

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Briefing by NATO Military Committee Chairman (6 pages)	03/26/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
002. cable	Re: Briefing on the Results of the Helsinki Summit (1 page)	03/31/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997 - Dec 1998 ([Helsinki])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/26/1997 - 03/31/1997]

2016-0126-M
ke4073

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA7406 0851744-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 261744Z MAR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 OSRI: RUEHMO
 DTG: 261744Z MAR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4867
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 INFO: ~~////~~
 SUBJ: BRIEFING BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0126-M (1.01)
 KBH 6/22/2023

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 007406

E.O. 12598: DECL: 03/26/97
 TAGS: NATO, RS, US
 SUBJECT: BRIEFING BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

1. CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE JOHN F. TEFFT. REASON 1(B) AND (D).

2. (X) SUMMARY. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE GENERAL KLAUS NAUMANN BRIEFED NATO AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW MARCH 26 ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS. NAUMANN FOUND THAT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT HAD ELIMINATED ALL RUSSIAN HOPES THAT ENLARGEMENT WOULD BE DELAYED. NAUMANN SPENT MUCH OF HIS TIME DISCUSSING THE INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUE WHICH HE SEES AS THE KEY PROBLEM FOR THE NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT. NAUMANN FOUND THE RUSSIANS RECEPTIVE TO FURTHER COOPERATION WITH NATO, ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THEY HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN NOT PARTICIPATING IN PFP. END SUMMARY.

3. (X) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE (CMC) GENERAL KLAUS NAUMANN BRIEFED NATO AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW MARCH 26 ON HIS 2-1/2 DAYS OF DISCUSSION WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH NATO. NAUMANN MET WITH RUSSIAN CHIEF OF STAFF SAMSONOV, DEFENSE MINISTER RODIONOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AFANASYEVSKIY, SECURITY COUNCIL CHIEF RYBKIN, DEFENSE COUNCIL CHIEF BATURIN, AND WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS ILYUKHIN, VOROBYEV, AND VORODIEV. HE ALSO VISITED THE 106TH AIRBORNE REGIMENT IN TULA AND BRIEFED THE GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY.

4. (X) NAUMANN SAID THE TIMING OF HIS VISIT WAS PERFECT. HE FOUND THAT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT HAD

ELIMINATED ALL HOPES ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE THAT ENLARGEMENT COULD BE DELAYED. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW ACCEPTED THAT ENLARGEMENT WILL OCCUR EVEN THOUGH IN NAUMANN'S VIEW THEY WILL NEVER REALLY ACCEPT THE FACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. NAUMANN SAID HE FOUND MOST RUSSIANS WITH A POSITIVE VIEW OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT BUT SOME, INCLUDING GENERAL SAMSONOV AND HIS DEPUTY GENERAL IVASHOV, NOT FULLY BRIEFED ON THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT. THEY WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT BRIEFED ON THE "INTENSE DISCUSSION" BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN ON FURTHER EXPANSION OF NATO. NAUMANN SAID HE TOLD HIS INTERLOCUTERS THAT THERE MAY VERY WELL BE A SECOND TRANCHE OF MEMBERSHIP, OR AT LEAST NATO WAS OPEN TO THAT POSSIBILITY.

5. (X) NAUMANN SAID THE FIRST ISSUE ON WHICH HE ATTEMPTED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION WAS WHAT NATO MEANS BY ITS STATEMENT OF THE THREE "NUCLEAR NO'S." NAUMANN SAID THE RUSSIAN AIM WAS STILL TO GET ALL U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS OUT OF EUROPE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE INDICATED IT WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE NATO PROPOSED-LANGUAGE FOR THE RUSSIAN-NATO AGREEMENT. THEY WANT TO RETURN TO THE LANGUAGE PRIMAKOV HAD SUGGESTED EARLIER. NAUMANN SAID HE ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCED THE RUSSIANS THAT THE "THREE NO'S" PROVIDED SUFFICIENT SECURITY FOR RUSSIA. HE REMINDED THE RUSSIANS THAT THEIR REDUCTION OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS NOT SATISFACTORY, IT DESERVED FURTHER EFFORT. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN RUSSIAN AREAS ACROSS THE BORDER FROM NORWAY. IT COULD ALSO BE TRUE SHOULD POLAND BECOME A MEMBER OF NATO GIVEN RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KALININGRAD. NAUMANN SAID THAT WHEN HE RAISED RECIPROCITY OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ONLY BATURIN RESPONDED THAT RUSSIA WAS STILL COMMITTED TO REDUCTION AND EFFORTS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE IN THIS REGARD.

6. (X) THE SECOND ISSUE NAUMANN DISCUSSED WAS THE MEANING OF THE NATO DECLARATION OF MARCH 14 ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. NAUMANN SAID HE LEFT NO DOUBT IN THE RUSSIANS' MINDS THAT THE ALLIANCE RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REINFORCE ANY NEW MEMBER. THIS IS PART OF THE COMMITMENT OF NATO MEMBERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME NAUMANN STRESSED THAT NATO WOULD REINFORCE ONLY IN CRISIS, AND ONLY RESPOND TO AN EVENT CAUSED FROM OUTSIDE. THERE WOULD BE NO NEW DEPLOYMENTS IN PEACETIME AND NO NATO EXERCISES WOULD GO BEYOND THEIR USUAL FRAMEWORK. NATO WOULD, OF COURSE, NOTIFY THE RUSSIANS OF SUCH EXERCISES AS IT DOES NOW.

7. (X) REGARDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN NEW NATO MEMBER STATES, NAUMANN SAID HE TOLD THE RUSSIANS HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT THE UPGRADES WOULD BE AT THIS POINT. "WE DON'T EVEN KNOW WHO THE NEW MEMBERS WILL BE." NAUMANN HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SMALL DEPLOYMENTS WOULD NOT BE A STUMBLING BLOCK. THE REAL STUMBLING BLOCK WOULD BE A MAJOR REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES. IVASHOV, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD NAUMANN THAT IF NATO DEPLOYED A COMBAT BRIGADE THAT WOULD NOT BE PROBLEM. NAUMANN TOLD THE RUSSIANS

WE WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE MAJOR FORCE REDEPLOYMENTS.
NATO MEMBERS HAVE NEITHER THE MONEY NOR FORCES FOR SUCH
A DEPLOYMENT.

8. (C) NAUMANN PREDICTED THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATION WITH
RUSSIA ON THE DEFINITION OF "INFRASTRUCTURE" WOULD
FOCUS ON THREE WORDS -- ADDITIONAL, PERMANENT AND
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 007406

EO. 12598: DECL: 03/26/97

TAGS: NATO, RS, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

SUBSTANTIAL. NAUMANN SAID THAT WE WILL NEED TO WORK
WITHIN THE NAC TO GET PRECISE DEFINITIONS OF THESE
TERMS. FOR THEIR PART, THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT ON THE
INFRASTRUCTURE QUESTION THEY NEED A LEGALLY BINDING
STATEMENT IN THE NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT. NAUMANN TOLD
THE RUSSIANS THAT HE DID NOT SEE A MAJORITY OF NATO
MEMBERS SUPPORTING A LEGALLY BINDING STATEMENT. HE
REMINDED THE RUSSIANS THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WAS
NOT A LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENT. THE RUSSIANS SAID THE
NEEDED SOMETHING THAT WAS LEGALLY BINDING TO PRESENT TO
THE DUMA. THEY RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NATO-
RUSSIA DOCUMENT WAS NOT GOING TO HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY
OTHER PARLIAMENTS OF NATO MEMBERS, AND IN THAT CASE
WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURES.

9. (C) NAUMANN SAID THAT A POSSIBLE WAY OUT ON THE
INFRASTRUCTURE QUESTION WOULD BE TO FOCUS ON THREE
ELEMENTS:

- LANGUAGE IN THE NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT;
- CFE COMMITMENTS (NAUMANN SAID HE EXPLAINED IN DETAIL
OUR PROPOSAL IN VIENNA); AND
- A MIX OF CBM'S AND CSBM'S.

NAUMANN SAID HE REMINDED THE RUSSIANS OF THE NEED FOR
RECIPROCITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THIS AREA AS WELL. HE
ASKED THE RUSSIANS TO PUBLISH THEIR MARCH 4 MILITARY
DOCTRINE. THE GENERALS TO WHOM HE SPOKE SAID THEY SAW
NO PROBLEM WITH THIS. ONE IN FACT SAID HE DID NOT
UNDERSTAND WHY THE MILITARY DOCTRINE HAD NOT ALREADY
BEEN PUBLISHED, SINCE ONLY ONE PERCENT INVOLVED
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION THAT HAD TO BE
CLASSIFIED.

10. (C) NAUMANN SAID THE THIRD POINT IN HIS
PRESENTATION TO HIS RUSSIAN INTERLOCUTORS WAS AN
EXPLANATION OF HOW NATO HAD CHANGED. NAUMANN SHOWED
THE NATO AMBASSADORS SEVERAL SETS OF SLIDES WHICH HE
USED TO SHOW HOW NATO FORCES AND READINESS HAD BEEN
REDUCED BETWEEN 1990 AND TODAY. THIS DEMONSTRATION OF
NATO'S SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS APPARENTLY IMPRESSED HIS
RUSSIAN INTERLOCUTERS. THEY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO
REFUTE THE POINTS; SOME INDICATED THEY DID NOT KNOW
WHAT HAD REALLY HAPPENED. NAUMANN NOTED THAT THIS
PRESENTATION HAD SEEMED TO "FLATTEN" ANTI-NATO DUMA

DEPUTY ILYUKHIN. NAUMANN SAID HE ALSO DISCUSSED CHANGES IN THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND SHOWED HOW IT WAS CLEARLY NOT DESIGNED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

11. (C) NAUMANN SHOWED THE RUSSIANS SOME CHARTS WHICH DEMONSTRATED WHAT GERMANY HAD DONE TO FORMER WARSAW PACT AIRFIELDS AND INSTALLATIONS IN EAST GERMANY. NAUMANN SAID HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO UNDERCUT RUSSIAN CONCERNS THAT INSTALLATIONS IN NEW NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES WOULD BE USED AS A SORT OF SPRINGBOARD BY NATO TO ATTACK RUSSIA. NAUMANN SHOWED THE NATO AMBASSADORS TWO SLIDES THAT DEPICTED THE NUMEROUS WARSAW PACT AIRFIELDS IN THE OLD GDR AND THE THREE REMAINING AIRFIELDS THAT ARE STILL BEING USED.

12. h(C) NAUMANN SAID THAT OVERALL HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS PRESENTATION HAD HAD SOME IMPACT. HE HAD THE FURTHER IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE WILLING TO ABANDON THEIR HARSH RHETORIC. THEY WERE FOCUSED, IN NAUMANN'S VIEW, ON THE 15TH OF APRIL RESUMPTION OF THE PRIMAKOV/SOLANA TALKS. THEY SEEMED TO BE SHOOTING TOWARD CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT IN MAY BUT NO ONE SPECIFICALLY CONFIRMED THAT.

13. (C) NAUMANN SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS ALSO IN DISCUSSING POTENTIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AN ENLARGED NATO. HE TOLD THE RUSSIANS WHAT THEY HAD MISSED BY NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NAUMANN WAS RIGHT TO REBUKE THEM. THEY HAD MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY AND NOW INTENDED TO PARTICIPATE IN PFP PROGRAMS. NAUMANN URGED THE RUSSIANS TO BE MORE PROACTIVE IN NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES WITH COOPERATION PARTNERS. HE INVITED SAMSONOV TO NATO ON APRIL 23 FOR A PFP MEETING. WHILE SAMSONOV MADE SOME POSITIVE NOISES, NAUMANN SAID THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS INTERNAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GENERAL STAFF AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ON THIS POINT. IVASHOV TOLD NAUMANN HE WOULD PERSONALLY DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BLOCK SAMSONOV'S APPEARANCE IN APRIL, BUT HE HELD OUT THE PROSPECT FOR A POSSIBLE PFP VISIT IN THE FALL. NAUMANN SUGGESTED THE RUSSIANS AGREE TO CREATE A SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY WITH NATO, BUT GOT NO RESPONSE. NAUMANN ALSO INVITED SAMSONOV TO MAKE A PERSONAL VISIT TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN THE FALL. SAMSONOV RESPONDED POSITIVELY.

14. (C) IN THE ENSUING QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION,
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 007406

E.O. 12598: DECL: 03/26/97

TAGS: NATO, RS, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING BY NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

NAUMANN MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS.

--IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE RUSSIANS ON BAL TIC MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, NAUMANN SAID HE REPLIED THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE BUT THAT THEIR COULD VERY WELL BE A SECOND WAVE OF NEW NATO MEMBERS.

--NAUMANN TOLD THE RUSSIANS NATO WILL NOT IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON FUTURE NATO MEMBERS REGARDING THE STATIONING OF TROOPS OR INFRASTRUCTURE. THESE WERE SOVEREIGN DECISIONS. NATO RESERVED THE RIGHT TO POSITION TROOPS WITHIN ANY COUNTRY, BUT WE HAD NO PLANS NOW TO DO SO. HE ALSO REITERATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SECOND CLASS NATO CITIZENSHIP WHICH THE RUSSIAN SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED.

--IN NAUMAN'S VIEW, THE BIGGEST PROBLEM NOW IS DEFINING THE TERM "INFRASTRUCTURE." "THE RUSSIANS WANT TO TIE NOT ONLY NATO'S HANDS, BUT ITS FEET." NAUMANN SAID HE TOLD THE RUSSIANS CFE HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED IN VIENNA. OTHER NON-NATO COUNTRIES WERE INCLUDED THERE AS WELL. HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW THINKING ABOUT THE NATIONAL CEILING PROPOSAL PERHAPS BEING IN THEIR INTEREST. NAUMANN SAID AFANASYEVSKIY WILL INSIST ON SOME LANGUAGE ON CFE BEING INCLUDED IN THE NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT.

--THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN LOSS OF ARMS SALES DUE TO NATO EXPANSION DID NOT COME UP.

--THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR THREE ZONES FOR CFE ALSO DID NOT COME UP.

--NAUMANN SAID THAT THE HELSINKI STATEMENTS ON START II?III AND ABM/TMD DID NOT COME UP DIRECTLY. THE ISSUE OF AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL SEA LAUNCHED MISSILES CAME UP TWO OR THREE TIMES AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. CLEARLY, NAUMANN SAID, THE RUSSIANS ARE "SCARED TO DEATH" OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL CRUISE MISSILES. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW WHEN THE U.S. LAUNCHED A CRUISE MISSILE ATTACK ON IRAQ. THE THEN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF COULD NOT BELIEVE HOW ACCURATE THESE MISSILES HAD BEEN.

--THE IDEA OF RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO HAD COME UP ONLY N PASSING. NAUMANN REITERATED TO THE NATO AMBASSADORS HIS OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA. HE RECALLED TELLING COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS THAT IF THEY COULD ANSWER POSITIVELY THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS, THEN THE ISSUE COULD BE DISCUSSED.

- --WOULD THE RUSSIANS AGREE TO COORDINATE THEIR SECURITY FROM BRUSSELS?

- --WOULD THE RUSSIANS PUT THEIR TROOPS UNDER NATO COMMAND?

- --WOULD THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE 16 DIFFERENT NATO MEMBERS AGREE TO DEFEND RUSSIA AT THE USSURI RIVER?

--NAUMANN DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL HOW THE 40 PERCENT REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZED NATO TANKS AND APC'S IN EUROPE WOULD RESULT IN THE REDUCTION OF NATO FORCES BY EIGHT ARMY DIVISIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT A COMPARISON OF THESE REDUCTIONS WITH THE HOLDINGS OF FUTURE NATO MEMBERS WOULD DEMONSTRATE HOW THE CURRENT CFE PROPOSAL COULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ONCE CEILINGS ARE REDUCED THEN NATO HOLDINGS WILL ALSO GO DOWN DUE TO THE DECLINE IN WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS. THE POINT HE TRIED TO STRESS WAS THAT THE ACTUAL THREAT THAT THE RUSSIANS PERCEIVE IN NATO EXPANSION WILL NOT INCREASE. NAUMANN SAID HE AVOIDED DISCUSSION OF THE QUALITY OF THE EQUIPMENT IN THE PROSPECTIVE NEW MEMBER STATES.

