Case Number: 2016-0114-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Russia & Ukraine, June 3-5, 2000
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Original OA/ID Number: 3632

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Moscow and Kiev, June 3-5, 2000 (6 pages) Partial release - KBH 11/20/2023	05/27/2000	P1/b(1)
~~002. memo~~	~~Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to President William J. Clinton re: Your June 5-6 Trip to Kiev, Ukraine (2 pages)~~	~~05/23/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~003. talking points~~	~~Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (4 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~004. talking points~~	~~Summary Points to be Made for Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~005. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (5 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
006. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	05/19/2000	P1/b(1)
~~007. talking points~~	~~First Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Arms Control and Security Issues (2 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~008. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for First Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Arms Control and Security Issues (2 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~009. talking points~~	~~Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (6 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~010. talking points~~	~~Summary Points for Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Economics (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~011. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (7 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023

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National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 3632

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2016-0114-M
kh1810

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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~~012. talking points~~	~~Farewell Call with Russian President Vladimir Putin (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~013. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for Farwell Call with Russian President Vladimir Putin (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~014. talking points~~	~~Courtesy Call with Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~015. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for Courtesy Call with Former Russian President Yeltsin (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~016. paper~~	~~Meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma (3 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~017. talking points~~	~~Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma (2 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~018. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for Meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma (4 pages)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
019. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	04/27/2000	P1/b(1)

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 5/19/2021
2016-0114-M

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO RUSSIA & UKRAINE

June 3 - 5, 2000

Records Management

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The President's Trip to Russia & Ukraine, June 3 - 5, 2000

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Divider Title: **SCOPE MEMORANDUM**

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PER E. O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 27, 2000

2016-0114-M [1.01]
KBH 5/14/2021

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Moscow and Kiev, June 3-5, 2000

I. RUSSIA

Your Moscow trip has five major objectives:

- To develop a forward-looking agenda with Putin (whose views on major issues remain at a formative stage), based on a common appreciation of the importance of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship;
- To survey Putin's goals and priorities on both domestic and foreign policy for this year and the remainder of his four-year term;
- To chart a path forward on tough arms control, nonproliferation, and commercial space launch issues;
- To signal our willingness to support an ambitious, Russian-owned economic reform program and to shape common expectations on the best response from the international community; and
- To lay markers on the paramount importance of Russia's democratic reforms, human rights, and press freedoms.

Opportunities and Risks. Putin sees his main objective as completing the structural transformation of Russia after several years of drift at the end of the Yeltsin era. Yeltsin's legacy puts him in an interesting position. On the one hand, there is unprecedented consensus inside Russia about what needs to be done, especially on the economic front, and the economy's recent revival appears to give Putin steerage that has been lacking for virtually the entire transition phase to date. On the other,

there is a real question whether systemic changes can be made without damaging hard-won democratic freedoms and over the objections of various vested interests (governors, oligarchs, natural monopolies). Our overarching goal is to encourage Putin (and, by extension, Russia) to stay on a Western-oriented course by getting Putin to define Russia's national interests and his own agenda in terms that mesh with our own.

Your ability to secure Putin's support for the win-win philosophy that underlies our approach toward the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship will be central to summit outcomes on arms control and other issues. Putin needs to understand that U.S.-Russian cooperation, on issues ranging from nonproliferation to regional conflicts, has a fundamental impact on the international security environment and that we have a common stake in Russia's success. Your meetings with Putin should also feature a frank assessment of the progress Russia has already made, the importance of staying the course on democratic and economic reforms, the main obstacles remaining (e.g., Chechnya, structural reform, crime and corruption), and the specific policies and steps required to overcome them.

Handling Putin. On the personal and psychological level, we need to be careful not to assume that we can take the same tack with Putin that you used so successfully with Yeltsin. There is a danger that Putin's collegial, friendly tone will mask areas of major disagreement. Putin may be tempted to tread water in our relationship until the next U.S. administration. The next few months will determine whether he can consolidate his authority, assemble a strong team, and craft a political strategy that advances his vision. So far, Putin's style suggests that he is more of a political blowtorch than a conciliator. It is unclear which approach will serve him better over the long haul, given Russia's tough political terrain.

Murky Picture on Democracy. Russia's fragile democracy and civil society are still awaiting clear signs that Putin's vision of a strong state is compatible with individual liberties, a vibrant civil society, and strong independent media. The recent heavy handed raid on the headquarters of media magnate Vladimir Gusinskiy has only fed these apprehensions. This very real uncertainty about Putin's true colors only adds to the importance of your articulating to Putin, quietly yet honestly, the central importance of democracy, economic liberalism, human rights, religious, and press freedoms, etc., for Russia's future and for our strategy of engagement and support for Russia's international integration.

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001. memo	Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Moscow and Kiev, June 3-5, 2000 [partial] (2 pages)	05/27/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0114-M
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New Government, Familiar Faces. Putin's pick for Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, was noncontroversial, and most of the government has been kept in place. This arrangement allows Putin to avoid having to fight battles early; backroom negotiations with various vested interests over cabinet positions can be particularly ugly. The current arrangement suggests that the Kasyanov government could be temporary and that the real shake-up will be postponed until later this year.

With little advanced warning, Putin has embarked on an ambitious series of political reforms to strengthen Moscow's control over the provinces and notoriously independent regional governors. He has convinced the Duma to extend its session until July to review the legislative proposals. Leaving aside the merits of these moves, the Putin team's body language implies that these efforts will take precedence over a long-overdue push on structural economic reforms.

A New Sense of Ownership on Economics. An encouraging sign from Putin's Russia is clear desire for ownership of its economic policies. The Putin team of market-oriented ministers and advisors is quite unified and has drafted its own program of "bold" reform initiatives, focused on the investment climate, tax reform, and protections for property rights. But designing and implementing are two different things. The real question is whether Putin seizes the unique opportunity created by the current economic upturn and his "honeymoon" with the Duma, or lets the opportunity slip away. Putin and his team seem open in principle to making WTO accession (albeit on discounted terms) a priority and using it as a tool to drive the reform process. Getting Putin to buy into a serious WTO process is key.

It is noteworthy that the Russians are not asking for much in the way of outside help, except for a Paris Club write-down of a significant share of their Soviet-era debts. They would like your support in getting a positive message out to investors. The Russians are trying to negotiate a new IMF program for Board approval as early as this summer, which we would support. An IMF program would set the stage for limited debt rescheduling (but not a write-down) of Soviet-era obligations, which is the most relief Russia would reasonably qualify for at this stage on the basis of need and performance.

Chechnya Wildcard. With the advent of warmer weather, the pace of hit-and-run attacks on Russian positions has increased significantly, E.O. 12958 1.4(c)

E.O. 12958 1.4(c) It is essential that you highlight the problems Chechnya is causing for his overall agenda and international standing and the need to tackle allegations of human rights violations in a meaningful way. The advice you gave him in Auckland a year ago has proven right: there is no military solution; seek a political one. Putin will inevitably respond with familiar refrains about how Russia is defending European civilization from a radical Islamic onslaught while presenting overdrawn connections between Chechnya and Kosovo, Afghanistan, and even insurgents in the Philippines.

The Schedule

Your one plus one dinner with Putin will set the tone for the rest of the summit. Rather than delve immediately into the details of arms control or economics, your goal should be to explain our overall approach to the strategic relationship and to draw Putin out on his goals for this year and the balance of his term in office. On Sunday morning, you will have some OTR time to interact with Muscovites before plunging into the summit meetings. The first meeting will focus on arms control and other security issues. At the end, we recommend that you have a short tete-a-tete with Putin on sensitive regional issues (e.g., N-K and the Balkans). The next meeting will focus on economics and trade and investment issues, followed by a signing ceremony, press conference, and radio call-in on an independent station. The next day you will address the Russian Duma, followed by a brief courtesy call on Yeltsin in the Kremlin, a wrap-up discussion with Putin, followed by a short visit to our Embassy.

II. UKRAINE

Critical Turning Point. Your visit to Ukraine comes at a critical stage in that country's transition. Kuchma's reelection over a Communist Party rival, the appointment of Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister, and early progress on domestic reforms have at least marginally enhanced Ukraine's forward momentum and European orientation. Since your meeting with Kuchma last December, he and Yushchenko have taken important steps, including downsizing and restructuring the government, passing a strong budget, and laying the groundwork for privatization of land and strategic enterprises in the energy sector. As reforms accelerated, vested interests began to dig in their heels. As a result, dozens of important reform initiatives have become frozen just prior to completion.

For the first time since independence, a case can be made that Ukraine's glass is half full. Going forward, an economically recovering Ukraine that is more discernibly on a path toward Europe would have important implications for the region. The key now is implementing the reforms that have been prepared. Near-term success will require Kuchma, Yushchenko, and the Rada to cooperate on implementing the budget, privatization, and reform of the agricultural and energy sectors.

Your visit has two key themes. First, to underscore our sense that Ukraine's success and European integration is possible and that we -- and the Europeans -- will respond to concrete results from reform. This is the message you have delivered to such good effect since December. Second, you will want to stress the virtue -- indeed the necessity -- of building political consensus around fundamental principles of market and democratic reform.

Each leg of the Kuchma-Yushchenko-Rada triangle is beset by its own important weaknesses. Kuchma is not a natural reformer. He lacks a clear understanding of Western ideas, still feels somewhat beholden to the oligarchs, and maintains a very short time horizon. Yushchenko is charismatic and reform-oriented, but is a weak manager. The Rada majority is an uncertain amalgam of disparate factions held together by Kuchma who has the final say over how key leaders vote. Your most important message in this context will be to encourage Kuchma to give stronger, more proactive support to Yushchenko's efforts, which are fundamentally in the right direction.

International Policy. Ukrainian foreign policy under Kuchma continues to be a net plus for United States' interests. Ukraine maintains a strong record on nonproliferation which has won it agreement from us to lift commercial space launch quotas. Kiev has been cooperative on the UN Security Council. Ukraine was relatively helpful during the Kosovo conflict -- Kuchma refrained from criticizing us openly and came to NATO's 50th anniversary last April despite strong pressure from Moscow -- and is with us in KFOR. Kiev skillfully manages its relations with Moscow and continues to build on its important relationships with Poland, the Balts, and other neighbors.

Kiev's success with Western Europe has been much more limited, primarily because its relationship with the EU continues to be a dialogue of the deaf. Ukraine wants a "political signal" concerning the possibility of eventual membership from the EU,

arguing that such a signal would be give a moral and psychological boost to the government and justify painful reforms to the people. Brussels argues that without concrete results, it makes no sense to discuss even associate membership (remember Turkey!). Kiev's relationship with NATO is more positive, due to Kiev's strong efforts and NATO's willingness to engage, and helps galvanize Ukrainian support for democratic reform and partnership with Europe and North America.

Influencing Change. Since your meeting with Kuchma in December, we have taken a more direct and firm stance with Kiev; we have insisted on seeing results from reform, broached sensitive issues such as high-level corruption, and asked for specific deliverables. Remarkably, on virtually every count, Ukraine has delivered. Kuchma appointed Yushchenko and accelerated reforms, solved a problem with the Jewish Agency you raised with him, and **agreed to a specific date for Chornobyl closure after you requested one. We expect five factories which pirate compact discs to be shut by the time you arrive. Kuchma appears to use the political cover we extend to exert pressure on his own system.** In your meetings with Kuchma, you will want to press him firmly on issues such as energy sector privatization and budget implementation, where near-term action is key to longer-term success.

The Schedule

Your first meeting will be a restricted session with Kuchma, where you will congratulate Kuchma for good progress on key issues such as Chornobyl, nonproliferation, and cooperation in the Balkans. You will also encourage him to be a more active supporter of accelerating reforms. Following this meeting both sides will be joined by cabinet-level officials for a broader discussion of economic reform and the politics of reform. You and Kuchma will then make a joint statement in which he announces December 15 as the date for the closure of Chornobyl and you announce our $78 million pledge for the sarcophagus. You will also announce our lifting of Ukraine's commercial satellite launch quota. You then travel by car to St. Michael's Square where you give your crowd speech. Upon conclusion of your crowd speech, you do a 10-minute meet and greet with a group of Ukraine's Next Generation leaders whom the Embassy has assembled and positioned near the stage. You then depart by motorcade to Air Force One.

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Divider Title: **MEMORANDA FROM STATE**

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.03)
KBH 5/14/2021

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS~~
DECL: 05/18/2010

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Strobe Talbott, Acting ST

SUBJECT: Your June 5-6 Trip to Kiev, Ukraine

Your trip to Kiev conveys a simple, powerful message to Ukraine and other former Soviet states: we will help them realize a future within the Euro-Atlantic community if they implement the policies needed to advance their free market and democratic transformations and make Euro-Atlantic integration possible. Ukraine's transformation is its responsibility, not ours. But we will help and, critically, we will support Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. For Kuchma, other official Ukrainians whom you will meet and, especially, the Ukrainian people whom you will address, this message is an essential complement to the Moscow visit. It telegraphs to all audiences that our policy in this region is not centered on Russia alone but is directed at the entire post-Communist world, no part of which is more important than Ukraine.

This may be your final trip to Eastern Europe and it conceptually resembles your first trip to Central and Eastern Europe in January 1994. Then as now, post-communist countries you addressed were in an uncertain tumultuous stage of their transformation; then as now, they looked to Moscow with concern and the West with uncertainty. You sent a message of hope tempered with recognition of their responsibilities and challenges, and the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians met the challenge. The message now is harder. Reforms in Ukraine and elsewhere are more difficult: public apathy is greater and democracy weaker and more flawed, the aspirations of national leaders are less certain. Yet our ability to send this message is stronger: while the challenge is great, we can argue with greater confidence that free-market democracy can work in a post-communist context. And American credibility in the region -- yours especially -- is now far better established.

Classified by Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 (b) (d)

reforms. Kuchma, while ambivalent about the free market, also understands that years of inaction have brought Ukraine poverty and misery. Last December, partly at our urging, he appointed Ukraine's first credibly reformist Prime Minister, Viktor Yushchenko, whom you met two weeks ago. The communists and other hard left elements are at a low point in the Parliament, having finally been deprived by Kuchma of their veto right over all major policy initiatives. A pro-government majority was formed earlier this year that has endorsed the government's reform agenda.

Yushchenko got off to a strong start on structural reforms, spearheading passage of a realistic and transparent budget, initiating sweeping reform of the bureaucracy, and successfully restructuring $2.6 billion in private sector debt. However, allegations that the central bank mismanaged IMF funds in 1996-98 (then headed by Yushchenko) have derailed renewal of the Fund program, weakened Yushchenko politically, and slowed reform. Ukraine's financial situation remains precarious. Yushchenko has been under fire from the oligarchs and their media outlets for failing to deliver renewed IFI lending, and, disingenuously given his ties to the oligarchs, from Kuchma for failing to move faster on reforms. But Yushchenko as Prime Minister lacks strong formal powers. What the Ukrainians need and Kuchma must provide is the determined political leadership to accelerate reforms and achieve a "critical mass" of free market momentum to break the cycle of economic decay and drift that endangers Ukraine's future. Kuchma needs to hear that he has a historic opportunity to leave as his legacy a stable, prosperous, independent, democratic and above all "European" Ukraine, and that his unstinting support for the Yushchenko government's agenda of reforms is key.

We hope Kuchma has heard this message and that you will be able to comment favorably on Ukraine's reform steps, perhaps offering qualified support for resumed IFI lending in the near future (needed to keep Ukraine solvent this summer). Beyond this, we have developed a strong set of deliverables for the trip --most dramatically including a date on Chornobyl closure (which will be applauded worldwide but most especially in Western Europe), a likely breakthrough on Ukrainian space launch quotas, hoped for progress on IPR, a new micro-lending program for Ukraine and more. These and the warm official (and popular) welcome you will almost certainly receive will make this trip an immediate success. Its long-term implication for our interests will depend on the impact of our message of hope, commitment and responsibility.

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Divider Title: **DINNER W/PRESIDENT PUTIN**

SCENESETTER: THE KREMLIN

The Moscow Kremlin (fortress) is the ancient residence of the rulers of Moscow. It is surrounded by brick walls and towers and, with neighboring Red Square, forms the heart of Moscow. The first cathedrals and residences were built in the 14th century. Cathedral Square is the focal point, surrounded by gold-domed churches. The Kremlin also contains several palaces, official administration buildings, a theater where Communist Party Congresses were previously held, and a small garden that overlooks the river.

The Great Kremlin Palace was built in the 15th century, attaining its present-day shape in the mid-19th century, and was the residence of the Imperial family. It is a good example of the Russian palace décor of the period, with lavish interiors and furnishings, and was expensively renovated in recent years. This is the primary location for large state events and ceremonies, such as Putin's inauguration.

The former Senate building, visible from Red Square, has been the official residence of the Russian president since 1991. It was built in the classical style under orders of Catherine II in the late 18th century; it was renovated after 1991 to restore its classical decor. Smaller state events and meetings are often held in the residence.

The Kremlin Wall bordering Aleksandrov Gardens houses the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the memorials to the Hero Cities of World War II. Aleksandrov Gardens borders Manezh Square, which includes an underground mall and outdoor sculptures and fountains.

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2016-0114-M (1.04)
KBH 5/14/2021

DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Develop rapport with Putin, sketch goals for summit discussions and outcomes. Highlight win-win philosophy that lies at center of our approach toward Russia.**

- **Engage Putin on his overall goals for Russia, especially on the economic front. Seek agreement on common objectives for U.S.-Russian strategic relationship over next eight months and remainder of Putin's four-year term.**

- **Lay markers on fundamental importance of safeguarding Russia's democratic reforms and hard-won freedoms (including independent mass media). Draw connection between Chechnya and Putin's agenda and desire for international integration.**

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Putin will want to convey that he is a worthy, self-assured successor to Yeltsin and that he is neither a pushover nor fundamentally opposed to equitable U.S.-Russian cooperation. Putin's intelligence background suggests that he will try to turn on the charm. Blair discovered that Putin is more likely to be candid in intimate settings, but you should bear in mind that Putin has a tendency to rely on pre-scripted comments on sensitive issues. Your overall goal for the dinner should be to get him to talk more freely and to get his buy-in for our win-win philosophy for U.S.-Russian relations.

By focusing on the big picture and the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, Putin will get a better understanding of your view of our common stake in making the relationship work. Ideally, he will come away from the meeting with some measure of reassurance that we are not trying to take advantage of Russia's weakness and diminished international standing. That would open the door to a more productive discussion of the tough tradeoffs necessary for progress on the strategic arms control package.

Putin is a master at playing to what he thinks interlocutors want to hear and at disguising his own true views. You should encourage Putin to catalogue his goals for Russia and the U.S.-Russian relationship and draw him out beyond the generalities. One way to do so will be to address the politics behind major

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issues, including the vested interests opposed to Putin's economic program.

You should be candid with Putin about the skepticism of the international community, given uncertainties about his commitment to democracy and liberal values. You should point to various tests that he faces in the near future (e.g., protecting press freedoms) and make clear that Chechnya could overshadow both his global and economic agendas.

AGENDA

Setting the Tone. Two key elements of your success with Yeltsin were to show appreciation of the tough policy road he was traveling and your ability to convince him that if Russia stayed on a reform course, we would move mountains to support him. Building a similar comfort level with Putin will be a lot harder, and he will be on the lookout for hints that we're patronizing or second-guessing him. He almost certainly believes that the West took advantage of Yeltsin to secure unilateral advantage, and he may be tempted to tread water until the next U.S. Administration. This could be a serious lost opportunity for him. The best way to overcome Putin's reticence is to make a strong opening presentation by noting the revival of the Russian economy and depicting the goals and priorities that you have pursued in support of Russian reform -- and the impact on the entire global security environment.

By putting things in this context and sketching our overall goals for Russia's transformation, Putin may begin to understand that the relationship (and, by extension, his own fortunes) can not flourish if they are rooted in purely zero-sum terms. Achieving that kind of intellectual breakthrough will be key to any progress we can achieve in more detailed discussions on arms control, regional, and economic issues on Sunday.

Benefits of New Strategic Relationship. By dint of personal experience and his own biography, Putin will appreciate just how much has changed in U.S.-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War. He was personally involved in reasserting civilian control over the military in the aftermath of the dash to Pristina last summer and probably appreciates just how much was at risk in our dispute over Kosovo. As a self-described "product of the Soviet propaganda system," he understands that qualitative changes in our relationship have enabled us to move beyond Cold War-era competition and a near-total fixation on the strategic nuclear balance. You should talk about the stakes for

U.S. and international security of Russia's successful transformation and international integration and why you have made these issues the centerpiece of the Administration's foreign policy.

Putin's Priorities -- and Blind Spots. You should draw Putin out on where he intends to take Russia during his initial period in office and beyond. Putin has shown good instincts so far on the economy, but faces significant resistance from vested interests and oligarchs. His team has indicated that they want to use his "honeymoon" period to alter Russia's political structures, hence the recent flurry of legislative proposals on strengthening the so-called "vertical of executive authority." Putin probably will play up the significance of steps to reconfigure the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, and to strengthen -- on paper at least -- his control over the governors.

You should ask Putin to review his political and economic priorities through the end of the year and the main stumbling blocks he anticipates. In response, Putin is likely to delve into standard descriptions of goals such as building a society where the law reigns supreme (i.e., a "dictatorship of law") and a stronger, rationalized set of state institutions that are not beholden to the narrow individual interests of Russia's notorious oligarchs and regional barons.

Putin has only just started to flesh out these concepts in practical policy terms, making it hard to judge what he really has in mind. A much-anticipated state of the nation address in June inevitably will yield clues, but two fundamental questions stand out. Will strengthening the role of the state actually enable him to improve people's lives without trammeling individual freedoms and will more rigid implementation of laws be premised on a level playing field and equal treatment? As Alan Greenspan has pointed out to the Russians, unwieldy organizational structures and statist tendencies are a big source of their problems. Unless the role of government is reduced, it will be hard for any Russian leader to reduce opportunities for corruption, mismanagement and abuse. In a similar vein, the Kremlin's spin regarding the raid on Gusinskiy's headquarters perceived by all to be an effort to intimidate his independent TV station NTV, fostered deep misgivings about Russia's direction and political pressure on the media and selective prosecution reminiscent of the Babitskiy affair.

Taking Democratic Reforms and Human Rights Seriously. This discussion of Putin's priorities will be a good point of departure for reminding Putin about the central importance of protecting democratic reforms and human rights. Putin is no slouch when it comes to expressing support for both concepts, but needs to hear directly from you that gains in these areas have created the foundation for our engagement with Russia. If they are threatened, so too is the basis for much of what Putin hopes to accomplish.

You should portray the Chechnya conflict in this context, noting the continuing cost to Russians and the impact on Russia's international standing. To head off Putin's standard defense of Russian behavior in Chechnya, you should argue that a Pyrrhic victory may be the best that Russia can hope for and that we learned in Vietnam the high cost of such an approach.

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SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of steps you take. Hope to hear about your strategy for moving Russia forward, priorities for next eight months, four years. Five core objectives for summit:

  - (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.

  - (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

  - (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as space launch.

  - (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus). See opportunities for win-win outcomes.

  - (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

- Respect for rule of law, transparency/predictability, fight against corruption central to how investors will view Russia.

- Important not to endanger elements of open society that establish Russia's standing in the world (e.g., freedom of religion, stronger democratic institutions, respect for individuals' rights, and the environment).

- Concerned about Russia's independent media, including the Babitsky case. Free media central to success of reforms.

- On Chechnya, know we disagree, but have told you enduring military solution not possible. Need genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Introduction

- Pleased to be back in Moscow at this crucial time for you and Russia. I was determined to reaffirm my support.

- Believe summit is a chance to make fresh start, take our cooperation to a new level. Relationship with Russia central to global peace and my overall agenda.

- Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of steps you take. See summit as opportunity to chart agenda that will carry us through Okinawa, UN Millennium Summit, and APEC.

- Also want to strengthen foundation for U.S.-Russian relations for next Administration. Understand Russia faces enormous challenges, but put highest premium on your success.

- Yeltsin brought freedom to Russia. Main challenge is to bring about stability, prosperity without endangering liberty. Want to learn more about your strategy for moving Russia forward and your priorities. Know you're not promising miracles.

Goals for Moscow Summit

- See five core objectives to come out of this summit:

  - (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.

  - (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

  - (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as commercial space launch.

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- (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus) where there are opportunities for win-win outcomes from working together.

- (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

Benefits of Strategic Relationship

- First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

- Have witnessed dramatic changes in relationship since 1992 in nearly all spheres. During Cold War era of rivalry and competition, main issue was strategic balance because we were adversaries.

- Situation now is totally different. Need to work hard to strengthen strategic equilibrium, increase confidence. Want to have more focused discussion on arms control issues tomorrow.

- Pleased that we're working together on new century's challenges -- economic cooperation and integration, ethnic conflict, terrorism, health, and transnational crime -- issues that really affect health of societies.

- For past seven and half years, one unifying concept behind my approach on all issues on our agenda -- to maximize possibility for win-win outcomes. Cooperation must provide tangible benefits for both sides to be sustainable.

- Should talk tonight about how we achieve greater sense of common purpose on security issues, Russia's international integration, regional security issues.

- Know that both of us are not entirely satisfied with ups and downs in relationship along the way. Important to remember, as Boris told me in Cologne, that we faced toughest test of our relations over Kosovo and passed.

- Dispute over Kosovo was sobering experience for both of us. Know you played key role in defusing conflict. Russian troop contribution still very reassuring to Serbs. Should talk candidly about how we handle these kinds of challenges in future.

Putin's Agenda

- You've had strong political and economic success. Russian economy has been enjoying rebound since 1998 financial crisis. Want to hear your plans to use this period to accelerate economic reforms, strengthen Russian democracy.

- Russia, like all countries, will need to grapple with range of forces shaping new international economic environment. We should talk a bit about how to be competitive in new global economy, how to strengthen human capital, technological edge.

- We live in an era of globalizing markets in which investors choose countries and not the other way around, but both benefit. Key is to improve investment climate.

- Respect for rule of law, transparency, and predictability central to how investors will view Russia. So, too, is your fight against corruption.

- Have seen corruption undermine growth and development in countries around the world. You have a unique chance early on to set standards.

Democracy, Chechnya

- You've emphasized importance of strengthening state institutions and connected that task to promoting Russia's national vitality.

- Agree that fostering Russia's internal strength will have major impact on success of reform effort and Russia's international role.

- Key question is whether that effort can be done without sacrificing the elements of a free society that establish Russia's standing in the world, enhanced respect for rule of law, freedom of religion, stronger democratic institutions, balanced relationship between center and regions, respect for individuals' rights, and the environment.

- Have seen disturbing developments recently about Russia's independent media, including the Babitsky case. Need to emphasize how important free media are to overall success of democratic reform effort.

- Same applies to Chechnya. I know we disagree on this but I said to you in Auckland last year I did not think there was an enduring military solution, and I still think that's true.

- Hope you will move from military to political and civilian phase.

- Nothing will help Russia's image more than genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

If raised: IFI's and External Debt

- International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing less important than in past, while World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

- United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a program that we hope could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

If raised: Russia's Soviet-era debt

- New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations.

- To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

- *If needed:* London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but not precedent for Paris Club.

If raised: WTO

- Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating Russia's accession to WTO and solid commercial terms, will speed your integration with global trading system, facilitating investment and economic growth.

- Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious about reform, integration. Prepared to engage actively with you.

If raised: EXIM Projects

- It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward. Understand progress is now being made on other EX-IM projects.

If raised: NATO Enlargement

- Share common interest in building secure, integrated Europe. Keeping door open to new members key element of building stability. Not pressing countries to join, but Allies will review enlargement process in 2002.

- Partners are asking to join, pursuing sovereign right to choose means to ensure own security. Not going to set arbitrary limits on enlargement process or rule out certain aspirants. Such moves will only add to sense of insecurity.

If raised: Kosovo/KFOR

- Recent attacks on Russian troops intolerable. We're pressing Kosovar Albanians privately to cool it. Your role in KFOR very important, very reassuring to Serbian population.

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FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **ARMS CONTROL ISSUES TO BE PROVIDED**
- **On nonproliferation, express appreciation for important summit plutonium initiatives. Draw connection between aggressive Russian efforts to curtail missile cooperation with Iran and progress on lifting space launch quota.**

CONTEXT OF MEETING

On nonproliferation and threat reduction, you should point to likely summit accomplishments as important examples of our cooperation on nonproliferation. The ***military plutonium*** disposition agreement will dispose of 34 tons each of weapons-origin plutonium. A possible ***civil plutonium*** initiative would require Russia to declare a moratorium on reprocessing and stop certain sensitive cooperation with Iran, in exchange for U.S. assistance on spent fuel storage and reactor R&D.

On the Iran missile problem, we are considering a decision to eliminate the commercial space launch quota in exchange for Russian actions to implement vigorously export controls and curtail missile assistance to Iran. The U.S.-Russian Commercial Space Launch Agreement, due to expire on December 31, 2000, established a quota (currently 20) for Russian launches of U.S.-built satellites. We have used this agreement as leverage over Russian performance on the Iran problem. Overplaying the leverage afforded by the quota could threaten Lockheed Martin's commercial space launch joint venture with the Russians as well as cooperation on the development of DoD's principal heavy lift space launch vehicle.

You will need to make clear that the problem of Russian missile assistance to Iran is not solved and that future U.S.-Russian space cooperation depends on Russian performance to implement the Gallucci-Koptev work plan. We are also proposing an exchange of letters between you and Putin to confirm Russia's commitments to halt missile assistance to Iran and our willingness to lift the space launch quota if Russia performs.

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On the Iran nuclear side, we are seeking private commitments from Russia to reaffirm the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin commitment (which restricted Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation to construction of Bushehr unit one and related training and fuel) in exchange for issuing the public joint statement on the civil plutonium initiative. Securing Russian acceptance of these commitments may require your personal intervention. We are proposing to codify these commitments in a private agreement signed by you and Putin. If the Russians implement them, the arrangement would lead to a long-term moratorium on additional civil reprocessing and increased peaceful nuclear cooperation to design advanced power reactors.

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE PROVIDED

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Arms Control

TO BE PROVIDED

Nonproliferation/Iran

- Know that Sandy and Sergey have been working hard to get nonproliferation issues ready. Plutonium initiatives they prepared will send exactly right signal about benefits of our cooperation to reduce the nuclear threat.

- Iran problem still not fixed. Would like to let space launch quota expire at end of year, but we need to see implementation of the Holum-Koptev plan. We've made some progress; need to sustain momentum on curtailing missile cooperation with Iran.

- Would like you to confirm that you will take specific steps we've discussed to end transfers of missile technology to Iran and vigorously implement export controls.

- If you take those agreed steps, I'm prepared to lift the quota.

- Unfortunately, nuclear problem seems to be getting worse. Iran is seeking sensitive technology from a variety of Russian entities for almost every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle, including sensitive fissile material production facilities.

- Hope you will instruct MinAtom and the FSB to investigate and shut down these Iranian efforts.

[If the civil plutonium agreement is completed]

- Pleased to be signing joint statement with you on our mutual commitment to halt reprocessing of nuclear power reactor fuel and work together to develop a new generation of nuclear power reactors.

- We will also be signing a private agreement specifying our mutual commitments to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran.

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- Hope you will instruct MinAtom and the FSB to ensure compliance with this commitment.

- On this basis, we can proceed with the joint research on reactor development.

(If raised:) Intelligence lead information

- There are limits to what we can provide without jeopardizing sources and methods. Have been burned in the past because some of the information we provided was used to cover up rather than to stop activities.

(If raised:) Nuclear subs in Russian Far East

- Willing to look at this problem. But need more information about type of spent fuel that's on board the subs. Hard for us to devote significant resources to environmental clean-up issue.

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SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Commend Putin's emphasis on economic reform and achieving tangible results for average Russians.**
- **Affirm support for Russia's early reengagement with the IFI's.**
- **Highlight importance of improving Russia's investment climate, including in the energy sector, through legal and institutional reforms and the fight against crime and corruption.**
- **Urge higher priority for serious effort at WTO accession, which would be a tool of strengthening Russia's global integration as well speeding the reform process and improving investment climate.**
- **Indicate your willingness to promote with international investors fact that Russia is getting its house in order and that investors should begin to take a fresh look.**
- **Lay out a longer-term vision of enhanced cooperation and interaction between Russia and America (e.g., expanded exchanges and new focus on common problems such as health care, climate change, and fighting drug addiction).**

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This meeting will center on the next phase of Russia's economic transformation into a fully functioning market economy, delivering sustainable growth and jobs and deepening Russia's integration into the global trade and investment system. The Russians are rightly proud that they are designing a reform program themselves, which will have been announced shortly before your arrival. You will want to hear from Putin and his team what their economic priorities are and how they plan to tackle them this year and beyond. You should ask Larry Summers to explore key economic policy areas in greater detail. This will set the stage for a discussion of how we can most effectively support Russia's reform efforts going forward.

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AGENDA

Putin's Economic Program. After declines in the level of real GDP in each year since the breakup of the Soviet Union (save a fractional increase in 1997), Russia's economy has registered about 7 percent growth in the past four quarters. Driving growth have been higher energy prices which help an energy supplier like Russia, and the collapse of the ruble in the financial crisis of 1998, which has effectively priced many imports out of the market and given a boost to domestic producers. The best place to start is by listening to Putin and his team summarize their priority economic objectives and their strategy for achieving them. They will likely address both macroeconomic policies (tight fiscal and monetary policies) and structural reforms (tax reform, property rights, rule of law, administrative reform, etc.) aimed at improving the investment climate and reversing capital flight. The Russians are asking for your personal encouragement of U.S. investors, support for a renewed IMF program and consideration of comprehensive debt relief for Soviet-era obligations. As Prime Minister Kasyanov has put it, "Russia foremost needs some moral and psychological support." You should ask Larry to comment on the Russian program and highlight areas where we can be supportive through bilateral and multilateral channels.

Overall, without being patronizing, we want to applaud and encourage the new sense of ownership and pragmatism in Russia's economic policy. And we want to be supportive without undermining the incentives for continued ownership and actual implementation of reforms, without which all the jawboning in the world will not attract once-burned Western investors.

A key question about Putin's political strategy for the economic program is timing. You will want to urge early, decisive action to take advantage of the "honeymoon" Putin is currently enjoying with a cooperative Duma and high oil and gas prices. Initial signals from the Putin coterie and Prime Minister Kasyanov suggest that he will pursue a fairly modest gameplan on economics and put real political muscle behind an overhaul of the country's political structures first. Still, the combination of stronger leadership and good macroeconomic performance could put Russia in a solid position to capitalize on a unique opportunity to catch up on long-delayed reform. As you have said many times, it is better to make the hard decisions early.

IFI's and External Debt. Russia seeks a renewed IMF program sometime this summer, which we believe is feasible and could support. The magnitude of the program would be limited to partial "refinancing" of Russia's obligations to the Fund, which we would also support. In other words, there would be no net new money. The message here is that the Russians want to reduce their exposure to the Fund over time. We will want to ensure that the structural reform measures associated with a new Fund program are substantive but realistic. Ask Larry to spell this out.

The Russians also seek Paris Club debt relief on their Soviet-era obligations, about half of which is owed to Germany. Putin quipped recently that G-7 hesitancy on debt relief suggests that "Russia is being punished for its good economic performance," but this should be viewed as mostly rhetorical posturing. Prime Minister Kasyanov indicated that Russia would like a two-staged approach: first interim relief, then a comprehensive solution agreed up front. Interim relief (limited rescheduling) in tandem with an IMF program makes sense. But, as we suggested at Cologne, we would be willing to look at further, more comprehensive debt relief only once Russia is satisfactorily performing under an IMF program and taking into account actual financial need. Furthermore, it must be underscored that, at this juncture and in the foreseeable future, the case for anything more than debt rescheduling is exceedingly difficult for our G-7 allies.

WTO. Putin has said positive things about WTO accession, but seems to believe it is a political decision, not a result of reforms undertaken. Despite some technical progress in trade negotiations, what has been lacking in Russia over the past few years is high-level buy-in that WTO accession should be a national priority. Now is a good opportunity to drive the point home. The process of WTO accession would promote Russia's full integration into the global commercial system and would be a tool Putin could use to discipline the reform efforts of his government. Kasyanov's initial response has been lukewarm, stressing that misinformation generated by various trade disputes with the Europeans has cooled domestic support for WTO accession. Still, undoing protectionism is really the flip side of pushing through the long-overdue structural reforms. With our China PNTR vote, Russia risks having the WTO train leave the station with China on board but Russia still on the platform.

We would want to secure Putin's buy-in and understanding that a serious push on WTO will reinforce other reform efforts. A good

first step would be to appoint a lead WTO negotiator as well as a sherpa to coordinate the intra-governmental process. These steps would be more important -- and credible -- than time-bound targets, which Russia has set and missed before.

Investment Climate. Putin knows that investment is the key to Russia's growth prospects and that so far the poor investment climate has prevented Russia from achieving anything near its full potential. Putin seems to understand that, in addition to maintaining macroeconomic stability, Russia must systematically create a level playing field so that it is transparent and reliable for investors who choose to play ball. This means a modern tax code, protections of property rights (including for shareholders, creditors, and landholders as well as intellectual property rights), and strengthening the rule of law and enforcement of judgments.

It will be important to emphasize that Russia will be judged by the priorities it sets and by the results it produces. Many investors have been burned in Russia before and will study things carefully before jumping back in. In that context, we should be willing to get the word out about Russia's "new pragmatism." You could note that Bob Strauss is planning to lead a trade mission in late June and that you might send Bill Daley out later this summer. Putin could send a couple of clear positive signals to American investors in the near term by placing priority on the passage of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).

Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption. An area that is important in its own right but will also contribute to a better investment climate is strengthening of the rule of law and law enforcement. Putin has talked about the "dictatorship of law" and the burden is on him to demonstrate that what he means by this is a modern law-based society and economy where both civil and investor rights are taken seriously and where corruption is punished.

There is a possibility that Russia may be cited as a "non-cooperative" country in the report to be issued later in June by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Passage by the Duma of the anti-money laundering law and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, therefore, would send a clear signal that Russia is serious about fighting cross-border crime.

Energy Investment Stillborn. Improvement of the overall business climate should help Russia diversify its economy and investment base, including manufacturing and services. Still,

for now no sector has more dynamic potential than the energy sector. Russia profited from the spike in oil prices through 1999 and early 2000, but you should note that Russia will not be able to continue living (relatively) well off energy earnings without a major push to attract foreign investment. First, the majority of Russia's existing oil and gas fields are mature and are sliding down the production curve. Most Russian oil companies lack the investment capital needed to reverse this trend. In addition, many international oil and gas companies no longer view Russia's oil and gas resources as a trophy and are preparing to pack their bags. Completion and implementation of the production sharing agreement (PSA) legal regime is probably the only signal that would persuade many western companies that Russia will welcome foreign investment in oil and gas. According to industry experts, some low-hanging fruit is within reach in terms of PSA-related legislation.

People-to-People Dimension, Health, Climate Change. We also want to expand human relationships between our two countries. Investments now in exchanges, educational and NGO partnerships, and similar initiatives will promote mutual understanding and strengthen ties in years to come. Our assistance budget has been shifting in this direction over the past two years or so, and this year we launched Jim Billington's exchange program that will bring 1,800 young Russian officials from all levels to the United States. A new public policy school in Moscow will add to the 53 university partnerships we have with Russia. We are also expanding our sponsorship of public access Internet sites to enhance Russians' exposure to global information and culture.

Russia faces tremendous health crises -- drug abuse, HIV, TB, as well as cardiovascular disease and cancer -- but lacks the policy expertise, infrastructure, and the resources to combat them effectively. The Russians have signaled an interest in additional assistance on drug abuse; there may be areas where collaborative research efforts could yield results beneficial to both societies. Donna Shalala has been in contact with her counterpart, with whom she co-chairs the Binational Commission's Health Committee. They are exploring ways to expand our joint work.

A third area is work to counter global climate change. Russia is in a strong position to benefit from financial flows under a future greenhouse gas emissions trading system in large part because we would likely need to buy excess Russian credits to meet our own Kyoto target. We are negotiating a joint statement on climate change that highlights our shared interest in

fighting climate change and that notes in particular Russia would dedicate a portion of its revenues from any trades to funding those actions that mitigate climate change and benefit the environment. A commitment of this nature by Russia is strategically important for us and Russia because it would remove a key argument for "caps" on trading by showing that trading in excess Russian allotments (denigrated by the EU as "hot air") would nonetheless bolster action on climate change.

UN Assessments. Finally, it is very important that you make a general point on Russian support of our effort on UN assessment reform (our primary objective is to reduce the disproportionate amount we pay on peacekeeping), which is critical to meeting our Helms-Biden benchmarks. Our Russian interlocutors at the UN have indicated a willingness to pay more, but tell us that a Presidential decision will be required.

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SUMMARY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ECONOMICS

- A peaceful, democratic, prosperous Russia is good for everyone; encouraged by focus on strategic reform program.

- Honeymoon important period. Eager to hear about your plans.

- International support, including IMF, still important. World Bank may be most useful as you move forward with structural reforms. Will support strong IFI programs.

- Can do limited debt rescheduling under new IMF program; further debt rescheduling in future depends on performance under IMF program and financial need.

- Focus on WTO is right. Encourages reforms and integration.

- WTO not a political process; requires concrete reforms. Hope you can accelerate accession process.

- China's entry into WTO remarkable. This is right approach, direction of 21st century.

- Now in an era of global markets. Capital has no nationality.

- Create transparent, predictable environment that protects investors. Your results will let me be your salesman.

- Strengthening the rule of law is critical. Builds democracy and encourages investment.

- Special focus intellectual property rights, which are tied to high-tech innovation, an area Russia could profit from.

- Corruption has been eating away at investor confidence over the years. Experience shows market reforms the best remedy.

- Energy sector has much promise. Implementing production sharing laws would encourage investment.

- Important to broaden our relationship beyond governments.

- Hope you can support our expanded exchanges (Billington program) and similar initiatives; should use Binational Commission to explore ways to cooperate on TB, HIV.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Putin's Reform Program

- Want Russia to be peaceful, democratic, and prosperous. Economics crucial dimension of this picture.

- First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

- Encouraged by new emphasis on economics, strong government team, and development of strategic reform program. Have clear sense that new, results-oriented pragmatism is in the air.

- Early part of new Administration is time to move on the difficult reforms. Would urge you to make maximum use of this window of opportunity; you have a "honeymoon" with both the Duma and the price of oil.

- As you roll out your economics program, investors will be looking both at your objectives (tax code, protection of shareholder rights, intellectual property rights, land code) and at your concrete strategy for implementing them.

- Would like to hear your economic priorities and strategy.

International Financial Institutions (IFI's) and External Debt

- International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing less important than in past, while World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

- United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a program that we hope could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

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If raised: Restructuring Russia's Soviet-era Debt

- New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations.

- To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

- *If needed:* London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but not precedent for Paris Club.

WTO

- Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating Russia's accession to WTO will speed your integration with global trading system, facilitating investment and economic growth.

- Well-defined agenda associated with WTO accession strongly overlaps with new government's core market-oriented reform agenda; the goal of WTO membership can be effective tool to discipline efforts government-wide.

- While Russia's accession started on fast track, negotiations have slowed over the past few years.

- Would be mistake to view WTO membership as political decision from outside; it very much depends on political decision from inside. Have you considered appointing government-wide coordinator (in addition to a lead WTO negotiator)?

- It is clear that this is the path to prosperity in 21st century. Even China is embracing this approach. Train is leaving the station; we would like to see Russia on it.

If raised: Bilateral Trade

- Want to see U.S.-Russia trade grow. Jackson-Vanik has no effect on U.S.-Russia trade.

- Know that anti-dumping cases (e.g., steel) have been source of friction; pleased they have been resolved. Binational Commission provides good mechanism to address structural trade issues.

- Also want to see Europe open its doors to trade with Russia. WTO will be a great tool of integration for you.

If raised: Jackson Vanik

- Administration has declared Russia to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, and Russia enjoys full MFN benefits.

- Congress remains concerned about issues such as implementation of Russia's religion law, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and the law allowing denial of right to emigrate for up to 10 years after access to state secrets.

- Encourage to continue to make changes that would persuade Congress to advance legislation graduating you from Jackson-Vanik.

If raised: Market Economy Status

- Know our experts are reviewing the options.

- Market economy status applies only to dumping cases and increases Russia's exposure to trade penalties.

- Important to move forward deliberately, recognizing all the pros and cons.

If raised: Unwrought Titanium

- Aware of interest in GSP designation for unwrought titanium. Due to deteriorating conditions in the U.S. market, we're unlikely to see resolution in the near term.

- Pleased we have already given Russia duty-free status for wrought titanium. Wrought titanium is the higher value-added product and we plan to continue to extend the duty free status.

If raised: Access to U.S. Steel Market

- Glad we signed bilateral agreement covering steel trade in 1999. These agreements provide relief to our steel industry. At the same time, Russian producers continue to have access to U.S. market.

- Hope to initiate a joint steel dialogue, which will give us the opportunity to work together to address some of the underlying structural issues that affect steel trade between our countries.

Investment Climate

- We live in an era of globalizing markets in which capital has no nationality. Investors choose countries and not the other way around -- but both benefit.

- Pleased that United States is number one source of direct foreign investment in Russia (about $4 billion since 1992), but Russia still lags far behind many other transition economies/emerging markets in level of foreign investment.

- Another symptom of the problem is persistent capital flight out of Russia.

- Key to attracting more investment and reversing capital flight is to improve investment climate: this is a game that can be won only by creating reliable, transparent institutional, and legal environment that meets needs of investors.

- Things that are good for foreign investors also good for Russian domestic businesses. Business basically wants same thing everywhere: to reduce risk, have predictability. Reducing corruption is an important part of the strategy. All difficult, but big rewards.

- Many essential elements to positive business environment, including macroeconomic stability (which you currently have), as well as structural, legal and institutional ingredients (e.g., tax code, property rights, rule of law, transparency).

- We will continue to provide technical assistance in many key areas to support your reform efforts.

- As always, implementation is the key. Because of all the ups and downs in recent years, investors will be cautious, will want to see results in Russia first.

- Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious about reform, integration.

- U.S. investors will also respond to ratification of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) signed in 1992.

- I want to help you get the message out that Russia is putting its house in order -- and is open for investment. Want to urge investors to take a fresh look.

- Have encouraged Bob Strauss to lead delegation of top U.S. CEO's to Moscow in June. I would also like to send Bill Daley here with a commercial mission later this summer.

Rule of Law, Anti Corruption

- Longer-term key to changing investor psychology is to enhance rule of law in commercial affairs. Many would-be investors have perception of an unreliable, risky business environment. Turning this perception around will have large impact.

- Investors looking for reliable, transparent and predictable commercial environment that meets international norms on issues such as property rights and contract enforcement.

- Special attention globally to intellectual property rights (IPR), which are so tied to high-tech innovation and investment in "new economy." Your commitment to enforce IPR and combat piracy key to broader integration goals.

- It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward. Understand progress is now being made on other EX-IM projects.

- Corruption problem has been eating away at investor confidence over the years. Experience shows best way to fight corruption is continued market reforms, streamlining (but not weakening) the state, and systematic enforcement of strong laws.

- Early passage of anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards would also be important step. Good way to follow through on the G-8 Anti-Crime Ministerial you hosted. U.S. experts ready to provide further assistance.

Energy Sector

- Know that you want to diversify Russia's economy and set the stage for investment in manufacturing, high-tech sectors and services -- i.e., integrate Russia with new global economy.

- But your energy sector still has vast potential.

- Foreign investment can help develop these resources, but frankly many energy sector investors have lost confidence in Russia.

- Implementing the Production Sharing Laws will be key signal.

People-to-People, Health

- Important to broaden our relationship so our societies know each other better.

- Exchanges, NGO partnerships, educational initiatives enrich both countries. These are long-term investments that will pay important dividends.

- We are expanding efforts in these areas, and I hope you can support them: for example, initiatives such as the new public policy school at Moscow State University and our expanded exchange program ("Billington program") for young political leaders.

- One area of particular concern is health. We both face serious challenges with drugs, HIV, other diseases. Russia has tremendous scientific talent; this is a promising area for collaborative work.

- Secretary Shalala will be in Moscow in July to co-chair Health Committee of Binational Commission. Propose we should give Committee mandate to explore.

Climate Change

- One area of opportunity is the environment, and climate change in particular. Our proposed joint statement highlights readiness to work on emissions trading, an area in which both Russia and the U.S. can benefit together.

UN Assessments

- Pleased we are working together on peacekeeping and other security issues at UN; hope we can have your support this year on reforms in the UN scales of assessments, especially in peacekeeping.

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Divider Title: JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE W/PRESIDENT PUTIN

Qs & As
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Divider Title: ECHO MOSKVY RADIO STATION INTERVIEW

SCENESETTER: EKHO MOSKVY RADIO STATION

Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow) is by far the most serious and most popular of Moscow-based radio stations. Ekho Moskvy was registered in August 1990 as the first non-governmental radio station in Russia. The total audience of Ekho Moskvy is over 50 million people, and the station reaches 85 major Russian cities. The station's broadcasts can be picked up in Seattle and Chicago by satellite, and on its own Internet website.

Discussions on the station frequently set the tone for the wider public debate on political and social issues. The station's talk shows frequently feature prominent Russian politicians and high-level officials from the United States and other countries. Interviews are often broadcast over NTV, Russia's leading private television network, which, like Ekho Moskvy, is part of the Media-MOST media holding company, owned by Vladimir Gusinskiy. Media-MOST was the subject of a heavy handed raid last month by masked agents of the government. Putin claims they were investigating corporate wrongdoing but some outside the government believe that the effect on the independent media has been unnerving.

REMARKS
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Qs & As
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Divider Title: **REMARKS TO DUMA**

SCENESETTER: THE STATE DUMA

The State Duma was created by the 1993 Russian constitution. It consists of 450 deputies, half of whom are elected directly from single-mandate districts, with the other half receiving seats proportionate to their party's nationwide vote. Each session of the Duma lasts four years. The Third Duma was elected in November, 1999 and took office in January, 2000.

The State Duma building, a nine-story structure steps away from the Kremlin and Red Square, was originally built in the 1930s to house the Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars). It later became the home of the Soviet state planning agency Gosplan. From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 1993, the Ministry of Economics was located in the building. Following the violent October 1993 confrontation between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet (whose facilities were turned over to the Russian Prime Minister and government apparatus), the State Duma has used this site for its meeting rooms and office space. There has been some speculation, fueled by Duma speaker Seleznev, that the Duma would move to St. Petersburg. This has caused Moscow Mayor Luzhkov to actively search for better quarters for the Duma.

REMARKS
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Divider Title: DEPARTURE CALL W/ PRESIDENT PUTIN

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FAREWELL CALL WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Close out any remaining summit business.**
- **Review upcoming schedule of interactions, highlight need for strong Russian presentation at Okinawa.**
- **Reenergize the Binational Commission as a mechanism to carry the work forward.**

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This session will be a short wrap-up meeting with Putin before he heads to the Rome to see the Pope and you go to Kiev. This is an opportunity to reflect on the summit, to tend to any unfinished business, and to chart a path forward to Okinawa and beyond. It is also an opportunity to reenergize the Binational Commission as an instrument for cooperation and summit follow-through.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FARWELL CALL WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- Think this has been a very good visit and shows the world that we are working actively, cooperatively on a broad agenda.

- Okinawa will be an important milestone. The stronger presentation you and your team can make, the better. You know that you will be judged by actions.

- Bilateral engagement will continue. The Binational Commission should help lead the way. Our respective Secretaries helped lay the groundwork for our meetings, and they stand ready to carry the work forward. Secretary Cohen is coming later this month. Secretary Shalala will be here in July. Hope Secretary Daley can lead mission.

- I'm committed to making maximum use of this year to achieve results and lay an even more solid foundation for United States and Russia in 21st century.

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Divider Title: COURTESY CALL W/FORMER PRESIDENT YELTSIN

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COURTESY CALL WITH FORMER RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Reaffirm Yeltsin's historic role in transforming Russia and building new relationship with international community.**

- **Stress need for Yeltsin's continued engagement on behalf of democratic reforms, especially press freedoms.**

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Due to Yeltsin's continued ill health, his role in Russian public life remains limited. The Yeltsin coterie/"family" (e.g., daughter Tatyana, former chief of staff Yumashev, shadowy oligarch Abramovich) remains active and influential behind the scenes with Putin and is working out a new modus vivendi with his team. Putin has been careful to give Yeltsin prominent billing in public events and commentary as "Russia's First President."

In addition to reviewing your joint accomplishments during Yeltsin's tenure, you should politely point out the important role Yeltsin played as a guarantor of democratic reforms. Yeltsin took a personal interest in safeguarding democracy and press freedoms, reining in numerous attempts to muzzle the press. Given increased pressure on the media under Putin, it would be helpful to let Yeltsin know that you are concerned about the situation and ask that he keep an eye on the issue.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR COURTESY CALL WITH FORMER RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Have had good visit. Think success of my discussions with Putin and his team is tied directly to enduring importance of your leadership as first President of democratic Russia.

- You brought liberty and freedom to Russia. Putin's task now is to consolidate those reforms, make sure that all Russians enjoy benefits of freer, more prosperous society, fully integrated with international community.

- Still see big challenges ahead. Hope that Vladimir and I can rely on your help. We still have our work cut out for us reducing the nuclear danger, moving forward on arms control agenda, tackling security challenges of 21st Century.

- Valued your role as guarantor of Russia's democratic reforms and Russian Constitution. Want you to stay engaged and keep close eye on respect for basic freedoms.

- Especially important that Russia develop tolerant, robust civil society. Key element of that transformation is strength of independent media, know that's important to you. Concerned by some recent setbacks; can you look into this?

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Divider Title: **EMBASSY EVENT**

SCENESETTER: AMERICAN EMBASSY MOSCOW

The cornerstone of U.S. Embassy Moscow's new office building (NOB) was laid in September 1979. In August 1985 work was suspended on the partially-completed NOB due to a serious security compromise, which created doubts that the building could ever be used.

After long negotiations with Soviet and Russian officials, the construction of NOB was resumed by Americans using American materials pursuant to an American-controlled design. That effort featured partial deconstruction of the NOB, rehabilitation of remaining portions of the building, addition of the four new floors plus penthouse, and completion of all systems of the building. The building was completed and occupied in May 2000.

The NOB is centrally located within the Embassy compound, which also contains residences and other office buildings, including the former chancery, which will continue to be occupied by Embassy staff. The NOB's modern design makes it a landmark on the Moscow skyline. The building overlooks Konyushkovskaya Street, a major urban thoroughfare, and beyond to a large city park.

REMARKS
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Divider Title: **UKRAINE**

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Divider Title: BILAT MEETINGS W/ PRESIDENT KUCHMA

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MEETING WITH
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT LEONID KUCHMA

KEY OBJECTIVES

- **Stress that acceleration of domestic economic and democratic reform will determine pace of integration with Europe, and our ability to be supportive.**

- **Urge Kuchma to be more proactively supportive of Yushchenko reform efforts, especially vis-à-vis vested interests.**

- **Encourage development of political consensus around key reform themes; stress need for building public support.**

- **Congratulate Ukraine on Chornobyl closure date and lifting of commercial satellite launch quota.**

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Kuchma has allowed reformist Prime Minister Yushchenko to proceed with a broad-based reform agenda generally, but has failed to expend the political capital necessary to bring key reforms to closure and implementation. Kuchma is personally uncertain about reforms, and remains strongly connected to powerful oligarchs. He needs strong encouragement to be a more proactive proponent of market and democratic reforms.

Following a brief restricted meeting with Kuchma where you should urge him to become more publicly supportive of market reforms, you will be joined by senior GOU leadership, whom you should encourage to accelerate implementation of reforms necessary for Ukraine's European integration.

AGENDA

Moving Forward Slowly. Kuchma's reelection last year over a Communist rival reinforced Ukraine's Western orientation and offered a chance for Kuchma to recommit to a reform agenda. At the Binational Commission meeting in December, we pushed hard for Kuchma to seize the opportunity and name a reformer as Prime Minister. Kuchma responded by naming Viktor Yushchenko, then the head of Ukraine's National Bank. Kuchma also succeeded in breaking the Communist grip on the Rada by using the threat of a referendum on Rada powers to piece together a majority coalition

of parties nominally supportive of the government. Although far from perfect, cooperation between the Presidency, the government, and the legislature is better today than any time since independence. Cooperation must be deepened, however, for many key reforms to move forward to implementation.

Support for Yushchenko. Kuchma's commitment to reform remains conditional and equivocal, and is constrained by his ties to Ukraine's oligarchs who, like their Russian brethren, profit from their control over key sectors of the economy, including energy and the media. A central question in Ukrainian politics is whether Kuchma will back Yushchenko's reform efforts when the tough decisions about implementation need to be made. Kuchma's conservative approach on vested interests only compounds Yushchenko's challenges in trying to rein in an unwieldy bureaucracy and avoid getting trapped by the oligarchs.

Signs of progress. Despite Kuchma's reluctance to expend political capital on reform, and despite the myriad other challenges the government faces, some important reforms have indeed been recorded. These include the launching of a sweeping reform of the bureaucracy, restructuring Ukraine's private external debt for 2000 and 2001, and passing a strong budget for 2000. The government has also made early progress on land reform and is moving, albeit very slowly, toward privatizing energy distribution enterprises in line with international standards. There has been notable progress in the area of regulatory reform (e.g., eliminating red tape) over the past several months.

In the first quarter of 2000, signs of economic stabilization began to emerge, including some improvement in industrial output, mostly a function of a weak currency and renewed demand from Russia. Inflation remains low and Ukraine is building foreign reserves even though it is not receiving IFI financing. Total foreign direct investment in Ukraine remains very low -- some $55 per capita compared to $1000 per capita in Poland and $406 per capita in Bulgaria -- mostly because Ukraine lacks the economic and legal institutions that would attract investors. Corruption remains a debilitating problem; following your advice to step up the fight against corruption last December, Kuchma has indeed focused on local corruption and even took a swipe at one medium-sized "oligarch" in Kiev. He has yet to move on bigger fish or in a way that will create a level, transparent playing field for everyone.

Chornobyl. When Yushchenko visited Washington, he told you privately that Ukraine is ready to close Chornobyl on December 15, 2000, and his government agreed that the public announcement of these plans would take place during your visit. In return, Yushchenko asked for help making a success of the sarcophagus pledging conference and securing European grant support for the purchase of fuel for coal- and gas-fired plants that will need to fill the gap between closure of Chornobyl and start-up of new generating capacity. We have responded to both of Yushchenko's requests. We got the Germans to accelerate preparations for the July 6 pledging conference (at which the U.S. delegation will announce an additional U.S. pledge of at least $78 million), and we have approached the EU at a variety of levels on the fossil fuel grants. At technical levels, EU officials are stressing that Ukraine needs to meet a variety of conditions before the EU will make good on its pledge, but we are continuing to work the issue with more senior officials.

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SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT LEONID KUCHMA

Restricted Meeting

- Glad to be in Kiev at such a promising moment.
- Appreciate what you've done to advance reforms. Important that Ukraine takes rightful place in Europe.
- This means pushing forward on domestic reforms.
- Enjoyed meeting Prime Minister Yushchenko. He is impressive. Together you and he can make fundamental changes.
- Pleased that we can announce Chornobyl closure today; you and I worked hard on that. Also glad that you were able to address intellectual property rights problems.
- We have a major announcement on commercial space launch that is a direct result of your strong record on non-proliferation; I hope that you can take advantage of the new opportunity.
- These are concrete steps that allow us to be your advocates with the Europeans. A lot still has to change, but with your leadership, I am convinced a lot can happen this year.
- Wanted to mention perception that political forces are working against what you and Viktor are trying to do, that reform agenda is increasingly at risk. This is the time to build your legacy.
- Taking on high-level corruption is difficult, but second term gives more room to maneuver. Important to do privatizations to European standards; everyone is watching closely.
- Acceleration of reforms is key to unlocking IMF and World Bank support, as well as attracting international investors.
- Urge you to take bold action this summer. Push energy sector privatization and fight corruption.
- Looking forward to my speech at St. Michael's. Want to reach out to Ukrainian people and send strong signal to international community.

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Expanded Meeting

- Greetings. (Special hello to Prime Minister Yushchenko -- Viktor -- whom you saw in Sandy's office May 9).

- So happy to be in Kiev. Most promising moment for your country since I've been President. Have real chance to deepen integration with Europe this year.

- Just had a good chat with President Kuchma. Last month we met with Viktor to hear details of reform plan. Very encouraging. Know Secretary Albright had a good visit here recently.

- As you do more on reforms, we're clearly able to be more supportive.

- Recent steps are encouraging. Public administration reform, debt restructuring, early steps on privatization all in right direction. People looking for strong implementation now.

- Especially glad you were able to address intellectual property rights issue. Sends a good signal to international community.

- These are concrete steps that allow us to be your advocates with the Europeans. A lot still has to change, but with your leadership, I'm convinced a lot can happen this year.

- Major concern is corruption. I know you've taken positive steps at local level. Reality is that international investors waiting for strong measures at national level.

- Taking on high-level corruption is difficult, but nothing sends a stronger signal to international community. Strongly urge you to make this a priority. We'll be supportive.

- Important to do privatizations to European standards; everyone is watching closely. Viktor, I'm eager to hear what progress you've made since we last met.

Pause for Yushchenko response.

- These are right kind of measures. Important to meet European norms. If you take bold measures this summer, you'll build momentum and strengthen ability to integrate.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT LEONID KUCHMA

RESTRICTED MEETING

- It's good to be in Kiev at a time of so much promise.
- Want to commend you for what you've done since your reelection. There's been positive movement on reforms.
- Especially delighted that we'll announce Chornobyl's closure date. We worked hard together to get this done.
- Pleased we could help get the Germans to set date for sarcophagus pledging conference in July. We'll keep working on the EU for fossil fuel.
- Prime Minister Yushchenko is a strong addition to your team. I enjoyed meeting with him when he was in Washington last month. Together you have built a solid agenda.
- Also glad to be able to announce our lifting of commercial space launch quotas. We can do this because of concrete results Ukraine has achieved in nonproliferation; am proud of what we've done and pleased to deepen our partnership in this way.
- Want to thank you for closing the pirating compact disk factories. Sends a good message to business and investment community.
- Appreciate your contribution to KFOR. Ukraine has done an excellent job. Helps deepen ties with United States and NATO.
- Want Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion with us going forward. Will help with financing.
- Wanted to have a chance to talk with you in a more private setting before we bring others in.
- Broad international perception that despite government's efforts, reforms have slowed, and that political forces are working against what you and Viktor are trying to do.

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- What you do in coming months will have a major impact on your legacy. You still have a unique chance to create a totally new chapter in Ukraine's history.

- Your responsibility to make positive change happen; we will keep door to West open.

- You are now in strongest political position: broad public support for your policies, Rada is more cooperative, Prime Minister is respected at home and abroad.

- Your public support for reforms will be decisive going forward, especially when it comes to vested interests.

- Taking on high-level corruption is difficult, but in second term you have more room to maneuver. As you go forward with large-scale privatization, important to meet European standards of transparency to attract strategic investors.

- Intensifying reforms for the remainder of the year will help take relationship with Europe to a new level. If I've got solid evidence, I'll work hard to encourage Europeans to move forward, but our support won't help without your results.

- Acceleration of reform is the key to unlocking the IMF and World Bank support as well as foreign investment.

- Want to underscore that our ability to be your forceful advocate will depend on you achieving concrete results; I'd urge you to take bold measures to move Ukraine forward this summer.

- Want to make sure to use this visit strategically and to send a strong message of support.

- Looking forward to my speech at St. Michael's. Important to reach out to Ukrainian people and build their support. I'll focus on your reforms and European integration.

If asked:

About IMF disbursement.

- Your cooperation and transparency have been right on target. Completion of policy reforms is the key to unlocking IMF support.

About Jackson-Vanik.

- Want to see Ukraine graduated in nearest possible future. Continue to work with Jewish community in Ukraine and United States and reach out to Congress. I know you're making progress.

About Odessa-Brody Pipeline.

- We've supported Odessa-Brody through a feasibility study. Key is to change investment environment to attract investors. Not much we can do until investors express interest and willingness to invest.

EXPANDED MEETING

- Pleased to see you all. I just had a good chat with President Kuchma. Good to see the Prime Minister; glad he was able to visit Washington last month.

- Have renewed hope in Ukraine's future thanks to the good work you're doing. During the visit we're announcing a number of important joint projects, including a date for Chornobyl closure, lifting of commercial satellite launch quota, and other important measures.

- I know that deep reforms like those you're pursuing are controversial. But you know that stagnation means certain failure. Success depends on everyone coming together around a common set of principles.

- If you can pull together and push some major reforms through to completion, I'll be as supportive as possible, including with the IMF and the Europeans. Need to create a "critical mass" of reforms that will produce growth.

- Spoke earlier with the President about need to meet European standards for your reforms. These standards are difficult to meet, but they are clear. I hope you will use them as a guide for moving forward.

- Important for Ukraine's future to become closely integrated within the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. Has major impact on security and stability in Ukraine and in the region.

- What you've done to move forward on intellectual property rights is a good example of moving toward global standards. Wanted to commend you for that.

- When Viktor was in Washington, he outlined your reform plans. Know you've been working since then and am eager to hear your update.

Pause for GOU response.

