

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Executive Secretary				
Original OA/ID Number: 2591				
Row: 35	Section: 2	Shelf: 11	Position: 3	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Samuel Berger to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Greece, Turkey, the OSCE Summit, Italy, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, November 14-23 (13 pages)	11/12/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
002. memo	Madeleine Albright to President William J. Clinton re: Your Bilateral Visit to Turkey, November 15-17, 1999 (3 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
003. paper	Trilateral Meeting with President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (6 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
004. talking points	Points to be Made for Trilateral Meeting with President Demirel and Prime Minister Ecevit (5 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
005. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/08/1999	P1/b(1)
006. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Courtesy Call by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (3 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
008. talking points	Summary Points for Courtesy Call with Prime Minister Ecevit (1 page)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
009. talking points	Points to be Made for Courtesy Call with Prime Minister Ecevit (3 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
010. paper	Meeting with Yildirim Akbulut, President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (2 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
011. talking points	Points to be Made with Yildirim Akbulut, President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1 page)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]

2016-0145-M

kh1824

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. report	Biography (1 page)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1)
~~013. paper~~	~~Meeting with His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (2 pages)~~	~~11/00/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 8/29/2019
~~014. talking points~~	~~Points to be Made for Meeting with His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (1 page)~~	~~11/00/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 8/29/2019
015. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1)
~~016. memo~~	~~Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to President William J. Clinton re: OSCE Istanbul Summit, November 18-19, 1999 (3 pages)~~	~~11/10/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]

2016-0145-M

kh1824

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 3/4/2019

2016-0145-M



**THE PRESIDENT'S
TRIP TO
TURKEY
AND THE OSCE SUMMIT**

November 14-19, 1999

Office of the Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE Summit November 14-19, 1999

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

TURKEY

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ANKARA

WREATH LAYING CEREMONY

Scenesetter

ARRIVAL CEREMONY

Scenesetter

Remarks

TRILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEMIREL AND PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biographies

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

Qs and As

Statement

COURTESY CALL BY PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

COURTESY CALL WITH SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biography

SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT

Remarks

STATE DINNER/AWARD PRESENTATION

Remarks

IZMIT**VISIT EARTHQUAKE SURVIVORS**

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

Remarks

ISTANBUL**U.S.-TURKISH BUSINESS LUNCH**

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

Remarks

VISIT VIRGIN MARY'S GROTTO

Scenesetter

VISIT EPHESUS MUSEUM

Scenesetter

VISIT ST. JOHN'S BASILICA

Scenesetter

CALL ON ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biography

OSCE SUMMIT

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

OSCE CULTURAL SHOW

Scenesetter

OSCE SUMMIT

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

Intervention

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KOCHARIAN OF ARMENIA

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biography

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biography

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biography

BAKU-CEYHAN SIGNING CEREMONY

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

Remarks

NGO DISCUSSION

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

OSCE SUMMIT DINNER

Scenesetter

CFE SIGNING

Scenesetter

Briefing Memorandum

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALIYEV OF AZERBAIJAN

Briefing Memorandum

Points to be Made

Biography

**SCOPE
MEMORANDUM**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.01)

3/6/2019 KBH

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *AB*

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Greece, Turkey, the OSCE Summit,
Italy, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, November 14 - 23

This trip to Europe is the last by an American President in the 20th century -- a century of extraordinary tumult but also triumph for our values. It provides an opportunity to highlight the progress made during your presidency toward a peaceful, undivided, democratic continent -- and the very real challenges that remain. In your speech at Georgetown, you described those challenges: integrating a democratic Russia with the West; stabilizing southeastern Europe; building a real peace in the Aegean and bridging the gap between Europe and Islam. Your trip will inevitably bring to life both the progress and problems and so highlight America's European agenda for the start of the new century.

I. TURKEY

Your trip to Turkey culminates the emergence during your presidency of a mature, multifaceted partnership with a country that will remain pivotal to U.S. interests for the foreseeable future. American influence and prestige in Turkey are at an all-time high. Turkey's internal evolution is favorable but fragile. Since taking office in June, Bulent Ecevit's coalition government has accomplished more in the areas of democratic reform, economic development, and relations with Greece than any of its predecessors this decade. But the fault lines are clear. Ecevit's health is frail and his coalition with the nationalist right precarious. The inadequate response by the government and the military to the August earthquake has caused many Turks to question the omnipotence of both institutions. And the outcome of the great "Turkish experiment" -- i.e., building an Islamic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 11/07/2009

country that is fundamentally secular, democratic, and modernizing -- is far from certain.

Seen as a freeze frame, your trip will capture a very positive moment in Turkey-U.S. relations and in Turkey itself. You will be able to applaud Turkey's progress toward greater democracy, a free market economy and stronger civil society. You will bring with you a comprehensive earthquake assistance package. You will welcome the thaw in Greek-Turkish relations and explore ways to move it forward. You should be able to reach closure on a scenario for starting Cyprus talks this fall and help lock in Turkey's EU candidacy. We expect that you will witness the signing of documents on the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline on which we have been working for several years, and possibly, the Trans Caspian gas project that will bring an East-West energy corridor closer to fruition. You will highlight new U.S.-Turkey commercial agreements worth billions of dollars. And you will be able to firm up Turkish positions on regional issues of real concern: Iraq, Armenia, and the Balkans.

Your challenge will be to help the Turks imagine a moving picture of the future in which Turkey affirms its democratic, modernizing, and secular course -- taking its rightful place in Europe while it serves as a stability bridge to the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey's outward confidence masks internal tensions -- between Kemalists and Islamists/Kurds, the State and civil society, nationalists and cosmopolitans, the military and democrats. If Turkey can reconcile these tensions and create productive outlets for the positive energy each group generates, it can build a future equal to the greatness of its past. If Turkey fails, a force for stability and progress in a volatile region could become a primary source of instability.

Monday, November 15 - Ankara

- Wreath Laying
- Bilat/Trilat with President Demirel and Prime Minister Ecevit
- Courtesy Call with Assembly Speaker
- Address to Turkish National Assembly
- Brief Meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit
- State Dinner

Your visit begins with a **wreath laying** ceremony at the tomb of Kamal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish state. From there, you will move to the Presidential Palace for a **meeting with President Demirel**. You will be joined for lunch by **Prime**

Minister Ecevit. Demirel's role in Turkey is somewhere between Stephanopoulos' in Greece and Chirac's in France -- much more than ceremonial, but still less than executive. You will want to praise his leadership in organizing the OSCE Summit, while reviewing its deliverables and difficulties (Chechnya). Demirel travels frequently and has taken a keen interest in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. You should engage him on these issues, as well as on Russia and Turkey's democratic reforms. When Ecevit joins the meeting, you should focus on energy, an area in which Demirel has played a lead and largely positive role, but where Ecevit has proved prickly (notably in his failure to follow through on a commitment to us to make clear publicly that Turkey is giving the Trans Caspian pipeline project priority over the Blue Stream deal with Russia)). You also will want to discuss cooperation in the Balkans; Turkey's evolving relationship with the E.U. and Greece; the status of Cyprus talks; and Iraq, where Turkey continues to support Operation Northern Watch by letting our planes fly out of Incirlik while chafing at sanctions and questioning our goals and strategy. In a **separate meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit** later in the day, you can detail our earthquake reconstruction efforts, encourage further economic reform, and urge implementation of new human rights laws and outreach to the Kurds.

Your **speech to the National Assembly** and your **call on the Speaker** are opportunities to highlight the importance we attach to a strong relationship with Turkey -- and your conviction that the course Turkey takes will help shape the 21st century. The National Assembly is at the heart of a remarkable period of reform. In just four months, it passed 69 laws, including landmark legislation on social security, international arbitration, democracy, and human rights. You should praise this progress and urge Assembly members to continue to seize the opportunity they have, and the responsibility they share, to further modernize and democratize Turkey.

The first day in Turkey will conclude with a **State Dinner** hosted by President Demirel.

Tuesday, November 16 - Izmit and Istanbul

- Visit Earthquake Survivors, U.S. Tent City
- U.S.-Turkey Business Lunch
- NGO Roundtable
- Cultural Visits in Istanbul

You will fly from Ankara to **Izmit**, epicenter of the August earthquake, where you will visit with survivors. The Turks have razed most of the earthquake-damaged buildings. In their place, and in the absence of permanent housing, tent cities have sprung up -- the one you will tour features U.S. tents. You will announce a comprehensive earthquake assistance package, including winterized tents for 10,000 people; a cooperation agreement between FEMA and Turkey; a TDA reconstruction conference; and new Ex/Im Bank and OPIC credit lines. In Istanbul, you also will speak to the **U.S.-Turkish Business Council**. You will want to praise recent and long awaited steps by Turkey to improve the investment climate -- notably a constitutional amendment giving greater access for companies to international arbitration. You also can highlight a large number of big dollar commercial contracts between our countries. You also will lead a **civil society roundtable discussion** with a broad cross section of Turkish NGOs, whose activities and influence are rapidly expanding.

Wednesday, November 17 - Istanbul

- Call on Ecumenical Patriarch
- Visit Ephesus
- OSCE Cultural Show

Your call on **Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew** will send an important message to Turkey about freedom of religion and to Greek, Greek Americans and Greek Orthodox around the world about your respect for their spiritual leader. (You will also have met with the leaders of Turkey's two other recognized communities -- the Armenians and the Jews at the State dinner.)

In the afternoon, you will tour **Ephesus**. Once the third city of the Roman Empire, it is among the best preserved classical sites in the eastern Mediterranean. Alexander the Great conquered the city in 334 B.C. St. John is said to have brought the Virgin Mary to Ephesus around 40 A.D., where she lived out the rest of her life. St. Paul preached there for three years.

The day concludes with the opening event of the OSCE Summit -- a **cultural show** hosted by President Demirel and attended by most of the 54 OSCE leaders.

II. THE OSCE SUMMIT

This is the OSCE's first summit since Lisbon in 1996; you last attended in Budapest in 1994. The Summit itself will likely focus on three important achievements: (i) a new **OSCE Charter on European Security** that sets out basic principles of democracy, human rights and security within and among the participating states; (ii) an **adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty** which takes into account the changed security environment since the original treaty was signed in 1990; and (iii) **REACT** (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams) a new OSCE mechanism to identify, train, and rapidly deploy civilian capabilities including policies to assist states in preventing, contending with or recovering from conflict (in effect a civilian counterpart to military peacekeepers).

The meeting will be seen through the filter of Chechnya. The danger is a "split screen" summit, with you and other leaders signing the Charter and the CFE treaty on one side, while Russia -- by its actions in Chechnya -- appears to be violating both on the other side. We are urging the Russians to take steps to reconcile these images: stop the indiscriminate bombing in Chechnya; start a political dialogue toward a settlement; make a clear commitment to come into eventual compliance with CFE flank limits; reach agreement with Georgia and Moldova on timetables for withdrawing Russian troops. Progress in these areas will shape our posture toward signing the Charter and the CFE.

During the Summit, you will conduct bilateral meetings with Yeltsin, Chirac, Kocharian (Armenia), Aliyev (Azerbaijan) and perhaps others and take part in side events to advance specific issues. Armenia and Azerbaijan have come close to an agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K), although the recent assassinations in Yerevan set back the time-table. We are remaining flexible on scheduling these bilats until we have a better sense of possible progress to be made and problems to address.

Thursday, November 18 - Istanbul

- OSCE Plenary Sessions and Intervention
- Bilateral Meetings with Chirac, Kocharian, Aliyev
- Side Events: Stability Pact, other TBD.
- OSCE Charter Signing
- Energy Signing Event
- OSCE Summit Dinner

You will be among the first speakers at the opening plenary session. Your short **intervention** will focus on your vision for European security in the 21st century -- and the OSCE's role in realizing that vision. Before you speak, we expect EU President Prodi to report on progress made by the **Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe** since Sarajevo.

On the margins of the plenary, you will meet separately with the **Armenian President Kocharian and Azeri President Aliyev**. You can bolster their N-K efforts to achieve an early breakthrough by assuring them of our continued help and support.

You also will meet with **French President Chirac**. He has recently been harshly critical of us on UN arrears, Iraq, NMD, and CTBT. The meeting is well timed to forge a common approach to Chechnya and the CFE treaty. Chirac also is eager to discuss the Middle East (where he wants to reinvigorate the Syrian track before Assad's health collapses and suggested a joint trip to Damascus (until Barak poured cold water on that idea)). Also on the agenda are Nagorno-Karabakh, European security and defense issues, the NMD/ABM dilemma, and Iraq.

Following the afternoon plenary session, you will **sign the OSCE Charter**. This will be the first major articulation of OSCE principles since the Charter of Paris, signed as the Cold War was ending in 1990. Drawing on the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo, it stresses the importance of strengthening the OSCE's capacity to prevent and manage crisis within states as well as between them. And it gives the OSCE new tools to do so, including REACT.

If negotiations conclude successfully, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan will sign -- and you will witness -- framework agreements for the **Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline**. It is also possible that these same parties, together with the leader of Turkmenistan, will sign inter-governmental agreements for the **Trans-Caspian gas project**. Either one of these signings would constitute a major milestone for our Caspian energy policy -- diversifying sources of supply, anchoring the energy-producing countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia more closely to the West, reinforcing Turkey's position as a regional power.

Friday Morning and Afternoon, November 19 - Istanbul

- CFE Signing
- OSCE Plenary and Closing Events
- Istanbul OTRs
- Travel to Greece

The **signature of an adapted CFE Treaty** is an important step in enhancing the security and stability in Europe for the next century; the situation in Chechnya (with Russian deployments that clearly exceed the new CFE limits) risks overshadowing the accomplishment. In addition, negotiations on issues related to the Treaty are going down to the wire, particularly with respect to new forces in Moldova and Georgia.

The Amendment Agreement will adapt the original NATO-Warsaw Pact Treaty, signed nine years ago in Paris on November 19th, by replacing CFE's outdated bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings, and providing for an enhanced verification regime. In eliminating the group structure, we have sought to ensure that CFE will continue to contribute to European security and accommodate further NATO enlargement. While the adapted treaty preserves essential NATO operational flexibility to act in a crisis, it will reassure Russia that there will not be a substantial eastward shift of NATO military potential in light of NATO enlargement. The adapted treaty will also enhance regional stability and the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors through tougher limits on and requirements for the consent to stationed forces; and assist European integration by opening the treaty to new members.

You will also take note of or adopt an accompanying document (the CFE Final Act), which will contain political (i.e., not legally binding) commitments concerning the way that individual states will choose to exercise their rights and obligations. If agreements can be reached on withdrawing Russian forces from Moldova and Georgia, they will be referenced in the Final Act.

Boris Yeltsin's possible appearance at Istanbul all but guarantees that Chechnya will dominate the summit. We have tentatively scheduled a bilat with him, or with Putin in his absence.

III. GREECE

A complicated history hangs over our relationship with Greece. Over the past quarter century, the legacy of our perceived imperial presence (Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, U.S. military bases), U.S. support for the Colonels and our failure to block Turkey's intervention in Cyprus produced the highest levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. Kosovo rekindled dormant Greek distrust of the United States. Ninety-five percent of the people opposed the NATO bombing campaign. The Simitis government paid lip service to public opinion with strident anti-bombing rhetoric, but maintained its commitments to NATO. The demonstrations planned by left wing groups during your visit are a product of this history.

Ironically, we have made real progress over the past decade in building a more positive and productive Greek-U.S. partnership, thanks to changes in Greece itself. In 1989, there were no two more polar opposites in NATO than Greece and the United States, and no two less similar leaders than Ronald Reagan and Andreas Papandreou. Then, Greece focused its foreign policy on the Third World and in building relations with rogue states like Libya and Iraq. It was a haven for Middle East terrorists and had not established diplomatic relations with Israel. It was isolated from its Balkan neighbors. It had a sclerotic, socialist economy that drove away foreign investors and left the country impoverished.

Under Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister George Papandreou, Greece has re-oriented its foreign policy. It has asserted leadership in the Balkans, with troops in Bosnia and Kosovo and an aggressive private sector. It has sponsored Middle East peace conferences and is making a major effort to improve relations with Israel. It is taking risks for a real peace with Turkey. Thanks to Simitis' economic reforms, Greece is on the verge of joining the European Monetary Union; it boasts one of the highest growth rates in the E.U. and its strongest performing stock markets. Perhaps most important, Greece is developing a new self-image. As George Papandreou put it: "Now Greece can be a leader, we can help neighbors, we have a different sense of them and ourselves. Before, we knew we were the poorest country in the E.U. Now, we see we are the richest country in the region."

Your top priority is to encourage the Greek people to look forward, rather than backward -- to help build an even stronger

U.S.-Greek partnership, to assert Greece's own leadership in the Balkans, and to assume the responsibility that comes with playing its rightful role in Europe.

Friday Evening, November 19 - Athens

- Arrival Remarks
- Meet and Greet with Greek-Americans
- State Dinner

You arrive in Athens in the early evening; you will make a **short statement** at the airport to set the tone for the visit. Your remarks about the demonstrations played very well in Greece -- confidence without condescension. Here, a brief statement about your enthusiasm for the trip and your respect for the new Greece (a leader in Southeast Europe, a leading economy in the E.U.) would help get your visit off to a good start.

A large number of prominent **Greek-Americans** will be in Athens, as will a **Congressional Delegation**. You will meet with both prior to the **State Dinner** at the Presidential Palace. Our community leaders were embarrassed that the Greek government failed to provide adequate security guarantees to make your trip possible as originally scheduled; they are grateful that you remained steadfast in your determination to go to Greece.