--NAUMANN ALSO STRESSED THAT THE PROPOSED 80 PERCENT REDUCTION OF 3,500 DPSS TANKS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISH NATO'S REINFORCEMENT ABILITY.

--ALTHOUGH THE CHARTS SHOWING THE LIMITED USE GERMANY WAS MAKING OF FORMER GDR INSTALLATIONS WAS EFFECTIVE, NAUMANN SAID THAT ONE HAD TO BE CAUTIOUS. HE SAID HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE 64 COMMAND BUNKERS IN EAST GERMANY WHEN REUNIFICATION TOOK PLACE. NONE ARE NOW BEING USED. ONLY THREE OR FOUR DEPOTS WERE NOW BEING USED. NAUMANN JOKED THAT EVEN THE "ELOQUENT AFANASYEVSKIY WAS REDUCED TO RELATIVELY FEW WORDS IN RESPONSE TO THIS PRESENTATION."

--THE DIVISION HE VISITED IN TULA HAD RECEIVED NO WAGES AS YET IN 1997.

TEFFT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 7406
<^SSN>7406
<^SSN>7406

TOR: 970326124558 M2684808
<^TOR>970326124641 M2684810
<^TOR>970326124724 M2684811

DIST: SIT: BELL DOWLING EGGERT ELKIND FEELEY FORT HAMEL MATERA PASCUAL PASSDOWN
PIFER RUMER SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA7783 0901343-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 311343Z MAR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 OSRI: RUEHMO
 DTG: 311343Z MAR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5136
 INFO: RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 4618
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2821
 RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 2259
 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 4101
 SUBJ: BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF THE HELSINKI
 SUMMIT
 REF STATE 57310

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M (1.02)
 KBH 6/22/2023

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 007783

GENEVA FOR JCIC AND SCC

E.O. 12958: DECL.: 3/31/22
 TAGS: PARM, PREL, KTIA, START, ABM, RS
 SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF THE HELSINKI
 SUMMIT

REF STATE 57310

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING CHIEF OF THE
 POLITICAL SECTION BRUCE DONAHUE. REASON: 1.6
 (X6) .

2. A/DCM INFORMED MFA SECURITY AFFAIRS AND
 DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR SERGEY KISLYAK ON
 MARCH 28 OF THE DEMARCHES IN MINSK, UKRAINE AND
 KAZAKSTAN ON THE START AND ABM/TMD RESULTS FROM
 THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. WE ALSO PASSED ALONG FYI
 COPIES OF THE TALKING POINTS TO KISLYAK'S OFFICE.
 HE THANKED US FOR THE INFORMATION.

TEFFT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
 SSN: 7783
 TOR: 970331090339 M2690593
 DIST:
 SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Briefing UAEG on the Vancouver Summit (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
002. cable	Re: Briefing our Allies on Vancouver Summit (1 page)	04/15/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
003. cable	Re: Baltic Extract of Vancouver Summit Readout (4 pages)	04/21/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Vancouver])
 OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/14/1993 - 04/21/1993]

2016-0126-M
ke4074

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 OSRI: RUFHADA
 LINE1: RAACZYUW RUFHADA3167 1040728-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: R 140727Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
 DTG: 140727Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 0221
 INFO: *****
 SUBJ: BRIEFING UAEG ON THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0126-M (1.03)
 KBM 6/22/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ABU DHABI 03167
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, EAID, NATO, TC
 SUBJECT: BRIEFING UAEG ON THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT
 REF: STATE 106512

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. ON APRIL 13, THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH ABDULLAH RASHID, THE DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND BRIEFED HIM ON THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT, DRAWING ON THE TALKING POINTS IN REFTEL. THE AMBASSADOR COVERED ALL OF THE MAJOR POINTS, STRESSING THE DANGERS OF A REVERSAL OF RUSSIAN REFORM, AND THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERED ITS CONTRIBUTION TO RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM AND STABILITY PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO WHICH MANY COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE UAE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE. THE U.S. HOPED THE UAE WOULD CONSIDER NEW WAYS TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS IMPORTANT TASK.

1. ABDULLAH RASHID ASKED A FEW QUESTIONS, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE BRIEFING BUT DID NOT HAVE MUCH SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO OFFER. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS, HE SAID THE UAEG HAD NOT MADE ANY RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO RUSSIA. HE PROMISED HOWEVER, TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF HIGHER AUTHORITIES. THE AMBASSADOR LEFT A NON-PAPER CONTAINING ALL OF THE RELEVANT POINTS IN THE REFTEL.

RUGH
 BT
 #3167
 NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
 SSN: 3167
 TOR: 930414033300 M0337938
 DIST:
 SIT: VAX

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OSRI: RUEHBKA
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 150939Z APR 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
DTG: 150939Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1199
INFO: *****
SUBJ: BRIEFING OUR ALLIES ON VANCOUVER SUMMIT
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BANGKOK 14321
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RS, TH
SUBJECT: BRIEFING OUR ALLIES ON VANCOUVER SUMMIT
REF: A. STATE 106512 B. 92 BANGKOK 55106
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. EMBASSY SHARED REF A POINTS ABOUT THE VANCOUVER
SUMMIT, ALONG WITH RELATED ITEMS FROM THE WIRELESS FILE,
WITH THE THAI FOREIGN MINISTRY ON APRIL 15.
3. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED TO NOTE THAT THAILAND'S
AMBASSADOR WAS NOT AMONG THE GROUP AT THE APRIL 5
BRIEFING BY THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR TALBOTT AND A/S
OXMAN. THAILAND IS ONE OF THE FEW DEVELOPING NATIONS
THAT HAS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEWLY
INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (REF B), A
TREND WE HAVE WARMLY WELCOMED. OUR LONG-STANDING TREATY
TIES AND GENERALLY WARM RELATIONS WITH THE THAI SHOULD
ALSO WARRANT THAT THAILAND BE INCLUDED IN SIMILAR
BRIEFINGS TO KEY ALLIES ON RUSSIA -- AND OTHER ISSUES OF
COMMON CONCERN -- WHENEVER POSSIBLE. LAMBERTSON
BT
#4321
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 4321
TOR: 930415065743 M0340331
DIST:
SIT: VAX

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0126-M(1.04)
KBH 6/22/2013

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 LINE1: OAASZYUW RUEHCAA1498 1111847-SSSS--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 LINE3: O 211847Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 211847Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: *****
 SUBJ: BALTIC EXTRACT OF VANCOUVER SUMMIT READOUT

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0126-M (1.05)
 KBH 6/22/2023

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 121498
 EXDIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, US, RS, EN, LG, LH
 SUBJECT: BALTIC EXTRACT OF VANCOUVER SUMMIT READOUT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PROVIDED IN PARAS. 3-6 FOR THE EMBASSIES' INFORMATION IS A DETAILED READOUT OF THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION ON THE BALTICS WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT. AMBASSADORS MAY BRIEF APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BASED ON THE POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA. 7.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

3. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER KOZYREV COULD CLARIFY THE RECENT REMARKS IN BRUSSELS BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE GRACHEV WITH REGARD TO WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE BALTICS. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT WE HAD LEGISLATION ON THE BOOKS REQUIRING CERTIFICATION THAT SUCH WITHDRAWALS WERE PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO AGREED SCHEDULES. THERE WERE DEADLINES FOR SUCH CERTIFICATIONS IN JUNE AND IN OCTOBER. WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MINISTER'S REMARKS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN AS DEFINITIVE AS THEY HAD BEEN PORTRAYED IN

THE PRESS. COULD KOZYREV CLARIFY THE SITUATION, THE SECRETARY ASKED?

4. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT GRACHEV HAD REPEATED YEL'TSIN'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 29, 1992. YEL'TSIN HAD EXPRESSED THE PRINCIPLED POSITION THAT RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS COULD NOT PROCEED IN THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH EACH OF THE BALTIC STATES. THESE AGREEMENTS WERE NEEDED

TO ESTABLISH A "CIVIL" WITHDRAWAL PROCESS AND TO ENSURE THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE HOUSING FOR TROOPS RETURNING TO RUSSIA. KOZYREV ADDED THAT RUSSIA HAD TROOPS DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. THESE TROOPS HAD BEEN DEPLOYED AND THEN LEFT IN PLACE BY THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, NOT RUSSIA. CARE HAD TO BE TAKEN THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES DID NOT FURTHER INCREASE THE SUFFERING OF THE MILITARY, SINCE THIS COULD CAUSE THEM TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE OPPONENTS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA. IF THAT OCCURRED, EVERYTHING THAT HAD HAPPENED, INCLUDING YEL'TSIN'S RECOGNITION OF BALTIC INDEPENDENCE, COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. KOZYREV RECALLED YEL'TSIN'S EMOTIONAL AUGUST 23, 1992 MEETING WITH BALTIC LEADERS IN WHICH HE HAD HANDED OVER DOCUMENTS RECOGNIZING BALTIC INDEPENDENCE. DESPITE THE GREAT SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE, ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS HAD CONTINUED AFTER YEL'TSIN'S OCTOBER 29 STATEMENT. KOZYREV SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SUCH WITHDRAWALS WERE STILL CONTINUING.

5. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE MAIN THING WAS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS A REAL AND SERIOUS PROBLEM. AS WE TRIED TO MOVE TOWARD GENUINE PARTNERSHIP, IT WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT NOT TO ANTAGONIZE CONGRESS BY FAILING TO ABIDE BY THE RESTRICTIONS IT HAD PLACED ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA. THE SECRETARY ASKED CHARGE COLLINS TO WORK WITH THE RUSSIAN SIDE TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS. KOZYREV REPLIED THAT HE WOULD ASK THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN EXPLAINING THE RUSSIAN POSITION TO CONGRESS. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO BUILD SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR THE IDEA OF ASSISTANCE AIMED AT CREATING CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY ADEQUATE HOUSING, FOR TROOPS RETURNING TO RUSSIA. KOZYREV UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INCLUSION OF MONEY FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN HIS VANCOUVER PACKAGE OF ASSISTANCE INITIATIVES. THIS WOULD BE THE BEST MEANS TO SEE THAT THIS ISSUE REMAINED ON TRACK.

6. THE SECRETARY REJOINED THAT WE NEEDED TO BE CAREFUL HOW WE HANDLED THIS PROGRAM. IT COULD NOT APPEAR THAT WE HAD RESPONDED TO A THREAT THAT TROOPS WOULD NOT BE

WITHDRAWN UNLESS HOUSING WERE CONSTRUCTED. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE ADDED THAT WE WANTED OUR HOUSING PROGRAM TO HAVE A MULTIPLIER EFFECT BY INFLUENCING OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN MEETING THE MILITARY HOUSING SHORTAGE. KOZYREV POINTED TO THE BALTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL AS A FORUM IN WHICH SUCH A MULTILATERAL INITIATIVE COULD BE ORGANIZED. ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT MOSCOW WAS ACTING UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. CONGRESS OR FROM ANY OTHER DIRECTION.

TALKING POINTS

7. BEGIN POINTS FOR USE WITH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

, - ON THE MARGINS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE APRIL 3-4 VANCOUVER SUMMIT, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ALSO HELD MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. KOZYREV ON BALTIC-RELATED ISSUES.

-- THE SECRETARY ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV'S MARCH 29 STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS REGARDING A SUSPENSION OF RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THE BALTICS.

-- THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION REQUIRED CERTIFICATION BY JUNE 1, 1993, THAT THERE BE SUBSTANTIAL WITHDRAWALS.

-- KOZYREV REPLIED THAT GRACHEV HAD REPEATED YEL'TSIN'S SUSPENSION DECREE OF OCTOBER 29, 1992. IN PRINCIPLE, YELTSIN HAD EXPRESSED THE POSITION THAT RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS COULD NOT PROCEED IN THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH EACH OF THE BALTIC STATES.

O THESE AGREEMENTS WERE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A "CIVIL" WITHDRAWAL PROCESS AND TO ENSURE THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE HOUSING FOR TROOPS RETURNING TO RUSSIA.

-- KOZYREV ADDED THAT RUSSIA HAD TROOPS DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. THESE TROOPS HAD BEEN DEPLOYED AND THEN LEFT IN PLACE BY THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, NOT RUSSIA. CARE HAD TO BE TAKEN THAT

WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES DID NOT FURTHER INCREASE THE SUFFERING OF THE MILITARY, SINCE THIS COULD CAUSE THEM TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE OPPONENTS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA.

-- IF THAT OCCURRED, KOZYREV SAID, THEN THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT YEARS COULD BE REVERSED.

-- KOZYREV ALSO NOTED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN FORCES FROM THE BALTICS WAS CONTINUING.

O HE ALSO UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INCLUSION OF MONEY FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN HIS VANCOUVER PACKAGE OF HOUSING ASSISTANCE.

-- THE SECRETARY NOTED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS ISSUE TO THE UNITED STATES AND MADE CLEAR THAT TROOPS SHOULD NOT DELAY WITHDRAWING UNTIL HOUSING WAS CONSTRUCTED.

-- WE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE US. HOUSING PROGRAM MIGHT GENERATE INTEREST IN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN MEETING THE MILITARY HOUSING SHORTAGES.

END POINTS. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#1498

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1498

TOR: 930421183626 M0350833

DIST:

SIT: BURNS VAX

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Briefing Friends and Allies on Clinton-Yeltsin Tokyo Meeting (4 pages)	07/20/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
002. cable	Re: Briefing on Clinton-Yeltsin - Denmark (1 page)	07/21/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
003. cable	Re: Briefing Latvia on Moscow Summit and Partnership for Peace (5 pages)	01/19/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
004. cable	Re: Briefing Lithuanians on Partnership for Peace (4 pages)	01/21/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1993 - Dec 1994 ([Yeltsin])
 OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/20/1993 - 01/21/1994]

2016-0126-M
 ke4075

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA9804 2012117-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZEX

LINE3: O 201759Z JUL 93

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 201759Z JUL 93

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHSD/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4824/4826
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 5809/5811
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000

INFO: ****

SUBJ: BRIEFING FRIENDS AND ALLIES ON CLINTON-YELTSIN
TOKYO MEETING

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 219804

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, RS, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FRIENDS AND ALLIES ON CLINTON-YELTSIN
TOKYO MEETING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE MATERIAL BELOW IN BRIEFING HOST
GOVERNMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF THE BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN
PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN IN TOKYO ON JULY 10.

MAJOR ISSUES COVERED

-- FOLLOW-UP ON BILATERAL COMMITMENTS MADE AT THE
VANCOUVER SUMMIT;

-- STATE OF CURRENT U.S.-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING THE RUSSIAN SALE
OF CRYOGENIC ROCKET ENGINES TO INDIA; AND

-- FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON ACCEPTED PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S
INVITATION TO VISIT RUSSIA LATER IN THE YEAR, AT A TIME TO
BE AGREED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

ASSISTANCE

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON OUTLINED THE PROGRESS ON THE
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGES THE U.S. HAD ANNOUNCED AT THE
VANCOUVER SUMMIT AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M (1.06)
KBM 6/22/2023

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT 65 PERCENT OF THE FUNDS IN THE DOLS. 1.6 BILLION PACKAGE ANNOUNCED AT THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT HAD ALREADY BEEN OBLIGATED.

-- THE DOLS. 1.8 BILLION PACKAGE ANNOUNCED AFTER THE VANCOUVER SUMMIT WAS PROGRESSING THROUGH THE CONGRESS; IT HAD ALREADY PASSED THE HOUSE AND WAS MOVING TO THE SENATE; THE PRESIDENT WAS HOPEFUL IT WOULD PASS THERE AS WELL.

-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EFFORTS AT PUTTING THESE PACKAGES TOGETHER AND GETTING THEM IMPLEMENTED; YELSTIN PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS EMBODIED.

REMNANTS OF THE COLD WAR

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID HE HAD RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO THE CONGRESS DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE A WIDE RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS DATING FROM THE COLD WAR.