- Want to underscore that you've laid a solid basis to move forward on the economic front. To ensure success, important to demonstrate decisive results in the very near term.

- Privatizing major enterprises will bring Western capital, strengthen ties to Europe, and build Ukraine's reputation. Will also contribute to economic growth. Important to do something tangible this summer.

- Also important to press ahead on high-level corruption and organized crime which hurt Ukraine.

- Know this problem isn't unique to Ukraine. Tackling it head-on sends a strong signal to European and American investors.

- Wanted to take a moment to tell you how much we appreciate your help in stemming the proliferation of dangerous technologies to third countries. Your record of achievement in this area allows us to lift our commercial space launch quota.

- We have shared interests in minimizing the threat from proliferation, and we value your contribution.

- This is only one area where we can cooperate in the UN Security Council. Glad to have another strong partner with us in New York.

- Wanted to close by saying that we're convinced that you have all the ingredients necessary to make historic changes in Ukraine this year.

- Move boldly now and build momentum. Ukrainian people will respond and give you their trust. The United States will be proud to stand beside you.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
019. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	04/27/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3632

FOLDER TITLE:
Trip Book-POTUS Trip to Russia and Ukraine, June 3-5, 2000

2016-0114-M
kh1810

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: REMARKS TO PEOPLE OF UKRAINE

SCENESETTER: THE MYKHAILIVSKYI GOLD-DOMED MONASTERY (St. Michael's Cathedral)

The Mykhailivskyi Gold-Domed Monastery was founded in 1108 by Prince Svyatopolk Izaslavych, the grandson of Prince Yaroslav, founder of St. Sophia Cathedral. Built over a five-year period, the monastery became the burial place for Kiev's princes. The walls of the cathedral were adorned with outstanding mosaics and frescos, but the structure and its collection were partially destroyed in 1240 by the Mongols.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the cathedral was reconstructed in the baroque style under the patronage of Ivan Mazepa, a Ukrainian hetman who later contested Russian control of the country.

The cathedral was a victim of the Communist regime's anti-religion campaign and was pillaged and destroyed in 1934-1935. Some of the original mosaics were preserved in the neighboring St. Sophia cathedral, while others were taken to art galleries in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In 1998, St. Michael's was reopened after a reconstruction effort funded by the Kiev city administration and donors in Ukraine and abroad. It again took its place as one of the city's major landmarks.

St. Sophia Cathedral will be visible to as you deliver your speech in St. Michael's Square, and you will refer to it in your remarks. Kiev's oldest structure, St. Sophia Cathedral was founded in 1037 by Prince Yaroslav, after a military victory on the site. Naming it after the Greek goddess of wisdom, Yaroslav intended to make the cathedral a cultural center of his Eastern Slavonic State. It became the place where the Kiev community gathered for assemblies, and where the Prince received foreign dignitaries.

The Cathedral in its present external form bears little resemblance to the original design, but the contents of the interior are an invaluable treasure. 260 meters of the original mosaics remain and approximately 3000 square meters of the original frescos have been restored.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

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Initials: KBH Date: 5/19/2021

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: U.S.-Russia Summit (4 pages)	06/02/2000	P1/b(1)
~~002. cable~~	~~re: Summit Trade and Investment Issues (6 pages)~~	~~06/03/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([Putin])
OA/Box Number: 530000

FOLDER TITLE:
[06/02/2000 - 06/03/2000]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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001. cable	re: U.S.-Russia Summit (4 pages)	06/02/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([Putin])
OA/Box Number: 530000

FOLDER TITLE:
[06/02/2000 - 06/03/2000]

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Cable

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2016-0114-M (1.23)
KBH 5/14/2021

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA2033 1551601-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 031601Z JUN 00
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI: RUEHMO
DTG:
ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4104
INFO: RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
SUBJ: SUMMIT TRADE AND INVESTMENT ISSUES:
AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC
ADVISER ILLARIONOV
TEXT: ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012033

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TAGS: ECON, EFIN, RS
SUBJECT: SUMMIT TRADE AND INVESTMENT ISSUES:
AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC
ADVISER ILLARIONOV

REF: STATE 101573

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES F. COLLINS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (C).

2. (C) SUMMARY: ON JUNE 1, AMBASSADOR COLLINS AND AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE SESTANOVICH MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC ADVISER AND RUSSIAN SHERPA ANDREY NIKOLAYEVICH ILLARIONOV TO RAISE POINTS REFTEL. ILLARIONOV MADE CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT PUTIN IS LOOKING FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT MEETING ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AND SHARES U.S. DESIRE FOR AS MUCH OF A JOINT MESSAGE ON RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE. MUCH OF THE RUSSIAN AGENDA OVERLAPS TO A LARGE EXTENT WITH U.S. POINTS, E.G., ON THE BIT, WTO AND PSA NORMATIVE ACTS. ON OTHER POINTS, ILLARIONOV SAID THAT THE GOR HAS PREPARED A 100-PAGE MEMORANDUM ON MARKET ECONOMY STATUS. HE APPEALED FOR U.S. ACTION ON JACKSON-VANIK IN THE CONTEXT OF SETTING A NEW TONE IN BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS, INCLUDING RUSSIA'S PRIORITY TO JOIN THE WTO, AND PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE UNRESOLVED MATTER OF RUSSIAN CREDITS TO THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA. ILLARIONOV NOTED THAT THE GOR WAS READY TO MAKE A JOINT STATEMENT ON MLAT RATIFICATION, BUT URGED THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO GET GOOD MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION, THAN A QUICK (BUT INADEQUATE) BILL. HE APPEALED FOR A RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST FOR A U.S. POSITION ON THE INCLUSION OF RUSSIA FROM THE OUTSET OF THE G-7/G-8 MEETING IN OKINAWA. ILLARIONOV CAME ACROSS AS FULLY IN COMMAND OF HIS BRIEF DESPITE HIS SHORT TENURE ON THE JOB, AND WELL-VERSED IN PUTIN'S THINKING. HE STRESSED THAT THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VERY MUCH HOPED TO HEAR FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING THE BENEFITS OF BUDGET DISCIPLINE, THE NEW ECONOMY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET TO THE ECONOMY. END SUMMARY.

SIGNALS AND TONE
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3. (C) ILLARIONOV AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A SUMMIT WHERE, ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, SIGNALS WOULD PREDOMINATE OVER SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS. THE GOR WAS ANXIOUS TO MAKE THE MOST OF POSITIVE SIGNALS CONFIRMING THE GOR'S INTENTION TO CARRY THROUGH ON ECONOMIC REFORM AND STRUCTURAL MEASURES. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR'S POINT THAT THE U.S. WAS LOOKING TO A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT, HE SAID THAT THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR PRESIDENT PUTIN. DEFINING A JOINT VIEW OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY WOULD BE KEY TO LINKING THE VARIOUS POSITIVE SIGNALS ON WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED.

BIT
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4. (C) ILLARIONOV NOTED THAT ON THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, A RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO EARLY RATIFICATION COULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY A U.S. STATEMENT UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A STEP. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ON THE BIT WITHIN THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. HE ADVISED THAT PRIME MINISTER KASYANOV WAS IN CHARGE OF THE BIT ISSUE, AND HAD COLLECTED GOR AND DUMA VIEWS OF THE TREATY. ILLARIONOV SAID THAT KASYANOV MAY PROPOSE "MINOR CORRECTIONS" WHICH WOULD ALLOW RATIFICATION.

WTO
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5. (C) AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY WELCOMED RUSSIA'S ATTACHING HIGH PRIORITY TO WTO ACCESSION, AND FURTHER NOTED THAT THE ACCESSION PROCESS WOULD DEMAND COMPLEX COORDINATION WITHIN THE GOR AND WITH THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC. WTO IS A SYMBOL OF RUSSIA'S COMMITMENT TO A RULES-BASED SYSTEM, AND IN THIS SENSE A MORE FUNDAMENTAL SIGNAL THAN THE BIT. ILLARIONOV AFFIRMED THAT THE COMMITMENT OF THE GOR REFLECTS PRESIDENT PUTIN'S PERSONAL BELIEF THAT JOINING WTO WAS A NECESSARY PART OF RUSSIA'S

ECONOMIC STRATEGY. ILLARIONOV SAID THAT THE GOR'S INTERNAL TARGET FOR ACCEDING TO WTO IS JANUARY 1. 2003 - WHICH HE CONSIDERED A REALISTIC TARGET. IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO GET COMPLEX ECONOMIC LEGISLATION APPROVED, ILLARIONOV FELT IT WAS BETTER TO SET A REALISTIC TARGET, ACHIEVE IT EARLY IF ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 012033

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POSSIBLE, BUT NOT TO GET TRAPPED INTO MEETING AMBITIOUS PUBLIC DEADLINES.

JACKSON-VANIK
---

6. (C) ILLARIONOV ARGUED THAT IF THE U.S. WANTED TO SEND A POSITIVE SIGNAL ON WTO ACCESSION, IT SHOULD COMMIT TO REMOVAL OF RUSSIA FROM JACKSON-VANIK RESTRICTIONS. BOTH AMBASSADORS COLLINS AND SESTANOVICH NOTED THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH A COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE IN THE POLITICAL CYCLE AND NOTED THAT RUSSIA IN PRACTICE ENJOYED FULL MFN STATUS AND THAT J-V HAD NO REAL EFFECT. ILLARIONOV COUNTERED THAT WHILE THE U.S. MAY FEEL THE LAW HAS NO PRACTICAL EFFECT, THE RUSSIAN SIDE THOUGHT IT DID. ILLARIONOV SUPPORTED THE IDEA THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON MIGHT DRAW THE LINK BETWEEN RUSSIAN WTO ACCESSION AND U.S. LIFTING OF JACKSON-VANIK. HE THOUGHT THAT A RUSSIAN STATEMENT OF THE PRIORITY OF WTO ACCESSION COULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY A U.S. STATEMENT THAT SUCH MOVES WOULD LEAD TO AN END TO THIS MEASURE AFFECTING BILATERAL TRADE.

OTHER RUSSIAN CONCERNS
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7. (C) ILLARIONOV ALSO PRESSED FOR U.S. LIFTING OF LIMITATIONS ON SUPER-COMPUTER SALES TO RUSSIA, QUOTAS ON SPACE LAUNCHES AND ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES. AMBASSADOR COLLINS CAUTIONED THAT SOME OF THESE ISSUES HAD LONG AND COMPLEX HISTORIES AND WERE MORE SUITED FOR EXPERT LEVEL DISCUSSION THAN SUMMIT CONSIDERATION. ILLARIONOV APPEARED TO TAKE THE POINT THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD FOCUS ON AREAS WHERE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

MARKET ECONOMY
---

8. (C) ILLARIONOV EXPLAINED THAT WHILE THE MINISTRY OF

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE (SEPTEL) MAY NOT HAVE MENTIONED IT, THE GOR WAS DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN PURSUING MARKET ECONOMY STATUS, AND HAD PREPARED A 100-PAGE MEMO ON THE SUBJECT (WHICH, ILLARIONOV JOKED, WAS AT LEAST SHORTER THAN THE GREF PLAN). HE ASKED WHETHER, AT THE SUMMIT, THE U.S. COULD BE EXPECTED TO WELCOME SUCH A STEP IF IT WERE RAISED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE. HE ARGUED THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD REINFORCE THE STRATEGIC MESSAGE THAT RUSSIA IS IN FACT, A MARKET ECONOMY. AMBASSADOR SESTANOVICH CAUTIONED THAT THE "QUASI-JUDICIAL" PROCESS FOR MAKING SUCH A DETERMINATION MIGHT MILITATE AGAINST A STATEMENT "WELCOMING" THE APPLICATION, BUT PROMISED TO GET BACK TO ILLARIONOV ON THE POINT.

PSA AND MLAT - AGREEMENT
---

9. (C) ILLARIONOV NOTED THAT THE GOR WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM ENDORSING EARLY COMPLETION OF NORMATIVE ACTS FOR PSA LEGISLATION, AND THOUGHT THAT UNDERLINING PSA'S IMPORTANCE WOULD BE A USEFUL ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S DUMA SPEECH. ILLARIONOV PROPOSED A JOINT STATEMENT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE CALLING FOR EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY.

MONEY LAUNDERING BILL
---

10. (C) ILLARIONOV ALLOWED THAT THE COMBINATION OF A BAD MONEY-LAUNDERING BILL LAST YEAR, CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS LESS THAN ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE BY (FORMER) SENIOR GOR OFFICIALS MEANT THAT LESS PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE THAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN - ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THEN-PRIME MINISTER PUTIN'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT ON THIS ISSUE AT LAST FALL'S ORGANIZED CRIME CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. HE ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS BETTER TO AVOID OVER-HASTE NOW, AND TO GET A GOOD MONEY-LAUNDERING BILL THROUGH THE DUMA. THERE WAS IN ANY EVENT, NO CHANCE OF GETTING A BILL ADOPTED BEFORE THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE MEETING IN PARIS THE WEEK OF JUNE 19. ILLARIONOV EXPRESSED SURPRISE, HOWEVER, WHEN HE WAS INFORMED THAT SIMPLE ADOPTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING LEGISLATION WOULD NOT REMOVE ANY RUSSIAN DESIGNATION AS A NON-COOPERATIVE JURISDICTION, AND THAT THEREFORE THIS

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EMBARRASSING STATUS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD BE IN EFFECT AT THE OKINAWA SUMMIT.

TRADE DELEGATION

11. (C) ILLARIONOV AGREED THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS COULD TAKE NOTE OF THE ENCOURAGING STEP OF THE FORTHCOMING HIGH-LEVEL U.S. TRADE MISSION LED BY ROBERT STRAUSS.

G-8

12. (C) HE SOUGHT CLARIFICATION BEFORE THE SUMMIT OF HIS REQUEST FOR A U.S. POSITION ON EARLY INCLUSION OF RUSSIA IN G-7/8 DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WAS A PARTICULAR PRIORITY OF PRESIDENT PUTIN.

YUGOSLAVIA LOANS

13. (C) AMBASSADOR COLLINS RAISED THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN LOANS TO YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEED FOR PUBLIC CLARIFICATION OF THIS ISSUE BY GOR. ILLARIONOV EXPRESSED HIS CONSTERNATION OVER THE ISSUE, SAYING THE FIRST HE HAD EVER HEARD OF ANY SUCH CREDITS WAS ON HIS TRIP LAST WEEK TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT SINCE HIS RETURN HE HAD SOUGHT INFORMATION FROM ALL PARTS OF THE GOR TO NO AVAIL AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR SUCH CREDITS IN EITHER THE FY-2000 OR FY-99 RUSSIAN BUDGET. HE SAID THAT SHAPOVALYANTS WAS NEITHER RESPONSIBLE FOR RUSSIAN FINANCIAL POLICY NOR A MEMBER OF THE CURRENT RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. HE SOUGHT ANY INFORMATION WE HAD ON THE REPORTS OF SUCH CREDITS (WHICH WE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED) ALONG WITH A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE THE PREVIOUS DAY (SEPTEL) WITH THE MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE. ILLARIONOV TOOK ON BOARD THE NEED FOR SOME KIND OF PUBLIC GOR CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUE BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

COMMENT

14. (C) ILLARIONOV, WHO WAS JOINED ONLY BY MFA NORTH AMERICA DEPUTY DIRECTOR KONDAKOV, AND WHO APPARENTLY STILL HAS VIRTUALLY NO STAFF DESPITE HIS DOUBLE RESPONSIBILITIES, APPEARED RELAXED BUT FOCUSSED IN THE DISCUSSION, CLEARLY HAVING MASTERED MATERIAL WHICH IN MEETINGS ONLY A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO, HE CONFESSED TO BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH. HE WAS ADROIT IN PRESSING HIS POINTS, AND GAVE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF WHEN HE COULD SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY ON PRESIDENT PUTIN'S VIEW AND WHERE ISSUES WERE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE HAS ALSO RETAINED HIS UNIQUE SENSE OF HUMOR. HE WAS GIVING AN INTERVIEW TO A GROUP OF WESTERN PRESS FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION. WHILE HE COMPLAINED THAT

"IZVESTIA" PUBLISHED AN "INTERVIEW" WITH HIM THAT
NEVER TOOK PLACE, HE HAS ESTABLISHED A HIGH MEDIA
PROFILE IN THE FEW WEEKS SINCE HE WAS NAMED
PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC ADVISER. HE SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN
TO HIS NEW ROLE WITH ALACRITY AND VERVE.

COLLINS

TOR: 06/03/00 12:34:36

DIST: SIT: BLACK BRUNS BRZEZINSKI NSC DAVIDSON DUNCAN ELKIND Gire HINCKLEY LEE
MASSEY MEDISH SUM2 TEDSTROM WEISS WOLOSKY
PRT: BASH BERGER BRADTKE CROCKER FUERTH POWELL RUDMAN SIBERELL SIT{C2}
STEINBERG USTR{P\\SOCKS\GRD-2PS,O6}
SIT: COQ

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mark Medish to Andrew Weiss re: Talking Points for First Meeting (9 pages)	06/02/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
002. email	Steedman Hinekley to Leandro Aragoneillo et al. re: Very Quick-and-dirty draft memo on the Moscow Summit (4 pages)	06/05/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
003. email	Steedman Hinekley to Leandro Aragoneillo re: for the VP's Book Tuesday [Memorandum for the Vice President from Leon Fuerth re: Preliminary Moscow Summit Readout] (4 pages)	06/06/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
004. email	Andrew Weiss to Mark Brzezinski re: Summit Read-Out (2 pages)	06/07/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
005. email	Andrew Weiss to Jonathan Elkind and Ian Bowles re: Fuller Read-Out from Putin Bilateral (3 pages)	06/09/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
006. email	Mark Medish to Andrew Weiss re: Moscow Summit Follow-Up (2 pages)	06/14/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
007. email	Jonathan Elkind to Andrew Weiss re: FW: Moscow Summit Follow-Up (5 pages)	06/15/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Moscow and Summit])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:
[06/02/2000-06/15/2000]

2016-0114-M
kh1812

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.34)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME 06/02/2000 1:59:21 PM

FROM Medish, Mark C. (RUE)

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/02/2000

DECLASSIFYON 06/03/2010

SUBJECT TALKING POINTS FOR FIRST MEETING ~~[SECRET]~~

TO Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner TPs__.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Introduction

* Pleased to be back in Moscow at this crucial time for you and Russia. I was determined to reaffirm my support.

* Believe summit is a chance to make fresh start, take our cooperation to a new level. Relationship with Russia central to global peace and my overall agenda.

* Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of steps you take. See summit as opportunity to chart agenda that will carry us through Okinawa, UN Millennium Summit, and APEC.

* Also want to strengthen foundation for U.S.-Russian relations for next Administration. Understand Russia faces enormous challenges, but put highest premium on your success.

* Yeltsin brought freedom to Russia. Main challenge is to bring about

stability,
prosperity without endangering liberty. Want to learn more about your strategy
for moving Russia forward and your priorities. Know you're not promising
miracles.

Goals for Moscow Summit

* See five core objectives to come out of this summit:

* (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship,
which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core
objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four
years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will
provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can
take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

* (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic
arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as
commercial space launch.
* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus) where
there are opportunities for win-win outcomes from working together.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that
benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in
reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

Benefits of Strategic Relationship

* First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique
opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

* Have witnessed dramatic changes in relationship since 1992 in nearly all
spheres. During Cold War era of rivalry and competition, main issue

was
strategic balance because we were adversaries.

* Situation now is totally different. Need to work hard to strengthen strategic
equilibrium, increase confidence. Want to have more focused discussion on arms
control issues tomorrow.

* Pleased that we're working together on new century's challenges -- economic
cooperation and integration, ethnic conflict, terrorism, health, and transnational crime -- issues that really affect health of societies.

* For past seven and half years, one unifying concept behind my approach on all
issues on our agenda -- to maximize possibility for win-win outcomes.

Cooperation must provide tangible benefits for both sides to be sustainable.

* Should talk tonight about how we achieve greater sense of common purpose on
security issues, Russia's international integration, regional security issues.

* Know that both of us are not entirely satisfied with ups and downs in
relationship along the way. Important to remember, as Boris told me in Cologne,
that we faced toughest test of our relations over Kosovo and passed.

*
Dispute over Kosovo was sobering experience for both of us. Know you played key
role in defusing conflict. Russian troop contribution still very reassuring to
Serbs. Should talk candidly about how we handle these kinds of challenges in
future.

Putin's Agenda

* You've had strong political and economic success. Russian economy has been
enjoying rebound since 1998 financial crisis. Want to hear your plans to use
this period to accelerate economic reforms, strengthen Russian democracy.

* Russia, like all countries, will need to grapple with range of forces shaping
new international economic environment. We should talk a bit about how to be
competitive in new global economy, how to strengthen human capital, technological
edge.

* We live in an era of globalizing markets in which investors choose countries
and not the other way around, but both benefit. Key is to improve investment
climate.

* Respect for rule of law, transparency, and predictability central to how
investors will view Russia. So, too, is your fight against corruption.

* Have seen corruption undermine growth and development in countries around the
world. You have a unique chance early on to set standards.

New Global Economy

* We are witnessing an unprecedented expansion of the global economic frontier.
There are several mutually reinforcing developments at the center of this
revolution.

* First, technological breakthroughs. Today, invention matters more than mass
production. And information matters most of all.

* Second, the spread of market forces. Advantage has shifted to systems in which
economic power and opportunities are more decentralized, in which individual
initiative and entrepreneurship flourish.

* Third, the truly global scope of economic integration. Along with the end of
the Cold War, this will be the great story of the 20th century: the appearance of
vibrant emerging markets, where literally billions of people live, moving toward
rapid growth.

* In U.S., we have tried to maximize benefits of these forces while striving to

strengthen our fundamentals.

Key challenges are to maintain fiscal discipline, make investments in people,
deepen our own markets through deregulation, support spread of information and
know-how, and make sure new markets work for all our people.

Democracy, Chechnya

* You've emphasized importance of strengthening state institutions and connected
that task to promoting Russia's national vitality.

* Agree that fostering Russia's internal strength will have major impact on
success of reform effort and Russia's international role.

* Key question is whether that effort can be done without sacrificing the
elements of a free society that establish Russia's standing in the world (e.g.,
enhanced respect for rule of law, freedom of religion, stronger democratic
institutions, balanced relationship between center and regions, respect for
individuals' rights, and the environment.

* Have seen disturbing developments recently about Russia's independent media,
including the Babitsky case. Need to emphasize how important free media are to
overall success of democratic reform effort.
* Same applies to Chechnya. I know we disagree on this but I said to you in
Auckland last year I did not think there was an enduring military solution, and I
still think that's true.

* Hope you will move from military to political and civilian phase.

* Nothing will help Russia's image more than genuine progress on accountability
for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time
OSCE mission.

If raised: Counterterrorism Cooperation

* Share concern about threat posed to stability by international

terrorists.
Critically important to protect human rights while fighting terrorism. Pleased
with direction of our cooperation between our special services on Bin Ladin.

If raised: Public Support for Government Restructuring Plan

* Need to let parliament, governors, and Russian public debate and review your
proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't want to
interfere.

If raised: IFI's

* International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new
phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing less important than in past,
while World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

* United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a program that we hope
could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

If raised: Russia's Soviet-era debt

* New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of Russia's
Soviet-era obligations.

* To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's
performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

* If needed: London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but
not precedent for Paris Club.

If raised: G8 to Replace G7

* Russian membership in a full G7/8 must await establishment of a stable, growing
and prosperous economy with a sophisticated financial system that is making
substantial contribution to global economic and financial system.

If raised: WTO

* Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating
Russia's accession to WTO and solid commercial terms, will speed your integration
with global trading system, facilitating investment and economic growth.

* Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious
about reform, integration. Prepared to engage actively with you.

If raised: Market Economy Status

* Understand you may be filing a petition with the Commerce Department. If you
do, they will review it in a legal proceeding according to the standard criteria.

* Important for you to recognize and weigh the pros and cons of market vs.
non-market status. These designations apply only to dumping cases. Market
status would actually increase your exposure to trade penalties.

If raised: Jackson-Vanik

* We have declared Russia to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, and Russia
enjoys full NTR benefits.

* Congress remains concerned about issues such as implementation of Russia's
religion law, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and law denying immigration up to ten years
after access to state secrets.

* Encourage changes that would persuade Congress to graduate you from
Jackson-Vanik.

If raised: EXIM Projects

* It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case
were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward.
Understand progress is now being made on other important EX-IM projects.

If raised: NATO Enlargement

* Share common interest in building secure, integrated Europe. Keeping door open to new members key element of building stability. Not pressing countries to join, but Allies will review enlargement process in 2002.

* Partners are asking to join, pursuing sovereign right to choose means to ensure own security. Not going to set arbitrary limits on enlargement process or rule out certain aspirants. Such moves will only add to sense of insecurity.

If raised: Kosovo/KFOR

* Recent attacks on Russian troops intolerable. We're pressing Kosovar Albanians privately to cool it. Your role in KFOR very important, very reassuring to Serbian population.

If raised: Supercomputers

* This technology advances very rapidly. To keep ahead of the curve, we regularly review and revise our control levels. In past five years, I have tripled level of computers that Russian civilian end-users can obtain without export license.

* Most recent change was implemented in February -- allows license-free export to civilian end-users of systems that operate at speeds up to 20,000 Millions of Theoretical Operations per Second. Exports above require export license.

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.25)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME	06/05/2000 5:00:49 PM
FROM	Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/05/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/06/2010
SUBJECT	VERY quick-and-dirty draft memo on the Moscow summit ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP) Babbitt, James F. (VP) Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP) Black, Steven K. (VP) Bolan, Christopher J. (VP) Davidson, Leslie K. (VP) Dennett, Todd H. (VP) Fuerth, Leon S. (VP) Gobush, Matthew N. (VP) Hinckley, Steedman (VP) Orfini, Michael H. (VP) Osius, Theodore G. (VP) Roberts, Michael W. (VP) Saunders, Richard M. (VP) Woolston, Ann E. (VP)
CARBON_COPY	
TEXT_BODY	So Q&D, in fact, I haven't even proofed it.
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT	000605 memo to vp on summit.doc

June 5, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Preliminary Moscow Summit Readout

I'm still in the process of gathering information, but wanted to give you at least a preliminary readout of the President's meetings with Putin. Overall, they produced few surprises. As expected, Putin more or less treaded water on strategic issues; invited closer cooperation on regional security issues; mouthed all the right things on the economy; and tenaciously defended Russian actions in Chechnya. Of specific interest to you, the Moscow summit:

* Produced no breakthroughs on arms control, but preserved our NMD options;

* Did not focus at length on nonproliferation issues, although an agreement on Russia's space launch quota was announced (if not perfectly executed - see below); and

* Touted the role of the US-Russia Binational Commission, which the President plugged publicly and privately in his talks with Putin.

* The most important development, in my view, may have been the time both presidents spent one-on-one, which in terms of personal chemistry could help pay dividends down the line. The biggest surprise was the extent to which Putin focused on Afghanistan, a harbinger of his domestic and security priorities.

Security Issues

According to Strobe, who was the only one to accompany the President for the most sensitive exchanges, the discussion of NMD went exactly as expected. Even so, Strobe says, we're on track - "not one station ahead, not one behind." We laid out our case, to which Putin's noncommittal answer was: let's keep talking. That was basically all that Strobe could tell me over the phone in the clear; I will report further details as they become clear.

Putin was clearly not anxious to get into nonproliferation issues, which in the end did not garner much discussion. Agreement was reached, however, on a joint statement regarding the space launch quota. Per that agreement, Putin was supposed to publicly take ownership of the proliferation problem by pledging certain commitments, while the President for his part would declare his "aim" to end launch constraints. As it turned out, the President delivered his statement at Sunday's press conference, but Putin did not deliver his. Members of the Russian delegation reportedly were embarrassed and chagrined that Putin dropped the ball. It's possible his omission was an honest mistake, but it needs to be corrected at the earliest opportunity.

Regional security issues yielded mixed results. There was much sparring over Chechnya, on which Putin was utterly uncompromising. The longest discussion was on Afghanistan, where Putin urged closer cooperation against instability/terrorism /Islamic threats originating from that part of the world. He specifically urged closer cooperation against UBL, to which the President reportedly agreed. Putin similarly welcomed more cooperation on Nagorno-Karabakh, but indicated he will support Armenia's request for a pause in the peace process. On CFE issues, Putin accused Georgia of failing to control its territory, but nevertheless pledged that Moscow will honor its commitments on base closings. He similarly pledged to honor Russian CFE commitments in Moldova, but warned that he would need more time to fulfill them. Discussion on the Balkans focused on Milosevic but apparently failed to make any progress. There was also a short exchange on NATO.

Economics

On economics, Putin pushed hardest for Paris Club debt relief. He pointed to the precedents established by the London Club deal and to Poland's 50

percent
write-off, and complained that the West is punishing Russia with debt payments
just when the Russian economy is beginning to recover.

Putin touted his economic gains and reform agenda. He said his top priorities
would include tax, customs and bank reform; new legislation on capital flight,
corruption and money laundering; PSA; and relations with the IFIs. Putin hopes
to reach a new deal with the IMF sometime before the July G-8 summit in Okinawa.
Putin also expressed interest in a range of trade topics, from Jackson-Vanik and
WTO to PNTR and supercomputers. Much discussion was devoted to climate change,
deforestation and other environmental issues, and Putin presented a lengthy
explanation of his move to disband the State Committee for Environmental
Protection, a decision he has since said he would reconsider. Finally, Putin
repeatedly expressed interest in putting to work the Binational Commission; the
President agreed, and explained what it is prepared to do, notwithstanding your
campaign schedule.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME	06/06/2000 2:23:17 PM
FROM	Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/06/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/07/2010
SUBJECT	for the VP's book Tue ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
CARBON_COPY	
TEXT_BODY	
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT	000605 memo to vp on summit.doc

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.26)
KBH 5/14/2021

June 6, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Preliminary Moscow Summit Readout

Apart from the readout from Sandy that I'll provide you separately, I'm still in
the process of gathering information and trying to reconcile conflicting accounts
of the President's meetings with Putin. But I wanted to provide you a preliminary synopsis. Overall, the summit produced few surprises. As expected,
Putin more or less treaded water on strategic issues; invited closer cooperation
on regional security issues; mouthed all the right things on the economy; and
tenaciously defended Russian actions in Chechnya. Of specific interest to you,
the Moscow summit:

* Produced no breakthroughs on arms control, but preserved our NMD options;

* Did not focus at length on nonproliferation issues, although the space launch
quota was addressed (if imperfectly); and

* Touted the role of the US-Russia Binational Commission, which the President
plugged publicly and privately in his talks with Putin.

The most important development, in my view, may have been the time both
presidents spent one-on-one, which in terms of personal chemistry could help pay
dividends down the line. The biggest surprise was the extent to which Putin
focused on Afghanistan, a harbinger of his domestic and security priorities.

Security Issues

According to Strobe, who was the only one to accompany the President for the
most sensitive exchanges, the discussion of NMD went exactly as expected: no
compromise was reached. Even so, Strobe says, we're on track - "not one station
ahead, not one behind." We laid out our case, to which Putin's noncommittal
answer was: let's keep talking.

Putin was clearly not anxious to get into nonproliferation issues, which were
not discussed at length. Agreement was reached, however, on a joint statement
regarding the space launch quota. Per that agreement, Putin was supposed to
publicly take ownership of the proliferation problem by pledging certain
commitments, while the President for his part would declare his "aim" to end
launch constraints. As it turned out, the President delivered his statement at
Sunday's press conference, but Putin did not deliver his. Members of the Russian
delegation reportedly were embarrassed and chagrined that Putin dropped the ball.
It's possible his omission was an honest mistake, but it needs to be

corrected
at the earliest opportunity (Ambassador Collins will raise it with Sergey Ivanov
today).

* It's still not yet clear when the military plutonium agreement will be ready
for your signing. I will let you know as soon as that becomes known. (Prime
Minister Kasyanov, by the way, participated by VTC in last week's CNN event in
Atlanta.)

Discussion of regional security issues yielded mixed results. There was much
sparring over Chechnya, on which Putin was utterly uncompromising. The longest
discussion was on Afghanistan, where Putin urged closer cooperation against
instability/terrorism/Islamic threats originating from that part of the world.
He specifically urged closer cooperation against UBL, to which the President
reportedly agreed. Putin similarly welcomed more cooperation on Nagorno-Karabakh,
but indicated he will support Armenia's request for a pause in the peace
process. On CFE issues, Putin accused Georgia of failing to control its

territory, but nevertheless pledged that Moscow will honor its commitments on
base closings. He similarly pledged to honor Russian CFE commitments in Moldova,
but warned that he would need more time to fulfill them. Discussion on the
Balkans focused on Milosevic but apparently failed to make any progress. There
was also a short exchange on NATO.

Economics

On economics, Putin pushed hardest for Paris Club debt relief. He pointed to
the precedents established by the London Club deal and to Poland's 50 percent
write-off, and complained that the West is punishing Russia with debt payments
just when the Russian economy is beginning to recover.

Putin touted his economic gains and reform agenda. He said his top

priorities
would include tax, customs and bank reform; new legislation on capital flight,
corruption and money laundering; PSA; and relations with the IFIs. Putin hopes
to reach a new deal with the IMF sometime before the July G-8 summit in Okinawa.
Putin also expressed interest in a range of trade topics, from Jackson-Vanik and
WTO to PNTR and supercomputers. Much discussion was devoted to climate change,
deforestation and other environmental issues, and Putin presented a lengthy
explanation of his move to disband the State Committee for Environmental
Protection, a decision he has since said he would reconsider. Finally, Putin
repeatedly expressed interest in making greater use of the Binational Commission.
The President agreed, and in his public remarks specifically called on the BNC
to carry the work forward.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.27)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME	06/07/2000 4:29:49 PM
FROM	Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/07/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/08/2010
SUBJECT	RE: Summit read-out ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO	Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
CARBON_COPY	Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE) Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE) Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE) Hinckley, Steedman (VP) Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN) Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN) Medish, Mark C. (RUE) Tedstrom, John E. (RUE) Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE) Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY

on afghan, VVP said there's this big arc of instability (yawn), RF has no plans for airstrikes. Presidents agreed to cooperate on dealing with Taliban through sanctions and other levers.

On money laundering,
VVP broke no new ground other than to say it's important and that we need to distinguish between means to fight it and means to fight capital flight and attract capital toward investment in Russia.

-----Original Message-----
From: Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)

Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2000 3:52 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Subject: Summit
read-out [UNCLASSIFIED]

AW: I feel I have yet to get a full read-out
on what happened at the summit. I realize that my interests are

low in the priority totem pole in comparison with what you and MM have to deal with, but I feel unable to speak with knowledge to people like Steedman, Jeff Starr, and others when they ask me what happened at the Moscow summit regarding CT and Central Asia. I also do not know what happened regarding Money Laundering and other rule of law issues, so am unable to respond when Lee W. asks what went down. Should we talk?? MB

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.2B)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME	06/09/2000 4:02:36 PM
FROM	Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/09/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/10/2010
SUBJECT	RE: fuller readout from putin bilat [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO	Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE) Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
CARBON_COPY	

TEXT_BODY

agree -- it's a mystery

-----Original Message-----
From: Elkind,
Jonathan H. (RUE)
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 3:43 PM
To: Weiss,
Andrew S. (RUE); Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
Subject: RE: fuller readout
from putin bilat [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

I still puzzle over Putin's statements
about where the regulatory functions will be placed. Is he (a) ill-informed?

(b) deliberately attempting to deceive? (c) not yet showing his hand
publicly?

I don't think that (c) is what is happening. Too artful.
Option (b) is just to easy a quip to make. Option (a) does not
really seem to fit either...

-----Original Message-----
From:
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 3:34 PM
To: Bowles,
Ian A. (ENV)
Cc: Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Subject: RE: fuller

readout from putin bilat [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

my memory is fuzzy on
what exactly went into the TPs but i don't recall the POC point.
that kind of request sounds like it was kinda below the waterline
for POTUS. recommend you push that request out to collins via front
channel or whatever omnibus follow up step you're planning.

memcon
hasn't been done but here's a snippet from the notes (pls treat as
close-hold).

The President said he was particularly pleased
by the statement on climate change. ("Having once been in Moscow
in January, I was afraid you might favor global warming.") There
were many economic possibilities for Russia in dealing with climate
change, not only because of its natural gas reserves, but because
jobs are created by the policies needed to deal with the problem.
It's a good trend that people can make money by doing good things
for the environment. All governments will want to be seen as pro-growth
and pro-environment at the same time. But given this reality, he
wanted to know why Putin had abolished the state committee on the
environment.

Putin explained this decision as follows. He knew
that the environment was one of Vice President Gore's special interests,
"one of his political aces." And the environment will e a priority
for us, after having been ignored for a long time. For example,
forest rehabilitation was a big issue, and the previous ministry
had combined two functions - environmental and industrial. But priority
had always been given to commercial considerations; environmental
concerns were left out; the same had happened to the environment
committee, which had a strong connection to commercial interests.
Now these would be separated totally. The prime minister had re-assigned

this responsibility to another ministry, which would aim to preserve
environmental protection. Licensing, meanwhile, would be done in
a separate government agency.

-----Original Message-----
From: Bowles,
Ian A. (ENV)
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 3:04 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew
S. (RUE)
Cc: Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Subject: fuller readout
from putin bilat [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

andrew -- jon gave me parts of

the readout, but i was still unclear on one question which was whether potus delivered the point on asking putin for a senior advisor to focus on climate change w/us and what if any response this drew from putin.

can you email me the relevent section of the overall readout on enviro if that has been done? thanks, ian

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.29)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME 06/14/2000 5:22:49 PM

FROM Medish, Mark C. (RUE)

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/2000

DECLASSIFYON 06/15/2010

SUBJECT Moscow summit follow up ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY
Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Fishel, Eugene (Gene) M. (RUE)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY

Russia

security

1. strategic arms control dialgoue

--
NMD -- next meeting Strobe/GEM June 19?
-- Start 3 -- next meeting
Holum/Kapralov?
-- shared early warning -- ?

2. non-proliferation

--
military Pu -- raise money for disposition? (Okinawa?)
-- civil
Pu -- ?
-- launch quota -- monitor progress on Holum-Koptev criteria
--

HEU -- issue E.O. immunizing assets from attachment

3. regional

--
Nato relationship: follow up from Cohen visit
-- Afghanistan/CT
working group: define scope of work, identify team at State
--
NK: bilateral efforts
-- Moldova/Georgia CFE: maintain pressure
to implement commitment
-- FRY: continue to look for opportunities
to apply pressure on Belgrade

non-security

-- IMF, World Bank:
monitor program status (Treasury lead; note -- Summers is considering pre-Okinawa trip to Moscow)
-- Debt: consider options for debt
relief, Okinawa communique language (Treasury, NEC lead)
-- WTO:
work with USTR to respond to Russian initiatives with technical advice, possible Barshefsky visit
-- BIT: consider amendments
to treaty (State, Treasury, Commerce studying Russian proposals)
--
Market Economy Status: study, respond to Russia paper on applying for status change (Commerce lead)
-- BNC: OVP working with Piskoppel
on summer agenda
-- investment climate: Strauss mission (?); consider
Daley mission later this year

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.30)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME	06/15/2000 4:03:25 PM
FROM	Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/14/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/15/2010
SUBJECT	FW: Moscow summit follow-up ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CARBON_COPY	Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)

TEXT_BODY

Andrew:

I have edited on top of Ian's edits.

Jon

-----Original
Message-----
From: Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
Sent: Thursday, June
15, 2000 2:47 PM
To: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE); Elkind, Jonathan H.
(RUE); Hinckley, Steedman (VP); Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Subject: FW:
Moscow summit follow-up ~~[SECRET]~~

All -- I have suggested 3 follow
up items on climate/enviro, but have questions for you on all 3.
Specifically, on read out from the bilat, it was not clear to me
whether Potus delivered the TP asking for a political level interlocutor

to work with us before the November climate meeting. We need
someone
apart from just Hydromet to talk with, however, this goes to what
the specific agenda and bureaucratic level of engagement for
upcoming
BNC meeting. Can you all shed light? Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Weiss,
Andrew S. (RUE)
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2000 9:05 PM
To: Medish,
Mark C. (RUE); Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE); Bowles, Ian A. (ENV); Hinckley, Steedman (VP); Maertens, Thomas R. (NONPRO); Yee, Hoyt
B. (EUR); Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE); Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE); Black, Steven K. (VP); Camp, Donald A. (NESA);
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ENVIRON
- Environmental; @NIS; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @EUROPE - European
Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: Moscow summit follow-up
~~[SECRET]~~

SRB asked that we provide a run-down on summit items
by Thursday morning. There are a few holes (e.g., enviro, NK/Georgia,
dumping) in attached doc that I'd appreciate your help on. Any missing
items?

Hans/Steve: I'd just assume not cover arms control issues
that are being discussed elsewhere. Is there anything like SEW that we need to cover?

Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Moscow Summit Follow-up Matrix.doc
U.S. - RUSSIA SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP
Issue
Next Steps
Military Plutonium Disposition Agreement
* VP, PM Kasyanov to sign agreement via video-link in June.

* POTUS letter to G-8 counterparts will highlight importance of financial
support.
Civil Plutonium Initiative (reprocessing moratorium)
* Issue remanded to experts-level discussion. Key sticking point is Russian
desire to sell additional power reactors to Iran, U.S. desire to get Russian
specific private assurances vis-à-vis nuclear cooperation with Iran.
HEU/NOGA Lawsuit

* POTUS to issue executive order immunizing Russian assets.
Space Launch Quota
* FM Ivanov made public comments on June 9 regarding Putin's commitment to
nonproliferation norms (missing from Putin's press conference remarks).

* Awaiting Russian performance on export control-related steps on problem
entities, Iranian procurement activities as specified in Holum-Koptev plan.

* Koptev visits Washington for talks on Commercial Space Launch Agreement on June
21-22.

* Leon Fuerth and Zvi Shtauber review of Russian proliferation issues in
Washington o/a June 26.
IMF, World Bank
* Monitor program status. Treasury lead. (Russians seeking Board vote on IMF
program by Okinawa; letter of intent more realistic.)

* Summers considering pre-Okinawa trip to Moscow.
Debt
* Interagency group considering options for debt relief, Okinawa communique
language. (Treasury/NEC lead)
WTO
* Russians needs to appoint senior point-person on accession.

* RESPOND TO RUSSIAN PROPOSALS ON TARRIFS??

* USTR to intensify work with Russians, respond to Russian intitiatives, provide
technical advice

* Possible Barshefsky visit
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT
* Agencies considering Russian-proposed amendments to Treaty.
Market Economy Status
* Commerce leading study, possible response to Russian paper on applying for
status change.
Investment Climate
* Strauss mission on hold, possible Daley mission (summer/fall)
DUMPING?????
* ?????????
Climate Change, Environment Issues

* Binational Commission to continue technical cooperation on climate change
* Embassy Moscow to request for a political level interlocutor with work with USG
on climate change in advance of November meeting on Kyoto Protocol.
* Embassy to continue stressing importance of Russian having independent
environmental regulatory function and credible environmental policy-making
entity. US Sherpa to raise our concerns with other G7.
Binational Commission
* Fuerth working with Piskoppel on summer agenda

Russian Role in "NATO Planning Committee"
* Putin raised with Cohen. Proposal focused on seeking role in NATO

decision-making. Non-starter.

* State/NSC/DoD to discuss other vehicles for invigorating NATO-Russia
cooperation
Afghanistan Working Group
* State preparing gameplan, goals, objectives for interagency consideration.

* Talbott complained to Russian ambassador about public announcement of group.
Nagorno-Karabakh
ELKIND: FILL IN PLEASE
Georgia
ELKIND: DITTO

CFE/Georgia/Moldova
* Putin visit to Moldova June 16

* Dunkereley visit to Georgia on June 22. Will prepare a draft MOU reflecting
what we will need to release our assistance, for Georgia to provide to Russia.

* Russia-Georgia bilats June 22-24
Russia/FRY
* Ad hoc interagency group seeking clarification of Russian loans, other
assistance. Legislation pending (Helms), which would impact on U.S. and IFI
assistance.

* SQUIB ON NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING

Proposal for FMs to participate at G-8 summit
* No support for idea in G-8 core group.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Andrew Weiss to Douglas Bayley et al. re: Classified Fax for Moscow (4 pages)	06/01/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
002. email	Andrew Weiss to Andrew Weiss re: Talking Points for First Meeting (11 pages)	06/02/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
003. email	Andrew Weiss to Cheryl Barnett et al. re: Talking Points for First Meeting (9 pages)	06/02/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
004. email	Tomasz Malinowski to John Tedstrom re: POTUS Moscow Plane Briefing (5 pages)	06/04/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Moscow and Summit])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:
[06/01/2000 - 06/04/2000]

2016-0114-M
kh1813

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.31)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME 06/01/2000 7:34:17 PM

FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/01/2000

DECLASSIFYON 06/02/2010

SUBJECT Clas fax for Moscow ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Rogers, Elizabeth B. (WHSR)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY
Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Maertens, Thomas R. (NONPRO)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

TEXT_BODY

Please secure fax below document to EmbMoscow at OOB Friday. Stamp
it urgent, eyes only for addresses. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Short Strokes Memo_.doc

June 1, 2000

TO: STROBE TALBOTT
JIM COLLINS
STEVE SESTANOVICH

FROM: MARK MEDISH AND ANDREW WEISS

SUBJECT: Final Summit Preparations

We know that time is limited to do a final run-through with the Russians about
the summit, but would be grateful for anything you can do to make sure that
people at the MFA and Presidential Administration are aware of how we expect
things to run. JFC's meeting with Prikhodko on Friday is probably the best venue
to accomplish this goal.

The attached two pages may be useful to walk various folks through the issues we
expect the President will want to discuss with Putin -- and to smoke out the
Russians on their issues. The briefing book that Strobe is carrying can shed
additional light on tone, context, etc.

The list of documents to be signed or issued is still a work in progress, but the
attached list is accurate to the best of our knowledge. (Note: We are not aware
of the final outcome of the ST-ISI convo re: whether to sign the Principles

Document.) There are also a few dogs/cats items that we plan to handle via fact
sheet (e.g., the people to people items, joint steel dialogue, etc.).

SRB looked tonight at the Russian-proposed numbers for the first afternoon
meeting on Sunday (VVP-plus seven and interpreter) and asked that JFC go back to
the Russians and ask them to slim this down. He was not specific, but our goal
for the arms control discussion is to keep the size of the meeting very small.
(FYI: U.S. manifest is presently WJC plus five and interpreter).

Finally, we urgently need JFC's guidance on likely Russian press questions at the
press conference as well as curveballs that might come up during the radio
call-in program. We will arrive in Berlin at approx. 2 p.m. Friday. Thanks
again.
Saturday, June 3

* Dinner Meeting

Topics: Goals for U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, vision for cooperation
over next eight months and next four years.

Sunday, June 4

* First Afternoon Meeting

Topics: Arms Control, Nonproliferation Issues

* Restricted Meeting

Topics: Balkans, N-K, Georgia

* Second Afternoon Meeting:

Topics: Economics, Trade and Investment Issues, Global Integration Agenda (e.g.,
WTO)

Monday, June 5, 20000

* Courtesy Call

Topics: Wrap-up session, view ahead toward Okinawa, UN Millennium summit.

MOSCOW SUMMIT DELIVERABLES/STATEMENTS

TO BE SIGNED BY PRESIDENTS

Shared Early Warning Memorandum of Agreement (pending)
Civil Plutonium Initiative (pending)
Joint Statement on Military Plutonium Disposition (pending)

TO BE ISSUED BY PRESIDENTS

Principles Document (pending)
Joint Statement on Climate Change (pending)

UNDER CONSIDERATION

Joint Statement on the Middle East

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.3Z)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME 06/02/2000 11:34:09 AM

FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/02/2000

DECLASSIFYON 06/03/2010

SUBJECT TALKING POINTS FOR FIRST MEETING [~~SECRET~~]

TO Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner Summary Points.doc

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of steps you take. Hope to hear about your strategy for moving Russia forward, priorities for next eight months, four years. Five core objectives for summit:

* (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

* (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation

such as
space launch.

* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus). See
opportunities for win-win outcomes.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that
benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in
reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

* Respect for rule of law, transparency/predictability, fight against corruption
central to how investors will view Russia.

* Important not to endanger elements of open society that establish Russia's
standing in the world (e.g., freedom of religion, stronger democratic institutions, respect for individuals' rights, and the environment).

* Concerned about Russia's independent media, including the Babitsky case. Free
media central to success of reforms.
* On Chechnya, know we disagree, but have told you enduring military solution not
possible. Need genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses,
meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.
6

2
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Introduction

* Pleased to be back in Moscow at this crucial time for you and Russia. I was
determined to reaffirm my support.

* Believe summit is a chance to make fresh start, take our cooperation to a new
level. Relationship with Russia central to global peace and my overall agenda.

* Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of
steps you take. See summit as opportunity to chart agenda that will carry us
through Okinawa, UN Millennium Summit, and APEC.

* Also want to strengthen foundation for U.S.-Russian relations for next
Administration. Understand Russia faces enormous challenges, but put highest
premium on your success.

* Yeltsin brought freedom to Russia. Main challenge is to bring about stability,
prosperity without endangering liberty. Want to learn more about your strategy
for moving Russia forward and your priorities. Know you're not promising
miracles.

Goals for Moscow Summit

* See five core objectives to come out of this summit:

* (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship,
which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core
objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four
years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will
provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can
take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

* (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic

arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as
commercial space launch.
* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus) where
there are opportunities for win-win outcomes from working together.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that
benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in
reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

Benefits of Strategic Relationship

* First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique
opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

* Have witnessed dramatic changes in relationship since 1992 in nearly all
spheres. During Cold War era of rivalry and competition, main issue was
strategic balance because we were adversaries.

* Situation now is totally different. Need to work hard to strengthen strategic
equilibrium, increase confidence. Want to have more focused discussion on arms
control issues tomorrow.

* Pleased that we're working together on new century's challenges -- economic
cooperation and integration, ethnic conflict, terrorism, health, and transnational crime -- issues that really affect health of societies.

* For past seven and half years, one unifying concept behind my approach on all
issues on our agenda -- to maximize possibility for win-win outcomes.

Cooperation must provide tangible benefits for both sides to be sustainable.

* Should talk tonight about how we achieve greater sense of common purpose on
security issues, Russia's international integration, regional security issues.

* Know that both of us are not entirely satisfied with ups and downs

in
relationship along the way. Important to remember, as Boris told me in Cologne,
that we faced toughest test of our relations over Kosovo and passed.

*
Dispute over Kosovo was sobering experience for both of us. Know you played key
role in defusing conflict. Russian troop contribution still very reassuring to
Serbs. Should talk candidly about how we handle these kinds of challenges in
future.

Putin's Agenda

* You've had strong political and economic success. Russian economy has been
enjoying rebound since 1998 financial crisis. Want to hear your plans to use
this period to accelerate economic reforms, strengthen Russian democracy.

* Russia, like all countries, will need to grapple with range of forces shaping
new international economic environment. We should talk a bit about how to be
competitive in new global economy, how to strengthen human capital, technological
edge.

* We live in an era of globalizing markets in which investors choose countries
and not the other way around, but both benefit. Key is to improve investment
climate.

* Respect for rule of law, transparency, and predictability central to how
investors will view Russia. So, too, is your fight against corruption.

* Have seen corruption undermine growth and development in countries around the
world. You have a unique chance early on to set standards.

Democracy, Chechnya

* You've emphasized importance of strengthening state institutions and connected
that task to promoting Russia's national vitality.

* Agree that fostering Russia's internal strength will have major impact on success of reform effort and Russia's international role.

* Key question is whether that effort can be done without sacrificing the elements of a free society that establish Russia's standing in the world, enhanced respect for rule of law, freedom of religion, stronger democratic institutions, balanced relationship between center and regions, respect for individuals' rights, and the environment.

* Have seen disturbing developments recently about Russia's independent media, including the Babitsky case. Need to emphasize how important free media are to overall success of democratic reform effort.

* Same applies to Chechnya. I know we disagree on this but I said to you in Auckland last year I did not think there was an enduring military solution, and I still think that's true.

* Hope you will move from military to political and civilian phase.

* Nothing will help Russia's image more than genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

If raised: IFI's and External Debt

* International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing less important than in past, while World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

* United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a program that we hope could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

If raised: Russia's Soviet-era debt

* New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of

Russia's
Soviet-era obligations.

* To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's
performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

* If needed: London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but
not precedent for Paris Club.

If raised: WTO

* Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating
Russia's accession to WTO and solid commercial terms, will speed your integration
with global trading system, facilitating investment and economic growth.

* Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious
about reform, integration. Prepared to engage actively with you.

If raised: EXIM Projects

* It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case
were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward.
Understand progress is now being made on other EX-IM projects.

If raised: NATO Enlargement

* Share common interest in building secure, integrated Europe. Keeping door open
to new members key element of building stability. Not pressing countries to
join, but Allies will review enlargement process in 2002.

* Partners are asking to join, pursuing sovereign right to choose means to ensure
own security. Not going to set arbitrary limits on enlargement process or rule
out certain aspirants. Such moves will only add to sense of insecurity.

If raised: Kosovo/KFOR

* Recent attacks on Russian troops intolerable. We're pressing Kosovar Albanians

privately to cool it. Your role in KFOR very important, very reassuring to
Serbian population.
6

2
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Regional Mtg.doc
MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON REGIONAL ISSUES

KEY OBJECTIVES

* Seek Putin's support for Nagorno-Karabakh peace by pointing to important
advantages for Russia (and his own standing) from resolving conflict.

* Lay marker on our support for Georgia's territorial integrity and highlight
need to implement CFE commitments from Istanbul summit.

* Gauge Putin's bottom line on the Balkans and willingness to join forces on
behalf of the anti-Milosevic opposition.

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K). We have built up to this conversation through a series
of engagements with the Russians. The overall goal is to focus Putin on the
prestige and security benefits that will accrue to Russia for helping achieve
peace in a region so close to Chechnya.

Active Russian support is the critical ingredient for N-K peace. We need Putin to
be ready to step forward, to state his support publicly, and then to match the

public statements with unmistakable private signals to Yerevan. Putin is likely to tell you that his government has received ambiguous messages from Armenian officials about whether they favor the peace plan that Kocharian and Aliyev have discussed. We are confident that Yerevan's ambiguity represents only nervousness about Moscow's stance. Our Minsk Group negotiator, Carey Cavanaugh, as well as Madeleine and I have all stressed to Russian counterparts that now is the time for peace, a peace that cannot happen without Russian activism. Your objective is to close the sale by convincing Putin that this is his time to take the world stage as peacemaker.

Georgian Security, CFE. The Russians remain concerned about cross-border actions by Chechens and their ethnic kin just over the border in Georgia. You should highlight our "red line" about Georgian sovereignty and express appreciation for Putin's public commitment to respect Georgia's territorial integrity. We are providing support for Georgia's border guards, including helicopters and training, and an OSCE-led border monitoring mission. On CFE-related withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova, you should signal the importance of Russian implementation of commitments from Istanbul. Putin should understand that our financial support, to help defray costs of the withdrawal, is conditioned on Russia's working out a detailed schedule of withdrawal of Russian forces -- including both Treaty-limited items and other equipment/personnel -- and accompanying transparency measures.

It is possible that Putin will want to talk about an "arc of instability" from Islamic extremism that runs from Kosovo to Afghanistan and Chechnya to Central Asia. There is a kernel of truth in what he says, and we certainly have some common interests: for example, UBL. But we must be exceedingly cautious here.

Our overriding interest is not to give any perception of license to the Russian
military campaign in Chechnya or the recent threat of airstrikes in Afghanistan.

Balkans, Milosevic. Despite their clear distaste for Milosevic on a personal
level, Russian actions (e.g., FRY Minister of Defense Ojdanic's visit to Moscow,
later regretted publicly by Foreign Minister Ivanov) demonstrate continued
support for the Belgrade regime. Your discussion with Putin could help persuade
the Russians that we have a common interest in the Balkans and that Moscow is
best served not by continued engagement with Milosevic, but by hastening his
early departure and ending the instability he has fostered in the region. You
should emphasize that we will remain active in the region so long as Milosevic
stays in power, but can hasten our departure with stability that could come from
end of Milosevic-era. What's more, the Serbian leader's habit of provoking
confrontations in order to distract from domestic problems increases the
likelihood of conflict -- and therefore the chance of renewed NATO involvement --
in Montenegro, in Kosovo, and ultimately in Serbia itself.

Putin may try to probe our willingness to grant Milosevic amnesty in exchange for
his agreement to step down. We need to avoid giving the Russians the impression
that we are looking to them to negotiate a deal with Milosevic. An open-ended
amnesty offer could convince Milosevic that he is free to act with impunity until
circumstances compel him to leave office. Rather, we want to leave the onus
squarely on Milosevic to declare his intent to leave, but intimate to the

Russians that there may be common ground between us for crafting an exit strategy
should that day come.
~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE 2

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/18/10

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.33)
KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME	06/02/2000 2:10:27 PM
FROM	Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/02/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/03/2010
SUBJECT	TALKING POINTS FOR FIRST MEETING [~~SECRET~~]
TO	Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE) Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE) Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE) Hinckley, Steedman (VP) Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN) Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN) Medish, Mark C. (RUE) Tedstrom, John E. (RUE) Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE) Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
CARBON_COPY	
TEXT_BODY	as sent to SRB
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT	Putin Dinner TPs___.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Introduction

* Pleased to be back in Moscow at this crucial time for you and Russia. I was
determined to reaffirm my support.

* Believe summit is a chance to make fresh start, take our cooperation to a new
level. Relationship with Russia central to global peace and my overall agenda.

* Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of

steps you take. See summit as opportunity to chart agenda that will carry us through Okinawa, UN Millennium Summit, and APEC.

* Also want to strengthen foundation for U.S.-Russian relations for next Administration. Understand Russia faces enormous challenges, but put highest premium on your success.

* Yeltsin brought freedom to Russia. Main challenge is to bring about stability, prosperity without endangering liberty. Want to learn more about your strategy for moving Russia forward and your priorities. Know you're not promising miracles.

Goals for Moscow Summit

* See five core objectives to come out of this summit:

* (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

* (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as commercial space launch.

* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus) where there are opportunities for win-win outcomes from working together.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

Benefits of Strategic Relationship

* First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique
opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

* Have witnessed dramatic changes in relationship since 1992 in nearly all
spheres. During Cold War era of rivalry and competition, main issue was
strategic balance because we were adversaries.

* Situation now is totally different. Need to work hard to strengthen strategic
equilibrium, increase confidence. Want to have more focused discussion on arms
control issues tomorrow.

* Pleased that we're working together on new century's challenges -- economic
cooperation and integration, ethnic conflict, terrorism, health, and transnational crime -- issues that really affect health of societies.

* For past seven and half years, one unifying concept behind my approach on all
issues on our agenda -- to maximize possibility for win-win outcomes.

Cooperation must provide tangible benefits for both sides to be sustainable.

* Should talk tonight about how we achieve greater sense of common purpose on
security issues, Russia's international integration, regional security issues.

* Know that both of us are not entirely satisfied with ups and downs in
relationship along the way. Important to remember, as Boris told me in Cologne,
that we faced toughest test of our relations over Kosovo and passed.

*
Dispute over Kosovo was sobering experience for both of us. Know you played key
role in defusing conflict. Russian troop contribution still very reassuring to
Serbs. Should talk candidly about how we handle these kinds of challenges in

future.

Putin's Agenda

* You've had strong political and economic success. Russian economy has been enjoying rebound since 1998 financial crisis. Want to hear your plans to use this period to accelerate economic reforms, strengthen Russian democracy.

* Russia, like all countries, will need to grapple with range of forces shaping new international economic environment. We should talk a bit about how to be competitive in new global economy, how to strengthen human capital, technological edge.

* We live in an era of globalizing markets in which investors choose countries and not the other way around, but both benefit. Key is to improve investment climate.

* Respect for rule of law, transparency, and predictability central to how investors will view Russia. So, too, is your fight against corruption.

* Have seen corruption undermine growth and development in countries around the world. You have a unique chance early on to set standards.

New Global Economy

* We are witnessing an unprecedented expansion of the global economic frontier. There are several mutually reinforcing developments at the center of this revolution.

* First, technological breakthroughs. Today, invention matters more than mass production. And information matters most of all.

* Second, the spread of market forces. Advantage has shifted to systems in which economic power and opportunities are more decentralized, in which individual initiative and entrepreneurship flourish.

* Third, the truly global scope of economic integration. Along with the end of
the Cold War, this will be the great story of the 20th century: the appearance of
vibrant emerging markets, where literally billions of people live, moving toward
rapid growth.

* In U.S., we have tried to maximize benefits of these forces while striving to
strengthen our fundamentals.

* Key challenges are to maintain fiscal discipline, make investments in people,
deepen our own markets through deregulation, support spread of information and
know-how, and make sure new markets work for all our people.

Democracy, Chechnya

* You've emphasized importance of strengthening state institutions and connected
that task to promoting Russia's national vitality.

* Agree that fostering Russia's internal strength will have major impact on
success of reform effort and Russia's international role.

* Key question is whether that effort can be done without sacrificing the
elements of a free society that establish Russia's standing in the world (e.g.,
enhanced respect for rule of law, freedom of religion, tough fight against
anti-Semitism, balanced relationship between center and regions, respect for
individuals' rights, and the environment.

* Have seen disturbing developments recently about Russia's independent media,
including the Babitsky case. Need to emphasize how important free media are to
overall success of democratic reform effort.
* Same applies to Chechnya. I know we disagree on this but I said to you in
Auckland last year I did not think there was an enduring military solution, and I
still think that's true.

* Hope you will move from military to political and civilian phase.

* Nothing will help Russia's image more than genuine progress on accountability
for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time
OSCE mission.

If raised: Counterterrorism Cooperation

* Share concern about threat posed to stability by international terrorists.
Critically important to protect human rights while fighting terrorism. Pleased
with direction of our cooperation between our special services on Bin Ladin.

If raised: Public Support for Government Restructuring Plan

* Need to let parliament, governors, and Russian public debate and review your
proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't want to
interfere.

If raised: IFI's

* International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new
phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing less important than in past,
while World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

* United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a program that we hope
could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

If raised: Russia's Soviet-era debt

* New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of Russia's
Soviet-era obligations.

* To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's
performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

* If needed: London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but

not precedent for Paris Club.

If raised: G-8 to Replace G-7

* Russian membership in a full G-7/8 not ripe.

* Must see establishment of stable, growing and prosperous economy with
sophisticated financial system that is making substantial contribution to global
economic, financial system.

If raised: WTO

* Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating
Russia's accession to WTO and solid commercial terms, will speed your integration
with global trading system, facilitating investment and economic growth.

* Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious
about reform, integration. Prepared to engage actively with you.

If raised: Market Economy Status

* Understand you may be filing a petition with the Commerce Department. If you
do, they will review it in a legal proceeding according to the standard criteria.

* Important for you to recognize and weigh the pros and cons of market vs.
non-market status. These designations apply only to dumping cases. Market
status would actually increase your exposure to trade penalties.

If raised: Jackson-Vanik

* We have declared Russia to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, and Russia
enjoys full NTR benefits.

* Congress remains concerned about issues such as implementation of Russia's
religion law, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and law denying immigration up to ten years
after access to state secrets.

* Encourage changes that would persuade Congress to graduate you from
Jackson-Vanik.

If raised: EXIM Projects

* It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case
were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward.
Understand progress is now being made on other important EX-IM projects.

If raised: NATO Enlargement

* Share common interest in building secure, integrated Europe. Keeping door open
to new members key element of building stability. Not pressing countries to
join, but Allies will review enlargement process in 2002.

* Partners are asking to join, pursuing sovereign right to choose means to ensure
own security. Not going to set arbitrary limits on enlargement process or rule
out certain aspirants. Such moves will only add to sense of insecurity.

If raised: Kosovo/KFOR

* Recent attacks on Russian troops intolerable. We're pressing Kosovar Albanians
privately to cool it. Your role in KFOR very important, very reassuring to
Serbian population.

If raised: Supercomputers

* This technology advances very rapidly. To keep ahead of the curve, we
regularly review and revise our control levels. In past five years, I have
tripled level of computers that Russian civilian end-users can obtain without
export license.

* Most recent change was implemented in February -- allows license-free export to
civilian end-users of systems that operate at speeds up to 20,000 Millions of
Theoretical Operations per Second. Exports above require export

license.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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KBH 5/14/2021

DATE-TIME	06/04/2000 4:30:27 PM
FROM	Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/04/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/05/2010
SUBJECT	potus moscow plane briefing [~~SECRET~~]
TO	Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
CARBON_COPY	Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE) Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE) Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE) Hinckley, Steedman (VP) Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN) Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN) Medish, Mark C. (RUE) Tedstrom, John E. (RUE) Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE) Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
TEXT_BODY	
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT	Potus Briefing.doc POTUS Briefing Checklist: Saturday Putin Dinner

1. Dealing with Putin

* What are Russian objectives? In public, to show strength, no bending to U.S.
and to demonstrate areas of tangible cooperation. In private, to be friendly,
give appearance of reasonableness. But Putin wants to keep options open, buy
time to mature, consolidate authority, and also hedge bets with respect to our
elections.

