

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anne Witkowsky to Anthony Lake, re: CFE: Letter to President Yeltsin (2 pages)	05/03/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. draft	[Draft of 001c] (2 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 579

FOLDER TITLE:

9503313

2014-0837-F
 ke3337

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3313

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY *AW*

SUBJECT: CFE: Letter to President Yeltsin

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
NOTED

Attached is a proposed letter from the President to President Yeltsin previewing our CFE message for the summit. Bob and Lynn Davis have also previewed the message in pre-summit discussions with DFM Mamedov, but we want to be absolutely sure that Yeltsin himself receives it so that he is fully prepared to engage next week. The letter lays out the deal on CFE: If Russia complies with the Treaty in November, we will work with them at the CFE Review Conference in May, 1996 to find a long-term solution to the flank problem. While we believe there is little chance that Yeltsin will direct the Russian military to bring Russia fully into compliance by November, primarily because of the equipment still required for the Chechnya operation, we believe that a strong message from the President might persuade Yeltsin to bring Russia much closer to compliance than they are now.

As you may recall, Yeltsin sent the President a letter in December on the CFE flank problem. Shortly thereafter senior Russian officials provided us with new information and ideas that explicitly replaced Yeltsin's approach, rendering a Presidential reply unnecessary. By transmitting our letter now, we are also trying to ensure that the discussions we have in Moscow are held on our terms, and are not derailed by questions about old Russian proposals which the Russians already know have no future.

The letter follows the line we briefed to the President yesterday. Because the President has already been briefed on the approach and time is short, we request that you approve the letter yourself. OSD, JCS, ACDA and State have cleared the draft.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letter to President Yeltsin.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON

LIBRARY PHOTOCOPIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0815-M-L (4.68)
11/29/2017

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

Attachment

Tab I Proposed letter to President Yeltsin

Concurrence by: John Beyrle *JNB*

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE:

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

IT WAS A PLEASURE SPEAKING TO YOU LAST WEEK. I WAS PLEASED THAT WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY AND OTHER ISSUES THAT WILL BE ON OUR AGENDA WHEN WE MEET.

ONE ISSUE WE DID NOT DISCUSS BUT WILL NEED TO TAKE UP IN MOSCOW IS THE CFE TREATY. THIS TREATY IS ONE OF THE SUCCESS STORIES OF THE LAST DECADE. IT HAS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR OUR WORK IN BEGINNING TO BUILD A NONCONFRONTATIONAL EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. WE NEED TO FIND A WAY TO MAINTAIN IT. OUR EXPERTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSING ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY. THEY HAVE MADE PROGRESS, BUT SOME CRITICAL ISSUES STILL REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED. I APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT AND HAVE STUDIED YOUR IDEAS CAREFULLY. I BELIEVE WE NEED TO TURN OUR ATTENTION TO CFE NOW.

I AM AWARE OF YOUR CONCERNS WITH CFE FLANK LIMITATIONS. THE STRATEGIC PICTURE HAS CHANGED IN EUROPE SINCE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. I UNDERSTAND AS WELL THE IMPORTANCE OF ALL PARTIES BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY WHEN ITS LIMITS COME INTO FORCE IN NOVEMBER. IF RUSSIA IS OUT OF COMPLIANCE AT THAT TIME, IT WILL BE SEEN BY THE REST OF EUROPE AS A POLITICAL STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA HAS CHOSEN NOT TO COOPERATE ON A VITAL SECURITY ISSUE. THE LONG-TERM RESULTS WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF EITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES, AND WOULD UNDERMINE OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE -- DESPITE SHORT TERM DIFFICULTIES -- WOULD BE WELCOMED THROUGHOUT EUROPE AS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT RUSSIA SEES ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE SECURITY INTERESTS AS BEING INTIMATELY ALIGNED WITH THOSE OF EUROPE.

THE RIGHT PLACE TO MEET RUSSIA'S FLANK CONCERNS IS THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE, IN MAY, 1996. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU AT THE CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS. THE KEY TO THIS, HOWEVER, IS RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY IN NOVEMBER.

I UNDERSTAND THAT IT WILL BE EASIER FOR YOU TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE IN NOVEMBER IF YOU HAVE SOME IDEA WHAT KINDS OF SOLUTIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MAY. FOR THAT

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PER E.O. 13526

12-2015-0815-A-2 (4.0)

11/21/2017

REASON, I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY EXPERTS TO SHARE WITH YOURS OUR IDEAS FOR ADDRESSING YOUR CONCERNS AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO DO THIS BY THE END OF NEXT MONTH. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY FOR STABILITY IN EUROPE, OUR FOCUS AT THE 1996 REVIEW CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ON FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE FLANK PROBLEM, NOT ON RENEGOTIATING THIS AGREEMENT.

BORIS, I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW. WE NEED TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO PREVENT THIS FROM BECOMING A SOURCE OF CONTENTION AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 579

FOLDER TITLE:

9503313

2014-0837-F
ke3337

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BEYRLE BLACKER COQ GRAY HARMON LAKEA PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2 W

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 050041Z MAY 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

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RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE OPENING OF BUSINESS.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

IT WAS A PLEASURE SPEAKING TO YOU LAST WEEK. I WAS PLEASED
THAT WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY AND
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MOSCOW IS THE CFE TREATY. THIS TREATY IS ONE OF THE SUCCESS
STORIES OF THE LAST DECADE. IT HAS BEEN AN ESSENTIAL
FOUNDATION FOR OUR WORK IN BEGINNING TO BUILD A
NONCONFRONTATIONAL EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. WE NEED TO FIND
A WAY TO MAINTAIN IT. OUR EXPERTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSING
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FORCE IN NOVEMBER. IF RUSSIA IS OUT OF COMPLIANCE AT THAT
TIME, IT WILL BE SEEN BY THE REST OF EUROPE AS A POLITICAL
STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA HAS CHOSEN NOT TO COOPERATE ON A VITAL
SECURITY ISSUE. THE LONG-TERM RESULTS WOULD NOT BE IN THE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
1/2 2015-0815-44-2
4/17/2018

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IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

INTEREST OF EITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES, AND WOULD UNDERMINE OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE.

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SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5975

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

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<MSGID> M1652282

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (1 page)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (1 page)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001e. memo	Steve Pifer to Anthony Lake, re: Yeltsin Letter to the President (1 page)	06/29/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 591

FOLDER TITLE:

9505020

2014-0837-F
 ke3338

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**HIS EXCELLENCY WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.**

Dear Bill,

I have perceived with great satisfaction our constructive discussions in Halifax which allowed to give a powerful impetus to the solution of the most urgent global problems. The G-8 gradually becomes one of the most important forums for strengthening peace and stability in the post-confrontation period.

The same considerations dictated my proposal to hold a summit meeting of leaders of our eight states next March or April in Moscow to discuss the whole complex of nuclear security issues which are a matter of great concern of the international community. I am glad that our initiative has been broadly endorsed, your part including.

I would like to inform you that Russia starts, on the basis of the results of Halifax, consultations with all interested countries in order to provide their comprehensive participation in this important forum.

I propose to early commit our foreign ministers to start immediate consultations on the scale and the agenda of the summit meeting in Moscow.

Sincerely,

B. YELTSIN

**Moscow, the Kremlin
June 28, 1995**

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Declassified per E.O. 13526
R2 2015-08/15-UN-2 (4.71)
4/19/2018

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
Г-ну Уильяму Джефферсону КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Дорогой Билл,

С большим удовлетворением воспринял наши конструктивные обсуждения в Галифаксе, позволившие дать мощный импульс решению самых неотложных глобальных проблем. "Восьмерка" постепенно превращается в один из важнейших форумов укрепления мира и стабильности в постконфронтационный период.

Этими же соображениями было продиктовано мое предложение провести в Москве в марте-апреле следующего года встречу лидеров наших восьми стран для обсуждения всего комплекса вопросов ядерной безопасности, который так волнует международное сообщество. Рад, что наша инициатива получила широкое признание, в том числе с вашей стороны.

Информирую тебя, что Россия, основываясь на результатах Галифакса, приступает к консультациям со всеми заинтересованными странами, чтобы обеспечить их полноправное участие в этой важной встрече.

Предлагаю, не теряя времени, поручить нашим министрам иностранных дел незамедлительно начать консультации о формате и повестке дня встречи в верхах в Москве.

С уважением,

Б. ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль
28 июня 1995 года

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Declassified per E.O. 13526
v2 1015-0815-M-2 (4.72)
4/19/2014

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 29, 1995


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *SP for CB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Letter to the President



The Russian Embassy delivered last night a brief June 28 letter from Yeltsin to the President. The letter:

- notes Yeltsin's satisfaction at the Halifax discussions;
- recalls Yeltsin's proposal for a Moscow summit of the eight leaders in March or April 1996 to discuss the complex of nuclear security issues;
- says Russia will begin consulting with "all interested countries" to ensure their participation; and
- proposes that foreign ministers begin immediate consultations on the summit's format and agenda.

The letter offers no insights into Russian thinking on the summit's substance. It suggests the Russians draw a distinction between the P-8 and others who may be invited to participate.

The letter does not require Presidential attention now. We will prepare a response at the appropriate time.

Why not answer now?
SP

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmission of the Sens-Brill memo at Tab I providing the text to State for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary) *ok* Talbott and Ambassador Pickering.

Attachments

- Tab I Sens-Brill Memorandum
- Tab A June 28 Yeltsin Letter to the President

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001-memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Get-Well Message to Yeltsin (1 page)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 593

FOLDER TITLE:

9505270

2014-0837-F
ke3339

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION

WASHINGTON
July 11, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

95 JUL 11 P7:27

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Get-Well Message to Yeltsin

Purpose

To approve a brief message to President Yeltsin urging a quick recovery from his hospitalization.

Background

Yeltsin was hospitalized today, where he underwent testing for *ischemia* -- a medical condition in which blood flow to vital organs is restricted. The organ apparently is Yeltsin's heart. While *ischemia* can precede a heart attack, by no means is such an attack inevitable. The presidential spokesman has said that Yeltsin's EKG is normal, that he is resting comfortably, that his condition is not serious and that he should be back at work by the end of the week. Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov separately confirmed to our Embassy that Yeltsin is expected to return to work by the weekend.

Yeltsin has a history of health problems. While we have no basis to contradict Yeltsin's spokesman or Mamedov, we would note that Yeltsin's office does have reason to put the best possible spin on his condition.

All indications are that Yeltsin continues to discharge his presidential functions. (Were a devolution of power necessary, under the Russian constitution, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin would become the acting president.)

Attached is a brief get-well message to Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve *Bill Clinton*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Get-Well Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VL 2015-0815-M-2 (4.74)
11/24/2017

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia (1 page)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. note	Handwritten note from President Clinton (1 page)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. note	{Duplicate of 001b} (1 page)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. draft	{Draft of 002a} (2 pages)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002a. cable	Re: [Letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002b. memo	{Duplicate of 001a} (1 page)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002c. memo	Steve Pifer to Anthony Lake, re: Presidential Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia (1 page)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002d. draft	{Duplicate of 001d} (2 pages)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002e. draft	{Draft of 002a} (2 pages)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 595

FOLDER TITLE:

9505587

2014-0837-F
 ke3340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
July 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin regarding Bosnia.

Background

Secretary Christopher reports that his discussions with Foreign Minister Kozyrev this evening in London did not go well. Kozyrev said he had been "disempowered" to discuss military questions and that Defense Minister Grachev had been instructed "not to give an inch" on greater military action in Bosnia. Kozyrev suggested that you be in direct touch with Yeltsin. The message at Tab A:

- previews for Yeltsin our plan for an ultimatum to Pale threatening a NATO air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs move against Gorazde;
- urges Yeltsin to use Russian diplomatic leverage with Pale to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease the attacks that would trigger NATO action; and
- stresses the importance of the Contact Group maintaining a united front in London on Friday.

We may well be in for a rough patch with Moscow over Bosnia. The Russians will not endorse our proposed NATO air campaign. But giving Yeltsin an early advance word of our intention and, just as important, the opportunity to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease and desist, increases the possibility of a muted Russian reaction if we should actually execute the campaign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve / Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2013-0656-M1 (Z.07)

11/5/2019

[2015-0815-M-2, 4.75]

What worked in 94 can
work again - The Serbs
went back on their commitments
to you & to the UN by taking
2 of our safe areas. But they did
out of fear that air attacks would
lead to hostage taking & perhaps a
% of the alliance let them do it.

WHAT WORKED IN 94 CAN
WORK AGAIN - THE SERBS
WENT BACK ON THEIR (COMMITMENTS ?)
TO YOU AND TO THE UN BY TAKING
TWO OF OUR SAFE AREAS. BUT _____
OUT OF FEAR THAT AIR ATTACKS WOULD
LEAD TO HOSTAGE TAKING AND PERHAPS A
% OF THE ALLIANCE LET THEM DO IT

PHOTOCOPIED FROM ORIGINAL HANDWRITING

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
RZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.76)
11/29/2017

What worked in 94 can
work again - The Serbs
went back on their commitments
to you & to the UN by taking
2 of our safe areas. But this was
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M2 (4.77)
11/29/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I HOPE YOU ARE FEELING BETTER AND THAT YOUR RECOVERY CONTINUES TO PROGRESS. I SAW YOUR INTERVIEW ON TELEVISION JULY 18 AND WAS GLAD TO SEE YOU LOOKING HEALTHY.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS REPORTED BACK TO ME ABOUT HIS TALK THURSDAY NIGHT WITH ANDREY KOZYREV IN LONDON. IN LIGHT OF THAT MEETING, THERE ARE SOME THINGS I NEED TO SAY TO YOU DIRECTLY.

IN RECENT DAYS, THE BOSNIAN SERBS' ONSLAUGHTS AGAINST UN SAFE AREAS -- SREBRENICA, ZEPA, GORAZDE, BIHAC AND SARAJEVO -- REFLECT A GENERAL MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY PALE'S FORCES. THIS OFFENSIVE HAS INFLECTED SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, TO STABILITY IN THE BALKANS AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE THUS FAR IGNORED ALL OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THEM TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS, WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS CANNOT GO ON. WORKING WITH OUR OTHER PARTNERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP, WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING PALE A WARNING THAT, IF THE ATTACKS ON GORAZDE CONTINUE, NATO FORCES WILL RESPOND WITH AN INTENSE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY TARGETS. THIS WOULD BE COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE BOSNIAN SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO, INCLUDING USE OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE TO OPEN SECURE ROUTES INTO THE CITY.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF FORCE. THE ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, ARE EITHER MASSIVE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO SHORE UP UNPROFOR OR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR. THE FORMER WOULD, I FEAR, PRODUCE GREATER MILITARIZATION OF THE SITUATION, WHILE THE LATTER COURSE WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE UN'S CREDIBILITY AND TRIGGER A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING AND MASSIVE REFUGEE FLOWS. I FIND EACH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTOCOPIED BY HANDWRITING

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-11-2 (4.78)

11/29/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DANGEROUS SITUATION AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

A HALT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS IS BY FAR THE BEST OUTCOME. BUT THE BOSNIAN SERBS MUST BE PUT ON NOTICE THAT, IF THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, NATO WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTION.

KARADZIC AND HIS CLIQUE APPEAR BENT ON HUMILIATING THE UN AND ALL OF THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND THE U.S., WHO HAVE TRIED SO HARD TO STOP THIS CONFLICT ON TERMS THAT ARE FAIR TO ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN SERB POPULATION. KARADZIC MUST NOT SUCCEED IN DEFYING THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS ACTIONS ARE, IN EFFECT, HOLDING THE SERBIAN POPULATION HOSTAGE FROM REINTEGRATION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

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IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY TOGETHER ON THIS, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MINISTERS KOZYREV AND GRACHEV IN LONDON TO WORK IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE CONTACT GROUP TO MAINTAIN A UNITED STAND.

BORIS, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE THOUGHT HARD ABOUT THE CHOICES FACING US. I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO USING FORCE IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS PERSIST IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UN SAFE AREAS. HOPEFULLY, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN GET THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO DESIST IN THESE ATTACKS SO THAT THE USE OF AIR POWER WILL NOT BE NECESSARY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS QUESTION. IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU BY PHONE, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY

BILL

(END TEXT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. cable	Re: [Letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 595

FOLDER TITLE:

9505587

2014-0837-F
ke3340

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLACKER COQ GRAY HARMON LAKEA PIFER PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 210427Z JUL 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

EO 13526.3.3(b)(1), EO 13526.3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HOPE YOU ARE FEELING BETTER AND THAT YOUR RECOVERY CONTINUES TO
PROGRESS. I SAW YOUR INTERVIEW ON TELEVISION JULY 18 AND WAS GLAD
TO SEE YOU LOOKING HEALTHY.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS REPORTED BACK TO ME ABOUT HIS TALK THURSDAY
NIGHT WITH ANDREY KOZYREV IN LONDON. IN LIGHT OF THAT MEETING,
THERE ARE SOME THINGS I NEED TO SAY TO YOU DIRECTLY.

IN RECENT DAYS, THE BOSNIAN SERBS' ONSLAUGHTS AGAINST UN SAFE AREAS
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GENERAL MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY PALE'S FORCES. THIS OFFENSIVE HAS
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SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO, INCLUDING USE OF THE RAPID REACTION
FORCE TO OPEN SECURE ROUTES INTO THE CITY.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

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IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

I FULLY UNDERSTAND RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF FORCE. THE ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, ARE EITHER MASSIVE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO SHORE UP UNPROFOR OR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR. THE FORMER WOULD, I FEAR, PRODUCE GREATER MILITARIZATION OF THE SITUATION, WHILE THE LATTER COURSE WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE UN'S CREDIBILITY AND TRIGGER A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING AND MASSIVE REFUGEE FLOWS. I FIND EACH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

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A HALT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS IS BY FAR THE BEST OUTCOME. BUT THE BOSNIAN SERBS MUST BE PUT ON NOTICE THAT, IF THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, NATO WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTION.

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IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS QUESTION. IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU BY PHONE, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#6483


NNNN
<MSGID> M1774428

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
July 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin regarding Bosnia.

Background

Secretary Christopher reports that his discussions with Foreign Minister Kozyrev this evening in London did not go well. Kozyrev said he had been "disempowered" to discuss military questions and that Defense Minister Grachev had been instructed "not to give an inch" on greater military action in Bosnia. Kozyrev suggested that you be in direct touch with Yeltsin. The message at Tab A:

- previews for Yeltsin our plan for an ultimatum to Pale threatening a NATO air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs move against Gorazde;
- urges Yeltsin to use Russian diplomatic leverage with Pale to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease the attacks that would trigger NATO action; and
- stresses the importance of the Contact Group maintaining a united front in London on Friday.

We may well be in for a rough patch with Moscow over Bosnia. The Russians will not endorse our proposed NATO air campaign. But giving Yeltsin an early advance word of our intention and, just as important, the opportunity to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease and desist, increases the possibility of a muted Russian reaction if we should actually execute the campaign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2013-0656-M (2.07)
8/28/2017
[2015-0815-M-2, 4.50]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5587

July 20, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *CB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia

The memorandum to the President at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to Yeltsin regarding Bosnia. In order to have a chance of affecting the approach that Kozyrev and Grachev take in London tomorrow, the message must go tonight.

Concurrence by: Alexander Vershbow *AV*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

V2 2015-0815-01-2 (4.81)

1/29/2017

PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-0815-11-2 (4,57)

11/24/2017

CONFIDENTIAL

DANGEROUS SITUATION AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

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WITH WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY

BILL

(END TEXT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

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DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

12/21/15-0815-11-2 (4,83)

11/24/2017

CONFIDENTIAL

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BE PUT ON
NOTICE

BE ABLE TO HELP DEFUSE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

A HALT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS IS BY FAR THE BEST OUTCOME. BUT THE BOSNIAN SERBS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT, IF THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, NATO WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTION.

KARADZIC AND HIS CLIQUE APPEAR BENT ON HUMILIATING THE UN AND ALL OF THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND THE U.S., WHO HAVE TRIED SO HARD TO STOP THIS CONFLICT ON TERMS THAT ARE FAIR TO ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN SERB POPULATION. KARADZIC MUST NOT SUCCEED IN DEFYING THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS ACTIONS ARE, IN EFFECT, HOLDING THE SERBIAN POPULATION HOSTAGE FROM REINTEGRATION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE EARLY WITH YOU ON THIS QUESTION, NOT JUST TO SEEK YOUR HELP WITH PALE, BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION. OUR PRACTICE OF CONSULTING PROMPTLY AND OF AVOIDING SURPRISES IS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING SENSITIVE ISSUES LIKE THE ONE WE CURRENTLY FACE IN BOSNIA.

IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY TOGETHER ON THIS, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MINISTERS KOZYREV AND GRACHEV IN LONDON TO WORK IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE CONTACT GROUP TO MAINTAIN A UNITED STAND.

BORIS, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE THOUGHT HARD ABOUT THE CHOICES FACING US. I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO USING FORCE IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS PERSIST IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UN SAFE AREAS. HOPEFULLY, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN GET THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO DESIST IN THESE ATTACKS SO THAT THE USE OF AIR POWER WILL NOT BE NECESSARY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS QUESTION. IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I AM PREPARED ~~AND WOULD LIKE~~ TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU BY PHONE, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY

BILL

(END TEXT)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Followup Message to Yeltsin on Bosnia (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001b. draft	Draft cable, re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] (1 page)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001c. cable	Re: [Letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001d. draft	Draft cable, re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] (1 page)	07/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 596

FOLDER TITLE:

9505725

2014-0837-F

ke3341

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
July 24, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Follow up Message to Yeltsin on Bosnia

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin on Bosnia following up on your July 20 message and taking account of the London conference.

Background

You wrote Yeltsin on July 20 on the need for the international community to stop the Bosnian Serb attacks on safe areas (Tab B). Russian Ministers Kozyrev and Grachev did not endorse our proposal for possible NATO air strikes at the London conference but generally took a cooperative approach and agreed on the need for the Bosnian Serbs to cease their attacks. (Both subsequently told the press that Russia had not joined in supporting an air campaign and expressed doubts about such a course of action.)

Yeltsin -- who left the hospital for rest at a sanitarium -- instructed Kozyrev to fly to Belgrade today to urge Milosevic to rein in the Bosnian Serbs. Kozyrev wrote Chris that Moscow was also using other channels to press the Bosnian Serbs.

We believe a short message to Yeltsin could usefully underscore several points: the need for decisive action if the Bosnian Serbs do not cease their attacks; appreciation for Russia's cooperative approach in London, despite reservations on use of air power; and your hope that Moscow will succeed in convincing the Serbs to defuse the situation. We have also added a short paragraph welcoming progress in the Russian-Chechen negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Follow up Message to Yeltsin
- Tab B July 20 Presidential Message to Yeltsin

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PER E.O. 13526
V2 2015-0815-M-2 (4.84)
11/29/2017

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF YOUR RELEASE FROM THE HOSPITAL. I HOPE THAT YOUR GOOD PROGRESS CONTINUES.

I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IN LONDON LAST FRIDAY REGARDING NEXT STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE BOSNIAN CRISIS. I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS YOU HAD COMING INTO THE CONFERENCE. YOU AND I SHARE A STRONG DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TOGETHER, AND WITH OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONTACT GROUP, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF THE FIGHTING AND TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND BILL PERRY HAVE REPORTED TO ME THAT THEY HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH ANDREY KOZYREV AND PAVEL GRACHEV. I AM PLEASED WITH THE COOPERATIVE APPROACH THAT YOUR MINISTERS TOOK IN LONDON, DESPITE RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF AIR POWER.

THE KEY NOW IS TO PREVENT A BOSNIAN SERB ASSAULT ON GORAZDE AND STOP THEIR ASSAULTS ON OTHER SAFE AREAS. LIKE YOU, WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN THIS EFFORT. BUT, IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS CONTINUE THEIR ONSLAUGHT, WE MUST STOP THEM FROM PLUNGING THE REGION INTO A WIDER WAR.

BORIS, IT IS CRITICAL AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT THE SERBIAN LEADERS, IN BELGRADE AS WELL AS PALE, UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE IN EARNEST. I KNOW THAT ANDREY IS OFF TO BELGRADE TO MAKE THIS CLEAR. I'M SURE HE WILL CONVEY TO THE SERB LEADERSHIP A STRONG MESSAGE FOLLOWING THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND IMPRESS UPON THEM THE DANGERS OF A WIDER WAR AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE WISH HIM WELL WITH THIS CRITICAL MISSION.

ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, I AM ENCOURAGED BY REPORTS THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS CLOSER TO ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA. I WISH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE DAYS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

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VZ 2015-0815-11-2 (4.85)

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11/24/2017

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cable	Re: [Letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 596

FOLDER TITLE:

9505725

2014-0837-F
ke3341

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, COMM, DOHSE, FUERTH, HALL, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG,
SIT., BLACKER, COQ, GRAY, HARMON, LAKEA, PIFER, PRIVACY_OUT, SIGLER, SUM, SUM2

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:210427Z JUL 95

FM: WHITE HOUSE

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

////

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HOPE YOU ARE FEELING BETTER AND THAT YOUR RECOVERY CONTINUES TO
PROGRESS. I SAW YOUR INTERVIEW ON TELEVISION JULY 18 AND WAS GLAD
TO SEE YOU LOOKING HEALTHY.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS REPORTED BACK TO ME ABOUT HIS TALK THURSDAY
NIGHT WITH ANDREY KOZYREV IN LONDON. IN LIGHT OF THAT MEETING,
THERE ARE SOME THINGS I NEED TO SAY TO YOU DIRECTLY.

IN RECENT DAYS, THE BOSNIAN SERBS' ONSLAUGHTS AGAINST UN SAFE AREAS
-- SREBRENICA, ZEPA, GORAZDE, BIHAC AND SARAJEVO -- REFLECT A
GENERAL MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY PALE'S FORCES. THIS OFFENSIVE HAS
INFLECTED SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, TO STABILITY IN
THE BALKANS AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE THUS FAR IGNORED ALL OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE
THEM TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS, WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED BY UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS CANNOT GO ON. WORKING WITH OUR
OTHER PARTNERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP, WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING PALE
A WARNING THAT, IF THE ATTACKS ON GORAZDE CONTINUE, NATO FORCES WILL
RESPOND WITH AN INTENSE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY
TARGETS. THIS WOULD BE COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE BOSNIAN
SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO, INCLUDING USE OF THE RAPID REACTION
FORCE TO OPEN SECURE ROUTES INTO THE CITY.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

SECRET

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VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.86)
11/29/2017

SECRET

I FULLY UNDERSTAND RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF FORCE. THE ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, ARE EITHER MASSIVE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO SHORE UP UNPROFOR OR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR. THE FORMER WOULD, I FEAR, PRODUCE GREATER MILITARIZATION OF THE SITUATION, WHILE THE LATTER COURSE WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE UN'S CREDIBILITY AND TRIGGER A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING AND MASSIVE REFUGEE FLOWS. I FIND EACH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

BORIS, I ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN TRYING TO PERSUADE PALE TO STOP ITS ASSAULTS ON THE SAFE AREAS, INCLUDING GORAZDE AND SARAJEVO. WHEN WE WERE AT A SIMILARLY CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN FEBRUARY 1994, RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY PROVED KEY IN PERSUADING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO CEASE THEIR ATTACKS, AVERTING THE USE OF NATO AIR POWER. WE HOPE YOU WILL AGAIN IN THIS INSTANCE BE ABLE TO HELP DEFUSE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

A HALT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS IS BY FAR THE BEST OUTCOME. BUT THE BOSNIAN SERBS MUST BE PUT ON NOTICE THAT, IF THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, NATO WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTION.

KARADZIC AND HIS CLIQUE APPEAR BENT ON HUMILIATING THE UN AND ALL OF THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND THE U.S., WHO HAVE TRIED SO HARD TO STOP THIS CONFLICT ON TERMS THAT ARE FAIR TO ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN SERB POPULATION. KARADZIC MUST NOT SUCCEED IN DEFYING THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS ACTIONS ARE, IN EFFECT, HOLDING THE SERBIAN POPULATION HOSTAGE FROM REINTEGRATION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE EARLY WITH YOU ON THIS QUESTION, NOT JUST TO SEEK YOUR HELP WITH PALE, BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION. OUR PRACTICE OF CONSULTING PROMPTLY AND OF AVOIDING SURPRISES IS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING SENSITIVE ISSUES LIKE THE ONE WE CURRENTLY FACE IN BOSNIA.

IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY TOGETHER ON THIS, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MINISTERS KOZYREV AND GRACHEV IN LONDON TO WORK IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE CONTACT GROUP TO MAINTAIN A UNITED STAND.

BORIS, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE THOUGHT HARD ABOUT THE CHOICES FACING US. I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO USING FORCE IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS PERSIST IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UN SAFE AREAS. HOPEFULLY, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN GET THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO DESIST IN THESE ATTACKS SO THAT THE USE OF AIR POWER WILL NOT BE NECESSARY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS QUESTION. IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU BY PHONE, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SECRET

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SECRET

SINCERELY

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#6483

NNNN

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>6483

<^TOR>950721003412 M1774428

FROM:
SITREPT

SECRET
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF YOUR RELEASE FROM THE HOSPITAL. I HOPE THAT YOUR GOOD PROGRESS CONTINUES.

I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IN LONDON LAST FRIDAY REGARDING NEXT STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE BOSNIAN CRISIS. I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS YOU HAD COMING INTO THE CONFERENCE. YOU AND I SHARE A STRONG DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TOGETHER, AND WITH OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONTACT GROUP, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF THE FIGHTING AND TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND BILL PERRY HAVE REPORTED TO ME THAT THEY HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH ANDREY KOZYREV AND PAVEL GRACHEV. I AM PLEASED WITH THE COOPERATIVE APPROACH THAT YOUR MINISTERS TOOK IN LONDON, DESPITE RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF AIR POWER.

THE KEY NOW IS TO PREVENT A BOSNIAN SERB ASSAULT ON GORAZDE AND STOP THEIR ASSAULTS ON OTHER SAFE AREAS. LIKE YOU, WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN THIS EFFORT. BUT, IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS CONTINUE THEIR ONSLAUGHT, WE MUST STOP THEM FROM PLUNGING THE REGION INTO A WIDER WAR.

BORIS, IT IS CRITICAL AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT THE SERBIAN LEADERS, IN BELGRADE AS WELL AS PALE, UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE IN EARNEST. I KNOW THAT ANDREY IS OFF TO BELGRADE TO MAKE THIS CLEAR. I'M SURE HE WILL CONVEY TO THE SERB LEADERSHIP A STRONG MESSAGE FOLLOWING THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND IMPRESS UPON THEM THE DANGERS OF A WIDER WAR AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE WISH HIM WELL WITH THIS CRITICAL MISSION.

ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, I AM ENCOURAGED BY REPORTS THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS CLOSE^R TO ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA. ~~IN ADDITION TO BEING DESIRABLE FOR OTHER REASONS, THIS OUTCOME WOULD GREATLY HELP THE CAUSE OF U.S. RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.~~ I WISH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE DAYS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

✓
VZ 7015-0815-11-2 (4,87)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Letter from Yeltsin on Bosnia (1 page)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001c. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001d. cable	Re: [Letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 597

FOLDER TITLE:

9505767

2014-0837-F
 ke3342

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5767
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8-4-95

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

95 AUG 3 P2:17

August 2, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from Yeltsin on Bosnia

2/1/ The Russian Ambassador delivered a July 25 letter from Yeltsin (Tab A) responding to your July 20 message on Bosnia (Tab B). Yeltsin expresses appreciation for your desire to consult and avoid surprises and stresses the importance of Contact Group unity. He expresses concern about the possibility of air strikes, which he asserts would escalate the fighting and make a return to the negotiating table more difficult. Yeltsin closes by noting that he has dispatched Foreign Minister Kozyrev to Belgrade in order "to defuse" the situation and expresses the hope that NATO will not take military action in the coming days.

Yeltsin's response is about what we anticipated. Just as Kozyrev and Defense Minister Grachev in London would not endorse use of NATO air power neither will Yeltsin. We will not be able to prevent Russian public posturing against NATO action. On the positive side, however, Yeltsin acknowledges your effort to consult closely and the importance of preventing rifts between us. The London conference set Kozyrev up in Belgrade to play good cop to our bad cop, and we will have to see what came from his efforts (he apparently is now back in Moscow).

The next step with Yeltsin is a phone call from you; we have put forward a schedule proposal.

Attachments

- Tab A July 25 Letter from Yeltsin
- Tab B Your July 20 Message to Yeltsin

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PER E.O. 13526
VL 2015-0895-M-2 (4.99)
11/29/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPIED CONFIDENTIAL WRITING

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
July 25, 1995

Dear Bill:

I have carefully studied your message on the most urgent issue of today's world politics - on ceasing bloodshed in Bosnia.

I appreciate your strong desire to consult, to avoid surprises, to work jointly. There is no other way. In the face of the most difficult situation in Bosnia it is only the unity of the Contact Group and of all international community which gives us the chance to find a solution.

Upon my instructions Ministers Kozyrev and Grachev have presented in London our vision of the situation. Just like you I am deeply worried by its taking a sharp turn for the worse and I have been analyzing all possible options for our further steps. I will say frankly: a military alternative cannot be acceptable for us. Everything within our capabilities should be done to keep the settlement process on the political track.

There still exists space for jointly promoting a plan for a peaceful way out of the Yugoslav crisis, first of all through realization of the proposals of the Contact Group. These considerations are behind our proposal to, in the interests of preserving the unity of the Contact Group, create an ad hoc negotiating "troika" composed of representatives of the EU, Russia, and the US.

This is how I see the strategy of our joint actions at this crucial moment: the earliest possible starting of negotiations between the warring sides on the basis of the Contact Group plan and implementing the formula of recognition of Bosnia by Belgrade in return for suspending part of the sanctions.

Until we finally prevail in launching direct dialogue between Sarajevo and Pale, bloodshed will not stop there. Moreover in this process we need Mr. Milosevic who actively works with the Bosnian Serbs.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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Declassified per E.O. 13526
Y2 2015-0815-M-2 (4A0)
4/19/2018

Another scenario - massive airstrikes and engagement of the Rapid Reaction Force. I believe that in this case the Croats will not stay aside either and would start military operations in the Krajina.

Thus we shall have a war of all against all, and this means a large scale troop deployment to save the UNPROFOR. And who will be responsible then for the loss of life in the peace-keeping force? Besides, how shall we then bring the sides to the negotiating table?

In order to defuse the current critical situation I am sending Minister Kozyrev to Belgrade. I will inform you of my further thinking upon his return. I hope that in the coming days there will be no military action by NATO undertaken in Bosnia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ Д. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Я внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием по самому срочному на сегодня вопросу мировой политики — прекращению кровопролития в Боснии.

Ценю твой твердый настрой советоваться, избегать неожиданностей, работать совместно. Другого пути нет. Перед лицом тяжелейшей ситуации в Боснии только единство контактной группы, да и всего мирового сообщества дает шанс найти выход.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Declassified per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.91)
4/19/2018

Другой сценарий - массированные авиаудары и применение сил быстрого реагирования. Думаю, что в этом случае в стороне не останутся и хорваты, начав военные действия в Краине.

Получим войну всех против всех, а значит крупномасштабное развертывание войск с целью спасения СООНО. Кто тогда будет нести ответственность за потери миротворческих сил? Кроме того, как тогда привести стороны за стол переговоров?

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С уважением,

Б. ЕЛЫЦИН

25 июля 1995 года
г. Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. cable	Re: [Letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 597

FOLDER TITLE:

9505767

2014-0837-F
ke3342

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SECRET

TAB B

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, COMM, DOHSE, FUERTH, HALL, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG,
SIT:, BLACKER, COQ, GRAY, HARMON, LAKEA, PIFER, PRIVACY_OUT, SIGLER, SUM, SUM2

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:210427Z JUL 95

FM: WHITE HOUSE

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.92)
11/29/2017

////

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HOPE YOU ARE FEELING BETTER AND THAT YOUR RECOVERY CONTINUES TO
PROGRESS. I SAW YOUR INTERVIEW ON TELEVISION JULY 18 AND WAS GLAD
TO SEE YOU LOOKING HEALTHY.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS REPORTED BACK TO ME ABOUT HIS TALK THURSDAY
NIGHT WITH ANDREY KOZYREV IN LONDON. IN LIGHT OF THAT MEETING,
THERE ARE SOME THINGS I NEED TO SAY TO YOU DIRECTLY.

IN RECENT DAYS, THE BOSNIAN SERBS' ONSLAUGHTS AGAINST UN SAFE AREAS
-- SREBRENICA, ZEPA, GORAZDE, BIHAC AND SARAJEVO -- REFLECT A
GENERAL MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY PALE'S FORCES. THIS OFFENSIVE HAS
INFLECTED SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, TO STABILITY IN
THE BALKANS AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE THUS FAR IGNORED ALL OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE
THEM TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS, WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED BY UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS CANNOT GO ON. WORKING WITH OUR
OTHER PARTNERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP, WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING PALE
A WARNING THAT, IF THE ATTACKS ON GORAZDE CONTINUE, NATO FORCES WILL
RESPOND WITH AN INTENSE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY
TARGETS. THIS WOULD BE COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE BOSNIAN
SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO, INCLUDING USE OF THE RAPID REACTION
FORCE TO OPEN SECURE ROUTES INTO THE CITY.

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

I FULLY UNDERSTAND RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF FORCE. THE ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, ARE EITHER MASSIVE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO SHORE UP UNPROFOR OR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR. THE FORMER WOULD, I FEAR, PRODUCE GREATER MILITARIZATION OF THE SITUATION, WHILE THE LATTER COURSE WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE UN'S CREDIBILITY AND TRIGGER A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING AND MASSIVE REFUGEE FLOWS. I FIND EACH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

BORIS, I ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN TRYING TO PERSUADE PALE TO STOP ITS ASSAULTS ON THE SAFE AREAS, INCLUDING GORAZDE AND SARAJEVO. WHEN WE WERE AT A SIMILARLY CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN FEBRUARY 1994, RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY PROVED KEY IN PERSUADING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO CEASE THEIR ATTACKS, AVERTING THE USE OF NATO AIR POWER. WE HOPE YOU WILL AGAIN IN THIS INSTANCE BE ABLE TO HELP DEFUSE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

A HALT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS IS BY FAR THE BEST OUTCOME. BUT THE BOSNIAN SERBS MUST BE PUT ON NOTICE THAT, IF THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, NATO WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTION.

KARADZIC AND HIS CLIQUE APPEAR BENT ON HUMILIATING THE UN AND ALL OF THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND THE U.S., WHO HAVE TRIED SO HARD TO STOP THIS CONFLICT ON TERMS THAT ARE FAIR TO ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN SERB POPULATION. KARADZIC MUST NOT SUCCEED IN DEFYING THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS ACTIONS ARE, IN EFFECT, HOLDING THE SERBIAN POPULATION HOSTAGE FROM REINTEGRATION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE EARLY WITH YOU ON THIS QUESTION, NOT JUST TO SEEK YOUR HELP WITH PALE, BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION. OUR PRACTICE OF CONSULTING PROMPTLY AND OF AVOIDING SURPRISES IS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING SENSITIVE ISSUES LIKE THE ONE WE CURRENTLY FACE IN BOSNIA.

IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY TOGETHER ON THIS, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MINISTERS KOZYREV AND GRACHEV IN LONDON TO WORK IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE CONTACT GROUP TO MAINTAIN A UNITED STAND.

BORIS, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE THOUGHT HARD ABOUT THE CHOICES FACING US. I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO USING FORCE IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS PERSIST IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UN SAFE AREAS. HOPEFULLY, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN GET THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO DESIST IN THESE ATTACKS SO THAT THE USE OF AIR POWER WILL NOT BE NECESSARY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS QUESTION. IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL, I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU BY PHONE, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

SINCERELY

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#6483

NNNN

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>6483

<^TOR>950721003412 M1774428

FROM:
SITREPT

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001.-letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002a.-letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002b.-letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 597

FOLDER TITLE:

9505772

2014-0837-F
 ke3343

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 25 » ИЮЛЯ 19 95 г.

Пр-1004
№ _____

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Я внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием по самому срочному на сегодня вопросу мировой политики - прекращению кровопролития в Боснии.

Ценю твой твердый настрой советоваться, избегать неожиданностей, работать совместно. Другого пути нет. Перед лицом тяжелейшей ситуации в Боснии только единство Контактной группы, да и всего мирового сообщества дает шанс найти выход.

Министры Козырев и Грачев по моему поручению изложили в Лондоне наше видение ситуации. Как и ты, я глубоко обеспокоен ее резким ухудшением и обдумывал все варианты наших дальнейших шагов. Прямо скажу - силовая альтернатива нас не может устроить. Нужно сделать все, что в наших силах, чтобы удержать процесс урегулирования в политическом русле.

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г. Вашингтон

Delivered to Mr. Clinton

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Стратегию наших совместных действий в этот критический момент вижу в следующем: скорейшее начало переговоров между враждующими сторонами на основе плана КГ и реализация формулы признания Боснии и Герцеговины со стороны Белграда за приостановку части санкций.

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Другой сценарий - массированные авиаудары и применение сил быстрого реагирования. Думаю, что в этом случае в стороне не останутся и хорваты, начав военные действия в Краине.

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С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

URGENT

PLEASE STAY

to Steve Pifer



5772

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin

July 25, 1995

Dear Bill:

I have carefully studied your message on the most urgent issue of today's world politics - on ceasing bloodshed in Bosnia.

I appreciate your strong desire to consult, to avoid surprises, to work jointly. There is no other way. In the face of the most difficult situation in Bosnia it is only the unity of the Contact Group and of all international community which gives us the chance to find a solution.

Upon my instructions Ministers Kozyrev and Grachev have presented in London our vision of the situation. Just like you I am deeply worried by its taking a sharp turn for the worse and I have been analyzing all possible options for our further steps. I will say frankly: a military alternative cannot be acceptable for us. Everything within our capabilities should be done to keep the settlement process on the political track.

There still exists space for jointly promoting a plan for a peaceful way out of the Yugoslav crisis, first of all through realization of the proposals of the Contact Group. These considerations are behind our proposal to, in the interests of preserving the unity of the Contact Group, create an ad hoc negotiating "troika" composed of representatives of the EU, Russia, and the US.

This is how I see the strategy of our joint actions at this crucial moment: the earliest possible starting of negotiations between the warring sides on the basis of the Contact Group plan and implementing the formula of recognition of Bosnia by Belgrade in return for suspending part of the sanctions.

Until we finally prevail in launching direct dialogue between Sarajevo and Pale, bloodshed will not stop there. Moreover in this process we need Mr. Milosevic who actively works with the Bosnian Serbs.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Declassified per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.94)
4/19/2018

Another scenario - massive airstrikes and engagement of the Rapid Reaction Force. I believe that in this case the Croats will not stay aside either and would start military operations in the Krajina.

Thus we shall have a war of all against all, and this means a large scale troop deployment to save the UNPROFOR. And who will be responsible then for the loss of life in the peace-keeping force? Besides, how shall we then bring the sides to the negotiating table?

In order to defuse the current critical situation I am sending Minister Kozyrev to Belgrade. I will inform you of my further thinking upon his return. I hope that in the coming days there will be no military action by NATO undertaken in Bosnia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

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Declassified per E.O. 13526
v2 2015-0815-m-2 (4.95)
4/19/2018

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С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

25 июля 1995 года
г.Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: July 26 Yeltsin Letter on Bosnia (2 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	07/26/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001e. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (3 pages)	07/26/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 597

FOLDER TITLE:

9505794

2014-0837-F
 ke3344

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

7/29/95

INFORMATION

July 27, 1995 JUL 27 P12:32

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: July 26 Yeltsin Letter on Bosnia

The Russian Embassy late on July 26 delivered a second message from Yeltsin on Bosnia (Tab A). It reports on the results of Kozyrev's discussions in Belgrade with Milosevic and Mladic. As expected, Kozyrev played good cop against the backdrop of threatened NATO air strikes. His goal clearly was to find a way to defuse the situation and avoid NATO use of force, just as the Russians did after NATO's February 1994 ultimatum. Kozyrev brought back a package containing some interesting elements -- provided the Bosnian Serbs are prepared to carry through.

The Serbs promised "to stay away from Gorazde and not undertake offensive actions in the Sarajevo region." Mladic asked for -- and the Russians apparently have agreed to -- a Russian UNPROFOR contingent in Gorazde, which may give the Bosnian Serbs political cover for not attacking. The Bosnian Serbs indicated they were prepared to open a road and utilities to Sarajevo, allow humanitarian convoys into Gorazde and apply similar steps to Bihać. They conditioned this, however, on the Bosnian Muslims showing restraint, offering a ready escape clause.

The Bosnian Serbs said they were ready to sign a cease-fire, which would be negotiated by Bosnian commanders with the participation of Contact Group military representatives. This could be hard to sell to the Bosnian government, absent a credible sign of Serb readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group plan.

Finally, Yeltsin joins with the UK and France in pressing us to endorse the Bildt plan. Among other things, it would offer Belgrade partial sanctions relief, which the Russians believe would help engage Milosevic to lean on Pale. (It also would play well to Yeltsin's domestic audience.) We still have substantive reservations about the Bildt plan, and the Bosnian government has thus far rejected it. We have, however, told the Contact Group that we are prepared to work to improve the package.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

✓ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.96)
11/29/2017

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

All in all, the Russians appear to be trying, within their constraints. The key question remains, however, how much of what Kozyrev heard the Serbs say are they actually prepared to deliver.

Attachment

Tab A July 26 Yeltsin Letter on Bosnia

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Translated from Russian

Dear Bill,

The latest events in Bosnia - the Government's refusal to extend the truce, active offensive actions by the Muslims in the Sarajevo area and counter-attacks against the safe areas by the Bosnian Serbs have sharply aggravated the situation in this region. Escalation of the conflict entered, so to say, the second round and we are discussing once again the issues of Gorazde, Sarajevo and Bihac.

I believe, and it was proved at the London meeting of the Ministers for foreign affairs, defense and Chiefs of general staff, that the Contact Group members achieved an understanding as regards the main issue - stable peace in the Balkans can be reached only through political means.

I am convinced that we will manage to put an end to this conflict, the most difficult and bloody in the post-war Europe, if we succeed in preserving the unity of the Contact Group, and not slide in the direction of the logic of force in the settlement, which will only throw back this process.

With the aim of preventing the development of the worst military scenario in Bosnia, I sent to Belgrade the Minister for foreign affairs Mr.Kozyrev who has met with Milosevic, the higher military authorities of FRY and with General Mladic. The overall result of the discussions - the chance to improve the situation exists.

I. The Serbs promised us to stay away from Gorazde and not to undertake offensive actions in the Sarajevo region. Mladic is asking that a part of the Russian UNPROFOR contingent be deployed in the Gorazde enclave as a "precaution". We insist that in this case additional units of other countries should be sent there. We are aware of such intention on the part of France.

His Excellency

William J.CLINTON

President of the United States of America

Washington, DC

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Declassified per E.O. 13526
v2 2015-0815-M-2 (4,97)
4/19/2018

I regard as important the readiness of Pale to keep open the road from Sarajevo to Kiseljac, to resume supplies of natural gas, electricity and water to the Bosnian capital. In principle we also agreed on humanitarian convoys to Gorazde, one of the options here being their passage through the territory of Serbia. All this could be implemented should the Muslim side display similar restraint, having renounced offensive actions.

This is fully applicable to the Bihac enclave. Here the Bosnian Serbs particularly complained about the presence of regular troops of the Croatian army.