-- WITH RESPECT TO COCOM, PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THIS WAS MORE COMPLICATED, AS IT WAS A MULTILATERAL ISSUE AND WOULD LEQUIRE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID HE INTENDED TO SEEK BROAD LIBERALIZATION OF THE COCOM GUIDELINES IN THE AREAS OF MACHINE TOOLS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS (INCLUDING FIBER OPTICS) AND COMPUTERS.

-- THE LONG-TERM GOAL OF THE U.S. IS TO TRANSFORM COCOM FROM AN ORGANIZATION AIMED AT RUSSIA INTO AN ORGANIZATION IN WHICH RUSSIA IS A PARTNER WORKING WITH US TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION.

-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN WELCOMED THIS NEW APPROACH.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON ALSO ASKED PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO ALLOW THE EMIGRATION OF 65 RUSSIANS MAINLY JEWS, WHO HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM LEAVING RUSSIA. THE PRESIDENT ASKED FURTHER THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH A PROCESS FOR REVIEW OF SUCH CASES.

SECURITY ISSUES

-- THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF SHARING THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE TO THE U.S. OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) TAKEN FROM DISMANTLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. PRESIDENT CLINTON UNDERSCORED OUR DESIRE THAT A MECHANISM BE AGREED FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROCEEDS OF HEU SALES WITH UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS, THUS ALLOWING THE U.S. AND RUSSIA TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE CONTRACT.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON THANKED PRESIDENT YELTSIN FOR HIS POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE RECENTLY-ANNOUNCED U.S. POSITION ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB).

-- BOTH PRESIDENTS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO PRESS FOR A CTB IN CONJUNCTION WITH RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF ALL NUCLEAR STATES FROM FURTHER TESTING.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY NEGOTIATIONS

-- THE PRESIDENTS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON A FRAMEWORK OF ADHERENCE TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) STANDARDS IN ORDER TO AVOID DISRUPTION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR, TO U.S.-RUSSIAN SPACE COOPERATION.

-- THEY AGREED THAT U.S. AND RUSSIAN EXPERTS WOULD RESUME TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

O IN FACT, THEY RESUMED THE FOLLOWING DAY IN MOSCOW AND CONCURRENTLY IN WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 14.

-- IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED MEETING OF VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN TO LAUNCH A COMMISSION ON SPACE AND ENERGY COOPERATION.

-- THE PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT, IF THE MTCR DISCUSSIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL, THEN THE INITIAL GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION COULD TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST MUTUALLY

CONVENIENT TIME.

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

BALTICS

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE BALTIC STATES.

-- THE PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING THE WELL-BEING OF ALL MINORITIES IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTIC STATES.

-- THE PRESIDENT OFFERED U.S. HELP TO ASSURE IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC COUNTRIES.

NORTH KOREA

-- THE PRESIDENTS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFORTS DESIGNED TO GET THE DPRK TO ROLL BACK ITS DECISION TO LEAVE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THEY AGREED TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER IN THIS EFFORT.

IRAN

-- THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO IRAN; PRESIDENT CLINTON SPECIFICALLY UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT IN TRANSFERS TO IRAN OF NUCLEAR

REACTORS AND SUBMARINES.

GEORGIA

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE ESCALATION OF FIGHTING IN ABKHAZIA AND THE PROSPECT FOR STABILITY IN GEORGIA. HE STRESSED PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING STABILITY IN GEORGIA.

-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID RUSSIA SUPPORTED THE UN'S CEASE FIRE EFFORTS AND ASKED FOR U.S. SUPPORT. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT THE EFFORT.

-- THE PRESIDENT REQUESTED RUSSIA'S HELP IN ASSURING A CEASE-FIRE IN ABKHAZIA.

-- HE ALSO PLEDGED GREATER U.S. AID FOR GEORGIA.

JAPAN

-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID HE WOULD PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN ON OCTOBER 10-11.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON WELCOMED THIS DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA AND JAPAN TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONS AND OFFERED TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO ASSIST. NAGORNO-KARABAKH

-- PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO HALT THE BLOODSHED.

UKRAINE

-- THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE RESOLUTION PASSED THE PREVIOUS DAY BY THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET THAT DECLARED SEVASTOPOL TO BE RUSSIAN TERRITORY. PRESIDENT YELTSIN EXPRESSED HIS DISPLEASURE WITH THE SUPREME SOVIET'S ACTION AND SAID HE WOULD NOT BE BOUND BY IT. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#9804

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9804

TOR: 930720171810 M0508209

DIST:

SIT: BURNS GOTTEMOELLER PONEMAN VAX

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: RAACZYUW RUFHCPA4908 2021556-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 211556Z JUL 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
OSRI: RUFHCP
DTG: 211556Z JUL 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1758
INFO: *****
SUBJ: BRIEFING ON CLINTON-YELTSIN MEETING -- DENMARK
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COPENHAGEN 04908
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, ZB, DA
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON CLINTON-YELTSIN MEETING -- DENMARK
REF: STATE 219804

(S) WE BRIEFED ANDERS ORNEMARK, MFA SECTION CHIEF
RESPONSIBLE FOR RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS, ON THE
PRESIDENT'S JULY 10 MEETING WITH YELTSIN. ORNEMARK
EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN AND SATISFACTION WITH
THE TREATMENT OF THE BALTICS AT THE MEETING. STONE
BT
#4908
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 4908
TOR: 930721154445 M0510126
DIST:
SIT: VAX

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M(1.07)
KBH 4/22/2023

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHRAA0147 0191032-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: P 191032Z JAN 94

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY RIGA

OSRI: RUEHRA

DTG: 191032Z JAN 94

ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3625

INFO: RUFHRSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0921

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0344

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1272

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0392

RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0061

RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0061

RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0069

RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0075

RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0042

RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0056

RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0180

RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0063

RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0393

RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 0478

RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0504

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0511

RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 1006

RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0374

RUEHRSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0393

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1003

RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1830

RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0459

RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 1759

SUBJ: BRIEFING LATVIA ON MOSCOW SUMMIT AND
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 RIGA 000147

NSC FOR KUPCHAN

STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR DAO

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, PINS, LG, NATO, NACC, PFP, RS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING LATVIA ON MOSCOW SUMMIT AND

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. ON JANUARY 17, NSC STAFFER CHARLES KUPCHAN,
USNATO'S PATRICK MOON, AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF, MET
MEMBERS OF LATVIA'S NSC ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.
LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS SAID HE HAD HEARD PRESIDENTS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262016-0126-M (1.08)
KRM 6/22/2023

CLINTON AND YELTSIN HAD AGREED RUSSIAN TROOPS SHOULD BE OUT OF LATVIA BY JULY 1. AMBASSADOR AND KUPCHAN SAID THEIR UNDERSTANDING WAS THE SUMMIT HAD NOT CHANGED THE DATE OF WITHDRAWAL, I.E., AUGUST 31. AMBASSADOR ASSURED LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS THAT A TEMPORARY, CONTINUING RUSSIAN PRESENCE WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE U.S.'S CONTINUING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH LATVIA. HE COMMENTED THAT, IF ANYTHING, REACHING A WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA WOULD IMPROVE USG WILLINGNESS FOR A SECURITY DIALOG.

3. LATVIAN QUESTIONS FOCUSSED ON WHETHER RUSSIA HAD SET LIMITS ON LATVIA'S PARTICIPATION IN PFP. KUPCHAN EXPLAINED THAT THE OPPORTUNITIES RUSSIA WOULD HAVE IN PFP DID NOT DIFFER FROM OTHER PARTNERS'. HE SAID, THOUGH, NATO COULD PREVENT RUSSIA FROM BECOMING MUCH MORE INVOLVED IN PFP THAN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT PFP ALLOWED STATES TO DIFFERENTIATE AMONG THEMSELVES. THE USG EXPECTED THE BALTICS AND THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP QUICK INTEGRATION WITH NATO. PARLIAMENTARIAN PANTELEJEVS ASKED WHAT WAS THE GEOGRAPHIC LIMIT TO EUROPE IN THE NEW "EUROPEAN ORDER." KUPCHAN EXPLAINED PFP WAS AVAILABLE TO ALL NACC STATES PLUS AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. EXPECTED THAT, IN ONE OR TWO YEARS, THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES WOULD NOT BE PARTICIPATING BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS. HE CONFIRMED PFP WOULD NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COUNTRIES WHO HAD APPLIED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP (E.G. LITHUANIA) AND THOSE WHO HAD NOT. AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT THE USG WOULD BE EXPANDING ITS BILATERAL MILITARY AID WITH LATVIA IN A WAY THAT WOULD HELP LATVIA PARTICIPATE IN PFP. KUPCHAN ADDED THAT LATVIA COULD EXPECT MORE CONTACTS, AS WELL AS SOME MATERIEL TO ALLOW LATVIA TO PARTICIPATE. PRESS REPORTS SAY LATVIA HAS DECIDED TO JOIN PFP. END SUMMARY.

TROOP WITHDRAWAL/SKRUNDA AND THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

4. ON JANUARY 17, NSC STAFF MEMBER CHARLES KUPCHAN AND USNATO'S PATRICK MOON, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF, BRIEFED MEMBERS OF LATVIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. LATVIA'S NSC IS ITS HIGHEST FOREIGN/DEFENSE AFFAIRS BODY.

5. AMBASSADOR OPENED BY BRIEFING ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT (SEPTEL). LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS SAID HE HAD HEARD IN THE NEWS THAT PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN HAD AGREED RUSSIAN TROOPS SHOULD BE OUT OF LATVIA BY JULY

1. (EMBASSY COMMENT: LATVIA AND RUSSIA HAD AGREED ON A DEADLINE OF AUGUST 31, 1994; LATVIA WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME AN EARLIER DATE. END COMMENT.) AMBASSADOR AND KUPCHAN SAID THEIR UNDERSTANDING WAS THE SUMMIT HAD NOT CHANGED THE DATE OF WITHDRAWAL, I.E., AUGUST 31.

6. ULMANIS ASKED WHETHER LATVIA'S REACTION TO A
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NSC FOR KUPCHAN

STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR DAO
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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RUSSIAN OFFER WOULD AFFECT USG POLICY TOWARDS LATVIA. AMBASSADOR SAID NO; A TEMPORARY, CONTINUING RUSSIAN PRESENCE WOULD NOT (ADVERSELY) AFFECT THE U.S.'S CONTINUING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH LATVIA. HE NOTED THAT A DOD DAS (KRUZEL) WOULD VISIT LATVIA SOON TO DISCUSS EXPANDING THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT, IF ANYTHING, REACHING A (WITHDRAWAL) AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA WOULD IMPROVE USG WILLINGNESS TO HAVE A SECURITY DIALOG, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT A POINT HE WOULD WANT TO MAKE PUBLICLY. A PITCH FOR PARTNERSHIP

7. KUPCHAN THEN BRIEFED ON PFP, LAYING OUT PFP'S PRINCIPAL GOALS, THE ADVANTAGES TO PARTICIPATION, AND THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS INVOLVED. HE EXPLAINED THE LATTER POINT MEANT THAT NATO AND THE U.S. WOULD DECLARE THEY ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF PARTNERS WHILE PARTNERS MUST COMMIT TO THE POLITICAL GOALS OF PFP, SUCH AS CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY, TRANSPARENCY OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND CSCE PRINCIPLES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND USE OF FORCE. HE NOTED THAT COUNTRIES THAT DEVIATE SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE PATH OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM WOULD HAVE THEIR PARTICIPATION AFFECTED.

8. MOON THEN WALKED THROUGH THE STEPS TOWARDS SIGNING UP FOR PFP: SIGNING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, PREPARING A PRESENTATION DOCUMENT AND WORKING OUT A PROGRAM OF PARTICIPATION. HE SAID NATO WOULD SEND A TEAM SHORTLY TO PROVIDE DETAILS. PFP AND THE RUSSIANS

9. PANTELEJEVS ASKED ABOUT THE LIMITS OF PFP AND WHAT PRECISELY HAD HAPPENED IN MOSCOW WITH THE RUSSIANS ON PFP. WITH LITHUANIA'S NATO APPLICATION ALMOST CERTAINLY IN MIND, ULMANIS INTERJECTED TO ASK WHETHER PFP WOULD DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAD APPLIED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THOSE WHO HAD NOT.

10. KUPCHAN ANSWERED THAT YELTSIN HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON RUSSIA FULLY INTENDED TO SIGN UP FOR PFP. KUPCHAN EXPLAINED THAT THE OPPORTUNITIES RUSSIA WOULD HAVE IN PFP WERE NOT ANY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OFFERED TO OTHER PARTNERS. HE QUALIFIED THIS BY ADDING THAT NATO WOULD RETAIN OVERALL CONTROL AND COULD PREVENT RUSSIA FROM BECOMING MUCH MORE INVOLVED IN PFP THAN OTHER COUNTRIES WERE ABLE TO. HE ADDED A SECOND QUALIFIER: PFP ALLOWED STATES TO DIFFERENTIATE AMONG THEMSELVES IN PRACTICE. HE SAID THE USG EXPECTED THE BALTICS AND THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES WILL DEVELOP FASTER INTEGRATION WITH NATO DUE TO THEIR DESIRE TO INTEGRATE. HE REITERATED THAT THE USG WANTED THIS TO BE A NATURAL PROCESS SO RUSSIA WOULD NOT FEEL COMPLETELY EXCLUDED OR UKRAINE FEEL ABANDONED TO RUSSIA'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. HE EXPLAINED A PARTNER WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO A LESSER LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IF IT BEGAN ITS PARTICIPATION LATER.

11. PANTELEJEVS ASKED WHAT WAS THE GEOGRAPHIC LIMIT TO EUROPE IN THE NEW "EUROPEAN ORDER" OF WHICH PFP WAS

PART. KUPCHAN ANSWERED THERE WAS NO GEOGRAPHIC LINE
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NSC FOR KUPCHAN

STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR DAO
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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SUBJECT: BRIEFING LATVIA ON MOSCOW SUMMIT AND
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DRAWN WHERE EUROPE ENDED. PFP WAS AVAILABLE TO ALL
NACC STATES AND "OTHER CSCE STATES WILLING AND ABLE TO
PARTICIPATE." HE DEFINED THE LATTER CATEGORY AS
AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND. HE NOTED THAT, IN
REALITY, THE U.S. EXPECTED THAT, IN ONE OR TWO YEARS,
THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES WOULD NOT BE PARTICIPATING
BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS. HE EXPLAINED THAT NACC
WOULD CONTINUE AS A FORUM, BUT THE "HARD CORE" OF
EXERCISES ETC. WOULD BE MOVED INTO PFP. (EMBASSY
COMMENT: PANTELEJEVS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR JAN 18 THAT
THE LATVIANS FEEL THE NEED TO BACK CENTRAL ASIA
CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM; HE SAID HIS
QUESTION WAS SPARKED BY CONCERN THAT, BY ACCEPTING PFP,
THE LATVIANS WOULD ABANDON THE CENTRAL ASIANS TO THE
RUSSIANS. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH PANTELEJEVS TO MAKE
CLEAR THAT CENTRAL ASIAN STATES HAVE THE SAME
INVITATION AND OPPORTUNITIES AS THE LATVIANS TO BENEFIT
FROM PFP, THOUGH IT DEPENDS ON THE CENTRAL ASIANS
THEMSELVES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEM. END COMMENT.)

12. ULMANIS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PFP WOULD NOT
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COUNTRIES WHO HAD APPLIED FOR NATO
MEMBERSHIP AND THOSE WHO HAD NOT. KUPCHAN ASSURED HIM
PFP WAS AVAILABLE EQUALLY TO BOTH CATEGORIES.