Saturday, November 20 - Athens and Florence

- Bilats with President Stephanopoulos and Prime Minister Simitis
- Courtesy Call with Opposition Leader Karamanlis
- Speech to Greek People
- Meet with Olympians
- Church OTR [tbd.]

Following an **arrival ceremony** at the Presidential Palace, you will meet with **President Stephanopoulos**, who plays a largely ceremonial role in Greek politics but is widely respected. You then will meet with **Prime Minister Simitis** and join him in a brief statement to the press. Simitis has made clear the he sees Greece's future in the European mainstream and that he wants good relations with the United States. However, he is pre-occupied with upcoming elections, now likely to be held in March, six months ahead of schedule. Much of what he says to you will be shaped by that context. You should underscore our commitment to further strengthen our bilateral relationship in

the wake of Kosovo, notably through trade and investment; encourage Simitis to continue reaching out to Turkey and to support its EU candidacy in Helsinki; highlight our efforts to launch comprehensive Cyprus settlement talks; set out an agenda for cooperation in Southeastern Europe; and urge results in combating November 17 and other terrorist groups. You can reiterate many of these points in your brief meeting with **Opposition Leader Kostas Karamanlis**, who is running behind Simitis in the polls. Karamanlis said all the rights things about the Balkans and combating terrorism during a trip to the United States early this year, only to take a stridently anti-NATO stand during Kosovo while playing down the terrorism problem once he returned home. You should press him on both points.

Your **speech** is a major opportunity to connect with the Greek people, focusing on what we can do together as allies to bring prosperity to our people, stability and democracy to the Balkans and real peace to the Aegean.

Prior to departure, you will speak to the embassy community and greet **Greek Olympians** past and present. The Greeks are proud to have been chosen to host the 2004 Games, especially having been denied the millennial Games in 2000 for lack of adequate facilities. This brief meeting will resonate well among the Greek people. If time permits, you will do an OTR event at a Greek Orthodox church.

IV. THIRD WAY CONFERENCE

Saturday Evening, November 20 - Sunday, November 21: Florence

- Bilat with Prime Minister D'Alema
- Third Way Events

Following a brief **bilateral meeting** with Prime Minister D'Alema, you will participate in a conference on "**Progressive Governance in the 21st Century.**" You will be joined by five other world leaders -- Prime Ministers D'Alema, Blair and Jospin, Chancellor Schroeder, and President Cardoso. In practical terms, they are all implementing domestic policies to foster economic dynamism and opportunity at the same time. As a result, they are pursuing a new politics neither of the old left nor of the right, but each in their own ways innovative. This new politics is a central subject of debate throughout Europe. You are widely acknowledged as the first major leader to have faced the new issues and to have created a new model on the center-left.

The Florence conference is the third in a series of public conferences on this international movement of policy and politics. The first took place in September 1998 at the New York University School of Law. The second took place in April of this year in Washington, sponsored by the Democratic Leadership Council. This event is co-sponsored by the NYU School of Law and the European University Institute.

The conference begins on Saturday night, November 20, with a dinner at Villa La Pietra, the former estate of Sir Harold Acton, now NYU's Florence facility. The First Lady will receive the Global Law School Program Leadership Award and deliver remarks. Romano Prodi will give a keynote address. On Sunday, November 21, at the Palazzo Vecchio, the leaders will first meet for breakfast. The morning panel will address "The New Economy: Equality and Opportunity." At a lunch given by the mayor of Florence, Javier Solana and Jaun Somavia, director-general of the International Labor Organization, will deliver remarks. The afternoon panel will address "The Democracies in the 21st Century: Values, Rights and Responsibilities," including discussion by the leaders in response to questions from distinguished thinkers in the audience.

V. BULGARIA

Bulgaria has advanced a long way in the past ten years from its earlier status as the most loyal of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Bouts of economic crisis and hyperinflation have made it a painful decade of deep change, but the result is now an economic stability few had ever thought possible. This change has come without bloodshed, the result of strong and competent leadership by President Stoyanov and, more lately, Prime Minister Kostov.

The Bulgarian government's support for NATO during the Kosovo crisis was opposed by the public and caused bitter splits in the political arena. After recent local elections that underlined this mood of waning popular approval for the government, Stoyanov and Kostov will be looking to your visit as a sign of approval for what Bulgaria has accomplished.

Stoyanov and the Bulgarians want to be sure the United States is committed to the idea of moving Southeast Europe into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Their fear, shared by other countries of Southeast Europe, is that the West will content itself with

rhetoric without taking concrete steps to help with reform or accelerate integration into European institutions.

Monday, November 22 - Sofia

- Wreath Laying
- Bilats with President Stoyanov and Prime Minister Kostov
- Roundtable with Bulgarian Youth
- Call on Parliament Leader
- Crowd Event
- State Dinner

After a brief **Wreath Laying Ceremony** at Bulgaria's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, you will **meet with President Stoyanov**, who has used his position to champion the cause of economic and democratic reform in Bulgaria. Your primary message to both Stoyanov and **Prime Minister Kostov** will be one of appreciation for Bulgaria's efforts in support of NATO and encouragement to keep making the hard choices on reform. The deliverables you announce in a subsequent **speech to the people of Sofia**, including an OPIC insurance guarantee worth millions of dollars for a U.S. firm investing in Bulgaria and news that Ex-Im Bank is now open for private business, will underscore your message of support. The themes of progress, ethnic tolerance, and reform will also predominate during your appearance at a **roundtable with students of the American University in Bulgaria**. Finally, you will make opening remarks at a **State Dinner** that will be attended by members of the government and various business leaders.

VI. KOSOVO

As the temperature drops and winter descends upon Kosovo, most Kosovars are busy rebuilding homes and businesses and preparing for the winter. Although movement of winterization material was hindered at the outset by logistical difficulties, donor contributions are now coming into Kosovo at a sharper pace. Kosovo's Albanians have returned from the hills and from refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania, and are reestablishing their rightful places in every facet of Kosovar business and society. For Kosovo's Serbs, however, this is a bleaker time, one marked by insecurity and fear. Your visit comes at a time when the messages of hope, tolerance, and patience will go a long way towards reassuring all Kosovars that their hardships are not for naught.

Kosovar Albanians remain extremely grateful to the United States, to NATO, and to you personally for securing their freedom. They are overjoyed at the prospect of your visit, and will welcome you warmly everywhere you go. You can share with them the prospect of a winter that will be tough but free of the threat of Serb repression for the first time in many years. You can also remind them of their responsibility to live according to international standards of tolerance now that the world has acted on their behalf.

Tuesday, November 23 - Macedonia and Kosovo

- Meeting with Macedonian President in Skopje
- Meeting with UNMIK head Kouchner and COMKFOR Reinhardt
- Meeting with Albanian and Serb leaders in Kosovo
- Visit to a DOD-supported School
- Speech to the People of Ferizaj/Urosevac
- Meet with U.S. troops at Camp Bondsteel

You will land in the Macedonian capital of Skopje to **meet at the airport with the newly elected President** (second-round elections will have been held on November 14). The meeting will afford you an opportunity to thank the often-maligned Macedonians for hosting almost 300,000 refugees during the crisis and acknowledge once again the importance of their contribution as a staging ground for KFOR and for humanitarian assistance to Kosovo. After a brief helicopter flight to the U.S. sector in Kosovo, headquartered at Camp Bondsteel near the predominantly Albanian town of Ferizaj (Urosevac in Serbian), your day will include a **meeting with Albanian and Serb leaders** and a separate **discussion with the heads of the UNMIK and KFOR missions**. You will also tour a local school supported by U.S. troops from Camp Bondsteel and their families. The single most important message of your visit will be tolerance. Albanians have a unique respect for your concerns and your vision as the leader of the country that spearheaded the NATO effort. Serbs, too, will listen with attention, though with a far greater degree of skepticism. Your **remarks to a crowd of Albanians** at the sports hall in Ferizaj will have wide resonance throughout the province at a time when Serbs and Albanians alike are looking for signs of our commitment to their future in Kosovo.

TURKEY





THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
DECL: 11/08/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0145-M (1.02)
3/4/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright *MKA*

SUBJECT: Your Bilateral Visit to Turkey, November 15-17,
1999

Your bilateral visit caps a year of intense U.S. engagement and cooperation. Turkey's extraordinary support in Kosovo, its continued cooperation on Iraq, our joint promotion of the Baku-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian pipelines, and our relief and reconstruction assistance after the catastrophic August 17 earthquake highlighted those efforts and Turkey's pivotal importance to the advancement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Europe, the Middle East, the Caspian and Central Asia.

Your visit comes at a critical time for Prime Minister Ecevit and his government. Much of his legislative and political agenda since he took office in June has been focused on passing human rights and other measures to ensure that your visit and the last major summit of the century are a credit to Turkey.

Since Ecevit's meeting with you in Washington, his coalition's continuing activism on domestic and foreign policy fronts has neutralized for now questions over the government's faltering response to the earthquake. The government introduced a draft FY2000 budget that most private analysts anticipate the IMF will approve, once revenue measures and spending cuts are spelled out. The reopening of two NGO human rights offices in the southeast, and State Minister Irtemcelik's all-day meeting on October 14 with Turkish NGOs helped sustain human rights progress, although problems remain. Ankara also hosted Prime Minister Barak and sent a ministerial-level delegation to Armenian Prime Minister Sarkisyan's funeral, the highest-level Turkish visit since Armenia's independence. Your visit and a smooth, successful summit should boost Ecevit's domestic political support and enhance prospects for progress on issues of importance to us.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Classified by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Reason: E.O. 12958 1.5 D

The most pressing of your bilateral objectives will be to urge Ecevit to ensure that Denktash engages fully and constructively in Cyprus talks. We hope that before the summit UNSYG Annan can announce that talks will take place in New York under UN auspices after the OSCE Summit. The Turkish side may not agree to such an announcement until the Summit, however.

Tangible progress on Cyprus will be one of the key factors influencing Greece's decision on whether to support Turkey's EU candidacy at the EU Summit in Helsinki. Another important factor will be continued progress in Greek-Turkish relations. Since your meeting with Ecevit, Greece and Turkey have continued constructive diplomatic and military-to-military efforts to improve relations. Most recently, the Turks delayed and scaled back the annual Toros exercise in and around Cyprus as a gesture to Greece. We also have encouraged Simitis to accept Ecevit's offer to meet during the OSCE Summit, and have urged both to consider a statement pledging no use or threat of force in resolving disputes. To help give the Greeks sufficient cover to support Turkey's EU candidacy you should encourage Demirel and Ecevit to reopen the Halki Seminary; and sign before the Helsinki Summit some or all of the eight bilateral agreements the two Foreign Ministries have negotiated over the last six months. I also recommend you announce during your trip our desire to work on a bilateral agreement with Turkey to reduce the pillage of historic cultural sites and artifacts.

Continued Turkish progress on human rights will be another important factor in persuading Sweden, Denmark and perhaps other EU countries to support Turkey's EU candidacy. Human rights improvements also will facilitate mutual U.S.-Turkish priorities, including arms transfers. To signal our support for Turkey's vibrant civil society, we have arranged a roundtable for you with representatives of six human rights, women's, and other NGOs on November 17 in Istanbul. In your bilateral meetings, you should welcome the important human rights steps Turkey has taken and urge continued progress that leads to concrete improvements on the ground.

To highlight our support for the east-west energy corridor and take advantage of the presence of Caspian leaders at the OSCE Summit, we are finalizing arrangements for you to witness: the signing of an Intergovernmental Agreement for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline by Demirel and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia; the initialing of the Turkish government guarantee, the Turkey-AIOC host-government agreement, and the Turkey-AIOC turnkey contract for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; and the signing of an

Interstate Framework Agreement on the Trans-Caspian pipeline by the three Presidents mentioned above and the President of Turkmenistan.

You will also address the U.S.-Turkish Business Council in Istanbul to signal our interest in expanding bilateral trade and investment and encouraging continued economic reform measures that will fuel private-sector-led growth. Following the meeting, we are arranging for you to witness the signing of several important energy and other contracts.

Finally, to demonstrate our continued support for Turkey's earthquake reconstruction efforts, you will stop in the earthquake zone to visit a tent city erected by Marines from the Kearsarge group, which provides winterized shelter for approximately 6,000 people. You can announce there: our donation of additional large winterized tents that can shelter 10,000 people or serve as schools and community centers; a conference in Turkey after Thanksgiving on "Turkey Reconstruction: Engineering Challenge" sponsored by the Trade and Development Agency; and FEMA's signing of a protocol with the GOT on cooperation in emergency management and disaster mitigation.

Your meetings with the progressive representatives of Turkey's society who personify the country's increasingly democratic, modern, market-oriented character; your support for Ecevit's own democratic and economic reforms; a successful OSCE Summit; and a decision by EU leaders to grant Turkey candidate status at the Helsinki summit are likely to give fresh impetus to Ecevit's longer-term reform efforts. These in turn will pay important dividends for U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey as the new millennium begins.

ANKARA

**WREATH LAYING
CEREMONY**

SCENESETTER: WREATH LAYING AT ANITKABIR
(THE ATATURK MAUSOLEUM)

You will lead a wreath-laying ceremony at Anitkabir immediately upon your arrival in Ankara. The ceremony pays homage to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey's modern, secular republic, and is mandatory for all high-level visitors to Ankara.

The Turkish people created the idea of a mausoleum to Ataturk as a place to honor the man who had led the independence war and created a modern nation out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Anitkabir covers some 700,000 square meters of high land in the Maltepe area of Ankara. Anitkabir's Peace Park contains plants from all areas of Turkey and the world. The mausoleum was designed by Turkish architect Emin Onat and was completed in 1953, fifteen years after Ataturk's death. Although many Americans see in it echoes of our own Lincoln Memorial, the layout, structure, and decoration are evocative of several Anatolian civilizations.

You will begin the wreath-laying ceremony by ascending a set of stairs. At the top of the stairs, a Turkish flag proudly flies on an American flagpole, constructed specifically for Anitkabir. The flagpole is the longest single-piece flagpole in Europe. Symbolic relief work is at the base: a torch of civilization, a sword of attack, a helmet of defense, an oak branch of victory, and an olive branch of peace.

You will be guided past the flagpole and into the proper place for the ceremony. You, followed by Turkish dignitaries and the remainder of your delegation, will proceed into the Hall of Honor, and to the end of the hall and Ataturk's tomb, which rests in front of spacious open windows. You will lay a wreath at the foot of Ataturk's tomb, assisted by two Turkish honor guard members. As you exit the hall, you will note Ataturk's last words to the Army, and a speech commemorating Ataturk's legacy inscribed on the walls. On the ceiling are 15th and 16th century Turkish kilim (flat-woven carpet) motifs.

Following the wreath laying, and the mandatory moment of silence, you will proceed to the Republic Tower, where you will sign the guest book. This area is connected to a small museum of Ataturk memorabilia where you will spend ten minutes.



SCENESETTER: THE PRESIDENCY -- ARRIVAL CEREMONY,
OFFICIAL MEETINGS AND STATE DINNER

You will take part in a brief arrival ceremony outside the Presidency. You will then move inside to meet with President Demirel, Prime Minister Ecevit, and other key Turkish cabinet members. You will return to the Presidency in the evening for the State Dinner. President Demirel will present you with the Award of Honor, which is bestowed on heads of state who have helped to develop friendly relations with Turkey.

The thickly wooded Presidency compound was built at the request of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on the capital's highest hills. It is referred to colloquially as the "Pink Palace" for its unusual exterior color scheme. The Presidency houses the presidential residence, a museum, and a series of office complexes. A guesthouse for visiting heads of state was added recently.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

CONFIDENTIAL

TRILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SULEYMAN DEMIREL AND
PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT

KEY OBJECTIVES

President Demirel

- Praise Demirel's leadership in organizing OSCE Summit, review deliverables, difficulties (Chechnya).
- Discuss situation, solutions to problems in Russia.
- Encourage Demirel to open land border with Armenia; seek his views on prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
- Welcome Turkey's human rights reforms, urge implementation/expansion, peace in southeastern Turkey.

President Demirel and Prime Minister Ecevit

- Express appreciation for progress on Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline; secure Ecevit's support for TCP gas project.
- Praise Turkish contributions to stability in southeast Europe.
- Reaffirm support for Turkey's EU candidacy and inclusion in European security deliberations.
- Encourage further Greece-Turkey rapprochement through political cooperation; military CBMs; Aegean dispute resolution; reopening of Halki Seminary.
- Convey importance of movement on Cyprus.
- Urge continued cooperation on Iraq.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

At about the midway point of your meeting with President Demirel you will be joined by Prime Minister Ecevit. Having discussed several issues one-one-one with Demirel, you will have the rest

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: November 6, 2009

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0145-M(103)

3/6/2019 KBH

of the meeting and lunch to cover several pressing foreign policy matters -- and nail down the GOT position more fully. (Note: Your separate discussion with Ecevit is covered in another memorandum.)

BACKGROUND

President Demirel

Since taking office in 1993, Suleyman Demirel has tried to steer a course of moderation between a more assertive military and the numerous elected civilian governments that have come and gone during his tenure. As President, Demirel has tried to use the bully pulpit, and his nominal chairmanship of the military-dominated Turkish National Security Council (NSC), to nudge Turkey toward greater cooperation with the United States and Europe. Demirel has staked out generally pro-Western positions without shying away from occasional criticism as a means to enhance his nationalist bona fides with the voters (e.g., Operation Provide Comfort in the early 1990s).

