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Original OA/ID Number: 468				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	One-on-One Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, January 13, 1994 (6 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002. memcon	One-on-One Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, January 15, 1994 (2 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
003. memo	re: The President's Private Meeting with Belarus Head of State Shushkevich, January 15, 1994 (3 pages)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Memcon])
 OA/Box Number: 468

FOLDER TITLE:

9400513

2016-0117-M
 kh1779

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 22 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UKRAINE
 BELARUS

RUSSIA
MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & DEMITRI ZAREZELINCK ON 15 JAN

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 26 JAN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

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FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 94072216 FOR DECISION
X 94081815 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 11, 1994

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2016-0117-M

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: One-on-One Memoranda of Conversations from the President's Trip to Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, January 12-15, 1994

Attached at Tabs I through III are the subject memoranda from the President's trip to Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Conversations be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Meeting with President Yeltsin 1/13/94
- Tab II Meeting with President Yeltsin 1/15/94
- Tab III Meeting with Chairman Shushkevich 1/15/94

TAB I

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262016-0117- M (1.01)
10/2/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: One-on-One Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter and notetaker)

Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Federation
Intrepreter

DATE, TIME: January 13, 1994, 9:00 - 9:45am
AND PLACE: The Kremlin

President Yeltsin: Bill, I welcome you in the most friendly way. I am looking forward to this visit. I am sure it will produce much for both of us. I'll start with the situation in Russia. Of course, after the elections, things here have gotten complicated. Still, from last year's confrontation between our legislative and executive powers, we've moved toward stabilizing the situation on the basis of the new constitution. (S)

I inaugurated the first session of the Federation Council and set forth basic goals of the Federation Council and the Duma. The last few days have not seen any "scandals." But the line-ups before us in the two houses of parliament are different. The Federation Council is made up of two representatives for each region. We believe the Federation Council will follow the Presidential line. The upper chamber can send back legislation passed President Yeltsin the Duma. That gives the President additional advantages. Also, I have veto power so I can make sure laws are passed based on the constitution. (S)

The democratic forces are 80 percent of the Federation Council. That instills a sense of optimism. The situation in the Duma is not so propitious. The Democrats failed to pool their efforts and were not able to unify themselves in the election campaign. They committed lots of technical mistakes and ended up with fewer seats than we expected. (S)

The democratic parties hold one third of the seats in the Duma. If you add the Duma territorial representatives the total strength of the democrats is 46 to 47 percent. If the Communists join with the Agrarians and others, they'll end up with the same amount. That means neither side will have a clear majority. So we will have factional fights going on all the time. (S)

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I still believe that gradually common sense will prevail. It is important that over the next two years, we develop a constructive approach in the interest of Russia and reform. (S)

We do not share the concern that is felt abroad with regard to Zhirinovskiy. He won on the basis of populist slogans and promises he can't keep. This is clear, and the voters will not fail to grasp it. I believe that unlike with the previous Supreme Soviet, I'll have to maintain more contact with the factions and leaders, as you're also doing. Your ambassador advises me to have tea and coffee with the various faction leaders and strike bargains with them. Of course its important not to overemphasize one faction. That will raise hackles with the other factions. I have been criticized for not swinging my weight behind Russia's Choice, but I did the right thing to let all the parties run on an equal footing. (S)

Early elections for the President are not on the horizon. Under the new constitution, the incumbent finishes his term in June 1996 provided I don't run for reelection. The issue of early Presidential elections has taken second place. (S)

Concerning those who backed the October unrest -- Ruts koy and Khasbulatov -- the procurator's office has presented written charges. Have you got any questions? (S)

The President: Thanks for the benefit of your thinking. It is of great interest to me and to everyone in the world. I have three observations: first, regarding Ambassador Pickering's advice about you spending time with the factions, I was elected with only 43 percent of the popular vote (although a large majority of the states). The Democrats have a narrow majority in Congress but are famous for not sticking together. Yet at the end of my first year in office, I have had more success than any President since Eisenhower. And I had to ask them to do hard things. The lesson is directly related to the amount of personal time with Congressional leaders. Even opponents are glad to be invited to the President's home and office. It's sometimes one of the most frustrating parts of the job, but it's worth it. The more time I put into it, the more I get out of it. You can't win over everyone, but can make big progress -- including with your opponents. I saw on the TV how they screamed. They'll insult you in the Duma, but they'll still be glad to be invited to see you. (S)

President Yeltsin: No doubt. (U)

The President: Many of those who voted for Zhirinovskiy decided at the last moment. It happens when people are frustrated and confused. They want to send a signal. In 1992, three percent of the voters decided in the last weekend to vote for Perot because they thought I would win, but wanted to send a signal. They knew I didn't need their votes to win. (S)

The reformers' campaign showed a recklessness I have often seen among our Democrats during a campaign. For years, Democrats

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would lose Presidential elections because they'd talk about government programs to fix problems, while the Republicans would talk about values and fears -- "We stand up for family, the greatness of America -- we're against crime." And they would get votes that Democrats might have won. (S)

The Republican strategy has often worked, and they have won more Presidential elections in recent years than Democrats, even though they didn't talk as much about concrete solutions to real problems. (S)

You rose to prominence because the people saw you standing up for them against things they were against -- not because you had a ten-point program. I think it was the image of you standing on a tank. Programs are important, but there are people in America who have insights that could be helpful. There might be benefit in having the reform bloc talk to our experts so that next time people who are worried about crime don't all vote for Zhirinovskiy. I leave it to you whether this could help. (S)

(Yeltsin nods)

This is not to change positions, but perhaps to change how reformers present themselves. You might send Gaydar or anyone else you choose to the U.S. to talk to our experts. I'll arrange a quiet meeting if you think it will help, OK? (S)

(Yeltsin nods enthusiastically)

If not, I'll drop it. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good. Let's do it. (U)

The President: I just returned from NATO, where everyone discussed the Russian elections. Many of the leaders there said don't overreact to Zhirinovskiy; others were afraid that the forces Zhirinovskiy represents are stronger than you have suggested. I believe it would be time well spent to have someone -- Kozyrev? -- give your view of these elections. It will help settle things down, deal with the unease, convince people of your perception and that you have a strategy. (S)

Finally, let me say something about economic issues. There is still an enormous amount of respect for you among the leaders with whom I deal, but there is an underlying theme: "Yeltsin is a great man, but he is fighting a losing the battle against the forces of history. It would be helpful for them to see that you don't believe that -- I don't believe it. We don't want people to have a stereotype of Russia that is frozen in the past. We want them to look to the future. So maybe you should invite some of them to Russia in the next few months. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thanks for that frank discussion. Next, lets talk about the reforms. We believe that part of the population voted for Zhirinovskiy because they were dissatisfied with the social policy. We have been concentrating on fighting against

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inflation. In December, it was the lowest it has been in a long time. This year we intend to stabilize the economy further and drive inflation down to five percent. At the same time, we will concentrate on the 12 percent of the population who are unhappy and who voted for Zhirinovskiy. They didn't vote for taking back Alaska, Ukraine and Crimea or for the fascism he embodies but rather because they are unhappy. (S)

Our goal is to broaden structural economic reform. Everyone feels the need to intensify movement down the road of reform and pick up the pace of reform. Out of an adult population of 115 million people, 50 million now have some form of private property. This is something we haven't seen in a long time. We've got to intensify privatization. Chubais was elected to the Duma, but he'll remain head of privatization because of his high professional skills. (S)

We won't be distracted President Yeltsin the same kind of confrontation between the two branches that we had in the past, so we can concentrate more on reform. (S)

In my upcoming February message (to a joint session of Parliament), I'll say that reform is still the main task. The focus now should be on breakthroughs in investment policy. Although investment from the U.S. is still not sufficient. We understand the difficulties you have. We are not asking for aid for our social needs. We don't want aid since that can lead to an anti-Western flareup. (S)

Incidentally, we are seeing signs of economic recovery. Conversion is going well. I recently had a conference with leaders of the defense industries. We agreed that 1994 will be the year of emphasis on civilian output of high quality. (S)

In Vancouver, we talked about the need for humanitarian assistance and investment assistance. That's not what we need now. How can we ask for U.S. aid to help with unemployment in Russia when you have unemployment in the U.S. too. But now help is needed for investment through companies and firms. Also in the rescheduling of foreign debts, and structural economic reform. We also need technical assistance in the destruction of nuclear weapons. Of the \$800 million (in SSD), I'm wondering about the possibility of ten percent being directed channeled to our research institutes that work on storage sites for the dismantled weapons. Senator Nunn was here recently and he said this could be done. (S)

Frankly, the work of the G-7 in Tokyo and the G-7 plus one has been very slow. The second tranche of the STF from the IMF has been delayed since August 1993. That concerns us. I read your speech in Brussels. It was a good speech. I agree 100 percent. But there is reason for doubt among the European leaders that we are really on the reform road. When you have ups and downs, that's part of the normal problem of any country in transition. (S)

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So far, there are still barriers to bilateral trade on the books in the U.S., though after Vancouver you accomplished a lot and I am grateful for that. Jackson-Vanik is still on the books, and that has stymied development of our trade relations. (S)

The President: First, I appreciate your reaffirmation of the overall direction of reform policy. You have a good team and a good policy. Second, you know I agree with you about the social impact and difficulty of transition. The rest of the world should be supportive and be sensitive. The thing is not to stop or slow down reforms but to be more sensitive to the difficulty. (S)

We've committed all of the Vancouver assistance package and distributed most of it. So the things that have been in our personal control we have moved quickly. On the second package, much is tied to the G-7. I too am frustrated and committed to moving it along faster. The international financial organizations understand too and are ready to move more quickly and flexibly if you are still committed to reform. (S)

Regarding the legal restrictions on trade and investment, we have done a lot but still have two big issues. On Jackson-Vanik, I too am frustrated. We have a whole history and a whole constituency invested in it. Now that they see we're both committed, they are holding us to the details. I have strong hopes we can get this done this year. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good. (U)

The President: Second is the question of how to become partners in the new COCOM regime. We are on the verge of getting that done. The one outstanding issue is the need for a clear sense from you and your government on arms sales to Iran. (S)

President Yeltsin: (Puzzled, turns to his notetaker) Iran, not Iraq? (U)

The President: Yes, Iran. (U)

President Yeltsin: Iran. (U)

The President: There are also three issues of diplomacy that affect my ability to influence the international community. First, Ukraine: It is a very great thing you two have done. It will help a lot. But we have to help him (Kravchuk) politically at home with the Rada so he doesn't get overruled on this. (S)

Second, NATO and Partnership for Peace: There were a lot of people in the U.S. and some in Europe who felt I should have given early membership for the Visegrad countries. And some who said, "it's a mess -- do nothing." But I believe your leadership gives us a chance to do something that has never been done since the rise of the nation state itself -- and that is have a Europe that is truly integrated and not divided. Walesa put it this

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way: "I know you like Yeltsin, but history is not on his side. Every second Russian is like Zhirinovskiy." (S)

(Yeltsin laughs ruefully)

Others did not agree -- they are for P4P. Support for P4P is rooted in large measure in their belief that you stand for the best future for Russia and for Europe. So it would help if you would say something public on that. (S)

President Yeltsin: I support you in that. It's a good proposal. We will support you. (U)

The President: The third issue is relations between Russia and the other states, especially the Baltics. On Georgia, people have mixed feelings. They are grateful to you for what you did to help Shevardnadze, but worry that before that some elements of the army supported the Abkhaz separatists. On the Baltics, there is support for withdrawal from Latvia, but concern about what will happen next. I know there's concern about Estonia and treatment of the Russians there. (S)

On Latvia, the issue is Skrunda. Russia wants five years to stay, and two years to withdraw; Latvia wants Russia to stay only three years with one year to withdraw. Let's agree to split the difference at 4 years and 18 months. On Latvia, the issue is Skrunda. If an announcement could be made on the Latvian issue, it would cut the legs out from under grousing in Europe over the future of Russia's relations with the other states. It would reinforce what the world wants to believe about the future of Russian foreign policy. It would go a long way toward wiping out that issue for awhile. I would take personal responsibility for going to the Latvians. I believe it would have a big positive impact on everything we're trying to do. (S)