* Putin wants order, power, prestige, respect. Despite his in-command appearance

and apparent pragmatism, Putin may not be totally up-to-speed on our issues. Has tendency to see respect deriving from entitlement rather than merit. Wants to be part of modern world, but does not fully understand it. Suspects that main U.S. objective is to do things "our way" -- because we can.

* Putin style. Chameleon, not transparent. Will try to be palsy, but will generally tell you what he thinks you want to hear. Key is to get him to open up.

* On tough issues like Chechnya and free media, Putin will likely trot out complex, vague theories of threats to security ("arc of instability" due to Islamic extremism); complaints about journalists/media (e.g., Babitskiy, Gusinskiy) and NGOs as "anti-Russian" or "traitors".

* On his issues (Chechnya, new "vertical" government restructuring effort, the economy), he'll be looking for tacit - and public approval. Instinctively believes in interests, cost/benefit analysis more than relationships. But road may be open to build latter. Wants to be treated as world leader in own right; very suspicious of your past relationship with Yeltsin.

* Maxims. Need to find a zone of dialogue that is neither patronizing on our part nor paranoid on theirs. Need to sell win-win philosophy. Must lay down markers on our core issues (democracy, human rights, Chechnya, free media) and seek personal commitments from Putin.

2. Dinner/Summit Objectives

* Sketch strategic relationship, fresh start, take to higher level based on hard-headed, common interest and win-win approach; look at next eight months, next four years. Convince Putin of our stake in Russia's success.

* Outline other summit goals: 1/ gain better understanding of

economic reform
priorities, 2/ chart path forward on challenging A/C and non-pro issues, 3/
win-win cooperation on regional security issues; 4/ tangible announcements
demonstrating benefits of cooperation

* Key outcomes:

1/ Principles document
2/ Shared Early Warning
3/ Military Pu
4/ Civil Pu (potential)
5/ Space Launch, Iran nonpro
6/ Climate Change

* A/C heart-to-heart. Turn to Strobe for an update on where we are, strategy for
dinner and Sunday meetings.

* Reflect on "new economy," globalization, "third way". Use as platform to jog
Putin's imagination about win-win opportunities, nature of national strength and
vitality in 21st century. Putin needs to seize opportunity ("honeymoon period")
on economy - now.

3. Fireproofers / Markers

Political Dimension: Managed Democracy?

* Putin may be headed in the direction of Pinochet or Fujimori, namely
pro-business, results-oriented economics combined with curbs on democracy, civil
liberties. Need to lay markers, avoid tacit endorsement.

* Chechnya. "Arc of instability stretching from Kosovo to to Afghanistan to
Chechnya," "tip of the iceberg," "fighting for civilization."

* Still not seriously investigating abuses or letting OSCE back in. New credible
reports this week from U.S. human rights community detailing massacres. Need to
use great caution on counterterrorism cooperation.

* Reform of Federal/Regional Structures. Trying to consolidate "vertical power."
Plan seems to radically shift separation of powers in favor of Kremlin (e.g.,
removal of popularly-elected governors by Presidential fiat) and add unnecessary
layers (seven "supergovernors").

* Unruliness of federalism in Russia and obvious desire for power by Putin
complicates issue, under debate in Parliament. Putin is looking for your public
endorsement of issue -- be careful to avoid.

* Crackdown on media. Putin will say he's not hostile; rather he's "going after
oligarchs (Gusinskiy) for tax evasion." Putin may call for you to soft-pedal
issue publicly or complain about visit to Moscow radio station.

* Duma speech will echo Putin's own words. Emphasize that real test of media
freedoms is dealing with extreme, unpalatable points of view.

* Jewish community. Putin has right instincts (grew up with Jewish family in
communal apartment). Urge him to speak up in public. Kremlin pressure on chief
rabbi to retire.

Economic Dimension: Self-reliance - and new demands

* Seems to put premium on self-reliance. Wants to diminish Western leverage.
Despite self-reliance and ethic of results, still a sense of entitlement,
expectation of uncritical political support from outside.

* Debt relief. Will press for it. "Why are you punishing us for our better than
expected performance?" We need to keep incentives right.

* Can give interim relief through rescheduling once they have IMF program.
Premature to talk about anything beyond that (reduction).

* G-8. May ask to abolish G-7, make Russia full member of G-7. Not ripe. G-7
comprises largest economies, financial players; crucial for financial crisis
management. G-8 is premier political club.

* WTO. Need to understand it's a question requiring political decision from
inside Russia, not from outside (i.e., U.S.). Highlight force multiplier effect
from pushing on WTO - e.g., benefits to China's own internal reforms.

* IMF. Complain that IMF is harping on old conditionality. Wants to lock in new
program by Okinawa. Should express in his team's ability to negotiate suitable
program with Fund. We support finalization of strong, new program.

Regional Security

* Afghanistan/Central Asia/Taleban. Putin may raise in context of UBL-Chechnya
link. Must avoid any green - or amber -- light for Russian airstrikes.

* Yugoslavia. Putin may complain about Kosovo independence, threats to Russian
forces. Emphasize we're not favoring Kosovo independence and we're telling
Albanians not to threaten Russian troops.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Cathy Millison to Andrew Weiss re: Russia, Kiev Trip [pages 151-236] (85 pages) Partial release - KBH 11/20/2023	06/06/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
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FOLDER TITLE:
[06/06/2000] [2]

2016-0114-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

* Georgia's independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty are very
important to the U.S., security of entire Caucasus region. Have long expressed
our concern about danger of spillover of conflict in neighboring Chechnya.

* Have been encouraged by President Putin's statements about respect for
Georgia's territorial integrity. Important that Russia and Georgia continue to
work together to ensure border is secure.

* * *
What are you and President Putin doing to achieve a solution to the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh?

* We have been working together on this issue for a long time. We have seen some
positive developments over past year, including direct discussions between
Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian.

* President Putin and I agreed to stay actively involved in promoting a

settlement. He will be seeing both Presidents soon. I saw Aliyev recently in
Washington. I will see Kocharian this month.

Russian citizens are having their human rights abused in the Baltics - why aren't
you speaking up about this and why are you pressing to bring these countries into
NATO?

* I know that this issue is very sensitive to people in Russia. But the Baltic
countries have made progress integrating ethnic Russians into their societies but
that process obviously is not yet complete.

* The independence of the Baltics is very important. Strong cooperation between
Russia and its closest neighbors is good for Russia, good for its neighbors, good
for stability in region.

* On the NATO issue, a more stable Europe is good for everybody - we should not have any new dividing lines. NATO membership is open to any and all European democracies that express interest and would contribute to the security of the Alliance. The Balts have expressed interest. We haven't made any decisions.

How do you evaluate your interaction with Russia on Caspian energy issues and manage Moscow's ambitions there? How do you respond to the charges that the US is pursuing a "sphere of influence" in the Caspian region at Russia's expense?

* U.S. not pursuing sphere of influence in Caspian region. Russia and U.S. both benefit from the emergence of thriving, prosperous independence countries in the Caspian region. Promoting economic development is best way to ensure long-run stability and stem ethnic tensions and extremism in the Caspian region.

* Development of the energy sector is key to economic prospects for most of these countries. We see this as a win-win opportunity, for Russia, the U.S, and the countries themselves.

* We favor multiple export pipelines. These are commercially driven projects. U.S. and Russian companies are competing with others for stakes.

ENVIRONMENT

Any comment on Putin's decree abolishing Russia's State Committee on Environment?
Did you raise with Putin?

* Have had constructive cooperation with Russians on the environment for more than 25 years including climate change and ozone depletion. Environmental matters very important in Russia, given huge scale of Soviet-era environmental damage.

* Pleased that we agreed on cooperation on climate change. Russia will give
appropriate pricing to environment.

* Part of effective environmental protection is having effective institutions -
both intelligent regulation and an active, independent non-governmental
environmental community. Applaud the work of Russian environmental
organizations.

If pressed -- Did you raise with Putin?

* We have been expressing concerns with the Russian government.

What is the significance of the joint statement on climate?

* The statement highlights our attention to this critical global environmental
challenge and our common agenda moving forward.

* It illustrates our shared vision that countries can achieve robust economic
growth while protecting the environment and taking action to combat climate
change.

* We're also going to cooperate with Russia in the measurement and reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions, the development of market-based tools for managing
those emissions, and the identification of specific opportunities to further
reduce or sequester those emissions.

* The statement reaffirms our belief that it would be counterproductive to our
environmental goals to limit the Kyoto mechanisms by placing quantitative
restrictions on their use. It reaffirms the importance of developing rigorous
and transparent rules and guidelines for the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility
mechanisms, including international emissions trading and "joint implementation"
projects.

Environmentalists and the EU charge that Russia is getting a free ride. Its greenhouse gas emissions are down, yes, but that's largely attributable to the overall economic downturn, not good environmental policy. Why should Russia be able to sell these "hot air" credits? Doesn't this undermine the integrity of the Kyoto agreement?

* The decline in Russian emissions since 1990 is attributable to a variety of causes, including sound energy and environmental policy decisions -- such as an increased reliance on clean burning natural gas over particularly dirty forms of coal -- as well as Russia's overall economic performance.

* All of these factors went into setting Russia's overall emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. Russia's target, like our own, was approved by the international community in 1997.

* The Kyoto market mechanisms, including emissions trading, help promote cost effective emission reductions, ensuring that each dollar or ruble spent produces the maximum environmental benefit.

* Limiting Russia's use of the Kyoto mechanisms would be neither fair nor justified if one wants to strengthen the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol.

Why shouldn't the international community place limits on "emissions trading?" Isn't the United States seeking to buy fake emissions credits anyway instead of taking action to address climate change at home?

* The United States intends fully to achieve a substantial portion of emission reductions at home. At the same time, limiting access to the Kyoto mechanisms would be unwise.

* The Kyoto market mechanisms, including emissions trading, help promote cost
effective emission reductions, ensuring that each dollar or ruble spent produces
the maximum environmental benefit.

* We should not force U.S. companies to reduce emissions in a costly manner if
they can do so at half the price abroad.

* A reduction abroad has the same environmental benefit as a reduction at home.
*

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT POTUS-Putin dinner, ST memo, Jan 3 00.doc
Saturday, June 03, 2000

To Sec. Albright and APNSA Berger
From Strobe Talbott
Subject: POTUS working dinner with Putin

This is a quick report on the dinner, concentrating on NMD and a couple of other
pressing and/or troublesome issues (e.g., Putin's tough talk in Chechnya). I'll
work with Peter on a fuller and more formal memcon, but I wanted you to have this
right away, among other things so that you could have it before going into the
Sunday sessions (that will now begin with another one-on-one).

First, NMD. It came up twice, once during the first half of the dinner (before
the tour of the Kremlin apartment) - with the President making the U.S. domestic
political case. Putin pushed back rather curtly: "yes, I see your point, but
follow the physician's oath - 'do no harm.'" Then it came up again at the very
end - after Putin had tried to close the evening down and move to the jazz
concert. The President did all the points we've discussed, with some additional
ones that certainly conveyed his conviction; Putin, in reply, did a

classic
yes-and-I-may-mean-no, saying he accepted the logic of the President's position,
but that he had huge domestic political problems of his own, including "from some
in the Ministry of Defense," but also from powerful parliamentary figures,
specifically Primakov. POTUS, in a wrap-up, referred to the idea of TMD
cooperation, stressing that while it was an idea worth pursuing, it didn't answer
the immediate problem - North Korea - in anything like the required time frame,
so it should be pursued in parallel with continuing to work on the core U.S.
proposal (including the breach feature). Putin recited counter-NMD arguments
derived from a distorted version of the Tank briefing we've given the Ivanovs,
claiming that our military has confirmed some of the worst suspicions about NMD's
capability and intent (i.e., it's directed against a strategic triad of the kind
only Russia possesses). Pushing back, POTUS urged him to spend some serious time
with Bill Cohen when he comes to Moscow and get a more accurate version of what
we're up to and why.

Now, here's a bit more from my notes...

A lot of personal stuff at the beginning; Putin lavishing praise on POTUS,
probing on the election prospects. It was in the context of laying out how he
sees the U.S. election that POTUS introduced NMD. He said that the
Republicans/Bush are staking out a position against the CTBT and the ABMT/mutual
deterrence; in general, Bush is going to try to blur the distinction between him
and Gore, but on foreign policy and national security - including strategic
defense and arms control - there will be real differences, with the public smart
enough to support Gore cuz he knows what he's talking about and has better
arguments; Bush's position will be, "on missile defense issues, I'll be different
and tougher [than Gore]" but that won't work. [Putin laughed heartily and

appreciatively for the first time in what was already a long evening.] Gore's
position, continued POTUS, will be, "Look, we - our Administration - has made
tough decisions that take account of the American people's interests." Bush,
meanwhile, will be relying, not very wittingly, on experts who have been at the
core of the old Republican establishment. Putin then said he was privately
hoping Gore wins, since "a new President from the other party wil lbe tempted to
say, 'We'll do it better and we'll be tougher,' and that will lead at best to a
hiatus when we can't afford one - when we need momentum as well as continuity."
POTUS then said he thought a Bush victory would be problematic because he's "now
talking about getting rid of mutual deterrence." He then told Putin, "You might
talk [Bush] out of it, but you'll be better off with the vice President."

Putin seemed prepared to let this topic die and was getting read to lead the tour
of the private quarters. POTUS said he wanted to make one more point:
"Obviously, on any of the idfficult issues between you'll have to make a decision
on whether to do a deal with us or wait until the next Administration. Is it
better to and easier to do it now or wait? It may be better but harder to do it
now." He then predicted that whoever wins the presidency, the Dems are going to
take back the House and recover some ground in the Senate. (He went into some
statistical detail on this. Putin seemed genuinely quite intrigued.) "Now, in
some ways, that may seem to argue for waiting until the next Administration to do
a deal. But I want to give you two arguments on the other side. Number one, in
American political culture, if the Presidency changes hands [i.e., parties], a
new president can change any policy that's not rooted in law. That virtually
always happens on domestic issues, but it almost never happens on foreign policy
issues. So if you think you can reach an agreement with us that's better than

the one with Bush, do it, because it will be much harder for him to change the
deal if it's done and he inherits it. If he wanted to change it, given the history of American politics, he'd almost have to make you a better deal than the
one you got from us. The second reason plays off your point about the danger of
a hiatus [if Bush wins]. You may have experienced something like this when you
came into office as Acting President. A new president is often afraid of making
a mistake - of looking weak, especially on a national-security issue; whereas I
have nothing to lose. I just want to do the right thing for America, for U.S.-Russian relations. I'm coming to the end of two terms, and I'm working for
the future. It's with the long term future in mind that I've come up with this
policy and this proposal, even though the policy involves hard choices for me and
the proposal involves hard choices for you."

Putin: "This logic is possible, but so is another logic. You're what number
President?" POTUS says 42nd. "You're the 42nd President - that's a good number!
You've done a lot for your country, particularly the upsurge in your economy,
maybe as much as any President since Roosevelt after the Depression. You've one
a lot for the world too. You were President of the U.S. when the Soviet Union
collapses and a new Russia was born. In that sense you're one of the leading
citizens of the world. From that point of view, I can't imagine you'd make a
dangerous mistake from the standpoint of mankind and international security.
Apart from your domestic politics, I believe youd want to make a decision that
will, as physicians say, 'do no harm.' Of course it would be better to come to
terms with you. But we need to find a basis on common ground. And we've also
got to find a way that allows you to make a decision that won't spur a new arms
race or return us to the mistrust and dangers of 15 years ago. And I'm not just
talking about Russia here. If we fail to find the right solution, other countries will react. How will that look? So please think carefully

before
taking a decision."

They then broke for the tour of the private quarters. On return for desert (in a
different room), Putin quickly got into an anti-Chechen rant as unrelenting as
anything he's done so far. It included a quite bitter denunciation of harping on
"alleged mythical atrocities of the Russian army" and a complaint against a -
truly mythical! - meeting between the Secretary of State and the "so-called
Chechen Foreign Minister."

Putin then said he wanted to review the agenda for Sunday. There was a cursory
discussion of topics, including the desirability of starting in another one-on-one.

POTUS made a pitch for the need for a post-Milosevic leadership in Serbia. Putin
said, "in strictest confidence," that he agreed, and that his people had been in
touch with "family and military circles" in Belgrade to bring that about. He
also took credit for the Serbian oppositionists coming to Moscow and getting
noticed (nothing about other visitors from Belgrade). But he then made a strong
argument against publicly insisting on Milosevic's removal, "since he's a
democratically elected leader," and the Serbian people would resent being told by
outsiders who their leader could be. He also tried to turn the tables and do a
heavy guilt-trip on how the Kosovo Serbs are suffering ethnic cleansing and
having their human rights violated. He then tried to close the discussion down.

POTUS said he had one more set of points he had to make, since, among other
things, Berger was discussing an aspect of it with Sergei Ivanov "and I want you
to have the full context when Sergei reports to you before we meet tomorrow."

"Okay," said Putin - in English.

POTUS: "I know this is a tough issue, but I want to get back to missile defense
and strategic stability. I realize, because I've listened carefully to what I've
heard from my people who've talked to yours, that we don't agree on this. But
there are some things I want you to hear directly from me.

"I believe very strongly, as my people have been saying to yours for all these
months, that Phase I of NMD is not a threat to Russia or to mutual deterrence.
We're stuck with mutual deterrence until we invent something better to take its
place - something that we both agree on.

"But while I believe that strongly, I believe just as strongly that the North
Korean missile program is a threat to us, and it's a threat that's coming at us
very fast. There are one or two others countries that will also threaten us in
the next 5-10 years.

"Now, please understand and believe what I'm saying: I've got a tough decision to
make. I haven't made it. I really haven't. I'm going to do what makes sense in
the long-term interests of my country - and also in the long-term interest of
what I believe, whether you agree or not, is in the interests of relations

between our countries. There's a test coming in July. That will have a lot to
do with the criterion of technology. There are three other criteria as well.
You know what they are. I'm going to have to balance a lot of idfferent factors.
But the key thing for you to know is that this isn't driven by politics; I'm not
just trying to cover Al Gore's backside here; that's not what this is about. You
may not agree with me, but I may concldue that we have the technology to deal
with this threat.

"Now, there are two reasons why I think it might be in your interest to work out
a deal along the lines of what I've proposed. Number one, I might

make possible
a more ambitious START III agreement than we can do otherwise. Number twoP if we
do make an agreement, it will be a strong precedent establishing that any future
steps on missile defense would have to be based on agreement.

"Let me say something about the Principles Document we're going to sign tomorrow.
It's a good, solid step - but it's an interim step. It gives us more time. That could mean more time to do something while I'm in office, or it could mean
more time if you chose to wait for my successor. I think you'd be making a
mistake, as I've already said, but in any event I think we've got a framework
here that protects both of our options. My options include proceeding with
technology that I'm convinced will work in the time frame of the threat. Your
options include either doing a deal with me or with the next guy.

"The Principles Document also reaffirms mutual deterrence while at the same time
acknowledging the need to deal with new threats. It's respectful and reaffirming
of the ABM Treaty, respectful and reaffirming of strategic stability between the
U.S. and Russia. But North Korea doesn't have the right to threaten the U.S., or
anyone else, with nuclear weapons and missiles. There's nothing in the ABM
Treaty protecting that for North Korea.

"Now, I know you've made this proposal of your own about boost-phase intercept.
I'm willing to work with you on that. But I can't make working with you on that
a quid pro quo for my dropping NMD if our people believe that the technology is
there that will deal with the North Korean threat. Boost-phase may have promise,
but it will take another 10 years or so, and the North Korean problem is coming a
lot faster than that.

"So the bottom line for tonight: if you decide you'd prefer to deal with my
successor, I can do something that will dramatically increase the time you'll

have to do so; that is, so that you won't be dealing with someone who's got about
60 days to make a decision of his own and to make a deal with you and who's
scared to death of looking weak.

"We're caught in a time warp here. 30 years from now people will look back on
the Cold War and the U.S.-Russian nuclear stand-off as ancient history; the U.S.
and Russia will be working together against new threats - rogue states that are
threatening the world with chemical and biological weapons and suitcase bombs,
new threats deriving from religious and ethnic conflict and religious extremism.
How do we get on the right side now for that point in the future - how do we make
sure that we're part of the same system working together - and not let ourselves
be trapped in the Cold War mentality while at the same time keeping mutual
deterrence strong between us until we come up with something better? And how do
we take advantage of the opportunity and the responsibility we have to bring
levels of nuclear weapons much lower? I believe we can have a hulluva lot of
mutual deterrence with small arsenals. That's the question, and the Principles
Document, combined with our proposal, is a good way forward to a common
understanding.

"I know it's tough. You do things I don't in Chechnya, and I do things you don't
like in Kosovo, but even while we manage those disagreements, we've got to deal
with the common problem of missile threats. That threat is a certainty; put
alongside that certainty the possibility that our country can put up a defense
that doesn't threat mutual deterrence but is, strictly speaking, a violation of
the ABM Treaty, and that means I've got to make a good-faith effort with you to
figure out how to change the treaty - not to ruin it but to make it hold up for
30 years.

"So you've got your decision to make, and I've got mine. Whatever I do, I promise I'll never support putting Russian in an untenable position with regard to mutual deterrence. Just don't think that this is a political problem for me: it's a strategic problem, a real strategic problem.

"If the best we can do is the Principles Document - and if I decide to go ahead with NMD - then I want to buy you as much time as possible to deal with the next guy. That's the background of Sandy's conversation with Sergei Ivanov. It's all about reaching an agreement, sooner or later, and not having a train wreck."

Putin's reply: "It may surprise you, but I agree with you, in contrrast to some of my colleagues, including several in the Ministry of Defense. In the future, suitcase bombs are a much bigger threat. There are some points where I could take issue you with. For example, when you say, 'We have to do it now.' I think it would be better to focus on the threats that we'll face 30 years from now..."

POTUS interrupts him: "I've got to focus on threats a lot sooner than that."
Putin seems rather thrown off his stride for a moment - genuinely surprised at the push-back. "Okay, but we have to think carefully on how to avoid any wrong steps. I can see perfectly clearly that the U.S. isn't getting ready to deliver a nuclear strike against Russia. But we've got to treat the balance between us very carefully, with an eye to the future as well as to the present.

"As for what the experts, including your own in the presence of my experts, tell us - I think it confirms a lot of our fears." He then repeats a distortion of what Sergei Ivanov heard in the tank - an alleged U.S. military confirmation that NMD is designed to protect against a triad, and only Russia has a triad. "That's why our people think the balance is upset or is going to be upset." He then

talks about a speech Primakov gave in the Parliament today about how Russia will need to take counter-measures, in the form of shorter-range missile capability, against U.S. ABM facilities in Europe (probably referring to Phase II radars in UK and Greenland).

POTUS interrupts briefly to say that Putin may not understand the phasing of our system and proposal.

Putin: "My point is, there's a frantic search going on here for counter-measures, and it could lead to an unexpected response."

He then asks rhetorically if POTUS knows the origin of the Soviet nuclear program. Then he tells the tale of Lavrenty Beria being put in charge by Stalin of the crash program to get nukes. Beria gathered all the scientists who had anything to contribute, assigned each of them a task and a deadline. Those who met their assignment on time were made Heroes of the Soviet Union; those who didn't were shot. Later, after de-Stalinization, a lot of those who were shot or sent off to die in the camps were posthumously made Heroes of the Soviet Union.
Then he comes to his point: quite a few American scientists spied for the USSR and passed along nuclear secrets to the Soviets - not, according to our host, because they were traitors to their country but because they believed in (you guessed it!) mutual deterrence, and wanted to make sure peace was assured by there being a balance.

POTUS had a rather short and simple come-back: "Interesting. I believe in mutual deterrence and balance too. That's why we're doing this document and making this proposal."

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Press Conference Statement.doc
6/4/00 11 am
Rosshirt
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
SUMMIT PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT
KREMLIN
SUNDAY, JUNE 4, 2000

Thank you, President Putin. I am pleased to be here in Moscow at this important time. Russia has a new President, a new government, a new Duma. Its economy is showing encouraging signs of growth. This adds up to a pivotal moment for Russia and a pivotal opportunity to build on the strong record of engagement between our countries.

I welcome President Putin's interest in building a Russia that enjoys the enduring strength of a stable democracy. President Yeltsin led Russia to freedom. Under President Putin, Russia has the chance to build prosperity while safeguarding that freedom.

We have had good discussions last night and today on a range of common interests, including non-proliferation and arms control. I congratulated President Putin on his key role in the Duma's ratification of START II and CTBT. And I am very pleased that today we agreed to two major new steps to reduce the nuclear danger.

We reached an important agreement each to destroy 34 tons of military-grade plutonium -- enough to make thousands of warheads. This is raw weapons material that will never fall into the wrong hands.

We also agreed to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow to share early warning information on missile and space launches. This is the first permanent U.S.-Russia military operation ever. In this new Center, Russian and American military officials will be working side-by-side, 24 hours a day, to

monitor
missile warning information. It is a milestone in enhancing strategic stability, and I welcome it.

The President and I also discussed our common commitment to prevent the
proliferation of missile technology, and our determination to exert firm control
over exports of sensitive technology and strictly enforce export control laws and
regulations.

We discussed our common interest in commercial space cooperation, including the
successful joint venture that launches commercial satellites. We agreed that our
teams would meet soon to discuss future cooperation in the commercial space area,
with the aim of moving toward eliminating existing constraints on commercial
space launches.

President Putin and I also had a thorough discussion of our work on the START III
Treaty and the issue of national missile defense. We have agreed to a Statement
of Principles, which makes clear that there is an emerging ballistic missile
threat that must be addressed, though we have not yet agreed on the best way to
do so. We have acknowledged that the ABM Treaty foresees the possibility of
changes in the strategic environment that might require it to be updated. We
have reaffirmed our commitment to pursue further reductions in offensive arms in
parallel with our discussions on defensive systems -- underscoring the importance
of strategic stability and mutual deterrence as a foundation for this work. We
have asked our experts to keep working to narrow differences, and to develop a
series of cooperative measures to address the missile threat.

President Putin and I also spent a large share of our time discussing economic
issues. I am encouraged by the economic plan he outlined and by the current
recovery, and I look forward to Russia pressing ahead with reforms that will make

the recovery last -- such as tax reform, anti-money laundering legislation, and
strong property rights protections.

Later this month, former U.S Ambassador to Moscow Bob Strauss will come to Russia
with a delegation of investors, including some of America's best known CEOs, to
discuss opportunities in Russia, and the steps Russia is taking to improve its
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The President and I also discussed Chechnya. I told him what I have said
before: that Russia's fight against terrorism is right, but violence against
innocent civilians is wrong -- and ultimately self-defeating. I urged the
President to seek a political solution, for I do not believe there can be a
meaningful military victory. I also urged him to move forward with transparent
and impartial investigations of human rights violations -- and authorize full
cooperation with the OSCE in that effort.

I also stressed with President Putin the importance of protecting the rights of
an independent media. I strongly agree with what President Putin has said --
that Russia has no future if it suppresses civic freedoms and the press.

President Putin and I also agreed to advance our technical cooperation on climate
change. We believe it is essential to complete work on the Kyoto protocol,
including its market mechanisms, which protect the environment, promote clean
energy, and reduce costs.

On all these issues, President Putin and I are asking the U.S.-Russia Binational
Commission -- under the leadership of Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Kasayanov -- to carry the work forward.

I was encouraged by our discussions, pleased with our agreements, and eager for
more progress. I also look forward to the chance to talk to the Russian people

-- tonight as I participate in a radio talk show -- and tomorrow, as I speak to
the Duma and Federation Council. Thank you.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Press Points on Brokaw Interview with Putin.doc
Press Points on Brokaw Interview with Putin

* Really a continuation of a theme that we have heard from the Russians for some
time, including when Foreign Minister Ivanov was in Washington in April.

* Specifically, there are two basic elements to the Russian approach:

* Political and diplomatic cooperation. This includes working with the U.S. on
issues like North Korea. It also includes multilateral initiatives, such as the
Russian idea to establish a "Global Control System" to work to provide diplomatic
and other incentives against proliferation.

* The Russians have also spoken to us about the possibility of cooperation on
theater missile defense, or TMD, although at a very general level. Such
cooperation would be focused on addressing threats from short or medium range
ballistic missiles.

* There's really a third element to Russia's proposals on cooperation: that is,
to date, they are not offering cooperation on changes to the ABM Treaty to allow
us to address new threats from long-range ballistic missiles.

* Clearly, we think we should cooperate on adapting the ABM Treaty, and we will
continue our work on this issue.

* However, we do see some positive overlap between our own proposals on
cooperation, and what Russia is proposing.

* First, President Putin made clear he believes there is an emerging threat of
ballistic missile proliferation, and has recognized the need to deal with this
new threat. That is positive, and we think it represents a step forward on this
issue - even if we do not yet agree on all aspects of how to deal with

this new
threat..

* Second, we agree we should work together with Russia, diplomatically and
politically, when and where we can, to combat missile threats.

* Third, we should work with other countries to reduce these threats.

* Finally, we should go forward with our current TMD exercise program, and
explore further cooperation in this area.

* Hope that this weekend's summit will provide an important impetus to working
together in these areas. But we do not see this as a substitute for our NMD
program.
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6/3/7:55

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT press statement - speech format.doc
6/4/00 11 am
Rosshirt

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DINNER MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

* Develop rapport with Putin, sketch goals for summit discussions and outcomes.
Highlight win-win philosophy that lies at center of our approach toward Russia.

* Engage Putin on his overall goals for Russia, especially on the economic front.
Seek agreement on common objectives for U.S.-Russian strategic relationship over
next eight months and remainder of Putin's four-year term.

* Lay markers on fundamental importance of safeguarding Russia's democratic
reforms and hard-won freedoms (including independent mass media). Draw
connection between Chechnya and Putin's agenda and desire for international
integration.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Putin will want to convey that he is a worthy, self-assured successor to Yeltsin
and that he is neither a pushover nor fundamentally opposed to equitable
U.S.-Russian cooperation. Putin's intelligence background suggests that he will
try to turn on the charm. Blair discovered that Putin is more likely to be
candid in intimate settings, but you should bear in mind that Putin has a
tendency to rely on pre-scripted comments on sensitive issues. Your overall goal
for the dinner should be to get him to talk more freely and to get his buy-in for
our win-win philosophy for U.S.-Russian relations.

By focusing on the big picture and the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, Putin
will get a better understanding of your view of our common stake in making the
relationship work. Ideally, he will come away from the meeting with some measure
of reassurance that we are not trying to take advantage of Russia's weakness and

diminished international standing. That would open the door to a more productive discussion of the tough tradeoffs necessary for progress on the strategic arms control package.

Putin is a master at playing to what he thinks interlocutors want to hear and at disguising his own true views. You should encourage Putin to catalogue his goals for Russia and the U.S.-Russian relationship and draw him out beyond the generalities. One way to do so will be to address the politics behind major issues, including the vested interests opposed to Putin's economic program.

You should be candid with Putin about the skepticism of the international community, given uncertainties about his commitment to democracy and liberal values. You should point to various tests that he faces in the near future (e.g., protecting press freedoms) and make clear that Chechnya could overshadow both his global and economic agendas.

AGENDA

Setting the Tone. Two key elements of your success with Yeltsin were to show appreciation of the tough policy road he was traveling and your ability to convince him that if Russia stayed on a reform course, we would move mountains to support him. Building a similar comfort level with Putin will be a lot harder, and he will be on the lookout for hints that we're patronizing or second-guessing him. He almost certainly believes that the West took advantage of Yeltsin to secure unilateral advantage, and he may be tempted to tread water until the next U.S. Administration. This could be a serious lost opportunity for him. The best way to overcome Putin's reticence is to make a strong opening presentation by noting the revival of the Russian economy and depicting the goals and priorities that you have pursued in support of Russian reform -- and the impact

on the
entire global security environment.

By putting things in this context and sketching our overall goals for Russia's
transformation, Putin may begin to understand that the relationship (and, by
extension, his own fortunes) can not flourish if they are rooted in purely
zero-sum terms. Achieving that kind of intellectual breakthrough will be key to
any progress we can achieve in more detailed discussions on arms control,
regional, and economic issues on Sunday.

Benefits of New Strategic Relationship. By dint of personal experience and his
own biography, Putin will appreciate just how much has changed in U.S.-Russian
relations since the end of the Cold War. He was personally involved in
reasserting civilian control over the military in the aftermath of the dash to
Pristina last summer and probably appreciates just how much was at risk in our
dispute over Kosovo. As a self-described "product of the Soviet propaganda
system," he understands that qualitative changes in our relationship have enabled
us to move beyond Cold War-era competition and a near-total fixation on the
strategic nuclear balance. You should talk about the stakes for U.S. and
international security of Russia's successful transformation and international
integration and why you have made these issues the centerpiece of the

Administration's foreign policy.

Putin's Priorities -- and Blind Spots. You should draw Putin out on where he
intends to take Russia during his initial period in office and beyond. Putin has
shown good instincts so far on the economy, but faces significant resistance from
vested interests and oligarchs. His team has indicated that they want to use his
"honeymoon" period to alter Russia's political structures, hence the recent
flurry of legislative proposals on strengthening the so-called "vertical

of
executive authority." Putin probably will play up the significance of steps to
reconfigure the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, and to
strengthen -- on paper at least -- his control over the governors.

You should ask Putin to review his political and economic priorities through the
end of the year and the main stumbling blocks he anticipates. In response, Putin
is likely to delve into standard descriptions of goals such as building a society
where the law reigns supreme (i.e., a "dictatorship of law") and a stronger,
rationalized set of state institutions that are not beholden to the narrow

individual interests of Russia's notorious oligarchs and regional barons.

Putin has only just started to flesh out these concepts in practical policy
terms, making it hard to judge what he really has in mind. A much-anticipated
state of the nation address in June inevitably will yield clues, but two
fundamental questions stand out. Will strengthening the role of the state
actually enable him to improve people's lives without trammeling individual
freedoms and will more rigid implementation of laws be premised on a level
playing field and equal treatment? As Alan Greenspan has pointed out to the
Russians, unwieldy organizational structures and statist tendencies are a big
source of their problems. Unless the role of government is reduced, it will be
hard for any Russian leader to reduce opportunities for corruption, mismanagement
and abuse. In a similar vein, the Kremlin's spin regarding the raid on
Gusinskiy's headquarters perceived by all to be an effort to intimidate his
independent TV station NTV, fostered deep misgivings about Russia's direction and
political pressure on the media and selective prosecution reminiscent of the
Babitskiy affair.

Taking Democratic Reforms and Human Rights Seriously. This discussion of Putin's

priorities will be a good point of departure for reminding Putin about the
central importance of protecting democratic reforms and human rights. Putin is
no slouch when it comes to expressing support for both concepts, but needs to
hear directly from you that gains in these areas have created the foundation for
our engagement with Russia. If they are threatened, so too is the basis for much
of what Putin hopes to accomplish.

You should portray the Chechnya conflict in this context, noting the continuing
cost to Russians and the impact on Russia's international standing. To head off
Putin's standard defense of Russian behavior in Chechnya, you should argue that a
Pyrrhic victory may be the best that Russia can hope for and that we learned in
Vietnam the high cost of such an approach.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/21/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner Pts Cooperation.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE PUTIN DINNER
COOPERATION

* Hope we can agree to move forward with cooperative programs in this area.
* Shared Early Warning, which we will sign tomorrow, is a good example of what we
can do together.
* We proposed last fall that we move forward with more cooperation, including on
intelligence assessments, theater missile defense, and other projects.
* I know you also have ideas in this area.

* Let's tell our experts to work on a joint statement on cooperation for us to
review in Okinawa. Include as much as possible.
* We don't see this as a substitute for our NMD program. But I think there are
things we can do working together that will help address this problem.
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1
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Card 1 of 1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner Summary Cards.doc
SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR
PUTIN

* Want to be supportive steps you take. Want to discuss about your strategy,
priorities for next eight months, four years. Five core objectives for summit:

* (1) Achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has
far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for
security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will
provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can
take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

*
(3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms
control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as space
launch.

* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus). See
opportunities for win-win outcomes.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that
benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., plutonium
initiatives).

* Respect for rule of law, transparency/predictability, fight against corruption
central to how investors will view Russia.

*
Important not to endanger elements of open society that establish Russia's
standing in the world (e.g., freedom of religion, strong democratic institutions,
fight against anti-Semitism, respect for individuals' rights and the environment). Free media central to success of reforms.

* On Chechnya, know we disagree, but more concerned than ever military solution
not possible. Need genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses,
meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

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Reason: 1.5
Declassify On: 6/2/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner Summary If Raised Cards.doc
CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* (If asked: Public support for government restructuring) Should let parliament
debate proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't
want to interfere.

* (If asked: Counterterrorism) Share concern about threat posed to stability by international terrorists. Critically important to protect human rights while fighting terrorism. Pleased with direction of our cooperation on Bin Ladin.

* (If asked: IFI's) Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. Will support reengagement with IMF on program that could be finalized, approved this summer. World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

*
(If asked: Russia's Soviet-era debt) New IMF program would provide basis for limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations. To consider further relief in future, must look at Russia's performance under IMF program and financial need. London Club debt agreement not precedent for Paris Club.

* (If asked: G-8 to replace G-7) Russian membership in a full G-7/8 not ripe.
Need establishment of stable, prosperous economy with sophisticated financial system that is making substantial contribution to global economic, financial system.

* (If asked: WTO) Accelerating Russia's accession to WTO on solid commercial terms will speed integration with global trading system, facilitate investment and economic growth. Prepared to engage actively with you.

*
(If asked: Jackson-Vanik) Russia is in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, enjoys full NTR benefits. Encourage changes on key issues that would persuade Congress to graduate you (e.g., religion law, anti-Semitism, and curbs on immigration up to ten years after access to state secrets).

* (If asked: NATO enlargement) Keeping door open to new members key element of

building stability. Allies will review enlargement process in 2002. Not going
to set arbitrary limits on enlargement process or rule out certain aspirants.

* (If asked: Kosovo/KFOR) Attacks on troops intolerable. We're pressing
Kosovar Albanians privately to cool it.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 06/02/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner Summary If Raised Points.doc
CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR DINNER MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* (If asked: Public support for government restructuring) Should let parliament
debate proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't
want to interfere.

* (If asked: Counterterrorism) Share concern about threat posed to stability by
international terrorists. Critically important to protect human rights while
fighting terrorism. Pleased with direction of our cooperation on Bin Ladin.

* (If asked: IFI's) Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. Will support reengagement with IMF on program that could be finalized,
approved this summer. World Bank can play very useful role in specific
structural reform areas.

* (If asked: Russia's Soviet-era debt) New IMF program would provide basis for

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and economic growth. Prepared to engage actively with you.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner Summary Points.doc

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* Want to be supportive steps you take. Want to discuss about your strategy,
priorities for next eight months, four years. Five core objectives for summit:

* (1) Achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has
far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for
security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will
provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can
take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

* (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic
arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as
space launch.

* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus). See
opportunities for win-win outcomes.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that
benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., plutonium
initiatives).

* Respect for rule of law, transparency/predictability, fight against corruption
central to how investors will view Russia.

* Important not to endanger elements of open society that establish Russia's
standing in the world (e.g., freedom of religion, strong democratic

institutions,
fight against anti-Semitism, respect for individuals' rights and the environment). Free media central to success of reforms.
*
* On Chechnya, know we disagree, but more concerned than ever military solution
not possible. Need genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses,
meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/2/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Dinner TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Introduction

* Pleased to be back in Moscow at this crucial time for you and Russia. I was
determined to reaffirm my support.

* Believe summit is a chance to make fresh start, take our cooperation to a new
level. Relationship with Russia central to global peace and my overall agenda.

* Very favorably inclined toward Russia, want to be as supportive as possible of
steps you take. See summit as opportunity to chart agenda that will carry us
through Okinawa, UN Millennium Summit, and APEC.

* Also want to strengthen foundation for U.S.-Russian relations for next
Administration. Understand Russia faces enormous challenges, but put highest

premium on your success.

* Yeltsin brought freedom to Russia. Main challenge is to bring about stability,
prosperity without endangering liberty. Want to learn more about your strategy
for moving Russia forward and your priorities. Know you're not promising
miracles.

Goals for Moscow Summit

* See five core objectives to come out of this summit:

* (1) Should achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship,
which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core
objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four
years.

* (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will
provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can
take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

* (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic
arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as
commercial space launch.
* (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus) where
there are opportunities for win-win outcomes from working together.

* (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that
benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., cooperation in
reducing nuclear danger through plutonium initiatives).

Benefits of Strategic Relationship

* First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique
opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

* Have witnessed dramatic changes in relationship since 1992 in nearly all spheres. During Cold War era of rivalry and competition, main issue was strategic balance because we were adversaries.

* Situation now is totally different. Need to work hard to strengthen strategic equilibrium, increase confidence. Want to have more focused discussion on arms control issues tomorrow.

* Pleased that we're working together on new century's challenges -- economic cooperation and integration, ethnic conflict, terrorism, health, and transnational crime -- issues that really affect health of societies.

* For past seven and half years, one unifying concept behind my approach on all issues on our agenda -- to maximize possibility for win-win outcomes.

Cooperation must provide tangible benefits for both sides to be sustainable.

* Should talk tonight about how we achieve greater sense of common purpose on security issues, Russia's international integration, regional security issues.

* Know that both of us are not entirely satisfied with ups and downs in relationship along the way. Important to remember, as Boris told me in Cologne, that we faced toughest test of our relations over Kosovo and passed.

*
Dispute over Kosovo was sobering experience for both of us. Know you played key role in defusing conflict. Russian troop contribution still very reassuring to Serbs. Should talk candidly about how we handle these kinds of challenges in future.

Putin's Agenda

* You've had strong political and economic success. Russian economy has been enjoying rebound since 1998 financial crisis. Want to hear your plans to use

this period to accelerate economic reforms, strengthen Russian democracy.

* Russia, like all countries, will need to grapple with range of forces shaping
new international economic environment. We should talk a bit about how to be
competitive in new global economy, how to strengthen human capital, technological
edge.

* We live in an era of globalizing markets in which investors choose countries
and not the other way around, but both benefit. Key is to improve investment
climate.

* Respect for rule of law, transparency, and predictability central to how
investors will view Russia. So, too, is your fight against corruption.

* Have seen corruption undermine growth and development in countries around the
world. You have a unique chance early on to set standards.

New Global Economy

* We are witnessing an unprecedented expansion of the global economic frontier.
There are several mutually reinforcing developments at the center of this
revolution.

* First, technological breakthroughs. Today, invention matters more than mass
production. And information matters most of all.

* Second, the spread of market forces. Advantage has shifted to systems in which
economic power and opportunities are more decentralized, in which individual
initiative and entrepreneurship flourish.

* Third, the truly global scope of economic integration. Along with the end of
the Cold War, this will be the great story of the 20th century: the appearance of
vibrant emerging markets, where literally billions of people live, moving toward
rapid growth.

* In U.S., we have tried to maximize benefits of these forces while striving to
strengthen our fundamentals.

* Key challenges are to maintain fiscal discipline, make investments in people,
deepen our own markets through deregulation, support spread of information and
know-how, and make sure new markets work for all our people.

Democracy, Chechnya

* You've emphasized importance of strengthening state institutions and connected
that task to promoting Russia's national vitality.

* Agree that fostering Russia's internal strength will have major impact on
success of reform effort and Russia's international role.

* Key question is whether that effort can be done without sacrificing the
elements of a free society that establish Russia's standing in the world (e.g.,
enhanced respect for rule of law, freedom of religion, tough fight against
anti-Semitism, balanced relationship between center and regions, respect for
individuals' rights, and the environment.

* Have seen disturbing developments recently about Russia's independent media,
including the Babitsky case. Need to emphasize how important free media are to
overall success of democratic reform effort.
* Same applies to Chechnya. I know we disagree on this but I said to you in
Auckland last year I did not think there was an enduring military solution, and I
still think that's true.

* Hope you will move from military to political and civilian phase.

* Nothing will help Russia's image more than genuine progress on accountability
for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time
OSCE mission.

If raised: Counterterrorism Cooperation

* Share concern about threat posed to stability by international terrorists.
Critically important to protect human rights while fighting terrorism. Pleased
with direction of our cooperation between our special services on Bin Ladin.

If raised: Public Support for Government Restructuring Plan

* Need to let parliament, governors, and Russian public debate and review your
proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't want to
interfere.

If raised: IFI's

* International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new
phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing less important than in past,
while World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

* United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a program that we hope
could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

If raised: Russia's Soviet-era debt

* New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of Russia's
Soviet-era obligations.

* To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's
performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

* If needed: London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but
not precedent for Paris Club.

If raised: G-8 to Replace G-7

* Russian membership in a full G-7/8 not ripe.

* Must see establishment of stable, growing and prosperous economy with

sophisticated financial system that is making substantial contribution to global
economic, financial system.

If raised: WTO

* Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating
Russia's accession to WTO on solid commercial terms, will speed your integration
with global trading system, facilitating investment and economic growth.

* Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious
about reform, integration. Prepared to engage actively with you.

If raised: Market Economy Status

* Understand you may be filing a petition with the Commerce Department. If you
do, they will review it in a legal proceeding according to the standard criteria.

* Important for you to recognize and weigh the pros and cons of market vs.
non-market status. These designations apply only to dumping cases. Market
status would actually increase your exposure to trade penalties.

If raised: Jackson-Vanik

* We have declared Russia to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, and Russia
enjoys full NTR benefits.

* Congress remains concerned about issues such as implementation of Russia's
religion law, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and law denying immigration up to ten years
after access to state secrets.

* Encourage changes that would persuade Congress to graduate you from
Jackson-Vanik.

If raised: EXIM Projects

* It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case

were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward.
Understand progress is now being made on other important EX-IM projects.

If raised: NATO Enlargement

* Share common interest in building secure, integrated Europe. Keeping door open
to new members key element of building stability. Not pressing countries to
join, but Allies will review enlargement process in 2002.

* Partners are asking to join, pursuing sovereign right to choose means to ensure
own security. Not going to set arbitrary limits on enlargement process or rule
out certain aspirants. Such moves will only add to sense of insecurity.

If raised: Kosovo/KFOR

* Recent attacks on Russian troops intolerable. We're pressing Kosovar Albanians
privately to cool it. Your role in KFOR very important, very reassuring to
Serbian population.

If raised: Supercomputers

* This technology advances very rapidly. To keep ahead of the curve, we
regularly review and revise our control levels. In past five years, I have
tripled level of computers that Russian civilian end-users can obtain without
export license.

* Most recent change was implemented in February -- allows license-free export to
civilian end-users of systems that operate at speeds up to 20,000 Millions of
Theoretical Operations per Second. Exports above require export license.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Farewell Call TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FARWELL CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* Think this has been a very good visit and shows the world that we are working
actively, cooperatively on a broad agenda.

* Okinawa will be an important milestone. The stronger presentation you and your
team can make, the better. You know that you will be judged by actions.

* Bilateral engagement will continue. The Binational Commission should help lead
the way. Our respective Secretaries helped lay the groundwork for our meetings,
and they stand ready to carry the work forward. Secretary Cohen is coming later
this month. Secretary Shalala will be here in July. Hope Secretary Daley can
lead mission.

* I'm committed to making maximum use of this year to achieve results and lay an
even more solid foundation for United States and Russia in 21st century.
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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/18/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Farewell Call.doc

FAREWELL CALL WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

* Close out any remaining summit business.

* Review upcoming schedule of interactions, highlight need for strong Russian
presentation at Okinawa.

* Reenergize the Binational Commission as a mechanism to carry the work forward.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This session will be a short wrap-up meeting with Putin before he heads to the
Rome to see the Pope and you go to Kiev. This is an opportunity to reflect on
the summit, to tend to any unfinished business, and to chart a path forward to
Okinawa and beyond. It is also an opportunity to reenergize the Binational
Commission as an instrument for cooperation and summit follow-through.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/17/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Farewell Cards.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FARWELL CALL WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 06/04/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Regional Mtg.doc
MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON REGIONAL ISSUES

KEY OBJECTIVES

* Seek Putin's support for Nagorno-Karabakh peace by pointing to important
advantages for Russia (and his own standing) from resolving conflict.

* Lay marker on our support for Georgia's territorial integrity and highlight
need to implement CFE commitments from Istanbul summit.

* Gauge Putin's bottom line on the Balkans and willingness to join forces on

behalf of the anti-Milosevic opposition.

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K). We have built up to this conversation through a series of engagements with the Russians. The overall goal is to focus Putin on the prestige and security benefits that will accrue to Russia for helping achieve peace in a region so close to Chechnya.

Active Russian support is a critical ingredient for N-K peace. We need Putin to be ready to step forward, to state his support publicly, and then to match the public statements with unmistakable private signals to Yerevan. Putin is likely to tell you that his government has received ambiguous messages from Armenian officials about whether they favor the peace plan that Kocharian and Aliyev have discussed. Yerevan's ambiguity probably represents a combination of nervousness about Moscow's stance and desire for an even better deal.

Georgian Security, CFE. The Russians remain concerned about cross-border actions by Chechens and their ethnic kin just over the border in Georgia. You should highlight our "red line" about Georgian sovereignty and express appreciation for Putin's public commitment to respect Georgia's territorial integrity. We are providing support for Georgia's border guards, including helicopters and training, and an OSCE-led border monitoring mission. On CFE-related withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova, you should signal the importance of Russian implementation of commitments from Istanbul. Putin should understand that our financial support, to help defray costs of the withdrawal, is conditioned on Russia's working out a detailed schedule of withdrawal of Russian forces -- including both Treaty-limited items and other equipment/personnel -- and accompanying transparency measures.

It is possible that Putin will want to talk about an "arc of instability" from
Islamic extremism that runs from Kosovo to Afghanistan and Chechnya to Central
Asia. There is a kernel of truth in what he says, and we certainly have some
common interests: for example, UBL. But we must be exceedingly cautious here.
Our overriding interest is not to give any perception of license to the Russian
military campaign in Chechnya or the recent threat of airstrikes in Afghanistan.

Balkans, Milosevic. Despite their clear distaste for Milosevic on a personal
level, Russian actions (e.g., FRY Minister of Defense Ojdanic's visit to Moscow,
later regretted publicly by Foreign Minister Ivanov) demonstrate continued
support for the Belgrade regime. Your discussion with Putin could help persuade
the Russians that we have a common interest in the Balkans and that Moscow is
best served not by continued engagement with Milosevic, but by hastening his
early departure and ending the instability he has fostered in the region. You
should emphasize that we will remain active in the region so long as Milosevic
stays in power, but can hasten our departure with stability that could come from
end of Milosevic-era. What's more, the Serbian leader's habit of provoking
confrontations in order to distract from domestic problems increases the
likelihood of conflict -- and therefore the chance of renewed NATO involvement --
in Montenegro, in Kosovo, and ultimately in Serbia itself.

Putin may try to probe our willingness to grant Milosevic amnesty in exchange for
his agreement to step down. We need to avoid giving the Russians the impression
that we are looking to them to negotiate a deal with Milosevic. An open-ended
amnesty offer could convince Milosevic that he is free to act with impunity until
circumstances compel him to leave office. Rather, we want to leave the onus
squarely on Milosevic to declare his intent to leave, but intimate to the

Russians that there may be common ground between us for crafting an exit strategy
should that day come.
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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/18/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Regional Summary Cards.doc
SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON REGIONAL ISSUES

* Nagorno-Karabakh. Believe you have important interest in enhancing security in
South. Finding solution important.

* Can't happen without strongest, clearest message of support, particularly to
Kocharian. Both states need to know you support peace, will play positive role
implementing it. Let's keep talking to them. I see Kocharian later this month.

* Georgia/CFE. Appreciate public commitment to respect territorial integrity of
southern neighbors such as Georgia. Georgia committed to border security. We are
trying to ensure they do everything they can. OSCE border mission very useful.

* Agreements on schedules for withdrawal of your forces from Georgia and Moldova
important.

* Afghanistan. No indication that Taleban have taken steps to comply with UN
resolutions or respond to requests for help expelling Bin Laden, closing down
network or training camps.

* Know that Sandy and Sergey talked about airstrikes threat last night and the

need to avoid steps that would increase tensions in the region. That's very
important.

* Need to consider additional steps by UN to increase diplomatic, economic
isolation of Taleban. Our people should be in touch about coordinated sanctions
(e.g., arms embargo).

* Counterterrorism. Share concern about threat from Afghanistan to stability to
Central Asia and beyond. Need to protect human rights while fighting terrorism.

* Value our counterterrorism cooperation, especially UBL. Place high priority on
bringing UBL to justice. Should keep focus on threats we both face, such as from
UBL and his network.
* Caspian. See our interests as compatible; want to support projects that
promote inter-state cooperation (e.g., CPC pipeline). Without private investment, projects will not happen. Want to promote economic development and
democracy across the new states in the region.

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Reason: 1.5 (b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/18/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Regional Summary Points.doc
SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON
REGIONAL ISSUES

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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/18/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin Regional TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

Nagorno-Karabakh

* Know the depth of your concerns about stability and security along your
southern border. View this as an understandable

* Achieving Nagorno-Karabakh peace treaty important and possible. Need to
intensify cooperation in Minsk Group. Parties need to know that you will support
them in anything that they think is right.

* Key ingredient will be your readiness to speak in favor of peace, to help
guarantee implementation of peace, to ensure that settlement results in improved
security and stability for Armenia and neighbors.

* We are ready to help with money, other resources as appropriate.

* Many elements that we think might be attractive to you -- huge achievement for
Russian diplomacy, a concrete role for OSCE.

(If raised:) Armenians giving ambiguous signals

* Let's keep talking to them. You're seeing Kocharian, Aliev at CIS summit later

this month. I'm seeing Kocharian this month, too. Important thing is that we
support them in anything they think is right. Let's intensify cooperation in
Minsk Group.

(If raised:) Peace plan means Turkish encircling of Armenia

* Essential that Armenia be able to count on continued trade ties to Iran.
That's why Russian role in implementation is so vital. Need ensure confidence
that Armenia preserves ties to Iran and to Russia.

Georgia

* Also hope you will reaffirm publicly desire to respect territorial integrity of
southern neighbors, including Georgia. That's key to keeping conflict from
spreading, calming regional tensions.

* We remain committed to Georgia's independence, sovereignty and integrity.

* Know Georgia takes seriously its obligation to operate secure border.
International community has close eye on border via enhanced OSCE border
monitoring mission.

* We continue to work with Georgia to ensure they are doing everything in their
power to disallow movement of personnel, materiel into Chechnya.

* Russian role is key to settlement in Abkhazia. My people ready to work with
you on this.

CFE

* Hope that Russia can reach bilateral understandings soon on schedules for the
withdrawal of your forces from Georgia -- as well as Moldova. U.S. financial
assistance to help defray costs of withdrawal not available indefinitely -- need
agreed schedules and transparency measures if we are to help.

* On related matter, know you agree it's important to consolidate our

success on
CFE at Istanbul by moving forward with ratification of the adapted Treaty. To do
that Russia needs to reduce to levels agreed for the flank in a way we can
confirm. Hope you can move ahead on this soon, too.

* Our senior advisors should continue discussions on next steps.

Afghanistan / Central Asia / Counterterrorism

* Share your assessment that Afghanistan has become a primary source of
terrorism, drugs and Islamic extremism. This is a threat to both our countries.

* Have seen no evidence that the Taliban have taken any steps to comply with UN
resolutions or respond to our requests for help expelling Bin Laden and his
organization, closing down training camps.

* Know that Sandy and Sergey talked about airstrikes threat last night and the
need to avoid steps that would increase tensions in the region. That's very
important.

* Need to consider additional steps by UN to increase diplomatic, economic
isolation of Taleban. Our people should be in touch about coordinated sanctions
(e.g., arms embargo and restriction of VIP travel).

* We value and appreciate the continuing cooperation between our special services
in addressing the problem of international terrorism, especially UBL. You know
priority we place on bringing Bin Laden to justice.

* Obviously, there are limits to our cooperation on Chechnya. For us, it isn't,
can't be one and the same as Afghanistan. We should keep the focus of our
efforts on threats that both our countries face, such as from UBL and his
network.
* Essential that Central Asian states protect human rights while fighting

terrorism, otherwise they'll drive people into arms of extremists. Regional
cooperation and united diplomatic front essential to stemming terrorism and
ensuring stability.

* We're planning to provide Central Asian countries with modest amount of border
security assistance to enhance their counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and
non-proliferation capabilities.

Caspian ("Great Game")

* Know that many Russians are skeptical about U.S. intentions in the Caspian
region, suggesting that our interest in pipelines is not really commercially
motivated and, more broadly, the U.S. is trying to kick Russia out of the region.

* We think this is an area where our interests are compatible and reinforcing:
see win/win opportunities here.

* There has never been any U.S. plan to push Russia out of the region. On the
contrary, we have consistently supported collaborative projects such as the CPC
pipeline as a part of our Caspian energy strategy.

* Instability in this region is not merely hypothetical question. See only two
ways to counteract, by force or by building prosperity. Our preference is to
promote economic development and democracy across the new states in the region.

* We have not wanted to allow Iran, which is a country intent on exporting
terrorism, to control the fate of these countries.

* It is true that there may be areas of commercial competition between our
companies, but we have no plan or intention to weaken Russia.

* Pipeline projects are commercially driven; without private investment, they
simply will not happen. Furthermore, the projects promote inter-state
cooperation, both oil and gas producers and transit countries, based on

mutual
interest.
* (If raised: Interference with Blue Stream) Not trying to work against Blue
Stream. We are trying to support Turkmenistan's and Azerbaijan's efforts to get
gas to Turkish market.
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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/18/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Questions and Answers Arms Control.doc
Arms Control Questions and Answers

Principles Document

Q:

"Strategic stability ... mutual deterrence" - sounds a lot like the kind of "old
think" that dominated the Cold War. What's new here?

A:

* Principles document is forward looking - talks squarely about new threats to
our security, and the need to address these threats, including the consideration
of changes to the ABM Treaty.

* At the same time, both the U.S. and Russia believe it is important to preserve
the foundation for reducing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War.

* Strategic stability and mutual deterrence still matter in managing the

strategic relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers.

Q:

Aren't you locking in the next President to outmoded concepts by signing this
document today?

A:

* These are not outmoded concepts, but important building blocks for managing our
strategic relationship with Russia, today and in the future.

* Next president will obviously be free to pursue whatever policies he determines
to be in our national interest.

* Expect the next President will also value a stable strategic relationship with
Russia.

Cooperation

Q:

Did you discuss President Putin's proposals for cooperation?

A:

* The Presidents did discuss both U.S. and Russian proposals for working together
to address ballistic missile threats.

* Dialogue has been ongoing for some time. U.S. has made wide-ranging proposals
to work cooperatively with Russia on the missile defense issue. Russia has also
made proposals. Intend to continue that dialogue.

* Hope to be able to move forward with further steps in the future. Signature of
Shared Early Warning agreement is a good example.

START / ABM

Q:

Was there any progress made on the central issue of ABM adaptation or START III?

A:

* Good discussion; have agreed to intensify our discussions on both START III and
ABM. Both sides interested in further defining the basic elements of START III.

* Expect dialogue to continue at Okinawa.

Treaty line

Q:

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with construction
activity on its ABM?

A:

* We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

Q:

If the President decides to go forward with NMD construction later this year,
won't he have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

A:

* We are examining what options would be available to the President, should this
question arise. We have not made any determination on this point.

Q:

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with
Russia at the summit? What was their reaction?

A:

* We discussed this issue in general; however, I would not suggest to you they
had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed
Russia of any conclusions.

Shared Early Warning

Q:

What is the objective of the shared early warning agreement?

A:

* Important agreement. Will strengthen strategic stability by further reducing
risk that ballistic missiles might be launched based on false warning of an
attack.

* Will also increase mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic
missile early warning systems of both sides.

Q:

Is there a linkage between implementation of shared early warning and NMD/ABM?

A:

* No. Moreover, the type of information that would be shared would not be useful
in guiding NMD interceptors.
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6/3/10:30

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Religious Leaders Scene.doc
SCENESETTER: MEETINGS WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Jewish Heritage and Holocaust Museum (Poklonnaya Gora Synagogue)

Located on the grounds of Victory Park and inaugurated in 1998, this synagogue
and museum is dedicated to victims of the Holocaust. Media magnate and President
of the Russian Jewish Congress Vladimir Gusinskiy was the primary donor and
organizer. The ground floor contains a small synagogue; the lower level features
a multi-media presentation about the Holocaust, as well as an exhibit designed in
cooperation with Russian state museums, archives and the Holocaust Foundation.

Mosque

Completed in 1997, this mosque, located in Victory Park, is dedicated to Muslim victims of World War II (known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia). It is a small, graceful three-story structure elaborately decorated in hand-carved stone, and graced by a crescent-shaped chandelier. Construction was financed by the city of Moscow. Prayers are conducted five times daily and are well-attended.

Cathedral of Christ the Savior

The original Christ the Savior Cathedral, which was built in the 1830s, commemorated the Russian defeat of Napoleon. The Cathedral was destroyed in 1931 under Stalin, who intended to build a monumental skyscraper on the site. (This was to be the centerpiece of central Moscow -- the "Seven Sister" skyscrapers that ring the city were modeled on its design.) The ground proved too marshy for such a large building, so a monumental outdoor swimming pool was installed instead. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the city of Moscow and a large group of corporate contributors succeeded in building a replica of the original Christ the Savior, which opened to the public in 1999. A museum about the history of the site fills the lower floor of the cathedral, and the rooftop

boasts a spectacular view of Moscow.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT rough jbs q on russia.doc

What are you and President Putin doing to achieve a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh?

We have been working together on this issue for a long time. We have seen some positive developments over past year, including direct discussions between Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian last year.

President Putin and I agreed to stay actively involved in promoting a

settlement.
He will bee seeing both Presidents soon. I saw Aliyev recently in Washington.
will bee seeing kohsc in was next month

Gerogia

Imedned, terrist, sover very important to US, security of entire caucause. Have
concerned about daner of spilloverfrom neightbroin chech.

Have been encouraged by pres pus tstm reitner respect for territ of his nieghbord.s important that georg and russi work togheter on seucre. Osce
mission big deal
Appreciate

Why do AMB when helms sez

Elected for 4 year. Will davance inte secureity and stabilyti until my last ay
in office.

Why pursue ABM as lame duck

Boost phase, rigged testys (Postor charge)

Unilateral reductions?

Bushehr

Have been very concerns for some time anbout risu iran nuclear cooperation. Have
seen indications problem is continuing.

Don't either us or russia wants iran armed with nucelar wreaps. That would poses
great threat, not only to our allies in the region, esp. istratel but to ouw

forces ther. Important to strengthen russian export controls, hold people
accountable for engaging in such

Baltics - why don't you criticize balts for

* Obvisu bvery sensitve issue. Balts have made some proiter sintergrating ethinc
russian but htat process not coplet. Osce intesnds to stay neageaed. Wei will
too.
*
* Indepdentce of Baltics very important. Know that Russia and other coutrnries
deepending cooperaiton with them on many levels. Good cooperation between russia
and its closest neightbir sis good for ru, good for neighb, good for stabiliy in
regoin

If pressed - are you going to bring them into NATO

More stable secure ueuor good for everybody haven't made any defcisions. Naot
m menber opend to any and all. Balts have exprexsed. No dividing linges in
eurpe. Nato open to all european demcoracires that that express interest and
would controb to allianc esecuriyt.

Riggest

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SCOPE MEMO.doc

May 27, 2000

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Moscow and Kiev, June 3-5, 2000

I. RUSSIA

Your Moscow trip has five major objectives:

* To develop a forward-looking agenda with Putin (whose views on major issues remain at a formative stage), based on a common appreciation of the importance of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship;

* To survey Putin's goals and priorities on both domestic and foreign policy for this year and the remainder of his four-year term;

* To chart a path forward on tough arms control, nonproliferation, and commercial space launch issues;

* To signal our willingness to support an ambitious, Russian-owned economic reform program and to shape common expectations on the best response from the international community; and

* To lay markers on the paramount importance of Russia's democratic reforms, human rights, and press freedoms.

Opportunities and Risks. Putin sees his main objective as completing the structural transformation of Russia after several years of drift at the end of the Yeltsin era. Yeltsin's legacy puts him in an interesting position. On the one hand, there is unprecedented consensus inside Russia about what needs to be done, especially on the economic front, and the economy's recent revival appears to give Putin steerage that has been lacking for virtually the entire transition phase to date. On the other, there is a real question whether systemic changes can be made without damaging hard-won democratic freedoms and over the objections of various vested interests (governors, oligarchs, natural monopolies). Our overarching goal is to encourage Putin (and, by extension, Russia) to stay on a Western-oriented course by getting Putin to define Russia's national interests and his own agenda in terms that mesh with our own.

Your ability to secure Putin's support for the win-win philosophy that underlies our approach toward the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship will be central to summit outcomes on arms control and other issues. Putin needs to understand that U.S.-Russian cooperation, on issues ranging from nonproliferation to regional conflicts, has a fundamental impact on the international security environment and that we have a common stake in Russia's success. Your meetings with Putin should also feature a frank assessment of the progress Russia has already made, the importance of staying the course on democratic and economic reforms, the main obstacles remaining (e.g., Chechnya, structural reform, crime and corruption), and the specific policies and steps required to overcome them.