13. KRISTOVSKIS ASKED ABOUT THE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS
INVOLVED. KUPCHAN NOTED NATO WOULD BEAR THE COSTS OF
ESTABLISHING AN OFFICE FACILITY, THOUGH PARTNERS WOULD
HAVE TO PAY SOME RENT FOR OFFICE SPACE AT NATO. HE
EXPLAINED THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR A MILITARY BUILDUP
WAS NOT IMPORTANT FOR PARTICIPATION, WHAT WAS IMPORTANT
WAS THE PERSONNEL WHO WOULD LEARN HOW NATO WORKED
TOGETHER. KUPCHAN SAID THE USG EXPECTED THE INITIAL
EXERCISES IN 1994 TO BE AT THE BATTALION LEVEL OR
LOWER; NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE BALTIC MIGHT INVOLVE A
FEW VESSELS, NOT LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES. AMBASSADOR
COMMENTED THAT THE USG WOULD BE EXPANDING ITS BILATERAL
MILITARY COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE WITH LATVIA IN A
WAY TO HELP LATVIA PARTICIPATE IN PFP. KUPCHAN ADDED
THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WANTED TO EXPAND CONTACTS ACROSS
THE BOARD WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE. KUPCHAN SAID LATVIA COULD EXPECT AN INCREASED
LEVEL OF CONTACTS, AS WELL AS THE TRANSFER OF SOME
MATERIEL TO ALLOW LATVIA TO PARTICIPATE.

14. PANTELEJEVS POSED A "PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION": WHAT
WAS THE THREAT PFP WAS MEANT TO COUNTER? KUPCHAN
ANSWERED THAT PFP ALLOWED NATO TO GO BACK TO BEING A
TRADITIONAL ALLIANCE AGAINST A THREAT IF NECESSARY AND
ALSO ALLOWED IT TO FOCUS ON PRESERVING MILITARY
SECURITY AMONG MEMBERS, NOT DIRECTED AGAINST A SPECIFIC
MILITARY THREAT. WHEN PANTELEJEVS PRESSED, KUPCHAN

CONFIRMED IT DID NOT RULE OUT A RETURN TO THE "OLD PATTERN" (OF DEFENSE AGAINST A THREAT). KUPCHAN EXPLAINED THAT TO EXTEND NATO MEMBERSHIP NOW COULD ENCOURAGE THE THREAT THE WEST HOPED WOULD GO AWAY FOR GOOD. HE WAS CONFIDENT, THOUGH, THAT NATO STOOD READY, IF THERE WERE A THREAT, TO EXTEND SECURITY GUARANTEES WHEN AND WHERE NECESSARY.

15. WRAPPING UP, ULMANIS PROMISED THAT LATVIA WOULD GIVE A RESPONSE "IN THE NEAREST FUTURE" ON ITS PARTICIPATION. PRESS REPORTS SINCE THEN SAY THE NSC DECIDED (NO SURPRISE) THAT LATVIA WILL PARTICIPATE IN PFP.

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NSC FOR KUPCHAN

STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR DAO

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, PINS, LG, NATO, NACC, PFP, RS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING LATVIA ON MOSCOW SUMMIT AND
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

PARTICIPANTS

16. LATVIA'S PRESIDENT ULMANIS PRESIDED AT HIS OFFICE. DEFENSE MINISTER PAVLOVSKIS (AN AMCIT), INTERIOR MINISTER KRISTOVSKIS, PARLIAMENT SPEAKER GORBUNOV, ANDREJS PANTELEJEVS (LATVIA'S WAY PARLIAMENTARY FACTION CHIEF AND CHAIR OF PARLIAMENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE) AND GUNDARS ZALKANS (AN AMCIT WHO IS THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISOR ON DEFENSE ISSUES AND SECRETARY OF THE NSC) ATTENDED. HARDIJS BAUMANIS AND OTHER PRESIDENTIAL AIDES WERE PRESENT. THE HEAD OF THE LATVIAN MFA'S AMERICAS DESK, EINARS SEMANIS, AND THE HEAD OF THE MFA'S OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, KAIJA GERTNERS (AN AMCIT), WERE BROUGHT INTO THE MEETING SINCE THEY WILL BE RESPONSIBLE AT THE MFA UNDER STATE SECRETARY RIEKSTINS FOR WORKING OUT LATVIA'S PARTICIPATION IN PFP.

SILINS

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RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1524
SUBJ: BRIEFING LITHUANIANS ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
TEXT:

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USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
NSC FOR KUPCHAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, NATO, PFP, LH, RS
SUBJECT: BRIEFING LITHUANIANS ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: NSC STAFFER CHARLES KUPCHAN
AND USNATO POLITICAL OFFICER PATRICK MOON BRIEFED
LITHUANIAN POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE PRESS ON THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DURING A BRIEF STOPOVER IN VILNIUS
ON JANUARY 17. OUR LITHUANIAN LISTENERS WERE APPRECIATIVE
OF THE VISIT, AND IT WAS CLEAR FROM MANY OF THEIR
QUESTIONS THAT THE PFP CONCEPT CONTAINED MANY ELEMENTS
UNFAMILIAR TO THEM. LOCAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE PFP CENTER ON
APPREHENSION OF WHAT KIND OF INFLUENCE RUSSIA MIGHT
EXERCISE OVER THE PARTNERSHIP'S ESTABLISHMENT AND
FUNCTIONING. THE LITHUANIANS ALSO WORRY ABOUT THE COSTS OF
THE PFP AND WHETHER THEIR FLEDGLING MILITARY WILL BE ABLE
TO COPE WITH THE NEW STANDARDS AND REQUIREMENTS MANDATED
BY THE PFP. REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN UPGRADING THE LOCAL
MILITARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO STANDARDS HENCE CAN BE
EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF OUR INTERLOCUTOR
SOUNDED DISAPPOINTED THAT THE NATO SUMMIT DLD NOT OFFER
LITHUANIA MORE CONCRETE PROSPECTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP,
SENIOR GOL FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS CONCEDED THAT THE PFP

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WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED FOR THE PRESENT. A NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARIANS AND JOURNALISTS WITH WHOM KUPCHAN AND MOON MET EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT COULD RESULT IN US-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE BALTIC STATES. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

3. NSC STAFFER CHARLES KUPCHAN AND USNATO POLITICAL OFFICER PATRICK MOON ARRIVED IN VILNIUS IN THE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 17 AND CONDUCTED AN INTENSIVE SERIES OF BRIEFINGS ON THE PFP FOR LITHUANIAN LEADERS THAT EVENING. KUPCHAN AND MOON, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF AND RESIDENT DAO, FIRST TRAVELLED TO THE LITHUANIAN PARLIAMENT (SEIMAS) FOR A MEETING WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS AND STAFF FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEES. OUR VISITORS THEN MOVED TO THE PARLIAMENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOR A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT WAS EXTENSIVELY COVERED BY THE STATE-OWNED NEWS NETWORK LATER THAT NIGHT. THERE FOLLOWED A BRIEFING FOR FOREIGN MINISTER POVILAS GYLYS, PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR JUSTAS PALECKIS AND STAFFERS FROM THE MFA AND MOD. KUPCHAN AND MOON ENDED THE EVENING AT A LATE SUPPER HOSTED BY CHARGE AND ATTENDED BY THE FOUR PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THE CENTRIST AND RIGHT-WING PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION.

4. INTEREST IN THE VISIT WAS NOTABLE, AS WITNESSED BY THE SOLID TURNOUT OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND PRESS REPRESENTATIVES, DESPITE THE LATE HOUR. PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM THE RULING DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY (LDDP) AS WELL AS THE RIGHT-OF-CENTER OPPOSITION WELCOMED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONCEPT AS OUTLINED BY KUPCHAN AND MOON, BUT CLEARLY EXPRESSED APPREHENSION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDUE RUSSIAN INFLUENCE BOTH DURING THE FORMATIVE PHASE OF PFP AND THE ACTUAL OPERATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP. ALGIRDAS GRICIUS, THE SENIOR LDDP DEPUTY ON THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF TREATING CIS MEMBER STATES AS INDIVIDUAL PFP MEMBERS WHEN, IN FACT THEY WOULD LIKELY FUNCTION AS PARTS OF AN ALREADY EXISTING MILITARY BLOC LED BY RUSSIA.

5. VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS, HEAD OF THE RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION, PROBED KUPCHAN AND MOON ON WHETHER RUSSIA WOULD EXERCISE ANY COORDINATING POWER IN SELECTING PFP MEMBERS AND APPROVING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS FOR COUNTRIES LIKE LITHUANIA. KUPCHAN EXPLAINED THAT THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE STRICTLY BETWEEN NEW PFP MEMBERS AND NATO, AND THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT ENJOY A RIGHT OF VETO OVER THESE QUESTIONS. TRANSPARENCY OF PFP ACTIVITIES WOULD ENSURE THAT NEITHER RUSSIA NOR ANY OF THE OTHER PFP PARTICIPANTS FELT THAT PFP COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST THEM.

6. ARVYDAS IVASKEVICIUS, AN LDDP MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COMMITTEE, POSED A QUESTION THAT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REPEATED BY JOURNALISTS AND OUR OTHER OFFICIAL INTERLOCUTORS, NAMELY, WHETHER THE PFP WOULD ASSIST COUNTRIES LIKE LITHUANIA TO ACQUIRE NATO-STANDARD ARMS AND EQUIPMENT,
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 VILNIUS 000141
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
NSC FOR KUPCHAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, NATO, PFP, LH, RS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING LITHUANIANS ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE SINCE INTEROPERABILITY OF MILITARY HARDWARE WOULD BE A REQUIREMENT FOR EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP. KUPCHAN NOTED THAT NEITHER THE PFP NOR NATO WOULD LIKE TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY ARMS BUILDUP IN THE REGION, GIVEN THE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP PREVAILING HERE. ARMS TRANSFERS USUALLY ARE ARRANGED ON A BILATERAL BASIS BETWEEN RECEIVING AND PROVIDING COUNTRIES. BUT THE PFP, THROUGH ITS COOPERATIVE WORK PROGRAMS, CAN PROVIDE PFP MEMBERS OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN MUCH ABOUT NATO TECHNICAL TRAINING, ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.

7. GRICIUS SAID THAT HE REGRETTED THAT NATO ACCEDED TO RUSSIAN PRESSURE AND DID NOT EXPLICITLY "DEFINE ITS GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS" DURING THE JANUARY SUMMIT. GRICIUS WARNED THAT IF, AT A LATER DATE, NATO WERE TO "CARELESSLY" EXTEND ITS BOUNDARIES TO POLAND AND STOP AT THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN BORDER, THEN RUSSIAN "PRO-IMPERIALISTS" MIGHT ASSUME THAT LITHUANIA WOULD BE LEFT WITHIN THE CIS SPHERE OF INTEREST. KUPCHAN COUNTERED THAT THIS IS PRECISELY THE REASON WHY THE PFP IS OPEN TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND WHY IT IS INTENT ON AVOIDING THE DRAWING OF NEW EAST-WEST BOUNDARIES IN EUROPE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

8. LANDSBERGIS CAUTIONED THAT LITHUANIAN PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT LATER QUESTION HOW THE FINANCIAL AND HUMAN COSTS OF PFP MEMBERSHIP, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE DEATHS OF LITHUANIAN PEACEKEEPING TROOPS, WOULD HEIGHTEN LITHUANIAN SECURITY. LANDSBERGIS NOTED THAT LITHUANIAN PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD BE ABLE TO CLEARLY PERCEIVE THE INCREASED SECURITY BENEFITS OF PFP MEMBERSHIP AS LITHUANIAN PFP PARTICIPATION DEEPENS.

9. FOREIGN MINISTER GYLYS, SPEAKING DURING KUPCHAN'S AND MOON'S SUBSEQUENT BRIEFING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, ALSO REFERRED TO THE PROSPECTIVE COSTS OF PFP MEMBERSHIP, ALTHOUGH HE CLEARLY ENDORSED THE PFP CONCEPT. GYLYS SAID THAT IN FOLLOWING PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISITS FROM BRUSSELS TO MOSCOW HE NOTED THAT THE US SEEMS TO CONSIDER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE POLAND AND FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS AS EQUAL PARTNERS. IN FACT, GYLYS SAID THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT INEQUALITIES. POLAND HAS ITS OWN MILITARY AND STATE STRUCTURES, WHILE LITHUANIA WAS DEPRIVED OF THESE ASSETS IN THE SOVIET ERA. SHOULD NOT NATO TAKE THIS DIFFERENCE INTO ACCOUNT IN FASHIONING THE PFP, ASKED GYLYS. SPECIFICALLY, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE WEST SHOULD NOT DO MORE TO MATERIALLY ASSIST THE COUNTRIES OF THE LATTER CATEGORY IN CREATING AND MODERNIZING THEIR MILITARIES.

10. IN GENERAL, GYLYS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR PALECKIS WELCOMED THE PFP AS A WISE "COMPROMISE" ADDRESSING THE SHARPLY DIFFERING INTERESTS OF RUSSIA AND THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. GYLYS AGREED THAT THE PFP SHOULD NOT CREATE NEW DIVISIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST EUROPE. PALECKIS ASKED HOW THE US WOULD REGARD LITHUANIAN MOVES TO SEEK CLOSER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE UKRAINE, BELARUS OR RUSSIA. KUPCHAN OFFERED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH RUSSIA WOULD BE BENEFICIAL, BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PRESSURE TO FORCE COOPERATION ON COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE PFP.

11. WITH REGARD TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TALKS IN MOSCOW,

HOWEVER, GYLYS AND SEVERAL OTHER OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF THE BALTIC STATES' HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES TOWARD THEIR RUSSIAN MINORITIES. GYLYS, AND GRICIUS BEFORE HIM, NOTED THAT LITHUANIA'S RUSSIAN MINORITY FACED ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CONDITIONS FROM THE MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN ESTNIA AND LATVIA (COMMENT: LITHUANIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAW ALLOWS VIRTUALLY ALL OF ITS RUSSIAN SPEAKING RESIDENTS TO BECOME LITHUANIAN CITIZENS. END COMMENT) HENCE IT IS NOT JUST TO SPEAK OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN THE "BALTICS," WITHOUT DISTINGUISHING LITHUNIA FROM LATVIA AND ESTONIA. GYLYS ALSO ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON PROMISED RUSSIA THAT NONE OF THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS WOULD ENTER NATO BEFORE RUSSIA.

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USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
NSC FOR KUPCHAN

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, NATO, PFP, LH, RS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING LITHUANIANS ON PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

12. COMMENT: OUR OTHER PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY INTERLOCUTORS SEEMED CONCERNED THAT THE CLINTON-YELTSIN TALKS SOMEHOW RESULTED IN US WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT MORE RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON LATVIA AND ESTONIA REGARDING THE RUSSIAN MINORITY COMMUNITIES. SEVERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE PUBLICLY VOICED FEARS OF US TOLERATION OF A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE "NEAR ABROAD" IN THE WAKE OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT REPORTED COMMENTS ON RETAINING RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: JCG: Briefing Close Allies, Turks and Norwegians (4 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
002. cable	Re: Briefing for Partners on Moscow and Kiev Summits (5 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
003. cable	Re: Washington Briefing of Partners on the Moscow and Kiev Summits (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
004. cable	Re: CFE: Briefing allies on Perry-Grachev Meeting (3 pages)	10/30/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
005. cable	Re: CFE: Briefing Allies on Flank Issue (3 pages)	04/23/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
006. cable	Re: Briefing of CEE and NIS Countries on the Moseow Summit (7 pages)	05/04/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023
007. cable	Re: CFE: Briefing the Turks on Flank Agreement (2 pages)	05/09/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

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 NSC Cables
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHVEN1389 1361300-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 161300Z MAY 95
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USVIENNA
 OSRI: RUEHVEN
 DTG: 161300Z MAY 95
 ORIG: USMISSION USVIENNA
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 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2470
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0842
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1905
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2060
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0367
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8972
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0755
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5// PRIORITY
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: JCG: BRIEFING CLOSE ALLIES, TURKS AND
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USVIENNA 001389
 STATE ALSO INFO ACDA/OA
 FROM USDEL OSCE
 EXDIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: 5/15/15
 TAGS: PREL, OSCE, PARM, KCFE
 SUBJECT: JCG: BRIEFING CLOSE ALLIES, TURKS AND
 - NORWEGIANS
 REF: USVIENNA 1289

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0126-M (1.10)
 KBM 6/22/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: USDEL BRIEFED NATO CLOSE ALLIES, TURKEY AND NORWAY ON THE CFE PORTIONS OF THE JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, MAY 10. DRAWING ON BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, U.S. STRESSED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION; WE INSIST ON COMPLIANCE WITH FLANK LIMITS IN NOVEMBER AND WOULD CONSIDER POSSIBLE WAYS TO ADDRESS RUSSIAN CONCERNS AT THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN MAY 1991. CLOSE ALLIES WELCOMED THE BRIEFING AND ALSO URGED THAT THE ALLIANCE GET ON QUICKLY WITH THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING WHAT STEPS IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE

ON THE FLANKS AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. NORWEGIAN AND TURKISH REPS SAID THE BRIEFING WOULD HELP ALLEVIATE CONCERNS THAT COULD BE RAISED BY DISTORTED REPORTING ON THE PESS CONFERENCE. TURKISH AMBASSADOR ALP (PROTECT) INDICATED HE HAS SOME IDEAS ON A FLANK SETTLEMENT, WHICH COULD BE SHARED "AT THE END OF OCTOBER" AND DISCUSSED SOME OF THE PARAMETERS OF A SETTLEMENT FROM THE TURKISH POINT OF VIEW. NORWEGIAN REPS DISCUSSED SOME OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES OSLO FACES ON THE FLANKS. END SUMMARY.

