIGATIONS.

WE HAVE DELAYED TABLING THE RESOLUTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ORDER TO ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS. NINE COUNCIL MEMBERS HAVE COMMITTED FIRMLY TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION, AND WE MUST MOVE SWIFTLY TO A VOTE.

I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THE DEPTH OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PASS AN EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION SOON. IF RUSSIA VETOES THE RESOLUTION, IT WOULD BE VERY HARMFUL TO THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. A RUSSIAN VETO WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS, THE AMERICAN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PUBLIC OR THE CONGRESS.

I DEEPLY APPRECIATE RUSSIA'S FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WHICH ARE ALREADY IN PLACE. AND I HOPE I CAN COUNT ON RUSSIA'S VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE NEW RESOLUTION.

SINCERELY.

BILL CLINTON

HIS EXCELLENCY
BORIS YELTSIN
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MOSCOW
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
BT
#2009
NNNN
<MSGID: M0696389

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 1, 1993

Dear Boris:

I am writing you today to seek your help, in a very concrete way, in our joint battle against international terrorism -- specifically, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which cost the lives of 270 innocent persons. As you know, Libya has for some time now been harboring two individuals who are widely suspected of having planned this heinous crime. As I said before the General Assembly, I remain determined to bring the Pan Am 103 bombers to justice. This is not only important to the families of the 270 people who were murdered, but to all of American public opinion. It is also central to a goal I share with you, making the UN a more effective tool for the deterrence of terrorism and violence.

We have looked carefully at the suggestions Foreign Minister Kozyrev made to Secretary Christopher to amend the draft resolution on Libyan sanctions. I fear these suggestions would either fatally weaken the resolution or else make it impossible for the resolution to get the support of the majority of the Security Council.

We have drafted this resolution carefully, conscious of the fact that the sanctions, to be effective, should have a much greater impact on Libya than on other nations. We have accomplished that, and I believe you will be able to support and implement the new sanctions without real cost to the Russian economy. I believe the new resolution will also hasten Libyan compliance, and bring us closer to the day Libya can resume normal commercial relations with Russia and other partners.

This resolution does not change the status quo in a way that adversely affects Russian interests. The assets freeze does not significantly alter Libya's income, and Libya will retain its present ability to use that income to pay its debts to Russia.

This resolution is not an appropriate mechanism to force payment of Libyan debt to Russia, but we are ready to work with you, in a bilateral and multilateral context, to keep the pressure on Libya to honor its obligations.

We have delayed tabling the resolution at the Security Council in order to address your concerns. Nine Council members have committed firmly to support the resolution, and we must move swiftly to a vote.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.92]

I want you to understand the depth of our determination to pass an effective sanctions resolution soon. If Russia vetoes the resolution, it would be very harmful to the interests of both our countries. A Russian veto would not be understood by the families of the victims, the American public or the Congress.

I deeply appreciate Russia's firm support for the Security Council resolutions which are already in place, and I hope I can count on Russia's vote in favor of the new resolution.

Sincerely,

Bill.

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~ 8433

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(1.93)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93 OCT 28 P10:27

October 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to the President on Libyan Sanctions

Purpose

To persuade Boris Yeltsin to support the P-3 resolution increasing sanctions on Libya.

Background

The Russians have taken a hard line on our new Libyan sanctions resolution: if the text is not amended to help them collect money Libya owes Moscow, Russia will veto. Foreign Minister Kozyrev suggested to Warren Christopher taking two or three weeks to discuss this with us, the UK and France. He also suggested amendments which are impractical and/or likely to lose the votes of other supporters of the resolution.

The last minute Russian position further frustrates our effort to pass the resolution in a timely fashion. We have the necessary votes without the Russians but would be risking their veto. The delay also increases the chance that other countries, especially Brazil and Venezuela, will reconsider their positions. Finally, the repeated delays have caused the Pan Am 103 families to begin to doubt our resolve.

Russia, in threatening to veto, is not fully aware of the depth of our commitment to rapid passage of the resolution, and of the likely reaction in Congress and U.S. public opinion. The families of Lockerbie victims will be furious with us, but even more so with Russia. This could erode Congressional support for aid to Russia. Your delivery of this message personally to Yeltsin should help to convince him of the risks inherent to the present course.

Kozyrev is under pressure on this issue from the Russian military and Finance Ministry, and told Foreign Secretary Hurd the matter was "out of his hands" because it had Yeltsin's support. Accordingly, the British and French urge you to raise this directly with Yeltsin; Major and (we believe) Mitterrand are prepared to do the same but believe it essential that you take the lead.

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

Russia has suggested that we, the UK and France should assist them in collecting frozen Libyan assets in our own countries and in third countries. Our laws make it virtually impossible to turn over funds frozen in the U.S. We have told the Russians, and you could reinforce this, that we will be sympathetic to Russian efforts to obtain Libyan funds frozen in other countries, and that we will continue to work with them to keep the pressure on Libya to repay its debt to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Boris Yeltsin at Tab A and authorize that a copy be sent immediately via backchannel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~

8433

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.99)
KBH 1/2/2025

October 28, 1993

P10:27

ACTION

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Kozyrev is under pressure on this issue from the Russian military and Finance Ministry, and told Foreign Secretary Hurd the matter was "out of his hands" because it had Yeltsin's support. Accordingly, the British and French urge you to raise this directly with Yeltsin; Major and (we believe) Mitterrand are prepared to do the same but believe it essential that you take the lead.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Russia has suggested that we, the UK and France should assist them in collecting frozen Libyan assets in our own countries and in third countries. Our laws make it virtually impossible to turn over funds frozen in the U.S. We have told the Russians, and you could reinforce this, that we will be sympathetic to Russian efforts to obtain Libyan funds frozen in other countries, and that we will continue to work with them to keep the pressure on Libya to repay its debt to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Boris Yeltsin at Tab A and authorize that a copy be sent immediately via backchannel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 1, 1993

Dear Boris:

I am writing you today to seek your help, in a very concrete way, in our joint battle against international terrorism -- specifically, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which cost the lives of 270 innocent persons. As you know, Libya has for some time now been harboring two individuals who are widely suspected of having planned this heinous crime. As I said before the General Assembly, I remain determined to bring the Pan Am 103 bombers to justice. This is not only important to the families of the 270 people who were murdered, but to all of American public opinion. It is also central to a goal I share with you, making the UN a more effective tool for the deterrence of terrorism and violence.

We have looked carefully at the suggestions Foreign Minister Kozyrev made to Secretary Christopher to amend the draft resolution on Libyan sanctions. I fear these suggestions would either fatally weaken the resolution or else make it impossible for the resolution to get the support of the majority of the Security Council.

We have drafted this resolution carefully, conscious of the fact that the sanctions, to be effective, should have a much greater impact on Libya than on other nations. We have accomplished that, and I believe you will be able to support and implement the new sanctions without real cost to the Russian economy. I believe the new resolution will also hasten Libyan compliance, and bring us closer to the day Libya can resume normal commercial relations with Russia and other partners.

This resolution does not change the status quo in a way that adversely affects Russian interests. The assets freeze does not significantly alter Libya's income, and Libya will retain its present ability to use that income to pay its debts to Russia.

This resolution is not an appropriate mechanism to force payment of Libyan debt to Russia, but we are ready to work with you, in a bilateral and multilateral context, to keep the pressure on Libya to honor its obligations.

We have delayed tabling the resolution at the Security Council in order to address your concerns. Nine Council members have committed firmly to support the resolution, and we must move swiftly to a vote.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.95]

I want you to understand the depth of our determination to pass an effective sanctions resolution soon. If Russia vetoes the resolution, it would be very harmful to the interests of both our countries. A Russian veto would not be understood by the families of the victims, the American public or the Congress.

I deeply appreciate Russia's firm support for the Security Council resolutions which are already in place, and I hope I can count on Russia's vote in favor of the new resolution.

Sincerely,

Bill.

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 8433

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.96)
KBH 1/2/2025

October 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to the President on Libyan Sanctions

Purpose

To persuade Boris Yeltsin to support the P-3 resolution increasing sanctions on Libya.

Background

The Russians have taken a hard line on our new Libyan sanctions resolution: if the text is not amended to help them collect money Libya owes Moscow, Russia will veto. Foreign Minister Kozyrev suggested to Warren Christopher taking two or three weeks to discuss this with us, the UK and France. He also suggested amendments which are impractical and/or likely to lose the votes of other supporters of the resolution.

The last minute Russian position further frustrates our effort to pass the resolution in a timely fashion. We have the necessary votes without the Russians but would be risking their veto. The delay also increases the chance that other countries, especially Brazil and Venezuela, will reconsider their positions. Finally, the repeated delays have caused the Pan Am 103 families to begin to doubt our resolve.

Russia, in threatening to veto, is not fully aware of the depth of our commitment to rapid passage of the resolution, and of the likely reaction in Congress and U.S. public opinion. The families of Lockerbie victims will be furious with us, but even more so with Russia. This could erode Congressional support for aid to Russia. Your delivery of this message personally to Yeltsin should help to convince him of the risks inherent to the present course.

Kozyrev is under pressure on this issue from the Russian military and Finance Ministry, and told Foreign Secretary Hurd the matter was "out of his hands" because it had Yeltsin's support. Accordingly, the British and French urge you to raise this directly with Yeltsin; Major and (we believe) Mitterrand are prepared to do the same but believe it essential that you take the lead.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Russia has suggested that we, the UK and France should assist them in collecting frozen Libyan assets in our own countries and in third countries. Our laws make it virtually impossible to turn over funds frozen in the U.S. We have told the Russians, and you could reinforce this, that we will be sympathetic to Russian efforts to obtain Libyan funds frozen in other countries, and that we will continue to work with them to keep the pressure on Libya to repay its debt to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Boris Yeltsin at Tab A and authorize that a copy be sent immediately via backchannel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8433

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 28, 1993



ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.97)
KBH 1/2/2025

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: RICHARD L. CANAS

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Yeltsin on Libyan Sanctions

As you know, the Russians are holding their vote on further Libyan sanctions hostage to further discussions on the Libyan debt to Russia. USUN, France and the UK agree that only the intervention of the President with Yeltsin will break this deadlock. We agree.

While there is sympathy for Russian petitions to use frozen assets to pay off Libyan debts, there is no support among the P-3 for the latest Russian requests which go far beyond this point. We do not believe the Russians will veto the resolution, (although they have threatened to do so), but they could easily delay the process by asking the UNSC to review an amendment. In either case, it is preferable to have the Russians with us on this issue and call for a vote quickly.

Prime Minister Major may formally request the President to call Yeltsin on this matter. We have not yet seen this request.

We have prepared a memorandum to the President (Tab I) outlining the situation and requesting that he sign the letter to Yeltsin soliciting his support and that he authorize a copy be sent immediately via backchannel.

Concurrences by: Nick Burns, Martin Indyk, Jeremy Rosner
Jenonne Walker

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter to Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

← form from

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Boris:

I wanted to thank you for agreeing to meet with Secretary Christopher on such short notice during his recent visit to Moscow. I thought it was important that you hear form him personally about our decisions regarding NATO and the Partnership for Peace. He reported to me that you also spoke in some detail about my upcoming visit to Moscow in January, which I continue to look forward to with great anticipation.

I am writing you today to seek your help, in a very concrete way, in our joint battle against international terrorism -- specifically, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which cost the lives of 270 innocent persons. As you know, Libya has for some time now been harboring two individuals who are widely suspected of having planned this heinous crime. As I said before the General Assembly, I remain determined to bring the Pan Am 103 bombers to justice. This is not only important to the families of the 270 people who were murdered, but to all of American public opinion. It is also central to a goal I share with you, making the UN a more effective tool for the deterrence of terrorism and violence.

We have looked carefully at the suggestions Foreign Minister Kozyrev made to Secretary Christopher to amend the draft resolution on Libyan sanctions. I fear these suggestions would either fatally weaken the resolution or else make it impossible for the resolution to get the support of the majority of the Security Council.

We have drafted this resolution carefully, conscious of the fact that the sanctions, to be effective, should have a much greater impact on Libya than on other nations. We have accomplished that, and I believe you will be able to support and implement the new sanctions without cost to the Russian economy. I believe the new resolution will also hasten Libyan compliance, and bring us closer to the day Libya can resume normal commercial relations with Russia and other partners.

This resolution does not change the status quo in a way that adversely affects Russian interests. The assets freeze does not significantly alter Libya's income, and Libya will retain its present ability to use that income to pay its debts to Russia.

real

[2015-0815-M-1, 1.98]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~We are determined to see that the new sanctions not cost Russia anything.~~ This resolution is not an appropriate mechanism to force payment of Libyan debt to Russia, but we are ready to work with you, in a bilateral and multilateral context, to keep the pressure on Libya to honor its obligations.

We have delayed tabling the resolution at the Security Council in order to address your concerns. Nine Council members have committed firmly to support the resolution, and we must move swiftly to a vote.

I want you to understand the depth of our determination to pass an effective sanctions resolution soon. If Russia vetoes the resolution, it would be very harmful to the interests of both our countries. A Russian veto would not be understood by the families of the victims, ~~or by~~ the American public or the Congress. ~~or it would also complicate efforts to pursue our bilateral assistance projects through the U.S. Congress.~~

I deeply appreciate Russia's firm support for the Security Council resolutions which are already in place, and I hope I can count on Russia's vote in favor of the new resolution.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (1.99)
KBH 1/2/2025

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to the President on Libyan Sanctions

Purpose

To persuade Boris Yeltsin to support the P-3 resolution increasing sanctions on Libya.

Background

The Russians have taken a hard line on our new Libyan sanctions resolution: if the text is not amended to help them collect money Libya owes Moscow, Russia will veto. Foreign Minister Kozyrev suggested to Warren Christopher taking two or three weeks to discuss this with us, the UK and France. He also suggested amendments which are ~~non-starters;~~ impractical and/or likely to lose the votes of other supporters of the resolution.

The last minute Russian position further frustrates our effort to pass the resolution in a timely fashion. We have the necessary votes without the Russians but would be risking their veto. The delay also increases the chance that other countries, especially Brazil and Venezuela, will reconsider their positions. Finally, the repeated delays have caused the Pan Am 103 families to begin to doubt our resolve.

Russia, in threatening to veto, is not fully aware of the depth of our commitment to rapid passage of the resolution, and of the likely reaction in Congress and U.S. public opinion. The families of Lockerbie victims will be furious with us, but even more so with Russia. This would ~~deeply~~ erode Congressional support for aid to Russia. Your delivery of this message personally to Yeltsin should help to convince him of the risks inherent to the present course.

Kozyrev is under pressure on this issue from the Russian military and Finance Ministry, and told Foreign Secretary Hurd the matter was "out of his hands" because it had Yeltsin's support. Accordingly, the British and French urge you to raise this directly with Yeltsin; Major and (we believe) Mitterrand are prepared to do the same but believe it essential that you take the lead.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Russia has suggested that we, the UK and France should assist them in collecting frozen Libyan assets in our own countries and in third countries. Our laws make it virtually impossible to turn over funds frozen in the U.S. We have told the Russians, and you should reinforce this, that we will be sympathetic to Russian efforts to obtain Libyan funds frozen in other countries, and that we will continue to work with them to keep the pressure on Libya to repay its debt to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Boris Yeltsin at Tab A and authorize that a copy be sent immediately via backchannel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SPECIAL ACCESS
8495

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.00)
KBH 1/2/2025

October 29, 1993

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NJB

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Yeltsin on Secretary Christopher's Visit

I have attached at Tab I a Presidential message to President Yeltsin thanking him for seeing Secretary Christopher last week and emphasizing the role that the Secretary and Kozyrev will play in preparing a successful summit meeting in January.

Secretary Christopher and Strobe Talbott suggested we send this message and Strobe has cleared the text. We had considerable trouble in arranging the Yeltsin meeting with the Secretary. Based on conversations with some Russian officials and our embassy, we believe that Kozyrev may have tried to block it. As you know, the Secretary and Kozyrev have not developed a close relationship. We understand that Kozyrev has been quite critical of the Secretary in Moscow, including possibly in conversations with Yeltsin in which the Secretary has been depicted as less than supportive of our close relationship with Russia.

When we discussed this problem with the Secretary, he agreed with our suggestion that the President send a message to Yeltsin, making clear his central role in our support for Yeltsin and Russian reform. The attached draft message is intended to convey that message directly to Yeltsin. We believe the President should also take the opportunity during his next phone conversation with Yeltsin, or in their January meetings, to reinforce this point.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmittal of the attached message to President Yeltsin via privacy channels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Message to President Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY PRODUCTIVE MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER LAST WEEK. I KNOW THAT YOU WERE RESTING AT YOUR DACHA, AND APPRECIATE THE TIME YOU TOOK TO MEET WITH HIM. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TOLD ME OF YOUR REACTION TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE BETWEEN NATO AND OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING RUSSIA. I AM VERY PLEASED THAT YOU AND I AGREE THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO BUILD A MORE SECURE FUTURE.

I WAS ALSO DELIGHTED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE, WHILE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WAS IN MOSCOW, MY VISIT TO RUSSIA IN MID-JANUARY. I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR STROBE TALBOTT TO MEET WITH HIS USUAL COUNTERPART, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV, IN MID-NOVEMBER TO BEGIN PLANNING FOR OUR MEETINGS. I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE VISIT BY THAT TIME.

I WANT OUR SUMMIT MEETING, AS DO YOU, TO BUILD ON THE PARTNERSHIP WE ESTABLISHED IN VANCOUVER AND TOKYO AND TO PRODUCE CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS TO BRING OUR TWO COUNTRIES EVEN CLOSER TOGETHER. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL DIRECT THIS EFFORT FOR OUR GOVERNMENT AND WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ANDREI KOZYREV AND YOUR OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS BEEN ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTS OF OUR NEW POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA. LIKE ME, HE HAS A DEEP INTEREST IN YOUR COUNTRY AND AN ABIDING COMMITMENT TO A CLOSER U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE AND ANDREI KOZYREV WILL PREPARE A GOOD SUMMIT MEETING FOR US IN JANUARY.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.01]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.02)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Yeltsin letter on CFE

Purpose

Attached for your approval is a draft response to President Yeltsin's September 17 letter on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). We believe the end of the first twelve-month CFE equipment reductions phase (November 17) provides a fortuitous opportunity to reply since it allows us to emphasize the theme that the Treaty has been a success and its integrity should be upheld. In the proposed reply, we remind the Russians of the value we place on the Treaty's full implementation and reiterate the view that the proper forum for dealing with the issue Yeltsin has raised in his letter is the Vienna Joint Consultative Group (JCG), where all 30 Treaty Parties are represented.

Before sending the letter, we want to preview it with our Allies in Brussels, in keeping with the practice of Allied consultations on this issue. After many of our NATO Allies received similar Yeltsin letters in September, we decided collectively that it would be better not to answer then than to rush back to Yeltsin with an essentially negative response, which might have complicated his relations with the military leaders who have been pushing this issue. In the intervening weeks Yeltsin appears to have stabilized his relationship with his military somewhat, and we do not believe a further delay in responding would be warranted. If we are to send the letter as recommended, we must have it approved now, then held for transmission after allied consultations.

Background

In Yeltsin's September 17 letter he argued in detail that CFE Treaty limits on equipment in the "flank zone" are a vestige of the Cold War which mandate a maldistribution of Russian forces and prevent Russia from adequately addressing instability in the Caucasus. While affirming his commitment to CFE's full implementation, Yeltsin seeks support for modifying or eliminating the flank zone limits this fall, with further review at the end of 1995 when reductions of Treaty Limited Equipment (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) will be complete.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Among NATO Allies there is consensus to reject Russian efforts to eliminate the flank ceiling, mainly in order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty but also to retain the stabilizing effects of a cap on forces in the Black Sea region. Some Allies -- notably the Turks and Norwegians -- see the flank limit as crucial to their security, and all agree on the importance of fulfilling CFE commitments. In NATO discussions, Allies have agreed that the best strategy for dealing with Russia's demands is to engage Russia in the JCG.

We should continue to handle this issue in the JCG. There, the multiple viewpoints of Parties can be brought to bear on the question of flank limits, and we can strive to address the issue on a technical, rather than a political level. The best way to handle the issue at the January Moscow summit (recognizing that we can expect Yeltsin to bring it up) is to ensure that you can point to work in progress in the JCG.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letter at Tab A.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B Letter from President Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[NOT TO BE TRANSMITTED UNTIL CONSULTATIONS COMPLETE]

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS:

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

AS YOU KNOW, THIS MONTH MARKS THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) AND THE END OF THE FIRST CFE EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS PHASE. ON THE OCCASION OF THIS IMPORTANT MILESTONE, I WANTED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY BOTH TO EXAMINE HOW THE TREATY IS FUNCTIONING AND TO ADDRESS THE POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME ON THE SUBJECT OF CFE.

YOU AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT CFE IS A CORNERSTONE FOR THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW EUROPE -- A FOUNDATION FOR A NEW PARTNERSHIP AMONG ITS PARTIES. THE VALUE OF THE TREATY LIES FIRST IN ITS BASIC PROVISIONS, AND MORE GENERALLY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREDICTABILITY AMONG ITS PARTIES. IT IS MAKING A KEY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN EUROPE IN A PERIOD OF TREMENDOUS CHANGE.

WE ALSO SHARE A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO SUCCESSFUL CFE IMPLEMENTATION. IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES AFFECTING THIS PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION, RUSSIA'S EFFORTS TO MEET ITS REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN THIS FIRST PHASE TANGIBLY DEMONSTRATE THE STRENGTH OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY.

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FOR THIS REASON, WE ARE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CONCERNS YOU HAVE RAISED WITH RESPECT TO FLANK ZONE LIMITS. WE TAKE THESE CONCERNS VERY SERIOUSLY. WE THEREFORE WELCOME YOUR CALL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE AMONG OUR JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP (JCG) DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA. WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR CHIEF NEGOTIATOR THERE TO EXPLORE YOUR CONCERNS. INITIAL EXCHANGES AT THE EXPERT LEVEL HAVE ALREADY HELPED US BETTER UNDERSTAND THE RUSSIAN POSITION AND ARE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.03)
KBH 1/2/2025

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

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I am not making secret of the fact, that full implementation of the Treaty costs Russia a lot in terms of great efforts, material, moral, social and at times political expense. I believe that the impact of continuous withdrawal of armed forces from Central European countries, undergoing profound military reform, lack of material base for the destruction of armaments on the implementation of the Treaty i self-evident and needs no additional clarifications. All this is complicated by a most difficult economic background.

At the same time, I believed and continue to believe, that the firm political choice made by Russia is favor of preserving the integrity of the Treaty - despite an evident incompatibility of some of its provisions with the new situation in Europe - has consolidated the European process, opened up additional possibilities for shaping principally new relations of peace, good-neighborhood and partnership. We does not call in question the Treaty balance system as such and maximum ceilings for the armaments to be reduced or stipulated by the Treaty.

Now, that the mechanism of the Treaty has started to work an full force and the reduction of armaments has become irreversible, it is high time to think jointly about how to make the Treaty face the new political realities, to rid it of remnants of the Cold War while keeping in fact everything valuable and positive for creating reliable structure of stability and security in Europe. Delay in adapting the Treaty to the goals of a "New Europe" can weaken the vitality of this document, lead to even more obvious conflict between some of its provisions and the dominating trend of European development as well as legitimate security interests of the State Parties.

Of course, there is no question about taking any urgent steps. I have rather in mind joint intellectual review of these issues with a view to achieving agreement by the end of 1995 - the time when the State parties must reach the final reduction

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.04]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ceilings. I proceed from the assumption that such joint deliberations could in essence become a part of negotiations on harmonization of the obligations of the CSCE member states in the area of security.

At the same time there is an issue which brooks no delay. This is the issue of the flank zone limitations. As you are aware, the redistribution of obligations of the former Soviet Union among the successor-states resulted in a shift in the proportions of levels fro Russia in the "extended Central Europe" zone and the flank zone to the disadvantage of the latter. From the overall level of 6400 tanks, 11480 armored combat vehicles and 6415 pieces of artillery Russia can deploy in regular units in the flank zone in Leningrad Military District (LenMD) and the North Caucuses Military District (NCMD) not more that 700 tanks, 580 armored combat vehicles and 1280 pieces of artillery. But these two military districts cover more that half of the European part of the territory of Russia.

This disbalance contradicts the basic principle of equality in rights and obligations as well as the principle of taking into account the security interests of all State Parties. Preservation of the current structure of flank-zone limitations is leading to the situation when some can deploy troops where they want to, while others can not do it in the regions where such a deployment is vital for securing defensive capacity and solving social problems.

Principle political acuteness of this problem lies in the fact that the configuration and levels of the flank-zone limitations oblige Russia to concentrate its main contingents of its conventional forces in the Baltic region and along the border with Belarus and Ukraine. In essence this situation leads to the regeneration of balance structure of the Cold War along the West-East line. this, as I strongly believe, runs conter to the goals of the Treaty and of Europe.

As the President of Russia I am deeply concern about extremely tense situation in the Southern region. Instability in the Caucuses and adjacent regions as well as the presence of serious "non-European" risks, growth of separatism and fundamentalism demand considerable military presence of Russia in the South - in NCMD - not only from its security standpoint but also in order to prevent destabilization of the situation in the border European context. One cannot exclude such a development when Russia for the seke of peace and security will be forced to make decisions which are not in line with the flank-zone limitations. Thus we face a real threat of the destabilization of the Treaty due to the situation in the South part

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of the area of application. But our policy of principle is not to weaken but to strengthen the Treaty.

I would like to drow your attention to the fact that steps taken by Russia jointly with other states in order to alleviate the situation in the Southern flank and to prevent splashes of confrontation there reaffirm once again the archaic nature of the flank-zone limitations. I confine muself to two examples: the implementation of the Treaty concerning the Black Sea Fleet, which we signed together with the president of ukraine, and the realization of the future agreement about deployment of Russian troops in Armenia reduce to minimum Russian capabilities in the NCMD and LenMD. It turns out that the Treaty limitations lay obstacles to the steps towards strengthening stability and security in this region.

I'm convinced that this problem could be solved. Having signed the Treaty State Parties accepted the flank-zone limitation for the USSR which by far exeed the flank-zone limits for Russia. I don't see any serious political-military reasons for the preservation of these limits after fundamental changes which took place in the plst-Soviet space.

The settlement of this problem will contribute to strengthening of accord in the Russian society in favor of increased cooperation with the CSCE partners in consolidating stability and security, thus expanding the basis for future measures in arms control.

We can't let ourselfs to delay the solution of the flank problem and put it under the table. Right now it's necessary to clarify this issue in order to choose the optimal configuration of Russian defense capabilities and prepare military and social infrastructure for the troops. I believe that agreements which will fully take into account the interests of security of Russia and of course its neigbour states can be reached this year during regular session of joint consultative group on the CFE Treaty. The Russian delegation will have al the necessary powers for that.

Proceeding from close interrelation betwen the national security of each CFE Treaty State Party and security of Europe at large, I count on Your understanding and constructive cooperation of our delegations in Vienna.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

September 17, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11/21/93 dh

November 20, 1993

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake seeking your approval of a draft letter to President Yeltsin responding to a letter he wrote in September on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. In essence, Yeltsin seeks support for modifying the Treaty's limits on military equipment in the "flank zone" -- a suggestion our NATO allies oppose.

Tony recommends that you approve the letter at this time so that it will be ready for transmission after consultations with our allies.

Approve (✓) Disapprove ( ) Discuss ( )
letter

DDS
Todd Stern

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.05]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11/21/93 05

November 20, 1993

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Approve (✓) Disapprove ( ) Discuss ( )
letter

DPS
Todd Stern

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.06]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
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FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(2.07)
KBH 1/2/2025

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

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NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

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BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

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AS YOU KNOW, THIS MONTH MARKS THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) AND THE END OF THE FIRST CFE EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS PHASE. ON THE OCCASION OF THIS IMPORTANT MILESTONE, I WANTED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY BOTH TO EXAMINE HOW THE TREATY IS FUNCTIONING AND TO ADDRESS THE POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME ON THE SUBJECT OF CFE.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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SINCERELY,

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BILL

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END TEXT
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.08)
KBH 1/2/2025

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23-Nov-1993 11:53 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: John R. Beyrle
(BEYRLE)

SUBJECT: green light on CFE letter

Bill Wood called me from Brussels 11/23 to report that the HLTF discussion of our letter to Yeltsin on CFE Flanks couldn't have gone better. The UK, France, and Germany all supported both the thrust of the letter as we outlined it in the meeting and our decision to send it soon. The Turks were also supportive -- they had said earlier in the meeting that it was up to each state to decide how to respond to Yeltsin, and so they were in no position to object when Bill announced what we planned to do.

The Turks say now they want to "consult" with us on the text of their own letter. At the HLTF, Bill was asked to read off our outline points at drafting speed; he noted that this was a summary of the text, not the actual words, but obviously Allies will draft their letters to parallel ours.

Bob, I recommend that we now remove the "hold" we had put on the letter and get it moving forward today so that it can go out tomorrow or Thursday at the latest. A number of allies asked us to let them know when the letter is sent, but some may not wait to find out. Thus, to ensure that our response leads the pack, it needs to move fast. I leave this in your hands; let me know if there is anything I can do to help in Anne's absence. I will work with her on instructions to Kornblum when she gets back.

Distribution:

FOR:	Robert G. Bell	(BELL)
FOR:	Anne A. Witkowsky	(WITKOWSKY)
CC:	Records	(RECORDS)
CC:	R. Nicholas Burns	(BURNS)
CC:	Rose E. Gottemoeller	(GOTTEMOELLER)
CC:	John R. Beyrle	(BEYRLE)

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(2.09)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1993

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11/21/93 ab

13:33

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Yeltsin letter on CFE

Purpose

Attached for your approval is a draft response to President Yeltsin's September 17 letter on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). We believe the end of the first twelve-month CFE equipment reductions phase (November 17) provides a fortuitous opportunity to reply since it allows us to emphasize the theme that the Treaty has been a success and its integrity should be upheld. In the proposed reply, we remind the Russians of the value we place on the Treaty's full implementation and reiterate the view that the proper forum for dealing with the issue Yeltsin has raised in his letter is the Vienna Joint Consultative Group (JCG), where all 30 Treaty Parties are represented.

Before sending the letter, we want to preview it with our Allies in Brussels, in keeping with the practice of Allied consultations on this issue. After many of our NATO Allies received similar Yeltsin letters in September, we decided collectively that it would be better not to answer then than to rush back to Yeltsin with an essentially negative response, which might have complicated his relations with the military leaders who have been pushing this issue. In the intervening weeks Yeltsin appears to have stabilized his relationship with his military somewhat, and we do not believe a further delay in responding would be warranted. If we are to send the letter as recommended, we must have it approved now, then held for transmission after allied consultations.

Background

In Yeltsin's September 17 letter he argued in detail that CFE Treaty limits on equipment in the "flank zone" are a vestige of the Cold War which mandate a maldistribution of Russian forces and prevent Russia from adequately addressing instability in the Caucasus. While affirming his commitment to CFE's full implementation, Yeltsin seeks support for modifying or eliminating the flank zone limits this fall, with further review at the end of 1995 when reductions of Treaty Limited Equipment (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) will be complete.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

Among NATO Allies there is consensus to reject Russian efforts to eliminate the flank ceiling, mainly in order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty but also to retain the stabilizing effects of a cap on forces in the Black Sea region. Some Allies -- notably the Turks and Norwegians -- see the flank limit as crucial to their security, and all agree on the importance of fulfilling CFE commitments. In NATO discussions, Allies have agreed that the best strategy for dealing with Russia's demands is to engage Russia in the JCG.

We should continue to handle this issue in the JCG. There, the multiple viewpoints of Parties can be brought to bear on the question of flank limits, and we can strive to address the issue on a technical, rather than a political level. The best way to handle the issue at the January Moscow summit (recognizing that we can expect Yeltsin to bring it up) is to ensure that you can point to work in progress in the JCG.

RECOMMENDATION

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Approve Disapprove

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Tab B Letter from President Yeltsin

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

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NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.10)
KBH 1/2/2025

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SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.11]

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ceilings. I proceed from the assumption that such joint deliberations could in essence become a part of negotiations on harmonization of the obligations of the CSCE member states in the area of security.

At the same time there is an issue which brooks no delay. This is the issue of the flank zone limitations. As you are aware, the redistribution of obligations of the former Soviet Union among the successor-states resulted in a shift in the proportions of levels fro Russia in the "extended Central Europe" zone and the flank zone to the disadvantage of the latter. From the overall level of 6400 tanks, 11480 armored combat vehicles and 6415 pieces of artillery Russia can deploy in regular units in the flank zone in Leningrad Military District (LenMD) and the North Caucuses Military District (NCMD) not more that 700 tanks, 580 armored combat vehicles and 1280 pieces of artillery. But these two military districts cover more that half of the European part of the territory of Russia.

This disbalance contradicts the basic principle of equality in rights and obligations as well as the principle of taking into account the security interests of all State Parties. Preservation of the current structure of flank-zone limitations is leading to the situation when some can deploy troops where they want to, while others can not do it in the regions where such a deployment is vital for securing defensive capacity and solving social problems.

Principle political acuteness of this problem lies in the fact that the configuration and levels of the flank-zone limitations oblige Russia to concentrate its main contingents of its conventional forces in the Baltic region and along the border with Belarus and Ukraine. In essence this situation leads to the regeneration of balance structure of the Cold War along the West-East line. this, as I strongly believe, runs conter to the goals of the Treaty and of Europe.

As the President of Russia I am deeply concern about extremely tense situation in the Southern region. Instability in the Caucuses and adjacent regions as well as the presence of serious "non-European" risks, growth of separatism and fundamentalism demand considerable military presence of Russia in the South - in NCMD - not only from its security standpoint but also in order to prevent destabilization of the situation in the border European context. One cannot exclude such a development when Russia for the seke of peace and security will be forced to make decisions which are not in line with the flank-zone limitations. Thus we face a real threat of the destabilization of the Treaty due to the situation in the South part

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of the area of application. But our policy of principle is not to weaken but to strengthen the Treaty.

I would like to drow your attention to the fact that steps taken by Russia jointly with other states in order to alleviate the situation in the Southern flank and to prevent splashes of confrontation there reaffirm once again the archaic nature of the flank-zone limitations. I confine muself to two examples: the implementation of the Treaty concerning the Black Sea Fleet, which we signed together with the president of ukraine, and the realization of the future agreement about deployment of Russian troops in Armenia reduce to minimum Russian capabilities in the NCMD and LenMD. It turns out that the Treaty limitations lay obstacles to the steps towards strengthening stability and security in this region.

I'm convinced that this problem could be solved. Having signed the Treaty State Parties accepted the flank-zone limitation for the USSR which by far exeed the flank-zone limits for Russia. I don't see any serious political-military reasons for the preservation of these limits after fundamental changes which took place in the plst-Soviet space.

The settlement of this problem will contribute to strengthening of accord in the Russian society in favor of increased cooperation with the CSCE partners in consolidating stability and security, thus expanding the basis for future measures in arms control.

We can't let ourselfs to delay the solution of the flank problem and put it under the table. Right now it's necessary to clarify this issue in order to choose the optimal configuration of Russian defense capabilities and prepare military and social infrastructure for the troops. I believe that agreements which will fully take into account the interests of security of Russia and of course its neigbour states can be reached this year during regular session of joint consultative group on the CFE Treaty. The Russian delegation will have al the necessary powers for that.

Proceeding from close interrelation betwen the national security of each CFE Treaty State Party and security of Europe at large, I count on Your understanding and constructive cooperation of our delegations in Vienna.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

September 17, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(2.12)
KBH 1/2/2025

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS:

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

AS YOU KNOW, THIS MONTH MARKS THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) AND THE END OF THE FIRST CFE EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS PHASE. ON THE OCCASION OF THIS IMPORTANT MILESTONE, I WANTED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY BOTH TO EXAMINE HOW THE TREATY IS FUNCTIONING AND TO ADDRESS THE POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME ON THE SUBJECT OF CFE.

YOU AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT CFE IS A CORNERSTONE FOR THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW EUROPE -- A FOUNDATION FOR A NEW PARTNERSHIP AMONG ITS PARTIES. THE VALUE OF THE TREATY LIES FIRST IN ITS BASIC PROVISIONS, AND MORE GENERALLY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREDICTABILITY AMONG ITS PARTIES. IT IS MAKING A KEY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN EUROPE IN A PERIOD OF TREMENDOUS CHANGE.

WE ALSO SHARE A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO SUCCESSFUL CFE IMPLEMENTATION. IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES AFFECTING THIS PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION, RUSSIA'S EFFORTS TO MEET ITS REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN THIS FIRST PHASE TANGIBLY DEMONSTRATE THE STRENGTH OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY.

OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS, APPROXIMATELY 17,000 PIECES OF HEAVY WEAPONRY HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY CFE PARTIES AND HUNDREDS OF INSPECTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. BUT MUCH WORK REMAINS. AS WE PRESS AHEAD, WE MUST KEEP IMPLEMENTATION ON TRACK AND STRIVE TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER CFE. EVERY TREATY PARTY HAS A STAKE IN SEEING OUR PROGRESS CONTINUE.

FOR THIS REASON, WE ARE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CONCERNS YOU HAVE RAISED WITH RESPECT TO FLANK ZONE LIMITS. WE TAKE THESE CONCERNS VERY SERIOUSLY. WE THEREFORE WELCOME YOUR CALL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE AMONG OUR JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP (JCG) DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA. WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR CHIEF NEGOTIATOR THERE TO EXPLORE YOUR CONCERNS. INITIAL EXCHANGES AT THE EXPERT LEVEL HAVE ALREADY HELPED US BETTER UNDERSTAND THE RUSSIAN POSITION AND ARE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.

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WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS IN THE JCG WHERE THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ARE REPRESENTED AND CAN SHARE IN THESE EXCHANGES. OUR COMMON GOAL, AS YOU STATED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, MUST BE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE TREATY. FOR THAT REASON, THE DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA SHOULD FOCUS ON WAYS TO WORK WITHIN THE TREATY TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD WE RISK UNRAVELING THIS AGREEMENT FOR WHICH WE HAVE WORKED SO HARD.

ONE OF THE CHIEF ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CFE TREATY WAS TO BALANCE THE SECURITY NEEDS OF ALL ITS SIGNATORIES, WHILE PRECLUDING THE DESTABILIZING BUILDUP OF FORCES IN ANY REGION. AS YOU OBSERVED IN YOUR LETTER, MUCH HAS CHANGED ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT SINCE THE CFE TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED AND SIGNED. OUR EARLIER SUCCESSES IN ADAPTING THE TREATY TO THESE NEW REALITIES DEMONSTRATE THE HIGH VALUE THAT ALL PARTIES PLACE ON THIS HISTORIC DOCUMENT, AND LEAVE US HOPEFUL THAT RUSSIA'S CONCERNS CAN ALSO BE RESOLVED FAIRLY, IN THE SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AMONG OUR DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL 8615

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.13)
KBH 1/2/2025

November 17, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL RGB

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY AW

SUBJECT: Response to Yeltsin letter on CFE

Attached for your approval is a draft response from the President to President Yeltsin's September 17 letter on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). We believe the end of the first twelve-month CFE equipment reductions phase (November 17) provides a fortuitous opportunity to reply since it allows us to emphasize the theme that the Treaty has been a success and its integrity should be upheld. In the proposed reply, we remind the Russians of the value we place on the Treaty's full implementation and reiterate the view that the proper forum for dealing with the issue Yeltsin has raised in his letter is the Vienna Joint Consultative Group (JCG), where all Treaty Parties are present.

The proposed letter has been informally coordinated both in Bob's IWG and with Strobe's office. Before sending the letter, we want to preview it with our Allies in Brussels, in keeping with the practice of Allied consultations on this issue. You will recall that after many of our NATO Allies received similar Yeltsin letters in September, we decided ~~collectively~~ that it would be better not to answer them than to give Yeltsin an immediate negative reply. In the intervening weeks Yeltsin appears to have stabilized his relationship with his military somewhat, and we do not believe a further delay in responding would be warranted. If we are to send the letter as recommended, we must have it approved this week, then held for transmission until November 26.

Background

The attached draft is a response to Yeltsin's September 17 letter in which he argued in detail that the CFE Treaty's limits on equipment in the "flank zone" are a vestige of the Cold War which mandate a maldistribution of Russian forces and prevent Russia from adequately addressing instability in the Caucasus. While affirming his commitment to CFE's full implementation, Yeltsin seeks support for modifying or eliminating the flank zone limits now, with further Treaty review at the end of 1995.

Among NATO Allies there is consensus to reject Russian efforts to eliminate the flank ceiling, mainly in order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty but also to retain the stabilizing

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effects of a cap on forces in the Black Sea region. While some Allies -- notably the Turks and Norwegians -- see the flank limit as crucial to their security, all agree on the importance of fulfilling all CFE commitments. In NATO discussions, Allies have agreed that the best strategy for dealing with Russia's demands is to engage Russia in the JCG.

Preliminary exchanges in the JCG on the question of removing flank zone limits, as proposed there by the Russians, have been underway for several weeks. Belarus, Armenia, and Ukraine have supported the Russian proposals. Through those discussions we are trying to ascertain more specifically the amount of additional headroom the Russians are seeking, and why the Treaty cannot accommodate their needs.

In the meanwhile, the Russians continue to raise the issue with us on a bilateral basis. On October 22, Secretary Christopher told Kozyrev in Moscow that the U.S. would like to be responsive to Russian concerns on CFE, but not to the point of reopening the Treaty. U.S. officials subsequently made a similar point in Kiev, in response to high-level Ukrainian statements that the flank limits posed economic, political, and security concerns for them.

A November 2 meeting of the Arms Control IWG agreed that we should continue to handle this issue in the JCG. There, the multiple viewpoints of Parties can be brought to bear on the question of flank limits, and we can strive to address the issue on a technical, rather than a political level. Any high-level bilateral U.S./Russian discussions that sought to resolve this issue at this time (as opposed to agreeing on a forum and procedure for addressing it) would put us squarely between the Russians and our Allies, in particular, the Turks and Norwegians. At the same time we do not want to complicate the already settled NATO summit agenda with the CFE issue, which could not be resolved then even if we wanted to. Since Allies will be nervous about the two Presidents meeting in Moscow immediately thereafter, the IWG has agreed that the best way to handle the issue at the January Moscow summit (recognizing that we can expect Yeltsin to bring it up) is to ensure that the President can point to work in progress in the JCG.

For now, we also should continue to point the Russians to the flexibility within the Treaty as the best way to accommodate their stated need for additional equipment in the southern region. This position is consistent with that which we have taken to this point.

Concurrences by: John Beyrle (In draft) and Jane Holl (In draft)

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the draft response to the President at TAB I, for approval this week.

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Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Response to Yeltsin
Tab B Letter from Yeltsin

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Copy to Foley

Translated from Russia

8655

Dear Bill:

I would like to tell you that after the tragic events in Moscow of the past days life in our capital and in the country is getting back to normal. We firmly intend to pursue the course of democratic reform.

Concerning topical international developments, let me say that I was very interested to learn about the series of proposals you made at the UN General Assembly concerning the pressing issue of enhancing the measures on the non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Steps in this direction are a priority of the Russian foreign policy as well.

One of the most effective measures to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and achieve nuclear disarmament would be to conclude a multilateral agreement banning the production of the weapon-grade fissile materials. Your proposals in this regard are essentially identical to the Russian position. Last January we already declared that the Russian weapon-grade plutonium-producing industrial rectors will be closed down until the year 2000 with some of them to be decomissioned under an accelerated schedule. We already discontinued production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes in 1989.

We reiterate our willingness to begin substantive negotiations at the Disarmament Conference on developing a multilateral agreement on a controlled cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissile materials. In these talks (involving, of course, all nuclear powers) we could agree that all nuclear states would place their weapon - grade materials released as a results of elimination and reduction

His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.14]

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of nuclear weapons under international control - under the IAEA auspices. In the interest of transparency we are ready to exchange data on the quantities of such materials and related storage facilities. We are prepared to cooperate with the US and other countries in implementing such measures as containing the process of building up excessive stockpiles of fissile materials, and over time, reducing these stockpiles worldwide and vigorously countering the reprocessing of old nuclear fuels and enriched uranium in unstable regions where there is a high risk of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons.

An initial discussion of the whole range of these issues could be conducted both on a bilateral basis - for example, within the framework of the dialogue on strategic stability, - and at the Geneva meeting of representative of the five nuclear powers.

I am confident that international efforts in the above areas can make a real contribution to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on the production of weapon-grade fissile materials.

Sincerely,

Boris Yeltsin

October 9, 1993
Moscow, Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы сообщить, что после трагических событий в Москве жизнь в нашей столице и в стране возвращается в нормальное русло. Намерены и далее решительно идти курсом демократических преобразований.

Касаясь актуальных международных дел, хочу отметить, что с интересом ознакомился с комплексом выдвинутых Вами на сессии Генассамблеи ООН предложений по злободневной проблеме укрепления мер нераспространения оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки. Шаги в этом направлении являются приоритетом и российской внешней политики.

Одной из наиболее эффективных мер на пути к предотвращению расползания ядерного оружия, а также к ядерному разоружению является заключение многостороннего соглашения о запрещении производства оружейных расщепляющихся материалов. Ваши предложения на этот счет совпадают с существом российской позиции. В январе прошлого года мы уже заявили, что российские промышленные реакторы по наработке оружейного плутония будут остановлены до 2000 года, причем некоторые из них - по ускоренному графику. Производство высокообогащенного урана для военных целей прекращено нами в 1989 году.