Handling Putin. On the personal and psychological level, we need to be careful not to assume that we can take the same tack with Putin that you used so successfully with Yeltsin. There is a danger that Putin's collegial, friendly tone will mask areas of major disagreement. Putin may be tempted to tread water in our relationship until the next U.S. administration. The next few months will determine whether he can consolidate his authority, assemble a strong team, and craft a political strategy that advances his vision. So far, Putin's style suggests that he is more of a political blowtorch than a conciliator. It is unclear which approach will serve him better over the long haul, given Russia's tough political terrain.

Murky Picture on Democracy. Russia's fragile democracy and civil society are still awaiting clear signs that Putin's vision of a strong state is compatible with individual liberties, a vibrant civil society, and strong independent media. The recent heavy handed raid on the headquarters of media magnate Vladimir Gusinskiy has only fed these apprehensions. This very real uncertainty about Putin's true colors only adds to the importance of your articulating to

Putin,
quietly yet honestly, the central importance of democracy, economic liberalism,
human rights, religious, and press freedoms, etc., for Russia's future and for
our strategy of engagement and support for Russia's international integration.

New Government, Familiar Faces. Putin's pick for Prime Minister, Mikhail
Kasyanov, was noncontroversial, and most of the government has been kept in
place. This arrangement allows Putin to avoid having to fight battles early;
backroom negotiations with various vested interests over cabinet positions can be
particularly ugly. The current arrangement suggests that the Kasyanov government
could be temporary and that the real shake-up will be postponed until later this
year.

With little advanced warning, Putin has embarked on an ambitious series of
political reforms to strengthen Moscow's control over the provinces and
notoriously independent regional governors. He has convinced the Duma to extend
its session until July to review the legislative proposals. Leaving aside the
merits of these moves, the Putin team's body language implies that these efforts
will take precedence over a long-overdue push on structural economic reforms.

A New Sense of Ownership on Economics. An encouraging sign from Putin's Russia
is clear desire for ownership of its economic policies. The Putin team of
market-oriented ministers and advisors is quite unified and has drafted its own
program of "bold" reform initiatives, focused on the investment climate, tax
reform, and protections for property rights. But designing and implementing are
two different things. The real question is whether Putin seizes the unique
opportunity created by the current economic upturn and his "honeymoon" with the
Duma, or lets the opportunity slip away. Putin and his team seem open

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Cathy Millison to Andrew Weiss re: Russia, Kiev Trip [pages 151-236] [partial] (1 page)	06/06/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Moscow and Summit])
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FOLDER TITLE:
[06/06/2000] [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

in
principle to making WTO accession (albeit on discounted terms) a priority and
using it as a tool to drive the reform process. Getting Putin to buy into a
serious WTO process is key.

It is noteworthy that the Russians are not asking for much in the way of outside
help, except for a Paris Club write-down of a significant share of their Soviet-era debts. They would like your support in getting a positive message out
to investors. The Russians are trying to negotiate a new IMF program for Board
approval as early as this summer, which we would support. An IMF program would
set the stage for limited debt rescheduling (but not a write-down) of Soviet-era
obligations, which is the most relief Russia would reasonably qualify for at this
stage on the basis of need and performance.

Chechnya Wildcard. With the advent of warmer weather, the pace of hit-and-run
attacks on Russian positions has increased significantly, 1.4(c)

It is essential that you highlight the problems Chechnya is causing for
his overall agenda and international standing and the need to tackle allegations
of human rights violations in a meaningful way. The advice you gave him in
Auckland a year ago has proven right: there is no military solution; seek a
political one. Putin will inevitably respond with familiar refrains about how
Russia is defending European civilization from a radical Islamic onslaught while
presenting overdrawn connections between Chechnya and Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
even insurgents in the Philippines.

The Schedule

Your one plus one dinner with Putin will set the tone for the rest of the summit.
Rather than delve immediately into the details of arms control or economics,

your goal should be to explain our overall approach to the strategic relationship and to draw Putin out on his goals for this year and the balance of his term in office. On Sunday morning, you will have some OTR time to interact with Muscovites before plunging into the summit meetings. The first meeting will focus on arms control and other security issues. At the end, we recommend that you have a short tete-a-tete with Putin on sensitive regional issues (e.g., N-K and the Balkans). The next meeting will focus on economics and trade and investment issues, followed by a signing ceremony, press conference, and radio call-in on an independent station. The next day you will address the Russian Duma, followed by a brief courtesy call on Yeltsin in the Kremlin, a wrap-up discussion with Putin, followed by a short visit to our Embassy.

II. UKRAINE

Critical Turning Point. Your visit to Ukraine comes at a critical stage in that country's transition. Kuchma's reelection over a Communist Party rival, the appointment of Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister, and early progress on domestic reforms have at least marginally enhanced Ukraine's forward momentum and European orientation. Since your meeting with Kuchma last December, he and Yushchenko have taken important steps, including downsizing and restructuring the government, passing a strong budget, and laying the groundwork for privatization of land and strategic enterprises in the energy sector. As reforms accelerated, vested interests began to dig in their heels. As a result, dozens of important reform initiatives have become frozen just prior to completion.

For the first time since independence, a case can be made that Ukraine's glass is half full. Going forward, an economically recovering Ukraine that is more discernibly on a path toward Europe would have important

implications for the
region. The key now is implementing the reforms that have been prepared.
Near-term success will require Kuchma, Yushchenko, and the Rada to cooperate on
implementing the budget, privatization, and reform of the agricultural and energy
sectors.

Your visit has two key themes. First, to underscore our sense that Ukraine's
success and European integration is possible and that we -- and the Europeans --
will respond to concrete results from reform. This is the message you have
delivered to such good effect since December. Second, you will want to stress
the virtue -- indeed the necessity -- of building political consensus around
fundamental principles of market and democratic reform.

Each leg of the Kuchma-Yushchenko-Rada triangle is beset by its own important
weaknesses. Kuchma is not a natural reformer. He lacks a clear understanding of
Western ideas, still feels somewhat beholden to the oligarchs, and maintains a
very short time horizon. Yushchenko is charismatic and reform-oriented, but is a
weak manager. The Rada majority is an uncertain amalgam of disparate factions
held together by Kuchma who has the final say over how key leaders vote. Your
most important message in this context will be to encourage Kuchma to give
stronger, more proactive support to Yushchenko's efforts, which are fundamentally
in the right direction.

International Policy. Ukrainian foreign policy under Kuchma continues to be a
net plus for United States' interests. Ukraine maintains a strong record on
nonproliferation which has won it agreement from us to lift commercial space
launch quotas. Kiev has been cooperative on the UN Security Council. Ukraine
was relatively helpful during the Kosovo conflict -- Kuchma refrained from
criticizing us openly and came to NATO's 50th anniversary last April

despite
strong pressure from Moscow -- and is with us in KFOR. Kiev skillfully manages
its relations with Moscow and continues to build on its important relationships
with Poland, the Balts, and other neighbors.

Kiev's success with Western Europe has been much more limited, primarily because
its relationship with the EU continues to be a dialogue of the deaf. Ukraine
wants a "political signal" concerning the possibility of eventual membership from
the EU, arguing that such a signal would be give a moral and psychological boost
to the government and justify painful reforms to the people. Brussels argues
that without concrete results, it makes no sense to discuss even associate
membership (remember Turkey!). Kiev's relationship with NATO is more positive,
due to Kiev's strong efforts and NATO's willingness to engage, and helps
galvanize Ukrainian support for democratic reform and partnership with Europe and
North America.

Influencing Change. Since your meeting with Kuchma in December, we have taken a
more direct and firm stance with Kiev; we have insisted on seeing results from
reform, broached sensitive issues such as high-level corruption, and asked for
specific deliverables. Remarkably, on virtually every count, Ukraine has
delivered. Kuchma appointed Yushchenko and accelerated reforms, solved a problem
with the Jewish Agency you raised with him, and agreed to a specific date for
Chornobyl closure after you requested one. We expect five factories which pirate
compact discs to be shut by the time you arrive. Kuchma appears to use the
political cover we extend to exert pressure on his own system. In your meetings
with Kuchma, you will want to press him firmly on issues such as energy sector
privatization and budget implementation, where near-term action is key to
longer-term success.

The Schedule

Your first meeting will be a restricted session with Kuchma, where you will
congratulate Kuchma for good progress on key issues such as Chornobyl,
nonproliferation, and cooperation in the Balkans. You will also encourage him to
be a more active supporter of accelerating reforms. Following this meeting both
sides will be joined by cabinet-level officials for a broader discussion of
economic reform and the politics of reform. You and Kuchma will then make a
joint statement in which he announces December 15 as the date for the closure of
Chornobyl and you announce our $78 million pledge for the sarcophagus. You will
also announce our lifting of Ukraine's commercial satellite launch quota. You
then travel by car to St. Michael's Square where you give your crowd speech.
Upon conclusion of your crowd speech, you do a 10-minute meet and greet with a
group of Ukraine's Next Generation leaders whom the Embassy has assembled and
positioned near the stage. You then depart by motorcade to Air Force One.

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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/22/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SEW Fact Sheet.doc
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
Moscow, Russia

June 4, 2000

Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Warning Center for the Exchange of
Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning

President Clinton and President Putin today signed the Memorandum Of Agreement
(MOA) Between The Government Of The United States and Government Of The Russian
Federation On The Establishment Of A Joint Center For The Exchange Of Data From
Early Warning Systems And Notifications Of Missile Launches.

This agreement - which is the first time the United States and Russia have agreed
to a permanent joint operation involving U.S. and Russian military personnel -
will establish a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow for the exchange of
information derived from each side's missile launch warning systems on the
launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

The exchange of this data will strengthen strategic stability by further reducing
the danger that ballistic missiles might be launched on the basis of false
warning of attack. It will also promote increased mutual confidence in the
capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides.

The JDEC will build upon the successful establishment and operation during the
millennium rollover of the temporary joint center for Y2K Strategic Stability in
Colorado Springs. The JDEC will be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week,
with American and Russian personnel.

The JDEC is also intended to serve as the repository for the notifications to be
provided as part of an agreed system for exchanging pre-launch notifications on

the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This agreement is
currently being negotiated separately.

Today's agreement is a significant milestone in ensuring strategic stability
between the United States and Russia.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Spaso House.doc
SCENESETTER: SPASO HOUSE

Spaso House has been the residence of American Ambassadors to Moscow since 1933.
The house was completed in 1914 for a wealthy merchant and manufacturer. It is
in the New Empire Style, with a bright yellow façade and a green dome, and is of
an impressive scale. After the Revolution, all such private homes were

appropriated for State use, and Spaso House was offered to the first American
ambassador to the Soviet Union, who arrived in 1933. Spaso House has hosted
several memorable events, been described in many novels, and hosted many famous
guests. It was redecorated in 1995, restoring the home to its original style. It
boasts an 82 foot-long hall, crowned by a domed ceiling, with the largest house
chandelier in Moscow. It also has a large dining room, a ballroom, and several
side rooms appropriate for small meetings.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
Status of Agreements.doc
Status of Agreements

Joint Statement of Principles. We have agreed with the Russians on a Joint
Statement of Principles that affirms the importance of strategic stability,

mutual deterrence and the ABM Treaty. The statement also acknowledges the emerging ballistic missile threat and the possibility of taking steps to make the ABM Treaty more relevant to the current, and prospective, security environment. The statement makes clear that the U.S. and Russia will intensify their discussions on START III and ABM, and that Ministers will report to Presidents on these issues. You and President Putin will sign.

Shared Early Warning. We have reached agreement on a Memorandum of Agreement to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow for sharing early warning information. The Center will be permanently manned by U.S. and Russian military personnel (the first permanent military cooperative arrangement between the United States and Russia). This agreement follows up your September 1998 joint statement with President Yeltsin. The exchange of near-real time data on ballistic missile launches will further reduce the danger that ballistic missiles might be launched on the basis of false warning of attack. You and President Putin will sign.

Military Plutonium. We are working to initial text of a detailed agreement tonight with the Russians to remove and dispose of 34 tons each of weapons grade plutonium. Congress has already appropriated $200 million for this project; we have asked for additional funds from Congress and the G-8. Expect you and President Putin will sign Joint Statement Sunday announcing completion of the agreement (Gore and Kasyanov to sign the actual agreement at a later date).

Civil Plutonium. We have made progress, but not reached agreement, on civil plutonium. Russia has agreed to a 20-year moratorium on reprocessing spent fuel. We have agreed to fund storage facilities for spent fuel. Russia has asked in return for joint research on a new generation nuclear reactor that is

more
proliferation resistant. We have asked Russia to reaffirm the Gore-Chernomyrdin
commitments with respect to nuclear technology and Iran. We have made some
progress, but Russia has still not agreed to restrict certain technology - in
particular, they have not reaffirmed what was said to Gore regarding not selling
additional nuclear reactors to Iran until after the Bushehr reactor is completed.
We have prepared points for you to use with Putin, urging that Russia reaffirm
its earlier commitment and proposing that we proceed with the civil plutonium
initiative.

Space Launch Quota. The Lockheed-Russian Joint Venture is an important source of
revenue for the Russians. It is also important to Lockheed and the U.S.
satellite industry. We have indicated consistently that any relaxation of the
quota would be tied to Russia's non-proliferation performance. U.S. and Russian
officials have completed a confidential document specifying actions that Russia
must take to tighten export controls and prevent missile assistance to Iran. In
return, you could say publicly that the U.S. is considering a decision to lift
the launch quota. We and the Russians are still negotiating over the precise
language of this public statement. I intend to raise with Ivanov tonight. This
approach will give us time to see if Russia is implementing the tightening
measures, and also give us time to work with Israel and Congress.
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6/3/10:10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT summarycards 2ndafternoonpts..doc
SUMMARY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ECONOMICS

* Global "new economy" radically expanding economic frontiers. Russia should
accelerate its integration with these trends.

* Want Russia to be peaceful, democratic and prosperous. Economics is crucial
dimension.

* Honeymoon important opportunity. Eager to hear your plans.

* International support, including IMF and World Bank, still important. Will
support strong IFI programs.

* Can do limited debt rescheduling under new IMF program; this would provide
substantial financial relief.

* Focus on WTO is right. Encourages reforms and integration. Hope you can
accelerate accession process.

* Now in an era of global markets. Capital has no nationality.

* Create transparent, predictable environment that protects investors. Your
results will let me be your salesman.

* Strengthening the rule of law is critical.

* Special focus on intellectual property rights, which are tied to high-tech
innovation, an area Russia could profit from.

* Corruption has been eating away at investor confidence over the years.
Experience shows market reforms the best remedy.

* Energy sector has much promise. Implementing production sharing agreement laws
would encourage investment.

* Pleased we are deepening our cooperation on critical challenge of climate
change.

* Important to broaden our relationship beyond governments.

* Hope you can support our expanded exchanges (Billington program) and similar
initiatives; should use Binational Commission to explore ways to cooperate on TB,
HIV.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
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summarycards2ndaftern if raised..doc
CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* (If asked: Russia's Soviet-era debt) New IMF program would provide basis for
limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations. To consider further
relief in future, must look at Russia's performance under IMF program and
financial need. London Club debt agreement not precedent for Paris Club.

* (If asked: G-8 to replace G-7) G-8 is premier political body. G-7 plays
needed role in addressing financial crises. Russian membership in a full G-7/8
not ripe. Need establishment of stable, prosperous economy with sophisticated
financial system that is making substantial contribution to global economic,
financial system.

* (If asked: Jackson-Vanik) Russia is in full compliance with Jackson-

Vanik,
enjoys full NTR benefits. Encourage changes on key issues that would persuade
Congress to graduate you (e.g., religion law, anti-Semitism, and curbs on
immigration up to ten years after access to state secrets).

* (If asked: Market Economy Status) Our experts have been reviewing options.
Status applies only in anti-dumping context, no broader significance. Market
status would actually increase Russia's exposure to trade penalties.

* (If asked: Access to Steel Market) Glad we signed suspension agreement
covering steel trade last year, providing relief for industry and continued
access for Russian producers. Pleased our experts have launched Joint Steel
Dialogue to address structural trade issues and provide technical assistance.

* (If asked: BIT) Know you have particular concerns about BIT. Think our
experts can redouble their work to find a way forward. Ratification would send
important signal to U.S. investors.

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~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Supplementary Points on Arms Control.doc
Supplementary Points on Arms Control

Q:

Why should the Russians do ABM when Senator Helms says any agreement would be
"dead on arrival" in the Senate?

A:

* Think an agreement to adapt the ABM Treaty to permit a limited NMD, as well as
an agreement to reduce further nuclear arsenals, would be recognized by our
Senate as being in our national interest.

Q:

Why are you so intent on concluding an agreement on ABM when your presidency is
almost over?

A:

* The American people elect presidents for four-year terms, and they are expected
to conduct foreign policy and act in the national interest for their entire term.

Q:

Isn't a boost-phase intercept system, such as that proposed by President Putin, a
better way to deal with the threat?

A:

* There are some advantages to a boost-phase system, as it can intercept missiles
before they dispense countermeasures.

* But we don't think such a system can be a substitute for our NMD program, which
is still the fastest, most affordable, and most advanced technology for NMD.

Q:

But isn't their evidence that the tests for the current system were rigged?

A:

* No there have been some allegations, but I'm confident I will get an accurate
assessment of the system's technical feasibility prior to making any decision on
deployment.

Q:

Why should Putin negotiate with you on START and ABM when Governor Bush is
offering unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal?

A:

* I don't think an offer of unilateral action in this area is necessarily reassuring to anyone.

* Governor Bush's approach is basically a "do whatever you want" approach to
managing strategic affairs, both on offense and defense.

* That's been tried before, and it led to an arms race that we are still trying
to throttle down.

* The approach we have put forward would ensure that reductions in offense, as
well as deployment of a limited NMD, would preserve stability, and enhance both
sides' security.

Q:

Did you discuss technology sharing with the Russians? Is Russia one of the
"civilized countries" you are prepared to share technology wit?

A:

* We had a good discussion of the possibility for cooperation in this area. We
have each made proposals, and we have asked our experts to look at this and
report back to us at Okinawa.

Q:

But are you prepared to give your NMD to Russia?

A:

* What we need to do is look at the proposals we now have on the table, and see
what we can agree to pursue. I think we can agree on more initiatives, like
shared early warning, that will enhance both countries security.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT usatoday editorial draft 2.doc
The case for negotiated agreements

President Clinton's guiding principle for our nuclear weapons policy is to not
have one more nuclear weapon than is necessary to defend our security. We've
demonstrated our ability to reduce our nuclear weapons stockpile from Cold War
heights - successfully (examples) and over the past decade over 8,000 deployed
nuclear weapons have been removed from the stockpiles in the United States and
former Soviet Union. Arms control treaties (former Soviet Union)

Preserving the ABM treaty and having a common path for reductions is important to
continuing this progress. We're now pursuing a START III treaty with Russia that
would reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear forces by 80 percent from

their Cold War
height. And we're doing this because negotiated arms control treaties - while
they make take more time -- ensure that both sides have a shared understanding of
the strategic environment and they help build the confidence that is necessary
for nations to reduce their nuclear stockpile.

Arms control treaties help prioritize reductions so we can focus on getting rid
of the most dangerous kinds of weapons -- like multiple-warhead missiles - first.
It gives our military planners greater predictability regarding Russia's nuclear
capabilities. And finally, the treaties include strict verification and inspection provisions to prevent cheating so both sides have the confidence to go
to lower levels.

As we proceed with plans for a limited national missile defense aimed at emerging
threat of a rogue nation like North Korea developing missile capabilities, we are
far more likely to avoid tensions with Russia and enhance our security if we
continue the process of negotiated arms control.

Some argue we should simply abandon this process and unilaterally reduce our
nuclear forces, while at the same time building up a full-fledged missile defense
reminiscent of Star Wars. This seems a sure recipe for reigniting the arms race
and reversing 20 years of arms control gains.

The goal of arms control is to reduce the danger of conflict and promote
stability - the ABM treaty - with its ..... - is im

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT usatoday editorial draft.doc
The case for negotiated agreements

We should not casually discard a process that over the past decade has led to the

removal of over 8,000 deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and former
Soviet Union. During the Cold War, these agreements helped us manage the
problem of Russia's strength. Today, they're equally important in helping us
manage the problem of Russia's potential weakness by making sure that Russia's
arms reductions occur in a stable, transparent and irreversible manner.

Negotiating mutual arms reductions with Russia is the best way to reduce the
danger of nuclear war -- because: (1) we can agree to reduce the most dangerous
kinds of weapons -- like multiple-warhead missiles; (2) our military planners
have greater predictability regarding Russia's nuclear capabilities; and (3) the
treaties include strict verification and inspection provisions to prevent
cheating. As we proceed with plans for a limited national missile defense aimed
at emerging small missile arsenals, we are far more likely to avoid tensions with
Russia and enhance our security if we continue the process of negotiated arms
control. And we're currently pursuing a START III treaty with Russia that would
reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear forces by 80 percent from their Cold War height.

Some argue we should simply abandon this process and unilaterally reduce our
nuclear forces, while at the same time building up a full-fledged missile defense
reminiscent of Star Wars. This would reignite the arms race and reverse the gains
of 20 years of arms control. It would undermine confidence and trust between the
United States and Russia and harm our cooperation to prevent the spread of
weapons to other nations. That cooperation is helping us meet the challenges of
the post-Cold War era - in our work to help the Russians downsize their nuclear
weapons complex, to ensure weapons scientists are not forced by economic hardship
to sell their expertise to the highest bidder and to irreversibly remove
plutonium from military use. The goal of arms control is to reduce the danger

of conflict and promote stability - it's more than just a numbers game. That's
why negotiated agreements continue to be essential.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Yeltsin Cards.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR COURTESY CALL WITH FORMER RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

* Have had good visit. Think success of my discussions with Putin and his team
is tied directly to enduring importance of your leadership as first President of
democratic Russia.

* You brought liberty and freedom to Russia. Putin's task now is to consolidate
those reforms, make sure that all Russians enjoy benefits of freer, more
prosperous society, fully integrated with international community.

* Still see big challenges ahead. Hope that Vladimir and I can rely on your
help. We still have our work cut out for us reducing the nuclear danger, moving
forward on arms control agenda, tackling security challenges of 21st Century.

* Valued your role as guarantor of Russia's democratic reforms and Russian
Constitution. Want you to stay engaged and keep close eye on respect for basic
freedoms.

* Especially important that Russia develop tolerant, robust civil society. Key
element of that transformation is strength of independent media, know that's
important to you. Concerned by some recent setbacks; can you look into this?

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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/18/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Yeltsin meeting.doc

COURTESY CALL WITH
FORMER RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

* Reaffirm Yeltsin's historic role in transforming Russia and building new
relationship with international community.

* Stress need for Yeltsin's continued engagement on behalf of democratic reforms,
especially press freedoms.

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Due to Yeltsin's continued ill health, his role in Russian public life remains
limited. The Yeltsin coterie/"family" (e.g., daughter Tatyana, former chief of
staff Yumashev, shadowy oligarch Abramovich) remains active and influential
behind the scenes with Putin and is working out a new modus vivendi with his
team. Putin has been careful to give Yeltsin prominent billing in public events
and commentary as "Russia's First President."

In addition to reviewing your joint accomplishments during Yeltsin's tenure, you
should politely point out the important role Yeltsin played as a guarantor of
democratic reforms. Yeltsin took a personal interest in safeguarding democracy
and press freedoms, reining in numerous attempts to muzzle the press. Given
increased pressure on the media under Putin, it would be helpful to let Yeltsin

know that you are concerned about the situation and ask that he keep an eye on
the issue.
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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Yeltsin TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR COURTESY CALL WITH FORMER RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. email~~	~~Andrew Weiss to Jonathan Elkind re: FW: First Plenary (13 pages)~~	~~06/07/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBM 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Moscow and Summit])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:
[06/07/2000]

2016-0114-M
kh1816

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.36)
KBH 7/25/2023

DATE-TIME 06/07/2000 5:22:15 PM

FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/07/2000

DECLASSIFYON 06/08/2010

SUBJECT FW: first plenary ~~[SECRET]~~

TO Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

-----Original Message-----
From: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Sent: Wednesday,
June 07, 2000 4:19 PM
To: Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Subject: first
plenary ~~[SECRET]~~

from SRS. note the holes.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

PutinPlenary1.doc
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Putin-Clinton, First Plenary Session, 4 June 2000, The Kremlin [Room?]

USG Participants: The President, MKA, SRB, ST, JFC, Slocombe, Sestanovich
(NOTETAKER).

Russian Participants: Putin, ISI, SBI, Prikhodko, GEM, Ushakov, Chkhikhvishvili
(NOTETAKER).

Putin opened the meeting by welcoming the President and observing that their
one-on-one meetings had had good results. Under the Clinton

Administration, it had been possible to manage Russian-American relations so that even when problems arose the overall level of relations stayed high and so that problems that might otherwise be insoluble could in fact be solved. He proposed to split the afternoons meetings into two parts - on security issues and then on economics.

The President answered that he was delighted to be in Moscow, and expressed his appreciation for the meetings already held. He proposed to get right into the agenda without further ado.

Putin proposed the following agenda topics: 1) START and ABM, 2) CFE, 3) Nuclear security and transparency, 4) disposition of plutonium from eliminated nuclear weapons, 5) nuclear cooperation, including cooperation against Iran, 6) global challenges to security, 7) cooperation with the U.N. and other international agencies, 8) Yugoslavia, and 9) NATO-Russian relations; he said he was ready to discuss any other subject the President might propose.

The President said he'd like to add Nagorno-Karabakh. It seems Kocharian feels he can't implement the settlement he worked out with Aliyev, so as to keep Armenia's border with Iran. Perhaps special arrangements might be found, including overpasses or secure corridors, but nothing will work without Putin's help. A settlement would be good for Russia, especially one that Putin personally facilitated. Some might think that continued conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan helped preserved Russian influence, but in fact instability on Russia's borders was dangerous. An N-K settlement would facilitate reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, which was also good for Russia. We had worked with France and Russia, but lacked the leverage to move things further; Putin's help was necessary.

Putin replied that he had first heard about the deal in Yerevan at the

Sargsian
funeral. His first reaction was positive. He agreed that Russian interests were
served by a settlement; this would allow cooperation between our neighbors and
with Russia. Russia had used its influence in the army and other institutions in
Armenia, and this had had some results, but the domestic political situation
blocked progress; some were able to use the idea of a territorial swap for
political advantage.

Putin said that Aliyev seemed to think that a settlement would give him a place
in history. This was a characteristic Eastern view ("Oriental people are think
and delicate" -- ?).

The Russian foreign ministry had supported the deal from the beginning. There
were different approaches within the Russian Security Council; some said
continued conflict would help Russian interests, but this was not right. We'll
keep working on a solution. But at our recent meeting in Minsk, Kocharian had
asked that we not press forward. He believed the time for a settlement might
come down the road, and we ought to trust him on this; he knows the situation
better than we. His political situation seems to be better, with some changes in
the government that had been achieved only with great difficulty. Despite this,
Kocharian wants a pause, and we should accept that.

Putin said he would see Kocharian and Aliyev when they attended the CIS summit;
he would use the occasion for separate meetings with them on this subject.

The President, turning to CFE, said we looked forward to Russian withdrawals from
Georgia and Moldova. He asked how Russia planned to meet the agreed withdrawal
schedules.

Putin replied that Russia had had an obligation to provide notification that it

had exceeded CFE flank limits, and had complied immediately, saying that force levels would be brought down after the operation in the Caucasus was completed; this would be possible as the situation stabilized. There are no longer any large-scale operations, so Russian levels would be brought into compliance with the treaty.

As for Georgia and Moldova, Russia had no wish to violate the treaty, which in any case covered equipment not stationed forces. The real issue in Georgia concerned Russian bases, which were separate from treaty obligations.

Negotiations with Georgia were underway; the next round was in June. He noted that if Russia left too quickly, Georgia would collapse as a state. Bandits would take over. Shevardnadze had lost control; Geogian government officials wouldn't even go to some parts of Georgia without Russian military protection. Local conditions prevented too rapid withdrawal; the same is true in Transnistria. The situation was delicate, but we are ready for the next step in June. Smirnov is a very difficult partner. During the last round of discussions, he said he now thought of Russia in a different manner [implication: negative]. He had gone hunting and disappeared for several weeks. The movement of trains has begun. Russia doesn't want to leave so much equipment there; it's no use for Russia or the Transnistrians, and they agreed. There's too much of it, and it's being traded. Putin will go to Moldova on June 18th, at Lucinschi's invitation. He'll discuss the situation in detail; it will be resolved in the long run, but he can't say whether the deadline will be met. Still, he thought all agreements would be fulfilled, and that financing would be received from international organizations.

The President asked Putin for his thinking about anti-terrorist cooperation, including against Usama bin Ladin.

Putin replied that our services are working together well. The Taliban had moved
their forces south. A kind of terrorist international had been created, with
support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and centered in Afghanistan. There are
two ways to deal with the Taliban. First, try to civilize them, as the Europeans
proposed; this was philosophically correct, but even as we pursue it, they
continue to hate us; they are hungry and want to eat every day. So (this is the
second approach) they had to see that they met organized resistance. It's not
likely that the Taliban will expel bin Ladin. There's just one way here, which
the US itself had used. We need to step up political pressures, including with
Pakistan and through international organizations. Pakistan will listen to the
U.S. A common front is necessary. Terrorists are being trained in Afghansitan
against both of us. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and even Kazakhstan are
vulnerable. Last year, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has been hit, and hostages
taken. The terrorists use drug money to support their operations. Drug
production in this region is increasing, and last year it had exceeded Latin
American production levels. Local authorities in Afghanistan support the
traffickers. Russian and American cooperation against this would be effective.
But if we don't cooperate, the terrorists would be able to squeeze into the gap
between us.

Igor Ivanov noted that he and Secretary Albright had agreed to establish a
working group on Afghanistan, working in three directions: first, in the U.N.;
second, to increase political pressure; third, to increase intelligence
cooperation, using "other means."

Putin added that he had met the Uzbek and other Central Asian leaders; they were
all affected by this problem and all afraid; they were unable to fight this
aggression. They are all Muslim states, and ideological subversion

was being
used to prepare aggression. An example was the recent call by one Chechen leader
for the worldwide extermination of Jews. We need to work together against this
sort of thing.

The President said he thought a working group was a good idea. A long effort was
ahead of us, lasting years.

Putin asked the President for his view of the situation.

The President replied that he thought more economic pressure was needed. In
addition, he said we would go to the Pakistanis. They are in a difficult position, having many tribal ties to bordering areas of Afghanistan, but he
thought Musharraf might decide to contribute at some point. This is a complex
region. Iran is one example; we like the new president, but the outcome of the
domestic struggle that's taking place is uncertain. Our problems with them
include their effort to acquire WMD, and we appreciate the important steps Russia
has taken to strengthen its export controls. We also object to Iran's attempts
to block the Middle East peace process.

In general, the President said, we have to use all tools available to us. In
dealing with the Taliban we have to keep the pressure up, using a comprehensive
approach.

Secretary Albright referred to her recent trip to Central Asia, which had
confirmed the Central Asian leaders' anxiety. Russian and U.S. interests in the
region coincided to a large extent, since only independent, democratic, and
stable countries would be able to fight off the terrorists.

Putin said he had been in Central Asia immediately after Secretary Albright. He
saw there that the less democratic the leaders the less they understood. In
Ashgabat, he saw the gold-plated statue of Niyazov that rotated on a tower every

24 hours; he also saw how he fed the ambassadors of leading countries tomatoes at
his receptions. Niyazov had asked him to be mild in his press conference
comments on the Taliban; he had refused.

Igor Ivanov observed that terrorist groups in many countries were now working
together. Despite this, Russia and the U.S. had worked together, and this had
helped make it possible for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.

The President said he didn't mind if Hizbollah pretended that it had run Israel
out of Lebanon; it wasn't true, of course. Israel had calculated that it needed
to get out, to advance a comprehensive settlement. He thought this might soon be
achieved. Iran needed to be dissuaded from trying to block this process,
although obviously this was connected to internal Iranian politics.

As for the U.S., we are more directly affected by bin Ladin, and here Russia and
the U.S. need a coordinated strategy. But in implementing this, he believed that
general airstrikes won't be effective. Before our strikes, we had specific
intelligence and were acting against a particular target. He doubted that
strikes would help in the current situation. If we're going to have to take the
heat for such strikes, they at least ought to have a high probability of success.
We ought to get our people together to develop a comprehensive approach.

Putin agreed that air strikes were not the best option, and siad Russia was not
planning them. But because of these threats, the Taliban had actually announced
that they had no plans for an attack. This was good. Perhaps a UN mission
should be sent to check on this situation, to force the Taliban to explain
themselves. It was good to keep them under tight pressure and not to let up. We
should instruct our services to work together, they'll find a common language.

Putin added that after our attack in Afghanistan the head of Russian intelligence had told him that Russia would have been able to be more precise, because our intelligence was better. But even with more precise intelligence, a strike in the current situation would not help.

The President said this was especially true in a heavily-populated place like Qandahar. We had observed that bin-Ladin was keeping himself surrounded by women and children, so that no attack could take place without provoking international outrage. It would be different if we were thinking of using soldiers on the ground, rather than long-range missiles. But in any case we had to make it costly for bin Ladin to continue.

The President said he was pleased with the renewed cooperation between Russia and NATO. This was now fully back on track. Robertson had had a good trip. We needed Putin's personal commitment to keep moving forward. The President pointed out that in his Aachen speech he had said that there were tow large unfinished problems in Europe: first, the situation in Southeast Europe and secondly, getting relations with Russia right. What we needed to do now was implement fully our agreement [Final Act?], and then go beyond it.

Putin said that he had seen the President's statement in Germany, especially concerning the need for Open Doors in Europe and cooperation with Russia. We had seen positive meaning in all this, and are ready to develop things further; there should be full-scale relations with NATO. But Russia was not for letting NATO substitute for other arrangements that had been worked out after 1945. If Russia and the US were able to coordinate their activities in the UN, they would have success; if they couldn't do so, they'd meet a dead end.

Putin said that he had seen the statement recently issued by nine countries in

Vilnius. "We can't but it but we welcome it." [?] Russia's attitude toward
NATO enlargement was unchanged. But he pointed out that when asked about
possible membership for Russia in NATO, he supported the idea. But he noted that
the U.S. had raised objections, and said nobody in the alliance was ready for
this.

The President replied that we should start now.

Putin said this was the first time Russia has heard such a reply, and that it was
a good one. He said NATO's attitude toward including Russia was important for
the way people viewed enlargement: if you're not willing to talk to us, then why
are you approaching our borders? But if you really want to have normal relations
with us, we need to develop them. The world will be very different in 20 or 50
years and we have to be ready for this. We have to pick a road without obstacles
[?]. The countries that are seeking membership are not threatened by anyone; we
want to improve relations with all of them. We don't want problems to appear,
and our activities will aim at preventing them.

The President said that from the outset of the NATO enlargement process he had
seen that it could be a problem for Russia. He was sensitive to this, but he
wanted it understood that NATO enlargement did not threaten Russia. He recalled
that in their meeting the night before, he had told Putin that if they and their
successors don't damage Russian-American relations, if China can develop its
relations with us, while resolving the Taiwan issue, if Pakistan and India can
avoid a major war, then the biggest international problems will be like Chechnya,
pitting the civilized world against terrorists, drug traffickers, rogue states,
and so forth. In such circumstances, NATO will be totally unrecognizable from
the alliance created after World War II. It would be, among other things, a

source of training and cooperation among big and small states [trying to deal
with these problems?].

The President repeated that he was serious about being ready to discuss NATO
membership with Russia; he recognized that Russian domestic considerations will
prevent this for now, but over time Russia should be part of every organization
that holds the civilized world together. If our successors focus on each other
as the main threats they have to worry about, they will be missing the
opportunity to deal cooperatively with other problems. He understood that for
many Russians NATO still had a negative connotation, but he hoped Putin would see
that Central European states don't feel threatened by Russia. We want to be
helpful; in particular, we should try to agree now about what the world will look
like in the next ten years or so. The President said he was dead serious in this
suggestion.

Putin said that it was not just the world that had changed in the past ten years
but Russia too. He agreed that it was important to try to look into the future.
Russia should not be led into ideological responses in dealing with a world of
chaos and disorder. There were obstacles, of course [to really cooperating with
NATO?]; during Soviet times, popular attitudes had developed that now had to be
broken, but in the process Russia must not be seen as losing its autonomy as a
state. The problem was that Russia was outside an organization that takes the
most important decisions. We should deliberate, figuring out how to develop
cooperation, then act on it. Russia is ready for cooperation, including for NATO
membership; if we hear that NATO is ready to accept us, then we will step
forward. But it is difficult to do so when our opinions are ignored. That's why
people prefer the UN, in which we have a vote.

The President said he was very encouraged by what he had heard. We

should think about this further, then maybe talk privately later. Obviously it is better for Russia to be in the tent. Russia should understand that we have many fights inside NATO and we don't always win them; the most important one that we had not won involved a failure, over the course of two years, to act in Bosnia; we'd had to work like hell. The President added that if Russia and the U.S. had not had a disagreement about Southeast Europe, we would not be having the present debate; our discussion could be much more straightforward.

Putin thanked the President for his remarks. He said that their discussion the night before had also been very interesting and philosophical. He then asked Foreign Minister Ivanov to report further on his discussion with Secretary Albright and others in the U.S. delegation.

Ivanov said they would like to propose to the presidents that foreign ministers take part in the G-8 meeting in Okinawa. The agenda for the meeting was very broad.

Putin asked whether the ministers thought the presidents would handle the discussion badly, to which Ivanov replied that the ministers would be responsible for implementing much of what the presidents agreed so being present would be useful to them.

The President noted that even before President Yeltsin had begun attending the meetings there had been a move to make G-7 meetings more informal; because some financial decisions remained on the agenda, it was agreed that finance ministers should continue to participate. The G-8 had become a political group with an economic component, rather than an economic group with a political component as it had been before. He said he agreed with Ivanov, and would try to fix the problem.

Ivanov thanked the president. As for documents that had been readied for the presidents, he said that they would sign the principles document as well as the memorandum of agreement to create a shared early warning center. They would also issue two further statements, on plutonium disposition and climate change. He noted that more than 200 documents had been signed by the presidents of Russia and the US since 1991.

The President said he was particularly pleased by the statement on climate change. ("Having once been in Moscow in January, I was afraid you might favor global warming.") There were many economic possibilities for Russia in dealing with climate change, not only because of its natural gas reserves, but because jobs are created by the policies needed to deal with the problem. It's a good trend that people can make money by doing good things for the environment. All governments will want to be seen as pro-growth and pro-environment at the same time. But given this reality, he wanted to know why Putin had abolished the state committee on the environment.

Putin explained this decision as follows. He knew that the environment was one of Vice President Gore's special interests, "one of his political aces." And the environment will e a priority for us, after having been ignored for a long time. For example, forest rehabilitation was a big issue, and the previous ministry had combined two functions - environmental and industrial. But priority had always been given to commercial considerations; environmental concerns were left out; the same had happened to the environment committee, which had a strong connection to commercial interests. Now these would be separated totally. The prime minister had re-assigned this responsibility to another ministry, which would aim to preserve environmental protection. Licensing, meanwhile, would be

done in a
separate government agency.

The President turned to Secretary Albright to complete the ministers' report on
their own discussion. She noted that they had discussed the Middle East Peace
Process, including the need to revive momentum on the multilateral track. They
had discussed a variety of people-tp-people contacts that should be given further
support. They had also discussed the possibility of expanding cooperation to
combat drug trafficking, with the aim of taking up this issue at Okinawa.

The President concluded by noting the importance of parliamentary contacts. Most
members of the US congress who take a strong interest in Russia have been doing
so for years; their ranks haven't been strengthened by new recruits. It was
important also to expand exchanges involving local officials such as mayors.
Both Russian and American officials benefited by such contact.

Putin proposed a short break, saying that he wanted to take the president to see
the new Kremlin plaque honoring recipients of the Order of Victory from the end
of World War II. General Eisenhower was one of these. So was Stalin. This was
part of our history, he said; nothing can be left out.
9

Case Number: 2016-0114-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 3967				
Document ID: 0004033				
Row: 43	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memcon~~	~~Memorandum of Conversation for the First Plenary Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, June 4, 2000 (11 pages)~~	~~01/09/2001~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~002. memcon~~	~~Memorandum of Conversation for the First Plenary Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, June 4, 2000; draft (11 pages)~~	~~01/09/2001~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Putin])
OA/Box Number: 3967

FOLDER TITLE:
0004033

2016-0114-M
kh1817

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0004033
RECEIVED: 16 JUN 00 16

TO: BERGER

CHRON FILE

FROM: MEDISH

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTUS MEMCON W/ PUTIN

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 22 JUN 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 5/19/2021
2016-0114-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	01010915	FOR DECISION
001		X	01011206	BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4033

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL	1	OP 1/10	see edits
BASH			
BRADTKE	2	W 1/11 First Draft	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	SWY 1/10	N
RECORDS MGMT.	4		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

01 JAN 9 PM 2:39

COMMENTS: MEMCON W/RUSSIAN PRES. PUTIN

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE ~~Yes~~

~~SECRET~~

4033

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 9, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: MARK MEDISH MCM

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President Vladimir Putin of Russia

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Vladimir Putin of Russia on June 4, 2000 in Moscow.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve AJB 1/11 Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 5/19/2021
2016-0114-M

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/19/10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.3d)
KBH 7/25/2023

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Plenary Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary Madeleine Albright
Ambassador James Collins
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States (notetaker)
Peter Afanasenko, State Department Interpreter

President Vladimir Putin
Ivan Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergey Ivanov, Security Council Secretary
Sergey Prikhodko, Foreign Affairs Advisor
Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Yuriy Ushakov, Russian Ambassador to the United States
Vladimir Chkhikvishvili, Director of North American Department

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 4, 2000, 1:33 p.m. - 2:40 p.m. (local time), The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia

President Putin: Mr. President, welcome once again to the Kremlin. I believe our one-on-one meeting last night yielded positive results. Under your leadership, it has been possible to manage Russian-American relations even when problems arise. That way, problems that might otherwise be insoluble can, in fact, be resolved. (S)

I propose that we split the afternoon's meetings into parts. The first meeting will focus on security issues, and the second will focus on economics. (U)

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/19/10

The President: That sounds fine. President Putin, I am delighted to be back in Moscow. I, too, want to thank you for the meetings that we've already held. Since we have a good deal to discuss, I propose we get right to the agenda without further ado. (U)

President Putin: Fine. I propose the following agenda topics: START and ABM; CFE; nuclear safety and transparency; disposition of plutonium from eliminated nuclear weapons; nuclear cooperation, including cooperation against Iran; global challenges to security; cooperation with the UN and other international institutions; Yugoslavia; and, NATO-Russian relations. These are the topics I would like to discuss during this first afternoon meeting, but I am ready to discuss any other subject you would like to propose. (S)

The President: I would like to add Nagorno-Karabakh to that list. It seems that President Kocharian feels he cannot implement the settlement he worked out with President Aliyev, so as to keep Armenia's border with Iran. Perhaps special arrangements might be found, including overpasses or secure corridors, but nothing will work without your help. A settlement to the Nagorno-Krabakh conflict would be good for Russia, especially one that you, as President, helped to facilitate. (S)

Some might think that continued conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan helps to preserve Russian influence. In reality, however, instability on Russia's borders is dangerous. A settlement would facilitate reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, which would also be good for Russia. We have worked at length with France and Russia to bring about such a settlement, but we lacked the leverage to move things ahead. Your help is necessary. (S)

President Putin: Yes, I understand. I first heard about the deal at the Sargsian funeral in Yerevan. My initial reaction was very positive. I agree that Russian interests are well-served by a settlement. This would allow cooperation between our neighbors and with our country. (S)

We have used our influence in the army and other institutions in Armenia, and this has had some results. However, the domestic political situation in Armenia blocked progress. Some leaders there were able to use the idea of a territorial swap for

political advantage. President Aliyev seems to think that a settlement would give him a place in history. (S)

Our Foreign Ministry has supported the Nagorno-Karabakh deal from the beginning. There were different approaches within the Russian Security Council. Some said continued conflict would help Russian interests, but this was not right. We'll keep working on a solution. (S)

However, I must tell you, Mr. President, that at my meeting in Minsk with President Kocharian, he asked me not to press forward. He believes the time for a settlement might come down the road. I think we ought to trust him on this, since he knows the situation better than we. His political situation seems to be better, as a result of many changes within the government that were achieved only with great difficulty. Despite this, President Kocharian wants a pause in the settlement process, and I think we should respect that. (S)

I will see President Kocharian and Aliyev when I attend the CIS Summit. I will use that occasion to hold separate meetings with each of them on this subject. (S)

The President: Thank you. I think that will help. Turning now to CFE, I am looking forward to Russia's withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova. How are you planning to meet the agreed withdrawal schedules? (S)

President Putin: Let me remind you, Mr. President, that Russia had an obligation to provide notification that it had exceeded CFE flank limits, and we complied immediately. We said that force levels would be brought down after the operation in the Caucuses was completed. This will become possible as the situation there stabilizes. There are no longer any large-scale operations, so Russian levels will be brought in to compliance with the treaty. (S)

As for Georgia and Moldova, Russia has no wish to violate the treaty, which in any case covered equipment and not stationed forces. The real issue in Georgia concerns Russian bases, which are separate from treaty obligations. Negotiations with Georgia are underway, and the next round is later this month. If Russian troops leave Georgia too quickly, it will collapse as a state. Bandits would take over the country. It is clear that President Shevardnadze has lost control. In fact, some Georgian Government officials refuse to travel to certain parts of the country without Russian military protection. (S)

Also, local conditions prevent a rapid withdrawal. The same is true in Transnistria. The situation is delicate, but we are ready for the next step later this month. Mr. Smirnov is a very difficult partner. During the last round of discussions, he said that he now thinks of Russia in a negative manner. He went hunting and has disappeared for several weeks. (S)

The movement of trains has begun. Russia doesn't want to leave behind so much equipment. It's no use for either of us, and they agree. There's too much of it, and I'm afraid it's being traded. I will go to Moldova on June 18, at President Lucinschi's invitation. I'll discuss the situation in detail. It will be resolved in the long run, but I can't say whether the deadline will be met. Still, I am confident that all agreements will be fulfilled, and that financing will be received from international organizations. (S)

The President: And what about anti-terrorism cooperation between our countries, particularly against Usama bin Laden? (S)

President Putin: I think our counterterrorism services are already working well together. The Taliban have moved their forces south. A kind of Terrorist International has been created, with support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and centered in Afghanistan. (S)

First, we tried to civilize them, as the Europeans proposed. This was philosophically correct, but even as we pursued it, they continue to hate us. They are hungry and want to eat every day. So, we followed a second approach - organized resistance. It's not likely that the Taliban will expel bin Laden. (S)

There's just one way here, which the United States itself has used. We need to step up political pressures, including with Pakistan and through international organizations. Pakistan will listen to the United States. A common front is necessary. (S)

Terrorists are being trained in Afghanistan against both of us. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and even Kazakhstan are vulnerable. Last year, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were hit, and hostages were taken. The terrorists use drug money to support their operations. Drug production in this region is increasing, and last year it exceeded Latin American production levels. Local authorities in Afghanistan support the traffickers. Russian and American cooperation against this would be effective. But if we

don't cooperate, the terrorists will squeeze into the gap between us. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Secretary Albright and I have agreed to establish a working group on Afghanistan, which will work in three directions: first, in the United Nations; second, to increase political pressure; and third, to increase intelligence cooperation using other means. (S)

President Putin: I have also met with the Uzbek and other Central Asian leaders. They are all affected by this problem and are all afraid. They feel vulnerable and unable to fight this aggression. They are all Muslim states, and ideological subversion is being used to prepare aggression. One example was the recent call by one Chechen leader for the worldwide extermination of Jews. We need to work together against this sort of thing. (S)

The President: Yes, I agree. And I think the working group is a good idea. There is a long effort ahead of us that will last years into the future. (S)

President Putin: What is your view of the situation? (U)

The President: I think that more economic pressure is needed. In addition, I will consult with the Pakistanis. They are in a difficult position with many tribal ties to bordering areas of Afghanistan. I think Musharraf might decide to contribute at some point. This is a complex region. Iran is a good example. We like the new president, but the outcome of the domestic struggle that is taking place is difficult to predict. (S)

Our problems with Iran include their effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we appreciate the important steps Russia has taken to strengthen your export controls. We also object to Iran's attempts to block the Middle East peace process. We must use all of the tools available to us. In dealing with the Taliban, we must also keep up the pressure, using a comprehensive approach. (S)

Secretary Albright: During my recent trip to central Asia, I experienced firsthand the anxiety over terrorism among the central Asian leaders. Russian and U.S. interests in the region coincide to a large extent, since only independent, democratic, and stable countries will be able to fight off the terrorists. (S)

President Putin: Yes. I was in central Asia immediately after your visit, Madam Secretary. I noticed that the less democratic leaders understood less about how to deal with terrorism. In Ashgabat, I saw the gold-plated statue of Niyazov that rotated on a tower every 24 hours. I also saw how he fed tomatoes to the ambassadors of leading countries at his receptions. Niyazov asked me to be mild in my press conference comments on the Taliban. I refused. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Terrorist groups in many countries are now working together. The fact that Russia and the United States are working together helped to make it possible for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. (S)

The President: I don't mind if the Hizbollah pretends that it ran Israel out of Lebanon. That's not true, of course. Israel calculated that it needed to get out in order to advance a comprehensive settlement. I think this might soon be achieved. Iran must be dissuaded from trying to block this process, although this is obviously closely connected to internal Iranian politics. (S)

As for the United States, we are more directly affected by bin Laden, and here Russia and the United States need a coordinated strategy. Air strikes will not be effective. Before our strikes, we had specific intelligence, and we were acting against a particular target. I doubt that Russian air strikes will help in the current situation. You're going to take a lot of heat for any strikes, and they do not have a high probability of success. We ought to get our people together to develop a comprehensive approach to dealing with bin Laden. (S)

President Putin: I agree that air strikes are not the best option, and I'll tell you that Russia is not planning them. But because of the threat of air strikes, the Taliban announced they had no plans for an attack. This was good. Perhaps a United Nations mission should be sent to check on this situation and to force the Taliban to explain themselves. It was good to keep them under tight pressure and not to let up. We should instruct our services to work together. I'm sure they'll find a common language. (S)

After the U.S. attack in Afghanistan, the head of our intelligence service told me that Russia would have been more precise because our intelligence was better than yours. But even with more precise intelligence, a strike in the current situation would not help. (S)

The President: This is especially true in a heavily populated place like Kandahar. We have observed that bin Laden surrounds himself with women and children so that no attack could take place without provoking an international outrage. It would be different if we were thinking of using soldiers on the ground rather than long-range missiles. But in any case, we had to make it costly for bin Laden to continue. (S)

I am pleased with the renewed cooperation between Russia and NATO. This is now fully back on track. Mr. Robertson had a good trip to Russia. We need your personal commitment to keep moving forward. In my speech in Aachen, I said that there were two unfinished problems in Europe: first, the situation in southeast Europe; and second, getting relations right with Russia. What we need to do now is fully implement our agreement, and then go beyond it. (S)

President Putin: Yes, I saw your statement in Germany concerning the need for open doors in Europe and cooperation with Russia. We saw very positive meaning in all of this, and we are ready to develop things further. There should be full-scale relations between Russia and NATO. But Russia is not in favor of letting NATO substitute for other arrangements that have been worked out since 1945. If Russia and the United States are able to coordinate their activities in the United Nations, we will be successful. If we can't do so, we'll meet a dead end. (S)

I also recently saw the statement issued by nine countries in Vilnius. Our attitude toward NATO enlargement remains unchanged. But I'll let you know that when I was asked about possible membership for Russia in NATO, I supported the idea. It's important to note, however, that the United Stated raised objections to my public statement, and I don't think anyone in the alliance is ready for this. (S)

The President: Well, we should start now. (S)

President Putin: This is the first time that we have heard such a statement from the United States, and I must say I am pleased. NATO's attitude toward including Russia is important for the way people view enlargement. If you're not willing to talk to us, then why are you approaching our borders? But if you really want to have normal relations with us, we need to develop them. We have to pick a road without obstacles. The countries that are seeking membership are not threatened by anyone. We want to

improve relations with all of them. We don't want problems to appear, and our activities will aim at preventing them. (S)

The President: From the outset of the NATO enlargement process, I knew that it could be a problem for Russia. I was sensitive to this, and I want it understood that NATO enlargement does not threaten Russia in any way. (S)

During our meeting last night, President Putin, I told you that if we and our successors don't damage U.S.-Russian relations; and if China can develop its relations with us, while resolving the Taiwan issue; and if Pakistan and India can avoid a major war; then the biggest international problems will be like Chechnya, pitting the civilized world against terrorists, drug traffickers, rogue states, and so forth. In such circumstances, NATO will be totally unrecognizable from the alliance created after World War II. It would be, among other things, a source of training and cooperation among big and small states in order to deal with these new international problems. (S)

I am serious about being ready to discuss NATO membership with Russia. I recognize that domestic considerations inside Russia will prevent this for now, but over time Russia should be a part of every organization that holds the civilized world together. If our successors focus on each other as the main threats they have to worry about, they will be missing the opportunity to deal cooperatively on other problems. (S)

I understand that, for many Russians, NATO still has a negative connotation. However, I hope that you will see that Central European states do not feel threatened by Russia. We want to be helpful. In particular, we should try to agree now about what the world will look like in the next ten years or so. I am serious in making this suggestion. (S)

President Putin: I understand. It's not just the world that has changed in the past ten years. Russia has changed, too. I agree that it is important to try to look into the future. Russia should not be led into ideological responses in dealing with a world of chaos and disorder. There are obstacles, of course, to real cooperation with NATO. (S)

During the Soviet period, popular attitudes developed that now must be broken. In the process, however, Russia must not be seen as losing its autonomy as a state. The problem is that Russia is outside of an organization that makes the most important decisions. We should deliberate, figure out how to

cooperate, and then act on it. Russia is ready for cooperation, including NATO membership. If we hear that NATO is ready to accept us, then we will step forward. But it is difficult to do so if our opinions are ignored. That's why our people prefer the United Nations, in which we have a vote. (S)

The President: I am very encouraged by what I am hearing. We should think about this further, then maybe talk privately later. Obviously, it is better for Russia to be in the tent. Russia needs to understand that we have many fights inside NATO, and the United States doesn't always win them. The most important fight that we didn't win involved a failure, over two years, to act in Bosnia. We had to work like hell. If Russia and the United States had not had a disagreement about southeast Europe, we would not be having the present debate. Our discussion could be much more straightforward. (S)

President Putin: Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate your remarks. I think our discussion last night was helpful and philosophical. I will now ask Foreign Minister Ivanov to report further on his discussion with Secretary Albright and others in the U.S. delegation. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: I would first like to propose that foreign ministers take part in the G-8 meeting in Okinawa next month. The agenda for the meeting is very broad. (S)

President Putin: Do you think that we will handle the discussions badly? (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Certainly not. However, since we will be responsible for implementing much of what you agree to, it will be useful for us to be there. (S)

The President: Even before President Yeltsin had begun attending the meetings, there had been a move to make the G-7 meetings more informal. Because financial issues remain on the agenda, we agreed that financial ministers should continue to participate. The G-8 has become a political group with an economic component, rather than an economic group with a political component as it was in the past. I understand Foreign Minister Ivanov's concerns and will look into the problem. (S)

President Putin: Thank you. As for the documents that have been prepared for us, I will sign the principles document as well as the memorandum of agreement to create the Shared Early Warning Center. We will also issue two further statements, on

plutonium disposition and climate change. Let me note that over 200 documents have been signed by the Presidents of Russia and the United States since 1991. (S)

The President: I am particularly pleased by the statement on climate change. Having once been in Moscow in January, I was afraid you might favor global warming. (Laughter.) There are many economic possibilities for Russia in dealing with climate change, not only because of your natural gas reserves, but because jobs are created by the policies needed to deal with the problem. (S)

It's a good trend that people can make money by doing good things for the environment. All governments will want to be seen as pro-growth and pro-environment at the same time. But given this reality, I want to know why you abolished the State Committee on the Environment. (S)

President Putin: I know that the environment is one of Vice President Gore's political aces. And the environment will be a priority for us, after having been ignored for a long time. For example, forest rehabilitation has been a big issue, and the previous ministry combined two functions: environmental and industrial. Priority was always given to commercial considerations; environmental concerns were routinely left out. (S)

The same thing happened to the Environmental Committee, which had a strong connection to commercial interests. Now these will be completely separate. The Prime Minister has reassigned this responsibility to another ministry, which will aim to preserve environmental protection. Licensing, meanwhile, will be done by a separate government agency. (S)

The President: Thank you for that explanation. I would now like to ask Secretary Albright to report on her discussion with Minister Ivanov. (S)

Secretary Albright: We discussed the Middle East peace process at length, including the need to revive momentum on the multilateral track. We also discussed a variety of people-to-people contacts that should be given further support. Finally, we discussed the possibility of expanding cooperation to combat drug trafficking, with the aim of highlighting this issue in Okinawa. (S)

The President: I think it is also important that we invigorate contacts between our respective parliaments. Most members of the U.S. Congress who take a strong interest in Russia have been doing this for years. However, their ranks haven't been strengthened by new recruits. It is also important to expand exchanges involving local officials, such as mayors. I strongly believe that both Russian and American officials benefit from these contacts. (S)

President Putin: Very well. At this time, I would like to propose a short break. Mr. President, I would like to take you to see the new Kremlin plaque honoring recipients of the Order of Victory from the end of World War II. General Eisenhower was one of these. So was Stalin. This is part of our history, and we believe nothing should be left out. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0114-M (1.38)
KBH 7/25/2023

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Plenary Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary Madeleine Albright
Ambassador James Collins
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States (notetaker)
Peter Afanasenko, State Department Interpreter

President Vladimir Putin
Ivan Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergey Ivanov, Security Council Secretary
Sergey Prikhodko, Foreign Affairs Advisor
Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Yuriy Ushakov, Russian Ambassador to the United States
Vladimir Chkhikvishvili, Director of North American Department

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 4, 2000, 1:33 p.m. - 2:40 p.m. (local time), The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia

President Putin: Mr. President, welcome once again to the Kremlin. I believe our one-on-one meeting last night yielded positive results. Under your leadership, it has been possible to manage Russian-American relations even when problems arise. That way, problems that might otherwise be insoluble can, in fact, be resolved. (S)

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke~~
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/19/10

I propose that we split the afternoon's meetings into parts. The first meeting will focus on security issues, and the second will focus on economics. (U)

The President: That sounds fine. President Putin, I am delighted to be back in Moscow. I, too, want to thank you for the meetings that we've already held. Since we have a good deal to discuss, I propose we get right to the agenda without further ado. (U)

President Putin: Fine. I propose the following agenda topics: START and ABM; CFE; nuclear safety and transparency; disposition of plutonium from eliminated nuclear weapons; nuclear cooperation, including cooperation against Iran; global challenges to security; cooperation with the UN and other international institutions; Yugoslavia; and, NATO-Russian relations. These are the topics I would like to discuss during this first afternoon meeting, but I am ready to discuss any other subject you would like to propose. (S)

The President: I would like to add Nagorno-Karabakh to that list. It seems that President Kocharian feels he cannot implement the settlement he worked out with President Aliyev, so as to keep Armenia's border with Iran. Perhaps special arrangements might be found, including overpasses or secure corridors, but nothing will work without your help. A settlement to the Nagorno-Krabakh conflict would be good for Russia, especially one that you, as President, helped to facilitate. (S)

Some might think that continued conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan helps to preserve Russian influence. In reality, however, instability on Russia's borders is dangerous. A settlement would facilitate reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, which would also be good for Russia. We have worked at length with France and Russia to bring about such a settlement, but we lacked the leverage to move things ahead. Your help is necessary. (S)

President Putin: Yes, I understand. I first heard about the deal at the Sargsian funeral in Yerevan. My initial reaction was very positive. I agree that Russian interests are well-served by a settlement. This would allow cooperation between our neighbors and with our country. (S)

We have used our influence in the army and other institutions in Armenia, and this has had some results. However, the domestic

political situation in Armenia blocked progress. Some leaders there were able to use the idea of a territorial swap for political advantage. President Aliyev seems to think that a settlement would give him a place in history. (S)

Our Foreign Ministry has supported the Nagorno-Karabakh deal from the beginning. There were different approaches within the Russian Security Council. Some said continued conflict would help Russian interests, but this was not right. We'll keep working on a solution. (S)

However, I must tell you, Mr. President, that at my meeting in Minsk with President Kocharian, he asked me not to press forward. He believes the time for a settlement might come down the road. I think we ought to trust him on this, since he knows the situation better than we. His political situation seems to be better, as a result of many changes within the government that were achieved only with great difficulty. Despite this, President Kocharian wants a pause in the settlement process, and I think we should respect that. (S)

I will see President Kocharian and Aliyev when I attend the CIS summit. I will use that occasion to hold separate meetings with each of them on this subject. (S)

The President: Thank you. I think that will help. Turning now to CFE, I am looking forward to Russia's withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova. How are you planning to meet the agreed withdrawal schedules? (S)

President Putin: Let me remind you, Mr. President, that Russia had an obligation to provide notification that it had exceeded CFE flank limits, and we complied immediately. We said that force levels would be brought down after the operation in the Caucuses was completed. This will become possible as the situation there stabilizes. There are no longer any large-scale operations, so Russian levels will be brought in to compliance with the treaty. (S)

As for Georgia and Moldova, Russia has no wish to violate the treaty, which in any case covered equipment and not stationed forces. The real issue in Georgia concerns Russian bases, which are separate from treaty obligations. Negotiations with Georgia are underway, and the next round is later this month. If Russian troops leave Georgia too quickly, it will collapse as a state. Bandits would take over the country. It is clear that President Shevardnadze has lost control. In fact, some Georgian

government officials refuse to travel to certain parts of the country without Russian military protection. (S)

Also, local conditions prevent a rapid withdrawal. The same is true in Transnistria. The situation is delicate, but we are ready for the next step later this month. Mr. Smirnov is a very difficult partner. During the last round of discussions, he said that he now thinks of Russia in a negative manner. He went hunting and has disappeared for several weeks. (S)

The movement of trains has begun. Russia doesn't want to leave behind so much equipment. It's no use for either of us, and they agree. There's too much of it, and I'm afraid it's being traded. I will go to Moldova on June 18, at President Lucinschi's invitation. I'll discuss the situation in detail. It will be resolved in the long run, but I can't say whether the deadline will be met. Still, I am confident that all agreements will be fulfilled, and that financing will be received from international organizations. (S)

The President: And what about anti-terrorism cooperation between our countries, particularly against Usama bin Laden? (S)

President Putin: I think our counter-terrorism services are already working well together. The Taliban have moved their forces south. A kind of Terrorist International has been created, with support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and centered in Afghanistan. (S)

First, we tried to civilize them, as the Europeans proposed. This was philosophically correct, but even as we pursued it, they continue to hate us. They are hungry and want to eat every day. So, we followed a second approach - organized resistance. It's not likely that the Taliban will expel bin Laden. (S)

There's just one way here, which the United States itself has used. We need to step up political pressures, including with Pakistan and through international organizations. Pakistan will listen to the United States. A common front is necessary. (S)

Terrorists are being trained in Afghanistan against both of us. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and even Kazakhstan are vulnerable. Last year, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were hit, and hostages were taken. The terrorists use drug money to support their operations. Drug production in this region is increasing, and last year it exceeded Latin American production levels. Local

authorities in Afghanistan support the traffickers. Russian and American cooperation against this would be effective. But if we don't cooperate, the terrorists will squeeze into the gap between us. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Secretary Albright and I have agreed to establish a working group on Afghanistan, which will work in three directions: first, in the United Nations; second, to increase political pressure; and third, to increase intelligence cooperation using other means. (S)

President Putin: I have also met with the Uzbek and other Central Asian leaders. They are all affected by this problem and are all afraid. They feel vulnerable and unable to fight this aggression. They are all Muslim states, and ideological subversion is being used to prepare aggression. One example was the recent call by one Chechen leader for the worldwide extermination of Jews. We need to work together against this sort of thing. (S)

The President: Yes, I agree. And I think the working group is a good idea. There is a long effort ahead of us that will last years into the future. (S)

President Putin: What is your view of the situation? (U)

The President: I think that more economic pressure is needed. In addition, I will consult with the Pakistanis. They are in a difficult position with many tribal ties to bordering areas of Afghanistan. I think Musharraf might decide to contribute at some point. This is a complex region. Iran is a good example. We like the new president, but the outcome of the domestic struggle that is taking place is difficult to predict. (S)

Our problems with Iran include their effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we appreciate the important steps Russia has taken to strengthen your export controls. We also object to Iran's attempts to block the Middle East peace process. We must use all of the tools available to us. In dealing with the Taliban, we must also keep up the pressure, using a comprehensive approach. (S)

Secretary Albright: During my recent trip to Central Asia, I experienced first-hand the anxiety over terrorism among the Central Asian leaders. Russian and U.S. interests in the region coincide to a large extent, since only independent, democratic,

and stable countries will be able to fight off the terrorists. (S)

