THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION October 26, 1995

95 OCT 26 P7:42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Get Well Message for Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0815-M-3 [5.36]
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To approve a get well message for Yeltsin.

Background

Yeltsin was hospitalized today at about 2:30 p.m. Moscow time for heart trouble. Principal Assistant Ilyushin told the press that Yeltsin had suffered an ischemic attack similar to the one in July and that, while a final diagnosis will be prepared tomorrow, there is no need for surgery. Ilyushin attributed the attack in part to Yeltsin's busy schedule and a cold. Asked whether the October 31 meeting with Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic would go ahead, Ilyushin said that would be decided on Friday.

Embassy Moscow reports this attack appears to have been milder than the July episode and that the Russians plan the same medical treatment. EO 13526 1.4c nothing to suggest that this attack is as -- or more -- serious than the one in July; EO 13526 1.4c This second attack in four months puts Yeltsin at greater future risk of another or more serious attack.

An aide to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin -- who would become acting president if Yeltsin died or became incapacitated -- told the press that Yeltsin's hospitalization would not cause Chernomyrdin to alter his schedule. (Chernomyrdin in the past has taken care to avoid any steps that might appear to usurp Yeltsin's place.)

Moscow is taking the news of Yeltsin's hospitalization calmly, as it did last summer. While Kremlin sources had recently told Embassy Moscow that Yeltsin had decided to run for reelection next June, this attack will give him strong grounds for pause. His currently low standing in public opinion polls will not be helped by the image of chronic heart trouble.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/26/00

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff


CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Tab A contains a brief get well message to Yeltsin. We have also quietly approached the Russians through Tom Pickering with an offer of medical assistance, should they desire it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve Bill Clinton

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Get Well Message for Yeltsin


PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING

9476

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
November 21, 1995

Dear Bill:

Our joint efforts in Dayton to promote the Bosnian settlement present one more evidence of the fact that our partnership is working, and moreover, does so on key issues for our national interests.

I hope that we shall preserve this close cooperation in the future as well based on the understandings confirmed in Hyde Park. What I mean here is our joint agreement to hold the final phase of the Bosnian settlement in Moscow.

Frankly speaking, though, I was puzzled by Mr.Christopher's raising a new issue in his telephone conversation with Mr.Kozyrev which we had not discussed with you in Hyde Park, that is, of lifting the arms embargo against former Yugoslavia.

This proposal looks rather illogical, especially against the background of our joint promise to the Europeans to seek an end, but not a build up of the conflict right in the heart of the Old Continent. In view of this, I propose to come back to the embargo issue later, within the framework of a general Balkans mechanism of arms limitation. In any case, we can encourage the legitimate right for self-defense only for those who have proven that they can use it reasonably and not at the expense of others. In this regard I propose to start thinking about a mechanism of a phased easing of the embargo and to lift it only after achieving solid peace.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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And lastly. It is necessary that Mr.Grachev and Mr.Perry, the military of Russia and NATO continue searching for an understanding on military aspects of the operation to implement the agreements in Bosnia, particularly on the concept, the plan, and the rules of engagement for this operation.

Once again I would like to express hope that our cooperation with you will lead to an early settlement of the most dangerous contemporary conflict - the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Наша совместная работа в Дейтоне по продвижению боснийского урегулирования - это еще одно доказательство того, что наше партнерство работает - причем работает в ключевых для наших национальных интересов вопросах.

Надеюсь, мы и впредь будем также тесно сотрудничать, основываясь на пониманиях, подтвержденных в Гайд-Парке. Имею в виду и нашу с тобой договоренность о проведении завершающего этапа боснийского урегулирования в Москве.

Признаюсь, правда, что меня озадачило то, что в телефонном разговоре с А.В.Козыревым У.Кристофер поднял новый вопрос, который мы с тобой не обсуждали в Гайд-Парке, о снятии эмбарго на поставки оружия в бывшую Югославию.

Это предложение выглядит достаточно нелогичным - особенно с учетом нашего с тобой обещания европейцам вести дело к свертыванию, а не наращиванию конфликта в сердце старого континента. Поэтому я предлагаю вернуться к вопросу об эмбарго позже, в рамках общего балканского механизма об ограничении вооружений. Во всяком случае, законное право на самооборону мы можем поощрять только у тех, кто доказал, что может им разумно, не за счет других, пользоваться. В этой связи предлагаю подумать над механизмом поэтапного смягчения эмбарго, а снять его после достижения прочного мира.

И последнее. Необходимо, чтобы Грачев и Перри, военные России и НАТО продолжили согласование военных аспектов операции по выполнению соглашений в Боснии, особенно концепции, плана и правил ведения этой операции.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Еще раз хочу выразить надежду, что наше с тобой сотрудничество приведет к скорейшему урегулированию наиболее опасного конфликта современности в бывшей Югославии.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль
21 ноября 1995 г.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8946
Re-do

December 18, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: COIT BLACKER

SUBJECT: December 13 Yeltsin Message

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.39)
KBH 12/13/2019

The memorandum to the President at Tab I conveys Yeltsin's December 13 message, in which the Russian President, or someone writing on his behalf, takes exception to the publication in the Russian press of a political analysis authored by Thomas Graham of Embassy Moscow and to Tom Pickering's recent remarks on the ownership of the disputed Kurile Islands. The memorandum notes the unusually sharp tone of the message, which we attribute less to genuine outrage than to pre-election maneuvering on the part of Russian authorities, and urges a low-key response.

State concurs in this assessment and is drafting a response for the President's signature for delivery after the Russian elections on December 17.

Concurrence by: Stanley Roth SP for

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

2. That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to State at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A December 13 Yeltsin Message
Tab II Memorandum to State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 12/14/05

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 13, 1995

Dear Bill:

I was hoping to meet with you in Paris on December 14 during the signing ceremony of the peaceful agreements on Bosnia. But I doubt that it will be possible to do so. At the Conference in Paris Russia will be represented by the Chairman of the Government Mr.Chernomyrdin.

I believe that relations between our two countries should be developing within the course of the agreements reached in Hyde Park. Unfortunately, recently there have taken place some instances which introduce undesirable complications into these relations. I am referring to an article in the Russian press of First Secretary of the US Embassy on issues of domestic politics and statements of Ambassador Pickering regarding the Kurile Islands chain.

I do not mean that the positions of Russia and the US should coincide on all issues. This would not be realistic. What I am talking about is another thing: when, where and who should be presenting this or that position. Imagine a situation when our Ambassador Vorontsov in the middle of the primaries, let us say, in California, deliberately voices our position on some painful issue to you. And there are many such issues. I am sure, you would evaluate such actions as a demarche against our partnership. And you would be right.

I hope that you will treat my message with understanding.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Рассчитывал встретиться с тобой в Париже 14 декабря при подписании мирных соглашений по Боснии. Однако вряд ли удастся это сделать. На конференции в Париже Россию будет представлять председатель Правительства В.С.Черномырдин.

Считаю, что отношения между нашими странами должны развиваться в русле договоренностей, достигнутых в Гайд-Парке. К сожалению, в последнее время имели место случаи, которые вносят в них нежелательные осложнения. Я имею в виду выступление в российской печати первого секретаря посольства США по внутриполитическим вопросам и высказывания посла Т.Пикеринга по островам Курильской гряды.

Речь не идет о том, чтобы позиции России и США по всем вопросам совпадали. Это - нереально. Речь идет о другом: когда, где и кому излагать ту или иную позицию. Представь, что наш посол Воронцов в разгар первичных выборов, скажем, в Калифорнии демонстративно огласил бы нашу позицию по какому-нибудь больному для вас вопросу. А таких вопросов немало. Уверен, что ты расценил бы такие действия как выпад против партнерства. И был бы пра

Рассчитываю, что ты с пониманием отнесешься к моему обращению.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

13 декабря 1995 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8946
Re-do

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.42)
KBH 12/13/2019

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: December 13 Yeltsin Message

On December 13 the Russian Embassy delivered a message to you from Boris Yeltsin, in which the Russian president takes pointed exception to two recent U.S. actions. The first issue he raises is the publication in the Russian press on November 23 of an analysis of Kremlin politics written by Thomas Graham of the political section of our Embassy in Moscow. Graham wrote an unflattering review of the competition among Russia's ruling cliques for publication in a Carnegie Endowment Journal. A Russian opposition newspaper got hold of it and ran it with a disclaimer that it represented the author's personal view. (In retrospect, State agrees with us that this kind of commentary by an Embassy official was inappropriate for any publication.) The article elicited a perfunctory protest from the Russian Foreign Ministry in late November.

The second incident to which the message refers is a December 8 comment by Ambassador Tom Pickering during his visit to the Russian island of Sakhalin. In response to a question posed by a Russian journalist, Tom restated long-standing U.S. policy that the four southernmost Kurile Islands, seized by the Soviet Union from Japan in the closing days of World War II, rightfully belong to Tokyo and should revert to Japanese control. Tom broke no new ground and was well within existing State Department guidance in responding as he did.

Yeltsin's message is unusual in two respects. The tone is uncharacteristically sharp (although it has a feigned quality to it); in addition, the message, which we would expect to travel from the Russian Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State, is instead from Yeltsin to you. Both features are attributable in our judgment to a case of preelection jitters in Moscow and, in particular, to the determination of the Russian Foreign Ministry and perhaps some in the Presidential apparatus that they must be seen as vigilant and forthright in defense of Russia's foreign policy interests.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 12/14/05

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We recommend a firm but low-key response and have asked State to draft a letter for your signature. we suggest waiting until after Christmas holiday.

Attachment
Tab A December 13 Yeltsin Message



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 13, 1995

Dear Bill:

I was hoping to meet with you in Paris on December 14 during the signing ceremony of the peaceful agreements on Bosnia. But I doubt that it will be possible to do so. At the Conference in Paris Russia will be represented by the Chairman of the Government Mr.Chernomyrdin.

I believe that relations between our two countries should be developing within the course of the agreements reached in Hyde Park. Unfortunately, recently there have taken place some instances which introduce undesirable complications into these relations. I am referring to an article in the Russian press of First Secretary of the US Embassy on issues of domestic politics and statements of Ambassador Pickering regarding the Kurile Islands chain.

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Sincerely,

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William J.Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

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Рассчитываю, что ты с пониманием отнесешься к моему обращению.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

13 декабря 1995 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«13» декабря 19 95 г.
№ Пр-1797

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

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Рассчитываю, что ты с пониманием отнесешься к моему обращению.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BLACKER COQ GRAY HARMON HESLIN LAKEA PASCUAL PIFER REZNIK SIGLER SUM

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 301803Z DEC 95

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-m-3(5.46)
KBH 12/13/2019

.
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.
.
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
.
.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
DEAR BORIS:

.
THANK YOU FOR THE HOLIDAY GREETING. I AGREE WITH ITS MESSAGE AND RECIPROCATE ITS SPIRIT. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS YOU ENUMERATE ARE A CAUSE FOR SATISFACTION AND PRIDE -- AND FOR CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS IN THE YEAR AHEAD. WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE IS, AS YOU SAY, PROOF OF OUR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER TO MEET THE GREATEST CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME -- ALWAYS DESPITE SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES, OFTEN AGAINST THE ODDS AND SOMETIMES AGAINST THE PREDICTIONS OF THE SKEPTICS AND PESSIMISTS.
.
AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, I'VE BEEN THINKING QUITE A BIT ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN YOUR COUNTRY OVER THE PAST WEEKS. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS GENERATED A GREAT DEAL OF COMMENTARY AROUND THE WORLD. BUT THE VOICE I HAVE LISTENED TO MOST ATTENTIVELY HAS BEEN YOUR OWN. I TAKE HEART FROM YOUR REAFFIRMATION OF A COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND TO POLICIES THAT WILL ENABLE RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION YOU AND I HAVE LAID OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS.
.
LET ME USE THIS OCCASION FOR A REAFFIRMATION OF MY OWN: I

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

BELIEVE, AS I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, IN THE WISDOM OF RUSSIA'S PEOPLE TO MAKE THE CHOICES FOR THEIR FUTURE AND THEIR CHILDREN THAT WILL BE WORTHY OF THEIR GREATNESS. I BELIEVE, TOO, THAT AS THEY CONTINUE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS AS CITIZENS OF A DEMOCRACY, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WILL SEE PAST THE IMMEDIATE HARDSHIPS OF A DIFFICULT TRANSITION AND EMBRACE THE PROMISE OF REFORM AND OF AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED WORLD. AND FINALLY, BORIS, I BELIEVE IN THE HISTORIC ROLE THAT YOU PERSONALLY HAVE PLAYED, DEMONSTRATING TRUST IN YOUR PEOPLE TO PUT YOUR COUNTRY ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY THE RIGHT COURSE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.

.

OUR WORK TOGETHER, MAN TO MAN, EYE TO EYE -- AS YOU SAY IN YOUR LETTER, WITH OUR SLEEVES ROLLED UP -- CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF THE GREAT GRATIFICATIONS OF MY PRESIDENCY. I BELIEVE THAT AS LONG AS RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES WORK TOGETHER, THERE IS NO TASK WE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH, ON BEHALF OF OUR SHARED INTERESTS AND THOSE OF HUMANITY. WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK STILL TO DO. YOU CAN COUNT ON ME IN 1996 TO GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO PRESERVING AND ADVANCING THE PROJECTS TO WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY DEVOTED SO MUCH OF OUR ENERGY.

.

HILLARY AND CHELSEA JOIN ME IN CONVEYING OUR WARMEST PERSONAL GREETINGS OF THE SEASON TO YOU AND NAINA, AS WELL AS TO YOUR WHOLE FAMILY.

.

SINCERELY,

.

BILL CLINTON

.

.

.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT
#7609

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



NNNN
<MSGID> M2018201

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9215

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12/30/95

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(5.97)
KBH 12/13/2019

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1995

95 DEC 29 AM : 37

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: New Year's Messages to Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin

Purpose

To approve New Year's messages to President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

Background

Yeltsin sent you holiday greetings on December 26 (Tab C). His letter notes that much was achieved this year, despite the skeptics' predictions, and recalls your three 1995 meetings as breakthrough events. Your message to Yeltsin (Tab A) replies in like tone, underscoring the promise that reform holds for Russia, the importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship and Yeltsin's role in Russia's transition.

The message at Tab B conveys New Year's wishes to Chernomyrdin, who sent you holiday greetings on December 22 (Tab D).

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

That you approve the message to Chernomyrdin at Tab B.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 12/30/05

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachments
Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B Message to Chernomyrdin
Tab C December 26 Message from Yeltsin
Tab D December 22 Message from Chernomyrdin


CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR THE HOLIDAY GREETING. I AGREE WITH ITS MESSAGE AND RECIPROCATE ITS SPIRIT. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS YOU ENUMERATE ARE A CAUSE FOR SATISFACTION AND PRIDE -- AND FOR CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS IN THE YEAR AHEAD. WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE IS, AS YOU SAY, PROOF OF OUR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER TO MEET THE GREATEST CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME -- ALWAYS DESPITE SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES, OFTEN AGAINST THE ODDS AND SOMETIMES AGAINST THE PREDICTIONS OF THE SKEPTICS AND PESSIMISTS.

AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, I'VE BEEN THINKING QUITE A BIT ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN YOUR COUNTRY OVER THE PAST WEEKS. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS GENERATED A GREAT DEAL OF COMMENTARY AROUND THE WORLD. BUT THE VOICE I HAVE LISTENED TO MOST ATTENTIVELY HAS BEEN YOUR OWN. I TAKE HEART FROM YOUR REAFFIRMATION OF A COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND TO POLICIES THAT WILL ENABLE RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION YOU AND I HAVE LAID OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS.

LET ME USE THIS OCCASION FOR A REAFFIRMATION OF MY OWN: I BELIEVE, AS I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, IN THE WISDOM OF RUSSIA'S PEOPLE TO MAKE THE CHOICES FOR THEIR FUTURE AND THEIR CHILDREN THAT WILL BE WORTHY OF THEIR GREATNESS. I BELIEVE, TOO, THAT AS THEY CONTINUE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS AS CITIZENS OF A DEMOCRACY, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WILL SEE PAST THE IMMEDIATE HARDSHIPS OF A DIFFICULT TRANSITION AND EMBRACE THE PROMISE OF REFORM AND OF AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED WORLD. AND FINALLY, BORIS, I BELIEVE IN THE HISTORIC ROLE THAT YOU PERSONALLY HAVE PLAYED, DEMONSTRATING TRUST IN YOUR PEOPLE TO PUT YOUR COUNTRY ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY THE RIGHT COURSE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.

OUR WORK TOGETHER, MAN TO MAN, EYE TO EYE -- AS YOU SAY IN YOUR LETTER, WITH OUR SLEEVES ROLLED UP -- CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF THE GREAT GRATIFICATIONS OF MY PRESIDENCY. I BELIEVE THAT AS LONG AS RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES WORK TOGETHER, THERE IS NO TASK WE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH, ON BEHALF OF OUR SHARED INTERESTS AND THOSE OF HUMANITY. WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK STILL TO DO. YOU CAN COUNT ON ME IN 1996 TO GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO PRESERVING AND ADVANCING THE PROJECTS TO WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY DEVOTED SO MUCH OF OUR ENERGY.

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HILLARY AND CHELSEA JOIN ME IN CONVEYING OUR WARMEST PERSONAL GREETINGS OF THE SEASON TO YOU AND NAINA, AS WELL AS TO YOUR WHOLE FAMILY.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)



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9215

Unofficial translation

December 26, 1995

Dear Mr. President, dear Bill:

Please, accept my wishes of Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to you and to all American people.

Despite predictions of the sceptics much has been done during the departing year. We have achieved an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty - which is, in my opinion, a cornerstone document of international law. A G-8 has started to function. Basis has been laid, albeit fragile yet, of peace in Bosnia. None of this would have been possible without coordination between Russia and the US.

More than once together with you we had to literally roll up our sleeves, take pens in our hands, and work out acceptable wordings. But this is normal. Too serious are the issues which find themselves at the crossing of the areas of vital interests for Russia and the US. I wouldn't deny it - I view our meetings with you at the 50th Anniversary of Victory Day in Moscow, in Halifax, and in Hyde Park as break-through events of 1995. I am sure, the Americans same as the Russians, accept and support the idea of equal partnership between Russia and the US.

Please render Naina's and mine friendly congratulations and regards to Hillary and Chelsea.

Happiness, good health, success, and good luck to you.

Sincerely,

your Boris.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Уважаемый Господин Президент, дорогой Билл,

Поздравляю тебя и в твоем лице американский народ с праздниками Рождества и Нового года!

Вопреки прогнозам скептиков, за минувший год сделано многое. Мы добились бессрочного и безоговорочного продления Договора о нераспространении, по моему мнению, - важнейшего документа международного права. Начала работать "группа восьми". Заложены основы, хотя пока и хрупкие, мира в Боснии, без координации между Россией и США ничего этого не было бы.

Нам с тобой не раз приходилось в буквальном смысле засучивать рукава, браться за карандаши и отрабатывать приемлемые формулировки. Но это - нормально. Слишком серьезные вопросы оказываются на пересечении зон жизненных интересов России и США. Не стану отрицать - рассматриваю наши с тобой встречи на 50-летие Победы в Москве, в Галифаксе и Гайд-Парке как рубежные события 1995 года. Уверен, что американцы, как и россияне, принимают и поддерживают идею равноправного партнерства между Россией и США.

Прошу тебя передать наши с Наиной дружеские поздравления и пожелания Хиллари и Челси.

Счастья, здоровья , успехов тебе и удачи!

Обнимаю тебя,

твой Борис.

26 декабря 1995 г.

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«26» декабря 1995 г.

№ПР-1871

г. Москва, Кремль

Уважаемый господин Президент, дорогой Билл,

Поздравляю тебя и в твоем лице американский народ с приближающимися праздниками Рождества и Нового года!

Вопреки прогнозам скептиков, за минувший год сделано многое. Мы добились бессрочного и безоговорочного продления Договора о нераспространении, по моему мнению, - важнейшего документа международного права. Начала работать "группа восьми". Заложены основы, хотя пока и хрупкие, мира в Боснии. Без координации между Россией и США ничего этого не было бы.

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Прошу тебя передать наши с Наиной дружеские поздравления и пожелания Хиллари и Челси.

Счастья, здоровья и успехов тебе! И удачи!

Обнимаю тебя, твой Борис

**ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ**
**господину УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ. КЛИНТОНУ**
**ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ**

г. Вашингтон

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Jan 26 Yeltsin letter re
NATO enlargement Cref
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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«26» января 19 96 г.

№ Пр-179

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы поделиться некоторыми соображениями в связи с твоим посланием по проблематике НАТО.

Дискуссия о расширении альянса наложила сильный негативный отпечаток на политическую атмосферу в Европе. Намечаются новые разделительные линии на континенте, ставятся под вопрос перспективы строительства единой Европы. Как в странах НАТО, так и в государствах Центральной и Восточной Европы должны отдавать себе отчет в том, что прием новых членов в альянс неизбежно возродит напряженность в международных отношениях.

Между тем запланированный декабрьской сессией совета НАТО на 1996 год этап интенсивного диалога с претендентами логически предполагает его формальное завершение уже к первой половине 1997 года. Следовательно, именно в этот период Организация Североатлантического договора должна вплотную подойти к практическим решениям - кого и когда принимать в свои члены.

Анализ подготовленного в НАТО исследования о расширении лишь подтверждает наши опасения относительно курса, взятого

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ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
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некоторыми странами-членами альянса. Об этом было прямо сказано находившейся в Москве делегации НАТО. Как его ни читай, там не найдешь убедительной мотивировки причин расширения. Нет и должного анализа перспектив европейской безопасности. Исследование противоречиво, порождает больше вопросов, чем дает ответов.

Тезис о том, что расширение альянса будет способствовать приближению к границам России "зоны стабильности", по меньшей мере сомнителен. Столь же необоснованны и утверждения о политическом вакууме, в котором якобы оказались страны Центральной и Восточной Европы после происшедших на континенте перемен. Тем более непонятна поспешность, с которой в НАТО пытаются принять решение, неоднозначно оцениваемое не только в России, но и в самих странах-участницах альянса.

Думаю, ты согласишься, что в настоящее время ни одно государство Центральной и Восточной Европы не отвечает перечисленным в исследовании критериям для приема в Североатлантический союз. Восточноевропейцы решают сложные долгосрочные и дорогостоящие задачи переходного периода и экономической стабилизации, многие имеют тлеющие этнические и территориальные проблемы. Тем не менее эти государства рассчитывают на скорейшую интеграцию в оборонительный союз, рассматривая это как способ повышения собственного международного престижа. Не исключено, что, находясь под "зонтиком" альянса, они займут более наступательную позицию при решении наболевших проблем с соседями.

В свою очередь НАТО взяла бы на себя обязательства по защите интересов пока еще нестабильных по многим параметрам государств-претендентов, в правящих элитах которых проявляются к тому же антироссийские настроения.

Настораживают военные аспекты: возможность размещения ядерного оружия и иностранных войск на территориях новых членов, проведения учений и переброс вооруженных сил. Как скажется такая военная деятельность на уровне доверия между европейскими государствами и стабильности? Как все это будет восприниматься в сопредельных государствах?

Военно-политические органы альянса в любом случае должны будут сформулировать новую ядерную политику и выработать концепцию использования ядерного оружия для защиты новых членов. Такая концепция не может включать в себя абстрактные неназванные цели, а в качестве противника представлять наркомафию или

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международный терроризм. Можно предположить, на какое государство будет сориентировано планирование широкомасштабных боевых действий с применением ядерного оружия.

Все последние документы НАТО наводят меня на мысль о том, что предполагается как военно-оборонительное, так и политическое расширение организации, претендующей на доминирование в европейских делах.

В процессе расширения НАТО, несмотря на всю его, по твоим, Билл, словам, взвешенность, постепенность и транспарентность, вижу попытки, направленные на оттеснение России на европейскую периферию.

Что же тогда делать России - она несомненно будет вынуждена соответствующим образом реагировать на складывающуюся вокруг нее новую ситуацию.

Убежден: не на расширении надо концентрироваться, а на продвижении совместной работы над моделью общей и всеобъемлющей безопасности для Европы. Нам надо глубже понять интересы и конкретные потребности всех стран в сфере безопасности. Только коллективными усилиями - и это еще раз подтвердил будапештский СМИД ОБСЕ - мы сможем выйти на формирование всеохватывающей системы, способной гарантировать стабильность и укрепить взаимное доверие.

Ключевой частью такой системы призвано стать подлинное партнерство между Россией и НАТО, основанное на реальном учете интересов друг друга.

В наших отношениях со странами НАТО накоплено немало: сокращение стратегических вооружений и обычных вооруженных сил, ликвидация ракет средней и малой дальности, вывод вооруженных сил с иностранных территорий. Установилась практика совместных военных учений, в том числе по программе "Партнерство ради мира".

Это позитивная тенденция и ее надо укреплять. Сотрудничество в рамках "Партнерства ради мира" и в более широком формате между Россией и НАТО предлагаю рассматривать как разумную, приемлемую для всех альтернативу расширению.

С достижением мирных соглашений по Боснии перед Россией и НАТО открывается возможность заложить прецедент практического военного сотрудничества. Переговоры наших министров обороны создали принципиальную основу для российского участия в боснийской операции. Вместе с тем ты знаешь, что у нас были и остаются

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определенные сомнения в отношении акцента на военных аспектах урегулирования. Откровенно скажу - многое будет зависеть от того, как на практике будет реализовываться военная операция. Это покажет, насколько альянс готов к трансформации в инструмент поддержания безопасности и стабильности или он остается военной организацией, опирающейся лишь на силовые методы решения проблем.

В Боснии предстоит пройти серьезное испытание на способность и готовность к сотрудничеству и партнерству. Не исключаю, что это может иметь критическое значение не только для Балкан, но и для всего постконфронтационного устройства.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1996

Dear Boris:

I have reflected on our January 26 conversation and on your letter regarding NATO. You and I have talked about this vital issue before and in great detail, especially last May during my visit to Moscow to commemorate the end of the Second World War. I welcome this opportunity to continue our exchange of views in the same open and candid spirit in which we have addressed it in the past. I have also asked Secretary Christopher to discuss this with Foreign Minister Primakov in Helsinki.

It seems to me that you and I have much to do together. We have already agreed on the importance of advancing the integration of the Euro-Atlantic community to enhance regional stability and to assure an undivided Europe. Now we must continue to adapt existing institutions, including the OSCE, the European Union, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace and NATO's growing relationship with Russia, to achieve this goal.

NATO is a key element in this. It is the essential diplomatic and consultative body through which the United States plays a stabilizing role in Europe -- the Alliance is not just a military organization. Over its forty-five years, NATO has contributed to the security of its members and to Europe as a whole and to changing fundamentally the dangerous dynamic of competitive military relations among the countries of Western Europe, including bitter past adversaries. NATO has been able to play this role in part because it has adapted to changing circumstances. NATO has taken in new members in the past, and it will do so in the future.

Boris, you and I agree on the need for a cooperative security structure in Europe to address the kinds of national and ethnic rivalries that have plagued Europe in the past. The task we face is to find a means to provide all the nations and people of Europe a sense of responsibility for the decisions which affect their national well-being. NATO is one element of a comprehensive structure to achieve this. We have already seen the states of Central Europe, as part of their preparations for possible NATO membership, demonstrating new flexibility in ending

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long-standing disputes. The prospect of NATO membership can also enhance internal stability and help assure the success of reform in Central Europe. This is to Russia's advantage; it is not a threat.

I want to reaffirm what I have told you previously about our approach on NATO enlargement. It will proceed in the steady, measured and transparent fashion you and I have discussed. Over the coming year, we will pursue an intensified exploration of the issues involved with all interested partners. This phase is open-ended; it will run through 1996. No decisions on which countries might join or when they might join have been taken. We will review progress at the December 1996 meeting of the North Atlantic Council and then decide what next steps to take.

I also want to address your concerns about the stationing of nuclear forces on Russia's borders. The NATO Enlargement Study made quite clear that "there is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members" and there is "no need now to change or modify any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or policy." We have repeatedly reviewed this issue with senior Russian officials. Unfortunately, some media reports and some statements by Russian commentators have significantly misstated this issue. I would also note that NATO's military doctrine has changed significantly over the last five years; the numbers of troops, tanks, planes and nuclear weapons have fallen dramatically -- by 90 percent in the case of NATO's nuclear forces.

I am equally dedicated to realizing the other elements of our broad approach: strengthening the Partnership for Peace; widening consultations and cooperation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; and developing further the OSCE security model, as you discussed in your letter. Practical cooperation with Russia is an essential element in this scheme. We can also take pride at the steps which Russia and NATO have already taken. We are creating habits of cooperation -- good habits, which we should strengthen.

Russian military liaison officers have recently taken up their posting inside NATO headquarters. Our diplomatic cooperation in the Contact Group was instrumental in achieving a peace settlement in Bosnia. And now our soldiers in Tuzla are serving side by side to implement that settlement, putting a final end to one of Europe's bloodiest and most senseless conflicts. This cooperation has created a practical model for future efforts between Russian and NATO and Russian and American armed forces.

Boris, a new century is coming. The Russians, Europeans and Americans of the next century deserve to live without fear of the

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recurrence of this century's tragedies. NATO's enlargement, to which I am committed, will help ensure stability for future generations. But enlargement is not a goal in and of itself. It is part of a means to achieve our shared goal of a more stable Europe.

And that goal includes a close, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, to which I am also committed. This is one of NATO's most important objectives. We both share an interest in deepening Russia's integration into European structures. In the end, it is Russia's choice, but I stand ready to build a cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO and would welcome your ideas on how we may ensure the success of this effort.

Integration and cooperation are at the center of America's political strategy in Europe. Exclusion of any country is contrary to our goals and counterproductive to the long-term security needs of the United States, Russia and the other European states. There is no benefit to Europe as a whole if Russia's security is decreased.

Boris, this is a frank and honest account of my perspective. I suspect we will be discussing this issue for some time, but I hope and believe we can continue to address it in the same spirit as we have in the past.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 96FEB 8 P5: February 7, 1996 96FEB 8 P5:44

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-m-3 (5.54)
KBH 12/13/2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Yeltsin Letter on NATO Enlargement

Purpose

To sign a letter to Russian President Yeltsin on NATO enlargement, which Secretary Christopher would hand over to Foreign Minister Primakov when they meet on Friday evening in Helsinki.

Background

As Yeltsin foreshadowed during your January 26 telephone conversation, he has written you on NATO enlargement (Tab B).

The letter recaps a string of oft-repeated Russian assertions: enlargement is causing new dividing lines in Europe; analysis of last fall's NATO study shows no convincing rationale for enlargement; the Central European states do not meet the requirements for membership; Russia is concerned about deployment of NATO nuclear weapons and foreign troops on the territory of new members; and enlargement will push Russia to Europe's periphery. Yeltsin closes by suggesting cooperation in the Partnership for Peace and between NATO and Russia as an alternative to expansion and by noting NATO-Russia cooperation in Bosnia.

It is disappointing that Moscow has not yet come to grips in a more realistic way with enlargement. Domestic politics -- and the antipathy toward expansion across the Russian political spectrum -- undoubtedly require Yeltsin to maintain blanket opposition through the June election. What happens after that will turn in part on the election results, but we should expect enlargement to remain a contentious issue in any case.

The Russians are showing greater sophistication in their efforts to slow enlargement. They have floated the notion that they might accept provision of NATO security guarantees as an alternative to membership. And they are working hard on our Allies; both the French and German foreign ministers got an earful during their visits last month to Moscow, as will Kohl when he travels to Russia on the 18th. The Russians may be having some success;

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/6/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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we will have to bolster the Allies on the need to proceed in the same steady manner that we have pursued to date.

We do not recommend taking on Yeltsin's assertions point-by-point. The response at Tab A instead notes your common understanding on the objective of an undivided Europe; the adaptation of existing European structures, including NATO, to promote that goal; and the creation of new relationships between NATO and Russia to encourage integration. We walk through our rationale in some detail in order to underscore to Yeltsin our desire to work with Russia, not against it.

Primakov has spoken assertively against NATO enlargement, and we see his hand in much of the Yeltsin message. He will undoubtedly raise it with Chris, who can use your response as a point of departure for an exchange on NATO.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Letter to Yeltsin
Tab B Yeltsin's January 26 Message

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Delivered 1/26

0537

Translated from Russian

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

Dear Bill,

I would like to share with you several considerations in connection with your message on NATO issues.

The discussion on enlargement of the alliance has put a strong negative imprint on political atmosphere in Europe. New division lines on the continent are emerging, the prospects of building a unified Europe are being put into question. Both in the NATO countries and in the states of Central and Eastern Europe it has to be understood that admission of new members into the alliance will inevitable give rise to new tension in international relations.

The phase of intensive dialogue with aspirants planned by December, 1996 NAC session, however, logically presupposes its formal completion already by the first half of 1997. Consequently, it is exactly during this period that NATO will have to come really close to practical decisions - who and when to adopt as its members.

Analysis of the study on enlargement prepared in NATO only confirms our apprehensions regarding the course taken by some member states of the alliance. This was said openly to the NATO delegation which visited Moscow. No matter now one reads the study, convincing motives for the reasons for enlargement can not be found there. Neither there is proper analysis of prospects for European security. This study is controversial, it gives rise to more questions than it provides answers.

The notion that the alliance's enlargement would contribute to bringing the "zone of stability" closer to the borders of Russia is dubious to say the least. Equally ungrounded are assertions about a political vacuum in which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have allegedly found themselves after the changes on the continent. Moreover all the more unclear is the hastiness with

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which NATO is trying to adopt a decision which is being ambiguously assessed not only in Russia, but also in the member - countries of the Alliance proper.

I believe you will agree that today none of the states of Central and Eastern Europe meet the requirements listed in the study for joining the Alliance. The East Europeans are busy solving complicated long-term and costly problems of the transitory period and of economic stabilization, many of them have smoldering ethnic and territorial discords. None the less these states are counting on an early integration into defensive alliance viewing this as means of elevating their international prestige. One cannot exclude that having found themselves under the Alliance's "umbrella" they wouldn't assume a more aggressive stand in solving sore issues with their neighbors.

NATO in its turn would have committed itself to defend the interests of yet unstable in many respects states - contenders, whose ruling elites are permeated with anti-Russian sentiments.

One can't help being concerned with the military aspects, a possibility of stationing nuclear weapons and foreign troops on the territories of new members, of holding military exercises and of troops' transfers. What effect will this military activity have on the level of trust between the European states, on stability? How all this will be interpreted in the neighboring countries?

Military-political bodies of the Alliance in any event will be obliged to formulate a new nuclear policy and to work out a concept of deployment of nuclear weapons to protect new members. Such a concept cannot include just abstract unnamed targets or put forward as enemy narcomafia and international terrorism. One can presuppose, what country will serve as a target for planning broad military operations with the use of nuclear weapons.

All the latest NATO documents lead me to think that the organization aspiring to dominate European affairs is to be expanded both in military and defense aspects and politically.

I see in the process of NATO expansion despite all its, as you put it, Bill, balanced, gradual and transparent nature attempts aimed at pushing Russia towards the periphery of Europe.

What is then Russia left to do - surely it will be forced to react appropriately to the new situation taking shape around it.

I am convinced: we should focus not on the expansion, but on advancing joint work on the model of general and comprehensive security for Europe. We must seek a deeper understanding of interests and specific requirements of all countries in the sphere of security. Only through collective efforts - and this has

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been once again proved by the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest - we can attain the formation of a comprehensive system capable of guaranteeing stability and consolidating mutual trust.

Genuine partnership between Russia and NATO based on the real accounting of each other's interests is called to become a key part of such a system.

Our relations with the countries of NATO have seen many things: reduction of strategic weapons and conventional armed forces, destruction of medium - and short-ranged missiles, and withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territories. A practice of joint military exercises has been set up, including those within the framework of "Partnership for Peace".

This is a positive trend and we need to reinforce it. I suggest that we view cooperation within the "Partnership for Peace" and in a wider format between Russia and NATO as a reasonable, acceptable for all alternative to the enlargement.

After peace agreement on Bosnia Russia and NATO are presented with opportunity to set a precedent of practical military cooperation. The talks between our defense ministers have created the overall basis for Russian participation in the operation in Bosnia. At the same time you know that we had and continue to have certain doubts regarding the emphasis on the military aspects of the settlement. I will say frankly - much will depend on the way in which the military operation will be carried out. This will show whether the alliance is ready for transformation into an instrument for maintaining security and stability, or it remains a military organization, which relies only on use of force for solving problems.

In Bosnia a serious test of ability and readiness for cooperation and partnership will have to be passed. I do not exclude that this will have critical importance not only for the Balkans, but for the overall post-confrontational order.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, The Kremlin
January 26, 1996

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Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов
Америки

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы поделиться некоторыми соображениями в связи с твоим посланием по проблематике НАТО.

Дискуссия о расширении альянса наложила сильный негативный отпечаток на политическую атмосферу в Европе. Намечаются новые разделительные линии на континенте, ставятся под вопрос перспективы строительства единой Европы. Как в странах НАТО, так и в государствах Центральной и Восточной Европы должны отдавать себе отчет в том, что прием новых членов в альянс неизбежно возродит напряженность в международных отношениях.

Между тем запланированный декабрьской сессией Совета НАТО на 1996 год этап интенсивного диалога с претендентами логически предполагает его формальное завершение уже к первой половине 1997 года. Следовательно, именно в этот период организация Североатлантического договора должна вплотную подойти к практическим решениям - кого и когда принимать в свои члены.

Анализ подготовленного в НАТО исследования о расширении лишь подтверждает наши опасения относительно курса, взятого некоторыми странами-членами альянса. Об этом прямо сказано на находившейся в Москве делегации НАТО. Как его ни читай, там не найдешь убедительной мотивировки причин расширения. Нет и должного анализа перспектив европейской безопасности. Исследование противоречиво, порождает больше вопросов, чем дает ответов.

Тезис о том, что расширение альянса будет способствовать приближению к границам России "зоны стабильности", по меньшей мере сомнителен. Столь же необоснованны и утверждения о политическом вакууме, в котором якобы оказались страны Центральной и Восточной Европы после происшедших на континенте перемен.

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Тем более непонятна поспешность, с которой в НАТО пытаются принять решение, неоднозначно оцениваемое на только в России, но и в самих странах-участницах альянса.

Думаю, ты согласишься, что в настоящее время ни одно государство Центральной и Восточной Европы не отвечает перечисленным в исследовании критериям для приема в Североатлантический союз. Восточноевропейцы решают сложные долгосрочные и дорогостоящие задачи переходного периода и экономической стабилизации, многие имеют тлеющие этнические и территориальные проблемы Тем не менее эти государства рассчитывают на скорейшую интеграцию в оборонительный союз, рассматривая это как способ повышения собственного международного престижа. Не исключено, что, находясь под "зонтиком" альянса, они займут более наступательную позицию при решении наболевших проблем с соседями.

В свою очередь НАТО взяла бы на себя обязательства по защите интересов пока еще нестабильных по многим параметрам государств-претендетов, в правящих элитах которых проявляются к тому же антироссийские настроения.

Настораживают военные аспекты, возможность размещения ядерного оружия и иностранных войск на территориях новых членов, проведения учений и перебросок вооруженных сил. Как скажется такая военная деятельность на уровне доверия между европейскими государствами и стабильности? Как все это будет восприниматься в сопредельных государствах?

Военно-политические органы альянса в любом случае должны будут сформулировать новую ядерную политику и выработать концепцию использования ядерного оружия для защиты новых членов. Такая концепция не может включать в себя абстрактные неназванные цели, а в качестве противника представлять наркомафию или международный терроризм. Можно предположить, на какое государство будет сориентировано планирование широкомасштабных боевых действий с применением ядерного оружия.

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Все последние документы НАТО наводят меня на мысль о том, что предполагается как военно-оборонительное, так и политическое расширение организации, претендующей на доминирование в европейских делах.

В процессе расширения НАТО, несмотря на всю его, по твоим, Билл, словам, взвешенность, постепенность и транспарентность, вижу попытки, направленные на оттеснение России на европейскую периферию.

Что же тогда делать России - она несомненно будет вынуждена соответствующим образом реагировать на складывающуюся вокруг нее новую ситуацию.

Убежден: не на расширении надо концентрироваться, а на продвижении совместной работы над моделью общей и всеобъемлющей безопасности для Европы. Нам надо глубже понять интересы и конкретные потребности всех стран в сфере безопасности. Только коллективными усилиями - и это еще раз подтвердил Будапештский СМИД ОБСЕ - мы сможем выйти на формирование всеохватывающей системы, способной гарантировать стабильность и укрепить взаимное доверие.

Ключевой частью такой системы призвано стать подлинное партнерство между Россией и НАТО, основанное на реальном учете интересов друг друга.

В наших отношениях со странами НАТО накоплено немало: сокращение стратегических вооружений и обычных вооруженных сил, ликвидация ракет средней и малой дальности, вывод вооруженных сил с иностранных территорий. Установилась практика совместных военных учений, в том числе по программе "Партнерство ради мира"

Это позитивная тенденция и ее надо укреплять. Сотрудничество в рамках "Партнерство ради мира" и в более широком формате между Россией и НАТО предлагаю рассматривать как разумную, приемлемую для всех альтернативу расширению.

С достижением мирных соглашений по Боснии перед Россией и НАТО открывается возможность заложить прецедент практического

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военного сотрудничества. Переговоры наших министров обороны создали принципиальную основу для российского участия в боснийской операции. Вместе с тем ты знаешь, что у нас были и остаются определенные сомнения в отношении акцента на военных аспектах урегулирования. Откровенно скажу - многое будет зависеть от того, как на практике будет реализовываться военная операция. Это покажет, насколько альянс готов к трансформации в инструмент поддержания безопасности и стабильности или он остается военной организацией, опирающейся лишь на силовые методы решения проблем.

В Боснии предстоит пройти серьезное испытание на способность и готовность к сотрудничеству и партнерству. Не исключаю, что это может иметь критическое значение не только для Балкан, но и для всего постконфронтационного устройства.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Москва, Кремль
26 января 1996 года

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recurrence of this ~~country's~~ century's tragedies. NATO's enlargement, to which I am committed, will help ensure stability for future generations. But enlargement is not a goal in and of itself. It is part of a means to achieve our shared goal of a more stable Europe.

And that goal includes a close, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, to which I am also committed. This is one of NATO's most important objectives. We both share an interest in deepening Russia's integration into European structures. In the end, it is Russia's choice, but I stand ready to build a cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO and would welcome your ideas on how we may ensure the success of this effort.

Integration and cooperation are at the center of America's political strategy in Europe. Exclusion of any country is contrary to our goals and counterproductive to the long-term security needs of the United States, Russia and the other European states. There is no benefit to Europe as a whole if Russia's security is decreased.

Boris, this is a frank and honest account of my perspective. I suspect we will be discussing this issue for some time, but I hope and believe we can continue to address it in the same spirit as we have in the past.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

Unofficial translation

Dear Bill:

In connection with the periodic session of the Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation I would like to give my estimate of the current period in our relations.

Our meeting in Hyde Park was of fundamental importance. Not only did we found mutually acceptable solutions to a number of the most complicated issues but we also managed to defend the strategy of partnership which has been fiercely attacked in recent months. Differing views that exist between our two countries on certain concrete problems, albeit most important, must not lead to confrontation on these problems or impede our interaction on other issues. Moreover, it should not undermine the foundation of partnership in our relations.

Furthermore. I am against limiting ourselves to crisis prevention or "good style" maintenance while refraining from major initiatives. The argument to the effect that common Russians or Americans are not prepared to give up the enemy image is false. To accept this logic would be tantamount to giving the trumps to the opposition. That is why I support wholeheartedly your intentions, which you mention in your New Year message, to make the year of 1996 a year of more progress in relations between Russia and the U.S.A.

I am confident that if we act with boldness and responsibility and take into account the legitimate interests of each other it will only reinforce the reforms which I carry out here in Russia an you - in the U.S.A.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

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In the time left before our meeting at the Moscow summit on nuclear safety I suggest specifically focusing on two areas.

Firstly, it is necessary to step up our efforts to stabilize the situation in major conflict regions, particularly in those where we managed to reach progress in recent time. Above all it refers to former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. It is especially important to prevent the Yugoslav settlement from failure. We could guarantee this by sticking to the spirit and letter of the Paris accords and ensuring the equilateral influence on all Bosnian sides.

Secondly, it is necessary to "close" economic debts. In the first place I have in mind the promised granting to Russia of the status of a country with transitional economy and persistent discrimination against us in export controls. I know that your abilities to influence the Congress during the election year are narrow. But these issues, if unresolved, contain the development of our trade and kill the desire of Russian business to seriously "stake" on the U.S. market. It is time to put an end to this abnormal situation.

This letter will be handed over to you by Victor Chernomyrdin. You can give your initial reaction to my proposals through him as well.

I deliberately do not touch upon arms control here. In connection with your January, 19 letter I shall prepare a special comprehensive response.

Yours truly,

Boris Yeltsin

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«25» января 1996 г.

№ Пр-171

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

В связи с проведением очередной сессии Российско-Американской комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству хотел бы передать тебе через Председателя Правительства Российской Федерации В.С.Черномырдина это послание и высказать некоторые соображения, которые, по моему мнению, являются важными для развития наших отношений.

Прежде всего полностью поддерживаю твой настрой сделать 1996 год годом дальнейшего прогресса в отношениях между Россией и США, о чем ты пишешь в своем новогоднем послании.

Договоренности в Гайд-Парке имеют принципиальное значение. Мы не только нашли взаимоприемлемые решения ряда сложных вопросов, но и отстояли стратегию партнерства, которая в последние месяцы нередко подвергалась критике со стороны наших политических оппонентов.

Убежден, если мы будем действовать смело и ответственно, считаться с законными интересами друг друга, это только укрепит курс, который мы проводим в своих странах. Хотел бы в этой связи подтвердить, что и после выборов в Государственную Думу и я, и Правительство России намерены последовательно проводить начатые реформы, делая особый упор на создании законодательной базы для крупных инвестиционных проектов.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Думаю, что для обеспечения устойчивости наших отношений в предстоящий период ключевое значение будет иметь московский саммит по ядерной безопасности, в рамках которого, надеюсь, нам удастся встретиться и обсудить основные проблемы российско-американских отношений. Предлагаю до нашей встречи в Москве на саммите по ядерной безопасности сосредоточить усилия на двух направлениях.

Во-первых, нужно поднажать на стабилизацию положения в основных конфликтных регионах, особенно в тех, где в последнее время удалось достичь прогресса. В первую очередь - в бывшей Югославии и на Ближнем Востоке. Особенно важно не допустить срыва югославского урегулирования. Гарантия против этого - надо держаться духа и буквы парижских соглашений и обеспечить "равновеликое" воздействие на все боснийские стороны.

Во-вторых, необходимо ускорить решение застарелых экономических проблем. Прежде всего имею в виду обещанное предоставление России статуса страны с переходной экономикой, устранение дискриминации России в области торговли, в сфере экспорта высоких технологий, доступ российской продукции на американский рынок.

Я понимаю, что в США есть силы, препятствующие позитивным переменам на этих направлениях наших отношений. Однако нерешенность указанных проблем сдерживает развитие нашей торговли, подрывает желание у российского бизнеса по-серьезному ориентироваться на американский рынок. Такую ситуацию нельзя считать нормальной.

Хотелось бы надеяться, что уже в ходе VI сессии Российско-Американской комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству обозначатся подвижки на этих направлениях, что подтвердит позитивные тенденции в развитии российско-американских отношений и будет способствовать созданию благоприятных условий в ходе президентских выборов как в России, так и в США.

Надеюсь в ближайшее время узнать твое отношение к моим соображениям. Я сознательно не затрагиваю здесь разоруженческую проблематику. В связи с твоим посланием от 19 января с.г. подготовлю специальный развернутый ответ.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 6/21/96 3159

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
May 8, 1996 96 MAY 8 P10 : 55

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(5.66)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To sign a letter to President Yeltsin.

Background

The letter at Tab A follows up on your lunch discussion with President Yeltsin on April 21 about the fate of reforms in Russian history. Your letter suggests that President Yeltsin has the opportunity to complete the reform process begun but never finished by Peter, Catherine and others, and offers him your full support in this endeavor.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Don't sign

Attachment
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/7/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Boris:

Thank you for taking my call last Tuesday. As always, I found our conversation very useful and trust that we will have the chance to talk again in the weeks to come.

I have also been thinking about our conversation over lunch in the Kremlin on April 21. Your depiction of Peter and Catherine as leaders committed to Russia's reform has led me to do some reading on my own about their remarkable contributions to the development of your country. As you noted at our lunch, for all their efforts to bring to the Russian people the benefits of reform, in the end their ambitions were only partly realized.

It occurs to me, Boris, that what your leadership affords Russia is the opportunity to complete the long process of reform begun but never finished by Peter, Catherine and other reformers in Russia's history.

The challenge you face is indeed daunting. As you go about meeting that challenge and completing the reform process in Russia, please know that you will continue to have my full support.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«13» мая 1996 г.

№Пр-921

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы поделиться с тобой взглядами на дальнейшее развитие сотрудничества глав ведущих государств мира.

Прежде всего как сопредседатель саммита в Москве хочу еще раз поблагодарить тебя лично и в целом американскую сторону за конструктивное сотрудничество в подготовке и проведении этого уникального мероприятия. Достигнутые в Москве договоренности стали крупным шагом в деле укрепления ядерной безопасности для всех. Граждане наших стран смогли убедиться, что "восьмерка" способна эффективно работать над решением самых насущных проблем. Важно не дать угаснуть импульсу, данному нами для решения всего комплекса проблем ядерной безопасности, скорее запустить механизм практической реализации московских договоренностей. Мы готовы энергично работать над этим совместно со своими партнерами.

Как и условились в Москве, я изложил в Пекине согласованную нами всеми позицию в пользу скорейшего заключения Договора о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Важно, что в Москве мы не ограничились рамками повестки дня и глубоко обсудили, а, главное, договорились о дальнейшем взаимодействии по такой актуальной проблеме, как Ливан.

Встреча в Москве, по-моему, значительно подняла авторитет "восьмерки" в мире, заметно расширила сферу нашего практического взаимодействия. Это - наш общий капитал, которым нужно разумно распорядиться. И здесь очень важен вопрос об эффективном использовании возможностей, предоставляемых предстоящей встречей в Лионе. Как мы с тобой уже говорили в Москве, нужно, чтобы эта встреча закрепила новое качество нашего сотрудничества. Это дало бы общественности ясный сигнал о том, что мы выходим на новый уровень взаимодействия.

Конечно, трансформация "семерки" в "восьмерку" - дело непростое. Мне отчасти понятны расхождения во взглядах между партнерами насчет темпов и форм дальнейшего сближения России с "клубом семи". Подчеркиваю: мы не "зациклены" здесь на максималистской позиции и не думаем добиваться создания полнокровной "восьмерки" ценой слома существующих координационных механизмов "семи".

С учетом этого предлагаю подумать над следующей схемой лионской встречи.

Во-первых, провести ее в три этапа:

- обсуждение экономических вопросов "семеркой" с оформлением соответствующего коммюнике;

- обсуждение экономических вопросов "восьмеркой" с принятием по рассматривавшимся темам заявления председателя;

- обсуждение политических и глобальных вопросов "восьмеркой" с принятием соответствующей политической декларации.

Во-вторых, надо, наверное, так изменить название встречи, чтобы оно отразило новый этап нашего сотрудничества. Подходящим, по-моему, было бы такое: "Встреча в верхах индустриальных держав".

Считаю, что такая схема полностью отвечает тем соображениям, которые ты мне излагал в Москве, и рассчитывая на твою поддержку. Что не менее важно, особенно для меня - договорившись о взаимоприемлемом варианте проведения Лиона, мы подтвердили бы курс на равноправное сотрудничество как в рамках "восьмерки", так и между Россией и США. Результат сказался бы при решении и других сложных вопросов, скажем, по Боснии или Гаити, или же связанных с разоружением, таких, как СНВ-2 и Договор об ОВСЕ.

Рассчитываю, несмотря на большую занятость в предвыборной кампании, оставаться с тобой в постоянном контакте. Надеюсь, что к встрече "шерпов" в конце мая мы уже сможем определиться по главным параметрам саммита в Лионе.

Послания аналогичного содержания я направляю и другим партнерам - участникам "восьмерки".

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.63)
KBH 12/13/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Letter on Lyons Summit

The Russian Embassy on May 14 delivered a letter from Yeltsin on the Lyons summit (Tab A). While stressing the importance he attaches to what he continues to call a "G-8," Yeltsin also notes that transforming the G-7 into a G-8 is not easy and that he is not fixed on a "maximalist position." He suggests Lyons be structured in three parts:

(1) discussion of economic issues by the G-7 with a communiqué;

(2) discussion of economic issues by the G-8 with a statement by the chairman; and

(3) discussion of political and global issues by the G-8 with a political declaration.

He asks your support and notes that he has sent similar messages to the other G-7 leaders. While our preference is to do away with the second item on Yeltsin's plan, the good news is that he is moving away from insistence on a full G-8 at Lyons, as you suggested to him in Moscow last month. This means we can avoid a showdown -- first within the G-7 and then with Russia -- and ultimate political embarrassment for Yeltsin.

We will meet shortly with NEC, State and Treasury to discuss the best way to respond~~ and steer the Russians to our preferred format for Lyons~~. There will be some further back and forth, but this is soluble.

Attachment
Tab A Incoming Letter from Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/14/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3347

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
96 MAY 16 P2:39
May 16, 1996

INFORMATION

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5-18-96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Letter on Lyons Summit

The Russian Embassy on May 14 delivered a letter from Yeltsin on the Lyons summit (Tab A). While stressing the importance he attaches to what he continues to call a "G-8," Yeltsin also notes that transforming the G-7 into a G-8 is not easy and that he is not fixed on a "maximalist position." He suggests Lyons be structured in three parts:

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.64)
KBH 12/13/2019

Attachment
Tab A Incoming Letter from Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/14/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

5941

Read & Chkhikvishvili 5/14

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
May 13, 1996

Dear Bill:

I would like to share with you some views regarding the prospects for continued cooperation between heads of the leading states of the world.

First of all in my capacity of co-chairman of the Summit in Moscow I would like to once again express my gratitude to you personally and to the American side in general for constructive cooperation in the preparation and holding of this unique activity. The agreements reached in Moscow have become a big step forward in consolidating nuclear security for all. The citizens of our countries got proof that the G-8 can effectively work on solving the most acute problems. It is important not to loose the impulse which we have given to solving the whole complex of nuclear security problems, to start the mechanism of implementation of the Moscow agreements soon. We are eager to work on this together with our partners.

As we had agreed in Moscow, while in Beijing I have laid down the position that we all have coordinated between us in favor of an early reaching of the comprehensive nuclear tests ban Treaty.

It is very important that in Moscow we have not limited ourselves just by the framework of the agenda but have deeply discussed and, what is most important, have agreed on our further interaction on such a burning issue as the Lebanon.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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The summit in Moscow, in my view, has considerably raised the prestige of the G-8 in the world, has broadened the sphere of our practical engagement. This constitutes our joint capital and we must use it wisely. In this respect particular importance goes to the effective way of using the possibilities offered by the forthcoming meeting in Lyon. As we have discussed it with you in Moscow, it is very important that this meeting consolidates the new quality of our cooperation. This would give the public a clear signal that we are approaching a new level of our interaction.

Naturally, transforming G-7 into G-8 is not an easy job. To a certain extent I understand the differences in views between the partners regarding the pace of further closing the distance between Russia and the "G-7 Club". I want to stress it - we are not fixated on a maximalist position and are not inclined to seek creation of a full fledged G-8 at the expense of dismantling the existing coordinating mechanisms of the G-7.

Bearing all this in mind, I propose the following scheme of the Lyon meeting.

In the first place, to hold it in three phases:

- discussion of the economic issues by the G-7 with releasing an appropriate communique;

- discussion of the economic issues by the G-8 with adopting a statement of the Chairman on the discussed issues;

- discussion of the political and global issues by the G-8 with adopting an appropriate political declaration.

In the second place, it is necessary, perhaps, to change the name of the meeting so that it would reflect a new phase of our cooperation. An appropriate one, in my view, would be: "Summit Meeting of Industrialized Nations".

I believe that such a scheme fully corresponds to the considerations you expressed to me in Moscow, and I count on your support. What is non the less important, especially for me, is the fact that through agreeing on a mutually acceptable plan of holding the Lyon meeting we would confirm the course for equal

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cooperation both in the framework of the G-8, and between Russia and the US. The result would be positive also in what regard solving other difficult issues, such as Bosnia or Haiti, or the ones dealing with the disarmament, like the START-2 Treaty and the CFE Treaty.

I hope to be continuously in touch with you despite the amount of work I am doing as part of the electoral campaign. I expect that by the time of the Sherpas' meeting at the end of May we shall already be in a position to determine the principal parameters of the Lyon Summit.

I am sending a similar message to other partners - members of the G-8.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы поделиться с тобой взглядами на дальнейшее развитие сотрудничества глав ведущих государств мира.

Прежде всего как сопредседатель саммита в Москве хочу еще раз поблагодарить тебя лично и в целом американскую сторону за конструктивное сотрудничество в подготовке и проведении этого уникального мероприятия. Достигнутые в Москве договоренности стали крупным шагом в деле укрепления ядерной безопасности для всех. Граждане наших стран смогли убедиться, что "восьмерка" способна эффективно работать над решением самых насущных проблем. Важно не дать угаснуть импульсу, данному нами для решения всего комплекса проблем ядерной безопасности, скорее запустить механизм практической реализации московских договоренностей. Мы готовы энергично работать над этим совместно со своими партнерами.

Как и условились в Москве, я изложил в Пекине согласованную нами всеми позицию в пользу скорейшего заключения Договора о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний.

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Встреча в Москве, по-моему, значительно подняла авторитет "восьмерки" в мире, заметно расширила сферу нашего практического взаимодействия. Это - наш общий капитал, которым нужно разумно распорядиться. И здесь очень важен вопрос об эффективном использовании возможностей, предоставляемых предстоящей встречей в Лионе. Как мы с тобой уже говорили в Москве, нужно, чтобы эта встреча закрепила новое качество нашего сотрудничества. Это дало бы общественности ясный сигнал о том, что мы выходим на новый уровень взаимодействия.

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С учетом этого предлагаю подумать над следующей схемой Лионской встречи.

Во-первых, провести ее в три этапа:

- обсуждение экономических вопросов "семеркой" с оформлением соответствующего коммюнике;

- обсуждение экономических вопросов "восьмеркой" с принятием по рассматривавшимся темам заявления председателя;

- обсуждение политических и глобальных вопросов "восьмеркой" с принятием соответствующей политической декларации.

Во-вторых, надо, наверное, так изменить название встречи, чтобы оно отразило новый этап нашего сотрудничества. Подходящим, по-моему, было бы такое: "Встреча в верхах индустриальных держав".

Считаю, что такая схема полностью отвечает тем соображениям, которые ты мне излагал в Москве, и рассчитываю на твою поддержку. Что не менее важно, особенно для меня - договорившись о взаимоприемлемом варианте проведения Лиона, мы подтвердили бы курс на равноправное сотрудничество как в рамках "восьмерки", так и между Россией и США. Результат сказался бы при решении и других сложных вопросов, скажем, по Боснии или Гаити, или же связанных с разоружением, таких, как СНВ-2 и Договор об ОВСЕ.

Рассчитываю, несмотря на большую занятость в предвыборной кампании, оставаться с тобой в постоянном контакте. Надеюсь, что к встрече "шерпов" в конце мая мы уже сможем определиться по главным параметрам саммита в Лионе.

Послания аналогичного содержания я направляю и другим партнерам - участникам "восьмерки".

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль
13 мая 1996 года

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Log # 3657

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To R Date 5/28/96

I find this letter bizarre. In the final two weeks of an all-consuming fight for his/Russia's life, Yeltsin gets a "business as usual" letter from POTUS that deals in detail with three of "our" issues (albeit important) - NATO/CFE/ABM; doesn't mention the election; and totally ignores the only issue Yeltsin cares about right now -- [help. V.S.: I cannot imagine Yeltsin

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

reacting well to this letter, admonishing him that "now is the time to maximize harmony between us." Do we totally believe Yeltsin will deal personally with these issues in the next two weeks? If so, then the letter (a) has to acknowledge that the President knows there is an election going on (b) respond in some fashion to Yeltsin's plea (c) perhaps be paved back (is the ABM issue as time/sensitive as CFE?)

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3657

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5.29.96

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.68)
KBH 12/13/2019

May 29, 1996

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tony Lake seeks your approval of the attached message to President Yeltsin. The message covers the following topics:

- congratulations on the Chechnya cease-fire;
- Yeltsin's request for financial assistance;
- your expectations for the June 3-4 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin;
- the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) issue under discussion at the Review Conference in Vienna; and
- confirmation of your April 21 promise on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) testing

**The full message is at Tab A.**

____ Approve ____ Disapprove ____ Discuss

Phil Caplan
Phil

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

5657

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ SSN: 0694 MSGID: M2247511

OAASZYUW RHEHAAA0694 1510140-SSSS--RUXXWHX RUEHMO RUEHC.

ZNY SSSSS

O **300141Z** MAY 96 ZFF1 ZFF4

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.69)
KBH 12/17/2019

FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
QQQQ

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I AM FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY YOUR CAMPAIGN AS IT ENTERS ITS FINAL WEEKS AND KNOW THIS IS A BUSY AND DECISIVE PERIOD FOR


YOU. I HESITATE TO BOTHER YOU, BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES THAT ARE TIME-SENSITIVE.

FIRST, HOWEVER, LET ME CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE IN CHECHNYA. THAT IS A VERY POSITIVE STEP, WHICH OPENS THE PATH TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE REMAIN READY TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT.

ON THE FINANCIAL CONCERNS THAT YOU RAISED ON MAY 7, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND I ARE FULLY ENGAGED. THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED TO PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT CONTACT THE IMF TO PRESENT ITS CONCERNS. AS WE SEE IT, THE KEY ISSUE IS TO HELP RUSSIA MEET CRITICAL PAYMENTS WHILE STAYING ON A COURSE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY. WE WILL CONTACT THE IMF TO URGE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY.

WE EXCHANGED MESSAGES EARLIER THIS YEAR ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND I OFFERED IN MOSCOW TO PREVIEW NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BERLIN TO ENSURE THERE

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ARE NO SURPRISES. THE BERLIN MEETING WILL FOCUS FIRST ON NATO'S INTERNAL ADAPTATION TO MEET THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD; THE PURPOSE OF THIS ADAPTATION IS TO IMPROVE THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE KINDS OF REGIONAL CRISES THAT THE FUTURE IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE, AS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND TO INCREASE THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO IN THESE NEW MISSIONS. SECOND, NATO MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS THE IFOR MISSION IN BOSNIA, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A SUCCESS STORY FOR THE ALLIANCE AND FOR NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION. THIRD, NATO MINISTERS WILL ADDRESS NATO OUTREACH EFFORTS SUCH AS THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PERVIOUS PLANNING, THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT INTEND TO ANNOUNCE ANY NEW STEPS ON ENLARGEMENT IN BERLIN. THAT PROCESS IS CONTINUING ALONG THE LINES THAT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, AND THE ALLIANCE IS CONDUCTING INTENSIFIED DIALOGUES WITH THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP. NATO MINISTERS WILL REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER AND


THEN CONSIDER WHAT NEXT STEPS TO TAKE.

OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRIEF YOUR OFFICIALS IN DETAIL ON WHAT WE EXPECT TO COME OUT OF THE BERLIN MEETING.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV WILL MEET IN BERLIN WITH THE SIXTEEN NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THAT HE WILL TAKE PART AS WELL IN A CONTACT GROUP SESSION AND MEET SEPARATELY WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER. THESE MEETINGS WILL PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON A RANGE OF VITAL ISSUES AND TO REAFFIRM THE STRENGTH OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

YOU AND I HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT TO RESOLVING THE CFE FLANK ISSUE, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR MAY 28 ORAL MESSAGE. WE HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS IN AGREEING ON A NEW MAP AND IN FINDING FLEXIBILITY THAT WILL ALLOW RUSSIA TO DEPLOY SUBSTANTIALLY MORE EQUIPMENT IN THE FLANK REGION. YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT THAT WE NEED TO REACH A SINGLE


UNDERSTANDING ON THE CFE TREATY THAT UNITES GEOGRAPHY AND NUMBERS IN A WAY SATISFYING ALL 30 TREATY PARTNERS. OUR NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON MAY 29 ON A SOLUTION TO WORK WITH THE OTHER CFE PARTIES IN VIENNA, AND I HAVE APPROVED THAT SOLUTION. LET'S INSTRUCT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY ON THAT BASIS, RATHER THAN WITH A JOINT APPEAL THAT COULD TAKE TIME TO FINALIZE. WE STILL HAVE A CHANCE TO SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER CFE

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PARTIES TO A RESOLUTION OF THE FLANK ISSUE BY THE END OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY.

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FINALLY, OUR DELEGATIONS TO THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) HAVE RETURNED TO GENEVA TO CONCLUDE A PART I AGREEMENT ON DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABM AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN JUNE, AS WE AGREED IN MOSCOW. YOU AND I DISCUSSED YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT OUR HIGHER-VELOCITY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AT THAT TIME. AS I SAID THEN, WHILE WE CAN AGREE NOT TO TEST SUCH SYSTEMS AGAINST STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE TARGETS, WE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER FLIGHT TEST LIMITS. BUT I CAN AGAIN TELL YOU THAT OUR MILITARY


HAS NO PLANS NOW TO CONDUCT A FLIGHT TEST OF ANY SUCH SYSTEM AGAINST ANY TARGET DURING THE NEXT THREE YEARS, AND I WILL LET YOU KNOW IF THESE PLANS CHANGE. IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION ABOUT THIS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW, SINCE I DO NOT BELIEVE THE SCC IS THE PLACE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION.

.

BORIS, I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO GO THROUGH THESE QUESTIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LYONS, WHERE WE WILL CONTINUE OUR PERSONAL PARTNERSHIP IN BUILDING A SAFER, BETTER WORLD FOR OUR PEOPLES. MEANWHILE, I WISH YOU WELL, MY FRIEND.