Подтверждаем нашу готовность начать на конференции по разоружению предметные переговоры по разработке многостороннего соглашения относительно контролируемого прекращения производства оружейных расщепляющихся материалов. На таких переговорах (разумеется, с участием всех ядерных держав) можно было бы условиться и о поставке всеми ядерными державами под международный контроль - под эгидой МАГАТЭ - оружейных материалов, высвобождающихся в результате уничтожения и сокращения ядерного оружия. В интересах транспарентности мы готовы к обмену данными о количестве таких материалов и объектах их хранения. Готовы сотрудничать с США и с другими странами в

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.15]

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осуществлении таких мер, как сдерживание накопления чрезмерных запасов расщепляющихся материалов, а со временем - и уменьшения этих запасов в мировом масштабе, активное противодействие переработке устаревшего ядерного топлива и обогащенного урана в нестабильных регионах с высоким риском бесконтрольного распространения ядерного оружия.

Предварительное обсуждение всего комплекса этих вопросов можно было бы провести как на двусторонней основе, например в рамках диалога по стратегической стабильности, так и на встречах представителе пяти ядерных держав в Женеве.

Уверен, что международные усилия на упомянутых направлениях могут реально способствовать достижению полного запрещения производств оружейных расщепляющихся материалов.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

9 октября 1993 года
Москва, Кремль

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.16)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11/29/93

November 29, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin on Ukrainian START Ratification

President Yeltsin has sent you a letter (Tab A) outlining his grave concern at the Ukrainian Parliament's action on START I and the Lisbon Protocol. He calls it an "extremely destructive decision" by the Parliament and warns against a widening "belt of nuclear instability". He appeals to you, in parallel with him, to bring your concerns to the Ukrainian government and to ask President Kravchuk for an assessment of how he, Kravchuk, plans to remedy the situation. Since you will be telephoning President Kravchuk on Monday morning to make these very points, it will be useful for you to read Yeltsin's letter prior to that call.

Although Yeltsin stresses that the Ukrainian Parliament's action has wiped out various agreements and compromises on the nuclear question, he is evidently willing to continue working toward a solution to the problem. The solution that the Russians and Ukrainians have concentrated on since they met at Massandra in September involves trading a firm timetable for withdrawal of the weapons (24 months is the Russian proposal) for an agreement on compensating the Ukrainians for the value of the nuclear materials in the weapons on Ukrainian territory. Yeltsin mentions this solution in his letter, so he does not appear to be abandoning the effort to negotiate with the Ukrainians. We will continue to work with both the Ukrainians and the Russians, especially on the compensation issue.

You should know that of the points that Yeltsin criticizes, the Parliament's decision to reject Article V of the Lisbon Protocol is the most serious, because it rejects Ukraine's commitment to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the earliest possible time. The Parliament's declaration that only 36 percent of nuclear delivery vehicles and 42 percent of warheads will be destroyed, while serious, seems to be mitigated by an accompanying statement that Ukraine can eliminate additional delivery vehicles and warheads (presumably up to 100 percent).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In your call to President Kravchuk, you will be asking him to clarify how he expects to remedy the problem caused by the Parliament's rejection of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol. You will also express strong concern about the Parliament's action, which you can communicate in your response to President Yeltsin.

Attachment
Tab A Letter from President Yeltsin

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2015-0815-M-1 (2.17)
KBH 1/2/2025

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Nov-1993 21:48 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON

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SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI BELL BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER PONEMAN POTTS SUM2
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<SUBJ>
YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON
UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 037050
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UA, RS
SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON
UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON CONCERNING THE UKRAINIAN RADA'S RATIFICATION OF START 1 WITH CONDITIONS. THE LETTER, WHICH IS DATED NOVEMBER 25, WAS GIVEN TO THE AMBASSADOR BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV NOVEMBER 26. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/ISCA.
3. BEGIN TEXT. NOVEMBER 25, 1993
NO. PR-1750
MOSCOW, KREMLIN

DEAR BILL,

I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTREMELY DESTRUCTIVE DECISION OF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE START 1 AGREEMENT.

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WHAT I HAVE IN MIND ARE THE NUMEROUS AMENDMENTS WHICH WERE ADOPTED BY THE RADA IN THE COURSE OF CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION, AND WHICH REVOLVE AROUND THE NON-OBLIGATION OF UKRAINE IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THIS HAS WIPED OUT THOSE COMPROMISES, AND FRANKLY SPEAKING, CONCESSIONS, WHICH, WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, WERE MADE IN RECENT TIMES IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THE UKRAINIAN SIDE TO FULFILL ITS OWN PROMISES, WHICH WERE RECORDED BOTH ON A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL BASIS, INCLUDING IN THE LISBON PROTOCOL, THE CORRESPONDING DECISIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CIS, AND THE MASSANDRA AGREEMENT.
THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP SAW THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR AMBITIONS IN THE PART OF WELL-KNOWN FORCES IN UKRAINE. WE WARNED THE WORLD COMMUNITY ABOUT THIS, OPENLY SPOKE UP AGAINST ANY WEAKENING ON A MATTER OF SUCH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE AMBITIONS WON THE DAY IN THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT. NUCLEAR ARMS HAVE BEEN DECLARED STATE PROPERTY OF UKRAINE; REFUSAL TO DESTROY ALL OF THE NUCLEAR-ARMED MISSILE ARSENAL LOCATED ON ITS TERRITORY (ONLY 36 PERCENT OF ITS MISSILE DELIVERY VEHICLES (RAKETONOSITELI), AND 42 PERCENT OF ITS WARHEADS) HAS BEEN DECLARED; ARTICLE 5 OF THE LISBON PROTOCOL CONCERNING UKRAINE'S OBLIGATION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR STATE WAS REJECTED.
WE SERIOUSLY FEAR THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION TAKEN WILL BE FELT IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. IT THREATENS THE BASIS FOR THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, WHICH IS ALREADY CORRODED BY THE WELL-KNOWN ACTIONS OF NORTH KOREA, WITH THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NEAR-NUCLEAR STATES. KAZAKHSTAN WILL ALSO ACT WITH AN EYE ON UKRAINE, REFUSING TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO RUSSIAN TERRITORY, AND ALSO ATTEMPTING TO DECLARE THEM ITS PROPERTY. FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING, THE "BELT OF NUCLEAR INSTABILITY" IS WIDENING IN THE WORLD, ENCOMPASSING NEW REGIONS WITH INCREASED VIOLENCE AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY.
IT ALSO CALLS INTO QUESTION THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE HISTORIC AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE START ONE AND TWO AGREEMENTS.
IN A WORD, WE CONSIDER THAT A GREAT BLOW HAS BEEN DEALT TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AS A WHOLE. THESE CONCLUSIONS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT BUT BE SHARED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE.
IN THESE CONDITIONS, IN OUR OPINION, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO COORDINATE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SITUATION FROM BECOMING IRREVERSIBLE.
FIRST OF ALL, IT IS NECESSARY, IN PARALLEL, FOR US TO

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BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP OUR CONCERNS. THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE IS MANEUVERING, TRYING TO DISTANCE ITSELF IN WORDS FROM THE DECISION OF THE RADA, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT SPEAKING OUT AGAINST IT. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND PRINCIPLED ASSESSMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KRAVCHUK OF THE PARLIAMENT'S DECISION, AND RADICAL MEASURES (SHOULD BE) TAKEN TO CORRECT THE SITUATION.

I AM READY TO APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE AND AMONG OTHER THINGS TELL HIM THAT WE CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE AS CONTRADICTING THE INTERESTS OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 037050

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UA, RS
SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY

COUNTRIES. I AM ALSO READY TO BRING TO KIEV'S ATTENTION THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CALL INTO QUESTION THE MEASURES OF PROPRIETARY MONITORING (AVTORSKIY NADZOR) AND SERVICING GUARANTEES FOR THE NUCLEAR ARMS LOCATED ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY SINCE RUSSIA ITSELF WOULD BE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOW BEEN CREATED, IN THE ROLE OF A VIOLATOR OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. WE EXPECT THAT CONFIRMATION OF UKRAINIAN CONFIRMATION OF ITS READINESS TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING, BY JANUARY 1, 1994, A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA WITHIN A TWENTY-FOUR MONTH PERIOD, INCLUDING THE ACCELERATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS OF THE MOST MODERN SS 24 MISSILES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING UKRAINE WITH PROCESSED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR ENERGY NEEDS.

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE URGENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE THREE STATES DEPOSITORIES OF THE NPT AND ALSO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE GOAL OF DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED, AND DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT SITUATION, TO TAKE APPROPRIATE DECISIONS AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. IT WOULD ALSO BE WORTHWHILE TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA MECHANISM, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

I HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE SUPPORTS SUCH AN APPROACH.

BILL, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THIS VERY SENSITIVE QUESTION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS STILL AN OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT AN IRREVOCABLE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS ACCORDING TO THE

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WORST SCENARIO.
WITH RESPECT.
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FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOB
FOR: ANDREASEN@A1@OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **CONFIDENTIAL** 9446

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.18)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1993

93 DEC 3 AM : 34

ACTION

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12/03/93 bpm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Response to President Yeltsin on Ukraine's Action on START

Purpose

To respond to President Yeltsin's November 25 letter to you concerning the Ukrainian Parliament's action on START I and the Lisbon Protocol.

Background

President Yeltsin sent you a letter (Tab B) expressing his grave concern at the Ukrainian Parliament's vote to ratify START I but reject Ukraine's commitment to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the earliest possible time. In his letter, Yeltsin appealed to you to bring your concerns, in parallel with him, to the Ukrainian government and to ask President Kravchuk for an assessment of how he, Kravchuk, plans to remedy the situation.

In your response to Yeltsin, you report on your November 29 telephone call to President Kravchuk in which you both brought your concerns to his attention and heard his remedy: resubmission of the START I/Lisbon Protocol package to the new Parliament that is to be elected in March. You also describe your conversation with Kravchuk about deactivation of the SS-24 missiles in Ukraine and stress to Yeltsin the importance of continuing to work with the Ukrainian government to bring about progress in this and other key areas of our denuclearization agenda. You take special note of our efforts to help resolve the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over compensation for the value of the nuclear materials in weapons in Ukraine by the time Vice President Gore visits Moscow in mid-December. This dispute is the last barrier to implementation of the deal on highly enriched uranium (HEU).

President Yeltsin asked in his letter that the United States join in urgent consultations about Ukraine among the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the three depositories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because of President Kravchuk's pledge to resubmit START I and the Lisbon Protocol, you advise Yeltsin that you believe such action would not be productive at this time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **CONFIDENTIAL**

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve for transmission the letter at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO PASS TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV DURING THEIR MEETING ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3.

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 25, IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED YOUR DEEP CONCERN AT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE START I TREATY AND LISBON PROTOCOL. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN -- THE PARLIAMENT'S VOTE REPUDIATES WHAT WE ARE WORKING TO ACCOMPLISH THROUGH THE LISBON PROTOCOL: THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE AND ITS ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. I HAVE ALSO BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE OTHER CONDITIONS THAT THE PARLIAMENT PLACED ON ITS RATIFICATION OF START I. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE ACTIONS IMPOSE SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS AGAINST BRINGING THE START TREATY INTO FORCE.

I TELEPHONED PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ON NOVEMBER 29 TO TELL HIM IN A FRANK WAY OF MY CONCERN ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS. I ALSO WANTED TO ASK HIM DIRECTLY WHAT REMEDY HE WOULD PROPOSE TO ADDRESS THE PARLIAMENT'S UNACCEPTABLE ACTION ON START I AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL. IN HIS RESPONSE, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK WAS CLEARLY CRITICAL OF THE PARLIAMENT'S VOTE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE PLANS TO RESUBMIT START I AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL AS A COMPLETE PACKAGE FOR A NEW VOTE BY THE PARLIAMENT THAT WILL BE SEATED FOLLOWING ELECTIONS IN MARCH. HE EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM AND ASKED FOR SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT SIT STILL IN THE MEANTIME; WE MUST WORK TOGETHER, YOU AND I, TO PRESS FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS. IN THIS REGARD, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK PLEDGED TO CONTINUE WORKING TO DEACTIVATE ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, ESPECIALLY THE SS-24 INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN NOTING THAT THE PARLIAMENT'S ACTION HAS GIVEN HIM SOME FLEXIBILITY TO PROCEED WITH SS-24 DEACTIVATION, HE STATED THAT UKRAINE IS DEACTIVATING THE 115TH REGIMENT OF THE 46TH SRF DIVISION AT PERVOMAYSK AND IS READY TO PROCEED TO DEACTIVATE A SECOND REGIMENT.

BORIS, THE SITUATION IS STILL FAR FROM CLEAR WITH REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR FORCES IN UKRAINE -- WE WILL WATCH CLOSELY AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOUR SIDE CAN PROVIDE ABOUT THE STATUS OF FORCES. AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH YOU AND THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT TO FIND A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION TO THIS SET OF PROBLEMS, BEGINNING WITH THE PROBLEM OF COMPENSATING UKRAINE FOR THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE WEAPONS RETURNED TO RUSSIA FOR ELIMINATION. YOUR SPECIALISTS, AS WELL AS THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT, HAVE BEEN EXAMINING OUR PROPOSALS FOR MOVING FORWARD ON THIS COMPENSATION QUESTION, AND I HOPE THAT WE CAN COME TO A RESOLUTION OF IT BY THE TIME VICE PRESIDENT GORE MEETS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IN MOSCOW IN MID-DECEMBER. YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER TO RESOLVE THE HEU ISSUE, AND I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD COME TO AGREEMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.19)
KBH 1/2/2025

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I ALSO EXPECT, BASED ON WHAT I UNDERSTAND OF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT'S ACTION, THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK WILL NOW HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY TO WORK ON THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPING A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. AS WE MOVE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE COMPENSATION ISSUE, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN RESOLUTION OF THE TIMETABLE ISSUE, IF BOTH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WOULD FIND IT USEFUL. WE WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED AT MASSANDRA. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH THE UKRAINIANS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. I WOULD EXPECT THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WILL AID YOUR OWN EFFORTS, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF OUR PROGRESS.

YOU ALSO SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME THAT WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE URGENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE THREE DEPOSITORIES OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO DISCUSS THE UKRAINIAN SITUATION. WHILE I ABSOLUTELY AGREE WITH THE URGENCY OF THIS SITUATION, I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S PLEDGE TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE PARLIAMENT'S ACTION CREATES A SITUATION IN WHICH EXTENSIVE HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES WOULD NOT BE A PRODUCTIVE APPROACH AT THIS TIME. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT, IN MY VIEW, THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHOULD CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AS WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH UKRAINE ON THESE ISSUES. I PARTICULARLY LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR FURTHER REACTION TO OUR PROPOSALS ON THE COMPENSATION ISSUE.

THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING SERGEI FILATOV TO VISIT WASHINGTON. I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING HIM. AL GORE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MID-DECEMBER AND TO HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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KBH 1/2/2025

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Nov-1993 21:48 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON

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YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON
UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 037050
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UA, RS
SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON
UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON CONCERNING THE UKRAINIAN RADA'S RATIFICATION OF START 1 WITH CONDITIONS. THE LETTER, WHICH IS DATED NOVEMBER 25, WAS GIVEN TO THE AMBASSADOR BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV NOVEMBER 26. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/ISCA.
3. BEGIN TEXT. NOVEMBER 25, 1993
NO. PR-1750
MOSCOW, KREMLIN

DEAR BILL,
I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTREMELY DESTRUCTIVE DECISION OF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE START 1 AGREEMENT.

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WHAT I HAVE IN MIND ARE THE NUMEROUS AMENDMENTS WHICH WERE ADOPTED BY THE RADA IN THE COURSE OF CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION, AND WHICH REVOLVE AROUND THE NON-OBLIGATION OF UKRAINE IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THIS HAS WIPED OUT THOSE COMPROMISES, AND FRANKLY SPEAKING, CONCESSIONS, WHICH, WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, WERE MADE IN RECENT TIMES IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THE UKRAINIAN SIDE TO FULFILL ITS OWN PROMISES, WHICH WERE RECORDED BOTH ON A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL BASIS, INCLUDING IN THE LISBON PROTOCOL, THE CORRESPONDING DECISIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CIS, AND THE MASSANDRA AGREEMENT.
THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP SAW THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR AMBITIONS IN THE PART OF WELL-KNOWN FORCES IN UKRAINE. WE WARNED THE WORLD COMMUNITY ABOUT THIS, OPENLY SPOKE UP AGAINST ANY WEAKENING ON A MATTER OF SUCH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE AMBITIONS WON THE DAY IN THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT. NUCLEAR ARMS HAVE BEEN DECLARED STATE PROPERTY OF UKRAINE; REFUSAL TO DESTROY ALL OF THE NUCLEAR-ARMED MISSILE ARSENAL LOCATED ON ITS TERRITORY (ONLY 36 PERCENT OF ITS MISSILE DELIVERY VEHICLES (RAKETONOSITELI), AND 42 PERCENT OF ITS WARHEADS) HAS BEEN DECLARED; ARTICLE 5 OF THE LISBON PROTOCOL CONCERNING UKRAINE'S OBLIGATION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR STATE WAS REJECTED.
WE SERIOUSLY FEAR THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION TAKEN WILL BE FELT IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. IT THREATENS THE BASIS FOR THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, WHICH IS ALREADY CORRODED BY THE WELL-KNOWN ACTIONS OF NORTH KOREA, WITH THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NEAR-NUCLEAR STATES. KAZAKHSTAN WILL ALSO ACT WITH AN EYE ON UKRAINE, REFUSING TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO RUSSIAN TERRITORY, AND ALSO ATTEMPTING TO DECLARE THEM ITS PROPERTY. FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING, THE "BELT OF NUCLEAR INSTABILITY" IS WIDENING IN THE WORLD, ENCOMPASSING NEW REGIONS WITH INCREASED VIOLENCE AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY.
IT ALSO CALLS INTO QUESTION THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE HISTORIC AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE START ONE AND TWO AGREEMENTS.
IN A WORD, WE CONSIDER THAT A GREAT BLOW HAS BEEN DEALT TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AS A WHOLE. THESE CONCLUSIONS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT BUT BE SHARED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE.
IN THESE CONDITIONS, IN OUR OPINION, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO COORDINATE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SITUATION FROM BECOMING IRREVERSIBLE.
FIRST OF ALL, IT IS NECESSARY, IN PARALLEL, FOR US TO

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP OUR CONCERNS. THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE IS MANEUVERING, TRYING TO DISTANCE ITSELF IN WORDS FROM THE DECISION OF THE RADA, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT SPEAKING OUT AGAINST IT. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND PRINCIPLED ASSESSMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KRAVCHUK OF THE PARLIAMENT'S DECISION, AND RADICAL MEASURES (SHOULD BE) TAKEN TO CORRECT THE SITUATION.

I AM READY TO APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE AND AMONG OTHER THINGS TELL HIM THAT WE CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE AS CONTRADICTING THE INTERESTS OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 037050

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UA, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY

COUNTRIES. I AM ALSO READY TO BRING TO KIEV'S ATTENTION THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CALL INTO QUESTION THE MEASURES OF PROPRIETARY MONITORING (AVTORSKIY NADZOR) AND SERVICING GUARANTEES FOR THE NUCLEAR ARMS LOCATED ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY SINCE RUSSIA ITSELF WOULD BE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOW BEEN CREATED, IN THE ROLE OF A VIOLATOR OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. WE EXPECT THAT CONFIRMATION OF UKRAINIAN CONFIRMATION OF ITS READINESS TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING, BY JANUARY 1, 1994, A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA WITHIN A TWENTY-FOUR MONTH PERIOD, INCLUDING THE ACCELERATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS OF THE MOST MODERN SS 24 MISSILES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING UKRAINE WITH PROCESSED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR ENERGY NEEDS.

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE URGENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE THREE STATES DEPOSITORIES OF THE NPT AND ALSO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE GOAL OF DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED, AND DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT SITUATION, TO TAKE APPROPRIATE DECISIONS AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. IT WOULD ALSO BE WORTHWHILE TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA MECHANISM, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

I HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE SUPPORTS SUCH AN APPROACH.

BILL, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THIS VERY SENSITIVE QUESTION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS STILL AN OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT AN IRREVOCABLE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS ACCORDING TO THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WORST SCENARIO.
WITH RESPECT.
B. YELTSIN. PICKERING
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FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOB
FOR: ANDREASEN@A1@OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9446

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.21)
KBH 1/2/2025

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Response to President Yeltsin on Ukraine's Action on START

Purpose

To respond to President Yeltsin's November 25 letter to you concerning the Ukrainian Parliament's action on START I and the Lisbon Protocol.

Background

President Yeltsin sent you a letter (Tab B) expressing his grave concern at the Ukrainian Parliament's vote to ratify START I but reject Ukraine's commitment to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the earliest possible time. In his letter, Yeltsin appealed to you to bring your concerns, in parallel with him, to the Ukrainian government and to ask President Kravchuk for an assessment of how he, Kravchuk, plans to remedy the situation.

In your response to Yeltsin, you report on your November 29 telephone call to President Kravchuk in which you both brought your concerns to his attention and heard his remedy: resubmission of the START I/Lisbon Protocol package to the new Parliament that is to be elected in March. You also describe your conversation with Kravchuk about deactivation of the SS-24 missiles in Ukraine and stress to Yeltsin the importance of continuing to work with the Ukrainian government to bring about progress in this and other key areas of our denuclearization agenda. You take special note of our efforts to help resolve the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over compensation for the value of the nuclear materials in weapons in Ukraine by the time Vice President Gore visits Moscow in mid-December. This dispute is the last barrier to implementation of the deal on highly enriched uranium (HEU).

President Yeltsin asked in his letter that the United States join in urgent consultations about Ukraine among the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the three depositories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because of President Kravchuk's pledge to resubmit START I and the Lisbon Protocol, you advise Yeltsin that you believe such action would not be productive at this time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve for transmission the letter at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter

per phone call to Kristie Kenney from Will Stock the President has authorized transmission of message

12/4

Stock

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO PASS TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV DURING THEIR MEETING ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3.

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 25, IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED YOUR DEEP CONCERN AT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE START I TREATY AND LISBON PROTOCOL. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN -- THE PARLIAMENT'S VOTE REPUDIATES WHAT WE ARE WORKING TO ACCOMPLISH THROUGH THE LISBON PROTOCOL: THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE AND ITS ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. I HAVE ALSO BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE OTHER CONDITIONS THAT THE PARLIAMENT PLACED ON ITS RATIFICATION OF START I. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE ACTIONS IMPOSE SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS AGAINST BRINGING THE START TREATY INTO FORCE.

I TELEPHONED PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ON NOVEMBER 29 TO TELL HIM IN A FRANK WAY OF MY CONCERN ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS. I ALSO WANTED TO ASK HIM DIRECTLY WHAT REMEDY HE WOULD PROPOSE TO ADDRESS THE PARLIAMENT'S UNACCEPTABLE ACTION ON START I AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL. IN HIS RESPONSE, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK WAS CLEARLY CRITICAL OF THE PARLIAMENT'S VOTE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE PLANS TO RESUBMIT START I AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL AS A COMPLETE PACKAGE FOR A NEW VOTE BY THE PARLIAMENT THAT WILL BE SEATED FOLLOWING ELECTIONS IN MARCH. HE EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM AND ASKED FOR SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT SIT STILL IN THE MEANTIME; WE MUST WORK TOGETHER, YOU AND I, TO PRESS FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS. IN THIS REGARD, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK PLEDGED TO CONTINUE WORKING TO DEACTIVATE ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, ESPECIALLY THE SS-24 INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN NOTING THAT THE PARLIAMENT'S ACTION HAS GIVEN HIM SOME FLEXIBILITY TO PROCEED WITH SS-24 DEACTIVATION, HE STATED THAT UKRAINE IS DEACTIVATING THE 115TH REGIMENT OF THE 46TH SRF DIVISION AT PERVOMAYSK AND IS READY TO PROCEED TO DEACTIVATE A SECOND REGIMENT.

BORIS, THE SITUATION IS STILL FAR FROM CLEAR WITH REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR FORCES IN UKRAINE -- WE WILL WATCH CLOSELY AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOUR SIDE CAN PROVIDE ABOUT THE STATUS OF FORCES. AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH YOU AND THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT TO FIND A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION TO THIS SET OF PROBLEMS, BEGINNING WITH THE PROBLEM OF COMPENSATING UKRAINE FOR THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE WEAPONS RETURNED TO RUSSIA FOR ELIMINATION. YOUR SPECIALISTS, AS WELL AS THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT, HAVE BEEN EXAMINING OUR PROPOSALS FOR MOVING FORWARD ON THIS COMPENSATION QUESTION, AND I HOPE THAT WE CAN COME TO A RESOLUTION OF IT BY THE TIME VICE PRESIDENT GORE MEETS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IN MOSCOW IN MID-DECEMBER. YOU AND I AGREED IN VANCOUVER TO RESOLVE THE HEU ISSUE, AND I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD COME TO AGREEMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

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2015-0815-M-1 (2.22)
KBH 1/2/2025

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I ALSO EXPECT, BASED ON WHAT I UNDERSTAND OF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT'S ACTION, THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK WILL NOW HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY TO WORK ON THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPING A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. AS WE MOVE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE COMPENSATION ISSUE, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN RESOLUTION OF THE TIMETABLE ISSUE, IF BOTH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WOULD FIND IT USEFUL. WE WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED AT MASSANDRA. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH THE UKRAINIANS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. I WOULD EXPECT THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WILL AID YOUR OWN EFFORTS, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF OUR PROGRESS.

YOU ALSO SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME THAT WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE URGENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE THREE DEPOSITORIES OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO DISCUSS THE UKRAINIAN SITUATION. WHILE I ABSOLUTELY AGREE WITH THE URGENCY OF THIS SITUATION, I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S PLEDGE TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE PARLIAMENT'S ACTION CREATES A SITUATION IN WHICH EXTENSIVE HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES WOULD NOT BE A PRODUCTIVE APPROACH AT THIS TIME. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT, IN MY VIEW, THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHOULD CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AS WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH UKRAINE ON THESE ISSUES. I PARTICULARLY LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR FURTHER REACTION TO OUR PROPOSALS ON THE COMPENSATION ISSUE.

THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING SERGEI FILATOV TO VISIT WASHINGTON. I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING HIM. AL GORE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MID-DECEMBER AND TO HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.23)
KBH 1/2/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Nov-1993 21:48 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON

<DIST>
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT{C2} SODERBERG
SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI BELL BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER PONEMAN POTTS SUM2
WHSR_IN WHSR_SPECIAL
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IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
<TO>
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3003
<SUBJ>
YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON
UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 037050
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UA, RS
SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON
UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON CONCERNING THE UKRAINIAN RADA'S RATIFICATION OF START 1 WITH CONDITIONS. THE LETTER, WHICH IS DATED NOVEMBER 25, WAS GIVEN TO THE AMBASSADOR BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV NOVEMBER 26. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/ISCA.
3. BEGIN TEXT. NOVEMBER 25, 1993
NO. PR-1750
MOSCOW, KREMLIN

DEAR BILL,
I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTREMELY DESTRUCTIVE DECISION OF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE START 1 AGREEMENT.

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WHAT I HAVE IN MIND ARE THE NUMEROUS AMENDMENTS WHICH WERE ADOPTED BY THE RADA IN THE COURSE OF CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION, AND WHICH REVOLVE AROUND THE NON-OBLIGATION OF UKRAINE IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THIS HAS WIPED OUT THOSE COMPROMISES, AND FRANKLY SPEAKING, CONCESSIONS, WHICH, WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, WERE MADE IN RECENT TIMES IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THE UKRAINIAN SIDE TO FULFILL ITS OWN PROMISES, WHICH WERE RECORDED BOTH ON A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL BASIS, INCLUDING IN THE LISBON PROTOCOL, THE CORRESPONDING DECISIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CIS, AND THE MASSANDRA AGREEMENT.
THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP SAW THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR AMBITIONS IN THE PART OF WELL-KNOWN FORCES IN UKRAINE. WE WARNED THE WORLD COMMUNITY ABOUT THIS, OPENLY SPOKE UP AGAINST ANY WEAKENING ON A MATTER OF SUCH FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE AMBITIONS WON THE DAY IN THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT. NUCLEAR ARMS HAVE BEEN DECLARED STATE PROPERTY OF UKRAINE; REFUSAL TO DESTROY ALL OF THE NUCLEAR-ARMED MISSILE ARSENAL LOCATED ON ITS TERRITORY (ONLY 36 PERCENT OF ITS MISSILE DELIVERY VEHICLES (RAKETONOSITELI), AND 42 PERCENT OF ITS WARHEADS) HAS BEEN DECLARED; ARTICLE 5 OF THE LISBON PROTOCOL CONCERNING UKRAINE'S OBLIGATION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR STATE WAS REJECTED.
WE SERIOUSLY FEAR THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION TAKEN WILL BE FELT IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. IT THREATENS THE BASIS FOR THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, WHICH IS ALREADY CORRODED BY THE WELL-KNOWN ACTIONS OF NORTH KOREA, WITH THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NEAR-NUCLEAR STATES. KAZAKHSTAN WILL ALSO ACT WITH AN EYE ON UKRAINE, REFUSING TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO RUSSIAN TERRITORY, AND ALSO ATTEMPTING TO DECLARE THEM ITS PROPERTY. FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING, THE "BELT OF NUCLEAR INSTABILITY" IS WIDENING IN THE WORLD, ENCOMPASSING NEW REGIONS WITH INCREASED VIOLENCE AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY.
IT ALSO CALLS INTO QUESTION THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE HISTORIC AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE START ONE AND TWO AGREEMENTS.
IN A WORD, WE CONSIDER THAT A GREAT BLOW HAS BEEN DEALT TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AS A WHOLE. THESE CONCLUSIONS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT BUT BE SHARED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE.
IN THESE CONDITIONS, IN OUR OPINION, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO COORDINATE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SITUATION FROM BECOMING IRREVERSIBLE.
FIRST OF ALL, IT IS NECESSARY, IN PARALLEL, FOR US TO

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP OUR CONCERNS. THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE IS MANEUVERING, TRYING TO DISTANCE ITSELF IN WORDS FROM THE DECISION OF THE RADA, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT SPEAKING OUT AGAINST IT. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND PRINCIPLED ASSESSMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KRAVCHUK OF THE PARLIAMENT'S DECISION, AND RADICAL MEASURES (SHOULD BE) TAKEN TO CORRECT THE SITUATION.

I AM READY TO APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE AND AMONG OTHER THINGS TELL HIM THAT WE CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE AS CONTRADICTING THE INTERESTS OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 037050

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UA, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START 1 TREATY

COUNTRIES. I AM ALSO READY TO BRING TO KIEV'S ATTENTION THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CALL INTO QUESTION THE MEASURES OF PROPRIETARY MONITORING (AVTORSKIY NADZOR) AND SERVICING GUARANTEES FOR THE NUCLEAR ARMS LOCATED ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY SINCE RUSSIA ITSELF WOULD BE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOW BEEN CREATED, IN THE ROLE OF A VIOLATOR OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. WE EXPECT THAT CONFIRMATION OF UKRAINIAN CONFIRMATION OF ITS READINESS TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING, BY JANUARY 1, 1994, A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA WITHIN A TWENTY-FOUR MONTH PERIOD, INCLUDING THE ACCELERATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS OF THE MOST MODERN SS 24 MISSILES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING UKRAINE WITH PROCESSED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR ENERGY NEEDS.

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE URGENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE THREE STATES DEPOSITORIES OF THE NPT AND ALSO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE GOAL OF DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED, AND DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT SITUATION, TO TAKE APPROPRIATE DECISIONS AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. IT WOULD ALSO BE WORTHWHILE TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA MECHANISM, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

I HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE SUPPORTS SUCH AN APPROACH.

BILL, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THIS VERY SENSITIVE QUESTION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS STILL AN OPPORTUNITY TO AVERT AN IRREVOCABLE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS ACCORDING TO THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WORST SCENARIO.
WITH RESPECT.
B. YELTSIN.

PICKERING

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Distribution:

FOR: POTTS@A1@OEOB
FOR: PONEMAN@A1@OEOB
FOR: GOTTEMOELLER@A1@OEOB
FOR: BURNS@A1@OEOB
FOR: BELL@A1@OEOB
FOR: AOKI@A1@OEOB
FOR: ANDREASEN@A1@OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL HILLIARD ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BURNS FILE PONEMAN SIGLER SUM2 WHSR_IN WHSR_OUT WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 070313Z DEC 93

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M.1 (2.24)
KBH 1/2/2025

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV
RUFHTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NODIS
QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 2
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE
.
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
.
HAGUE: PLEASE PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS- EYES ONLY.
KIEV: AMBASSADOR- COPY FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.
.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:
.
AS YOU MADE CLEAR IN YOUR LAST LETTER TO ME, NO ISSUE ON WHICH YOU AND I ARE WORKING TOGETHER IS MORE IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW IN UKRAINE. YOU AND I AGREE THAT UKRAINE MUST FULFILL ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE LISBON PROTOCOL TO BECOME A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. I REACTED, AS YOU DID, VERY NEGATIVELY TO THE UKRAINIAN RADA'S RECENT ACTION ON START AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THE RADA ACTION CONVINCED ME THAT YOU AND I MUST STEP UP OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR ALL. WE CANNOT WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND THE SEATING OF A NEW RADA; RATHER, WE MUST ACT NOW, IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT, TO SET IN MOTION A SERIES OF EVENTS THAT WILL GUARANTEE THE OUTCOME WE BOTH WANT: THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE AND THE REMOVAL OF THEIR WARHEADS TO RUSSIA FOR SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT.
.
DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT DAYS GIVE ME HOPE, AND ALSO A SENSE OF URGENCY. IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT I HAD WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ON NOVEMBER 29, AND IN SUBSEQUENT DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS IN KIEV, THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DEACTIVATION OF 20 SS-24 MISSILES BY THE END OF THIS MONTH AND THE DEACTIVATION OF THE REMAINING SS-24S BY MARCH 1994. DEACTIVATION WOULD MEAN THE REMOVAL OF THE FRONT ENDS CONTAINING THE WARHEADS. THE UKRAINIAN SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THESE ACTIONS BY ENSURING THAT SILO DOORS ARE OPENED. UKRAINE HAS ALSO DROPPED ITS EARLIER INSISTENCE ON DIRECT COMPENSATION FOR THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN REMOVED TO RUSSIA, BUT WOULD INSTEAD SEEK SOME RELIEF FROM RUSSIA FOR ITS ENERGY DEBT.

.

I HAVE ASKED MY EXPERTS TO BRIEF YOURS IN DETAIL ON THESE EXCHANGES. BUT THE KEY FACT IS THIS: PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT LAST MAY BE PREPARED TO TAKE CONCRETE, IRREVERSIBLE AND VERIFIABLE STEPS TOWARD GIVING UP ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO HOLD ON TO SS-24S, THE MOST MODERN AND THREATENING WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, HE IS NOW COMMITTED TO A TIMETABLE THAT WILL MEAN THERE ARE NO ACTIVE SS-24S BY THE TIME THE NEW RADA COMES INTO OFFICE. THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE VERY WELCOME, GIVEN THE SUPPORT FOR RETAINING SS-24S THAT WE HAVE OBSERVED IN THE RADA IN THE PAST.

.

TO BE SURE, EXPERIENCE AND PRUDENCE DICTATE THAT WE RESERVE JUDGMENT ON THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO DELIVER ON THIS PROMISE. WE MUST PUT THIS NEW UKRANIAN OFFER TO A PRACTICAL TEST. TO THAT END, I URGE YOU TO AUTHORIZE TWO STEPS ON THE PART OF YOUR GOVERNMENT:

.

--FIRST, AS YOU SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, WE SHOULD COME TO TERMS ON AN AGREEMENT OVER HOW TO SHARE PROCEEDS FOR THE SALE OF THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN THE WARHEADS. I HOPE THIS CAN HAPPEN BY NEXT WEEK WHEN VICE PRESIDENT GORE MEETS WITH YOU AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IN MOSCOW.

.

--SECOND, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK HAS PROPOSED TO STORE THE SS-24 WARHEADS TEMPORARILY IN FACILITIES KNOWN AS "S" SITES. I REALIZE THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHICH REQUIRES RUSSIAN ASSENT AND COOPERATION, POSES TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR YOUR SIDE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE DECIDING FACTOR SHOULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE WARHEADS OFF THE MISSILES AND ON THEIR WAY TO YOUR ELIMINATION FACILITIES IN RUSSIA. MAKING THE "S" SITES AVAILABLE REMOVES A REASON FOR FURTHER UKRAINIAN DELAY.

.

PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS EVIDENTLY READY TO RESUME WORK ON DEVELOPING A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY, PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED AT MASSANDRA. OUR OWN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN UKRAINE MADE GREAT PROGRESS THIS WEEKEND WITH THE SIGNING OF OUR BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT. I EXPECT THAT THIS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PROGRESS WILL AID YOUR OWN EFFORTS.

.

IN THIS CONTEXT, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONE POINT. I REMAIN DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO NOTHING TO UNDERCUT THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU WERE SEEKING IN YOUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT MASSANDRA. SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE BEEN CAREFUL IN MY OWN CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND IN WHAT I AM URGING HERE NOT TO IMPEDE THE CHANCES THAT UKRAINE WILL AGREE TO A 24-MONTH TIMETABLE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS TERRITORY. THAT STRATEGY CAN REMAIN IN PLACE AS WE PURSUE RAPID PROGRESS IN THESE OTHER AREAS.

.

BORIS, WHEN WE MET IN TOKYO IN JULY, YOU ASKED ME TO STEP UP OUR TRILATERAL EFFORTS TO REACH A SOLUTION TO THIS VEXING AND PERILOUS CHALLENGE. WE MAY WELL BE ON THE VERGE OF JUST SUCH A SOLUTION. WE GOT TO THIS POINT BY WORKING TOGETHER, YOU AND I, AND BY HOLDING TO A COMBINATION OF FIRM PRINCIPLES, UNWAVERING OBJECTIVES AND REALISTIC TACTICS. AS THE CUSTODIANS OF THE TWO LARGEST NUCLEAR ARSENALS ON EARTH--AND AS THE LEADERS OF TWO GREAT COUNTRIES THAT HAVE GONE FROM RIVALRY TO PARTNERSHIP--WE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. IN COOPERATION WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, WE CAN DO THAT IN THE COMING WEEKS, PERHAPS EVEN IN THE COMING DAYS.

.

I HOPE THAT WE CAN MAKE DECISIVE PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES AND THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO CLOSURE ON THE KEY PRINCIPLES FOR FINAL AGREEMENT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. I KNOW THAT HE IS GREATLY LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND TO HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NODIS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 2

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THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING SERGEI FILATOV ENOUGH TIME OFF FROM HIS WORK TO COME TO WASHINGTON. I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING HIM.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL CLINTON

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END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT

#2258

NNNN

<MSGID> M0762873

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Immediate to Moscow
Through State Channels
NODIS ~~-- Confidential~~

Action -- Moscow

Info -- SecState
Kiev
Hague

Slug line: Hague: Please pass to Under Secretary Davis

KIEV: AMBASSADOR - COPY FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DEAR BORIS:

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DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT DAYS GIVE ME HOPE, AND ALSO A SENSE OF URGENCY. IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT I HAD WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ON NOVEMBER 29, AND IN SUBSEQUENT DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS IN KIEV, THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE DEACTIVATION OF 20 SS-24 MISSILES BY THE END OF THIS MONTH AND THE DEACTIVATION OF THE REMAINING SS-24S BY MARCH 1994. DEACTIVATION WOULD MEAN THE REMOVAL OF THE FRONT ENDS CONTAINING THE WARHEADS. THE UKRAINIAN SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THESE ACTIONS BY ENSURING THAT SILO DOORS ARE OPENED. UKRAINE HAS ALSO DROPPED ITS EARLIER INSISTENCE ON DIRECT COMPENSATION FOR THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN REMOVED TO RUSSIA, BUT WOULD INSTEAD SEEK SOME RELIEF FROM RUSSIA FOR ITS ENERGY DEBT.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.25]

-- SECOND, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK HAS PROPOSED TO STORE THE SS-24 WARHEADS TEMPORARILY IN FACILITIES KNOWN AS "S" SITES. I REALIZE THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHICH REQUIRES RUSSIAN ASSENT AND COOPERATION, POSES TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR YOUR SIDE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE DECIDING FACTOR SHOULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE WARHEADS OFF THE MISSILES AND ON THEIR WAY TO YOUR ELIMINATION FACILITIES IN RUSSIA. MAKING THE "S" SITES AVAILABLE REMOVES A REASON FOR FURTHER UKRAINIAN DELAY.

PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS EVIDENTLY READY TO RESUME WORK ON DEVELOPING A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY, PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED AT MASSANDRA. OUR OWN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN UKRAINE MADE GREAT PROGRESS THIS WEEKEND WITH THE SIGNING OF OUR BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT. I EXPECT THAT THIS PROGRESS WILL AID YOUR OWN EFFORTS.

IN THIS CONTEXT, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONE POINT. I REMAIN DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO NOTHING TO UNDERCUT THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU WERE SEEKING IN YOUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT MASSANDRA. SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE BEEN CAREFUL IN MY OWN CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND IN WHAT I AM URGING HERE NOT TO IMPEDE THE CHANCES THAT UKRAINE WILL AGREE TO A 24-MONTH TIMETABLE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS TERRITORY. THAT STRATEGY CAN REMAIN IN PLACE AS WE PURSUE RAPID PROGRESS IN THESE OTHER AREAS.

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I HOPE THAT WE CAN MAKE DECISIVE PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES AND THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO CLOSURE ON THE KEY PRINCIPLES FOR FINAL AGREEMENT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. I KNOW THAT HE IS GREATLY LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND TO HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN.

THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING SERGEI FILATOV ENOUGH TIME OFF FROM HIS WORK TO COME TO WASHINGTON. I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING HIM.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.26)
KBH 1/2/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRANSMITTAL: LETTER MUST BE RECEIVED IN MOSCOW BY OOB ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7. IT SHOULD ALSO BE SLUGGED FOR U/S LYNN DAVIS IN THE HAGUE, FOR USE IN A MEETING ON DECEMBER 7.

MESSAGE IS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

1. ~~FOR~~ AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW:

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR BORIS:

AS YOU MADE CLEAR IN YOUR LAST LETTER TO ME, NO ISSUE ON WHICH YOU AND I ARE WORKING TOGETHER IS MORE IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW IN UKRAINE. YOU AND I AGREE THAT UKRAINE MUST FULFILL ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE LISBON PROTOCOL TO BECOME A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. I REACTED, AS YOU DID, VERY NEGATIVELY TO THE UKRAINIAN RADA'S RECENT ACTION ON START AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THE RADA ACTION CONVINCED ME THAT YOU AND I MUST STEP UP OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR ALL. WE CANNOT WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND THE SEATING OF A NEW RADA; RATHER, WE MUST ACT NOW, IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT, TO SET IN MOTION A SERIES OF EVENTS THAT WILL GUARANTEE THE OUTCOME WE BOTH WANT: THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE AND THE REMOVAL OF THEIR WARHEADS TO RUSSIA FOR SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT.

DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT DAYS GIVE ME HOPE, AND ALSO A SENSE OF URGENCY. IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT I HAD WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ON NOVEMBER 29, AND IN SUBSEQUENT DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS IN KIEV, THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE DEACTIVATION OF 20 SS-24 MISSILES BY THE END OF THIS MONTH AND THE DEACTIVATION OF THE REMAINING SS-24S BY MARCH 1994. DEACTIVATION WOULD MEAN THE REMOVAL OF THE FRONT ENDS CONTAINING THE WARHEADS. THE UKRAINIAN SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THESE ACTIONS BY ENSURING THAT SILO DOORS ARE OPENED. UKRAINE HAS ALSO DROPPED ITS EARLIER INSISTENCE ON DIRECT COMPENSATION FOR THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN REMOVED TO RUSSIA, BUT WOULD INSTEAD SEEK SOME RELIEF FROM RUSSIA FOR ITS ENERGY DEBT.

I HAVE ASKED MY EXPERTS TO BRIEF YOURS IN DETAIL ON THESE EXCHANGES. BUT THE KEY FACT IS THIS: PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT LAST MAY BE PREPARED TO TAKE CONCRETE, IRREVERSIBLE AND VERIFIABLE STEPS TOWARD GIVING UP ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO HOLD ON TO SS-24S, THE MOST MODERN AND THREATENING WEAPONS IN UKRAINE, HE IS NOW COMMITTED TO A TIMETABLE THAT WILL MEAN THERE ARE NO ACTIVE SS-24S BY THE TIME THE NEW RADA COMES INTO OFFICE. THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE VERY WELCOME, GIVEN THE SUPPORT FOR RETAINING SS-24S THAT WE HAVE OBSERVED IN THE RADA IN THE PAST.

TO BE SURE, EXPERIENCE AND PRUDENCE DICTATE THAT WE RESERVE JUDGMENT ON THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO DELIVER ON THIS

PROMISE. WE MUST PUT THIS NEW UKRANIAN OFFER TO A PRACTICAL TEST. TO THAT END, I URGE YOU TO AUTHORIZE TWO STEPS ON THE PART OF YOUR GOVERNMENT:

-- FIRST, AS YOU SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, WE SHOULD COME TO TERMS ON AN AGREEMENT OVER HOW TO SHARE PROCEEDS FOR THE SALE OF THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN THE WARHEADS. I HOPE THIS CAN HAPPEN BY NEXT WEEK WHEN VICE PRESIDENT GORE MEETS WITH YOU AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IN MOSCOW.

-- SECOND, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK HAS PROPOSED TO STORE THE SS-24 WARHEADS TEMPORARILY IN FACILITIES KNOWN AS "S" SITES. I REALIZE THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHICH REQUIRES RUSSIAN ASSENT AND COOPERATION, POSES TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR YOUR SIDE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE DECIDING FACTOR SHOULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE WARHEADS OFF THE MISSILES AND ON THEIR WAY TO YOUR ELIMINATION FACILITIES IN RUSSIA. MAKING THE "S" SITES AVAILABLE REMOVES A REASON FOR FURTHER UKRAINIAN DELAY.

PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS EVIDENTLY READY TO RESUME WORK ON DEVELOPING A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY, PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED AT MASSANDRA. OUR OWN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN UKRAINE MADE GREAT PROGRESS THIS WEEKEND WITH THE SIGNING OF OUR BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT. I EXPECT THAT THIS PROGRESS WILL AID YOUR OWN EFFORTS.

IN THIS CONTEXT, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONE POINT. I REMAIN DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO NOTHING TO UNDERCUT THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU WERE SEEKING IN YOUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT MASSANDRA. SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE BEEN CAREFUL IN MY OWN CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND IN WHAT I AM URGING HERE NOT TO IMPEDE THE CHANCES THAT UKRAINE WILL AGREE TO A 24-MONTH TIMETABLE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS TERRITORY. THAT STRATEGY CAN REMAIN IN PLACE AS WE PURSUE RAPID PROGRESS IN THESE OTHER AREAS.

BORIS, WHEN WE MET IN TOKYO IN JULY, YOU ASKED ME TO STEP UP OUR TRILATERAL EFFORTS TO REACH A SOLUTION TO THIS VEXING AND PERILOUS CHALLENGE. WE MAY WELL BE ON THE VERGE OF JUST SUCH A SOLUTION. WE GOT TO THIS POINT BY WORKING TOGETHER, YOU AND I, AND BY HOLDING TO A COMBINATION OF FIRM PRINCIPLES, UNWAVERING OBJECTIVES AND REALISTIC TACTICS. AS THE CUSTODIANS OF THE TWO LARGEST NUCLEAR ARSENALS ON EARTH--AND AS THE LEADERS OF TWO GREAT COUNTRIES THAT HAVE GONE FROM RIVALRY TO PARTNERSHIP--WE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. IN COOPERATION WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, WE CAN DO THAT IN THE COMING WEEKS, PERHAPS EVEN IN THE COMING DAYS.

I HOPE THAT WE CAN MAKE DECISIVE PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES AND THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO CLOSURE ON THE KEY PRINCIPLES FOR FINAL AGREEMENT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. I KNOW THAT HE IS GREATLY LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND TO HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN.

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THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING SERGEI FILATOV ENOUGH TIME OFF FROM HIS WORK TO COME TO WASHINGTON. I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING HIM.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT.

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I ALSO EXPECT, BASED ON WHAT I UNDERSTAND OF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT'S ACTION, THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK WILL NOW HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY TO WORK ON THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPING A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. AS WE MOVE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE COMPENSATION ISSUE, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN RESOLUTION OF THE TIMETABLE ISSUE, IF BOTH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WOULD FIND IT USEFUL. WE WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED AT MASSANDRA. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH THE UKRAINIANS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. I WOULD EXPECT THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WILL AID YOUR OWN EFFORTS, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF OUR PROGRESS.

YOU ALSO SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME THAT WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE URGENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE THREE DEPOSITORIES OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO DISCUSS THE UKRAINIAN SITUATION. WHILE I ABSOLUTELY AGREE WITH THE URGENCY OF THIS SITUATION, I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S PLEDGE TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE PARLIAMENT'S ACTION CREATES A SITUATION IN WHICH EXTENSIVE HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES WOULD NOT BE A PRODUCTIVE APPROACH AT THIS TIME. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT, IN MY VIEW, THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHOULD CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AS WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH UKRAINE ON THESE ISSUES. I PARTICULARLY LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR FURTHER REACTION TO OUR PROPOSALS ON THE COMPENSATION ISSUE.

THANK YOU FOR ALLOWING SERGEI FILATOV TO VISIT WASHINGTON. I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING HIM. AL GORE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MID-DECEMBER AND TO HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN. ~~FINALLY, THROUGH YOU, I WOULD LIKE TO WISH MY BEST TO ALL DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN RUSSIA IN YOUR UPCOMING ELECTIONS.~~

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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2015-0815-M-1 (2.27)
KBH 1/2/2025

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 143368
BL
Russian

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Moscow, December 15, 1993

No. Pr-1838 9329550

Dear Bill:

The adoption on December 12, 1993 of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation completes the political shaping of the young Russian democracy. Now, the most important thing is the progressive realization of the economic reforms. The Russian leadership, despite some ups and downs in the political situation, will continue the reforms aimed at the financial stabilization and restructuring of the economy of the country in accordance with the Declaration of the Government of Russia of November 5, 1993.

Reaffirming our commitment to consistent reforms in all sectors of the economy, we are counting primarily on our own resources. In addition, we welcome any action by the

His Excellency
Mr. Bill Clinton
President of the
United States of America

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.28]

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international community to cooperate with our efforts to integrate the Russian economy in the world economy, and the broadening of mutually advantageous and equal cooperation.

The year 1993 was an important stage in the development of relations between the G-7 and the Russian Federation in the interests of all participants of that process.

The most important thing right now is not to lose momentum in the development of our mutual relations, and to implement the political and economic achievements of the Tokyo meeting.

In the political sphere, the mechanism of the Eight is practically already taking shape, and we hope that for Naples, we shall be able to arrive at the level of jointly working out a position that will find reflection in our joint political statement on the most urgent international problems. As regards the economy, the formula 7 + 1 applies for the present. But here, too, I believe you agree with me that the recently signed joint political declaration on partnership and cooperation between Russia and the European Union, and the upcoming conclusion of an agreement brings us closer to the transformation of the Group of Seven into a Group of Eight.

I avail myself of the occasion to send the people of your country as well as yourself and your family my best New Year's wishes for peace, prosperity, and happiness.

[sgd.] B. Yeltsin

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«15» декабря 19 93 г.

№ Пр-1838

г. МОСКВА

Дорогой Билл,

Принятие 12 декабря 1993 года новой Конституции Российской Федерации завершает политическое оформление молодой российской демократии. Сейчас главное - поступательное проведение в жизнь экономических реформ. Российское руководство, несмотря ни на какие колебания политической конъюнктуры, будет продолжать преобразования, направленные на финансовую стабилизацию и структурную перестройку экономики страны в соответствии с Заявлением правительства России от 5 ноября 1993 года.

Подтверждая нашу приверженность последовательным преобразованиям во всех секторах экономики, естественно, мы рассчитываем, в первую очередь, на собственные силы. Вместе с тем, мы приветствуем любые действия международного сообщества, направленные на содействие нашим усилиям по интеграции российской экономики в мировое хозяйство, расширению взаимовыгодного и равноправного сотрудничества.

1993 год стал важным этапом в развитии отношений "Группы семи" и Российской Федерации в интересах всех участников данного процесса.

Главное сейчас - не потерять темп в наших взаимоотношениях, на практике реализовать политический и экономический позитив Токийской встречи.


ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.29]

В политической сфере у нас уже фактически сложился механизм "восьмерки" и мы надеемся, что к Неаполю удастся выйти на уровень совместной выработки позиций, что найдет отражение в нашем общем политическом заявлении по наиболее актуальным международным проблемам. Что касается экономики, пока действует формула "7+1". Но и здесь, думаю, Вы согласитесь со мной, недавнее подписание совместной политической декларации о партнерстве и сотрудничестве между Россией и Европейским союзом и предстоящее заключение Соглашения приближает трансформацию "Группы семи" в "восьмерку".

Пользуясь случаем, хочу направить наилучшие новогодние поздравления народу Вашей страны, Вам лично и Вашим близким, с пожеланиями мира, благополучия и счастья.



Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«15» июня 1993 г.

№ Пр-928

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Сердечно благодарю Вас за теплые поздравления и добрые пожелания по случаю Национального дня новой, демократической России.

Разделяю Ваше мнение о том, что ванкуверские договоренности открывают широкие возможности для дальнейшего укрепления плодотворного российско-американского партнерства в интересах народов наших стран и всего мирового сообщества.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.30]

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«3» июня 1993 г.

№ Пр-857

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Со времени саммита в Ванкувере по ряду ключевых направлений российско-американского партнерства достигнуты солидные результаты. На встрече министров иностранных дел и финансов в Токио был разработан план международной поддержки экономических реформ в России. Успешно прошло первое, "учредительное" заседание российско-американской группы по стратегической стабильности. В решающей степени благодаря нашему сопредседательству возобновились арабо-израильские переговоры. Наконец, удалось переломить тенденцию к разрастанию югославского кризиса.

Работа по реализации согласованной нами в Ванкувере программы российско-американского стратегического партнерства идет полным ходом. Ключ к ее успеху - плотная координация наших усилий на всех уровнях. На днях я принимал Вашего нового посла Пикеринга и остался доволен состоявшейся беседой. Считаю, что Президент США сделал удачный выбор с учетом исключительно ответственного момента в строительстве российско-американского партнерства.

Однако возникает необходимость "сверить часы": определиться, где мы находимся через два месяца после Ванкувера, с какими трудностями столкнулись, на каких задачах надо сосредоточиться в ближайшие недели.

Прежде всего - об экономических делах. Ускоренную приватизацию и акционирование наряду с борьбой с инфляцией Президент и Правительство рассматривают как главное направление в своей экономической политике. На период до конца текущего года и далее нами разработаны конкретные меры по стабилизации экономики, о которых Россия информировала Международный валютный фонд. Эта реалистичная и взвешенная экономическая программа, принятая совместно

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
г-ну УИЛЬЯМУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.31]

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Правительством и Центральным банком, открывает путь для широкого сотрудничества России с международными финансовыми организациями.

Как Вам известно, мы особенно заинтересованы в создании трех фондов - кредитования системных преобразований, приватизации и структурных реформ и фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса. Эти фонды называются по-разному, но их деятельность должна быть сфокусирована на одну задачу - поддерживать, подкреплять в финансовом и экспертном отношениях приватизацию в России. Свой фонд приватизации мы уже создали, он работает. Теперь надо включить в работу международные факторы.

Благодарен Вам за письмо от 19 мая, которое расцениваю как подтверждение намерения администрации США помочь нам в беспромедлительном оформлении соответствующих соглашений с МВФ, Мировым банком и ЕБРР.

Убежден, что достижение взаимопонимания с Международным валютным фондом и энергичная поддержка наших усилий со стороны США в духе ванкуверских договоренностей создают благоприятные условия для успеха Токийского саммита.

Мне понятны бюджетные проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются Соединенные Штаты, трудности, испытываемые администрацией в ее взаимодействии с конгрессом. В то же время надеюсь, что Вам удастся "провести" через конгресс дополнительные меры американского содействия России, о которых было объявлено в апреле в Токио.

Намерен сделать все от меня зависящее для обеспечения нормальных, цивилизованных условий для притока американских инвестиций и технологий в Россию. Главное здесь - завершить, хотя бы в основном, формирование правовой инфраструктуры. Новая конституция, процесс принятия которой сейчас вошел в решающую стадию, по моему глубокому убеждению, призвана гарантировать благоприятные условия для быстрого продвижения экономических реформ и для развертывания широкомасштабного экономического сотрудничества с внешним миром. Шансы на скорое разрешение нынешнего конституционного кризиса расцениваю как реальные. Активная деятельность Президента по ускорению конституционного процесса, обнародованный Президентом проект новой Конституции уже получили убедительную поддержку большинства субъектов федерации.

Параллельно работаем над решением конкретных практических вопросов, касающихся эффективного использования западного экономического содействия. Важный элемент общей схемы взаимодействия - четкая межправительственная координация. Согласен с Вами, что нельзя медлить с открытием в Москве специального представительства "семерки" по вопросам многостороннего содействия российским реформам.

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С удовлетворением воспринял Ваш призыв к конгрессу США устранить законы времен "холодной войны", не соответствующие новому уровню доверия и партнерства между нашими странами и мешающие развитию двустороннего экономического сотрудничества.

Одним из наиболее ярких таких примеров является поправка Джексона-Вэника. Распространение ее действия на демократическую Россию - явный анахронизм, к тому же играющий на руку противникам российско-американского сближения. Что касается проблемы так называемых отказников, могу подтвердить, как уже говорил послу Пикерингу, что я беру ее под свой личный контроль. Соответствующие поручения даны.

Рассчитываю, что созданная нами в Ванкувере комиссия во главе с премьер-министром В.С.Черномырдиным и вице-президентом А.Гором придаст дополнительный импульс экономическому взаимодействию между Россией и США. Я принял решение о том, чтобы в соответствии с приглашением А.Гора В.С.Черномырдин посетил Вашингтон 14-16 июня. Надеюсь, что Вы сможете принять его для обсуждения основных проблем российско-американского экономического сотрудничества.

Необходимо, чтобы уже первая сессия комиссии принесла осязаемые результаты. Исходим из того, что к этому времени должна быть завершена подготовка таких важных документов, как исполнительный контракт по высокообогащенному урану, соглашение о крупной кредитной линии Эксимбанка США для топливно-энергетического комплекса России, соглашение о принципах справедливой конкуренции на рынке космических услуг, а также достигнута договоренность об участии России в проекте создания космической станции "Фридом".

Надеюсь, что администрация США в процессе проведения через конгресс проекта бюджетных расходов на международную программу создания станции "Фридом" сможет окончательно определиться по конкретным параметрам российского участия в ней.

В свете договоренностей в Ванкувере дал поручение об уточнении нашего подхода в отношении контракта с Индией по криогенным ракетным блокам. Рассчитываем закрыть эту проблему в ходе консультаций наших экспертов и завершить работу над двусторонним меморандумом по вопросам ракетного экспорта. Но эта проблема решается не изолированно.

Пора начать реализовывать на практике намеченную нами многообещающую перспективу российско-американского космического сотрудничества. Удовлетворен ходом подготовки двустороннего соглашения по коммерческим запускам спутников.

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Рассчитываю, что Вы продолжите диалог по этим вопросам с партнерами по Европейскому сообществу, чтобы мы могли достичь компромиссной договоренности на приемлемых для всех заинтересованных сторон условиях.

Рассчитываю на продуктивность предстоящего в начале июня визита в Москву министра финансов США Л.Бентсена. В ходе этого визита надо, в частности, постараться закрыть остающиеся вопросы, связанные с теми сельскохозяйственными кредитами, которые были предоставлены Соединенными Штатами бывшему СССР, а затем переоформлены на Россию.

Важным событием в наших экономических отношениях явилось бы введение в действие соглашения по высокообогащенному урану. Я в целом доволен прогрессом в выработке исполнительного контракта к нему. Надеюсь, что нам удастся в короткие сроки окончательно договориться по взаимоприемлемым ценовым параметрам.

Если же касаться вопроса о разделе с Украиной доходов от продаж урана, то наше видение проблемы было подробно изложено в недавнем письме А.В.Козырева госсекретарю У.Кристоферу. К сожалению, Киев продолжает затягивать решение данного вопроса, уходит от ответа на переданные нами учитывающие его пожелания предложения. В этой ситуации делу не способствует сохранение американской стороной увязки введения в силу соглашения по урану с урегулированием спорных вопросов между Россией и Украиной, касающихся утилизации ядерных боеприпасов, временно размещенных на украинской территории. Эта увязка объективно усиливает позиции тех сил на Украине, которые саботируют поиск взаимоприемлемых решений ядерной проблемы на переговорах с Россией. Хотел бы призвать Вас с учетом всех обстоятельств еще раз взвесить целесообразность такого подхода.

Несколько слов об общей ситуации в наших отношениях с Украиной. Я приветствую заинтересованность администрации США в стабильном, конструктивном развитии отношений между Россией и Украиной и Вашу готовность оказать содействие в этом деле. Буду откровенен: вы можете помочь - и нам, и себе, - если не допустите появления у украинских лидеров иллюзий, будто США могли бы при определенных обстоятельствах смириться с ядерным статусом Украины. Сомнения в этом вопросе были бы чрезвычайно опасны. Расширять экономическое сотрудничество с Украиной, когда она срывает выполнение официально взятых ею на себя обязательств по присоединению к Договору о нераспространении в качестве неядерного государства и по ратификации Договора СНВ-1, было бы контрпродуктивно и недальновидно. Хочу, чтобы Вы знали о моей позиции на этот счет, и надеюсь на понимание.

Еще один актуальный вопрос - об отношениях России со странами Балтии. Они складываются непросто. Речь прежде всего идет о негибкой позиции ряда руководителей этих стран, ущемлении прав русскоязычного населения, выдвижении

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необоснованных финансовых требований к России. Хочу подчеркнуть, что там, где спорные вопросы решаются на взаимовыгодной основе, отношения нормализуются.

С удовлетворением отмечаю выраженное Вами намерение продолжать работать с целью обеспечения полной защиты прав человека в балтийских государствах, в том числе прав национальных меньшинств. Надеемся, в частности, что администрация поможет нам добиться корректировки Латвией и Эстонией законодательства в области гражданства. Можно было бы провести обстоятельный экспертный обмен мнениями по этим проблемам. Готовы предоставить конкретные данные о фактах нарушений прав человека в этих государствах.

Еще одна крупная проблема - отсутствие договорных рамок для вывода войск и социальных гарантий для остающихся военных пенсионеров. Мы уже вывели более половины наших войск, однако этот процесс тормозится отсутствием соответствующих соглашений. Надеюсь, что Вы с пониманием отнесетесь к нашему подходу и будете учитывать его в Ваших контактах со странами Балтии. Признателен за готовность оказать содействие в решении практических проблем, связанных с выводом войск. Важное значение в этом плане имеет Ваша инициатива, объявленная в Ванкувере, предусматривающая содействие в профессиональной переподготовке и строительство жилья для военнослужащих. Требуется привлечь международную поддержку, чтобы этот проект принес желаемую отдачу.

Теперь о Югославии. С удовлетворением узнал о том, что после серии интенсивных консультаций нашим министрам удалось выработать Программу совместных действий по урегулированию в бывшей Югославии. Чтобы удержать ситуацию в Боснии и Герцеговине от, казалось, необратимого срыва, требовались незамедлительные шаги. С учетом остроты момента Ваша беседа с министром иностранных дел России была нужной и своевременной.

Сейчас у нас есть общая позиция пяти членов СБ ООН, наиболее глубоко вовлеченных в поиски югославского урегулирования. Созданы политические предпосылки для того, чтобы остановить кровопролитие, предотвратить разрастание конфликта и привести в движение механизмы урегулирования на основе, заложенной процессом Вэнса-Оуэна.

Положен конец вредным спекуляциям на тему о якобы непримиримых расхождениях в подходах США, Европы и России к югокризису. Неокоммунистическая оппозиция в России целенаправленно культивировала эти спекуляции в расчете поставить под сомнение принципиальный курс Президента на стратегическое партнерство с США.

Особенно доволен тем, что мы с Вами остались верны духу партнерства. Скоординированность подходов и действий России и США - ключевой элемент, без которого невозможно прочное и справедливое решение ни одной серьезной международной проблемы. Совместную позицию выработать сложнее, чем принять

одностороннее решение. Однако потенциал многосторонних акций сегодня значительно выше. Российская сторона готова к продолжению самого тесного сотрудничества с США по югославским делам.

Надо быстрее развязать югославский узел, чтобы вплотную взяться за другие "кризисные точки", отвлекающие внимание от внутренних социально-экономических преобразований. На очереди, в частности, - Нагорный Карабах и Таджикистан.

Билл, мы часто связываемся по телефону, но при этом, как правило, приходится заниматься текущими "горячими" делами. Считаю, что вопрос о реализации ванкуверских решений заслуживает отдельного обстоятельного телефонного разговора. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор в самое ближайшее время, как только американские эксперты изучат наши соображения.

Желаю успехов в осуществлении Ваших планов модернизации Америки. Прошу передать Хиллари самые наилучшие пожелания от меня и Наины.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«12» мая 19 93 г.

№ Пр-709

г. МОСКВА

Дорогой Билл,

С удовлетворением отмечаю, что отношения Российской Федерации с участниками "группы 7" выходят на тот уровень доверия, который позволяет перевести достигнутое качество политического партнерства в конкретную стратегию полномасштабного сотрудничества в поддержку российских реформ.

Договоренности, достигнутые на встрече министров иностранных дел и финансов "семерки" и Российской Федерации в Токио 14-15 апреля, подтвердили наш общий настрой именно на такую работу.

Наше взаимодействие в реализации социально-экономических преобразований в России поддерживается россиянами, о чем свидетельствуют результаты референдума 25 апреля. Сейчас крайне важно без промедления приступить к осуществлению взятого нами курса на конкретные дела.

Необходимо, чтобы объявленные на апрельской встрече министров меры начали энергично реализовываться в виде реальных проектов, ориентированных на конкретных адресатов. Это будет осязаемым вкладом в социально-экономическое развитие России.

В самое ближайшее время основное внимание желательно сосредоточить на следующих приоритетных проектах:

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г-ну УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.32]

1. Создание фонда поддержки малого и среднего бизнеса в России с учетом выделяемых Европейским банком реконструкции и развития средств. Наши предложения на сей счет уже были направлены заместителем Председателя Правительства Б.Г.Федоровым.

2. Заключение с Международным валютным фондом соглашения в соответствии с новой программой по кредитованию системных преобразований в размере 3 млрд.ам.долл.

3. Создание специального фонда приватизации и структурных реформ.

Российские представители готовы к предметному согласованию этих и других вопросов реализации стратегии партнерства. Рассчитываю, что и Вы дадите необходимые поручения и будете держать эту работу под Вашим личным контролем. Достижение в ближайшие два месяца конкретных результатов создаст благоприятные условия для успеха июльского саммита в Токио, на деле продемонстрирует значение партнерства России и стран "семерки" для продвижения российских реформ.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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we need to
decide how to
respond



[2015-0815-M-1, 2.33]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 1/31

~~SECRET~~

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2015-0815-M-1 (2.33)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1994

94 JAN28 P11:41

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin

On January 27, Ambassador Pickering was given a letter for you from President Yeltsin dealing with a number of economic and foreign policy issues (full text at Tab A). The key elements of the letter are:

-- a strong, personal recommitment to economic reform, coupled with a request that you, to reciprocate, continue to lead the Western effort to support Russian reform;

-- acceptance of the U.S. goal of integrating Russia into the international community via cooperation on major foreign policy issues;

-- a critique of those who view Russian policy in neighboring states as neo-imperialist, and a promise that this policy will be governed by international standards;

-- a call for Russia and the U.S. to work together on integrating Russia into the G-7, first on the political side but ultimately on the economic side as well (Yeltsin claims this will increase popular support for reform);

-- an invitation for G-7 finance ministers to meet in Moscow to discuss reforms and Russian government plans with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

In passing the letter, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov stressed its confidential nature; we are saying nothing in public for now. A shorter version has been sent to other G-7 heads of state. Mamedov also conveyed Yeltsin's personal appreciation for your recent public statements in support of Russian reform.

The letter combines strong reassurances on reform and foreign policy and conveys a sense of Yeltsin's determination to keep on top of the process. We have heard the G-7 pitch before, of course, but not previously with such insistence, or the surrounding context of accommodation on reform and foreign policy. We plan to discuss our ideas for reacting to the ideas in the letter when we meet with you on Monday to review our Russia/Ukraine policy in general.

~~SECRET~~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachments
Tab A Text of Yeltsin Letter

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THE YELTSIN-CLINTON LETTER PROVIDED TO THE AMBASSADOR BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 27.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(LOGO) PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
26 JANUARY 1994
NO. PR-94
MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN

DEAR BILL,

I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO APPEAL TO YOU PERSONALLY VIA THIS LETTER. WE NEED TO DETERMINE HOW TO CARRY MATTERS FURTHER.

I KNOW THAT THE FATE OF RUSSIAN REFORM WORRIES MANY. I DO NOT TAKE THIS WORRY AS INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. QUITE THE OPPOSITE, I ACCEPT ITS LEGITIMACY: WE ARE A PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE WORLD DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA. I CAN SAY CLEARLY AND WITHOUT CONTRADICTION: I ANSWER FOR REFORM IN RUSSIA BEFORE THE COUNTRY AND BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS THE PRESIDENT WHO RECEIVED HIS MANDATE IN A NATIONAL ELECTION AND TWICE CONFIRMED IT IN REFERENDUMS. AS PRESIDENT I GUARANTEE: THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN COURSE.

WE HAVE NOT COME SO FAR AND WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY IN ORDER NOW, WHEN THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND A CHANCE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE WORK WITH THE PARLIAMENT, TO TURN BACK.

I AM TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MOOD OF RUSSIANS. I AM FOLLOWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. I AM GIVING THE GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK INDEPENDENTLY, AND AT THE SAME TIME I AM SETTING OUT THE GENERAL DIRECTIONS OF ITS WORK, NOTING THE BOUNDARIES BEYOND WHICH IT SHOULD NOT GO. I HELP (IT) TO SEE IN PERSPECTIVE, TO MORE DEEPLY UNDERSTAND ITS RESPONSIBILITY.

OF COURSE, REFORM IN A COUNTRY SUCH AS RUSSIA CANNOT TAKE PLACE "IN ONE BREATH." PERIODS OF RADICAL CHANGE HAVE ALREADY BEEN REPLACED BY PERIODS OF CALMER (REFORM), AND THEN A NEW UPTURN BEGAN. BUT THE MAIN THING IS FORWARD MOVEMENT, AND THIS IS WHAT I ANSWER FOR -- SUCH MOVEMENT CONTINUES AND WILL CONTINUE.

I WOULD LIKE TO TELL THOSE WHO CRITICIZE US TODAY, WHO UNJUSTLY ACCUSE US OF CURTAILING REFORM: CALM DOWN, DON'T HURRY TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS, WEIGH EVERYTHING ATTENTIVELY. THIS IS RUSSIA. AND LIFE IN RUSSIA IS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN IT SEEMS FROM OUTSIDE. I AM SURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THIS FULL

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WELL.

ACCEPTING THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE COURSE OF RUSSIAN REFORM, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON SEVERAL FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS.

WE HAVE BUILT, AND ARE BUILDING OUR FOREIGN POLICY ON THE BASIS OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING, NATURALLY, OUR NEIGHBORS. AND WE DEMAND THE SAME OF THEM. WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THESE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES, WE PLAN TO DEFEND OUR LEGAL INTERESTS -- IF NEED BE IN A TOUGH AND FIRM MANNER, JUST AS OTHER STATES DO WHEN IT COMES TO DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN HONOR AND RESPECT. NO ONE SHOULD HAVE ANY DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE.

WHEN PEOPLE OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF INTEREST AND GOOD WILL ADVISE US TO STRENGTHEN RUSSIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN THE NEAR ABROAD WITH INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND PRESENCE, AND CALL OUR ATTENTION TO MUTUAL TRANSPARENCY, WE ACCEPT AND GREET SUCH AN APPROACH AND ARE WILLING TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THIS DIRECTION. BUT I WIL
L SAY OPENLYN I AM SERIOUSLY
WORRIED BY THE SPREADING SPECULATION ABOUT A REBIRTH OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM.

WE SPOKE OF THIS IN MOSCOW AND, IN MY VIEW REVIEWED THE QUESTION FAIRLY FULLY. CHARGES OF NEO-IMPERIALISM ARE UNJUST AND IRRESPONSIBLE. AND, I THINK, (THEY ARE) NOT DISINTERESTED. THEREFORE, WE CANNOT ALLOW OPPONENTS OF CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST TO FORCE US TO PAUSE. ANY BREATHER, IN PLACE OF THE PROMISED ACTIVIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP, WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF OPPONENTS OF REFORM AND, IN THE BROADER SCHEME, OF THE RIGHT-CONSERVATIVE FORCES BOTH IN RUSSIA AND IN THE WEST.

WE NEED TO ACT. I PROPOSE WE QUICKLY BEGIN WORK ON THE PRACTICAL REALIZATION OF OUR EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON THE NEED FOR A FULL-SCALE PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA BY WORKING OUT AND CONFIRMING AT A MEETING OF THE SEVEN IN NAPLES THE BASIC POSITIONS OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE "SEVEN" BOTH IN THE ECONOMIC AND IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERES. THIS STRATEGY SHOULD CLEARLY STATE THE PERSPECTIVE FOR TURNING THE "SEVEN" INTO THE "EIGHT," STARTING IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE.

I FEEL IT NECESSARY PARTICULARLY TO STRESS: WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS NOT AFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLED JOINT ACTIVITY ON THE BASIS OF JOINT DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT. WHAT I AM PROPOSING IS TO TAKE CONCRETE

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DECISIONS ABOUT CONCRETE STEPS TIED TO CLEAR TIME PARAMETERS.

I KNOW THAT THE TRANSITION TO A NEW STAGE IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WIT THE "SEVEN" CARRIES WITH IT ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ARE READY TO TAKE THESE UPON THEMSELVES. THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT, V.S. CHERNOMYRDIN, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE QUESTIONS.

WE CONFIRM OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE IN MOSCOW THE FINANCE MINISTERS OF THE "SEVEN" IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF MATTERS. ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF THESE ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS WE WOULD BE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE "SHERPAS."

IN ADDITION, I PROPOSE TO ORDER THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO WORK OUT BEFORE NAPLES THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTENT OF SUCH A STRATEGY (INCLUDING WITH THE USE OF OUR GROUP ON STRATEGIC STABILITY). THE RESULTS OF THIS WORK -- BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL -- WOULD BE REPORTED TO US SO THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS COULD PRESENT ON THIS BASIS A JOINT RUSSIAN-AMERICAN INITIATIVE, HAVING INVITED OUR PARTNERS IN THE "SEVEN" TO JOIN IT.

THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A STRATEGY WILL ALLOW US TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN US (SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE SITUATIONS WITH LIBYA, YUGOSLAVIA, IRAQ), AND GUARANTEE THE PROGRESSIVE NATURE AND DEPENDABILITY OF OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION.

IN ADDITION, A POLITICAL DOCUMENT OF THE "EIGHT" FIXING THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A PROGRAM OF COOPERATION, WOULD HELP TO BUILD A SOCIAL CONSENSUS: BOTH IN RUSSIA -- IN FAVOR OF REFORM -- AND IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST -- IN SUPPORT OF SUCH A COURSE OF THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP.

BILL, I'LL BE OPEN. I KNOW IT ISN'T EASY FOR YOU NOW. THEY ARE ATTACKING YOU SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY SEE THAT YOU HAVE BEGUN AN IMPORTANT JOB, WHICH INEVITABLY AFFECTS MANY INTERESTS. BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT YOU WILL WIN OUT AND REALIZE YOUR "AGENDA FOR AMERICA." I HOPE THAT, REGARDLESS OF INTERNAL MATTERS, YOU WILL CONTINUE YOUR ACTIVE ROLE IN WORLD POLITICS.

IN MOSCOW I SHARED WITH YOU MY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. AS IT TURNS OUT, OF THE ENTIRE TOKYO PACKAGE, ONLY THOSE ASPECTS WHICH YOU TOOK PERSONALLY UPON YOURSELF WERE REALIZED IN FULL. I CALL ON YOU AGAIN THIS TIME TO DEMONSTRATE LEADERSHIP IN WORKING OUT A STRATEGY TO BRING RUSSIA CLOSER TO THE "SEVEN." I WILL NOT HIDE THE FACT THAT I SUPPORTED

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THE AMERICAN IDEA OF "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" FIRST OF ALL TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POTENTIAL FOR INTEGRATION CONTAINED IN IT. I AM VERY MUCH COUNTING ON AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE OF THE USA TO THIS CURRENT INITIATIVE OF
THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP.

CONCURRENTLY, I AM DESPATCHING LETTERS TO THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE "SEVEN," IN WHICH I BRIEFLY BRING UP THIS IDEA, BUT FOR THE MOMENT NOT THE DETAILS. I THINK THAT JOINT WORK ON IT WILL BE A WORTHY MEANS OF REALIZING OUR CONCLUSIONS ON THE FORMATION BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND THE U.S. OF A RELATIONSHIP OF MATURE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, AS YOU AND I STATED IN THE MOSCOW DECLARATION.

I AWAIT YOU THOUGHTS.

WITH RESPECT.

/S/

B. YELTSIN

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill,

I was pleased to receive your message concerning the results of your Geneva meeting with President Assad of Syria.

I fully share your assessments of our discussions in Moscow and regard the message itself as yet another manifestation of our common desire to strengthen our relations of partnership.

I believe that the US-Syrian meeting in Geneva was an important and productive one. Judging from H.Assad's optimistic statement (and he is not known to indulge in grandiloquence), a movement has finally begun toward unblocking the situation at Syrian-Israeli talks. This progress should now be advanced in every way, and we intend to act in this direction.

For my part, I would like to inform you that early this year I sent my personal message to President Assad, in which I also urged him to adopt a more flexible position and try to arrive at practical agreements in the talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Indeed, as both of us are convinced, the Syrian-Israeli component is becoming a key one within the context of the Arab-Israeli settlement and it is apparently the area on which we should focus as a matter of priority as we continue to search for mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of troops withdrawal, ensuring security, and establishing peace.

I am pleased to note that our efforts - in the Middle East affairs, too - go in the same direction. This reinforces the practice of Russian-American strategic partnership. I believe that as the talks are about to move to a qualitatively new stage not only in the Palestinian, but in the Syrian segment as well -

His Excellency
Mr.William J.Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.35]

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and as the possibility of reaching agreements is becoming realistic, our interaction should be even closer.

Being aware of the great responsibility devolving on it by virtue of a co-sponsor status, Russian diplomacy shall continue to work vigorously and purposefully so as to help as much as possible, in accordance with the Madrid mandate, to get us closer to the ultimate objective of the Middle East peace process. This objective is the establishment of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. In the process, our diplomats shall continue to work in closest contact with their US colleagues.

With best wishes,

Boris YELTSIN

January 24, 1994
Moscow, Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Дорогой Билл,

Рад был получить Ваше послание относительно итогов встречи с президентом Сирии Х.Асадом в Женеве.

В полной мере разделяю высказанные в нем оценки наших переговоров в Москве, а само послание рассматриваю как еще одно проявление нашей общей нацеленности на упрочение партнерских отношений.

Считаю, что американо-сирийская встреча в Женеве была важной и продуктивной. Судя по оптимистическому заявлению Х.Асада (он, насколько известно, скуп на громкие слова), наконец-то, началось движение в сторону разблокирования ситуации на переговорах между Сирией и Израилем. Эту подвижку сейчас надо всячески развивать, и мы имеем в виду действовать в этом ключе.

Со своей стороны хочу информировать, что в начале года я направил личное послание президенту Асаду, в котором также побуждал его занять более гибкую позицию, выходить на практические договоренности в переговорах между Дамаском и Тель-Авивом. Ведь сирийско-израильское направление, по нашему общему убеждению, становится ключевым в комплексе арабо-израильского урегулирования, и, очевидно, именно на нем в первую очередь нам следовало бы сконцентрировать усилия в поисках взаимоприемлемых развязок по таким проблемам, как вывод войск, обеспечение безопасности и установление мира.

С удовлетворением отмечаю, что наши усилия - и в ближневосточных делах - идут в одном направлении. Это укрепляет практику российско-американского стратегического партнерства. Думаю, что на предстоящем этапе, когда переговоры не только на палестинском, но и на сирийском участке вступают в качественно новую стадию и реальной становится возможность достижения договоренностей, наше взаимодействие должно стать еще теснее.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.36]

Сознавая высокую ответственность статуса коспонсора, российская дипломатия будет по-прежнему работать энергично и целенаправленно с тем, чтобы в соответствии с мадридским мандатом максимально помочь приближению конечной цели ближневосточного мирного процесса. Это - установление всеобъемлющего, справедливого и прочного мира на Ближнем Востоке на основе резолюций 242 и 338 Совета Безопасности ООН. При этом наши дипломаты будут, как и прежде, работать в самом тесном контакте с американскими коллегами.

С наилучшими пожеланиями,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
24 января 1994 года

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~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT ~~HAS~~ SEEN

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KBH 1/2/2015

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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February 9, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from Yeltsin on Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh

The Russian Embassy delivered to us today the attached letter (Tab A) from President Yeltsin to you which focuses principally on Nagorno-Karabakh but ends with some thoughts on the crisis in Bosnia.

The reference to Bosnia at the end of the letter is brief and straightforward. Yeltsin proposes close U.S.-Russian consultations on the crisis this week in order to prevent further bloodshed. As you know, we hope to arrange a call between you and Yeltsin on February 9 to intensify consultations with the Russian leadership. Following your call, Secretaries Christopher and Perry will contact Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defense Minister Grachev on Thursday and Friday to assure we are touching all bases in the Russian government. Jim Collins is in Moscow this week to handle Bosnia with the Russians, and he will follow up on these calls to assure our message is heard in the Foreign Ministry and Kremlin.

The bulk of Yeltsin's letter is devoted to Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia's anger that we have not fully supported its attempt to impose a solution to that conflict. Since the beginning of your Administration, we have tried to work cooperatively with Russia in pressing the Azeris and Armenians to agree to a CSCE-sponsored cease-fire and negotiations. The Russians have flirted with this idea but more often than not worked against it by pushing their own plan for a Russian-sponsored cease-fire which would be enforced by the introduction of Russian troops.

Yeltsin's complaint in the letter that our embassies in the region acted recently to convince the Armenians and Azeris to resist the Russian plan is technically correct but only one part of a complex story. We have been consistently open with the Russians about our unhappiness with their own approach because it includes a Russian troop presence as the enforcement mechanism. We also believe that the Russians are trying to extract economic and military concessions as part of the deal which would infringe upon the sovereignty of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. We will prepare a response from you to Yeltsin on this issue which will emphasize our common interest in convincing the parties to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Attachment
Tab A Letter from President Yeltsin

Dear Bill,

It is with the sense of great satisfaction that I keep memories of our recent meetings in Moscow, and frank exchange of views on many problems, including the acute ones.

In the signed by us Moscow Declaration, we reiterated the fundamental importance of the Russian-US cooperation and noted the fact that relations between Russia and the United States have entered the stage of a mature strategic partnership, based on equality, mutual advantage and recognition of national interests of each other. From this perspective we discussed a broad range of international issues and stated our resolve to intensify the coordination of our efforts with a view to prompt peaceful settlement of conflicts. This directly had to do with the conflicts in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.

It is precisely due to such understanding, Bill, that I have to address you with regard to the questions which cause us concern. Most recently, there has appeared a noticeable departure on the part of the US side in dealing with the Karabakh problem, from the course aimed at coordination and cooperation with Russia.

We have learnt that one of these days the US representatives transmitted in Baku and Yerevan, as well as to Stepanakert, a representation, in which they expressed themselves against the Russian plan of achieving cease-fire and ending hostilities. The statement proceeded directly to say that the "US does not approve of the Russian plan". We are especially concerned that this step was undertaken unilaterally at the time of our intensive contacts with the parties in conflict, which were geared towards setting up a meeting in Moscow between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia with participation of a representative from the Nagorny Karabakh to sign an agreement on cease-fire.
We can not but consider this as an

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President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.38]

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attempt to undermine the Russian peace-building effort in the region, to compromise it in the eyes of the conflicting sides.

I would like to underscore that the main reason why the settlement has not been reached is the lack of reliable cease-fire and end of hostilities. Russia's efforts are specifically targeted at such an agreement, which, as we have repeatedly emphasized, should constitute an integral part of the comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the frameworks of the Minsk process.

Bill, I count on your understanding of a sincere and deep interest Russia has in a prompt settlement of the protracted Karabakh conflict, which unfolds in immediate proximity to our borders. I expect that the US representatives will exercise a constructive approach to this issue in accordance with the spirit of partnership in our relations.

Also, we continue to be seriously concerned with the situation in Bosnia, were, apparently, increasinly heated warfare develops, of all against all type. And this despite the entire history of the conflict, which has shown that stake made by any side on a solution by force would provide neither military victory nor political solution. The prolonging of carnage is fraught with most tragic consequences both for Bosnia proper and beyond, including the Islamic world, where fundumentalist and extremist attitudes can gain ground.

I think, that in order to avert a new and more brutal cycle of violance, it is imperative that we and you make urgent joint efforts, coordinate steps and take unified approaches as much as possible. I believe, that there is a need to hold in the nearest future the Russian-US consultations on this problem, and to search for common ground which could expedite the process of political settlement in Bosnia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

February 8, 1994
Moscow, the Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ
АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

С чувством глубокого удовлетворения вспоминаю наши недавние встречи в Москве, откровенные обмены мнениями по многим, в том числе острым проблемам.

В подписанной нами "Московской декларации" мы подтвердили фундаментальную важность российско-американского сотрудничества и отметили что отношения между Россией и США вступили в стадию зрелого стратегического партнерства, базирующегося на равенстве, взаимной выгоде и признании национальных интересов друг друга. С этих позиций мы обсуждали широкий круг международных проблем и заявили о своей решимости интенсифицировать координацию наших усилий в целях содействия скорейшему мирному разрешению конфликтов. Это прямо касалось конфликтов в ряде новых независимых государств из бывшего Советского Союза и в бывшей Югославии.

Именно исходя из такого понимания, вынужден, Билл, срочно обратиться к тебе по тревожащим нас вопросам. В последние дни в подходе американской стороны к карабахской проблеме обозначился заметный отход от линии на координацию и сотрудничество с Россией.

Нам стало известно, что на днях американские представители передали в Баку и Ереване, а также для Степанакерта представление, в котором высказались против российского плана по достижению прекращения огня и военных действий. В нем прямо сказано, что США "не одобряют российский план". Особенно настораживает то, что этот шаг был предпринят в одностороннем порядке в период наших интенсивных контактов с конфликтующими сторонами в целях организации встречи в Москве президентов Азербайджана и Армении с участием представителя Нагорного Карабаха для подписания соглашения о прекращении огня. Мы не можем расценить это иначе, как попытку подрыва российских миротворческих усилий в регионе, их дискредитацию в глазах конфликтующих сторон.

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Хочу подчеркнуть, что главной причиной неудач в урегулировании является отсутствие надежного прекращения огня и военных действий. Усилия России сосредоточены именно на заключении такого соглашения, которое, как мы неоднократно подчеркивали, должно стать составной частью всеобъемлющего урегулирования конфликта в рамках Минского процесса.

Билл, рассчитываю на твое понимание искренней и глубокой заинтересованности России в скорейшем урегулировании затянувшегося карабахского конфликта, происходящего в непосредственной близости от наших границ. Ожидаю, что американские представители проявят конструктивный подход в этом вопросе в соответствии с партнерским духом наших отношений.

Серьезную озабоченность продолжает вызывать у нас и положение в Боснии, где, похоже, все сильнее разгорается бессмысленная война все против всех. И это несмотря на всю историю конфликта, показавшую, что ставка любой из сторон на силовое решение не дает ни военной победы, ни политической развязки. Продолжение бойни чревато самыми трагическими последствиями как для самой Боснии, так и шире, включая исламский мир, где могут усилиться фундаменталистские, экстремистские настроения.

Думаю, что во избежание нового, еще более жесткого цикла насили необходимы срочные совместны наши с вами усилия, координация шагов и максимально возможное единство подходов. Считаю, назрела потребность в ближайшее время провести российско-американские консультации по данной проблеме, поискать совпадающие элементы, способные форсироват процесс политического урегулирования в Боснии.

С искренним уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

8 февраля 1994 года
Москва, Кремль

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PER E. O. 13526

Originator: WHITE HOUSE

Subject : ***NO SUBJECT FOUND***

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KBH 1/2/2025

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
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SECTION 1 OF 2
3.3(b)(6) PLEASE DELIVER TO CHARGE RICHARD M. MILES.

CHARGE MILES PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RYURIKOV AT MOSCOW OOB, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY THAT I REGRET VERY MUCH THE COMPLICATIONS THAT PREVENTED US FROM SPEAKING BY TELEPHONE ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. I HOPE THERE ARE NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THE PROBLEMS IN MAKING THE CALLS. I WANTED TO SPEAK TO YOU PERSONALLY ON WEDNESDAY CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA BEFORE ANY DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED FROM BRUSSELS. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE TELEPHONE LINE MADE THAT CONVERSATION IMPOSSIBLE, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES PREVENTED US FROM TALKING ON THURSDAY. I WAS ALSO TOLD THAT YOU HAD TO WAIT ON THE LINE ON THURSDAY. THAT WAS NOT MY INTENTION, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE.

I HAVE ASKED MY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TONY LAKE, TO WORK CLOSELY WITH DMITRIY RYURIKOV TO SCHEDULE ANOTHER CALL TODAY, FEBRUARY 11. I WILL BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME TO SPEAK WITH YOU. THE BEST TIME FOR ME IS AT 9:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME. IN ANTICIPATION OF THAT CONVERSATION, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU DIRECTLY THROUGH THIS LETTER ABOUT THE PLAN OF ACTION THAT I THINK WE NEED TO UNDERTAKE TOGETHER TO REACH PEACE IN BOSNIA.

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 9 WITH YOUR VIEWS ON THE BOSNIAN CRISIS. AFTER A CAREFUL READING OF THE LETTER, I BELIEVE WE SHARE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM AND A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE NATO ANNOUNCEMENT, AND MY OWN STATEMENT MADE IN WASHINGTON LATE FEBRUARY 9. THESE STATEMENTS DESCRIBE THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE PLAN OF ACTION, AND THE REASONING THAT UNDERLIES IT. THE MAIN POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO YOU NOW -- AND I HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THEM IN GREATER DETAIL DURING OUR PHONE CALL -- ARE AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST, WE ARE COMMITTED TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. I HAVE INSTRUCTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO ENSURE THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN US, AS YOU SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT I SENT AMBASSADOR JIM COLLINS TO MOSCOW LAST SUNDAY TO CONSULT WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE PLAN THAT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS. HE HAS HAD IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE WEEK WITH YOUR SENIOR OFFICIALS. I HOPE THAT TYPE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WILL CONTINUE.