CLOSE ALLIES

3. ON MAY 11, U.S. CHIEF DELEGATE SELL BRIEFED CLOSE ALLIES ON THE CFE PORTION OF THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, DRAWING ON THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. CLOSE ALLIES WELCOMED THE INFORMATION. GERMAN REP ERNST AND BRITISH REP HAIN-COLE POINTED OUT THAT THE ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE ISSUE REVEALED THE DESIRABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE MOVING QUICKLY TO DEVELOP A POSITION ON WHAT KINDS OF STEPS IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE TO ADDRESS LEGITIMATE RUSSIAN CONCERNS AT THE MAY 1996 CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE. ALL CLOSE ALLIES ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO DEVELOP A POSITION ON HOW TO RESPOND TO LIKELY RUSSIAN FLANK DEPLOYMENTS OVER TREATY LIMITS IN NOVEMBER. HAIN-COLE SAID THE BRITISH TEAM AT THE UPCOMING HLTf WOULD INITIATE A DISCUSSION, AMONG CLOSE ALLIES ONLY, OF POSSIBLE OUTLINES OF A FLANK SETTLEMENT, ALONG THE LINES HAIN-COLE HAD OUTLINED IN THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S JCG CLOSE ALLIES MEETING (REFTEL).

4. ON MAY 12, U.S. CHIEF DELEGATE SELL BRIEFED TURKISH AMBASSADOR ALP AND NORWEGIAN DCM HOVDKINN ON CFE ASPECTS OF THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. DRAWING ON THE BACKGROUNDER BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, SELL ASSURED TURKISH AND NORWEGIAN REPS THAT IT IS THE STRONG VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THAT RUSSIA SHOULD COMPLY IN FULL WITH THE CFE TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED AND, IN THE CONTEXT OF FULL RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE IN NOVEMBER, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS AS APPROPRIATE TO A REVIEW CONFERENCE, BUT NOT TO RENEGOTIATE THE TREATY.

5. THE NORWEGIAN AND TURKISH REPS EXPRESSED STRONG APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. BRIEFING. THEY NOTED THAT PRESS REPORTS OF THE JOINT CONFERENCES, WHERE PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD "SURELY SUPPORT" RUSSIA ON THE CFE FLANKS ISSUE HAD RAISED QUESTIONS IN THEIR CAPITALS AND COULD BECOME A POLITICAL ISSUE. THUS, IT WAS GOOD THE U.S. HAD TAKEN ACTION TO NIP THE PROBLEM EARLY. TURKISH

AMBASSADOR ALP, NOTING THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO SPEAK AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WONDERED WHETHER YELTSIN HAD DELIBERATELY TRIED TO PUT PRESIDENT CLINTON ON THE SPOT BY SAYING THAT THE U.S. "SUPPORTED" RUSSIA ON THE FLANKS.

6. AMBASSADOR ALP CONTINUED THAT HE WAS VERY GLAD TO HEAR THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION OF "COMPLY IN NOVEMBER, ADDRESS CONCERNS IN MAY" BECAUSE THAT POSITION MADE A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE. IT ALLOWED THE ALLIANCE TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE WITH MOSCOW, IN AN EFFORT TO DRIVE THE RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT FIGURES AS LOW AS POSSIBLE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE ALLIANCE WORKED OUT A MUTUALLY AGREED POSITION FOR NOVEMBER 1995 AND FOR THE MAY 1996 REVIEW CONFERENCE.

7. FOR TURKEY, ALP CONTINUED, THE PROBLEM HAS BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS. THE MAJOR ISSUE IS HOW MUCH TLE WILL RUSSIA BE ALLOWED TO HAVE IN THE FLANK ZONE. ALP AGREED WITH SELL THAT, AT PRESENT, THE RUSSIANS ARE SEEKING IN EFFECT A DOUBLE COMPENSATION IN THE FLANKS. FIRST, THEY ARE SEEKING TO EXCLUDE FROM CFE FLANK LIMITS ALL TLE IN THE 58TH ARMY. FOR THE REST OF THE FLANKS, THE RUSSIANS WILL SAY THEY ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY, BUT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS THAT WE BELIEVE GO BEYOND THE TREATY, SUCH AS EXEMPTING TLE IN NAVAL INFANTRY/COASTAL DEFENSE UNITS FROM FLANK CEILINGS.

8. ALP ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT FOR TURKEY THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE FLANK PROBLEM IS SECONDARY. AN EXTRA "500 TANKS AND 2000 ACVS" WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE BALANCE AND TURKEY IS CAPABLE OF TAKING ACTION TO DEFEND ITSELF. ALP SAID THE ALLIANCE SHOULD USE THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE JCG TO GET A CLEAR IDEA ABOUT SPECIFIC RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES. ONE DANGER IS THAT EXCESS RUSSIAN FLANK DEPLOYMENTS COULD PROVOKE THE TURKISH MILITARY TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL TLE IN THE ZONE. THIS, IN TURN, COULD SPARK EXTRA GREEK DEPLOYMENTS, WHICH WOULD ADD AN UNDESIRABLE NEW ELEMENT TO THE FLANK EQUATION.

9. POLITICALLY, ALP SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ANY FLANK SETTLEMENT NOT APPEAR TO GIVE RUSSIA A "FREE HAND" IN THE CAUCASUS. IT WOULD ALSO BE ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE FOR ANY FLANK SETTLEMENT TO REQUIRE AN AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY TO FORMALLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TLE ALLOWED IN THE FLANK ZONES. ANY SUCH CHANGES WOULD NEVER BE APPROVED BY THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT.

10. SELL NOTED THAT BY DEFINING WHAT A FLANK SETTLEMENT COULD NOT DO, IT APPEARED THAT ALP WAS, AT LEAST IMPLICITLY, OPENING UP THE POSSIBILITY THAT

SOME KINDS OF FLANK SETTLEMENTS COULD BE ACCEPTABLE. SELL ADDED THAT, AT THE ANTLYA SEMINAR, PARTICIPANTS HAD RAISED THE TACTICAL QUESTION OF WHAT AND WHEN THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TELL THE RUSSIANS ABOUT HOW IT MIGHT ADDRESS FLANK CONCERNS. ALP REPLIED THAT HE HAS HIS OWN IDEAS ON BOTH POINTS AND HE WOULD SHARE THEM "AT THE PROPER TIME," WHICH HE LATER CLARIFIED WOULD BE "THE END OF OCTOBER."

11. THE NORWEGIANS WERE MORE RESERVED THAN THE TURKS. NORWEGIAN DELOFF HOEL ASKED HOW THE ALLIANCE COULD CONSIDER DOING ANYTHING TO ADDRESS RUSSIAN CONCERNS ON THE FLANKS IN LIGHT OF RUSSIAN "GENOCIDE" IN CHECHNYA. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER RUSSIA HAD ANY "LEGITIMATE" SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE CAUCASUS THAT COULD NOT BE MET WITHIN FLANK LIMITS.

12. THE NORWEGIANS ALSO SAID THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE "MODIFICATIONS" TO THE FLANK LIMITS RAISED MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN OSLO, EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS COMPLIED IN NOVEMBER. THEY POINTED OUT THAT THE CFE TREATY HAD BEEN "SOLD" IN OSLO ON THE BASIS THAT AT THE END OF THE 40-MONTH REDUCTION PERIOD, THERE WOULD BE LESS TLE ALONG NORWEGIAN BORDERS (BASICALLY IN THE KOLA PENINSULA) THAN HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. NORWAY HAD

BEEN GIVEN PRIVATE ASSURANCES BY THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS SCORE. THERE IS NOW, HOWEVER, AN EQUAL OR GREAT QUANTITY OF TLE IN THAT REGION THEN HAD BEEN THERE IN 1992. BROWN

BT

#1389

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1389

TOR: 950516102043 M1669729

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHNOA2065 1381305-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH

LINE3: R 181305Z MAY 95

LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO

OSRI: RUEHNO

DTG: 181305Z MAY 95

ORIG: USMISSION USNATO

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3065

INFO: RHDLPKD/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD/N5/N52//
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-ATA/AEAGC-EX//
 RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DOXM//
 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
 RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0556
 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 4001
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 3675
 RUEHDB/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0672
 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 3112
 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0998
 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2884
 RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 2947
 RUCBTEC/USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJ5-E/ECJ5-J/ECJ3//
 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 2906
 RUSNPAN/HQ MARFOREUR BOEBLINGEN GE//G3//
 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 3283
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 3079
 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3825
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3199
 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 2915
 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 3584
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 3580
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH//

SUBJ: BRIEFING FOR PARTNERS ON MOSCOW AND KIEV
 SUMMITS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 002065

STATE FOR EUR/RPM

DEFENSE FOR ISA (EUR-NATO), PDUSD (A&T) LONGUEMARE,
 OUSD (A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD (A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND
 ISP (RU&E)

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M (1.11)
 KPH 6/22/2023

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, PARM

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR PARTNERS ON MOSCOW AND KIEV
SUMMITS

REF: USNATO 1970

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING WITH NATO PERMREPS ON MAY 12 (REFTTEL), S/NIS SENIOR COORDINATOR COLLINS AND SDAS KORNBLUM BRIEFED PFP/NACC PARTNERS (EXCEPT RUSSIA, UKRAINE, UZBEKISTAN, GEORGIA, TAJIKISTAN, AZBERBAIZAN, TURKMENISTAN) ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW AND KIEV SUMMITS. COLLINS AND KORNBLUM PROVIDED AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THE BRIEFING PROVIDED TO PERMREPS (SEE PARA 15, REFTTEL) AND RESPONDED TO PARTNER QUESTIONS ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS, THE KIEV SUMMIT, REGIONAL ISSUES, CFE, U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS, RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN RUSSIA. END SUMMARY.

U.S. POSITION ON CFE

3. RESPONDING TO THE ESTONIAN REP, KORNBLUM SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD LAID OUT NATO POSITIONS ON THE CFE TREATY WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN; THE U.S. EXPECTED FULL COMPLIANCE WITH CFE IN NOVEMBER 1995 WHEN THE REDUCTIONS PERIOD ENDED. THE 1996 REVIEW CONFERENCE WAS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR RUSSIA TO RAISE ITS PROBLEMS WITH THE TREATY.

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

4. KORNBLUM RESPONDED TO A QUESTION FROM THE CZECH CHARGE BY CONFIRMING THAT RUSSIA HAD AGREED TO APPROVE FORMALLY ITS IPP AND BEYOND-PFP DOCUMENT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT RUSSIA WOULD FORMALLY TAKE THIS STEP BEFORE THE NAC AND NACC MINISTERIALS AT THE END OF MAY. KORNBLUM CONFIRMED FOR THE POLISH REP THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT RAISE SPECIFIC PRECONDITIONS FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT. RESPONDING TO THE SWEDISH REP, KORNBLUM SAID HE EXPECTED THAT NATO AND RUSSIA WOULD ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA TO EXPLORE HOW TO DEVELOP THE 16-PLUS-1 RELATIONSHIP PROVIDED FOR IN THE BEYOND-PFP DOCUMENT. COLLINS ADDED THAT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN PFP, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WOULD PROMOTE AND FACILITATE MANY PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS WITH NATO COUNTRIES.

U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP

-----1-----

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 002065

STATE FOR EUR/RPM

DEFENSE FOR ISA (EUR-NATO), PDUSD (A&T) LONGUEMARE,
OUSD (A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD (A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND
ISP (RU&E)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, OARM

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR PARTNERS ON MOSCOW AND KIEV
SUMMITS

5. IN HIS RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE LITHUANIAN
REP, COLLINS STRESSED THAT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT HAD BEEN A
SUCCESS IN THAT IT ESTABLISHED A PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE
PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR GIVE AND TAKE ON BOTH SIDES.
OF COURSE, NOT ALL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED, BUT THIS WAS NOT
EXPECTED. PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE AREAS OF EUROPEAN
SECURITY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND ARMS CONTROL. THE SUMMIT
CONFIRMED THAT BOTH SIDES CONTINUED TO SHARE COMMON
PRINCIPLES. PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID THAT IT WAS IN THE
INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES THAT RUSSIA BE COMMITTED TO
RESOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES. THIS PROCESS OF
DIALOGUE WOULD CONTINUE THIS YEAR; THE PRESIDENTS WOULD
MEET AT THE G-7/G-8 MEETING IN HALIFAX AND SOMETIME IN
THE FALL, PROBABLY AT THE UN.

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

6. ON CHECHNYA, COLLINS OBSERVED THAT RUSSIA WAS PAYING
A HEAVY PRICE. THE PRESIDENT HAD DISCUSSED THIS TOPIC AT
LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND HAD URGED EXTENSION OF
THE CEASE-FIRE. YELTSIN SAID THAT RUSSIA'S OBJECTIVE IN
CHECHNYA WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE AREA WAS AN INTEGRAL PART
OF RUSSIA. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN
REAFFIRMED THAT RUSSIA WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO BROADER
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES AND WAS PERMITTING, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE OSCE TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE SITUATION.
KORNBLUM ADDED THAT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT RUSSIA HAD
OPENED ITSELF TO THE WORLD, WHICH WAS QUITE DIFFERENT
FROM THE CLOSED SOCIETY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE RUSSIAN
LEADERSHIP HAD ACCEPTED THAT THIS OPEN AND "NON-PARANOIC"
BEHAVIOR WAS CORRECT.

7. REPLYING TO A QUESTION FROM THE MOLDOVAN REP ON THE
STATUS OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN MOLDOVA AND THE SLOVENIA REP
ON DISCUSSION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN, COLLINS AND KORNBLUM STRESSED THAT

DISCUSSIONS AT THIS SUMMIT FOCUSED ON DEFINING THE U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE BROADER ISSUE OF RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO WESTERN INSTITUTIONS, WITH LITTLE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN MOLDOVA, THE U.S. CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE ROLE OF THE OSCE MISSION IN MOLDOVA. (COLLINS SEPARATELY INFORMED THE MOLDOVAN REP THAT S/NIS REGIONAL AFFAIRS COORDINATOR JOSEPH PRESEL WOULD BE IN MOLDOVA THE WEEK OF MAY 15 TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE TRANSDNIESTER SITUATION.) WHILE THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RAISED THE ISSUE WITH FM KOZEREV AND URGED FULL RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE CONTACT GROUP.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 002065

STATE FOR EUR/RPM

DEFENSE FOR ISA (EUR-NATO), PDUSD (A&T) LONGUEMARE,
OUSD (A&T) DES (VOLKMAN), OUSD (A&T) ID&PP (BRUCE) AND
ISP (RU&E)

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, NACC, PARM

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR PARTNERS ON MOSCOW AND KIEV
SUMMITS

UKRAINE

8. ASKED BY THE LATVIAN AMBASSADOR TO REVIEW THE SUMMIT IN KIEV, COLLINS EXPLAINED THAT 1994 HAD BEEN MARKED BY EXTRAORDINARY ACCOMPLISHMENTS, BEGINNING WITH THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT IN JANUARY. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT WAS INTENDED TO RECOGNIZE THIS PROGRESS AND UKRAINE'S STATUS AS A SERIOUS MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WHILE NO MAJOR AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED, THERE WERE BILATERAL TALKS AND A FULL SCHEDULE OF OTHER EVENTS. COLLINS SAID THAT UKRAINE UNDERSTOOD THAT NATO WOULD ENLARGE ALTHOUGH IT WAS CONCERNED WITH THE PACE. IT DID NOT WANT NATO ENLARGEMENT TO RESULT IN A NEW CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA WITH UKRAINE IN THE MIDDLE. UKRAINE SUPPORTED A DIALOGUE BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD SEEK A SIMILAR DIALOGUE BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE.