.

SINCERELY, BILL

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BT
#0694

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1996

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
96 MAY 29 P2:37
5.29.96

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.70)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin previewing the Berlin NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting and discussing the CFE flank and ABM/TMD demarcation issues. Your message should go as soon as possible; we need Yeltsin's help to close the flank issue.

Background

Yeltsin is hard on the campaign trail, and this is an awkward time to bother him, but we have several time-sensitive issues.

***Chechnya.*** Yeltsin and Chechen rebel leader Yandarbiyev agreed to a cease-fire on May 27, and Yeltsin visited Chechnya on May 28. Your letter opens by congratulating Yeltsin on the cease-fire.

***Financial Assistance.*** On Yeltsin's request for financial assistance, Larry Summers had good talks in Moscow on May 22, including with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Ambassador Pickering believes the Russians understand that we are doing what we can but that our options are strictly limited. The next step is for the Russians to engage the IMF. The Vice President sent Chernomyrdin a message on May 24 noting that we are urging the IMF to be as flexible as possible. Your message reiterates that point (until we have an assessment of the talks between the Russians and IMF, we cannot offer specific suggestions).

***NAC Preview.*** You previewed for Yeltsin in a late November message the December 1995 NAC and walked him through the enlargement process again in a February message. These were useful in keeping Russian anxieties in check while affirming our commitment to enlargement. During your April 21 Moscow meeting, you offered to be in touch prior to the June 3-4 Berlin NAC. Your message outlines our expectations for the meeting, making clear that while NATO Ministers will note that enlargement is proceeding, they will take no new steps in Berlin.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/28/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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***CFE Flank Issue.*** The Russians have incorporated into their position the geography that you and Yeltsin agreed on, but we have had a difficult back-and-forth discussion on numbers. Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov and Pickering have discussed what we hope will provide a solution that can be agreed to by all CFE parties before the Review Conference closes on Friday, though time is very short. We have sent Pickering final instructions to try to close agreement with the Russians.

Mamedov also today gave Pickering an oral message from Yeltsin on CFE (Tab B). It outlines the Russian view and suggests a bilateral appeal by the two of you to the Conference. We think that is a bad idea: it would be seen by smaller CFE states as pressure, and in any event, there is no time to negotiate such an appeal when the hard work must begin now among all CFE parties.

***ABM/TMD Demarcation.*** At your April 21 meeting, you told Yeltsin the U.S. military has no plans now to conduct a flight test of a higher-velocity TMD system against any target during the next three years. Your message puts that statement on paper, which is key to reaching a Part I demarcation agreement at the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B May 28 Oral Yeltsin Message on CFE



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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.71)
KBH 12/13/2019



AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I AM FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY YOUR CAMPAIGN AS IT ENTERS ITS FINAL WEEKS AND KNOW THIS IS A BUSY AND DECISIVE PERIOD FOR YOU. I HESITATE TO BOTHER YOU, BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES THAT ARE TIME-SENSITIVE.

FIRST, HOWEVER, LET ME CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE IN CHECHNYA. THAT IS A VERY POSITIVE STEP, WHICH OPENS THE PATH TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE REMAIN READY TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT.

ON THE FINANCIAL CONCERNS THAT YOU RAISED ON MAY 7, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND I ARE FULLY ENGAGED. THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED TO PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT CONTACT THE IMF TO PRESENT ITS CONCERNS. AS WE SEE IT, THE KEY ISSUE IS TO HELP RUSSIA MEET CRITICAL PAYMENTS WHILE STAYING ON A COURSE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY. WE WILL CONTACT THE IMF TO URGE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY.

WE EXCHANGED MESSAGES EARLIER THIS YEAR ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND I OFFERED IN MOSCOW TO PREVIEW NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BERLIN TO ENSURE THERE ARE NO SURPRISES. THE BERLIN MEETING WILL FOCUS FIRST ON NATO'S INTERNAL ADAPTATION TO MEET THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD; THE PURPOSE OF THIS ADAPTATION IS TO IMPROVE THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE KINDS OF REGIONAL CRISES THAT THE FUTURE IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE, AS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND TO INCREASE THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO IN THESE NEW MISSIONS. SECOND, NATO MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS THE IFOR MISSION IN BOSNIA, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A SUCCESS STORY FOR THE ALLIANCE AND FOR NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION. THIRD, NATO MINISTERS WILL ADDRESS NATO OUTREACH EFFORTS SUCH AS THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PERVIOUS PLANNING, THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT INTEND TO ANNOUNCE ANY NEW STEPS ON ENLARGEMENT IN BERLIN. THAT PROCESS IS CONTINUING ALONG THE LINES THAT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, AND THE ALLIANCE IS CONDUCTING INTENSIFIED DIALOGUES WITH THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP. NATO MINISTERS WILL REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER AND THEN CONSIDER WHAT NEXT STEPS TO TAKE.


Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/28/06

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OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRIEF YOUR OFFICIALS IN DETAIL ON WHAT WE EXPECT TO COME OUT OF THE BERLIN MEETING.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV WILL MEET IN BERLIN WITH THE SIXTEEN NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THAT HE WILL TAKE PART AS WELL IN A CONTACT GROUP SESSION AND MEET SEPARATELY WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER. THESE MEETINGS WILL PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON A RANGE OF VITAL ISSUES AND TO REAFFIRM THE STRENGTH OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

YOU AND I HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT TO RESOLVING THE CFE FLANK ISSUE, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR MAY 28 ORAL MESSAGE. WE HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS IN AGREEING ON A NEW MAP AND IN FINDING FLEXIBILITY THAT WILL ALLOW RUSSIA TO DEPLOY SUBSTANTIALLY MORE EQUIPMENT IN THE FLANK REGION. YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT THAT WE NEED TO REACH A SINGLE UNDERSTANDING ON THE CFE TREATY THAT UNITES GEOGRAPHY AND NUMBERS IN A WAY SATISFYING ALL 30 TREATY PARTNERS. OUR NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON MAY 29 ON A SOLUTION TO WORK WITH THE OTHER CFE PARTIES IN VIENNA, AND I HAVE APPROVED THAT SOLUTION. LET'S INSTRUCT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY ON THAT BASIS, RATHER THAN WITH A JOINT APPEAL THAT COULD TAKE TIME TO FINALIZE. WE STILL HAVE A CHANCE TO SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER CFE PARTIES TO A RESOLUTION OF THE FLANK ISSUE BY THE END OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY.

FINALLY, OUR DELEGATIONS TO THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) HAVE RETURNED TO GENEVA TO CONCLUDE A PART I AGREEMENT ON DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABM AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN JUNE, AS WE AGREED IN MOSCOW. YOU AND I DISCUSSED YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT OUR HIGHER-VELOCITY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AT THAT TIME. AS I SAID THEN, WHILE WE CAN AGREE NOT TO TEST SUCH SYSTEMS AGAINST STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE TARGETS, WE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER FLIGHT TEST LIMITS. BUT I CAN AGAIN TELL YOU THAT OUR MILITARY HAS NO PLANS NOW TO CONDUCT A FLIGHT TEST OF ANY SUCH SYSTEM AGAINST ANY TARGET DURING THE NEXT THREE YEARS, AND I WILL LET YOU KNOW IF THESE PLANS CHANGE. IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION ABOUT THIS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW, SINCE I DO NOT BELIEVE THE SCC IS THE PLACE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION.

BORIS, I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO GO THROUGH THESE QUESTIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LYONS, WHERE WE WILL CONTINUE OUR PERSONAL PARTNERSHIP IN BUILDING A SAFER, BETTER WORLD FOR OUR PEOPLES. MEANWHILE, I WISH YOU WELL, MY FRIEND.

SINCERELY, BILL

(END TEXT)



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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3657
Re-do

May 28, 1996



DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.72)
KBH 12/13/2019

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER SP for

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin

The memorandum to the President at Tab I proposes a message to Yeltsin that addresses the upcoming NATO ministerial, CFE and ABM/TMD demarcation, and notes that the President and Vice President are engaged on the financial concerns raised by Yeltsin. The message should go as soon as possible.

Concurrence by: SP for Alexander Vershbow, Dan Fried, Bob Bell, Carlos Pascual

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B May 28 Oral Yeltsin Message on CFE

OK; see letter revisions
R

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/28/06

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565+

~~SECRET~~

MAY 28 ORAL MESSAGE FROM YELTSIN TO POTUS REGARDING CFE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-3 [5.73]
KBH 12/13/2019




BEGIN TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE.

DEAR BILL,

IN MOSCOW, WE PAID SERIOUS ATTENTION TO RESOLUTION OF THE CFE FLANK ISSUE, AS WELL AS OUR

~~SECRET~~

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FURTHER EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE TREATY AND ADAPT IT TO CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS IN EUROPE. WE AGREED TO ACT JOINTLY ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON VIEW OF AN AGREED OUTLINE OF A SOLUTION.

OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TO DATE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO COMPLETELY TRANSFORM OUR UNDERSTANDING INTO SPECIFIC, AGREED LANGUAGE. AT THE CFE CONFERENCE IN VIENNA A FINAL AGREEMENT ON A COMPROMISE PACKAGE SOLUTION TO THE FLANK ISSUE IS SLIPPING AWAY. MOREOVER, THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE BEGUN TO LINK THE ISSUE OF BEGINNING THE MODERNIZATION OF THE TREATY WITH A SOLUTION TO THE FLANK ISSUE. THE POSITION OF THE U.S. AND TURKEY ALSO WAS A SURPRISE TO US WHEN, AT THE LAST MOMENT, A COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF REDUCING CONVENTIONAL ARMS EAST OF THE URALS, WHICH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WITH DIFFICULTY, WAS ESSENTIALLY BLOCKED WITHOUT PRESENTING ANY SPECIFIC REASONS.

I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT AT THIS CRITICAL POINT IN TIME IT IS NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THE POLITICAL WILL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE WORK BY ALL COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE TREATY, TO DEMONSTRATE HEALTHY PRAGMATISM AND READINESS TO CONSIDER THE INTERESTS OF OTHER PARTIES TO THE FULLEST.

ON THE FLANKS. WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING OUR POSITIONS SUBSTANTIALLY CLOSER. WE OBTAINED A SOLUTION TO THE FLANK "GEOGRAPHY," WHERE THE RUSSIAN SIDE EXPRESSED THE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS TO COMPROMISE. WE ARE NOW CLOSE ON THE "NUMBERS" FOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE FLANKS OF EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY.

IT SEEMS THAT THE MAIN THING LEFT TO DO IS TO AGREE ON A SINGLE UNDERSTANDING ON CFE TREATY "FLEXIBILITY" IN ORDER TO UNITE "GEOGRAPHY" AND "NUMBERS" IN A WAY THAT WOULD SATISFY EVERYONE, AND ENSURE THE FULL UTILIZATION OF APPROPRIATE TREATY POSSIBILITIES, IN PARTICULAR REALLOCATION OF THE CURRENT TASHKENT QUOTAS AND TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS.

I THINK THAT IT IS NECESSARY QUICKLY TO INSTRUCT OUR DELEGATIONS TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF KEY UNDERSTANDINGS ALREADY ACHIEVED, ACHIEVING THE QUICKEST POSSIBLE RESOLUTION OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE FLANKS WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF OUR UNDERSTANDING IN MOSCOW. QUANTITATIVELY,



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WITHIN THREE YEARS RUSSIA WILL REACH THE LEVEL OF 3800 ACV'S IN THE OLD FLANK ZONE. DURING THIS THREE-YEAR PERIOD RUSSIA WILL NOT EXCEED ITS CURRENT OVERALL LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS IN THIS ZONE. WE WILL AGREE THAT ALL TREATY FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE UTILIZED. THE U.S. WILL COOPERATE IN THIS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER OF QUOTAS FOR ACV'S, TANKS AND ARTILLERY FROM OUR NEIGHBORS ON THE FLANKS, AS WELL AS OTHER POSSIBILITIES ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY. (IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE, REACHING THE AGREED LEVELS OF CORRESPONDING EQUIPMENT IN THE FLANKS WOULD, OBJECTIVELY, BE DOU
BTFUL.) WE ARE
PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE IDEA THAT BEFORE THE END OF THE THREE-YEAR PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS IN THE FLANKS THERE WOULD BE AN UNDERSTANDING IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TREATY MODERNIZATION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING ALL WEAPONS WHICH WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD IN SO-CALLED DESIGNATED PERMANENT STORAGE SITES (DPSS), TO REGULAR UNITS. (IF, IN THAT TIME PERIOD, SUCH A SOLUTION IS NOT AGREED, WE WOULD BE FORCED TO UTILIZE THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY WHICH PERMIT PLACING THE APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT IN SO-CALLED MILITARY STORAGE SITES.) NATURALLY, WE WOULD BE PREPARED FOR FULL TRANSPARENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE FLANK ZONES. ON THIS BASIS WE WOULD QUICKLY REACH A FINAL SOLUTION, WORKING OUT THE NECESSARY DETAILS ON THE EXPERT LEVEL.

I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US, THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.,TO APPEAL WITH A JOINT MESSAGE TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CURRENT CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA, IN WHICH WE WOULD CALL FOR THE RAPID SOLUTION OF THE FLANK PROBLEM, AND ABOVE ALL FOR THE COOPERATION OF ALL STATES AND FOR FULL UTILIZATION OF ALL APPROPRIATE TREATY FLEXIBILITY. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD CALL UPON THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE TO FIX IN THEIR DECISIONS AN AGREEMENT ON BEGINNING PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON STRENGTHENING THE TREATY AND ADAPTING IT TO CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS. THIS WOULD ALSO HELP OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO BOTH OF US.

I ATTACH A POSSIBLE DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE CONFERENCE.

I AWAIT YOUR EARLY REACTION.

END TEXT



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7. ~~(S)~~ FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT PROVIDED ALONG WITH THE YELTSIN ORAL MESSAGE.

BEGIN TEXT.

APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RUSSIA AND THE U.S. TO THE CONFERENCE REVIEWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

DEAR PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE.

RUSSIA AND THE U.S. CONSIDER THAT THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, WHOSE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF ACTIVITY YOU ARE REVIEWING AT THIS FORUM IN VIENNA, IS ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. IN THE COURSE OF IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY IMPRESSIVE RESULTS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. MORE THAN 50,000 PIECES OF WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN REDUCED, AND A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE MILITARY SPHERE.

WE CONFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS OF THE TREATY, AS LAID OUT IN ITS PREAMBLE, AND WE WELCOME THE INTENTION OF ALL STATES TO WORK IN THE DIRECTION OF FULLY IMPLEMENTING IT.

AT THE SAME TIME AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF CHANGED POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON THE CONTINENT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SOLUTIONS BE FOUND WHICH WILL ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY FUNCTIONING OF THE TREATY, SO THAT IT CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL-MILITARY STABILITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, INTO THE 21ST CENTURY.

WE ARE PREPARED FOR MUTUAL FLEXIBILITY IN RESOLVING THE FLANK ISSUE, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF APPROPRIATE STATES IN THE FLANK ZONE. WE BELIEVE THAT A QUICK SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH THE PERMITTED QUANTITIES OF ARMAMENTS IN THESE ZONES IS IMPORTANT, ALONG WITH FULL UTILIZATION TO THESE ENDS OF ALL FLEXIBILITY AND POSSIBILITIES FOUND IN THE TREATY. WE APPEAL FOR THE FULL COOPERATION OF ALL IN THIS, ABOVE ALL THE STATES IN THE FLANKS.

WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT A DECISION BE TAKEN AT THE CONFERENCE ON BEGINNING PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF MODERNIZING THE TREATY. INTERIM RESULTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AT



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THE TIME OF THE LISBON SUMMIT MEETING.

THE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS.

B.N. YELTSIN W. CLINTON

END TEXT.

8. ~~(S)~~ AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT THE MESSAGE SEEMS IN GENERAL IN KEEPING WITH THE AD REFERENDUM PACKAGE, BUT THAT IF THE PACKAGE IS ACCEPTED, THE JOINT STATEMENT WOULD NEED

APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION.

9. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: MAMEDOV, JUST BACK FROM PARIS, SEEMED BOTH MORE UPBEAT AND MORE ENGAGED ON CFE THAN AT THE LAST MEETING. SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE TWO-HOUR SESSION HE OVERRULED KISLYAK'S POSITION ON KEY ISSUES. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT SECURING INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT IN MOSCOW WOULD REQUIRE ALL DAY MAY 28. SINCE MAMEDOV IS DEPARTING FOR VIENNA EARLY ON MAY 29, FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LIKELY HAVE TO TAKE PLACE WITH HIM THERE. PICKERING
BT
#4431

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>4431
<^TOR>960528090058 M2244336

FROM:
SITREPRT



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (S.74)
KBH 12/13/2019



AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I ~~HAVE FOLLOWED~~ AM FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY YOUR CAMPAIGN AS IT ENTERS ITS FINAL WEEKS AND KNOW THIS IS A BUSY AND DECISIVE PERIOD FOR YOU. I HESITATE TO BOTHER YOU, BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES THAT ARE TIME-SENSITIVE.

FIRST, HOWEVER, LET ME CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE IN CHECHNYA. THAT IS A VERY POSITIVE STEP, WHICH OPENS THE PATH TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE REMAIN READY TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT.

ON THE FINANCIAL CONCERNS THAT YOU RAISED ON MAY 7, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND I ARE FULLY ENGAGED. THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED TO PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT CONTACT THE IMF TO PRESENT ITS CONCERNS. AS WE SEE IT, THE KEY ISSUE IS TO HELP RUSSIA MEET CRITICAL PAYMENTS WHILE STAYING ON A COURSE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY. WE WILL CONTACT THE IMF TO URGE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY.

WE EXCHANGED MESSAGES EARLIER THIS YEAR ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND I OFFERED IN MOSCOW TO PREVIEW NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BERLIN TO ENSURE THERE ARE NO SURPRISES. THE BERLIN MEETING WILL FOCUS FIRST ON NATO'S INTERNAL ADAPTATION TO MEET THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD; THE PURPOSE OF THIS ADAPTATION IS TO IMPROVE THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE KINDS OF REGIONAL CRISES THAT THE FUTURE IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE, AS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND TO INCREASE THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO IN THESE NEW MISSIONS. SECOND, NATO MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS THE IFOR MISSION IN BOSNIA, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A SUCCESS STORY FOR THE ALLIANCE AND FOR NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION. THIRD, NATO MINISTERS WILL ADDRESS NATO OUTREACH EFFORTS SUCH AS THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PREVIOUS PLANNING, ~~AS WE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW,~~ THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT INTEND TO ANNOUNCE ANY NEW STEPS ON ENLARGEMENT IN BERLIN. THAT PROCESS IS CONTINUING ALONG THE LINES THAT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, AND THE ALLIANCE IS CONDUCTING INTENSIFIED DIALOGUES WITH THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP. NATO MINISTERS WILL REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER AND ONLY THEN CONSIDER WHAT NEXT STEPS TO TAKE.

OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRIEF YOUR OFFICIALS IN DETAIL ON WHAT WE EXPECT TO COME OUT OF THE BERLIN MEETING.



Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/28/06

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I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV WILL MEET IN BERLIN WITH THE SIXTEEN NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THAT HE WILL TAKE PART AS WELL IN A CONTACT GROUP SESSION AND MEET SEPARATELY WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER. THESE MEETINGS WILL PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON A RANGE OF VITAL ISSUES AND TO REAFFIRM THE STRENGTH OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

YOU AND I HAVE DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT TO RESOLVING THE CFE FLANK ISSUE, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR MAY 28 ORAL MESSAGE. WE HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS IN AGREEING ON A NEW MAP AND IN FINDING FLEXIBILITY THAT WILL ALLOW RUSSIA TO DEPLOY SUBSTANTIALLY MORE EQUIPMENT IN THE FLANK REGION. YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT THAT WE NEED TO REACH A SINGLE UNDERSTANDING ON THE CFE TREATY THAT UNITES GEOGRAPHY AND NUMBERS IN A WAY SATISFYING ALL 30 TREATY PARTNERS. AMBASSADOR PICKERING HAS MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS TO DEPUTY MINISTER MAMEDOV IN THIS REGARD, WHICH SHOULD PROVIDE A SOLUTION THAT WE CAN ~~WORK~~ WITH THE OTHER CFE PARTIES IN VIENNA. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ~~BEST~~ DONE BY OUR DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA -- ~~AND OUR EMBASSIES IN~~ CAPITALS -- THAN THROUGH A JOINT U.S.-RUSSIA ~~APPEAL~~. I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY THE END OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE ON MAY 31 AND HOPE YOU WILL GIVE YOUR NEGOTIATORS APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS.

FINALLY, OUR DELEGATIONS TO THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) HAVE RETURNED TO GENEVA TO CONCLUDE A PART I AGREEMENT ON DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABM AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN JUNE, AS WE AGREED IN MOSCOW. YOU AND I DISCUSSED YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT OUR HIGHER-VELOCITY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AT THAT TIME. AS I SAID THEN, WHILE WE CAN AGREE NOT TO TEST SUCH SYSTEMS AGAINST STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE TARGETS, WE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER FLIGHT TEST LIMITS. BUT I CAN AGAIN TELL YOU THAT OUR MILITARY HAS NO PLANS NOW TO CONDUCT A FLIGHT TEST OF ANY SUCH SYSTEM AGAINST ANY TARGET DURING THE NEXT THREE YEARS, AND I WILL LET YOU KNOW IF THESE PLANS CHANGE. IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION ABOUT THIS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW, SINCE I DO NOT BELIEVE THE SCC IS THE PLACE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION.

BORIS, I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO GO THROUGH THESE QUESTIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LYONS, WHERE WE WILL CONTINUE OUR PERSONAL PARTNERSHIP IN BUILDING A SAFER, BETTER WORLD FOR OUR PEOPLES. MEANWHILE, I WISH YOU WELL, MY FRIEND.

SINCERELY, BILL

(END TEXT)



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3657

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.75)
KBH 12/13/2019

May 28, 1996

[redacted]

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER SP for

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin

→ Steve P

(P)

(Magers)

The memorandum to the President at Tab I proposes a message to Yeltsin that addresses the upcoming NATO ministerial, CFE and ABM/TMD demarcation. The message should go as soon as possible.

On reflection following this morning's senior directors meeting, we believe it better that the letter not address Yeltsin's request for financial assistance. We have nothing substantive to say beyond the Vice President's Friday message to Chernomyrdin. We have noted this in the memo to the President.

Concurrence by: (SP for Alexander Vershbow, Dan Fried, Bob Bell, Carlos Pascual)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Message to Yeltsin
Tab B May 28 Oral Yeltsin Message on CFE

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/28/06

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National Security Council
The White House

TELCON 3163
5:15PM

3657

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Would like to have Sent out ASAP

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

⇨ Steve P

(Magnes)

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DECLASSIFIED
UNDER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.75)
KBH 12/13/2019

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/28/06

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National Security Council
The White House

Log # 3657

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____

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## ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To R Date 5/28/96

I find this letter bizarre. In the final two weeks of an all-consuming fight for his/Russia's life, Yeltsin gets a "business as usual" letter from POTUS that deals in detail with three of "our" issues (albeit important) - NATO/CFE/ABM; doesn't mention the election; and totally ignores the only issue Yeltsin cares about right now -- [help. V.S.

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

I cannot imagine Yeltsin reacting well to this letter, admonishing him to that "now is the time for maximizing harmony between us." Do we really believe Yeltsin will deal personally with these issues in the next two weeks? If so, then the letter (a) has to acknowledge that the President knows there is an election going on (b) respond in some fashion to Yeltsin's plea (c) perhaps be pared back (is the ABM issue as time sensitive as CFE?)

| | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE |
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| Lake | 3 | |
| Situation Room | | |
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COMMENTS: Would like to Sent out ASAP

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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~~SECRET~~

3971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-9-96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON 96 JUN 8 P3:59

June 8, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.77)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To approve a message (Tab A) to President Yeltsin on Lyon, Russia's financial concerns, START II and democracy in Russia.

Background

***On the campaign trail.*** Your message will likely reach Yeltsin somewhere on the campaign trail. He is traveling June 8-11 before marking Russia's National Day in Moscow. He will then visit St. Petersburg and return to Yekaterinburg on June 14, where he launched his campaign four months ago.

***Lyon.*** The sherpas have agreed to a three-phase format for Lyon: discussion of economic issues at seven, followed by discussion of global issues (e.g., environment, terrorism/crime) at eight and of foreign policy issues at eight. The Russians are comfortable with this structure, which builds on your discussion with Yeltsin in Moscow and his May 13 letter to you (Tab B). Chirac, as chair of the G-7, confirmed this format to Yeltsin on June 4.

***Russia's financial concerns.*** We have gone a long way toward facilitating Russia's dialogue with the IMF. Bob Rubin and Larry Summers met with Russia's Finance Minister and Central Bank Deputy Governor; they have also contacted IMF management to urge flexibility. (The IMF has already been very forward-leaning to keep Russia in compliance with its program.)

The IMF told the Russians why an increase in the new $10.2 billion program or a shift from monthly to quarterly disbursements would not be possible. However, the IMF did not rule out a Currency Stabilization Fund (CSF). A CSF could be as large as $6 billion; in an emergency, it could be set up quickly. A CSF is not budget support, but it could give the Russians flexibility to spend their own money while reducing the risk of financial instability. Such a fund could, however, have downsides. Its



cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

sudden introduction could create the perception that a financial crisis is imminent and promote the crash it is intended to avert.

We are encouraging the IMF to put in place the groundwork for a CSF so that we could move quickly to get the concurrence of the Allies if the ruble comes under pressure. Treasury has contacted IMF management; they are formulating their position. We have not contacted the other G-7 for fear of a leak, but we can expect some resistance. We also advise against telling Yeltsin about the CSF, as it might trigger an unchecked spending spree.

***START II.*** Yeltsin wrote you on June 3 (Tab C) to propose that the period for START II reductions be extended from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2008. We are assessing how important this is for Moscow. It poses difficulties here: it could increase our costs if we keep additional missile systems on line beyond 2003 and would require Congressional approval, opening an opportunity for Hill mischief-making. Moreover, an appearance of a slowdown in U.S./Russian strategic arms cuts could have an adverse impact on the CTBT negotiation. The interagency is reviewing this; your message notes that you will get back to Yeltsin on it.

***Democracy in Russia.*** This should be your last communication with Yeltsin prior to the June 16 election. It closes by noting how far democracy has come in Russia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin
Tab B Yeltsin's May 13 Message on Lyon
Tab C Yeltsin's June 3 Message on START II

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

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SEND VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS [redacted] EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR/CHARGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN; THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I KNOW THIS IS A PERIOD OF PARTICULARLY INTENSE ACTIVITY FOR YOU. I HAVE BEEN THINKING A GOOD DEAL ABOUT RUSSIA, U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED TOGETHER.

IN RECENT DAYS, THE LAST NUCLEAR WARHEADS MOVED FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA FOR DISMANTLEMENT. THE SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRILATERAL ACCORD, TO WHICH WE DEVOTED SO MUCH TIME IN LATE 1993 AND EARLY 1994, SHOWS HOW WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO WORK WITH UKRAINE TO MAKE THE WORLD -- AND OUR OWN CITIZENS -- SAFER. THE RESOLUTION OF THE CFE FLANK ISSUE IN VIENNA, WHICH WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW IN APRIL, OFFERS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF OUR ABILITY TO SOLVE TOUGH ISSUES IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES OUR SHARED INTERESTS.

I UNDERSTAND OUR SHERPAS HAVE AGREED ON A FORMAT FOR THE LYON SUMMIT THAT BUILDS ON WHAT WE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW AND THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF THE EIGHT. I THINK THAT FORMAT WILL BE VERY WORKABLE AND WILL UNDERSCORE THE GROWING ROLE OF THE EIGHT -- AND OF RUSSIA'S GROWING ROLE IN THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES TO ADDRESS A RANGE OF GLOBAL ISSUES.

I ALSO WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT, SINCE YOU RAISED WITH ME RUSSIA'S FINANCING NEEDS, I HAVE TRACKED CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS ON THAT FRONT. SECRETARY RUBIN AND DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS MET WITH THE TEAM YOU SENT TO WASHINGTON AND CAREFULLY MONITORED YOUR TEAM'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF. WE HAVE BEEN VERY CLEAR WITH THE IMF: WE TOLD THEM WE VIEW SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA AS A MATTER OF TOP IMPORTANCE AND URGED THEM TO BE FLEXIBLE AND PRAGMATIC. WE ALSO TOLD THEM WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THE RUBLE AND YOUR FINANCIAL MARKETS.

WE HAVE ASKED THE IMF TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBLE MECHANISM TO READY ITSELF TO REACT IN THE EVENT OF FINANCIAL MARKET INSTABILITY. I THINK THE $2.1 BILLION THAT THE IMF HAS ALREADY DISBURSED TO RUSSIA THIS YEAR IS A SOLID SIGN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT YOUR REFORM


Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6, X6

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-3 [5.78]
KBH 12/13/2019

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I HAVE ALSO REVIEWED YOUR JUNE 3 LETTER ON START II. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE, AND I WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU AFTER FURTHER REVIEW.

ALL IN ALL, AS I REFLECT BOTH ON THE LAST THREE AND A HALF YEARS AND ON THE PERIOD AHEAD, I AM STRUCK BY HOW MUCH YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED AS THE LEADER OF RUSSIA, AND ALSO BY HOW MUCH YOU AND I HAVE ACCOMPLISHED TOGETHER IN THE FIELDS OF SECURITY, DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. YOU CAN TAKE PARTICULAR PRIDE IN THE PROGRESS OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY, JUST AS I BELIEVE WE AMERICANS CAN TAKE PRIDE IN OUR UNSTINTING SUPPORT FOR THAT PROCESS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN LYON. MY BEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd Chkhikvishvili 5/14

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.79)
KBH 12/13/2019

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
May 13, 1996

Dear Bill:

I would like to share with you some views regarding the prospects for continued cooperation between heads of the leading states of the world.

First of all in my capacity of co-chairman of the Summit in Moscow I would like to once again express my gratitude to you personally and to the American side in general for constructive cooperation in the preparation and holding of this unique activity. The agreements reached in Moscow have become a big step forward in consolidating nuclear security for all. The citizens of our countries got proof that the G-8 can effectively work on solving the most acute problems. It is important not to loose the impulse which we have given to solving the whole complex of nuclear security problems, to start the mechanism of implementation of the Moscow agreements soon. We are eager to work on this together with our partners.

As we had agreed in Moscow, while in Beijing I have laid down the position that we all have coordinated between us in favor of an early reaching of the comprehensive nuclear tests ban Treaty.

It is very important that in Moscow we have not limited ourselves just by the framework of the agenda but have deeply discussed and, what is most important, have agreed on our further interaction on such a burning issue as the Lebanon.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



The summit in Moscow, in my view, has considerably raised the prestige of the G-8 in the world, has broadened the sphere of our practical engagement. This constitutes our joint capital and we must use it wisely. In this respect particular importance goes to the effective way of using the possibilities offered by the forthcoming meeting in Lyon. As we have discussed it with you in Moscow, it is very important that this meeting consolidates the new quality of our cooperation. This would give the public a clear signal that we are approaching a new level of our interaction.

Naturally, transforming G-7 into G-8 is not an easy job. To a certain extent I understand the differences in views between the partners regarding the pace of further closing the distance between Russia and the "G-7 Club". I want to stress it - we are not fixated on a maximalist position and are not inclined to seek creation of a full fledged G-8 at the expense of dismantling the existing coordinating mechanisms of the G-7.

Bearing all this in mind, I propose the following scheme of the Lyon meeting.

In the first place, to hold it in three phases:

- discussion of the economic issues by the G-7 with releasing an appropriate communique;

- discussion of the economic issues by the G-8 with adopting a statement of the Chairman on the discussed issues;

- discussion of the political and global issues by the G-8 with adopting an appropriate political declaration.

In the second place, it is necessary, perhaps, to change the name of the meeting so that it would reflect a new phase of our cooperation. An appropriate one, in my view, would be: "Summit Meeting of Industrialized Nations".

I believe that such a scheme fully corresponds to the considerations you expressed to me in Moscow, and I count on your support. What is non the less important, especially for me, is the fact that through agreeing on a mutually acceptable plan of holding the Lyon meeting we would confirm the course for equal

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cooperation both in the framework of the G-8, and between Russia and the US. The result would be positive also in what regard solving other difficult issues, such as Bosnia or Haiti, or the ones dealing with the disarmament, like the START-2 Treaty and the CFE Treaty.

I hope to be continuously in touch with you despite the amount of work I am doing as part of the electoral campaign. I expect that by the time of the Sherpas' meeting at the end of May we shall already be in a position to determine the principal parameters of the Lyon Summit.

I am sending a similar message to other partners - members of the G-8.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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SECRET

Unofficial translation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.80)
KBH 12/13/2019

June 3, 1996
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

I would like to once again express my satisfaction with the results of our discussions with you in Moscow both in the framework of the G-8 negotiations and, especially, in the bilateral format. I am glad that with every meeting we are consistently moving forward in solving issues which find themselves in the center of the agenda of the Russian-American relations, first of all in the field of strengthening security.

I hope that, in particular, the progress we have achieved in consolidating the ABM Treaty will help us successfully finalize ratification of the START-2 Treaty by the Russian Parliament.

The entry of the Treaty into force is much delayed therefore the terms of limitations envisaged in it - before January 1, 2003, are not realistic any more. The pace of the limitations envisaged in the Treaty will be hardly realizable for Russia because of technical and, which is the most important, of financial reasons.

In this connection we are interested in adjusting the terms of arms' limitations by the Treaty extending them until January 1, 2008. This constitutes a necessary decision without which the Treaty will hardly be viable. Such an opinion is widely shared also in the Russian Duma.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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I propose, without delay and without waiting for the Duma to finalize the ratification process, to hold bilateral consultations on this issue on a high level. In their course we could also discuss a number of other problems related to the Treaty, in particular measures to bring down costs.

I hope for your understanding in this most important issue for our two countries and for the whole world.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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FM WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (581)
KBH 12/13/2019

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EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.

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AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN.

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THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
BEGIN TEXT:

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DEAR BORIS:

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN LYON. MY BEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

#0785


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IMMEDIATE

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**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

TO [redacted] MOSCOW
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~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

2015-0815-M-3 [5.82]
KBH 12/13/2019

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EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE.
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AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN.
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THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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SINCERELY,

BILL

#0785



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NNNN
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



~~SECRET~~

SEND VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR/CHARGE

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN; THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6, X6

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2015-0815-M-3 [5.83]
KBH 12/13/2019

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



PROGRAM. AS YOU KNOW, THAT OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN A GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF U.S. POLICY SINCE I CAME INTO OFFICE, AND YOU CAN COUNT ON MY GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE IMF. AT THE SAME TIME, I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT IT IS CRUCIAL THAT RUSSIA MAINTAIN ITS STRONG ECONOMIC POLICIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED STABILITY OF THE RUBLE AND TO STAY ON COURSE.

I HAVE ALSO REVIEWED YOUR JUNE 3 LETTER ON START II. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE, AND I WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU AFTER FURTHER REVIEW.

ALL IN ALL, AS I REFLECT BOTH ON THE LAST THREE AND A HALF YEARS AND ON THE PERIOD AHEAD, I AM STRUCK BY HOW MUCH YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED AS THE LEADER OF RUSSIA, AND ALSO BY HOW MUCH YOU AND I HAVE ACCOMPLISHED TOGETHER IN THE FIELDS OF SECURITY, DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. YOU CAN TAKE PARTICULAR PRIDE IN THE PROGRESS OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY, JUST AS I BELIEVE WE AMERICANS CAN TAKE PRIDE IN OUR UNSTINTING SUPPORT FOR THAT PROCESS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN LYON. MY BEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



June 7, 1996



DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(5.84)
KBH 12/13/2019

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER SP for

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to President Yeltsin which addresses, inter alia, the question of Russia's financial needs. The substance of the section of the letter on Russia's financial needs has been cleared with Treasury. Secretary Christopher also has cleared the message.

We believe this should be sent as soon as possible, to avoid awkward questions if word were to leak of a Presidential message to Yeltsin on the eve of the June 16 election.

Concurrence by: SP for Carlos Pascual, Bob Bell, Dan Tarullo

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin
Tab B Yeltsin's May 13 Message on Lyon
Tab C Yeltsin's June 3 Message on START II

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

sudden introduction could create the perception that a financial crisis is imminent and promote the crash it is intended to avert.

We are encouraging the IMF to put in place the groundwork for a CSF so that we could move quickly to get the concurrence of the Allies if the ruble comes under pressure. Treasury has contacted IMF management; they are formulating their position. We have not contacted the other G-7 for fear of a leak, but we can expect some resistance. We also advise against telling Yeltsin about the CSF, as it might trigger an unchecked spending spree.

***START II.*** Yeltsin wrote you on June 3 (Tab C) to propose that the period for START II reductions be extended from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2008. We are assessing how important this is for Moscow. It poses difficulties here: it could increase our costs if we keep additional missile systems on line beyond 2003 and would require Congressional approval, opening an opportunity for Hill mischief-making. Moreover, an appearance of a slowdown in U.S./Russian strategic arms cuts could have an adverse impact on the CTBT negotiation. The interagency is reviewing this; your message notes that you will get back to Yeltsin on it.

***Democracy in Russia.*** This should be your last communication with Yeltsin prior to the June 16 election. It closes by noting how far democracy has come in Russia~~, and your belief that the forthcoming election will carry it forward~~.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin
Tab B Yeltsin's May 13 Message on Lyon
Tab C Yeltsin's June 3 Message on START II

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.85)
KBH 12/13/2019



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PROGRAM. AS YOU KNOW, THAT OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN A GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF U.S. POLICY SINCE I CAME INTO OFFICE, AND YOU CAN COUNT ON MY GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE IMF. AT THE SAME TIME, I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT IT IS CRUCIAL THAT RUSSIA MAINTAIN ITS STRONG ECONOMIC POLICIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED STABILITY OF THE RUBLE AND TO STAY ON COURSE.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN LYON. MY BEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.8c)
KBH 12/13/2019



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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

On dealing with
Instability etc—

Answer very
Generally---

"Gore-Chernomyrdin-Primakov

WE Memo
Visit to DC
12 a couple of
days.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**REVISED**

4580

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7-5-96

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.38)
KBH 12/13/2019

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- Missed you in Lyons. Hope you are feeling better now.

- Your election victory is great news -- for you, for Russia and for all of us who believe in Russia's democratic future. My warmest congratulations.

- Followed your campaign, election closely. Most impressed by decision of Russian people to reject the past and choose a forward-looking course -- real credit to you, personally, and to your campaign staff.

- Also impressed by your recovery from low standing in opinion polls in January. In early 1992, most polls wrote me off, but I won in November and earned title of "come-back kid." Think I'll have to share title with you now.

- Russian people can take great pride in progress Russia is making down path of democratic development and economic reform. You should take pride as well in your leadership down that path -- and in strong endorsement Russian voters have given your reform policies.

  (Pause for Yeltsin comment)

- Have together accomplished much over last three years for our two great peoples. With your new mandate, we can look forward to building on our record of mutual success, further advancing our shared vision for U.S.-Russian relations.

- Had good discussion with Chernomyrdin in Lyons. He represented you well.

- Moscow meeting between Vice President and Chernomyrdin comes at ideal time; they are doing very good work together.

- Vice President hopes to see you as well. He will come prepared to talk about broad range of issues and will have ideas on where we can focus our efforts in coming months.

- Again, warmest congratulations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 7/02/01

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(*If Yeltsin complains about scheduling Contact Group meeting without consulting Moscow or urges we not re-impose sanctions*)

- Purpose of Contact Group is to get together and consult on important Bosnia issues. That's why British proposed Contact Group on July 10.

- Karadzic issue is real and urgent -- jeopardizing implementation of Dayton peace accords.

- Obviously, will hold Contact Group agenda open for any issues your side wants to discuss.

(*If Yeltsin invites you to inauguration on August 9*)

- August will be political month here -- could be very difficult for me to get away. But will see what I can do.

(*If Yeltsin requests you meet Mamedov to receive letter*)

- Will try to receive him.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4580

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7/5/96

July 3, 1996 96 JUL 3 P9:14

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Early Communication to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.89)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

Assuming that the Russian election results show a clear-cut Yeltsin victory early July 4, to propose points for a call to Yeltsin or, if a call is not possible that day, to secure your approval for a congratulatory message to Yeltsin.

Background

Although the official results for the July 3 run-off will not be available until the weekend at the earliest, we expect to have a fairly complete unofficial tally from the Russian Central Election Commission the morning of July 4. If the results show a tight contest between Yeltsin and Zyuganov or a Zyuganov victory, we would propose no call or message on Thursday.

Our expectation, however, remains that Yeltsin will win, and that this should be clear on Thursday morning. We will be closely tracking the results here, in conjunction with State, CIA and Embassy Moscow. If it appears to be a "solid" Yeltsin win (i.e., no risk of congratulating Dewey for beating Truman and no reports of significant irregularities in the voting process), we recommend that you attempt on July 4 a short congratulatory call to Yeltsin (points are at Tab A).

Setting up such a call on short notice, given the eight-hour time difference and possible conflicts in your and his schedule, could be difficult on Thursday. If we are unable to set up the call, we recommend transmitting the congratulatory message at Tab B. If you pre-approve the message, we will release it on July 4 only if you cannot talk to Yeltsin.

In the event that you are unable to talk to Yeltsin on Thursday and we send the message, we would nevertheless pursue with the Russians a brief call as early as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 7/02/01

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

In addition to your communicating with Yeltsin, the speechwriters have a passage for insertion into one of your July 4 speeches. We are also preparing for release on Thursday a fuller "Statement by the President" congratulating Yeltsin and the Russian people if the election result is clear.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points at Tab A if we can place a call to Yeltsin on July 4.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you pre-approve the message at Tab B for release if a call on July 4 is not possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Points for Congratulatory Call to Yeltsin
Tab B Congratulatory Message to Yeltsin



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.90)
KBH 12/13/2019

- Missed you in Lyons. Hope you are feeling better now.

- Your election victory is great news -- for you, for Russia and for all of us who believe in Russia's democratic future. My warmest congratulations.

- Followed your campaign, election closely. Most impressed by decision of Russian people to reject the past and choose a forward-looking course -- real credit to you, personally, and to your campaign staff.

- Also impressed by your recovery from low standing in opinion polls in January. In early 1992, most polls wrote me off, but I won in November and earned title of "come-back kid." Think I'll have to share title with you now.

- Russian people can take great pride in progress Russia is making down path of democratic development and economic reform. You should take pride as well in your leadership down that path -- and in strong endorsement Russian voters have given your reform policies.

  (Pause for Yeltsin comment)

- Have together accomplished much over last three years for our two great peoples. With your new mandate, we can look forward to building on our record of mutual success, further advancing our shared vision for U.S.-Russian relations.

- Had good discussion with Chernomyrdin in Lyons. He represented you well.

- Moscow meeting between Vice President and Chernomyrdin comes at ideal time; they are doing very good work together.

- Vice President hopes to see you as well. He will come prepared to talk about broad range of issues and will have ideas on where we can focus our efforts in coming months.

- Again, warmest congratulations.



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(*If Yeltsin complains about scheduling Contact Group meeting without consulting Moscow or urges we not re-impose sanctions*)

- Purpose of Contact Group is to get together and consult on important Bosnia issues. That's why British proposed Contact Group on July 10.

- Karadzic issue is real and urgent -- jeopardizing implementation of Dayton peace accords.

- Obviously, will hold Contact Group agenda open for any issues your side wants to discuss.

(*If Yeltsin invites you to inauguration on August 9*)

- August will be political month here -- could be very difficult for me to get away. But will see what I can do.

(*If Yeltsin requests you meet Mamedov to receive letter*)

- Will try to receive him.



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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.91)
KBH 12/13/2019

- Missed you in Lyons. Hope you are feeling better.

- Have seen Russian election results. Your victory is great news -- for you, for Russia and for all of us who believe in Russia's democratic future. Warmest congratulations.

- Followed your campaign and two ballots closely. Most impressed by decision of Russian people to reject past, choose forward-looking course -- real credit to you, personally, and to your campaign staff.

- Also impressed by your recovery from low standing in opinion polls in January. In early 1992, most polls wrote me off, but won in November and earned title of "come-back kid." Think I'll have to share title with you now.

- Russian people can take great pride in progress Russia is making down path of democratic development and economic reform. You should take pride as well in your leadership down that path -- and in endorsement Russian voters have given your reform policies.

- Have together accomplished much over last three years to advance American-Russian partnership and strengthen safety and prosperity of our two great peoples. Looking toward working with you to build on our record of mutual success.

- Vice President hopes to see you shortly. Will have ideas on where we can focus efforts in coming months.

(If appropriate)

- Hope Zyuganov will accept results gracefully and play constructive role in opposition. Is he prepared to work with your Administration?

- Again, warmest congratulations.



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 12, 1996

Dear Boris:

I am delighted that Al Gore and Victor Chernomyrdin are meeting this week. On the heels of your historic victory at the polls, I welcome the opportunity for Al to explore with you and Victor where we take our relationship in the months ahead. It is with this in mind that I have asked Al to carry this letter.

Your electoral success has vindicated your courageous leadership and the reform path that you have diligently pursued over the past four years. Since our first meeting in Vancouver, we have established an exceptionally productive relationship predicated on two ideas. The first is your commitment to, and our support for, reform. The second is cooperation on security and foreign policy issues designed to make the United States, Russia and the rest of the world safer and more secure. I believe that your victory provides momentum to move forward on both of these fronts.

You and I have worked well together because of our ability to focus on the key issues. I think that we need to do the same now, to make the most of the remainder of 1996.

You have won an extraordinary mandate to broaden and deepen economic reform. As I told you on the phone, I will work with you to make the most of this opportunity. In particular, I agree with you that greater American investment is key. This is in the interests of both our countries. If Russia can improve the climate for investment, I will personally work to encourage U.S. companies to be more active. Al will be prepared to discuss specific ideas with you and Victor.

I have seen your July 10 speech to the people of Russia. I am impressed by your commitment to move against crime and corruption and to take steps that will boost economic production and the standard of living of your people. I was pleased to hear that you are considering plans to overhaul the social safety net. As you do this, it is equally important to ensure financial stability and the integrity of the IMF program.

We should also use the coming months to demonstrate the vitality of our cooperation in the areas of arms control and diplomacy. I look forward to continuing our work together on managing regional

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

conflicts. Our cooperation continues to be a cornerstone for advancing the peace process in the Middle East.

Let me stress one issue in particular: the daunting task of assuring the success of the elections in Bosnia scheduled for September 14. Bosnia has been a pathbreaking example of how the United States and Russia can cooperate to good effect. However, Karadzic's continuing active presence threatens the election; it threatens the implementation of the Dayton Accords; and it threatens all that we have accomplished together. For me, this is one of the most serious and important issues of the coming months. As I stressed to Mr. Mamedov in the Oval Office, you and I need to give priority to the urgent task of bringing about Karadzic's removal from all positions of power and influence. We must not let tactical and procedural differences impede us or distract us from the overarching objective and the stakes involved. Al will underscore and amplify my thinking on this subject, to which, as I hope you can tell, I attach the very highest significance.

I also hope that you will capitalize on your new political strength to achieve Duma ratification of START II with the aim of exchanging instruments by October. This is in the interests of the United States and Russia. I am considering your suggestion about lengthening the START II reduction period. This approach raises serious concerns on our part, but I will write shortly to address this in greater detail. As I have written you separately, we must also work hard to be able to sign the CTBT by September.

European security will loom large on our agenda this fall. You said during our July 5 phone conversation that you had some thoughts about NATO and European security. I would suggest our foreign ministers continue this important discussion when they meet in Djakarta next week. You know of my strong commitment to creating a European security system, including an enlarged NATO, that takes into account the interests of all countries in the region and that fulfills our shared vision of an undivided, more secure Europe. It is particularly important that we move without delay to develop the NATO-Russia relationship and that we find ways to keep our differences in perspective.

Sincerely,

Bill

Boris - It is clear that our agenda holds the promise of making our relationship stronger and making the world safer. I am committed to realizing that promise and I know that you are committed to do the same.

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4760
7-12-96

96 JUL 12 A9:30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION July 12, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.93)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To sign a letter for Vice President Gore to give to President Yeltsin.

Background

Tab A contains a letter to Yeltsin, which we propose that the Vice President hand over at his July 15 meeting with the Russian President. The letter addresses Yeltsin's request in your recent phone call that you do everything you can to promote foreign investment in Russia. It reminds him of the need for the Russian government to take steps to improve the climate for such investment, a point the Vice President will emphasize. In the letter, you also reiterate our priorities for the relationship in the coming months, namely START II, CTBT and building the NATO-Russia relationship.

Since your message will be in the form of a hand-carried letter rather than the normal cable, we suggest that you give it a more personal touch by adding -- in your hand -- the following message at the end:

> "Boris, it is clear that our busy agenda in the months ahead holds the promise of further strengthening our bilateral relationship. I am committed to realizing that promise. I know that I have your commitment to do the same."

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Letter to President Yeltsin
Tab B July 4 Yeltsin Letter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/12/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

96 JUL 10 A11 : 11

Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your congratulations on my victory in the presidential elections. I see it, above all, as a victory for reforms and democracy in Russia. The election results are the final guarantee against any attempts to push Russia off the path it has opted for.

The election campaign was not an easy one. We had to counter Communist demagoguery, a "game without rules" approach, and provocations. But during the whole campaign I was strictly following the line that elections should be held in time, that they should be fair and free and that people should express their will. Such options as toughening our foreign policy or artificially exacerbating domestic situation to score easy points did not exist for me.

I appreciate responsible and sound position which you have taken during these stormy months. I am aware that not everyone in the US approved this position and that strong pressure was exerted upon you. Nevertheless, you managed to stand firm. You understand that the world situation in general, strategic stability at the global level and in the key regions to a large extent depends on the democracy and reforms' success in Russia. You realize the significance of cooperation with strong democratic Russia. This is a matter of pivotal importance.

We also attach primary importance to the development of close relations of constructive and equal partnership with the United States. I believe that the election results reinforce my mandate for building such relationship with the United States.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I sincerely regret that we did not have a chance to meet in Lyon. But I believe I was right because at such moments one should stay with his nation, and I appreciate your understanding.

I remember all the agreements we reached in Moscow. Some of them, first of all on the "flank" issue, have already been implemented and considerable progress has been achieved on the others. In this situation we should not slow down the momentum. It is necessary that we constantly stay in touch. I view your meeting with Victor Chernomyrdin in Lyon as very useful. We look forward to Vice-President Gore's visit to Moscow in mid-July. Apparently, consultations will be needed at Foreign Ministers' level, first of all, to discuss the START-ABM, NATO and the Middle East set of issues.

But all these contacts are not a substitute for our direct dialogue. In the next few months we should by all means find an opportunity to exchange views on the principal directions of relations between our countries for the forthcoming period. In a sense, these months will be a dateline. We will have to take decisions on a number of important international and military and political issues. I would like these decisions to be yet another reaffirmation of the course toward equal and mutually beneficial partnership between Russia and the United States.

The election campaign in Russia is over. The election campaign in the US is entering its final stage. In this connection I would like to assure you that you can count on my full understanding. I feel confident that the Americans, just like the Russians, do not want a return to the Cold War.

Thank you again for your friendly congratulations.

With best regards,

**B.Yeltsin**

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«04» июля 1996 г.

№ Пр-1538

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Спасибо тебе за поздравление по поводу моей победы на выборах. Рассматриваю ее прежде всего как победу дела реформ и демократии в России. Итоги выборов - это окончательная гарантия против любых попыток сбить Россию с избранного пути.

Избирательная кампания складывалась непросто. Пришлось столкнуться с коммунистической демагогией, с "игрой без правил", с провокациями. Но на всем протяжении предвыборной борьбы я неукоснительно держался линии на то, чтобы выборы состоялись четко в назначенный срок, чтобы они были честными и свободными, чтобы народ высказал свою волю. Таких вариантов, как ужесточить внешнюю политику или искусственно обострить обстановку внутри страны в расчете на легкие "очки", для меня не существовало.

Я ценю ответственную и солидную позицию, которую занимал ты в эти бурные месяцы. Знаю, что не все в США были согласны с этой позицией, что на тебя оказывалось сильное давление. Тем не менее, ты устоял. Ты понимаешь, что от успеха демократии и реформ в России во

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

многом зависит ситуация в мире в целом, стратегическая стабильность на глобальном уровне и в ключевых регионах. Ты понимаешь значение сотрудничества с сильной, демократической Россией. Это - принципиально важно.

Мы тоже придаем исключительное значение развитию с Соединенными Штатами тесных отношений конструктивного и равноправного партнерства. Исхожу из того, что итоги выборов подкрепляют мой мандат на строительство с США таких отношений.

Искренне сожалею, что нам не удалось встретиться в Лионе. Однако считаю, что поступил правильно - в такие минуты надо быть со своим народом, - и благодарен тебе за проявленное понимание.

Я помню все наши московские договоренности. Некоторые из них, прежде всего - по "фланговой" проблеме, уже реализованы, по другим - достигнут существенный прогресс. В этой ситуации нельзя терять темп работы. Необходимо поддерживать постоянный контакт. Как весьма полезную расцениваю вашу встречу с В.С.Черномырдиным в Лионе. Ждем приезда в Москву в середине июля вице-президента А.Гора. Очевидно, потребуются консультации на уровне министров иностранных дел, прежде всего по комплексу вопросов СНВ-ПРО, НАТО и Ближнему Востоку.

Однако все эти контакты - не замена прямого разговора между нами. В ближайшие месяцы нам обязательно нужно будет найти возможность обменяться мнениями по главным направлениям отношений между нашими странами на предстоящий период. Эти месяцы будут в определенном смысле рубежными. Предстоит принять решения по ряду важных международных и военно-политических вопросов. Я хочу, чтобы эти решения стали новым подтверждением курса на равноправное и взаимовыгодное партнерство между Россией и США.

Избирательная кампания в России позади. Избирательная кампания в США вступает в завершающий этап. В этой связи могу заверить тебя, что ты можешь рассчитывать на полное понимание с моей стороны. Уверен, что американцы, как и россияне, не желают возврата к "холодной войне".

Еще раз благодарю тебя за дружеское поздравление.

С наилучшими пожеланиями,

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Б.Ельцин

Dear Boris:

I am delighted that Al Gore and Victor Chernomyrdin are meeting this week. On the heels of your historic victory at the polls, I welcome the opportunity for Al to explore with you and Victor where we take our relationship in the months ahead. It is with this in mind that I have asked Al to carry this letter.

Your electoral success has vindicated your courageous leadership and the reform path that you have diligently pursued over the past four years. Since our first meeting in Vancouver, we have established an exceptionally productive relationship predicated on two ideas. The first is your commitment to, and our support for, reform. The second is cooperation on security and foreign policy issues designed to make the United States, Russia and the rest of the world safer and more secure. I believe that your victory provides momentum to move forward on both of these fronts.

You and I have worked well together because of our ability to focus on the key issues. I think that we need to do the same now, to make the most of the remainder of 1996.

You have won an extraordinary mandate to broaden and deepen economic reform. As I told you on the phone, I will work with you to make the most of this opportunity. In particular, I agree with you that greater American investment is key. This is in the interests of both our countries. If Russia can improve the climate for investment, I will personally work to encourage U.S. companies to be more active. Al will be prepared to discuss specific ideas with you and Victor.

I have seen your July 10 speech to the people of Russia. I am impressed by your commitment to move against crime and corruption, and to take steps that will boost economic production and the standard of living of your people. I was pleased to hear that you are considering plans to overhaul the social safety net. As you do this, it is equally important to ensure financial stability and the integrity of the IMF program.

We should also use the coming months to demonstrate the vitality of our cooperation in the areas of arms control and diplomacy. I

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look forward to continuing our work together on managing regional conflicts. Our cooperation continues to be a cornerstone for advancing the peace process in the Middle East.

Let me stress one issue in particular: the daunting task of assuring the success of the elections in Bosnia scheduled for September 14. Bosnia has been a pathbreaking example of how the ~~U.S.~~ United States and Russia can cooperate to good effect. However, Karadzic's continuing active presence threatens the election; it threatens the implementation of the Dayton Accords; and it threatens all that we have accomplished together. For me, this is one of the most serious and important issues of the coming months. As I stressed to Mr. Mamedov in the Oval Office, you and I need to give priority to the urgent task of bringing about Karadzic's removal from all positions of power and influence. We must not let tactical and procedural differences impede us or distract us from the overarching objective and the stakes involved. Al will underscore and amplify my thinking on this subject, to which, as I hope you can tell, I attach the very highest significance.

I also hope that you will capitalize on your new political strength to achieve Duma ratification of START II with the aim of exchanging instruments by October. This is in the interests of the United States and Russia. I am considering your suggestion about lengthening the START II reduction period. This approach raises serious concerns on our part, but I will write shortly to address this in greater detail. As I have written you separately, we must also work hard to be able to sign the CTBT by September.

European security will loom large on our agenda this fall. You said during our July 5 phone conversation that you had some thoughts about NATO and European security. I would suggest our foreign ministers continue this important discussion when they meet in Djakarta next week. You know of my strong commitment to creating a European security system, including an enlarged NATO, that takes into account the interests of all countries in the region and that fulfills our shared vision of an undivided, more secure Europe. It is particularly important that we move without delay to develop the NATO-Russia relationship and that we find ways to keep our differences in perspective.

Sincerely,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03
PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG TRIP
SIT: COQ HARMON LAKEA MILLISON PASSDOWN PETERS SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
SIT: NODIS

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 141505Z AUG 96

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.97)
KBH 12/13/2019

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NODIS
QQQQ

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MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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STATE: FOR THE SECRETARY AND DEPSEC ONLY.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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DEAR BORIS:

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PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1578 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
I AM WRITING TO RESPOND TO YOUR LETTER REGARDING RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES. I BELIEVE YOU ARE AWARE THAT I MET WITH THE THREE BALTIC PRESIDENTS ON JUNE 25 IN WASHINGTON, AND HILLARY VISITED ESTONIA DURING HER RECENT TRIP TO CENTRAL AND NORTHERN EUROPE.

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I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON SEVERAL ISSUES THAT YOU RAISED IN YOUR LETTER -- HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REGION, THE CONTINUITY OF BALTIC STATEHOOD AND NATO'S OPENNESS TO ADMITTING EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES.

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FIRST, I AM PLEASED THAT YOU EXPRESSED YOUR GOOD WILL AND THE GOOD WILL OF RUSSIA TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES. CERTAINLY, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THESE COUNTRIES AND WANTS TO SEE THEM PARTICIPATE IN THE WIDER COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AS SECURE, PROSPERING DEMOCRACIES, AT PEACE AT HOME AND WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS.

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I KNOW THE SITUATION OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN THE BALTIC


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PAGE 3 RHEHAAA1578 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
STATES IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION FOR YOU AND FOR MANY OF YOUR COUNTRYMEN. I ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO IT AS WELL. I THUS HAVE HAD MY PEOPLE HERE AND IN OUR EMBASSIES FOLLOW CLOSELY THE STATUS OF RUSSIAN AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS -- INDEED, THE BROADER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION -- IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA. WHILE THEY HAVE FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF A SYSTEMATIC PATTERN OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN THE BALTICS, AN ASSESSMENT SHARED BY THE OSCE AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE ISSUE OF THE RUSSIAN AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS VERY CLOSELY, AS WE FOLLOW SUCH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD.

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WHEN I DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITY WITH THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS IN WASHINGTON, I URGED PRESIDENT MERI AND PRESIDENT ULMANIS TO DO EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO ENSURE THAT THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATIONS -- BOTH CITIZEN AND NONCITIZEN -- HAVE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME INTEGRATED INTO THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC OF THEIR NATIONS. THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED TO ME THAT THEY SEE THIS AS A TOP PRIORITY FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR THEIR COUNTRIES.

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA1578 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
I BELIEVE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ESTONIA CAN AND SHOULD BE IMPROVED, AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT ALL SIDES MAKE A REAL EFFORT TO AVOID EXCESSIVE RHETORIC.

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ON THE CONTINUITY OF BALTIC STATEHOOD, OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. THE UNITED STATES NEVER RECOGNIZED THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES INTO THE USSR IN 1940 AND RESTATED THAT POLICY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE NEXT 51 YEARS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE CONTINUITY OF STATEHOOD OF THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES FROM 1921 TO THE PRESENT, WE SUPPORT CURRENT BORDERS RECOGNIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WOULD ONLY SUPPORT CHANGES DECIDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONCERNED STATES. THE ESTONIAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED PUBLICLY AND TO US THAT IT HAS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON RUSSIA. WE URGE RUSSIA AND ESTONIA TO MAKE A FAIR AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY BORDER TREATY A BILATERAL PRIORITY AND TO ADOPT A PRACTICAL APPROACH TOWARD THAT END.

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AS FOR MY ADMINISTRATION S POLICY ON NATO, YOU KNOW THAT I

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA1578 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
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REASON TO FORECLOSE IN ADVANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ANY OF EUROPE S NEW DEMOCRACIES. AS I TOLD THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS PRIVATELY ON JUNE 25 AND THEN STATED PUBLICLY, THE DOOR TO NATO SHOULD REMAIN OPEN TO ALL SUCH DEMOCRACIES. IN MY VIEW, THAT INCLUDES THE BALTICS AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. INDEED, AS YOU KNOW, I CONSIDER THAT THE DOOR IS OPEN TO RUSSIA AS WELL.

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IN ADDITION, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL TAKE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO WORK TOGETHER WITH NATO TO DEVELOP A SUBSTANTIVE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. RUSSIA HAS A CENTRAL ROLE TO PLAY IN DEFINING EUROPE S SECURITY SYSTEM, AND A STRONG NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP WILL BE A KEY FACTOR IN BUILDING A STABLE, SECURE AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE; WE SHOULD DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN THIS RELATIONSHIP.

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BORIS, LET ME SAY AGAIN THAT I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO



GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND TO RESOLVING THE OLD FEARS THAT EXIST. GOOD, STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE SMALL NATIONS AND RUSSIA, BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT, ARE IMPORTANT TO THE BALTIC STATES, TO RUSSIA AND TO THE ENTIRE REGION.

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SINCERELY,

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BILL

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>1578
<MSGID> M2357335


CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5347

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

96 AUG 13 P4:58

August 13, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Yeltsin on the Baltics

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.98)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To respond to President Yeltsin's letter on the Baltics.

Background

In his letter to you, Yeltsin accuses Estonia and Latvia of a "policy of infringement on the rights and freedoms of the Russian-speaking population," complains that the United States is "easing its pressure" on Estonia and Latvia, expresses displeasure at Estonia's position on the border negotiations and puts down a marker against future Baltic membership in NATO.

Your response picks up on Yeltsin's stated desire to promote good-neighborly relations with the Baltic states and reminds him that we support their independence and integration with the global community. You note that we have seen no evidence of a systematic pattern of human rights abuses, but you inform Yeltsin that you urged President Meri and President Ulmanis in June to work to ensure the ethnic Russian populations feel at home. On the Estonian-Russian border issue, you express your hope for a practical and fair solution. Finally, you reaffirm U.S. policy on NATO enlargement, repeat that the door is open to all of Europe's new democracies and reiterate our desire to build a substantive NATO-Russian relationship.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve Bill Clinton

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 8/13/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (5.99)
KBH 12/13/2019

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

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I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON SEVERAL ISSUES THAT YOU RAISED IN YOUR LETTER -- HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REGION, THE CONTINUITY OF BALTIC STATEHOOD AND NATO'S OPENNESS TO ADMITTING EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES.

FIRST, I AM PLEASED THAT YOU EXPRESSED YOUR GOOD WILL AND THE GOOD WILL OF RUSSIA TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES. CERTAINLY, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THESE COUNTRIES AND WANTS TO SEE THEM PARTICIPATE IN THE WIDER COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AS SECURE, PROSPERING DEMOCRACIES, AT PEACE AT HOME AND WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS.

I KNOW THE SITUATION OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN THE BALTIC STATES IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION FOR YOU AND FOR MANY OF YOUR COUNTRYMEN. I ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO IT AS WELL. I THUS HAVE HAD MY PEOPLE HERE AND IN OUR EMBASSIES FOLLOW CLOSELY THE STATUS OF RUSSIAN AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS -- INDEED, THE BROADER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION -- IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA. WHILE THEY HAVE FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF A SYSTEMATIC PATTERN OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN THE BALTICS, AN ASSESSMENT SHARED BY THE OSCE AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE ISSUE OF THE RUSSIAN AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS VERY CLOSELY, AS WE FOLLOW SUCH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD.

WHEN I DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITY WITH THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS IN WASHINGTON, I URGED PRESIDENT MERI AND PRESIDENT ULMANIS TO DO EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO ENSURE THAT THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATIONS -- BOTH CITIZEN AND NONCITIZEN -- HAVE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME INTEGRATED INTO THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC OF THEIR NATIONS. THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED TO ME THAT THEY SEE THIS AS A TOP PRIORITY FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR THEIR COUNTRIES. I BELIEVE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ESTONIA CAN AND SHOULD BE IMPROVED, AND IT


Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/12/06

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WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT ALL SIDES MAKE A REAL EFFORT TO AVOID EXCESSIVE RHETORIC.

ON THE CONTINUITY OF BALTIC STATEHOOD, OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. THE UNITED STATES NEVER RECOGNIZED THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES INTO THE USSR IN 1940 AND RESTATED THAT POLICY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE NEXT 51 YEARS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE CONTINUITY OF STATEHOOD OF THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES FROM 1921 TO THE PRESENT, WE SUPPORT CURRENT BORDERS RECOGNIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WOULD ONLY SUPPORT CHANGES DECIDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONCERNED STATES. THE ESTONIAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED PUBLICLY AND TO US THAT IT HAS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON RUSSIA. WE URGE RUSSIA AND ESTONIA TO MAKE A FAIR AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY BORDER TREATY A BILATERAL PRIORITY AND TO ADOPT A PRACTICAL APPROACH TOWARD THAT END.