THE SECOND POINT RELATES TO THE AIR STRIKES THAT ARE THREATENED AS A PART OF THE PLAN. WE EXPECT THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT -- SERBS AND MOSLEMS ALIKE -- WILL WITHDRAW THEIR ARTILLERY OR PLACE IT UNDER UN CONTROL DURING THE TEN-DAY PERIOD THAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.

WE HOPE ALSO THAT THERE WILL BE NO SHELLING OF SARAJEVO. I KNOW OF YOUR CONCERN THAT ANY APPROACH BE EVEN-HANDED, AND I BELIEVE THAT

THIS ONE IS: IT REQUIRES ALL SIDES TO OBSERVE ITS PROVISIONS. WE HOPE THAT YOUR INFLUENCE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS CAN CONVINCE THEM TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS THAT WILL PREVENT THE USE OF AIR STRIKES.

.

THIRD, I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA PREFERRED THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEVELOP A PLAN OF ACTION, AS OPPOSED TO NATO. WE BELIEVE OUR PLAN IS COMPATIBLE WITH YOUR DESIRES, IN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALREADY MADE THE INITIAL DECISION WHEN IT AUTHORIZED ALL NECESSARY MEANS -- INCLUDING AIR STRIKES -- TO CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO CRAFT AN APPROACH THAT BUILDS ON SOME IDEAS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED AND THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT YOUR KEY CONCERNS.

.

FOURTH, WE ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE IN BOSNIA. OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON FOUR ELEMENTS: (1) HELPING THE BOSNIANS DEFINE REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SETTLEMENT; (2) CONVINCING THE SERBS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF

THEIR OFFER TO ADDRESS BOSNIAN CONCERNS; (3) TOGETHER WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, WORKING WITH BELGRADE AND ZAGREB TO MAKE CLEAR IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO COOPERATE; AND (4) AFFIRMING OUR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO HELP IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE NATO'S FEBRUARY 9 DECISION COMPLEMENTS THIS STRATEGY. AMBASSADOR COLLINS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH YOUR OFFICIALS. WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA'S COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROCESS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE, AND THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT WE MUST ACT. AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE DECISION WE HAVE MADE WILL HELP MOVE THE PARTIES CLOSER TO THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WE ALL AGREE IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR A LONG-TERM RESOLUTION OF THIS TERRIBLE HUMAN TRAGEDY. I HOPE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO REINVIGORATE THE DIPLOMATIC SEARCH FOR PEACE. THIS IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST, AND WE CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF WE STAY TOGETHER.

.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO REITERATE MY COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING THE STRAIGHTFORWARD PERSONAL DIALOGUE THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE BASIS FOR OUR EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP. OUR ABILITY TO BE IN DIRECT CONTACT AND SPEAK FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER IS A VITAL ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, AND ONE THAT I VALUE HIGHLY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU LATER TODAY.

.

SINCERELY,

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BILL

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END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#2771
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** DEMAND PRINT **

PRW228 0420409

MATCH = ** NONE **

ACTION =

INFO =

TOTAL COPIES = 0

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [2.41]

KBH 1/2/2025

RVW013PRW228
OAAMZYUW YELADA 2770 0420406-MNSH--YEXXWHX YEKOHR.|
ZNY MMNSH ZZK
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 110406Z FEB 94 ZFF 1/4
FM WHITE HOUSE
3.3(b)(6)
ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 2
3.3(b)(6) PLEASE DELIVER TO CHARGE RICHARD M. MILES.

CHARGE MILES PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RYURIKOV AT MOSCOW OOB, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY THAT I REGRET VERY MUCH THE COMPLICATIONS THAT PREVENTED US FROM SPEAKING BY TELEPHONE ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. I HOPE THERE ARE NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THE PROBLEMS IN MAKING THE CALLS. I WANTED TO SPEAK TO YOU PERSONALLY ON WEDNESDAY CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA BEFORE ANY DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED FROM BRUSSELS. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE TELEPHONE LINE MADE THAT CONVERSATION IMPOSSIBLE, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES PREVENTED US FROM TALKING ON THURSDAY. I WAS ALSO TOLD THAT YOU HAD TO WAIT ON THE LINE ON THURSDAY. THAT WAS NOT MY INTENTION, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE.

I HAVE ASKED MY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TONY LAKE, TO WORK CLOSELY WITH DMITRIY RYURIKOV TO SCHEDULE ANOTHER CALL TODAY, FEBRUARY 11. I WILL BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME TO SPEAK WITH YOU. THE BEST TIME FOR ME IS AT 9:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME. IN ANTICIPATION OF THAT CONVERSATION, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU DIRECTLY

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~~S E C R E T~~
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~~S E C R E T~~

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THROUGH THIS LETTER ABOUT THE PLAN OF ACTION THAT I THINK WE NEED TO UNDERTAKE TOGETHER TO REACH PEACE IN BOSNIA.

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 9 WITH YOUR VIEWS ON THE BOSNIAN CRISIS. AFTER A CAREFUL READING OF THE LETTER, I BELIEVE WE SHARE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM AND A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE NATO ANNOUNCEMENT, AND MY OWN STATEMENT MADE IN WASHINGTON LATE FEBRUARY 9. THESE STATEMENTS DESCRIBE THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE PLAN OF ACTION, AND THE REASONING THAT UNDERLIES IT. THE MAIN POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO YOU NOW -- AND I HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THEM IN GREATER DETAIL DURING OUR PHONE CALL -- ARE AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST, WE ARE COMMITTED TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. I HAVE INSTRUCTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO ENSURE THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN US, AS YOU SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT I SENT AMBASSADOR JIM COLLINS TO MOSCOW LAST SUNDAY TO CONSULT WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE PLAN THAT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS. HE HAS HAD IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE WEEK WITH YOUR SENIOR OFFICIALS. I HOPE THAT TYPE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WILL CONTINUE.

THE SECOND POINT RELATES TO THE AIR STRIKES THAT ARE THREATENED AS A PART OF THE PLAN. WE EXPECT THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT -- SERBS AND MOSLEMS ALIKE -- WILL WITHDRAW THEIR ARTILLERY OR PLACE IT UNDER UN CONTROL DURING THE TEN-DAY PERIOD THAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.

WE HOPE ALSO THAT THERE WILL BE NO SHELLING OF SARAJEVO. I KNOW OF YOUR CONCERN THAT ANY APPROACH BE EVEN-HANDED, AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS ONE IS: IT REQUIRES ALL SIDES TO OBSERVE ITS PROVISIONS. WE HOPE THAT YOUR INFLUENCE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS CAN CONVINCE THEM TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS THAT WILL PREVENT THE USE OF AIR STRIKES.

THIRD, I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA PREFERRED THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEVELOP A PLAN OF ACTION, AS OPPOSED TO NATO. WE BELIEVE OUR PLAN IS COMPATIBLE WITH YOUR DESIRES, IN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALREADY MADE THE INITIAL DECISION WHEN IT AUTHORIZED ALL NECESSARY MEANS -- INCLUDING AIR STRIKES -- TO CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO CRAFT AN APPROACH THAT BUILDS ON SOME IDEAS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED AND THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT YOUR KEY CONCERNS.

FOURTH, WE ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE IN BOSNIA. OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON FOUR ELEMENTS: (1) HELPING THE BOSNIANS DEFINE REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SETTLEMENT; (2) CONVINCING THE SERBS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF

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~~S E C R E T~~

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~~S E C R E T~~

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TOR 0420406 NCN 00954688 PAGE 1 >>> N I A C T <<<

** DEMAND PRINT **

PRW230 0420410

MATCH = ** NONE **

ACTION =

INFO =

TOTAL COPIES = 0

RVW015PRW230
OAAMZYUW YELADA 2771 0420406-MNSH--YEXXWHX YEKOHR.|
ZNY MMNSH ZZK
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 110406Z FEB 94 ZFF-1/4
FM WHITE HOUSE
3.3(b)(6)
ZEM
S E ~~C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
FINAL SECTION OF 2
THEIR OFFER TO ADDRESS BOSNIAN CONCERNS; (3) TOGETHER WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, WORKING WITH BELGRADE AND ZAGREB TO MAKE CLEAR IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO COOPERATE; AND (4) AFFIRMING OUR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO HELP IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE NATO'S FEBRUARY 9 DECISION COMPLEMENTS THIS STRATEGY. AMBASSADOR COLLINS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH YOUR OFFICIALS. WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA'S COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROCESS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

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BORIS, I KNOW THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE, AND THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT WE MUST ACT. AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE DECISION WE HAVE MADE WILL HELP MOVE THE PARTIES CLOSER TO THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WE ALL AGREE IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR A LONG-TERM RESOLUTION OF THIS TERRIBLE HUMAN TRAGEDY. I HOPE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO REINVIGORATE THE DIPLOMATIC SEARCH FOR PEACE. THIS IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST, AND WE CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF WE STAY TOGETHER.

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IN CLOSING, I WANT TO REITERATE MY COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING THE STRAIGHTFORWARD PERSONAL DIALOGUE THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE BASIS FOR OUR EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP. OUR ABILITY TO BE IN DIRECT CONTACT AND SPEAK FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER IS A VITAL ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, AND ONE THAT I VALUE HIGHLY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU LATER TODAY.

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~~S E C R E T~~

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~~S E C R E T~~

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SINCERELY,
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BILL
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END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#2771

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~~S E C R E T~~

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

~~S E C R E T~~

2015-0815-M-1 [2.42]
KBH 1/2/2025

01 00 OO SSSS AA ZYUW VAX671

WHITE HOUSE
3.3(b)(6)
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
3.3(b)(6) PLEASE DELIVER TO CHARGE RICHARD M. MILES.
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CHARGE MILES PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RYURIKOV AT MOSCOW OOB, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
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03 00

SPEAKING WITH YOU LATER TODAY.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL

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END TEXT
DECL: OADR

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

THE CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RYURIKOV AT MOSCOW OOB, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.43)
KBH 1/2/2025

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY THAT I REGRET VERY MUCH THE COMPLICATIONS THAT PREVENTED US FROM SPEAKING BY TELEPHONE ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. I HOPE THERE ARE NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THE PROBLEMS IN MAKING THE CALLS. I WANTED TO SPEAK TO YOU PERSONALLY ON WEDNESDAY CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA BEFORE ANY DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED FROM BRUSSELS. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE TELEPHONE LINE MADE THAT CONVERSATION IMPOSSIBLE, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES PREVENTED US FROM TALKING ON THURSDAY. I WAS ALSO TOLD THAT YOU HAD TO WAIT ON THE LINE ON THURSDAY. THAT WAS NOT MY INTENTION, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE.

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~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

WE HOPE ALSO THAT ~~THERE~~ THERE WILL ~~SIDES~~ BE NO SHELLING OF SARAJEVO.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IT REQUIRES ALL SIDES TO ~~STOP FIGHTING~~ OBSERVE ITS PROVISIONS. WE HOPE THAT YOUR INFLUENCE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS CAN CONVINCE THEM TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS THAT WILL PREVENT THE USE OF AIR STRIKES.

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SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2015-0815-M-1 [2.44]
KBH 1/2/2025

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: COQ FILE HILLIARD PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM2 WHSR_IN WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 110406Z FEB 94

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 2
3.3(b)(6) PLEASE DELIVER TO CHARGE RICHARD M. MILES.

CHARGE MILES PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RYURIKOV AT MOSCOW OOB, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
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FOURTH, WE ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE IN BOSNIA. OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON FOUR ELEMENTS: (1) HELPING THE BOSNIANS DEFINE REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SETTLEMENT; (2) CONVINCING THE SERBS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF

THEIR OFFER TO ADDRESS BOSNIAN CONCERNS; (3) TOGETHER WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, WORKING WITH BELGRADE AND ZAGREB TO MAKE CLEAR IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO COOPERATE; AND (4) AFFIRMING OUR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO HELP IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE NATO'S FEBRUARY 9 DECISION COMPLEMENTS THIS STRATEGY. AMBASSADOR COLLINS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IN

GREATER DETAIL WITH YOUR OFFICIALS. WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA'S COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROCESS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE, AND THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT WE MUST ACT. AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE DECISION WE HAVE MADE WILL HELP MOVE THE PARTIES CLOSER TO THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WE ALL AGREE IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR A LONG-TERM RESOLUTION OF THIS TERRIBLE HUMAN TRAGEDY. I HOPE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO REINVIGORATE THE DIPLOMATIC SEARCH FOR PEACE. THIS IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST, AND WE CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF WE STAY TOGETHER.

.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO REITERATE MY COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING THE STRAIGHTFORWARD PERSONAL DIALOGUE THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE BASIS FOR OUR EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP. OUR ABILITY TO BE IN DIRECT CONTACT AND SPEAK FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER IS A VITAL ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, AND ONE THAT I VALUE HIGHLY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU LATER TODAY.

.

SINCERELY,

.

BILL

.

.

END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#2771
NNNN
<MSGID> M0876645

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET

THE CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RYURIKOV AT MOSCOW OOB, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.45)
KBH 1/2/2025

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO LET YOU KNOW PERSONALLY THAT I REGRET VERY MUCH THE COMPLICATIONS THAT PREVENTED US FROM SPEAKING BY TELEPHONE ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. I HOPE THERE ARE NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THE PROBLEMS IN MAKING THE CALLS. I WANTED TO SPEAK TO YOU PERSONALLY ON WEDNESDAY CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA BEFORE ANY DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED FROM BRUSSELS. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE TELEPHONE LINE MADE THAT CONVERSATION IMPOSSIBLE, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES PREVENTED US FROM TALKING ON THURSDAY. I WAS ALSO TOLD THAT YOU HAD TO WAIT ON THE LINE ON THURSDAY. THAT WAS NOT MY INTENTION, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE.

I HAVE ASKED MY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, ANTHONY LAKE, TO WORK CLOSELY WITH DMITRIY RYURIKOV TO SCHEDULE ANOTHER CALL FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11. I PROPOSE 9:00 AM EST (WASHINGTON TIME) BUT WILL WORK HARD TO FIND ANY MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME IF 9:00 AM DOES NOT WORK FOR YOU. IN ANTICIPATION OF THAT CONVERSATION, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU DIRECTLY THROUGH THIS LETTER ABOUT THE PLAN OF ACTION THAT I THINK WE NEED TO UNDERTAKE TOGETHER TO REACH PEACE IN BOSNIA.

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 9 WITH YOUR VIEWS ON THE BOSNIAN CRISIS. AFTER A CAREFUL READING OF THE LETTER, I BELIEVE WE SHARE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM AND A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE NATO ANNOUNCEMENT AND MY OWN STATEMENT MADE IN WASHINGTON LATE FEBRUARY 9. THESE STATEMENTS DESCRIBE THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE PLAN OF ACTION, AND THE REASONING THAT UNDERLIES IT. THE MAIN POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO YOU NOW -- AND I HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THEM IN GREATER DETAIL DURING OUR PHONE CALL -- ARE AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST, WE ARE COMMITTED TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. I HAVE INSTRUCTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO ENSURE THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN US, AS YOU SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT I SENT AMBASSADOR JIM COLLINS TO MOSCOW LAST SUNDAY SPECIFICALLY TO CONSULT WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE PLAN THAT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS. HE HAS HAD IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE WEEK WITH YOUR SENIOR OFFICIALS. I HOPE THAT TYPE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WILL CONTINUE.

THE SECOND POINT RELATES TO THE AIR STRIKES THAT ARE THREATENED AS A PART OF THE PLAN. THEY ARE A LAST RESORT. WE EXPECT THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT -- SERBS AND MOSLEMS ALIKE -- WILL WITHDRAW THEIR ARTILLERY OR PLACE IT UNDER UN CONTROL DURING THE

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TEN-DAY PERIOD THAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED. I KNOW OF YOUR CONCERN THAT ANY APPROACH BE EVEN-HANDED, AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS ONE IS: IT REQUIRES ALL SIDES TO STOP FIGHTING. WE HOPE THAT YOUR INFLUENCE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS CAN CONVINCE THEM TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS THAT WILL PREVENT THE USE OF AIR STRIKES.

THIRD, I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA PREFERRED THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEVELOP A PLAN OF ACTION, AS OPPOSED TO NATO. WE BELIEVE OUR PLAN IS COMPATIBLE WITH YOUR DESIRES, IN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALREADY MADE THE INITIAL DECISION WHEN IT AUTHORIZED ALL NECESSARY MEANS -- INCLUDING AIR STRIKES -- TO CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO CRAFT AN APPROACH THAT BUILDS ON SOME IDEAS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED AND THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT YOUR KEY CONCERNS.

FOURTH, WE ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE IN BOSNIA. OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON FOUR ELEMENTS: (1) HELPING THE BOSNIANS DEFINE REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SETTLEMENT; (2) BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SERBS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THEIR OFFER TO ADDRESS BOSNIAN CONCERNS; (3) TOGETHER WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, WORKING WITH BELGRADE AND ZAGREB TO MAKE CLEAR IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO COOPERATE; AND (4) AFFIRMING OUR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO HELP IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE NATO'S FEBRUARY 9 DECISION COMPLEMENTS THIS STRATEGY. AMBASSADOR COLLINS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH YOUR OFFICIALS. WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA'S COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROCESS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE AND THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT WE MUST ACT. AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE DECISION WE HAVE MADE WILL HELP MOVE THE PARTIES CLOSER TO THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WE ALL AGREE IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR A LONG-TERM RESOLUTION OF THIS TERRIBLE HUMAN TRAGEDY. I HOPE THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO REINVIGORATE THE DIPLOMATIC SEARCH FOR PEACE. THIS IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST, AND WE CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF WE STAY TOGETHER.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO REITERATE MY COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING THE STRAIGHTFORWARD PERSONAL DIALOGUE THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE BASIS FOR OUR EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP. OUR ABILITY TO BE IN DIRECT CONTACT AND SPEAK FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER IS A VITAL ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, AND ONE THAT I VALUE HIGHLY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU LATER TODAY.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

1278

Translated from Russian

February 16, 1994

Dear Bill,

Once again, I have to write to you on the Sarajevo problem. I will not go into the details spelled out in the statement by the Government of the Russian Federation, whose text I am enclosing. It is still a draft. Before it becomes an official document, I would like once again to communicate with you. In this statement, as well as in the contacts between our foreign policy agencies in recent days we have provided a detailed explanation of the problems we are faced with. I am convinced that your side, too, understands these obvious things. Yet we see attempts at proving to us that the opposite is true. What do they expect us to do? To pretend that we somehow do not see the difference between a NATO decision and a decision of the UN Security Council? To support the unilateral NATO ultimatum and do so at a time when there is a major debate going on in Russia and in the world at large about which direction NATO is evolving - either toward partnership for peace or toward building up its position of strength in the international arena?

You know my answer to this question. We want to become a true partner. And a mature partner at that, as you and I agreed, and we expect the same from you. The Moscow Declaration you and I signed is now being tested in Sarajevo. There is a chance to correct the situation. Let us find a compromise and do it quickly, let us make the extra effort. I will once again pressure Milosevic (we have already done that; he promised to try his best, and the Serbs are already cooperating with the UN forces in Sarajevo). But I ask that you, too, meet me halfway. After all, the NATO decision was

His Excellency
William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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taken in response to Boutros-Ghali's request to tell him if the Alliance was ready to provide aircraft at the UN request. In Brussels you went further than that. But in his letter to the Security Council dated February 10 Boutros-Ghali only recorded your readiness to act at the UN request, no more than that. There was no talk about an ultimatum. I see no reason why NATO cannot adopt this position of the UN Secretary General.

If NATO has decided to strike no matter what or who, then developments in Europe will be unpredictable. How do you see a probable scenario after the air strikes have begun, Bill? Of course, one can hope for a "happy end", one can hope that everybody will surrender and peace will settle in, but you and I are familiar with the experience of this war, we know the ways of the Serbs and the Muslims. (Incidentally, encouraged by the NATO ultimatum the Muslims have already gotten psyched up and are refusing to reach agreement on Sarajevo and with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina are rejecting the peace plan and demanding that everything begin from scratch). Therefore, the resumption of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina scenario is more likely. What will NATO do then? What will the United States do? Will it dispatch an expeditionary corps to wage a full-scale war in Europe?

I am not raising these questions in a rhetorical fashion. I need to, I must understand the logic of your actions today, the sequence of steps being planned now in Washington. If what is being programmed is a war, think about what options are left to me?

Something must urgently be done. And the next step is up to the United States.

Things would be helped by a public clarification from Washington in the spirit of our telephone conversation, i.e. that there will be no strikes on the Serbs if they comply with the UN forces' demands and that in any event the use of air force will be ordered by the United Nations. Such a clarification should come

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personally from you. Otherwise, - after the letdowns and understatements of the past few days, - no one will believe it.

I expect to get your reaction by the morning February 18 Moscow time. I hope your response will be such as to allow us not to issue the statement of the Government of Russia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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Draft

Statement

by the Government of the Russian Federation

The attention of the whole world community today is drawn to the situation around Sarajevo. The sufferings of this city's civilian population have long demanded effective measures on the part of the world community to stop hostilities in and around Sarajevo. A year and a half ago at the 47th UNGA session Russia proposed placing Sarajevo under the administrative control of the United Nations and later put forward other concrete initiatives to demilitarize the city in the context of our efforts to resolve the Bosnia crisis and the Yugoslavia crisis as a whole. We have constantly worked and continue to work with all the parties to the conflict, encouraging each of them toward an earliest adoption of the peace plan.

In late January of this year Russia proposed to urgently convene a UN Security Council meeting to consider, among other things, measures to strengthen the safe areas regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Sarajevo.

Unfortunately, only the tragedy in Sarajevo on February 5, whose causes are now being investigated, finally made everybody realize the need for immediate action. Once again, we demanded that the UN Security Council meet to adopt the necessary measures to ensure a cease-fire in Sarajevo, withdrawal of heavy weapons by all parties or placing them under the UN control, and to effectively protect the UN personnel, including, if needed, through the use of air force in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

It is indeed unfortunate that Russia's proposal at the time was not accepted. At the same time the Sarajevo problem was taken to the NATO Council in response to the Secretary General's request to inform him whether NATO would be ready to provide its aircraft

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to support the UN personnel in the exercise of its mandate in the event the United Nations requested that.

Having confirmed its readiness to do that, first expressed as far back as August 1993, the North Atlantic Council went further and adopted additional decisions which went far beyond the Security Council resolutions and the specific request of the UN Secretary General. There were no required consultations with Russia and the other members of the Security Council. NATO unilaterally declared both the specific borders of the zone subject to demilitarization and the list of heavy weapons to be transferred to the UN forces, as well as other "details" which, in accordance with UN practice, would presumably be the subject of a Security Council resolution.

Most importantly, however, NATO decisions contain a 10-day ultimatum upon expiration of which members of the Alliance intend to carry out air strikes at the heavy arms left in the zone of Sarajevo. According to the norms of international law still in effect, even imposition of economic sanctions, let alone the use of military force, require a Security Council resolution. The Security Council has already made a firm determination that force, including aircraft, can be used to put an end to attacks on UN forces, and this provision has long been in effect in safe areas on Bosnian territory, including Sarajevo. Additional grounds for use of force, especially involving destruction of ground targets with inevitable civilian casualties, can only be established by the Security Council. The same goes for the timeframe under which such a condition can be triggered.

Therefore, we are not talking about whether such decisions are needed now or not. We are talking about the fact that the unilateral decision of NATO doesn't fit into the UN framework.

A week after the North Atlantic Council session it became known that a part of its decision wasn't made public at all and is in fact secret.

Thus a situation has arisen under which a group of states-members of NATO have embarked upon the road of unilateral action

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and are adopting decisions on problems within the prerogatives of the UN Security Council without even suggesting that their approach be ratified by the Security Council.

Trying to preserve the unity of action of the world community, Russia managed to have the UN Security Council convened. However, its discussions brought no result.

Extreme concern is caused by the incessant mass media reports to the effect that, upon expiration at night on February 21 of the unilateral ultimatum of NATO, members of the alliance intend to begin air strikes, regardless of the Security Council position or of the actual situation in the zone of Sarajevo. NATO ultimatum has already had a destructive influence on the process of negotiations on Bosnian settlement.

It is absolutely clear that neither the Russian Federation, nor the UN can bear any responsibility for future developments under this scenario. Beyond control of the Security Council are now also, in effect, the UN forces in the zone of Sarajevo which, on one hand, are obliged to act on the basis of their mandate and, on the other hand, find themselves in the immediate area where the NATO operation will be carried out involving not only support for those forces as requested by the UN Secretary General, but also other objectives set by NATO, not by the Security Council. In this situation the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the Security Council cannot be responsible for safety of the UN forces lacking an appropriate mandate. We want the UN forces to know that.

Russia doesn't think that all possibilities are exhausted to avoid the worst-case scenario. We support the approach suggested by the UN Secretary General in his letter of February 10 to the President of the Security Council. We are convinced that it's not too late for the Security Council to urgently consider the question of redefinition of the mandate of UN forces to ensure effective demilitarization of Sarajevo. We are also ready in the process to consider the proposals contained in NATO decisions. Of course, it doesn't mean that all of them will be endorsed by the

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Security Council. But such are the rules established by the international community for adoption of agreed upon measures, such is the nature of the UN and of the partnership we would like to pursue in the world arena.

In the case of Sarajevo the area of agreement is extraordinarily large. All the members of the Security Council have a common purpose - to remove heavy arms from this zone or to put them under UN control. But the ways to achieve that purpose must be agreed upon, and they must be agreed upon within the UN. The other road means unilateral action, and full responsibility for it is borne by those who follow this road.

This responsibility is all the greater since the consequences of use of force out of context of the Security Council resolutions would go far beyond Sarajevo, would create a qualitatively new situation in Bosnia, Europe and the world as a whole. For the first time in recent years decisions on such a key question of international life would have been adopted not jointly in the Security Council, but unilaterally.

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Дорогой Билл,

Вновь вынужден обратиться по проблеме Сараево. Не буду вдаваться в детали, изложенные в Заявлении Правительства Российской Федерации, текст которого я прилагаю. Это - пока проект. Прежде чем он станет официальным документом, я хотел бы еще раз обратиться к тебе. В нем, да и в контактах между нашими внешнеполитическими ведомствами в последние дни мы подробным образом изложили возникшие у нас проблемы Убежден, что и у вас понимают эти очевидные вещи, однако почему-то пытаются доказать нам обратное. Чего от нас ожидают? Чтобы мы сделал вид, будто не видим разницы между решением НАТО и решением Совета Безопасности ООН? Чтобы поддержали односторонний ультиматум НАТО, да еще в тот самый момент, когда в России и в мире крупно спорят, куда трансформируется Североатлантический альянс - в сторону партнерства ради мира или к усилению своих силовых позиций на международной арене?

Мой ответ на этот вопрос ты знаешь. Мы хотим стать подлинными партнерами, причем партнерами зрелыми, как мы с тобой договорились и ждем того же от вас. Наша с тобой Московская декларация проходит сейчас проверку в Сараево. Есть возможность выправить ситуацию. Давай срочно найдем компромисс, предпримем дополнительные усилия. Я еще раз нажму на Милошевича (мы уже сделали это, он обещал постараться, и сербы уже сотрудничают с силами ООН в Сараево). Но прошу и тебя пойти навстречу. В конце концов решение НАТО принято в ответ на просьбу Бутроса-Гали сообщить, готов ли Альянс предоставить авиацию по просьбе ООН. Вы в Брюсселе пошли дальше. Но Бутрос-Гали в своем письме в Совет Безопасности ООН от 10 февраля зафиксировал только вашу готовность действовать по запросу ООН, не более того. Об ультиматуме речь не шла. Не вижу причин, по которым НАТО не может принять эту позицию генерального секретаря ООН.

Если в НАТО решили бить, не считаясь ни с кем и ни с чем, то развитие событий в Европе будет непредсказуемым. Как ты, Билл, представляешь себе вероятный сценарий после начала бомбардировок? Конечно, можно надеяться на "хэппи энд", что сразу все сдадутся и

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наступит мир, но мы оба знакомы с опытом этой войны, знаем повадки и сербов и мусульман. (Последние, кстати, окрыленные ультиматумом НАТО уже закусили удила, отказываются договариваться по Сараево, а по Боснии в целом отвергают мирный план и требуют начать все с чистого листа). Так что более вероятен сценарий возобновления полномасштабных боевых действий в БиГ. Что тогда будет делать НАТО? Что будут делать США? Пошлют экспедиционный корпус для ведения полномасштабной войны в Европе?

Ставлю эти вопросы не риторически. Мне надо, необходимо понимать сегодня логику твоих поступков, последовательность планируемых в Вашингтоне шагов. Если запрограммирована война, то подумай, какие варианты действий остаются у меня?

Надо срочно что-то делать. И следующий шаг - за США.

Делу помогло бы публичное разъяснение из Вашингтона в духе нашего телефонного разговора - что ударов по сербам не будет, если они выполнят требования сил ООН, и что в любом случае команду на применение авиации будет давать ООН. Такое разъяснение должно исходить от тебя лично. Иначе - после накладок и недомолвок последних дней - никто не поверит.

Рассчитываю получить твою реакцию до утра 18 февраля по московскому времени. Надеюсь, твой ответ будет таким, который позволит нам не выступать с Заявлением Правительства России.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

16 февраля 1994 г.

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Проект

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Внимание всего мирового сообщества приковано сегодня к ситуации вокруг Сараево. Страдания мирных жителей этого города давно требовал действенных мер со стороны международного сообщества для прекращения в нем и вокруг него всех боевых действий. Полтора года назад на 47-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН Российская Федерация предлагал поставить Сараево под административное управление ООН, выдвигала впоследствии другие конкретные инициативы по его демилитаризации в контексте наших усилий по урегулированию боснийского конфликта и в целом югокризиса. Мы постоянно работали и работаем со всеми сторонам в конфликте, побуждая каждую из них скорейшему принятию мирного плана.

В конце января этого года Россия выступила за срочный созыв Совета Безопасности, в том числе для рассмотрения мер укрепления режима безопасных районов в Боснии и Герцеговине, включая Сараево.

К сожалению, только трагедия в Сараево 5 февраля, причины которой сейчас расследуются, заставила наконец всех осознать необходимость неотложных действий. Мы вновь потребовали созыва Совета Безопасности с целью принятия необходимых мер по прекращению огня в Сараево, вывода из зоны города тяжелых вооружений всех сторон или взятия их под контроль ООН – а также для эффективной защиты персонала ООН, в том числе, если потребуется, и с использованием авиации в соответствии с имеющимися резолюциями Совета Безопасности.

Приходится сожалеть, что предложение России тогда не было принято. Одновременно проблема Сараево была вынесена на Совет НАТО в ответ на просьбу генерального секретаря ООН сообщить, будет ли НАТО готова предоставить свою авиацию для поддержки персонала ООН в осуществлении имеющегося у него мандата в случае, если об этом попросят Объединенные Нации.

Подтвердив свою готовность к этому, выраженную еще в августе 1993 года, Совет НАТО принял сверх того дополнительные решения,

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которые далеко выходят за рамки резолюции Совета Безопасности и конкретного обращения генерального секретаря ООН. При этом необходимых консультаций с Россией и другими членами Совета Безопасности не было НАТО в одностороннем порядке объявила и конкретные границы зоны, подлежащей демилитаризации, и перечень видов тяжелого вооружения для передачи силам ООН, и другие "детали", которые по практике ООН должны были бы стать предметом резолюции Совета Безопасности.

Главное, однако, в том, что в решениях НАТО выдвинут 10-дневный ультиматум, по истечении которого члены Альянса намерены наносить удары с воздуха по оставшемуся в зоне Сараево тяжелому вооружению. Согласно действующим до сих пор нормам международного права даже введение экономических санкций, не говоря уже о применении военной силы, требует резолюции Совета Безопасности. Совет Безопасности уже твердо решил, что для пресечения нападений на силы ООН может применяться сила, в том числе при поддержке авиации. И это положение уже давно действует в безопасных районах на территории Боснии, в том числе в Сараево. Дополнительные условия применения силы, тем более сопряженного с уничтожением наземных целей с неизбежными жертвами среди гражданского населения, может устанавливать только Совет Безопасности, как и сроки вступления этих условий в действие.

Поэтому речь не идет о том, нужны или нет сейчас решения такого рода. Речь о том, что одностороннее решение НАТО не вписывается в рамки ООН.

Спустя неделю после сессии Совета НАТО выяснилось, что часть принятого на ней решения вообще не предана огласке и является секретной.

Таким образом сложилась ситуация, при которой группа государств входящих в НАТО, встала на путь односторонних действий и принимает решения по проблемам, являющимся прерогативой Совета Безопасности ООН, даже не ставя вопрос об утверждении своих подходов в Совете Безопасности.

Стремясь к сохранению единства действий мирового сообщества, Россия добилась созыва Совета Безопасности ООН. Однако дискуссии на нем результатов не дали.

Вызывают крайнюю озабоченность непрекращающиеся сообщения средств массовой информации о том, что по истечении в ночь с

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20 на 21 февраля одностороннего ультиматума НАТО члены Альянса намереваются приступить к ударам с воздуха, независимо от позиции Совета Безопасности и от реальной ситуации в зоне Сараево. Ультиматум НАТО уже оказал деструктивное влияние и на ход переговоров о боснийском урегулировании.

Совершенно ясно, что за дальнейшее развитие событий по этому сценарию не может нести какой-либо ответственности ни Российская Федерация, ни ООН. По сути дела вне контроля Совета Безопасности оказываются и силы ООН в зоне Сараево, которые, с одной стороны, обязаны действовать на основе имеющегося у них мандата, а с другой - оказываются непосредственно в районе, где будет осуществляться операция НАТО, связанная не только с поддержкой этих сил, как об этом просил генеральный секретарь ООН, но и с осуществлением других целей поставленных НАТО, но не Советом Безопасности. В этой ситуации Российская Федерация как постоянный член Совета Безопасности не может отвечать за безопасность сил ООН, не имеющих соответствующего мандата. Мы хотим, чтобы силы ООН об этом знали.

Россия не считает, что исчерпаны возможности избежать развития событий по худшему сценарию. Мы поддерживаем подход, предложенный генеральным секретарем ООН в его письме на имя председателя Совета Безопасности от 10 февраля. Убеждены, что еще не поздно срочно рассмотреть в Совете Безопасности вопрос об уточнении мандата сил ООН для обеспечения эффективной демилитаризации Сараево. Готовы при этом рассмотреть и предложения, содержащиеся в решениях НАТО. Разумеется это не значит, что все они будут одобрены Советом Безопасности. Но таковы правила, установленные в международном сообществе для достижения согласованных мер, такова природа ООН и того партнерства, которое мы хотим развивать на мировой арене.

В случае с Сараево поле для согласия чрезвычайно велико. У всех членов Совета Безопасности есть общая цель - убрать из этого района тяжелые вооружения или взять их под контроль ООН. Но средства достижения этой цели должны быть согласованы, и согласованы в рамках ООН. Другой путь означает односторонние действия, и всю ответственность за них несут те, кто этому пути следует.

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Эта ответственность тем более велика, что последствия применен. силы вне контекста резолюций Совета Безопасности вышли бы далеко за рамки Сараево, создали бы качественно новую ситуацию в Боснии, Евро и в мире в целом. Впервые за последние годы по ключевому вопросу мировой жизни решения принимались бы не совместно в Совете Безопасности, а в одностороннем порядке.

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Translated from Russian

February 16, 1994

Dear Bill,

Once again, I have to write to you on the Sarajevo problem. I will not go into the details spelled out in the statement by the Government of the Russian Federation, whose text I am enclosing. It is still a draft. Before it becomes an official document, I would like once again to communicate with you. In this statement, as well as in the contacts between our foreign policy agencies in recent days we have provided a detailed explanation of the problems we are faced with. I am convinced that your side, too, understands these obvious things. Yet we see attempts at proving to us that the opposite is true. What do they expect us to do? To pretend that we somehow do not see the difference between a NATO decision and a decision of the UN Security Council? To support the unilateral NATO ultimatum and do so at a time when there is a major debate going on in Russia and in the world at large about which direction NATO is evolving - either toward partnership for peace or toward building up its position of strength in the international arena?

You know my answer to this question. We want to become a true partner. And a mature partner at that, as you and I agreed, and we expect the same from you. The Moscow Declaration you and I signed is now being tested in Sarajevo. There is a chance to correct the situation. Let us find a compromise and do it quickly, let us make the extra effort. I will once again pressure Milosevic (we have already done that; he promised to try his best, and the Serbs are already cooperating with the UN forces in Sarajevo). But I ask that you, too, meet me halfway. After all, the NATO decision was

His Excellency
William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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taken in response to Boutros-Ghali's request to tell him if the Alliance was ready to provide aircraft at the UN request. In Brussels you went further than that. But in his letter to the Security Council dated February 10 Boutros-Ghali only recorded your readiness to act at the UN request, no more than that. There was no talk about an ultimatum. I see no reason why NATO cannot adopt this position of the UN Secretary General.

If NATO has decided to strike no matter what or who, then developments in Europe will be unpredictable. How do you see a probable scenario after the air strikes have begun, Bill? Of course, one can hope for a "happy end", one can hope that everybody will surrender and peace will settle in, but you and I are familiar with the experience of this war, we know the ways of the Serbs and the Muslims. (Incidentally, encouraged by the NATO ultimatum the Muslims have already gotten psyched up and are refusing to reach agreement on Sarajevo and with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina are rejecting the peace plan and demanding that everything begin from scratch). Therefore, the resumption of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina scenario is more likely. What will NATO do then? What will the United States do? Will it dispatch an expeditionary corps to wage a full-scale war in Europe?

I am not raising these questions in a rhetorical fashion. I need to, I must understand the logic of your actions today, the sequence of steps being planned now in Washington. If what is being programmed is a war, think about what options are left to me?

Something must urgently be done. And the next step is up to the United States.

Things would be helped by a public clarification from Washington in the spirit of our telephone conversation, i.e. that there will be no strikes on the Serbs if they comply with the UN forces' demands and that in any event the use of air force will be ordered by the United Nations. Such a clarification should come

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personally from you. Otherwise, - after the letdowns and understatements of the past few days, - no one will believe it.

I expect to get your reaction by the morning February 18 Moscow time. I hope your response will be such as to allow us not to issue the statement of the Government of Russia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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Draft

Statement

by the Government of the Russian Federation

The attention of the whole world community today is drawn to the situation around Sarajevo. The sufferings of this city's civilian population have long demanded effective measures on the part of the world community to stop hostilities in and around Sarajevo. A year and a half ago at the 47th UNGA session Russia proposed placing Sarajevo under the administrative control of the United Nations and later put forward other concrete initiatives to demilitarize the city in the context of our efforts to resolve the Bosnia crisis and the Yugoslavia crisis as a whole. We have constantly worked and continue to work with all the parties to the conflict, encouraging each of them toward an earliest adoption of the peace plan.

In late January of this year Russia proposed to urgently convene a UN Security Council meeting to consider, among other things, measures to strengthen the safe areas regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Sarajevo.

Unfortunately, only the tragedy in Sarajevo on February 5, whose causes are now being investigated, finally made everybody realize the need for immediate action. Once again, we demanded that the UN Security Council meet to adopt the necessary measures to ensure a cease-fire in Sarajevo, withdrawal of heavy weapons by all parties or placing them under the UN control, and to effectively protect the UN personnel, including, if needed, through the use of air force in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

It is indeed unfortunate that Russia's proposal at the time was not accepted. At the same time the Sarajevo problem was taken to the NATO Council in response to the Secretary General's request to inform him whether NATO would be ready to provide its aircraft

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to support the UN personnel in the exercise of its mandate in the event the United Nations requested that.

Having confirmed its readiness to do that, first expressed as far back as August 1993, the North Atlantic Council went further and adopted additional decisions which went far beyond the Security Council resolutions and the specific request of the UN Secretary General. There were no required consultations with Russia and the other members of the Security Council. NATO unilaterally declared both the specific borders of the zone subject to demilitarization and the list of heavy weapons to be transferred to the UN forces, as well as other "details" which, in accordance with UN practice, would presumably be the subject of a Security Council resolution.

Most importantly, however, NATO decisions contain a 10-day ultimatum upon expiration of which members of the Alliance intend to carry out air strikes at the heavy arms left in the zone of Sarajevo. According to the norms of international law still in effect, even imposition of economic sanctions, let alone the use of military force, require a Security Council resolution. The Security Council has already made a firm determination that force, including aircraft, can be used to put an end to attacks on UN forces, and this provision has long been in effect in safe areas on Bosnian territory, including Sarajevo. Additional grounds for use of force, especially involving destruction of ground targets with inevitable civilian casualties, can only be established by the Security Council. The same goes for the timeframe under which such a condition can be triggered.

Therefore, we are not talking about whether such decisions are needed now or not. We are talking about the fact that the unilateral decision of NATO doesn't fit into the UN framework.

A week after the North Atlantic Council session it became known that a part of its decision wasn't made public at all and is in fact secret.

Thus a situation has arisen under which a group of states-members of NATO have embarked upon the road of unilateral action

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and are adopting decisions on problems within the prerogatives of the UN Security Council without even suggesting that their approach be ratified by the Security Council.

Trying to preserve the unity of action of the world community, Russia managed to have the UN Security Council convened. However, its discussions brought no result.

Extreme concern is caused by the incessant mass media reports to the effect that, upon expiration at night on February 21 of the unilateral ultimatum of NATO, members of the alliance intend to begin air strikes, regardless of the Security Council position or of the actual situation in the zone of Sarajevo. NATO ultimatum has already had a destructive influence on the process of negotiations on Bosnian settlement.

It is absolutely clear that neither the Russian Federation, nor the UN can bear any responsibility for future developments under this scenario. Beyond control of the Security Council are now also, in effect, the UN forces in the zone of Sarajevo which, on one hand, are obliged to act on the basis of their mandate and, on the other hand, find themselves in the immediate area where the NATO operation will be carried out involving not only support for those forces as requested by the UN Secretary General, but also other objectives set by NATO, not by the Security Council. In this situation the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the Security Council cannot be responsible for safety of the UN forces lacking an appropriate mandate. We want the UN forces to know that.

Russia doesn't think that all possibilities are exhausted to avoid the worst-case scenario. We support the approach suggested by the UN Secretary General in his letter of February 10 to the President of the Security Council. We are convinced that it's not too late for the Security Council to urgently consider the question of redefinition of the mandate of UN forces to ensure effective demilitarization of Sarajevo. We are also ready in the process to consider the proposals contained in NATO decisions. Of course, it doesn't mean that all of them will be endorsed by the

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Security Council. But such are the rules established by the international community for adoption of agreed upon measures, such is the nature of the UN and of the partnership we would like to pursue in the world arena.

In the case of Sarajevo the area of agreement is extraordinarily large. All the members of the Security Council have a common purpose - to remove heavy arms from this zone or to put them under UN control. But the ways to achieve that purpose must be agreed upon, and they must be agreed upon within the UN. The other road means unilateral action, and full responsibility for it is borne by those who follow this road.

This responsibility is all the greater since the consequences of use of force out of context of the Security Council resolutions would go far beyond Sarajevo, would create a qualitatively new situation in Bosnia, Europe and the world as a whole. For the first time in recent years decisions on such a key question of international life would have been adopted not jointly in the Security Council, but unilaterally.

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Дорогой Билл,

Вновь вынужден обратиться по проблеме Сараево. Не буду вдаваться в детали, изложенные в Заявлении Правительства Российской Федерации, текст которого я прилагаю. Это - пока проект. Прежде чем он станет официальным документом, я хотел бы еще раз обратиться к тебе. В нем, да и в контактах между нашими внешнеполитическими ведомствами в последние дни мы подробным образом изложили возникшие у нас проблемы. Убежден, что и у вас понимают эти очевидные вещи, однако почему-то пытаются доказать нам обратное. Чего от нас ожидают? Чтобы мы сделали вид, будто не видим разницы между решением НАТО и решением Совета Безопасности ООН? Чтобы поддержали односторонний ультиматум НАТО, да еще в тот самый момент, когда в России и в мире крупно спорят, куда трансформируется Североатлантический альянс - в сторону партнерства ради мира или к усилению своих силовых позиций на международной арене?

Мой ответ на этот вопрос ты знаешь. Мы хотим стать подлинными партнерами, причем партнерами зрелыми, как мы с тобой договорились и ждем того же от вас. Наша с тобой Московская декларация проходит сейчас проверку в Сараево. Есть возможность выправить ситуацию. Давай срочно найдем компромисс, предпримем дополнительные усилия. Я еще раз нажму на Милошевича (мы уже сделали это, он обещал постараться, и сербы уже сотрудничают с силами ООН в Сараево). Но прошу и тебя пойти навстречу. В конце концов решение НАТО принято в ответ на просьбу Бутроса-Гали сообщить, готов ли Альянс предоставить авиацию по просьбе ООН. Вы в Брюсселе пошли дальше. Но Бутрос-Гали в своем письме в Совет Безопасности ООН от 10 февраля зафиксировал только вашу готовность действовать по запросу ООН, не более того. Об ультиматуме речь не шла. Не вижу причин, по которым НАТО не может принять эту позицию генерального секретаря ООН.

Если в НАТО решили бить, не считаясь ни с кем и ни с чем, то развитие событий в Европе будет непредсказуемым. Как ты, Билл, представляешь себе вероятный сценарий после начала бомбардировок? Конечно, можно надеяться на "хэппи энд", что сразу все сдадутся и

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наступит мир, но мы оба знакомы с опытом этой войны, знаем повадки и сербов и мусульман. (Последние, кстати, окрыленные ультиматумом НАТО, уже закусили удила, отказываются договариваться по Сараево, а по Боснии в целом отвергают мирный план и требуют начать все с чистого листа). Так что более вероятен сценарий возобновления полномасштабных боевых действий в БИГ. Что тогда будет делать НАТО? Что будут делать США? Пошлют экспедиционный корпус для ведения полномасштабной войны в Европе?