Demirel has been a fixture in Turkish politics since the 1960s. He has rebounded from two military coups, incarceration, and a seven-year ban on political activity to serve seven terms as Prime Minister and one as President. Unlike his visionary predecessor, Turgut Ozal, the 74 year-old Demirel is known more for his consensus-building skills than for the ability to craft bold, new initiatives. Like most Turkish politicians who have had run-ins with the military, Demirel has often proved cautious on sensitive policy debates, such as pro-Kurdish reforms and civilian oversight of the military. Frustrated by his limited decision making role as Turkey's largely ceremonial Chief of State, his main goal is to establish a "French-style" presidential system of government that, in his view, is the answer to Turkey's chronic instability -- and a fitting way to cap his long career. His term expires in May 2000, but constitutional amendments that he has proposed would allow him to remain in office for another five to seven years. Given the lack of alternative candidates, Demirel stands a good chance of succeeding.

You might start the meeting by expressing our ongoing solidarity with Turkey in the wake of the August earthquake, while saving a more detailed discussion of reconstruction efforts for your meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit.

AGENDAIssues for One-on-One Session with Demirel

OSCE Summit. The Summit represents a major opportunity for Turkey to showcase itself under the international spotlight -- and microscope. Turkey wants to demonstrate that it is ready for a seat at the center of European affairs; while the rewards of a successful summit would be great, the cost of failure is also likely to be high. You should praise Demirel for his lead role in organizing the Summit.

Demirel is well aware of our concerns about a "split screen" summit, with leaders signing the amended CFE treaty and the OSCE Charter on one side, while the Russians violate both commitments on the other. He will want to hear your ideas for managing the Chechnya problem, as well as any last minute issues concerning the Summit's principle deliverables: an adapted CFE treaty (whose new flank limits Turkey played a lead role in negotiating); the CFE Charter; and new steps like REACT to make the OSCE more operational.

Russia. Most Turks recognize the importance of maintaining ties to Russia, but instability in Chechnya and the North Caucasus are complicating the relationship. Demirel will be interested in your views, including your recent meeting with Putin. You should underscore that we have pressed the Russians on Chechnya, stressing our concern over civilian casualties, the need to allow free movement for displaced people and urging Russia to proactively pursue a political dialogue. While we are concerned that terrorists may use Georgia and Azerbaijan as a transit area for resources to the North Caucasus, we also believe that Georgia and Azerbaijan do not want their territory to be used to provide support for terrorists. We do not want the Chechnya conflict to increase tensions between Russia and its neighbors Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan. We have encouraged Turkey and Armenia to re-establish relations. Armenia has taken some significant steps -- agreeing to Istanbul as the venue for the OSCE summit and providing humanitarian aid to Turkey after the earthquake. The Turks have been receptive, but say that formal relations must wait for a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. You should encourage him to take a bold step by opening the land border between Turkey and Armenia, which also would be good for Turkey's economy. Demirel is using his close relationship with President Aliyev to support a sensitive deal that has been under

discussion between Aliyev and Armenian President Kocharian and would involve territorial adjustments. You should praise Demirel's efforts on behalf of that dialogue, and solicit his views on the recent assassination of Armenian Prime Minister Sarkisyan and its potential impact on Aliyev's thinking.

Human Rights/Democratization. Demirel has tried to help foster a more open political atmosphere by meeting with -- and thereby lending legitimacy to -- Kurdish mayors and activists in the southeast, and by speaking out against prosecutorial overreach against a politician stripped of her parliamentary seat for trying to take the oath of office in an Islamic headscarf. On the minus side, Demirel recently reiterated support for long-standing Turkish policy against Kurdish broadcasting rights, claiming such reforms would "divide the State" -- probably reflecting a determination by the generals that their recent hints at Kurdish cultural reforms went too far.

You should express appreciation for Demirel's delicate position as the military's chief civilian interlocutor and reiterate our commitment to support Turkey's fight against terrorism -- while noting that further progress on democratization and human rights is important to our bilateral relationship. You will want to solicit his views on the debate sparked by recent public statements from the Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeals strongly criticizing the weaknesses of Turkey's political system -- including the State's crackdown on freedom of speech and against heretofore unobjectionable religious organizations. You will also want to emphasize our view that reforms can and ought to be instituted without supporting formal "group rights" -- regarded as criminally "separatist" in Turkey.

Issues for Demirel and Ecevit

Energy Issues. Since you saw Ecevit at the White House, our Caspian energy policy has made important strides forward. Concerning the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Azerbaijan's dominant foreign producer, BP-Amoco, announced that it now conditionally supports the building of an oil line to Ceyhan. This may make possible the signing of inter-governmental framework agreements during your visit to Turkey. (Update to be provided.) The critical next step will be to assemble in early 2000 commitments from companies to ship oil through a Baku-Ceyhan line. Regarding the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCP), the principle hurdles are governmental rather than commercial. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan need to recognize the need to work together and share the Turkish gas market; Demirel can help make this happen.

You should also reiterate our understanding that Turkey's top priority is TCP, not Blue Stream, as well as strong opposition to Turkey's taking gas from Iran.

Kosovo/SEE. The Turks want to play a leading role in the Stability Pact and other international strategic planning and decision-making for Southeastern Europe. They deployed 1,600 troops to NATO operations in Bosnia (SFOR), and another 1,100 to Kosovo (KFOR). The GOT has also contributed almost \$50 million in aid to Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia in the past year. Turkey proposed and provides the first commander for the Multinational Peace Force for Southeast Europe (MPFSEE), a brigade-sized force composed of troops from participating southeastern European countries (including Greece), headquartered in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. You should express to Demirel appreciation for Turkey's contributions to the region.

Turkey-EU. Turkey-EU relations have improved since Ecevit's visit to Washington. EU Foreign Ministers approved a new aid package that includes up to 800 million Euros in aid and other funds to Turkey. Ankara's EU prospects were enhanced by the Commission's recent recommendation that Turkey be granted candidate status -- but that negotiations on membership not begin until Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria (democracy/human rights). The EU Presidency subsequently reported that lack of progress on Cyprus remained a concern. You should reiterate to both leaders our strong, unconditional support for Turkey's candidacy, but also remind them that the more they can do to create a favorable climate, the better the chances will be. The Turks continue to worry that they are being excluded from EU efforts to build a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which also will come to a head in Helsinki. Your strong statement in support of their inclusion was deeply appreciated by Ecevit, and played well in Turkey.

Greece-Turkey Relations. The remarkable progress in Greece-Turkey relations over the past few months has been called "seismic diplomacy," but in fact began before the earthquake. You should encourage Demirel and Ecevit to continue to contribute to the positive climate -- particularly by pushing Denktash to agree to talks on Cyprus (see below) or by agreeing to a resolution mechanism for disputes in the Aegean. The Greek press is paving the way for a meeting between Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Ecevit on the margins of the OSCE Summit. The Turks have also agreed to our suggestion that they scale back their annual "Toros" military exercise with the Turkish Cypriots (scheduled for 15-22 November). We are also trying to

encourage Ecevit to reiterate support for the Madrid Declaration of July 1997, in which Turkish and Greek leaders expressed intent to support "no first use" of force in the Aegean, and a commitment to abide by international law in resolving their disputes. Less difficult, but still important, Turkish steps could include re-opening the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary in Istanbul, closed since 1971. A Turkish suggestion that Halki be reopened as an adjunct to a Turkish university is a non-starter for the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul.

Cyprus. During your White House meeting, Ecevit promised that he would bring Denktash to the table for negotiations under UN auspices without preconditions -- the negotiations to be announced at Istanbul and to commence in early December. Demirel and his staff played a key role in greasing the skids of this deal. You should confirm with both of them that the deal is still on and that Denktash will attend talks in **New York**. You should press them on the need for the talks to tackle real issues (security, property, freedom of movement, status) and not be talks about talks. A failure to engage seriously will harm Turkey's chances for EU candidacy in Helsinki.

Iraq. You should be prepared for Ecevit to make a strong push on the Turkey section of the Dutch-UK draft resolution. As you know, the Turks strongly oppose provisions to bring illegal Iraqi smuggling (through Turkey) into the oil-for-food program. This is important to ensure that the UN -- not Saddam -- controls revenues from this traffic, and that appropriate portions of the revenue are provided for the compensation fund, northern Iraq, and the costs of UN operations in Iraq. You should make clear to Ecevit and Demirel that the illegal trade through Turkey must be a part of a new, omnibus Iraq resolution.

At the White House, Ecevit asked you to support exempting this trade under an Article 50 waiver. We have looked at this issue extensively. It is a non-starter: the Security Council has never granted an Article 50 waiver on any sanctions issue. If the Security Council were to do so for Turkey under the Iraq sanctions, it would open a floodgate of requests for exemptions from other countries to other UN sanctions. You should also emphasize that our commitment to work with the Iraqi opposition does not presage an independent Kurdish state.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TRILATERAL MEETING WITH
WITH PRESIDENT DEMIREL AND PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEMIREL

OSCE

- Congratulations on organizing Summit. I know first hand from NATO Summit logistical and political challenge it presents. Tremendous opportunity to spotlight Turkey.
- I know you share concerns that Chechnya casts a shadow over Summit. We propose [tbd.]
- As we deal with Chechnya, important we also spotlight important achievements of Istanbul: adapted CFE Treaty that Turkey played key role in negotiating; new Charter that sets out vision for 21st century security; and initiatives to make OSCE more operational like REACT.

Russia/Chechnya

- Made it clear to Putin that while we support Russia's sovereignty and right to combat terrorism, we're deeply concerned over civilian casualties, lack of free movement for displaced people.
- Convinced there is no military solution. We are urging Russia to proactively pursue a political dialogue.
- Concerned terrorists may use Georgia and Azerbaijan as transit area for resources to North Caucasus, but believe Georgia and Azerbaijan do not want territory to be used to support terrorists. Must avoid conflict increasing tensions between Russia and Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Turkey/Armenia/Azerbaijan

- Encouraged by positive signals sent by Armenian: did not try to block Istanbul as Summit site, sent earthquake aid.
- Given your position of strength, can you take bold step: open Turkey's land border with Armenia? What about other areas for cooperation, like World Monuments Fund?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0145-M (1.04)
3/6/2019 KBH

- How does the assassination of Armenian PM Sarkisyan affect prospects for an N-K settlement?

Democracy -- Human Rights

- Impressed with steps Turkey has taken to enhance democracy: removal of military judges from state security courts; release of detainees; anti-torture laws; amnesty and repentence bills; political parties law. Next steps?
- U.S.-Turkish counter-terrorism cooperation against Ocalan and the PKK is bilateral success story. But convinced no purely military solution to Kurdish issues. Civilian leadership in expanding rights for all is crucial.
- How do you see opportunities for political and cultural reforms to reach out to Kurdish-origin citizens?
- I appreciate vital role you have played in listening to and representing the people of the Anatolian heartland and their respect for tradition, including religion.
- Read with interest recent speech by Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeals on need for sweeping reforms to protect free speech -- including religiously-derived ideas. What do you make of concerns he raised?

POINTS FOR JOINT ECEVIT-DEMIREL MEETING AND LUNCH

Energy Issues

- Appreciate your leadership in developing East-West energy corridor. Our strategic partnership in this area key to energy security and diversification.
- We were pleased to learn that BP now conditionally supports the building of an oil line to Ceyhan.
- Critical next step will be to assemble in early 2000 commitments from companies to ship oil thru Baku-Ceyhan line.
- Want to confirm that Turkey is giving top priority to TCP Very important to us.
- We strongly oppose taking gas from Iran.

Kosovo/SEE

- Deeply appreciate Turkey's extraordinary support in Kosovo, and important role it played in the stand-up of the Multinational Peace Force for Southeast Europe (MPFSEE).
- We strongly support a leading role for Turkey in allied and regional decision-making on Southeast Europe.
- Pleased with progress on Stability Pact. Believe we have a good package to announce in Istanbul: commitment to fight corruption; Investment Compact; Declaration of Intent of regional states to destroy, secure small arms and stockpiles; agreement on Media Charter for protection of journalists.

Relations with the EU

- You know I have strongly supported and continue to support unconditional candidacy for Turkey.
- Pleased Turkey-EU relations have improved since Mr. Ecevit visited Washington. How do you see prospects for Helsinki?
- Continued progress on human rights and willingness to enter into Cyprus talks should permit a success at Helsinki.
- On ESDI, we are also in vigorous agreement. Full participation of non-EU NATO Allies in EU-led operations remains a top priority for us.
- Also important to move ahead on NATO-EU links and making NATO assets available to the EU. Best way to keep EU from wanting to create separate structures that exclude both of us.

Greece-Turkey

- Want to commend important steps Turkey and Greece have taken to improve Greek-Turkish relations, including:
 - the response of both countries to the earthquakes;
 - the Foreign Ministry talks on trade, environment, crime;
 - the activation of joint NATO commands in Greece and Turkey.
- Greek-Turkish participation in Southeast European brigade.

- Believe Greece's gestures -- to approve EU funding for Turkey that they had previously blocked and to cut military exercises for the rest of this year -- are very helpful.
- Hope you will consider more steps to help maintain momentum in run up to Helsinki and before Greek elections next spring.
- Most important is movement on Cyprus and agreement to Aegean dispute resolution mechanism.
- Reopening Halki Seminary would also be welcome step for Turkey's Greek community and would further improve climate before the OSCE and Helsinki summits.
- Other positive step would be to reiterate support for 1977 Madrid Declaration, in which Turkish and Greek leaders expressed intent to support "no first use" of force in Aegean, commitment to abide by international law to resolve disputes.

Cyprus [Placeholder]

- Pleased parties have agreed/will agree to attend talks in **New York**. Important these be serious talks tackling real issues.
- Insecurity on island can only be resolved by a just, comprehensive settlement -- under which Turkish security forces would play significant role and both communities would exercise considerable control in a loose federation.
- Financial considerations don't trump security -- but virtue of solution we envision would have added benefit of alleviating heavy burdens now borne by Turkey, Turkish Cypriots:
 - Economy of northern Cyprus lags far behind south, with a per capita GDP of only \$3,700 -- compared to GDP \$13,000 percent among Greek Cypriots;
 - Turkey also must foot bill for maintaining and garrisoning 30,000 troops -- cost of maintaining large presence on Cyprus must, in aftermath of earthquake, be an even greater drain on military resources.
 - Convinced we can reach settlement that answers fundamental interests of both sides and that provides security for

Turkish Cypriots for next 25 years and beyond. Time to take question mark away and forge lasting security.

Iraq [Placeholder]

- On Iraq, want to reiterate our commitment to containing Saddam until we can help bring about his downfall. Share your determination to keep Iraq united and appreciate your continued strong support for the No-Fly Zones.
- **(If pressure on Dutch-UK Draft)** Had extensive discussions with the cosponsors of the draft. Strong sentiment that the trade through Turkey must be part of the oil-for-food system to ensure that the revenues go into the UN escrow accounts, not to Saddam Hussein's regime.
- Want to continue to work with you to make sure that these provisions are as responsive to your needs and concerns as possible.
- **(If asked about Article 50 Waiver)** We have discussed that with our colleagues on the Security Council and it just can't be done. Council has never granted an Article 50 waiver and to do so would be to open a Pandora's box.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/08/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]

2016-0145-M
kh1824

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]

2016-0145-M
kh1824

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



**Q' S AND A' S
TO BE PROVIDED**

**STATEMENT
TO BE PROVIDED**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COURTESY CALL BY PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Reaffirm support for earthquake reconstruction efforts.
- Applaud economic reform, make clear IMF Stand-By Agreement depends on sound 2000 budget, continued reform.
- Reaffirm support for closer bilateral trade ties.
- Welcome Turkey's human rights reforms, urge implementation, and encourage Turkey to pursue peace in Southeastern Turkey.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

(You will have discussed international issues in trilateral.) In the first 100 days since taking office in June 1999, Bulent Ecevit's government did more in the areas of economic reform, human rights, and relations with Greece than any of its predecessors in your two terms as President. These achievements were all the more remarkable in that Ecevit pushed them through Parliament while managing a coalition government beset by major divisions, including between his Democratic Left Party (DSP) and its main partner, the rightist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

In recent weeks, Ecevit has found the going slower. Turkey is still reeling from the August earthquake. While Ecevit has weathered the political aftershocks, his administration received poor marks for its handling of the crisis. Public disapproval of the State and government has been exacerbated by accusations that senior MHP figures allegedly sought to profit from the devastation by illegally awarding reconstruction contracts to their cronies. Despite Ecevit's reputation for integrity, only one in four Turks now have a positive view of him -- down from 35 percent in July. Even the military, the most respected institution in Turkey, has come under criticism for its mishandling of the earthquake -- remarkable, in that "insulting the Armed Forces" is a crime punishable by incarceration.

AGENDA

Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction. The quake killed more than 17,000, injured another 24,000, and left over 300,000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: November 6, 2009

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0145-M (1.07)

3/4/2019 KBH

people homeless. To date, the USG has provided \$14.5 million in relief aid, including two search and rescue teams, three naval ships, and 2,200 military personnel, and tents, blankets, and other relief supplies.

You can tell Ecevit that we have put together a comprehensive package to: (i) winterize the 5,500 tents (housing 25,000 to 50,000 people) already deployed and airlift another 500 large DoD winterized tents to provide shelter for 10,000 people; (ii) arrange through TDA a conference in Turkey bringing together U.S. and Turkish public and private sector experts on reconstruction projects; (iii) build Turkish emergency response and disaster mitigation expertise through training and exchanges with FEMA and USAID; (iv) establish through Ex-Im a \$200 million line of credit for reconstruction projects [~~tbd~~]; (v) through DoD, respond to the GOT's request for spare parts to assist in the reconstruction of the Golcuk naval base.