President Yeltsin: We'll discuss it and I'll get back to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0117-M (1.02)
10/2/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: One-on-One Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter and notetaker)

Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Federation
Interpreter

DATE, TIME: January 15, 1994, 9:00 - 9:20am
AND PLACE: The Kremlin

The President started the conversation by saying that before he came to Moscow, he had worked hard with the G-7 to achieve the three aims which the U.S. and Russia shared: first, to get the next 1.5 billion dollars from the IMF to Russia; second, to get some debt relief (restructuring); third, to get flexibility in the conditions set by the international financial institutions for setting conditions for aid. The G-7 nations agreed to this if the President would push for reforms in Russia, since they believed that President Yeltsin was committed to these reforms.
(S)

President Clinton said that he had asked for today's meeting with President Yeltsin because President Yeltsin had told him on the previous day that there would be some changes in personnel in his government related to economic positions. For example, Gaidar would lead the party of reformers in the parliament. This was, of course, for President Yeltsin, not President Clinton, to decide, and President Clinton had come to better understand during the days he had just spent in Moscow, talking to the people in the streets and in the TV studio, the political pressures facing President Yeltsin. President Yeltsin only wished that as President Yeltsin worked through these issues in the coming days, he would think about what President Clinton was saying.
(S)

President Clinton said President Yeltsin's decision could have an impact on all the individuals who were committed to achieving the desired goals for Russia. President Clinton's credibility was connected to President Yeltsin's indication that he would continue the reforms, which were linked to a specific team of people. Perhaps this would change, but the impression was that

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Yeltsin would continue the reforms, so that people would stay in line to do what they said they would. (S)

President Clinton continued that there should not be a signal that Russia was backing away from financial responsibility and reforms. If this happened, President Clinton would lose credibility with the G-7 and the international financial institutions. (S)

President Clinton indicated that this was what he was up against. He was not trying to interfere in Yeltsin's affairs. He understood Yeltsin's political difficulties, but he needed to say to those who were committed to help Russia that there was someone there who advocated the right long-term economic course. This was what President Clinton wished that Yeltsin would think about as he made his difficult decisions. (S)

President Yeltsin replied that President Clinton saw the situation, and these difficulties did exist. (S)

President Clinton continued that he had two impressions on the basis of his meeting with people in the streets and after the televised part of the TV show. From Yeltsin's point of view, one of these was negative, and the other was positive. The negative aspect was that most ordinary citizens and some well-educated ones did not feel connected to what Yeltsin was doing. They did not feel that their lives had improved. The positive aspect was that they were interested in what was going on and most of them believed that Yeltsin was doing the right thing, that he was on the right side of history. Yeltsin had unleashed democracy, and without that President Clinton's TV show would not have been possible, and the recently held elections would not have been possible. (S)

President Clinton continued that if President Yeltsin ran into problems during the early days of his work with the Duma, he might appeal directly to the people over national television. At home in the U.S. President Clinton found that if Congress did not agree with him, but if the people did, and told their Congressmen, the Congress would vote to support him. (S)

President Clinton continued that the Russian people wished to be with President Yeltsin. They knew that their success depended on President Yeltsin's success. Perhaps President Yeltsin could do such a TV program. The members of the Duma would hear from their constituents and would want to work with the President. This kind of approach works in the U.S. The Russian people are with Yeltsin. It is a struggle. The United States will stay engaged and help as much as possible. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Jan-1994 02:44 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

BURNS@a1@OEOB
BEYRLE@a1@OEOB

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0117-M (1.03)
10/2/2018 KBH

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@a1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE MEETING WITH BELARUS

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<SUBJ>

PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE MEETING WITH BELARUS

HEAD OF STATE SHUSHKEVICH

<TEXT>

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WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, BILL), PREL, US, BO

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE MEETING WITH BELARUS

HEAD OF STATE SHUSHKEVICH

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT

SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN (HEAD OF STATE)

STANISLAV STANISLAVOVICH SHUSHKEVICH

ALSO PRESENT: AMBASSADOR DAVID SWARTZ

(AS NOTETAKER AND INTERPRETER)

TIME AND PLACE:

JANUARY 15, 1994; 4:15 - 4:45 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT'S LIMOUSINE, TRAVELLING

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BETWEEN KUROPATY AND MINSK II AIRPORT

3. CHAIRMAN SHUSHKEVICH BEGAN BY SAYING HE APPRECIATED THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR A PRIVATE CHAT. HE SAID THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BELARUS IS EXTREMELY DELICATE. CURRENT TENSIONS COULD BE EASILY SPARKED INTO OPEN POLITICAL CONFLICT, EVEN SOCIAL TURMOIL. HE SAID HE WANTED TO THANK THE PRESIDENT MOST SINCERELY FOR HIS MESSAGE OF MODERATION AND DETERMINATION NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN BELARUS' INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESS. THIS MESSAGE WAS ALL THE MORE SALUTARY, SHUSHKEVICH CONTINUED, BECAUSE MOST OF THE OBLAST LEADERS ON HIS DELEGATION AT THE BILATERAL MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY REPRESENTED CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS OF BELARUS' POLITICAL SPECTRUM. AFTER THE MEETING, HE SAID, A NUMBER OF THEM CAME UP TO HIM TO SAY THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS HAD CONVINCED THEM THAT AMERICA DOES NOT HAVE SINISTER INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO BELARUS.

4. SHUSHKEVICH SAID HE HAD NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY MARCH, 1994. HE SAID HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ELECTIONS BUT INDICATED THE POLITICAL FORCES AT PLAY IN BELARUS PROBABLY WILL NOT ALLOW A VOTE THAT SOON. GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ECONOMY, AND THUS THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CITIZENS' STANDARD OF LIVING, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO WAIT A BIT LONGER ANYWAY. OTHERWISE, THE HEAVY PROTEST VOTE THAT OCCURRED IN RUSSIA IN DECEMBER COULD BE REPEATED HERE.

5. THE PRESIDENT ASKED SHUSHKEVICH FOR HIS VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA. SHUSHKEVICH REPLIED THAT THE STRONG SHOWING BY ZHIRINOVSKIY AND HIS PARTY IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS WAS REFLECTIVE OF RUSSIANS' UNHAPPINESS AND FRUSTRATION OVER THE SLOWNESS IN MOVING FROM COMMUNISM TO THE PROMISED BETTER LIFE. HE THOUGHT THE INFLUENCE OF BOTH THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ZHIRINOVSKIY-ITES HAS PEAKED WITH THE ELECTIONS. AS PART OF THE ESTABLISHMENT THEY WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO BLAME YELTSIN FOR THE ECONOMIC FAILURES THAT ARE SURELY STILL AHEAD. THEY TOO WILL SHARE IN THAT BLAME. FURTHERMORE, THE COMBINATION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE FACT OF YELTSIN HAVING BEEN POPULARLY ELECTED WILL MEAN HE HAS AMPLE POWER TO DOMINATE THE DUMA OR EVEN DISMISS IT SHOULD STALEMATES ARISE.

6. SHUSHKEVICH CONTINUED THAT RUSSIA IS A HUGE, VERY DIVERSE COUNTRY. SUCH CONDITIONS INVITE POWERFUL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY. EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE OF THIS HETEROGENEITY PERFORCE NECESSITATES THE STRONG LEADERSHIP THAT YELTSIN CAN GIVE. BELARUS IS A DIFFERENT STORY. IT IS A SMALL COUNTRY, ONE WITH A VERY HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY. THE NEED FOR STRONG EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP IS THUS

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LESS.

7. THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO BROADER WORLD ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT ASKED SHUSHKEVICH WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. SHUSHKEVICH REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD LITTLE ABOUT THAT TROUBLED REGION AND DOUBTED OTHERS DID EITHER IF THEY HADN'T SPENT MANY YEARS THERE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN TERMS OF ANTAGONISMS THE MOST HE HAD EVER HEARD BEFORE WAS THAT SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, AND PERHAPS SLOVENIA, DISLIKED THE GERMANS. NO ONE HAD EVER HEARD OF ANTI-MUSLIM PASSIONS OR OF THE INTENSITY OF ANTI-SERB FEELINGS UNTIL THE RECENT VIOLENCE BEGAN.

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WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, BILL), PREL, US, BO

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE MEETING WITH BELARUS HEAD OF STATE SHUSHKEVICH

8. SHUSHKEVICH VOLUNTEERED SOME THOUGHTS ON CHINA. HE HAD SPENT FOUR DAYS THERE IN VERY INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH ALL LAYERS OF SOCIETY AND CAME AWAY WITH THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT EXOGENOUS EFFORTS TO ACCELERATE THE COURSE OF DEMOCRATIZATION WERE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE MASSES ARE POORLY EDUCATED, IF AT ALL. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COPE WITH THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY IF THEY HAD IT.

9. SHUSHKEVICH SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE A VERY SPECIFIC ISSUE, ONE WHICH HE SAID WOULD NO DOUBT MAKE THE INTERPETER (AMBASSADOR SWARTZ) UNCOMFORTABLE. SHUSHKEVICH SAID HE HAD HEARD THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO CHANGE AMBASSADORS IN MINSK. THE LAST THING HE WOULD WANT TO DO IS INTERFERE IN INTERNAL U.S. AFFAIRS, SHUSHKEVICH CONTINUED, BUT IF THERE WERE ANY WAY TO RETHINK THIS DECISION HE WOULD WELCOME IT. THE AMBASSADOR IS PLUGGED IN TO ALL ASPECTS OF BELARUS LIFE. THIS MEANS OF COURSE THAT HE HAS MADE ENEMIES ALONG THE WAY, BUT THAT IS TO BE CONSIDERED AN HONOR. INDEED ONE THING THE AMBASSADOR AND I HAVE IN COMMON, SHUSHKEVICH SAID, IS THAT WE HAVE THE SAME ENEMIES. IF THE PRESIDENT MUST MAKE A CHANGE, HE CONCLUDED, HE SAID HE HOPED SOMEONE EQUALLY CAPABLE COULD BE FOUND.

SWARTZ

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Three-Plus-Three Meeting with President Kravchuk of Ukraine, January 12, 1994 (5 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Patriarch Aleksiy II of Russia, January 13, 1994 (3 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
003. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Trilateral Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on Security Issues, January 14, 1994 (3 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
004. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Second Expanded Bilateral Session with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, January 14, 1994 (8 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
005. cable	re: President's Dinner with President Yeltsin, January 14, 1994 (11 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
006. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Prime Minister Kobich of Belarus, January 15, 1994 (3 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
007. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Members of the Belarusian National Front, January 15, 1994 (2 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Memcon])
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FOLDER TITLE:

9400586

2016-0117-M
 kh1780

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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001 ITOH	Z 94020211 FOR DECISION
001	X 94020417 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
001 ITOH	Z 94020417 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 94020417 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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002	940204	GROSSMAN, M	
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National Security Council
The White House

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Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ASK 2/4</u>	<u>⊗</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>WHL 2/4</u>	<u>⊗</u>
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SUBJECT: MEMCONS FM PRES TRIP TO UKRAINE / RUSSIA & BELARUS 12 - 15 FEB
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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0586

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2016-0117-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's
Trip to Ukraine, Russia and Belarus,
January 12-15, 1994 (S)

Attached at Tabs I through VII are the subject memoranda for use
by Secretary Christopher and transmittal via NODIS cable to the
appropriate country Ambassadors and Charges. A diskette
containing the memoranda is attached for your convenience. (S)

William H. Itoh
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

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Declassify on: OADR

TAB I

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0117-M (1.04)
10/2/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Three-Plus-Three Meeting with President Kravchuk of Ukraine (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
George Sajevich, Interpreter

Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine
Anatoliy Zlenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anton Butenko, National Security Advisor

DATE, TIME: January 12, 1994, 8:20 - 9:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: Borispol Airport, Ukraine

The President: I am delighted to be here. (U)

President Kravchuk: We had a lot to worry about in setting up this meeting, but now everything is fine. (U)

The President: This is a beautiful room. (U)

President Kravchuk: We can show you much better places. (U)

The President: I will give you another chance one day. I was very impressed with your soldiers, playing their instruments in the cold. They showed great pride and spirit. I like that. I also liked your bread and salt ceremony. (U)

President Kravchuk: It's our tradition to meet guests with bread and salt and young girls. Ukrainian girls are famous for their beauty. And if you come in May or June, you will see all the beauty of the country. (U)

The President: I don't really get to see enough of the countries I visit, although I did get to take a run early one morning in Brussels. Mr. Christopher went running early in the morning in Prague. He was the responsible one. (U)

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[Question from the press (Helen Thomas): President Kravchuk, do you think you will be able to implement this agreement with the U.S. on nuclear weapons?] (U)

President Kravchuk: We have prepared certain documents and I am sure with certain assistance we will be able to implement them. (U)

The President: They have good bread here, Helen. This is your kind of place -- they like to eat first, then get down to business. (U)

[Pool spray concludes.]