2. The Bosnian Serbs declare their readiness to proceed with signing an agreement on ceasing hostilities throughout the whole territory of Bosnia. Solution to this issue could be searched through starting direct negotiations of commanders of the armies in conflict with participation of high-level military representatives of the Contact Group. Thus it would become possible to clear the obstacles for political process and prepare for negotiations on the basis of the peace plan of the Contact Group. Mr.Mladic agrees with this idea and could put forward an initiative to this effect. Should there be a positive response to such a proposal, the Bosnian Serbs will immediately renounce the blockade of the Sarajevo airport.

3. We became convinced that the influence of Belgrade upon the Bosnian Serbs and in the first place upon their military will grow if we take a decisive step - that is support the plan of Mr.Bildt, which provides for recognition of Bosnia and suspension of part of sanctions against Belgrade. I regard this as the key issue, as a turning point towards comprehensive settlement. If we are striving to provide for peace in Bosnia and a just territorial partition between the two entities - the Muslim-Croat and the Serb - at the ratio of 51/49, we should not procrastinate any more the adoption of the Bildt document, which accumulates all our achievements.

4. If we act in accordance with such a plan then we may soon be able to arrive at direct dialogue between Pale and Sarajevo, in which Mr.Milosevic will be our active ally.

We undertake to go to the end of our part of the road in working with the Serbs. I expect our partners to act likewise in putting pressure on Sarajevo.

I am sending similar messages to leaders of all Contact Group countries.

Sincerely,

BORIS

July 26, 1995
Moscow, the Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Последние события в Боснии – отказ правительства БИГ продолжить перемирие, активные наступательные действия мусульман в районе Сараево и ответные нападения боснийских сербов на зоны безопасности резко обострили ситуацию в этом районе. Эскалация конфликта пошла как бы по второму кругу, вновь говорим о Горажде, Сараево, Бихаче.

Думаю, а лондонская встреча министров иностранных дел, обороны и начальников генеральных штабов подтверждает это, что члены контактной группы согласны в главном – добиться устойчивого мира на Балканах можно лишь политическими средствами.

Уверен, что если удастся сохранить единство КГ, не ска- титься на путь силовой логики в урегулировании, которая лишь отбро- сит этот процесс, мы сможем добиться прекращения этого самого тяжелого и кровопролитного конфликта в послевоенной Европе.

Для того, чтобы предотвратить развитие событий в Боснии по самому худшему военному сценарию, я направил в Белград министра иностранных дел Козырева, который встретился с Милошевичем, высшим военным руководством СРЮ, а также генералом Младичем. Общий итог дискуссий – шанс на улучшение обстановки есть.

1. Сербы обещали нам не трогать Горажде и не предпринимать наступательных действий в районе Сараево. Для "надежности" Младич просит разместить в анклав Горажде часть персонала рос- сийского контингента СООНО. Мы настаиваем, чтобы в таком случае туда были направлены дополнительные подразделения других стран. Нам известно, что такое намерение высказывала Франция.

Важным считаю готовность Пале держать открытой дорогу Сараево – Киселяк, возобновить снабжение боснийской столицы газом, электричеством и водой. В принципе договорились и о гуманитарных

конвоях в Горажде, причем как вариант, можно использовать для их проводки территорию Сербии. Все это можно реализовать, если такую же сдержанность проявит и мусульманская сторона, отказавшись от наступательных действий.

В полной мере это относится и к анклаву Бихач. Здесь боснийские сербы особенно жаловались на присутствие регулярных сил хорватской армии.

2. Боснийские сербы заявляют о своей готовности пойти на подписание соглашения о прекращении враждебных действий по всей территории Боснии. Поискать решение этого вопроса можно было бы, начав прямые переговоры командующих противоборствующих армий с участием высокопоставленных военных КГ. Таким образом удалось бы расчистить завалы в политическом процессе и подготовить переговоры на базе мирного плана КГ. Младич с этой идеей согласен и мог бы выступить с соответствующей инициативой. При наличии позитивного ответа на такое предложение боснийские сербы сразу откажутся от блокады сараевского аэродрома.

3. Убедились, что влияние Белграда на боснийских сербов и прежде всего на их военных будет нарастать, если мы сделаем решительный шаг – поддержим план К.Бильдта, предусматривающий признание БИГ и приостановку части санкций в отношении Белграда. Считаю это ключевым моментом, поворотным пунктом к всеобъемлющему урегулированию. Если мы хотим обеспечить мир в Боснии и справедливый территориальный раздел между двумя образованиями: мусульмано-хорватским и сербским – в пропорции 51/49, мы не должны больше оттягивать принятие документа Бильдта, аккумулирующего все наши наработки.

4. Если будем действовать по такому плану, уже вскоре можем выйти на прямой диалог Пале с Сараево, где нашим активным союзником будет Милошевич.

Берем на себя обязательство пройти свою часть пути, работая с сербами, до конца. Ожидая, что также будут вести дело наши партнеры, нажимая на Сараево.

3.

Послания аналогичного содержания я направляю всем руководителям стран-членов КГ.

С уважением,

БОРИС

26 июля 1995 года
г.Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Letter from President Yeltsin on Bosnia (2 pages)	08/17/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/1072
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. letter	{Duplicate of 001b} (3 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. letter	{Duplicate of 001c} (2 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001e. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

August 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Letter From President Yeltsin On Bosnia

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The Russian Ambassador delivered a letter from Yeltsin (Tab A) on the situation in Bosnia and the urgent need for a negotiated settlement. Yeltsin makes four central points. First, Serb President Milosevic is committed to a political settlement of the crisis, and he supports both the Contact Group peace plan and an immediate cessation of hostilities. Second, the Croats must be warned of any "unreasoned steps" that could render the situation uncontrollable. Third, the Serbs have earned some relief from the sanctions currently in place, and pressures within Russia for a unilateral suspension of the sanctions regime are mounting. Finally, Yeltsin renews his call for a trilateral meeting, most likely under Moscow's auspices, that would bring together Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic, which he links by inference to the convening of a multilateral summit to ratify a Balkan peace settlement.

The letter's rather urgent tone is more striking than the specific points that Yeltsin raises, all of which Kozyrev conveyed to me in our recent meeting in Sochi. Doubtless, at least some of that urgency is genuine: time is of the essence and the Russians are concerned that without immediate action, the situation could radically deteriorate. The call for prompt action and Yeltsin's ominous warnings about a failure to seize the initiative are also designed, however, to ensure a prominent Russian role in the diplomatic efforts currently underway and in the negotiation of any final settlement.

The letter does not require an immediate response, although a phone conversation or a written response from you will be in order once we have evaluated the results of our most recent diplomatic efforts and agreed on next steps.

Attachment
Tab A August 14 Letter from President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-Z (4.44)
11/29/2017

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin

August 14, 1995

Dear Bill:

I have received Mr.Milosevic in Moscow. I regret that Mr.Tudjman refused to meet. He himself has missed a solid opportunity to already now defuse the tense situation between Zagreb and Belgrade. We could have advanced even further: the Serbian leader is ready for that.

Mr.Milosevic has confirmed his commitment to a political settlement of the crisis, his readiness for continued maximum restraint.

Bill, as I understand it, Mr.Kozyrev and Mr.Christopher have had a constructive discussion. The Secretary of State has promised to actively work with the Croats and the Muslims. Mr.Tudjman should be cautioned against any further unreasoned steps. Croatian attacks in Sector East may render the situation uncontrollable. We all should very clearly realize that.

Let me particularly dwell on the refugees issue. My recent statement contains specific measures. I will only add that the "exodus" of the 200,000 desperate Serbs, of which 50,000 are carrying arms, can drastically alter the situation in Bosnia.

Now regarding Bosnia. Belgrade strongly supports the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group, favours an immediate cessation of all hostilities on the Bosnian territory.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, DC

Declassified per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (S.00)
4/19/2018

Naturally, Mr. Milosevic, and he himself has said so, cannot exert influence on Mr. Karadzic now, but he still has some levers of influence on General Mladic and he has promised us to use them. Possibly we could take some steps as well aimed at putting down hostilities on the part of the Serbs. But Sarajevo remains the main obstacle to solving this issue. I am expecting you to carry out appropriate work. While the shooting still continues, the parties will not come to the negotiating table.

Another most important condition for stopping the bloodshed and with it for bringing closer political compromise is solving the sanctions issue. I consider this altogether as a key issue of the settlement. We cannot delay solving this issue any longer. Belgrade has met our conditions. We should withdraw all reservations and act in the light of the efforts made within the Contact Group, by Mr. C. Bildt in particular. This could be of serious help to Mr. Milosevic, would allow him to actively struggle for influence on Mr. Mladic and on the Serbian public opinion on the whole. Then we will be able to persuade Pale to negotiate. The CG peace plan, thus, would serve as a basis and a starting point for the negotiations. Mr. Milosevic has some specific ideas which could play an important role in the search for compromise.

If there is no progress on the sanctions issue we will lose a good chance of settling the conflict. Our peoples will justly put the blame for this on us. To tell you the truth, the pressure in favor of withdrawing from the regime of sanctions, especially against the background of threats to lift the arms embargo, is mounting daily in Russia.

There also remains the objective of achieving a trilateral meeting between Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Milosevic.

I attach particular importance to the proposal which I shared with you and other leaders of the G-8 in Halifax, that is to hold a summit meeting with the participation of the conflicting sides.

I firmly count on preserving the unity of the Contact Group.

It is essential that our two nations act in unison. I welcome your decision to send Mr.Lake for a meeting with Mr.Kozyrev. I am forwarding similar messages to all leaders of the CG member states.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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To ATTACH to
PKG # 6228
RUSSIAN/606454
— TN

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin

August 14, 1995

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His Excellency
William J. Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, DC

Declassified per E.O. 13526
PL 2015-0815-M-2 (S.O.I.)
4/19/2018

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I firmly count on preserving the unity of the Contact Group.

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Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ Д.Б. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Принял в Москве С.Милошевича. Сожалею, что от встречи отказался Ф.Туджман. Он сам упустил верную возможность уже сегодня снять острую напряженность на линии Загреб-Белград. Могли бы двинуться дальше, сербский лидер готов к этому.

С.Милошевич подтвердил приверженность политическому урегулированию кризиса, готовность и дальше проявлять максимальную сдержанность.

Билл, как я понимаю, между А.В.Козыревым и У.Кристофером состоялся конструктивный разговор. Госсекретарь обещал активно поработать с хорватами и мусульманами. Ф.Туджмана надо отвлечь от дальнейших непродуманных шагов. Атаки хорватов в "секторе Восток" могут сделать ситуацию неконтролируемой. Мы все должны отдавать себе в этом отчет.

Отдельно о беженцах. Конкретные меры содержатся в моем заявлении. Добавлю - "исход" 200 тысяч отчаявшихся сербов, из которых 50 тысяч с оружием, может радикально изменить обстановку в Боснии.

Теперь о Боснии. В Белграде твердо поддерживают мирный план контактной группы, выступают за немедленное прекращение всех боевых действий на территории БИГ. Конечно, С.Милошевич, об этом он сказал сам, воздействовать на Р.Караджича сейчас не может, но какое-то влияние на генерала Р.Младича у него остается, и он этим обещал воспользоваться. Возможно и мы смогли бы предпринять шаги, направленные на прекращение враждебных действий со стороны сербов. Но главным препятствием в этом вопросе остается Сараево. Ожидаю, что и вы проведете соответствующую работу. Пока идет перестрелка, за стол переговоров стороны не сядут.

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v2 2015-0815-M-2 (5,02)
4/19/2018

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Другое важнейшее условие прекращения кровопролития, а значит приближения к политической развязке кризиса – решение вопроса о санкциях. Считаю это вообще ключевой проблемой урегулирования. Дальше тянуть с этим нельзя. Белград выполнил наши условия. Надо снимать все оговорки и действовать в ключе тех усилий, которые предпринимаются по линии КГ, в частности, К.Бильдтом. Это было бы серьезной подмогой С.Милошевичу, позволило ему активно побороться за влияние на Р.Младича и сербское общественное мнение в целом. Тогда сможем усадить Пале за стол переговоров. При этом мирный план КГ служил бы основой и исходной точкой переговоров. У С.Милошевича есть конкретные соображения, которые могли бы сыграть важную роль в нахождении развязок.

Если же не будет сдвигов по санкциям, потеряем хороший шанс выхода из конфликта. Наши народы справедливо обвинят в этом нас. Не скрою, в России давление в пользу выхода из режима санкций, особенно на фоне угроз об отмене эмбарго, нарастает с каждым днем.

Остается также задача выйти на трехстороннюю встречу А.Изетбеговича, Ф.Туджмана и С.Милошевича.

Особое значение придаю предложению, которым делился с тобой и другими лидерами "восьмерки" в Галифаксе, о проведении встречи на высшем уровне с участием противоборствующих сторон.

Твердо рассчитываю на сохранение единства КГ. Особо важно, чтобы наши две страны действовали в унисон. Приветствую твое решение направить Э.Лейка для разговора с А.В.Козыревым. Аналогичные послания я направляю всем лидерам государств-членов Контактной группы.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

14 августа 1995 года
г. Москва, Кремль



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 14 » августа 19 95 г.

№ Пр-1100

г. Москва, Кремль

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOSCOPY

Дорогой Билл,

Принял в Москве С.Милошевича. Сожалею, что от встречи отказался Ф.Туджман. Он сам упустил верную возможность уже сегодня снять острую напряженность на линии Загреб-Белград. Могли бы двинуться дальше, сербский лидер готов к этому.

С.Милошевич подтвердил приверженность политическому урегулированию кризиса, готовность и дальше проявлять максимальную сдержанность.

Билл, как я понимаю, между А.В.Козыревым и У.Кристофером состоялся конструктивный разговор. Госсекретарь обещал активно поработать с хорватами и мусульманами. Ф.Туджмана надо отвратить от дальнейших непродуманных шагов. Атаки хорватов в "секторе Восток" могут сделать ситуацию неконтролируемой. Мы все должны отдавать себе в этом отчет.

Отдельно о беженцах. Конкретные меры содержатся в моем заявлении. Добавлю - "исход" 200 тысяч отчаявшихся сербов, из которых 50 тыс. с оружием, может радикально изменить обстановку в Боснии.

Теперь о Боснии. В Белграде твердо поддерживают Мирный план Контактной группы, выступают за немедленное прекращение всех боевых действий на территории БиГ. Конечно, С.Милошевич, об этом он сказал сам, воздействовать на Р.Караджича сейчас не может, но какое-то

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ

влияние на генерала Р.Младича у него остается, и он этим обещал воспользоваться. Возможно и мы смогли бы предпринять шаги, направленные на прекращение враждебных действий со стороны сербов. Но главным препятствием в этом вопросе остается Сараево. Ожидая, что и вы проведете соответствующую работу. Пока идет перестрелка, за стол переговоров стороны не сядут.

Другое важнейшее условие прекращения кровопролития, а значит и приближения к политической развязке кризиса - решение вопроса о санкциях. Считаю это вообще ключевой проблемой урегулирования. Дальше тянуть с этим нельзя. Белград выполнил наши условия. Надо снимать все оговорки и действовать в ключе тех усилий, которые предпринимаются по линии КГ, в частности, К.Бильдтом. Это было бы серьезной подмогой С.Милошевичу, позволило ему активно побороться за влияние на Р.Младича и сербское общественное мнение в целом. Тогда сможем усадить Пале за стол переговоров. При этом Мирный план КГ служил бы основой и исходной точкой переговоров. У С.Милошевича есть конкретные соображения, которые могли бы сыграть важную роль в нахождении развязок.


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С уважением,



Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001- draft	{Draft of 003a} (2 pages)	09/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/15/2022
002- letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
003a- cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] (3 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
003b- memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Yeltsin Letter on Bosnia and Recommended Response (2 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
003c- draft	{Draft of 003a} (2 pages)	09/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
003d- letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
003e- letter	{Duplicate of 002} (1 page)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

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2014-0837-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 7 REGARDING BOSNIA.

I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT. THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING ~~TODAY~~ IN GENEVA WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. THE PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED A SINGLE DOCUMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT ADDRESS THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES. THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR MILESTONE ON THE PATH TO THE SETTLEMENT WE BOTH WANT. *I AM GLAD THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV PARTICIPATED SO USEFULLY.*

OF COURSE, WE SEE TODAY'S MEETING IN GENEVA AS BUT ONE STEP IN A COMPLEX PROCESS. I AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS BROUGHT US THIS FAR DOWN THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS. A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN MISSION WILL HOST THE CONTACT GROUP NEXT WEEK IN GENEVA AND THAT THE NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH THE PARTIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. I AGREE THAT, WHEN WE ARE CLOSE TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO HOLD A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO RATIFY THE RESULTS.

AS WE WORK TOWARDS THESE MEETINGS, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU -- AND TO COOPERATE CLOSELY -- IN PERSUADING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON TODAY IN GENEVA. YOUR WORK ON THIS WITH BELGRADE AND PALE IS CRITICAL, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

I RECOGNIZE YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NATO'S USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS. THIS MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SHELLING OF THE SARAJEVO MARKETPLACE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC 836, WHICH AUTHORIZES UNPROFOR TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO PROTECT THE U.N. SAFE AREAS, AND WITH THE LONDON DECLARATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE LOOKING FOR THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO REMOVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. WHEN THE BOMBING WILL STOP IS IN THE HANDS OF GENERAL MLADIC. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL DO WHAT YOU CAN TO HELP IN THIS REGARD.

ON OUR PART, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE EXPECT THAT THEIR FORCES WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAWALS. THE BOSNIAN COMMANDER, GENERAL DELIC, HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED US THAT THEY WILL RESPECT OUR REQUEST IN THIS REGARD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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11/29/2017

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BORIS, OUR COMMON GOAL, AS YOU NOTE, IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. ~~WE BELIEVE THE MILITARY ACTION UNDERSCORES TO ALL THE PARTIES THE NEED TO CONCLUDE A REASONABLE COMPROMISE.~~

IN PART DUE TO YOUR EFFORTS, SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC HAS ALREADY DISPLAYED A NEW DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN SUPPORTING THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA MEETING AND IN URGING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. LET US WORK TOGETHER TO CONVINCING THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP TO FOLLOW MILOSEVIC'S LEAD AND CHOOSE THE PATH OF PEACE.

I AM ONCE AGAIN GRATEFUL FOR OUR CHANNEL OF FRANK COMMUNICATION. OUR PRACTICE OF TIMELY CONSULTATIONS REMAINS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING CRITICAL ISSUES -- AND ENSURING THAT THEY DO NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR SHARED, LONG-TERM INTEREST IN A STEADY STRENGTHENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OR COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING THE SITUATION WITH YOU ON THE PHONE ~~SOON~~ *WHENEVER YOU WISH.*

WITH WARM REGARDS.

BILL

(END OF TEXT)

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 7 » сентября 19 95 г.

№ Пр-1219

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Ситуация в бывшей Югославии продолжает вызывать у меня серьезное беспокойство.

Ты знаешь, что мы решительно высказались против натовских бомбардировок в БиГ. Однако после непродолжительного затишья они опять возобновились. Тем самым были перечеркнуты все рамки миротворческой операции. Она по существу превратилась в экзекуцию боснийских сербов.

Такое положение считаю недопустимым. Действия авиации НАТО следует немедленно прекратить. В этом твердо рассчитываю на тебя.

Необходимо интенсифицировать мирный процесс.

Направляю в Женеву на заседание Контактной группы первого заместителя Министра иностранных дел И.Иванова. Уверен, что действуя совместно с твоим представителем Р.Холбруком и К.Бильдтом, им удастся ускорить достижение окончательного решения. Речь идет прежде всего о конституционном устройстве БиГ и карте разграничения.

Признателен тебе за поддержку моей инициативы о созыве мирной конференции по Югославии. Динамика подготовки дает реальные основания для ее проведения во второй половине октября.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ


г.Вашингтон

Предлагаю провести конференцию в Москве. На фоне наших разногласий по авиаударам это имело бы большое значение, поскольку подчеркнуло бы единство наших действий. Не скрою, что и предвыборная обстановка в стране требует от меня учитывать напряжение в общественном мнении, вызванное односторонними действиями НАТО.

О конкретной дате конференции мы могли бы договориться позднее.

Аналогичные послания направляю всем лидерам государств - членов Контактной группы.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BLACKER BREMNER CLARKER COQ DAALDER FETIG FLANAGAN HARMON HESLIN I

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 092005Z SEP 95

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

QQQQ

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

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AS WE WORK TOWARDS THESE MEETINGS, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE

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4/17/2018

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PAGE 02 OF 03

CONTACT WITH YOU -- AND TO COOPERATE CLOSELY -- IN PERSUADING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON TODAY IN GENEVA. YOUR WORK ON THIS WITH BELGRADE AND PALE IS CRITICAL, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

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WITH WARM REGARDS,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

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BILL

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END TEXT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6655
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9/9/95

ACTION

September 9, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *TL*

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Letter on Bosnia and Recommended Response

95 SEP 9 12:16

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin regarding Bosnia.

Background

Yeltsin wrote you on September 7 (Tab B). The letter:

- expresses concern about continued NATO air strikes, which Yeltsin calls an "execution" of the Bosnian Serbs and says must be stopped immediately;
- calls for intensifying the peace process, expressing support for the Contact Group and reiterating his proposal for a summit in Moscow on the former Yugoslavia; and
- is explicit about the domestic political pressure he is under, noting that the "pre-election situation" forces him to take account of public concerns over NATO actions.

Yeltsin issued a public statement the same day (Tab C) condemning air strikes and suggesting Russia might reconsider its approach to relations with NATO. Yeltsin escalated the rhetoric in a September 8 press conference. He again forcefully criticized air strikes, lashed out at NATO enlargement -- "a major political blunder" -- and questioned NATO-Russia relations: "NATO is bombing Serbs and we are told to sit at the negotiating table and sign an agreement with NATO. Why should we? What for?"

Moscow took as measured a tone as we could have hoped for during the initial round of NATO air strikes last week. Moreover, the Russians played a constructive role at today's Geneva meeting. But Russian anxieties are increasing with this week's resumption of the air campaign, and Yeltsin is under heavy -- and growing -- domestic political pressure. The Duma will meet in special session on September 9 and is likely to call on the government to review Russian participation in Partnership for Peace, fire Foreign Minister Kozyrev for Russia's "failed diplomacy," and

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY W/IC HANDWRITING
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seek an immediate end to air strikes. The Russians have asked for a UNSC meeting this evening to make their case about UN authority over the air strikes. They have privately indicated they will not seek UNSC action, suggesting the call for the meeting is prompted by tomorrow's Duma session.

We do not believe that Yeltsin wants to break with us or the Contact Group over Bosnia. Nor does he wish to see differences on air strikes spill over into the broader relationship or the question of NATO-Russia relations. But domestic pressures are limiting Yeltsin's freedom to maneuver and could force him to take steps to underscore Russian displeasure that he might otherwise prefer to avoid.

Moreover, Yeltsin seemed genuinely angry at the perception that Russia has been so marginalized as a key European issue is being decided and Russian pleas for NATO restraint go unheeded. His September 8 press conference showed flashes of wounded pride, e.g., when he asked rhetorically why Balkan developments were being "dictated from overseas" rather than handled by Europeans.

The situation in Bosnia is placing a real strain on relations with the Russians, which could impact other issues like the NATO-Russia relationship and affect the tone of your meeting with Yeltsin in October. The response at Tab A will not satisfy Yeltsin on his principal point: we cannot accommodate him on halting the air strikes. But we have tried to emphasize other themes that will strike a more positive chord: our desire to keep working closely with the Russians on the peace track, Moscow's key role with Belgrade and Pale, the difference between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, and the possibility of a high-level meeting to ratify the results of the diplomatic process.

You will likely need to follow this with a phone call next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin
- Tab B September 7 Yeltsin Letter on Bosnia
- Tab C September 7 Yeltsin Public Statement on Bosnia

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AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 7 REGARDING BOSNIA.

I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT. THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN GENEVA WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. THE PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED A SINGLE DOCUMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT ADDRESS THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES. THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR MILESTONE ON THE PATH TO THE SETTLEMENT WE BOTH WANT. I AM GLAD THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV PARTICIPATED SO USEFULLY.

OF COURSE, WE SEE TODAY'S MEETING IN GENEVA AS BUT ONE STEP IN A COMPLEX PROCESS. I AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS BROUGHT US THIS FAR DOWN THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS. A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN MISSION WILL HOST THE CONTACT GROUP NEXT WEEK IN GENEVA AND THAT THE NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH THE PARTIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. I AGREE THAT, WHEN WE ARE CLOSE TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO HOLD A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO RATIFY THE RESULTS.

AS WE WORK TOWARDS THESE MEETINGS, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU -- AND TO COOPERATE CLOSELY -- IN PERSUADING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON TODAY IN GENEVA. YOUR WORK ON THIS WITH BELGRADE AND PALE IS CRITICAL, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

I RECOGNIZE YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NATO'S USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS. THIS MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SHELLING OF THE SARAJEVO MARKETPLACE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC 836, WHICH AUTHORIZES UNPROFOR TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO PROTECT THE U.N. SAFE AREAS, AND WITH THE LONDON DECLARATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE LOOKING FOR THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO REMOVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. WHEN THE BOMBING WILL STOP IS IN THE HANDS OF GENERAL MLADIC. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL DO WHAT YOU CAN TO HELP IN THIS REGARD.

ON OUR PART, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE EXPECT THAT THEIR FORCES WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAWALS. THE BOSNIAN

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12 2015-0815-M-2 (5.08)

11/24/2017

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COMMANDER, GENERAL DELIC, HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED US THAT THEY WILL RESPECT OUR REQUEST IN THIS REGARD.

BORIS, OUR COMMON GOAL, AS YOU NOTE, IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

IN PART DUE TO YOUR EFFORTS, SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC HAS ALREADY DISPLAYED A NEW DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN SUPPORTING THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA MEETING AND IN URGING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. LET US WORK TOGETHER TO CONVINCE THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP TO FOLLOW MILOSEVIC'S LEAD AND CHOOSE THE PATH OF PEACE.

I AM ONCE AGAIN GRATEFUL FOR OUR CHANNEL OF FRANK COMMUNICATION. OUR PRACTICE OF TIMELY CONSULTATIONS REMAINS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING CRITICAL ISSUES -- AND ENSURING THAT THEY DO NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR SHARED, LONG-TERM INTEREST IN A STEADY STRENGTHENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OR COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING THE SITUATION WITH YOU ON THE PHONE WHENEVER YOU WISH.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

BILL.

(END OF TEXT)

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Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin

September 7, 1995

Dear Bill:

The situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to worry me seriously.

You know that we have spoken decisively against NATO's airstrikes in Bosnia. Nevertheless after a short pause these have started again. Thus the whole peace-keeping operation framework was undermined. In fact it has turned into an execution of the Bosnian Serbs.

I consider such a situation unacceptable. The NATO air force actions must be stopped immediately. I strongly count on you in this regard.

The peace process should be intensified.

I am sending First Deputy Foreign Minister I.Ivanov to Geneva to take part in the meeting of the Contact Group. I am confident that acting together with your representative R.Holbrooke, as well as with K.Bildt they will be able to expedite reaching a final decision. What I mean is first of all the constitutional arrangement for Bosnia and the division map.

I am grateful for your support of my initiative on holding an international Conference on Yugoslavia. The dynamics of preparatory work provide a solid basis for its holding in the second half of October.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Declassified per E.O. 13526
PL 2015-0815-UN-2 (S.OA)
4/14/2018

I propose to hold this Conference in Moscow. Against the background of our disagreements on the airstrikes this would have great importance since it would manifest unity of our actions. I would not conceal it from you - the pre-election situation in my country impels me to take into account a heated atmosphere in the public opinion resulting from the unilateral NATO actions.

We could agree on the exact date for the Conference later.

I am sending similar messages to all leaders of the Contact Group member-states.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Ситуация в бывшей Югославии продолжает вызывать у меня серьезное беспокойство.

Ты знаешь, что мы решительно высказались против натовских бомбардировок в БИГ. Однако после непродолжительного затишья они опять возобновились. Тем самым были перечеркнуты все рамки миротворческой операции. Она по существу превратилась в экзекуцию боснийских сербов.

Такое положение считаю недопустимым. Действия авиации НАТО следует немедленно прекратить. В этом твердо рассчитываю на тебя.

Необходимо интенсифицировать мирный процесс.

Направляю в Женеву на заседание Контактной группы первого заместителя министра иностранных дел И. Иванова. Уверен, что действуя совместно с твоим представителем Р. Холбруком и К. Бильдтом, им удастся ускорить достижение окончательного решения. Речь идет прежде всего о конституционном устройстве БИГ и карте разграничения.

Признателен тебе за поддержку моей инициативы о созыве мирной конференции по Югославии. Динамика подготовки дает реальные основания для ее проведения во второй половине октября.

Предлагаю провести конференцию в Москве. На фоне наших разногласий по авиаударам это имело бы большое значение, поскольку подчеркнуло бы единство наших действий. Не скрою, что и предвыборная обстановка в стране требует от меня учитывать напряжение в общественном мнении, вызванное односторонними действиями НАТО.

О конкретной дате конференции мы могли бы договориться позднее.

Аналогичные послания направляю всем лидерам государств-членов Контактной группы.

С уважением,

Б. ЕЛЬЦИН

г. Москва, Кремль

7 сентября 1995 года

Declassified per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-m-2 (S.10)
4/19/2018

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001- letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	09/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 2300

FOLDER TITLE:

9409142

2014-0837-F
ke3313

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



9142

**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

« 3 » сентября 1994 г.

№ Пр-1228

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

В преддверии встречи в Вашингтоне, а также наших выступлений на 49-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН, хотел бы в духе партнерства сверить в доверительном ключе наши ориентиры.

Размышляя о том, какие идеи и предложения включить в свою речь в ООН, я исходил из того, что они должны идти в русле наших с тобой совместных идей по наиболее злободневным темам многосторонней повестки дня. В первую очередь намерен акцентировать внимание на таких темах, как роль и задачи ООН в решении глобальных проблем и укреплении международной безопасности, вклад России в урегулирование конфликтов в мире, в том числе в СНГ, совершенствование миротворческих механизмов, в частности, необходимость наращивания сотрудничества между ООН и региональными организациями, поддержка усилий ООН по эффективному реагированию на чрезвычайные гуманитарные ситуации, актуальные вопросы нераспространения и разоружения.

Центральным блоком моей речи планирую сделать инициативу по укреплению стратегической стабильности. По существу речь идет о формулировании новой повестки в этой области.

Актуальность этой задачи определяется рядом факторов.

В их числе - проведение весной будущего года конференции по вопросу о продлении Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, нарастающий прессинг развивающихся стран в отношении дальнейших шагов по ядерному разоружению,

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
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PER E.O. 13526
v2 2015-08/15-м (3,51)
4/19/2018

необходимость сохранения динамики, созданной российско-американскими договоренностями, и подключения к этому процессу остальных ядерных держав.

Я проанализировал складывающуюся ситуацию и пришел к выводу - ограничиться хотя и важными, но частичными мерами на двусторонней основе не удастся.

Конкретно имею в виду выдвинуть предложение о разработке в рамках ядерной "пятерки" договора о ядерной безопасности и стратегической стабильности. Такой договор мог бы предусматривать: запрет производства расщепляющихся материалов для оружия, запрет повторного использования в оружии расщепляющихся материалов, извлеченных из ядерных боезарядов, а также дальнейшие сокращения ядерных боеприпасов и стратегических носителей.

Таким образом, этот документ охватывал бы четыре главных звена ядерной цепи и обеспечивал бы необратимый характер последующего ядерного разоружения.

В речи в ООН планирую прочертить общие рамки этой инициативы, поскольку важно дать импульс ее продвижению. Не скрою, хотел бы видеть ее совместной инициативой России и США. Это придало бы дополнительную весомость нашему обращению, продемонстрировало бы действенность российско-американского партнерства.

Мне доложили, что в начале сентября с.г. в Москве пройдет серия рабочих консультаций по комплексу вопросов безопасности. Российские эксперты будут готовы ответить на любые вопросы по содержанию будущей инициативы и согласовать совместные шаги по ее продвижению.

Окончательно же договориться на этот счет, в частности по примерным цифрам и срокам, можно будет при личной встрече "один на один".

У меня есть и другие конкретные соображения относительно укрепления стратегической стабильности, мер доверия и гармонизации ядерных доктрин и структур стратегических сил ("пакет СНВ-3"), которые я сознательно не буду оглашать публично. Сперва нам с тобой надо переговорить, чтобы придти к общему знаменателю.

С нетерпением жду твоей реакции.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (1 page)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to President Yeltsin (1 page)	11/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. draft	[Draft of 001a] (3 pages)	11/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 483

FOLDER TITLE:

9409344

2014-0837-F
 ke3314

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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001a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (1 page)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1)

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PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
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FM WHITE HOUSE

TO EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

A NUMBER OF ISSUES HAVE ARISEN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT I
WISH TO DISCUSS WITH YOU. THEY INCLUDE NEXT STEPS FOLLOWING
THE RADA'S RATIFICATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY,
BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING
TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE GULF. ON ALL THESE
ISSUES THERE HAS BEEN GOOD PROGRESS IN RECENT DAYS -- THANKS
IN PART TO OUR WORKING TOGETHER. WE SHOULD BUILD ON THAT
PROGRESS IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAS JUST CONCLUDED A VERY
SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH HIGHLIGHTED UKRAINE'S
COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM AND DENUCLEARIZATION. WITH THE
RADA'S RATIFICATION OF UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY, WE CAN PROCEED WITH OUR PLANS FOR A
JOINT MEETING IN BUDAPEST WITH PRESIDENT KUCHMA, PRESIDENT
NAZARBAYEV AND PRESIDENT LUKASHENKO TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS
OF RATIFICATION FOR START I AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY
ASSURANCES FOR BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE. I ALSO LOOK
FORWARD TO RECEIVING -- WITH YOU AND JOHN MAJOR -- UKRAINE'S
INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION TO THE NPT TREATY. THESE SUCCESSES
ARE THE RESULTS OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF NON-
PROLIFERATION. THEY DEMONSTRATE WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE -- AND
THE BENEFITS FOR WORLD PEACE -- WHEN WE WORK TOGETHER AND
CONSULT CLOSELY.

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PAGE 02 OF 04

IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT I TURN TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 11 REGARDING IRAQ. IRAQ'S RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDER IS AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. RUSSIA PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. YOU AND ANDREY KOZYREV CAN TAKE PRIDE IN HELPING TO BRING ABOUT A RESULT WHICH MET FULLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS YOU RIGHTLY NOTED, IT DEMONSTRATES THAT NO ONE WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENJOY THE FRUITS OF AGGRESSION. AND ONCE AGAIN, OUR COOPERATION WAS CRITICAL IN ENSURING THE RIGHT RESULT.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN THIS APPROACH AS WE LOOK AT NEXT STEPS. WE AGREE THAT SECURITY COUNCIL EFFORTS SHOULD NOW FOCUS ON BRINGING THE IRAQIS TO COMPLY FULLY -- AS THEY HAVE REGARDING KUWAIT'S BORDERS AND SOVEREIGNTY -- WITH REMAINING UNSC REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS THE RETURN OF KUWAITI MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND REPRESSION OF MINORITIES IN IRAQ.

THE QUESTION NOW IS HOW TO DO THIS. I NOTE YOUR SUGGESTION TO "OPEN UP A CONSTRUCTIVE PERSPECTIVE" TO MOVE IRAQ IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN OUR VIEW, MAKING CLEAR TO IRAQ THAT THE PATH TO MODIFICATION OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME LIES ONLY THROUGH FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS IS THE SUREST, FASTEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. ANY SUGGESTION THAT IRAQ CAN WAIT OUT THE COUNCIL OR SATISFY IT THROUGH PARTIAL STEPS SEEMS LIKELY TO MAKE OUR COMMON TASK MORE DIFFICULT. I AM CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD RUN JUST SUCH A RISK WERE WE TO ESTABLISH A FIXED TIME FRAME FOR ASSESSING IRAQI COOPERATION WITH THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS DETAILED THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS POINT IN HIS RECENT VERY GOOD AND CLEAR EXCHANGE WITH ANDREY KOZYREV. IT IS CRUCIAL THAT THEY STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH, SO THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

THAT SAID, BORIS, WHEN IRAQ FULLY MEETS THE CRITERIA THE UN HAS ESTABLISHED ON ALL THESE ISSUES, AS IT APPEARS TO HAVE DONE WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE ISSUE OF KUWAIT'S BORDERS, WE ARE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE STEPS AS WELL. U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AFTER THE BAGHDAD ANNOUNCEMENTS PROVED OUR READINESS IN THIS REGARD, AND OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK, WORKING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AGREED ON A STATEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT NOTING IRAQ'S ACTION.

WHEN WE LAST MET, WE AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH, ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, ON MATTERS CONCERNING EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING NATO AND CSCE. IN A SEPARATE LETTER, I

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

WILL BE SENDING YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THESE TWO SUBJECTS. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU NOW THAT WHAT THE NATO ALLIES DO AT THE UPCOMING NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) SESSION IN BRUSSELS WILL BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH WHAT YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN THE WHITE HOUSE DURING YOUR VISIT.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO PROPOSE AT THE NAC A TIMETABLE OR LIST FOR NATO EXPANSION. INSTEAD, WE PLAN TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON WHAT IS INVOLVED IN NATO MEMBERSHIP -- WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS ARE, AND WHAT THE RATIONALE IS FOR A NEW, EXPANDED NATO, WHICH IS NOT DIRECTED AT ANY COUNTRY, BUT IS INTENDED TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY AND PROMOTE THE INTEGRITY OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE. IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE WILL SEEK A COMMON VIEW AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS OF THE ISSUES RELATING TO NATO MEMBERSHIP AND PRESENT IT TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WHO ARE INTERESTED.

#4925

NNNN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 2

OUR PRAGMATIC PARTNERSHIP COVERS A BROAD AND COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP. COOPERATION TO PROMOTE REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. THIS IS TRUE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AS IN EUROPE. AND IT HAS YIELDED SUCCESS THIS MONTH IN BOTH REGIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THIS PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. FINALLY, BORIS, THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS, IN YOUR LAST LETTER, OF FRIENDSHIP AND ENCOURAGEMENT. I APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT IN WHICH YOU OFFERED THEM AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

DECL: OADR

#4926

NNNN

<MSGID> M1382305

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

President Yeltsin last wrote to you November 11 (Tab B), following Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to Baghdad and the subsequent Iraqi recognition of Kuwait. Yeltsin specifically asked you to support the drafting of the UNSC statement welcoming the Iraqi action, which we were able to do. Your response (Tab A) acknowledges the key role Russia played and highlights our cooperative efforts to ensure a good outcome. In the same vein, your message notes our joint role in promoting Ukrainian accession to the NPT, and looks ahead to the Budapest CSCE Summit and upcoming high-level NATO meetings in the context of the understandings you and Yeltsin reached in September over the NATO expansion question.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for delivery to President Yeltsin by Embassy Moscow.

Approve SRB approved Disapprove _____
per Veit 11/26

Attachments

- Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
- Tab B Incoming Yeltsin Letter, Nov. 11

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PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-W1-2 (3,53)
11/29/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

A NUMBER OF ISSUES HAVE ARISEN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT I WISH TO DISCUSS WITH YOU. THEY INCLUDE NEXT STEPS FOLLOWING THE RADA'S RATIFICATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE GULF. ON ALL THESE ISSUES THERE HAS BEEN GOOD PROGRESS IN RECENT DAYS -- THANKS IN PART TO OUR WORKING TOGETHER. WE SHOULD BUILD ON THAT PROGRESS IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAS JUST CONCLUDED A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH HIGHLIGHTED UKRAINE'S COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM AND DENUCLEARIZATION. WITH THE RADA'S RATIFICATION OF UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WE CAN PROCEED WITH OUR PLANS FOR A JOINT MEETING IN BUDAPEST WITH PRESIDENT KUCHMA, PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV AND PRESIDENT LUKASHENKO TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOR START I AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING -- WITH YOU AND JOHN MAJOR -- UKRAINE'S INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION TO THE NPT TREATY. THESE SUCCESSES ARE THE RESULTS OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF NON-PROLIFERATION. THEY DEMONSTRATE WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE -- AND THE BENEFITS FOR WORLD PEACE -- WHEN WE WORK TOGETHER AND CONSULT CLOSELY.

IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT I TURN TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 11 REGARDING IRAQ. IRAQ'S RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDER IS AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. RUSSIA PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. YOU AND ANDREY KOZYREV CAN TAKE PRIDE IN HELPING TO BRING ABOUT A RESULT WHICH MET FULLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS YOU RIGHTLY NOTED, IT DEMONSTRATES THAT NO ONE WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENJOY THE FRUITS OF AGGRESSION. AND ONCE AGAIN, OUR COOPERATION WAS CRITICAL IN ENSURING THE RIGHT RESULT.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

✓ 2015-0815-01-2 (354)

11/24/2017

THE QUESTION NOW IS HOW TO DO THIS. I NOTE YOUR SUGGESTION TO "OPEN UP A CONSTRUCTIVE PERSPECTIVE" TO MOVE IRAQ IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN OUR VIEW, MAKING CLEAR TO IRAQ THAT THE PATH TO MODIFICATION OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME LIES ONLY THROUGH FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS IS THE SUREST, FASTEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. ANY SUGGESTION THAT IRAQ CAN WAIT OUT THE COUNCIL OR SATISFY IT THROUGH PARTIAL STEPS SEEMS LIKELY TO MAKE OUR COMMON TASK MORE DIFFICULT. I AM CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD RUN JUST SUCH A RISK WERE WE TO ESTABLISH A FIXED TIME FRAME FOR ASSESSING IRAQI COOPERATION WITH THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS DETAILED THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS POINT IN HIS RECENT VERY GOOD AND CLEAR EXCHANGE WITH ANDREY KOZYREV. IT IS CRUCIAL THAT THEY STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH, SO THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

THAT SAID, BORIS, WHEN IRAQ FULLY MEETS THE CRITERIA THE UN HAS ESTABLISHED ON ALL THESE ISSUES, AS IT APPEARS TO HAVE DONE WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE ISSUE OF KUWAIT'S BORDERS, WE ARE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE STEPS AS WELL. U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AFTER THE BAGHDAD ANNOUNCEMENTS PROVED OUR READINESS IN THIS REGARD, AND OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK, WORKING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AGREED ON A STATEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT NOTING IRAQ'S ACTION.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS, IN YOUR LAST LETTER, OF FRIENDSHIP AND ENCOURAGEMENT. I APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT IN WHICH YOU OFFERED THEM AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BUDAPEST.

(END TEXT)

SINCERELY,

BILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

unofficial translation

Moscow, The Kremlin

November 11, 1994

Dear Bill:

In accordance with the agreement between us I would like to inform you without delay about our steps regarding Iraq which were designed to submit Mr.S.Hussein into observance of all relating resolutions of the UN Security Council and first of all to make him recognize the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait.

As we have reported beforehand through confidential channels, I have decided to send Mr.Kozyrev to Baghdad in order to render a decisive pressure on the Iraqi regime on this issue. He has managed to literally wring out of Hussein a legal commitment to recognize the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait which is endorsed by now by all Iraqi official bodies including the National Assembly and the Revolutionary Command Council.

This commitment corresponds to the most severe international criteria and first and foremost to the UNSC Resolutions 833 and 949. All necessary documentation upon our insistence is being immediately submitted by Iraq to the United Nations Organization.

His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington D.C.

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PER E.O. 13526
v2 2015-0815-11-2 (3,65)
11/29/2017

Thus, through being reasonably tough but at the same time without driving Hussein into a corner, we have finally managed together with you ^{and} with the support of all international community to achieve a very important result having demonstrated that no one will be permitted to enjoy the fruits of an aggression. Among other things it underscores once again how rich is the potential of the Russian-American partnership, of the mutual understanding between the Presidents of Russia and the US.

We should not stop now at what has been already achieved, we should encourage Iraq to keep on moving in the right direction up to its full compliance with all the relating decisions of the Security Council. For that purpose a decision of the UN Security Council is required which would open up a constructive perspective now that Iraq has in practice crossed the Rubicon. I hope that you will give your personal instructions to your representative in the UN to urgently get in touch and start working with us in order to accomplish in the earliest possible time this long awaited step. It is quite clear that this decision should be a well-weighted one, it should not precede the events, but it also should not lag behind them.

Bill,

Using the American manner of putting things, we have managed to snatch a big diplomatic victory from the jaws of a defeat, and I am sure that this will only raise the prestige of our two great powers to still higher levels, will consolidate peace all over the world and first of all in the Middle East being an intersection of the most important strategic interests not only for Russia and the US.

I believe that the peoples of our two countries will give due merit to what has been achieved. I know that the results of the recent midterm elections in the US are not very encouraging, but ^(you & I) ~~we~~ are tough fighters ~~with you~~ and we have already proved that we can ^{take a punch.} ~~stand to a blow~~. The most important thing is to keep the right perspective. In the foreign policy area our common priority, as I have already said it, is a pragmatic partnership. I expect to discuss with you all specific issues in Budapest.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 483

FOLDER TITLE:

9409421

2014-0837-F
 ke3315

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

9421

unofficial translation

Moscow, The Kremlin
November 11, 1994

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His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington D.C.

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VA 2015-0815-1-1 (3,51)
4/19/2018

Thus, through being reasonably tough but at the same time without driving Hussein into a corner, we have finally managed together with you with the support of all international community to achieve a very important result having demonstrated that no one will be permitted to enjoy the fruits of an aggression. Among other things it underscores once again how rich is the potential of the Russian-American partnership, of the mutual understanding between the Presidents of Russia and the US.

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Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г. ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

В соответствии с договоренностью оперативно информирую тебя о наших шагах в отношении Ирака, призванных заставить С. Хусейна соблюдать все соответствующие резолюции СБ ООН и прежде всего признать суверенитет и независимость Кувейта.

Как мы заранее сообщили по конфиденциальным каналам, я решил направить Козырева в Багдад, чтобы оказать решающий нажим на иракский режим в этом вопросе. Ему удалось наконец буквально вырвать у Хусейна юридическое обязательство, одобренное теперь всеми иракскими инстанциями, включая Национальную ассамблею и Совет революционной командования, признать суверенитет и независимость Кувейта.

Это обязательство соответствует самым строгим международным критериям и в первую очередь резолюциям 833 и 949 СБ ООН. Вся необходимая документация по нашему настоянию незамедлительно представляется Ираком в Организацию Объединенных Наций.

Таким образом, проявляя разумную жесткость и в то же время не загоняя Хусейна в угол, мы с тобой сумели наконец при поддержке всего Международного сообщества добиться очень важного результата, показав, что никому не позволим пользоваться плодами агрессии. Помимо всего прочего, это еще раз показывает, каким богатым потенциалом обладает российско-американское партнерство, личное взаимопонимание президентов России и США.

Сейчас надо не останавливаться на достигнутом, побуждать Ирак продолжать двигаться в правильном направлении, вплоть до полного соблюдения всех соответствующих решений Совета безопасности. Для этого требуется решение СБ ООН, открывающее конструктивную перспективу теперь, когда Багдад по существу перешел рубикон. Рассчитываю, что ты дашь личное поручение своему представителю в ООН срочно поработать с нами ради скорейшего осуществления этого назревшего шага. Понятно, решение должно быть взвешенным, не опережать событий, но и не отставать от них.