Economic Policy. The earthquake was a serious but not fatal setback to Turkey's economy. We expect real GNP to decline by up to 2.5 percent in 1999 -- following a 3.8 percent increase in 1998. Ecevit's government has already pushed through Parliament landmark reforms in social security, banking, and laws allowing for international arbitration. Now, passage of implementing legislation for various amendments and for market-based regulation of the energy and telecommunications sectors would spur increased U.S. investment. The IMF is poised to approve a \$3-4 billion stand-by arrangement in late autumn -- if the GOT passes a year-2000 budget which cuts chronic high inflation, reduces the budget deficit from the current 11-12 percent of GNP, and begins to shrink the growing domestic public debt. The draft budget currently before parliament appears close to IMF criteria and would reduce inflation from the current 65 percent rate to 25 percent by end-2000. As is always the case in Turkey, implementation is the key. You should praise Ecevit's commitment to tough measures and encourage him to stay the course. You can tell him that we are prepared to support an IMF Stand-By Arrangement, provided the budget submitted meets the criteria.

Trade and Investment. During Ecevit's September visit, we granted special flexibility that should let Turkey ship an added \$108 million in textiles in 1999 and 2000. A Trade and Investment Framework agreement (TIFA), signed during the visit, awaits Turkey's ratification.

Ecevit asked you to consider establishing a Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) in southeastern Turkey and tied to the U.S.- Israel Free Trade Agreement. The Israelis are lukewarm and a QIZ would require Congressional authorization; you should downplay its prospects. You can tell Ecevit that, assuming new copyright laws are implemented, we expect to reinstate GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) suspended due to deficiencies in Turkey's intellectual property rights (IPR) regime. You can also point to the imminent conclusion of several significant investment deals -- including a half dozen power projects worth nearly \$4 billion -- as evidence that our trade and investment relationship is maturing.

Democratization. Under Ecevit, parliament has passed numerous reforms that, if implemented, would significantly enhance Turkey's democracy. These include: removing military judges from the State Security Courts; a limited amnesty for terrorists who cooperate with the State; laws granting parole to some incarcerated journalists and activists; and increased sentences for torturers and those who interfere with torture investigations. Above all, Ecevit engineered amendments to Turkey's onerous Political Parties Law, making it more difficult for the courts to close political organizations that promote unorthodox views.

You should praise these steps -- and, by observing how important these issues are to us, make Ecevit understand that further progress is important to our bilateral relationship. You will want to solicit his views on the debate sparked by recent public statements from the Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeals strongly criticizing the weaknesses of Turkey's political system -- particularly the military-led crackdown on religious freedom.

Kurds/PKK. It appears -- for now -- that jailed PKK leader Ocalan's followers are obeying his orders and holding fire. About 700 of an estimated 5000 armed militants have left Turkey. Meanwhile, in a gesture to Turkey's Kurds, Ecevit and President Demirel made a joint visit to the region to promote economic investment. Subsequently, the National Security Council recommended lifting the quasi-military "State of Emergency" regime in one of six southeastern provinces.

An end to PKK violence would fundamentally alter the Kurdish issue in Turkey. You should reiterate our commitment to the fight against terrorism -- while underscoring our support for efforts at dialogue between the GOT and Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY POINTS FOR COURTESY CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT

Earthquake Reconstruction

- Pleased I'll announce comprehensive package: (i) winterized tents for 10,000 people; TDA conference; FEMA training program; Ex/Im special credit line; looking at Navy spare parts.

Economic Reform

- Applaud landmark reforms: arbitration, social security, banking reform. A sound 2000 budget is needed to support IMF stand-by agreement.

Trade and Investment

- Pleased we did textiles, TIFA. Plan to restore GSP provided you implement new IPR regime.
- QIZ difficult, requires Congressional approval.
- Number of important pending investment deals show our trade and investment relationship is maturing.

Human Rights/Democracy

- Applaud steps to enhance democracy -- removing military judges; freeing detainees; anti-torture penalties; repentance and amnesty bills; political parties law. Next steps?
- How do you read apparent PKK cease-fire, withdrawals? What steps could you take on political, educational, cultural rights?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0145-M (1.08)
3/6/2019 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR COURTESY CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT

Earthquake Reconstruction

- We are determined to continue to provide needed help. I'm pleased I will be able to announce that we are:
 - winterizing the 5,500 tents (housing 25,000 to 50,000 people) already deployed and airlifting another 500 DoD winterized tents to provide shelter for 10,000 people;
 - arranging through TDA a conference in Turkey bringing together U.S. and Turkish public and private sector experts on reconstruction projects.
- Working with you to build Turkish emergency response and disaster expertise through training and exchanges with FEMA and USAID.
- Establishing through Ex-Im a \$200 million line of credit for reconstruction projects. [tbd]
- Responding to your request for spare parts to assist in the reconstruction of the Golcuk naval base. [tbd.]
- Are there other steps we can take that would help?

(Watch Out For) FMF Debt Forgiveness

- Forgiveness of Turkey's FMF debt is not feasible.
- The cost would be prohibitively high (Congress operating under cost-caps). Would also negatively affect Turkey's international credit rating.

Economic Reform

- Commend you for the economic reforms your government has made in areas of international arbitration, Social Security reform, and banking.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.09)

3/4/2019 KBH

- These landmark reforms, and approval of your sound 2000 budget, would help us to support a strong stand-by agreement with the IMF. How do you see budget's prospects in parliament?

Trade and Investment

- Despite the problems our textile industry is facing, pleased we could give special flexibility on your textile quotas to help address earthquake-specific damage.
- We look forward to the first TIFA Council meeting. [date]
- Hope to restore GSP benefits provided you implement new IPR law.
- Impressive list projects on the verge of signature -- including power projects worth nearly \$4 billion. Evidence our trade and investment relationship starting to mature.

Human Rights/Democratization

- I welcome important human rights measures your government has promoted, including amending the political parties law, increasing penalties for torture, postponing sentences of some journalists; removing military judges from Security Courts.
- I encourage you to push for full implementation of these reforms. What other steps are you planning?
- What are your views on enhancing the role of NGOs in Turkish society?

Kurdish Issue/Southeast Development

- U.S.-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation against Ocalan and the PKK is one of our bilateral success stories. What is your assessment of PKK withdrawals and apparent cease-fire?
- Convinced there is no purely military solution to Kurdish issues. Civilian leadership in expanding basic rights for all is crucial. Do you see further steps on political, educational, and cultural reforms.

- Ambassador Parris told me he led a successful trade and investment mission to the southeast in mid-October.

Freedom of Expression/Religion

- I understand that Sami Selcuk, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeals, and other leading citizens recently have voiced their concerns about the need to expand freedom of expression -- including the freedom to express religiously derived ideas. What are your views?



SCENESETTER: THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

You will deliver a speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Parliament). More than half of the 550 members of the Parliament elected in April 1999 are serving their first term in office. Prior to delivering the speech, you will pay a brief courtesy call on the Speaker of Parliament.

The Parliament, as an institution, was the first organization founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. His aphorism, "Sovereignty Belongs to the People Unconditionally" is the TGNA's official motto. Under Ataturk's direction, the first parliament passed the sweeping legal, judicial, cultural, and governmental reforms that laid the foundations for the establishment of the Republic.

The current Parliament House was designed by Austrian architect Clemens Holzmeister, who also designed the Presidential Palace. Opened in 1961, it is Turkey's third parliament complex. The General Assembly Hall, where you will speak, was reopened in 1998 after a several-year renovation and has been supplied with state-of-the-art technology.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH YILDIRIM AKBULUT,
PRESIDENT OF THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Applaud progress Turkey has made in enhancing its democracy. Solicit Speaker Akbulut's views on further democratic reform -- particularly freedom of speech, expression, and assembly.
- Applaud landmark economic legislation passed by Parliament -- including social security bill and international arbitration law -- and ask about next steps.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Yildirim Akbulut, a member of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) of former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, assumed the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) after the April 1999 elections that brought ANAP into coalition with Prime Minister Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

A fixture on ANAP's conservative wing, Akbulut served as Prime Minister under his patron, the late President (and ANAP founder) Turgut Ozal in 1989-1991. Not an original thinker, Akbulut was regarded as a supporter of Ozal's ambitious vision of anchoring Turkey to the West and expanding democracy -- while allowing Islam a place in the public square. His return to prominence in ANAP reflects a bid by the "technocratic" Yilmaz to reach out to disaffected conservatives. Akbulut's wife, Samia, was a judge on the Supreme Court during the controversial case to close the Islamist Refah Party in 1997-98. (Although she reportedly sympathized with the Refah legal argument, the Islamists lost.)

Officially, Akbulut (addressed as "Mr. President") is second only to President Demirel on Turkey's protocol chart, and serves as acting President during Demirel's absences abroad. In fact, however, the TGNA Presidency is largely ceremonial.

AGENDA

You should discuss with Akbulut the state of democratization in Turkey. Since 1997, the military-led pressure campaign on "reactionary" (religious) and "separatist" (pro-Kurdish) elements has been a defining feature of Turkish domestic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0145-M (1.10)
3/6/2014 KBH

politics. Elected civilians, even some of those who largely agree with the military agenda, such as Prime Minister Ecevit, are now trying to get some breathing room to determine how fast and how far (if at all) to implement the various pro-secularist recommendations made by the military-dominated National Security Council (NSC).

Under Ecevit, parliament has passed laws removing military judges from the State Security Courts; issued a limited amnesty for terrorists who cooperate with the State; passed laws granting parole to some incarcerated journalists and activists; and increased sentences for torturers and those who interfere with torture investigations. Above all, Ecevit engineered amendments to Turkey's onerous Political Parties Law, making it more difficult for the courts to close political organizations that promote unorthodox views. If implemented, these reforms could have highly positive implications for democratization in Turkey. This will take some encouragement from us.

You also should praise the important economic reforms Parliament has passed in recent months -- including a landmark social security bill that raises the retirement age for women from 38 to 58 and for men from 43 to 60; and an international arbitration bill that creates a much more favorable climate for foreign investment.

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO MAKE WITH YILDIRIM AKBULUT,
PRESIDENT OF THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

- Very impressed with important work Parliament and Prime Minister have accomplished in recent months -- political parties law, anti-torture edicts, release of journalists and Akin Birdal, repentance, and amnesty laws, efforts at dialogue with HADEP mayors and NGOs. What further steps do you see Turkey taking to enhance its democracy?
- Also very impressed with landmark economic legislation you have passed, notably social security reform and international arbitration law. Where do you stand on budget -- key to IMF stand by agreement -- and other economic steps like privatization?

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.11)

3/6/2019 KBH

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. report	Biography (1 page)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]

2016-0145-M
kh1824

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

[REDACTED]

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**



**VISIT EARTHQUAKE
SURVIVORS**



SCENESETTER: U.S. TENT CAMP IN DOGUKISLA

Dogukisla tent camp was established by U.S. Marines after the devastating earthquake on August 17. The camp hosts an estimated 6,000 people in 435 U.S. military tents and 600 makeshift tents. Most tents have electricity, and heat is provided by gas heating units distributed by the Government of Turkey. As the temperature drops, the residents of this camp and other tent residents throughout the disaster zone are unhappy that the Turkish government has not yet provided the pre-fabricated housing that was promised. Many residents of Dogukisla, however, are grateful to reside in the U.S. military tents, which are widely recognized as superior in quality to many of the other tents distributed.

Food in the tent city is provided three times a day via an on-site kitchen. Sewage and water lines are also in place. The government and a Turkish NGO focused on women's rights also run a rehabilitation center to provide counseling, educational, and recreational services for children and the elderly. Three additional community social centers are located in prefabricated buildings on-site as is one police station.

Dogukisla is located in Kocaeli province, Izmit, a major textile-producing area of Turkey. About 60 miles southeast of Istanbul, Kocaeli is the area hardest hit by the earthquake. Of the over 15,000 people who perished during the quake, 9,190 were killed in Kocaeli province and an additional 9,816 were injured. Nearly 8,000 buildings either collapsed or were later razed as the result of earthquake damage. Given the substantial bulldozing that has taken place, you will see little actual damage during the visit.

U.S. tents and other relief supplies were distributed throughout Kocaeli province, including the Bekirpasa area near the Dogukisla site.

VISIT TO U.S. TENT CAMP IN IZMIT

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Express condolences for losses caused by the earthquake.
- Announce comprehensive assistance package.

CONTEXT

Background: The devastating earthquake that struck Turkey on August 17 took the lives of an estimated 17,000 people, injured approximately 24,000 and displaced anywhere from 400,000 to 600,000. The earthquake also caused a fire that roared for several days at one of Turkey's major oil refineries, causing substantial damage. Measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale, the quake was one of the most powerful recorded in this century, nearly rivaling the 7.9-magnitude that devastated San Francisco in 1906. Izmit, about 60 miles southeast of Istanbul, was most severely hit. The Government of Turkey and the military were strongly criticized in the local press for a slow, uncoordinated response, and for failing to better enforce building codes in the area. The United States, however, was much praised for its quick and robust response to the quake, as was Greece.

Current Situation: While the Turks have razed most of the earthquake-damaged buildings, tent cities throughout the disaster zone provide visible evidence of the scope of the disaster. Over 100,000 tents, concentrated in 121 tent cities, now provide housing for an estimated 450,000 people. While the government initially planned to move many of the displaced to prefabricated housing before the winter, it now anticipates that most will need to spend the winter in tents. Many of the tents currently in place are not capable of withstanding winter; others, including most of the U.S. tents, require liners that the government has purchased but has not yet installed. As temperatures drop, tent residents are becoming increasingly frustrated with their condition.

U.S. Assistance: The United States responded immediately to the quake, deploying two 70-person rescue teams to join international search and rescue efforts. Funded by USAID, the teams from Virginia and Florida recovered survivors from the rubble and donated equipment to the Izmit fire department and a volunteer rescue organization. The U.S. military also deployed the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group to support relief operations. Three naval ships and 2,100 marines and sailors distributed over 6,000 of 7,023 tents donated by DoD,

constructed 10 tent sites, and provided clean water and medical and dental care to earthquake victims. The United States also donated additional relief supplies, including blankets, hygiene kits, and medical supplies, as well as body bags, bringing our total assistance to about \$14.5 million. In early November, following reports of inadequate winter shelter, USAID deployed a logistical expert to Izmit to work with local authorities to determine whether further U.S. assistance is needed to help winterize existing tents, and to identify locations for our new tent contribution. In addition, we aggressively supported other assistance for Turkey from the IFI's, which has exceeded expectations.

New Announcements: You will announce a comprehensive earthquake package that includes winterized tents for the homeless; a cooperation agreement between FEMA and Turkish authorities; a TDA reconstruction conference to bring U.S. companies, the Turkish government, and the Turkish private sector together; and new lines of credit from the Ex-Im Bank and OPIC.

The first piece of the package -- the donation of 500 large U.S. military tents to house an estimated 10,000 people and priority community services (schools, clinics) -- is quick impact. Some of these tents arrived shortly before your visit, the balance will arrive soon after. FEMA, with USAID funding, will work with the Government of Turkey to streamline its disaster response and will sign a protocol with the government on cooperation in emergency management and disaster mitigation.

Shortly before his meeting with you in September, Prime Minister Ecevit withdrew his request for U.S. assistance in sponsoring a housing loan guarantee program. Instead, we are looking at ways to help Turkey's economy recover and increase foreign investment. The Trade and Development Agency will hold a reconstruction conference in Turkey after Thanksgiving. DoD is looking at providing spare parts to repair the Golcuk naval base, which was heavily damaged by the quake. Most significantly, Ex-Im and OPIC are looking at extending lines of credit and launching new projects to support reconstruction. As a result, Turkey would have access to substantial credit (about \$500 million) at low interest and U.S. companies would benefit from the business.

Given budget constraints, our reconstruction assistance, while significant, falls short of Turkish expectations that the U.S. would provide substantial outright grants.

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

ISTANBUL

SCENESETTER: BUSINESS LEADERS' LUNCHEON
IMPERIAL CHALET IN YILDIZ PARK

You will attend luncheon at the Imperial Chalet in Yildiz Park, hosted by the Turkish-U.S. Business Council of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) and the American-Turkish Council (ATC), which will include 150 senior Turkish and U.S. business representatives. President Demirel will also attend. Following a ten-minute ceremony, during which American firms and Turkish Government officials will sign and initial a number of contracts, lunch will be served. At the conclusion of the main course, you and President Demirel will each make 5 minutes of prepared remarks, after which Ambassador Parris will invite one business representative from each of the Turkish and American communities to make a one-minute presentation.

The Imperial Chalet is located on the grounds of Yildiz (Star) Park, whose gardens date at least to the reign of Murat IV (1623 - 40). The buildings of the Yildiz Palace complex were built over a century, starting in the reign of Mahmut II (1808-39), through the reign of Abdul Hamit II (1876-1909). Abdul Hamit lived almost exclusively on the grounds of this Palace, preferring its secluded setting to more exposed residences along the Bosphorus shore. Like most Sultans before him, he also practiced a trade, establishing workshops at Yildiz to manufacture high-grade furniture and porcelain for this and other imperial palaces.

The Chalet is composed of two buildings, constructed in 1889 and 1898. It is the most splendid of the surviving residences in Yildiz Palace, with 50 rooms, the largest being the Reception Hall. The Palace was used principally as a residence for visiting royalty, notably Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1895. During that visit, Germany concluded an alliance with Ottomans.

With the fall of the Empire, the palace buildings fell into disrepair, but in recent years the Turkish Touring and Automobile Association restored the Chalet.