AS FOR MY ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON NATO, YOU KNOW THAT I AM COMMITTED, AS ONE ELEMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, TO A DELIBERATE AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. I SEE NO REASON TO FORECLOSE IN ADVANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ANY OF EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES. AS I TOLD THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS PRIVATELY ON JUNE 25 AND THEN STATED PUBLICLY, THE DOOR TO NATO SHOULD REMAIN OPEN TO ALL SUCH DEMOCRACIES. IN MY VIEW, THAT INCLUDES THE BALTICS AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. INDEED, AS YOU KNOW, I CONSIDER THAT THE DOOR IS OPEN TO RUSSIA AS WELL.

IN ADDITION, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL TAKE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO WORK TOGETHER WITH NATO TO DEVELOP A SUBSTANTIVE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. RUSSIA HAS A CENTRAL ROLE TO PLAY IN DEFINING EUROPE'S SECURITY SYSTEM, AND A STRONG NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP WILL BE A KEY FACTOR IN BUILDING A STABLE, SECURE AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE; WE SHOULD DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN THIS RELATIONSHIP.

BORIS, LET ME SAY AGAIN THAT I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND TO RESOLVING THE OLD FEARS THAT EXIST. GOOD, STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE SMALL NATIONS AND RUSSIA, BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT, ARE IMPORTANT TO THE BALTIC STATES, TO RUSSIA AND TO THE ENTIRE REGION.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)



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Unofficial translation

June 20, 1996

Dear Bill:

Following our fruitful dialogue on the Baltic issue which was particularly intensive at the time when the Russian Federation was implementing its political decision to withdraw troops from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, I would like to share with you our current concerns.

During the past period of time we have been able to resolve with the Baltic states a number of complicated bilateral issues, to make a significant advance in normalization of our relations with Lithuania and, to a certain extent, with Latvia. Nevertheless, there are some "vulnerable points" where we do not encounter our partners' required willingness, primarily in Tallinn and in Riga, to take into account Russian interests. These issues touch upon the most important issue Russia is facing today - the situation with our compatriots in these countries. This situation remains to be quite difficult to which effect testifies an incessant flow of appeals and letters from the Russians living in Estonia and Latvia.

These people are complaining about an extremely slow pace of naturalization process in Latvia and Estonia, initially caused by unreasonably high requirements at the language, history and constitution examination and further aggravated by the abuse of power by local officials. A huge gap in the political, social-economic, cultural and other rights of the citizens and non-citizens still exists. In Estonia tension with regard to the problem of the Orthodox church remains, as well as an uncertain situation with issuing passports to foreigners; the situation with providing resident permits to

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, DC

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some non-indigenous citizens is deteriorating. Estonia is not in full compliance with its obligations under the agreement on Russian retired military personnel.

In Latvia the radical nationalists have not abandoned their attempts to advance new discriminational laws (on language and education), which would strongly affect the status of the Russian-speaking residents.

In Latvia and Estonia they are often not ready to listen even to, as we view them, modest recommendations of independent international experts, including the UN Committee on Human Rights in Geneva, or to the conclusions of the OSCE missions in Tallinn and Riga stressing a necessity to make certain adjustments to the domestic legislation and administration practices.

To a great extent, such negative approach is due to direct or indirect support for the Estonians and Latvians on the part of some states. Unfortunately this support is perceived in Tallinn and Riga not as an encouragement of the development of a stable civil society and a state based on the rule of law, strengthening the democracy, respect for the human rights, but rather as a consent with their policy of infringement on the rights and freedoms of the Russian-speaking population. It is not difficult to imagine how this policy is perceived in Russia.

At the same time, it appears that the US for some reason has recently eased its pressure on Tallinn and Riga in terms of encouraging a more balanced impartial approach of the Baltic nations to the humanitarian situation in their countries.

A few comments on the border issue. We have significantly advanced towards signing an appropriate treaty with Lithuania. The situation is more complicated with Latvia and, particularly, with Estonia. Estonian politicians often say: we have given up our territorial claims against Russia, but Russians are reluctant to make a symbolic gesture - to recognize the Tartu treaty. These statements mislead the world public opinion. Suffice it to recall that the Tartu treaty endorsed border line which includes 2000 sq.km of indigenous Russian lands, is institutionalized in the

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constitution and the Law of the Estonian Republic on the state border. These documents have been neither denounced nor reviewed. That is the reason why we can not speak yet about the "withdrawal of the territorial claims by Estonia". We naturally can not recognize the Tartu treaty even for "half-hour", as suggested by many, because when Estonia became a part of the Soviet Union it ceased to exist as a subject of the international law and treaties and agreements signed by it became void. Only the interstate treaty of January 12, 1991 can serve as the basis for our relations with Tallinn. The sooner Tallinn understands this reality the sooner the border treaty will be signed.

Our strategic objective on the Baltic track is to promote good-neighborly relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. We only wish good to the Baltic nations. In particular, nobody intends to create obstacles to the interaction of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia with the European Union and other European political, economic and humanitarian institutions. We expect this to encourage the formation of genuinely democratic civilized states, to help disperse the old fears. Russia on its part is prepared to provide guarantees of security to the Baltic states - alone or, if needed, jointly with NATO.

But of course it is out of the question even a hypothetical possibility of extending the NATO's sphere of operation onto the Baltic states. This perspective is absolutely unacceptable for Russia, and we would consider any steps in this direction as a direct challenge to the interests of our national security, destruction of fundamental structures of the European stability (including of course, the CFE Treaty, to which we have recently so painstakingly given a second life.)

I hope that the American side will use its capabilities to clarify to Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius our serious concerns on the above issues.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5347

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-m-3 (6.01)
KBH 12/13/2019

(BEGIN TEXT)

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for us as well?

white

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/12/06

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLOSELY, AS WE FOLLOW SUCH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD.

ON THE CONTINUITY OF BALTIC STATEHOOD, OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. THE UNITED STATES NEVER RECOGNIZED THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES INTO THE USSR IN 1940 AND RESTATED THAT POLICY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE NEXT 51 YEARS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE CONTINUITY OF STATEHOOD OF THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES FROM 1921 TO THE PRESENT, WE SUPPORT CURRENT BORDERS RECOGNIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WOULD ONLY SUPPORT CHANGES DECIDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONCERNED STATES. THE ESTONIAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED PUBLICLY AND TO US THAT IT HAS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON RUSSIA. WE URGE RUSSIA AND ESTONIA TO MAKE A FAIR AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY BORDER TREATY A BILATERAL PRIORITY AND TO ADOPT A PRACTICAL APPROACH TOWARD THAT END.

AS FOR MY ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON NATO, YOU KNOW THAT I AM COMMITTED, AS ONE ELEMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, TO A DELIBERATE AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. I SEE NO REASON TO FORECLOSE IN ADVANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ANY OF EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES. AS I TOLD THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS PRIVATELY ON JUNE 25 AND THEN STATED PUBLICLY, THE DOOR TO NATO SHOULD REMAIN OPEN TO ALL SUCH DEMOCRACIES. IN MY VIEW, THAT INCLUDES THE BALTICS AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. INDEED, AS YOU KNOW, I CONSIDER THAT THE DOOR IS OPEN TO RUSSIA AS WELL.

IN ADDITION, I HOPE THAT RUSSIA WILL TAKE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO WORK TOGETHER WITH NATO TO DEVELOP A SUBSTANTIVE NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. RUSSIA HAS A CENTRAL ROLE TO PLAY IN DEFINING EUROPE'S SECURITY SYSTEM, AND A STRONG NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP WILL BE A KEY FACTOR IN BUILDING A STABLE, SECURE AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE; WE SHOULD DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN THIS RELATIONSHIP.

BORIS, LET ME SAY AGAIN THAT I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND TO RESOLVING THE OLD FEARS THAT EXIST. GOOD, STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE SMALL NATIONS AND RUSSIA, BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT, ARE IMPORTANT TO THE BALTIC STATES, TO RUSSIA AND TO THE ENTIRE REGION.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.02)
KBH 12/13/2019

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Yeltsin on the Baltics

Purpose

To respond to President Yeltsin's letter on the Baltics.

Background

In his letter to you, Yeltsin accuses Estonia and Latvia of a "policy of infringement on the rights and freedoms of the Russian-speaking population," complains that the United States is "easing its pressure" on Estonia and Latvia, expresses displeasure at Estonia's position on the border negotiations and puts down a marker against future Baltic membership in NATO.

Your response picks up on Yeltsin's stated desire to promote good-neighborly relations with the Baltic states and reminds him that we support their independence and integration with the global community. You note that we have seen no evidence of a systematic pattern of human rights abuses, but you inform Yeltsin that you urged President Meri and President Ulmanis in June to work to ensure the ethnic Russian populations feel at home. On the Estonian-Russian border issue, you express your hope for a practical and fair solution. Finally, you reaffirm U.S. policy on NATO enlargement, repeat that the door is open to all of Europe's new democracies and reiterate our desire to build a substantive NATO-Russian relationship.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 8/12/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

recd 8/9
6am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5393

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

| | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harmon | | | |
| Dohse | 1 | B | |
| Sens | | | |
| Soderberg | | | |
| Berger | 2 | BN | see notes |
| Lake | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| West Wing Desk | 3 | | |
| Records Mgt. | | | |
| Pifer | 4 | | see notes |
| | | | |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

return to Pifer/Bell

→ SRB:

We left the last page as was. Yeltsin won't care about our costs but will care about our longer strategic aims. The reference to costs makes the sentence sound less like a threat.

Steve

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~
**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03
PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG TRIP
SIT: COQ HARMON LAKEA MILLISON PASSDOWN PIFER SIGLER SUM SUM2
SIT: PRIVACY_OUT

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0815-M-3 [6.04]
KBH 12/13/2019

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO [redacted] MOSCOW
INFO ////
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

.
AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

.
BEGIN TEXT:

.
.
DEAR BORIS:

.
AL GORE HAS GIVEN ME A FULL REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW AND HIS MEETING WITH YOU. IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION, AND AL AND VICTOR CONTINUE TO DO TERRIFIC WORK TOGETHER.

.
BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP ON THE GOOD WORK YOU AND I DID TOGETHER LAST APRIL IN MOSCOW. WE AGREED THEN THAT, ONCE THE RUSSIAN ELECTION WAS OVER, YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD PRESS THE DUMA TO RATIFY START II. I HOPE YOU CAN NOW MOVE ON THIS, SO THAT WE CAN BE IN A POSITION TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IN OCTOBER. BRINGING THE TREATY INTO FORCE WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF OUR PEOPLES AND UNDERSCORE OUR JOINT LEADERSHIP IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT.

.
YOU WROTE ME OF YOUR INTEREST IN LENGTHENING THE START II REDUCTION PERIOD. I DO NOT THINK THAT WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE. IT WOULD MEAN THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINING NUCLEAR FORCES AT HIGHER LEVELS FOR A LONGER PERIOD THAN WE NOW PLAN, SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING OUR COSTS. THIS IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST, OR RUSSIA'S. MOREOVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE COST TO RUSSIA OF LENGTHENING THE REDUCTION PERIOD WOULD EXCEED THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING START II ON SCHEDULE. BRINGING START II INTO FORCE THIS FALL WOULD ALLOW MORE THAN SIX YEARS TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIRED CUTS. MY EXPERTS BELIEVE THIS TIME SHOULD SUFFICE; INDEED, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA ARE REDUCING FORCES UNDER START I WELL AHEAD OF THE SCHEDULE MANDATED BY THAT AGREEMENT. FINALLY, WE NEED TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT SLOWING THE REDUCTION PACE, SO THAT WE DO NOT



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

GIVE CERTAIN STATES A PRETEXT TO QUESTION OUR COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION, ESPECIALLY IN THE LAST DAYS OF OUR EFFORT TO CONCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

ON AN ISSUE CLOSELY RELATED TO START II, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE SOME GOOD NEWS. MY ADMINISTRATION HAS WORKED HARD TO PREVENT CONGRESS FROM LEGISLATING ACTIONS THAT WOULD UNDERMINE OR BREACH THE ABM TREATY. THIS YEAR, THE TREATY WAS THREATENED MAINLY BY OBJECTIONABLE PROVISIONS RELATED TO ABM MULTILATERALIZATION AND DEMARCATION CONTAINED IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR THE COMING FISCAL YEAR. WITH THE THREAT OF A VETO, WE SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING THE CONGRESS TO DROP ALL THESE PROVISIONS FROM THE FINAL BILL.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THOUGH, I AM CONCERNED BY THE DISCUSSION ON ABM/TMD DEMARCATION IN JAKARTA. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIAN POSITION PRESENTED THERE WAS THAT RUSSIA IS NOT PREPARED TO SIGN THE PART I DEMARCATION AGREEMENT (COVERING LOWER VELOCITY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS), WHICH OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE CONCLUDED IN GENEVA, UNTIL WE REACH AGREEMENT ON PART II (COVERING HIGHER VELOCITY SYSTEMS).

THIS IS A CHANGE FROM WHAT YOU AND I DECIDED IN APRIL. WE AGREED THEN TO COMPLETE AND ENTER INTO FORCE THE PART I AGREEMENT BY THE END OF JUNE AND TO TRY TO FINISH PART II BY OCTOBER. WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THE FORMER, AND MY GOVERNMENT REMAINS PREPARED TO ACCOMPLISH THE LATTER. BUT I FEAR THAT THE LINKAGE SUGGESTED IN JAKARTA COULD WELL INSPIRE THOSE IN CONGRESS WHO OPPOSE THE ABM TREATY TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE IT. IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE RETURN TO OUR APRIL UNDERSTANDING.

TO THIS END, BORIS, I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT APPROPRIATE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR GOVERNMENTS, ALONG WITH UKRAINE, BELARUS AND KAZAKSTAN, SIGN THE NOW COMPLETE PART I ABM/TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER, AS WELL AS THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MULTILATERALIZATION AND THE TWO OTHER ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS. I AM SURE WE CAN ARRANGE A SIGNING ON THE MARGINS OF THE 51ST SESSION OF THE UNGA OR OF THE SIGNING OF A CTBT IF WE SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING THAT HISTORIC AGREEMENT. THESE STEPS, ALONG WITH ACTION BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PRESS THE DUMA TO RATIFY START II, WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL, PROVIDING CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO OUR PUBLICS OF THE VALUE OF OUR COMMON, COOPERATIVE WORK TO RESOLVE THE TOUGH ISSUES OF THE DAY.

WITH YOUR INAUGURATION BEHIND YOU, I HOPE THAT YOU GET SOME TIME TO GET AWAY FOR A REAL VACATION. YOU CERTAINLY HAVE EARNED IT.

SINCERELY,



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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BILL
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#1547

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.05)
KBH 12/13/2019

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SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

~~SECRET~~

Unofficial translation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.06)
KBH 12/13/2019

June 3, 1996
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

I would like to once again express my satisfaction with the results of our discussions with you in Moscow both in the framework of the G-8 negotiations and, especially, in the bilateral format. I am glad that with every meeting we are consistently moving forward in solving issues which find themselves in the center of the agenda of the Russian-American relations, first of all in the field of strengthening security.

I hope that, in particular, the progress we have achieved in consolidating the ABM Treaty will help us successfully finalize ratification of the START-2 Treaty by the Russian Parliament.

The entry of the Treaty into force is much delayed therefore the terms of limitations envisaged in it - before January 1, 2003, are not realistic any more. The pace of the limitations envisaged in the Treaty will be hardly realizable for Russia because of technical and, which is the most important, of financial reasons.

In this connection we are interested in adjusting the terms of arms' limitations by the Treaty extending them until January 1, 2008. This constitutes a necessary decision without which the Treaty will hardly be viable. Such an opinion is widely shared also in the Russian Duma.

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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I propose, without delay and without waiting for the Duma to finalize the ratification process, to hold bilateral consultations on this issue on a high level. In their course we could also discuss a number of other problems related to the Treaty, in particular measures to bring down costs.

I hope for your understanding in this most important issue for our two countries and for the whole world.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

June 3 letter on START II

5393

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«3» июня 1996 г.

№ Пр-1140

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы еще раз выразить удовлетворение результативностью наших с тобой бесед в Москве как в рамках переговоров "восьмерки", так и, особенно, в двустороннем формате. Рад, что от встречи к встрече мы последовательно продвигаемся в решении вопросов, стоящих в центре повестки дня российско-американских отношений, прежде всего в области укрепления безопасности.

Надеюсь, в частности, что достигнутый нами прогресс в области укрепления Договора по ПРО позволит успешно завершить ратификацию Договора СНВ-2 российским парламентом.

Сейчас в контексте ратификационного процесса в Госдуме Договора СНВ-2 возникла проблема, требующая нашего личного внимания. Она касается сроков выполнения этого Договора.

Вступление Договора в силу затянулось, и предусмотренный в нем срок сокращений - до 1 января 2003 г. - не является более реалистичным. Заложенные в Договоре темпы сокращений будут для России трудно осуществимыми в техническом, но, главное, в финансовом плане.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

В этой связи мы заинтересованы в том, чтобы скорректировать сроки сокращений вооружений по Договору, продлив их до 1 января 2008 г. Это - необходимое решение, без которого Договор вряд ли будет жизнеспособен. Такое мнение широко разделяется и в российской Думе.

Предлагаю без задержки, не дожидаясь завершения процесса ратификации Договора Думой, провести по этому вопросу двусторонние консультации на высоком уровне. На них также можно было бы обсудить и ряд других связанных с Договором проблем, в частности меры по снижению расходов.

Надеюсь на твое понимание в этом важнейшем для наших двух стран и всего мира деле.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

June 3 letter on START II

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«3» июня 1996 г.

№ Пр-1140

г. Москва, Кремль

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ БИЛЛУ КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Надеюсь на твое понимание в этом важнейшем для наших двух стран и всего мира деле.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5393
Re-do

August 8, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.09)
KBH 12/13/2019

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STEVE PIFER/BOB BELL

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Yeltsin on START II Ratification and ABM/TMD Demarcation

The memorandum to the President at Tab I recommends a message to President Yeltsin urging him to push for START II ratification by the Duma and to return to our April understanding on ABM/TMD demarcation, specifically, to instruct his government to sign the "Part I" ABM/TMD demarcation agreement in September.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin
Tab B June 3 Yeltsin Message on START II

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(6.10)
KBH 12/13/2019

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on START II Ratification and ABM/TMD Demarcation

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin urging START II ratification and a return to our April understanding on ABM/TMD demarcation.

Background

The message to Yeltsin at Tab A seeks to do three things.

***START II Ratification.*** Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin made clear to the Vice President that they appreciate the stance the United States took in the run-up to the Russian elections. We want to capitalize on that goodwill to press for START II ratification by the Duma.

***START II Reduction Period.*** Yeltsin suggested in a June letter (Tab B) that we extend the START II reduction period. We want to discourage this: it would require that we maintain a larger strategic force than currently planned, while posing greater costs to Moscow and some risk to our effort to conclude a CTBT.

***ABM/TMD Demarcation.*** You and Yeltsin agreed in April to conclude and bring into force the "Part I" ABM/TMD demarcation agreement (covering lower velocity theater missile defense systems) as soon as possible, while working on the "Part II" agreement (concerning higher velocity systems) with a view to finishing it in October. While the "Part I" agreement is ready for signature, Foreign Minister Primakov told Secretary Christopher in Jakarta that the Russians would not sign it until "Part II" is ready. This is a retreat from your April agreement; if the Russians hold to it and word leaks on the Hill, it could prompt our critics to redouble their efforts to legislate actions in the ABM/TMD area that would undermine the ABM Treaty.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET
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RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin
Tab B June 3 Yeltsin Message on START II

Yeltsin won't care about our costs but should care about our maintaining a much larger strategic force.

) Why should he care?



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AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

AL GORE HAS GIVEN ME A FULL REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW AND HIS MEETING WITH YOU. IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION, AND AL AND VICTOR CONTINUE TO DO TERRIFIC WORK TOGETHER.

BORIS, I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP ON THE GOOD WORK YOU AND I DID TOGETHER LAST APRIL IN MOSCOW. WE AGREED THEN THAT, ONCE THE RUSSIAN ELECTION WAS OVER, YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD PRESS THE DUMA TO RATIFY START II. I HOPE YOU CAN NOW MOVE ON THIS, SO THAT WE CAN BE IN A POSITION TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IN OCTOBER. BRINGING THE TREATY INTO FORCE WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF OUR PEOPLES AND UNDERSCORE OUR JOINT LEADERSHIP IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT.

YOU WROTE ME OF YOUR INTEREST IN LENGTHENING THE START II REDUCTION PERIOD. I DO NOT THINK THAT WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE. IT WOULD MEAN THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINING NUCLEAR FORCES AT HIGHER LEVELS FOR A LONGER PERIOD THAN WE NOW PLAN, SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING OUR COSTS. THIS IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST, OR RUSSIA'S. MOREOVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE COST TO RUSSIA OF LENGTHENING THE REDUCTION PERIOD WOULD EXCEED THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING START II ON SCHEDULE. BRINGING START II INTO FORCE THIS FALL WOULD ALLOW MORE THAN SIX YEARS TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIRED CUTS. MY EXPERTS BELIEVE THIS TIME SHOULD SUFFICE; INDEED, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA ARE REDUCING FORCES UNDER START I WELL AHEAD OF THE SCHEDULE MANDATED BY THAT AGREEMENT. FINALLY, WE NEED TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT SLOWING THE REDUCTION PACE, SO THAT WE DO NOT GIVE CERTAIN STATES A PRETEXT TO QUESTION OUR COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION, ESPECIALLY IN THE LAST DAYS OF OUR EFFORT TO CONCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

ON AN ISSUE CLOSELY RELATED TO START II, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE SOME GOOD NEWS. MY ADMINISTRATION HAS WORKED HARD TO PREVENT CONGRESS FROM LEGISLATING ACTIONS THAT WOULD UNDERMINE OR BREACH THE ABM TREATY. THIS YEAR, THE TREATY WAS THREATENED MAINLY BY OBJECTIONABLE PROVISIONS RELATED TO ABM MULTILATERALIZATION AND DEMARCATION CONTAINED IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR THE COMING FISCAL YEAR. WITH THE THREAT OF A VETO, WE SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING THE CONGRESS TO DROP ALL THESE PROVISIONS FROM THE FINAL BILL.

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2015-0815-M-3 (6.11)
KBH 12/13/2019

IN THIS CONTEXT, THOUGH, I AM ~~VERY~~ CONCERN
~~MINISTER PRIMAKOV TOLD SECRETARY CHRISTOPH~~
DEMARCATION IN JAKARTA. ~~MR. PRIMAKOV SAID~~
PREPARED TO SIGN THE PART I DEMARCATION AG
VELOCITY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS)
HAVE CONCLUDED IN GENEVA UNTIL WE REACH
(COVERING HIGHER VELOCITY SYSTEMS). ← A CHANGE FROM
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COMPLETE AND ENTER INTO FORCE THE PART I A
JUNE AND TO TRY TO FINISH PART II BY OCTOBE
ACCOMPLISHED THE FORMER, AND MY GOVERNMENT
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~~PRIMAKOV~~ COULD WELL INSPIRE THOSE IN CONGRE
TREATY TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO UNDERMI
THAT WE RETURN TO OUR APRIL UNDERSTANDING. ← BUT I FEAR T

given likelihood that Yeltsin will not become actively engaged now, do we want to go after Primakov so directly? He is likely to get a pass on this, given Yeltsin's health. Does this come from? De-personalize.

TO THIS END, BORIS, I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE
REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR GOVERNMENTS, ALONG
AND KAZAKSTAN, SIGN THE NOW COMPLETE PART
AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER, AS WELL AS THE MEM
STANDING ON MULTILATERALIZATION AND THE TWO OTHER ACCOMPANYING
DOCUMENTS. I AM SURE WE CAN ARRANGE A SIGNING ON THE MARGINS OF THE 51ST SESSION OF THE UNGA OR THE SIGNING OF A CTBT IF WE SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING THAT HISTORIC AGREEMENT. THESE STEPS, ALONG WITH ACTION BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PRESS THE DUMA TO RATIFY START II, WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL, PROVIDING CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO OUR PUBLICS OF THE VALUE OF OUR COMMON, COOPERATIVE WORK TO RESOLVE THE TOUGH ISSUES OF THE DAY.

WITH YOUR INAUGURATION BEHIND YOU, I HOPE THAT YOU GET SOME TIME TO GET AWAY FOR A REAL VACATION. YOU CERTAINLY HAVE EARNED IT.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)


PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

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He is likely to get a boost on this, given Yeltsin's health. Does this cause him? De-personalize.

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(END TEXT)

BY THE DISCUSSION

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIAN POSITION IS THAT THERE WAS

THEN



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(END TEXT)

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~~SECRET~~

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KBH 12/13/2019

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 1.6 X6

~~SECRET~~
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SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.19)
KBH 12/13/2019

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin on START II Ratification and ABM/TMD Demarcation

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin urging START II ratification and a return to our April understanding on ABM/TMD demarcation.

Background

The message to Yeltsin at Tab A seeks to do three things.

***START II Ratification.*** Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin made clear to the Vice President that they appreciate the stance the United States took in the run-up to the Russian elections. We want to capitalize on that goodwill to press for START II ratification by the Duma.

***START II Reduction Period.*** Yeltsin suggested in a June letter (Tab B) that we extend the START II reduction period. We want to discourage this: it would require that we maintain a larger strategic force than currently planned, while posing greater costs to Moscow and some risk to our effort to conclude a CTBT.

***ABM/TMD Demarcation.*** You and Yeltsin agreed in April to conclude and bring into force the "Part I" ABM/TMD demarcation agreement (covering lower velocity theater missile defense systems) as soon as possible, while working on the "Part II" agreement (concerning higher velocity systems) with a view to finishing it in October. While the "Part I" agreement is ready for signature, Foreign Minister Primakov told Secretary Christopher in Jakarta that the Russians would not sign it until "Part II" is ready. This is a retreat from your April agreement; if the Russians hold to it and word leaks on the Hill, it could prompt our critics to redouble their efforts to legislate actions in the ABM/TMD area that would undermine the ABM Treaty.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copies → Andreasen
Veshbow
Parris

Office of Language Services
Department of State
(Translation)

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IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(6.15)
KBH 12/13/2019

LS No. 150501
Russian
JS/PH

His Excellency
Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

July proved to be very productive as regards Russian-U.S. contacts. Your July 5th telephone call after my victory in the election, though brief, enabled us to compare our positions on the main issues bearing on our relations. We exchanged messages of fundamental importance. I consider your message of July 12, conveyed to me by Al Gore, to be a reaffirmation of your willingness to further the partnership with Russia, in spite of the hectic election campaign in the U.S. The regular session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission produced solid results. Mr. Primakov, as he later told me, was also pleased with his talks with Secretary Christopher in Jakarta.

I believe we agree that a favorable moment has arrived in Russian-U.S. relations, which we should use to make further progress, particularly in the major issues on our agenda. The next few months will be of decisive importance for our work on these issues. We shall have to make a number of crucial decisions. I am sure Americans will duly appreciate the fact that their president is not putting off these decisions until after the election.

We have also reached agreement concerning the priorities of our joint work.

One long-term priority is to ensure the flow of direct private investments from the U.S. into the Russian economy. We are presently taking additional steps to improve the

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FR) 08.09. '96 11:39 NO. 1460044254 PAGE 2

investment climate. But we count on your administration also to take specific measures aimed at encouraging American investment in Russia.

New coordinated steps by our countries are needed to defuse regional crises. The situations in Bosnia and the Near East require special attention.

I fully concur with your view that our cooperation remains the cornerstone of the Near East peace process. Thanks to our countries' efforts, some constructive shifts have become evident in the policy of the Israeli government. Our parallel contacts with Egypt, which now plays a stabilizing role in the region, were well-timed. But we must not rest until we succeed in bringing about a resumption of talks on the basis of the key principles of Madrid. I have instructed Mr. Primakov to visit the Near East in October. He will inform Mr. Christopher of the outcome of his talks and consult with him regarding further steps.

Your concerns about the situation in Bosnia are quite understandable. Your opponents may use a breakdown of the Dayton Agreements as ammunition against you. Like you, we are also interested in the success of the Dayton process. We have jointly resolved the "Karadzic problem"--of that I am certain. The main objective today is to hold proper elections in Bosnia. We must concentrate on preparing the elections and not endanger them for the sake of momentary political advantages.

I also wish to say something about the problem of NATO. Without an agreement between Russia and the U.S. on this issue, the current positive trends in Europe cannot be maintained. That is why it is so important for us to begin a confidential dialogue on the whole range of issues pertaining to European security. The Russian side is ready to participate constructively. I assume the U.S. side likewise seeks an agreement that would not harm the national interests of either Russia or the United States. We could formalize it in a binding manner at our next meeting.

In conclusion, I shall touch briefly on problems relating to strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. Here we must work together intensively. I would like to call your attention once more to the fact that demarcation of strategic and non-strategic ABM defense and adjustment of the schedule for reducing strategic weapons are factors in the ratification of the START II Treaty.

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When the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs comes to the U.S. in September, he will be prepared for substantive discussions of all these issues. I hope you will have time for a thorough, informal talk with him.

Respectfully,

B. Yel'tsin

Moscow, the Kremlin

August 5, 1996

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FR) 08.09. '96 11:39 NO. 14600442S4 PAGE 4

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«05» августа 1996 г.

№ Пр-1702

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Июль оказался весьма продуктивным с точки зрения российско-американских контактов. Телефонный разговор, состоявшийся 5 июля, после моей победы на выборах, хотя был кратким, позволил нам сверить позиции по главным вопросам наших отношений. Мы с тобой обменялись принципиально важными посланиями. Рассматриваю твое послание от 12 июля, которое привез А.Гор, как подтверждение твоей готовности продвигать партнерство с Россией, несмотря на предвыборный прессинг в США. Солидными результатами завершилась очередная сессия Комиссии Черномырдин-Гор. Е.М.Примаков, как он мне рассказывал, также остался удовлетворен своими переговорами с У.Кристофером в Джакарте.

Как представляется, у нас есть общее понимание, что в российско-американских отношениях сложился благоприятный момент, которым надо воспользоваться для продвижения в первую очередь по центральным вопросам нашей повестки дня. Ближайшие месяцы будут иметь решающее значение для работы по этим вопросам. Нам предстоит принять ряд ответственных решений. Уверен, американцы по достоинству оценят, что их президент не откладывает эти решения на период после выборов.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Относительно приоритетов совместной работы у нас тоже есть согласие.

Долгосрочный приоритет - обеспечение притока прямых частных капиталовложений из США в российскую экономику. Мы сейчас осуществляем дополнительные мероприятия по улучшению инвестиционного климата. Но мы рассчитываем, что одновременно и твоей администрацией будут приняты конкретные меры, направленные на стимулирование американских инвестиций в Россию.

Нужны новые скоординированные шаги наших стран по урегулированию региональных кризисов. Особого внимания требует ситуация в Боснии и на Ближнем Востоке.

Полностью разделяю твою оценку, что наше сотрудничество остается краеугольным камнем ближневосточного мирного процесса. Благодаря предпринятым нашими странами усилиям в политике израильского правительства обозначились кое-какие конструктивные подвижки. Вовремя были проведены наши параллельные контакты с Египтом, который сейчас играет стабилизирующую роль в регионе. Но ни в коем случае нельзя успокаиваться, пока мы не добьемся возобновления переговоров на основе базовых принципов Мадрида. Я дал указание Е.М.Примакову осуществить визит на Ближний Восток в октябре месяце. О результатах своих переговоров он проинформирует У.Кристофера и договорится с ним о дальнейших шагах.

Озабоченности, которые ты высказываешь в связи с обстановкой в Боснии, вполне понятны. Твои оппоненты могут использовать против тебя срыв в реализации Дейтонских соглашений. Мы, так же как и ты, заинтересованы в успехе Дейтонского процесса. "Проблему Караджича" мы совместно закрыли. Я в этом уверен. Сегодня главное - это четкое проведение выборов в Боснии. Необходимо сосредоточиться на подготовке выборов и не подвергать их опасности ради сиюминутных пропагандистских выигрышей.

Особо хочу сказать о проблеме НАТО. Без договоренности между Россией и США по этому вопросу нынешние позитивные тенденции в Европе не сохранить. Вот почему так важно, что мы начали доверительный диалог по всему комплексу вопросов европейской безопасности. Российская сторона настроена конструктивно. Исхожу из того, что американская сторона также ориентирована на подготовку договоренности, которая не ущемляла бы национальные интересы ни

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России, ни США. Оформить ее обязывающим образом могли бы мы с тобой при очередной встрече.

В заключение, вкратце коснусь проблематики СНВ-ПРО. Здесь необходима наша совместная энергичная работа. Сейчас хочу еще раз привлечь твое внимание к тому обстоятельству, что разграничение стратегической и нестратегической ПРО и корректировка сроков сокращения стратегических вооружений являются факторами ратификации Договора СНВ-2.

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С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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rec'd 8/6 x Vbrontsov

Translated from Russian

Dear Bill,

The month of ~~June~~ July proved to be very productive in terms of Russian-American contacts. The telephone conversation which we had on July 5 after my victory in the elections, however brief it was, still allowed us to coordinate our positions on key issues of our relations. You and I have exchanged extremely important letters. I consider your letter of July 12 which was brought by A.Gore as an affirmation of your readiness to promote partnership with Russia despite the pre-election pressure in the US. Sound results marked the end of the last session of the Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission. As Y.Primakov told me he was pleased with his negotiations with W.Christopher in Djakarta.

It appears that we have a common understanding that we are witnessing a favourable moment in Russian-American relations and we should take advantage of it to advance primarily in central issues of our agenda. Next months will have a decisive significance for our work on these issues. We have a number of important decisions to make. I am confident that Americans will appreciate the fact that their President does not put these decisions off till the end of elections.

We also have a consent in terms of priorities of mutual work.

Long-term priority is to ensure a flow of direct private investments into the Russian economy from the US. We are currently taking additional measures to improve investment climate. In the meantime we expect that your administration will simultaneously take concrete measures aimed at stimulating American investments in Russia.

There is a need for new coordinated steps by our countries to settle regional crises. Situations in Bosnia and the Middle East require special attention.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

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I fully share your evaluation that our cooperation remains a cornerstone in the Middle East peace process. Due to efforts made by our countries certain constructive shifts are evolving in the Israeli government policy. Our parallel contacts with Egypt which now plays a stabilizing role in the region were very timely. But we should by no means rest until we achieve the resumption of talks on the basis of Madrid fundamental principles. I have instructed Y.Primakov to pay a visit to the Middle East in October. He will inform W.Christopher on the results of his negotiations and coordinate further steps with him.

Concerns that you express in terms of situation in Bosnia are quite understandable. Your opponents can use the failure in the implementation of the Dayton accords against you. We, as well as you, are interested in the success of the Dayton process. We have jointly resolved the "Karadzic problem". In that I am quite confident. Our main objective today is a sharp organization of elections in Bosnia. It is necessary to concentrate on preparation of elections and not to jeopardize them for the sake of momentary propaganda successes.

I would like to draw special attention to the problem of NATO. Present positive trends in Europe can not be preserved without an agreement between Russia and the US on this issue. That is why it is important that we have started a confidential dialogue on the entire set of issues of European security. The attitude of the Russian side is constructive. I presume that the American side is also oriented on preparing an agreement that would not infringe on national interests of either Russia or the US. At our next meeting we could put that into a binding shape.

In conclusion I will briefly touch upon the problem of START-ABM. Here there is a need for our joint vigorous work. I would only like to focus your attention on the fact that demarcation between strategic and non-strategic ABM and the correction of timetable of strategic arms reduction are factors of ratification of the START-2 Treaty.

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When the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia comes to the US in September he will be ready for an in-depth conversation on all these issues. I hope you will have time for substantial informal conversation with him.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

Moscow, The Kremlin
August 5, 1996

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Июль оказался весьма продуктивным с точки зрения российско-американских контактов. Телефонный разговор, состоявшийся 5 июля, после моей победы на выборах, хотя был кратким, позволил нам сверить позиции по главным вопросам наших отношений. Мы с тобой обменялись принципиально важными посланиями. Рассматриваю твое послание от I2 июля, которое привез А.Гор, как подтверждение твоей готовности продвигать партнерство с Россией, несмотря на предвыборный прессинг в США. Солидными результатами завершилась очередная сессия Комиссии Черномырдин - Гор. Е.М.Примаков, как он мне рассказывал, также остался удовлетворен своими переговорами с У.Кристофером в Джакарте.

Как представляется, у нас есть общее понимание, что в российско-американских отношениях сложился благоприятный момент, которым надо воспользоваться для продвижения в первую очередь по центральным вопросам нашей повестки дня. Ближайшие месяцы будут иметь решающее значение для работы по этим вопросам. Нам предстоит принять ряд ответственных решений. Уверен, американцы по достоинству оценят, что их президент не откладывает эти решения на период после выборов.

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лирование американских инвестиций в Россию.

Нужны новые скоординированные шаги наших стран по урегулированию региональных кризисов. Особого внимания требует ситуация в Боснии и на Ближнем Востоке.

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Особо хочу сказать о проблеме НАТО. Без договоренности между Россией и США по этому вопросу нынешние позитивные тенденции в Европе не сохранить. Вот почему так важно, что мы начали доверительный диалог по всему комплексу вопросов европейской безопасности. Российская сторона настроена конструктивно. Исхожу из того, что американская сторона также ориентирована на подготовку договоренности, которая не ущемляла бы национальные интересы ни России, ни США. Оформить ее обязывающим образом могли бы мы с тобой при очередной встрече.

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С уважением, Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль

5 августа 1996 г.

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«05» августа 1996 г.
№ Пр-1702

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Июль оказался весьма продуктивным с точки зрения российско-американских контактов. Телефонный разговор, состоявшийся 5 июля, после моей победы на выборах, хотя был кратким, позволил нам сверить позиции по главным вопросам наших отношений. Мы с тобой обменялись принципиально важными посланиями. Рассматриваю твое послание от 12 июля, которое привез А.Гор, как подтверждение твоей готовности продвигать партнерство с Россией, несмотря на предвыборный прессинг в США. Солидными результатами завершилась очередная сессия Комиссии Черномырдин-Гор. Е.М.Примаков, как он мне рассказывал, также остался удовлетворен своими переговорами с У.Кристофером в Джакарте.

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ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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rec'd 6/27

Translated from Russian

June 27, 1996

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your message on Bosnia which you have sent to me as well as to other members of "the eight".

I regret that we will not be able to meet in Lyon. Nevertheless V.Chernomyrdin is ready for a most constructive cooperation to find solution to our common tasks.

One of them is a comprehensive implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace accord. We have already done a good job although some problems persist. I share your view on the need for additional efforts by the world community to ensure a lasting peace in the region.

Elections and re-establishment of the economic potential of Bosnia are the cornerstones of its return to normal life. Here our evaluations fully coincide. I support your proposal on preparation and adoption by "the eight" of a document which would present a general overview of the situation, note our efforts in support of the political implementation and economic revival, assist the work of international institutions and the High Representative K.Bildt. Naturally, in it we also ought to induce the parties to more actively comply with their obligations.

I believe that our experts will constructively work on the text of such a document in Lyon.

His Excellency
William J.Clinton
The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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One of most important stages in the settlement is about to begin now. The "inertia of hostility" is too great on every side. In order to overcome it we need patience, persistence and a balanced approach. I think that threats of taking unilateral measures especially on the scale of reinstating the sanctions regime would be really counterproductive. Their price - a disruption of the peace process - is too high.

I am sure that, while proceeding responsibly and from agreed positions, we shall be able to surmount existing difficulties and to give in Lyon a new impetus to political settlement.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

Moscow, the Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю за послание по Боснии, которое ты направил мне, а также другим членам "восьмерки".

Сожалею, что не удастся встретиться в Лионе. Вместе с тем, В.С.Черномырдин готов к самому конструктивному взаимодействию в решении наших общих задач.

Одна из них – всеобъемлющее выполнение мирного соглашения по Боснии и Герцеговине. Сделано уже немало, хотя проблемы, конечно, остаются. Разделяю твое мнение о необходимости дополнительных усилий международного сообщества для обеспечения стабильного мира в этом районе.

Проведение выборов и восстановление экономического потенциала Боснии – краеугольные камни ее возвращения к нормальной жизни. Здесь наши оценки полностью совпадают. Поддерживаю твое предложение о подготовке и принятии "восьмеркой" документа, который бы характеризовал общий взгляд на ситуацию, отмечал наши усилия в поддержку политической имплементации и экономического возрождения, содействовал работе международных институтов и высокого представителя К.Бильдта. Разумеется, в нем мы должны также побуждать стороны к более активному выполнению взятых на себя обязательств.

Рассчитываю, что наши эксперты в Лионе конструктивно поработают над текстом такого документа.

Сейчас в урегулировании наступает один из ответственных этапов. У всех сторон еще слишком велика "инерция вражды". Для того, чтобы преодолеть ее, нам необходимы терпение, настойчивость

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сбалансированный подход. Думаю, что угрозы принятия односторонних мер, да еще таких, как возобновление режима санкций, были бы весьма контрпродуктивными. Цена их - срыв мирного процесса - слишком высока.

Уверен, действуя ответственно, с согласованных позиций, мы преодолеем имеющиеся трудности, сможем дать в Лионе новый импульс политическому урегулированию.

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
27 июня 1996 г.

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June 27 letter on Bosnia

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«27» июня 1996 г.
№ Пр-1482

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Высокого представителя К.Бильдта. Разумеется, в нем мы должны также побуждать стороны к более активному выполнению взятых на себя обязательств.

Рассчитываю, что наши эксперты в Лионе конструктивно поработают над текстом такого документа.

Сейчас в урегулировании наступает один из ответственных этапов. У всех сторон еще слишком велика "инерция вражды". Для того, чтобы преодолеть ее, нам необходимы терпение, настойчивость, сбалансированный подход. Думаю, что угрозы принятия односторонних мер, да еще таких как возобновление режима санкций, были бы весьма контрпродуктивными. Цена их - срыв мирного процесса - слишком высока.

Уверен, действуя ответственно, с согласованных позиций, мы преодолеем имеющиеся трудности, сможем дать в Лионе новый импульс политическому урегулированию.

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

(reaction)
5580
x Mcuyan 6/14

Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

I have received your messages. I am pleased by the resolutions which we have recently managed to accomplish with the decisive role of the Russian-American interaction. Undoubtedly, these resolutions are very important themselves whether it is disentangling of the flank issue, starting negotiations on updating the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, launching the NATO internal reform or developing the Lion summit three-stage formula. Far more valuable is the fact that the achieved agreements enable us to begin a serious dialog on ensuring a cooperative security in Europe and the entire world on the threshold of the 21 century and on the role of our two nations as natural leaders in the international cooperation.

We have realized almost all provisions of the agenda we designated in Moscow in April. Now we should expediently revert to the genuinely co-sponsor mode of work on promoting the peace process in the Middle East and conclude the coordination of the START ABM package. Noting this I am requesting you to pay particular attention to the issue of extending the terms of carrying out reductions under the START-2 Treaty which I have recently written you about.

I am planning to discuss all these issues at our bilateral meeting after the conclusion of the Lion summit.

HIS EXCELLENCY,
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

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I highly appreciate your cordial congratulation on the occasion of the Russian national holiday. I am confident that the upcoming presidential elections in Russia will become an assurance of the historic choice made by the Russian people six years ago.

Sincerely,

Till our meeting in Lion,

B.Yeltsin

Moscow, The Kremlin

June 14, 1996

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ Дж. КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Получил твои послания. Удовлетворен теми решениями, которые нам удалось достичь в последние дни при решающей роли российско-американского взаимодействия. Эти решения, бесспорно, важны и сам по себе, идет ли речь о разблокировании фланговой проблемы, о зап ске переговоров по модернизации Договора об обычных вооруженных с лах в Европе, о начале внутренней реформы в НАТО или о выработке трехэтапной формулы проведения саммита в Лионе. Но не менее ценно то, что достигнутые договоренности выводят нас на серьезный разго вор об обеспечении кооперативной безопасности в Европе и мире в ц лом на пороге XXI столетия и о роли наших двух держав как естест ных лидеров международного сотрудничества.

Мы реализовали почти все позиции той повестки дня, которую наметили в апреле в Москве. Теперь надо быстрее вернуться в подл но коспонсорский режим работы по продвижению мирного процесса на Ближнем Востоке и закончить согласование пакета по СНВ III. При этом прошу тебя особенно внимательно отнестись к вопросу о продл сроков осуществления сокращений по договору СНВ-2, о котором я н давно писал.

Рассчитываю обсудить все эти вопросы на нашей двусторонней встрече по завершении саммита в Лионе.

Благодарю тебя за теплое поздравление по случаю национально праздника России. Уверен, что предстоящие президентские выборы в России станут подтверждением исторического выбора, сделанного ро сиянами шесть лет назад.

С уважением, до встречи в Лионе,

Б.Ельцин

Москва, Кремль
14 июня 1996 года

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June 14 letter on Russian-Amer Interaction

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«14» июня 19 96 г.

№ Пр-1324

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Получил твои послания. Удовлетворен теми решениями, которые нам удалось достичь в последние дни при решающей роли российско-американского взаимодействия. Эти решения, бесспорно, важны и сами по себе, идет ли речь о разблокировании фланговой проблемы, о запуске переговоров по модернизации Договора об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе, о начале внутренней реформы в НАТО или о выработке трехэтапной формулы проведения саммита в Лионе. Но не менее ценно и то, что достигнутые договоренности выводят нас на серьезный разговор об обеспечении кооперативной безопасности в Европе и мире в целом на пороге XXI столетия и о роли наших двух держав как естественных лидеров международного сотрудничества.

Мы реализовали почти все позиции той повестки дня, которую наметили в апреле в Москве. Теперь надо быстрее вернуться в подлинно коспонсорский режим работы по продвижению мирного процесса на Ближнем Востоке и закончить согласование пакета по СНВ-ПРО. При этом прошу тебя особенно внимательно отнестись к вопросу о продлении сроков осуществления сокращений до Договору СНВ-2, о котором я недавно писал.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Рассчитываю обсудить все эти вопросы на нашей двусторонней встрече по завершении саммита в Лионе.

Благодарю тебя за теплое поздравление по случаю Национального праздника России. Уверен, что предстоящие президентские выборы в России станут подтверждением исторического выбора, сделанного россиянами шесть лет назад.

С уважением, до встречи в Лионе,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Steve -- we can close out all the outstanding presidential correspondence with Kuchma and Lukashenko.

The President received three letters from Lukashenko, not two as indicated by the tracking system. We have agreed with State that the President should not respond to these letters as it is highly likely that they would be misused by Lukashenko to portray a "close relationship" with the President of the United States. We have verbally communicated to Belarusian officials our responses to the various policy issues they have raised with us.

The two Kuchma letters have been addressed by a letter from Vice President Gore to Kuchma (which I have attached). This is appropriate given the new Kuchma-Gore Commission. We, at some point, need to gin up a letter from the President to Kuchma to show that that relationship still exists, but it should not be driven by the Kuchma letters we have received.

Carlos

Exec Sec -

As per above, please close Lukashenko letter files (#5066, #6141, #7910) - No response appropriate at this time

Also as per above, please close Kuchma letter files (#7061, #0954) - VP message has answered.

Thanks.

Steve Pate

2/13/97

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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

I highly value the close personal attention that you pay to the START-ABM problems. At this point they have most likely become one of the centerpieces in the relations of our two countries and I hope that through our joint efforts we will accomplish their most expedient resolution.

In my letter of June 3, 1996, I raised the issue of extending the term of strategic arms reduction under START-2 till January 1, 2008. Once again I would like to underscore that this is extremely important for Russia considering the current economic and financial difficulties. In addition, the implementation of the START-2 requirements within the term specified earlier would overlap with fulfilling the obligations under START-1 which would be an excessive burden for our country. This is also corroborated by the fact that the coming into force of START-1, the obligations of which continue START-2, has been delayed for several years. We have thoroughly calculated the required implementation costs of START-2 and we do not share the American standpoint that it could be less expensive. On the whole, unless we take expedient measures to adjust the term the issue could become a serious hindering factor in the ratification process.

I believe that it is in our mutual interest to resolve the problem of extending the term of START-2 implementation as soon as possible for which we could use the upcoming political consultations between our two countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia will be prepared for a detailed discussion of this matter during his coming trip to the US.

Some words about the anti-missile defense. I would like to express satisfaction with your and your administration's actions for the protection of the ABM Treaty in the US Congress. On my part, I lend my utmost assistance to keep the ABM Treaty a guarantor of strategic stability in the contemporary world. If you and I, with the participation of Belorus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine,

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

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manage to resolve shortly the two important problems related to the ABM Treaty - its multilateral nature and the demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM - it will be a convincing evidence of expedience and necessity of our joint efforts on strengthening the viability of this most important international treaty.

I would like to alleviate your concern regarding the resolution of the problem of demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM which you have written to me about. With the same persistence as we implemented our arrangement to develop the first part of the agreement on demarcation (concerning low-velocity systems of tactical ABM) by the end of June, we intend to achieve the implementation of the other element of our arrangement - to have the second part of the agreement (on high-velocity systems) ready in October, so that by that time the problem of demarcation will be fully resolved. There are no reasons to question our readiness to attain this goal. I am pleased that you intend to obtain this as well. It is in our mutual interests to do everything possible to present as soon as possible to the public of our countries solid evidence that the work on the demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM resulted in the development of the complete text of the agreement. This would provide a sound backing for the ABM Treaty and would allow me to enable the Duma to ratify START-2. I suppose that you will agree with the significance of achieving such a result.

As for your proposal to sign within a short period of time only the first part of the agreement without waiting until all negotiations on demarcation are complete, I do not think this will be in the best interests of our cause. Furthermore, this course of action is entirely unjustified, and we can only lose our pace of work on the entire agreement on demarcation.

There is not much time left until October. That is why it is so important now not to allow any delay in the resumption of our experts' work in Geneva. We should start their meeting as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, The Kremlin
September 17, 1996

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«17» сентября 19 96 г.

№ Пр-1875

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Высоко ценю большое личное внимание, которое ты уделяешь проблемам СНВ-ПРО. Пожалуй, сейчас они вышли на одно из центральных мест в отношениях наших стран, и я надеюсь, что совместными усилиями мы сумеем добиться их скорейшего решения.

В своем обращении от 3 июня с.г. я поставил вопрос о продлении срока осуществления сокращений стратегических вооружений по Договору СНВ-2 до 1 января 2008 года. Хочу еще раз подчеркнуть, что для России это чрезвычайно важно, принимая во внимание испытываемые нами экономические и финансовые трудности. Помимо прочего, осуществление предусмотренных Договором СНВ-2 требований в ранее установленный срок накладывалось бы на выполнение обязательств по Договору СНВ-1, что было бы непосильным бременем для нашей страны. Это тем более верно, что и вступление в силу Договора СНВ-1, обязательства по которому как бы продолжают Договор СНВ-2, задержалось на несколько лет. Мы тщательно просчитали требуемые затраты на выполнение Договора СНВ-2 и не разделяем американскую точку зрения, что это можно сделать дешевле. В целом же, если не принять быстрых мер по корректировке срока, этот вопрос может стать серьезным тормозящим фактором ратификационного процесса.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

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Считаю, что в наших общих интересах как можно скорее решить проблему продления срока выполнения Договора СНВ-2, для чего можно было бы использовать предстоящие политические консультации между нашими странами. К предметному разговору на эту тему будет готов министр иностранных дел России во время его предстоящей поездки в США.

Теперь о противоракетной обороне. Хотел бы выразить удовлетворение действиями твоей администрации и твоими лично в защиту Договора по ПРО при работе с конгрессом США.

Со своей стороны, всемерно содействую тому, чтобы Договор по ПРО оставался гарантом стратегической стабильности в современном мире. И если нам с тобой удастся в самое ближайшее время с участием Белоруссии, Казахстана и Украины довести до конца решение двух важных проблем, связанных с Договором по ПРО, - о его многостороннем характере и о разграничении стратегической и нестратегической ПРО, - это будет убедительным доказательством полезности и необходимости наших совместных усилий по укреплению жизнеспособности этого важнейшего международного соглашения.

Хотел бы снять твою обеспокоенность в отношении хода решения проблемы разграничения стратегической и нестратегической ПРО, о чем ты мне писал. Так же настойчиво, как осуществлялась наша с тобой договоренность выработать первую часть соглашения по разграничению (в отношении низкоскоростных систем нестратегической ПРО) к концу июня, мы намерены действовать и для выполнения другого элемента нашей договоренности - иметь в октябре вторую часть соглашения (по высокоскоростным системам) так, чтобы к этому времени проблема разграничения была решена полностью. Нет никаких оснований сомневаться в нашей готовности достичь этой цели. Рад, что и ты намерен добиваться этого. В наших общих интересах сделать все необходимое, чтобы как можно скорее представить общественности наших стран убедительное доказательство того, что работа по разграничению стратегической и нестратегической ПРО завершилась подготовкой соглашения в полном объеме. Это явилось бы солидным подкреплением Договора по ПРО и позволило бы мне побудить Думу ратифицировать Договор СНВ-2. Думаю, ты согласишься с важностью достижения такого результата.

Что же касается твоего предложения подписать в ближайшее время лишь первую часть соглашения, не дожидаясь завершения переговоров по разграничению в целом, то не думаю, что это отвечает интересам

дела. Скажу больше. Такой образ действия ничем не оправдан, мы можем лишь потерять темп работы над договоренностью по разграничению в целом.

Времени до октября остается немного. Именно поэтому сейчас важно не допустить задержки в возобновлении работы экспертов в Женеве. Нужно как можно скорее начать их встречу.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Дорогой Билл,

Высоко ценю большое личное внимание, которое ты уделяешь проблемам СНВ-ПРО. Пожалуй, сейчас они вышли на одно из центральных мест в отношениях наших стран, и я надеюсь, что совместными усилиями мы сумеем добиться их скорейшего решения.

В своем обращении от 3 июня с.г. я поставил вопрос о продлении срока осуществления сокращений стратегических вооружений по Договору СНВ-2 до I января 2008 года. Хочу еще раз подчеркнуть, что для России это чрезвычайно важно, принимая во внимание испытываемые нами экономические и финансовые трудности. Помимо прочего, осуществление предусмотренных Договором СНВ-2 требований в ранее установленный срок накладывалось бы на выполнение обязательств по Договору СНВ-I, что было бы непосильным бременем для нашей страны. Это тем более верно, что и вступление в силу договора СНВ-I, обязательства по которому как бы продолжает Договор СНВ-2, задержалось на несколько лет. Мы тщательно просчитали требуемые затраты на выполнение Договора СНВ-2 и не разделяем американскую точку зрения, что это можно сделать дешевле. В целом же, если не принять быстрых мер по корректировке срока, этот вопрос может стать серьезным тормозящим фактором ратификационного процесса.

Считаю, что в наших общих интересах как можно скорее решить проблему продления срока выполнения Договора СНВ-2, для чего можно было бы использовать предстоящие политические консультации между нашими странами. К предметному разговору на эту тему будет готов министр иностранных дел России во время его предстоящей поездки в США.

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Теперь о противоракетной обороне. Хотел бы выразить удовлетворение действиями твоей администрации и твоими лично в защиту Договора по ПРО при работе с Конгрессом США.

Со своей стороны, всемерно содействую тому, чтобы Договор по ПРО оставался гарантом стратегической стабильности в современном мире. И если нам с тобой удастся в самое ближайшее время с участием Белоруссии, Казахстана и Украины довести до конца решение двух важных проблем, связанных с Договором по ПРО, – о его многосторонне характере и о разграничении стратегической и нестратегической ПРО, – это будет убедительным доказательством полезности и необходимости наших совместных усилий по укреплению жизнеспособности этого важнейшего международного соглашения.

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Что же касается твоего предложения подписать в ближайшее время лишь первую часть соглашения, не дожидаясь завершения переговоров по разграничению в целом, то не думаю, что это отвечает

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интересам дела. Скажу больше, такой образ действия ничем не оправдан, мы можем лишь потерять темп работы над договоренностью по разграничению в целом.

Времени до октября остается немного. Именно поэтому сейчас важно не допустить задержки в возобновлении работы экспертов в Женеве. Нужно как можно скорее начать их встречу.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль

17 сентября 1996 года

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Read for Yurunkov 9/18
Put into system

Unofficial translation

6737

Dear Bill,

I highly value the close personal attention that you pay to the START-ABM problems. At this point they have most likely become one of the centerpieces in the relations of our two countries and I hope that through our joint efforts we will accomplish their most expedient resolution.

In my letter of June 3, 1996, I raised the issue of extending the term of strategic arms reduction under START-2 till January 1, 2008. Once again I would like to underscore that this is extremely important for Russia considering the current economic and financial difficulties. In addition, the implementation of the START-2 requirements within the term specified earlier would overlap with fulfilling the obligations under START-1 which would be an excessive burden for our country. This is also corroborated by the fact that the coming into force of START-1, the obligations of which continue START-2, has been delayed for several years. We have thoroughly calculated the required implementation costs of START-2 and we do not share the American standpoint that it could be less expensive. On the whole, unless we take expedient measures to adjust the term the issue could become a serious hindering factor in the ratification process.

I believe that it is in our mutual interest to resolve the problem of extending the term of START-2 implementation as soon as possible for which we could use the upcoming political consultations between our two countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia will be prepared for a detailed discussion of this matter during his coming trip to the US.

Some words about the anti-missile defense. I would like to express satisfaction with your and your administration's actions for the protection of the ABM Treaty in the US Congress. On my part, I lend my utmost assistance to keep the ABM Treaty a guarantor of strategic stability in the contemporary world. If you and I, with the participation of Belorus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine,

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

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manage to resolve shortly the two important problems related to the ABM Treaty - its multilateral nature and the demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM - it will be a convincing evidence of expedience and necessity of our joint efforts on strengthening the viability of this most important international treaty.

I would like to alleviate your concern regarding the resolution of the problem of demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM which you have written to me about. With the same persistence as we implemented our arrangement to develop the first part of the agreement on demarcation (concerning low-velocity systems of tactical ABM) by the end of June, we intend to achieve the implementation of the other element of our arrangement - to have the second part of the agreement (on high-velocity systems) ready in October, so that by that time the problem of demarcation will be fully resolved. There are no reasons to question our readiness to attain this goal. I am pleased that you intend to obtain this as well. It is in our mutual interests to do everything possible to present as soon as possible to the public of our countries solid evidence that the work on the demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM resulted in the development of the complete text of the agreement. This would provide a sound backing for the ABM Treaty and would allow me to enable the Duma to ratify START-2. I suppose that you will agree with the significance of achieving such a result.

As for your proposal to sign within a short period of time only the first part of the agreement without waiting until all negotiations on demarcation are complete, I do not think this will be in the best interests of our cause. Furthermore, this course of action is entirely unjustified, and we can only lose our pace of work on the entire agreement on demarcation.

There is not much time left until October. That is why it is so important now not to allow any delay in the resumption of our experts' work in Geneva. We should start their meeting as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, The Kremlin
September 17, 1996

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Дорогой Билл,

Высоко ценю большое личное внимание, которое ты уделяешь проблемам СНВ-ПРО. Пожалуй, сейчас они вышли на одно из центральных мест в отношениях наших стран, и я надеюсь, что совместными усилиями мы сумеем добиться их скорейшего решения.

В своем обращении от 3 июня с.г. я поставил вопрос о продлении срока осуществления сокращений стратегических вооружений по Договору СНВ-2 до I января 2008 года. Хочу еще раз подчеркнуть, что для России это чрезвычайно важно, принимая во внимание испытываемые нами экономические и финансовые трудности. Помимо прочего, осуществление предусмотренных Договором СНВ-2 требований в ранее установленный срок накладывалось бы на выполнение обязательств по Договору СНВ-I, что было бы непосильным бременем для нашей страны. Это тем более верно, что и вступление в силу Договора СНВ-I, обязательства по которому как бы продолжают Договор СНВ-2, задержалось на несколько лет. Мы тщательно просчитали требуемые затраты на выполнение Договора СНВ-2 и не разделяем американскую точку зрения, что это можно сделать дешевле. В целом же, если не принять быстрых мер по корректировке срока, этот вопрос может стать серьезным тормозящим фактором ратификационного процесса.

Считаю, что в наших общих интересах как можно скорее решить проблему продления срока выполнения Договора СНВ-2, для чего можно было бы использовать предстоящие политические консультации между нашими странами. К предметному разговору на эту тему будет готов министр иностранных дел России во время его предстоящей поездки в США.

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Теперь о противоракетной обороне. Хотел бы выразить удовлетворение действиями твоей администрации и твоими лично в защиту Договора по ПРО при работе с Конгрессом США.

Со своей стороны, всемерно содействую тому, чтобы Договор по ПРО оставался гарантом стратегической стабильности в современном мире. И если нам с тобой удастся в самое ближайшее время с участием Белоруссии, Казахстана и Украины довести до конца решение двух важных проблем, связанных с Договором по ПРО, – о его многостороннем характере и о разграничении стратегической и нестратегической ПРО, – это будет убедительным доказательством полезности и необходимости наших совместных усилий по укреплению жизнеспособности этого важнейшего международного соглашения.

Хотел бы снять твою обеспокоенность в отношении хода решения проблемы разграничения стратегической и нестратегической ПРО, о чем ты мне писал. Так же настойчиво, как осуществлялась наша с тобой договоренность выработать первую часть соглашения по разграничению (в отношении низкоскоростных систем нестратегической ПРО) к концу июня, мы намерены действовать и для выполнения другого элемента нашей договоренности – иметь в октябре вторую часть соглашения (по высокоскоростным системам) там, чтобы к этому времени проблема разграничения была решена полностью. Нет никаких оснований сомневаться в нашей готовности достичь этой цели. Рад, что и ты намерен добиваться этого. В наших общих интересах сделать все необходимое, чтобы как можно скорее представить общественности наших стран убедительное доказательство того, что работа по разграничению стратегической и нестратегической ПРО завершилась подготовкой соглашения в полном объеме. Это явилось бы солидным подкреплением Договора по ПРО и позволило бы мне побудить Думу ратифицировать Договор СНВ-2. Думаю, ты согласишься с важностью достижения такого результата.

Что же касается твоего предложения подписать в ближайшее время лишь первую часть соглашения, не дожидаясь завершения переговоров по разграничению в целом, то не думаю, что это отвечает

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интересам дела. Скажу больше, такой образ действия ничем не оправдан, мы можем лишь потерять темп работы над договоренностью по разграничению в целом.

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С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Москва, Кремль

17 сентября 1996 года

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 9-27-96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1996 96 SEP 26 P3:13

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Postponement of Yeltsin's Surgery

DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (4.32)
KBH 12/13/2019

***Yeltsin's Status.*** A group of cardiologists examined Yeltsin on Wednesday and subsequently told the press that the surgery should go forward in six to ten weeks. Dr. Michael DeBakey, who took part in the examination, privately told Ambassador Pickering that Yeltsin should do well ~~in surgery and has a high prospect of success.~~ DeBakey agreed with delaying the surgery, noting that there are a couple of problems (possible stomach ulcer, thyroid) that should be treated in advance of the operation, but he saw no sign of liver, kidney or lung trouble. DeBakey found Yeltsin in good spirits -- alert, outgoing, joking and very appreciative of your support. DeBakey plans to return to Moscow with a ventricular assistance unit to be available if needed during the surgery.

***Yeltsin Message.*** In a brief message delivered on September 24, Yeltsin thanked you for your concern and your recommendation of Drs. DeBakey and Roberts (Tab A). DeBakey's presence and contribution has been noted widely in Russia. Roberts (the critical care specialist) is ready to go; Pickering is pursuing with the Russians when and how they wish to consult with him.

***Temporary Power Transfer to Chernomyrdin.*** The Kremlin asserts that Yeltsin is doing light paperwork in the hospital, and he met with Chernomyrdin on Tuesday. Russia, however, broke new ground last week when Yeltsin signed a decree making provision for temporary transfer of presidential power (including control of nuclear weapons) to Chernomyrdin during his operation. This decree will be implemented when Yeltsin signs a second decree, presumably on the eve of his surgery.

***Political Maneuvering.*** Some maneuvering for position to succeed Yeltsin has already begun -- though cautiously since, if the surgery goes well, there will be no immediate succession issue. Chernomyrdin is now in the best position owing to his constitutional place in the line of succession. Lebed will likely seek

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X 6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY W/O HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

to make up the distance by raising his public profile. Others -- possible contenders and power brokers, such as Communist leader Zyuganov and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov -- will be plotting to improve their positions, should there be another presidential race.

***The Next Three-Four Months.*** With Moscow politics dominated by Yeltsin's health, Russian policy, both domestic and foreign, is likely to include few new initiatives. With surgery delayed six to ten weeks, even the best-case scenario (full recovery six to eight weeks after a successful surgery) would mean Yeltsin's absence from affairs of state and bilateral relations for three or four months.

***If Yeltsin Takes Longer to Recover.*** Zyuganov has already called on Yeltsin to resign. Should Yeltsin need longer than three to four months to resume his full duties, others could join in calling on him to step down, increasing the possibility of a challenge to the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin pro tem arrangement. Russia might then face a constitutional crisis and a new phase in a struggle to succeed Yeltsin.

Attachment
Tab A September 24 Yeltsin Message



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***The Next Three-Four Months.*** With Moscow politics dominated by Yeltsin's health, Russian policy, both domestic and foreign, is likely to ~~be on autopilot -- with few key decisions made or~~ include few new initiatives. ~~taken.~~ With surgery delayed six to ten weeks, even the best-case scenario (full recovery six to eight weeks after a successful surgery) would mean Yeltsin's absence from affairs of state and bilateral relations for three or four months.

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Attachment
Tab A September 24 Yeltsin Message

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (4.33)
KBH 12/13/2019



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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**
**OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES**
**Translating Division**

LS No. J1P711212
BL/LAP
Russian

**The President**
**of the Russian Federation**
**Moscow**
**The Kremlin**

No. Pr-2046

November 6, 1996

Dear Bill:

I want to congratulate you once more very sincerely on your election victory. This was an honest, convincing victory, worthy of you and of the kind of new, forward-looking statesman that you represent. I am sincerely glad for you and for America.