President Putin: Yes. I was in Central Asia immediately after your visit, Madam Secretary. I noticed that the less democratic leaders understood less about how to deal with terrorism. In Ashgabat, I saw the gold-plated statue of Niyazov that rotated on a tower every 24 hours. I also saw how he fed tomatoes to the ambassadors of leading countries at his receptions. Niyazov asked me to be mild in my press conference comments on the Taliban. I refused. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Terrorist groups in many countries are now working together. The fact that Russia and the United States are working together helped to make it possible for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. (S)

The President: I don't mind if the Hizbollah pretends that it ran Israel out of Lebanon. That's not true, of course. Israel calculated that it needed to get out in order to advance a comprehensive settlement. I think this might soon be achieved. Iran must be dissuaded from trying to block this process, although this is obviously closely connected to internal Iranian politics. (S)

As for the United States, we are more directly affected by bin Laden, and here Russia and the United States need a coordinated strategy. Air strikes will not be effective. Before our strikes, we had specific intelligence, and we were acting against a particular target. I doubt that Russian air strikes will help in the current situation. You're going to take a lot of heat for any strikes, and they do not have a high probability of success. We ought to get our people together to develop a comprehensive approach to dealing with bin Laden. (S)

President Putin: I agree that air strikes are not the best option, and I'll tell you that Russia is not planning them. But because of the threat of air strikes, the Taliban announced they had no plans for an attack. This was good. Perhaps a United Nations mission should be sent to check on this situation and to force the Taliban to explain themselves. It was good to keep them under tight pressure and not to let up. We should instruct our services to work together. I'm sure they'll find a common language. (S)

After the U.S. attack in Afghanistan, the head of our intelligence service told me that Russia would have been more

precise because our intelligence was better than yours. But even with more precise intelligence, a strike in the current situation would not help. (S)

The President: This is especially true in a heavily populated place like Kandahar. We have observed that bin Laden surrounds himself with women and children so that no attack could take place without provoking an international outrage. It would be different if we were thinking of using soldiers on the ground rather than long-range missiles. But in any case, we had to make it costly for bin Laden to continue. (S)

I am pleased with the renewed cooperation between Russia and NATO. This is now fully back on track. Mr. Robertson had a good trip to Russia. We need your personal commitment to keep moving forward. In my speech in Aachen, I said that there were two unfinished problems in Europe: first, the situation in southeast Europe; and second, getting relations right with Russia. What we need to do now is fully implement our agreement, and then go beyond it. (S)

President Putin: Yes, I saw your statement in Germany concerning the need for open doors in Europe and cooperation with Russia. We saw very positive meaning in all of this, and we are ready to develop things further. There should be full-scale relations between Russia and NATO. But Russia is not in favor of letting NATO substitute for other arrangements that have been worked out since 1945. If Russia and the United States are able to coordinate their activities in the United Nations, we will be successful. If we can't do so, we'll meet a dead end. (S)

I also recently saw the statement issued by nine countries in Vilnius. Our attitude toward NATO enlargement remains unchanged. But I'll let you know that when I was asked about possible membership for Russia in NATO, I supported the idea. It's important to note, however, that the United Stated raised objections to my public statement, and I don't think anyone in the alliance is ready for this. (S)

The President: Well, we should start now. (S)

President Putin: This is the first time that we have heard such a statement from the United States, and I must say I am pleased. NATO's attitude toward including Russia is important for the way people view enlargement. If you're not willing to talk to us, then why are you approaching our borders? But if you really

want to have normal relations with us, we need to develop them. We have to pick a road without obstacles. The countries that are seeking membership are not threatened by anyone. We want to improve relations with all of them. We don't want problems to appear, and our activities will aim at preventing them. (S)

The President: From the outset of the NATO enlargement process, I knew that it could be a problem for Russia. I was sensitive to this, and I want it understood that NATO enlargement does not threaten Russia in any way. (S)

During our meeting last night, President Putin, I told you that if we and our successors don't damage U.S.-Russian relations; and if China can develop its relations with us, while resolving the Taiwan issue; and if Pakistan and India can avoid a major war; then the biggest international problems will be like Chechnya, pitting the civilized world against terrorists, drug traffickers, rogue states, and so forth. In such circumstances, NATO will be totally unrecognizable from the alliance created after World War II. It would be, among other things, a source of training and cooperation among big and small states in order to deal with these new international problems. (S)

I am serious about being ready to discuss NATO membership with Russia. I recognize that domestic considerations inside Russia will prevent this for now, but over time Russia should be a part of every organization that holds the civilized world together: If our successors focus on each other as the main threats they have to worry about, they will be missing the opportunity to deal cooperatively on other problems. (S)

I understand that, for many Russians, NATO still has a negative connotation. However, I hope that you will see that Central European states do not feel threatened by Russia. We want to be helpful. In particular, we should try to agree now about what the world will look like in the next ten years or so. I am serious in making this suggestion. (S)

President Putin: I understand. It's not just the world that has changed in the past ten years. Russia has changed, too. I agree that it is important to try to look into the future. Russia should not be led into ideological responses in dealing with a world of chaos and disorder. There are obstacles, of course, to real cooperation with NATO. (S)

During the Soviet period, popular attitudes developed that now must be broken. In the process, however, Russia must not be

seen as losing its autonomy as a state. The problem is that Russia is outside of an organization that makes the most important decisions. We should deliberate, figure out how to cooperate, and then act on it. Russia is ready for cooperation, including NATO membership. If we hear that NATO is ready to accept us, then we will step forward. But it is difficult to do so if our opinions are ignored. That's why our people prefer the United Nations, in which we have a vote. (S)

The President: I am very encouraged by what I am hearing. We should think about this further, then maybe talk privately later. Obviously, it is better for Russia to be in the tent. Russia needs to understand that we have many fights inside NATO, and the United States doesn't always win them. The most important fight that we didn't win involved a failure, over two years, to act in Bosnia. We had to work like hell. If Russia and the United States had not had a disagreement about southeast Europe, we would not be having the present debate. Our discussion could be much more straightforward. (S)

President Putin: Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate your remarks. I think our discussion last night was helpful and philosophical. I will now ask Foreign Minister Ivanov to report further on his discussion with Secretary Albright and others in the U.S. delegation. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: I would first like to propose that foreign ministers take part in the G-8 meeting in Okinawa next month. The agenda for the meeting is very broad. (S)

President Putin: Do you think that we will handle the discussions badly? (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Certainly not. However, since we will be responsible for implementing much of what you agree to, it will be useful for us to be there. (S)

The President: Even before President Yeltsin had begun attending the meetings, there had been a move to make the G-7 meetings more informal. Because financial issues remain on the agenda, we agreed that financial ministers should continue to participate. The G-8 has become a political group with an economic component, rather than an economic group with a political component as it was in the past. I understand Foreign Minister Ivanov's concerns and will look into the problem. (S)

President Putin: Thank you. As for the documents that have been prepared for us, I will sign the principles document as well as the memorandum of agreement to create the Shared Early Warning Center. We will also issue two further statements, on plutonium disposition and climate change. Let me note that over 200 documents have been signed by the Presidents of Russia and the United States since 1991. (S)

The President: I am particularly pleased by the statement on climate change. Having once been in Moscow in January, I was afraid you might favor global warming. (Laughter.) There are many economic possibilities for Russia in dealing with climate change, not only because of your natural gas reserves, but because jobs are created by the policies needed to deal with the problem. (S)

It's a good trend that people can make money by doing good things for the environment. All governments will want to be seen as pro-growth and pro-environment at the same time. But given this reality, I want to know why you abolished the State Committee on the Environment. (S)

President Putin: I know that the environment is one of Vice President Gore's political aces. And the environment will be a priority for us, after having been ignored for a long time. For example, forest rehabilitation has been a big issue, and the previous ministry combined two functions: environmental and industrial. Priority was always given to commercial considerations; environmental concerns were routinely left out. (S)

The same thing happened to the Environmental Committee, which had a strong connection to commercial interests. Now these will be completely separate. The Prime Minister has reassigned this responsibility to another ministry, which will aim to preserve environmental protection. Licensing, meanwhile, will be done by a separate government agency. (S)

The President: Thank you for that explanation. I would now like to ask Secretary Albright to report on her discussion with Minister Ivanov. (S)

Secretary Albright: We discussed the Middle East peace process at length, including the need to revive momentum on the multilateral track. We also discussed a variety of people-to-people contacts that should be given further support. Finally, we discussed the possibility of expanding cooperation to combat

drug trafficking, with the aim of highlighting this issue in Okinawa. (S)

The President: I think it is also important that we invigorate contacts between our respective parliaments. Most members of the U.S. Congress who take a strong interest in Russia have been doing this for years. However, their ranks haven't been strengthened by new recruits. It is also important to expand exchanges involving local officials, such as mayors. I strongly believe that both Russian and American officials benefit from these contacts. (S)

President Putin: Very well. At this time, I would like to propose a short break. Mr. President, I would like to take you to see the new Kremlin plaque honoring recipients of the Order of Victory from the end of World War II. General Eisenhower was one of these. So was Stalin. This is part of our history, and we believe nothing should be left out. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2016-0114-M

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: Putin, Russia and the Summit (5 pages)	05/21/2000	P1/b(1)
~~002. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: NMD [National Missile Defense] (2 pages)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~003. paper~~	~~Your Dinner with Putin (15 pages)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~004. notes~~	~~Notes from the Deputy Secretary of State (1 page)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~005. note~~	~~re: Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (2 pages)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~006. talking points~~	~~Contingency Points for Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (1 page)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~007. talking points~~	~~Contingency Points for Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (2 pages)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~008. talking points~~	~~Summary Points for Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Economics (1 page)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~009. talking points~~	~~Five Core Economic Messages (2 pages)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~010. talking points~~	~~re: Regional Issues (1 page)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~011. talking points~~	~~Summary Points for Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Regional Issues (1 page)~~	~~05/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023
~~012. talking points~~	~~Dinner Points (Supplemental) (1 page)~~	~~06/00/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. talking points	Summary Points to be Made for Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (1 page)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
014. report	Status of Agreements (1 page)	06/03/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
015. notes	Notes re: G-8, APEC, and WTO (2 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
016. notes	Notes from the Deputy Secretary of State [duplicate of 004] (1 page)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
017. note	re: Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin [duplicate of 005] (2 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
018. talking points	Contingency Points for Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin [duplicate of 006] (3 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
019. talking points	Contingency Points for Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin [duplicate of 007] (4 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
020. talking points	Summary Points for Second Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Economics [duplicate of 008] (3 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
021. talking points	re: Regional Issues [duplicate of 010] (3 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
022. talking points	Summary Points for Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Regional Issues [duplicate of 011] (3 pages)	05/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
023. talking points	Dinner Points (Supplemental) [duplicate 12] (3 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
024. talking points	Summary Points to be Made for Dinner Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin [duplicate of 013] (3 pages)	06/00/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

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RECORD ID: 0006924
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 00 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 21 MAY 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
ECONOMIC SUMMIT
AP
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR POTUS MTG W/ PRES PUTIN IN JUN -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 13 NOV 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MEDISH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 7/25/2023
2016-0114-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PRESIDENT	Z	00110715	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	00110715	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: Putin, Russia and the Summit (5 pages)	05/21/2000	P1/b(1)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SANDY

SUBJECT: NMD

Having talked with Cohen and Slocombe, and discussed it further with Strobe, there is one further point to add to Strobe's excellent presentation.

We both believe it is essential that you not leave Putin (in private or public) with the impression that you essentially have decided to defer or that your doubts are mounting -- even with a wink and a nod. This is the case for several reasons:

1. Only if he believes there is a reasonable chance you might proceed is there any prospect he will come back after the summit ready to make a deal;

2. If Putin's people put out (as they certainly will) that you hinted that you intend to defer, we will suffer a double blow: [1] a Russian veto over U.S. national security [2} delivered to the Russians (before consulting with any in the Congress or the American people);

3. While Bill Cohen is fine with the Principles Document, I don't know what his advice will be on deferral. He is entitled to make his case to you. If he doesn't have that opportunity, before the fact, we will have serious backbiting problems from the Pentagon (not Bill himself; he is too loyal, but he and his people are way out publicly on this and we need to give them a way back that doesn't hurt or embitter them).

4. It would be a really bad early signal to Putin that if he digs in his heels, we fold on the spot. It will not foster cooperation; rather it will encourage

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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intransigence. You need to be at least inscrutable, even a bit forward leaning on NMD to give you the greatest ability when we get back home to 1) decide and 2) fashion a rationale and strategy that has integrity (and doesn't either hurt Gore or force him to go "upscale" to close the gap with Bush). The headline we must avoid is: "CLINTON IN MOSCOW ABANDONS NMD."

So what does this mean as a practical matter? It means you need to sound convincing about the threat and your responsibility to the American people to deal with it in the best fashion. It means you need to be persuasive on the opportunity he has with you as President. It means that the framework embodied in the attached talking points for use at Saturday night's dinner maximizes your opportunities going forward. On this issue, at this time and place, less is more.

Russia's Chief Rabbi Complains to Putin

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Service

MOSCOW — The chief rabbi of Russia, Adolf Shayevich, has complained to President Vladimir Putin that the Kremlin is trying to force him out of office and is interfering in the affairs of the Jewish community, according to a letter he sent to Mr. Putin.

The attempt to put pressure on Mr. Shayevich, who has been spiritual leader of the Soviet and then Russian Jewish community since 1989, was described by other Jewish leaders as highly unusual. They said it appeared to represent another twist in a Kremlin campaign against the media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, who is president of the Russian Jewish Congress, an umbrella group of 60 Jewish organizations.

Mr. Gusinsky heads an independent media conglomerate, Media-Most, that has been openly critical of Mr. Putin, and which was the target of a recent raid by armed masked men.

Separately, Mr. Gusinsky said Thursday that anti-Semitism remains a problem in Russia, but not as a state policy, as it was in Soviet times. "For the purposes of political struggle, certain political forces, which belong to state structures, sometimes use nationalism and anti-Semitism," he told a group of reporters.

"And the state does not make any attempt to stop it. This happens. I do not see any real state policy in the field of anti-Semitisim."

A copy of Mr. Shayevich's letter to Mr. Putin was made available to The Washington Post. The Kremlin declined to comment.

Pinchas Goldschmidt, chief rabbi of Moscow, said the Kremlin was attempting to install its own set of Jewish leaders by pushing Mr. Shayevich out in favor of a different group. He said the Kremlin was attempting to control religions, just as Mr. Putin was also trying to control regional governors.

Last year, a new Jewish community group, the Federation of Jewish Communities, was founded, headed by Rabbi Berl Lazar of the ultra-orthodox Habad movement. The federation drew public declarations of support from government officials at its first meeting in November. It is viewed by some in the Jewish community as an effort to draw support away from the group Mr. Gusinsky leads.

Mr. Shayevich wrote to Mr. Putin on Wednesday that he feared the new group, with the Kremlin's approval, was going to try to elect a new chief rabbi of Russia and he had been told by an unnamed Kremlin official to step aside. "Needless to say," he added, "I have no intention" of quitting.

"Moreover," he added, "I consider as unacceptable the interference by the state into the internal affairs of religious communities."

In Soviet times, the authorities attempted to control many religions, including the Russian Orthodox Church, by manipulating and infiltrating the leadership.

Mr. Goldschmidt said the Putin government was attempting to muffle independent voices. "The Jewish community in Russia has become very much like any Jewish community in the world, openly supporting Israel, openly supporting Jewish interests around the world, and openly criticizing the government when they do something wrong," he said. "The new government doesn't like that."

For example, he said, Mr. Shayevich has protested Russian arms deals with Iran. Mr. Shayevich is also president of the Jewish Agency of Russia, which oversees emigration to Israel. He has a reputation, however, as a low-key leader of the community.

"This latest event creates much doubt within the Jewish community as to the commitment of the new government to the freedom of belief in today's Russia," Mr. Goldschmidt said.

Democracy Cannot Survive in Russia Without an Independent Press

By Igor Malashenko

MOSCOW — Americans, I gather, are not all that interested in President Bill Clinton's upcoming visit to Moscow. Russia is no longer a superpower, after all, and there are no hot issues on the bilateral agenda, except perhaps a possible proposal to amend the ABM Treaty.

It is also true that most Russians are not particularly excited about a visit by the American president. Nevertheless, this event is important for Russians — far more, I believe, than for Americans.

Mr. Clinton will be visiting Moscow during the formative period of the Putin presidency — a period when there is still no convincing answer to the often-asked question "Who is Vladimir Putin?" Mr. Putin himself hardly seems to know. He enjoys record levels of popularity among the Russian public, but his political agenda is not clear. Mr. Putin and his team have been successful in consolidating power, but toward what end is also unclear.

Is power itself the only goal, or is power to be used to further political and economic reform in Russia? So far, there are few encouraging signs. An important test is Mr. Putin's treatment of the independent press, a sine qua non of a functioning democracy. And while Mr. Putin does pay rhetorical tribute to freedom of the press, he often acts otherwise.

Earlier this year, Andrei Babitsky, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent who did critical stories on Russian forces in Chechnya, was abducted by Russian secret services, mistreated by them and framed as a criminal. Mr. Putin called him "a traitor" for doing his job.

On May 11, four days after Mr. Putin's inauguration as president, heavily armed government agents in ski masks raided offices of Media-MOST, the largest privately owned group of news outlets in Russia, which had published critical articles on Mr. Putin's conduct of the Chechen war, on high-level corruption and on questionable activities of the FSB (successor agency to the Soviet KGB).

Acts of intimidation by government agencies send chilling signals to the Russian journalistic community and are intended, among other things, to cause journalists to practice self-censorship. Both Mr. Putin and a number of his aides have experience in the Soviet KGB or the Russian FSB, organizations that can hardly be regarded as strongholds of democratic values.

Moreover, not only are many Russian officials cynical about democratic values, they believe their Western counterparts are equally cynical. A typical ex-KGB person in government is very likely to think along the following lines: "These guys in the West think about their constituencies, public opinion and the damned free press, but when it comes right down to it, they are smart enough to pay no more than lip service to this democracy-above-all stuff."

It is this misperception that Mr. Clinton will have an opportunity to dispel on his visit. If he takes an unequivocal position on freedom of the press in Russia, it could change Mr. Putin's policy toward the independent media significantly. Because it is essential to Mr. Putin to be admitted to the exclusive club of Western leaders — thereby matching Boris Yeltsin's success — I have no doubt he would take seriously a personal warning from President Clinton on such a matter as press freedom.

On the other hand, if Mr. Clinton prefers not to take a chance on causing friction in a newly developing relationship and fails to speak out on this matter, there is little doubt that Russia's independent press is going to be in very deep trouble soon.

In the final analysis, Russia's problems must be managed by Russians. It is up to us, all Russians, to decide whether we wish to live in a modern society, enjoying freedom of the press and other political and economic liberties, or whether we will accept political authoritarianism.

But today's Russia cannot and should not become an isolated nation. There is no iron curtain between Russia and the West any more. Continuing dialogue between Russian and Western leaders should be used to remind the Kremlin that adherence to democratic principles cannot be considered the domestic affair of any nation but is rather a subject of universal concern.

It is possible that Russia's new leaders do not fully appreciate the fact that for the outside world, the treatment of the press is one of the most important indicators not only of the direction in which Russia is heading domestically but also of its future policies toward its neighbors and the West. Mr. Clinton's visit could help provide them with a fuller appreciation of this truth.

Just about every Russian wants a strong, united Russia. Many want a free, democratic Russia. The new leaders of Russia should understand that both of these goals are furthered by an independent press.

The writer, first deputy chairman of Media-MOST, wrote this for The Washington Post. Media-MOST owns a television network and radio station and publishes a newspaper and, in partnership with The Washington Post Co.'s Newsweek, a weekly newsmagazine.

The Washington Post ONLINE

A Slaughter in Chechnya

By Sharon LaFraniere and Daniel Williams
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, June 2, 2000; Page A1

Maliko Labazanova, left, comforts a neighbor at her ruined street in Aldi, where Russian soldiers massacred 45 civilians in February. (Special to The Washington Post)

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NAZRAN, Russia, June 1 – Maliko Labazanova walked up from her cellar on the morning of Feb. 5 feeling more hopeful than she had in many weeks. Russian soldiers had driven the rebels out of Grozny, the Chechen capital. Her neighborhood of Aldi, on Grozny's southwestern outskirts, was blessedly quiet. The bombing had stopped.

Labazanova, 49, headed across the street to fry some meat for an elderly neighbor, she recalled recently in an interview. All around her, residents fell into their prewar morning routines. Two men filled a wheelbarrow with flasks and went to fetch water from a spring. Four friends worked to fix a damaged roof. A nurse peeled potatoes. If the war wasn't over, it had at least taken a breather.

Six hours later, Labazanova returned to the cellar, dragging the bodies of three relatives killed by uniformed Russian officers. Spared herself by a sympathetic soldier who ordered her to play dead so he wouldn't get in trouble for failing to shoot her, Labazanova hid in the cellar for the next week, separated from the bloody corpses by only a curtain.

The rampage by Russian soldiers in Aldi claimed the lives of more than 45 civilians in a single day in what was apparently the biggest massacre of the nine-month-old war, according to witnesses and human rights investigators. By afternoon, corpses were scattered throughout Aldi's streets and the air was crackling with the sound of roof tiles splitting atop burning houses, witnesses said.

Some people were killed before they could say a word, others after they had handed over their last rubles and begged the uniformed marauders for their lives. Residents heard some soldiers joke about whether to use a green antiseptic to mark targets on people's foreheads.

Even some colleagues of the Interior Ministry riot police known as OMON, suspected of carrying out the killings, seemed appalled at the bloodshed. "Have you gone mad?" one OMON commander was heard yelling into his handset.

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The Aldi massacre was the latest and bloodiest example of the mass shooting of civilians, part of a pattern of human rights abuses by Russian forces in the war against Chechnya's separatist militants. Other Russian tactics include artillery and aerial bombardment of towns and cities to drive rebels into the wilderness and the mass detention of hundreds of Chechens, mostly men, in camps where some were tortured and raped.

Chechen refugees have provided compelling accounts to journalists and human rights groups of two other cases of large-scale wanton shootings, in which Russian forces entered neighborhoods and killed civilians after hostilities had ceased. One occurred in the town of Alkhan-Yurt, where 16 people were killed from Dec. 1 to Dec. 18, according to the New York-based group Human Rights Watch. The other, in the Grozny district of Staropromyslovsky, stretched from Dec. 22 to Jan. 21, and left 38 civilians dead and seven missing, the group said.

Human Rights Watch, the only foreign organization to conduct exhaustive probes of human rights abuses in Chechnya, is scheduled to release a report on the Aldi massacre on Friday. The Russian human rights group Memorial is also working on a reconstruction of the incident. Memorial says 46 people were killed in Aldi; Human Rights Watch reached a higher number, which included civilians killed on streets nearby but outside Aldi.

Documentation of the Aldi massacre has taken more time than probes into previous mass killings, in part because it has been difficult to contact witnesses. The Russian government has refused to allow human rights workers or journalists to visit the region, and refugee traffic slowed earlier this year because of travel restrictions and barriers. The Washington Post interviewed eight witnesses who were at home in Aldi on Feb. 5. The interviews took place over a two-week period, mostly here in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, the Russian region to the west of Chechnya, where several witnesses traveled to tell their stories.

Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have called for an international investigation of Russia's actions in Chechnya. The United Nations, the Clinton administration and other Western governments have not pressed the issue.

President Clinton, who will hold his first summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin this weekend, plans to focus on the state of Russian democracy, economic reform and missile defense, U.S. officials said.

The Russian government insists that it can investigate human rights violations on its own. It has refused to grant Mary Robinson, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, access to Aldi and similar sites.

Vladimir Kalamanov, Russia's human rights commissioner for Chechnya, said some crimes against Chechen civilians have been committed, but "not many," and investigations are underway. At his insistence, he said, more prosecutors have been assigned to such cases, including three working on Aldi. "We will investigate this in detail," Kalamanov said.

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A civilian prosecutor has handed witnesses and relatives pieces of paper acknowledging that something ugly happened in Aldi. "On Feb. 5, 2000, in the first half of the day . . . employees of the Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry in the course of checking passports commited mass killing of civilians," the paper said. Then the name of a victim is written.

Aldi survivors are skeptical, and too afraid, in some cases, to cooperate with a Russian-led inquiry. "It seems to me it was just a way to calm people down, by pretending something will be done," said Uzbek Haji-Muradov, whose brother Alvi was shot near his home on Matasha-Muzayeva Street.

It is unclear which Russian units carried out the Aldi killings. Memorial, the Russian group, believes two Interior Ministry units, from St. Petersburg and Ryazan, were the culprits.

Home to an estimated 4,600 people in peacetime, Aldi largely emptied during the winter months of bombing. The mostly single-story brick and clay houses sat empty. Of the few hundred people who remained, most were middle-aged or elderly. They cut down neighborhood trees for wood and braved 24-hour bombardments to fetch water.

By Feb. 5, a cold, sunny morning, it seemed they had survived. Russian forces had announced they had captured Grozny, and only a "cleansing" operation remained. Army conscripts who had swept through Aldi the day before were polite, even friendly, witnesses recalled. They had told residents to have their passports ready the next day, because the Interior Ministry OMON forces would be checking.

A few of the young conscripts spoke of the OMON in ominous terms. If a certain unit came, one soldier told resident Galina Umaeva, "you will be unlucky." Koka Demilhanova said a conscript warned her: "Don't be afraid of us. Be afraid of those who come after us."

Maliko Labazanova, a former shop clerk, was across the street from her home, frying meat for her elderly neighbor Vaha Tasuyev, when she saw the first soldier clad in gray camouflage. He led Tasuyev's son, Abdurahman, 51, into the yard at gunpoint, she said. Abdurahman had been helping his friend Sultan patch a roof.

Abdurahman's head was down and his face was pale, Labazanova said. "He demands money," he told his father. "They killed Sultan."

With trembling hands, the old man emptied his black leather purse of its contents – 75 rubles, a little more than three dollars. The soldier refused to let Abdurahman go, so Tasuyev's other son ran to a neighbor and came back with 150 more rubles. Still, the soldier led Abdurahman away, shouting at the old man, his other son and Labazanova not to follow. The Tasuyevs found Abdurahman's body that night.

Ahiyadi, a welder who helped Tasuyev with the roof, was also led home by a soldier who pointed a gun at him. He said he gave jewelry to the soldier, who let him go, saying: "Pray for me, because, you see, I didn't kill you."

Soldiers came to Labazanova's house in Tsimlyansky Alley an hour or so after she left the Tasuyevs, but they were peaceful. She walked next door to tell neighbor Ahmed Abdulhanov the document check was over. A former warehouse manager and distant relative of Labazanova's, the 76-year-old bald man sat dejectedly in the corridor. His daughter-in-law whispered: "There are corpses in the street."

Back home, Labazanova urged her sister-in-law Zena Abulmejidova and brother-in-law Hussain Abulmejidov to hide in the cellar. But Zena, her hands plunged in bread dough, told her: "It's all over on our street. Nothing will happen to us."

Hussain, described as mildly retarded, refused to go to the cellar without Zena. About an hour later, Labazanova said, she heard shouts of abuse in her yard. Two soldiers pointed their weapons at Zena, Hussain and the old man, Abdulhanov. "Maliko, bring money," Abdulhanov told her.

She raced down the empty street to her neighbors', pounding and shouting at the gate. Then she ran back with three 100-ruble notes in her hand. A wounded gray cat stumbled toward her, trailing its intestines. "Then my feet refused to move," she said.

In her courtyard, one soldier laughed at her offering. "Is this money?" he demanded. He told another soldier to "shake her down" inside the house.

Labazanova said she tried to hide between the stove and the wall. When the soldier pointed his gun at her, she grabbed his boots, begging to be spared. "Please. I have sons like you," she told him.

"If I don't kill you, they'll kill me," he answered. Then he shot at the ceiling and ordered her to play dead. Outside, she heard shots and the cries of Abdulhanov's cows and sheep as his shed went up in flames. When she left the house, she found the old man's body, the top of his head blown off and his gold teeth bashed out. Nearby were the bodies of Zena and Hussain.

Her neighbors were panicked and stricken. One woman told Labazanova she had been raped in front of her young son.

"If I had had a gun at that point, I would have killed, too," Labazanova said, tears streaming down her face as she sat on a stool in a refugee camp in Ingushetia. "I would not have cared if they killed me. What they have done is incomprehensible."

Around the corner, at 38 Hoperskaya St., Zina Shidayeva met her tormentors at 9:30 a.m.

She had already heard shooting, she recalled. Women ran down the street screaming, "They are killing us." Shidayeva, her husband, a neighbor and Luisa, an 18-year-old girl who had just arrived from a neighboring district, cowered in the kitchen, where they were cutting onions.

A soldier told them to leave the house because he and his men were going to set it aflame. But the occupants demurred, fearful of going into

the street.

The soldier raised the stakes. "If you want, I will let you live, but give me something," he said.

Shidayeva told him she had nothing, and he left – only to return later. In the meantime, Shidayeva ventured to the corner and saw corpses on the street. The first one she saw was Alvi Haji-Muradov, who had been shot through the mouth, the back of his head blown away by the exiting bullet. "I cried to Allah and ran home," Shidayeva recalled.

Shots rang out behind her, but she returned unhurt. Soon, the soldier in gray returned and asked again for money and jewelry. She had hidden earrings and a watch, but had trouble finding them.

She finally found the booty and turned it over, but the soldier wanted more. "You have a husband and a neighbor," he said threateningly.

"But I have no money," she pleaded.

"All right. I will let you live. You remind me of my mother," the soldier said.

Other soldiers entered the house. Shidayeva wanted to investigate what had happened around the corner. She offered cigarettes to the soldier in charge in exchange for a tour, saying she wanted to see whether some particular neighbors were alive.

Shidayeva and her escort walked past Alvi Haji-Muradov's body, then another, that of an old man, Aindi Azuyev. Further on was Koka Bisultanova, a blond woman who sold pharmaceutical goods out of her house. Then a couple in a yard, then a 71-year-old woman named Rekat Akhmadova. Dogs and cats were also victims.

After Shidayeva returned home, she asked her escort why they had shot harmless residents, even women. "We were told to kill everybody," the man said matter-of-factly. At 4 p.m., the guests left, after firing off a few rounds – "so that our comrades will think we killed you," the soldier explained. As he left, he said, "We should send in a big rocket here to erase all this."

When Luisa came out of hiding, she asked about her mother, Aimani Gudayeva. Shidayeva didn't have the heart to tell her she had seen Gudayeva's corpse. "She must be in some basement," she told the girl.

"I still don't sleep well at night," Shidayeva said in an interview the other day. "I close my eyes, and I see the corpses lying in the street. I feel that at any moment what happened then could happen again."

At the other end of the neighborhood, Asiat Chadaeva, a 32-year-old nurse, learned from a commander that people had died. She heard him shout into his handset: "Have you gone mad?" Then he pulled her aside.

"Our men have killed some old people by mistake," he told her. "Bury them quickly."

He had just hurried off in an armored personnel carrier when a neighbor walked up with a sobbing 9-year-old girl, Laila. The girl told Chadaeva that she, her mother and two other men had been staying in the house of Avalu Sugaipov, around the corner.

Her mother walked out of the house to greet the soldiers because she thought they would not shoot a woman, Laila said. She was immediately cut down by machine gun fire, as were the others. Sugaipov managed to push Laila back inside the house before he fell.

Laila told Chadaeva she hid there under the bed, behind a sack of onions. Then she heard a soldier say, "Pour it."

"Wait, where is the child?" another soldier asked. "Come out!"

He pulled her scarf over her eyes as he carried her through the yard, but she still saw her mother's bloody body. In the street, he gave her a can of pork.

After eight days, a relative came to pick the girl up. A 10-year-old boy came along. "They killed my mother," Laila told him. "Don't cry," the boy told her. "They killed my father and pulled out his teeth."

Soldiers looted Aldi's houses for ten days after the massacre, residents said. "They told each other to be careful not to scratch the furniture," said Waha Zakryeva, a resident.

When they parked an army truck in front of the Musaevs' house, Yusup Musaev told neighbors: "I could not utter a word." Four members of the Musaev family were killed on Feb. 5. Asked what the soldiers took, Yusup told a neighbor: "Everything."

While the soldiers stole, some residents prepared a videotape. On it, Maliko Ganaeva, an elderly woman, describes how her husband and two sons were shot as they returned home from fixing her nephew's roof. A neighbor who tried to help her drag off her son's body was shot, too, she said. "Are there people left in the world?" she asked, before dissolving into wails of grief. "Please help."

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New York Times
Date: 06/03/2000

Putin Rebuked Over Chechnya Atrocity

By CELESTINE BOHLEN

MOSCOW, June 2 -- An international human rights group today challenged the Russian government to seek out and try the Russian servicemen who went on a rampage near Grozny on Feb. 5, killing at least 60 civilians.

The atrocity, which was first reported on within weeks, is believed to be the worst of the latest Chechen war.

In a report that documents the massacre and the pillaging that followed, Human Rights Watch called on Russian authorities to pursue a vigorous investigation into what happened in a Grozny suburb, Noviye Aldi.

Released on the eve of President Clinton's arrival in Moscow, the report -- drawn from accounts of more than 35 eyewitnesses -- comes as a rebuke to President Vladimir V. Putin, who has made repeated promises to pursue reports of war crimes during the eight-month war.

"The Russian government has not undertaken any serious investigation of these horrendous crimes," said Holly Cartner, executive director of the Europe and Central Asia divison of Human Rights Watch.

"The failure to address what amounts to war crimes in Aldi directly contradicts Putin's statement on May 29 that "all violations of the law in Chechnya will be stamped out in the most severe fashion regardless of who committed them,' " she said.

Spokesmen for two Russian officials in charges of various investigations in Chechnya could not be reached for comment today. Vladimir Kalamanov, named by Mr. Putin as the Kremlin's special envoy for human rights, has said that his investigative team, which includes two Europeans, have received corroborating evidence of atrocities in Noviye Aldi, as well as in Alkhan-Yurt and in the Staropromyslovsky region of Grozny, the capital.

But so far, only one known war crimes case has been put to a Russian military court. That involves Colonel Yuri Budanov, commander of a tank regiment, who has been charged with raping and murdering a Chechen woman.

Human Rights Watch and Memorial, a Russian rights group, have pressed Moscow to call in international, independent investigators, arguing that Russian investigative teams are not trusted by local people. Although both groups have compiled detailed eyewitness accounts of alleged war

crimes, no Russian official has contacted them to see their evidence, according to Human Rights Watch.

Reports of a massacre at Noviye Aldi began to trickle into the overcrowded refugee camps in Ingushetia in mid-February. In an interview with The New York Times published on Feb. 22, a woman -- who gave only her first name, Sapiyat -- described how after several days of round-the-clock shelling by Russian forces, the town fell silent.

"Suddenly, it became calm," she said. "And the troops started mopping up. We thought they would just check everyone's passports. But it was a cleansing of everything alive. They killed cattle, dogs, people -- children and old people."

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the violence began with the arrival of special police and "contract soldiers," who are older than regular army conscripts and more brutal, usually dressed in camouflage uniforms, wearing hats or head scarves,

"As the soldiers spread through Aldi, they engaged in an orgy of killing, arson and rape," the report says. "Human Rights Watch has eyewitness testimony describing the murder of eight people; in each case, the witnesses identified the killers as Russian contract soldiers."

The organization confirmed the execution of 60 civilians: 52 men and eight women, one 82 years old. A 1-year-old was also killed, according to Human Rights Watch. The report also recounts secondhand testimony of a gang rape in which three women were killed, while a fourth fled into hiding.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

6.1.01

Mr. President —

attached are three memos particularly worth reading in connection w/ your Putin/Moscow —

I) a memo from Sobel (Jim) violating cherished State Department protocol here, to protect us both on Putin and your opening dinner Sat night

II) a memo from Madeleine/Steve Sestanovich which is quite cogent;

III) the short memo I sent you after my meeting w/ Putin two weeks ago.

Andy

YOUR DINNER WITH PUTIN

Your encounter on Saturday night will be among the more important of your presidency. It could set a positive tone and lay the ground for substantive progress not just for the Moscow Summit as a whole, but for the next seven months and the three more meetings you'll have with Putin (Okinawa/G-8, UNGA Millennium Summit and APEC).

But Saturday's dinner will be risky as well. Putin's desire to distinguish himself from Yeltsin, Putin's temptation to hedge his bets and play the angles of our own presidential race, his paradoxical combination of cockiness and inexperience, his desire to please domestic and bureaucratic constituencies that are deeply hostile, even vengeful toward the U.S. and the West — all these factors could conspire to make this a lost opportunity, or worse.

What follows are…

1. An overall strategy and set of guidelines for the dinner.
2. Some thoughts on the historical backdrop of Putin's presidency.
3. An analysis of Putin himself.
4. Some thoughts about Putin's approach toward you.
5. Suggested talking-points for the dinner.

1. STRATEGY AND GUIDELINES

- The dinner is a chance to clarify in Putin's mind the parameters — negative and positive — of what's possible between the U.S. and Russia between now and the end of your term.

- You should strike a balance between, on the one hand, respect for him personally and for Russia and, on the other, skepticism about the ominous or counterproductive direction in which he's moved, especially on Chechnya and free press.

- He's counting on you and Tony Blair to be his principal sponsors in Okinawa, which is shaping up to be his real coming-out. He needs to understand that your (and Blair's) willingness and ability to play that role will depend in significant measure on the overall direction of Russian internal policy.

- At the same time, it's important not to over-promise; you should be honest about what you can't deliver, even if Russia does more or less the right things (e.g., Jackson-Vanik). There are at least three reasons for this. First, it's a fact that we are constrained politically in what we can do this year; Putin knows that, and even if he doesn't, he'll know soon enough. Second, Putin likes to be described as a leader who promises less but delivers more than Yeltsin, and he'll value that quality in you. Third, we — the U.S. and the West — have suffered in Russia from the perception that we promised them the moon in '93, billions of dollars that never appeared.

2. PUTIN'S PREDECESSORS: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In preparing to meet with Putin, it might be helpful to step back and look at the sequence of leaders that preceded him, since he is defining himself in part as a corrective to what he sees as their excesses and shortcomings.

Starting with Gorbachev and continuing under Yeltsin, Russia underwent an epochal transformation. It was rooted in a deep structural economic and ideological crisis. The transformation came about largely because of the rivalry between two leaders: Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But it was also a symbiosis. They needed and played off each other at least as much as they came to hate each other.

Gorbachev worked his part of the transformation from above and from within, trying in vain to save the Union and the Party by modernizing them (and by diminishing their reliance on brute force). That opened up fissures that doomed both the Union and the Party and created the conditions for Yeltsin to move in.

Yeltsin was every bit as much a creature of the old system as Gorbachev, but while Gorbachev mastered and could therefore work his own will on the system, Yeltsin had been rejected by it (and by Gorbachev). He therefore had a personal motive for tearing down what Gorbachev was trying to preserve — i.e., the CPSU and the USSR — not least because Gorbachev himself presided over both.

That led Yeltsin to set himself up as the revolutionary reformer, the defiant democrat, "the man on the tank" and the first leader in Russian history to seek, repeatedly, a democratic mandate. It was Yeltsin who…

1. took over executive power in the (then still-Soviet Russian Federation) through a democratic election;
2. defied and defeated the old order when it tried to make a comeback in the August '91 coup, destroyed the CPSU and thus completed his triumph over Gorbachev;
3. dissolved the USSR;
4. recognized Baltic independence;
5. reaffirmed intra-republic boundaries as new international ones, thus rejecting irredentist (i.e., Milošević-esque) forces that would have prosecuted claims against Crimea and other "Russian" areas of the "Near Abroad";
6. sponsored popular referendums that gave Russia a post-Soviet parliament and a post-Soviet constitution;
7. sought, and won, re-election against the leader of the resurgent Communists;
8. permitted the development of a thriving free press;
9. dismantled the monolith of the state economy (while Russia has paid a huge price in the corruption and inequity that have come with privatization, the re-establishment of state control is all but impossible);
10. banged on the door of the G-7 until it let him in and became the G-8;*
11. withdrew Russian troops from the Baltics and from former Warsaw Pact states;*

12. agreed to a diplomatic and military partnership with an expanding NATO, even when NATO bombed Yugoslavia.*

All twelve of these developments were in the long-term interest of the U.S., and a number of them occurred with the active support and encouragement of the U.S. President (i.e., Bush, then yourself). Several of them — especially those asterisked — might well not have happened without your own vigorous engagement.

That was the positive side of the Yeltsin era — and it was very positive indeed. But there was the negative side too, and it also looms large in its consequences. It included a welter of setbacks, crises, self-inflicted wounds, systemic weaknesses and personal foibles, first and foremost Yeltsin's own. As a result, Russia is now passing from that era to a new one (which it would be premature to call the Putin era) with the following clouds on its horizon:

— crime and corruption are rampant;

— xenophobia and the uglier forms of nationalism are making a comeback;

— democracy, and democratization, are fragile;

— freedom of the press is in doubt, and under pressure from the Kremlin itself;

— rule of law is a slogan honored more in the breach than the observance;

— Russia is waging a brutal and atavistic war in Chechnya.

In all cases, we've focused our policy on those problems as they've developed (e.g., anti-crime, rule-of-law, democracy-building

initiatives as part of our bilateral assistance; working with the EU and UNHRC to induce Russia in the right direction on Chechnya).

3. PUTIN AND RUSSIA

- Putin is self-consciously setting about to define himself as different from Yeltsin. In addition to proving himself effective where Yeltsin was feckless, someone who delivers as opposed to someone who promises, young and vigorous where Yeltsin was tired and often incapacitated, Putin is bent on establishing himself as a "cool" leader of a resurgent (strong) Russia in contrast to a "hot" leader of a merely recovering (weak) Russia.
- That aspiration has potentially dangerous implications for both domestic and foreign policy.
- Another personal point: Putin both sees and presents himself (notably including in the quickie book on him, *First Person*) as a figure who represents a fundamental continuity with the past — again, in contrast to Yeltsin, who saw and presented himself as personifying a break with the past. Putin's self-image is as a guy who decided as a boy to devote himself to the cause of Russia's *security*, and who has seamlessly pursued that profession even as the institution in which he made his career changed initials. The hard, and heart-felt, part of his vocabulary is revealing: *order*, *dictatorship* of laws, etc.

  — If Putin has a Kremlin forebear, it's probably Andropov — the reformist top cop, the guy who tried to derive from the discipline and instruments of force of the KGB the energy to save the old Soviet Union.

- When he uses soft words like "market," "freedom," "civil society" and "democracy," there's often a suggestion of telling part of his audience what he think it wants to hear, and even then, these words tend to be in the context of *what Russia must do and be in order to be strong and secure.*

- At the same time, on many issues, he hasn't made up his own mind. He doesn't have a set of fixed principles or plans. He has instincts.

- Some of his instinct are atavistic and even dangerous. For example, when faced with a problem, he gravitates toward a bureaucratic-executive solution (sign a decree, send in the armed guys in masks) rather than a normative or more broadly institutional solution (rule-of-law, change the political and economic culture).

- He's loyal to the idea of the Russian state. For him, that's a point of continuity that overrides the *dis*continuity that has marked the transition from the Czarist Empire, to the Soviet Communism system, to democratic Russia.

- For Putin, Russia is not, as it was for Lenin and Stalin, a giant canvas on which to paint Revolution and Power. For Putin, it's much more *Mother Russia,* and she's hurting; she's poor; she's complaining; she's disillusioned; she's defiant; she's brave, long-suffering, but by no means ready to give up. In his own eyes, he's a son suddenly grown up to be protector. The state is the means of protecting Russia, making her strong again.

- He's steeped in the calculus of interests and instrumentalities. Talk of grand vistas puts him on his guard; it sounds like a

smokescreen — like hoodwinking. He prefers to be operational; he's a detail man — a realist rather than a visionary, an executive rather than a revolutionary.

- Yeltsin was all big-picture — he saw himself as a world-historical figure. Putin's the opposite: he talks the talk on democracy and civil society and free press, but big ideas — whether Communism or Democracy — don't really resonate with him.

- Putin prides himself for being a realist, and his realism includes recognition that Russia is in bad shape. The St. Petersburg clichés about him are true: St. Petersburg *is* different from Moscow; St. Pete looks out on Europe, the land of Nokias and BMWs, while Moscow looks eastward, toward the steppes of Central Asia, whence come the barbarian hordes. You'll be coming to Moscow from Germany. So, in a sense, is Putin. It was while posted there as a low-level spy that he saw that the West works and the Soviet system didn't — and he saw it from *East* Germany.

- While he's got a healthy self-esteem, mixed with an unhealthy reliance on Russia's grubbier levers of power, he knows that there's a lot he doesn't know about the world into which he's suddenly been thrust. Therefore he will be a good listener, in many ways better than Yeltsin.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

4. PUTIN AND YOU

- Just as Putin wants to distinguish himself from Yeltsin, he wants to distinguish his relationship with you from yours with Yeltsin. He doesn't want to be your pal. He's not interested in a "Bill-and-Volodya" atmosphere or image.

- He craves recognition but not familiarity. He's cultivated a slightly ominous remoteness with his own people, and it's worked spectacularly in political terms — at least so far. He'll want his perceived relationship with you to reinforce that aspect of his political personality: *don't get too close; don't tread on me*. One of his favorite expressions is: "Anyone who insults us will not live to see tomorrow's dawn." There are flashes of the street fighter in his style of engagement: coiled, cool, tough, soft-spoken, vigilant. He's someone whose eyes narrow and flash with controlled anger if you look at him sideways or seem to be patronizing him or dictating to him.

- So he doesn't really want your friendship. Rather, he wants your respect. And this isn't just, or even primarily, personal: he has a political purpose here; he wants the working relationship projected to the world by the Summit to convey a sense that the U.S. and the West now respect Russia in a way that wasn't the case during the Yeltsin years.

- Putin is the self-conscious, self-cultivated personification of the widespread feeling in Russia that we, the U.S., and you personally may have your heart in the right place and mean what you say about wanting Russia to make it, etc., but that when the chips were down — as they were so often — you insisted on, and

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

got your way, with Yeltsin. You made him eat NATO enlargement, the bombing of Iraq, the bombing of Yugoslavia.

➢ ***That does not mean that you should give an inch on these issues. The world is better off with NATO enlargement, with Saddam (more or less) in his box, with Kosovo under UN control rather than the MUP's. You should rebuff any attempt by Putin to engage, subtly or otherwise, in guilt-tripping. If he tries that tactic, you should use it as an opportunity to remind him that we've got our interests, priorities and leadership role to play, and we hope over time that Russia will understand that its own interests depend on keeping the Miloševićs and Saddams of this world in check.***

By the same token, we can't let him throw us off our game plan for NMD/AMB/START. Among other things, you can remind him that Russia — not the U.S. — has an operational anti-ballistic-missile defense system deployed today.

- The judo clichés about him are true. In interviews and his book, he talks a lot about what he's learned from the sport: *respect your opponent; use his strength against him; don't humiliate him, but don't let him humiliate you.*

- So Putin's agenda at dinner includes: *no more Mr. Push-over.* On some issues — for sure Chechnya, perhaps the crackdown on Media-MOST — he'll make a point of being Mr. Push-back.

➢ ***Again, you can use a little judo on him — do some pushing back of your own. For example, at some point***

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

during the dinner, you might find a moment to let him know that the border between Chechnya and Georgia in particular — and the southern border of Russia in general — is the brightest of all red lines.

In the same spirit, you should let him know that by letting his Ministry of Defense coddle an indicted Serbian war-criminal, and by letting Russia more generally give aid and comfort to Milošević, he's flirting with old-think and risking his own broader agenda.

- Putin prides himself on being a patriot — not a nationalist or an imperialist He's a team player, now the captain of Team Russia. He's prepared to reach out to Communists, liberals, former rivals, ethnic non-Russians — anyone who will join and help him in making Russia a winner again.
- He's an insider, someone up from the ranks, a little guy who's become a big guy — the opposite of an élitist.
- This doesn't mean he'll try to pull a Khrushchev-with-Kennedy in Vienna (or a Khrushchev-with-Nixon in the kitchen debate). He'll be courteous, probably flattering, seemingly accommodating. You'll hear a lot of agreement and thanks. But there will be an undertone of skepticism, reserve, suspicion. He masks his natural competitiveness in seeming conciliation.
- He wants to use the meeting to lay the basis for what Russia would like the world to see as a more balanced, pragmatic, results-oriented relationship with the U.S.
- He's suspicious by nature, by profession, and by entourage. He has guys around him who, like Iago, have been whispering (or in

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

some cases, shouting) poisonous stuff in his ear about the U.S. and about you: we're out to keep Russia down; to make sure it never gets back on its feet. And, of course, we're out to deprive it of a credible strategic deterrent. Much of what he hears from you he'll be quietly, coolly judging against that template of wariness.

➢ ***One issue on which this subtext will be close to the surface is the Russian periphery. Putin tends to see a replay of the Great Game, with us and our oil companies seeking to edge Russia out in exploitation of Caspian Basin energy. He's also on something of a roll in the region. He's been visiting capitals in Central Asia, telling the leaders there that they'd better cuddle closer to Russia or they'll be naked before the threat of extremist Islam — and he's finding some sympathy for that message.***

You've got an opportunity to rebut in highly practical — even urgent — terms, and it's on Nagorno-Karabakh. There are signs that Aliyev and Kocharian may finally be ready, once again, to move toward closure on an N-K deal, but both are counting on you to get Putin to support them politically and diplomatically. If Putin refuses to do so, it will confirm <u>our</u> suspicions — and many others' — that he wants to keep the former Republics weak, conflicted and dependent on Moscow. If, however, he's prepared to join you in supporting an N-K deal, it will be a powerful signal that the U.S. and Russia do indeed have a shared interest in regional peace — and in mutually beneficial economic/energy development of the region.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

5. A SUGGEST APPROACH FOR YOU TO TAKE

- "Vladimir, let's use this dinner to talk about Russian and American interests, where they coincide, where they don't — how we can maximize the former and manage the latter.
- "You're just starting out, I'm wrapping up. But I'm going to give a lot of priority in my last seven months to steadying out U.S.-Russian relations and making sure that when you sit down with my successor, you and he have a solid base on which to build.
- "We've got three meetings after this one, and all of them are built around international institutions where the U.S. and Russia have leadership rolls: the G-8, the UN and APEC.
- "Let's use both the symbolism and the substance of those meetings to underscore Russia's role in the international system and the U.S.'s support for that role.
- "I want to do that because it's in the U.S.'s interest for Russia to play that kind of role.
- "That's for two sets of reasons.
- "One is that we've just emerged from a century in which the U.S. and Russia were not just rivals but adversaries. That hostility had huge opportunity costs. It cost the U.S. trillions; it contributed to the collapse of the USSR as a state and as a system; it brought us to the brink of nuclear war. That's reason enough not to let ourselves get back into a Cold War or a Cold Peace.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

- "But there are positive reasons too. There are all these problems facing both of us — and facing the rest of the world — that stand no chance of solution unless the U.S. and Russia work together on them.

- "Russia brings vast value-added to a common cause. That's because of its huge natural and human resources and its sheer geopolitical mass: it abuts the Asia/Pacific region, China, the Islamic world, South Asia, the Caspian — all of which are areas rife with opportunity and danger — and, as Madeleine emphasized in her speech in London, it's also part of Europe.

- "That's why I want to use this troika of meetings — Okinawa, UNGA and APEC — to consolidate our being, in key respects, on the same side, both bilaterally and institutionally.

- "But for Tony Blair and me [possible reference to Schroeder] to use our own influence to the maximum in those settings, we need to be able to point to convincing evidence that Russia, under your leadership, is moving in the right direction on four issues:

    1. Democracy/free press (nature of Russian society and politics)
    2. Chechnya (how you deal with the threat of terrorism and disorder without treating whole categories of your citizenry as enemies and without intimidating neighbors)
    3. Non-proliferation
    4. Rule-of-law, which is the key to counter-corruption and to building an investment climate.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

- "But I'm not here to lecture you on this stuff. In fact, every point I've made picks up on what I've heard from you. I've listened to what you've said about democracy, civil society and free press ('without them, Russia has no future'); I've listened to what you've said about defeating corruption and attracting investment; I've heard you talk about the threat to Russia of extremist regimes on your border; I've listened to you talk about the importance of Russia's enforcing its own laws."

-§-

The above is notional. We will have talking points on the full range of specifics likely to come up. The main point is that, whatever chips on his shoulder and whatever steely glints in his eye, your host at dinner on Saturday knows that "the West" is the only game in town, and he knows that his guest is the Chairman of the Board of the West. He knows that your own attitude toward Russia is essentially positive. He sees himself as a modern man and wants Russia to make it as a modern country. Moreover, he seems to understand that he will not succeed — and Russia will not succeed — unless it is able to plug into the global economy. And in that, he knows he needs your help.

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He included NATO-Russia on his list. You might briefly welcome resumption of cooperation, George Robertson visit here — commit us to putting NATO-Russia cooperation fully back on track.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Crucial that you reiterated 1) NATO not a threat to Russia 2) NATO's door is open — no one is excluded; 3) No decision on next round. 4) Need to close gap between NATO & Russia

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

[I'm going to Tallinn Tuesday to meet Balts. Need to tell them we're stuck with our policy)

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

One worry here:

Need to leave no misunderstanding that we oppose air strikes as way of countering Taliban. Otherwise, a green light problem.

Has this been made clear in other (one/one) discussion? How do we square this with our bombing UBL's camps in Afghanistan? Bc

If not, should clarify.

That was specifically against UBL - not against Taliban - which needs to be dealt with other ways - sanctions, pressure - cannot solve Taliban problem with air-strikes

I know this is hard but we must be careful not to give green light

---

We have to tr

CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- ***(If asked:*** Russia's Soviet-era debt) New IMF program would provide basis for limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations. To consider further relief in future, must look at Russia's performance under IMF program and financial need. London Club debt agreement not precedent for Paris Club.

- ***(If asked:*** G-8 to replace G-7) G-8 is premier political body. G-7 plays needed role in addressing financial crises. Russian membership in a full G-7/8 not ripe. Need establishment of stable, prosperous economy with sophisticated financial system that is making substantial contribution to global economic, financial system.

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:

- ***(If asked:*** Jackson-Vanik) Russia is in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, enjoys full NTR benefits. Encourage changes on key issues that would persuade Congress to graduate you (e.g., religion law, anti-Semitism, and curbs on immigration up to ten years after access to state secrets).

- ***(If asked:*** Market Economy Status) Our experts have been reviewing options. Status applies only in anti-dumping context, no broader significance. Market status would actually increase Russia's exposure to trade penalties.

- ***(If asked:*** Access to Steel Market) Glad we signed suspension agreement covering steel trade last year, providing relief for industry and continued access for Russian producers. Pleased our experts have launched Joint Steel Dialogue to address structural trade issues and provide technical assistance.

- **(If asked:** BIT) Know you have particular concerns about BIT. Think our experts can redouble their work to find a way forward. Ratification would send important signal to U.S. investors.

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CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- ***(If asked:*** Public support for government restructuring) Should let parliament debate proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't want to interfere.

- ***(If asked:*** Counterterrorism) Share concern about threat posed to stability by international terrorists. Critically important to protect human rights while fighting terrorism. Pleased with direction of our cooperation on Bin Ladin.

- ***(If asked:*** IFI's) Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. Will support reengagement with IMF on program that could be finalized, approved this summer. World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 06/02/10

- Hope you can support our expanded exchanges (Billington program) and similar initiatives; should use Binational Commission to explore ways to cooperate on TB, HIV.

Space launch
~~prompt~~ mightstay - need space
BNT - consultation
- insist - get FCCP

WTO - Qs / Asks for US help -

P —

on space launches —

made an important step today but we need to maintain a little distance from decision

agreed ~~to~~ language — "move towards elimination" of quota on space launches

@

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Econ

① IMF New Arrears

② WB can help w/ Str. Ref

③ If tax MF good — also need tramp / protect for I / comfort for

④ Debt Relief → Gen. in forgiving my debt but get prob for him

→ Runs in HIPC

→ Argue Debt Service too Hi → Leave open option to do more →

Restructuring

can cut 25%

IMF pay + financial aid provided basis for further relief

(IMF - I'll help you w/ Congress to Pass Cliff to get 6m 1/3% Tariff Reduction)

⑤ G-8 → need stable progressive economy — Asylum financial system — (can't have / any for debt relief for I)

⑥ WTO → for it but might be on Social Issues, term like China Discrimination Ship — Use it as they did to advance reform.

⑦ I-V — in past, Graduation → rel law, anti-Semi, embargo can't up to 10 years access to Security

⑧ Illit Edu

Doping

Economic Sanctions

Most corrupt.

⑨ GPS-Satellite

Iran Bus!

⑩ SAL - might comp.

Space

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ECONOMICS

- Global "new economy" radically expanding economic frontiers. Russia should accelerate its integration with these trends.
- Want Russia to be peaceful, democratic and prosperous. Economics is crucial dimension.
- Honeymoon important opportunity. Eager to hear your plans.
- International support, including IMF and World Bank, still important. Will support strong IFI programs.
- Can do limited debt rescheduling under new IMF program; this would provide substantial financial relief.
- Focus on WTO is right. Encourages reforms and integration. Hope you can accelerate accession process.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:

- Now in an era of global markets. Capital has no nationality.
- Create transparent, predictable environment that protects investors. Your results will let me be your salesman.
- Strengthening the rule of law is critical.
- Special focus on intellectual property rights, which are tied to high-tech innovation, an area Russia could profit from.
- Corruption has been eating away at investor confidence over the years. Experience shows market reforms the best remedy.
- Energy sector has much promise. Implementing production sharing agreement laws would encourage investment.
- Pleased we are deepening our cooperation on critical challenge of climate change.
- Important to broaden our relationship beyond governments.

~~SECRET~~ 2

- ***Afghanistan.*** No indication that Taleban have taken steps to comply with UN resolutions or respond to requests for help expelling Bin Laden, closing down network or training camps.
- Know that Sandy and Sergey talked about airstrikes threat last night and the need to avoid steps that would increase tensions in the region. That's very important.
- Need to consider additional steps by UN to increase diplomatic, economic isolation of Taleban. Our people should be in touch about coordinated sanctions (e.g., arms embargo).
- ***Counterterrorism.*** Share concern about threat from Afghanistan to stability to Central Asia and beyond. Need to protect human rights while fighting terrorism.
- Value our counterterrorism cooperation, especially UBL. Place high priority on bringing UBL to justice. Should keep focus on threats we both face, such as from UBL and his network.

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Pretty good framework from MARK MCDISH

FIVE CORE ECONOMIC MESSAGES

1. SELF-RELIANCE. After 1998 financial crisis, there were billboards all over Moscow saying "Nobody will save Russia but us ourselves." This obviously reflects a profound perspective and points to the growing sense of self-reliance, ownership and responsibility that is beginning to lift Russia. Outside world can still help in some important ways, but fundamental choices are for Russia. → and we will!

2. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY. With new leadership, new Duma and high oil prices and economic recovery, Russia has never been in a stronger position to move forward. Frankly, lesson of 1990s is that it will take determination, decisive action and a sense of urgency.

3. POLITICS OF ECONOMICS. Reform of state/government and reform of economy are deeply interconnected. Need effective state organization and mechanisms to implement policies. But state must also know its bounds and allow an open economy to breathe. Dealing firmly but equitably with sources of resistance to reform also crucial.

In all of this, bear in mind that HOW is as important as WHAT.

4. INVESTMENT CLIMATE. Capital has no nationality. Investors choose countries, not other way around. Business climate is critical question. Key ingredients:

1/ maintain good fiscal, monetary policies,
2/ structural reforms that affect microeconomics,
3/ containing and defeating corruption.
4/ Rule of law - judicial + administrative

5. GLOBAL HORIZON / NEW ECONOMY. No major industrialized country can afford to stand outside the profound trends of globalization — the information revolution, the spread of markets and global integration. Your (and our) goal should be to tap into these trends as much as possible.

(e.g. WTO)

Key for Russia to speed its integration process. At the same time, to diversify its economy beyond the old workhorse industries into the new high-tech sectors including services.

3. Regional Issues:

- On Nagorno-Karabakh, time to reenergize Minsk Co-Chairs after your summit with Aliyev and Kocharian.

- On CFE, need concrete results. Suggest task experts to agree in next week's meeting on measures for additional flank transparency and develop projects where U.S. funding could assist Russian withdrawal from Georgia.

- On Moldova, need renewed Putin effort to get Transnistrian separatists to accept Russian withdrawal.

- In February you made clear to me your views on Milosevic. As long as Milosevic in power, instability in the Balkans. In Russia's interest to support Serb people, not regime.

Iran
Also they need to be helpful
on UNSPP - they are stirring up trouble.

SECRETARY OF STATE

a
This is very tricky discussion - welcome in some ways he is right. but we cannot come out of here with agreement to depress every opposition element in Central Asia

SECRETARY OF STATE

That is why we suggested working PP

UBL/Afghan
must propose but not a small group from each side to discuss how we can increase Aide/economic on Taliban. Might endorse Chirac already doing some aid contact

Pres –

On proliferation to Iran, I'd suggest:

– world common threat; outcome in Iran uncertain;

– know you've taken important steps, including new export controls

– Iran still trying to gain sensitive nuclear/missile technology from Russia, others

– vital that we continue to work together to stop all leakage.

R

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON REGIONAL ISSUES

- ***Nagorno-Karabakh.*** Believe you have important interest in enhancing security in South. Finding solution important.

- Can't happen without strongest, clearest message of support, particularly to Kocharian. Both states need to know you support peace, will play positive role implementing it. Let's keep talking to them. I see Kocharian later this month.

- ***Georgia/CFE.*** Appreciate public commitment to respect territorial integrity of southern neighbors such as Georgia. Georgia committed to border security. We are trying to ensure they do everything they can. OSCE border mission very useful.

- Agreements on schedules for withdrawal of your forces from Georgia and Moldova important.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/18/10

- ***Caspian.*** See our interests as compatible; want to support projects that promote inter-state cooperation (e.g., CPC pipeline). Without private investment, projects will not happen. Want to promote economic development and democracy across the new states in the region.

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DINNER POINTS
(Supplemental)

- Broad summit agenda - want to cover a lot of ground.
- But let me start with strategic issues.
- I still believe, as my people have been saying to yours for 9 months, that Phase I of NMD deployed in accordance with modest changes in ABM Treaty would best serve US *and Russian* interests.
- Proposed deal would strengthen ABM Treaty regime in face of new threats, *without harming Russian deterrent*.
- Would also permit more ambitious START III that's not possible otherwise.
- Sit precedent but further steps require Russ. agreement — might slow GOP Actually accelerate Negotiations

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(D)
Declassify On: 6/2/10

- Principles Document that we'll sign tomorrow is *solid, interim step* - it gives us more time.
- Reduces fever on all sides. Credit to both of us.
- Reaffirms core principles (mutual deterrence, need to deal with new threats, impulse to cooperative initiatives).
- Leaves both of us with options for future.
- In my case, want to be 100% clear: I haven't decided on NMD, based on 4 criteria, threat, feas, cost, impact on overall security
- What I do know is that this whole problem arises because of a real, strategic threat to American population.
- Goes to heart of my responsibilities as President.

~~SECRET~~

- NMD not a threat to Russia, but North Korean missile program *is* a threat to my people, my country.
- Bottom line: ABMT *does* protect principle of mutual deterrence between US and Russia, *but does not protect North Korea's right to threaten the US*.
- So we've got a window still to work this problem between us, Vladimir. Urge you take advantage of it.
- If you choose not to - and prefer to deal with my successor - I've got a options available to me that will give maximum time for discussion with next Administration.
- Sandy will be discussing these ideas - *in strictest confidence* - Sergei Ivanov.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- Want to be supportive steps you take. Want to discuss about your strategy, priorities for next eight months, four years. Five core objectives for summit:
  - (1) Achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic ~~relationship~~, which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.
  - (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5
Declassify On: 6/2/10

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  - (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as space launch.
  - (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus). See opportunities for win-win outcomes.
  - (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., plutonium initiatives)
- Respect for rule of law, transparency/predictability, fight against corruption central to how investors will view Russia.

- Important not to endanger elements of open society that establish Russia's standing in the world (e.g., freedom of religion, strong democratic institutions, fight against ~~anti-Semitism~~, respect for individuals' rights and the environment). Free media central to success of reforms.
- On Chechnya, know we disagree, but more concerned than ever military solution not possible. Need genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

SITUATION ROOM TRIP EVENING SUMMARY June 4, 2000

UNCLASSIFIED

ASIA

PHILIPPINES: Bomb exploded in Manila's international airport, badly damaging restroom but causing no injuries...marks fifth explosion in Manila in recent weeks. (U) State telcon; AP a0427

AFRICA

ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: Eritrea claimed it repulsed Ethiopian forces, almost completely destroying one division, in battle near port of Assab. (U) Reuters a6923

EUROPE/EURASIA

GEORGIA: Kidnappers of UN observer team demanded ransom for release of four hostages ...Georgian media reported kidnappers asked for $300,000. (U) AP a0422

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

MEPP: Security surrounding Prime Minister Barak was increased in response to rise in threats from Jewish settlers...Barak, in cabinet statement, noted 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Rabin did not stop peace process and added, "If there is one thing that kills the legitimacy of the struggle of the settlers, it is actions such as these." (U) Reuters a6975; AP a0414

We don't need
to belabor

You are seeing Kochtitzky
in three weeks in DC

You might
talk about
1993 budget
good decisions
led to lower
rates, good
investment
climate boom

That was good. I wouldn't change 42 billion

G-8

Isn't much of the Paris Club debt private debt. V

6/3/10:10

Status of Agreements

Joint Statement of Principles. We have agreed with the Russians on a Joint Statement of Principles that affirms the importance of strategic stability, mutual deterrence and the ABM Treaty. The statement also acknowledges the emerging ballistic missile threat and the possibility of taking steps to make the ABM Treaty more relevant to the current, and prospective, security environment. The statement makes clear that the U.S. and Russia will intensify their discussions on START III and ABM, and that Ministers will report to Presidents on these issues. You and President Putin will sign.