TURKISH-U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL-AMERICAN TURKISH COUNCIL LUNCHEON

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Promote U.S.-Turkey economic relations.
- Urge continued privatization/structural economic reform.
- Encourage business groups to participate in the political and economic reform process/debate.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

You will address a luncheon hosted by the Turkish-U.S. Business Council of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) and the American-Turkish Council (ATC). Some 150 senior Turkish and U.S. business representatives will attend; President Demirel also will speak.

The Turkish-U.S. Business Council. The Turkish-U.S. Business Council was established in 1985 by the quasi-official DEIK. Representing Turkey's business elite (the largest member, Koc Holding, accounts for some 7 percent of Turkey's GDP) -- Council/DEIK members work with the government to improve economic relations between Turkey and the outside world, while attending to the narrower interests of member companies and institutions.

American-Turkish Council (ATC). The ATC, chaired by former Senator Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, is the leading business association in the United States devoted to the promotion of U.S.-Turkish commercial, defense, and cultural relations. The ATC maintains a diverse membership including U.S. and Turkish companies and individuals with an interest in U.S.-Turkish relations.

AGENDA

Economic reform. The earthquake last August was a serious but not fatal setback to Turkish economic prospects. We expect real GNP to decline by up to 2.5 percent in 1999 -- following a 3.8 percent increase in 1998. The Ecevit government has chalked up impressive legislative accomplishments that will help Turkey's long-term economic prospects and improve the general business climate. These include: a law allowing foreign investors access to international arbitration and reducing State authority to block investments (a key IMF demand); social

security reforms raising the retirement age for women from 38 to 58 and for men from 43 to 60; banking sector reforms; and a strict budget proposal for FY 2000 budget that projects a surplus (excluding interest payments) of 3.75 percent GDP; by comparison, the 1999 figure is 0-1 percent. You should praise these reforms and encourage further progress; for example, the need to pursue privatization and to reform copyright laws to protect intellectual property -- and, above all, the passage of a sound FY01 budget.

U.S.-Turkey Trade. The Commerce Department designated Turkey as one of our ten "Big Emerging Markets" in 1996. In 1998, bilateral trade reached \$6 billion while total U.S. investment in Turkey was valued at \$1.1 billion. The Turks imported U.S. goods worth \$4.1 billion and exported to the U.S. \$2.2 billion, up from \$2.6 billion and \$865 million, respectively, in 1992.

In response to the earthquake, we increased the flexibility of quotas on Turkish textiles to provide for an additional \$110 million in exports through 2000. During your trip, the EX/IM Bank and OPIC will announce significant enhancements to their programs for Turkey. OPIC will double its exposure to more than \$1 billion and EX/IM will delegate to 12 Turkish banks \$1 billion in lending authority. These new facilities will catalyze earthquake reconstruction projects and, more broadly, give a boost to the Turkish economy.

You will also want to note that there are numerous bilateral contracts and policy initiatives just completed or nearing completion, including:

- A \$30 million vessel tracking system (VTS) contract, awarded to Lockheed, that will help set safe limits for tanker traffic in the Bosphorus strait;
- An agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power (PUNPA), which includes training for reactor operations/maintenance;
- Five hydroelectric power projects worth \$5 billion;
- Beginning of discussions on a joint U.S.-Turkey irrigation project for southeastern Anatolia; and
- A \$90 million corn milling facility that will produce high fructose corn syrup.

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

**VISIT VIRGIN
MARY'S GROTTO**

SCENESETTER: THE HOUSE OF THE VIRGIN MARY

You will visit a chapel that stands on what is believed by many to be the site of the last home of the Virgin Mary. The house of the Virgin Mary is located in a national park on the top of Mount Bulbul, above the ancient city of Ephesus.

You will walk up a gentle incline to the site. On the right as you approach the house are panels on which the story of the house of the Virgin Mary is written in different languages. A small chapel stands on the site today. The site belongs to the Turkish Government, but a small staff of Roman Catholic clergymen tends the chapel and conducts services there. Water from the fountain below the chapel is believed to have medicinal properties. The site is sacred to Christians as well as Muslims, who revere Mary as the mother of a prophet.

St. John is said to have brought the Virgin Mary circa A.D. 37-45 to Ephesus, where she lived the rest of her life. Outsiders discovered the house after a German nun, Katherina Emmerich (1771-1824), described the site in a vision. Lazarist clergy from Izmir followed Emmerich's detailed descriptions, and in 1891 discovered the foundation of a small Byzantine church dating from the 6th or 7th centuries. The church is believed to have been built on the site long venerated by local Christians as the location of the Virgin Mary's house.

The Turkish Government in 1951 completed the restoration of the chapel. In 1967, Pope Paul VI visited the site and confirmed the authenticity of the legend. Each August 15, a service presided over by Orthodox and Muslim clergy honors Mary's assumption into heaven.



SCENESETTER: EPHEBUS

You will tour the ancient city of Ephesus November 17. Once the third city of the Roman Empire, it is among the best preserved/reconstructed classical cities in the eastern Mediterranean. Austrian archeologists have done most of the excavation. Dr. Toni Cross, an archeologist and Director of the American Research Institute in Turkey, and Cengiz Içten, an archeologist with the Ephesus Museum, will escort you through the site, as they did for the First Lady in 1996.

Ionian Greeks colonized Ephesus in the 10th century B.C., although the original settlement was east of the current excavation. Ephesus enjoyed a well-protected harbor and by the 6th century B.C. had developed into a major trading port. It was also a center for the worship of Artemis (Diana to the Romans), the virgin goddess of the hunt and the moon. When King Croesus of Lydia attacked Ephesus in the 560 B.C., the inhabitants of the wall-less city stretched a rope the 1.2 km distance from the temple of Artemis to the city, expecting the goddess to protect them. It did not work. Croesus conquered the city, only to be displaced by the Persians fifteen years later. After a tumultuous period of war and revolt, the city was taken without a fight in 334 B.C. by Alexander the Great. Silting of the harbor required the city to move to its present location. Ephesus came under Roman control after 133 B.C. and was made capital of the province of Asia in 27 B.C. Ephesus continued to prosper, becoming one of the largest cities in the Empire. Buildings from this period are visible at the site today.

St. John is said to have brought the Virgin Mary to Ephesus circa A.D. 37-45, where she lived out the rest of her life. Circa A.D. 53, St. Paul came and preached in the city for three years. According to the Bible, Paul was so successful that silversmiths, seeing their lucrative trade in images of Diana suffering, spread rumors that someone was being disrespectful to Diana, and gathered a huge crowd in the Great Theater. St. Paul was dissuaded from entering the arena, and left Ephesus shortly thereafter. St. John later left the city to spread the Gospel, returning after his release from prison in Rome.

A Gothic attack in A.D. 262 marked the waning of the city's wealth. Continued silting of the harbor diminished trade and brought disease. In the 4th century AD, a basilica was built at the near-by site of St. John's grave. Eventually, the city was abandoned in favor of near-by Selçuk.

**VISIT ST. JOHN'S
BASILICA**



SCENESETTER: ST. JOHN'S BASILICA

You will visit the ruins of St. John's Basilica in the town of Selçuk on November 17. Located on the southern slope of Ayasoluk Hill, the site contains the grave of St. John, the apostle. Dr. Toni Cross, an archeologist and Director of the American Research Institute in Turkey, and Cengiz İçten, an archeologist with the Ephesus Museum, will escort you through the site.

The first church on this site was built in the 4th century. Later, Emperor Justinian (527-565) had a large basilica erected here. This structure rivaled the Aya Sofya in Istanbul. At the site today are the ruins and some reconstruction of this structure.

On the peak of the hill overlooking the church is the citadel. First constructed in the 6th century, it was rebuilt by the Selcuks and restored again in recent years. Visible to the west are the Isa Bey Mosque and to the southwest the site of the fabled Temple of Artemis. The Isa Bey Mosque was built in 1375 by the Emir of Aydin in a transitional, post-Selcuk, pre-Ottoman style. A solitary pillar standing in a field marks the location of the 4th century B.C. Temple of Artemis, the largest temple ever constructed of marble and considered one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. The temple was built on the site of a smaller but still grand temple to Artemis which was destroyed in 356 B.C. by a mad arsonist, Herostratos, who reportedly claimed he did it to be remembered in history. He succeeded.

**CALL ON ECUMENICAL
PATRIARCH**



SCENESETTER: ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE

You will pay a courtesy call on the Ecumenical Patriarch, His All Holiness Bartholomew I, at the Ecumenical Patriarchate located in the Phanar (Fener) district.

The Patriarchal Church of Saint George in Phanar is the fifth church in Istanbul that has housed the Ecumenical Patriarchate since 1453. The church served as a convent until Patriarch Matthew II converted it into the seat of the Patriarchate. Patriarch Timothy II refurbished the church in 1614. Destroyed by fire in 1720, it was rebuilt by Patriarch Jeremiah III. During the same year, the church was renovated and a dome was constructed. Later the dome was destroyed, and Patriarch Gregorios VI repaired the church in 1836. The Patriarchal church, in its present form, is a basilica with three aisles.

Among the most precious and valuable artifacts of the Patriarchal Church of Saint George is the Patriarchal Throne, which, according to the inscriptions under the eaves on its gables, was given as a gift in 1577 to the Patriarchal Church of the Panagia Pammakaristos by Patriarch Jeremiah II. The throne, standing four meters high, is made of walnut. It is inlaid with ivory, pearl and colored wood in a vine-like pattern. Another revered artifact is the Holy Column of the Flagellation of the Lord. It is reputedly a portion of the column where Jesus Christ was tied and whipped by Roman soldiers during His Passion, before being crucified. The church also hosts the icons of Panagia Pammakaristos (Virgin Mary the Most Blessed), John the Baptist, Panagia Faneromeni (The Appearance of Virgin Mary); and the holy relics of the Great Martyr Saint Euphemia, Saint Theofano and Saint Solomone.

The administrative center of the Patriarchate is housed in a group of four buildings. These were destroyed in 1941 when a faulty electrical circuit caused a fire; reconstruction was accomplished 46 years later, in 1987. They consist of a four story main building, an adjoining building, as well as two others called Papadika.

The main building houses the various offices of the Patriarchate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH
HIS ALL HOLINESS ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMEW

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Support freedom of religion as a key tenet of enhancing democracy in Turkey.
- Support reopening of Halki seminary.
- Solicit Patriarch's views on the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul and Patriarchate-GOT relations.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

To the Government of Turkey (GOT), Bartholomew is officially only the leader of a small (3-4,000 strong) Greek Orthodox religious community in Istanbul. To Orthodox Christians everywhere, he is the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and the leader of their community worldwide. The friction and interplay between these essentially contradictory views have shaped and determined the fate of the Patriarchate since the birth of the secular Turkish Republic in 1923. Although the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul has declined precipitously in recent decades, the fact of the Patriarch's leading role in world Orthodoxy -- and the Turkish Government unwillingness to recognize this -- continues to raise Turkish, Greek, and Greek Orthodox hackles and consigns Bartholomew to a delicate and vulnerable position.

Your call on the Patriarch will send an important message to Turkey about freedom of religion and to Greeks, Greek Americans, and Greek Orthodox around the world about your respect for their spiritual leader.

AGENDA

Halki Seminary. Greece has long been asking us for help in persuading Turkey to re-open the Greek Orthodox Halki religious seminary near Istanbul, which has been closed since 1971. We support this and have been encouraging the Turks to find a way around their ban on private religious educational institutions, their grounds for keeping Halki closed. Turkish concerns about Halki stem in part from the memories of Greek Orthodox "separatism" and support for mainland Greece after World War I.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0145-m (1.13)
3/6/2019 KBN

More importantly, the Turkish Government almost certainly worries that reopening Halki would pave the way for legitimizing independent Islamic organizations and private religious instruction -- which the secular Kemalist establishment in Turkey sees as the principal threat to the survival of the Republic.

Bartholomew envisions Halki as the key to a renaissance of Orthodox theology -- and crucial to the perpetuation of the Patriarchate in Istanbul. He worries, however, that GOT trial balloons suggesting Halki be reopened as an adjunct to a Turkish University -- thereby skirting legal prohibitions on private religious institutions -- will continue to leave him vulnerable to the vicissitudes of GOT politics.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
HIS ALL HOLINESS ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMEW

- Tell me about your community here in Turkey -- how is it faring?
- How are your relations with the Government of Turkey?
- We continue to urge Turkey to find a way to re-open the Halki Seminary as a sign of their good will and commitment to the freedoms of expression and religion that are the essence of democracy.
- Progress on Halki likely would help Turkey in its bid to integrate with Europe.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.14)

3/6/2019 KBH

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [1]

2016-0145-M
kh1824

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



OSCE



**MEMORANDUM
FROM STATE**

[REDACTED]

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1999

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: 11/08/09

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**2016-0145-M (1.16)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright *LUXA*

SUBJECT: OSCE Istanbul Summit, November 18-19, 1999

The OSCE Summit is the culmination of our efforts to implement a new Euro-Atlantic partnership, building on the vision you set forth in your 1998 Berlin speech. We set one key pillar of that partnership at NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit. The second pillar was the U.S.-EU Summit in Cologne and the Southeast Europe Summit in Sarajevo, which together established a forward-looking framework for U.S.-EU cooperation and the integration of Southeast Europe into the transatlantic mainstream. In Istanbul, we want to round out the picture by laying out our vision for the OSCE's role.

The conflict in Chechnya casts a shadow over Istanbul and the two documents we want from the Summit: the Charter and the adapted CFE Treaty. We will have some hard decisions to make, particularly if matters get worse in Chechnya in the days ahead, but I want to outline the bigger picture of what we are trying to achieve in Istanbul.

The Charter is the "strategic concept" for the almost 25-year-old OSCE. Born in the Cold War, the OSCE is unique as a consensus-based organization which sets norms about how governments should treat their people and, since 1989, helps build democracies. Previously a talk shop, the OSCE's missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have made it "action central": with the right tools and support, the OSCE's civilians give us options between doing nothing or putting our men and women in uniform in harm's way. NATO is our institution of choice when we have to act militarily with European allies; we turn to the U.S.-EU link to coordinate our common political and economic interests; and we want the OSCE to focus on democracy promotion and civilian crisis management.

Bosnia and Kosovo are examples of the new kinds of threats we face in European security. During the Cold War we focussed on building cooperation and defusing tensions between states or opposing Alliances. In the post-Cold war

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Reasons: E.O. 12958 1.5 (b) and (d)

era we face new types of conflicts as we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo -- those emerging from within societies as opposed to between states. The key message we want to emphasize from this Charter is that the OSCE has to deal with these kinds of conflicts.

Our second goal is to back these words with capability. Our troops can deploy quickly when they need to, but the international community does not have a parallel civilian rapid reaction capability. It needs one. That is why we designed and proposed the Rapid Expert and Advisory Cooperation Teams: REACT. Under this program, participating States will provide the OSCE the names of experts in rule of law, human rights, policing, and elections, etc. These experts could deploy on short notice. Some problems need the help of a competent outsider to prevent tension from escalating into conflict. That is REACT's purpose.

The third goal is signing the adapted CFE Treaty, which balances three sets of concerns. For the Russians, the Treaty structure makes clear they will not face an unpredictable eastward shift of NATO military potential through enlargement. The smaller NIS get internationally binding legal limits on Russian force levels in their region, providing new leverage over the number and status of Russian forces stationed outside Russian territory. NATO advances its goals -- facilitation of enlargement and our Open Door policy, and enhanced Treaty verification -- and the Treaty helps the NIS affirm their sovereignty.

We have made clear to the Russians and others what is required if we are to sign the adapted CFE treaty and are close to final terms on those provisions. But the Russians still have to complete negotiations with Moldova and Georgia for withdrawing their remaining troops and equipment. We are helping mediate the Georgian discussions and there are some hopeful signs in both sets of talks, but it's possible there may not be enough progress to clinch the deals. If not, and the Georgians or Moldovans feel their security concerns have not been met, we may have to consider delaying the treaty's submission for ratification or even reconsider signing it at Istanbul.

We also want to use Istanbul to endorse the concrete progress that has been made in the past three months under the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. We have achieved a respectable package, including anticorruption, investment, protection of free media, lowering regional trade barriers, destroying arms stockpiles, and regional infrastructure.

Endorsement of these short-term achievements will generate new political momentum for more ambitious longer-term projects within the region.

Finally, the Russians have been telling us since June that Istanbul would be the occasion to "turn the page" with us and NATO after the Kosovo air campaign. We agreed and have worked to make this Summit a success on that basis.

As a result of Chechnya, obtaining our objectives at the Istanbul Summit has gotten a lot harder. As much as we want to get the West's relationship with Russia back on track, it needs to be on the right basis. Russia must observe the same OSCE norms of behavior as other OSCE members. It cannot indiscriminately attack civilians and expect us to conduct business as usual. Moreover, several leaders of smaller countries are charging the OSCE and us with hypocrisy for treating them differently from big ones, like Russia. They have a point.

Clearly we want to go beyond merely turning the page with the Russians on Kosovo and instead use this summit to encourage Moscow to live up to OSCE norms. The Russians have taken a first step by inviting an OSCE mission. If Russian performance does not improve before the summit, we will have to consider additional steps at Istanbul.

The combination of principles and tools we want to adopt in Istanbul is designed to establish a strong role for the OSCE as the third pillar of our new Euro-Atlantic security relationship and as more than a talk shop in the next century. While there will be short-term costs to our relationship with Russia, holding firm to our principles will establish a firmer basis for that relationship to grow.