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v2 2015-0615-M-2 (3.57)
4/19/2018

Билл, мы сумели, пользуясь американским выражением, вырвать крупную дипломатическую победу из челюстей поражения, и я уверен, что это еще выше поднимет престиж наших великих держав, укрепит мир во всем мире и прежде всего на Ближнем Востоке, где скрестились важнейшие стратегические интересы не только России и Соединенных Штатов

Думаю, и наши народы по достоинству оценят достигнутое. Знаю, что результаты промежуточных выборов в США не очень радуют, но мы с тобой стойкие бойцы и доказали, что умеем держать удар. Главное – сохранять верную перспективу. Во внешней политике наш совместный приоритет, как я уже говорил, – прагматическое партнерство. Все конкретные аспекты надеюсь обсудить с тобой в Будапеште.

Искренне твой,

Б.ЕЛЦИН

II ноября 1994 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (3 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Yeltsin (2 pages)	11/09/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Yeltsin [in Russian] (2 pages)	11/09/1994	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 223

FOLDER TITLE:

9409474

2014-0837-F
ke3316

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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9474

Delivered to
NSC by Russian
Embassy 11.9.94

Unofficial translation

~~Confidential~~

November 9, 1994
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

On my initiative Mr.E.Primakov, director of the Russia's External Intelligence Service has visited Cuba recently. He has spent there many hours in "one-on-one" conversations with F.Castro. He also met with Raul Castro and other Cuban leaders. The contents of these discussions seems important to me and I would like you to know about them.

In Fidel Castro's words, he is very well aware that he has to proceed in his policies from the new realities and that he can not count on Russia to support a confrontational course vis-a-vis US. In many respects there have already taken place and continue to take place radical changes in the Cuban foreign and domestic policy. Among them are renunciation of support for any antigovernmental forces in Latin America, complete cessation of all activities in the African continent, beginning of the shift towards market economy and democratization of the Cuban society.

The Primakov's discussions with the acting Prime-Minister Laje and Finance Minister Rodrigues show that the inclination towards market-oriented transformations is profound and could become irreversible. At the same time one can feel that further movement of Cuba along that road - ~~its dynamics and depth~~ *-- the dynamism & depth of that movement --* would to a large extent depend on the reaction from the outside world. This conclusion is also entirely valid insofar as the process of democratization is concerned, although the case is more complex here due to the continuing stake on the one-party system and deep-rooted psychological stereotypes within the society, which erode slowly, and there is no way to ignore that.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
President of the United States

of America
Washington, DC
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PER E.O. 13526
1/2 2015-0815-M-2 (3,599)
4/19/2018

Fidel Castro has been forthright in telling Primakov that not only ^{has} he made a choice in favor of normalizing, and possibly improving relations with the United States, but he is ready for ~~serious compromises~~ along that way. He recognizes that in this respect "the best option for Cuba" is that ^a ~~the~~ Democratic President holds office in the US. "I believe in Clinton's decency, his sincerity and that encourages me", said Castro.

Touching upon the US negotiating position on Cuban emigration which to a certain extent gets tougher, Mr. Castro ~~referred~~ ^{attributed} it to the November elections in Florida, and said that he hopes for a change to the better.

Mr. Primakov has formed an opinion that F. Castro would like you to know about his willingness to pursue a realistic policy, and he would like to demonstrate that there is a difference between the traditional outward Cuban rhetoric and the inner position which he indeed adheres to in reality.

Some other Primakov's impressions are as follows:

A new stratum of younger leaders, more flexible and more adapted to present realities, is gathering strength in Cuba, albeit with Castro's prestige remaining in place, that is to say, under his "patronage". This by no means implies that his influence on the emerging new leaders will remain the same in all respects, but for the time being their success depends in many ways on the evolution of Castro's own views (of course, this process is interrelated).

A differentiated approach to Cuban emigration is becoming apparent. According to Castro, a significant part of the emigrants stand for an improvement in ~~of~~ Cuban-American relations, which would open doors for an "emigrant business" in Cuba. At the same time the country does not seem ~~to~~ reconciled with those of the emigrants who take extreme stands, especially following the statement by one of the leaders of this group saying that after their return they should "have Cuba to themselves for three days" in order to do away with all the supporters of the present regime.

I will feel gratified if these assessments prove useful in whatever extent to you.

Sincerely,

Boris Yeltsin

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КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНО

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Дорогой Билл,

По моей инициативе недавно на Кубе побывал директор Службы внешней разведки России Е.Примаков. Он провел там многочасовые беседы "один на один" с Ф.Кастро. Встречался также с Р.Кастро, другими кубинскими руководителями. Содержание этих разговоров показалось мне важным, и я хотел бы, чтобы ты знал о них.

По словам Ф.Кастро, он хорошо понимает, что должен исходить в своей политике из новых условий, не сможет рассчитывать на поддержку Россией конфронтационной линии в отношении США. Во многом уже произошли и продолжают радикальные изменения в кубинской внешней и внутренней политике. Среди них – отказ от помощи любым антиправительственным силам в Латинской Америке, полное прекращение всех операций на африканском континенте, начало движения к рыночной экономике и демократизации кубинского общества.

Беседы Примакова с исполняющим функции премьера Лахе и министром финансов Родригесом показывают, что настрой на рыночные преобразования основателен, может приобрести необратимый характер. Вместе с тем чувствуется, что дальнейшее движение Кубы по этому пути – его динамизм и глубина – во многом будут зависеть от реакции внешнего мира. Такой вывод полностью относится и к процессу демократизации, хотя здесь дело сложнее в результате продолжающейся ставки на однопартийную систему и устоявшихся психологических стереотипов в обществе, которые размываются медленно, и это нельзя игнорировать.

Ф.Кастро прямо сказал Примакову, что он не только сделал выбор в пользу нормализации и возможного улучшения отношений с США, но и готов к серьезным компромиссам на этом пути. Он понимает, что в этом смысле "лучшим вариантом для Кубы" является нахождение у власти в США президента от демократической партии. "Я верю в порядочность Клинтона, – сказал Кастро, – его искренность, и это меня обнадеживает".

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4/19/2018

Касаясь некоторого ужесточения американской переговорной позиции по кубинским эмигрантам, Кастро отнес это за счет ноябрьских выборов во Флориде и сказал, что надеется на изменение к лучшему.

У Примакова сложилось мнение, что Ф.Кастро хотел бы, чтобы ты знал о его готовности проводить реалистичную политику, показать, что существует разница между выплескиваемой на поверхность традиционной кубинской риторикой и внутренней позицией, которой он придерживается в действительности.

Из других впечатлений Примакова:

На Кубе набирает силу молодая прослойка лидеров, более гибких и более приспособленных к нынешним временам, но происходит это при сохранении авторитета Ф.Кастро, так сказать, под его "патронажем". Это отнюдь не означает, что его влияние на растущих новых лидеров сохранится во всем, но на сегодняшний день их успех во многом зависит от эволюции взглядов самого Кастро (конечно, этот процесс взаимосвязанный).

Начинает проявляться дифференцированный подход к кубинской эмиграции. По словам Кастро, значительная ее часть хочет улучшения кубино-американских отношений, что открыло бы двери для "эмигрантского бизнеса" на Кубе. В то же время в стране чувствуется непримиримость к той части эмигрантов, которые занимают крайние позиции, особенно после заявления одного из лидеров этой группы, что после своего возвращения им нужно "отдать Кубу на три дня", чтобы расправиться со всеми сторонниками нынешнего режима.

Буду удовлетворен, если тебе в какой-то степени окажутся полезными эти оценки.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

9 ноября 1994 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. draft	[Incomplete Draft of 001b] (1 page)	12/00/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (1 page)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 7/25/2022
001e. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Yeltsin on NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. draft	[Draft of 001b] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001e. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the President (2 pages)	11/30/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001f. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (1 page)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 483

FOLDER TITLE:

9409556

2014-0837-F
 ke3317

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

9576

OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" OR ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I WOULD ASK THAT YOU REFLECT ON THIS CLARIFICATION AND HOPE YOU CAN RECONSIDER YOUR ACTION AND AGREE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

Know that Andrei asked for a clarification of NATO policy yesterday. hope in light of my clarification to you that it will not be possible

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (1 page)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 483

FOLDER TITLE:

9409556

2014-0837-F
ke3317

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
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INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO
SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO
RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY
COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK
IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH
QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO
LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN
WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A
NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION.
SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON
WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING
-- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL,
INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE
OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND
I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE
WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO
ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN
A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY
STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED
THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE.
MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT
OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO,
ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

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PAGE 02 OF 04

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 1, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED. AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28, OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" ON ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY

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PAGE 03 OF 04

INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO
#4979

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 2

RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSING A

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PAGE 04 OF 04

RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL
END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

94 DEC 1 P 7: 53

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0816-M-2(3,63)

11/29/2017

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh

Purpose

To answer President Yeltsin's November 30 letter on NATO expansion and to gain Yeltsin's agreement to cooperate on establishing a multilateral CSCE peacekeeping force in N-K.

Background

NATO Expansion

Yeltsin's most recent letter (Tab B) agrees with your views on a strengthened CSCE, but mischaracterizes our policy on NATO expansion -- referring, among other things, to "plans to start negotiations with candidates" by mid-1995. After we received the letter, Strobe spoke with Kozyrev's deputy Mamedov to reiterate our adherence to the understandings you and Yeltsin reached in September: no surprises, careful inter-Alliance deliberations, full transparency and consultations with Russia. Mamedov said that some in the Russian government were predicting that the mid-term election results would force you to change that policy; Yeltsin's letter represented a "pre-emptive shot." We believe a quick, clear response from you directly to Yeltsin is warranted-- all the more so in light of Kozyrev's unexpected action today in Brussels.

Nagorno-Karabakh

During your several discussions on Nagorno-Karabakh with President Yeltsin in September, he expressed skepticism that the CSCE would be able to mount a multinational peacekeeping force and declined to agree to our proposal. Since then, the CSCE has mounted a credible effort with 39 countries offering strong political support for the CSCE multilateral force and more than 20 stepping forward with contributions of troops or resources. Several other countries are considering serious contributions and

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are awaiting agreement at Budapest before making final decisions. Only Russia has expressed specific opposition and has even questioned the CSCE's legal basis for conducting peacekeeping operations.

Your message stresses that the CSCE has a legitimate mandate for peacekeeping, points to the progress the CSCE has made in putting together the force, assures Russia that it will continue to play a key role in the conflict resolution process, emphasizes that cooperation will enhance Russia's international reputation and agrees to Russian proposals to enhance UN support for the CSCE peacekeeping effort. You end by encouraging Russia to cooperate with us in the spirit of partnership and requesting a response to your proposal before Budapest.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message attached at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
- Tab B Letter from Yeltsin
- Tab C November 28 Message to Yeltsin

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING -- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL, INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE. MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO, ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 1, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED. AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28, OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS

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OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" ON ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

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OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUING A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

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Moscow
The Kremlin
November 30, 1994

Dear Bill:

In response to your letter of November 28 I would like to share some of my ideas with you on the eve of the Budapest CSCE summit.

I am glad you agree with me that the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe should play an important role in creating a common space for security and cooperation of free democratic states. I believe you will agree that the objective here is not a cosmetic renovation of the CSCE facade. Our proposals are aimed at creating a full-fledged all-European organization with a sound legal base. This is indispensable for the CSCE to seriously deal with the issues of peace-keeping.

For us this is an issue of national security. We expect most close cooperation with the UN and the CSCE.

I shall frankly say that against the background of our promising joint efforts, one completely fails to understand the reasons behind a new revitalizing of the discussion on speeding up the broadening of NATO. We have agreed with you that there will be no surprises, that first we should pass through this phase of partnership, whereas issues of further evolution of NATO should not be decided without due account to the opinion and interests of Russia.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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Adoption of an expedited time-table, plans to start negotiations with the candidates already in the middle of the next year will be interpreted, and not only in Russia, as the beginning of a new split of Europe.

I confirm our serious interest in developing profound cooperation with NATO - both through the potential of the Partnership for Peace program, and in the form of direct bilateral interaction.

I believe that Minister Kozyrev and Secretary of State Christopher will discuss these issues on December 2 in Brussels.

Looking forward to seeing you in Budapest.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (1 page)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 483

FOLDER TITLE:

9409556

2014-0837-F
ke3317

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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FM: WHITE HOUSE

TO:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

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QQQQ

SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

A NUMBER OF ISSUES HAVE ARISEN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT I WISH TO DISCUSS WITH YOU. THEY INCLUDE NEXT STEPS FOLLOWING THE RADA'S RATIFICATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE GULF. ON ALL THESE ISSUES THERE HAS BEEN GOOD PROGRESS IN RECENT DAYS – THANKS IN PART TO OUR WORKING TOGETHER. WE SHOULD BUILD ON THAT PROGRESS IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAS JUST CONCLUDED A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH HIGHLIGHTED UKRAINE'S COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM AND DENUCLEARIZATION. WITH THE RADA'S RATIFICATION OF UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WE CAN PROCEED WITH OUR PLANS FOR A JOINT MEETING IN BUDAPEST WITH PRESIDENT KUCHMA, PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV AND PRESIDENT LUKASHENKO TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOR START I AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING – WITH YOU AND JOHN MAJOR – UKRAINE'S INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION TO THE NPT TREATY. THESE SUCCESSES ARE THE RESULTS OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF NON-PROLIFERATION. THEY DEMONSTRATE WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE – AND THE BENEFITS FOR WORLD PEACE – WHEN WE WORK TOGETHER AND

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Per E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (3.66)

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11/29/2017

CONSULT CLOSELY.

IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT I TURN TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 11 REGARDING IRAQ. IRAQ'S RECOGNITION OF KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDER IS AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. RUSSIA PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. YOU AND ANDREY KOZYREV CAN TAKE PRIDE IN HELPING TO BRING ABOUT A RESULT WHICH MET FULLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS YOU RIGHTLY NOTED, IT DEMONSTRATES THAT NO ONE WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENJOY THE FRUITS OF AGGRESSION. AND ONCE AGAIN, OUR COOPERATION WAS CRITICAL IN ENSURING THE RIGHT RESULT.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN THIS APPROACH AS WE LOOK AT NEXT STEPS. WE AGREE THAT SECURITY COUNCIL EFFORTS SHOULD NOW FOCUS ON BRINGING THE IRAQIS TO COMPLY FULLY -- AS THEY HAVE REGARDING KUWAIT'S BORDERS AND SOVEREIGNTY -- WITH REMAINING UNSC REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS THE RETURN OF KUWAITI MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND REPRESSION OF MINORITIES IN IRAQ.

THE QUESTION NOW IS HOW TO DO THIS. I NOTE YOUR SUGGESTION TO "OPEN UP A CONSTRUCTIVE PERSPECTIVE" TO MOVE IRAQ IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN OUR VIEW, MAKING CLEAR TO IRAQ THAT THE PATH TO MODIFICATION OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME LIES ONLY THROUGH FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS IS THE SUREST, FASTEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. ANY SUGGESTION THAT IRAQ CAN WAIT OUT THE COUNCIL OR SATISFY IT THROUGH PARTIAL STEPS SEEMS LIKELY TO MAKE OUR COMMON TASK MORE DIFFICULT. I AM CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD RUN JUST SUCH A RISK WERE WE TO ESTABLISH A FIXED TIME FRAME FOR ASSESSING IRAQI COOPERATION WITH THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS DETAILED THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS POINT IN HIS RECENT VERY GOOD AND CLEAR EXCHANGE WITH ANDREY KOZYREV. IT IS CRUCIAL THAT THEY STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH, SO THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

THAT SAID, BORIS, WHEN IRAQ FULLY MEETS THE CRITERIA THE UN HAS ESTABLISHED ON ALL THESE ISSUES, AS IT APPEARS TO HAVE DONE WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE ISSUE OF KUWAIT'S BORDERS, WE ARE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE STEPS AS WELL. U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AFTER THE BAGHDAD ANNOUNCEMENTS PROVED OUR READINESS IN THIS REGARD, AND OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK, WORKING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AGREED ON A STATEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT NOTING IRAQ'S ACTION.

WHEN WE LAST MET, WE AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH, ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, ON MATTERS CONCERNING EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING NATO AND CSCE. IN A SEPARATE LETTER, I WILL BE SENDING YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THESE TWO SUBJECTS. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU NOW THAT WHAT THE NATO ALLIES DO AT THE UPCOMING NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) SESSION IN BRUSSELS WILL BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH WHAT YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN THE WHITE HOUSE DURING YOUR VISIT.

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THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO PROPOSE AT THE NAC A TIMETABLE OR LIST FOR NATO EXPANSION. INSTEAD, WE PLAN TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON WHAT IS INVOLVED IN NATO MEMBERSHIP -- WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS ARE, AND WHAT THE RATIONALE IS FOR A NEW, EXPANDED NATO, WHICH IS NOT DIRECTED AT ANY COUNTRY, BUT IS INTENDED TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY AND PROMOTE THE INTEGRITY OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE. IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE WILL SEEK A COMMON VIEW AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS OF THE ISSUES RELATING TO NATO MEMBERSHIP AND PRESENT IT TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WHO ARE INTERESTED.

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FINAL SECTION OF 2

OUR PRAGMATIC PARTNERSHIP COVERS A BROAD AND COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP. COOPERATION TO PROMOTE REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. THIS IS TRUE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AS IN EUROPE. AND IT HAS YIELDED SUCCESS THIS MONTH IN BOTH REGIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THIS PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. FINALLY, BORIS, THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS, IN YOUR LAST LETTER, OF FRIENDSHIP AND ENCOURAGEMENT. I APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT IN WHICH YOU OFFERED THEM AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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NNNN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Letter from President Yeltsin on NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh (2 pages)	12/04/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001e. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. draft	Draft cable, re: [Message from the President to President Yeltsin] (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 224

FOLDER TITLE:

9409622

2014-0837-F
 ke3318

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ⁹⁶²²

THE WHITE HOUSE

12/4/94

WASHINGTON
December 4, 1994

94 DEC 4 P3:17

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin on NATO and Nagorno-Karabakh

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-W1-2 (3,67)
11/29/2017

Making good progress

The Russian Embassy delivered to us on Saturday night a response from President Yeltsin to your letter on NATO and PFP (both letters are attached). As you remember, you had written Yeltsin December 2 to complain about their lack of consultation with us before Kozyrev refused to sign the PFP implementing documents in Brussels and to make a last attempt to convince him to sign on in Budapest to a CSCE-led peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yeltsin's letter offers an olive branch on the NATO issue by stating that Russia will sign the PFP documents but needs assurances from us first on the future direction of NATO expansion. Stating that he was surprised by the December 1 NAC decision to proceed with discussions on the process of NATO expansion, he suggests that you and Chancellor Kohl travel to Russia in January to discuss this issue with him. While we obviously need to consult very closely with the Russians to reassure them about our intentions on NATO expansion, the idea of an early summit with Yeltsin and Kohl is probably not the right way to proceed. You need not respond to this letter today since you will not have a bilateral or any chance of a private conversation with Yeltsin in Budapest. We can discuss on the plane how we might respond to these ideas after Budapest.

On Nagorno-Karabakh, Yeltsin states that you and he should return to your September Summit discussions and make this a mirror image of Haiti. He gives some hope that it might be possible to agree at Budapest that the CSCE should develop a peacekeeping mission for Nagorno-Karabakh and emphasizes the importance of your willingness to have the UN Security Council "bless the CSCE operation."

As you remember, you had lengthy discussions with him in September on Nagorno-Karabakh. You did not concede that it should be treated as an exact parallel with Haiti and parted with major differences between our two positions. We are making an effort today to bridge those differences in order to gain

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Yeltsin's agreement that the final Budapest CSCE communique will have all leaders call for a CSCE-led peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. This would represent a major breakthrough in our efforts to tie at least some of Russia's activities in neighboring states to international principles and constraints.

The Russians proposed to us December 3 in Budapest that they might be able to agree to a CSCE-led force if we would commit to the following:

-- A Russian military officer would command the CSCE security force (the force that will do the actual peacekeeping that could be up to 50% Russian);

-- The CSCE Head of Mission (the official in overall charge of the entire peacekeeping operation consisting of a security force and observer force) should be a civilian but need not be Russian;

-- Russia should be made a co-chair, with Sweden, of the Minsk Group which is the CSCE sub-group responsible for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations.

In response, we instructed our negotiators in Budapest to approach today our closest partners on this issue, Germany, Sweden and Hungary, as well as Azerbaijan and Armenia, to agree on a response to the Russian proposal. If we can gain their agreement, we will propose to the Russians later today the following:

--As you stated in your letter to Yeltsin, we could co-sponsor a UN Security Council resolution that welcomes the CSCE peacekeeping operation and provides UN technical support;

--We would agree that the Russians could become co-chairs, with Sweden, of the Minsk Group so long as they end their parallel negotiating track that has done so much to harm the CSCE plans during the past year. This is a major concession on our part;

--We could agree that a Russian officer would command the CSCE security force. We would insist, however, that the overall Head of Mission for the CSCE operation be a third country military officer (probably a Finnish General). The CSCE Observer Force would be headed by a non-Russian as well. This will be more difficult for the Russians to accept but represents, in our view, as far as we should go to accommodate Yeltsin on this important issue.

We should know whether the Russians can accept this proposal by the time we talk on the plane to Budapest.

Dear Bill:

I have carefully read your message of December 2. The question of NATO evolution has become today central for our relations and for European stability as a whole. That is why nothing should be left insufficiently discussed between us in this question.

The meaning of my message to you of November 30 should not be seen as declaring alert. In the days before the Budapest summit I wanted to stress the importance of coordinated actions of Russia and the United States on issues of reforming European security structures.

I welcome your reaffirmation of our September agreements. It is important though that these be adequately reflected in relevant multilateral documents. I was confident that this would be the case with the NAC communique of December 1.

I can not agree with your appraisal of this document as containing nothing new and unexpected. I am not inclined to dramatize the situation, but the NAC desition requires careful analysis and explanations to us.

The Russia-NATO partnership program will be concluded, there should be no doubt here. A.Kozyrev will explain this to his colleagues. But we need assurances that enlargement, rather than partnership, is not being emphasized now. The problem should be tackled as a large-scale one, there should be dialogue on adopting specific obligations and security guarantees for Russia and NATO which would correspond to the nature of radical changes in the European situation. Only in this context one could contemplate NATO enlargement, the alliance being new and transformed through partnership.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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PER E.O. 13526

10/15-0815-M-2(3.68)
1/19/2018

I think you will agree that a candid conversation is necessary in order to have, as you propose yourself, a clear view of our reciprocal approaches and of the prospects. I propose organizing such conversation with your participation as well as with that of Helmut Kohl in January next year at a residence near Moscow.

As for Nagorny Karabakh, our understanding on preparation and adoption of a Security Council resolution which would "bless" the start of a peace-keeping operation, preferably - according to the Haiti scenario, undoubtedly, stays in force. This resolution will be a serious document and it will not be possible to prepare it in a couple of days. That is why we should look forward towards including into the Budapest decisions, as Kozyrev and Christopher talked about this in Brussels, language on the CSCE making an important contribution within its powers and in close coordination with Russia (not in competition with it) into both the negotiating process and forming under UN auspices multinational peace-keeping forces for Nagorny Karabakh. The details have to be elaborated later. Naturally, parallel to this work would be undertaken on the text of a UNSC resolution. By the way, as far as I understand, Europeans support such an approach.

Looking forward to our meeting in Budapest.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 3, 1994

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием от 2 декабря с.г. Вопрос эволюции НАТО стал сегодня ключевым для наших отношений, да и для европейской стабильности в целом. Поэтому здесь между нами не должно оставаться ничего недосказанного.

Смысл моего послания к тебе от 30 ноября с.г. заключается не в том, чтобы бить тревогу. В преддверии саммита в Будапеште я хотел подчеркнуть важность скоординированных действий России и США в вопросах реформирования структур европейской безопасности.

Я приветствую подтверждение тобой наших сентябрьских договоренностей. Важно, однако, чтобы они получали адекватное отражение в соответствующих многосторонних документах. Я был уверен, что так будет и с коммюнике Совета НАТО, принятым 1 декабря.

Не могу согласиться с твоей оценкой этого документа как не содержащего ничего нового и неожиданного. Не склонен к драматизации, но принятое Советом НАТО решение требует тщательного анализа, разъяснений нам.

Программа партнерства "Россия-НАТО" будет заключена, сомнений здесь быть не должно. А.В.Козырев объяснит это своим коллегам. Однако нам нужны заверения, что акцент не переносится сейчас с партнерства на расширение. Всю проблему надо ставить по-крупному, вести речь о принятии конкретных обязательств и гарантий безопасности России и НАТО, соответствующих характеру кардинальных перемен в европейской ситуации. Только в этом контексте можно будет думать о расширении НАТО, причем новой, трансформированной партнерством НАТО.

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PER E.O. 13526

12/2015-0815-M-2 (3,69)

4/19/2018

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Думаю, ты согласишься, что необходим откровенный разговор, чтобы, как ты сам предлагаешь, иметь точный взгляд на подходы друг друга и на перспективы. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор с участием тебя и Гельмута Коля в январе будущего года на даче под Москвой.

Что касается Нагорного Карабаха, наше взаимопонимание о подготовке и принятии резолюции Совета Безопасности, "благодаря" запуск миротворческой операции, желательно – по гаитянскому сценарию, безусловно, остается в силе. Эта резолюция – серьезный документ, и за пару дней ее не отработать. Поэтому, скорее, нам следует ориентироваться на то, чтобы в решениях Будапешта записать, как об этом говорили в Брюсселе Козырев и Кристофер, что СБСЕ будет вносить важный посильный вклад в тесном взаимодействии с Россией (а не в соревновании с ней) как в переговорный процесс, так и в формирование под эгидой ООН многонациональных миротворческих сил для Нагорного Карабаха. Детали предстоит отработать позднее. Параллельно, естественно, шла бы работа и над текстом резолюции СБ ООН. Кстати, насколько я понимаю, европейцы поддерживают такой подход.

До встречи в Будапеште.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

Москва, Кремль
"3" декабря 1994 года

*President's letter to Yeltsin delivered on
December 2.*

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-11-2 (3.70)

11/24/2017

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING -- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL, INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE. MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO, ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 1, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED. AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28, OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS

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OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" OR ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSING A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	[Duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

9639

Unofficial translation

Moscow

The Kremlin

December 1, 1994

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your friendly letter of November 28. I fully share your high assessment of our joint actions during the Iraqi crisis, as well as on other burning issues.

Regretfully, the development of events keeps placing still new complex tasks before the Russian-American partnership. What particularly bothers me is an "unfinished" process of Ukraine's joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in favor of which we have been working so much together with you.

I would like, naturally, to share your hope that we shall finally "close" this issue in Budapest.

But it is not all that simple, and our latest contacts with Kiev have caused new concerns. The question is, how Ukraine's joining the NPT will be officially formulated. Against the background of the well-known decisions of the Supreme Rada, it is absolutely indispensable that the Ukrainian document unambiguously reads that Ukraine specifically joins the NPT as a non-nuclear state. At the same time, as the Ukrainians let it be understood, in their version of this document there will be included in this or that form certain provisos of the Supreme Rada which will de-jure consolidate a "special situation" of Ukraine in connection with the Treaty, its "property right" on nuclear weapons.

His Excellency

William J. CLINTON

The President of the

United States of America

Washington, D.C.

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VD 2015-0815-M-2 (3,71)

4/19/2018

I will say frankly that we cannot and will not accept such an approach. This would run counter to the essence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as to Ukraine's commitments, taken under the Lisbon Protocol, that is to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state.

Recognition of Ukraine, even for a limited period of time, as the "sixth nuclear power" will irreversibly undermine the Treaty on the eve of discussions on the issue of its prolongation in 1995. Other volunteers will turn up straight away to try to acquire various "exceptions". One could recall for instance the recently ended North Korean crisis.

Very few days are left before the Budapest summit. The signing and exchange of ratification instruments may be hampered. We cannot let it happen. This will be a blow against the non-proliferation concept, and against the prestige of the states-depositaries. In connection with this I propose that, in a parallel manner, a clear signal should be delivered to Mr.L.Kuchma that it is necessary to turn to the only reasonable alternative.

In case Kiev does not find the nerve to legally reaffirm its non-nuclear status in joining the Treaty, the signing of the Memorandum on nuclear security assurances for Ukraine will be hardly possible for us, as well as putting the START-I into force. As a result this could make questionable the implementation of most significant agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, including also the far-reaching ones which we discussed with you in Washington.

As usual, I count on your understanding and support which were once again so clearly portrayed in your letter of November 28, 1994.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж. Клинтону
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Спасибо за твое дружеское послание от 28 ноября с.г. Полностью согласен с твоей высокой оценкой наших совместных действий в период иракского кризиса, по другим острым вопросам.

К сожалению, события ставят все новые непростые задачи перед российско-американским партнерством. Особенно беспокоит "незавершенность" процесса присоединения Украины к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО), ради которого мы с тобой столько поработали.

Хотелось бы, конечно, разделить твою надежду, что в Будапеште мы окончательно "закроем" этот вопрос.

Дело, однако, обстоит не так просто, и наши последние контакты с Киевом вызвали новые опасения. Вопрос упирается в то, как будет оформлено присоединение Украины к ДНЯО. С учетом известных решений Верховной Рады абсолютно необходимо, чтобы в украинском документе было недвусмысленно сказано, что Украина присоединяется к договору именно как неядерное государство. В то же время, как дают понять украинцы, в их варианте документа в той или иной форме будут воспроизведены оговорки Верховной Рады, которые де-юре закрепляли бы "особую ситуацию" Украины применительно к договору, ее "право собственности" на ядерное оружие.

Скажу прямо, такой подход мы принять не можем и не примем. Это противоречило бы сути самого договора о нераспространении, равно как и обязательствам Украины, уже взятым по Лиссабонскому протоколу, а именно – присоединиться к ДНЯО в качестве государства, не обладающего ядерным оружием.

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12 2015-0815-11-2 (3,72)

4/19/2018

Признание Украины, хотя бы на какое-то время, "шестой ядерной державой" необратимо подорвет договор в канун рассмотрения вопроса о его продлении в 1995 году. Сразу найдутся и другие охотники выторговать для себя различные "исключения". Вспомним хотя бы только что закончившийся кризис с КНДР.

До Будапешта остаются считанные дни. Подписание и обмен ратификационными документами могут быть сорваны. Допустить этого нельзя. Это будет удар по нераспространению, по престижу стран-депозитариев. В связи с этим предлагаю незамедлительно дать параллельный ясный сигнал Л.Кучме, что надо выходить на единственно разумный вариант.

Если же Киев не найдет в себе сил юридически подтвердить неядерный характер своего присоединения к договору, для нас вряд ли станет возможным подписание меморандума о гарантиях безопасности для Украины, равно как и введение в силу Договора СНВ-I. В результате под вопрос может быть поставлена реализация крупнейших договоренностей в сфере ядерного разоружения, в том числе и более далеких, которые мы с тобой обсуждали в Вашингтоне.

Как всегда, рассчитываю на твое понимание и поддержку, которые так ярко проявились опять в твоём послании от 28 ноября с.г.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

1 декабря 1994 г.

г.Москва, Кремль



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 1 » декабря 19 94 г.

№ Пр-1762

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Спасибо за твое дружеское послание от 28 ноября с.г. Полностью согласен с твоей высокой оценкой наших совместных действий в период иракского кризиса, по другим острым вопросам.

К сожалению, события ставят все новые непростые задачи перед российско-американским партнерством. Особенно беспокоит "незавершенность" процесса присоединения Украины к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО), ради которого мы с тобой столько поработали.

Хотелось бы, конечно, разделить твою надежду, что в Будапеште мы окончательно "закроем" этот вопрос.

Дело, однако, обстоит не так просто. И наши последние контакты с Киевом вызвали новые опасения. Вопрос упирается в то, как будет оформлено присоединение Украины к ДНЯО. С учетом известных решений Верховной Рады абсолютно необходимо, чтобы в украинском документе было недвусмысленно сказано, что Украина присоединяется к Договору именно как неядерное государство. В то же время, как дают понять украинцы, в их варианте документа в той или иной форме будут воспроизведены оговорки Верховной Рады, которые де-юре закрепляли бы "особую ситуацию" Украины применительно к Договору, ее "право собственности" на ядерное оружие.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖОРДЖУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Скажу прямо, такой подход мы принять не можем и не примем. Это противоречило бы сути самого Договора о нераспространении, равно как и обязательствам Украины, уже взятым по Лиссабонскому протоколу, а именно - присоединиться к ДНЯО в качестве государства, не обладающего ядерным оружием.

Признание Украины, хотя бы на какое-то время, "шестой ядерной державой" необратимо подорвет Договор в канун рассмотрения вопроса о его продлении в 1995 году. Сразу найдутся и другие охотники выторговать для себя различные "исключения". Вспомним хотя бы только что закончившийся кризис с КНДР.

До Будапешта остаются считанные дни. Подписание и обмен ратификационными документами могут быть сорваны. Допустить этого нельзя. Это будет удар по нераспространению, по престижу стран-депозитариев. В связи с этим предлагаю незамедлительно дать параллельный ясный сигнал Л.Кучме, что надо выходить на единственно разумный вариант.

Если же Киев не найдет в себе сил юридически подтвердить неядерный характер своего присоединения к Договору, для нас вряд ли станет возможным подписание меморандума о гарантиях безопасности для Украины, равно как и введение в силу Договора СНВ-1. В результате под вопрос может быть поставлена реализация крупнейших договоренностей в сфере ядерного разоружения, в том числе и более далеко идущих, которые мы с тобой обсуждали в Вашингтоне.

Как всегда, рассчитываю на твое понимание и поддержку, которые так ярко проявились опять в твоём послании от 28 ноября с.г.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Re: [Message to President Yeltsin from President Clinton] [Released in Part] (5 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/15/2022
001b. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on NATO Expansion (2 pages)	12/07/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. draft	[Draft of 001a] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001e. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001f. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001g. draft	Draft cable, re: [Message from the President to President Yeltsin] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002a. memo	[Duplicate of 001c] (2 pages)	12/07/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002b. draft	[Duplicate of 001d] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002c. letter	[Duplicate of 001e] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002d. letter	[Duplicate of 001f] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002e. draft	[Duplicate of 001g] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:

9409696

2014-0837-F

ke3320

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. memo	[Duplicate of 001e] (2 pages)	12/07/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002g. draft	[Duplicate of 001d] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002h. letter	[Duplicate of 001e] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002i. letter	[Duplicate of 001f] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002j. draft	[Duplicate of 001g] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002k. note	Todd Stern to the President, re: proposed message to President Yeltsin (1 page)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002l. draft	[Revised Draft of 001a] (2 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002m. memo	[Duplicate of 001e] (2 pages)	12/07/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002n. draft	[Duplicate of 001d] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002o. letter	[Duplicate of 001e] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002p. letter	[Duplicate of 001f] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
002q. draft	[Duplicate of 001g] (3 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ

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([Yeltsin and HS])
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~~S E C R E T~~
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TOR 3442029 NCN 01718760 PAGE 1

>>> N I A C T <<<

** DEMAND PRINT **

PRW837

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MATCH = ** NONE **

ACTION =

INFO =

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RVW804PRW837
OAAMZYUW YELADA 5049 3442029-MNSH--YEXXWHX YEKOHR. |
ZNY MMNSH ZKZ
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 102029Z DEC 94 ZFF-1/4
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO [EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)]

ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 2

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER IMMEDIATELY
UPON RECEIPT TO PRESIDENT YELSTIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM
CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC
COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY
OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON
THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE
THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL
CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS
AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC
DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU CHOSE, WITHOUT
ADVANCE WORD AND CONSULTATION, TO CRITICIZE PUBLICLY NATO S
DECISIONS ON ITS FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE.

ALONG WITH RUSSIA S SUDDEN REFUSAL ON DECEMBER 1 TO SIGN THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS, THESE ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP OUR GOVERNMENTS AND YOU AND I PERSONALLY HAVE
DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHEN WE MET IN SEPTEMBER YOU

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~~S E C R E T~~
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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (3.74)
11/29/2017

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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~~S E C R E T~~
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TOR 3442029 NCN 01718760 PAGE 2

>>> N I A C T <<<

MADE CLEAR RUSSIA S SENSITIVITIES OVER THE ISSUE OF NATO S EXPANSION, AND I PLEDGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENSURE NO SURPRISES FOR YOU AS WE BEGAN THE FIRST PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEK, I FEEL WE ADHERED SCRUPULOUSLY TO THAT PLEDGE.

WHILE I UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEFORE BUDAPEST THAT YOU HARBORED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION, THERE WAS NOTHING IN YOUR LETTERS THAT INDICATED THE APPROACH YOU CHOSE TO TAKE IN YOUR BUDAPEST REMARKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE AND TO AGREE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WHICH OF COURSE ARE NATURAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, ARE BETTER DISCUSSED FULLY IN PRIVATE BEFORE EITHER OF US FEELS COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE THE OTHER PUBLICLY. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE BUILT TOGETHER.

FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEPTION OF A U.S. - RUSSIA RIFT AS A SYMPTOM OF DEEPER PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.

FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEBATE. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I DO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR YOU PERSONALLY AND FOR ALL RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT YOU AND I WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I AM WELL AWARE THAT YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN PARTICULAR AND, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I AM TAKING THOSE INTO FULL ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEED.

YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE

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~~S E C R E T~~
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~~SECRET~~
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TOR 3442029 NCN 01718760 PAGE 2

>>> N I A C T <<<

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~~SECRET~~
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~~S E C R E T~~
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TOR 3442029 NCN 01718760 PAGE 3

>>> N I A C T <<<

TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE A FULL AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND #5049

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~~S E C R E T~~
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~~S E C R E T~~
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TOR 3442029 NCN 01718761 PAGE 1

>>> N I A C T <<<

** DEMAND PRINT **

PRW840

3442033

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RVW807PRW840
OAAMZYUW YELADA 5050 3442029-MNSH--YEXXWHX YEKOHR. |
ZNY MMNSH ZKZ
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 102029Z DEC 94 ZFF-1/4
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ
FINAL SECTION OF 2
REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR
EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND
LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE
FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

*
BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK
FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST
CONVENIENCE.

*
SINCERELY,

*
BILL

*
END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5050

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~~S E C R E T~~
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~S E C R E T~~

01 00

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Per E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (3.75)

11/29/2017

THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

~~S E C R E T VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS~~

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT TO PRESIDENT YELSTIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU CHOSE, WITHOUT ADVANCE WORD AND CONSULTATION, TO CRITICIZE PUBLICLY NATO'S DECISIONS ON ITS FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE.

ALONG WITH RUSSIA'S SUDDEN REFUSAL ON DECEMBER 1 TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS, THESE ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP OUR GOVERNMENTS AND YOU AND I PERSONALLY HAVE DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHEN WE MET IN SEPTEMBER YOU MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S SENSITIVITIES OVER THE ISSUE OF NATO'S EXPANSION, AND I PLEDGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENSURE NO SURPRISES FOR YOU AS WE BEGAN THE FIRST PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEK, I FEEL WE ADHERED SCRUPULOUSLY TO THAT PLEDGE.

WHILE I UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEFORE BUDAPEST THAT YOU HARBORED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION, THERE WAS NOTHING IN YOUR LETTERS THAT INDICATED THE APPROACH YOU CHOSE TO TAKE IN YOUR BUDAPEST REMARKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE AND TO AGREE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WHICH OF COURSE ARE NATURAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, ARE BETTER DISCUSSED FULLY IN PRIVATE BEFORE EITHER OF US FEELS COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE THE OTHER PUBLICLY. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE BUILT TOGETHER.

FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED

~~S E C R E T~~

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~~S E C R E T~~

02 00

CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEPTION OF A U.S. - RUSSIA "RIFT" AS A SYMPTOM OF DEEPER PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.

FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEBATE. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I DO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR YOU PERSONALLY AND FOR ALL RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT YOU AND I WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I AM WELL AWARE THAT YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN PARTICULAR AND, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I AM TAKING THOSE INTO FULL ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEED.

YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA'S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE A FULL AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

SINCERELY,

~~S E C R E T~~

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~~S E C R E T~~

03 00

BILL

END TEXT
DECL: OADR


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on NATO Expansion

Purpose

To give President Yeltsin your thoughts on the Budapest Summit and NATO expansion.

Background

Attached at Tab A is a message to Boris Yeltsin giving him your frank thoughts on his remarks at the Budapest summit and reaffirming the major outlines of our European security policy.

The message makes three basic points: 1) it conveys in unmistakably direct terms your disappointment over his public criticism of NATO and the U.S. and even your own role at Budapest and urges him to keep our disagreements private; 2) describes again your strong wish to help create a unified Europe without divisions in which Russia is fully integrated with the West; and 3) proposes that the Vice President and then Secretary Christopher pursue an intense dialogue with Russian officials on this issue.

We plan to have Ambassador Pickering deliver the text of your message with our own Russian translation so that Yeltsin sees and reads exactly what you mean to convey.

Given Yeltsin's remarks in Budapest, we need obviously to pursue a more intensive round of discussions on NATO expansion with the Russians. The Vice President will see Yeltsin on December 16 in Moscow and will seek to have an open and frank talk with him about what the NAC did and did not decide last week. We will then seek Russian agreement to have Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev begin a series of discussions on this issue in January. We want to keep these discussions bilateral and resist Yeltsin's urge to include Germany. Agreeing to such a proposal would cause us major problems with other NATO allies and would send the wrong message to the Central Europeans, many of whom fear the great powers will decide matters over their heads.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

We will also work interagency during the coming weeks to prepare ourselves for discussions with the Russians that are more direct and frank on European security than any we have had before. As you suggested to us in Budapest, it may be that the Russians are looking for a more clear view of how NATO expansion will play out in the long-term. While we cannot predict ourselves how events will unfold down the road, we can bring them into discussions that are more frank and open than those we have had with them in the past.

We hope to schedule a meeting with you and the Vice President early next week to discuss this issue before the Vice President's trip to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the transmission to Moscow of the message attached at Tab A. *Talbot and Fwerth concur.*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B December 2 Incoming Message from Yeltsin
Tab C December 1 Outgoing Message to Yeltsin

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION IMMEDIATELY UPON DELIVERY

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU CHOSE, WITHOUT ADVANCE WORD AND CONSULTATION, TO CRITICIZE PUBLICLY NATO'S DECISIONS ON ITS FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE. ALONG WITH RUSSIA'S SUDDEN REFUSAL ON DECEMBER 1 TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS, THESE ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP OUR GOVERNMENTS AND YOU AND I PERSONALLY HAVE DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHEN WE MET IN SEPTEMBER YOU MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S SENSITIVITIES OVER THE ISSUE OF NATO'S EXPANSION, AND I PLEDGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENSURE NO SURPRISES FOR YOU AS WE BEGAN THE FIRST PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEK, I FEEL WE ADHERED SCRUPULOUSLY TO THAT PLEDGE.

WHILE I UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEFORE BUDAPEST THAT YOU HARBORED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION, THERE WAS NOTHING IN YOUR LETTERS THAT INDICATED THE APPROACH YOU CHOSE TO TAKE IN YOUR BUDAPEST REMARKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE AND TO AGREE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WHICH OF COURSE ARE NATURAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, ARE BETTER DISCUSSED FULLY IN PRIVATE BEFORE EITHER OF US FEELS COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE THE OTHER PUBLICLY. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE BUILT TOGETHER.

FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE

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ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEPTION OF A U.S.-RUSSIA "RIFT" AS A SYMPTOM OF DEEPER PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.

FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEBATE. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I DO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR YOU PERSONALLY AND FOR ALL RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT YOU AND I WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I AM WELL AWARE THAT YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN PARTICULAR AND, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I AM TAKING THOSE INTO FULL ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEED.

YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA'S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I REGRET THAT I WILL BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO RUSSIA IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU PERSONALLY AS YOU PROPOSED IN YOUR LAST LETTER. MY DOMESTIC SCHEDULE IS TOO FULL TO CONSIDER ANOTHER TRIP OVERSEAS. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE AN OPEN AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

BILL CLINTON

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I have carefully read your message of December 2. The question of NATO evolution has become today central for our relations and for European stability as a whole. That is why nothing should be left insufficiently discussed between us in this question.

The meaning of my message to you of November 30 should not be seen as declaring alert. In the days before the Budapest summit I wanted to stress the importance of coordinated actions of Russia and the United States on issues of reforming European security structures.

I welcome your reaffirmation of our September agreements. It is important though that these be adequately reflected in relevant multilateral documents. I was confident that this would be the case with the NAC communique of December 1.

I can not agree with your appraisal of this document as containing nothing new and unexpected. I am not inclined to dramatize the situation, but the NAC desition requires careful analysis and explanations to us.

The Russia-NATO partnership program will be concluded, there should be no doubt here. A.Kozyrev will explain this to his colleagues. But we need assurances that enlargement, rather than partnership, is not being emphasized now. The problem should be tackled as a large-scale one, there should be dialogue on adopting specific obligations and security guarntees for Russia and NATO which would correspond to the nature of radical changes in the European situation. Only in this context one could contemplate NATO enlargement, the alliance being new and transformed through partnership.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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11/21/2017

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I think you will agree that a candid conversation is necessary in order to have, as you propose yourself, a clear view of our reciprocal approaches and of the prospects. I propose organizing such conversation with your participation as well as with that of Helmut Kohl in January next year at a residence near Moscow.

As for Nagorny Karabakh, our understanding on preparation and adoption of a Security Council resolution which would "bless" the start of a peace-keeping operation, preferably - according to the Haiti scenario, undoubtedly, stays in force. This resolution will be a serious document and it will not be possible to prepare it in a couple of days. That is why we should look forward towards including into the Budapest decisions, as Kozyrev and Christopher talked about this in Brussels, language on the CSCE making an important contribution within its powers and in close coordination with Russia (not in competition with it) into both the negotiating process and forming under UN auspices multinational peace-keeping forces for Nagorny Karabakh. The details have to be elaborated later. Naturally, parallel to this work would be undertaken on the text of a UNSC resolution. By the way, as far as I understand, Europeans support such an approach.

Looking forward to our meeting in Budapest.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 3, 1994

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием от 2 декабря с.г. Вопрос эволюции НАТО стал сегодня ключевым для наших отношений, да и для европейской стабильности в целом. Поэтому здесь между нами не должно оставаться ничего недосказанного.

Смысл моего послания к тебе от 30 ноября с.г. заключается не в том, чтобы бить тревогу. В преддверии саммита в Будапеште я хотел подчеркнуть важность скоординированных действий России и США в вопросах реформирования структур европейской безопасности.

Я приветствую подтверждение тобой наших сентябрьских договоренностей. Важно, однако, чтобы они получали адекватное отражение в соответствующих многосторонних документах. Я был уверен, что так будет и с коммюнике Совета НАТО, принятым 1 декабря.

Не могу согласиться с твоей оценкой этого документа как не содержащего ничего нового и неожиданного. Не склонен к драматизации, но принятое Советом НАТО решение требует тщательного анализа, разъяснений нам.

Программа партнерства "Россия-НАТО" будет заключена, сомнения здесь быть не должно. А.В.Козырев объяснит это своим коллегам. Однако нам нужны заверения, что акцент не переносится сейчас с партнерства на расширение. Всю проблему надо ставить по-крупному, вести речь о принятии конкретных обязательств и гарантий безопасности России и НАТО, соответствующих характеру кардинальных перемен в европейской ситуации. Только в этом контексте можно будет думать о расширении НАТО, причем новой, трансформированной партнерством НАТО.

Думаю, ты согласишься, что необходим откровенный разговор, чтобы, как ты сам предлагаешь, иметь точный взгляд на подходы друг друга и на перспективы. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор с участием тебя и Гельмута Коля в январе будущего года на даче под Москвой.