Shared Early Warning. We have reached agreement on a Memorandum of Agreement to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow for sharing early warning information. The Center will be permanently manned by U.S. and Russian military personnel (the first permanent military cooperative arrangement between the United States and Russia). This agreement follows up your September 1998 joint statement with President Yeltsin. The exchange of near-real time data on ballistic missile launches will further reduce the danger that ballistic missiles might be launched on the basis of false warning of attack. You and President Putin will sign.

Military Plutonium. We are working to initial text of a detailed agreement tonight with the Russians to remove and dispose of 34 tons each of weapons grade plutonium. Congress has already appropriated $200 million for this project; we have asked for additional funds from Congress and the G-8. Expect you and President Putin will sign Joint Statement Sunday announcing completion of the agreement (Gore and Kasyanov to sign the actual agreement at a later date).

Civil Plutonium. We have made progress, but not reached agreement, on civil plutonium. Russia has agreed to a 20-year moratorium on reprocessing spent fuel. We have agreed to fund storage facilities for spent fuel. Russia has asked in return for joint research on a new generation nuclear reactor that is more proliferation resistant. We have asked Russia to reaffirm the Gore-Chernomyrdin commitments with respect to nuclear technology and Iran. We have made some progress, but Russia has still not agreed to restrict certain technology – in particular, they have not reaffirmed what was said to Gore regarding not selling additional nuclear reactors to Iran until after the Bushehr reactor is completed. We have prepared points for you to use with Putin, urging that Russia reaffirm its earlier commitment and proposing that we proceed with the civil plutonium initiative.

Space Launch Quota. The Lockheed-Russian Joint Venture is an important source of revenue for the Russians. It is also important to Lockheed and the U.S. satellite industry. We have indicated consistently that any relaxation of the quota would be tied to Russia's non-proliferation performance. U.S. and Russian officials have completed a confidential document specifying actions that Russia must take to tighten export controls and prevent missile assistance to Iran. In return, you could say publicly that the U.S. is considering a decision to lift the launch quota. We and the Russians are still negotiating over the precise language of this public statement. I intend to raise with Ivanov tonight. This approach will give us time to see if Russia is implementing the tightening measures, and also give us time to work with Israel and Congress.

G-8
APEC
UNTO

Govt Okinawa
Prob : Challenge
Press Rel Freedom

Executive → Notes -
partners assets for Control

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

① Prin Doc

Int Actors

New Threat

[redacted] Meeting

↳ Q: Does NAFTA set Precedent.
Int Agreement that is Limited to?.

Design

↳ want to promote ADR framework
↳ is ready to accept Mutual Agreement.

NOGA OK

- ~~①~~ Pure Econ + Self-reliance post '98
Now New Worlds, New Dimn, High Tech, Econ Recov - Move
pol of econ — Govt, & reform together.
Investment - go for, Street Mfg, Corrupt, Law —
Global — Limits - WTO, Sector 4 TO

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

Democracy Cannot Survive in Russia Without an Independent Press

By Igor Malashenko

MOSCOW — Americans, I gather, are not all that interested in President Bill Clinton's upcoming visit to Moscow. Russia is no longer a superpower, after all, and there are no hot issues on the bilateral agenda, except perhaps a possible proposal to amend the ABM Treaty.

It is also true that most Russians are not particularly excited about a visit by the American president. Nevertheless, this event is important for Russians — far more, I believe, than for Americans.

Mr. Clinton will be visiting Moscow during the formative period of the Putin presidency — a period when there is still no convincing answer to the often-asked question "Who is Vladimir Putin?" Mr. Putin himself hardly seems to know. He enjoys record levels of popularity among the Russian public, but his political agenda is not clear. Mr. Putin and his team have been successful in consolidating power, but toward what end is also unclear.

Is power itself the only goal, or is power to be used to further political and economic reform in Russia? So far, there are few encouraging signs. An important test is Mr. Putin's treatment of the independent press, a sine qua non of a functioning democracy. And while Mr. Putin does pay rhetorical tribute to freedom of the press, he often acts otherwise.

Earlier this year, Andrei Babitsky, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent who did critical stories on Russian forces in Chechnya, was abducted by Russian secret services, mistreated by them and framed as a criminal. Mr. Putin called him "a traitor" for doing his job.

On May 11, four days after Mr. Putin's inauguration as president, heavily armed government agents in ski masks raided offices of Media-MOST, the largest privately owned group of news outlets in Russia, which had published critical articles on Mr. Putin's conduct of the Chechen war, on high-level corruption and on questionable activities of the FSB (successor agency to the Soviet KGB).

Acts of intimidation by government agencies send chilling signals to the Russian journalistic community and are intended, among other things, to cause journalists to practice self-censorship. Both Mr. Putin and a number of his aides have experience in the Soviet KGB or the Russian FSB, organizations that can hardly be regarded as strongholds of democratic values.

Moreover, not only are many Russian officials cynical about democratic values, they believe their Western counterparts are equally cynical. A typical ex-KGB person in government is very likely to think along the following lines: "These guys in the West think about their constituencies, public opinion and the damned free press, but when it comes right down to it, they are smart enough to pay no more than lip service to this democracy-above-all stuff."

It is this misperception that Mr. Clinton will have an opportunity to dispel on his visit. If he takes an unequivocal position on freedom of the press in Russia, it could change Mr. Putin's policy toward the independent media significantly. Because it is essential to Mr. Putin to be admitted to the exclusive club of Western leaders — thereby matching Boris Yeltsin's success — I have no doubt he would take seriously a personal warning from President Clinton on such a matter as press freedom.

On the other hand, if Mr. Clinton prefers not to take a chance on causing friction in a newly developing relationship and fails to speak out on this matter, there is little doubt that Russia's independent press is going to be in very deep trouble soon.

In the final analysis, Russia's problems must be managed by Russians. It is up to us, all Russians, to decide whether we wish to live in a modern society, enjoying freedom of the press and other political and economic liberties, or whether we will accept political authoritarianism.

But today's Russia cannot and should not become an isolated nation. There is no iron curtain between Russia and the West any more. Continuing dialogue between Russian and Western leaders should be used to remind the Kremlin that adherence to democratic principles cannot be considered the domestic affair of any nation but is rather a subject of universal concern.

It is possible that Russia's new leaders do not fully appreciate the fact that for the outside world, the treatment of the press is one of the most important indicators not only of the direction in which Russia is heading domestically but also of its future policies toward its neighbors and the West. Mr. Clinton's visit could help provide them with a fuller appreciation of this truth.

Just about every Russian wants a strong, united Russia. Many want a free, democratic Russia. The new leaders of Russia should understand that both of these goals are furthered by an independent press.

The writer, first deputy chairman of Media-MOST, wrote this for The Washington Post. Media-MOST owns a television network and radio station and publishes a newspaper and, in partnership with The Washington Post Co.'s Newsweek, a weekly newsmagazine.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Russia's Chief Rabbi Complains to Putin

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Service

MOSCOW — The chief rabbi of Russia, Adolf Shayevich, has complained to President Vladimir Putin that the Kremlin is trying to force him out of office and is interfering in the affairs of the Jewish community, according to a letter he sent to Mr. Putin.

The attempt to put pressure on Mr. Shayevich, who has been spiritual leader of the Soviet and then Russian Jewish community since 1989, was described by other Jewish leaders as highly unusual. They said it appeared to represent another twist in a Kremlin campaign against the media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, who is president of the Russian Jewish Congress, an umbrella group of 60 Jewish organizations.

Mr. Gusinsky heads an independent media conglomerate, Media-Most, that has been openly critical of Mr. Putin, and which was the target of a recent raid by armed masked men.

Separately, Mr. Gusinsky said Thursday that anti-Semitism remains a problem in Russia, but not as a state policy, as it was in Soviet times. "For the purposes of political struggle, certain political forces, which belong to state structures, sometimes use nationalism and anti-Semitism," he told a group of reporters.

"And the state does not make any attempt to stop it. This happens. I do not see any real state policy in the field of anti-Semitisim."

A copy of Mr. Shayevich's letter to Mr. Putin was made available to The Washington Post. The Kremlin declined to comment.

Pinchas Goldschmidt, chief rabbi of Moscow, said the Kremlin was attempting to install its own set of Jewish leaders by pushing Mr. Shayevich out in favor of a different group. He said the Kremlin was attempting to control religions, just as Mr. Putin was also trying to control regional governors.

Last year, a new Jewish community group, the Federation of Jewish Communities, was founded, headed by Rabbi Berl Lazar of the ultra-orthodox Habad movement. The federation drew public declarations of support from government officials at its first meeting in November. It is viewed by some in the Jewish community as an effort to draw support away from the group Mr. Gusinsky leads.

Mr. Shayevich wrote to Mr. Putin on Wednesday that he feared the new group, with the Kremlin's approval, was going to try to elect a new chief rabbi of Russia and he had been told by an unnamed Kremlin official to step aside.

"Needless to say," he added, "I have no intention" of quitting.

"Moreover," he added, "I consider as unacceptable the interference by the state into the internal affairs of religious communities."

In Soviet times, the authorities attempted to control many religions, including the Russian Orthodox Church, by manipulating and infiltrating the leadership.

Mr. Goldschmidt said the Putin government was attempting to muffle independent voices. "The Jewish community in Russia has become very much like any Jewish community in the world, openly supporting Israel, openly supporting Jewish interests around the world, and openly criticizing the government when they do something wrong," he said. "The new government doesn't like that."

For example, he said, Mr. Shayevich has protested Russian arms deals with Iran. Mr. Shayevich is also president of the Jewish Agency of Russia, which oversees emigration to Israel. He has a reputation, however, as a low-key leader of the community.

"This latest event creates much doubt within the Jewish community as to the commitment of the new government to the freedom of belief in today's Russia," Mr. Goldschmidt said.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

THE WHITE HOUSE 6.1.08

Mr. President –

attached are three memos particularly worth reading in connection w/ Putin / Moscow –

I) a memo from Jakobe (Jim violating cherished State Department protocol here) to protect us both on Putin and your opening dinner Sat night

II) a memo from Madeleine / Steve Rosenovich which is quite cogent;

III) the short memo I sent you after my meeting w/ Putin two weeks ago.

Andy

He included NATO-Russia on his list. You might briefly welcome resumption of cooperation, George Robertson visit here — commit us to putting NATO-Russia cooperation fully back on track.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Crucial that you reiterated 1) NATO not a threat to Russia 2) NATO's door is open — no one is excluded; 3) No decision on next round. 4) Need to close gap between NATO & Russia

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

[I'm going to Tallinn Tuesday to meet Balts. Need to tell them we're stuck with our policy)

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

One worry here:

Need to leave no misunderstanding that we oppose air strikes as way of countering Taliban. Otherwise, a green light problem.

Has this been made clear in other (one/one) discussion? How do we square resistance bombing UBL's camps in Afghanistan? BC

If not, should clarify.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

That was specifically against UBL-
not against Taliban - which needs
to be dealt with other ways- sanctions,
pressure - cannot solve Taliban problem
with air-strikes

I know this is hard but we must
be careful not to give green light

We have to tr

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

~~SECRET~~

CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- ***(If asked:*** Russia's Soviet-era debt) New IMF program would provide basis for limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations. To consider further relief in future, must look at Russia's performance under IMF program and financial need. London Club debt agreement not precedent for Paris Club.

- ***(If asked:*** G-8 to replace G-7) G-8 is premier political body. G-7 plays needed role in addressing financial crises. Russian membership in a full G-7/8 not ripe. Need establishment of stable, prosperous economy with sophisticated financial system that is making substantial contribution to global economic, financial system.

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2016-0114-M (1.5d)
KBH 7/25/2023

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
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- ***(If asked:*** Jackson-Vanik) Russia is in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, enjoys full NTR benefits. Encourage changes on key issues that would persuade Congress to graduate you (e.g., religion law, anti-Semitism, and curbs on immigration up to ten years after access to state secrets).

- ***(If asked:*** Market Economy Status) Our experts have been reviewing options. Status applies only in anti-dumping context, no broader significance. Market status would actually increase Russia's exposure to trade penalties.

- ***(If asked:*** Access to Steel Market) Glad we signed suspension agreement covering steel trade last year, providing relief for industry and continued access for Russian producers. Pleased our experts have launched Joint Steel Dialogue to address structural trade issues and provide technical assistance.

- (**If asked:** BIT) Know you have particular concerns about BIT. Think our experts can redouble their work to find a way forward. Ratification would send important signal to U.S. investors.

~~SECRET~~

CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR DINNER MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

- ***(If asked:*** Public support for government restructuring) Should let parliament debate proposals. Our history shows it's hard to strike right balance; don't want to interfere.

- ***(If asked:*** Counterterrorism) Share concern about threat posed to stability by international terrorists. Critically important to protect human rights while fighting terrorism. Pleased with direction of our cooperation on Bin Ladin.

- ***(If asked:*** IFI's) Russia is entering new phase in its relationship with IFI's. Will support reengagement with IMF on program that could be finalized, approved this summer. World Bank can play very useful role in specific structural reform areas.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 06/02/10

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WJC HANDWRITING

- Hope you can support our expanded exchanges (Billington program) and similar initiatives; should use Binational Commission to explore ways to cooperate on TB, HIV.

Span Comm
~~prompt~~ might stay - need speaker
BIT - consultation
- might - get Ecop

WTO - Qs / Ans for US Delg -

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

P—

On Space launches —

made an important step today but we need to maintain a little distance pan decision

agreed ~~to~~ language —

" move towards elimination "

of quota on space launches

@

Econ

Econ

(1) IMF New Arrivals

(2) WB can help w/ St. Ref

(3) If tax rf good — also need transp / power for I / corrupt fight

(4) Debt Relief → Get in forgiveness debt budget prob for him

→ Run in HIPC

→ Agn Debt service too Hi → Leave open option to go more →

Restructuring

can cut 25%

IMF pay +

finan need old provide basis for further relief —

(5) G-8 → need stable progressive economy — stop his finan system — (can't have / any to debt relief for. I).

(6) WTO → for it but must be on solid comm. terms like China

Discount China — Use it as they did to advance reform.

(7) J-V — in prin, Graduation → no loan, anti-Sem, condition must up to 10 yrs after access to Security —

(8) Illit econ

Doping

Econ Inf

(9) Most corrupt.

(10) Spl - need long.

(9) Pers Bus!

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ECONOMICS

- Global "new economy" radically expanding economic frontiers. Russia should accelerate its integration with these trends.

- Want Russia to be peaceful, democratic and prosperous. Economics is crucial dimension.

- Honeymoon important opportunity. Eager to hear your plans.

- International support, including IMF and World Bank, still important. Will support strong IFI programs.

- Can do limited debt rescheduling under new IMF program; this would provide substantial financial relief.

- Focus on WTO is right. Encourages reforms and integration. Hope you can accelerate accession process.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On:

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- Now in an era of global markets. Capital has no nationality.

- Create transparent, predictable environment that protects investors. Your results will let me be your salesman.

- Strengthening the rule of law is critical.

- Special focus on intellectual property rights, which are tied to high-tech innovation, an area Russia could profit from.

- Corruption has been eating away at investor confidence over the years. Experience shows market reforms the best remedy.

- Energy sector has much promise. Implementing production sharing agreement laws would encourage investment.

- Pleased we are deepening our cooperation on critical challenge of climate change.

- Important to broaden our relationship beyond governments.

- ***Afghanistan.*** No indication that Taleban have taken steps to comply with UN resolutions or respond to requests for help expelling Bin Laden, closing down network or training camps.

- Know that Sandy and Sergey talked about airstrikes threat last night and the need to avoid steps that would increase tensions in the region. That's very important.

- Need to consider additional steps by UN to increase diplomatic, economic isolation of Taleban. Our people should be in touch about coordinated sanctions (e.g., arms embargo).

- ***Counterterrorism.*** Share concern about threat from Afghanistan to stability to Central Asia and beyond. Need to protect human rights while fighting terrorism.

- Value our counterterrorism cooperation, especially UBL. Place high priority on bringing UBL to justice. Should keep focus on threats we both face, such as from UBL and his network.

3. Regional Issues:

- On Nagorno-Karabakh, time to reenergize Minsk Co-Chairs after your summit with Aliyev and Kocharian.

- On CFE, need concrete results. Suggest task experts to agree in next week's meeting on measures for additional flank transparency and develop projects where U.S. funding could assist Russian withdrawal from Georgia.

- On Moldova, need renewed Putin effort to get Transnistrian separatists to accept Russian withdrawal.

- In February you made clear to me your views on Milosevic. As long as Milosevic in power, instability in the Balkans. In Russia's interest to support Serb people, not regime.

Iran
Also they need to be helpful
on MEPP - they are stirring up trouble.

SECRETARY OF STATE

a
This is very tricky discussion - because in
some ways he is right. but we cannot
come out of here with agreement to repress
every opposition element in Central Asia

SECRETARY OF STATE

That is why we suggested working grp

UBL / Afghan

MKF proposed last nite a small group from each side to discuss how we can increase dipl / economic pressure on Taliban. Might endorse (already doing some with coop)

Pres –

On <u>proliferation to Iran</u>, I'd suggest:

- word common threat; outcome in Iran uncertain;

- know you've taken important steps, including new export controls

- Iran still trying to gain sensitive nuclear/missile technology from Russia, others

- vital that we continue to work together to stop all leakage.

R

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON REGIONAL ISSUES

- ***Nagorno-Karabakh.*** Believe you have important interest in enhancing security in South. Finding solution important.

- Can't happen without strongest, clearest message of support, particularly to Kocharian. Both states need to know you support peace, will play positive role implementing it. Let's keep talking to them. I see Kocharian later this month.

- ***Georgia/CFE.*** Appreciate public commitment to respect territorial integrity of southern neighbors such as Georgia. Georgia committed to border security. We are trying to ensure they do everything they can. OSCE border mission very useful.

- Agreements on schedules for withdrawal of your forces from Georgia and Moldova important.

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/18/10

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- ***Caspian.*** See our interests as compatible; want to support projects that promote inter-state cooperation (e.g., CPC pipeline). Without private investment, projects will not happen. Want to promote economic development and democracy across the new states in the region.

~~SECRET~~

DINNER POINTS
(Supplemental)

- Broad summit agenda - want to cover a lot of ground.
- But let me start with strategic issues.
- I still believe, as my people have been saying to yours for 9 months, that Phase I of NMD deployed in accordance with modest changes in ABM Treaty would best serve US *and Russian* interests.
- Proposed deal would strengthen ABM Treaty regime in face of new threats, *without harming Russian deterrent*.
- Would also permit more ambitious START III that's not possible otherwise.
- Sit president that further Arms reduc require Russ. agreement — might since GOP openly discussing withdrawing

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(D)
Declassify On: 6/2/10

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KBH 7/25/2023

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WJC HANDWRITING

- Principles Document that we'll sign tomorrow is *solid, interim step* - it gives us more time.
- Reduces fever on all sides. Credit to both of us.
- Reaffirms core principles (mutual deterrence, need to deal with new threats, impulse to cooperative initiatives).
- Leaves both of us with options for future.
- In my case, want to be 100% clear: I haven't decided on NMD, based on 4 criteria, threats, feas, cost, impact on overall security
- What I do know is that this whole problem arises because of a real, strategic threat to American population.
- Goes to heart of my responsibilities as President.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

- NMD not a threat to Russia, but North Korean missile program *is* a threat to my people, my country.

- Bottom line: ABMT *does* protect principle of mutual deterrence between US and Russia, *but does not protect North Korea's right to threaten the US.*

- So we've got a window still to work this problem between us, Vladimir. Urge you take advantage of it.

- If you choose not to - and prefer to deal with my successor - I've got a options available to me that will give maximum time for discussion with next Administration.

- Sandy will be discussing these ideas - *in strictest confidence* - Sergei Ivanov.

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WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

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- Want to be supportive steps you take. Want to discuss about your strategy, priorities for next eight months, four years. Five core objectives for summit:
  - (1) Achieve common appraisal of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which has far-reaching impact on international security. Can identify core objectives for security, economic cooperation for next eight months, next four years.
  - (2) Want better understanding of your economic agenda and priorities. Will provide basis for identifying constructive steps we, international community can take to promote your economic efforts going forward.

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Reason: 1.5
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WJC HANDWRITING

- (3) Should chart path forward on tough security issues, especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation, and areas of important cooperation such as space launch.

- (4) Joint appraisal of regional security issues (e.g., Balkans, Caucasus). See opportunities for win-win outcomes.

- (5) Reach tangible announcements to highlight practical cooperation that benefits both our countries and international community (e.g., plutonium initiatives)

- Respect for rule of law, transparency/predictability, fight against corruption central to how investors will view Russia.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

- Important not to endanger elements of open society that establish Russia's standing in the world (e.g., freedom of religion, strong democratic institutions, fight against ~~anti-Semitism~~, respect for individuals' rights and the environment). Free media central to success of reforms.

- On Chechnya, know we disagree, but more concerned than ever military solution not possible. Need genuine progress on accountability for human rights abuses, meaningful steps on political track, return of full-time OSCE mission.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

You are seeing Kocharian
in three weeks in DC.

That was good. I wouldn't change 42 billion

G-8

Isn't much of the Paris Club debt private debt. ✓

You might talk about 1993 — tough
Good decisions led to lower rates; good investment climate — economic boom

We don't need to believe

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Photo File

[illegible] CUT HAS SEEN

6-6-00

PHOTOCOPY
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. email~~	~~Cathy Millison to Andrew Weiss re: Russia, Kiev Trip [pages 1-150 of 236] (150 pages)~~	~~06/06/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Moscow and Summit])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:
[06/06/2000] [1]

2016-0114-M
kh1814

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0114-M [1.35]
KBH 7/25/2023

DATE-TIME	06/06/2000 2:05:00 PM
FROM	Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/06/2000
DECLASSIFYON	06/07/2010
SUBJECT	RE: Russia, Kiev trip [~~SECRET~~]
TO	Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CARBON_COPY	
TEXT_BODY	

-----Original Message-----
From: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Sent: Tuesday,
June 06, 2000 1:54 PM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Cc: @RUSSIA
- Russia/Ukraine
Subject: Russia, Kiev trip [UNCLASSIFIED]

Cathy
and June:

Thanks a million for all of your help, good humor and patience during the trip. We're all very happy about how things turned out -- and we have no doubt that that was in large part due to your efforts.

Andrew

p.s. When it's convenient,
could you shoot us an email with the contents of the trip drives, so that we can stay current? Thanks again.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT	1st Afternoon Meeting (Arms Control & Security).doc FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING WITH

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

KEY OBJECTIVES

* ARMS CONTROL ISSUES TO BE PROVIDED

* On nonproliferation, express appreciation for important summit plutonium initiatives. Draw connection between aggressive Russian efforts to curtail missile cooperation with Iran and progress on lifting space launch quota.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

On nonproliferation and threat reduction, you should point to likely summit accomplishments as important examples of our cooperation on nonproliferation. The military plutonium disposition agreement will dispose of 34 tons each of weapons-origin plutonium. A possible civil plutonium initiative would require Russia to declare a moratorium on reprocessing and stop certain sensitive cooperation with Iran, in exchange for U.S. assistance on spent fuel storage and reactor R&D.

On the Iran missile problem, we have agreed with the Russians on consultations to "move toward" eliminating the commercial space launch quota in exchange for Russian actions to implement vigorously export controls and curtail missile assistance to Iran. You and Putin would use agreed language on this issue at your press conference. The U.S.-Russian Commercial Space Launch Agreement, due to expire on December 31, 2000, established a quota (currently 20) for Russian launches of U.S.-built satellites. We have used this agreement as leverage over Russian performance on the Iran problem. Overplaying the leverage afforded by the quota could threaten Lockheed Martin's commercial space launch joint venture with the Russians as well as cooperation on the development of DoD's principal

heavy lift space launch vehicle.

You will need to make clear that the problem of Russian missile assistance to
Iran is not solved and that future U.S.-Russian space cooperation depends on
Russian performance to implement the Gallucci-Koptev work plan. We are also
proposing an exchange of letters between you and Putin to confirm Russia's
commitments to halt missile assistance to Iran and our willingness to lift the
space launch quota if Russia performs.

On the Iran nuclear side, we are seeking private commitments from Russia to
reaffirm the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin commitment (which restricted Russian-Iranian
nuclear cooperation to construction of Bushehr unit one and related training and
fuel) in exchange for issuing the public joint statement on the civil plutonium
initiative. Securing Russian acceptance of these commitments may require your
personal intervention. We are proposing to codify these commitments in a private
agreement signed by you and Putin. If the Russians implement them, the
arrangement would lead to a long-term moratorium on additional civil reprocessing
and increased peaceful nuclear cooperation to design advanced power reactors.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/17/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1st Afternoon Mtg (ACl Security) TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Arms Control

TO BE PROVIDED

Nonproliferation/Iran

* Know that Sandy and Sergey have been working hard to get nonproliferation issues ready. Plutonium initiatives they prepared will send exactly right signal about benefits of our cooperation to reduce the nuclear threat.

* Iran problem still not fixed. Would like to let space launch quota expire at end of year, but we need to see implementation of the Holum-Koptev plan. We've made some progress; need to sustain momentum on curtailing missile cooperation with Iran.

* Would like you to confirm that you will take specific steps we've discussed to end transfers of missile technology to Iran and vigorously implement export controls.

* If you take those agreed steps, I'm prepared to lift the quota.

* Unfortunately, nuclear problem seems to be getting worse. Iran is seeking sensitive technology from a variety of Russian entities for almost every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle, including sensitive fissile material production facilities.

* Hope you will instruct MinAtom and the FSB to investigate and shut down these Iranian efforts.

[If the civil plutonium agreement is completed]

* Pleased to be signing joint statement with you on our mutual commitment to halt reprocessing of nuclear power reactor fuel and work together to develop a new generation of nuclear power reactors.

* We will also be signing a private agreement specifying our mutual

commitments
to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran.

* Hope you will instruct MinAtom and the FSB to ensure compliance with this
commitment.

* On this basis, we can proceed with the joint research on reactor development.

(If raised:) Intelligence lead information

* There are limits to what we can provide without jeopardizing sources and
methods. Have been burned in the past because some of the information we
provided was used to cover up rather than to stop activities.

(If raised:) Nuclear subs in Russian Far East

* Willing to look at this problem. But need more information about type of spent
fuel that's on board the subs. Hard for us to devote significant resources to
environmental clean-up issue.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/17/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1st Afternoon Mtg (Nonpro) Cards.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

* Very pleased we've completed the military plutonium agreement. Need to work
together at Okinawa to raise international funds.

* Iran problem still not fixed. Glad we have agreed on the Holum-

Koptev plan to
halt missile assistance to Iran.

* Also important that we've agreed on language for stating publicly commitment to
strong export controls and on consultations about moving toward eliminating space
launch quota. Can only lift quota if there's strong implementation of controls.

* I will make our understanding on this issue clear during our press conference;
important you do so, too.

*
Unfortunately, nuclear problem getting worse. Iran is getting sensitive

technology from Russian entities that will help it acquire nuclear weapons, which
I know you don't want.

* Hope you will instruct MINATOM and the FSB to investigate and shut down these
Iranian efforts.

* Disappointed that Iran nuclear issue also blocked agreement on initiative to
halt reprocessing of nuclear power reactor fuel and work together to develop new
generation of nuclear power reactors.

* I expect Russia to live up its existing commitment on Iran, which PM
Chernomyrdin gave to Vice President Gore in 1995: no additional nuclear
cooperation until the Bushehr reactor is completed.

* Know that Adamov wants to sell additional power reactors, but unilateral
revision of formal government commitments is unacceptable.

* Propose that Al Gore and new PK Kasyanov take this issue up and try to resolve
it before Okinawa.

* We can then announce a new civil plutonium initiative to complement the
military plutonium agreement we are announcing today.

3
~~SECRET~~ Card of 3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Card 1 of 1

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 06/03/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1st Afternoon Mtg (Nonpro) Contingency Cards.doc
CONTINGENCY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

(If raised:) Intelligence lead information

* There are limits to what we can provide without jeopardizing sources and
methods. Have been burned in the past because some of the information we
provided was used to cover up rather than to stop activities.

(If raised:) Nuclear subs in Russian Far East

* Willing to look at this problem. Understand you're prepared to give us
information we need about type of spent fuel that's on board the subs. Will take
a close look, but hard for us to devote significant resources to environmental
clean-up issue.

(If raised:) Supercomputers

* This technology advances very rapidly. To keep ahead of the curve, we
regularly review and revise our control levels. In past five years, I have
tripled level of computers that Russian civilian end-users can obtain without
export license.

(If raised:) HEU-related NOGA lawsuit

* We think we found way to fix problem. We're acting as quickly as we can.

2
~~SECRET~~ Card of 2

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~~SECRET~~ Card 1 of 1

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 06/02/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1st Afternoon Mtg (Nonpro) Contingency TPs.doc
CONTINGENCY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

(If raised:) Intelligence lead information

* There are limits to what we can provide without jeopardizing sources and
methods. Have been burned in the past because some of the information we
provided was used to cover up rather than to stop activities.

(If raised:) Nuclear subs in Russian Far East

* Willing to look at this problem. Understand you're prepared to give us
information we need about type of spent fuel that's on board the subs. Will take
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export license.

(If raised:) HEU-related NOGA lawsuit

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/17/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

1st Afternoon Mtg (Nonpro) TPs.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

* Very pleased we've completed the military plutonium agreement. Need to work
together at Okinawa to raise international funds.

* Iran problem still not fixed. Glad we have agreed on the Holum-Koptev plan to
halt missile assistance to Iran.

* Also important that we've agreed on language for stating publicly commitment to
strong export controls and on consultations about moving toward eliminating space
launch quota. Can only lift quota if there's strong implementation of controls.

* I will make our understanding on this issue clear during our press conference;

important you do so, too.

* Unfortunately, nuclear problem getting worse. Iran is getting sensitive
technology from Russian entities that will help it acquire nuclear weapons, which
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* Hope you will instruct MINATOM and the FSB to investigate and shut down these
Iranian efforts.

* Disappointed that Iran nuclear issue also blocked agreement on initiative to
halt reprocessing of nuclear power reactor fuel and work together to develop new
generation of nuclear power reactors.

* I expect Russia to live up its existing commitment on Iran, which PM
Chernomyrdin gave to Vice President Gore in 1995: no additional nuclear
cooperation until the Bushehr reactor is completed.

* Know that Adamov wants to sell additional power reactors, but unilateral
revision of formal government commitments is unacceptable.

* Propose that Al Gore and new PK Kasyanov take this issue up and try to resolve
it before Okinawa.

* We can then announce a new civil plutonium initiative to complement the
military plutonium agreement we are announcing today.

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/17/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

2nd Afternoon Meeting (Econ & Non-Security).doc
SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

* Commend Putin's emphasis on economic reform and achieving tangible results for
average Russians.

* Affirm support for Russia's early reengagement with the IFI's.

* Highlight importance of improving Russia's investment climate, including in the
energy sector, through legal and institutional reforms and the fight against
crime and corruption.

* Urge higher priority for serious effort at WTO accession, which would be a tool
of strengthening Russia's global integration as well speeding the reform process
and improving investment climate.

* Indicate your willingness to promote with international investors fact that
Russia is getting its house in order and that investors should begin to take a
fresh look.

* Lay out a longer-term vision of enhanced cooperation and interaction between
Russia and America (e.g., expanded exchanges and new focus on common problems
such as health care, climate change, and fighting drug addiction).

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This meeting will center on the next phase of Russia's economic transformation
into a fully functioning market economy, delivering sustainable growth and jobs
and deepening Russia's integration into the global trade and investment system.
The Russians are rightly proud that they are designing a reform program
themselves, which will have been announced shortly before your arrival. You will
want to hear from Putin and his team what their economic priorities

are and how
they plan to tackle them this year and beyond. You should ask Larry Summers to
explore key economic policy areas in greater detail. This will set the stage for
a discussion of how we can most effectively support Russia's reform efforts going
forward.

AGENDA

Putin's Economic Program. After declines in the level of real GDP in each year
since the breakup of the Soviet Union (save a fractional increase in 1997),
Russia's economy has registered about 7 percent growth in the past four quarters.
Driving growth have been higher energy prices which help an energy supplier like
Russia, and the collapse of the ruble in the financial crisis of 1998, which has
effectively priced many imports out of the market and given a boost to domestic
producers. The best place to start is by listening to Putin and his team summarize their priority economic objectives and their strategy for achieving
them. They will likely address both macroeconomic policies (tight fiscal and
monetary policies) and structural reforms (tax reform, property rights, rule of
law, administrative reform, etc.) aimed at improving the investment climate and
reversing capital flight. The Russians are asking for your personal encouragement of U.S. investors, support for a renewed IMF program and
consideration of comprehensive debt relief for Soviet-era obligations. As Prime
Minister Kasyanov has put it, "Russia foremost needs some moral and psychological
support." You should ask Larry to comment on the Russian program and highlight
areas where we can be supportive through bilateral and multilateral channels.

Overall, without being patronizing, we want to applaud and encourage the new
sense of ownership and pragmatism in Russia's economic policy. And we want to be
supportive without undermining the incentives for continued

ownership and actual
implementation of reforms, without which all the jawboning in the world will not
attract once-burned Western investors.

A key question about Putin's political strategy for the economic program is
timing. You will want to urge early, decisive action to take advantage of the
"honeymoon" Putin is currently enjoying with a cooperative Duma and high oil and
gas prices. Initial signals from the Putin coterie and Prime Minister Kasyanov
suggest that he will pursue a fairly modest gameplan on economics and put real
political muscle behind an overhaul of the country's political structures first.
Still, the combination of stronger leadership and good macroeconomic performance
could put Russia in a solid position to capitalize on a unique opportunity to
catch up on long-delayed reform. As you have said many times, it is better to
make the hard decisions early.

IFI's and External Debt. Russia seeks a renewed IMF program sometime this
summer, which we believe is feasible and could support. The magnitude of the
program would be limited to partial "refinancing" of Russia's obligations to the
Fund, which we would also support. In other words, there would be no net new
money. The message here is that the Russians want to reduce their exposure to
the Fund over time. We will want to ensure that the structural reform measures
associated with a new Fund program are substantive but realistic. Ask Larry to
spell this out.

The Russians also seek Paris Club debt relief on their Soviet-era obligations,
about half of which is owed to Germany. Putin quipped recently that G-7
hesitancy on debt relief suggests that "Russia is being punished for its good
economic performance," but this should be viewed as mostly rhetorical posturing.
Prime Minister Kasyanov indicated that Russia would like a two-

staged approach:
first interim relief, then a comprehensive solution agreed up front. Interim
relief (limited rescheduling) in tandem with an IMF program makes sense. But, as
we suggested at Cologne, we would be willing to look at further, more

comprehensive debt relief only once Russia is satisfactorily performing under an
IMF program and taking into account actual financial need. Furthermore, it must
be underscored that, at this juncture and in the foreseeable future, the case for
anything more than debt rescheduling is exceedingly difficult for our G-7 allies.

WTO. Putin has said positive things about WTO accession, but seems to believe it
is a political decision, not a result of reforms undertaken. Despite some
technical progress in trade negotiations, what has been lacking in Russia over
the past few years is high-level buy-in that WTO accession should be a national
priority. Now is a good opportunity to drive the point home. The process of WTO
accession would promote Russia's full integration into the global commercial
system and would be a tool Putin could use to discipline the reform efforts of
his government. Kasyanov's initial response has been lukewarm, stressing that
misinformation generated by various trade disputes with the Europeans has cooled
domestic support for WTO accession. Still, undoing protectionism is really the
flip side of pushing through the long-overdue structural reforms. With our China
PNTR vote, Russia risks having the WTO train leave the station with China on
board but Russia still on the platform.

We would want to secure Putin's buy-in and understanding that a serious push on
WTO will reinforce other reform efforts. A good first step would be to appoint a
lead WTO negotiator as well as a sherpa to coordinate the intra-governmental
process. These steps would be more important -- and credible -- than

time-bound
targets, which Russia has set and missed before.

Investment Climate. Putin knows that investment is the key to Russia's growth
prospects and that so far the poor investment climate has prevented Russia from
achieving anything near its full potential. Putin seems to understand that, in
addition to maintaining macroeconomic stability, Russia must systematically
create a level playing field so that it is transparent and reliable for investors
who choose to play ball. This means a modern tax code, protections of property
rights (including for shareholders, creditors, and landholders as well as
intellectual property rights), and strengthening the rule of law and enforcement
of judgments.

It will be important to emphasize that Russia will be judged by the priorities it
sets and by the results it produces. Many investors have been burned in Russia
before and will study things carefully before jumping back in. In that context,
we should be willing to get the word out about Russia's "new pragmatism." You
could note that Bob Strauss is planning to lead a trade mission in late June and
that you might send Bill Daley out later this summer. Putin could send a couple
of clear positive signals to American investors in the near term by placing
priority on the passage of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).

Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption. An area that is important in its own right but
will also contribute to a better investment climate is strengthening of the rule
of law and law enforcement. Putin has talked about the "dictatorship of law" and
the burden is on him to demonstrate that what he means by this is a modern
law-based society and economy where both civil and investor rights are taken
seriously and where corruption is punished.

There is a possibility that Russia may be cited as a "non-cooperative"

country in
the report to be issued later in June by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Passage by the Duma of the anti-money laundering law and the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty, therefore, would send a clear signal that Russia is serious
about fighting cross-border crime.

Energy Investment Stillborn. Improvement of the overall business climate should
help Russia diversify its economy and investment base, including manufacturing
and services. Still, for now no sector has more dynamic potential than the
energy sector. Russia profited from the spike in oil prices through 1999 and
early 2000, but you should note that Russia will not be able to continue living
(relatively) well off energy earnings without a major push to attract foreign
investment. First, the majority of Russia's existing oil and gas fields are
mature and are sliding down the production curve. Most Russian oil companies
lack the investment capital needed to reverse this trend. In addition, many
international oil and gas companies no longer view Russia's oil and gas resources
as a trophy and are preparing to pack their bags. Completion and implementation
of the production sharing agreement (PSA) legal regime is probably the only
signal that would persuade many western companies that Russia will welcome
foreign investment in oil and gas. According to industry experts, some

low-hanging fruit is within reach in terms of PSA-related legislation.

People-to-People Dimension, Health, Climate Change. We also want to expand human
relationships between our two countries. Investments now in exchanges,
educational and NGO partnerships, and similar initiatives will promote mutual
understanding and strengthen ties in years to come. Our assistance budget has
been shifting in this direction over the past two years or so, and this year we
launched Jim Billington's exchange program that will bring 1,800

young Russian officials from all levels to the United States. A new public policy school in Moscow will add to the 53 university partnerships we have with Russia. We are also expanding our sponsorship of public access Internet sites to enhance Russians' exposure to global information and culture.

Russia faces tremendous health crises -- drug abuse, HIV, TB, as well as cardiovascular disease and cancer -- but lacks the policy expertise, infrastructure, and the resources to combat them effectively. The Russians have signaled an interest in additional assistance on drug abuse; there may be areas where collaborative research efforts could yield results beneficial to both societies. Donna Shalala has been in contact with her counterpart, with whom she co-chairs the Binational Commission's Health Committee. They are exploring ways to expand our joint work.

A third area is work to counter global climate change. Russia is in a strong position to benefit from financial flows under a future greenhouse gas emissions trading system in large part because we would likely need to buy excess Russian credits to meet our own Kyoto target. We are negotiating a joint statement on climate change that highlights our shared interest in fighting climate change and that notes in particular Russia would dedicate a portion of its revenues from any trades to funding those actions that mitigate climate change and benefit the environment. A commitment of this nature by Russia is strategically important for us and Russia because it would remove a key argument for "caps" on trading by showing that trading in excess Russian allotments (denigrated by the EU as "hot air") would nonetheless bolster action on climate change.

UN Assessments. Finally, it is very important that you make a general point on Russian support of our effort on UN assessment reform (our primary objective is

to reduce the disproportionate amount we pay on peacekeeping), which is critical
to meeting our Helms-Biden benchmarks. Our Russian interlocutors at the UN have
indicated a willingness to pay more, but tell us that a Presidential decision
will be required.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/22/02

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2nd Afternoon Meeting Summary If Raised Points.doc
CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

* (If asked: Russia's Soviet-era debt) New IMF program would provide basis for
limited rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era obligations. To consider further
relief in future, must look at Russia's performance under IMF program and
financial need. London Club debt agreement not precedent for Paris Club.

* (If asked: G-8 to replace G-7) G-8 is premier political body. G-7 plays
needed role in addressing financial crises. Russian membership in a full G-7/8
not ripe. Need establishment of stable, prosperous economy with sophisticated
financial system that is making substantial contribution to global economic,
financial system.

* (If asked: Jackson-Vanik) Russia is in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik,
enjoys full NTR benefits. Encourage changes on key issues that would persuade

Congress to graduate you (e.g., religion law, anti-Semitism, and curbs on
immigration up to ten years after access to state secrets).

* (If asked: Market Economy Status) Our experts have been reviewing options.
Status applies only in anti-dumping context, no broader significance. Market
status would actually increase Russia's exposure to trade penalties.

* (If asked: Access to Steel Market) Glad we signed suspension agreement
covering steel trade last year, providing relief for industry and continued
access for Russian producers. Pleased our experts have launched Joint Steel
Dialogue to address structural trade issues and provide technical assistance.

* * * * * * * * * * (If asked: BIT) Know you have particular concerns about
BIT. Think our experts can redouble their work to find a way forward.

Ratification would send important signal to U.S. investors.
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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/21/08

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2nd Afternoon Meeting Summary Points.doc
SUMMARY POINTS FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN ON ECONOMICS

* Global "new economy" radically expanding economic frontiers. Russia should
accelerate its integration with these trends.

* Want Russia to be peaceful, democratic and prosperous. Economics is crucial
dimension.

* Honeymoon important opportunity. Eager to hear your plans.

* International support, including IMF and World Bank, still important. Will
support strong IFI programs.

* Can do limited debt rescheduling under new IMF program; this would provide
substantial financial relief.

* Focus on WTO is right. Encourages reforms and integration. Hope you can
accelerate accession process.

* Now in an era of global markets. Capital has no nationality.

* Create transparent, predictable environment that protects investors. Your
results will let me be your salesman.

* Strengthening the rule of law is critical.

* Special focus on intellectual property rights, which are tied to high-tech
innovation, an area Russia could profit from.

* Corruption has been eating away at investor confidence over the years.
Experience shows market reforms the best remedy.

* Energy sector has much promise. Implementing production sharing agreement laws
would encourage investment.

* Pleased we are deepening our cooperation on critical challenge of climate
change.

* Important to broaden our relationship beyond governments.

* Hope you can support our expanded exchanges (Billington program) and similar
initiatives; should use Binational Commission to explore ways to cooperate on TB,
HIV.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/27/10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2nd Afternoon Mtg TPs.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR SECOND AFTERNOON MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

New Global Economy

* We are witnessing an unprecedented expansion of the global economic frontier.
There are several mutually reinforcing developments at the center of this
revolution.

* First, technological breakthroughs. Today, invention matters more than mass
production. And information matters most of all.

* Second, the spread of market forces. Advantage has shifted to systems in which
economic power and opportunities are more decentralized, in which individual
initiative and entrepreneurship flourish.

* Third, the truly global scope of economic integration. Along with the end of
the Cold War, this will be the great story of the 20th century: the appearance of
vibrant emerging markets, where literally billions of people live, moving toward
rapid growth.

* In U.S., we have tried to maximize benefits of these forces while striving to
strengthen our fundamentals.

* Key challenges are to maintain fiscal discipline, make investments in people,
deepen our own markets through deregulation, support spread of information and
know-how, and make sure new markets work for all our people.

* Hope Russia can accelerate its integration into these global trends.

Putin's Reform Program

* Want Russia to be peaceful, democratic, and prosperous. Economics crucial
dimension of this picture.

* First chapter of Russia's transition is behind you. Next chapter is unique
opportunity to consolidate successes and make real progress in new areas.

* Encouraged by new emphasis on economics, strong government team, and
development of strategic reform program. Have clear sense that new, results-oriented pragmatism is in the air.

* Early part of new Administration is time to move on the difficult reforms.
Would urge you to make maximum use of this window of opportunity; you have a
"honeymoon" with both the Duma and the price of oil.

* As you roll out your economics program, investors will be looking both at your
objectives (tax code, protection of shareholder rights, intellectual property
rights, land code) and at your concrete strategy for implementing them.

* Would like to hear your economic priorities and strategy.

International Financial Institutions (IFI's) and External Debt

* International support still important. Recognize that Russia is entering new
phase in its relationship with IFI's. IMF financing may be less critical tough
still important. World Bank can play useful role in specific structural reform
areas such as banking sector, social sector, pension reform.

* United States will support your reengagement with IMF on a strong, new program
that we hope could be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

If raised: Restructuring Russia's Soviet-era Debt

* New IMF program would provide basis for a limited rescheduling of Russia's
Soviet-era obligations.

* This approach could provide substantial financial relief.

* To consider further relief in the future, would have to look at Russia's
performance under an IMF program as well as financial need.

* If needed: London Club debt agreement earlier this year good achievement, but
not precedent for Paris Club.

If raised: Move from G-7 to G-8

* G-8 is the world's premier political forum in large part because Russia is a
member. G-8 addresses range of important issues facing international community
(e.g., cross-border financial crime, infectious disease, terrorism).

* G-7 as grouping of largest economies and financial actors has been key
instrument in coping wit global financial crises. We need to preserve it as a
means of close coordination.

* Russian membership in a full G-8 is not ripe.

WTO

* Think your focus on WTO is critical insight and opportunity. Accelerating
Russia's accession to WTO will speed your integration with global trading system,
facilitating investment and economic growth.

* Well-defined agenda associated with WTO accession strongly overlaps with new
government's core market-oriented reform agenda; the goal of WTO membership can
be effective tool to discipline efforts government-wide.

* While Russia's accession started on fast track, negotiations have slowed over
the past few years.

* Would be mistake to view WTO membership as political decision from outside; it
very much depends on your political decision from inside. Have you considered
appointing government-wide coordinator (in addition to a lead WTO negotiator)?

* It is clear that this is the path to prosperity in 21st century. Even China is
embracing this approach. Train is leaving the station; we would like to see
Russia on it.

If raised: Bilateral Trade

* Want to see U.S.-Russia trade grow. Jackson-Vanik has no effect on U.S.-Russia
trade.

* Know that anti-dumping cases (e.g., steel) have been source of friction; glad
they have been resolved by suspension agreements.

* Binational Commission provides good mechanism for cooperation on trade issues.
Pleased that our experts have just agreed to establish a Joint Steel Dialogue to
address structural trade issues and to provide a framework for technical
assistance.

* Also want to see Europe open its doors to trade with Russia. WTO will be great
tool of trade expansion and integration for you.

If raised: Jackson-Vanik

* Administration has declared Russia to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik,
and Russia enjoys full NTR benefits.

* Congress remains concerned about issues such as implementation of Russia's
religion law, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and the law allowing denial of right to
emigrate for up to 10 years after access to state secrets.

* Encourage you to continue to make changes that would persuade Congress to
advance legislation graduating you from Jackson-Vanik.

If raised: Market Economy Status

* Know our experts have extensively reviewed the options on "non-market economy"
vs. "market economy" status under U.S. trade laws.

* Status applies only to anti-dumping context, has no broader significance.

* Market economy status would actually increase Russia's exposure to trade
penalties. For example, would lose ability to use suspension agreements to
resolve disputes and would be subject to countervailing duties.

* Important to move forward deliberately, recognizing all the pros and cons.

If raised: Unwrought Titanium

* Aware of interest in GSP designation for unwrought titanium. Due to
deteriorating conditions in the U.S. market, we're unlikely to see resolution in
the near term.

* Pleased we have already given Russia duty-free status for wrought titanium.
Wrought titanium is the higher value-added product and we plan to continue to
extend the duty free status.

If raised: Access to U.S. Steel Market

* Glad we signed bilateral agreement covering steel trade in 1999. These
agreements provide relief to our steel industry. At the same time, Russian
producers continue to have access to U.S. market.

* Pleased that our experts have just agreed to launch Joint Steel Dialogue, which
will give us the opportunity to work together to address some of the underlying
structural issues that affect steel trade between our countries.

Investment Climate

* We live in an era of globalizing markets in which capital has no

nationality.
Investors choose countries and not the other way around -- but both benefit.

* Pleased that United States is number one source of direct foreign investment in
Russia (about $4 billion since 1992), but Russia still lags far behind many other
transition economies/emerging markets in level of foreign investment.

* Another symptom of the problem is persistent capital flight out of Russia.

* Key to attracting more investment and reversing capital flight is to improve
investment climate: this is a game that can be won only by creating reliable,
transparent institutional, and legal environment that meets needs of investors.

* Things that are good for foreign investors also good for Russian domestic
businesses. Business basically wants same thing everywhere: to reduce risk, have
predictability. Reducing corruption is an important part of the strategy. All
difficult, but big rewards.

* Many essential elements to positive business environment, including

macroeconomic stability (which you currently have), as well as structural, legal
and institutional ingredients (e.g., tax code, property rights, rule of law,
transparency).

* We will continue to provide technical assistance in many key areas to support
your reform efforts. Binational Commission plays a useful role.

* As always, implementation is the key. Because of all the ups and downs in
recent years, investors will be cautious, will want to see results in Russia
first.

* Redoubling efforts on WTO would reinforce the message that you are serious
about reform, integration.

* U.S. investors will also respond to ratification of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) signed in 1992.

* I want to help you get the message out that Russia is putting its house in
order -- and is open for investment. Want to urge investors to take a fresh
look.

* Have encouraged Bob Strauss to lead delegation of top U.S. CEO's to Moscow in
June. I would also like to send Bill Daley here with a commercial mission later
this summer.

If raised: Russian Concerns About BIT

* Know you have concerns about particular provisions of BIT. Think our experts
can redouble their work to find a way forward. Ratification would send important
signal to U.S. investors.

Rule of Law, Anti Corruption

* Longer-term key to changing investor psychology is to enhance rule of law in
commercial affairs. Many would-be investors have perception of an unreliable,
risky business environment. Turning this perception around will have large
impact.

* Investors looking for reliable, transparent and predictable commercial
environment that meets international norms on issues such as property rights and
contract enforcement.

* Special attention globally to intellectual property rights (IPR), which are so
tied to high-tech innovation and investment in "new economy." Your commitment to
enforce IPR and combat piracy key to broader integration goals.

* It was good that rule-of-law concerns relating to the Chernogorneft (TNK) case
were ultimately sorted out allowing sizable EX-IM projects to move forward.

Understand progress is being made on other important EX-IM projects.

* Corruption problem has been eating away at investor confidence over the years.
Experience shows best way to fight corruption is continued market reforms,
streamlining (but not weakening) the state, and systematic enforcement of strong
laws.

* Early passage of anti-money laundering legislation that meets international
standards would also be important step. Good way to follow through on the G-8
Anti-Crime Ministerial you hosted. U.S. experts ready to provide further
assistance.

Energy Sector

* Know that you want to diversify Russia's economy and set the stage for
investment in manufacturing, high-tech sectors and services -- i.e., integrate
Russia with new global economy.

* But your energy sector still has vast potential.

* Foreign investment can help develop these resources, but frankly many energy
sector investors have lost confidence in Russia.

* Implementing the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) Laws will be key signal.

People-to-People, Health

* Important to broaden our relationship so our societies know each other better.

* Exchanges, NGO partnerships, educational initiatives enrich both countries.
These are long-term investments that will pay important dividends.

* We are expanding efforts in these areas, and I hope you can support them: for
example, initiatives such as the new public policy school at Moscow State
University and our expanded exchange program ("Billington

program") for young
political leaders.

* One area of particular concern is health. We both face serious challenges with
drugs, HIV, other diseases. Russia has tremendous scientific talent; this is a
promising area for collaborative work.

* Secretary Shalala will be in Moscow in July to co-chair Health Committee of
Binational Commission. Propose we should give Committee mandate to explore.

Climate Change

* Pleased we are deepening cooperation on critical challenge of climate change.

* Have worried that some in Europe want to limit ability to use all the flexibility Kyoto allows. Russia stands to gain billions if we can build market
for emissions trading. Will benefit both the environment and the economy.

* Encourage you to direct one of your senior advisors to work with us closely on
this in the next few months.

UN Assessments

* Pleased we are working together on peacekeeping and other security issues at
UN; hope we can have your support this year on reforms in the UN scales of
assessments, especially for peacekeeping.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 5/22/00

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT American Embassy.doc
SCENESETTER: AMERICAN EMBASSY MOSCOW

The cornerstone of U.S. Embassy Moscow's new office building (NOB) was laid in
September 1979. In August 1985 work was suspended on the partially-completed NOB
due to a serious security compromise, which created doubts that the building
could ever be used.

After long negotiations with Soviet and Russian officials, the construction of
NOB was resumed by Americans using American materials pursuant to an
American-controlled design. That effort featured partial deconstruction of the
NOB, rehabilitation of remaining portions of the building, addition of the four
new floors plus penthouse, and completion of all systems of the building. The
building was completed and occupied in May 2000.

The NOB is centrally located within the Embassy compound, which also contains
residences and other office buildings, including the former chancery, which will
continue to be occupied by Embassy staff. The NOB's modern design makes it a
landmark on the Moscow skyline. The building overlooks Konyushkovskaya Street, a
major urban thoroughfare, and beyond to a large city park.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Arms Control Paragraph for Putin News Conference.doc
Arms Control Paragraph for Putin News Conference

President Putin and I had a thorough discussion of arms control, including
national missile defense, the ABM treaty and START III.

The United States and Russia still have significant disagreements on these
matters. Russia believes that any changes to the ABM Treaty could undermine
strategic stability and threaten Russia' strategic deterrent. The United States
believes the Treaty can be adapted to allow for a limited national

missile
defense and still preserve strategic stability and mutual deterrence between the
United States and Russia.

But we have agreed to keep working hard to narrow our differences and try to
resolve disagreements.

Today, President Putin and I have agreed on a set of principles to guide our
experts in intensified talks on further reductions in START III and ABM issues.
We have also signed an important agreement to establish a joint center in Moscow
staffed with U.S. and Russian personnel to share early warning data on ballistic
missile launches, and have instructed our experts to work hard to develop
additional initiatives for working together to combat ballistic missile proliferation.
1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

ARMS CONTROL POINTS FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING SUNDAY WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT
VLADIMIR PUTIN.doc
ARMS CONTROL POINTS FOR FIRST AFTERNOON MEETING SUNDAY WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT
VLADIMIR PUTIN

Overview

* We had a good discussion last night on NMD, ABM and START.

* Three things I'd like to start with.

* First, clear we have differences, and we spoke frankly about what they are. I
think that's an important part of the process we are engaged in, and will help
bring us closer together in the months ahead.

* Second, I think it's also clear that we both recognize there are new threats to
our security, and that we need to take steps to deal with these threats.

* Third, we can work cooperatively on this problem, or at least some aspects of it. Looking forward to signing tonight our agreement to move forward with an agreement on Shared Early Warning. I think we can agree to do more, and we should work hard on this in the months ahead.

Our differences

* Let me just spend a few minutes talking about our differences.

* First thing I want to make clear is we don't have a missile defense program because we are worried about Russia.

* We have a missile defense program because, as President, I must explore every possible means to defend American citizens from states like North Korea, Iran or Iraq.

* North Korea has come very close to having an ICBM capable of striking the U.S.

* I simply cannot accept our vulnerability to these threats, especially if we have the technology to defeat them.

* Second point I want to make clear is that our missile defense program is not "Star Wars." Star Wars was directed against Russia. Our NMD program is not, and Russia will retain a secure deterrent even if we go forward with our NMD.

* Third point is that I want both our countries to get our in front of this problem. That's why I told Strobe last summer to try to reach an agreement on changes to ABM before I had to make a decision on whether to go forward with our NMD this year.

* Still think that's the way to go, and I hope we can make progress. Don't want the ABM Treaty to be a casualty of our NMD program. But on all three of the points I just mentioned, I understand that Russia has a different view.

Where we agree

* So that's where I think we still don't see eye to eye. We need to keep talking
to see if we can reach greater understanding on these points.

* But I think we also found some common ground last night, and that is reflected
in the Joint Statement of Principles we will sign this evening.

* I think these principles are important. They demonstrate our commitment to
dealing with new threats, including the consideration of possible changes to the
ABM Treaty.

* Principles also reaffirm our commitment to maintaining strategic stability,
mutual deterrence and ABM while we find ways to address these new threats. That
is of fundamental importance to our approach to this issue.

* Principles make clear we should redouble our efforts to move forward on ABM and
START III. My experts are prepared to hand over a draft paper on basic elements
of a START III Treaty, which I'm hoping we can discuss further in Okinawa. We
also need to get John Holum and Strobe back together with your experts to
continue our work on ABM.

Cooperation

* Finally, let me just say a few words on the issue of cooperation. We put a
number of ideas on the table last year, and Russia has responded with some ideas
of its own.

* I think we should work hard to develop a joint statement on cooperation that
you and I can review in Okinawa, and identify those areas that we can move
forward.

* I'm prepared to move as quickly as we can with this, but I need to be clear: I
do not view this effort as a substitute for our NMD program. And I

don't think
you should view it in that way either.
3

2

6/4/1:05

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger Ivanov Breach.doc
Berger-Ivanov Points on ABM Treaty "Breach" Issue

* We have a path forward through the summit on ABM and START III. Principles
Document should help lower the temperature on this issue.

* Hope this can lead too real progress, including the possibility of agreements
this year on START / ABM.

* With or without an ABM agreement, the President will make a decision on NMD
deployment later this year, based on the four criteria you know well.

* If the President does decide to go forward with NMD, the practical step he will
need to take is to authorize the signing of contracts to begin ABM radar
construction in Alaska next spring.

* Our lawyers have examined when construction activity in Alaska for this radar
would violate the ABM Treaty, or trigger a possible U..S notice of withdrawal.

* Strong case that none of the actions this President might take would violate
the ABM Treaty, or trigger a notice of intent to breach the Treaty.

* Moreover, according to our analysis, the Treaty line would not be crossed until
spring 2002 (FYI: when the construction of the track that supports the ABM
radar's antenna begins) -- still years ahead of when the radar would be operational.

* With this analysis, the U.S. would not need to consider the question of

withdrawal from the Treaty until the fall of 2001, giving you maximum time to
work this issue with the next administration.

* Want to be clear that I'm not informing you today we will adopt this approach,
or this interpretation of the Treaty. But I would encourage you to consider not
taking issue with this analysis, if this is where we are later this year. Will
buy you more time to work the issue with the next Administration.
1

6/3/8:50

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger Pts Card Breach.doc
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with the next Administration.

2

2
Card of 2

Card 1 of 1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Cooperation Proposals.doc
U.S. Proposals on Cooperation on Missile Defense and ABM

Last September, the U.S. proposed working with Russia on a number of cooperative
initiatives related to missile defense and the ABM Treaty. In general, Russia
has been prepared to engage on those proposals that it feels are not directly
related to NMD (such as shared early warning), and has shied away from
initiatives that appear designed to co-opt Russian agreement to changing the ABM
Treaty. Last week, we gave Mamedov a proposed Joint Statement for this weekend
including a commitment to work on these ideas; Mamedov suggested we try to work
such a statement for Okinawa.

Discussions on missile threats. The U.S. proposed expanding discussions on missile threats, including annual briefings of intelligence estimates relating to foreign missile developments. The U.S. also proposed working together on the publication of an annual "joint" intelligence assessment on trends in ballistic missile developments. Discussions ongoing.

Space-based sensors. The U.S. proposed expanding programs of cooperation in the area of space-based sensors (including a two-satellite research and development program to explore next generation infra-red sensors to detect ballistic missile launches). We also said we were willing to consider more far-reaching

cooperation on space-based sensors following an agreement on our Phase I NMD, including the launch of existing early warning satellites, or the acquisition of new satellites for launch (making clear the U.S. would consider assisting in the funding of this effort if affordable). Discussions ongoing on satellite R&D program.

Theater missile defense. The U.S. proposed to resume, and then extend our joint Theater Missile Defense (TMD) exercise program, with the objective of working to enhance the ability of U.S.-Russian TMD systems to operate together. We also proposed exploring the possibility of sharing missile track data between U.S. and Russian TMD units that might operate together to enhance the effectiveness of both sides' TMD systems. Discussions ongoing.

Boost-phase missile defense. The U.S. recently proposed to discuss concepts, technology and cooperation in boost-phase missile defense systems, including a joint assessment of the potential to use such defenses to counter third country missile threats. Russians have yet to react, although Putin's recent remarks may be consistent with this effort.

Missile warning information. The U.S. and Russia have now agreed to move ahead to create a Joint Warning Center under the Shared Early Warning initiative; we have also proposed to discuss sharing enhanced missile warning information (i.e., missile trajectory data) through that program to enhance the usefulness of the planned joint warning center and shared early warning arrangement. Discussions ongoing.

Defense simulation. The U.S. proposed establishing a U.S-Russian modeling and simulation center for joint analyses of missile defense challenges, including examining the effectiveness of various defense architectures. Russians have shown no interest.

Joint presence. The U.S. proposed exploring possible forms of "joint presence" - that is, the stationing of both U.S. and Russian personnel - at both a U.S. and Russian radar missile early warning site. Russians have shown no interest.

Assistance on large phased array radar. The U.S. proposed to discuss possible U.S. assistance (including funding, if affordable) to facilitate completion of construction of the Mishelevka large phased array early warning radar (LPAR); this radar could then provide data as part of the Shared Early Warning initiative. Russians have shown no interest.

Confidence building and transparency. The U.S. proposed to discuss confidence building and transparency measures designed to provide mutual confidence that ABM systems will not threaten each other's deterrent. These measures could include data exchanges; prior notification of events; voluntary demonstrations, observations, exhibitions and/or visits to missile defense-related facilities; and enhancing the ABM Treaty's verification regime. Russians have shown no interest.

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6/3/8:35

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT duma 4.doc
Malinowski

President William Jefferson Clinton
Address at Russian State Duma To Russian Parliamentarians
June 5, 2000

I am honored to speak with you, the members of the State Duma and the Federation
Council. It is important to me to have this opportunity, because through you, I
can also speak to the citizens you represent, and because the prospects for
virtually every common initiative President Putin and I have discussed over the
past two days will depend on your counsel and consent.

I have made five trips to Russia in my years as President. I have worked with
President Yeltsin and now President Putin. I have met with the leadership of the
Duma. I have spoken with Russia's religious leaders, with its media, with
educators, scientists and students, listening to their vision of the future and
sharing my own. I have been here at moments of extraordinary optimism about
Russia's march toward freedom and prosperity. I have been here at moments of
concern that Russia was somehow fated to fall backward.

I believed strongly when I first came here, and believe today, that Russia's
future is in Russia's hands. It is not predestined and cannot be determined by
others. I believed, and still believe, that yours is among the most important
journeys the world will witness in my lifetime. The character of the 21st
century for all people will be strongly influenced by the success of Russia's
people in building a modern, democratic nation that is part of the life

of the
world. And so, the world has sought to support your efforts, sharing with you a
sense of pride when democracy has advanced, and a sense of disappointment when
opportunities were missed.

It is not for me to tell the Russian people what has happened in these last few
years. I know that your progress has come with unfulfilled expectations and
unexpected tragedies. I know there have been moments, especially during the
financial crisis of 1998, when some wondered if the new Russia would end up as
another grand social experiment gone wrong.

But when we look at Russia today, Russia's friends do not see a country gone
wrong. We see an economy that is growing because it is producing goods and
services people want and need. We see a nation of enterprising citizens who are
beginning, despite all obstacles, to bring good jobs and a normal life to their
communities. We see a society with 65,000 non-governmental organizations, like
Eco-Juris, which is helping citizens defend their rights in court, like Vozrozhdenie [Vaz-razh-DYEN-yeh], which is aiding families with disabled
children, like the local chambers of commerce that have sprung up across Russia.
We see a country full of people taking responsibility for their future, like the
people of Gadzhiyevo [Gahd-zhee-YEH-voh] on the Arctic Circle who organized a
referendum to protect the environment of their town.

We see a country transforming its system of higher education to meet the demands
of the modern world, with institutions like the new Law Faculty at Novgorod
University and the New Economic School in Moscow. We see a country preserving
its magnificent literary heritage, as the Pushkin library is doing in its effort
to replenish the shelves of libraries across Russia. We see a country entering
the information age, with cutting edge software companies, with internet centers

at universities from Kazan [Kah-ZAHN] to Ufa [oo-FAH] to Yakutsk [Yah-KOOTSK], with a whole generation of young people more connected to the world beyond their borders than any past generation could ever have imagined. We see Russian citizens with no illusions about the road ahead, yet voting in extraordinary numbers against any return to the past. We see a Russia that has just completed a democratic transfer of executive power for the first time in a thousand years -- a triumph of institutions, of a constitution, of a people.