9. THE ESTONIAN REP ASKED ABOUT UKRAINIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK'S SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. MEDIATE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. COLLINS REPLIED THAT THIS SUGGESTION WAS DISCUSSED. THE U.S. WAS WILLING TO PLAY SUCH A ROLE, BUT ONLY IF AND WHEN BOTH SIDES WANT A U.S. ROLE AND THE U.S. HAD A CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THE PROCESS. AS OF NOW, UNLIKE THE EARLIER SITUATION WITH

THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THERE WAS NO SUCH AGREEMENT.

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN RUSSIA

10. THE SLOVAK AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT U.S. VIEWS REGARDING BUSINESS PROSPECTS IN RUSSIA. COLLINS EXPLAINED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION WAS A MIXED PICTURE. THE NUMBER OF U.S. COMPANIES INVESTING IN AND DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA WAS CONTINUING TO GROW; THE U.S. WAS THE LARGEST OUTSIDE INVESTOR IN RUSSIA. BUT THERE WERE MANY RESTRAINTS ON REACHING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF OUTSIDE INVESTMENT. WHILE THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA, THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE CAUTION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENTS, BUT RUSSIA STILL LACKED THE BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF A MARKET ECONOMY.

HUNTER
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#2065

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

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SSN: 2065

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TOR: 950518091406 M1674103

<^TOR>950518091511 M1674106

<^TOR>950518091722 M1674113

DIST:

SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER FRIED GARDNER HESLIN NSC PIFER SCHMIDT STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA4669 1431616-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O R 222155Z MAY 95

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 222155Z MAY 95

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHMPI/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3013-3015
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 5581-5583
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 8787-8789
 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0000
 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0000
 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0000
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 2035-2037
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY RIGA 4149-4193
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 2963-2965
 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 4951-4953
 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0000
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6079-6081
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0000

INFO: ZEN/SECDEF WASHDC 5884-5886
 ZEN/USMISSION USNATO 7340-7342
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY MINSK 2557-2559
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0599-0601
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0663-0665
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1283-1285
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0178-0180
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 7167-7169
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0145-0147
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2411-2413
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 1830-1832
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 6088-6090
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5/0000//1032-1034
 ZEN/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJ5-E/ECJ5-J//
 ZEN/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-ATA/AEAGC-EX//
 ZEN/USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA
 ZEN/USDOCO SOUTH NAPOLES IT//INJTAF//
 ZEN/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
 ZEN/CINCUSAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD/N5/N53//
 ZEN/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA //POLAD//
 ZEN/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS//POUCH//

SUBJ: WASHINGTON BRIEFING OF PARTNERS ON THE MOSCOW
 AND KIEV SUMMITS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 124669

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M(1.12)
 KBH 6/22/2023

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, NACC, OSCE, RS, UP
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON BRIEFING OF PARTNERS ON THE MOSCOW
AND KIEV SUMMITS

REF: (A) USNATO 1970, (B) USNATO 2065

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN A MAY 18 BRIEFING OF SELECTED NON-NATO EUROPEAN PARTNERS (POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, ROMANIA, BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUAAIA, SLOVENIA, AND ALBANIA), DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, S/NIS COORDINATOR COLLINS, AND EUR S/DAS KORNBLUM REVIEWED THE OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW AND KIEV SUMMITS. COLLINS AND KORNBLUM PROVIDED AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THEIR BRIEFING FOR NATO PERMREPS MAY 12 (REF A). TALBOTT IN HIS REMARKS NOTED THAT CLINTON STRESSED TO YELTSIN THAT RUSSIA COULD NOT STOP OR SLOW DOWN THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THAT IT SERVED THE INTEREST OF ALL OF EUROPE, ESPECIALLY RUSSIA, THAT RUSSIA BE PART OF THE PROCESS OF BUILDING NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES. IN A QUESTION-ANSWER PERIOD, THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM BALTIC STATES, EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT

RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH NATO. END SUMMARY.

TALBOTT'S REMARKS

3. TALBOTT SAID THAT THE RUSSIAN PERFORMANCE IN BRUSSELS AND BUDAPEST LAST DECEMBER INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP THOUGHT BY REFUSING TO GO FORWARD IN DEVELOPING A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP THEY COULD SLOW DOWN THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION. SINCE BUDAPEST, TALBOTT SAID, THE U.S. HAS USED NUMEROUS CHANNELS -- E.G. THREE CHRISTOPHER-KOZYREV MEETINGS VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, LOWER LEVEL MEETINGS -- TO STRESS TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THAT STRATEGY WOULD NOT WORK.

4. IN MOSCOW CLINTON TOLD YELTSIN THAT THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION WAS ON TRACK, THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF THE SOVEREIGN DECISION OF ALLIES AND THAT IT SERVED THE INTEREST OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. TALBOTT SAID THAT CLINTON STRESSED THAT IT WAS ALSO IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIES FOR RUSSIA TO BE PART OF THE PROCESS OF BUILDING NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES IN EUROPE. CLINTON URGED YELTSIN TO IMPLEMENT THE TWO OUTSTANDING NATO DOCUMENTS -- INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM AND DOCUMENT ON ENHANCED NATO-RUSSIA CONSULTATION -- BY THE TIME OF THE NATO MINISTERIALS AT THE END OF MAY. TALBOTT SAID THAT WHILE WE FULLY EXPECT THE RUSSIANS TO DO SO, NOTHING IS CERTAIN.

Q'S AND A'S

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5. A BALTIC STATE REPRESENTATIVE BEGAN THE QUESTION PERIOD BY ASKING WHETHER RUSSIA WOULD PLAY A "LEADING ROLE" IN PFP. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND AT A PENTAGON BRIEFING THAT RUSSIA WOULD HAVE SUCH A SPECIAL STATUS.
 6. KORNBLUM REPLIED THAT "LEADING" MEANT THAT RUSSIA AS A MAJOR POWER WOULD BE EXPECTED TO BE A PARTICULARLY ACTIVE PFP PARTNER. LEADING THUS REFERRED TO THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES AND INTENSITY OF PARTICIPATION, NOT TO ANY SUPERVISORY FUNCTION.
 7. ANOTHER BALTIC STATE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT RUSSIA COULD ACCEPT NATO EXPANSION SO LONG AS IT DID NOT TOUCH ANY OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH RUSSIA HAD A BORDER.
 8. TALBOTT SAID THAT YELTSIN HAD NOT INDICATED ANYTHING OF THE KIND DURING HIS MEETING WITH CLINTON. TALBOTT NOTED, HOWEVER, THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP'S PREOCCUPATION WITH NEXT YEAR'S ELECTIONS AND THEIR SENSE OF VULNERABILITY TO THE EXTREME NATIONALISTS. THE CURRENT LEADERS HAVE DONE A POOR JOB OF SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION.
 9. TALBOTT SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT NATO HAD ALREADY EXPANDED MORE THAN ONCE, AND EXPANSION HAD BOTH ENHANCED DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES AND HELPED STABILIZE THE REGION. HE GAVE THE EXAMPLE OF GREECE AND TURKEY AND HE ADDED THAT COOPERATION WITH NATO HAD INFLUENCED HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA TO COME TO TERMS ON THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY ISSUE.
 10. A BALTIC STATE REPRESENTATIVE ASKED ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW ON BILLS IN CONGRESS THAT SEEMED TO FAVOR BRINGING THE VISEGRAD STATES INTO NATO AHEAD OF THE BALTIC STATES AND OTHERS.
 11. TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IS CLEAR: IT IS PREMATURE TO NAME COUNTRIES OR TO ESTABLISH TIMETABLES. OUR CURRENT FOCUS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ON THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF EXPANSION.
 12. A CENTRAL EUROPEAN ASKED HOW UKRAINE FIT INTO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION.
 13. TALBOTT SAID THAT UKRAINE WAS VERY IMPORTANT. IT IS NATURALLY CONCERNED ABOUT NATO EXPANSION WHICH IT FEARS COULD CREATE A NEW DIVISION OF EUROPE, LEAVING UKRAINE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE LINE. IN KIEV TALBOTT SAID CLINTON UNDERScoreD OUR INTEREST IN STABLE DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE, AS WELL AS IN ALL8FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS, AND CONGRATULATED THE UKRAINIANS ON THEIR RESPONSIBLE SECURITY POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO PFP, CFE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
 14. A CENTRAL EUROPEAN ASKED TALBOTT IF THE THE RESULTS

OF THE CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT MADE HIM MORE OPTIMISTIC OR LESS OPTIMISTIC WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES.

15. TALBOTT SAID THAT A MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT WAS PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS THAT THEIR BLOCKING GAME OF LAST DECEMBER WILL NOT WORK. TALBOTT CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD NEITHER EXPECT NOR PRESS FOR

MOSCOW'S BLESSING OF NATO EXPANSION. IT WILL NOT COME, AND TO ASK FOR RUSSIAN ENDORSEMENT IMPLIES THAT WE NEED IT. IN FACT, WE ARE MERELY SEEKING TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITION TO THE RUSSIANS.

16. A BALTIC STATE REPRESENTATIVE ASKED ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE CLINTON-YELTSIN DISCUSSION ON CHECHNYA.

17. COLLINS SAID THAT CLINTON HAD MADE FOUR POINTS TO YELTSIN: FIRST, THE MORATORIUM ON FIGHTING SHOULD BE EXTENDED AND MADE PERMANENT. SECOND, MOSCOW SHOULD TURN QUICKLY TOWARDS THE PROCESS OF FINDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THIRD, MOSCOW SHOULD COOPERATE FULLY WITH HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE OSCE. FINALLY, IF THE CHECHNYA PROBLEM WAS NOT RESOLVED SOON, MOSCOW WOULD FIND ITSELF PAYING A GROWING PRICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. COLLINS SAID THAT YELTSIN RESPONDED THAT THE MILITARY PHASE IN CHECHNYA WAS COMING TO AN END AND THAT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WOULD BE TAKING OVER FROM THE ARMY. THE MAIN RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES NOW, YELTSIN SAID WERE TO REESTABLISH A GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND TO BEGIN RECONSTRUCTION. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#4669

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4669

TOR: 950523122045 M1681705

DIST:

SIT: BEYRLE BLACKER FRIED GARDNER NSC VERSHBOW

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA5408 3030145-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 300144Z OCT 95
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 300144Z OCT 95
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE 6047
INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6504
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 4033
SUBJ: CFE: BRIEFING ALLIES ON PERRY-GRACHEV MEETING
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 255408

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M (1.13)
KBM 6/22/2023

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE; USNATO PASS TO U/S DAVIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/28/05

TAGS: PARM, PREL, KCFE, NATO, OSCE

SUBJECT: CFE: BRIEFING ALLIES ON PERRY-GRACHEV MEETING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENTS ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, AS EARLY IN THE DAY AS POSSIBLE, ON THE RESULTS OF RECENT CFE DISCUSSIONS HELD BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY AND RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV, USING POINTS IN PARA. 3 BELOW. ANKARA AND OSLO SHOULD BRIEF AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL (IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, AMBASSADOR GROSSMAN SHOULD BRIEF GOT OFFICIALS). OTHER NATO POSTS SHOULD BRIEF HLTF REPS. USDEL OSCE SHOULD BRIEF ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA.

3. BEGIN BRIEFING POINTS.

-- OVER THE PAST MONTHS, THE USG HAS BEEN WORKING ACTIVELY WITH ALLIES TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CFE FLANK ISSUE THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL, PRESERVES THE TREATY'S INTEGRITY, AND DOES NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY TREATY PARTY. THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN PURSUED IN ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS AT ALL LEVELS AND IN VIENNA, AS WELL AS THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS.

-- IN THIS CONTEXT, DURING THE RECENT U.S. VISIT BY RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GRACHEV, WE CONTINUED OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

-- WE REITERATED THE NEED FOR A RESPONSE TO NATO'S

PROPOSAL AT THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP IN VIENNA.

-- CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY MANY ALLIES AT LAST WEEK'S HLTF, WE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE EXCESSIVE NATURE OF RUSSIA'S PLANNED COUNTERPROPOSAL AS IT WAS DESCRIBED INFORMALLY TO ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA, AS DISCUSSED BY GRACHEV WITH SECRETARY PERRY IN GENEVA, AND, MOST RECENTLY, AS PRESENTED BY YELTSIN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON AT HYDE PARK.

-- IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, SECRETARY PERRY AND MINISTER GRACHEV REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT INCLUDE THE LENINGRAD OBLAST IN ITS COUNTERPROPOSAL AS ONE OF THE OBLASTS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE FLANK ZONE.

-- THE LENINGRAD OBLAST CONTAINS OVER 1900 PIECES OF TLE. THUS, DROPPING IT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES THE AMOUNT OF TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT WHICH RUSSIA'S COUNTERPROPOSAL WOULD EXEMPT FROM THE FLANK LIMITS.

-- FOR ITS PART, THE U.S. RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN ADDRESSING THE AREAS OF RUSSIA'S GREATEST CONCERN, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTH.

-- SECRETARY PERRY EMPHASIZED THAT A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WILL REQUIRE THE AGREEMENT OF ALL 30 CFE STATES.

-- THE USG CONSIDERS THIS A WELCOME AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEP ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- THIS IS AN ISSUE ON WHICH WE WILL WANT TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH ALLIES. AS NOTED AT LAST THURSDAY'S HLTF, THERE WILL BE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL HLTF MEETINGS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- IN THE MEANTIME, A SENIOR-LEVEL TEAM LED -- BY UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS WILL VISIT ANKARA THIS WEEK TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH TURKEY, ONE OF THE ALLIES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU ADVISED OF THE RESULTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

FOR ANKARA: THE LAST TWO TICKS SHOULD BE REPLACED BY THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE TEAM LED BY UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU OUR THOUGHTS ON APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS DURING THEIR VISIT TO ANKARA THIS WEEK.

TALBOTT

BT

#5408

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5408

TOR: 951029214658 M1925637

DIST:

PRT: SIT

SIT: BELL BLACKER NSC PIFER SUM SUM2 WITKOWSKY

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA3783 1140405-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 230404Z APR 96
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 230404Z APR 96
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 INFO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
 SUBJ: CFE: BRIEFING ALLIES ON FLANK ISSUE
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2016-0126-M (1.14)
 KBM 6/22/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 083783

EXDIS//USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE//ANKARA ALSO PASS KORNBLUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/06
 TAGS: PARM, PREL, KCFE
 SUBJECT: CFE: BRIEFING ALLIES ON FLANK ISSUE

USNATO ALSO PASS JIM COLLINS

1. CLASSIFIED BY CRAIG DUNKERLEY, DIRECTOR EUR/RPM.

REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. PARA 4 CONTAINS MESSAGE FOR ALLIES FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT BRIEFING ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE CFE FLANK ISSUE AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. NATO CAPITALS SHOULD PASS THIS MESSAGE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL1 USING THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3. (EMBASSY ANKARA SHOULD NOTE THAT THIS RESPONDS TO THE REQUEST MADE DURING THE TALBOTT-OYMEN TELCON FOR A PAPER FOR FM GONENSAY LAYING OUT WHAT WAS DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW.) IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THIS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, POSTS SHOULD ALSO MAKE SURE THIS INFORMATION REACHES HLTF POINTS OF CONTACT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. USDEL OSCE AND US MISSION NATO MAY ALSO DRAW FROM THIS INFORMATION TO BRIEF HEADS OF ALLIED DELEGATIONS.

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

-- DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S MESSAGE REPORTS ON THE DISCUSSION OF THE CFE FLANK ISSUE WITH THE RUSSIANS.

(FOLLOWING TICK FOR EMBASSY ANKARA ONLY)

-- THIS MESSAGE ALSO RESPONDS TO U/S OYMEN'S REQUEST TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT FOR A WRITTEN ACCOUNT OF WHAT WAS DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW.