President Kravchuk: I am glad to greet you here in Ukraine. The agreement the journalists are so fixed on -- it really is an historic moment in our lives. I am speaking not only in terms of global problems, but also in terms of relations between Ukraine and the United States. It might initiate a qualitatively new phase of our lives. As host, I would like you, the guest, to have the chance to express your ideas first. (U)

The President: I am extremely pleased that we have been able to work through this very difficult matter. You have shown enormous vision and courage in your dealings. I know this has been and will be difficult because of people in the Rada who do not agree. But I am here to tell you that I will do everything I can for the people of Ukraine and for you, sir, so that the people of Ukraine will see you have made the right decision. I will do everything I can to see that all commitments are met by all parties. (U)

Second, I want to help you move on to the more important job of stabilizing your economy. The United States wants to help. In the end, your security and the greatness of your nation will depend on your ability to unleash the economic power of your nation and have a security partnership with the United States. That will assure your security more than nuclear weapons could. I can say, for example, that I have just come from meeting with the heads of state of the NATO countries. I think you would have been pleased at the private discussions of the sixteen leaders. Every one of them understands the strategic importance of your independence and wants your country to have a strong and leading role in the center of Europe. (U)

I hope you will join in the Partnership for Peace that we have offered to all the republics of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Our American military leaders are looking forward to military-to-military contacts and working together. I can also say that I told all the leaders at NATO that if we could work through the nuclear issue, we should all take on an economic commitment to Ukraine. On economic issues, I am well aware that putting a stop to inflation will take the same kind of political courage that it took to come to agreement on the nuclear issue. I can say that whatever you do, the United States will do its best to help. But the more you are willing to do, the more I will be able to get assistance from the IMF and World Bank and

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the more people out there will be willing to help. We can talk about the details. (S)

I would like to ask you a question. I would like to know if there is anything I can do or say while I am here, or after I leave, to ease opposition to the deal in the Rada. (U)

President Kravchuk: I thank you for the information about your discussions at NATO. It comes as states there show more respect for Ukraine. I took the political decision on the nuclear problem guided by concern about the future of Ukraine. My executive power stands on my decision and on the position expressed in the documents. Certainly, we will have opposition; I knew we would. Certainly, we should start our broader cooperation so that I can tell our people that after I took this position on the nuclear question, there was a change in attitude toward assistance to our country. That would help. When we have stabilization for our currency and private investment for Ukraine, then everyone will understand that the agreements signed by the three Presidents were the only possible step. (S)

We have managed these agreements thanks to the position of the United States. That is why your visit is of historic importance. The position of the United States as guarantor of the documents to be signed will raise the authority of the documents and of all of us. Problems are grave in the economy, especially inflation and problems of conversion. These are important and difficult. There are technical problems with elimination of the weapons and ensuring the rights of Strategic Rocket Forces officers, especially housing. We hope this will be sorted out in the way we agreed and put in documents we will sign. I hope our experts will be able to finish the charter and the agreements on technical programs. (S)

We shall act in accordance with the agreements we are going to sign. I am glad all the parties will do everything they can to implement the agreements. This is important for us and for Russia -- especially for Russia, where political and economic processes are not so stable. The United States can become the guarantor of the agreements and use its authority. (S)

The President: We should decide on when you will visit Washington. I would like to suggest to you the second week in March, the week of March 12. I know that you have parliamentary elections coming up at the end of March and you will be campaigning, so I wanted to be sure the time would be convenient for you. (U)

President Kravchuk: [After consulting with Mr. Zlenko and Mr. Butenko] The week of March 12 will be fine. (U)

The President: We will be back to you shortly with an exact date. Between the visit of the economic delegation and your visit in March we can work out some aspects of our economic cooperation. We also have to get the negotiations completed for compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons that were

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transferred from Ukraine in 1991 and 1992. We are supposed to have that question decided by May 14. I will talk to Mr. Yeltsin about starting those negotiations in February. (S)

President Kravchuk: We are also interested in seeing the beginning of real activity. We have to start work on the strategic complexes. We have funds available for their safe and secure dismantlement. (U)

The President: We have made available at least \$175 million in Nunn-Lugar funds. I think you know that those funds can extend to defense conversion and the other areas you mentioned. Secretary Christopher told you in October that we can commit to \$155 million this year. This is an absolute minimum. We can do more, but how much more depends in large measure on what you do with reform. We have also decided to commit to an Enterprise Fund for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova -- \$40 million in 1994, but we can build on it. It is very important to start. We are also prepared to support both trade and investment. We will do what we can. (S)

As I said, there are difficult decisions for you to make. Any help we give will not be effective unless you slow the rate of inflation. But I think we can do much here. I was please to see how clearly the NATO leaders understand. If you get started, the rest of the world will be ready to come here and help in whatever way possible. I believe if you go forward you could expect to receive between \$3 and 3.5 billion in the first year alone. (S)

I would like to mention one more thing of special interest to Ukraine. I am exploring with the other G-7 nations the possibility of setting up a program with the IMF to pay for energy imports. I believe I will be able to successfully persuade the G-7 to do so. So that, Mr. President is most of what I want to say. I am very impressed by your courage and vision on the nuclear issue. We can do more if you can move forward on reform. And we can get others to help as well, with trade and investment and in other areas. (S)

President Kravchuk: Thank you, Mr. President, for your good words. Your proposals and forecasts are of great importance for Ukraine and its independence. Tomorrow we will be considering in the Cabinet of Ministers the budget for next year. It is based on economic reform and a strict privatization policy. Our delegation to visit the United States will have all these materials and programs to show you. Ukraine would like to take the path of reform and democratization in the world. You should also know that now is a time of hardship for us. Energy prices have risen 5000 times over the past few years and the military complex is 33 percent of the defense industrial capacity of the former Soviet Union. (S)

The President: The world community should understand that the combination of military burden and energy burden that you bear are really quite unique. That is one reason why I would like to see a specific energy proposal out of the G-7. Then we could

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move on to other broad problems. You must get the inflation rate down to deal with the economy. You have managed well considering the problems you have. Secretary Christopher has something to add. (e)

Secretary Christopher: In an excess of caution I would like to say something about the signing ceremony. It will be an historic event and a celebration. It will not be a negotiating session. We are prepared to move promptly on the compensation issue, but it would be disconcerting if we moved to start negotiating on Friday. With regard to the confidential side letters, the United States intends to do everything it can to keep confidential their existence and their contents. In closing, I would like to thank President Kravchuk and his colleagues for their cooperation in these very important negotiations. (e)

The President: May I ask one more question? I would like to take this opportunity to get the benefit of your thinking on political conditions in Russia. What do you think about Zhirinovsky? Will there be any changes in the foreign policy of Russia? What do you think? (e)

President Kravchuk: On Zhirinovsky -- if it were only him, there would be no worries. But there are two forces very close to him, the communists and the peasants and in those two parties there is a majority. The only guarantee is the adoption of the constitution. But this is possible only while Yeltsin is in office. But there is no eternal president and we worry about expansion. There are extremist forces in Russia and Ukraine. My vision is to support Russia; otherwise, the situation in Russia will become more tense. Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin understand. Now there is no serious worry or danger but the situation is not stable. Russians were brought up in greatness. They dream of empire, especially the officers of the army. There are millions of them, especially in the Black Sea Fleet. They gave a lot of votes to Zhirinovsky, then to the communists, then to Gaidar. These are true data. That is why I told Mr. Yeltsin in Ashgabat to cooperate in a closer way. I think your participation in the processes may stop the negative trends. We too have nationalists, forces opposing the President on nuclear weapons. They are not numerous but we should not give them the possibility to spread. They are ready for unthinkable actions. They are actually speculating on the situation and making it even worse. Actually, I can now hold the political situation, but it is a hard process. Ukraine as a country will play a stabilizing role. The world public will understand the documents we sign the day after tomorrow, our cooperation in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

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TAB II

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0117-M (1.05)
10/2/2013 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Patriarch Aleksiy II of Russia
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
John Beyrle, Director for Russia, Ukraine and
Eurasia Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Kiril Borisov, Interpreter

Aleksiy II, Patriarch
Metropolitan Kiril of Smolensk and
Kaliningrad

DATE, TIME January 13, 1994, 4:35 - 5:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kuntsevo Hospital, Moscow

Patriarch Aleksiy II: I am sorry that I must greet you in a hospital. I had wanted you to be able to visit me at our monastery. But I thank you for coming to see me here. I know that you have a very busy schedule, and I consider this a mark of respect for the spiritual values that we represent. (U)

I would like to offer our profound condolences on the death of your mother. I know that this happened on the eve of your departure from the United States. With your permission, I would like to offer a prayer for the eternal repose of your mother. [All stand for prayer and moment of silence.] (U)

I know that your time is limited. I would like briefly to tell you about the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. For more than 1000 years we have spread the word of God throughout Russia. Recently we passed through a difficult period, one that can genuinely be called genocidal. It is difficult for Westerners to imagine the repression and persecution that believers in our church were forced to suffer. For this reason, we welcome with all of our heart and soul the democratic changes taking place in our society, including the freedom of conscience. (U)

We do not want to be a state church; we want to remain outside of religion. Still, the moral condition of our society is not a matter of indifference to us. We want to bring the spiritual condition back to health after the last seventy-plus years. One service we can perform is peacemaking among that nations of the

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CIS. Ours is not just a Russian church; it goes beyond the current borders of Russia into the former USSR. We try to preserve stability and to further peace and prevent the incitement of ethnic strife and hatred. Recently, at our initiative, meetings were held in Azerbaijan between representatives of the Muslim and Armenian churches. And in October, I conducted talks between the government and Supreme Soviet. I had been in the United States; when I left, I had no idea I would need to mediate this conflict. I wanted only to prevent bloodshed. I felt that only the Church could restrain the warring sides. (U)

In June 1994, in either Moscow or Minsk, there will be a conference on the Christian faith and human animosity. The American National Council of Churches of Christ is providing us great deal of help in this. I received a telegram from them this week asking me to convey their condolences to you. (U)

Mr. President, we cannot but help be concerned by the results of the recent election in Russia. And we are concerned by the violations of human rights and freedom of conscience, especially in Ukraine, where the Orthodox Church is subjected to repressive methods from official sources because the liturgy requires that they mention their subservience to the Patriarchy of Moscow. We are also concerned by the situation in the Baltic states. (U)

We are extremely grateful for the help you are giving Russia during this difficult period, and would like to thank the American people through you for the help you have given us. We have set up an infrastructure to distribute humanitarian aid and ensure that it reaches those who really need it. (U)

The short time we have doesn't give us much time for discussion. But if you'd allow me, I could send you a letter through Ambassador Pickering. (U)

I do have one question: I know that many in the United States don't understand our position on matters of faith and the law on religions. There are no restrictions now on the freedom of conscience. But we would want to disallow those who come in under the cloak of religion to spread hateful propaganda. After the 75-year spiritual vacuum we have lived through, any religious leader who speaks to the people receives attention. Certain sects and teachings are permitted to proselytize here more than in any other country. (U)

The President: I was sad that we were unable to meet this past fall. But I am sure you did the right thing by returning home. As you may know, I first came to Russia as a student 24 years ago. My first impression upon returning is one of joy that people have the freedom of worship again. Today I visited the church on Red Square that you have just rebuilt. (U)