I would not presume to tell the people you represent how to weigh the gains of freedom against the pain of economic hardship, corruption and crime. They do not yet have the Russia they were promised in 1991. But I believe they now have a realistic opportunity to build that kind of Russia themselves, in far greater measure than a decade ago, because of the foundations they have laid, the institutions they have built and the choices they have made.

The world faces a very different Russia today than it did in 1991. Like all countries, Russia also faces a very different world. Its defining feature is globalization, the tearing down of boundaries between people, nations and cultures, so that what happens anywhere has an impact everywhere. During the 1990s, the volume of international trade almost doubled. Links among businesses, universities, advocacy groups, charities, and churches have multiplied across physical space -- and cyberspace. In the developing world, some of the poorest villages are beginning to be connected to the information highway.

The Russian people did more than just about anyone else to make possible this new world of globalization, by ending the divisions of the Cold War world. Now Russia, America and all nations are subject to the new rules of the global

economy. One of those rules, to adapt a phrase from your history, is that it's
no longer possible to build prosperity in one country. 1 To prosper, our
economies must be competitive in a global marketplace. And to compete, the most
important resource we all must develop is our people, giving them the tools and
freedom to reach their potential. That is the challenge we have tried to meet in
America in the last few years.

Indeed, the changes we have seen in the global economy pose hard questions both
our nations have to answer. A fundamental question is how do we define our
internal strength and vitality today, and what role should government play in
building it?
Some people believe that government is no longer relevant to people's lives in a
globalized, interconnected world. I don't believe that is true. But experience
has taught us all that government must be smaller, less bureaucratic, more
market-oriented; it should focus on empowering people by investing in education
and training rather than simply accruing power for itself. Above all, a strong
state should use its strength to enforce the rule of law, to protect the
powerless against the powerful, and to defend democratic freedoms, including
freedom of expression and religion and the press. That is true for any society
trying to succeed in the modern world. For any society, the answer to law
without order is not order without law.

Another fundamental question is how do countries define their strength in the
world today? Do they define it as the power to dominate neighbors, or the
confidence to be a good neighbor? Do they define what they are against simply in
terms of what others are for? Or do they join with others in common endeavors
that advance common interests? This Duma's ratification of START II and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty suggests you are answering these questions in a way

that will make for both a stronger Russia and a better world.

A related question, for both Russia and America, is how to define our relationship today? Clearly, Russia has passed through the phase when it depended on outside aid to survive a hard transition. Today, what Russia needs is outside investment. What America must ask is not so much what can we do for Russia, but what can we do with Russia to advance common interests?

To build that kind of relationship, we Americans have to overcome the temptation to think that we have all the answers -- that if only Russia would see things our way, its troubles would go away. Russia will not choose a course simply because others wish it; it will choose what its interests clearly demand and its people democratically embrace.

I believe another problem is that many Russians still suspect America does not wish them well. Thus they see our relationship in zero-sum terms, assuming that every assertion of American power must diminish Russia, and every assertion of Russian strength must threaten America. That isn't right, either. America wants a strong Russia. We want to see a Russia strong enough to protect its territorial integrity while respecting that of its neighbors, strong enough to meet threats to its security, to help maintain strategic stability, and most important, to join with others for common goals.

Certainly, our interests are not identical. But on many issues that matter to our people, they do coincide. So we have an obligation, it seems to me, to focus on the goals we can and should advance together in our mutual interest.
What can we do together in the years to come?

One goal should be to build a normal economic relationship based on trade and investment between our countries and contact among our people. We've never had a better opportunity.

This is the time, while Russia's economy is growing and oil prices are high, when
I hope Russia will create more diversified economy. The economies that will
power the 21st century will be built not just on resources from the soil, which
are limited, but the genius and initiative of individual citizens, which are
unlimited.

This is the time when I hope you will finish putting in place the institutions of
a modern economy, with laws that protect property, that ensure openness and
accountability, and that establish a rational, equitable tax code. Such an
economy would keep Russian capital in Russia and bring foreign capital to Russia.

This is the time to win the fight against crime and corruption, or investment
will move to safer shores. That is why I hope you will soon pass a strong law
against money laundering that meets international standards.

This is also the time I hope Russia will make an all out effort to take the steps
needed to join the World Trade Organization. Membership in the WTO reinforce
economic reform, give you better access to foreign markets and ensure your
trading partners treat you fairly. Russia should not be the only major
industrialized country standing outside the global trading system. You should be
inside the system, with America and China and Brazil and Japan and the members of
the European Union, helping to shape its rules for the benefit of all. We will
support you, but you must recognize that the decision to join the WTO can only
come from inside Russia.

A second goal of our partnership should be to meet threats to our security
together. The same advances that are bringing the world together are also making
tools of destruction deadlier, cheaper and more available, making us all more

vulnerable to terrorism, organized crime, and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In such a world we need to protect our security in cooperation, not competition, with others.

Since 1991, we have already cooperated to cut our nuclear arsenals by 40 percent, in removing nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and fighting illicit trafficking in deadly technology. Together, we extended the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, banned chemical weapons, agreed to end nuclear testing, urged India and Pakistan to back away from nuclear confrontation. Yesterday, President Putin and I announced two more important steps: Each of our countries will destroy 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, enough to build thousands of nuclear weapons. And we will establish a system to give each other early warning of missile tests and space launches, to avoid any miscalculation. I am proud of this record, and I hope you are, too.
We will continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals by negotiating a START III treaty, and to secure the weapons and materials that remain. But we have to be realistic. Despite our best efforts, the possibility exists that nuclear and other deadly weapons will fall into dangerous hands. The technology required to launch missiles capable of delivering them over long distances is still spreading. The question is not whether this threat is emerging. The question is how best to deal with it. It is my strong preference that any response strengthen strategic stability and the arms control regime. If we pursue that goal together, we will all be more secure.

As you well know, I will be deciding soon whether the United States should deploy a National Missile Defense system designed to protect the American people against this danger. I will consider many factors in making that decision -- the nature of the threat, the cost of meeting it, the effectiveness of our technology, and the impact it will have on our overall security, including our

relationship with
Russia and preserving the ABM Treaty. The system we are contemplating would not
undermine Russia's deterrent - and that is a question not only of our intent, but
also of its technical capabilities. All this reflects a basic truth: As we look
at the world today, the fundamental threat is not one we pose to each other, but
one we face in common.

There are many other security challenges I know you'll agree we face in common.
There is the danger of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis, which not only claim
millions of lives, but which ruin economies and threaten the survival of nations.
The world needs our leadership in this fight; it needs America and Russia to
make it a national priority. When President Putin and I go to the G-8 summit
this July, I hope we will all support a global strategy against infectious

disease.

The world also needs us to help meet the threat of environmental pollution, with
strong institutions at home and leadership abroad. Fortunately, we can do this
now without sacrificing economic growth, thanks to the incredible advances we
have seen in science and technology. In the Kyoto climate change treaty, we
joined to harness market forces to encourage these advances to fight global
warming. And today, on World Environment Day, and I am pleased that President
Putin and I have agreed to deepen our cooperation on climate change.

A third goal that demands our engagement is to build a world less divided along
ethnic, racial, and religious lines. It is ironic that despite all the advances
of modern civilization, we are all still grappling with our oldest division, our
vulnerability to hatred of those different from ourselves. Russia and America
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depends on ethnic and religious harmony. And history teaches us that

true and
lasting harmony cannot be maintained by force.

That is one reason I and so many of Russia's friends are dismayed by the war in
Chechnya.
I know that to many Russians, the conflict seems a necessary response to the
threat of terrorism. But a key to isolating and destroying the forces of terror
is to discriminate between terrorists and civilians; otherwise, we exacerbate the
problem we seek to solve. Is the problem in Chechnya any closer to solution --
now that cities have been destroyed and thousands of Russian citizens have been
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resistance? Is this the model for resolving ethnic tensions along Russia's vast
southern periphery? If it is, those tensions will grow. So I urge you, with
profound respect for the challenge you face, to seek a political solution to this
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A final goal, related to all the others, is to build here in Europe a community
that is democratic, at peace and without divisions, a community that encompasses
Russia and strengthens our ability to advance common interests. We have never
had that kind of Europe before. So building it will require changing some old
patterns of thinking.

There are still people who resist the idea that Russia is part of Europe, who
insist that Russia is fundamentally different from the nations that are building
a united Europe. Of course there are historical and cultural differences, and
it's a good thing -- for that is what makes our lives interesting. But are the
differences between, say, Russia and France any greater than those between Sweden
and Spain, or England and Greece, or for that matter, between America and Europe?
Of course not. Integration in Europe and across the Atlantic came about because

people who are different chose to come together. Estrangement between Russia and the west was also the product of our choices. But we have the power to choose a better future.

We can do it by integrating our economies, making common cause against common threats, by promoting ethnic and religious tolerance and human rights. We can do it by making sure that none of the institutions of European and transatlantic unity are closed to Russia. And if Russia chooses not to pursue full membership in these institutions, we must make sure their eastern borders become gateways for Russia, instead of barriers to travel, trade and security cooperation.

We should also work together to help others in Europe enjoy freedom from violence and fear. I am proud that we have together made the OSCE into an effective champion of human rights in Europe. I am proud we have together adapted the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to reduce conventional arms in Europe and eliminate the division of the continent into military blocks. I also believe it is a hopeful thing that despite our different outlook on the war in the former Yugoslavia, our armed forces have worked together to keep the peace.

We have disagreed about Kosovo. But now that the war is over, let me suggest something we should be able to agree on - that the people of Serbia deserve to live in a normal country, with the same freedoms the people of Russia and America enjoy. I would ask you to consider that the struggle in Belgrade now is not between Serbia and NATO; it is between the Serbian people and their leaders. The Serbian people are asking the world to back democracy. Our response doesn't have to be identical. But Russia and America should be on their side.

In the relationship we are building, should we not try to stand abroad for the

values each of us has been building at home? I believe we should. I also know
that kind of relationship won't be built overnight. Russia's history, like

America's, teaches us well that there are no shortcuts to great achievements.
But we have laid strong foundations.

It has helped a great deal that so many members of our Congress have visited you
here. I know a number of Duma committee chairmen visited our Congress last month
and that members of the Federation Council have been invited to come to
Washington. And the most important new Russian-American relationship is the
relationship among our people -- the student exchanges; the business partnerships; the collaboration among our universities, foundations, and
hospitals; the sister city links; the growing family ties. Many of the Russians
and Americans involved in these exchanges are very young. They have no adult
memories of the Cold War. They do not carry the burdens and baggage of the past,
only the normal, universal desire to build a good future with those who share
their hopes and dreams.

We, too, must have a sense of responsibility to the future. America and Russia
are not destined to be adversaries; we are not destined to be allies. For us
there is no fate waiting to be revealed, only a future waiting to be created, by
the actions we take and the choices we make every day.

I leave you today looking to the future with realistic hope that we will choose
wisely.
I believe we will continue to build a relationship of mutual respect and mutual
endeavor, always telling each other the truth as they see it, always striving to
find common ground, always remembering that the world we seek can come into being
only if Russia and America are on the same side of history. I'm confident we
will do this, not because I'm sure that everything always turns out well. I'm

confident because I know that partnership is the right course for both our
nations. Our people see it. I believe the governments they elect will always
see it. And our children will see the results - a world that is more prosperous,
free and at peace than ever before. Thank you.
1 A famous Leninist slogan, after the failure of revolutions in the rest of
Europe, was to "build socialism in one country" - a call for total self-reliance.

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Malinowski

President William Jefferson Clinton
Address at Russian State Duma
To Russian Parliamentarians
Moscow, Russia
June 5, 2000

I am honored to speak with you, the members of the State Duma and the Federation
Council. It is important to me to have this opportunity, because through you, I
can also speak to the citizens you represent, and because the prospects for
virtually every common initiative President Putin and I have discussed over the
past two days will depend on your counsel and consent.

I have made five trips to Russia in my years as President. I have worked with
President Yeltsin and now President Putin. I have met with the leadership of the
Duma.
I have spoken with Russia's religious leaders, with its media, with educators,
scientists and students, listening to their vision of the future and sharing my
own. I have been here at moments of extraordinary optimism about Russia's march

toward freedom and prosperity. I have been here at moments of concern that
Russia was somehow fated to fall backward.

I believed strongly when I first came here, and believe today, that Russia's
future is in Russia's hands. It is not predestined and cannot be determined by
others. I believed, and still believe, that yours is among the most important
journeys the world will witness in my lifetime.
The character of the 21st century for all people will be strongly influenced by
the success of Russia's people in building a modern, democratic nation that is
part of the life of the world. And so, the world has sought to support your
efforts, sharing with you a sense of pride when democracy has advanced, and a
sense of disappointment when opportunities were missed.

It is not for me to tell the Russian people what has happened in these last few
years. I know that your progress has come with unfulfilled expectations and
unexpected tragedies.

I know there have been moments, especially during the financial crisis of 1998,
when some wondered if the new Russia would end up as another grand social
experiment gone wrong.

But when we look at Russia today, Russia's friends do not see a country gone
wrong. We see an economy that is growing because it is producing goods and
services people want and need. We see a nation of enterprising citizens who are
beginning, despite all obstacles, to bring good jobs and a normal life to their
communities.

We see a society with 65,000 non-governmental organizations, like Eco-Juris,
which is helping citizens defend their rights in court, like Vozrozhdenie
[Vaz-razh-DYEN-yeh], which is aiding families with disabled children, like the
local chambers of commerce that have sprung up across Russia. We

see a country
full of people taking responsibility for their future, like the people of Gadzhiyevo [Gahd-zhee-YEH-voh] on the Arctic Circle who organized a referendum to
protect the environment of their town.

We see a country transforming its system of higher education to meet the demands
of the modern world, with institutions like the new Law Faculty at Novgorod
University and the New Economic School in Moscow. We see a country preserving
its magnificent literary heritage, as the Pushkin library is doing in its effort
to replenish the shelves of libraries across Russia. We see a country entering
the information age, with cutting edge software companies, with internet centers
at universities from Kazan [Kah-ZAHN] to Ufa [oo-FAH] to Yakutsk [Yah-KOOTSK],
with a whole generation of young people more connected to the world beyond their
borders than any past generation could ever have imagined.
We see Russian citizens with no illusions about the road ahead, yet voting in
extraordinary numbers against any return to the past. We see a Russia that has
just completed a democratic transfer of executive power for the first time in a
thousand years -- a triumph of institutions, of a constitution, of a people.

I would not presume to tell the people you represent how to weigh the gains of
freedom against the pain of economic hardship, corruption and crime. They do not
yet have the Russia they were promised in 1991.

But I believe they now have a realistic opportunity to build that kind of Russia
themselves, in far greater measure than a decade ago, because of the foundations
they have laid, the institutions they have built and the choices they have made.

The world faces a very different Russia today than it did in 1991. Like

all
countries, Russia also faces a very different world. Its defining feature is
globalization, the tearing down of boundaries between people, nations and
cultures, so that what happens anywhere has an impact everywhere. During the
1990s, the volume of international trade almost doubled.
Links among businesses, universities, advocacy groups, charities, and churches
have multiplied across physical space -- and cyberspace. In the developing
world, some of the poorest villages are beginning to be connected to the
information highway.

The Russian people did more than just about anyone else to make possible this new
world of globalization, by ending the divisions of the Cold War world. Now
Russia, America and all nations are subject to the new rules of the global
economy. One of those rules, to adapt a phrase from your history, is that it's
no longer possible to build prosperity in one country. 1
To prosper, our economies must be competitive in a global marketplace. And to
compete, the most important resource we all must develop is our people, giving
them the tools and freedom to reach their potential. That is the challenge we
have tried to meet in America in the last few years.

Indeed, the changes we have seen in the global economy pose hard questions both
our nations have to answer. A fundamental question is how do we define our
internal strength and vitality today, and what role should government play in
building it?

Some people believe that government is no longer relevant to people's lives in a
globalized, interconnected world. I don't believe that is true. But experience
has taught us all that government must be smaller, less bureaucratic, more
market-oriented; it should focus on empowering people by investing in education
and training rather than simply accruing power for itself. Above all, a

strong
state should use its strength to enforce the rule of law, to protect the powerless against the powerful, and to defend democratic freedoms, including
freedom of expression and religion and the press. That is true for any society
trying to succeed in the modern world.
For any society, the answer to law without order is not order without law.

Another fundamental question is how do countries define their strength in the
world today? Do they define it as the power to dominate neighbors, or the
confidence to be a good neighbor? Do they define what they are against simply in
terms of what others are for? Or do they join with others in common endeavors
that advance common interests? This Duma's ratification of START II and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty suggests you are answering these questions in a way
that will make for both a stronger Russia and a better world.
A related question, for both Russia and America, is how to define our relationship today? Clearly, Russia has passed through the phase when it
depended on outside aid to survive a hard transition. Today, what Russia needs
is outside investment. What America must ask is not so much what can we do for
Russia, but what can we do with Russia to advance common interests?

To build that kind of relationship, we Americans have to overcome the temptation
to think that we have all the answers -- that if only Russia would see things our
way, its troubles would go away.
Russia will not choose a course simply because others wish it; it will choose
what its interests clearly demand and its people democratically embrace.

I believe another problem is that many Russians still suspect America does not
wish them well. Thus they see our relationship in zero-sum terms, assuming that
every assertion of American power must diminish Russia, and every assertion of
Russian strength must threaten America. That isn't right, either.

America wants
a strong Russia.

We want to see a Russia strong enough to protect its territorial integrity while
respecting that of its neighbors, strong enough to meet threats to its security,
to help maintain strategic stability, and most important, to join with others for
common goals.

Certainly, our interests are not identical. But on many issues that matter to
our people, they do coincide. So we have an obligation, it seems to me, to
focus on the goals we can and should advance together in our mutual interest.
What can we do together in the years to come?

One goal should be to build a normal economic relationship based on trade and
investment between our countries and contact among our people. We've never had a
better opportunity.

This is the time, while Russia's economy is growing and oil prices are high, when
I hope Russia will create more diversified economy. The economies that will
power the 21st century will be built not just on resources from the soil, which
are limited, but the genius and initiative of individual citizens, which are
unlimited.

This is the time when I hope you will finish putting in place the institutions of
a modern economy, with laws that protect property, that ensure openness and
accountability, and that establish a rational, equitable tax code. Such an
economy would keep Russian capital in Russia and bring foreign capital to Russia.

This is the time to win the fight against crime and corruption, or investment
will move to safer shores. That is why I hope you will soon pass a strong law

against money laundering that meets international standards.

This is also the time I hope Russia will make an all out effort to take the steps needed to join the World Trade Organization. Membership in the WTO reinforce economic reform, give you better access to foreign markets and ensure your trading partners treat you fairly. Russia should not be the only major industrialized country standing outside the global trading system. You should be inside the system, with America and China and Brazil and Japan and the members of the European Union, helping to shape its rules for the benefit of all. We will support you, but you must recognize that the decision to join the WTO can only come from inside Russia.

A second goal of our partnership should be to meet threats to our security together. The same advances that are bringing the world together are also making tools of destruction deadlier, cheaper and more available, making us all more vulnerable to terrorism, organized crime, and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In such a world we need to protect our security in

cooperation, not competition, with others.

Since 1991, we have already cooperated to cut our nuclear arsenals by 40 percent, in removing nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and fighting illicit trafficking in deadly technology. Together, we extended the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, banned chemical weapons, agreed to end nuclear testing, urged India and Pakistan to back away from nuclear confrontation. Yesterday, President Putin and I announced two more important steps: Each of our countries will destroy 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, enough to build thousands of nuclear weapons. And we will establish a system to give each other early warning of missile tests and space launches, to avoid any miscalculation. I am proud of this record, and I hope you are, too.

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treaty, and to secure the weapons and materials that remain. But we have to be
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strengthen strategic stability and the arms control regime. If we pursue that
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a National Missile Defense system designed to protect the American people against
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of the threat, the cost of meeting it, the effectiveness of our technology, and
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All this reflects a basic truth: As we look at the world today, the fundamental
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There are many other security challenges I know you'll agree we face in common.
There is the danger of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis, which not only claim
millions of lives, but which ruin economies and threaten the survival of nations.
The world needs our leadership in this fight; it needs America and Russia to
make it a national priority. When President Putin and I go to the G-8 summit
this July, I hope we will all support a global strategy against infectious

disease.

The world also needs us to help meet the threat of environmental pollution, with strong institutions at home and leadership abroad. Fortunately, we can do this now without sacrificing economic growth, thanks to the incredible advances we have seen in science and technology. In the Kyoto climate change treaty, we joined to harness market forces to encourage these advances to fight global warming. And today, on World Environment Day, and I am pleased that President Putin and I have agreed to deepen our cooperation on climate change.

A third goal that demands our engagement is to build a world less divided along ethnic, racial, and religious lines. It is ironic that despite all the advances of modern civilization, we are all still grappling with our oldest division, our vulnerability to hatred of those different from ourselves. Russia and America ought to be concerned about this because the stability of both our societies depends on ethnic and religious harmony. And history teaches us that true and lasting harmony cannot be maintained by force.

That is one reason I and so many of Russia's friends are dismayed by the war in Chechnya.
I know that to many Russians, the conflict seems a necessary response to the threat of terrorism. But a key to isolating and destroying the forces of terror is to discriminate between terrorists and civilians; otherwise, we exacerbate the problem we seek to solve.
Is the problem in Chechnya any closer to solution -- now that cities have been destroyed and thousands of Russian citizens have been killed, increasing the bitterness civilians who had no sympathy for the armed resistance? Is this the model for resolving ethnic tensions along Russia's vast southern periphery? If it is, those tensions will grow. So I urge you, with profound respect for the

challenge you face, to seek a political solution to this conflict.
A final goal, related to all the others, is to build here in Europe a community
that is democratic, at peace and without divisions, a community that encompasses
Russia and strengthens our ability to advance common interests. We have never
had that kind of Europe before. So building it will require changing some old
patterns of thinking.

There are still people who resist the idea that Russia is part of Europe, who
insist that Russia is fundamentally different from the nations that are building
a united Europe. Of course there are historical and cultural differences, and
it's a good thing -- for that is what makes our lives interesting. But are the
differences between, say, Russia and France any greater than those between Sweden
and Spain, or England and Greece, or for that matter, between America and Europe?
Of course not. Integration in Europe and across the Atlantic came about because
people who are different chose to come together. Estrangement between Russia and
the west was also the product of our choices. But we have the power to choose a
better future.

We can do it by integrating our economies, making common cause against common
threats, by promoting ethnic and religious tolerance and human rights.

We can do it by making sure that none of the institutions of European and
transatlantic unity are closed to Russia. And if Russia chooses not to pursue
full membership in these institutions, we must make sure their eastern borders
become gateways for Russia, instead of barriers to travel, trade and security
cooperation.

We should also work together to help others in Europe enjoy freedom from violence
and fear. I am proud that we have together made the OSCE into an effective
champion of human rights in Europe.

I am proud we have together adapted the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to reduce conventional arms in Europe and eliminate the division of the continent into military blocks. I also believe it is a hopeful thing that despite our different outlook on the war in the former Yugoslavia, our armed forces have worked together to keep the peace.

We have disagreed about Kosovo. But now that the war is over, let me suggest something we should be able to agree on - that the people of Serbia deserve to live in a normal country, with the same freedoms the people of Russia and America enjoy.
I would ask you to consider that the struggle in Belgrade now is not between Serbia and NATO; it is between the Serbian people and their leaders. The Serbian people are asking the world to back democracy. Our response doesn't have to be identical. But Russia and America should be on their side.

In the relationship we are building, should we not try to stand abroad for the values each of us has been building at home? I believe we should. I also know that kind of relationship won't be built overnight. Russia's history, like America's, teaches us well that there are no shortcuts to great achievements.
But we have laid strong foundations.
It has helped a great deal that so many members of our Congress have visited you here. I know a number of Duma committee chairmen visited our Congress last month and that members of the Federation Council have been invited to come to Washington. And the most important new Russian-American relationship is the relationship among our people -- the student exchanges; the business partnerships; the collaboration among our universities, foundations, and hospitals; the sister city links; the growing family ties. Many of the Russians and Americans involved in these exchanges are very young. They have no adult

memories of the Cold War.
They do not carry the burdens and baggage of the past, only the normal, universal
desire to build a good future with those who share their hopes and dreams.

We, too, must have a sense of responsibility to the future. America and Russia
are not destined to be adversaries; we are not destined to be allies. For us
there is no fate waiting to be revealed, only a future waiting to be created, by
the actions we take and the choices we make every day.

I leave you today looking to the future with realistic hope that we will choose
wisely.
I believe we will continue to build a relationship of mutual respect and mutual
endeavor, always telling each other the truth as they see it, always striving to
find common ground, always remembering that the world we seek can come into being
only if Russia and America are on the same side of history. I'm confident we
will do this, not because I'm sure that everything always turns out well. I'm
confident because I know that partnership is the right course for both our
nations. Our people see it. I believe the governments they elect will always
see it. And our children will see the results - a world that is more prosperous,
free and at peace than ever before. Thank you.
1 A famous Leninist slogan, after the failure of revolutions in the rest of
Europe, was to "build socialism in one country" - a call for total self-reliance.

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SCENESETTER: THE STATE DUMA

The State Duma was created by the 1993 Russian constitution. It consists of 450
deputies, half of whom are elected directly from single-mandate districts, with
the other half receiving seats proportionate to their party's nationwide vote.
Each session of the Duma lasts four years. The Third Duma was elected in
November, 1999 and took office in January, 2000.

The State Duma building, a nine-story structure steps away from the Kremlin and
Red Square, was originally built in the 1930s to house the Sovnarkom (Council of
People's Commissars). It later became the home of the Soviet state planning
agency Gosplan. From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 1993, the
Ministry of Economics was located in the building. Following the violent October
1993 confrontation between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet (whose facilities were
turned over to the Russian Prime Minister and government apparatus), the State
Duma has used this site for its meeting rooms and office space. There has been
some speculation, fueled by Duma speaker Seleznev, that the Duma would move to
St. Petersburg. This has caused Moscow Mayor Luzhkov to actively search for
better quarters for the Duma.

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President William Jefferson Clinton
Address to Russian State Duma
June 5, 2000

I am profoundly honored to speak with you, the members of the State Duma and the
Federation Council. The wonderful thing about speaking with you is that through
you, I can also speak to the millions of citizens across this vast country whom
you represent. The essential thing about speaking with you is that the prospects
for virtually every common initiative President Putin and I have discussed will
depend on your wise counsel and consent. [The comforting thing about speaking to
any democratic parliament is that even if you disagree with one or two

of the
things I plan to say, some of you may disagree with each other even more!]

I have made five trips to Russia in my years as President. In these visits, of
course, I have worked with President Yeltsin and now President Putin; I have met
a number of times with the leadership of the Duma; I have spoken with Russia's
religious leaders, with representatives of its independent media, with its new
entrepreneurs and with university students, listening to their vision of the
future and sharing my own. I have been here at moments of extraordinary optimism
about Russia's progress toward freedom and prosperity. I have been here at
moments of great concern that Russia was somehow fated to falter or fall
backward.

I believed very strongly when I first came here, and I believe today, that
Russia's future is Russia's choice. It is not predestined and it cannot be

determined by others. I also believed then, and still believe now, that yours is
among the most important journeys the world will witness in my lifetime. The
character of the 21st century for my people and for all people will be strongly
influenced by the success of the Russian people in building a modern, democratic
nation that is part of the life of the world. And so, we have sought to support
your efforts, sharing your pride in the progress of democracy, accepting our
share of accountability for the missed opportunities along the way.
It is not for me to tell the Russian people what has happened in these last few
years. I know that your progress has come with unfulfilled expectations and
unexpected tragedies. I know there have been moments, especially during the
financial crisis of 1998, when some wondered if the reforms would end up as
another grand social experiment gone wrong.

But when we look at Russia today, Russia's friends do not see a

country gone
wrong. We see an economy that is growing because it is finally producing the
goods and services people need. We see a nation full of entrepreneurs who have
turned small loans into companies that are starting, despite of all obstacles, to
create good jobs and bring normal life back to countless communities. We see a
society with 65,000 non-governmental organizations, like Eco-Juris, which is
helping citizens defend their environmental rights in court, like Vozrozhdenie
[Vaz-razh-DYEN-yeh], which is aiding families with disabled children get the
services they need, like the local chambers of commerce that have sprung up
across Russia. We see a country full of people taking responsibility for their
future, like the people of Gadzhiyevo [Gahd-zhee-YEH-voh] on the Arctic Circle
who organized a referendum to stop the storage of radioactive waste in their
town.

We see a country transforming its system of higher education to meet the demands
of the modern world, with institutions like the new Law Faculty at Novgorod
University and the New Economic School in Moscow. We see a country preserving
its magnificent literary heritage, as the Pushkin library is doing in its effort
to replenish the shelves of libraries across Russia. And we see a country that
is entering the information age, with new internet centers at universities from
Kazan to Ufa to Yakutsk, and a whole generation of young people who are more
connected to the world beyond their borders than any past generation could ever
have imagined.

We also see Russian voters with no illusions about the road ahead, yet repeatedly
rejecting any return to the past. We see you, the members of this Federal
Assembly, confronting hard challenges, exercising leadership in reducing nuclear
arms and banning nuclear testing. We see a Russia that has just

completed a
democratic transfer of executive power for the first time in a thousand years --
a triumph not so much of an individual, but of institutions, of a constitution.

I would not presume to tell the people you represent how to weigh the gains of
freedom against the pain of economic hardship, corruption and crime. They do not
yet have the Russia they were promised in the heady days of 1991. But I believe
they now have a realistic opportunity to build that kind of Russia themselves, in
far greater measure than they had a decade ago, because of the foundations they
have laid and the institutions they have built and the choices they have made.

The world sees a very different Russia today than it did in 1991. Like all
countries, Russia also faces a very different world. Its defining feature is
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cultures, so that what happens anywhere has an impact everywhere. During the
1990s, the volume of international trade almost doubled. Links among

corporations, universities, advocacy groups, charities, and churches have grown
exponentially across physical space -- and cyberspace. All kinds of services,
from bookkeeping to computer programming, are being exchanged through the
Internet by people thousands of miles apart. When Americans call Microsoft today
for help with their computer software they're as likely to be connected to an
expert in India as they are to someone in the United States. In the developing
world, some of the poorest villages are beginning to be connected to the Internet
by enlightened local governments.

In nation after nation, these changes have created opportunities to skip a
generation of economic development. They also threaten to leave behind nations
that do not seize those opportunities.

Ironically, the Russian people did more than just about anyone else to usher in
this new world of globalization, by ending the divisions of the Cold War world.
Now Russia, America and all nations must play by its new rules. One of those
rules, to adapt a phrase from your history, is that it's no longer possible to
build capitalism in one country.1 To prosper, we must compete in a global
marketplace. And to compete, one resource we all must develop is our people,
giving them the tools and freedom to reach their potential. That is the challenge we have tried to meet in America in the last few years. And while we
have done well, we still have a long way to go.

The changes we have seen in the global economy pose hard questions both our
nations have to answer. A fundamental question is how do we define our internal
strength and vitality today, and what role should government play in building it?

Some people believe that government is no longer relevant to people's lives in a
globalized, interconnected world. I don't believe that is true. But experience
has taught us all that government must be smaller, less bureaucratic, more
market-oriented; it should focus on empowering people by investing in education
and training rather than simply accruing power for itself. Above all, a strong
state should use its strength to enforce the rule of law, to protect the powerless against the powerful, and to defend democratic freedoms, including
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. These are the very qualities any
society needs to succeed in the modern world. President Putin has said that is
the kind of state he wants to build in Russia. I hope he will succeed. For the
answer to law without order is not order without law.

Another fundamental question is how do we define our strength in the world today?
Do we define it simply as the power to block initiatives by other countries that

threaten our interests? Or as the power to join with others in initiatives that advance common interests? This Federal Assembly's ratification of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty suggests you are answering that question in a way that will make for both a stronger Russia and a better world.

A related question, for both Russia and America, is how do we define our relationship today?
Clearly, the terms of our relationship have changed since the beginning of the 1990's. Russia has passed through the phase when it understandably depended on outside aid to endure a hard transition. Today, what Russia needs most is investment. What America must ask is not so much what can we do for Russia, but what can we do with Russia to advance common interests?

To build that kind of relationship, one problem we Americans have to overcome is the tendency we sometimes have to think that we know all the answers -- that if only Russia would see things our way, it's troubles would go away. We need to understand that Russia will not choose a particular course simply because others wish it; it will choose what its interests clearly demand and its people democratically embrace.

I believe another problem is that many Russians still suspect America does not wish them well. Thus they see our relationship in zero-sum terms, assuming that every assertion of American power must diminish Russia, and every assertion of Russian strength must threaten America. That isn't right, either. It hurts us both, making it harder to join forces for common goals.

Of course, our interests are not identical. But on the issues that matter most to our people, there is no question that they largely coincide. So we have an obligation, it seems to me, to define our relationship in positive terms, to focus on the goals we can and should advance together in our mutual interest.

What can Russia and America do together in the years to come?

One common goal should be to build a normal economic relationship based on trade and investment between our countries and contact among our people. We've never had a better opportunity, now that Russia's economy is growing. That opportunity must be seized.

This is the time, while oil prices are high, when I hope Russia will create a diversified economy. The economies that will power the 21st century will be built not just on resources from the soil, which are limited, but the genius and initiative of individual citizens, which are unlimited.

This is the time when I hope you will finish putting in place the institutions of a modern economy, with laws that protect property, that ensure openness and accountability, and that establish a rational, equitable and progressive tax code. Such an economy would bring foreign capital to Russia and to keep Russian capital in Russia. President Putin has made clear he wants to improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment. I hope he will have your support.

This is the time to win the fight against crime and corruption, or investment will move to safer shores. Remember, in a global economy, investors choose their preferred destination, not the other way around. That is why I hope you will soon pass a strong law against money laundering.

This is also the time I hope Russia will make an all out push to join the World Trade Organization. Membership in the WTO will not only reinforce economic reform in Russia; it will give you better access to foreign markets and ensure your trading partners treat you fairly. Russia should not be the only major industrialized country standing outside the global trading system. You should be inside the system, with America and China and Brazil and India and

the members of
the European Union, helping to shape its rules for the benefit of all.

A second goal of our partnership should be to meet threats to our security
together. The advent of globalization and the revolution in technology have
fundamentally changed the nature of those threats. The same advances that are
bringing the world together are also making tools of destruction deadlier,
cheaper and more available, making us all more vulnerable to terrorism, organized
crime, and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In such a
world we need to protect our security in cooperation, not competition, with
others.
Consider what we've already done together to reduce the risks posed by weapons of
mass destruction. Since 1991, we've cut our nuclear arsenals by X percent,
removed nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and put in place
strong barriers against illicit trafficking. Together, we extended the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty, banned chemical weapons, agreed to end nuclear testing,
urged India and Pakistan to back away from nuclear confrontation. Yesterday,
President Putin and I announced two more giant steps: Each of our countries will
destroy 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, enough to build tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons. And we will establish a system to give each other early warning
of missile tests and space launches, to avoid any miscalculation. I am proud of
this record, and I hope you are, too.

We will continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals by negotiating a START III
treaty, and to secure the weapons and materials that remain. But we have to be
realistic. Despite our best efforts, the possibility that nuclear weapons will
fall into dangerous hands. The technology required to launch missiles capable of
delivering them over long distances is still spreading. And no nation is more

threatened than Russia, because of your proximity to areas of conflict.

As you well know, I will be deciding soon whether the United States should deploy a National Missile Defense system that would be designed to protect us against this threat, while preserving the ABM Treaty, which is important to us both. I will consider many factors in making that decision -- the nature of the threat, the cost of meeting it, the effectiveness of our technology, and the impact it will have on our overall national security, including our relationship with Russia.

Not long ago, a Russian defense official said that your nation would be able to overwhelm the missile defense system we are planning. He was right. And that is precisely our point. The system we are contemplating would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent, nor is it intended to. For America and Russia, the real threat is not one we pose to each another, but one we face in common. It is a threat we should focus on meeting together.
There are many other security challenges I know you'll agree we face in common.
There is the danger of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis, which not only claim millions of lives, but which ruin economies and threaten the very survival of nations and societies. We are working with Russian scientists, including scientists once engaged in biological weapons research, to find treatments and vaccines. We should do this for our own people. But the whole world also needs our leadership; it needs America and Russia to make this a national priority.
When President Putin and I go to the G-8 summit in Japan this July, I hope we and our fellow leaders will support a global strategy against infectious disease.

The world also needs us to help meet the threat of environmental pollution and climate change, with strong institutions at home and leadership abroad.

Fortunately, we no longer have to choose between protecting the environment and growing our economies. In a few years, we may have automobiles three or four times as efficient as those we drive today. Soon, scientists will almost certainly unlock the chemical block that will allow us to produce eight gallons of fuel from farm products for one gallon of gasoline. And in the Kyoto climate change treaty, we proposed to harness market forces to encourage these gains and allow countries like Russia to earn credits worth potentially billions of dollars as they fight global warming. [Yesterday, President Putin and I reached an agreement that Russia would dedicate a portion of the revenue from these credits to promote clean energy and reduce pollution. It will help us convince our partners in Europe and Asia to support this important initiative, and I thank him for it today.]

A third goal that demands our engagement is to build a world less divided along ethnic, racial, and religious lines. The great irony I've observed in looking at the world this last decade, from the Middle East to the Balkans to Africa, is that despite all the advances of modern civilization, we are all still vulnerable our oldest demon, our vulnerability to hatred of those different from ourselves. Russia and America ought to be especially concerned about this because we are both multiethnic nations. The stability of our societies depends on ethnic and religious harmony. And we've learned from history that true and lasting harmony cannot be maintained by force.

That is one reason I and so many of Russia's friends are dismayed by the war in Chechnya. I know that to many Russians, the conflict seems a necessary response to the threat of terrorism. I know I speak to you on behalf of a country that has many times used force to meet that threat. But the key to isolating and destroying the forces of terror is to

discriminate
between terrorists and civilians; otherwise, we only exacerbate the problem we
seek to solve.

Is the problem in Chechnya any closer to solution -- now that cities have been
destroyed, now that thousands of Russian citizens have been killed and more than
200,000 have fled, now that the sovereignty Russia is rightly defending is
increasingly being rejected by civilians who are caught between Russian forces
and the armed resistance? And is this the model for resolving ethnic tensions
along Russia's vast southern periphery? If so, those tensions will grow. So
will the danger of a wider conflict that can tear down the bridges we have all
been building to the Muslim world. So I urge you, with profound respect for the
difficulty of the challenge you face, to seek with the Chechens a political
solution to this conflict.

A final goal, related to all the others, is to build here in Europe a community
that is democratic, at peace and without divisions, a community that encompasses
Russia and strengthens our ability to advance common interests. We have never
had that kind of Europe before. So by definition, building it will require
changing some old patterns of thinking.

There are still people in the west, and I imagine a few people in your country,
who resist the idea that Russia is part of Europe, who insist that Russia is
culturally and historically different from the nations that are building a united
Europe. But are the differences between, say, Russia and France any greater than
those between Sweden and Spain, or England and Greece, or for that matter,
between America and Europe? Of course not. Integration in Europe and across the
Atlantic came about because people who are different chose to come together to
advance common ends. Estrangement between Russia and the west

has also been the
product of our choices. But we have the power to choose a better future.

We can do it by doing many of the things I have suggested today, by integrating
our economies, making common cause against common threats, by promoting ethnic
and religious tolerance and human rights. We can do it by making sure that none
of the institutions of European and transatlantic unity are closed to Russia.
And if Russia chooses not to pursue full membership in these institutions, we
must make sure their eastern borders become gateways to Russia, instead of
barriers to travel, trade and security cooperation.

We should also work together to help others in Europe enjoy freedom from violence
and fear. I am proud that we have together made the OSCE into an effective
champion of human rights in Europe. I am proud we have together adapted the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to reduce conventional arms in Europe and
eliminate the division of the continent into military blocks. I also believe it
is a good and hopeful thing that despite our different outlook on the war in the
former Yugoslavia, our armed forces have been able to work together to keep the
peace.

Last year, we disagreed about Kosovo. But now that the war is over, I would like
to suggest there is something we should be able to agree on - that the people of
Serbia deserve to live in a normal country, with the same rights and freedoms the
people of Russia and America enjoy. I would ask you to consider that the
struggle in Belgrade now is not between Serbia and NATO; it is between the
Serbian people and their leaders. The Serbian people are asking the world now to
back democracy. Our response to their call doesn't have to be identical. But
there should be no doubt that America and Russia are on their side.

In the relationship we are building, we must try to stand together abroad for the values we have been building at home. I believe we have gone some way down that hopeful road these last few years - perhaps not as far as the idealists hoped, but certainly better than the some of the realists thought possible. Of course, the test of our partnership will be the test of time. Russia's history teaches us there are no shortcuts to great achievements; American history teaches the same thing. But the foundations we have laid are strong.

It has helped a great deal that so many members of our Congress have visited you here. I know our Senate has invited members of the Federation Council to come to Washington; I hope you will do so soon. And the most important new Russian-American relationship is the relationship among our people -- the student exchanges; the business partnerships; the collaboration among our universities, foundations, and hospitals; the sister city links; the growing family ties. We should do everything in our power to encourage that part of our relationship to grow.

Above all, we must have a sense of responsibility to the future. America and Russia are not fated to be adversaries; we are not fated to be allies. For us there is no destiny waiting to be revealed, only a future waiting to be created, by the actions we take and the choices we make -- today.

I leave you today looking to the future with realistic hope that we will choose wisely. I believe we will continue to build a relationship of mutual respect and mutual endeavor, always telling each other the truth as they see it, always striving to find common ground, always remembering that the world we seek can come into being only if Russia and America are on the same side of history. I'm confident we will do this not because I'm sure that everything always turns out well. I'm confident because I know that partnership is the right course

for both
our nations. Our people see it. I believe the governments they elect will
always see it. And our children will see the results - a world that is more
prosperous, free and at peace than ever before. Thank you.
1 A famous Leninist slogan, after failure of communist revolutions outside
Russia, was to "build communism in one country." -- a call for total self-reliance.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT DUMA2.DOC
President William Jefferson Clinton
Address to Russian State Duma
June 5, 2000

I am honored to speak with you, the members of the State Duma and the Federation
Council. It is very important to me to have this opportunity, because through
you, I can also speak to the citizens you represent, and because the prospects
for virtually every common initiative President Putin and I have discussed over
the past two days will depend on your wise counsel and consent.

I have made five trips to Russia in my years as President. I have worked with
President Yeltsin and now President Putin; I have met with the leadership of the
Duma; I have spoken with Russia's religious leaders, with its independent media,
with new entrepreneurs and with university students, listening to their vision of
the future and sharing my own. I have been here at moments of extraordinary
optimism about Russia's march toward freedom and prosperity. I have been here at
moments of great concern that Russia was somehow fated to fall backward.

I believed strongly when I first came here, and I believe today, that Russia's
future is Russia's choice. It is not predestined and it cannot be determined by

others. I also believed, and still believe, that yours is among the most important journeys the world will witness in my lifetime. The character of the
21st century for all people will be strongly influenced by the success of the
Russian people in building a modern, democratic nation that is part of the life
of the world. And so, the whole world has sought to support your efforts,
sharing with you a sense of pride when democracy has advanced, and a sense of
responsibility when opportunities were missed.

It is not for me to tell the Russian people what has happened in these last few
years. I know that your progress has come with unfulfilled expectations and
unexpected tragedies. I know there have been moments, especially during the
financial crisis of 1998, when some wondered if the new Russia would end up as
another grand social experiment gone wrong.
But when we look at Russia today, Russia's friends do not see a country gone
wrong. We see an economy that is growing because it is producing goods and
services people need. We see a nation of entrepreneurs who are beginning,
despite all obstacles, to create good jobs and bring normal life to their communities. We see a society with 65,000 non-governmental organizations, like
Eco-Juris, which is helping citizens defend their rights in court, like Vozrozhdenie [Vaz-razh-DYEN-yeh], which is aiding families with disabled
children, like the local chambers of commerce that have sprung up across Russia.
We see a country full of people taking responsibility for their future, like the
people of Gadzhiyevo [Gahd-zhee-YEH-voh] on the Arctic Circle who organized a
referendum to protect the environment of their town.

We see a country transforming its system of higher education to meet the demands
of the modern world, with institutions like the new Law Faculty at Novgorod
University and the New Economic School in Moscow. We see a country preserving
its magnificent literary heritage, as the Pushkin library is doing in its effort

to replenish the shelves of libraries across Russia. We see a country entering
the information age, with cutting edge software companies, with internet centers
at universities from Kazan [Kah-ZAHN] to Ufa [oo-FAH] to Yakutsk [Yah-KOOTSK],
with a whole generation of young people who are more connected to the world
beyond their borders than any past generation could ever have imagined. We see
Russian voters with no illusions about the road ahead, yet rejecting any return
to the past. We see a Russia that has just completed a democratic transfer of
executive power for the first time in a thousand years -- a triumph of institutions, of a constitution, of a people.

I would not presume to tell the people you represent how to weigh the gains of
freedom against the pain of economic hardship, corruption and crime. They do not
yet have the Russia they were promised in 1991. But I believe they now have a
realistic opportunity to build that kind of Russia themselves, in far greater
measure than a decade ago, because of the foundations they have laid and the
institutions they have built and the choices they have made.

The world faces a very different Russia today than it did in 1991. Like all
countries, Russia also faces a very different world. Its defining feature is
globalization, the tearing down of boundaries between people, nations and
cultures, so that what happens anywhere has an impact everywhere. During the
1990s, the volume of international trade almost doubled. Links among

corporations, universities, advocacy groups, charities, and churches have grown
exponentially across physical space -- and cyberspace. All kinds of services,
from bookkeeping to computer programming, are being exchanged through the
Internet by people thousands of miles apart. In the developing world, some of
the poorest villages are beginning to be connected to the information highway.

The Russian people did more than just about anyone else to usher in this new world of globalization, by ending the divisions of the Cold War world. Now Russia, America and all nations are subject to the new rules of the global economy. One of those rules, to adapt a phrase from your history, is that it's no longer possible to build capitalism in one country.1 To prosper, our

economies must be competitive in a global marketplace. And to compete, the most important resource we all must develop is our people, giving them the tools and freedom to reach their potential. That is the challenge we have tried to meet in America in the last few years.

Indeed, the changes we have seen in the global economy pose hard questions both our nations have to answer. A fundamental question is how do we define our internal strength and vitality today, and what role should government play in building it?

Some people believe that government is no longer relevant to people's lives in a globalized, interconnected world. I don't believe that is true. But experience has taught us all that government must be smaller, less bureaucratic, more market-oriented; it should focus on empowering people by investing in education and training rather than simply accruing power for itself. Above all, a strong state should use its strength to enforce the rule of law, to protect the powerless against the powerful, and to defend democratic freedoms, including freedom of expression and religion and the press. President Putin has said that "Russia will have no future if it suppresses civic freedoms and the press." That is true for any society trying to succeed in the modern world. For any society, the answer to law without order is not order without law.

Another fundamental question is how do we define our strength in the world today? Do we define it as the power to dominate our neighbors, or the

confidence to be
a good neighbor? Do we define it simply as the power to block collective
international initiatives we are against, or as the confidence to join with
others in initiatives that advance common interests? This Duma's ratification
of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty suggests you are answering that
question in a way that will make for both a stronger Russia and a better world.

A related question, for both Russia and America, is how to define our relationship today?
Clearly, Russia has passed through the phase when it depended on outside aid to
survive a hard transition. Today, what Russia needs is outside investment. What
America must ask is not so much what can we do for Russia, but what can we do
with Russia to advance common interests?

To build that kind of relationship, we Americans have to overcome the tendency
sometimes to think that we have all the answers -- that if only Russia would see
things our way, its troubles would go away. Russia will not choose a particular
course simply because others wish it; it will choose what its interests clearly
demand and its people democratically embrace.

I believe another problem is that many Russians still suspect America does not
wish them well. Thus they see our relationship in zero-sum terms, assuming that
every assertion of American strength must diminish Russia, and every assertion of
Russian strength must threaten America. That isn't right, either. It hurts us
both, making it harder to join forces for common goals.
Certainly, our interests are not identical. But on many issues that matter to
our people, they do coincide. So we have an obligation, it seems to me, to
focus on the goals we can and should advance together in our mutual interest.
What can we do together in the years to come?

One goal should be to build a normal economic relationship based on

trade and
investment between our countries and contact among our people. We've never had a
better opportunity.

This is the time, while Russia's economy is growing and oil prices are high, when
I hope Russia will create more diversified economy. The economies that will
power the 21st century will be built not just on resources from the soil, which
are limited, but the genius and initiative of individual citizens, which are
unlimited.

This is the time when I hope you will finish putting in place the institutions of
a modern economy, with laws that protect property, that ensure openness and
accountability, and that establish a rational, equitable tax code. Such an
economy would keep Russian capital in Russia and bring foreign capital to Russia.

This is the time to win the fight against crime and corruption, or investment
will simply move to safer shores. That is why I hope you will soon pass a
strong law against money laundering that meets international standards.

This is also the time I hope Russia will make an all out effort to take the steps
needed to join the World Trade Organization. Membership in the WTO reinforce
economic reform, give you better access to foreign markets and ensure your
trading partners treat you fairly. Russia should not be the only major
industrialized country standing outside the global trading system. You should be
inside the system, with America and China and Brazil and Japan and the members of
the European Union, helping to shape its rules for the benefit of all. We will
support you, but you must recognize that the decision to join the WTO can only
come from inside Russia.

A second goal of our partnership should be to meet threats to our

security
together. The same advances that are bringing the world together are also making
tools of destruction deadlier, cheaper and more available, making us all more
vulnerable to terrorism, organized crime, and the spread of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons. In such a world we need to protect our security in

cooperation, not competition, with others.

Consider what we've already done together to reduce the risks posed by weapons of
mass destruction. Since 1991, we've cut our nuclear arsenals by X percent,
cooperated in removing nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and
fought illicit trafficking. Together, we extended the Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty, banned chemical weapons, agreed to end nuclear testing, urged India and
Pakistan to back away from nuclear confrontation. Yesterday, President Putin and
I announced two more giant steps: Each of our countries will destroy 34 tons of
weapons grade plutonium, enough to build tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.
And we will establish a system to give each other early warning of missile tests
and space launches, to avoid any miscalculation. I am proud of this record, and
I hope you are, too.

We will continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals by negotiating a START III
treaty, and to secure the weapons and materials that remain. But we have to be
realistic. Despite our best efforts, the possibility exists that nuclear and
other deadly weapons will fall into dangerous hands. The technology required to
launch missiles capable of delivering them over long distances is still
spreading. The question is not whether this threat is emerging. The question is
how best to deal with it. It is my strong preference that any response
strengthen strategic stability and the arms control regime. If we pursue that
goal together, we will all be more secure.
As you well know, I will be deciding soon whether the United States should deploy

a National Missile Defense system that would be designed to protect us against
this danger, while preserving the ABM Treaty, which is important to us both. I
will consider many factors in making that decision -- the nature of the threat,
the cost of meeting it, the effectiveness of our technology, and the impact it
will have on our overall national security, including our relationship with
Russia. The system we are contemplating would not permit us to undermine
Russia's deterrent, nor is it intended to. It simply reflects a basic truth:
For America and Russia, the real threat is not one we pose to each other, but one
we face in common.

There are many other security challenges I know you'll agree we face in common.
There is the danger of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis, which not only claim
millions of lives, but which ruin economies and threaten the survival of nations.
The world needs our leadership in this fight; it needs America and Russia to
make it a national priority. When President Putin and I go to the G-8 summit
this July, I hope we will all support a global strategy against infectious

disease.

The world also needs us to help meet the threat of environmental pollution and
climate change. Fortunately, we no longer have to choose between protecting the
environment and growing our economies. In a few years, we may have automobiles
four times as efficient as those we drive today. Soon, scientists will almost
certainly unlock the chemical block that will let us produce eight gallons of
fuel from farm products for one gallon of gasoline. In the Kyoto climate change
treaty, we proposed to harness market forces to encourage these gains and allow
countries like Russia to earn credits worth potentially billions of dollars as
they fight global warming. President Putin and I have reached an agreement that
Russia would dedicate a portion of the revenue from these credits to

promote
clean energy and cut pollution. It will help convince our partners in Europe and
Asia to support this important initiative, and I thank him for it.

A third goal that demands our engagement is to build a world less divided along
ethnic, racial, and religious lines. It is ironic that despite all the advances
of modern civilization, we are all still grappling with our oldest demon, our
vulnerability to hatred of those different from ourselves. Russia and America
ought to be concerned about this because the stability of both our societies
depends on ethnic and religious harmony. And history teaches us that true and
lasting harmony cannot be maintained by force.

That is one reason I and so many of Russia's friends are dismayed by the war in
Chechnya.
I know that to many Russians, the conflict seems a necessary response to the
threat of terrorism. But the key to isolating and destroying the forces of terror
is to discriminate between terrorists and civilians; otherwise, we only
exacerbate the problem we seek to solve.

Is the problem in Chechnya any closer to solution -- now that cities have been
destroyed, now that thousands of Russian citizens have been killed and more than
200,000 have fled, increasing the bitterness and anger even of those civilians
who had no sympathy for the armed resistance? And is this the model for
resolving ethnic tensions along Russia's vast southern periphery? If so, those
tensions will grow. So I urge you, with profound respect for the difficulty of
the challenge you face, to seek with responsible Chechens a political solution
to this conflict.

A final goal, related to all the others, is to build here in Europe a community
that is democratic, at peace and without divisions, a community that encompasses
Russia and strengthens our ability to advance common interests. We

have never
had that kind of Europe before. So building it will require changing some old
patterns of thinking.

There are still people who resist the idea that Russia is part of Europe, who
insist that Russia is fundamentally different from the nations that are building
a united Europe. Of course there are historical and cultural differences, and
it's a good thing -- for that is what makes our lives interesting. But are the
differences between, say, Russia and France any greater than those between Sweden
and Spain, or England and Greece, or for that matter, between America and Europe?
Of course not. Integration in Europe and across the Atlantic came about because
people who are different chose to come together. Estrangement between Russia and
the west has also been the product of our choices. But we have the power to
choose a better future.

We can do it by integrating our economies, making common cause against common
threats, by promoting ethnic and religious tolerance and human rights. We can do
it by making sure that none of the institutions of European and transatlantic
unity are closed to Russia. And if Russia chooses not to pursue full membership
in these institutions, we must make sure their eastern borders become gateways
for Russia, instead of barriers to travel, trade and security cooperation.

We should also work together to help others in Europe enjoy freedom from violence
and fear. I am proud that we have together made the OSCE into an effective
champion of human rights in Europe. I am proud we have together adapted the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to reduce conventional arms in Europe and
eliminate the division of the continent into military blocks. I also believe it
is a good and hopeful thing that despite our different outlook on the war in the

former Yugoslavia, our armed forces have been able to work together to keep the
peace.

We have disagreed about Kosovo. But now that the war is over, let me suggest
something we should be able to agree on - that the people of Serbia deserve to
live in a normal country, with the same freedoms the people of Russia and America
enjoy. I would ask you to consider that the struggle in Belgrade now is not
between Serbia and NATO; it is between the Serbian people and their leaders. The
Serbian people are asking the world to back democracy. Our response doesn't have
to be identical. But Russia and America should be on their side.

In the relationship we are building, should we not try to stand abroad for the
values we have been building at home? I believe we should. I also know that
kind of relationship won't be built overnight. Russia's history, like America's,
teaches us well that there are no shortcuts to great achievements. But we are
laying the foundations.

It has helped a great deal that so many members of our Congress have visited you
here. I know our Senate has invited members of the Federation Council to come to
Washington; I hope you will do so soon. And the most important new
Russian-American relationship is the relationship among our people -- the student
exchanges; the business partnerships; the collaboration among our universities,
foundations, and hospitals; the sister city links; the growing family ties. Many
of the Russians and Americans involved in these exchanges are very young. They
have no adult memories of the Cold War. They do not carry the burdens and
baggage of the past, only the normal, universal desire to build a better future
with those who share their hopes and dreams.

We, too, must have a sense of responsibility to the future. America and Russia
are not fated to be adversaries; we are not fated to be allies; we are not

fated
to be anything. For us there is no destiny waiting to be revealed, only a future
waiting to be created, by the actions we take and the choices we make -- today
and every day.

I leave you today looking to the future with realistic hope that we will choose
wisely. I believe we will continue to build a relationship of mutual respect and
mutual endeavor, always telling each other the truth as they see it, always
striving to find common ground, always remembering that the world we seek can
come into being only if Russia and America are on the same side of history. I'm
confident we will do this, not because I'm sure that everything always turns out
well. I'm confident because I know that partnership is the right course for both
our nations. Our people see it. I believe the governments they elect will
always see it. And our children will see the results - a world that is more
prosperous, free and at peace than ever before. Thank you.
1 A famous Leninist slogan, after the failure of revolutions outside Russia, was
to "build socialism in one country." -- a call for total self-reliance.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT DUMA3.DOC
President William Jefferson Clinton
Address to Russian State Duma
June 5, 2000

I am honored to speak with you, the members of the State Duma and the Federation
Council. It is very important to me to have this opportunity, because through
you, I can also speak to the citizens you represent, and because the prospects
for virtually every common initiative President Putin and I have discussed over
the past two days will depend on your counsel and consent.

I have made five trips to Russia in my years as President. I have worked with President Yeltsin and now President Putin; I have met with the leadership of the Duma; I have spoken with Russia's religious leaders, with its media, with educators, scientists and university students, listening to their vision of the future and sharing my own. I have been here at moments of extraordinary optimism about Russia's march toward freedom and prosperity. I have been here at moments of great concern that Russia was somehow fated to fall backward.

I believed strongly when I first came here, and I believe today, that Russia's future is in Russia's hands. It is not predestined and it cannot be determined by others. I also believed, and still believe, that yours is among the most important journeys the world will witness in my lifetime. The character of the 21st century for all people will be strongly influenced by the success of the Russian people in building a modern, democratic nation that is part of the life of the world. And so, the whole world has sought to support your efforts, sharing with you a sense of pride when democracy has advanced, and a sense of disappointment when opportunities were missed.

It is not for me to tell the Russian people what has happened in these last few years. I know that your progress has come with unfulfilled expectations and unexpected tragedies. I know there have been moments, especially during the financial crisis of 1998, when some wondered if the new Russia would end up as another grand social experiment gone wrong.
But when we look at Russia today, Russia's friends do not see a country gone wrong. We see an economy that is growing because it is producing goods and services people want and need. We see a nation of enterprising citizens who are beginning, despite all obstacles, to create good jobs and bring normal life to their communities. We see a society with 65,000 non-governmental

organizations,
like Eco-Juris, which is helping citizens defend their rights in court, like
Vozrozhdenie [Vaz-razh-DYEN-yeh], which is aiding families with disabled
children, like the local chambers of commerce that have sprung up across Russia.
We see a country full of people taking responsibility for their future, like the
people of Gadzhiyevo [Gahd-zhee-YEH-voh] on the Arctic Circle who organized a
referendum to protect the environment of their town.

We see a country transforming its system of higher education to meet the demands
of the modern world, with institutions like the new Law Faculty at Novgorod
University and the New Economic School in Moscow. We see a country preserving
its magnificent literary heritage, as the Pushkin library is doing in its effort
to replenish the shelves of libraries across Russia. We see a country entering
the information age, with cutting edge software companies, with internet centers
at universities from Kazan [Kah-ZAHN] to Ufa [oo-FAH] to Yakutsk [Yah-KOOTSK],
with a whole generation of young people more connected to the world beyond their
borders than any past generation could ever have imagined. We see Russian
citizens with no illusions about the road ahead, yet voting in extraordinary
numbers against any return to the past. We see a Russia that has just completed
a democratic transfer of executive power for the first time in a thousand years
-- a triumph of institutions, of a constitution, of a people.

I would not presume to tell the people you represent how to weigh the gains of
freedom against the pain of economic hardship, corruption and crime. They do not
yet have the Russia they were promised in 1991. But I believe they now have a
realistic opportunity to build that kind of Russia themselves, in far greater
measure than a decade ago, because of the foundations they have laid, the
institutions they have built and the choices they have made.

The world faces a very different Russia today than it did in 1991. Like all countries, Russia also faces a very different world. Its defining feature is globalization, the tearing down of boundaries between people, nations and cultures, so that what happens anywhere has an impact everywhere. During the 1990s, the volume of international trade almost doubled. Links among businesses, universities, advocacy groups, charities, and churches have grown exponentially across physical space -- and cyberspace. In the developing world, some of the poorest villages are beginning to be connected to the information highway.

The Russian people did more than just about anyone else to make possible this new world of globalization, by ending the divisions of the Cold War world. Now Russia, America and all nations are subject to the new rules of the global economy. One of those rules, to adapt a phrase from your history, is that it's no longer possible to build prosperity in one country.1 To prosper, our economies must be competitive in a global marketplace. And to compete, the most important resource we all must develop is our people, giving them the tools and freedom to reach their potential. That is the challenge we have tried to meet in America in the last few years.

Indeed, the changes we have seen in the global economy pose hard questions both our nations have to answer. A fundamental question is how do we define our internal strength and vitality today, and what role should government play in building it?

Some people believe that government is no longer relevant to people's lives in a globalized, interconnected world. I don't believe that is true. But experience has taught us all that government must be smaller, less bureaucratic,

more
market-oriented; it should focus on empowering people by investing in education
and training rather than simply accruing power for itself. Above all, a strong
state should use its strength to enforce the rule of law, to protect the powerless against the powerful, and to defend democratic freedoms, including
freedom of expression and religion and the press. That is true for any society
trying to succeed in the modern world. For any society, the answer to law
without order is not order without law.

Another fundamental question is how do countries define their strength in the
world today? Do they define it as the power to dominate neighbors, or the
confidence to be a good neighbor? Do they define what they are against simply in
terms of what others are for? Or do they join with others in common endeavors
that advance common interests? This Duma's ratification of START II and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty suggests you are answering these questions in a way
that will make for both a stronger Russia and a better world.

A related question, for both Russia and America, is how to define our relationship today?
Clearly, Russia has passed through the phase when it depended on outside aid to
survive a hard transition. Today, what Russia needs is outside investment. What
America must ask is not so much what can we do for Russia, but what can we do
with Russia to advance common interests?

To build that kind of relationship, we Americans have to overcome the temptation
to think that we have all the answers -- that if only Russia would see things our
way, its troubles would go away. Russia will not choose a particular course
simply because others wish it; it will choose what its interests clearly demand
and its people democratically embrace.

I believe another problem is that many Russians still suspect America does not

wish them well. Thus they see our relationship in zero-sum terms, assuming that
every assertion of American power must diminish Russia, and every assertion of
Russian strength must threaten America. That isn't right, either. America wants
a strong Russia - a Russia strong enough to protect its territorial integrity
while respecting that of its neighbors, to meet threats to its security, to help
maintain strategic stability, and most important, to join with others to meet
common goals.

Certainly, our interests are not identical. But on many issues that matter to
our people, they do coincide. So we have an obligation, it seems to me, to
focus on the goals we can and should advance together in our mutual interest.
What can we do together in the years to come?

One goal should be to build a normal economic relationship based on trade and
investment between our countries and contact among our people. We've never had a
better opportunity.

This is the time, while Russia's economy is growing and oil prices are high, when
I hope Russia will create more diversified economy. The economies that will
power the 21st century will be built not just on resources from the soil, which
are limited, but the genius and initiative of individual citizens, which are
unlimited.

This is the time when I hope you will finish putting in place the institutions of
a modern economy, with laws that protect property, that ensure openness and
accountability, and that establish a rational, equitable tax code. Such an
economy would keep Russian capital in Russia and bring foreign capital to Russia.

This is the time to win the fight against crime and corruption, or investment

will move to safer shores. That is why I hope you will soon pass a strong law against money laundering that meets international standards.

This is also the time I hope Russia will make an all out effort to take the steps needed to join the World Trade Organization. Membership in the WTO reinforce economic reform, give you better access to foreign markets and ensure your trading partners treat you fairly. Russia should not be the only major industrialized country standing outside the global trading system. You should be inside the system, with America and China and Brazil and Japan and the members of the European Union, helping to shape its rules for the benefit of all. We will support you, but you must recognize that the decision to join the WTO can only come from inside Russia.

A second goal of our partnership should be to meet threats to our security together. The same advances that are bringing the world together are also making tools of destruction deadlier, cheaper and more available, making us all more vulnerable to terrorism, organized crime, and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In such a world we need to protect our security in

cooperation, not competition, with others.

Consider what we've already done together to reduce the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction. Since 1991, we've cut our nuclear arsenals by 40 percent, cooperated in removing nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and fought illicit trafficking in deadly technology. Together, we extended the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, banned chemical weapons, agreed to end nuclear testing, urged India and Pakistan to back away from nuclear confrontation. Yesterday, President Putin and I announced two more giant steps: Each of our countries will destroy 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium, enough to build thousands of nuclear weapons. And we will establish a system to give

each other
early warning of missile tests and space launches, to avoid any miscalculation.
I am proud of this record, and I hope you are, too.