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Executive Secretary

Original OA/ID Number:

2591

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	2	11	3	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	OSCE Summit (4 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
002. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/05/1999	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac (4 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
004. talking points	Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
005. paper	Points to be Made for Meeting with French Jacques Chirac (5 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
006. report	Biography (2 pages) Partial Release - KBH 9/7/2017	11/04/1999	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
008. talking points	Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin (2 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
009. talking points	Points to be Made for Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
010. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/04/1999	P1/b(1)
011. talking points	Meeting with Turkish NGOs (2 pages)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
012. talking points	Points to be Made in Meeting with Turkish NGOs (1 page)	11/00/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

2016-0145-M

kh1825

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~013. paper~~	~~CFE Adaptation Agreement and Final Act (2 pages)~~	~~11/00/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 8/29/2019
014. report	Biography (2 pages)	08/05/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

2016-0145-M
kh1825

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SCENESETTER: OSCE CULTURAL EVENT AT
THE LUTFI KIRDAR INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AND
EXHIBITION CENTER

On Wednesday, November 17 at 7:30 p.m., you are invited to attend a dance/musical performance by the Istanbul State Opera and Ballet at the Lutfi Kirdar International Convention and Exhibition Center. The performance will be followed by a reception hosted by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, at the main foyer of the Center for invited guests.

The International Convention and Exhibition Center (ICEC) was named for Dr. Lutfi Kirdar (1898-1961), the longest serving (1938-1949) governor and mayor of Istanbul since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. He is remembered for his modernization of the city and his many projects for improving public services.

The ICEC, Turkey's largest convention center, first opened its doors in June 1996 for the United Nations Habitat II Conference and was officially inaugurated on September 5, 1996. The Center is located in the Harbiye district of Istanbul, approximately 2 miles from OSCE Summit site.

The Lutfi Kirdar center was selected as international media center for the OSCE Summit and will also be the venue for the November 19 adapted CFE Treaty signing ceremony. The closing OSCE Summit press conference will also be held at the Lutfi Kirdar center.

SCENESETTER: OSCE EVENTS AT CIRAGAN PALACE

OSCE Events

Opening Ceremony. The opening ceremony of the OSCE summit will take place on Thursday, November 18, at 9:00 a.m. Opening remarks will be made by four speakers: President Demirel; Mr. Vollebaek, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE (Norway); Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan; and Ms. Helle Degn, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (Denmark). These remarks will be followed by the statements by the Heads of the participating states, OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, and the OSCE Partners for Cooperation.

Plenary Session. The first plenary session will follow the opening ceremony from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. The second plenary session will be held on the afternoon of November 18, from 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. The last plenary session will be held on Friday, November 19, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.

Heads of the 54 participating states will speak in order determined by lot. You are the sixth scheduled speaker, following Uzbekistan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Germany, and Sweden. Romania immediately follows you. Interventions are scheduled for five minutes or less per Head. Statements will also be made by the Heads of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation and the OSCE Partners for Cooperation.

Family Photo. On Thursday, from 12:30 to 1:00 p.m., after the morning plenary session, you will be part of a "family photo" to be taken of the Heads of the 54 participating states.

The family photo will be taken outside of the Ciragan Palace on the marble promenade that abuts the palace and runs the length of the Bosphorus frontage. The photo will be framed against views of the Ortakoy mosque further up the Bosphorus, the Ataturk bridge linking Europe and Asia, the palace, and the Bosphorus itself.

Luncheon. Following the family photo, from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., you will attend a lunch hosted by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of Turkey for all Heads at the Bellini Restaurant located in the Ciragan Palace. The Bellini restaurant is one of many located in the palace section of the Ciragan and commands views of the Bosphorus.

Charter Signing. On Thursday, at a time and manner to be determined, probably at the end of the afternoon plenary session and before your official dinner, you and all Heads of the 53

other participating states will participate in the signing of the OSCE Charter on European Security. This Charter will reflect agreement of OSCE participating states on what responsibilities they have and what steps the organization and its various bodies may be empowered to take.

The Ciragan Palace

The OSCE summit will be held in the Ciragan (pronounced: chi-ra-AUN) palace and hotel, the former residence of Ottoman Sultans located directly on the European shore of the Bosphorus -- the Strait dividing Europe and Asia and linking the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara. An Armenian architect, Nikogos Balyan, whose grand nineteenth century creations line the Bosphorus, built the Ciragan palace in 1874. At Sultan Abdul Mecit I's request, Balyan added to his design Arabic architectural touches from sketches of Moorish buildings such as the Alhambra at Granada in Spain. The Ciragan's history as an imperial residence is a sad, short one. Sultan Abdul Aziz died there in 1876, supposedly committing suicide, although his friends believe he had been murdered. His successor, Murat V, was imprisoned in the palace for a year after a brief reign of only three months. The Ciragan briefly became the home of the Parliament in 1909 until a fire in 1910 destroyed much of the structure. It remained a burnt out shell, before being restored by Japanese money and Arab management in 1990 as the Ciragan Palace Hotel Kempinski. It is considered one of the finest hotels in the country.

With its reputation as Istanbul's most prestigious hotel, the Ciragan has hosted many U.S. officials: President and Mrs. Bush in 1991, Secretary Warren Christopher in 1993, Secretary James Baker in 1994, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1996, and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton in 1996. The Ciragan was also the site of John F. Kennedy, Jr.'s honeymoon.

The Plenary Hall

The Ballroom of the Ciragan palace will serve as the summit plenary hall. This big airy hall with large windows overlooking the Bosphorus is situated on the second floor of the palace. You will be seated at a large oval table near OSCE leadership.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSCE SUMMIT

CONTEXT OF MEETINGS

This is the OSCE's first summit since 1996, and the first time you will have participated since you went to Budapest in 1994. The summit features three main deliverables: (i) a **Charter on European Security**, an agreement among participating states on basic principles of democracy, human rights, and security among and within societies; (ii) an **adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty**, which updates the 1990 Treaty to take account of the changed security environment in post-Cold War Europe; and (iii) **REACT** (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams), a new OSCE mechanism to identify, train, and rapidly deploy civilians (such as administrators, election experts, and possibly police) to assist states in preventing, contending with, or recovering from conflict.

Originally conceived as an opportunity to "turn the page" with Russia after NATO enlargement and Kosovo, the summit now takes place against the backdrop of Chechnya, where Russian actions risk making common pronouncements on human rights or new arms control arrangements appear hollow. The Russians view the OSCE as a high priority; we have sought to use this leverage to persuade them to seek a peaceful end to the conflict, cease indiscriminate bombing, and allow humanitarian aid to flow in and refugees to leave. On CFE -- also a Russian priority (though in endgame deal-making they are claiming otherwise) -- we have pressed a three-part strategy to get what we need to sign in light of Chechnya: a firm Russian commitment to come into compliance with the adapted Treaty once the Chechen crisis is resolved; transparency in military activities in the Caucasus; and agreements on troop withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova. Prime Minister Putin made Russia's commitment to compliance and continued transparency when you were in Oslo; the Russians have been more difficult on Georgia in particular, as well as Moldova.

Negotiations on both the Charter and CFE may go down to the wire. We need to be conscious of a possible "split-screen" image of you and other leaders signing diplomatic and arms control agreements on one side and the Russians in violation of both on the other. At the same time, both documents are worth having because they set standards against which the Russians (and others) can be measured. This was the value of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, where the Soviet commitments on human rights -- initially seen as cynical and insincere -- were used for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 8, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.17)
3/6/2019 KSH

years by civil society groups throughout Eastern Europe protesting against Soviet domination. Similarly, if we do not lock in an adapted CFE treaty, the existing treaty can continue to function, but over time it will become so anachronistic that it will wither away. In the near term, having put the adapted treaty on hold, we would lose leverage to press for Russian equipment reductions in the Caucasus.

Beyond locking in important commitments on security and arms control, your participation in this summit is an opportunity to highlight key human and economic dimensions of the OSCE's mandate, like advancing religious freedom, and combating corruption, torture, and trafficking in women and children (the First Lady will participate in a special OSCE session on this on the margins of the summit). You will deliver a new means of making the OSCE effective with REACT. You also will help strengthen and bring attention to other OSCE institutions like the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities Office, and the Representative on Media Freedom, all of which have vastly increased the OSCE's contribution to European democracy and human rights during the 1990s. Finally, your participation will highlight the role OSCE missions have quietly played in countries like Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Russia (Chechnya), Tajikistan, and Ukraine since the first mission was dispatched in 1992.

The summit will be attended by nearly all the leaders of the OSCE's 54 participating states, including possibly Boris Yeltsin. Tony Blair, who has said he needs to be in London for the opening of parliament on November 17, will be a notable exception. The Belarussian leader, Aleksandr Lukashenko, will be the most awkward guest.

ISSUES

Charter. This will be the first major articulation of OSCE principles of security, democracy and human rights since the landmark Charter of Paris, signed as the Cold War was ending in 1990. Drawing on the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo, it stresses the importance of strengthening the OSCE's capacity to prevent and manage crises within states as well as between them. The Charter will not only emphasize this principle with words but also through our REACT concept, which strengthens the OSCE's practical ability to deal with such crises. We also succeeded in including in the Charter the need to take effective measures against torture, strengthen freedom of religion, and ensure it

is extended to minority faiths, repeal criminal defamation statutes, ensure equal rights for all citizens and make a stronger commitment to public integrity.

Echoing the debates we had during the negotiations of NATO's Strategic Concept, one of the most difficult issues in negotiating the charter was the language on use of force, with the Russians and the French pushing for language that would subordinate our ability to act to the UN Security Council. We also had differences with the Russians -- and many European states -- over what to say about a role for the OSCE in peacekeeping; Russia and some Europeans wanted to develop the OSCE's capacity to do its own peacekeeping missions (as opposed to relying on NATO or the UN). We ultimately agreed that the OSCE should keep open the possibility of OSCE-led missions, but did not commit to anything concrete.

Adapted CFE Treaty. The adapted treaty, to be signed by the leaders of the 30 CFE Parties (out of 54 OSCE participating states), updates the original 1990 Treaty, which places limits on five categories of conventional weapons (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters). The adapted treaty replaces CFE's outdated bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings and provides for an enhanced verification regime. It will ensure that the treaty's contributions to stability and predictability will be preserved, and in some cases, improved.

You also will take note of or adopt an accompanying document (the CFE Final Act) which will contain political commitments concerning the way individual state will exercise their rights and obligations. If agreements can be reached between Russia and Moldova and Georgia, they will be reference in the Final Act.

The amended treaty balances three overall sets of concerns. The Russians sought to use CFE adaptation to limit the impact of NATO enlargement by banning NATO stationed forces on the territories of new members. While they failed to achieve this goal, the new Treaty structure makes clear that Russia will not face a substantial eastward shift of NATO military potential as a consequence of enlargement. The smaller Newly Independent States (NIS) have used CFE to set internationally binding legal limits on Russian force levels in their region and to gain new leverage over the number and status of Russian forces stationed outside Russian territory. NATO has used adaptation both to advance its own goals -- like allowance for operational

flexibility in a crisis and enhanced transparency -- and to help the NIS affirm their sovereignty.

Earlier this year, the CFE parties resolved many of the key outstanding CFE issues. Most important for NATO operations was agreement to permit temporary deployment levels above ceilings for crisis operations and that there would be no geographic constraints on aircraft and helicopters. That Decision also settled the provisions of a new flank regime. Left unresolved were the enhanced verification and information exchange provisions we need to monitor the new, much more detailed limits of the adapted treaty.

REACT. REACT is a U.S. initiative to create an OSCE mechanism to identify, train, and rapidly deploy civil society teams expert in the law, journalism, elections, government administration, and NGOs. Their mission would be to assist states in preventing, contending with or recovering from conflicts. We see this as the most concrete deliverable of the summit, conceptually the first prong in a conflict-prevention and response spectrum running from civilian intervention through policing and peacekeeping to the use of military force (or, put another way, from the unarmed to the side-armed to the heavily armed). On policing, we have had to limit REACT to training and monitoring (many participating states' oppose "militarizing" the concept) but we have left the door open for an eventual "executive policing" role (i.e., whereby OSCE police could carry weapons and have the authority to arrest). [TBC]

To keep the costs of the program down, few permanent staff will be hired to run REACT, which will be based in a small office in the OSCE Secretariat, with participating states managing their own potential contributions. We foresee overall annual operating costs somewhere around \$750,000, with the U.S. share of 9 percent equating to less than \$70,000. We are not prepared to link REACT to peacekeeping as the Russians and French would have liked, but we agreed in the Charter that REACT could evolve, leaving the door open in theory.

We want REACT made operational promptly after the summit and seek adoption of a U.S. proposed implementation plan. We also want states to develop domestic programs for REACT implementation, including provisions for recruitment and training.

**INTERVENTION
TO BE PROVIDED**

**BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
TO BE PROVIDED**

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/05/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

2016-0145-M
kh1825

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0145-M (1.19)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEETING WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Reinforce need to maintain a common strategy for working with Russia on Chechnya.
- Solicit Chirac's support for the parties' effort to settle Nagorno-Karabakh, and his help in mobilizing resources to implement an agreement.
- [Placeholder (to be updated by @NESA) Exchange views on Middle East Peace Process, including Syrian track].
- Underscore importance of a new comprehensive resolution on Iraq while reiterating red lines.
- Reiterate support for ESDI; urge compatible political statements by NATO and EU on ESDI in December.
- Reiterate U.S. commitment to strategic stability, ABM Treaty, and development of limited NMD.
- Emphasize support for UN Mission in Kosovo chief Bernard Kouchner and urge French support for Stability Pact for Kosovo.
- Encourage France to work with U.S. towards successful Seattle WTO Ministerial, including by keeping unripe issues off the agenda and developing a package of "deliverables."

CONTEXT OF MEETING

U.S.-French relations remain strong although France's dogged pursuit of its interests and push for a prominent EU role often lead to important policy differences. You recently responded to a letter from Chirac criticizing U.S. plans to pursue National Missile Defense. He considers NMD and the Senate vote on CTBT as further proof of U.S. "unilateralism," and wants us to take French views into account, including on Russia/Chechnya, Middle East peace process, and Nagorno-Karabakh. He continues to enjoy high approval ratings at home, an economy boasting the highest GDP growth in the Euro zone, and the prospect of an even brighter international spotlight when France assumes the EU Presidency (July 1, 2000). But Chirac's RPR party is in shambles and his

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 11, 2009

popular rival for the 2002 presidency, Prime Minister Jospin, gets most of the credit for the economy. Chirac knows that his best strategy is to place himself above politics and to distinguish himself in the international arena.

AGENDA

Russia/Chechnya

France's response to Russia's military action in **Chechnya** tracks closely with our own. You should stress the importance of highlighting common themes about Chechnya at the summit. There is little daylight between us on the main issues (e.g., support for Russia's territorial integrity, desire for peaceful resolution).

Nagorno-Karabakh

By the time you meet Chirac, our negotiators will have shared with the French an informal document summarizing the USG's understanding of the N-K deal the Armenians and Azerbaijanis are working toward. The negotiations are at a sensitive stage, with the Azerbaijanis wanting to press forward quickly while the Armenians are cautiously trying to build domestic and international support before moving ahead. Support from France will be critical in encouraging the parties to move ahead, notably by providing the political cover the parties need to reach an agreement, and mobilizing EU funds and observers needed to implement the deal.

[MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS - Placeholder to be updated by NESAs:

Chirac met with Barak and Arafat in Paris on November 8. He urged Barak to help revive the Syrian track as soon as possible, in light of Assad's deteriorating health. Chirac reiterated an offer to Arafat to intercede with the international community on the issues of Palestinian refugees.]

ESDI

The French continue to take the lead in promoting development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Other EU members oppose to varying degrees France's maximalist approach, which stresses European "autonomy" and keeps non-EU allies on the sidelines. Chirac's speech last month in Strasbourg made reassuring references to the transatlantic link and NATO; you should urge Chirac to ensure French representatives at the EU and NATO follow up his words with deeds. In particular, we would like the EU Summit in Helsinki on December 10-11 to make a statement on ESDI that addresses our concerns.

Southeast Europe

The United States and France agree on broad parameters of Kosovo policy but differ on some tactics. The French are concerned that the U.S. position on **Kosovo** may be shifting in favor of independence; you should reassure Chirac this is not so and praise the good efforts of French KFOR troops and of UN Mission in Kosovo chief Bernard Kouchner. The French are concerned by Kouchner's difficulties working with the United Nations New York bureaucracy and fear he may be too friendly with Kosovar Albanian leaders. You should discourage any rush to ease sanctions on Belgrade.

We also want the EU to develop and announce a package of programs in support of the **Stability Pact**. Perhaps fearing that EU prerogatives would be compromised, the French have not been helpful in ensuring the Pact produces concrete results quickly. They have also not been supportive of continued NATO efforts to forge greater regional cooperation, now that the immediate crisis in Kosovo has subsided.

National Missile Defense

France opposes U.S. plans to negotiate revisions to the ABM Treaty in order to allow deployment of a limited **NMD** system. Chirac sent you a letter rejecting our rationale for a limited NMD, and opposing changes in the ABM Treaty. You replied on November 9, underscoring your commitment to the Treaty, deterrence and strategic stability, along with the need to change the Treaty to permit deployment of a limited NMD system in the face of new threats.

Iraq

We have made some progress in narrowing the gaps with the French on the draft omnibus UNSC resolution on **Iraq**, and Paris will be key to bringing the Russians and Chinese along. Still, very important differences remain. In particular, the French want the sanctions on Iraq suspended as soon as Iraq begins to cooperate with a new UN disarmament program, whereas we have made clear that we will not accept suspension of sanctions until Iraq has complied fully with its disarmament obligations. The French Government is also threatening to introduce a new resolution that would allow Iraq to purchase an additional \$300 million in oil spares, which we oppose. Iraq has no urgent need for more spare parts, and this resolution would undermine the UK-Dutch draft, which should be the vehicle to address this issue.