Ставлю эти вопросы не риторически. Мне надо, необходимо понимать сегодня логику твоих поступков, последовательность планируемых в Вашингтоне шагов. Если запрограммирована война, то подумай, какие варианты действий остаются у меня?

Надо срочно что-то делать. И следующий шаг - за США.

Делу помогло бы публичное разъяснение из Вашингтона в духе нашего телефонного разговора - что ударов по сербам не будет, если они выполнят требования сил ООН, и что в любом случае команду на применение авиации будет давать ООН. Такое разъяснение должно исходить от тебя лично. Иначе - после накладок и недомолвок последних дней - никто не поверит.

Рассчитываю получить твою реакцию до утра 18 февраля по московскому времени. Надеюсь, твой ответ будет таким, который позволит нам не выступать с Заявлением Правительства России.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

16 февраля 1994 г.

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Проект

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Внимание всего мирового сообщества приковано сегодня к ситуации вокруг Сараево. Страдания мирных жителей этого города давно требовали действенных мер со стороны международного сообщества для прекращения в нем и вокруг него всех боевых действий. Полтора года назад на 47-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН Российская Федерация предлагала поставить Сараево под административное управление ООН, выдвигала впоследствии другие конкретные инициативы по его демилитаризации в контексте наших усилий по урегулированию боснийского конфликта и в целом югокризиса. Мы постоянно работали и работаем со всеми сторонами в конфликте, побуждая каждую из них скорейшему принятию мирного плана.

В конце января этого года Россия выступила за срочный созыв Совета Безопасности, в том числе для рассмотрения мер укрепления режима безопасных районов в Боснии и Герцеговине, включая Сараево.

К сожалению, только трагедия в Сараево 5 февраля, причины которой сейчас расследуются, заставила наконец всех осознать необходимость неотложных действий. Мы вновь потребовали созыва Совета Безопасности с целью принятия необходимых мер по прекращению огня в Сараево, вывода из зоны города тяжелых вооружений всех сторон или взятия их под контроль ООН – а также для эффективной защиты персонала ООН, в том числе, если потребуется, и с использованием авиации в соответствии с имеющимися резолюциями Совета Безопасности.

Приходится сожалеть, что предложение России тогда не было принято. Одновременно проблема Сараево была вынесена на Совет НАТО в ответ на просьбу генерального секретаря ООН сообщить, будет ли НАТО готова предоставить свою авиацию для поддержки персонала ООН в осуществлении имеющегося у него мандата в случае, если об этом попросят Объединенные Нации.

Подтвердив свою готовность к этому, выраженную еще в августе 1993 года, Совет НАТО принял сверх того дополнительные решения,

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которые далеко выходят за рамки резолюции Совета Безопасности и конкретного обращения генерального секретаря ООН. При этом необходимых консультаций с Россией и другими членами Совета Безопасности не было. НАТО в одностороннем порядке объявила и конкретные границы зоны, подлежащей демилитаризации, и перечень видов тяжелого вооружения для передачи силам ООН, и другие "детали", которые по практике ООН должны были бы стать предметом резолюции Совета Безопасности.

Главное, однако, в том, что в решениях НАТО выдвинут 10-дневный ультиматум, по истечении которого члены Альянса намерены наносить удары с воздуха по оставшемуся в зоне Сараево тяжелому вооружению. Согласно действующим до сих пор нормам международного права даже введение экономических санкций, не говоря уже о применении военной силы, требует резолюции Совета Безопасности. Совет Безопасности уже твердо решил, что для пресечения нападений на силы ООН может применяться сила, в том числе при поддержке авиации. И это положение уже давно действует в безопасных районах на территории Боснии, в том числе в Сараево. Дополнительные условия применения силы, тем более сопряженного с уничтожением наземных целей с неизбежными жертвами среди гражданского населения, может устанавливать только Совет Безопасности, как и сроки вступления этих условий в действие.

Поэтому речь не идет о том, нужны или нет сейчас решения такого рода. Речь о том, что одностороннее решение НАТО не вписывается в рамки ООН.

Спустя неделю после сессии Совета НАТО выяснилось, что часть принятого на ней решения вообще не предана огласке и является секретной.

Таким образом сложилась ситуация, при которой группа государств, входящих в НАТО, встала на путь односторонних действий и принимает решения по проблемам, являющимся прерогативой Совета Безопасности ООН, даже не ставя вопрос об утверждении своих подходов в Совете Безопасности.

Стремясь к сохранению единства действий мирового сообщества, Россия добилась созыва Совета Безопасности ООН. Однако дискуссии на нем результатов не дали.

Вызывают крайнюю озабоченность непрекращающиеся сообщения средств массовой информации о том, что по истечении в ночь с

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20 на 21 февраля одностороннего ультиматума НАТО члены Альянса намереваются приступить к ударам с воздуха, независимо от позиции Совета Безопасности и от реальной ситуации в зоне Сараево. Ультиматум НАТО уже оказал деструктивное влияние и на ход переговоров о боснийском урегулировании.

Совершенно ясно, что за дальнейшее развитие событий по этому сценарию не может нести какой-либо ответственности ни Российская Федерация, ни ООН. По сути дела вне контроля Совета Безопасности оказываются и силы ООН в зоне Сараево, которые, с одной стороны, обязаны действовать на основе имеющегося у них мандата, а с другой - оказываются непосредственно в районе, где будет осуществляться операция НАТО, связанная не только с поддержкой этих сил, как об этом просил генеральный секретарь ООН, но и с осуществлением других целей, поставленных НАТО, но не Советом Безопасности. В этой ситуации Российская Федерация как постоянный член Совета Безопасности не может отвечать за безопасность сил ООН, не имеющих соответствующего мандата. Мы хотим, чтобы силы ООН об этом знали.

Россия не считает, что исчерпаны возможности избежать развития событий по худшему сценарию. Мы поддерживаем подход, предложенный генеральным секретарем ООН в его письме на имя председателя Совета Безопасности от 10 февраля. Убеждены, что еще не поздно срочно рассмотреть в Совете Безопасности вопрос об уточнении мандата сил ООН для обеспечения эффективной демилитаризации Сараево. Готовы при этом рассмотреть и предложения, содержащиеся в решениях НАТО. Разумеется, это не значит, что все они будут одобрены Советом Безопасности. Но таковы правила, установленные в международном сообществе для достижения согласованных мер, такова природа ООН и того партнерства, которое мы хотим развивать на мировой арене.

В случае с Сараево поле для согласия чрезвычайно велико. У всех членов Совета Безопасности есть общая цель - убрать из этого района тяжелые вооружения или взять их под контроль ООН. Но средства достижения этой цели должны быть согласованы, и согласованы в рамках ООН. Другой путь означает односторонние действия, и всю ответственность за них несут те, кто этому пути следует.

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Эта ответственность тем более велика, что последствия применения силы вне контекста резолюций Совета Безопасности вышли бы далеко за рамки Сараево, создали бы качественно новую ситуацию в Босния, Европе и в мире в целом. Впервые за последние годы по ключевому вопросу мировой жизни решения принимались бы не совместно в Совете Безопасности, а в одностороннем порядке.

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IMMEDIATE ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: BERGER FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: COQ FILE SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 041741Z MAR 94

FM WHITE HOUSE

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PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [2.54]
KBH 1/2/2025

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS,

.

THE WEEKS SINCE OUR LAST PHONE CONVERSATION HAVE BEEN EVENTFUL, AND OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD TO MANAGE SOME DIFFICULT MOMENTS. YET THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONTINUE TO COOPERATE ON ISSUES OF IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO US AND TO THE WORLD. THAT IS IN NO SMALL MEASURE BECAUSE YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED SUCH A GOOD PERSONAL AND WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

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I WILL BE RESPONDING SEPARATELY TO YOUR RECENT LETTER ON THE G-7. PROMPTED BY OUR DISCUSSIONS AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS SINCE THEN, I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN THE G-7, AND WE ARE DEVELOPING SOME WAYS OF ENHANCING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION AT NAPLES.

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YOU KNOW, I'M SURE, THAT I WILL BE MEETING IN THE COMING DAYS WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND CHAIRMAN SHEVARDNADZE HERE IN WASHINGTON, AND I PLAN TO INFORM YOU PROMPTLY ABOUT THOSE DISCUSSIONS.

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AS PART OF MY DETERMINATION TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU, I WANTED IN THIS LETTER TO REVIEW BRIEFLY MY PERSPECTIVE ON THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. WHILE MUCH WORK AND MANY DIFFICULTIES ARE BEFORE US, THERE IS MORE REASON FOR ENCOURAGEMENT NOW THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE I CAME INTO OFFICE. THAT IS IN SIGNIFICANT MEASURE BECAUSE OF THE WAY IN WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND MINE HAVE BEEN WORKING TOGETHER, BOTH THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS AND IN THE UNITED NATIONS, TOWARD OUR COMMON GOAL: A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT LEADING TO A LASTING PEACE IN THAT TORMENTED REGION.

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WHEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CROATIANS SIGNED A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON TUESDAY, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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IN THE COMING WEEKS, WE WILL FOCUS OUR EFFORTS ON ENCOURAGING THE PARTIES TO COMPLETE A CONSTITUTION FOR THE FEDERATED BOSNIAN STATE AND TO COME TO TERMS ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES. AMBASSADOR REDMAN AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CHURKIN ARE IN CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER. AMBASSADOR PICKERING WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES CLOSELY AND REGULARLY --ON LITERALLY A DAILY BASIS WHEN NECESSARY -- IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE AND OURS COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER. YOU AND I SURELY AGREE THAT IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE CONSULT IN ADVANCE, WHEN POSSIBLE, BEFORE UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS THAT WILL BEAR ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, WHO LEAVES SHORTLY ON A TRIP TO ASIA, WILL MAKE A STOP IN VLADIVOSTOK ON MARCH 14 IN ORDER TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV. THEY WILL HAVE A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT ON ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES ON WHICH YOU AND I ARE WORKING SO HARD.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU SOON.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL CLINTON

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END TEXT
DECL: OADR
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<MSGID> M0916922

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ACTION = SUPV(1)

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FM WHITE HOUSE
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ZEM
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

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WHITE HOUSE
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QQQQ
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

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2015-0815-M-1 [2.56] KBH 1/2/2025

CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER. AMBASSADOR PICKERING WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES CLOSELY AND REGULARLY --ON LITERALLY A DAILY BASIS WHEN NECESSARY -- IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE AND OURS COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER. YOU AND I SURELY AGREE THAT IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE CONSULT IN ADVANCE, WHEN POSSIBLE, BEFORE UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS THAT WILL BEAR ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL CLINTON

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END TEXT
DECL: OADR

#0000

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

1994 MAR -4 PM 12:54
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 3/4

1564
Re-do

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1994 94 MAR 4 A9:00

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on Bosnia Agreement

Purpose

To approve transmission of a message to President Yeltsin on the Bosnia-Croatia Framework Agreement.

Background

Following your phone calls to Tudjman and Izetbegovic, you asked whether you should also contact Yeltsin to inform him of this breakthrough. We believe that a message to Yeltsin is definitely called for, in light of your agreement to stay in close touch on Bosnia during your Sunday, February 20 phone call and the importance of the framework agreement. The message you would convey to Yeltsin (Tab A) would be upbeat, stressing the need for the U.S. and Russia to maintain close consultations to achieve our shared objectives.

However, we do not believe that a phone call is the best way to convey this message. The Ames case is still casting a shadow over the relationship, and Yeltsin has signalled that this is an issue he prefers not to deal with you directly on at this time. However, because of the intense media interest in any communication between you and Yeltsin over the case, it would be difficult to explain any phone call you initiated in which the issue did not come up. We thus propose an indirect reference to the case in your letter, mentioning it as one subject among others in the relationship.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmission of the attached message to President Yeltsin.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

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Attachment
Tab A Message to Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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(BEGIN TEXT)

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Declassify on: OADR

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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, WHO LEAVES SHORTLY ON A TRIP TO ASIA, WILL MAKE A STOP IN VLADIVOSTOK ON MARCH 14 IN ORDER TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV. THEY WILL HAVE A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT ON ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES ON WHICH YOU AND I ARE WORKING SO HARD.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 3/4

1564
Re-do

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1994

94 MAR 4 A9:00

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on Bosnia Agreement

Purpose

To approve transmission of a message to President Yeltsin on the Bosnia-Croatia Framework Agreement.

Background

Following your phone calls to Tudjman and Izetbegovic, you asked whether you should also contact Yeltsin to inform him of this breakthrough. We believe that a message to Yeltsin is definitely called for, in light of your agreement to stay in close touch on Bosnia during your Sunday, February 20 phone call and the importance of the framework agreement. The message you would convey to Yeltsin (Tab A) would be upbeat, stressing the need for the U.S. and Russia to maintain close consultations to achieve our shared objectives.

However, we do not believe that a phone call is the best way to convey this message. The Ames case is still casting a shadow over the relationship, and Yeltsin has signalled that this is an issue he prefers not to deal with you directly on at this time. However, because of the intense media interest in any communication between you and Yeltsin over the case, it would be difficult to explain any phone call you initiated in which the issue did not come up. We thus propose an indirect reference to the case in your letter, mentioning it as one subject among others in the relationship.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmission of the attached message to President Yeltsin.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.60)
KBH 1/2/2025

Attachment
Tab A Message to Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR


cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2018

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1994



ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.61)
KBH 1/2/2025

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE JB

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin: Business Development Mission to Russia

Secretary of Commerce Brown will lead a Presidential Mission to Moscow, Yekaterinburg, and St. Petersburg March 27 - April 2 to promote the commercial side of our economic relationship with Russia, and identify ways to lower the barriers to Western trade and investment. The Business Development Mission will include a delegation of 25-30 CEOs. Secretary Brown will also co-chair a meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin subcommittee on business development during the stop in Moscow to advance the agenda in anticipation of this summer's meeting of the full G-C Commission.

There is potential for progress on trade and investment, but we will need to overcome a lot of obstacles within the governmental bureaucracy and in the Duma. As a first step, we want to raise the profile of the Mission as high as possible. We are requesting separately a send-off meeting for the Delegation with the President, and we anticipate that the Vice President will meet them for a debrief upon their return. To help ensure the requisite level of attention on the Russian side, we propose sending the attached message from the President to Yeltsin now. This will be followed by a more detailed Gore-Chernomyrdin letter previewing our expectations for the Mission, which we will send out next week.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth LF

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached Presidential message for transmission.

Approve TL Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Presidential Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.62)
KRH 1/2/2025

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

NO DOUBT YOU WERE AS PLEASED AS I TO LEARN THAT ON MARCH 14, OUR NEGOTIATORS WERE ABLE TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA'S LOW ENRICHED URANIUM EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS AN ISSUE THAT YOU FIRST RAISED WITH ME IN VANCOUVER LAST YEAR, AND I AM DELIGHTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE IT. THIS BREAKTHROUGH REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD EXPANDING OUR COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP, AN AREA THAT WE AGREED DURING OUR MEETINGS IN MOSCOW SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRIORITY FOCUS OF OUR RELATIONS.

IN THAT CONNECTION, YOU WILL RECALL THAT I ANNOUNCED IN MOSCOW THAT COMMERCE SECRETARY RONALD BROWN WOULD LEAD A PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO RUSSIA. I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT SECRETARY BROWN HAS ORGANIZED AN OUTSTANDING DELEGATION WHICH WILL VISIT RUSSIA MARCH 28 TO APRIL 2. IT INCLUDES OVER 30 OF THE FOREMOST AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS IN THE FIELDS OF OIL AND GAS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND PHARMACEUTICALS, AND AEROSPACE, AS WELL AS SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

DURING THE VISIT, SECRETARY BROWN AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS MINISTER DAVYDOV WILL CO-CHAIR A MEETING OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN ME IN INSTRUCTING THEM TO REACH THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS AND ACHIEVE THE PRIORITY PROJECTS THAT WILL ENABLE OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP TO DEVELOP AT THE MOST RAPID PACE POSSIBLE.

AMERICAN BUSINESSES ARE READY FOR LARGE-SCALE INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA, AS THE OUTSTANDING DELEGATION WHICH SECRETARY BROWN HAS ORGANIZED WILL CONFIRM. WHAT THEY NEED IS THE ASSURANCE THAT THEY ARE WELCOME, THAT THEIR INVESTMENTS ARE SAFE, AND THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO OPERATE THEIR BUSINESSES IN A WAY COMPARABLE TO THAT IN MOST OTHER COUNTRIES.

I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ACT NOW TO BRING THIS ABOUT. THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT STEP THAT COULD BE TAKEN WOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL MAJOR COMMERCIAL PROJECTS THAT ARE AWAITING ACTION AND THAT YOU AND I DISCUSSED AT EACH OF OUR THREE MEETINGS. SUCCESS IN THESE HIGHLY VISIBLE PROJECTS -- FOR EXAMPLE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF FULL APPROVAL FOR THE PENDING OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IN SAKHALIN AND TIMAN PECHORA -- WOULD ENCOURAGE MANY MORE FIRMS TO ACT NOW RATHER THAN WAITING. SOME OF OUR FIRMS ARE BEGINNING TO DOUBT THAT THEY CAN DO BUSINESS IN RUSSIA. I HOPE WE CAN SHOW THEM BY THE APPROVAL OF THESE PROJECTS, THAT AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS CAN DO BUSINESS TOGETHER. VICE PRESIDENT GORE WILL WRITE SOON TO PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN IN GREATER DETAIL REGARDING THESE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMPORTANT PROJECTS. I STRONGLY HOPE THAT WE CAN ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON THEM IN CONNECTION WITH THE MEETING OF THE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE IN MOSCOW.

IN ADDITION, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND I HOPE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY BROWN AND THE PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION BEFORE THEY DEPART AND AFTER THEY RETURN FROM RUSSIA. I ENCOURAGE YOU AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN TO RECEIVE THEM AS WELL, IF POSSIBLE. THESE HIGHLY-VISIBLE MEETINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE KREMLIN WOULD UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS INITIATIVE AND DEMONSTRATE THE PRIORITY THAT WE ATTACH TO EXPANDING OUR COMMERCIAL TIES.

I HOPE THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS IMPORTANT MISSION, YOU, THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, THE PARLIAMENT, AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WILL SEE THE COMMITMENT THAT AMERICAN COMPANIES ARE READY TO MAKE AS LONG-TERM PARTNERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE RUSSIAN MARKET ECONOMY. WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY UNDERSTANDS THAT THEY ARE NOT JUST WELCOME, BUT ARE STRONGLY WANTED, AS YOUR PARTNERS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
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2015-0815-M-1 [2.63]
KBH 1/2/2025

SECTION 1 OF 2
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. .

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BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

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NO DOUBT YOU WERE AS PLEASED AS I TO LEARN THAT ON MARCH 14, OUR NEGOTIATORS WERE ABLE TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA'S LOW ENRICHED URANIUM EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS AN ISSUE THAT YOU FIRST RAISED WITH ME IN VANCOUVER LAST YEAR, AND I AM DELIGHTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE IT. THIS BREAKTHROUGH REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD EXPANDING OUR COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP, AN AREA THAT WE AGREED DURING OUR MEETINGS IN MOSCOW SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRIORITY FOCUS OF OUR RELATIONS.

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IN ADDITION, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND I HOPE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY BROWN AND THE PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION BEFORE THEY DEPART AND AFTER THEY RETURN FROM RUSSIA. I ENCOURAGE YOU AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN TO RECEIVE THEM AS WELL, IF POSSIBLE. THESE HIGHLY-VISIBLE MEETINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE KREMLIN WOULD UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS INITIATIVE AND DEMONSTRATE THE PRIORITY THAT WE ATTACH TO EXPANDING OUR COMMERCIAL TIES.

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FINAL SECTION OF 2

WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY UNDERSTANDS THAT THEY ARE NOT JUST WELCOME, BUT ARE STRONGLY WANTED, AS YOUR PARTNERS.

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SINCERELY,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BILL

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END TEXT
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#2976
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<MSGID> M0943728

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> not yet on pres. schedule

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(we will not include sens. if we can't get on the schedule)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(2.64)
KBH 1/2/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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not yet on Pres schedule

KK

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SINCERELY,

BILL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.6.5)
KBH 1/2/2025

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2344

March 25, 1994
Moscow,
Kremlin

Dear Bill:

I write to express my extreme concern over the conflict in Abkhasia which has been going on for more than one and a half years already and still remains unresolved. I strongly believe that uniting the will and the efforts of our two states in order to radically improve the prevailing situation in this region would be in the interests of both Russia and the United States.

The reality to-day is such that we are dealing with a kind of vicious circle there: without stabilizing the situation there and without return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to their historic homes no substantial progress in the political settlement process will be possible. And without this progress, the UN Security Council members, including the U.S., are not ready to take a decision on a peacekeeping operation. We remain convinced that such an operation is necessary to ward off the war, to facilitate the resolution of the refugee problem, and to provide for a peaceful and secure life of the civilian population. This question is becoming particularly urgent in view of the fact that there remains a serious threat of the resumption of armed clashes which can lead to massive bloodshed, human rights and humanitarian law violations.

We tend to share the U.S. position regarding the expansion of the U.N. peacekeeping activities, including the U.S. criteria for setting up new operations. We also attach primary importance to the need to have a clear idea about the final objectives of any such operation as well as to see its execution in the political

His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.66]

context. At the same time, formal abidance by the general criteria does not always lead to the desired results in a concrete situation. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhasian conflict, it is hardly productive to advance rigid demands to achieve a "break through" toward an overall settlement as a condition for starting a peacekeeping operation. It is important to preserve the possibility of an effective international presence to be able to influence the conflicting parties, so as to push them toward resolving their differences at the negotiating table.

That is why Russia, together with Georgia, has again recently requested the UN Security Council to consider a peacekeeping operation either by the Organization, or with its approval, which would rely upon the Russian military contingent. We are also in favor of expanding the presence of international observers in the area of conflict.

We hope, Mr. President, that the U.S. representative in the Security Council will support the Russian-Georgian request to carry out a peacekeeping operation in the area of the Georgian-Abkhasian conflict.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«25» марта 19 94 г.

№ Пр-319

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Мое обращение к Вам связано с крайней озабоченностью в связи с неурегулированностью конфликта в Абхазии, который продолжается уже более полутора лет. Я твердо уверен, что интересам России и США отвечало бы объединение воли и усилий наших государств в целях коренного улучшения сложившейся ситуации в этом регионе.

Реальность сегодня такова, что образовался своего рода замкнутый круг: без стабилизации обстановки, возвращения сотен тысяч беженцев в места постоянного проживания невозможен какой-либо существенный прогресс в политическом урегулировании. А без этого прогресса члены СБ ООН, в том числе США, не готовы принять решение о проведении миротворческой операции. Мы убеждены по-прежнему - такая операция нужна, чтобы поставить преграду войне, содействовать решению проблемы беженцев, обеспечить спокойную и безопасную жизнь мирного населения. Особую срочность этому вопросу придает то, что сохраняется серьезная опасность возобновления вооруженных столкновений, способных привести к массовому кровопролитию, нарушениям прав человека и норм гуманитарного права.

Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.67]

Нам близка позиция США относительно расширения миротворческой деятельности ООН, в том числе - критерии для учреждения новых операций. Мы также придаем первостепенное значение необходимости ясно представлять себе конечные цели любой операции и увязывать ее проведение с прогрессом в политической сфере. Вместе с тем, формальное следование общим критериям не всегда способно привести к ожидаемому результату в конкретной ситуации. В случае с грузино-абхазским конфликтом вряд ли продуктивно выдвигать жесткое требование о "прорыве" к всеобъемлющему урегулированию в качестве условия для проведения миротворческой операции. Важно сохранять возможность эффективного международного присутствия для воздействия на конфликтующие стороны с тем, чтобы подталкивать их к разрешению противоречий за столом переговоров.

Именно поэтому Россия совместно с Грузией вновь обратилась недавно в Совет Безопасности ООН с просьбой о рассмотрении вопроса о проведении Организацией или с ее одобрения миротворческой операции, опирающейся на российский военный контингент. Мы выступаем также за расширение присутствия в зоне конфликта международных наблюдателей.

Надеемся, господин Президент, на поддержку американским представителем в Совете Безопасности ООН просьбы России и Грузии о проведении миротворческой операции в зоне грузино-абхазского конфликта.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

[2015-0815-m-1, 2.68]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

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сфере. Вместе с тем, формальное следование общим критериям не всегда способно привести к ожидаемому результату в конкретной ситуации. В случае с грузино-абхазским конфликтом вряд ли продуктивно выдвигать жесткое требование о "прорыве" к всеобъемлющему урегулированию в качестве условия для проведения миротворческой операции. Важно сохранять возможность эффективного международного присутствия для воздействия на конфликтующие стороны с тем, чтобы подталкивать их к разрешению противоречий за столом переговоров.

Именно поэтому Россия совместно с Грузией вновь обратилась недавно в Совет Безопасности ООН с просьбой о рассмотрении вопроса о проведении организацией или с ее одобрения миротворческой операции, опирающейся на российский военный контингент. Мы выступаем также за расширение присутствия в зоне конфликта международных наблюдателей.

Надеемся, господин Президент, на поддержку американским представителем в Совете Безопасности ООН просьбы России и Грузии о проведении миротворческой операции в зоне грузино-абхазского конфликта.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

" 25 " марта 1994 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.69]

2600

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«29» декабря 1993 г.

№ Пр-1906

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хочу выразить удовлетворение в связи с вступлением в силу "Закона о дружбе с Россией".

Сделан еще один важный шаг в реализации ванкуверских договоренностей. Это событие весьма символично. Конгресс США стряхнул остатки пыли эпохи "холодной войны". Еще раз продемонстрирована двухпартийная поддержка в США нашим с Вами усилиям по налаживанию динамичного и результативного российско-американского партнерства.

Пользуясь случаем, поздравляю Вас с другой важной победой - в вопросе о Североамериканской зоне свободной торговли. Значение САЗСТ не ограничивается рамками Северной Америки. Придан импульс интеграционным процессам во всем мире.

В Содружестве Независимых Государств также налицо перелом в настроениях в пользу ускорения интеграции на новой, равноправной основе. Это - одна из тем нашего с Вами разговора, перспективная область взаимодействия.

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Очевидно, что центральное место на саммите займут вопросы нераспространения, в первую очередь - денуклеаризации Украины, а также реформирования структур международной стабильности: от ООН до НАТО. Наряду с этим предлагаю сосредоточиться на таких темах, как взаимодействие России с "семеркой", стыковка миротворческих усилий России и США, новые инициативные шаги в сфере разоружения.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Проделанная под руководством Премьер-министра России и Вице-президента США работа позволяет рассчитывать на солидное экономическое наполнение саммита. Для его успеха важно закрыть вопрос по оружейному урану, а также закрепить наметившийся прогресс в устранении трех других проблем.

Нужно с самого начала обеспечить равноправное участие России в формировании механизмов экспортного контроля на этапе после КОКОМ.

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И, наконец, поправка Джексона-Вэника. Если президент США выступит с инициативой ее отмены, это будет по достоинству оценено россиянами.

Пользуясь случаем, поздравляю Вас и всю Вашу семью с наступающим Новым годом.

Ждем вас в Москве.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.70]

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2600

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Kremlin
Moscow

December 29, 1993

No. Pr.-1906

Dear Bill:

I want to express my gratification at the entry into force of the Law on Friendship with Russia.

One more important step has been accomplished in the realization of the Vancouver agreements. This event is very symbolic. The U.S. Congress has shaken off the remaining dust of the Cold War era. Once more, the bipartisan support in the United States for our common efforts to build a dynamic and effective Russian-American partnership was demonstrated.

I want to avail myself of the occasion to congratulate you on another important victory in the matter of the North American Free Trade Zone. The importance of NAFTA is not confined to North America. It has set in motion integration processes all over the world.

In the Commonwealth of Independent States, too, there is a crisis in the attitudes that now lean toward speeding up integration on a new basis of equal rights. This is one of the subjects of our talks, a promising area of interaction.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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We attach special importance to the Moscow Summit. It must be future-oriented and directed towards dealing with major long-term questions. In essence, we are starting a dialogue on the role and place of Russia and the United States in a multipolar world, and the agenda of our strategic partnership on the threshold of the twenty-first century.

It is obvious that the central issue at the summit will be non-proliferation, primarily the denuclearization of Ukraine, as well as reforms of the structures of international stability, from the United Nations to NATO. At the same time, I propose that we concentrate on such subjects as interaction of Russia with the G-7, the linkage of the Russian and American peacemaking efforts, and new initiatives in the sphere of disarmament.

The work done under the leadership of the Prime Minister of Russia and the Vice President of the United States allows us to count on a solid, economic content of the summit. For its success, it will be important to conclude the question of weapons-grade uranium as well as to consolidate the hoped-for progress in eliminating three other problems.

From the onset, Russia's participation on a basis of equality in the formation of export control mechanisms in the post-COCOM era must be assured.

Russia, a country whose economy is in transition, must have the possibility to deliver goods to the American market, in the production of which she is able to compete. We must jointly search for solutions. Without this, changes in obsolete legislation will not produce the desired effect. This concerns

primarily the resumption of deliveries of our commercial uranium to the United States.

And finally, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. If the U.S. President takes the initiative for its repeal, this will be duly appreciated by the Russians.

I avail myself of the occasion to wish you and your family a very Happy New Year.

We are expecting you in Moscow

Respectfully yours,

sgd. B. Yeltsin

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.71]

2600

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«29» декабря 19 93 г.

№ Пр-1906

г. Москва, Кремль

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
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г.Вашингтон

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И, наконец, поправка Джексона-Вэника. Если президент США выступит с инициативой ее отмены, это будет по достоинству оценено россиянами.

Пользуясь случаем, поздравляю Вас и всю Вашу семью с наступающим Новым годом.

Ждем вас в Москве.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.72]

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«30» МАРТА 1994 г.

№_____

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю тебя за недавнее послание по экономическим вопросам. Доволен, что, несмотря на внутриполитический прессинг, нам удается продвигаться и на этом направлении. Однако, у меня есть серьезная озабоченность. Мы не можем и не должны проходить мимо, когда саботируются решения, принимаемые на высшем уровне. Я имею в виду подключение России к разработке нового режима экспортного контроля, призванного заменить КОКОМ.

Если честно, Билл, я не понимаю, что происходит. В Москве мы условились, что Россия будет на равных основаниях со всеми участвовать в создании нового механизма экспортного контроля. Госсекретарь подтвердил это А.В.Козыреву во Владивостоке. Однако, вопреки этим заверениям Россию не пригласили на многостороннюю встречу в Гааге, специально созванную для согласования параметров этого режима.

Я сперва засомневался, когда узнал, что участие России блокируют США. Настолько это не вяжется с целями и практикой зрелого партнерства. Но мне подтвердили - против выступают американские представители, остальные - за.

Твои эксперты ссылаются на поставки российского оружия Ирану. Я уже не говорю о том, что предварительные условия и дискриминационные увязки неуместны между партнерами. Вопрос серьезнее. Складывается впечатление, что торговля с Ираном - это предлог, что определенные круги в США не хотят вхождения России в "новый КОКОМ".

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Иран просто не может быть непреодолимой проблемой. Ведь мы гарантируем соблюдение всех международных режимов нераспространения. Не раз разъясняли, что наши поставки не носят дестабилизирующего характера.

Мы готовы ко всем вариантам. Конечно, если Россия окажется вне новых механизмов взаимодействия, трагедии не произойдет. Ориентироваться на автоматическое присоединение России к режиму, создаваемому за закрытыми для нас дверями, не следует. Мы, разумеется, останемся верными нашим международным обязательствам, будем и дальше проявлять ответственность и сдержанность. Без нас, однако, пострадает эффективность будущего режима. Предпочли бы другой вариант - равноправное международное сотрудничество в этой сфере.

Наш выбор зависит от тебя, Билл, от того политического решения, которое ты примешь. Мы, соответственно, будем определяться относительно возможностей нормального, серьезного сотрудничества в вопросах экспортного контроля. Делегировать это решение бюрократии нельзя.

Наше партнерство выдержало сложные испытания. Рассчитываю, что и в этом случае удастся договориться о совместном, скоординированном подходе.

Искренне твой,



Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Translated from Russian

Moscow, the Kremlin,
April 16, 1994

Dear Bill:

I am obliged to address you on a problem which seriously disturbs me. The situation in Bosnia carries an ever growing threat of an escalation with UN forces being drawn into it.

NATO airstrikes have ricocheted against the UNPROFOR, brought about confrontation of the international forces with the Serbs, have put into question the whole negotiating process.

Having received your message of February 18, I thought that after Sarajevo we had an understanding: Russian - U.S. consultations should precede adoption of decision on the use of military force in Bosnia. If necessary - on the level of presidents. Both airstrikes at Gorazde were carried out not only without consultations with Russia, but even without letting us know about them. In both cases we were informed post factum.

As you know, UN Security Council Resolution 844 stipulates that the Secretary General has to hold consultations with members of Security Council. This has not been done. The procedure for adopting decision on the use of air force was violated.

At my instructions the Russian Foreign Ministry has demanded explanations from the Secretary General. We reserve the right to make public our views. But now we are dealing with something else.

I am disappointed by the new letdown in the mechanism of Russian - US coordination. You can judge by yourself how this looks from the outside. The Serbs are being bombed without

His Excellency
William Jefferson CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.73]

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consulting Russia. Afterwards we are being appealed to finish off the Serbs, while the mediation role of Russia is being praised to the skies. This is not a division of labor, but rather a mockery of it.

It is not that we are feeling offended by someone (there are attempts at certain quarters to portray the situation in such a way). We can not keep silent when we see that the situation is about to explode. The military course leads to a dead end. We are in favor of another approach.

Our special representatives V.Churkin and Ch.Redman have actively worked this week and seem to have steered the negotiating process toward the finish line. The signing of an agreement on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia is within reach. A new impulse is needed now in order for the war in Bosnia to stop.

In this regard I want to frankly say that it is time to touch upon the prospect of decreasing and lifting the sanctions. Without this there will be no agreement on peace in Bosnia. I realize that this is not an easy question for you. But its consideration will give an important signal to the Serbs prompting their restraint and constructive approach.

Hoping to meet with your understanding,

B.YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
Уильяму Джефферсону КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Вынужден обратиться к тебе по проблеме, которая меня серьезно беспокоит. Ситуация в Боснии все больше грозит эскалацией с вовлечением сил ООН.

Бомбардировки НАТО рикошетом ударили по СООНО, вызвали конфронтацию международных сил с сербами, поставили под вопрос весь переговорный процесс.

Получив твое послание от 18 февраля, я полагал, что после Сараево у нас есть понимание - принятию решения о задействовании военной силы в Боснии должны предшествовать российско-американские консультации. Если надо - на уровне президентов. Оба воздушных удара под Горажде были нанесены не только без консультаций с Россией, но даже без нашего ведома. В обоих случаях мы были проинформированы пост-фактум.

Как тебе известно, резолюция 844 СБ ООН предусматривает, что генеральный секретарь проводит консультации с членами Совета Безопасности. Этого сделано не было. Порядок принятия решения об использовании авиации был нарушен.

По моему указанию МИД России затребовал разъяснений у генсекретаря. Мы резервируем за собой право придать гласности наши оценки. Но сейчас речь о другом.

Я разочарован тем, что дал очередной сбой механизм российско-американской координации. Посуди сам, как это выглядит со стороны.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.74]

По сербам бьют, не консультируясь с нами, а потом всячески превознося посредническую роль России, призывают нас додавливать сербов. Это - не разделение труда, а пародия на него.

Дело совсем не в том, что мы на кого-то обиделись, как сейчас кое-кто пытается представить дело. Мы не можем молчать, когда видим, что ситуация идет вразнос. Военный путь - тупиковый. Мы выступаем за другой путь.

Наши спецпредставители В.Чуркин и Ч.Рэдман активно поработали на этой неделе и, кажется, вывели переговорный процесс на финишную прямую. Подписание соглашения о прекращении враждебных действий в БИГ вполне достижимо. Сейчас нужен новый импульс, чтобы война в Боснии прекратилась.

В этой связи хочу откровенно сказать, что пора приоткрыть перспективу ослабления и снятия санкций. Без этого никакого соглашения о мире в БИГ не будет. Понимаю, что для вас это непростой вопрос. Но его рассмотрение было бы важным сигналом сербам, побуждало бы их к сдержанности и конструктивности.

Надеюсь на понимание.

Б.Ельцин

Москва, Кремль
16 апреля 1994 г.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Translated from Russian

TALKING POINTS

At the same time we are now addressing S.Milosevic. As A.Kozyrev told W.Christopher during their phone conversation, we are putting forward before S.Milosevic a very tough and specific question: we demand that he use his influence and make the military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs cease hostilities at Gorazde. A.Kozyrev may fly to Belgrade in order to prod both parties towards signing an agreement on cessation of hostilities.

We are counting on a constructive response of the US side should we manage in the coming day or two to deblock the situation and bring the parties to sign this agreement. It is in this spirit that A.Kozyrev took Mr. Christopher's message of April 16 and their conversation today at 16.00 Moscow time. We proceed from the premise that the US side will also urgently increase its work with the Muslims, including the field commanders: should the Muslim provocations fail to stop, it will not be possible to steer the Serb command at Gorazde toward restraint. It is necessary to promptly work in the UN - there should be no automatism in bombing any party.

We take as a constructive signal the readiness of US side to consider issues related to sanctions. We quite realize that one can speak about this issue in a practical manner only in the context of ceasing the bloodshed in Gorazde, reaching a general agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims and setting free the detained UN personnel. We are specially insisting on the latter demand in Belgrade and Pale. It is our people who are now at risk as well.

We are looking towards continuing most constant and close contact in Bosnian affairs on all levels at this critical moment.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.75]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Сейчас мы параллельно обращаемся к С.Милошевичу. Вопрос перед ним, как сказал А.В.Козырев в сегодняшнем телефонном разговоре У.Кристоферу, ставится жестко и конкретно: требуем, чтобы он использовал свое влияние и добился от военного руководства боснийских сербов прекращения боевых действий под Горажде. А.В.Козырев возможно вылетит в Белград, чтобы подтолкнуть обе стороны к подписанию соглашения о прекращении враждебных действий.

Мы рассчитываем на конструктивную реакцию американской стороны, если в ближайшие день-два нам удастся разблокировать ситуацию и вывести стороны на подписание этого соглашения. А.В.Козырев именно так расценил послание У.Кристофера от 16 апреля и их беседу сегодня в 16.00 по московскому времени. Исходим из того, что американская сторона также резко активизирует работу с мусульманами, в том числе с полевыми командирами на местах, - если не прекратятся мусульманские провокации, склонить сербское командования под Горажде к сдержанности не получится. Надо незамедлительно поработать и в ООН - никакого автоматизма в бомбардировках кого бы то ни было быть не должно.

Мы воспринимаем как конструктивный сигнал готовность американской стороны рассмотреть вопросы, касающиеся санкций. При этом вполне отдаем себе отчет в том, что о практическом решении этого вопроса можно говорить лишь в контексте прекращения кровопролития в Горажде, заключения общего соглашения между сербами и мусульманами и освобождения задержанного персонала ООН. На последнем требовании особо настаиваем перед Белградом и Пале. Ведь опасности подвергаются сейчас и наши люди.

Рассчитываем на продолжение самых оперативных и тесных контактов по боснийским делам на всех уровнях в этот критический момент.

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[2015-0815-M.1, 2.76]

Translated from Russian

Moscow, the Kremlin,
April 16, 1994

Dear Bill:

I am obliged to address you on a problem which seriously disturbs me. The situation in Bosnia carries an ever growing threat of an escalation with UN forces being drawn into it.

NATO airstrikes have ricocheted against the UNPROFOR, brought about confrontation of the international forces with the Serbs, have put into question the whole negotiating process.

Having received your message of February 18, I thought that after Sarajevo we had an understanding: Russian - U.S. consultations should precede adoption of decision on the use of military force in Bosnia. If necessary - on the level of presidents. Both airstrikes at Gorazde were carried out not only without consultations with Russia, but even without letting us know about them. In both cases we were informed post factum.

As you know, UN Security Council Resolution 844 stipulates that the Secretary General has to hold consultations with members of Security Council. This has not been done. The procedure for adopting decision on the use of air force was violated.

At my instructions the Russian Foreign Ministry has demanded explanations from the Secretary General. We reserve the right to make public our views. But now we are dealing with something else.

I am disappointed by the new letdown in the mechanism of Russian - US coordination. You can judge by yourself how this looks from the outside. The Serbs are being bombed without

His Excellency
William Jefferson CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.77]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

consulting Russia. Afterwards we are being appealed to finish off the Serbs, while the mediation role of Russia is being praised to the skies. This is not a division of labor, but rather a mockery of it.

It is not that we are feeling offended by someone (there are attempts at certain quarters to portray the situation in such a way). We can not keep silent when we see that the situation is about to explode. The military course leads to a dead end. We are in favor of another approach.

Our special representatives V.Churkin and Ch.Redman have actively worked this week and seem to have steered the negotiating process toward the finish line. The signing of an agreement on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia is within reach. A new impulse is needed now in order for the war in Bosnia to stop.

In this regard I want to frankly say that it is time to touch upon the prospect of decreasing and lifting the sanctions. Without this there will be no agreement on peace in Bosnia. I realize that this is not an easy question for you. But its consideration will give an important signal to the Serbs prompting their restraint and constructive approach.

Hoping to meet with your understanding,

B.YELTSIN

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Translated from Russian

TALKING POINTS

At the same time we are now addressing S.Milosevic. As A.Kozyrev told W.Christopher during their phone conversation, we are putting forward before S.Milosevic a very tough and specific question: we demand that he use his influence and make the military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs cease hostilities at Gorazde. A.Kozyrev may fly to Belgrade in order to prod both parties towards signing an agreement on cessation of hostilities.

We are counting on a constructive response of the US side should we manage in the coming day or two to deblock the situation and bring the parties to sign this agreement. It is in this spirit that A.Kozyrev took Mr. Christopher's message of April 16 and their conversation today at 16.00 Moscow time. We proceed from the premise that the US side will also urgently increase its work with the Muslims, including the field commanders: should the Muslim provocations fail to stop, it will not be possible to steer the Serb command at Gorazde toward restraint. It is necessary to promptly work in the UN - there should be no automatism in bombing any party.

We take as a constructive signal the readiness of US side to consider issues related to sanctions. We quite realize that one can speak about this issue in a practical manner only in the context of ceasing the bloodshed in Gorazde, reaching a general agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims and setting free the detained UN personnel. We are specially insisting on the latter demand in Belgrade and Pale. It is our people who are now at risk as well.

We are looking towards continuing most constant and close contact in Bosnian affairs on all levels at this critical moment.

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.78]

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IMMEDIATE ~~SECRET~~ 30+1

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: BURNS COQ FILE PONEMAN PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2

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FM WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E, O. 13526

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~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

2015-0815-M-1 [2.79]

SECTION 1 OF 2
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

KBH 1/2/2025

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

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BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

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I ENJOYED VERY MUCH OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON APRIL 20 ON BOSNIA. BASED ON OUR DISCUSSION, I BELIEVE WE SHARE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AS WE APPROACH THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE. I AM PLEASED THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THEIR OWN DISCUSSIONS TO IMPLEMENT A JOINT APPROACH TO HELP BRING PEACE TO THE REGION.

.

MY PURPOSE IN WRITING IS NOT TO DISCUSS BOSNIA BUT TO RESPOND TO YOUR LETTERS TO ME CONCERNING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NAPLES G-7 MEETING AND EXPORT CONTROLS. I READ YOUR LETTERS CAREFULLY AND HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF CONSIDERATION TO THE CONCERNS YOU RAISED IN THEM. BEFORE REPLYING DIRECTLY ON THESE ISSUES, I WANTED TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR THE POSITIVE APPROACH AND THE CANDOR IN YOUR LETTERS. THIS STRAIGHTFORWARDNESS IS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP YOU AND I ESTABLISHED IN VANCOUVER, TOKYO AND MOSCOW. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR ABILITY TO WORK EFFECTIVELY ON THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD.

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I REMAIN DEEPLY COMMITTED TO A SOLID AND PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND HOPE WE CAN STAY IN TOUCH PERSONALLY SO THAT WE CAN STEER A CLEAR AND CALM COURSE TOGETHER IN THE COMING MONTHS. I WILL WRITE TO YOU SOON ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN WORKING ON TOGETHER. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT THE G-7 MEETING IN NAPLES WHERE WE SHOULD ARRANGE A SEPARATE BILATERAL MEETING. IN ADDITION, I TRUST YOU WILL BE FREE THIS COMING AUTUMN, AS WE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW, TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

I KNOW FROM OUR DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW AND YOUR JANUARY LETTER THAT YOU HAVE A DEEP INTEREST IN INTEGRATING RUSSIA MORE CLOSELY WITH THE WORK OF THE G-7. I SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE. WHILE WE AGREED IN MOSCOW THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT FOR RUSSIA TO BE A FULL MEMBER, I STRONGLY SUPPORT YOUR WISH TO BE MORE INVOLVED WITH THE POLITICAL WORK OF THE G-7. I HAVE BEEN PUSHING WITHIN THE G-7 TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN. I UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER CIAMPI HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH YOU TO DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF G-7 DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE.

I BELIEVE WE ARE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL ENSURE GREATER AND MORE MEANINGFUL RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION AT THE NAPLES SUMMIT THAN IN YEARS PAST. THIS COULD ENTAIL A STATEMENT RELEASED ON THE DAY OF YOUR MEETING WITH G-7 LEADERS ON MAJOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. AT YOUR REQUEST, WE INTEND TO INVOLVE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PLANNING FOR THE SUMMIT. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN STRENGTHENING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE G-7 AND WILL REFLECT RUSSIA'S CRITICAL ROLE IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

JUST AS YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS YEAR'S NAPLES SUMMIT WILL ENHANCE RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES, I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT RUSSIA WILL JOIN THE FOLLOW-ON REGIME TO COCOM, WHICH WENT OUT OF BUSINESS ON MARCH 31. I APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE ENCOUNTERED OVER RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW EXPORT CONTROL ARRANGEMENT TO REPLACE COCOM. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW REGIME AND AM ENCOURAGED THAT OUR EXPERTS WILL MEET NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN DETAIL. ONE OF THE CENTRAL GOALS OF THIS NEW REGIME IS TO PREVENT THE SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE BEHAVIOR IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE TOGETHER.