Patriarch Aleksiy II: It was just rechristened. (U)

The President: I lit a candle in memory of my mother. And I was

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glad to see so many young people. 24 years ago this month, I visited the Novodevichy Monastery. They were in the midst of a funeral, and I was struck by how devout and strong the believers were, but it seemed then that they were all older people. Today I saw so many young people, and it gladdened my heart. (U)

Patriarch Aleksiy II: This is true not just in Moscow. I have visited 18 regions of Russia and the same thing can be seen there, too. (U)

The President: I also appreciate your comments on religious liberty. My church was supporting for many years the right of Russians to worship. I am a Baptist, which is the largest denomination in the United States. So many of the leaders of my church asked me about the Law on Religions and so I am glad to hear your answer. I agree with you that people who couldn't worship for years are easy prey for false preachings. But they need to keep their eyes open so that when they hear the truth, they can have faith in it. I also appreciate your support for reform. I hope during this trip that I can convey to ordinary citizens that the United States is committed to the economic restoration of the country so that each person can live up to his spiritual potential. The recent elections made clear that many people do not see a better life coming out of this transition period and don't believe that society will get better. And when a great people cannot imagine a great future for themselves, they of course look backward. So I hope that through TV broadcasts, or meetings in the street, they'll feel that the U.S. is helping. (U)

The spiritual dimension is definitely important. When I heard how the Kazan Cathedral was destroyed and rebuilt, I was deeply moved. I hope that you will feel free to write to me and send messages. The future of your country is important to the U.S. and the whole world. And you will have a lot to say about how it all comes out. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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TAB III

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0117-M (1.06)
10/2/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Trilateral Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on Security Issues (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
William Miller, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State (Designate)
Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
LTG Michael Ryan, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

Russia
Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Viktor Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister
Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister
Yuri Baturin, Secretary of National Security
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
General Pavel Grachev, Defense Minister
Dmitriy Ryurikov, President's National Security Advisor

Ukraine
Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine
Yukhym Zwigilskiy, Acting Prime Minister
Anatoliy Zlenko, Foreign Minister
General Vitaliy Radetsky, Defense Minister
Anton Buteyko, President's National Security Advisor
Yevhen Marchuk, Security Minister
Valeriy Shmarov, Deputy Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 14, 1994, 8:35 - 8:55 a.m.
St. Catherine's Hall, The Kremlin

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President Yeltsin: Respected colleagues, we must put to rest one of the last problems of the Cold War. With this agreement, we will cement the global regime of nonproliferation, give impulse to radical reductions and remove the remaining barrier to disarmament. Our signature on the documents has legal, political and moral power. Each of us is writing a letter to our colleagues, making a package of documents with the Trilateral Statement and Annex. The letters are part of the package. They represent a balance of interests for the national security of all parties. We each entertained compromises and did not surrender positions of principle. We are giving Ukraine the opportunity to start in practice to implement independence while maintaining a policy of denuclearization. Its nuclear weapons are to be withdrawn within 28 & 1/2 months beginning on January 14 for their subsequent dismantling -- a minimum of 200 in the first 10 months. This is a very important beginning to a process. Russia and the U.S. will give full guarantees of security, as a sign of friendship and good neighborliness -- safely cementing it. (S)

Russia will give just compensation for strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations to agree on amount of compensation for the highly enriched uranium (HEU) in tactical nuclear weapons that were withdrawn from Ukraine. This must be done in a way that corresponds with the Massandra accords. We will do everything necessary to maintain ecological safety and will take into account costs to Russia for storage and transport of weapons. The United States will also extend substantial assistance. And the United States and Russia will have the possibility to proceed to ratify and implement START II. We are already ready to begin discussing further reductions with the United States, and further measures to enhance strategic stability, like the detargeting initiative we will announce today. (S)

I would like to underline the constructive role of Bill Clinton in developing and building a formula for agreement. I also applaud the willingness of the United States to work with Belarus and Kazakhstan as well as Ukraine on peaceful uses of nuclear material. (U)

[Yeltsin offers floor to the President; the President turns to President Kravchuk.]

President Kravchuk: I am sure we will sign the documents today because they are ready to sign, are they not? We have taken an enormous step in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Our agreements make this possible. They are a sign of mutual understanding of the problems of Ukraine and the good will to work on them. We again confirm that there is no alternative to nuclear disarmament. We will take the stable path. We will do everything possible so that the trilateral process works. From our side, the state of Ukraine will strictly adhere to the agreement. We are sure this will happen. I thank the United States and Russia for understanding the problems of Ukraine and for your readiness to assist us. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill? (U)

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The President: Thank you very much. I want to commend you both on your wisdom and vision. I am very glad to have had the opportunity to be personally involved, as I know the Vice President is. I will continue to be personally involved. We must work to the end to keep our commitments. I am glad to hear you both say you feel the same way. I believe this agreement makes the world safer and each of our countries more secure. I am especially pleased to see the development of progress between Ukraine and Russia. As both President Yeltsin and President Kravchuk said to me separately, it is in Russia's interest for Ukraine to be stable and strong and it is in Ukraine's interest for Russia to be stable. Both countries have much potential to offer. The United States will actively participate in developing partnership among us. (C)

I'd like to end by drawing your attention to this tie a friend gave me over Christmas. He said it's a good symbol of my presidency. It says "carpe diem" -- seize the day. And you have done exactly that. I am convinced that in times of change those who survive are those who seize the day. We have all said enough. I think we should go sign the agreements. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you -- but we have to do the exchange of letters first. As I understand I pass this letter to President Clinton and I am expecting a letter from Leonid Makarovich. (C)

[All review letters.]

President Yeltsin: I am satisfied. Let's go into the adjacent hall for the signing. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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TAB IV

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0117-M (1.07)
10/2/2013 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Second Expanded Bilateral Session with
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
David Gergen, Counselor to the President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
(Designate)
Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy
Dr. Lynn Davis, Under Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs
LTG Michael Ryan, Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russia,
Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, NSC Staff
(Notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian
Federation
Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister
Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the
U.S.
Yurii Baturin, Secretary of National Security
Council
Viktor Ilyushin, Advisor to President Yeltsin
General Pavel Grachev, Defense Minister
Sergey Filatov, Chief of Presidential
Administration
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Oleg Lobov, Head of National Security Council
Dmitriy Ryurikov, President's National
Security Advisor

DATE, TIME January 14, 1994, 9:35 - 11:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: St. Catherine's Hall, The Kremlin

The President: Mr. President, today we are going to talk about
security and foreign policy. Thank you again for the dinner. I
ate so much that I don't know if I feel more or less secure. (U)

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President Yeltsin: From the medicinal point of view, all of it was beneficial. (U)

The President: In no area have the results of our cooperation and partnership been more dramatic than in the area of arms control and nonproliferation. (U)

Successful agreement on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) underpins the broad scope of future space cooperation, including our Space Station partnership. The United States supports full Russian membership in the MTCR. We have gone a long way toward the mutual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from Belarus and Kazakhstan. Where Ukraine is concerned, the agreement we celebrated today shows how far we've come in the past year. And our cooperation on safe and secure dismantlement has advanced to include a broad scope of cooperation, including defense conversion. You asked me yesterday to commit to allocating ten percent of Nunn-Lugar funds directly to research facilities and I have promised to do so. (C)

I am also very pleased that we are signing today the contract for the purchase of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia. You and I have been wanting to do this since Vancouver. The contract is worth at least \$12 billion to Russia over the 20-year life of the contract. This is a very positive initiative. (U)

President Yeltsin: [Nodding.] Yes. (U)

The President: Let me take a few minutes to talk about the momentum of arms control -- how to keep going to resolve old business and begin new. We must proceed as rapidly as possible to implement START I. The Ukraine agreement signed today will help us to do that. I think we should also look forward to the ratification of START II. We should discuss how we will press ahead with START II -- how you intend to press ahead with the new parliament. (U)

Now let's talk about the old business of biological weapons, which we have discussed before. I understand that you have made a personal commitment to end the offensive biological weapons program that you inherited from the Soviet Union when you became President of Russia. (U)

[Yeltsin nods.]

Our people believe that there is still illegal work going on -- our specialists have handed your side a report summarizing our concerns. I look forward to continuing to work with you to resolve this problem. (C)

[Yeltsin shakes his head vigorously and continues to shake his head, pointing to Minister of Defense Grachev, who also shakes his head.]

President Yeltsin: There is no illegal work. (U)

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The President: I am glad we have accelerated progress on chemical weapon issues. The U.S. and Russia have the largest CW stockpiles and we should lead the way on early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States is seeking Senate ratification by July -- we hope the Russian parliament will, too. (C)

President Yeltsin: We have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are not producing any new weapons. (C)

[Minister of Defense Grachev, in a quiet aside to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, says that Russia has not ratified the CWC and that he will tell the U.S. side Russian plans in that regard.]

The President: We have asked you to ratify by July. If you have already ratified, then we have to do a Bilateral Destruction Agreement that is consistent with the CWC. That's our next job. (C)

Now, on fissile materials: we already have broad agreement on the potential for progress. We appreciate the support you have given for a multilateral convention banning production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. I welcome your willingness to place materials under international safeguards. I think we should plan bilateral expert talks on this subject. I also want to welcome the Chernomyrdin-Gore working groups on shutting down plutonium production reactors and on nuclear material control and accounting. These are big issues for us, too, and we look forward to working with you on them. (U)

On the question of regional security threats -- it is important work closely on issues affecting North Korea, the Middle East, Iraq and South Asia. We have done a lot since Vancouver on replacing COCOM with a regime in which Russia would be an original member. We have a joint statement in that regard. It confirms Russia's readiness to end arms trade with Iran, Libya, Iraq and North Korea. (U)

President Yeltsin: [Interrupting:] Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea? (U)

The President: Yes. We think the advantages of membership in this COCOM follow-on regime far outweigh the profits from arms sales to these countries. Last night we had a short discussion of the Iran issue. You reminded me that the submarine sale was made under the USSR, before you became President of Russia. Our State Department believes that your sales have been more extensive. I want to do a few more issues, then give the floor to Dr. Lynn Davis, who knows the facts on Iran. (C)

Regarding the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we will need to work closely to secure the agreement of those countries still straddling the fence to the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. (U)

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I've also been very glad to hear that we have been able to work together on a Comprehensive Test Ban. I appreciate that you've continued the testing moratorium despite the recent Chinese test. I hope we can continue our bilateral cooperation on CTB issues as well as coordinate our positions among the P-5, anticipating the formal opening of CTB negotiations later this month. (U)

I'd like to mention a few more issues. As you know, we are proceeding with a welcome first step in strategic disengagement, joint detargeting. Now we have to move to fuller strategic disengagement. Our experts will be meeting later this month to discuss joint measures such as notifying strategic forces exercises. These measures help lend credibility to what we are both trying to achieve to lessen tensions. (C)

The last issue I'd like to discuss has to do with the ABM Treaty. I'm pleased with the progress we've made in technical talks on the recent U.S. proposals to multilateralize the ABM Treaty and create a demarcation between "theater" and "strategic" missile defenses. (C)

Minister Grachev: [Interrupting:] Strategic and non-strategic. (U)

The President: Yes. As you know, we take the ABM Treaty very seriously. We intend to work with you to make sure that this treaty regime continues intact. In that regard, I have a suggestion I would like to put to you on the ABM site at Skrunda, Latvia. (C)

President Yeltsin: Skrunda? (U)

The President: Yes, the ABM radar at Skrunda. I understand you need a reasonable time to withdraw from that site. That is truly understandable, but I wanted to raise with you the possibility of splitting the difference in your negotiations with Latvia over the withdrawal. Because of the other issues we have to address in Estonia, if we deal well with this issue in Latvia it would really help to send a good signal about our partnership and Russia's leadership role in Europe. It would have a positive impact on our Partnership for Peace discussions all across Europe. As I understand the present state of the negotiations, Russia is asking for five years of continued presence at the radar site and two years to withdraw, while Latvia is asking for three years of presence and one year to withdraw. I would suggest that you split the difference. If you are willing, I will do everything I can to secure Latvia's agreement to a four-year, eighteen-month split. (C)