Что касается Нагорного Карабаха, наше взаимопонимание о подготовке и принятии резолюции Совета Безопасности, "благодаря которой" запуск миротворческой операции, желательно - по гаитянскому сценарию, безусловно, остается в силе. Эта резолюция - серьезный документ, и за пару дней ее не отработать. Поэтому, скорее, нам следует ориентироваться на то, чтобы в решениях Будапешта записать как об этом говорили в Брюсселе Козырев и Кристофер, что СБСЕ будет вносить важный посильный вклад в тесном взаимодействии с Россией (а не в соревновании с ней) как в переговорный процесс, так и в формирование под эгидой ООН многонациональных миротворческих сил для Нагорного Карабаха. Детали предстоит отработать позднее. Параллельно, естественно, шла бы работа и над текстом резолюции СБ ООН. Кстати, насколько я понимаю, европейцы поддерживают такой подход.

До встречи в Будапеште.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЦИН

Москва, Кремль
"3" декабря 1994 года

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11/21/07

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING -- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL, INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE. MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO, ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 1, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28. OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS

OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" OR ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUING A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 1997 DEC 7 P 9:59

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on NATO Expansion

Purpose

To give President Yeltsin your thoughts on the Budapest Summit and NATO expansion.

Background

Attached at Tab A is a message to Boris Yeltsin giving him your frank thoughts on his remarks at the Budapest summit and reaffirming the major outlines of our European security policy.

The message makes three basic points: 1) it conveys in unmistakably direct terms your disappointment over his public criticism of NATO and the U.S. and even your own role at Budapest and urges him to keep our disagreements private; 2) describes again your strong wish to help create a unified Europe without divisions in which Russia is fully integrated with the West; and 3) proposes that the Vice President and then Secretary Christopher pursue an intense dialogue with Russian officials on this issue.

We plan to have Ambassador Pickering deliver the text of your message with our own Russian translation so that Yeltsin sees and reads exactly what you mean to convey.

Given Yeltsin's remarks in Budapest, we need obviously to pursue a more intensive round of discussions on NATO expansion with the Russians. The Vice President will see Yeltsin on December 16 in Moscow and will seek to have an open and frank talk with him about what the NAC did and did not decide last week. We will then seek Russian agreement to have Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev begin a series of discussions on this issue in January. We want to keep these discussions bilateral and resist Yeltsin's urge to include Germany. Agreeing to such a proposal would cause us major problems with other NATO allies and would send the wrong message to the Central Europeans, many of whom fear the great powers will decide matters over their heads.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

11/29/2017

We will also work interagency during the coming weeks to prepare ourselves for discussions with the Russians that are more direct and frank on European security than any we have had before. As you suggested to us in Budapest, it may be that the Russians are looking for a more clear view of how NATO expansion will play out in the long-term. While we cannot predict ourselves how events will unfold down the road, we can bring them into discussions that are more frank and open than those we have had with them in the past.

We hope to schedule a meeting with you and the Vice President early next week to discuss this issue before the Vice President's trip to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the transmission to Moscow of the message attached at Tab A. *Talbot and Fuerth concur.*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B December 2 Incoming Message from Yeltsin
Tab C December 1 Outgoing Message to Yeltsin

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION IMMEDIATELY UPON DELIVERY

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU CHOSE, WITHOUT ADVANCE WORD AND CONSULTATION, TO CRITICIZE PUBLICLY NATO'S DECISIONS ON ITS FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE. ALONG WITH RUSSIA'S SUDDEN REFUSAL ON DECEMBER 1 TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS, THESE ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP OUR GOVERNMENTS AND YOU AND I PERSONALLY HAVE DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHEN WE MET IN SEPTEMBER YOU MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S SENSITIVITIES OVER THE ISSUE OF NATO'S EXPANSION, AND I PLEDGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENSURE NO SURPRISES FOR YOU AS WE BEGAN THE FIRST PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEK, I FEEL WE ADHERED SCRUPULOUSLY TO THAT PLEDGE.

WHILE I UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEFORE BUDAPEST THAT YOU HARBORED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION, THERE WAS NOTHING IN YOUR LETTERS THAT INDICATED THE APPROACH YOU CHOSE TO TAKE IN YOUR BUDAPEST REMARKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE AND TO AGREE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WHICH OF COURSE ARE NATURAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, ARE BETTER DISCUSSED FULLY IN PRIVATE BEFORE EITHER OF US FEELS COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE THE OTHER PUBLICLY. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE BUILT TOGETHER.

FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE

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11/29/2017

ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEPTION OF A U.S.-RUSSIA "RIFT" AS A SYMPTOM OF DEEPER PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.

FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEBATE. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I DO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR YOU PERSONALLY AND FOR ALL RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT YOU AND I WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I AM WELL AWARE THAT YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN PARTICULAR AND, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I AM TAKING THOSE INTO FULL ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEED.

YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA'S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I REGRET THAT I WILL BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO RUSSIA IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU PERSONALLY AS YOU PROPOSED IN YOUR LAST LETTER. MY DOMESTIC SCHEDULE IS TOO FULL TO CONSIDER ANOTHER TRIP OVERSEAS. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE AN OPEN AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

BILL CLINTON

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I have carefully read your message of December 2. The question of NATO evolution has become today central for our relations and for European stability as a whole. That is why nothing should be left insufficiently discussed between us in this question.

The meaning of my message to you of November 30 should not be seen as declaring alert. In the days before the Budapest summit I wanted to stress the importance of coordinated actions of Russia and the United States on issues of reforming European security structures.

I welcome your reaffirmation of our September agreements. It is important though that these be adequately reflected in relevant multilateral documents. I was confident that this would be the case with the NAC communique of December 1.

I can not agree with your appraisal of this document as containing nothing new and unexpected. I am not inclined to dramatize the situation, but the NAC desition requires careful analysis and explanations to us.

The Russia-NATO partnership program will be concluded, there should be no doubt here. A.Kozyrev will explain this to his colleagues. But we need assurances that enlargement, rather than partnership, is not being emphasized now. The problem should be tackled as a large-scale one, there should be dialogue on adopting specific obligations and security guarantees for Russia and NATO which would correspond to the nature of radical changes in the European situation. Only in this context one could contemplate NATO enlargement, the alliance being new and transformed through partnership.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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I think you will agree that a candid conversation is necessary in order to have, as you propose yourself, a clear view of our reciprocal approaches and of the prospects. I propose organizing such conversation with your participation as well as with that of Helmut Kohl in January next year at a residence near Moscow.

As for Nagorny Karabakh, our understanding on preparation and adoption of a Security Council resolution which would "bless" the start of a peace-keeping operation, preferably - according to the Haiti scenario, undoubtedly, stays in force. This resolution will be a serious document and it will not be possible to prepare it in a couple of days. That is why we should look forward towards including into the Budapest decisions, as Kozyrev and Christopher talked about this in Brussels, language on the CSCE making an important contribution within its powers and in close coordination with Russia (not in competition with it) into both the negotiating process and forming under UN auspices multinational peace-keeping forces for Nagorny Karabakh. The details have to be elaborated later. Naturally, parallel to this work would be undertaken on the text of a UNSC resolution. By the way, as far as I understand, Europeans support such an approach.

Looking forward to our meeting in Budapest.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 3, 1994

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием от 2 декабря с.г. Вопрос эволюции НАТО стал сегодня ключевым для наших отношений, да и для европейской стабильности в целом. Поэтому здесь между нами не должно оставаться ничего недосказанного.

Смысл моего послания к тебе от 30 ноября с.г. заключается не в том, чтобы бить тревогу. В преддверии саммита в Будапеште я хотел подчеркнуть важность скоординированных действий России и США в вопросах реформирования структур европейской безопасности.

Я приветствую подтверждение тобой наших сентябрьских договоренностей. Важно, однако, чтобы они получали адекватное отражение в соответствующих многосторонних документах. Я был уверен, что так будет и с коммюнике Совета НАТО, принятым 1 декабря.

Не могу согласиться с твоей оценкой этого документа как не содержащего ничего нового и неожиданного. Не склонен к драматизации, но принятое Советом НАТО решение требует тщательного анализа, разъяснений нам.

Программа партнерства "Россия-НАТО" будет заключена, сомнения здесь быть не должно. А.В. Козырев объяснит это своим коллегам. Однако нам нужны заверения, что акцент не переносится сейчас с партнерства на расширение. Всю проблему надо ставить по-крупному, вести речь о принятии конкретных обязательств и гарантий безопасности России и НАТО, соответствующих характеру кардинальных перемен в европейской ситуации. Только в этом контексте можно будет думать о расширении НАТО, причем новой, трансформированной партнерством НАТО.

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Думаю, ты согласишься, что необходим откровенный разговор, чтобы, как ты сам предлагаешь, иметь точный взгляд на подходы друг друга и на перспективы. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор с участием тебя и Гельмута Коля в январе будущего года на даче под Москвой.

Что касается Нагорного Карабаха, наше взаимопонимание о подготовке и принятии резолюции Совета Безопасности, "благославляющей" запуск миротворческой операции, желательно - по гаитянской сценарию, безусловно, остается в силе. Эта резолюция - серьезный документ, и за пару дней ее не отработать. Поэтому, скорее, нам следует ориентироваться на то, чтобы в решениях Будапешта записать как об этом говорили в Брюсселе Козырев и Кристоффер, что СБСЕ будет вносить важный посильный вклад в тесном взаимодействии с Россией (а не в соревновании с ней) как в переговорный процесс, так и в формирование под эгидой ООН многонациональных миротворческих сил для Нагорного Карабаха. Детали предстоит отработать позднее. Параллельно, естественно, шла бы работа и над текстом резолюции СБ ООН. Кстати, насколько я понимаю, европейцы поддерживают такой подход.

До встречи в Будапеште.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль
"3" декабря 1994 года

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2017/11/29

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING -- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL, INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE. MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO, ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 1, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28, OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS

OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" OR ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSING A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

December 7, 1994

94 DEC 7 P 9:59

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on NATO Expansion

Purpose

To give President Yeltsin your thoughts on the Budapest Summit and NATO expansion.

Background

Attached at Tab A is a message to Boris Yeltsin giving him your frank thoughts on his remarks at the Budapest summit and reaffirming the major outlines of our European security policy.

The message makes three basic points: 1) it conveys in unmistakably direct terms your disappointment over his public criticism of NATO and the U.S. and even your own role at Budapest and urges him to keep our disagreements private; 2) describes again your strong wish to help create a unified Europe without divisions in which Russia is fully integrated with the West; and 3) proposes that the Vice President and then Secretary Christopher pursue an intense dialogue with Russian officials on this issue.

We plan to have Ambassador Pickering deliver the text of your message with our own Russian translation so that Yeltsin sees and reads exactly what you mean to convey.

Given Yeltsin's remarks in Budapest, we need obviously to pursue a more intensive round of discussions on NATO expansion with the Russians. The Vice President will see Yeltsin on December 16 in Moscow and will seek to have an open and frank talk with him about what the NAC did and did not decide last week. We will then seek Russian agreement to have Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev begin a series of discussions on this issue in January. We want to keep these discussions bilateral and resist Yeltsin's urge to include Germany. Agreeing to such a proposal would cause us major problems with other NATO allies and would send the wrong message to the Central Europeans, many of whom fear the great powers will decide matters over their heads.

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PER E.O. 13526

2017/11/24

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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We will also work interagency during the coming weeks to prepare ourselves for discussions with the Russians that are more direct and frank on European security than any we have had before. As you suggested to us in Budapest, it may be that the Russians are looking for a more clear view of how NATO expansion will play out in the long-term. While we cannot predict ourselves how events will unfold down the road, we can bring them into discussions that are more frank and open than those we have had with them in the past.

We hope to schedule a meeting with you and the Vice President early next week to discuss this issue before the Vice President's trip to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the transmission to Moscow of the message attached at Tab A. *Talbot and Fuertth concur.*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Message to Yeltsin
- Tab B December 2 Incoming Message from Yeltsin
- Tab C December 1 Outgoing Message to Yeltsin

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION IMMEDIATELY UPON DELIVERY

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU CHOSE, WITHOUT ADVANCE WORD AND CONSULTATION, TO CRITICIZE PUBLICLY NATO'S DECISIONS ON ITS FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE. ALONG WITH RUSSIA'S SUDDEN REFUSAL ON DECEMBER 1 TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS, THESE ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP OUR GOVERNMENTS AND YOU AND I PERSONALLY HAVE DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHEN WE MET IN SEPTEMBER YOU MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S SENSITIVITIES OVER THE ISSUE OF NATO'S EXPANSION, AND I PLEDGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENSURE NO SURPRISES FOR YOU AS WE BEGAN THE FIRST PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEK, I FEEL WE ADHERED SCRUPULOUSLY TO THAT PLEDGE.

WHILE I UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEFORE BUDAPEST THAT YOU HARBORED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION, THERE WAS NOTHING IN YOUR LETTERS THAT INDICATED THE APPROACH YOU CHOSE TO TAKE IN YOUR BUDAPEST REMARKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE AND TO AGREE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WHICH OF COURSE ARE NATURAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, ARE BETTER DISCUSSED FULLY IN PRIVATE BEFORE EITHER OF US FEELS COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE THE OTHER PUBLICLY. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE BUILT TOGETHER.

FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE

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ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEPTION OF A U.S.-RUSSIA "RIFT" AS A SYMPTOM OF DEEPER PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.

FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEBATE. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I DO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR YOU PERSONALLY AND FOR ALL RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT YOU AND I WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I AM WELL AWARE THAT YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN PARTICULAR AND, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I AM TAKING THOSE INTO FULL ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEED.

YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA'S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I REGRET THAT I WILL BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO RUSSIA IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU PERSONALLY AS YOU PROPOSED IN YOUR LAST LETTER. MY DOMESTIC SCHEDULE IS TOO FULL TO CONSIDER ANOTHER TRIP OVERSEAS. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE AN OPEN AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

BILL CLINTON

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I have carefully read your message of December 2. The question of NATO evolution has become today central for our relations and for European stability as a whole. That is why nothing should be left insufficiently discussed between us in this question.

The meaning of my message to you of November 30 should not be seen as declaring alert. In the days before the Budapest summit I wanted to stress the importance of coordinated actions of Russia and the United States on issues of reforming European security structures.

I welcome your reaffirmation of our September agreements. It is important though that these be adequately reflected in relevant multilateral documents. I was confident that this would be the case with the NAC communique of December 1.

I can not agree with your appraisal of this document as containing nothing new and unexpected. I am not inclined to dramatize the situation, but the NAC desition requires careful analysis and explanations to us.

The Russia-NATO partnership program will be concluded, there should be no doubt here. A.Kozyrev will explain this to his colleagues. But we need assurances that enlargement, rather than partnership, is not being emphasized now. The problem should be tackled as a large-scale one, there should be dialogue on adopting specific obligations and security guarantees for Russia and NATO which would correspond to the nature of radical changes in the European situation. Only in this context one could contemplate NATO enlargement, the alliance being new and transformed through partnership.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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I think you will agree that a candid conversation is necessary in order to have, as you propose yourself, a clear view of our reciprocal approaches and of the prospects. I propose organizing such conversation with your participation as well as with that of Helmut Kohl in January next year at a residence near Moscow.

As for Nagorny Karabakh, our understanding on preparation and adoption of a Security Council resolution which would "bless" the start of a peace-keeping operation, preferably - according to the Haiti scenario, undoubtedly, stays in force. This resolution will be a serious document and it will not be possible to prepare it in a couple of days. That is why we should look forward towards including into the Budapest decisions, as Kozyrev and Christopher talked about this in Brussels, language on the CSCE making an important contribution within its powers and in close coordination with Russia (not in competition with it) into both the negotiating process and forming under UN auspices multinational peace-keeping forces for Nagorny Karabakh. The details have to be elaborated later. Naturally, parallel to this work would be undertaken on the text of a UNSC resolution. By the way, as far as I understand, Europeans support such an approach.

Looking forward to our meeting in Budapest.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 3, 1994

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием от 2 декабря с.г. Вопрос эволюции НАТО стал сегодня ключевым для наших отношений, да и для европейской стабильности в целом. Поэтому здесь между нами не должно оставаться ничего недосказанного.

Смысл моего послания к тебе от 30 ноября с.г. заключается не в том, чтобы бить тревогу. В преддверии саммита в Будапеште я хотел подчеркнуть важность скоординированных действий России и США в вопросах реформирования структур европейской безопасности.

Я приветствую подтверждение тобой наших сентябрьских договоренностей. Важно, однако, чтобы они получали адекватное отражение в соответствующих многосторонних документах. Я был уверен, что так будет и с коммюнике Совета НАТО, принятым 1 декабря.

Не могу согласиться с твоей оценкой этого документа как не содержащего ничего нового и неожиданного. Не склонен к драматизации, но принятое Советом НАТО решение требует тщательного анализа, разъяснений нам.

Программа партнерства "Россия-НАТО" будет заключена, сомнений здесь быть не должно. А.В.Козырев объяснит это своим коллегам. Однако нам нужны заверения, что акцент не переносится сейчас с партнерства на расширение. Всю проблему надо ставить по-крупному, вести речь о принятии конкретных обязательств и гарантий безопасности России и НАТО, соответствующих характеру кардинальных перемен в европейской ситуации. Только в этом контексте можно будет думать о расширении НАТО, причем новой, трансформированной партнерством НАТО.

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11/24/2017

Думаю, ты согласишься, что необходим откровенный разговор, чтобы, как ты сам предлагаешь, иметь точный взгляд на подходы друг друга и на перспективы. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор с участием тебя и Гельмута Коля в январе будущего года на даче под Москвой.

Что касается Нагорного Карабаха, наше взаимопонимание о подготовке и принятии резолюции Совета Безопасности, "благодаря" запуск миротворческой операции, желательного – по гаитянскому сценарию, безусловно, остается в силе. Эта резолюция – серьезный документ, и за пару дней ее не отработать. Поэтому, скорее, нам следует ориентироваться на то, чтобы в решениях Будапешта записать как об этом говорили в Брюсселе Козырев и Кристофер, что СБСЕ будет вносить важный посильный вклад в тесном взаимодействии с Россией (а не в соревновании с ней) как в переговорный процесс, так и в формирование под эгидой ООН многонациональных миротворческих сил для Нагорного Карабаха. Детали предстоит отработать позднее. Параллельно, естественно, шла бы работа и над текстом резолюции СБ ООН. Кстати, насколько я понимаю, европейцы поддерживают такой подход.

До встречи в Будапеште.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

Москва, Кремль
"3" декабря 1994 года

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING -- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL, INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE. MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO, ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 10, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28, OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS

OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" OR ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSING A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 9, 1994

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a proposed message to President Yeltsin on NATO expansion expressing your disappointment about his remarks in Budapest and reiterating the basic thrust of our European security policy.

NSC is very eager for you to review and clear the proposed message. Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth concur.

Approve

Disapprove

Discuss


Todd Stern

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v2 2015-0815-M-2 (3.91)

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION IMMEDIATELY UPON DELIVERY

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU CHOSE, WITHOUT ADVANCE WORD AND CONSULTATION, TO CRITICIZE PUBLICLY NATO'S DECISIONS ON ITS FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE. ALONG WITH RUSSIA'S SUDDEN REFUSAL ON DECEMBER 1 TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DOCUMENTS, THESE ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP OUR GOVERNMENTS AND YOU AND I PERSONALLY HAVE DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHEN WE MET IN SEPTEMBER YOU MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S SENSITIVITIES OVER THE ISSUE OF NATO'S EXPANSION, AND I PLEDGED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENSURE NO SURPRISES FOR YOU AS WE BEGAN THE FIRST PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEK, I FEEL WE ADHERED SCRUPULOUSLY TO THAT PLEDGE.

WHILE I UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEFORE BUDAPEST THAT YOU HARBORED CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION, THERE WAS NOTHING IN YOUR LETTERS THAT INDICATED THE APPROACH YOU CHOSE TO TAKE IN YOUR BUDAPEST REMARKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE AND TO AGREE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WHICH OF COURSE ARE NATURAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT POWERS, ARE BETTER DISCUSSED FULLY IN PRIVATE BEFORE EITHER OF US FEELS COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE THE OTHER PUBLICLY. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE BUILT TOGETHER.

FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE

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11/29/2017

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ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEPTION OF A U.S. - RUSSIA "RIFT" AS A SYMPTOM OF DEEPER PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.

FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEBATE. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I DO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE FOR YOU PERSONALLY AND FOR ALL RUSSIANS. I BELIEVE IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT YOU AND I WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I AM WELL AWARE THAT YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT NATO EXPANSION IN PARTICULAR AND, AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I AM TAKING THOSE INTO FULL ACCOUNT AS WE PROCEED.

YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA'S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE AN OPEN AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 1999 **DEC 7 P 9: 59**ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on NATO Expansion

Purpose

To give President Yeltsin your thoughts on the Budapest Summit and NATO expansion.

Background

Attached at Tab A is a message to Boris Yeltsin giving him your frank thoughts on his remarks at the Budapest summit and reaffirming the major outlines of our European security policy.

The message makes three basic points: 1) it conveys in unmistakably direct terms your disappointment over his public criticism of NATO and the U.S. and even your own role at Budapest and urges him to keep our disagreements private; 2) describes again your strong wish to help create a unified Europe without divisions in which Russia is fully integrated with the West; and 3) proposes that the Vice President and then Secretary Christopher pursue an intense dialogue with Russian officials on this issue.

We plan to have Ambassador Pickering deliver the text of your message with our own Russian translation so that Yeltsin sees and reads exactly what you mean to convey.

Given Yeltsin's remarks in Budapest, we need obviously to pursue a more intensive round of discussions on NATO expansion with the Russians. The Vice President will see Yeltsin on December 16 in Moscow and will seek to have an open and frank talk with him about what the NAC did and did not decide last week. We will then seek Russian agreement to have Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev begin a series of discussions on this issue in January. We want to keep these discussions bilateral and resist Yeltsin's urge to include Germany. Agreeing to such a proposal would cause us major problems with other NATO allies and would send the wrong message to the Central Europeans, many of whom fear the great powers will decide matters over their heads.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Declassify on: **PAGE****CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY**

We will also work interagency during the coming weeks to prepare ourselves for discussions with the Russians that are more direct and frank on European security than any we have had before. As you suggested to us in Budapest, it may be that the Russians are looking for a more clear view of how NATO expansion will play out in the long-term. While we cannot predict ourselves how events will unfold down the road, we can bring them into discussions that are more frank and open than those we have had with them in the past.

We hope to schedule a meeting with you and the Vice President early next week to discuss this issue before the Vice President's trip to Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the transmission to Moscow of the message attached at Tab A. *Talbot and Fuerth concur.*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A	Message to Yeltsin
Tab B	December 2 Incoming Message from Yeltsin
Tab C	December 1 Outgoing Message to Yeltsin

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION IMMEDIATELY UPON DELIVERY

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AFTER MY RETURN FROM BUDAPEST BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT BOTH THE TONE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND EVEN ON THE NATURE OF MY OWN PARTICIPATION THERE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAN THE ONE WE HAVE HAD DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. I THINK YOU WILL CONCUR THAT WE NEED A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND THAT WE SHOULD DEDICATE OURSELVES TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE.

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FOR MY PART, I WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE IN MY OWN PUBLIC COMMENTS MY STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROVIDE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE AS AN UNDIVIDED CONTINENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE HERE, AND TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOR ANYONE TO BE

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YOU ALSO KNOW FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AIM OF THE U.S. IS TO HELP CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED, STABLE AND PEACEFUL EUROPE IN THE NEXT CENTURY IN WHICH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE CAN FULLY PARTICIPATE. THIS PROCESS, WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO COMPLETE, MUST INCLUDE A STRENGTHENED CSCE. IT MUST ALSO INCLUDE A RENEWED NATO. BORN IN THE COLD WAR, NATO WAS, AND REMAINS, A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WITH THE COLD WAR OVER, NATO MUST NOW EVOLVE THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AS AN ADDITIONAL MISSION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A LONG-TERM PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES; AND THROUGH GRADUAL EXPANSION OVER TIME. THIS PROCESS MUST RESULT IN RUSSIA'S FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST THROUGH YOUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE PARIS CLUB AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS, YOUR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE G-7 AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. THAT COLLABORATION COULD POSSIBLY EVOLVE TOWARD MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RAISED IN YOUR DECEMBER 3 LETTER CONCERNING NATO'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OUR COMMON AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A FULL INTEGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST -- INCLUDING STRENGTHENED LINKS WITH NATO -- WITH NO NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. I REGRET THAT I WILL BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO RUSSIA IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU PERSONALLY AS YOU PROPOSED IN YOUR LAST LETTER. MY DOMESTIC SCHEDULE IS TOO FULL TO CONSIDER ANOTHER TRIP OVERSEAS. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO HAVE AN OPEN AND CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH YOU WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK. HE AND I WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER INTENSIVELY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I WOULD PROPOSE FURTHER THAT MINISTER KOZYREV AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MEET IN JANUARY AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF OUR EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA. YOU AND I CAN BE IN TOUCH BY PHONE AND LETTER ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD TO PREPARE FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

3

BORIS, WE MUST NOT ALLOW THESE DIFFERENCES TO PERSIST. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

BILL CLINTON

Dear Bill:

I have carefully read your message of December 2. The question of NATO evolution has become today central for our relations and for European stability as a whole. That is why nothing should be left insufficiently discussed between us in this question.

The meaning of my message to you of November 30 should not be seen as declaring alert. In the days before the Budapest summit I wanted to stress the importance of coordinated actions of Russia and the United States on issues of reforming European security structures.

I welcome your reaffirmation of our September agreements. It is important though that these be adequately reflected in relevant multilateral documents. I was confident that this would be the case with the NAC communique of December 1.

I can not agree with your appraisal of this document as containing nothing new and unexpected. I am not inclined to dramatize the situation, but the NAC desition requires careful analysis and explanations to us.

The Russia-NATO partnership program will be concluded, there should be no doubt here. A.Kozyrev will explain this to his colleagues. But we need assurances that enlargement, rather than partnership, is not being emphasized now. The problem should be tackled as a large-scale one, there should be dialogue on adopting specific obligations and security guarantees for Russia and NATO which would correspond to the nature of radical changes in the European situation. Only in this context one could contemplate NATO enlargement, the alliance being new and transformed through partnership.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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11/29/2017

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I think you will agree that a candid conversation is necessary in order to have, as you propose yourself, a clear view of our reciprocal approaches and of the prospects. I propose organizing such conversation with your participation as well as with that of Helmut Kohl in January next year at a residence near Moscow.

As for Nagorny Karabakh, our understanding on preparation and adoption of a Security Council resolution which would "bless" the start of a peace-keeping operation, preferably according to the Haiti scenario, undoubtedly, stays in force. This resolution will be a serious document and it will not be possible to prepare it in a couple of days. That is why we should look forward towards including into the Budapest decisions, as Kozyrev and Christopher talked about this in Brussels, language on the CSCE making an important contribution within its powers and in close coordination with Russia (not in competition with it) into both the negotiating process and forming under UN auspices multinational peace-keeping forces for Nagorny Karabakh. The details have to be elaborated later. Naturally, parallel to this work would be undertaken on the text of a UNSC resolution. By the way, as far as I understand, Europeans support such an approach.

Looking forward to our meeting in Budapest.

Sincerely,

B. YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 3, 1994

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием от 2 декабря с.г. Вопрос эволюции НАТО стал сегодня ключевым для наших отношений, да и для европейской стабильности в целом. Поэтому здесь между нами не должно оставаться ничего недосказанного.

Смысл моего послания к тебе от 30 ноября с.г. заключается не в том, чтобы бить тревогу. В преддверии саммита в Будапеште я хотел подчеркнуть важность скоординированных действий России и США в вопросах реформирования структур европейской безопасности.

Я приветствую подтверждение тобой наших сентябрьских договоренностей. Важно, однако, чтобы они получали адекватное отражение в соответствующих многосторонних документах. Я был уверен, что так будет и с коммюнике Совета НАТО, принятым 1 декабря.

Не могу согласиться с твоей оценкой этого документа как не содержащего ничего нового и неожиданного. Не склонен к драматизации, но принятое Советом НАТО решение требует тщательного анализа, разъяснений нам.

Программа партнерства "Россия-НАТО" будет заключена, сомнений здесь быть не должно. А.В. Козырев объяснит это своим коллегам. Однако нам нужны заверения, что акцент не переносится сейчас с партнерства на расширение. Всю проблему надо ставить по-крупному, вести речь о принятии конкретных обязательств и гарантий безопасности России и НАТО, соответствующих характеру кардинальных перемен в европейской ситуации. Только в этом контексте можно будет думать о расширении НАТО, причем новой, трансформированной партнерством НАТО.

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Думаю, ты согласишься, что необходим откровенный разговор, чтобы, как ты сам предлагаешь, иметь точный взгляд на подходы друг друга и на перспективы. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор с участием тебя и Гельмута Коля в январе будущего года на даче под Москвой.

Что касается Нагорного Карабаха, наше взаимопонимание о подготовке и принятии резолюции Совета Безопасности, "благославляющей" запуск миротворческой операции, желательно - по гаитянскому сценарию, безусловно, остается в силе. Эта резолюция - серьезный документ, и за пару дней ее не отработать. Поэтому, скорее, нам следует ориентироваться на то, чтобы в решениях Будапешта записать, как об этом говорили в Брюсселе Козырев и Кристофер, что СБСЕ будет вносить важный посильный вклад в тесном взаимодействии с Россией (а не в соревновании с ней) как в переговорный процесс, так и в формирование под эгидой ООН многонациональных миротворческих сил для Нагорного Карабаха. Детали предстоит отработать позднее. Параллельно, естественно, шла бы работа и над текстом резолюции СБ ООН. Кстати, насколько я понимаю, европейцы поддерживают такой подход.

До встречи в Будапеште.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЦИН

Москва, Кремль
"3" декабря 1994 года

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

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11/24/2017

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I WANTED TO BE SURE TO RESPOND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY CLOSELY COORDINATED ON TWO KEY ISSUES: NATO AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION ON BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE WE SEE EACH OTHER IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY HOW SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED I WAS TO LEARN OF ANDREI KOZYREV'S ACTIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1. WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL OUR PLANS REGARDING A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE ADHERED ASSIDUOUSLY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH YOU AND I AGREED: NO SURPRISES; HIGH PRIORITY ON MAINTAINING -- AND STRENGTHENING -- THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP; AND CAREFUL, INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT DELIBERATIONS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINION AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

THESE PRINCIPLES REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES WERE WELL SERVED WHEN, AT A MEETING ARRANGED AT RUSSIA'S REQUEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR ADHERENCE TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND TO BEGIN A NEW STAGE IN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, ANDREI UNEXPECTEDLY STATED RUSSIA'S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THESE STEPS. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SUCH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST IN PRIVATE. MY EXPERTS BRIEFED YOURS IN DETAIL, AND WELL IN ADVANCE, ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NAC COMMUNIQUE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, TOO, ANDREI HAD NO REASON FOR SURPRISE - MUCH LESS AN UNPLEASANT ONE.

AT THE MOMENT WE RECEIVED THE NEWS FROM BRUSSELS OF ANDREI'S ACTION, I WAS AT WORK ON A RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. THAT LETTER, AND ANDREI'S STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS, REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE CLEAR UP THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REFERENCES IN YOUR LETTER TO "SPEEDING UP THE EXPANSION OF NATO," "ADOPTION OF AN EXPEDITED TIMETABLE," AND "PLANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES" ALL SUGGEST AN INACCURATE VIEW OF MY APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE AND OF THE PROPOSALS THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MADE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) ON DECEMBER 1, WHICH THE NAC ENDORSED AS I LAST WROTE YOU ON NOVEMBER 28. OUR INTENTION AT THE NAC WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS

OF EXAMINING THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL ENTER NATO, OR WHEN. WE DID NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDER AT THE DECEMBER 1 NATO MEETING A TIMETABLE OR LIST OF CANDIDATE NATIONS, OR INITIATE ALLIANCE WORK ON THESE QUESTIONS. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED PARTNERS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT YEAR AFTER NATO COMPLETES ITS INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS" OR ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT A PRESENTATION OF NATO THINKING ON THE PURPOSES OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP.

I BELIEVE THAT CHRIS EXPLAINED THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION TO ANDREI IN BRUSSELS. I KNOW THAT ANDREI ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF NATO POLICY YESTERDAY. I HOPE IN LIGHT OF MY CLARIFICATION TO YOU THAT IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ANDREI SIGN THESE DOCUMENTS AS WE HAD EXPECTED.

OUR APPROACH TO NATO HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE BROADER, INCLUSIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH ARE CENTERED ON THE CSCE. I PUT FORWARD IN MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND OTHER CSCE COLLEAGUES AN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CSCE. WE ALSO CAN AGREE WITH PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE CSCE TO THE "ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE." THROUGH THESE STEPS WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE STRONGER ROLE FOR CSCE WHICH YOU AND I DESIRE.

ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY SENSE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN BUDAPEST ON MONDAY, ACTING TOGETHER AS WE AGREED IN SEPTEMBER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CSCE ALREADY POSSESSES THE MANDATE FOR PEACEKEEPING. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT AND IS IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UN CHARTER. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BUDAPEST SUMMIT REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FAITH IN THE MANDATE WE HAVE GIVEN THE CSCE BY ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. WE CAN DO THIS BY INCLUDING IN THE FINAL STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT A CALL FOR DEPLOYING A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

THIS PAST SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON, WE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. YOU EXPRESSED AT THAT TIME CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CSCE'S ABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

I BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN SHOULD LAY TO REST YOUR RESERVATIONS. THE CSCE MINSK GROUP HAS WORKED HARD TO ASSEMBLE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THIRTY-NINE STATES HAVE OFFERED STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT AND MORE THAN 20 MEMBER STATES HAVE ALREADY STEPPED FORWARD WITH OFFERS OF TROOPS OR RESOURCES. IF THE SUMMIT ENDORSES A PEACEKEEPING

OPERATION, I AM CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS WILL STEP FORWARD.

THESE COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO CREATE A CSCE-LED MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, MY VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIAN/NIS COMPONENT COULD COMPRISE UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. YOUR COMMITMENT TO CSCE AND IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD BE EVIDENT TO ALL.

FROM OUR LENGTHY EXCHANGES, AND THOSE OF OUR SUBORDINATES, I AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE ARE WILLING TO INTRODUCE WITH YOU A RESOLUTION AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS A CSCE OPERATION. WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO ENHANCE THE CSCE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING THE PROVISION OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CSCE ON PEACEKEEPING.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN PLACE ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BORIS, RUSSIAN MEDIATION HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. I WOULD EXPECT THAT RUSSIA'S KEY AND ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSING A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN AGREEING AT BUDAPEST TO TAKE THIS PEACE PROCESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. DOING SO WILL UNDERSCORE THE CSCE'S GROWING STATURE AS AN ORGANIZATION THAT CAN TACKLE DIFFICULT SECURITY ISSUES AND WILL HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT RESULT FROM OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO PARTNERSHIP.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	12/13/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (3 pages)	12/13/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: CFE Treaty: Letter from President Yeltsin (2 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002b. letter	[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	12/13/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
002c. memo	Anne Witkowsky to Anthony Lake, re: CFE Treaty: Letter from President Yeltsin (1 page)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:

9409826

2014-0837-F
 ke3321

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Unofficial translationDecember 13, 1994
Moscow

Dear Bill,

As I have told you in Washington, Russia is still adherent to the CFE Treaty. In spite of all our difficulties we are doing maximum within our capabilities to fulfil it.

At the same time I want to stress again that the flank problem - if not resolved urgently - can undermine the very basis of the Treaty.

Since September 1993 when I first addressed you with a personal letter underlining the principled importance for Russia of resolving the flank problem stemming from the CFE Treaty Russia has spared much effort to explain to the partners by the Treaty the essence of our concerns and to try to jointly work out mutually acceptable solutions. I have to state that the reaction of the American side and of other Western colleagues to our proposals does not satisfy Russia.

Nor can we be satisfied with the results of the recent trilateral consultations in London where the latest attempt to find a solution to the flank problem has been taken. Variants of proposed solutions to us - to use the opportunities permitted by the Treaty - do not remove completely Russian concerns. Not to mention the fact that the measures taken in the framework of the existing Treaty rights and obligations do not require any additional consultations with the parties to the Treaty and, on the legal basis, can be and will be accomplished by our side unilaterally.

His Excellency

William J. CLINTON

The President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

PER E.O. 13526

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N2 2015-0815-A-2 (3,98)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 4/19/2018

The problem could be resolved in a general way on the basis of the two Russian proposals presented earlier. Firstly, that is by means of a minor adjustment of the commitments layed out in the Statement of the Government of the Soviet Union of June 14, 1991 regarding conventional armaments and equipment at the disposal of the Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry.

The adjustment consists in not placing these armaments under the flank limitations stipulated by the Treaty. At the same time the commitment worded in the Statement to hold, by the end of the reduction period, the armaments of the Coastal Defense forces and the Naval Infantry within the aggregate maximum numerical limitations set for Russia, would remain valid. Adherence to this commitment could be reaffirmed by a corresponding additional statement by the Russian Government.

Secondly, a change of border lines of the flank military districts of Russia could serve as an additional measure. The map with the new border lines of the flank districts of Russia can be passed to the Joint consultative group on CFE Treaty, and to the depository of the Treaty, and circulated among all the parties to the Treaty on December 15, 1994 during the annual information exchange.

Even then such a decision leaves us in a difficult situation considering the fact that we are obliged to maintain considerable forces in the "hot spots" such as Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova. Though this is a topic for a separate discussion in the framework of the peaceful settlement which you and me are trying to reach with the help of the CSCE and the UN.

Taking into account that the time factor urges us to resolve, without a delay, the problem of flanks, I propose that our representatives meet in the earliest possible time to discuss these ideas. Consultations on this issue could be also held, as you have proposed, in a broader format - with the participation of the UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Norway and Ukraine.

I suppose that our states are interested in maintaining the effectiveness and viability of the CFE Treaty which is one of the corner-stones of European security. We would no like to have Russia, being placed in a difficult and unequal position, when its security interests are

not taken into consideration and its peace-keeping efforts are damaged, act on a unilateral basis.

At the same time, Bill, I'll be utmostly frank: if we are unable to find mutually acceptable compromises to the flank problem, Russia will have no other option in 1995, than to exceed Treaty limitations on conventional armaments in its flank area. I mean, of course, that this excess will only be temporary.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Как я говорил тебе в Вашингтоне, Россия по-прежнему остается приверженной Договору об ОБСЕ. Несмотря на все имеющиеся у нас сложности, мы делаем максимум возможного для его выполнения.

В то же время хочу вновь подчеркнуть, что фланговая проблема — без ее срочного решения — грозит подорвать саму основу Договора.

За время, прошедшее с сентября 1993 года, когда я впервые обратился к тебе с личным посланием относительно принципиальной важности для России решения фланговой проблемы по Договору об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе, Россия предприняла немало усилий, чтобы разъяснить партнерам по Договору суть наших озабоченностей и попытаться сообща найти взаимоприемлемые решения. Вынужден констатировать, что реакция американской стороны и других западных коллег на наши предложения Россию не удовлетворяет.

Не могут устроить нас и результаты недавних трехсторонних консультаций в Лондоне, где была предпринята последняя попытка найти развязки фланговой проблемы. Предложенные нам варианты решений — за счет использования допускаемых Договором возможностей — не снимают полностью российскую озабоченность. Не говоря уже о том, что меры, принимаемые в рамках существующих договорных прав и обязательств, не нуждаются в дополнительном согласовании с партнерами по Договору и на законных основаниях могут быть и будут осуществлены нами в одностороннем порядке.

Проблему в основных чертах можно было решить на базе двух из ранее высказанных российских предложений. Во-первых, путем небольшой корректировки обязательств, содержащихся в заявлении

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DATE 10/15/08 BY M-2 (3.99)

4/19/2018

правительства СССР от 14 июня 1991 года в отношении обычных вооружений и техники, находящихся в силах береговой обороны и морской пехоте.

Корректировка заключается в том, чтобы не распространять на эти вооружения предусмотренные Договором фланговые ограничения. При этом оставалось бы в силе содержащееся в этом заявлении обязательство о том, что вооружения сил береговой обороны и морской пехоты к концу периода сокращений будут входить в общие максимальные уровни, установленные для России. Приверженность этому обязательству могла бы быть подтверждена соответствующим дополнительным заявлением правительства России.

Во-вторых, дополнительной мерой могло бы стать некоторое изменение границ фланговых военных округов России. Карту с новыми границами фланговых округов России можно будет передать в совместную консультативную группу по Договору об ОБСЕ, депозитарию Договора, а также распространить ее среди всех государств-участников при ежегодном обмене информацией 15 декабря с.г.

Причем даже такое решение оставляет нас в сложном положении в связи с тем, что мы вынуждены содержать значительные силы в "горячих точках" - Грузия, Армения, Молдавия. Но это - предмет отдельного разговора в рамках мирного урегулирования, которого мы с тобой добиваемся с помощью ОБСЕ и ООН.

Учитывая, что фактор времени требует от нас безотлагательного решения проблемы флангов, предлагаю, чтобы наши представители встретились в ближайшее время для рассмотрения этих соображений. Консультации по этому вопросу могли бы быть проведены также, как ты предложил, в более широком формате - с участием Англии, Франции, Германии, Турции, Норвегии и Украины.

Полагаю, что наши страны заинтересованы в сохранении действенности и жизнеспособности Договора об ОБСЕ как одного из краеугольных камней европейской безопасности. Не хотелось бы, чтобы России, поставленной в тяжелое и неравноправное положение, при котором не учитываются ее интересы безопасности, наносился ущерб

3.

ее миротворческим усилиям, пришлось действовать в одностороннем порядке.

В то же время, Билл, буду предельно откровенен: если нам не удастся сообща найти общеприемлемые развязки фланговой проблемы, в 1995 году у России не останется иного выхода, кроме как превышение установленных Договором ограничений на обычные вооружения, находящиеся в ее фланговом районе. Речь идет, безусловно, о временном характере такого превышения.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

"13" декабря 1994 г.
Москва

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9826

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12-16-94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1994

94 DEC 16 08:21

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-08/5-11-2 (4.00)
11/21/2017

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: CFE Treaty: Letter from President Yeltsin

On December 14, the Russian Embassy passed the attached letter to you from President Yeltsin on the subject of the CFE Treaty. As you know, for over a year the Russians have been seeking relief from the Treaty's flank limits so that they can station more equipment (tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery) on Russia's southern border and in adjacent states in the Transcaucasus region.

In the letter, Yeltsin states that the solutions proposed by the U.S. and our Allies "do not remove completely Russian concerns". Yeltsin contends that the flank problem could be resolved if we were to agree to two alternative proposals for changing the flank limits: exempt coastal defense/naval infantry units and change the boundaries of the flank region. As we have made clear to the Russians in previous meetings, both of these proposals are problematic because both would most likely require Treaty amendment.

The most worrisome aspect of the letter is Yeltsin's blunt warning that absent "mutually acceptable compromises to the flank problem," Russia will have "no other option" but to temporarily exceed the flank limits. This warning may complicate your ability to sign the pending Nunn/Lugar certification that Russia is "committed to comply" fully with the CFE Treaty.

Since your September summit with Yeltsin there has been modest progress on this issue. In October, senior U.S., UK, and Russian experts held a trilateral meeting, which Yeltsin refers to in his letter. There, we pursued a detailed discussion of the flexibility within the Treaty, and at the meeting's conclusion, believed that our differences were narrowed to about 1000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs). We have told the Russians that the near term benefit to them of deploying an additional 1000 ACVs is not worth the very high political cost of Treaty non-compliance. The Russians obviously disagree. Moscow's intervention in Chechnya -- an area located in the CFE flank zone -- is only likely to strengthen Russian resolve. We will provide a draft response for you soon.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

PHOTOCOPY AND HANDWRITING
CLINTON

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Attachment
Tab A Letter from President Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~

Unofficial translation

December 13, 1994
Moscow

Dear Bill,

As I have told you in Washington, Russia is still adherent to the CFE Treaty. In spite of all our difficulties we are doing maximum within our capabilities to fulfil it.

At the same time I want to stress again that the flank problem - if not resolved urgently - can undermine the very basis of the Treaty.

Since September 1993 when I first addressed you with a personal letter underlining the principled importance for Russia of resolving the flank problem stemming from the CFE Treaty Russia has spared much effort to explain to the partners by the Treaty the essence of our concerns and to try to jointly work out mutually acceptable solutions. I have to state that the reaction of the American side and of other Western colleagues to our proposals does not satisfy Russia.

Nor can we be satisfied with the results of the recent trilateral consultations in London where the latest attempt to find a solution to the flank problem has been taken. Variants of proposed solutions to us - to use the opportunities permitted by the Treaty - do not remove completely Russian concerns. Not to mention the fact that the measures taken in the framework of the existing Treaty rights and obligations do not require any additional consultations with the parties to the Treaty and, on the legal basis, can be and will be accomplished by our side unilaterally.

His Excellency

William J. CLINTON

The President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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172 2015-0815-M-2 (4,01)
4/19/2018

The problem could be resolved in a general way on the basis of the two Russian proposals presented earlier. Firstly, that is by means of a minor adjustment of the commitments layed out in the Statement of the Government of the Soviet Union of June 14, 1991 regarding conventional armaments and equipment at the disposal of the Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry.

The adjustment consists in not placing these armaments under the flank limitations stipulated by the Treaty. At the same time the commitment worded in the Statement to hold, by the end of the reduction period, the armaments of the Coastal Defense forces and the Naval Infantry within the aggregate maximum numerical limitations set for Russia, would remain valid. Adherence to this commitment could be reaffirmed by a corresponding additional statement by the Russian Government.

Secondly, a change of border lines of the flank military districts of Russia could serve as an additional measure. The map with the new border lines of the flank districts of Russia can be passed to the Joint consultative group on CFE Treaty, and to the depository of the Treaty, and circulated among all the parties to the Treaty on December 15, 1994 during the annual information exchange.

Even then such a decision leaves us in a difficult situation considering the fact that we are obliged to maintain considerable forces in the "hot spots" such as Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova. Though this is a topic for a separate discussion in the framework of the peaceful settlement which you and me are trying to reach with the help of the CSCE and the UN.

Taking into account that the time factor urges us to resolve, without a delay, the problem of flanks, I propose that our representatives meet in the earliest possible time to discuss these ideas. Consultations on this issue could be also held, as you have proposed, in a broader format - with the participation of the UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Norway and Ukraine.

I suppose that our states are interested in maintaining the effectiveness and viability of the CFE Treaty which is one of the corner-stones of European security. We would no like to have Russia, being placed in a difficult and unequal position, when its security interests are

not taken into consideration and its peace-keeping efforts are damaged, act on a unilateral basis.

At the same time, Bill, I'll be utmostly frank: if we are unable to find mutually acceptable compromises to the flank problem, Russia will have no other option in 1995, than to exceed Treaty limitations on conventional armaments in its flank area. I mean, of course, that this excess will only be temporary.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 15, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY *AW*

SUBJECT: CFE Treaty: Letter from President Yeltsin

On the evening of December 14, the Russian Embassy delivered to Bob Bell a disturbing letter on the CFE flank issue from President Yeltsin.

In addition to proposing two "solutions" we and our NATO Allies have previously told the Russians were non-starters, Yeltsin warns bluntly that unless "mutually acceptable compromises" are found, Russia will violate the flank limits next year. This obviously complicates the President's ability to submit this year's Nunn/Lugar certification. We have provided a short information memorandum on the letter for the President and will prepare a draft response soon. The letter has also been passed to the Vice President's party in Moscow.