FINALLY, I UNDERSTAND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAS DECIDED TO
#3265
NNNN
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
FINAL SECTION OF 2
POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO NATO TO SIGN THE MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENTS FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO RESCHEDULE HIS VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY CONCERNS YOU MAY HAVE IN THE MEANTIME. OUR BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS ARE A GOOD FOUNDATION TO BUILD CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARIES THROUGH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.

IN CLOSING, BORIS, LET ME REAFFIRM MY STRONG COMMITMENT TO WORKING IN CONCERT WITH YOU ON THESE ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA. THE PARTNERSHIP WE HAVE BUILT CAN BE A FORCE FOR TREMENDOUS GOOD IN THE WORLD. FOR MY PART, I PLEDGE CONTINUED COOPERATION AND CLOSE CONSULTATION TO MAKE BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES SUCCEED TOGETHER TOWARD THAT END.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.80)
KBH 1/2/2025

April 20, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB for NB

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on G-7 and COCOM

I recommend that you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab I for transmission to Moscow this week. As you know, Yeltsin has written several letters to the President on key issues, including Russia's wish for more intensive participation in the G-7 summit, COCOM, Bosnia, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

The President's phone call with Yeltsin on April 20 obviates the need for a response on Bosnia although I would anticipate the need for them to talk or communicate by letter as the Christopher-Kozyrev contacts proceed during the next week.

We are preparing with State a response to the letters on Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh which will focus, in part, on some of the problems we have had with the Russians on foreign policy cooperation in general. This response should appropriately follow the small group meeting we discussed on Russian foreign policy which I hope to be able to schedule with you soon.

The message at Tab I focusses on two important issues that the Russians have told us are particularly important for Yeltsin personally--G-7 and COCOM. Yeltsin wrote to the President in January on G-7. We delayed a response pending results of the G-7's deliberations on how to handle Russia at the Naples Summit. Now that Prime Minister Ciampi has responded on behalf of the G-7 to Yeltsin, the President ought to communicate directly to him our strong support for greater Russian involvement, short of membership.

Given Yeltsin's concern with the follow-on regime to COCOM, the attached message also provides a brief interim response to Yeltsin's recent letter on COCOM and points to next week's experts discussions in London (where Lynn Davis will meet Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov) where we hope to narrow the differences. Finally, the message also mentions our hope that Kozyrev will reschedule his visit to NATO to begin Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Concurrences by: Robert Fauver, Jenonne Walker

RECOMMENDATION

That approve the message at Tab I to President Yeltsin for transmission to Moscow

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Message to President Yeltsin
Tab II Incoming letters from Yeltsin on G-7 and on COCOM

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.81)
KBH 1/2/2025

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE

CHARGE MILES: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I ENJOYED VERY MUCH OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON APRIL 20 ON BOSNIA. BASED ON OUR DISCUSSION, I BELIEVE WE SHARE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AS WE APPROACH THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE. I AM PLEASED THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THEIR OWN DISCUSSIONS TO IMPLEMENT A JOINT APPROACH TO HELP BRING PEACE TO THE REGION.

MY PURPOSE IN WRITING IS NOT TO DISCUSS BOSNIA BUT TO RESPOND TO YOUR LETTERS TO ME CONCERNING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NAPLES G-7 MEETING AND EXPORT CONTROLS. I READ YOUR LETTERS CAREFULLY AND HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF CONSIDERATION TO THE CONCERNS YOU RAISED IN THEM. BEFORE REPLYING DIRECTLY ON THESE ISSUES, I WANTED TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR THE POSITIVE APPROACH AND THE CANDOR IN YOUR LETTERS. THIS STRAIGHTFORWARDNESS IS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP YOU AND I ESTABLISHED IN VANCOUVER, TOKYO AND MOSCOW. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR ABILITY TO WORK EFFECTIVELY ON THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD.

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I KNOW FROM OUR DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW AND YOUR JANUARY LETTER THAT YOU HAVE A DEEP INTEREST IN INTEGRATING RUSSIA MORE CLOSELY WITH THE WORK OF THE G-7. I SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE. WHILE WE AGREED IN MOSCOW THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT FOR RUSSIA TO BE A FULL MEMBER, I STRONGLY SUPPORT YOUR WISH TO BE MORE INVOLVED WITH THE POLITICAL WORK OF THE G-7. I HAVE BEEN PUSHING WITHIN THE G-7 TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN. I UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER CIAMPI HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH YOU TO DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF G-7 DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE.

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ECONOMIC ISSUES. AT YOUR REQUEST, WE INTEND TO INVOLVE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PLANNING FOR THE SUMMIT. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN STRENGTHENING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE G-7 AND WILL REFLECT RUSSIA'S CRITICAL ROLE IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

JUST AS YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS YEAR'S NAPLES SUMMIT WILL ENHANCE RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES, I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT RUSSIA WILL JOIN THE FOLLOW-ON REGIME TO COCOM, WHICH WENT OUT OF BUSINESS ON MARCH 31. I APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE ENCOUNTERED OVER RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW EXPORT CONTROL ARRANGEMENT TO REPLACE COCOM. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW REGIME AND AM ENCOURAGED THAT OUR EXPERTS WILL MEET NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN DETAIL. ONE OF THE CENTRAL GOALS OF THIS NEW REGIME IS TO PREVENT THE SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE BEHAVIOR IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE TOGETHER.

FINALLY, I UNDERSTAND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO NATO TO SIGN THE MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENTS FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO RESCHEDULE HIS VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY CONCERNS YOU MAY HAVE IN THE MEANTIME. OUR BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS ARE A GOOD FOUNDATION TO BUILD CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARIES THROUGH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.

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SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (282)
KBH 1/2/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE YELTSIN-CLINTON LETTER PROVIDED TO THE AMBASSADOR BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAYEDOV ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 27.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(LOGO) PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
26 JANUARY 1994
NO. PR-94
MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN

DEAR BILL,

I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO APPEAL TO YOU PERSONALLY VIA THIS LETTER. WE NEED TO DETERMINE HOW TO CARRY MATTERS FURTHER.

I KNOW THAT THE FATE OF RUSSIAN REFORM WORRIES MANY. I DO NOT TAKE THIS WORRY AS INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. QUITE THE OPPOSITE, I ACCEPT ITS LEGITIMACY: WE ARE A PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE WORLD DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA. I CAN SAY CLEARLY AND WITHOUT CONTRADICTION: I ANSWER FOR REFORM IN RUSSIA BEFORE THE COUNTRY AND BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS THE PRESIDENT WHO RECEIVED HIS MANDATE IN A NATIONAL ELECTION AND TWICE CONFIRMED IT IN REFERENDUMS. AS PRESIDENT I GUARANTEE: THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN COURSE.

WE HAVE NOT COME SO FAR AND WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY IN ORDER NOW, WHEN THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND A CHANCE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE WORK WITH THE PARLIAMENT, TO TURN BACK.

I AM TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MOOD OF RUSSIANS. I AM FOLLOWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. I AM GIVING THE GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK INDEPENDENTLY, AND AT THE SAME TIME I AM SETTING OUT THE GENERAL DIRECTIONS OF ITS WORK, NOTING THE BOUNDARIES BEYOND WHICH IT SHOULD NOT GO. I HELP (IT) TO SEE IN PERSPECTIVE, TO MORE DEEPLY UNDERSTAND ITS RESPONSIBILITY.

OF COURSE, REFORM IN A COUNTRY SUCH AS RUSSIA CANNOT TAKE PLACE "IN ONE BREATH." PERIODS OF RADICAL CHANGE HAVE ALREADY BEEN REPLACED BY PERIODS OF CALMER (REFORM), AND THEN A NEW UPTURN BEGAN. BUT THE MAIN THING IS FORWARD MOVEMENT, AND THIS IS WHAT I ANSWER FOR -- SUCH MOVEMENT CONTINUES AND WILL CONTINUE.

I WOULD LIKE TO TELL THOSE WHO CRITICIZE US TODAY, WHO UNJUSTLY ACCUSE US OF CURTAILING REFORM: CALM DOWN, DON'T HURRY TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS, WEIGH EVERYTHING ATTENTIVELY. THIS IS RUSSIA. AND LIFE IN RUSSIA IS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN IT SEEMS FROM OUTSIDE. I AM SURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THIS FULL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WELL.

ACCEPTING THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE COURSE OF RUSSIAN REFORM, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON SEVERAL FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS.

WE HAVE BUILT, AND ARE BUILDING OUR FOREIGN POLICY ON THE BASIS OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING, NATURALLY, OUR NEIGHBORS. AND WE DEMAND THE SAME OF THEM. WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THESE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES, WE PLAN TO DEFEND OUR LEGAL INTERESTS -- IF NEED BE IN A TOUGH AND FIRM MANNER, JUST AS OTHER STATES DO WHEN IT COMES TO DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN HONOR AND RESPECT. NO ONE SHOULD HAVE ANY DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE.

WHEN PEOPLE OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF INTEREST AND GOOD WILL ADVISE US TO STRENGTHEN RUSSIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN THE NEAR ABROAD, WITH INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND PRESENCE, AND CALL OUR ATTENTION TO MUTUAL TRANSPARENCY, WE ACCEPT AND GREET SUCH AN APPROACH AND ARE WILLING TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THIS DIRECTION. BUT I WIL
L SAY OPENLYN I AM SERIOUSLY
WORRIED BY THE SPREADING SPECULATION ABOUT A REBIRTH OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM.

WE SPOKE OF THIS IN MOSCOW AND, IN MY VIEW REVIEWED THE QUESTION FAIRLY FULLY. CHARGES OF NEO-IMPERIALISM ARE UNJUST AND IRRESPONSIBLE. AND, I THINK, (THEY ARE) NOT DISINTERESTED. THEREFORE, WE CANNOT ALLOW OPPONENTS OF CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST TO FORCE US TO PAUSE. ANY BREATHER, IN PLACE OF THE PROMISED ACTIVIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP, WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF OPPONENTS OF REFORM AND, IN THE BROADER SCHEME, OF THE RIGHT-CONSERVATIVE FORCES BOTH IN RUSSIA AND IN THE WEST.

WE NEED TO ACT. I PROPOSE WE QUICKLY BEGIN WORK ON THE PRACTICAL REALIZATION OF OUR EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON THE NEED FOR A FULL-SCALE PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA BY WORKING OUT AND CONFIRMING AT A MEETING OF THE SEVEN IN NAPLES THE BASIC POSITIONS OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE "SEVEN" BOTH IN THE ECONOMIC AND IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERES. THIS STRATEGY SHOULD CLEARLY STATE THE PERSPECTIVE FOR TURNING THE "SEVEN" INTO THE "EIGHT," STARTING IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE.

I FEEL IT NECESSARY PARTICULARLY TO STRESS: WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS NOT AFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLED JOINT ACTIVITY ON THE BASIS OF JOINT DIRECTIONS OF MOVEMENT. WHAT I AM PROPOSING IS TO TAKE CONCRETE

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DECISIONS ABOUT CONCRETE STEPS TIED TO CLEAR TIME PARAMETERS.

I KNOW THAT THE TRANSITION TO A NEW STAGE IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WIT THE "SEVEN" CARRIES WITH IT ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ARE READY TO TAKE THESE UPON THEMSELVES. THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT, V.S. CHERNOMYRDIN, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE QUESTIONS.

WE CONFIRM OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE IN MOSCOW THE FINANCE MINISTERS OF THE "SEVEN" IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF MATTERS. ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF THESE ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS WE WOULD BE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE "SHERPAS."

IN ADDITION, I PROPOSE TO ORDER THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO WORK OUT BEFORE NAPLES THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTENT OF SUCH A STRATEGY (INCLUDING WITH THE USE OF OUR GROUP ON STRATEGIC STABILITY). THE RESULTS OF THIS WORK -- BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL -- WOULD BE REPORTED TO US SO THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS COULD PRESENT ON THIS BASIS A JOINT RUSSIAN-AMERICAN INITIATIVE, HAVING INVITED OUR PARTNERS IN THE "SEVEN" TO JOIN IT.

THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A STRATEGY WILL ALLOW US TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN US (SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE SITUATIONS WITH LIBYA, YUGOSLAVIA, IRAQ), AND GUARANTEE THE PROGRESSIVE NATURE AND DEPENDABILITY OF OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION.

IN ADDITION, A POLITICAL DOCUMENT OF THE "EIGHT" FIXING THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A PROGRAM OF COOPERATION, WOULD HELP TO BUILD A SOCIAL CONSENSUS: BOTH IN RUSSIA -- IN FAVOR OF REFORM -- AND IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST -- IN SUPPORT OF SUCH A COURSE OF THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP.

BILL, I'LL BE OPEN. I KNOW IT ISN'T EASY FOR YOU NOW. THEY ARE ATTACKING YOU SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY SEE THAT YOU HAVE BEGUN AN IMPORTANT JOB, WHICH INEVITABLY AFFECTS MANY INTERESTS. BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT YOU WILL WIN OUT AND REALIZE YOUR "AGENDA FOR AMERICA." I HOPE THAT, REGARDLESS OF INTERNAL MATTERS, YOU WILL CONTINUE YOUR ACTIVE ROLE IN WORLD POLITICS.

IN MOSCOW I SHARED WITH YOU MY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. AS IT TURNS OUT, OF THE ENTIRE TOKYO PACKAGE, ONLY THOSE ASPECTS WHICH YOU TOOK PERSONALLY UPON YOURSELF WERE REALIZED IN FULL. I CALL ON YOU AGAIN THIS TIME TO DEMONSTRATE LEADERSHIP IN WORKING OUT A STRATEGY TO BRING RUSSIA CLOSER TO THE "SEVEN." I WILL NOT HIDE THE FACT THAT I SUPPORTED

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THE AMERICAN IDEA OF "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" FIRST OF ALL TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POTENTIAL FOR INTEGRATION CONTAINED IN IT. I AM VERY MUCH COUNTING ON AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE OF THE USA TO THIS CURRENT INITIATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP.

CONCURRENTLY, I AM DESPATCHING LETTERS TO THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE "SEVEN," IN WHICH I BRIEFLY BRING UP THIS IDEA, BUT FOR THE MOMENT NOT THE DETAILS. I THINK THAT JOINT WORK ON IT WILL BE A WORTHY MEANS OF REALIZING OUR CONCLUSIONS ON THE FORMATION BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND THE U.S. OF A RELATIONSHIP OF MATURE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, AS YOU AND I STATED IN THE MOSCOW DECLARATION.

I AWAIT YOU THOUGHTS.

WITH RESPECT.

/S/

B. YELTSIN

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.83)
KBH 1/2/2025

BEGIN TEXT:

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
30 MARCH I994
PAGE 002 MOSCOW ~~S E C R E T~~
MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN
DEAR BILL,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT MESSAGE ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. I AM SATISFIED THAT, IN SPITE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE, WE ARE SUCCEEDING IN MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION. NEVERTHELESS, I HAVE A SERIOUS CONCERN. WE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT ALLOW IT TO PASS WHEN DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ARE SABOTAGED. I HAVE IN MIND RUSSIA'S JOINING IN THE PREPARATION OF THE NEW EXPORT CONTROL REGIME WHICH WILL REPLACE COCOM.

TO BE HONEST, BILL, I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING. IN MOSCOW WE AGREED THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE ON AN EVEN BASIS WITH ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN CREATING THE NEW EXPORT CONTROL MECHANISM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THIS TO A.V. KOZYREV IN VLADIVOSTOK. STILL, IN SPITE OF THESE ASSURANCES, RUSSIA WAS NOT INVITED TO THE MULTILATERAL MEETING IN THE HAGUE, CALLED SPECIALLY TO AGREE ON THE PARAMETERS OF THIS REGIME.

AT FIRST I DOUBTED IT WHEN I FOUND OUT THAT THE USA IS BLOCKING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION. THIS IS SO MUCH OUT OF KEY WITH THE GOALS AND PRACTICE OF A MATURE PARTNERSHIP. BUT THEY CONFIRMED TO ME -- THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WERE OPPOSED, THE REST IN FAVOR.

YOUR EXPERTS REFERRED TO THE SUPPLY OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS TO IRAN. I WILL NOT EVEN MENTION THAT PRECONDITIONS AND DISCRIMINATORY LINKAGE HAVE NO -PLACE BETWEEN PARTNERS. THE QUESTION IS SERIOUS. THE OPINION IS BECOMING CURRENT THAT TRADE WITH IRAN IS A PRETEXT, THAT CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE U.S. DO NOT WANT RUSSIA'S ENTRY INTO THE "NEW COCOM."

IRAN SIMPLY CANNOT BE AN UNRESOLVABLE PROBLEM. AFTER ALL, WE HAVE GUARANTEE TO ABIDE BY ALL INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES. WE HAVE ON MANY OCCASIONS EXPLAINED THAT OUR SHIPMENTS DO NOT HAVE A DESTABILIZING CHARACTER.

WE ARE READY FOR ANY VARIANT. OF COURSE, IF RUSSIA WINDS UP OUTSIDE THE NEW MECHANISMS OF MUTUAL
PAGE 003 MOSCOW ~~S E C R E T~~
ACTION IT WILL NOT BE A TRAGEDY. ONE SHOULD NOT ASSUME RUSSIA'S AUTOMATIC ACCESSION TO A REGIME CREATED BEHIND DOORS WHICH WERE CLOSED TO US. WE, OF COURSE, WILL REMAIN LOYAL TO OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DISPLAY RESPONSIBILITY AND RESTRAINT. WITHOUT US, HOWEVER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW REGIME WILL SUFFER. WE WOULD PREFER ANOTHER VARIANT -- EQUAL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS SPHERE.

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OUR CHOICE DEPENDS ON YOU, BILL, ON THE POLITICAL DECISION WHICH YOU WILL TAKE. WE, CORRESPONDINGLY, WILL DEERMINE OUR POSSIBILITIES FOR NORMAL, SERIOUS COOPERATION ON QUESTIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL. IT IS WRONG TO DELEGATE THIS DECISION TO THE BUREAUCRACY.

OUR PARTNERSHIP IS UNDERGOING DIFFICULT TRIALS. I AM COUNTING, IN THIS CASE ALSO, ON REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON A JOINT, COORDINATED APPROACH.

SINCERELY YOURS,

/S/

B.YELTSIN

END TEXT.

DELAS: OADR

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

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4225

Translated from Russian

May 26, 1994
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I read your message of May 19 on Bosnia very carefully. Our thinking goes in the same direction. I am sure that without close contact between you and I and without our joint actions nothing good will come out there at all.

On May 13 in Geneva our ministers produced a very good document. It is important not to let it get bogged down in small details.

In my view, the following needs to be done at this time.

First, I would ask you, Bill, to finally tell Izetbegovic that his troops should stop provoking the Serbs. We are trying to restrain them, but this is a thakless job, and at some point the Serb extremists may again blow a fuse. That would be something that I think neither of us wants.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be much more stable, if the Serbs and the Muslims signed an agreement on cessation of hostilities, as stipulated in the ministers' document. We should not allow them to drag their feet on this. After all, the necessary preparatory work has already been done, and that with the participation of the US and Russian special representatives. So let's both of us press on the Serbs and the Muslims that they sign this agreement within the next few days.

Indeed, the political atmospere for this is good, for the contact group is beginning the discussion of the Bosnia map with the parties.

His Excellency
Mr. William J. CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.84]

We told the Serbs in no uncetain terms that there is no way the Serb entity as part of the Bosnia Union can claim more than 49 percent. Now the contact group should exercise firmness so as to help the parties find a concrete territorial solution taking into account the fact that, as was noted during the ministerial meeting, the territories of both entities - the Croat-Muslim and the Serb - should be viable and sensible.

All this work should proceed under a constant pressure from above. I think the ministers should, without delay, schedule another meeting in the same format, perhaps inviting the parties to the conflict to participate. If things go well, it ought to be able to define the contours of the summit meeting. I am glad you liked my idea in this regard.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с Твоим посланием от 19 мая по Боснии. Мыслим мы в одном направлении. Уверен, что без нашего с Тобой тесного контакта и совместных действий ничего путного там не получится.

Министры согласовали в Женеве 13 мая короший документ. Важно не дать ему завязнуть в спорах по мелочам.

По-моему, сейчас необходимо предпринять следующее.

Во-первых, прошу тебя, Билл, скажи, наконец, Изетбеговичу, чтобы его войска перестали провоцировать сербов. Мы их сдерживаем, но занятие это неблагодарное, и в какой-то момент сербские экстремисты вновь могут закусить удила. Думаю, это не нужно ни Тебе, ни мне.

Обстановка в БИГ стала бы намного стабильнее, если бы серби и мусульмане подписали соглашение о прекращении враждебных действий, как об этом говорится в документе министров. Не надо позволять им тянуть с этим делом. Ведь необходимая подготовительная работа уже проделана, причем с участием американского и российского спецпредставителей. Давай потребуем от сербов и мусульман, чтобы они подписали такое соглашение в ближайшие дни.

Тем более, что политическая атмосфера для этого неплохая: контактная группа приступает к обсуждению со сторонами карты БИГ.

Мы вполне определенно сказали сербам, что больше, чем на 49 процентов сербское образование в составе унии БИГ претендовать

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.85]

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не может. Теперь контактная группа должна проявить упорство, чтобы помочь сторонам найти конкретное территориальное решение, с учетом того, что, как говорилось на министерской встрече, территории своих - и хорвато-мусульманского, и сербского образований - должны быть жизнеспособными и разумными.

Вся эта работа должна находиться под постоянным прессингом сверху. Думаю, министрам надо, не затягивая, назначить новую встречу в том же формате, может быть, с приглашением конфликтующих сторон. При хорошем раскладе на ней определятся контуры встречи в верхах. Рад, что тебе понравилась моя идея на этот счет.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

26 мая 1994 г.
Москва, Кремль

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4718

Translated from Russian

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.8b)
KBH 1/2/2025

June 7, 1994
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill:

Over these past weeks the US-Russian partnership has been working with greater effectiveness. On the plus side, we have developed a joint platform for a Bosnia settlement, have coordinated quite closely with respect to the Middle East affairs, and have achieved mutual understanding in the matter concerning the format of NATO's relations with Russia. The establishment of a political Group of Eight has, without doubt, been a major development. Some problems remain, however, (the "new COCOM", practical support for peacekeeping efforts of each other, specifically, Russia's efforts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh), but things have been moving. According to the reports I am getting, our experts continue to work on compromise options.

My overall impression is that our partnership is maturing not only in form, but in substance, and is beginning to reflect, although not always as yet, a carefully constructed balance of interests. Given this fact, the upcoming summit in Naples provides an excellent opportunity for us. We will be able both to broadly exchange views on the main elements of Russian-American partnership, which were conveyed to the US side in Vladivostok, and to review some concrete ideas and cooperative projects. The main theme, it seems to me, ought to be the concept of the Russian President's state visit to the United States in the fall of this year.

In this context, we need already now to have a clear sense of how our contacts are going to be organized. First of all, we must decide on the timeframe of the visit. With a clearly defined

His Excellency
Mr. William J.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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timeframe, the Gore-Ghernomyrdin commission will be able to fully focus on building the economic contents of the fall summit, the foreign ministers will deal with the political agenda, and the defense ministers will move on the military issues, such as joint exercises of peace-keeping contingents.

I wish to make some specific proposals and hope they will be acceptable to you. I could come to Washington on Friday, September 23. On the following day we would hold formal talks with the participation of our delegations and on Sunday we could go out of town and, in an informal setting, have a frank discussion of the key issues of our partnership. We could also fly together to New York and on the plane pursue matters relating to our coordination in multilateral cooperation.

Therefore, it would be logical that the Presidents of Russia and the United States address the UN General Assembly on the first day of the general debate, that is, on September 26, and do so with a minimal time differential (I am planning to speak in the afternoon, and I understand you want to do it in the morning), presenting essentially a common program. We also could have a joint meeting with Boutros Boutros-Gali, perhaps over lunch.

Such a scenario would make it possible to conduct fully substantive US-Russian talks and at the same time ensure an appropriate place to our statements in the United Nations. I think it would fit your schedule, too, since I know that after the opening of the general debate in the General Assembly you will have to deal with a stream of Presidents and Prime Ministers who will be coming to the General Assembly.

In addition to the concept and the format of the fall summit, it will be also useful for us in Naples to discuss such major subjects as the bilateral Russian-American component in the transformation of the G-7 into G-8, reforming the structures of European stability, assessment of Russian and US peace-keeping efforts, and possible new approaches to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We should perhaps briefly compare our conclusions of the results of the June session of the Commission

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on Economic and Technological Cooperation. In other words, we would outline the subjects for a detailed conversation during my visit to the United States.

I will be in touch shortly concerning the exact time and place of our meeting in Naples.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.87]

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Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

В последние недели российско-американское партнерство начинае работать результативнее. У нас в активе - совместная платформа по боснийскому урегулированию, довольно плотная координация по ближневосточным делам, выход на взаимопонимание в вопросе о формате отношений России с НАТО. Безусловно, крупное событие - создание политической "восьмерки". Остаются и проблемы ("новый КОКОМ", поддержка на практике миротворческих усилий друг друга, конкретно - российских в Абхазии и Нагорном Карабахе), но они не застыли. Как мне докладывают, эксперты продолжают работать над компромиссными вариантами.

Общее впечатление: наше партнерство становится зрелым не только по форме, но и по содержанию, начинает воплощать - хотя еще не всегда - выверенный баланс интересов сторон. С учетом этого, двусторонняя российско-американская встреча в верхах в Неаполе - как нельзя кстати. Мы сможем как в крупном плане обменяться мнениями по основным элементам российско-американского партнерства, переданным американской стороне во Владивостоке, так и оперативно рассмотреть некоторые конкретные идеи и проекты сотрудничества. Главная тема, как мне представляется, - это концепция государственного визита президента России в США осенью с.г.

В этой связи нам нужно уже сейчас придать четкую организацион перспективу нашим контактам. Прежде всего надлежит определиться по срокам визита. Имея фиксированные временные ориентиры, комиссия В.С.Черномырдина - А.Гора сможет в полную силу сосредоточиться

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на подготовке экономического наполнения осеннего саммита, министры иностранных дел займутся политической повесткой, а министры обороны подработают военные вопросы, такие как совместные учения миротворческих контингентов.

Вношу конкретные предложения и надеюсь, что они тебя устроят. Я мог бы прилететь в Вашингтон в пятницу, 23 сентября. На следующи день мы провели бы официальные переговоры с участием делегаций, а в воскресенье могли бы выехать за город, чтобы в неформальной обстановке откровенно поговорить по ключевым вопросам нашего партнерства. В Нью-Йорк мы тоже могли бы вылететь вместе, продолжи на борту самолета согласование тематики многостороннего взаимодействия.

Отсюда - логически вытекают обращения президентов России и США к Генеральной Ассамблее ООН в первый день общей дискуссии. 26 сентября, с минимальным разрывом (я планирую выступить после обеда, а ты, как я понимаю, - утром), по существу с общей программой. Можно провести и совместную встречу с Бутросом Гали - скажем, за ланчем.

Такая схема позволила бы провести полновесные российско-американские переговоры и одновременно обеспечить подобающее место нашим выступлениям в ООН. Думаю, она удобна и для тебя, поскольку, как я знаю, после открытия общей дискуссии в ООН к тебе в Вашингтон на полторы-две недели начинается паломничество приехавших на Генассамблею президентов и премьер-министров.

Кроме концепции и формата осеннего саммита, на встрече в Неаполе нам есть смысл также обсудить такие крупные темы, как двусторонний российско-американский компонент в трансформации "семерки" в "восьмерку", реформирование структур европейской стабильности, оценка миротворческих усилий России и США, возможные новые подходы к борьбе с распространением оружия массового уничтожения. Наверное, следовало бы на коротке сопоставить наши выводы по итогам июньского заседания Комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству. То есть, по сути мы наметили бы

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темы для развернутого проговора в ходе моего визита в США.

По точному времени и месту встречи в Неаполе отвечу в самое ближайшее время.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

7 июня 1994 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0865-M [4.31]
KBH 1/2/2025

4859

Translated from Russian

June 15, 1994
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,


I have carefully analysed our latest telephone conversaiton.

[redacted] 3.3(b)(6)

I have a concrete suggestion to make. As you and I agreed earlier, Minister Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher will meet [redacted] 3.3(b)(6) This meeting could be held soon in Brussels. At that time, too, the Russian foreign minister intends to sign a framework document concerning the Partnership for Peace program. I hope that in addition to this we will be able to find an appropriate form for recording the intention of Russia and NATO to pursue full-fledged cooperation, as it was stated, incidentally, in the latest NATO Council's communique.

I hope that the US Secretary of State will be taking part in this action. Among other things, this will be important for affirming US role and responsibility in Europe, and for imparting an impetus to Russia-NATO cooperation and Russian-American partnership.

His Excellency
Mr. William J.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.



Also, the ministers will have an opportunity to work on the concept of the September summit; I believe it is time that we get down to this business in earnest. I expect to have a thorough discussion of this matter in Naples.

I look forward to an early and positive response.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0865-M [4.31]
KBH 1/2/2025

4859

Translated from Russian

June 15, 1994
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,


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President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.



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Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2015-0815-M-1 [2.92]
KBH 1/2/2025

PRT: BERGER COMM COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: FILE GRAY PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 210229Z JUL 94

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

.

AS YOU KNOW, BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF BOTH CONFLICTS AND UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN YOU HAVE ABOUT STABILITY IN AREAS CLOSE TO YOUR BORDERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS ALSO FAVOR A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT IF RUSSIA AND THE UN AND CSCE WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY AND COOPERATIVELY, WE WILL HAVE A BETTER CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS.

.

I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR RECENT LETTER DESCRIBING YOUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN GEORGIA. I FIRMLY SUPPORT THE GOALS EMBODIED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON ABKHAZIA THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS APPROVED. OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN GEORGIA SHOULD BE TO SAFEGUARD GEORGIA'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ENCOURAGE A STABLE PEACE AND FRUITFUL NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND ENSURE THE RESETTLEMENT OF GEORGIAN REFUGEES THROUGHOUT ABKHAZIA. WE RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIAN COOPERATION AND SUPPORT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS.

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I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE UN TO AGREE ON INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED GUIDELINES FOR THE CIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN ABKHAZIA; TO INCREASE THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION'S ACTIVITIES TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE; TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF UN PERSONNEL; AND TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE UN OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG). THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EXPANSION OF A REVISED UNOMIG. BASED ON THE UN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION'S SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WE WOULD BE PREPARED LATER ON TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF UN RECOGNITION FOR THE OPERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A VOLUNTARY FUND.

IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, I BELIEVE WE ARE AT A CROSSROADS. IF WE MERGE THE RUSSIAN AND CSCE EFFORTS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO TURN THE FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE INTO A PERMANENT PEACE. ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE ENDORSED A SUBSTANTIVE ROLE FOR THE CSCE IN WORKING OUT A LASTING CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. AZERBAIJAN INSISTS THAT ANY CIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON ITS TERRITORY HAVE A CSCE MANDATE, LIMITED DURATION AND INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT. ARMENIA ALSO ENDORSES A COMBINATION OF THE CSCE PLAN AND RUSSIAN INITIATIVES.

OUR TASK IS TO WORK TOGETHER ON A PLAN THAT WILL MEET THE PARTIES' SECURITY NEEDS AND CONCERNS AND PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS. I URGE YOU TO INSTRUCT YOUR NEGOTIATORS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH CSCE MINSK GROUP CHAIRMAN ELIASSON AND US TO CRAFT AN AGREEMENT THAT IS FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE CSCE.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITIES IN BOTH THE GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICTS AND THE NEED FOR RESOLUTE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO HELP RESOLVE THEM. I BELIEVE WE MUST COORDINATE OUR NEXT STEPS CAREFULLY TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD DISRUPT THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND TRUST OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO FORGE OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#3959
NNNN
<MSGID> M1161220

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 4983

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7-20-94

July 19, 1994

94 JUL 19 P4:05

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (293)
KBH 1/24/2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on the Conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh

Purpose

To send a message to President Yeltsin encouraging Russian cooperation with UN and CSCE efforts to resolve the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Background

President Yeltsin has written to you requesting support for Russia's role in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Our position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is fairly straightforward. The Georgia issue is more complicated, particularly because of what we are trying to achieve in the UN on other issues such as Haiti and Bosnia.

I) Nagorno-Karabakh

The Russians have persistently tried to undermine the negotiation efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group in favor of their own mediation plan. Both the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians fear a Russian-only solution because it would give the Russians overriding influence in the region and infringe on their sovereignty and independence. For the first time since the war began, the Azerbaijanis and Armenians have agreed on the common grounds for a resolution to the conflict. This common approach requires the participation of the CSCE to monitor closely the activities of a Russian force that would separate the warring factions. Your message urges Russian cooperation with the CSCE so that we will not lose this opportunity to work for a genuine peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.

II) Georgia

President Yeltsin wrote to you on June 21 to inform you of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) plans for deploying a Russian peacekeeping operation (PKO) to Abkhazia, Georgia. Yeltsin requests your support for the CIS PKO and the establishment of a UN voluntary fund to help finance the PKO.

Background on Georgia: In the Spring, the UN Security Council determined that conditions were not satisfactory for establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Georgia,

PHOTOCOPY ~~SECHANDWRITING~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

because the parties failed to agree on a comprehensive political settlement and the Abkhaz oppose the introduction of a UN force. Subsequently, the Russians determined, primarily for their own national reasons, that they would not wait until conditions were conducive to a UN force.

In June, the Russians dispatched their own forces to Georgia as peacekeepers, with the assent of President Shevardnadze, but without any UN Security Council recognition or endorsement, even of the sort granted to the French before it sent troops to Rwanda or to the U.S. and allies in Somalia. Although the CIS has provided political blessing to the Russian deployment, no other CIS countries have agreed to participate in the force.

The U.S. Position: We have sought to avoid blessing and taking responsibility for Russian actions we cannot control while encouraging the Russians to adhere to international peacekeeping norms and standards. We will vote to expand the UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to observe the CIS PKO and monitor the cease-fire and return of refugees. We will continue to resist a UN voluntary fund for the force until it has shown that it is abiding by international peacekeeping standards. However, we may need to revisit this position in light of progress in negotiations with our Western allies and Russia in New York. Your message explains our policy and encourages the Russians to work closely with the UN toward a lasting political solution to the Abkhazia conflict.

Implications for Haiti: You asked about the implications of our policy on CIS peacekeeping in Georgia for our efforts to reconstitute the UN mission in Haiti.

Perceived Double Standard: The Russians have complained repeatedly that the U.S. and our allies maintain a double standard with respect to Russia. While supporting French activities in Rwanda and, potentially, a U.S.-led UN mission in Haiti, we have refused to bless and fund the Russian role in Georgia. The U.S. has stressed that Russia's history with respect to the former Soviet Union and her active involvement on the side of the Abkhaz distinguish this case from others such as Haiti or Rwanda. Despite our considerable unease, the U.S. has been careful not to oppose Russian peacekeeping in Georgia.

UNSC Action in June: In late June, the UNSC considered a resolution briefly extending the mandate of the small UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and another setting the broad parameters for the reconstituted UN mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The Russians sought to link the two issues and threatened to veto the Haiti resolution if the U.S. did not agree to "welcome" the CIS deployment in Georgia. After discussions with the U.S. in Moscow and lengthy negotiations at the UN, the Russians agreed to resolution language "noting with satisfaction" the beginning of CIS assistance in Georgia.

This month, U.S. interests in Haiti and Russia's interests in Georgia will intersect at two points in the UN Security Council: 1) Before July 21, the UN will consider a resolution expanding UNOMIG from 55 to 135 observers and clarifying its role with respect to the CIS force; 2) By the end of the month, the UN will also consider a resolution authorizing the establishment of a reconfigured UNMIH.

The Russians' willingness to be supportive on Haiti will depend, at least in part, on their satisfaction with respect to Georgia.

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

Next Steps in the UNSC: We will continue to argue that Georgia and Haiti should not be linked in the UNSC, particularly since Haiti involves revising the mandate of an existing UN mission to which the members states have already agreed. Moreover, the proposed new mandate for UNMIH has already been largely approved by the OAS.

-- **Georgia:** The Secretary General has recently issued a report on Georgia, which will serve as the basis for UNSC action this month. The report is wholly consonant with the U.S. view that UN observers should monitor the CIS force and enjoy complete autonomy and freedom of movement. Provided there is support in the Council for the Secretary General's recommendations, as there normally is, we hope to be able to avoid any direct confrontation with the Russians that could further complicate achievement of our goals with respect to Haiti.

We will try to work with the Russians to craft mutually acceptable language in the forthcoming resolution that recognizes in some fashion CIS activities in Georgia and approves UNOMIG's mandate as proposed by the Secretary General.

-- **Haiti:** Provided that negotiations over Georgia are not acrimonious, we expect the Russians ultimately will not veto a Haiti resolution. The Russians recognize the importance of Haiti to the U.S. and may be reluctant to force a confrontation on such a high profile issue.

The dynamics in the Security Council remain fluid, and we will weigh carefully at every stage the ramifications of our Georgia policy for our efforts to achieve U.S. objectives on Haiti, Iraq, Bosnia and other issues of importance at the UN.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A to President Yeltsin for transmission to Moscow.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter from Yeltsin

PHOTOCOPY FOR HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (294)
KBH 1/2/2025

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS,

AS YOU KNOW, BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF BOTH CONFLICTS, AND UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN YOU HAVE ABOUT STABILITY IN AREAS CLOSE TO YOUR BORDERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS ALSO FAVOR A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT IF RUSSIA AND THE UN AND CSCE WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY AND COOPERATIVELY, WE WILL HAVE A BETTER CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS.

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I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE UN TO AGREE ON INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED GUIDELINES FOR THE CIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN ABKHAZIA; TO INCREASE THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION'S ACTIVITIES TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE; TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF UN PERSONNEL; AND TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE UN OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG). THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EXPANSION OF A REVISED UNOMIG. BASED ON THE UN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION'S SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WE WOULD BE PREPARED LATER ON TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF UN RECOGNITION FOR THE OPERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A VOLUNTARY FUND.

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~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

IS FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE CSCE.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITIES IN BOTH THE GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICTS AND THE NEED FOR RESOLUTE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO HELP RESOLVE THEM. I BELIEVE WE MUST COORDINATE OUR NEXT STEPS CAREFULLY TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD DISRUPT THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND TRUST OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO FORGE OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

~~SECRET~~

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Translated from Russian

Moscow, The Kremlin
June 21, 1994

Dear Bill,

I write again concerning the issue of the Georgian-Abkhazian settlement.

Finally, we are beginning to see light at the end of the tunnel - on May 14 the Georgian and Abkhazian sides have signed in Moscow the ceasefire and disengagement agreement. Because in his recent report on May 3, 1994, the UN Secretary General noted the absence of appropriate conditions for a UN peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, the parties to the conflict have requested the Council of the Heads of the C.I.S. member states to deploy C.I.S. peacekeeping forces. We cannot afford any further delay, for the situation is fraught with a new explosion.

Let me inform you that the Council decided to respond to this appeal. At the same time our assumption, naturally, is that the C.I.S. does not supplant UN efforts, but contributes to the creation of the most favorable conditions for them. The decision adopted goes along the lines of one of the options proposed by the UN Secretary General in his report. Ensuring from the very beginning close interaction between the peace-keepers and the UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) will also serve these objectives. We expect that the Security Council will make necessary decisions to increase the strength of the UNOMIG personnel, enlarge and further clarify its mandate. We expect also that a special voluntary Fund will be created under the UN auspices, which, in our view would help involve more states to peace-making activities.

In making this decision, Russia and other C.I.S. member states are taking into consideration both the developments in the area of conflict and the internal political situation in Georgia. It is extremely important to contribute, with all the means available, to stabilizing the situation in the country and to support Mr. Shevardnadze.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 2.95]

I believe that active mediation efforts by the UN should be continued in order to achieve a comprehensive political settlement in Abkhazia. Russia continues to be ready to render all possible assistance to such efforts.

I hope that the C.I.S. steps will be positively received by the international community and will be supported by the Security Council. I would very much like to be assured of understanding on the part of the United States.

I believe that mutual understanding and continued cooperation between the US and Russia in the Abkhazian settlement, as well as in dealing with other conflicts that pose a threat to international peace and security would be in the interests of our two states.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«21» июня 1994 г.

№ Пр-612

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Вновь обращаюсь к Вам по проблеме урегулирования грузино-абхазского конфликта.

Наконец забрезжил свет в конце туннеля - 14 мая в Москве грузинская и абхазская стороны подписали Соглашение о прекращении огня и разъединении сил. В силу того, что в своем последнем докладе от 3 мая 1994 г. Генеральный секретарь ООН констатировал отсутствие надлежащих условий для проведения операции по поддержанию мира в Абхазии силами ООН, стороны в конфликте обратились к Совету глав государств-участников СНГ с просьбой ввести миротворческие силы Содружества. Больше медлить нельзя, ибо обстановка чревата новым взрывом.

Информирую, что Совет принял решение откликнуться на эту просьбу. При этом мы, естественно, исходим из того, что Содружество не подменяет усилий ООН, а содействует созданию для них наиболее благоприятных условий. Принятое решение идет в русле одного из предлагаемых Генеральным секретарем ООН в его упомянутом докладе вариантов действий. Обеспечение с самого начала тесного взаимодействия миротворческих сил и Миссии ООН по наблюдению в Грузии (МООННГ) также призвано служить этим целям. Ожидаем, что Совет Безопасности примет необходимые решения по увеличению численного состава, расширению и уточнению мандата МООННГ. Рассчитываем также на учреждение под эгидой ООН специального добровольного Фонда, что, на наш взгляд, содействовало бы привлечению к миротворческим усилиям широкого круга государств.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

[2015-0815-M-1, 2.96]

Принимая такое решение, Россия и другие страны СНГ учитывают как развитие ситуации в зоне конфликта, так и внутриполитическую ситуацию в Грузии. Крайне важно содействовать всеми возможными средствами стабилизации положения в стране, поддержать Э.А.Шеварднадзе. Считаю, что активные посреднические усилия ООН по достижению всеобъемлющего политического урегулирования в Абхазии должны быть продолжены. Россия же по-прежнему готова оказывать им всемерное содействие.

Надеюсь, что действия Содружества будут позитивно восприняты мировым сообществом и найдут поддержку в Совете Безопасности. Хотелось бы твердо рассчитывать на понимание со стороны США.

Полагаю, что взаимопонимание и продолжение сотрудничества США и России в абхазском урегулировании, как, впрочем, и при разрешении других конфликтных ситуаций, угрожающих международному миру и безопасности, отвечало бы интересам наших государств.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 4983.redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (297)
KBH 1/2/2025

July 15, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: R. NICHOLAS BURNS/RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: ROSEMARIE FORSYTHE/SUSAN RICE

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Russian President Yeltsin on Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh

Attached at Tab A is a message from the President to Russian President Yeltsin on the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. We had sent the message earlier, and the President had a question on how our policy on Georgia would affect our policy on Haiti. We have amended our earlier version of your memo to the President (Tab I) to answer that question.

The message from the President to Yeltsin is, in part, a reply to Yeltsin's June 21 letter on the Russian/CIS peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Georgia. The President's reply reviews our policy toward Abkhazia and Russian peacekeeping and informs Yeltsin that we will consider endorsement of the PKO and the establishment of a UN voluntary fund only after we have evidence that the PKO is performing its duties in conformity with international peacekeeping norms and standards. This is consistent with the President's May 31 decision based on the Deputies' recommendations.

The message also addresses the problems we have had gaining Russian cooperation with the CSCE on Nagorno-Karabakh. We have been requesting Russian cooperation at all levels on Nagorno-Karabakh, and despite this, the Russians continue to undermine the CSCE and push their own plan. They are pursuing their own plan because they would not be able to establish permanent military bases in Azerbaijan, gain a larger share of the Caspian oil deals, or have controlling influence in the region with a CSCE agreement. The President's message emphasizes the unique opportunity we have for peace and urges the Russians to cooperate with the CSCE.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

Tab B Incoming Letter from Yeltsin

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
4983

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (2.98)
KBH 1/2/2025

94 JUN 29 P7:52

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on the Conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh

Purpose

To encourage Russian cooperation with UN and CSCE efforts to resolve the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Background

On Georgia, President Yeltsin wrote to you on June 21 to inform you of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) plans for deploying a Russian peacekeeping operation (PKO) to Abkhazia, Georgia. Yeltsin requests your support for the CIS PKO and the establishment of a UN voluntary fund to help finance the PKO.

We have sought to avoid blessing and taking responsibility for Russian actions we cannot control while encouraging the Russians to adhere to international peacekeeping norms and standards. In the UN, we will vote to expand the UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) from 50 to 150 to observe the CIS PKO and monitor the cease-fire and return of refugees. We will withhold any U.S. support for a UN voluntary fund for the CIS force until it has shown that it is abiding by international peacekeeping standards. We have told the Russians that we will not agree to a formal UN mandate that would put blue helmets on Russian heads and pay for the operation. Your message explains our policy and encourages the Russians to work closely with the UN toward a lasting political solution to the Abkhazia conflict.

On Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russians have persistently tried to undermine the negotiation efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group in favor of their own mediation plan. Both the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians fear a Russian-only solution because it would give the Russians overriding influence in the region and infringe on their sovereignty and independence. For the first time since the war began, the Azerbaijanis and Armenians have agreed on the common grounds for a resolution to the conflict. This common approach requires the participation of the CSCE to monitor closely the activities of a Russian force that would separate the warring factions. Your message urges Russian cooperation with the CSCE

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

SECRET

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

so that we will not lose this opportunity to work for a genuine peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A to President Yeltsin for transmission to Moscow.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter from Yeltsin

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(2.99)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

AS YOU KNOW, BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF BOTH CONFLICTS AND UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN YOU HAVE ABOUT STABILITY IN AREAS CLOSE TO YOUR BORDERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS ALSO FAVOR A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT IF RUSSIA AND THE UN AND CSCE WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY AND COOPERATIVELY, WE WILL HAVE A BETTER CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS.

I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR RECENT LETTER DESCRIBING YOUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN GEORGIA. I FIRMLY SUPPORT THE GOALS EMBODIED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON ABKHAZIA THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS APPROVED. OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN GEORGIA SHOULD BE TO SAFEGUARD GEORGIA'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ENCOURAGE A STABLE PEACE AND FRUITFUL NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND ENSURE THE RESETTLEMENT OF GEORGIAN REFUGEES THROUGHOUT ABKHAZIA. WE RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIAN COOPERATION AND SUPPORT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS.

I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE UN TO AGREE ON INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED GUIDELINES FOR THE CIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN ABKHAZIA; TO INCREASE THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION'S ACTIVITIES TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE; TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF UN PERSONNEL; AND TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE UN OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG). THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EXPANSION OF A REVISED UNOMIG. BASED ON THE UN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION'S SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WE WOULD BE PREPARED LATER ON TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF UN RECOGNITION FOR THE OPERATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A VOLUNTARY FUND.

IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, I BELIEVE WE ARE AT A CROSSROADS. IF WE MERGE THE RUSSIAN AND CSCE EFFORTS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO TURN THE FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE INTO A PERMANENT PEACE. ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE ENDORSED A SUBSTANTIVE ROLE FOR THE CSCE IN WORKING OUT A LASTING CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. AZERBAIJAN INSISTS THAT ANY CIS PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON ITS TERRITORY HAVE A CSCE MANDATE, LIMITED DURATION AND INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT. ARMENIA ALSO ENDORSES A COMBINATION OF THE CSCE PLAN AND RUSSIAN INITIATIVES.

OUR TASK IS TO WORK TOGETHER ON A PLAN THAT WILL MEET THE PARTIES' SECURITY NEEDS AND CONCERNS AND PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS. I URGE YOU TO INSTRUCT YOUR NEGOTIATORS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH CSCE MINSK GROUP CHAIRMAN ELIASSON AND US TO CRAFT AN AGREEMENT THAT

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IS FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT AND WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE CSCE.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE COMPLEXITIES IN BOTH THE GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICTS AND THE NEED FOR RESOLUTE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO HELP RESOLVE THEM. I BELIEVE WE MUST COORDINATE OUR NEXT STEPS CAREFULLY TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD DISRUPT THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND TRUST OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO FORGE OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. I LOOK FORWARD TO ASSESSING OUR COMMON PROGRESS ON THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES IN NAPLES.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

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Translated from Russian

Moscow, The Kremlin
June 21, 1994

Dear Bill,

I write again concerning the issue of the Georgian-Abkhazian settlement.

Finally, we are beginning to see light at the end of the tunnel - on May 14 the Georgian and Abkhazian sides have signed in Moscow the ceasefire and disengagement agreement. Because in his recent report on May 3, 1994, the UN Secretary General noted the absence of appropriate conditions for a UN peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, the parties to the conflict have requested the Council of the Heads of the C.I.S. member states to deploy C.I.S. peacekeeping forces. We cannot afford any further delay, for the situation is fraught with a new explosion.

Let me inform you that the Council decided to respond to this appeal. At the same time our assumption, naturally, is that the C.I.S. does not supplant UN efforts, but contributes to the creation of the most favorable conditions for them. The decision adopted goes along the lines of one of the options proposed by the UN Secretary General in his report. Ensuring from the very beginning close interaction between the peace-keepers and the UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) will also serve these objectives. We expect that the Security Council will make necessary decisions to increase the strength of the UNOMIG personnel, enlarge and further clarify its mandate. We expect also that a special voluntary Fund will be created under the UN auspices, which, in our view would help involve more states to peace-making activities.

In making this decision, Russia and other C.I.S. member states are taking into consideration both the developments in the area of conflict and the internal political situation in Georgia. It is extremely important to contribute, with all the means available, to stabilizing the situation in the country and to support Mr. Shevardnadze.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.00]

I believe that active mediation efforts by the UN should be continued in order to achieve a comprehensive political settlement in Abkhazia. Russia continues to be ready to render all possible assistance to such efforts.

I hope that the C.I.S. steps will be positively received by the international community and will be supported by the Security Council. I would very much like to be assured of understanding on the part of the United States.

I believe that mutual understanding and continued cooperation between the US and Russia in the Abkhazian settlement, as well as in dealing with other conflicts that pose a threat to international peace and security would be in the interests of our two states.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.01]

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«21» июня 19 94 г.

№ Пр-612

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Вновь обращаюсь к Вам по проблеме урегулирования грузино-абхазского конфликта.

Наконец забрезжил свет в конце туннеля - 14 мая в Москве грузинская и абхазская стороны подписали Соглашение о прекращении огня и разъединении сил. В силу того, что в своем последнем докладе от 3 мая 1994 г. Генеральный секретарь ООН констатировал отсутствие надлежащих условий для проведения операции по поддержанию мира в Абхазии силами ООН, стороны в конфликте обратились к Совету глав государств-участников СНГ с просьбой ввести миротворческие силы Содружества. Больше медлить нельзя, ибо обстановка чревата новым взрывом.

Информирую, что Совет принял решение откликнуться на эту просьбу. При этом мы, естественно, исходим из того, что Содружество не подменяет усилий ООН, а содействует созданию для них наиболее благоприятных условий. Принятое решение идет в русле одного из предлагаемых Генеральным секретарем ООН в его упомянутом докладе вариантов действий. Обеспечение с самого начала тесного взаимодействия миротворческих сил и Миссии ООН по наблюдению в Грузии (МООННГ) также призвано служить этим целям. Ожидаем, что Совет Безопасности примет необходимые решения по увеличению численного состава, расширению и уточнению мандата МООННГ. Рассчитываем также на учреждение под эгидой ООН специального добровольного Фонда, что, на наш взгляд, содействовало бы привлечению к миротворческим усилиям широкого круга государств.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Принимая такое решение, Россия и другие страны СНГ учитывают как развитие ситуации в зоне конфликта, так и внутриполитическую ситуацию в Грузии. Крайне важно содействовать всеми возможными средствами стабилизации положения в стране, поддержать Э.А.Шеварднадзе. Считаю, что активные посреднические усилия ООН по достижению всеобъемлющего политического урегулирования в Абхазии должны быть продолжены. Россия же по-прежнему готова оказывать им всемерное содействие.

Надеюсь, что действия Содружества будут позитивно восприняты мировым сообществом и найдут поддержку в Совете Безопасности. Хотелось бы твердо рассчитывать на понимание со стороны США.

Полагаю, что взаимопонимание и продолжение сотрудничества США и России в абхазском урегулировании, как, впрочем, и при разрешении других конфликтных ситуаций, угрожающих международному миру и безопасности, отвечало бы интересам наших государств.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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4983

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: R. NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: ROSEMARIE FORSYTHE RF

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Russian President Yeltsin on Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh

Attached at Tab A is a message from the President to Russian President Yeltsin on the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The message is, in part, a reply to Yeltsin's June 21 letter on the Russian/CIS peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Georgia. The President's reply reviews our policy toward Abkhazia and Russian peacekeeping and informs Yeltsin that we will consider endorsement of the PKO and the establishment of a UN voluntary fund only after we have evidence that the PKO is performing its duties in conformity with international peacekeeping norms and standards. This is consistent with the President's May 31 decision based on the Deputies' recommendations.

The message also addresses the problems we have had gaining Russian cooperation with the CSCE on Nagorno-Karabakh. We have been requesting Russian cooperation at all levels on Nagorno-Karabakh, and despite this, the Russians continue to undermine the CSCE and push their own plan. They are pursuing their own plan because they would not be able to establish permanent military bases in Azerbaijan, gain a larger share of the Caspian oil deals, or have controlling influence in the region with a CSCE agreement. The President's message emphasizes the unique opportunity we have for peace and urges the Russians to cooperate with the CSCE.

Concurrence by: Susan Rice per fax

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter from Yeltsin

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.02)
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7/5
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 4, 1994

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Phone Call to President Yeltsin

Your upcoming visit to Riga and Warsaw will touch on subjects (troop withdrawals, Russian minorities, NATO expansion) that are sensitive domestic issues in Russia. We believe it advisable for you to touch base with Yeltsin briefly by phone before departing on the trip, to inform him in advance of your plans and to explain what you hope to accomplish. You can highlight, in particular, subjects you plan to raise that address Russian concerns (treatment of minorities in the Baltics) and your desire to be helpful in closing out the Russian-Estonian troop withdrawal talks.

The call will also allow you to preview your meeting with Yeltsin at the Naples summit, both in the G-7 and bilateral context. Yeltsin sent you a letter recently previewing his ideas on issues for the "G-8" political discussions, and promoting his vision of a much more activist G-7+1. This phone call is not the place to get into the substance of Yeltsin's ideas, some of which are non-starters. (Our chief Russian interlocutor, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, commented that we shouldn't take every word literally; he claimed the Russian bureaucracy had thrown "the kitchen sink" into the letter.) But it will be helpful to note that you have seen the letter and look forward to discussing some of the ideas in it at Naples.

You can communicate to Yeltsin that we are pleased by Russia's new role in the G-7 on political issues and hope to maintain it as a model for next year's summit in Halifax. In addition, you can tell him the U.S. will support Russia's full involvement in Political Directors meetings between summits. We still believe, of course, that the time is not yet right for Russia to formally join the G-7 as a full member.

Attachments
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B June 28 Letter from Yeltsin

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2015-0815-M-1 (3.03)
KBH 1/2/2025

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
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2015-0815-M-1 (3.04)
KBH 1/2/2025

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

-- Look forward to seeing you in Naples. Will be visiting Riga and Warsaw first. Wanted to touch base with you to explain what I'm hoping to accomplish on this trip.



-- In Riga, I'll meet tomorrow with the three Baltic Presidents. Will be discussing the troop withdrawal issue. Very important to complete this process by August 31. We don't want this subject on the agenda when you visit Washington in September.

-- Estonia is the last hurdle. We had good meetings with Estonian Foreign Minister here last week; he indicated some flexibility on last remaining issues. I plan to obtain President Meri's ideas when I see him, and then discuss them with you in Naples. I want to be as helpful as I can.

-- I also plan to raise with the three Presidents the issue of the Russian minority in the Baltics. You know my views: Russians and other ethnic groups must be included in the political and social life of these countries.

-- Was happy that President Ulmanis sent the citizenship law back to Parliament. I'll continue to press for a more inclusive quota.

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-- I'll give an outdoor speech in Riga. I'll be clear about our support for troop withdrawal August 31, but I'll also speak clearly about fair treatment of Russian minorities.

-- In Warsaw, the focus will be on support for reform and security integration into the rest of Europe.

-- I'll be emphasizing the importance of the Partnership for Peace and our willingness to help all partners develop the capability to take part.

-- I will reiterate what NATO said in January: NATO will eventually expand. But I will not announce any timetables.

-- Just a word or two about Naples. I received your letter about the future of Russia's participation in the G-7.

-- I'm looking forward to our own discussions on political and economic issues in Naples.

-- We support your full participation in the political discussions.

-- I think this arrangement brings Russia much closer to the G-7 and will promote our common action on important global political issues.

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-- I will support Russia's full participation in meetings of Political Directors between summits.

-- I'm sure our economic sherpas will stay in touch as well, although probably less frequently.

-- When we see each other, we can discuss your letter in more detail.

-- We'll have a chance in our private bilateral meeting to plan for our summit meeting in September, and announce the dates.

(IF YELTSIN ASKS FOR RUSSIA TO BE A FULL MEMBER OF THE G-8:

-- I think we should stay with the present arrangement.

-- As we discussed in Moscow, you economic transition will need to evolve further before full membership is possible.)

(IF YELTSIN ASKS ABOUT BOSNIA:

-- I'm pleased Christopher and Kozyrev are meeting today (Tuesday) on Bosnia in Geneva.

-- We are working well together in the Contact Group.

-- It is important we stay together on the map and the incentives/disincentives that we put to the parties.

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-- This is one of the issues the G-7 will want to discuss with you in Naples.)

(IF YELTSIN RAISES NORTH KOREA:

-- We'll certainly want to discuss this with the G-7 in Naples.

-- Pleased Christopher and Kozyrev were able to agree on the structure of the resolution.

-- Our third round of talks with the North Koreans begins Friday, July 8. So I may have more to tell you in Naples.)

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Translated from Russian

June 28, 1994
Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill:

Last January, soon after our Moscow meeting, I wrote to you to share my thoughts about how I visualize the process of Russia - Group of Seven convergence and the G-7 transformation into a Group of Eight. Now, on the eve of the Naples summit, when this is about to become a reality, I wish to engage you in more substantive and detailed discussion regarding cooperation program within the framework of the "political Group of Eight". I believe it is essential that from its inception this mechanism prove effective and influential. Russian-American partnership is called upon to set the pace and the thrust of its work. Hence, the importance of close and sustained cooperation between us.

If we want the fine-tuning of the cooperative process under the G-8 format to continue, we need to decide on a clear sequence of our next steps. The Naples summit will provide an opportunity to discuss both the main areas of cooperation and possible concrete approaches to addressing the most urgent problems. The G-8 might become an effective lever in influencing world developments. For this to happen, we must come to Naples being very clear about what we want to agree on.

As for the political Group of Eight as such, we are not proposing that its work be formalized. Rather, we are talking about a more active use of the existing forms of coordination. Those would involve summit-level meetings and periodic ministerials. To be sure, issues would have to be worked more thoroughly, and this will be the task of our experts, "sherpas", and political directors. It would be also important to agree that

His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.05]

delegations of the eight countries, through working consultations, coordinate their actions in various international fora, such as the United Nations, CSCE, etc.

Work should be continued to improve economic cooperation under the "seven plus one" formula. This would involve adding greater regularity to the finance ministers' meetings and engaging Russia in summit-level economic discussions, perhaps as early as in Naples. I wrote about this recently to Italy's Prime Minister. To this end, it will be necessary to identify the set of issues which the G-7 has an objective interest in discussing together with Russia. In addition to supporting the Russian reform, those issues could include the situation in key commodity markets, implementation of trans-national projects, environment, combatting drug trafficking and money laundering, the problem of developing countries' foreign debt and others. So far as I can judge, a measure of understanding in this matter emerged during the meeting of personal representatives of the G-7 leaders and Russia held in Naples on June 19.

Among the foreign policy themes, let me point out the following.

First of all, it is peace-keeping. To us, settlement of conflicts on the former USSR territory is of particular importance. The peace-making efforts by Russia and other C.I.S. countries are fully consistent with universally recognized rules of international law, the UN Charter, and are being pursued with the consent of parties to the conflict. As a member of the political Group of Eight, Russia is counting on the understanding and support for its actions. You must trust us in these matters, just as we trust you. For example, we rely on US assessments of the situation in Haiti or the French ones as regards Rwanda. This is essential, for agreement within the G-8 will largely determine how constructive the UN Security Council is going to be in responding to emerging regional challenges.

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Nor should the G8 distance itself from the task of reforming the structures of ensuring stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. While leaving a key role to CSCE, we ought to move toward such a model which would co-opt in a natural way the European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the West European Union, and the C.I.S. It is important that leading powers outside of the region, above all Japan, be able to make a tangible contribution to this process.

We are prepared for active interaction within the G-8 in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive products and technologies. In this context I wish to reiterate that Russia is interested in participating in the future export control regime. But the latter's specific parameters must be agreed upon within a multilateral format with our participation from day one. Involvement in these consultations cannot be made contingent on fulfillment of some pre-conditions.

The Naples summit could become an important landmark in achieving a settlement in Bosnia. We must counter the obstruction of the parties to the conflict with the will of the international Community. The G-8 must send a clear joint message supporting the on-going effort in pursuance of the foreign minister's communique of May 13 last. If the warring parties fail to agree or will not want to agree, we shall force a settlement on them. This is the purpose of additional steps which are now being worked out at the ministerial level. We will not tolerate indefinitely the bloodshed in Bosnia.

Only the united will of the world powers can keep North Korea in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In Naples, Russia and the United States could present joint ideas about specific steps to accomplish this goal. We would be happy if the US could resume its dialogue with Pyongyang and achieve results (although, frankly, here again we saw a "surprise" reversal on this issue as it was returned into a bilateral context after you and I had agreed on joint efforts in the Security Council). Be that as it may, the

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convening of an international conference would provide a realistic opportunity for achieving a generally acceptable comprehensive solution to the existing problems on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, as I said on more than one occasion, we do not rule out the option of step-by-step application of sanctions if negotiations fail to produce desired results.

As the co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, Russia and the US could lead the whole G-8 in this matter.

Finally, I wish to mention the problem which, undoubtedly, must be on the G-8 agenda, that of ensuring human rights. Many an armed conflict have been fostered by massive violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, by mistreatment of ethnic minorities. This is why Russia supports joint actions by democratic states and the G-8 aimed at preventing and eradicating discrimination and racial, ethnic, and religious strife. In coordination with our partners we intend to seek greater effectiveness of international human rights protection mechanisms. I hope that our partners, for their part, will be mindful of Russia's legitimate concern over discrimination of the Russian-speaking populations in some former USSR republics. When I was discussing the possibilities available to the G-8 in terms of influencing developments, I had this problem in mind, too.

If we prove to be able to agree on joint actions on the issues I raised above and, perhaps, on other international problems, this will be a major achievement indeed. Strategic partnership within the G-8 will then be more than a symbol; it will be a real instrument of coordination and realization of the balance of interests and will add predictability and integrity to international developments.

I will be conveying these views to other G-8 partners as well. But you understand, of course, that without US-Russian agreement consensus within the G-8 will not be possible to achieve.

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I am very much counting on your support and a positive response.

See you in Naples.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

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CONGRATULATORY LTR. 5701

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«4» июля 19 94 г.

№ Пр-846

г. Москва, Кремль

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Поздравляю Вас и в Вашем лице народ Соединенных Штатов Америки по случаю Национального праздника США - Дня независимости.

4 июля - значимая дата не только для вашей страны. Принятая в этот день в 1776 г. "Декларация независимости" воплотила универсальные демократические принципы. Этот документ и сегодня не утратил своей важности.

Упорный труд талантливых и предприимчивых людей из многих стран мира позволил создать в США процветающее демократическое многонациональное общество. Россияне с добрыми чувствами воспринимают впечатляющие достижения американцев во многих сферах общественной жизни.

Как и Россия, США решают сегодня задачу адаптации своих социальных и экономических структур к новым вызовам на пороге XXI века. В этих условиях наше партнерство естественно. Оно призвано сыграть центральную роль в обеспечении глобальной стабильности и налаживании широкого многостороннего сотрудничества.

Примите, господин Президент, в этот знаменательный день наилучшие пожелания счастья и благополучия Вам и Вашим близким, мира и процветания американскому народу.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.06]

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Translated from Russian

July 25, 1995
Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill,

I am in receipt of the letter from the leaders of American firms Caterpillar, Paccar, and the Russian ZIL automobile company.

I share the concern of the major industialists over the economic situation in Russia. I appreciate their efforts to create a network of joint ventures for the purpose of restructuring one of the largest Russian enterprises with the participation of US companies.

If successful, this undertaking could become a new phase in pursuing the economic cooperation whose principles we jointly declared.

I believe this initiative really needs state support. Our government has already been given relevant instructions with respect to the ZIL automobile company.

If you decide to endorse and support this project, I will instruct Premier Chernomyrdin to initiate an early examination, discussion, and preparation a decision within the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission.

With best wishes,

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
Mr.William J.CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1,3.07]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6363

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 22, 1994

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.08)
KBH 1/2/2025

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE JB

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin re: Caterpillar-Zil

Attached is a Presidential message of response to Yeltsin's July 25th letter asking that the President support a joint venture between Caterpillar and PACCAR and the giant ZIL autoworks in Moscow. He suggests that this matter be taken up within the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. The proposed response notes that this is an important project which deserves our full support, and informs Yeltsin of the many ways in which the U.S. government, through the Trade and Development Agency and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, has already demonstrated its commitment to this project.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission.

Attachments
Tab I Message to President Yeltsin
Tab II Incoming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 SUPPORTING THE JOINT PROJECT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN FIRMS CATERPILLAR AND PACCAR AND THE RUSSIAN AUTOMOBILE COMPANY ZIL. I AM PLEASED THAT YOU AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROJECT. WITH YOUR SUPPORT, AND THE HARD WORK OF THE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PARTNERS, THE VENTURE IS SURE TO BE A SUCCESS.

AS YOU MAY KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITS COMMITMENT TO THIS PROJECT. THE U.S. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (OPIC) HAS PROVIDED THE INVESTMENT INSURANCE TO COVER PACCAR'S INITIAL INVESTMENT IN THE JOINT VENTURE. IN DECEMBER 1993, DURING THE MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION, OPIC SIGNED A FINANCE AND INSURANCE PROTOCOL WITH ZIL, CATERPILLAR AND PACCAR FOR THE ENTIRE PROJECT. THE U.S. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY HAS ALSO FUNDED A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL STUDY PROGRAMS RELATED TO THIS JOINT INITIATIVE.

I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THIS PROJECT AND HOPE THAT YOU WILL ENCOURAGE ZIL, CATERPILLAR AND PACCAR TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE RELEVANT U.S. AND RUSSIAN AGENCIES. THIS VENTURE IS A MODEL FOR FUTURE ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND DESERVES OUR FULLEST SUPPORT.

WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.09)
KBH 1/2/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Translated from Russian

July 25, 1995
Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill,

I am in receipt of the letter from the leaders of American firms Caterpillar, Paccar, and the Russian ZIL automobile company.

I share the concern of the major industialists over the economic situation in Russia. I appreciate their efforts to create a network of joint ventures for the purpose of restructuring one of the largest Russian enterprises with the participation of US companies.

If successful, this undertaking could become a new phase in pursuing the economic cooperation whose principles we jointly declared.

I believe this initiative really needs state support. Our government has already been given relevant instructions with respect to the ZIL automobile company.

If you decide to endorse and support this project, I will instruct Premier Chernomyrdin to initiate an early examination, discussion, and preparation a decision within the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission.

With best wishes,

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
Mr.William J.CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.10]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: BEYRLE BURNS COQ FAUVER FILE GRAY SIGLER SUM SUM2 WHSR_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 260331Z AUG 94

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
QQQQ
FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.11)
KBH 1/2/2025

.
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR BORIS:

.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 SUPPORTING THE JOINT PROJECT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN FIRMS CATERPILLAR AND PACCAR AND THE RUSSIAN AUTOMOBILE COMPANY ZIL. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT VENTURE WITH VERY GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS.

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.
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.
WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

.
SINCERELY,

.
BILL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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END TEXT
DECL: OADR
BT
#4243
NNNN
<MSGID> M1221432

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6363

August 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE JB

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin re: Caterpillar-Zil

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.12)
KBH 1/2/2025

Attached is a Presidential message of response to Yeltsin's July 25th letter asking that the President support a joint venture between Caterpillar and PACCAR and the giant ZIL autoworks in Moscow. He suggests that this matter be taken up within the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. The proposed response notes that this is an important project which deserves our full support, and informs Yeltsin of the many ways in which the U.S. government, through the Trade and Development Agency and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, has already demonstrated its commitment to this project.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission. OK AW

Attachments
Tab I Message to President Yeltsin
Tab II Incoming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

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WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.13)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Translated from Russian

July 25, 1995
Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill,

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With best wishes,

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
Mr.William J.CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.14]

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.15]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Конфиденциально

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«18» августа 1994 г.
№ Пр-1153

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

События в бывшей Югославии вновь диктуют необходимость срочно посоветоваться.

После Неаполя многое изменилось. Наши совместные усилия в работе с Милошевичем дали крупный результат. Он пошел на фактический разрыв с Караджичем и его воинственной линией. Свою искренность доказывает делом: поставки боснийским сербам прекращены, контакты с ними прерваны.

Этот поворот в линии Милошевича нельзя игнорировать. Иначе мы позволим радикальной оппозиции в Сербии сместить его. Если же Милошевич, положение которого не из легких, под давлением сил, настроенных на войну, падет, рухнет весь созданный нами каркас боснийского урегулирования. Дело придется иметь с людьми куда менее конструктивными, чем нынешний сербский лидер, причем по всем аспектам кризиса вокруг бывшей Югославии.

Скажутся эти события и внутри наших стран, у нас с тобой появятся проблемы, гораздо более серьезные, чем требования в одностороннем порядке снять эмбарго на поставки оружия мусульманам или прекратить санкции в отношении СРЮ. Мы не имеем права допустить эскалации войны в БиГ, вовлечения в нее соседних стран. Уверен, что мы не позволим подорвать достигнутое нами взаимодействие в ключевом для судеб Европы вопросе.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Судя по поступающим сообщениям, работа в Нью-Йорке на югославском направлении ведется как бы по инерции, без должного учета кардинальных перемен в линии Белграда, увязает в техницизмах. Считаю важным, чтобы мы с тобой придали необходимый политический импульс урегулированию, которое, несмотря на все сложности, реально достижимо.

Конкретно предлагаю:

1. Ни в коем случае не торопиться с ужесточающими мерами против СРЮ. Уже сейчас приоткрыть перед Белградом позитивную перспективу - снять первый набор санкций. Как я знаю, такая возможность заложена в ответном послании У.Кристофера А.В.Козыреву от 13 августа.

2. Договориться о взаимоприемлемых формах международного мониторинга на границе с БиГ (Белград уже идет на беспрепятственный допуск к контрольным пунктам дипломатов, мы готовы добиваться допуска также сотрудников УВКБ, неправительственных организаций и т.п.). Заявить, что если режим границы будет соблюдаться - снимем остальные санкции.

3. Подтвердить зафиксированное на Женеве-1 равноправное положение боснийских сербов в будущей Унии БиГ. Предлагаю сделать в ближайшие дни параллельные публичные заявления, что члены контактной группы исходят из принципа равноправия составляющих Унию босанско-хорватского и сербского образований, включая и вступление в конфедеративные отношения с соседними государствами.

4. Приструнить все воинствующие круги в Боснии. Прямо скажу, сейчас наступают войска Федерации. Такая их активность на руку Караджичу и удар по Милошевичу. Без твоего влияния с этим положением не покончить. Прошу тебя довести до Федерации позицию США.

5. Поддержать переговорный процесс в Краине (такое согласие в контактной группе есть) с целью полной нормализации данной проблемы. Хотя она и не связана напрямую с боснийскими делами, это - неотъемлемая часть всеобъемлющего урегулирования в бывшей Югославии. Поэтому предлагаю, параллельно с работой в СБ ООН по БиГ, подготовить резолюцию о необходимости ускорить выполнение решений ООН по Краине.

Наши совместные усилия на прежних этапах урегулирования показали, что, когда мы вместе, прогресс гарантирован. Сейчас особенно важно действовать сообща, быстро и нестандартно.

Б.Ельцин

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.16]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Конфиденциально

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«18» августа 1994 г.
№ Пр-1153

г. Москва, Кремль

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Судя по поступающим сообщениям, работа в Нью-Йорке на югославском направлении ведется как бы по инерции, без должного учета кардинальных перемен в линии Белграда, увязает в техницизмах. Считаю важным, чтобы мы с тобой придали необходимый политический импульс урегулированию, которое, несмотря на все сложности, реально достижимо.

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Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WESTWING WOLIN
SIT: FILE PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2 WHSR_IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 022108Z SEP 94

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
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FOR AMBASSADOR/CHARGE
.
PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
.
.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
DEAR BORIS:

I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETINGS THIS MONTH IN WASHINGTON AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WAYS TO ENHANCE OUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP. BUILDING A STRONG PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO ME PERSONALLY AS WELL AS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, I MUST WORK HAND-IN-HAND WITH OUR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO CREATE THE FRAMEWORK ON WHICH TO BUILD OUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP. ONE OF OUR STRONGEST SUPPORTERS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS IS SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY. THE SENATOR HAS PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE IN MY ABILITY TO GAIN SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS FOR OUR PARTNERSHIP. SENATOR LEAHY WILL BE MAKING A TRIP TO RUSSIA IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. I WOULD BE PERSONALLY APPRECIATIVE IF YOU COULD FIND THE TIME TO RECEIVE THE SENATOR DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

BILL

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-1 [3.17]
KBH 1/2/2025

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#4291
NNNN
<MSGID> M1234432

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7071

September 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE JB

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin: Meeting in Moscow with Senator Leahy

Senator Pat Leahy is leading a delegation to Russia September 6-10, 1994. Given his central role in support of our policy toward Russia and the NIS, we believe it is very important that he meet with Yeltsin during his visit to convey first hand a sense of Hill views on events in Russia and our assistance effort. Because Yeltsin does not usually meet with U.S. Congressional delegations, it has been hard to get a commitment out of his office for this meeting. We thus recommend sending the attached message from the President.

Concurrence by: Mike Andricos

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Message for President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.18)
KBH 9/2/2025

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE
AMEMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETINGS THIS MONTH IN WASHINGTON AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WAYS TO ENHANCE OUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP. BUILDING A STRONG PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO ME PERSONALLY AS WELL AS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, I MUST WORK HAND-IN-HAND WITH OUR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO CREATE THE FRAMEWORK ON WHICH TO BUILD OUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP. ONE OF OUR STRONGEST SUPPORTERS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS IS SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY. THE SENATOR HAS PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE IN MY ABILITY TO GAIN SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS FOR OUR PARTNERSHIP. SENATOR LEAHY WILL BE MAKING A TRIP TO RUSSIA IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. I WOULD BE PERSONALLY APPRECIATIVE IF YOU COULD FIND THE TIME TO RECEIVE THE SENATOR DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

BILL

(END TEXT)

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.19)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Translated from Russian

Moscow, August 18, 1994

Dear Bill,

The events in former Yugoslavia dictate once again the necessity of prompt consultation.

Much has changed after the Naples meeting. Our joint efforts in working with Milosevic have yielded one major result. In fact he broke with Karadzic and the latter's bellicose policy. His sincerity is proved by his deeds: supplies to Bosnian Serbs have been stopped, and all contacts with them severed.

This turnaround in Milosevic' policy should not be ignored. Otherwise we would let the radical opposition in Serbia remove him. Should Milosevic whose situation is far from being easy fall under the pressure of those who seek war, then the whole structure of the settlement of Bosnia crisis will unravel. If this happens we will have to deal with people far less constructive than today's Serb leader, and in all aspects of the crisis in former Yugoslavia at that.

This will have implications for your and my country too, and create problems much more serious than the demands to lift the embargo on arms supplies to the Muslims or sanctions regarding FRY. We have no right to escalate the war in Bosnia or to draw neighboring countries to the conflict. I am sure that we will not allow anyone to put in jeopardy our cooperation on the issue which is so crucial for Europe.

According to the available information, the work in New York on Yugoslav issues seems to be carried out as if through inertia, without due regard for the radical changes in Belgrade's policy, bogging down in technicalities. I believe it important for us to give the necessary political impetus to the settlement which despite all the difficulties is, in fact, achievable.

His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.20]

Specifically, I propose:

1. That there be no hurry, by any means, with tightening measures against FRY. Let us show Belgrade already now that there exists a positive prospect for lifting the first stage of sanctions. As far as I know, this possibility was mentioned in Mr.Christopher's response to Kozyrev of August 13.

2. Agreeing on mutually acceptable forms of international monitoring on the Bosnia borders (Belgrade is already accepting to provide unhindered access of diplomats to checkpoints, and we are ready to press for access of UNHCR personnel, NGOs, etc.). Should the border regime be observed the other sanctions will be lifted.

3. Confirming the equality of Bosnian Serbs in the future Bosnian Union. I propose making promptly parallel public statements to the effect that the contact group members proceed from the principle of equal rights for the Bosniac-Croat and the Serb entities which will comprise the Union, including entering into confederative arrangements with neighboring states.

4. Cutting all the militant circles in Bosnia to size. Let me be frank; these are the Federation troops which are on the offensive now. This activity of theirs plays into the hand of Karadzic and undercuts Milosevic. This situation will not be ended withour your influence. I'm asking you to bring the US position to the Federations' attention.

5. Supporting the negotiating process in Krajina with a view to completely settling this problem, since there exists such an agreement in the contact group. Though not being directly linked to the Bosnia affairs, this problem is an integral part of the comprehensive settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Thus I propose that, concurrently with the work on Bosnia in the UN Security Council, a resolution be prepared on the necessity to speed up the implementation of UN decisions on Krajina.

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Our joint efforts at earlier stages of the settlement have demonstrated that progress is guaranteed when we are together. Now it is particularly important to act jointly, swiftly, and imaginatively.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.21)
KBH 1/2/2025

September 21, 1994



Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: R. NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: ROSEMARIE FORSYTHE RF

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Letter on Nagorno-Karabakh

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum on a letter President Yeltsin sent to President Clinton on Nagorno-Karabakh. The letter proposes that the U.S. support a UN blessing for a CIS peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The proposal is inconsistent with our efforts to find a peaceful solution through the CSCE and with our view that the CIS does not qualify as a UN Chapter VIII regional organization.

The Russians, at least at the level of Foreign Minister, rejected our last proposal to accelerate the CSCE process because they do not want any other country or organization to control peacekeeping or negotiations in the Caucasus. Russia's cooperation in any solution is necessary because Russia's deep military, economic and political involvement in the region gives it the power to disrupt any peace initiative it does not approve. You'll recall that Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan told the President in August that the Russians were providing significant military and economic support to Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Both the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis have described Russian threats against them if they do not cooperate with the Russian initiative. Despite Russian threats, the parties to the conflict have welcomed our proposal with enthusiastic support.

The Armenians and the Azerbaijanis say the greatest fear of the present Russian negotiators is that President Clinton may persuade President Yeltsin to agree to cooperate with the CSCE. Our only real chance of gaining Russian cooperation at this point appears to be through a personal appeal by the President to Yeltsin.

Concurrences by: Susan Rice, Kathleen Stephens
SR KS

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RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Incoming
Tab B Message to Ter-Petrosyan

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7662
Re-do

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.22)
KBH 1/2/2025

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Letter on Nagorno-Karabakh

President Yeltsin sent you on September 18 a letter on Nagorno-Karabakh. The letter proposes that the U.S. support UN blessing of a CIS peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. This is an old proposal the Russians are resurrecting in their constant quest to gain UN recognition for their peacekeeping operations. The proposal is inconsistent with our efforts to work out a CSCE-brokered peace and with our view that the CIS does not qualify as a regional organization capable of neutral peacekeeping.

The Russians have consistently resisted cooperation with the CSCE and are constantly trying to undermine it with other proposals that reinforce Russia's leading role as a mediator. After an initial positive reaction to our last initiative to accelerate the CSCE process, the Russians rejected it in favor of the proposal contained in this letter. The Armenians and particularly the Azerbaijanis prefer our CSCE initiative because they fear Russian infringement on their independence and sovereignty. On September 23, you sent a message to Ter-Petrosyan to confirm his support for our proposal (Tab B), and you are seeing Azerbaijani President Aliyev on Monday to seek his support as well.

We are hoping that you can persuade Yeltsin during your meeting with him next week to agree on a combined CSCE-Russian plan that would recognize Russia's significant role in resolving the conflict but give the CSCE the lead as a neutral international body. We want the Russians to work with the CSCE on an agreement among the parties that would include a formalization of the present cease-fire, immediate deployment of CSCE monitors, a series of confidence-building measures such as withdrawals and lifting of blockades, a multilateral aid package, a statement of principles to guide the CSCE conference on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of a CSCE-endorsed international peacekeeping force (rather than a CIS force).

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachments:
Tab A Incoming
Tab B Message to Ter-Petrosyan

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956-9160

Translated from Russian

Moscow
The Kremlin
September 18, 1994

Dear Bill:

I view as a demonstration of real partnership your eagerness to use your own prestige in order to help us settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the continuation of which threatens not only Russian, but international security. Frankly speaking, I have long been waiting for a constructive response to my letters to you regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as to the recent letter of Minister Kozyrev addressed to the US Secretary of State.

Progress has been achieved at the recent Moscow meeting of Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but not all knots have been untied. You have noted that I had to act not by myself, but via Minister Kozyrev - for it is dangerous to create high expectations when the risk of a set-back still remains.

That is why there are no conditions for a quadripartite meeting. But Mr.Aliev and Mr.Ter-Petrossian share my opinion that it would be helpful to discuss this issue with you during bilateral meetings.

I would like to support your idea to give an extra political incentive to the settlement under Russian-American auspices.

To be more precise, I propose to jointly, you and me, put forward an initiative at the UN in which to declare an intention to get "a blessing" in the Security Council for a CIS peace-keeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, to be transformed later

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.23]

under the UN flag. I realize that it will be Russian peace-keepers who will have to start this operation and to carry its principal load, but it is very important for this mission to be of an international character. I would welcome US willingness to take part in the UN operation after the stability in the region is restored.

At the same time it is indispensable so that the CSCE renders real assistance to the settlement. Regrettably, lack of coordination with the pivotal efforts can be traced in the activities of the CSCE mission, including with those which we undertake with the participation of the top-level leaders of the conflicting parties. I expect you to instruct correspondingly your representatives in the CSCE so as to jointly finetune this mechanism. The main thing is to ensure deployment of a viable CSCE monitoring mission to implement the agreement. We believe that a CSCE Minsk Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh has an important role to play in the subsequent efforts.

I am certain that if we act in this manner, we can advance a decisive breakthrough towards a guaranteed settlement. I want to stress it again, that I have a very high esteem of the US and your personal contribution to a success of the settlement including economic resurrection of the countries - victims of this senseless conflict.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT TER-PETROSYAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR PRESIDENT TER-PETROSYAN,

DURING OUR MEETING LAST MONTH, WE BOTH AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IN THAT SPIRIT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR SUPPORT FOR AN IMPORTANT CSCE PEACE INITIATIVE ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I KNOW HOW EAGER YOU ARE TO END THIS WAR AND CONCENTRATE ON ARMENIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. I BELIEVE WE SHARE THE SAME INTERESTS, AND I AM STRONGLY COMMITTED TO FINDING A LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION.

AS AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT MENTIONED DURING HER RECENT TRIP TO ARMENIA, WE WOULD LIKE TO ACCELERATE THE CSCE MINSK GROUP PEACE PROCESS AND HAVE A CONCRETE AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE SOME STEPS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE DECEMBER CSCE SUMMIT IN BUDAPEST.

I WILL BE PROPOSING TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT WE ANNOUNCE AT OUR SUMMIT AN AGREEMENT TO FORMALIZE THE CEASE-FIRE, DEPLOY A CSCE PRESENCE IN THE REGION, IMPLEMENT A SERIES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES INCLUDING A PARTIAL LIFTING OF BLOCKADES, COORDINATE A MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVE PLAN FOR THE PARTIES, AND ESTABLISH A SET OF PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE CSCE MINSK GROUP CONFERENCE ON THE FINAL POLITICAL STATUS OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

I KNOW YOU ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ARMENIANS. AS YOU KNOW, THE CSCE IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR N-K. WE ARE ACTIVELY ASSISTING THE CSCE IN THIS OPTION AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS AS PART OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED BEFORE THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT.

I HOPE YOU WILL SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL. I PLAN TO ASK PRESIDENT ALIYEV FOR HIS SUPPORT AS WELL WHEN WE MEET ON SEPTEMBER 26. I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TELL THEM BOTH THAT THIS PROPOSAL MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL. I BELIEVE WE HAVE A GENUINE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE AND SINCERELY HOPE I CAN COUNT ON YOUR COOPERATION.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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INFO ////
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

2015-0815-M-1 [3.25]
KBH 1/2/2025

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

I AM WRITING TO YOU ABOUT A MATTER OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY. AS YOU KNOW, SADDAM HUSSEIN IS MASSING REPUBLICAN GUARD DIVISIONS ON THE BORDER WITH KUWAIT. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT WITHIN A FEW DAYS HE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO INVADE KUWAIT AGAIN. THE MOVEMENT OF THESE DIVISIONS IS NOT AN EXERCISE. THE UNITS ARE FULLY EQUIPPED. SADDAM'S THREATENING STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT HE SEEKS TO CREATE A CRISIS. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO TAKE RISKS. WE MUST PLAN FOR THE WORST BECAUSE WE KNOW WHAT HE IS CAPABLE OF DOING.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT WE BOTH VALUE STABILITY -- ESPECIALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- AND HAVE A SHARED INTEREST IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES PEACEFULLY. SINCE 1991 THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS GIVEN SADDAM EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE HIS INTENTION TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH HIS NEIGHBORS AND HIS OWN PEOPLE. YET HE HAS RESISTED COOPERATION WITH UN INSPECTIONS UNTIL HE HAD NO CHOICE. HE STILL REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDERS. THE IRAQI REGIME HAS NEVER ACCOUNTED FOR KUWAITI PRISONERS OR MISSING PERSONS AND PREFERS TO PUNISH THE IRAQI PEOPLE RATHER THAN COMPLY WITH UN RESOLUTIONS.

IN VIEW OF OUR EXPERIENCE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST NOT ALLOW HIM TO REPEAT HIS AGGRESSION. THE UNITED STATES IS SENDING A LARGE NUMBER OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT TO THE REGION TO DETER AN IRAQI INVASION. AS

YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALSO ORDERED TROOPS TO DEPLOY TO THE REGION AS WELL. THESE DEPLOYMENTS ARE PRECAUTIONARY, NOT AGGRESSIVE.

BORIS, I HOPE THAT I CAN RELY ON YOUR FULL SUPPORT IN THE UN FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER STATES THAT WILL BE DISPATCHING FORCES TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN THE COMING DAYS. I ASK THAT YOU CONTINUE TO REGISTER WITH IRAQ YOUR OPPOSITION TO SADDAM'S FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN AND HIS AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARD KUWAIT. THE VERBAL MESSAGE THAT I UNDERSTAND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAHAF, SEEKING A HALT TO THE ADVANCE OF IRAQI TROOPS ON KUWAIT, SHOULD HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE IRAQIS THAT THEIR ACTIONS ARE ANATHEMA TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY. IT IS VITAL THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE CRUCIAL DAYS THAT LIE AHEAD. WE WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU REGARDING ANY FURTHER STEPS THAT MAY BE CONTEMPLATED. WE NEED TO ENSURE THE IRAQIS ARE NOT MISLED INTO BELIEVING THAT THEY CAN USE THIS SITUATION TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT
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2015-0815-M-1 (3.2c)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~SECRET~~

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT):

DEAR BORIS,

I AM WRITING TO YOU ABOUT A MATTER OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY. AS YOU KNOW, SADDAM HUSSEIN IS MASSING REPUBLICAN GUARD DIVISIONS ON THE BORDER WITH KUWAIT. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT WITHIN A FEW DAYS HE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO INVADE KUWAIT AGAIN. THE MOVEMENT OF THESE DIVISIONS IS NOT AN EXERCISE. THE UNITS ARE FULLY EQUIPPED. SADDAM'S THREATENING STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT HE SEEKS TO CREATE A CRISIS. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO TAKE RISKS. WE MUST PLAN FOR THE WORST BECAUSE WE KNOW WHAT HE IS CAPABLE OF DOING.

BORIS, I KNOW THAT WE BOTH VALUE STABILITY -- ESPECIALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- AND HAVE A SHARED INTEREST IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES PEACEFULLY. SINCE 1991 THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS GIVEN SADDAM EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE HIS INTENTION TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH HIS NEIGHBORS AND HIS OWN PEOPLE. YET HE HAS RESISTED COOPERATION WITH UN INSPECTIONS UNTIL HE HAD NO CHOICE. HE STILL REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDERS. THE IRAQI REGIME HAS NEVER ACCOUNTED FOR KUWAITI PRISONERS OR MISSING PERSONS AND PREFERS TO PUNISH THE IRAQI PEOPLE RATHER THAN COMPLY WITH UN RESOLUTIONS.

IN VIEW OF OUR EXPERIENCE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST NOT ALLOW HIM TO REPEAT HIS AGGRESSION. THE UNITED STATES IS SENDING A LARGE NUMBER OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT TO THE REGION TO DETER AN IRAQI INVASION. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALSO ORDERED TROOPS TO DEPLOY TO THE REGION AS WELL. THESE DEPLOYMENTS ARE PRECAUTIONARY, NOT AGGRESSIVE.

BORIS, I HOPE THAT I CAN RELY ON YOUR FULL SUPPORT IN THE UN FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER STATES THAT WILL BE DISPATCHING FORCES TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN THE COMING DAYS. I ASK THAT YOU CONTINUE TO REGISTER WITH IRAQ YOUR OPPOSITION TO SADDAM'S FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN AND HIS AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARD KUWAIT. THE VERBAL MESSAGE THAT I UNDERSTAND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAHAF, SEEKING A HALT TO THE ADVANCE OF IRAQI TROOPS ON KUWAIT, SHOULD HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE IRAQIS THAT THEIR ACTIONS ARE ANATHEMA TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY. IT IS VITAL THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE CRUCIAL DAYS THAT LIE AHEAD. WE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU REGARDING ANY FURTHER STEPS THAT MAY BE CONTEMPLATED. WE NEED TO ENSURE THE IRAQIS ARE NOT MISLED INTO BELIEVING THAT THEY CAN USE THIS SITUATION TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.27]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1994

Dear Boris:

Thank you for your letter of October 14. I wanted to respond quickly because we are at a critical point in the Iraqi crisis. I recall very well our good phone conversation on Monday, particularly our agreement at that time to work closely together and to ensure that Iraq not be rewarded in any way for this latest military threat to Kuwait.