Now I would like to turn to Dr. Davis so that she can go over the facts on the Iran arms sales to clear the air. (U)

Dr. Davis: Russia is now Iran's major arms supplier, the only country sending modern weapons to Iran. These deliveries amounted to \$600 million this year and included advanced fighter aircraft and tanks as well as the missiles to be delivered by

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these sophisticated aircraft. I have shared these details with some of your staff. The COCOM regime will end in the next month, to be replaced with a new export control regime that would have Russia as one of its original members. With that membership will come the benefits of high-technology trade in arms. In that context, I hope you will make it possible to end the sale of arms to Iran, one of the most serious threats facing you and us. (S)

President Yeltsin: We have a full plate of issues -- of course, they are no less relevant for us than they are for you. We will begin with some issues to be discussed by the Minister of Defense, then I will discuss other issues. (U)

Minister Grachev: Taking into account the fact that we have quite a few issues to touch on, I would like to begin with biological weapons. We understand your anxiety, but I would like to inform you that in the context of the 1992 Trilateral Statement, your and UK experts visited two facilities after September 1992 and one in St. Petersburg before September 1992. We have agreed on a further schedule of visits and working group meetings. In response to your lingering concerns, we are prepared to organize visits of your experts to any other facility and also information exchanges to deal with any uncertainty. But these activities can only take place on a reciprocal basis. We work from that principle with you; we must insist on reciprocity. We also want to work with you on an international verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. (S)

On chemical weapons, we have encountered problems with implementation. This is an economic matter. (S)

President Yeltsin: [Interrupting:] But we will not produce, just destroy. (U)

Minister Grachev: With the resolution of three major tasks, we will be able to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. The first is conversion of production facilities, the second is financing of destruction and the third is preparing facilities for the physical process of elimination. We need to resolve these tasks in the fastest possible time in order to ease ratification of the convention. It is very important for there to be some economic benefits. We have to be able to demonstrate that value is being extracted from chemical weapons plants through conversion. In order to be able to sell the convention to our Parliament, we will have to be able to show that we are getting value for the facilities. (S)

On the fissile material cutoff, we do not see a problem with concluding this on a bilateral basis. This is indicated by the way in which you stopped production of weapons grade plutonium. I would like to inform you that we will cease to operate plutonium production reactors by the year 2000. We believe it would serve our mutual interests if production of fissionable materials would be halted not only by the nuclear powers but also by the nuclear threshold states. We are not opposed to multilateral negotiations in this regard. (U)

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Where nuclear testing is concerned, the position of Russia is known. Boris Nikolayevich (Yeltsin) has expressed it. We are ready to go further, that is, to proceed to multilateral negotiations with the participation of the nuclear powers, but involving as large a number of countries as possible -- those that are on the threshold. We want to ensure that nuclear tests by all countries are halted and that effective verification of this occurs by national technical means. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. I would like to dwell on several other issues. First, our partnership relationship. It will be important to develop global stability on the basis of a new system of international relations involving an active U.S.-Russian partnership. That formula could be laid out in a joint document defining various aspects of our partnership. Second, on detargeting, I suggest that we set up a delegation to proceed with bilateral discussion of an agreement on detargeting. Third, on the ABM Treaty: I am prepared to respond positively to your proposal on Latvia, to proceed with a four-year, eighteen-month formula, but at the same time I request that you make a statement on the rights of the Russia-speaking population in Latvia. (S)

Now, on neutron-beam weapons: I understand that you are conducting laboratory tests of neutron beam weapons. We should either agree to develop these weapons together, or perhaps you could tell us that you are not developing them. (S)

We are for START III. Our newly elected Parliament will ratify START II and we are ready to do the next step with you. We must level the balance among the various branches of the strategic forces -- submarines and missiles, silo-based, mobile and advanced types. We are engaged in a pace of warhead destruction that is 1000 per month. We will continue along this front, as we agreed with you. (S)

On testing -- we are for a Comprehensive Test Ban. We are glad that the moratorium is continuing but need a greater step. If you and I decide then the other nuclear powers will join in this wise move. (S)

We support your initiative on the nonproliferation of missile technology and are glad to adhere to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Although we had preliminary discussions with Iran, in March 1993 we denied Iran delivery of heavy water reactors. I agree with Ms. Davis that we have agreement about the supply of weapons to Iran. However, it is difficult for us to revoke the contract because we would pay penalties amounting to \$4.3 billion. Of course, we understand your view and will do our best to lessen the volume of deliveries. (S)

On biological and chemical weapons, as the Minister of Defense told you, everything you said is so. We have agreed with you on CW destruction and your assistance, amounting to \$30 million.

(S)

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I would in conclusion agree with you about regional problems -- Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The time has come for us to proceed to propose an initiative to reshape world institutions such as the United Nations and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as other institutions that work in the old way. They do not stand up to current requirements. This is a very good time to come up with a common position on this, because it is the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. It is possible to move a very serious way. I would also like to ask you to recognize the Commonwealth of Independent States as a world institution and part of the international world structure. (S)

The President: First, I want to say how much I appreciate your openness and the straightforward manner in which you are discussing these matters. If we are going to be friends and partners, we have to talk as we are today. I welcome General Grachev's statement on the BW visits. We will follow up on that. Second, with regard to the question of neutron beam research, we are not developing a weapon. Let us get our experts together to compare notes and recommend steps to address your concerns. I do not want you to be concerned about this. We will follow up with whatever steps are necessary to alleviate your concerns. (S)

President Yeltsin: And then in one and the same stroke we would resolve the problem of external intelligence. (S)

The President: Yes. With regard to your interest in the Global Protection System: we have been doing a total review of our defense policy, one aspect of which is what should be the follow-up to the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have now finished that review, so our experts should meet and discuss what to do next with the Global Protection System program. (S)

On START III, I think it would be appropriate to assign a group of experts to discuss this issue, but I am concerned that we not go too far before we ratify START II and implement START I and II. It would be useful to develop a framework for discussion of START III, but I don't want to get so far ahead that people are concerned that our words are outrunning our deeds. (S)

President Yeltsin: [Nods.]

The President: On Latvia, I understand that you are not prepared to respond to our suggestion. On the rights of the Russians there, I understand that the CSCE has sent a special team to Latvia to look into the minority rights issue. Perhaps we should let that team complete their work and then return to the idea. [Responding to comment that Yeltsin had responded favorably to timeframe suggestion:] Good, let us pursue this approach now and as part of it I will make a statement on the rights of Russian minorities. We will contact the Latvians immediately. (S)

Mr. Lobov: What about recognizing the CIS? (U)

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The President: [To Yeltsin:] Since you and I have never discussed reform of the United Nations, I don't know what to say about it --but I do think it's worth looking at. Let's get our Foreign Ministers together to discuss it. (C)

President Yeltsin: Yes, let's get our Foreign Ministers together. (U)

The President: For my last point, I wanted to mention the positive sign of partnership that I take from our discussions of Skrunnda, neutron weapons, START III and GPS. We need an active Russian-American partnership, but we have to be careful how we characterize that relationship to the rest of the world. The whole reason the United States did the Partnership for Peace was so that two powerful partners like Russia and the United States would not get together and divide Europe again. If we lead in the proper way, we have a chance to help create if not a united Europe, then an integrated Europe -- not divided for the first time in its history. People are concerned at how America is characterizing its role. We have to be careful how others look at us -- so people don't think we're dividing Europe. We have a remarkable partnership, but we have to be careful how we characterize it so that people don't think that we are carving up their countries and predetermining their futures. (C)

President Yeltsin: [Nodding.] All right, we should go to our press conference. Since it was to start at 10:45, it's already underway. [Time: 11:15.] (U)

The President: Good, then we don't have to answer many questions. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S DINNER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
JANUARY 14, 1994

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. THIS CABLE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR CLEARANCE.
3. SUMMARY: IN A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT DOMESTIC AND WORLD AFFAIRS ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 13TH. PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND PRESIDENT CLINTON TALKED ABOUT THE TRILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR UKRAINE AND

ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED ATTITUDES IN THE COUNTRY AMONG THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE, PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NEW EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THE PARLIAMENT, AND RUSSIAN INTEREST IN REDUCING ARMS TRADE WITH IRAN AND OPENING UP THE SANCTIONS REGIME AGAINST IRAQ IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE IRAQI REPAYMENT OF A PORTION OF ITS DEBT OO RUSSIA.

THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF MILITARY COOPERATION AS WELL AS BOSNIA. PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN BOTH DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT RELATIONSHIP TO THE FUTURE OF WORLD STABILITY AND PEACE, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SIGNALLED A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN HIS CABINET, DROPPING FORMER PRIME MINISTER GAYDAR TO WORK IN THE LOWER-HOUSE OF THE NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATURE.

PRESIDENT CLINTON EXPLAINED THE CONCEPT OF ENSURING A LONG TERM PEACE IN EUROPE THROUGH FRANK CONSULTATION AND STRONG AND CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT WITH CARE TAKEN TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE INTEREST OF OTHERS.
END SUMMARY.

4. THE PRESIDENT MET WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE DACHA AT NOVA OGAREVA OUTSIDE OF MOSCOW ON JANUARY 14TH FOR A DINNER IN WHICH A NUMBER OF BUSINESS ISSUES AROSE. THIS MEMCOM RECORDS THE BUSINESS DISCUSSION. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY BENSON, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE STROBE TALBOTT AND AMBASSADOR PICKERING. PRESIDENT YELTSIN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PRIME MINISTER CHRNOMYRDIN, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SOSKOVETS, FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV AND BY HIS LEGAL ADVISOR ILLYUSHIN.

5. AFTER OPENING PLEASANTRIES, PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO HAVING HAD A CHANCE TO SEE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON THE STREETS OF MOSCOW. HE TOLD PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT HE HAD PASSED ON HIS CONCERNS TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S ADVISORS ABOUT THE PEOPLE AND THEIR REACTIONS.

6. PRESIDENT YELTSIN CHANGED THE SUBJECT AND NOTED MRS. YELTSIN HAD CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO A WONDERFUL ARTICLE "IZVESTIA" NEWSPAPER HAD RUN ON PRESIDENT CLINTON. THE ARTICLE ALSO COVERED MRS. CLINTON'S ACTIVITIES.

7. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN RETURNED TO THE INITIAL COMMENT ABOUT PEOPLE BEING WORRIED. THEY ARE CRITICAL OF US AND THEY ARE CERTAINLY RIGHT, HE SAID. TO DO BETTER, I HAVE SENT SERGEI ALEXANDROVICH FILATOV, THE KREMLIN CHIEF-OF-STAFF, TO LEARN ABOUT YOUR SYSTEM. WE ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT ABOUT HOW TO BE MORE EFFICIENT AT OUR WORK AND TO SPREAD THE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THOSE WHO CAN CARRY THEM OUT. THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR COLLKAGUES IN THE CABINET IS STRONG AND WE HAVE A STRONG CABINET.

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8. PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO SPREAD AROUND THE DECISION MAKING. "IF I DON'T HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION, I ASK THE CABINET TO DO IT." PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED AND SAID THAT IT IS THE SAME IN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. MRS. YELTSIN HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT APPEARED AS IF THE AMERICANS HAD A GOOD ORGANIZATION FOR RUNNING THEIR GOVERNMENT AND QUESTIONED WHY HE DID NOT TAKE SOME LESSONS FROM THEM.

9. PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT THERE IS AN OLD SAYING ABOUT A PROPHET WITHOUT HONOR IN HIS OWN COUNTRY. HE THEN COMPLIMENTED VICE PRESIDENT GORE, NOTING THAT HE RELIED HEAVILY

ON THE VICE PRESIDENT WHO HAS AN EXCELLENT MIND, DOES MANY DIFFERENT THINGS AND DOES THEM WELL. PRESIDENT CLINTON THEN THANKED PRESIDENT YELTSIN FOR WORKING SO CLOSELY WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN AND THE LATTER FOR HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION.