Concurrence by: Rosemarie Forsythe *RF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum and letter to the President.

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Letter from Yeltsin

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	12/24/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. note	Todd Stern to the President, re: [Message to President Yeltsin] (1 page)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to President Yeltsin on European Security and Economic Reform (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. draft	[Draft of 001a] (2 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001e. draft	[Draft of 001c] (2 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001f. draft	[Duplicate of 001d] (2 pages)	12/00/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:

9409931

2014-0837-F
 ke3322

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (3 pages)	12/24/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
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INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME ON THE RESULTS OF HIS
VISIT TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK, HIGHLIGHTED BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN
EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITH YOU. I WANTED TO TAKE THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY FOR AGREEING TO RECEIVE HIM,
EVEN AS YOU RECUPERATED FROM SURGERY IN THE HOSPITAL. I WAS HAPPY
TO LEARN THAT YOU ARE RECOVERING AND THAT YOU EXPECT TO RETURN TO A
NORMAL SCHEDULE SHORTLY.

AS I WROTE TO YOU IN MY EARLIER LETTER, THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE
IN THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP TO ALLOW DISPUTES OR
MISUNDERSTANDINGS TO PERSIST AND THREATEN ALL THAT YOU AND I HAVE
WORKED TOGETHER TO BUILD FOR NEARLY TWO YEARS NOW. THIS IS WHY I
FELT IT SO IMPORTANT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY TO YOU
PERSONALLY MY STRONG COMMITMENT BOTH TO THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP
AND TO THE GOAL OF A STABLE, INTEGRATED AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE. I AM
CERTAIN THAT HE LEFT YOU IN NO DOUBT ON THAT SCORE. I HOPE THAT YOU
ALSO NOW HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF MY POSITION ON EUROPEAN
SECURITY ISSUES AS THEY RELATE TO THE FUTURE OF NATO. SPECIFICALLY,
I WANT TO REAFFIRM OUR SEPTEMBER UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATO WILL PROCEED GRADUALLY AND OPENLY. I AM
DETERMINED THAT OUR PARTNERSHIP CONTINUE TO PROGRESS IN PARALLEL
WITH THIS PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD DISCUSS HOW TO
DEEPEN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO. THE DISCUSSIONS THE VICE
PRESIDENT HAD WITH YOU HAVE CERTAINLY GIVEN US A CLEARER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS THAT RUSSIA HAS

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PER E.O. 13526
11/29/2017

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS.

HAVING THUS CLEARED THE AIR AND PUT TO REST THE PERCEPTION OF A MAJOR "RIFT" BETWEEN US, WE CAN NOW MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR POSITIONS. THE JANUARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND ANDREI KOZYREV WILL BE THE FIRST IN WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A NUMBER OF SUCH SESSIONS DESIGNED TO ENSURE A FULL TRANSPARENCY REGARDING BOTH ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS ON BOTH OUR PARTS. THE AGREEMENT TO KEEP THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS AND OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE COCOM SUCCESSOR REGIME WILL BE IMPORTANT TO OUR SUCCESS.

I KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUE IS ALMOST WITHOUT QUESTION THE MOST IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE ISSUE WE WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW LAID A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR DEALING WITH THE MANY QUESTIONS AND COMPLEXITIES THAT LIE AHEAD. I LOOK FORWARD TO KEEPING THIS IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

BEFORE CLOSING, I WANTED TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON A QUESTION I KNOW THE VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER: RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM PLANS AND THE 1995 BUDGET. I HAVE ADMIRERD THE FIRM STAND YOU HAVE TAKEN IN FAVOR OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AT CRITICAL MOMENTS DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE BUDGET YOU HAVE PROPOSED FOR 1995 CONTINUES THAT VERY AMBITIOUS APPROACH, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A PREREQUISITE FOR RENEWED GROWTH, LOW INFLATION AND THUS CONTINUED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REFORM. AS YOUR GOVERNMENT FACES THE PROSPECT OF EVEN FURTHER BUDGET REDUCTIONS AHEAD, I HOPE YOU ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT A STRONG REFORM COURSE. UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, 1995 CAN BE THE YEAR OF STABILIZATION OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD TO ENSURE THAT A STRONG RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PROGRAM IS ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE-SCALE WESTERN SUPPORT.

BORIS, THIS HAS BEEN A YEAR OF DIFFICULTIES AND CHALLENGES ON MANY FRONTS FOR BOTH OF US. BUT WE CAN LOOK BACK WITH PRIDE AND A SENSE OF GENUINE ACCOMPLISHMENT OVER WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED TOGETHER, BOTH FOR OUR OWN PEOPLES AND FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS. BECAUSE OF OUR JOINT DEDICATION TO BUILD A SAFER WORLD, MANKIND APPROACHES THIS CHRISTMAS SEASON WITH GREATER ASSURANCE FROM A STEADILY DIMINISHING NUCLEAR THREAT AND A CONTINUED COMMITMENT BY RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES TO THE COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP THAT HAS BROUGHT IT ABOUT. LET US RESOLVE TO DEEPEN AND EXPAND THAT PARTNERSHIP IN 1995, AND BEYOND.

HILLARY JOINS ME IN SENDING YOU AND NAINA THE WARMEST GREETINGS OF THE SEASON, AND OUR SINCERE WISHES FOR HEALTH AND FULFILLMENT IN THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NEW YEAR.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL

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END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5134

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<MSGID> M1433462

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12/23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 22, 1994

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a draft message to President Yeltsin following up on and reaffirming the assurances Vice President Gore made to him concerning NATO expansion during their recent meeting in Moscow. Tony would like to get your approval to send the message before the Christmas holiday, if possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discuss _____


Todd Stern

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

V2 2015-0815-M-2 (4.04)

11/29/2017

PHOTOCOPIED BY CIA HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12/23

9931

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

94 DEC 22 P7:17

December 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

V2 2015-0815-M-2 (4,05)

11/24/2017

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on European Security and Economic Reform

Purpose

To reaffirm to President Yeltsin the Vice President's assurances to him in Moscow on NATO expansion and to convey our continued support for economic reform.

Background

Following his successful meetings in Moscow last week with Boris Yeltsin, the Vice President suggested that we prepare a message from you to Yeltsin reaffirming our central message on NATO expansion. As you know, the Vice President succeeded in convincing Yeltsin that the assurances you gave to him in September on the pace of NATO expansion and of our determination to take account of Russia's interests still constitute the core of U.S. and NATO policy. Yeltsin had misinterpreted the December 1 NAC communique to believe that NATO might decide in 1995 to set a timetable for expansion and even to begin negotiations with prospective members. His tough Budapest speech was thus a message to you and other western leaders that we could not say one thing to him and do another behind his back.

Fortunately, the Vice President's long meeting with Yeltsin permitted us to clarify this misimpression and to put our overall relationship with him back on track. Your long letter to Yeltsin after Budapest which set the record straight and suggested that we keep our disagreements private, rather than public, also made a deep impression on Yeltsin and his advisors. While the European security issue will continue to be a major source of discussion and potential disagreement between the Russians and us, we appear to have surmounted the atmosphere of crisis brought

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

about by Yeltsin and Kozyrev's speeches and actions in early December.

Your message to Yeltsin reaffirms the basis of NATO policy on expansion and our determination to proceed gradually and openly with due regard to Russia's interests. It acknowledges our agreement that Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev should meet in January to begin more intensive discussions of this issue. The message also emphasizes the importance of you and Yeltsin keeping personally engaged on this issue.

Your message also mentions our deep interest in continuing our support for Russia's economic reforms. According to Yeltsin's senior economic advisors, he must make a fundamental decision in the coming weeks about whether to fight for a strict 1995 budget with the Duma. If Yeltsin can win this fight, Russia will have a fairly good chance to earn an IMF Standby agreement that would produce more than \$8 billion in IFI financing. If Yeltsin gives way, a Standby might not be achieved. Treasury believes strongly that your message to Yeltsin on reform will strengthen the reformers inside the government, including Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who are arguing for a tough line on the budget.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A for transmission to President Yeltsin

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

PRIVACY CHANNEL

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME ON THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK, HIGHLIGHTED BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITH YOU. I WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY FOR AGREEING TO RECEIVE HIM, EVEN AS YOU RECUPERATED FROM SURGERY IN THE HOSPITAL. I WAS HAPPY TO LEARN THAT YOU ARE RECOVERING AND THAT YOU EXPECT TO RETURN TO A NORMAL SCHEDULE SHORTLY.

AS I WROTE TO YOU IN MY EARLIER LETTER, THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE IN THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP TO ALLOW DISPUTES OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS TO PERSIST AND THREATEN ALL THAT YOU AND I HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO BUILD FOR NEARLY TWO YEARS NOW. THIS IS WHY I FELT IT SO IMPORTANT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY TO YOU PERSONALLY MY STRONG COMMITMENT BOTH TO THE U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP AND TO THE GOAL OF A STABLE, INTEGRATED AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE. I AM CERTAIN THAT HE LEFT YOU IN NO DOUBT ON THAT SCORE. I HOPE THAT YOU ALSO NOW HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF MY POSITION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AS THEY RELATE TO THE FUTURE OF NATO. SPECIFICALLY, I WANT TO REAFFIRM OUR SEPTEMBER UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO WILL PROCEED GRADUALLY AND OPENLY. I AM DETERMINED THAT OUR PARTNERSHIP CONTINUE TO PROGRESS IN PARALLEL WITH THIS PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD DISCUSS HOW TO DEEPEN RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO. THE DISCUSSIONS THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD WITH YOU HAVE CERTAINLY GIVEN US A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS THAT RUSSIA HAS REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS.

HAVING THUS CLEARED THE AIR AND PUT TO REST THE PERCEPTION OF A MAJOR "RIFT" BETWEEN US, WE CAN NOW MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR POSITIONS. THE JANUARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND ANDREI KOZYREV WILL BE THE FIRST IN WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A NUMBER OF SUCH SESSIONS DESIGNED TO ENSURE A FULL TRANSPARENCY REGARDING BOTH ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS ON BOTH OUR PARTS. THE AGREEMENT TO KEEP THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IN CLOSE

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11/29/2017

TOUCH ON THIS AND OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE COCOM SUCCESSOR REGIME WILL BE IMPORTANT TO OUR SUCCESS.

I KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUE IS ALMOST WITHOUT QUESTION THE MOST IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE ISSUE WE WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW LAID A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR DEALING WITH THE MANY QUESTIONS AND COMPLEXITIES THAT LIE AHEAD. I LOOK FORWARD TO KEEPING THIS IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

BEFORE CLOSING, I WANTED TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON A QUESTION I KNOW THE VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER: RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM PLANS AND THE 1995 BUDGET. I HAVE ADMIRERD THE FIRM STAND YOU HAVE TAKEN IN FAVOR OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AT CRITICAL MOMENTS DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE BUDGET YOU HAVE PROPOSED FOR 1995 CONTINUES THAT VERY AMBITIOUS APPROACH, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A PREREQUISITE FOR RENEWED GROWTH, LOW INFLATION AND THUS CONTINUED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REFORM. AS YOUR GOVERNMENT FACES THE PROSPECT OF EVEN FURTHER BUDGET REDUCTIONS AHEAD, I HOPE YOU ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT A STRONG REFORM COURSE. UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, 1995 CAN BE THE YEAR OF STABILIZATION OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD TO ENSURE THAT A STRONG RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PROGRAM IS ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE-SCALE WESTERN SUPPORT.

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HILLARY JOINS ME IN SENDING YOU AND NAINA THE WARMEST GREETINGS OF THE SEASON, AND OUR SINCERE WISHES FOR HEALTH AND FULFILLMENT IN THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

BILL


(END TEXT)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4,07)
11/24/2017

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on European Security and Economic Reform

Purpose

To reaffirm to President Yeltsin the Vice President's assurances to him in Moscow on NATO expansion and to convey our continued support for economic reform.

Background

Following his successful meetings in Moscow last week with Boris Yeltsin, the Vice President suggested that we prepare a message from you to Yeltsin reaffirming our central message on NATO expansion. As you know, the Vice President succeeded in convincing Yeltsin that the assurances you gave to him in September on the pace of NATO expansion and of our determination to take account of Russia's interests still constitute the core of U.S. and NATO policy. Yeltsin had misinterpreted the December 1 NAC communique to believe that NATO might decide in 1995 to set a timetable for expansion and even to begin negotiations with prospective members. His tough Budapest speech was thus a message to you and other western leaders that we could not say one thing to him and do another behind his back.

Fortunately, the Vice President's long meeting with Yeltsin permitted us to clarify this misimpression and to put our overall relationship with him back on track. Your long letter to Yeltsin after Budapest which set the record straight and suggested that we keep our disagreements private, rather than public, also made a deep impression on Yeltsin and his advisors. While the European security issue will continue to be a major source of discussion and potential disagreement between the Russians and us, we appear to have surmounted the atmosphere of crisis brought about by Yeltsin and Kozyrev's speeches and actions in early December.

Your message to Yeltsin reaffirms the basis of NATO policy on expansion and our determination to proceed gradually and openly

with due regard to Russia's interests. It acknowledges our agreement that Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev should meet in January to begin more intensive discussions of this issue. The message also emphasizes the importance of you and Yeltsin keeping personally engaged on this issue.

Your message also mentions our deep interest in continuing our support for Russia's economic reforms. According to Yeltsin's senior economic advisors, he must make a fundamental decision in the coming weeks about whether to fight for a strict 1995 budget with the Duma. If Yeltsin can win this fight, Russia will have a fairly good chance to earn an IMF Standby agreement that would produce more than \$8 billion in IFI financing. If Yeltsin gives way, a Standby might not be achieved. Treasury believes strongly that your message to Yeltsin on reform will strengthen the reformers inside the government, including Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who are arguing for a tough line on the budget.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A for transmission to President Yeltsin

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

PRIVACY CHANNEL

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

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I KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUE IS ALMOST WITHOUT QUESTION THE MOST IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE ISSUE WE

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2017/11/29

WILL CONFRONT TOGETHER. I BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW LAID A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR DEALING WITH THE MANY QUESTIONS AND COMPLEXITIES THAT LIE AHEAD. I LOOK FORWARD TO KEEPING THIS IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

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HILLARY JOINS ME IN SENDING YOU AND NAINA THE WARMEST GREETINGS OF THE SEASON, AND OUR SINCERE WISHES FOR HEALTH AND FULFILLMENT IN THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anne Witkowsky to Anthony Lake, re: CFE: Response to President Yeltsin's Letter (3 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	12/13/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 225

FOLDER TITLE:

9409970

2014-0837-F
ke3323

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 12123
5:45PM

9970

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 9970
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN AVO _____

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>Burns/Bell</u>	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>see comment</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

*How do we
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9970

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 23, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL ^{RGB} NICHOLAS BURNS ^{NB}

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY ^{AW}

SUBJECT: CFE: Response to President Yeltsin's letter

At a December 20 IWG meeting chaired by Bob, we reviewed the December 13 Yeltsin letter on CFE. The IWG decided to delay a substantive reply until after we have conducted a more thorough review of our possible options. We plan to prepare an options paper for consideration by Deputies early in January. In the meantime we will have Ambassador Pickering convey an acknowledgement of the letter and that the President will plan to send a substantive reply next month.

As noted in your memo to the President the day the Yeltsin letter was delivered, the two alternatives that Yeltsin suggests are non-starters because we believe they would require amendment of the Treaty or its associated documents. Since Russian officials have ruled out all other "flexibility options" or asserted that they do not go far enough, we appear to be at a fundamental crossroads. Yeltsin warns in the letter that absent "mutually acceptable compromises to the flank problem," Russia will have "no other option" but to exceed ("temporarily", he says) the flank limits. Similar threats have been made by the Russian representative in Vienna (though Mamedov told the Norwegians this week that Russia would, in the end, comply with the Treaty).

In this context, we believe that Deputies should be given the opportunity to review the alternatives to staying on the course we have taken for the last year, i.e., telling the Russians to use the flexibility within the Treaty. We now need to ask ourselves whether there is any agency that might now advocate a more radical approach, such as supporting a Russian-proposed change that would require an amendment process. If so, we should examine whether there are quid-pro-quo that might facilitate our seeking such a deal. To date, no agency has recommended such a course in Bob's IWG. But if we do not seek a radical new approach, and continue to insist that the Russians stay within the Treaty, it is important that senior policy-makers understand we will almost certainly enter a game of brinkmanship in which the Russians will continue to threaten to violate the Treaty regardless of the consequences.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER EO 13526

2015-0815-11-2 (7.58)

11/29/2017

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2

Tab I Letter from President Yeltsin

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial translation

December 13, 1994
Moscow

Dear Bill,

As I have told you in Washington, Russia is still adherent to the CFE Treaty. In spite of all our difficulties we are doing maximum within our capabilities to fulfil it.

At the same time I want to stress again that the flank problem - if not resolved urgently - can undermine the very basis of the Treaty.

Since September 1993 when I first addressed you with a personal letter underlining the principled importance for Russia of resolving the flank problem stemming from the CFE Treaty Russia has spared much effort to explain to the partners by the Treaty the essence of our concerns and to try to jointly work out mutually acceptable solutions. I have to state that the reaction of the American side and of other Western colleagues to our proposals does not satisfy Russia.

Nor can we be satisfied with the results of the recent trilateral consultations in London where the latest attempt to find a solution to the flank problem has been taken. Variants of proposed solutions to us - to use the opportunities permitted by the Treaty - do not remove completely Russian concerns. Not to mention the fact that the measures taken in the framework of the existing Treaty rights and obligations do not require any additional consultations with the parties to the Treaty and, on the legal basis, can be and will be accomplished by our side unilaterally.

His Excellency

William J. CLINTON

The President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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VZ 2015-0815-11-2 (759)
11/24/2017

The problem could be resolved in a general way on the basis of the two Russian proposals presented earlier. Firstly, that is by means of a minor adjustment of the commitments layed out in the Statement of the Government of the Soviet Union of June 14, 1991 regarding conventional armaments and equipment at the disposal of the Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry.

The adjustment consists in not placing these armaments under the flank limitations stipulated by the Treaty. At the same time the commitment worded in the Statement to hold, by the end of the reduction period, the armaments of the Coastal Defense forces and the Naval Infantry within the aggregate maximum numerical limitations set for Russia, would remain valid. Adherence to this commitment could be reaffirmed by a corresponding additional statement by the Russian Government.

Secondly, a change of border lines of the flank military districts of Russia could serve as an additional measure. The map with the new border lines of the flank districts of Russia can be passed to the Joint consultative group on CFE Treaty, and to the depository of the Treaty, and circulated among all the parties to the Treaty on December 15, 1994 during the annual information exchange.

Even then such a decision leaves us in a difficult situation considering the fact that we are obliged to maintain considerable forces in the "hot spots" such as Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova. Though this is a topic for a separate discussion in the framework of the peaceful settlement which you and me are trying to reach with the help of the CSCE and the UN.

Taking into account that the time factor urges us to resolve, without a delay, the problem of flanks, I propose that our representatives meet in the earliest possible time to discuss these ideas. Consultations on this issue could be also held, as you have proposed, in a broader format - with the participation of the UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Norway and Ukraine.

I suppose that our states are interested in maintaining the effectiveness and viability of the CFE Treaty which is one of the corner-stones of European security. We would no like to have Russia, being placed in a difficult and unequal position, when its security interests are

not taken into consideration and its peace-keeping efforts are damaged, act on a unilateral basis.

At the same time, Bill, I'll be utmostly frank: if we are unable to find mutually acceptable compromises to the flank problem, Russia will have no other option in 1995, than to exceed Treaty limitations on conventional armaments in its flank area. I mean, of course, that this excess will only be temporary.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia (1 page)	09/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. draft	{Draft of 002a} (1 page)	09/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. cable	Re: {Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin} (3 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002a. cable	Re: {Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin} [Released in Part] (2 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002b. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia (1 page)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002c. draft	{Duplicate of 001b} (1 page)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002d. cable	{Duplicate of 001c} (3 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002e. cable	{Duplicate of 001c} (3 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 603

FOLDER TITLE:

9506749

2014-0837-F
 ke3348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia

Purpose

To approve a short message to Yeltsin regarding Bosnia.

Background

You wrote Yeltsin on Bosnia on September 9 (Tab B). Since then, Moscow has continued to make clear its strong objections to NATO air strikes. As expected, the Duma overwhelmingly passed a non-binding resolution calling for a UNSC session to reconsider air strikes, suspension of Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace, and dismissal of Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Russian ambassadors at NATO and the UN on September 11 expressed their concern about air strikes, with the Russian permanent representative in New York circulating a draft UNSC resolution that *inter alia* would order a halt to further strikes.

Yeltsin began his vacation on September 10 and has not yet answered your September 9 letter. A short follow-up message now will set the stage for Strobe's arrival in Moscow on Thursday. Coming close on the heels of your weekend message, it will also signal to Yeltsin your desire, despite differences over air strikes, to work as closely as possible with Russia on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia
- Tab B September 9 Message to Yeltsin

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PER E.O. 13526

12-2015-0815-11-2 (S.11)

11/24/2017

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6749

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

WITH THE EVENTS MOVING SO QUICKLY IN THE BALKANS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEKEND, WE HAVE URGED THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAWALS OF HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE SARAJEVO EXCLUSION ZONE. OUR AMBASSADOR IN SARAJEVO RAISED WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC ON SUNDAY, AND SINCE THEN IZETBEGOVIC HAS MADE PUBLIC ASSURANCES THAT HIS FORCES WILL NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION.

AS WE WORK TO BRING THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS TO TAKE STEPS FOR PEACE, WE APPRECIATE YOUR ONGOING EFFORTS, BOTH IN BELGRADE AND PALE, WHICH HELPED ACHIEVE THE RESULTS IN GENEVA LAST WEEK. I HOPE THAT YOU MIGHT MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO PERSUADE GENERAL MLADIC TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS.

TO ENSURE THAT WE MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT, I HAVE ASKED DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE TALBOTT TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK. I WANT STROBE TO DISCUSS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND YOUR OTHER SENIOR ADVISERS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, OUR THINKING ON NEXT STEPS, AND HOW THE BALKAN CRISIS FITS INTO THE BROADER QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE NEED TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO RESOLVE THE BALKAN CRISIS, AND TO KEEP IT IN PERSPECTIVE GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BROADER QUESTIONS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO STROBE'S REPORT ON HIS MEETINGS WITH YOUR ADVISERS, AND TO SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH IN NEW YORK.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY

BILL

(END TEXT)

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PER E.O. 13526

12 2015-0815-11-2 (5.12)

11/24/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, COMM, DOHSE, FUERTH, HALL, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, BELL, BLACKER, BREMNER, CLARKER, COQ, DAALDER, FETIG, FLANAGAN, HARMON, HESLIN, LAKEA, MITCHELL, PASCUAL, PETERS, PIFER, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SIGLER, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_OUT

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:092005Z SEP 95

FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO:
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY
QQQQ
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 7 REGARDING BOSNIA.

I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT. THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN GENEVA WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. THE PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED A SINGLE DOCUMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT ADDRESS THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES. THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR MILESTONE ON THE PATH TO THE SETTLEMENT WE BOTH WANT. I AM GLAD THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV PARTICIPATED SO USEFULLY.

OF COURSE, WE SEE FRIDAY S MEETING IN GENEVA AS BUT ONE STEP IN A COMPLEX PROCESS. I AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS BROUGHT US THIS FAR DOWN THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS. A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN MISSION WILL HOST THE CONTACT GROUP NEXT WEEK IN GENEVA AND THAT THE NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH THE PARTIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. I AGREE THAT, WHEN WE ARE CLOSE TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO HOLD A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO RATIFY

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12-2015-0815-44-2 (5.13)

11/29/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE RESULTS.

AS WE WORK TOWARDS THESE MEETINGS, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE

CONTACT WITH YOU -- AND TO COOPERATE CLOSELY -- IN PERSUADING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON TODAY IN GENEVA. YOUR WORK ON THIS WITH BELGRADE AND PALE IS CRITICAL, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

I RECOGNIZE YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NATO'S USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS. THIS MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SHELLING OF THE SARAJEVO MARKETPLACE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC 836, WHICH AUTHORIZES UNPROFOR TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO PROTECT THE U.N. SAFE AREAS, AND WITH THE LONDON DECLARATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE LOOKING FOR THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO REMOVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. WHEN THE BOMBING WILL STOP IS IN THE HANDS OF GENERAL MLADIC. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL DO WHAT YOU CAN TO HELP IN THIS REGARD.

ON OUR PART, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE EXPECT THAT THEIR FORCES WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAWALS. THE BOSNIAN COMMANDER, GENERAL DELIC, HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED US THAT THEY WILL RESPECT OUR REQUEST IN THIS REGARD.

BORIS, OUR COMMON GOAL, AS YOU NOTE, IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

IN PART DUE TO YOUR EFFORTS, SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC HAS ALREADY DISPLAYED A NEW DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN SUPPORTING THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA MEETING AND IN URGING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. LET US WORK TOGETHER TO CONVINCE THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP TO FOLLOW MILOSEVIC'S LEAD AND CHOOSE THE PATH OF PEACE.

I AM ONCE AGAIN GRATEFUL FOR OUR CHANNEL OF FRANK COMMUNICATION. OUR PRACTICE OF TIMELY CONSULTATIONS REMAINS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING CRITICAL ISSUES -- AND ENSURING THAT THEY DO NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR SHARED, LONG-TERM INTEREST IN A STEADY STRENGTHENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OR COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING THE SITUATION WITH YOU ON THE PHONE WHENEVER YOU WISH.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

BILL

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END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT
#6810

NNNN
<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN> 6810
<^TOR> 950909161740 M1847722

FROM:
SITREPT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [Released in Part] (2 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 603

FOLDER TITLE:

9506749

2014-0837-F
ke3348

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLACKER COQ GRAY HAMILTON HARMON LAKEA PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2 VERS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131554Z SEP 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

WITH THE EVENTS MOVING SO QUICKLY IN THE BALKANS, IT IS ESSENTIAL
THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEKEND, WE HAVE URGED THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TO
EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY BOSNIAN SERB
WITHDRAWALS OF HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE SARAJEVO EXCLUSION ZONE. OUR
AMBASSADOR IN SARAJEVO RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC
ON SUNDAY, AND SINCE THEN IZETBEGOVIC HAS MADE PUBLIC ASSURANCES
THAT HIS FORCES WILL NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION.

AS WE WORK TO BRING THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS TO TAKE STEPS FOR PEACE, WE
APPRECIATE YOUR ONGOING EFFORTS, BOTH IN BELGRADE AND PALE, WHICH
HELPED ACHIEVE THE RESULTS IN GENEVA LAST WEEK. I HOPE THAT YOU
MIGHT MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO PERSUADE GENERAL MLADIC TO TAKE THE
NECESSARY STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS.

TO ENSURE THAT WE MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT, I HAVE ASKED DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE TALBOTT TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK. I
WANT STROBE TO DISCUSS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND YOUR OTHER
SENIOR ADVISERS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, OUR
THINKING ON NEXT STEPS AND HOW THE BALKAN CRISIS FITS INTO THE
BROADER QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND OUR BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP. WE NEED TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO RESOLVE THE BALKAN
CRISIS AND TO KEEP IT IN PERSPECTIVE GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
BROADER QUESTIONS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

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11/29/2017

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

.
I LOOK FORWARD TO STROBE'S REPORT ON HIS MEETINGS WITH YOUR ADVISERS
AND TO SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH IN NEW YORK.

.
WITH WARM REGARDS,

.
SINCERELY

.
BILL

.
END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#6827

NNNN

<MSGID> M1852972

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9/13/95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
September 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia

95 SEP 13 10:52

Purpose

To approve a short message to Yeltsin regarding Bosnia.

Background

You wrote Yeltsin on Bosnia on September 9 (Tab B). Since then, Moscow has continued to make clear its strong objections to NATO air strikes. As expected, the Duma overwhelmingly passed a non-binding resolution calling for a UNSC session to reconsider air strikes, suspension of Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace and dismissal of Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Russian ambassadors at NATO and the UN on September 11 expressed their concern about air strikes, with the Russian permanent representative in New York circulating a draft UNSC resolution that *inter alia* would order a halt to further strikes.

Yeltsin began his vacation on September 10 and has not yet answered your September 9 letter. A short follow-up message now will set the stage for Strobe's arrival in Moscow on Thursday. Coming close on the heels of your weekend message, it will also signal to Yeltsin your desire, despite differences over air strikes, to work as closely as possible with Russia on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia
- Tab B September 9 Message to Yeltsin

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VL 2015-0815-M-2 (5.15)
11/21/2017

CLINTON COPY BY JAR HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6741

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

WITH THE EVENTS MOVING SO QUICKLY IN THE BALKANS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

AS I WROTE YOU LAST WEEKEND, WE HAVE URGED THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAWALS OF HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE SARAJEVO EXCLUSION ZONE. OUR AMBASSADOR IN SARAJEVO RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC ON SUNDAY, AND SINCE THEN IZETBEGOVIC HAS MADE PUBLIC ASSURANCES THAT HIS FORCES WILL NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION.

AS WE WORK TO BRING THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS TO TAKE STEPS FOR PEACE, WE APPRECIATE YOUR ONGOING EFFORTS, BOTH IN BELGRADE AND PALE, WHICH HELPED ACHIEVE THE RESULTS IN GENEVA LAST WEEK. I HOPE THAT YOU MIGHT MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO PERSUADE GENERAL MLADIC TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS.

TO ENSURE THAT WE MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT, I HAVE ASKED DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE TALBOTT TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK. I WANT STROBE TO DISCUSS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AND YOUR OTHER SENIOR ADVISERS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, OUR THINKING ON NEXT STEPS AND HOW THE BALKAN CRISIS FITS INTO THE BROADER QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE NEED TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO RESOLVE THE BALKAN CRISIS AND TO KEEP IT IN PERSPECTIVE GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BROADER QUESTIONS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO STROBE'S REPORT ON HIS MEETINGS WITH YOUR ADVISERS AND TO SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH IN NEW YORK.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY

BILL

(END TEXT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2015-0815-11-2 (5,16)

11/24/2017

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:092005Z SEP 95

FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO:
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

QQQQ
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 7 REGARDING BOSNIA.

I BELIEVE THAT WE NOW HAVE A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT. THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN GENEVA WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. THE PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED A SINGLE DOCUMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT ADDRESS THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES. THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR MILESTONE ON THE PATH TO THE SETTLEMENT WE BOTH WANT. I AM GLAD THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV PARTICIPATED SO USEFULLY.

OF COURSE, WE SEE FRIDAY S MEETING IN GENEVA AS BUT ONE STEP IN A COMPLEX PROCESS. I AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS BROUGHT US THIS FAR DOWN THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS. A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN MISSION WILL HOST THE CONTACT GROUP NEXT WEEK IN GENEVA AND THAT THE NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH THE PARTIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. I AGREE THAT, WHEN WE ARE CLOSE TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO HOLD A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO RATIFY

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THE RESULTS.

AS WE WORK TOWARDS THESE MEETINGS, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE

CONTACT WITH YOU -- AND TO COOPERATE CLOSELY -- IN PERSUADING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON TODAY IN GENEVA. YOUR WORK ON THIS WITH BELGRADE AND PALE IS CRITICAL, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

I RECOGNIZE YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NATO S USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS. THIS MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SHELLING OF THE SARAJEVO MARKETPLACE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC 836, WHICH AUTHORIZES UNPROFOR TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO PROTECT THE U.N. SAFE AREAS, AND WITH THE LONDON DECLARATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE LOOKING FOR THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO REMOVE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. WHEN THE BOMBING WILL STOP IS IN THE HANDS OF GENERAL MLADIC. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL DO WHAT YOU CAN TO HELP IN THIS REGARD.

ON OUR PART, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE EXPECT THAT THEIR FORCES WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAWALS. THE BOSNIAN COMMANDER, GENERAL DELIC, HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED US THAT THEY WILL RESPECT OUR REQUEST IN THIS REGARD.

BORIS, OUR COMMON GOAL, AS YOU NOTE, IS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

IN PART DUE TO YOUR EFFORTS, SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC HAS ALREADY DISPLAYED A NEW DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN SUPPORTING THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA MEETING AND IN URGING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS. LET US WORK TOGETHER TO CONVINCING THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP TO FOLLOW MILOSEVIC S LEAD AND CHOOSE THE PATH OF PEACE.

I AM ONCE AGAIN GRATEFUL FOR OUR CHANNEL OF FRANK COMMUNICATION. OUR PRACTICE OF TIMELY CONSULTATIONS REMAINS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING CRITICAL ISSUES -- AND ENSURING THAT THEY DO NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR SHARED, LONG-TERM INTEREST IN A STEADY STRENGTHENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OR COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING THE SITUATION WITH YOU ON THE PHONE WHENEVER YOU WISH.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

BILL

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END TEXT

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

QQQQ

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT **YELTSIN**. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

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DATE 2015-0815-M-Z (S.14)

11/29/2017

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WITH WARM REGARDS,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BLACKER BREMNER CLARKER COQ DAALDER FETIG FLANAGAN HARMON
HESLIN LAKEA MITCHELL PASCUAL PETERS PIFER SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
SIGLER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_OUT

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SIT: GRAY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. Memo	Anthony Lake of the President, re: September 22 Yeltsin Message on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. letter	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. letter	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001e. letter	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002a. letter	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
002b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

07/25/2022

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: September 22 Yeltsin Message on Bosnia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
v2 2015-0715-M-2 (S,19)
11/29/2017

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Yeltsin wrote you last Friday on Bosnia (Tab A). He notes Kozyrev's "useful and timely" talks with Strobe (albeit misrepresenting some of what Strobe said), asserts the bombing halt will give an impulse to the peace process and calls for efforts to restrain all the warring parties. Yeltsin eschews the harsh public line he has taken on Bosnia and NATO in recent days. He expresses the hope that, having put the "recent estrangement and break-down" in the past, the two of you can now strengthen relations. He rejects "pessimistic evaluations" of the relationship's prospects, noting that cooperation on Bosnia will signal a choice "in favor of the springtime spirit of Moscow."

Chris received a parallel message from Kozyrev. ~~These track with what Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedev told Strobe last week; the Russians share our desire to contain Bosnia as a problem on the bilateral agenda.~~ At the same time, the Yeltsin and Kozyrev letters put down markers that renewed air strikes or some other Bosnia break-down will negatively affect bilateral relations.

Reflecting Russian pique at NATO air strikes, Moscow has suspended preparations for the Peacekeeper-95 exercise in Kansas and for four other exercises with NATO countries. ~~Mamedev cautioned that events might lead Yeltsin to freeze the overall NATO-Russia relationship -- although the Russians have not been particularly energetic in developing it since last spring.~~

The next critical question that touches on NATO, Bosnia and Russia is the Bosnia implementation force. We want a mechanism that preserves a single chain of command under NATO but also accommodates Russian participation. That will not be easy; Moscow will press for the UN to have overall control.

Bosnia and NATO thus will likely be leading topics when you see Yeltsin next month in New York. A short call ~~later this week~~ to Yeltsin, to stress to him your interest in managing Bosnia and keeping the relationship moving forward, would be useful. You might make similar points to Kozyrev on the margins of Thursday's Middle East ceremony.

next Monday

HL

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2

Attachment

Tab A September 22 Yeltsin Message on Bosnia

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Dear Bill,

I have received your letters on the crisis in Yugoslavia.

I shall reply separately and in the same detailed manner to the first of them which gives an overview of the US approach. Now I would like to focus on some thoughts which appeared in connection with S.Talbott's consultations in Moscow.

A.Kozyrev reported to me that he had had a frank, useful and timely conversation with your personal representative. I think that now you better understand the reasons for our strongly negative stand with regard to the NATO bombings which continued until recent days.

Far from undermining the desire of the parties to halt hostilities and begin serious negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group proposals, the complete cessation of bombings will impart a decisive impulse to the peace process. This is also proved by the document signed by the Serbs which links the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo and compliance with other UN decisions with a general cease-fire and cessation of NATO airstrikes.

In Kozyrev's words, Mr.Talbott said that the bombings had been stopped in no small measure due to the impact of public comments by the Russian President. It would be good if this point were noted in your country in public as well. I believe that you understand the significance of such a step.

You asked me through Mr.Talbott to support the accord that was reached. In this connection I propose to instruct our Ministers of defense, who plan to meet in the coming days, to discuss specific military-political means of consolidating the gains achieved so far. It goes without saying that work on the political settlement will continue to be channeled mainly through the cooperation, conducted under our guidance, between Mr.Kozyrev and Mr.Christopher, and between all other partners in the Contact Group. The next meeting of the Contact Group in Moscow under the chairmanship of Russia must bring concrete results and ensure the breakthrough from war to peace in Yugoslavia.

I also agree that you and I should strongly intensify our efforts in restraining all parties to the conflict - be it the Serbs, the Muslims or the Croats - from provoking one another to continue and escalate the fighting. This is crucial. I hope that our joint and coordinated parallel steps will create essential conditions for successfully holding a conference on peaceful

His Excellency

William J.CLINTON

President of the United States of America

Washington, DC

settlement in Yugoslavia in Moscow in the middle of October. Our French, German, British and other partners in the Contact Group share this hope.

By overcoming the recent estrangement and break-down in contacts on the major contemporary crisis, we will undoubtedly strengthen mutual determination of the Russian and US Presidents to make the trend towards partnership irreversible.

This was always important, and it is particularly important at this moment, when certain forces are attempting to sow discord between us in the run-up to our talks in New York. I reject pessimistic evaluations of the prospects for Russian-American relations which can often be heard now and on which political opposition in both our countries is trying to capitalize.

By adjusting our cooperation on the former Yugoslavia and achieving concrete results in this area in the next few days we will demonstrate a clear choice of the two leaders in favor of the springtime spirit of Moscow.

I am prepared to continue the usual sincere dialogue - over the phone or by any other means - on all pressing issues.

Sincerely,

B. YELTSIN

September 22, 1995

ВНО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Дорогой Билл,

Получил твои письма по югославскому кризису.

На первое из них, излагающее развернутый подход США, отвечу отдельно и в таком же подробном ключе. Сейчас же хотел бы сосредоточиться на некоторых соображениях, возникших в связи с консультациями в Москве С.Тэлбота.

А.В.Козырев доложил мне, что у него состоялся с твоим личным представителем откровенный, полезный и своевременный разговор. Теперь, думаю, ты лучше понимаешь мотивы нашей резко негативной позиции относительно продолжавшихся вплоть до последнего времени бомбардировок НАТО.

Окончательная остановка бомбардировок не только не подорвет стремление сторон к прекращению огня и началу серьезных переговоров на базе предложений контактной группы, но, напротив, придаст решающий импульс мирному процессу. Об этом свидетельствует и подписанный сербами документ, увязывающий отвод тяжелых вооружений от Сараево и выполнение других решений ООН с всеобщим прекращением огня и налетов НАТО.

По словам Козырева, Тэлбот говорил, что бомбардировки были прекращены не в последнюю очередь под воздействием публичной оценки президента России. Было бы хорошо, чтобы это было отмечено у вас также публично. Думаю, ты понимаешь значение такого шага.

Ты попросил меня через Тэлбота поддержать достигнутую договоренность. В этой связи предлагаю дать поручение нашим министрам обороны, которые планируют встретиться на днях, обсудить конкретные военно-политические пути закрепления появившихся подвижек. Разумеется, главным каналом работы над политическим урегулированием остается осуществляемое под нашим руководством сотрудничество Козырева и Кристофера, всех других партнеров по контактной группе. Очередная встреча контактной группы в Москве под российским председательством должна принести ощутимые результаты, обеспечить перелом от войны к миру в Югославии.

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Согласен и с тем, что нам с тобой надо резко активизировать усилия по удержанию всех участников конфликта – будь то сербы, мусульмане или хорваты – от провоцирования друг друга на продолжение и эскалацию вооруженной борьбы. Это принципиально важно. Надеюсь, что наши совместные и согласованные параллельные шаги создадут необходимые условия для успешного проведения в Москве в середине октября конференции по югославскому мирному урегулированию. Эту надежду разделяют и наши французские, немецкие, английские и другие партнеры по контактной группе.

Преодолев возникшее отчуждение и срыв в контактах по крупнейшему современному кризису, мы, не сомневаюсь, еще больше укрепим обоюдную решимость президентов России и США сделать тенденцию к партнерству необратимой.

Это было важно всегда, особенно важно сейчас, когда кое-кто пытается внести разлад между нами в преддверии наших переговоров в Нью-Йорке. Я отвергаю пессимистические оценки перспектив российско-американских отношений, которые сейчас часто раздаются и на которых пытается нажиться наша с тобой политическая оппозиция.

Отладив наше сотрудничество по Югославии и добившись здесь в ближайшие дни конкретных результатов, мы продемонстрируем четкий выбор двух лидеров в пользу весеннего духа Москвы.

Готов продолжить как всегда откровенный диалог – по телефону или в другой форме – по всем наиболее важным вопросам.

Искренне твой,

Б. ЕЛЬЦИН

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September 22, 1995

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Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

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Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

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РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

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
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
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001b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

I have received your letters on the crisis in Yugoslavia.

I shall reply separately and in the same detailed manner to the first of them which gives an overview of the US approach. Now I would like to focus on some thoughts which appeared in connection with S.Talbott's consultations in Moscow.

A.Kozyrev reported to me that he had had a frank, useful and timely conversation with your personal representative. I think that now you better understand the reasons for our strongly negative stand with regard to the NATO bombings which continued until recent days.

Far from undermining the desire of the parties to halt hostilities and begin serious negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group proposals, the complete cessation of bombings will impart a decisive impulse to the peace process. This is also proved by the document signed by the Serbs which links the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo and compliance with other UN decisions with a general cease-fire and cessation of NATO airstrikes.

In Kozyrev's words, Mr.Talbott said that the bombings had been stopped in no small measure due to the impact of public comments by the Russian President. It would be good if this point were noted in your country in public as well. I believe that you understand the significance of such a step.

You asked me through Mr.Talbott to support the accord that was reached. In this connection I propose to instruct our Ministers of defense, who plan to meet in the coming days, to discuss specific military-political means of consolidating the gains achieved so far. It goes without saying that work on the political settlement will continue to be channeled mainly through the cooperation, conducted under our guidance, between Mr.Kozyrev and Mr.Christopher, and between all other partners in the Contact Group. The next meeting of the Contact Group in Moscow under the chairmanship of Russia must bring concrete results and ensure the breakthrough from war to peace in Yugoslavia.

I also agree that you and I should strongly intensify our efforts in restraining all parties to the conflict - be it the Serbs, the Muslims or the Croats - from provoking one another to continue and escalate the fighting. This is crucial. I hope that our joint and coordinated parallel steps will create essential conditions for successfully holding a conference on peaceful

His Excellency

William J.CLINTON

President of the United States of America

Washington, DC

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settlement in Yugoslavia in Moscow in the middle of October. Our French, German, British and other partners in the Contact Group share this hope.

By overcoming the recent estrangement and break-down in contacts on the major contemporary crisis, we will undoubtedly strengthen mutual determination of the Russian and US Presidents to make the trend towards partnership irreversible.

This was always important, and it is particularly important at this moment, when certain forces are attempting to sow discord between us in the run-up to our talks in New York. I reject pessimistic evaluations of the prospects for Russian-American relations which can often be heard now and on which political opposition in both our countries is trying to capitalize.

By adjusting our cooperation on the former Yugoslavia and achieving concrete results in this area in the next few days we will demonstrate a clear choice of the two leaders in favor of the springtime spirit of Moscow.

I am prepared to continue the usual sincere dialogue - over the phone or by any other means - on all pressing issues.

Sincerely,

B. YELTSIN

September 22, 1995

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
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4/16/2018

Согласен и с тем, что нам с тобой надо резко активизировать усилия по удержанию всех участников конфликта – будь то сербы, мусульмане или хорваты – от провоцирования друг друга на продолжение и эскалацию вооруженной борьбы. Это принципиально важно. Надеюсь, что наши совместные и согласованные параллельные шаги создадут необходимые условия для успешного проведения в Москве в середине октября конференции по югославскому мирному урегулированию. Эту надежду разделяют и наши французские, немецкие, английские и другие партнеры по контактной группе.

Преодолев возникшее отчуждение и срыв в контактах по крупнейшему современному кризису, мы, не сомневаюсь, еще больше укрепим обоюдную решимость президентов России и США сделать тенденцию к партнерству необратимой.

Это было важно всегда, особенно важно сейчас, когда кое-кто пытается внести разлад между нами в преддверии наших переговоров в Нью-Йорке. Я отвергаю пессимистические оценки перспектив российско-американских отношений, которые сейчас часто раздаются и на которых пытается нажиться наша с тобой политическая оппозиция.

Отладив наше сотрудничество по Югославии и добившись здесь в ближайшие дни конкретных результатов, мы продемонстрируем четкий выбор двух лидеров в пользу весеннего духа Москвы.

Готов продолжить как всегда откровенный диалог – по телефону или в другой форме – по всем наболевшим вопросам.

Искренне твой,

Б. ЕЛЬЦИН

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] (2 pages)	10/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. draft	[Draft of 001a] (1 page)	10/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to Yeltsin on Perry-Grachev Meeting (2 pages)	09/30/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. memo	Steve Pifer to Anthony Lake, re: Presidential Message to Yeltsin Proposing Perry-Grachev Meeting (1 page)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 606

FOLDER TITLE:

9507215

2014-0837-F

ke3351

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLACKER COQ FICKLIN GRAY HARMON LAKEA PIFER SIGLER SUM SUM2 WHSR_OUT W

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 021603Z OCT 95

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY NODIS

QQQQ

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE:
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

IT WAS A PLEASURE TALKING WITH YOU ON WEDNESDAY. ON THURSDAY, I
HAD A GOOD CONVERSATION WITH ANDREY ON THE MARGINS OF THE

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SIGNING CEREMONY HERE AT THE WHITE HOUSE. IT
WAS AN EXCELLENT FOLLOW-UP TO OUR OWN DISCUSSION. THANK YOU FOR
THE LETTER THAT ANDREY DELIVERED; THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
TESTIFIES TO WHAT OUR COOPERATION CAN ACHIEVE.

WITH THE AGREEMENT ON AN ADDITIONAL SET OF PRINCIPLES BY THE
BALKAN PARTIES, EVENTS ARE MOVING QUICKLY. WHILE THERE IS MUCH
WORK STILL TO BE DONE ON A PEACE AGREEMENT, WE NEED TO CONTINUE
AND INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A
SETTLEMENT. RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A
FORCE IS VERY IMPORTANT, AND, AS I TOLD ANDREY, I AM SENSITIVE TO YOUR
CONCERNS ABOUT HOW RUSSIAN FORCES WOULD WORK WITH AND RELATE TO
NATO FORCES IN THIS OPERATION. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM SURE YOU
UNDERSTAND MY CONCERN FOR A PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENT THAT PROVIDES
FOR AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE, SO THAT WE MAKE
SURE THAT THE LIVES OF OUR SOLDIERS ARE NOT PLACED NEEDLESSLY AT
RISK.

WARREN AND ANDREY AND THEIR STAFFS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO ADDRESS
THIS SUBJECT. IT IS IMPORTANT NOW THAT OUR SENIOR MILITARY

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11/29/2017

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ADVISERS BEGIN TO EXCHANGE IDEAS. I THEREFORE HAVE ASKED BILL PERRY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MEETING WITH PAVEL GRACHEV TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION. I HOPE YOU AGREE ON THE VALUE OF SUCH A MEETING AND THAT MINISTER GRACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO MEET WITH BILL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THEY SHOULD LOOK AT HOW BEST TO INVOLVE RUSSIAN FORCES IN A WAY THAT MAKES PRACTICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL SENSE.