We will continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals by negotiating a START III
treaty, and to secure the weapons and materials that remain. But we have to be
realistic. Despite our best efforts, the possibility exists that nuclear and
other deadly weapons will fall into dangerous hands. The technology required to
launch missiles capable of delivering them over long distances is still spreading. The question is not whether this threat is emerging. The question is
how best to deal with it. It is my strong preference that any response strengthen strategic stability and the arms control regime. If we pursue that
goal together, we will all be more secure.

As you well know, I will be deciding soon whether the United States should deploy
a National Missile Defense system designed to protect the American people against
this danger. I will consider many factors in making that decision -- the nature
of the threat, the cost of meeting it, the effectiveness of our technology, and
the impact it will have on our overall security, including our relationship with
Russia and preserving the ABM Treaty. The system we are contemplating would not
undermine Russia's deterrent - and that is a question not only of our intent, but
also of its technical capabilities. All this reflects a basic truth: As we look
at the world today, the fundamental threat is not one we pose to each other, but
one we face in common.

There are many other security challenges I know you'll agree we face in common.
There is the danger of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis, which not only claim
millions of lives, but which ruin economies and threaten the survival of nations.
The world needs our leadership in this fight; it needs America and Russia to
make it a national priority. When President Putin and I go to the G-8

summit
this July, I hope we will all support a global strategy against infectious

disease.

The world also needs us to help meet the threat of environmental pollution, with
strong institutions at home and leadership abroad. Fortunately, we can do this
now without sacrificing economic growth, thanks to the incredible advances we
have seen in science and technology. In the Kyoto climate change treaty, we
joined to harness market forces to encourage these advances to fight global
warming. And today, on World Environment Day, and I am pleased that President
Putin and I have agreed to deepen our cooperation on climate change.

A third goal that demands our engagement is to build a world less divided along
ethnic, racial, and religious lines. It is ironic that despite all the advances
of modern civilization, we are all still grappling with our oldest division, our
vulnerability to hatred of those different from ourselves. Russia and America
ought to be concerned about this because the stability of both our societies
depends on ethnic and religious harmony. And history teaches us that true and
lasting harmony cannot be maintained by force.

That is one reason I and so many of Russia's friends are dismayed by the war in
Chechnya.
I know that to many Russians, the conflict seems a necessary response to the
threat of terrorism. But a key to isolating and destroying the forces of terror
is to discriminate between terrorists and civilians; otherwise, we only
exacerbate the problem we seek to solve.

Is the problem in Chechnya any closer to solution -- now that cities have been
destroyed and thousands of Russian citizens have been killed, increasing the
bitterness civilians who had no sympathy for the armed resistance? Is this the
model for resolving ethnic tensions along Russia's vast southern

periphery? If
it is, those tensions will grow. So I urge you, with profound respect for the
difficulty of the challenge you face, to seek a political solution to this conflict.

A final goal, related to all the others, is to build here in Europe a community
that is democratic, at peace and without divisions, a community that encompasses
Russia and strengthens our ability to advance common interests. We have never
had that kind of Europe before. So building it will require changing some old
patterns of thinking.

There are still people who resist the idea that Russia is part of Europe, who
insist that Russia is fundamentally different from the nations that are building
a united Europe. Of course there are historical and cultural differences, and
it's a good thing -- for that is what makes our lives interesting. But are the
differences between, say, Russia and France any greater than those between Sweden
and Spain, or England and Greece, or for that matter, between America and Europe?
Of course not. Integration in Europe and across the Atlantic came about because
people who are different chose to come together. Estrangement between Russia and
the west was also the product of our choices. But we have the power to choose a
better future.

We can do it by integrating our economies, making common cause against common
threats, by promoting ethnic and religious tolerance and human rights. We can do
it by making sure that none of the institutions of European and transatlantic
unity are closed to Russia. And if Russia chooses not to pursue full membership
in these institutions, we must make sure their eastern borders become gateways
for Russia, instead of barriers to travel, trade and security cooperation.

We should also work together to help others in Europe enjoy freedom

from violence
and fear. I am proud that we have together made the OSCE into an effective
champion of human rights in Europe. I am proud we have together adapted the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to reduce conventional arms in Europe and
eliminate the division of the continent into military blocks. I also believe it
is a good and hopeful thing that despite our different outlook on the war in the
former Yugoslavia, our armed forces have been able to work together to keep the
peace.

We have disagreed about Kosovo. But now that the war is over, let me suggest
something we should be able to agree on - that the people of Serbia deserve to
live in a normal country, with the same freedoms the people of Russia and America
enjoy. I would ask you to consider that the struggle in Belgrade now is not
between Serbia and NATO; it is between the Serbian people and their leaders. The
Serbian people are asking the world to back democracy. Our response doesn't have
to be identical. But Russia and America should be on their side.

In the relationship we are building, should we not try to stand abroad for the
values each of us has been building at home? I believe we should. I also know
that kind of relationship won't be built overnight. Russia's history, like

America's, teaches us well that there are no shortcuts to great achievements.
But we have laid strong foundations.
It has helped a great deal that so many members of our Congress have visited you
here. I know a number of Duma committee chairmen visited our Congress last month
and that members of the Federation Council have been invited to come to
Washington. And the most important new Russian-American relationship is the
relationship among our people -- the student exchanges; the business
partnerships; the collaboration among our universities, foundations, and
hospitals; the sister city links; the growing family ties. Many of the

Russians
and Americans involved in these exchanges are very young. They have no adult
memories of the Cold War. They do not carry the burdens and baggage of the past,
only the normal, universal desire to build a better future with those who share
their hopes and dreams.

We, too, must have a sense of responsibility to the future. America and Russia
are not destined to be adversaries; we are not destined to be allies. For us
there is no fate waiting to be revealed, only a future waiting to be created, by
the actions we take and the choices we make every day.

I leave you today looking to the future with realistic hope that we will choose
wisely. I believe we will continue to build a relationship of mutual respect and
mutual endeavor, always telling each other the truth as they see it, always
striving to find common ground, always remembering that the world we seek can
come into being only if Russia and America are on the same side of history. I'm
confident we will do this, not because I'm sure that everything always turns out
well. I'm confident because I know that partnership is the right course for both
our nations. Our people see it. I believe the governments they elect will
always see it. And our children will see the results - a world that is more
prosperous, free and at peace than ever before. Thank you.
1 A famous Leninist slogan, after the failure of revolutions outside Russia, was
to "build socialism in one country." -- a call for total self-reliance.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Ekho Moskvy Q & A.doc
Ekho Moskvy Curve Balls

U.S. DOMINANCE/ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA

Why does U.S. want to keep Russia down and turn it into a supplier of raw
material for the West? Why is U.S. investment in Russia so low?

* We have a huge stake in what is going on in your country. In our own interest
that Russia succeeds. We see Russia as a great nation and an emerging market
with enormous potential.

* Energy sector obviously important, but goal should be to diversify Russia's
economy and integrate with global economy.

* U.S. is largest source of foreign investment in Russia since 1992. Would like
to see our level of trade and investment grow. Opportunities will be created by
improved investment climate through reforms, passing Bilateral Investment Treaty,
Russia's accession to WTO.

U.S. behaves like arrogant hyperpower, hegemon. How would you like it if
Russians were more active in your backyard?

* Know that U.S. often comes across as dominant because of its economic
prosperity and global interconnectedness.

* Core U.S. interest is to promote democracy, peace and prosperity around the
world. We are not shy about that, but it's not a threat to anybody but enemies
of peace and freedom.

* We welcome a world that's increasingly interconnected and interdependent. See
many centers of gravity, politically, economically, culturally: European Union,
China, Japan, Latin America, Russia, emerging markets.

* See many opportunities to cooperate with Russia on important global and
regional issues.

When you took office, you promised to help bring democracy and prosperity to

Russia. Russia today is a basket-case. How do you answer the Russian people?

* Fact is, Russians are freer today and more democratic than at any time in
history.

* If we've learned anything over the past 10 years, it is that transitions hurt
most when reforms come only slowly. It has been the lack of reforms that has
hurt Russia.

* I'm glad President Putin wants to accelerate reforms and Russia's integration
into the global economy, and I hope success comes as quickly as possible.

* We all know that progress will be uneven, but America will not turn its back on
Russia or throw up our hands.

Almost exactly a year ago, after Pristina, U.S.-Russian relations were in crisis.
Any improvement since then?

* I think Boris Yeltsin was right on target when he told me at the Cologne G-8
summit last year that Kosovo was the toughest test our relationship ever faced --
and that we passed it.

* I am very glad that the situation has changed quite a bit since then. Our
relationship is a lot better, our troops are working well together to bring peace
to that very difficult place, and Russia and NATO are re-engaging.

* It's not realistic to think that the U.S. and Russia will agree on everything,
but I think it's important to keep talking and to try to bridge differences
wherever possible.

CHECHNYA

Everyone knows Georgia is serving as a base for Chechen rebels attacking Russian

forces. What are you doing about it?

* The international community is actively involved in this issue through an OSCE
border monitoring mission aimed at ensuring there are no flows across the border.

* Georgia's independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty are very
important to the U.S., security of entire Caucasus region. Have long expressed
our concern about danger of spillover of conflict in neighboring Chechnya.

* Have been encouraged by President Putin's statements about respect for
Georgia's territorial integrity. Important that Russia and Georgia continue to
work together to ensure border is secure.

Why is it that you complain about abuses in Chechnya when the U.S. and NATO did
the same thing in Kosovo?

* Intervention in Kosovo was to stop a deliberate genocidal campaign of the
Milosevic regime that threatened the security of region and our NATO allies.

* Don't question Russia's right to protect territorial integrity, combat terrorism. But must also respect rule of law, human rights. Indiscriminate
attacks on civilians unacceptable.

* Deplore human rights abuses wherever they occur. Insist on discrimination
between combatants and innocent civilians. Call for full, transparent investigation of reported abuses, violations of international norms.

PRESS FREEDOMS/DEMOCRACY

Did you press Putin about the continued crackdown on the media? Doesn't raid on
Media MOST make clear that freedom of press is in jeopardy? Is that why you're
appearing on a Gusinskiy-owned station?

* Am very concerned about the need to protect free and independent media in

Russia. Key issue for Russian democracy. Talked to President Putin about issue
at length.

* I think it's important that President Putin has said "Russia will have no
future if we suppress civic freedoms and the press."

* In any free society, we can't expect to like or enjoy everything the press says
or does. But the development of independent media in Russia is a singular
achievement, it's something that never existed here before. It's a source of
strength and vitality, must be cherished - and protected.

Haven't efforts at reform just resulted in the control of Russia's economy by
corrupt officials and oligarchs?

* I talked about this issue with Putin. Corruption is a real threat to Russia's
stability, democratization and prospects for a broadly shared rise in living
standards.

* Market reform and rule of law must be at heart of fight against corruption.
Need competition, transparency and enforceable legal rights.

* Corruption stems from too little reform, not too much.

* Legal reform and the battle against corruption are a central focus for US
policy and our work with Russia both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Putin is threatening democracy by strengthening central authority at the expense
of Russia's governors. What is your reaction?

* It's responsibility of Russian people and their leaders to decide how to
structure government. Know that Russian parliament is examining these proposed
laws now. That's right way to handle such things.

* Believe that regional autonomy and development of strong, stable relations

between central government and Russia's regions are among most important aspects
of Russia's post-Communist transformation.

Any reaction to reports that the Kremlin is pressuring Russia's chief rabbi to
resign? Did you discuss this with Putin?

* I believe freedom of religion is a fundamental human right and a key aspect of
Russia's transformation. The flowering of religious life, especially the rebirth
of Jewish life and culture, in post-Communist Russia is nothing short of
remarkable.

* I've seen the reports about Rabbi Shayevich's (shah-YAY-vich's) situation, and
I'm concerned. We're trying to gather the facts on the situation. Obviously, do
not believe that the state should interfere in religious affairs.
Aren't you concerned about the stalemate over the Russian Orthodox monastery in
Jericho?

* We believe that this situation should be resolved in an orderly manner through
a legal process that allows both sides an opportunity to be heard, not by force
or decree.

IMF/WORLD BANK SUPPORT, DEBT RELIEF

Will you support IMF and World Bank loans for Russia?

* We support Russia's reengagement with the IMF and hope a strong, new program
can be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

* Believe World Bank can play a crucial role supporting key structural reforms on
Russia's agenda, including in banking, social sector and pension reform.

If you really wanted to help us, why don't you write off our Soviet-era debt?
* Russia's financial situation is as strong now as at anytime since 1992, and it

looks to be getting stronger.
* Most of that debt isn't ours-it belongs to the Europeans, and we can't dictate
to them.
* What will really help Russia is deeper, faster reforms. Think it is most
important that Russia focus on consolidating its economic recovery.
* Want to do everything we can to encourage Russia on its path to recovery,
growth.

CORRUPTION

Do you have any concrete evidence of high-level Russian corruption?

* Have uncovered no evidence of systemic diversions of U.S. bilateral assistance.

* Follow these allegations closely, but do not comment on intelligence or
sensitive law enforcement issues.

* Urge Russians to get tough on corruption and to cooperate, in full, with
investigations, no matter where evidence leads.

G-7 vs. G-8

Will the U.S. support abolishing the G-7 and making Russia a full member of the
G-8?

* The G-8 is a premier global political body precisely because Russia is part of
it. The G-8 addresses a range of important issues facing the international
community (e.g., crossborder financial crime, infectious disease, terrorism).

* The G-7 as a grouping of the largest economies and financial actors has been a
key instrument in coping with global financial crises. Still serves a useful
purpose.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Ekho Moskvy.doc
SCENESETTER: EKHO MOSKVY RADIO STATION

Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow) is by far the most serious and most popular of Moscow-based radio stations. Ekho Moskvy was registered in August 1990 as the first non-governmental radio station in Russia. The total audience of Ekho Moskvy is over 50 million people, and the station reaches 85 major Russian cities. The station's broadcasts can be picked up in Seattle and Chicago by satellite, and on its own Internet website.

Discussions on the station frequently set the tone for the wider public debate on political and social issues. The station's talk shows frequently feature prominent Russian politicians and high-level officials from the United States and other countries. Interviews are often broadcast over NTV, Russia's leading private television network, which, like Ekho Moskvy, is part of the Media-MOST media holding company, owned by Vladimir Gusinskiy. Media-MOST was the subject of a heavy handed raid last month by masked agents of the government. Putin claims they were investigating corporate wrongdoing but some outside the government believe that the effect on the independent media has been unnerving.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT
Exchanges and People to People Programs.doc
EXCHANGES AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PROGRAMS

Over the last seven years, USG-supported exchange programs have grown dramatically--from less than 100 Russian participants per year under the old Soviet agreement on educational and cultural exchanges to nearly 40,000. People to people initiatives expose Russians to new ideas, forge lasting linkages

between Russians and Americans, and prepare the next generation of leaders.
Exchanges establish contacts between Americans and Russians who speak the same
language - entrepreneur to entrepreneur, legislator to legislator, student to
student - and lead them to discover new ways to approach our shared concerns.
Returned exchangees find support among a growing network of alumni who are
contributing to Russia's future.

USG-sponsored exchanges range from year-long programs in U.S. high schools for
Russian students, to graduate degree programs for promising young professionals,
to internships for entrepreneurs to professional exchanges for legislators.
Exchangees have been hosted by American families, communities and businesses in
all 50 states. They are selected for their leadership potential and typically
share what they have learned with their families, colleagues, communities and
regions. The USG will spend nearly $50 million this year to support exchanges
with Russia.

Substantive, mutually-beneficial partnerships between American and Russian
businesses and institutions are flourishing. For example, there are currently
117 Russian-American Sister Cities, 15 hospital partnerships supported by the USG
and 53 USG-funded university partnerships. Demand is growing steadily on both
sides. Partnerships have complemented individual exchanges by providing an
intellectual framework for practical, joint work in areas such as environmental
protection, health care, curriculum development and economic development. This
year the U.S. will utilize a partnership between U.S. and Russian educational
institutions to help Russia develop a first-class School of Public Policy to
train Russia's future public officials, and business and non-profit sector
leaders.

The availability and use of Internet on both sides has increased dramatically,
facilitating communication between Americans and Russians. The Internet is a
vital source of information for Russians reaching out to fill the information
void they experienced under Communism. To this end, the USG has supported 33
public access Internet sites in Russia and will add an additional 22 this year.

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Kremlin.doc
SCENESETTER: THE KREMLIN

The Moscow Kremlin (fortress) is the ancient residence of the rulers of Moscow.
It is surrounded by brick walls and towers and, with neighboring Red Square,
forms the heart of Moscow. The first cathedrals and residences were built in the
14th century. Cathedral Square is the focal point, surrounded by gold-domed
churches. The Kremlin also contains several palaces, official administration
buildings, a theater where Communist Party Congresses were previously held, and a
small garden that overlooks the river.

The Great Kremlin Palace was built in the 15th century, attaining its present-day
shape in the mid-19th century, and was the residence of the Imperial family. It
is a good example of the Russian palace décor of the period, with

lavish
interiors and furnishings, and was expensively renovated in recent years. This
is the primary location for large state events and ceremonies, such as Putin's
inauguration.

The former Senate building, visible from Red Square, has been the official
residence of the Russian president since 1991. It was built in the classical
style under orders of Catherine II in the late 18th century; it was renovated
after 1991 to restore its classical decor. Smaller state events and meetings are
often held in the residence.

The Kremlin Wall bordering Aleksandrov Gardens houses the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier and the memorials to the Hero Cities of World War II. Aleksandrov
Gardens borders Manezh Square, which includes an underground mall and outdoor
sculptures and fountains.

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Potus Briefing: Saturday Putin Dinner

1. Dealing with Putin

* What are Russian objectives? In public to show strength, no bending to U.S.;
to demonstrate areas of tangible cooperation. In private to preserve constructive dialogue; but to keep options open, buy time for Putin to mature,
consolidate authority, and also hedge bets with respect to our elections.

* Putin wants order, power, prestige, respect. Despite proud self-reliance and
apparent pragmatism, may have tendency to see respect deriving from entitlement
rather than merit. Wants to be part of modern, "win-win" era of globalization,
but does not fully understand it. Suspects that main U.S. objective is to take
advantage of Russian weakness.

* Putin style. Chameleon, not transparent. Prefers formality, perhaps

as
self-defense. Will generally try to tell you what he thinks you want to hear.
On tough issues like Chechnya and free media, will likely trot out complex,
vague theories of threats to security ("arc of instability" due to Islamic

extremism; some journalists, NGOs as "anti-Russian" or "traitors"). Will be
looking for tacit approval. Instinctively believes in interests, cost/benefit
analysis more than relationships, but road may be open to build latter.

* Maxims. Need to find a zone of dialogue that is neither patronizing on our
part nor paranoid on theirs. Lay down personal markers on tough issues and seek
personal commitments from Putin.

2. Dinner Objectives

* Sketch strategic relationship, fresh start, take to higher level based on
hard-headed common interest; look at next eight months, next four years.

* Outline other summit goals: 1/ gain better understanding of economic reform
priorities, 2/ chart path forward on challenging A/C and non-pro issues, 3/ joint
appraisal of regional security issues; 4/ tangible announcements demonstrating
benefits of cooperation

* Key outcomes:

1/ Principles document
2/ Shared Early Warning
3/ Military Pu
4/ Civil Pu (potential)
5/ Space Launch
6/ Climate Change
7/ Steel Dialogue

* A/C heart-to-heart.

* Reflect on "new economy," globalization, "third way". Use as platform to jog
Putin's imagination about win-win opportunities, nature of national

strength and
vitality in 21st century.

3. Fireproofers / Markers

Political Dimension: Managed Demcoracy?

* Putin may be headed in the direction of Pinochet or Fujimori, namely
pro-business, results-oriented economics combined with abridgement of civil
liberties. Need to lay markers, avoid tacit endorsement.

* Chechnya. "Arc of instability stretching from Kosovo to to Afghanistan to
Chechnya," "tip of the iceberg," "fighting for civilization." Tendency to see
friends and foes. Still not seriously investigating abuses.

* Reform of Federation Council. Trying to consolidate "vertical power."
Ambiguous. Good to remove immunity for governors, but seems to radically shift
seperation of powers (removal of elected officials) and add unnecessary layers
("supergovernors"). Power aggrandizement? What are ultimate intentions?

* Human Rights Organizations (Amnesty Inernational). "Anti-Russian propaganda."

* Crackdown on media. "Going after oligrachs (Gusinsky) for tax evasion."

* Jewish community. Kremlin pressure on chief rabbi to retire.

Economic Dimension: Self-Reliance?

* Seems to put premium on self-reliance. Wants to diminish Western leverage.
Despite self-reliance and ethic of results, still a sense of entitlement, expectation of uncritical political support from outside.

* Debt relief. May press for it. "Why are you punishing us for our better than
expected performance?" Need to keep incentives right. Can give interim relief

through rescheduling.

* G8. Abolish G7. Not ripe. G7 comprises largest economies, financial players;
crucial for financial crisis management. G8 is premier political club.

* WTO. Need to understand it's a question political decision from inside Russia,
not from outside. Membership is based on policies, objective criteria.

* IMF. Complain that IMF is harping on old conditionality.

* Market economy status. Seem caught up with prestige of label. Not weighing
pros and cons (greater exposure to trade penalities).

Regional Security

* Afghanistan/Central Asia.

* Nagorno-Karabakh

* Milosevic. FRY loans?

-- Regional Security

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PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

THE SUMMIT, STATE OF RELATIONSHIP
* timing of summit
* main accomplishments
* state of relationship
* relationship with Presidents Yeltsin/Putin
* what Clinton presidency meant for Russian people
* advice to next US president
* areas of US-Russian conflict/cooperation

CHECHNYA

* Russian atrocities in Chechnya
* war crimes
* free pass
* steps to influence Russia's actions

FREEDOMS/DEMOCRACY
* crackdown on media
* Babitskiy
* law on religion
* strengthening central authority

ENVIRONMENT
* abolishment of agency for environmental protection

RUSSIA/FRY
* war criminal meeting in Moscow/Russian loan to Belgrade

SUPPORT FOR IFI LENDING
* support for continued assistance
* safeguarding against misappropriation
* Chechnya

CORRUPTION
* evidence of high level corruption
* oligarchism
* what Russians should do to fight corruption
* diversion of US assistance to Chechnya
* how ordinary Russians have benefited from US aid

ECONOMIC POLICY
* Putin's economic policy
* pace of economic reform
* debt reduction
* summit strategy
* reasons for optimism

ARMS CONTROL/NONPROLIFERATION
TO BE DRAFTED BY @DEFENSE, @NONPRO

REGIONAL ISSUES
* Caspian energy
* managing Moscow's ambitions in the Caspian
* sphere of influence
* US relations with Taleban
* Russia's threat to bomb Afghanistan
* Abkhazia

US-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION
* Gore-Chernomyrdin

THE SUMMIT

When you took office, you promised to help bring democracy and prosperity to Russia. Russia today is a basket-case, President Putin has shown none of Yeltsin's democratic leanings, and the U.S. and Russia are fighting about arms control as if we're back in the 1980s. Isn't your policy a failure?

* The U.S. has core national interests at stake in success of Russia's transition toward democracy, free market, and productive engagement with the world community. Every American is safer today -- and Russians arefreer than ever -- because of what's happening in Russia.

* President Putin and I have spent a lot of time discussing how to build on that important foundation. We talked a lot about our priorities for the months and years ahead.

* I don't think it's fair to caricature what's going on here or in the U.S.-Russian relationship. In both areas, we've had our ups and downs over the past seven and a half years. But our responsibility as Presidents is to stay focused on the issues (arms control, nonproliferation, etc.) that make this relationship so important to world peace.

* That doesn't mean papering over differences or wishing away problems. President Putin has said that Russia has a lot of work to do to put its own house in order. I agree and want to work with him and other Russians who want to build a more democratic, prosperous country.

* It would be huge mistake simply to turn our backs on Russia or throw up our hands. I have long said that the process of building a new Russia is going to be measured in decades and generations.

Doesn't your visit show that all you care about is getting an arms control deal
and aren't really focused on the problems that Russian journalists, human rights
activists, and innocent Chechens are facing from the Putin government?

* Need to step back and recognize that this meeting is only the first of four
meetings I expect to have with Putin this year.

* I would ask you whether we can have more of an impact on important issues like
human rights and press freedoms by disengaging and trying to shout from the
sidelines. Believe it's much more effective to engage directly with Russia's
leaders and the Russian people on these issues.

* I made clear to President Putin that Russia's embrace of democracy, individual
and human rights is fundamental to the success of reform and Russia's continued
international integration.

* I also emphasized that we're concerned by the very real problems that Russia is
having in some of these areas. I hope that by talking honestly and directly my
visit can make a difference.

* It was important for me to come here to deal with the other issues that are on
our agenda - e.g., the future of the Russian economy, our cooperation with Russia
in key areas of the world such as the Balkans, and the important arms control and
nonproliferation challenges we face.

* We've had productive exchanges on all these issues and have found ways to move
things forward.

Almost exactly a year ago, Russian troops moved on the Pristina Airport. That
was a real low point in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Do you think that things
have gotten much better since then - either for the U.S.-Russian relationship or

for the people of Kosovo?

* I think Boris Yeltsin was right on target when he told me at the Cologne G-8
summit last year that Kosovo was the toughest test our relationship ever faced --
and that we passed it. I am very glad that the situation has changed quite a bit
since then. Our relationship is a lot better, and our troops are working well
together to bring peace to that very difficult place.

* It's been almost two years since I've been to Moscow which was then in the
throes of a major financial crisis. I'm impressed by the resilience of the
Russians in their economic recovery. Impressed by the new sense of responsibility for economic policies and results and the government's determination to push the steps needed to let the economy continue to grow.

* But I don't want to diminish the importance of issues where we don't see eye to
eye -- e.g., the war in Chechnya, ABM/NMD. It's not realistic to think that the
U.S. and Russia will agree on everything, but I think it's important to keep
talking and to try to bridge differences wherever possible.

You had a unique and special relationship with President Yeltsin. Will you have
as close and productive a relationship with Putin? What did you mean when you
said the U.S. can do business with President Putin?

* President Yeltsin's lasting achievement was dismantling the communist system
and building new political institutions under democratically elected leaders
within a constitutional framework.

* Bilateral relationship under President Yeltsin produced enormous gains for both
Russians and Americans. I think that history will treat him very well. Look
forward to seeing him tomorrow.

* I'm glad to get to know President Putin better. We've met three

times in less
than a year, and I hope to see him three more times in coming months.

* In our conversations here, we've focused on the fundamental principles and
common interests that guide our relations. Think there's a lot of common ground
to build prosperity and security for our citizens.

* What I've said about President Putin was based on statements he's made about
his goals and objectives and his commitments to accelerate economic reforms and
to respect human rights.

*
* As Putin has said, the real test will be the actions his government takes --
Russian people and international community will judge him on that basis and the
results generated by his approach to governing this vast country.

What would be your advice to the next U.S. President on working with Russia?
What mistakes do you hope your successor avoids?

* First and foremost, we need to keep working to make our people safer. That
means reducing nuclear arsenals, ensuring that weapons of mass destruction don't
fall into the wrong hands, and dealing with new threats (e.g., computer crime,
terrorism, transnational organized crime).

* I hope my successor is blessed with vision and patience in his dealings with
Russia. Russia is only just embarking on an enormous journey. We're going to
have to try to have an impact on the outcome, but our influence is largely on the
margins.

* The most important fact remains that the choices and the real hard work ahead
can only be dealt with by the Russian people themselves. I think it would be
fundamentally mistaken to understate them or their desire to seize this

opportunity for a better future. It's in all our interests that they succeed,
but we need to be realistic about the challenges still ahead.

CHECHNYA

What did you say to Putin about Russian atrocities in Chechnya, which have been
documented in such detail by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International? What
difference will it make?

* I've been very disturbed by reports of killings at Aldi (all-DEE). The war in
Chechnya was a very prominent issue in my discussions with President Putin. I
think that reflects the importance this issue holds for both the U.S.-Russian
relationship and Russia's own future and international standing.

* I talked to President Putin about the damage that the war is doing to Russia's
stated objectives of protecting its territorial integrity and defending citizens
against terrorism. The Russian military campaign is only fueling the cycle of
violence.

* I made clear once again that a military solution is not viable. Sadly, the
stepped up level of violence in the region in recent weeks suggests that Russia
is becoming trapped in a quagmire that will only get worse before it gets better.

* The only way to find a lasting solution is to take meaningful steps on
political track, begin dialogue with responsible Chechen leaders. I'm obviously
very concerned about humanitarian impact, refugee situation. The suffering of
innocent civilians is completely unacceptable.

* I pressed President Putin to conduct transparent and impartial investigations
of human rights violations and to cooperate fully with international organizations (e.g., OSCE). We've been very disappointed by Russian footdragging

on this.

if pressed -- Why hasn't the U.S. accused Russia of war crimes?

* Gravely concerned by allegations of human rights violations by Russian forces
in Chechnya. That's why we co-sponsored resolution on Chechnya at the UN
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. That resolution outlined steps Russia
should take to investigate these reports and cooperate with international human
rights organizations.

* Russian actions in Chechnya raise fundamental questions under international
humanitarian law that merit immediate and impartial investigation by Russian
authorities.

* Thorough investigation necessary to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute any
individual for specific criminal acts. Will continue to urge the Russian

Government to conduct open and transparent investigations, prosecute those
responsible.

Aside from rhetoric, what steps are you taking to influence Russia's actions in
Chechnya?

* Remain convinced there can be no military solution to the conflict and that the
Chechnya conflict poses a threat to the security of the entire Caucasus region.
Urge Russian Government to pursue a lasting political solution through dialogue
with responsible leaders.

* The US tried to help alleviate suffering of civilians by providing more than
$10 million to international humanitarian relief organizations helping people
displaced by the conflict.

* We have also pushed for full Russian cooperation with organizations such as the

OSCE. We've helped ensure that the Red Cross has access to all detainees and
detention centers. I'm disappointed by the obstacles in front of the OSCE and
asked President Putin to remove them.
*

PRESS FREEDOMS/DEMOCRACY

Did you press Putin about the continued crackdown on the media? Doesn't raid on
Media MOST make clear that freedom of press is in jeopardy?

* Am very concerned about state of free media in Russia. Key issue for Russian
democracy. Talked to President Putin about issue at length.

* I think it's important that President Putin has said "Russia will have no
future if we suppress civic freedoms and the press."

* In any free society, we can't expect to like or enjoy everything the press says
or does. But the development of independent media in Russia is a singular
achievement, it's something that never existed here before. It's a source of
strength and vitality, must be cherished - and protected.

Did you and Putin discuss the Babitskiy case?

* I have addressed this issue in the past. In so many ways, freedom of press is
central to success of Russian democracy, just as it is to the success of democracy in any country.

* The strange case of Mr. Babitskiy and the Russian government's handling of it
raised many questions about respect for independent media and freedom of speech.

* Tolerance of opposing or extreme views, even when we find them distasteful, is
extremely important.

* I hope there will be a speedy resolution of outstanding charges against
Babitskiy in a manner consistent with Russian law and freedom of the

press.

Any reaction to reports that the Kremlin is pressuring Russia's chief rabbi to
resign?

* I believe that freedom of religion is a fundamental human right and a key
aspect of Russia's transformation. The flowering of religious life, especially
the rebirth of Jewish life and culture, in post-Communist Russia is nothing short
of remarkable.

* I've seen the reports about Rabbi Shayevich's (shah-YAY-vich's) situation, and
I'm concerned. We're trying to gather the facts on the situation. Obviously, do
not believe that the state should meddle in the affairs of religious organizations.

Any comment on Putin's plan to strengthen central authority at the expense of
Russia's governors? Does this look like a prelude to the return of authoritarianism?

* It's responsibility of Russian people and their leaders to decide how to
structure government. Know that Russian parliament is examining these proposed
laws now. That's right way to handle such things.

* Believe that regional autonomy and development of strong, stable relations
between central government and Russia's regions are among most important aspects
of Russia's post-Communist transformation.

ENVIRONMENT

Any comment on Putin's decree abolishing Russia's State Committee on Environment?
Did you raise with Putin?

* Have had constructive cooperation with Russians on the environment for more

than 25 years including climate change and ozone depletion. Environmental matters very important in Russia, given huge scale of Soviet-era environmental damage.

* Up to Russians to determine the structure of their own government. But it's a false choice to conceive of environmental protection as something that can only happen at the expense of economic development. The two goals go hand in hand and must be pursued in tandem.

* Part of effective environmental protection is having effective institutions - both intelligent regulation and an active, independent non-governmental environmental community. Applaud the work of Russian environmental organizations.

If pressed -- Did you raise with Putin?

* We have been expressing concern with the Russian government.

Q: In his Duma speech, President Clinton called for building "strong environmental organizations." Was this a signal to Duma members of American concern over the Putin restructuring plan?

* Russia must decide the structure for Russia's government.
* In the United States, we have the cleanest environment and strongest economy in a generation.
*
*

Q: What is the significance of the joint statement on climate change?

It indicates sustained, high level attention to this critical global environmental challenge and underscores our history of cooperation with Russia and our common agenda moving forward. The statement's key elements are:
* Promotion of a shared vision that countries can achieve robust economic growth while protecting the environment and taking action to combat climate change;

* Reaffirmation of both countries' opposition to proposals to limit the Kyoto
mechanisms by placing quantitative restrictions on their use;
* Reaffirmation of the importance of developing rigorous and transparent rules
and guidelines for the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms, including
international emissions trading and "joint implementation" projects;
* A declaration by the United States that it intends to expand cooperation with
Russia in the measurement and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, the
development of market-based tools for managing those emissions, and the
identification of specific opportunities to further reduce or sequester those
emissions.

Q: Environmentalists and the EU charge that Russia is getting a free ride. Its
greenhouse gas emissions are down, yes, but that's largely attributable to the
overall economic downturn, not good environmental policy. Why should Russia be
able to sell these "hot air" credits? Doesn't this undermine the integrity of
the Kyoto agreement?

* The decline in Russian emissions since 1990 is attributable to a variety of
causes, including sound energy and environmental policy decisions -- such as an
increased reliance on clean burning natural gas over particularly dirty forms of
coal -- as well as Russia's overall economic performance.

* All of these factors went into setting Russia's overall emissions target under
the Kyoto Protocol. Russia's target, like our own, was approved by the

international community in 1997.

* The Kyoto market mechanisms, including emissions trading, help promote cost
effective emission reductions, ensuring that each dollar or ruble spent produces
the maximum environmental benefit.

* Limiting Russia's use of the Kyoto mechanisms would be neither fair nor

justified if one wants to strengthen the environmental effectiveness of the
Protocol.

Q: Why shouldn't the international community place limits on "emissions
trading?" Isn't the United States seeking to buy fake emissions credits anyway
instead of taking action to address climate change at home?

* The United States intends fully to achieve a substantial portion of emission
reductions at home. At the same time, limiting access to the Kyoto mechanisms
would be unwise.

* The Kyoto market mechanisms, including emissions trading, help promote cost
effective emission reductions, ensuring that each dollar or ruble spent produces
the maximum environmental benefit.

* We should not force U.S. companies to reduce emissions in a costly manner if
they can do so at half the price abroad.

* A reduction abroad has the same environmental benefit as a reduction at home.
Q: Environmentalists think Russian extra allotments ("hot air") are only
acceptable if they lead to real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Do you
agree? Why is this not a fair point?
* The Kyoto targets were agreed on an international basis in 1997. While the
U.S. and Russia are negotiating partners in the so-called "Umbrella Group," how
Russia decides to participate in the Kyoto agreement is Russia's decision.
* Under the U.S./Russia agreement on climate change, we will continue our
technical work with Russia on monitoring, verification and accounting of
emissions. This work is in our common interest as we develop a strong system for
emissions trading that benefits the environment in a cost effective manner.
Q: In the past few months, the United States has now reached new agreements with
India, China and Russia on climate change. What is your strategy?

* Climate change is the President's top environmental priority. He and Vice
President Gore have and will continue to make building an effective international
response to climate change a key foreign policy objective.
* In the case of India and China, the agreements signal a new openness to
dialogue on the ways developing countries can achieve robust economic growth
while still taking action on climate change.
* In the case of Russia, the agreement underscores our common interest in
building robust, transparent and cost-effective solutions into the framework
being developed under the Kyoto Protocol.
* *

RUSSIA/FRY

The Russians seem to be cozying up to Milosevic. They've hosted an indicted war
criminal, FRY Defense Minister Ojdanic, and announced new loans to Serbia. How
can you tolerate this and how can you support IMF loans to a country that behaves
this way?

* I was dismayed by reports that an indicted war criminal was received by Russian
Government last month. We expressed our concerns immediately to the Russians
about the serious problems this visit created. I think it's appropriate that
they've apologized for the incident and pledged this won't happen again.

* We've been talking extensively with the Russians about the exact nature of the
loans that may have been extended or are under consideration. This is very
serious matter. I think it's important that Russia avoid steps that would reduce
international isolation of Milosevic regime.

* Make decisions on IMF assistance to Russia based on our national interest,
including our interest in a Russia that is making progress toward economic

reform.

G7/G8

Will U.S. support abolishing the G7 and making Russia a full member of the G8?

* The G8 is a premier global political body precisely because Russia is part of
it. We appreciate Russia's role.

* The G7 as a grouping of the largest economies and financial actors has been a
key instrument in coping with global financial crises. We need to preserve it as
a means of close coorindation.

SUPPORT FOR IFI LENDING

Will you support assistance from the IMF and World Bank for Russia?

* We support Russia's reengagement with the IMF and hope a strong, new program
can be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

* Believe World Bank can play a crucial role supporting key structural reforms on
Russia's agenda, including in banking, social sector and pension reform.

Will you support debt relief for Russia?
* New IMF program would provide basis for limited debt rescheduling by the Paris
Club.
* Think it is most important that Russia focus on consolidating its economic
recovery and putting in place sound macro- and micro-economic policies, which
will help spur economic growth and attract private investment.

If pressed: The Russians say they really need debt forgiveness but they're being
punished because they're economy is doing better than expected. Why won't you
provide debt reduction?

* Want to do everything we can to encourage Russia on its path to recovery,
growth.

* Limited debt rescheduling tied to an IMF program would provide real financial
relief.

Do you support resuming IMF funding to Russia as it continues its campaign in
Chechnya?

* Make decisions on whether to support financing for Russia based on our national
interest, including our interest in a democratic, stable Russia that is making
real progress on economic reform.
* IMF funding should be provided only when program conditions have been met.

WTO

Does the U.S. support Russia's accession to WTO?

* We have long encouraged Russia's quest to join WTO. Think it's wise for Russia
to accelerate its efforts which will only reinforce the reforms.

* Clear that WTO membership is path to prosperity in 21st century. Key to
unlocking global economic opportunities.

CORRUPTION

Do you have any concrete evidence of high-level Russian corruption, siphoning off
of U.S. aid?

* Have uncovered no evidence of systemic or large-scale diversions of U.S.
bilateral assistance.

* Follow these allegations closely, but do not comment on intelligence or
sensitive law enforcement issues.

* Appropriate safeguards in place with respect to any IMF and World Bank programs
going forward.

* Urge Russians to get tough on corruption and to cooperate, in full, with
investigations, no matter where evidence leads.

Haven't efforts at reform just resulted in the control of Russia's economy by
corrupt officials and oligarchs?

* Corruption is a real threat to Russia's stability, democratization and prospects for a broadly shared rise in living standards.

* Market reform and rule of law must be at heart of fight against corruption.
Need competition, transparency and enforceable legal rights.

* Corruption stems from too little reform, not too much.

* Legal reform and the battle against corruption are a central focus for US
policy and our work with Russia both bilaterally and multilaterally.

In light of the high cost of the war in Chechnya, how do you know that financial
aid to Russia is not being diverted to support Russian actions in Chechnya?

* U.S. aid is specifically targeted. Two-thirds of bilateral assistance is aimed
at reducing threat of proliferation of WMD. Remainder consists largely of
humanitarian assistance for vulnerable groups focused on promoting grassroots
reform outside Moscow.

* IMF, World Bank programs strictly conditioned on fulfillment of specific
economic policy actions which we have a strong interest in promoting.

* *

PUTIN'S ECONOMIC POLICY

What do you think of Putin's economic policies?

* Had a good discussion of reform agenda. Gained better understanding of
priorities.

* Encouraged by early emphasis on tax reform, WTO accession, strengthening

property rights and overall plans to improve investment environment, all of which
are signals in the right direction. Will be judged by results.

* Key to seize the great opportunity Russia is currently enjoying thanks to
favorable energy prices and push ahead.

* Encourage Russia to build on its current economic upswing and undertake reforms
necessary to achieve sustainable growth that will result in improved living
standards for all Russian citizens.

Do you really expect investment to flow into Russia? What about all the capital
flight?

* In this global market, investors choose their destinations, and not the other
way around. Key for emerging markets is to create an attractive business
climate. That is only way to reverse the flow of capital.

* Believe many investors will be willing to take a fresh look at Russia,

particularly once key structural reforms are coming into place.

* Pleased that Ambassador Bob Strauss will be leading a delegation of top
American CEO's to Russia later this month.
Why are you any more optimistic now that Russia will implement real reform than
in the past?

* Transition to an open market economy has been long, hard path. Russia has
already accomplished a lot, including overcoming major disappointments.

* We talked at length about how to finish the job. Maintaining economic
stability, building a modern, pro-growth business climate are key to boosting
needed investment -- both foreign and domestic.

* Success will obviously depend on having clear sense of purpose, which President
Putin and his team display. Real test will be follow through on planned reforms.

ARMS CONTROL

TO BE PROVIDED BY @DEFENSE AND @NONPRO

NONPROLIFERATION, COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH

Russia continues to provide sensitive technology to

REGIONAL ISSUES

Did you talk about Caspian energy issues with Putin?

* Talked with Putin about range of energy issues, including development of
Caspian Basin resources. Russia and US both benefit from emergence of thriving,
prosperous countries in the Caspian region. Promoting economic development is
best way to ensure long-run stability and stem the rise of extremism.

* Development of the energy sector is key to economic prospects for most of these
countries. We see this as a win-win opportunity, for Russia, the U.S, and the
countries themselves.

* We favor multiple export pipelines. These are commercially driven projects.
US and Russian companies are competing with others for stakes.

How does the Administration intend to interact with Russia on Caspian energy
issues and manage Moscow's ambitions there?

* Russia and US will both benefit from building stable, functioning democratic
nations with viable economies in Caspian region, and from preventing terrorism,
smuggling and ethnic tension there.

* Energy exports will help provide wherewithal. At a minimum, therefore, our
mutual interests lie in cooperation in the energy arena. Already, Russian and

American companies are business partners in nearly all major oil and gas projects
in Caspian. Indeed, Russia is very much a part of the "East-West" energy
corridor.

* Hope to strengthen the independence and prosperity of the new states, bolster
energy security and diversity of supply, establish economic linkages to mitigate
regional conflicts, and expand business opportunities for our companies.

* Focusing on our varied mutual interests in the Caspian region will remain a
regular part of our dialogue with Russia, and energy partnerships will remain a
cornerstone of that cooperation.

How do you respond to the charges that the US is pursuing a "sphere of influence"
in the Caspian region, especially at the expense of Russia?

* U.S. not pursuing sphere of influence in Caspian region. Hope to promote
stability and facilitate formation of regional partnerships.

* Continue to engage these countries on a range of areas of mutual concern, from
non-proliferation to economic reform to energy development.

* Also cooperate with Russia in Caspian. Our companies work with theirs in a
number of oil and gas projects.

Did you discuss Russian threat to bomb Afghanistan over Taleban and UBL aid to
Chechen rebels?

* We've talked a lot to Russians about this issue and have urged restraint. For
their part, the Russians have dismissed suggestions that they are planning any
such action.

* I've said repeatedly that a military solution to the Chechen situation is not

possible. A wider conflict benefits no one. We think it would be quite destabilizing to expand the conflict to areas outside Russia.

* There's also no disputing that the Taleban continue to flaunt the will of the
international community and are harboring Bin Laden and his terrorist network.

* Believe Taleban and world community should exercise all effective means to
bring Bin Laden to justice, in accordance with the relevant Security Council
resolution.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT POTUS Moscow Press Conf Q&As.doc
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

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THE SUMMIT, THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

When you took office, you promised to help bring democracy and prosperity to
Russia. Russia today is a basket-case, President Putin has shown none of
Yeltsin's democratic leanings, and the U.S. and Russia are fighting about arms
control as if we're back in the 1980s. Isn't your policy a failure?

* The U.S. has core national interests at stake in success of Russia's transition
toward democracy, free market, and productive engagement with the world
community. Every American is safer today -- and Russians are freer than ever --
because of what's happening in Russia.

* President Putin and I have spent a lot of time discussing how to build on that
important foundation. We talked a lot about our priorities for the months and
years ahead.

* Engagement is not a favor to Russia, but the best way to pursue our interests.

* That doesn't mean papering over differences or wishing away problems.

* It would be huge mistake simply to turn our backs on Russia or throw up our
hands. I have long said that the process of building a new Russia is going to be
measured in decades and generations.

Doesn't your visit show that all you care about is getting an arms control deal
and aren't really focused on the problems that Russian journalists, human rights
activists, and innocent Chechens are facing from the Putin government?

* Discussed full range of issues, including press freedoms, Chechnya, and other
areas where we have concerns.

* Best way to engage directly with Russia's leaders and the Russian people on
these issues.

* I made clear to President Putin that Russia's embrace of democracy, individual
and human rights is fundamental to the success of reform and Russia's continued
international integration.
* * Have a full range of issues that areimportant to the American people - e.g.,
the future of the Russian economy, our cooperation with Russia in key areas of
the world such as the Balkans, and the important arms control and nonproliferation challenges we face.

* We've had productive exchanges on all these issues and have found ways to move
things forward.

Almost exactly a year ago, Russian troops moved on the Pristina Airport. That
was a real low point in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Do you think that things
have gotten much better since then - either for the U.S.-Russian relationship or
for the people of Kosovo?

* I think Boris Yeltsin was right on target when he told me at the Cologne G-8
summit last year that Kosovo was the toughest test our relationship ever faced --
and that we passed it. I am very glad that the situation has changed quite a bit
since then. Our relationship is a lot better, our troops are working well

together to bring peace to that very difficult place, and Russia and NATO are
re-engaging.

* * It's not realistic to think that the U.S. and Russia will agree on everything, but I think it's important to keep talking and to try to bridge
differences wherever possible.

You had a unique and special relationship with President Yeltsin. Will you have
as close and productive a relationship with Putin? What did you mean when you
said the U.S. can do business with President Putin? What's he like as a person?

* President Yeltsin's lasting achievement was dismantling the communist system
and building new political institutions under democratically elected leaders
within a constitutional framework.

* Bilateral relationship under President Yeltsin produced enormous gains for both
Russians and Americans. I think that history will treat him very well. Look
forward to seeing him tomorrow.

* I'm glad to get to know President Putin better. We've met three times in less
than a year, and I hope to see him three more times in coming months. Putin
clearly is very bright, understands the big challenges facing Russia.

* Proud of my relationship with Yeltsin - produced real gains for U.S. and Russia
- but ultimately not a question of personalities but of relations between our two
countires.

* In our conversations here, we've focused on the fundamental principles and
common interests that guide our relations. Think there's a lot of common ground
to build prosperity and security for our citizens.

* What I've said about President Putin was based on statements he's made about
his goals and objectives and his commitments to accelerate economic reforms and
to respect human rights.

* As Putin has said, the real test will be the actions his government takes --
Russian people and international community will judge him on that basis and the
results generated by his approach to governing this vast country.

What would be your advice to the next U.S. President on working with Russia?
What mistakes do you hope your successor avoids?

* First and foremost, we need to keep working to make our people safer. That
means reducing nuclear arsenals, ensuring that weapons of mass destruction don't
fall into the wrong hands, and dealing with new threats (e.g., computer crime,
terrorism, transnational organized crime).

* I hope my successor is blessed with vision and patience in his dealings with
Russia. Russia is only just embarking on an enormous journey. We're going to
have to try to have an impact on the outcome, but our influence is largely on the
margins.

* The most important fact remains that the choices and the real hard work ahead
can only be dealt with by the Russian people themselves. I think it would be
fundamentally mistaken to understate them or their desire to seize this

opportunity for a better future. It's in all our interests that they succeed,
but we need to be realistic about the challenges still ahead.

Edmund Pope, a Navy veteran, is being held on espionage charges in a Russian
prison. Did you ask Putin to release him?

* I'm familiar with his case. It has been raised appropriately.

Do you agree with the Washington Post's assessment of the Vice President
Binational Commission? It seems that the VP was very well-meaning, but many of
the issues that the commission worked on unraveled or appear naïve in retrospect.

CHECHNYA

What did you say to Putin about Russian atrocities in Chechnya,

which have been
documented in such detail by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International? What
difference will it make?

* I've been very disturbed by reports of killings at Aldi (all-DEE). We discussed the war in Chechnya as we have in all our meetings. Also concerned
about the humanitarian situation.

* I talked to President Putin about the damage that the war is doing to Russia's
stated objectives of protecting its territorial integrity and defending citizens
against terrorism. The Russian military campaign is only fueling the cycle of
violence.

* I made clear once again that a military solution is not viable.

* The only way to find a lasting solution is to take meaningful steps on
political track. I'm obviously very concerned about humanitarian impact, refugee
situation. The suffering of innocent civilians is completely unacceptable.

* I pressed President Putin to conduct transparent and impartial investigations
of human rights violations and to cooperate fully with international organizations (e.g., OSCE). We've been very disappointed by Russian footdragging
on this.

Why hasn't the U.S. accused Russia of war crimes?

* Gravely concerned by allegations of human rights violations by Russian forces
in Chechnya. That's why we co-sponsored resolution on Chechnya at the UN
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. That resolution outlined steps Russia
should take to investigate these reports and cooperate with international human
rights organizations.

* Russian actions in Chechnya raise fundamental questions under international
humanitarian law that merit immediate and impartial investigation by

Russian
authorities.

* Thorough investigation necessary to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute any
individual for specific criminal acts. Will continue to urge the Russian

Government to conduct open and transparent investigations, prosecute those
responsible.

Aside from rhetoric, what steps are you taking to influence Russia's actions in
Chechnya?

* Remain convinced there can be no military solution to the conflict and that the
Chechnya conflict poses a threat to the security of the entire Caucasus region.
Urge Russian Government to pursue a lasting political solution through dialogue
with responsible leaders.

* The US tried to help alleviate suffering of civilians by providing more than
$10 million to international humanitarian relief organizations helping people
displaced by the conflict.

* We have also pushed for full Russian cooperation with organizations such as the
OSCE. We've helped ensure that the Red Cross has access to all detainees and
detention centers. I'm disappointed by the obstacles in front of the OSCE and
asked President Putin to remove them.

Why is it that you complain about abuses in Chechnya when the U.S. and NATO did
the same thing in Kosovo? How would you react if Puerto Rico tried to secede?

* Intervention in Kosovo was to stop a deliberate genocidal campaign of the
Milosevic regime that threatened the security of region and our NATO allies.

* Don't question Russia's right to protect territorial integrity, combat

terrorism. But must also respect rule of law, human rights. Indiscriminate
attacks on civilians unacceptable.

* Deplore human rights abuses wherever they occur. Insist on discrimination
between combatants and innocent civilians. Call for full, transparent investigation of reported abuses, violations of international norms.

What did you mean when you talked about "liberating" Groznyy?

* Civilians obviously in terrible position, caught between brutal Russian
military campaign and armed militants. Have consistently acknowledged that there
are terrorists in Chechnya, and Russia has a right to combat terrorism. Used the
word "liberate" in this context.
*

PRESS FREEDOMS/DEMOCRACY

Did you press Putin about the continued crackdown on the media? Doesn't raid on
Media MOST make clear that freedom of press is in jeopardy?

* Am very concerned about the need to protect free and independent media in
Russia. Key issue for Russian democracy. Talked to President Putin about issue
at length.

* I think it's important that President Putin has said "Russia will have no
future if we suppress civic freedoms and the press."

* In any free society, we can't expect to like or enjoy everything the press says
or does. But the development of independent media in Russia is a singular
achievement, it's something that never existed here before. It's a source of
strength and vitality, must be cherished - and protected.

Did you and Putin discuss the Babitskiy case?

* [I have addressed this issue in the past.]

* * * I hope there will be a speedy and fair resolution of outstanding charges
against Babitskiy in a manner consistent with Russian law and freedom of the
press.

Any reaction to reports that the Kremlin is pressuring Russia's chief rabbi to
resign? Did you discuss this with Putin?

* I believe that freedom of religion is a fundamental human right and a key
aspect of Russia's transformation. The flowering of religious life, especially
the rebirth of Jewish life and culture, in post-Communist Russia is nothing short
of remarkable.

* I've seen the reports about Rabbi Shayevich's (shah-YAY-vich's) situation, and
I'm concerned. We're trying to gather the facts on the situation. Obviously, do
not believe that the state should interfere in the affairs of religious organizations.

Any comment on Putin's plan to strengthen central authority at the expense of
Russia's governors? Does this look like a prelude to the return of authoritarianism?

* It's responsibility of Russian people and their leaders to decide how to
structure government. Know that Russian parliament is examining these proposed
laws now. That's right way to handle such things.

* Believe that regional autonomy and development of strong, stable relations
between central government and Russia's regions are among most important aspects
of Russia's post-Communist transformation.

ARMS CONTROL

START / ABM

Was there any progress made on the central issue of ABM adaptation or START III?

* Good discussion; have agreed to intensify our discussions on both START III and
ABM. Both sides interested in further defining the basic elements of START III.

* Expect dialogue to continue at Okinawa.

* * * Aren't you locking in the next President to outmoded concepts and an
ineffective system by signing this document today?

* These are not outmoded concepts, but important building blocks for managing our
strategic relationship with Russia, today and in the future. Does not limit U.S.
freedom to choose what we need to do for our security, but makes it more likely
we find a cooperative approach to dealing with new threats.

* Next president will obviously be free to pursue whatever policies he determines
to be in our national interest.

* Expect the next President will also value a stable strategic relationship with
Russia.

Why should the Russians do a deal on ABM when Senator Helms says any agreement
would be "dead on arrival" in the Senate?

* Think an agreement to adapt the ABM Treaty to permit a limited NMD, as well as
an agreement to reduce further nuclear arsenals, would be recognized by our
Senate as being in our national interest.

Why are you so intent on concluding an agreement on ABM when your presidency is
almost over?

* The American people elect presidents for four-year terms, and they are expected
to conduct foreign policy and act in the national interest for their

entire term.

Isn't a boost-phase intercept system, such as that proposed by President Putin, a
better way to deal with the threat?

* There are some advantages to a boost-phase system, as it can intercept missiles
before they dispense countermeasures.

* But we don't think such a system can be a substitute for our NMD program, which
is still the fastest, most affordable, and most advanced technology for NMD.

Why should Putin negotiate with you on START and ABM when Governor Bush is
offering unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal?

* I don't think an offer of unilateral action in this area is necessarily reassuring to anyone.

* Governor Bush's approach is basically a "do whatever you want" approach to
managing strategic affairs, both on offense and defense.

* That's been tried before, and it led to an arms race that we are still trying
to throttle down.

* The approach we have put forward would ensure that reductions in offense, as
well as deployment of a limited NMD, would preserve stability, and enhance both
sides' security.

Isn't their evidence that the tests for the current system were rigged?

* No. There have been some allegations, but I'm confident I will get an accurate
assessment of the system's technical feasibility prior to making any decision on
deployment.

Principles Document

"Strategic stability ... mutual deterrence" - sounds a lot like the kind of "old
think" that dominated the Cold War. What's new here?

* Principles Document is forward looking - it talks squarely about new threats to
our security, and the need to address these threats, including the consideration
of changes to the ABM Treaty.

* At the same time, both the U.S. and Russia believe it is important to preserve
the basic principles like the ABM Treate which is key to get the deeper nuclear
cuts we all seek.

* Strategic stability and mutual deterrence still matter in managing the

strategic relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers.

Missile Defense Cooperation

Did you discuss President Putin's proposals for cooperation?

* President Putin and I discussed both U.S. and Russian proposals for working
together to address ballistic missile threats. Pleased that we both agree there
are new threats which we need to address.

* Dialogue has been ongoing for some time. U.S. has made wide-ranging proposals
to work cooperatively with Russia on the missile defense issue. Russia has also
made some interesting proposals. Intend to continue that dialogue.

* Hope to be able to move forward with further steps in the future. Signature of
Shared Early Warning agreement is a good example.

Did you discuss technology sharing with the Russians? Is Russia one of the
"civilized countries" you are prepared to share technology with?

* We had a good discussion of the possibility for cooperation in this area. We
have each made proposals, and we have asked our experts to look at

this and
report back to us at Okinawa.

But are you prepared to give your NMD to Russia?

* What we need to do is look at the proposals we now have on the table, and see
what we can agree to pursue. I think we can agree on more initiatives, like
shared early warning, that will enhance both countries security.

* *
Treaty line

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with construction
activity on its ABM?

* We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

If you make a decision to go forward with NMD construction later this year, won't
you have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

* Am not going to speculate now on consequences of decision I haven't yet made.

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with the
Russians at the summit? What was their reaction?

* We discussed this issue in general; however, I would not suggest to you they
had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed
Russia of any conclusions.

Shared Early Warning

What is the objective of the shared early warning agreement?

* Important agreement. The first U.S.-Russian military institution. Will
strengthen strategic stability by further reducing risk that ballistic missiles
might be launched based on false warning of an attack.

* Will also increase mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic
missile early warning systems of both sides.

Is there a linkage between implementation of shared early warning and NMD/ABM?

* No. Shared early warning is in our common intersts regardless of where we go
with ABM/NMD.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
IMF/WORLD BANK SUPPORT, DEBT RELIEF

Will you support assistance from the IMF and World Bank for Russia?

* We support Russia's reengagement with the IMF and hope a strong, new program
can be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

* Believe World Bank can play a crucial role supporting key structural reforms on
Russia's agenda, including in banking, social sector and pension reform.

The Russians say they really need debt forgiveness but they're being punished
because they're economy is doing better than expected, even though this debt has
its origins in the Soviet era. Why won't you provide debt reduction? Will you
support debt relief for Russia?
* New IMF program necessary before any consideration of debt relief possible.
* Think it is most important that Russia focus on consolidating its economic
recovery and putting in place sound macro- and micro-economic policies, which
will help spur economic growth and attract private investment.

* Want to do everything we can to encourage Russia on its path to recovery,
growth.

Do you support resuming IMF funding to Russia as it continues its campaign in
Chechnya?

* Make decisions on whether to support financing for Russia based on our national
interest, including our interest in a democratic, stable Russia that is making
real progress on economic reform.
* IMF funding should be provided only when program conditions have been met.
* I would point out that U.S. aid is specifically targeted. Two-thirds of

bilateral assistance is aimed at reducing threat of proliferation of WMD.
Remainder is focused on promoting grassroots reform outside Moscow, humanitarian
assistance for vulnerable groups.

WTO

Does the U.S. support Russia's accession to WTO?

* We have long encouraged Russia's quest to join WTOon a sound basis. Think it's
wise for Russia to accelerate its efforts, which will only reinforce the reforms.

* Clear that WTO membership is path to prosperity in 21st century. Key to
unlocking global economic opportunities.

CORRUPTION

Do you have any concrete evidence of high-level Russian corruption, siphoning off
of U.S. aid? Mabatek, Yeltsin?

* Have uncovered no evidence of systemic diversions of U.S. bilateral assistance.

* Follow these allegations closely, but do not comment on intelligence or
sensitive law enforcement issues.

* Appropriate safeguards in place with respect to any IMF and World Bank programs
going forward.

* Urge Russians to get tough on corruption and to cooperate, in full, with

investigations, no matter where evidence leads.

Haven't efforts at reform just resulted in the control of Russia's economy by
corrupt officials and oligarchs?

* I talked about this issue with Putin. Corruption is a real threat to Russia's
stability, democratization and prospects for a broadly shared rise in living
standards.

* Market reform and rule of law must be at heart of fight against corruption.
Need competition, transparency and enforceable legal rights.

* Corruption stems from too little reform, not too much.

* Legal reform and the battle against corruption are a central focus for US
policy and our work with Russia both bilaterally and multilaterally.

* * *
* *

PUTIN'S ECONOMIC POLICY

What do you think of Putin's economic policies?

* Had a good discussion of reform agenda. Gained better understanding of
priorities.

* Encouraged by early emphasis on tax reform, WTO accession, strengthening
property rights and overall plans to improve investment environment, all of which
are signals in the right direction. Will be judged by results.

* Key to seize the great opportunity Russia is currently enjoying thanks to
favorable energy prices and push ahead.

* Encourage Russia to build on its current economic upswing and undertake reforms
necessary to achieve sustainable growth that will result in improved living
standards for all Russian citizens.

Do you really expect investment to flow into Russia? What about all the capital
flight?

* In this global market, investors choose their destinations, and not the other
way around. Key for emerging markets is to create an attractive business
climate. That is only way to reverse the flow of capital.

* Believe many investors will be willing to take a fresh look at Russia,

particularly once key structural reforms are coming into place.

* Pleased that Ambassador Bob Strauss will be leading a delegation of top
American CEO's to Russia later this month.
*
Why are you any more optimistic now that Russia will implement real reform than
in the past?

* Transition to an open market economy has been long, hard path. Russia has
already accomplished a lot, including overcoming major disappointments.

* Believe Russia understands that in globalized economy reform is necessary to
succeed.

* We talked at length about how to finish the job. Maintaining economic
stability, building a modern, pro-growth business climate are key to boosting
needed investment -- both foreign and domestic.

*
NONPROLIFERATION, COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH

Are you linking the space launch quota to Russian missile assistance to Iran?

* Our ability to cooperate with Russia in peaceful space ventures depends in part
on Russia maintaining tighter controls over sensitive missile technology and
preventing transfers to countries such as Iran.

* I hope we'll be in a position to consider lifting the quota later this year,
depending on Russian progress in this area.

What are you doing to stop Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear and missile
programs?

* I believe the Russian leadership shares our interest in preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons and missiles to Iran. However, we remain concerned that
sensitive technology has been leaking out of Russia to Iran.

* Although Russia has made progress strengthening its export controls, the
problem persists. We will continue our efforts to cooperate with the Russian
government to strengthen its export controls and, as necessary, impose penalties
against Russian companies and individuals who provide sensitive assistance to
Iran.

Are you worried that Russia is helping Iran get nuclear weapons, including
through their cooperation in building a nuclear reactor at Bushehr?

* Putin and I discussed this issue today. We have been very clear for quite a
long time about our concerns about the risks created by Russian-Iranian nuclear
cooperation. Unfortunately, that problem is getting worse.

* I don't believe that any country, including Russia, wants to see an Iran armed
with nuclear weapons. That would pose an enormous threat, not only to our allies
in the region, especially Israel, but to our forces there as well.

How can you be sure that the scientists you're supporting through Nunn-Lugar
programs aren't engaged in BW activities?

* Under our assistance programs, we are engaging in peaceful scientific research
with former Soviet BW scientists. These programs have given us

unprecedented
access to the civilian part of the former Soviet BW program.

* Our interaction and access enhance our confidence that these institutes are no
longer engaged in offensive BW work. We have strict auditing and oversight
procedures in place to ensure that U.S. funds are used for intended purposes.

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REGIONAL, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Will the U.S. support abolishing the G-7 and making Russia a full member of the
G-8?

* The G-8 is a premier global political body precisely because Russia is part of
it. The G-8 addresses a range of important issues facing the international
community (e.g., crossborder financial crime, infectious disease, terrorism).

* The G-7 as a grouping of the largest economies and financial actors has been a
key instrument in coping with global financial crises. Believe it continues to
serve a sueful purpose.

The Russians seem to be cozying up to Milosevic. They've hosted an indicted war
criminal, FRY Defense Minister Ojdanic, and announced new loans to Serbia. How
can you tolerate this and how can you support IMF loans to a country that behaves
this way?

* I was dismayed by reports that an indicted war criminal was received by Russian
Government last month. We expressed our concerns immediately to the Russians
about the serious problems this visit created. I raised with Putin. Appropriate
that they've apologized for the incident and pledged this won't happen again.

* We've been talking extensively with the Russians about the exact nature of the

loans that may have been extended or are under consideration. This is very
serious matter. I think it's important that Russia avoid steps that would reduce
international isolation of Milosevic regime.

* Russia as a democracy has an interest in helping Serbian people enjoy the
freedom of democracy. Hope we can work together toward this goal.

* Make decisions on IMF assistance to Russia based on our national interest,
including our interest in a Russia that is making progress toward economic
reform.
* * *

Why aren't you dealing with Milosevic? After all, he's still the elected leader
of Yugoslavia and despite all your ill will toward him, it's obvious he isn't
going anywhere.

* We want good relations with Serbia. So long as Serbia is run by an indicted
war criminal, that's not going to be possible. We have a common interest with
Russia in having Serbia turn the page, begin a new democratic phase.
* * *

* * Did you discuss Russian threat to bomb Afghanistan over Taleban and UBL aid
to Chechen rebels?

* We've talked a lot to Russians about this issue and have urged them not to take
counterproductive actions. For their part, the Russians have assured us they are
not planning any such action.

*
Russian officials have been complaining Georgia is serving as a base for Chechen
rebels attacking Russian forces. Are you concerned? What are you doing?

* The international community is actively involved in this issue through an OSCE
border monitoring mission aimed at ensuring there are no flows across the border.