I understand that the statements in support of the partnership with Russia that you made in recent months did not come easily to you, but you withstood the pre-election pressure. During the election campaign in Russia, I, too, was under pressure, but I did not allow it to turn Russian-American relations into a subject for pre-election debates.

I will not deny that while we were following the course of the election campaign in the United States, we observed with alarm a resurgence of nationalist forces. It seems that certain circles find the idea of an equal partnership with Russia, multilateral actions and collective security, and greater effectiveness of the U.N. unacceptable on principle. And now, after your victory, these forces do not intend to give up their attempts at influencing the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

I believe that the best response to extremists, both in Russia and in the U.S., is to intensify our joint work. Attention must be focused on those matters where a mutually acceptable balance of interests has not yet been achieved, first and foremost the issue of reforming European security structures.

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I know that some in the U.S. have recently been suggesting that a pause in our dialogue would be desirable. They base this on the situation in Russia and my operation. I want to make this clear: a pause in Russian-American relations at this time, considering the advances that have been made in our discussions regarding a whole series of problems that are of the greatest importance for the fate of the world, would be tantamount to a retreat.

I personally monitor the negotiations, and I intend to pursue them to a successful conclusion. As soon as I return to a normal schedule, we shall have to arrange a full-fledged working meeting. The time is ripe for such a meeting. As we preliminarily agreed, it must center on setting the agenda for the next four years.

I am impressed by your idea, which you shared with Ye.M. Primakov in New York, that the United States needs a strong Russia as a partner for the twenty-first century. And we need a strong, self-assured, predictable United States with a presence in both Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region. Proceeding from this mutual interest, we must also formulate a new agenda.

Meanwhile, we can let our foreign ministers and experts increase their efforts to find mutually acceptable approaches to all key problems--European security, including adapting the CFE Treaty to the new realities, the problems concerning ABM defense and strategic offensive arms, the Middle East peace process, a settlement for the former Yugoslavia, and stabilization [of the situation] in Afghanistan. The Russian negotiators possess the necessary authority

I shall eagerly await our meeting.

I congratulate and embrace you.

Yours truly,

Boris [Yeltsin]

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«6» ноября 1996 г.

№ Пр-2046

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хочу еще раз сердечно поздравить тебя с победой на выборах. Это была честная, убедительная победа, достойная тебя и того образа нового, обращенного в будущее политика, который ты воплощаешь. Я искренне рад за тебя и за Америку.

Понимаю, что заявления в поддержку партнерства с Россией, с которыми ты выступал в последние месяцы, давались тебе нелегко, но ты выдержал предвыборный прессинг. В период избирательной кампании в России на меня тоже давили, однако я не позволил превратить российско-американские отношения в тему предвыборных дебатов.

Не скрою, отслеживая ход предвыборной борьбы в США, мы с тревогой наблюдали оживление националистических сил. Похоже, что для определенных кругов в принципе неприемлемы идеи равноправного партнерства с Россией, многосторонних действий и коллективной безопасности, повышения эффективности ООН. И сейчас, после твоей победы, эти силы не собираются отказываться от попыток повлиять на формирование внешней политики США.

Считаю, что лучший ответ экстремистам и в России, и в США - это интенсификация нашей совместной работы. Главное внимание надо уделить тем вопросам, по которым пока не удается выйти на взаимоприемлемый баланс интересов, в первую очередь - вопросу о реформировании структур европейской безопасности.

Мне известно, что кое-кто в США с недавних пор заговорил о желательности паузы в нашем диалоге. При этом ссылаются на ситуацию в России, на мою операцию. Хочу внести ясность: допустить сейчас

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паузу в российско-американских отношениях, с учетом продвинутости наших обсуждений по целому ряду важнейших для судеб мира проблем, было бы равносильно откату.

Я лично контролирую ход переговоров и намерен довести их до успешного завершения. Как только вернусь к нормальному графику, нам с тобой нужно будет договориться о полновесной рабочей встрече. Такая встреча назрела. В центр ее надо поставить, как мы предварительно уславливались, согласование повестки дня на новую четырехлетку.

Мне импонирует твоя мысль, которой ты поделился с Е.М.Примаковым в Нью-Йорке, о том, что Соединенным Штатам нужна сильная Россия как партнер на XXI век. А нам нужны сильные, уверенные в себе, предсказуемые Соединенные Штаты, которые бы присутствовали и в Европе, и в АТР. Отталкиваясь от этой обоюдной заинтересованности, и надо формировать новую повестку дня.

Пока же пусть наши министры иностранных дел и эксперты наращивают усилия по поиску взаимоприемлемых подходов по всем ключевым вопросам - европейской безопасности, включая адаптацию Договора об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе к новым реалиям, проблематике ПРО-СНВ, ближневосточному мирному процессу, урегулированию в бывшей Югославии, стабилизации в Афганистане. Необходимые полномочия у российских переговорщиков имеются.

Буду с нетерпением ожидать встречи с тобой.

Поздравляю и обнимаю тебя.

Твой Борис

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«6» ноября 19 96 г.

№ Пр-2046

г. Москва, Кремль

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Я лично контролирую ход переговоров и намерен довести их до успешного завершения. Как только вернусь к нормальному графику, нам с тобой нужно будет договориться о полновесной рабочей встрече. Такая встреча назрела. В центр ее надо поставить, как мы предварительно уславливались, согласование повестки дня на новую четырехлетку.

Мне импонирует твоя мысль, которой ты поделился с Е.М.Примаковым в Нью-Йорке, о том, что Соединенным Штатам нужна сильная Россия как партнер на XXI век. А нам нужны сильные, уверенные в себе, предсказуемые Соединенные Штаты, которые бы присутствовали и в Европе, и в АТР. Отталкиваясь от этой обоюдной заинтересованности, и надо формировать новую повестку дня.

Пока же пусть наши министры иностранных дел и эксперты наращивают усилия по поиску взаимоприемлемых подходов по всем ключевым вопросам - европейской безопасности, включая адаптацию Договора об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе к новым реалиям, проблематике ПРО-СНВ, ближневосточному мирному процессу, урегулированию в бывшей Югославии, стабилизации в Афганистане. Необходимые полномочия у российских переговорщиков имеются.

Буду с нетерпением ожидать встречи с тобой.

Поздравляю и обнимаю тебя.

Твой Борис

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 29, 1996

Dear Boris:

I have been following the reports of your recovery and am delighted with the progress you are making. It sounds as though you will be back performing your full duties in the very near future.

I was also pleased to receive your November 6 letter. I share much of your thinking. Frankly, it seems to me that the relationship between our two countries has drifted in recent months. Speaking very personally, I have missed being able to work with you directly at several critical moments.

I fully agree with you that this is not the time for any kind of pause in our relations. In fact, I would put it even more forcefully -- you and I need to take back the initiative, to reinstill the vision, spirit and commitment that we first defined together in Vancouver nearly four years ago. You and I must define for our peoples and our governments a clear, bold course for the next phase of our relations. We must assert joint leadership in setting the U.S.-Russian relationship on a firm and irreversible path of partnership and cooperation, burying forever old patterns of mistrust and old habits of confrontation. As I look ahead to the next four years, I want to work with you to guarantee that we leave the most positive legacies possible to our countries and peoples as they move into the 21st century.

I have particularly in mind our shared commitment to reducing as much as possible the danger of thermonuclear war. We need to get the START II Treaty ratified and have it enter into force, and then negotiate further significant reductions in strategic forces. I understand the political and financial concerns on your side about START II implementation and have asked my people to do some hard thinking about what we could do to get START II approved by the Duma and START III underway. I have no doubt that it will require our personal engagement -- yours and mine -- to break through the obstacles that have formed in recent months.

Our joint efforts will also be required to keep Europe undivided and to ensure Russia the major voice on European security issues that it deserves and European stability needs. We view European

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security in all its dimensions -- political, economic, military and social; it should be a fabric of many different institutions, agreements and relationships. In this context, it is important that NATO-Russian relations develop smoothly and in parallel with NATO enlargement. We have some time to accomplish this goal, which is in both our interests, before the NATO summit next summer and before the first new members enter the Alliance in 1999. But we should instruct our people to work harder and more creatively -- starting right now. On issues of special interest to the Russian side, such as deployment of nuclear weapons and conventional forces on the territory of new Alliance members, I believe we will find ways to address your concerns. We can, for example, use the process of CFE adaptation and the development of patterns of NATO-Russian cooperation that we commenced at Hyde Park to try to meet your concerns in a way acceptable to all interested parties.

Russia's integration into other European and global structures remains one of my key goals. I want to take a close look at what we can do to advance this objective in specific ways that will benefit Russia's economic development.

I think that there is great and unfulfilled potential in our bilateral economic relations. Increased two-way trade and greater, much greater, American investment in Russia is in both our countries' interests. Al and Viktor have done a superb job with their Commission over the last three years and have made considerable progress. But we need to engage personally to reinforce their efforts if the economic relationship between our countries is to reflect its true potential.

I also want to explore ways to broaden contacts between our peoples. Americans and Russians have much in common. With further opportunities to interact, trust and mutual confidence will grow, removing forever the stereotypes that linger in our societies. I think we should concentrate in particular on the young and find ways to reinforce their commitment to our shared vision for our future relations.

These are some areas where we can focus; there are others as well where our personal engagement can make the crucial difference and yield real results.

I like your idea of an early working meeting and was thinking of exactly the same thing myself. I am looking for a time that would work for me and be convenient for you, and will get back to you in the near future. That will give us the chance to define personally the direction for our countries' relations, both for 1997 and for the remainder of our respective terms in office.

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I look forward to your response. My best and that of Hillary to both you and Naina.

Sincerely,

Bill

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

Boris —

The conventional wisdom here, and I suspect in Russia as well, is that 1997 will be a year of limiting damage, not making progress in our relations. Let's prove the cynics and skeptics wrong, just as we did at Hyde Park and make good things happen in 1997 with new initiatives and lasting favorable answers to the big questions of our time. I look forward to seeing you soon!

Bill

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

'96 NOV 27 PM 6:50 7721

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1996

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11-29-96

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.38)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To approve a letter to Yeltsin for the Vice President to deliver to Chernomyrdin in Lisbon that would propose a meeting with Yeltsin in the United States as early as mid-February.

Background

The coming year will pose special challenges for Russia and for U.S.-Russian relations. NATO enlargement will stress the bilateral relationship and could continue to stymie progress on arms control, particularly Duma ratification and entry into force of START II. Our economic relations will continue to languish absent a hard push by the Yeltsin government to create a more attractive climate for investment as well as to reverse the revenue collapse that threatens Moscow's ability to fund basic governmental functions.

The Russian approach to the relationship has suffered from Yeltsin's prolonged absence. Primakov appears to have the lead on foreign policy; his is not the creative advice or guidance that is needed. Unless Yeltsin reengages, this drift could well continue and threaten to undo much of what you and Yeltsin have accomplished. Fortunately, his recovery appears on track, and he should be able to resume a full schedule in early 1997.

We recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A, which the Vice President could hand to Chernomyrdin on Monday in Lisbon. The letter cites the need for the two of you to engage directly to reinvigorate the vision and spirit of Vancouver and set the U.S.-Russian relationship on an irreversible path of partnership. To do this, the letter proposes a meeting in the United States as early as mid-February. Yeltsin should be receptive; his November 6 message to you (Tab B) expressed concern about the state of relations and suggested an early working meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/26/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We believe that Chernomyrdin, Chubays and Defense Minister Rodionov are inclined to build cooperative relations with the United States. Primakov, if given clear guidance from above, should fall into line as well. Yeltsin is the key. The earlier you get to him, the better our chances of encouraging a more cooperative Russian policy and avoiding crunch points later in the year over issues such as NATO enlargement.

To personalize the message, we recommend that you add the following hand-written postscript at the bottom of page three:

> Boris, the conventional wisdom here, and I suspect in Russia as well, is that 1997 will be at best a year of damage limitation for our bilateral relations. Let's prove the cynics wrong, just as we did at Hyde Park, and make 1997 a year of something far more positive -- of renewed opportunity, of vigorous initiatives, of lasting and favorable answers to the big questions of our time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Yeltsin at Tab A and add the handwritten postscript.

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Letter to Yeltsin
Tab B November 6 Yeltsin Message


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7721

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.39)
KBH 12/13/2019

November 26, 1996

ACTION

Return to P. Pifer 11-27-96

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Yeltsin and Schedule Proposal for Meeting

The memorandum to the President at Tab I proposes a letter to Yeltsin to be carried by the Vice President for delivery to Chernomyrdin in Lisbon. The letter responds to Yeltsin's November 6 message and, among other things, proposes a meeting in the United States as early as mid-February. The schedule proposal at Tab II requests time for such a meeting. Strobe has approved the letter and supports an early Presidential meeting with Yeltsin.

You should note that the START paragraph in the letter says the President plans to write Yeltsin shortly with some ideas on how to get START II approved by the Duma and START III underway. Bob Bell and I believe that, while principals have not yet decided on a specific option, there is a general view that we must do something to advance the prospects for START II ratification in Russia. If we do not wish to put the President ahead of the process, we could change "I plan" in the penultimate sentence to "I hope." That, however, would reduce the impact of the passage.

Concurrence by: Robert Bell (in draft) SP for, Sandy Vershbow SP for, Dan Fried SP for, Leon Fuerth SP for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I and the schedule proposal at Tab II.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter to Yeltsin
Tab B November 6 Yeltsin Message
Tab II Schedule Proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/26/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**
**OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES**
**Translating Division**

LS No. J1P711212
BL/LAP
Russian

**The President**
**of the Russian Federation**
**Moscow**
**The Kremlin**

No. Pr-2046

November 6, 1996

Dear Bill:

I want to congratulate you once more very sincerely on your election victory. This was an honest, convincing victory, worthy of you and of the kind of new, forward-looking statesman that you represent. I am sincerely glad for you and for America.

I understand that the statements in support of the partnership with Russia that you made in recent months did not come easily to you, but you withstood the pre-election pressure. During the election campaign in Russia, I, too, was under pressure, but I did not allow it to turn Russian-American relations into a subject for pre-election debates.

I will not deny that while we were following the course of the election campaign in the United States, we observed with alarm a resurgence of nationalist forces. It seems that certain circles find the idea of an equal partnership with Russia, multilateral actions and collective security, and greater effectiveness of the U.N. unacceptable on principle. And now, after your victory, these forces do not intend to give up their attempts at influencing the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

I believe that the best response to extremists, both in Russia and in the U.S., is to intensify our joint work. Attention must be focused on those matters where a mutually acceptable balance of interests has not yet been achieved, first and foremost the issue of reforming European security structures.

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I know that some in the U.S. have recently been suggesting that a pause in our dialogue would be desirable. They base this on the situation in Russia and my operation. I want to make this clear: a pause in Russian-American relations at this time, considering the advances that have been made in our discussions regarding a whole series of problems that are of the greatest importance for the fate of the world, would be tantamount to a retreat.

I personally monitor the negotiations, and I intend to pursue them to a successful conclusion. As soon as I return to a normal schedule, we shall have to arrange a full-fledged working meeting. The time is ripe for such a meeting. As we preliminarily agreed, it must center on setting the agenda for the next four years.

I am impressed by your idea, which you shared with Ye.M. Primakov in New York, that the United States needs a strong Russia as a partner for the twenty-first century. And we need a strong, self-assured, predictable United States with a presence in both Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region. Proceeding from this mutual interest, we must also formulate a new agenda.

Meanwhile, we can let our foreign ministers and experts increase their efforts to find mutually acceptable approaches to all key problems--European security, including adapting the CFE Treaty to the new realities, the problems concerning ABM defense and strategic offensive arms, the Middle East peace process, a settlement for the former Yugoslavia, and stabilization [of the situation] in Afghanistan. The Russian negotiators possess the necessary authority

I shall eagerly await our meeting.

I congratulate and embrace you.

Yours truly,

Boris [Yeltsin]

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**Pifer, Steven K.**

| | |
|---|---|
| **From:** | Pifer, Steven K. |
| **To:** | @NSA - Natl Security Advisor |
| **Cc:** | /R, Record at A1; Bell, Robert G.; Dohse, Fred J.; Fuerth, Leon S.; Schmidt, John R.; Vershbow, Alexander R.; Wise, William M.; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine |
| **Subject:** | POTUS Letter to Yeltsin 1.5 (d) 11/26/06 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~] |
| **Date:** | Wednesday, November 27, 1996 5:04PM |
| **Priority:** | High |

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(6.41)
KBH 12/13/2019

PLEASE PASS TO TONY FROM PIFER

I've done some language changes to the POTUS letter to Yeltsin to address the three points you raised and run them by Leon and Strobe:

START para:

-- Delete "Bill Perry gave me a very useful report on his recent visit to Moscow. I plan to write you shortly with some ideas in this regard." The thrust then is that POTUS has asked his people to do some hard thinking, and he and Yeltsin will have to engage, but no specific commitment to new ideas.

NATO para:

-- Change the first sentence to: "On one issue of special interest to the Russian side, I see no reason -- and there is no plan or intention -- for NATO to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new Alliance members, nor do I foresee any need for the Alliance to do so." This makes the sentence speak for just POTUS, not the Alliance.

-- Alternatively, delete the first two sentences in the para and "Moreover, we can" at the start of the third sentence and replace with the following: "On issues of special interest to the Russian side, such as deployment of nuclear weapons and conventional forces on the territory of new Alliance members, I believe we will find ways to address your concerns. We can, for example,"

Penultimate para: (p. 3)

-- If there is any way to keep the second sentence, which invites Yeltsin as early as mid-February, that is really the punchline of the letter (Strobe asked that I also convey his strong view in this regard). If it won't fly with the schedulers, we could replace the second sentence with the following: "I am looking for a time that would work for me and be convenient for you, and will get back to you in the near future."


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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

In April you and I had quite a successful , in my opinion, discussions in Moscow on the necessity to strengthen the ABM Treaty, commitment to which you and I have reiterated on many occasions. We agreed that by June our negotiators would conclude the first part of the agreement on non-circumvention of the Treaty - on demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM applicable to the so-called lower-velocity systems and by October - complete the second final part of the agreement - on higher-velocity systems.

This agreement on non-circumvention of the AMB Treaty, essential, among other, from the point of view of necessity to give an additional impulse to the process of the Start-II ratification, unfortunately remained unfulfilled.

In spite of our success in June when we worked out the first part of the "demarcation", the situation with the second part is much worse.

We have been persuading the American side to resume negotiations in the framework of the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission in order dwell upon specific work and fulfill it by the agreed time. This issue was also considered by the heads of our foreign policy offices. Their New York September agreement was considered to be aimed at rendering an impulse to the joint work on the demarcation. In this context we are prepared to sign documents pertaining to the first stage.

HIS EXCELLENCY
William J.CLINTON
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA

Washington, D.C.

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In saying so I presume that Washington has never had any doubts about our position: the agreement on demarcation can enter into force only when all of it is ready and not just its first part which, I must say not a key one, compared to the second part. Nevertheless at our talks in Geneva we were faced with the situation when for a long time it was difficult to bring the American delegation to discussing the second part of the agreement. The State Department hastily announced the negotiations a failure even prior to the deputy ministers' meeting and Under Secretary of State did not even come to Geneva where she was awaited by her counterparts from Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.

We are concerned that according to the position assumed by your delegation in Geneva until the second part of the agreement is developed the American Side in non prepared (regardless of the understanding on which you and I were drawing in April) to guarantee that there will be no testing of the respective systems. Moreover, the American Side does not guarantee than until such an agreement these systems will not be deployed. I hope you will agree that under these circumstances a lot of questions arise regarding the essence of the US position on non-circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

We do not want to dramatize the situation. We are interested in intense joint work on full implementation on our understandings. The Russian delegation has all the necessary instructions, and we hope that the work in Geneva will resume without any artificial delays. I am counting on your personal attention to this issue in order to give an essential impulse to the negotiations.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 6, 1996

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«6» декабря 1996 г.
№ Пр-2184

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

В апреле в Москве мы с тобой обсуждали, и думаю успешно, необходимость укрепления Договора по ПРО, приверженность которому и ты, и я подчеркивали неоднократно. Мы условились, что наши переговорщики к июню завершат первую часть договоренности по необходу этого Договора - о разграничении стратегической и тактической ПРО применительно к так называемым низкоскоростным системам, а к октябрю - и вторую, заключительную часть такой договоренности - по высокоскоростным системам.

Эта договоренность по необходу Договора по ПРО, важная, в том числе, с точки зрения необходимости придания дополнительного импульса процессу ратификации Договора СНВ-2, к сожалению, оказалась нереализованной. Если в июне был достигнут успех и первая часть "разграничения" была разработана, то со второй дела обстоят хуже.

Мы долго добивались от американской стороны возобновления переговоров в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии по Договору по ПРО с тем, чтобы заняться предметной работой и успеть выполнить ее в намеченные сроки. Этот вопрос рассматривали и наши министры иностранных дел. Их сентябрьская договоренность в Нью-Йорке рассматривалась как нацеленная на то, чтобы придать импульс совместной работе по разграничению. В этом контексте мы готовы подписать документы, касающиеся первого этапа.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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При этом, я полагаю, в Вашингтоне никогда не было сомнений в нашей позиции: договоренность по разграничению может вступить в силу тогда, когда она будет готова вся, а не только лишь ее первая и, надо сказать, не ключевая, по сравнению со второй, часть. Между тем мы столкнулись на переговорах в Женеве с такой ситуацией, когда американская делегация долго не выходила вообще на какой-либо разговор по второй части договоренности. Госдепартамент же поспешил объявить переговоры провалившимися еще до встречи заместителей министров, а заместитель госсекретаря США даже не прибыла в Женеву, где ее ожидали коллеги из Белоруссии, Казахстана, России и Украины.

Нас беспокоит и то, что, судя по позиции, занятой вашей делегацией в Женеве, американская сторона в условиях, пока не разработана вторая часть договоренности, даже не готова (вопреки пониманиям, которые у нас с тобой вырисовывались в апреле) гарантировать, что не будут проводиться испытания соответствующих систем. Более того, она не гарантирует, что до этого момента не будет и развертывания таких систем. Надеюсь, ты согласишься, что на таком фоне возникает немало вопросов относительно того, в чем же заключается позиция США по необходу Договора по ПРО.

Мы не хотим драматизировать ситуацию. Заинтересованы в интенсивной совместной работе по полной реализации наших с тобой договоренностей. Российская делегация имеет все необходимые инструкции, и мы надеемся, что работа в Женеве возобновится без искусственных промедлений. Я рассчитываю на твое личное внимание к этому вопросу с тем, чтобы придать необходимый импульс соответствующим переговорам.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Rec'd from Russian Emb 12/26

8253

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 25, 1996

Dear Bill:

I am writing this message because of the unprecedented in their dangerous consequences recent events in Lima.

Taking of diplomatic representatives from many countries as hostages raises in me, the President of Russia, and in all Russian public indignation and utter concern.

Taking of hostages by terrorists constitutes a challenge to all of the international community. This is another testimony to the fact that terrorism is not limited by national boundaries.

All this confirms the correctness of our decisions to join forces in combatting the proliferation of terrorism. A meeting in France this July of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Special Services of our states proceeded in the same direction.

Nevertheless, in my view the situation emerging in Lima demands a demonstration in practice how we can act to help unprotected people who have become victims of the terrorists.

Fully realizing the complexity of the situation in the Peruvian capital, I propose the following:

- to adopt a joint statement by the leaders of the ~~G-8~~ Eight and to offer to the President of Peru Alberto Fujimori required coordinated help and assistance in solving the conflict including possible dispatch to the area of special anti-terrorist teams from National Security Services;

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- in case the Peruvian side agrees, to create on the basis of the agreements reached at the meeting in France a joint headquarters composed of representatives of Special Services from the "G-8" countries with the aim to conduct an operation to rescue the hostages.

I hope that solidarity of our actions will help consolidate the unity of states in combatting international terrorism and will be a serious warning to those who continue to use acts of terrorism for any purposes.

I have sent similar messages to all leaders of the ~~G-8~~ "Eight."

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Мое послание обусловлено беспрецедентными по своей опасности событиями, происходящими в последние дни в Лиме.

Захват дипломатических представителей многих государств в качестве заложников вызывает у меня как Президента России, у всей российской общественности возмущение и крайнюю обеспокоенность.

Захват террористами заложников - вызов всему мировому сообществу, еще одно свидетельство того, что терроризм не ограничен национальными рамками.

Все это подтверждает верность наших решений объединить усилия в борьбе с распространением терроризма. В этом же направлении прошло в июле с.г. во Франции совещание на уровне министров иностранных дел и руководителей спецслужб наших государств.

Однако складывающаяся в Лиме обстановка требует, по моему мнению, показать на практике, как мы умеет действовать, чтобы помочь беззащитным людям, ставшим жертвами террористов.

Осознавая сложность ситуации в перуанской столице, предлагаю:

-выступить с совместным заявлением руководителей "восьмерки" и предложить президенту Перу Альберто Фухимори необходимую скоординированную помощь и содействие в разрешении конфликта, включая и возможное направление туда специальных отрядов по борьбе с терроризмом из национальных служб безопасности;

- в случае согласия перуанской стороны, опираясь на договоренности, достигнутые на совещании во Франции, создать объединенный штаб из представителей спецслужб стран "восьмерки" в целях проведения операции по освобождению заложников.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Надеюсь, что солидарность наших действий будет способствовать укреплению единства государств в борьбе с международным терроризмом и явится серьезным предупреждением тем, кто продолжает использовать акты террора в любых целях.

Аналогичные послания направлены мною всем руководителям государств "восьмерки".

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
25 декабря 1996 года

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your message in which you informed me about an international meeting on assistance in the reconstruction of Lebanon on December 16 in Washington, DC. I share your considerations regarding its purposes.

Russia traditionally keeps friendly relations with Lebanon constantly calls for establishing peaceful and stable environment essential for the development of this country, consolidation of its sovereignty and economic reconstruction. The efforts which are made jointly by Russian and American co-sponsors of the Middle-Eastern peace process correspond with these purposes.

Our representatives will participate in the Washington meeting. We are profoundly interested in the revival of Lebanon and prepared to actively promote the success of this important meeting coordinating our activities with you.

I would like to inform you that during his recent visit to Beirut Y.Primakov transmitted to the Prime Minister of Lebanon R.Hariri an invitation to visit Moscow next year. We expect that the enhancement of the Russian-Lebanise cooperation will be usefull for resolving the problems that Lebanon currently faces.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, DC

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

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Please make a package, No reply necessary.

Rec'd from Russian Emb. 11/25/96

B.YELTSIN

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, DC

Please log into system. No action required. Thanks

Kathy Cooper

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

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HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, DC

Please log into system. No action required, Thanks
Kathy Cooper

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю за послание, в котором ты сообщаешь об организации в Вашингтоне 16 декабря международной встречи по вопросам оказания содействия восстановлению Ливана. Разделяю высказанные тобой соображения относительно ее целей.

Россия традиционно поддерживает дружественные отношения с Ливаном, неизменно выступает за создание мирных и стабильных условий, необходимых для развития этого государства, укрепления его суверенитета и экономической реконструкции. Этим задачам отвечают те усилия, которые совместно прилагаются российским и американским коспонсорами ближневосточного мирного процесса.

Наши представители примут участие в Вашингтонской встрече. Мы искренне заинтересованы в возрождении Ливана и готовы во взаимодействии с Вами активно способствовать успешному проведению этого важного мероприятия.

Хотел бы информировать, что в ходе недавнего пребывания в Бейруте Е.М.Примаков передал премьер-министру Ливана Р.Харири приглашение посетить Москву в будущем году. Рассчитываем на то, что активизация российско-ливанского сотрудничества пойдет на пользу в деле решения стоящих перед Ливаном проблем.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль

Delivered by Russian Emb 1/27 0530
Put into System

Unofficial translation

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your message of December 31, 1996. I am satisfied by the fact that the "G-8" countries in their joint statement have strongly condemned the barbarian act of mass terrorism - the taking of hostages in an Ambassador's residence in Lima. Of particular importance is readiness expressed by us to render support on a collective basis to the Peruvian Government with the use of all means which may be requested by it.

I support the proposal by J. Chirac, the President of France, for the Ambassadors of the "G-8" countries in Lima to stay in close touch so that they could discuss the alternatives of rendering assistance in response to possible requests by the Peruvian Government or leadership of Japan. The Russian Ambassador in Peru has been instructed accordingly.

What has happened convincingly proves how important it is to strengthen cooperation within the "G-8" in combatting international terrorism. I believe that this issue should be one of the priorities in preparing the Summit in Denver under your chairmanship.

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
Господину Уильяму Дж.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю за твое послание от 31 декабря 1996 г. Удовлетворен тем, что члены "восьмерки" в совместном заявлении решительно осудили варварский акт массового терроризма - захват заложников в резиденции посла в Лиме. Важное значение имеет выраженная нами готовность оказать на коллективной основе поддержку перуанскому правительству с использованием всех средств, которые могут быть им запрошены.

Поддерживаю предложение президента Франции Ж.Ширака о том, чтобы послы стран "восьмерки" в Лиме оставались в тесном контакте для обсуждения вариантов оказания поддержки в ответ на возможное пожелание перуанского правительства или руководства Японии. Послу России в Перу даны соответствующие указания.

Происшедшее убедительно доказывает важность углубления сотрудничества в "восьмерке" для противодействия международному терроризму. Считаю, что эта тема должна стать одним из приоритетов в ходе подготовки саммита в Денвере, который пройдет под твоим председательством.

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 18, 1997

Dear Boris:

I was pleased to receive your letter when I met with Viktor and have asked my new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to convey to you my response.

I had a valuable meeting with Viktor; he and Al gave me an excellent report on the work of their Commission. We can be proud of what they have done; this mechanism for cooperation, under their leadership, has exceeded our expectations when we conceived the idea. They also had very good discussions in preparation for our upcoming summit.

Based on our correspondence of the last few months, I believe that we share the view that Helsinki offers a key opportunity to inject new momentum into the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship. In addition, while Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov are conducting the formal talks, our bilateral contacts on NATO-Russia relations remain vitally important. If you and I can come to a common understanding in Helsinki of what the NATO-Russia relationship should be, that will have a major -- indeed, decisive -- impact on the NATO-Russia dialogue and on the broader effort to shape a more stable, secure and undivided Europe.

I have carefully read your letter. We clearly agree on the main issues that will comprise our Helsinki agenda: START, economics and European security. Al and Viktor had detailed exchanges on each of these questions, which Madeleine intends to continue during her visit to Moscow.

On START, I fully appreciate your concerns about not having to spend large sums of money to build new missiles so that Russia can meet the START II limits. I had my people craft our proposed START III guidelines to address precisely those concerns. In particular, our proposal that a START III treaty would extend the START II elimination period for two years, in combination with a START III limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads, will permit Russia to spread the costs of treaty implementation over a longer period and remove any need for Russia to use scarce resources to build new missiles to replace those we have agreed to eliminate.

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In the context of knowing your intentions regarding your readiness to push for Duma approval of START II, I would propose to announce publicly the START III guidelines in Helsinki. That would send a clear signal of our mutual determination to reduce further the nuclear danger; entry into force of START II and early negotiation and conclusion of a START III treaty would strengthen the legacy of greater safety and security that the two of us can leave to the citizens of our countries.

Boris, like you, I am frustrated that a resolution of the ABM/TMD demarcation issue continues to elude our experts. We need to instruct our people to think creatively on this and get away from the overly technical approach that has produced only stalemate. Both of our countries have an interest in defending against theater missiles that could be developed by rogue states; indeed, this may be an area where NATO and Russia can cooperate to mutual advantage. At the same time, the ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and I am committed to its preservation. An early demarcation agreement would strengthen my ability to protect the Treaty against those who would weaken it.

On economics, I remember well our telephone conversation last July on the importance of American investment to Russia. Al and Viktor had a good exchange on this and agreed on the economic agenda for our meeting in Helsinki. The steps they discussed to facilitate investment and promote Russia's integration into the international economic system are the right ones.

Madeleine is bringing a draft joint statement on economics that I hope you will carefully consider. It would combine your commitment to take the policy and legal steps necessary to create a more attractive investment climate in Russia with my commitment to make available financing to support substantial American investment there, in excess of four billion dollars. I am also prepared to commit to support accelerated Russian membership in key international economic institutions that will define global economic and trade relations for the 21st century.

Let me return to the question of NATO-Russian relations. This is the most difficult challenge that we face -- managing this issue in a manner that suits our mutual interests in cooperative relations and in a secure Europe. Let me make a few things clear. This is a new NATO that has changed substantially since the Cold War. It will change further. Part of that change is the enlargement process, which is moving ahead on the steady path begun in 1994. The NATO summit in July will invite certain countries to begin negotiations on accession to the Washington Treaty, with the objective of entering into the Alliance by 1999.

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But, at the same time, I hope that you will think back on our many conversations on European security, going back to September 1994. I have always been candid and open with you, and when I have made commitments, I have kept them.

It is in this context that I want to make clear to you my commitment to shape Europe's evolution in a way that does not threaten Russia and to develop a robust NATO-Russia relationship, one which makes your country a true partner of the Alliance and assures Russia the major role in Europe that it deserves. We have put forward many ideas: a NATO-Russia charter; a permanent consultative mechanism that would permit, where appropriate, joint decision-making and action; adaptation of the CFE Treaty and, in the process, addressing some Russian concerns about the military implications of enlargement; and other steps to make clear that NATO, always a defensive alliance, has changed fundamentally with the end of the Cold War, is not directed against Russia and continues to evolve. Madeleine will review the details with Foreign Minister Primakov.

Boris, NATO seeks with Russia an unprecedented relationship. There are some things that your side has asked for that we will not be able to do. But there is much that we can do and a lot that we already have offered. I hope that you and your experts will look at our proposals in this spirit.

Finally, your letter raised the Eight and Denver. Al and Viktor had a good discussion on this subject, and I will be thinking of that as we refine our plans for the June summit. I just received your February 12 letter on ideas for consideration by the Eight and will respond at a later date.

I hope your recovery is progressing smoothly and look forward eagerly to seeing you next month in Helsinki.

Sincerely,

Bill

Boris – I am so pleased to see you feeling better and back at work. Helsinki will be critical to both our countries. I am very optimistic that we will work together, as we have in the past, to make important breakthroughs.

Bill

His Excellency Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 0864

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-18-97

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.53)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

To sign a letter to Yeltsin that Madeleine can deliver next week.

Background

The Yeltsin letter that Chernomyrdin gave you last week (Tab B) essentially accepts our agenda for Helsinki: European security, nuclear arms control and economics. Yeltsin expressed particular concern about NATO forces and infrastructure on the territory of new members, and reiterated the importance the Russians attach to an agreement between the Alliance and Russia. He noted the importance of your upcoming summit in addressing these questions.

Your letter at Tab A underscores the critical nature of the Helsinki summit and recaps our proposals for START III guidelines, an economics/investment initiative and a robust NATO-Russia relationship. It also notes that you just received Yeltsin's February 12 letter (not attached) with ideas for consideration by the Eight (we will prepare a response later).

Madeleine will present this to Yeltsin. You might add a short handwritten postscript at the end along the following lines:

> Boris -- Helsinki is indeed a crucial event. I have high expectations and am very optimistic that you and I, working together as we have in the past, will make some important breakthroughs. Bill

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Letter to Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Yeltsin Letter

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 2/18/07

PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES**
**Department of State**
**(Translation)**

LS No. 702204
LAP/JS
Russian

[Emblem of the Russian Federation]

PRESIDENT
of the Russian Federation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-m-3 (6.54)
KBH 12/13/2019

January 30, 1997
No. Pr-137

Moscow, The Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I would like to take this opportunity to say that I was pleased with our telephone conversation in December and with our exchange of letters.

I believe you and I agreed on the main point, i.e. that it is necessary to utilize the next four years to make the equitable partnership between Russia and the U.S. irreversible. 1997 will be decisive from the standpoint of implementing this understanding and will set the tone for the development of Russian-U.S. relations over the long term.

His Excellency William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It so happens that a whole range of issues of a strategic nature need to be resolved right at this moment. The understanding between us will, in large part, determine the progress of this work.

First of all, there is, of course, the issue of NATO. For us this issue is fundamental. That is why we have invariably reacted negatively to the plans for expanding the alliance and especially to the possibility of moving NATO's military infrastructure eastward. In this regard there is consensus among virtually all the political forces in our country, including those represented in the State Duma, where several important treaties and agreements between our countries are in the process of ratification.

Our position is neither anti-American nor anti-Western. It is prompted by the fact that, from an objective standpoint, implementation of the plans for NATO expansion -- regardless of whether or not this is the objective -- will lead to the establishment of new dividing lines in Europe and to deterioration of the geopolitical situation as a whole. We cannot be satisfied with statements that the expansion plans do not imply an intention to create estrangement between the countries of Europe.

NATO expansion will seriously impair Russia's geostrategic position and will cause direct harm to our national security interests.

But I certainly do not regard the situation as deadlocked. I believe you, and I trust that our justified concern will, as you said, not simply be

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noted, but will be taken into account in a clear and precise form. It would be best if this were done, as you yourself stated publicly, in the form of an official agreement between Russia and NATO.

Guarantees that the alliance's military infrastructure will not be moved eastward must be recorded; this includes non-deployment of foreign troops and their armaments, and non-deployment of any items of military infrastructure or any sort of "combined" forces, as well as non-deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them.

In this context expediting the negotiations on updating the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe would be of great importance.

At the same time, it is necessary to develop, in the agreement, a mechanism for consultations and interaction between Russia and NATO that would ensure equitable security cooperation and decision-making by consensus with regard to issues that could affect our interests.

There is not a great deal of time to work out all these issues. Therefore, we need to move forcefully and purposefully. Of course, you and I will ultimately have to resolve the fundamental, key issues. Our upcoming meeting in March will be particularly important from this standpoint as well.

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Arms control issues are another major item. Like the NATO problem, they, too, do not exist in a vacuum. They likewise are affected by the overall situation.

I fully agree with you -- we must remember that it was largely owing to our successes in disarmament that our countries were able to move from the confrontation of the "Cold War" to our current cooperation. Like you, I am concerned about the future of the strategic offensive arms reduction process. In March I will be prepared to share with you my specific ideas in this regard. But for now, I would like to confirm several fundamental issues.

All the agreements you and I reached in April of last year must be implemented. This applies not only to ratification of the START II Treaty and the discussion of the next stage, i.e. deeper cuts in strategic offensive arms, but also to ensuring strategic conditions in which this will be possible. I refer, above all, to our agreement on strengthening the ABM Treaty.

At the most complex stage of our joint work, when the issue of high-velocity non-strategic ABM systems was being resolved, the negotiations started to bog down. They must be given impetus. This could be done by recording a joint obligation to the effect that until the negotiations on demarcation are completed, the parties will not test the systems that are the subject of the ABM Treaty negotiations.

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I would ask you to consider again our concern over the time frame for implementing reductions under START II. For purely financial and economic reasons, we will not be able to implement the reductions within the initially scheduled time frame. After all, when the Treaty was signed in 1993, we assumed that its implementation would also begin in 1993. Since that time four years have passed. This fact cannot be ignored.

Of course, while understanding the key importance of security issues, like you, I would not want to limit our discussions solely to these issues. An economic base is no less important for the stable development of relations between our countries.

In this connection, I would remind you of our joint statement of 1994 on "Partnership for Economic Progress." Not everything is going smoothly in terms of its implementation. To date, not all discriminatory restrictions have been removed. However, when we signed that document, it was expected that it would determine the strategic areas of our economic cooperation.

It would also be worthwhile to devote greater attention to practical projects related to large-scale U.S. capital investments in Russia.

And now a few words on the multilateral aspect of Russian-U.S. relations, since in the present circumstances one cannot rely solely on bilateral accords. It seems to me that from the standpoint of international

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stability it is essential that Russia and the U.S. become involved in issues of integration and that there be close ties between our countries and new centers of economic influence.

At this time, when you, Bill, are chairing the "G-8" and are beginning to prepare for the meeting in Denver, these problems must occupy an important place in our bilateral dialogue. Russia is interested in having a successful summit with concrete, meaningful results. I now have more opportunities to help bring this about because, since the "G-8" meetings in Moscow and Lyons, the Russian side has been participating in discussing not only political problems, but all global problems as well. I hope to continue discussing new ideas concerning the "G-8" during our upcoming meeting in March. I will single out two in particular: steps to further transform the "G-7" into a full-fledged "G-8", and holding a new "G-8" event in Russia in 1998 on one of the current global problems.

I am deliberately directing your attention to the most complex issues, although there are other matters -- global, regional and bilateral -- that we will need to discuss during our meeting. But these are currently the central issues.

I am certain that you and I both understand the importance of the present moment.

Respectfully,

[s] B. Yeltsin

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

0864

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(6.55)
KBH 12/13/2019

«30» января 19 97 г.

№ Пр-137

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Пользуясь случаем, хочу выразить удовлетворение нашим телефонным разговором в декабре, а также обменом письмами.

Думаю, мы с тобой договорились о главном - надо использовать ближайшие четыре года, чтобы придать необратимость равноправному партнерству между Россией и США. 1997 год будет решающим для претворения в жизнь этого понимания и задаст тон развитию российско-американских отношений на длительную перспективу.

Так сложилось, что целый ряд вопросов стратегического характера предстоит решать именно сейчас. Как пойдет эта работа - во многом будет зависеть от договоренности между нами.

В первую очередь это, конечно, вопрос о НАТО. Для нас это принципиальный вопрос. Поэтому мы неизменно негативно относимся к планам расширения альянса и особенно к возможности продвижения военной инфраструктуры НАТО на Восток. На этот счет у нас в стране существует консенсус практически всех политических сил, в том числе представленных в Государственной Думе, где на ратификации сейчас находятся несколько важных договоров и соглашений между нашими странами.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

CONFIDENTIAL

Наша позиция не имеет ни антиамериканской, ни антизападной направленности. Она продиктована тем, что реализация планов расширения НАТО объективно, вне зависимости от того, ставит ли кто такую цель или нет, приведет к созданию новых разделительных линий в Европе, ухудшению всей геополитической ситуации. Мы не можем довольствоваться заявлениями о том, что за планами расширения не стоит намерение создать отчужденность между государствами Европы.

Расширение НАТО коренным образом ухудшит геостратегическое положение России, нанесет непосредственный ущерб интересам нашей национальной безопасности.

Но я вовсе не считаю ситуацию тупиковой. Я тебе верю и рассчитываю на то, что наша обоснованная озабоченность будет, как ты и говорил, не просто принята во внимание, но и учтена в ясной и четкой форме. Лучше всего это было бы сделать, как ты сам заявлял публично, в форме официального соглашения между Россией и НАТО.

Должны быть зафиксированы гарантии непродвижения военной инфраструктуры альянса на Восток, включая неразмещение иностранных войск и их вооружений, неразвертывание объектов военной инфраструктуры или каких-либо "объединенных" сил, а также неразмещение ядерного оружия и его носителей.

В этом контексте существенное значение имело бы ускорение переговоров о модернизации Договора об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе.

Одновременно в соглашении необходимо разработать механизм консультаций и взаимодействия между Россией и НАТО, обеспечивающий равноправное сотрудничество в сфере безопасности, консенсусное принятие решений по вопросам, которые могут затронуть наши интересы.

Времени для отработки всех этих вопросов не так уж много. Поэтому действовать надо энергично и целеустремленно. Конечно, решать принципиальные, ключевые вопросы в конечном счете придется нам с тобой. Наша предстоящая встреча в марте будет иметь особое значение и с этой точки зрения.

Другой крупный блок - вопросы контроля над вооружениями. Как и проблема НАТО, они тоже существуют не в вакууме. И на них влияет общая обстановка.

Я полностью согласен с тобой - мы должны помнить, что во многом благодаря успехам в разоружении наши страны смогли перейти от конфронтации "холодной войны" к нынешнему взаимодействию. Как

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и ты, я обеспокоен судьбой процесса сокращения стратегических наступательных вооружений. В марте буду готов поделиться с тобой конкретными соображениями на этот счет. Сейчас же хотел бы подтвердить некоторые принципиальные моменты.

Должны быть выполнены все договоренности, которые мы с тобой достигли в апреле прошлого года. Речь идет не только о ратификации Договора СНВ-2 и обсуждении следующего этапа - еще более глубоких сокращений стратегических наступательных вооружений, но и об обеспечении тех стратегических условий, в которых это будет возможно. Имею в виду прежде всего нашу с тобой договоренность укрепить Договор по ПРО.

На самом сложном этапе нашей совместной работы, когда согласовывалось решение по высокоскоростным системам нестратегической ПРО, переговоры забуксовали. Необходимо придать им импульс. Таким импульсом могла бы стать фиксация совместного обязательства, что на период до завершения переговоров по разграничению стороны не будут испытывать системы, в отношении которых мы ведем переговоры применительно к Договору по ПРО.

Прошу тебя еще раз рассмотреть нашу озабоченность относительно сроков осуществления сокращений по Договору СНВ-2. По чисто финансово-экономическим причинам мы не сможем уложиться с реализацией сокращений в первоначально намеченные сроки. Ведь, когда Договор подписывался в 1993 году, мы исходили из того, что его осуществление тоже начнется в 1993 году. С тех пор прошло четыре года. Это нельзя игнорировать.

Разумеется, мне, как и тебе, не хотелось бы ограничивать наше обсуждение исключительно вопросами безопасности, понимая их ключевое значение. Для устойчивого развития отношений между нашими странами не менее важна их экономическая база.

В этой связи хотел бы напомнить о нашем с тобой заявлении 1994 года "Партнерство для экономического прогресса". С его выполнением не все обстоит благополучно. До сих пор не все дискриминационные ограничения сняты. Между тем, когда мы ставили под этим документом свои подписи, предполагалось, что он определит стратегические направления нашего сотрудничества в экономической области.

Больше внимания стоило бы уделить и практическим проектам, связанным с крупномасштабными капиталовложениями США в Россию.

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Теперь - несколько слов о многостороннем аспекте российско-американских отношений, поскольку в нынешних условиях невозможно опираться только на двусторонние договоренности. Как мне представляется, подключение России и США к интеграционным вопросам, тесные связи наших стран с новыми центрами экономического влияния весьма важны для обеспечения международной стабильности.

Теперь, когда ты, Билл, являешься председателем "восьмерки" и начинаешь готовить встречу в Денвере, эта проблематика должна занять важное место и в нашем двустороннем диалоге. Россия заинтересована в успешном саммите с конкретными, весомыми результатами. У меня теперь больше возможностей способствовать этому, поскольку после встреч "восьмерки" в Москве и Лионе российская сторона участвует в обсуждении не только политических, но и всех глобальных проблем. Надеюсь на продолжение обсуждения с тобой в ходе предстоящей встречи в марте новых идей, касающихся "восьмерки". Особо выделяю две: о шагах по дальнейшей трансформации "семерки" в полномасштабную "восьмерку" и о проведении в России в 1998 году нового мероприятия "восьмерки" по одной из актуальных глобальных проблем.

Я сознательно заостряю твое внимание на самых сложных вопросах, хотя есть и другие - глобальные, региональные и двусторонние, - о которых нам нужно будет с тобой поговорить при встрече. Но эти вопросы сейчас центральные.

Убежден, что мы с тобой оба понимаем значение переживаемого момента.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«12» февраля 19 97 г.

№ ПР-183

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы поделиться с тобой, как с только что вступившим в права председателя "восьмерки", некоторыми соображениями к предстоящему денверскому саммиту.

Прежде всего хочу подчеркнуть: Россия заинтересована в том, чтобы встреча в Денвере прошла с успехом и увенчалась весомыми результатами. В этой связи полагаю важным отметить следующее. Московский саммит, а затем встреча в Лионе дали сильный импульс практическому взаимодействию стран "восьмерки" по глобальным проблемам. Считаю это очень перспективным направлением работы "восьмерки", непосредственно затрагивающим интересы простых граждан. В Денвере мы могли бы сделать новые важные шаги для развития сотрудничества на этом направлении.

Первое. Думаю, Денвер прежде всего должен стимулировать дальнейшую работу уже действующих механизмов сотрудничества по ядерной безопасности, борьбе с терроризмом и оргпреступностью, реформе социально-экономического сектора ООН. Все они, по-моему, доказали свою полезность. Важно продолжить в формате "восьмерки" диалог по ядерному нераспространению, в том числе в контексте подготовки очередной Конференции по рассмотрению Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Второе. Нашим важным приоритетом должна оставаться работа по реализации решений Московского саммита. В этой связи хотел бы проинформировать тебя, что в Думу направлены на ратификацию документы о присоединении России к Венской Конвенции о гражданской ответственности за ядерный ущерб.

Третье. В Денвере важно договориться о налаживании практического взаимодействия спецслужб и правоохранительных органов стран "восьмерки" в сфере борьбы с незаконным оборотом ядерных материалов. Российская сторона подготовила и уже вынесла на рассмотрение партнеров проект рамочной договоренности по этому вопросу.

Четвертое. Поскольку решения Лиона значительно расширили сферу "восьмерочного" сотрудничества, нам стоит подумать и о новых механизмах взаимодействия. В частности, на таких направлениях как экология, создание глобального информационного сообщества, борьба с эпидемиями.

Пятое. Важное место в ходе подготовки к Денверу должна занять проблематика предстоящей спецсессии ГА ООН по окружающей среде и развитию. Полагаю, "восьмерке" стоило бы поработать над согласованием общих подходов к вопросам, которые будут рассматриваться на спецсессии.

Шестое. В настоящее время мы думаем и над практическими инициативами в области экологии, которые могли бы быть рассмотрены и одобрены нами в Денвере. Знаю, что ты также придаешь особое значение этой проблематике и высказал в Лионе ряд интересных конкретных идей, с которыми я согласен - о необходимости сотрудничества в охране лесов, уменьшении парникового эффекта. Полагаю, можно поработать над тем, чтобы выйти к Денверу на совместные инициативы. Кроме высказанных тобой идей, весьма актуальными мне также кажутся такие возможные сферы нашей кооперации как мониторинг экологии северной части Тихого океана и прогнозирование землетрясений в этом районе. Стоит подумать о дальнейшем развитии нашего сотрудничества в исследовании Антарктики.

Среди возможных крупных научно-технических проектов, которые могли бы также объединить страны "восьмерки", - налаживание сотрудничества в создании Международной космической станции. Предлагаю подумать о подписании в Денвере соглашения по этому вопросу, которое в основном уже готово.

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Седьмое. События только что завершившегося года еще раз показали исключительную важность задачи укрепления нашего взаимодействия в противодействии международному терроризму и оргпреступности. Существенный вклад в решение этой задачи внес саммит в Шарм-аш-Шейхе, состоявшийся по твоей инициативе, а также министерское антитеррористическое совещание в Париже. Со своей стороны, считаю, что полностью сохраняет свою актуальность инициатива, выдвинутая Россией на совещании в Париже, о выработке Конвенции о сотрудничестве в борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма. Нами подготовлен и внесен в ООН проект такой Конвенции, и я надеюсь на конструктивное сотрудничество наших партнеров по "восьмерке" в его дальнейшем продвижении. В равной степени это относится и к американскому предложению о разработке Конвенции о борьбе с терроризмом, связанным с применением взрывных устройств.

Рассчитываю, что в ходе подготовки к Денверу и на самой встрече мы сделаем новые шаги и в продвижении к полноформатной "восьмерке". Особо полагаюсь именно на твою поддержку в этом вопросе.

В частности, это касается нашего конкретного пожелания - ввести в практику и официально оформить в Денвере "постоянное приглашение" для российских представителей во все рабочие механизмы "семерки". Для нас также важно, чтобы в итоговом документе Денвера была четко обозначена цель скорого преобразования "семерки" в полноформатную "восьмерку". Считаю полезным и нужным продолжить хорошо зарекомендовавшую себя практику проведения специализированных встреч "восьмерки" на высшем и министерском уровнях и предметно рассмотреть этот вопрос на денверской встрече. Россия была бы готова взять на себя роль организатора такого мероприятия в 1998 году. Перспективной темой для него могло бы стать будущее мировой энергетики. Интерес представляют также и ключевые глобальные экологические проблемы, реформа ООН. Рассчитываю на твою поддержку в продвижении этой идеи.

Надеюсь, что в Денвере в экономическом документе "семерки" будет зафиксировано признание нашими партнерами того факта, что Россия в результате проводимой политики реформ превратилась в страну с рыночной экономикой.

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Соображения, которыми я, дорогой Билл, поделился с тобой, изложены мною в посланиях и другим коллегам по "восьмерке". Надеюсь, что эти мысли станут предметом обсуждения на встрече наших личных представителей в "восьмерке", намеченной на середину февраля.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.57)
KBH 12/13/2019

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 26, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL CP

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Yeltsin Letter to G-7

President Yeltsin sent roughly the same letter (Tab II) to all the G-7 heads with specific recommendations for the Denver Summit. President Clinton will respond on behalf of the G-7. We have worked with Dan Tarullo to produce the draft at Tab I. Tarullo is getting Treasury clearance; Jim Collins has cleared for State. Once Dan has internal U.S. clearances, he will circulate the letter to G-7 Sherpas for their clearance prior to sending it forward to the President for signature.

Yeltsin's incoming letter has a long list of suggestions, including follow-up on last year's Moscow Summit, UN reform, anti-terrorism, crime and corruption, global environmental and energy issues and nuclear safety. He also makes a pitch for a full G-8. Rather than address each of Yeltsin's points, the President's response covers key themes and makes clear that Yeltsin's suggestions will be worked by the Sherpas. We consciously avoided a direct response on the G-8 request: once we make the offer, we want it to come from the President in person, not in a response from the Seven, and we want to use it for maximum leverage on other issues. Instead, we have underscored that we intend Denver to continue the trend toward the Eight which we began last year at Lyon; this is as forward-leaning a response as we think the other Seven will clear.

Concurrence by: CR for Gary Samore, Liz Verville

RECOMMENDATION

That you clear on the letter at Tab I, which Dan Tarullo will then circulate to G-7 Sherpas.

Approve A/ w/changes Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Clinton to Yeltsin Letter on Denver Summit
Tab II Incoming


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Dear Boris:

Thank you for your letter of February 12, regarding the preparations for the Denver Summit. On behalf of our other colleagues, let me respond to your constructive suggestions, and convey my strong commitment to make this meeting a success for all the participants.

Our agenda, as you noted, should build upon the achievements of last year's meetings in Moscow and Lyon. Our meeting in Denver should display, in concrete terms, our ability to consolidate the benefits of global integration and address common challenges. I believe there is full agreement among the Eight on these objectives. As you noted, Denver also provides an opportunity to address a new set of global challenges, such as cooperation in protecting the global environment and in combating infectious diseases.

~~Again~~ I all of us share ~~the~~ your view that Denver should focus on concrete achievements. You are absolutely correct that, on nuclear safety and security, we must all live up to the commitments we made at the Moscow Summit. Already, we have made much progress. Together, we have taken important steps to combat nuclear smuggling, to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear materials, and to safely dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. ~~We are pleased~~ I am delighted to hear that you have submitted the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability to the Duma for ratification. And, in the coming months, we should do more on reactor safety. Here, as our representatives have discussed, ~~Russia can give our collective efforts a major boost by complying with its~~ commitment to the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account and intensifying cooperation ~~with the Eight~~ on the safety of old-designed reactors.

(Seems key, hard to cite)

As you note in your letter, we have made significant progress on the other issues in our ongoing global agenda. The Eight's cooperation on UN Reform has been critical to revitalizing that institution. Secretary General Annan has expressed his commitment to advancing the reform agenda that the Eight launched at Halifax, and as we prepare for Denver we should consider how best to support his efforts.

Likewise, the Eight's coordinated efforts are helping set the standard for international cooperation in combating crime and terrorism. Between now and Denver, we should work to implement the ambitious agenda set out in the Lyon Summit's 40 recommendations on combating crime, and in the Paris Ministerial's 25 recommendations on combating terrorism. On counterterrorism, in particular, ~~we~~ I share your view that the

it is important to strengthen compliance with our

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Eight should try to sustain the momentum behind worldwide support for our common goals, including concrete progress in ratifying both existing and new treaties.

Our focus on concrete achievements ~~in these areas~~ also should guide our efforts to address the next set of global challenges, such as the environment and infectious diseases. As you note, Denver will be an important opportunity to highlight cooperation on international environmental issues, particularly since our Summit will be immediately followed by the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit. As you know, our personal representatives are now considering a range of issues for joint action, including several of the new initiatives suggested in your letter.

Finally, in my capacity as chair of this year's Summit, I want to affirm my commitment to build on the important steps we took in 1996 under Jacques' leadership to give formal international recognition to the Eight. A trend has been established, and ~~this trend~~ should be continued ~~in a way that recognizes~~ Russia's role and responsibilities as an international leader. In the coming months, our personal representatives will be meeting to prepare for the Denver Summit. Your suggestions will be very important to shaping these discussions and to reinforcing the success we have achieved among the Eight.

If Boris, I look forward to seeing you in Helsinki next month and to continuing our dialogue on these issues. With warm wishes,

greatly

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Recd fm Russ Embs 2/13/97

Unofficial translation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (4.59)
KBH 12/13/2019

Moscow, the Kremlin
February 12, 1997

Dear Bill:

I would like to share with you some ideas regarding the preparations for the Denver Summit - since you have just entered into the function of the Chairman of the "G-8".

First of all I would like to stress: Russia is interested in a success and solid results of the Denver Summit. In this connection I believe it important to note the following. The Moscow Summit and then the meeting in Lyon have added a strong impetus to practical interaction between the "G-8" countries on global issues. I think that this is a very promising direction of the "G-8" activity which touches upon the interests of simple citizens. We could make new important steps in Denver to promote cooperation on this track.

First, in my view, Denver should first of all activate the work of already existing mechanisms of cooperation on nuclear security, on combatting terrorism and organized crime, and on reforming the socioeconomic activities of the United Nations Organization. As it seems to me, all of them have proven their usefulness. It is important to continue in the "G-8" format a dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation, including in the context of preparing the next conference on nuclear non-proliferation.

**His Excellency**
**William J. Clinton**
**President of the United States of America**
**Washington, D.C.**

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Second. Efforts to implement the Moscow Summit decisions should remain our important priority. In this connection I would like to inform you that we have forwarded to the State Duma for ratification the documents on Russia's joining the Vienna convention on civil responsibility for nuclear damage.

Third. It is important to agree in Denver on establishing practical cooperation between special services and law enforcement agencies of the "G-8" countries in the area of combatting illegal trafficking of nuclear materials. The Russian side has already prepared and made available for partners' attention a draft framework agreement on this issue.

Fourth. Since the decisions in Lyon have considerably broadened the area of the "G-8" cooperation it would be worthwhile to consider new mechanisms of interaction. In particular on such tracks as ecology, creation of a global informational community, combatting epidemics.

Fifth. The agenda of the forthcoming special session of the UN General Assembly on environment and development should occupy an important place in the course of preparations for Denver. I believe the "G-8" might try to coordinate shared approaches to the issues which will be under consideration during the UN GA special session.

Sixth. At present we are considering practical initiatives as well in the field of ecology which could be considered and approved by us in Denver. I know that you also attribute particular importance to these problems and have proposed a number of interesting concrete ideas in Lyon with which I agree - regarding a necessity of cooperation in preserving forests, on alleviating the green-house effect. I believe that some joint initiatives could be worked out for Denver. Besides the ideas you have proposed, among the prospective burning issues for our cooperation, as I see it, could be ecological monitoring in the Northern part of the Pacific Ocean and prognostication of earthquakes in this area. We could also give a thought to our further cooperation in exploration of the Antarctic.

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Among possible big scientific technical projects which could also unite the "G-8" countries I would note building cooperation in the creation of an international outer space station. I propose to consider signing an agreement in Denver on this issue which is basically ready.

Seventh. The events of the last year have once again demonstrated a particular importance of strengthening our interaction in combatting international terrorism and organized crime. The Sharm El-Sheikh Summit which has been organized thanks to your initiative has contributed considerably to solving this problem, as well as the Ministerial anti-terrorist meeting in Paris. I for one still believe that Russia's initiative in Paris - to work out a convention on combatting nuclear terrorism acts - fully preserves its importance. We have prepared and submitted to the UN a draft of this convention and I count on a constructive cooperation of our partners in the "G-8" in its further advancement. The same is true in relation to the American proposal on drafting a convention on combatting terrorism with the use of explosive devices.

I hope that during the preparation for the Denver Summit and at the Summit itself we shall make new steps to advance the creation of a full-scale "G-8" as well. I have special expectations in what regards your support in this issue.

In particular it refers to our concrete desire to introduce into practice and officially formalize in Denver a "standing invitation" for Russian representatives to all working mechanisms of the "G-7". It is also important for us so that the Denver final document clearly formulated an objective of an early transformation of the "G-7" into a full-scale "G-8". I believe that it would be useful and worthwhile to continue a positive practice of specialized meetings of the "G-8" on the summit and ministerial levels and to discuss thoroughly this issue at the Denver Summit. Russia could take upon itself the organizing role for holding such an event in 1998. A prospective topic for it could be the issue of the future of world power engineering. Key


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I hope that the "G-7" economic document in Denver will finally spell out the recognition by our partners of the fact that in the result of the policy of reforms Russia has been transformed into a country with the market economy.

The ideas which I have shared with you, dear Bill, I have also sent to other "G-8" colleagues. I hope that these ideas will become the subject for a discussion during the meeting of our personal representatives in the "G-8" in mid-February.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(6.60)
KBH 12/13/2019

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы поделиться с тобой, как только что вступившим в права председателя "восьмерки", некоторыми соображениями к предстоящему денверскому саммиту.

Прежде всего хочу подчеркнуть: Россия заинтересована в том, чтобы встреча в Денвере прошла с успехом и увенчалась весомыми результатами. В этой связи полагаю важным отметить следующее. Московский саммит, а затем встреча в Лионе дали сильный импульс практическому взаимодействию стран "восьмерки" по глобальным проблемам. Считаю это очень перспективным направлением работы "восьмерки", непосредственно затрагивающим интересы простых граждан. В Денвере мы могли бы сделать новые важные шаги для развития сотрудничества на этом направлении.

Первое, думаю, Денвер прежде всего должен стимулировать дальнейшую работу уже действующих механизмов сотрудничества по ядерной безопасности, борьбе с терроризмом и оргпреступностью, реформе социально-экономического сектора ООН. Все они, по-моему, доказали свою полезность. Важно продолжить в формате "восьмерки" диалог по ядерному нераспространению, в том числе в контексте подготовки очередной конференции по рассмотрению Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия.

Второе. Нашим важным приоритетом должна оставаться работа по реализации решений московского саммита. В этой связи хотел бы проинформировать тебя, что в Думу направлены на ратификацию документы о присоединении России к Венской конвенции о гражданской ответственности за ядерный ущерб.

Третье. В Денвере важно договориться о налаживании практического взаимодействия спецслужб и правоохранительных органов стран "восьмерки" в сфере борьбы с незаконным оборотом ядерных материалов. Российская сторона подготовила и уже вынесла на рассмотрение

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Пятое. Важное место в ходе подготовки к Денверу должна занимать проблематика предстоящей спецсессии ГА ООН по окружающей среде и развитию. Полагаю, "восьмерке" стоило бы поработать над согласованием общих подходов к вопросам, которые будут рассматриваться на спецсессии.

Шестое. В настоящее время мы думаем и над практическими инициативами в области экологии, которые могли бы быть рассмотрены и одобрены нами в Денвере. Знаю, что ты также придаешь особое значение этой проблематике и высказал в Лионе ряд интересных конкретных идей, с которыми я согласен - о необходимости сотрудничества в охране лесов, уменьшении парникового эффекта. Полагаю, можно поработать над тем, чтобы выйти к Денверу на совместные инициативы. Кроме высказанных тобой идей, весьма актуальными мне также кажутся такие возможные сферы нашей кооперации как мониторинг экологии северной части Тихого океана и прогнозирование землетрясений в этом районе. Стоит подумать о дальнейшем развитии нашего сотрудничества в исследовании Антарктики.

Среди возможных крупных научно-технических проектов, которые могли бы также объединить страны "восьмерки" - налаживание сотрудничества в создании международной космической станции. Предлагаю подумать о подписании в Денвере соглашения по этому вопросу, которое в основном уже готово.

Седьмое. События только что завершившегося года еще раз показали исключительную важность задачи укрепления нашего взаимодействия в противодействии международному терроризму и оргпреступности. Существенный вклад в решение этой задачи внес саммит в Шарм-аш-Шейхе, состоявшийся по твоей инициативе, а также министерскккое антитеррористическое совещание в Париже. Со своей

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стороны считаю, что полностью сохраняет свою актуальность инициатива, выдвинутая Россией на совещании в Париже, о выработке конвенции о сотрудничестве в борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма. Нами подготовлен и внесен в ООН проект такой конвенции, и я надеюсь на конструктивное сотрудничество наших партнеров по "восьмерке" в его дальнейшем продвижении. В равной степени это относится и к американскому предложению о разработке конвенции о борьбе с терроризмом, связанным с применением взрывных устройств.

Рассчитываю, что в ходе подготовки к Денверу и на самой встрече мы сделаем новые шаги и в продвижении к полноформатной "восьмерке". Особо полагаюсь именно на твою поддержку в этом вопросе.

В частности, это касается нашего конкретного пожелания ввести в практику и официально оформить в Денвере "постоянное приглашение для российских представителей во все рабочие механизмы "семерки". Для нас также важно, чтобы в итоговом документе Денвера была четко обозначена цель скорого преобразования "семерки" в полноформатную "восьмерку". Считаю полезным и нужным продолжить хорошо зарекомендовавшую себя практику проведения специализированных встреч "восьмерки" на высшем и министерском уровнях и предметно рассмотреть этот вопрос на Денверской встрече. Россия была бы готова взять на себя роль организатора такого мероприятия в 1998 году. Преспективной темой для него могло бы стать будущее мировой энергетики. Интерес представляют также и ключевые глобальные экологические проблемы, реформа ООН. Рассчитываю на твою поддержку в продвижении этой идеи.

Надеюсь, что в Денвере в экономическом документе "семерки" будет зафиксировано признание нашими партнерами того факта, что Россия в результате проводимой политики реформ превратилась в страну с рыночной экономикой.

Соображения, которыми я, дорогой Билл, поделился с тобой, изложены мною в посланиях и другим коллегам по "восьмерке".