BORIS, I BELIEVE WE CAN FIND A SOLUTION THAT MEETS YOUR CONCERNS AND OURS. AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN OUR DEFENSE MINISTERS COULD FACILITATE THIS AND PREPARE FOR OUR OWN DISCUSSION ON THE BALKANS AT HYDE PARK. IT CAN ALSO HELP MAKE IMPLEMENTATION OF A BOSNIA SETTLEMENT ANOTHER SUCCESS STORY FOR U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION.

WARM REGARDS,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT
#6979

NNNN
<MSGID> M1882692

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

IT WAS A PLEASURE TALKING WITH YOU ON WEDNESDAY. ON THURSDAY, I HAD A GOOD CONVERSATION WITH ANDREY ON THE MARGINS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SIGNING CEREMONY HERE AT THE WHITE HOUSE. IT WAS AN EXCELLENT FOLLOW-UP TO OUR OWN DISCUSSION. THANK YOU FOR THE LETTER THAT ANDREY DELIVERED; THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS TESTIFIES TO WHAT OUR COOPERATION CAN ACHIEVE.

WITH THE AGREEMENT ON AN ADDITIONAL SET OF PRINCIPLES BY THE BALKAN PARTIES, EVENTS ARE MOVING QUICKLY. WHILE THERE IS MUCH WORK STILL TO BE DONE ON A PEACE AGREEMENT, WE NEED TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT. RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE IS VERY IMPORTANT, AND, AS I TOLD ANDREY, I AM SENSITIVE TO YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT HOW RUSSIAN FORCES WOULD WORK WITH AND RELATE TO NATO FORCES IN THIS OPERATION. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM SURE YOU UNDERSTAND MY CONCERN FOR A PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE, SO THAT WE MAKE SURE THAT THE LIVES OF OUR SOLDIERS ARE NOT PLACED NEEDLESSLY AT RISK.

WARREN AND ANDREY AND THEIR STAFFS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT. IT IS IMPORTANT NOW THAT OUR SENIOR MILITARY ADVISERS BEGIN TO EXCHANGE IDEAS. I THEREFORE HAVE ASKED BILL PERRY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MEETING WITH PAVEL GRACHEV TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION. I HOPE YOU AGREE ON THE VALUE OF SUCH A MEETING AND THAT MINISTER GRACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO MEET WITH BILL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THEY SHOULD LOOK AT HOW BEST TO INVOLVE RUSSIAN FORCES IN A WAY THAT MAKES PRACTICAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL SENSE.

BORIS, I BELIEVE WE CAN FIND A SOLUTION THAT MEETS YOUR CONCERNS AND OURS. AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN OUR DEFENSE MINISTERS COULD FACILITATE THIS AND PREPARE FOR OUR OWN DISCUSSION ON THE BALKANS AT HYDE PARK. IT CAN ALSO HELP MAKE IMPLEMENTATION OF A BOSNIA SETTLEMENT ANOTHER SUCCESS STORY FOR U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION.

WARM REGARDS,

BILL

(END TEXT)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10/2/95

September 30, 1995

95 SEP 30 P12:31

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on Perry-Grachev Meeting

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin proposing a Perry-Grachev meeting to discuss Russian participation in a Bosnia peace implementation force.

Background

In a follow-up to your September 28 talk with Andrey Kozyrev on an implementation force for Bosnia, the Russian Foreign Minister suggested to Strobe that we engage Defense Minister Grachev, preferably soon, on how Russia might participate. He recommended that Bill Perry see Grachev. While cautioning that Grachev is "in an ideological mode," Kozyrev feels Perry could help get him to address the issue in practical terms. Kozyrev suggested you put this idea directly to Yeltsin.

Accommodating Russian sensitivities on this issue will not be easy. The challenge will be to preserve NATO command and control while providing political cover for Moscow. One idea is to put a Russian contingent under "UN commander" Janvier (who would report to NATO); a second is to assign Russian forces duties other than implementation (demining, engineering tasks) for which they could be outside the NATO chain. There may be other fixes, as well.

We should engage the Russian military promptly. Bill is prepared to meet with Grachev on October 7 or 8. The message at Tab A proposes to Yeltsin an early Perry-Grachev meeting and urges that Grachev be instructed to work to find a practical solution for Russian participation in the implementation force. Our Embassy in Moscow will immediately follow up delivery of your letter with specific ideas to the Ministry of Defense on the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

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PER E.O. 13526
V2 2015-0815-M-2 (5.30)
11/21/2017

PHOTOCOPIED BY BRJ HANDED TO ROOM

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Message to Yeltsin

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *CB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin Proposing
Perry-Grachev Meeting

The memorandum to the President at Tab I recommends a letter to Yeltsin suggesting a Perry-Grachev meeting to discuss how Russia might participate in a Bosnia peace implementation force.

DOD would like to begin talking to the Russian Defense Ministry tomorrow about the meeting. That should not happen, however, until after the President's message has been delivered. We thus hope the President can approve this message tonight.

Concurrence by: Alexander Vershbow *SP for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Message to Yeltsin

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	10/19/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 610

FOLDER TITLE:

9507752

2014-0837-F
ke3353

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

7752

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
October 19, 1995

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your message of August 11, 1995. I fully share your assessment of our two countries' efforts to decrease the threat of nuclear proliferation and of the New-York Conference which has indefinitely and unconditionally extended the NPT Treaty. I agree that the next meaningful step in this direction should be finalizing the drafting of the Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty at the Conference on disarmament.

With a view to contribute to finding mutually acceptable decisions on all important issues under discussion at Geneva talks we are also working on the complicated issue of the scope of non-prohibited activities by the future Treaty. In the context of these efforts our Ministers of Defence and of the Atomic energy have sent a letter to their American colleagues proposing to hold without delay a meeting of experts which would permit to correlate our approaches. Unfortunately, the answer to this proposal has arrived already after the US had made public its initiative. Whereas, as I see it, our partnership should be built on the basis of timely coordination of efforts and actions, moreover on issues relating to nuclear weapons.

For Russia, as well as for the United States, it is principally important to ensure reliability and safety of the existing nuclear weapons in the conditions of comprehensive nuclear test ban, and to determine the nature and the scope of measures necessary for that. Same as you, I do not exclude a

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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v2 2015-08/15-M-2 (5.34)
4/19/2018

situation when there might be necessary to withdraw from the future Treaty if the supreme national interests demand it. But it is doubtful that such a step should be "programmed" already today especially on the eve of finalizing the work on the Treaty.

Insofar as broadening the scientific-technical cooperation between Russia and the United States in this field is concerned, undoubtedly, it would correspond to the interests of our countries and would promote successful completing of the work over the future Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I believe that concrete fields, possibilities, and necessities of such cooperation could be discussed at a meeting of Russian and US specialists which it would be appropriate to summon in the nearest possible time. What is needed here is an unorthodox, as well as intensive, in other words, really partnership like exchange of technologies, equipment, and of the accumulated experience and, if we approach the issue in even broader terms, - a breakthrough to a new level of engagement which would finally permit refusal of all nuclear explosions.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

PLS PUT INTO THE
SYSTEM —

HAND-DELIVERED TO
RWE DIRECTORATE 10/19

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
Господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю за послание от 11 августа 1995 года. Полностью разделяю твою оценку усилий наших двух стран по снижению угрозы ядерного распространения и нью-йоркской конференции, бессрочно и безусловно продлившей Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия. Согласен, что следующим значительным шагом в этом направлении должно стать завершение разработки Договора о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний на конференции по разоружению.

Стремясь содействовать нахождению общеприемлемых решений по всем важным проблемам, обсуждаемым на переговорах в Женеве, мы также прорабатываем сложный вопрос об объеме не запрещенной по будущему договору деятельности. В рамках такой проработки наши министры обороны и атомной энергии обратились с письмом к своим американским коллегам с предложением безотлагательно провести встречу специалистов, чтобы можно было "сверить часы". К сожалению, ответ на это предложение поступил уже после обнародования инициативы США. Между тем, как мне представляется, наше партнерство должно строиться на своевременном согласовании усилий и действий, тем более по вопросам, связанным с ядерным оружием.

Для России, как и для Соединенных Штатов, принципиально важно обеспечить надежность и безопасность существующего ядерного оружия в условиях всеобъемлющего запрещения на ядерные испытания, определить характер и объемы необходимых для этого мероприятий. Так же, как и ты, не исключаю ситуации, когда может потребоваться выход из будущего договора, если это диктуют высшие национальные интересы. Но вряд ли целесообразно уже сейчас "программировать" такой шаг, тем более в преддверии завершения работы над договором.

Что касается расширения научно-технического сотрудничества в этой области между Россией и Соединенными Штатами, то оно, несомненно

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4/19/2018

отвечало бы как интересам наших государств, так и успешному завершению работы над будущим договором о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний. Полагаю, что конкретные аспекты, возможности и потребности такого сотрудничества могли бы быть обсуждены в ходе встречи специалистов России и США, которую было бы целесообразно провести в ближайшее время. Здесь важен незабюрократизированный и интенсивный, словом, подлинно партнерский обмен технологиями, оборудованием и накопленным опытом, а если брать шире – выход на новый уровень взаимодействия, который в конечном счете и позволил бы отказаться от любых ядерных взрывов.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

19 октября 1995 года
г.Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: President Yeltsin's Christmas Letter to You (1 page)	01/03/1995	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	12/24/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	12/24/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022
001e. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(+) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 484

FOLDER TITLE:

9410029

2014-0837-F
 ke3324

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10029 1/5/95

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 3, 1995

95 JAN 3 P12: 27

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: President Yeltsin's Christmas Letter to You

President Yeltsin wrote you on Christmas Eve to send holiday greetings and to provide his assessment of U.S.-Russian relations at the end of 1994. He also wrote to you on December 30 concerning NATO expansion. In that letter, Yeltsin invited you to attend the V-E ceremonies in Moscow on May 9.

Despite some tension in the relationship over Bosnia, President Yeltsin professes general satisfaction with the state of the U.S.-Russian relationship. He mentions in particular Ukraine's accession to the NPT, which he attributes in large part to the coordinated efforts of Russia and the United States. He sees future challenges as likely to be less daunting and lists them as reorganizing international institutions for the post Cold War period, establishing new approaches to ensuring strategic stability, and broadening economic cooperation.

President Yeltsin notes that the most difficult task in the coming year will be to work out Russia's relationship with NATO, but he suggests this presents an opportunity as well as a challenge. He credits the Vice President's trip with helping to clarify the misunderstanding on what NATO will do in 1995.

I do not believe these letters require an immediate response this weekend. We will provide you with a draft letter to Yeltsin on NATO expansion shortly before Secretary Christopher sees Kozyrev in Geneva on January 17-18. We will also send you separately our recommendations on a visit to Moscow in May for the V-E day ceremonies.

Attachment
Tab A Incoming

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.05)
11/29/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

PHOTOCOPY BY JAR HANDWRITING

Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

Please receive my congratulations on Christmas and New Year holidays.

The year 1994 was not an easy one. The crises extremely aggravated at one and the same time in several regions of the world were feverous. Consider even just the Bosnian problem as one of those. Opponents to our partnership, and there are plenty of them both in Russia and the United States, impeded in every possible way. The Russian-American card is more often played in internal political struggle. Both unforced discrepancies and disappointments occurred between us.

Nevertheless, as the year goes down, I am satisfied, on the whole, with the results of Russian-American cooperation. Our partnership has passed severe ordeals. It is efficient and productive. It is quite enough to mention Ukraine's joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state which took place a great deal, if not in the first place, due to the coordinated efforts of Russia and the United States.

It is to be supposed that from the year to come we expect challenges not less serious. We have only started to reorganize the existing international structures formed basically during the "cold war" period, and to establish, on the basis of common democratic values and a just balance of interests, new approaches to ensuring the strategic stability and broadening economic cooperation, but we learned, and this is the main result of the year as I view it, to value our partnership. We proved it certain that confrontation in the world cannot be overcome and the "peace dividend" cannot be obtained without a fair, pragmatic and constructive interaction between Russia and the United States.

We can gain a lot, if we do not let the conjunctive ideas influence our decisions, if we build the policy of partnership on a broad aboveparty basis, and elucidate the importance of it to the people.

One of the main and the most difficult tasks set before us consists in working out of an agreement on the forms and content of Russia's relations with the NATO. At the same time the most alluring perspective opens here.

His Excellency

William J. Clinton

The President of the

United States of America

Washington, D.C.

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PL 2015-0815-M-2 (4.10)

4/19/2018

The next task in turn is a creative application of the existing experience in the Asian-Pacific region. This will enable us to place the last link in the chain of democracy, stability and prosperity from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Bill, on the threshold of the upcoming New Year holiday, I would like to emphasize the value I attach to the relations of friendship and cooperation established between us. Having everything going on smoothly it is easy to be partners. The truth of mutual confidence is tested in ordeals.

May I wish you good luck and success in your pursuing the chosen course. Happiness, good health and prosperity to you, to Hillary and to Chelsea. Naina joins me in my congratulations and the wishes.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

December 24, 1994

Moscow, The Kremlin

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г. ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

Прими поздравления с праздниками Рождества и Нового года.

1994 год был непростым. Лихорадили до предела обострившиеся кризисы сразу в нескольких регионах мира. Одна боснийская проблема чего стоит. Всячески мешали противники нашего партнерства – а их хватает и в России, и в США. Российско-американскую карту чаще стали использовать во внутривосточной борьбе. Случались между нами и ненадуманые разногласия, и разочарования.

Однако в целом я удовлетворен итогами года для российско-американского сотрудничества. Наше партнерство выдержало трудные испытания. Оно работает и приносит результаты. Достаточно упомянуть присоединение Украины к Договору о нераспространении в качестве неядерного государства, состоявшееся во многом, если не в первую очередь, благодаря скоординированным усилиям России и США.

Надо полагать, в будущем году нас ожидают не менее серьезные вызовы. Мы только приступаем к реформированию существующих, сложившихся в основном в годы "холодной войны" международных структур, к формированию на базе общих демократических ценностей и справедливого баланса интересов новых подходов к обеспечению стратегической стабильности и углублению экономического сотрудничества, но мы научились – и в этом я вижу главный итог года – ценить наше партнерство. Мы убедились, что без честного, прагматического, конструктивного взаимодействия между Россией и США конфронтацию в мире не преодолеть и "мирный дивиденд" не получить.

Если не позволять конъюнктурным соображениям влиять на наши решения, если строить курс на партнерство на широкой, надпартийной основе, если разъяснять людям его важность – мы можем достичь очень многого.

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v. 2015-0815-M-2 (4.11)
4/11/2014

Главная и самая сложная изстоящих перед нами задач – выработка договоренности о формах и содержании отношений России с НАТО. Но здесь же открывается и самая заманчивая перспектива. Следующая задача на очереди – творческое применение накопленного опыта в азиатско-тихоокеанском регионе. Это позволит нам замкнуть кольцо демократии, стабильности и процветания от Ванкувера до Владивостока.

Билл, в преддверии Нового года, хочу особо сказать, что я дорожу сложившимися между нами отношениями дружбы и сотрудничества. Когда все идет гладко – партнерами быть несложно. Истинность взаимного доверия проверяется в испытаниях.

Желаю тебе удачи и успеха в проведении избранного курса. Счастья, здоровья и благополучия тебе, Хиллари и Челси. Наина присоединяется ко всем моим поздравлениям и пожеланиям.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЦИН

24 декабря 1994 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you under the impression of a positive and open conversation we had with Mr.Gore.

His visit appeared to be very timely, and not only in terms of economics. I was really very concerned about the decisions taken at the NATO December meeting. For instance, in paragraph 6 of the Communique it is clearly stated that you will have discussed among yourselves, by spring 1995, all the organizational issues of enlargement of NATO, and by December you will present the results of these deliberations to states which intend to join NATO.

Our concern was corroborated by the statement you made in Budapest that during the NATO December meeting further steps were taken in preparation for enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I proceeded from the assumption that we had agreed in Washington in a totally different way which is not to act hastily, but rather to achieve, in the first place, agreement between us on Russia's full-scale partnership with NATO, and only after that to start tackling the issues of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I reacted accordingly in Budapest.

I am pleased that Mr.Gore has tried to eliminate these serious misunderstandings.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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02/2015-0768-AM (1.71)
11/14/2017

First, he assured me that no negotiations are envisaged for the year 1995 on admitting new states into NATO, and only an internal study of the concept of a possible enlargement of NATO will take place.

This is acceptable to us. I hope that from now on you will personally use your authority and by practical policy "adjust" paragraph 6 of the Brussels Communiqué.

Second, we have agreed with Mr. Gore to devote the year 1995 to achieving an understanding, first and foremost with you as the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance, and then with other NATO member-states, on new relations between Russia and this Organization. Correspondingly, work will be carried out within NATO both on a possible expansion and the necessary evolution of the alliance. In other words, coordinated actions will enable us to achieve a common understanding of further strategy by the end of 1995.

In conclusion, I note with regret that you and I have once again had a breakdown in communication. I am aware that you are upset about this as much as I am, all the more so since this "skirmish" could have been easily avoided. Let us agree at last on efficient regular contacts concerning this extremely important issue.

I am pleased that the Secretary of State accepts Mr. Kozyrev's proposal that they regularly, rather than occasionally, discuss the NATO issue during their personal meetings. Let them discuss it in a preliminary manner already in January, and then meet as many times as necessary for working out proposals for us on future relations between new Russia and new NATO.

I hope that this preparatory work will be completed by our next meeting. This time I am offering you an official invitation to pay a visit to Moscow on May 9 to take part in celebration of the historic Victory Day. In addition to our participation in multilateral events we could find time for a thorough discussion, in the first place, of the NATO issue, and of other urgent issues as well.

I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties which have emerged. As I told Mr.Gore, Russia is a partner of the United States. The President of the Russian Federation personally guarantees that.

I will be waiting for your reciprocal ideas.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 29, 1994

Его Превосходительству
господину Уильяму Дж. КЛИНТОНУ,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки,
Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Пишу тебе под впечатлением хорошего, откровенного разговора, который состоялся у нас с А. Гором.

Его визит оказался очень своевременным и не только в экономическом плане. Меня действительно серьезно обеспокоили решения декабрьской сессии НАТО. Так, в пункте шестом коммюнике черным по белому написано, что к весне 1995 года вы обсудите все организационные вопросы расширения НАТО между собой. А уже в декабре представите результаты этих обсуждений тем странам, которые хотят присоединиться к НАТО.

Наша обеспокоенность была подтверждена сделанным тобой в Будапеште заявлением о том, что на декабрьской сессии НАТО были предприняты "дальнейшие шаги по подготовке к расширению" Североатлантического союза. Я исходил из того, что в Вашингтоне мы с тобой условились совсем о другом: не торопиться, сначала договориться друг с другом о полномасштабном партнерстве России и НАТО и только потом подступаться к вопросам расширения Североатлантического союза. Соответственно я и отреагировал в Будапеште.

Рад, что А. Гор постарался снять эти серьезные недоразумения.

Во-первых, он заверил меня, что в 1995 году не предусматривается никаких переговоров о приеме в НАТО новых государств, а лишь внутреннее изучение концепции возможного расширения НАТО.

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72 2015-0815-41-2 (4.12)
11/14/2017

Такой вариант нам подходит. Теперь, надеюсь, что лично употребишь свой авторитет и практической политикой "подправишь" шестой пункт Брюссельского коммюнике.

Во-вторых, с А.Гором мы условились посвятить 1995 год тому, чтобы договориться, прежде всего с вами как лидерами Североатлантического союза, а затем и с другими странами-членами НАТО, о новых отношениях между Россией и этой организацией. Соответственно внутри НАТО будут работать как над возможным расширением, так и над необходимой эволюцией альянса. То есть, действуя скоординированно, придем к общему пониманию дальнейшей стратегии к концу 1995 года.

И, в заключение, о том, что у нас с тобой, к сожалению, в очередной раз произошел сбой с коммуникациями. Знаю, что ты огорчен этим не меньше меня, тем более, что всей этой "стычки" легко было избежать. Давай, наконец, условимся о четких регулярных контактах по этому важнейшему вопросу.

Удовлетворен, что госсекретарь принимает предложение Козырева вплотную, а не от случая к случаю, заниматься НАТО на их личных встречах. Пусть они в предварительном плане переговорят на эту тему уже в январе. А затем встречаются столько раз, сколько нужно, для подготовки предложений нам с тобой о будущих взаимоотношениях новой России с новой НАТО.

Надеюсь, что эта подготовительная работа будет закончена к нашей с тобой следующей встрече. Теперь уже официально приглашаю тебя посетить Москву 9 мая для празднования исторического Дня Победы. Помимо участия в многосторонних мероприятиях мы с тобой могли бы выбрать время для обстоятельного разговора, прежде всего по НАТО, а также по другим актуальным вопросам.

Уверен, что мы преодолеем возникшие трудности. Как я передал А.Гору, Россия – партнер США. Президент Российской Федерации лично гарантирует это.

Буду ждать твоих встречных соображений.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль

29 декабря 1994 года

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 226

FOLDER TITLE:

9410108

2014-0837-F

ke3326

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2-Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 03 » декабря 19⁹⁴ г.

№ ПР-1756п

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием от 2 декабря с.г. Вопрос эволюции НАТО стал сегодня ключевым для наших отношений, да и для европейской стабильности в целом. Поэтому здесь между нами не должно оставаться ничего недосказанного.

Смысл моего послания к тебе от 30 ноября с.г. заключается не в том, чтобы бить тревогу. В преддверии саммита в Будапеште я хотел подчеркнуть важность скоординированных действий России и США в вопросах реформирования структур европейской безопасности.

Я приветствую подтверждение тобой наших сентябрьских договоренностей. Важно, однако, чтобы они получали адекватное отражение в соответствующих многосторонних документах. Я был уверен, что так будет и с коммюнике Совета НАТО, принятым 1 декабря.

Не могу согласиться с твоей оценкой этого документа как не содержащего ничего нового и неожиданного. Не склонен к драматизации, но принятое Советом НАТО решение требует тщательного анализа, разъяснений нам.

Программа партнерства "Россия - НАТО" будет заключена, сомнений здесь быть не должно. А.В.Козырев объяснит это своим коллегам. Однако нам нужны заверения, что акцент не переносится сейчас с партнерства на расширение. Всю проблему надо ставить

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
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по-крупному, вести речь о принятии конкретных обязательств и гарантий безопасности России и НАТО, соответствующих характеру кардинальных перемен в европейской ситуации. Только в этом контексте можно будет думать о расширении НАТО. Причем новой, трансформированной партнерством НАТО.

Думаю, ты согласишься, что необходим откровенный разговор, чтобы, как ты сам предлагаешь, иметь точный взгляд на подходы друг друга и на перспективы. Предлагаю организовать такой разговор с участием тебя и Гельмута Коля в январе будущего года на даче под Москвой.

Что касается Нагорного Карабаха, наше взаимопонимание о подготовке и принятии резолюции Совета Безопасности, "благословляющей" запуск миротворческой операции, желательно - по гаитянскому сценарию, безусловно, остается в силе. Эта резолюция - серьезный документ, и за пару дней ее не отработать. Поэтому, скорее, нам следует ориентироваться на то, чтобы в решениях Будапешта записать, как об этом говорили в Брюсселе Козырев и Кристофер, что СБСЕ будет вносить важный посильный вклад в тесном взаимодействии с Россией (а не в соревновании с ней) как в переговорный процесс, так и в формирование под эгидой ООН многонациональных миротворческих сил для Нагорного Карабаха. Детали предстоит отработать позднее. Параллельно, естественно, шла бы работа и над текстом резолюции СБ ООН. Кстати, насколько я понимаю, европейцы поддерживают такой подход.

До встречи в Будапеште.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a-note	John Podesta to the President, re: [Proposed Letter to President Yeltsin] (1 page)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/15/2022
001b-note	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c-cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001d-memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to President Yeltsin on NATO and Chechnya (2 pages)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001e-draft	[Draft of 001c] (3 pages)	01/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001f-letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001g-cable	[Duplicate of 001c] [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001h-memo	John Beyrle to Anthony Lake, re: Presidential Message to Yeltsin (1 page)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001i-draft	[Incomplete duplicate of 001c] (1 page)	01/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 558

FOLDER TITLE:

9500095

2014-0837-F
 ke3327

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 1/6
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1995

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a proposed letter to President Yeltsin, which Tony Lake would like Yeltsin to receive before a Russian security council meeting that is going to occur tomorrow morning, Russian time. Consequently, the letter must be cabled from the White House tonight.

Unless you have a problem with the letter, Tony will have it cabled after 9:30 pm.

John Podesta
Todd Stern

oll

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 1/6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1995

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a proposed letter to President Yeltsin, which Tony Lake would like Yeltsin to receive before a Russian security council meeting that is going to occur tomorrow morning, Russian time. Consequently, the letter must be cabled from the White House tonight.

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John Podesta
Todd Stern

See

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 558

FOLDER TITLE:

9500095

2014-0837-F
ke3327

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
SIT: GRAY PRIVACY_OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 060319Z JAN 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO E.O. 13526.3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE READ YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 29 WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE. THE
QUESTION OF THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES IS
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING US. AS I HAVE MENTIONED,
RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AND YOUR VIEWS ON HOW THE PROCESS SHOULD GO
FORWARD ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MY THINKING AND PLANNING. I CAN
ASSURE YOU THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE.

YOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN MOSCOW UNDERScoreD THE
IMPORTANCE THAT YOU AND I ATTACH TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS
CRITICAL ISSUE. LET ME STRESS THAT WHAT I TOLD YOU IN WASHINGTON
REGARDING NATO EXPANSION -- AND WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED
IN YOUR MEETING LAST MONTH -- STILL STANDS. NATO WILL NOT EXPAND IN
1995 AND THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS IN 1995 ON ADMITTING NEW
STATES TO NATO. AS THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD YOU, THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT MY GOVERNMENT AND I HAVE TOLD YOU AND WHAT
NATO DECIDED IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1.

YOU RAISED PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE IN YOUR LETTER. THAT
PARAGRAPH CALLS FOR A STUDY THAT WILL CLARIFY WITHIN NATO THE
RATIONALE AND THE PROCESS FOR EXPANSION. THE STUDY WILL ALSO FOCUS
ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. NATO HAS
DECIDED TO PRESENT THE RESULTS OF THESE DELIBERATIONS TO INTERESTED
PARTNERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS. FOR MY PART, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL DECIDE
TO BE AMONG THE FIRST TO HEAR THIS BRIEFING.

YOU ARE CORRECT IN RECALLING THAT, AT OUR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, WE
ALSO AGREED THAT THE PROCESSES FOR EXPANDING NATO AND BUILDING A

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[2015-0815-M-2, 4.18]

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VZ 2015-0768-M (1.72)
11/14/2017

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA SHOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL. THESE ARE BOTH ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BUILD A STABLE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATO NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL, NOT SEQUENTIALLY. HOWEVER, THE DECISION ON EXPANSION MUST BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE ALONE.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS ON THIS MATTER. YOUR LETTER CORRECTLY WARNS AGAINST THE DANGER OF MISCOMMUNICATION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A PROMPT AND CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO -- OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ON ANY ITEM ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA -- IS THE SUREST WAY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER WILL COME TO GENEVA PREPARED TO EXPLORE THESE ISSUES IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. I HOPE THAT ANDREI KOZYREV WILL LIKewise BE READY FOR A FRANK GIVE AND TAKE ON RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING ON RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, AS THE PROCESS OF EXPANSION UNFOLDS. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE GENEVA MEETING CAN FORM PART OF WHAT YOU HAVE CALLED "EFFICIENT, REGULAR CONTACTS" ON THIS AND OTHER CRITICAL SUBJECTS.

BORIS, I ALSO WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU MY VIEWS ABOUT THE ON-GOING TRAGEDY ON CHECHNYA. YOU HAVE HEARD NUMEROUS REPORTS ABOUT THE OFFICIAL AMERICAN POSITION. I WANTED YOU TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME WHERE I STAND WITH REGARD TO THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

I UNDERSTAND THE DILEMMA THAT YOU FACE. WE HAVE STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO STATE, OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RUSSIA. WE HAVE SAID THAT CHECHNYA IS PART OF RUSSIA AND THAT WE OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS BY FORCE, WHETHER BY MEANS OF AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ONE STATE AGAINST ANOTHER OR BY MEANS OF ARMED SECESSIONISM.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE DEEPLY DISTRESSED OVER THE GROWING COST IN HUMAN LIFE, INCLUDING AMONG CIVILIANS, INCURRED BY THE ATTEMPT AT A MILITARY SOLUTION. WHILE THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN OUR VIEW THAT CHECHNYA IS AN INTERNAL RUSSIAN MATTER, THERE IS ALSO NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THAT VIEW AND OUR HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL RESOLVE THE MATTER IN A FASHION CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, NOTABLY THOSE ENSHRINED IN THE OSCE DOCUMENT THAT WE AGREED TO IN BUDAPEST A LITTLE OVER A MONTH AGO. IN THIS SENSE, I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THE CHECHNYA CRISIS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

CLINTON ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

IN THIS CONNECTION, I KNOW THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS PROPOSED TO YOU USE OF THE MECHANISMS OF THE OSCE AS A POSSIBLE MEANS TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE A REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION AND I HOPE RUSSIA WILL CHOOSE TO WORK WITH THE OSCE ON THIS BASIS. IN GENERAL, BORIS, I JUST WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT WE WILL ENCOURAGE ANY EFFORT TO FIND A LASTING END TO THE BLOODSHED AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE DISPUTE. I KNOW THAT THESE MUST BE DIFFICULT DAYS FOR YOU AND I THUS STAND READY TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DETAIL IF YOU WISH.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO MOSCOW IN MAY. I WILL BE GETTING BACK TO YOU SHORTLY ON THIS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5171

NNNN

<MSGID> M1447063

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

PRIVACY CHANNEL

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

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YOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN MOSCOW UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE THAT YOU AND I ATTACH TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE. LET ME STRESS THAT WHAT I TOLD YOU IN WASHINGTON REGARDING NATO EXPANSION -- AND WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED IN YOUR MEETING LAST MONTH -- STILL STANDS. NATO WILL NOT EXPAND IN 1995 AND THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS IN 1995 ON ADMITTING NEW STATES TO NATO. AS THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD YOU, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT MY GOVERNMENT AND I HAVE TOLD YOU AND WHAT NATO DECIDED IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1.

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PER E.O. 13526

Vz 2015-0768-m (1.72)

11/14/2017

[2015-0815-m-2,4,20]

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS ON THIS MATTER. YOUR LETTER CORRECTLY WARNS AGAINST THE DANGER OF MISCOMMUNICATION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A PROMPT AND CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO -- OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ON ANY ITEM ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA -- IS THE SUREST WAY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING.

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO MOSCOW IN MAY. I WILL BE
GETTING BACK TO YOU SHORTLY ON THIS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you under the impression of a positive and open conversation we had with Mr.Gore.

His visit appeared to be very timely, and not only in terms of economics. I was really very concerned about the decisions taken at the NATO December meeting. For instance, in paragraph 6 of the Communique it is clearly stated that you will have discussed among yourselves, by spring 1995, all the organizational issues of enlargement of NATO, and by December you will present the results of these deliberations to states which intend to join NATO.

Our concern was corroborated by the statement you made in Budapest that during the NATO December meeting further steps were taken in preparation for enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I proceeded from the assumption that we had agreed in Washington in a totally different way which is not to act hastily, but rather to achieve, in the first place, agreement between us on Russia's full-scale partnership with NATO, and only after that to start tackling the issues of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I reacted accordingly in Budapest.

I am pleased that Mr.Gore has tried to eliminate these serious misunderstandings.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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PER E.O. 13526

15-0768-M (1,71)

11/14/2017

[2015-0815-M-2, 4,21]

First, he assured me that no negotiations are envisaged for the year 1995 on admitting new states into NATO, and only an internal study of the concept of a possible enlargement of NATO will take place.

This is acceptable to us. I hope that from now on you will personally use your authority and by practical policy "adjust" paragraph 6 of the Brussels Communiqué.

Second, we have agreed with Mr. Gore to devote the year 1995 to achieving an understanding, first and foremost with you as the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance, and then with other NATO member-states, on new relations between Russia and this Organization. Correspondingly, work will be carried out within NATO both on a possible expansion and the necessary evolution of the alliance. In other words, coordinated actions will enable us to achieve a common understanding of further strategy by the end of 1995.

In conclusion, I note with regret that you and I have once again had a breakdown in communication. I am aware that you are upset about this as much as I am, all the more so since this "skirmish" could have been easily avoided. Let us agree at last on efficient regular contacts concerning this extremely important issue.

I am pleased that the Secretary of State accepts Mr. Kozyrev's proposal that they regularly, rather than occasionally, discuss the NATO issue during their personal meetings. Let them discuss it in a preliminary manner already in January, and then meet as many times as necessary for working out proposals for us on future relations between new Russia and new NATO.

I hope that this preparatory work will be completed by our next meeting. This time I am offering you an official invitation to pay a visit to Moscow on May 9 to take part in celebration of the historic Victory Day. In addition to our participation in multilateral events we could find time for a thorough discussion, in the first place, of the NATO issue, and of other urgent issues as well.

I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties which have emerged. As I told Mr. Gore, Russia is a partner of the United States. The President of the Russian Federation personally guarantees that.

I will be waiting for your reciprocal ideas.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 29, 1994

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001g, cable	[Duplicate of 001c] [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)

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([Yeltsin and HS])
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FOLDER TITLE:

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0768-M (1.72)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

11/14/2017

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

02 00

MATTER. YOUR LETTER CORRECTLY WARNS AGAINST THE DANGER OF MISCOMMUNICATION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A PROMPT AND CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO -- OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ON ANY ITEM ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA -- IS THE SUREST WAY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

03 00

BILL

END TEXT
DECL: OADR

#0000

CLINTON ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0095

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 5, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*
FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *J.B.*
SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President covering his proposed response to President Yeltsin's Dec. 29 letter on NATO expansion. We have incorporated several paragraphs on Chechnya as well, in the hope of presenting the President's views to Yeltsin in advance of a Russian Security Council meeting scheduled for Friday morning in Moscow. For this reason, it would be most useful if this message could be approved for transmission no later than 10 p.m. EST January 5.

||

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Sandy Vershbow, Dan Fried *for all*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President or, alternatively, approve the message for transmission yourself.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Proposed Response
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

1/2 2015 0815-M-2 (4.73)
11/21/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PRIVACY CHANNEL

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(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE READ YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 29 WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE. THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING US. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AND YOUR VIEWS ON HOW THE PROCESS SHOULD GO FORWARD ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MY THINKING AND PLANNING. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE.

YOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN MOSCOW UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE THAT YOU AND I ATTACH TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE. LET ME STRESS THAT WHAT I TOLD YOU IN WASHINGTON REGARDING NATO EXPANSION -- AND WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED IN YOUR MEETING LAST MONTH -- STILL STANDS. NATO WILL NOT EXPAND IN 1995 AND THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS IN 1995 ON ADMITTING NEW STATES TO NATO. AS THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD YOU, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT MY GOVERNMENT AND I HAVE TOLD YOU AND WHAT NATO DECIDED IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1.

YOU RAISED ^{GRAPH} PARA 6 OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE IN YOUR LETTER. THAT PARAGRAPH CALLS FOR A STUDY THAT WILL CLARIFY WITHIN NATO THE RATIONALE AND THE PROCESS FOR EXPANSION. THE STUDY WILL ALSO FOCUS ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. NATO HAS DECIDED TO PRESENT THE RESULTS OF THESE DELIBERATIONS TO INTERESTED PARTNERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS. FOR MY PART, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL DECIDE TO BE AMONG THE FIRST TO HEAR THIS BRIEFING.

YOU ARE CORRECT IN RECALLING THAT, AT OUR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE PROCESSES FOR EXPANDING NATO AND BUILDING A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA SHOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL. THESE ARE BOTH ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BUILD A STABLE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATO NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL, NOT SEQUENTIALLY. HOWEVER, THE DECISION ON EXPANSION MUST BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE ALONE.

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12 2015-0815-m-2 (4,24)

11/14/2017

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 558

FOLDER TITLE:

9500100

2014-0837-F
ke3328

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Translated from Russian

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you under the impression of a positive and open conversation we had with Mr.Gore.

His visit appeared to be very timely, and not only in terms of economics. I was really very concerned about the decisions taken at the NATO December meeting. For instance, in paragraph 6 of the Communique it is clearly stated that you will have discussed among yourselves, by spring 1995, all the organizational issues of enlargement of NATO, and by December you will present the results of these deliberations to states which intend to join NATO.

Our concern was corroborated by the statement you made in Budapest that during the NATO December meeting further steps were taken in preparation for enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I proceeded from the assumption that we had agreed in Washington in a totally different way which is not to act hastily, but rather to achieve, in the first place, agreement between us on Russia's full-scale partnership with NATO, and only after that to start tackling the issues of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. I reacted accordingly in Budapest.

I am pleased that Mr.Gore has tried to eliminate these serious misunderstandings.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.25)
11/14/2017

First, he assured me that no negotiations are envisaged for the year 1995 on admitting new states into NATO, and only an internal study of the concept of a possible enlargement of NATO will take place.

This is acceptable to us. I hope that from now on you will personally use your authority and by practical policy "adjust" paragraph 6 of the Brussels Communiqué.

Second, we have agreed with Mr.Gore to devote the year 1995 to achieving an understanding, first and foremost with you as the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance, and then with other NATO member-states, on new relations between Russia and this Organization. Correspondingly, work will be carried out within NATO both on a possible expansion and the necessary evolution of the alliance. In other words, coordinated actions will enable us to achieve a common understanding of further strategy by the end of 1995.

In conclusion, I note with regret that you and I have once again had a breakdown in communication. I am aware that you are upset about this as much as I am, all the more so since this "skirmish" could have been easily avoided. Let us agree at last on efficient regular contacts concerning this extremely important issue.

I am pleased that the Secretary of State accepts Mr.Kozyrev's proposal that they regularly, rather than occasionally, discuss the NATO issue during their personal meetings. Let them discuss it in a preliminary manner already in January, and then meet as many times as necessary for working out proposals for us on future relations between new Russia and new NATO.

I hope that this preparatory work will be completed by our next meeting. This time I am offering you an official invitation to pay a visit to Moscow on May 9 to take part in celebration of the historic Victory Day. In addition to our participation in multilateral events we could find time for a thorough discussion, in the first place, of the NATO issue, and of other urgent issues as well.

I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties which have emerged. As I told Mr. Gore, Russia is a partner of the United States. The President of the Russian Federation personally guarantees that.

I will be waiting for your reciprocal ideas.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 29, 1994

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 3571

FOLDER TITLE:

9500266

2014-0837-F
ke3329

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Dear Bill:

I have carefully examined your letter of November 8, 1994 regarding the contacts between our states in the field of biological and chemical weapons. I agree, that these difficult problems that cause mutual concern need permanent supervision.

I am pleased that progress has been achieved lately on biological weapons issues. Our experts are actively advancing towards resolution of the remaining questions. There is a necessity to make a final clarification regarding the necessary steps to be taken in this direction. I would consider it expedient to act according the following plan: first of all to complete the work on the joint document regulating the implementation of the trilateral Joint Statement on biological weapons, and then to conduct reciprocal visits to military biological facilities. My experts have clear instructions and are ready to work actively on these issues.

We proceed from the assumption that the former Soviet Union biological weapons development programs cannot serve the basis for continuous allegations against Russia for the previous activities in this area. Any kind of development of this type of weapons were discontinued according to my direct order, and it is time now to close the case.

I suppose that experts of our countries should work more actively on resolving the existing problems in the chemical weapons field. In particular we are interested in finding a solution which could reduce for Russia costs of the Convention implementation. This would conform to the spirit of the promises given earlier by the US side.

As for implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum, it is important to agree on some key definitions of the multilateral Convention. We should avoid the attempts to correct the appropriate regulations stipulated in the Convention.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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PER E.O. 13526

(2) 2015-0815-W-2 (4,26)
4/19/2018

One more issue. Our research works in the chemical weapons field caused concern of the American side. In this connection I would like to inform you confidentially that under my decision these works were discontinued in 1992. Accordingly I expect you to confirm that similar works have been discontinued in the United States too.

I also believe that the discussions on the issues of chemical and biological weapons in the framework of Chernomyrdin-Gore meeting were useful. They prove that the agreements are not only necessary but possible. I propose to provide our experts with a new, broader and more flexible mandate for an early progress in this extremely important field of disarmament, and confidence straightening.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

January 11, 1995
Moscow, the Kremlin

Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Д.Клинтону
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим письмом от 8 ноября 1994 г. по вопросам контактов между нашими странами в области биологического и химического оружия. Согласен, что эти непростые проблемы, вызывающие озабоченность обоюдного характера, требуют постоянного контроля.

Рад, что в делах, связанных с биологическим оружием, в последнее время достигнут прогресс. Наши эксперты активно продвигаются к решению остающихся вопросов. Здесь нужно внести окончательную ясность относительно того, какие шаги и каким образом должны быть осуществлены в этом направлении. Считаю целесообразным действовать по следующей схеме: прежде всего доработать совместный документ, регламентирующий выполнение трехстороннего заявления по биологии, а затем провести взаимные посещения военно-биологических объектов. Мои эксперты имеют четкие инструкции и готовы энергично работать над этими вопросами.

Исходим из того, что наличие программ разработки биологического оружия у бывшего СССР не может быть основанием для постоянных обвинений России за прошлую деятельность в этой области. Все разработки такого вида оружия прекращены по моему прямому распоряжению и пора закрыть этот вопрос.

В области химического оружия полагаю, что эксперты наших стран должны энергичнее поработать над снятием имеющихся проблем. Заинтересованы, в частности, и в том, чтобы совместно найти решения, которые позволят снизить расходы России при осуществлении конвенции. Это соответствовало бы духу обещаний, ранее данных американской стороной.

Что касается выполнения Вашингтонского меморандума, то здесь важно договориться в отношении некоторых ключевых определений по многосторонней конвенции. Надо избегать попыток корректировать соответствующие правила, зафиксированные в конвенции.

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100-315-015-1-2 (4.17)
4/17/2014

И еще одно. Исследования в области разработки у нас химического оружия вызвали озабоченность американской стороны. В связи с этим хочу доверительно проинформировать тебя о том, что по моему мнению эти работы были прекращены в 1992 году, соответственно рассчитываю услыхать от тебя подтверждение того, что аналогичные работы прекращены и в СЛА.

Считаю также полезными те обсуждения по вопросам химического и биологического оружия, которые состоялись в рамках встречи Черномыртин - Гор, они подтверждают, что договоренности не только необходимы, но и возможны. Предлагаю дать нашим экспертам мандат, более широкий и гибкий мандат для скорейшего продвижения в этой важнейшей области разоружения и укрепления доверия.

С уважением,

В.В.Путин

11 января 1995 г.
г. Москва, Кремль

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Letter from President Yeltsin on Chechnya (2 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (4 pages)	01/16/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/15/2022
001c. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. memo	John Beyrle to Anthony Lake, re: Letter to the President from Yeltsin on Chechnya (1 page)	01/17/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 559

FOLDER TITLE:

9500343

2014-0837-F
ke3330

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
1-18-95

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1995

95 JAN 18 AIO : 39

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin on Chechnya

The Russian Embassy has delivered President Yeltsin's response to your January 6 letter concerning Chechnya (Tab A). The letter is somewhat cooler and more defensive in tone than other recent correspondence from Yeltsin (not surprising, given the sensitivities involved) and stresses repeatedly the internal nature of the affair. Yeltsin goes into some detail on the criminal character of the regime in Grozny and says their intransigence had left Russia with no other choice than to use force. He notes the generally restrained character of U.S. public comments on the situation and hopes for our continued understanding of Russia's internal problems to avoid having Chechnya become a "test case" for the U.S.-Russia partnership.

At the same time, Yeltsin gives explicit assurances on some areas of key importance to us and the international community, saying that humanitarian aspects are legitimate subjects of international concern; that Russia is interested in cooperation on these issues; and that OSCE decisions create an acceptable basis for its involvement in, e.g., helping re-establish civilian rule.

The letter is notable for what it does not say. Yeltsin notes that the military phase of the conflict is ending but does not express a view on how the reconciliation process can be accomplished, or even refer to the need for a political solution. He also avoids any expression of regret over civilian casualties, noting only that the operation has been difficult and caused more death and destruction than expected.

Secretary Christopher had a good discussion of Chechnya with Kozyrev in Geneva on Tuesday. Kozyrev assured him that he is in frequent touch with Yeltsin, whom he described as "on top" of the situation in Chechnya. Kozyrev described Russia's goals there as an end to the fighting followed by free elections for a new government. After we have had a fuller readout of the Christopher-Kozyrev talks, we will consider how best to respond to what Yeltsin has written.

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RZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4,28)
11/28/2017

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Attachments

- Tab A Incoming Yeltsin Letter
- Tab B Your Letter of January 6

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

Unofficial translation

Moscow, The Kremlin
January 16, 1995

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you on an issue which is purely an internal affair of Russia, although it is not the matter of just our concern. I am referring to the events in Chechnya. I would like to advise you on my evaluation of the situation. In your letter of January 6, 1995 you have expressed an interest in such information.

The Chechen problem has been inherited by us at the time of disintegration of the Soviet Union. Our attempts to resolve it by peaceful means that we have been taking in the course of three years have not given results. Any of our proposals aimed at getting to an agreement on the status of the Chechen Republic in the framework of the Russian Federation have been rejected. The criminal regime that came into power illegally turned the Republic into a strong hold of organized crime, including drug trafficking, and of political extremism not only in the scale of the Northern-Caucasus region and even that of Russia. Chechnya, in its nature, became a mafioso-terrorist formation allied with the international criminal world which was fraught with an extreme danger of criminality in many countries of the world, including those considered to be relatively safe in this respect today, of a sharp increase of international drug and arms smuggling and even could lead to undermining the global non-proliferation regime.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

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PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-11-2 (4.79)
11/29/2017

An extraordinary situation has developed, requiring special measures. The use of force was not our choice, but it has been imposed on us by the Dudaev regime. However, we were left with no other way out. We also kept in mind the obligation taken with respect to the OSCE documents, which is not to allow the existence of armed groups which are not controlled by the constitutional government bodies. As President I must give back to the population of Chechnya their civil and political rights including the right to self-determination as a subject of the Russian Federation in accordance with the state Constitution in force.

It is true, the operation on the disarmament of the illegal military units in Chechnya has passed in a hard way, was accompanied by a greater loss of life and material losses than we expected. The Grozny regime has torpedoed all peaceful initiatives of the Russian Government including the latest appeal which guaranteed amnesty to the fighters who would voluntarily lay down their weapons. Under such circumstances we could not respond to the provocations of the criminals who have come to power in Grozny by building up the use of force since this would inevitably lead to an increase of victims among the civilian population. In fact, this was the reason why the military phase of solving the conflict took that long.

These, in a nutshell, are the facts about this problem. I would stress it again that the reestablishment of the constitutional law in the Chechen Republic has been and remains our exclusive internal affair. At the same time we, nevertheless, acknowledge that the human rights insurance aspect does not constitute a solely Russian internal concern and, as we have already said, we are interested in cooperation on these issues. Besides, there are many mercenaries from other countries who are fighting on the side of the Dudayev's guerillas. This aspect of the problem

also requires discussion in order to reliably seal off the access routes for mercenaries.