10. PRESIDENT CLINTON TURNED THEN TO THE RECEPTION WHICH HE HAD JUST COME FROM AT SPASO HOUSE NOTING THAT HE HAD MET MANY REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS PARTIES. PRESIDENT YELTSIN ASKED IF MEMBERS OF THE UPPER-HOUSE WERE THERE AND PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THESE PARLIAMENTARIANS REMINDED HIM OF HOME. MANY HAD DIFFERENT IDEAS AND SOME OF THEM WERE QUITE GOOD. WE TRY TO MAKE IT A PRACTICE OF LOOKING AT THESE GOOD IDEAS AS A WAY TO IMPROVE OUR JOB PERFORMANCE. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID HE VERY MUCH AGREED AND THAT HE TOO WANTED TO WORK WITH THE PARLIAMENTARIANS ON THEIR IDEAS.

11. PRESIDENT CLINTON REMARKED THAT ONE OF THE BIGGEST SURPRISES FOR HIM IN COMING INTO OFFICE WAS GAINING A CLEAR VIEW OF WHAT HE COULD DO AND WHAT HE COULD NOT DO AS PRESIDENT. IN SOME AREAS IT IS MUCH HARDER TO ACT THAN OTHERS, HE SAID, AND IN SOME AREAS HE CAN DO MORE. HE ALSO NOTED TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY SOME OF THE IMPROVED FIGURES ON THE ECONOMY WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED THAT MORNING, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF THE DEFICIT FROM 20 TO 9 PERCENT, THE IMPROVED FIGURES ON BRINGING DOWN INFLATION, AND THE FIGURES WHICH SHOWED THAT THE RUBLE WAS BEING STABILIZED OVER TIME.

12. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THERE ARE STILL LOTS OF DIFFICULTIES AHEAD IN 1994. "SINCE LAST JANUARY WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND I FIRST GOT ENGAGED IN THESE

PROBLEMS THERE HAVE BEEN MANY CHANGES AND DIFFICULTIES. THE GENTLEMAN SITTING NEXT TO THE PRIME MINISTER, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SOSKOVETS IS PARTICULARLY AWARE OF THESE SINCE HE REPRESENTS OUR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION SECTOR. IF THINGS GO WRONG THEY ARE GOING TO BE HIS RESPONSIBILITY."

13. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN SAID TOMORROW WE EXPECT WE CAN DISCUSS MILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS QUESTIONS, EXCEPT OF COURSE FOR UKRAINE WHICH IS NOW SETTLED AND ON WHICH WE EXPECT TO HAVE A SIGNING. HE NOTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WOULD BE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AMERICAN INFORMATION ON UKRAINE. (EARLIER, PRESIDENT CLINTON SPOKE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ABOUT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAD COME UP OVER THE DAY, IN CONFORMING THE AGREEMENT TEXT AND SOME CHANGES THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED TO INTRODUCE, AND ASKED HIM NOT TO DO SO.) YELTSIN CONTINUED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD AGREEMENT AND THAT IT WAS GOOD FOR ALL THE PARTIES. HE NOTED THE TWENTY-EIGHT AND ONE-HALF MONTHS THAT THE UKRAINIANS HAD AGREED, IN THE SECRET LETTER, TO BE THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THEY WOULD DISMANTLE AND MOVE ALL WARHEADS OUT OF UKRAINE. AND TOMORROW, PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID, "WE WILL MEET AND THEN GO INTO THE ROOM AND SIGN THE OTHER AGREEMENTS AND ANSWER A FEW QUESTIONS. THAT HAS ALL BEEN AGREED BY OUR PROTOCOL PEOPLE AND AFTER THAT WE WILL NOT PAY ANYMORE ATTENTION TO KRAVCHUK, WHO WILL LEAVE."

14. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID, HE WOULD WORK TO HONOR THE AGREEMENTS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT HIS PEOPLE HAD TO DO THE TECHNICAL WORK IN UKRAINE ON THE MISSILES. HE SAID, "WE CAN NOT BE RESPONSIBLE, HOWEVER, FOR THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THOSE WARHEADS AND MISSILES IF WE ARE NOT PERMITTED ACCESS TO THEM OR TO RECEIVE THEM BACK IN THIS COUNTRY." WHEN WE DISMANTLE THEM WE WILL GET BACK THE NUCLEAR FUEL. AS YOU KNOW, HE TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON, WE WILL GIVE UKRAINE ONE HUNDRED TONS OF URANIUM (REFERRING TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLIES CONTAINING LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM) AND WE WILL RECEIVE BACK THE FIRST TWO HUNDRED WARHEADS.

15. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN SAID "IZVESTIA" HAD WRITTEN THAT IF THEY WERE WRITING THE PROGRAM FOR BILL CLINTON IN RUSSIA THEY WOULD HAVE DONE IT DIFFERENTLY. THEY RECOMMENDED MORE INFORMAL MEETINGS AND WITH DIFFERENT CIRCLES. THEY SAID

YOU SHOULD SPEAK WITH MORE RANK AND FILE PEOPLE. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT OF COURSE HE HAD DONE IT TODAY AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED THAT WAS VERY GOOD.

16. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MEAL, PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL A PRIMARY EXPORTER OF RIFLES AND CARBINES. THEY HAD NOT YET PRIVATIZED THEIR ARMS INDUSTRY SO ALL THEIR EXPORTS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE A STATE MONOPOLY. WE NOTE YOUR REQUEST ABOUT IRAN AND IRAQ. WE DO NOT INTEND TO

EXPORT TO IRAN. HE TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON THAT WITH RESPECT TO IRAN AND THE REPORTS THAT WE ARE BUILDING A TANK FACTORY IN IRAN, ARE TOTALLY INCORRECT. WE ARE NOT DOING SO. HE ADDED THAT WE HAD ONLY TRANSFERRED ONE SUBMARINE. THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE BY THE FORMER USSR AND RUSSIA HAD CARRIED IT OUT.

17. TURNING TO IRAQ, PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT THEY WANTED TO REDUCE THE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. THE IRAQIS OWE RUSSIA OVER SIX BILLION DOLLARS. THE RUSSIANS HAD HOPED, REALISTICALLY, OF GETTING BACK THREE BILLION DOLLARS IF IRAQ COULD SELL OIL. THEY WILL NEED AMERICAN HELP TO DO SO AND IT WAS NOT JUST A POLITICAL QUESTION FOR RUSSIA. ALL THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD TO DO WAS TO RELEASE THE RESTRICTIONS ON IRAQI EXPORTS, PARTICULARLS ON OIL. IT CAN BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA IN TERMS OF RECOVERING ITS DEBTS FROM IRAQ. IF THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT THIS STEP, RUSSIA WILL GET THREE BILLION DOLLARS FROM THE IRAQIS. KOZYREV INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO EMPHASIZE THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WAS TALKING ABOUT THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, NOT JUST THE U.S.

18. PRESIDENT YELTSIN CONTINUED THAT BY RUSSIAN CALCULATIONS THEY WOULD GET BACK ABOUT ONE-HALF OF THE DEBT.

19. THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR RUSSIA. OIL PRICES ARE DEPRESSED AT THE PRESENT TIME AND IF IRAQ SOLD MORE OIL IT WOULD FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE OIL PRICE PICTURE AND THIS WOULD EFFECT RUSSIA. HE ASKED SECRETARY BENSON ALSO TO COMMENT. SECRETARY BENSON SAID THE FUEL MARKET HAD JUST GONE THROUGH A VERY SERIOUS SLIP AND IN THE FUTURE MORE SLIPS WERE EXPECTED. MORE WOULD CERTAINLY COME IF THE IRAQIS STARTED PUMPING SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF OIL. OUR CONCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES IS THAT RUSSIA WOULD LOSE MORE ON SALES THAN IT WOULD GAIN ON DEBT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THERE WERE ALSO POLITICAL QUESTIONS HERE, NOT JUST ECONOMIC ONES WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO US, INCLUDING IRAQ'S CONTINUED MISBEHAVIOR AND FAILURE TO OBSERVE U.N. RESOLUTIONS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO HIS MINISTERS ABOUT THIS. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE OIL CALCULATIONS AND THAT IT WAS ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY. BUT RUSSIA MUST HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DO IT. U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS PARTICULARLY STRONG. RUSSIA HAS INFLUENCE THERE TOO, OF COURSE. BUT WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT REMOVING THE SANCTIONS, JUST

LESSENING THE SANCTIONS ON IRAQI OIL.

20. KOZYREV AGAIN INTERRUPTED AND SAID IT IS RUSSIA'S IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. HOLDS THE TOUGHEST POSITION ON THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

21. PRESIDENT CLINTON ASKED AGAIN WHETHER IRAQIS WERE COMPLYING WITH U.N. RULES?

22. YELTSIN NOTED IN RESPONSE THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOT IN EVERY RESPECT. WE AGREE, HE SAID, THAT THE ATTITUDES TOWARD MINORITIES IN THE IRAQ HAVE NOT CHANGED. WE ALSO AGREE WITH YOU ON THE BORDERS WITH KUWAIT. IT WAS A VERY IMPORTANT RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BY IRAQ, BUT NOT EVERYWHERE. BUT WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A VERY TOUGH LESSON TO LEARN. CAN'T WE CONSIDER, IN SOME MANNER, FINDING A WAY TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS? IN THIS CASE, WE NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER PERMANENT FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

23. KOZYREV ALSO SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO USE OLD PRICES TO CALCULATE THE DEBTS. WE HAVE WITH RESPECT TO THAT, TALKED TO THEM AS WELL ABOUT AN AGREEMENT TO USE SOME KIND OF MECHANISM TO OFF-SET THE DEBTS THE WAY WE DID WITH THE INDIAN DEBTS. IN THAT CASE, HE SAID, IRAQI ITSELF DOES NOT GAIN ANYTHING. ALL OF OIL INCOME WILL BE USED TO PAY BACK THEIR OLD DEBTS TO RUSSIA.

24. THE DISCUSSION ENDED WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON AGAIN REPEATING THE DIFFICULTIES THIS WOULD CAUSE.

25. AFTER ANOTHER INTERLUDE IN THE CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT YELTSIN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE SECURITY SERVICES OF BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES WERE WORKING BETTER TOGETHER THAN THEY HAD BEFORE. WE CANNOT DO IT, HE SAID, WITH JAPAN AND KOREA, ONLY WITH YOU. THERE ARE NO CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE SERVICES ON BOTH SIDES AND WE ARE QUITE SATISFIED WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING. HE SAID

HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE "AMERICAN SECRET SERVICE" WAS UNDER THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SUMMARIZED BY SAYING AGAIN THAT THE SPECIAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE) SERVICES WERE WORKING WELL TOGETHER AND THAT THE AMERICAN SECRET SERVICE HAD HELPED IN MAKING THE VISIT A SUCCESS. PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT HE HOPED THAT THE RUSSIAN SECURITY PEOPLE WERE POSSIBLY FRIGHTENED BY HIS VISIT TO THE STREET CROWD THIS AFTERNOON NEAR THE KREMLIN, BUT THEY DID AN EXCELLENT JOB. PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN RETURN NOTED THAT AT TIMES HE HAS GONE INTO A CROWD OF A HUNDRED-THOUSAND PEOPLE

AND THAT HIS SECURITY PROTECTION SERVICE HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB.

26. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN SAID THAT HE WAS WORKING HARD WITH THE PARLIAMENT. HIS CLOSE COLLEAGUE, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHUMEIKO, HAD BEEN RUNNING HARD FOR SPEAKER OF THE NEW UPPER-HOUSE. HE HAD COME WITHIN TWO VOTES OF WINNING BUT THAT HAD NOT YET HAPPENED. (SUBSEQUENTLY, THE NEXT DAY SHUMEIKO DID WIN BY A VOTE OR TWO.) PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT THEY HAD BADLY WANTED HIM TO WIN IN THE FEDERAL UPPER-HOUSE. THE UPPER-HOUSE WOULD HAVE STRONG RESPONSIBILITIES AND COULD NULLIFY LEGISLATION OF THE LOWER-HOUSE. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO HAVE SHUMEIKO WORKING CLOSELY WITH HIM AND IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD BE THE LEADER OF THE NEW LOWER-HOUSE, THE STATE DUMA. A DEBATE WAS STILL GOING ON. HAPPILY, YELTSIN NOTED, THAT ZHIRINOVSKIY HAD JUST WITHDRAWN. RYBKIN WAS A COMMUNIST AND WAS NOT SOMEONE THAT YELTSIN WANTED. YELTSIN IN EFFECT SAID THAT HE WANTED LUKHIN THERE, THE CURRENT AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. HE WAS THE CENTRIST. HE WAS NOT NECESSARILY WITH YELTSIN, BUT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE YELTSIN LINE. HE WAS AN INTELLIGENT MAN AND HE WOULD AVOID CONFRONTATION. HE HAS POLITICAL "SMARTS" AND HE UNDERSTANDS THE BALANCE OF FORCES. THE PROBLEM WOULD INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT STRUGGLE AND WOULD CONTINUE TOMORROW. PRESIDENT CLINTON ASKED IF THERE WERE ONLY TWO CANDIDATES FOR SPEAKER. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN SAID, NO THERE WERE NINE CANDIDATES, BUT SOME HAD ALREADY WITHDRAWN AND OTHERS WOULD PROBABLY DROP OUT AS THE VOTING WENT ON. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHAKRAY WAS ALSO THERE AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIM. ZHIRINOVSKIY HAD DROPPED AND IT WAS NOW A NARROW SLATE. THE OUTCOME WAS STILL UNCERTAIN.

27. YELTSIN ADDED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE FRACTIONS IN THE LOWER-HOUSE, IT WAS STILL A KIND OF 50-50 BALANCE. THERE WAS GREAT HOPE AMONG HIS FOLLOWERS FOR GETTING HELP FROM THE SOME 65 REGIONAL DEPUTIES IN THE LOWER-HOUSE WHO WERE STILL DECLARED TO BE INDEPENDENTS. "WE HAVE HOPE FOR THEM," HE SAID, "AND WE WANT IT TO GO WELL IN THE GOVERNING PROCESS. MORE IMPORTANTLY," PRESIDENT YELTSIN ADDED, "GAYDAR WAS THE LEADER OF 'RUSSIA'S CHOICE' IN THE PARLIAMENT. HE WAS BOTH INTELLECTUAL AND WISE AND KNOWS THE SITUATION VERY WELL AND WE HAVE GREAT HOPE FOR HIS INFLUENCE ON THE LOWER-HOUSE." (PRESIDENT YELTSIN CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT GAYDAR WOULD BE OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND WORK ONLY IN THE DUMA.)

28. AFTER ANOTHER INTERLUDE, PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT HE HAS MAINTAINED A STEADY WEIGHT AT 100 KILOS (220 LBS MORE OR LESS) FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS PLAYING TENNIS ACTIVELY HE WEIGHED A LITTLE LESS --

85 KILOS. HE SAID THAT HIS OVERALL HEIGHT IS 187 CENTIMETERS AND THOUGHT THAT HE WAS A LITTLE SHORTER THAN PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE HAD NOTICED THAT IN THE PICTURES.

29. PRESIDENT CLINTON ASKED PRESIDENT YELTSIN ABOUT WHETHER HE CONTINUED TO KEEP UP WITH HIS SPORTING ACTIVITIES. PRESIDENT YELTSIN TURNED ASIDE THE QUESTION BY SAYING THAT WE ARE BOTH STRONG PEOPLE. WE BOTH LIKE COMPETITION AND HARD WORK. WE VALUE THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP WITH AMERICA AND WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IT COVERS FULLY OUR POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS.

30. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID WE WISHED WE COULD PUT IT TO WORK IN BOSNIA. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE IT FUNCTIONING IN THAT AREA. ALL THE FACTIONS WANT TO DO IS FIGHT AND HE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER A BIT ABOUT IT LAST NIGHT IN THE CAR COMING IN FROM THE AIRPORT. KOZREV NOTED THAT NEXT MONDAY

NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN AGAIN. HE SAID WE WILL DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO GET THE SERBS TO COOPERATE. WE MUST ALSO NOW WORK TOGETHER ON THE MUSLIMS AND THE CROATS WHO SEEM MUCH LESS CALM AND MORE PRONE TO MAKE TROUBLE.

31. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID, LAST YEAR THE DIFFICULTIES WERE OVER THE SERBS. WE DON'T WANT TO IMPLY THAT IT WAS ONLY THE SERBS, BUT LAST YEAR THE SERBS WERE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. NOW THE SCENE HAS SHIFTED AND THE MUSLIMS AND THE CROATS ARE CONTINUING TO BE DIFFICULT. THE MOST WORRISOME PROBLEM IS THE CONTINUING HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CROATS IN THE CENTER OF BOSNIA AND THE CROAT UNWILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE THE MUSLIMS WITH ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE SEA.

32. YELTSIN THEN NOTED THAT RUSSIA STILL HAS TO CONTEND WITH ALL THE CONFLICTS GOING ON IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY NO ONE HELPS US VERY MUCH. IT IS VERY PAINFUL FOR US. THE ALLEGATIONS OF IMPERIAL ASPIRATIONS ARE HARMING US AND ARE NOT CORRECT. WE WANT LESS BLOODSHED. IN MOLDOVA WE MOVED IN AND STOPPED THE BLOODSHED. WE HAVE ALSO DONE THE SAME THING IN SOUTH OSSETIA. WE INTEND TO TRY TO HELP IN GEORGIA. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND WE HAVE HELPED SHEVARDNADZE. TO SHOW MY INTEREST AND SUPPORT I INTEND TO VISIT GEORGIA IN LATE FEBRUARY.

33. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT GENERAL GRACHEV JUST HAD A GOOD VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND WE ENJOYED TALKING WITH HIM ABOUT THESE ISSUES INCLUDING THE ONES THAT WE HAVE JUST TOUCHED ON. HE ASKED GENERAL GRACHEV IF HE

HAD ESTABLISHED GOOD CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICAN MILITARY.

34. GRACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD DONE SO AND THAT THE TWO MILITARIES HAD MUCH IN COMMON, PERHAPS MORE THAN ANY OTHERS. HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT THEY HAD ESTABLISHED THE DIRECT TELEPHONE LINK AND THAT HE HAD A GOOD CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY ASPIN LAST WEEK. THEY WOULD LIKE CLOSER COOPERATION. IN JULY, THERE WOULD BE A BILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISE IN RUSSIA INVOLVING ELEMENTS OF THE 27TH MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION AND THE AMERICAN 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION. GRACHEV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO INVITE BOTH PRESIDENTS TO ATTEND. YELTSIN ADDED, "WHY NOT TAKE PART AND BE PRESENT WHEN IT HAPPENS." PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BEST AT THIS STAGE NOT TO TAKE PART, BUT TO SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOP.

35. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN SAID THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS GOING TO DAVOS TO ATTEND THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM WHICH A LOT OF LEADERS WOULD ATTEND. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT HE HAD NO PLANS TO DO SO AND YELTSIN SAID THEN, "I WON'T EITHER."

36. PRESIDENT CLINTON THEN SAID THAT OUR CONGRESS WILL BE IN SESSION AND I NEED TO BE WORKING WITH THEM. PARTICULARLY ON SOME OF MY IMPORTANT DOMESTIC INITIATIVES. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD MEET IN JULY AT THE G-7 MEETING IN NAPLES AND THAT WE CAN WORK OUT A GOOD SET OF ARRANGEMENTS THERE.

37. PRESIDENT CLINTON THEN ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO INVITE PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO PAY AN OFFICIAL STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE AUTUMN OF 1994.

38. YELTSIN RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY GOOD AND HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO IT. THEY WOULD ALSO CONTINUE

THEIR CONTACTS INTENSIVELY BETWEEN MEETINGS, URGING MORE LETTER EXCHANGES AND TELEPHONE CALLS. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT THIS SCHEDULE WILL GIVE US OPPORTUNITIES TO MEET DIRECTLY IN THE SUMMER AND FALL. OUR ELECTIONS WILL BE IN THE FALL AND IT WILL BE GOOD FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SEE HOW WE ARE WORKING TOGETHER.

39. PRESIDENT CLINTON TURNED TO GENERAL GRACHEV AND SAID THAT THE EXERCISES ARE CLEARLY BEING PLANNED FOR THE SUMMER AND THEY WILL FIT INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. IN EFFECT, PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CAN DO MUCH MORE IN ENCOURAGING PROGRESS AND AVOIDING FRIGHTENING THE OTHER EUROPEANS.

40. YELTSIN SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE IN FULL SUPPORT OF IT AND PRESIDENT CLINTON THANKED HIM.

41. GRACHEV THEN ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A DECISION FROM THE TWO PRESIDENTS ON AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE NEW AMERICAN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID HE WOULD LIKE THE IDEA VERY MUCH.

42. MINISTER GRACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD MET LES ASPIN IN GARMISCH. HE HAD TALKED TO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER AT NATO ABOUT EXPLAINING RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE. THEY HAD AGREED THAT IN FEBRUARY, ALTHOUGH NO DATE WAS YET FIRMED UP, TO MEET AGAIN IN GERMANY TO EXPLAIN THE MILITARY DOCTRINE TO ALL THE OTHER MINISTERS FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES. COULD SECRETARY INMANN PERHAPS ATTEND THAT MEETING?

43. PRESIDENT CLINTON THEN REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE BECAUSE SECRETARY INMANN WOULD HAVE TO BE CONFIRMED BEFORE HE COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A MEETING, PARTICULARLY OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

44. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE DEFENSE MINISTER EXPLAIN THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE. WOERNER AT NATO HAD ASKED HIM ABOUT IT. HE SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING HIS DEFENSE MINISTER OFF FOR THAT. HE WILL HAND OUT COPIES OF THE DOCTRINE SO YOU ALL CAN STUDY AND CRITICIZE IT.

45. YELTSIN SAID THAT THE U.S.-RUSSIAN POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WAS CLEARLY MOST IMPORTANT TODAY IN THEIR APPROACH TO SECURITY AND STABILITY. WE ALL HAVE TO THINKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO STABILIZATION. THIS WOULD APPLY TO ALL AREAS OF THE WORLD AND WE CERTAINLY AGREE WITH YOU ON NATO. RUSSIA HAS TO BE THE FIRST COUNTRY TO JOIN NATO. THEN THE OTHERS FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE CAN COME IN. THERE SHOULD BE A KIND OF CARTEL OF THE U.S., RUSSIA, AND THE EUROPEANS TO HELP TO ENSURE AND IMPROVE WORLD SECURITY.