-- THE U.S. APPROACH DURING THE EXCHANGES IN MOSCOW WAS BASED ON THE U.S.-TURKISH PROPOSAL WHICH ALLIES HAVE DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY IN THE HLTF AND FOR WHICH ALLIES EXPRESSED COLLECTIVE SUPPORT IN VIENNA.

-- SOLID ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH WAS A KEY FACTOR IN OUR BEING ABLE TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD ON THIS BASIS.

-- AS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTES, WE PRESSED THE RUSSIANS VERY HARD ON THE NEED TO ACCEPT THE MAP GEOGRAPHY PROPOSED IN THE U.S.-TURKISH APPROACH, I.. THE REMOVAL FROM THE FLANK ZONE OF PSKOV OBLAST IN THE NORTH AND VOLGOGRAD AND ASTRAKHAN OBLASTS IN THE SOUTH, PLUS THE REMOVAL OF THE KUSHCHEVSKAYA CAPITAL REPAIR FACILITY FROM THE FLANK ZONE, ALONG WITH A PORTION OF THE EASTERN PART OF THE ROSTOV OBLAST.

-- IN TURN, THE RUSSIANS ARGUED HARD FOR THE REMOVAL OF THEIR FACILITIES AT NOVOROSSISK IN KRASNODAR KRAY FROM THE FLANK ZONE. U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS EXPLAINED HOW WE BELIEVE RUSSIA COULD MEET ITS FLANK OBLIGATIONS BY REMOVING SOME ACV'S FROM NOVOROSSISK WHILE LEAVING NOVOROSSISK IN THE FLANK ZONE. THE PRESIDENT PRESSED THIS POINT, AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED.

-- THE NEXT STEP IS FOR RUSSIA TO GET BACK TO US WITH A PROPOSAL ON NUMBERS AND TIMING THAT INCORPORATES THE GEOGRAPHY THE PRESIDENTS AGREED UPON.

-- ALLIES WILL NEED TO STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT AS WE PRESS TO FINALIZE AN APPROACH ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CFE STATES PRIOR TO THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE.

END TALKING POINTS.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT.

IN HIS APRIL 21 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, PRESIDENT CLINTON EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIA'S LIVING UP TO TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AND THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE FLANK ISSUE BY THE TIME OF THE MAY 15 REVIEW CONFERENCE. WE ARE COMMITTED TO A CONFERENCE THAT BEGINS THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION OF THE TREATY, BUT WE MUST REMOVE THE CLOUD REGARDING RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY.

THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT HOW AN APPROACH THAT COMBINES OUR MAP GEOGRAPHY WITH GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART ON NUMBERS AND CONSTRAINTS ALLOWS RUSSIA TO COMPLY WITH THE TREATY AND HAVE THE EQUIPMENT IT NEEDS IN THE REGION, MORE THAN DOUBLING THE EQUIPMENT THE TREATY NOW PERMITS RUSSIA IN THE FLANK.

THE PRESIDENT NOTED OUR MILITARY EXPERTS BELIEVE RUSSIA COULD ACCEPT OUR APPROACH IF RUSSIA WOULD MOVE SOME OF THE ACVS STATIONED AT NOVOROSSISK, RATHER THAN INSISTING THAT NOVOROSSISK BE REMOVED FROM THE FLANK ZONE.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED AND SAID THAT RUSSIA WOULD MOVE SOME ACVS FROM NOVOROSSISK. IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE MEETING, HE MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S COMMITMENT TO GET THE FLANK ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE TIME THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OPENS.

THE NEXT STEP IS TO WORK OUT A FINAL NUMBER FOR ACVS IN THE CURRENT FLANK REGION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES, AND AN AGREED SCHEDULE FOR RUSSIAN REDUCTIONS BELOW 4,000 ACVS TO THIS NUMBER. IN DISCUSSIONS ON THE DAYS PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTS' MEETING, WE STRESSED THE NEED FOR AGREED INTERPRETATIONS (NO EXCLUSION OF MILITARY STORAGE SITES, NO EXCLUSION FOR EQUIPMENT TO BE REMOVED, NO UTILIZATION OF REALLOCATIONS AND TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF THE RELEVANT GOVERNMENTS, AND REDUCTIONS NOT CONDITIONED ON ASSESSMENTS OF STABILITY) SO THAT THE NUMBERS ARE REAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS. MAMEDOV AGREED THAT FLANK REDUCTIONS NEED NOT BE CONTINGENT ON STABILITY IN THE REGION, AS LONG AS THIS DOES NOT PREJUDICE THEIR OPTIONS FOR PROPOSALS ON MODERNIZING THE TREATY AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. THE BALL IS NOW IN THE RUSSIAN COURT TO GET BACK TO US ON NUMBERS.

END TEXT.
TALBOTT
BT
#3783

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 3783
TOR: 960423011610 M2193065
DIST:
SIT: PASCUAL WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA2646 1250308-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 040140Z MAY 96

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 040140Z MAY 96

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ZEN/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/EASTERN EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 3618-3621
ZEN/INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG PRIORITY 2590-2593
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0000

INFO: ////

SUBJ: BRIEFING OF CEE AND NIS COUNTRIES ON THE MOSCOW
SUMMIT

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 092646

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: 04/26/16

TAGS: PREL, RS

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF CEE AND NIS COUNTRIES ON THE MOSCOW
SUMMIT

REF: (A) USNATO 1858 (B) BRUSSELS 4203

1. CLASSIFIED BY JAMES F. COLLINS, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
FOR THE NIS, REASON 1.6. ENTIRE TEXT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

2. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 26, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR THE NEW
INDEPENDENT STATES COLLINS BRIEFED AMBASSADORS FROM OVER
30 CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND NEW INDEPENDENT STATES
ON THE BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND
PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN MOSCOW APRIL 21, AND ON THE U.S.
PERCEPTION OF THE P-S SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND
SECURITY WHICH PRECEDED IT. THE AMBASSADORS' QUESTIONS
FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING FOCUSED ON U.S.-RUSSIAN EXCHANGES
ON NATO ENLARGEMENT AND CHECHNYA.

3. THIS SESSION CONCLUDED THE OFFICIAL BRIEFINGS BEGUN
WITH AMBASSADOR COLLINS' MEETING AT NATO APRIL 22-23.
ADDRESSEE POSTS MAY DRAW UPON THIS CABLE AS APPROPRIATE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0126-M (1.15)
KRM 6/22/2023

WITH HOST GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS, BUT SHOULD CHARACTERIZE AS INFORMAL ANY BRIEFINGS POSTS MAY UNDERTAKE BASED ON THIS CABLE. FOR SEOUL: AMBASSADOR SHOULD USE POINTS TO BRIEF FOREIGN MINISTER GONG (NOTE - DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT PROMISED GONG MARCH 26 TO PROVIDE BRIEFING POINTS PRIOR TO GONG'S MAY 5 TRAVEL TO MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW AND ATMOSPHERICS

4. 5/NIS AMBASSADOR COLLINS OPENED THE APRIL 26 BRIEFING WITH AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO RUSSIA THE PREVIOUS WEEK. THE TIMING OF THIS TRIP WAS DETERMINED BY THE DECISION MADE AT THE G-7 MEETING IN HALIFAX LAST JUNE TO HOLD A P-B NUCLEAR SUMMIT IN MOSCOW THIS SPRING. THE U.S. DECIDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ARRANGE A BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON THE MODEL OF THE MEETING IN HYDE PARK IN OCTOBER 1995. THIS RESULTED IN ABOUT FIVE HOURS OF BILATERAL MEETINGS.

5. THE PRESIDENT FLEW APRIL 18 FROM TOKYO TO ST PETERSBURG. HE LAID A WREATH A PISKAROVSKOYE CEMETERY WHERE THOUSANDS OF VICTIMS OF THE 1941-44 NAZI SIEGE OF LENINGRAD LAY BURIED IN MASS GRAVES. THE PRESIDENT ALSO MET WITH THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH METROPOLITAN AT KAZAN CATHEDRAL AND VISITED THE HERMITAGE AND CATHERINE'S PALACE. ALTHOUGH THE ST PETERSBURG LEG OF THE JOURNEY WAS CONSIDERED A PRIVATE PROGRAM, IT SERVED TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF REFORM IN RUSSIA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIA'S CULTURAL TRADITIONS.

6. THE PRESIDENT PROCEEDED TO MOSCOW APRIL 19 FOR A DINNER OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MARKING THE BEGINNING OF THE P-B SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY. P-B MEETINGS CONTINUED THROUGH APRIL 20. ON APRIL 21, PRESIDENT CLINTON HELD A ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH WHICH SENIOR ADVISORS JOINED, AND FINISHING UP WITH A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION AT THE SPASO HOUSE RESIDENCE OF AMBASSADOR PICKERING WITH EIGHTEEN RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING THREE CANDIDATES IN THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

7. AMBASSADOR COLLINS SAID THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON CONSIDERED THE P-B SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY TO HAVE BEEN A VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. AMBASSADOR COLLINS STATED THAT THE U.S. HAD LIMITED EXPECTATIONS FOR SPECIFIC RESULTS IN THE BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN

PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THESE MEETINGS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON TWO SECURITY ISSUES, CFE FLANK LIMITATIONS AND ABM/TMD DEMARCATION. THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A GOOD EXCHANGE AND AGREED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT DURING THIS POLITICAL SEASON. BOTH MADE CLEAR THEIR INTEREST IN PREVENTING ISSUES FROM BECOMING DISRUPTIVE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THIS MEETING, THE TENTH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN, DEMONSTRATED HOW WELL THE TWO LEADERS WORK TOGETHER AND ILLUSTRATED AGAIN

THE STABLE AND SOLID BASIS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

P-S SUMMIT

8. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE U.S., THE P-S SUMMIT REPRESENTED A SERIOUS EFFORT BY THE EIGHT COUNTRIES INVOLVED -- JOINED BY UKRAINE FOR A SESSION ON CHORNOBYL -- TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE DISPOSAL AND DISPOSITION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN ENVIRONMENTALLY SAFE AND ECOLOGICALLY SECURE WAYS. THE U.S. VIEWED AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THE AGREEMENT ON A STATEMENT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), AN OBJECTIVE THE U.S. HAD SOUGHT FOR A SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME. AMONG THE P-S SUMMIT'S OTHER MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE PROGRESS ON MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING (MPC&A) AND DISPOSITION OF FISSILE MATERIALS. AMBASSADOR COLLINS NOTED THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE P-S SUMMIT IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD ASSIST IN COMBATTING THIS PROBLEM AS APPROPRIATE. THE SUMMIT ALSO GAINED RUSSIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRIORITY OF SAFETY IN THE OPERATION OF REACTORS AND THE HANDLING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND WASTES. THE U.S. AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS INTEND TO BUILD ON THIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO STRENGTHEN OUR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON IMPROVING NUCLEAR SAFETY.

9. IN THE P-S SESSION WITH UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KUCHMA, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO CLOSE THE CHORNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY BY 2000. THIS SESSION ALSO EXAMINED WAYS OF INCREASING SAFETY AT THE CHORNOBYL STATION, INCLUDING A NEW SARCOPHAGUS FOR THE FAILED REACTOR.

U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL MEETINGS

10. THE ONE-ON-ONE SESSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN LASTED TWO HOURS. IT WAS FOLLOWED BY A SMALL WORKING LUNCH, WHICH INCLUDED AMBASSADOR PICKERING,

CHIEF OF STAFF PANETTA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER LAKE, HIS DEPUTY SANDY BERGER, AND AMBASSADOR COLLINS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN WAS JOINED ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE BY FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER RYURIKOV, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BATURIN, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV, AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV.

11. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETINGS INCLUDE:

THE MIDDLE EAST

THE MIDDLE EAST DOMINATED THE DISCUSSION AT THE P-8 DINNER APRIL 19, WITH THE HEADS OF STATE ISSUING A CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN ALSO DISCUSSED HOW TO END THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HEZBOLLAH IN SOME DETAIL DURING THEIR ONE-ON-ONE, AND REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS AS RECEIVED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE

ENVOYS -- SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV -- WHO WERE TRAVELING IN THE REGION AND WHO THEREFORE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE MOSCOW MEETINGS. ON SUBSTANCE, THE PRESIDENTS AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A PROMPT CEASE-FIRE. PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THE DANGERS OF "DIPLOMACY BY COMMITTEE11 AND SUGGESTED THE RUSSIAN EFFORTS BE COORDINATED WITH OUR OWN. PRESIDENT CLINTON ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT RUSSIA WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD WHERE IT HAS INFLUENCE TO HELP BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

CFE

PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE CFE TREATY, WITH THE CONVERSATION REVOLVING AROUND THE U.S.-TURKISH PROPOSAL, SUPPORTED BY THE ALL NATO ALLIES, WHICH INVOLVES THE REVISION OF THE FLANK MAPS AND AN AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS FOR EQUIPMENT IN THE FLANK REGIONS. SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED, OPENING THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN MAY IF NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED WITH DISPATCH. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT BY THE TIME OF THE MAY REVIEW CONFERENCE

ABM/TMD

PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED ON THE ISSUE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES (TMDS) AND ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE

SYSTEMS (ABMS) BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN. AS A RESULT, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AGREED TO SEND NEGOTIATING TEAMS BACK TO GENEVA NEXT MONTH WITH THE GOAL OF CONCLUDING AN INITIAL DEMARCATION AGREEMENT BY JUNE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL CONFIRM THAT U.S. TMD PROGRAMS CAN GO FORWARD AND STRENGTHEN THE ABM TREATY, WITH THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AGREE IS A CORNERSTONE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE ABM TREATY WILL ALSO HELP THE U.S. REALIZE THE BENEFITS OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS MANDATED BY THE START TREATIES.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

AMBASSADOR COLLINS STATED THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT AND U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN IFOR WERE NOT MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE DISCUSSION. PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT U.S. POLICY ON ENLARGEMENT, INCLUDING PLANS FOR THE JUNE NAC, HAD NOT CHANGED. PRESIDENT CLINTON STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID STATEMENTS ON EITHER SIDE THAT WOULD MAKE IT HARDER TO MANAGE THIS ISSUE. BOTH PRESIDENTS AGREED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE.

THE TWO PRESIDENTS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION WITH RUSSIA'S COOPERATION WITH NATO IN BOSNIA AND WITH AMERICAN FORCES IN IFOR. PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING ELECTIONS AND REBUILDING BOSNIA.

G-7/G-8

AT THE WORKING LUNCH, WHEN SENIOR STAFF FROM BOTH SIDES JOINED, THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE FUTURE OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE G-7. AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION, PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOTED RUSSIA'S INTEREST IN BECOMING A FULL MEMBER OF THE G-7. PRESIDENT CLINTON EXPLAINED THE RATIONALE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE G-7 IN TERMS OF THE IMPORTANT FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC WORK PERFORMED BY THAT BODY. PRESIDENT CLINTON STATED THAT CONSENSUS EXISTS AMONG THE 7 FOR THAT BODY TO CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED. HE ALSO NOTED THE SUCCESS OF THE P-8 IN ADDRESSING AN AGENDA, SUCH AS NUCLEAR SAFETY, IMPORTANT TO THE EIGHT. PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED ON THE NEED TO ENHANCE THE WORK OF THE P-8, INCLUDING AT LYONS.

CHINA

THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S IMPENDING TRIP TO CHINA, PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED TO RAISE IN BEIJING P-8 INTEREST IN CHINESE ADHERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR SUMMIT STATEMENT ON CTBT. THIS PLEDGE WAS WELCOMED BY THE OTHER 7 COUNTRIES.

IRAN NUCLEAR REACTOR

THE TWO PRESIDENTS HELD A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN. PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED, ONCE AGAIN, U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE NUCLEAR REACTOR DEAL. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE.