It is from these positions that I evaluate the reaction of Russia's partners to the developments in Chechnya. I notice that, as a rule, rather well-balanced positions are being occupied. But I am having an impression that the official circles of some countries are trying to counter-balance their recognition of the Chechen problem as an internal Russian affair with various recommendations which do not always happen to be responsible and constructive ones.

I've been informed that the US comments within the recent several weeks have invariably been notable for their restrained character and an understanding of the situation. That's why I learned with bewilderment about the recent statements in which Russia has been accused of violating the OSCE documents. Such accusations are counterproductive since they are being used by the Chechen criminal leaders.

A correct understanding is especially important now when the settlement of the Chechen crisis enters a new phase. The military phase is coming to its close and at the stage when the situation is getting normal participation of the international community, and first of all of the OSCE is possible. For example, the OSCE experience in helping establish a civilian rule will be of use, as well as that in assistance to organizing elections and supervising them.

The statement of January 12 of the Chairman of the OSCE Permanent Council creates an acceptable framework for a joint work in these directions.

I am basing my assessment on the assumption that it would be in our common interests not to let the Chechen problem turn into a testcase for the relationship between Russia and the United States. The adversaries of our partnership would like exactly this. I attribute on the account of their activity the speculations in the press regarding the future of democracy in Russia

I expect that you will not stay aside but would clearly voice your position. Most acute internal problems, both socioeconomic and political, are characteristic today for many big countries. Russia is no exception in this respect. And there should be no "double standards" in the approach to us on these problems.

I hope that in the nearest future I will be able to inform you about the final transit towards peaceful reconstruction in Chechnya.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 559

FOLDER TITLE:

9500343

2014-0837-F
ke3330

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
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VZ 2015-0768-M (1.72)

11/14/2017

TO EO.13526/3.3(b)(6)

INFO ////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE READ YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 29 WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE. THE
QUESTION OF THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES IS
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING US. AS I HAVE MENTIONED,
RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AND YOUR VIEWS ON HOW THE PROCESS SHOULD GO
FORWARD ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MY THINKING AND PLANNING. I CAN
ASSURE YOU THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE.

YOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN MOSCOW UNDERSCORED THE
IMPORTANCE THAT YOU AND I ATTACH TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS
CRITICAL ISSUE. LET ME STRESS THAT WHAT I TOLD YOU IN WASHINGTON
REGARDING NATO EXPANSION -- AND WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED
IN YOUR MEETING LAST MONTH -- STILL STANDS. NATO WILL NOT EXPAND IN
1995 AND THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS IN 1995 ON ADMITTING NEW
STATES TO NATO. AS THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD YOU, THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT MY GOVERNMENT AND I HAVE TOLD YOU AND WHAT
NATO DECIDED IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 1.

YOU RAISED PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE IN YOUR LETTER. THAT
PARAGRAPH CALLS FOR A STUDY THAT WILL CLARIFY WITHIN NATO THE
RATIONALE AND THE PROCESS FOR EXPANSION. THE STUDY WILL ALSO FOCUS
ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. NATO HAS
DECIDED TO PRESENT THE RESULTS OF THESE DELIBERATIONS TO INTERESTED
PARTNERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS. FOR MY PART, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL DECIDE
TO BE AMONG THE FIRST TO HEAR THIS BRIEFING.

YOU ARE CORRECT IN RECALLING THAT, AT OUR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, WE
ALSO AGREED THAT THE PROCESSES FOR EXPANDING NATO AND BUILDING A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA SHOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL. THESE ARE BOTH ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BUILD A STABLE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE. IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATO NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL, NOT SEQUENTIALLY. HOWEVER, THE DECISION ON EXPANSION MUST BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE ALONE.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS ON THIS MATTER. YOUR LETTER CORRECTLY WARNS AGAINST THE DANGER OF MISCOMMUNICATION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A PROMPT AND CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO -- OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ON ANY ITEM ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA -- IS THE SUREST WAY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER WILL COME TO GENEVA PREPARED TO EXPLORE THESE ISSUES IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. I HOPE THAT ANDREI KOZYREV WILL LIKEWISE BE READY FOR A FRANK GIVE AND TAKE ON RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES, INCLUDING ON RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, AS THE PROCESS OF EXPANSION UNFOLDS. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE GENEVA MEETING CAN FORM PART OF WHAT YOU HAVE CALLED "EFFICIENT, REGULAR CONTACTS" ON THIS AND OTHER CRITICAL SUBJECTS.

BORIS, I ALSO WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU MY VIEWS ABOUT THE ON-GOING TRAGEDY ON CHECHNYA. YOU HAVE HEARD NUMEROUS REPORTS ABOUT THE OFFICIAL AMERICAN POSITION. I WANTED YOU TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME WHERE I STAND WITH REGARD TO THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

I UNDERSTAND THE DILEMMA THAT YOU FACE. WE HAVE STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO STATE, OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RUSSIA. WE HAVE SAID THAT CHECHNYA IS PART OF RUSSIA AND THAT WE OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS BY FORCE, WHETHER BY MEANS OF AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ONE STATE AGAINST ANOTHER OR BY MEANS OF ARMED SECESSIONISM.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE DEEPLY DISTRESSED OVER THE GROWING COST IN HUMAN LIFE, INCLUDING AMONG CIVILIANS, INCURRED BY THE ATTEMPT AT A MILITARY SOLUTION. WHILE THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN OUR VIEW THAT CHECHNYA IS AN INTERNAL RUSSIAN MATTER, THERE IS ALSO NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THAT VIEW AND OUR HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL RESOLVE THE MATTER IN A FASHION CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, NOTABLY THOSE ENSHRINED IN THE OSCE DOCUMENT THAT WE AGREED TO IN BUDAPEST A LITTLE OVER A MONTH AGO. IN THIS SENSE, I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THE CHECHNYA CRISIS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

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PAGE 03 OF 03

IN THIS CONNECTION, I KNOW THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS PROPOSED TO YOU USE OF THE MECHANISMS OF THE OSCE AS A POSSIBLE MEANS TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE A REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION AND I HOPE RUSSIA WILL CHOOSE TO WORK WITH THE OSCE ON THIS BASIS. IN GENERAL, BORIS, I JUST WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT WE WILL ENCOURAGE ANY EFFORT TO FIND A LASTING END TO THE BLOODSHED AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE DISPUTE. I KNOW THAT THESE MUST BE DIFFICULT DAYS FOR YOU AND I THUS STAND READY TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DETAIL IF YOU WISH.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO MOSCOW IN MAY. I WILL BE GETTING BACK TO YOU SHORTLY ON THIS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#5171

NNNN

<MSGID> M1447063

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 17, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Yeltsin on Chechnya

Attached at Tab I is an information memorandum to the President summarizing the letter from President Yeltsin on Chechnya that was delivered by the Russian Embassy today. We have sent a copy to Secretary Christopher in Geneva. We should avoid any public mention of the letter at least until we have had a chance to digest the Christopher-Kozyrev discussion on Chechnya.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Incoming Letter from Yeltsin
- Tab B President's Letter of January 6

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

10-2015-0815-M-2 (4,31)

11/24/2017

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a-letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	11/09/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b-letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 560

FOLDER TITLE:

9500351

2014-0837-F
ke3331

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



Конфиденциально

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 9 » ноября 19 94 г.

№ Пр-1594

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

По моей инициативе недавно на Кубе побывал директор Службы внешней разведки России Е.Примаков. Он провел там многочасовые беседы "один на один" с Ф.Кастро. Встречался также с Р.Кастро, другими кубинскими руководителями. Содержание этих разговоров показалось мне важным, и я хотел бы, чтобы ты знал о них.

По словам Ф.Кастро, он хорошо понимает, что должен исходить в своей политике из новых условий, не сможет рассчитывать на поддержку Россией конфронтационной линии в отношении США. Во многом уже произошли и продолжают радикальные изменения в кубинской внешней и внутренней политике. Среди них - отказ от помощи любым антиправительственным силам в Латинской Америке, полное прекращение всех операций на африканском континенте, начало движения к рыночной экономике и демократизации кубинского общества.

Беседы Примакова с исполняющим функции премьера Лахе и министром финансов Родригесом показывают, что настрой на рыночные преобразования основателен, может приобрести необратимый характер. Вместе с тем чувствуется, что дальнейшее движение Кубы по этому пути - его динамизм и глубина - во многом будут зависеть от реакции внешнего мира. Такой вывод полностью относится и к процессу демократизации, хотя здесь дело сложнее в результате продолжающейся ставки на однопартийную систему и устоявшихся психологических стереотипов в обществе, которые размываются медленно, и это нельзя игнорировать.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ


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Сейчас надо не останавливаться на достигнутом, побуждать Ирак продолжать двигаться в правильном направлении, вплоть до полного соблюдения всех соответствующих решений Совета Безопасности. Для этого требуется решение СБ ООН, открывающее конструктивную перспективу теперь, когда Багдад по существу перешел рубикон. Рассчитываю, что ты дашь личное поручение своему представителю в ООН срочно поработать с нами ради скорейшего осуществления этого назревшего шага. Понятно, решение должно быть взвешенным, не опережать событий, но и не отставать от них.

Билл, мы сумели, пользуясь американским выражением, вырвать крупную дипломатическую победу из челюстей поражения, и я уверен, что это еще выше поднимет престиж наших великих держав, укрепит мир во всем мире и прежде всего на Ближнем Востоке, где скрестились важнейшие стратегические интересы не только России и Соединенных Штатов.

Думаю, и наши народы по достоинству оценят достигнутое. Знаю, что результаты промежуточных выборов в США не очень радуют, но мы с тобой стойкие бойцы и доказали, что умем держать удар. Главное - сохранять верную перспективу. Во внешней политике наш совместный приоритет, как я уже говорил, - прагматическое партнерство. Все конкретные аспекты надеюсь обсудить с тобой в Будапеште.

Искренне твой,



Б.Ельцин

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 11 » ноября 19 94 г.

№ Пр-1618

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

В соответствии с договоренностью оперативно информирую тебя о наших шагах в отношении Ирака, призванных заставить С.Хусейна соблюдать все соответствующие резолюции СБ ООН и прежде всего признать суверенитет и независимость Кувейта.

Как мы заранее сообщили по конфиденциальным каналам, я решил направить Козырева в Багдад, чтобы оказать решающий нажим на иракский режим в этом вопросе. Ему удалось наконец буквально вырвать у Хусейна юридическое обязательство, одобренное теперь всеми иракскими инстанциями, включая национальную ассамблею и совет революционного командования, признать суверенитет и независимость Кувейта.

Это обязательство соответствует самым строгим международным критериям и в первую очередь резолюциям 833 и 949 СБ ООН. Вся необходимая документация по нашему настоянию незамедлительно представляется Ираком в Организацию Объединенных Наций.

Таким образом, проявляя разумную жесткость и в то же время не загоняя Хусейна в угол, мы с тобой сумели наконец при поддержке всего международного сообщества добиться очень важного результата, показав, что никому не позволим пользоваться плодами агрессии. Помимо всего прочего, это еще раз показывает, каким богатым потенциалом обладает российско-американское партнерство, личное взаимопонимание президентов России и США.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Ф.Кастро прямо сказал Примакову, что он не только сделал выбор в пользу нормализации и возможного улучшения отношений с США, но и готов к серьезным компромиссам на этом пути. Он понимает, что в этом смысле "лучшим вариантом для Кубы" является нахождение у власти в США Президента от Демократической партии. "Я верю в порядочность Клинтона, - сказал Кастро, - его искренность, и это меня обнадеживает".

Касаясь некоторого ужесточения американской переговорной позиции по кубинским эмигрантам, Кастро отнес это за счет ноябрьских выборов во Флориде и сказал, что надеется на изменение к лучшему.

У Примакова сложилось мнение, что Ф.Кастро хотел бы, чтобы ты знал о его готовности проводить реалистичную политику, показать, что существует разница между выплескиваемой на поверхность традиционной кубинской риторикой и внутренней позицией, которой он придерживается в действительности.

Из других впечатлений Примакова:

На Кубе набирает силу молодая прослойка лидеров, более гибких и более приспособленных к нынешним временам, но происходит это при сохранении авторитета Ф.Кастро, так сказать, под его "патронажем". Это отнюдь не означает, что его влияние на растущих новых лидеров сохранится во всем, но на сегодняшний день их успех во многом зависит от эволюции взглядов самого Кастро (конечно, этот процесс взаимосвязанный).

Начинает проявляться дифференцированный подход к кубинской эмиграции. По словам Кастро, значительная ее часть хочет улучшения кубино-американских отношений, что открыло бы двери для "эмигрантского бизнеса" на Кубе. В то же время в стране чувствуется непримиримость к той части эмигрантов, которые занимают крайние позиции, особенно после заявления одного из лидеров этой группы, что после своего возвращения им нужно "отдать Кубу на три дня", чтобы расправиться со всеми сторонниками нынешнего режима.

Буду удовлетворен, если тебе в какой-то степени окажутся полезными эти оценки.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake and W. Bowman Cutter to the President, re: Letter from President Yeltsin on G-7 and Chechnya (2 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	02/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. memo	John Beyrle to Anthony Lake, re: Memorandum to the President: 2/20 Letter from President Yeltsin (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 567

FOLDER TITLE:

9501393

2014-0837-F
 ke3332

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN³
2/27/95

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 24, 1995

95 FEB 24 P7:29

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
W. BOWMAN CUTTER *WBC*

SUBJECT: Letter from President Yeltsin on G-7 and Chechnya

Attached is a letter President Yeltsin sent you February 20, suggesting ways to expand Russia's participation at the Halifax G-7 summit and commenting on Chechnya.

Regarding Halifax, Yeltsin seeks to include in this year's summit agenda a full-fledged discussion of global economic issues and the reform of international institutions. This would go well beyond the format for political discussions between the G-7 and Russia last year in Naples. Among the issues Yeltsin would include under this heading are lessons of the Mexico crisis, the outlook for the global economy as a whole, and other topics such as export control, organized crime, and nuclear power safety that were not covered in discussions with him last year in Naples.

In planning for the Halifax summit, we have agreed with our G-7 partners that the Naples format should be maintained. There will, however, be some modifications to accommodate an expanded role for Yeltsin. For example, we and the other G-7 members have accepted a Canadian proposal to replace the non-working state dinner at the end of the second day (when Yeltsin arrives) with a heads-only working dinner that includes the Russian President. This new meeting will provide a venue for exchanging views on some of the above areas.

We also have a preliminary consensus among our G-7 partners to include several new transnational issues, such as organized crime and counterterrorism, on the agenda of the political, or "P-8," discussions. But we and the others have resisted including traditional G-7 issues such as global economic policy, or the review of the international economic institutions, on the agenda because of the limited ability of Moscow to bring any real expertise to the table other than advocacy of its own limited interests. We understand that the Canadians have communicated this agreed G-7 position to Moscow.

On Chechnya, Yeltsin offers assurances that the conflict will not throw Russia's economic stabilization off track, and argues

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

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DATE 2015-08/15 BY M-2 (4,34)
10/17/94/72.7

~~SECRET~~

2

SECRET

against efforts to use Chechnya to "push Russia aside" in international forums. He asks you to withstand pressures to abandon your "balanced" public comments on Chechnya, and looks for your support with the G-7 and IFIs regarding Russia's participation in the world economy.

President Yeltsin's letter does not require an immediate answer. Russia's Minister of Economics (and Sherpa-equivalent) will be visiting Washington next week for discussions that will cover planning for Halifax, after which we will consider the best form and content for a response.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming Letter

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

Unofficial translation

Moscow, The Kremlin
February 20, 1995

Dear Bill:

Practical work is getting underway on preparing the Summit meeting in Halifax. I want you to know my views with regard to the concept of this meeting and, in particular, of the role of Russia, and what attitude I am counting on on the part of our partners.

We do not place unrealistic objectives before ourselves. Russia is not interested in an artificial transformation of the "G-7" into a "G-8". But slowing this process would also be a mistake. I proceeded from an assumption that we had a complete understanding in this regard.

I believe that we should speak about a phased, that is, from a meeting to a meeting, broadening of Russia's participation, first of all through the inclusion into the discussion of global economic problems. Thus, a step should be made forward in this respect in Halifax as compared to Naples. Such an approach, in our view, is justified both by the progress of economic reforms in Russia since the time of the Naples Summit, and by the problems of reforming the international economic institutions increasingly coming to the forefront.

Besides, on the negotiation table there are such global issues as the outlook for world economy as a whole, facilitating access to foreign markets, assistance to countries with transitional economy. Russia is ready to contribute to the discussion of these issues. Of particular interest for us would be ideas on how to develop, in light of lessons of the recent financial crisis in Mexico, a global early warning system to ward off such crises. Finally, the agenda that had already been dwelt upon in Naples (the questions of export control, combating international organized crime, particularly, "money laundering", nuclear power station safety and so on) also needs an in-depth review in the format of "G-8". There is also such a "sore" subject as migration and refugees.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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PER E.O. 13526

VE 2015-0815-M-2 (4,35)

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It seems to me that these questions, given their importance, require a separate independent discussion. To try to "hook" them up to political agenda is not serious. Should we try to limit ourselves to a brief conversation over a working dinner, we will simply scramble it.

I suggest that during the second half of the first day of the Summit we arrange a separate meeting, of course with participation of Russia, for a detailed discussion of these items. It would be possible to summarize the results of this discussion in the Chairman's special statement devoted to global economic problems. With such an arrangement in place, we would be able, during the evening dinner, to exchange views in an informal manner on strategic challenges of the future and on our capability to meet them.

The second day of the Summit, like it was in Naples, will be fully devoted to the consideration of political issues in the format of a full-scale "G-8". It would make sense to close this day by adopting a communique on the political agenda and by a joint press-conference.

We do expect a lot from the Summit in Halifax. Now is too important a moment for us to afford the luxury a "figure-head" meeting.

It goes without saying that the Summit has to be prepared in a proper way. This work has to employ all the mechanisms for reaching common understandings -- contacts of the foreign ministers, meetings of sherpas and political directors, etc. While doing so, Russian representatives have to be assured equal participation in all the events leading to Halifax.

In this context I would like to touch upon one more question. I know that in some quarters doubts are being expressed as to whether the actions taken to restore the constitutional order in Chechnya would result in destabilizing the Russian budget and a slide back in the reform process. On this subject, I as the President guarantee that there will be no reversal in the reforms. All necessary measures will be taken to retain the main parameters of the adopted course aimed at further stabilization and continuation of radical reforms.

If, on the other hand, the intention is to use the events in Chechnya to "freeze" the partnership with Russia we do not accept such an approach. Chechnya is our tragedy. As I described to you on the phone, we were forced to take extreme measures for the sake of keeping democracy and stability in Russia. More than anybody, we are interested in the overcoming, as soon as possible, of temporary violations of human rights and freedoms. We grieve over casualties and ruins. To use the events in

Chechnya to push Russia aside from full-fledged participation in world economy and politics would amount to "penalizing" Russian reforms.

Bill, I am fully aware that it is not easy for you to maintain reserve and balance in public statements. I know that you are under an increasing pressure. Still, I believe that you will be able to stand your ground.

I am sending similar letters to the other leaders of "G-7". I trust that you will find a proper opportunity to convey to them, as well as to the leadership of IMF and World Bank, your position in support of Russia's participation in world economy -- along the lines of your speech in Cleveland and at a recent joint press-conference with H.Kohl.

Sincerely,

B. YELTSIN

February 21, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT D. BLACKER/^{LB for CB}ROBERT FAUVER ^{off-RCF}

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE ^{JNB}

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President: 2/20 Letter from President Yeltsin

Attached is a memorandum for the President summarizing a letter he received from Russian President Yeltsin. No immediate response to the letter is called for, since the main issue discussed, Russia's participation in the Halifax Summit, will require consultations among the G-7.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Incoming Yeltsin Letter

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VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4,36)
11/29/2017

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	02/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	[Duplicate of 001c] (3 pages)	02/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (3 pages)	02/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. letter	[Duplicate of 001c] (3 pages)	02/20/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

February 20, 1995
No. Pr-247
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

We are beginning concrete preparations for the Halifax summit. I would like you to know how I envision this meeting, particularly Russia's role in it, and what my expectations are regarding the attitude of our partners.

We are not setting unrealistic goals. Russia is not interested in artificially forcing the process of transforming the G-7 into the G-8. But delaying this process would also be a mistake. It was my impression we had an understanding on this matter.

I believe we should speak of a gradual (from meeting to meeting) expansion of Russia's role, especially by including Russia in the group discussing global economic problems. Thus, in Halifax we ought to take a step forward on this path in comparison with Naples. Such an approach, in our view, is justified both by the progress of economic reforms in Russia since the Naples summit and by the greater attention being paid to problems of reforming international economic institutions.

Moreover, we have on the negotiation table such global issues as prospects for the world economy in general, facilitating access to external markets, and assistance to countries with an economy in transition. Russia is prepared to contribute to a discussion of them. We are particularly interested in proposals for developing--on the basis of lessons from the recent financial crisis in Mexico--a global system for early warning of such crises. Lastly, the agenda, which was already touched upon in Naples (problems of export control, combatting international organized crime, especially money-laundering, the safety of nuclear power plants, etc.)

His Excellency
Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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#2 2015-0815-M-2 (4.37)
4/19/2018

also requires more thorough preparations within the G-8 format. There is likewise the critical matter of migration and refugees.

It seems to me that in view of the importance of these matters, a separate, independent discussion will be necessary. Trying to "tack" them onto the political agenda would be foolish. And if we attempt to confine ourselves to a brief talk at a working lunch, we will simply have to race through the discussion.

I propose that during the second half of the first day of the summit a separate meeting be held (with Russia's participation, of course) to go over these matters carefully. The results of this talk could be summarized in a special statement on global economic problems issued by the chairman. With the work set up in this way, it would be possible for us during a free discussion at the evening dinner to exchange views on future strategic challenges and our ability to cope with them.

The second day of the summit, as in Naples, will be fully devoted to considering political matters within the framework of the whole G-8. It would be advisable to conclude it with the adoption of a statement on the political agenda and with a joint press conference.

We really do expect a great deal from the Halifax summit. We cannot afford the luxury of holding just an ordinary meeting at this critical juncture.

Needless to say, the summit must be prepared in a proper manner. This work should involve all available position-coordinating mechanisms: contacts between foreign ministers and meetings between "sherpas" and policy makers. Here equal participation in all aspects of the preparations for Halifax must be ensured for the Russian representatives.

In this connection, I wish to broach one other matter. I am aware that misgivings are being expressed in some places that actions to restore constitutional order in Chechnya may lead to disruption of the Russian budget and to a roll-back of reforms. On this point I as President can guarantee: there will be no roll-back of reforms. All necessary steps will be taken to maintain the basic parameters of the course we have developed to consolidate stabilization and continue radical reforms.

If there is talk of using events in Chechnya to "freeze" partnership with Russia, we do not accept such a statement of the question. As I have told you over the telephone, we were compelled to resort to extreme measures for the sake of preserving democracy and stability in Russia. We are more interested than anyone else in speedily eliminating temporary curtailments of human rights and freedoms, and we sorrow over the victims and destruction. Blocking Russia from full participation in the world economy and politics under the pretext of events in Chechnya would mean "punishing" the reforms in Russia.

Bill, I realize restraint and responsibility are not easy to achieve in public statements. I know you are under pressure. Nonetheless, I believe you will bear up.

I am sending similar messages to other G-7 leaders as well. I expect that you will find a convenient opportunity to explain to them, and to the leadership of the IMF and the World Bank, your position on support for Russia's participation in the world economy--in the spirit in which you expressed yourself in Cleveland and at the recent joint press conference with Helmut Kohl.

Respectfully,
[s] B. Yeltsin



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 20 » февраля 19 95 г.

№ Пр-247

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

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Мы не ставим нереальные цели. Россия не заинтересована в том, чтобы искусственно форсировать процесс трансформации "семерки" в "восьмерку". Но и торможение этого процесса было бы ошибкой. Исходил из того, что у нас было понимание на этот счет.

Считаю, что речь должна идти о поэтапном - от встречи к встрече - расширению участия России, прежде всего - за счет включения в круг обсуждения глобальной экономической проблематики. Так, в Галифаксе должен быть сделан шаг вперед на этом пути в сравнении с Неаполем. Такой подход, на наш взгляд, оправдан как прогрессом экономических реформ в России со времени встречи в Неаполе, так и выдвиганием на передний план проблем реформирования международных экономических институтов.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Declassified per E.O. 13526
RZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.38)
4/19/2018

Кроме того, на столе переговоров находятся такие глобальные вопросы, как перспективы мировой экономики в целом, облегчение доступа на внешние рынки, содействие странам с переходной экономикой. Россия готова внести вклад в их обсуждение. Особый интерес для нас представляют предложения о разработке, с учетом уроков недавнего финансового кризиса в Мексике, глобальной системы раннего предупреждения подобных кризисов. Наконец, повестка дня, уже затрагивавшаяся в Неаполе (вопросы экспортного контроля, борьбы с международной организованной преступностью, в частности с "отмыванием денег", безопасности АЭС и другие), также нуждается в углубленном проговоре в формате "восьми". Есть и такая "больная" тема, как миграция и беженцы.

Мне представляется, что эти вопросы с учетом их важности диктуют необходимость проведения отдельного самостоятельного обсуждения. Пытаться "присоединить" их к политической повестке - несерьезно. Если же попробуем ограничиться коротким разговором за рабочим обедом - просто скомкаем обсуждение.

Предлагаю во второй половине первого дня саммита провести отдельное заседание с участием, конечно, России для обстоятельного обсуждения этих тем. Суммировать результаты этого обсуждения можно было бы в специальном заявлении председателя, посвященном глобальной экономической проблематике. При таком построении работы у нас появилась бы возможность в ходе вечернего обеда в режиме свободной дискуссии обменяться мнениями о стратегических вызовах будущего и о нашей способности ответить на них.

Второй день саммита, как и в Неаполе, будет полностью занят рассмотрением политических вопросов в рамках полномасштабной "восьмерки". Его целесообразно завершить принятием коммюнике по политической повестке дня и совместной пресс-конференцией.

Мы действительно очень многого ожидаем от саммита в Галифаксе. Сейчас слишком ответственный момент, чтобы мы могли позволить себе роскошь проведения дежурной встречи.

Разумеется, саммит должен быть надлежащим образом подготовлен. Эта работа должна вестись с задействованием всех имеющихся механизмов согласования позиций - и контактов министров иностранных дел, и встреч "шерп" и политдиректоров. При этом должно быть обеспечено равноправное участие российских представителей во всех без исключения мероприятиях в процессе подготовки к Галифаксу.


В этой связи хочу коснуться еще одного вопроса. Мне известно, что сейчас кое-где высказываются сомнения, не обернутся ли действия по восстановлению конституционного порядка в Чечне разбалансированием российского бюджета и откатом реформ. На этот счет я, как президент, даю гарантию - отката реформ не будет. Будут приняты все необходимые меры, чтобы сохранить основные параметры разработанного курса на закрепление стабилизации, продолжение радикальных реформ.

Если же речь идет о том, чтобы воспользоваться событиями в Чечне для "замораживания" партнерства с Россией, мы такую постановку вопроса не принимаем. Чечня - это наша трагедия. Как рассказывал тебе по телефону, мы вынуждены были пойти на крайние меры ради сохранения демократии и стабильности в России. Мы больше кого бы то ни было заинтересованы в быстрейшем преодолении временных ущемлений прав и свобод человека, скорбим по поводу жертв и разрушений. Отстранить Россию под предлогом событий в Чечне от полноценного участия в мировой экономике и политике - значило бы "наказать" реформы в России.

Билл, я отдаю себе отчет в том, что тебе нелегко дается сдержанность и ответственность в публичных заявлениях. Знаю, что давление на тебя усиливается. Тем не менее, верю, что ты устоишь.

Аналогичные послания направляю также другим лидерам стран "семи". Рассчитываю, что ты найдешь удобную возможность довести до них, а также до руководства МВФ и Мирового банка свою позицию в поддержку участия России в мировой экономике - в том ключе, как ты высказывался в Кливленде и на недавней совместной пресс-конференции с Г.Колем.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 20 » февраля 19 95 г.

№ Пр-247

г. Москва, Кремль

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

8.1.01 - 6.0000

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
В этой связи хочу коснуться еще одного вопроса. Мне известно, что сейчас кое-где высказываются сомнения, не обернутся ли действия по восстановлению конституционного порядка в Чечне разбалансированием российского бюджета и откатом реформ. На этот счет я, как президент, даю гарантию - отката реформ не будет. Будут приняты все необходимые меры, чтобы сохранить основные параметры разработанного курса на закрепление стабилизации, продолжение радикальных реформ.

Если же речь идет о том, чтобы воспользоваться событиями в Чечне для "замораживания" партнерства с Россией, мы такую постановку вопроса не принимаем. Чечня - это наша трагедия. Как рассказывал тебе по телефону, мы вынуждены были пойти на крайние меры ради сохранения демократии и стабильности в России. Мы больше кого бы то ни было заинтересованы в быстрейшем преодолении временных ущемлений прав и свобод человека, скорбим по поводу жертв и разрушений. Отстранить Россию под предлогом событий в Чечне от полноценного участия в мировой экономике и политике - значило бы "наказать" реформы в России.

Билл, я отдаю себе отчет в том, что тебе нелегко дается сдержанность и ответственность в публичных заявлениях. Знаю, что давление на тебя усиливается. Тем не менее, верю, что ты устоишь.

Аналогичные послания направляю также другим лидерам стран "семи". Рассчитываю, что ты найдешь удобную возможность довести до них, а также до руководства МВФ и Мирового банка свою позицию в поддержку участия России в мировой экономике - в том ключе, как ты высказывался в Кливленде и на недавней совместной пресс-конференции с Г.Колем.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 20 » февраля 19 95 г.

№ Пр-247

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Начинается практическая работа по подготовке саммита в Галифаксе. Хочу, чтобы ты знал, как я представляю себе концепцию этой встречи, в частности - роль России, и на какое отношение со стороны наших партнеров рассчитываю.

Мы не ставим нереальные цели. Россия не заинтересована в том, чтобы искусственно форсировать процесс трансформации "семерки" в "восьмерку". Но и торможение этого процесса было бы ошибкой. Исходил из того, что у нас было понимание на этот счет.

Считаю, что речь должна идти о поэтапном - от встречи к встрече - расширении участия России, прежде всего - за счет включения в круг обсуждения глобальной экономической проблематики. Так, в Галифаксе должен быть сделан шаг вперед на этом пути в сравнении с Неаполем. Такой подход, на наш взгляд, оправдан как прогрессом экономических реформ в России со времени встречи в Неаполе, так и выдвиганием на передний план проблем реформирования международных экономических институтов.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Declassified per E.O. 13526
v2 2015-0815-m-2 (4.4a)
4/19/2018

Кроме того, на столе переговоров находятся такие глобальные вопросы, как перспективы мировой экономики в целом, облегчение доступа на внешние рынки, содействие странам с переходной экономикой. Россия готова внести вклад в их обсуждение. Особый интерес для нас представляют предложения о разработке, с учетом уроков недавнего финансового кризиса в Мексике, глобальной системы раннего предупреждения подобных кризисов. Наконец, повестка дня, уже затрагивавшаяся в Неаполе (вопросы экспортного контроля, борьбы с международной организованной преступностью, в частности с "отмыванием денег", безопасности АЭС и другие), также нуждается в углубленном проговоре в формате "восьми". Есть и такая "больная" тема, как миграция и беженцы.

Мне представляется, что эти вопросы с учетом их важности диктуют необходимость проведения отдельного самостоятельного обсуждения. Пытаться "присоединить" их к политической повестке - несерьезно. Если же попробуем ограничиться коротким разговором за рабочим обедом - просто скомкаем обсуждение.

Предлагаю во второй половине первого дня саммита провести отдельное заседание с участием, конечно, России для обстоятельного обсуждения этих тем. Суммировать результаты этого обсуждения можно было бы в специальном заявлении председателя, посвященном глобальной экономической проблематике. При таком построении работы у нас появилась бы возможность в ходе вечернего обеда в режиме свободной дискуссии обменяться мнениями о стратегических вызовах будущего и о нашей способности ответить на них.

Второй день саммита, как и в Неаполе, будет полностью занят рассмотрением политических вопросов в рамках полномасштабной "восьмерки". Его целесообразно завершить принятием коммюнике по политической повестке дня и совместной пресс-конференцией.

Мы действительно очень многого ожидаем от саммита в Галифаксе. Сейчас слишком ответственный момент, чтобы мы могли позволить себе роскошь проведения дежурной встречи.

Разумеется, саммит должен быть надлежащим образом подготовлен. Эта работа должна вестись с задействованием всех имеющихся механизмов согласования позиций - и контактов министров иностранных дел, и встреч "шерп" и политдиректоров. При этом должно быть обеспечено равноправное участие российских представителей во всех без исключения мероприятиях в процессе подготовки к Галифаксу.


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С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Re: [Message from President Clinton to President Yeltsin] [partial] (6 pages)	03/15/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. draft	[Draft of 001a] (5 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Message to President Yeltsin on NATO Expansion and NATO Russian Relations (2 pages)	03/14/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. draft	[Duplicate of 001b] (5 pages)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001e. memo	Coit Blacker to Anthony Lake, re: Presidential Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 570

FOLDER TITLE:

9501883

2014-0837-F
 ke3334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN
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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 1 OF 3

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

UPON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA IN JANUARY, WARREN CHRISTOPHER
GAVE ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH ANDREI KOZYREV.
AMBASSADOR PICKERING HAS INDICATED THAT HIS MARCH 10 SESSION
WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ALSO PRODUCTIVE. THESE
DISCUSSIONS DEMONSTRATE THE WISDOM OF OUR DECISION TO
INTENSIFY OUR WORK TOGETHER ON THE MOST IMPORTANT AND
CHALLENGING ISSUES FACING US IN THE COMING YEARS. AS
AMBASSADOR PICKERING SAID IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER KOZYREV, OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO TO
ENSURE THAT OUR NEXT MEETING IS A SUCCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO
THAT MEETING AND HOPE, IN THE NEAREST FUTURE, TO BE ABLE TO
RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION TO ATTEND V-E DAY CELEBRATIONS IN
MOSCOW ON MAY 9.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR OFFERS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO
CREATE A MORE PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC AND STABLE EUROPE FOR THE
BENEFIT OF ALL ITS CITIZENS. WHILE WE WANT TO PRESERVE AND
BUILD UPON THE VERY CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. - RUSSIAN BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP, WE BOTH AGREE THAT ONE OF THE CENTRAL GOALS OF
THIS PROCESS MUST BE THE CREATION OF AN INCLUSIVE SYSTEM OF
SECURITY FOR THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION. WE WANT TO WORK WITH
YOU TO HELP BUILD POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS THAT WILL CREATE AN INCLUSIVE AND UNDIVIDED
EUROPE FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0815-11-2
11/29/2017

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PAGE 02 OF 06

AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON LAST SEPTEMBER, MY APPROACH IS TO BUILD A BROAD STRUCTURE OF SECURITY, STABILITY AND SHARED VALUES ON THE FOUNDATIONS ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN EUROPE. WE SHOULD USE THE STRENGTHS OF INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE OSCE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO. EACH HAS EVOLVED GREATLY DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW REALITIES IN EUROPE. WORKING TOGETHER, WE SHOULD NOW ENSURE THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED STATES.

AS YOU KNOW, NATO HAS ALREADY CHANGED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR. NATO IS AND WILL REMAIN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE OF NATIONS WHO SHARE A COMMON COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW. THE CONCEPT OF CONTAINMENT NO LONGER GOVERNS NATO STRATEGY AND PLANNING. AS EARLY AS JULY 1990 AT THE LONDON SUMMIT, NATO DECLARED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSIDERED WARSAW PACT STATES AS ADVERSARIES. NATO'S NEW STRATEGY REFLECTS THE PROFOUND CHANGES THAT ARE TAKING PLACE. BY THE END OF 1991, NATO DECLARED THAT THE MOST LIKELY RISKS TO SECURITY NOW ARISE AS A RESULT OF INSTABILITIES STEMMING FROM ETHNIC AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND EMERGING DANGERS SUCH AS THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

NATO HAS RESTRUCTURED ITS MILITARY FORCES ACCORDINGLY. THE FORMER CONCENTRATIONS OF HEAVY FORCES IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY LIGHTER AND MORE FLEXIBLE FORCES BETTER ABLE TO RESPOND TO A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SECURITY CHALLENGES. THESE FORCES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES.

REFLECTING THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ALLIANCE HAS ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONAL LINKS TO ALL OF EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES THROUGH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL. AT THE JANUARY 1994 NATO SUMMIT, ALLIED LEADERS ADOPTED SEVERAL NEW INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO ADVANCE FURTHER THE ALLIANCE'S ADAPTATION TO MEETING THESE NEW CHALLENGES. THESE INITIATIVES ARE STILL BEING IMPLEMENTED.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THERE IS CONSENSUS WITHIN NATO THAT THE ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY IN EUROPE COULD BE FURTHERED THROUGH ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THE ALLIANCE FROM THE RANKS OF DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ACTIVE IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. NATO HAS BEGUN A PROCESS OF INTERNAL STUDY ON THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS. AS YOU KNOW, WE WILL PRESENT THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO PARTNER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING RUSSIA, BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING OF NATO MINISTERS IN 1995. AS YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN SEPTEMBER,

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PAGE 03 OF 06

IN THE U.S. VIEW, RUSSIA IS NOT EXCLUDED FROM ELIGIBILITY TO JOIN NATO. LET ME STRESS AGAIN, HOWEVER, THAT NATO WILL MAKE NO DECISIONS THIS YEAR TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS.

THE U.S., IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, ALSO AGREED THAT AS THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES IN EUROPE PROCEEDS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DEFINE THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO IN PARALLEL TO OUR STUDY OF NATO'S OWN DEVELOPMENT. WE SUGGESTED TO OUR NATO ALLIES THAT, DURING 1995, NATO SHOULD ENGAGE RUSSIA IN A DISCUSSION OF THE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. OUR ALLIES HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THIS EFFORT. OUR AIM WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT RUSSIA'S OWN RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE DEVELOPS IN HARMONY WITH NATO'S EVOLUTION. BOTH ELEMENTS ARE CRITICAL TO STABILITY IN EUROPE.

I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL WISH TO CONSULT WITH OTHER NATO
#5586

NNNN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 2 OF 3

MEMBERS AS WELL ON THESE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY HOW TO DEVELOP AND REGULARIZE YOUR CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO. WE ARE OPEN TO YOUR IDEAS ON HOW TO MAKE THE RELATIONSHIP EFFECTIVE.

BORIS, AS I HAVE SAID ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO NATO. WE SHOULD WORK TO DEVELOP CLOSER TIES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO AND TO DEFINE A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP IN THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND OF THE MEMORANDUM ON ENHANCED CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS. IN LIGHT OF CHECHNYA, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU REAFFIRM RUSSIA'S STRONG INTEREST IN INTEGRATING WITH THE WEST AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE BUILDING OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER BASED ON A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY, RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW AS EMBODIED IN OSCE PRINCIPLES.

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PAGE 04 OF 06

MOVING FORWARD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT FOR PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WOULD SEND EUROPE A STRONG AND IMPORTANT SIGNAL.

I ALSO KNOW THAT THE LEGACY OF SOVIET RULE HAS LED MANY IN RUSSIA TO DISTRUST NATO AND VIEW IT AS A RELIC OF THE COLD WAR. TO HELP ADDRESS THIS, I AM ENCLOSING WITH THIS LETTER A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE STEPS NATO HAS TAKEN SINCE 1990 IN THE EVOLUTION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, IN THE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE USEFUL IN HELPING YOU TO RESPOND TO LINGERING MISTRUST AND MISIMPRESSIONS IN YOUR COUNTRY.

BORIS, WE HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO, TOGETHER AND WITH OTHERS, IN BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE A GOOD START. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU ON THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL

ANNEX TO CLINTON-YELTSIN LETTER

ALREADY IN JULY 1990, NEW GOALS FOR THE ALLIANCE WERE SET FORTH IN THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION. NATO DECLARED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSIDERED MOSCOW AN ADVERSARY AND ANNOUNCED A NEW PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, NATO CALLED FOR A RESTRUCTURING OF ITS MILITARY FORCES AND A REORIENTATION OF ITS STRATEGY. THIS DECLARATION ALSO ESTABLISHED THE FIRST TIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE THEN-EXISTENT WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.

THEN, IN JUNE 1991 IN COPENHAGEN, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ISSUED A STATEMENT ON "PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE." NATO DECLARED THAT "WE DO NOT WISH TO ISOLATE ANY COUNTRY, NOR TO SEE A NEW DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO HELP CREATE A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE." THIS OBJECTIVE HAS GUIDED NATO'S POLICIES EVER SINCE. IT REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF NATO'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROJECT SECURITY THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE, THE FORCES AND MISSIONS OF NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMANDS HAVE BEEN RADICALLY RESTRUCTURED. ~~THE FORCES CONCENTRATIONS OF HEAVILY ARMED~~

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PAGE 05 OF 06

CORPS IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY LIGHTER AND MORE MOBILE FORCES BETTER ABLE TO RESPOND TO A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SECURITY CHALLENGES. THESE FORCES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO DEFEND PEACE IN EUROPE, EITHER ON NATO TERRITORY OR -- IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE UN OR THE OSCE -- IN AREAS OF INSTABILITY OR CRISIS.

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AT THE BRUSSELS SUMMIT IN JANUARY 1994, ALLIANCE LEADERS ADDED EVEN MORE SUBSTANCE TO NATO'S NEW ROLE THROUGH ADOPTION OF A BROAD STRATEGY OF COOPERATION THROUGHOUT EUROPE. IN REAFFIRMING THE POLITICAL COURSE SET BY THE LONDON AND ROME SUMMITS AND THE MILITARY REDIRECTION ENSHRINED IN THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, NATO ENDORSED A SERIES OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

FINAL SECTION OF 3

"INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO LASTING PEACE, STABILITY AND WELL-BEING IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE ALLIANCE'S FUNDAMENTAL GOAL."

THESE INITIATIVES INCLUDED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, THROUGH WHICH WE INVITED RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES TO "JOIN US IN NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFORTS TO WORK ALONGSIDE THE ALLIANCE." THE PARTNERSHIP OF PEACE IS DESIGNED TO BUILD LASTING TIES BETWEEN PARTNER STATES SUCH AS RUSSIA AND NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURES. IN ADDITION, FOR SOME COUNTRIES THE PARTNERSHIP MAY SERVE AS A FOUNDATION FOR A FUTURE APPLICATION FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE. FOR OTHERS IT WILL CONSTITUTE A PERMANENT RELATIONSHIP WHICH ASSISTS IN SUPPORTING THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTNER COUNTRIES.

SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN RUSSIA SIGNED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IN JUNE 1994, RUSSIA AND NATO ALSO AGREED TO DEVELOP A SPECIAL PROGRAM OF COOPERATION. NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN WHICH PRODUCED BOTH RUSSIA'S INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM WITHIN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND A SEPARATE DOCUMENT ON NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE PARTNERSHIP; THESE ACCORDS AWAIT FINAL APPROVAL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

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PER E.O. 13526
1/2 2015-0815-W-2 (4/12)
11/24/2017

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DEAR BORIS:

UPON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA IN JANUARY, WARREN CHRISTOPHER GAVE ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH ANDREI KOZYREV. AMBASSADOR PICKERING HAS INDICATED THAT HIS MARCH 10 SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ALSO PRODUCTIVE. THESE DISCUSSIONS DEMONSTRATE THE WISDOM OF OUR DECISION TO INTENSIFY OUR WORK TOGETHER ON THE MOST IMPORTANT AND CHALLENGING ISSUES FACING US IN THE COMING YEARS. AS AMBASSADOR PICKERING SAID IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO TO ENSURE THAT OUR NEXT MEETING IS A SUCCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO THAT MEETING AND HOPE, IN THE NEAREST FUTURE, TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION TO ATTEND V-E DAY CELEBRATIONS IN MOSCOW ON MAY 9.

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AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON LAST SEPTEMBER, MY APPROACH IS TO BUILD A BROAD STRUCTURE OF SECURITY, STABILITY AND SHARED VALUES ON THE FOUNDATIONS ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN EUROPE. WE SHOULD USE THE STRENGTHS OF INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE OSCE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO. EACH HAS EVOLVED GREATLY DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW REALITIES IN EUROPE. WORKING TOGETHER, WE SHOULD NOW ENSURE THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED STATES.

AS YOU KNOW, NATO HAS ALREADY CHANGED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR. NATO IS AND WILL REMAIN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE OF NATIONS WHO SHARE A COMMON COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW. THE CONCEPT OF CONTAINMENT NO LONGER GOVERNS NATO STRATEGY AND PLANNING. AS EARLY AS JULY 1990 AT THE LONDON SUMMIT, NATO DECLARED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSIDERED WARSAW PACT STATES AS ADVERSARIES. NATO'S NEW STRATEGY REFLECTS

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CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO. WE ARE OPEN TO YOUR IDEAS ON HOW TO MAKE THE RELATIONSHIP EFFECTIVE.

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I ALSO KNOW THAT THE LEGACY OF SOVIET RULE HAS LED MANY IN RUSSIA TO DISTRUST NATO AND VIEW IT AS A RELIC OF THE COLD WAR. TO HELP ADDRESS THIS, I AM ENCLOSING WITH THIS LETTER A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE STEPS NATO HAS TAKEN SINCE 1990 IN THE EVOLUTION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, IN THE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE USEFUL IN HELPING YOU TO RESPOND TO LINGERING MISTRUST AND MISIMPRESSIONS IN YOUR COUNTRY.

BORIS, WE HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO, TOGETHER AND WITH OTHERS, IN BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE A GOOD START. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU ON THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

BILL

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ANNEX TO CLINTON-YELTSIN LETTER

ALREADY IN JULY 1990, NEW GOALS FOR THE ALLIANCE WERE SET FORTH IN THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION. NATO DECLARED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSIDERED MOSCOW AN ADVERSARY AND ANNOUNCED A NEW PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, NATO CALLED FOR A RESTRUCTURING OF ITS MILITARY FORCES AND A REORIENTATION OF ITS STRATEGY. THIS DECLARATION ALSO ESTABLISHED THE FIRST TIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE THEN-EXISTENT WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.

THEN, IN JUNE 1991 IN COPENHAGEN, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ISSUED A STATEMENT ON "PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE." NATO DECLARED THAT "WE DO NOT WISH TO ISOLATE ANY COUNTRY, NOR TO SEE A NEW DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO HELP CREATE A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE." THIS OBJECTIVE HAS GUIDED NATO'S POLICIES EVER SINCE. IT REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF NATO'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROJECT SECURITY THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE, THE FORCES AND MISSIONS OF NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMANDS HAVE BEEN RADICALLY RESTRUCTURED. THE FORMER CONCENTRATIONS OF HEAVILY ARMORED CORPS IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY LIGHTER AND MORE MOBILE FORCES BETTER ABLE TO RESPOND TO A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SECURITY CHALLENGES. THESE FORCES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO DEFEND PEACE IN EUROPE, EITHER ON NATO TERRITORY OR -- IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE UN OR THE OSCE -- IN AREAS OF INSTABILITY OR CRISIS.

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3/14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1995

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on NATO Expansion and NATO-Russia Relations

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin on NATO expansion and the development of NATO-Russia relations.

Background

At their January meeting in Geneva, Secretary Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev agreed to an exchange of letters between you and President Yeltsin focusing on the prospective expansion of NATO and the development of relations between NATO and Russia. The idea was to describe NATO's evolution over the past five years into an organization that does not threaten Russia in order to neutralize domestic Russian opposition to NATO expansion and to facilitate Moscow's approval of the Partnership for Peace documents that Kozyrev abruptly refused to sign last December. The attached message, from you to Yeltsin, begins the process; we anticipate that your message will be discussed in some detail when Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev meet in Geneva, March 22-23, and that a formal Russian response will be forthcoming soon thereafter.