Trade

The French Government is advocating a broad WTO **trade round** encompassing all major elements but with rules that protect French culture. The French Government argues that a broad round (that includes the "unripe" issues such as competition and investment) will give developing countries a stake in negotiations, but France's real aim may be to delay new trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture (at least until after the 2002 elections). Despite the EU political leadership's commitment to the new Round, lower levels in the Commission are not showing the needed flexibility in Geneva in drafting the Seattle Ministerial Declaration which will set out the new Round's agenda. The EU has been particularly reluctant to move on the agricultural portion of the agenda and support our Seattle deliverables.

On biotechnology, there is widespread public concern about bio-engineered foods, and Chirac's public statements have added fuel to the fire. Our goal is to depoliticize the debate. You made this point with Chirac at the G-8, and, in that spirit, the OECD is preparing a biotech report, and USDA is working bilaterally with French officials. Also, you agreed with Prodi to establish a high-level dialogue on biotechnology among senior government officials, which we hope France will support.

On labor, France has joined the EU consensus to call for a "standing forum" on labor issues involving the WTO, International Labor Organization, and possibly the international financial institutions. This is not as forward leaning as our proposal for a WTO working group, which we are still pursuing. You agreed with Prodi in late October on the need for a dialogue on trade and labor, but did not resolve the issue of modalities (standing forum versus WTO working group).

On the environment, the EU, while sharing our common commitment to sustainable development objectives, has not embraced some of our specific proposals. For example, on transparency reforms, we believe the WTO should open its dispute panel meetings to the public and also allow the public to submit amicus briefs. We also believe that the WTO should promote "win/win" environmental objectives such as reduction in environmentally damaging subsidies that promote overharvesting by fishing fleets.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

Chechnya

- Need to maintain common front with Russians, urge political solution, stress civilian casualties will isolate Russia.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- Strongly support courageous efforts of Kocharian and Aliyev to resolve conflict. Hope you will encourage parties to reach a settlement and urge Boris to be supportive.

[MEPP - to be provided by @NESA]

Iraq

- UK/Dutch draft UNSC resolution is the right course. Our bottom line same: can't agree to trigger for sanctions suspension short of full Iraqi compliance with disarmament roadmap. This is as far as we can go.

ESDI

- Support ESDI backed by real capabilities, enhances ability to manage crises, strengthens transatlantic link; involves all Allies.
- Aim for compatible statements by NATO, EU in December.

National Missile Defense

- As my response to your letter stressed, committed to preserving strategic stability, deterrence, and ABM Treaty.
- U.S. pursuit of limited NMD not incompatible with treaty's central purpose; changes we are discussing will strengthen Treaty, relieve pressure to withdraw.
- No deployment decision until next summer at earliest. Want to keep in close contact with you and Blair. Meantime, keep NMD and ABM off front pages and out of UNGA.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.20)
3/6/2019 KBH

Kosovo/Bosnia

- French forces doing important work in tough areas of Kosovo. Need to avoid ethnic cantons that partition Kosovo.
- Kouchner and UNMIK doing excellent job and deserve full support and critical funding necessary to succeed.
- Critical to stay the course on sanctions and continue support for Serb opposition.

Stability Pact/SEE

- Pact off to a strong start. Important to reaffirm our commitment today; continue momentum.

WTO

- Determined to work with France, EU for successful launch of new Round.
- New Round needs to open new markets; agriculture liberalization will benefit EU budget, consumers and developing countries.
- Need to establish dialogue within WTO on trade and labor issues; also need to increase WTO transparency to build support for new Round.
- Need concrete results at Seattle in e-commerce, procurement transparency, tariff liberalization.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

Chechnya

- Need to maintain common front on Chechnya during summit, urge Russians to seek political solution.
- Important we press common themes in public. Want to strike balance between Russia's right to protect its territorial integrity, citizens and growing humanitarian impact, ramifications for Russia's standing.
- Need to make clear that purely military solution won't work. Russians need to be proactive in search for dialogue. OSCE or other third party can help.
- Want to be as supportive as possible of Red Cross, UNHCR relief efforts. Hope France and EU partners will do all they can to help.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- Plan to speak to Aliyev and Kocharian today. Strongly support their courageous efforts to resolve conflict. Their ability to keep details of negotiations secret for months testifies to their determination.
- Hope you will also convey your support and encouragement when you see Aliyev and Kocharian and that you will encourage Boris to be supportive.
- French, Russian, and U.S. support will also be key to implementing an agreement. Look to you and to France to take the lead in mobilizing EU to provide resources and observers needed to make deal stick.

If Chirac raises the details of the proposed settlement:

- Know plan is bold, even radical, and sure to be controversial. But ideas proposed by parties. Think it critical that we do all we can to support their efforts to achieve peace.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0145-M (1.21)
3/4/2019 KBH

[MEPP - @NESA will provide]

Iraq

- On UK/Dutch draft UN Security Council resolution, our bottom line remains unchanged. Can't agree to a trigger for sanctions suspension short of full Iraqi compliance with a disarmament roadmap. This is as far as we can go.
- We are comfortable with the language on the trigger in the current draft. Believe this meets our needs and yours.
- (*If he raises French proposed resolution on oil spare parts*) The right way to handle this issue is the UK/Dutch draft. The French draft would undercut the UK/Dutch draft and, besides, there is no urgent need for Iraq to receive more spare parts.

ESDI

- Position on ESDI is clear: support a strong, integrated, more capable Europe as a valued partner and ally. Emphasis should be on improving European capabilities.
- Three goals as ESDI develops: politically, to strengthen the transatlantic link; militarily, to be effective; and to retain fullest possible participation of all Allies.
- Aim for compatible political statements by NATO and EU on ESDI in December that narrow gap between Washington and Cologne.

National Missile Defense

- Appreciated your thoughtful letter on National Missile Defense; as my response indicated, we agree on the importance of strategic stability and deterrence; the ABM Treaty is central to both.
- Want to work with Russia on changes to Treaty that will permit deployment of limited NMD to counter rogue threats.
- Changes we seek are compatible with ABM's central purpose -- to maintain strategic stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

- Will make a decision on deployment next summer at earliest, taking into account threat, technical feasibility, cost and arms control. Want to keep in direct contact with you and Tony Blair on this issue.
- Let's keep NMD and ABM off front pages, and not before the UN General Assembly. Don't want Russia to think it can divide alliance or ignore issue; that will only increase pressure on me or my successor to withdraw from the Treaty.

Kosovo/Bosnia

- Appreciate French contributions to Bosnia and Kosovo. French forces doing important work in tough areas of Kosovo. Cannot let status quo harden into Serb cantonization.
- Bernard Kouchner is also doing excellent job under difficult circumstances and deserves our full support.
- Need your help convincing EU states to financially support UNMIK. Facing critical budget deficits that could undermine the fragile progress we've made.
- Critical we maintain pressure on Milosevic. We will continue to support opposition in manner visible to Serbian people; but must stay the course on sanctions.

Stability Pact/SEE

- Pact and other stabilization efforts have had a strong start. We must keep up momentum and show our commitment. What we're doing here today helps demonstrate to region we're serious, and that they must do their part.
- [Pleased Commission, here today and in Brussels yesterday at Kosovo Donors Conference, has pledged substantial resources for reform and reconstruction of region. Hope you and other member states will match that effort.]
- Key is to combine that assistance with the types of institutional efforts that will create real stability. Hope France will play a supportive role, both within the EU in terms of increasing trade and investment and forging closer political economic ties, and within NATO in terms of strengthening regional security cooperation.

- [Would be very important signal on value of reforms and our commitment to bring region into international mainstream if, by Seattle, we can announce that all, including the EU, have agreed to Albanian and Croatian WTO membership. Need France to drop its opposition.]

WTO

- My Administration is determined to work closely with EU and member states for successful launch of a new trade Round.
- Had good discussions with Prodi, Pascal Lamy October 27; now should build on areas of agreement before Seattle, particularly on developing country proposals such as greater market access for LDCs.
- New Round needs to focus on opening markets for agriculture and other goods and services EU budget and consumers as well as developing countries will benefit from agricultural liberalization.
- Need to establish at Seattle a dialogue on trade and labor issues. Pleased that President Prodi agreed to this at our meeting and that you are supportive as well. I continue to believe a WTO working group (versus a "standing forum") is the best way to structure the dialogue.
- We need concrete results at Seattle itself in areas such as e-commerce, procurement transparency, tariff liberalization, to build momentum for the new Round.
- Hope we can make real progress on transparency reforms at the WTO and promote "win/win" environmental initiatives in order to build public support for the new Round from key constituencies.

If Chirac raises specific trade issues:

Biotechnology (if raised):

- As we discussed at the G-8, the politicization of this issue is undercutting the work of international institutions, threatens promise of biotechnology to solve world food needs.
- Current EU approval process is not working; we lost \$400 million of corn exports.

- Need solutions that address food safety and consumer concerns without stigmatizing safe food products.
- My agreement with Prodi to establish high-level U.S.-EU dialogue on these issues involving senior officials of appropriate agencies will be an important way forward.
- Beef Hormones (if raised): We are exploring with the EU possible compensation deal on non-hormone treated beef as a temporary solution to end retaliation prior to removal of your ban on our hormone-treated beef. Let's see where discussions go.
- Bananas (if raised): Important for the integrity of the system that France/EU comply with the WTO ruling. Commission's latest proposal appears to still be WTO-inconsistent. Increasing domestic pressure on us to do something further -- we will continue to abide by our WTO obligations.
- Hushkits (if raised): EU regulation on aircraft engine hushkits has had chilling effect on trans-Atlantic trade in aircraft and aircraft engines. Told Prodi we need a commitment from EU to lift this regulation.

(IF TIME PERMITS: Iranian Jews)

- Very important we continue to press Iranians on 13 Iranian Jews imprisoned on trumped up charges of espionage.
- Interested to hear what President Khatami may have said to you about them when he was in Paris.
- Appreciate past French support on this matter.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	Biography [partial] (2 pages)	11/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

2016-0145-M
kh1825

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

1.4c, 3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.22)
2/27/2017 KBN

FRANCE

Jacques CHIRAC
(Phonetic: sheRAHK)

President (since 1995)

Addressed as: Mr. President 3.5c

Jacques Chirac's image is suffering as turmoil within his neo-Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) party continues. 1.4c, 1.4d

Chirac's party placed third in France's European Parliament (EP) election in mid-June 1999, after a campaign that revealed continuing divisions in the center-right over European integration and the lack of a coherent policy agenda. The second-place finish—behind the Socialists—of the center-right Euroskeptic list led by RPR renegade Charles Pasqua rocked the party. Some conservatives blame Chirac for contributing to the fragmentation of the center-right by failing to develop a clear policy program and by preventing new leadership talent from emerging to preserve his chances for a second term; his probable opponent is Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, head of the Socialist-led coalition government. 3.5c

Managing Cohabitation 3.5c

In the traditional Bastille Day press interview in mid-July 1999, Chirac asked for RPR and broader center-right unity and urged a halt to internecine bickering, calling for center-right ranks to find common ground and to elaborate a vision that sets them apart from the left. Chirac rebuffed calls for a more combative approach in his "cohabitation" with Jospin, asserting that cohabitation reflects the desire of the French public. Critics charge that Chirac's policy of "constructive cohabitation" further demoralizes the center-right, according to press reports. 3.5c

Although Chirac may not be as aggressive as his critics would like, he is stepping up his criticism of the ruling coalition's program, and the tone of cohabitation is becoming more tense. Chirac is urging the government to cut the public debt

1.4c, 3.5c



Consensus on Foreign Affairs 3.5c

Chirac successfully used his foreign affairs role—in which the Constitution gives him preeminence—to reassert himself on the domestic political scene after mid-1997, when he sacrificed the RPR's overwhelming majority in the National Assembly by calling an election 10 months early; that voting ushered in cohabitation with the leftist coalition government. Jospin's team has been satisfied to work within the broad foreign policy parameters set by the President. Both men avidly supported the Allied air campaign in the Balkans, a policy that met with widespread public approval. Chirac has emphasized constructive ties to Russia in the wake of tensions over Serbia, as has Jospin. Since the election of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in May 1999, both Chirac and Jospin have advocated a role for Paris in any renewed peace talks, press reports indicate. 3.5c

and taxes. He terms pension reform, which Jospin's team has been reluctant to tackle, "urgent" and is advocating a retirement system based on private savings. He opposes Jospin's proposal to amend the Constitution to pave the way for legislation allowing limited use of regional languages in France. Chirac also has disparaged plans to institute a 35-hour workweek, a highlight

(continued)

LP 99-109499

4 November 1999

1.4c, 3.5c

of the government's fall 1999 legislative agenda. The President and Prime Minister also exchanged barbs in early November 1999 when the Socialist Finance Minister resigned in an emerging graft scandal. Chirac is likely to tread carefully, however; polls indicate that the public strongly disapproves of blatant jockeying between the President and the Prime Minister. The President has largely avoided confrontations on the most sensitive issues where presidential and governmental authority overlap. 3.5c

Chirac faces continuing challenges within the center-right ranks, highlighted by the decision of some RPR politicians to ignore his edict not to accept the tacit support of the far-right National Front during regional elections in 1998 and 1999. Moreover, Chirac has long been out of favor with the RPR's right wing for implementing military and security reforms that broke cherished ideological barriers. For example, he unilaterally launched France's initiative for greater participation in NATO. 3.5c

Chirac, nonetheless, remains the default candidate of the center-right for the 2002 presidential contest. 1.4c, 1.4d Chirac's close associate and RPR deputy Bernard Pons points out that Chirac appears to be the only figure capable of uniting the fractious center-right in a presidential campaign. Pons notes that the presidential and French parliamentary elections are three years away and that time is on Chirac's side.

3.5c

Advocating Greater EU Independence 3.5c

Referring to recent transatlantic trade frictions over the EU import ban on hormone-treated beef, Chirac said publicly in September 1999 that one single power, "albeit a respectable and friendly one," should not rule the planet's food markets. Looking to the WTO's Seattle Round of talks set for late November, Chirac has pleaded for new rules on food and environmental safety. He has asserted that the United States backs the sale of a product "if it has not been proven dangerous," whereas Europeans advocate "the principle of caution." The question, Chirac noted, is whether

countries can be forced to import products that their people see as risky in the name of international trade liberalization. 3.5c

Speaking before the Atlantic Treaty Association in October 1999, Chirac stressed that NATO would continue to be the primary organization for collective defense in Europe—but argued that it should be reinforced by a strong European defense pillar. Chirac called for a permanent EU security council and for improvements in European defense capabilities to allow the EU to act on its own when necessary. 3.5c

A Life in Politics 3.5c

Chirac was born on 29 November 1932. He studied at the Institute for Political Studies before fulfilling Army duty and later attended the National School of Administration (1959). Chirac was elected to the National Assembly in 1967 representing Correze, a seat he held for three decades (only stepping down to assume other government posts). In 1962, Chirac joined then Prime Minister (1962-68) Georges Pompidou's staff, receiving his first government post in 1967 in the Ministry of Social Affairs; Chirac later held several cabinet posts, including that of Minister of the Interior (1974). He served as Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976, when he resigned over economic and political differences with then President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. During 1977-95, Chirac was mayor of Paris. His first failed presidential bid was in 1981; his rivalry with Giscard split the conservative vote and contributed to the center-right's defeat by Socialist François Mitterrand. After a second tour as Prime Minister (1986-88), Chirac was defeated again in the 1988 presidential election. 3.5c

Chirac speaks English well; the media say that he also speaks some Russian. During the early 1950s, Chirac attended a summer term at Harvard and worked briefly at a Howard Johnson's restaurant and for Anheuser-Busch while he traveled throughout the United States. Chirac enjoys poetry and detective stories. He and his wife, Bernadette, have two biological daughters,

MTG W/PRESIDENT
YELTSIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Underscore U.S. concerns about Chechnya, need for Russia to step back from self-isolating approach to conflict.
- Encourage support for use of OSCE good offices to facilitate dialogue with Chechen leaders and develop political track that addresses Russia's underlying security concerns.
- Stress need to advance ABM amendments, NMD cooperation, deeper cuts under START III. Urge Yeltsin not to allow arms control to become a political football inside Russia.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Yeltsin may try to compensate for his physical frailty with combative public statements about Western noninterference in Chechnya and the need for a common front against terrorism. There is a good chance that Yeltsin will try to divert attention from Chechnya by stepping up criticism of U.S. moves on ABM/NMD, just as his statements over NATO enlargement marred the 1994 OSCE Budapest summit.

Yeltsin's aloofness from day-to-day policymaking has left Chechnya in Putin's hands which has catapulted Putin to the forefront of contenders to succeed Yeltsin. Stirrings in the top ranks of the military may prompt Yeltsin to demonstrate in Istanbul that he's in charge in the North Caucasus. So far, there is no evidence that Yeltsin is less committed to the military's and Putin's hard-line approach, and you should expect him to take an uncompromising stance in private particularly to our common interest in combatting terrorism. You will need to emphasize the importance of working through tough problems as you did in Cologne. You need to underscore that despite disagreements on Chechnya, CFE, ABM/NMD and nonproliferation, we also share a common objective of Russia's integration with the international community, and that should be the foundation for our work.

AGENDA

Chechnya. Yeltsin's dependence on staff briefings means that he may have an overly rosy view of Russian military "successes."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.23)
3/6/2019 KBH

(The situation on the ground is far less favorable.) It will be hard to convince him that Russia's military strategy risks embroiling the army in a quagmire that imperils innocent civilians and damages Russia's international reputation. He also will have an inflated picture of foreign involvement in the conflict. While foreign funds and mujahedin elements are a factor in the conflict, the overwhelming majority of fighters are Chechen with Russian-designed equipment.