46. HE ADDED, "IN TRUTH, RUSSIA IS NOT YET READY TO JOIN NATO." RUSSIA FIRSTS NEEDS TO START THINKING ABOUT REACTIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THERE IS A POTENTIAL CHINESE REACTION. THERE IS PERHAPS A FORECAST ON THE FUTURE THROUGH STUDIES BY THE CIA? WE DON'T HAVE A KGB ANYMORE TO UNDERTAKE OUR OWN. WE ARE GOING TO SAVE A LOT OF MONEY WITH THAT STEP. WE SAVED IT, OF COURSE, FOR USES IN OTHER PARTS OF OUR COUNTRY. YELTSIN THEN ADDED THAT SOMETIMES WE ARE CRITICIZED IN OUR GOVERNMENT FOR OUR CLOSE CONTACTS WITH AND PURPORTED INFLUENCE FROM THE WEST ON US. BUT OUR PRIMARY PARTNERSHIP IS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IT IS FIRM AND SOLID. NOT ONLY IS HE THANKFUL FOR IT, BUT RUSSIA IS BETTER OFF FOR IT. EVEN MORE SO, WE APPRECIATE THE ATTITUDE AND SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT TOWARDS RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP, AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. EVEN MORE SO WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE IT. THIS IS MY PERSONAL VIEW AND IT IS A FRANK ONE, BUT IT SHOULD

BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD ON YOUR SIDE. WE HAVE GREAT RESPECT FOR YOU, FOR YOUR WORK, FOR YOUR POLITICS AND FOR WHAT YOU ARE DOING. IT IS THROUGH JOINT EFFORTS WE CAN DO MORE TOGETHER. OUR PEOPLE, PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID, KNOW YOU AS OUR PAPERS SAID TODAY. THEY KNOW YOUR NAME, THEY KNOW IT IS BILL, AND THEY UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION. YOU COME TO RUSSIA NOT TO CONFRONT US, BUT WITH THE AFFECTION AND LOVE OF OUR PEOPLE AND WITH A SENSE OF SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA. WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO SOLVE BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

47. PRESIDENT CLINTON REPLIED THAT THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE DESTINED FOR GRKATNESS AND THAT THEY WERE RIGHT TO BELIEVE IN THEIR OWN POSITIVE FUTURE. NOW IN EUROPE WE HAVE POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND OUR COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE, AND WE HAVE A CHANCE TO MAKE A TRULY MAJOR IMPACT ON EUROPE. HERE WE HAVE THE FIRST CHANCE EVER SINCE THE RISE OF THE NATION STATE TO HAVE THE ENTIRE CONTINENT OF EUROPE LIVE IN PEACE. WE ARE ALL WORKING TOGETHER TOWARD THE TIME WHEN WE WILL ALL CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON ONE OF US, AN ATTACK ON EVERY ONE OF US. EVERYONE NOW MUST RESPECT THE EXISTING BORDERS. WORKING TOGETHER WE CAN DO MORE THAN JUST TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN THE NEAR ABROAD AND IN RUSSIA. ALL OVER EUROPE WE HAVE SEEN A RECORD OF SELF-INFLECTED BLOODSHED. NOW WE HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THOSE ISSUES.

48. PRESIDENT CLINTON CONTINUED THAT IF WE CONSIDER TURKEY AS PART OF EUROPE, TURKEY IS TRYING TO ENGAGE

ITSELF IN EUROPE, THEN WE CAN SAY OF A WHOLE PERIOD OF HISTORY, ONLY THE MONGOLS LED AN INVASION OF EUROPE FROM OUTSIDE. THERE WILL NOT BE MUCH IMPACT FROM CHINA, POSSIBLY FOR THE FUTURE BUT THAT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A LIKELY POSSIBILITY. THEREFORE, WE COULD GUARANTEE THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE A CENTURY OF PEACE OR MORE. ALL THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE WOULD BE INVOLVED. IF YOUR EFFORTS ARE SUCCESSFUL AND OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ENDURE, THAT WILL BE KEY TO GAINING THIS OBJECTIVE.

49. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID, "I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE IT AND I AGREE WITH ALL THAT YOU HAVE SAID. THE TWO OF US HAVE A UNIQUE POTENTIAL AS PARTNERS, THAT IF WE DECIDE TO DO SOMETHING TOGETHER, EVEN IN THE FACE OF OBSTACLES, IF WE HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IT CAN BE DONE. AS A RESULT, WITHOUT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO OF US IT

IS HARD TO ENVISAGE CONTINUATION OF A PEACEFUL AND
STABLE WORLD. IF WE CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER AS YOU
SUGGEST, WE CAN DO MUCH TO ENSURE PEACE AND STABILITY
FOR EUROPE AND FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD."

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TAB VI

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262016-0117-M (1.09)
10/2/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Kebich of Belarus
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
David Swartz, U.S. Ambassador to Belarus
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
(Designate)
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
John Beyrle, Director for Russia, Ukraine and
Eurasia Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Dmitriy Zarechnak, Interpreter

Vyacheslav Kebich, Prime Minister
Mikhail Myasnikovich, First Deputy Prime
Minister
Mr. Lyng, Deputy Prime Minister for Economics
Petr Kravchanka, Foreign Minister
Stanislav Radkevich, Chairman of the State
Committee for External Economic Relations
Stanislav Bogdankevich, Chairman of the
Belarusian State Bank
Pavel Kozlovskiy, Defense Minister
Mr. Dragovets, Chief of Information
Directorate, Council of Ministers
Sergei Martynov, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME January 15, 1994, 1:12 - 1:40 p.m.
AND PLACE: Voyskovoy 4 Guest House, Minsk, Belarus

Prime Minister Kebich: There has been great interest in your visit among the Belarusian people. We offer our condolences on your mother's death; I know this is a difficult time for you.
(U)

I have followed with interest your visits to Moscow and Kiev. The first thing I want to say is that we are building a law-based society in Belarus. I want to inform you on how the course of reforms is going. There can be no return to the past -- reforms are irreversible. It would of course be incorrect to say that we

are not lagging behind somewhat in our reforms. But this is caused not by the government but by the Supreme Soviet. Despite all our efforts, we have been unable to quicken to pace of reforms. We have adopted all the laws that allow us to carry the reforms forward, but there is still much to be done. (S)

I want to dwell on some of our problems, as well. One of these is the monopolized industry that we inherited. The Soviet Union imposed giant industries on our country, like the huge 40,000 person Belarus tractor facility. Despite their size, we have had some success in liberalizing and privatizing factories. (S)

Another problem is how to change the people's outlook. Three or four years ago, if we had tried to declare that we would have private property, we'd all have lost our jobs. But we have succeeded in convincing the people that this is a good thing, that there can be different forms of ownership. Our transition to a market economy is a synthesis of the experience of all the countries that have traveled this road ahead of us. We have qualified for World Bank loans and assistance from the International Monetary Fund, but we are looking for more help from them. (S)

Another problem is personnel. Where can we find the new, young personnel to put in charge of these reforms? We sorely need such people. We need more businessmen from the West and the United States. We are ready to extend our hand -- not for a handout, but for equal partnership. (S)

The President: I think our relations are off to a strong start, especially with the ratification of the nuclear accords, and the visit by Chairman Shushkevich. You have done a good job of planning the work you must do to fulfill your nuclear obligations, and have made good use of the Nunn-Lugar money we have provided. On the economic side, we are proposing to set up an American Business Center here and establish a Business Development Commission. (S)

Prime Minister Kebich: We thank you very much for this. Through help provided by the Export-Import bank, we are updating a truck factory not far from here. As regards the Nunn-Lugar funds, I have to say that the amount provided has been small. We are obliged to destroy over 2000 tanks and hundreds of armored vehicles. It is good that you have been able to reach agreement with Ukraine and provide them assistance, but we are uninformed about the compensation aspect of this deal. We were hoping for new Nunn-Lugar money. But our outstretched hand went unnoticed. (S)

The President: During our negotiations with the Russians and Ukrainians, we said we didn't want to sign an agreement that did not have a good compensation package. We should have contacted you about this sooner, but the negotiations were concluded at the eleventh hour. I rode to the Moscow airport this morning with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and he told me that he will be in touch with you on the compensation issue. If the terms he is

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offering are not satisfactory, you should contact our Ambassador here in Minsk. (S)

Investment in your economy is the best guarantee of your long-term prosperity. Ambassador Swartz has told me of a \$50 million project to modernize the Mozur oil refinery in Belarus that the U.S. companies General Electric, Honeywell and Westinghouse are interested in taking part in. It would be good if you would consider their offers seriously. (S)

Prime Minister Kebich: Another thing that would help our economy and relations would be a bilateral U.S.-Belarusian commission along the lines of a Gore-Chernomyrdin commission. (S)

The President: Regarding your desire for more assistance from the IMF, that is tied very closely to the pace of reform. You should look closely at the experience of Russia and other countries in transition. The international financial institutions want a commitment to reform. Take the Czechs as an example. They have a low level of privatization, but their reforms are advanced in other areas, and they are receiving a great deal of international help. (S)

Prime Minister Kebich: Recently the IMF gave our country a very favorable assessment. I am interested in your reaction to my idea of a Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission for Belarus. (S)

The President: Let me give that some thought and get back to you. We would need to give some consideration to the form that such a commission would take. (S)

Prime Minister Kebich: Mr. President, I see that the time for our meeting is expiring. I would like to thank you very much for the hospital that you are donating to us. And I want to reiterate that as we build our democracy here in Belarus, we will emulate the American model. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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TAB VII

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262016-0117-M (1.10)
10/2/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Members of the Belarusian National Front (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
David Swartz, U.S. Ambassador to Belarus
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State (Designate)
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, NSC Staff
John Beyrle, Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Iiril Borisov, Interpreter

Zenon Posnyak, Chairman of the Parliamentary Opposition
Vladimir Zablotskiy, Deputy Chairman, Popular Front
Aleksandr Dobrovol'skiy, Chair of the United Democratic Party
Oleg Trusov, Head of Social Democratic Citizenry
Sergei Levshunov, Popular Front

DATE, TIME: January 15, 1994, 1:45 - 2:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Voyskovoy 4 Guest House, Minsk, Belarus

The President: It's good to meet you all. I know that you are outnumbered but I want to urge you to stay the course. We support what you are trying to do. I have told Prime Minister Kebich and the government about the need for reform -- I hope that will be a help to you. Really, I've come here today to listen. (C)

Mr. Posnyak: Mr. President, we hold views that are different from those of Kebich and Shushkevich. We represent the Popular Front, and are in strict opposition to the government and the Supreme Soviet. When we won our independence in 1991, the old government and Supreme Soviet were in place from the communist

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regime. We were unable to hold new elections. Now we have had two years of talk about reforms, but the country isn't ready for them. Central planning persists. Corruption has risen steeply. We have the sense that the government is following a policy that favors the maintenance of the Russian empire. There has been no deep democratic reform. Radio and television are still predominantly pro-government; we have practically no access to television. It is understandable that you want to help, but you should not provide financial assistance to this government. It doesn't help us, it only helps keep the old regime in place. (C)

We held a referendum in 1992 for new elections. The results were adopted, but were then annulled by the Supreme Soviet. We consider the current parliament to be illegitimate. We would like to receive assistance toward the democratization of Belarus -- we need political reform more than economic reform. We want you to understand this situation. (C)

The second question we would like to raise is the policy of Russia toward our country. This amounts to an economic war, a policy of imperialism. The nomenklatura keeps this policy in place. A currency union between Russia and Belarus is being discussed but this is a bluff. Because of the level of privatization in Russia, this would be a disaster for us. It is economic capitulation before Russian capitalism. This union cannot take place -- it will put us in total economic dependency. We want Russia and the world to know about this. (C)

Mr. Levshunov: I must disagree with one aspect of what Mr. Posnyak has said -- we do need economic help. We are in a paradoxical situation -- we need democratic reform, but the people are most interested in economic improvement. If you help develop our economy, it will help us out of this paradox. But I agree this cannot be through credits that support the current government. (C)

Mr. Posnyak: The military influence of Russia is also an obstacle for us. (C)

The President: We have made it clear to the government that there is a limit to what we can do until new elections are held, until we see real movement toward greater democratic reforms. I was interested to hear the difference of opinion you expressed regarding economic aid, because we have the same disputes within our own government. Most of the aid that we have provided has been Nunn-Lugar assistance to the denuclearization effort. And we have now set up a new regional enterprise fund, involving Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, and plan to open an American business center here as well. I think the more that we can set people up in their own businesses, the more pressure there will be on people to change. But there is a limit to what we are prepared to do without elections and greater economic reforms.

(C)

-- End of Conversation --

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0586

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's Trip to Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, January 12-15, 1994

Attached at Tabs I thru VII are the subject memoranda from the President's trip to Ukraine, Russia and Belarus.

Concurrences by: John Beyrle *JB* and Rose Gottemoeller *JA*

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Conversations be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ *Kear* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Three-Plus-Three Meeting with Kravchuk
- Tab II Meeting with Patriarch Aleksiy II
- Tab III Trilateral Meeting on Security Issues with U.S., Russia and Ukraine
- Tab IV Second Expanded Bilateral Session with Yeltsin
- Tab V Cable - President's Dinner with Yeltsin
- Tab VI Meeting with Prime Minister Kebich of Belarus
- Tab VII Meeting with Belarusian National Front of Belarus

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRYNARA*, Date *10/2/2018*
2016-0117-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~