Content of the Message

Your message, which Ambassador Pickering previewed with Foreign Minister Kozyrev during their hour-long meeting on March 10, makes the following points: that we seek the creation of an inclusive system of security for the Euro-Atlantic region in which Russia will play an integral part; that we should rely on such existing institutions as NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as we go about this process; and that NATO, which has evolved enormously over the past five years, has already established important institutional links with Europe's new democracies through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. The message goes on to describe the process by which NATO is

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likely to expand, noting, among other points, that the Alliance will make no decisions regarding NATO enlargement in 1995 and that Russia will not be excluded from eligibility to join NATO.

The message also notes the importance we attach to a parallel effort to define the direction of Russia's relationship with a changing NATO and that a key objective in this effort will be to ensure that the NATO-Russia relationship develops in harmony with NATO's own evolution.

The conclusion of your message urges Yeltsin in the strongest terms to make good on Russia's commitment to join the Partnership for Peace and to sign the memorandum on enhanced NATO-Russia consultations that Kozyrev -- at Yeltsin's direction -- refused to sign in Brussels last December.

The appendix to the message reiterates these points in a form that the Russian government can quote from publicly, or even share with key members of the Duma. This allows us to maintain the confidentiality of your correspondence with Yeltsin while simultaneously speaking through him to a larger audience.

As noted, we will be discussing with Russian officials the substance of Yeltsin's reply to this letter. In Strobe's recent meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov and, again, in Pickering's meeting with Kozyrev late last week, the Russians raised unacceptable conditions on NATO's expansion -- such as binding commitments not to deploy nuclear weapons or foreign troops on new members' territory. Your message sidesteps these issues, but we will continue to press the Russians to abandon these sorts of demands.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A



Attachment

Tab A Message to Yeltsin (including Appendix)

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DEAR BORIS:

UPON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA IN JANUARY, WARREN CHRISTOPHER GAVE ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH ANDREI KOZYREV. AMBASSADOR PICKERING HAS INDICATED THAT HIS MARCH 10 SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ALSO PRODUCTIVE. THESE DISCUSSIONS DEMONSTRATE THE WISDOM OF OUR DECISION TO INTENSIFY OUR WORK TOGETHER ON THE MOST IMPORTANT AND CHALLENGING ISSUES FACING US IN THE COMING YEARS. AS AMBASSADOR PICKERING SAID IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO TO ENSURE THAT OUR NEXT MEETING IS A SUCCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO THAT MEETING AND HOPE, IN THE NEAREST FUTURE, TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION TO ATTEND V-E DAY CELEBRATIONS IN MOSCOW ON MAY 9.

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ANNEX TO CLINTON-YELTSIN LETTER

ALREADY IN JULY 1990, NEW GOALS FOR THE ALLIANCE WERE SET FORTH IN THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION. NATO DECLARED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSIDERED MOSCOW AN ADVERSARY AND ANNOUNCED A NEW PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH THE STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, NATO CALLED FOR A RESTRUCTURING OF ITS MILITARY FORCES AND A REORIENTATION OF ITS STRATEGY. THIS DECLARATION ALSO ESTABLISHED THE FIRST TIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE THEN-EXISTENT WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.

THEN, IN JUNE 1991 IN COPENHAGEN, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ISSUED A STATEMENT ON "PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE." NATO DECLARED THAT "WE DO NOT WISH TO ISOLATE ANY COUNTRY, NOR TO SEE A NEW DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO HELP CREATE A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE." THIS OBJECTIVE HAS GUIDED NATO'S POLICIES EVER SINCE. IT REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF NATO'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROJECT SECURITY THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE, THE FORCES AND MISSIONS OF NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMANDS HAVE BEEN RADICALLY RESTRUCTURED. THE FORMER CONCENTRATIONS OF HEAVILY ARMORED CORPS IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY LIGHTER AND MORE MOBILE FORCES BETTER ABLE TO RESPOND TO A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SECURITY CHALLENGES. THESE FORCES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO DEFEND PEACE IN EUROPE, EITHER ON NATO TERRITORY OR -- IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE UN OR THE OSCE -- IN AREAS OF INSTABILITY OR CRISIS.

THE CONCEPT OF CONTAINMENT HAS DISAPPEARED FROM NATO'S STRATEGY. NO COUNTRY, INCLUDING RUSSIA, IS ANY LONGER CLASSIFIED AS AN OPPONENT OR AN ENEMY. THESE POINTS WERE SET FORTH CLEARLY IN THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT WHICH ALLIANCE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ADOPTED AT THE ROME SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 1991, AND THEY HAVE BEEN ENSHRINED IN NATO MILITARY PLANNING DOCUMENTS EVER SINCE. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT MADE CLEAR THAT CRISIS MANAGEMENT WOULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT MISSION FOR THE ALLIANCE, IN ADDITION TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

AT THE SAME ROME SUMMIT, ALLIANCE LEADERS CREATED THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL AND INVITED RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION TO JOIN. THE NACC, AS IT IS KNOWN, HAS PROVED TO BE A USEFUL VEHICLE FOR POLITICAL CONTACT AND CONSULTATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR WHEN LEVELS OF TRUST WERE STILL BEING DEFINED. BUT AS THE LEVEL OF TRUST HAS INCREASED, NATO HAS REDOUBLED ITS EFFORTS TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN

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EUROPE AND TO BUILD CLOSER, INSTITUTIONAL LINKS AIMED AT PROMOTING COMMON APPROACHES TO COMMON PROBLEMS.

AT THE BRUSSELS SUMMIT IN JANUARY 1994, ALLIANCE LEADERS ADDED EVEN MORE SUBSTANCE TO NATO'S NEW ROLE THROUGH ADOPTION OF A BROAD STRATEGY OF COOPERATION THROUGHOUT EUROPE. IN REAFFIRMING THE POLITICAL COURSE SET BY THE LONDON AND ROME SUMMITS AND THE MILITARY REDIRECTION ENSHRINED IN THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, NATO ENDORSED A SERIES OF "INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO LASTING PEACE, STABILITY AND WELL-BEING IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE ALLIANCE'S FUNDAMENTAL GOAL."

THESE INITIATIVES INCLUDED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, THROUGH WHICH WE INVITED RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES TO "JOIN US IN NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFORTS TO WORK ALONGSIDE THE ALLIANCE." THE PARTNERSHIP OF PEACE IS DESIGNED TO BUILD LASTING TIES BETWEEN PARTNER STATES SUCH AS RUSSIA AND NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURES. IN ADDITION, FOR SOME COUNTRIES THE PARTNERSHIP MAY SERVE AS A FOUNDATION FOR A FUTURE APPLICATION FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE. FOR OTHERS IT WILL CONSTITUTE A PERMANENT RELATIONSHIP WHICH ASSISTS IN SUPPORTING THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTNER COUNTRIES.

SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN RUSSIA SIGNED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IN JUNE 1994, RUSSIA AND NATO ALSO AGREED TO DEVELOP A SPECIAL PROGRAM OF COOPERATION. NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN WHICH PRODUCED BOTH RUSSIA'S INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM WITHIN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND A SEPARATE DOCUMENT ON NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE PARTNERSHIP; THESE ACCORDS AWAIT FINAL APPROVAL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1883
Re-do

March 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

COIT BLACKER *CB*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin

At the January 1995 Ministerial session in Geneva, Foreign Minister Kozyrev indicated to Secretary Christopher that an exchange of letters between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on NATO expansion and NATO-Russia relations would be helpful to his government as it seeks to prepare Russian popular and elite opinion for the reality of NATO enlargement. When Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov was in Washington in late February, he confirmed the utility of such an exchange and indicated that the draft letter that we had prepared, and that we had shared with our NATO allies, was what the Russian government had in mind.

In their meeting on March 10, Ambassador Pickering and Foreign Minister Kozyrev also discussed the President's message. Kozyrev asked for something more specific on three issues -- on the prospective NATO-Russia consultative mechanism, on the non-deployment of NATO military forces on the territory of new member states and on Russian arms sales to the countries of Central Europe. The President's message effectively sidesteps all three issues, which we think appropriate given where we are in this process. Kozyrev will certainly return to these issues, however, when he and Secretary Christopher meet in Geneva later this month.

The attached message, from President Clinton to President Yeltsin, has been fully vetted through the interagency process and cleared by the deputies in a meeting held on Friday, March 3.

Concurrence by:

Daniel Fried *DF* and Alexander Vershbow *N*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on:

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PER E.O. 13526

DATE 2015-0815-M-2 (4.45)

11/29/2017

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Message to Boris Yeltsin (including Appendix)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore [in Russian] (2 pages)	06/08/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore [in Russian] (2 pages)	06/26/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001c. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (1 page)	06/29/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001d. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	06/25/1993	P1/b(1)
001e. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (1 page)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001f. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	09/18/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001g. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	04/16/1994	P1/b(1)
001h. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (1 page)	05/06/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001i. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	05/10/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001j. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (4 pages)	06/28/1994	P1/b(1)
001k. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (4 pages)	06/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 574

FOLDER TITLE:

9502499

2014-0837-F
 ke3335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001l. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	06/20/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001m. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	06/20/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001n. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001o. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001p. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages) [partial]	06/15/1994	P1/b(1) VZ
001q. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages) [partial]	06/16/1994	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number: 574

FOLDER TITLE:

9502499

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ
СОВЕТА МИНИСТРОВ — ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«08» ИЮНЯ 1993 г.

№ 1349П-П7

г. Москва

Уважаемый господин Вице-президент,

В связи с проведением Конституционного совещания, требующего моего обязательного присутствия в Москве, выехать в Вашингтон я смогу не ранее 16 июня. В этой связи предлагаю согласовать новые сроки проведения нашей встречи. Мы могли бы провести пленарное заседание комиссии 17-18 июня, после чего осуществить задуманную поездку по стране.

В связи с тем, что до нашей намеченной встречи осталось совсем немного времени, хотел бы также обратить Ваше внимание на вопрос, не терпящий отлагательств. Речь идет о российско-американском сотрудничестве в космической сфере.

В этом контексте хотел бы подчеркнуть, что, сознавая возможные негативные последствия, к которым могла бы привести утечка технологии производства военной ракетной техники, Россия ввела в действие эффективную национальную систему экспортного контроля, которая разработана на основе мировой практики с учетом достигнутого высокого уровня кооперации предприятий космического профиля, расположенных на территории Украины и других государств СНГ.

Его Превосходительству
господину Альберту Гору
Вице-президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки, округ Колумбия
Соединенные Штаты Америки

Со всей ответственностью заявляю, что Правительство России и уполномоченные государственные органы будут требовать неукоснительного соблюдения российскими экспортерами данного режима контроля, направленного на уменьшение опасности распространения ракетного оружия.

Открывающиеся перспективы расширения российско-американского космического сотрудничества, особенно после Ванкуверской встречи в верхах, потребовали дополнительных консультаций экспертов сторон с тем, чтобы найти развязки проблем, которые все еще имеются в этой области. С нашей стороны - это неуверенность в получении американских экспортных лицензий на запуск коммерческих спутников российскими ракетами во исполнение программы, намеченной на 1995-2000 гг. Со стороны США, как мы понимаем, это - принятие Россией обязательств по контролю за экспортом ракетной техники и некоторые положения контракта Главкосмоса с индийской организацией космических исследований.

Понимая озабоченность наших американских коллег данной проблемой, мы в ближайшее время проведем переговоры с индийской стороной о корректировке упомянутого контракта, а также примем меры по дальнейшему совершенствованию национальной системы экспортного контроля в соответствии с общепринятыми в мировой практике принципами.

Взаимоприемлемые подходы к решению этих вопросов мы предлагаем обсудить в ходе нашей предстоящей встречи.

Выражаю уверенность, что Вы разделяете нашу позицию в том, что было бы крайне желательно до принятия взаимоприемлемого решения воздержаться от каких-либо опрометчивых односторонних действий, которые могут оказаться губительными для перспектив российско-американского сотрудничества в космосе и заблокируют конструктивные переговоры, которые мы с Вами наметили провести в Вашингтоне.

Буду признателен, если Вы найдете возможным согласиться с данным предложением.

С уважением,



В. Черномырдин



ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ
СОВЕТА МИНИСТРОВ — ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 26 » ИЮНЯ 19 93 г.

№ 1478п-П2

г. Москва

Уважаемый господин Вице-президент,

Мое настоящее письмо к Вам вызвано ситуацией, сложившейся после визита в США российской делегации, ее переговоров с американскими коллегами по актуальным вопросам двусторонних отношений, прежде всего, конечно, в области космоса.

Как мы знаем, несмотря на стремление найти развязки имеющихся здесь проблем, связанных с индийским контрактом и вопросами контроля за экспортом ракетной технологии, на данном этапе переговоров пока не удалось выйти на компромиссное решение, которое в достаточной мере учитывало бы различные интересы сторон.

Полагаю, что такой результат во многом объясняется сложным характером обсуждаемых проблем, детальная проработка которых требует времени и усилий.

Убежден, что возможности для нахождения взаимоприемлемого решения далеко не исчерпаны. Мы должны идти дальше по пути развития экономического сотрудничества, действуя в духе Ванкуверских договоренностей.

Нет сомнений, что Россия и Соединенные Штаты Америки, обладающие мощным потенциалом сотрудничества в космосе, должны сделать все от них зависящее для его использования в интересах своих народов и всего человечества.

Говоря конкретно об индийской сделке, я бы предложил провести консультации с участием России, США и Индии (на двух- и трехсторонней основе), которые могли бы, на мой взгляд, помочь

Его Превосходительству
господину АЛЬБЕРТУ ГОРУ,
Вице-президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки,
Вашингтон, округ Колумбия
Соединенные Штаты Америки

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вывести из тупика обсуждение этой проблематики. Представляется, что такие переговоры было бы лучше провести в конфиденциальном порядке. Со своей стороны, еще раз подтверждаю готовность предпринять необходимые шаги в этом направлении.

Выражаю надежду, что Вы, господин Вице-президент, разделяете высказанные мной мысли и используете Ваше влияние и высокий авторитет, чтобы не допустить неоправданной паузы в развитии отношений между нашими странами. Полагаю, что обоюдные усилия, подкрепленные результатами встречи президентов наших стран в Токио 10 июля с.г., позволят найти правильное решение, что даст нам возможность в ближайшей перспективе провести заседание Межправительственной комиссии, на которой будут достигнуты важные договоренности, в том числе в области космоса.

С уважением,



В. Черномырдин



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 29 » ИЮНЯ 19 93 г.

№ Пр-1051

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

По случаю Национального праздника Соединенных Штатов Америки - Дня независимости - хочу передать Вам и всему дружественному американскому народу теплые поздравления и искренние пожелания мира, счастья и прогресса.

Убежден, что продолжение успешно начатого строительства нового партнерства между нашими великими странами открывает широчайшие перспективы для совместной деятельности во исполнение вековой мечты человечества - создания подлинно безопасного и процветающего мира.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
в Вашингтоне

Photocopy by Дж. Клинтон Handwriting

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v2 2015-0815-M-2 (4,97)



**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

« 14 » октября 19 94 г.
№ Пр-1427

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Как обещал, информирую тебя о наших шагах в отношении Ирака.

В соответствии с договоренностью А.Козырев срочно посетил Багдад и в итоге сложных переговоров с иракцами вывел их на готовность признать суверенитет и границу Кувейта, о чем официально заявлено. Получены твердые заверения, что иракские войска отведены на тыловые позиции.

Договоренности открывают путь к военной разрядке между Ираком и Кувейтом.

Очень важно, чтобы мы и дальше тесно координировали наши усилия, теперь уже в рамках СБ ООН, с целью добиться действительно прочной безопасности для Кувейта, да и региона в целом: от мер давления перешли к политическому процессу, поощряя позитивные шаги Ирака поэтапным смягчением санкций.

Я поручил А.Козыреву по завершении его миссии в регион срочно вылететь в США. Прошу тебя принять его для беседы по принципиальным вопросам. Затем он встретится с У.Кристофером для обсуждения этой и многих других проблем в развитие наших бесед в Вашингтоне.

Рассчитываю, что ты также дашь соответствующие указания представителю США в СБ ООН, где Козырев выступит с докладом. Разумеется, исхожу из того, что, как мы с тобой договорились, СБ ООН не будет принимать никаких решений до приезда А.Козырева.

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
ГОСПОДИНУ БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ
г. Вашингтон

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4/14/2018

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РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 18 » сентября 1994 г.

№ Пр-1300

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Вижу настоящее проявление партнерства в том, что ты готов использовать свой личный престиж, чтобы помочь нам в урегулировании конфликта в Нагорном Карабахе, продолжение которого угрожает не только российской, но и международной безопасности. Честно скажу, что давно ожидал конструктивного отклика на мои послания тебе по Нагорному Карабаху, а также последнее письмо А.Козырева государственному секретарю США.

На недавней встрече президентов Армении и Азербайджана в Москве достигнут прогресс, но далеко не все узлы развязаны. Ты обратил внимание на то, что мне пришлось действовать не самому, а пока через А.Козырева - опасно создать завышенные ожидания, когда сохраняется риск неудачи.

Поэтому условий для четырехсторонней встречи нет. Но Г.Алиев и Л.Тер-Петросян разделяют мое мнение, что полезно будет обсудить с тобой этот вопрос в ходе двусторонних встреч.

Хочу поддержать твою идею придать дополнительный политический импульс урегулированию под российско-американской эгидой.


Конкретно я предлагаю нам с тобой выступить в ООН с инициативой, в которой объявить о намерении получить "благословение" Совета Безопасности на миротворческую операцию СНГ в Нагорном Карабахе, а затем и перевести ее под флаг ООН. Понимаю, что начать и нести основную ношу придется российским миротворцам, но важно, чтобы миссия имела международный характер. Приветствовал бы готовность США принять участие в операции ООН после того, как стабильность в регионе будет восстановлена.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

При этом необходимо, чтобы реальную помощь урегулированию оказало СБСЕ. К сожалению, в действиях миссии СБСЕ пока проявляется нескоординированность с центральными усилиями, в том числе предпринимаемыми нами с участием высших руководителей сторон в конфликте. Рассчитываю, что ты дашь соответствующие указания своим представителям в СБСЕ, чтобы совместно отладить этот механизм. Главное - обеспечить солидную миссию наблюдателей СБСЕ для реализации соглашения. Мы отводим важную роль Минской конференции в последующих усилиях.

Действуя таким образом, я уверен, мы сможем помочь решающему прорыву к гарантированному урегулированию. Еще раз хочу подчеркнуть, что высоко ценю вклад США и твой лично в успех урегулирования, в том числе в экономическое восстановление пострадавших от этого бессмысленного конфликта стран.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин



**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

« 6 » мая 19 94 г.

№ Пр-551

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

В связи с отмечаемым 50-летием высадки союзнических войск в Нормандии хочу приветствовать тебя, а также всех участников одной из важнейших операций второй мировой войны.

Это событие представляется особо значимым, поскольку приближается 50-летие нашей общей победы над фашизмом, вклад России в которую хорошо известен. В следующем году мы подведем черту под событиями полувековой давности, которые научили всех нас лучше ценить мир и совместно работать на его благо.

Сейчас, когда наш взгляд устремлен в будущее и усилия направлены на укрепление международной стабильности, мы возвращаемся к событиям прошлого с целью не только почтить память павших, но и утвердить в сознании нынешнего и грядущих поколений важнейший урок. Он заключается в том, что безопасность ни одного государства не может быть укреплена за счет интересов других. Она обеспечивается, как показывает опыт, только совместной работой, развитием равноправных партнерских отношений.

В этом вижу смысл отмечаемых исторических юбилеев.

С наилучшими пожеланиями,

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

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4/19/2018

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 10 » мая 19 94 г.

№ Пр-572

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

13 мая в Женеве состоится важная встреча министров иностранных дел России, США, Англии, Франции, Германии с участием ЕС и ООН по проблемам боснийского урегулирования.

Необходимо, чтобы она была результативной и чтобы боснийские стороны, наконец, почувствовали, что мировое сообщество не намерено больше терпеть их бесконечные препирательства по тем или иным деталям в условиях продолжающегося конфликта.

Полагаю, что министры могли бы:

потребовать, чтобы сербы и мусульмане заключили соглашение о прекращении враждебных действий на всей территории БиГ. Оно предусматривало бы развод войск сторон и размещение между ними сил ООН;

поддержать концепцию унии БиГ, состоящей из двух частей (мусульмано-хорватской федерации и сербской республики);

одобрить "временную компромиссную" карту БиГ, по которой 51% территории предоставлялся бы мусульмано-хорватской федерации и 49% - сербской республике;

предложить сербам отойти на границы, обозначенные для их республики в составе унии БиГ на "временной компромиссной" карте. При этом выполнение сербами данного требования сопровождалось бы приостановкой действия санкций против СРЮ;

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

подтвердить, что Сараево вплоть до окончательного политического урегулирования в БиГ оставался бы под контролем ООН.

На переговоры об окончательном политическом урегулировании можно было бы дать сторонам еще год. В случае неудачи - провести арбитраж на новой международной конференции.

Если бы этот план действий был одобрен нашими министрами, а затем принят самими конфликтующими сторонами, то уже в ближайшее время, скажем в конце мая, мы могли бы провести встречу в верхах в том же составе. На ней стороны подписали бы необходимые соглашения: об унии БиГ, о "временной компромиссной" карте, о прекращении враждебных действий, по Сараево.

Думаю, что тогда мир воочию убедился бы, что великие державы, когда они вместе берутся за дело, могут быстро добиться внушительных результатов.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

JRB-FYI

Translated from Russian

June 20, 1994
Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill,

Appreciating, as I do, your interest in achieving normalization of our relations with the Latvian Republic and the practical assistance of the US side in assuring an early, orderly, and honorable withdrawal of the Russian troops from Latvia, I believe it necessary - particularly in the run-up to your scheduled visit to Riga, to call your attention to another very important problem of which you are also aware.

After having signed a package of military agreements with Latvia, we in Russia expected that the tight knot of issues, involving the situation of ethnic Russians in Latvia, too, would be untangled in a serious and respectful manner. We hoped that we would be able to demonstrate to other countries a worthy example of a constructive and amicable approach to dealing with existing delicate and painful humanitarian problems.

What we see, however, is that our worst fears are becoming a reality. Of late, the Latvian Parliament, Sejm, has adopted a number of laws and legislative amendments which do not improve, but, on the contrary, make the situation with the non-indigenous Latvian population rights even worse and are indicative of Latvia's continued course toward establishing a legal foundation for discriminatory policies and practices, infringement on civilian and political, as well as socio-economic and other rights of the country's Russian-speaking residents.

We are particularly worried about the law on citizenship approved in the second reading by the Latvian Sejm on June 9, which contains even tougher than before formulations vis-a-vis the Russian-speaking population proposed by the national radicals.

Contrary to the recommendations of the CSCE and the European Council experts, the provisions of the draft law essentially affirm the principle of naturalization quotas. According to the expert estimates, no more than one fourth of

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
President of the
United States of America
Washington D.C.

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4/29/2018

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nearly 800,000 Latvia's non-citizen permanent residents can expect being granted citizenship by the year 2000. The rest will become eligible for requesting Latvian citizenship only in the next century and in accordance with a quota not exceeding 0.1 percent of the total Latvian citizens for the previous year. In effect, this quota will amount to no more than 2,000 persons per year.

The law preserves an extensive list of persons who are even denied the right to seek Latvian citizenship and effectively toughens requirements concerning tests for the knowledge of the Latvian language, the Constitution and the history of the country. At the same time, no clear provision is made with respect to the timeframe and the procedure for considering citizenship applications, which has great potential for official arbitrariness, as was the case with the mandatory registration of Latvia's residents.

Adoption of this law in its present form scheduled for June 22 will threaten increased tensions and instability in Latvia and the Baltic region as a whole and will have most serious and negative repercussions in Russia.

Under the circumstances, it would be desirable to influence Riga appropriately and to prevent the situation in this neuralgic point of Europe from drifting toward an ethnic conflict.

I would hope that, through our joint actions, the course of events will be channeled toward a sensible and solely acceptable direction, that of normalization of inter-ethnic relations in Latvia. For its part, Russia will continue to consistently persevere in this direction.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN



**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

« 20 » июня 19 94 г.

№Пр-760

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Ценя твой интерес к нормализации наших отношений с Латвийской Республикой и практическое содействие американской стороны в обеспечении скорого, упорядоченного и достойного вывода российских войск из Латвии, считаю необходимым, особенно в преддверии твоего планируемого визита в Ригу, обратить внимание на другую важнейшую проблему, которая тебе также известна.

Подписав с Латвией пакет военных соглашений, мы в России рассчитывали, что и тугой узел проблем, связанных с положением этнических россиян в Латвии, будет развязан в серьезной и уважительной атмосфере. Мы надеялись, что сможем показать другим странам достойный пример конструктивного и доброжелательного подхода к урегулированию существующих деликатных и болезненных вопросов в гуманитарной сфере.

На деле, однако, сбываются наши худшие опасения. В последнее время латвийский парламент - Сейм - принял ряд законов и поправок к законам, которые не улучшают, а наоборот, ухудшают положение с обеспечением прав некоренного населения Латвии, свидетельствуют о продолжении курса на подведение правовой базы под политику и практику дискриминации, ущемления гражданских и политических, а также социально-экономических и иных прав русскоязычных жителей страны.

Особенно тревожит принятие 9 июня с.г. Сеймом Латвии во втором чтении проекта закона о гражданстве, в котором содержатся более жесткие, чем ранее, дискриминационные по отношению к русскоязычному населению формулировки, предложенные национал-радикалами.

**ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ**

г.Вашингтон

Положения законопроекта, вопреки рекомендациям международных экспертов СБСЕ и Совета Европы, по сути закрепляют принцип квот натурализации. По подсчетам экспертов, на получение гражданства Латвии к 2000 году могут рассчитывать около четверти из примерно 800 тысяч ее постоянных жителей, не имеющих гражданства. Остальные получают право просить о принятии их в гражданство ЛР лишь в следующем веке и в соответствии с квотой, не превышающей 0,1 процента от числа латвийских граждан за предыдущий год. Практически эта квота составит не более 2 тыс. человек в год.

Сохраняется обширный перечень лиц, которым отказывается даже в праве ходатайствовать о получении латвийского гражданства, фактически ужесточаются требования к сдаче экзаменов по латышскому языку, конституции и истории страны. В то же время сроки и порядок рассмотрения заявлений на получение гражданства четко не определены, что может открыть широкое поле для чиновничьевого произвола, как это было при прохождении обязательной регистрации постоянных жителей Латвии.

Принятие в таком виде закона о гражданстве, намеченное на 22 июня с.г., грозит усилением напряженности и нестабильности в самой Латвии и в балтийском регионе, вызовет самый серьезный и отрицательный резонанс в России.

В этой ситуации желательно оказать соответствующее воздействие на Ригу, предотвратить дрейф ситуации в этой болевой точке Европы в сторону конфликта на этнической почве.

Хотел бы рассчитывать, что нашими совместными усилиями ход событий будет направлен в разумное и единственно приемлемое русло - к нормализации межнациональных отношений в Латвии. Со своей стороны Россия будет и впредь последовательно и настойчиво действовать именно в этом направлении.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Moscow, The Kremlin

June 22, 1994

Dear Bill:

Thank you very much for your early and substantive reply to my letter. I am very satisfied that we continue acting in close consultations with each other on the North Korean nuclear problem which remains in the focus of our attention.

In my view, there is much in common in both our approaches to this problem which might considerably facilitate arrival to a joint draft Resolution of the Security Council. Let me confirm, that we pay particular attention to the need, while doing everything in a coordinated and reliable manner, to work out exactly a joint Russian-American draft Resolution. That is why we consider it important to refrain from any actions not corresponding to the spirit of our agreement in this regard.

I believe, that we shall be able to combine in the draft Resolution both the sanctions issue, the list of which should be thoroughly discussed, and the issue of an international conference. Our assumption is that an international conference will provide North Korea with the last chance to show its readiness to settle the nuclear problem. One cannot exclude, and I agree with you on this, that Pyongyang may try to use the international conference in order to delay solving of the nuclear problem. But we can avoid this, if we set up a strict time frame for the convening of the conference and condition the possibility of the introduction of sanctions by the result efficiency of its work. It is quite obvious, that if Pyongyang doesn't accept the conditions fixed in the Resolution, sanctions will follow, first in the "mild version" form, as we have agreed with you.

His Excellency
William J. CLINTON
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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12 2015-0815-M-2 (4,58)
4/19/2018

I appreciate your information concerning the results of J.Carter's visit to Pyongyang. I would be very glad, if your negotiations with the Koreans brought positive results. At the same time, on the basis of our previous experience, we believe that at this stage a combination of a broad format of negotiations with the complex approach to the settlement of the Korean Peninsula problems would be more effective.

With regard to Russia's joining the "Partnership for Peace" program, I agree with your assessment of this event as of an important and momentous one. Of a particular importance for us would be a simultaneous and equal coming into force of the "Partnership for Peace" program, and adoption of a comprehensive cooperation program "Russia-NATO" which would reflect the real role of Russia in the European and world affairs, as well as its status of a nuclear nation.

In the nearest future I intend to share with you some detailed ideas on basic issues which relate, on the eve of the Naples summit, to forming up a "political G-8".

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 22 » июня 19 94 г.

№ Пр-786

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю тебя за быстрый и содержательный ответ на мое послание. Я весьма удовлетворен, что мы продолжаем действовать, тесно консультируясь по северокорейской ядерной проблеме, которая остается в фокусе и моего, и твоего внимания.

Я вижу, что и в вашем, и в нашем подходе к этой проблеме есть много общего, что может значительно облегчить выход на совместный проект резолюции Совета Безопасности. Хочу подтвердить, что мы придаем особое значение тому, чтобы, делая все скоординированно и солидно, разработать именно совместный российско-американский проект резолюции. Поэтому считаем важным воздерживаться от каких-либо действий, которые не отвечали бы духу нашей с тобой договоренности на этот счет.

Уверен, нам удастся в проекте резолюции сочетать вопрос о санкциях, набор которых следует всесторонне обсудить, и международную конференцию. Исходим из того, что проведение международной конференции предоставит Северной Корее последний шанс продемонстрировать готовность урегулировать ядерную проблему. Нельзя исключать, и здесь я согласен с тобой, что Пхеньян попытается воспользоваться проведением международной конференции для затягивания решения ядерной проблемы. Однако этого можно не допустить, определив жесткие временные сроки созыва конференции, а также поставив возможность введения санкций в зависимость от результативности ее работы. Очевидно, что если Пхеньян не примет условия резолюции, последуют санкции, первоначально в мягком варианте, как мы с тобой договорились.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

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Благодарен тебе за информацию об итогах визита Джимми Картера в Пхеньян. Был бы рад, если бы ваши переговоры с северокорейцами дали позитивные результаты. Вместе с тем, учитывая прошлый опыт, нам представляется, что на данном этапе сочетание широкого формата переговоров с комплексным подходом к решению проблем Корейского полуострова было бы более эффективным.

Что касается присоединения России к "Партнерству ради мира", согласен с твоей оценкой этого события как важного и знаменательного. Для нас особое значение имеет одновременное и на равных введение в действие и "Партнерства ради мира", и принятия полновесной программы сотрудничества "Россия-НАТО", которая отражала бы реальную роль России в европейских и мировых делах, ее статус ядерной державы.

В самое ближайшее время планирую поделить с тобой развернутыми соображениями в преддверии разговора в Неаполе по комплексу основных вопросов, которые встают в связи с формированием "политической восьмерки".

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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9502499

2014-0837-F
ke3335

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Translated from Russian

June 15, 1994
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I have carefully analysed our latest telephone conversaiton.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

I have a concrete suggestion to make. As you and I agreed ' earlier, Minister Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher will meet [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) This meeting could be held soon in Brussels. At that time, too, the Russian foreign minister intends to sign a framework document concerning the Partnership for Peace program. I hope that in addition to this we will be able to find an appropriate form for recording the intention of Russia and NATO to pursue full-fledged cooperation, as it was stated, incidentally, in the latest NATO Council's communique.

I hope that the US Secretary of State will be taking part in this action. Among other things, this will be important for affirming US role and responsibility in Europe, and for imparting an impetus to Russia-NATO cooperation and Russian-American partnership.

His Excellency
Mr. William J. CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
KBH 2015-0865-M (4.31) 7/9/2018

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY [2015-0815-M-2, p. 60]



EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Also, the ministers will have an opportunity to work on the concept of the September summit; I believe it is time that we get down to this business in earnest. I expect to have a thorough discussion of this matter in Naples.

I look forward to an early and positive response.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001q. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] [partial] (2 pages)	06/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and HS])
OA/Box Number: 574

FOLDER TITLE:

9502499

2014-0837-F
ke3335

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

« 16 » ИЮНЯ 1994 г.

№ Пр-755

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Я внимательно проанализировал наш телефонный разговор. EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

[Redacted block containing EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)]

У меня есть конкретное предложение. Как мы с тобой договорились, А.В.Козырев и У.Кристофер встретятся [Redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Эту встречу можно провести в ближайшее время в Брюсселе. Тогда же министр иностранных дел Российской Федерации намерен подписать рамочный документ по программе "Партнерство ради мира". Надеюсь, что в дополнение к этому удастся найти подходящую форму, чтобы зафиксировать намерение России и НАТО развивать полномасштабное сотрудничество, как об этом говорится, кстати, и в последнем коммюнике Совета НАТО.

Рассчитываю, что госсекретарь США будет участвовать в этом мероприятии. Это важно и с точки зрения затверждения роли и ответственности США в Европе, и для придания импульса сотрудничеству России с НАТО, и для российско-американского партнерства.

[Redacted block containing EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)]

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон


Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 2015-0865-M (4.31)
29/2018 [2015-0815-M-2, 4.61]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Кроме того, министры поработают над концепцией сентябрьского саммита - этим вопросом пора заниматься вплотную. Я настроен на основательный разговор на эту тему в Неаполе.

Рассчитываю на скорый положительный ответ.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (3 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 07/25/2022
001b. letter	Translation of letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. letter	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. letter	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001e. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1) VZ
001f. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton [in Russian] (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1) VZ

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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and HS])
 OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:

9502745

2014-0837-F
 ke3336

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 146929
JS/PH
Russian

PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

9506584

February 27, 1995
No. Pr-304
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

I am writing you in regard to a matter of high priority: how to ensure the successful outcome of the upcoming April-May Conference of Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Preparations for the Conference are proceeding with difficulty. There is no guarantee we will be able to gain a sure majority in favor of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

At our meeting in Washington we agreed to coordinate our respective efforts. I believe that work here should focus on two areas.

On the one hand, it is imperative that we firmly oppose the destructive policy of certain countries toward the Treaty, especially attempts to discredit it, and the tactic of "wrangling" concessions from the nuclear states by linking its extension to the solution of other problems--which may be important, but which are nonetheless independent--relating to nuclear disarmament and strengthening the security of non-nuclear states.

His Excellency
Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.62)
4/17/2018

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

On the other hand, it is in our interest to constructively address the present concerns of non-aligned countries. This could have a decisive effect on countries that have not yet decided on what the Treaty's fate should be. We must bring home our conviction to the vacillating ones that the Treaty is a time-tested document, a cornerstone of international security, and a guarantee of stability on the global and regional levels. It is needed by everyone--countries large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear.

Specifically, it would be especially important to hasten agreement on security guarantees for non-nuclear states, which could be "sanctified" by the UN Security Council on the eve of the conference.

Another practical task we should do our utmost to accomplish in the near future is to agree on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Our delegation has instructions to conclude an appropriate treaty this very year. To this end, we are counting on increased cooperation between our representatives in Geneva.

There is one more important aspect. We can bring over the whole group of nonaligned countries to our side only if they are sure they will have the opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peaceful nuclear energy--with strict guarantees of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, of course.

We intend to send a message from the RF Foreign Ministry to a number of key countries whose position is crucial to the future of the Treaty, and to work actively for accession to the Treaty of those states that have not yet done this.

I am instructing the Russian representatives at all appropriate forums and in [foreign] capitals to work closely with your representatives.

I hope that our countries, like all those who bear special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, will act in concert and with the utmost commitment to ensuring the success of the conference in practice.

Respectfully,
[s] B. Yeltsin

PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

March 1, 1995
No. Pr-333
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

I am writing you regarding the progress of the talks between Russia and the International Monetary Fund on granting Russia a standby credit in the amount of 6.25 billion U.S. dollars. During the talks we reached agreement on many matters and accepted the basic recommendations of the IMF, but the final solution to the problem is dragging on.

The Government of Russia has developed a financial stabilization plan and a draft of the 1995 federal budget that does not provide for financing of the budget deficit by issuing currency; the deficit remains fairly large, however, owing to a number of objective factors. We cannot reduce it substantially in a year without threatening the social and political stability of our society and the process of consistent economic reform. According to the draft federal budget approved by the State Duma in its third reading, almost 50 percent of the deficit will be covered through foreign loans, basically with credits granted by international financial organizations, especially the IMF. As a result, the matter of concluding an agreement with the IMF becomes particularly important, since failure to receive credits, or a long delay in receiving them, will place us in a situation where the RF Government will have to reconsider the financial stabilization plan. This may have a serious effect on the domestic political situation in our country. I must point out that today obtainment of these credits is determining the fate of Russian reforms and the democratic transformations in our country.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2015-0815-M-2 (4.63)
4/19/2018

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The time frame for making this decision is of crucial importance to Russia now. For two months, federal budget expenditures have been financed solely by tax revenues, which are not subject to a rapid increase. Some sectors of the economy have not been receiving necessary funding, and miners are staging demonstrations that jeopardize political stability in Russia.

The situation is developing in such a way that unless a decision is made to grant Russia IMF funds within a month, the government will be forced to seek alternative ways of extricating itself from the present crisis.

I hope that in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding that characterizes the relations between us and our countries, you will support my appeal and bring your fullest influence to bear to expedite a favorable decision by the IMF on granting Russia the aforesaid credit.

Sincerely,
[s] B. Yeltsin

9506584



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 27 » февраля 19 95 г.

№ Пр-304

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Обращаюсь к тебе по приоритетному вопросу обеспечения успешного исхода предстоящей в апреле-мае Конференции участников Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия.

Подготовка к Конференции идет непросто. Нет гарантий, что удастся добиться уверенного большинства в пользу решения о бессрочном и безусловном продлении Договора.

На встрече в Вашингтоне мы договорились координировать наши соответствующие усилия. Думается, что работу здесь надо вести по двум направлениям.

С одной стороны, безусловно, необходимо твердо противодействовать деструктивной линии отдельных стран в отношении Договора, прежде всего попыткам его дискредитации, тактике "выторговывания" уступок у ядерных держав путем увязки его продления с решением других, пусть важных, но самостоятельных проблем ядерного разоружения и укрепления безопасности неядерных стран.

С другой стороны, в наших общих интересах дать конструктивный ответ на имеющиеся озабоченности неприсоединившихся стран. Это могло бы оказать решающее воздействие на те страны, которые еще не сделали выбор в отношении судьбы Договора. Важно донести до

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ Соединенных

Declassified per E.O. 13526
R2 2015-0815-m-2 (4164)
4/14/7618

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колеблющихся нашу убежденность в том, что Договор - проверенный временем документ, краеугольная основа международной безопасности, гарантия стабильности на глобальном и региональном уровнях. Он нужен всем - большим и малым странам, ядерным и неядерным.

В конкретном плане особое значение имело бы ускорение согласования гарантий безопасности неядерным государствам, которые мог бы "освятить" - в преддверии Конференции - Совет Безопасности ООН.

Другая практическая задача - сделать уже в ближайшее время максимум для достижения договоренности о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний. Наша делегация имеет указание вести дело к заключению соответствующего договора уже в этом году. Рассчитываем на расширение взаимодействия наших представителей в Женеве с этой целью.


Есть и еще один важный аспект. Мы только в том случае привлечем целую группу неприсоединившихся стран на свою сторону, если у них будет уверенность в возможности пользоваться благами мирной атомной энергии, разумеется, при строжайших гарантиях нераспространения ядерного оружия.

Имеем в виду направить обращение Министра иностранных дел России ряду ключевых стран, от позиции которых зависит будущее Договора, а также провести активную работу в пользу присоединения к Договору тех государств, которые этого еще не сделали.

Мною дается указание российским представителям на всех соответствующих форумах и в столицах работать скоординированно в консультациях с вашими представителями.

Надеюсь, что наши страны, как и все, на ком лежит особая ответственность за поддержание международного мира и безопасности, будут действовать согласованно, с максимальной нацеленностью на практическое обеспечение успеха Конференции.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« I » марта 19 95 г.

№ Пр-333

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Обращаюсь к тебе относительно хода переговоров России с Международным валютным фондом о предоставлении России резервного кредита в размере 6,25 млрд. долларов США. В ходе переговоров мы согласовали многие вопросы и приняли основные рекомендации МВФ, однако окончательное решение вопроса затягивается.

Правительство России подготовило план финансовой стабилизации и проект федерального бюджета на 1995 год, не предусматривающий эмиссионное финансирование бюджетного дефицита, который, однако, при этом, в силу ряда объективных причин остается достаточно большим. Мы не можем существенно сократить его в течение года без угрозы для социально-политической стабильности в обществе и процесса последовательного реформирования экономики. В утвержденном Государственной Думой в третьем чтении проекте федерального бюджета предусмотрено, что покрытие дефицита будет осуществлено почти на 50 процентов за счет внешних заимствований, в основном за счет кредитов международных финансовых организаций и в первую очередь - МВФ. В силу этого вопрос заключения соглашения с МВФ приобретает особую значимость, так как неполучение кредитов или существенная задержка с ними поставят нас в ситуацию, когда Правительство Российской Федерации должно будет пересмотреть план финансовой стабилизации, что серьезно может сказаться на внутривнутриполитической ситуации в стране. Вынужден отметить, что сегодня получение этих кредитов определяет судьбу российских реформ и демократических преобразований в нашей стране.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ
ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Reclassified per E.O. 13526
v2 2015-0815-M-2 (4165)
4/10/2014

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Принципиальное значение для России сейчас имеют сроки принятия решения. Два месяца расходы из федерального бюджета финансируются только за счет налоговых поступлений, которые не поддаются быстрому увеличению. Некоторые отрасли экономики не получают необходимых средств, проходят выступления шахтеров, ставящие под угрозу политическую стабильность в стране.

Ситуация складывается таким образом, что если в течении месяца не будет принято решение о предоставлении России средств МВФ, Правительство будет вынуждено искать альтернативные пути выхода из создавшегося положения.

Надеюсь, что в духе дружбы и взаимопонимания, характерных для отношений между нами и нашими странами, ты поддержишь это мое обращение и употребишь все возможное влияние для ускорения принятия в МВФ положительного решения по вопросу о предоставлении России упомянутого кредита.

Искренне,



Б. Ельцин



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« 27 » февраля 19 95 г.

№ Пр-304

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Обращаюсь к тебе по приоритетному вопросу обеспечения успешного исхода предстоящей в апреле-мае Конференции участников Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия.

Подготовка к Конференции идет непросто. Нет гарантий, что удастся добиться уверенного большинства в пользу решения о бессрочном и безусловном продлении Договора.

На встрече в Вашингтоне мы договорились координировать наши соответствующие усилия. Думается, что работу здесь надо вести по двум направлениям.

С одной стороны, безусловно, необходимо твердо противодействовать деструктивной линии отдельных стран в отношении Договора, прежде всего попыткам его дискредитации, тактике "выторговывания" уступок у ядерных держав путем увязки его продления с решением других, пусть важных, но самостоятельных проблем ядерного разоружения и укрепления безопасности неядерных стран.

С другой стороны, в наших общих интересах дать конструктивный ответ на имеющиеся озабоченности неприсоединившихся стран. Это могло бы оказать решающее воздействие на те страны, которые еще не сделали выбор в отношении судьбы Договора. Важно донести до

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

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колеблющихся нашу убежденность в том, что Договор - проверенный временем документ, краеугольная основа международной безопасности, гарантия стабильности на глобальном и региональном уровнях. Он нужен всем - большим и малым странам, ядерным и неядерным.

В конкретном плане особое значение имело бы ускорение согласования гарантий безопасности неядерным государствам, которые мог бы "освятить" - в преддверии Конференции - Совет Безопасности ООН.

Другая практическая задача - сделать уже в ближайшее время максимум для достижения договоренности о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний. Наша делегация имеет указание вести дело к заключению соответствующего договора уже в этом году. Рассчитываем на расширение взаимодействия наших представителей в Женеве с этой целью.


Есть и еще один важный аспект. Мы только в том случае привлечем целую группу неприсоединившихся стран на свою сторону, если у них будет уверенность в возможности пользоваться благами мирной атомной энергии, разумеется, при строжайших гарантиях нераспространения ядерного оружия.

Имеем в виду направить обращение Министра иностранных дел России ряду ключевых стран, от позиции которых зависит будущее Договора, а также провести активную работу в пользу присоединения к Договору тех государств, которые этого еще не сделали.

Мною дается указание российским представителям на всех соответствующих форумах и в столицах работать скоординированно в консультациях с вашими представителями.

Надеюсь, что наши страны, как и все, на ком лежит особая ответственность за поддержание международного мира и безопасности, будут действовать согласованно, с максимальной нацеленностью на практическое обеспечение успеха Конференции.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

« I » марта 19 95 г.

№ Пр-333

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Обращаюсь к тебе относительно хода переговоров России с Международным валютным фондом о предоставлении России резервного кредита в размере 6,25 млрд. долларов США. В ходе переговоров мы согласовали многие вопросы и приняли основные рекомендации МВФ, однако окончательное решение вопроса затягивается.

Правительство России подготовило план финансовой стабилизации и проект федерального бюджета на 1995 год, не предусматривающий эмиссионное финансирование бюджетного дефицита, который, однако, при этом, в силу ряда объективных причин остается достаточно большим. Мы не можем существенно сократить его в течение года без угрозы для социально-политической стабильности в обществе и процесса последовательного реформирования экономики. В утвержденном Государственной Думой в третьем чтении проекте федерального бюджета предусмотрено, что покрытие дефицита будет осуществлено почти на 50 процентов за счет внешних заимствований, в основном за счет кредитов международных финансовых организаций и в первую очередь - МВФ. В силу этого вопрос заключения соглашения с МВФ приобретает особую значимость, так как неполучение кредитов или существенная задержка с ними поставят нас в ситуацию, когда Правительство Российской Федерации должно будет пересмотреть план финансовой стабилизации, что серьезно может сказаться на внутривнутриполитической ситуации в стране. Вынужден отметить, что сегодня получение этих кредитов определяет судьбу российских реформ и демократических преобразований в нашей стране.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ
ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

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Принципиальное значение для России сейчас имеют сроки принятия решения. Два месяца расходы из федерального бюджета финансируются только за счет налоговых поступлений, которые не поддаются быстрому увеличению. Некоторые отрасли экономики не получают необходимых средств, проходят выступления шахтеров, ставящие под угрозу политическую стабильность в стране.

Ситуация складывается таким образом, что если в течении месяца не будет принято решение о предоставлении России средств МВФ, Правительство будет вынуждено искать альтернативные пути выхода из создавшегося положения.

Надеюсь, что в духе дружбы и взаимопонимания, характерных для отношений между нами и нашими странами, ты поддержишь это мое обращение и употребишь все возможное влияние для ускорения принятия в МВФ положительного решения по вопросу о предоставлении России упомянутого кредита.

Искренне,



Б. Ельцин