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Надеюсь, что эти мысли станут предметом обсуждения на встрече наших личных представителей в "восьмерке", намеченной на середину февраля.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Москва, Кремль
12 февраля 1997 года

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2015-0815-M-3 (6.61)
KBH 12/13/2019

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 26, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL CP

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Yeltsin Letter to G-7

President Yeltsin sent roughly the same letter (Tab II) to all the G-7 heads with specific recommendations for the Denver Summit. President Clinton will respond on behalf of the G-7. We have worked with Dan Tarullo to produce the draft at Tab I. Tarullo is getting Treasury clearance; Jim Collins has cleared for State. Once Dan has internal U.S. clearances, he will circulate the letter to G-7 Sherpas for their clearance prior to sending it forward to the President for signature.

Yeltsin's incoming letter has a long list of suggestions, including follow-up on last year's Moscow Summit, UN reform, anti-terrorism, crime and corruption, global environmental and energy issues and nuclear safety. He also makes a pitch for a full G-8. Rather than address each of Yeltsin's points, the President's response covers key themes and makes clear that Yeltsin's suggestions will be worked by the Sherpas. We consciously avoided a direct response on the G-8 request: once we make the offer, we want it to come from the President in person, not in a response from the Seven, and we want to use it for maximum leverage on other issues. Instead, we have underscored that we intend Denver to continue the trend toward the Eight which we began last year at Lyon; this is as forward-leaning a response as we think the other Seven will clear.

Concurrence by: Gary Samore, Liz Verville

RECOMMENDATION

That you clear on the letter at Tab I, which Dan Tarullo will then circulate to G-7 Sherpas.

Approve A w/changes Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Clinton to Yeltsin Letter on Denver Summit
Tab II Incoming

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Dear Boris:

Thank you for your letter of February 12, regarding the preparations for the Denver Summit. On behalf of our other colleagues, let me respond to your constructive suggestions, and convey my strong commitment to make this meeting a success for all the participants.

Our agenda, as you noted, should build upon the achievements of last year's meetings in Moscow and Lyon. Our meeting in Denver should display, in concrete terms, our ability to consolidate the benefits of global integration and address common challenges. I believe there is full agreement among the Eight on these objectives. As you noted, Denver also provides an opportunity to address a new set of global challenges, such as cooperation in protecting the global environment and in combating infectious diseases.

~~Again~~ I ~~A~~ll of us share ~~the~~ your view that Denver should focus on concrete achievements. You are absolutely correct that, on nuclear safety and security, we must all live up to the commitments we made at the Moscow Summit. Already, we have made much progress. Together, we have taken important steps to combat nuclear smuggling, to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear materials, and to safely dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. ~~We are pleased~~ to hear that you have submitted the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability to the Duma for ratification. And, in the coming months, we should do more on reactor safety. Here, as our representatives have discussed, ~~Russia can give our collective efforts a major boost by complying with its~~ commitment to the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account and intensifying cooperation ~~with the Eight~~ on the safety of old-designed reactors.

I am delighted

Should check me

As you note in your letter, we have made significant progress on the other issues in our ongoing global agenda. The Eight's cooperation on UN Reform has been critical to revitalizing that institution. Secretary General Annan has expressed his commitment to advancing the reform agenda that the Eight launched at Halifax, and as we prepare for Denver we should consider how best to support his efforts.

it is important to strengthen compliance with our

Likewise, the Eight's coordinated efforts are helping set the standard for international cooperation in combating crime and terrorism. Between now and Denver, we should work to implement the ambitious agenda set out in the Lyon Summit's 40 recommendations on combating crime, and in the Paris Ministerial's 25 recommendations on combating terrorism. On counterterrorism, in particular, ~~we~~ I share your view that the

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Eight should try to sustain the momentum behind worldwide support for our common goals, including concrete progress in ratifying both existing and new treaties.

Our focus on concrete achievements ~~in these areas~~ should guide our efforts to address the next set of global challenges, such as the environment and infectious diseases. As you note, Denver will be an important opportunity to highlight cooperation on international environmental issues, particularly since our Summit will be immediately followed by the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit. As you know, our personal representatives are now considering a range of issues for joint action, including several of the new initiatives suggested in your letter.

Finally, in my capacity as chair of this year's Summit, I want to affirm my commitment to build on the important steps we took in 1996 under Jacques' leadership to give formal international recognition to the Eight. A trend has been established, and ~~this trend~~ should be continued ~~in a way that recognizes~~ Russia's role and responsibilities as an international leader. In the coming months, our personal representatives will be meeting to prepare for the Denver Summit. Your suggestions will be very important to shaping these discussions and to reinforcing the success we have achieved among the Eight.

I look forward to seeing you in Helsinki next month and to continuing our dialogue on these issues.

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Recd from Russ Rel 2/13/97

Unofficial translation

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.63)
KBH 12/13/2019

Moscow, the Kremlin
February 12, 1997

Dear Bill:

I would like to share with you some ideas regarding the preparations for the Denver Summit - since you have just entered into the function of the Chairman of the "G-8".

First of all I would like to stress: Russia is interested in a success and solid results of the Denver Summit. In this connection I believe it important to note the following. The Moscow Summit and then the meeting in Lyon have added a strong impetus to practical interaction between the "G-8" countries on global issues. I think that this is a very promising direction of the "G-8" activity which touches upon the interests of simple citizens. We could make new important steps in Denver to promote cooperation on this track.

First, in my view, Denver should first of all activate the work of already existing mechanisms of cooperation on nuclear security, on combatting terrorism and organized crime, and on reforming the socioeconomic activities of the United Nations Organization. As it seems to me, all of them have proven their usefulness. It is important to continue in the "G-8" format a dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation, including in the context of preparing the next conference on nuclear non-proliferation.

**His Excellency**
**William J. Clinton**
**President of the United States of America**
**Washington, D.C.**

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Second. Efforts to implement the Moscow Summit decisions should remain our important priority. In this connection I would like to inform you that we have forwarded to the State Duma for ratification the documents on Russia's joining the Vienna convention on civil responsibility for nuclear damage.

Third. It is important to agree in Denver on establishing practical cooperation between special services and law enforcement agencies of the "G-8" countries in the area of combatting illegal trafficking of nuclear materials. The Russian side has already prepared and made available for partners' attention a draft framework agreement on this issue.

Fourth. Since the decisions in Lyon have considerably broadened the area of the "G-8" cooperation it would be worthwhile to consider new mechanisms of interaction. In particular on such tracks as ecology, creation of a global informational community, combatting epidemics.

Fifth. The agenda of the forthcoming special session of the UN General Assembly on environment and development should occupy an important place in the course of preparations for Denver. I believe the "G-8" might try to coordinate shared approaches to the issues which will be under consideration during the UN GA special session.

Sixth. At present we are considering practical initiatives as well in the field of ecology which could be considered and approved by us in Denver. I know that you also attribute particular importance to these problems and have proposed a number of interesting concrete ideas in Lyon with which I agree - regarding a necessity of cooperation in preserving forests, on alleviating the green-house effect. I believe that some joint initiatives could be worked out for Denver. Besides the ideas you have proposed, among the prospective burning issues for our cooperation, as I see it, could be ecological monitoring in the Northern part of the Pacific Ocean and prognostication of earthquakes in this area. We could also give a thought to our further cooperation in exploration of the Antarctic.


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Among possible big scientific technical projects which could also unite the "G-8" countries I would note building cooperation in the creation of an international outer space station. I propose to consider signing an agreement in Denver on this issue which is basically ready.

Seventh. The events of the last year have once again demonstrated a particular importance of strengthening our interaction in combatting international terrorism and organized crime. The Sharm El-Sheikh Summit which has been organized thanks to your initiative has contributed considerably to solving this problem, as well as the Ministerial anti-terrorist meeting in Paris. I for one still believe that Russia's initiative in Paris - to work out a convention on combatting nuclear terrorism acts - fully preserves its importance. We have prepared and submitted to the UN a draft of this convention and I count on a constructive cooperation of our partners in the "G-8" in its further advancement. The same is true in relation to the American proposal on drafting a convention on combatting terrorism with the use of explosive devices.

I hope that during the preparation for the Denver Summit and at the Summit itself we shall make new steps to advance the creation of a full-scale "G-8" as well. I have special expectations in what regards your support in this issue.

In particular it refers to our concrete desire to introduce into practice and officially formalize in Denver a "standing invitation" for Russian representatives to all working mechanisms of the "G-7". It is also important for us so that the Denver final document clearly formulated an objective of an early transformation of the "G-7" into a full-scale "G-8". I believe that it would be useful and worthwhile to continue a positive practice of specialized meetings of the "G-8" on the summit and ministerial levels and to discuss thoroughly this issue at the Denver Summit. Russia could take upon itself the organizing role for holding such an event in 1998. A prospective topic for it could be the issue of the future of world power engineering. Key


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I hope that the "G-7" economic document in Denver will finally spell out the recognition by our partners of the fact that in the result of the policy of reforms Russia has been transformed into a country with the market economy.

The ideas which I have shared with you, dear Bill, I have also sent to other "G-8" colleagues. I hope that these ideas will become the subject for a discussion during the meeting of our personal representatives in the "G-8" in mid-February.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Четвертое. Поскольку решения Лиона значительно расширили сферу "восьмерочного" сотрудничества, нам стоит подумать и о новых механизмах взаимодействия. В частности, на таких направлениях как экология, создание глобального информационного сообщества, борьба с эпидемиями.

Пятое. Важное место в ходе подготовки к Денверу должна занимать проблематика предстоящей спецсессии ГА ООН по окружающей среде и развитию. Полагаю, "восьмерке" стоило бы поработать над согласованием общих подходов к вопросам, которые будут рассматриваться на спецсессии.

Шестое. В настоящее время мы думаем и над практическими инициативами в области экологии, которые могли бы быть рассмотрены и одобрены нами в Денвере. Знаю, что ты также придаешь особое значение этой проблематике и высказал в Лионе ряд интересных конкретных идей, с которыми я согласен - о необходимости сотрудничества в охране лесов, уменьшении парникового эффекта. Полагаю, можно поработать над тем, чтобы выйти к Денверу на совместные инициативы. Кроме высказанных тобой идей, весьма актуальными мне также кажутся такие возможные сферы нашей кооперации как мониторинг экологии северной части Тихого океана и прогнозирование землетрясений в этом районе. Стоит подумать о дальнейшем развитии нашего сотрудничества в исследовании Антарктики.

Среди возможных крупных научно-технических проектов, которые могли бы также объединить страны "восьмерки" - налаживание сотрудничества в создании международной космической станции. Предлагаю подумать о подписании в Денвере соглашения по этому вопросу, которое в основном уже готово.

Седьмое. События только что завершившегося года еще раз показали исключительную важность задачи укрепления нашего взаимодействия в противодействии международному терроризму и оргпреступности. Существенный вклад в решение этой задачи внес саммит в Шарм-Аш-Шейхе, состоявшийся по твоей инициативе, а также министерсккое антитеррористическое совещание в Париже. Со своей


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стороны считаю, что полностью сохраняет свою актуальность инициатива, выдвинутая Россией на совещании в Париже, о выработке конвенции о сотрудничестве в борьбе с актами ядерного терроризма. Нами подготовлен и внесен в ООН проект такой конвенции, и я надеюсь на конструктивное сотрудничество наших партнеров по "восьмерке" в его дальнейшем продвижении. В равной степени это относится и к американскому предложению о разработке конвенции о борьбе с терроризмом, связанным с применением взрывных устройств.

Рассчитываю, что в ходе подготовки к Денверу и на самой встрече мы сделаем новые шаги и в продвижении к полноформатной "восьмерке". Особо полагаюсь именно на твою поддержку в этом вопросе.

В частности, это касается нашего конкретного пожелания ввести в практику и официально оформить в Денвере "постоянное приглашение" для российских представителей во все рабочие механизмы "семерки". Для нас также важно, чтобы в итоговом документе Денвера была четко обозначена цель скорого преобразования "семерки" в полноформатную "восьмерку". Считаю полезным и нужным продолжить хорошо зарекомендовавшую себя практику проведения специализированных встреч "восьмерки" на высшем и министерском уровнях и предметно рассмотреть этот вопрос на Денверской встрече. Россия была бы готова взять на себя роль организатора такого мероприятия в 1998 году. Преспективной темой для него могло бы стать будущее мировой энергетики. Интерес представляют также и ключевые глобальные экологические проблемы, реформа ООН. Рассчитываю на твою поддержку в продвижении этой идеи.

Надеюсь, что в Денвере в экономическом документе "семерки" будет зафиксировано признание нашими партнерами того факта, что Россия в результате проводимой политики реформ превратилась в страну с рыночной экономикой.

Соображения, которыми я, дорогой Билл, поделился с тобой, изложены мною в посланиях и другим коллегам по "восьмерке".


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Надеюсь, что эти мысли станут предметом обсуждения на встрече наших личных представителей в "восьмерке", намеченной на середину февраля.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Москва, Кремль
12 февраля 1997 года

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(6.65)
KBH 12/13/2019

Unofficial translation

May 19, 1997

Dear Bill,

I was gratified to read your letter received in the wake of the negotiations between Yevgeny Primakov and Javier Solana which resulted in the agreement on the Russia-NATO document. I also consider this agreement historic. What is crucial - as the result of the succesful conclusion of this work there are neither winners nor losers. Everybody won - first and foremost - the peoples of our countries, which have borne the major burden of the "cold war". Russians and Americans have the right to expect from their leaders that Europe in the Third millenium will indeed be undivided, peaceful and democratic. The forthcoming signing of the Russia-NATO document will undoubtedly influence in the most constructive way the overall course of the world affairs.

I am pleased that you not only highly regard this strategic agreement, but also emphasize that Russia contributed decisively towards its completion. I also agree with you that Paris would not have been possible without Helsinki. The arrangements which you and I reached in the capital of Finland layed down the foundation for concluding the negotiations on the Founding Act. Now - as you have also written in your letter - we must demonstrate to everybody, both to the supporters of the agreement and its opponents, that it works. It is no less important to capitalize on the constructive political momentum created by this breakthrough for moving forward in other key areas.

I have in mind first of all the Vienna negotiations. We did not insist

HIS EXCELLENCY WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

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on incorporating overly specific provisions in the Founding Act, because it was decided to fix those at the Vienna talks on the CFE adaptation. I instructed my negotiators to step up the work in every possible way and I urge you to do the same. It is essential that we, as soon as possible, optimally - by Paris, fulfil the commitment that we undertook to conclude the framework agreement on the CFE adaptation which would define the features of the modernized Treaty.

Today this is a priority task. But it is not the only one. Notwithstanding all the importance of European issues we did not limit ourselves in Helsinki to discussing those alone. We have outlined an extensive agenda for Russian-U.S. cooperation. I think that in Paris we should briefly review how it is being implemented. Then in Denver we can have a more thorough discussion.

In my view special attention now should be payed to the issue of Russia's final integration into the "Eight" as well as of our accession to the WTO and other global economic fora.

Again, I congratulate you on our common victory. I am looking forward to doing it in person in Paris.

B.Yeltsin

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.66)
KBH 12/13/2019

«19» мая 1997 г.

№ Пр-758

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

С удовлетворением прочел твое послание, полученное по горячим следам переговоров Е.М.Примакова с Х.Соланой, которые завершились согласованием документа Россия - НАТО. Я также считаю это соглашение историческим. Главное - в результате успешного завершения этой работы нет ни победителей, ни побежденных. Выиграли все - и прежде всего народы наших стран, которые вынесли на себе основное бремя "холодной войны". Россияне и американцы вправе ожидать от своих лидеров, что Европа третьего тысячелетия будет действительно неразделенной, мирной и демократической. Предстоящее подписание документа Россия - НАТО, несомненно, окажет самое конструктивное воздействие и на общий ход дел в мире.

Я рад, что ты не только высоко оцениваешь это стратегическое соглашение, но и выделяешь как решающий тот вклад, который внесла в его достижение Россия. Согласен с тобой и в том, что без Хельсинки не было бы Парижа. Наши с тобой договоренности в столице Финляндии заложили фундамент для завершения согласования Основополагающего акта. Теперь - а ты об этом тоже пишешь - надо показать всем - и сторонникам этого соглашения, и критикам, - что

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г.Вашингтон

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оно работает. Не менее важно воспользоваться создавшимся благодаря этому прорыву конструктивным политическим моментом для продвижения на других ключевых направлениях.

Прежде всего я имею в виду переговоры в Вене. Мы не стали настаивать на включении в Основополагающий акт излишне конкретных положений, потому что было решено зафиксировать их на переговорах в Вене по адаптации Договора об ОВСЕ. Я дал указание своим переговорщикам всемерно активизировать работу и призываю тебя поступить аналогичным образом. Необходимо как можно скорее, самое лучшее - к Парижу, выполнить взятое нами на себя обязательство и заключить рамочное соглашение по адаптации ДОВСЕ, которое определило бы лицо обновленного Договора.

Это - сегодня приоритетная задача. Но не единственная. При всей важности европейских дел мы с тобой не ограничились в Хельсинки их обсуждением. У нас намечена обширная повестка дня российско-американского сотрудничества. Думаю, что уже в Париже нам нужно накоротке посмотреть, как идет ее реализация. Тогда в Денвере можно будет поговорить более обстоятельно.

Особое внимание сейчас, на мой взгляд, следует уделить вопросу об окончательной интеграции России в "восьмерку", а также о нашем вступлении в ВТО и другие глобальные экономические форумы.

Еще раз поздравляю тебя с нашей общей победой. Рассчитываю лично сделать это в Париже.

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Recd NSC/RME
7/14/95

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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

Following the practice of trustful exchange of opinions on pressing international problems established between us I would like to share with you a number of considerations regarding the Transcaucasian region.

It is a historically established fact that the Trans-Caucasus is the region of Russia's vital interests. The main goal of the Russian policy regarding this region is to ensure lasting stability on our southern borders, to assist in the formation of territorially integral, stable and friendly nations - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

Meanwhile, unfortunately, the Trans-Caucasus is one of the most explosive areas on the post-Soviet territory. The unsettled conflicts in Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Osetia not only impede the steady development of the new independent states in the Transcaucasian region, but deteriorate the situation in the Caucasus on the whole which, as you realize, is particularly painful for Russia.

With the assistance from other concerned states, the UN and OSCE we managed to steer the Transcaucasian conflicts to certain positive lines: the cease-fire is observed, appropriate negotiating mechanisms are working. However, the current state of "neither war, nor peace" is fraught with new threats.

It is known that Minister Primakov and secretary Albright have discussed the situation with the settlement of the Abkhazian conflict. In June we took a number of additional steps to lead the negotiations out of the dead-end. We managed to coordinate a document which fixed the parties' agreements on the key elements of the settlement - the preservation of territorial integrity of Georgia and return of refugees. The Abkhazian leadership, not without our pressing influence, expressed readiness to sign the document. The Georgian side, which representatives agreed to it in Moscow,

**His Excellency**
**William Jefferson Clinton**
**President of the United States of America**
**Washington, D.C.**

JUL 17 14:48

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then began to insist on additional discussions of the text. It appears that at this point the practical political decision depends to a larger extent on Tbilisi than on others.

It is also noteworthy that Tbilisi develops an intention to resolve the Abkhazian problem by force - by hands of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. As you understand, this is not something we can accept. In this situation, according to our information, the Georgian side counts on the US consent to send in forces of other countries, the core of which, according to Tbilisi's plans, might consist of American armed forces.

The Georgian President is persistently urged to pursue the military resolution of the Abkhazian problem by extremist, revanchist elements. Their intention is obvious - to drag Georgia into a new turn of the armed conflict, which will question the very possibility of its settlement, discredit E.Shevardnadze and lead Georgia off the course of democratic development.

In these circumstances, in my opinion, it is important in the interests of the cause and E.Shevardnadze himself that Tbilisi does not receive "signals" which could be interpreted as a possibility of forcible return of refugees. Political negotiations could be continued only if peace is kept in the conflict zone which is ensured mainly by the Russian peacekeepers' presence there. Their withdrawal can result in a new bloodshed.

We intend to take additional efforts to convince the parties to reach the signing of the document coordinated in Moscow. At this point this is the main objective. Attempts to revise the established pattern and format of the negotiations, including by convening some international conference on Abkhazia, could, on our view, only complicate the ongoing negotiating process, cast it back to square one.

Quite satisfying is the interaction which has established between our countries in the settlement of another conflict - Nagorny Karabakh. The issue of the conflict was in the center of the negotiations with the Azerbaijani President Aliev during his recent visit to Moscow. The discussion was, certainly, not a simple one, but we had an understanding that in the end we managed to convince the Azerbaijani President of the necessity of a more flexible and constructive approach to the key issues of the

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settlement. I have instructed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intensify work with the conflicting parties. However, I would not like these words to be interpreted to some extent as Russia's intention to pursue an autonomous line on issues of Nagorny-Karabakh settlement.

As we have agreed, we will continue to act in the format of three co-chairman from Russia, the US and France and we do not intend to deviate from this line.

Moreover, in my opinion, it is necessary to develop the positive impact produced on the conflicting parties by the statement of the Presidents of Russia, the US and France on Nagorny Karabakh made in Denver, as well as to increase political pressure. It is important that the parties to the conflict should literally feel the three powers breathing down their necks, understand that they have no other way but the one leading to peace and consent on the basis of the rational and non-typical proposals which our countries have put on the table of negotiations.

I am hoping for a mutual understanding in the above issues.

On our side, we are prepared to boost interaction with the US to ensure stability and security in the Trans-Caucasus an the entire world.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

Moscow, Kremlin
July 12, 1997

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ABKHAZIA + GEORGIA

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
## РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«12» июля 1997 г.

№ Пр-1129

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Следуя установившейся между нами практике доверительного обмена мнениями по актуальным международным проблемам, хотел бы высказать ряд соображений, касающихся Закавказья.

Исторически так сложилось, что Закавказье представляет для России регион ее важных интересов. Основная задача российской политики в отношении этого региона - обеспечение надежной стабильности на наших южных рубежах, содействие становлению там территориально целостных, устойчивых и дружественных нам государств - Азербайджана, Армении и Грузии.

Между тем Закавказье, к сожалению, относится к числу наиболее взрывоопасных точек на постсоветском пространстве. Неурегулированность конфликтов в Нагорном Карабахе, Абхазии и Южной Осетии не только препятствует нормальному развитию новых независимых государств в Закавказском регионе, но и ухудшает ситуацию на Кавказе в целом, что как ты понимаешь, особенно болезненно для России.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
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Нам удалось с помощью других заинтересованных государств, ООН и ОБСЕ вывести закавказские конфликты на определенные позитивные рубежи: соблюдается прекращение огня, действуют соответствующие переговорные механизмы. Однако нынешнее состояние "ни мира, ни войны" чревато новыми угрозами.

Е.Примаков и М.Олбрайт, как известно, обсудили положение дел в урегулировании абхазского конфликта. В июне мы предприняли ряд дополнительных шагов, чтобы вывести переговоры из тупика. Удалось согласовать документ, в котором фиксировались договоренности сторон по ключевым проблемам урегулирования - сохранение территориальной целостности Грузии и возвращение беженцев. Абхазское руководство, не без нашего нажимного воздействия, выразило готовность подписать документ. Грузинская же сторона, представители которой в Москве с ним согласились, затем начала настаивать на дополнительном обсуждении текста. Сейчас, пожалуй, практическое политическое решение зависит в гораздо большей степени от Тбилиси, чем от других.

Следует отметить и то, что у Тбилиси проявляется стремление решить абхазскую проблему силой - руками российского миротворческого контингента. Как ты понимаешь, мы на это пойти не можем. В такой ситуации, по имеющейся у нас информации, грузинская сторона рассчитывает получить согласие США направить воинский контингент других стран, ядро которого, согласно планам Тбилиси, могут составить американские вооруженные силы.

На военное решение абхазской проблемы Президента Грузии настойчиво подталкивают экстремистские, реваншистские элементы. Их расчет очевиден - втянуть Грузию в новый виток вооруженного конфликта, урегулирование которого тем самым будет вообще поставлено под вопрос, дискредитировать Э.Шеварднадзе, свернуть Грузию с демократического пути развития.

В этих условиях считаю важным, в интересах дела, да и самого Э.Шеварднадзе, чтобы Тбилиси не получил "сигналы", которые могли бы быть интерпретированы им как возможность силового возвращения беженцев. Продолжение политических переговоров может проходить только при сохранении мирных условий в зоне конфликта, а это обеспечивается главным образом присутствием там российских миротворцев. Их уход может привести к новому кровопролитию.

Мы намерены предпринять дополнительные усилия с тем, чтобы убедить стороны выйти на подписание согласованного в Москве

документа. Сейчас - это главная задача. Попытки же пересмотреть сложившуюся схему и формат переговоров, в том числе путем созыва некоей международной конференции по Абхазии, могут, по нашему мнению, лишь осложнить идущий переговорный процесс, отбросить его назад к нулевой отметке.

Вызывает удовлетворение взаимодействие, которое установилось между нашими странами в урегулировании другого конфликта - нагорно-карабахского. Вопрос об этом конфликте был в центре переговоров с Президентом Азербайджана Г.Алиевым во время его недавнего визита в Москву. Разговор был, разумеется, непростым, но у нас возникло понимание, что в его итоге все же удалось убедить Президента Азербайджана в необходимости более гибкого и конструктивного подхода к ключевым проблемам урегулирования. Мною даны указания российскому МИД интенсифицировать работу с конфликтующими сторонами. Я, однако, не хочу, чтобы эти мои слова были интерпретированы в какой-то степени как стремление России проводить автономную линию по вопросам нагорно-карабахского урегулирования.

Мы, как договорились, будем и далее действовать в формате трех сопредседателей от России, США и Франции. И от этой линии отступать не собираемся.

Более того, необходимо, на мой взгляд, развить то позитивное воздействие, которое оказало на конфликтующие стороны Заявление президентов России, США и Франции по Нагорному Карабаху, сделанное в Денвере, усилить политический прессинг. Важно, чтобы стороны в конфликте буквально чувствовали дыхание в затылок трех великих держав, поняли, что иного пути, кроме как ведущего к миру и согласию, на основе тех рациональных и нестандартных по своему содержанию предложений, которые положили на стол переговоров наши страны, у них просто нет.

Надеюсь на взаимопонимание в изложенных мною выше вопросах.

Со своей стороны мы готовы к активизации взаимодействия с США для обеспечения стабильности и безопасности в Закавказье и мире в целом.

С уважением,

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Б.Ельцин

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

Следуя установившейся между нами практике доверительного обмена мнениями по актуальным международным проблемам, хотел бы высказать ряд соображений, касающихся Закавказья.

Исторически так сложилось, что Закавказье представляет для России регион ее важных интересов. Основная задача российской политики в отношении этого региона - обеспечение надежной стабильности на наших южных рубежах, содействие становлению там территориально целостных, устойчивых и дружественных нам государств - Азербайджана, Армении и Грузии.

Между тем Закавказье, к сожалению, относится к числу наиболее взрывоопасных точек на постсоветском пространстве. Неурегулированность конфликтов в Нагорном Карабахе, Абхазии и Южной Осетии не только препятствует нормальному развитию новых независимых государств в Закавказском регионе, но и ухудшает ситуацию на Кавказе в целом, что как ты понимаешь, особенно болезненно для России.

Нам удалось с помощью других заинтересованных государств, ООН и ОБСЕ вывести закавказские конфликты на определенные позитивные рубежи: соблюдается прекращение огня, действуют соответствующие переговорные механизмы. Однако нынешнее состояние "ни мира, ни войны" чревато новыми угрозами.

Е.Примаков и М.Олбрайт, как известно, обсудили положение дел в урегулировании абхазского конфликта. В июне мы предприняли

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ряд дополнительных шагов, чтобы вывести переговоры из тупика. Удалось согласовать документ, в котором фиксировались договоренности сторон по ключевым проблемам урегулирования - сохранение территориальной целостности Грузии и возвращение беженцев. Абхазское руководство, не без нашего нажимного воздействия, выразило готовность подписать документ. Грузинская же сторона, представители которой в Москве с ним согласились, затем начала настаивать на дополнительном обсуждении текста. Сейчас, пожалуй, практическое политическое решение зависит в гораздо большей степени от Тбилиси, чем от других.

Следует отметить и то, что у Тбилиси проявляется стремление решить абхазскую проблему силой - руками российского миротворческого контингента. Как ты понимаешь, мы на это пойти не можем. В такой ситуации, по имеющейся у нас информации, грузинская сторона рассчитывает получить согласие США направить воинский контингент других стран, ядро которого, согласно планам Тбилиси, могут составить американские вооруженные силы.

На военное решение абхазской проблемы президента Грузии настойчиво подталкивают экстремистские, реваншистские элементы. Их расчет очевиден - втянуть Грузию в новый виток вооруженного конфликта, урегулирование которого тем самым будет вообще поставлено под вопрос, дискредитировать Э.Шеварднадзе, свернуть Грузию с демократического пути развития.

В этих условиях считаю важным, в интересах дела, да и самого Э.Шеварднадзе, чтобы Тбилиси не получил "сигналы", которые могли бы быть интерпретированы им как возможность силового возвращения беженцев. Продолжение политических переговоров может проходить только при сохранении мирных условий в зоне конфликта, а это обеспечивается главным образом присутствием там российских миротворцев. Их уход может привести к новому кровопролитию.

Мы намерены предпринять дополнительные усилия с тем, чтобы убедить стороны выйти на подписание согласованного в Москве документа. Сейчас - это главная задача. Попытки же пересмотреть

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сложившуюся схему и формат переговоров, в том числе путем созыва некоей международной конференции по Абхазии, могут, по нашему мнению, лишь осложнить идущий переговорный процесс, отбросить его назад к нулевой отметке.

Вызывает удовлетворение взаимодействие, которое установилось между нашими странами в урегулировании другого конфликта - Нагорно-Карабахского. Вопрос об этом конфликте был в центре переговоров с президентом Азербайджана Г.Алиевым во время его недавнего визита в Москву. Разговор был, разумеется, непростым, но у нас возникло понимание, что в его итоге все же удалось убедить президента Азербайджана в необходимости более гибкого и конструктивного подхода к ключевым проблемам урегулирования. Мною даны указания российскому МИД интенсифицировать работу с конфликтующими сторонам Я, однако, не хочу, чтобы эти мои слова были интерпретированы в какой-то степени как стремление России проводить автономную линию по вопросам Нагорно-Карабахского урегулирования.

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С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
12 июля 1997 года

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«25» июля 1997 г.

№ Пр-1245

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Состоявшийся недавно в Денвере саммит "восьмерки" позволил выявить многие узловые вопросы международного развития, без решения которых будет трудно обеспечить дальнейший прогресс и процветание наших стран. Для меня лично он, среди прочего, в новом, более остром ракурсе высветил проблему подготовки кадров, которая в последнее время выдвинулась на одно из центральных мест в нашей стратегии реформ. Без тысяч высококвалифицированных специалистов, без модернизации технологий управления Россия не сможет выйти на траекторию устойчивого роста и занять достойное место в мировой экономике.

Чтобы решить эту задачу, намерен дать молодым россиянам реальную возможность резко повысить свой социальный статус, получить ключевые позиции не только в государственной, но и в коммерческой сфере, и за счет этого содействовать образованию нового типа высококвалифицированных менеджеров.

Будущее России должно быть в руках динамичного поколения, на собственной судьбе убедившегося в преимуществах демократии и социально ориентированной рыночной экономики, обладающего современным мышлением и мотивацией.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Хотел бы подчеркнуть: речь идет не только о подготовке специалистов в отдельных, пусть даже исключительно важных, сферах деятельности, а о модернизации самой идеологии и психологии сегодняшнего российского общества и на этой основе - его надежной интеграции в мировое сообщество.

Для достижения этой цели мы намерены в течение определенного периода ежегодно направлять на учебу в бизнес-школы России и развитых стран значительное число молодых специалистов. Успешно закончившим будет гарантирована работа, соответствующая их профессиональному уровню, и возможности успешной карьеры.

Считаю критически важной подготовку специалистов в области управления компаниями, финансами, сбытом, стратегического планирования, а также права, управленческого консалтинга, информационных технологий, управления качеством, производительностью, персоналом, научно-техническими и опытно-конструкторскими работами.

Значительная часть затрат на обучение будет профинансирована Россией, в том числе и заинтересованными частными фирмами и компаниями.

В то же время надеюсь, что ввиду исключительной важности указанных программ ты найдешь возможность переориентировать часть технической помощи, направляемой России, на их финансирование, а также оказать содействие в организации стажировки выпускников бизнес-школ в передовых корпорациях Соединенных Штатов. Речь идет как о двусторонних, так и многосторонних программах помощи, а также содействии через международные организации.

Я назначил ответственным за реализацию программ обучения молодых специалистов Первого заместителя Председателя Правительства Российской Федерации Бориса Немцова.

Надеюсь на самое широкое конструктивное сотрудничество по этим вопросам, и твою политическую поддержку наших усилий с тем, чтобы начать обучение первой, "пилотной" партии молодых специалистов уже в конце этого года, а со следующего - перейти к их широкомасштабной подготовке на основе согласованных планов.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

~~SECRET~~

Draft

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IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.71)
KBH 12/13/2019

6132

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, IMMEDIATE

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

MOSCOW FOR THE CHARGE

See penultimate paragraph

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY ONLY

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON BOSNIA, IRAN AND PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE, AND DRAFT LAW ON RELIGION

CHARGE SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

HILLARY AND I HAVE NOW RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FROM OUR VACATION REFRESHED AND READY FOR THE FALL. WE TRUST YOU AND NAINA ARE ALSO WELL. WE HAVE A VERY BUSY AND IMPORTANT SEASON AHEAD OF US IN OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN AND ADVANCE U.S.- RUSSIAN RELATIONS. THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 22 WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. THAT IS WHEN AL GORE AND VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN WILL BE HOLDING THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION, MADELEINE ALBRIGHT AND I WILL BE MEETING WITH YEVGENY PRIMAKOV IN NEW YORK, AND THEN MADELEINE AND YEVGENY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL. MADELEINE AND YEVGENY SHOULD ALSO CONCLUDE THE START-II PROTOCOL DURING THEIR FIRST BILATERAL MEETING, AS I NOTED IN MY PREVIOUS LETTER. WE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO RESOLVE ANY OUTSTANDING ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROTOCOL SO THAT IT CAN BE SIGNED IN NEW YORK. WE COULD THEN MOVE INTO A PUBLIC SETTING TO SIGN ABM AGREEMENTS WITH THE OTHER THREE COUNTRIES.

THESE MEETINGS CAN BUILD ON THE GROUNDBREAKING WORK WE DID TOGETHER IN HELSINKI, PARIS, AND DENVER AND SET US ON A PATH TOWARD OUR NEXT SUMMIT MEETING. I WILL HAVE SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS ON OUR MEETING TO SHARE WITH YEVGENY WHEN WE MEET.

AS WE PREPARE FOR THIS BUSY SEASON, I WANTED TO COMMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU ON SOME ISSUES OF CONCERN THAT WE NEED TO WORK THROUGH SO THAT THEY DON'T COMPLICATE OUR OTHER EFFORTS. ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, YOU AND I HAVE STEPPED IN FROM TIME TO TIME TO MANAGE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE



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ARISEN BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS. WE HAVE ALWAYS DONE SO IN A SPIRIT OF RESPECT FOR THE COMPLEXITY OF EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO KEEP SPECIFIC PROBLEMS FROM DISTRACTING US FROM OUR LARGER, COMMON OBJECTIVES, AND FROM DERAILING US FROM OUR LONG-RANGE COURSE.

THE FIRST IS BOSNIA, WHICH I KNOW IS OF GREAT CONCERN TO YEVGENY AND YOUR COLLEAGUES AS WELL. IN ADDITION TO HAVING BROUGHT PEACE TO THAT COUNTRY AND PRESERVED IT THERE, OUR JOINT EFFORT IN BOSNIA HAS BECOME PROOF OF OUR OVERALL COMMITMENT - AND ABILITY - TO WORK TOGETHER. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, OUR VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO APPROACH PROBLEMS IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY THE CONTINUING POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, SEEM TO HAVE BEGUN TO DIVERGE. I AM GLAD THE SEPTEMBER 4 MEETING OF THE CONTACT GROUP IN BRUSSELS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER 13-14 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. BUT THESE ELECTIONS ARE ONLY THE FIRST STEP. ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS ARE THE NEXT. ALL CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS EXCEPT RUSSIA ARE SOLIDLY UNITED IN SUPPORT OF THE OSCE BEGINNING PREPARATIONS TO MONITOR THOSE ELECTIONS. I AM CONCERNED THAT THE ABSENCE OF CONTACT GROUP UNITY WILL JEOPARDIZE THESE ELECTIONS AND THE PROGRESS THAT WE'VE ALREADY ACHIEVED.

I HOPE WE CAN CLOSE RANKS WITHIN THE CONTACT GROUP TO SUPPORT OSCE PLANNING FOR NEW ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS AND IN FOLLOWING THROUGH IN VIENNA TO GIVE THE OSCE THE RESOURCES IT NEEDS TO CARRY OUT THIS TASK. WE MUST GIVE THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA THE CHANCE TO VOICE THEIR OPINION, WITHOUT FEAR OF INTIMIDATION, AND THE CHANCE TO REBUILD THEIR SOCIETY BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW. UNITY ON THIS ISSUE WILL ALSO HELP ENSURE THAT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL IS AS POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE.

THE SECOND ISSUE OF CONCERN IS RUSSIA'S DRAFT LAW ON FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS. I KNOW WHAT A DIFFICULT DECISION YOU FACED IN JULY WHEN YOU VETOED THE DUMA'S DRAFT LAW. I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR ELOQUENT EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION CONTAINED IN YOUR VETO MESSAGE. BUT THE NEW VERSION OF THE DRAFT LAW APPEARS NOT TO BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES YOU OUTLINED IN YOUR VETO MESSAGE. I HOPE THAT YOUR ADMINISTRATION CAN WORK ACTIVELY WITH THE DUMA TO ENSURE THAT THE DRAFT THAT PASSES TRULY UPHOLDS THE PRINCIPLES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS YOU ARTICULATED SO WELL IN YOUR JULY 21 MESSAGE.

ON IRAN, I BELIEVE THE KOPTEV-WISNER TALKS ARE OFF TO A SERIOUS START AND I THANK YOU FOR SUPPORTING THIS EFFORT. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WILL BE MEETING AGAIN AND I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO AL'S REPORT WHEN HE RETURNS FROM THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION.

FINALLY, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 EXPLAINING THE NEED FOR MANAGEMENT TRAINING IN RUSSIA. AS YOU MAY KNOW, WE ARE ALREADY SUPPORTING A RANGE OF PROJECTS AIMED AT DEVELOPING MANAGEMENT SKILLS THAT INCLUDE INTERNSHIPS FOR



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RUSSIANS IN U.S. COMPANIES, BUSINESS STUDIES AT U.S. AND RUSSIAN UNIVERSITIES AND SHORT-TERM BUSINESS COURSES IN RUSSIA. WE ARE PREPARED TO BUILD ON THESE PROGRAMS. I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR COLLINS AND HIS STAFF TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NEMTSOV AND OTHERS IN YOUR GOVERNMENT TO LEARN HOW WE CAN BEST MEET YOUR NEEDS.

YOU AND I HAVE LABORED HARD TO BRING ABOUT A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES APPROPRIATE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR PEOPLES. AS WE ENTER A NEW SEASON OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, I AM CONFIDENT OF OUR ABILITY TO GO FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH, AND TO WORK TOGETHER, YOU AND ME, IN OVERCOMING ANY OBSTACLES THAT MAY ARISE.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)



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Rec'd from Russian Embassy 7/25 5289

Put into system -
Action: RVE

Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

The recent Denver Summit of the Eight has allowed to reveal many key issues of international development. Without solving them, it will be difficult to ensure further progress and prosperity of our countries. For me personally, the Summit, among other things, has given a new, sharper perspective of the problem of personnel training, which has recently become one of the top priorities in our reform strategy. Without thousands of qualified specialists, without modernization of management technologies Russia will not be able to achieve steady growth and prominent position in the world economy.

In order to solve this problem I intend to give young Russians a real opportunity to sharply raise their social status, to obtain key positions not only in state, but in commercial sphere and, thus, to assist in the formation of the new type of highly-skilled managers.

Russia's future shall be in the hands of a dynamic generation whose own destiny has made it believe in the advantages of democracy and socially-oriented market economy, and who possess modern mentality and motivation.

I would like to stress that this concerns not only the training of specialists in specific, even extremely important fields, but the modernization of the ideology and psychology of the contemporary Russian society and, on this basis, its steady integration into the world community.

In order to attain this goal we intend to send over a specific time-period annually to business schools in Russia and a number of developed countries a considerable number of young specialists. Successful graduates will receive guaranteed employment in accordance with their professional level and opportunities for a successful career.

His Excellency
William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington D.C.

JUL 28 8:16

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I attach principal importance to the training of specialists in the area of corporate, financial, sales management, strategic planning, law, management consulting, information technologies; quality, production and personnel management, research and development.

A substantial part of the training expenses will be financed by Russia, including interested private firms and companies.

At the same time I hope that due to the extreme importance of the above programs you will find an opportunity to redirect a part of the technical assistance allocated for Russia, to finance these programs and provide assistance in arranging internship of business school graduates in major U.S. corporations. This concerns both bilateral and multilateral assistance programs as well as assistance through international organizations.

I have appointed Mr. Boris Nemtsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, to oversee the implementation of the young specialists training programs.

I hope for the broadest constructive cooperation on all these issues and your political support of our efforts, in order to begin the training of the first "pilot" group of young specialists in late June 1997, and beginning from the next year - to begin their full-scale training on the basis of coordinated plans.

Sincerely,

Boris Yeltsin

Moscow, Kremlin
July 25, 1997

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5289

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

Состоявшийся недавно в Денвере саммит "восьмерки" позволил выявить многие узловые вопросы международного развития, без решения которых будет трудно обеспечить дальнейший прогресс и процветание наших стран. Для меня лично он, среди прочего, в новом, более остром ракурсе высветил проблему подготовки кадров, которая в последнее время выдвинулась на одно из центральных мест в нашей стратегии реформ. Без тысяч высококвалифицированных специалистов, без модернизации технологий управления Россия не сможет выйти на траекторию устойчивого роста и занять достойное место в мировой экономике.

Чтобы решить эту задачу, намерен дать молодым россиянам реальную возможность резко повысить свой социальный статус, получить ключевые позиции не только в государственной, но и в коммерческой сфере, и за счет этого содействовать образованию нового типа высококвалифицированных менеджеров.

Будущее России должно быть в руках динамичного поколения, на собственной судьбе убедившегося в преимуществах демократии и социально ориентированной рыночной экономики, обладающего современным мышлением и мотивацией.

Хотел бы подчеркнуть: речь идет не только о подготовке специалистов в отдельных, пусть даже исключительно важных, сферах деятельности, а о модернизации самой идеологии и психологии сегодняшнего российского общества и на этой основе его надежной интеграции в мировое сообщество.

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Для достижения этой цели мы намерены в течение определенного периода ежегодно направлять на учебу в бизнес-школы России и развитых стран значительное число молодых специалистов, успешно закончившим будет гарантирована работа, соответствующая их профессиональному уровню, и возможности успешной карьеры.

Считаю критически важной подготовку специалистов в области управления компаниями, финансами, сбытом, стратегического планирования, а также права, управленческого консалтинга, информационных технологий, управления качеством, производительностью, персоналом, научно-техническими и опытно-конструкторскими работами.

Значительная часть затрат на обучение будет профинансирована Россией, в том числе и заинтересованными частными фирмами и компаниями.

В то же время надеюсь, что в виду исключительной важности указанных программ ты найдешь возможность переориентировать часть технической помощи, направленной России, на их финансирование, а также оказать содействие в организации стажировки выпускников бизнес-школ в передовых корпорациях Соединенных Штатов. Речь идет как о двусторонних, так и многосторонних программах помощи, а также содействии через международные организации.

Я назначил ответственным за реализацию программ обучения молодых специалистов Первого заместителя Председателя Правительства Российской Федерации Бориса Немцова.

Надеюсь на самое широкое конструктивное сотрудничество по этим вопросам, и твою политическую поддержку наших усилий с тем, чтобы начать обучение первой, "пилотной" партии молодых специалистов уже в конце этого года, а со следующего - перейти к их широкомасштабной подготовке на основе согласованных планов.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.МОСКВА, КРЕМЛЬ
25 июля 1997 года

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«12» августа 1997 г.

№ Пр-1329

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Прими поздравления по случаю дня твоего рождения!

Знаю, что ты будешь отмечать его в отпуске, поэтому также желаю тебе хорошо отдохнуть и восстановить силы после многотрудной работы. По себе знаю, как это важно.

Внимательно слежу за твоими успехами. Особенно порадовался за тебя, когда мне доложили, что тебе удалось договориться с конгрессом по формуле сбалансирования федерального бюджета. Это - очень большое дело. Аналогичная задача стоит и перед нами в России.

С удовлетворением отмечаю, что реализуются наши с тобой решения, принятые в Хельсинки, Париже и Денвере. Заключение промежуточной договоренности по адаптации Договора об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе расцениваю как очень солидную заявку. В ходе последних раундов переговоров наших министров иностранных дел достигнут прогресс и по вопросам об СНВ и ПРО. Таким образом, закладывается основа для нашего с тобой следующего саммита.

Мы с Наиной желаем тебе всего наилучшего - здоровья, успехов и удачи.

С искренним уважением,

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
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ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

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Unofficial translation

August 12, 1997

Dear Bill,

Please accept my congratulations on the occasion of your birthday!

I know that you will be celebrating it while on vacation, and so, I wish you to have a good rest, to regain strength after hard work. I know from my own experience how important it is.

I closely follow your successes. It gave me special pleasure to have learned that you had reached a balanced-budget agreement with Congress. This is a great achievement. We are facing a similar challenge in Russia.

It is satisfying to note that our decisions taken in Helsinki, Paris and Denver are being implemented. I consider the interim agreement on adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe as a very significant statement to that effect. During the recent rounds of negotiations our foreign ministers have also achieved progress on START and ABM issues. In this way the ground for our next summit is being prepared.

Naina and I send you our best wishes - for strong health, success and good luck.

Yours sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin

His Excellency
William J.CLINTON
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.ВАШИНГТОН

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Мы с Наиной желаем тебе всего наилучшего - здоровья, успехов и удачи.

С искренним уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль

12 августа 1997 года

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Unofficial translation

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your letter of September 8. In turn, I would like to share with you some ideas on the goals for the forthcoming period.

A solid basis has, indeed, been laid for our further work. Despite skeptic's forecasts, during the first six months of the year - in Helsinki, Paris and Denver - we convincingly demonstrated that we could achieve results meeting the interests of both our countries and the rest of the world. Considerable progress was made in ensuring strategic stability - through the prospect of further reductions in strategic offensive arms and guarantee of steadfastness of the ABM Treaty. The Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed, whose implementation in good faith should contribute to strengthening mutual security. At Denver, the Eight started, for the first time, to work at full strength.

But there can be no pauses in Russia-US relations. Most essential now is to consolidate and build on what has been achieved. Like yourself, I am keeping the implementation of what we have agreed upon under stringent control. I have given Mr. E.M.Primakov specific instructions on how to implement the agenda we have jointly laid out. In this context I consider your forthcoming meeting in New York to be of critical importance.

HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

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I am pleased to note that our joint efforts to find solutions that would effectively prevent any attempt to circumvent the ABM Treaty have yielded good results. Our representatives are to sign relevant documents within the next few days. As to the procedure of signing, obviously it should be agreed upon taking into consideration views of all the parties to those agreements.

I believe that the commitment to the Treaty which we both reaffirmed during our meeting in Helsinki should remain a guiding principle of our countries' attitude toward this most important Treaty safeguarding strategic stability for years to come. The agreed package of documents on ABM is a solid basis for that. However, honest and strenuous work will be needed so that no breakthroughs in technologies could undermine the determination of both states to preserve the ABM Treaty.

I am convinced that only working together and jointly defining the conformity of specific programs with the ABM Treaty can we attain that lofty goal. It is all the more important in view of both countries' stake in achieving further reduction of strategic offensive arms. Without the stability of the ABM Treaty stability of offensive arms reductions can not be ensured.

With the package of ABM agreements to be signed we are intensifying our work with the deputies of the State Duma for the ratification of START-2 and are ready to continue dialogue with the US on further reductions of strategic offensive arms as we agreed upon in Helsinki.

You and I have done a lot to ensure that former harsh strategic confrontation between our countries is steadily replaced by cooperation, trust and predictability. In this regard, I believe that in the context of a

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significant progress made by both sides in strengthening the ABM Treaty and in reducing strategic offensive arms we should not allow the development of new military technologies that can undermine the strategic stability.

Let me be frank with you. We are alarmed by the US military's intention to develop a whole gamut of anti-satellite weapons systems. The aim is obvious - to develop a capability to destroy space surveillance and control systems of other countries, including, of course, the Russian ones. That means that missile attack warning and surveillance systems that ensure the required transparency, and therefore predictability and stability may be jeopardized. At one time we possessed an anti-satellite capability. We renounced it as soon as we realized the futility a first strike notion. Within our military doctrine there is no place for such systems which constitute an absolutely destabilizing factor.

I suggest that our experts should carry on an in-depth and open dialogue on those issues. The immediate goal is to agree on the ban on any systems destroying strategic warning satellites. Normally they stay in high orbits and such an agreement can be reached quickly enough. Then the problem of how to deal with possible destabilization in low orbits should be tackled as well. We are ready to work together. We do not rule out joint projects, say, to ensure ecological safety in the case of fall of large space objects - satellites and even asteroids.

However, all our work should be organized in such a way as to ensure that none of us feels that his security is being undermined - otherwise, we will inevitably revert to the Cold War logic which we together have worked so hard to destroy.

I am pleased to note certain progress made in negotiations on conventional weapons. A useful interim agreement was reached last July

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on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. It is important on this basis - without losing momentum - to take more concrete measures to build the whole structure of limitations under the adapted Treaty which would ensure sound stability on the continent. In this context and with due regard to the steps we have taken to bring our positions closer with those of the US and other NATO countries we count on further reciprocal moves on the part of our partners, particularly on the issue of reduced levels of armaments.

As we agreed in Helsinki, we are pursuing our active work with the Duma with the aim of early ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Together with the deputies we are working on the ratification documents. It is important that now, in the Hague, within the framework of the mechanisms for carrying out the Convention, the US should meet our concerns in the search for solutions related to the practical implementation of this document on a multilateral basis.

Indeed, our current calendar is not confined to the urgent issues of security. International matters also require close attention.

The situation in the Middle East causes particular concern. I was shocked by the terrorist acts in Jerusalem. Those tragic events only strengthen my conviction that terrorists should not be allowed to derail the peace process. It is of paramount importance now to ensure the effectiveness of our interaction as co-sponsors of the Middle East settlement.

In Bosnia, the normalization process is proceeding very slowly. Actually the country is far from the model built at Dayton. The situation in the Republika Srpska causes particular concern. Coordinated efforts are needed to resolve a deep constitutional crisis there by peaceful

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political means. To achieve that, closer interaction within the Contact Group and parallel work with the parties are required.

I appreciate your firm determination to go on with the joint work aimed at reaching settlement in the Caucasus Region which you expressed in your letter of August 21. Our joint - together with the French - efforts to settle the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict start to exert due influence on the parties. We should try to come to an agreement on the first stage of the settlement before the end of the year.

I see the need to step up work to implement the objectives we set in Helsinki, of strengthening trade and economic relations, stimulating US investments in Russia and achieving early integration of Russia into the world economy. The IX session of the Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation in Moscow and Samara is of crucial significance for qualitative growth of the economic component of our relations. I intend to discuss in-depth the goals in this area during the meeting with A.Gore and V.S.Chernomyrdin on September 23.

Also I hope that you will support my initiative to launch the training of Russian management personnel in the US and other developed countries as I wrote you last July. We could have a more focused discussion of this subject with A.Gore.

And finally, I believe that current affairs notwithstanding, it is time we started to shape a prospective agenda of our relations at the turn of the millennium. I proceed from the fact that you appreciated my suggestion to work out a major joint document on partnership reaching out into 21st century. This could be the pivotal subject at our next summit. I suggest that we give relevant instructions without delay.

Bill, I see promising prospects for making progress within the whole spectrum of our relations.

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I presume that the mandate for joint work in New York and Moscow this month has been clearly defined and will make it possible to prepare our future meeting in a substantive and comprehensive manner.

Sincerely,

B. YELTSIN

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«____»_____19____г.

№ Пр-1513

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Спасибо за твое письмо от 8 сентября с.г. В свою очередь хочу поделиться некоторыми мыслями о задачах на предстоящий период.

Действительно, создана солидная основа для нашей дальнейшей работы. Вопреки прогнозам скептиков, в первой половине года - в Хельсинки, Париже и Денвере - мы убедительно продемонстрировали, что можем выходить на результаты, отвечающие интересам не только наших стран, но и остального мира. Налицо значительный прогресс в обеспечении стратегической стабильности - через перспективу дальнейших сокращений стратегических наступательных вооружений и гарантии незыблемости Договора по ПРО. Подписан Основополагающий акт Россия-НАТО, добросовестная реализация которого должна послужить укреплению взаимной безопасности. В Денвере впервые в полную силу заработала "восьмерка".

Но российско-американские отношения не знают пауз. Сейчас для нас главное - закрепить и развить достигнутое. Как и ты, я держу на строгом контроле выполнение наших договоренностей. Я дал Е.М.Примакову конкретные поручения по реализации той повестки дня, которую мы совместно определили. Принципиальное значение в этом плане придаю вашей беседе в Нью-Йорке.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

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С удовлетворением хочу констатировать, что наши совместные усилия в поиске решений, которые надежно предотвратили бы обход Договора по ПРО, дают хорошие результаты. Наши представители подпишут эти документы уже в ближайшие дни. Что касается процедуры и порядка подписания, то их, видимо, следует согласовать с учетом всех сторон этих договоренностей.

Считаю, что приверженность Договору, которую мы с тобой подтвердили в ходе нашей встречи в Хельсинки, должна и впредь быть руководящим принципом отношения наших стран к этому важнейшему Договору, гарантирующему стратегическую стабильность на годы вперед. Согласованный пакет документов по ПРО - хорошая основа для этого. Однако потребуется честная и напряженная работа с тем, чтобы никакие рывки в технологиях не могли подорвать решимость обоих государств сохранить Договор по ПРО.

Уверен, что только работая вместе и совместно определяя соответствие тех или иных программ Договору по ПРО, мы можем обеспечить достижение этой высокой цели. Это тем более важно с учетом взаимной заинтересованности в дальнейшем сокращении СНВ. Без стабильности Договора по ПРО стабильность сокращения наступательных вооружений обеспечить невозможно.

С учетом подписываемого пакета договоренностей по ПРО мы разворачиваем энергичную работу с депутатами Государственной Думы в пользу ратификации Договора СНВ-2 и готовы к продолжению диалога с США о дальнейшем сокращении СНВ, как мы об этом уже условились в Хельсинки.

Мы сделали с тобой немало для того, чтобы былое жесткое стратегическое противостояние между нашими странами последовательно заменялось сотрудничеством, доверием и предсказуемостью. В этой связи, думаю, мы не должны допускать, чтобы на фоне серьезного прогресса, достигнутого сторонами в области укрепления Договора по ПРО и сокращения СНВ, развивались новые направления военных технологий, способные взорвать стратегическую стабильность.

Буду откровенен. Нас беспокоит настрой американских военных на разработку целой гаммы систем противоспутникового оружия. Цель ясна - создание потенциала, способного ликвидировать космические системы наблюдения и управления других стран, включая, разумеется, российские. Это означает, что средства

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предупреждения о ракетном нападении и наблюдения, обеспечивающие необходимую транспарентность, а значит предсказуемость и стабильность, могут оказаться под угрозой. У нас был в свое время противоспутниковый потенциал. Мы от него отказались как только осознали всю бесперспективность ориентации на первый удар. В рамках нашей военной доктрины нет места таким системам, являющим собой абсолютно дестабилизирующий фактор.

Я предлагаю, чтобы наши специалисты провели глубокий откровенный диалог по этим вопросам. Ближайшая задача - условиться о запрете на любые системы, поражающие спутники стратегического предупреждения. Они, как правило, находятся на высоких орбитах, и задача выхода на такую договоренность решается достаточно быстро. Далее необходимо решить, как предотвратить возможную дестабилизацию и на низких орбитах. Готовы работать вместе. Не исключаем и совместных разработок, скажем, для обеспечения экологической безопасности в случае падения крупных космических объектов - спутников и даже астероидов.

Но вся работа должна быть построена так, чтобы никто из нас не ощущал, что его безопасность подрывается, иначе мы неизбежно вернемся к логике "холодной войны", для слома которой мы так много с тобой сделали.

С удовлетворением отмечаю и определенный прогресс на переговорах по обычным вооружениям. В вопросе адаптации Договора об ОВСЕ в июле с.г. достигнута полезная промежуточная договоренность. На этой основе важно, не теряя темпа, переходить к большей конкретике, к выстраиванию всей системы ограничений адаптированного Договора, который обеспечил бы надежную стабильность на континенте. В этом контексте, с учетом предпринятых нами шагов к сближению с позициями США и других стран НАТО, мы рассчитываем на дальнейшее встречное движение со стороны наших партнеров - в частности, в вопросе о пониженных уровнях вооружений.

Как мы с тобой условились в Хельсинки, продолжаем энергичную работу с Думой, с тем чтобы уже в ближайшее время у нас была ратифицирована Конвенция о запрещении химоружия. Совместно с депутатами работаем над ратификационными документами. Важно, чтобы сейчас в Гааге в рамках механизмов осуществления Конвенции США шли навстречу нашим

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озабоченностям в поиске решений, связанных с практической реализацией этого документа на многосторонней основе.

Разумеется, наш текущий календарь не исчерпывается неотложными вопросами безопасности. Пристального внимания требуют международные дела.

Особую тревогу внушает ситуация на Ближнем Востоке. Меня потрясли теракты в Иерусалиме. Эти трагические события лишь укрепляют мое убеждение, что террористам нельзя позволить сорвать мирный процесс. Сейчас исключительно важно обеспечить эффективность нашего взаимодействия как коспонсоров ближневосточного урегулирования.

В Боснии процесс нормализации продвигается с большим трудом. Страна по существу далека от той модели, которая была выстроена в Дейтоне. Особую озабоченность вызывает обстановка в Республике Сербской. Нужны согласованные усилия, чтобы вывести ситуацию там из глубокого конституционного кризиса мирными политическими средствами. А для этого требуется теснее взаимодействовать в рамках Контактной группы и работать со сторонами на параллельных курсах.

Ценю твой твердый настрой на продолжение совместной работы по достижению урегулирования в Кавказском регионе, о чем ты пишешь в ответном письме от 21 августа с.г. Наши совместные - с французами - усилия в урегулировании нагорно-карабахского конфликта начинают оказывать должное воздействие со стороны. Надо постараться прийти к соглашению по первому этапу урегулирования до конца текущего года.

Вижу необходимость прибавить в работе по реализации поставленных нами в Хельсинки целей углубления торгово-экономических связей, стимулирования американских инвестиций в Россию и скорейшей интеграции России в мировую экономику. Ключевое значение для качественного наращивания экономической составляющей наших отношений призвана сыграть IX сессия Комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству. Имею в виду обстоятельно обсудить задачи на этом направлении при встрече 23 сентября с.г. с А.Гором и В.С.Черномырдиным.

Наконец, рассчитываю, что ты откликнешься на мое начинание по организации подготовки российских управленческих кадров в США и других развитых странах, о чем я написал тебе в июле с.г. Мы могли бы предметно поговорить об этом с А.Гором.

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И последнее. Думаю, пора, несмотря на текущие дела, приступить к формированию перспективной повестки дня наших отношений на рубеже тысячелетий. Исхожу из того, что тебе импонирует мое предложение о подготовке масштабного совместного документа по партнерству, обращенному в XXI век. Эта тема стала бы стержневой на нашем следующем саммите. Предлагаю, не откладывая, дать соответствующие поручения.

Билл, я вижу обнадеживающие перспективы для продвижения по всему спектру наших отношений. Полагаю, что мандат для совместной работы в Нью-Йорке и Москве в этом месяце четко определен и позволит основательно и комплексно подготовить нашу будущую встречу.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
October 30, 1997

Dear Bill:

We have developed a good tradition between us - to regularly and directly check each other's positions on the current issues. If there is an achievement - we need to think how to promote this success, if problems arise - to swiftly localize and resolve them. We will need to interact closely in the coming months for the next Russian-American summit in Moscow to meet our expectations.

I am satisfied with the joint work we have done during this Fall. The negotiations by Yevgeni Primakov in New York and by Albert Gore in Moscow have made it possible to considerably advance in key directions which we have identified with you in Helsinki, Paris, and Denver.

The solid package of disarmament documents signed in New York I believe to be a major success. These agreements will determine the course of disarmament process for years to come. Reaching of agreements on delimiting the strategic and non-strategic missile defense consolidates the survivability of the ABM Treaty. Agreements regarding START issues clearly demonstrate the commitment of the two of us to further advance along the way of limiting the nuclear arsenals. Such major steps in consecutive implementation of our Helsinki decisions permit

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President of the United States of America
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us to accelerate work aimed at insuring ratification and early putting into effect of the START-2 Treaty. I am currently actively engaged in this work.

In this connection I would like to stress that I attribute a principled importance to your agreement to already now start a detailed expert level work over the START-3. This approach will permit us immediately after ratification of the START-2 Treaty to, without losing time, hold full-scale negotiations and to draft a new START-3 Treaty which I for one see as our main joint contribution into ensuring nuclear security and strategic stability already for the 21-st Century. I propose to think about a possibility to give at our next summit meeting an assessment of the work by experts over the START-3 and to draw in some form an intermediary conclusion to what will have been done by then and, if need be, to specify further objectives.

In our economic basket I also see some reassuring outlooks. As usual, the recent session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has had a very busy agenda. An important result is adopting of a detailed program of our joint activity for the nearest years which has been drafted upon our instructions. A mechanism of regional investment initiative has been activated with which we associate hopes for a substantial increase in the influx of American investments directly into the Russian regions under the guarantees of local administrations. Victor Chernomyrdin has instructed our experts to prepare proposals on further perfection of the work of the Commission by the time of its next session which is being planned for early next year in the US. I believe that, since this is already an established tradition, Victor Chernomyrdin and Albert Gore could take upon themselves preparation of a large block of issues for our next summit.

Therefore, on key tracks we are witnessing a stable advance forward. But alongside that there exist some circumstances which are beginning to worry us seriously.

First is Iran. I am convinced that it would be dangerous to make our relations hostage to one, albeit an important, "Iranian factor". I have written to you, there are no violations whatsoever of the norms of missile non-proliferation on our

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part. We have not had and are not having any cooperation with Iran in the sphere of ballistic missiles on the state level. Insofar as the contacts of Russian organizations are concerned, then either in this area there was no leek of missile technologies, or in case of such a risk we have been taking and will be taking against it most decisive measures. The Russian-Iranian cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy has been conducted in a transparent manner and in full compliance with the norms of non-proliferation. I keep my word on this and personally control the whole set of these issues.

I would like to stress: we proceed not only from our joint agreement with you, but also from our own national interests. Iran is our neighbor, and naturally we do not want emergence there of a missile-nuclear potential. That is why we are so insistent in our attempts to integrate Iran into the multilateral efforts to avoid proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.

When you have concrete concerns, we are ready to discuss and resolve them. For that purpose we have appointed our plenipotentiary representatives. We have provided through the channel Koptev-Wiesner detailed information on each issue raised and have been utterly candid in doing so. I agree with the assessment of this cooperation between our two countries which is contained in the joint report of our special representatives, as very satisfactory.

But what do we have in the result? Our sincerity is being questioned. Time and again leeks occur to your press of highly sensitive materials of our confidential exchanges. Great nervousness is being fanned around this problem. We have even taken an unprecedented step - we have invited CIA Director and acquainted him with the operational information. By doing this we want to establish absolute clarity about this issue, to demonstrate that it does not have any concealed "double bottom".

Nevertheless, I cannot rid myself of a feeling that activity is rising in the US of those who would like to use the Iranian issue in order to complicate our relations, including trade-economic ones. Otherwise, how else can we interpret

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attempts to apply pressure on us in connection with the contract to develop natural gas deposits in Iran with the participation of Russia's "GAZPROM"? An agreement with the Iranians in this regard signed together with the French and Malaysian partners fully corresponds with the generally accepted principles of free trade and fair competition. There is no need to say that we do not recognize an ex-territorial character of the corresponding American legislation. We believe that it infringes on the inalienable right of states to freely develop trade-economic relations with each other. If the threat of sanctions against our largest Russian company is realized, then, whether we want it or not, considerable harm will be done to our relations. I hope very much that you will take all necessary measures to avoid such an outcome.

Another worrisome topic is a growing outburst of emotions in the United States around the issue of "Russian Organized Crime". The report of American experts in this regard has caused a most negative reaction in our country. Official representatives of your administration as well, for instance, the FBI Director, have gone public with highly pessimistic forecasts.

It is true, we encounter real problems connected with the organized crime and corruption. But you know about my steps aimed at eradicating this evil. We are combating crime decisively and hard. But shade should not be cast against the overall emerging free enterprise in Russia thus linking Russian business as a whole to "Mafia". Particularly worrying is the fact that the issue of "Russian Organized Crime" is being raised into a category of a threat to the US national security. A wave of speculations on this issue can only complicate the unfolding anti-criminal cooperation between the law enforcement bodies of our two countries to which we attribute very big importance. We are also ready to an increased cooperation in this field with other countries, including in the framework of the mechanisms of "The Eight". I hope that you will give instructions to correct negative accents in this regard.

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Yet another issue, emergence of which in our relations, to be frank with you, I expected least of all. It causes great concern with me because of its apparent incompatibility with the high level of confidence to which I, as well as you, I am sure, attach primary importance.

An additional meaning to this issue gives the fact that it directly concerns one of the central processes - both in the bilateral and multilateral sense - of cutting and limiting of weapons. Development of this process is inconceivable without participation in it of Russian and American military specialists many of whom have khowlege of important state secrets. Until recently security of Russian military personnel visiting the US as part of inspection groups and military delegations has been provided on the correspondingly high level.