NIS/CIS

PRESIDENT YELTSIN SHARED HIS VIEWS ON CIS INTEGRATION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION TO RUSSIA AND STATING THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT RUSSIA WAS INTERESTED PRIMARILY IN GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CITED THE EU AS A MODEL. PRESIDENT CLINTON MADE CLEAR THE U.S. VIEW THAT ANY INCREASED COOPERATION AMONG THE NIS MUST BE VOLUNTARY, PROMOTE THE PROSPERITY AND STABILITY OF THE INVOLVED COUNTRIES, AND LEAVES THOSE COUNTRIES OPEN TO ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD. PRESIDENT CLINTON STATED FLATLY THAT GREATER COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA MUST NOT RESULT IN THE REDIVISION OF EUROPE OR THE CREATION OF EXCLUSIVE BLOCS.

CHE CHNYA

PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, BUT URGED YELTSIN TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE

PROBLEM.

KOREA

PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT THE FOUR-POWER KOREAN INITIATIVE WAS A WAY TO BLUNT NORTH KOREA'S INTERESTS IN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE U.S. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE STRUCTURE REFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE TWO KOREAS, CHINA, AND THE U.S. SIGNED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

MEETING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS

12. FOLLOWING THE BILATERAL MEETINGS, PRESIDENT CLINTON AND HIS ADVISERS MET FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH ABOUT A DOZEN RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEADERS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY AND TO PROVIDE PRESIDENT CLINTON AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CURRENT ISSUES WITH INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING THE FULL RANGE OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL OPINION. IN RESPONSE TO A SUBSEQUENT QUESTION ASKED BY ONE OF THE AMBASSADORS PRESENT AT THE BRIEFING, AMBASSADOR COLLINS ELABORATED ON THE SESSION.

13. MOSCOW MAYOR LUZHKOVA OPENED THE SESSION BY SETTING FORTH A FAIRLY STARK PICTURE OF THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM UNDERWAY IN RUSSIA AND SAID THAT THE JUNE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REPRESENTED A MAJOR CHOICE FOR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. THE REST OF THE DISCUSSION REVOLVED AROUND THAT POINT. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY PRESENT, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ZYUGANOV AND DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE DUMA SVETLANA GORYAVHEVA, SUGGESTED THAT CHANGE IS IMPERATIVE. ZYUGANOV ASSERTED HIS SUPPORT FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY, A MIXED ECONOMY, AND RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO WESTERN INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS ITS RECENT ACCESSION TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. REPRESENTATIVES OF PRO-REFORM MOVEMENT AND PARTIES SAID THAT A COMMUNIST PARTY VICTORY IN JUNE WOULD BE BAD FOR RUSSIA AND REPRESENT A RETURN TO THE FAILED POLICIES OF THE PAST. BORIS NEMTSOV, THE REFORM GOVERNOR OF NIZHEGOROD REGION, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN THIS REGARD. LENINGRAD OBLAST GOVERNOR ALEKSANDR BELYAKOV COMPLAINED TO THE PRESIDENT DURING THE APRIL 21 ROUNDTABLE OF THE TREATMENT OF THE 500,000 RUSSIAN-SPEAKING RESIDENTS OF ESTONIA ON RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND ECONOMIC GROUNDS. BELYAKOV STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT HEARD BELYAKOV OUT, RECALLED COMMENTS HE HAD MADE CALLING ON THE BALTICS NOT TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST NON-CITIZEN RESIDENTS DURING A SPEECH IN RIGA IN 1994, AND PROMISED TO GET BACK TO BELYAKOV.

14. AMBASSADOR COLLINS NOTED HIS IMPRESSION THAT RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS ARE INCREASING SOPHISTICATED AND THAT THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN WILL BE HOTLY-CONTESTED AND HARD-FOUGHT. ALL THE CANDIDATES PRESENT INDICATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO REMAIN IN THE CONTEST THROUGH THE FIRST ROUND OF BALLOTING, SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 16.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

15. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PUBLIC REPRESENTATIONS OF THEIR PRIVATE DISCUSSION ON NATO ENLARGEMENT AND ON CHECHNYA.

16. ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, AMBASSADOR COLLINS NOTED AGAIN THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT A MAJOR PART OF THE DISCUSSION. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT RUSSIA AND THE U.S. DO NOT SEE EYE-TO-EYE ON ENLARGEMENT, BUT PRESIDENT CLINTON MADE IT CLEAR TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS ALREADY TAKEN THE DECISION TO EXPAND, BUT THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS WHEN THE ALLIANCE WILL EXPAND AND WHO ITS NEW MEMBERS WILL BE. PRESIDENT CLINTON STRESSED THE OPEN, TRANSPARENT, AND ON-GOING NATURE OF THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SURPRISES AND THAT THE ALLIANCE IS FOLLOWING THE STRATEGY FOR ENLARGEMENT THAT IT SET FORTH TWO YEARS AGO. THIS WAS NOT TO SUGGEST, CONCLUDED AMBASSADOR COLLINS, THAT THERE WAS ANY NARROWING OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE U.S. ON NATO ENLARGEMENT IN MOSCOW.

17. ON CHECHNYA, AMBASSADOR COLLINS NOTED THAT MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE BEFORE THE REPORTED DEATH OF DUDAYEV, SO THE CHECHEN LEADER'S DEMISE HAD NOT FACTORED INTO THE DISCUSSIONS. NO NEW GROUND WAS COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION. PRESIDENT YELTSIN AFFIRMED THAT HIS MARCH 31 PEACE INITIATIVE WAS SERIOUS; HE SAID HE WAS TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO ADVANCE HIS INITIATIVE. PRESIDENT CLINTON MADE CLEAR THE U.S VIEW THAT THE FIGHTING NEEDS TO STOP AND THAT THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CLINTON ALSO SAID THE U.S. WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2646

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2646

TOR: 960503232426 M2211468

DIST:

SIT: BELL BLACKER FEELEY FRIED PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHAKA4652 1301439-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 091439Z MAY 96
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 OSRI: RUEHAK
 DTG: 091439Z MAY 96
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5700
 INFO: RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: CFE: BRIEFING THE TURKS ON FLANK AGREEMENT
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 004652

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2016-0126-M (1.16)
 KBH 4/22/2023

EXDIS

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/06
 TAGS: PARM, PREL, KCFE, TU, US
 SUBJECT: CFE: BRIEFING THE TURKS ON FLANK AGREEMENT
 NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 95751

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: J.L. CLUNAN, POLMIL COUNSELOR,
 U.S. EMBASSY ANKARA. RETSON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. ~~(S)~~ WITH U/S OYMEN OUT OF TURKEY, AND TURKISH HLTF
 REP BULUC IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, ON MAY 9 WE DELIVERED
 U/S DAVIS'S LETTER AS WELL AS TALKING POINTS, NON-PAPER
 AND TEXT OF AGREED ELEMENTS CONTAINED REFTEL TO BULUC.
 AFTER READING THE PAPERS, BULUC EXPRESSED HIS
 APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S.'S EFFORTS AT THE HIGHEST
 POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC LEVELS (INCLUDING LYN~~v~~ DAVIS)
 TO WORK WITH TURKEY ON THIS ISSUE. HE CONTINUED THAT
 "WE WILL READ THESE PAPERS AND THE VARIOUS TURKISH
 AGENCIES WILL DIGEST THEM FULLY."
3. ~~(S)~~ BULUC THEN SAID THAT THE GOT WOULD MEASURE THE
 VARIOUS PARAMETERS CITED IN OUR NONPAPER AGAINST A VERY
 IMPORTANT YARDSTICK--THE PAPER DUNKERLEY AND BULUC
 DEVELOPED AT OSLO. BULUC NOTED HE HAD INDICATED AT THAT
 TIME THAT THE TECHNICAL PARAMETERS IN THE OSLO PAPER
 WERE TURKEY'S BOTTOM LINE. "WE WILL MEASURE THE U.S.
 PROPOSALS THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED TODAY AGAINST THAT
 YARDSTICK."
4. ~~(S)~~ BULUC THEN MENTIONED ONE CONTINUING CONCERN
 THAT TURKEY HAD, TO WIT, THE REALLOCATION OF TASHKENT

QUOTAS. HE NOTED THAT IN THE BULUC-DUNKERELY OSLO PAPER THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A FLANK SOLUTION CANNOT BE MADE CONTINGENT ON PLACING PRESSURE ON THIRD COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT IT CANNOT BE SEEN THAT WE ARE MAKING DEALS OVER THE HEADS OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WILL CAJOLE THESE COUNTRIES TO DO WHAT WE WANT THEM TO DO.

5. (X) RUSSIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF GEOGRAPHY CANNOT BE SEEN AS PROGRESS ISOLATED FROM KEY ELEMENTS OF THE U.S.-TURKISH PROPOSAL. FORCE LEVELS AND GEOGRAPHY ARE LINKED. THEY ARE NOT ISOLATED ELEMENTS. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE RUSSIANS, BASED ON THE CLINTON-YELTSIN TALKS, HAVE ACCEPTED A CERTAIN FORCE STRUCTURE.

GROSSMAN
BT
#4652

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4652

TOR: 960509110645 M2218043

DIST:

SIT: BELL SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Ambassador's Briefing to ASEAN Ambassadors (4 pages)	07/06/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 11/20/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1999 - Dec 2000 ([Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 530000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/06/1999]

2016-0126-M
ke4077

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA5493 1871431-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 061431Z JUL 99

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

OSRI: RUEHMO

DTG: 061431Z JUL 99

ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3936

INFO: RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2414

RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1584

RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0322

RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0122

RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0018

RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0246

RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 0693

RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0229

RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0056

RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0021

RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0789

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S BRIEFING TO ASEAN AMBASSADORS
ON

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 015493

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/09

TAGS: PREL, RS, ASEAN

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S BRIEFING TO ASEAN AMBASSADORS
ON

U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER KOSOVO

(U) CLASSIFIED BY KIRK AUGUSTINE, ACTING MINISTER-
COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5 (B, D)

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: ON JUNE 29, AMBASSADOR COLLINS GAVE A BRIEFING ON THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT EVENTS IN KOSOVO ON U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS TO THE AMBASSADORS FROM JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND ALL ASEAN COUNTRIES EXCEPT BRUNEI AND VIETNAM. A SUMMARY OF THE BRIEFING IS PROVIDED BELOW FOR EMBASSIES' INFORMATION. END SUMMARY

2. ~~(S)~~ AMBASSADOR COLLINS BEGAN HIS BRIEFING BY SAYING THAT THE WEST HAD BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH RUSSIA IN DEALQG WITH THE KOSOVO SITUATION NOT ONLY SINCE THE BOMBING BEGAN IN MARCH BUT IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND A HALF SINCE THE SITUATION THERE BEGAN DETERIORATING SERIOUSLY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO'S USE OF FORCE IN KOSOVO HAS TESTED THE U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, ALONG WITH THE RELATIONSHIPS

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2016-0126-m (1.17)

KBH 6/22/2023

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND EUROPE AND RUSSIA AND NATO. AS WE EVALUATE WHERE THINGS STAND NOW IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE, HOWEVER, EXACTLY WHAT WAS TESTED. THE ISSUES FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES.

3. (C) FIRST OF ALL, KOSOVO TESTED THE DOMESTIC SCENE WITHIN RUSSIA ITSELF. PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S CRITICS HAD TRIED TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT RUSSIA'S FUNDAMENTAL ORIENTATION TOWARD THE WEST AND ITS COOPERATION WITH NATO IN AN EFFORT TO PUSH A CONTRARY COURSE. THAT LINE DID NOT PREVAIL, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO. RUSSIA IS NOW BECOMING ENMESHED IN THE KOSOVO PEACEKEEPING OPERATION AND NEEDS TO WORK WITH NATO IN ORDER TO MAKE THE OPERATION AS A WHOLE A SUCCESS.

4. (C) AT THE SAME TIME, THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF COOPERATION WITH THE WEST WAS LARGELY UNEFFECTED BY THE EVENTS IN KOSOVO BUT THE POTENTIAL WAS THERE. THE AMBASSADOR REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THERE WAS ANY DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN RUSSIA'S COOPERATION WITH NATO OVER KOSOVO AND RUSSIA'S AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF. RUSSIA'S COOPERATION WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK PROCEEDED ON A TRACK SEPARATE FROM KOSOVO. HOWEVER, IF RUSSIA HAD NOT FOUND A WAY TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH NATO, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HARDER POLITICALLY TO WORK SUCCESSFULLY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. HERE TOO, THE RUSSIANS WERE RESISTING A BREAK WITH THE REFORM PATH LAID DOWN OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

5. (C) AFTER THE HELSINKI AND COLOGNE MEETINGS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA WERE GETTING BACK TO BUSINESS, TO USE NSC ADVISOR BERGER'S PHRASE. IN COMING MONTHS, OUR FOCUS WOULD BE ALONG TWO GENERAL DIRECTIONS. FIRST, ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, WE WILL ENCOURAGE RUSSIA TO STICK WITH THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE TO THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK, AND PRESS THE GOR TO COME TO CLOSURE ON DEALS ON THE DEBT ISSUE WITH THE LONDON AND PARIS CLUBS. SECOND, IN THE SECURITY FIELD, WE WILL PURSUE CONTINUED DIALOGUE ON NON-PROLIFERATION CONTROLS, STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AND THE ABM TREATY.

6. (C) THE WAY AHEAD ON SECURITY ISSUES WILL BE THE MORE DIFFICULT OF THE TASKS WE FACE IN MOVING THE U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP BEYOND KOSOVO, THE AMBASSADOR SAID. WITH REGARD TO PROLIFERATION, IT IS NO SECRET THAT OUR PRIMARY CONCERN IS WITH IRAN'S EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. IN OUR VIEW, THE CENTRAL PROBLEM WITH RUSSIA IN THIS REGARD IS PRIMARILY ONE OF IMPLEMENTATION, RATHER THAN POLICY, ALTHOUGH WE DO HAVE SOME SHARP POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR-RELATED COOPERATION WITH IRAN. THE DUMA'S PASSAGE OF THE NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW IS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND WE HAVE DEVELOPED PROMISING WORKPLANS WITH THE

RUSSIANS TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. NEEDS TO SEE THE LEAKAGES OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY EFFECTIVELY DEALT WITH IF WE ARE TO ADDRESS RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT SANCTIONS AND LIMITS ON SPACE COOPERATION.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 015493

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/09

TAGS: PREL, RS, ASEAN

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S BRIEFING TO ASEAN AMBASSADORS
ON

U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER KOSOVO

7. (✓) PROCEEDING AHEAD ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID, WILL CONSIST FIRST OF PUSHING FOR START II RATIFICATION. WE CAN EXPLORE NOW SOME IDEAS ON START III, BUT WE ARE PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS ON START III UNTIL START II IS RATIFIED. WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE RUSSIANS THAT WHEN THE DUMA RECONVENES IN THE FALL, THE GOR WILL PUSH FOR START II RATIFICATION. WE WILL ALSO TALK WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THE ABM TREATY AND OUR NEED TO CONSIDER NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE. THIS IS AN AREA WHERE THERE ARE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

8. (✓) IN THE COMING MONTHS, THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED, WE HAVE AN ACTIVE PROGRAM OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS PLANNED, WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV MEETING IN SINGAPORE; PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN WILL VISIT WASHINGTON SOMETIME BETWEEN MID-JULY AND MID-AUGUST; AND DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT WILL HOLD TALKS LATE THIS MONTH TO DISCUSS SECURITY ISSUES. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY THAT RELATIONS ARE BACK TO NORMAL, BUT DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES THE TWO SIDES FACED OVER KOSOVO, DURING THE BOMBING CAMPAIGN BOTH CONTINUED PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS IN MOST AREAS. THE GOR EMPHASIZED TO US DURING THE SPRING THAT IT WANTED TO INSULATE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP FROM KOSOVO. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS WERE SUSPENDED, BUT ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES AND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM, FOR EXAMPLE, CONTINUED WITHOUT INTERRUPTION.

COLLINS

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 5493

<^SSN>5493

TOR: 990706105112 M3945372

<^TOR>990706105202 M3945373

DIST:

SIT: ALLEN BELL BENJAMIN BLACK BRADEN BRODY BUSBY BUTLER DAVIDSON ELKIND

FLANAGAN GUARNIERI HAMMER HURLEY KAUFMAN SAPIRO SCHULTE SEGAL STROMSETH
TEDSTROM VACCARO WEISS
SIT: NSC