Your pitch should reaffirm our support for Russia's territorial integrity and right to protect the security of its citizens against terrorism. However, you should remind Yeltsin that we have been down this road before and are skeptical that Russia can achieve its objectives through a purely military approach. You should encourage him to use the OSCE or other intermediaries to kick-start a dialogue with responsible Chechen leaders as a way to make progress on key Russian security concerns (e.g., inhibiting terrorist activities and criminality). Depending on the status of the CFE end-game, you may need to explain why progress on Russian withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova is critically important to our support for the adapted Treaty.

Arms Control. The Russians have launched a high-profile campaign to oppose our NMD program and our proposal to modify the ABM Treaty. Just as Yeltsin used the Budapest summit to warn about a "cold peace," it is conceivable Yeltsin will rail against the possible collapse of the arms control regime. To head this off, you should focus Yeltsin's attention on the relationship between arms control and his legacy. We have a small window to make progress on ABM amendments and START III before the Russian political calendar forces a shutdown.

You should emphasize that any U.S. deployment of a limited NMD will not threaten Russia's deterrent (consistent with the public statements of Yeltsin's own generals), and we are preparing modest amendments to the ABM Treaty that would not undermine strategic stability. We have also made serious proposals on possible NMD and ABM-related cooperation that could have tangible benefits for Russia's security, but Russia has yet to engage on most of these ideas. You should make clear to Yeltsin that both ABM and START need to move together. You should ask that he endorse this approach and energize his team accordingly.

Elections. The upcoming elections will make or break Yeltsin's legacy and Russia's internal transformation. To its credit, Russia is experiencing real politics as politicians and parties jockey for power. But Kremlin insiders are also tightening

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

pressure on opposition parties and the media. You should stress to Yeltsin how these elections will define his legacy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Hallmark of our relationship has been ability to work through tough issues. That's what we did in Cologne in June and numerous other times. Despite differences on Chechnya, ABM/NMD, or Iran, we have to keep our eye on the ball.
- Three points on Chechnya. First, my support for Russia's territorial integrity and right to defend citizens against terrorism unyielding. Realize challenges in North Caucasus very serious; key question is what's most effective response.
- Second, worried military operation is causing civilian casualties and damaging Russia's reputation. Know that's not your intent, but as conflict drags on, so will international pressure to criticize and isolate Russia. That's not desirable.
- Third point: hope you will look for alternatives. OSCE team visit good first step. There are no easy answers, but important for you to be proactive in search for credible interlocutors or third party who could act as intermediary.
- Chechnya crisis has put real strain on adapted CFE Treaty. Welcome Putin's statement in Oslo on full compliance with flank limits, transparency. But must underscore significance of progress on withdrawal schedules from Georgia and Moldova.
- On arms control, we agreed in Cologne to push for real progress during our remaining time in office. Agree on need to reduce our nuclear arsenals; committed to pursuing those through START III along with changes to the ABM treaty.
- Changes we're pursuing to the ABM Treaty do not change fundamental purpose. Important to protect against a rogue threat that affects U.S. and Russia. Want to cooperate here.
- Third, system we're developing will not affect Russia's strategic deterrent. Your generals confident they can overwhelm limited NMD system. Need to refrain from rhetoric that complicates difficult task. Should aim by end of January to reiterate common underlying principles and objectives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.24)

3/6/2019 KBH

- Upcoming elections key to your legacy and Russia's transition to democratic state. Know there will be rumors, but important to keep reaffirming your commitment to free and fair outcome.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT
BORIS YELTSIN

Overall Relationship

- Hallmark of our relationship has been ability to work through tough issues. That's what we did in Cologne in June and numerous other times.
- Even when we've had disagreements, you and I have shown that we can break through them because we're united by common support for Russia's transformation, international integration.
- That's just as important right now, despite our differences on Chechnya, ABM/NMD, or Iran. We have to keep our eye on the ball, not get derailed by disagreements.

Chechnya

- Three points on Chechnya. First, my support for Russia's territorial integrity and right to defend citizens against terrorism unyielding. Realize challenges in North Caucasus very serious; key question is what's most effective response.
- That leads to my second point. Worried military operation is causing increased civilian casualties and damaging Russia's international reputation. Know that's not your intent, but conflict's intensity has increased as forces moved southward.
- Your troops are relying more and more on artillery and air strikes against rebels who, by all accounts, are completely intermingled with the civilians.
- Very concerned that this approach will destroy cities and villages, not save them. Civilian casualties will get worse, and so will international pressure to criticize and isolate Russia. None of these outcomes is desirable.
- As a friend, must tell you that intensified military campaign will have enormous costs. Ask you to avoid this. Very concerned that Russia could become trapped in protracted conflict. That could damage things we both care deeply about.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 6, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.25)
3/6/2019 KBH

- Third point: hope you will look for alternatives. OSCE team visit good first step. There are no easy answers, but important for you to be proactive in search for credible interlocutors.
- Urge you to consider a third party -- whether the OSCE, another party, a Russian, -- who could act as an intermediary until you are able to have direct contacts.

CFE

- Chechnya crisis has put real strain on adapted CFE Treaty. Putin's statement in Oslo that Russia will return full compliance with CFE flank limits was important as is continued transparency on force levels.
- Need to underscore significance of progress on schedules for Russian withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova. To sign Treaty, we must be able to show that CFE flank limits are meaningful, despite the fact that Russia has exceeded Treaty levels.

Arms Control

- You and I agreed in Cologne that we'd push to make real progress during our remaining time in office. Have responded to your recent letter on ABM.
- First, I too want to reduce our nuclear arsenals, and I'm committed to pursue this through START III together with changes to the ABM treaty.
- Second, changes we're pursuing to the ABM Treaty do not change its fundamental nature. Rather, it lets us protect against a rogue threat that affects U.S. and Russia. U.S. team has made concrete proposals for cooperation.
- Third, system we're developing will not affect Russia's strategic deterrent. Your generals have said they can overwhelm our limited NMD system.
- Let me suggest two things. First, need to urge teams to continue business-like work and refrain from harsh rhetoric which is complicating an already difficult task.

- Second, let's aim, as I suggested in my letter, for a target date at the end of January to reiterate the underlying principles and objectives we have in common.
- This would guide the actions you and I and our successors take on matters of strategic stability, including efforts later next year to reconcile U.S. and Russian positions on ABM and START.

Elections

- Before leaving, wanted to dwell on the positive and how far you've taken Russia. Upcoming elections are key to securing your legacy and demonstrating to world that Russia has made the transition to a democratic state.
- Know there will be rumors about election irregularities, but you've made commitment to free and fair outcome. Hope you will keep making strong statements that make your intentions clear and keep the playing field level for all the candidates.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

2016-0145-M
kh1825

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**BAKU-CEYHAN
SIGNING**

CASPIAN ENERGY SIGNING CEREMONY

KEY OBJECTIVE

- To witness the signing of framework agreements for the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Presidents Demirel, Shevardnadze, and Aliyev will sign framework agreements to enable the construction of energy export pipelines: Baku-Ceyhan for oil, and possibility for the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) for gas. President Nazarbayev may sign a side agreement on the shipment of Kazakhstani oil production through the Baku-Ceyhan line. President Niyazov will be a fourth signatory for TCP.

U.S. Caspian policy. Since 1995, we have advocated a policy of multiple pipelines to export Caspian oil and gas to world markets. The legacy of Soviet energy development in the Caspian was a pipeline system with all lines transiting Russia before they reached export markets. We acted in support of a simple proposition -- that the mere fact of choices would reduce dramatically the temptation to turn off the taps and to reduce the political and economic dependency of countries in the region to a single nation (e.g., Russia or Iran).

Baku-Ceyhan. The proposed Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline would move one million barrels of crude oil per day from Azerbaijan via Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan [JAY-hahn]. This rate is responsive to Turkish environmental and safety concerns about increasing oil shipments through the Bosphorus.

Baku-Ceyhan also symbolizes new regional self-sufficiency for the Caspian energy-producing states, as well as a new regional vision for Turkey as the linchpin in the development of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The pipeline would give the Caspian countries both direct access to Western markets and to a deepwater port on the Mediterranean.

Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCP). As important as Baku-Ceyhan is for Turkey politically and economically, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline is even more directly relevant to Turkish domestic energy security. Turkey's growth is hampered by gas shortages, and TCP would alleviate these shortages and provide for integration of eastern Turkey with the national gas grid.

TCP is also a lifeline for Turkmenistan, which sits wedged between the world's two largest gas producers, Russia, and Iran. Azerbaijan too is developing world-class gas reserves, and it too seeks to pump gas to Turkey.

**REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.27)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEETING WITH TURKISH NGOS

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Strongly support the expansion of civil society in Turkey.
- Make clear that the State and civil society are not engaged in a zero sum game -- they can be mutually reinforcing.
- Reiterate U.S. view that the answers to Turkey's complex problems lie in "more democracy, not less."

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Turkey's civil society has expanded remarkably over the past 15 years. But the current country-wide debate over the nature of governance and the role of the state -- sparked by the government's slow and ineffectual response to the August earthquake and by Turkey's top judge, who eloquently criticized the deficiencies of Turkish democracy -- is unprecedented. Your meeting with a broad cross section of NGO leaders will further legitimize their activities, while sending a message to the Government of Turkey (GOT) that working with as opposed to holding back non-governmental actors is in its interest.

Since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the Turkish Republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Turkey has been dominated by an aggressively secularist, Westernizing elite. Today, however, the "Kemalists" find themselves increasingly at odds with a resurgence of Islamic and multiethnic traditions and with the growing numbers of Turks influenced by the West's more libertarian outlook. A new class of intellectuals is increasingly dismayed over the limitations of the Turkish political system. Businessmen are becoming important advocates for limited political reform. The emergence of new media outlets -- including 2,000 local radio and TV stations -- will prove increasingly tough for the censors to control. Meanwhile, myriad human rights groups, charitable foundations, and "alternative" media networks, are providing new outlets for dissent.

How to react to this dynamic societal debate is a challenge for the government, torn between maintaining control over Islamist activities and reducing social pressures by opening a closed political system to outside actors. The GOT prevented NGOs and Islamic groups from providing earthquake aid, lest they get the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 3, 2009

credit -- even in areas where government assistance was lacking. Yet it also recently initiated a high-level dialogue with NGOs and will include them in its OSCE delegation for the first time.

AGENDA

NGOs and the Earthquake. The Turkish state's slow response to the earthquake stands in stark contrast to the relief efforts led primarily by Islamic-oriented organizations but prominently featuring secular-minded groups as well. One minister in the Ecevit government publicly charged that Turkey's top-heavy State structure was itself "lying beneath the rubble" of the quake zone; and even Prime Minister Ecevit acknowledged the post-quake situation demonstrated the need for major reform of the Turkish system. You should commend the NGO sector for its rapid response, and invite their representatives to share with you their experiences (and frustrations) in dealing with governmental agencies in aftermath of the quake.

Democratization. You should use your meeting to commend NGO efforts to broaden the political debate in Turkish society and to help make Turkish democracy deliver for all its citizens. You can ask them about efforts to create forums for communication and cooperation between like-minded groups and individuals. As with the earthquake relief effort, you should also solicit their views about the prospects for democratic reform of State institutions, the political culture, and in the area of human rights. You may be asked for your views on Turkey's problems with its Kurds and Islamic "reactionaries." You should reiterate our long-standing view that the answer to these and other problems lies by expanding, not restricting, democratic freedoms for all Turkish citizens.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH TURKISH NGOS

Earthquake/Democratization

- We were all deeply moved by the terrible earthquake. But we were also gladdened by the quick and energetic relief efforts of Turkey's increasingly dynamic NGOs -- which demonstrated yet again what private individuals can do when they work together voluntarily.
- I am convinced your growth can and should be a source of strength for the state, not a source of concern. That has been our experience.
- I also commend NGOs for interjecting new life in the vigorous democratization debate in Turkey. The U.S. has always believed that the answers to Turkey's complex problems lie in "more democracy, not less."
- I'd like to hear about some of your ideas and experiences from the earthquake and the democracy debate.

Kurdish Problem

- U.S.-Turkish counter-terrorism cooperation against Ocalan and the PKK is one of our bilateral success stories. But there is no purely military solution to Kurdish issues. Civilian leadership in expanding basic rights for all is crucial.
- How do you see opportunities -- not only for economic but political and cultural reforms -- to reach out to citizens of Turkey's citizens of Kurdish origin?

Freedom of Expression/Religion

- We are aware of the great debate in Turkey on the relationship of secularism and religion. Such examinations are natural, healthy, and essential in a democratic society.
- I understand that the Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeals, and other leading citizens recently have voiced their concerns about the need for expanding freedom of expression -- including the freedom to express religiously-derived ideas. What are your views?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: November 3, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.28)
3/6/2019 KBH



SCENESETTER: DINNER

On Thursday, November 18, at 8:00 p.m., you will attend a dinner hosted by President Suleyman Demirel of Turkey at the Swissotel for Heads, Foreign Ministers, and Members of Delegations and their spouses. Approximately 800 guests are expected to attend.

The Swissotel, a deluxe 5-star hotel located in the center of Istanbul in a park setting on the European banks of the Bosphorus, has been in business since March 1991. The spacious gardens of the hotel were previously the gardens of the Dolmabahce palace, which was the last residence of the Ottoman Sultans. Situated on a wooded hilltop, the hotel commands views of the Bosphorus and Asian coast.

The dinner will be held in the hotel's Fuji ballroom which has a capacity to seat 900.



**SCENESETTER: SIGNING OF THE TREATY ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)**

On Friday, November 19 at 8:00 a.m., (TBC), you will participate in the signing of an adapted CFE Treaty which will update an agreement that has been a cornerstone of European security since it was signed in 1990. The signing will take place at the Lutfi Kirdar International Convention and Exhibition Center.

The representative of the depository country, Prime Minister Kok of the Netherlands, will inaugurate the ceremony with a brief statement. President Demirel, as the host country representative, will make a brief statement welcoming the leaders, stressing the importance of the CFE treaty, and will invite the leaders to sign the Amendment Document. (President Demirel was an original signer of the Helsinki Final Act, as Prime Minister, and a photo of him at that time appears in Henry Kissinger's most recent book of memoirs.) The signature pages for each country will be placed before the 30 leaders of the CFE states to sign simultaneously. President Demirel, congratulating the participants, will confirm that the Final Act (which submits the Amendment Document to the Heads,) is accepted/taken note of, as proposed. There will be no further statements. The brief ceremony will end with a champagne toast.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CFE ADAPTATION AGREEMENT AND FINAL ACT

Negotiators are preparing two documents related to CFE:

- **CFE Adaptation Agreement** amends the 1990 CFE Treaty and related documents. This legally binding agreement is to be signed by Heads of State/Government.
- **CFE Final Act** contains political commitments accompanying the Amendment Agreement. It will be adopted by Heads of State/Government, but not signed.

Adaptation Agreement

The Adaptation Agreement will create a new, highly stable and transparent set of limitations on conventional armaments (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters). In signing this agreement, we and the other States Parties will demonstrate our common commitment to enhancing security and stability in Europe.

- Brings the treaty into line with today's European security realities, including an enlarged NATO. The Adaptation Agreement replaces the treaty's obsolete bloc structure with nationally based limits. This will, for example, eliminate the requirement for our new NATO allies to coordinate their equipment limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries.
- Provides for enhanced transparency, including more information and on-site inspections. This additional transparency is particularly important on a regional basis, where relatively smaller changes in force levels can have an impact on stability.
- Adds an accession clause will extend stability to other parts of Europe by opening the treaty to non-NATO and former-Warsaw Pact members. In joining, countries would take on treaty obligations, but in return could share in the treaty benefits of receiving information about and conducting inspections on the forces of other parties. Accession is subject to approval by all 30 Parties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
declassify on: November 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0145-M (1.29)
3/4/2019 KBH

- Enhances regional stability and the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors through strengthened requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, including notifications to all parties as to whether consent has been granted. This is of particular importance Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
- An adapted Treaty will reassure the Russians about NATO's eastward movement, through new national and territorial ceilings (vice NATO-wide group and "zonal" limits) and lower limits for NATO countries as a whole. At the same time, it protects flexibility for allies to adjust these limits within NATO, and to exceed them in a crisis, by specified amounts, with a "temporary deployment."
- The adapted treaty makes key adjustments to the flank regime, which are crucial for Turkey and Norway. For Turkey, the deal locks in revised limits on Russia in the south that permit more ACVs on Russian territory, but that in return are more constraining on Russian forces outside Russia, in the Caucasus and other parts of the flank. For Norway, the deal includes a private no-increase commitment in the northern part of the flank (via confidential letter from Ivanov).

CFE Final Act

The CFE Final Act will contain political commitments that are related to the Adaptation Agreement, and which are undertaken by individual or groups of states. Still under negotiation, the Final Act will include, for example:

- A general commitment to compliance by all States Parties.
- Russia's commitment not to increase its forces in Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts, opposite the Baltic states.
- Commitments by a group of countries in Central Europe to exercise restraint with regard to future equipment levels.
- If agreed, the Russian agreements with Georgia and Moldova on force withdrawals.
- Russia's specific commitment to return to compliance with its flank limits as soon as possible [under negotiation].



**BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
TO BE PROVIDED**

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. report	Biography (2 pages)	08/05/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2591

FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Trip to Turkey and the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe] Summit, November 14-19, 1999 [2]

2016-0145-M

kh1825

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 3/4/2019

2016 - 0145 - M

~~SECRET~~