At the same time, I have recently been informed about an incident with one of the officers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From September 28 to October 5 a delegation of Russian military experts has been visiting the US with the objective to prepare Russian-American exercise on anti-missile defense, part of which was Colonel Yegorov Vladimir Leonidovich. At 10 p.m. on September 28 in Room 392 of the "Ramada" hotel in New York City he was attacked, forcefully injected with a special syringe, and then interrogated for the purpose of intelligence.

Medical inspection of Colonel Yegorov V.L. upon his return to Moscow has confirmed that he had been subjected to phsycotropic agents.

Apparently, Bill, such actions in the style of the "Cold War" period should not be left unattended in order to exclude repetition of these incidents in the future. That is why I have decided to address you personally in connection with this incident.

Bill, we have repeatedly shown to skeptics how to find solutions to, at times, very complicated problems and to get to the results which would meet our mutual interests. I am sure that we shall constructively and in a coordinated manner work

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over the preparation of an advanced agenda for the Moscow summit meeting.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
December 1, 1997

Dear Bill:

I have studied carefully your message regarding Iraq. I believe that it is extremely important for us to continue our dialogue on this burning issue.

In addition to what I have already told you in our telephone conversation on November 22, I would like to present to you in detail our views regarding our position on resolving the situation around Iraq.

The main thing for today is the fact that we have managed to avoid the worst scenario. Of particular importance, in my view, is the fact that we have managed to find ways out of the crisis in the result of close cooperation between our countries, including in Geneva. It is important now to preserve and promote further this cooperation. Our representatives in this regard should avoid interpretations which might be at variance with the substance of the dialogue between us.

I must say that we share many views presented in your message. Just like you, we are interested in a situation when Iraq does not posses weapons of mass destruction. What is required for that is first and foremost full compliance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and Iraq's constructive cooperation with the UN Special Commission.

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Washington, D.C.

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But it is not possible to indefinitely make a stake on the pressure methods alone. In such a case - and the Iraqis have told us that directly - they come to a conclusion that further cooperation simply loses sense because there are no hopes left for the sanctions to be lifted.

It has cost much effort to persuade Iraq to lift the limitations regarding the participation of the US citizens in the inspections activities by the Special Commission. We have presented this condition as an imperative prerequisite of our cooperation with the Iraqis in the political settlement. And in that situation we have given to the Iraqis no commitments, and we couldn't have given them any, in the name of the UN Security Council. Our objective was to persuade Baghdad to fully comply with its obligations and to demonstrate that only this approach can lead Iraq to the lifting of sanctions.

I am convinced that under the present circumstances further enlarging of the US military forces in the Persian Gulf is counterproductive. It can be that Baghdad hopes to use such a development for strengthening its positions inside Iraq and in the Arab world on the whole, where the situation now is far from what it used to be back in 1990.

I think that in order to fully normalize the situation and to be able to move forward to the objectives you speak about in your message we need, on the one hand, to demand from Iraq to comply with its obligations stemming from the UNSC Resolutions, and, on the other, to give an objective assessment of the situation regarding fulfilling the mandates by the Special Commission and the IAEA.

First of all, the time has come to acknowledge a possibility to pass from inspections to monitoring on the "nuclear file". The recent report by the IAEA can serve as the basis for this, which confirms that there are no signs of preserving by Iraq of forbidden nuclear materials or conducting by Iraq of prohibited nuclear activities. Naturally, and in this I fully share you views, even after the formal closing of the Iraq's "nuclear file" its nuclear activity should be under a tight control. I propose to give direct instructions to the IAEA

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- in the name of the UN Security Council - to reliably ensure this within the framework of a continuous monitoring.

Another sphere where the Special Commission has come very close to fulfilling the disarmament part of its mandate is the "missile file". I believe that after clarifying a number of still remaining issues in this field, all efforts in the near future should be fully concentrated on the permanent monitoring as well.

The situation is very different with the "chemical" and the "biological" files where, as you correctly note it, many questions still remain. Their settling will, apparently, demand much efforts.

For the Special Commission to be able to effectively fulfill its missions I believe it expedient to introduce a number of improvements in its work, naturally, not at the expense of the competence of this body. The first step in this direction has already been taken at the extraordinary session of the Special Commission on November 21. When we are talking about the composition of the Special Commission and its inspections' groups we do not mean limiting the American presence. But for the Commission to acquire a more balanced character it might be necessary to increase the number of representatives from other countries, not necessarily from Russia.

The most acute question is the issue of the U2 aircraft being used by the Special Commission. In a situation when the inspectors have returned back to Iraq the necessity of its intensive deployment has subsided. I believe it is necessary to demonstrate restraint and to temporarily use the U2 aircraft to the South from the 32 parallel.

Let us also think about the French proposal regarding rotating the monitor plane. Why not use the experience we have in the framework of the "open sky" regime? I am talking about the flights, for example, of a Russian aircraft with the joint Russian-American crew over the territory of Bosnia. Naturally, it is not necessarily the Russian aircraft which can fly over Iraq.

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One other serious problem is inspections of "sensitive sites". A sensible solution should be found here which would, on the one hand, take into account the interests of the Special Commission, and on the other would spare the national feelings of the Iraqis.

I have acquainted myself with satisfaction with your opinion regarding the necessity to increase humanitarian aid to Iraq. I believe that our two countries could initiate in December adopting a resolution by the UN Security Council permitting Iraq to substantially increase export of its oil in exchange for humanitarian goods.

I am counting on a continuation of our constructive and open exchange of opinions on the Iraqi situation, as well as on other topics.

In the end I would like to thank you for a high assessment of Russia's efforts and to once again assure you that we attribute high importance to our solidarity and interaction in resolving this dangerous crisis.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

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9/21/10

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Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием по Ираку. Считаю исключительно важным продолжение нашего диалога по этой острой проблеме.

В дополнение к тому, что сообщил тебе в нашем телефонном разговоре 22 ноября с.г., хотел бы детальнее изложить соображения по нашей позиции в вопросе урегулирования вокруг Ирака.

Главное на сегодняшний день состоит в том, что удалось предотвратить худшее. Особое значение, на мой взгляд, имеет то, что пути выхода из кризиса удалось найти в результате тесного взаимодействия наших стран, в том числе в Женеве. Важно теперь это сотрудничество сохранять и развивать дальше. Наши представители должны в этой связи избегать интерпретаций, расходящихся с содержанием нашего с тобой диалога.

Должен сказать, что многие взгляды, изложенные в твоем послании, мы разделяем. Мы тоже заинтересованы в том, чтобы Ирак не обладал оружием массового уничтожения. Для этого необходимо прежде всего полное выполнение соответствующих резолюций Совета Безопасности ООН и конструктивное сотрудничество Ирака со Спецкомиссией ООН.

Однако нельзя бесконечно делать ставку только на методы давления. Иначе иракцы - и об этом они прямо говорили нам - приходят к выводу, что дальнейшее сотрудничество просто теряет смысл, поскольку надежд на снятие санкций у них не остается.

Стоило немалого труда убедить Ирак отменить ограничения на участие граждан США в инспекционной деятельности Спецкомиссии. Мы прямо обозначили это требование в качестве обязательного условия своего сотрудничества с иракцами в политическом урегулировании. При этом каких-либо обязательств от имени Совета Безопас-

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ности мы иракцам не давали и не могли давать. Наша цель состояла в том, чтобы добиться полного выполнения Багдадом своих обязательств и показать, что только такой подход выведет Ирак на снятие санкций.

Убежден, что в нынешней ситуации наращивание военной группировки США в Персидском заливе контрпродуктивно. Может быть в Багдаде рассчитывают именно на то, что это будет содействовать укреплению его позиций внутри Ирака и в арабском мире в целом, где обстановка сейчас далеко не та, какой была в 1990 году.

Считаю, что для окончательной нормализации обстановки и продвижения к тем целям, о которых говорится в твоем послании, необходимо, с одной стороны, требовать выполнения Ираком своих обязательств по резолюциям СБ, а с другой - дать объективную оценку положения дел с выполнением мандатов Спецкомиссии и МАГАТЭ.

Прежде всего назрела необходимость признать возможность перехода от инспекций к мониторингу по "ядерному досье". Основанием для этого служит последний доклад МАГАТЭ, в котором подтверждается отсутствие признаков сохранения Ираком запрещенных ядерных материалов или проведения им запрещенной ядерной деятельности. Естественно - и тут я полностью с тобой согласен - ядерная деятельность Ирака и после формального закрытия "ядерного досье" должна плотно контролироваться. Предлагаю дать от имени СБ ООН прямое поручение МАГАТЭ надежно обеспечить это в рамках системы постоянного мониторинга.

Другая сфера, в которой Спецкомиссия вплотную приблизилась к выполнению разоруженческой части своего мандата, - "ракетное досье". Полагаю, что после прояснения ряда остающихся вопросов в этой области все усилия в недалеком будущем следует сосредоточить также целиком на постоянном мониторинге.

По-иному обстоит дело с "химическим" и "биологическим" досье, где, как ты справедливо отмечаешь, сохраняется еще много вопросов. Их прояснение потребует, очевидно, значительных усилий.

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Для того, чтобы Спецкомиссия могла эффективно выполнять свои задачи, полагаю целесообразным внести ряд усовершенствований в ее работу, естественно, без ущерба для компетенции этого органа. Первый шаг в этом направлении был сделан на чрезвычайной сессии Спецкомиссии 21 ноября с.г. Когда мы говорим о составе Спецкомиссии и ее инспекционных групп, то не имеем в виду сокращение американского присутствия. Но для того, чтобы придать ей более сбалансированный характер, нужно было бы увеличить число представителей из других стран, не обязательно из России.

Наиболее острый вопрос - о самолете У-2, используемом Спецкомиссией. В условиях, когда инспекторы ООН вернулись в Ирак, необходимости в его интенсивном использовании нет. Считаю необходимым проявить сдержанность и временно использовать У-2 в зоне южнее 32 параллели.

Давай подумаем и над французским предложением о ротации самолета-наблюдателя. Почему бы не воспользоваться имеющимися у нас наработками в рамках осуществления режима "открытого неба"? Имею в виду, например, полеты российского самолета со смешанным российско-американским экипажем над территорией Боснии и Герцеговины. Естественно, над Ираком могут летать и не российские самолеты.

Еще одна серьезная проблема - инспектирование "чувствительных объектов". Нужно найти разумное решение, учитывающее, с одной стороны, интересы Спецкомиссии, а с другой - национальные чувства иракцев.

С удовлетворением воспринял твое мнение о необходимости увеличить гуманитарную помощь Ираку. Думаю, что наши страны могли бы в декабре инициировать принятие резолюции Совета Безопасности, разрешающей Ираку значительно увеличить экспорт нефти для закупки гуманитарных товаров.

Рассчитываю на продолжение нашего конструктивного и откровенного обмена мнениями по иракской проблематике, а также по другим вопросам.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

В заключение хочу поблагодарить тебя за высокую оценку усилий России и еще раз сказать, что мы придаем большое значение нашей солидарности и взаимодействию в преодолении этого опасного кризиса.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Москва, Кремль
I декабря I997 года

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: BERGER COM COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT STEINBERG
SIT: COQ COURTNEY FICKLIN FORT POOLE SUM2
SIT: NODIS

---

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 141843Z JAN 98

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NODIS
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.82)
KBH 12/13/2019

MOSCOW FOR THE AMBASSADOR

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY ONLY

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

AMBASSADOR SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5783 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

DEAR BORIS:

UPON RETURNING FROM A BRIEF VACATION WITH MY FAMILY IN ST. THOMAS, I LEARNED THAT YOU HAD JUST BEGUN A WELL-DESERVED VACATION AT LAKE VALDAI. I VERY MUCH ENJOYED RELAXING WITH MY FAMILY OVER THE HOLIDAYS, AND HOPE THAT YOU HAVE AN EQUALLY ENJOYABLE TIME AMID THE WINTER BEAUTY OF NORTHWEST RUSSIA.

AS YOU SAID IN YOUR NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO ME, 1997 WAS REMARKABLE FOR BOTH THE CHALLENGES IT PRESENTED AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WE ACHIEVED. WE DEMONSTRATED THAT, BY WORKING TOGETHER, AN UNDIVIDED AND MORE SECURE EUROPE WAS NOT BEYOND OUR GRASP.

I KNOW THAT WITH THE SAME ENERGY AND CREATIVITY IN 1998, WE CAN LEAVE BEHIND US A LEGACY OF PEACE AND COOPERATION THAT BRINGS PROSPERITY TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND CREATES A MORE SECURE WORLD. AS I SAID IN MY DECEMBER 17 LETTER, WE HAVE AN


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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM




OPPORTUNITY AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION. WE WILL ALSO WORK TO ADVANCE RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH WILL REINFORCE THE HISTORIC REFORM EFFORTS YOU HAVE BEGUN AT HOME. LET US WORK TOWARD THESE GOALS.

.

HILLARY AND CHELSEA JOIN ME IN RECIPROCATING YOUR WARM HOLIDAY GREETINGS AND IN WISHING YOU, NAINA, YOUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN THE VERY BEST HEALTH AND HAPPINESS IN 1998.

.

BORIS, WE HAVE A LOT OF IMPORTANT WORK TO DO TOGETHER, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR NEXT MEETING.

.

SINCERELY,

.

BILL

.

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>5783
<MSGID> M3104435



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8667

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, IMMEDIATE

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.83)
KBH 12/13/2019

NODIS

MOSCOW FOR THE AMBASSADOR

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY ONLY

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

AMBASSADOR SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

{BEGIN TEXT}

DEAR BORIS:

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I KNOW THAT WITH THE SAME ENERGY AND CREATIVITY IN 1998, WE CAN LEAVE BEHIND US A LEGACY OF PEACE AND COOPERATION THAT BRINGS PROSPERITY TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND CREATES A MORE SECURE WORLD. AS I SAID IN MY DECEMBER 17 LETTER, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION. WE WILL ALSO WORK TO ADVANCE RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH WILL REINFORCE THE HISTORIC REFORM EFFORTS YOU HAVE BEGUN AT HOME. LET US WORK TOWARD THESE GOALS.

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BORIS, WE HAVE A LOT OF IMPORTANT WORK TO DO TOGETHER, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR NEXT MEETING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify On: 1/8/08

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SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)



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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
1-13-98 8667

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

JAN - 9 1998
10:55 pm

January 9, 1998

2015-0815-M-3 [6.84]
KBH 12/13/2019

ACTION

DOWNGRADED FROM
~~TOP SECRET~~ TO ~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: New Year's Message to President Yeltsin

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

President Yeltsin sent a personal holiday message (Tab B), citing joint accomplishments in 1997 and best wishes for 1998. He noted the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the summit of the Eight, APEC and progress on arms control. Yeltsin's recovery from a December respiratory ailment has lagged, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] He has postponed a visit to India.

In the past, Yeltsin has drawn strength from the historic nature of the tasks facing him. Reference to the legacy of security that you two can leave for future generations could bolster his resolve. On December 17, you sent Yeltsin a long, substantive letter referring to future challenges. This message will reinforce that letter, while emphasizing the value of the personal relationship. Your response points to the potential for further bilateral achievements in 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Letter
Tab C December 17 Letter to President Yeltsin

~~TOP SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (b), (c), (d)
Declassify On: X6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~TOP SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1997

Dear Boris:

As always, I've been thinking about you. I was delighted to receive your message and I hope you're feeling better.

It was good talking to you on November 22. I agree we should try to speak more frequently. As 1997 draws to a close, I would like to review with you several issues that we have both raised in recent correspondence and conversations, and propose a path ahead as we approach the new year and our own prospective meeting in Russia.

I appreciated your December 1 letter on Iraq. We clearly agree on the need to stand together and do all we can to maintain unity within the Security Council in dealing with Saddam Hussein. Madeleine and Yevgeniy are working hard and well on this issue, but it also needs constant attention from you and me. The latest Iraqi challenge is its refusal to allow inspectors access to all "sensitive sites." Without free and unfettered access, UNSCOM and IAEA cannot be sure they are satisfying the Council's mandate. We simply cannot let Iraqi intransigence over this vital requirement risk the efforts that we have been making to re-establish Iraq's compliance.

On a related matter that I know is important to you, our experts agree that the nuclear file is the farthest along in the transition to long-term monitoring. If Iraq cooperates fully, the IAEA should be able to work through its five concerns and report its satisfaction to the Security Council. Once the Council receives such reports for the other weapons categories, the Council can then judge whether Iraq has met the requirements of the relevant resolutions. However, moving any category into long-term monitoring requires full Iraqi compliance, the extent and pace of which will determine the timing of transition. And long-term monitoring must still include unrestricted inspection access to any sites necessary.

Finally with respect to Iraq, you have referred to the desirability of other countries' offering additional inspectors and surveillance capabilities. The United States is supportive of broad participation in UNSCOM's efforts by Security Council

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members, as long as UNSCOM maintains its independence, its technical expertise and objectivity, and its ability to discharge the Council's mandate.

I know you and I agree on the common goal -- preventing Saddam from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. We must not let Saddam split us and flout the decisions of the United Nations.

On Iran, I think we are beginning to make progress in our joint effort to counter Iran's unrelenting attempt to acquire missile technology. The expulsion of the Iranian diplomat was a step in the right direction. I am also gratified to hear that Russia intends to make further concrete moves in the coming weeks to prevent Iran from using Russian entities to achieve its ends. The next Koptev-Wisner meeting in January will be of the highest importance. Much is riding on its outcome, and we must do everything we can to make sure that it is successful. My advisers have discussed this matter in great detail with yours, and I would ask you to ensure that the weeks immediately ahead see a genuine turning point for the better on this issue.

Specifically, I hope you will consider issuing a public directive further tightening the export control regime and bringing firms and individuals into line with your policy of ending all cooperation with the Iranian missile program, including items that are not specifically controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime. This so-called "catch all" mechanism is essential to plug potential loopholes in Russia's export control system. Any publicity you could give to the recent arrest of Russians involved with Iran would also be helpful.

In your October 30 letter, you raised concerns about the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and Gazprom's investment in Iran's South Pars gas field. It is because of our shared opposition to Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction that I have approached you directly on what I see as the extremely unwise participation of Gazprom -- and other foreign companies -- in South Pars. I am being equally candid with Jacques Chirac and other leaders. The logic of my position is simple and, I hope, compelling: major investments in the energy sector that strengthen Iran's economic position also bolster its ability to pursue WMD and support terrorism.

Boris, I have listened to you carefully on this as on all other subjects, and I know this subject is very sensitive. I can only encourage you to look at the long term effects this deal can

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have on enhancing Iran's ability to carry out its current policies -- several of which potentially threaten Russia as much as any country. I hope you will consider using your government's very substantial influence and large ownership stake to see that Gazprom withdraws from this ill-considered and potentially harmful transaction.

Should this project proceed, ILSA sanctions on Gazprom remain a very real possibility. Our diplomats have already discussed our law and the sanctions with your Foreign Ministry, Energy Ministry and the leadership of Gazprom, and they will continue to do so. I have tried hard to avoid attracting public attention to this matter. At a minimum, I will continue to ensure that there will be equitable treatment of Russia and no surprises in U.S. decisions or actions - since this has been one of the guiding principles of our dealings with each other these past five years.

From a purely commercial point of view, I also question Russia's interest in helping Iran become a more effective commercial competitor in international gas markets. On the other hand, the mutual commercial benefits for American and Russian companies in the Caspian area underline the potential for closer cooperation between our two countries in this critical region.

Let me now respond on another issue you have raised: in your mid-September letter, you expressed concern that the United States was developing an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability that would jeopardize strategic stability. I fully share your desire to ensure that neither of our countries feels its nuclear security is undermined. That is why we strictly adhere to the Outer Space Treaty and other international conventions that establish legally-binding prohibitions against the use, or threat of use, of force against satellites. As you know, I recently vetoed a Congressional appropriation for flight-testing a kinetic energy ASAT weapon. To allay your concerns, I propose that we issue a joint statement when we meet next year that would clearly and publicly reiterate our mutual obligations. During the December 3-4 strategic stability talks here, we provided your experts with a proposal for elements of such a statement, as well as our suggestions for joint projects in the areas of sharing early warning and space environment data and preventing accidental laser illumination of satellites.

I will now turn to what -- I'll be frank -- was for me a rather surprising issue that you raised in your October 30 letter. I'm referring to the alleged mistreatment of Colonel Yegorov while

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he was in New York with a Russian ABM/TMD delegation. Naturally, I attach great seriousness to any question that you put directly to me, and I promptly ordered a thorough investigation of the allegation that he was injected with psychotropic drugs and interrogated for intelligence purposes while in New York. The heads of all the relevant agencies have personally overseen the inquiries and left me in no doubt that the allegations are totally without substance. I must say, Boris, I am puzzled by this affair. I do not know the basis of Colonel Yegorov's troubles, but I give you my personal word that no U.S. government agencies or officials were the cause.

This letter has, necessarily, dealt with several of the difficult issues we have faced in the recent weeks. The good news is that, largely because of your and my personal commitment and involvement, we continue to find ways of coping with even the most serious problems. For example, we welcomed the release from detention of Mr. Bliss, and I hope your government will soon drop the espionage charge against him and allow him to return home to his family for the holidays.

I would like to close by reaffirming my strong belief that the fundamentals of the great work you and I have done together remain strong and provide us a foundation for the future.

For myself, I continue to do all I can to support Russian reform and integration into the international community and your participation in the global economy. I encouraged the new impetus that you and Prime Minister Hashimoto have given to Russian-Japanese relations. As I wrote you, I was also pleased that APEC members agreed with my recommendation for Russia's membership. I can assure you as well that we have been in close touch with the IMF and World Bank as Russia has worked through recent economic difficulties. Your leadership to advance the budget through the Duma had a calming effect on financial markets. I welcomed news of your economic team's progress in dealing with the IMF mission to pave the way for resumption of assistance. Our work with the World Bank, we believe, promoted a willingness to accelerate lending as soon as the IMF program is back on track. This will keep your economy on the road to recovery we hope to see in 1998 and can only add to Russia's stability. I support that goal both because it is important to you, and because it is important to me.

Like you, I have persisted in the course on which we embarked in 1993 because it is the right thing to do -- for the United States, for Russia, and for the future of our relationship.

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Like you, I believe that an important part of our job is to clear away the barriers to cooperation and to nurture broad public consensus on the importance of a Russian-American partnership. As I've said many times, to you and in public, a strong, prosperous, democratic Russia is in the interests of the whole world.

Let me conclude by expressing my high hopes for the coming year. You and I have talked frequently about the need to make our meeting next year not only a celebration of what we have accomplished together over these past five years, but a statement of our vision for the relationship in the next century. There is still much we must accomplish together, in Europe and elsewhere. Further deepening the NATO-Russia partnership next year and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe at a Summit in 1999 will symbolize the cooperative agenda we both want to pursue into the next century.

As I mentioned on the phone when we last talked, I look forward to beginning the formal summit planning process with you once START II is ratified. Al and Victor Stepanovich too have much to be proud of -- we want to see their upcoming tenth Commission meeting highlight those accomplishments and lay the groundwork for a very full and substantive agenda for our summit. I know that despite bumps in the road, the way ahead is clear: we seek the same goals of peace and prosperity for our people.

As we approach the holiday season, Hillary and I wish you and Naina peace and good health. We have a lot of good work to do together in 1998.

Sincerely,

Bill

His Excellency
Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow

—Boris, I have paid the closest personal attention to all the issues you raised, and I will continue to do so as we work together to solve them—

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, IMMEDIATE

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (687)
KBH 12/13/2019

MOSCOW FOR THE AMBASSADOR

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY ONLY

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

AMBASSADOR SHOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

{BEGIN TEXT}

DEAR BORIS:

UPON RETURNING FROM A BRIEF VACATION WITH MY FAMILY IN ~~SUNNY~~ ST. THOMAS, I LEARNED THAT YOU HAD JUST BEGUN A WELL-DESERVED VACATION AT LAKE VALDAI. I VERY MUCH ENJOYED RELAXING WITH MY FAMILY OVER THE HOLIDAYS, AND HOPE THAT YOU HAVE AN EQUALLY ENJOYABLE TIME AMID THE WINTER BEAUTY OF NORTHWEST RUSSIA.

AS YOU SAID IN YOUR NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO ME, 1997 WAS REMARKABLE FOR BOTH THE CHALLENGES IT PRESENTED AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WE ACHIEVED. WE DEMONSTRATED THAT, BY WORKING TOGETHER, AN UNDIVIDED AND MORE SECURE EUROPE WAS NOT BEYOND OUR GRASP.

I KNOW THAT WITH THE SAME ENERGY AND CREATIVITY IN 1998, WE CAN LEAVE BEHIND US A LEGACY OF PEACE AND COOPERATION THAT BRINGS PROSPERITY TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND CREATES A MORE SECURE WORLD. AS I SAID IN MY DECEMBER 17 LETTER, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION. WE WILL ALSO WORK TO ADVANCE RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH WILL REINFORCE THE HISTORIC REFORM EFFORTS YOU HAVE BEGUN AT HOME. LET US WORK TOWARD THESE GOALS.

HILLARY AND CHELSEA JOIN ME IN RECIPROCATING YOUR WARM HOLIDAY GREETINGS AND IN WISHING YOU, NAINA, YOUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN THE VERY BEST HEALTH AND HAPPINESS IN 1998.

BORIS, WE HAVE A LOT OF IMPORTANT WORK TO DO TOGETHER, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR NEXT MEETING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify On: 1/8/08


LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



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~~TOP SECRET~~

8667

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2015-0815-M-3 [6.88]
KBH 12/13/2019

DOWNGRADED FROM
~~TOP SECRET~~ TO ~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: New Year's Message to President Yeltsin

Purpose

~~To~~ approve ~~a New Year's~~ message to President Yeltsin.

Background

President Yeltsin sent ~~you~~ a personal holiday message (Tab B), citing ~~your~~ joint accomplishments in 1997 and ~~extending best~~ wishes for 1998. He ~~particularly~~ noted ~~the significance of~~ the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the summit of the Eight, APEC and progress on arms control. Yeltsin's recovery from a December respiratory ailment has lagged, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] He has ~~already~~ postponed a visit to India.

In the past, Yeltsin has drawn strength from the historic nature of the tasks facing him. ~~Your~~ reference to the legacy of ~~prosperity and~~ security that ~~the~~ two of you can leave for future generations could bolster his resolve, ~~to tackle the challenges of 1998~~. On December 17, you sent Yeltsin a long, substantive letter referring to ~~those~~ further challenges. This message will ~~be timely in~~ reinforce ~~ing~~ that letter, while emphasizing the value of the personal relationship. Your response ~~reciprocates Yeltsin's warm tone and~~ points to the potential for further bilateral achievements in 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message ~~to President Yeltsin~~ at Tab A.

Approve Disapprove

~~TOP SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (b), (c), (d)
Declassify On: X6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

1363

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
February 23, 1998

Dear Bill:

Russia, as well as the United States, is seriously concerned with a possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including of chemical weapons, and their delivery means. This problem has become particularly important under the current complicated situation in the Middle East.

As you know, I have treated with understanding the concerns of the American side with regard to possible non-sanctioned contacts of some Russian organizations with Iran in the area of missile technologies. I have given most categorical instructions to thoroughly investigate and prevent such attempts.

At the same time I would like to share with you our worries in connection with the intentions of Israel, of which we have learnt, to receive samples of chemical munitions of various types in the US. More than that, in our knowledge, these intentions receive an understanding in the US. No matter what reasons of insuring the national security of Israel are used to justify these developments, the international non-proliferation regime must be respected by everyone without any free-will exceptions and double standards. In the regional context, Israel's access to these weapons would seriously complicate the already tense situation in the Middle East.

I am strongly convinced that you will have every understanding with regard to my concern and will take all measures necessary to avoid proliferation of so dangerous a weapon of mass destruction. The current level of our partnership offers me a strong basis for such a conviction.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

**His Excellency**
**William J. Clinton**
**President of the United States of America**
**Washington, D.C.**

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

1363

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
February 23, 1998

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Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

Moscow, the Kremlin
February 23, 1998

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Sincerely,

FEB 23 20:16

Boris YELTSIN

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Россию,как и Соединенные Штаты, серьезно беспокоит возможность распространения оружия массового уничтожения, в том числе химического, а также средств его доставки. Особую актуальность эта проблема приобрела в нынешней непростой обстановке на Ближнем Востоке.

Как ты знаешь, я с пониманием воспринял озабоченность американской стороны в отношении сведений о возможных несанкционированных контактах некоторых российских организаций с Ираном в области ракетных технологий. Мною даны категорические указания о тщательном расследовании и предотвращении подобных попыток.

Одновременно хотел бы поделиться с тобой нашей тревогой в связи со ставшими нам известными намерениями Израиля получить в США образцы химических боеприпасов различных типов. И более того, как нам представляется, эти намерения встречают понимание в США. Какими бы соображениями национальной безопасности Израиля это ни оправдывалось, международный режим нераспространения должен соблюдаться всеми, без каких-либо произвольных исключений и двойных стандартов. В региональном же плане доступ Тель-Авива к такому оружию серьезно осложнит и без того напряженную ситуацию на Ближнем Востоке.

Я глубоко убежден, что ты с полным пониманием воспримешь мою тревогу и примешь должные меры к тому, чтобы предотвратить распространение столь опасного вида оружия массового уничтожения. Нынешний уровень нашего партнерства является прочным фундаментом для такой моей убежденности.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

г.Москва, Кремль
23 февраля 1998 года

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«23» февраля 1998 г.

№ Пр-251

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Россию, как и Соединенные Штаты, серьезно беспокоит возможность распространения оружия массового уничтожения, в том числе химического, а также средств его доставки. Особую актуальность эта проблема приобрела в нынешней непростой обстановке на Ближнем Востоке.

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ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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двойных стандартов. В региональном же плане доступ Тель-Авива к такому оружию серьезно осложнит и без того напряженную ситуацию на Ближнем Востоке.

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С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«1» декабря 19 97 г.

№ Пр-1992

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Внимательно ознакомился с твоим посланием по Ираку. Считаю исключительно важным продолжение нашего диалога по этой острой проблеме.

В дополнение к тому, что сообщил тебе в нашем телефонном разговоре 22 ноября с.г., хотел бы детальнее изложить соображения по нашей позиции в вопросе урегулирования вокруг Ирака.

Главное на сегодняшний день состоит в том, что удалось предотвратить худшее. Особое значение, на мой взгляд, имеет то, что пути выхода из кризиса удалось найти в результате тесного взаимодействия наших стран, в том числе в Женеве. Важно теперь это сотрудничество сохранять и развивать дальше. Наши представители должны в этой связи избегать интерпретаций, расходящихся с содержанием нашего с тобой диалога.

Должен сказать, что многие взгляды, изложенные в твоем послании, мы разделяем. Мы тоже заинтересованы в том, чтобы Ирак не обладал оружием массового уничтожения. Для этого необходимо прежде всего полное выполнение соответствующих резолюций Совета Безопасности ООН и конструктивное сотрудничество Ирака со Спецкомиссией ООН.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Однако нельзя бесконечно делать ставку только на методы давления. Иначе иракцы - и об этом они прямо говорили нам - приходят к выводу, что дальнейшее сотрудничество просто теряет смысл, поскольку надежд на снятие санкций у них не остается.

Стоило немалого труда убедить Ирак отменить ограничения на участие граждан США в инспекционной деятельности Спецкомиссии. Мы прямо обозначили это требование в качестве обязательного условия своего сотрудничества с иракцами в политическом урегулировании. При этом каких-либо обязательств от имени Совета Безопасности мы иракцам не давали и не могли давать. Наша цель состояла в том, чтобы добиться полного выполнения Багдадом своих обязательств и показать, что только такой подход выведет Ирак на снятие санкций.

Убежден, что в нынешней ситуации наращивание военной группировки США в Персидском заливе контрпродуктивно. Может быть в Багдаде рассчитывают именно на то, что это будет содействовать укреплению его позиций внутри Ирака и в арабском мире в целом, где обстановка сейчас далеко не та, какой была в 1990 году.

Считаю, что для окончательной нормализации обстановки и продвижения к тем целям, о которых говорится в твоем послании, необходимо, с одной стороны, требовать выполнения Ираком своих обязательств по резолюциям СБ, а с другой - дать объективную оценку положения дел с выполнением мандатов Спецкомиссии и МАГАТЭ.

Прежде всего назрела необходимость признать возможность перехода от инспекций к мониторингу по "ядерному досье". Основанием для этого служит последний доклад МАГАТЭ, в котором подтверждается отсутствие признаков сохранения Ираком запрещенных ядерных материалов или проведения им запрещенной ядерной деятельности. Естественно - и тут я полностью с тобой согласен - ядерная деятельность Ирака и после формального закрытия "ядерного досье" должна плотно контролироваться. Предлагаю дать от имени СБ ООН прямое поручение МАГАТЭ надежно обеспечить это в рамках системы постоянного мониторинга.

Другая сфера, в которой Спецкомиссия вплотную приблизилась к выполнению разоруженческой части своего мандата, - "ракетное досье". Полагаю, что после прояснения ряда остающихся вопросов в

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этой области все усилия в недалеком будущем следует сосредоточить также целиком на постоянном мониторинге.

По-иному обстоит дело с "химическим" и "биологическим" досье, где, как ты справедливо отмечаешь, сохраняется еще много вопросов. Их прояснение потребует, очевидно, значительных усилий.

Для того, чтобы Спецкомиссия могла эффективно выполнять свои задачи, полагаю целесообразным внести ряд усовершенствований в ее работу, естественно, без ущерба для компетенции этого органа. Первый шаг в этом направлении был сделан на чрезвычайной сессии Спецкомиссии 21 ноября с.г. Когда мы говорим о составе Спецкомиссии и ее инспекционных групп, то не имеем в виду сокращение американского присутствия. Но для того, чтобы придать ей более сбалансированный характер, нужно было бы увеличить число представителей из других стран, не обязательно из России.

Наиболее острый вопрос - о самолете У-2, используемом Спецкомиссией. В условиях, когда инспекторы ООН вернулись в Ирак, необходимости в его интенсивном использовании нет. Считаю необходимым проявить сдержанность и временно использовать У-2 в зоне южнее 32 параллели.

Давай подумаем и над французским предложением о ротации самолета-наблюдателя. Почему бы не воспользоваться имеющимися у нас наработками в рамках осуществления режима "открытого неба"? Имею в виду, например, полеты российского самолета со смешанным российско-американским экипажем над территорией Боснии и Герцеговины. Естественно, над Ираком могут летать и не российские самолеты.

Еще одна серьезная проблема - инспектирование "чувствительных объектов". Нужно найти разумное решение, учитывающее, с одной стороны, интересы Спецкомиссии, а с другой - национальные чувства иракцев.

С удовлетворением воспринял твое мнение о необходимости увеличить гуманитарную помощь Ираку. Думаю, что наши страны могли бы в декабре инициировать принятие резолюции Совета Безопасности, разрешающей Ираку значительно увеличить экспорт нефти для закупки гуманитарных товаров.

Рассчитываю на продолжение нашего конструктивного и откровенного обмена мнениями по иракской проблематике, а также по другим вопросам.

В заключение хочу поблагодарить тебя за высокую оценку усилий России и еще раз сказать, что мы придаем большое значение нашей солидарности и взаимодействию в преодолении этого опасного кризиса.

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

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# DEPARTMENT OF STATE
## OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
### Translating Division

**LS No.** 038669
Russian
reference: 9804475
JS/PH

PRESIDENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

December 1, 1997
No. Pr-1992
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill:

I have carefully studied your message on Iraq. I believe it is vital to continue our dialogue on this urgent matter.

As a follow-up to what I told you in our telephone conversation of November 22, I would like to present in more detail the ideas underlying our policy in regard to resolving the Iraq crisis.

For today, the main thing is that we have succeeded in averting the worst. Of particular significance, in my opinion, is the fact that we managed to find a way out of the crisis through close cooperation between our countries, including in Geneva. It is important now to maintain this cooperation and develop it

His Excellency
William J. Clinton,
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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further. In this connection, our representatives should avoid interpretations that are inconsistent with the content of our dialogue.

I must say we share many of the views expressed in your message. It is also our intent that Iraq not possess weapons of mass destruction. To this end, it is necessary above all that Iraq comply fully with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and cooperate constructively with the UN Special Commission.

However, one cannot rely solely on coercive methods forever. Otherwise the Iraqis--and they have told us this directly--will conclude that further cooperation is simply pointless, since they will have no hope of sanctions being lifted.

It took considerable effort to persuade Iraq to eliminate restrictions on the participation of U.S. citizens in the Special Commission's inspection activities. We specified this requirement as a mandatory condition for our cooperating with the Iraqis in a political settlement. But we did not and could not give the Iraqis any commitments on behalf of the Security Council. Our goal was to have Baghdad comply fully with its obligations and to show that only this approach could bring about the lifting of sanctions against it.

I am certain that increasing the U.S. combat group in the Persian Gulf is counterproductive in the current situation. Perhaps Baghdad is hoping that this will strengthen its [or "his"; it is unclear what the Russian pronoun here is referring to--translator's note] position inside Iraq and in the Arab world as a whole, where the situation now is far different from what it was in 1990.

In my view, to achieve final normalization of the situation and move ahead toward the goals mentioned in your message, it is necessary on the one hand to demand Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions,

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and on the other hand to objectively assess the state of affairs in regard to implementation of the mandates of the Special Commission and the IAEA.

First of all, it has become necessary to recognize the possibility of proceeding from inspections to monitoring based on the "nuclear case file." The grounds for this is the latest IAEA report, which confirms there is no sign that Iraq retains prohibited nuclear materials or that it is engaging in prohibited nuclear activities. Of course (and here I agree with you completely), Iraq's nuclear activities must be monitored carefully, even after the "nuclear case file" is formally closed. I propose that the IAEA be directly tasked, on behalf of the UN Security Council, with reliably arranging this within the framework of a permanent monitoring system.

The other sphere in which the Special Commission has come close to implementing the disarmament part of its mandate is the "missile case file." I believe that after a number of questions remaining in this area have been clarified, all efforts in the near future should concentrate entirely on continuous monitoring.

The situation is different with respect to chemical and biological weapons, where, as you rightly point out, there are still many questions. Evidently a great deal of effort will be needed to clarify them.

In order that the Special Commission may effectively accomplish its tasks, I think it advisable to improve its operations in a number of ways, without, of course, infringing on the competency of this agency. The first step in this direction was taken at the extraordinary session of the Special Commission held on November 21. When we talk about the makeup of the Special Commission and its inspection teams, we do not have in mind a reduction in the U.S. presence. But in order to make it [the Commission] more balanced, the number of

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representatives from other countries--not necessarily Russia--ought to be increased.

The most acute problem is connected with the U-2 aircraft used by the Special Commission. Now that the UN inspectors have returned to Iraq, there is no need for its intensive use. I believe it is essential to show restraint and use the U-2 temporarily in the zone south of the thirty-second parallel.

Let us also consider the French proposal to rotate the observer aircraft. Why not take advantage of the experience we have gained in enforcing the "Open Skies" regime? I have in mind, for example, the flights of the Russian aircraft with a mixed Russian-U.S. crew over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, airplanes that are not Russian can also fly over Iraq.

There is one more serious problem--the inspection of "sensitive sites." A reasonable solution must be found, one that takes into account the interests of the Special Commission on the one hand, and the national feelings of the Iraqis on the other.

I was pleased with your idea about the need to increase humanitarian aid to Iraq. I believe that in December our countries could initiate the adoption of a Security Council resolution permitting Iraq to considerably increase oil exports to purchase humanitarian goods.

I look forward to continuing our constructive and frank exchange of views on the Iraq issue and on other matters as well.

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In conclusion, I wish to thank you for your high opinion of Russia's efforts and to reiterate that we attach great importance to our solidarity and collaboration in overcoming this dangerous crisis.

Respectfully,
[s] B. Yeltsin

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«1» декабря 19 97 г.

№ Пр-1992

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

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Главное на сегодняшний день состоит в том, что удалось предотвратить худшее. Особое значение, на мой взгляд, имеет то, что пути выхода из кризиса удалось найти в результате тесного взаимодействия наших стран, в том числе в Женеве. Важно теперь это сотрудничество сохранять и развивать дальше. Наши представители должны в этой связи избегать интерпретаций, расходящихся с содержанием нашего с тобой диалога.

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

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Считаю, что для окончательной нормализации обстановки и продвижения к тем целям, о которых говорится в твоем послании, необходимо, с одной стороны, требовать выполнения Ираком своих обязательств по резолюциям СБ, а с другой - дать объективную оценку положения дел с выполнением мандатов Спецкомиссии и МАГАТЭ.

Прежде всего назрела необходимость признать возможность перехода от инспекций к мониторингу по "ядерному досье". Основанием для этого служит последний доклад МАГАТЭ, в котором подтверждается отсутствие признаков сохранения Ираком запрещенных ядерных материалов или проведения им запрещенной ядерной деятельности. Естественно - и тут я полностью с тобой согласен - ядерная деятельность Ирака и после формального закрытия "ядерного досье" должна плотно контролироваться. Предлагаю дать от имени СБ ООН прямое поручение МАГАТЭ надежно обеспечить это в рамках системы постоянного мониторинга.

Другая сфера, в которой Спецкомиссия вплотную приблизилась к выполнению разоруженческой части своего мандата, - "ракетное досье". Полагаю, что после прояснения ряда остающихся вопросов в

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этой области все усилия в недалеком будущем следует сосредоточить также целиком на постоянном мониторинге.

По-иному обстоит дело с "химическим" и "биологическим" досье, где, как ты справедливо отмечаешь, сохраняется еще много вопросов. Их прояснение потребует, очевидно, значительных усилий.

Для того, чтобы Спецкомиссия могла эффективно выполнять свои задачи, полагаю целесообразным внести ряд усовершенствований в ее работу, естественно, без ущерба для компетенции этого органа. Первый шаг в этом направлении был сделан на чрезвычайной сессии Спецкомиссии 21 ноября с.г. Когда мы говорим о составе Спецкомиссии и ее инспекционных групп, то не имеем в виду сокращение американского присутствия. Но для того, чтобы придать ей более сбалансированный характер, нужно было бы увеличить число представителей из других стран, не обязательно из России.

Наиболее острый вопрос - о самолете У-2, используемом Спецкомиссией. В условиях, когда инспекторы ООН вернулись в Ирак, необходимости в его интенсивном использовании нет. Считаю необходимым проявить сдержанность и временно использовать У-2 в зоне южнее 32 параллели.

Давай подумаем и над французским предложением о ротации са́молета-наблюдателя. Почему бы не воспользоваться имеющимися у нас наработками в рамках осуществления режима "открытого неба"? Имею в виду, например, полеты российского самолета со смешанным российско-американским экипажем над территорией Боснии и Герцеговины. Естественно, над Ираком могут летать и не российские самолеты.

Еще одна серьезная проблема - инспектирование "чувствительных объектов". Нужно найти разумное решение, учитывающее, с одной стороны, интересы Спецкомиссии, а с другой - национальные чувства иракцев.

С удовлетворением воспринял твое мнение о необходимости увеличить гуманитарную помощь Ираку. Думаю, что наши страны могли бы в декабре инициировать принятие резолюции Совета Безопасности, разрешающей Ираку значительно увеличить экспорт нефти для закупки гуманитарных товаров.

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Рассчитываю на продолжение нашего конструктивного и откровенного обмена мнениями по иракской проблематике, а также по другим вопросам.

В заключение хочу поблагодарить тебя за высокую оценку усилий России и еще раз сказать, что мы придаем большое значение нашей солидарности и взаимодействию в преодолении этого опасного кризиса.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

~~SECRET~~ 4847

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-m-3 (6.98)
KBH 12/13/2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Agenda for September Summit Meeting

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin outlining our priorities for the September Summit.

Background

The message to President Yeltsin at Tab A congratulates him on the negotiation of an international financial stabilization package and reviews recent parallel actions by the U.S. and Russia to halt Russian entities' cooperation with Iran's missile program. The message also addresses our agenda for the Summit. spell out

At Tab B is our preliminary assessment of objectives for the Summit and its possible impact on Russian reform.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Background Paper on Summit Objectives
Tab C Incoming Correspondence

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 7/21/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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4847

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IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (6.99)
KBH 12/13/2019

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNIY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR YOUR THOUGHTS ON OUR UPCOMING SUMMIT. I WAS MOVED BY YOUR REMARKS AT THE CZAR'S FUNERAL LAST FRIDAY. YOUR SPEECH UNDERSCORED OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE TODAY'S PROBLEMS IN A WAY THAT BENEFITS FUTURE GENERATIONS. I HOPE THAT OUR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER WILL DEMONSTRATE TO OUR PUBLICS THAT WE ARE TACKLING HARD PROBLEMS AND CREATING A PARTNERSHIP THAT WILL MAKE THEM MORE PROSPEROUS AND MORE SECURE.

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PUTTING RUSSIA'S FISCAL HOUSE IN ORDER REQUIRES AMBITIOUS ACTION, AND A GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE. YOUR LEADERSHIP AND THE RESOLUTE STANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN MUCH OF THE ANTI-CRISIS PROGRAM THE FORCE OF LAW, AND I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOU TO PRESS FOR ENACTMENT OF THE REMAINING PIECES SHORTLY. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SUPPORT FOR A CONDITIONAL $22.6 BILLION FINANCING PACKAGE AGAIN DEMONSTRATES OUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN FORCES WITH YOU TO ACCELERATE REFORM. I HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED BY THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR ECONOMIC TEAMS THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. YET THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRISIS STILL LOOMS, MAKING IT ESSENTIAL TO USE THIS TIME WISELY,

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I ALSO SEE ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION AS CENTRAL TO OUR AGENDA. I AM PROUD OF ANDREY KOKOSHIN'S AND SANDY BERGER'S RECENT EFFORTS TO SHOW THAT RUSSIA'S EXPORT CONTROLS ARE WORKING. THEIR APPROACH IS SOUND: RUSSIA TAKES THE LEAD IN INVESTIGATING COMPANIES SUSPECTED OF PROLIFERATION, AND THE U.S. REINFORCES YOUR WORK THROUGH PARALLEL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. Spell out OUR COOPERATION, FOR NOW, HAS DEMONSTRATED THE WISDOM OF THE JOINT APPROACH AND CONFOUNDED THOSE WHO ADVOCATE UNILATERAL SANCTIONS. BUT TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM PERMANENTLY, WE NEED ADDITIONAL CONCRETE STEPS TO END RUSSIAN ENTITIES' COOPERATION WITH IRAN'S WMD AND MISSILE PROGRAMS. THESE PROGRAMS POSE A SERIOUS DANGER TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR GOALS FOR SECURING START II RATIFICATION AND PUTTING US ON A TRAJECTORY TOWARD EVEN DEEPER REDUCTIONS AND GREATER STRATEGIC STABILITY. IN LIGHT OF RECENT NUCLEAR TESTS BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN, WE ALSO WILL HAVE OUR WORK CUT OUT FOR US TO STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, INCLUDING OUR COMMON EFFORTS TO DISPOSE OF EXCESS MILITARY PLUTONIUM.

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SINCERELY,
WILLILAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT.

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~~SECRET~~

# Framing Our Goals for the Moscow Summit

This paper summarizes our initial thinking on the context and issues for the Moscow Summit.

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2015-0815-M-3 (7.00)
KBH 12/13/2019

## The Context

The Moscow Summit comes at a time of considerable stress within Russia and in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Despite the landmark agreement with the IMF and an ambitious economic reform program, the Yeltsin reform team continues to face daily challenges to its survival. Markets and investors are deeply skeptical that the Russian government can deliver on promised tax collections and expenditure cuts. Workers across Russia remain unpaid and angry, the Duma ducked passage of tough anti-crisis measures, additional cabinet changes are in the offing, and the infamous oligarchs continue to put their personal interests over the common good. The sense of siege that Yeltsin conveyed in his last phone call has not lifted, and there is a general fear in Moscow of a replay of the financial crisis.

The Yeltsin team will seek to portray your willingness to come now as a strong reaffirmation of the course they have chosen and that the gains for Russia of pursuing reform and cooperation with the United States outweigh the pain for average citizens.

As detailed in our communications plan, our public objectives are threefold: to ~~point up~~ highlight Russia's tremendous progress since 1992; to be frank about the tough problems that remain (financial, proliferation); and to highlight the U.S. stake in a strong and successful Russia. We will want to demonstrate that cooperation is already paying dividends and to present a shared "Vision to 2000" that can touch a chord with the average Russian.

That will be a tall order. Many Russians are disenchanted with the current course and suspicious at best about U.S. motives and behavior. However, the younger generation is more optimistic about the future -- and we will want to capture their enthusiasm and perspective as best we can in your public events.

It will be equally important to reaffirm the importance of our partnership with Russia for America. Among our elites, euphoria about Russia's potential has given way to cynicism about whether Russia is capable of real change or arresting its lengthy decline. Many in Congress and the media see Russia as more of a hindrance than a help -- a country that undermines U.S. objectives in the Balkans and the Middle East; that allows technology transfers to Iran; that sometimes bullies its neighbors; where a few get rich while others sink into poverty; where religious freedom is threatened; and whose Duma resists ratifying START II.

Yes. Need this reason [Declassif on ?

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This public souring on Russia has begun to cut into our policy flexibility and our ability to support reform. We do not expect dramatic arms control agreements or other signings that can electrify publics and elites. But with the Summit, we have an opportunity to reach over the heads of Beltway skeptics to remind the American people how far Russia has come and how much of a stake we have in its continued progress, despite the many bumps in its long road.

The Agenda

As we have in the past, we anticipate three reinforcing "baskets": 1) security and nonproliferation issues; 2) foreign policy and regional issues; and 3) economics and our common vision for the future of the relationship.

***Economics.*** This conversation will very much depend on Russia's economic health at the end of August. You will want to encourage Yeltsin to maintain his engagement on economics and remind him that there will be several key milestones toward the end of the year, including passage of the 1999 budget. Assuming that the IMF stabilization package holds, the central question for this Summit is investment, just as it was at Helsinki. In fact, little has changed from the Helsinki agenda, and the harder task this time around for the Russians is convincing investors that they are serious about reform. The Vice President will press Kiriyenko hard on actions to improve investor sentiment. We expect Yeltsin to raise perennial concerns such as market economy status, anti-dumping cases, and Jackson-Vanik.

***Nonproliferation and Security.*** While we have made considerable progress in recent weeks with Russia to halt transfers of missile technology to Iran, we are still suffering a "credibility gap" on the Hill. The House vote on overriding your veto of Iran missile sanctions is on hold indefinitely, but there will be a constant temptation to schedule a vote if the Russians fail to put real teeth into their export control system.

The strategy we have developed is sound: press Russia to get its export control system to work, and reinforce Russian actions by targeting our administrative measures on companies that Russia publicly identifies as proliferation threats. Yeltsin may complain that the U.S. unilaterally imposed sanctions or that ~~the U.S. has~~ we have not cracked down on proliferators at home. He probably is not fully aware of the scale of the Iran problem, spelled out



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and we will arm you with materials for convincing him that Russian activities with Iran (including in the nuclear sphere) have gone well beyond acceptable bounds or previous understandings.

Publicly, we will want to show we are united in seeing proliferation of WMD as the 21st Century security threat and working very hard on specific measures to stop it. Ideally, we will want to catalogue these actions, Russia's next steps, joint actions (e.g., on excess military plutonium, the Biological Weapons Convention, and possibly South Asia), and potential benefits from cooperation (e.g., increased Russian access to the space launch market) in a joint Summit statement.

On arms control, you should press for Yeltsin's private assurance that he will do whatever is required to get START II ratified this fall, and his agreement that formal START III negotiations will begin immediately thereafter. You should make clear that your shared legacy requires a breakthrough this year on START II ratification if we hope to achieve START III before you both leave office. At the summit, you may need to deflect efforts by Yeltsin to bypass or renegotiate START II, to negotiate specific START III issues (including lowering the Helsinki-agreed limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads), as well as to impose unacceptable limits on U.S. anti-satellite capabilities. On the positive side, we are working on an initiative to share early warning data on ballistic missile launches.

***Regional Issues.*** The NATO 50th anniversary summit in Washington next April is very much on Russian minds. They are worried about another round of enlargement or forward movement on Baltic aspirations for membership. Without prejudging your decision (or Alliance deliberations) on how to handle the Open Door at the summit, you can reassure Yeltsin that the Summit's emphasis will be on defining NATO's post-Cold War mission, which includes a key constructive role for Russia. However, you will need to ensure that Yeltsin does not misconstrue such assurances as a waning commitment to the Open Door or a hint that Baltic membership is off the table. Your central messages will be no surprises and a sustained commitment to partnership with Russia on European security. We are working to develop proposals for invigorating the NATO-Russia partnership, including a role for Russia within CJTF's and a NATO-Russia center in Moscow on civil emergency response.

The Russians also are pressing to conclude before the NATO summit a new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), but their negotiators have not shown much flexibility. The Russians



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want a new Treaty whose terms would allow them to say that NATO enlargement has not damaged Russia's strategic position in Europe, but they are trying to place unacceptable constraints on NATO. We should indicate we are ready to try to accelerate the negotiations, with the more realistic objective of a document that captures progress by the end of the year toward a new Treaty and signature of an adapted Treaty at next year's OSCE summit.

Your regional discussions with Yeltsin could include the Middle East, Kosovo, the Baltics and the Caucasus/Caspian. Specific topics will depend on the Vice President's discussions with Kiriyenko and Madeleine's discussions with Primakov. On NIS issues, Yeltsin needs to hear (again) that we are not seeking to displace Russia in its own backyard. Rather, our goal is to work together. We hope to develop a joint set of principles on Caspian energy that would highlight a "win-win" scenario for energy development.

Looking Ahead

At your final press conference with Yeltsin, we will want to release a joint statement that ties together elements of the relationship, achievements of the meeting, and our "Vision to 2000." It will underscore both states' interest in promoting global economic stability and growth, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and stopping regional conflicts. Another underlying message will be the degree to which these issues are interconnected. It is not a Chinese menu from which to pick and choose.

A key to the success of your visit will be your ability to reach out to the Russian people and demonstrate that our partnership extends beyond government-to-government relations and is good for both countries. The First Lady will play a major role in conveying this message. She and Mrs. Yeltsin plan to convene an NGO conference with 100-200 Russians and Americans who will highlight their work in small business development, health, environment, rule of law and education. The overarching theme is that society-to-society ties help people in both our countries and provide a foundation for Russian-American relations into the 21st Century. We are working on a drop-by at the conference, and it could prove an excellent venue for a speech on future relations and common challenges. We are also looking at venues for speeches that reach out to the Russian people, including a "factory floor" speech to Russian workers.



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KBH 12/13/2019

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

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Immediate

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So far, that has not occurred.

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SINCERELY,
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END TEXT.

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[Emblem of the Russian Federation]

President of the Russian Federation

July 3, 1998

No. Pr-925

Moscow, The Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I read your letter with interest. I was delighted by your determination to pursue active joint work in the spirit of the accords we reached in Birmingham. I view these accords as a reliable "road map" which will enable us to move forward in the coming months toward resolving urgent as well as longer-term problems.

The fact that the positive plans we outlined in Birmingham provide a convincing response to opponents of Russian-U.S. cooperation is also important. Our mutual commitment to relations based on partnership remains firm.

I believe we should consider our work on settling the Kosovo crisis as a positive achievement of our cooperation. Our detailed exchange of views on the situation over the telephone was useful. This strengthened my confidence that by acting in concert we will be able to convince Mr. Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanian leadership

His Excellency William J. Clinton,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

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to resolve the problem through negotiation. My agreements with Milosevic are working. As I have said, I am counting on the U.S. side to influence the Kosovar Albanian leaders so that they clearly realize there is no alternative to a political settlement.

As for your decision to veto the draft legislation on sanctions in connection with Iran's missile program, I appreciate this step. I know you will keep your word. That is why we immediately reacted in a positive fashion, including publicly. We again stressed that we will continue to strictly implement a firm national policy aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, including any illegal shipments of missile technology to Iran. You can be sure of that. The specific steps we have taken in that direction – and A.A. Kokoshin recently informed you in detail about these steps – are proving their effectiveness. These measures also include uncompromising oversight by law enforcement agencies to ensure strict compliance with Russian export control regulations.

I welcome and support your determination to keep the Russian-U.S. partnership from being needlessly damaged. Of course, your veto of the aforementioned bill may not be the end of this matter. However, I assume that you will use all the means at your disposal to prevent entry into force of this discriminatory document, not to mention the anti-Russian sanctions.

Continuing the "Iran theme," I would like to say that I support your intention to work toward normalizing U.S. relations with Teheran. I feel this is a correct and wise choice. We have always believed that a change for the better in U.S.-Iranian relations will help to strengthen international stability and security. For our part, we are pursuing a policy of constructive inclusion of Iran in the world community's efforts to ensure non-

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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, to stabilize the situation in the Near and Middle East and to combat terrorism. I believe additional opportunities for this are now opening up. Normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations could, among other things, also serve to eliminate unnecessary irritants in U.S. relations with third countries that are developing normal, legitimate ties with Teheran.

A few words about our other priorities. As you know, Bill, these days I am very much occupied with economic matters. We will resolutely implement our governmental program of financial and economic stabilization. We acted expeditiously in submitting the package of corresponding draft legislation to the Federal Assembly. As you are well aware, one cannot delay in matters involving a need to protect the country from crises in world financial markets. Very intensive work lies ahead, but I am confident that we will overcome our difficulties. I appreciate the fact that you support – not in words, but in deeds – our policy of reform, especially in the current critical financial and economic situation, at a time when we are engaged in serious negotiations with international financial organizations.

In accomplishing the objectives of stabilization, we intend not just to maintain, but also to consistently step up the pace of Russian-U.S. economic cooperation. The upcoming meeting in Moscow between S.V. Kiriyenko and A. Gore should fully activate the mechanism of the Russian-U.S. Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation. Perhaps the co-chairmen will have to clarify the priorities, forms and methods of work of the Commission so as to avoid duplicating work being done through other channels and on other issues. The results of this meeting will, to a large extent,

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determine the contents of the "economic basket" at the upcoming Russian-U.S. summit meeting.

I was pleased to read in your letter that you are prepared to come to Russia as soon as practically feasible. I want to reaffirm that we could tentatively plan on the fall. At the same time, I want to assure you that holding our meeting without any kind of linkages does not in any way mean slackening our efforts to complete ratification of the START II Treaty.

Bill, I trust that we will have several opportunities to "make sure our watches are synchronized" prior to our meeting in Moscow. I have instructed Ye.M. Primakov to handle all operational matters concerning our relations, including preparations for the summit, and to remain in close contact with Mrs. Albright.

I am convinced that if we work together in a smooth, well-coordinated manner at the current time which is, to put it bluntly, critical, this will make it possible to properly prepare for the Moscow summit and to lay the foundation for putting Russian-U.S. relations on a new level of partnership as we approach the 21st century.

Respectfully,

[s] B. Yeltsin

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«3» июля 1998 г.

№ Пр-925

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

С интересом ознакомился с твоим письмом. Меня воодушевил твой настрой на активную совместную работу в духе договоренностей, достигнутых нами в Бирмингеме. Эти договоренности рассматриваю как надежную "дорожную карту", которая позволит продвинуться в предстоящие месяцы по пути решения как неотложных, так и более долгосрочных проблем.

Важно и то, что намеченная нами в Бирмингеме позитивная перспектива - это убедительный ответ противникам российско-американского сотрудничества. Обоюдная приверженность партнерским основам наших отношений остается прочной.

Думаю, мы должны записать в актив нашего взаимодействия работу над урегулированием кризиса вокруг Косово. Хорошо, что мы подробно обменялись оценками ситуации по телефону. Это укрепило мою уверенность, что, действуя совместно, мы сможем убедить С.Милошевича и руководство косовских албанцев решать проблему путем переговоров. Мои договоренности с С.Милошевичем работают. Как я говорил, рассчитываю на воздействие с американской стороны на руководство косовских албанцев, чтобы они четко осознавали, что альтернативы политическому урегулированию нет.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЁННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

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Что касается твоего решения наложить вето на законопроект о санкциях в связи с ракетной программой Ирана, то я по достоинству оценил этот шаг. Знаю, что ты свое слово держишь. Поэтому мы сразу же позитивно отреагировали и в публичном плане. Вновь подчеркнули, что будем и впредь неуклонно проводить в жизнь твердую государственную политику, направленную на недопущение распространения оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки, включая любые незаконные поставки ракетной технологии в Иран. Ты можешь быть в этом уверен. Предпринятые нами конкретные меры в этом направлении - а о них недавно вас подробно информировал А.А.Кокошин - доказывают свою эффективность. Эти меры включают и бескомпромиссный надзор со стороны правоохранительных органов за неукоснительным соблюдением введенных в России норм экспортного контроля.

Я приветствую и поддерживаю твою решимость защитить российско-американское партнерство от ненужного ущерба. Понятно, что твое вето в отношении указанного законопроекта, возможно, еще не поставит финальную точку. Однако исхожу из того, что ты задействуешь весь имеющийся в твоем распоряжении арсенал средств, чтобы не допустить вступления этого дискриминационного акта, а тем более антироссийских санкций, в силу.

Продолжая “иранскую тему”, хотел бы поддержать твое намерение вести дело к нормализации отношений США с Тегераном. Считаю, что это правильный и мудрый выбор. Мы всегда полагали, что поворот к лучшему в американо-иранских отношениях будет способствовать укреплению международной стабильности и безопасности. Со своей стороны ведем линию на конструктивное включение Ирана в усилия мирового сообщества по обеспечению нераспространения ОМУ и средств его доставки, стабилизации ситуации на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, борьбе с терроризмом. Думается, что сейчас для этого открываются дополнительные возможности. Американо-иранская нормализация способна, помимо прочего, послужить и снятию ненужных раздражителей в отношениях США с третьими странами, развивающими нормальные и легитимные связи с Тегераном.

Несколько слов о других наших приоритетах. Ты знаешь, Билл, что в эти дни мне приходится плотно заниматься экономическими делами. Мы будем решительно реализовывать правительственную программу финансово-экономической стабилизации. Оперативно внесли в Федеральное Собрание пакет соответствующих законопроектов. Тебе хорошо известно, что нельзя медлить, когда

речь идет о необходимости защитить страну от кризисных явлений на мировых финансовых рынках. Предстоит очень напряженная работа, но, уверен, трудности мы преодолеем. Я ценю, особенно в нынешней острой финансовой и экономической ситуации, в момент, когда мы ведем ответственные переговоры с международными финансовыми организациями, твою поддержку - не на словах, а на деле - нашей политики реформ.

Решая стабилизационные задачи, настроены не просто сохранить, но и последовательно наращивать темпы российско-американского экономического взаимодействия. Предстоящая встреча в Москве С.В.Кириенко с А.Гором должна запустить на полные обороты механизм Российско-Американской комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству. Очевидно, сопредседателям потребуется уточнить приоритеты, формы и методы деятельности Комиссии, чтобы не дублировать работу по другим каналам и другим вопросам. Результаты этой встречи во многом определят наполнение экономической корзины предстоящего российско-американского саммита.

Я с удовлетворением прочел в твоем письме слова о том, что ты готов прибыть в Россию в ближайшие практически возможные сроки. Подтверждаю, что мы могли бы ориентироваться на осень. Одновременно хочу тебя заверить, что проведение нашей встречи без каких-либо увязок ни в коей мере не означает ослабления работы по завершению ратификации Договора СНВ-2.

Билл, рассчитываю, что до нашей встречи в Москве у нас еще не раз будет возможность "сверить часы". По всем оперативным вопросам наших отношений, в том числе в контексте подготовки к саммиту, я поручил работать, оставаясь в тесном контакте с М.Олбрайт, Е.М.Примакову.

Убежден, что наше ритмичное и слаженное взаимодействие на нынешнем, прямо скажем, критическом отрезке времени позволит хорошо подготовить московский саммит и заложить базу для вывода российско-американских отношений на новый уровень партнерства к рубежу XXI века.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.04)
KBH 12/13/2019

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR YOUR THOUGHTS ON OUR UPCOMING SUMMIT. I WAS MOVED BY YOUR REMARKS AT THE CZAR'S FUNERAL LAST FRIDAY. YOUR SPEECH UNDERSCORED OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE TODAY'S PROBLEMS IN A WAY THAT BENEFITS FUTURE GENERATIONS. I HOPE THAT OUR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER WILL DEMONSTRATE TO OUR PUBLICS THAT WE ARE TACKLING HARD PROBLEMS AND CREATING A PARTNERSHIP THAT WILL MAKE THEM MORE PROSPEROUS AND MORE SECURE.

BORIS, CRISES OFTEN FORCE MAJOR AND LONG-LASTING POLICY CHANGES. I BELIEVE, AS I THINK YOU DO, THAT THE DECISIONS YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE MAKING NOW WILL CHART RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC COURSE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. HISTORIANS MAY LOOK BACK ON THIS PERIOD AS A DEFINING MOMENT FOR RUSSIA.

PUTTING RUSSIA'S FISCAL HOUSE IN ORDER REQUIRES AMBITIOUS ACTION, AND A GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE. YOUR LEADERSHIP AND THE RESOLUTE STANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN MUCH OF THE ANTI-CRISIS PROGRAM THE FORCE OF LAW, AND I KNOW YOU WILL PRESS FOR ENACTMENT OF THE REMAINING PIECES SHORTLY. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S SUPPORT FOR A CONDITIONAL $22.6 BILLION FINANCING PACKAGE AGAIN DEMONSTRATES OUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN FORCES WITH YOU TO ACCELERATE REFORM. I HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED BY THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR ECONOMIC TEAMS THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. YET THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRISIS STILL LOOMS, MAKING IT ESSENTIAL TO USE THIS TIME WISELY, TO CONTINUE CUTTING THE DEFICIT, AND TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM SWIFTLY.

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IN THIS CONTEXT, I HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT WHAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH AT OUR MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. AS IN THE PAST, ECONOMICS, SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES SHOULD FORM THE CORE OF OUR AGENDA. I HAVE ASKED VICE PRESIDENT GORE TO WORK HARD WITH PRIME MINISTER KIRIYENKO TO PREPARE FOR OUR MEETING.

I HOPE OUR ECONOMICS AGENDA WILL BUILD ON THE RESULTS FROM THE HELSINKI AGENDA AND REFLECT THE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN. AT HELSINKI WE DEFINED AN AGENDA FOR INVESTMENT, GROWTH AND RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. WE HAVE ACHIEVED REAL PROGRESS ON INTEGRATION, AS RUSSIA BECAME PART OF THE G-8, THE PARIS CLUB AND APEC. OUR CHALLENGE NOW IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR SHARED DETERMINATION TO ACCELERATE REFORM WILL NOT WANE AS THE IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL CRISIS EASES AND THAT INTEGRATION WILL CONTINUE. THESE STEPS ARE CRUCIAL TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA. I ALSO HOPE TO SHARE WITH YOU A VISION FOR HOW OUR TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT INTERACT IN THE NEXT CENTURY AS WELL AS THE BENEFITS OF BRINGING OUR SOCIETIES CLOSER TOGETHER.

I ALSO SEE ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION AS CENTRAL TO OUR AGENDA. I AM PROUD OF ANDREY KOKOSHIN'S AND SANDY BERGER'S RECENT EFFORTS TO SHOW THAT RUSSIA'S EXPORT CONTROLS ARE WORKING. THEIR APPROACH IS SOUND: RUSSIA TAKES THE LEAD IN INVESTIGATING COMPANIES SUSPECTED OF PROLIFERATION, AND THE UNITED STATES REINFORCES YOUR WORK THROUGH PARALLEL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. OUR COOPERATION, FOR NOW, HAS DEMONSTRATED THE WISDOM OF THE JOINT APPROACH AND CONFOUNDED THOSE WHO ADVOCATE UNILATERAL SANCTIONS. BUT TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM PERMANENTLY, WE NEED TO END RUSSIAN ENTITIES' COOPERATION WITH IRAN'S WMD AND MISSILE PROGRAMS. SO FAR, THAT HAS NOT OCCURRED. THESE PROGRAMS POSE A SERIOUS DANGER TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR GOALS FOR SECURING START II RATIFICATION AND PUTTING US ON A TRAJECTORY TOWARD EVEN DEEPER REDUCTIONS AND GREATER STRATEGIC STABILITY. IN LIGHT OF RECENT NUCLEAR TESTS BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN, WE ALSO WILL HAVE OUR WORK CUT OUT FOR US TO STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, INCLUDING OUR COMMON EFFORTS TO DISPOSE OF EXCESS MILITARY PLUTONIUM.

FINALLY, I HOPE WE CAN ADDRESS A SERIES OF IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, PARTICULARLY A SHARED VISION FOR THE NEW EUROPE AND RUSSIA'S ROLE WITHIN IT. THE WORK WE DO IN THIS AREA WILL LEAVE A LEGACY WELL INTO THE NEXT CENTURY. THE CALENDAR OVER THE COMING MONTHS IS BUSY AND COMPLEX, INCLUDING THE NATO SUMMIT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA'S PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO,

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AL GORE WILL COME TO MOSCOW WITH A FULL SENSE OF MY THINKING ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS AT THE SUMMIT. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THE TIME TO TALK WITH HIM. PREPARING A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT IS A TALL ORDER. I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR PEOPLE WILL PUSH HARD TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE LITTLE TIME AVAILABLE. I HOPE THAT YOU ENJOY YOUR VACATION IN SHUYSKAYA CHUPA AND NORTHWESTERN RUSSIA. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SHORTLY.

SINCERELY,
WILLILAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT.

Needs to be Info
AMEMBASSY KIEV
PASS TO LEON Fuerth
for Vice President

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03
PRT: COMM
SIT: NODIS

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 230105Z JUL 98

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

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TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
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SINCERELY,

BILL

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7-22-98

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1998

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.06)
KBH 12/13/2019

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Agenda for September Summit Meeting

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin outlining our priorities for the September Summit.

Background

The message to President Yeltsin at Tab A congratulates him on the negotiation of an international financial stabilization package and reviews recent parallel actions by the United States and Russia to halt Russian entities' cooperation with Iran's missile program. The message also addresses our agenda for the Summit.

At Tab B is our preliminary assessment of objectives for the Summit and its possible impact on Russian reform.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Background Paper on Summit Objectives
Tab C Incoming Correspondence

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 7/21/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.07)
KBH 12/13/2019

## Framing Our Goals for the Moscow Summit

This paper summarizes our initial thinking on the context and issues for the Moscow Summit.

### The Context

The Moscow Summit comes at a time of considerable stress within Russia and in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Despite the landmark agreement with the IMF and an ambitious economic reform program, the Yeltsin reform team continues to face daily challenges to its survival. Markets and investors are deeply skeptical that the Russian government can deliver on promised tax collections and expenditure cuts. Workers across Russia remain unpaid and angry, the Duma ducked passage of tough anti-crisis measures, additional cabinet changes are in the offing, and the infamous oligarchs continue to put their personal interests over the common good. The sense of siege that Yeltsin conveyed in his last phone call has not lifted, and there is a general fear in Moscow of a replay of the financial crisis.

The Yeltsin team will seek to portray your willingness to come now as a strong reaffirmation of the course they have chosen and that the gains for Russia of pursuing reform and cooperation with the United States outweigh the pain for average citizens.

As detailed in our communications plan, our public objectives are threefold: to highlight Russia's tremendous progress since 1992; to be frank about the tough problems that remain (financial, proliferation); and to highlight the U.S. stake in a strong and successful Russia. We will want to demonstrate that cooperation is already paying dividends and to present a shared "Vision to 2000" that can touch a chord with the average Russian.

That will be a tall order. Many Russians are disenchanted with the current course and suspicious at best about U.S. motives and behavior. However, the younger generation is more optimistic about the future -- and we will want to capture their enthusiasm and perspective as best we can in your public events.

It will be equally important to reaffirm the importance of our partnership with Russia for America. Among our elites, euphoria about Russia's potential has given way to cynicism about whether Russia is capable of real change or arresting its lengthy decline. Many in Congress and the media see Russia as more of a hindrance than a help -- a country that undermines U.S.


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objectives in the Balkans and the Middle East; that allows technology transfers to Iran; that sometimes bullies its neighbors; where a few get rich while others sink into poverty; where religious freedom is threatened; and whose Duma resists ratifying START II.

This public souring on Russia has begun to cut into our policy flexibility and our ability to support reform. We do not expect dramatic arms control agreements or other signings that can electrify publics and elites. But with the Summit, we have an opportunity to reach over the heads of Beltway skeptics to remind the American people how far Russia has come and how much of a stake we have in its continued progress, despite the many bumps in its long road.

The Agenda

As we have in the past, we anticipate three reinforcing "baskets": 1) security and nonproliferation issues; 2) foreign policy and regional issues; and 3) economics and our common vision for the future of the relationship.

***Economics.*** This conversation will very much depend on Russia's economic health at the end of August and, in particular, whether the Duma enacts key outstanding aspects of the IMF package. You will want to encourage Yeltsin to maintain his engagement on economics and remind him that there will be several key milestones toward the end of the year, including passage of the 1999 budget. Assuming that the IMF stabilization package holds, the central question for this Summit is investment, just as it was at Helsinki. In fact, little has changed from the Helsinki agenda, and the harder task this time around for the Russians is convincing investors that they are serious about reform. The Vice President will press Kiriyenko hard on actions to improve investor sentiment. We expect Yeltsin to raise perennial concerns such as market economy status, anti-dumping cases, and Jackson-Vanik.

***Nonproliferation and Security.*** While we have made considerable progress in recent weeks with Russia to halt transfers of missile technology to Iran, we are still suffering a "credibility gap" on the Hill. The House vote on overriding your veto of Iran missile sanctions is on hold indefinitely, but there will be a constant temptation to schedule a vote if the Russians fail to put real teeth into their export control system.



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The strategy we have developed is sound: press Russia to get its export control system to work, and reinforce Russian actions by targeting our administrative measures on companies that Russia publicly identifies as proliferation threats. Yeltsin may complain that the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions or that we have not cracked down on proliferators at home. He probably is not fully aware of the scale of the Iran problem, and we will arm you with materials for convincing him that Russian activities with Iran (including in the nuclear sphere) have gone well beyond acceptable bounds or previous understandings.

Publicly, we will want to show we are united in seeing proliferation of WMD as the 21st Century security threat and working very hard on specific measures to stop it. Ideally, we will want to catalogue these actions, Russia's next steps, joint actions (e.g., on excess military plutonium, the Biological Weapons Convention, and possibly South Asia), and potential benefits from cooperation (e.g., increased Russian access to the space launch market) in a joint Summit statement.

On arms control, you should press for Yeltsin's private assurance that he will do whatever is required to get START II ratified this fall, and his agreement that formal START III negotiations will begin immediately thereafter. You should make clear that your shared legacy requires a breakthrough this year on START II ratification if we hope to achieve START III before you both leave office. At the summit, you may need to deflect efforts by Yeltsin to bypass or renegotiate START II, to negotiate specific START III issues (including lowering the Helsinki-agreed limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads), as well as to impose unacceptable limits on U.S. anti-satellite capabilities. On the positive side, we are working on an initiative to share early warning data on ballistic missile launches.

***Regional Issues.*** The NATO 50th anniversary summit in Washington next April is very much on Russian minds. They are worried about another round of enlargement or forward movement on Baltic aspirations for membership. Without prejudging your decision (or Alliance deliberations) on how to handle the Open Door at the summit, you can reassure Yeltsin that the summit's emphasis will be on defining NATO's post-Cold War mission, which includes a key constructive role for Russia. However, you will need to ensure that Yeltsin does not misconstrue such assurances as a waning commitment to the Open Door or a hint that Baltic



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membership is off the table. Your central messages will be no surprises and a sustained commitment to partnership with Russia on European security. We are working to develop proposals for invigorating the NATO-Russia partnership, including a role for Russia within CJTF's and a NATO-Russia center in Moscow on civil emergency response.

The Russians also are pressing to conclude before the NATO summit a new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), but their negotiators have not shown much flexibility. The Russians want a new Treaty whose terms would allow them to say that NATO enlargement has not damaged Russia's strategic position in Europe, but they are trying to place unacceptable constraints on NATO. We should indicate we are ready to try to accelerate the negotiations, with the more realistic objective of a document that captures progress by the end of the year toward a new Treaty and signature of an adapted Treaty at next year's OSCE summit.

Your regional discussions with Yeltsin could include the Middle East, Kosovo, the Baltics and the Caucasus/Caspian. Specific topics will depend on the Vice President's discussions with Kiriyenko and Madeleine's discussions with Primakov. On NIS issues, Yeltsin needs to hear (again) that we are not seeking to displace Russia in its own backyard. Rather, our goal is to work together. We hope to develop a joint set of principles on Caspian energy that would highlight a "win-win" scenario for energy development.

Looking Ahead

At your final press conference with Yeltsin, we will want to release a joint statement that ties together elements of the relationship, achievements of the meeting, and our "Vision to 2000." It will underscore both states' interest in promoting global economic stability and growth, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and stopping regional conflicts. Another underlying message will be the degree to which these issues are interconnected. It is not a Chinese menu from which to pick and choose.

A key to the success of your visit will be your ability to reach out to the Russian people and demonstrate that our partnership extends beyond government-to-government relations and is good for both countries. The First Lady will play a major role in conveying this message. She and Mrs. Yeltsin plan to convene an



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NGO conference with 100-200 Russians and Americans who will highlight their work in small business development, health, environment, rule of law and education. The overarching theme is that society-to-society ties help people in both our countries and provide a foundation for Russian-American relations into the 21st Century. We are working on a drop-by at the conference, and it could prove an excellent venue for a speech on future relations and common challenges. We are also looking at venues for speeches that reach out to the Russian people, including a "factory floor" speech to Russian workers.



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Unofficial translation

July 3, 1998

Dear Bill,

I have read your message with interest. I was encouraged by your disposition to actively perform joint work in the spirit of the agreements which we achieved in Birmingham. I view these agreements as a reliable "road map" which will allow to advance the resolution of both pressing and more long-term problems over the coming months.

Quite important also is the fact that the positive perspective that we have outlined in Birmingham is a convincing response to the opponents of the Russian-American cooperation. Mutual commitment to the partnership basis of our relations remains solid.

I believe that the work on settling the Kosovo crisis should be entered on the credit side of our interaction. It was beneficial that we thoroughly exchanged our evaluations of the situation over the phone. This solidified my confidence that if we act jointly we will be able to persuade S.Milosevic and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to resolve the problem by means of negotiations.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

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My agreements with S.Milosevic are working. As I have stated I am counting on the American side's influence on the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians so that they would clearly understand that there is no alternative to a political settlement.

As to your decision to veto the bill on sanctions in connection with the Iran's missile program I highly valued this step. I know that you live up to your word. That is why we immediately made public our positive reaction. Once again we emphasized that we would continue to steadily pursue a firm state policy of banning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, including any illegal shipment of missile technology to Iran. You can make no doubt about it. Specific measures that we have taken in this field - A.Kokoshin has recently informed you about them in detail - prove their effectiveness. These measures include uncompromising supervision by our law enforcement agencies of strict observance of the export control regulations recently introduced in Russia.

I welcome and support your determination to protect the Russian-American partnership from unnecessary damage. It is clear that your veto on the said bill possibly will not bring the matter to the closing. However, I presume that you will utilize the entire arsenal of means at your disposal not to allow this discriminatory act and, moreover, anti-Russian sanctions to enter into force.

To continue the "Iranian issue" I would like to buttress your intention to advance to normalization of the US relations with Tehran. I believe this is the right and wise choice. We have always thought that a turn for the better in the American-Iranian relationship will strengthen international stability and security.

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On our side we are pursuing the line of Iran's constructive involvement in the would community efforts to ensure non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, stabilization of the situation in the Middle East and combat against terrorism. In our view, additional opportunities to achieve this are currently opening up. American-Iranian normalization could, among other, serve to alleviate unneeded irritants in the US relations with the third countries which are developing good and legitimate ties with Tehran.

Some words about our other priorities. You are aware, Bill, that these days I am deeply involved in resolving economic matters. We will decisively implement the government program of financial and economic stabilization. We have expediently submitted to the Federal Assembly a package of appropriate bills. You know very well that there should be no delays when there is a need to protect the country from crisis occurrences on the world financial markets. Hard work awaits us, but I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties. I value your support - not in words but in deed - for our reform policy, particularly in the current crucial financial and economic situation, at a moment when we are conducting important negotiations with international financial organizations.

Resolving stabilization tasks we are inclined not only to preserve but consistently increase the rate of the Russian-American economic interaction. The upcoming meeting between S.Kiriyenko and A.Gore must launch the mechanism of the Russian-American Commission on Economic and Technological cooperation at full throttle. The co-chairmen will obviously need to clarify priorities, shapes and methods of the Commission's activity in order not to duplicate the work performed on other issues and via other channels. The results

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of this meeting will largely define the contents of the economic basket of the upcoming Russian-American summit.

I was pleased to learn from your letter that you are ready to come to Russia as soon as it is practically possible. I am confirming that we could tentatively make plans for the fall. At the same time I would like to assure you that holding our meeting without any linkages in no way means easing up on concluding the work on the START-2 ratification.

Bill, anticipate that prior to our meeting in Moscow we will have a number of opportunities to "synchronize our clocks". I have instructed Y.Primakov to be in charge of all operational issues of our relations, including in the context of preparations for the summit, staying in close contact with M.Albright.

I am certain that our smooth and well-coordinated interaction in the current and - to be quite frank - crucial space of time will allow to prepare the Moscow summit well and to lay the basis to elevate the Russian-American relationship to a new level of partnership by the beginning of the XXI century.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

Moscow, Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

С интересом ознакомился с твоим письмом. Меня воодушевил твой настрой на активную совместную работу в духе договоренностей, достигнутых нами в Бирмингеме. Эти договоренности рассматриваю как надежную "дорожную карту", которая позволит продвинуться в предстоящие месяцы по пути решения как неотложных, так и более долгосрочных проблем.

Важно и то, что намеченная нами в Бирмингеме позитивная перспектива - это убедительный ответ противникам российско-американского сотрудничества. Обоюдная приверженность партнерским основам наших отношений остается прочной.

Думаю, мы должны записать в актив нашего взаимодействия работу над урегулированием кризиса вокруг Косово. Хорошо, что мы подробно обменялись оценками ситуации по телефону. Это укрепило мою уверенность, что, действуя совместно, мы сможем убедить С.Милошевича и руководство косовских албанцев решать проблему путем переговоров. Мои договоренности с С.Милошевичем работают. Как я говорил, рассчитываю на воздействие с американской стороны на руководство косовских албанцев, чтобы они четко осознавали, что альтернативы политическому урегулированию нет.

Что касается твоего решения наложить вето на законопроект о санкциях в связи с ракетной программой Ирана, то я по достоинству оценил этот шаг. Знаю, что ты свое слово держишь. Поэтому мы сразу же позитивно отреагировали и в публичном плане. Вновь подчеркнули, что будем и впредь неуклонно проводить в жизнь твердую государственную политику, направленную на недопущение

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распространения оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки, включая любые незаконные поставки ракетной технологии в Иран. Ты можешь быть в этом уверен. Предпринятые нами конкретные меры в этом направлении - а о них недавно Вас подробно информировал А.А.Кокошин - доказывают свою эффективность. Эти меры включают и бескомпромиссный надзор со стороны правоохранительных органов за неукоснительным соблюдением введенных в России норм экспортного контроля.

Я приветствую и поддерживаю твою решимость защитить российско-американское партнерство от ненужного ущерба. Понятно, что твое вето в отношении указанного законопроекта, возможно, еще не поставит финальную точку. Однако исхожу из того, что ты задействуешь весь имеющийся в твоем распоряжении арсенал средств, чтобы не допустить вступления этого дискриминационного акта, а тем более антироссийских санкций, в силу.

Продолжая "иранскую тему", хотел бы поддержать твое намерение вести дело к нормализации отношений США с Тегераном. Считаю, что это правильный и мудрый выбор. Мы всегда полагали, что поворот к лучшему в американо-иранских отношениях будет способствовать укреплению международной стабильности и безопасности. Со своей стороны ведем линию на конструктивное включение Ирана в усилия мирового сообщества по обеспечению нераспространения ОМУ и средств его доставки, стабилизации ситуации на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, борьбе с терроризмом. Думается, что сейчас для этого открываются дополнительные возможности. Американо-иранская нормализация способна, помимо прочего, послужить и снятию ненужных раздражителей в отношениях США с третьими странами, развивающими нормальные и легитимные связи с Тегераном.

Несколько слов о других наших приоритетах. Ты знаешь, Билл, что в эти дни мне приходится плотно заниматься экономическими делами. Мы будем решительно реализовывать правительственную

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программу финансово-экономической стабилизации. Оперативно внесли в Федеральное Собрание пакет соответствующих законопроектов. Тебе хорошо известно, что нельзя медлить, когда речь идет о необходимости защитить страну от кризисных явлений на мировых финансовых рынках. Предстоит очень напряженная работа, но, уверен, трудности мы преодолеем. Я ценю, особенно в нынешней острой финансовой и экономической ситуации, в момент, когда мы ведем ответственные переговоры с международными финансовыми организациями, твою поддержку - не на словах, а на деле - нашей политики реформ.

Решая стабилизационные задачи, настроены не просто сохранить, но и последовательно наращивать темпы российско-американского экономического взаимодействия. Предстоящая встреча в Москве С.В.Кириенко с А.Гором должна запустить на полные обороты механизм российской-американской Комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству. Очевидно, сопредседателям потребуется уточнить приоритеты, формы и методы деятельности Комиссии, чтобы не дублировать работу по другим каналам и другим вопросам. Результаты этой встречи во многом определят наполнение экономической корзины предстоящего российско-американского саммита.

Я с удовлетворением прочел в твоем письме слова о том, что ты готов прибыть в Россию в ближайшие практически возможные сроки. Подтверждаю, что мы могли бы ориентироваться на осень. Одновременно хочу тебя заверить, что проведение нашей встречи без каких-либо увязок ни в коей мере не означает ослабления работы по завершению ратификации Договора СНВ-2.

Билл, рассчитываю, что до нашей встречи в Москве у нас еще не раз будет возможность "сверить часы". По всем оперативным вопросам наших отношений, в том числе в контексте подготовки к саммиту, я поручил работать, оставаясь в тесном контакте с М.Олбрайт, Е.М.Примакову.

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Убежден, что наше ритмичное и слаженное взаимодействие на нынешнем, прямо скажем, критическом отрезке времени позволит хорошо подготовить московский саммит и заложить базу для вывода российско-американских отношений на новый уровень партнерства к рубежу XXI века.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

г.Москва, Кремль

3 июля 1998 года

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The strategy we have developed is sound: press Russia to get its export control system to work, and reinforce Russian actions by targeting our administrative measures on companies that Russia publicly identifies as proliferation threats. Yeltsin may complain that the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions or that we have not cracked down on proliferators at home. He probably is not fully aware of the scale of the Iran problem, and we will arm you with materials for convincing him that Russian activities with Iran (including in the nuclear sphere) have gone well beyond acceptable bounds or previous understandings.

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On arms control, you should press for Yeltsin's private assurance that he will do whatever is required to get START II ratified this fall, and his agreement that formal START III negotiations will begin immediately thereafter. You should make clear that your shared legacy requires a breakthrough this year on START II ratification if we hope to achieve START III before you both leave office. At the summit, you may need to deflect efforts by Yeltsin to bypass or renegotiate START II, to negotiate specific START III issues (including lowering the Helsinki-agreed limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads), as well as to impose unacceptable limits on U.S. anti-satellite capabilities. On the positive side, we are working on an initiative to share early warning data on ballistic missile launches.

***Regional Issues.*** The NATO 50th anniversary summit in Washington next April is very much on Russian minds. They are worried about another round of enlargement or forward movement on Baltic aspirations for membership. Without prejudging your decision (or Alliance deliberations) on how to handle the Open Door at the summit, you can reassure Yeltsin that the summit's emphasis will be on defining NATO's post-Cold War mission, which includes a key constructive role for Russia. However, you will need to ensure that Yeltsin does not misconstrue such assurances as a waning commitment to the Open Door or a hint that Baltic



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membership is off the table. Your central messages will be no surprises and a sustained commitment to partnership with Russia on European security. We are working to develop proposals for invigorating the NATO-Russia partnership, including a role for Russia within CJTF's and a NATO-Russia center in Moscow on civil emergency response.

The Russians also are pressing to conclude before the NATO summit a new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), but their negotiators have not shown much flexibility. The Russians want a new Treaty whose terms would allow them to say that NATO enlargement has not damaged Russia's strategic position in Europe, but they are trying to place unacceptable constraints on NATO. We should indicate we are ready to try to accelerate the negotiations, with the more realistic objective of a document that captures progress by the end of the year toward a new Treaty and signature of an adapted Treaty at next year's OSCE summit.

Your regional discussions with Yeltsin could include the Middle East, Kosovo, the Baltics and the Caucasus/Caspian. Specific topics will depend on the Vice President's discussions with Kiriyenko and Madeleine's discussions with Primakov. On NIS issues, Yeltsin needs to hear (again) that we are not seeking to displace Russia in its own backyard. Rather, our goal is to work together. We hope to develop a joint set of principles on Caspian energy that would highlight a "win-win" scenario for energy development.

Looking Ahead

At your final press conference with Yeltsin, we will want to release a joint statement that ties together elements of the relationship, achievements of the meeting, and our "Vision to 2000." It will underscore both states' interest in promoting global economic stability and growth, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and stopping regional conflicts. Another underlying message will be the degree to which these issues are interconnected. It is not a Chinese menu from which to pick and choose.

A key to the success of your visit will be your ability to reach out to the Russian people and demonstrate that our partnership extends beyond government-to-government relations and is good for both countries. The First Lady will play a major role in conveying this message. She and Mrs. Yeltsin plan to convene an



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NGO conference with 100-200 Russians and Americans who will highlight their work in small business development, health, environment, rule of law and education. The overarching theme is that society-to-society ties help people in both our countries and provide a foundation for Russian-American relations into the 21st Century. We are working on a drop-by at the conference, and it could prove an excellent venue for a speech on future relations and common challenges. We are also looking at venues for speeches that reach out to the Russian people, including a "factory floor" speech to Russian workers.



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## Framing Our Goals for the Moscow Summit

This paper summarizes our initial thinking on the context and issues for the Moscow Summit.

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### The Context

The Moscow Summit comes at a time of considerable stress within Russia and in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Despite the landmark agreement with the IMF and an ambitious economic reform program, the Yeltsin reform team continues to face daily challenges to its survival. Markets and investors are deeply skeptical that the Russian government can deliver on promised tax collections and expenditure cuts. Workers across Russia remain unpaid and angry, the Duma ducked passage of tough anti-crisis measures, additional cabinet changes are in the offing, and the infamous oligarchs continue to put their personal interests over the common good. The sense of siege that Yeltsin conveyed in his last phone call has not lifted, and there is a general fear in Moscow of a replay of the financial crisis.

The Yeltsin team will seek to portray your willingness to come now as a strong reaffirmation of the course they have chosen and that the gains for Russia of pursuing reform and cooperation with the United States outweigh the pain for average citizens.

As detailed in our communications plan, our public objectives are threefold: to highlight Russia's tremendous progress since 1992; to be frank about the tough problems that remain (financial, proliferation); and to highlight the U.S. stake in a strong and successful Russia. We will want to demonstrate that cooperation is already paying dividends and to present a shared "Vision to 2000" that can touch a chord with the average Russian.

That will be a tall order. Many Russians are disenchanted with the current course and suspicious at best about U.S. motives and behavior. However, the younger generation is more optimistic about the future -- and we will want to capture their enthusiasm and perspective as best we can in your public events.

It will be equally important to reaffirm the importance of our partnership with Russia for America. Among our elites, euphoria about Russia's potential has given way to cynicism about whether Russia is capable of real change or arresting its lengthy decline. Many in Congress and the media see Russia as more of a hindrance than a help -- a country that undermines U.S.


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Declassify on: 7/21/08

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objectives in the Balkans and the Middle East; that allows technology transfers to Iran; that sometimes bullies its neighbors; where a few get rich while others sink into poverty; where religious freedom is threatened; and whose Duma resists ratifying START II.

This public souring on Russia has begun to cut into our policy flexibility and our ability to support reform. We do not expect dramatic arms control agreements or other signings that can electrify publics and elites. But with the Summit, we have an opportunity to reach over the heads of Beltway skeptics to remind the American people how far Russia has come and how much of a stake we have in its continued progress, despite the many bumps in its long road.

The Agenda

As we have in the past, we anticipate three reinforcing "baskets": 1) security and nonproliferation issues; 2) foreign policy and regional issues; and 3) economics and our common vision for the future of the relationship.

***Economics.*** This conversation will very much depend on Russia's economic health at the end of August. You will want to encourage Yeltsin to maintain his engagement on economics and remind him that there will be several key milestones toward the end of the year, including passage of the 1999 budget. Assuming that the IMF stabilization package holds, the central question for this Summit is investment, just as it was at Helsinki. In fact, little has changed from the Helsinki agenda, and the harder task this time around for the Russians is convincing investors that they are serious about reform. The Vice President will press Kiriyenko hard on actions to improve investor sentiment. We expect Yeltsin to raise perennial concerns such as market economy status, anti-dumping cases, and Jackson-Vanik.

***Nonproliferation and Security.*** While we have made considerable progress in recent weeks with Russia to halt transfers of missile technology to Iran, we are still suffering a "credibility gap" on the Hill. The House vote on overriding your veto of Iran missile sanctions is on hold indefinitely, but there will be a constant temptation to schedule a vote if the Russians fail to put real teeth into their export control system.



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***Regional Issues.*** The NATO 50th anniversary summit in Washington next April is very much on Russian minds. They are worried about another round of enlargement or forward movement on Baltic aspirations for membership. Without prejudging your decision (or Alliance deliberations) on how to handle the Open Door at the summit, you can reassure Yeltsin that the summit's emphasis will be on defining NATO's post-Cold War mission, which includes a key constructive role for Russia. However, you will need to ensure that Yeltsin does not misconstrue such assurances as a waning commitment to the Open Door or a hint that Baltic membership is off the table. Your central messages will be no



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0885981-C

[Emblem of the Russian Federation]

President of the Russian Federation

July 3, 1998

No. Pr-925

Moscow, The Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I read your letter with interest. I was delighted by your determination to pursue active joint work in the spirit of the accords we reached in Birmingham. I view these accords as a reliable "road map" which will enable us to move forward in the coming months toward resolving urgent as well as longer-term problems.

The fact that the positive plans we outlined in Birmingham provide a convincing response to opponents of Russian-U.S. cooperation is also important. Our mutual commitment to relations based on partnership remains firm.

I believe we should consider our work on settling the Kosovo crisis as a positive achievement of our cooperation. Our detailed exchange of views on the situation over the telephone was useful. This strengthened my confidence that by acting in concert we will be able to convince Mr. Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanian leadership

His Excellency William J. Clinton,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.



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to resolve the problem through negotiation. My agreements with Milosevic are working. As I have said, I am counting on the U.S. side to influence the Kosovar Albanian leaders so that they clearly realize there is no alternative to a political settlement.

As for your decision to veto the draft legislation on sanctions in connection with Iran's missile program, I appreciate this step. I know you will keep your word. That is why we immediately reacted in a positive fashion, including publicly. We again stressed that we will continue to strictly implement a firm national policy aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, including any illegal shipments of missile technology to Iran. You can be sure of that. The specific steps we have taken in that direction – and A.A. Kokoshin recently informed you in detail about these steps – are proving their effectiveness. These measures also include uncompromising oversight by law enforcement agencies to ensure strict compliance with Russian export control regulations.

I welcome and support your determination to keep the Russian-U.S. partnership from being needlessly damaged. Of course, your veto of the aforementioned bill may not be the end of this matter. However, I assume that you will use all the means at your disposal to prevent entry into force of this discriminatory document, not to mention the anti-Russian sanctions.

Continuing the "Iran theme," I would like to say that I support your intention to work toward normalizing U.S. relations with Teheran. I feel this is a correct and wise choice. We have always believed that a change for the better in U.S.-Iranian relations will help to strengthen international stability and security. For our part, we are pursuing a policy of constructive inclusion of Iran in the world community's efforts to ensure non-


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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, to stabilize the situation in the Near and Middle East and to combat terrorism. I believe additional opportunities for this are now opening up. Normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations could, among other things, also serve to eliminate unnecessary irritants in U.S. relations with third countries that are developing normal, legitimate ties with Teheran.

A few words about our other priorities. As you know, Bill, these days I am very much occupied with economic matters. We will resolutely implement our governmental program of financial and economic stabilization. We acted expeditiously in submitting the package of corresponding draft legislation to the Federal Assembly. As you are well aware, one cannot delay in matters involving a need to protect the country from crises in world financial markets. Very intensive work lies ahead, but I am confident that we will overcome our difficulties. I appreciate the fact that you support – not in words, but in deeds – our policy of reform, especially in the current critical financial and economic situation, at a time when we are engaged in serious negotiations with international financial organizations.

In accomplishing the objectives of stabilization, we intend not just to maintain, but also to consistently step up the pace of Russian-U.S. economic cooperation. The upcoming meeting in Moscow between S.V. Kiriyenko and A. Gore should fully activate the mechanism of the Russian-U.S. Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation. Perhaps the co-chairmen will have to clarify the priorities, forms and methods of work of the Commission so as to avoid duplicating work being done through other channels and on other issues. The results of this meeting will, to a large extent,


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determine the contents of the "economic basket" at the upcoming Russian-U.S. summit meeting.

I was pleased to read in your letter that you are prepared to come to Russia as soon as practically feasible. I want to reaffirm that we could tentatively plan on the fall. At the same time, I want to assure you that holding our meeting without any kind of linkages does not in any way mean slackening our efforts to complete ratification of the START II Treaty.

Bill, I trust that we will have several opportunities to "make sure our watches are synchronized" prior to our meeting in Moscow. I have instructed Ye.M. Primakov to handle all operational matters concerning our relations, including preparations for the summit, and to remain in close contact with Mrs. Albright.

I am convinced that if we work together in a smooth, well-coordinated manner at the current time which is, to put it bluntly, critical, this will make it possible to properly prepare for the Moscow summit and to lay the foundation for putting Russian-U.S. relations on a new level of partnership as we approach the 21st century.

Respectfully,

[s] B. Yeltsin


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LS 0885981-D

[Emblem of the Russian Federation]

President of the Russian Federation

July 6, 1998

No. Pr-947

Moscow, The Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I read with interest your letter of June 23, 1998, regarding further joint steps by the G8 to implement the Kyoto accords on the problem of global climate change.

I fully share your opinion regarding the advisability of holding a meeting of experts from our countries on the aforementioned issues within the framework of preparations for the next Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires. It goes without saying that there must be thorough preparations for the Conference with the participation of the competent national agencies. I have already directed the relevant Russian government agencies to prepare very thoroughly and seriously for the upcoming work.

I am confident that potentially we have every opportunity to ultimately reach a proper solution to this problem, which is of the utmost importance to all humanity.

Respectfully,

[s] B. Yeltsin

His Excellency William J. Clinton,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.



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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«3» ИЮЛЯ 1998 г.
№ Пр-925

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

С интересом ознакомился с твоим письмом. Меня воодушевил твой настрой на активную совместную работу в духе договоренностей, достигнутых нами в Бирмингеме. Эти договоренности рассматриваю как надежную "дорожную карту", которая позволит продвинуться в предстоящие месяцы по пути решения как неотложных, так и более долгосрочных проблем.

Важно и то, что намеченная нами в Бирмингеме позитивная перспектива - это убедительный ответ противникам российско-американского сотрудничества. Обоюдная приверженность партнерским основам наших отношений остается прочной.

Думаю, мы должны записать в актив нашего взаимодействия работу над урегулированием кризиса вокруг Косово. Хорошо, что мы подробно обменялись оценками ситуации по телефону. Это укрепило мою уверенность, что, действуя совместно, мы сможем убедить С.Милошевича и руководство косовских албанцев решать проблему путем переговоров. Мои договоренности с С.Милошевичем работают. Как я говорил, рассчитываю на воздействие с американской стороны на руководство косовских албанцев, чтобы они четко осознавали, что альтернативы политическому урегулированию нет.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЁННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

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Что касается твоего решения наложить вето на законопроект о санкциях в связи с ракетной программой Ирана, то я по достоинству оценил этот шаг. Знаю, что ты свое слово держишь. Поэтому мы сразу же позитивно отреагировали и в публичном плане. Вновь подчеркнули, что будем и впредь неуклонно проводить в жизнь твердую государственную политику, направленную на недопущение распространения оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки, включая любые незаконные поставки ракетной технологии в Иран. Ты можешь быть в этом уверен. Предпринятые нами конкретные меры в этом направлении - а о них недавно вас подробно информировал А.А.Кокошин - доказывают свою эффективность. Эти меры включают и бескомпромиссный надзор со стороны правоохранительных органов за неукоснительным соблюдением введенных в России норм экспортного контроля.

Я приветствую и поддерживаю твою решимость защитить российско-американское партнерство от ненужного ущерба. Понятно, что твое вето в отношении указанного законопроекта, возможно, еще не поставит финальную точку. Однако исхожу из того, что ты задействуешь весь имеющийся в твоем распоряжении арсенал средств, чтобы не допустить вступления этого дискриминационного акта, а тем более антироссийских санкций, в силу.

Продолжая "иранскую тему", хотел бы поддержать твое намерение вести дело к нормализации отношений США с Тегераном. Считаю, что это правильный и мудрый выбор. Мы всегда полагали, что поворот к лучшему в американо-иранских отношениях будет способствовать укреплению международной стабильности и безопасности. Со своей стороны ведем линию на конструктивное включение Ирана в усилия мирового сообщества по обеспечению нераспространения ОМУ и средств его доставки, стабилизации ситуации на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, борьбе с терроризмом. Думается, что сейчас для этого открываются дополнительные возможности. Американо-иранская нормализация способна, помимо прочего, послужить и снятию ненужных раздражителей в отношениях США с третьими странами, развивающими нормальные и легитимные связи с Тегераном.

Несколько слов о других наших приоритетах. Ты знаешь, Билл, что в эти дни мне приходится плотно заниматься экономическими делами. Мы будем решительно реализовывать правительственную программу финансово-экономической стабилизации. Оперативно внесли в Федеральное Собрание пакет соответствующих законопроектов. Тебе хорошо известно, что нельзя медлить, когда

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речь идет о необходимости защитить страну от кризисных явлений на мировых финансовых рынках. Предстоит очень напряженная работа, но, уверен, трудности мы преодолеем. Я ценю, особенно в нынешней острой финансовой и экономической ситуации, в момент, когда мы ведем ответственные переговоры с международными финансовыми организациями, твою поддержку - не на словах, а на деле - нашей политики реформ.

Решая стабилизационные задачи, настроены не просто сохранить, но и последовательно наращивать темпы российско-американского экономического взаимодействия. Предстоящая встреча в Москве С.В.Кириенко с А.Гором должна запустить на полные обороты механизм Российско-Американской комиссии по экономическому и технологическому сотрудничеству. Очевидно, сопредседателям потребуется уточнить приоритеты, формы и методы деятельности Комиссии, чтобы не дублировать работу по другим каналам и другим вопросам. Результаты этой встречи во многом определят наполнение экономической корзины предстоящего российско-американского саммита.

Я с удовлетворением прочел в твоем письме слова о том, что ты готов прибыть в Россию в ближайшие практически возможные сроки. Подтверждаю, что мы могли бы ориентироваться на осень. Одновременно хочу тебя заверить, что проведение нашей встречи без каких-либо увязок ни в коей мере не означает ослабления работы по завершению ратификации Договора СНВ-2.

Билл, рассчитываю, что до нашей встречи в Москве у нас еще не раз будет возможность "сверить часы". По всем оперативным вопросам наших отношений, в том числе в контексте подготовки к саммиту, я поручил работать, оставаясь в тесном контакте с М.Олбрайт, Е.М.Примакову.

Убежден, что наше ритмичное и слаженное взаимодействие на нынешнем, прямо скажем, критическом отрезке времени позволит хорошо подготовить московский саммит и заложить базу для вывода российско-американских отношений на новый уровень партнерства к рубежу XXI века.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«6» ИЮЛЯ 1998 г.

№ Пр-947

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

С интересом ознакомился с твоим посланием от 23 июня с.г. относительно дальнейших совместных шагов "восьмерки" по реализации Киотских договоренностей по проблеме глобального изменения климата.

Полностью разделяю твое мнение о целесообразности проведения встречи экспертов наших стран по указанным вопросам в рамках подготовки к следующей Конференции Сторон в Буэнос-Айресе. Безусловно, эта Конференция должна быть детально подготовлена с привлечением компетентных национальных ведомств. Я уже сориентировал соответствующие российские правительственные учреждения готовиться к предстоящей работе со всей тщательностью и ответственностью.

Уверен, что у нас потенциально есть все возможности, чтобы в итоге прийти к должному решению этой наиважнейшей для всего человечества проблемы.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PRT: BERGER COMM COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT STEINBERG SUTPHEN
SIT: COQ MCELDOWNEY PASCUAL SCHULTE SCHWARTZ SUM2 WEISS
SIT: NODIS

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 032033Z OCT 98

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NODIS
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.16)
KBH 12/13/2019

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AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

.

BEGIN TEXT:

.

DEAR BORIS:

.

THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO IS REACHING A CRITICAL POINT. A HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THAT HAS ENVELOPED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE WILL WORSEN WITH THE ONSET OF WINTER.

ONCE AGAIN THE WORLD IS CONFRONTED BY COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY MILOSEVIC'S SECURITY FORCES ON CIVILIANS AND SENSELESS MASSACRES. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO WATCH IDLY AS MILOSEVIC LEADS THE BALKANS INTO ANOTHER CYCLE OF BLOODSHED, ATROCITIES AND MISERY.

.

THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TOGETHER TO BRING THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO TO AN END. THANKS LARGELY TO OUR SUCCESSFUL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AN IMPORTANT RESOLUTION ON KOSOVO ON SEPTEMBER 23. THAT WORK BUILT ON A LONG SERIES OF REINFORCING EFFORTS BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IN MARCH, WE AND OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES SPELLED OUT THE PRECISE STEPS THAT MILOSEVIC MUST TAKE TO REGAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. AT A MEETING WITH YOU IN MOSCOW IN JUNE, MILOSEVIC PROMISED YOU THAT HE WOULD TAKE SEVERAL OF THESE ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY.

.

IN HIS ACTUAL BEHAVIOR, MILOSEVIC HAS BEEN NOTHING BUT DEFIANT. FOR MONTHS NOW, HE HAS IGNORED THE INTERNATIONAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

COMMUNITY'S CLEAR-CUT DEMANDS FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO

ACTION BY SECURITY FORCES AND THEIR WITHDRAWAL; ACCESS AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS; UNIMPEDED ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS; AND CLEAR PROGRESS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION. MILOSEVIC'S COMPLIANCE WITH THESE DEMANDS REMAINS INADEQUATE.

.

THE DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS AT OUR DISPOSAL ARE QUICKLY RUNNING OUT. AFTER THE UN RESOLUTION, THE CONTACT GROUP MET IN NEW YORK AND GAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR AMBASSADORS IN BELGRADE TO UNDERSCORE ONCE AGAIN OUR EXPECTATIONS OF MILOSEVIC. WHEN MILOSEVIC RECEIVED THEM, HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE PLANNED TO IGNORE THEIR MESSAGE. THE CONTACT GROUP POLITICAL DIRECTORS MET AGAIN LAST FRIDAY IN LONDON. I AM PLEASED THAT WE AGREED ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO PRESENT BOTH TO MILOSEVIC AND THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS. WE ALL WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE IF AND WHEN DIPLOMACY HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS.

.

IN RECENT DAYS, NATO HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE TO MILOSEVIC THAT HIS ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO COMPEL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. WE DO NOT WISH TO USE FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS URGENT TASK, BUT MILOSEVIC'S ACTIONS -- THE CEASELESS VIOLENCE AND THE FLOUTING OF THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- LEAVE US LITTLE ALTERNATIVE. IF HE DOES NOT COMPLY IN COMING DAYS WITH OUR LONG-STANDING DEMANDS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO RESPOND DECISIVELY.

.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE BALKANS. WE MUST KEEP UP THE REGULAR AND MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR TEAMS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES BETWEEN MADELEINE AND IGOR, OUR IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS AT NATO, AND THE CONTACT GROUP'S ATTENTIVE WORK ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. MILOSEVIC MUST NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN SPLIT US OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF FORCE IS OFF THE TABLE. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO STOP THE KILLING IN KOSOVO, USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, AND SHOW THE ENEMIES OF

PEACE THAT THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED. AS IN BOSNIA, I KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS WE OVERCOME THIS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE BALKANS.

.

SINCERELY,
BILL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**



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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>0611
<MSGID> M3494485

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(7.17)
KBH 12/13/2019

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6432

October 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: ANDREW WEISS

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(7.18)
KBH 12/13/2019

SUBJECT: Response to Russian President Yeltsin on Kosovo

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Kosovo. The message underscores the seriousness of the situation in Kosovo and the need to work closely together to ensure Milosevic's compliance with the international community's long-standing demands.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte, Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/2/08

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

6432

Unofficial translation

September 17, 1998

Dear Bill,

As a follow up of our recent discussions of Kosovo I would like to inform you what we have done to build on the Moscow joint statement on Kosovo.

I have urgently sent to Belgrade the First Deputy Foreign Minister, currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor S.Ivanov to deliver my personal message to President Milosevic. In this message I frankly expressed my deep concern regarding the situation in Kosovo emphasizing the acute humanitarian problem which is turning into severe suffering for the civilian population and threatening to develop into a real catastrophe.

As a result of difficult negotiations with S.Milosevic we managed to persuade him to make very serious additional moves.

The president of the FRY publicly confirmed that in the interest of Kosovo settlement he would strictly adhere to the commitments assumed by him in Moscow.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

SEP 18 14:46

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In response to my call he promised that the Yugoslav authorities would grant guarantees of safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to the places of their permanent residence.

Belgrade is ready for full cooperation with all international humanitarian organizations. The Yugoslav authorities intend to conduct jointly with UNHCR and ICRC verification of the number of refugees and inspect the areas of their location to provide urgent aid.

It is also important that S.Milosevic firmly promised that there would be no new refugee flows out of Yugoslavia.

We believe that the practical implementation of these essential agreements would indisputably promote relief of tension in Kosovo and around it.

Therefore, as we have agreed, I have exerted strong pressure on S.Milosevic in order not to allow a humanitarian tragedy there.

It is critical now to exert similar pressure on Kosovo Albanian leaders as well. Provocative sallies, terrorist acts, coustant threatening of civilians must end. It is a common knowledge that Albanian fighters formations operate openly from the Albanian territory where they have bases and enjoy complete impunity.

We talked with your in Moscow, Bill, about the need for parallel efforts in combating terrorism - one of the most dangerous challenges to the security of the contemporary world. This is precisely the approach we need regarding terrorist activity in Kosovo.

Russian representatives maintain continuous contact with Ambassador Hill. Sound interaction has been established. The practice of achieving intermediate

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agreements as a step to a complete settlement in Kosovo based on strict respect for territorial integrity of Yugoslavia appears to us well-justified.

As to the humanitarian problem I believe that it is important to take advantage of the obligations assumed by the FRY President without any delay and focus on ensuring a possibility for refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes before winter.

Now, more than ever, it is particularly important to act in concert using the entire set of political means. Only this way we can alter the situation in the region and ultimately untie this complex knot. This can not be achieved through force. That I am certain about.

The resolution of the Kosovo problem will largely depend on our close future interaction on this track.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.ВАШИНГТОН

Дорогой Билл,

В продолжение наших недавних обсуждений косовской проблематики хочу проинформировать тебя о том, что нами было предпринято в развитие Московского совместного Заявления о ситуации в Косово.

Я срочно направил в Белград первого заместителя министра, а теперь министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации И.С.Иванова с моим личным посланием президенту С.Милошевичу. В нем откровенно изложил глубокую озабоченность положением в Косово с особым акцентом на остроту гуманитарной проблемы, оборачивающейся тяжелыми страданиями для мирного населения и грозящей перерасти в настоящую катастрофу.

В результате непростых переговоров с С.Милошевичем удалось подвигнуть его на очень серьезные дополнительные шаги.

Президент СРЮ публично подтвердил, что он будет строго придерживаться взятых им в Москве обязательств в интересах косовского урегулирования.

В ответ на мой призыв он объявил о предоставлении югославским руководством гарантий безопасного возвращения всех беженцев и перемещенных лиц в места их постоянного проживания.

Белград готов к самому широкому сотрудничеству со всеми международными гуманитарными организациями. Совместно с УВКБ и МККК югославские власти намерены провести выверку численности беженцев и обследовать районы их сосредоточения для оказания неотложной помощи.

Важно и то, что С.Милошевич твердо обещал, что новых потоков беженцев за пределы Югославии не будет.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Мы считаем, что практическая реализация этих принципиально важных договоренностей, несомненно, способствовала бы ослаблению напряженности в Косово и вокруг него.

Таким образом, как мы с тобой и договаривались, я серьезно нажал на С.Милошевича, чтобы не допустить там гуманитарной трагедии.

Крайне важной сейчас оказать такое же давление и на лидеров косовских албанцев. Должны быть прекращены провокационные вылазки, террористические акции, постоянное запугивание мирного населения. Ведь всем известно, что формирования албанских боевиков открыто действуют с территории Албании, где они имеют базы и пользуются полной безнаказанностью.

Билл, мы говорили с тобой в Москве о необходимости параллельных усилий в борьбе с терроризмом - одним из самых опасных вызовов безопасности современного мира. Именно такой подход нужен и в отношении террористической деятельности в Косово.

Российские представители поддерживают постоянный контакт с послом К.Хиллом. С ним налажено неплохое взаимодействие. Тактика достижения промежуточных договоренностей как этапа к полному урегулированию в Косово, основанному на строгом уважении территориальной целостности Югославии, представляется нам оправданной.

Что касается гуманитарной проблемы, то считаю важным без промедления воспользоваться обязательствами, взятыми президентом СРЮ, и сосредоточиться на том, чтобы обеспечить беженцам и перемещенным лицам возможность вернуться к своим очагам до наступления зимы.

Сейчас как никогда важно действовать согласованно, используя весь набор политических средств. Только так можно переломить ситуацию в крае и в конечном итоге развязать этот сложный узел. Силовым путем этого не добиться. Я в этом твердо убежден.

От того, насколько мы и дальше будем тесно взаимодействовать на этом направлении, во многом будет зависеть разрешение проблемы Косово.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
17 сентября 1998 года

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6432

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.21)
KBH 12/13/2019

Purpose

Respond to a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Kosovo.

Background

The message to President Yeltsin is a key aspect of our strategy to engage the Russians on Kosovo. In the coming days we will continue to consult closely with them bilaterally, through the Contact Group, and at NATO. On Friday, Yeltsin and other Russian officials publicly criticized the potential use of force and called for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. They clearly have not come to terms with the reality that the threat to use force is the only way to change Milosevic's behavior. Your message underscores our desire for a political solution in Kosovo, but notes that our patience is running out.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

Attachment
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10/2/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«17» сентября 1998 г.
№ Пр-1260

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Билл, мы говорили с тобой в Москве о необходимости параллельных усилий в борьбе с терроризмом - одним из самых опасных вызовов безопасности современного мира. Именно такой подход нужен и в отношении террористической деятельности в Косово.

Российские представители поддерживают постоянный контакт с послом К.Хиллом. С ним налажено неплохое взаимодействие. Тактика достижения промежуточных договоренностей как этапа к полному урегулированию в Косово, основанному на строгом уважении территориальной целостности Югославии, представляется нам оправданной.

Что касается гуманитарной проблемы, то считаю важным без промедления воспользоваться обязательствами, взятыми Президентом СРЮ, и сосредоточиться на том, чтобы обеспечить беженцам и перемещенным лицам возможность вернуться к своим очагам до наступления зимы.

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Сейчас как никогда важно действовать согласованно, используя весь набор политических средств. Только так можно переломить ситуацию в крае и в конечном итоге развязать этот сложный узел. Силовым путем этого не добиться. Я в этом твердо убежден.

От того, насколько мы и дальше будем тесно взаимодействовать на этом направлении, во многом будет зависеть разрешение проблемы Косово.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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LS 0885981-D

[Emblem of the Russian Federation]

President of the Russian Federation

July 6, 1998

No. Pr-947

Moscow, The Kremlin

Dear Bill,

I read with interest your letter of June 23, 1998, regarding further joint steps by the G8 to implement the Kyoto accords on the problem of global climate change.

I fully share your opinion regarding the advisability of holding a meeting of experts from our countries on the aforementioned issues within the framework of preparations for the next Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires. It goes without saying that there must be thorough preparations for the Conference with the participation of the competent national agencies. I have already directed the relevant Russian government agencies to prepare very thoroughly and seriously for the upcoming work.

I am confident that potentially we have every opportunity to ultimately reach a proper solution to this problem, which is of the utmost importance to all humanity.

Respectfully,

[s] B. Yeltsin

His Excellency William J. Clinton,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«6» ИЮЛЯ 1998 г.

№ Пр-947

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

С интересом ознакомился с твоим посланием от 23 июня с.г. относительно дальнейших совместных шагов "восьмерки" по реализации Киотских договоренностей по проблеме глобального изменения климата.

Полностью разделяю твое мнение о целесообразности проведения встречи экспертов наших стран по указанным вопросам в рамках подготовки к следующей Конференции Сторон в Буэнос-Айресе. Безусловно, эта Конференция должна быть детально подготовлена с привлечением компетентных национальных ведомств. Я уже сориентировал соответствующие российские правительственные учреждения готовиться к предстоящей работе со всей тщательностью и ответственностью.

Уверен, что у нас потенциально есть все возможности, чтобы в итоге прийти к должному решению этой наиважнейшей для всего человечества проблемы.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

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г.Вашингтон

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

*Unofficial translation*

**PRESIDENT**
**OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

September 18, 1998
Moscow, the Kremlin

Dear Bill,

First of all, I wish to express my satisfaction over the constructive outcome of our recent meeting in Moscow. Our discussions made it possible not only to lay the foundations for common approaches to a wide spectrum of topical international problems but also to firm up the strategic guidelines of Russian-U.S. partnership with an eye to the 21st century.

It is also a good thing that you were able to see with your own eyes Russia's current developments, to understand and assess the magnitude of problems that we have to face. Likewise, it is extremely important that you have spoken out in support of our efforts to find a way out of the current crisis.

Pursuant to our discussions in Moscow, the situation calls for urgent corrective measures to be taken in respect of the market reforms now underway in our national economy, including those intended to provide greater social protection for the country's population. They will be carried out by Russia's new government headed by Yevgeni M. Primakov whom you know well. His appointment serves as a symbol of concord in society and of unity of a wide

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In Moscow the two of us shared the understanding of the global nature of the current economic crisis that had a most serious impact on Russia and affected even the United States. In our telephone conversation of September 12 you were quite right to observe that no country in the world can come out of the crisis on its own. We continue to have a stake in cooperation with the United States, both on bilateral and multilateral basis. We are also ready for active interaction with international financial institutions and, of course, for interaction in the G-8 framework.

Let me thank you for your support in having the London meeting on the political and economic situation in Russia conducted in the G-8 format. We have not forgotten that the now existing full-fledged G-8 was ultimately formed in Denver with your direct participation. We are counting on further interaction.

I consider it important to support maintenance and consolidation of the Russian-American Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation which is a unique mechanism of economic interaction between our two countries. Yevgeni Primakov will work in close cooperation with Albert Gore. I don't see any difficulties in this area. We assume that the next session of the Commission will be convened as previously planned - winter 1999.

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Respectfully,

Boris Yeltsin

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«18» сентября 1998 г.

№ Пр-1264

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Прежде всего хотел бы выразить удовлетворение конструктивными итогами нашей недавней встречи в Москве. Состоявшиеся у нас с тобой обсуждения позволили не только заложить основы для совместных подходов к широкому кругу актуальных международных проблем, но и затвердить стратегические ориентиры российско-американского партнерства с прицелом на XXI век.

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С уважением,

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*Unofficial translation*

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

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№ Пр-1264

г. Москва, Кремль

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С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Unofficial translation

November 11, 1998

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your message of October 7, 1998 on such important issue as elaboration of a legally binding Protocol aimed at strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons of 1972.

The Russian Federation firmly supports further acceleration of appropriate negotiations to work out the Protocol in earliest possible time. We have agreed with you about it in Moscow and adopted the appropriate joint statement. Following this spirit, during the last round of Geneva negotiations in October, 1998 the Russian delegation supported the adoption of the working schedule of the Ad Hoc Group of states-participants of the Convention for 1999 providing for a considerable increase in negotiations time.

We expect that in close contact with other participants in negotiations we will be able to move forward in developping an effective and economical monitoring regime of the implementation of the Convention, which will take into account the positions of all concerned states and will be based on agreed objective criteria.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

NOV 12 12:47

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I also think that both Russia and the U.S. are in need of such a control regime which would not infringe on the interests of security and of the national industry. I hope that during the negotiations our mutual constructive approach will allow us to find reciprocal solutions.

Sincerely,

B.Yeltsin

Moscow, Kremlin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю тебя за твое послание от 7 октября с.г. по такому важному вопросу, как разработка юридически обязывающего протокола, призванного укрепить Конвенцию о запрещении биологического оружия 1972 г

Российская Федерация твердо поддерживает дальнейшее ускорение соответствующих переговоров для выработки протокола в возможно короткие сроки. Об этом мы с тобой договорились в Москве и приняли соответствующее Совместное заявление. Действуя в этом духе, российская делегация на последнем раунде переговоров в октябре с.г. в Женеве поддержала принятие графика работы специальной группы государств-участников Конвенции на 1999 год, предусматривающего существенное увеличение переговорного времени.

Рассчитываем на то, что нам в тесном контакте с другими участниками переговоров удастся продвинуться в разработке эффективного и экономичного режима проверки выполнения Конвенции, который будет учитывать позиции всех заинтересованных государств и основываться на согласованных объективных критериях.

Считаю также, что и России, и США необходим такой режим контроля, который не наносил бы ущерба интересам безопасности и функционирования национальной промышленности. Надеюсь на то, что наш обоюдный конструктивный подход позволит найти на переговорах взаимоприемлемые развязки.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

г.Москва, Кремль
11 ноября 1998 года

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«11» ноября 19 98 г.

№ Пр-1478

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю тебя за твое послание от 7 октября с.г. по такому важному вопросу, как разработка юридически обязывающего Протокола, призванного укрепить Конвенцию о запрещении биологического оружия 1972 года.

Российская Федерация твердо поддерживает дальнейшее ускорение сответствующих переговоров для выработки Протокола в возможно короткие сроки. Об этом мы с тобой договорились в Москве и приняли соответствующее совместное заявление. Действуя в этом духе, российская делегация на последнем раунде переговоров в октябре с.г. в Женеве поддержала принятие графика работы Специальной группы государств-участников Конвенции на 1999 год, предусматривающего существенное увеличение переговорного времени.

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(Translation)

LS No. 1290345
CT/PH
Russian

[emblem]
**PRESIDENT**
**OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

---

November 27, 19 98
No: Pr-1529
The Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your November 15 letter concerning the forthcoming Conference to Support Middle East Peace and Development in Washington. I fully share the view that this forum is very important. Its mission is to express the aspirations of the international community for promoting real progress in achieving a Palestinian-Israeli settlement. The assistance aimed at economic and social development of the Palestinian self-government is, no doubt, a substantive factor strengthening the peace process. We highly regard the contribution to this cause of the United States, the European Union, and other major Middle East donors.

Within its capabilities, Russia is assisting the Palestinian National Authority in the field of personnel training and some other areas. Bilateral Russian-Palestinian cooperation in different spheres is being increased.

HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We will continue to render active political assistance to the Arab-Israeli dialog. You know that on the eve of the U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli Summit in Maryland I held negotiations with Yasser Arafat in Moscow. I think that they were useful in strengthening the constructive attitude of the Palestinian leadership.

I commend your personal contribution to the drafting of the Wye River Memorandum. I hope that this success will be tangibly fortified by the Washington Conference.

On our part we intend to vigorously support the implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements that were reached, as well as the forthcoming, exceptionally important negotiations to define the final status of Palestinian territories. We are ready to put the Russian-American co-sponsor mechanisms into effective action at this crucial stage of the Middle East settlement.

I appreciate the invitation to the Conference for a Russian representative. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. D. Sredin, has been instructed to represent Russia. I intend to send a personal message of greetings addressed to the forum participants. I sincerely wish it to be a success.

Respectfully,

[signature]

B. Yeltsin

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Unofficial translation

November 27, 1998

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«27» ноября 1998 г.

№ Пр-1529

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю тебя за послание от 15 ноября относительно предстоящего проведения в Вашингтоне Конференции в поддержку ближневосточного мирного процесса и развития. Полностью разделяю мнение о большом значении этого форума. Он призван выразить стремление международного сообщества реально способствовать прогрессу в палестино-израильском урегулировании. Помощь экономическому и социальному развитию самоуправления палестинцев, несомненно, является существенным фактором, подкрепляющим переговорный процесс. Высоко ценим вклад в это дело Соединенных Штатов, Европейского Союза и других крупных ближневосточных доноров.

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ
ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

02PP1639.DOC 24.11.98 14 Ю

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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С уважением,

Б.Ельцин



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8066

Unofficial translation

November 27, 1998

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PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«27» ноября 1998 г.

№ Пр-1529

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Благодарю тебя за послание от 15 ноября относительно предстоящего проведения в Вашингтоне Конференции в поддержку ближневосточного мирного процесса и развития. Полностью разделяю мнение о большом значении этого форума. Он призван выразить стремление международного сообщества реально способствовать прогрессу в палестино-израильском урегулировании. Помощь экономическому и социальному развитию самоуправления палестинцев, несомненно, является существенным фактором, подкрепляющим переговорный процесс. Высоко ценим вклад в это дело Соединенных Штатов, Европейского Союза и других крупных ближневосточных доноров.

Россия в меру своих возможностей оказывает Палестинской национальной администрации содействие в сфере подготовки кадров и некоторых других областях. Наращивается двустороннее российско-палестинское сотрудничество по различным направлениям.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ
ДЖЕФФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Мы и впредь будем оказывать активное политическое содействие арабо-израильскому диалогу. Ты знаешь, что накануне американо-палестино-израильского саммита в штате Мэриленд я провел в Москве переговоры с Я.Арафатом. Полагаю, они были полезными с точки зрения закрепления конструктивного настроя палестинского руководства.

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Со своей стороны, намерены энергично поддерживать реализацию достигнутых палестино-израильских договоренностей и предстоящие чрезвычайно важные переговоры об определении окончательного статуса палестинских территорий. Готовы к эффективному задействованию механизмов российско-американского коспонсорства на этом очень ответственном этапе в ближневосточном урегулировании.

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С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«27» ноября 19 98 г.

№ Пр-1529

г. Москва, Кремль

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ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«24» декабря 1998 г.

№ Пр-1693

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Поздравляю тебя, весь американский народ с Рождеством и Новым годом.

Уходящий год был непростым. Произошло углубление азиатского финансового кризиса, который очень болезненно ударил и по России. Сложной была и внутриполитическая ситуация в наших странах. Обострились старые, появились новые региональные конфликты.

Укрепление международной безопасности и стабильности настоятельно требует продолжения кропотливой совместной работы России и США с использованием политических и дипломатических методов. По-прежнему уверен, что добиться разрешения международных кризисов с помощью непродуманных силовых акций, тем более в обход Совета Безопасности ООН, невозможно.

Интересам наших стран отвечает наращивание политического взаимодействия. Верю, что в 1999 году нам удастся не только

APR 13 11:19

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

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сохранить, но и приумножить достигнутый в наших отношениях положительный потенциал с тем, чтобы в XXI век народы России и США вступили, уверенно глядя в будущее.

Мы с Наиной желаем тебе, Хиллари и Челси счастья, здоровья и благополучия в Новом году!

С уважением,



Б.Ельцин

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

Unofficial translation

December 24, 1998

Dear Bill,

I would like to wish you and all American people a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

The year that is coming to an end was not an easy one. The Asian financial crisis, which delivered a very painful blow upon Russia as well, has deepened. The domestic political situation in our countries has also been complicated. Old regional conflicts have been aggravating while new ones have emerged.

Strengthening international security and stability resolutely calls for continuing the tedious joint work of Russia and the US using political and diplomatic means. I am still certain that it is impossible to achieve settlement of international crises through unreasoned military actions, particularly circumventing the UN Security Council.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, D.C.

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Building up political interaction is in the best interests of our countries. I believe that in 1999 we will not only be able to preserve but develop the positive potential generated in our relations so that the Russian and American nations enter the 21 century looking into the future with confidence.

Naina and I wish you, Hillary and Chelsea happiness, health and prosperity in the New Year.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

Moscow, Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
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Поздравляю тебя, весь американский народ с Рождеством и Новым годом.

Уходящий год был непростым. Произошло углубление азиатского финансового кризиса, который очень болезненно ударил и по России. Сложной была и внутриполитическая ситуация в наших странах. Обострялись старые, появились новые региональные конфликты.

Укрепление международной безопасности и стабильности настоятельно требуют продолжения кропотливой совместной работы России и США с использованием политических и дипломатических методов. По-прежнему уверен, что добиться разрешения международных кризисов с помощью непродуманных силовых акций, тем более в обход Совета Безопасности ООН, невозможно.

Интересам наших стран отвечает наращивание политического взаимодействия. Верю, что в 1999 году нам удастся не только сохранить, но и приумножить достигнутый в наших отношениях положительный потенциал с тем, чтобы в XXI век народы России и США вступили, уверенно глядя в будущее.

Мы с Наиной желаем тебе, Хиллари и Челси счастья, здоровья и благополучия в Новом году.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

г.Москва, Кремль
24 декабря 1998 года

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7953 Ø Chechnya

Unofficial translation

October 18, 1999

Dear Bill,

I am writing in response to your recent letters concerning the situation in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus in general. We already discussed this problem with you during our telephone conversation. On my instructions I.S.Ivanov in September explained to you in detail our principled approach. In conjunction with your request V.V.Putin met several days ago with the U.S. Ambassador to Russia and as a follow-up to the conversation in ~~Oakland~~ (Auckland) gave an exhaustive assessment of the current situation.

I would like to reiterate that Russia has become target of an attack, unprecedented in its cruelty and cynicism, by terrorist and bandit formations basing in Chechnya. Killings (the list of victims includes foreign citizens as well), kidnapping, plunder etc. have acquired mass character. These formations have launched armed incursions into Dagestan and, as shown by the data at our disposal, they have organized and carried out inhuman terrorist acts in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buynaksk killing hundreds of innocent people.

OCT 27 14:10

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D.C.

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Such actions must not go unpunished and we will put an end to them. As President of the Russian Federation, I am more than anyone else interested in protecting lives and ensuring legitimate rights and well-being of Russian citizens in Chechnya or any other region of Russia. That is why I view my principal task in destroying the nest of terrorism and violence that has formed in the Chechen Republic in order to prevent new casualties among peaceful population, to stop arbitrary acts committed by bandits and terrorists against all law-abiding citizens both in Chechnya itself and in neighboring territories.

To achieve this, it is necessary to restore constitutional order in Chechnya, to locate and neutralize all terrorists and their leaders, to block this contagion from spreading - and such plans are contrived now - to other Northern Caucasus' regions. These are the main objectives of the federal forces. We will be taking tough actions, making sure that our steps are commensurate with the scale and extent of the terrorist threat. And I can say here that we are not going to repeat the mistakes of events in Chechnya in 1994-1996. Political questions, including the status of Chechnya, must and will be resolved by political means through negotiations with those leaders of the Chechen people who reject violence and terror.

Another important moment. The Chechen Republic has essentially become a stronghold of international terrorism and religious extremism, the preachers of which aim to destabilize the situation in the Northern Caucasus, and eventually to tear this region away from Russia, to establish there a terrorist state which will threaten the security of not only Russia, but other countries as well.

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I believe only joint efforts will enable us to counteract this global terrorism challenge. Following our telephone conversation, I instructed Russian law enforcement agencies to intensify contacts with their U.S. partners. It is of primary importance to ensure that our special agencies clearly identify the prospects, forms and substance of the antiterrorism cooperation at a new stage and commence practical work in this direction.

I would like to stress once again that I stand for the most intensive Russian-American interaction, both on a bilateral basis and as part of multilateral efforts to combat international terrorism. Simultaneously, we are certainly ready to continue discussing in confidence all issues of concern. It is important to keep our dialogue free from any factors of conjuncture, to ensure that strategically it facilitates constructive continuity in Russian-American relations, upon which we agreed in Cologne.

Sincerely,

Boris Yeltsin

Moscow, the Kremlin

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ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Пишу в ответ на твои последние послания по поводу ситуации в Чечне и на Северном Кавказе в целом. Мы уже обсуждали эту проблему с тобой в ходе телефонного разговора. По моему поручению И.С.Иванов в сентябре с.г. подробно изложил тебе наш принципиальный подход. В связи с твоей просьбой В.В.Путин встретился на днях с послом США в России и в развитие беседы в Окленде дал исчерпывающую оценку того, как сейчас складывается обстановка.

Хочу еще раз подчеркнуть, что Россия стала объектом беспрецедентной по жестокости и цинизму атаки со стороны террористических и бандитских формирований, базирующихся в Чечне. Убийства, в том числе иностранных граждан, похищения людей, грабежи и т.д. приобрели массовый характер. Эти формирования осуществили вооруженные вылазки в Дагестан, организовали и провели, как свидетельствуют имеющиеся у нас данные, бесчеловечные террористические акты в Москве, Волгодонске, Буйнакске, приведшие к гибели сотен ни в чем не повинных людей.

Подобные действия не могут оставаться безнаказанными, и мы положим им конец. Я, как Президент Российской Федерации, больше чем кто-либо заинтересован в сохранении жизни, обеспечении законных прав и благополучия российских граждан, будь-то в Чечне или других регионах России. Поэтому вижу основную задачу в том, чтобы подавить образовавшееся в Чеченской

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Республике гнездо терроризма и насилия с тем, чтобы не допустить новых жертв среди мирного населения, прекратить произвол, осуществляемый бандитами и террористами против всех законопослушных граждан как в самой Чечне, так и на прилегающих к ней территориях.

Для этого необходимо восстановить в Чечне конституционный порядок, найти и обезвредить всех террористов и их руководителей, перекрыть пути экспансии этой заразы - а такие планы вынашиваются - в другие районы Северного Кавказа. Именно в этом заключаются главные цели федеральных сил. Мы будем действовать жестко, соизмеряя наши шаги с масштабностью и степенью террористической угрозы. При этом могу сказать, что повторять ошибок чеченских событий 1994-1996 годов мы не собираемся. Политические вопросы, включая статус Чечни, должны и будут решаться политическим путем в переговорах с теми лидерами чеченского народа, которые не приемлют насилие и террор.

Еще один важный момент. Чеченская Республика по существу превратилась в форпост международного терроризма и религиозного экстремизма, проповедники которых стремятся дестабилизировать ситуацию на Северном Кавказе, а в конечном итоге - отторгнуть этот регион от России и создать там террористическое государство, которое будет угрожать безопасности не только России, но и других стран.

Считаю, что только сообща мы можем противодействовать этому глобальному террористическому вызову. После нашего телефонного разговора я дал поручение российским правоохранительным ведомствам активизировать контакты с американскими партнерами. Главное, чтобы наши спецведомства

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четко определили перспективы, формы и содержание антитеррористического сотрудничества на новом этапе и приступили к практической деятельности на этом направлении.

Хочу еще раз подчеркнуть, что я выступаю за самое плотное российско-американское взаимодействие как на двусторонней основе, так и в рамках многосторонних усилий в борьбе против международного терроризма. Одновременно мы, конечно, готовы к продолжению доверительного разговора по всем проблемным вопросам. Важно, чтобы наш диалог был свободен от каких-либо конъюнктурных моментов, а в стратегическом плане способствовал конструктивной преемственности в российско-американских отношениях, о чем мы с тобой договорились в Кельне.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

г. Москва, Кремль

18 октября 1999 года

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05
PRT: COMM
SIT: COQ
SIT: NODIS

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 110332Z NOV 99

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
~~S E C R E T~~ NODIS
QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 2

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.48)
KBH 12/13/2019

CHARGE: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 30 ABOUT HOW WE MUST PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA4980 ~~S E C R E T~~
CRUCIAL AREA OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. WHILE YOUR LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT WE STILL HAVE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, I FOUND IT THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. I BELIEVE IT PROVIDES FURTHER IMPETUS FOR THE DIALOGUE THAT OUR TEAMS -- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV, SECRETARY COHEN AND MARSHAL SERGEYEV -- HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

YOU AND I HAVE GRAPPLED WITH THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SINCE OUR FIRST MEETING AS PRESIDENTS, IN VANCOUVER. OVER THE YEARS, WE'VE REACHED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS AND ISSUED SEVERAL JOINT STATEMENTS. I STAND BY ALL OF THOSE, AND BELIEVE THEY CREATE A PLATFORM FOR CONTINUED WORK.

WHEN WE MET LAST YEAR IN MOSCOW, WE UNDERSCORED THE NEED TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING US BOTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY. WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LAY THE GROUND NOW FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE FUTURE. OUR COLOGNE STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL WAS A FURTHER STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. IT STARTED FROM THE PREMISE THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES FACE UNPRECEDENTED THREATS


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PAGE 3 RHEHAAA4980 ~~S E C R E T~~
TO THEIR SECURITY, ESPECIALLY THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY, INCLUDING MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES. WE SHOULD ADDRESS AND RESOLVE THOSE CHALLENGES THROUGH MUTUAL COOPERATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT OF OUR INTERESTS. I JOIN YOU IN WANTING, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, TO USE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MECHANISMS AND POSSIBLE NEW ONES.

THE CORE ISSUE, AS YOU POINT OUT IN YOUR LETTER, IS WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE ABM TREATY. THAT TREATY, WHICH I'VE SAID REPEATEDLY IS PART OF THE BEDROCK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM, NOT ONLY PERMITS US BUT OBLIGES US TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION THAT HAVE A BEARING ON ITS OWN PROVISIONS AND TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR MAKING THE TREATY MORE RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS AND CHALLENGES THAT WERE NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED 27 YEARS AGO.

PART OF WHAT I HOPE YOU AND I CAN ACCOMPLISH IS A JOINT REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO CONTINUING EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE TREATY IN THE FUTURE. ONE WAY TO BOLSTER THE

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA4980 ~~S E C R E T~~
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY UNDER PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE CONDITIONS IS THROUGH MEASURES TO PROMOTE GREATER OPENNESS AND TRUST BETWEEN THE SIDES.

YOU ALSO STRESSED IN YOUR LETTER THE NEED TO REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. HERE, TOO, I AGREE COMPLETELY. OUR HELSINKI DISCUSSIONS ON START III GAVE DIRECTION AND SET PARAMETERS FOR OUR PURSUIT OF THAT GOAL. IN COLOGNE, WE AGREED THAT OUR DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS AND ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROCEED WITH THE SAME URGENCY. LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE BALANCED SO AS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF BOTH PARTIES EQUALLY.

IT IS SPECIFICALLY WITH THIS BALANCE IN MIND THAT I SIGNED INTO LAW THE "NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999," WHICH YOU CITE IN YOUR LETTER. BEFORE SIGNING THAT BILL ON JULY 23, CRUCIAL CHANGES WERE MADE IN ITS TEXT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT COMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR CRITERIA THAT WILL SERVE AS THE BASIS OF MY DECISION, NEXT YEAR, ON WHETHER TO DEPLOY A LIMITED NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: 1) THE TECHNICAL

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA4980 ~~S E C R E T~~
CAPACITY OF THE SYSTEM NOW UNDERGOING DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING; 2) THE COST; 3) AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO THE


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UNITED STATES FROM ROGUE STATES, AND 4) THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OVERALL SECURITY, INCLUDING THOSE SERVED BY STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL.

I STRESS THAT I HAVE NOT MADE ANY DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT. RATHER, I HAVE DEFINED THE TERMS FOR A DECISION IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESPOUSED.

AT THE END OF THE DAY, I HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO WHATEVER I FEEL IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND MY COUNTRY -- AND TO MAKE SURE THAT MY SUCCESSOR IS FULLY ABLE TO DO THE SAME. I APPRECIATE YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO THAT EFFECT, AND OF COURSE, I RECOGNIZE YOUR OWN HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT I HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CLEAR ABOUT MY DETERMINATION TO WEIGH CAREFULLY ALL FACTORS IN MY ULTIMATE DECISION, NOTABLY INCLUDING THE FACTORS YOU LAY OUT SO FORCEFULLY IN YOUR LETTER.

PAGE 6 RHEHAAA4980 ~~S E C R E T~~
YOUR LETTER FOCUSES ON ONE FACTOR IN PARTICULAR: THE IMPACT ON MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND PARTICULARLY ON RUSSIA'S OWN SECURITY.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME ON THIS POINT.

THE PLAN I AM PURSUING, BOTH FOR AN INITIAL DEPLOYMENT BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 2005 AND A POSSIBLE SECOND PHASE BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 2010, IS FOR AN ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE DESIGNED TO COPE WITH THIRD-COUNTRY THREATS WHILE NOT THREATENING THE RUSSIAN DETERRENT FORCE. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THESE THREATS ARE EMERGING. NORTH KOREA HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED AND TESTED ONE LONG RANGE MISSILE AND IS DEVELOPING A SECOND LONGER RANGE ONE. SIMILARLY, MISSILE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS CONTINUE IN IRAN. THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE PROTECTION FROM SUCH THREATS.

EVEN AS WE DISCUSS WAYS OF ADAPTING THE ABM TREATY TO NEW REALITIES, I AM COMMITTED TO REINFORCE WHAT YOU AND I AGREE IS THE ESSENTIAL PREMISE OF THE TREATY: TO PREVENT A DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSES THAT UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN THE STRATEGIC
~~S E C R E T~~ NODIS
QQQQ
FINAL SECTION OF 2
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA AND IN THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE. AS MY COLLEAGUES CONDUCT OUR SIDE OF OUR DIALOGUE, ONE OF THEIR GUIDING PRINCIPLES WILL BE TO REINFORCE THAT FOUNDATION, WHICH HAS BEEN TESTED OVER DECADES.


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IN THIS REGARD, I NOTE THAT YOUR MILITARY HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE MORE THAN CAPABLE OF OVERWHELMING THE KIND OF LIMITED NMD THAT WE ENVISAGE AGAINST ROGUE STATES. MY OWN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS AGREE THAT RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC DETTERENT FORCES TODAY AND AT PROJECTED START II LEVELS WOULD EASILY BE ABLE TO PENETRATE THE LIMITED



NMD SYSTEM WE ARE CONSIDERING. OUR DEFENSE EXPERTS ARE TALKING WITH YOURS ABOUT WHY WE ARE CONVINCED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. I HAVE MADE CLEAR MY DESIRE TO ENHANCE THE ABM TREATY'S INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION REGIME TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT ANY REVISED TREATY LIMITS ARE NOT BEING VIOLATED AND TO ENSURE THERE IS NO SUDDEN "BREAKOUT" CAPACITY TO MOVE FROM A LIMITED SYSTEM TO ONE THAT WOULD THREATEN RUSSIA'S INTERESTS. ONE OF THE MANY BENEFITS OF MAINTAINING THE ABM TREATY AND SUSTAINING THE START PROCESS WILL BE TO ENSURE A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

PRECISELY BECAUSE WE NEED TO COOPERATE IN DEALING WITH A COMMON THREAT -- I HAVE PROPOSED WAYS OF WORKING COOPERATIVELY WITH RUSSIA ON MISSILE DEFENSE. WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED A WIDE RANGE OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES THAT WOULD PROVIDE TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO RUSSIAN SECURITY IN COPING WITH THIRD-COUNTRY THREATS. MY EXPERTS HAVE INDICATED TO YOURS A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING, WHERE RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE, INDIVIDUAL G-8 MEMBERS IN SOME OF THESE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE



INITIATIVE THAT YOU MADE AT THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE.

BORIS, LET ME REDUCE THE CHALLENGE WE FACE TO ITS ESSENCE: I DO NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION NEXT YEAR OF HAVING TO CHOOSE BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT MY NATION AGAINST A REAL AND LOOMING DANGER AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, KEEPING THE ABM TREATY IN FORCE. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU, TOO, WILL FACE A TOUGH DECISION. YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA TO JOIN THE U.S. IN AMENDING -- OR AS I SEE IT, UPDATING AND STRENGTHENING -- THE ABM TREATY. SOME WILL TELL YOU, NO DOUBT, THAT ANY CHANGES WILL THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF YOUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT. I DISAGREE WITH THESE CHARACTERIZATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND I CAN AVOID SUCH EITHER/OR, LOSE/LOSE CHOICES. I BELIEVE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE.


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THIS IS NOT A THEORETICAL PROPOSITION: IT IS A HIGHLY PRACTICAL AND TECHNICAL ONE. UNDER MADELEINE'S AND IGOR'S DIRECTION, STROBE TALBOTT AND YURI MAMEDOV HAVE CONDUCTED THREE



ROUNDS OF FOCUSED AND DISCIPLINED EXCHANGES AND ARE PREPARING FOR A FOURTH. (I THINK WE NEED TO INSTRUCT OUR TEAMS TO INCREASE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR EXCHANGES CAN ALSO BE CHARACTERIZED AS "CONFIDENTIAL": TOO MUCH OF WHAT IS ALREADY A DIFFICULT DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY DISCUSSION IS REVERBERATING IN PUBLIC.) STROBE AND YURI HAVE INCLUDED IN THEIR MEETINGS HIGH-RANKING EXPERTS FROM OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. IN THAT DIALOGUE, MY COLLEAGUES HAVE LAID OUT FOR YOURS CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS THAT I BELIEVE, IF CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AND OBJECTIVELY, WILL ANSWER A NUMBER OF THE CONCERNS YOU RAISE IN YOUR LETTER, PARTICULARLY YOUR APPREHENSION THAT THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM I PROPOSE AND THE AMENDMENTS IT WOULD REQUIRE TO THE ABM TREATY WOULD NULLIFY KEY LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY.

LET ME CONCLUDE WITH A CONCRETE SUGGESTION. I HAVE TRIED, IN THIS REPLY TO YOUR LETTER, TO CLARIFY SOME UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND OVERARCHING OBJECTIVES THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN COMMON. LET US AIM FOR A TARGET DATE AT THE END OF JANUARY TO REITERATE THESE PRINCIPLES IN A JOINT STATEMENT. THAT WOULD



GUIDE THE ACTIONS THAT YOU AND I AND OUR SUCCESSORS TAKE ON MATTERS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, INCLUDING IN OUR OWN EFFORTS LATER NEXT YEAR TO RECONCILE U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY WITH REGARD TO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, THE ABM TREATY, AND THE START PROCESS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

ECL: X1
^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
^SSN>4980
MSGID> M4145393


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~~SECRET~~ 8043

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(7.49)
KBH 12/13/2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Response to President Yeltsin on ABM Treaty

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin on ABM Treaty.

Background

President Yeltsin sent you a lengthy letter on ABM/NMD issues on October 30. His message enumerated various Russian concerns about our proposed gameplan, but did not break new ground. Still, we believe that the letter deliberately created an opening for us to lay out the basic elements of a joint U.S.-Russian document which could be issued early next year. That document would provide additional reassurance about U.S. intentions as well as our continued support for the principles of strategic stability and mutual deterrence.

Your message to Yeltsin at Tab A explains the substance and process guiding our overall approach. It also covers most aspects of the joint document described above. The letter asks Yeltsin to restrain the desire of part of the Russian national security team to turn this issue into a public showdown and sets the stage for your upcoming discussions in Istanbul.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve A Disapprove _____

SRB AUTHORIZES TRANSMISSION

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/09/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~/NODIS

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
IER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(7.50)
KBH 12/13/2019

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. CHARGE: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 30 ABOUT HOW WE MUST PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE CRUCIAL AREA OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. WHILE YOUR LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT WE STILL HAVE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, I FOUND IT THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. I BELIEVE IT PROVIDES FURTHER IMPETUS FOR THE DIALOGUE THAT OUR TEAMS -- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV, SECRETARY COHEN AND MARSHAL SERGEYEV -- HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

YOU AND I HAVE GRAPPLED WITH THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SINCE OUR FIRST MEETING AS PRESIDENTS, IN VANCOUVER. OVER THE YEARS, WE'VE REACHED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS AND ISSUED SEVERAL JOINT STATEMENTS. I STAND BY ALL OF THOSE, AND BELIEVE THEY CREATE A PLATFORM FOR CONTINUED WORK.

WHEN WE MET LAST YEAR IN MOSCOW, WE UNDERSCORED THE NEED TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING US BOTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY. WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LAY THE GROUND NOW FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE FUTURE. OUR COLOGNE STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL WAS A FURTHER STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. IT STARTED FROM THE PREMISE THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES FACE UNPRECEDENTED THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY, ESPECIALLY THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY, INCLUDING MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES. WE SHOULD ADDRESS AND RESOLVE THOSE CHALLENGES THROUGH MUTUAL COOPERATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT OF OUR INTERESTS. I JOIN YOU IN WANTING, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, TO USE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MECHANISMS AND POSSIBLE NEW ONES.

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THE CORE ISSUE, AS YOU POINT OUT IN YOUR LETTER, IS WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE ABM TREATY. THAT TREATY, WHICH I'VE SAID REPEATEDLY IS PART OF THE BEDROCK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM, NOT ONLY PERMITS US BUT OBLIGES US TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION THAT HAVE A BEARING ON ITS OWN PROVISIONS AND TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR MAKING THE TREATY MORE RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS AND CHALLENGES THAT WERE NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED 27 YEARS AGO.

PART OF WHAT I HOPE YOU AND I CAN ACCOMPLISH IS A JOINT REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO CONTINUING EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE TREATY IN THE FUTURE. ONE WAY TO BOLSTER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY UNDER PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE CONDITIONS IS THROUGH MEASURES TO PROMOTE GREATER OPENNESS AND TRUST BETWEEN THE SIDES.

YOU ALSO STRESSED IN YOUR LETTER THE NEED TO REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. HERE, TOO, I AGREE COMPLETELY. OUR HELSINKI DISCUSSIONS ON START III GAVE DIRECTION AND SET PARAMETERS FOR OUR PURSUIT OF THAT GOAL. IN COLOGNE, WE AGREED THAT OUR DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS AND ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROCEED WITH THE SAME URGENCY. LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE BALANCED SO AS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF BOTH PARTIES EQUALLY.

IT IS SPECIFICALLY WITH THIS BALANCE IN MIND THAT I SIGNED INTO LAW THE "NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999," WHICH YOU CITE IN YOUR LETTER. BEFORE SIGNING THAT BILL ON JULY 23, CRUCIAL CHANGES WERE MADE IN ITS TEXT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT COMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR CRITERIA THAT WILL SERVE AS THE BASIS OF MY DECISION, NEXT YEAR, ON WHETHER TO DEPLOY A LIMITED NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: 1) THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE SYSTEM NOW UNDERGOING DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING; 2) THE COST; 3) AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ROGUE STATES, AND 4) THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OVERALL SECURITY, INCLUDING THOSE SERVED BY STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL.

I STRESS THAT I HAVE NOT MADE ANY DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT. RATHER, I HAVE DEFINED THE TERMS FOR A DECISION IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESPOUSED.

AT THE END OF THE DAY, I HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO WHATEVER I FEEL IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND MY COUNTRY -- AND TO MAKE SURE THAT MY SUCCESSOR IS FULLY ABLE TO DO THE SAME. I APPRECIATE YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO THAT EFFECT, AND OF COURSE, I RECOGNIZE YOUR

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OWN HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT I HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CLEAR ABOUT MY DETERMINATION TO WEIGH CAREFULLY ALL FACTORS IN MY ULTIMATE DECISION, NOTABLY INCLUDING THE FACTORS YOU LAY OUT SO FORCEFULLY IN YOUR LETTER.

YOUR LETTER FOCUSES ON ONE FACTOR IN PARTICULAR: THE IMPACT ON MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND PARTICULARLY ON RUSSIA'S OWN SECURITY.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME ON THIS POINT.

THE PLAN I AM PURSUING, BOTH FOR AN INITIAL DEPLOYMENT BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 2005 AND A POSSIBLE SECOND PHASE BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 2010, IS FOR AN ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE DESIGNED TO COPE WITH THIRD-COUNTRY THREATS WHILE NOT THREATENING THE RUSSIAN DETERRENT FORCE. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THESE THREATS ARE EMERGING. NORTH KOREA HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED AND TESTED ONE LONG RANGE MISSILE AND IS DEVELOPING A SECOND LONGER RANGE ONE. SIMILARLY, MISSILE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS CONTINUE IN IRAN. THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE PROTECTION FROM SUCH THREATS.

EVEN AS WE DISCUSS WAYS OF ADAPTING THE ABM TREATY TO NEW REALITIES, I AM COMMITTED TO REINFORCE WHAT YOU AND I AGREE IS THE ESSENTIAL PREMISE OF THE TREATY: TO PREVENT A DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSES THAT UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA AND IN THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE. AS MY COLLEAGUES CONDUCT OUR SIDE OF OUR DIALOGUE, ONE OF THEIR GUIDING PRINCIPLES WILL BE TO REINFORCE THAT FOUNDATION, WHICH HAS BEEN TESTED OVER DECADES.

IN THIS REGARD, I NOTE THAT YOUR MILITARY HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE MORE THAN CAPABLE OF OVERWHELMING THE KIND OF LIMITED NMD THAT WE ENVISAGE AGAINST ROGUE STATES. MY OWN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS AGREE THAT RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC DETTERENT FORCES TODAY AND AT PROJECTED START II LEVELS WOULD EASILY BE ABLE TO PENETRATE THE LIMITED NMD SYSTEM WE ARE CONSIDERING. OUR DEFENSE EXPERTS ARE TALKING WITH YOURS ABOUT WHY WE ARE CONVINCED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. I HAVE MADE CLEAR MY DESIRE TO ENHANCE THE ABM TREATY'S INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION REGIME TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT ANY REVISED TREATY LIMITS ARE NOT BEING VIOLATED AND TO ENSURE THERE IS NO SUDDEN "BREAKOUT" CAPACITY TO MOVE FROM A LIMITED SYSTEM TO ONE THAT WOULD THREATEN RUSSIA'S INTERESTS. ONE OF THE MANY BENEFITS OF MAINTAINING THE ABM TREATY AND SUSTAINING THE START PROCESS WILL BE TO ENSURE A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

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PRECISELY BECAUSE WE NEED TO COOPERATE IN DEALING WITH A COMMON THREAT -- I HAVE PROPOSED WAYS OF WORKING COOPERATIVELY WITH RUSSIA ON MISSILE DEFENSE. WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED A WIDE RANGE OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES THAT WOULD PROVIDE TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO RUSSIAN SECURITY IN COPING WITH THIRD-COUNTRY THREATS. MY EXPERTS HAVE INDICATED TO YOURS A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING, WHERE RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE, INDIVIDUAL G-8 MEMBERS IN SOME OF THESE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE INITIATIVE THAT YOU MADE AT THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE.

BORIS, LET ME REDUCE THE CHALLENGE WE FACE TO ITS ESSENCE: I DO NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION NEXT YEAR OF HAVING TO CHOOSE BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT MY NATION AGAINST A REAL AND LOOMING DANGER AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, KEEPING THE ABM TREATY IN FORCE. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU, TOO, WILL FACE A TOUGH DECISION. YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA TO JOIN THE U.S. IN AMENDING -- OR AS I SEE IT, UPDATING AND STRENGTHENING -- THE ABM TREATY. SOME WILL TELL YOU, NO DOUBT, THAT ANY CHANGES WILL THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF YOUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT. I DISAGREE WITH THESE CHARACTERIZATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND I CAN AVOID SUCH EITHER/OR, LOSE/LOSE CHOICES. I BELIEVE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE.

THIS IS NOT A THEORETICAL PROPOSITION: IT IS A HIGHLY PRACTICAL AND TECHNICAL ONE. UNDER MADELEINE'S AND IGOR'S DIRECTION, STROBE TALBOTT AND YURI MAMEDOV HAVE CONDUCTED THREE ROUNDS OF FOCUSED AND DISCIPLINED EXCHANGES AND ARE PREPARING FOR A FOURTH. (I THINK WE NEED TO INSTRUCT OUR TEAMS TO INCREASE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR EXCHANGES CAN ALSO BE CHARACTERIZED AS "CONFIDENTIAL": TOO MUCH OF WHAT IS ALREADY A DIFFICULT DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY DISCUSSION IS REVERBERATING IN PUBLIC.) STROBE AND YURI HAVE INCLUDED IN THEIR MEETINGS HIGH-RANKING EXPERTS FROM OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. IN THAT DIALOGUE, MY COLLEAGUES HAVE LAID OUT FOR YOURS CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS THAT I BELIEVE, IF CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AND OBJECTIVELY, WILL ANSWER A NUMBER OF THE CONCERNS YOU RAISE IN YOUR LETTER, PARTICULARLY YOUR APPREHENSION THAT THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM I PROPOSE AND THE AMENDMENTS IT WOULD REQUIRE TO THE ABM TREATY WOULD NULLIFY KEY LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY.

LET ME CONCLUDE WITH A CONCRETE SUGGESTION. I HAVE TRIED, IN THIS REPLY TO YOUR LETTER, TO CLARIFY SOME UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND OVERARCHING OBJECTIVES THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN COMMON. LET US AIM FOR A TARGET DATE AT THE END OF JANUARY TO REITERATE

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THESE PRINCIPLES IN A JOINT STATEMENT. THAT WOULD GUIDE THE ACTIONS THAT YOU AND I AND OUR SUCCESSORS TAKE ON MATTERS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, INCLUDING IN OUR OWN EFFORTS LATER NEXT YEAR TO RECONCILE U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY WITH REGARD TO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, THE ABM TREATY, AND THE START PROCESS.

SINCERELY,

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

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I would like to share with you in a confident and most sincere manner some considerations regarding the situation currently emerging in our dialogue on START and ABM issues.

At the outset I would like to stress that I regard this not only as one of the key directions in the Russian-American relations but also as affecting basic security interests of the entire world community. I am convinced that the only reasonable way to proceed would be to build on what we have achieved over the recent years in the field of arms control. That is why I attach particular importance to the Joint Statement which we adopted in Cologne and I watch closely over its implementation. However, the state of affairs here leaves an ambivalent impression.

On the one hand, certain progress is obvious. I am satisfied to see that you have reaffirmed your commitment to the agreements which we have previously reached. What I have in mind is in the first place the readiness of the U.S. side to continue the work on further strategic arms reductions, the possibility of going in these reductions below the level of nuclear warheads coordinated in Helsinki, which you do not rule out. This would be universally beneficial.

At the same time, - and we have both repeatedly stated this - the ABM Treaty is of fundamental importance for further strategic offensive arms reductions, and for strategic stability and international security. We have jointly set in Cologne our intent to continue efforts to strengthen this Treaty, to increase its viability and effectiveness in the future. In this regard, I have been profoundly concerned by your signing the bill which proclaimed the deployment of the national system of the missile defense of the territory of the



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country the policy of the United States, and even more by the continuation of the real tests of its elements. The deployment of such a system, as you know, is incompatible with the key provision of the ABM Treaty which makes its essence - the obligation of the two sides not to deploy the ABM system defenses of the territory of the country and not to provide the base for such a defense. The renunciation of this obligation would in effect mean the ABM Treaty fundamental reorientation, that is the Treaty would begin to permit what it had been developed and signed to prohibit. It would be not a strengthened ABM Treaty, but an entirely different treaty. Possible consequences of such a change, quite frankly, appear to us dangerous not only for further reductions in strategic offensive arms, but for the entire disarmament process and for the international stability as a the whole. I presume that you, as well as I, are not indifferent as to which are going to be the results of our joint efforts in this field and what reliability margin of international security we will leave to our successors.

I have previously heard the assertions of the U.S. side that the deployment of the NMD of the territory of the country will not jeopardize Russia's strategic deterrence capability and that the U.S. is allegedly prepared to provide to Russia appropriate guarantees.

Bill, from the very beginning of the process of strategic offensive arms limitations and reductions thirty years ago this process has been based on the main idea, incorporated in the ABM Treaty, that our two sides remain vulnerable to the strategic offensive arms of the other side, since this is the only way one can ensure the reliability of deterrence from a nuclear attack as the numbers of offensive arms are being reduced. The alternative to such an

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approach would be higher levels of strategic offensive arms and other nuclear armaments and less reliable and less stable strategic relationship system where a first strike under certain circumstances might cease to be something absolutely irrational. This can be seen especially clearly at reduced levels of strategic offensive arms, provided for in START II, and in particular at those we talk about within the framework of our START III discussion. In such a situation no guarantees would be capable of removing the role of the worst destabilizing factor in the strategic equation which is objectively inherent in an ABM system and which increases at the latter gains in its development. And the U.S. plans - as far as I am informed - provide for the build-up in the ABM system potential. In my view, the creation of such an eventuality is not the best prospect. Russia may find itself placed in a position where it would be compelled to take appropriate, and not necessarily symmetrical, measures to ensure in an adequate way its own security. That is precisely why I want to reiterate that the renunciation of the key limitations established by the ABM Treaty, incurs the threat of frustrating the process of limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments. We would not like to be the participants in it.

Nor am I convinced at all that ABM deployments would impede the processes of proliferation of the technologies of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles. I think the result would rather be the opposite: ABM deployments would whip these processes up and urge new countries to possess such technologies in the circumstances where they would be actually defenseless against the super-armed United States. The opportunities for the

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strengthening of non -proliferation regimes are far from being exhausted, and some of them were addressed in Cologne.

On the other hand, I am sure that if we firmly adhere to the ABM Treaty and activate the potential of the 1997 Agreements on the demarcation of strategic and non-strategic ABM defenses, and if we apply efforts on a global scale, including cooperation in the field of missile technology non-proliferation and export control, we, acting together, will be capable of countering the threats the U.S. side refers to when it advocates the development of the U.S. NMD.

Bill, I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that a complex and capital-consuming process such as a the development and deployment of strategic ABM defenses has an enormous momentum of its own. Once set in motion, it runs the risk of far exceeding the limits which are presently addressed in the U.S. programs as they are known to us.

I understand that the situation around the ABM Treaty is now extremely complicated. In my view, however, a way out of it has to be found, taking into account all that I have said above. And all this largely - if not primarily - depends on you.

I would request that you, Bill, weigh everything up once again before taking further steps in the field of strategic ABM defenses. Of course, no one has the right to veto such activities of the United States, just as there is no right of veto with respect to Russia's activities in ensuring its security. But I believe that it would not be the best thing to do to see in the Third Millennium by shattering what has been created in the interest of the world through joint Russian and U.S. efforts. I also hope that the U.S. side will be able to reconsider

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its present attitude to our draft resolution of the UN General Assembly on the question of preserving and complying with the ABM Treaty which is fully based on what we have agreed upon with you.

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Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы доверительно и предельно откровенно поделиться с тобой соображениями относительно ситуации, складывающейся в настоящее время в нашем диалоге по вопросам СНВ и ПРО.

Сразу хочу подчеркнуть, что считаю это направление не только одним из ключевых в российско-американских отношениях, но и затрагивающим основные интересы безопасности всего международного сообщества. Убежден, что наращивать достигнутое за последние годы в области контроля над вооружениями - единственно разумный путь. Именно поэтому придаю особое значение принятому нами в Кельне Совместному заявлению, внимательно слежу за его реализацией. Положение дел здесь, однако, оставляет двойственное впечатление.

С одной стороны, налицо определенный прогресс. С удовлетворением воспринял подтверждаемую тобой приверженность тем договоренностям, которые мы достигли ранее. Прежде всего имею в виду проявленную американской стороной готовность к продолжению работы над дальнейшими сокращениями стратегических наступательных вооружений, неисключаемую

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тобой возможность идти в этих сокращениях ниже согласованного в Хельсинки уровня ядерных боезарядов. Это было бы на пользу всем.

Вместе с тем, и мы с тобой об этом неоднократно заявляли, фундаментальное значение для дальнейших сокращений СНВ, для укрепления стратегической стабильности и международной безопасности имеет Договор по ПРО. Мы совместно зафиксировали в Кельне наше намерение продолжать усилия по укреплению этого договора, повышению его жизнеспособности и эффективности в будущем. В связи с этим меня глубоко обеспокоило подписание тобой закона, провозглашающего развертывание национальной системы противоракетной обороны территории страны политикой Соединенных Штатов, и тем более - продолжение реальных испытаний ее элементов. Развертывание такой системы, как ты знаешь, несовместимо с ключевым положением Договора по ПРО, составляющим его суть, - обязательством сторон не развертывать системы ПРО территории своей страны и не создавать основу для такой обороны. Отказ от этого обязательства означал бы по существу принципиальную переориентацию Договора по ПРО, то есть Договор стал бы разрешать то, для запрещения чего был разработан и подписан. Это был бы отнюдь не укрепленный Договор по ПРО, а совсем другой Договор. Возможные последствия такого изменения, скажу тебе откровенно, нам представляются опасными не только для дальнейших сокращений СНВ, но и всего разоруженческого процесса и международной стабильности в целом. А тебе, как и мне, думаю, небезразлично, каковы будут результаты наших общих усилий в этой области, какой запас прочности международной безопасности мы оставим нашим преемникам.

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Мне уже приходилось слышать утверждения американской стороны, что развертывание национальной системы ПРО территории страны не поставит под угрозу способность России к стратегическому сдерживанию и что США, мол, готовы предоставить России соответствующие гарантии.

Билл, с самого начала процесса ограничения и сокращения стратегических наступательных вооружений тридцать лет назад этот процесс основывался на главной идее, заложенной в Договор по ПРО. А именно, что обе наши стороны остаются уязвимыми для СНВ другой стороны, поскольку только так можно обеспечить надежность сдерживания от ядерного нападения при уменьшающихся количествах наступательных вооружений. Альтернатива такому подходу - более высокие уровни СНВ и других ядерных вооружений и менее надежная и менее стабильная система стратегических взаимоотношений, при которой первый удар может при определенных обстоятельствах перестать быть абсолютно иррациональным. Все это особенно четко просматривается на пониженных уровнях СНВ, предусмотренных в Договоре СНВ-2, и особенно тех, о которых мы ведем разговор в рамках обсуждения СНВ-3. И никакие гарантии в такой ситуации не были бы способны устранить объективно присущую системе ПРО и возрастающую с ее развитием роль сильнейшего дестабилизирующего фактора в стратегическом уравнении. А планами США, насколько я информирован, предусматривается наращивание потенциала системы ПРО. Не лучшая, на мой взгляд, перспектива создавать такую ситуацию. Россия может оказаться поставленной в такое положение, когда она будет вынуждена принять соответствующие, не обязательно симметричные, меры по адекватному обеспечению собственной безопасности. Именно поэтому

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хочу повторить еще раз, что отказ от ключевых ограничений, установленных Договором по ПРО, несет с собой угрозу сорвать процесс ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений. Мы не хотели бы быть участниками этого.

Совершенно не убежден и в том, что развертывание ПРО будет тормозить процессы распространения технологий оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки. Думаю, результат, скорее, будет обратным - развертывание ПРО подхлестнет эти процессы и подтолкнет новые страны на путь овладения такими технологиями в условиях своей фактической незащищенности перед сверхвооруженностью США. Для укрепления режимов нераспространения возможности далеко не исчерпаны, и о некоторых из них шел разговор в Кельне.

С другой стороны, я уверен, что, если мы будем твердо придерживаться Договора по ПРО и задействуем потенциал договоренностей по разграничению стратегической и нестратегической ПРО 1997 года, а также подключим усилия на глобальном уровне, включая сотрудничество в области нераспространения ракетных технологий и экспортного контроля, то, действуя совместно, мы сможем успешно противостоять тем угрозам, на которые американская сторона ссылается, выступая за создание НПРО США.

Хотел бы, Билл, обратить твое внимание и на то, что такой сложный и капиталоемкий процесс, как создание и развертывание стратегической ПРО, имеет огромную собственную инерцию развития. Будучи запущенным, он рискует далеко перекрыть те границы, о которых сейчас идет речь в известных нам американских программах.

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Понимаю, что ситуация вокруг Договора по ПРО сейчас чрезвычайно сложная. Из нее, однако, на мой взгляд, нужно найти выход с учетом всего того, о чем я говорил выше. И это зависит во многом, если не в первую очередь, от тебя.

Просил бы тебя, Билл, еще раз все взвесить, прежде чем предпринимать дальнейшие шаги в области стратегической ПРО. Разумеется, права вето на такую деятельность Соединенных Штатов ни у кого нет, равно как нет такого права и в отношении деятельности России в области обеспечения своей безопасности. Но полагаю, что не лучшим способом было бы встречать третье тысячелетие крушением того, что было создано в интересах мира совместными усилиями России и США. Надеюсь также, что американская сторона сможет пересмотреть свой нынешний подход к нашему проекту Резолюции Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН по вопросу о сохранении и соблюдении Договора по ПРО, который полностью основывается на наших с тобой договоренностях.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

г.Москва, Кремль
30 октября 1999 года

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8043

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~/NODIS

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3(7.53)
KRH 12/13/2019

1. CHARGE: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 30 ABOUT HOW WE MUST PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE CRUCIAL AREA OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. WHILE YOUR LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT WE STILL HAVE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, I FOUND IT THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. I BELIEVE IT PROVIDES FURTHER IMPETUS FOR THE DIALOGUE THAT OUR TEAMS — SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV, SECRETARY COHEN AND MARSHAL SERGEYEV — HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

YOU AND I HAVE GRAPPLED WITH THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SINCE OUR FIRST MEETING AS PRESIDENTS, IN VANCOUVER. OVER THE YEARS, WE'VE REACHED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS AND ISSUED SEVERAL JOINT STATEMENTS. I STAND BY ALL OF THOSE, AND BELIEVE THEY CREATE A PLATFORM FOR CONTINUED WORK.

WHEN WE MET LAST YEAR IN MOSCOW, WE UNDERSCORED THE NEED TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING US BOTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY. WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LAY THE GROUND NOW FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE FUTURE. OUR COLOGNE STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL WAS A FURTHER STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. IT STARTED FROM THE PREMISE THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES FACE UNPRECEDENTED THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY, ESPECIALLY THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY, INCLUDING MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES. WE SHOULD ADDRESS AND RESOLVE THOSE CHALLENGES THROUGH MUTUAL COOPERATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT OF OUR INTERESTS. I JOIN YOU IN WANTING, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, TO USE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MECHANISMS AND POSSIBLE NEW ONES.

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THE CORE ISSUE, AS YOU POINT OUT IN YOUR LETTER, IS WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE ABM TREATY. THAT TREATY, WHICH I'VE SAID REPEATEDLY IS PART OF THE BEDROCK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM, NOT ONLY PERMITS US BUT OBLIGES US TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION THAT HAVE A BEARING ON ITS OWN PROVISIONS AND TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR MAKING THE TREATY MORE RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS AND CHALLENGES THAT WERE NOT ANTICIPATED WHEN THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED 27 YEARS AGO.

PART OF WHAT I HOPE YOU AND I CAN ACCOMPLISH IS A JOINT REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO CONTINUING EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE TREATY IN THE FUTURE. ONE WAY TO BOLSTER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY UNDER PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE CONDITIONS IS THROUGH MEASURES TO PROMOTE GREATER OPENNESS AND TRUST BETWEEN THE SIDES.

YOU ALSO STRESSED IN YOUR LETTER THE NEED TO REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. HERE, TOO, I AGREE COMPLETELY. OUR HELSINKI DISCUSSIONS ON START III GAVE DIRECTION AND SET PARAMETERS FOR OUR PURSUIT OF THAT GOAL. IN COLOGNE, WE AGREED THAT OUR DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS AND ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROCEED WITH THE SAME URGENCY. LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE BALANCED SO AS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF BOTH PARTIES EQUALLY.

IT IS SPECIFICALLY WITH THIS BALANCE IN MIND THAT I SIGNED INTO LAW THE "NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999," WHICH YOU CITE IN YOUR LETTER. BEFORE SIGNING THAT BILL ON JULY 23, CRUCIAL CHANGES WERE MADE IN ITS TEXT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT COMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR CRITERIA THAT WILL SERVE AS THE BASIS OF MY DECISION, NEXT YEAR, ON WHETHER TO DEPLOY A LIMITED NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: 1) THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE SYSTEM NOW UNDERGOING DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING; 2) THE COST; 3) AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ROGUE STATES, AND 4) THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OVERALL SECURITY, INCLUDING THOSE SERVED BY STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL.

I STRESS THAT I HAVE NOT MADE ANY DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT. RATHER, I HAVE DEFINED THE TERMS FOR A DECISION IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT YOU AND I HAVE ESPOUSED.

AT THE END OF THE DAY, I HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO WHATEVER I FEEL IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND MY COUNTRY -- AND TO MAKE SURE THAT MY SUCCESSOR IS FULLY ABLE TO DO THE SAME. I APPRECIATE YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO THAT EFFECT, AND OF COURSE I RECOGNIZE YOUR

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OWN HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT I HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CLEAR ABOUT MY DETERMINATION TO WEIGH CAREFULLY ALL FACTORS IN MY ULTIMATE DECISION, NOTABLY INCLUDING THE FACTORS YOU LAY OUT SO FORCEFULLY IN YOUR LETTER.

YOUR LETTER FOCUSES ON ONE FACTOR IN PARTICULAR: THE IMPACT ON MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND PARTICULARLY ON RUSSIA'S OWN SECURITY.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME ON THIS POINT.

THE PLAN I AM PURSUING -- BOTH FOR AN INITIAL DEPLOYMENT BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 2005 AND A POSSIBLE SECOND PHASE BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 2010 -- IS FOR AN ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE DESIGNED TO COPE WITH THIRD-COUNTRY THREATS WHILE NOT THREATENING THE RUSSIAN DETERRENT FORCE. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THESE THREATS ARE EMERGING. NORTH KOREA HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED AND TESTED ONE LONG RANGE MISSILE AND IS DEVELOPING A SECOND LONGER RANGE ONE. SIMILARLY, MISSILE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS CONTINUE IN IRAN. THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE PROTECTION FROM SUCH THREATS.

EVEN AS WE DISCUSS WAYS OF ADAPTING THE ABM TREATY TO NEW REALITIES, I AM COMMITTED TO REINFORCE WHAT YOU AND I AGREE IS THE ESSENTIAL PREMISE OF THE TREATY: TO PREVENT A DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSES THAT UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA AND IN THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE. AS MY COLLEAGUES CONDUCT OUR SIDE OF OUR DIALOGUE, ONE OF THEIR GUIDING PRINCIPLES WILL BE TO REINFORCE THAT FOUNDATION, WHICH HAS BEEN TESTED OVER DECADES.

IN THIS REGARD, I NOTE THAT YOUR MILITARY HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE MORE THAN CAPABLE OF OVERWHELMING THE KIND OF LIMITED NMD THAT WE ENVISAGE AGAINST ROGUE STATES. MY OWN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS AGREE THAT RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC DETTERENT FORCES TODAY AND AT PROJECTED START II LEVELS WOULD EASILY BE ABLE TO PENETRATE THE LIMITED NMD SYSTEM WE ARE CONSIDERING. OUR DEFENSE EXPERTS ARE TALKING WITH YOURS ABOUT WHY WE ARE CONVINCED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. I HAVE MADE CLEAR MY DESIRE TO ENHANCE THE ABM TREATY'S INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION REGIME TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT ANY REVISED TREATY LIMITS ARE NOT BEING VIOLATED AND TO ENSURE THERE IS NO SUDDEN "BREAKOUT" CAPACITY TO MOVE FROM A LIMITED SYSTEM TO ONE THAT WOULD THREATEN RUSSIA'S INTERESTS. ONE OF THE MANY BENEFITS OF MAINTAINING THE ABM TREATY AND SUSTAINING THE START PROCESS WILL BE TO ENSURE A HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

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PRECISELY BECAUSE WE NEED TO COOPERATE IN DEALING WITH A COMMON THREAT -- I HAVE PROPOSED WAYS OF WORKING COOPERATIVELY WITH RUSSIA ON MISSILE DEFENSE. WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED A WIDE RANGE OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES THAT WOULD PROVIDE TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO RUSSIAN SECURITY IN COPING WITH THIRD-COUNTRY THREATS. MY EXPERTS HAVE INDICATED TO YOURS A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING, WHERE RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE, INDIVIDUAL G-8 MEMBERS IN SOME OF THESE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE INITIATIVE THAT YOU MADE AT THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE.

BORIS, LET ME REDUCE THE CHALLENGE WE FACE TO ITS ESSENCE: I DO NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION NEXT YEAR OF HAVING TO CHOOSE BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT MY NATION AGAINST A REAL AND LOOMING DANGER AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, KEEPING THE ABM TREATY IN FORCE. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU, TOO, WILL FACE A TOUGH DECISION. YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA TO JOIN THE U.S. IN AMENDING -- OR AS I SEE IT, UPDATING AND STRENGTHENING -- THE ABM TREATY. SOME WILL TELL YOU, NO DOUBT, THAT ANY CHANGES WILL THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF YOUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT. I DISAGREE WITH THESE CHARACTERIZATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND I CAN AVOID SUCH EITHER/OR, LOSE/LOSE CHOICES. I BELIEVE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE.

THIS IS NOT A THEORETICAL PROPOSITION: IT IS A HIGHLY PRACTICAL AND TECHNICAL ONE. UNDER MADELEINE'S AND IGOR'S DIRECTION, STROBE TALBOTT AND YURI MAMEDOV HAVE CONDUCTED THREE ROUNDS OF FOCUSED AND DISCIPLINED EXCHANGES AND ARE PREPARING FOR A FOURTH. (I THINK WE NEED TO INSTRUCT OUR TEAMS TO INCREASE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR EXCHANGES CAN ALSO BE CHARACTERIZED AS "CONFIDENTIAL": TOO MUCH OF WHAT IS ALREADY A DIFFICULT DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY DISCUSSION IS REVERBERATING IN PUBLIC.) STROBE AND YURI HAVE INCLUDED IN THEIR MEETINGS HIGH-RANKING EXPERTS FROM OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. IN THAT DIALOGUE, MY COLLEAGUES HAVE LAID OUT FOR YOURS CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS THAT I BELIEVE, IF CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AND OBJECTIVELY, WILL ANSWER A NUMBER OF THE CONCERNS YOU RAISE IN YOUR LETTER, PARTICULARLY YOUR APPREHENSION THAT THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM I PROPOSE AND THE AMENDMENTS IT WOULD REQUIRE TO THE ABM TREATY WOULD NULLIFY KEY LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY.

LET ME CONCLUDE WITH A CONCRETE SUGGESTION. I HAVE TRIED, IN THIS REPLY TO YOUR LETTER, TO CLARIFY SOME UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND OVERARCHING OBJECTIVES THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE IN COMMON. LET US AIM FOR A TARGET DATE AT THE END OF JANUARY TO REITERATE

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THESE PRINCIPLES IN A JOINT STATEMENT. THAT WOULD GUIDE THE ACTIONS THAT YOU AND I AND OUR SUCCESSORS TAKE ON MATTERS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, INCLUDING IN OUR OWN EFFORTS LATER NEXT YEAR TO RECONCILE U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY WITH REGARD TO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, THE ABM TREATY AND THE START PROCESS.

SINCERELY,

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

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~~SECRET~~ 8043

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0815-M-3 (7.54)
KBH 12/13/2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Response to President Yeltsin on ABM Treaty

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin on ABM Treaty.

Background

President Yeltsin sent you a lengthy letter on ABM/NMD issues on October 30. His message enumerated various Russian concerns about our proposed gameplan, but did not break new ground. Still, we believe that the letter deliberately created an opening for us to lay out the basic elements of a joint U.S.-Russian document which could be issued early next year. That document would provide additional reassurance about U.S. intentions as well as our continued support for the principles of strategic stability and mutual deterrence.

Your message to Yeltsin at Tab A explains the substance and process guiding our overall approach. It also covers most aspects of the joint document described above. The letter asks Yeltsin to restrain the desire of part of the Russian national security team to turn this issue into a public showdown and sets the stage for your upcoming discussions in Istanbul.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/09/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ**
**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«30» октября 1999 г.
№ Пр-1417

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы доверительно и предельно откровенно поделиться с тобой соображениями относительно ситуации, складывающейся в настоящее время в нашем диалоге по вопросам СНВ и ПРО.

Сразу хочу подчеркнуть, что считаю это направление не только одним из ключевых в российско-американских отношениях, но и затрагивающим основные интересы безопасности всего международного сообщества. Убежден, что наращивать достигнутое за последние годы в области контроля над вооружениями - единственно разумный путь. Именно поэтому придаю особое значение принятому нами в Кёльне Совместному заявлению, внимательно слежу за его реализацией. Положение дел здесь, однако, оставляет двойственное впечатление.

С одной стороны, налицо определенный прогресс. С удовлетворением воспринял подтверждаемую тобой приверженность тем договоренностям, которые мы достигли ранее. Прежде всего имею в виду проявленную американской стороной готовность к продолжению работы над дальнейшими сокращениями стратегических наступательных вооружений, не исключаемую тобой

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г.Вашингтон

ВОС 28.10.99 г. АЛ

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возможность идти в этих сокращениях ниже согласованного в Хельсинки уровня ядерных боезарядов. Это было бы на пользу всем.

Вместе с тем, и мы с тобой об этом неоднократно заявляли, фундаментальное значение для дальнейших сокращений СНВ, для укрепления стратегической стабильности и международной безопасности имеет Договор по ПРО. Мы совместно зафиксировали в Кёльне наше намерение продолжать усилия по укреплению этого Договора, повышению его жизнеспособности и эффективности в будущем. В связи с этим меня глубоко обеспокоило подписание тобой закона, провозглашающего развертывание национальной системы противоракетной обороны территории страны политикой Соединенных Штатов, и тем более - продолжение реальных испытаний ее элементов. Развертывание такой системы, как ты знаешь, несовместимо с ключевым положением Договора по ПРО, составляющим его суть, - обязательством Сторон не развертывать системы ПРО территории своей страны и не создавать основу для такой обороны. Отказ от этого обязательства означал бы по существу принципиальную переориентацию Договора по ПРО, то есть Договор стал бы разрешать то, для запрещения чего был разработан и подписан. Это был бы отнюдь не укрепленный Договор по ПРО, а совсем другой договор. Возможные последствия такого изменения, скажу тебе откровенно, нам представляются опасными не только для дальнейших сокращений СНВ, но и всего разоруженческого процесса и международной стабильности в целом. А тебе, как и мне, думаю, небезразлично, каковы будут результаты наших общих усилий в этой области, какой запас прочности международной безопасности мы оставим нашим преемникам.

Мне уже приходилось слышать утверждения американской стороны, что развертывание национальной системы ПРО территории страны не поставит под угрозу способность России к стратегическому сдерживанию и что США, мол, готовы предоставить России соответствующие гарантии.

Билл, с самого начала процесса ограничения и сокращения стратегических наступательных вооружений тридцать лет назад этот процесс основывался на главной идее, заложенной в Договор по ПРО, а именно, что обе наши стороны остаются уязвимыми для СНВ другой стороны, поскольку только так можно обеспечить надежность сдерживания от ядерного нападения при уменьшающихся количествах

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наступательных вооружений. Альтернатива такому подходу - более высокие уровни СНВ и других ядерных вооружений и менее надежная и менее стабильная система стратегических взаимоотношений, при которой первый удар может при определенных обстоятельствах перестать быть абсолютно иррациональным. Все это особенно четко просматривается на пониженных уровнях СНВ, предусмотренных в Договоре СНВ-2, и особенно тех, о которых мы ведем разговор в рамках обсуждения СНВ-3. И никакие гарантии в такой ситуации не были бы способны устранить объективно присущую системе ПРО и возрастающую с ее развитием роль сильнейшего дестабилизирующего фактора в стратегическом уравнении. А планами США, насколько я информирован, предусматривается наращивание потенциала системы ПРО. Не лучшая, на мой взгляд, перспектива создавать такую ситуацию. Россия может оказаться поставленной в такое положение, когда она будет вынуждена принять соответствующие, не обязательно симметричные, меры по адекватному обеспечению собственной безопасности. Именно поэтому хочу повторить еще раз, что отказ от ключевых ограничений, установленных Договором по ПРО, несет с собой угрозу сорвать процесс ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений. Мы не хотели бы быть участниками этого.

Совершенно не убежден и в том, что развертывание ПРО будет тормозить процессы распространения технологий оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки. Думаю, результат, скорее, будет обратным - развертывание ПРО подхлестнет эти процессы и подтолкнет новые страны на путь овладения такими технологиями в условиях своей фактической незащищенности перед сверхвооруженностью США. Для укрепления режимов нераспространения возможности далеко не исчерпаны, и о некоторых из них шел разговор в Кёльне.

С другой стороны, я уверен, что, если мы будем твердо придерживаться Договора по ПРО и задействуем потенциал договоренностей по разграничению стратегической и нестратегической ПРО 1997 года, а также подключим усилия на глобальном уровне, включая сотрудничество в области нераспространения ракетных технологий и экспортного контроля, то, действуя совместно, мы сможем успешно противостоять тем угрозам, на которые американская сторона ссылается, выступая за создание НПРО США.

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Хотел бы, Билл, обратить твое внимание и на то, что такой сложный и капиталоемкий процесс, как создание и развертывание стратегической ПРО, имеет огромную собственную инерцию развития. Будучи запущенным, он рискует далеко перекрыть те границы, о которых сейчас идет речь в известных нам американских программах.

Понимаю, что ситуация вокруг Договора по ПРО сейчас чрезвычайно сложная. Из нее, однако, на мой взгляд, нужно найти выход с учетом всего того, о чем я говорил выше. И это зависит во многом, если не в первую очередь, от тебя.

Просил бы тебя, Билл, еще раз все взвесить, прежде чем предпринимать дальнейшие шаги в области стратегической ПРО. Разумеется, права вето на такую деятельность Соединенных Штатов ни у кого нет, равно как нет такого права и в отношении деятельности России в области обеспечения своей безопасности. Но полагаю, что не лучшим способом было бы встречать третье тысячелетие крушением того, что было создано в интересах мира совместными усилиями России и США. Надеюсь также, что американская сторона сможет пересмотреть свой нынешний подход к нашему проекту резолюции Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН по вопросу о сохранении и соблюдении Договора по ПРО, который полностью основывается на наших с тобой договоренностях.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

Unofficial translation

October 30, 1999

Dear Bill,

I would like to share with you in a confident and most candid manner some considerations regarding the situation currently emerging in our dialogue on START and ABM issues.

At the outset I would like to stress that I regard this not only as one of the key directions in the Russian-American relations but also as affecting basic security interests of the entire world community. I am convinced that the only reasonable way to proceed would be to build on what we have achieved over the recent years in the field of arms control. That is why I attach particular importance to the Joint Statement which we adopted in Cologne and I watch closely over its implementation. However, the state of affairs here leaves an ambivalent impression.

On the one hand, certain progress is obvious. I am satisfied to see that you have reaffirmed your commitment to the agreements which we have previously reached. What I have in mind in the first place is the readiness of the U.S. side to continue the work on further strategic arms reductions, the possibility of going in these reductions below the level of nuclear warheads agreed upon in Helsinki, which you do not rule out. This would be universally beneficial.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J.CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington D.C.

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At the same time, - and we have both repeatedly stated this - the ABM Treaty is of fundamental importance for further strategic offensive arms reductions, and for strategic stability and international security. We have jointly set in Cologne our intent to continue efforts to strengthen this Treaty, to increase its viability and effectiveness in the future. In this regard, I have been deeply concerned by your signing the bill which proclaimed the deployment of the national system of the missile defense of the territory of the country the policy of the United States, and even more by the continuation of the real tests of its elements. The deployment of such a system, as you know, is incompatible with the key provision of the ABM Treaty which makes its essence - the obligation of the two sides not to deploy the ABM defense system of the territory of the country and not to provide the base for such a defense. The renunciation of this obligation would in effect mean the ABM Treaty fundamental reorientation, that is the Treaty would begin to permit what it had been developed and signed to prohibit. It would be not a strengthened ABM Treaty, but an entirely different treaty. Possible consequences of such a change, quite frankly, appear to us dangerous not only for further reductions in strategic offensive arms, but for the entire disarmament process and for the international stability as a whole. I presume that you, as well as I, are not indifferent as to which are going to be the results of our joint efforts in this field and what reliability margin of international security we will leave to our successors.

I have previously heard the assertions of the U.S. side that the deployment of the NMD of the territory of the country will not jeopardize Russia's strategic deterrence capability and that the U.S. is allegedly prepared to provide appropriate guarantees to Russia.

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Bill, from the very beginning of the process of strategic offensive arms limitations and reductions thirty years ago, this process has been based on the main idea, incorporated in the ABM Treaty, namely, that our two sides remain vulnerable to the strategic offensive arms of the other side, since this is the only way one can ensure the reliability of deterrence from a nuclear attack as the numbers of offensive arms are being reduced. The alternative to such an approach would be higher levels of strategic offensive arms and other nuclear armaments and less reliable and less stable strategic relationship system where a first strike under certain circumstances might cease to be something absolutely irrational. This can be seen especially clearly at reduced levels of strategic offensive arms, provided for in START II, and in particular at those we talk about within the framework of our START III discussion. In such a situation no guarantees would be capable of removing the role of the worst destabilizing factor in the strategic equation which is objectively inherent in an ABM system and which increases as the latter gains in its development. And the U.S. plans - as far as I am informed - provide for the build-up in the ABM system potential. In my view, the creation of such an eventuality is not the best prospect. Russia may find itself placed in a position where it would be compelled to take appropriate, and not necessarily symmetrical, measures to ensure its own security in an adequate way. That is precisely why I want to reiterate that the renunciation of the key limitations established by the ABM Treaty, incurs the threat of frustrating the process of limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments. We would not like to be the participants in it.

Nor am I convinced at all that ABM deployments would impede the processes of proliferation of the technologies of weapons of mass destruction

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and of their delivery vehicles. I think the result would rather be the opposite: ABM deployments would whip these processes up and urge new countries to possess such technologies in the circumstances where they would be actually defenseless against the super-armed United States. The opportunities for the strengthening of non -proliferation regimes are far from being exhausted, and some of them were addressed in Cologne.

On the other hand, I am sure that if we firmly adhere to the ABM Treaty and activate the potential of the 1997 Agreements on the demarcation of strategic and non-strategic ABM defenses, and if we apply efforts on a global scale, including cooperation in the field of missile technology non-proliferation and export control, we, acting together, will be capable of countering the threats the U.S. side refers to when it advocates the development of the U.S. NMD.

Bill, I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that a complex and capital-consuming process such as the development and deployment of strategic ABM defenses has an enormous momentum of its own. Once set in motion, it runs the risk of far exceeding the limits which are presently addressed in the U.S. programs as they are known to us.

I understand that the situation around the ABM Treaty is now extremely complicated. In my view, however, a way out of it has to be found, taking into account all that I have said above. And all this largely - if not primarily - depends on you.

I would request that you, Bill, weigh everything up once again before taking further steps in the field of strategic ABM defenses. Of course, no one has the right to veto such activities of the United States, just as there is no right of veto with respect to Russia's activities in ensuring its security. But I believe

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that it would not be the best thing to do to enter the Third Millennium having destroyed what has been created in the interest of the world through joint Russian and U.S. efforts. I also hope that the U.S. side will be able to reconsider its present attitude to our draft resolution of the UN General Assembly on the question of preserving and complying with the ABM Treaty which is fully based on what we have agreed upon with you.

Respectfully,

B.Yeltsin

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# ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

**РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

«30» октября 1999 г.

№ Пр-1417

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,

Хотел бы доверительно и предельно откровенно поделиться с тобой соображениями относительно ситуации, складывающейся в настоящее время в нашем диалоге по вопросам СНВ и ПРО.

Сразу хочу подчеркнуть, что считаю это направление не только одним из ключевых в российско-американских отношениях, но и затрагивающим основные интересы безопасности всего международного сообщества. Убежден, что наращивать достигнутое за последние годы в области контроля над вооружениями - единственно разумный путь. Именно поэтому придаю особое значение принятому нами в Кёльне Совместному заявлению, внимательно слежу за его реализацией. Положение дел здесь, однако, оставляет двойственное впечатление.

С одной стороны, налицо определенный прогресс. С удовлетворением воспринял подтверждаемую тобой приверженность тем договоренностям, которые мы достигли ранее. Прежде всего имею в виду проявленную американской стороной готовность к продолжению работы над дальнейшими сокращениями стратегических наступательных вооружений, не исключаемую тобой

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возможность идти в этих сокращениях ниже согласованного в Хельсинки уровня ядерных боезарядов. Это было бы на пользу всем.

Вместе с тем, и мы с тобой об этом неоднократно заявляли, фундаментальное значение для дальнейших сокращений СНВ, для укрепления стратегической стабильности и международной безопасности имеет Договор по ПРО. Мы совместно зафиксировали в Кёльне наше намерение продолжать усилия по укреплению этого Договора, повышению его жизнеспособности и эффективности в будущем. В связи с этим меня глубоко обеспокоило подписание тобой закона, провозглашающего развертывание национальной системы противоракетной обороны территории страны политикой Соединенных Штатов, и тем более - продолжение реальных испытаний ее элементов. Развертывание такой системы, как ты знаешь, несовместимо с ключевым положением Договора по ПРО, составляющим его суть, - обязательством Сторон не развертывать системы ПРО территории своей страны и не создавать основу для такой обороны. Отказ от этого обязательства означал бы по существу принципиальную переориентацию Договора по ПРО, то есть Договор стал бы разрешать то, для запрещения чего был разработан и подписан. Это был бы отнюдь не укрепленный Договор по ПРО, а совсем другой договор. Возможные последствия такого изменения, скажу тебе откровенно, нам представляются опасными не только для дальнейших сокращений СНВ, но и всего разоруженческого процесса и международной стабильности в целом. А тебе, как и мне, думаю, небезразлично, каковы будут результаты наших общих усилий в этой области, какой запас прочности международной безопасности мы оставим нашим преемникам.

Мне уже приходилось слышать утверждения американской стороны, что развертывание национальной системы ПРО территории страны не поставит под угрозу способность России к стратегическому сдерживанию и что США, мол, готовы предоставить России соответствующие гарантии.

Билл, с самого начала процесса ограничения и сокращения стратегических наступательных вооружений тридцать лет назад этот процесс основывался на главной идее, заложенной в Договор по ПРО, а именно, что обе наши стороны остаются уязвимыми для СНВ другой стороны, поскольку только так можно обеспечить надежность сдерживания от ядерного нападения при уменьшающихся количествах

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наступательных вооружений. Альтернатива такому подходу - более высокие уровни СНВ и других ядерных вооружений и менее надежная и менее стабильная система стратегических взаимоотношений, при которой первый удар может при определенных обстоятельствах перестать быть абсолютно иррациональным. Все это особенно четко просматривается на пониженных уровнях СНВ, предусмотренных в Договоре СНВ-2, и особенно тех, о которых мы ведем разговор в рамках обсуждения СНВ-3. И никакие гарантии в такой ситуации не были бы способны устранить объективно присущую системе ПРО и возрастающую с ее развитием роль сильнейшего дестабилизирующего фактора в стратегическом уравнении. А планами США, насколько я информирован, предусматривается наращивание потенциала системы ПРО. Не лучшая, на мой взгляд, перспектива создавать такую ситуацию. Россия может оказаться поставленной в такое положение, когда она будет вынуждена принять соответствующие, не обязательно симметричные, меры по адекватному обеспечению собственной безопасности. Именно поэтому хочу повторить еще раз, что отказ от ключевых ограничений, установленных Договором по ПРО, несет с собой угрозу сорвать процесс ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений. Мы не хотели бы быть участниками этого.

Совершенно не убежден и в том, что развертывание ПРО будет тормозить процессы распространения технологий оружия массового уничтожения и средств его доставки. Думаю, результат, скорее, будет обратным - развертывание ПРО подхлестнет эти процессы и подтолкнет новые страны на путь овладения такими технологиями в условиях своей фактической незащищенности перед сверхвооруженностью США. Для укрепления режимов нераспространения возможности далеко не исчерпаны, и о некоторых из них шел разговор в Кёльне.

С другой стороны, я уверен, что, если мы будем твердо придерживаться Договора по ПРО и задействуем потенциал договоренностей по разграничению стратегической и нестратегической ПРО 1997 года, а также подключим усилия на глобальном уровне, включая сотрудничество в области нераспространения ракетных технологий и экспортного контроля, то, действуя совместно, мы сможем успешно противостоять тем угрозам, на которые американская сторона ссылается, выступая за создание НПРО США.

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Хотел бы, Билл, обратить твое внимание и на то, что такой сложный и капиталоемкий процесс, как создание и развертывание стратегической ПРО, имеет огромную собственную инерцию развития. Будучи запущенным, он рискует далеко перекрыть те границы, о которых сейчас идет речь в известных нам американских программах.

Понимаю, что ситуация вокруг Договора по ПРО сейчас чрезвычайно сложная. Из нее, однако, на мой взгляд, нужно найти выход с учетом всего того, о чем я говорил выше. И это зависит во многом, если не в первую очередь, от тебя.

Просил бы тебя, Билл, еще раз все взвесить, прежде чем предпринимать дальнейшие шаги в области стратегической ПРО. Разумеется, права вето на такую деятельность Соединенных Штатов ни у кого нет, равно как нет такого права и в отношении деятельности России в области обеспечения своей безопасности. Но полагаю, что не лучшим способом было бы встречать третье тысячелетие крушением того, что было создано в интересах мира совместными усилиями России и США. Надеюсь также, что американская сторона сможет пересмотреть свой нынешний подход к нашему проекту резолюции Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН по вопросу о сохранении и соблюдении Договора по ПРО, который полностью основывается на наших с тобой договоренностях.

С уважением,

Б.Ельцин

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