With this in mind, I must tell you frankly that the Russian-Iraqi Joint Statement raises serious concerns. The statement notes that, once Iraq recognizes the sovereignty and borders of Kuwait, Russia will support efforts to set a date for starting a restricted period for testing the official monitoring operation after which Russia will support lifting oil sanctions. In other words, your statement would allow Iraq to use this crisis to set in motion negotiations on modifying the sanctions regime.

You told me during our phone call that you were dispatching Andrey Kozyrev to Baghdad. You no doubt remember my urging that his mission in no way yield to Iraq's interest in linking an end to the current crisis to the lifting of sanctions. I am concerned that this is what is now occurring. I want you to know that my position has not changed. We must not allow Saddam Hussein to use his aggressive moves to pressure the Security Council into reconsidering sanctions.

I recall you also expressed on Monday the hope that we would delay action in New York while your Foreign Minister was in the Gulf region. It appears from your letter that you mistook my lack of response to this specific point as agreement to support such a delay. I regret this misunderstanding. Iraqi forces remain in the south in a position to renew the threat to Kuwait in a matter of hours. Under these circumstances, the Security Council cannot stand idle.

The Security Council now has before it a resolution that will ensure Iraq cannot again threaten its neighbors. I strongly believe we should move ahead and I hope you will join us. We

have to deal immediately with Iraq's threatening behavior and that issue must be divorced from the question of Iraq's compliance with other UN Security Council Resolutions.

We are interested in hearing directly from Andrey Kozyrev the results of his mission as soon as possible. For that purpose, I am ready to send Warren Christopher to New York for a meeting this Sunday.

Boris, our countries have worked together well in the Gulf and on a host of international issues. In five meetings, you and I have developed a close working relationship, and significantly advanced our bilateral partnership and international security.

I want to be clear on this. The security of the Gulf is vital to us, as I know it is to you. We should not allow Saddam Hussein to maneuver us into taking separate sides on this critical issue. If we allow him to do so, it could have a damaging and even dangerous impact -- not only on our common search for peace and security in the Gulf, but on the U.S.-Russian partnership that you and I have worked so hard to build.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

2015-0815-M-1 [3.28]
KBH 1/2/2025

QQQQ
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

.

PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN.

.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 14. I WANTED TO RESPOND QUICKLY BECAUSE WE ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT IN THE IRAQI CRISIS. I RECALL VERY WELL OUR GOOD PHONE CONVERSATION ON MONDAY, PARTICULARLY OUR AGREEMENT AT THAT TIME TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AND TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ NOT BE REWARDED IN ANY WAY FOR THIS LATEST MILITARY THREAT TO KUWAIT.

.

WITH THIS IN MIND, I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT THE RUSSIAN-IRAQI JOINT STATEMENT RAISES SERIOUS CONCERNS. THE STATEMENT NOTES THAT, ONCE IRAQ RECOGNIZES THE SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDERS OF KUWAIT, RUSSIA WILL SUPPORT EFFORTS TO SET A DATE FOR STARTING A RESTRICTED PERIOD FOR TESTING THE OFFICIAL MONITORING OPERATION AFTER WHICH RUSSIA WILL SUPPORT LIFTING OIL SANCTIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, YOUR STATEMENT WOULD ALLOW IRAQ TO USE THIS CRISIS TO SET IN MOTION NEGOTIATIONS ON MODIFYING THE SANCTIONS REGIME.

.

YOU TOLD ME DURING OUR PHONE CALL THAT YOU WERE DISPATCHING ANDREY KOZYREV TO BAGHDAD. YOU NO DOUBT REMEMBER MY URGING THAT HIS MISSION IN NO WAY YIELD TO IRAQ'S INTEREST IN LINKING AN END TO THE CURRENT CRISIS TO THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. I AM CONCERNED THAT THIS IS WHAT IS NOW OCCURRING. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT MY POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED. WE MUST NOT ALLOW SADDAM HUSSEIN TO USE HIS AGGRESSIVE MOVES TO PRESSURE THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO RECONSIDERING SANCTIONS.

.

I RECALL YOU ALSO EXPRESSED ON MONDAY THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD DELAY ACTION IN NEW YORK WHILE YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER WAS IN THE GULF REGION. IT APPEARS FROM YOUR LETTER THAT YOU MISTOOK MY LACK OF RESPONSE TO THIS SPECIFIC POINT AS AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT SUCH A DELAY. I REGRET THIS MISUNDERSTANDING. IRAQI FORCES REMAIN IN THE SOUTH IN A POSITION TO RENEW THE THREAT TO KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT STAND IDLE.

.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOW HAS BEFORE IT A RESOLUTION THAT WILL ENSURE IRAQ CANNOT AGAIN THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS. I STRONGLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE AHEAD AND I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN US. WE HAVE TO DEAL IMMEDIATELY WITH IRAQ'S THREATENING BEHAVIOR AND THAT ISSUE MUST BE DIVORCED FROM THE QUESTION OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

.

WE ARE INTERESTED IN HEARING DIRECTLY FROM ANDREY KOZYREV THE RESULTS OF HIS MISSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FOR THAT PURPOSE, I AM READY TO SEND WARREN CHRISTOPHER TO NEW YORK FOR A MEETING THIS SUNDAY.

.

BORIS, OUR COUNTRIES HAVE WORKED TOGETHER WELL IN THE GULF AND ON A HOST OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. IN FIVE MEETINGS, YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP, AND SIGNIFICANTLY ADVANCED OUR BILATERAL PARTNERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

.

I WANT TO BE CLEAR ON THIS. THE SECURITY OF THE GULF IS VITAL TO US, AS I KNOW IT IS TO YOU. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW SADDAM HUSSEIN TO MANEUVER US INTO TAKING SEPARATE SIDES ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE. IF WE ALLOW HIM TO DO SO, IT COULD HAVE A DAMAGING AND EVEN DANGEROUS IMPACT -- NOT ONLY ON OUR COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF, BUT ON THE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO BUILD.

.

SINCERELY,

.

BILL CLINTON

.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

#4507

NNNN
<MSGID> M1306100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10/14

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 8368

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.29)
KBH 1/2/2025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

October 14, 1994

94 OCT 14 P3:21

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to President Yeltsin

Purpose

To respond to President Yeltsin's letter regarding Iraq.

Background

Yeltsin sent you a letter today which defends the Russian-Iraqi joint statement as leading to a relaxation of tensions, and urges that we work together in the UN to enhance the security of Kuwait and to "acknowledge Iraq's positive steps with the gradual relaxation of sanctions." He insists that Kozyrev's mission to Baghdad was in accordance with your Monday discussion and that you agreed then that we would not proceed with any UNSC action until Kozyrev arrives in New York. Yeltsin also requests that you meet with Kozyrev early next week.

Your response focuses on the serious problems we have with the Russian initiative. You make clear that:

- you will not allow Saddam Hussein to use his aggressive move to pressure the Security Council into a negotiation over the lifting of sanctions
- you did not agree to postpone action in the UNSC and that you believe it is essential to act now because Iraqi forces still pose a threat to Kuwait
- Russia should join the U.S., U.K. and France in passing a resolution that will ensure Iraq cannot again threaten its neighbors
- you will send Secretary Christopher to New York to meet Kozyrev
- Yeltsin should not allow Saddam to maneuver us into taking separate sides on this critical issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmittal of this letter to President Yeltsin. Chris and Strobe agree.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Letter to Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
Tab C Transcript of your October 10 telephone conversation

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Dear Bill,

As I promised, I am informing you of our steps with regard to Iraq.

As agreed, A. Kozyrev urgently visited Baghdad and, as a result of difficult negotiations with the Iraqis, brought them to the point of being ready to recognize the sovereignty and borders of Kuwait, about which there has been an official declaration. Firm assurances have been received that the Iraqi forces are being withdrawn to positions in the rear.

These agreements open the way to military detente between Iraq and Kuwait.

It is very important that we continue to coordinate our efforts closely, now already in the framework of the Security Council of the U.N., with the goal of achieving truly durable security for Kuwait, and indeed for the region as a whole: let us move from measures of pressure to a political process, encouraging positive steps on the part of Iraq with a gradual relaxation of sanctions.

I have instructed A. Kozyrev to fly immediately to the United States after the completion of his mission in the region. I request that you receive him for a conversation on key questions. Thereafter he will meet with W. Christopher to consider this and many other problems in further development of our conversations in Washington.

I am counting on you giving as well corresponding instructions to the U.S. representative in the U.N. Security Council, where Kozyrev will give a report. Clearly, I am acting on the basis of the agreement you and I reached that the U.N. Security Council will not take any decisions before the arival of A. Kozyrev.

B. Yeltsin

To His Excellency
The President of the United State of America
Mr. William Clinton.

Washington, DC

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.30]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.31)
KBH 1/2/2025

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin
Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetaker: Jessica Stern

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1993, 12:15 - 12:40pm

President Clinton: Hello Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello Bill. (U)

President Clinton: Good evening. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'm glad to hear your voice. (U)

President Clinton: It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'm calling to follow up on the letter I sent you earlier today. I just wanted to reiterate to you personally how grave the situation is in Iraq, and how important it is that the United States and Russia remain united in responding to it. The latest information we have shows that Iraqi troops are massing at the border. But we know that the Iraqis are being hurt by the sanctions. The best way for Iraq to get relief is for Saddam to demonstrate that he is prepared to live in peace with his neighbors and to honor the UN resolutions. This buildup of forces shows us just the opposite: that Saddam is still dangerous and unpredictable. The Iraqi military is still a potent force. And as you know, our past experience leaves us with no other choice than to prepare for the possibility that Saddam could invade Kuwait again. We simply cannot assume that Saddam is bluffing. The best way to deter him from exploiting this build-up on the border is to move our own forces into the region as fast as possible so that we can make it clear to him that there is a serious danger represented by his move -- and that he must reverse it. (S)

We must not link this demand in any way to the question of sanctions. To do so would reward Iraq's threatened aggression and could mislead Saddam regarding the strength of our resolve.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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We cannot let him, in effect, use this aggressive move to have us reconsider the sanctions. We cannot let him blackmail us on this. We need your support on this. I hope I can continue to count on your support on this.

President Yeltsin: I understand the point. I hope you understand that I'm equally disturbed by the situation in Iraq. I am following the situation very closely...hour by hour.

First, a confidential point of information. Mindful of the fact that Primakov has good relations with the Chief of Iraqi External Intelligence, Primakov called yesterday to speak with him about Iraq's intentions. We also sent a special message to the Iraqi leadership warning against any rash actions. They assured us that what's happening on the border is no more than military exercises. We are satisfied with the information exchange we have had with the US on the problem and because of these exchanges the UNSC is well informed on the situation and has taken steps to warn Baghdad. Kozyrev told me about his discussion with Christopher and I am satisfied with the division of labor here: forceful action together with diplomatic pressure.

I took particular note of what Secretary of State Christopher said to Kozyrev, and reading between the lines of what you've told me. You are massing troops as a defensive measure and will only use force in defense of Kuwait. Still, Bill, I believe we have some diplomatic moves to make. Of course we have to handle Hussein in a tough way but on the other hand we should try not to drive him into a corner otherwise we could have on our hands a serious international crisis. And the Middle East Peace Process could be threatened. Saddam Hussein has people close to his way of thinking who would like to see the peace process threatened.

I also instructed Kozyrev to depart immediately to Iraq for talks with the Iraqi leadership. Next, I have instructed him to go to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and only then, afterwards, to report his results at the UNSC, whether developments are positive or negative.

I request that you in the 2-3 days while Kozyrev is traveling in the area not to present any new initiatives at the Security Council. Since Christopher is also in the ME and our co-sponsorship of ME peace process has produced positive results, this should be widely publicized by the press.

Now, if we see any open aggression, Russia would of course be on the side of the US.

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I now have an important question I want to raise with you on a different subject. As far as I know the Foreign Ministers of G7 are going to convene in Canada to discuss credit lines and Ukrainian debt. Do you remembers that when we talked in the past we have talked about the G8? The country to which Ukraine owes the biggest amount -- $4 billion -- is Russia. And yet Russian representatives have not been invited to attend the meeting in Canada. We were surprised to hear about this. Ukraine supports an invitation to Russia to the G7 meeting. Kuchma mentioned it to Chernomyrdin a couple of days ago when Chernomyrdin was in Kiev. This was all I wanted to tell you.

President Clinton: My understanding is that the meeting is sub-ministerial and that no decisions will be taken and that there will be a later meeting at which Russia would participate. But I support Russia's participation in this first meeting as well. And I have no problem getting back to the G7 to suggest that. People from your side should contact the G7 leaders. I support you on this. I have no problem with your participation in this meeting and I will go back to suggest that.

President Yeltsin: All the more so because Kuchma is going to attend.

President Clinton: I have no problem with your attending the meeting. I support that. If you can have Kozyrev contact some of the other G7 members -- Kohl especially -- that might help.

President Yeltsin: O.K. Good. Thank you. (U)

President Clinton: I have to say one other thing about the Iraqi business so that there can be no misunderstanding between us. I think it is fine for Kozyrev to try to talk some sense into Saddam. But I cannot agree to relaxing the sanctions and the security council resolutions in return for his withdrawing his troops. That is completely unacceptable to me.

President Yeltsin: I think these are 2 different questions that must be considered separately. The first question is the withdrawal of troops. The second issue is that, in the normal prescribed fashion, we must consider whether Iraq is recognizing the relevant UNSC resolutions, they must confirm the border with Kuwait.

President Clinton: Yes. One other point. You have read my intent properly. I do not want armed confrontation with Iraq and I'm moving my troops to defend Kuwait, for defensive purposes only. But there's a limit to how long I can leave them there -- I can't leave them there indefinitely. There will be a point

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when I will not be able to leave aircraft and troops there indefinitely. If Hussein creates a permanent threat in the area. I won't take further actions without speaking with you further. What we're doing is for defensive purposes but if there are not results I can't keep these troops there indefinitely. We will of course have other discussions before anything happens. But I wanted to lay this out up front. We will talk again.

President Yeltsin: I get your point and I'm in full agreement. (U)

President Clinton: O.K. Thank you very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: O.K. Thank you and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 10/22

October 21, 1994 94 OCT 21 P4:27

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.32)
KBH 1/2/2025

Purpose

To give Boris Yeltsin your assessment of the results of our exchanges with the Russians over the Iraq crisis; confirm your continued commitment to the partnership you and Yeltsin have built; and seek Yeltsin's support on dealing with Ukraine.

Background

The Kozyrev mission to Baghdad and our resultant dispute with Moscow put the U.S.-Russia relationship to its severest test since our clash over Bosnia in February. The crisis confirmed that foreign policy issues continue to be the biggest problems we face in our bilateral dealings. But it also revealed that our partnership is ultimately a strong one, founded on a serious, shared commitment to solving problems and avoiding blow-ups.

We are talking with the Russians at various levels to learn more about their decision-making process in this case, which seems to have functioned erratically. What is already clear is the central role the communications between you and Yeltsin played in helping us avoid a major breakdown. However, Yeltsin's last oral message to you (Tab B) had a testy tone to it -- perhaps reflecting a view at some level that the vote on UNSCR 949 was a win for us and a loss for Moscow. Whatever its genesis, we don't believe it should be the last word in the exchange. The attached message to Yeltsin highlights the positive aspects of our interaction on this issue, while reiterating our firm position against any near-term consideration of the sanctions question.

The second part of the letter, in a more back-to-business vein, deals with Ukraine. True to your commitment to Yeltsin when you last spoke, we have won agreement for Russia to take part in the G-7 conference in Winnipeg on Ukraine. To augment the balance-of-payments support we are marshaling for Ukraine, we need Russia's agreement to freeze some of the energy debt it is owed by Kiev. We also seek Yeltsin's intervention to secure Russian acceptance of the package of multilateral security guarantees

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

that President Kuchma sees as essential to his effort to convince the Rada to approve the NPT this year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for delivery to President Yeltsin.

Approve ___/___ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B October 17 Oral Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.33)
KBH 1/2/2025

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT):

Dear Boris:

In the aftermath of the vote at the Security Council on UNSCR 949, I wanted to give you my sense of where matters stand with Iraq, and of the meaning of this episode for our bilateral relationship.

First of all, I would highlight the crucial importance of the fact that Russia and the United States joined together in the unanimous vote for UNSCR 949. This sent a clear message to Iraq that the threats to which it resorted two weeks ago were unacceptable and must not be repeated. U.S. determination to ensure that Iraq not again threaten its neighbors should not be underestimated. We have made this clear to Baghdad. I also want to reiterate our strongly-held view that any discussion of sanctions relief for Iraq in the wake of this episode is premature. The time for such discussion will come only at the November Sanctions review in the Security Council but it is inadvisable for now.

Throughout this crisis, our governments were in regular contact, and you and I together addressed key issues at critical moments. You understood that American vital interests were at stake; we appreciated that Russia's were also involved. This enabled us to reach agreement on the resolution at the Security Council. It also highlights for me the importance of prompt and candid communications between us personally and between our governments.

In the process of reaching agreement on the resolution, some differences surfaced. This is no surprise; in many respects, it is normal. The important point is that we were able to work through these differences frankly, with respect for each other's positions, and with recognition of the importance of our overall relationship.

Boris, this episode demonstrates clearly that our partnership is strong. It also shows that we will not let third parties disrupt the relationship that you and I have worked so hard to establish. We had spoken of the importance of this principle many times, and it was gratifying to see us put it into practice so effectively.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We must draw on these lessons as we work on the Gulf and other critical issues in the days ahead.

Boris, I wanted to take this opportunity, before closing, to raise two issues in connection with our joint efforts to help Ukraine. As I told you when we spoke on October 10, I support Russia's participation in the Winnipeg Conference on Ukraine. After your call, we spoke with the Canadian hosts and other G-7 partners, and found that they, too, supported your attendance in Winnipeg. We look forward to your participation on October 27.

Russia's involvement in the process of multilateral economic support for Ukraine is very important. I believe a key way that Russia can promote the kind of accelerated reform that both President Kuchma and the Rada appear to have united behind could be through a rescheduling of Ukraine's energy debts to Russia. For our part, we have committed $100 million in balance-of-payments support and are seeking similar support from other countries that will take part in the conference. Agreement by Russia to reschedule debt service would be viewed favorably in the G-7 and would doubtless influence others to contribute materially toward this important goal. I also believe Russia would benefit economically as Ukraine becomes better able to meet future energy bills.

As we agreed in Washington, Ukrainian accession to the NPT is the other priority of our dialogue with Kiev. We would like to wrap this up in time for the CSCE Summit in Budapest. From our contacts with the Ukrainian government and in the Rada, it is increasingly clear that swift progress on this front may be likely once we can provide specific expression of the security assurances that we committed to in the Trilateral Statement. We have provided your Foreign Ministry with a draft document on assurances for presentation to Kiev. I know it is not easy for you to sign this document; it is not easy for the United Kingdom or the United States, but the British are prepared to sign, as are we. I hope that you will join us to ensure the achievement of our common objective. I believe we must act within the next week to ensure that President Kuchma can succeed in convincing the Rada to accede to the NPT before the Budapest CSCE meeting.

As always, many thanks for your consideration of these issues, and warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Bill

END TEXT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

As you realise, dear Bill, having voted in favour of the UNSC Resolution on Iraq we had to really make an effort upon ourselves, since Minister Kozyrev had not been going on his trip behind the US back and it would have been proper to wait until he arrived. I have given appropriate instructions regarding the vote being governed by the supreme interests of the US-Russian partnership.

But I want to say it quite candidly that in case of a strike against Iraq after it has expressed its intention to recognise Kuwait and its borders, in other words, has clearly voiced its readiness to fulfil the demands of the UNSC Resolutions, I will not be able to control the internal situation in Russia and the position of the Duma from taking an anti-American turn and I will be obliged to ~~act~~ speak out accordingly. References to Iraq having not withdrawn its tanks to their permanent stationment positions, are not valid. Both through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' channels and from intelligence reports we have confirmation on the contrary.

I hope that you will understand correctly the motives of my present letter.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.34]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1(3.3.5)
KBH 1/2/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 21, 1994

ACTION

Cable Dept 10/24/94 16:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin

Purpose

To give Boris Yeltsin your assessment of the results of our exchanges with the Russians over the Iraq crisis; confirm your continued commitment to the partnership you and Yeltsin have built; and seek Yeltsin's support on dealing with Ukraine.

Background

The Kozyrev mission to Baghdad and our resultant dispute with Moscow put the U.S.-Russia relationship to its severest test since our clash over Bosnia in February. The crisis confirmed that foreign policy issues continue to be the biggest problems we face in our bilateral dealings. But it also revealed that our partnership is ultimately a strong one, founded on a serious, shared commitment to solving problems and avoiding blow-ups.

We are talking with the Russians at various levels to learn more about their decision-making process in this case, which seems to have functioned erratically. What is already clear is the central role the communications between you and Yeltsin played in helping us avoid a major breakdown. However, Yeltsin's last oral message to you (Tab B) had a testy tone to it -- perhaps reflecting a view at some level that the vote on UNSCR 949 was a win for us and a loss for Moscow. Whatever its genesis, we don't believe it should be the last word in the exchange. The attached message to Yeltsin highlights the positive aspects of our interaction on this issue, while reiterating our firm position against any near-term consideration of the sanctions question.

The second part of the letter, in a more back-to-business vein, deals with Ukraine. True to your commitment to Yeltsin when you last spoke, we have won agreement for Russia to take part in the G-7 conference in Winnipeg on Ukraine. To augment the balance-of-payments support we are marshaling for Ukraine, we need Russia's agreement to freeze some of the energy debt it is owed by Kiev. We also seek Yeltsin's intervention to secure Russian acceptance of the package of multilateral security guarantees

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

that President Kuchma sees as essential to his effort to convince the Rada to approve the NPT this year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for delivery to President Yeltsin.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B October 17 Oral Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.3b)
KBH 1/2/2025

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE

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(BEGIN TEXT):

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First of all, I would highlight the crucial importance of the fact that Russia and the United States joined together in the unanimous vote for UNSCR 949. This sent a clear message to Iraq that the threats to which it resorted two weeks ago were unacceptable and must not be repeated. U.S. determination to ensure that Iraq not again threaten its neighbors should not be underestimated. We have made this clear to Baghdad. I also want to reiterate our strongly-held view that any discussion of sanctions relief for Iraq in the wake of this episode is premature. The time for such discussion will come only at the November Sanctions review in the Security Council but it is inadvisable for now.

Throughout this crisis, our governments were in regular contact, and you and I together addressed key issues at critical moments. You understood that American vital interests were at stake; we appreciated that Russia's were also involved. This enabled us to reach agreement on the resolution at the Security Council. It also highlights for me the importance of prompt and candid communications between us personally and between our governments.

In the process of reaching agreement on the resolution, some differences surfaced. This is no surprise; in many respects, it is normal. The important point is that we were able to work through these differences frankly, with respect for each other's positions, and with recognition of the importance of our overall relationship.

Boris, this episode demonstrates clearly that our partnership is strong. It also shows that we will not let third parties disrupt the relationship that you and I have worked so hard to establish. We had spoken of the importance of this principle many times, and it was gratifying to see us put it into practice so effectively.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We must draw on these lessons as we work on the Gulf and other critical issues in the days ahead.

Boris, I wanted to take this opportunity, before closing, to raise two issues in connection with our joint efforts to help Ukraine. As I told you when we spoke on October 10, I support Russia's participation in the Winnipeg Conference on Ukraine. After your call, we spoke with the Canadian hosts and other G-7 partners, and found that they, too, supported your attendance in Winnipeg. We look forward to your participation on October 27.

Russia's involvement in the process of multilateral economic support for Ukraine is very important. I believe a key way that Russia can promote the kind of accelerated reform that both President Kuchma and the Rada appear to have united behind could be through a rescheduling of Ukraine's energy debts to Russia. For our part, we have committed $100 million in balance-of-payments support and are seeking similar support from other countries that will take part in the conference. Agreement by Russia to reschedule debt service would be viewed favorably in the G-7 and would doubtless influence others to contribute materially toward this important goal. I also believe Russia would benefit economically as Ukraine becomes better able to meet future energy bills.

As we agreed in Washington, Ukrainian accession to the NPT is the other priority of our dialogue with Kiev. We would like to wrap this up in time for the CSCE Summit in Budapest. From our contacts with the Ukrainian government and in the Rada, it is increasingly clear that swift progress on this front may be likely once we can provide specific expression of the security assurances that we committed to in the Trilateral Statement. We have provided your Foreign Ministry with a draft document on assurances for presentation to Kiev. I know it is not easy for you to sign this document; it is not easy for the United Kingdom or the United States, but the British are prepared to sign, as are we. I hope that you will join us to ensure the achievement of our common objective. I believe we must act within the next week to ensure that President Kuchma can succeed in convincing the Rada to accede to the NPT before the Budapest CSCE meeting.

As always, many thanks for your consideration of these issues, and warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Bill

END TEXT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO RECEIVE ATTENTION BEFORE THE TRILATERAL BW MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 11-12, 1994.

DEAR BORIS:

DURING OUR SUMMIT IN SEPTEMBER, YOU AND I SPOKE ABOUT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AGREED THAT WE WOULD REMAIN PERSONALLY ENGAGED ON THESE ISSUES TO ENSURE THAT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING CONCERNS. WE ALSO AGREED OUR EXPERTS WOULD MEET IN OCTOBER TO DEVELOP A DOCUMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 1992 TRILATERAL STATEMENT ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, TO DISCUSS THE PAST SOVIET/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND THE WYOMING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

AS YOU KNOW, EXPERTS TALKS WERE HELD IN MOSCOW IN MID-OCTOBER ON BOTH BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUES. DURING THE BW TALKS, OUR EXPERTS, TOGETHER WITH THOSE FROM THE U.K., MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON A DOCUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SEPTEMBER 1992 TRILATERAL STATEMENT. VERY LITTLE PROGRESS, HOWEVER, WAS MADE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PAST BW PROGRAM. INDEED, THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, RUSSIAN EXPERTS DENIED THAT BIOPREPARAT WAS EVER INVOLVED IN THE BW PROGRAM AND RESURRECTED THE DISCREDITED SOVIET CLAIM THAT THE 1979 ANTHRAX OUTBREAK AT SVERDLOVSK WAS CAUSED BY CONTAMINATED MEAT.

U.S., RUSSIAN, AND BRITISH EXPERTS WILL HOLD ANOTHER BW MEETING IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. YOU AND I MUST ENSURE THAT THIS MEETING CLEARS THE WAY FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT, INCLUDING INITIAL VISITS TO MILITARY BIOLOGICAL FACILITIES IN THE U.S., RUSSIA, AND THE U.K. BEGINNING EARLY NEXT YEAR. SUCCESSFUL MILITARY SITE VISITS WILL HELP BUILD CONFIDENCE THAT THE BW PROGRAM RUSSIA INHERITED FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN TERMINATED. I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT THESE VISITS SHOULD BE PURSUED IN PARALLEL WITH EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT UPON DETAILS FOR IMPLEMENTING ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT.

IN CONTRAST TO OUR BW TALKS, VIRTUALLY NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN OUR BILATERAL EXPERTS TALKS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ~~INDEED, IT APPEARED THAT RUSSIAN EXPERTS HAD NO INTENTION OF EVEN DISCUSSING THE KEY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS.~~ U.S. EXPERTS WERE AND REMAIN PREPARED TO OFFER CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS AND PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE COST OF CONVERTING CW FACILITIES -- CONCERNS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO BOTH THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND THE WYOMING MOU. BUT THE SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.37]

EARLIER THIS YEAR, VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINSTER CHERNOMYRDIN BEGAN A VERY PRIVATE DIALOGUE ON THE BW ISSUE. I BELIEVE THAT THEIR DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THESE CW PROBLEMS. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE IN MOSCOW IN MID-DECEMBER FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION. I PROPOSE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES HOLD POLITICAL-LEVEL TALKS ON THE BDA AND THE WYOMING MOU IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS MEETING AND THAT THE HEADS OF OUR RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS THEN REPORT DIRECTLY TO VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS.

BORIS, ALTHOUGH I AM DISAPPOINTED IN THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT EXPERTS TALKS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, I BELIEVE THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. FOR THAT TO HAPPEN, HOWEVER, WE NEED TO GIVE THESE ISSUES OUR PERSONAL ATTENTION. WE SHOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH AFTER THE UPCOMING MEETINGS IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES. AS ALWAYS, I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU.

BILL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR ~~PLEASE~~ SHOULD DELIVER AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO RECEIVE ATTENTION BEFORE THE TRILATERAL BW MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 11-12, 1994.

DEAR BORIS:

DURING OUR SUMMIT IN SEPTEMBER, YOU AND I SPOKE ABOUT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND AGREED THAT WE WOULD REMAIN PERSONALLY ENGAGED ON THESE ISSUES ~~IN ORDER~~ TO ENSURE THAT PROGRESS WAS ~~BEING~~ MADE IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING CONCERNS. ~~AT THE SAME TIME~~, WE ALSO AGREED OUR EXPERTS WOULD MEET IN OCTOBER TO DEVELOP A DOCUMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 1992 TRILATERAL STATEMENT ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, TO DISCUSS THE PAST SOVIET/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND THE WYOMING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

AS YOU KNOW, EXPERTS TALKS WERE HELD IN MOSCOW IN MID-OCTOBER ON BOTH BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUES. DURING THE BW TALKS, OUR EXPERTS, TOGETHER WITH THOSE FROM THE U.K., MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON A DOCUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SEPTEMBER 1992 TRILATERAL STATEMENT. VERY LITTLE PROGRESS, HOWEVER, WAS MADE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PAST BW PROGRAM. INDEED, THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, RUSSIAN EXPERTS DENIED THAT BIOPREPARAT WAS EVER INVOLVED IN THE BW PROGRAM AND RESURRECTED THE DISCREDITED SOVIET CLAIM THAT THE 1979 ANTHRAX OUTBREAK AT SVERDLOVSK WAS CAUSED BY CONTAMINATED MEAT.

U.S., RUSSIAN, AND BRITISH EXPERTS WILL HOLD ANOTHER ~~A FURTHER~~ BW MEETING IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. YOU AND I MUST ENSURE THAT THIS MEETING CLEARS THE WAY FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT, INCLUDING INITIAL VISITS TO MILITARY BIOLOGICAL FACILITIES IN THE U.S., RUSSIA, AND THE U.K. BEGINNING EARLY NEXT YEAR. SUCCESSFUL MILITARY SITE VISITS WILL HELP BUILD CONFIDENCE THAT THE BW PROGRAM RUSSIA INHERITED FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN TERMINATED. I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT THESE VISITS SHOULD BE PURSUED IN PARALLEL WITH EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT UPON DETAILS FOR IMPLEMENTING ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT.

IN CONTRAST TO OUR BW TALKS, VIRTUALLY NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN OUR BILATERAL EXPERTS TALKS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. INDEED, IT ~~SOON BECAME CLEAR~~ APPEARED THAT RUSSIAN EXPERTS HAD NO INTENTION OF EVEN DISCUSSING THE KEY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS. U.S. EXPERTS WERE AND REMAIN PREPARED TO OFFER CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS AND PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE COST OF CONVERTING CW FACILITIES -- CONCERNS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO BOTH THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND THE WYOMING MOU. BUT THE SOLUTIONS TO

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.38]

THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

EARLIER THIS YEAR, ~~THE~~ VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINSTER CHERNOMYRDIN BEGAN A VERY PRIVATE DIALOGUE ON THE BW ISSUE. I BELIEVE THAT THEIR DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THESE CW PROBLEMS. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE IN MOSCOW IN MID-DECEMBER FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION. I ~~WOULD LIKE TO~~ PROPOSE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES HOLD POLITICAL-LEVEL TALKS ON THE BDA AND THE WYOMING MOU IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS MEETING, AND THAT THE HEADS OF OUR RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS THEN REPORT DIRECTLY TO ~~THE~~ VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS.

BORIS, ALTHOUGH I AM DISAPPOINTED IN THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT EXPERTS TALKS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, I BELIEVE ~~THAT~~ THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. ~~IN ORDER~~ FOR THAT TO HAPPEN, HOWEVER, WE NEED TO GIVE THESE ISSUES OUR PERSONAL ATTENTION. WE SHOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH AFTER THE UPCOMING MEETINGS IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES. AS ALWAYS, I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU.

~~WILLIAM J. CLINTON~~
BILL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2015-0815-M-1 [3.39]
KBH 1/2/2025

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: BURNS COQ GRAY PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2

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FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
EYES ONLY: FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

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AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO RECEIVE ATTENTION BEFORE THE TRILATERAL BW MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 11-12, 1994.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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SINCERELY,

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BILL

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END TEXT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECL: OADR

#4794

NNNN
<MSGID> M1348715

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 8832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.40)
KBH 1/2/2025

94 NOV 4 P9:57

ACTION November 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues

Purpose

To secure President Yeltsin's help in resolving outstanding chemical and biological weapons issues.

Background

In mid-October, U.S. experts participated in talks in Moscow on chemical and biological weapons issues. These talks were a direct result of your recent summit with President Yeltsin, where it was agreed that U.S. and Russian (and, in the case of BW, British) experts would meet without delay to address a range of issues relevant to Russia's compliance with its chemical and biological arms control obligations. While some progress was made in the Trilateral BW talks, the U.S. cut short the CW talks because of a lack of Russian interest in discussing substantive issues.

Russia's unwillingness to resolve outstanding concerns related to its chemical and biological weapons activities is extremely worrisome from an arms control perspective. These issues also, however, have wider implications. Opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention were able to use concerns about Russian CBW activities to derail U.S. ratification of the CWC this year. Critics of Nunn-Lugar and Russian aid also seized upon these issues, offering amendments that would have killed key elements of these programs unless you certified that Russia was complying with its chemical and biological arms control obligations. Similar amendments will almost certainly be proposed next year. Supporters of our Russia policy will have a difficult time opposing such amendments, which have as their goal Russian arms control compliance. In short, unless we make tangible progress on CBW issues with the Russians in the months ahead, future ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Congressional support for key Russian assistance programs may be seriously affected.

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~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

During the summit, you and President Yeltsin agreed that you would remain personally engaged on CBW issues in order to ensure that progress was being made in resolving outstanding concerns. We believe that you should send a letter to President Yeltsin about the recent talks, noting that you have also asked the Vice President to follow-up on these issues with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. A proposed letter is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letter at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

per Wolcin/Sews 11/7/94

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Letter to President Yeltsin

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO RECEIVE ATTENTION BEFORE THE TRILATERAL BW MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 11-12, 1994.

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.41]

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BILL

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8832

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN/NICHOLAS BURNS EH for

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS EDH

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues

At Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding for the President's approval a proposed letter to President Yeltsin on Russian chemical and biological weapons activities.

Concurrence by: Rose Gottemoeller, EH for Leon Fuerth, Robert Bell, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Proposed Letter to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015 0815-m-1 (3.42)
KBH 1/2/2025

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-1 (3.43)
KBH 1/3/2025

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

8832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

November 4, 1994 94 NOV 4 P9:57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues

Purpose

To secure President Yeltsin's help in resolving outstanding chemical and biological weapons issues.

Background

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

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RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letter at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Letter to President Yeltsin

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.44]

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BILL

Beyrle, John R.

From:	Beyrle, John R.
To:	@UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Cc:	/R, Record at A1; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia
Subject:	10/28 Yeltsin Letter on Mideast [~~SECRET~~]
Date:	Wednesday, November 09, 1994 2:51PM

To Neal Wolin from John Beyrle

Neal-- we have read through the subject letter (#8835) several times and talked with the NESA Directorate and we both agree that it doesn't need to be answered. The letter is fairly generic, saying that Russia will continue to work with us as a cosponsor of the Madrid peace process. But it does not lay down any markers on specific actions they plan to take that would require us to respond. The tone of the letter is unusual, very stilted and formal. We don't want to launch a dialogue on the Madrid process on this basis, and so we recommend just filing it away.

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2015-0815-M-1 (3.45)
KBH 1/2/2025

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8835

Unofficial translation

Please receive my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference.

Madrid forum, which has given an impulse to the Middle East peace process, has marked a historical turn of the Arabs and Israelis towards peaceful co-existance and joint search for a comprehensive and just Middle East settlement on the basis of the principles, approved in Madrid.

Today we once again do justice to the courage and political far-sightedness, produced at that time by the Arab and Israeli leaders, their determination to put an end to the sanguinary confrontation that lasted for decades, which made it possible to concentrate the creative energy of their peoples and the region's rich resources on the goals of peaceful creativity and economic prosperity.

Over the last three years the peaceful process, overcoming inevitable obstructions and falls, not only became irreversible, but also produced tangible practical results. You may rely on it that Russia, as a cosponsor of the Madrid process will in future, in close cooperation with you, actively contribute to achieving its ultimate goals.

Taking this opportunity, I wish you good health and further success, and peace and prosperity to your people.

With best regards.

B.YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.46]

Прошу принять мои искренние поздравления по случаю третьей годовщины Мадридской мирной конференции по Ближнему Востоку.

Мадридский форум, который привел в движение ближневосточный мирный процесс, ознаменовал собой исторический поворот арабов и израильтян к мирному сосуществованию, совместным поискам всеобъемлющего и справедливого ближневосточного урегулирования на основе принципов, одобренных в Мадриде.

Сегодня мы вновь отдаем должное мужеству и политической дальновидности, которые тогда были проявлены арабскими и израильскими руководителями, их решимости положить конец длившейся десятилетиями кровопролитной конфронтации, что позволило направить творческую энергию своих народов и богатейшие ресурсы региона на цели мирного созидания и экономического процветания.

За истекшие три года мирный процесс, преодолевая неизбежные завалы и сбои, не только принял необратимый характер, но и принес весомые практические результаты. Можете быть уверены, что Россия в качестве коспонсора мадридского процесса и в дальнейшем, тесно взаимодействуя с вами, будет активно содействовать достижению его конечных целей.

Пользуясь случаем, желаю Вам крепкого здоровья и дальнейших успехов, а вашему народу – мира и процветания.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

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[2015-0815-M-1, 3.47]

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2015-0815-M-1(3.48)
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 4, 1994 94 NOV 4 PM :08

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from Yeltsin

President Yeltsin has sent a reply to your letter of October 25, in which you shared your views on the Iraq crisis and sought Yeltsin's support on issues involving Ukraine. Yeltsin's response (Tab A) is positive in tone and very forward looking: he says he counts on seeing you at the CSCE Summit in Budapest for more discussion of the new European security architecture. He agrees that the partnership is strong, despite our disagreements, and highlights the importance of personal contact between you. He declares the "misunderstanding" over Iraq to be settled. He calls for an adequate international response, however, when Iraq's legal recognition of Kuwait becomes a fact. (The Russian Ambassador clarified that what is meant here is an eventual lifting of the restriction on Iraqi oil sales.)

The letter briefly reiterates two recurrent themes in our foreign policy discussions with Moscow: support for Belgrade as a key to a settlement in Bosnia, and continued Russian interest in supplying reactors to North Korea.

The bulk of the letter responds to your points on Ukraine. Yeltsin highlights the energy debt support that Russia has promised Kiev (you specifically requested this in your letter), and chides the other "G-8" members for their inadequate response. On NPT, you had asked Yeltsin to join us and the UK in agreeing to security assurances needed to secure approval of the NPT in the Ukrainian Rada. His response indicates that he is ready to sign the document in Budapest only after some "holes" in the draft are plugged. We will consult in Moscow to learn the size of these holes and urge the Russians to signal immediately to Kiev that they have no objection in principle to a signing -- a major sticking point until now -- which will have a positive impact on the Rada NPT debate. Our goal remains to have Ukraine accede to the NPT before Kuchma's State visit to Washington on November 22.

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

Attachments:
Tab A Incoming Yeltsin Letter
Tab B Your Letter of October 25

[2015-0815-M-1, 3.49]

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Translated from Russian

Moscow, the Kremlin

November 2, 1991

Dear Bill:

This is an answer to your letter of October 25.

Your ideas regarding the value and the priority of our partnership accord with my approach. A mutually beneficial partnership with the United States on the basis of equality is for us a strategic choice. It is functioning, and well, despite emerging discords. Obviously, these are unavoidable, since our states have their own interests which have been shaping for centuries. However, the issue is not so much the existence of discords, but the way in which to approach and overcome them.

I believe that the degree of trust we have reached between us presupposes a careful treatment of the partner's view, even if it makes one to adjust his plans. There should exist the basic understanding that Russian-American partnership constitutes the central factor in the world's politics. If we let ourselves weaken it, seeking a transient gain, we'll undermine the positive perspective of international development, and reduce the chances of settlement of specific problems - be it issues of Bosnia or Iraq.

I share your words on the importance of a personal trustworthy contact between the presidents.

Now regarding the specific issues.

On the situation around Iraq. I view this misunderstanding as settled. The main thing is that we have managed to switch the process of the crisis settlement onto political track. I do not have an impression that we have come back to a situation we had been in a few months ago. We have a program of action. The prospect of legal recognition of Kuwait by Iraq has become more clear. When this transforms into a fact, the

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

international community is expected to adequately respond to it. We should not seal the existing situation, otherwise an explosion will be inevitable.

On the situation in Bosnia. It is important to support Belgrade whose constructive stand presents the main chance to reopen the path to political settlement. A priority issue here is to deblock humanitarian deliveries to Yugoslavia. As regards the issue of arms embargo which is rather difficult for you, I believe that we should find a solution acceptable for all members of the contact group.

It is important to continue our cooperative work on the North Korean issue. I would like to hope that the agreement signed between the United States and the DPRK will lead to a return of the DPRK into the NPT. However, it remains questionable for us how far the DPRK's monitoring obligations stipulated by this agreement correspond with the requirements of the NPT and IAEA equally applicable to all.

There is an aspect which directly touches upon our interests. We have already discussed it with you. We cannot be satisfied if Russia is pushed aside from a full-fledged participation in restructuring North Korea's nuclear program. I expect that our light-water reactors will be considered without bias, the more so, since they are acceptable for the DPRK. This is what they openly tell us in Pyongyang.

I would like to note the role you played in ensuring Russia's participation at the Winnipeg conference on assistance to economic reforms in Ukraine. It is a question of principle for us. Apart from Russia, no one in fact renders currently any serious assistance to Ukraine. President Kuchma has complained to me about that recently in Moscow. I have promised to support him and have sent Mr.Kozyrev to Winnipeg where he presented our new package of assistance to Ukraine. The "Winnipeg package" weighs 700 million dollars. Regrettably, the reciprocal contributions of other "G-8" members are clearly inadequate yet to the scope of most severe economic problems confronting Ukraine. I await your help in this issue.

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In general we have established very good mutual understanding, including in personal terms, with President Kuchma. I have once again stressed the importance of compliance with the tripartite agreement regarding Ukraine's joining the NPT and rendering security guarantees to Kiev by the depositary states of this Treaty. There exists no ambiguity now on this issue between me and President Kuchma. We are planning to resolve all specific bilateral issues with signing of a historic Russian-Ukrainian treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership during my upcoming visit to Kiev.

Bearing this in mind I am ready to make a decision now with regard to signing a document on guarantees. It is clear the leaders' signatures should seal a really milestone document which would cover all the concerns of Ukraine which is fraternal to us. Until yet there are too many "caverns" in the draft. In particular, in Ukraine's western flank where Ukraine has its own problems. At present, against the background of discussions on expanding NATO, these concerns look even more serious. The same is true regarding the issue of "flank limitations". As you know, it also exists for Ukraine.

That is why I propose to urgently instruct our experts to finalize the draft text of the agreement on guarantees, for us to be able to sign it in Budapest with clear conscience. Time is pressing us here with due notice to the work that President Kuchma is conducting now with the Rada.

Bill,

It is utmostly important to fill our political mutual understanding regarding partnership with practical equal partnership and precise coordination of actions on these most vital issues.

I count very much on meeting with you in Budapest. We have much to talk about, and first of all, about transforming European stability structures.

Sincerely,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

To: BURNSN, COMM, GRAYW, SIGLERR, MCGEATHT, SIGLERR
cc:
From: SITREPRT
Date: 10/24/94 04:28:07 PM
Subject: //*NO SUBJECT FOUND*//

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QQQQ
FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VOTE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNSCR 949, I WANTED TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE OF WHERE MATTERS STAND WITH IRAQ, AND OF THE MEANING OF THIS EPISODE FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD HIGHLIGHT THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES JOINED TOGETHER IN THE UNANIMOUS VOTE FOR UNSCR 949. THIS SENT A CLEAR MESSAGE TO IRAQ THAT THE THREATS TO WHICH IT RESORTED TWO WEEKS AGO WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND MUST NOT BE REPEATED. U.S. DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ NOT AGAIN THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. WE HAVE MADE THIS CLEAR TO BAGHDAD. I ALSO WANT TO REITERATE OUR STRONGLY-HELD VIEW THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR IRAQ IN THE WAKE OF THIS EPISODE IS PREMATURE. THE TIME FOR SUCH DISCUSSION WILL COME ONLY AT THE NOVEMBER SANCTIONS REVIEW IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT IT IS INADVISABLE FOR NOW.

THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS, OUR GOVERNMENTS WERE IN REGULAR CONTACT, AND YOU AND I TOGETHER ADDRESSED KEY ISSUES AT CRITICAL MOMENTS. YOU UNDERSTOOD THAT AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE; WE APPRECIATED THAT RUSSIA'S WERE ALSO INVOLVED. THIS ENABLED US TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS FOR ME THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMPT AND CANDID COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US PERSONALLY AND BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS.

IN THE PROCESS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION, SOME DIFFERENCES SURFACED. THIS IS NO SURPRISE; IN MANY RESPECTS, IT IS NORMAL. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT WE WERE ABLE TO WORK THROUGH THESE DIFFERENCES FRANKLY, WITH RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS, AND WITH RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF