

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001a-memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re Letter (1 page) | 11/08/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001b-letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (1 page) | nd | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 White House Office of Records Management-Subject File-General
 CO094
 OA/Box Number: 21695

FOLDER TITLE:

086226SS

2011-1037-F
 kc1148

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of October 10. I fully share your views on the importance of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion.

My Administration's commitment to support the Battalion, which I announced in Riga in July, underscores our desire to see the Baltic States established as contributing members of the new Europe we are working together to build. It is a vivid expression as well of our support for the sovereignty and independence of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. I assure you of my personal commitment to this pledge.

I enjoyed seeing you again at the United Nations in September and regret I will be traveling abroad during your upcoming visit to Washington. I wish you every success as you continue to lead the Latvian people along the road of *briviba* and prosperity.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton^A

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Latvian Republic
Riga

CS

UNCLASSIFICATION

086226 SS
9008

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0094

ACTION

November 94 NOV 98 PG: 26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Letter To Latvian President Ulmanis

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Latvian President Ulmanis.

Background

Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis has written you seeking reaffirmation of your commitment to the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. The letter is clearly motivated by reports that the Administration had considered reprogramming the \$10 million promised for the Baltic Battalion, which you announced during your speech in Riga, in order to help fund the Haiti operation. The attached response makes clear, as have your previous messages to the Congress on this subject, that you stand behind your commitment to the Baltic states.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter attached at Tab A, which we will deliver to President Ulmanis during his private visit to Washington November 12-13.

Attachments

- Tab A Proposed Response
- Tab B Incoming Ulmanis Letter

OK
AP
JL

UNCLASSIFICATION

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001a. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/28/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001b. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/28/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001e. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (draft) (1 page) | 10/28/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001d. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (draft) (1 page) | 10/28/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001e. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (draft) (1 page) | 10/28/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001f. draft | Gift Unit draft POTUS to President Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/06/1993 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001g. note | handwritten re POTUS topics discussed w President Ulmanis (1 page) | nd | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 White House Office of Records Management Subject Files-General
 GI002
 OA/Box Number: 10781

FOLDER TITLE:

043496

2011-1037-F
 kcl194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for the magnificent amber stone. I appreciate your thoughtfulness and support.

It was a pleasure to meet you at the United Nations. I deeply valued our discussion and appreciated hearing your insights on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvian territory. I am also encouraged by the prospect of the commencement of the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund. It will usher in a new era of cooperation between our nations.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
Chairman of the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PC

043496

GI002

October 28, 1993

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Handwritten notes:
GPO
OK
to embassy
attached
old
PC

Sincerely,

WILL CLINTON A

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

BC/EKS/TF/bws (Corres. #1053421)

✓cc: White House Gifts

(NOTE: Letter redone for correction in address 11/03/93 -- emu)

DISPATCH THRU STATE DEPARTMENT 931102

October 28, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for the magnificent amber stone. I appreciate your thoughtfulness and support.

It was a pleasure to meet you at the United Nations. I deeply valued our discussion and appreciated hearing your insights on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvian territory. I am also encouraged by the prospect of the commencement of the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund. It will usher in a new era of cooperation between our nations.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
Chairman of the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

BC/EKS/TF/bws (Corres. #1053421)

cc: White House Gifts

Xeroxed copy of personally signed original to NH through John Podesta

CLEAR THRU JOHN PODESTA
CLEAR THRU ITOH

PRESIDENT TO SIGN

DISPATCH THRU STATE DEPARTMENT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

October 28, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

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Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON A

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
Chairman of the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

93 1029

BC/EKS/TF/bws (Corres. #1053421)

cc: White House Gifts

Xeroxed copy of personally signed original to NH through John Podesta

CLEAR THRU JOHN PODESTA
CLEAR THRU ITOH

PRESIDENT TO SIGN

DISPATCH THRU STATE DEPARTMENT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

9325308

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for the magnificent amber stone. I appreciate your thoughtfulness and support.

It was a pleasure to meet you at the United Nations. I deeply valued our discussion and appreciated hearing your insights on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvian territory. I am also encouraged by the prospect of the commencement of the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund. It will usher in a new era of cooperation between our nations.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
Chairman of the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

Dear Tim:

Should read as follows:

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga.

Merci,

CLINTON LIBRARY ^{Deb} PHOTOCOPY
Deb

GIFT UNIT-DRAFT OF BC LETTER

TK

INITIALS: BC / eks /

DOCUMENT TITLE: /gifts/draft/ulmanis.guntis.eks

DRAFT DATE / LETTER DATE: Oct 06 1993 /

CORRESPONDENCE #: 1053421

CLEAR WITH: ITOH

WHCC:

CC: WH Gifts

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:
His Excellency Guntis Ulmanis
Chairman of the Supreme Council
Of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

ENCLOSURES AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
DISPATCH THROUGH STATE DEPARTMENT

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for the magnificent amber stone. I appreciate your
thoughtfulness and support.

It was a pleasure to meet you at the United Nations. I deeply valued
our discussion, *and appreciate hearing your insights on the* ~~I realize the grave importance of the removal of~~ *of*
Russian troops *from Latvian territory.* ~~from the Baltic States to your country's well being~~ *newspaper*
~~This is a significant issue which is of great concern to the United States~~

also
I am encouraged by the prospect of the commencement of the Baltic-
American Enterprise Fund. It will usher in a new era of cooperation
between our nations.

Sincerely,

*Name of new Latvian
Pres for State*

MM

OCT 27 1993

per Andrew Filthi at State Dept.
(647-3187) :

- this was the President's first meeting with these 3 leaders
- they discussed the U.S.'s support for getting Russian troops in Baltic out.

also

- support for already ^{agreed upon} ~~established~~ of Baltic-American Enterprise Fund. (President very enthusiastic about idea.)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 001. draft | letter from POTUS to Guntis Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/30/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. draft | letter from POTUS to Guntis Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/30/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. draft | letter from POTUS to Guntis Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/28/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. draft | proposed para for POTUS letter to Guntis Ulmanis (1 page) | 10/22/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005. letter | Guntis Ulmanis to POTUS (2 pages) | 09/04/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 White House Office of Records Management Subject File-General
 GI002
 OA/Box Number: 17041

FOLDER TITLE:

283305

2011-1037-F
 kc1150

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

283305

GI002

October 30, 1998

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for the striking sculpture of the "Skrunda Monster" and for your recent letter concerning the deactivation of the radar facility. The sculpture is a wonderful reminder of the great success of our partnership. Working together, we have closed a chapter on the past without acrimony and set a course for a better future for the people of Latvia, Russia, and the entire Baltic Sea region.

I'm pleased that you were able to attend the United Nations conference in New York. It was an important gathering, and I welcome every opportunity for representatives of member nations to meet and help ensure the security and prosperity of people around the world.

Mrs. Clinton joins me in sending best wishes to you, your family, and all the people of Latvia.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON A

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

BC/LEA/RSM/RLM/DWB/pfs-pfs
(Corres. #4120349)
(10.ulmanis.g)

~~cc: White House Gifts~~
~~cc: Neal Sharma, 97 OEOB~~

~~Xeroxed copy of personally signed original to NH~~
~~through Phil Caplan~~
~~CLEAR THROUGH PHIL CAPLAN~~
DISPATCH THROUGH STATE 10-29-98
~~PRESIDENT TO SIGN~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1998

30

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for the striking sculpture of the "Skrunda Monster" and for your recent letter concerning the deactivation of the radar facility. The sculpture is a wonderful reminder of a great success in our partnership. Working together, we have closed a chapter on the past without acrimony and paved the way for a better future for the people of Latvia, Russia, and the entire Baltic Sea region.

the

of

set a course

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Mrs. Clinton joins me in sending best wishes to you, your family, and all the people of Latvia.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

OCT 27 1998

Ulmanis Ltr
ale
10/27/98

Cleared by NSC

October 28, 1998

10/22 (initials) 10/23

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for the striking sculpture of the "Skrunda Monster" and for your recent letter concerning the deactivation of the radar facility. The sculpture is a wonderful reminder of a great success in our partnership. Working together, we have closed a chapter on the past without acrimony and paved the way for a better future for the people of Latvia, Russia, and the entire Baltic Sea region.

^{Jim}
~~I am~~ pleased that you were able to attend the United Nations conference in New York. It was an important gathering, and I welcome ~~the~~ ^{every} opportunity for representatives of member nations to meet and help ~~secure~~ ^{ensure} the security and prosperity of people around the world.

Mrs. Clinton joins me in sending best wishes to you, your family, and the people of Latvia.

Sincerely, ^{all}

His Excellency
Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

ok
[Handwritten signature]

BC/LEA/pfs (Corres. #4120349)
(10.ulmanis.g)

cc: White House Gifts
cc: Neal Sharma, 97 OEOB

Xeroxed copy of personally signed original to NH through Phil Caplan

CLEAR THROUGH PHIL CAPLAN
DISPATCH THROUGH STATE
PRESIDENT TO SIGN

OCT 23 1998

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NSC proposed new first para for #4120349

Letter to Latvian President Ulmanis

Thank you very much for the striking sculpture of the "Skrunda Monster," and for your recent letter concerning the deactivation of the radar facility. The sculpture is a wonderful reminder of a great success in our partnership. Working together, we have closed a chapter on the past without acrimony and paved the way for a better future for the people of Latvia, Russia and the entire Baltic Sea region.

OCT 22 1998

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



Related letter
received 5/14

Latvijas Valsts prezidents

Riga, September 4, 1998

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

Related letter

Mr. President,

Although we signed documents to formalize a partnership between Latvia and the United States in January of this year, our working partnership as presidents of our respective countries began many years earlier. It is my distinct pleasure to report to you the successful completion of one very important undertaking that was launched by our partnership in 1994.

The phased-array radar station in Skrunda, Latvia, was switched off on August 31st at 12:03 PM local time. The phase of dismantling will begin this week.

I am writing to you, Mr. President, to thank you for the critical role you played in bringing us to this historical moment. Thanks to your efforts, and those of order U.S. officials and experts, 1994 marked the culmination of talks between Latvia and Russia which led to the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces from Latvian territory.

The agreement on Skrunda was one of the most difficult compromises reached in the process of talks concerning troop withdrawal. Even at the time when the forces of the former Soviet Union were departing from many Eastern European countries, Latvia had to reach a decision to preserve a Russian Federation military facility on its soil.

In this case, your support, as well as that of European statesmen and experts played a crucial role in arriving at a solution. Financial support from the United States, Sweden, and Finland made it possible to achieve a "full" withdrawal and to begin the process of cleaning up and reclaiming the land which had been part of the former military bases. We are particularly grateful to the United States for your generous assistance which brought about the dismantling of a major part of the Skrunda facility in 1994. On August 31, the last phase of this dismantlement project went into effect.

Latvian and Russian cooperation in accordance with *The Agreement on the Skrunda Phased Array Radar Station Legal Status and Temporary Functioning and Period of Dismantlement* is evidence that, in the context of a complex issue, a positive result is yielded when agreements are followed precisely.

In closing, I would like to underline the contribution of the OSCE and its member states, which were involved in fulfillment of the agreement and ensuring the inspection procedures, which in themselves were an essential part of the eventual realization of objectives.

Mr. President, please accept my deep gratitude for what you have done to help Russia and Latvia fulfill an agreement which is important for the stability of Europe and for the existence of cooperative relations in the Baltic Sea region. Throughout your term in office you have been a true friend of the Latvian people. Your friendship, leadership and vision has meant a great deal to our country, and continues to bring us important dividends.

Respectfully yours

Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Guntis Ulmanis', written over a horizontal line.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001a. memo | Sandy Berger to POTUS re Letter to President Ulmanis (2 pages) | 08/29/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001b. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (2 pages) | nd | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 White House Office of Records Management-Subject File CF
 ME001
 OA/Box Number: CF1703

FOLDER TITLE:

276307SS

2011-1037-F
kc1152

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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UNCLASSIFIED

~~w/ Confidential Attachment~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5982redo

BT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1998

C.F.

27630755
MEODI

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*
SUBJECT: Letter to President Ulmanis of Latvia

Purpose

To bolster Latvian President Ulmanis' efforts to win a national referendum on citizenship law reforms that will improve the political rights of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia. To also show President Yeltsin, on the eve of the Summit, that we have been doing our part to encourage these reforms in Latvia. We want to convince Yeltsin that Russia's economic pressure on Latvia is actually strengthening nationalist opponents of the citizenship reforms.

Background

We have encouraged the Latvians to enact several reforms in their citizenship laws, which have been recommended by the OSCE, as a way to advance their integration into Western institutions and defuse tensions that have arisen with Moscow. Your April letter to Ulmanis (Tab B) and other efforts we have taken helped assure the Latvian parliament's approval in July of legislation that would ease the ability of presently stateless Russians, particularly children, to obtain Latvian citizenship. However, a signature campaign by nationalist parties has forced this legislation to be subject to a national referendum next month.

Moscow has undertaken a campaign of political and economic pressure, including calls for boycotts of Latvian goods, in response to Latvia's slowness in changing its citizenship laws and other perceived slights. This pressure is designed to play to nationalist constituencies in Russia and to underscore the Russian government's firm objection to Baltic integration into NATO and other Western institutions.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~w/ Confidential Attachment~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2016-0314-M (1.01)
6/12/2023 vl

Our Ambassador to Latvia would deliver this letter to Ulmanis on Tuesday, September 1. In your talks with Yeltsin, you could then point to this letter as further evidence of our efforts to secure Latvian reforms and encourage Yeltsin, as Madeline has urged Foreign Minister Primakov, to end the economic pressure on Latvia and undertake a more constructive dialogue with Ulmanis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Ulmanis

Tab B Previous letters to President Ulmanis

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

I want to take the opportunity of Ambassador Napper's return to Latvia to share with you my thoughts on the development of U.S.-Latvian relations and our joint efforts to accelerate the integration of Latvia and the other Baltic nations into global and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Since the signing of the Charter of Partnership on January 16, together we have made significant progress in implementing the charter's provisions and realizing its promise. The working groups on military and economic cooperation have achieved positive results in meetings this spring. On July 8, the first session of the Partnership Commission met in Riga to chart the course for development of American-Baltic relations over the next year. The United States and Latvia are rapidly expanding and deepening their partnership in building a new European security system, fostering regional and bilateral cooperation and combating international terrorism and organized crime. In this connection, we appreciate Latvia's strong statement of support for our recent military action against terrorist camps and facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan.

I also wish to address another issue of great importance to both the United States and Latvia -- the proposed legislation to amend Latvia's citizenship law. As Secretary Albright underscored in her June 8 meeting with Prime Minister Krasts and in her interview with Latvian television on July 22, the United States strongly supports the amendments to Latvia's citizenship law passed by the Saeima on June 22. These amendments are fully consistent with international human rights standards and OSCE recommendations. The enactment and implementation of the June 22 law would leave no reason for the OSCE or the United States to recommend further modifications of Latvia's citizenship legislation. The United States will not support further efforts to move the goal posts on this issue. At the

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2016-0314-M(1.02)
6/12/2023 RZ

same time, we cannot support proposed amendments to the citizenship law that do not fulfill OSCE recommendations.

It is my understanding that the June 22 law will now be voted upon by the Latvian people in a nationwide referendum. Of course, we fully respect Latvia's democracy and its constitutional process. We have also made clear that we oppose the use of economic boycotts and other forms of external pressure to try to force changes in Latvian law. At the same time, we believe strongly that enactment of the June 22 law is vital to Latvia's efforts to accelerate its integration into global and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Guntis, I commend you once again for your leadership and vision in working to achieve the social integration of your nation. I recognize that your personal efforts have been instrumental in ensuring the Saeima's passage of the changes in the citizenship law. As we discussed when we met in the White House on January 16, the new law is also a critical component of your efforts to build a democratic, multi-ethnic society in Latvia. I therefore hope that the Latvian people and the leaders of all political parties will see the vital importance of a strong positive vote in favor of the June 22 law. This result in the referendum would enable Latvia to sustain the momentum of its integration efforts and provide a strong new impetus to the development of relations between the United States and Latvia. You and the Latvian people can rest assured of my personal support for this historic step in your country's development.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Bill Clinton" with a stylized flourish at the end.

His Excellency Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 001a. memo | Sandy Berger to POTUS re Letter to Latvian President (1 page) | 10/15/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ |
| 001b. letter | POTUS to President Ulmanis (1 page) | nd | P1/b(1) VZ |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 White House Office of Records Management-Subject File CF
 ME001
 OA/Box Number: CF1703

FOLDER TITLE:

281523SS

2011-1037-F
 kc1153

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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C. F.

6935

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

28152355

ME001

'98 OCT 15 PM 6:45

October 15, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (K) *FB*

SUBJECT: Letter to Latvian President Ulmanis

Purpose

To congratulate President Ulmanis for his leadership in securing approval, by a 53-44 percent margin, of an October 3 national referendum on amendments to Latvia's citizenship laws.

Background

These amendments abolish certain restrictions on naturalization, grant citizenship to stateless children born after the restoration of Latvian independence in 1991 and simplify naturalization tests for senior citizens. The amendments are fully consistent with international norms and remove a major impediment to improved relations with Russia.

Passage of the referendum is due in large part to the vision and courage of President Ulmanis. You sent Ulmanis several encouraging letters during this campaign. This letter commends his leadership and reaffirms our commitment to advancing Latvia's integration into the transatlantic community.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to President Ulmanis

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2023
2016-0314-M-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 10/14/98

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Congratulations on the positive outcome of the October 3 referendum on amendments to Latvia's citizenship and naturalization laws. I was delighted the Latvian people expressed a strong desire to put their laws into compliance with universal human rights standards. That democratically-made choice will promote cultural diversity while safeguarding Latvian language and traditions. It will also advance your integration into the European and transatlantic communities.

This success for Latvia is, in large part, attributable to your courageous advocacy of the new laws. Your many public statements, especially in the last days of the campaign, were important in ensuring that voters made an informed and enlightened choice. We will work with you, as we pledged in the Charter of Partnership, to facilitate implementing this new legislation.

I also congratulate you on Latvia's accession to the World Trade Organization on October 14. The United States remains firmly committed to helping your country more fully integrate into transatlantic and European institutions.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton ^A

His Excellency Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

*Returned to Staff Sec
10-16-98*

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 001-briefing | Meeting with American Community (2 pages) | 07/00/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Communications
Russell Horowitz
OA/Box Number: 6418

FOLDER TITLE:

Trip of the President to Latvia, Poland, Italy and Germany, July 6-12, 1994 [Binder] [1]

2011-1037-F
kc1160

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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MEETING WITH AMERICAN COMMUNITY

CONTEXT OF EVENT

This is your opportunity to make contact directly with the large and diverse [official] American community in Warsaw. Ambassador Nicholas Rey has been at post since the fall.

YOUR OBJECTIVE.

- o Acknowledge the work of Americans and their families representing the U.S. in Poland and the Polish employees who support them.
- o Note the broad scope of work the community is engaged in; new missions for a new Europe.

CORE POINTS (Text of remarks to be provided)

BACKGROUND

The Warsaw Embassy, a small Iron Curtain reporting post in 1989, is now hub of a strong American effort to help Poland complete its transformation. The official community numbers . . . At the Peace Corps presence is the largest in the world. The Embassy supports . . . long term advisors working directly for the Polish government, including a Military Liaison team of four officers working out of the Defense Ministry. We also have Consulates General in Krakow and Poznan.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 6/5/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 2013-08-11-1

Maria Edelman
Shielding the Flame

Jan Nowak
Courage from Warsaw

fighting for a Free Poland
mysterious deeds of heroes

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 001. memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Trip to Latvia, July 6 (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Visit to Latvia (3 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003a. briefing paper | Meeting and Signing Ceremony (3 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003b. report | report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/14/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004a. briefing paper | Working Lunch (4 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004b. report | report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004c. report | report (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 004d. report | report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(i) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005a. briefing paper | Radar Site (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005b. briefing paper | Troop Withdrawals (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005c. briefing paper | Russian Minority (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005d. briefing paper | Naval Base (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 First Lady's Office
 First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
 OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
 kc1151

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 005e. briefing paper | Latvia Political-Economic Overview (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005f. briefing paper | Estonia Political-Economic Overview (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005g. briefing paper | Lithuania Political-Economic Overview (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Trip to Poland, July 6-7, 1994 (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 007. memo | Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Trip to Poland (5 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 008. briefing | Arrival Ceremonies (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009a. briefing paper | Meeting (4 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009b. report | report (2 pages) | 04/28/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 010. briefing | Dinner (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 011. briefing | Wreath Laying (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 012. briefing | Ceremony (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 013a. briefing paper | Meeting (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 First Lady's Office
 First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
 OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
 kcl151

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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|-----------------------|--------------------------------|------------|----------------------|
| 013b. report | report (2 pages) | 06/16/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 013c. report | report (1 page) | 06/16/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 014a. briefing paper | Meeting (3 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 014b. report | report (2 pages) | 06/15/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 015. briefing | Speech (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 016. briefing | Ceremony (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 017. briefing | Reception (3 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 018. briefing | Meeting (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 019. briefing | Departure (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 020a. briefing paper | US Investment (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 020b. briefing paper | Partnership for Peace (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 020c. briefing paper | EU-Polish Relations (1 page) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

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 OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
 kcl151

RESTRICTION CODES

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|------------|----------------------|
| 020d. briefing paper | Bilateral Issues (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 020e. briefing paper | Initiatives Checklist (2 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 First Lady's Office
 First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
 OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
kcl151

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT:

Your Trip to Latvia, July 6

Your trip to Latvia is an historic visit. While only a short stop, you will be the first American President to visit the Baltic states. This visit will include a bilateral meeting and signing ceremony with Prime Minister Birkavs and a working lunch with the three Baltic Presidents. Your open air speech at Freedom Monument is expected to be publicly viewed by perhaps as many as ten thousand people. Your public remarks will be provided separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

ARRIVAL CEREMONY

BILATERAL AND SIGNING CEREMONY WITH PRIME MINISTER BIRKAUS

WORKING LUNCH WITH BALTIC PRESIDENTS

PRESS AVAILABILITY

SPEECH AT FREEDOM PLAZA

MEETING WITH LATVIAN POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS

MEETING WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VL NARA, Date 6/5/2023

2016-0314-M-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓
SUBJECT: Your Visit to Latvia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-m-1 (1,2)
6/12/2023 VL

OVERVIEW

Your seven-hour stop in Riga July 6 represents a highly symbolic and dramatic kickoff for your third trip to Europe this year. The symbolism lies in the message you convey by the very fact of your visit: America champions the sovereignty of the Baltic states and supports their reintegration into the Western fold, rejecting any pretension of a Russian sphere of influence in the region. The drama of your visit is historical. America sheltered the flame of Baltic independence during five decades of Soviet occupation. Your arrival as the first American President to set foot on Baltic soil constitutes a decisive affirmation of the rebirth of these three small states as independent nations. The theme of the continuing consolidation of a new post-Cold War Europe will recur at every stop of your trip, from your discussions with President Walesa, through your meeting with Yeltsin in a new political "G-8" in Naples, to your walk through the Brandenburg Gate in an undivided Berlin. But your visit to Riga, climaxed by an open air speech to thousands of Baltic citizens, will underscore in a simple yet powerful way the epochal nature of the change that has come to Europe.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Demonstrate our continued staunch support for the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States.
- o Highlight the importance of the Russian troop withdrawal this summer and our role in promoting it. Seek to bridge differences between Estonia and Russia on troop withdrawal talks.
- o Emphasize the continued security and economic integration of the Baltic states as a priority U.S. goal for the future.

BACKGROUND

Support for the Independence of the Baltic Countries. You meet this objective largely by the very fact of your visit, which has already generated great excitement among the governments and

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peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This central message of support resonates well among the Baltic people, who were by far the most Westernized in the former USSR and are looking firmly toward Europe and North America in search of full reintegration. They have not forgotten that the U.S. never recognized the Soviet Union's occupation from 1940 to 1991; that we maintained and financed their exiled legations to Washington during those five decades; and that we promptly returned the gold reserves that we safeguarded for their eventual independence.

History has taught the people of the Baltics to fear that their periods of sovereignty will be short-lived; many are convinced that a resurgent Russia will sooner or later threaten them once again. Your meeting in Riga with the three Baltic heads of state will send a clear message that we do not recognize a Russian "sphere of influence" in the region and will demonstrate that we are not willing to countenance Russia's presence in every part of the former Soviet Union. For these reasons, the Riga stop will also resonate at home with the nearly one million Baltic-Americans who have been so vocal and active with us and the Congress in support of Baltic independence.

Highlight the U.S. Role in Russian Troop Withdrawals. The central issue of your discussions in Riga and a major topic of your outdoor speech will be our involvement in promoting the final withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics this summer. Russian forces are out of Lithuania and will be close to gone from Latvia by the time you arrive. Russia and Estonia are nearing the end of their negotiations; we expect to be able to take advantage of your visit and your meeting with Yeltsin four days later, to promote final agreement there, as well. Specifically, we are encouraging Estonian President Meri to give you a letter in Riga with his near-bottom-line positions on the withdrawal talks for transferral to Yeltsin four days later in Naples. Coupled with the pullout from Germany in late August, agreement on the Estonian withdrawal means that the Russian military will, for the first time since 1945, be back inside the pre-WWII borders of the former Soviet Union.

The United States has been the most influential country in convincing the Russians to leave the Baltics. Although the previous administration began the battle, you can rightly claim the lion's share of the credit. Your personal diplomacy with Yeltsin, our funding of 5,000 houses for departing Russian officers and our financial assistance to dismantle the Skrunda ABM site have all been crucial tactical contributions to the success of the withdrawal talks.

While you can credibly defend the right of the Baltic states to live without Russian troops, you should also leave an important public message with the Baltic leaders and publics: they need to live in peace with Russia. This relates to the large ethnic Russian minority that will remain in the Baltics after the troops are gone. The Balts need to treat this group with decency and work to include them in the social and political fabric of their societies. This is consistent with the approach we have

maintained since you took office. It is also good politics for our relationship with Yeltsin and Russia.

The Future of U.S.-Baltic Relations. Much of the emphasis of your visit will be placed on our actions in the past to promote Baltic independence. The third major objective of your visit should be to talk about the future. There is concern that once the Russian troops are removed, America will forget about the Baltics. You can counter that argument by spelling out the remarkably broad program of cooperation that we envision in the economic and security spheres. We have welcomed all three states into PFP and will work to make theirs a meaningful membership through a \$10 million FY-95 program to help train the nascent Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. On the economic side, you will announce the \$50 million capitalization of the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund, sign a trade pact with the Latvians and look forward to further expansion of trade and investment through a Baltic business development mission this fall.

The economic success story of the Baltics will help reinforce the point that Western assistance alone cannot assure prosperity; privatization, growth and trade are the surest guarantees of longterm political stability and normal, neighborly relations with Russia. Our support for this continuing economic integration with the West will in many ways be our most durable and valuable legacy to the people and governments of the Baltic states.

KEY EVENTS

Baltic Presidents Lunch. This is the centerpiece of the visit, the original concept event for the trip. You will meet over lunch for an hour and a half with Presidents Meri, Brazauskas and Ulmanis in a structure as informal as we can make it in order to allow for a more relaxed and natural discussion. We expect a heavy focus on the Russian-Estonian withdrawal talks, there should also be a good exchange on economic and security issues of concern to the three Presidents.

Open Air Speech. Against the backdrop of Freedom Monument in downtown Riga, you will address a crowd in the surrounding square that could number well over ten thousand. The central theme of your brief remarks will be America's celebration of the Baltic rebirth of freedom and our determination to stand by the region as it completes its reintegration into the Western fold.

Latvian Bilateral Events. You will have a brief meeting with Latvian Prime Minister Birkavs, followed by a ceremony to sign the bilateral trade agreement. Later, President Ulmanis will host a reception where you will have the chance to meet Latvia's political, cultural and business leadership. The reception will be held in Riga's newly re-opened Stock Exchange.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BILATERAL MEETING AND SIGNING CEREMONY
WITH LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER BIRKAVS

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

This half-hour meeting and signing ceremony is a mark of appreciation for the Latvian government's agreement to act as host for your multilateral visit. Your interlocutor is Prime Minister Birkavs, whose role as head of government has been eclipsed in recent months by the need to conduct business at the Presidential level between you, Yeltsin and President Ulmanis, whose role in Latvian politics is largely ceremonial. Birkavs is also serving as Acting Foreign Minister following the resignation of the former FM over allegations he cooperated with the KGB before Latvia's independence.

The Latvian government is honored by your decision to visit Riga, and deeply appreciates your personal efforts to help Latvia and Russia sign the troop withdrawal agreement on April 30. The Russians have indicated that their pullout is likely to be completed before the August 31 deadline. In fulfillment of our commitment to help the Latvians dismantle the Skrunda radar site, a U.S. team recently visited Riga to begin coordinating the joint effort. We have now doubled our contribution to the Skrunda dismantlement fund, from \$2 million to \$4 million. The meeting will also afford an opportunity to reiterate our concerns about Latvia's draft citizenship law, which contains an unacceptably small quota for non-Latvians.

At the conclusion of your meeting, you and Prime Minister Birkavs will sign the Bilateral Trade Agreement, underscoring our support for Latvia's future integration into the Western economic fold.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Reassure Latvia about continuing U.S. interest in smooth implementation of the troop withdrawal agreement, citing Skrunda dismantlement and housing vouchers.
- o Stress our strong interest in strengthening bilateral relations through increased emphasis on trade and investment and broadening security ties.
- o Encourage passage of a generous and inclusive citizenship law.

Introduction and thanks

- o I want to reiterate my thanks to you and President Ulmanis for inviting me to Riga and acting as host for the meeting with Presidents Meri and Brazauskas.

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- o The statesmanship Latvia has displayed in concluding the troop withdrawal agreement with Moscow has earned the respect of all of us. We look forward to working with you and with Moscow to ensure full, timely implementation.

Skrunda dismantlement

- o When I met President Ulmanis in Washington in May, I told him we would provide at least \$2 million to fulfill our promise to help you take down the large structure at Skrunda.
- o An American team recently visited Skrunda and met your experts. We are well on the way to coordinating our efforts. But it appears dismantlement will cost more than we first thought.
- o We have identified another \$2 million in funding for the project; brings our total commitment to \$4 million. We will continue to encourage other states to contribute, as well.

Housing vouchers

- o We have tried to provide a real incentive for Russian compliance with the withdrawal deadline through our \$160 million program to resettle demobilized officers.
- o You have helped us by working with the Russians to identify specific officers who qualify for the program. We have increased the number of vouchers available from 1,000 to 2,500, split equally between Latvia and Estonia.

Bilateral issues

- o The troop withdrawal sends a positive signal to traders and investors. I am announcing today the board members of the Baltic American Enterprise Fund to be chaired by Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, President of the Atlantic Council, which will have \$50 million in investment capital to support private business development in the Baltics.
- o Looking forward to the Central Europe trade and investment conference in Washington this fall. Afterwards, we will send out a trade development mission to the Baltics, including participation by major U.S. firms.
- o Your active participation in Partnership for Peace will help strengthen your security ties to the West. We have also asked our Congress to provide \$10 million in FY95 funds to support regional peacekeeping forces, including the Baltic Peacekeeping battalion.

- o (IF ASKED ABOUT JOINTLY DEVELOPING RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SITE AT VENTSPILS AS A SCIENCE/TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER):
 - Intriguing proposal. Would be happy to explore details to see if we could make this work.
- o (IF ASKED ABOUT WILLINGNESS TO PURCHASE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDING IN RIGA, ENABLING LATVIA TO BUY NEW BUILDING IN D.C.):
 - I am told that our present tight budget still will not allow us to purchase the building here. If the funds become available, we will raise this with you again.

Naturalization law

- o Pleased that President Ulmanis remanded this law to parliament. We share view of CSCE and others that the citizenship quota is far too restrictive.
- o Encourage you to find ways to include your large Russian minority in political and social life of your country.
- o Know this is difficult issue here but we are convinced you will be better off in the long-term if Russians are treated fairly.

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| 003b. report | report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/14/1994 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
kc1151

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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3.5c

Valdis BIRKAVS
(Phonetic: BEERkavs)

LATVIA

*Prime Minister (since July 1993);
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since 7 June 1994)*

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

Declassified
in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1
(1.23) 6/12/2023
VZ



Valdis Birkavs has had to rely on his considerable legal expertise and political savvy to keep his minority coalition government on a proreform path, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c
He assumed the Foreign Ministry portfolio when his predecessor, Georgs Andrejevs, resigned—after admitting to having worked for the KGB in the early 1960s. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c
Birkavs will hold the post until a new minister is named, which they say may not be until the fall of 1994. He has been termed a crisp, clearheaded, tough-talking politician by the Baltic press. [redacted] 1.4(c)

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] 1.4(c) [redacted] 3.5c

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[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

The Prime Minister has steered the government toward areas that he considers key to transforming Latvia into a market economy and to drawing the country into Western organizations—economic reform continues to move forward, an agreement has been reached on Russian troop withdrawal, and Latvia has joined the Partnership for Peace program. However, Birkavs still faces the ethnically touchy issue of establishing a citizenship law, the resolution of which is needed for the country's incorporation into organizations such as the Council of Europe. [redacted] 3.5c

Birkavs was born on 27 July 1942 in Riga. After attending the Riga Polytechnic Institute, he performed his mandatory service in the Soviet army. Birkavs subsequently earned a law degree (with honors) from Latvian State University's law school in 1969. He also holds a Ph.D. in criminology. Birkavs began his career at the Latvian Justice Ministry's Forensic and Criminology Laboratory, which provides expert

witnesses for the court system. In 1988 he established the Latvian Lawyers' Association, the first independent bar organization in what was then the Soviet Union, and he was elected its first president. He became involved in the independence movement in 1990 when he was elected to the Saeima (parliament) as a proindependence Popular Front candidate. He served as one of the parliament's experts on legislation matters and, according to press reports, he frequently was sought out by other members of parliament for advice on procedure and phraseology; he became a deputy speaker in 1992. [redacted] 3.5c

The press describes Birkavs—who speaks English, Russian, and Latvian—as a refined intellectual. He admitted in an interview that because of his knowledge and experience, he never

[redacted] 3.5c

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(continued)
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3.5c

has suffered from an inferiority complex. Birkavs enjoys vacationing at his summer house by the Baltic Sea; he says that proximity to the sea provides him creative and physical freedom to think and write. He also enjoys sports—skiing, tennis, and sailing (in which he once competed at the international professional level). In a January 1994

basketball match, Birkavs led members of his Cabinet to victory over a team drawn from the Lithuanian Cabinet; he quickly fouled out of the game. Birkavs and his wife, Aina, have a son.

3.5c

14 June 1994

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WORKING LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENTS
OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This meeting is the centerpiece of your visit to the Baltics: an opportunity to convey to the Baltic heads of state, as a group, the assurances of America's commitment to the future of their independent nations and to the prosperity and development the Baltic region as a whole. All three Baltic Presidents deeply appreciate your personal involvement in promoting the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, and you will be able to provide them evidence of our commitment to ensure smooth implementation of the withdrawal agreements. The Estonian-Russian talks are at a sensitive endgame phase, and your discussions with President Meri may yield enough progress on the outstanding issues to allow the outlines of a final deal to take shape when you meet President Yeltsin in Naples on Sunday.

Beyond the troop withdrawal issue, though, this luncheon should focus on the future. History and geopolitical realities inspire deep pessimism among the Baltic people and their leaders. There is great fear of resurgent Russian nationalism and a lingering suspicion that America will put the Baltics on the back burner once the Russian troops are gone. There is also uncertainty, especially in Latvia and Lithuania, that a successful transition to a market economy is in sight. The single overriding message for you to leave with your Baltic counterparts is our determination to help them reintegrate into the Western security and economic fold and our rejection of the idea of a Russian "sphere of influence" in the Baltics. The surest guarantee of long-term Baltic sovereignty and prosperity lies in close integration with Europe and North America and, simultaneously, normal relations with a reforming, stable Russia. In this respect, the Baltic leaders will value your assurances that our relations with Russia remain healthy, resilient and realistic.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Hail progress in achieving full Russian troop withdrawal and our commitment to the implementation phase of the process.
- o Express readiness to help conclude the Russia-Estonia talks, specifically by carrying a message from President Meri to your meeting with Yeltsin in Naples.
- o Stress need for an enlightened policy of including the Russian ethnic minority in political and social life.
- o Make clear our steadfast support for Baltic security and economic integration with the West.

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- o Stress the strength of our ties with Moscow, but reject any suggestion of a Russian sphere of influence in the Baltics.

CORE POINTS

Russian Troop Withdrawals

- o Congratulations to all three on progress in withdrawal of Russian forces. These agreements will help you establish normal relations with your big neighbor and create a better climate for reforms and trade and investment.
- o August 31 is a firm deadline as far as we are concerned. We've told Russia that withdrawals cannot drag on past then. I believe Yeltsin is committed to deadline -- doesn't want this as a long-term problem in our relations.
- o We are committed to make these agreements work. Have made ready 2,500 housing vouchers so that departing officers can buy apartments in Russia. The Russians are responding. The first vouchers are already being handed over to qualified officers.
- o Our contribution to Skrunda dismantlement now totals \$4 million. We are providing over \$1 million to the international fund to help clean up Paldiski. We will also work closely within CSCE to monitor implementation.
- o Estonian-Russian talks seem close to final agreement. President Meri, we want to be helpful. I will see Yeltsin in Naples on Sunday; what will it take to close the deal? Can I be helpful?
- o I believe you need to close the deal with President Yeltsin personally and not allow this to go back to mid-level negotiators.

Separate points for Meri pull-aside:

- o Believe the Russians will accept that their officers have the same rights to privatize their flats as Estonians; no more no less. Will support you fully on this.
- o Regarding cutoff date for residence permit applications, urge you to be flexible. Our housing vouchers can "buy off" some of the disputed group.
- o On Paldiski reactors, key is the status of the facility. Russians will likely agree to civilian status for the interim period -- personnel would not wear uniforms. We will support you in pushing for shortest period -- 6-12 months.
- o Key is a signed agreement with date of August 31.

Russia and Russian Ethnic Minority

- o We've survived some rough spots in our relations with Russia. Yeltsin and I are committed to keeping things on track. We have learned to manage disagreements through frequent diplomatic consultation. Yeltsin and I call or write frequently to give direction and keep things moving.
- o We've been impressed by Chernomyrdin and his pragmatism on economic decisions. Vice President Gore has close personal relationship with him. Overall, reform process is still moving forward.
- o I mention this because a large part of your security depends on a stable, reforming Russia. Helping Russia make that hard transition is still my top foreign policy priority.
- o We reject any suggestion that the Baltics lie in any sort of Russian "sphere of influence." We are watching Russian actions closely in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but the Baltic states are in a completely different category. You are pointed westward and we want you to remain that way.
- o The Russian minority in your countries is a fact of life you must deal with. I know it's difficult. I urge you to find ways to include them in the social and political life of your countries, consistent with CSCE and other multilateral suggestions. Make it a priority to keep this problem manageable. Let us know how we can help.

Bilateral and Multilateral Security Relations

- o Expanding our security relations with your countries is a priority for us. It emphasizes our support for your sovereignty. The first sessions of the bilateral working groups on defense matters were a good start to build upon.
- o We strongly support your integration into the Euroatlantic community multilaterally. You are already playing a constructive role in the CSCE and NACC.
- o Now, we welcome you into the Partnership for Peace. Your membership will play a pivotal role in your integration.
- o I strongly support the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion initiative and have asked Congress to give us \$10 million in our FY95 budget to support this and other regional peacekeeping groups. The battalion is an excellent example of regional cooperation and a model for other Central and East European states.

Economic Cooperation and Support

- o Your progress toward building market democracies is remarkable. I realize that the battle is far from won and urge you to stay the course.

- o Our economic assistance for the Baltic region will fall a bit in the coming year, in line with cuts to all other countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
- o We have placed a renewed emphasis on trade and investment. I have just approved the board of the Baltic American Enterprise fund. It will be headed by Rozanne Ridgway, our former Ambassador to Finland and East Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for Europe. She is now President of the Atlantic Council.
- o I know you have been waiting a while for the Fund to start up. I have put it on a fast track to start making the first grants from its \$50 million before September.
- o The White House is also sponsoring a Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe this fall. Afterwards, we will send to your countries a major Baltic Business Development Mission, bringing many top U.S. firms with it.

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| 004b. report | report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
kel151

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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3.5c

Lennart MERI
(Phonetic: MAYree)

President (since 1992)

Addressed as: Mr. President

ESTONIA

Declassified
in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1
(1.25) 6/12/2023
VZ



Estonia's first president since 1940, Lennart Meri
EO 13526 1.4c is publicly
committed to integrating his country with the West
and eradicating the vestiges of 50 years of Soviet
occupation. He is adamant in urging the withdrawal
of Russian military forces from Estonian territory by
31 August 1994 and does not pass up an opportunity
to assail their continued presence in talks with
Western officials and in the press. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Meri did avoid major conflict with Russia in July
1993 when he rejected at the eleventh hour an anti-
Russian Aliens Law that would have put tight
restrictions on granting citizenship to non-Estonians.

EO 13526 1.4c he remains
sensitive to Moscow's charges of discrimination
against ethnic Russians living in Estonia. 3.5c

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EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Soviets. After returning to his homeland after World
War II, Meri graduated from Tartu University in
1953 with a degree in history. He was a well-known
reformist intellectual before entering politics in the
late 1980s, having spent much of the preceding three
decades as a radio editor, documentary filmmaker,
and author of books on Finnic-Ugric ethnic groups
in the Soviet Union. By 1989, Meri had emerged as
a prominent member of the independence-minded
Popular Front. After serving as Foreign Minister, he
was Ambassador to Finland for several months.

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EO 13526 1.4c

Background and Personal Notes

Meri is an ethnic Estonian. He was born on
29 March 1929 in Tallinn, the son of a post-World
War I Estonian diplomat who had served in Paris
and Berlin. In 1941, his family was deported to
Siberia after the republic was occupied by the

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EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c . He is capable of carrying on several conversations in multiple languages simultaneously—in addition to his native Estonian, he speaks English, French, German, Finnish, Italian, Danish, and Swedish. Meri is an electronics junkie and has many phones. His wife, Helle, is about 30 years his junior and is an actress and an opera singer. The couple has a young daughter, Tulle, who was born around 1985. Meri also has two sons from a previous marriage. 3.5c

17 June 1994

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|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004d. report | report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]

2011-1037-F
kc1151

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Algirdas Mikolas BRAZAUSKAS
(Phonetic: brahZOWskas)

President (since February 1993)

Addressed as: Mr. President

LITHUANIA

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Algirdas Brazauskas is [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c
[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

[redacted] 1.4(c) his country's most popular politician in a poll published in March 1994.

[redacted] 3.5c

Brazauskas supports cultivating good relations with Western countries, especially the United States. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c He has energetically expanded economic and security ties with the West, and he was the first Baltic leader to apply for NATO membership. He wants to attract Western investment, but he has warned that Lithuania also needs to improve relations with its eastern neighbors, according to press reports. Brazauskas, who has publicly noted Lithuania's dependence on Russia as its main energy supplier, has made liberalizing trade with Russia a top priority. [redacted] 3.5c

Party Politics

Brazauskas was born on 22 September 1932. He holds a candidate's degree in both construction engineering and economics (roughly equivalent to a Ph.D. in this country). After a Soviet apparatchik career in successive positions of increasing responsibility in the construction and supply sector and in the Communist Party apparatus of Lithuania, Brazauskas was named first secretary of Lithuania's Communist Party in 1988. In late 1989 he drew the

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proindependence Lithuanian Communist Party out from under the umbrella of the Soviet Communist Party. The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party was formed from the remnants of that party in 1990, and he headed it until April 1993. After Lithuania gained independence in 1991, Brazauskas unsuccessfully ran for chairman of the parliament.

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United States

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c) Married to a retired doctor, he has twin daughters and several grandchildren.

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Personal Notes

17 June 1994

Brazauskas does not speak English but reads it well. He speaks Russian and Polish, as well as Lithuanian. He has traveled widely, including to the

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SKRUNDA RADAR SITE: DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE

The radar facility at Skrunda, Latvia comprises three large ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars. Two older radars were constructed during the 1960's to track northern Europe and especially the Northeast Atlantic. They were fully operational by 1971, predating the 1972 ABM Treaty. Each radar consists of two antenna buildings with a control building between them. These are the radars that the Russians will run for four more years under the troop withdrawal agreement with Latvia. It provides Russia time to replace this coverage with facilities either in Moscow or Belarus.

Construction of the third site, a large phased-array radar (LPAR), began in 1986 in order to replace the older Hen House radars. These buildings were near external completion when construction was halted in early 1992. Although inoperable, the 18-storied skyscraper stands as a symbolically ominous reminder to Latvians of Soviet/Russian presence. For this reason the Latvians want the LPAR destroyed quickly. Our \$4 million dismantlement assistance package is designed to help them do so.

On April 30, 1994, the Latvians and Russians signed a troop withdrawal agreement that included Russia's consent to turn over the LPAR immediately to Latvian control. Under the terms of agreement, the CSCE is to establish a mission to help monitor implementation of the Skrunda provisions (4 years of continued operation by the Russians plus another 18 months for dismantlement). We are encouraging the Latvians and the Russians in Vienna to give the CSCE an idea of the composition and mandate for the CSCE mission.

The Latvians have now taken over the LPAR, although Russians guard the site. In addition to our \$4 million toward dismantlement, the Swedes have also committed \$1 million and the British have agreed to help resolve Latvia's environmental concerns over radio waves from the site. We have asked other Western donors to contribute to this project.

An interagency technical assessment team visited Latvia in mid-June to assess dismantlement parameters and to determine project costs. The team will assist in preparation of bid specifications for contractors to complete demolition as soon as possible.

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RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS

The issue of Russian troop withdrawals is a genuine U.S. foreign policy success story. Our strategy to get those troops out has been threefold.

The first approach has been to use our good offices with the Baltic states in reassuring them of continued U.S. support for their sovereignty and independence long after the troops are gone. We have done this through high-level visits and telephone calls, establishing a normal defense and security relationship bilaterally and through Partnership for Peace and cooperating with the Baltic states and Russians on dismantling and cleaning up Russian military facilities that symbolically pose a threat to Baltic security (the Paldiski nuclear training reactor and Skrunda radar).

The parallel approach has been to work with the Baltic states to ensure that they treat their ethnic Russian populaces equitably. We have done this through establishment of resident CSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia and multilateral programs to support the teaching of Estonian and Latvian to the Slavic communities, for example.

Along with our Russian officer housing program to relocate retired military officers to Russia, we have repeatedly reminded the Russian Government at the highest levels of its international commitment to withdraw its troops speedily and unconditionally no later than August 31, 1994.

Lithuania

The Defense Ministers of Lithuania and Russia signed an agreement on September 8, 1992 calling for complete Russian troop withdrawals by August 31, 1993. Despite a last-minute suspension of the withdrawals by the Russian government, active intervention by the U.S. and other Western governments ensured that the deadline was met. Lithuania continues to express solidarity with its Baltic neighbors in calling for Russia to withdraw its forces from Estonia and Latvia by August 31, 1994.

Like most Baltic Sea states, Lithuania remains deeply concerned about the excessive concentration of Russian troops in neighboring Kaliningrad (any resupply of these troops must go either by sea or, more practically, by rail through Lithuania) and would like to see a substantial number of these troops withdrawn.

Latvia

In order to promote a Latvian-Russian troop withdrawal agreement, at the Moscow Summit in January you suggested a compromise of four years and 18 months for the continuing operation and

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subsequent dismantlement of the Skrunda radar facility. Yeltsin accepted the compromise, and the Latvian Government also agreed to it.

That compromise formed the basis for the resolution of remaining issues, and Presidents Ulmanis and Yeltsin signed a troop withdrawal agreement on April 30. Less than 7,000 Russian soldiers now remain in Latvia, and Russia has stated that it will withdraw most of the rest by as early as July 31. The Russian navy already departed on June 1.

Estonia

Negotiators admit that more than 90% of the issues connected with a troop withdrawal agreement were resolved long ago. No progress was made until recently when, at your initiative, Russia agreed to raise its level of representation in the talks. FM Kozyrev and Estonian President Meri held a productive private meeting in Tallinn on May 25, and Russian DFM Churkin traveled to Tallinn the next week to negotiate directly with FM Luik. Despite some progress, the negotiations have again stalled over three main issues:

Application for residence permits by retired officers. The Estonians insist that applicants must have retired before August 21, 1991 (their "independence day") to be considered. The Russians want a broader formulation: anyone can apply, and the Estonians can deny whomever they want based on their laws. We are recommending that the Estonians throw in the towel here and accept the Russian formula; we have told them that we will front-load our housing vouchers in favor of the post-August 21 group they are concerned about.

Housing for retired officers. Moscow has revived an earlier position that retired officers should have an automatic right to privatize and thus take cost-free ownership of the apartments they live in. Even Estonians do not have this right; they must buy the right to privatize. Here, the Russians need to give.

Paldiski. This is the naval nuclear reactor training facility that the Russians are abandoning. They want the right to remove the fissile core and unspecified "secret" parts, which means they would need to remain at the facility for some time after the August 31 withdrawal date. The Estonians want all troops out by that date. The obvious, Skrunda-like solution is for the two sides to agree on an interim period (6-12 months is reasonable) for "civilianized" (i.e., non-uniformed) Russian personnel to carry out the defueling and related work.

Now that the United States, Sweden and other nations will be active in a multilateral effort on environmental cleanup of the two land-based nuclear submarine training reactors at Paldiski, this issue also should be easily resolved. The Energy Department has committed its support for this effort with a package of evaluation and training measures worth approximately \$2 million.

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THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTIC STATES

Aside from our usual human rights concerns, a major part of our strategy to promote the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States has been to press for fair and equitable treatment of the Russian minority. Russia routinely accuses Estonia and Latvia of massive violations of the human rights of their large Russian-speaking population, and often some Russian officials have tried to link these issues with the troop withdrawal issue.

We have supported the visits to Estonia and Latvia of numerous international human rights experts from non-government and inter-governmental organizations. We have agreed with their conclusions that there is no pattern of human rights violations there. Estonia accepted a CSCE mission in December 1992, and Latvia accepted a CSCE mission in November 1993. We are very pleased with the results of these missions in resolving a number of problems, such as the Aliens Law controversy in Estonia and the provocative behavior of the former Latvian Citizenship and Naturalization Department Director. The CSCE mission in Latvia is headed by an American Foreign Service Officer.

Lithuania

Ethnic Russians comprise only seven percent of Lithuania's population, and most of them automatically became citizens under Lithuania's liberal citizenship law of December, 1991. Unlike its Baltic neighbors, Lithuania did not experience a dramatic proportional rise in the number of postwar non-ethnic Lithuanians. This happened because border adjustments reintroduced a large number of ethnic Lithuanians. In addition, Stalin's Russification policy was not implemented as harshly in agricultural Lithuania as elsewhere.

Estonia

Estonia generally has taken a very pragmatic course in addressing the issue of its large ethnic Russian noncitizen community. Roughly 38 percent of its inhabitants are noncitizens; about 33 percent are ethnic Russian, most of whom live in the urban, industrialized Northeast. Estonia allowed its noncitizens to vote in municipal elections and granted citizenship to practically all noncitizens who wanted to run to office. For the elderly and handicapped, Estonia has dropped its language requirement for citizenship, and its citizenship law requires only a three-year residency, two years of which are retroactive. Estonia agreed to most of the revisions proposed by the CSCE to its Law on Aliens from last summer, which substantially eased a potential crisis in Russian-Estonian relations.

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Latvia

Latvia has taken a much more hesitant and legalistic approach to dealing with its large noncitizen community. Part of this may be related to the dynamics of the troop withdrawal process and part from doubts about the loyalty of these ethnics, even though they have not shown an inclination toward organizing politically. As in Estonia, a majority of ethnic Russians supported independence. However, a large number did not and are overwhelmingly anti-Yeltsin in sentiment. Few speak Latvian. While ethnic Russians comprise about the same percentage of the population as in Estonia, ethnic Slavs are 48 percent of Latvia's inhabitants and control an estimated 80 percent of the economy. The law on naturalization, with its strict quota system is contentious and unacceptable to us and most other European countries. We encouraged Latvia to review this aspect of the draft law, and it has been remanded to the Parliament for more work.

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PALDISKI NAVAL BASE

The Soviet Navy used Paldiski as a warm-water port since the late 1940s. Construction of the land-based nuclear submarine training facility that houses two reactors began in the 1960s. By 1989, however, the navy declared the reactors unsafe and obsolete and ordered them shut down. The military base reverted to Estonian control in August 1993, but the nuclear training facility remains under Russian control.

Russia made a commitment to decommission and dismantle the reactors at Paldiski and is expected to begin removing the reactors this summer in accordance with a plan that was discussed with an international group of nuclear experts.

During a recent visit, the Estonian Prime Minister mentioned the importance of U.S. support for a multilateral effort to help clean up the Paldiski site. The Energy Department has committed its support for this effort with a package of evaluation and training measures worth approximately \$2 million. The Swedish government has already committed \$1.25 million to this cleanup project, and it appears likely that other interested governments in the region will also join the effort once the United States officially participates.

By helping the Estonians and Russians eliminate radioactive risks, U.S. involvement in a Paldiski cleanup program will also ensure smooth implementation of Russia's pledge to clean the area of other hazardous materials. A multilateral program with substantial U.S. participation will help prevent future Estonian-Russian disputes over this matter and thereby enhance regional security and stability.

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By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2023
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LATVIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The Latvian Ambassador calls Latvia "a nation of lawyers" in mentality. Culturally, Latvians most reflect their Lutheran German heritage and emulate Swedes. The Latvian language is neither Slavic nor Germanic, but a Baltic tongue related to Lithuanian. Under Hanseatic and German influence since the 13th century, Latvia always has used its geographic location as an important commercial trading center.

After 200 years of continuous Russian rule, a bloody civil war erupted in 1918 when part of the independence movement sided with the Bolsheviks. By 1920, the Germans and Bolsheviks were defeated. Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis, uncle of the current President, headed the independence struggle and the first independent government. Before the Depression Latvia's minorities enjoyed cultural autonomy, the economy reformed and recovered. As in the other Baltic States, the mid-1930's brought authoritarian rule to Latvia.

Soviet and Nazi invasions during World War II reduced Latvia's population by one-third by 1945. During that decade, about 60,000 were deported to Siberia, and thousands fled to the West. The Soviets radically colonized and urbanized Latvia by bringing in thousands of Slavic industrial workers.

In March 1990, democratic elections gave the Popular Front independence movement a majority in the Supreme Council. In January 1991, shortly after a parallel attempt in Lithuania, Soviet political and military forces tried to overthrow the Latvian government. Eight people were killed. Latvia regained its independence in the wake of the aborted Soviet coup in August 1991.

Latvia's economic situation is steadily improving. The country enjoys a positive trade balance, relatively restrained inflation, and a very stable currency. Latvia still imports 90 percent of its energy from the NIS. De facto agricultural privatization also has occurred. Ethnic Slavs comprise 48 percent of the populace and control an estimated 80 percent of the economy.

Latvia signed a troop withdrawal agreement with Russia on April 30, paving the way for the departure of Russia's remaining 7,000 or so troops by August 31, 1994. The Russian navy already has departed, and the troops may be gone by as early as July 31. About 800 Russian technicians will remain to operate the Skrunda radar facility for another four years under CSCE supervision.

With the withdrawal agreement, Latvia now needs to focus on privatization as well as citizenship and naturalization legislation. The Latvian citizenship law emerged from Parliament with unacceptably low quotas for citizenship by non-Latvians

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(i.e., Russians), in direct contradiction to suggestions from CSCE and the Council of Europe for greater inclusivity. President Ulmanis has remanded the law back to Parliament for a rewrite. The United States has defended Latvia's human rights record against Russian accusations. We remain engaged in the issue and have supported the presence of a resident CSCE mission to promote harmonious relations between ethnic Russians and Latvians.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, Latvia seeks GATT membership and associate membership status in the EU. Latvia actively pursues Western security relationships and enthusiastically supports Partnership for Peace (PFP).

The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Latvia on July 28, 1922, and reestablished ties on September 2, 1991. Latvian representation in the U.S. continued uninterrupted for over 70 years. The U.S. never recognized the forcible incorporation of Latvia into the USSR. About 85,000 Americans of Latvian descent play an active role in bilateral relations.

Latvia enjoys MFN status and GSP privileges. We will sign a Bilateral Trade and Intellectual Property Protection Agreement during your visit. In 1993, Latvia exported to the U.S. \$22.6 million and imported \$89.5 million, the latter being chiefly agricultural commodities under concessional programs. American firms registered \$35 million out of a total \$110 million in foreign investment. The U.S. is the largest Western investor in Latvia and, by far, Kellogg's is the biggest single U.S. investor.

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ESTONIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

A Nordic people closely akin to the Swedes culturally and the Finns linguistically, Estonians did not enjoy national independence until the interwar period. That Republic enjoyed relative economic prosperity but suffered political instability. Then, as now, personalities rather than real issues determined politics.

The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact brought an end to Estonian independence by 1940. The next decade brought 10,000 Soviet deportations and 5,500 deaths in Nazi camps. Ten percent of the population fled to the West. Soviet rule brought large numbers of urban Slavic immigrants to industrialize Estonia's northeast.

Nevertheless, Estonia remained a window on the West and enjoyed a relatively extensive range of contacts with Finland through August 20, 1991, when it regained independence in the wake of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union. The transition to independence was entirely bloodless.

Estonia has generally done a good job in managing the ethnic Russian issue, both in domestic terms as well as in its bilateral relations with Russia. The United States has defended Estonia's human rights record against exaggerated accusations. We will continue to remain engaged in the issue and have supported the presence of a resident CSCE mission to promote harmonious relations between ethnic Russians and Estonians.

Estonia is a regional role model for reform. It has a balanced budget, free trade, annual inflation under 30% and a stable currency. Privatization is occurring at a relatively fast clip, except in the heavily Russian-ethnic Northeast. Barely 25% of its trade is with the NIS. Over 90% of small and medium-sized firms are in private hands, while two-thirds of large firms have been privatized. Only agricultural privatization lags.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an association partner of the WEU, Estonia seeks GATT membership. Estonia actively pursues Western security relationships and eagerly signed on to Partnership for Peace (PFP).

Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over \$33 million to Estonia's economic transformation and to address humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program is now over \$6 million.

Estonia's phased graduation from AID's assistance programs, to be completed by 1996, recognizes Estonia's position at the vanguard of Eastern European reform. In 1993, Estonian trade with the

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United States amounted to \$20 million in exports and \$54 million in imports, the latter being mainly agricultural commodities under concessional programs. U.S. investment, consisting of about 145 firms, makes up \$20 million of \$185 million in foreign investment in Estonia.

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LITHUANIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Lithuania is a staunchly Catholic nation with a strong sense of national identity dating back to its glory days as a medieval empire, when it stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Subsequently tied in a union with Poland for centuries, Lithuania was an independent nation again from 1918 to 1940, when it was annexed by the USSR.

Under the leadership of intellectuals, the Lithuanian reform movement Sajudis was formed in mid-1988, declaring a program of democratic and national rights. After 50 years of occupation, in 1990 the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared Lithuania independent from the Soviet Union. The USSR responded with the imposition of a harsh economic blockade, and in January 1991 unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the elected government, killing 13 civilians and injuring hundreds. Lithuania finally regained its full independence in August 1991.

Politico-economic gridlock and economic mismanagement returned the former Communists to power in elections in the autumn of 1992, but they have not fared much better than their predecessors. Politics traditionally has been marred by a disorganized but effectively disruptive opposition.

The new currency is very stable, and inflation has been brought under control (about a 30 percent annual rate). However, economic reform has stalled. Because it won on the premise of improving social conditions, the Government has shied away from making tough fiscal/privatization decisions. Although it finally passed comprehensive privatization legislation this spring, the opposition has now succeeded in forcing a public referendum on the Government's plan.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an associate partner of the WEU, Lithuania also seeks GATT membership. Lithuania actively pursues Western security relationships, has formally applied to join NATO, and already has submitted its presentation document for Partnership for Peace (PFP).

Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over \$66 million to Lithuania's economic and political transformation and to address humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program totals over \$9 million. In 1993 Lithuania exported \$16.1 million in goods to the U.S. and imported \$56.8 million, primarily agricultural commodities under concessional programs. U.S.-Lithuanian firms registered 235 of 3,674 foreign joint ventures, and of \$115 million in total foreign investment, the U.S. holds a \$35 million share. Philip Morris is a major investor.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Poland, July 6-7, 1994

Your visit to Poland includes meetings with President Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak, a state dinner hosted by Walesa, a major speech at the Polish parliament, an informal meeting/reception with assembled CEE Foreign Ministers and ceremonial events connected with the Polish and Jewish communities. Your public remarks will be provided separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

ARRIVAL CEREMONIES

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT WALESZA

PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH PRESIDENT WALESZA

STATE DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT WALESZA

WREATH LAYING AT TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

CEREMONY AT WARSAW GHETTO MEMORIAL

COURTESY MEETING WITH SPEAKERS OF BOTH HOUSES

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAWLAK

SPEECH AT THE POLISH PARLIAMENT

CEREMONY AT WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL

RECEPTION WITH CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS

AMERICAN COMMUNITY EVENT

DEPARTURE CEREMONIES

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/6/2023
2016-0314-M-1

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓
SUBJECT: Your Trip to Poland

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OVERVIEW

You visit Poland July 6-7, just after Riga and before the G-7 Summit and German/EU stops. The Warsaw stop is bilateral; Secretary Christopher will hold a concurrent Ministerial with his Central and East European counterparts. Your events include meetings with President Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak, a speech at Parliament, a meeting with the CEE foreign ministers and ceremonial events. With you will be U.S. business executives, American Jewish and Polish-American Community leaders and Lane Kirkland.

Poland pioneered the communist world's democratic transformation in 1989 and has made major, even inspiring, strides. But success is not assured and remaining problems are daunting. The economy is growing rapidly but unevenly. Large-scale unemployment and other social stresses from wrenching change weakened support for reform. The outcome was the victory, in September 1993 elections, of parties with roots in the old regime. Reforms have been maintained but are at risk. The widespread and corrosive sense of economic insecurity is compounded by Poles' sense of exposure to the unstable NIS and, in their view, a deteriorating Russia. Many Poles fear the West will never accept CEE, but keep it at arms length as a vulnerable buffer zone.

Poland represents a key test of our objective of enlarging the world's community of market democracies. If Poland "makes it" -- carries its democratic and market transformation to irreversibility -- then our goals for the post-communist world will be vindicated in a major post-communist country. The outcome in Poland is up to the Poles, not us. Poland is close to success. What we say and do can make a difference while Poland and the post-communist world stand at a critical balance.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Confirm to the Poles and all CEE's that we welcome their membership in the family of democratic nations.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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- o Support continued market economic reforms by emphasizing Poland's tremendous strides since 1989 and offering new initiatives.
- o Support Polish efforts to ameliorate human problems created by the collapse of the Soviet-style economic system.
- o Reassure an apprehensive Polish society that America remains committed to it and its future in Europe; that Russia does not have a veto over Poland's integration with the West; that you are prepared to advance NATO's stated objective of expansion to Eastern democracies.

POLAND'S PROGRESS; POLAND'S PROBLEMS

The Economic Dimension. Poland invented "shock therapy" market reforms and proved these bring results. What Poles call "Poland A" -- fast-track, modernizing, entrepreneurial -- has made major gains. After an initial sharp decline (18% of GDP), the economy grew at 4% in 1993 and may do even better this year, one of Europe's best rates. GDP is over 50% private. While core heavy industries are still state owned, manufacturing is about 40% private and that share is rising; construction and services are overwhelmingly private. Warsaw and other big cities are transformed, with growing middle classes and pockets of affluence.

But millions are left behind. "Poland B" -- insecure, depressed, disoriented -- represents the majority of the country. Unemployment has levelled off at 16% but is uneven: single digit in Warsaw and 25% or higher in some areas. Workers in some heavy industries and the public sector -- used to socialist-era entitlements -- have seen living standards drop and insecurity rise. New opportunities are abundant in some big cities but sparse in the provinces. Housing shortages limit workers' ability to move to jobs in dynamic areas. Crime is growing and it feeds a sense of insecurity. Around 20% of the country may be considered middle class or better; about 20% impoverished; the remainder is just getting by.

Poland's economic hardships result from the collapse of the Soviet trading system, recession in Western Europe, inherent deficiencies of communist economies and Poland's transformation to a market system. But many Poles blame the reforms for all their difficulties. Poland's lesson is that a flourishing private sector is necessary for successful reform, but not sufficient. Democratic government has a role in providing necessary services, regulation and helping people whom the new economy has not yet reached. Without this, reform's political base may erode faster than the new economy can strengthen it.

The Political Dimension. The Solidarity forces which took power in 1989 knew their political base might erode before they turned the economy around. The economic upturn they counted on arrived, but too late and too unevenly. September 1993 elections brought to power a coalition of the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance

(SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), which used to be a communist front in the farm areas. PSL's leader Waldemar Pawlak took over as Prime Minister; SLD reformers took the difficult economic portfolios. Walesa, exercising his constitutional power, named the foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers. Strains among these power centers are growing.

Leaving behind their anti-reform campaign rhetoric, SLD leaders have continued the economic reforms of previous Solidarity-based governments. Most top SLD leaders appear to be genuine converts to democracy and market reforms. But PSL tends toward social conservatism and statism. Their electorates -- SLD's industrial and some white collar workers and pensioners and PSL's peasants -- are ambivalent about reform, tempted by protectionism and inflationary subsidies. The prospect of integration into the West, emotional attachment to the U.S. and a deep desire to be part of a "normal" country has persuaded Pawlak and his PSL to acquiesce in reform. But unless more is done to address social strains feeding disillusionment, reform could be badly damaged.

The Security Dimension. The Poles, Walesa especially, push security as the core of the relationship. Like most CEE's, Poles feel exposed to what they see as a chaotic NIS and a neo-imperialist Russia. They do not feel immediately threatened but fear the West will, perhaps tacitly, allow Russia to reassume hegemony in CEE. The Polish government -- including Walesa in a recent letter to you -- has focussed on a request for \$25 million in bilateral military support and on NATO's expansion as symbolic of our intentions. Their concerns are often put in stark terms; they are quick to suspect the worst about a U.S. or NATO "special relationship" with Russia. Politically, lack of confidence in the West works against reformers committed to the Western option.

Warsaw's concerns are exaggerated but reflect Polish history. The Poles know the importance of a positive outcome in Russia. But they seek assurances that we will not, for the sake of our Russian equities, sacrifice them; that the road is open to Poland's (and CEE's) integration into the West; that NATO's expansion to new democracies is, as you said in Prague, a matter of when and how. The Poles seek an expanded NATO to include CEE, a strengthened NATO-Russian relationship, and more robust European institutional ties (e.g., via CSCE). After initial grousing, the Poles accepted PFP and are playing an active role; the first PFP exercise on former Warsaw Pact territory, scheduled for September, will take place in Poland, including U.S. forces. The Poles want a robust exercise.

OUR AGENDA

The Entrepreneurial Side. We should emphasize to Pawlak in particular that Poland's achievements in quelling inflation and achieving stability can still be undone; that an erosion of support for restructuring and privatization can leave the economy at an untenable half-way point on the verge of success. You can note past, ongoing and future U.S. efforts. Aside from bilateral assistance, we have taken the lead in coordination between the

U.S., EU, IFI's and key Western governments in providing economic support and assistance. You will be able to announce:

- A \$65 million Poland Partners Fund -- result of your Prague initiative to increase OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) engagement in CEE. Half the Fund comes from U.S. labor unions.
- An initiative to provide at least \$75 million equity for newly-privatized firms, working with the Enterprise Fund and EBRD.

The Social and Human Side. Your Administration recognizes the importance of attention to the human impact of economic dislocation. You announced this shift of approach in Prague and we have since sought to put it in programmatic terms. We should not suggest the U.S. or any outsider can resolve these problems, or that we should no longer stress continued macroeconomic stabilization and privatization. But we have worked with the Poles, and IFI's and the EU, to develop programs for the benefit of those who have suffered greatly as a result of economic decline. As examples of our efforts, you can announce:

- A micro-lending program to help set up businesses, targeted at high unemployment areas.
- A sustained effort to increase Polish housing construction -- perhaps the most depressed sector in the economy -- both by accelerating existing programs and setting up pilot demonstration projects.
- Joint efforts with the Poles to modernize their pension, welfare and health policy systems.
- A regional law enforcement initiative to fight white collar and organized crime.

Security and Poland's Integration. While deflecting exaggerated Polish concerns, you should confirm our interest in Polish security, our rejection of a Russian veto over CEE's integration into the West or a "special relationship" with NATO at CEE's expense and our intention to proceed on the course you charted in January. We then said NATO would expand and PFP was the best road to that expansion. We also said we would reorient bilateral military programs with CEE to support PFP. You can take next steps by announcing:

- Our intention that NATO expand on country-by-country basis, not just in the event of failure of democratic reform in Russia.
- The political bases for eventual NATO membership, including democracy, market economies and responsible security policies.

- Offer to seek \$100 million including \$25 million for Poland, starting in FY '96, for military cooperation with new Partners to support PFP initiatives.
- U.S. willingness to support a meaningful PFP exercise in Poland this September, the first to be held on former Warsaw Pact territory.

Bilateral Issues

- We may be able during the visit to exchange Instruments of Ratification for our Bilateral Economic Treaty (BET). You would simply note the event.
- As Pawlak mentioned in Prague, the Poles want to conclude our bilateral agreement on Poland's GATT reaccession. Final issues include poultry quotas and aircraft and semi-conductor tariffs.
- We are concerned about an on-again, off-again Polish tank sale to Iran.
- We have asked the Poles to set aside the sentence of former Polish Colonel Kuklinski, who, motivated by ideology, worked nine years for the CIA before being exfiltrated in 1981. This is sensitive in Poland.
- The Poles have pressed hard for Vice President Gore to attend their 50th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising.

EVENTS

Meetings with Walesa and PM Pawlak. The Walesa meeting will take place the first evening, followed by a press availability and State Dinner. You should discuss security, urge continued reforms and convey our awareness of social dislocation. With Pawlak the next day, you can stress market reforms and discuss our initiatives in greater detail.

Wreath Layings. You have three: the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; a monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, accompanied by American Jewish Community leaders and; a monument to the Warsaw Uprising, whose 50th Anniversary falls August 1, accompanied by a Polish-American group. The Uprising is deeply-felt by all Poles.

Speech. You will address the Polish Parliament and guests the second day, also meeting briefly beforehand with the Marshals (speakers) of Parliament's two Houses.

CEE Foreign Ministers. After the speech you and Walesa will meet with the CEE Foreign Ministers, who will have held a Ministerial with Secretary Christopher.

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ARRIVAL CEREMONIES AT
WARSAW OKECIE AIRPORT, PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The Poles organize a set-piece arrival ceremony for every Official Visit. Your ceremony will be different because airport ceremony will be very brief and the major protocolary event will take place at the newly-renovated Presidential Palace (the Radziwill Palace). There will be no arrival statements.

BACKGROUND

Airport. You will be met by Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski (o-la-HOFF-ski) and other Polish government officials. Among them will be Jan Piekarski, (pye-KAR-ski), the new Deputy Chief of Protocol but until recently head of the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad. Piekarski earned high praise (and a Superior Honor Award) from the State Department and deep thanks from Senator Boren for his work, including efforts on behalf of an arrested American citizen. Also among them will be newly-named Ambassador to the U.S. Jerzy Kozminski (kozh-MEEN-ski), whose credentials you accepted in June.

For the U.S., Ambassador Nicholas Rey and Mrs. Rey will be present, and others from the Embassy. Rey is a direct descendent of Mikolaj Rej, the greatest literary figure of the Polish Renaissance.

You will walk through an honor guard cordon to your limousine and depart for the Marriott Hotel.

Presidential Palace. This is a set piece, rather elaborate ceremony taking place both outside and inside the Palace.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2023
2016-0314-M-1

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MEETING WITH
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESZA

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Walesa (va-WHEN-sa) considers himself the guarantor of Polish reforms; President since 1990, he has used his limited constitutional powers to push and prod Poland's market transformation and integration into the West. As you recall, Walesa's style combines deliberate (and frustrating) unpredictability, metaphors either colorful or opaque and natural forcefulness. Sometimes insightful and inspired, Walesa can be abrupt or rambling. Despite occasional populist rhetoric, Walesa has supported reform at virtually every difficult moment -- and there have been many -- even at considerable political cost to himself.

Walesa has held center stage in Poland since 1980, but in recent years his popularity has dropped sharply (only 25% support him, according to a recent poll). This stems partly from Walesa's difficulty in finding a Presidential as opposed to Tribune's voice, partly from his solo leadership style and partly from disillusionment with the reform program. Walesa will run for reelection in late 1995; he has not decided whether to run as an "anti-communist" outsider against the current government or as a Presidential figure above politics. He may look to his standing in the West to help him at home.

Despite an appreciation of the West's support before and after 1989, Walesa is uncertain of the West's commitment to CEE. He has more faith in the U.S. than in Western Europe, but worries we are tempted by isolationism or a "naive" pro-Russian tilt. Walesa has stated that the West's response to the democratic breakthrough in 1989 was inadequate and stressed to visitors that the overwhelming majority of Poles has suffered deprivation in the wake of the Communist collapse. He believes that the West should be of greater help to Poland.

Security will be central to Walesa's agenda -- he regards as inevitable Russia's return to neo-imperialism. He will press for movement on NATO expansion and assurance that Poland will not be left in an insecure "grey zone" outside the West. He has again staked out a position on NATO expansion and requested bilateral security assistance (\$25 million to support PFP activities), though less aggressively than before the Prague Summit. The Poles will host PFP's first exercise on former Warsaw Pact territory this September; we will take part. The Poles want a "muscular" exercise; we want to be supportive without turning it into a provocative event.

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YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Affirm that Poland's future lies with the democratic, free-market West and that the U.S. is committed to helping Poland on that road.
- o Set out U.S. views on European security, including our policy of NATO's gradual expansion to Eastern democracies such as Poland.
- o Affirm U.S. support for Poland's market transformation.
- o Convey your awareness of human problems created by the collapse of the old regime's economic system and our willingness to help Poland ameliorate them.

CORE POINTS

European Security, NATO, Poland

- o Expansion of democracy central goal of U.S. foreign policy. Want Poland, other CEEs, to take full-fledged place in a secure Europe. Reject insecure "grey zone" for CEE.
- o Led by U.S., NATO took firm decision in January to expand to Europe's new democracies. Should work together to make it happen in way that increases security, not confrontation.
- o The way ahead is open.
 - NATO's expansion will take place country by country.
 - New members must be democracies, market economies, responsible in their security and foreign policies.
 - PFP is the practical road to NATO membership. Militaries need time to work together. PFP provides means. Pleased Poland is active Partner.
 - Good that Poland will host first PFP exercise in former Warsaw Pact in September. Want exercise to be as robust as possible.
 - Russia cannot veto this process. A catastrophe in Russia would accelerate expansion, but expansion does not depend on democracy's failure in Russia.
- o Should work together to get Russia used to idea of NATO's expansion; to see it as stabilizing, not threat.
- o This will take time but direction is clear. Hope while President to welcome new democracies as new allies.

Bilateral Military Program

- o Have considered Poland's request for \$25 million to support your participation in PFP. You make good case that applies to other new partners, too.
- o Our next budget -- for year beginning October 1 -- is nearly set: I'm asking Congress for about \$25 million for military cooperation with CEE countries.
- o Will try to do more the year after. Will ask Congress for \$100 million for military cooperation with new Partners to support PFP initiatives. Request will include \$25 million for Poland.

Support for Free Market Reforms

- o Admire Poland's achievements since 1989; you're on the right track, proving free market transformation is possible.
- o Your role in supporting reforms is essential; I respect it. Keep fighting inflation; implement Mass Privatization.
- o Proud of U.S. support since 1989: \$200 million of the \$1 billion Stabilization Fund, unprecedented official debt reduction worth \$2.4 billion, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund capitalized at \$240 million. I intervened to support London Club (commercial debt) reduction deal expected to be worth over \$5 billion to Poland.
- o Will keep helping:
 - Seek more U.S. investment in Poland. Have brought U.S. executives here.
 - Will announce \$65 million Poland Partners Fund, a capital investment fund set up by OPIC. Half the Fund financed by American labor unions, so Lane Kirkland is part of this too.
 - Will announce initiative with Enterprise Fund and EBRD to bring \$75 million of capital resources to newly-privatized firms under Mass Privatization program.
 - Supporting Poland's accession to OECD.
- o Will improve coordination with EU, other Western supporters of Poland, CEE. Energize EU; make most of resources.
- o Want to finish up Business and Economic Treaty. We're ready to exchange Instruments of Ratification when Poland adheres to Berne Convention on intellectual property.
- o Should conclude our bilateral GATT reaccession talks. Very few issues remain; can compromise on poultry quotas; hope we can move semi-conductors and aircraft.

- o [If asked] Want to ensure greatest possible market access for Polish, other CEE products in U.S., EU. Free trade agreement might complicate Polish membership in EU.

Coping with Social Dislocation

- o Know people have been hurt by collapse of the old system. Unemployment and insecurity can generate social, political problems, even as Polish economy now grows fast.
- o Outsiders cannot solve problem; answer lies in growth, led by private sector. But cannot ignore human side.
- o Our governments have been consulting closely in recent weeks, discussing some ideas; listening to yours.
 - Want to accelerate housing construction: get existing program moving, start demonstration projects.
 - To fight unemployment, want to establish micro-lending program to help small businesses, especially in high unemployment areas.
 - U.S. prepared to send teams to help you modernize your pension, welfare and health policy systems.
- o We're both concerned about new mafias, some from outside Poland. Will announce new CEE law enforcement initiative to help Poles, others, fight white collar, organized crime.

Warsaw Uprising

- o (If asked). Admire Poland's decision to make this important commemoration a ceremony of reconciliation with Germans, Russians invited. U.S. will be represented at high level.

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DINNER HOSTED BY
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESZA

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CONTEXT OF EVENT

This will be a large, formal dinner -- the first at the newly-refurbished Presidential (Radziwill) Palace. The occasion gives you the chance to continue with topics not fully covered in the earlier bilateral. It is Walesa's usual style to be aggressive at the start of meetings, so by the dinner you may have heard a lot about Polish NATO membership and the alleged inadequacies of the West's response to post-1989 Europe. At the dinner itself, however, Walesa may be comparatively relaxed. It is a good chance to discuss regional developments, Russia and Poland's transformation and Walesa's role in it. You and Walesa will exchange toasts.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Underscore U.S. commitment to Poland's reforms and to Poland's becoming a full member of an integrated Euro-Atlantic world.
- o Reiterate Walesa's important role in keeping Poland's reforms on track.
- o Emphasize your recognition of Poland's progress to date, while stressing the need to continue market reforms and deal with social dislocations.
- o Urge that U.S. and Poland work together to handle Euro-Atlantic expansion carefully, rejecting any suggestion that the U.S. will give Russia a tacit or explicit veto over the process.

CORE POINTS (Text of toast to be provided separately)

U.S. Commitment

- o Poland key to our objective of a secure Europe of market democracies.
- o Committed to Poland's full integration: reject "grey zone" for CEE; no Russian veto; Polish security important.
- o U.S. is rejecting neo-isolationism. Will stay engaged.

Walesa's role

- o Respect your historic role as Solidarity's leader, first President of new Poland. Kept reforms on track.

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- o Value your pledge to be guarantor of reforms.
- o Pleased you signed Polish budget; boosts international confidence.

Poland's Progress, Problems

- o Poland a success; shows radical reforms work.
- o Impressive growth; new preliminary IMF Stand-by Agreement, increasing interest by investors show promising future.
- o "Poland A" -- growing, entrepreneurial, active Poland -- is the future. But "Poland B" -- mired in depression, unemployment, less private activity -- can drag you down.
- o U.S. wants to keep supporting entrepreneurial Poland fulfill potential; at same time, help you cope with social, human dislocation. U.S. working with IFI's and EU to organize joint efforts.

European Integration

- o NATO's decision to expand, PFP, put us on road to expansion of Western democratic community.
- o Appreciate Poland's constructive policy toward Eastern neighbors. Your friendship with Ukraine helps; Kravchuk cites your arguments in his decision to agree to denuclearize Ukraine.
- o We know your history with Russia. Always danger of history repeating itself. But for first time Russian people have voice. If democracy takes root, Russia will turn toward improving lives of its people.
- o Aware of past; are prepared for adversarial relations if we must; but must work for better outcome if we can.

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WREATH LAYING
TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

This is a standard ceremonial event for State visits. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is a four column single-story structure -- all that remains of the Saxon Palace blown up by the retreating Germans. The ceremony is a set piece without formal remarks. You will be asked to sign the Book of Remembrance adding appropriate comments. Invited guests will include Polish-Americans accompanying you.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Demonstrate U.S. respect for Polish independence and those who defended it.
- o Note Poland's role as WWII Ally, as noted in the Tomb's inscriptions of battles in Polish history.

CORE POINTS

- o Poland and the world owe much to the valor of Polish soldiers.
- o Poland is taking rightful place as member of Western, democratic family: once an ally, now a friend, perhaps an ally again.

BACKGROUND

Inscribed on the tomb are the names of significant battles in Polish history, including defeat of the Teutonic Knights in 1410. The taking of Moscow in 1610, the failed Kosciuszko Uprising in 1794, the defeat of the Bolsheviks in 1920, the Warsaw Jewish Ghetto Uprising in 1943, the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, and WWII battles in which the Poles fought as Allies. Democratic governments after 1989 added the names of many battles consigned to "non-history" under the old regime.

CEREMONY

A military band and honor guard will be to your right; guests to your left. You will follow soldiers bearing the wreath and marching at a slow step. The soldiers place the wreath while you place your hand over your heart as the military band sounds a trumpet call. Afterwards, a Polish officer will brief you on the history of the Tomb and Polish military history. You sign the book at the end. You will not make any remarks.

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CEREMONY AT
WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING MEMORIAL

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The event marks our respect for the heroes of the Jewish Ghetto who took up arms in courageous, hopeless defiance. In April 1993, Vice President Gore attended the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, organized by Lech Walesa. You will make brief public remarks in this candle-lighting ceremony. A small group of leaders from the American and Polish Jewish communities will be present. The monument is located in what was a pre-War Jewish neighborhood and then part of the Ghetto. The Germans razed the entire area; the apartments now standing are post-war.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Demonstrate our undiminished memory of the Holocaust.
- o While acknowledging the uniquely horrible character of the Holocaust, note that the dark purveyors of ethnic and racial hatred are still among us.

BACKGROUND

Pre-WWII Poland was a multi-ethnic society with a significant Jewish minority (9 percent of the population, 30 percent of pre-War Warsaw). Jews had been present in Poland since the 14th century; a large percentage of American Jews trace their ancestry to lands now or once Polish. The German occupiers built the Warsaw Ghetto in 1940; Jews found outside without permission were put to death at once. After the systematic mass killings began in 1941, hundreds of thousands of Jews were taken from the Ghetto and transported to death camps from an embarkation point three blocks north of the Monument.

With only about 60,000 Jews left alive and German intentions clear, several hundred mostly young Jews took up arms in an effort to die fighting. The Uprising began on April 19, 1943, during Passover. They beat back initial German assaults and held out for 22 days. The Germans burnt the Ghetto down and flushed out the fighters building by building. Some escaped through the sewers. A few survive to this day, including one of the leaders, Marek Edelman, who remained in Poland and became a Solidarity activist and celebrated Polish hero.

Poland's tiny (under 10,000) Jewish community -- while mostly old and impoverished -- has been strengthened since 1989 by some young families who have rediscovered their ethnic heritage.

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MEETING WITH POLISH PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKERS
SEJM MARSHAL OLEKSY AND SENATE MARSHAL STRUZIK

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Shortly before your speech in the Sejm ("same"), you will proceed for a brief meeting in the Parliament Building with the Marshals (speakers) of the Sejm and Senate. Poland's provisional constitution (a permanent constitution is being drafted) provides for a parliamentary system of government. The Sejm is by far the more powerful body and its Marshal an influential figure. The Senate, in existence only since 1989, is little more than advisory.

Sejm Marshal Jozef Oleksy (o-LEK-see) is a leader of the largest Parliamentary party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), one of the two ruling parties. Both SLD and its governing partner, Prime Minister Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party (PSL), have old regime antecedents but so far have maintained a generally reformist direction. Widely regarded as reformist, Oleksy describes himself as a Western social democrat as opposed to "left populists" in his party. Nevertheless, Oleksy has been publicly skeptical about reliance on the U.S. to support Polish integration into the West. In this, he reflects a view, held by a variety of political figures, that the U.S. is not genuinely interested in CEE and that Poland has to explore alternatives to an (allegedly) futile search for Western acceptance.

Struzik (STRU-zhik) is a less dynamic figure, with mixed PSL and Solidarity background. He is a doctor and has managed a provincial hospital in the city of Plock. Personally close to Pawlak, Struzik is the closest thing to a modern, reformed PSL leader. He speaks of PSL building on its conservative base rather than old regime past and becoming a Polish version of the German CDU/CSU.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Stress U.S. commitment to support democratic Poland's full integration into the West.
- o Confirm U.S. willingness to work with Poland's democratically-elected government on the basis of its programs, not its ideological antecedents.
- o Urge continuation of Poland's bold, successful market reforms.
- o Note U.S. interest in helping Poland deal with human and social dislocation caused by the failed former system.

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CORE POINTS

U.S. Goals

- o U.S. seeks expansion of democratic family of nations from Euro-Atlantic base. Poland included.
- o Our vision inclusive: no anti-Russian encirclement or bloc.
- o No Russian veto either; reject CEE in "grey zone."
- o Must manage expansion of trans-Atlantic, other institutions (NATO) in way that increases everyone's security.
- o Pleased by Polish participation in PFP. Is road to increased Polish security, NATO membership. Hope Parliament will support this program.

Polish Reforms

- o Basis of U.S.-Polish relations remains democratic, market reforms in Poland and U.S. support.
- o Poland's progress since 1989 impressive. Past the worst.
 - Important to continue market transformation, mass privatization, continued macroeconomic stability; keep inflation from returning and destroying gains.
 - Aware of human and social dislocation caused by collapse of old system. Want to help; U.S. ready with specifics.
- o Reject "third way" of statist protectionism. Has been tried
 - Africa, Latin America, South Asia -- always failed.
- o Sejm, Senate passed sound budget; now IMF has concluded another preliminary agreement with GOP worth \$773 million. Will parliament maintain reformist direction?

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MEETING WITH
POLISH PRIME MINISTER WALDEMAR PAWLAK

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Pawlak (PAHV-lak) is young, a farmer as well as politician and a product of post-1989 Poland rather than an apparatchik. He owes much of his rise to Lech Walesa, who once saw him as a protegee. Pawlak's lack of outward sophistication has led friends and enemies to underestimate him. Soft-spoken, adept at maneuver and skilled at hiding his considerable ambition, Pawlak is ambivalent about to Poland's market reforms. As Premier, he supported a sound 1994 budget that earned IMF support.

Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party (PSL), however, is an anti-reform bastion. It seeks to represent the interest of the more than 30% of the population living on farms. The party is a direct descendent of a communist satellite party and its internal structures are less remade than those of its coalition partner, the reborn former communists. PSL's committed electorate -- small-holding peasants -- are conservative on social issues, isolationist on foreign policy and statist and protectionist on economic issues. PSL's social conservatism has garnered considerable Catholic Church support. The Party's popularity is rising, as it avoids association with tough economic reforms.

Pawlak has little responsibility for foreign affairs. He focusses on economic issues, and there is considerable tension between PSL and the reformers -- young intellectuals from the ex-communist party -- who run key economic ministries. Pawlak plays a balancing game, maintaining macroeconomic stability, keeping privatization on track though at a lesser pace and pushing PSL patronage interests hard behind the scenes. While the Polish economy is growing strongly, a lack of GOP leadership could weaken reform at a midpoint and allow inflation to return.

You met Pawlak in Prague last January. One notion he suggested, without elaboration then or since, was an economic "Partnership for Prosperity." This meeting is a place to focus on economic and social issues and he may bring up his "PFP"; you should not. Pawlak wants an invitation to the U.S. in 1995 but we should be careful: Presidential elections will be held that fall and Pawlak may run against Walesa. In May, Pawlak sent you an e-mail greetings on Internet and will appreciate your referring to it.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Strengthen Pawlak's commitment to Poland's market transformation, stressing the need to fight inflation and continue structural transformation.

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- o Convey your awareness of human problems created by the collapse of the old regime's economic system and our willingness to help Poland ameliorate them.
- o Raise bilateral trade issues.
- o Affirm that Poland's future lies with the democratic, free-market West and that the U.S. is committed to helping a democratic Poland on that road.

CORE POINTS

Support for Free Market Reforms

- o Poland's achievements since 1989 impressed the world; on the right track but more to do. Inflation could return and wipe out gains. Important to carry out Mass Privatization.
 - Continued reforms require leadership to continue. Hope we can count on you.
- o Proud of U.S. support: Stabilization Fund, unprecedented official debt reduction, Enterprise Fund. I supported successful London Club (commercial debt) reduction.
- o We'll keep helping:
 - Seek more U.S. investment in Poland. Have brought U.S. executives here.
 - Will announce \$65 million Poland Partners Fund, a capital investment fund set up by OPIC.
 - Will announce initiative with Enterprise Fund and EBRD to bring \$75 million of capital resources to newly privatized firms.
 - Support Poland's accession to OECD.
- o Will improve coordination with EU, other Western supporters of Poland, CEE. Energize EU; make most of resources.
- o Want to finish up Business and Economic Treaty. We're ready to exchange Instruments of Ratification when Poland adheres to Berne Convention on intellectual property.
- o Agree we should conclude our bilateral GATT reaccession talks. Very few issues remain; can compromise on poultry quotas; hope we can move semi-conductors and aircraft.
- o (If asked) Want to ensure greatest possible market access for Polish, other CEE products in U.S., EU. Free trade agreement might complicate Polish membership in EU.

Coping with Social Dislocation

- o People have been hurt by collapse of the old system. Unemployment and insecurity can generate social, political problems, even as Polish economy grows fast.
- o Outsiders cannot solve problem; answer lies in growth, led by private sector. But cannot ignore human side.
- o Our governments have been consulting closely in recent weeks, discussing some ideas; listening to yours.
 - Want to accelerate housing construction: get existing program moving, start demonstration projects.
 - To fight unemployment, want to establish micro-lending program to help small businesses, especially in high unemployment areas.
 - U.S. prepared to send teams to help you modernize your pension, welfare and health policy systems.
- o We're both concerned about new mafias, some from outside Poland. Will announce a new CEE law enforcement initiative to help Poles, others, fight white collar, organized crime.

European Security, NATO, Poland

- o Expansion of democracy central goal of U.S. foreign policy. Want Poland, other CEEs, to take full-fledged place in a secure Europe. Reject insecure "grey zone" for CEE.
- o Led by U.S., NATO took firm decision in January to expand to Europe's new democracies. Should work together to make it happen in way that increases security, not confrontation.
- o Should work together to get Russia used to idea of NATO's expansion; to see it as stabilizing, not threat.

Bilateral Military Program

- o Have considered Poland's request for \$25 million to support your participation in PFP. Your case applies to other new partners, too.
- o Our next budget -- for year beginning October 1 -- is nearly set: I'm asking Congress for about \$25 million for military cooperation with CEE countries.
- o Will try to do more the year after. Will ask Congress for \$100 million for military cooperation with new Partners to support PFP initiatives. Request will include \$25 million for Poland.

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SPEECH TO THE POLISH PARLIAMENT

CONTEXT OF EVENT

This is the major speech of the July trip and intended to reach CEE, all-European and U.S., as well as Polish, audiences. Both Houses of the Polish Parliament (the Sejm and Senate) will be in attendance; guests will include Americans accompanying you from the U.S. A peripheral body under the old regime, since 1989 the Polish parliament has been a center of the country's political life. President Bush addressed the Parliament in July 1989; Vice President Gore did so in April 1993.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Underscore the U.S. objective of building a bigger trans-Atlantic community, including as many of the new CEE and NIS democracies as possible.
- o Affirm your commitment to Polish democracy, security and market reform.
- o Make clear our intention that NATO expand to new democracies, including a democratic Poland.
- o Strengthen Polish commitment to reform at a difficult mid-way point, stressing U.S. respect for Polish accomplishments to date and awareness of social and human dislocation.
- o Showcase U.S. initiatives to help Poland further its transformation begun in 1989.
- o Link the liberation of Europe begun in Normandy with our own efforts today.

CORE POINTS (Speech text to be provided)

BACKGROUND

You will be speaking to a special session of the Sejm ("SAME"). The main chamber seats 546 people on the main floor with another 200 in the gallery. The building dates from the 1920's; it was rebuilt after WWII.

September 1993 elections produced, from 36 percent of the popular vote, a nearly 65 percent majority for two parties with antecedents in the old regime -- the Alliance of the Democratic Left and the Polish Peasant Party -- who constitute the government coalition. Post-Solidarity parties constitute most of the opposition. You are speaking at the formal invitation of Sejm Marshal (speaker) Jozef Oleksy, one of the most pro-reform ex-communist leaders.

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CEREMONY AT
WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The Warsaw Uprising beginning August 1, 1944 was the high point of Polish resistance to Germany during WWII and an event of stirring heroism as well as terrible suffering. The Uprising has enormous significance to Poles everywhere, and your participation in a commemorative ceremony at one of Warsaw's monuments to the Uprising will be appreciated. You will be accompanied by a group of Polish-Americans who came with you to Warsaw. One of several monuments to the Uprising, the "Little Soldier" Monument commemorates children who fought in the Uprising. It stands by the Medieval old city wall.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Pay tribute to the heroes of the Uprising and, more broadly, to Poland's contribution to the Allied effort in WWII.
- o Link Polish resistance in WWII to our themes from Normandy and our objectives of expanding democracy in Europe today.

CORE POINTS (Remarks to be provided separately)

BACKGROUND

In the summer of 1944 the Soviet Army was pushing back the Germans along a broad front in Poland and appeared ready to take Warsaw. But the pro-Western London Government-in-exile and its Home Army in Poland were worried about Soviet political intentions. The Poles believed they could forestall a communist takeover only if they themselves liberated their capital before the Soviets arrived.

As the Soviets approached Warsaw, the Home Army launched its Uprising on August 1, 1944 and quickly seized control of most of the city. But they failed to capture the Vistula River bridges and major roads. At that point, the Soviet advance came to a halt just outside Warsaw, probably on Stalin's orders. With the Soviets standing still across the river, the Germans had time to crush the Uprising. Bitter fighting took place for two months as the German ring tightened. Stalin complicated U.S. and British efforts to supply the Home Army by air (though our efforts are still remembered fondly by Home Army veterans). In October, the Home Army surrendered. The Germans dynamited what was left of Warsaw. The Soviets resumed their advance in January, 1945 and installed a communist regime that lasted until 1989.

The Poles seek high-level U.S. attendance at the 50th Anniversary Commemorative event to be held this August 1. Mitterrand, Major, Herzog and possibly Chernomyrdin are planning to attend and the Poles have pressed for the Vice President to represent us.

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RECEPTION FOR
CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS

CONTEXT OF EVENT

While your visit is bilateral, the Warsaw stop also reinforces our commitment to democracy, security and market economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. This point is especially important for southern tier states -- Romania and Bulgaria, Albania -- who believe themselves to have made major sacrifices in adherence to the Serbian sanctions regime and worry they have decidedly second-tier status in our thinking.

The Poles easily accepted our request and invited the CEE Foreign Ministers: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, FYROM, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to meet with Secretary Christopher; we later added Croatia and Bosnia. Your meeting with them takes the form of a reception at the Presidential (Radziwill) Palace following your speech to the Polish Parliament and two ceremonial events.

While each foreign minister has separate concerns, all support continued U.S. engagement in Europe and CEE, seek greater U.S. investment in their countries and urge that the U.S. not consign their region to a Russian sphere of influence or security "grey zone." Secretary Christopher will have met with the CEE Foreign Ministers for two hours that afternoon; he will brief you on the results of the meeting. You will meet with each Foreign Minister briefly and informally in the course of the reception.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Underscore U.S. support for democracy, security and economic reform throughout CEE.
- o Emphasize to southern-tier CEE's -- especially Bulgaria and Romania -- that we do not consign them to inferior status but that our relations will be a function of their progress toward democracy and economic reform, and conduct of responsible foreign policies.
- o Emphasize to front-line states that we appreciate their support for Serbian sanctions and hope for a settlement soon.
- o Convey particular points to individual Foreign Ministers.

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CORE POINTS

U.S. Objectives in CEE

- o U.S. seeks expansion of democratic family of nations from Euro-Atlantic base. All CEE can be part.
- o Our vision inclusive: no anti-Russian encirclement or bloc; no Russian veto either; reject CEE in "grey zone."
- o Must manage expansion of trans-Atlantic, other institutions, e.g., NATO, in way that increases everyone's security.
- o Pleased by CEE participation in PFP. Is road to NATO membership. Hope your governments will continue to support.

CEE Reforms

- o Basis of U.S. relations with CEE's remains democratic, market reforms, U.S. support for transformation.
- o Progress impressive. Some CEE's past the worst, show way for others.
 - Important to continue market transformation, mass privatization, macroeconomic stability.
 - Aware of human and social dislocation caused by collapse of old system. Want to help.
- o Reject "third way" of statist protectionism. Has been tried -- Africa, Latin America, south Asia -- always failed.
- o Reforms not the cause of problems but the cure. Slowing reforms not answer.
- o U.S. engaged: greater coordination with EU, major Western countries, IFI's to help across board; Trade and Investment Conference in fall, expanded OPIC programs; new efforts to help with social dislocation. Try in Poland; perhaps expand.

Specific Country Points

- o **Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Hungary:** Urge continued adherence to Serbian sanctions; understand how difficult, joint efforts on transport corridors, infrastructure can ease some burden.
- o **Romania:** (FM Teodor Melescanu (meh-lesh-KAH-noo)): Pleased by Romania's progress with IMF, World Bank; support for PFP. Important now to continue reforms.

- o **Bulgaria:** (FM Stanislav Daskalov (DAWS-kloff)): Important to restart reform momentum. Want to see Bulgaria succeed; important to avoid false sense of isolation or neglect.
- o **Hungary:** (State Secretary Janos Martonyi (MAHR-tohn-ye) will head delegation; FM designate Kovacs (KO-vach) will be in delegation): Look forward to working with new government. Appreciated President Goncz's assurance that Hungary's reforms and pro-Western policies would continue.
- o **Albania:** (FM Alfred Serreqi (seh-RECH-ee)): Encourage progress in treatment of its ethnic Greek minority. Understand concern about Kosovo; very much on U.S. agenda.
- o **Slovakia:** (FM Edward Kukan (KU-kahn)): Support new government's reformist direction; intensifying efforts to help. Hope September elections support continued reforms. Welcome President Kovac's commitment to reform from June 21 meeting.
- o **Czech Republic:** (FM Josef Zieleniec (ZHE-len-ets): Republic doing well. Each country's integration to West will be individual; we look to new democracies to cooperate regionally, too. (If asked: Hope to resolve complex budgetary issue of possible RFE/RL move to Prague.)
- o **Slovenia:** (FM Alojz Peterle (PAY-ter-lay)): Slovenia becoming success story. We support your integration into West and have made that point with GOI. Difficult to lift arms embargo, but want to find ways to recognize Slovenia's status as apart from conflict in former Yugoslavia.
- o **Croatia:** (FM Mato Granic (GRA-nich): All parties should accept Contact Group territorial compromise. Negotiations only road to peace. Peace your first step to West. Should renew UNPROFOR.
- o **Bosnia:** (FM Irfan Ljubijankic (lyoo-BYAN-kich): Pleased Congact Group produced realistic, serious territorial compromise; is best chance for peace. International will to enforce strong; serious incentives and disincentives.
- o **Poland:** (FM Andrzej Olechowski (o-la-HOFF-ski)): Appreciate Polish hosting meeting. Understand Polish interest in moving rapidly toward Western integration; are making progress.

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MEETING WITH AMERICAN COMMUNITY

CONTEXT OF EVENT

This is your opportunity to make contact directly with the large and diverse official American community in Warsaw. Ambassador Nicholas Rey has been at post since the fall.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Acknowledge the work of Americans and their families representing the U.S. in Poland and the Polish employees who support them.
- o Note the broad scope of work the community is engaged in; new missions for a new Europe.

CORE POINTS (Text of remarks to be provided)

BACKGROUND

The Warsaw Embassy, a small Iron Curtain reporting post in 1989, is now hub of a strong American effort to help Poland complete its transformation. The official community numbers 270, including Peace Corps, long-term advisors and Embassy staff. There are 154 American family members not employed by the Embassy and 440 Polish nationals working for the Embassy. The Peace Corps presence is among the largest in the world. We also have Consulates General in Krakow and Poznan.

The meeting will take place following the formal Departure Ceremony at the Presidential Palace at the Ambassador's Residence. Built in the early-1960's, the Residence is located in an attractive neighborhood.

The Residence took on special significance during the mid- and late-1980's, when it served as unofficial haven and meeting place for Solidarity intellectuals. Jaruzelski once remarked derisively that "Solidarity was just a bunch of intellectuals who went to dinner at (then Ambassador) John Davis' house." One year later, Jaruzelski sat down to lunch with the newly-empowered Solidarity leadership and President Bush. After 1989, the Residence (then home to former Ambassador Tom Simons) served as a place where Poles of all political persuasion could meet and conduct business.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By R NARA, Date 6/6/23
2016-0314-M-1

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DEPARTURE CEREMONIES AT
THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND OKECIE AIRPORT

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The by-the-numbers departure ceremonies, standard for every Official Visit, are the exact reverse of the Arrival Ceremonies. No remarks are required.

BACKGROUND

The elaborate departure ceremony will take place at the Presidential Palace. You will proceed to the airport immediately after greeting the official American community at the Ambassador's Residence.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2023
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U.S. INVESTMENT IN POLAND

U.S. investment in Poland has grown rapidly as the Polish economy recovered from the initial shocks imposed by adjustment and the breakdown of the CEMA trading area. At the close of 1993, U.S. investments in Poland totalled approximately \$1.2 billion, with another \$1.0 billion committed to future projects. U.S. investment, in fact, dwarfs that of other nations, accounting for approximately 44 percent of total foreign investment in Poland. Italy (11 percent), France (7 percent) and Germany (6 percent) follow. Major U.S. corporate investors include Coca Cola, Proctor and Gamble, Ameritech, Levi Strauss, Gerber and Dupont Conoco. U.S. interest in portfolio investment in Poland has also grown rapidly.

This U.S. investment interest stems first from Poland's consistent reform effort and strong macroeconomic performance. Poland was the first country in Eastern Europe to return to growth during the 1990s, with a 1.5 percent increase in real GDP in 1992 and a further 4.0 percent increase in 1993. In 1994, that growth is expected to further accelerate to between 4.5 and 5.0 percent. Investors cite Poland's large internal market (35 million people), skilled workforce, relatively low manpower costs, improving intellectual property rights protection and growing access to markets in the European Union (with whom Poland has negotiated an association agreement, which will provide for essentially free trade within a decade). U.S. investors have benefitted from strong support from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency and the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

Investors remain concerned about the poor state of Polish infrastructure, an inefficient and risk-adverse banking system, a still poorly developed capital market and the unexpectedly slow pace of large-scale privatization, which has left many major industrial plants in the hands of the government. Residual concerns exist about regional stability, popular support for reform within Poland, and the longer-term economic policies of the center-left coalition elected in September, 1993.

To stimulate further trade and investment, the U.S. will sponsor a Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe during the fall of 1994. This conference will bring together investors from the United States with policy-makers from CEE countries. Its purpose is to focus attention on the potential for U.S. trade and investment in the region, obstacles and steps CEE governments can take to promote it.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2023
2016-0314-11-1

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POLAND, NATO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

Integration into Western economic and security structures -- above all, the EU and NATO -- is a key Polish foreign policy goal. It has enormous political and emotional significance. The Poles had hoped that Yeltsin's August 1993 declaration in Warsaw (to the effect that Russia would not object to Poland's joining NATO, quickly walked back) would open the way for rapid progress toward this goal. Prior to the NATO summit, Walesa and other officials were vocal and sometimes strident in calling for NATO membership to ensure Poland was not left in a "security vacuum" or the victim of a "new Yalta."

The Poles have since come around to the view that, since PFP is what NATO has on offer, they should take an active role in it. Poland was the third state to join PFP, the first to submit its Presentation Document and the first to draft with NATO an Individual Partnership Program (currently being reviewed in Warsaw prior to NAC approval). Poland has offered to host the first PFP field exercise in a Partner country later this year, but is not satisfied with the scope of the exercise being offered by NATO military officials. There is also U.S. interest in whether Poland might (as it suggested in the past) permanently dedicate a former Soviet exercise area as a peacekeeping training/exercise facility.

The Poles miss no opportunity, however, to reiterate their interest in early NATO membership and their desire for either a direct commitment or an indirect "signal" (e.g., announcement of NATO membership criteria) that their accession will not be long delayed. Walesa's letter to President Clinton of June 10 said that "we expect, Mr. President, that during your visit to Poland you will state that Poland will soon find itself among the members of the Alliance."

The Poles are particularly sensitive to any suggestion of a Russian droit de regard over their relationship with NATO and threatened to withdraw from PFP if Moscow were granted a "special status" within the Partnership. The June 9 NAC Ministerial in Istanbul made clear that NATO will not enter into a formal "special relationship" with Russia and that Russia will enter PFP on the same basis as other partners.

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EUROPEAN UNION-POLISH RELATIONS

European Union membership is near the top of Polish foreign policy objectives. EU-Polish relations have remained good, despite changes in Polish governments.

Poland's EU Association Agreement (AA) addresses a broad range of trade and political relations and envisions but does not guarantee eventual EU membership. In April, Poland formally applied for EU membership; the GOP understands that the EU will not begin serious consideration of its application before 1997. The biggest obstacles to Polish membership are the relative weakness of its economic development and its large agricultural sector. If Poland were admitted, it would be entitled to huge subsidies under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and economic development funds. Nevertheless, the Germans have been strong advocates of Polish membership.

EU-Polish contacts at high levels are frequent. The EU has been Poland's greatest source of economic assistance; from 1990 through June 1993, the EU and member states had committed over \$8.5 billion to Poland, including debt forgiveness (U.S. figure for the period was \$3.9 billion).

Trade and Market Access: Poland has complained about access to EU markets, usually following the imposition of an EU trade restriction on Polish exports, notably on steel and agricultural products. These should become more rare as the AA is fully implemented, though the Poles will be watching EU application of its safeguard provisions. Under the AA, most Polish industrial goods will enter the EU duty- and quota-free beginning on January 1, 1995; restrictions on steel and textiles will be lifted later. The EU and Poland will have free trade in all non-agricultural sectors by January 1, 1997. Thanks in part to the AA, Polish exports to the EU rose over 40% from 1990 to 1993, despite the European recession; however, imports from the EU more than doubled, thanks to increased consumer demand in Poland and the appreciation of the zloty in real terms. As a result, Poland's billion dollar-plus trade surplus with the EU in 1990 became a \$2.5 billion deficit in 1993.

European Stability Pact ("Balladur Pact"): The GOP remains unhappy with the European Stability Pact; it does not consider itself to be an "object" of the Pact as it argues, with some justice, that Poland has no border or minority problems. The Poles did not participate in bilateral meetings with the EU on the Pact and maintain that at a minimum the Pact's focus needs to be diverted to "good neighborly" relations including, in particular, economic cooperation, in order to make it possible for them to participate. It would also like its agreement with Germany to be included in the Pact. Germany is not enthused.

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U.S. - POLISH BILATERAL ISSUES

General: Bilateral relations are very good. Nevertheless, both sides, after decades of mutual admiration and little actual interaction, are learning to deal with the inevitable negatives in relations, including trade issues, Polish security concerns and arms sales.

Security Issues: Integration into Western economic and security structures -- above all, the EU and NATO -- is a key Polish foreign policy goal, and Warsaw presses for NATO membership at every opportunity. Developments in Moscow have increased the Poles' sense of urgency for NATO membership.

Initially, the Poles were disappointed with the Partnership for Peace (PFP), hoping instead for a commitment to early Polish membership in NATO. The Poles have since taken a vigorous, even model, approach to PFP. Poland was the first country to submit the completed Presentation Document identifying the resources it plans to contribute to PFP activities, and has also agreed to host a PFP field exercise (involving U.S. forces) in Fall 1994.

Iraq Protecting Power: Poland serves as the protecting power for the U.S. in Iraq and has done a superlative job in defending U.S. interests and citizens there. Particularly notable were Polish Ambassador Piekarski's efforts to get detained American businessman Kenneth Beaty released and to ensure his well-being during his prolonged detention by Iraqi authorities. Beaty was freed in November. In February, President Clinton wrote to President Walesa in praise of Piekarski's work. Piekarski received a U.S. Superior Honor Award from the State Department for his efforts.

Tank Sale to Iran: In 1991, the Polish government agreed to sell 115 T-72 tanks to Iran. The Poles told us repeatedly it was a one-time-only transaction, not the beginning of an arms relationship. Earlier this year the deal appeared to fall through for financial reasons and the Poles told us informally it was off. We repeatedly made senior-level warnings to the GOP (including one from Vice President Gore) that the transaction "would not be cost free" to U.S.-Polish relations. Internally, we decided to grandfather the Polish tank sale in exchange for a commitment that Poland will avoid all objectionable trade in the future and will fully abide by the terms of the COCOM successor regime. With the apparent collapse of the tank deal, no action was taken. On instruction, Embassy Warsaw has asked the GOP whether the transaction is definitively off. We know from special intelligence that some tanks have been shipped.

Kuklinski Case: In 1971 Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of the Polish general staff, volunteered to provide intelligence to the U.S. He did so -- motivated by ideology -- until 1981 and was

exfiltrated shortly before martial law. His contributions were extremely valuable. Poland's communist authorities tried him in absentia and convicted him of treason for his activities. None of Poland's post-1989 governments has been eager to reverse the treason verdict, a move that much of the Polish officer corps (not just ostensible pro-communists) would regard as an insult. However, given the circumstances of Kuklinski's action during a period of Poland's subjugation to Soviet hegemony, we have urged the Poles to set aside the sentence.

PRAGUE INITIATIVES CHECKLIST

Sustained High Level of Engagement: Since your Prague trip there has been sustained high level engagement with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Cabinet members and senior level travellers include: UN Amb. Albright and Gen. Shalikashvili (throughout the region), Commerce Sec. Brown (Warsaw), Atty. Gen. Reno (planned - Budapest), Deputy Sec. Talbott (Warsaw and Bratislava), Under Sec. Tarnoff (Warsaw, Budapest and Prague), Under Sec. Davis (Budapest, Bratislava, Sofia and Skopje) and NSC Senior Director Schifter (Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Bratislava and Budapest).

Democracy Network: USAID expects to start awarding grants for the "Democracy Network" this summer. We will provide about \$30 million in grants to U.S. NGOs over the next 3-5 years. In turn, the selected U.S. NGOs will cooperate with and support CEE counterparts involved in public policy.

Improved Market Access: We have agreed with the EU to avoid megaphone diplomacy on this sensitive matter. We can do little more to expand CEE access to our markets; the EU cites "domestic political realities" as preventing its further concessions. The U.S. is interested in working with CEE states to address their own sizeable barriers to exports and could work with the EU.

U.S. Trade Remedy Laws: NEC Deputies agreed to explore Congressional receptivity to a proposal to establish an inquiry-based trade remedy for CEE/NIS "economies in transition." The new remedy would apply in lieu of current market surge and anti-dumping provisions applied to non-market economies.

U.S.-sponsored Conference on CEE Investment and Trade: This proposal has sparked great interest in the CEE. It will probably take place in Cleveland in September or October. We are arranging for U.S. private sector cooperation in hosting the conference. The conference will focus not only on both trade and investment opportunities in the region, but also on what measures these countries should take to make their business climate more attractive. Key CEE ministers -- but not heads of government -- will be invited to attend and learn.

Early OECD Membership for Visegrad Countries: With strong U.S. leadership the OECD Ministerial Communique stated our intention to begin negotiation with the V-4 on membership as soon as possible. Eventual OECD membership will depend largely on how quickly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia can bring their laws, regulations and practices into conformity with OECD guidelines on trade, investment and the environment.

Regional Infrastructure Improvements: At a February 1994 meeting in Vienna, the USG and CSCE partners developed a regional road

infrastructure plan for short-term projects in the southern CEE countries. The EU has been slow to provide its share of the funding necessary to implement these projects. TDA is working on a series of special infrastructure programs; it has been funded to the level of \$3 million for regional programs. State and Customs continue to lead an effort to develop a transport corridor around Serbia for perishable agricultural commodities from the southern Balkans. We are trying to identify possible sources of funding for the "Highways for Peace" proposal.

Regional Civil/Military Airspace Management: DoD has provided \$500,000 toward the cost of a preliminary study of a regional integrated civil air traffic control system/military air sovereignty regime. The Visegrad states other than the Czech Republic have endorsed this initiative. The target date for completion of the preliminary study is the end of FY94.

Social Sector Restructuring Assistance: Using primarily existing assistance resources, and coordinating with other international donors, we have launched an initiative to help Poland in this area. Our focus is the financing and provision of retirement and disability pensions, poverty relief, health care, housing and job generation. We will draw on our experience in Poland to assist other CEE countries.

Post-privatization Assistance: Treasury has developed a proposal involving at least \$50 million from the EBRD, \$15 million from the Polish-American Enterprise Fund and up to \$10 million of USG technical assistance) to support companies newly privatized under the Polish Mass Privatization Program.

Bilateral Working Groups on Security: So far this year alone, we have held BWGs -- consultations on regional security, defense relations and bilateral assistance -- with ten CEE non-combatants (all except Hungary, with whom we will meet in the fall and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

Peacekeeping Units: With our support, the Baltic states have launched a joint peacekeeping battalion initiative. We have requested \$10 million for FY95 to support CEE peacekeeping, including the Baltic Battalion.

Removing Cold War-era Restrictions: We have finished removing all CEE states (except those subject to the Yugoslav arms embargo) from the International Traffic in Arms proscribed destination list. In addition, we and our allies removed Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland -- but not Romania or Bulgaria -- from the COCOM proscribed destination list before the termination of COCOM on March 31. Finally, this year you signed Presidential Determinations (PDs) for all CEE states not already covered by PDs and not subject to the Yugoslav arms embargo. These PDs make these states eligible to participate in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 001a. memo | Susan Braden to Samuel Berger, re: Presidential Meeting with Baltic President Meri, Brazauskas and Ulmanis on January 16, 1998 (1 page) | 01/09/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001b. briefing paper | From Samuel Berger, re: Meeting with Baltic Presidents (6 pages) | 01/16/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001c. talking points | Points to be Made for Meeting with Estonian President Meri, Latvian President Ulmanis and Lithuanian President Brazauskas (3 pages) | ea-01/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001d. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 001e. report | U.S. Government Report (1 page) | 01/12/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 001f. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 001g. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 001h. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 12/30/1997 | P1/b(1) |
| 001i. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Central and Eastern European Affairs (Flanagan, Stephen)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia, 1997-1998 [1]

2011-1037-F
 ke2181

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

January 9, 1998



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN *SJF*

FROM: SUSAN R. BRADEN *SB*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Baltic Presidents Meri, Brazauskas and Ulmanis on January 16, 1998

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding briefing material and talking points for his meeting with Baltic Presidents Lennert Meri, Guntis Ulmanis and Algirdas Brazauskas on January 16, 1998.

Concurrences by: Ki Fort *KE SF* and Nancy McEldowney *NMF SF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Scenario
- Tab C Biographies
- Tab D Secretary of State Memo to the President
- Tab E Partnership Charter

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *VL* NARA, Date *6/6/2025*
2016-03/14-01-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 1/9/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH BALTIC PRESIDENTS

DATE: January 16, 1998

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 1:40 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Underscore our commitment to advancing the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's into Western institutions and to strengthening our bilateral relations.
- As a symbol of this commitment, sign the Charter of Partnership, which codifies the terms of the relationship and maps out the road ahead.
- Reaffirm our commitment to keep NATO's door open and support their efforts to become members of NATO. Also note our support for their accession, on appropriate terms, to the EU and WTO.
- Applaud Baltic efforts to develop friendly relations with their neighbors, particularly Russia, and offer support for expanded cooperation between Russia and northeastern Europe in areas where there is common ground.

II. BACKGROUND

The Baltic Presidents see this visit as a truly historic occasion both because of the Charter signing and because it will be the last time they, as key figures in their countries' post-communist transformations, will be together with you in the White House. Valdas Adamkus, a Lithuanian-American former EPA official in Chicago, will replace Brazauskas, who chose not to seek reelection, next month. Meri, nearly 70, is unlikely to stand for another term, and Ulmanis, whose second term expires next year, probably won't run again.

These very different men -- the urbane and intellectual Meri, the earthy, former Communist Brazauskas, and the

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2016-0314-01-1 (1,47)

6/12/2023 VZ

centrist, business-like Ulmanis -- have succeeded in putting their states at the forefront of the reform movement in Central Europe. Over the past four years, they have successfully used their positions to forward democratic reform, continue the transition to market-oriented economies, move closer to Western institutions, and enhance relations with their neighbors, including Russia.

All three leaders believe that the **United States is key to their full reintegration into the West**. For over fifty years, successive U.S. Administrations maintained a strong policy of non-recognition of their forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union. We then played a critical role in helping them implement democratic and free market reforms and strengthen their security and sovereignty. The Charter of Partnership you will sign during this visit symbolizes how far they have come since 1991 and expresses our commitment to help them complete this journey.

The Charter is a **political statement of common principles and a framework** for the expansion of our relations. Most importantly to the Baltics, it affirms that they are part of our vision for a new Europe and will not be left out or discriminated against due to history or geography.

- On NATO, it builds on the Madrid Summit, stating that **the United States welcomes Baltic aspirations and supports their efforts to join NATO**. It also recalls Madrid's caveat that aspirants must be able to assume the responsibilities of membership and that Allies must agree inclusion of any new members would serve overall European stability. **It does not pre-commit us to Baltic membership or extend any surrogate security guarantees.**
- The Baltic states reaffirm their commitment to continue market-oriented reforms. The four governments pledge to enhance joint efforts to promote cooperative relations throughout the Baltic region, including with Russia.
- The Charter notes the progress of existing bilateral working groups on defense and establishes a new working group on trade, investment, and related fields. It also establishes a Partnership Commission of senior officials, who will hold annual stock-taking meetings.

Moving Ahead Along. As evidence of our commitment to pursuing Charter goals, you will announce at the signing ceremony the establishment of a **Baltic-American Partnership Fund** -- using \$7.5 million of our assistance money and **matching funds from George Soros** -- whose charter will be to foster the development on non-governmental organizations in these states. Also during their visit here, Charlene Barshefsky will sign a bilateral investment treaty with Lithuania (Estonia and Latvia have accords already), Bob Rubin will sign **treaties against double taxation** with all three states, and Attorney General Reno and FBI Director Freeh will announce **enhanced cooperation** among the three in **administration of justice and combating organized crime.**

Likely Topics

NATO Membership. The Baltic Presidents will raise their aspirations for NATO membership. They all hope there will be a second tranche of new members in 1999, and at least Lithuania believes it is well on the way to qualifying. Lithuania, with the largest population, has, in fact, devoted the most resources and made the greatest progress of the three in building its armed forces. But even they have very limited capabilities to work with NATO in defense of their territory or in peacekeeping missions elsewhere.

While continuing to advance the public line that all Baltic states belong in NATO, both Tallinn and Riga realize that they won't be ready militarily to join soon and that most Allies have serious reservations about their membership because of Russian objections. Thus, they have focused their efforts on joining the EU. In their meeting with you, the presidents will accept the view that it is premature to discuss the "next tranche" and that the Charter does not commit the United States to support their bid. However, they will **seek reaffirmation that NATO's door remains open, and, as Strobe has put it, that we are working seriously to help them walk through that door.**

- You should urge them to focus on taking advantage of the many programs we and the Allies are offering, including \$18 million in military assistance next year, to help them enhance their security, ability to work with NATO, and preparations for membership. You might remind them that the Charter is neither a security guarantee nor a firm commitment to support their membership.

Investment, EU and WTO. The Baltic economies are all still in transition, but Estonia and Latvia are the furthest along. U.S. investment in the region has been slow to develop, now totaling about \$550 million, only 19 percent of all their foreign investment.

- **Estonia** has made steady progress across the board and in 1996 became the first Central European country to "graduate" from our assistance program Support for East European Democracy (SEED). In December, it was the only Baltic state invited to commence EU accession talks.
- **Latvia** is close to getting an offer from the EU to begin accession talks. Its strong progress was slowed by lagging privatization and a 1995 banking crisis.
- **Lithuania** has made steady progress in privatization but has suffered from very slow growth (linked to taxation policies and a lagging financial sector).

Regarding the WTO, Latvia has been the most aggressive of the three in pursuing this goal. Its bid, however, is being held up over the issue of audiovisual services, which pits us against the EU and puts Latvia and the other two Baltic EU aspirants in between. The EU is insisting that Latvia make no commitment to open its market to audiovisual services. While ready to accept Latvia's adoption of current (51 percent foreign) EU content restrictions, we want Riga to go no further and believe this is a significant concession.

- You should tell the Presidents that we are very supportive of their accession to the EU and the WTO -- on defensible terms -- and hope the audiovisual issue with the EU can be resolved soon. You might also note our interest in expanding trade and investment.

Russians & Hansa. The Baltic leaders cooperate well with each other and most of their neighbors. The Nordics and the United States have supported several initiatives that promote regional security and compatibility with NATO, including the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Baltbat). The Nordics have extensive trade and investment in the region.

Lithuanian-Russian relations are the best of the three, in large part because Russian speakers account for only 8 percent of the population. In October, Presidents Yeltsin

and Brazauskas signed a demarcation agreement of the land border with Kaliningrad. Vilnius remains concerned, however, about transit through Lithuania from this heavily-militarized Russian province to its west.

Latvia and Estonia, which have much larger ethnic Russian communities, maintain normal but cool relations with Russia. Estonia and Latvia have not reached border agreements, primarily because of Moscow's linkage of conditions on the treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities (29 and 33 percent respectively). They have, however, begun practical cooperation with Russia on such problems as border controls and countering crime.

In August 1994, with your intervention, Russia withdrew its troops from Latvia **except for about 800 technicians who stayed to operate the Skrunda missile early-warning radar facility** until it shuts down this August. Russia has allowed agreed inspections of this facility. But Latvia is concerned that departure of the technicians and the commencement of dismantlement may be slowed due to construction delays in the essential replacement facility in Belarus. Based on political signs and available intelligence, **we expect Russia to abide fully by the terms of the agreement with Latvia, which Yeltsin has previously affirmed to you.**

In December, as part of an emerging "charm offensive," **President Yeltsin** floated the notion of enhanced economic cooperation with the Baltic states, but linked it to Baltic neutrality and offers of **joint security guarantees**. The Balts promptly rejected the latter notions, making clear that they aspire to be members of NATO.

- Rather than fight Moscow on Baltic membership in NATO, we have sought to focus on areas where there is a common ground. Madeleine and Strobe have told their Russian interlocutors, that we must agree to disagree on NATO, but we want to help promote expanded cooperation between northeastern Europe and northern Russia (as existed in Hanseatic period) in trade, energy development, the environment, and combating transnational problems such as organized crime. You should encourage the Baltic Presidents to pursue a similar tack as a way to show Moscow that Baltic integration will create opportunities.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Scenario at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

See Scenario at Tab B.

V. SEQUENCE

See Scenario at Tab B.

Attachments

| | |
|-------|--|
| Tab A | Points to be Made |
| Tab B | Scenario |
| Tab C | Biographies |
| Tab D | Secretary of State Memo to the President |
| Tab E | Summary of The Charter of Partnership |

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ESTONIAN PRESIDENT MERI, LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS AND
LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT BRAZAUSKAS

Partnership Charter

- Charter important for United States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania because it marks how far we have come toward our shared goal of building a new Europe and advancing your integration into West. Also maps out clear directions for road ahead.
- Charter makes clear our "real, profound and enduring interest" in independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and security of your countries.
- Can be very proud of your individual and collective efforts to advance goals of Charter even before it was completed. Need to keep working to promote respect for rights of all citizens and deal with legacy of past.
- Together, you are creating facts of integration on ground through your participation in PFP, IFOR, and host of regional initiatives.
- Charter gives us many opportunities to expand and improve relations in both security and economic fields. Events of last few days -- signing of double tax treaties, initiatives on justice and organized crime, and creation of Baltic-American Partnership Fund - show that we are already moving to build on this framework.

NATO Enlargement

- Welcome your desire and support your efforts to become members of NATO. Want to underscore that NATO's door will remain open.
- Your membership will depend on satisfaction of NATO principles, including your ability to contribute to overall security.
- First round of enlargement will not be last. But it's too soon to talk about next steps. We must all focus on getting first round "right" and securing Senate ratification. Welcome your help in this regard. The

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stronger our success in integrating Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, easier next steps will be.

- This is good time to make use of intensified dialogue, Partnership for Peace enhancements and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to deepen your engagement with Alliance.
- We are committed to helping you advance these goals in more systematic ways. Fully support work of our military experts to assess needs of your countries' armed forces and help you develop realistic defense plans. We will increase our security assistance next year and work closely with other donor states.

EU/WTO Accession

- Support each of your efforts to join EU, but recognize decisions will be made by Europeans.
- We support your accession to WTO on appropriate terms. Will be as flexible as can; hope EU will do same.
- As Ambassador Barshevsky explained, we will continue to work with EU on what we think is reasonable compromise on audiovisual content that is consistent with goals of EU Broadcast Directive and protects our interest in maintaining an open market.

Relations with Neighbors

- Applaud effort to develop cooperative relationship with each other, Nordics, and Russia.
- Especially pleased with your joint effort to promote regional security and interoperability with NATO through participation in Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Batlbat), Baltic Sea Squadron (Baltron), and regional airspace initiative (Baltnet).
- Now it's time to explore in detail opportunities for building economic and other non-security cooperation throughout Baltic region. Am fully committed to enhancing our involvement in Nordic/Baltic and Baltic/Russian cooperative ventures.

Russia

- Encouraged by recent signature of Kaliningrad border agreement between Presidents Brazauskas and Yeltsin in Moscow.
- Agreement meets one of fundamental responsibilities in relationship between neighboring states, establishment of common borders in mutually satisfactory manner. With border agreements in place, Lithuania and Russia can move on to other areas of cooperation.
- Hope Russia will sign similar agreements with Estonia and Latvia soon. Pleased that Estonia and Latvia are committed to expanding practical cooperation with Russia on common concerns.
- Know Latvia concerned that Russia may delay departure from Skrunda radar facility. We expect Russia to abide fully by terms of agreement with Latvia. Have strong indications that Russia intends to do so.
- Note Russia has proposed security guarantees to you. As we stated publicly, agree sovereign states have right to choose their own security orientation, including whether or not to become member of an Alliance. Your choice is clear.
- Want to work with you and Nordics to expand cooperation between northern Europe and Russia in areas where we all have common interests. Charter notes increased cooperation in economic development, trade, environmental arena as well as in fight against organized crime. As you have heard in meetings earlier this week, we are ready to move on this agenda in practical ways.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|----------------------|
| 001. memo | Anthony Lake to the President, re: Your Visit to Latvia (3 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. briefing | Re: Bilateral Meeting and Signing Ceremony with Latvian Prime Minister Birkavs (3 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. report | U.S. Government Report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/14/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. briefing | Re: Working Lunch with the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (4 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005. report | U.S. Government Report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 007. report | U.S. Government Report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 008. briefing | Re: Skrunda Radar Site: Dismantlement Assistance (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009. briefing | Re: Russian Troop Withdrawals (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 010. briefing | Re: The Russian Minority in the Baltic States (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 011. briefing | Re: Paldiski Naval Base (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 012. briefing | Re: Latvia: Political-Economic Overview (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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| 013. briefing | Re: Estonia: Political Economic Overview (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 014. briefing | Re: Lithuania: Political Economic Overview (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 015. memo | Anthony Lake to the President, re: Your Trip to Poland (5 pages) | 07/01/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 016. briefing | Re: Arrival Ceremonies at Warsaw Okęcie Airport, Presidential Palace (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 017. briefing | Re: Meeting with Polish President Lech Walesa (4 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 018. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 04/28/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 019. briefing | Re: Dinner Hosted by Polish President Lech Walesa (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 020. briefing | Re: Wreath Laying Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 021. briefing | Re: Ceremony at Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Memorial (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 022. briefing | Re: Meeting with Polish Parliamentary Speakers Sejm Marshal Oleksy and Senate Marshal Struzik (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 023. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 06/16/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 024. report | U.S. Government Report (1 page) | 06/16/1994 | P1/b(1) |

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|-----------------------|--|-------------|----------------------|
| 025. briefing | Re: Meeting with Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak (3 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 026. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 06/15/1994 | P1/b(1) |
| 027. briefing | Re: Speech to the Polish Parliament (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 028. briefing | Re: Speech at Warsaw Uprising Memorial (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 029. briefing | Re: Reception for CEE Foreign Ministers (3 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 030. briefing | Re: Meeting with the American Community (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 031. briefing | Re: U.S. Investment in Poland (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 032. briefing | Re: Poland, NATO and the Partnership for Peace (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 033. briefing | Re: European Union - Polish Relations (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 034. report | Re: U.S. - Polish Bilateral Issues (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 035. briefing | Re: Prague Initiatives Checklist (2 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓
SUBJECT: Your Visit to Latvia

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2016-0314-M-1 (2.91)
6/12/2023 v2

OVERVIEW

Your seven-hour stop in Riga July 6 represents a highly symbolic and dramatic kickoff for your third trip to Europe this year. The symbolism lies in the message you convey by the very fact of your visit: America champions the sovereignty of the Baltic states and supports their reintegration into the Western fold, rejecting any pretension of a Russian sphere of influence in the region. The drama of your visit is historical. America sheltered the flame of Baltic independence during five decades of Soviet occupation. Your arrival as the first American President to set foot on Baltic soil constitutes a decisive affirmation of the rebirth of these three small states as independent nations. The theme of the continuing consolidation of a new post-Cold War Europe will recur at every stop of your trip, from your discussions with President Walesa, through your meeting with Yeltsin in a new political "G-8" in Naples, to your walk through the Brandenburg Gate in an undivided Berlin. But your visit to Riga, climaxed by an open air speech to thousands of Baltic citizens, will underscore in a simple yet powerful way the epochal nature of the change that has come to Europe.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Demonstrate our continued staunch support for the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States.
- o Highlight the importance of the Russian troop withdrawal this summer and our role in promoting it. Seek to bridge differences between Estonia and Russia on troop withdrawal talks.
- o Emphasize the continued security and economic integration of the Baltic states as a priority U.S. goal for the future.

BACKGROUND

Support for the Independence of the Baltic Countries. You meet this objective largely by the very fact of your visit, which has already generated great excitement among the governments and

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peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This central message of support resonates well among the Baltic people, who were by far the most Westernized in the former USSR and are looking firmly toward Europe and North America in search of full reintegration. They have not forgotten that the U.S. never recognized the Soviet Union's occupation from 1940 to 1991; that we maintained and financed their exiled legations to Washington during those five decades; and that we promptly returned the gold reserves that we safeguarded for their eventual independence.

History has taught the people of the Baltics to fear that their periods of sovereignty will be short-lived; many are convinced that a resurgent Russia will sooner or later threaten them once again. Your meeting in Riga with the three Baltic heads of state will send a clear message that we do not recognize a Russian "sphere of influence" in the region and will demonstrate that we are not willing to countenance Russia's presence in every part of the former Soviet Union. For these reasons, the Riga stop will also resonate at home with the nearly one million Baltic-Americans who have been so vocal and active with us and the Congress in support of Baltic independence.

Highlight the U.S. Role in Russian Troop Withdrawals. The central issue of your discussions in Riga and a major topic of your outdoor speech will be our involvement in promoting the final withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics this summer. Russian forces are out of Lithuania and will be close to gone from Latvia by the time you arrive. Russia and Estonia are nearing the end of their negotiations; we expect to be able to take advantage of your visit and your meeting with Yeltsin four days later, to promote final agreement there, as well. Specifically, we are encouraging Estonian President Meri to give you a letter in Riga with his near-bottom-line positions on the withdrawal talks for transferral to Yeltsin four days later in Naples. Coupled with the pullout from Germany in late August, agreement on the Estonian withdrawal means that the Russian military will, for the first time since 1945, be back inside the pre-WWII borders of the former Soviet Union.

The United States has been the most influential country in convincing the Russians to leave the Baltics. Although the previous administration began the battle, you can rightly claim the lion's share of the credit. Your personal diplomacy with Yeltsin, our funding of 5,000 houses for departing Russian officers and our financial assistance to dismantle the Skrunda ABM site have all been crucial tactical contributions to the success of the withdrawal talks.

While you can credibly defend the right of the Baltic states to live without Russian troops, you should also leave an important public message with the Baltic leaders and publics: they need to live in peace with Russia. This relates to the large ethnic Russian minority that will remain in the Baltics after the troops are gone. The Balts need to treat this group with decency and work to include them in the social and political fabric of their societies. This is consistent with the approach we have

maintained since you took office. It is also good politics for our relationship with Yeltsin and Russia.

The Future of U.S.-Baltic Relations. Much of the emphasis of your visit will be placed on our actions in the past to promote Baltic independence. The third major objective of your visit should be to talk about the future. There is concern that once the Russian troops are removed, America will forget about the Baltics. You can counter that argument by spelling out the remarkably broad program of cooperation that we envision in the economic and security spheres. We have welcomed all three states into PFP and will work to make theirs a meaningful membership through a \$10 million FY-95 program to help train the nascent Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. On the economic side, you will announce the \$50 million capitalization of the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund, sign a trade pact with the Latvians and look forward to further expansion of trade and investment through a Baltic business development mission this fall.

The economic success story of the Baltics will help reinforce the point that Western assistance alone cannot assure prosperity; privatization, growth and trade are the surest guarantees of longterm political stability and normal, neighborly relations with Russia. Our support for this continuing economic integration with the West will in many ways be our most durable and valuable legacy to the people and governments of the Baltic states.

KEY EVENTS

Baltic Presidents Lunch. This is the centerpiece of the visit, the original concept event for the trip. You will meet over lunch for an hour and a half with Presidents Meri, Brazauskas and Ulmanis in a structure as informal as we can make it in order to allow for a more relaxed and natural discussion. We expect a heavy focus on the Russian-Estonian withdrawal talks, there should also be a good exchange on economic and security issues of concern to the three Presidents.

Open Air Speech. Against the backdrop of Freedom Monument in downtown Riga, you will address a crowd in the surrounding square that could number well over ten thousand. The central theme of your brief remarks will be America's celebration of the Baltic rebirth of freedom and our determination to stand by the region as it completes its reintegration into the Western fold.

Latvian Bilateral Events. You will have a brief meeting with Latvian Prime Minister Birkavs, followed by a ceremony to sign the bilateral trade agreement. Later, President Ulmanis will host a reception where you will have the chance to meet Latvia's political, cultural and business leadership. The reception will be held in Riga's newly re-opened Stock Exchange.

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BILATERAL MEETING AND SIGNING CEREMONY
WITH LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER BIRKAVS

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

This half-hour meeting and signing ceremony is a mark of appreciation for the Latvian government's agreement to act as host for your multilateral visit. Your interlocutor is Prime Minister Birkavs, whose role as head of government has been eclipsed in recent months by the need to conduct business at the Presidential level between you, Yeltsin and President Ulmanis, whose role in Latvian politics is largely ceremonial. Birkavs is also serving as Acting Foreign Minister following the resignation of the former FM over allegations he cooperated with the KGB before Latvia's independence.

The Latvian government is honored by your decision to visit Riga, and deeply appreciates your personal efforts to help Latvia and Russia sign the troop withdrawal agreement on April 30. The Russians have indicated that their pullout is likely to be completed before the August 31 deadline. In fulfillment of our commitment to help the Latvians dismantle the Skrunda radar site, a U.S. team recently visited Riga to begin coordinating the joint effort. We have now doubled our contribution to the Skrunda dismantlement fund, from \$2 million to \$4 million. The meeting will also afford an opportunity to reiterate our concerns about Latvia's draft citizenship law, which contains an unacceptably small quota for non-Latvians.

At the conclusion of your meeting, you and Prime Minister Birkavs will sign the Bilateral Trade Agreement, underscoring our support for Latvia's future integration into the Western economic fold.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Reassure Latvia about continuing U.S. interest in smooth implementation of the troop withdrawal agreement, citing Skrunda dismantlement and housing vouchers.
- o Stress our strong interest in strengthening bilateral relations through increased emphasis on trade and investment and broadening security ties.
- o Encourage passage of a generous and inclusive citizenship law.

Introduction and thanks

- o I want to reiterate my thanks to you and President Ulmanis for inviting me to Riga and acting as host for the meeting with Presidents Meri and Brazauskas.

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- o The statesmanship Latvia has displayed in concluding the troop withdrawal agreement with Moscow has earned the respect of all of us. We look forward to working with you and with Moscow to ensure full, timely implementation.

Skrunda dismantlement

- o When I met President Ulmanis in Washington in May, I told him we would provide at least \$2 million to fulfill our promise to help you take down the large structure at Skrunda.
- o An American team recently visited Skrunda and met your experts. We are well on the way to coordinating our efforts. But it appears dismantlement will cost more than we first thought.
- o We have identified another \$2 million in funding for the project; brings our total commitment to \$4 million. We will continue to encourage other states to contribute, as well.

Housing vouchers

- o We have tried to provide a real incentive for Russian compliance with the withdrawal deadline through our \$160 million program to resettle demobilized officers.
- o You have helped us by working with the Russians to identify specific officers who qualify for the program. We have increased the number of vouchers available from 1,000 to 2,500, split equally between Latvia and Estonia.

Bilateral issues

- o The troop withdrawal sends a positive signal to traders and investors. I am announcing today the board members of the Baltic American Enterprise Fund to be chaired by Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, President of the Atlantic Council, which will have \$50 million in investment capital to support private business development in the Baltics.
- o Looking forward to the Central Europe trade and investment conference in Washington this fall. Afterwards, we will send out a trade development mission to the Baltics, including participation by major U.S. firms.
- o Your active participation in Partnership for Peace will help strengthen your security ties to the West. We have also asked our Congress to provide \$10 million in FY95 funds to support regional peacekeeping forces, including the Baltic Peacekeeping battalion.

- o (IF ASKED ABOUT JOINTLY DEVELOPING RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SITE AT VENTSPILS AS A SCIENCE/TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER):
 - Intriguing proposal. Would be happy to explore details to see if we could make this work.
- o (IF ASKED ABOUT WILLINGNESS TO PURCHASE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDING IN RIGA, ENABLING LATVIA TO BUY NEW BUILDING IN D.C.):
 - I am told that our present tight budget still will not allow us to purchase the building here. If the funds become available, we will raise this with you again.

Naturalization law

- o Pleased that President Ulmanis remanded this law to parliament. We share view of CSCE and others that the citizenship quota is far too restrictive.
- o Encourage you to find ways to include your large Russian minority in political and social life of your country.
- o Know this is difficult issue here but we are convinced you will be better off in the long-term if Russians are treated fairly.

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 003. report | U.S. Government Report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/14/1994 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 816

FOLDER TITLE:

Briefing Books - President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994

2011-1037-F
ke2198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

3.5c

Valdis BIRKAUS
(Phonetic: BEERkavs)

LATVIA

*Prime Minister (since July 1993);
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since 7 June 1994)*

Declassified
in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1
(2.93) 6/12/23
VZ

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister



©

Valdis Birkavs has had to rely on his considerable legal expertise and political savvy to keep his minority coalition government on a proreform path, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

He assumed the Foreign Ministry portfolio when his predecessor, Georgs Andrejevs, resigned—after admitting to having worked for the KGB in the early 1960s. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

Birkavs will hold the post until a new minister is named, which they say may not be until the fall of 1994. He has been termed a crisp, clearheaded, tough-talking politician by the Baltic press. [redacted] 1.4(c)

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

The Prime Minister has steered the government toward areas that he considers key to transforming Latvia into a market economy and to drawing the country into Western organizations—economic reform continues to move forward, an agreement has been reached on Russian troop withdrawal, and Latvia has joined the Partnership for Peace program. However, Birkavs still faces the ethnically touchy issue of establishing a citizenship law, the resolution of which is needed for the country's incorporation into organizations such as the Council of Europe. [redacted] 3.5c

witnesses for the court system. In 1988 he established the Latvian Lawyers' Association, the first independent bar organization in what was then the Soviet Union, and he was elected its first president. He became involved in the independence movement in 1990 when he was elected to the Saeima (parliament) as a proindependence Popular Front candidate. He served as one of the parliament's experts on legislation matters and, according to press reports, he frequently was sought out by other members of parliament for advice on procedure and phraseology; he became a deputy speaker in 1992. [redacted] 3.5c

Birkavs was born on 27 July 1942 in Riga. After attending the Riga Polytechnic Institute, he performed his mandatory service in the Soviet army. Birkavs subsequently earned a law degree (with honors) from Latvian State University's law school in 1969. He also holds a Ph.D. in criminology. Birkavs began his career at the Latvian Justice Ministry's Forensic and Criminology Laboratory, which provides expert

The press describes Birkavs—who speaks English, Russian, and Latvian—as a refined intellectual. He admitted in an interview that because of his knowledge and experience, he never

[redacted] 3.5c

[redacted] 3.5c

(continued)
[redacted] 3.5c

3.5c

has suffered from an inferiority complex. Birkavs enjoys vacationing at his summer house by the Baltic Sea; he says that proximity to the sea provides him creative and physical freedom to think and write. He also enjoys sports—skiing, tennis, and sailing (in which he once competed at the international professional level). In a January 1994

basketball match, Birkavs led members of his Cabinet to victory over a team drawn from the Lithuanian Cabinet; he quickly fouled out of the game. Birkavs and his wife, Aina, have a son.

3.5c

14 June 1994

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WORKING LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENTS
OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This meeting is the centerpiece of your visit to the Baltics: an opportunity to convey to the Baltic heads of state, as a group, the assurances of America's commitment to the future of their independent nations and to the prosperity and development the Baltic region as a whole. All three Baltic Presidents deeply appreciate your personal involvement in promoting the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, and you will be able to provide them evidence of our commitment to ensure smooth implementation of the withdrawal agreements. The Estonian-Russian talks are at a sensitive endgame phase, and your discussions with President Meri may yield enough progress on the outstanding issues to allow the outlines of a final deal to take shape when you meet President Yeltsin in Naples on Sunday.

Beyond the troop withdrawal issue, though, this luncheon should focus on the future. History and geopolitical realities inspire deep pessimism among the Baltic people and their leaders. There is great fear of resurgent Russian nationalism and a lingering suspicion that America will put the Baltics on the back burner once the Russian troops are gone. There is also uncertainty, especially in Latvia and Lithuania, that a successful transition to a market economy is in sight. The single overriding message for you to leave with your Baltic counterparts is our determination to help them reintegrate into the Western security and economic fold and our rejection of the idea of a Russian "sphere of influence" in the Baltics. The surest guarantee of long-term Baltic sovereignty and prosperity lies in close integration with Europe and North America and, simultaneously, normal relations with a reforming, stable Russia. In this respect, the Baltic leaders will value your assurances that our relations with Russia remain healthy, resilient and realistic.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Hail progress in achieving full Russian troop withdrawal and our commitment to the implementation phase of the process.
- o Express readiness to help conclude the Russia-Estonia talks, specifically by carrying a message from President Meri to your meeting with Yeltsin in Naples.
- o Stress need for an enlightened policy of including the Russian ethnic minority in political and social life.
- o Make clear our steadfast support for Baltic security and economic integration with the West.

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- o Stress the strength of our ties with Moscow, but reject any suggestion of a Russian sphere of influence in the Baltics.

CORE POINTS

Russian Troop Withdrawals

- o Congratulations to all three on progress in withdrawal of Russian forces. These agreements will help you establish normal relations with your big neighbor and create a better climate for reforms and trade and investment.
- o August 31 is a firm deadline as far as we are concerned. We've told Russia that withdrawals cannot drag on past then. I believe Yeltsin is committed to deadline -- doesn't want this as a long-term problem in our relations.
- o We are committed to make these agreements work. Have made ready 2,500 housing vouchers so that departing officers can buy apartments in Russia. The Russians are responding. The first vouchers are already being handed over to qualified officers.
- o Our contribution to Skrunda dismantlement now totals \$4 million. We are providing over \$1 million to the international fund to help clean up Paldiski. We will also work closely within CSCE to monitor implementation.
- o Estonian-Russian talks seem close to final agreement. President Meri, we want to be helpful. I will see Yeltsin in Naples on Sunday; what will it take to close the deal? Can I be helpful?
- o I believe you need to close the deal with President Yeltsin personally and not allow this to go back to mid-level negotiators.

Separate points for Meri pull-aside:

- o Believe the Russians will accept that their officers have the same rights to privatize their flats as Estonians; no more no less. Will support you fully on this.
- o Regarding cutoff date for residence permit applications, urge you to be flexible. Our housing vouchers can "buy off" some of the disputed group.
- o On Paldiski reactors, key is the status of the facility. Russians will likely agree to civilian status for the interim period -- personnel would not wear uniforms. We will support you in pushing for shortest period -- 6-12 months.
- o Key is a signed agreement with date of August 31.

Russia and Russian Ethnic Minority

- o We've survived some rough spots in our relations with Russia. Yeltsin and I are committed to keeping things on track. We have learned to manage disagreements through frequent diplomatic consultation. Yeltsin and I call or write frequently to give direction and keep things moving.
- o We've been impressed by Chernomyrdin and his pragmatism on economic decisions. Vice President Gore has close personal relationship with him. Overall, reform process is still moving forward.
- o I mention this because a large part of your security depends on a stable, reforming Russia. Helping Russia make that hard transition is still my top foreign policy priority.
- o We reject any suggestion that the Baltics lie in any sort of Russian "sphere of influence." We are watching Russian actions closely in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but the Baltic states are in a completely different category. You are pointed westward and we want you to remain that way.
- o The Russian minority in your countries is a fact of life you must deal with. I know it's difficult. I urge you to find ways to include them in the social and political life of your countries, consistent with CSCE and other multilateral suggestions. Make it a priority to keep this problem manageable. Let us know how we can help.

Bilateral and Multilateral Security Relations

- o Expanding our security relations with your countries is a priority for us. It emphasizes our support for your sovereignty. The first sessions of the bilateral working groups on defense matters were a good start to build upon.
- o We strongly support your integration into the Euroatlantic community multilaterally. You are already playing a constructive role in the CSCE and NACC.
- o Now, we welcome you into the Partnership for Peace. Your membership will play a pivotal role in your integration.
- o I strongly support the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion initiative and have asked Congress to give us \$10 million in our FY95 budget to support this and other regional peacekeeping groups. The battalion is an excellent example of regional cooperation and a model for other Central and East European states.

Economic Cooperation and Support

- o Your progress toward building market democracies is remarkable. I realize that the battle is far from won and urge you to stay the course.

- o Our economic assistance for the Baltic region will fall a bit in the coming year, in line with cuts to all other countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
- o We have placed a renewed emphasis on trade and investment. I have just approved the board of the Baltic American Enterprise fund. It will be headed by Rozanne Ridgway, our former Ambassador to Finland and East Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for Europe. She is now President of the Atlantic Council.
- o I know you have been waiting a while for the Fund to start up. I have put it on a fast track to start making the first grants from its \$50 million before September.
- o The White House is also sponsoring a Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe this fall. Afterwards, we will send to your countries a major Baltic Business Development Mission, bringing many top U.S. firms with it.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 005. report | U.S. Government Report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 816

FOLDER TITLE:

Briefing Books - President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994

2011-1037-F
ke2198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

3.5c

Lennart MERI
(Phonetic: MAYree)

President (since 1992)

Addressed as: Mr. President

ESTONIA

Declassified
in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1
(2.95) 6/12/2023
VZ



Estonia's first president since 1940, Lennart Meri
EO 13526 1.4c is publicly committed to integrating his country with the West and eradicating the vestiges of 50 years of Soviet occupation. He is adamant in urging the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Estonian territory by 31 August 1994 and does not pass up an opportunity to assail their continued presence in talks with Western officials and in the press. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Meri did avoid major conflict with Russia in July 1993 when he rejected at the eleventh hour an anti-Russian Aliens Law that would have put tight restrictions on granting citizenship to non-Estonians.

EO 13526 1.4c he remains sensitive to Moscow's charges of discrimination against ethnic Russians living in Estonia. 3.5c

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EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Soviets. After returning to his homeland after World War II, Meri graduated from Tartu University in 1953 with a degree in history. He was a well-known reformist intellectual before entering politics in the late 1980s, having spent much of the preceding three decades as a radio editor, documentary filmmaker, and author of books on Finnic-Ugric ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. By 1989, Meri had emerged as a prominent member of the independence-minded Popular Front. After serving as Foreign Minister, he was Ambassador to Finland for several months.

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EO 13526 1.4c

Background and Personal Notes

Meri is an ethnic Estonian. He was born on 29 March 1929 in Tallinn, the son of a post-World War I Estonian diplomat who had served in Paris and Berlin. In 1941, his family was deported to Siberia after the republic was occupied by the

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3.5c

(continued)
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EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c . He is capable of carrying on several conversations in multiple languages simultaneously—in addition to his native Estonian, he speaks English, French, German, Finnish, Italian, Danish, and Swedish. Meri is an electronics junkie and has many phones. His wife, Helle, is about 30 years his junior and is an actress and an opera singer. The couple has a young daughter, Tulle, who was born around 1985. Meri also has two sons from a previous marriage. 3.5c

17 June 1994

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 007. report | U.S. Government Report [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 06/17/1994 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 816

FOLDER TITLE:

Briefing Books - President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994

2011-1037-F
ke2198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Algirdas Mikolas BRAZAUSKAS
(Phonetic: brahZOWskas)

President (since February 1993)

Addressed as: Mr. President

LITHUANIA

Declassified
in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1
(2.97) 6/12/2023
VZ



Algirdas Brazauskas is [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] 1.4(c) his country's most popular politician in a poll published in March 1994.

[redacted] 3.5c

Brazauskas supports cultivating good relations with Western countries, especially the United States. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

He has energetically expanded economic and security ties with the West, and he was the first Baltic leader to apply for NATO membership. He wants to attract Western investment, but he has warned that Lithuania also needs to improve relations with its eastern neighbors, according to press reports. Brazauskas, who has publicly noted Lithuania's dependence on Russia as its main energy supplier, has made liberalizing trade with Russia a top priority. [redacted] 3.5c

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Party Politics

Brazauskas was born on 22 September 1932. He holds a candidate's degree in both construction engineering and economics (roughly equivalent to a Ph.D. in this country). After a Soviet apparatchik career in successive positions of increasing responsibility in the construction and supply sector and in the Communist Party apparatus of Lithuania, Brazauskas was named first secretary of Lithuania's Communist Party in 1988. In late 1989 he drew the

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proindependence Lithuanian Communist Party out from under the umbrella of the Soviet Communist Party. The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party was formed from the remnants of that party in 1990, and he headed it until April 1993. After Lithuania gained independence in 1991, Brazauskas unsuccessfully ran for chairman of the parliament.

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United States

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c) Married to a retired doctor, he has twin daughters and several grandchildren.

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Personal Notes

17 June 1994

Brazauskas does not speak English but reads it well. He speaks Russian and Polish, as well as Lithuanian. He has traveled widely, including to the

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SKRUNDA RADAR SITE: DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE

The radar facility at Skrunda, Latvia comprises three large ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars. Two older radars were constructed during the 1960's to track northern Europe and especially the Northeast Atlantic. They were fully operational by 1971, predating the 1972 ABM Treaty. Each radar consists of two antenna buildings with a control building between them. These are the radars that the Russians will run for four more years under the troop withdrawal agreement with Latvia. It provides Russia time to replace this coverage with facilities either in Moscow or Belarus.

Construction of the third site, a large phased-array radar (LPAR), began in 1986 in order to replace the older Hen House radars. These buildings were near external completion when construction was halted in early 1992. Although inoperable, the 18-storied skyscraper stands as a symbolically ominous reminder to Latvians of Soviet/Russian presence. For this reason the Latvians want the LPAR destroyed quickly. Our \$4 million dismantlement assistance package is designed to help them do so.

On April 30, 1994, the Latvians and Russians signed a troop withdrawal agreement that included Russia's consent to turn over the LPAR immediately to Latvian control. Under the terms of agreement, the CSCE is to establish a mission to help monitor implementation of the Skrunda provisions (4 years of continued operation by the Russians plus another 18 months for dismantlement). We are encouraging the Latvians and the Russians in Vienna to give the CSCE an idea of the composition and mandate for the CSCE mission.

The Latvians have now taken over the LPAR, although Russians guard the site. In addition to our \$4 million toward dismantlement, the Swedes have also committed \$1 million and the British have agreed to help resolve Latvia's environmental concerns over radio waves from the site. We have asked other Western donors to contribute to this project.

An interagency technical assessment team visited Latvia in mid-June to assess dismantlement parameters and to determine project costs. The team will assist in preparation of bid specifications for contractors to complete demolition as soon as possible.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VL NARA, Date 6/8/2023
2016-0314-M-1

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DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2,98)

6/12/2023 RL

RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS

The issue of Russian troop withdrawals is a genuine U.S. foreign policy success story. Our strategy to get those troops out has been threefold.

The first approach has been to use our good offices with the Baltic states in reassuring them of continued U.S. support for their sovereignty and independence long after the troops are gone. We have done this through high-level visits and telephone calls, establishing a normal defense and security relationship bilaterally and through Partnership for Peace and cooperating with the Baltic states and Russians on dismantling and cleaning up Russian military facilities that symbolically pose a threat to Baltic security (the Paldiski nuclear training reactor and Skrunda radar).

The parallel approach has been to work with the Baltic states to ensure that they treat their ethnic Russian populaces equitably. We have done this through establishment of resident CSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia and multilateral programs to support the teaching of Estonian and Latvian to the Slavic communities, for example.

Along with our Russian officer housing program to relocate retired military officers to Russia, we have repeatedly reminded the Russian Government at the highest levels of its international commitment to withdraw its troops speedily and unconditionally no later than August 31, 1994.

Lithuania

The Defense Ministers of Lithuania and Russia signed an agreement on September 8, 1992 calling for complete Russian troop withdrawals by August 31, 1993. Despite a last-minute suspension of the withdrawals by the Russian government, active intervention by the U.S. and other Western governments ensured that the deadline was met. Lithuania continues to express solidarity with its Baltic neighbors in calling for Russia to withdraw its forces from Estonia and Latvia by August 31, 1994.

Like most Baltic Sea states, Lithuania remains deeply concerned about the excessive concentration of Russian troops in neighboring Kaliningrad (any resupply of these troops must go either by sea or, more practically, by rail through Lithuania) and would like to see a substantial number of these troops withdrawn.

Latvia

In order to promote a Latvian-Russian troop withdrawal agreement, at the Moscow Summit in January you suggested a compromise of four years and 18 months for the continuing operation and

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subsequent dismantlement of the Skrunda radar facility. Yeltsin accepted the compromise, and the Latvian Government also agreed to it.

That compromise formed the basis for the resolution of remaining issues, and Presidents Ulmanis and Yeltsin signed a troop withdrawal agreement on April 30. Less than 7,000 Russian soldiers now remain in Latvia, and Russia has stated that it will withdraw most of the rest by as early as July 31. The Russian navy already departed on June 1.

Estonia

Negotiators admit that more than 90% of the issues connected with a troop withdrawal agreement were resolved long ago. No progress was made until recently when, at your initiative, Russia agreed to raise its level of representation in the talks. FM Kozyrev and Estonian President Meri held a productive private meeting in Tallinn on May 25, and Russian DFM Churkin traveled to Tallinn the next week to negotiate directly with FM Luik. Despite some progress, the negotiations have again stalled over three main issues:

Application for residence permits by retired officers. The Estonians insist that applicants must have retired before August 21, 1991 (their "independence day") to be considered. The Russians want a broader formulation: anyone can apply, and the Estonians can deny whomever they want based on their laws. We are recommending that the Estonians throw in the towel here and accept the Russian formula; we have told them that we will front-load our housing vouchers in favor of the post-August 21 group they are concerned about.

Housing for retired officers. Moscow has revived an earlier position that retired officers should have an automatic right to privatize and thus take cost-free ownership of the apartments they live in. Even Estonians do not have this right; they must buy the right to privatize. Here, the Russians need to give.

Paldiski. This is the naval nuclear reactor training facility that the Russians are abandoning. They want the right to remove the fissile core and unspecified "secret" parts, which means they would need to remain at the facility for some time after the August 31 withdrawal date. The Estonians want all troops out by that date. The obvious, Skrunda-like solution is for the two sides to agree on an interim period (6-12 months is reasonable) for "civilianized" (i.e., non-uniformed) Russian personnel to carry out the defueling and related work.

Now that the United States, Sweden and other nations will be active in a multilateral effort on environmental cleanup of the two land-based nuclear submarine training reactors at Paldiski, this issue also should be easily resolved. The Energy Department has committed its support for this effort with a package of evaluation and training measures worth approximately \$2 million.

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THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTIC STATES

Aside from our usual human rights concerns, a major part of our strategy to promote the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States has been to press for fair and equitable treatment of the Russian minority. Russia routinely accuses Estonia and Latvia of massive violations of the human rights of their large Russian-speaking population, and often some Russian officials have tried to link these issues with the troop withdrawal issue.

We have supported the visits to Estonia and Latvia of numerous international human rights experts from non-government and inter-governmental organizations. We have agreed with their conclusions that there is no pattern of human rights violations there. Estonia accepted a CSCE mission in December 1992, and Latvia accepted a CSCE mission in November 1993. We are very pleased with the results of these missions in resolving a number of problems, such as the Aliens Law controversy in Estonia and the provocative behavior of the former Latvian Citizenship and Naturalization Department Director. The CSCE mission in Latvia is headed by an American Foreign Service Officer.

Lithuania

Ethnic Russians comprise only seven percent of Lithuania's population, and most of them automatically became citizens under Lithuania's liberal citizenship law of December, 1991. Unlike its Baltic neighbors, Lithuania did not experience a dramatic proportional rise in the number of postwar non-ethnic Lithuanians. This happened because border adjustments reintroduced a large number of ethnic Lithuanians. In addition, Stalin's Russification policy was not implemented as harshly in agricultural Lithuania as elsewhere.

Estonia

Estonia generally has taken a very pragmatic course in addressing the issue of its large ethnic Russian noncitizen community. Roughly 38 percent of its inhabitants are noncitizens; about 33 percent are ethnic Russian, most of whom live in the urban, industrialized Northeast. Estonia allowed its noncitizens to vote in municipal elections and granted citizenship to practically all noncitizens who wanted to run to office. For the elderly and handicapped, Estonia has dropped its language requirement for citizenship, and its citizenship law requires only a three-year residency, two years of which are retroactive. Estonia agreed to most of the revisions proposed by the CSCE to its Law on Aliens from last summer, which substantially eased a potential crisis in Russian-Estonian relations.

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Latvia

Latvia has taken a much more hesitant and legalistic approach to dealing with its large noncitizen community. Part of this may be related to the dynamics of the troop withdrawal process and part from doubts about the loyalty of these ethnics, even though they have not shown an inclination toward organizing politically. As in Estonia, a majority of ethnic Russians supported independence. However, a large number did not and are overwhelmingly anti-Yeltsin in sentiment. Few speak Latvian. While ethnic Russians comprise about the same percentage of the population as in Estonia, ethnic Slavs are 48 percent of Latvia's inhabitants and control an estimated 80 percent of the economy. The law on naturalization, with its strict quota system is contentious and unacceptable to us and most other European countries. We encouraged Latvia to review this aspect of the draft law, and it has been remanded to the Parliament for more work.

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PALDISKI NAVAL BASE

The Soviet Navy used Paldiski as a warm-water port since the late 1940s. Construction of the land-based nuclear submarine training facility that houses two reactors began in the 1960s. By 1989, however, the navy declared the reactors unsafe and obsolete and ordered them shut down. The military base reverted to Estonian control in August 1993, but the nuclear training facility remains under Russian control.

Russia made a commitment to decommission and dismantle the reactors at Paldiski and is expected to begin removing the reactors this summer in accordance with a plan that was discussed with an international group of nuclear experts.

During a recent visit, the Estonian Prime Minister mentioned the importance of U.S. support for a multilateral effort to help clean up the Paldiski site. The Energy Department has committed its support for this effort with a package of evaluation and training measures worth approximately \$2 million. The Swedish government has already committed \$1.25 million to this cleanup project, and it appears likely that other interested governments in the region will also join the effort once the United States officially participates.

By helping the Estonians and Russians eliminate radioactive risks, U.S. involvement in a Paldiski cleanup program will also ensure smooth implementation of Russia's pledge to clean the area of other hazardous materials. A multilateral program with substantial U.S. participation will help prevent future Estonian-Russian disputes over this matter and thereby enhance regional security and stability.

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By VZ NARA, Date 6/8/23
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LATVIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The Latvian Ambassador calls Latvia "a nation of lawyers" in mentality. Culturally, Latvians most reflect their Lutheran German heritage and emulate Swedes. The Latvian language is neither Slavic nor Germanic, but a Baltic tongue related to Lithuanian. Under Hanseatic and German influence since the 13th century, Latvia always has used its geographic location as an important commercial trading center.

After 200 years of continuous Russian rule, a bloody civil war erupted in 1918 when part of the independence movement sided with the Bolsheviks. By 1920, the Germans and Bolsheviks were defeated. Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis, uncle of the current President, headed the independence struggle and the first independent government. Before the Depression Latvia's minorities enjoyed cultural autonomy, the economy reformed and recovered. As in the other Baltic States, the mid-1930's brought authoritarian rule to Latvia.

Soviet and Nazi invasions during World War II reduced Latvia's population by one-third by 1945. During that decade, about 60,000 were deported to Siberia, and thousands fled to the West. The Soviets radically colonized and urbanized Latvia by bringing in thousands of Slavic industrial workers.

In March 1990, democratic elections gave the Popular Front independence movement a majority in the Supreme Council. In January 1991, shortly after a parallel attempt in Lithuania, Soviet political and military forces tried to overthrow the Latvian government. Eight people were killed. Latvia regained its independence in the wake of the aborted Soviet coup in August 1991.

Latvia's economic situation is steadily improving. The country enjoys a positive trade balance, relatively restrained inflation, and a very stable currency. Latvia still imports 90 percent of its energy from the NIS. De facto agricultural privatization also has occurred. Ethnic Slavs comprise 48 percent of the populace and control an estimated 80 percent of the economy.

Latvia signed a troop withdrawal agreement with Russia on April 30, paving the way for the departure of Russia's remaining 7,000 or so troops by August 31, 1994. The Russian navy already has departed, and the troops may be gone by as early as July 31. About 800 Russian technicians will remain to operate the Skrunda radar facility for another four years under CSCE supervision.

With the withdrawal agreement, Latvia now needs to focus on privatization as well as citizenship and naturalization legislation. The Latvian citizenship law emerged from Parliament with unacceptably low quotas for citizenship by non-Latvians

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(i.e., Russians), in direct contradiction to suggestions from CSCE and the Council of Europe for greater inclusivity. President Ulmanis has remanded the law back to Parliament for a rewrite. The United States has defended Latvia's human rights record against Russian accusations. We remain engaged in the issue and have supported the presence of a resident CSCE mission to promote harmonious relations between ethnic Russians and Latvians.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, Latvia seeks GATT membership and associate membership status in the EU. Latvia actively pursues Western security relationships and enthusiastically supports Partnership for Peace (PFP).

The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Latvia on July 28, 1922, and reestablished ties on September 2, 1991. Latvian representation in the U.S. continued uninterrupted for over 70 years. The U.S. never recognized the forcible incorporation of Latvia into the USSR. About 85,000 Americans of Latvian descent play an active role in bilateral relations.

Latvia enjoys MFN status and GSP privileges. We will sign a Bilateral Trade and Intellectual Property Protection Agreement during your visit. In 1993, Latvia exported to the U.S. \$22.6 million and imported \$89.5 million, the latter being chiefly agricultural commodities under concessional programs. American firms registered \$35 million out of a total \$110 million in foreign investment. The U.S. is the largest Western investor in Latvia and, by far, Kellogg's is the biggest single U.S. investor.

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ESTONIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

A Nordic people closely akin to the Swedes culturally and the Finns linguistically, Estonians did not enjoy national independence until the interwar period. That Republic enjoyed relative economic prosperity but suffered political instability. Then, as now, personalities rather than real issues determined politics.

The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact brought an end to Estonian independence by 1940. The next decade brought 10,000 Soviet deportations and 5,500 deaths in Nazi camps. Ten percent of the population fled to the West. Soviet rule brought large numbers of urban Slavic immigrants to industrialize Estonia's northeast.

Nevertheless, Estonia remained a window on the West and enjoyed a relatively extensive range of contacts with Finland through August 20, 1991, when it regained independence in the wake of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union. The transition to independence was entirely bloodless.

Estonia has generally done a good job in managing the ethnic Russian issue, both in domestic terms as well as in its bilateral relations with Russia. The United States has defended Estonia's human rights record against exaggerated accusations. We will continue to remain engaged in the issue and have supported the presence of a resident CSCE mission to promote harmonious relations between ethnic Russians and Estonians.

Estonia is a regional role model for reform. It has a balanced budget, free trade, annual inflation under 30% and a stable currency. Privatization is occurring at a relatively fast clip, except in the heavily Russian-ethnic Northeast. Barely 25% of its trade is with the NIS. Over 90% of small and medium-sized firms are in private hands, while two-thirds of large firms have been privatized. Only agricultural privatization lags.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an association partner of the WEU, Estonia seeks GATT membership. Estonia actively pursues Western security relationships and eagerly signed on to Partnership for Peace (PFP).

Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over \$33 million to Estonia's economic transformation and to address humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program is now over \$6 million.

Estonia's phased graduation from AID's assistance programs, to be completed by 1996, recognizes Estonia's position at the vanguard of Eastern European reform. In 1993, Estonian trade with the

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United States amounted to \$20 million in exports and \$54 million in imports, the latter being mainly agricultural commodities under concessional programs. U.S. investment, consisting of about 145 firms, makes up \$20 million of \$185 million in foreign investment in Estonia.

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LITHUANIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Lithuania is a staunchly Catholic nation with a strong sense of national identity dating back to its glory days as a medieval empire, when it stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Subsequently tied in a union with Poland for centuries, Lithuania was an independent nation again from 1918 to 1940, when it was annexed by the USSR.

Under the leadership of intellectuals, the Lithuanian reform movement Sajudis was formed in mid-1988, declaring a program of democratic and national rights. After 50 years of occupation, in 1990 the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared Lithuania independent from the Soviet Union. The USSR responded with the imposition of a harsh economic blockade, and in January 1991 unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the elected government, killing 13 civilians and injuring hundreds. Lithuania finally regained its full independence in August 1991.

Politico-economic gridlock and economic mismanagement returned the former Communists to power in elections in the autumn of 1992, but they have not fared much better than their predecessors. Politics traditionally has been marred by a disorganized but effectively disruptive opposition.

The new currency is very stable, and inflation has been brought under control (about a 30 percent annual rate). However, economic reform has stalled. Because it won on the premise of improving social conditions, the Government has shied away from making tough fiscal/privatization decisions. Although it finally passed comprehensive privatization legislation this spring, the opposition has now succeeded in forcing a public referendum on the Government's plan.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an associate partner of the WEU, Lithuania also seeks GATT membership. Lithuania actively pursues Western security relationships, has formally applied to join NATO, and already has submitted its presentation document for Partnership for Peace (PFP).

Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over \$66 million to Lithuania's economic and political transformation and to address humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program totals over \$9 million. In 1993 Lithuania exported \$16.1 million in goods to the U.S. and imported \$56.8 million, primarily agricultural commodities under concessional programs. U.S.-Lithuanian firms registered 235 of 3,674 foreign joint ventures, and of \$115 million in total foreign investment, the U.S. holds a \$35 million share. Philip Morris is a major investor.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓
SUBJECT: Your Trip to Poland

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2016-0314-M-1 (2.99)
6/12/2023 VZ

OVERVIEW

You visit Poland July 6-7, just after Riga and before the G-7 Summit and German/EU stops. The Warsaw stop is bilateral; Secretary Christopher will hold a concurrent Ministerial with his Central and East European counterparts. Your events include meetings with President Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak, a speech at Parliament, a meeting with the CEE foreign ministers and ceremonial events. With you will be U.S. business executives, American Jewish and Polish-American Community leaders and Lane Kirkland.

Poland pioneered the communist world's democratic transformation in 1989 and has made major, even inspiring, strides. But success is not assured and remaining problems are daunting. The economy is growing rapidly but unevenly. Large-scale unemployment and other social stresses from wrenching change weakened support for reform. The outcome was the victory, in September 1993 elections, of parties with roots in the old regime. Reforms have been maintained but are at risk. The widespread and corrosive sense of economic insecurity is compounded by Poles' sense of exposure to the unstable NIS and, in their view, a deteriorating Russia. Many Poles fear the West will never accept CEE, but keep it at arms length as a vulnerable buffer zone.

Poland represents a key test of our objective of enlarging the world's community of market democracies. If Poland "makes it" -- carries its democratic and market transformation to irreversibility -- then our goals for the post-communist world will be vindicated in a major post-communist country. The outcome in Poland is up to the Poles, not us. Poland is close to success. What we say and do can make a difference while Poland and the post-communist world stand at a critical balance.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Confirm to the Poles and all CEE's that we welcome their membership in the family of democratic nations.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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- o Support continued market economic reforms by emphasizing Poland's tremendous strides since 1989 and offering new initiatives.
- o Support Polish efforts to ameliorate human problems created by the collapse of the Soviet-style economic system.
- o Reassure an apprehensive Polish society that America remains committed to it and its future in Europe; that Russia does not have a veto over Poland's integration with the West; that you are prepared to advance NATO's stated objective of expansion to Eastern democracies.

POLAND'S PROGRESS; POLAND'S PROBLEMS

The Economic Dimension. Poland invented "shock therapy" market reforms and proved these bring results. What Poles call "Poland A" -- fast-track, modernizing, entrepreneurial -- has made major gains. After an initial sharp decline (18% of GDP), the economy grew at 4% in 1993 and may do even better this year, one of Europe's best rates. GDP is over 50% private. While core heavy industries are still state owned, manufacturing is about 40% private and that share is rising; construction and services are overwhelmingly private. Warsaw and other big cities are transformed, with growing middle classes and pockets of affluence.

But millions are left behind. "Poland B" -- insecure, depressed, disoriented -- represents the majority of the country. Unemployment has levelled off at 16% but is uneven: single digit in Warsaw and 25% or higher in some areas. Workers in some heavy industries and the public sector -- used to socialist-era entitlements -- have seen living standards drop and insecurity rise. New opportunities are abundant in some big cities but sparse in the provinces. Housing shortages limit workers' ability to move to jobs in dynamic areas. Crime is growing and it feeds a sense of insecurity. Around 20% of the country may be considered middle class or better; about 20% impoverished; the remainder is just getting by.

Poland's economic hardships result from the collapse of the Soviet trading system, recession in Western Europe, inherent deficiencies of communist economies and Poland's transformation to a market system. But many Poles blame the reforms for all their difficulties. Poland's lesson is that a flourishing private sector is necessary for successful reform, but not sufficient. Democratic government has a role in providing necessary services, regulation and helping people whom the new economy has not yet reached. Without this, reform's political base may erode faster than the new economy can strengthen it.

The Political Dimension. The Solidarity forces which took power in 1989 knew their political base might erode before they turned the economy around. The economic upturn they counted on arrived, but too late and too unevenly. September 1993 elections brought to power a coalition of the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance

(SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), which used to be a communist front in the farm areas. PSL's leader Waldemar Pawlak took over as Prime Minister; SLD reformers took the difficult economic portfolios. Walesa, exercising his constitutional power, named the foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers. Strains among these power centers are growing.

Leaving behind their anti-reform campaign rhetoric, SLD leaders have continued the economic reforms of previous Solidarity-based governments. Most top SLD leaders appear to be genuine converts to democracy and market reforms. But PSL tends toward social conservatism and statism. Their electorates -- SLD's industrial and some white collar workers and pensioners and PSL's peasants -- are ambivalent about reform, tempted by protectionism and inflationary subsidies. The prospect of integration into the West, emotional attachment to the U.S. and a deep desire to be part of a "normal" country has persuaded Pawlak and his PSL to acquiesce in reform. But unless more is done to address social strains feeding disillusionment, reform could be badly damaged.

The Security Dimension. The Poles, Walesa especially, push security as the core of the relationship. Like most CEE's, Poles feel exposed to what they see as a chaotic NIS and a neo-imperialist Russia. They do not feel immediately threatened but fear the West will, perhaps tacitly, allow Russia to reassume hegemony in CEE. The Polish government -- including Walesa in a recent letter to you -- has focussed on a request for \$25 million in bilateral military support and on NATO's expansion as symbolic of our intentions. Their concerns are often put in stark terms; they are quick to suspect the worst about a U.S. or NATO "special relationship" with Russia. Politically, lack of confidence in the West works against reformers committed to the Western option.

Warsaw's concerns are exaggerated but reflect Polish history. The Poles know the importance of a positive outcome in Russia. But they seek assurances that we will not, for the sake of our Russian equities, sacrifice them; that the road is open to Poland's (and CEE's) integration into the West; that NATO's expansion to new democracies is, as you said in Prague, a matter of when and how. The Poles seek an expanded NATO to include CEE, a strengthened NATO-Russian relationship, and more robust European institutional ties (e.g., via CSCE). After initial grousing, the Poles accepted PFP and are playing an active role; the first PFP exercise on former Warsaw Pact territory, scheduled for September, will take place in Poland, including U.S. forces. The Poles want a robust exercise.

OUR AGENDA

The Entrepreneurial Side. We should emphasize to Pawlak in particular that Poland's achievements in quelling inflation and achieving stability can still be undone; that an erosion of support for restructuring and privatization can leave the economy at an untenable half-way point on the verge of success. You can note past, ongoing and future U.S. efforts. Aside from bilateral assistance, we have taken the lead in coordination between the

U.S., EU, IFI's and key Western governments in providing economic support and assistance. You will be able to announce:

- A \$65 million Poland Partners Fund -- result of your Prague initiative to increase OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) engagement in CEE. Half the Fund comes from U.S. labor unions.
- An initiative to provide at least \$75 million equity for newly-privatized firms, working with the Enterprise Fund and EBRD.

The Social and Human Side. Your Administration recognizes the importance of attention to the human impact of economic dislocation. You announced this shift of approach in Prague and we have since sought to put it in programmatic terms. We should not suggest the U.S. or any outsider can resolve these problems, or that we should no longer stress continued macroeconomic stabilization and privatization. But we have worked with the Poles, and IFI's and the EU, to develop programs for the benefit of those who have suffered greatly as a result of economic decline. As examples of our efforts, you can announce:

- A micro-lending program to help set up businesses, targeted at high unemployment areas.
- A sustained effort to increase Polish housing construction -- perhaps the most depressed sector in the economy -- both by accelerating existing programs and setting up pilot demonstration projects.
- Joint efforts with the Poles to modernize their pension, welfare and health policy systems.
- A regional law enforcement initiative to fight white collar and organized crime.

Security and Poland's Integration. While deflecting exaggerated Polish concerns, you should confirm our interest in Polish security, our rejection of a Russian veto over CEE's integration into the West or a "special relationship" with NATO at CEE's expense and our intention to proceed on the course you charted in January. We then said NATO would expand and PFP was the best road to that expansion. We also said we would reorient bilateral military programs with CEE to support PFP. You can take next steps by announcing:

- Our intention that NATO expand on country-by-country basis, not just in the event of failure of democratic reform in Russia.
- The political bases for eventual NATO membership, including democracy, market economies and responsible security policies.

- Offer to seek \$100 million including \$25 million for Poland, starting in FY '96, for military cooperation with new Partners to support PFP initiatives.
- U.S. willingness to support a meaningful PFP exercise in Poland this September, the first to be held on former Warsaw Pact territory.

Bilateral Issues

- We may be able during the visit to exchange Instruments of Ratification for our Bilateral Economic Treaty (BET). You would simply note the event.
- As Pawlak mentioned in Prague, the Poles want to conclude our bilateral agreement on Poland's GATT reaccession. Final issues include poultry quotas and aircraft and semi-conductor tariffs.
- We are concerned about an on-again, off-again Polish tank sale to Iran.
- We have asked the Poles to set aside the sentence of former Polish Colonel Kuklinski, who, motivated by ideology, worked nine years for the CIA before being exfiltrated in 1981. This is sensitive in Poland.
- The Poles have pressed hard for Vice President Gore to attend their 50th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising.

EVENTS

Meetings with Walesa and PM Pawlak. The Walesa meeting will take place the first evening, followed by a press availability and State Dinner. You should discuss security, urge continued reforms and convey our awareness of social dislocation. With Pawlak the next day, you can stress market reforms and discuss our initiatives in greater detail.

Wreath Layings. You have three: the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; a monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, accompanied by American Jewish Community leaders and; a monument to the Warsaw Uprising, whose 50th Anniversary falls August 1, accompanied by a Polish-American group. The Uprising is deeply-felt by all Poles.

Speech. You will address the Polish Parliament and guests the second day, also meeting briefly beforehand with the Marshals (speakers) of Parliament's two Houses.

CEE Foreign Ministers. After the speech you and Walesa will meet with the CEE Foreign Ministers, who will have held a Ministerial with Secretary Christopher.

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ARRIVAL CEREMONIES AT
WARSAW OKECIE AIRPORT, PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The Poles organize a set-piece arrival ceremony for every Official Visit. Your ceremony will be different because airport ceremony will be very brief and the major protocolary event will take place at the newly-renovated Presidential Palace (the Radziwill Palace). There will be no arrival statements.

BACKGROUND

Airport. You will be met by Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski (o-la-HOFF-ski) and other Polish government officials. Among them will be Jan Piekarski, (pye-KAR-ski), the new Deputy Chief of Protocol but until recently head of the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad. Piekarski earned high praise (and a Superior Honor Award) from the State Department and deep thanks from Senator Boren for his work, including efforts on behalf of an arrested American citizen. Also among them will be newly-named Ambassador to the U.S. Jerzy Kozminski (kozh-MEEN-ski), whose credentials you accepted in June.

For the U.S., Ambassador Nicholas Rey and Mrs. Rey will be present, and others from the Embassy. Rey is a direct descendent of Mikolaj Rej, the greatest literary figure of the Polish Renaissance.

You will walk through an honor guard cordon to your limousine and depart for the Marriott Hotel.

Presidential Palace. This is a set piece, rather elaborate ceremony taking place both outside and inside the Palace.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VL NARA, Date 6/8/2023

2016-0314-M-1

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MEETING WITH
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESZA

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Walesa (va-WHEN-sa) considers himself the guarantor of Polish reforms; President since 1990, he has used his limited constitutional powers to push and prod Poland's market transformation and integration into the West. As you recall, Walesa's style combines deliberate (and frustrating) unpredictability, metaphors either colorful or opaque and natural forcefulness. Sometimes insightful and inspired, Walesa can be abrupt or rambling. Despite occasional populist rhetoric, Walesa has supported reform at virtually every difficult moment -- and there have been many -- even at considerable political cost to himself.

Walesa has held center stage in Poland since 1980, but in recent years his popularity has dropped sharply (only 25% support him, according to a recent poll). This stems partly from Walesa's difficulty in finding a Presidential as opposed to Tribune's voice, partly from his solo leadership style and partly from disillusionment with the reform program. Walesa will run for reelection in late 1995; he has not decided whether to run as an "anti-communist" outsider against the current government or as a Presidential figure above politics. He may look to his standing in the West to help him at home.

Despite an appreciation of the West's support before and after 1989, Walesa is uncertain of the West's commitment to CEE. He has more faith in the U.S. than in Western Europe, but worries we are tempted by isolationism or a "naive" pro-Russian tilt. Walesa has stated that the West's response to the democratic breakthrough in 1989 was inadequate and stressed to visitors that the overwhelming majority of Poles has suffered deprivation in the wake of the Communist collapse. He believes that the West should be of greater help to Poland.

Security will be central to Walesa's agenda -- he regards as inevitable Russia's return to neo-imperialism. He will press for movement on NATO expansion and assurance that Poland will not be left in an insecure "grey zone" outside the West. He has again staked out a position on NATO expansion and requested bilateral security assistance (\$25 million to support PFP activities), though less aggressively than before the Prague Summit. The Poles will host PFP's first exercise on former Warsaw Pact territory this September; we will take part. The Poles want a "muscular" exercise; we want to be supportive without turning it into a provocative event.

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YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Affirm that Poland's future lies with the democratic, free-market West and that the U.S. is committed to helping Poland on that road.
- o Set out U.S. views on European security, including our policy of NATO's gradual expansion to Eastern democracies such as Poland.
- o Affirm U.S. support for Poland's market transformation.
- o Convey your awareness of human problems created by the collapse of the old regime's economic system and our willingness to help Poland ameliorate them.

CORE POINTS

European Security, NATO, Poland

- o Expansion of democracy central goal of U.S. foreign policy. Want Poland, other CEEs, to take full-fledged place in a secure Europe. Reject insecure "grey zone" for CEE.
- o Led by U.S., NATO took firm decision in January to expand to Europe's new democracies. Should work together to make it happen in way that increases security, not confrontation.
- o The way ahead is open.
 - NATO's expansion will take place country by country.
 - New members must be democracies, market economies, responsible in their security and foreign policies.
 - PFP is the practical road to NATO membership. Militaries need time to work together. PFP provides means. Pleased Poland is active Partner.
 - Good that Poland will host first PFP exercise in former Warsaw Pact in September. Want exercise to be as robust as possible.
 - Russia cannot veto this process. A catastrophe in Russia would accelerate expansion, but expansion does not depend on democracy's failure in Russia.
- o Should work together to get Russia used to idea of NATO's expansion; to see it as stabilizing, not threat.
- o This will take time but direction is clear. Hope while President to welcome new democracies as new allies.

Bilateral Military Program

- o Have considered Poland's request for \$25 million to support your participation in PFP. You make good case that applies to other new partners, too.
- o Our next budget -- for year beginning October 1 -- is nearly set: I'm asking Congress for about \$25 million for military cooperation with CEE countries.
- o Will try to do more the year after. Will ask Congress for \$100 million for military cooperation with new Partners to support PFP initiatives. Request will include \$25 million for Poland.

Support for Free Market Reforms

- o Admire Poland's achievements since 1989; you're on the right track, proving free market transformation is possible.
- o Your role in supporting reforms is essential; I respect it. Keep fighting inflation; implement Mass Privatization.
- o Proud of U.S. support since 1989: \$200 million of the \$1 billion Stabilization Fund, unprecedented official debt reduction worth \$2.4 billion, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund capitalized at \$240 million. I intervened to support London Club (commercial debt) reduction deal expected to be worth over \$5 billion to Poland.
- o Will keep helping:
 - Seek more U.S. investment in Poland. Have brought U.S. executives here.
 - Will announce \$65 million Poland Partners Fund, a capital investment fund set up by OPIC. Half the Fund financed by American labor unions, so Lane Kirkland is part of this too.
 - Will announce initiative with Enterprise Fund and EBRD to bring \$75 million of capital resources to newly-privatized firms under Mass Privatization program.
 - Supporting Poland's accession to OECD.
- o Will improve coordination with EU, other Western supporters of Poland, CEE. Energize EU; make most of resources.
- o Want to finish up Business and Economic Treaty. We're ready to exchange Instruments of Ratification when Poland adheres to Berne Convention on intellectual property.
- o Should conclude our bilateral GATT reaccession talks. Very few issues remain; can compromise on poultry quotas; hope we can move semi-conductors and aircraft.

- o [If asked] Want to ensure greatest possible market access for Polish, other CEE products in U.S., EU. Free trade agreement might complicate Polish membership in EU.

Coping with Social Dislocation

- o Know people have been hurt by collapse of the old system. Unemployment and insecurity can generate social, political problems, even as Polish economy now grows fast.
- o Outsiders cannot solve problem; answer lies in growth, led by private sector. But cannot ignore human side.
- o Our governments have been consulting closely in recent weeks, discussing some ideas; listening to yours.
 - Want to accelerate housing construction: get existing program moving, start demonstration projects.
 - To fight unemployment, want to establish micro-lending program to help small businesses, especially in high unemployment areas.
 - U.S. prepared to send teams to help you modernize your pension, welfare and health policy systems.
- o We're both concerned about new mafias, some from outside Poland. Will announce new CEE law enforcement initiative to help Poles, others, fight white collar, organized crime.

Warsaw Uprising

- o (If asked). Admire Poland's decision to make this important commemoration a ceremony of reconciliation with Germans, Russians invited. U.S. will be represented at high level.

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DINNER HOSTED BY
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESA

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2016 0314M-1 (3,02)
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CONTEXT OF EVENT

This will be a large, formal dinner -- the first at the newly-refurbished Presidential (Radziwill) Palace. The occasion gives you the chance to continue with topics not fully covered in the earlier bilateral. It is Walesa's usual style to be aggressive at the start of meetings, so by the dinner you may have heard a lot about Polish NATO membership and the alleged inadequacies of the West's response to post-1989 Europe. At the dinner itself, however, Walesa may be comparatively relaxed. It is a good chance to discuss regional developments, Russia and Poland's transformation and Walesa's role in it. You and Walesa will exchange toasts.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Underscore U.S. commitment to Poland's reforms and to Poland's becoming a full member of an integrated Euro-Atlantic world.
- o Reiterate Walesa's important role in keeping Poland's reforms on track.
- o Emphasize your recognition of Poland's progress to date, while stressing the need to continue market reforms and deal with social dislocations.
- o Urge that U.S. and Poland work together to handle Euro-Atlantic expansion carefully, rejecting any suggestion that the U.S. will give Russia a tacit or explicit veto over the process.

CORE POINTS (Text of toast to be provided separately)

U.S. Commitment

- o Poland key to our objective of a secure Europe of market democracies.
- o Committed to Poland's full integration: reject "grey zone" for CEE; no Russian veto; Polish security important.
- o U.S. is rejecting neo-isolationism. Will stay engaged.

Walesa's role

- o Respect your historic role as Solidarity's leader, first President of new Poland. Kept reforms on track.

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- o Value your pledge to be guarantor of reforms.
- o Pleased you signed Polish budget; boosts international confidence.

Poland's Progress, Problems

- o Poland a success; shows radical reforms work.
- o Impressive growth; new preliminary IMF Stand-by Agreement, increasing interest by investors show promising future.
- o "Poland A" -- growing, entrepreneurial, active Poland -- is the future. But "Poland B" -- mired in depression, unemployment, less private activity -- can drag you down.
- o U.S. wants to keep supporting entrepreneurial Poland fulfill potential; at same time, help you cope with social, human dislocation. U.S. working with IFI's and EU to organize joint efforts.

European Integration

- o NATO's decision to expand, PFP, put us on road to expansion of Western democratic community.
- o Appreciate Poland's constructive policy toward Eastern neighbors. Your friendship with Ukraine helps; Kravchuk cites your arguments in his decision to agree to denuclearize Ukraine.
- o We know your history with Russia. Always danger of history repeating itself. But for first time Russian people have voice. If democracy takes root, Russia will turn toward improving lives of its people.
- o Aware of past; are prepared for adversarial relations if we must; but must work for better outcome if we can.

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WREATH LAYING
TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

This is a standard ceremonial event for State visits. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is a four column single-story structure -- all that remains of the Saxon Palace blown up by the retreating Germans. The ceremony is a set piece without formal remarks. You will be asked to sign the Book of Remembrance adding appropriate comments. Invited guests will include Polish-Americans accompanying you.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Demonstrate U.S. respect for Polish independence and those who defended it.
- o Note Poland's role as WWII Ally, as noted in the Tomb's inscriptions of battles in Polish history.

CORE POINTS

- o Poland and the world owe much to the valor of Polish soldiers.
- o Poland is taking rightful place as member of Western, democratic family: once an ally, now a friend, perhaps an ally again.

BACKGROUND

Inscribed on the tomb are the names of significant battles in Polish history, including defeat of the Teutonic Knights in 1410. The taking of Moscow in 1610, the failed Kosciuszko Uprising in 1794, the defeat of the Bolsheviks in 1920, the Warsaw Jewish Ghetto Uprising in 1943, the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, and WWII battles in which the Poles fought as Allies. Democratic governments after 1989 added the names of many battles consigned to "non-history" under the old regime.

CEREMONY

A military band and honor guard will be to your right; guests to your left. You will follow soldiers bearing the wreath and marching at a slow step. The soldiers place the wreath while you place your hand over your heart as the military band sounds a trumpet call. Afterwards, a Polish officer will brief you on the history of the Tomb and Polish military history. You sign the book at the end. You will not make any remarks.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2023

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CEREMONY AT
WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING MEMORIAL

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The event marks our respect for the heroes of the Jewish Ghetto who took up arms in courageous, hopeless defiance. In April 1993, Vice President Gore attended the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, organized by Lech Walesa. You will make brief public remarks in this candle-lighting ceremony. A small group of leaders from the American and Polish Jewish communities will be present. The monument is located in what was a pre-War Jewish neighborhood and then part of the Ghetto. The Germans razed the entire area; the apartments now standing are post-war.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Demonstrate our undiminished memory of the Holocaust.
- o While acknowledging the uniquely horrible character of the Holocaust, note that the dark purveyors of ethnic and racial hatred are still among us.

BACKGROUND

Pre-WWII Poland was a multi-ethnic society with a significant Jewish minority (9 percent of the population, 30 percent of pre-War Warsaw). Jews had been present in Poland since the 14th century; a large percentage of American Jews trace their ancestry to lands now or once Polish. The German occupiers built the Warsaw Ghetto in 1940; Jews found outside without permission were put to death at once. After the systematic mass killings began in 1941, hundreds of thousands of Jews were taken from the Ghetto and transported to death camps from an embarkation point three blocks north of the Monument.

With only about 60,000 Jews left alive and German intentions clear, several hundred mostly young Jews took up arms in an effort to die fighting. The Uprising began on April 19, 1943, during Passover. They beat back initial German assaults and held out for 22 days. The Germans burnt the Ghetto down and flushed out the fighters building by building. Some escaped through the sewers. A few survive to this day, including one of the leaders, Marek Edelman, who remained in Poland and became a Solidarity activist and celebrated Polish hero.

Poland's tiny (under 10,000) Jewish community -- while mostly old and impoverished -- has been strengthened since 1989 by some young families who have rediscovered their ethnic heritage.

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MEETING WITH POLISH PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKERS
SEJM MARSHAL OLEKSY AND SENATE MARSHAL STRUZIK

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Shortly before your speech in the Sejm ("same"), you will proceed for a brief meeting in the Parliament Building with the Marshals (speakers) of the Sejm and Senate. Poland's provisional constitution (a permanent constitution is being drafted) provides for a parliamentary system of government. The Sejm is by far the more powerful body and its Marshal an influential figure. The Senate, in existence only since 1989, is little more than advisory.

Sejm Marshal Jozef Oleksy (o-LEK-see) is a leader of the largest Parliamentary party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), one of the two ruling parties. Both SLD and its governing partner, Prime Minister Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party (PSL), have old regime antecedents but so far have maintained a generally reformist direction. Widely regarded as reformist, Oleksy describes himself as a Western social democrat as opposed to "left populists" in his party. Nevertheless, Oleksy has been publicly skeptical about reliance on the U.S. to support Polish integration into the West. In this, he reflects a view, held by a variety of political figures, that the U.S. is not genuinely interested in CEE and that Poland has to explore alternatives to an (allegedly) futile search for Western acceptance.

Struzik (STRU-zhik) is a less dynamic figure, with mixed PSL and Solidarity background. He is a doctor and has managed a provincial hospital in the city of Plock. Personally close to Pawlak, Struzik is the closest thing to a modern, reformed PSL leader. He speaks of PSL building on its conservative base rather than old regime past and becoming a Polish version of the German CDU/CSU.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Stress U.S. commitment to support democratic Poland's full integration into the West.
- o Confirm U.S. willingness to work with Poland's democratically-elected government on the basis of its programs, not its ideological antecedents.
- o Urge continuation of Poland's bold, successful market reforms.
- o Note U.S. interest in helping Poland deal with human and social dislocation caused by the failed former system.

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CORE POINTS

U.S. Goals

- o U.S. seeks expansion of democratic family of nations from Euro-Atlantic base. Poland included.
- o Our vision inclusive: no anti-Russian encirclement or bloc.
- o No Russian veto either; reject CEE in "grey zone."
- o Must manage expansion of trans-Atlantic, other institutions (NATO) in way that increases everyone's security.
- o Pleased by Polish participation in PFP. Is road to increased Polish security, NATO membership. Hope Parliament will support this program.

Polish Reforms

- o Basis of U.S.-Polish relations remains democratic, market reforms in Poland and U.S. support.
- o Poland's progress since 1989 impressive. Past the worst.
 - Important to continue market transformation, mass privatization, continued macroeconomic stability; keep inflation from returning and destroying gains.
 - Aware of human and social dislocation caused by collapse of old system. Want to help; U.S. ready with specifics.
- o Reject "third way" of statist protectionism. Has been tried -- Africa, Latin America, South Asia -- always failed.
- o Sejm, Senate passed sound budget; now IMF has concluded another preliminary agreement with GOP worth \$773 million. Will parliament maintain reformist direction?

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MEETING WITH
POLISH PRIME MINISTER WALDEMAR PAWLAK

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Pawlak (PAHV-lak) is young, a farmer as well as politician and a product of post-1989 Poland rather than an apparatchik. He owes much of his rise to Lech Walesa, who once saw him as a protegee. Pawlak's lack of outward sophistication has led friends and enemies to underestimate him. Soft-spoken, adept at maneuver and skilled at hiding his considerable ambition, Pawlak is ambivalent about to Poland's market reforms. As Premier, he supported a sound 1994 budget that earned IMF support.

Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party (PSL), however, is an anti-reform bastion. It seeks to represent the interest of the more than 30% of the population living on farms. The party is a direct descendent of a communist satellite party and its internal structures are less remade than those of its coalition partner, the reborn former communists. PSL's committed electorate -- small-holding peasants -- are conservative on social issues, isolationist on foreign policy and statist and protectionist on economic issues. PSL's social conservatism has garnered considerable Catholic Church support. The Party's popularity is rising, as it avoids association with tough economic reforms.

Pawlak has little responsibility for foreign affairs. He focusses on economic issues, and there is considerable tension between PSL and the reformers -- young intellectuals from the ex-communist party -- who run key economic ministries. Pawlak plays a balancing game, maintaining macroeconomic stability, keeping privatization on track though at a lesser pace and pushing PSL patronage interests hard behind the scenes. While the Polish economy is growing strongly, a lack of GOP leadership could weaken reform at a midpoint and allow inflation to return.

You met Pawlak in Prague last January. One notion he suggested, without elaboration then or since, was an economic "Partnership for Prosperity." This meeting is a place to focus on economic and social issues and he may bring up his "PFP"; you should not. Pawlak wants an invitation to the U.S. in 1995 but we should be careful: Presidential elections will be held that fall and Pawlak may run against Walesa. In May, Pawlak sent you an e-mail greetings on Internet and will appreciate your referring to it.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Strengthen Pawlak's commitment to Poland's market transformation, stressing the need to fight inflation and continue structural transformation.

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- o Convey your awareness of human problems created by the collapse of the old regime's economic system and our willingness to help Poland ameliorate them.
- o Raise bilateral trade issues.
- o Affirm that Poland's future lies with the democratic, free-market West and that the U.S. is committed to helping a democratic Poland on that road.

CORE POINTS

Support for Free Market Reforms

- o Poland's achievements since 1989 impressed the world; on the right track but more to do. Inflation could return and wipe out gains. Important to carry out Mass Privatization.
 - Continued reforms require leadership to continue. Hope we can count on you.
- o Proud of U.S. support: Stabilization Fund, unprecedented official debt reduction, Enterprise Fund. I supported successful London Club (commercial debt) reduction.
- o We'll keep helping:
 - Seek more U.S. investment in Poland. Have brought U.S. executives here.
 - Will announce \$65 million Poland Partners Fund, a capital investment fund set up by OPIC.
 - Will announce initiative with Enterprise Fund and EBRD to bring \$75 million of capital resources to newly privatized firms.
 - Support Poland's accession to OECD.
- o Will improve coordination with EU, other Western supporters of Poland, CEE. Energize EU; make most of resources.
- o Want to finish up Business and Economic Treaty. We're ready to exchange Instruments of Ratification when Poland adheres to Berne Convention on intellectual property.
- o Agree we should conclude our bilateral GATT reaccession talks. Very few issues remain; can compromise on poultry quotas; hope we can move semi-conductors and aircraft.
- o (If asked) Want to ensure greatest possible market access for Polish, other CEE products in U.S., EU. Free trade agreement might complicate Polish membership in EU.

Coping with Social Dislocation

- o People have been hurt by collapse of the old system. Unemployment and insecurity can generate social, political problems, even as Polish economy grows fast.
- o Outsiders cannot solve problem; answer lies in growth, led by private sector. But cannot ignore human side.
- o Our governments have been consulting closely in recent weeks, discussing some ideas; listening to yours.
 - Want to accelerate housing construction: get existing program moving, start demonstration projects.
 - To fight unemployment, want to establish micro-lending program to help small businesses, especially in high unemployment areas.
 - U.S. prepared to send teams to help you modernize your pension, welfare and health policy systems.
- o We're both concerned about new mafias, some from outside Poland. Will announce a new CEE law enforcement initiative to help Poles, others, fight white collar, organized crime.

European Security, NATO, Poland

- o Expansion of democracy central goal of U.S. foreign policy. Want Poland, other CEEs, to take full-fledged place in a secure Europe. Reject insecure "grey zone" for CEE.
- o Led by U.S., NATO took firm decision in January to expand to Europe's new democracies. Should work together to make it happen in way that increases security, not confrontation.
- o Should work together to get Russia used to idea of NATO's expansion; to see it as stabilizing, not threat.

Bilateral Military Program

- o Have considered Poland's request for \$25 million to support your participation in PFP. Your case applies to other new partners, too.
- o Our next budget -- for year beginning October 1 -- is nearly set: I'm asking Congress for about \$25 million for military cooperation with CEE countries.
- o Will try to do more the year after. Will ask Congress for \$100 million for military cooperation with new Partners to support PFP initiatives. Request will include \$25 million for Poland.

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SPEECH TO THE
POLISH PARLIAMENT

CONTEXT OF EVENT

This is the major speech of the July trip and intended to reach CEE, all-European and U.S., as well as Polish, audiences. Both Houses of the Polish Parliament (the Sejm and Senate) will be in attendance; guests will include Americans accompanying you from the U.S. A peripheral body under the old regime, since 1989 the Polish parliament has been a center of the country's political life. President Bush addressed the Parliament in July 1989; Vice President Gore did so in April 1993.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Underscore the U.S. objective of building a bigger trans-Atlantic community, including as many of the new CEE and NIS democracies as possible.
- o Affirm your commitment to Polish democracy, security and market reform.
- o Make clear our intention that NATO expand to new democracies, including a democratic Poland.
- o Strengthen Polish commitment to reform at a difficult mid-way point, stressing U.S. respect for Polish accomplishments to date and awareness of social and human dislocation.
- o Showcase U.S. initiatives to help Poland further its transformation begun in 1989.
- o Link the liberation of Europe begun in Normandy with our own efforts today.

CORE POINTS (Speech text to be provided)

BACKGROUND

You will be speaking to a special session of the Sejm ("SAME"). The main chamber seats 546 people on the main floor with another 200 in the gallery. The building dates from the 1920's; it was rebuilt after WWII.

September 1993 elections produced, from 36 percent of the popular vote, a nearly 65 percent majority for two parties with antecedents in the old regime -- the Alliance of the Democratic Left and the Polish Peasant Party -- who constitute the government coalition. Post-Solidarity parties constitute most of the opposition. You are speaking at the formal invitation of Sejm Marshal (speaker) Jozef Oleksy, one of the most pro-reform ex-communist leaders.

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CEREMONY AT
WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The Warsaw Uprising beginning August 1, 1944 was the high point of Polish resistance to Germany during WWII and an event of stirring heroism as well as terrible suffering. The Uprising has enormous significance to Poles everywhere, and your participation in a commemorative ceremony at one of Warsaw's monuments to the Uprising will be appreciated. You will be accompanied by a group of Polish-Americans who came with you to Warsaw. One of several monuments to the Uprising, the "Little Soldier" Monument commemorates children who fought in the Uprising. It stands by the Medieval old city wall.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Pay tribute to the heroes of the Uprising and, more broadly, to Poland's contribution to the Allied effort in WWII.
- o Link Polish resistance in WWII to our themes from Normandy and our objectives of expanding democracy in Europe today.

CORE POINTS (Remarks to be provided separately)

BACKGROUND

In the summer of 1944 the Soviet Army was pushing back the Germans along a broad front in Poland and appeared ready to take Warsaw. But the pro-Western London Government-in-exile and its Home Army in Poland were worried about Soviet political intentions. The Poles believed they could forestall a communist takeover only if they themselves liberated their capital before the Soviets arrived.

As the Soviets approached Warsaw, the Home Army launched its Uprising on August 1, 1944 and quickly seized control of most of the city. But they failed to capture the Vistula River bridges and major roads. At that point, the Soviet advance came to a halt just outside Warsaw, probably on Stalin's orders. With the Soviets standing still across the river, the Germans had time to crush the Uprising. Bitter fighting took place for two months as the German ring tightened. Stalin complicated U.S. and British efforts to supply the Home Army by air (though our efforts are still remembered fondly by Home Army veterans). In October, the Home Army surrendered. The Germans dynamited what was left of Warsaw. The Soviets resumed their advance in January, 1945 and installed a communist regime that lasted until 1989.

The Poles seek high-level U.S. attendance at the 50th Anniversary Commemorative event to be held this August 1. Mitterrand, Major, Herzog and possibly Chernomyrdin are planning to attend and the Poles have pressed for the Vice President to represent us.

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RECEPTION FOR
CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS

CONTEXT OF EVENT

While your visit is bilateral, the Warsaw stop also reinforces our commitment to democracy, security and market economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. This point is especially important for southern tier states -- Romania and Bulgaria, Albania -- who believe themselves to have made major sacrifices in adherence to the Serbian sanctions regime and worry they have decidedly second-tier status in our thinking.

The Poles easily accepted our request and invited the CEE Foreign Ministers: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, FYROM, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to meet with Secretary Christopher; we later added Croatia and Bosnia. Your meeting with them takes the form of a reception at the Presidential (Radziwill) Palace following your speech to the Polish Parliament and two ceremonial events.

While each foreign minister has separate concerns, all support continued U.S. engagement in Europe and CEE, seek greater U.S. investment in their countries and urge that the U.S. not consign their region to a Russian sphere of influence or security "grey zone." Secretary Christopher will have met with the CEE Foreign Ministers for two hours that afternoon; he will brief you on the results of the meeting. You will meet with each Foreign Minister briefly and informally in the course of the reception.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Underscore U.S. support for democracy, security and economic reform throughout CEE.
- o Emphasize to southern-tier CEE's -- especially Bulgaria and Romania -- that we do not consign them to inferior status but that our relations will be a function of their progress toward democracy and economic reform, and conduct of responsible foreign policies.
- o Emphasize to front-line states that we appreciate their support for Serbian sanctions and hope for a settlement soon.
- o Convey particular points to individual Foreign Ministers.

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CORE POINTS

U.S. Objectives in CEE

- o U.S. seeks expansion of democratic family of nations from Euro-Atlantic base. All CEE can be part.
- o Our vision inclusive: no anti-Russian encirclement or bloc; no Russian veto either; reject CEE in "grey zone."
- o Must manage expansion of trans-Atlantic, other institutions, e.g., NATO, in way that increases everyone's security.
- o Pleased by CEE participation in PFP. Is road to NATO membership. Hope your governments will continue to support.

CEE Reforms

- o Basis of U.S. relations with CEE's remains democratic, market reforms, U.S. support for transformation.
- o Progress impressive. Some CEE's past the worst, show way for others.
 - Important to continue market transformation, mass privatization, macroeconomic stability.
 - Aware of human and social dislocation caused by collapse of old system. Want to help.
- o Reject "third way" of statist protectionism. Has been tried -- Africa, Latin America, south Asia -- always failed.
- o Reforms not the cause of problems but the cure. Slowing reforms not answer.
- o U.S. engaged: greater coordination with EU, major Western countries, IFI's to help across board; Trade and Investment Conference in fall, expanded OPIC programs; new efforts to help with social dislocation. Try in Poland; perhaps expand.

Specific Country Points

- o **Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Hungary:** Urge continued adherence to Serbian sanctions; understand how difficult, joint efforts on transport corridors, infrastructure can ease some burden.
- o **Romania:** (FM Teodor Melescanu (meh-lesh-KAH-noo)): Pleased by Romania's progress with IMF, World Bank; support for PFP. Important now to continue reforms.

- o **Bulgaria:** (FM Stanislav Daskalov (DAWS-kloff)): Important to restart reform momentum. Want to see Bulgaria succeed; important to avoid false sense of isolation or neglect.
- o **Hungary:** (State Secretary Janos Martonyi (MAHR-tohn-ye) will head delegation; FM designate Kovacs (KO-vach) will be in delegation): Look forward to working with new government. Appreciated President Goncz's assurance that Hungary's reforms and pro-Western policies would continue.
- o **Albania:** (FM Alfred Serreqi (seh-RECH-ee)): Encourage progress in treatment of its ethnic Greek minority. Understand concern about Kosovo; very much on U.S. agenda.
- o **Slovakia:** (FM Edward Kukan (KU-kahn)): Support new government's reformist direction; intensifying efforts to help. Hope September elections support continued reforms. Welcome President Kovac's commitment to reform from June 21 meeting.
- o **Czech Republic:** (FM Josef Zieleniec (ZHE-len-ets): Republic doing well. Each country's integration to West will be individual; we look to new democracies to cooperate regionally, too. (If asked: Hope to resolve complex budgetary issue of possible RFE/RL move to Prague.)
- o **Slovenia:** (FM Alojz Peterle (PAY-ter-lay)): Slovenia becoming success story. We support your integration into West and have made that point with GOI. Difficult to lift arms embargo, but want to find ways to recognize Slovenia's status as apart from conflict in former Yugoslavia.
- o **Croatia:** (FM Mato Granic (GRA-nich): All parties should accept Contact Group territorial compromise. Negotiations only road to peace. Peace your first step to West. Should renew UNPROFOR.
- o **Bosnia:** (FM Irfan Ljubijankic (lyoo-BYAN-kich): Pleased Congact Group produced realistic, serious territorial compromise; is best chance for peace. International will to enforce strong; serious incentives and disincentives.
- o **Poland:** (FM Andrzej Olechowski (o-la-HOFF-ski)): Appreciate Polish hosting meeting. Understand Polish interest in moving rapidly toward Western integration; are making progress.

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MEETING WITH AMERICAN COMMUNITY

CONTEXT OF EVENT

This is your opportunity to make contact directly with the large and diverse official American community in Warsaw. Ambassador Nicholas Rey has been at post since the fall.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Acknowledge the work of Americans and their families representing the U.S. in Poland and the Polish employees who support them.
- o Note the broad scope of work the community is engaged in; new missions for a new Europe.

CORE POINTS (Text of remarks to be provided)

BACKGROUND

The Warsaw Embassy, a small Iron Curtain reporting post in 1989, is now hub of a strong American effort to help Poland complete its transformation. The official community numbers 270, including Peace Corps, long-term advisors and Embassy staff. There are 154 American family members not employed by the Embassy and 440 Polish nationals working for the Embassy. The Peace Corps presence is among the largest in the world. We also have Consulates General in Krakow and Poznan.

The meeting will take place following the formal Departure Ceremony at the Presidential Palace at the Ambassador's Residence. Built in the early-1960's, the Residence is located in an attractive neighborhood.

The Residence took on special significance during the mid- and late-1980's, when it served as unofficial haven and meeting place for Solidarity intellectuals. Jaruzelski once remarked derisively that "Solidarity was just a bunch of intellectuals who went to dinner at (then Ambassador) John Davis' house." One year later, Jaruzelski sat down to lunch with the newly-empowered Solidarity leadership and President Bush. After 1989, the Residence (then home to former Ambassador Tom Simons) served as a place where Poles of all political persuasion could meet and conduct business.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VR NARA, Date 6/6/2023
2018-0314-11-1

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U.S. INVESTMENT IN POLAND

U.S. investment in Poland has grown rapidly as the Polish economy recovered from the initial shocks imposed by adjustment and the breakdown of the CEMA trading area. At the close of 1993, U.S. investments in Poland totalled approximately \$1.2 billion, with another \$1.0 billion committed to future projects. U.S. investment, in fact, dwarfs that of other nations, accounting for approximately 44 percent of total foreign investment in Poland. Italy (11 percent), France (7 percent) and Germany (6 percent) follow. Major U.S. corporate investors include Coca Cola, Proctor and Gamble, Ameritech, Levi Strauss, Gerber and Dupont Conoco. U.S. interest in portfolio investment in Poland has also grown rapidly.

This U.S. investment interest stems first from Poland's consistent reform effort and strong macroeconomic performance. Poland was the first country in Eastern Europe to return to growth during the 1990s, with a 1.5 percent increase in real GDP in 1992 and a further 4.0 percent increase in 1993. In 1994, that growth is expected to further accelerate to between 4.5 and 5.0 percent. Investors cite Poland's large internal market (35 million people), skilled workforce, relatively low manpower costs, improving intellectual property rights protection and growing access to markets in the European Union (with whom Poland has negotiated an association agreement, which will provide for essentially free trade within a decade). U.S. investors have benefitted from strong support from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency and the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

Investors remain concerned about the poor state of Polish infrastructure, an inefficient and risk-adverse banking system, a still poorly developed capital market and the unexpectedly slow pace of large-scale privatization, which has left many major industrial plants in the hands of the government. Residual concerns exist about regional stability, popular support for reform within Poland, and the longer-term economic policies of the center-left coalition elected in September, 1993.

To stimulate further trade and investment, the U.S. will sponsor a Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe during the fall of 1994. This conference will bring together investors from the United States with policy-makers from CEE countries. Its purpose is to focus attention on the potential for U.S. trade and investment in the region, obstacles and steps CEE governments can take to promote it.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2013

7016-0314-M-1

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POLAND, NATO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

Integration into Western economic and security structures -- above all, the EU and NATO -- is a key Polish foreign policy goal. It has enormous political and emotional significance. The Poles had hoped that Yeltsin's August 1993 declaration in Warsaw (to the effect that Russia would not object to Poland's joining NATO, quickly walked back) would open the way for rapid progress toward this goal. Prior to the NATO summit, Walesa and other officials were vocal and sometimes strident in calling for NATO membership to ensure Poland was not left in a "security vacuum" or the victim of a "new Yalta."

The Poles have since come around to the view that, since PFP is what NATO has on offer, they should take an active role in it. Poland was the third state to join PFP, the first to submit its Presentation Document and the first to draft with NATO an Individual Partnership Program (currently being reviewed in Warsaw prior to NAC approval). Poland has offered to host the first PFP field exercise in a Partner country later this year, but is not satisfied with the scope of the exercise being offered by NATO military officials. There is also U.S. interest in whether Poland might (as it suggested in the past) permanently dedicate a former Soviet exercise area as a peacekeeping training/exercise facility.

The Poles miss no opportunity, however, to reiterate their interest in early NATO membership and their desire for either a direct commitment or an indirect "signal" (e.g., announcement of NATO membership criteria) that their accession will not be long delayed. Walesa's letter to President Clinton of June 10 said that "we expect, Mr. President, that during your visit to Poland you will state that Poland will soon find itself among the members of the Alliance."

The Poles are particularly sensitive to any suggestion of a Russian droit de regard over their relationship with NATO and threatened to withdraw from PFP if Moscow were granted a "special status" within the Partnership. The June 9 NAC Ministerial in Istanbul made clear that NATO will not enter into a formal "special relationship" with Russia and that Russia will enter PFP on the same basis as other partners.

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EUROPEAN UNION-POLISH RELATIONS

European Union membership is near the top of Polish foreign policy objectives. EU-Polish relations have remained good, despite changes in Polish governments.

Poland's EU Association Agreement (AA) addresses a broad range of trade and political relations and envisions but does not guarantee eventual EU membership. In April, Poland formally applied for EU membership; the GOP understands that the EU will not begin serious consideration of its application before 1997. The biggest obstacles to Polish membership are the relative weakness of its economic development and its large agricultural sector. If Poland were admitted, it would be entitled to huge subsidies under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and economic development funds. Nevertheless, the Germans have been strong advocates of Polish membership.

EU-Polish contacts at high levels are frequent. The EU has been Poland's greatest source of economic assistance; from 1990 through June 1993, the EU and member states had committed over \$8.5 billion to Poland, including debt forgiveness (U.S. figure for the period was \$3.9 billion).

Trade and Market Access: Poland has complained about access to EU markets, usually following the imposition of an EU trade restriction on Polish exports, notably on steel and agricultural products. These should become more rare as the AA is fully implemented, though the Poles will be watching EU application of its safeguard provisions. Under the AA, most Polish industrial goods will enter the EU duty- and quota-free beginning on January 1, 1995; restrictions on steel and textiles will be lifted later. The EU and Poland will have free trade in all non-agricultural sectors by January 1, 1997. Thanks in part to the AA, Polish exports to the EU rose over 40% from 1990 to 1993, despite the European recession; however, imports from the EU more than doubled, thanks to increased consumer demand in Poland and the appreciation of the zloty in real terms. As a result, Poland's billion dollar-plus trade surplus with the EU in 1990 became a \$2.5 billion deficit in 1993.

European Stability Pact ("Balladur Pact"): The GOP remains unhappy with the European Stability Pact; it does not consider itself to be an "object" of the Pact as it argues, with some justice, that Poland has no border or minority problems. The Poles did not participate in bilateral meetings with the EU on the Pact and maintain that at a minimum the Pact's focus needs to be diverted to "good neighborly" relations including, in particular, economic cooperation, in order to make it possible for them to participate. It would also like its agreement with Germany to be included in the Pact. Germany is not enthused.

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U.S. - POLISH BILATERAL ISSUES

General: Bilateral relations are very good. Nevertheless, both sides, after decades of mutual admiration and little actual interaction, are learning to deal with the inevitable negatives in relations, including trade issues, Polish security concerns and arms sales.

Security Issues: Integration into Western economic and security structures -- above all, the EU and NATO -- is a key Polish foreign policy goal, and Warsaw presses for NATO membership at every opportunity. Developments in Moscow have increased the Poles' sense of urgency for NATO membership.

Initially, the Poles were disappointed with the Partnership for Peace (PFP), hoping instead for a commitment to early Polish membership in NATO. The Poles have since taken a vigorous, even model, approach to PFP. Poland was the first country to submit the completed Presentation Document identifying the resources it plans to contribute to PFP activities, and has also agreed to host a PFP field exercise (involving U.S. forces) in Fall 1994.

Iraq Protecting Power: Poland serves as the protecting power for the U.S. in Iraq and has done a superlative job in defending U.S. interests and citizens there. Particularly notable were Polish Ambassador Piekarski's efforts to get detained American businessman Kenneth Beaty released and to ensure his well-being during his prolonged detention by Iraqi authorities. Beaty was freed in November. In February, President Clinton wrote to President Walesa in praise of Piekarski's work. Piekarski received a U.S. Superior Honor Award from the State Department for his efforts.

Tank Sale to Iran: In 1991, the Polish government agreed to sell 115 T-72 tanks to Iran. The Poles told us repeatedly it was a one-time-only transaction, not the beginning of an arms relationship. Earlier this year the deal appeared to fall through for financial reasons and the Poles told us informally it was off. We repeatedly made senior-level warnings to the GOP (including one from Vice President Gore) that the transaction "would not be cost free" to U.S.-Polish relations. Internally, we decided to grandfather the Polish tank sale in exchange for a commitment that Poland will avoid all objectionable trade in the future and will fully abide by the terms of the COCOM successor regime. With the apparent collapse of the tank deal, no action was taken. On instruction, Embassy Warsaw has asked the GOP whether the transaction is definitively off. We know from special intelligence that some tanks have been shipped.

Kuklinski Case: In 1971 Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of the Polish general staff, volunteered to provide intelligence to the U.S. He did so -- motivated by ideology -- until 1981 and was

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exfiltrated shortly before martial law. His contributions were extremely valuable. Poland's communist authorities tried him in absentia and convicted him of treason for his activities. None of Poland's post-1989 governments has been eager to reverse the treason verdict, a move that much of the Polish officer corps (not just ostensible pro-communists) would regard as an insult. However, given the circumstances of Kuklinski's action during a period of Poland's subjugation to Soviet hegemony, we have urged the Poles to set aside the sentence.

PRAGUE INITIATIVES CHECKLIST

Sustained High Level of Engagement: Since your Prague trip there has been sustained high level engagement with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Cabinet members and senior level travellers include: UN Amb. Albright and Gen. Shalikashvili (throughout the region), Commerce Sec. Brown (Warsaw), Atty. Gen. Reno (planned - Budapest), Deputy Sec. Talbott (Warsaw and Bratislava), Under Sec. Tarnoff (Warsaw, Budapest and Prague), Under Sec. Davis (Budapest, Bratislava, Sofia and Skopje) and NSC Senior Director Schifter (Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Bratislava and Budapest).

Democracy Network: USAID expects to start awarding grants for the "Democracy Network" this summer. We will provide about \$30 million in grants to U.S. NGOs over the next 3-5 years. In turn, the selected U.S. NGOs will cooperate with and support CEE counterparts involved in public policy.

Improved Market Access: We have agreed with the EU to avoid megaphone diplomacy on this sensitive matter. We can do little more to expand CEE access to our markets; the EU cites "domestic political realities" as preventing its further concessions. The U.S. is interested in working with CEE states to address their own sizeable barriers to exports and could work with the EU.

U.S. Trade Remedy Laws: NEC Deputies agreed to explore Congressional receptivity to a proposal to establish an inquiry-based trade remedy for CEE/NIS "economies in transition." The new remedy would apply in lieu of current market surge and anti-dumping provisions applied to non-market economies.

U.S.-sponsored Conference on CEE Investment and Trade: This proposal has sparked great interest in the CEE. It will probably take place in Cleveland in September or October. We are arranging for U.S. private sector cooperation in hosting the conference. The conference will focus not only on both trade and investment opportunities in the region, but also on what measures these countries should take to make their business climate more attractive. Key CEE ministers -- but not heads of government -- will be invited to attend and learn.

Early OECD Membership for Visegrad Countries: With strong U.S. leadership the OECD Ministerial Communique stated our intention to begin negotiation with the V-4 on membership as soon as possible. Eventual OECD membership will depend largely on how quickly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia can bring their laws, regulations and practices into conformity with OECD guidelines on trade, investment and the environment.

Regional Infrastructure Improvements: At a February 1994 meeting in Vienna, the USG and CSCE partners developed a regional road

infrastructure plan for short-term projects in the southern CEE countries. The EU has been slow to provide its share of the funding necessary to implement these projects. TDA is working on a series of special infrastructure programs; it has been funded to the level of \$3 million for regional programs. State and Customs continue to lead an effort to develop a transport corridor around Serbia for perishable agricultural commodities from the southern Balkans. We are trying to identify possible sources of funding for the "Highways for Peace" proposal.

Regional Civil/Military Airspace Management: DoD has provided \$500,000 toward the cost of a preliminary study of a regional integrated civil air traffic control system/military air sovereignty regime. The Visegrad states other than the Czech Republic have endorsed this initiative. The target date for completion of the preliminary study is the end of FY94.

Social Sector Restructuring Assistance: Using primarily existing assistance resources, and coordinating with other international donors, we have launched an initiative to help Poland in this area. Our focus is the financing and provision of retirement and disability pensions, poverty relief, health care, housing and job generation. We will draw on our experience in Poland to assist other CEE countries.

Post-privatization Assistance: Treasury has developed a proposal involving at least \$50 million from the EBRD, \$15 million from the Polish-American Enterprise Fund and up to \$10 million of USG technical assistance) to support companies newly privatized under the Polish Mass Privatization Program.

Bilateral Working Groups on Security: So far this year alone, we have held BWGs -- consultations on regional security, defense relations and bilateral assistance -- with ten CEE non-combatants (all except Hungary, with whom we will meet in the fall and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

Peacekeeping Units: With our support, the Baltic states have launched a joint peacekeeping battalion initiative. We have requested \$10 million for FY95 to support CEE peacekeeping, including the Baltic Battalion.

Removing Cold War-era Restrictions: We have finished removing all CEE states (except those subject to the Yugoslav arms embargo) from the International Traffic in Arms proscribed destination list. In addition, we and our allies removed Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland -- but not Romania or Bulgaria -- from the COCOM proscribed destination list before the termination of COCOM on March 31. Finally, this year you signed Presidential Determinations (PDs) for all CEE states not already covered by PDs and not subject to the Yugoslav arms embargo. These PDs make these states eligible to participate in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|----------------------|
| 001. briefing | Draft paper, re: The Russian Minority in the Baltic States (3 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. briefing | Draft paper, re: Lithuania: Political-Economic Overview (4 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. briefing | Draft paper, re: Latvia: Political-Economic Overview (4 pages) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. briefing | Sample Background Paper (1 page) | ea. 07/1994 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

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THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTIC STATES

Aside from our usual human rights concerns, a major part of our strategy to promote the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States has been to press for fair and equitable treatment of the Russian minority. Russia routinely accuses Estonia and Latvia of massive violations of the human rights of their large Russian-speaking population, and often some Russian officials have tried to link these issues with the troop withdrawal issue. ~~While we refuse to accept linkage of these issues--or any issue--to the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic States, there are a number of ways that we have tried to assist in addressing this practical problem.~~

We have supported the visits to Estonia and Latvia of numerous international human rights experts from non-government and inter-governmental organizations. We have agreed with their conclusions that there is no pattern of human rights violations there. ~~Nevertheless, we have strongly encouraged Estonia and Latvia to accept the presence of resident CSCE missions to monitor these political conditions, offered support to the host governments in drafting legislation affecting these Russians, and provided ombudsman-like services to the Russian communities.~~

Estonia accepted a CSCE mission in December 1992, and Latvia accepted a CSCE mission in November 1993. We are very pleased with the results of these missions in resolving a number of problems, such as the Aliens Law controversy in Estonia and the provocative behavior of the former Latvian Citizenship and Naturalization Department Director. The CSCE mission in Latvia is headed by an American Foreign Service Officer.

Lithuania

Ethnic Russians comprise only 7% of Lithuania's population, and most of them automatically became citizens under Lithuania's liberal ~~more optional~~ citizenship law of December, 1991. ~~A few ethnic Poles and Russians have raised concerns that the law does not clearly specify equal civil treatment for minorities should they choose not to become citizens. Vilnius, however, states that these minorities do enjoy equal rights, and we have not seen any evidence to contradict that claim. Unlike its Baltic neighbors, Lithuania did not experience a dramatic proportional rise in the number of postwar non-ethnic Lithuanians. This happened because border adjustments reintroduced a large number of ethnic Lithuanians. In addition, Stalin's Russification policy was not implemented as harshly in agricultural Lithuania as elsewhere. Lithuania is a member of the Council of Europe.~~

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

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Estonia

Estonia generally has taken a very pragmatic course in addressing the issue of its large ethnic Russian noncitizen community. Roughly 38% of its inhabitants are noncitizens; about 33% are ethnic Russian, most of whom live in the urban, industrialized Northeast, ~~and form overwhelming majorities in many towns and cities there.~~ Estonia allowed its noncitizens to vote in municipal elections and granted citizenship to practically all noncitizens who wanted to run to office. For the elderly and handicapped, Estonia has dropped its language requirement for citizenship, and its citizenship law requires only a three-year residency, two years of which are retroactive. Estonia agreed to most of the revisions proposed by the CSCE to its Law on Aliens from last summer, which substantially eased a potential crisis in Russian-Estonian relations. ~~Until its bureaucracy can issue permanent "green cards" that can also be used as ID and travel documents, Estonia has issued temporary blanket documents for its noncitizens.~~ Privatization in the Northeast has been intentionally delayed so as to dampen the effects of unemployment on the Russian community. In May 1993, ~~Estonia gained full membership in the Council of Europe.~~

Latvia

Latvia has taken a much more hesitant and legalistic approach to dealing with its large noncitizen community. Part of this may be related to the dynamics of the troop withdrawal process, and part from doubts about the loyalty of these ethnics, even though they have not shown an inclination toward organizing politically. As in Estonia, a majority of ethnic Russians supported independence. However, a large number did not and are overwhelmingly anti-Yeltsin in sentiment. Few speak Latvian. While ethnic Russians comprise about the same percentage of the population as in Estonia, ethnic Slavs are 48% of Latvia's inhabitants and control an estimated 80% of the economy. ~~Ethnic Latvians do not comprise a majority in seven of its eight largest cities and form a (powerful) majority only in the countryside.~~ ~~The law on naturalization, accomodating many recommendations from the Council of Europe, recently passed its second reading in parliament,~~ with its strict quota system, is contentious and unacceptable to us. We ~~are~~ encouraged ~~to~~ Latvia to review this aspect of the draft law,

and) most other European countries.

Summary

Western involvement, through bilateral consultations and the CSCE missions, enables us to gain the confidence of Estonian and Latvian officials necessary to make fundamental progress on the issue of the fair and equitable treatment of Russian noncitizens in Estonia and Latvia. We and the Balts realize that it is in

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our interests to have the spirit and letter of their laws accord with Western standards.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~LITHUANIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Lithuania is staunchly Catholic nation with a strong sense of national identity dating back to its glory days as a medieval empire, when it stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Subsequently tied in a union with Poland for centuries, Lithuania was an independent nation again from 1918 to 1940, when it was annexed by the USSR. ~~Lithuanian is neither Slavic nor Germanic, but Baltic, the prototypal Indo-European language.~~

Under the leadership of intellectuals, the Lithuanian reform movement Sajudis was formed in mid-1988, declaring a program of democratic and national rights. After fifty years of occupation, in 1990 the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared Lithuania independent from the Soviet Union. The USSR responded with the imposition of a harsh economic blockade, and in January 1991 unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the elected government, killing 13 civilians and injuring hundreds. ~~That February, a national referendum was held in which over 90% of voters approved Lithuania's independence. Soviet military-security forces continued their illegal actions, including forcible conscriptions, seizure of buildings, attacks on customs posts, and killings of customs and police officials. Lithuania finally regained its full independence in August 1991.~~

A parliamentary democracy, Lithuania has held free and fair elections, and passed a constitution and a lenient citizenship law. It has significantly improved relations with its neighbors, especially Poland, with which it signed a Friendship Treaty in April 1994.

Politico-economic gridlock and economic mismanagement returned the former Communists to power in elections in the autumn of 1992, but they have not fared much better than their predecessors, ~~the government headed by the founder of the Sajudis movement, former President Landsbergis.~~ Politics traditionally has been marred by a disorganized but effectively disruptive opposition.

The new currency is very stable, and inflation has been brought under control (about a 30% annual rate). However, economic reform has stalled. Because it won on the premise of improving social conditions, the Government has shied away from making tough fiscal/privatization decisions. Although it finally passed comprehensive privatization legislation this spring, the opposition has now succeeded in forcing a public referendum on the Government's plan.

On June 2 Prime Minister Slezevicius announced that his Government would resign in accordance with the constitutional requirement to do so when more than half of the cabinet is changed. 29 left-wing members of parliament from the ruling Labor Party (LDDP) also have initiated a vote of no confidence in Slezevicius. While the motion

probably will not carry, it signals a significant fracture--typical
of Lithuanian politics--in the LDDP's ability to govern comfortably.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an associate partner of
the WEU, Lithuania also seeks GATT membership.

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Lithuania actively pursues Western security relationships, has formally applied to join NATO, and already has submitted its presentation document for Partnership for Peace (PFP).

~~The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Lithuania on July 28, 1922, and reestablished ties on September 2, 1991. Lithuanian representation in the U.S. has continued for over 70 years. The U.S. never recognized the forcible incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR. Nearly one million Americans of Lithuanian descent play an active role in bilateral relations.~~

~~Lithuania enjoys MFN and GSP treatment. It also signed a Bilateral Trade and Intellectual Property Protection Agreement with the U.S. in April and will sign a Bilateral Investment Treaty this summer as well as a Science and Technology Cooperation agreement with the Secretary during the July visit.~~

~~Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over \$66 million to Lithuania's economic and political transformation and to address humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program totals over \$9 million. We are aiming to get the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund up and running within the next few months and are working to get better Eximbank and OPIC credit ratings for Lithuania.~~

~~Lithuania remains highly dependent upon Russia and the NIS for trade and energy. By developing Lithuania's port, hydroelectric and refinery capabilities, we and the Nordics are working to make Lithuania more energy independent and attractive to Western trade and investment. We are working to improve the safety of the Chernobyl-style nuclear reactor at Ignalina.~~

~~Sensationalized tales of public corruption and a dramatic increase in crime have become Lithuanians' priority concerns. We are reviewing the Government's request for FBI/police assistance, particularly on organized crime impacting the U.S.~~

~~Russia withdrew its troops from Lithuania on August 31, 1993, but military transit to and from the Kaliningrad enclave still needs to be resolved. Russia is withholding MFN status until Lithuania grants unrestricted transit rights. Lithuania has shown solidarity with its Baltic neighbors in their relations with Russia.~~

~~The United States remains firmly committed to supporting Lithuanian independence and its integration into a democratic Europe. Therefore, we currently are shaping an expanded military-to-military program designed to help place Lithuanian (and Baltic) defense institutions on a firm, democratic footing.~~

~~In 1993 Lithuania exported \$16.1 million in goods to the U.S. and imported \$56.8 million, primarily agricultural commodities~~

under concessional programs. U.S.- Lithuanian firms registered 235 of 3,674 foreign joint ventures, and of \$115 million in total foreign investment, the U.S. holds a \$35 million share. Philip Morris is a major investor.

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LATVIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The Latvian Ambassador calls Latvia "a nation of lawyers" in mentality. Culturally, Latvians most reflect their Lutheran German heritage and emulate Swedes. Latvian is neither Slavic nor Germanic, but ~~is~~ a Baltic language related to Lithuanian. *The language*

Under Hanseatic and German influence since the 1200s, Latvia always has used its geographic location as an important commercial trading center. ~~A non-NIS capital, Riga nonetheless remains the financial capital for doing business in the FSU.~~ *longue*

After 200 years of continuous Russian rule, a bloody civil war erupted in 1918 when part of the independence movement sided with the Bolsheviks. By 1920, ~~the~~ ^(S) Germans and Bolsheviks were defeated. ~~Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis, uncle of the current President, headed the independence struggle and the first independent government. Before the Depression, Latvia's minorities enjoyed cultural autonomy, and the economy reformed and recovered. As in the other Baltic States, the mid-1930's brought the rise of authoritarian rule to Latvia.~~

Soviet and Nazi invasions during World War II reduced Latvia's population by one-third by 1945. During that decade, about 60,000 were deported to Siberia, and thousands fled to the West. The Soviets radically urbanized Latvia by bringing in thousands of Slavic industrial workers. *colonized and*

In March 1990, democratic elections gave the Popular Front independence movement a majority in the Supreme Council. In January 1991, shortly after a parallel attempt in Lithuania, Soviet political and military forces tried to overthrow the Latvian government. Eight people were killed. Latvia regained its independence ~~during the aborted Soviet coup in August 1991.~~ *in the wake of*

Latvia's economic situation is steadily improving. The country enjoys a positive trade balance, relatively restrained inflation, and a very stable currency, ~~the lats~~. Latvia still imports 90% of its energy from the NIS. De facto agricultural privatization also has occurred. ~~Comprising 48% of the populace~~ *Ethnic Slavs* ~~control an estimated 80% of the economy, making economic, not political reform a key issue to Latvia's future ethnic harmony.~~ *and*

Latvia signed a troop withdrawal agreement with Russia on April 30, paving the way for the departure of Russia's remaining 7,000 or so troops by August 31, 1994. The Russian navy already has departed, and the troops may be gone by as early as July 31. About 800 Russian technicians will remain to operate the Skrunda radar facility for another four years under ~~some type of~~ CSCE supervision.

With the withdrawal agreement, Latvia now needs to focus on privatization as well as citizenship and naturalization

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

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Latvian citizenship law

legislation. The latter law, patterned after recommendations from the COE, recently passed its second reading in parliament. The United States has defended Latvia's human rights record against Russian accusations. We remain engaged in the issue and have supported the presence of a resident CSCE mission to promote harmonious relations between ethnic Russians and Latvians.

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emerged from Parliament with unacceptably low quotas for citizenship by non-Latvians (i.e., Russians). The law has been remanded to President Ulmanis who has remanded the law back to Parliament for a rewrite.

in direct contradiction to suggestions from CSCE and the Council of Europe for greater inclusivity

Latvia held free and fair elections on June 5-6, 1993, giving the pro-reform "Latvia's Way" party a plurality of votes and placing them in an uneasy center-right coalition with the Farmer's Union. In nationwide municipal elections on May 30 uncontested by Latvia's Way, the right-wing parties triumphed. FM Andrejevs resigned in early June over accusations that he and four other members of Parliament cooperated with the KGB prior to Latvia's independence.

Relations with the United States and the West

A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, Latvia seeks GATT membership and associate membership status in the EU. Latvia actively pursues Western security relationships and enthusiastically supports Partnership for Peace (PFP).

The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Latvia on July 28, 1922, and reestablished ties on September 2, 1991. Latvian representation in the U.S. continued uninterrupted for over 70 years. The U.S. never recognized the forcible incorporation of Latvia into the USSR. About 85,000 Americans of Latvian descent play an active role in bilateral relations.

~~The Defense Minister is an American citizen, and a large number of other government officials are U.S. and Western expatriates.~~

Latvia enjoys MFN status and GSP privileges. ^{we will} It hopes to sign a Bilateral Trade and Intellectual Property Protection Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Treaty during your visit. ~~The Secretary will sign a Science and Technology Cooperation agreement with the Government of Latvia at the same time.~~

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Through 1993, the U.S. committed over \$90 million to Latvia's economic transformation and to address humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program totals over \$6 million.

Latvia remains highly dependent upon Russia and the NIS for trade and energy but also prospers from it through collecting revenue from a Russian energy pipeline. By developing Latvia's port, hydroelectric and refinery capabilities, we and the Nordics are working to make Latvia more energy independent and attractive to Western trade and investment.

We are aiming to get the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund up and running within the next few months and are working to get better Eximbank and OPIC credit ratings for Latvia.

The United States remains firmly committed to supporting Latvian independence and its integration into a democratic Europe. Therefore, we currently are shaping an expanded military-to-military program designed to help place Latvian (and Baltic) defense institutions on a firm, democratic footing.

In 1993, Latvia exported to the U.S. \$22.6 million and imported \$89.5 million, the latter being chiefly agricultural commodities under concessional programs. American firms registered \$35 million out of a total \$110 million in foreign investment. The U.S. is the largest Western investor in Latvia and by far, Kellogg's is our biggest investor.

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THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

Over the past two years, Italy effectively stepped up its campaign against crime organizations -- Mafia (Cosa Nostra) in Sicily, the Camorra in Naples, and the 'Ndragheta in Calabria, Italy's boot-heel. Displaying considerable political will in the face of Mafia intimidation, the government beefed up paramilitary forces in Sicily, sent army units to Sicily and Sardinia, and increased resources for police and prosecutors. Massive public revulsion following Mafia murders of police, prosecutors, and judges assisted these efforts. The FBI assisted in the investigation.

Italian authorities have arrested scores of Mafiosi, including the reputed bosses of the two largest families. A number of magistrates accused of having organized crime ties are also under investigation or arrest; hundreds of politicians tainted by such association have been drummed from office. Italy also strengthened anti-organized crime laws, established a witness protection program, and developed more realistic evidentiary rules and undercover operations. The new government could resurvey the criminal justice landscape in response to calls that some 1989 revisions to the criminal code have not functioned as expected. Experts worry, however, that changing the law on witness protection could weaken efforts to recruit, such witnesses, now numbering over 700.

Despite Italy's successes, some experts estimate that criminal activity (including penetration of legitimate businesses) generates \$50 billion turnover annually. U.S. and Italian law enforcement cooperation has been directed at financial flows, especially money laundering.

Our bilateral law enforcement cooperation with Italy is one of the strongest with any country. Significant U.S. investigative and prosecutorial resources in Italy are dedicated to organized crime and drug matters, and cooperation with Italian law enforcement is excellent and mutually productive. In a late 1993 visit to Italy, FBI Director Freeh reaffirmed our commitment to assist Italian anti-organized crime efforts. We seek to expand anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism cooperation, bilaterally, through U.S.-EU exchanges, and in the G-7. Italy hosts a ministerial conference on organized crime this October in Naples; we plan strong U.S. participation.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By N NARA, Date 6/8/2023
2016-0314-M-1

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| 014. report | Re: [EU Accession Talks] [Released in Part] (4 pages) | 03/31/2000 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia [2]

2011-1037-F
ke2189

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Special Analysis

Latvia and Lithuania Playing Catch Up to Estonia in EU Accession Talks

3.5c

Latvia and Lithuania, which began EU accession talks on 28 March, are determined to make substantial progress this year to increase their chances of joining the EU in the first wave. Baltic officials worry that a second wave may be significantly delayed to avoid overtaxing member states.

- ❑ Riga and Vilnius began negotiations this week on eight of the 31-chapter *acquis communautaire* (laws and regulations)—including competition and statistics but excluding agriculture, energy, and the environment, which are likely to be more difficult for most candidates.
- ❑ Latvian MFA Deputy State Secretary Kesteris and Lithuanian Deputy Foreign Minister Usackas—the chief EU negotiators for their countries—told the press on the opening day of talks this week that they aim to close four or five chapters by summer and to double the number of chapters open by yearend. Usackas expressed hope that the French EU presidency that begins on 1 July will maintain the momentum by opening another eight chapters.
- ❑ EO 13526 1.4c Latvian and Lithuanian officials, like other EU aspirants and European Commission President Prodi, support differentiation that will allow candidates to proceed at their own pace and not be held back by others. If the three Baltic states do not join the EU simultaneously, Latvia and Lithuania want to prolong the Bal-

tic Free Trade Agreement on agricultural goods, which has been in force for the past few years.

3.5c

Both Countries Spurring the Reform Process

Latvia plans to complete all negotiations by 2003 and be ready to accede by 2005, EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c *Riga's capacity to legislate and implement the numerous and complex EU required reforms will be the single largest obstacle to EU accession.*

- ❑ The European Commission's acting chief negotiator for Latvia recently urged Riga to focus on creating the necessary institutions and legislation to meet EU criteria, EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)
- ❑ The results of a public opinion poll conducted in Latvia last month suggest that public support for



Membership for Latvia and Lithuania unlikely before 2005.

Central & East European Update

31 March 2000

EU membership is waning—44 percent compared with 50 percent last November—because of concern about the impact on the small agricultural sector. At the same time, the percentage of Latvians opposed to EU membership has risen to 38 percent—and in some rural areas to as high as 51 percent—up from 28 percent, according to the press. 3.5c

The long-awaited start of talks may spur Vilnius to implement politically costly reforms in an election year. EO 13526 1.4c Vilnius plans to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 and be ready to join the EU by 2004.

□ The cabinet on Wednesday approved a draft law that would allocate between 10 and 20 percent of the budgets from 2001 to 2003 on areas related to EU and NATO entry. EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c)

□ *The priority that Vilnius places on EU accession prompted it to amend its national energy strategy last year on the eve of the EU Helsinki Summit, to make the politically sensitive decision to close unit one of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) by 2005, and to set a closure date for Ignalina's second unit by 2004.* Public support for EU membership fell sharply last year at least partly in response to



Lithuania trading nuclear power for EU accession.

Estonia: Baltic Frontrunner in EU Race 3.5c

Estonia, the Baltic frontrunner in EU accession talks—which it began in 1998 and plans to complete by 2002—has closed only eight chapters so far. *Tallinn wants to be ready to accede by 2003, but has to adjust its liberal legislation—among the most liberal in Europe—to conform to the EU's laws and regulations.*



Ilves: Pushing hard for EU accession.

• Foreign Minister Ilves early this year advised the Riigikogu (parliament) that 2000 will be a critical year for Estonia's EU integration and that it will become clear by autumn whether Estonia will retain its place among the fast-track candidates. He warned that "poor homework" or delays in adopting important laws could postpone Estonia's accession to 2007 or later. The Estonian-EU Joint Council meeting in Brussels last month identified key areas, such as customs, where "progress has been slow."

• Ilves's comments coincided with Tallinn's adoption of this year's government plan for EU integration, which also contains guidelines for the 2001-2002 period. The plan addresses in greater detail than previously what is required to improve the country's administrative capacities—an area criticized in last year's EU "report card" EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c), 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c Estonian officials openly worry that, as EU membership approaches, member states might be threatened by and move to quash Estonia's pro-open market and low-tariff policies. Estonia's Ambassador to the EU recently acknowledged that "there is a price to be paid for accession." *Most Estonian officials, however, are willing to pay this price to gain security and trade benefits that EU membership will bring.*

3.5c

EU pressure to close the INPP, which provides nearly 80 percent of Lithuania's energy. 3.5c

Usaksas recently told reporters, Ukraine is a promising market for Lithuanian goods.

But Lithuania's Bid Is More Complex

Lithuania's agricultural sector, uncertainty over the socioeconomic impact of INPP's closure, and the upcoming Seimas (parliamentary) election this fall—which will result in a center or center-left coalition—are likely to complicate Vilnius's EU accession bid. Lithuania, the largest Baltic state and the one with the biggest agricultural sector, was hardest hit by the Russian financial crisis and resultant loss of its key agricultural market.

- Prime Minister Kubilius's cabinet early this year authorized the Foreign Ministry to begin talks with the European Commission on increasing import tariffs on some EU food products until Vilnius recovers from the sharp decline in its food exports to Russia. Vilnius also wants to maintain its free trade agreement with Ukraine for five years after joining the EU because, as

- The closure of INPP—which is the primary employer in the town of Visaginas and which employs 5,000 mostly ethnic Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian workers—will have a serious socioeconomic impact on the region surrounding the plant. A government task force has begun to consider how to tackle the resulting unemployment and government and EU officials say they plan to attract foreign investment to Visaginas, but local residents are skeptical.

- The surprise second-place finish of the anti-EU Farmers' Party—which has few political allies at the national level—in 19 March municipal elections is unlikely to be repeated in the upcoming Seimas election, *but it underscores the plight of rural areas, which are still reeling from the Russian crisis and whose inhabitants fear the impact of EU membership on their livelihood.* 3.5c

Coming Events

- 4-5 Lithuanian President Adamkus visits Poland.
- 7 Hungarian Prime Minister Orban travels to Estonia.
- 8-9 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mikhaylova and Polish Foreign Minister Geremek co-host a meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, on "Communicating Reforms and Reforming Communications." Representatives from the 10 former communist countries seeking EU membership have been invited to attend.
- 10 Estonian Prime Minister Laar visits France.
- 10-13 Hungarian President Goncz travels to Japan.
- 12-13 Heads of Government of the Council of Baltic Sea States meet in Denmark.
- 14-17 Polish President Kwasniewski travels to Turkey.
- 28-29 The Presidents of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine gather in the Hungarian town of Szekesfehervar to discuss European integration and regional cooperation.
- 5-6 Hungary hosts WTO meeting on the integration of Southeast Europe into the world economy.
- 23-24 Ukrainian Prime Minister Yushchenko travels to Brussels for a meeting of the EU-Ukrainian Cooperation Council.
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This information is Unclassified.

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Saturday, April 01, 2000 10:59 AM
To: Black, Steven K. (VP); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON); Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE); Cables; Crawford, Bernard T. (EUR/INTERN); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS); Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE); Hinckley, Steedman (VP); Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR); Lee, Malcolm R. (NEC); Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN); Medish, Mark C. (RUE); Munter, Cameron P. (EUR); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Tedstrom, John E. (RUE); vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE); Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: GOR SANCTIONS AGAINST LATVIA "PROBABLY" OFF

ActionAddres: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0564
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2016-0314-14-1 (2,07)
6/12/2023 v2

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/05
TAGS: PREL, RS, LG, NEI
SUBJECT: GOR SANCTIONS AGAINST LATVIA "PROBABLY" OFF

REF: (A) MOSCOW 7819 (B) MOSCOW 7690

(U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS KIRK AUGUSTINE. REASONS: 1.5 (B&D).

1. (S) SUMMARY. WITH A DUMA VOTE ON DRAFT

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LEGISLATION FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON LATVIA HAVING BEEN POSTPONED FROM MARCH 29 TO APRIL 5 (REF A), IT APPEARS THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS A POSITIVE DUMA VOTE ON A HARSH -- BUT TOOTHLESS -- RESOLUTION CONDEMNING RIGA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY THERE. THE SANCTIONS BILL WILL PROBABLY BE REMANDED TO COMMITTEE, READY TO BE RATTLED OMINOUSLY FROM TIME TO TIME TO DRAMATIZE THE INTENSITY OF RUSSIA'S CONCERNS. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC INTEREST IN GOR-LATVIAN AFFAIRS, THERE IS BROADER INTEREST IN THE VOTE BECAUSE IT WILL REPRESENT BOTH AN EARLY OPERATIONAL INDICATION OF THE COURSE PUTIN WILL STEER ON FOREIGN POLICY AND A SIGN OF WHETHER THE DUMA WILL FOLLOW HIS LEAD ON THOSE ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

WAITING TO SEE PUTIN'S POSITION

2. (U) HARDIS BAUMANIS, DCM AT THE LATVIAN EMBASSY, TOLD US THE OUTCOME OF THE SCHEDULED MARCH 29 DUMA VOTE ON THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION WAS IN DOUBT UNTIL LATE ON MARCH 28, WHEN BORIS PASTUKHOV, A FORMER FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WHO IS NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE DUMA COMMITTEE ON CIS AFFAIRS AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN SPEAKERS ABROAD, CAME FORWARD WITH A RESOLUTION (SEE PARA 8 BELOW) THAT WHILE HARSHLY CRITICAL OF LATVIA, CALLED FOR NO ACTION BEYOND RENEWED GOR APPEALS TO THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO LOOK INTO LATVIA'S DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES. IN SOME CONFUSION, COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST BACKERS OF THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION OBTAINED A WEEK'S DELAY OF ACTION.

3. (S) SOME DUMA MEMBERS MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY A MARCH 28 VISIT OF A LEFT-WING LATVIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, WHICH MET WITH A NUMBER OF KEY DUMA FIGURES, INCLUDING PASTUKHOV, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ROGOZIN, DUMA VICE PRESIDENT LUKIN AND YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV. IGOR YUERGENS, A BUSINESSMAN ACTIVE IN BALTIC ISSUES THROUGH THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY, TOLD US MARCH 31 THAT HE HAD SET UP THE DELEGATION'S MEETINGS IN THE DUMA. BOTH YUERGENS AND BAUMANIS (WHO WAS BRIEFED BY THE DELEGATION BEFORE IT DEPARTED) REPORT THAT ALL THE RUSSIAN POLITICIANS MENTIONED ABOVE ASSURED THE LATVIAN DELEGATION THEY OPPOSED THE SANCTIONS BILL.

4. (S) MORE INTERESTING WAS THAT THE YEDINSTVO DEPUTIES WITH WHOM THE LATVIAN DELEGATION SPOKE SEEMED NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM THE KREMLIN ON WHETHER THEY SHOULD SUPPORT OR OPPOSE THE SANCTIONS. BOTH YUERGENS AND BAUMANIS EXPRESSED THE COMMON VIEW THAT PUTIN CAN AND WILL DETERMINE WHICH WAY YEDINSTVO DEPUTIES VOTE. THE QUESTION THUS WAS WHETHER THE YEDINSTVO DEPUTIES' UNCERTAINTY MEANT THAT PUTIN MIGHT BE RECONSIDERING THE KREMLIN'S OPPOSITION UNDER YELTSIN TO ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL EARLIER VERSIONS OF THE SANCTIONS BILL. YUERGENS' THOUGHT THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED ON MARCH 28 WAS THAT FOR UNDETERMINED REASONS, PASTUKHOV (A MEMBER OF OTECHESTVO, NOT YEDINSTVO) HAD RECEIVED A KREMLIN SIGNAL TO TURN OFF THE SANCTIONS. THAT WOULD PROBABLY, YUERGENS THOUGHT, LEAD TO A POSITIVE APRIL 5 VOTE ON PASTUKHOV'S RESOLUTION, WITH THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION REMANDED TO COMMITTEE FOR FURTHER STUDY AND PERIODIC RATTLING. BAUMANIS ALSO THOUGHT THAT OUTCOME WAS LIKELY.

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5. (S) YUERGENS ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT -- LIKE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE HERE -- HE STILL HAD NO CLEAR IDEA OF PUTIN'S FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS. THUS WHILE HE PRESUMED AND HOPED THE KREMLIN WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO YEDINSTVO BEFORE THE APRIL 5 VOTE THAT IT SHOULD OPPOSE THE SANCTIONS, YUERGENS SAID A FAILURE BY PUTIN TO DO SO WOULD BE A "TROUBLING" FIRST SIGN OF A HARDER PUTIN LINE THAT COULD BE SIGNIFICANT EVEN BEYOND THE BALTIC CONTEXT.

MFA POSITION CLEAR, DUMA COMMITTEE SPLIT

6. (U) THE MFA, EVIDENTLY ON AUTO-PILOT WITH POSITIONS LEFT OVER FROM YELTSIN'S PRESIDENCY, HAS
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CLEARLY OPPOSED THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION.
REITERATING IN A MESSAGE TO THE DUMA IN EARLY MARCH POSITIONS ALREADY TRANSMITTED IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1999 WHEN THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION WENT THROUGH EARLIER DUMA READINGS, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AVDEYEV PROVIDED A VARIETY OF RATIONALES FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION, INCLUDING THAT:

- SANCTIONS WOULD LEAD TO A DE FACTO BREAK IN RELATIONS WITH LATVIA;
- THEY WOULD IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS HURT THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATION IN LATVIA (NOTING, E.G., THAT 47 PERCENT OF RAILWAY WORKERS WHO WOULD BE AFFECTED BY A CUTTING OFF OF TRANSIT TRADE WERE ETHNIC RUSSIANS);
- "A BASIC AND MOST PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF ADOPTING THE DRAFT LEGISLATION WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL DAMAGE TO RUSSIA." THE LIMITATIONS OF RUSSIAN PORTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NOT PERMIT A FULL RE-ROUTING OF CARGOES NOW PASSING THROUGH LATVIA. EVEN A PARTIAL RE-ROUTING WOULD ENTAIL INCREASED COSTS AND HARM RUSSIAN TRANSPORT INTERESTS, WHO MIGHT SEEK COMPENSATION FROM THE GOR BUDGET. SUPPLIES OF IMPORTANT MEDICINES FROM LATVIA WOULD BE INTERRUPTED. LATVIAN RETALIATION SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED. IN SUM, SANCTIONS WOULD HARM RUSSIAN MOR THAN LATVIAN INTERESTS.
- A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS OF THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION WOULD VIOLATE THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL CODE (INVOLVING, E.G., ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVATE CONTRACTS); AND
- THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION WOULD ALSO VIOLATE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL GOR COMMITMENTS ON TRADE, FINANCE AND BANKING AFFAIRS, TRANSPORT, AND LEGAL COOPERATION, AS WELL AS A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS WITH LATVIA.

7. (U) IN A MARCH 7 REPORT TO THE DUMA COUNCIL, PASTUKHOV SAID HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN "UNANIMOUS ON THE NEED FOR RUSSIA TO TAKE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER MEASURES TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF RUSSIANS IN LATVIA AS WELL AS IN OTHER STATES THAT HAD BEEN REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET

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UNION, WHERE THEY ARE BEING GROSSLY VIOLATED." HOWEVER, THE PARTICULAR SANCTIONS LEGISLATION AT ISSUE PASSED THE COMMITTEE ONLY BY A FIVE-FOUR MARGIN (WITH ONE ABSTENTION). PASTUKHOV WARNED THAT THE ECONOMIC STEPS CONTEMPLATED "WOULD DEFINITELY PRODUCE A REACTION NOT ONLY BY THE BALTIC STATES, BUT ALSO BY SOME WESTERN GOVERNMENTS." SUCH REACTIONS MIGHT BE LINKED TO CLAIMS OF GOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CHECHNYA. SANCTIONS AGAINST WTO MEMBER LATVIA COULD "CREATE FURTHER DIFFICULTIES FOR RUSSIA'S POSSIBLE ENTRY INTO THAT ORGANIZATION." IN GENERAL, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS NEEDED "CAREFUL STUDY" BY RUSSIAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING THE CONSEQUENCES "FOR THE ALREADY POOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POSITION" OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN LATVIA.

PASTUKHOV'S RESOLUTION

8. (U) THE RESOLUTION THAT IS TO BE VOTED ON APRIL 5 AND MAY IN EFFECT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION EXPRESSES IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE "EXTREME CONCERN OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY ABOUT CONTINUING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC." THEIR MAIN PROBLEMS ARE A "MASSIVE DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP AND THE STRENGTHENING OF DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES IN THE SPHERE OF LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION." THE RESOLUTION ALSO NOTES THAT IN LATVIA "GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE VIOLATED, A CAMPAIGN OF PERSECUTION HAS BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST FIGHTERS AGAINST FASCISM, AND EFFORTS ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN TO REEVALUATE THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR." LATVIA'S POLICIES TOWARD RUSSIAN SPEAKERS "SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A REMNANT OF APARTHEID IN A EUROPEAN STATE THAT NONETHELESS DECLARES ITS ADHERENCE TO THE IDEA OF A UNITED EUROPE." RUSSOPHOBIA IS PURSUED IN LATVIA BY FORCES THAT "WANT TO SEE RUSSIA HUMILIATED, WEAK, AND SPLINTERED."

9. (U) RUSSIA'S GOAL, PASTUKHOV'S RESOLUTION FURTHER STATES, REMAINS THAT OF GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS, BUT THE FUTURE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, "INCLUDING IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, WILL DEPEND TO A DECISIVE DEGREE ON REAL OBSERVANCE OF THE BASIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF CITIZENS OF THE

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~~RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC.~~ THE STATE DUMA SUPPORTS TAKING ALL NECESSARY MEASURES, EVEN INCLUDING THE INTRODUCTION OF FURTHER ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS ON LATVIA, WITH THE AIM OF SECURING FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL OBSERVANCE BY IT OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW." THE DUMA THEREFORE "RECOMMENDS" THAT PUTIN DIRECT THE MFA TO AGAIN APPROACH THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR "DECISIONS TO ADDRESS THE UNINTERRUPTED VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC."

WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?

10. (S) YUERGENS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RE-EMERGENCE OF A THREAT OF SANCTIONS LEGISLATION AT THIS TIME MIGHT SEEM CURIOUS TO WESTERNERS. IN MANY WAYS, HE SAID, BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH LATVIA WERE BETTER THAN THEY WERE A YEAR AGO. BUT FRUSTRATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE SLOWNESS OF NATURALIZATION OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS LIVING IN LATVIA AND WHAT TO RUSSIAN EYES ARE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT STEPS TOWARD ASSIMILATION, NOT INTEGRATION, OF NON-LATVIANS LIVING THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE PUBLIC MARCH 16 MARCH OF VETERANS OF THE LATVIAN LEGION OF THE SS AND BY A LATVIAN DECISION, TEN YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE, TO INTRODUCE A NEW JUNE HOLIDAY INTENTIONALLY AIMED AT ANTAGONIZING RUSSIA. HE MENTIONED ALONG THE SAME LINES THE RECENT GRANTING TO YELTSIN OF A LATVIAN OFFICIAL ORDER WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS WITH YELTSIN OR THE GOR. "HOW DO THEY EXPECT US TO REACT," YUERGENS ASKED, NOTING THAT WHEN THE FRENCH HAD DECIDED TO GRANT BREZHNEV AN ORDER IT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF EIGHT MONTHS OF DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS. THE KONONOV CASE, WHICH WAS SEEN AS OPENING UP TO POTENTIAL PROSECUTION ALL ACTIONS EVER TAKEN BY RUSSIANS AGAINST THE NAZIS, HAD HAD A PARTICULARLY NEGATIVE EFFECT IN RUSSIA. YUERGENS SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND LATVIA'S BEHAVIOR ONLY AS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED OF A SMALL COUNTRY TO KEEP ASSERTING ITSELF THROUGH AN "UNENDING STREAM OF INSULTS" AGAINST A LARGER NEIGHBOR.

SOME EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE GAP

11. (S) YUERGENS' REMARKS ARE NOTEWORTHY IN PART BECAUSE HE MAY HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON GOR BALTIC POLICY THROUGH HIS ROLE IN THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY (WHERE HE WAS CO-AUTHOR OF ITS TWO STUDIES ON RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD THE BALTICS) AND VIA CLOSE PERSONAL TIES TO, AMONG OTHERS, CHIEF KREMLIN FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SERGEY PRIKHODKO. YUERGENS' VIEWS ARE ALSO OF NOTE BECAUSE HE IS ONE OF THOSE MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TRYING TO BUILD NON-OFFICIAL LINKS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND LATVIA -- HE WILL PARTICIPATE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE INITIAL "BALTIC FORUM" MEETING OF RUSSIAN AND LATVIAN PUBLIC FIGURES IN RIGA IN EARLY JUNE.

12. (S) BAUMANIS ALSO REFERRED TO THE UPCOMING "BALTIC FORUM" MEETING AS A POTENTIALLY PROMISING DEVELOPMENT, BUT FEARED IT WOULD HAVE NO POSITIVE IMPACT IF ON THE LATVIAN SIDE ONLY LEFT-WING POLITICIANS WHO ALREADY ARE WELL-CONNECTED IN RUSSIA PARTICIPATED IN IT. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD JANIS URBANOVICH, ONE OF THE DELEGATION THAT VISITED MOSCOW TO OPPOSE THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION AND A LATVIAN ORGANIZER OF THE "BALTIC FORUM," THAT LATVIA'S GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE MEETING UNLESS IT INCLUDED A BROAD SPECTRUM OF LATVIAN POLITICIANS. ALONG THE SAME LINES BUT OUTSIDE THE "BALTIC FORUM" CONTEXT, BAUMANIS SAID THE LATVIAN EMBASSY HAD APPROACHED IRINA KHAKAMADA OF THE UNION OF RIGHTIST FORCES (SPS), TRYING TO INTEREST HER PARTY IN MAKING CONTACT WITH CENTRIST POLITICAL FORCES IN LATVIA; SHE HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT NO STEPS HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN.


COMMENT

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13. ~~(S)~~ BOTH BAUMANIS AND YUERGENS POINTED TO EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND LATVIA, BUT NEITHER WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT A THOROUGHGOING IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS LIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM. WE SHARE THAT VIEW. IN ADDITION TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 008076

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/05
TAGS: PREL, RS, LG, NEI
SUBJECT: GOR SANCTIONS AGAINST LATVIA "PROBABLY" OFF

DIFFERING TAKES ON THEIR SHARED HISTORY AND ITS MEANING FOR THE PRESENT -- AND THE REAL SENSITIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE STATUS AND TREATMENT OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN LATVIA -- THE TWO COUNTRIES BOTH APPEAR TO SEE THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. GOR OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT SAY SO, MAY WELL CALCULATE THAT A CLOUDLESS SKY BETWEEN MOSCOW AND RIGA COULD INCREASE THE CHANCE OF AN EARLY LATVIAN ENTRY INTO NATO. WHETHER A CLEAR SIGN FROM RIGA THAT IT HAD DECIDED AGAINST NATO ENTRY WOULD MAKE MOSCOW LESS PRONE TO HYPERVENTILATE OVER THE "UNENDING STREAM OF INSULTS" THAT YUERGENS COMPLAINED ABOUT IS LESS CLEAR. IN ANY EVENT, SINCE LATVIA PRESUMABLY WILL NOT BACK AWAY FROM ITS INTEREST IN NATO, WE BELIEVE THE MOST REALISTIC SCENARIO FOR RELATIONS IN THE NEAR TERM IS VARIATIONS OF THE LOW-GRADE TENSIONS SEEN OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. IF PUTIN WERE TO COME DOWN IN FAVOR OF THE DUMA SANCTIONS BILL, THAT WOULD BE A FIRST SIGN THAT IT WILL NO LONGER BE "BUSINESS AS USUAL" BETWEEN RUSSIA AND LATVIA. BUT LARGELY FOR THE REASONS AVDEYEV AND PASTUKHOV POINTED OUT (PARAS 6-7), WE EXPECT PUTIN TO SEND THE SIGNAL TO THE DUMA THAT IT CAN GROWL AS LOUDLY AS IT WANTS, BUT HE WILL BE IN CHARGE OF ITS TEETH.
COLLINS



Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2000 11:04 AM
To: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Cables; Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR U/S LARSON VISIT TO LATVIA

ActionAddres: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4801
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Date Time: 301520Z MAR 00
Distribution: SIT: Blinken NSC Norland
PRT: Jacobson

Identifier: M4370514
InfoAddres: RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0649
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 1703
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 1847

Line1: OAAUZYUW RUEHRAA1252 0901520-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
Line2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
Line3: O 301520Z MAR 00
Line4: FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
Originator: AMEMBASSY RIGA
Precedence: IMMEDIATE
Profiles: BLINKENA
CABLES
NORLANDR

StationRoutingIndicator: RUEHRA
StationSerialNumber: 1252
TimeOfReceipt: 03/30/2000 11:05:34 ET

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 RIGA 001252

DEPT FOR U/S LARSON AND EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, ECON, PREL, LG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S LARSON VISIT TO LATVIA

REFTELS: A) RIGA 1152 B) 99 RIGA 4181

1. (U) SUMMARY: LATVIA SEEKS TO REGAIN ITS HISTORIC ROLE AS A MAJOR EUROPEAN PORT AND ECONOMIC CENTER. THE LATVIANS WILL MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS THIS GOAL PROVIDED THREE FACTORS ARE MET: THE COUNTRY IS AT PEACE WITH RUSSIA, THE GOVERNMENT IS SUCCESSFUL IN BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND A COMMERCIAL CODE THAT MEETS WESTERN STANDARDS, AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE REMAINS SUPPORTIVE OF THIS RAPID CHANGE AND DOES NOT FALL PREY TO THE DIVISIVE FORCES OF CORRUPTION, ETHNIC TENSION OR ECONOMIC DISPARITY. YOUR VISIT AS PART OF THE BALTIC AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP CHARTER PROCESS IS A TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST LATVIA TO ACHIEVE ITS GOAL. END SUMMARY

BALTIC-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP

2.(U) OUR MISSION AT EMBASSY RIGA REFLECTS THE COMMITMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE SIGNED THE BALTIC AMERICAN CHARTER IN JANUARY 1998 FOR THE U.S. TO STAND BY THE BALTICS AS THEY TRANSFORM THEMSELVES TO BECOME MEMBERS OF EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS. WE ENGAGE WITH THE LATVIANS ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRANSPARENT, COMPETITIVE MARKET ECONOMY OPEN TO AMERICAN INVESTMENT. IN ADDITION, WE OFFER ASSISTANCE TO LATVIA TO BUILD A

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2016-0314-M-1 (208)
6/12/2013 VZ

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE THAT CAN SUSTAIN THE RAPID TRANSITION. ON THE SECURITY SIDE, WE WORK TO HELP THE LATVIANS TO UPGRADE THEIR MILITARY STRUCTURE SO THEY CAN BEGIN TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND BECOME THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR NATO.

3. (U) THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP THAT GENERATED YOUR VISIT IS ONE OF TWO (THE OTHER IS DEFENSE) THAT WERE SET UP AS FORUMS FOR THE U.S. AND LATVIA TO REVIEW ISSUES PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF THE BALTIC AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION WHICH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT WILL LEAD IN JUNE. HE ENCOURAGED THE CREATION OF THE ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP AND ITS PARALLEL PRIVATE SECTOR DIALOGUE SPECIFICALLY TO ADVANCE COOPERATION ON KEY TRADE, INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL ISSUES.

4. (U) THE AGENDA FOR THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP IS DIVIDED INTO MULTILATERAL ISSUES, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL ISSUES, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR DIALOGUE. KEY ISSUES THAT YOU WILL FACE ARE OUTLINED BELOW:

MULTILATERAL ISSUES

5.(U) THE U.S. IS OFFICIALLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT LATVIA'S BID TO JOIN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS AS IT RESUMES ITS PLACE AS A EUROPEAN NATION. WE WERE ACTIVE IN THEIR WTO MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS, SUPPORT THEIR MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU, AND WORK WITH THEM TO REFORM THEIR MILITARY WITH AN EYE TOWARDS EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP. THEY WILL ASK WHY OUR SUPPORT DOES NOT EXTEND TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE AUSTRALIA GROUP WHICH THEY FEEL IS ANOTHER WESTERN ORGANIZATION TO WHICH ANY RESPECTABLE EUROPEAN NATION SHOULD BELONG. THEY ALSO NOTE OUR LACK OF INTEREST IN THE OECD WORKING GROUP ON THE BALTICS. YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ALL ORGANIZATIONS COME WITH OBLIGATIONS. THIS INCLUDES THE WTO WHERE LATVIA STILL HAS IMPLEMENTATION WORK TO COMPLETE IN ORDER TO MEET ITS IPR OBLIGATIONS. LATVIA SHOULD START TO DISCERN WHICH OF THESE FORUMS ARE STRATEGICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL TO LATVIA AND IN WHICH ORGANIZATIONS IT CAN USEFULLY PARTICIPATE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

6. (U) LATVIA IS A STRONG PROPONENT OF BALTIC COOPERATION. THE LATVIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE BETTER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BALTIC STATES AND RUSSIA. THEY HAVE MADE REPEATED EFFORTS TO RESTART GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIA BUT SO FAR RUSSIA HAS REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN A NORMAL DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE. THE LATIVANS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS LATVIA-RUSSIA ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (SEE REFTELS). YOU SHOULD NOTE THE U.S. SUPPORT FOR NEI AND OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE COOPERATIVE NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS IN THE REGION.

BILATERAL ISSUES

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 RIGA 001252

DEPT FOR U/S LARSON AND EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ETRD, ECON, PREL, LG

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S LARSON VISIT TO LATVIA

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7. (U) THE TOP BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND LATVIA ARE IMPROVING THE CLIMATE FOR INVESTMENT, THE PROGRESS OF PRIVATIZATION, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT.

8. (U) PRIVATIZATION: LATVIA HAS A VERY POSITIVE STORY TO TELL IN TERMS OF IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC REFORM AND STRENGTHENING ITS MARKET ECONOMY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NEARLY COMPLETED THE PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED PROPERTY, AND ONLY A HANDFUL OF LARGE STATE ENTERPRISES REMAIN TO BE FULLY RESTRUCTURED (LATVENERGO, LATVIJAS GAZE, VENTSPILS NAFTA, THE LATVIAN SHIPPING COMPANY AND LATTELEKOM, THE TELEPHONE COMPANY.) THE PRIVATE SECTOR NOW ACCOUNTS FOR 65 PERCENT OF GDP AND 69 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT IN LATVIA.

9. (U) YOU SHOULD URGE THE LATVIANS TO PROCEED WITH THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE KEY STATE MONOPOLIES. PRIVATIZATION WILL ATTRACT MAJOR AMERICAN INVESTORS AS WELL AS PROPEL THE LATVIAN ECONOMY BEYOND THIS STUMBLING BLOCK TO OVERALL ECONOMIC REFORM. SECRETARY RICHARDSON DURING HIS FEBRUARY VISIT PUSHED THE LATVIANS HARD ON THE NEED TO PRIVATIZE ENERGY ASSETS. THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DEVELOPED A STRATEGY TO BREAK UP THE ELECTRIC MONOPOLY INTO SEVERAL DIVISIONS ONLY ONE OF WHICH WILL BE PRIVATIZED. EVEN THIS MINIMAL PLAN HAS FACED POLITICAL OPPOSITION.

10. (U) LAW ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL AND REGULATORY STRUCTURES, HOWEVER, MUST BE IN PLACE FOR PRIVATIZATION TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE LATVIANS ARE INCREASINGLY FOCUSING ON ISSUES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, AS WELL AS LEGAL AND JUDICIAL STRUCTURES THAT ARE CRITICALLY TIED TO THE ATTRACTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT. EVEN WITH LATVIA'S AID GRADUATION OF SUMMER 1999, THE U.S. HAS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE THAT IT CAN (AND DOES) STILL OFFER INCLUDING INL COURSES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, USTTI TELECOMMUNICATION COURSES AND OTHER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. WE ALSO HAVE SEVERAL PROGRAMS IN BORDER CONTROL - WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE THE EXPORT CONTROL TRACKER SYSTEM IS ALMOST FULLY IN PLACE AND WE HAVE INSTALLED RADIATION DETECTORS AT KEY BORDERS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION GOALS. THE LATVIANS HAVE BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THESE PROGRAMS AND WE CAN EXPAND THEM IF THEY AGREE.

11. (U) INVESTMENT CLIMATE: THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE BUSINESS CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS. IT CO-FINANCED A FIAS REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS TO INVESTMENT IN 1999 AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMPLEMENTED MOST OF THE RECOMMENDED REMEDIES. FURTHER INITIATIVES IN THE AREAS OF TAX REFORM AND IMPROVING REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. FOR THE PAST YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT HAS HELD A GROWING DIALOGUE WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS OVER A VARIETY OF ISSUES FROM CUSTOMS TO TAXES. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE THE LATVIANS TO WIDEN THAT DIALOGUE TO INCLUDE ANY NEW LEGISLATION AND TO CONSULT EARLIER IN THE PROCESS SO AS TO AVOID THE NEED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL ONCE A DRAFT LAW IS CIRCULATED.

PRIVATE SECTOR DIALOGUE

12. (U) THIRTY AMERICAN AND LATVIAN BUSINESSES WILL MEET THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 5 TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC WORKING

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GROUP. THEY WILL DISCUSS A VARIETY OF TOPICS INCLUDING IPR, TAXES AND OTHER REFORMS INCLUDING THE DRAFT LABOR LAW. THIS LAW IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS FACED IN THE REFORM OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM. AS WRITTEN THE LAW WOULD ALLOW ANY TWO EMPLOYEES TO START A UNION. THE LAW THEN REQUIRES THE COMPANY TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE INDEXED WAGES. THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE IN ENCOURAGING THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT TO WORK WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN REVISING THE LAW. SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR GROUP WILL PRESENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS AT THE END OF THE WORKING GROUPS AGENDA. YOUR VISIT SPARKED THIS FIRST EVER FORMAL MEETING BETWEEN THE AMERICAN CHAMBER AND A GROUP OF LATVIAN BUSINESSES. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER, BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

HISTORY

13. (U) THE CITY OF RIGA WAS FOUNDED IN 1201. AT THIS TIME GERMAN CRUSADER KNIGHTS, WITH THE CATHOLIC UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 RIGA 001252

DEPT FOR U/S LARSON AND EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ETRD, ECON, PREL, LG

SUBJECT: SCENESSETTER FOR U/S LARSON VISIT TO LATVIA

CHURCH'S ENCOURAGEMENT, CONQUERED THE LOCAL LIV, LATGALE AND ZEMGALE TRIBES. GERMAN BARONS, DESCENDENTS OF THESE KNIGHTS, DOMINATED LATVIA'S ECONOMY UNTIL LAND REFORM DURING LATVIA'S BRIEF INDEPENDENCE PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR ONE. RIGA AND LATVIA'S OTHER HANSEATIC CITIES WERE PROSPEROUS TOWNS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE AGES. AFTER CONQUEST OF NORTHERN LATVIA BY THE SWEDES IN THE EARLY 17TH CENTURY, RIGA WAS THE LARGEST CITY OF THE SWEDISH KINGDOM. THE SWEDISH-RUSSIAN WAR OF THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY DEVASTATED THE AREA BUT AFTER RUSSIAN REFORMS AND A NATIONAL AWAKENING IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY, RIGA BECAME A MAJOR PORT AND THE THIRD LARGEST CITY IN TSARIST RUSSIA. THE INDEPENDENT LATVIA THAT EXISTED BRIEFLY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS WAS ON AN ECONOMIC PAR WITH DENMARK BUT SUFFERED DEVASTATING HUMAN LOSS DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR TWO. SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1991, LATVIA HAS STRUGGLED TO REGAIN ITS PLACE AS THE STRATEGIC ECONOMIC CENTER OF THAT BROADER VISION OF EUROPE THAT INCLUDES RUSSIA.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW

14. (SBU) LATVIA IS JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF ITS SUCCESS IN BUILDING A STABLE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT LED BY PRIME MINISTER ANDRIS SKELE IS COMPOSED OF LATVIA'S THREE LARGE CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES AND HAS BEEN IN POWER SINCE MID-JULY 1999. LIKE THE PREVIOUS RULING COALITIONS, THE SKELE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO PURSUING INTEGRATION INTO EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS AND TO DEVELOPING A PROSPEROUS MARKET ECONOMY. SKELE HAS SERVED TWICE PREVIOUSLY AS PRIME MINISTER AND IS KNOWN AS A PRAGMATIC, STRONGLY PRO-BUSINESS LEADER. THE PARLIAMENT ELECTED CANADIAN-LATVIAN VAIRA VIKI-FRIEBERGA PRESIDENT ON JUNE 17, 1999. SHE IS LATVIA'S SECOND PRESIDENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE AND IS THE FIRST WOMAN PRESIDENT IN

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EASTERN EUROPE.

15. (SBU) LATVIA ACHIEVED ONE OF ITS CENTRAL POLICY OBJECTIVES WHEN IT WAS INVITED TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN DECEMBER 1999. THE GOVERNMENT'S DRIVE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS LARGELY DRIVEN DOMESTIC POLICY. ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF DOMESTIC LEGISLATION IS BEING MODIFIED TO ACCORD WITH EU REQUIREMENTS. THE LATVIANS ARE STRUGGLING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, FROM BORDER CONTROL UNITS TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, AND FROM REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES TO MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC REVENUES. LATVIA HAS ALSO FOCUSED ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF INTEGRATING ITS APPROXIMATELY 700,000 LARGELY RUSSIAN-SPEAKING NON-CITIZENS, WHO MAKE UP ABOUT THIRTY PERCENT OF THE OVERALL POPULATION. IN OCTOBER 1998, THE LATVIAN PEOPLE VOTED IN A NATIONAL REFERENDUM TO EASE THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS FOR NON-CITIZENS, AND IN DECEMBER 1999, THE PARLIAMENT PASSED AN OSCE-COMPLIANT LANGUAGE LAW THAT WILL FOSTER THE USE OF LATVIAN WITHOUT VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF NON-LATVIAN SPEAKERS.

16. (SBU) CURRENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING STEPS TO DEAL WITH ANOTHER DIFFICULT ISSUE: THE TRAGIC LEGACY OF THE WORLD WAR II ATROCITIES OF THE HOLOCAUST AND THE SOVIET OCCUPATION. IN 1999 THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED AN HISTORICAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE EVENTS OF THE PAST, AND RECENTLY THE AUTHORITIES INVITED PROSECUTORS FROM THE U.S., CANADA, THE U.K., AUSTRALIA, GERMANY, AND ISRAEL TO HELP ASSESS THE EVIDENCE AGAINST ALLEGED LATVIAN WAR CRIMINAL KONRADS KALEJS, WHO WAS DEPORTED FROM BRITAIN.

17. (SBU) ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT, LATVIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA HAVE CONTINUED TO BE DIFFICULT. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS REFUSED TO RESTART THE LATVIAN-RUSSIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION OR TO SIGN A BORDER AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, RUSSIA HAS IMPLEMENTED RESTRICTIVE TRANSPORT, CUSTOMS AND BANKING REGULATIONS THAT TARGET TRADE AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH LATVIA. SOME ENERGY OFFICIALS ALLEGE THAT PERIODIC RUSSIAN DECISIONS TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF OIL EXPORTS THROUGH THE PIPELINE TO VENTSPILS ARE DRIVEN BY A POLITICAL AGENDA RATHER THAN BY ECONOMIC MOTIVES. AT THE HEART OF RUSSIA'S COMPLAINTS IS ALLEGEDLY THE STATUS OF LATVIA'S RUSSIAN-SPEAKING NON-CITIZENS, ALTHOUGH RUSSIA'S BROADER OBJECTIVE SEEMS TO BE KEEPING LATVIA WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

18. (U) LATVIA ENJOYED STRONG ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN 1997, WHEN GDP GROWTH REACHED 8.6 PERCENT. IN THE LAST UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 RIGA 001252

DEPT FOR U/S LARSON AND EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ETRD, ECON, PREL, LG

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S LARSON VISIT TO LATVIA

QUARTER OF 1998, HOWEVER, POSITIVE GROWTH TRENDS IN LATVIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WERE DERAILED BY THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS. OVERALL GDP GROWTH IN 1999 WAS LESS THAN ONE PERCENT. THERE ARE POSITIVE SIGNS OF STABILIZATION, HOWEVER, AND MOST OBSERVERS ARE PREDICTING BETWEEN 2 AND 3 PERCENT GDP GROWTH IN 2000.

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UNEMPLOYMENT CURRENTLY HAS STABILIZED AT AROUND 9.1 PERCENT, YEAR-ON-YEAR INFLATION AT THE END OF DECEMBER 1999 WAS A LOW 3.2 PERCENT, AND THE NATIONAL CURRENCY HAS REMAINED STABLE. DURING 1999 LATVIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BOTH PLUMMETED, BUT LATVIANS ARE PLEASED WITH THE DRAMATIC REORIENTATION OF THEIR COUNTRY'S TRADE TOWARDS EUROPE. IN THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1999, 63 PERCENT OF LATVIA'S EXPORTS WENT TO THE EU, AND 6.9 PERCENT WENT TO RUSSIA. THE EU'S SHARE OF LATVIA'S IMPORTS WAS 56 PERCENT DURING THE SAME NINE-MONTH PERIOD.

19. (U) LATVIA HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. AS OF THE END OF JUNE 1999, TOTAL FDI EXCEEDED \$1.7 BILLION, OR APPROXIMATELY \$710 PER CAPITA. U.S. INVESTMENT INTO LATVIA IS ESTIMATED BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO BE ABOUT \$400 MILLION, ALTHOUGH THE GOL CREDITS U.S. INVESTMENT AT APPROXIMATELY \$200 MILLION. THE U.S. IS THE SECOND LARGEST FOREIGN INVESTOR IN LATVIA -- AFTER DENMARK. LATVIA BECAME A MEMBER OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN FEBRUARY 1999. THE U.S. AND LATVIA RATIFIED THE TREATY ON AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION IN DECEMBER 1999. HOLMES

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
Sent: Monday, March 06, 2000 11:34 AM
To: @APNSA
Cc: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN); Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: Attendees at the Latvian FM Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

Attendees will be
Indulis Berzins, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Peteris Vinkelis, Charge d'Affaires and Counselor
Artiga Daudze, Director of 2nd Political Department, MFA

Tony Blinken
Dick Norland

3/6/00.
Berzins
- POTUS visit to Latvia? - clear msg. - strong push.
- Regional cooperation.

JBS - need to show Russia that we're not w/out cooperation.

Berzins - give Russia a clear message. "Cautious optimism."
- after election, will know better what Russia's real policy is.
- create a relatively good environment during election campaign. Hard to control.

JBS - yes. negative rationalization can erupt.

IB - Ukraine improving - thinking about details of reforms.

JBS - We have told Ukraine of loss of regional particularity.

(EU)
IB - good progress. Russian-speakers suggest EU
EU not instead of NATO.

JBS - agree - not mutually exclusive. need pol/sec. reforms -
regions can cooperate.

IB - Putin advisers are cynical.

TO: Jim Steinberg
THRU: Tony Blinken
From Dick Norland

Subject: Meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins

Latvian-Russian relations have soured lately, and FM Berzins will use his Monday meetings with Strobe and you to seek U.S. support. Russia has launched strong verbal attacks accusing Latvia of being pro-Nazi because it convicted ethnic-Russian Latvian citizen Vasily Kononov of war crimes. Putin wrote to President Vike-Freiberga, and FM Ivanov has written scathing letters to Secretary Albright as well as EU and COE foreign ministers. Berzins wrote Albright March 2 expressing his concerns over the seniority and tone of the Russian attacks, and asking for OSCE countries to engage Russia in a "constructive dialogue" on Latvia. FM Cook, on Berzins' behalf, raised Latvia with Ivanov last week.

Still, the Latvians know they must improve their record on **Nazi war crime prosecutions**. Latvia hosted a February 16-17 multilateral conference on Nazi war crimes to facilitate prosecution of suspected Nazi war criminals, and DOJ has pledged to send resident advisors to expedite the preparation of judicial cases for convictions. Latvia recently decided to repeal observance of March 16 as "Latvian Soldiers Memorial Day" and is developing education projects with help from experienced Europeans to re-examine their negative roles during the Nazi occupation and Holocaust.

You should tell Berzins that the U.S. supports the vigorous prosecution of all suspected of war crimes and genocide, regardless of background, but that Latvia needs to be equally zealous in pursuit of accused Nazis. We need to remind the Balts that the success of their efforts in this regard will affect their relations with the U.S. and rest of the world.

You can also commend Berzins for the real steps his government has taken to pass and implement OSCE-compliant laws on **social integration**, but point out that the recent Russian attacks indicate the importance of maintaining an OSCE presence in Tallinn and Riga to protect the Balts from false assertions. Latvia has passed a basically OSCE-compliant language and naturalization law, and we currently are funding a \$250,000 Latvian language-training program for Russian speakers. Berzins would appreciate your thoughts on "**whither Russia**" following the Presidential elections, whether Putin wins or not.

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2016-0314-M-1 (2.10)
6/14/2023 VZ

Ultimately, Latvia remains focused on NATO membership. Thanks to an energetic Defense Minister, MOD staff, and Chief of Defense, Latvia has become an eager participant in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) process and has received some constructive feedback from NATO on its preparations for membership. Latvia is committed to increasing its GDP percentage dedicated to defense. You should urge Berzins to remain focused on meeting Latvia's 2% goal by 2002.

Points to Make

War Crimes, Holocaust Issues

- We will be reminding Russians that Kononov was found guilty of killing civilians, not of anti-fascist acts, and that all countries must vigorously prosecute all kinds of war crimes.
- Welcome Latvia's hosting recent international meeting to facilitate prosecution of Nazi criminals, especially Konrads Kalejs. Latvia needs to demonstrate that it is as zealous in pursuit of Nazi-era criminals, like Kalejs, as those who worked with the Soviets. Bottom line: Latvia must prosecute Nazi war criminals now - affects Latvia's relations with U.S.
- We look forward to continued, productive work between your prosecutor's office and the DOJ to expedite the Kalejs case.
- Rep. Lantos enjoyed recent visit. Must follow through on public comments, many laudable proposed conferences, Riga University's Judaic Studies Center. Historical issues might be most difficult and important to deal with in Latvia's preparations for membership in NATO.
- GOL full funding of its Holocaust Commission, engaging experts on commission, and treating issue seriously with focus on specific goals is crucial to Commission's success.
- The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum works with Latvian archives, can work with Commission.
- If GOL works out program details with Vad Yashem, USG will try to help fund public school Holocaust education. Glad GOL has liaison project with the Task Force for this purpose.

Social Integration/Relations with Russia

- USG plans informal meeting in Tallinn March 30 with Latvia, Nordics. Goals are to target more effectively U.S. and Nordic social integration assistance and to get Nordic and Baltic agreement on how to change the OSCE missions. Situation in Latvia, Estonia changed much since inception of missions.
- Sensitive to concerns that missions are impediment to EU accession talks. However, some sort of OSCE mission for near-term is buffer to Russian criticisms and ensures continued smooth implementation of legislation.

NATO enlargement and MAP

- Admire Latvia's spending resources on defense, and abiding by determination to reach 2% of GDP by 2002. May be difficult; every incremental increase counts.
- Impressed by Latvia's resurgent political commitment, defense planning and capabilities. Latvia on right track for 2002.
- Continue to use your well-written and comprehensive Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare for NATO membership.
- Will continue to endorse publicly a vigorous, merit-based "Round 2" for NATO enlargement in 2002, open to all aspirants regardless of potential Russian opposition.
- Can't speak for next Administration, but certain it will remain committed to Open Door policy outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration.

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: P - Under Secretary Pickering

FROM: EUR - Marc Grossman
S/NIS - Ross Wilson, Acting

SUBJECT: Reply to OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel's on Russia's
Relations with the Baltics and Ukraine

On February 25 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel sent you a letter expressing his concern over the Russian government's increasingly strident rhetoric against what it claims to be "the encouragement of Nazism" in Estonia and Latvia. Van der Stoel reiterated that given these and other circumstances, it remains in Estonia's and Latvia's and the OSCE's interests to maintain the resident OSCE missions. Van der Stoel also expressed concern about the implications of Russia's tougher line toward Ukraine on the rights of "Russian speakers" in that country, which he speculated could be part of a new policy of assertiveness on Russia's part in defending the interests of Russians in the other former Soviet republics.

We suggest that you sign the attached letter that supports van der Stoel's position on the need to maintain an OSCE presence and further outlines what the United States and other "friends of the Balts" intend to do on this issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter at Tab 1.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Proposed response
- Tab 2 - Incoming correspondence and FM Ivanov letter

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Mr. van der Stoel,

Thank you for your February 25 letter expressing your concern over the Russian government's increasingly strident rhetoric against what it claims to be "the encouragement of Nazism" in the Baltics. We share those concerns and agree it remains in the interest of Estonia, Latvia, and the OSCE to maintain a continued OSCE presence in Tallinn and Riga.

Near the end of March the United States plans to hold an informal meeting in Tallinn with other "friends of the Balts" as a first step toward two separate goals. First, we want to target more effectively U.S. and Nordic assistance to facilitate and encourage social integration in the Baltics. Secondly, we want to get Nordic and Baltic agreement on how to change the mandates of the OSCE missions, since the situation on the ground has changed since their inception. While we are sensitive to Estonian and Latvian concerns that the missions are an impediment to their accession talks with the European Union, we share your belief that we should keep some sort of OSCE presence for the near-term as a buffer to the Russian criticisms that you encountered and also as insurance that the Governments do not backtrack. As we proceed, we will keep you informed and involved in this process.

Your letter also raised Russian criticism of Ukrainian actions aimed at Russian-speakers. We agree the situation bears watching and may argue for maintaining an OSCE presence there. I would be interested in your views on this. We plan to discuss Russian-Ukrainian relations with Prime Minister Yushchenko during his visit to Washington March 14-16. Our consistent message to the Ukrainians is that progress on democratic and economic reforms will speed Ukraine's western integration and solidify its independence.

During this period of political transition in Russia, it is important to remind the Russian leadership that positive engagement with the Baltics and Ukraine is the best way to resolve outstanding problems. We have an on-going dialogue with the Russian government on this issue. We continue to appreciate your successful efforts.

Sincerely,

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering

His Excellency

Max van der Stoel,

High Commissioner on National Minorities,

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

The Hague, The Netherlands

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DRL/BA:TJResler
EUR/RUS:KSheehan, MYovanovitch
EUR/WST:ESchultz, MWarlick
S/NIS:JBeyrle, RWilson
P:SNWhite, GPDoty
EUR:WEAndrusyszyn

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ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: P - Under Secretary Pickering

FROM: EUR - Marc Grossman

SUBJECT: Reply to OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel on OSCE Missions
in Estonia and Latvia

On February 25 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel sent you a letter expressing his concern over the Russian government's increasing rhetoric against what it claims to be "the encouragement of Nazism" in Estonia and Latvia. Van der Stoel reiterated that given these and other circumstances, it remains in Estonia and Latvia's (and the OSCE's) interests to maintain the resident missions. Van der Stoel also expressed concern about the implications of Russia's tougher line toward Ukraine on the rights of "Russian speakers" in that country, which he speculated could be part of a new policy of assertiveness on Russia's part in defending the interests of Russians in the other former Soviet republics.

We suggest that you sign the attached letter that supports his position on the need to maintain OSCE missions and further outlines what the United States and other "friends of the Balts" intend to do on this issue. You also may share a copy of the non-paper that the Secretary will hand Russian FM Ivanov March 3 in response to his February 22 letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter at Tab 1.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Proposed response
- Tab 2 - Incoming correspondence and FM Ivanov letter

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

2016-0514-m-2 (2.14)
6/12/2023 RZ

Dear Mr. van der Stoel,

Thank you for your February 25 letter expressing your concern over the Russian government's increasing rhetoric against what it claims to be "the encouragement of Nazism" in the Baltics and its reference to anti-Russian measures in Ukraine. We share those concerns, and for those and other reasons agree that it remains in Estonia, Latvia, and the OSCE's interests to maintain a continued OSCE presence in Tallinn and Riga. We also believe the increasing Russian rhetoric regarding the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine bears close watching and may present another argument for maintaining an OSCE presence in that country.

Near the end of March the United States plans to hold an informal meeting in Tallinn with other "friends of the Balts" as a first step toward two separate goals. First, we want to target more effectively U.S. and Nordic assistance to facilitate and encourage social integration in the Baltics. Secondly, we want to get Nordic and Baltic agreement on how to change the OSCE missions, since the situation on the ground has changed since the inception of the missions' mandate. While we are sensitive to Estonian and Latvian concerns that the missions are an impediment to their accession talks with the European Union, we share your belief that we should keep some sort of OSCE presence for the near-term as a buffer to the Russian criticisms that you encountered and also as insurance that the Governments do not backtrack. As we proceed, we will keep you informed and involved in this process.

On Ukraine, we plan to discuss Russian-Ukrainian relations with Prime Minister Yushchenko during his visit to Washington March 14-16. Our consistent message to the Ukrainians has been that progress on democratic and economic reforms will speed Ukraine's western integration and solidify its independence.

For your information, I also am forwarding you a copy of a non-paper that Secretary Albright will hand Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov during their March 3 meeting in Moscow, in response to Ivanov's February 22 letter on related subjects. During this period of political transition in Russia, it is important to remind the Russian leadership that positive engagement with the Baltics is the best way to resolve outstanding problems. We continue to appreciate your successful efforts.

Sincerely,

Thomas R. Pickering

His Excellency

Max van der Stoel,

High Commissioner on National Minorities,

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

The Hague, The Netherlands.

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DRL/BA:WBSilverman, TJResler
EUR/RUS:KSheehan, MYovanovitch
EUR/WST:ESchultz, MWarlick
S/NIS:JBeyrle, RWilson
P:SNWhite, GPDoty (info)
EUR:WEAndrusyszyn

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Baltic Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals

The U. S. and Russia agree that all countries must vigorously prosecute Nazi war criminals among their citizens regardless of ideology. We have firmly and consistently demanded the prosecution of all kinds of war criminals. The U. S. has repeatedly reminded Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia that the success of their efforts in prosecuting Nazi war criminals will affect their relations with us and the rest of the world.

The Baltic countries are making progress in prosecuting Nazi war criminals. Lithuania has indicted two Nazi war criminals and has gone to extraordinary lengths to overcome judicial hurdles to ongoing prosecutions by enacting legislation that will allow *in absentia* trials.

You raised the case of Vassily Kononov, a Latvian citizen who was recently tried and convicted, according to international norms, of war crimes. We understand that he was found guilty of killing civilians and sentenced to six years imprisonment. The sentence has not been carried out because Mr. Kononov has filed an appeal. The Latvian Government has stated that Mr. Kononov was brought to trial because of war crimes, not anti-fascist activities. We understand that you have raised this case with the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna and requested that the resident OSCE Mission in Riga monitor the case. While the current resident OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia will continue to monitor the Latvian and Estonian Government's implementation of OSCE-consistent legislation and their treatment of resident non-citizens, the United States consequently does not support an expansion of the current mandate.

You also raised the case of Konrads Kalejs. Latvia hosted a February 16-17 multilateral prosecutorial conference on Nazi war crimes to facilitate the prosecution of suspected Nazi war criminals such as Kalejs and others. We are supporting these efforts. The U. S. Department of Justice has pledged sending resident advisors to expedite the preparation of judicial cases for convictions.

Beyond these individual cases, we believe that positive engagement with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is the way to resolve outstanding problems in this area. Latvia's decision on February 17 to repeal observance of March 16 as "Latvian Soldiers Memorial Day" was a positive step. As a result of the recent Stockholm Holocaust conference which we supported, Latvia and Lithuania are developing education projects with help from experienced Europeans to re-examine their respective negative roles during the Nazi occupation and Holocaust. This work also is proceeding within the forum of international experts on the respective Presidential Historical Commissions. The U. S. supports the work of these Commissions.

Finally, we note that U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos, a Holocaust survivor, visited all three countries in January to promote Holocaust education and to demand more attention to the prosecution of Nazi war crimes. U.S. Administration officials make the same points regularly to their Baltic counterparts and insist that the Governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia cannot "play favorites" with regards to the execution of international justice against war criminals without risking their status as respected members of the transatlantic community.

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EUR - Marc Grossman

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister
Indulis Berzins (IN-doo-lis BEAR-zinsh)
Monday, March 6; 10:15am
Your office

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Discuss Russian criticism of Latvia, and commend its progress in advancing the social integration of Russian speakers.
2. Reiterate Latvia's need to follow through on Nazi war crime prosecutions and Holocaust education.
3. Praise Latvia's progress towards meeting its Membership Action Plan (MAP) goals, but provide a reality check on what can be accomplished this year on NATO enlargement.

II. APPROACH

FM Berzins will seek your support in dealing with Russia's attacks on Latvia for the conviction of ethnic-Russian Latvian citizen Vasily Kononov for war crimes. Acting President Putin has written to President Vike-Freiberga, and FM Ivanov has written an appeal on behalf of Kononov to EU and COE foreign ministers. These actions give further credence to OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel's concern, in a February 25 letter to U/S Pickering, over Russia's increasingly strong rhetoric against what it claims to be the "encouragement of Nazism" in the Baltics. Berzins wrote the Secretary March 2 (tab 2) expressing his concerns over the seniority and tone of Russian attacks, and asking for OSCE countries to engage Russia in a "constructive dialogue" on Latvia. UK FM Cook, on Berzins behalf, raised Latvia with FM Ivanov last week. The UK has told us that Ivanov blasted the Latvians as being pro-Nazi.

You should tell Berzins that the U.S. supports the vigorous prosecution of all suspected of war crimes and genocide, regardless of background, but that Latvia needs to be equally zealous in pursuit of accused Nazis. We need to continue to remind the Balts that the success of their efforts in this regard will affect their relations with the U.S. and rest of the world.

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2016-0314-M-2 (7.16)
6/2/2015 RZ

You can also commend Berzins for the real steps his government has taken to pass and implement OSCE-compliant laws, but that the recent Russian attacks indicate the importance of maintaining an OSCE presence in Tallinn and Riga to protect them from false assertions. Latvia has otherwise taken positive steps on social and historical issues. It has passed a basically OSCE-compliant language and naturalization law, and we currently are funding a \$250,000 Latvian language-training program for Russian speakers.

Latvia hosted a February 16-17 multilateral prosecutorial conference on Nazi war crimes to facilitate prosecution of suspected Nazi war criminals, and USDOJ has pledged to send resident advisors to expedite the preparation of judicial cases for convictions. Latvia recently decided to repeal observance of March 16 as "Latvian Soldiers Memorial Day" and is developing education projects with help from experienced Europeans to re-examine their respective negative roles during the Nazi occupation and Holocaust. We also are working with the Latvians, Estonians, and "friends of the Balts" on a strategy to adapt the resident OSCE presence to the improved situation on the ground.

Thanks to an energetic, well-focused Defense Minister, MOD staff, and Chief of Defense, Latvia has become an eager participant in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) process and finally seems to have come up with a constructive review of its preparations for membership and commitment to increasing GDP percentage dedicated to defense. You should ensure that Berzins himself remains focused on meeting Latvia's 2% goal by 2002.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Deputy Secretary
D staff
EUR DAS Walter Andrusyszyn
EUR/NB Leader (notetaker)

LATVIA

FM Indulis Berzins
MFA Counselor Mark Dayton
MFA #2 PolDir Argita Daudze
MFA America Div.-Klavs Sniedze
Charge Peteris Vinkelis

IV. MEDIA: Official photographers only at top of meeting.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Talking Points
Tab 2 - Berzins-Secretary Letter
Tab 3 - Biographic sketch

Talking Points

War Crimes, Holocaust Issues

- IF ASKED: Provided non-paper to Russia noting that Kononov found guilty of killing civilians, not of anti-fascist acts, and that all countries must vigorously prosecute all kinds of war crimes.
- We look forward to continued, productive work between your prosecutor's office and the DOJ to expedite the Kalejs case.
- Welcome Latvia's hosting recent international meeting to facilitate prosecution of Nazi criminals, especially Konrads Kalejs. Latvia needs to demonstrate that it is as zealous in pursuit of Nazi-era criminals, like Konrads Kalejs, as those who worked with the Soviets. Bottom line: Latvia must prosecute Nazi war criminals now. Affects Latvia's relations with U.S. and others.
- Rep. Lantos enjoyed recent visit. Must follow through on public comments, many laudable proposed conferences, Riga University's Judaic Studies Center. Historical issues might be most difficult and important to deal with in Latvia's preparations for membership in NATO.
- GOL full funding of Holocaust Commission, engaging experts on commission, and treating issue seriously with focus on specific goals is crucial to Commission's success.
- The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum works with Latvian archives, can work with Commission.
- If GOL works out program details with Vad Yashem, USG will try to help fund public school Holocaust education. Glad GOL has liaison project with the Task Force for this purpose.

Social Integration

- USG plans informal meeting in Tallinn March 30 with Latvia, Nordics. Goals are to target more effectively U.S. and Nordic social integration assistance and to get Nordic and Baltic agreement on how to change the OSCE missions. Situation in Latvia, Estonia changed much since inception of missions.
- Sensitive to concerns that missions are impediment to EU accession talks. However, some sort of OSCE mission for near-term is buffer to Russian criticisms and ensures continued smooth implementation of legislation.

NATO enlargement and MAP

- Admire Latvia's spending resources on defense, and abiding by determination to reach 2% of GDP by 2002. May be difficult; every incremental increase counts.
- Impressed by Latvia's resurgent political commitment, defense planning and capabilities. Latvia on right track for 2002. Can't backtrack on commitments when you've come this far.
- Continue to use your well-written and comprehensive Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare for NATO membership.
- Will continue to endorse publicly a vigorous, merit-based "Round 2" for NATO enlargement in 2002, open to all aspirants regardless of potential Russian opposition.
- Unlikely any new Administration will reverse Open Door policy, but Latvia must be realistic about further expectations before U.S. elections.

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Drafter: EUR/NB:ALSilski, 7-8378, 02/28/2000
Cleared: EUR:DEGraze, DRLeader
EUR/RUS:KSheehan
EUR/RPM:JLNovak, RKScott
P:SNWhite
PM/PRS:JReside
EUR:WEAndrusyszyn

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (2.17)
6/12/2023 VL

~~SECRET~~

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ when separated from attachment)
DECL: 07/01/2002

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EUR - Marc Grossman

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Lithuanian Parliamentarians
Vytautas Landsbergis (LAHNS-bear-ghiss), Rimantas Dagys
(dah-GEESE), and Emanuelis Zingeris (ZING-air-iss)
Tuesday, March 7; 2:00pm
Your office

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Praise Lithuania's progress to date on "Membership Action Plan" (MAP) priorities, promoting U.S. investment, allowing in absentia trials for Nazi war criminals, agreeing to close Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, and effecting "good neighbor" policies towards Russia and Belarus.
2. Give Lithuania a "reality check" on the Alliance's enlargement timetable and on what this Administration can accomplish in 2000.
3. Encourage continued efforts to attract U.S. investment.

II. APPROACH

Speaker Landsbergis and his colleagues are in Washington for a dinner at the Capitol, hosted by Speaker Hastert, to commemorate the anniversary of U.S. non-recognition of Lithuania's incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

With GOL fiscal mismanagement compounding the impact of the Russian economic crisis on Lithuania's economy, Landsbergis' Conservative Party is in trouble and the center-left is gaining strength. Many of his MPs are "jumping ship" for a new conservative-centrist party led by former PM Paksas, who resigned in protest over the Williams deal. Although the economy appears to have bottomed out, Landsbergis' authoritarian and controversial leadership has made him the "Newt Gingrich" of Lithuania, and his party likely will be gutted by defections and

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Classified by EUR DAS Andrusyszyn; Reasons 1.5 (B), (D)

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routed during the March 19 municipal elections and parliamentary elections in fall. To consolidate his party's position and the otherwise impressive gains made during his tenure as speaker, Landsbergis wants the United States and the Alliance to further demonstrate responsiveness to Lithuania's security needs (i.e., that Lithuania is on a "fast track" for NATO membership in 2002).

This meeting provides an opportunity to thank Landsbergis for his support for the Williams investment, for which he is paying a political price. You will also want to acknowledge Landsbergis' willingness to change laws to facilitate trials of accused Nazi war criminals, and Lithuania's openness to cooperation with its neighbors, including through projects with Kaliningrad and Belarus.

On NATO enlargement, you should reiterate that we will continue to lay down clear public and private markers endorsing a vigorous, merit-based next round for NATO enlargement, which would be open to the Baltic states regardless of potential Russian opposition. Although it is unlikely the next administration will reverse the Open Door policy, Landsbergis needs to be realistic about his expectations. Lithuania also should be encouraged to stay on track for 2002 with further progress on such MAP goals as resolving Holocaust issues and reaching 2% of GDP spending on defense.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Deputy Secretary
D staff
EUR DAS Walter Andrusyszyn
EUR/NB notetaker

LITHUANIA

Speaker Vytautas Landsbergis
Deputy Speaker Rimantas Dagys
MP Emanuelis Zingeris
Amb. Stasys Sakalauskas

IV. MEDIA

Official photographers only at the top of the meeting.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Talking Points
Tab 2 - Biographic sketches

TALKING POINTS

U.S. Investments

- Congratulations on GOL's agreement with Williams as strategic investor in the Lithuanian energy sector, and with Pennox on investment in Klaipeda steel industry.
- Know how controversial Williams deal became in Lithuania. Fully appreciate GOL's political willpower. Will continue to support Williams in dealing with Lukoil, Russia, and IFIs.
- These investments are good for Lithuania and its security, good for us, and contribute to regional prosperity and integration. Builds closer bilateral economic ties, facilitates transfer of the latest energy technology to Lithuania, strengthens Lithuania's energy independence and financial standing.

EU relations and Ignalina

- Congratulations on beginning accession talks with EU; hope Lithuania concludes WTO negotiations this year.
- Appreciate resolve to close Ignalina One reactor by 2005, which should facilitate accession talks with EU. What is EU doing to help? Will work with DOE Secretary Richardson (just returned from Vilnius energy conference) on what we can do.

NATO enlargement and MAP

- Admire Lithuania's spending resources on defense, and abiding by determination to reach 2% of GDP by 2002. May be difficult; every incremental increase counts.
- Very impressed by Lithuania's political commitment and defense planning and capabilities. Lithuania serious about preparing for NATO membership, and is on right track for 2002. Can't backtrack on commitments when you've come this far.
- Continue to use your well-written and comprehensive Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare for NATO membership. Encourage more realistic focus on national defense requirements (e.g. force sustainability, equipment upgrades, conscription).
- Will continue to endorse publicly a vigorous, merit-based "Round 2" for NATO enlargement in 2002, open to all aspirants regardless of potential Russian opposition.

- Unlikely any new Administration will reverse Open Door policy, but Lithuania must be realistic about further expectations before respective fall elections.

Russian relations

- Great work on cultivating excellent relations with Russia and on Kaliningrad assistance, especially during GOL's chairing of CBSS. This increases regional stability.
- USG funding several GOL initiatives under NEI (e.g., business/public administration training, AIDS education). GOL funding for treatment of Russian casualties in Chechnya **smart** political move for several reasons.
- Your views on Russian elections, Baltic policy? Welcome Russian Amb. Zubakov's statements that NATO accession is internal Lithuanian policy. Moscow has no veto over Lithuanian accession to CFE or NATO.

War Crimes/Holocaust Issues

- Perception of Lithuania as democracy and NATO candidate will be affected in part by how Lithuania deals with past, prosecutes Nazi war criminals. MAP also includes social issues (addressing war crimes legacy).
- President Adamkus' historical commission to examine war crimes legacy goes long way towards helping heal old wounds. Please work with Vad Yashem, others to ensure it functions effectively and gains full support of Israel and American Jewish lobbies. What is its status?
- Recognize that GOL is doing what it can to bring accused Nazi war criminals to justice, but disappointed that none yet have been brought to trial. Congratulations on passing legislation enabling accused war criminals to be tried in absentia. Hope that GOL soon will be able to prosecute a case fully.

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- 5 -

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EUR/RUS:KSheehan
EUR/RPM:JLNovak
P:SNWhite
PA/PRS:JReside

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Baltic Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals

The U. S. and Russia agree that all countries must vigorously prosecute Nazi war criminals among their citizens regardless of ideology. We have firmly and consistently demanded the prosecution of all kinds of war criminals. The U. S. has repeatedly reminded Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia that the success of their efforts in prosecuting Nazi war criminals will affect their relations with us and the rest of the world.

The Baltic countries are making progress in prosecuting Nazi war criminals. Lithuania has indicted two Nazi war criminals and has gone to extraordinary lengths to overcome judicial hurdles to ongoing prosecutions by enacting legislation that will allow *in absentia* trials.

You raised the case of Vassily Kononov, a Latvian citizen who was recently tried and convicted, according to international norms, of war crimes. We understand that he was found guilty of killing civilians and sentenced to six years imprisonment. The sentence has not been carried out because Mr. Kononov has filed an appeal. The Latvian Government has stated that Mr. Kononov was brought to trial because of war crimes, not anti-fascist activities. We understand that you have raised this case with the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna and requested that the resident OSCE Mission in Riga monitor the case. While the current resident OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia will continue to monitor the Latvian and Estonian Government's implementation of OSCE-consistent legislation and their treatment of resident non-citizens, the United States consequently does not support an expansion of the current mandate.

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Finally, we note that U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos, a Holocaust survivor, visited all three countries in January to promote Holocaust education and to demand more attention to the prosecution of Nazi war crimes. U.S. Administration officials make the same points regularly to their Baltic counterparts and insist that the Governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia cannot "play favorites" with regards to the execution of international justice against war criminals without risking their status as respected members of the transatlantic community.

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Cleared: EUR:DEGraze - OK
EUR/RPM:AFeatherstone
OK DRL/BA:TJResler
OK EUR/RUS:DRussell
S/NIS:JBeyrle

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 001. paper | Re: [Latvian-Russian Border Agreement] (2 pages) | n.d. | P1/b(1) VZ |
| 002. report | Re: [Latvian politics] (2 pages) | 02/18/2000 | P1/b(1) |
| 003. email | White House Situation Room to Steven Black, et al., re: [Latvia in Politics] (5 pages) | 01/27/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia [3]

2011-1037-F
ke2190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Non Paper
On The Current Status With Regard To The Latvian - Russian Border Agreement

Negotiations on the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on the State Border started in the early 90-ties. The formation of the Latvian and Russian border commissions started in 1995 and was completed in 1996. The first meeting of the border commissions took place on April 18-19, 1996.

During the entire process of the negotiations Latvian side showed pragmatism and willingness to develop good neighbouring relations with the Russian Federation. Latvia demonstrated its readiness to compromise by accepting the demand of the Russian side not to make a reference to the 1920 Peace Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the Soviet Russia. Such reference was intended to reaffirm the continuity of Latvia's statehood and was important because in the Riga Peace Agreement Russia renounced any claims to the Latvian territory and people.

Latvia made further concessions by agreeing to accept the administrative border between the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Latvia as the border between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation, giving up the territory of Abrene district (*Pitalovskiy Rayon*) which was Latvian territory until 1940.

The work of the border commissions was completed on October 30, 1997. The delegations met in Pskov and the heads of the delegations approved the border delimitation map and agreed on the text of the Draft Agreement on the State Border and its two appendixes (description of the border and delimitation map).

On December 9, 1997 the Government of Latvia examined the draft Agreement and gave its authorisation to sign it.

After that Latvia has repeatedly approached the Russian side and expressed its readiness to sign the Agreement. Unfortunately, the Russian side has not responded favourably to this request.

The Russian Federation has used the following arguments to explain its unwillingness to sign the Agreement:

1. The internal procedures to prepare for signing are complex and would take a long time.
2. The Latvian - Russian relations should be viewed in their entirety. The signing of the border agreement is not possible without substantial improvement of Latvia's compliance with international human and minority rights' standards.
3. The State Duma, is dominated by leftist forces and would not ratify the agreement.

Latvia does not consider these arguments as valid ones. The complexity of internal procedures can not be used as an excuse for not signing an agreement. The procedures have not prevented Russia from entering into hundreds if not thousands of international agreements.

In Latvia's view the signing of border agreement must not be linked to any other issue. Latvia's compliance with the international human and minority rights standards has been recognised by the organisations authorised to monitor their observance. Even if the Russian Federation maintains its position, to which Latvia does not agree, it can not be an obstacle for signing the agreement.

Eventual difficulties with the ratification, even if they existed, should not be an obstacle to sign the agreement. Moreover, after December 1999 elections the composition of the State Duma has changed and at present a significant number of the MPs support the Government. That allows the Russian Federation to demonstrate its genuine will to develop a constructive dialogue with Latvia and to sign the Agreement on the State Border.

Despite the fact that the Agreement on the State Border is not signed in practice both sides have accepted the borderline as defined in the draft. The border crossing points and other installations are being developed accordingly.

Latvia

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2000 10:51 AM
To: Black, Steven K. (VP); Bolan, Christopher J. (VP); Brody, Richard J. (VP); Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE); Cables; Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE); Medish, Mark C. (RUE); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Tedstrom, John E. (RUE); Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIA IN POLITICS #33, JANUARY 10-23, 2000

ActionAddrees: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4508
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
DateTime: 271540Z JAN 00
Distribution: SIT: BLACK BOLAN BRODY BRZEZINSKI NSC DAVIDSON ELKIND MEDISH NORLAND
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 PRT: JACOBSON

Identifier: M4263755
InfoAddrees: RUCNNEI/NORTHERN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE COLLECTIVE
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1616
 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA 0339
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
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Line1: RAAUZYUW RUEHRAA0367 0271540-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000367

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA IN POLITICS #33, JANUARY 10-23, 2000

REF: RIGA 4173

SUMMARY

1. THE PREVIOUS TWO WEEKS SAW A FURTHER DETERIORATION OF LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE SAEIMA STATEMENT AND PRIME MINISTER SKELE'S REMARKS ON CHECHNYA, DENOUNCED THE CONVICTION OF THE RED PARTISAN, VASILY KONONOV, AND CONTINUED TO ATTACK LATVIA'S NEW LANGUAGE LAW. IN DOMESTIC POLITICS, THE NATIONALIST "FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM" PARTY ACCUSED ITS SENIOR RULING COALITION

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PARTNER, "THE PEOPLE'S PARTY," OF CONDUCTING SECRET TALKS WITH THE OPPOSITION TO SEEK A NEW COALITION. ON THE BRIGHTER SIDE, PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKI-FREIBERGA APPOINTED MFA'S UNDERSECRETARY AIVIS RONIS AS LATVIA'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. DESPITE OPPOSITION FROM THE SAEIMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. END SUMMARY.

RUSSIA CONDEMNS LATVIAN STANCE ON CHECHNYA

2. HOPES OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SUFFERED ANOTHER SETBACK AS BOTH PRIME MINISTER ANDRIS SKELE AND THE SAEIMA ANGERED MOSCOW BY MAKING PRONOUNCEMENTS ON RUSSIA'S MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN CHECHNYA. IN A TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE JANUARY 13, SKELE REMARKED THAT RUSSIA'S DECISION NOT TO ALLOW MEN AGED FROM TEN TO SIXTY TO PASS THROUGH THE CHECKPOINTS ON THE CHECHEN BORDER AMOUNTED TO "STARK GENOCIDE." THIS STATEMENT PROVOKED IMMEDIATE BACKLASH FROM MOSCOW. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ANNOUNCED THAT IT VIEWED SKELE'S REMARKS AS AN "ATTEMPT TO DISTORT THE FACTS AND TO JUSTIFY CHECHEN TERRORISTS." THE RUSSIAN STATEMENT WARNED THAT "LATVIA'S EFFORTS TO BUILD RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THE BASIS OF SUCH PRONOUNCEMENTS ARE UNPRODUCTIVE." SKELE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE "SEPARATION OF TEN-YEAR-OLD BOYS FROM THEIR MOTHERS" COULD NOT BE CALLED OTHER THAN GENOCIDE BUT EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT RUSSIA HAD LIFTED ITS BAN ON CHECHEN MEN TO CROSS THE BORDER.

3. AFTER MANY WEEKS OF LINGERING THE SAEIMA FINALLY ADOPTED A STATEMENT JANUARY 20 URGING RUSSIA TO HALT ITS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN CHECHNYA AND TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT "RESPECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION RIGHTS OF PEOPLES." AS EXPECTED, THE RUSSIAN REACTION TO THE SAEIMA STATEMENT WAS ONE OF CONDEMNATION. A FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN IN MOSCOW STATED THAT RUSSIA "CANNOT HOLD TALKS WITH TERRORISTS AT WHOSE HANDS THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS ARE DYING" AND THAT IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE POSITION OF THE LATVIAN LEGISLATORS WAS NOTHING BUT "DIRECT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS AND SEPARATISTS." MARIS RIEKSTINS, STATE SECRETARY OF THE LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, SAID RUSSIA HAD EITHER MISUNDERSTOOD THE STATEMENT OR DELIBERATELY DISTORTED THE LATVIAN POSITION. AIVARS GROZA, PRIME MINISTER SKELE'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR, EXPLAINED THAT THE SAEIMA DID NOT QUESTION RUSSIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BUT THAT IT HAD JUST EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN OVER THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN THE REGION. (COMMENT: THE WORDING OF THE SAEIMA STATEMENT WAS NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING LATVIA'S BALTIC NEIGHBORS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SAID ABOUT THE CONFLICT. RUSSIA'S HARSH REACTION TO IT SUGGESTS THAT MOSCOW'S SENSITIVITY TO ANY PRONOUNCEMENTS FROM RIGA REMAINS HEIGHTENED. END COMMENT.)

RED PARTISAN CONVICTED TO SIX-YEAR JAIL TERM

4. ON JANUARY 21, THE RIGA REGIONAL COURT FOUND A FORMER SOVIET PARTISAN, VASILY KONONOV, GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES AND SENTENCED HIM TO A SIX-YEAR IMPRISONMENT. KONONOV WAS ACCUSED OF MURDERING NINE CIVILIANS IN AN EASTERN LATVIAN VILLAGE DURING THE WAR. ACCORDING TO THE COURT, A GROUP OF EIGHTEEN RED PARTISANS CLAD IN GERMAN UNIFORMS AND LED BY KONONOV HAD RAIDED THE VILLAGE OF MAZIE BATI ON THE EVENING OF MAY 27, 1944, KILLING OR BURNING ALIVE NINE

CIVILIANS, INCLUDING A WOMAN WHO WAS NINE MONTHS PREGNANT. THE PROSECUTION BASED THE CONVICTION ON EYEWITNESSES' ACCOUNTS, SOVIET ERA ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS, AND MEMOIRS OF FORMER RED PARTISANS. KONONOV UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 RIGA 000367

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PLEADED NOT GUILTY, AND HIS LAWYER HAS ALREADY APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT AGAINST THE SENTENCE. A FEW DOZEN SUPPORTERS OF KONONOV, MAINLY ELDERLY RUSSIANS AND SEVERAL YOUTHS OF THE "NATIONAL BOLSHEVIK PARTY," LISTENED TO THE VERDICT AND AFTERWARDS CHANTED "DEATH TO THE COURT" AND "DEATH TO THE FASCISTS." KONONOV BECAME THE FIRST PERSON IN INDEPENDENT LATVIA CONVICTED OF WAR CRIMES; TWO PREVIOUS VERDICTS HANDED DOWN TO ALFONS NOVIKS AND MIKHAIL FARBTUKH WERE FOR GENOCIDE AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF LATVIA. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE CONVICTION OF VASILY KONONOV PROVOKED IMMEDIATE CONDEMNATION FROM RUSSIA WHICH EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT KONONOV'S PROSECUTION TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF LATVIA'S "RELUCTANCE" TO TRY THE LATVIAN-BORN SUSPECTED NAZI WAR CRIMINAL, KONRADS KALEJS.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY BLASTS LATVIA'S LANGUAGE LAW

5. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS ISSUED AN OFFICIAL "COMMENTARY" ON LATVIA'S LANGUAGE LAW ADOPTED BY THE SAEIMA LAST DECEMBER. ALTHOUGH THE LAW HAD PASSED MUSTER WITH THE OSCE AND THE EU, THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY MAINTAINS THAT IT VIOLATES SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND IS DISCRIMINATORY TOWARDS NON-LATVIANS. THE RUSSIAN MFA DOCUMENT CONTAINS NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL LAWS, CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS WHICH THE LAW SUPPOSEDLY CONTRADICTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMENTARY STRESSES THAT THE LANGUAGE LAW LIMITS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN CULTURE AND LANGUAGE AND HAS AN EXPLICIT ASSIMILATORY CHARACTER. ALSO, THE COMMENTARY DENOUNCES THE NORM WHICH DECARES ALL LANGUAGES, EXCEPT LATVIAN AND LIV (THE TONGUE OF AN INDIGENOUS FINNO-UGRIC PEOPLE BARELY SPOKEN ANYMORE), AS FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING RUSSIAN. (COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMENTARY WAS TO SUBSTANTIATE MOSCOW'S OBJECTIONS TO LATVIA'S LANGUAGE LAW AFTER THE INITIAL HIGHLY RHETORICAL STATEMENT IN DECEMBER (REFTEL. RUSSIA IS UNLIKELY EVER TO RECONCILE ITSELF TO THE FACT THAT RUSSIAN, BEING THE NATIVE TONGUE OF ALMOST 40 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN LATVIA, IS LEGALLY A FOREIGN LANGUAGE HERE. END COMMENT.)

COALITION PARTIES SQUABBLE OVER TALKS WITH OPPOSITION

6. THE RECENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER ANDRIS SKELIS AND LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION "FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN A UNITED LATVIA" PARLIAMENTARY FACTION HAVE PROMPTED FRESH SPECULATION ABOUT THE RULING COALITION'S STABILITY. ON JANUARY 21, MEMBERS OF THE "FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM" PARTY CALLED A SPECIAL PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH THEY ACCUSED THE "PEOPLE'S PARTY," A SENIOR COALITION PARTNER, OF CONDUCTING CLANDESTINE MEETINGS WITH THE OPPOSITION WITH THE INTENTION OF FORMING A NEW

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GOVERNMENT. "FATHERLAND" WAS PARTICULARLY OUTRAGED THAT SKELE TALKED WITH THE PRO-MOSCOW "HUMAN RIGHTS" FACTION. THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS "PEOPLE'S PARTY" REJECTED "FATHERLAND'S" ACCUSATIONS AS UNFOUNDED SAYING THAT THEY ARE TALKING WITH ALL OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING THEIR IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS. DESPITE THE DISAGREEMENT WITH "FATHERLAND," SKELE REITERATED HIS EARLIER POSITION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S STABILITY IS NOT IN JEOPARDY. "FATHERLAND'S" LEADERS WERE LESS OPTIMISTIC BUT THEY NEVERTHELESS STATED THAT THE CURRENT CENTER-RIGHT COALITION WAS THE BEST IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO TOPPLE IT. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE SKELE GOVERNMENT LOOKS STRONG NOW, THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE COMING MONTHS. THE "PEOPLE'S PARTY" AND "FATHERLAND" ARE LIKELY TO LOCK HORNS OVER SUCH ISSUES AS THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE ENERGY CONCERN "LATVENERGO" AND OVER WHO SHOULD LEAD THE PRIVATIZATION AGENCY WHEN ITS CURRENT DIRECTOR JANIS NAGLIS LEAVES HIS POST IN THE SPRING. WITH THAT IN VIEW, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE "PEOPLE'S PARTY" HAS BEGUN TESTING THE WATERS FOR A NEW COALITION ARRANGEMENT WITHOUT "FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM." END COMMENT.)

PRESIDENT APPOINTS RONIS AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.

7. ON JANUARY 17, PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKE-FREIBERGA APPOINTED MFA'S UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE AIVIS RONIS AS LATVIA'S AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. DESPITE OPPOSITION FROM THE SAEIMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. ALTHOUGH THE UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 RIGA 000367

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COMMITTEE'S VOTE IS ONLY ADVISORY, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME A NOMINEE FOR AMBASSADORSHIP DID NOT WIN ITS SUPPORT -- THE VOTE ON RONIS SPLIT 4-4. THE OPPOSITION "SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC" AND "HUMAN RIGHTS IN A UNITED LATVIA" FACTIONS JOINED HANDS WITH "FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM" TO OPPOSE RONIS' APPOINTMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF HIS "YOUTH AND INEXPERIENCE." COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN GUNTARS KRASTS WARNED THAT RONIS' CONFIRMATION COULD COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

8. AIVIS RONIS, 31, HAS BEEN WORKING IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SINCE 1991. HE HAS SERVED AS THE FIRST SECRETARY IN THE LATVIAN EMBASSY IN STOCKHOLM, AND IN 1999 WAS APPOINTED AS THE NON-RESIDENT AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY. RONIS HOLDS A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY. FOREIGN MINISTER INDULIS BERZINS AND FORMER LATVIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. OJARS KALNINS HAVE BOTH DESCRIBED RONIS AS AN EXPERIENCED AND TALENTED DIPLOMAT.

QUOTES

9. "IF HE WAS SO INNOCENT, HE WOULD NOT BE TRAVELING AROUND THE WORLD BUT WOULD BE SPENDING HIS OLD AGE IN A QUIET AUSTRALIAN SUBURB," SAID LATVIAN PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKE-FREIBERGA ABOUT THE ALLEGED NAZI WAR CRIMINAL, 86-YEAR-OLD KONRADS KALEJS.

10. "AMERICA IS TOO BIG A COUNTRY TO SEND A ROOKIE

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THERE. IF THIS HAPPENS, RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WILL NOT
WORSEN BUT OUR EMBASSY THERE WILL BECOME IMPOTENT,"
PREDICTED JANIS JURKANS, LEADER OF THE PRO-MOSCOW "HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A UNITED LATVIA" PARLIAMENTARY FACTION,
SPEAKING AGAINST THE NOMINATION OF AIVIS RONIS AS
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
HOLMES

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| 001. email | White House Situation Room to Steven Black, et al., re: [Latvian-Russian Relations] (7 pages) | 12/17/1999 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. email | White House Situation Room to Antony Blinken, et al., re: [Latvia Politics] (4 pages) | 12/14/1999 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. email | White House Situation Room to Antony Blinken, et al., re: Latvian Historical Commission and Yad Vashem (3 pages) | 11/23/1999 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. email | Stephen Flanagan to Richard Norland and Antony Blinken, re: It's UNGA time again! Call for bilat suggestions! (1 page) | 08/27/1999 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005a. paper | Latvia: Internal Overview (1 page) | ea-09/1999 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005b. paper | Latvia: External Overview (1 page) | ea-09/1999 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
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Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Friday, December 17, 1999 10:32 PM
To: Black, Steven K. (VP); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Brody, Richard J. (VP); Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE); Cables; Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Dunn, John A. (RUE/INTERN); Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE); Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN); Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR); Kaufman, Stuart J. (RUE); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Pascual, Carlos E. (RUE); Tedstrom, John E. (RUE); vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE); Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS STILL DIFFICULT

ActionAddrees: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4362
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DateTime: 171551Z DEC 99
Distribution: SIT: BLACK BLINKEN BRODY BRZEZINSKI Nsc DAVIDSON DUNN ELKIND Jacobson KASS KAUFMAN NORLAND PASCUAL TEDSTROM VONLIPSEY WEISS YEE
Identifier: M4208545
InfoAddrees: RUCNNEI/NORTHERN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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SUBJECT: LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS STILL DIFFICULT

REFS: A) RIGA 4074, B) RIGA 2362 C) RIGA 0102

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES H. HOLMES FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

1. (S) LATVIAN OFFICIALS TELL US THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CONTINUING TENSIONS IN LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. DESPITE SEVERAL POLITICALLY DIFFICULT AND SIGNIFICANT STEPS TAKEN BY LATVIA TO EASE THESE TENSIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE 1998 CITIZENSHIP REFERENDUM, THE 1999 SOCIAL INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK, AND PASSAGE OF AN OSCE-COMPLIANT LANGUAGE LAW IN DECEMBER 1999), RUSSIA HAS MAINTAINED TENSION-ELEVATING MEASURES VIRTUALLY NON-STOP FOR THE PAST TWENTY-ONE MONTHS. MOST RECENTLY, THE ISSUE HAS BEEN RUSSIA'S HARSH CONDEMNATION OF LATVIA'S REVISED LANGUAGE LAW, WHILE LAST MONTH THE ISSUE WAS THE RUSSIAN DUMA'S SANCTIONS BILL AGAINST LATVIA. WHILE OFFICIALS HERE ATTRIBUTE MUCH OF THIS "LATVIA BASHING" TO PRE-ELECTION POSTURING, THEY WORRY THAT CONTINUED HOSTILE RELATIONS WILL UNDERMINE REGIONAL COOPERATION EFFORTS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN ACCURATE INFORMATION AND DATA, THE EMBASSY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO PROVIDE DETAILS ABOUT ONGOING RUSSIAN ECONOMIC MEASURES AND BARRIERS TO TRADE THAT HAVE

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TARGETED LATVIA. A SENIOR OFFICIAL ASSERTED THAT WHILE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS HAVE HURT LATVIAN BUSINESSES, OF GREATER CONCERN TO LATVIA IS THE NEARLY TOTAL LACK OF PROGRESS SINCE MARCH 1998 IN NORMALIZING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. EMBASSY COMMENT BEGINS AT PARA 22. END SUMMARY.

RUSSIAN IRE WITH LATVIA'S LANGUAGE LAW

2. (S) LONGSTANDING RUSSIAN DISPLEASURE WITH THE DISADVANTAGED STATUS OF LATVIA'S LARGE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING NON-CITIZEN MINORITY (APPROXIMATELY 550,000) HAS FOCUSED FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS ON THE REVISED LANGUAGE LAW, FINALLY PASSED BY THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT ON DECEMBER 9 (REF A). THE LATVIAN PRESS HAS REPORTED ON RUSSIAN DEMARCHES TO THE EU, THE OSCE, AND THE U.S., DESCRIBING THE LAW AS "FUNDAMENTALLY DISCRIMINATORY" AND THE REVISIONS AS "INADEQUATE." RUSSIA'S CALL FOR THE EU TO RECONSIDER, IN LIGHT OF THE NEWLY PASSED LANGUAGE LAW, THE INVITATION TO LATVIA TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS, DREW A SUMMONS FOR THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR FROM THE LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. SENIOR LATVIAN OFFICIALS ALSO REBUKED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PROVOCATIVE REFERENCES TO LATVIAN "HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS" AND ITS PREDICTIONS OF A "HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE" FOR THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY. FOREIGN MINISTER BERZINS CHARACTERIZED RUSSIAN STATEMENTS ON THE LANGUAGE LAW AS INTERFERENCE IN LATVIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND AS AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL IMPROVEMENT IN LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

THE DUMA SANCTIONS BILL: ANOTHER "NEGATIVE MOMENT" IN LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

3. (U) IN LATE NOVEMBER, THE FOCUS OF BILATERAL TENSIONS WAS THE RUSSIAN DUMA'S DECISION TO PASS A DRAFT SANCTIONS LAW TARGETED AGAINST LATVIA. THE LATVIAN PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER AND ECONOMIC MINISTER CRITICIZED THE ACTION AS FOSTERING HOSTILE RELATIONS WITH A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY, AND AS ULTIMATELY SELF-DEFEATING, AS THE SANCTIONS WOULD ALSO HURT RUSSIANS DOING BUSINESS IN LATVIA AND RUSSIAN-SPEAKING NON-CITIZENS IN LATVIA WHO WORK IN THE TRANSIT TRADE SECTOR. THE THREE SENIOR OFFICIALS ATTRIBUTED THE DUMA BILL'S PASSAGE TO PRE-ELECTION POSTURING, AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT APPROVE THE LAW.

4. (S) IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBASSY OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS CHARACTERIZED THE DUMA SANCTIONS BILL AS ANOTHER UNWELCOME REMINDER OF RUSSIA'S CONTINUING HOSTILITY TOWARDS LATVIA. THE MFA OFFICIALS COMPLAINED THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS REMAINED UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE EVEN AT THE WORKING LEVEL, AS EVIDENCED BY ITS REFUSAL TO RESTART THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION PROCESS (REF B). SIX BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SPHERES, THEY SAID, HAVE LONG BEEN LANGUISHING, AWAITING REENGAGEMENT FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE UNSIGNED AND UNRATIFIED BORDER AGREEMENT.

A LAUNDRY LIST OF ECONOMIC "SANCTIONS"

5. (S) IN HOPES OF REPLACING ANECDOTES WITH CASE STUDIES AND RUMOR WITH STATISTICS, EMBASSY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO PREPARE AN OVERVIEW OF LATVIAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WE RECEIVED A NINE-PAGE PAPER EXPLAINING THE DYNAMICS OF THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP AND HIGHLIGHTING THE "POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS" THAT RUSSIA HAS TARGETED AGAINST LATVIA IN THE AREAS OF BANKING, TRANSIT TRADE, AND CUSTOMS. THE PAPER (FAXED TO EUR/NB) SHOWS THAT WHILE LATVIA'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS HAVE SHIFTED DRAMATICALLY FROM RUSSIA AND THE NIS TO THE EU, RUSSIA STILL OCCUPIES A DOMINANT POSITION IN LATVIA'S TRANSIT TRADE SECTOR, WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT 15% OF GDP. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE FALLOFF IN TRANSIT TRADE, THE PAPER ARGUES THAT RUSSIAN "DISCRIMINATORY" TRADE MEASURES HAVE EXACERBATED ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR LATVIAN BUSINESSES IN PARTICULAR.

6. (U) THE FOLLOWING (PARAS 7-21) SUMMARIZES THE MFA'S PRESENTATION OF RUSSIAN "DISCRIMINATORY" REGULATIONS AND OTHER TRADE MEASURES THAT HAVE HURT THE LATVIAN ECONOMY. WHERE RELEVANT, PERSPECTIVES FROM LOCAL COMMERCIAL SOURCES HAVE BEEN ADDED.

BANKING

7. (SBU) UNRESTRICTED LATVIAN BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN OFFERING CREDITS IN RUSSIA, AND DENY RUSSIAN CREDIT INSTITUTIONS PERMISSION TO OPEN BRANCH OFFICES IN LATVIA. THESE INSTRUCTIONS ALSO PROHIBIT LATVIAN COMPANIES FROM ACQUIRING SHARES IN RUSSIAN CREDIT INSTITUTIONS, AND REQUIRE RUSSIAN BANKS TO COVER ALL TRANSACTIONS WITH LATVIAN RESIDENTS WITH 100% RESERVES.

8. (SBU) MORE RECENTLY, IN THE SPRING OF 1999, THE RUSSIAN CENTRAL BANK ISSUED DIRECTIVES NUMBER 500-Y AND 600-Y, WHICH TIGHTEN CONTROLS OVER CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS AND REQUIRE COMPULSORY RESERVES FOR BANKS HAVING TRANSACTIONS WITH "OFF-SHORE" BANKS (A LIST OF WHICH INCLUDES LATVIAN BANKS). MOREOVER, IN A NUMBER OF CASES, LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN RUSSIA (CASES ARE CITED FROM MOSCOW, KURSK, AND BELGOROD) HAVE REPORTEDLY REFERRED TO THESE REGULATIONS, AS WELL AS TO THE DUMA'S DRAFT SANCTIONS LAW, AS A MEANS TO EVADE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OR THE ENFORCEMENT OF RUSSIAN COURT DECISIONS FAVORABLE TO THE LATVIAN BANKS.

9. (SBU) THE ASSOCIATION OF LATVIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS HAS SPECULATED THAT EACH NEW RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA HAS REDUCED THE LATVIAN BANKS' CLIENT BASE IN RUSSIA BY ABOUT 10%.

TRANSIT TRADE: RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION

10. (SBU) IN 1998 THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CANCELLED RAILWAY SHIPMENT DISCOUNTS ON CARGOES TRAVELLING TO AND FROM LATVIA, AN ACTION WHICH MADE TRANSPORT SERVICES OFFERED BY THE LATVIAN RAILWAYS MORE EXPENSIVE AND LESS COMPETITIVE. (THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THE LATVIAN RAILWAYS HAS SUFFERED THIS FATE. IN PREVIOUS YEARS THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TEMPORARILY REMOVED DISCOUNTS FOR CARGO BEING TRANSPORTED THROUGH LATVIA.) IN JULY 1999, RUSSIA ADOPTED THE SAME POLICY TOWARD ESTONIA AND FINLAND, BUT THE LATVIANS SAY THAT IN PRACTICE THE RUSSIANS HAVE CONTINUED TO APPLY DISCOUNTED TARIFFS FOR

THOSE COUNTRIES, UNLIKE FOR LATVIA.

11. (SBU) THE LATVIAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION PROVIDED EXAMPLES OF HOW RAILWAY TRANSIT COSTS FROM RUSSIA THROUGH LATVIA HAVE RISEN AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS OF DISCOUNTED TARIFFS. THESE INCLUDE: DIESEL FUEL (AN INCREASE OF BETWEEN 22% AND 39%, DEPENDING ON TOTAL KILOMETERS SHIPPED); STEEL (64%); MINERAL FERTILIZER, PHOSPHATE (10%); AND TIMBER/ROUND TREES (A RISE OF BETWEEN 39% AND 74% DEPENDING ON TOTAL KILOMETERS SHIPPED). THE MFA ESTIMATES THAT OVERALL THERE WAS AN 8% DROP IN RAIL CARGO TRANSITING LATVIA IN 1998 AND A FURTHER 15% DROP IN 1999. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THAT PART OF THIS FALLOFF IS DUE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN RUSSIA.

TRANSIT TRADE: ROAD TRANSPORTATION

12. (SBU) IN 1999, THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT REDUCED BY MORE THAN 75% THE NUMBER OF PERMITS AVAILABLE FOR LATVIAN CARGO TRANSPORTERS TO ENTER RUSSIA. ACCORDING TO LATVIAN GOVERNMENT DATA, THE RUSSIAN TRANSPORT MINISTRY IN 1998 ISSUED 30,000 UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTATION PERMITS TO LATVIAN TRUCKERS (ALLOWING SHIPMENT OF GOODS TO RUSSIA FROM LATVIA AND FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.) IN ADDITION, LATVIAN TRUCKERS WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN - THROUGH PURCHASE - AN ADDITIONAL 30,000 PERMITS. IN 1999, HOWEVER, THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY ISSUED ONLY 10,000 UNIVERSAL PERMITS, AND 3,500 BILATERAL PERMITS (DESIGNED FOR TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS ONLY FROM LATVIA.) MOREOVER, THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY FOR LATVIAN TRANSPORTERS TO BUY ADDITIONAL PERMITS. THE RUSSIAN MFA'S EXPLANATION FOR THIS DECISION WAS THAT RUSSIAN TRUCKERS WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY OBTAINING LATVIAN VISAS AND THAT THE RESTRICTIONS WERE NECESSARY TO RESTORE SOME PARITY IN THE NUMBER OF RUSSIAN AND LATVIAN TRUCKERS ENGAGED IN TRANSIT TRADE -- AN EXPLANATION WHICH THE LATVIANS REGARD AS OISINGENUOUS (SEE PARA 14 BELOW.)

13. (SBU) ACCORDING TO THE LATVIAN STATE ROAD DIRECTORATE, LATVIAN TRUCKERS CURRENTLY NEED SOME 50,000 PERMITS TO ACCOMMODATE ANTICIPATED TRANSIT TRADE VOLUMES TO RUSSIA, FAR ABOVE THE 10,000 NOW OFFICIALLY AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE LATVIANS SAY THE 3,500 BILATERAL PERMITS ARE OF LITTLE USE, SINCE TRANSIT TRADE INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRIES COMPRISES THE VAST BULK OF GOODS SHIPPED BETWEEN LATVIA AND RUSSIA.

14. (SBU) LATVIAN OFFICIALS DISCOUNT THE RUSSIAN ARGUMENT ABOUT LACK OF PARITY IN ROADWAY TRANSIT TRADE, SAYING THAT FAR MORE LATVIANS THAN RUSSIANS ARE ACTIVE IN THE TRUCKING BUSINESS. NEVERTHELESS, LATVIA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO EASE VISA ISSUANCE FOR RUSSIAN TRUCKERS: VISAS CAN NOW BE OBTAINED AT THE BORDER FREE OF CHARGE. NEVERTHELESS, THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS NOT RECIPROCATED WITH GREATER NUMBERS OF TRANSPORT PERMITS FOR LATVIAN DRIVERS.

TRANSIT TRADE: POULTRY BUSINESS

15. (SBU) IN AUGUST 1999, THE RUSSIAN STATE CUSTOMS COMMITTEE ISSUED INSTRUCTION 531 WHICH STIPULATES THAT IMPORTS OF POULTRY AND POULTRY PRODUCTS FROM COUNTRIES NOT HAVING LAND BORDERS WITH RUSSIA MUST PASS THROUGH SPECIFIED RUSSIAN PORTS. TO DATE, THIS DECREE HAS BEEN SPORADICALLY IMPLEMENTED AND THE RUSSIAN CUSTOMS HAS RECENTLY POSTPONED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER UNTIL JANUARY 1, 2000. WHILE NOT SPECIFICALLY TARGETED AGAINST

LATVIA, THE IMPACT OF THE CUSTOMS INSTRUCTION, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECT THE U.S., LATVIA AND ESTONIA, AS INCREASINGLY GREATER VOLUMES OF U.S. COMMERCIAL CHICKEN EXPORTS TO RUSSIA HAVE BEEN SHIPPED VIA BALTIC PORTS SINCE THE DEVALUATION OF THE RUBLE IN AUGUST 1998. THE LATVIAN SANITARY BORDER CONTROL INSPECTION ESTIMATES THAT 215,000 TONS OF U.S. POULTRY PRODUCTS TRANSITED LATVIAN PORTS IN THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF 1999. SOME U.S. POULTRY INDUSTRY SOURCES SAY THE TOTAL VOLUME OF U.S. CHICKEN TRANSPORTED THROUGH LATVIAN PORTS IN 1999 IS CLOSE TO 300,000 TONS.

16. (SBU) WHILE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN CUSTOMS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN POSTPONED TWICE, THE EFFECT OF THE ORDER HAS BEEN A TEMPORARY DISRUPTION OF TRADE FLOWS. EXPEDITERS IN THE PORT OF RIGA SAY SHIPMENTS OF U.S. POULTRY SLUMPED DRAMATICALLY IN NOVEMBER, AND QUANTITIES OF CHICKEN WERE SHIPPED TO RUSSIA THROUGH "GRAY" CUSTOMS CHECKPOINTS, OR THROUGH NEW TRADE ROUTES, INCLUDING, ACCORDING TO UNOFFICIAL REPORTS, THE PORT OF POTI ON THE BLACK SEA IN GEORGIA. A REPRESENTATIVE OF A MAJOR U.S. SHIPPING COMPANY TOLD US, HOWEVER, THAT SHIPMENTS OF U.S. POULTRY THROUGH RIGA PORT ARE BEGINNING TO PICK UP AGAIN. HE SAYS THE MARKET IS COUNTING ON ANOTHER DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER AND IS RISKING PRODUCT IN THE PIPELINE THROUGH LATVIA IN ORDER TO AVOID THE HIGHER COSTS AND GREATER INCONVENIENCES OF SHIPPING THROUGH THE PORT OF ST. PETERSBURG.

17. (SBU) THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN CUSTOMS INSTRUCTION ON LATVIAN ENTERPRISES HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT. ONE LARGE FIRM, THE RIGA SHIPPING AGENCY, THAT HAS SERVICED OVER 90% OF THE FLOW OF U.S. POULTRY PRODUCTS (SHIP FREIGHTING, EXPEDITING, LOGISTICS) TEMPORARILY SAW ITS BUSINESS FALL TO NEARLY NOTHING. THE NEW COLD STORAGE WAREHOUSE AT THE RIGA COMMERCIAL PORT THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED ESPECIALLY TO HANDLE THE U.S. POULTRY TRADE HAS RECENTLY BEEN OPERATING AT ONLY 10% OF CAPACITY AND HAD TO LAY OFF WORKERS. OTHER AFFECTED BUSINESSES ARE THE LATVIAN RAILWAY AND INDIVIDUAL TRUCKING COMPANIES THAT REPORTEDLY EARNED PROFITS OF BETWEEN \$10-\$20 PER TON OF POULTRY SHIPPED.

CUSTOMS RESTRICTIONS

18. (SBU) IN DECEMBER 1998, THE RUSSIAN STATE CUSTOMS COMMITTEE ISSUED AN INSTRUCTION (NUMBER 01-15/27126 OF 12/23/98) ESTABLISHING A RESTRICTIVE REGIME OF CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AIMED AT BUSINESS WITH LATVIA. UNDER THIS REGULATION, THE RUSSIAN CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO UNDERTAKE THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF CARGOES FROM LATVIA, TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT DELAYED TAX PAYMENTS FOR LATVIAN GOODS, AND TO VERIFY THAT THE RECEIVER OF THE LATVIAN GOODS IS REGISTERED BY THE RUSSIAN TAX AUTHORITIES. WHILE NONE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE OBJECTIONABLE IN AND OF THEMSELVES, BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES IN THE TRANSIT TRADE HERE TELL US THAT THE DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF CUSTOMS REQUIREMENTS AGAINST LATVIA PROVIDES THE RUSSIAN CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO DELAY LATVIAN SHIPMENTS AND DEMAND BRIBES.

OIL TRANSIT: POLITICS LURKS EVERYWHERE

19. (U) THE ECONOMICS - AND POLITICS - OF TRANSIT TRADE IN RUSSIAN OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS STILL LOOM LARGE IN THE

LATVIAN ECONOMY. OVERALL, RUSSIAN EXPORTS ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 80% OF TRANSIT TRADE VOLUMES THROUGH LATVIA (FOLLOWED BY BELARUS - 11%; LITHUANIA - 2%; AND KAZAKHSTAN - 2%). OF THE MAJOR GOODS IN TRANSIT FROM RUSSIA IN THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1999, CRUDE OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS PREDOMINATED (24.2 MILLION TONS, OR 57% OF TOTAL TRANSIT), FOLLOWED BY GENERAL CARGOES (INCLUDING CONTAINERS, RO-RO CARGOES, TIMBER, BLACK METALS -- 23% OF TOTAL TRANSIT) AND POTASSIUM (18% OF TOTAL TRANSIT.)

20. (S) THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFLICTING INFORMATION AND SPECULATION ABOUT THE REASONS FOR FLUCTUATING RUSSIAN OIL EXPORTS THROUGH LATVIA. THE LATVIAN PRESS FREQUENTLY QUOTES RUSSIAN OIL SECTOR SOURCES IN ALLEGING THAT MOSCOW IS REDUCING OIL EXPORTS THROUGH VENTSPILS IN RETALIATION FOR LATVIA'S POLICY TOWARD ITS RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY. OTHERS SEE POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS (INCLUDING A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO UNDERCUT LATVIA'S ECONOMY) IN RUSSIA'S PREFERENCE FOR BUILDING A NEW OIL EXPORT PIPELINE THROUGH

NORTHWEST RUSSIA RATHER THAN A SECOND BALTIC PIPELINE TO VENTSPILS' ICE-FREE PORT. IN MANY CASES, GENUINE RUSSIAN DOMESTIC ENERGY REQUIREMENTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS OR CONCERNS ABOUT HIGH LATVIAN PIPELINE TARIFFS ARE UNDERVALUED IN ASSESSMENTS OF RUSSIA'S OIL EXPORT POLICY.

21. (S) IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, THE ISSUE OF REDUCED RUSSIAN OIL EXPORTS HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE PRESS. RUSSIA'S TRANSNEFT SET REDUCED QUOTA LIMITS ON CRUDE OIL TRANSIT FOR THE THIRD QUARTER AND REPORTEDLY ESTABLISHED A QUOTA FOR THE FOURTH QUARTER THAT WOULD HAVE CUT CRUDE OIL EXPORTS THROUGH VENTSPILS BY ONE THIRD. REDUCTIONS IN EXPORT QUOTAS FOR RUSSIAN OIL PRODUCTS (ACCOUNTING FOR 24% OF ALL TRANSIT TRADE) HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE DRACONIAN. FLOWS OF OIL PRODUCTS THROUGH LATVIA IN OCTOBER 1999 WERE A MERE 50% OF THE VOLUMES TRANSPORTED IN OCTOBER 1998. AMID ACCUSATIONS OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL PRESSURE ON LATVIA, THE VENTSPILS PORT AND THE LATVIAN PIPELINE COMPANY DECIDED IN DECEMBER TO REDUCE THEIR TARIFFS EACH BY U.S. TWENTY CENTS PER TON TO ATTRACT GREATER VOLUMES OF RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL. THERE ARE NOW INDICATIONS THAT FOURTH QUARTER RUSSIAN OIL EXPORTS THROUGH VENTSPILS WILL INDEED EXCEED THE ESTABLISHED QUOTA. WHATEVER THE FINAL TALLY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS SECTOR TO THE LATVIAN ECONOMY -- AND THE STATE BUDGET -- MEANS THAT THIS ASPECT OF LATVIAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL REMAIN HIGHLY VISIBLE AND PRONE TO POLITICIZATION.

COMMENT

22. (S) OUR LATVIAN INTERLOCUTORS POINT WITH GREAT SATISFACTION TO LATVIA'S GROWING ATTACHMENT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION. THE EU HELSINKI SUMMIT INVITATION TO BEGIN ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN EARLY 2000 WAS MET WITH JOY. SUPPORT FROM THE OSCE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, AND THE USG FOR THE REVISED LATVIAN LANGUAGE LAW (PASSED BY THE PARLIAMENT ON DECEMBER 9) HAS BEEN BROADLY INTERPRETED AS A U.S. AND EUROPEAN-BACKED REPUDIATION OF RUSSIA'S STANCE ON THE LEGISLATION. IN THE AREA OF BILATERAL TRADE AS WELL, RUSSIA HAS DRAMATICALLY LOST ITS SIGNIFICANCE AS LATVIA'S PRIMARY TRADE PARTNER. LATVIAN EXPORTS TO RUSSIA IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1999, FOR EXAMPLE, ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY 6.9% OF ALL EXPORTS, DOWN FROM 15.9% IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1998.

23. (S) LATVIAN OFFICIALS CHARGE THAT RUSSIA HAS SINGLED OUT LATVIA IN THE APPLICATION OF DISCRIMINATORY TRADE

MEASURES IN ORDER TO PUNISH THIS BALTIC NATION FOR ALLEGED POLITICAL "TRANSGRESSIONS." THE DISPROPORTIONATE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THESE "UNOFFICIAL SANCTIONS" HAS FALLEN ON BUSINESSES IN THE TRANSIT TRADE SECTOR: PORT WORKERS, FREIGHT FORWARDERS, TRUCKERS, THE LATVIAN RAILWAYS, ETC. MFA OFFICIALS TELL US THEY INTEND TO RESPOND TO THIS DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA'S NEGOTIATIONS TO ENTER THE WTO.

24. (C) THE LATVIANS' CHIEF FRUSTRATION IS THAT RUSSIA IS USING TRADE SANCTIONS AS A POLITICAL LEVER, WHILE REFUSING TO OPEN THE CHANNELS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A RESOLUTION OF ITS CONCERNS. ACCORDING TO A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL, THE CONUNDRUM IS THAT RUSSIA'S CONTINUING HOSTILITY PRECLUDES LATVIA'S ATTEMPTS TO MAKE HEADWAY IN NORMALIZING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THEREBY TO RESPOND RATIONALLY TO RUSSIA'S GRIEVANCES. THE LATVIANS HOPE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE MAY IMPROVE AFTER THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS NEXT WEEK. OTHERWISE, SAID THE MFA OFFICIAL, THE DREAM OF THE EU'S NORTHERN DIMENSION AND THE USG'S NORTHERN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE TO FOSTER COOPERATION AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS ACROSS THE WHOLE REGION COULD BE STALEMATED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

25. (C) FINALLY, OUR POSITION SHOULD BE CLEAR ON TWO POINTS. FIRST, THERE IS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF "HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS" OR A "HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE" FOR THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY IN LATVIA AS ASSERTED BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. INDEED, THE LATVIANS HAVE TAKEN SUBSTANTIAL STEPS OVER THE PAST YEAR TO ADVANCE THE INTEGRATION OF ITS RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY: THE OCTOBER 1998 CITIZENSHIP REFERENDUM (WHICH ELIMINATED THE SO-CALLED "WINDOWS SYSTEM" THAT DELAYED OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATURALIZATION); THE 1999 SOCIAL INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK (THAT OUTLINES A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INCORPORATING NON-CITIZENS INTO THE LATVIAN MAINSTREAM); AND PASSAGE OF AN OSCE-COMPLIANT LANGUAGE LAW IN DECEMBER 1999.

26. (C) SECOND, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRUMBEAT OF ANTI-LATVIAN RHETORIC AND DISCRIMINATORY TRADE MEASURES COMING OUT OF MOSCOW WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY CORROSIVE TO RUSSIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS IF NOT CORRECTED IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. IT WOULD BE WELL TO INVEST SOME OF OUR EQUITIES (POSSIBLY THROUGH THE PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION PROCESS) IN GOOD OFFICES WORK ON BEHALF OF LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS OVER THE NEXT FIVE TO SIX MONTHS.
HOLMES

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 1999 10:45 AM
To: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIA'S PEDOPHILIA SCANDAL: ACCUSATIONS AND DENIALS FLY THICK AND FAST AROUND PRIME MINISTER SKELE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 141447Z DEC 99
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4340
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: IMMEDIATE
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TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, NATO, EU, RS, LG

SUBJECT: LATVIA'S PEDOPHILIA SCANDAL: ACCUSATIONS AND DENIALS FLY THICK AND FAST AROUND PRIME MINISTER SKELE

REFS: (A) RIGA 3966; (B) RIGA 3407; (C) RIGA 3007

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES H. HOLMES FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: SIMMERING ACCUSATIONS OF PEDOPHILIA AGAINST SENIOR LATVIAN OFFICIALS HAVE SURFACED IN A PUBLIC ROW BETWEEN SAEIMA DEPUTIES OVER PRIME MINISTER SKELE'S ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE SCANDAL. THE NAME-CALLING INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON NATIONAL TELEVISION ONE WEEK PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION REPORT ON THE SCANDAL, WHICH PURPORTEDLY WILL "NAME NAMES" OF SENIOR OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT. ALTHOUGH COMMISSION MEMBERS DENY THAT SKELE IS AMONG THOSE IMPLICATED IN THE REPORT, AIDES CLOSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER (AND TO PRESIDENT VIKE-FREIBERGA, WHOSE STAFF IS REPORTEDLY ALSO UNDER INVESTIGATION) HAVE PRIVATELY VOICED CONCERN TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE SCANDAL MIGHT RESULT IN A GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR AND POSSIBLY COST SKELE HIS JOB. NO SOLID EVIDENCE AGAINST SKELE (OR OTHER OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY UNDER INVESTIGATION, SUCH AS JUSTICE MINISTER BIRKAVS, DEFENSE MINISTER KRISTOVSKIS, OR PRESIDENTIAL AIDE BONDARS) HAS SURFACED. NEVERTHELESS, THE SCANDAL IS LIKELY TO EMBROIL LATVIA IN NASTY AND PROLONGED POLITICAL INFIGHTING, WHEN IT SHOULD INSTEAD BE BUILDING ON THE SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESSSES LAST WEEK AT THE EU SUMMIT, IN APPROVING IMPORTANT SOCIAL INTEGRATION PROGRAMS, AND IN PASSING THE LANGUAGE LAW. END SUMMARY.

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6/12/2023 VL

PEDOPHILIA SCANDAL GOES PUBLIC

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3. (U) IN THE DECEMBER 9 EDITION o.S<
~SD"PEOPLE'S PARTY" FACTION IN THE SAEIMA, TRADED
ACCUSATIONS OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S ALLEGED
INVOLVEMENT IN LATVIA'S SIMMERING PEDOPHILIA SCANDAL.
WITHOUT NAMING SKELE DIRECTLY, INKENS ASSERTED THAT A
"MALE MONICA LEWINSKY" HAD PROVIDED SEXUAL SERVICES TO
A "HIGH-RANKING STATE OFFICIAL" (READ: SKELE) SIX
YEARS AGO FOR A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY. INKENS
ALSO HINTED DARKLY, BUT WITHOUT FURTHER ELABORATION,
THAT OTHER WITNESSES ARE PREPARED TO COME FORWARD WITH
FURTHER TESTIMONY AGAINST THE "HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL."

4. (U) BERZINS RESPONDED THAT HE HAD EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING TAPED TRANSCRIPTS OF SECRET CONVERSATIONS,
WHICH PROVED THAT LATVIAN INDEPENDENT TELEVISION
(WHICH IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH INKENS) HAD SUBORNED
YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN TO GIVE FALSE TESTIMONY AGAINST
SKELE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS IN EXCHANGE FOR MONEY
AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. HE ALSO ACCUSED INKENS OF
WORKING WITH JANIS ADAMSONS, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION INVESTIGATING THE
PEDOPHILIA AFFAIR, TO PRODUCE A REPORT IN THE DECEMBER
16 SAEIMA SESSION DAMAGING TO SKELE. ADAMSONS
SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED PLOTTING WITH INKENS, AND ADDED
THAT SKELE'S NAME WAS NOT AMONG THOSE IN THE
COMMISSION'S REPORT. UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE EU
SUMMIT IN HELSINKI, SKELE HIMSELF DISMISSED INKENS'
ALLEGATIONS AS POLITICAL SMEAR-MONGERING ON THE PART
OF A LONGTIME OPPONENT.

PRIVATE WORRIES

5. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE THEIR PUBLIC BRAVADO, SKELE AND HIS
SUPPORTERS ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCANDAL FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND FOR THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF. ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN RECENT WEEKS, HE AND HIS AIDES
HAVE APPROACHED THE AMBASSADOR TO SIGNAL THEIR
CONCERN. FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE MAJOR
EXCHANGES:

-- ON NOVEMBER 27, AT THE "PEOPLE'S PARTY'S" ANNUAL
CONFERENCE, THE AMBASSADOR FOUND SKELE'S MANNER
DISTINCTLY AND UNCHARACTERISTICALLY SUBDUED. IN
ADDITION, SKELE MADE THE SURPRISING STATEMENT TO THE
AMBASSADOR THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT COALITION "IS
PROBABLY STRONG AND STABLE, BUT I'M NOT SO SURE ABOUT
MY GOVERNMENT." HE ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO JOIN HIM
IN A PRIVATE LUNCH ON DECEMBER 23 AND SAID THAT THERE
WAS A "TRUCE" ON MUD-SLINGING UNTIL AFTER THE EU
SUMMIT IN HELSINKI. SOON IN THE NEW YEAR, HOWEVER, HE
EXPECTED THAT HIS NAME WOULD BE DRAGGED THROUGH THE
LATVIAN MUD.

-- AT A DECEMBER 6 RECEPTION, SKELE'S FOREIGN POLICY
ADVISOR AIVARS GROZA ASKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR A
PRIVATE WORD. HE REPORTED THAT SKELE HAD DIRECTED HIM
TO FLAG FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION THAT THE MUD-
SLINGING WOULD LIKELY RESUME RIGHT AFTER HELSINKI WITH
THE RELEASE OF A POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED PARLIAMENTARY
COMMISSION REPORT ON PORNOGRAPHY. HE MAINTAINED THAT
THE COMMISSION HAD THE TESTIMONY OF "A YOUNG MAN FROM
DAUGAVPILS" TO THE EFFECT THAT "THE NAME OF ANDRIS
SKELE HAD BEEN HEARD BY HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THIS
PORNOGRAPHY." GROZA SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER
MIGHT THEREFORE WANT TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR EARLIER
THAN THE SCHEDULED DECEMBER 23 LUNCHEON TO SEEK

ADVICE.

-- ON TWO OCCASIONS IN PAST WEEKS, PRESIDENT VIKE-FREIBERGA EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION TO THE AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE PEDOPHILIA CASE. IN PARTICULAR, SHE HAD ASKED THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE TO BRIEF HER ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE, INCLUDING THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S PUBLIC COMMENT THAT SOME THREADS OF THE CASE LEAD BACK TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. (NOTE: THE CHIEF SUSPECT IS ALLEGEDLY MARTINS BONDARS, THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF. END NOTE.) THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, RATHER THAN COOPERATION, SHE RECEIVED A RESPONSE WHICH SHE CHARACTERIZED AS "ABSOLUTELY TYPICAL OF THE OLD SOVIET SYSTEM. IT WAS PURE SOVIET. AN ATTEMPT TO SIDELINE ME AND MY OFFICE. AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE SURE I ESTABLISH NO BASE OF AUTHORITY INDEPENDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT." VIKE-FREIBERGA NOTED THAT AFTER SEVERAL VERY HARSH EXCHANGES, SHE AND THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL HAD AGREED ON A MORATORIUM ON PUBLIC SNIPING -- BUT ADDED, "WE'LL SEE."

COMMENT

6. ~~(S)~~ SO FAR, NONE OF THE PARTIES IN THE DISPUTE HAS PRODUCED A SHRED OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS ALLEGATIONS. A WHISPERING CAMPAIGN ALLEGING THAT SKELE, JUSTICE MINISTER BIRKAVS, DEFENSE MINISTER KRISTOVSKIS, AND BONDARS HAVE VARIOUSLY ENGAGED IN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT WITH UNDERAGE BOYS AND GIRLS, AND IN BISEXUAL ACTIVITIES, HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR NEARLY TWO MONTHS, BUT TO DATE NEITHER THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE NOR THE SAEIMA COMMISSION HAS REVEALED THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE ALLEGATIONS ARE BASED NOR HAVE SKELE AND HIS SUPPORTERS PROVEN THEIR CONTENTION THAT THE ACCUSATIONS ARE THE RESULT OF A WIDESPREAD PLOT ON THE PART OF SKELE OPPONENTS LIKE INKENS AND ADAMSONS, ORCHESTRATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARCH-ENEMY, VENTSPILS MAYOR AIVARS LEMBERGS. UNTIL AND UNLESS HARD EVIDENCE EMERGES, IT IS NO MORE POSSIBLE TO ASSESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE ALLEGATIONS THAN A PLAYGROUND SCRAP OF THE "AM-NOT; ARE-TOO" VARIETY. (IT IS NOT LOST ON US, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE RUMORS ACCOUNT FOR "ONE EACH" FROM THE THREE-PARTY COALITION: SKELE, FROM "PEOPLE'S PARTY"; BIRKAVS, FROM "LATVIA'S WAY"; AND KRISTOVSKIS, FROM "FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM.")

7. ~~(S)~~ EVEN SO, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT ARE DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL REVERBERATIONS OF THE SCANDAL. WHETHER THAT CONCERN STEMS FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENCE THAT IS LIKELY TO EMERGE AS THE INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE, OR FROM THE FACT THAT SUCH SORDID ALLEGATIONS ARE INEVITABLY DAMAGING, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE TRUE, IS STILL UNCLEAR. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO SKELE (AND THE OTHER OFFICIALS INVOLVED) THAT THE USG WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SKELE AS THE DULY ELECTED LEADER OF LATVIA'S GOVERNMENT UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAVE ALSO ADVISED HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT CHARGES OF THIS NATURE, EVEN THOSE BASED ON THE MOST SHALLOW EVIDENCE, WILL BE CORROSIVE TO LATVIA'S NATIONAL REPUTATION AND SKELE'S GOOD NAME, INCLUDING IN THE U.S. FOR THAT REASON, WE HAVE ADDED, IF THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SOLID INFORMATION THAT HIS NAME WILL BE DRAWN INTO THIS QUAGMIRE, AND HIS CONDUCT AND CONSCIENCE ARE CLEAR, HE SHOULD GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE PENDING BAD PRESS.

8. ~~(S)~~ WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THIS AFFAIR, IT IS SORDID AND MAY WELL PLUNDER THE POSITIVE POLITICAL

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MOMENTUM OF THIS PAST WEEK. NOT ONLY ARE CHARGES OF THIS NATURE PARTICULARLY DISTURBING, BUT SO, TOO, ARE THE BLATANT POLITICAL USES TO WHICH THEY ARE BEING PUT. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHETHER PUBLIC DISGUST OVER THE AFFAIR WILL FORCE CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT (AS SKELE OBLIQUELY SUGGESTED TO THE AMBASSADOR) OR EVEN THE FALL OF THE COALITION. NEVERTHELESS, THE SCANDAL IS SURE TO ENMESH LATVIA IN NASTY POLITICAL INFIGHTING FOR SOME TIME TO COME. RATHER THAN BUILDING FROM SUCH POLITICAL SUCCESSES AS PASSING THE LANGUAGE LAW, OFFICIALLY APPROVING THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, AND ACHIEVING FAST TRACK EU NEGOTIATING STATUS AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, LATVIANS MAY ENTER THE NEW YEAR FACING A PARTICULARLY UNSAVORY EXAMPLE OF THEIR LEADERS' SELF-DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR. END COMMENT.

HOLMES

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 1999 9:21 AM
To: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIAN HISTORICAL COMMISSION AND YAD VASHEM

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 231415Z NOV 99
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4246
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: PRIORITY
SSN: 3845
TOR: 991123091445 M4164833

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 003845

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB, EU/OHI, EUR/RHA

TEL AVIV FOR POL ANDERSON

JUSTICE FOR OSI ROSENBAUM AND MACQUEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC NORLAND

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, IS, EN, LH, LG

SUBJECT: LATVIAN HISTORICAL COMMISSION AND YAD VASHEM

REFS: (A) STATE 216180; (B) TEL AVIV 14742;
(C) VILNIUS 3242; (D) TALLINN 3516;
(E) RIGA 3733; (F) STATE 156993 (NOTAL)

(U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) VISITING ISRAELI MFA OFFICIAL ZVI RAV-NER AND ISRAELI CHARGE RONIT BEN-DOR CATEGORICALLY DENIED TO THE DCM NOVEMBER 16 THE ASSERTIONS IN REF A THAT ISRAEL "HAS WITHDRAWN SUPPORT" FROM THE LATVIAN HISTORICAL COMMISSION AND THAT THE GOL "HAS NOT CONSULTED YAD VASHEM" ABOUT WORKING WITH THE COMMISSION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS MAINTAINED, THE LATVIAN COMMISSION'S EFFORTS TO DIFFERENTIATE THE HOLOCAUST AS UNIQUE AMONG THE ATROCITIES OF WORLD WAR II, HAS, IN RAV-NER'S WORDS, BEEN "NOTED POSITIVELY" IN TEL AVIV AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE "A STEP AHEAD" OF THE TWO OTHER COMMISSIONS IN THIS RESPECT. (SEE ALSO REF F.) RAV-NER SAID THAT HE IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH YAD VASHEM AND THAT ITS WORK WITH THE LATVIANS IS CONTINUING, ALBEIT MORE SLOWLY THAN EITHER PARTY WOULD LIKE. HE ADDED THAT, UPON HIS RETURN TO ISRAEL, HE WOULD CONTACT THE WASHINGTON EMBASSY TO "STRAIGHTEN THIS MATTER UP."

2. (SBU) IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE DCM, LATVIAN OFFICIALS ALSO EXPRESSED "BEWILDERMENT" AT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON'S CONTENTION THAT THE GOL HAS NOT ASKED YAD VASHEM TO WORK WITH ITS HISTORICAL COMMISSION. FORMER PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR AND INFORMAL CONSULTANT TO THE HISTORICAL COMMISSION ARMANDS GUTMANIS NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUS STREAM OF CORRESPONDENCE GOING BACK OVER A YEAR AMONG OFFICIALS IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE LATVIAN HISTORICAL COMMISSION, AND YAD

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VASHEM. HE ESPECIALLY SINGLED OUT A JULY 12 LETTER FROM YAD VASHEM EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AVNER SHALEV TO COMMISSION CHAIRMAN ANDRIS CAUNE, WHICH, INTER ALIA, ASSURES CAUNE THAT "YAD VASHEM WILL BE HAPPY TO COOPERATE WITH LATVIA'S COMMISSION OF HISTORIANS AND STANDS AT YOUR DISPOSAL FOR ANY EXPERT ADVICE OR DOCUMENTATION, AS WELL AS PARTICIPATION IN THE [HOLOCAUST] TASK FORCE." GUTMANIS ALSO CONFIRMED THAT ONE SPECIFIC GOL-YAD VASHEM PROJECT -- IN WHICH TWO LATVIAN HISTORY TEACHERS WILL DEPART FOR TRAINING IN HOLOCAUST EDUCATION IN ISRAEL IN DECEMBER -- IS ALREADY SETTLED AND THAT OTHERS, INCLUDING SENDING YAD VASHEM EXPERTS IN HOLOCAUST STUDIES TO RIGA, ARE WELL UNDERWAY.

3. (SBU) AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH THE LATVIANS AND THE ISRAELIS AGREED THAT THE LATVIAN COMMISSION HAS HARD WORK TO DO TO WIN YAD VASHEM'S FULL ENDORSEMENT. DESPITE THE PROGRESS TO DATE, GUTMANIS AND THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE HISTORICAL COMMISSION'S LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT SINCE ITS PROMISING INAUGURAL MEETING IN JULY. IN THE NEARLY FIVE MONTHS SINCE, THE COMMISSION HAS HAD LITTLE OR NO COMMUNICATION WITH ITS FOREIGN MEMBERS, HAS PRODUCED NO ACTION PLAN FOR THE COMING YEAR, AND HAS PROVIDED NO UPDATES ON WORK IN PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH LATVIAN MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE INSIST THAT SUBSTANTIVE WORK IS UNDERWAY (SEE REF E FOR DETAILS). RAV-NER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHANGE OF PRESIDENTS IN THE SUMMER AND BUDGET PROBLEMS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE HISTORICAL COMMISSION HAD SLOWED THE COMMISSION'S WORK. NEVERTHELESS, HE CAUTIONED THAT ALTHOUGH YAD VASHEM WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK QUIETLY WITH THE LATVIANS, IT WOULD NOT PUBLICLY ENDORSE THE COMMISSION UNTIL IT PRODUCED CONCRETE RESULTS. GUTMANIS AGREED THAT THE COMMISSION MUST GET OFF THE MARK QUICKLY. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST THIS WEEK SELECTED A NEW MEMBER OF HER STAFF TO SERVE AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES. HE STRESSED THAT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE NEW DIRECTOR TO "GET THE COMMISSION OFF THE GROUND" AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING IMMEDIATELY PROVIDING YAD VASHEM AND OTHERS WITH STATUS REPORTS ON THE COMMISSION'S WORK IN PROGRESS.

4. (SBU) COMMENT: CRITICISM OF THE VARIOUS BALTIC HISTORICAL COMMISSIONS FROM ABROAD IS, IN OUR VIEW, BECOMING INCREASINGLY FREQUENT AND DISTURBING. AS WAS UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 RIGA 003845

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB, EUR/OHI, EUR/RHA

TEL VIV FOR POL ANDERSON

JUSTICE FOR OSI ROSENBAUM AND MACQUEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC NORLAND

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, IS, EN, LH, LG

SUBJECT: LATVIAN HISTORICAL COMMISSION AND YAD VASHEM

THE CASE WITH ADL DIRECTOR FOXMAN'S EARLIER LETTER OF RESIGNATION FROM THE LATVIAN COMMISSION AND SECOND SECRETARY TAMIR'S STATEMENTS NOW, THE COMMISSIONS ARE BEING CONDEMNED, OFTEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE PLAYERS ON THE GROUND AND GENERALLY ON THE BASIS OF FAULTY OR PARTIAL INFORMATION (AS REFS C,D, AND E SHOW). ALTHOUGH THE GOL AND OTHER SUPPORTERS OF THE

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COMMISSIONS HAVE USUALLY BEEN ABLE TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT EX POST FACTO, THE ALLEGATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO AN ATMOSPHERE OF DISTRUST THAT SEEMS TO SURROUND THESE COMMISSIONS ABROAD -- AND TO THE READINESS OF OTHERS TO PILE FURTHER INACCURATE CRITICISM ON TOP OF THAT THAT HAS GONE BEFORE.

5. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: A PARTICULARLY DISTURBING FEATURE IN THESE CASES IS THE CRITICS' TENDENCY TO ATTRIBUTE WHATEVER WEAKNESS ONE OF THE BALTIC COMMISSIONS MIGHT POSSESS TO THE OTHER TWO, WHETHER MERITED OR NOT. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE THE LITHUANIAN OR ESTONIAN COMMISSIONS, ESPECIALLY ON SUCH SENSITIVE ISSUES AS THE TREATMENT OF THE HOLOCAUST. WE CAN SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE LATVIANS HAVE PAID PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ESTABLISHING A COMMISSION THAT DISTINGUISHES THE HOLOCAUST FROM THE OTHER ATROCITIES OF WORLD WAR II -- EFFORTS THAT THE LOCAL LATVIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY, ISRAELI OFFICIALS (INCLUDING EARLIER THIS YEAR THOSE IN THE WASHINGTON EMBASSY; SEE REF F), AND AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS HAVE COMMENDED AS SERIOUS, CREDIBLE AND PROMISING. TO CONDEMN THE LATVIAN COMMISSION IN THIS RESPECT FOR THE ALLEGED FAILINGS OF GENERALIZED "BALTIC COMMISSIONS" (OR CONVERSELY TO CONDEMN THE OTHERS FOR SOME PURPORTED WEAKNESS OF THE LATVIANS) IS NEITHER ACCURATE NOR FAIR. INDEED, APPLYING A "LEAST FAVORED NATION" STANDARD NOT ONLY COMPOUNDS THE MANIFOLD PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THE COMMISSIONS ARE CURRENTLY GRAPPLING, BUT ALSO SERIOUSLY HARMS THESE PROMISING ATTEMPTS AT HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION BEFORE THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO PROVE THEMSELVES.

6. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: IN BRIEF, WE BELIEVE THE LATVIANS HAVE, AT LEAST, GOT THE PROCESS INTO ACCEPTABLE FORM. THOSE WHO ARE PAYING ATTENTION "ON-THE-GROUND" AGREE. OUR EFFORTS WILL NOW FOCUS ON PRACTICAL STEPS OF PLANNING, RESOURCE CREATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION. THAT'S WHAT WE ARE SAYING TO THE GOV, THE COMMISSION'S LEADERSHIP AND THE LOCAL JEWISH COMMUNITY. AND THAT'S THE MESSAGE WE BELIEVE CAN BE MOST FAIR AND HELPFUL IN WASHINGTON. END COMMENT.

HOLMES

LATVIA
→

Flanagan, Stephen J. (CEE)

From: Flanagan, Stephen J. (CEE)
Sent: Friday, August 27, 1999 10:38 AM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Subject: FW: It's UNGA time again! Call for bilat suggestions ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

FYI. President Friberg of Latvia will now attend UNGA in place of the PM. Still feel a pull-aside with her, re the language law, is a good idea. Pull-asides with the Estonian and Lithuanian PMs also good to do. but could defend not seeing them on protocol grounds. POTUS has not met with other Baltic PMs.

POTUS met with lithuanian President in November, and at the NATO Summit -- where he also saw President Meri.

Freiburga is also pushing for a meeting with FLOTUS, either here or in NYC to tout Vital Voices, which she will also attend. I'll pass Dick the background.

—Original Message—

From: Flanagan, Stephen J. (CEE)
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 1999 4:19 PM
To: Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
Cc: Stromseth, Jane E. (MULTI); @SENIORS - Senior Directors; @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: FW: It's UNGA time again! Call for bilat suggestions ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

CEE suggests pull-asides/photo ops with either the Latvian or all three of the new Baltic Prime Ministers -- all new since March. The next generation of Baltic leaders. In priority order: Andris Skele, Latvia; Mart Laar, Estonia; and Rolandas Paksas, Lithuania. **Skele** is the most important meeting -- we want to urge him to defuse a problem with Russia over the new Latvian language law.

—Original Message—

From: Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
Sent: Tuesday, July 27, 1999 5:21 PM
To: Stromseth, Jane E. (MULTI); @SENIORS - Senior Directors
Cc: @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs
Subject: RE: It's UNGA time again! Call for bilat suggestions ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Spoke with Eric and Jane, and in the interest of keeping on more meeting off the scope -- suggest that you all forward your suggestions for bilats to me by COB tomorrow. Will consolidate suggestions into a decision memo for SRB and get his guidance.

We'll save the meeting until we need to discuss the details. Thanks
Steve

—Original Message—

From: Stromseth, Jane E. (MULTI)
Sent: Tuesday, July 27, 1999 3:29 PM
To: @SENIORS - Senior Directors
Cc: @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs
Subject: It's UNGA time again! Call for bilat suggestions ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

The President will attend the UN General Assembly in New York on Tuesday, September 21. Traditionally, he has had an average of three bilats during his UNGA visit. Eric will chair a meeting this Friday at 2:00 p.m. in Room 472 to discuss possible bilats with the aim of compiling a prioritized list of suggestions for SRB. We welcome your attendance and your suggestions on this. Please send them to @ MULTI at your earliest convenience. Thanks. Call me if you have any questions (69141).

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2016-0314-11-1 (224)
6/12/2023 v2

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**Latvia: Internal Overview**

Political: Latvia is a parliamentary democracy. Parliament itself has been fragmented into numerous parties and alliances for several years, making passage of reform legislation cumbersome and time-consuming. International observers again deemed the October 1998 elections for the 100-seat Parliament (Saeima) free and fair. The current government is another fragile right-center three party minority coalition. President Guntis Ulmanis' pragmatic, incremental approach toward reform has helped Latvia to continue Western integration; FM Valdis Birkavs is supportive but ineffective. The judiciary is independent but not well trained, efficient, or free from corruption. Parliament will elect a new president June 17. Unlike in Estonia, ethnic Russians and resident noncitizens (who comprised 20% of Latvia's pre-war populace) are somewhat "empowered," since they strongly predominate in commerce and are scattered throughout urban areas nationwide. Ethnic Latvians do not constitute a majority in seven of Latvia's eight largest cities.

Economic

The Latvian economy is moving in the right direction, but privatization of the transit and energy sectors remains stalled over charges and countercharges of corruption and conflict of interest. Private enterprise in trade and services is thriving. Almost 95% of agricultural land is farmed privately, and 60% of all land is in private hands. The currency is strong and freely traded. GDP per capita is over \$2,556--a steady increase since 1996. Unemployment appears to have peaked at a post-independence high of 10%, up from 7% in 1997. Annual inflation was less than 3%, down from 8% percent in 1997. Hit hard by the Russian economic crisis, the Latvian economy still managed 4% GDP growth in 1998 but is expected to increase by 2% in 1999.

Other

Latvian-Russian relations appear to have bottomed out over the past year owing to Russia's allegations of human rights abuses of ethnic Russians in Latvia and to subsequent trade boycotts by several Russian regions. In grudging response to the OSCE HCNM's recommendations for the integration of Latvia's Russian community, the government amended the citizenship law by removing the cumbersome "windows" system (where tranches of non-citizens become eligible for naturalization over a six-year period). After forcing a public referendum, it also finally enacted the more controversial issue of the immediate naturalization of children born in Latvia after August 21, 1991. On March 19 the parliament approved on the second of three readings amendments to the language and education laws, for promoting the study and use of the Latvian language. The OSCE has objected that the current bill's provisions regulating the use of language in the private sector beyond the fields of public security and health and consumer protection violate the freedoms of speech and assembly, the right to privacy, and the freedom of choice provisions of the labor code. Parliament has agreed to work with OSCE experts to conform the language to international norms.

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**Latvia: External Overview**

Political: Latvia's foreign policy aims to achieve eventual integration with Estonia and Lithuania into European institutions through close collaboration with the Nordics, Germany, and U.S. and cooperation with Russia. Latvia now claims it is the only true "Baltic" state, since Estonia seeks Nordic identity and Lithuania Central European. Latvia also relies most on political ties with its neighbors, who in turn fear Latvia's poor performance will drag them down.

Like its Baltic neighbors, Latvia is realistic about its chances for NATO membership but has not yet demonstrated a commitment to reform or provided sufficient funding for attaining NATO interoperability. According to the Pentagon's recent study, Latvia also lags far behind Lithuania and Estonia in such basics as quality of life and procurement practices. The National Defense Forces do not get along with the Home Guard, which actually is far more efficient and better organized and equipped.

A PFP participant, Latvia contributes troops to the NATO Stabilization Force in the former Yugoslavia and police to the United Nations International Police Task Force in Brcko. It also dispatched an 8-member medical unit to assist Kosovar refugees in Albania, and sent \$100,000 in aid to Kosovo. The Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Baltbat) headquarters are near Riga.

Economic: Latvia acceded the WTO in February. Latvia also would be further along in EU accession talks were it not for its currently strained relations with Russia and for the perception of pervasive, endemic judicial corruption and ongoing conflict of interest scandals in Latvia's industrial privatization.

Long-term trade with Russia will remain important because of bilateral reliance on transit trade, oil/gas pipelines, and Riga's prominence in regional banking. However, almost 50% of Latvia's trade already lies with EU-member states. Since the departure of Kellogg's (for market reasons), the U.S. has diminished in importance as a trading/investment partner, and despite submitting lowest bids, several U.S. firms (including Lockheed-Martin) have failed to obtain contracts and complained about the lack of transparency in tenders. Intellectual property protection also is a serious problem.

Other: Together with his other Baltic colleagues, President Ulmanis has endorsed establishment of a historical commission to review crimes against its citizens during the Nazi/Soviet occupation.

Latvia will graduate from SEED at the end of FY1999 but will remain eligible for regional USAID assistance programs.

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Vaira VIKE-FREIBERGA

(Phonetic: VEETSya-FRAYbaiguh)

*President (since 8 July 1999)**Addressed as: Madam President* 3.5c

Clinical psychologist Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the second repatriate to lead a Baltic state and the first female president in Central and Eastern Europe, has a reputation as pragmatic and fair and has already demonstrated a willingness to make tough political decisions. The day she was inaugurated as President, the Saeima (Parliament) overwhelmingly passed a controversial language law that contained provisions running counter to OSCE recommendations and, in some cases, possibly violating Latvia's Constitution. Vike-Freiberga made a politically risky move in rejecting the measure and returning it to the Saeima for reconsideration. EO 13526 3.5(c)

Inexperienced in Politics but Politically Savvy

EO 13526 3.5(c)

Vike-Freiberga, a nonpartisan who has never held public office, became a candidate for president in an unusual manner. A group of Latvian intellectuals issued an open letter in late 1998 calling for her candidacy. Three political parties that span Latvia's political spectrum—including one in the then-ruling coalition—reached an agreement just before the June 1999 election to support her candidacy if no one was elected during the first round of Saeima voting. Vike-Freiberga became a candidate late in the evening on election day, after six rounds of rancorous voting in which even the color of ink used to mark ballots was a subject of contention. She was elected in the seventh round and, after the election, even her children expressed surprise that she had won. EO 13526 3.5(c)

Even before taking office, Vike-Freiberga demonstrated political savvy. As President-elect, she appeared on a live Moscow television show in



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A Harbinger of Greater Openness? 3.5c

Although her positions on Latvian foreign policy mirror the country's longstanding priorities—achieving EU and NATO accession while building solid working relations with Moscow—Vike-Freiberga's election appears to mark a sea change in Latvian politics and may presage an acceleration of political and economic reform. Prominent Latvian political observer Aivars Ozolins commented in late June that the election of Vike-Freiberga constitutes a radical change and that politics will become more open and transparent. Moreover, scholars who analyze the role of women in leadership positions have noted that women who are outsiders and beat the electoral odds create higher expectations of reform. 3.5c

which she skillfully handled tough questions from the interviewer regarding the treatment of ethnic Russians in Latvia. Vike-Freiberga's television appearance reflects her interest in improving relations with Moscow. It also deflects criticism from domestic detractors that her lack of a Russian-language capability could reflect negatively on relations with Moscow. EO 13526 3.5(c)

Taking the Moral High Road 3.5c

Vike-Freiberga has stated that she plans to press for Latvian membership in the EU and NATO, but her biggest priority as president, she says, is to instill in Latvians a sense of trust and pride in their government. As she tapped former Prime Minister and staunch economic reformer Andris Skele to form a new government just days after her inauguration, Vike-Freiberga issued a stern warning to both him and his cabinet to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest between government and business—a problem that had plagued the previous administration.

EO 13526 3.5(c)

The integration of noncitizens—largely ethnic Russians—into Latvian society poses the most difficult problem for the country, Vike-Freiberga told reporters. Noting that she had been a refugee for several years until settling in Canada, she professed understanding for the feelings of ethnic minorities. Vike-Freiberga also claimed to reporters that Latvia seemed calm compared to Canada, where some Quebecois have sought to separate from the rest of the country, and that she expects Latvia's permanent residents to be loyal to their home. 3.5c

A Repatriated Cultural Activist 3.5c

After World War II, Vike-Freiberga, then age 7, fled Latvia with her family; she settled in Canada in her early 20s but retained a strong interest in Latvia. She taught her children Latvian and authored seven books on Latvian folklore:

- Vike-Freiberga was a longtime leader in Canada's tiny ethnic Latvian community—for example, she coordinated the first Latvian song festival in 1959 and directed the Latvian Youth Ethnic Heritage Seminars in 1979.
- Together with her computer-scientist husband Imants Freibergs, Vike-Freiberga became renowned in Latvia for her extensive research and analysis of *dainas*, folk songs that play a central role in Latvian culture. In an unparalleled effort that earned them several major awards, she and Freibergs compiled and

stored nearly 1 million *dainas*. In a separate effort, Vike-Freiberga published extensively on the psycholinguistics of *dainas*. 3.5c

Vike-Freiberga returned to Latvia in October 1998 to lead the government-funded Latvian Institute, a newly formed organization whose mission is to promote a positive image of Latvia abroad, but apparently did not expect to relocate permanently. She did not relinquish her Canadian citizenship until the day before the election and even then expressed remorse for moving away from a country that had been good to her and for which she had great affection. 3.5c

Career and Personal Data 3.5c

Vike-Freiberga was born on 1 December 1937 in Riga. She attended school at a Latvian refugee camp in Lubeck, Germany, and at a French school in Casablanca, Morocco. Vike-Freiberga earned a B.A. in liberal arts and an M.A. in psychology from the University of Toronto in 1958 and 1960, respectively; a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from McGill University in 1965; and an LLD from Queen's University in 1991. She taught and translated Spanish during 1958-60 and then worked as a clinical psychologist at the Toronto Psychiatric Hospital from 1960 to 1961. In 1965 she joined the clinical psychology faculty of the University of Montreal, where she remained until 1998. Vike-Freiberga's academic interests, on which she has published extensively, include psycho-pharmacology, psycholinguistics, and memory. She is a member of the Royal Society of Canada and a recipient of the Big Medal of the Latvian Academy of Science. From 1979 until 1981, Vike-Freiberga served on the Human Factors committee for NATO. 3.5c

In addition to her native Latvian, Vike-Freiberga speaks fluent English, French, German, and Spanish, as well as some Italian and Portuguese. She and her husband have two adult children—Indra Karoline, who resides in Canada, and Karlis Roberts Freibergs, a newspaper editor who moved to Latvia in 1990 and played an active role in the independence movement. 3.5c

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|----------------------|
| 001. note | Handwritten notes (1 page) | n.d. | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002a. paper | Latvia WTO Accession Background (2 pages) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002b. talking points | Re: Latvia WTO Accession (1 page) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. memo | Charlene Barshefsky to the President, re: EU Summit - Latvia's Accession to the World Trade Organization (3 pages) | ea. 05/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Latvia WTO [World Trade Organization]/[Economic Bilateral Working Group]

2011-1037-F
 ke2192

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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LATVIA WTO ACCESSION BACKGROUND

Latvia is caught between competing EU and U.S. demands on audiovisual services. We have requested, and Latvia is prepared to agree, that Latvia maintain its audiovisual services market open as part of its accession to the WTO. The EU, however, urged on by France, is insisting that Latvia not make these commitments, using the leverage of Latvia's eventual membership in the EU.

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are among 30 or so nations acceding to the World Trade Organization. Each country joining the WTO must provide commitments on treatment of service suppliers (accountancy firms, banks, insurance companies, or telecommunications companies) of other WTO members. The content and scope of these commitments are the subjects of negotiation with each acceding country.

The three Baltic states are close to completing WTO accession negotiations, with Latvia the furthest ahead. While there are other outstanding goods, services and agricultural issues in each of the Baltic accessions, the most politically contentious issue is audiovisual services. Latvia is the first country acceding to the WTO that may also join the EU, although probably not before 2005 at the earliest (Latvia is in the second tier of EU applicant countries).

Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, an important U.S. objective in all WTO accessions is to maintain markets open to U.S. exports of films, television shows and home video, worth more than \$10.2 billion annually. We have been successful in obtaining these commitments from countries acceding to the WTO.

The EU has instructed the Baltics, as future EU members, not to take commitments in the audiovisual sector. No current EU member made market access commitments for audiovisual services, and most took a series of exemptions from WTO rules that permit them to discriminate in the sector among trading partners.

Our request to Latvia in audiovisual services is a compromise that would accommodate the EU's current practices and at the same time ensure that potential EU members applying to the WTO keep their markets open in this sector at least until they become EU members. We have tabled similar requests of Russia and some half-dozen other former Soviet Union countries acceding to the WTO.

When the EU encourages potential EU members to introduce or maintain restrictive measures in advance of their entry into the EU, it is effectively restricting MFN trade liberalization to suit its own interests. It is also undermining WTO rules aimed at ensuring that preferential trade agreements - like the EU - do not have a chilling effect on world trade. Similarly the EU also has encouraged its prospective new members to raise tariffs and agricultural supports to very high EU levels when they join the WTO, to provide a more protected market for EU exports afterwards.

LATVIA WTO ACCESSION

- I am disappointed that the EU continues to characterize the United States as preventing Latvia from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). We have proposed a significant and fair compromise on the audiovisual services issue to your negotiators. We are still awaiting a response.
- Latvia has assured us at senior levels that it is prepared to undertake these commitments. It is unfair to Latvia and unacceptable to us that the EU seeks to impose its own views on Latvia. This is one of a handful of issues remaining in Latvia's WTO accession.
- We both want to see Latvia in the WTO. Given recent events in Latvia, it is especially important that we should keep to our last Summit's goal of ensuring Baltic accession by year's end.
- The United States and the EU both have market access concerns in the audiovisual area [Note: U.S. industry estimates its exports at \$10 billion annually.] We will need to make a good faith effort to address each other's problems and resolve this issue in a satisfactory way. Let's agree to have our officials engage substantively and constructively.

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Charlene Barshefsky

SUBJECT: EU Summit - Latvia's Accession to the World Trade Organization

ISSUE

I request that you raise with President Santer at the Summit the EU's continued blocking of Latvia's admission to the World Trade Organization.

Latvia is caught between competing EU and U.S. demands on audiovisual services. We have requested -- and Latvia is prepared to agree -- that Latvia maintain its audiovisual services market open as part of its accession to the WTO. The EU, however -- urged on by France -- is insisting that Latvia *not* make these commitments, using the leverage of Latvia's eventual membership in the EU.

SUGGESTED POINTS TO MAKE

- I am dismayed that the EU continues to prevent Latvia from acceding to the WTO by insisting that Latvia not undertake commitments in audiovisual services. In December, you raised Latvia's accession with me, asking that our officials seek a solution. Ambassador Barshefsky responded promptly. Her staff met with Sir Leon's staff on at least three occasions, and last month she wrote Sir Leon in yet another attempt to move forward.
- Latvia is prepared to join the WTO with audiovisual commitments. The time has come for the EU to work constructively to find an acceptable alternative.
- In reality, this issue has nothing to do with Latvia or audiovisual commitments. It has to do with the EU's desire to extend the scope of its trade policy to *potential* EU members long before it is entitled to do so under WTO rules.
- It is unacceptable to say that because Latvia plans to join the EU in five, or seven, or 10 years, Latvia today must follow Community policy on audiovisual services. WTO accession and EU membership are two separate procedures. Neither of us is helped if the EU tries to undermine WTO procedures in anticipation of expanded EU membership sometime in the future.
- The time has come for our officials to engage substantively and constructively on this issue.

If Santer claims that audiovisual issues are the only sticking point in Latvia's WTO accession:

- This is simply incorrect. Other WTO issues remain before Latvia can conclude its

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6/12/2012 v2

accession negotiations, including protection of intellectual property rights and commitments on agriculture market access.

If Santer claims the U.S. is trying to unravel the "ceasefire" on audiovisual issues from the end of the Uruguay Round, or that Latvia's audiovisual market has little commercial importance:

- Like you, we are seeking to negotiate commercially meaningful commitments from each of the thirty or so countries acceding to the WTO. American filmed entertainment is popular in virtually every country in the world -- our industry estimates annual exports at over \$10 billion.

If Santer claims that the U.S. is asking more from Latvia than from original WTO Members during the Uruguay Round:

- In the Uruguay Round, countries provided commitments to maintain their current practices and not implement further restrictions ["standstill" commitments]. We are asking *less* than that from Latvia. In our request of Latvia and the other Baltics, we have specifically excluded commitments in the three areas where the Baltics have an open market but for which the EU itself has taken audiovisual exceptions to WTO obligations:
 - the Broadcast Directive, which encourages, but does not require, governments to reserve up to 51 percent of airtime in certain entertainment programming for "European" works;
 - support programs for the domestic film industry; and
 - preferential treatment of films produced under government-to-government "coproduction" agreements.
- Our request of Latvia and the other Baltics asks for commitments only in other areas (e.g., establishment of cinema chains and freedom from airtime quotas in programming not subject to the Broadcast Directive) consistent with current EU and Latvian practice

BACKGROUND

Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are among 30 or so countries acceding to the World Trade Organization. Each country joining the WTO must provide commitments on treatment of service suppliers (for example, accountancy firms, banks, insurance companies, or telecommunications companies) of other WTO Members. The content and scope of these commitments is the subject of negotiation with each acceding country.

The three Baltic states are close to completing WTO accession negotiations, with Latvia the furthest ahead. While there are other outstanding goods, services, and agriculture issues in each of the Baltic accessions, the most politically contentious issue is audiovisual services. Latvia is the first country acceding to the WTO that may also join the EU, although probably not before 2005,

at the earliest (Latvia is in the second tier of EU applicant countries).

Audiovisual Services Commitments

Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, an important U.S. objective in all WTO accessions is to obtain commitments to maintain markets open to U.S. exports of films, television shows, and home video. Our industry estimates these exports at \$10.2 billion for 1995. We have been successful in obtaining these commitments from countries acceding to the WTO.

The EU has instructed the Baltics, as future EU members, not to take commitments in the audiovisual sector. No current EU member made market access commitments for audiovisual services, and most took a series of exemptions from WTO rules that permit them to discriminate in this sector among trading partners.

Our request to Latvia in audiovisual services is a compromise that would accommodate the EU's current practices and at the same time ensure that potential EU members applying to the WTO keep their markets open for audiovisual services at least until they become EU members. We have tabled or soon will table similar requests of Russia and some half-dozen other former Soviet Union countries acceding to the WTO.

We have told the Baltics that we cannot "sell" a package domestically that excludes this sector completely, given its commercial significance. Latvia and the other Baltics feel caught between the EU and the United States. Latvia's Finance Minister reconfirmed last month that his government is prepared to make audiovisual commitments in the WTO. Estonia had already included such commitments in one of its first draft submissions to the WTO.

Troubling WTO Implications

The EU's insistence that *potential* EU members, including those years from membership, conform *now* to the commitments taken by the EU in the Uruguay Round is troubling. When the EU encourages potential EU members to introduce or maintain restrictive measures in advance of their entry into the EU, it is effectively restricting MFN trade liberalization to suit its own interests. It is also undermining WTO rules aimed at ensuring that preferential trade agreements -- like the EU -- do not have a chilling effect on world trade. Similarly, the EU also has encouraged its prospective new members to raise tariffs and agricultural supports to very high EU levels when they join the WTO, to provide a more protected market for EU exports afterwards.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001. memo | Marc Grossman to the Deputy Secretary, re: Status of Russian Minority in Latvia (5 pages) | ea-04/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. email | White House Situation Room to Susan Braden, et al., re: [Latvian Social Integration] (8 pages) | 04/16/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Latvia - Citizenship

2011-1037-F
 ke2193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (229)
6/12/2023 VL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: 04/14/03
TO: The Deputy Secretary
FROM: EUR - Marc Grossman
SUBJECT: Status of Russian Minority in Latvia

SUMMARY: A key part of our strategy with regard to the ethnic minority in Latvia is to focus both sides on the facts and avoid exaggerated statements. This memo provides you facts and statistics on the situation, our analysis of the OSCE recommendations, and our assessment of Latvian progress in addressing the problem.

STATISTICS:

| | |
|---|--|
| Total Population: | 2.5 million |
| Ethnic Latvians: | 56.7% |
| Ethnic Russian: | 30.2% |
| Other ethnic Groups: | 11.0% |
| Naturalized Russians: | 38.9% of Russian Minority (about 300,000) |
| Non-Citizen Russians: | 65.9% of total non-citizen population (about 453,000) |
| Eligible to Naturalize under "window system" 1995-1997: | 124,000 |
| Applied for Naturalization 1995-1997: | 8,200 |

THEIR PLACE IN SOCIETY

Unlike in Estonia, the Russian minority plays a major role in the Latvian economy. Ethnic Russians control most of the commanding heights of the economy, especially in the areas of energy, transit and financial services. A Latvian newspaper recently reported that among the fifteen wealthiest persons in Latvia, a majority of them were ethnic Russians. Prime Minister Krast originally planned to include ethnic Russian businessmen in the private sector group accompanying his delegation to Washington. One estimate is that the Russian control 75% of Latvia's GDP.

Latvia has the highest rate of intermarriage among the Baltics (e.g., in 1996 34% of all marriages were mixed); almost 50% of all Latvian families have some relative of another nationality.

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Classified By: Ron Asmus, EUR DAS

Reason: 1.6 (b) and (c)
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- 2 -

Survey research conducted by Western firms in Latvia has also shown that a solid majority of Russian speakers in the country feel that they are better off than they would be in Russia and intend to stay. At the same time, there is resentment against what they see as a second class status.

These same statistics make some Latvians nervous. Many Latvians still see the Russian speaking minority as a symbol of forced Sovietization. Many Latvians are still not certain of the political loyalties of the Russian-speaking minority. For example, only 56% of non-citizens support Latvia's status as an independent state. Moreover, the fact that ethnic Russians do play such a major role in the economy reinforces the concern that Latvians do not really run their own country. One of the major factors determining Latvia's official naturalization policy, i.e., the "windows" system, was the fear that the Russian speaking minority would rush to become citizens and swamp the political process. Ironically, they made the offer and almost no one took them up on it.

NATURALIZATION TRACK RECORD

The window system of naturalization allows successive age groups of non-citizens to apply. Applicants must have resided in Latvia for five years, pass language and history tests, and pay a \$52 fee. With the opening of the 1998 window, the total number of non-citizens eligible for naturalization between 1995 and 1998 is 152,000, about 23% of the non-citizen population. To date, only about 8,500 have applied for naturalization indicating fundamental problems with the system, the perception of one's chances of success in the system being one of the key ones. The March 1998 NGO-sponsored study "Towards Social Integration" indicates that only 27% of those eligible under the window system plan to apply for naturalization in the next year, and 18% of all non-citizens do not wish to obtain Latvian citizenship at all.

Studies indicate that language remains a real barrier. Both language and history tests were simplified in 1997, and the overall passing rates for both tests are now above 95%. Nevertheless, the tests are broadly perceived by non-citizens as a major obstacle to naturalization. The March study indicated that some 56% of non-citizens over 30 cited lack of confidence in their ability to pass the exams as a reason for not pursuing naturalization.

KEY OSCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The OSCE Mission in Riga and the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) Max van der Stoep have recommended simplification of the naturalization system, elimination of the "window system" of application, naturalization of stateless children born in Latvia since independence without language and history testing, simplified language and history testing

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- 3 -

requirements, and adoption of state language laws in conformity with Latvia's international commitments. While many of these proposals appear commonsensical, they in fact are more liberal than those in effect in many, if not most, West European countries, e.g., Germany, Sweden or Switzerland.

Progress to date has been slower, for example, than in neighboring Estonia. Estonia has implemented 29 out of 30 of HCNM van der Stoel's recommendations, and has developed a national integration plan. Latvia's larger minority, complicated coalition politics and greater anxiety over Russian influence in society have combined to slow the naturalization and integration process.

The OSCE, while noting that there is no systematic pattern of human rights abuses, has encouraged Latvia to make progress in implementing the HCNM's recommendations. The 1997 U.S. Human Rights report notes similar findings, and calls on Latvia to expedite naturalization and integration. The biggest hurdles remain:

- The window system (which initially was an OSCE recommendation) remains in place;
- There have been no changes in citizenship laws for children;
- There is no consensus on language and labor laws that conform to international standards;
- Shortages of qualified Latvian language teachers continue to hamper the integration of non-citizens.
- Non-citizens are barred from certain occupations and private land ownership.

CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

In a significant break though on April 15, a Special Cabinet Meeting of the Latvian Government decided to propose legislation on a number of significant measures to address these problems, including elimination of the "window" system, and the immediate granting of citizenship to all stateless children born in Latvia since 1991. The government mandated that the amendments to the citizenship law be presented to Prime Minister Krasts by April 21st, and be introduced in the Saeima by the 23rd. The Government also plans to introduce amendments to proposed language and labor laws pending before the Saeima that would bring those bills into conformity with international legal norms.

These measures represent a major step forward, and we plan to issue a press statement praising the Latvian Government and encouraging the Saeima to pass this legislation. Continuing pressure from Russia may decrease the likelihood of passage, since hard-line parties will not want to be seen as "bowing" to Russian threats. In his April 2 letter to FM Primakov, HCNM van der Stoel noted the potential for Russian pressure to backfire in

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- 4 -

this way. Van der Stoel will be in Latvia on the 17th, and plans to issue a statement praising these measures.

The Latvians have been edging toward making some significant breakthroughs on these issues for some time. When Ulmanis met with POTUS, he underscored his desire to use the Baltic Charter and the confidence it gave Latvia to move on the minority issue. However, Prime Minister Krasts's party has been skeptical if not opposed. Our strong and vocal support for passage of the bills, as well as Russian moderation, will be critical to success in teh Saeima

Attachment: Latvian Performance on Key Non-Citizen Issues

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Drafted: EUR/RPM:SPenhune ok
EUR/RPM:JRosenblatt
EUR/NB:GMilovanovic ok
EUR/RUS:SGwaltney
EUR:RDAsmus

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 1998 7:57 AM
To: Braden, Susan R.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Fort, Jane B.; McEldowney, Nancy E.
Subject: LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ACTION PLAN

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 161047Z APR 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1538
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 1155
TOR: 980416074940 M3246021

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 RIGA 001155

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, UNDERSECRETARY EIZENSTAT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB AND S/NIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USAID FOR AA/ENI DAVID COWLES, AND ENI/ECA PAULA FEENEY
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ACTION PLAN

REFS: (A) RIGA 1061, (B) RIGA 0155

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARA 3.

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST

2. IN PREVIOUS CABLES, WE HAVE PROVIDED BACKGROUND ON LATVIA'S CURRENT POLITICAL CRISES AND AN ACTION PLAN IN WHICH WE SUGGEST WAYS IN WHICH LATVIAN INFLUENCE CAN ASSIST LATVIA MOST EFFECTIVELY. THIS MESSAGE BUILDS ON REFTELS BY FOCUSING SPECIFICALLY ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE - SOCIAL INTEGRATION - WHICH IS BEDEVILING LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND LATVIA'S STANDING WITH WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. IT SUGGESTS CONCRETE ACTIONS WHICH WILL HAVE TANGIBLE AND LONG-LASTING EFFECTS ON THE SITUATION. I UNDERSCORE, HOWEVER, THAT THESE ACTIONS WILL REQUIRE (A) URGENT USG ATTENTION, AND (B) ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES. I ENVISION THAT THESE PROPOSALS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE CURRENT MANDATE OF OUR USAID MISSION, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSEOUT IN SEPTEMBER 1999.

3. ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS:

O ALOG THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, I RECOMMEND WE PROVIDE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE DECISIONS OF A SPECIAL LATVIAN CABINET MEETING ON APRIL 15 WHICH CALLED FOR (1) ABOLISHING ARTIFICIAL AGE RESTRICTIONS (E.G. "WINDOWS") THAT HAVE IMPEDED NATURALIZATION OF NON-CITIZENS; (2) GRANTING CITIZENSHIP TO STATELESS CHILDREN BORN IN LATVIA AFTER AUGUST 21, 1991 (THE DATE ON WHICH LATVIA REGAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE); AND

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6/12/2013 v2

(3) STATING THAT ANY AMENDMENTS TO LATVIA'S LABOR CODE AND LANGUAGE LAW BE "IN LINE WITH THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW." IF IMPLEMENTED, THESE DECISIONS WOULD APPEAR TO FULFILL THE MOST IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR MINORITIES MAX VAN DER STOEL. OF COURSE THERE ARE MANY HURDLES TO CROSS AND MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR BACKTRACKING BETWEEN NOW AND ENACTMENT OF THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION. WE WILL DOUBTLESS HAVE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO HELP SEE THIS PROCESS THROUGH. HOWEVER, THIS CABINET DECISION REPRESENTS THE MOST PROMISING BREAKTHROUGH ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION SINCE LATVIA'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1991. WE MUST MOVE NOW TO PROVIDE CONCRETE SUPPORT.

0 WE SHOULD WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH LATVIAN INSTITUTIONS, ESPECIALLY THE NATURALIZATION BOARD, TO PROVIDE NON-CITIZENS WITH ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS. THE NATURALIZATION BOARD HAS PLANS TO ESTABLISH AN INFORMATION DEPARTMENT FOR OUTREACH TO POTENTIAL NON-CITIZEN APPLICANTS FOR NATURALIZATION. AN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION OF FUNDING OR ADVISORY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AND EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED AND WOULD BE PIVOTAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE OUTREACH EFFORT.

0 A THIRD APPROACH IS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO STRENGTHEN LATVIA'S NATIONAL PROGRAM TO TEACH THE LATVIAN LANGUAGE TO THOSE NON-CITIZENS WHO DON'T SPEAK THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE. UNDP IS ALREADY CONTRIBUTING CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE TO THIS EFFORT AND COORDINATING THE EFFORTS OF OTHER DONORS. A DONORS GROUP HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSIDER HOW ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE COULD BE MOBILIZED IN SUPPORT OF THE LANGUAGE PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT H

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 RIGA 001155

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, UNDERSECRETARY EIZENSTAT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB AND S/NIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USAID FOR AA/ENI DAVID COWLES, AND ENI/ECA PAULA FEENEY
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG

SUBJECT: LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ACTION PLAN

AS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO DEVELOP A NEW PROGRAM FOR SOCIAL INTEGRATION THAT IS BEING PREPARED BY AN INTER-MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUP. A TROIKA OF THE UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR AND THE EU HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO WORK WITH THIS GROUP. THIS PROCESS MAY OPEN OTHER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES IN LATVIA.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATVIA: THE PEOPLE SPEAK

4. OUR ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING PORTRAIT OF THE STATE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATVIA DRAWN FROM SURVEY DATA COMPILED BY THE LATVIAN NATURALIZATION BUREAU IN ITS LANDMARK STUDY, "TOWARD SOCIAL INTEGRATION," PUBLISHED IN MARCH, 1998. THE STUDY WAS CONDUCTED IN NOVEMBER 1997-JANUARY 1998 WITH SUPPORT FROM THE SOROS FOUNDATION, THE UNDP, THE

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EU PHARE PROGRAM, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DONORS. THE SURVEY DATA WAS DEVELOPED FROM DIRECT INTERVIEWS OF 1,507 CITIZENS AND 1,502 NON-CITIZENS RANDOMLY SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED AT THEIR RESIDENCES. THE SURVEY BUILDS UPON EARLIER, LESS COMPREHENSIVE SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN 1991 AND 1994. THE NEW SURVEY FORMS THE FACTUAL BACKDROP AGAINST WHICH LATVIAN LEADERS WILL CONSIDER CHANGES IN THEIR POLICIES ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND NATURALIZATION.

A SNAPSHOT OF LATVIA'S POPULATION

5. THE TOTAL POPULATION OF LATVIA IS APPROXIMATELY 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE, WITH THE FOLLOWING ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION: LATVIAN (56.7%), RUSSIAN (30.2%), BELARUSSIAN (4.2%), UKRAINIAN (2.8%), POLISH (2.6%), LITHUANIAN (1.4%), AND LESS THAN ONE PERCENT FROM EACH OF SEVEN OTHER NATIONALITIES. AMONG THE RUSSIAN ETHNIC POPULATION, 38.9% (ALMOST 300,000) PERSONS ARE CITIZENS OF LATVIA. THESE RUSSIAN ETHNIC CITIZENS COMPRISE 16.3% OF LATVIA'S TOTAL CITIZENRY. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF RUSSIAN ETHNIC NON-CITIZENS IN LATVIA IS ALMOST 453,000 OR 65.9% OF THE ALMOST 688,000 NON-CITIZENS RESIDENT IN LATVIA. THE ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE REMAINING NON-CITIZENS IS BELARUSSIAN (12.1%), UKRAINIAN (9.2%), POLISH (3.4%), LITHUANIAN (3.3%), AND SEVEN OTHER NATIONALITIES WITH LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE NON-CITIZEN POPULATION.

SOE HOPEFUL SIGNS

6. THE SURVEY DATA REVEALS A RANGE OF POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL INTEGRATION THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A MORE GENEROUS NATURALIZATION POLICY.
O 80% OF BOTH CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS FELT THAT THEY HAD "CLOSE" OR "VERY CLOSE" TIES TO LATVIA.

O 94% OF CITIZENS AND 90% OF NON-CITIZENS RESPONDED THAT THEY INTENDED TO STAY IN LATVIA. LESS THAN 1% OF BOTH GROUPS SAID THAT THEY HAD DECIDED TO LEAVE LATVIA. INTERESTINGLY, AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE (15-30 YRS.), MORE CITIZENS (17%) THAN NON-CITIZENS (12%) INDICATED THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING LEAVING LATVIA.

O LATVIA HAS A VERY HIGH INCIDENCE OF INTERMARRIAGE. IN 1996, 34% OF ALL MARRIAGES WERE ETHNICALLY MIXED, RANGING FROM 17% FOR LATVIANS TO UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 RIGA 001155

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, UNDERSECRETARY EIZENSTAT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB AND S/NIS
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SUBJECT: LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ACTION PLAN

ABOUT 90% FOR BELARUSSIANS, UKRAINIANS, POLK, AND LITHUANIANS.

O ALMOST 50% OF ALL LATVIAN FAMILIES HAS SOME RELATIVE OF ANOTHER NATIONALITY

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O ALMOST 90% OF LATVIANS SAY THAT THEY HAVE FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES OF ANOTHER NATIONALITY.

SOME TROUBLING SIGNS

7. NEVERTHELESS, THE SURVEY RESULTS INDICATE SIGNIFICANT FEELINGS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY AND ISOLATION AMONG THE POPULACE THAT COULD HAMPER SOCIAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS.

O ONLY 56% OF NON-CITIZENS SAY THAT THEY SUPPORT LATVIA'S STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE (THE FIGURE WAS 35% IN 1991 AND 53% IN 1994).

O 28% OF LATVIANS SAY THAT THEY FEAR LOSING THEIR ETHNIC IDENTITY.

O 73% OF NON-CITIZENS (COMPARED TO 43% OF CITIZENS) EXPRESSED A FEELING OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ONE'S STATUS TODAY AND TOMORROW". 47% OF NON-CITIZENS (COMPARED WITH 17% CITIZENS) SAID THAT THEY FELT "HUMILIATION" IN THEIR LIVES.

O AT THE SAME TIME, 74% OF NON-CITIZENS (COMPARED WITH 83% OF CITIZENS) AGREED THAT, IN EVERYDAY LIFE, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS. (THE SURVEY CONCLUDES THAT THE DATA UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY RATHER THAN EVERYDAY LIFE EXPERIENCE AS THE BASIS OF NON-CITIZEN ANXIETY.)

O BOTH LATVIANS AND NON-LATVIANS FEEL ECONOMIC HARDSHIP. 62% OF CITIZENS AND 61% OF NON-CITIZENS ESTIMATED THEIR MONTHLY EXPENDITURES PER FAMILY MEMBER AT LESS THAN 50 LATS (APPROXIMATELY \$100).

O 30% OF NON-CITIZENS AND 26% OF CITIZENS REPORT DIFFICULTY IN FINDING A JOB. APPROXIMATELY 33% OF ETHNIC RUSSIAN CITIZENS REPORT DIFFICULTY FINDING A JOB. SURVEY INDICATES THAT CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS WITH POOR LATVIAN LANGUAGE SKILLS HAVE MORE TROUBLE FINDING A JOB.

O AMONG BOTH CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS RESPECT FOR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IS LOW (21% OF BOTH GROUPS SAY THEY TRUST THE PARLIAMENT; 26% OF CITIZENS AND 22% OF NON-CITIZENS SAY THEY TRUST THE CABINET OF MINISTERS; AND 10% OF BOTH GROUPS SAY THEY TRUST POLITICAL PARTIES).

O PARTICIPATION AMONG BOTH GROUPS IN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IS LOW: TRADE UNIONS (12% CITIZENS, 5% NON-CITIZENS); CHURCHES (6% CITIZENS, 2% NON-CITIZENS); SPORTS OR ENTERTAINMENT ORGANIZATIONS (4% CITIZENS, 1% NON-CITIZENS).

THE LATVIAN LANGUAGE: UNIFIER OR DIVIDER?

8. ACCORDING TO THE SURVEY DATA, MOST RESIDENTS OF LATVIA WANT TO USE THE LATVIAN LANGUAGE, BUT MOST NON-UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 RIGA 001155

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SUBJECT: LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ACTION PLAN

CITIZENS FEEL THEIR LATVIAN LANGUAGE ABILITIES ARE
VERY POOR.

0 90% OF BOTH CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS BELIEVE
THAT ALL INHABITANTS OF LATVIA MUST KNOW THE LATVIAN
LANGUAGE.

0 HOWEVER, 20% OF NON-CITIZENS SAY THAT THEY KNOW
NO LATVIAN AT ALL, WHILE 40% OF NON-CITIZENS JUDGE
THEIR LATVIAN AS "VERY POOR".

0 73% OF NON-CITIZENS AND 60% OF CITIZENS WHOSE
NATIVE LANGUAGE IS NOT LATVIAN SAY THAT THEY WOULD
LIKE TO IMPROVE THEIR LATVIAN LANGUAGE.

0 YET, 79% OF NON-CITIZENS SUPPORT DESIGNATION OF
RUSSIAN AS A SECOND OFFICIAL LANGUAGE.

0 76% OF LATVIANS SAY THAT THEY SPEAK MORE RUSSIAN
THAN LATVIAN OR RUSSIAN ONLY IN BUSINESS AND SOCIAL
CONTACTS WITH NON-LATVIANS. ONLY 6% OF LATVIANS SAY
THAT THEY SPEAK PREDOMINANTLY LATVIAN IN DAILY
CONTACTS WITH NON-LATVIANS.

CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION: COMPLEX
CONTRADICTIONS

9. THE SURVEY REVEALS SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS ON THE PRIORITY TO
NATURALIZE NON-CITIZENS BORN IN LATVIA. HOWEVER,
THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER THE
FAIRNESS OF THE EXISTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
NATURALIZATION, INCLUDING THE AGE QUOTAS OF THE
"WINDOWS" SYSTEM, AND THE LATVIAN LANGUAGE AND HISTORY
EXAMS.

0 DESPITE THEIR REPORTED FRUSTRATIONS WITH NON-
CITIZEN STATUS, ALMOST ONE IN FIVE NON-CITIZENS (18%)
DOES NOT WISH TO OBTAIN LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP. 80% OF
THOSE WHO SAY THAT THEY DO NOT WANT LATVIAN
CITIZENSHIP REPORT THAT THEY WANT NO CITIZENSHIP AT
ALL.

0 OF THOSE NON-CITIZENS NOW ELIGIBLE TO APPLY
(YOUNG PERSONS AGE 15-25), ONLY 27% PLAN TO USE THAT
RIGHT IN THE NEXT YEAR.

0 66% OF NON-CITIZENS HAVE NOT PERSONALLY INQUIRED
ABOUT THE NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS.

0 NON-CITIZENS CITE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR NOT
PURSUING NATURALIZATION:

0 LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO PASS
THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY EXAM (40% OF THOSE UNDER AGE
30, 56% AMONG OVER 30);

0 LACK OF INTEREST (26% OF THOSE UNDER AGE 30,

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37% AMONG OVER 30);

O ALIENATION FROM THE LATVIAN STATE (20% AMONG BOTH UNDER AND OVER AGE 30);

O UNWILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE THE DUTIES OF CITIZEN (20% AMONG BOTH UNDER AND OVER AGE 30);

O NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATURALIZATION

PROCEDURE (33% AMONG BOTH UNDER AND OVER AGE 30).
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 RIGA 001155

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SUBJECT: LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION: ACTION PLAN

O 54% OF CITIZENS AND 34% OF NON-CITIZENS SAID THAT LATVIAN LANGUAGE AND HISTORY EXAMS SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR NATURALIZATION (26% OF CITIZENS AND 34% OF NON-CITIZENS REPLIED "MAYBE" TO THIS QUESTION).

O 48% OF CITIZENS AND 56% OF NON-CITIZENS BELIEVE THAT THE EXAM REQUIREMENTS ARE TOO HIGH. YET, ONLY 7% OF NON-CITIZENS REPORT ANY PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE NATURALIZATION BOARD (THE ONLY SOURCE OF AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON THE EXAMS) DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS. (THE SURVEY CONCLUDES THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF NON-CITIZENS GET THEIR INFORMATION ON NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FROM INDIRECT SOURCES.)

O 69% OF NON-CITIZENS AND 28% OF CITIZENS BELIEVE THAT THE LAW ON CITIZENSHIP SHOULD BE CHANGED. 33% OF CITIZENS AND 66% OF NON-CITIZENS FAVOR SIMPLIFICATION OF THE HISTORY EXAM. 20% OF CITIZENS AND MORE THAN 50% OF NON-CITIZENS SUPPORT SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LANGUAGE EXAM. HOWEVER 15% OF CITIZENS BELIEVE THAT NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE MORE STRICT.

O 25% OF CITIZENS AND 66% OF NON-CITIZENS SUPPORT CANCELING THE AGE QUOTAS OF THE "WINDOWS" SYSTEM. (NOTE: UNDER THIS SYSTEM, MOST NON-CITIZENS MAY APPLY FOR NATURALIZATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SCHEDULE THAT BEGAN IN 1996 AND ENDS IN 2003. IN 1996, APPLICATIONS WERE ACCEPTED FROM PERSONS AGE 16-20 WHO WERE BORN IN LATVIA. IN 1997, APPLICANTS BORN IN LATVIA UP TO 25 YEARS OF AGE MAY APPLY. EACH YEAR PROGRESSIVELY OLDER NON-CITIZENS MAY APPLY UNTIL BY 2003 ALL NON-CITIZENS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION.)

O 66% OF NON-CITIZENS SAY THAT, IF THE "WINDOWS" WERE ABOLISHED, ALL MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILY WOULD SEEK NATURALIZATION TOGETHER.

O 82% OF CITIZENS AND 95% OF NON-CITIZENS AGREE THAT PRIORITY IN NATURALIZATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO NON-CITIZENS BORN IN LATVIA. HOWEVER, ONLY 28% OF CITIZENS WOULD DROP THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY EXAMS FOR NON-CITIZENS BORN IN LATVIA.

O ONLY 15% OF NON-CITIZENS REPORT HAVING RECEIVED THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT'S NON-CITIZEN TRAVEL DOCUMENT.

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60% OF NON-CITIZENS REPORT A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS DOCUMENT.

COMMENT:

10. THESE SURVEY RESULTS SUGGEST THAT CURRENT NATURALIZATION RATES ARE SO LOW (LESS THAN 7.3% IN THE TWO "WINDOWS" THAT ARE NOW OPEN) BECAUSE THERE IS NO "PUSH" AND NO "PULL" ON NON-CITIZENS TO ENTER THE PROCESS. WHILE NON-CITIZENS EXPRESS PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY AND FRUSTRATION, THEY DO NOT EXPERIENCE THE KIND OF NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-CITIZEN STATUS IN THEIR DAILY LIVES THAT MIGHT "PUSH" THEM INTO NATURALIZATION. AT THE SAME TIME, NON-CITIZENS DO NOT SEE LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP AS CONFERRING ON THEM INCENTIVES SUFFICIENT TO "PULL" THEM INTO THE NATURALIZATION PROCES. THE RESULT IS THE SORT OF DRIFT AND INDECISION THAT IS REFLECTED IN THIS POLL DATA.

11. IN ASSESSING A POSSIBLE AMERICAN ROLE IN ACCELERATING THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES WOULD BE REQUIRED AND THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE UNCERTAIN. IT UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 RIGA 001155

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MAY BE THAT ONLY GENERATIONAL TRANSITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF LATVIA INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER WESTERN INSTITUTIONS CAN DECISIVELY ACCELERATE SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATVIA. HOWEVER, IF WE WANT A ROLE IN THIS PROCESS, THREE APPROACHES COULD BE CONSIDERED.

RECOMMENDED U.S. ROLE

12. CONTINUE CAREFUL DIPLOMACY WITH THE LATVIANS TO CONVINCING THEM TO IMPLEMENT THE VERY POSITIVE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED DURING THE APRIL 15 SPECIAL CABINET MEETING. THE CBSS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MINORITIES OLE ESPERSON WILL VISIT LATVIA PRIL 16, AND OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR MINORITIEMAX VAN DER STOEL WILL VISIT APRIL 16-17. WE ANTICIPATE THAT BOTH VISITORS WILL PROVIDE STRONG SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE DECISIONS. THE U.S. SHOULD DO THE SAME BOTH IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE DIPLOMACY. IN PARTICULAR, IF THE OSCE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN FACT IMPLEMENTED, ANY REMAINING RATIONALE FOR RUSSIA'S CONTINUING OVERBLOWN CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE AGAINST LATVIA WILL VANISH. WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE LATVIANS TO SEE THAT THESE DECISIONS ARE IN FACT IMPLEMENTED. WITH THE RUSSIANS OUR MESSAGE SHOULD BE PLAIN: "ENOUGH IS ENOUGH."

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13. LATVIA WILL NEED MUCH PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE THE BREAKTHROUGH ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION THAT IS NOW WITHIN REACH. I BELIEVE THAT A CONCRETE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION IS ESSENTIAL. WE SHOULD WORK WITH LATVIAN INSTITUTIONS, ESPECIALLY THE NATURALIZATION BOARD, TO PROVIDE NON-CITIZENS WITH ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS. THE NATURALIZATION BOARD HAS ESTABLISHED AN INFORMATION DEPARTMENT FOR OUTREACH TO POTENTIAL NON-CITIZEN APPLICANTS FOR NATURALIZATION. A PROJECT PROPOSAL FOR US \$540,000 TO GET THE CENTER LAUNCHED HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO EU PHARE FOR FUNDING. THE GOVERNMENT OF LATVIA WILL CONTRIBUTE AN ADDITIONAL \$162,000. THE PURPOSE OF THE CENTER IS TO PROVIDE NON-CITIZENS WITH ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS. FIELD OFFICES IN LIEPAJA AND DAUGAUPILS ARE ALSO ENVISIONED. USAID/RIGA HAS HAD DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATURALIZATION BOARD (WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUP MENTIONED IN PARA 3) WHO HAS REQUESTED USG ASSISTANCE TO RECRUIT AND FUND A LONG-TERM (1-2 YEARS) ADVISOR TO HELP THE CENTER DEVELOP A NATIONWIDE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN. THE BOARD IS DEVELOPING A SCOPE-OF-WORK. AN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION FOR FUNDING ADVISORY ASSISTANCE THIS FISCAL YEAR WOULD NOT ONLY BE TIMELY BUT EFFECTIVELY AND IMMEDIATELY UTILIZED AND MAY BE CRITICAL TO THE CENTER'S SUCCESS, AS IT COULD BE A WHILE BEFORE EU FUNDING IS MADE AVAILABLE.

14. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO STRENGTHEN LATVIA'S NATIONAL PROGRAM TO TEACH THE LATVIAN LANGUAGE TO THOSE NON-CITIZENS WHO DON'T SPEAK THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE. UNDP IS ALREADY CONTRIBUTING CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE TO THIS EFFORT AND COORDINATING THE EFFORTS OF OTHER DONORS. A DONORS GROUP HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSIDER HOW ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE COULD BE MOBILIZED IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO DEVELOP A NEW PROGRAM FOR SOCIAL INTEGRATION THAT IS BEING PREPARED BY AN INTER-UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 RIGA 001155

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MINISTERIAL WORKING GROUP. THIS GROUP IS DUE TO SUBMIT ITS REPORT IN LATE JUNE. HERE AGAIN, A TIMELY AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION WOULD HELP KEEP UP LATVIAN MOMENTUM AND LEVERAGE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER DONORS. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER ON OPPORTUNITIES DEVELOPED DURING THIS PROCESS AS THEY DEVELOP.
NAPPER

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001. letter | Guntis Ulmanis, President of Latvia, to President Clinton [2 copies] (4 pages) | 09/04/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. report | Re: [Skrunda] (8 pages) | 03/11/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 003. notes | Handwritten notes (1 page) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004a. email | Stephen Flanagan to William Courtney, et al., re: [Skrunda] (1 page) | 02/04/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 004b. cable | Re: [Report] (2 pages) | 02/01/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 004c. cable | Re: [Skrunda] (2 pages) | 12/08/1997 | P1/b(1) |
| 005. report | Re: Nuclear Security and Proliferation [Atomic Energy Act] (4 pages) | 09/26/1997 | P1/b(1), P3/b(3) |
| 006. report | Re: [Missile Warning] (7 pages) | 09/21/1998 | P1/b(1) |

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Latvijas Valsts prezidents

Riga, September 4, 1998

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

Mr. President,

Although we signed documents to formalize a partnership between Latvia and the United States in January of this year, our working partnership as presidents of our respective countries began many years earlier. It is my distinct pleasure to report to you the successful completion of one very important undertaking that was launched by our partnership in 1994.

The phased-array radar station in Skrunda, Latvia, was switched off on August 31st at 12:03 PM local time. The phase of dismantling will begin this week.

I am writing to you, Mr. President, to thank you for the critical role you played in bringing us to this historical moment. Thanks to your efforts, and those of order U.S. officials and experts, 1994 marked the culmination of talks between Latvia and Russia which led to the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces from Latvian territory.

The agreement on Skrunda was one of the most difficult compromises reached in the process of talks concerning troop withdrawal. Even at the time when the forces of the former Soviet Union were departing from many Eastern European countries, Latvia had to reach a decision to preserve a Russian Federation military facility on its soil.

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In this case, your support, as well as that of European statesmen and experts played a crucial role in arriving at a solution. Financial support from the United States, Sweden, and Finland made it possible to achieve a "full" withdrawal and to begin the process of cleaning up and reclaiming the land which had been part of the former military bases. We are particularly grateful to the United States for your generous assistance which brought about the dismantling of a major part of the Skrunda facility in 1994. On August 31, the last phase of this dismantlement project went into effect.

Latvian and Russian cooperation in accordance with *The Agreement on the Skrunda Phased Array Radar Station Legal Status and Temporary Functioning and Period of Dismantlement* is evidence that, in the context of a complex issue, a positive result is yielded when agreements are followed precisely.

In closing, I would like to underline the contribution of the OSCE and its member states, which were involved in fulfillment of the agreement and ensuring the inspection procedures, which in themselves were an essential part of the eventual realization of objectives.

Mr. President, please accept my deep gratitude for what you have done to help Russia and Latvia fulfill an agreement which is important for the stability of Europe and for the existence of cooperative relations in the Baltic Sea region. Throughout your term in office you have been a true friend of the Latvian people. Your friendship, leadership and vision has meant a great deal to our country, and continues to bring us important dividends.

Respectfully yours

Guntis Ulmanis
President of the Republic of Latvia

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Guntis Ulmanis', written in dark ink.



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President of the Republic of Latvia

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Guntis Ulmanis', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Martin Van Heumen

Media: Programming
✓ NO license on cable TV
✓ Independent station.

World Bank / EBRD

✓
✓
World Bank NGO
✓ NGO engaged
✓

CAST₃

✓ County assistance strategies

✓
Continuation of Contact Study

① Engage in region

② Work on problems

③

✓ Action Plan

✓

✓

NGOs

✓ ~~the~~ ~~center~~
✓ Ideas show how assist change

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

✓ 1/8/85

✓

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|----------------------|
| 001a. memo | Stephen Flanagan to Samuel Berger, re: Memecon with Baltic Presidents on January 16, 1998 (1 page) | 01/30/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001b. memo | Glyn Davies to William Burns, re: Memorandum of Conversation with Baltic Presidents (1 page) | ea. 01/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001c. memeon | Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Baltic Presidents (6 pages) | 01/16/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002a. memo | Susan Braden to Samuel Berger, re: Presidential Meeting with Baltic Presidents Meri, Brazauskas and Ulmanis on January 16, 1998 (1 page) | 01/09/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002b. briefing paper | From Samuel Berger, re: Meeting with Baltic Presidents (6 pages) | 01/16/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002c. talking points | Points to be Made for Meeting with Estonian President Meri, Latvian President Ulmanis and Lithuanian President Brazauskas (3 pages) | ea. 01/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002d. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002e. report | U.S. Government Report (1 page) | 01/12/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002f. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002g. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002h. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 12/30/1997 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Central and Eastern European Affairs (Flanagan, Stephen)
 OA/Box Number: 1785

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia, 1997-1998 [2]

2011-1037-F
 ke2182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002i. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Central and Eastern European Affairs (Flanagan, Stephen)
 OA/Box Number: 1785

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia, 1997-1998 [2]

2011-1037-F
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January 30, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN *sjf*

SUBJECT: Memcon with Baltic Presidents on January 16, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Presidents Meri of Estonia, Ulmanis of Latvia and Brazauskas of Lithuania on January 16, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/4/2023
2016-0314-M-1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Baltic Presidents
(U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Presidents Meri of Estonia, Ulmanis of Latvia and Brazauskas of Lithuania is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/23
2016-0314-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0629-M (1.38)

6/12/2023 VZ

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Baltic Presidents

PARTICIPANTS:

- The President
- The Vice President
- Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
- Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
- Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
- Larry Napper, U.S. Ambassador to Latvia
- Keith Smith, U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania
- Walter Andrusyszyn, U.S. Chargé to Estonia
- Stephen Flanagan, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Central and Eastern European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
- Tiina Ets, Interpreter (Estonia)
- Alvin Skipsna, Interpreter (Latvia)
- Emilija Sakadolskas, Interpreter (Lithuania)

Estonia

- Lenert Meri, President
- Kalev Stoicescu, Ambassador to the U.S.
- Indrek Tarand, Chancellor, Permanent Under Secretary
- Sven Jurgenson, Director, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Kaja Tael, Interpreter

Latvia

- Guntis Ulmanis, President
- Valdis Birkavs, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Ojars Kalnins, Ambassador to the U.S.
- Ivars Millers, Chief of Staff
- Ieva Zalcburga, Interpreter

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 1/30/08

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Lithuania

Algirdas Brazauskas, President
Algirdas Saudargas, Minister of Foreign
Affairs

Stasys Sakalauskas, Ambassador to the U.S.
Neris Germanas, Advisor to the President
Zita Makutiene, Interpreter

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:

January 16, 1998, 1:40 - 2:25 p.m.
The Cabinet Room

The President: Today is an important day. I just want to make a few remarks and really listen to what you have to say. (U)

The Charter of Partnership is an historic document and a demonstration of our commitment to advance integration of your countries into Western institutions through concrete initiatives. We welcome your aspirations to join the Alliance and are committed to keeping NATO's door open. The first round of enlargement will not be the last, but we need to get the first round right. Welcome your help. (U)

I applaud your efforts to work together and with your neighbors, particularly with Russia. We welcome the recent Lithuanian-Russian border agreement and hope that Russia will sign agreements with Estonia and Latvia soon. (U)

We strongly support your accession to WTO, and I hope we can complete your three separate negotiations this year. I know you discussed this issue with Ambassador Barshefsky earlier in the week. She has since advised me that she discussed the problem on audiovisual with Sir Leon Brittan yesterday, and they agreed to work together expeditiously to find a solution. In fact, U.S. and EU officials will meet next week. But I want to underscore that I have made clear to Ambassador Barshefsky that this must be resolved this year. (U)

Now, I really want to hear what you all have to say. (U)

President Meri: Thank you very much for your comments and your support to make this day possible. The Charter is truly an historic document and we welcome it. We are committed to moving forward on implementation. On WTO, we are very grateful for your commitment and hope that this can be resolved very soon.

(U)

The President: Again, on WTO I just want to emphasize that we want this resolved this year. I truly believe that it is in the interest of the United States and the EU to work this out so that we don't stand in the way of your integration. ~~(S)~~

President Meri: There is also the question of our membership in the OECD, which we hope can be resolved soon. At the same time, we are busy in Estonia developing our economy and building practical cooperation with all our neighbors, including Russia, as you mentioned. One of my favorite projects is the effort to get internet connections in every school in Estonia. I hope Mr. Vice President that when you arrive in the White House, sometime after the year 2000, that every school will be connected. (U)

President Brazauskas: I am most grateful for this opportunity to meet with you. A stable security system is important to Lithuania and to all of us. - This Charter signing is the most important event on the political agenda of Lithuania this year and we look forward to its implementation. We desire NATO membership and are working through the development of our military forces and other actions to make this possible. We have, indeed, signed the Border Delimitation Treaty with Russia, and hope that this will spur others.

We are also working to put our relations with Belarus on a broader and more normal course. But still there are other problems that relate to the internal politics of Belarus.

I welcome your words on WTO. WTO and OECD membership are highly important to Lithuania. We recognize that we can't be members of these and other Western institutions unless we meet the criteria and clear up remaining problems. But I am grateful to all elements of the U.S. government, particularly on the military side, for your help in this regard. ~~(S)~~

The President: Thank you for those words. I welcome the Estonian border cooperation and also Lithuania's border agreements. ~~(S)~~

President Meri: Our border agreement is nearly ready. ~~(S)~~

President Ulamanis: Mr. Napper, Ambassador Napper speaks such beautiful Latvian, I am going to follow his example and deliver my remarks in English. I'll do my best. (U)

The President: That's pretty good. Your English is a lot better than my Latvian. (U)

President Ulmanis: Mr. President, we have a common vision, economic, political and social. This is enshrined in the Charter of Partnership, which we fully embrace. We look forward to working actively on implementation. In fact, I would like to propose that we have the first quadrilateral meeting of the Partnership Council in Riga. (S)

The 1994 NATO Summit has two formal objectives: to review progress of applicant countries towards membership and to set the agenda for the Alliance in the 21st Century. We want to be part of that vision. (S)

Mr. President, thank you for your leadership and your support in our dealings with Russia. I have a vision of a new Russia that is a good neighbor. We are building practical cooperation with Russia to advance this goal. You can count on Latvia to do its part. I recently sent a letter to President Yeltsin expressing my hopes for further cooperation with Russia. I received a very cordial response that thanked me for my efforts to reconcile relations between Russia and Latvian society. (S)

Finally, Mr. President, Latvia will be celebrating the 80th anniversary of its independence in November of this year. I would like to welcome you to Riga for this celebration. (U)

The President: I am encouraged by your vision of Russia and its relations with the Baltic states. I welcome your positive input and I think we have made some good progress. Now I know you have been concerned that Russia may delay its departure from the Skrunda radar facility. We expect Russia to abide fully by the terms of the agreement and have strong indications that Russia intends to do so. But we'll keep on top of this. I would like to ask Vice President Gore to say a few words. (S)

The Vice President: This is an historic meeting. It will be looked back upon as important in the development of transatlantic and European relations. Your pleasures are matched by ours. I also look forward to working on the many practical areas of cooperation that we have outlined. (U)

Secretary Albright: We had a wonderful lunch at the State Department and really celebrated this day. We are delighted that Strobe will soon follow up as head of the Partnership Commission. One of the issues we discussed at lunch was our

guests' concerns about Ukraine, and I would invite them to mention some of these to you, Mr. President. (S)

President Meri: Thank you, Madame Secretary. It may seem inappropriate for such a small country to speak of helping such a large country as Ukraine, but I think we have common experiences that can be of value to our friends in Kiev. Estonia has been successful in building up its financial and the banking sector. President Kuchma knows how to get things done, but he might be able to use some of the lessons of our experience in certain sectors, as a post-Soviet society, to good effect. One thing is clear, it is important that all of us support Ukraine. Because Ukraine's success is also a way to ensure democracy in Russia. (S)

President Brazauskas: I also want to say a word about Ukraine. Relations between all three Baltic states and Ukraine are good. Our security depends on stability and democracy being preserved in Ukraine. A month ago I had a meeting with President Kuchma and I feel that President Kuchma adheres to the same line. But his situation is very difficult. All the military factories are either closed down or at a standstill. Thousands of workers are affected. This common attention to Ukraine is helpful. (S)

President Ulmanis: I welcome this discussion. Ukraine's stability is critical to security in the region. Elections are coming up in Ukraine and the left-wing is active. I think that it is important that we engage Ukraine in our Hanseatic cooperation. (S)

By the way, I hope that the United States will play a role in the Council of the Baltic Sea States. (S)

The Vice President: We would welcome the opportunity to help advance regional cooperation and to include Ukraine. (S)

Secretary Albright: Also on Belarus, the three Presidents have some very interesting ideas on how to deal with this situation. We discussed this over lunch. (S)

President Brazauskas: Lukashenko has lost touch with reality and is only concerned with maintaining power. We need to appeal to the forces of reason in Belarus. Russia can play a constructive role here. We need to press ahead together with some of the ideas we discussed at lunch (NFI). (S)

Deputy Secretary Talbott: The Council of the Baltic Sea States can be a practical vehicle for our engagement in regional cooperation. In particular, we want to participate in the Operative Committee of the Working Group on Organized Crime.
(S)

President Ulmanis: We discussed this in the Justice Department earlier today. We are in agreement with this. (S)

President Meri: One last point with regard to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. These can seem outdated now that the Cold War is over, but there are many tasks involved in building a democratic society, more than just having elections. Free media and the flow of ideas are also vitally important. (U)

Finally, let me say "I am delighted that Strobe Talbott will lead the "Joint Commission." It ensures solid implementation.
(U)

The President: Well thank you all very, very much. I think we need to proceed to the signing ceremony. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

January 9, 1998



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN *SJF*

FROM: SUSAN R. BRADEN *SB*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Baltic Presidents Meri, Brazauskas and Ulmanis on January 16, 1998

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding briefing material and talking points for his meeting with Baltic Presidents Lennert Meri, Guntis Ulmanis and Algirdas Brazauskas on January 16, 1998.

Concurrences by: Ki Fort *KE* and Nancy McEldowney *NMF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Scenario
- Tab C Biographies
- Tab D Secretary of State Memo to the President
- Tab E Partnership Charter

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VZ NARA, Date 6/6/2013
2018-0314-M-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 1/9/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH BALTIC PRESIDENTS

DATE: January 16, 1998

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 1:40 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0656-1M (1.51)

4/27/2022 v2

I. PURPOSE

- Underscore our commitment to advancing the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's into Western institutions and to strengthening our bilateral relations.
- As a symbol of this commitment, sign the Charter of Partnership, which codifies the terms of the relationship and maps out the road ahead.
- Reaffirm our commitment to keep NATO's door open and support their efforts to become members of NATO. Also note our support for their accession, on appropriate terms, to the EU and WTO.
- Applaud Baltic efforts to develop friendly relations with their neighbors, particularly Russia, and offer support for expanded cooperation between Russia and northeastern Europe in areas where there is common ground.

II. BACKGROUND

The Baltic Presidents see this visit as a truly historic occasion both because of the Charter signing and because it will be the last time they, as key figures in their countries' post-communist transformations, will be together with you in the White House. Valdas Adamkus, a Lithuanian-American former EPA official in Chicago, will replace Brazauskas, who chose not to seek reelection, next month. Meri, nearly 70, is unlikely to stand for another term, and Ulmanis, whose second term expires next year, probably won't run again.

These very different men -- the urbane and intellectual Meri, the earthy, former Communist Brazauskas, and the

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify on: 1/9/08

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centrist, business-like Ulmanis -- have succeeded in putting their states at the forefront of the reform movement in Central Europe. Over the past four years, they have successfully used their positions to forward democratic reform, continue the transition to market-oriented economies, move closer to Western institutions, and enhance relations with their neighbors, including Russia.

All three leaders believe that **the United States is key to their full reintegration into the West**. For over fifty years, successive U.S. Administrations maintained a strong policy of non-recognition of their forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union. We then played a critical role in helping them implement democratic and free market reforms and strengthen their security and sovereignty. The Charter of Partnership you will sign during this visit symbolizes how far they have come since 1991 and expresses our commitment to help them complete this journey.

The Charter is a political statement of common principles and a framework for the expansion of our relations. Most importantly to the Baltics, it affirms that they are part of our vision for a new Europe and will not be left out or discriminated against due to history or geography.

- **On NATO, it builds on the Madrid Summit, stating that the United States welcomes Baltic aspirations and supports their efforts to join NATO.** It also recalls Madrid's caveat that aspirants must be able to assume the responsibilities of membership and that Allies must agree inclusion of any new members would serve overall European stability. **It does not pre-commit us to Baltic membership or extend any surrogate security guarantees.**
- The Baltic states reaffirm their commitment to continue market-oriented reforms. The four governments pledge to enhance joint efforts to promote cooperative relations throughout the Baltic region, including with Russia.
- The Charter notes the progress of existing bilateral working groups on defense and establishes a new working group on trade, investment, and related fields. It also establishes a Partnership Commission of senior officials, who will hold annual stock-taking meetings.

Moving Ahead Along. As evidence of our commitment to pursuing Charter goals, you will announce at the signing ceremony the establishment of a **Baltic-American Partnership Fund** -- using \$7.5 million of our assistance money and **matching funds from George Soros** -- whose charter will be to foster the development on non-governmental organizations in these states. Also during their visit here, Charlene Barshefsky will sign a bilateral investment treaty with Lithuania (Estonia and Latvia have accords already), Bob Rubin will sign **treaties against double taxation** with all three states, and Attorney General Reno and FBI Director Freeh will announce enhanced **cooperation** among the three in administration of **justice and combating organized crime**.

Likely Topics

NATO Membership. The Baltic Presidents will raise their aspirations for NATO membership. They all hope there will be a second tranche of new members in 1999, and at least Lithuania believes it is well on the way to qualifying. Lithuania, with the largest population, has, in fact, devoted the most resources and made the greatest progress of the three in building its armed forces. But even they have very limited capabilities to work with NATO in defense of their territory or in peacekeeping missions elsewhere.

While continuing to advance the public line that all Baltic states belong in NATO, both Tallinn and Riga realize that they won't be ready militarily to join soon and that most Allies have serious reservations about their membership because of Russian objections. Thus, they have focused their efforts on joining the EU. In their meeting with you, the presidents will accept the view that it is premature to discuss the "next tranche" and that the Charter does not commit the United States to support their bid. However, they will **seek reaffirmation that NATO's door remains open**, and, as Strobe has put it, that we are **working seriously to help them walk through that door**.

- You should urge them to focus on taking advantage of the many programs we and the Allies are offering, including \$18 million in military assistance next year, to help them enhance their security, ability to work with NATO, and preparations for membership. You might remind them that the Charter is neither a security guarantee nor a firm commitment to support their membership.

Investment, EU and WTO. The Baltic economies are all still in transition, but Estonia and Latvia are the furthest along. U.S. investment in the region has been slow to develop, now totaling about \$550 million, only 19 percent of all their foreign investment.

- **Estonia** has made steady progress across the board and in 1996 became the first Central European country to "graduate" from our assistance program Support for East European Democracy (SEED). In December, it was the only Baltic state invited to commence EU accession talks.
- **Latvia** is close to getting an offer from the EU to begin accession talks. Its strong progress was slowed by lagging privatization and a 1995 banking crisis.
- **Lithuania** has made steady progress in privatization but has suffered from very slow growth (linked to taxation policies and a lagging financial sector).

Regarding the WTO, Latvia has been the most aggressive of the three in pursuing this goal. Its bid, however, is being held up over the issue of audiovisual services, which pits us against the EU and puts Latvia and the other two Baltic EU aspirants in between. The EU is insisting that Latvia make no commitment to open its market to audiovisual services. While ready to accept Latvia's adoption of current (51 percent foreign) EU content restrictions, we want Riga to go no further and believe this is a significant concession.

- You should tell the Presidents that we are very supportive of their accession to the EU and the WTO -- on defensible terms -- and hope the audiovisual issue with the EU can be resolved soon. You might also note our interest in expanding trade and investment.

Russians & Hansa. The Baltic leaders cooperate well with each other and most of their neighbors. The Nordics and the United States have supported several initiatives that promote regional security and compatibility with NATO, including the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Baltbat). The Nordics have extensive trade and investment in the region.

Lithuanian-Russian relations are the best of the three, in large part because Russian speakers account for only 8 percent of the population. In October, Presidents Yeltsin

and Brazauskas signed a demarcation agreement of the land border with Kaliningrad. Vilnius remains concerned, however, about transit through Lithuania from this heavily-militarized Russian province to its west.

Latvia and Estonia, which have much larger ethnic Russian communities, maintain normal but cool relations with Russia. Estonia and Latvia have not reached border agreements, primarily because of Moscow's linkage of conditions on the treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities (29 and 33 percent respectively). They have, however, begun practical cooperation with Russia on such problems as border controls and countering crime.

In August 1994, with your intervention, Russia withdrew its troops from Latvia **except for about 800 technicians who stayed to operate the Skrunda missile early-warning radar facility** until it shuts down this August. Russia has allowed agreed inspections of this facility. But Latvia is concerned that departure of the technicians and the commencement of dismantlement may be slowed due to construction delays in the essential replacement facility in Belarus. Based on political signs and available intelligence, **we expect Russia to abide fully by the terms of the agreement with Latvia, which Yeltsin has previously affirmed to you.**

In December, as part of an emerging "charm offensive," **President Yeltsin** floated the notion of enhanced economic cooperation with the Baltic states, but linked it to Baltic neutrality and offers of **joint security guarantees**. The Balts promptly rejected the latter notions, making clear that they aspire to be members of NATO.

- Rather than fight Moscow on Baltic membership in NATO, we have sought to focus on areas where there is a common ground. Madeleine and Strobe have told their Russian interlocutors, that we must agree to disagree on NATO, but we want to help promote expanded cooperation between northeastern Europe and northern Russia (as existed in Hanseatic period) in trade, energy development, the environment, and combating transnational problems such as organized crime. You should encourage the Baltic Presidents to pursue a similar tack as a way to show Moscow that Baltic integration will create opportunities.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Scenario at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

See Scenario at Tab B.

V. SEQUENCE

See Scenario at Tab B.

Attachments

| | |
|-------|--|
| Tab A | Points to be Made |
| Tab B | Scenario |
| Tab C | Biographies |
| Tab D | Secretary of State Memo to the President |
| Tab E | Summary of The Charter of Partnership |

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ESTONIAN PRESIDENT MERI, LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS AND
LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT BRAZAUSKAS

Partnership Charter

- Charter important for United States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania because it marks how far we have come toward our shared goal of building a new Europe and advancing your integration into West. Also maps out clear directions for road ahead.
- Charter makes clear our "real, profound and enduring interest" in independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and security of your countries.
- Can be very proud of your individual and collective efforts to advance goals of Charter even before it was completed. Need to keep working to promote respect for rights of all citizens and deal with legacy of past.
- Together, you are creating facts of integration on ground through your participation in PFP, IFOR, and host of regional initiatives.
- Charter gives us many opportunities to expand and improve relations in both security and economic fields. Events of last few days -- signing of double tax treaties, initiatives on justice and organized crime, and creation of Baltic-American Partnership Fund - show that we are already moving to build on this framework.

NATO Enlargement

- Welcome your desire and support your efforts to become members of NATO. Want to underscore that NATO's door will remain open.
- Your membership will depend on satisfaction of NATO principles, including your ability to contribute to overall security.
- First round of enlargement will not be last. But it's too soon to talk about next steps. We must all focus on getting first round "right" and securing Senate ratification. Welcome your help in this regard. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)
Declassify On: 1/9/08

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PER E.O. 13526
2014-0656-M (1.52)

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stronger our success in integrating Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, easier next steps will be.

- This is good time to make use of intensified dialogue, Partnership for Peace enhancements and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to deepen your engagement with Alliance.
- We are committed to helping you advance these goals in more systematic ways. Fully support work of our military experts to assess needs of your countries' armed forces and help you develop realistic defense plans. We will increase our security assistance next year and work closely with other donor states.

EU/WTO Accession

- Support each of your efforts to join EU, but recognize decisions will be made by Europeans.
- We support your accession to WTO on appropriate terms. Will be as flexible as can; hope EU will do same.
- As Ambassador Barshevsky explained, we will continue to work with EU on what we think is reasonable compromise on audiovisual content that is consistent with goals of EU Broadcast Directive and protects our interest in maintaining an open market.

Relations with Neighbors

- Applaud effort to develop cooperative relationship with each other, Nordics, and Russia.
- Especially pleased with your joint effort to promote regional security and interoperability with NATO through participation in Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Batlbat), Baltic Sea Squadron (Baltron), and regional airspace initiative (Baltnet).
- Now it's time to explore in detail opportunities for building economic and other non-security cooperation throughout Baltic region. Am fully committed to enhancing our involvement in Nordic/Baltic and Baltic/Russian cooperative ventures.

Russia

- Encouraged by recent signature of Kaliningrad border agreement between Presidents Brazauskas and Yeltsin in Moscow.
- Agreement meets one of fundamental responsibilities in relationship between neighboring states, establishment of common borders in mutually satisfactory manner. With border agreements in place, Lithuania and Russia can move on to other areas of cooperation.
- Hope Russia will sign similar agreements with Estonia and Latvia soon. Pleased that Estonia and Latvia are committed to expanding practical cooperation with Russia on common concerns.
- Know Latvia concerned that Russia may delay departure from Skrunda radar facility. We expect Russia to abide fully by terms of agreement with Latvia. Have strong indications that Russia intends to do so.
- Note Russia has proposed security guarantees to you. As we stated publicly, agree sovereign states have right to choose their own security orientation, including whether or not to become member of an Alliance. Your choice is clear.
- Want to work with you and Nordics to expand cooperation between northern Europe and Russia in areas where we all have common interests. Charter notes increased cooperation in economic development, trade, environmental arena as well as in fight against organized crime. As you have heard in meetings earlier this week, we are ready to move on this agenda in practical ways.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|-------------|----------------------|
| 001. report | RE: [Latvia] [Released in Part] (4 pages) | 11/08/1995 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. memo | Daniel Fried to Anthony Lake, re: Your Brief Meeting with Latvian Ambassador Kalnins (1 page) | 07/14/1995 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. report | Biography (1 page) | ca. 06/1995 | P1/b(1) |
| 004. report | Biography (1 page) | ca. 06/1995 | P1/b(1) |
| 005. memo | Re: Circular 175 Authorization for Negotiation and Conclusion of Treaties on Treatment and Protection of Investment (4 pages) | ea. 1990 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Central and Eastern European Affairs (Fried, Daniel)
 OA/Box Number: 893

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia - Richard Schifter [1]

2011-1037-F
 ke2183

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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d Latvia



Intelligence Report

Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis

8 November 1995

Latvia: Bumps on the Road to Reform 3.5c

The large vote cast for several fringe parties in last month's parliamentary elections highlighted the Latvian public's disenchantment with painful economic reforms. The fragmented coalition government that eventually emerges could backslide on economic reform, but broad popular support for Western integration probably will force it ultimately to toe the line on reform. Pervasive crime and corruption, however, could stymie Latvia's transition to a "mature" democratic society. At the same time that Riga is working to normalize relations with Moscow, deep-rooted suspicions about Russia's intentions toward Latvia are prompting closer ties to the West. 3.5c

Political Developments. Parliamentary elections held on 30 September and 1 October failed to produce an obvious winner, with nine parties splitting 100 seats. *The unexpected success of several wildcard parties--representing both the far left and far right--probably will make sustaining a workable coalition extremely difficult.*

- In the election aftermath, several leftist parties and the right-wing populist People's Movement for Latvia--headed by German-born Joachim Siegerist, renowned for being booted out of the previous parliament for poor attendance and charged in Germany for inciting racial hatred--formed a self-described "Centrist Bloc" comprising at least 48 seats. EO 13526 1.4c
- The core of the Centrist Bloc is the "Democratic Party Saimnieks," which received the most votes, claiming 18 seats. Founded by former Latvian Communist Party members, "Saimnieks"--which perhaps not ironically means "master"--has ties to organized crime and Russian intelligence front companies, including Nordex, EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c 3.5c

Although this Bloc has so far drawn the most support from elected deputies, President Ulmanis on 7 November tapped a member of the right-of-center National Conciliation


This report was requested by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to support the Secretary's upcoming trip to the Baltic states. It was prepared by 3.5c Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, New States Division, OSE, 3.5c

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (1.66)

6/12/2023 VZ



Bloc--Maris Grinblats, the head of the ultranationalist For Fatherland and Freedom Party--to try to form a government. A parliamentary majority must approve Grinblats's proposed government; he will be hard-pressed to win the support of five uncommitted, but left-leaning Socialist deputies. Grinblats's failure could force Ulmanis to turn to the Center Bloc to form a government or possibly call for new elections.

- To ensure that any coalition government continues working to integrate Latvia into Western political, economic, and security organizations, Ulmanis in mid-October called on the lameduck parliament to approve a formal application to the European Union. Ulmanis then called together the leaders of all of the parties to be represented in the new parliament and secured their endorsement of the application, which was formally presented in Brussels later in the month. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

3.5c

Organized Crime. Organized criminal activity pervades the Latvian economy and undercuts reforms. EO 13526 1.4c Organized crime groups--mostly ethnic Russian with strong international connections--focus their activities on illegal trade between former Soviet states and the West, using deepwater ports in Riga and Ventspils.

- EO 13526 1.4c Latvia's organized crime gangs derive their primary revenues from selling stolen Western automobiles and illegal shipments of Russian oil, as well as by facilitating illegal immigration to Europe; extortion and racketeering are also major money earners. 3.5c

Latvia's legitimate economy has been penetrated to a large degree. Described as the "Switzerland of the East" for its lucrative banking sector, Latvia is the money laundering capital of the former Soviet Union, EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

- Preliminary investigations by the FBI and audits by a US accounting firm uncovered a major international money-laundering operation that was run out of Latvia's largest commercial bank--Bank Baltija, which collapsed in May. Bank Baltija moved millions of dollars through its accounts in the United States and created a network of offshore companies. EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Economic Reform. *Twin financial crises this year are undermining Latvia's economic recovery.* The failure of 16--out of 55--banks and the government's inability to collect tax revenues have spawned a larger-than-expected budget deficit and forced

the lameduck parliament in late October to pass a supplementary budget bill increasing the debt ceiling to 92 million lats from 40 million.

- The amended budget cut the amount earmarked this year for compensation to depositors of failed banks to 3.5 million lats from 23 million, according to press reports. 3.5c

Projections for this year's economic performance have been adjusted to reflect the current crises. IMF officials are concerned about Latvia's derailed reform program and lack of effort by the government to get back on track, EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

- The IMF and Latvian Government last year had predicted that GDP would grow by 4 percent; current projections are for zero growth, EO 13526 1.4c
- The lameduck parliament's draft 1996 budget does not provide for a balanced budget, as was called for in Riga's IMF program; 1.4(c)
EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d) a zero deficit next year would be impossible, 1.4(c) the planned deficit of 68 million lats is too high. *The IMF probably will pressure Riga to lower next year's deficit target, demanding constructive government action to cut the budget and improve revenue collection.*
- A Center Bloc coalition government probably would be less inclined to rigorously abide by IMF programs; "Saimnieks" and Siegerist's party have promised further budget-busting social safety-net outlays, according to the Embassy. 3.5c

Relations With Russia. Ulmanis and the two governments that served with him since June 1993 have worked to normalize often strained relations with Russia; the April 1994 agreements on Russian troop withdrawals and Moscow's continued operation of the Skrunda ballistic missile warning facility resolved the most contentious bilateral issues.

- "Saimnieks" and the other leftist parties represent the interests of Russian businesses in Latvia, as well as ethnic Russian residents, EO 13526 1.4c A Center Bloc government probably would support measures to curry favor with Moscow--for example, easing implementation of, or changing, Latvian language requirements in order to better integrate ethnic Russians into Latvian society. 3.5c

Despite resolution of the main problems, *most Latvians remain deeply suspicious of Russia's intentions toward the Baltic states*. Riga's concerns were exacerbated by last month's publication in the Russian press of an alleged draft military doctrine that calls for Russia to invade the Baltic states should NATO admit them as members.

- In response to the draft's publication, Latvian Prime Minister Gailis considered invoking a clause in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) agreement that Riga interprets to allow a PFP signatory to seek formal consultations with NATO if that state considers that its security is threatened, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

3.5c

NATO and PFP. By all accounts, fear of Russian threats to its security is the driving force behind Latvia's national security strategy--the main focus of which is rapid integration into Western political, economic, and security structures. Various sources indicate that *Latvia considers NATO the best guarantor of its security and will use every opportunity to press NATO members for assistance in gaining entry*.

- Although Latvian officials have admitted that the country is not currently prepared to join NATO, they have said that any enlargement strategy that does not allow for the Baltic states' eventual entry into NATO would be tantamount to sacrificing them to a Russian sphere of influence a la Molotov-Ribbentrop, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c)

- To promote its candidacy, Latvia actively participates in PFP. *The Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT)--a nascent peacekeeping unit composed of troops from each of the Baltic countries--is the main vehicle for Latvia's participation in PFP*. Last year, Riga devoted 10 percent of its defense budget--about \$2 million--to establish the BALTBAT training center at Adazi, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

3.5c

July 14, 1995

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

NOTED

SUBJECT: Your Brief Meeting with Latvian Ambassador Kalnins
Monday, July 17, 3:30-3:40pm

Latvian Ambassador Ojars Kalnins requested a ten-minute meeting in order: a) to present a small, mounted piece of concrete from the "imploded" Skrunda LPAR facility; and, b) to thank you for a quick USG response to a Latvian request for assistance in dealing with the Bank Baltija collapse.

-- Skrunda. On May 4, the former-Soviet radar complex at Skrunda was "imploded" in accordance with a Latvian-Russian agreement. The U.S. -- the Army Corps of Engineers working through a U.S. contractor -- ran the actual implosion, which took place on the fifth anniversary of the day the Latvian Soviet Republic Parliament declared independence. The implosion went off according to plan; it was followed by a rock concert.

-- Bank Baltija. One of Latvia's most prominent private banks collapsed this spring, amid charges of corruption and fraud and (unconfirmed) rumors of Russian criminal and/or intelligence meddling. In response to urgent Latvian requests, our SEED Act Coordinator dispatched, in quick succession, a Secret Service financial crimes officer and a Treasury advisor; we are preparing to send a larger FBI team to work with Latvian law enforcement officials to investigate possible criminal acts. We also are helping Latvia reform its weak banking system, a longer-term project to consolidate new, small private banks into a viable net.

Kalnins credits SEED Coordinator Ralph Johnson and us for the USG responsiveness. This is an example of how our CEE assistance program has improved in the last couple of years. We were able to combine different programs (our Treasury advisor program and resources from the President's CEE law enforcement initiative) and move interagency and fast.

Kalnins promised he won't raise Russia, NATO, officer housing, Baltic Battalion funding or other tough issues.

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (1.67)

6/12/2023 *rc*

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

Bilateral Investment

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ACTION MEMORANDUM S/S 4/10
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MB2
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-2

TO: D - Mr. Eagleburger
FROM: EB - Eugene J. McAllister^{FM}
L - Abraham D. Sofaer^{AO}
SUBJECT: Circular 175 Authorization for Negotiation and
Conclusion of Treaties on Treatment and Protection
of Investment

IT
AIM
F/CWA

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Authorization pursuant to the Circular 175 procedure (11 FAM 700 et seq.) to negotiate and conclude treaties on the treatment and protection of investment with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with various countries in Eastern Europe.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Recent political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union and in the various countries of Eastern Europe have led to increased interest in direct investment in these countries by U.S. companies. A principal objective of U.S. foreign policy with respect to these countries is to support political liberalization and the movement toward a market orientation for the economy. Increased direct investment by U.S. investors would be a valuable source of capital and managerial expertise and, by assisting in the modernization of the economy and the raising of living standards, would promote the development and durability of democratic institutions.

This memorandum seeks authority to negotiate and conclude bilateral investment treaties with the Soviet Union and various countries in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are the initial priorities; negotiations with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic would also be covered by this authorization. Approval

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DECL: OADR

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2016-0314-M-1 (1.70)

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of this blanket authority will obviate the need for requesting Circular 175 authority for each new negotiation, and is specifically authorized by 11 FAM 722.5 when a series of agreements of the same general type is contemplated.

In 1983 similar blanket authority was granted for the current program of negotiating bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developing and lower-income developed countries. At that time it was noted that there are a number of antecedents to the ongoing U.S. effort to negotiate BITs, including: the longstanding U.S. policy to protect American investment overseas; previously negotiated Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties, most of which contain provisions relevant to investment; and the successful efforts by other developed countries to negotiate investment protection agreements.

Authority to negotiate BITs was granted, with respect to the earliest such treaties, on a case by case basis, and, subsequently, pursuant to the 1983 blanket authorization noted above. The blanket authorization served as the basis for the recently-concluded negotiation of a Business and Economic Treaty with Poland. While the blanket authorization could, as a matter of law, also provide a basis for the proposed treaties with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries other than Poland, we believe that a separate authorization is desirable for several reasons. First, no separate grant of authority was sought with respect to Poland because it had not yet been decided whether the agreement would be concluded as a treaty or as an executive agreement. It has been decided that a treaty rather than an executive agreement is likely to be the appropriate form for such agreements, it is appropriate to confirm this decision with respect to all analogous agreements with Eastern European countries. In addition, the U.S. has learned through the negotiations with Poland that it will be necessary to adapt certain of the BIT provisions to the circumstances of evolving Eastern European economies. The proposed treaties with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries thus will be sufficiently different as to merit separate authorization.

THE TREATY PROPOSAL

The U.S. proposes to commence negotiation with the Soviet Union and Eastern European states of agreements containing the following key elements:

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- 3 -

1. A very broad definition of investment which will enjoy the benefits of the treaty, covering both traditional investment forms and contemporary patterns of service industry and contract investment, as well as corporate tiers of investment regardless of place of incorporation of subsidiaries;
2. Establishment of investment will be permitted on terms and conditions which accord national treatment or most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, whichever is more favorable. Similarly, after establishment investment will receive national or MFN treatment, whichever is more favorable. In addition, we would attempt to incorporate a prohibition on the use of performance requirements as well as provisions providing investors certain specific protections not comprehended by either national or MFN treatment in non-market economies;
3. Standards of expropriation and compensation derived from international law and recognized by the U.S.;
4. Free transfers of capital, returns, compensation and other payments into and out of the host country;
5. Dispute settlement procedures both for disputes between the host country and a national of the other country, and disputes arising between the governments.

It is likely that U.S. negotiators will have to accept deviations from one or more of these standards in order to achieve an agreement with the countries in question. For example, the content of the "fair market value" standard of compensation for expropriation also is not entirely evident in a centrally-planned, non-market economy. Moreover, as long as the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe lack market price regimes, the governments of those countries may be reluctant to agree to an unqualified right to transfer capital, profits, and other payments, particularly local currency profits. U.S. negotiators should pursue the dual goals of achieving the best agreement possible under current circumstances and of using these negotiations as a medium for advising these governments on fundamental economic reforms. Thus, these negotiations may provide a measure of leverage in helping to move the Soviet and Eastern European economies toward a market orientation.

The Congress and the private sector support the concept of negotiating investment protection agreements with the Soviet

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- 4 -

Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The interests of U.S. investors would clearly be served by agreements protecting them against discriminatory treatment in these countries and ensuring that they are able to compete on an equal footing with both local and third country firms.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize, pursuant to the Circular 175 procedures (11 FAM 700 et seq.), the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs or his designee and the Legal Adviser or his designee, to join with the United States Trade Representative or her designee, with the concurrence of appropriate regional bureaus and interested agencies, in negotiating and concluding treaties on the treatment and protection of investment with the Soviet Union and certain countries in Eastern Europe, along the lines set forth in this memorandum and the accompanying Memorandum of Law (Tab 1).

APR 10 1990

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A - Memorandum of Law
- Tab B - Draft Treaty

Drafted: EB/IFD/OIA: JF *JF* re und: Wang 1610

Cleared: EB/IFD/OIA: RCreis
EB/ITC/EWT: AParker
L/EBC: KPropp
L: MYoung
C: NBurns
D/EEA: RBarry
EUR/SOV: JHerbst
EUR/EEY: JCloud
Treasury: COuellette
USTR: CSerwer, DPrice
Commerce: SLewenz
FMP/MP: AFairchild (Subs) *Su for*
EB: ALarson *AL*

JF

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| 002. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 03/07/1995 | P1/b(1) |

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Intelligence Report

Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis

7 March 1995

Latvia: Political and Economic Overview 3.5c

A peaceful government transition, the promulgation of a moderate citizenship law, and adherence to an ambitious economic program during the past year demonstrate Latvia's continued commitment to democratic and free market reforms. 3.5c

In July 1994, a dispute over agricultural tariffs precipitated the collapse of the coalition government formed after the June 1993 parliamentary elections by the Latvia's Way and Farmers' Union parties.

- President Ulmanis first tapped the increasingly popular nationalist Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) to form a government, but the Parliament rejected the proposed rightwing coalition.
- *In September, Ulmanis again turned to Latvia's Way—the dominant party in the Parliament, holding 33 of the 100 seats—to form a government.* The Parliament accepted the centrist coalition put forth by Prime Minister Gailis, which includes Latvia's Way, the Political Economists Union, and several independents—among them two Farmers' Union defectors. 3.5c

The Gailis government currently appears strong enough to fulfill the remainder of its term, but *the popularity of Latvia's Way's is declining as a result of public perceptions that Riga is too conciliatory toward Moscow. As a result, Latvia's Way probably will lose power during the October 1995 parliamentary elections.* In what may have been a harbinger, nationalist parties trounced Latvia's Way during May 1994 local government elections. 3.5c

As a sign of the Parliament's growing political maturity, the legislature adopted an unpopular, but comparatively liberal and internationally acceptable, citizenship law during the summer 1994 government crisis and in the face of strong public support for nationalist parties.

- In response to widespread criticism from Western countries and the Council of Europe (COE), the Parliament deleted a strict quota provision that would have limited naturalizations to only 2,000 individuals per year.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (1.71)

6/12/2023 VZ

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3.5c

- The passage of the law removed the last obstacle to COE membership; Latvia was formally admitted on 10 February 1995. 3.5c

Latvia is second only to Estonia in progress on economic reform in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Riga has ardently pursued a program of financial austerity and economic restructuring to counteract the three-year-old crisis resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet command-administrative system and disruptions in trade with other FSU states.

- *Private enterprises now account for over 55 percent of Latvian GDP, as Riga has made rapid headway in privatizing most farms and small enterprises. Most large and medium-size industrial firms remain in government hands, but the regime recently undertook new initiatives to expedite their transfer, including making a public request for buyers for 45 enterprises in November.*
- *The government has freed all prices, except utilities and rents.*
- *Since introducing its national currency--the lat--in 1992, the government has tightly controlled monetary emissions. The lat is now one of the most stable currencies in Europe.*
- *In February, an IMF delegation praised Latvia's performance, noting the 10-percent drop in annual inflation during 1994--at 34 percent, the lowest among the FSU states. The IMF also highlighted Latvia's 2-percent increase in GNP over 1993, and the Fund projected GNP to grow by 3 to 5 percent this year.* 3.5c

Latvia has made steady gains in diversifying its trade relations away from the weak economies of the FSU. Trade with members of the CIS now accounts for only about 40 percent of total trade, as compared with over 80 percent in 1990, according to official statistics. Russia remains Latvia's largest partner, accounting for 28 percent of total two-way trade. 3.5c

Latvia's economic prospects are good. The surging strength of the private sector, coupled with increasing efficiency in industry as a whole, probably will lead to renewed economic growth this year. 3.5c

This report was requested by the National Security Council in advance of Vice President Gore's planned visit to Estonia. It was prepared by 3.5c Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, New States Division, OSE, 3.5c

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 001. memo | To Ambassador Napper, re: Latvia's Position on the Chechen Crisis (2 pages) | 09/26/1996 | P1/b(1) VZ |
| 002. report | Re: New Latvian Government [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 12/22/1995 | P1/b(1) VZ |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Central and Eastern European Affairs (Fried, Daniel)
 OA/Box Number: 894

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia, 1996

2011-1037-F
ke2185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM

Date: 9/26/96
From: Alvis Ancans, POL 
To: Ambassador Napper
Subject: Latvia's Position on the Chechen Crisis

SAEIMA

August 23

Six Saeima members handed over to the Russian embassy a letter addressed to Boris Yeltsin, demanding immediate recognition of the Chechen independence and withdrawal of Russian troops from the breakaway republic. Russian ambassador Rannikh refused to see the parliamentarians. The letter was signed by 62 members of the Saeima (including Imants Daudiss and Janina Kusnere of the Saeima Presidium), although most active pro-Chechen MPs represent the so-called Chechen Support Group headed by MP Juris Vidins of Fatherland and Freedom.

Saeima Speaker Ilga Kreituse remarked she agreed in principle to what was said in the document but could not sign it due to her status. Foreign minister Birkavs would not have signed it either, she added.

September 5

In a ceremony held in the Saeima, two unofficial representatives of the Chechen republic in Latvia presented members of the Chechen Support Group with a flag of their republic to thank the "Latvian people for supporting the Chechen struggle for freedom." A few days later the media reported that one of the "Chechen representatives" was staying in Latvia illegally and was subject to deportation from the country.

GOVERNMENT

There have been no statements by the government officials in recent months regarding the situation in Chechnya. According to the MFA, the Latvian government considers the conflict Russia's internal problem as was officially stated last year. At the same time, the Latvian government calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and expresses concern over the large number of civilian casualties in the republic.

PRESIDENTSeptember 24

According to the president's press office, Guntis Ulmanis took part in the discussion on the situation in Chechnya at the COE Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg this week. He had reportedly noted that "human rights are not only Russia's internal problem because Russia is a COE member and human rights violations in Chechnya has an impact on the COE." Speaking at a news conference after the COE Parliamentary Assembly, Ulmanis said that the events in Chechnya must be discussed "openly, courageously and critically."

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 002. report | Re: New Latvian Government [Released in Part] (2 pages) | 12/22/1995 | P1/b(1) |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Central and Eastern European Affairs (Fried, Daniel)
OA/Box Number: 894

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia, 1996

2011-1037-F
ke2185

RESTRICTION CODES

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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (1.74)
6/12/2023 VZ

Latvia
↗

22 December 1995

New Latvian Government

The Latvian parliament on Thursday voted 70 to 24 to confirm a six party coalition government--headed by businessman Andris Skele--that cuts a wide swath across the political spectrum, including the leftist "Saimnieks" and Unity Parties, the centrist Latvia's Way party, and the nationalist right-wing parties Fatherland and Freedom, Conservative "LNNK," and Farmers Union-Christian Democrats bloc. For now, the parties' leaders have committed themselves to keeping Latvia on the reform track, according to press; but while the mix of parties could temper radicals on either end of the spectrum, the divergent ideologies ultimately will probably destroy the coalition. In addition, the backgrounds of some of the new ministers indicates that government corruption could dramatically increase:

- Prime Minister Andris Skele (37)...largely a political unknown, wealthy businessman... former deputy, then acting, Agriculture Minister in Latvia's first post-Soviet government (1991)...chairman of board of state-owned Latvian Shipping Company. EO 13526 1.4c

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

- Deputy Prime Minister Ziedonis Ceveris (35)...former Interior Minister (1991-93), Communist Party Youth Organization activist...co-chairs Saimnieks, largest leftist party in parliament. EO 13526 1.4c

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4c

- Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Andrejs Krastins (44)...leading member of National Conservative Party...former deputy chairman of parliament (1993-November 1995)...known for anti-Russian rhetoric. EO 13526 1.4c

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4c

[Redacted]

3.5c

SUBJECT: New Latvian Government

EO 13526 1.4c

- Interior Minister Colonel Dainis Turlais (45)...member of Saimnieks party...former Defense Forces chief and Deputy Defense Minister (January 1992-October 1994)...served 20 years in Soviet Army before 1991...espouses anti-Western defense philosophy: opposes joining NATO, wants to send Latvian military officers for Russian training. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

- Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister Alberts Kauls (57)...populist leader of the Unity Party...former chairman of Latvian perestroika-era collective farm and Gorbachev adviser...barred from recent election list because of brief involvement in pro-Soviet Latvian Salvation Committee after Latvia's independence. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c, 1.4(d)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|----------|----------------------|
| 001. memo | Diek Norland to Jim Steinberg, re: Meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins (3 pages) | ea. 2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Blinken, Antony)
 OA/Box Number: 3773

FOLDER TITLE:

Meeting - Minister of Foreign Affairs - Indulis Berzins w/JS [Jim Steinberg]

2011-1037-F
ke2186

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO: Jim Steinberg
THRU: Tony Blinken
From: Dick Norland

Subject: Meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins

Latvian-Russian relations have soured lately, and FM Berzins will use his Monday meetings with Strobe and you to seek U.S. support. Russia has launched strong verbal attacks accusing Latvia of being pro-Nazi because it convicted ethnic-Russian Latvian citizen Vasily Kononov of war crimes. Putin wrote to President Vike-Freiberga, and FM Ivanov has written scathing letters to Secretary Albright as well as EU and COE foreign ministers. Berzins wrote Albright March 2 expressing his concerns over the seniority and tone of the Russian attacks, and asking for OSCE countries to engage Russia in a "constructive dialogue" on Latvia. FM Cook, on Berzins' behalf, raised Latvia with Ivanov last week.

Still, the Latvians know they must improve their record on **Nazi war crime prosecutions**. Latvia hosted a February 16-17 multilateral conference on Nazi war crimes to facilitate prosecution of suspected Nazi war criminals, and DOJ has pledged to send resident advisors to expedite the preparation of judicial cases for convictions. Latvia recently decided to repeal observance of March 16 as "Latvian Soldiers Memorial Day" and is developing education projects with help from experienced Europeans to re-examine their negative roles during the Nazi occupation and Holocaust.

You should tell Berzins that the U.S. supports the vigorous prosecution of all suspected of war crimes and genocide, regardless of background, but that Latvia needs to be equally zealous in pursuit of accused Nazis. We need to remind the Balts that the success of their efforts in this regard will affect their relations with the U.S. and rest of the world.

You can also commend Berzins for the real steps his government has taken to pass and implement OSCE-compliant laws on **social integration**, but point out that the recent Russian attacks indicate the importance of maintaining an OSCE presence in Tallinn and Riga to protect the Balts from false assertions. Latvia has passed a basically OSCE-compliant language and naturalization law, and we currently are funding a \$250,000 Latvian language-training program for Russian speakers. Berzins would appreciate your thoughts on "**whither Russia**" following the Presidential elections, whether Putin wins or not.

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2016-0314-M-1 (1.75)
6/12/2023 12

Ultimately, Latvia remains focused on **NATO membership**. Thanks to an energetic Defense Minister, MOD staff, and Chief of Defense, Latvia has become an eager participant in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) process and has received some constructive feedback from NATO on its preparations for membership. Latvia is committed to increasing its GDP percentage dedicated to defense. You should urge Berzins to remain focused on meeting Latvia's 2% goal by 2002.

Points to Make

War Crimes, Holocaust Issues

- We will be reminding Russians that Kononov was found guilty of killing civilians, not of anti-fascist acts, and that all countries must vigorously prosecute all kinds of war crimes.
- Welcome Latvia's hosting recent international meeting to facilitate prosecution of Nazi criminals, especially Konrads Kalejs. Latvia needs to demonstrate that it is as zealous in pursuit of Nazi-era criminals, like Kalejs, as those who worked with the Soviets. Bottom line: Latvia must prosecute Nazi war criminals now - affects Latvia's relations with U.S.
- We look forward to continued, productive work between your prosecutor's office and the DOJ to expedite the Kalejs case.
- Rep. Lantos enjoyed recent visit. Must follow through on public comments, many laudable proposed conferences, Riga University's Judaic Studies Center. Historical issues might be most difficult and important to deal with in Latvia's preparations for membership in NATO.
- GOL full funding of its Holocaust Commission, engaging experts on commission, and treating issue seriously with focus on specific goals is crucial to Commission's success.
- The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum works with Latvian archives, can work with Commission.
- If GOL works out program details with Vad Yashem, USG will try to help fund public school Holocaust education. Glad GOL has liaison project with the Task Force for this purpose.

Social Integration/Relations with Russia

- USG plans informal meeting in Tallinn March 30 with Latvia, Nordics. Goals are to target more effectively U.S. and Nordic social integration assistance and to get Nordic and Baltic agreement on how to change the OSCE missions. Situation in Latvia, Estonia changed much since inception of missions.
- Sensitive to concerns that missions are impediment to EU accession talks. However, some sort of OSCE mission for near-term is buffer to Russian criticisms and ensures continued smooth implementation of legislation.

NATO enlargement and MAP

- Admire Latvia's spending resources on defense, and abiding by determination to reach 2% of GDP by 2002. May be difficult; every incremental increase counts.
- Impressed by Latvia's resurgent political commitment, defense planning and capabilities. Latvia on right track for 2002.
- Continue to use your well-written and comprehensive Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare for NATO membership.
- Will continue to endorse publicly a vigorous, merit-based "Round 2" for NATO enlargement in 2002, open to all aspirants regardless of potential Russian opposition.
- Can't speak for next Administration, but certain it will remain committed to Open Door policy outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001. draft | U.S.-EU Bracketed Text, New Transatlantic Agenda Senior Level Group Report to the US-EU Summit (6 pages) | 05/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. talking points | WTO Latvia Points for POTUS at U.S.-EU Summit (1 page) | 05/11/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. memo | To the President, re: EU Summit-Latvia's Accession to the World Trade Organization (3 pages) | 05/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. paper | Re: Latvia and WTO Accession (3 pages) | 05/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005. paper | Re: Audiovisual Services Commitments (2 pages) | 05/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. paper | Re: Latvia and WTO Accession (2 pages) | 05/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Brown, Keirn)
OA/Box Number: 2195

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia/WTO [World Trade Organization]/[U.S. - European Union]

2011-1037-F
ke2187

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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May 12, 1998 1:30 pm

U.S.-EU BRACKETED TEXT

NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA
SENIOR LEVEL GROUP REPORT TO THE US-EU SUMMIT
LONDON, MAY 18, 1998

~~During the UK Presidency, we have made substantial progress in reaching goals set at the last Summit and overcoming differences which, if left unresolved, could limit our ability to work together. [Additional language TBD] We have negotiated an understanding on disciplines governing investment in copyrighted property that will go far to protect the interests of U.S. and EU investors overseas. We have agreed on principles for enhancing political cooperation and using sanctions. We have strengthened our cooperation on counter-terrorism and nonproliferation, as set out in statements to be issued at the Summit. Our negotiators are poised to begin discussions on a major new trade liberalization initiative to implement the goal we set for ourselves in the New Transatlantic Agenda of "contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations."~~

We have cooperated on key foreign policy issues to enhance the effectiveness of EU and US diplomacy.

We have worked together to address the current crisis in Kosovo. We have provided support for the new reformist Government in the Republika Srpska. We drove forward together implementation of the Dayton agreement, in particular, refugee return including through the recent Refugee Return Conferences of Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and supported economic reforms in Bosnia required by the international financial institutions.

Following up on the Joint Statement on Ukraine agreed in December 1997, a joint demarche was made to the Ukrainian authorities after the elections, stressing the critical importance of continuing political and economic reforms. We have identified further areas for possible cooperation including, common approaches on trade and investment issues, energy sector reform, civil society and nuclear safety. We have endorsed a five-point agenda to develop a common approach with the Russian Federation and all interested parties to the problem of nuclear waste management in Northwest Russia. We are arranging a joint training program for election monitors in Slovakia to prepare for the 1998 general elections. We have cooperated closely on Turkey and on Cyprus. We are working together to address cross-border smuggling in Romania under the SECI initiative.

Elsewhere we have intensified our ~~discussion~~ consultations on policy towards Iran, focusing on issues of common concern. We have developed closer cooperation on issues such as weapons of mass destruction and counter-terrorism. We have established a new, high-level U.S.-EU coordination mechanism on the Middle East Peace Process. We have worked closely on human rights issues in Geneva. The U.S.

and EU have both taken steps to press Burma to respect human rights and democratic principles.

We enhanced the impact of our development economic assistance efforts through close coordination of USAID and European Commission programs. [U.S.: Among our many cooperative endeavors, we have supported electoral reform in El Salvador, delivered food aid to North Korea and emergency assistance to victims of El Nino in Central and South America, launched efforts to combat violence against women, and implemented joint projects to help destitute women in Bangladesh and immunize children in West Africa.]¹ We co-chaired the May 5 Donor Support Group meeting for Afghanistan in London.

We have worked together to address global challenges, to promote international law enforcement and address environmental concerns.

We are jointly supporting information campaigns in Poland and Ukraine to discourage trafficking in women. U.S. law enforcement experts visited the EU's Europol Drugs Unit (forerunner of Europol) in January. A return visit by EU experts will take place in June. We have held expert level meetings on corruption and money-laundering under the auspices of the Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime [EU: , and U.S. representatives attended a meeting of academics to discuss organized crime in Europe.] We have explored opportunities for cooperation on stolen vehicles. We have supported the Caribbean Drugs Initiative to tackle drugs trafficking in the Caribbean. We have begun a dialogue on follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. [U.S.: Specific programs are already addressing environmental issues affecting climate change in Brazil and Ukraine, and we have agreed to promote cleaner technologies in developing countries.]² The Task Force on Communicable Diseases has agreed to focus its work on [to be completed after co-chairs meeting in early May].³

We have developed our bilateral trade and economic relationship and our cooperation on multilateral trade issues.

[Transatlantic Trade Initiative TBD] We have worked together in the World Trade Organization in preparation for the May Ministerial [EU: so as to insure that the necessary groundwork gets underway for future multilateral negotiations, and for the Summit celebrating] [U.S.: , which also celebrates] the 50th Anniversary of the GATT. We managed to defuse a number of potentially serious trade disputes. We have worked in various fora to advance our common goals on electronic commerce as agreed at the December 1997 Summit, including establishing a dialogue to address the free flow and protection of personal data. We are ready to sign a Positive Comity Agreement to enhance cooperation between our competition agencies and a Veterinary Equivalency Agreement, which will facilitate transatlantic trade in animals and animal products. We have initiated* negotiated a parallel agreement on auto standards within the UN/ECE framework. We have identified ways we can cooperate [U.S. to tackle intellectual property rights violations in third countries]. [EU: to promote worldwide respect for Intellectual Property Rights] [Reflect IPR Statement as appropriate.] We are signing the Mutual Recognition

Agreement and have advanced negotiations on two new sectors – veterinary biologics and fasteners.

We have strengthened links between our peoples.

We are presenting awards to 50 individuals and organizations [U.S.: in the new democracies]⁵ who have promoted democratic values and civil society in their countries. We have agreed to provide around \$2.5 million each for joint civic education and civil society initiatives in Ukraine. We have encouraged the Transatlantic Business Dialogue to continue its important work strengthening transatlantic trade relations. We held a major conference involving governments, the business community, labor representatives and NGOs to discuss a codes of conduct on trade and international labor standards.⁶ We have encouraged the launch of other similar dialogues. Following its first meeting, the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) is being taken forward with action on several fronts, and we have agreed to organize a Consumer Dialogue. Our grant-giving foundations and NGOs have agreed to work together to better allocate scarce resources; ~~To this end,~~ a handbook of relevant U.S. and EU NGOs and initiatives has been published. We held the first meeting of the Joint Committee on Higher Education and Vocational Training, which welcomed the solid achievements made in this field under the NTA.

We have involved our parliamentarians more closely in the EU/U.S. process; an increased number of parliamentary visits took place; legislators from respective parliaments will be involved in the EU/U.S. Summit; and an internship program has been set up in the European Parliament and in the US Congress. As part of our implementation of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement signed in December 1997, we are holding in June a U.S.-EU roundtable conference. We jointly organized a conference in Akron, Ohio, in February to look at ways to increase employability and tackle social exclusion. We have given support for the successful implementation of the Transatlantic Information Exchange Service (TIES), a mega-site on the Internet which will enable our NGOs to develop contacts and cooperate together. [EU: We are organizing a scientific conference in June on food and products derived from plant biotechnology.]

New Priorities

For the next six months we will focus on the following:

I. Promoting Peace, Stability, Democracy and Development

Work together in the Former Yugoslavia, particularly Kosovo, Bosnia, and throughout the Western Balkans. Implement our program of cooperation in Ukraine. Continue to work closely together on Cyprus and Turkey. Further discuss and implement with all parties concerned, in the first place the Russian Federation, our joint plan for nuclear waste management in Northwest Russia. Increase coordination on other nuclear safety issues. Put into practice the consultative mechanism set up to ensure better coordination of our efforts on the Middle East Peace Process. Continue to cooperate on Iran, particularly on issues of shared concern. Examine the possibility for

cooperation on technical assistance to develop the rule of law in China. Continue to work together and with African partners to promote human rights, good governance and conflict prevention. Continue our active consultations on UN reform and finances. Use our High Level Assistance Consultations in October to reinforce our cooperation [EU: on assistance] [U.S.: on economic, development and humanitarian issues].⁷ Assess ways of further enhancing our demining cooperation in specific areas such as mine action institutions and capacity building in afflicted countries, the development of appropriate technology and information exchange on mine exporting countries. Work for the successful completion of the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol by the end of 1998. ~~Continue to look for ways to~~ Further enhance our cooperation on non-proliferation and export controls. Consider scope for a joint EU/U.S. code of conduct on arms exports. [U.S.: Seek ways to secure KEDO's viability and continued success in promoting regional stability in Northeast Asia and strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.]⁸ [EU: Consolidate cooperation in KEDO together with Japan and the Republic of Korea for the viability of the organization and success in meeting its objectives, thus strengthening global non-proliferation efforts.]⁹ Work to advance our goals on human rights in countries where there are serious abuses [U.S.: of concern, including Burma and Cuba].¹⁰

II. Responding to Global Challenges we will

[EU: Continue to work closely together on counterterrorism, exchanging information (e.g., on terrorism fundraising), raising awareness of new threats, encouraging universal adherence to international conventions and improving liaison on counterterrorism assistance programs.] [U.S.: Continue our consultation on terrorism over a range of issues including export controls on items of use to terrorists and terrorism fundraising, and aviation security (adjunct after U.S./Trade discussions)]¹¹ Improve liaison in areas where EU and U.S. counter-terrorist programs are in progress. ~~Cooperate on drug issues, continuing to~~ Explore the possibility of extending cooperation on drug issues in other areas regions such as Central Asia and Latin America, including the Andes. Maintain close cooperation between U.S. law enforcement agencies and the EU Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime. In the light of our evaluation, consider whether to expand to other countries our initiative to discourage trafficking in women. Review the possibilities for cooperation on stolen vehicles.

Following signing of the charters inaugurating the Regional Environment Centers (RBCs) in Moldova, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, ensure they become quickly operational and consider setting up additional RBCs in other countries, starting in Central Asia. [U.S.: We are preparing cooperation on environmental protection in Central Asia and Lake Baikal.]¹² Continue our dialogue on environmental issues, including on the Biosafety Protocol and the follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol. Work to resolve outstanding issues before the November climate change meeting in Buenos Aires. Plan for a Transatlantic Chemicals Conference. ~~in~~ [EU: The Task Force on Communicable Diseases has agreed to focus its work on surveillance and alert of certain priority diseases, in particular

foodborne diseases and antimicrobial resistance, training exchanges and field investigations, and exchange of information on outbreaks and other events.]

III. Expanding World Trade and Closer Economic Relations

[Statement on Trade Relations TBD]. Implement our joint statement on electronic commerce, giving priority to the urgent issues of data privacy [EU: and internet self-governance, including a global, market-based system of domain name allocation]. [Regulatory co-operation tbd]. Implement the MRA and seek early signature of the new annexes on veterinary biologics and fasteners. Strengthen efforts to protect and enforce intellectual property rights worldwide [U.S.: in third countries]. [Reflect IPR Statement as appropriate] Building on our ongoing bilateral consultations, explore ways to cooperate [EU: in a mutually acceptable framework to develop] [U.S.: in the development of] a global navigation satellite system. Support the various projects of the Transatlantic Small Business Initiative, in particular, the U.S.-EU Partnership Meeting in Chicago which will bring together 200 small and medium-sized enterprises. Continue our exchange on macro-economic issues as the EU approaches the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Within multilateral fora, [U.S.: continue to support OECD efforts] [EU: reaffirm the importance we attach to our efforts in the OECD] to achieve a comprehensive multilateral framework for investment with high standards of liberalization and investment protection that has effective dispute settlement procedures and is open to non-member countries. [U.S.: Support the current work program] [EU: Pursue the work underway] on investment in the WTO. [U.S.: Once that program has been completed,] Seek the support of all our partners for next steps towards the creation of investment rules in the WTO. Pursue our common efforts in the WTO to conclude the negotiations, already well advanced, on expansion in the coverage of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA II). Work to implement the outcome of the May WTO Ministerial.

IV. Building Bridges

Under our Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, [U.S.: launch] [EU: encourage joint partnerships to develop] collaborative projects. Cooperate to ensure the success of the Vienna Conference on People-to-People Cooperation in October, [U.S.: including the participation of representatives from Central and Eastern Europe].¹³ Implement our projects in Ukraine on civic education, municipal and public administration, transparency, and parliamentary exchange. Seek progress on the establishment of the Transatlantic NGO Dialogue on development, economic, and humanitarian assistance. Support the visit by representatives of the Supreme Court to the European institutions that will take place in July.

Contribute to a successful TABD Conference in November and take its recommendations into account in our future work. Actively support the Consumer Dialogue following its launch this summer. ~~Encourage the further strengthening~~

Support the work of the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue. Convene a Conference on Disability in the Workplace in Madrid in October, a conference on Health and Safety at Work in Luxembourg in October, and a seminar on work organization in Brussels in June. Fully support the partnerships established at the Akron meeting on employability. Support the follow-up to the successful conference held in February on Codes of Conduct and International Labor Standards.

- ¹ Commission has still not gotten clearance for our bracketed language.
- ² Member States had heartburn with reference to Brazil reforestation as climate change related and with Ukraine because it raised intra-EU divisions over nuclear energy.
- ³ Moved to the priorities section, since merely mentioning that they met to set priorities seem weak.
- ⁴ EU experts say no initialling is foreseen.
- ⁵ EU notes that some democracies are not "new" (e.g., Czech Republic) while other recipients come from countries whose democratic credentials are doubtful (e.g., Tadjikistan). We should drop or reformulate.
- ⁶ Makes language consistent with text under Priorities.
- ⁷ Since different DGs handle development, humanitarian assistance and economic assistance, our formulation leaves people out. EU might go with my reformulation, though it would be shorter to use EU text.
- ⁸ EU rightly notes that there is no global regims.
- ⁹ In my view, this sentence should not only be taken out, it should be taken out and shot!
- ¹⁰ EU notes, and I agree, that countries of concern is a term of art used in non-proliferation, not in human rights.
- ¹¹ Drew Arena and EU both note that aviation security has not been discussed in U.S.-EU consultations.
- ¹² Language from Achievements section.
- ¹³ There is vehement Member State objection to specific reference to Central and Eastern Europe; we need to find a formulation that will take that into account while still meeting our needs.

WTO Latvia Points For POTUS at U.S.-EU Summit

- I am disappointed that the EU continues to characterize the United States as preventing Latvia from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). We have offered a significant and fair compromise on this issue to your negotiators.
- We both want to see Latvia accede to the World Trade Organization. Given recent events in Latvia, it is especially important that we should keep to our last Summit's goal of ensuring Baltic accession by year's end.
- The United States and EU both have serious market access concerns in this case. We will need to make a good faith effort to address each other's problems and resolve this issue in a satisfactory way.

DRAFT

USTRI ERA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Charlene Barshefsky

SUBJECT: EU Summit - Latvia's Accession to the World Trade Organization

ISSUE

I request that you raise with President Santer at the Summit the EU's continued blocking of Latvia's admission to the World Trade Organization.

Latvia is caught between competing EU and U.S. demands on audiovisual services. We have requested -- and Latvia is prepared to agree -- that Latvia maintain its audiovisual services market open as part of its accession to the WTO. The EU, however -- urged on by France -- is insisting that Latvia *not* make these commitments, using the leverage of Latvia's eventual membership in the EU.

SUGGESTED POINTS TO MAKE

- I am dismayed that the EU continues to prevent Latvia from acceding to the WTO by insisting that Latvia not undertake commitments in audiovisual services. In December, you raised Latvia's accession with me, asking that our officials seek a solution. Ambassador Barshefsky responded promptly. Her staff met with Sir Leon's staff on at least three occasions, and last month she wrote Sir Leon in yet another attempt to move forward.
- Latvia is prepared to join the WTO with audiovisual commitments. The time has come for the EU to work constructively to find an acceptable alternative.
- In reality, this issue has nothing to do with Latvia or audiovisual commitments. It has to do with the EU's desire to extend the scope of its trade policy to *potential* EU members long before it is entitled to do so under WTO rules.
- It is unacceptable to say that because Latvia plans to join the EU in five, or seven, or 10 years, Latvia today must follow Community policy on audiovisual services. WTO accession and EU membership are two separate procedures. Neither of us is helped if the EU tries to undermine WTO procedures in anticipation of expanded EU membership sometime in the future.
- The time has come for our officials to engage substantively and constructively on this issue.

If Santer claims that audiovisual issues are the only sticking point in Latvia's WTO accession:

- This is simply incorrect. Other WTO issues remain before Latvia can conclude its

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accession negotiations, including protection of intellectual property rights and commitments on agriculture market access.

If Santer claims the U.S. is trying to unravel the "ceasefire" on audiovisual issues from the end of the Uruguay Round, or that Latvia's audiovisual market has little commercial importance:

- Like you, we are seeking to negotiate commercially meaningful commitments from each of the thirty or so countries acceding to the WTO. American filmed entertainment is popular in virtually every country in the world -- our industry estimates annual exports at over \$10 billion.

If Santer claims that the U.S. is asking more from Latvia than from original WTO Members during the Uruguay Round:

- In the Uruguay Round, countries provided commitments to maintain their current practices and not implement further restrictions ["standstill" commitments]. We are asking *less* than that from Latvia. In our request of Latvia and the other Baltics, we have specifically excluded commitments in the three areas where the Baltics have an open market but for which the EU itself has taken audiovisual exceptions to WTO obligations:
 - the Broadcast Directive, which encourages, but does not require, governments to reserve up to 51 percent of airtime in certain entertainment programming for "European" works;
 - support programs for the domestic film industry; and
 - preferential treatment of films produced under government-to-government "coproduction" agreements.
- Our request of Latvia and the other Baltics asks for commitments only in other areas (e.g., establishment of cinema chains and freedom from airtime quotas in programming not subject to the Broadcast Directive) consistent with current EU and Latvian practice

BACKGROUND

Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are among 30 or so countries acceding to the World Trade Organization. Each country joining the WTO must provide commitments on treatment of service suppliers (for example, accountancy firms, banks, insurance companies, or telecommunications companies) of other WTO Members. The content and scope of these commitments is the subject of negotiation with each acceding country.

The three Baltic states are close to completing WTO accession negotiations, with Latvia the furthest ahead. While there are other outstanding goods, services, and agriculture issues in each of the Baltic accessions, the most politically contentious issue is audiovisual services. Latvia is the first country acceding to the WTO that may also join the EU, although probably not before 2005,

at the earliest (Latvia is in the second tier of EU applicant countries).

Audiovisual Services Commitments

Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, an important U.S. objective in all WTO accessions is to obtain commitments to maintain markets open to U.S. exports of films, television shows, and home video. Our industry estimates these exports at \$10.2 billion for 1995. We have been successful in obtaining these commitments from countries acceding to the WTO.

The EU has instructed the Baltics, as future EU members, not to take commitments in the audiovisual sector. No current EU member made market access commitments for audiovisual services, and most took a series of exemptions from WTO rules that permit them to discriminate in this sector among trading partners.

Our request to Latvia in audiovisual services is a compromise that would accommodate the EU's current practices and at the same time ensure that potential EU members applying to the WTO keep their markets open for audiovisual services at least until they become EU members. We have tabled or soon will table similar requests of Russia and some half-dozen other former Soviet Union countries acceding to the WTO.

We have told the Baltics that we cannot "sell" a package domestically that excludes this sector completely, given its commercial significance. Latvia and the other Baltics feel caught between the EU and the United States. Latvia's Finance Minister reconfirmed last month that his government is prepared to make audiovisual commitments in the WTO. Estonia had already included such commitments in one of its first draft submissions to the WTO.

Troubling WTO Implications

The EU's insistence that *potential* EU members, including those years from membership, conform *now* to the commitments taken by the EU in the Uruguay Round is troubling. When the EU encourages potential EU members to introduce or maintain restrictive measures in advance of their entry into the EU, it is effectively restricting MFN trade liberalization to suit its own interests. It is also undermining WTO rules aimed at ensuring that preferential trade agreements -- like the EU -- do not have a chilling effect on world trade. Similarly, the EU also has encouraged its prospective new members to raise tariffs and agricultural supports to very high EU levels when they join the WTO, to provide a more protected market for EU exports afterwards.

LATVIA AND WTO ACCESSION

ISSUE

Latvia is caught between competing EU and U.S. demands on audiovisual services. We have requested -- and Latvia is prepared to agree -- that Latvia maintain its audiovisual services market open as part of its accession to the WTO. The EU, urged on by France, is insisting that Latvia *not* make these commitments, using the leverage of Latvia's eventual membership in the EU.

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SUGGESTED POINTS TO MAKE

- I am disappointed that the EU continues to characterize the United States as preventing Latvia from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). We have proposed a significant and fair compromise on the audiovisual services issue to your negotiators. We are still awaiting a response.
- Latvia has assured us at senior levels that it is prepared to undertake these commitments. It is unfair to Latvia and unacceptable to us that the EU seeks to impose its own views on Latvia. This is one of a handful of issues remaining in Latvia's WTO accession.
- We both want to see Latvia in the WTO. Given recent events in Latvia, it is especially important that we should keep to our last Summit's goal of ensuring Baltic accession by year's end.
- The United States and the EU both have market access concerns in the audiovisual area [Note: U.S. industry estimates its exports at \$10 billion annually]. We will need to make a good faith effort to address each other's problems and resolve this issue in a satisfactory way. Let's agree to have our officials engage substantively and constructively.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

If the EU claims that audiovisual issues are the only sticking point in Latvia's WTO accession:

- This is simply incorrect. Other WTO issues remain before Latvia can conclude its accession negotiations, including protection of intellectual property rights and commitments on agriculture market access.

If the EU claims the U.S. is trying to unravel the "ceasefire" on audiovisual issues from the end of the Uruguay Round, or that Latvia's audiovisual market has little commercial importance:

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LATVIA AND WTO ACCESSION

Issue

Latvia is caught between competing EU and U.S. demands on audiovisual services. We have requested -- and Latvia is prepared to agree -- that Latvia maintain its audiovisual services market open as part of its accession to the WTO. The EU, however, urged on by France, is insisting that Latvia *not* make these commitments, using the leverage of Latvia's eventual membership in the EU.

Points to Make

- I am dismayed that the EU continues to prevent Latvia from acceding to the WTO by insisting that Latvia not undertake commitments in audiovisual services. In December, President Santer raised Latvia's accession with President Clinton, asking that our officials seek a solution. Ambassador Barshefsky responded promptly. Her staff met with Sir Leon's staff on at least three occasions, and last month she wrote Sir Leon in yet another attempt to move forward.
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- This is simply incorrect. Other WTO issues remain before Latvia can conclude its accession negotiations, including protection of intellectual property rights and commitments on agriculture market access.

LATVIA WTO ACCESSION - TALKING POINTS FOR THE SUMMIT

- I am disappointed that the EU continues to characterize the United States as preventing Latvia from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). We have proposed a significant and fair compromise on the audiovisual services issue to your negotiators. We are still awaiting a response.
- Latvia has assured us at senior levels that it is prepared to undertake these commitments. It is unfair to Latvia and unacceptable to us that the EU seeks to impose its own views on Latvia. This is one of a handful of issues remaining in Latvia's WTO accession.
- We both want to see Latvia in the WTO. Given recent events in Latvia, it is especially important that we should keep to our last Summit's goal of ensuring Baltic accession by year's end.
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 001a. email | Antony Blinken to Richard Norland and Cameron Munter, re: Latvia/NATO (2 pages) | 11/06/2000 | P1/b(1) |
| 001b. email | White House Situation Room to Christopher Bolan, et al., re: Latvians Unveil Memorial to Waffen SS Conseripts (1 page) | 11/05/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. email | Dean Haas to Richard Norland, re: From Tracey Jacobson in Riga: Meeting with Latvian Prosecutor General Maizitis on Kalejs Case/Prosecutors' Conference (5 pages) | 08/16/2000 | b(7)(E) |
| 003. memo | Re: ICRAS Distribution 00-04 [partial] (1 page) | 07/12/2000 | b(7)(C) |
| 004. paper | Re: Politeal/Social Constraints (1 page) | ea. 2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005. fax | To Alan Villabroza and Matt Spence, re: ICRAS rating for Latvia (1 page) | 07/20/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. report | Country Risk Assessment Report (10 pages) | 06/23/2000 | P1/b(1) |
| 007. report | Re: [Latvian politics] (4 pages) | 06/02/2000 | P1/b(1) |
| 008. email | White House Situation Room to John Fiecklin, et al., re: Letter from President Clinton to President Vaira Vike-Freiberga (2 pages) | 06/23/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009a. letter | President Clinton to President Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia (1 page) | 06/20/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009b. memo | Samuel Berger to the President, re: Response to Latvian President (1 page) | 06/17/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia [1]

2011-1037-F
 ke2188

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 009e. letter | Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, to President Clinton (2 pages) | 05/30/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009d. letter | Andris Berzins, Prime Minister of Latvia, to President Clinton (2 pages) | 05/31/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009e. letter | Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, to President Clinton (2 pages) | 05/30/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2021 |
| 010. email | White House Situation Room to Steven Black, et al., re: Latvian-Russian Relations (8 pages) | 05/25/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 011a. email | White House Situation Room to Christopher Bolan, et al., re: Latvian Parliament (2 pages) | 05/05/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 011b. report | Re: Latvia: New Coalition Formed (1 page) | 05/05/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2000 2:12 PM
To: Bolan, Christopher J. (VP); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIANS UNVEIL MEMORIAL TO WAFEN SS CONSCRIPTS

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Distribution: SIT: BOLAN DAVIDSON NORLAND YEE
Identifier: R05bdf20
Originator: Reuters
Precedence: RUSH
TimeOfReceipt: 11/05/2000 15:11:20 ET

Amb. Ronis
726-8213

a1585

^BC-LATVIA-NAZI

^Latvians unveil memorial to Waffen SS conscripts

RIGA, Nov 5 (Reuters) - About 1,000 people, including Defence Minister Girts Kristovskis, gathered on Sunday in western Latvia to unveil a monument to men who fought alongside the Germans during World War Two, local media reported.

The Nazis drafted some 146,000 Latvian men into a Waffen SS unit in 1943 and 1944 in a last-ditch mobilisation after heavy setbacks at the hands of the Soviet Red Army.

The Latvian unit, known as the Latvian legion, was one of the last holdouts during the war, helping the Germans to fend off the Red Army in the Western Latvian region of Kurzeme until Berlin surrendered to the Allies. The unit has been at the centre of controversy for several years.

Sunday's meeting in Lestene, about 100 km (60 miles) from Riga, was the culmination of several years of efforts by the legionnaires to gather the remains of fallen comrades for a cemetery burial and build a memorial to them.

News agency BNS reported that Commander in Chief of the armed services Gundars Abols also attended Sunday's rainy ceremony.

In 1998, Latvia's parliament sacked then Commander in Chief Juris Dalbins for taking part in a commemoration of the Waffen SS legion in Riga after the government had told officials not to participate.

Their annual processions through the capital Riga have been criticised by Jewish groups for making heroes out of those who fought for the Third Reich and have embarrassed Latvian leaders eager to guide their country into the European Union.

However, the legionnaires say they have been misrepresented as ageing Nazis nostalgic for the days of Hitler and note that they were drafted illegally by the Germans.

At the end of the war, the Allies effectively cleared the members of the legion, saying membership would not be a hindrance to immigration.

RB-- 11/05/00 15:07:14

Conscripts -
Cemetery not recognized for 50 years.
Coop. w/ Russia + Germany +
restore graves - request.
(4)
Tragic moment for Latvia.
MOD paid request to Rose who
did - tragic war - not too political
story.
have Soviet, German etc.
Cemeteries.
PM spoke → *not condemning MOD,*
Pierzins
press secy: embodied this cent as gov respect
& soldiers who've died in Latvian soil

Then why
celebrate ?

11/6/00
Amb. Ronis:
• Award to PAVUS ?
• letter to Pres. of Latvia.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLITICAL/SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS (Cleared by State and NSC Europe, please replace the section on pgs. 3-4 with this)

Since independence was restored in 1991, Latvia has experienced a series of coalition Governments – nine in all, whose average life span has been 13 months. Much of this political volatility stems from disputes over potentially lucrative privatization ventures involving state enterprises. Strong personal and financial links between the business and political sectors have raised the stakes in these disputes. This trend of shaky coalition Governments is expected to continue, particularly as no single party appears set to win an overall majority. Latvians are showing frustration with the status quo, as more established political parties are rejected and voters turn to new parties in an attempt to force change. In the 1998 election, the People's Party -- which had been in existence for less than a year -- received the largest share of the vote. The current Government, led by Prime Minister Andris Berzins, took office on May 5, 2000. The previous Government, led by Andris Skele, collapsed following internal squabbling over privatization issues. In general, despite the frequent changes in leadership, Latvia's Governments have all supported market reform and integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Latvia's foreign relations center around its desire to integrate with Western Europe through NATO and EU membership, and its continued strained relations with Russia. Latvia eagerly wants to join the European Union (EU) and NATO. Latvia is slated to join the second wave of EU expansion, which the GOL hopes to complete by 2003 – a somewhat optimistic goal. Latvia maintains a vigorous lobbying effort to join NATO, is a member of the Partnership for Peace, and is considered one of the seven most promising NATO aspirant countries. However, a decision on the next round of NATO enlargement is not expected at least until 2002.

Latvia's major foreign policy challenge involves relations with Russia. Latvia shares a common border with, economic dependence on, and a large ethnic population from Russia. Yet relations have been strained since Latvia's independence. In early 2000 Russia threatened to impose sanctions on Latvia due to Moscow's perception that the GOL was not adequately protecting the civil rights of ethnic Russians in Latvia. Two issues have been particularly thorny: a proposed law requiring the Latvian language to be used in all business dealings, and the trial of a 77 year-old former Soviet freedom fighter for crimes against Latvian civilians during World War II. Latvian-Russian relations improved slightly after the Latvian-only language legislation was amended, and the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of the former Soviet freedom fighter. Nonetheless, Latvia's avowed interest in NATO membership, which Russia strongly opposes, continues to engender Russian resentment.

U.S.-Latvian relations are strong -- stemming from the U.S. refusal to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union -- and are expected to remain close and vibrant.

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7016-0314-01-1 (1.82)
6/12/2023 v2

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

OFFICE OF NORDIC AND BALTIC AFFAIRS

2201 C Street, NW; Room 5229
phone: (202) 647-8378
fax: (202) 736-4170
e-mail: SilskiAL@eurms.state.gov

| | | |
|-----|--------------------|-----------------|
| TO: | Alan Villabroza | OMB |
| | <u>Matt Spence</u> | <u>NSC</u> |
| | (name) | (agency) |
| | 395-5770 | 395-3947 |
| | <u>456-9150</u> | <u>456-9151</u> |
| | (fax number) | (phone number) |

FROM: Andrew L. Silski
Foreign Affairs Specialist for Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

SUBJECT: ICRAS rating for Latvia

COMMENTS: EB hasn't yet shared the Latvia report, although I did clear on the Estonia report. For that matter, I have not seen the Lithuania one.

Only two small changes to an otherwise excellent report:

In POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESTRAINTS, note the spelling of "Berzins."

In the same section, same paragraph near the end of the same sentence, end it as "over tackling privatization." There was no scandal.

Anyway, it's rare to find someone else in the USG who really understands the dynamics of Latvian politics and how it affects privatization, and vice versa. Bravo.

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2000 9:14 PM
To: Cables; Ficklin, John W. (RECORDS); Medish, Mark C. (RUE); Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC); Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Subject: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKE-FREIBERGA

ActionAddres: AMEMBASSY RIGA 2556
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
DateTime: 240041Z JUN 00
Distribution: SIT: NSC Ficklin Medish Millison Norland Wasserman Weiss
Identifier: M4507863
InfoAddres: ////
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Line2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
Line3: R 240041Z JUN 00
Line4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
Originator: SECSTATE WASHDC
Precedence: ROUTINE
Profiles: CABLES
FICKLINJ
MEDISHM
MILLISOC
NORLANDR
WASSERME
WEISSA
StationRoutingIndicator: RUEHC
StationSerialNumber: 0924
TimeOfReceipt: 06/23/2000 21:13:20 ET

UNCLAS STATE 120924

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, LG
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKE-FREIBERGA

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKE-FREIBERGA. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT OF MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOVERNMENT OF LATVIA WISHES TO DO SO. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW VIA POUCH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

JUNE 20, 2000
DEAR MADAM PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR WRITING PRIOR TO MY RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. YOUR CONCERNS WERE VERY MUCH IN MIND DURING MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN. I AM CONVINCED THAT, BASED ON OUR TALKS, PRESIDENT PUTIN UNDERSTANDS CLEARLY THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO ENSURING STABLE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING IN THE BALTIC REGION. THIS ISSUE, ALONG WITH RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND THE SUCCESS OF

ECONOMIC REFORMS, WILL HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT ON RUSSIA'S INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION.

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TO UNDERSCORE OUR SUPPORT FOR LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA, I ASKED DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE TALBOTT TO REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES AT THE JUNE 7 MEETING OF THE U.S.-BALTIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN TALLINN. I WELCOME THE REAFFIRMATION AT THAT MEETING OF OUR COMMON VISION OF A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE, AND OF OUR GOAL TO CREATE TOGETHER CONDITIONS TO COMPLETE THE INTEGRATION OF LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA INTO EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT ALSO USED THAT OCCASION TO CONFIRM PUBLICLY THAT THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS RECENT STATEMENTS BY RUSSIAN OFFICIALS CONCERNING LATVIA TO BE COMPLETELY UNWARRANTED BY THE FACTS. HE CALLED FOR RESUMPTION OF A FULL DIALOGUE AND ENHANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ITS BALTIC NEIGHBORS, AIMED AT DEVELOPING MORE STABLE AND PROSPEROUS RELATIONS IN THE REGION. I HOPE THAT SUCH A DIALOGUE WILL BEGIN TO DEVELOP SOON.

AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR WRITING ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON /S/

HER EXCELLENCY
VAIRA VIKI-FREIBERGA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
R1GA

END TEXT.
TALBOTT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 2000

Dear Madam President:


Thank you for writing prior to my recent visit to Moscow. Your concerns were very much in mind during my discussions with President Putin. I am convinced that, based on our talks, President Putin understands clearly the importance the United States attaches to ensuring stable and cooperative relations between Russia and its neighbors, including in the Baltic region. This issue, along with respect for democratic principles and the success of economic reforms, will have a direct impact on Russia's international integration.

To underscore our support for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, I asked Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to represent the United States at the June 7 meeting of the U.S.-Baltic Partnership Commission in Tallinn. I welcome the reaffirmation at that meeting of our common vision of a Europe whole and free, and of our goal to create together conditions to complete the integration of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into European and transatlantic institutions.

Deputy Secretary Talbott also used that occasion to confirm publicly that the United States considers recent statements by Russian officials concerning Latvia to be completely unwarranted by the facts. He called for resumption of a full dialogue and enhanced cooperation between Russia and its Baltic neighbors, aimed at developing more stable and prosperous relations in the region. I hope that such a dialogue will begin to develop soon.

Again, thank you for writing on this important matter.

Sincerely,



Her Excellency
Vaira Vike-Freiberga
President of the Republic of Latvia
Riga

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6-20-00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *MB*

SUBJECT: Response to Latvian President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (1.87)
6/12/2023 VZ

Purpose

Respond to President Vike-Freiberga's concerns about Russian policy toward the Baltic states.

Background

President Vike-Freiberga wrote to you just before your meetings in Moscow to express the hope that Russia's rhetoric and policies toward its Baltic neighbors might soften as a result of your visit. Your response points out that we share these concerns and continue to make clear to the Russians our expectation that they will work to promote stability and cooperation with their neighbors, including in the Baltic region.

A letter from Latvia's new Prime Minister, Andris Berzins, accompanied the letter from President Vike-Freiberga. Berzins thanks you for your congratulatory note upon his becoming Prime Minister and outlines his Government's goals in the months ahead. No response is required at this time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to President Vike-Freiberga at Tab A.

Attachments

- Tab A Response to President Vike-Freiberga
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

William Jefferson Clinton
President of the
United States of America

Riga, May 30, 2000

Dear Mr. President,

June 14, 2000 marks a significant date in the history of US-Baltic relations. For over fifty years, it was a date that reflected the consistent non-recognition policy by the US Government and its people of the illegal incorporation of the Baltic countries into the USSR. This policy of non-recognition provided the people of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania with the hope that the ideals of democracy, freedom and justice would prevail, and result in the renewed independence of these countries.

Ten years ago, Latvia once again resumed responsibility for its own development, and has been actively pursuing its goals of full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. The outstanding work of your administration in the Baltic policy area deserves true admiration and widespread recognition. With the practical assistance and vocal support of the United States, Latvia has showed visible and consistent progress in strengthening democracy, human rights, economic growth and social integration within the country.

Latvia has received broad support of its efforts both in the United States and in Europe. A vivid example of this occurred during my recent visit to New York City and Harvard University, and during my meetings with Americans of various backgrounds and careers in the political, academic and business communities. These individuals might have held different views on politics and on the immediate challenges that face the Baltic States, but they were united in their belief that Latvia's future lies in a Europe united and free, and in an increasingly close partnership with the United States.

Latvia deeply appreciates the highly supportive and active policy of the United States in the Baltic region during the past years. This policy has taken an important part of your own personal time and consideration, Mr. President, and, as a result, has helped the Baltic region to become one of the most dynamic and stable in Europe. I am extremely pleased to note the existence of ambitious plans for our common work this year in terms of high-level political meetings and active work within the Partnership Charter framework.

We in Latvia are looking forward to your upcoming visit to Moscow and to your meetings with Russia's newly elected President, Vladimir Putin. Latvia fully supports a policy of engagement and dialogue with Russia that could contribute to Russia's development as a modern European country. Our own practical efforts in this area clearly follow the principles of the US-Baltic

JUN 2 14:57

Partnership, and are targeted at the establishment of a prosperous and stable European continent. Latvia is ready share the common responsibility of the international community in this regard, not least as the next presiding state of the Council of Europe.

We realize that Russia is currently facing a wide array of social, political, and economic problems. We hope that the new Russia of President Putin will demonstrate its commitment to true European values in its internal and foreign policies. For Latvians, the reversal of some of Russia's obstructive policies and rhetoric towards its Baltic neighbors, which have been an integral part of Russian foreign policy for the past few years, would certainly be a welcome sign of such a commitment. We are closely following the evolving situation that regard.

Mr. President, I wish you every success during your challenging visit. I am convinced that your upcoming meeting with President Putin, like previous Summit meetings you have had with Russian leaders, will bring a renewed sense of security to the people in the Baltic countries.

Yours sincerely,

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga
President of the Republic of Latvia

Please enter into the system.

*Delivered by Latvian Embassy
to Dick Norland 6/1/00.
ACTION: EVR. INFO: RUE
(Norland)*

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LATVIJAS REPUBLIKAS MINISTRU PREZIDENTS
Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia

16 Brīvības Blāz., Rīga LV-1520, Latvia, tel. (+371) 7332232, fax (+371) 7286598

Rīga, 31 May 2000

H. E. Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to express my most sincere thanks for your letter of congratulations on the occasion of my appointment as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia.

Assuming the duties of the Head of the Government of Latvia I fully realize that the challenges we are going to face require lots of energy and hard work. Let me assure you that the newly formed Government of Latvia is prepared to work actively, maintaining continuity of the Government's agenda both internally and internationally.

We highly value the US positive assessment of Latvia's legislation on citizenship, language and minority related issues that are in full compliance with OSCE standards. The Government of Latvia is grateful for the US support for our work on integration of Latvian society. The implementation of the National Program "Integration of Society in Latvia" will strengthen the democratic civil society on the basis of common values. Work in this direction will be one of the priorities for the new Government of Latvia.

We have always greatly appreciated the US political support for Latvia's aspirations to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. We are very pleased that our intensive work with the European Commission has resulted in the invitation to start accession negotiations, as it was decided at EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. We are prepared to proceed with these negotiations quickly and efficiently.

Latvia's goal to join NATO remains unchanged. In this respect, I wish to reiterate my Government's commitment to raise defense spending up to 2% of GDP by year 2003.

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Latvia is engaged in close co-operation with the Baltic states and other aspirant countries preparing for NATO membership. The significance of this co-operation was confirmed in the statement of nine Foreign ministers at the Vilnius conference on 19 May 2000. The inclusion of all European democracies into NATO will complete the historic task of building Europe whole and free. Latvia's Government relies on strong and continuous support of the United States in our way of becoming full NATO member.

I wish to assure you that we will continue to strongly adhere to all our international commitments and to support the efforts to keeping and preserving of peace in all parts of the globe.

I am glad that the relationship between our countries is based on the true partnership and common vision of the future of Europe and the whole contemporary world. The signing of US-Baltic Partnership Charter and its subsequent successful implementation serves as the most important element in strengthening ties between Latvia and the United States that covers all the major spheres of our partnership.

As we approach the third Partnership Commission in June 2000, I would like to note with satisfaction the positive results of the work of the bilateral and quadrilateral bodies created under the Charter, and most recently - the economic working group meeting in April this year.


Let me reiterate the deep and continuous interest of Latvia in expanding our economic partnership that undoubtedly has a huge potential for further development. I am planning to visit the United States in September this year. I view it as an opportunity to contribute personally to fostering our dialogue on issues of political and economic co-operation.

Latvia is deeply interested in the growth of economic co-operation and political stability of the Baltic Sea area and we will strongly support all initiatives, aimed at achieving this goal, particularly the US involvement through the NEI projects.

I look forward to the traditionally close co-operation with the US Government on the issues of regional as well as global importance.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,



Andris Bērziņš
Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia



Latvijas Valsts prezidents

Riga, May 30, 2000

The Hon. Mr. William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

June 14, 2000 marks a significant date in the history of US-Baltic relations. For over fifty years, it was a date that reflected the consistent non-recognition policy by the US Government and its people of the illegal incorporation of the Baltic countries into the USSR. This policy of non-recognition provided the people of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania with the hope that the ideals of democracy, freedom and justice would prevail, and result in the renewed independence of these countries.

Ten years ago, Latvia once again resumed responsibility for its own development, and has been actively pursuing its goals of full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. The outstanding work of your administration in the Baltic policy area deserves true admiration and widespread recognition. With the practical assistance and vocal support of the United States, Latvia has showed visible and consistent progress in strengthening democracy, human rights, economic growth and social integration within the country.

Latvia has received broad support of its efforts both in the United States and in Europe. A vivid example of this occurred during my recent visit to New York City and Harvard University, and during my meetings with Americans of various backgrounds and careers in the political, academic and business communities. These individuals might have held different views on politics and on the immediate challenges that face the Baltic States, but they were united in their belief that Latvia's future lies in a Europe united and free, and in an increasingly close partnership with the United States.

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
Latvia deeply appreciates the highly supportive and active policy of the United States in the Baltic region during the past years. This policy has taken an important part of your own personal time and consideration, Mr. President, and, as a result, has helped the Baltic region to become one of the most dynamic and stable in Europe. I am extremely pleased to note the existence of ambitious plans for our common work this year in terms of high-level political meetings and active work within the Partnership Charter framework.

We in Latvia are looking forward to your visit to Moscow and to your meetings with Russia's newly elected President, Vladimir Putin. Latvia fully supports a policy of engagement and dialogue with Russia that could contribute to Russia's development as a modern European country. Our own practical efforts in this area clearly follow the principles of the US-Baltic Partnership, and are targeted at the establishment of a prosperous and stable European continent. Latvia is ready share the common responsibility of the international community in this regard, not least as the next presiding state of the Council of Europe.

We realize that Russia is currently facing a wide array of social, political, and economic problems. We hope that the new Russia of President Putin will demonstrate its commitment to true European values in its internal and foreign policies. For Latvians, the reversal of some of Russia's obstructive policies and rhetoric towards its Baltic neighbors, which have been an integral part of Russian foreign policy for the past few years, would certainly be a welcome sign of such a commitment. We are closely following the evolving situation in that regard.

Mr. President, I wish you every success during your challenging visit. I am convinced that your meeting with President Putin, like previous Summit meetings you have had with Russian leaders, will bring a renewed sense of security to the people in the Baltic countries.

Yours sincerely,



Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga
President of the Republic of Latvia

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2000 1:41 PM
To: Black, Steven K. (VP); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE); Cables; Crawford, Bernard T. (RECORDS); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE); Hinckley, Steedman (VP); Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR); Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN); Medish, Mark C. (RUE); Munter, Cameron P. (EUR); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Tedstrom, John E. (RUE); vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE); Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE); Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: MOSCOW RENEWS ANTI-LATVIAN ATTACKS

ActionAddrees: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5000
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DateTime: 251716Z MAY 00
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Identifier: M4461698
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Precedence: BLACKS
Profiles: BLINKENA BRZEZINM CABLES CRAWFORB DAVIDSOL ELKINDJ HINCKLES KASSN MASSEYS MEDISHM MUNTERC NORLANDR TEDSTROJ VONLIPSR WEISSA WOLOSKYL YEEH

StationRoutingIndicator: RUEHRA
StationSerialNumber: 1945
TimeOfReceipt: 05/25/2000 13:40:43 ET

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2016-0314-M-1 (1.91)

6/12/2023 VR

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HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/10

TAGS: PREL,, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, KJUS, LG, RS

SUBJECT: LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: MOSCOW RENEWS
ANTI-LATVIAN ATTACKS

REFS: (A) RIGA 1588; (B) RIGA 1494; (C) MOSCOW 11249;
(D) HELSINKI 2435; (E) USNATO 1134;
(F) MOCOW 10633; (G) STATE 83918;
(H) MOSCOW 1051; (I) RIGA 1152 AND PREVIOUS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN L. WLTHERS
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

1. ~~(S)~~ WINSTON CHURCHILL ONCE FAMOUSLY SAID, "I CANNOT FORECAST TO YOU THE ACTION OF RUSSIA. IT'S A RIDDLE WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY INSIDE AN ENIGMA" DESPITE THEIR HIGH REGARD FOR ENGLAND'S WARTIME PRIME MINISTER, MOST LATVIANS WOULD RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE. WESTERN COMMENTATORS MIGHT ECHO SOME OF CHURCHILL'S BEMUSEMENT IN THEIR DESCRIPTIONS OF RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN AS A "QUESTION MARK" AND HIS POLICIES AS "UNDETERMINED." HOWEVER, RUSSIA'S SUSTAINED HOSTILITY AGAINST LATVIA, NOW INTO ITS THIRD YEAR, DENIES LATVIANS THE LUXURY OF ANY SUCH AMBIVALENCE. NEITHER NEW GOVERNMENTS IN RIGA AND MOSCOW NOR DRAMATIC CHANGES IN LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION LAW OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, NEITHER THE FAVORABLE TESTIMONY OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATVIA NOR LATVIAN OFFERS TO ENGAGE RUSSIA IN DIALOGUE ON THE ISSUE, HAVE DIMINISHED MOSCOW'S FIERCE RHETORICAL ATTACKS NOR LOOSENED THE ECONOMIC STRICTURES AGAINST TRADE WITH LATVIA. COINCIDENT WITH PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER, RUSSIAN CRITICISM OF LATVIA HAS BECOME EVER HARsher AND MORE STRIDENT. THIS CABLE PROVIDES EMBASSY RIGA'S THOUGHTS ON THE DETERIORATION OF LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND ON POSSIBLE USG APPROACHES TO HELP EASE THE CURRENT TENSIONS. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

HIGH OCTAVE ALLEGATIONS

2. ~~(S)~~ IN RECENT WEEKS, THE TONE OF RUSSIAN CRITICISM OF LATVIA AND, TO A DEGREE, ESTONIA IN A WIDE VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL FORA HAS REACHED EVER HIGHER OCTAVES ON THE SCALE OF SHRILLNESS. SINCE FEBRUARY 2000, FOR EXAMPLE, SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICIALS HAVE CHARGED THAT:

-- "THE 'BROWN PLAGUE' IS SPREADING AROUND THE CONTINENT" AND "THE SPROUTS OF [NAZI] REVANCHISM ARE

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SHOOTING FROM THE BALTIC STATES." (FM IVANOV LETTER TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, FEBRUARY 22, 2000).

-- "REMARKS UNPRECEDENTED IN THEIR ANTI-RUSSIAN TONE AND FOLLOWING THE WORST TRADITIONS OF THE COLD WAR HAVE COME FROM RIGA." (RUSSIAN MFA STATEMENT ON LATVIAN PRESIDENT VIKE-FREIBERGA'S APRIL 27 BBC INTERVIEW, MAY 3, 2000.)

-- "REVANCHIST AND FASCIST TRENDS" ARE INCREASING IN LATVIA AND ESTONIA. (FM IVANOV LETTER TO PORTUGUESE FM GAMA AND EU CFSP HIGH REPRESENTATIVE SOLANA, MAY 15, 2000.)

-- "THE DANGER OF THE REBIRTH OF FASCISM AND THE REVERSAL OF THE OUTCOME OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR [IS APPARENT] IN LATVIA." (FM IVANOV NON-PAPER PRESENTED TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, APRIL 27, 2000.)

-- "ETHNIC CLEANSING, TRICKED OUT IN PSEUDO-CIVILIZED TRAPPINGS, IS TAKING PLACE IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES." (FM IVANOV NON-PAPER PRESENTED TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, APRIL 27, 2000.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 RIGA 001945

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MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO DEPSEC TALBOTT

THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC NORLAND AND JACOBSON

HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/10

TAGS: PREL,, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, KJUS, LG, RS

SUBJECT: LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: MOSCOW RENEWS ANTI-LATVIAN ATTACKS

-- "LEGAL OUTRAGES COMMITTED BY THE LATVIAN AUTHORITIES AGAINST SICK AND OLD PEOPLE STINK OF NAZI SENTIMENTS." (RUSSIAN MFA PRESS STATEMENT ON THE CONVICTION OF FORMER RED ARMY VETERAN, MIKHAIL FARBTUHS, FOR WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II, MAY 18, 2000.)

3. (S) BEYOND THE VERBAL ASSAULTS ON LATVIA, THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER TROUBLING SIGNS: VANDALS HAVE DEFACED THE LATVIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW (LAST WEEK, UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS SET FIRE TO A GOL VEHICLE ON THE EMBASSY GROUNDS) AND ITS CONSULATE IN ST. PETERSBURG; INFORMAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE STILL IN PLACE DESPITE THE SHELVING OF AN OFFICIAL SANCTIONS BILL IN THE DUMA; THE RUSSIAN MFA HAS DEMANDED THAT RUSSIAN FIRMS NOT ATTEND LATVIAN-SPONSORED COMMERCIAL EVENTS, NOTABLY THOSE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ANNUAL EBRD BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING IN RIGA; AND DIPLOMATIC INTERCHANGE AT SENIOR LEVELS REMAINS AT A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL.

THE FACTS

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4. (S) FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE GOL AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ON THE GROUND, THE MOST UNSETTLING ASPECT OF RUSSIA'S CURRENT BEHAVIOR IS THAT IT OCCURS AT A TIME OF REMARKABLE ADVANCES IN THE PURPORTED AREAS OF RUSSIA'S PRIMARY CONCERNS. AS DRAWN FROM FM IVANOV'S APRIL 27 NON-PAPER TO THE SECRETARY, THOSE CONCERNS CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

-- SOCIAL INTEGRATION: THE NON-PAPER ALLEGES THAT AT THE CURRENT RATE OF NATURALIZATION (12,000 PER YEAR), THE "ELIMINATION OF MASS STATELESSNESS IN LATVIA WILL TAKE ABOUT 50 YEARS." IN FACT, THE FIGURE OF 12,000 NATURALIZATIONS IN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAW AS REVISED IN 1998 EQUALS THE TOTAL NATURALIZED IN ALL PREVIOUS YEARS SINCE LATVIA REGAINED INDEPENDENCE. WITH CONTINUED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OPERATION OF THE LATVIAN NATURALIZATION BOARD AND ITS SECURING OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FROM THE GOL AND WESTERN PARTNERS, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO EXPECT THOSE NUMBERS TO RISE SIGNIFICANTLY IN COMING YEARS. NOR DOES THE NON-PAPER NOTE THAT THE LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP LAW IS AMONG THE MOST LIBERAL IN EUROPE; THAT VIRTUALLY EVERY NON-CITIZEN RESIDENT OF LATVIA IS ELIGIBLE TO NATURALIZE; THAT THE LAW ASKS ONLY FOR THE APPLICANT TO DECLARE HIS DESIRE TO BECOME A CITIZEN, AND TO PASS A HISTORY AND A LANGUAGE EXAMINATION; THAT OVER 95 PERCENT OF APPLICANTS PASS BOTH THESE EXAMS ON THE FIRST TRY; AND THAT UNDER MODIFIED FEE SCHEDULES, LESS THAN 60 PERCENT OF APPLICANTS PAY THE FULL APPLICATION FEE. IN ADDITION, STATELESS CHILDREN BORN IN LATVIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE CAN ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP VIRTUALLY AUTOMATICALLY ON THE APPLICATION OF THEIR PARENTS. MOREOVER, THE HIGH RATES OF INTER-ETHNIC MARRIAGES IN LATVIA AND THE PROJECTED TRENDS IN MORTALITY RATES MAY ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING THE NUMBERS OF LATVIAN CITIZENS IN COMING YEARS.

-- LANGUAGE: THE NON-PAPER ASSERTS THAT THE LATVIAN AUTHORITIES "VIRTUALLY IGNORED" THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS IN DRAFTING THEIR LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION LAWS. NOT TRUE. THE GOL COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH A RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS, INCLUDING FROM THE OSCE AND COE, IN FORMULATING THESE LAWS. CONTRARY TO THE NON-PAPER'S ASSERTION, THE LANGUAGE LAW AS PASSED IN ITS FINAL FORM ON DECEMBER 9, 1999, COMPLIES WITH OSCE STANDARDS PROTECTING PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITIES FROM GOVERNMENT INTRUSION AND WAS ENDORSED

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ANTI-LATVIAN ATTACKS

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BY THE USG, THE EU, THE COE, THE OSCE AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. MOREOVER, THE NON-PAPER DOES NOT MENTION THE STEEP RISE IN DEMAND AMONG RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS FOR LATVIAN LANGUAGE TRAINING. NOT ONLY HAVE INCREASED NUMBERS OF ADULTS SOUGHT SUCH TRAINING THROUGH ADULT TRAINING CENTERS AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BUT RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PARENTS HAVE ENROLLED THEIR CHILDREN IN LATVIAN-LANGUAGE SCHOOLS TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT OVER 73 PERCENT OF ALL FIRST GRADERS IN LATVIA NOW STUDY IN LATVIAN. NOT ONLY IS THIS A DE FACTO TESTAMENT TO THE RUSSIAN MINORITY'S DESIRE AND INTENTION TO INTEGRATE, THE INCREASED LATVIAN LANGUAGE CAPABILITY OF TODAY'S FIRST GRADERS WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON NATURALIZATION IN COMING YEARS.

-- WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS: THE NON-PAPER ATTACKS LATVIA FOR REFUSING TO BRING SUSPECTED NAZI WAR CRIMINAL, KONRADS KALEJS, TO TRIAL, WHILE CONVICTING FORMER RED ARMY PARTISAN VASILIS KONONOV OF WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II. THE USG'S POLICY ADHERES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT ALL SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS MUST BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE, REGARDLESS OF THEIR NATIONALITY OR POLITICAL AFFILIATION. NOT ONLY HAVE WE DECLARED THIS PRINCIPLE TO THE RUSSIANS, WE HAVE MADE ESPECIALLY CLEAR TO THE LATVIANS OUR EXPECTATION THAT THEY SHOW EQUAL DILIGENCE AND ZEAL IN PROSECUTING THOSE LATVIANS WHO PARTICIPATED IN NAZI ATROCITIES AS IN PROSECUTING THOSE GUILTY OF CRIMES ON THE SOVIET SIDE. WE ARE, MOREOVER, WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE LATVIAN PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION OF KALEJS AND OTHERS LATVIANS WHO COLLABORATED WITH THE NAZIS. IN CONTRAST, RUSSIA HAS BEEN MINIMALLY RESPONSIVE TO OUR REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THE KALEJS INVESTIGATION, EVEN THOUGH CRITICAL RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE CASE ARE IN RUSSIA'S POSSESSION. CONCERNING KONONOV, THE LATVIAN SUPREME COURT -- IN A RULING THAT BELLED RUSSIAN ATTACKS ON THE IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE LATVIAN COURTS -- ON APPEAL OVERTURNED HIS CONVICTION IN THE LOWER COURTS AND RELEASED HIM FROM CUSTODY. UNLESS THE PROSECUTORS CAN PRESENT PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE TO THE JUSTICES TO REOPEN THE CASE, THE JUDGMENT WILL STAND. THE SAME RIGHT OF APPEAL IS OPEN TO OTHER CONVICTED WAR CRIMINALS, INCLUDING FORMER KGB AGENT MIKHAIL FARBTUHS.

LATVIAN RESPONSES

5. (S) FOR THEIR PART, LATVIAN OFFICIALS HAVE, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, LARGELY REFRAINED FROM COUNTERATTACKS ON RUSSIA. THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF TENSION, THEY HAVE HELD FIRM TO A STRATEGY OF AVOIDING STATEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED PROVOCATIVE, OF ADHERING TO A MANTRA CALLING FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE, AND OF SEEKING MEETINGS WITH SENIOR RUSSIAN LEADERS AIMED AT LOWERING THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE. THE ONE EXCEPTION IS PRESIDENT VAIRA VIKI-FREIBERGA, WHO HAS ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS SPOKEN FORCEFULLY ON RUSSIA, MOST RECENTLY IN AN APRIL 27 INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC.

6. (S) PUBLICLY, THE MFA (WHICH, WE HAVE LEARNED, WAS CAUGHT OFF GUARD BY THE COMMENTS) HAS DOWNPLAYED HER REMARKS, ESPECIALLY HER CLEARLY EXAGGERATED NOTIONS OF RUSSIA'S PRESENT MILITARY THREAT TO THE BALTICS. PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, MFA SOURCES TELL US THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS STRUCK A CHORD WITH MANY OFFICIALS AND THE PUBLIC FOR SAYING OUT LOUD WHAT THEY SUSPECT OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ONLY MURMUR IN PRIVATE. NOR ARE LATVIANS IMPRESSED BY RUSSIAN PROFESSIONS OF HURT AND SURPRISE AT VIKE-FREIBERGA'S COMMENTS (JUST SO MANY CROCODILE TEARS, IN THEIR VIEW) OR THEIR SUGGESTIONS THAT THE INTERVIEW SOMEHOW UPSET PROMISING PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS
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(DISINGENUOUS AT BEST).

SO, WHAT'S GOING ON?

7. (S) DESPITE LATVIA'S COMMENDABLE, ALBEIT NOT PERFECT, RECORD SINCE 1998, MOSCOW HAS REFUSED TO CREDIT ANY ADVANCES IN LATVIAN SOCIAL INTEGRATION OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, NOT EVEN AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE ON THE ISSUE. NOR HAS IT TAKEN ANY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP, ISSUED ANY POSITIVE STATEMENT, OR CONTRIBUTED A SINGLE RUBLE TO BACKING MEASURES THAT ADDRESS THE ISSUES IT PROFFESSES TO HOLD IMPORTANT. INSTEAD, THE UNRELENTING DRUMBEAT OF ANTI-LATVIAN RHETORIC GOES ON. AT ONE LEVEL, MOSCOW'S CONSTANT "PLAYING OF THE ETHNIC CARD" REFLECTS RUSSIA'S BELIEF THAT SUSTAINING TENSION IN THE BALTICS WILL DELAY, PERHAPS THWART NATO (AND EVEN EU) ENLARGEMENT IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, THE RECENT ATTACKS ALSO SEEMED LINKED TO TWO ADDITIONAL FACTORS:

✓ -- CHECHNYA: IT IS CLEAR THAT RUSSIA IS STRAINING TO DEFLECT THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OVER THEIR CONDUCT OF THE CHECHEN WAR. ALTHOUGH ANY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SITUATIONS IN CHECHNYA AND IN LATVIA IS, AS SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER LINDH RECENTLY PUT IT, "VULGAR," THE FACT IS THAT RUSSIA IS LIKELY TO USE LATVIA AS A WHIPPING BOY AS LONG AS IT IS UNDER PRESSURE OVER CHECHNYA.

✓ -- PUTIN: WHATEVER THE THOUGHTS BEHIND HIS INSCRUTABLE SMILE, THE RUSSIAN LEADER'S APPEAL TO RUSSIAN PRIDE AND TO RESTORED SLAVIC GREATNESS HAS GIVEN RUSSIAN NATIONALISM GREATER CURRENCY THAN

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BEFORE. AS A RESULT OF THEIR OWN BITTER EXPERIENCES WITH THE PUTIN GOVERNMENT, LATVIANS ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT NOT ONLY EXPLOITS, BUT ENCOURAGES THESE SENTIMENTS. THEY ARE SIMPLY UNCONVINCED THAT PUTIN'S UNRELENTING PROSECUTION OF THE CHECHEN WAR WAS ONLY A MACHIAVELLIAN PLOY TO WIN THE PRESIDENCY AND THAT HE IS NOW POISED TO "REVERT" TO A MODERNIZER. VIEWED FROM RIGA, HIS WORDS AND ACTIONS (REVAMPING STALINIST SYMBOLS, EXTOLLING THE KGB, CENTRALIZING EXECUTIVE POWER AT THE EXPENSE OF THE REGIONS) DEMONSTRATE HIS COMMITMENT, BOTH FROM AN IDEOLOGICAL AND A UTILITARIAN POINT VIEW, TO A NEW, MILITANT BRAND OF NATIONALISM -- ONE THAT BODES ILL FOR LATVIA AND OTHER FORMER SOVIET STATES.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

9. (S) FACED WITH ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS IN THE PAST, WESTERN NATIONS, OURSELVES INCLUDED, HAVE SOUGHT TO TEMPER RUSSIAN IRE THROUGH PROMISES TO URGE THE LATVIANS TO TAILOR THEIR ACTIONS WITH AN EYE TOWARDS MOLLIFYING RUSSIA. THIS PATTERN PREVAILED DURING LATVIA'S DEBATE OVER THE CITIZENSHIP LAW IN JUNE 1998, THE SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIP REFERENDUM IN OCTOBER 1998, AND THE REVISION OF THE LANGUAGE LAW IN DECEMBER 1999. WILL IT WORK NOW? WE BELIEVE NOT. IN EACH OF THESE MAJOR INSTANCES (AND IN OTHERS BESIDES), THE LATVIANS ACCEDED TO OUR URGINGS WITHOUT NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON RUSSIAN ATTITUDES. LACKING MOVEMENT ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE, IT IS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT THE LATVIANS WILL BE AS RECEPTIVE TO APPROACHES FOR ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS -- PARTICULARLY, GIVEN THE FACT THAT (A) WITH LATVIA'S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL INTEGRATION NOW VIRTUALLY COMPLETED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS THEY COULD MAKE AND (B) THAT WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THEM THAT ONCE ESSENTIAL SOCIAL INTEGRATION LEGISLATION WAS PASSED,
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WE WOULD NOT ESCALATE OUR DEMANDS FOR MORE.

10. (S) IT IS TIME, IN OUR VIEW, FOR THE USG, THE EU, AND LATVIA'S OTHER PARTNERS TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AND RESOLVE IN PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS TO ABANDON THEIR CURRENT UNPRODUCTIVE BALTIC POLICY. IT IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR LATVIA'S SAKE, BUT FOR OUR OWN POLICY OF PROMOTING REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE BALTICS, THAT WE MAKE CLEAR TO RUSSIA THAT ITS CURRENT

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CRITICISM IS INIMICAL BOTH TO ITS INTERESTS AND TO OURS. THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATH TO ASSISTING RUSSIAN RESIDENTS IN THE BALTICS IS THROUGH POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE LATVIAN AND ESTONIAN GOVERNMENTS, ~~NOT UNSUPPORTED ALLEGATIONS~~. IT IS TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF ALL PARTIES IN THE REGION (A) TO PREVENT THE BALTICS FROM BECOMING A "FAULT LINE" FOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THE WEST; (B) TO ENHANCE THE ORDERLY INTEGRATION OF LATVIA'S AND ESTONIA'S RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATIONS, AND TO FOSTER DEMOCRACY-BUILDING, THE RULE OF LAW, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS THEMSELVES; AND (C) TO CARRY OUT THESE MEASURES WITH A FLEXIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY THAT WOULD UNDERSCORE THE FACT THAT, HANDLED COOPERATIVELY, BALTIC INTEGRATION INTO EUROPE HAS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES FOR RUSSIA, THE BALTICS AND OURSELVES.

WITHERS

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2000 2:49 PM
To: Bolan, Christopher J. (VP); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIA:LatvianParliament

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Distribution: SIT: BOLAN DAVIDSON NORLAND YEE
PRT: JACOBSON
Identifier: F1302e10
Originator: FBIS
Precedence: RUSH
TimeOfReceipt: 05/05/2000 13:50:44 ET

F5153
FBIS 153MAY05 UNCLAS
LATVIA: Latvian Parliament Approves New Cabinet Composition
CE0005050181 Riga Latvian Radio 1 in Latvian 1555 GMT 5 May 00

[FBIS Report] The Latvian parliament, meeting in extraordinary session, has expressed a vote of confidence in the government formed by Andris Berzins. As Latvia was in the process of defeating Russia at (ice-hockey in St. Petersburg at the time the session was due to begin, the hall was inquorate and the vote was delayed until after the victory. The vote was 69 in favour, 24 against, no abstentions.

The cabinet is made up as follows:

Prime Minister, Andris Berzins

Minister of Defence, Girts Valdis Kristovksis

→ Foreign Minister, Indulis Berzins

Minister of Economics, Aigars Kalvitis

Minister of Finance, Gundars Berzins

Minister of Internal Affairs, Mareks Seglins

Minister of Education and Science, Karlis Greiskalns

Minister of Culture, Karina Petersone

Minister of Welfare, Andrejs Pozarnovs

Minister of Transport, Anatolijs Gorbunovs

Minister of Justice, Ingrida Labucka

Minister of Environmental Protection and Regional Development,
Vladimirs Makarovs

Minister of Agriculture, Atis Slakteris

Minister with Special Responsibility for Cooperation with
International Financial Institutions, Roberts Zile

*Berzins should last a year.
Letter would be appropriate.
Cognat.
great still
close cooperation*

(Berzins is out)

Minister with Special Responsibility for State Reform, Janis

Krumins

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(ENDALL)

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12

INR

Latvia: New Coalition Formed (U)

Prime Minister-designate Andris Berzins yesterday announced an agreement to form a four-party centrist coalition, according to press reports. The prior coalition—Berzins' Latvia's Way, former Prime Minister Skele's People's party, and the For the Fatherland and Freedom (FFF) party—remains intact, with the addition of the New party. The coalition will control 69 of the 100 seats in parliament, which is expected to approve the coalition today. (U)

- **COMMENT:** Berzins sought a stable coalition that would last until elections in fall 2002; this is the ninth government since independence. To achieve stability and bolster public trust in the government, Berzins excluded previous prime ministers—notably Skele—from the cabinet. (S)

Foreign policy priorities will remain EU and NATO membership and relations with Moscow. Berzins publicly called for Russia and Latvia to make improved relations a mutual foreign policy priority. Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins (no relation to Andris) and Defense Minister Kristovskis are expected to retain their posts. (S)

The government will work to keep the currency stable, maintain tight fiscal policy, reduce the current account deficit (10.2% of GDP in 1999), and balance the budget (3.5% of GDP deficit in 1999). **The one possible glitch in this scenario is continued FFF insistence on a clear outline for privatization.** (S)

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By VZ NARA, Date 6/12/2023
2016-0314-m-1 (1.92)

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May 5, 2000

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|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001. email | From Richard Norland, re: [SRB Meeting with Latvian PM] (1 page) | 04/12/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 002. email | White House Situation Room to Christopher Bolan, et al., re: Latvian PM Skele Fires Economics Minister (2 pages) | 04/06/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 003. email | Andrew Weiss to Richard Norland, re: [Latvian PM Skele] (1 page) | 04/05/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. email | Richard Norland to Andrew Weiss, re: [Latvian PM Skele] (1 page) | 04/05/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005. email | White House Situation Room to Christopher Bolan, et al., re: [Latvian PM] (1 page) | 04/04/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. email | Richard Norland to Tracey Jacobson and Antony Blinken, re: Matt, please help me out! (2 pages) | 04/04/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 007. email | Antony Blinken to Tracey Jacobson and Richard Norland, re: Matt, please help me out! (1 page) | 04/04/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 008. email | Richard Norland to Sharon Storey, re: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB (1 page) | 04/03/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009. email | Sharon Storey to Richard Norland, re: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB (1 page) | 04/03/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 010. email | Richard Norland to Marilyn Scott Perez, re: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB (1 page) | 03/27/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 011. email | Marilyn Scott Perez to Richard Norland, re: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB (1 page) | 03/27/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

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 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia [2]

2011-1037-F
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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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| 012. email | Sharon Storey to Richard Norland, re: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB (1 page) | 03/24/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 013a. fax | Embassy of Latvia to Richard Norland, re: Update on Visiting Latvian Ministers (1 page) | 02/11/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 013b. report | U.S. Government Report (3 pages) | 08/17/1999 | P1/b(1) |
| 014. report | Re: [EU Accession Talks] [Released in Part] (4 pages) | 03/31/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 015. email | White House Situation Room to Steven Black, et al., re: [Russia-Latvia relations] (6 pages) | 04/01/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 016. email | White House Situation Room to Antony Blinken and Richard Norland, re: [Scenesetter] (6 pages) | 03/30/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 017. email | Nancy Maxfield to Tracey Jacobson and Richard Norland, re: Attendees at Latvian FM Meeting (1 page) | 03/06/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 018. memo | Diek Norland to Jim Steinberg, re: Meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins (3 pages) | 03/03/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 019. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 11/03/1999 | P1/b(1) |
| 020a. memo | Mare Grossman and Ross Wilson to Under Secretary Pickering, re: Reply to OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoep (1 page) | 03/03/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 020b. letter | Ambassador Thomas Pickering to Max van der Stoep (2 pages) | 03/01/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia [2]

2011-1037-F
 ke2189

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 021a. memo | Mare Grossman to Under Secretary Pickering, re: Reply to OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoep on OSCE Missions (1 page) | 03/03/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 021b. letter | Thomas Pickering to Max van der Stoep (2 pages) | 03/01/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 021c. paper | Re: Baltic Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals (1 page) | ea-03/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 023. memo | Mare Grossman to the Deputy Secretary, re: Your Meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins (5 pages) | 02/28/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 024. memo | Mare Grossman to the Deputy Secretary, re: Your Meeting with Lithuanian Parliamentarians (5 pages) | 02/29/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 025. paper | Re: Baltic Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals (2 pages) | 03/01/2000 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 026. list | Delegation List for U.S.-Latvia Bilateral Working Group [partial] [10 U.S.C. 424] (1 page) | 03/17/2000 | P3/b(3) |

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Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia [2]

2011-1037-F
ke2189

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Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Wednesday, April 12, 2000 3:34 PM
To: @APNSA
Cc: @BLINKEN; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Subject: Cancel SRB Meeting with Latvian PM Skele (April 25 - 11:30) ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

Embassy Riga and Latvian Embassy here advise that with PM Skele's resignation today and the prospect of several weeks' political turmoil in Latvia (which will probably result in a new Prime Minister other than Skele), we should not expect Skele to be here on April 25 for his meeting with Sandy. Please "postpone" the meeting.

FYI, Skele's resignation after nine months in office stems more from his abrasive leadership style than policy differences, although brewing confrontation came to a head with his decision last week to fire his economics minister over disagreements about privatization strategy. Basic lines of Latvian policy (pro-reform, pro-EU/NATO) are expected to stay the same. Skele will act as caretaker until a new government is formed. -- but his April 25 visit is definitely off.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (1,13)
6/12/2023 V2

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2000 12:22 PM
To: Bolan, Christopher J. (VP); Cables; Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIAN PM SKELE FIRES ECONOMICS MINISTER; GOVERNMENT PLUNGES INTO CRISIS

ActionAddrees: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4824
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Date Time: 061533Z APR 00
Distribution: SIT: BOLAN NSC DAVIDSON NORLAND YEE
PRT: JACOBSON
Identifier: M4382513
InfoAddrees: RUCNNEI/NORTHERN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0345
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 0141
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1645
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0367
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
Line1: OAAUZYUW RUEHRAA1331 0971533-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
Line2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
Line3: O 061533Z APR 00
Line4: FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
Originator: AMEMBASSY RIGA
Precedence: IMMEDIATE
Profiles: BOLANC
CABLES
DAVIDSOL
NORLANDR
YEEH
StationRoutingIndicator: RUEHRA
StationSerialNumber: 1331
TimeOfReceipt: 04/06/2000 11:23:27 ET

UNCLAS RIGA 001331

STATE FOR EUR/ADAS ANDRUSYSZYN, EUR/NB, S/NIS
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC NORLAND AND JACOBSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIAN PM SKELE FIRES ECONOMICS MINISTER;
GOVERNMENT PLUNGES INTO CRISIS

1. ON APRIL 6, PRIME MINISTER ANDRIS SKELE DISMISSED MINISTER OF ECONOMY VLADIMIRS MAKAROV ("FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM" PARTY), PUTTING THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN JEOPARDY. AFTER AN EMERGENCY MEETING, "FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM" ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL NOT NOMINATE A CANDIDATE TO REPLACE MAKAROV UNTIL THE CONFIDENCE VOTE IN THE SKELE CABINET SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 13. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW "FATHERLAND" WILL VOTE. THE NO CONFIDENCE MOTION WAS PROPOSED BY THE OPPOSITION "SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC" PARTY. SKELE AND MAKAROV HAVE BEEN ON A COLLISION COURSE FOR MONTHS, BITTERLY DISAGREEING ON SUCH ISSUES AS PRIVATIZATION OF LARGE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PRIVATIZATION AGENCY. THE BOILING POINT CAME APRIL 5 WHEN MAKAROV -- CONTRARY TO WHAT THE GOVERNMENT AGREED -- REVOKED PRIVATIZATION AGENCY DIRECTOR JANIS NAGLIS'S RIGHTS TO SIGN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

2. THE QUESTION ON EVERYONE'S LIPS NOW IS WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WILL WEATHER THIS CRISIS. WE SEE THREE

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2016-0314-M-1 (1.94)
6/12/2023 12

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS HOW THE CURRENT SITUATION MIGHT DEVELOP: A) "FATHERLAND" REMAINS IN THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE CABINET IS RESHUFFLED (WITH EITHER SKELE OR MAKAROV'S GONE) AND THE CENTER-RIGHT THREE-PARTY COALITION CONTINUES TO RULE THE COUNTRY; B) "FATHERLAND" DEFECTS; THE GOVERNMENT LOSES THE CONFIDENCE VOTE, AND THE "PEOPLE'S PARTY," "LATVIA'S WAY" AND THE SMALL "NEW PARTY" FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD ENJOY A THREE-VOTE MAJORITY IN THE SAEIMA; AND C) LESS LIKELY, "LATVIA'S WAY" AND "FATHERLAND" AGREE TO DUMP SKELE AND HIS "PEOPLE'S PARTY" AND TEAM UP WITH THE "NEW PARTY" AND THE "SOCIAL DEMOCRATS" TO REVIVE THE POST-1998 ELECTION GOVERNMENT MODEL, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT KRISTOPANS AT THE HELM.

3. IT IS OBVIOUS -- AND EVEN "FATHERLAND" LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THIS -- THAT ALL THREE RULING PARTIES CONSIDER THE CURRENT COALITION THE MOST REASONABLE OPTION IN TERMS OF SHARED POLICY POSITIONS, BUT BOTH "LATVIA'S WAY" AND "FATHERLAND" -- ESPECIALLY THE LATTER -- ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH SKELE'S AUTOCRATIC GOVERNING STYLE AND WOULD NOT BE HEARTBROKEN IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO OUST HIM. THEIR KEY PROBLEM IS THAT NEITHER HAS A VIABLE CANDIDATE WITH WHICH TO REPLACE HIM. CLEARLY, THE RULING COALITION IS NOW FACING ITS BIGGEST MOMENT OF TRUTH SINCE IT TOOK OFFICE IN JULY 1999. ITS FATE LARGELY HINGES ON HOW "FATHERLAND" WILL VOTE ON APRIL 13.

4. COMMENT: EMBASSY SEES NO/NO OUTCOME OF THIS GOVERNMENT CRISIS WHICH WOULD PLACE IN JEOPARDY LATVIA'S BASIC FOREIGN POLICY TENANTS: 1) PRO-U.S.; 2) PRO-NATO MEMBERSHIP; 3) PRO EU ACCESSION; AND 4) CONTINUED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP NORMAL DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.
HOLMES

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2000 5:39 PM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Cc: @BLINKEN; Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN); Gobush, Matthew N. (VP); @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject: RE: Latvian PM Skele - photo op with POTUS? ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I'm fine with doing. Don't think we need to be too sophisticated in what our message to the russians would be -- the photo is the message and it's probably enough to give him a hug. it will show we care about the little guys, are watching the russians closely, etc.

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To: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE); @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
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Subject: Latvian PM Skele - photo op with POTUS? ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amb. Holmes (in Latvia) is proposing that we look into a POTUS/VP photo op for Skele when he meets with Sandy on April 25 (11:30). Leaving aside scheduling issues, we wanted to consult with @RUSSIA on this.

First of all, one possible impediment has been pushed aside: Skele gets a clean bill of health regarding charges launched against him by a political opponent that he was part of a paedophile ring. The report of a commission looking into the charges was declassified and released by Skele yesterday. It exonerates him. The Embassy is confident that there is "not a shred of credible evidence" to sustain the accusations against Skele, which are motivated by political antagonisms -- Amb. Holmes sees "no potential to embarrass" Sandy or VP/POTUS by having Skele come to the White House.

Our aim in receiving Skele here was to show support in the face of Russia's toughening posture on treatment of Russian-speakers, war crimes and Nazi issues, culminating in the draft sanctions legislation introduced in the Duma. Failure of the sanctions bill to pass eases the pressure somewhat, but a photo op with POTUS could be used to (a) signal continued interest in preventing Russian bullying, (b) praise the Russians for holding off on sanctions, and (c) call on both sides to continue to address their problems in a civilized way (including making sure the Latvians address WWII legacy issues properly). One downside might be that praising the Russians for not imposing sanctions could actually backfire. What are your thoughts?

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (1.95)

6/17/2013 VZ

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Call Latvians -

move Skele @ 11:30.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (1,96)

6/12/2022 v2
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: WHSR
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 12:33 PM
To: Bolan, Christopher J. (VP); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Norland, Richard B. (EUR); Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Subject: LATVIAN PM SAYS CLEARED IN PAEDOPHILE SCANDAL

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Distribution: SIT: BOLAN DAVIDSON NORLAND YEE
PRT: JACOBSON
Identifier: Rea025d1
Originator: Reuters
Precedence: RUSH
TimeOfReceipt: 04/04/2000 11:35:03 ET

EUR/NB will check w/ Embassy Riga re: SREB - Skele meeting.
"OK"

a1856
^BC-LATVIA-SCANDAL

^Latvian PM says cleared in paedophile scandal
RIGA, April 4 (Reuters) - Latvian Prime Minister Andris Skele said on Tuesday that an independent investigation has cleared him and other high ranking officials of allegations of involvement in a paedophile ring.

Last October parliament set up a commission to examine the details of a year-long probe conducted by the prosecutor's office into the suspected ring that officials have said could involve as many as 600 people.

Opposition deputy Janis Adamsons, who heads the commission, then stunned parliament in February when he told the chamber that Skele, Justice Minister Valdis Birkavs and State Revenue Service head Andrejs Sonciks could be implicated in the scandal.

All three denied any involvement.

"The Constitution Protection Bureau has checked these allegations and found them groundless," Skele told journalists before heading into a cabinet meeting.

Constitution Protection Bureau Deputy Chief Uldis Dzenitis told Reuters the bureau would not provide any information on the findings, which it handed to Skele as a member of the National Security Council.

"The premier has received a clear and strong conclusion from the Constitution Protection Bureau that no publicly known state official has been implicated in the scandal," the Prime Minister's spokesman Jurgis Liepnieks told Reuters.

"This conclusion refers to both those named earlier, (including Skele) as implicated in a paedophile ring," Liepnieks added.

Adamsons dismissed the conclusion as hasty and promised that an expected commission report will include both the named officials and add new names. No date for the final report has been set.

Analysts have said the allegations appeared to be a case of party politics taken to extremes by Adamson, a long-time political enemy of Skele.

RB-- 04/04/00 10:55:25

4/5/00
Damian Leach - per Emb. Riga DCM.
Ped. accusation - not a shred of credible evidence -
- pol. motivated.
- no potential for embarrassment.

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 3:55 PM
To: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Cc: Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Subject: RE: Matt, please help me out! [UNCLASSIFIED]

Tracey, thanks.

✓ I think our first step will be to reassure ourselves on Skele -- agree with you that he's probably fine, but want to do an updated reality check.

Then will run the idea by RUE -- as Tony says, there may well be good reasons come late April to help the Latvians out vis-a-vis the Russians (that's how we sold the meeting to Sandy).

If you are talking to Amb. Holmes, you might let him know that his "vetting" of Skele will be especially important -- he should be hearing from Damien Leader soon (I spoke to Damien this morning) -- and if there is anything else he'd like to add to bolster the request, he can cable or fax it to us. Dick.

-----Original Message-----

From: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 3:43 PM
To: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: RE: Matt, please help me out! [UNCLASSIFIED]

Let me know if I can help.

TJ

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 2:53 PM
To: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN); Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: RE: Matt, please help me out! [UNCLASSIFIED]

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-----Original Message-----

From: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 2:38 PM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Cc: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Subject: RE: Matt, please help me out! [UNCLASSIFIED]

Tony, what do you think? I discussed with Bob, and he feels that we should handle this request as we would handle any request from an Ambassador -- ie., put it forward to SRB with a recommendation. It would not be good if the Amb comes with Skele, and says to SRB, "Too bad we couldn't have a photo op," and SRB says "I didn't even know there was a request."

On the pedophilia thing, it strikes me that most see this as a political mudslinging on the part of the opposition. The scandal has itself become something of a laughing stock. Damien will have a better view than I will, but I can't imagine this should stop Skele, a sitting PM, from visiting SRB.

TJ

-----Original Message-----

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 2:28 PM
To: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN); Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Cc: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Subject: RE: Matt, please help me out! [UNCLASSIFIED]

I don't think we should push for a photo op for Skele -- we've got too many other EUR irons in the fire hoping for POTUS time. Please discuss with Tony Blinken and me before proceeding with this.

In addition, I've asked Damien Leader to check urgently with Embassy Riga on the allegations that Skele is involved in a paedophilia ring, which allegations surfaced again today in the press (in the form of Skele announcing that a commission looking into the matter has given him a clean bill of health). Is Amb .Holmes absolutely convinced there is no problem in having Skele at the White House? I realize these charges originate with a political enemy -- but I also can see Sandy (or VP or POTUS) looking us in the eye and saying "WHAT?!"

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2016-0514-m-2 (1.98)
6/12/2013 v2

-----Original Message-----

From: Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2000 1:48 PM
To: Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Cc: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: Matt, please help me out! [UNCLASSIFIED]

Matt, Ambassador Holmes in Latvia has asked me to check on the availability of the VP for a photo op for Prime Minister Skele, who will be meeting with SRB at 11:30 April 25. Can you let me know if the VP is even in Washington then?

FYI Dick -- he's also asked about the possibility of a POTUS photo op. I am happy to deal this issue with Bob/Sandy (I'm pretty sure the answer will be NO) but if you want to do it in your channels that's OK too.

Thanks
TJ

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Thanks
TJ

11:30

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Monday, April 03, 2000 4:28 PM
To: Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

Sharon, an email from Marilyn while you were away said this meeting was agreed but gave me 10:30 as the time, rather than 11:30, and that is what I gave the Latvians. If 10:30 is not good, I will change that to 11:30, but I wanted to check with you first. will send you the earlier email FYI. thanks. Dick.

-----Original Message-----

From: Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sent: Monday, April 03, 2000 3:47 PM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

SRB has seen and accepts Please offer April 25th at 11:30am. thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 6:42 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

TO: SRB
THROUGH: TONY BLINKEN
FROM: DICK NORLAND

The Latvian Embassy has requested a meeting with you for Prime Minister Andris Skele on April 24 or 25. Skele will be visiting the U.S. in connection with events celebrating the 10th anniversary of the restoration of Latvian independence. He would want to thank you for U.S. support, review progress on social integration in Latvia as well as relations with Russia, and reaffirm U.S. policy on NATO enlargement.

Late April could be a very important time at which to send a signal of White House support for the Balts in general and Latvia in particular. The number, level and intensity of Russian verbal attacks aimed at Latvia in recent weeks, combined with a serious move in the Duma to impose economic sanctions, is beginning to set off real alarm bells in Latvia. While the Latvians realize some of this is probably the result of Russian electoral politics, they are not convinced the tide will ebb once the presidential election is over. To the extent the Russian campaign is an effort to divert western criticism on Chechnya, it will likely continue. Your meeting with Skele would provide a useful opportunity to reaffirm our support for Latvia.

- OK - schedule meeting
- Decline
- Discuss

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (2.00)
6/12/2023 VL

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sent: Monday, April 03, 2000 3:47 PM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

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From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 6:42 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO: SRB
THROUGH: TONY BLINKEN
FROM: DICK NORLAND

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- OK - schedule meeting
- Decline
- Discuss

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (2.01)
6/12/2023 VZ

TUES. 4/25

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2000 12:13 PM
To: Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Latvian Embassy confirms they accept 10:30 on Tuesday, April 25. Will provide list of participants (imagine it will be PM + 3 on the Latvian side, with Blinken, Norland and Medish/Weiss on the U.S. side). Will provide paper by email in advance of the meeting (will clear with @RUSSIA). thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2000 11:43 AM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Mr. Berger has read your e-mail and has agreed to do this meeting. Please offer 10:30am on 25 April. Please provide a list of proposed participants and Mr. Berger will need a paper prepared for the meeting. Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 6:42 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO: SRB
THROUGH: TONY BLINKEN
FROM: DICK NORLAND

The Latvian Embassy has requested a meeting with you for Prime Minister Andris Skele on April 24 or 25. Skele will be visiting the U.S. in connection with events celebrating the 10th anniversary of the restoration of Latvian independence. He would want to thank you for U.S. support, review progress on social integration in Latvia as well as relations with Russia, and reaffirm U.S. policy on NATO enlargement.

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- _____ OK - schedule meeting
- _____ Decline
- _____ Discuss

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
7016-0314-M-1 (2.02)
6/12/2023 R2

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2000 11:43 AM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday

Mr. Berger has read your e-mail and has agreed to do this meeting. Please offer 10:30am on 25 April. Please provide a list of proposed participants and Mr. Berger will need a paper prepared for the meeting. Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 6:42 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confirmed

TO: SRB
THROUGH: TONY BLINKEN
FROM: DICK NORLAND

+ 3 { PM
Amb.
HEA Sec State }

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- OK - schedule meeting 4/25 - 10:30
- Decline
- Discuss

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0814-M-1 (2.03)
6/12/2023 VZ

Norland, Richard B. (EUR)

From: Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 9:59 PM
To: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 6:42 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Latvian Prime Minister seeks appt. with SRB ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

TO: SRB
THROUGH: TONY BLINKEN
FROM: DICK NORLAND

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_____ OK - schedule meeting
_____ Decline
_____ Discuss

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314 -1-1 (2.04)
6/12/2025 RZ

EMBASSY OF LATVIA

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET

| | | | |
|-------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| TO: | Richard NORLAND | FROM: | Peteris Vinkelis, Charge d'Affaires |
| AT: | NSC | DATE: | 02/11/00 |
| FAX NUMBER: | 456-9150 | TOTAL NO. OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: | 1 |

UPDATE ON VISITING LATVIAN MINISTERS

Dear Dick,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Mr. Indulis Berzins, will meet Deputy Secretary Talbott Monday March 6, 2000 10:15 AM.

Minister will host a lunch on 12:30 pm.

We would greatly appreciate an opportunity to have a meeting at NSC Monday **afternoon**.

Prime Minister Mr. Skele will be in D.C. on Monday, April 24, **AND** Tuesday, April 25. It might somewhat widen the window of opportunity for high-level meetings at the WH.


Yours,

Peteris Vinkelis

• not 4/25 9-10 am
 • not lunch ~ 4/24 - 12:30 pm
 2 p

Yes _____ No _____

Talk to Damien Leader.



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001. email | White House Situation Room to Susan Braden, et al., re: [Latvia-Russia Relations] (3 pages) | 04/01/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002a. fax | Fax coversheets (4 pages) | 03/13/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002b. report | Re: [Russian-Latvian Relations] (1 page) | 03/12/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 003. email | White House Situation Room to Susan Braden, et al., re: [Latvia] (6 pages) | 04/06/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. email | White House Situation Room to Stephen Flanagan, et al., re: [Meeting] (2 pages) | 07/20/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 005. email | White House Situation Room to Susan Braden, et al., re: [Deputy Secretary's July 8 Meeting] (4 pages) | 07/20/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. memo | Eileen Malloy to the Deputy Secretary, re: [Your Meeting with Vladis Birkavs] (6 pages) | 04/23/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 007. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 008. briefing | Re: [Latvia] (1 page) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009. talking points | [Talking Points for Moseow Trip] (3 pages) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 010a. memo | Eileen Malloy and Ross Wilson to the Secretary, re: [Latvia] (5 pages) | 04/23/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 010b. paper | Re: [Operational Plan] (4 pages) | 04/23/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Russia - Latvia [1]

2011-1037-F
 ke2195

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 011a. memo | Eileen Malloy and Ross Wilson to the Secretary, re: [Latvia] (5 pages) | 04/23/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 011b. paper | Re: [Operational Plan] (4 pages) | 04/23/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 012a. briefing paper | Re: [Latvia] (1 page) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 012b. talking points | [Talking Points for Moscow Trip] (3 pages) | ea. 1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Russia - Latvia [1]

2011-1037-F

ke2195

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, April 06, 1998 8:27 AM
To: Braden, Susan R.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Roberts, Michael W.
Subject: LATVIA: A TROUBLED PARTNER -- THE ACTION

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 061125Z APR 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1503
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 1061
TOR: 980406081823 M3231934

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-01-1 (2.55)
6/12/2023 RZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 RIGA 001061

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND
DAS ASMUS, AND EUR/NB
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST. PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA: A TROUBLED PARTNER -- THE ACTION
PLAN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR LARRY C. NAPPER,
REASON 1.5(B), (D).

2. (S) SUMMARY: IN A SEPARATE CABLE, WE HAVE PROVIDED
OUR PORTRAIT OF LATVIA AS A TROUBLED PARTNER. THIS
CABLE PROVIDES A FIVE-TRACK ACTION PLAN TO WORK WITH
LATVIA TO OVERCOME ITS CURRENT TIME OF TROUBLES AND TO
HELP LATVIA BECOME A STRONGER PARTNER FOR THE UNITED
STATES IN THE BALTIC REGION. THE FIVE TRACKS ARE
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION; INTERNAL INTEGRATION OF
LATVIAN SOCIETY; U.S.-LATVIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS;
LATVIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA; AND, FINALLY,
STRENGTHENING LATVIA'S EFFORTS TO COPE WITH ITS
HISTORY. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL FIVE TRACKS MUST BE
PURSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN COORDINATION WITH U.S.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN OUR OWN OPERATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN-BALTIC CHARTER AND THE
NORTHERN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) LATVIA'S TIME OF TROUBLES (SEPTTEL) COINCIDES
WITH OUR OWN EFFORTS TO GIVE GREATER OPERATIONAL FOCUS
TO THE CONCEPTS FOR BALTIC POLICY THAT WE HAVE
ELABORATED OVER THE PAST YEAR, INCLUDING THE OPEN DOOR
IN NATO, THE AMERICAN-BALTIC CHARTER AND THE NORTHERN
EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. THESE CONCEPTS HAVE PROVIDED AN
ORIGINAL AND EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
DYNAMICS OF THE BALTIC REGION AND A VISION FOR ITS
FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE POLICY
FRAMEWORK WE HAVE CREATED HAS GENERATED EXTREMELY HIGH
EXPECTATIONS THROUGHOUT THIS REGION, INCLUDING IN
LATVIA. PERHAPS THE LITMUS TEST OF THIS OPERATIONAL
PHASE OF OUR BALTIC POLICY WILL BE OUR ABILITY TO HELP
LATVIA THROUGH THIS TIME OF TROUBLES AND ENABLE IT TO
BECOME A STRONGER CANDIDATE FOR INTEGRATION INTO EUROPE
AND PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE RECOMMEND
INITIATIVES ALONG THE FOLLOWING FIVE TRACKS.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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4. ~~(S)~~ THE INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION TRACK

=====

-- WTO ACCESSION. THE IMPASSE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ON AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES HAS IMPEDED LATVIA'S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR MANY MONTHS. ON JANUARY 16, THE PRESIDENT ASSURED THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS THAT EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM RAPIDLY. THE WTO IS THE ONLY MAJOR WESTERN ORGANIZATION THAT LATVIA CAN ACTUALLY HOPE TO JOIN IN THIS CENTURY. WE MUST RENEW OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE U.S.-EU SUMMIT IN MAY SO THAT WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH BALTIC WTO ACCESSION BY THE TIME OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE AMERICAN-BALTIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN JUNE.

-- THE OPEN DOOR IN NATO AND THE KIEVENAAR STUDY. WE MUST COMPLETE WORK ON THE FIRST PHASE OF MAJOR GENERAL KIEVENAAR'S STUDY OF BALTIC MILITARIES AND MOVE QUICKLY TO THE PHASE OF DEVELOPING CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF LATVIAN, ESTONIAN AND LITHUANIAN MILITARY FORCES. IF WE CAN MOVE RAPIDLY INTO PHASE TWO OF THE KIEVENAAR STUDY, THIS WILL BOLSTER CONFIDENCE IN LTVIA, AS WELL AS IN THE OTHER TWO BALTIC STATES.

-- BALTIC OECD PROGRAM. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE A WAY SHOULD BE FOUND TO PROVIDE FUNDING FOR A SPECIAL PROGRAM WITHIN OECD FOR THE BALTIC STATES.

-- CBSS MINISTERIAL AND ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE. WE MUST ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH FOR AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CBSS TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 RIGA 001061

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ASMUS, AND EUR/NB
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST. PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG

SUBJECT: LATVIA: A TROUBLED PARTNER -- THE ACTION PLAN

AND THE CBSS MINISTERIAL IN COPENHAGEN THIS JUNE.

-- FOSTERING BALTIC COOPERATION. WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO REINVIGORATE BALTIC COOPERATION IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS: DIRECT U.S. ASSISTANCE TO LATVIA AND LITHUANIA IN RESOLVING THEIR MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE IF THE PARTIES DESIRE; CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BALTICS ON CSBMS IN THE BALTIC REGION; AND AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE WITH THE BALTICS ON CFE, BEGINNING WITH THE U.S.-SPONSORED MEETING WITH ALL THREE BALTIC COUNTRIES IN RIGA ON APRIL 8-9.

=====

5. ~~(S)~~ THE INTERNAL INTEGRATION OF LATVIAN SOCIETY TRACK

=====

-- USE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT DURING PRIME MINISTER KRASTS APRIL 16-17 VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO PRESS FOR LIBERALIZATION OF LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAW.

-- USE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT DURING THE KRASTS VISIT TO PRESS FOR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT OF AMENDMENTS TO THE LANGUAGE AND LABOR LAWS TO AVOID FURTHER INFLAMING INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS.

-- WORK WITH UNDP AND EUROPEAN UNION EMBASSIES IN RIGA TO PRESS FOR FOLLOW UP TO THE LATVIAN NATURALIZATION OFFICE STUDY OF ATTITUDES CONCERNING SOCIAL INTEGRATION. WORK WITH LATVIA'S NEW INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON INTEGRATION POLICY TO DEVELOP CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS.

-- ARRANGE A VISIT BY DRL ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHATTUCK TO RIGA. THE VISIT MIGHT TAKE PLACE DURING THE MAY 4-5 CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION SPONSORED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION. THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BROAD CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SHATTUCK AND ALL RELEVANT PARTIES IN THE INTEGRATION DEBATE.

-- MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY WITH A SIGNIFICANT U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGA LAW SCHOOL TO STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW IN LATVIA. THIS CONTRIBUTION MIGHT BE IN THE FORM OF PROFESSORSHIPS IN THE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND/OR PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

-- CONTINUE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL DIALOGUE IN RIGA WITH LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONALIST FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM PARTY TO DRIVE HOME THE NECESSITY FOR RAPID MOVEMENT ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION ISSUES.

-- CONSIDER A CONCRETE U.S. CONTRIBUTION THROUGH FUNDING OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON MINORITIES AND/OR THE PROPOSED INFORMATION CENTER OF THE LATVIAN NATURALIZATION BOARD IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AND IMPROVE INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND PROMOTE ACCELERATED NATURALIZATION.

=====

6. ~~(S)~~ THE U.S.-LATVIAN BILATERAL TRACK

=====

-- ORGANIZE HIGH LEVEL VISITS FOR PRIME MINISTER KRASTS WITH THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE AND WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR IN THE WHITE HOUSE DURING KRASTS' VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS WOULD BOLSTER LATVIAN CONFIDENCE WHILE GIVING US AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO PUSH THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 RIGA 001061

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ASMUS, AND EUR/NB
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST. PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA: A TROUBLED PARTNER -- THE ACTION PLAN

PRIME MINISTER ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

-- ORGANIZE SUCCESSFUL START OF TX U.S.-LATVIAN ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP ON APRIL 16, INVOLVING AN ADVISORY ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

-- PROCEED WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S VISIT TO RIGA FOR THE FIRST SESSION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL UNDER THE AMERICAN-BALTIC CHARTER. THIS VISIT SHOULD PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT WE ARE ABLE TO

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ARRANGE FOR AMERICAN PARTICIPATION AT THE CBSS
MINISTERIAL IN COPENHAGEN.

-- INCREASE AND INTENSIFY U.S.-LATVIAN ANTI-TERRORISM
COOPERATION. WE HAVE OFFERED LIMITED TRAINING OF
LATVIAN ANTI-TERRORIST UNITS IN THE PAST, BUT THIS HAS
NOT HAD A HIGH PRIORITY BECAUSE THE TERRORIST THREAT IN
LATVIA WAS PERCEIVED TO BE LOW. WHILE THAT THREAT IS
STILL LOW BY EUROPEAN STANDARDS, GREATER ATTENTION TO
COOPERATION AND TRAINING AGAINST TERRORISM IS CLEARLY
WARRANTED.

-- ORGANIZE MEETINGS FOR PRIME MINISTER KRASTS WITH
FBI AND CIA OFFICIALS ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND VISIT TO
THE INTERAGENCY ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE CENTER AT
THE CIA.

-- CONDUCT SUCCESSFUL SESSION OF THE BILATERAL WORKING
GROUP ON POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN RIGA IN THE
FIRST WEEK IN MAY.

-- COMPLETE WORK ON PENDING AGREEMENTS IN THE ANTI-
CRIME AREA: SIGN THE BILATERAL CUSTOMS COOPERATION
AGREEMENT; UPDATE THE EXISTING EXTRADITION TREATY; AND
NEGOTIATE A NEW AGREEMENT ON CAR THEFT.

-- PROCEED WITH RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY ON DOUBLE
TAXATION BY THE LATVIAN SAEIMA AND THE U.S. SENATE.

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7. (C) THE LATVIAN-RUSSIAN BILATERAL TRACK

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-- JOIN THE GOVERNMENT OF LATVIA IN CONDEMNING THE
APRIL 6 EXPLOSION IN THE VICINITY OF THE RUSSIAN
EMBASSY IN RIGA. EXTEND THE FBI INVESTIGATION OF THE
APRIL 2 EXPLOSION AT THE RIGA JEWISH SYNAGOGUE TO
INCLUDE THIS NEW BOMBING INCIDENT.

-- COORDINATE WITH EUROPEAN UNION AND OSCE TO USE
AMERICAN INFLUENCE TO HELP RESTART THE BILATERAL
DIALOGUE BETWEEN RIGA AND MOSCOW.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, COUNTER RUSSIAN EFFORTS IN
INTERNATIONAL FORA SUCH AS THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION TO UNFAIRLY CRITICIZE LATVIA FOR ALLEGED
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

-- EXPLORE CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION AMONG LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN THE LATVIAN-ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN BORDER AREA
BY WORKING WITH THE EXISTING COUNCIL FOR COOPERATION OF
THE BORDER REGIONS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES.

-- BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA AND
LATVIA IN DISMANTLING THE HEN HOUSE RADAR AT SCRUNDA.
THE UNITED STATES PROVIDED RESOURCES FOR DISMANTLEMENT
OF THE LARGE-PHASED ARRAY RADAR AT THE SAME SITE IN
1995. U.S. ASSISTANCE MAY BE NEEDED SINCE RUSSIA MAY
NOT AVE THE WILL OR THE RESOURCES TO FOLLOW THROUGH
WITH DISMANTLEMENT OF THE FACILITY AND RESTORATION OF
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 RIGA 001061

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND
DAS ASMUS, AND EUR/NB
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST. PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA: A TROUBLED PARTNER -- THE ACTION
PLAN

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THE SITE TO APPROPRIATE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS.

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8. ~~(C)~~ THE HISTORIC LEGACY TRACK

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-- WORK WITH LATVIA, ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA TO ORGANIZE A JOINT EFFORT TO EXAMINE THE CAUSE, CONSEQUENCES, PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION OF HATE CRIMES. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN JUNE COULD ANNOUNCE A ONE-YEAR PROGRAM OF JOINT WORK WITH A REPORT TO BE DELIVERED TO THE 1999 SESSION OF THE PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION. UNDER THIS INITIATIVE, WE COULD BRING TOGETHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, NGO REPRESENTATIVES, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITIES TO SHARE EXPERIENCE AND IDEAS ON ELIMINATION OF HATE CRIMES.

-- WE SHOULD ARRANGE FOR PRIME MINISTER KRASTS TO PAY A VIP VISIT TO THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM DURING HIS APRIL 16-17 TRIP TO WASHINGTON. THIS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MEETING BETWEEN KRASTS AND AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS AT WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS AND UNDERSCORE THEIR MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE.

-- WE SHOULD INVITE LATVIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS TO BE HELD NOVEMBER 9-12 AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WONDER WHETHER THE CONFERENCE MIGHT EXPAND ITS AGENDA TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF RESTITUTION OF JEWISH COMMUNAL PROPERTY SEIZED BY THE NAZIS DURING THE WARTIME PERIOD.

-- PROVIDE TIMELY FBI SUPPORT FOR A THOROUGH LATVIAN INVESTIGATION OF THE APRIL 2 BOMBING OF THE RIGA SYNAGOGUE. THIS WILL HELP ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT.

-- WELCOME ACTION BY LATVIA'S PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TO REMOVE FROM OFFICE LATVIAN POLICE OFFICIALS WHO FAILED TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR THE SYNAGOGUE, AS WELL AS THOSE MILITARY OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE LATVIAN LEGION COMMEMORATION ON MARCH 16 IN CONTRAVENTION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. THIS WILL REINFORCE THE NOTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF OFFICIALS IN A DEMOCRACY AND UNDERSCORE OUR SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH LATVIA'S HISTORIC LEGACY. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT AS SOON AS THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT RATIFIES THESE DISMISSALS FOLLOWING ITS EASTER RECESS.

-- CONSIDER PROPOSING TO THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS THAT THEY JOINTLY ORGANIZE A COMMISSION OF HISTORIANS TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS OF WORLD WAR II IN THE BALTIC REGION. IN ORDER TO AVOID SINGLING OUT ANY ONE COUNTRY, THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN LATVIA, ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA. THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD INCLUDE WARTIME DEPORTATIONS OF BALTIC POPULATIONS BY THE SOVIETS, AS WELL AS WARTIME ATROCITIES BY THE GERMANS AND THEIR BALTIC COLLABORATORS. AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE AND NAPPER MADE THIS SUGGESTION TO PRESIDENT ULMANIS AND OTHER RANKING LATVIAN OFFICIALS ON APRIL 2. PRESIDENT ULMANIS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD EU AMBASSADORS THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF SUCH A COMMISSION.

-- AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE INVESTIGATIONS OF WORLD WAR TWO WAR CRIMINALS IN LATVIA. WE SHOULD PRESS THE LATVIAN

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GOVERNMENT TO MAKE USE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HAS BEEN
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 RIGA 001061

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND
DAS ASMUS, AND EUR/NB
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST. PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA: A TROUBLED PARTNER -- THE ACTION
PLAN

COLLECTED IN CONTEXT WITH OSI AND TO PROCEED WITH
INDICTMENTS AND TRIALS WHERE WARRANTED.

-- CONTINUE TO PURSUE PROPERTY RESTITUTION BY LATVIAN
AUTHORITIES TO JEWISH GROUPS FROM WHICH COMMUNAL
PROPERTY WAS CONFISCATED DURING THE WAR.

-- CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE RIGA JEWISH
COMMUNITY ON THE FULL RANGE OF HISTORIC LEGACY ISSUES.
NAPPEB

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, July 20, 1998 9:48 AM
To: Flanagan, Stephen J.; Lee, Malcolm R.; McEldowney, Nancy E.
Subject: DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S ONE-ON-ONE MEETING

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
DTG: 201124Z JUL 98
MSGTO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1902
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2005
TOR: 980720094356 M3384386

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526
296-0214-2-2 (2.56)
6/12/2023 VL

~~SECRET~~ RIGA 002005

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, LG
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S ONE-ON-ONE MEETING
WITH LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE JOHN WITHERS FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ AT THE END OF DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S JULY 8 MEETING WITH LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS (SEPTEL), THE PRESIDENT ASKED TO SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY. IN A TEN-MINUTE DISCUSSION, ULMANIS RAISED TWO MATTERS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN: A POSSIBLE REFERENDUM ON AMENDMENTS TO THE LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP LAW AND CONTINUED RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON LATVIA. THE FOLLOWING IS DRAWN FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S NOTES ON THE CONVERSATION.
2. ~~(S)~~ THE PRESIDENT BEGAN BY VOICING "DEEP WORRY" ABOUT THE EFFORTS OF PRIME MINISTER KRASTS AND THE NATIONALIST PARTIES TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO HOLD A REFERENDUM ON LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAW. HOW, ULMANIS ASKED, CAN PRESSURE THAT IS "EFFECTIVE AND NOT JUST RHETORIC" BE BROUGHT ON KRASTS AND THE NATIONALISTS TO DESIST FROM THIS COURSE? ONE WAY, THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED, IS TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. THEIR MESSAGE, HE MAINTAINED, SHOULD BE THAT IF SUFFICIENT SIGNATURES ARE COLLECTED TO REQUIRE A REFERENDUM, THE MONEY WOULD BE CUT OFF. THIS SHOULD BE DONE, HE ADVISED, IN A MANNER THAT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT IRREVERSIBLE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE WAS "INVITING FIRE" AGAINST HIMSELF BY MAKING THE SUGGESTION, THE PRESIDENT NONETHELESS SAID THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD ALLOW HIM TO CONVENE AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE CABINET AND TO STOP THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING SIGNATURES. SO FAR, HE SAID, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT HEARD THE OTHER WARNINGS HE HAS RECEIVED, INCLUDING THAT FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT IN HER MEETING WITH KRASTS ON JUNE 8 IN NEW YORK.
3. ~~(S)~~ TURNING TO RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, ULMANIS ACCUSED PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SPOKESMAN SERGEY YASTRZHEMSKIY OF MASTERMINDING THE RUSSIANS' PRESSURE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LATVIA. IN ULMANIS' VIEW, FOREIGN MINISTER YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV IS "A PROBLEM," BUT YASTRZHEMSKIY IS THE MAIN PERSON BEHIND THE KREMLIN

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POLICY OF A "BLACK INFORMATION CAMPAIGN" AGAINST LATVIA. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT YELTSIN IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH HIM. YELTSIN HAD HEARD FROM SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER PERSSON, GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL, LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT ADAMKUS, AND OTHERS, URGING SUCH A MEETING. ACCORDING TO ULMANIS, YELTSIN HAS SAID YES TO A MEETING, BUT YASTRZHEMSKIY HAS THEN MANAGED TO ISOLATE HIM. ULMANIS URGED THAT THE U.S. USE ITS INFLUENCE TO GET YELTSIN TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH HIM.

4. ~~(S)~~ THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S PARTY.

WITHERS

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: WHSR
Sent: Monday, July 20, 1998 9:40 AM
To: Braden, Susan R.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; McEldowney, Nancy E.
Subject: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JULY 8 MEETING WITH

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 201121Z JUL 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1897
ORIG: AMEMBASSY RIGA
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2002
TOR: 980720093257 M3384379

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2,57)

6/12/2023 VL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 002002

DEPARTMENT FOR D, EUR/DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB, S/NIS
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - FLANAGAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, LG

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JULY 8 MEETING WITH
LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER KRASTS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE JOHN WITHERS FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D) .

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: IN A JULY 8 MEETING IN RIGA, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT PRESSED LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER GUNTARS KRASTS TO EXERT HIS INFLUENCE IN ACHIEVING THE ENACTMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT'S JUNE 22 AMENDMENTS TO THE LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP LAW. FINAL PASSAGE OF THE AMENDMENTS, WHICH OPPONENTS ARE TRYING TO PREVENT THROUGH CALLING A REFERENDUM IN THE AUTUMN, WOULD, HE INSISTED, GREATLY STRENGTHEN THE UNITED STATES IN GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO DESIST FROM THEIR RELENTLESS PRESSURE ON LATVIA OVER THE ISSUE. TALBOTT INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE U.S., IN THE FORM OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, IS WILLING TO INTERCEDE ON LATVIA'S BEHALF WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN DURING THEIR SEPTEMBER SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY STRENGTHENED IF BY THE TIME OF THE MEETING, THE CALLS FOR A REFERENDUM HAVE BEEN DEFEATED AND THE OSCE-COMPLIANT AMENDMENTS WHICH THE SAEIMA PASSED ON JUNE 22 ARE LAW. IN REPLY, KRASTS LIMITED HIMSELF TO COMPLAINING THAT THE OSCE WOULD "MOVE THE GOALPOSTS" EVEN IF THE JUNE 22 AMENDMENTS WERE ADOPTED. HE AVOIDED ANY COMMITMENT TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY BRIEFLY UPDATED KRASTS ON U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS ON LATVIA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(S)~~ IN A THIRTY-MINUTE DISCUSSION DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAW, TALBOTT TOLD KRASTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS GOOD OFFICES IN COUNTERING THE RUSSIAN PRESSURE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LATVIA. THE U.S., TALBOTT SAID, WANTS TO BE THE CHAMPION OF LATVIA'S INTEGRATION INTO EURO-ATLANTIC STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS. ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM THAT ROLE EFFECTIVELY DEPENDS, HOWEVER, ON THE FATE OF THE OSCE-COMPLIANT AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW WHICH THE SAEIMA PASSED ON JUNE 22. AT THAT TIME, TALBOTT

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MAINTAINED, THE USG FELT OPTIMISM AND RELIEF AT THE PARLIAMENT'S BOLD DECISION. THOSE FEELINGS TURNED TO APPREHENSION WHEN NATIONALIST DEPUTIES SUBSEQUENTLY INITIATED A SIGNATURE CAMPAIGN CALLING FOR A REFERENDUM TO REVERSE THE SAEIMA'S ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE USG RESPECTS THE DEPUTIES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK A REFERENDUM, THE U.S. FEELS PUZZLEMENT AND FOREBODING AT THE PROSPECT THAT THE SAEIMA'S RESOLUTIONS OF JUNE 22 MIGHT NOW BE UNDONE.

3. (S) NEVERTHELESS, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, THE UNITED STATES WILL, TALBOTT DECLARED, DO ALL IT CAN TO ASSIST LATVIA IN ITS TENSE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS, THE U.S. HAS OPPOSED RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO CONDEMN LATVIA IN A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL FORA. BOTH THE PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECRETARY ALBRIGHT HAVE WRITTEN LETTERS SUPPORTING LATVIA'S PROGRESS ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND CALLING ON RUSSIA TO LOWER ITS ANTI-LATVIAN RHETORIC. NOW, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO HAVE PRESIDENT CLINTON RAISE RUSSIA'S RECENT HARSH TREATMENT OF LATVIA DIRECTLY WITH YELTSIN AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IN SEPTEMBER. TALBOTT CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TENOR OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE DETERMINED BY LATVIAN ACTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP. IF THE JUNE 22 AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN ENACTED AT THE TIME OF THE MEETING WITH YELTSIN, THE PRESIDENT'S INTERCESSION CAN BE CORRESPONDINGLY FORCEFUL. IF NOT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO INTERCEDE AS STRONGLY. IT IS VITAL THEREFORE FOR LATVIA'S LEADERS, STARTING WITH KRASTS HIMSELF AS THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT AND THE HEAD OF HIS PARTY, TO EXERT THEMSELVES TO THE UTMOST IN URGING THE LATVIAN PEOPLE TO SUSTAIN THE SAEIMA'S JUNE 22 DECISIONS.

4. (S) IN REPLY, KRASTS ASSERTED THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT THE REFERENDUM: IN HIS VIEW, THE REFERENDUM IS SIMPLY ANOTHER WAY OF SEEKING APPROVAL FOR WHAT THE SAEIMA DID. ONLY ONE QUESTION -- THAT OF "AUTOMATIC" CITIZENSHIP FOR STATELESS CHILDREN BORN IN LATVIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE -- IS AT ISSUE; THE OTHER -- ABOLITION OF THE "WINDOWS" AGE RESTRICTIONS ON NATURALIZATION -- IS NOT CONTROVERSIAL. THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE STATELESS CHILDREN LIES WITH THE OSCE. IT HAS YET TO STATE PUBLICLY AND EXPLICITLY THAT THE JUNE 22 AMENDMENTS CONSTITUTE ITS FINAL REQUIREMENTS ON AMENDING THE CITIZENSHIP LAW. THE OSCE HAS, KRASTS CLAIMED, "SHIFTED THE GOALPOSTS" IN THE PAST. WHAT GUARANTEE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 RIGA 002002

DEPARTMENT FOR D, EUR/DAS ASMUS, EUR/NB, S/NIS
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - FLANAGAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RS, LG
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JULY 8 MEETING WITH
LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER KRASTS

DID LATVIA HAVE THAT IT WOULD NOT DO SO AGAIN, AS THE RUSSIANS HAVE DONE? LATVIA, HE DECLARED, HAS BECOME PART OF AN OSCE "EXPERIMENT" ON CITIZENSHIP QUESTIONS. A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER VAN DER STOEL THAT NO FURTHER DEMANDS WILL BE FORTHCOMING WOULD ASSIST IN DEFEATING THE REFERENDUM DRIVE.

5. (S) TALBOTT NOTED THAT LATVIA HAS BEEN THROUGH A ROUGH PERIOD RECENTLY AND THAT THE U.S. WANTS NOTHING FURTHER TO HAPPEN THAT WOULD MAKE LATVIA'S JOB EVEN

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HARDER. THE U.S. POSITION ON CITIZENSHIP HAS BEEN CONSISTENT: OTHER MAY MOVE GOALPOSTS, BUT NOT US. IT IS, IN FACT, LATVIA THAT CAN MAKE THE PROCESS EASIER OR HARDER. IF THE REFERENDUM FAILS, GOOD THINGS WILL ENSUE. WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO TELL THE RUSSIANS TO CEASE THEIR PRESSURE CAMPAIGN ON LATVIA. IT IS IN RUSSIA'S INTEREST TO DO SO. RUSSIA WILL ONLY ISOLATE ITSELF IF IT CLAIMS THAT THE JUNE 22 DECISIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH. ITS CONTINUED RESORT TO PRESSURE WILL, MOREOVER, ONLY RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS STRATEGIC INTENTIONS. IT IS CRITICAL, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT LATVIA NOT ISOLATE ITSELF BY VOTING THE JUNE 22 DECISIONS DOWN.

6. (S) TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF LATVIA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO, TALBOTT TOLD KRASTS THAT MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE CHARLENE BARSHEVSKY AND EU TRADE COMMISSIONER SIR LEON BRITTAN WERE IN PROGRESS AND WOULD NOT CONCLUDE UNTIL AFTER HIS DEPARTURE FROM RIGA. HE WAS NOT THEREFORE IN A POSITION TO BRIEF KRASTS AT THAT MOMENT, BUT UNDERSECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS STUART EIZENSTAT, WHO WOULD BE IN VILNIUS JULY 9 FOR THE CBSS TRADE MINISTERIAL, COULD PROVIDE LATVIA'S ECONOMIC MINISTER STRUJEVICS WITH AN UPDATE AT THAT TIME. TALBOTT REITERATED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CONCERN, EXPRESSED AT THE BALTIC CHARTER SIGNING IN JANUARY, THAT LATVIA NOT GET CAUGHT IN A "SANDWICH" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EU POSITIONS ON AUDIO-VISUALS. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS COMMITTED TO SEEKING A COMPROMISE SOLUTION THAT WOULD RESPECT U.S., EU AND LATVIAN EQUITIES.

7. (S) COMMENT: IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, KRASTS RESORTED TO THE FAMILIAR TACTICS OF DOWNPLAYING THE SERIOUSNESS OF LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP ISSUES AND OF PLACING THE BLAME FOR LATVIA'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES ON SOMEONE ELSE, IN THIS INSTANCE, MAX VAN DER STOEL. THROUGHOUT HIS WHOLE IMPASSIONED DISPLAY, HOWEVER, HE AVOIDED ANY COMMITMENT TO EXERTING A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON THE PROCESS OR INDEED TO INVOLVING HIMSELF AT ALL IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. RATHER, AS HE HAS THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE CONTROVERSY, HE HAS PREFERRED, IN THE WORDS OF THE OLD FOLKSONG, "TO TURN HIS HEAD AND PRETEND THAT HE JUST DOESN'T SEE." IN SO DOING, HE HAS SUCCEEDED ONLY IN ISOLATING HIMSELF BOTH FROM HIS PARTY (WHICH IS ANGERED BY HIS DECISION IN MAY TO PERMIT AMENDMENT OF THE CITIZENSHIP LAW TO GO BEFORE THE SAEIMA IN THE FIRST PLACE) AND FROM THE GOVERNMENT AT LARGE FOR REFUSING TO CARRY OUT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS ITS HEAD. WHAT HE GAINS FROM SUCH OBDURACY IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO PERCEIVE, EXCEPT POSSIBLY KRASTS HIMSELF.

8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: THAT SAID, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MESSAGE REGISTERED LOUD AND CLEAR. OUR WILLINGNESS TO WEIGH IN ON LATVIA'S BEHALF AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, CONTINGENT OF COURSE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM PROCESS, UNDERSCORES IN UNMISTAKABLE TERMS THE PRIORITY WHICH WE ATTACH BOTH TO NORMALIZING LATVIA'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND TO ACHIEVING THE INTEGRATION OF LATVIAN SOCIETY. THAT MESSAGE MAY NOT GALVANIZE KRASTS -- ALTHOUGH IT MAY NEUTRALIZE ANY THOUGHTS HE MIGHT HAVE OF PLAYING A NEGATIVE ROLE IN THE PROCESS -- BUT IT WILL CERTAINLY ENERGIZE THOSE WHO WANT TO SEE THEIR SOCIETY BROUGHT TOGETHER AND THE CALLS FOR A REFERENDUM DEFEATED. END COMMENT.

9. (S) THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED BY THE DEPUTY

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SECRETARY'S PARTY.

WITHERS

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520
April 23, 1998

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL (with SECRET attachment)~~

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2.58)

6/12/2013 VZ

DECL: 04/23/08

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EUR - Eileen Malloy, Acting

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Valdis Birkavs, Latvian Foreign Minister, Friday, April 24, 11:00am, Your Office

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Stress need to make real progress on minority issues.
2. Preview our "shore-up" Latvia strategy.
3. Brief on any Latvia points raised during your recent meetings with Russian officials.

II. APPROACH

We should use this meeting to hold Latvia's feet to the fire on minority issues. The Latvian Parliament is now considering helpful but domestically controversial amendments to citizenship legislation, and the government is shaky, at best. Birkavs, a capable Foreign Minister and leader of the coalition party "Latvia's Way" (16/100 seats in Parliament), is ready and willing to play the right role, and he wants to use his meeting with you to carry home a strong message of U.S. concern. Since this meeting is the first senior level contact we have had with Latvia since the deterioration in relations with Russia, we also should reassure Birkavs that the U.S. will help Latvia weather the storm. We can also note that in London, we have asked U/S Pickering and Eizenstat to argue against Russian proposals to use the G-8 as a forum for discussion of minority issues in Latvia and Estonia and to raise Latvia's WTO aspirations with the EU.

You can remind Birkavs that we are standing by to reschedule the U.S.-Latvia economic BWG in late May, and that you look forward to your visit to Riga in late June to launch the U.S. - Baltic Partnership Commission. You last saw Birkavs during the January Baltic Presidents' visit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: EUR/DAS RDAsmus

Reason: 1.5 (b) and (d)

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III. BACKGROUND

A. Minority Issues

The situation in Riga is unsettled. There likely will be a vote of confidence in PM Krasts' government next Thursday, and the outcome is uncertain. A key factor is a controversial government proposal to amend the citizenship law, which should go to the Saeima next week. PM Krasts and his opponents are near agreement on removing the cumbersome "windows" system (under which tranches of non-citizens become eligible for naturalization over a six year period).

An even more controversial issue concerns the naturalization of children born in Latvia after August 21, 1991. The government prefers to accept OSCE Minorities Commissioner van der Stoel's recommendation (also accepted by Estonia) to make all such children eligible immediately. The government would package this amendment with changes in the language and education laws to promote the study and use of the Latvian language. Meanwhile, the opposition parties argue for a proposal that would require these children to reach the age of 16 before requesting naturalization and also require them to present some evidence of competency in the Latvian language. This variant would almost certainly be unacceptable to van der Stoel.

Your bottom line should be: Nothing less than van der Stoel's recommendations and his active endorsement of the proposals will do. There can be no retreat or compromise, and everything should be done to move the legislation as quickly as possible. This is vital not only to preserve unanimous EU and U.S. support, but also to head off Russian efforts to push for changes in Latvia's citizenship law that exceed the OSCE's recommendations (e.g., quotas).

B. Our Shore-Up Latvia Strategy

We have just sent to the Secretary a proposed strategy for Latvia that would follow up on letters she sent to Primakov and the President sent to President Ulmanis. Our strategy seeks -- through diplomacy, public affairs and some assistance -- to ensure that Latvia does not fall behind the other Baltic nations on the path toward full integration into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. We suggest you outline the key elements of the strategy for Birkavs.

C. Debrief on Your Recent Meetings with Russian Officials

While we understand that Latvia did not figure prominently in your recent meetings with Primakov, Avdeyev and others, Birkavs would find reassurance in your willingness to give him a sense of how these meetings went.

D. U/S Pickering and Eizenstat's Talks with the EU and Mamedov

At a Friday EU SLG lunch in London (which will have taken place just before you see Birkavs), we asked U/S Pickering to urge the EU to work with us to reassure Latvia and to push for continued progress on minority issues. We asked U/S Eizenstat to urge EU cooperation in resolving remaining issues in Latvia's bid for WTO membership. At a dinner with Mamedov that evening, we have asked U/S Pickering to discourage Russia from seeking to use the G-8 as a forum for discussing minority issues in Latvia and Estonia.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Deputy Secretary
EUR/DAS Ron Asmus
D Staff
EUR/NB notetaker

OTHER COUNTRY

Foreign Minister Birkavs
Ambassador Ojars Kalnins
Mark Dayton, Assistant to
FM Birkavs (AmCit)

Attachment:

- Tab 1 - Talking Points
- Tab 2 - Biographic Material

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- 4 -

April 23, 1998

Drafter: TJEvans *TJE*

ID: BM - April 24 D Birkavs mtg

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Clearance: EUR/NB:GMilovanovic
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Clearance: DRL:JMerz
Clearance: P:BStephenson
Clearance: EUR/RPM:JMcGhee/SPenhune

TJE

TALKING POINTS

Minority Issues

- Government's proposed amendments to naturalization and citizenship legislation very positive development, welcomed by OSCE, US, and us.
- Adherence to OSCE recommendations gets Latvia a united front of support, shows OSCE works, argues against using other criteria or objectives.
- Bottom line: Nothing less than van der Stoel's recommendations and his active endorsement of the proposals will do. No retreat or compromise, move the legislation as quickly as possible.
- Caution: Be careful with packaging this important amendment with other changes to education and language laws which might slow down passage.
- Tough job in front of you, changes are not easy, we'll support you publicly. Privately, we are telling Russians that continued rhetorical confrontation will not help.
- Earlier today in London, we asked U/S Pickering to make similar points with the EU SLG.

U.S. Strategy on Latvia

- Charter of Partnership now our foundation, but given current situation, we have recommended the Secretary put in place a supplemental plan to support Latvia's integration efforts.
- Combination of diplomacy, public affairs, and some assistance. Key points:
 - Focus high level U.S. attention on "win-win" objectives for Latvia and Russia, including involvement in regional cooperation.
 - Urge Latvian reform on minority issues, publicly endorse improvements.
 - Work with Russia to reduce counterproductive policies and rhetoric.
 - More active role in promoting historical reconciliation in Baltics, including open treatment of the Holocaust.

Recent Talks with Russian Officials

- Extent to which Latvia was raised, mood of the talks, etc.

U/S Pickering/Eizenstat's meetings with EU and Mamedov

- At a lunch in London today, we asked U/S Pickering to urge our EU friends to work with us to:

promote reform on minorities in Latvia, publicly commend improvements.

send a message to the Russians that the OSCE is our measuring stick and that they should not move the goal posts.

urge Russia to address minority issues in Latvia and Estonia through direct dialogue and at the OSCE, not the UN or G-8. (We asked Pickering to make the same point with Mamedov at his Friday dinner.)

- On Latvia-WTO, we asked U/S Eizenstat to note that:

we are still waiting for a substantive response from the EU to our compromise proposal on audio-visual services for Latvia's WTO accession application.

essential that we give renewed effort to resolving the WTO issue as part of our efforts to encourage Latvia's integration into the global economy.

Upcoming Visits

- We understand PM Krasts' decision to postpone his visit to the U.S. and hope he can reschedule soon. U/S Eizenstat has reserved time on May 25 for the U.S.-Latvia economic BWG. Let us know if this works for you.
- I look forward to my late June visit to Riga to launch the first meeting of the U.S.-Baltic Partnership Commission.

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Latvia

New Legislation Proposed: On April 15, the Latvian Cabinet proposed new legislation abolishing the "window" system of naturalization (which limited naturalization by age, with the "window" of those eligible to naturalize opening incrementally over a period of ten years), granting citizenship to stateless children born in Latvia and modifying draft Labor and Language laws to meet international standards. This is a major breakthrough for the Government, but will face a rocky road in the Latvian parliament. Passage will likely depend on our strong and vocal support for the bills, and on moderated Russian rhetoric.

Primakov letter to Albright: On April 14, FM Primakov sent Secretary Albright a second Latvia letter, which crossed in the mail with her letter on the same subject and included a list of six issues on which the Russians want Latvia to make progress. The newly-proposed Legislation will address 5 out of 6 of the Russian demands, and Latvia is already making progress to address the 6th demand. In some cases, the Russian demands go beyond OSCE recommendations. Attachments 1 and 2 outline Latvian progress in addressing OSCE Recommendations and Primakov's demands.

Attachments:

1. Latvian Progress on Key OSCE Recommendations
2. Latvian Progress on Key Issues Identified in 4/14 Primakov Letter.
3. Van der Stoel announcement

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2016-0314-M-1 (2.60)

6/12/2023 VL

Talking Points prepared for Dep Sec Talbot's
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Talking Points

- Hope you agree that Latvian Cabinet's proposed changes in Latvia's naturalization and citizenship legislation were a very positive development; clear Latvia beginning to make important progress.
- Van der Stoel publicly welcomed the Latvian government's action. A very good sign. Our long-standing position has been to encourage prompt implementation of OSCE recommendations. Show OSCE works.
- The President wrote Ulmanis two weeks ago and urged dialogue between Latvia and Russia as well as prompt implementation of OSCE recommendations.
- Thanks to effort on all sides, we believe many of the issues Primakov raised in his April 14 letter have been addressed by the proposals announced April 15 by the Latvian cabinet, including:
 - Proposal to abolish "window" naturalization system and to grant immediate citizenship to stateless children.
 - Proposal to provide additional language training; tests have already been simplified and the pass rate was 98 percent last year;
 - Proposal to amend language law so it will conform with international standards;
 - Proposal to amend labor laws to comply with international legal norms.
- On the issue of participation in municipal elections raised in Primakov's letter, we note that OSCE has not made any recommendations on this matter. Fixing the window problem, however, should also solve problem of disenfranchisement.
- We agree with Van der Stoel that a Latvian commitment to speedier and genuine social integration could help establish a firm basis for inter-ethnic harmony.
- Clearly Latvian Government and Ulmanis will have a tough job working their proposed changes through the Latvian parliament. Nothing would do more to complicate their job than an atmosphere of continuing rhetorical confrontation.

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2016-0314-M-4 (2.61)

6/2/2023 v2

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- Latvian Government has taken a bold step; what we all need to do is support it; any pressures against Latvia now would only be counterproductive.
- We will continue to work with Ulmanis and the Latvian government to help get these forward-looking proposals enacted into law. Encourage you to do the same.
- Let's keep our eye on the common goal. If the Latvian government can secure passage of all the proposals it announced this week, they will have enacted the essential OSCE recommendations.

(if raised, sanctions against Latvia):

- Madeleine very glad to hear in your April 14 letter that Russian government not contemplating comprehensive trade sanctions against Latvia. But even existing boycotts and threats are causing significant harm to the process of solving this issue. Hurts all residents of Latvia, including Russian minority. Complicates passage of legislative changes. Time to stop rhetoric and start dialogue. Time to welcome the changes and encourage them constructively; not to harm them recklessly.

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Watch Out For:

Primakov may argue, as he did in his April 14 letter to the Secretary, that Latvia is "pursuing a deliberate policy of discrimination against minorities."

- There is no systematic pattern of human rights violations in Latvia.

Russia has called for a G-8 statement on Latvia.

- Continuing inflammatory rhetoric and boycotts will make any G-8 consideration of this issue impossible.

Primakov may note his dissatisfaction with the situation of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia.

- If currently pending legislation is passed, Estonia will have addressed all 30 of the OSCE's main recommendations.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520
April 23, 1998

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (2.62)
6/12/2023 VZ

DECL: 04/12/08
TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Eileen Malloy, Acting
S/NIS - Ross Wilson, Acting
SUBJECT: Strategy on Latvia

SUMMARY

Russo-Latvian tensions are the first real test of the Baltic Charter and the NEI. Our first challenge is to stimulate a return to good faith Russo-Latvian dialogue and help create a dispassionate environment in which the Latvian parliament can take up the far-reaching legislative proposals announced by the Latvian government on April 15. Those proposals, if enacted, would address key OSCE recommendations and improve Latvian nationality, language and labor law to the benefit of Russian and other minorities. We must also assist Latvia to make the integration of minorities work. More broadly, our strategy seeks -- through diplomacy, public affairs and some assistance -- to ensure that Latvia does not fall behind the other Baltic nations on the path toward full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. To achieve these goals we would foster reform and integration, help Latvia make progress on minority issues, work to convince the Russians that pressure and inflamed rhetoric are counterproductive, stimulate historical reconciliation in all three Baltic states, and engage pro-actively in public diplomacy.

DISCUSSION

We have been working to develop a Latvia strategy to follow up on your letter to Primakov and the President's letter to Ulmanis. The letters have already had a positive effect - both Ulmanis and Primakov have welcomed our intervention - but we'll need to stay engaged with both sides. While we understand Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev has agreed to meet Latvian State Secretary

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REASON: 1.5B(1)DP
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Reikstins on April 23, it remains to be seen if this will lead to resumption of genuine dialogue. Meanwhile, Latvia's political instability, exacerbated by Russian threats of economic measures, risks making it fall behind the other two Baltic states in the quest for greater European integration.

We have in the past had considerable success in using our good offices to cool Baltic-Russian tensions. This was most evident during the end-game negotiations surrounding Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltics in 1994. The Baltic Charter and the NEI give us even more clout with both sides, and we should use it. We have a role to play and we should do so before the US ethnic community makes Latvia part of the public debate on NATO enlargement.

Tensions between Russia and Latvia, including Russian threats of "economic measures" to punish Latvia for its treatment of non-citizen Russophones, have shaken Latvia's coalition government and could prove a destabilizing factor in the region. Latvia has been making good progress on OSCE recommendations, but work remains to be done. On April 15 the GOL decided to propose new legislation which would open the naturalization process to all interested and qualified non citizens and would grant immediate citizenship to stateless children born in Latvia since independence in 1991. The GOL also decided to propose amendments to bring pending labor and language laws into conformity with international norms.

We have publicly welcomed this major breakthrough by the Latvian government. The proposed measures, if enacted by the Saeima, would address key OSCE recommendations -- the basis by which we measure Latvian performance on minority issues. But the nationalists of PM Krasts's party and others will make passage difficult. Success will likely depend on our strong and vocal support for passage of the bills, and on moderated Russian rhetoric.

Continuing Russian pressure -- including inflamed public rhetoric, economic measures, and moving the goalposts beyond OSCE recommendations -- threatens to derail the Latvian government's dash to implement OSCE recommendations. It makes the GOL moves appear to be bowing to Moscow and stiffens the nationalistic opposition in the Latvian Saeima. This is the first serious test of the Baltic Charter, and of the NEI principle that there is

a "win-win" outcome to be achieved through cooperation rather than confrontation. In addition to managing the Russia side of the equation, we need a plan for supporting, strengthening and counseling Latvia now and over the longer haul.

Our proposed strategy would:

- Focus US high level attention on getting Riga and Moscow to "win-win." While we would work with the EU and OSCE where appropriate, leaving this issue to either organization would only compound the problem.
- Maximize the prospects for passage of key legislation in the Saeima and for Latvian progress on reform and minority issues by reassuring Riga that it does not face this problem alone. We would take a "tough love" approach that assures them that we remain committed to their Western integration but that they need to adopt and implement OSCE-consistent solutions to the minority issue and regulate their relations with their eastern neighbor.
- Continue to push Moscow to focus on implementation of the OSCE recommendations and drop counterproductive threats of economic pressure. This will require continued high-level dialogue with the Russians. While recognizing that Russian policy is also being shaped in part by domestic politics, we must push back in the face of exaggerated statements and demonstrate that quiet diplomacy can still work. The GOL's bold April 15 decisions have already helped prove our point. We must also hold the line that recommendations formulated by the OSCE -- which Russia itself promotes as the premier human rights institution -- are the standard against which to measure Latvian performance. Any Russian attempts to move the goalposts must be discouraged, encourage both lower rhetoric from Moscow and passage of the proposed legislation by the Latvian parliament.
- Pursue and, if possible, strengthen our efforts to promote regional cooperation despite the current Latvian-Russian dispute. This will allow a Latvian-Russian dialogue to continue, serve as a confidence-building measure, and demonstrate that our policy can ride out patches of rough weather.

- Work with all three Baltic states to promote historical reconciliation and a more open treatment of the Holocaust.
- Move pro-actively to get our story out at home with the Baltic-American and ethnic community and preempt charges from conservatives that we did not standup to Russian pressure. We should also be prepared for questions when the Senate debate on NATO enlargement resumes April 20th.

TAB 1: Operational Plan for Latvia Strategy

April 23, 1998

Drafter:

EUR/DAS:Rasmus

ID: LatviaRonmemoTOSECSshort April 16

Tel. 76556

Clearance: EUR/NB:GMilovanovic
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Clearance: EUR/EEA:SThayer
Clearance: EUR/RPM:SPenhune
Clearance: EUR/ERA:SCristina
Clearance: P:BStephenson
Clearance: D:MSullivan

The Integration/Reform Track

Objective: Find steps to underscore our commitment to Latvia's Western integration that cannot be portrayed as anti-Russian. We should work closely with the Nordics, Poles and the EU to coordinate our efforts.

- Accelerate US/EU talks on WTO accession. This is the only institution that Latvia has a chance of joining this century. Resolving the US/EU logjam on this would provide an enormous political/psychological boost and would make good on a Baltic Charter commitment.
- Ratify treaty on double taxation by U.S. Senate and Latvian Saeima.
- Use General Kievenaar's defense baseline study and security BWG visit in early May to underscore our long-term commitment to helping Latvia become a stronger candidate.
- Find an opportunity (e.g. interview, speech) for a senior USG official to reaffirm publicly the U.S. commitment to Baltic--including Latvia's--integration into Western institutions.

Making Progress on Minority Issues

Objective: To support the GOL and convince the Saeima that it must move boldly ahead on OSCE recommendations. Work closely with van der Stoel, Nordics and EU. Develop shared assessment on what has already been achieved as well as what remains to be done.

- Implement RPM/OSCE action plan outlining bilateral and multilateral steps U.S. could take to facilitate movement on minority issue.
- Coordinate an action plan with other friendly countries, e.g. Nordics, Poland, EU, other Baltics.
- Empower Larry Napper to continue Ambassadorial level dialogue in Riga with the leadership of the Nationalist Fatherland and Freedom Party to drive home the necessity of rapid movement on social integration issues.
- Reinforce Larry from Washington, e.g., arrange a visit by DRL A/S Shattuck to Riga. The visit could take place during the

May 4-5 conference on social integration sponsored by the EU. This would provide an opportunity for broad consultations between Shattuck and all relevant parties in the integration debate.

- Announce a concrete USG contribution to the Riga Law School project to underscore commitment to the rule of law in the region and particularly in Latvian society. The school will be open to members of all ethnic groups, including Russians, in Latvia, as well as to Estonians and Lithuanians.
- Make a concrete U.S. contribution through funding or technical assistance to the Latvian President's Council on Minorities and/or proposed Information Center of the Latvian Naturalization Board in order to promote accelerated naturalization and integration of minorities.

Working with the Russians

Objective: Convince Moscow that current pressure on Latvia is counterproductive in terms of improving the status of the Russian-speaking minority. Encourage Moscow to avoid exaggerated rhetoric and to resume dialogue.

- Establish factual and shared U.S./EU/OSCE assessment of what progress Latvia has made, share it with the Russians, and get it into the public domain.
- Use U.S.-Russian channels to encourage Russia to adopt a more factual treatment of the issue and to give quiet diplomacy a chance. Discourage threats of sanctions or other punitive "economic measures" as likely to be counterproductive and to hurt Russians in Latvia as much as Latvia itself..
- Encourage Russia to agree that OSCE recommendations and assessments are the basis upon which we will work with the Latvians (i.e. discourage the Russians from 'moving the goal posts.) Coordinate on this issue with the EU and others to convince Moscow that there is a common front among the international community in support of OSCE recommendations.
- Rebuff any Russian efforts to mobilize international community to further isolate or stigmatize Latvia, e.g., Russian proposal for G-8 statement.

The Historical Reconciliation Track

Objective: Follow up on Riga synagogue bombing. Convince all the Balts that they should more proactively address the issue of the

past, especially the Holocaust, in order i.a. to prevent mishandling of future veterans' commemorations.

- Keep FBI actively involved in Latvian investigation of the April 2nd bombing of the Riga synagogue. This will help enhance the credibility of the government's investigation of the incident.
- Provide crisis management (including public affairs) training to Latvia (or regionally to all three Baltic states) to enhance domestic capacity to coordinate effectively in a crisis.
- Publicly welcome action by Latvian President and National Security Council to remove from office those military officers who participated in the Latvian Legion commemoration as well as police officials who failed to provide effective protection for the synagogue as soon as these actions are ratified by the Latvian parliament after the Easter recess.
- Continue to encourage the Baltics to form a Historical Commission that would examine the events of World War II in the Baltic region. The Lithuanians and Latvians are already indicated that they favor this proposal as does the AJC.
- Work with the Baltics in a joint effort to examine the cause, consequences, prevention and prosecution of hate crimes. The Joint Partnership Commission could announce a one-year program of joint work with recommendations to be delivered to the Commission.
- Invite Latvia and other Baltic states to participate in the Washington conference on Holocaust era assets.
- Continue to pursue property restitution by Latvian authorities to Jewish groups from which communal property was confiscated during the war.

Developing a Public Profile

Objective: Get our side of the story out to preempt conservative criticism that we have not been tough enough on the Russians. Be prepared for questions on the Baltic issue when the Senate resumes debate on enlargement next week.

- Meet with the CEEC on this issue (perhaps at Deputy Secretary level).
- Background a sympathetic journalist on what we are doing.

- Develop fact sheets on what Latvia has and has not done on the minority issue.
- Do tough Qs and As in advance for the Senate debate on enlargement.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520
April 23, 1998

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2.64)
6/12/2023 VZ

DECL: 04/12/08
TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Eileen Malloy, Acting
S/NIS - Ross Wilson, Acting
SUBJECT: Strategy on Latvia

SUMMARY

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Reason: 1.5BandD

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2016-0314-A-2 (2.05)
6/12/2014 v2

May 4-5 conference on social integration sponsored by the EU. This would provide an opportunity for broad consultations between Shattuck and all relevant parties in the integration debate.

- Announce a concrete USG contribution to the Riga Law School project to underscore commitment to the rule of law in the region and particularly in Latvian society. The school will be open to members of all ethnic groups, including Russians, in Latvia, as well as to Estonians and Lithuanians.
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- Use U.S.-Russian channels to encourage Russia to adopt a more factual treatment of the issue and to give quiet diplomacy a chance. Discourage threats of sanctions or other punitive "economic measures" as likely to be counterproductive and to hurt Russians in Latvia as much as Latvia itself..
- Encourage Russia to agree that OSCE recommendations and assessments are the basis upon which we will work with the Latvians (i.e. discourage the Russians from 'moving the goal posts.) Coordinate on this issue with the EU and others to convince Moscow that there is a common front among the international community in support of OSCE recommendations.
- Rebuff any Russian efforts to mobilize international community to further isolate or stigmatize Latvia, e.g., Russian proposal for G-8 statement.

The Historical Reconciliation Track

Objective: Follow up on Riga synagogue bombing. Convince all the Balts that they should more proactively address the issue of the

past, especially the Holocaust, in order i.a. to prevent mishandling of future veterans' commemorations.

- Keep FBI actively involved in Latvian investigation of the April 2nd bombing of the Riga synagogue. This will help enhance the credibility of the government's investigation of the incident.
- Provide crisis management (including public affairs) training to Latvia (or regionally to all three Baltic states) to enhance domestic capacity to coordinate effectively in a crisis.
- Publicly welcome action by Latvian President and National Security Council to remove from office those military officers who participated in the Latvian Legion commemoration as well as police officials who failed to provide effective protection for the synagogue as soon as these actions are ratified by the Latvian parliament after the Easter recess.
- Continue to encourage the Baltics to form a Historical Commission that would examine the events of World War II in the Baltic region. The Lithuanians and Latvians are already indicated that they favor this proposal as does the AJC.
- Work with the Baltics in a joint effort to examine the cause, consequences, prevention and prosecution of hate crimes. The Joint Partnership Commission could announce a one-year program of joint work with recommendations to be delivered to the Commission.
- Invite Latvia and other Baltic states to participate in the Washington conference on Holocaust era assets.
- Continue to pursue property restitution by Latvian authorities to Jewish groups from which communal property was confiscated during the war.

Developing a Public Profile

Objective: Get our side of the story out to preempt conservative criticism that we have not been tough enough on the Russians. Be prepared for questions on the Baltic issue when the Senate resumes debate on enlargement next week.

- Meet with the CEEC on this issue (perhaps at Deputy Secretary level).
- Background a sympathetic journalist on what we are doing.

- Develop fact sheets on what Latvia has and has not done on the minority issue.
- Do tough Qs and As in advance for the Senate debate on enlargement.

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Latvia

New Legislation Proposed: On April 15, the Latvian Cabinet proposed new legislation abolishing the "window" system of naturalization (which limited naturalization by age, with the "window" of those eligible to naturalize opening incrementally over a period of ten years), granting citizenship to stateless children born in Latvia and modifying draft Labor and Language laws to meet international standards. This is a major breakthrough for the Government, but will face a rocky road in the Latvian parliament. Passage will likely depend on our strong and vocal support for the bills, and on moderated Russian rhetoric.

Primakov letter to Albright: On April 14, FM Primakov sent Secretary Albright a second Latvia letter, which crossed in the mail with her letter on the same subject and included a list of six issues on which the Russians want Latvia to make progress. The newly-proposed Legislation will address 5 out of 6 of the Russian demands, and Latvia is already making progress to address the 6th demand. In some cases, the Russian demands go beyond OSCE recommendations. Attachments 1 and 2 outline Latvian progress in addressing OSCE Recommendations and Primakov's demands.

Attachments:

1. Latvian Progress on Key OSCE Recommendations
2. Latvian Progress on Key Issues Identified in 4/14 Primakov Letter.
3. Van der Stoel announcement

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2016-0314-A1-1 (2.66)

6/12/2023 VR

Talbott Points prepared for Dep Sec Talbott's
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Moscow trip - meeting w/ Primakov

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking Points

- Hope you agree that Latvian Cabinet's proposed changes in Latvia's naturalization and citizenship legislation were a very positive development; clear Latvia beginning to make important progress.
- Van der Stoel publicly welcomed the Latvian government's action. A very good sign. Our long-standing position has been to encourage prompt implementation of OSCE recommendations. Show OSCE works.
- The President wrote Ulmanis two weeks ago and urged dialogue between Latvia and Russia as well as prompt implementation of OSCE recommendations.
- Thanks to effort on all sides, we believe many of the issues Primakov raised in his April 14 letter have been addressed by the proposals announced April 15 by the Latvian cabinet, including:
 - Proposal to abolish "window" naturalization system and to grant immediate citizenship to stateless children.
 - Proposal to provide additional language training; tests have already been simplified and the pass rate was 98 percent last year;
 - Proposal to amend language law so it will conform with international standards;
 - Proposal to amend labor laws to comply with international legal norms.
- On the issue of participation in municipal elections raised in Primakov's letter, we note that OSCE has not made any recommendations on this matter. Fixing the window problem, however, should also solve problem of disenfranchisement.
- We agree with Van der Stoel that a Latvian commitment to speedier and genuine social integration could help establish a firm basis for inter-ethnic harmony.
- Clearly Latvian Government and Ulmanis will have a tough job working their proposed changes through the Latvian parliament. Nothing would do more to complicate their job than an atmosphere of continuing rhetorical confrontation.

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2016-0314-M-1 (2.67)

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- Latvian Government has taken a bold step; what we all need to do is support it; any pressures against Latvia now would only be counterproductive.
- We will continue to work with Ulmanis and the Latvian government to help get these forward-looking proposals enacted into law. Encourage you to do the same.
- Let's keep our eye on the common goal. If the Latvian government can secure passage of all the proposals it announced this week, they will have enacted the essential OSCE recommendations.

(if raised, sanctions against Latvia):

- Madeleine very glad to hear in your April 14 letter that Russian government not contemplating comprehensive trade sanctions against Latvia. But even existing boycotts and threats are causing significant harm to the process of solving this issue. Hurts all residents of Latvia, including Russian minority. Complicates passage of legislative changes. Time to stop rhetoric and start dialogue. Time to welcome the changes and encourage them constructively; not to harm them recklessly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Watch Out For:

Primakov may argue, as he did in his April 14 letter to the Secretary, that Latvia is "pursuing a deliberate policy of discrimination against minorities."

- There is no systematic pattern of human rights violations in Latvia.

Russia has called for a G-8 statement on Latvia.

- Continuing inflammatory rhetoric and boycotts will make any G-8 consideration of this issue impossible.

Primakov may note his dissatisfaction with the situation of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia.

- If currently pending legislation is passed, Estonia will have addressed all 30 of the OSCE's main recommendations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|----------------------|
| 001a. memo | Eileen Malloy to the Deputy Secretary, re: [Your Meeting with Vladis Birkavs] (6 pages) | 04/23/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 001b. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 01/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 002. report | Re: [Russia/Latvia] (1 page) | 04/24/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 003. memo | Ron Asmus to Marc Grossman, re: [Latvia] (6 pages) | 04/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 004. report | Re: [Russian-Latvian Relations] (2 pages) | 04/15/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 005. email | White House Situation Room to Susan Braden, et al., re: [Letter] (2 pages) | 04/15/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 006. memo | Ron Asmus to Marc Grossman, re: [Latvia] (5 pages) | 04/12/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 007a. memo | Lawrence Butler to James Steinberg, re: [Your meeting with Ambassador Jukka Valtasaari] (2 pages) | 04/06/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 007b. report | U.S. Government Report (2 pages) | 04/06/1998 | P1/b(1) |
| 008. cable | Draft Cable, re: POTUS Letter to Latvian President Ulmanis (3 pages) | 04/09/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 009. cable | Re: POTUS Letter to Latvian President Ulmanis (3 pages) | 04/09/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 010. email | Susan Braden to Stephen Flanagan, re: Preparations for Bucharest Conference (2 pages) | 04/09/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Russia - Latvia [2]

2011-1037-F
ke2196

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|-------------|----------------------|
| 011. note | Handwritten note (1 page) | ea. 04/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 012. cable | Draft Cable, re: POTUS Letter to Latvian President Ulmanis (3 pages) | 04/09/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 013a. memo | E. Anthony Wayne to the Secretary, re: Letter to Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on Russian-Latvian Relations (5 pages) | 04/08/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |
| 013b. cable | Draft Cable, re: Secretary's Letter to Primakov on Russian-Latvian Relations (3 pages) | 04/08/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 European Affairs (Norland, Richard)
 OA/Box Number: 2630

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia: Russia - Latvia [2]

2011-1037-F

ke2196

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520
April 23, 1998

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL (with SECRET attachment)~~

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2.68)
6/12/2023 VR

DECL: 04/23/08

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EUR - Eileen Malloy, Acting

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Valdis Birkavs, Latvian Foreign
Minister, Friday, April 24, 11:00am, Your Office

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Stress need to make real progress on minority issues.
2. Preview our "shore-up" Latvia strategy.
3. Brief on any Latvia points raised during your recent meetings with Russian officials.

II. APPROACH

We should use this meeting to hold Latvia's feet to the fire on minority issues. The Latvian Parliament is now considering helpful but domestically controversial amendments to citizenship legislation, and the government is shaky, at best. Birkavs, a capable Foreign Minister and leader of the coalition party "Latvia's Way" (16/100 seats in Parliament), is ready and willing to play the right role, and he wants to use his meeting with you to carry home a strong message of U.S. concern. Since this meeting is the first senior level contact we have had with Latvia since the deterioration in relations with Russia, we also should reassure Birkavs that the U.S. will help Latvia weather the storm. We can also note that in London, we have asked U/S Pickering and Eizenstat to argue against Russian proposals to use the G-8 as a forum for discussion of minority issues in Latvia and Estonia and to raise Latvia's WTO aspirations with the EU.

You can remind Birkavs that we are standing by to reschedule the U.S.-Latvia economic BWG in late May, and that you look forward to your visit to Riga in late June to launch the U.S. - Baltic Partnership Commission. You last saw Birkavs during the January Baltic Presidents' visit.

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Classified By: EUR/DAS RDAsmus

Reason: (1.5)(b) and (7)
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III. BACKGROUND

A. Minority Issues

The situation in Riga is unsettled. There likely will be a vote of confidence in PM Krasts' government next Thursday, and the outcome is uncertain. A key factor is a controversial government proposal to amend the citizenship law, which should go to the Saeima next week. PM Krasts and his opponents are near agreement on removing the cumbersome "windows" system (under which tranches of non-citizens become eligible for naturalization over a six year period).

An even more controversial issue concerns the naturalization of children born in Latvia after August 21, 1991. The government prefers to accept OSCE Minorities Commissioner van der Stoel's recommendation (also accepted by Estonia) to make all such children eligible immediately. The government would package this amendment with changes in the language and education laws to promote the study and use of the Latvian language. Meanwhile, the opposition parties argue for a proposal that would require these children to reach the age of 16 before requesting naturalization and also require them to present some evidence of competency in the Latvian language. This variant would almost certainly be unacceptable to van der Stoel.

Your bottom line should be: Nothing less than van der Stoel's recommendations and his active endorsement of the proposals will do. There can be no retreat or compromise, and everything should be done to move the legislation as quickly as possible. This is vital not only to preserve unanimous EU and U.S. support, but also to head off Russian efforts to push for changes in Latvia's citizenship law that exceed the OSCE's recommendations (e.g., quotas).

B. Our Shore-Up Latvia Strategy

We have just sent to the Secretary a proposed strategy for Latvia that would follow up on letters she sent to Primakov and the President sent to President Ulmanis. Our strategy seeks -- through diplomacy, public affairs and some assistance -- to ensure that Latvia does not fall behind the other Baltic nations on the path toward full integration into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. We suggest you outline the key elements of the strategy for Birkavs.

C. Debrief on Your Recent Meetings with Russian Officials

While we understand that Latvia did not figure prominently in your recent meetings with Primakov, Avdeyev and others, Birkavs would find reassurance in your willingness to give him a sense of how these meetings went.

D. U/S Pickering and Eizenstat's Talks with the EU and Mamedov

At a Friday EU SLG lunch in London (which will have taken place just before you see Birkavs), we asked U/S Pickering to urge the EU to work with us to reassure Latvia and to push for continued progress on minority issues. We asked U/S Eizenstat to urge EU cooperation in resolving remaining issues in Latvia's bid for WTO membership. At a dinner with Mamedov that evening, we have asked U/S Pickering to discourage Russia from seeking to use the G-8 as a forum for discussing minority issues in Latvia and Estonia.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Deputy Secretary
EUR/DAS Ron Asmus
D Staff
EUR/NB notetaker

OTHER COUNTRY

Foreign Minister Birkavs
Ambassador Ojars Kalnins
Mark Dayton, Assistant to
FM Birkavs (AmCit)

Attachment:

- Tab 1 - Talking Points
- Tab 2 - Biographic Material

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

April 23, 1998

Drafter: TJEvans *TJE*

ID: BM - April 24 D Birkavs mtg

Tel. 7-8908

Clearance: EUR/NB:GMilovanovic
Clearance: EUR/ERA:SCristina/KHadda
Clearance: EUR/RUS:SGwaltney
Clearance: DRL:JMerz
Clearance: P:BStephenson
Clearance: EUR/RPM:JMcGhee/SPenhune

TJE

TALKING POINTS

Minority Issues

- Government's proposed amendments to naturalization and citizenship legislation very positive development, welcomed by OSCE, US, and us.
- Adherence to OSCE recommendations gets Latvia a united front of support, shows OSCE works, argues against using other criteria or objectives.
- Bottom line: Nothing less than van der Stoel's recommendations and his active endorsement of the proposals will do. No retreat or compromise, move the legislation as quickly as possible.
- Caution: Be careful with packaging this important amendment with other changes to education and language laws which might slow down passage.
- Tough job in front of you, changes are not easy, we'll support you publicly. Privately, we are telling Russians that continued rhetorical confrontation will not help.
- Earlier today in London, we asked U/S Pickering to make similar points with the EU SLG.

U.S. Strategy on Latvia

- Charter of Partnership now our foundation, but given current situation, we have recommended the Secretary put in place a supplemental plan to support Latvia's integration efforts.
- Combination of diplomacy, public affairs, and some assistance. Key points:
 - Focus high level U.S. attention on "win-win" objectives for Latvia and Russia, including involvement in regional cooperation.
 - Urge Latvian reform on minority issues, publicly endorse improvements.
 - Work with Russia to reduce counterproductive policies and rhetoric.
 - More active role in promoting historical reconciliation in Baltics, including open treatment of the Holocaust.

Recent Talks with Russian Officials

- Extent to which Latvia was raised, mood of the talks, etc.

U/S Pickering/Eizenstat's meetings with EU and Mamedov

- At a lunch in London today, we asked U/S Pickering to urge our EU friends to work with us to:

promote reform on minorities in Latvia, publicly commend improvements.

send a message to the Russians that the OSCE is our measuring stick and that they should not move the goal posts.

urge Russia to address minority issues in Latvia and Estonia through direct dialogue and at the OSCE, not the UN or G-8. (We asked Pickering to make the same point with Mamedov at his Friday dinner.)

- On Latvia-WTO, we asked U/S Eizenstat to note that:

we are still waiting for a substantive response from the EU to our compromise proposal on audio-visual services for Latvia's WTO accession application.

essential that we give renewed effort to resolving the WTO issue as part of our efforts to encourage Latvia's integration into the global economy.

Upcoming Visits

- We understand PM Krasts' decision to postpone his visit to the U.S. and hope he can reschedule soon. U/S Eizenstat has reserved time on May 26 for the U.S.-Latvia economic BWG. Let us know if this works for you.
- I look forward to my late June visit to Riga to launch the first meeting of the U.S.-Baltic Partnership Commission.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

[Handwritten signature]

13 APR '98 17:05

MESSAGE NO. 008433 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 5

FROM: Milovanovic, Gillian EUR/NB 647-5669 5229
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Staying on Top of Latvian Problem.

| <u>TO: (Agency)</u> | <u>DELIVER TO:</u> | <u>Extension</u> | <u>Room No.</u> |
|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| <u>NSC</u> | <u>Steve Flanagan</u> | | <u>368</u> |
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FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 6/7/2023
2016-0314-M-1

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: WHSR
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 1998 8:34 AM
To: Braden, Susan R.; Cohen, Julie E.; Courtney, William H.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Elkind, Jonathan H.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Fooks, Michael D.; Fort, Jane B.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Pascual, Carlos E.
Subject: LETTER TO FM PRIMAKOV ON RUSSIAN-LATVIA RELATIONS
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
DTG: 150314Z APR 98
MSGTO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 7269
TOR: 980415082030 M3244083

~~SECRET~~ STATE 067269

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO DEPSEC TALBOTT'S PARTY. TODEP 4001.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/08

TAGS: PREL, RS

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FM PRIMAKOV ON RUSSIAN-LATVIA RELATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE KOR THE NIS. REASONS: 1.5 (B AND D). NIACT JUSTIFICATION: EMBASSY MOSCOW MUST DELIVER THIS LETTER AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE APRIL 15.

1. ~~(S)~~ EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

2. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR YEVGENIY:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR EARLIER LETTER ON LATVIA AND RECENT EVENTS THERE. I WAS PLEASED THAT WE HAD THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS LATVIA BRIEFLY DURING OUR DINNER MEETING IN COLOGNE.

SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, TENSIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND RIGA HAVE RISEN AGAIN AND WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS DANGEROUS

TREND. WE ARE PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY THE RECENT BOMBINGS IN RIGA AND THE ENSUING ESCALATION OF RHETORIC, INCLUDING RE PORTS THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS ASKED THE GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER LEVYING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LATVIA.

WE HAVE IMPRESSED ON THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT THE NEED TO INVESTIGATE FULLY THE BOMBINGS AT THE SYNAGOGUE AND THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN RIGA AND TO TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO PREVENT RECURRENCES. AT LATVIAN REQUEST, FBI AGENTS ARE USING THEIR EXPERTISE TO HELP ADVANCE THE INVESTIGATIONS. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT IS FULLY COMMITTED TO TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS. THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT'S DISMISSAL OF GENERAL DALBINS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE LATVIAN LEGION CEREMONIES ALSO REFLECTED ITS STATED REJECTION OF FASCISM.

WE ARE ALSO ENCOURAGING PRESIDENT ULMANIS AND SENIOR LATVIAN OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE RUSSIAN ETHNIC MINORITY IN

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2016-0314-m-1 (2.78)

6/12/2023 r2

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LATVIA, AND THEY HAVE PUBLICLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THIS APPROACH, DESPITE HEAVY CRITICISM FROM THEIR POLITICAL OPPONENTS. WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT TAKEN UP THESE OFFERS TO RESUME A DIRECT DIALOGUE. THREATS OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE ARE CERTAIN TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THEY WILL WEAKEN THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH ARE MOST MODERATE ON CITIZENSHIP ISSUES.

WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT EVENTS AND ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITY ARE EMOTIONAL, BOTH IN RUSSIA AND LATVIA. BUT IF, AS I THINK WE AGREE, THE GOAL IS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN LATVIA AND TO PROMOTE IMPROVED RELATIONS, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THE PATH TO A SOLUTION LIES THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AND THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE OSCE, NOT USE OF THREATS.

WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE OSCE AND HIGH COMMISSIONER VAN DER STOEL TO FACILITATE A RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN LATVIA AND WE HAVE MADE PROTECTION AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES A KEY PRINCIPLE OF OUR BALTIC CHARTER. OUR IDEAL FOR LATVIA AND FOR ALL THE BALTIC STATES IS TO SEE THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES. WE ARE URGING LATVIA TO IMPLEMENT THE OSCE'S WELL THOUGHT-OUT RECOMMENDATIONS PROMPTLY. HIGH COMMISSIONER VAN DER STOEL

TELLS US LATVIA HAS ALREADY MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THIS REGARD, ALTHOUGH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. WE AGREE WITH HIM THAT THE TIME IS RIPE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO SEE THIS WORK THROUGH. THEREFORE, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN ENGAGEMENT RATHER THAN LET AN ATMOSPHERE OF THREATS AND HEIGHTENING RHETORIC PREVAIL. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS ALSO WRITTEN PRESIDENT ULMANIS TO SUPPORT HIS SINCERE EFFORTS TO PURSUE PRACTICAL STEPS WITH RUSSIA TO ADDRESS KEY ISSUES WITHOUT DELAY AND URGE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALL ETHNIC MINORITIES THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF OSCE RECOMMENDATIONS.

YEVGENIY, IT IS WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND THAT I URGE YOU TO TAKE UP LATVIA'S OFFER AND ENGAGE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.

YOU AND I HAVE HAD MANY CONVERSATIONS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OSCE TO EUROPE'S FUTURE. AS WE CONTINUE THE SERIOUS WORK OF DEVELOPING AN OSCE CHARTER, LET MAKE THE RESOLUTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS ISSUES IN LATVIA A SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE OF THE OSCE'S ESSENTIAL ROLE IN ADDRESSING EUROPE'S PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW EUROPE.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH STROBE WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK.

SINCERELY,

MADELEINE
ALBRIGHT

-1-

April 12, 1998

To: Marc Grossman
 From: Ron Asmus
 Subject: Staying on Top of the Latvian Problem
 cc: Milovanovic

Marc:

Escalating tensions between Russia and Latvia, including Russian threats of "economic measures" to punish Latvia for its treatment of non-citizen Russophones, have shaken Latvia's coalition government and are a destabilizing factor in the region. Latvia has been making progress on OSCE recommendations, but much work remains to be done. Russian pressure -- including setting pre-conditions for a dialogue and moving the goalposts beyond OSCE recommendations -- threatens to make further progress harder, however, by making any conciliatory moves on citizenship and language issues appear to be kowtowing to Moscow. This is the first serious test of the Baltic Charter, and of the NEI principle that there is a "win-win" outcome to be achieved through cooperation rather than confrontation.

N/B and I have been working with Larry Napper to develop a Latvia strategy to follow up on the POTUS-Ulmanis and MKA-Primakov letters. The letters are by themselves unlikely to stabilize Latvia or re-start the Russo-Latvian dialogue. The Russian side currently seems to believe that their pressure strategy -- which enjoys considerable domestic support -- is working, and that they have little if anything to gain from resuming a dialogue with Latvia now. Meanwhile, Latvia's political instability, exacerbated by that pressure, risks making it fall behind the other two Baltic states in the quest for greater European integration.

Both the Baltic Charter and the NEI suggest we have a role to play -- before the soured atmosphere spills over onto US-Russia relations and before the US ethnic community makes Latvia part of the public debate on NATO enlargement.

The Latvian State Secretary arrives Monday night for consultations on Tuesday. If you agree with this strategy, we should discuss it with S/NIS and Strobe so that I can act on it then.

Our proposed strategy would:

Y Recognize US potential to get both Riga and Moscow to do the right thing and focus US high level attention on getting to "win-win." Leaving this issue to the EU and/or the OSCE would only compound the problem. But we are well positioned to bring them together to help resolve the problem.

Y Maximize the prospects for further prompt Latvian progress on reform and on minority issues by reassuring Riga that it does not face this problem alone. We would take a "tough love" approach that assures them that we remain committed to their Western integration but that they need to find and implement OSCE-consistent solutions to the minority issue and regulate their relations with their eastern neighbor.

- Let's publish

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2016-0314-M-2 (2.79)
6/12/2012 v2

STEVE - MARC HAS
 SEEN + APPROVES
 IN PRINCIPLE - FOR
 YOUR INFO FOR
 TOMORROW'S MTGS.

GILLIAN

¥ Continue to try to convince Moscow that their current strategy is not likely to work and that there is an alternative. This will require continued high-level dialogue with the Russians. While recognizing that Russian policy is also being shaped by domestic politics, we must push back in the face of exaggerated statements and demonstrate that quiet diplomacy can still work. If we can get the Latvians to move on some key issues, it will make it easier for the Russian side to back down. We must also hold the line that recommendations formulated by the OSCE -- which Russia itself promotes as the premier human rights institution -- are the standard against which to measure Latvian performance. Russian attempts to move the goalposts must be discouraged, including through coordinating our positions with the EU.

¥ Pursue and, if possible, strengthen our efforts to promote regional cooperation and not allow that process to be paralyzed by the current Latvia-Russian dispute. This will allow a Latvian-Russian dialogue to continue, if only indirectly, and serve as a confidence-building measure. It will also demonstrate that our policy can ride out patches of rough weather.

¥ Work with all three Baltic states to promote historical reconciliation and a more open treatment of the Holocaust. *LM*

¥ Move pro-actively to get our story out at home with the Baltic-American and ethnic community and preempt charges from conservatives that we did not stand up to Russian pressure. We should also be prepared for questions when the Senate debate on N+ resumes April 20th.

Before he leaves for Europe on Wednesday, we will want to reach agreement on the broad outlines of such a strategy with Strobe. Below is a first illustrative cut.

The Integration/Reform Track

Objective: Find steps to underscore our commitment to Latvia's Western integration that cannot be portrayed as anti-Russian. We should work closely with the Nordics, Poles and the EU to coordinate our efforts.

¥ Accelerate US/EU talks on WTO accession. This is the only institution that Latvia has a chance of joining this century. Resolving the US/EU logjam on this would provide an enormous political/psychological boost and would make good on a Baltic Charter commitment. *

¥ Ratify treaty on double taxation by U.S. Senate and Latvian Saeima.

¥ Use Kievenaar study and security BWG visit in early May to underscore our long-term commitment to helping Latvia become a stronger candidate.

¥ Find an opportunity (e.g. interview, speech) for a senior USG official to reaffirm publicly the U.S. commitment to Baltic--including Latvia's--integration into Western institutions.

Making Progress on the Minority Issues

Objective: To convince Riga that it must move ahead on OSCE recommendations more quickly. Work closely with van der Stoep, Nordics and EU. Develop shared assessment on what has already been achieved as well as what remains to be done.

- Y Implement RPM/OSCE action plan outlining bilateral and multilateral steps U.S. could take to facilitate movement on minority issue.
- Y Coordinate an action plan with other friendly countries, e.g. Nordics, Poland, EU, other Baltics.
- Y Empower Larry Napper to continue Ambassadorial level dialogue in Riga with the leadership of the Nationalist Fatherland and Freedom Party to drive home the necessity of rapid movement on social integration issues.
- Y Reinforce Larry from Washington, e.g., arrange a visit by DRL A/S Shattuck to Riga. The visit could take place during the May 4-5 conference on social integration sponsored by the EU. This would provide an opportunity for broad consultations between Shattuck and all relevant parties in the integration debate.
- Y Announce a concrete USG contribution to the Riga Law School project to underscore commitment to the rule of law in the region and particularly in Latvian society. (The school will be open to Russians in Latvia.)
- Y Make a concrete U.S. contribution through funding or technical assistance to the Latvian President's Council on Minorities and/or proposed Information Center of the Latvian Naturalization Board in order to promote accelerated naturalization.

Dealing with the Russians

Objective: Convince Moscow that current pressure on Latvia is counterproductive in terms of improving the status of the Russian-speaking minority. Encourage Moscow to avoid exaggerated rhetoric and to resume dialogue. I defer to S/NIS on how best to do this but here are some ideas.

- Y Establish factual and shared U.S./EU/OSCE assessment of what progress Latvia has made and get it into the public domain.
- Y Use U.S.-Russian channels to encourage Russia to adopt a more factual treatment of the issue and to give quiet diplomacy a chance. Discourage threats of sanctions or other punitive "economic measures" as likely to be counterproductive.
- Y Get Russia to agree that OSCE recommendations and assessments are the basis upon which we will work with the Latvians (i.e. discourage the Russians from 'moving the goal posts.) Coordinate on this issue with the EU and others to convince Moscow that there is a common front among the international community in support of OSCE recommendations. *
- Y Refuse any Russian efforts to mobilize international community to further isolate or beat up on Latvia, e.g., Russian proposal for G-8 statement.

The Historical Reconciliation Track

Objective: Follow up on Riga synagogue bombing. Convince all the Balts that they should more proactively address the issue of the past, especially the Holocaust, in order i.a. to prevent mishandling of future veterans' commemorations.

¥ Keep FBI actively involved in Latvian investigation of the April 2nd bombing of the Riga synagogue. This will help enhance the credibility of the government's investigation of the incident.

Provide crisis management (including public affairs) training to Latvia (or regionally to all three Baltic states) to enhance domestic capacity to coordinate effectively in a crisis.

¥ Publicly welcome action by Latvian President and National Security Council to remove from office those military officers who participated in the Latvian Legion commemoration as well as police officials who failed to provide effective protection for the synagogue as soon as these actions are ratified by the Latvian parliament after the Easter recess.

¥ Continue to encourage the Baltics to form a Historical Commission that would examine the events of World War II in the Baltic region. The Lithuanians and Latvians are already indicated that they favor this proposal as does the AJC.

¥ Work with the Baltics in a joint effort to examine the cause, consequences, prevention and prosecution of hate crimes. The Joint Partnership Commission could announce a one-year program of joint work with recommendations to be delivered to the Commission.

¥ Invite Latvia and other Baltic states to participate in the Washington conference on Holocaust era assets.

¥ Continue to pursue property restitution by Latvian authorities to Jewish groups from which communal property was confiscated during the war.

Developing A Public Profile

Objective: Get our side of the story out to preempt conservative criticism that we have not been tough enough on the Russians. Be prepared for questions on the Baltic issue when the Senate resumes debate on enlargement next week.

¥ Meet with the CEEC on this issue. If Strobe can't do it before he leaves, you and Sestanovich should do it.

¥ Background a sympathetic journalist on what we are doing. I would suggest Fred Hiatt from the WP or Erlanger from the NYT.

¥ Develop fact sheets on what Latvia has and has not done on the minority issue.

¥ Do tough Qs and As in advance for the Senate debate on enlargement.

Possible Secretary Visit

We should consider using a high-level visit to Riga to maximize our leverage with all parties. There is always a temptation by some to see a problem involving the Baltics such as this one as too hard to handle. But the philosophy behind our NEI was to turn that logic on its head and to instead view this as an opportunity to show what we can do to change or break out of these old patterns of confrontation.

While Strobe is the point person on Baltic issues, S/S has asked us for recommendations on what MKA could do in the intervals of May 10-12 and May 15-17. I can think of no better way of maximizing our chances of making progress on these issues across the board than by sending S to Riga. And there are fewer problems facing us today with more potential for mischief in Europe than this one. She always said she wanted to go to Riga. It would be a bold step but one where I think she could really show leadership. Even the prospect of a S visit would significantly enhance our leverage with both the Latvians and the Russians. It would underscore our commitment to the region and the fact that it is the U.S.--and only the U.S.--that can broker this kind of win-win outcome.

If S cannot do it, I think you should consider making a trip to Riga.

April 6, 1998



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

FROM: LAWRENCE E. BUTLER

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador Jukka Valtasaari, Finnish MFA State Secretary, 4:15-4:30 p.m., Tuesday, April 7, 1998

Valtasaari does not have any particular objective in his Easter visit to Washington. He has a meeting Wednesday with Strobe, who is also hosting a dinner Sunday. As you know, Valtasaari is close to President Ahtisaari and has a reputation as a "big picture" thinker. Given that you have only fifteen minutes, you will want to discuss developments in the Baltics (Latvia) and Kosovo/Macedonia, in addition to any issues he may want to raise or brief on (possibly Ahtisaari's idea of a three-way U.S.-EU-Russia summit during Finland's EU presidency in the second half of 1999 and Ahtisaari's recent visit to the Ukraine). Valtasaari will be accompanied by Ambassador Laajava and Political Counselor Antti Turunen. I will join you.

Latvia

- Note concern for continuing deterioration in Latvian-Russian relations. Some in Moscow have tried to exacerbate the incidents. Recent bombings outside the main synagogue and the Russian Embassy won't help. FBI is assisting Latvian police with investigations.
- Raise need to look for ways to dampen tensions and promote Russian/Baltic cooperation. Hope Finnish government will do the same.
- Welcome recent proposals by Lithuanian President Adamkus for new CSBMs and enhanced economic, environmental, and law enforcement cooperation with Russia. Ideas like these merit further exploration and support.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2.80)

6/12/2023 v2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 4/6/98

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- Express interest in participating in the work of the CBSS Working Group on organized crime.

Northeast Europe Initiative/Northern Dimension

- Express appreciation for GOF decision to participate in the Murmansk Cask project. Note our hope that Finns will match our \$500,000 contribution.

Macedonia/Kosovo

- The Finns participate in both UNPREDEP (220 soldiers) and SFOR. Helsinki shares our view that an international force will be required after the UNPREDEP mandate expires in August. The Finnish Defense Minister has said Finland would prefer an extension, but could accept EAPC coordination of a NATO-led force with a UN blessing.
- Explore with Valtasaari implications for participation in UNPREDEP should violence in Kosovo spread across the border. (Finnish law forbids participation in "peacemaking" actions.)

U.S.-EU-Russia Summit

- This is a ploy to get the President to travel to Helsinki in December 1999. The previous summit will have been in Germany in May/June with the expectation that we would host the December semi-annual event.
- You should note that it is too early to make a commitment.

Concurrences by: Steve ^{SP}Flanagan

Attachment
Tab A Biography

INITIALS

| | | |
|--------|-----|-----|
| APPR: | THE | ... |
| DRAFT: | EVA | ... |
| CLR 1: | EAW | ... |
| CLR 2: | RDA | ... |
| CLR 3: | VNU | ... |
| CLR 4: | CPA | ... |
| CLR 5: | DHA | ... |
| CLR 6: | | ... |
| CLR 7: | | ... |
| CLR 8: | | ... |

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0314-11-1 (2,82)

6/12/2023 v2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NB:EVANSTJ:TJE
04/09/98 7-8908
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR:EAWAYNE EUR:RDASMUS S/NIS:VNULAND P:CPANGELO
S/P:DHAMILTON S/S: S/S-O: NSC:SFLANAGAN

NIACT/IMMEDIATE RIGA

IMMEDIATE VILNIUS, TALLINN IMMEDIATE, EURPO PRIORITY
VIENNA FOR OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OPDC, LG, RS, OSCE

SUBJECT: POTUS LETTER TO LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR-ACTING E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(C)~~ DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POST TO DELIVER TO PRESIDENT ULMANIS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON. NO ORIGINAL SIGNED VERSION WILL FOLLOW. DEPARTMENT HAS NO PLAN TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO DO SO.

2. ~~(C)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT ULMANIS:

I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT PRIME MINISTER KRASTS HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND OTHER U.S. CITIES. WE FULLY UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT HIS DECISION TO REMAIN IN LATVIA AT THIS TIME. ~~LET ME REASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE U.S. LATVIA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

✓ | I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY I ADMIRE THE
LEADERSHIP YOU HAVE SHOWN UNDER ~~SOME~~ FAIRLY DIFFICULT
CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU HAVE VERY EFFECTIVELY USED YOUR OFFICE
TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
✓ | A DEMOCRATIC AND FREE SOCIETY. ~~I KNOW FROM MY OWN~~
~~EXPERIENCE THAT~~ THESE ISSUES CAN BE COMPLEX AND
CONTROVERSIAL, BUT YOU HAVE MANAGED TO ADDRESS THEM IN A
POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. YOUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS
CHALLENGING THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT TO REVIEW LATVIA'S
CITIZENSHIP LAWS CONVEY THE IMPORTANT MESSAGE THAT THE
INTEGRATION OF INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND
| ETHNIC MINORITIES IS IN THE LONG--TERM INTEREST OF THE
LATVIAN STATE. YOUR REMINDER THAT LATVIA'S PUBLIC SERVANTS
AND MEMBERS OF ITS MILITARY MUST ADHERE TO YOUR NATION'S
POLICY GOALS DEMONSTRATES LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY. YOUR EFFORTS TO
KEEP AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH YOUR NEIGHBORS SHOWS THAT LATVIA
IS SERIOUS ABOUT CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND
COOPERATION.

✓
ok | LATVIA HAS COME A LONG WAY IN A SHORT TIME, and I am
confident that you will continue efforts to address those
areas, such as the situation of ethnic russians, where work
remains to be done. ~~BUT I KNOW THAT NOT ALL YOUR NEIGHBORS~~
~~AGREE. RUSSIA ASSERTS THAT IT IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE~~
~~PACE OF CHANGE IN LATVIA, ESPECIALLY ON THE ISSUE OF THE~~
~~SITUATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN COMMUNITY. THE~~
UNITED STATES SUPPORTS AND RELIES ON THE WORK OF THE OSCE
AND ITS MISSION IN RIGA TO EVALUATE LATVIA'S PERFORMANCE ON
ASSURING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO
RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. WE AGREE WITH THE
OSCE FINDINGS THAT LATVIA HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS AND IS
MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ~~YET I AM SURE YOU AGREE~~
~~THAT MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE.~~

X | WHEN WE STOOD TOGETHER IN THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE
HOUSE LAST JANUARY TO SIGN THE CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP, WE
ESTABLISHED IMPORTANT SHARED PRINCIPLES INVOLVING BOTH
HUMAN RIGHTS RELATIONS WITH NEIGHORS. AS YOU CONTINUE YOUR
CREATIVE EFFORTS ~~TO STIMULATE CREATIVE APPROACHES TO~~
STRENGTHEN THESE RELATIONS AND ASSURE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
EVERYONE IN LATVIA, ~~ISSUES IN LATVIA,~~ WE STAND READY TO
SUPPORT YOU. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT IS
NOW CONSIDERING HELPFUL AMENDMENTS TO THE CITIZENSHIP LAW.
| PROGRESS IN THIS AREA ~~THIS~~ WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP IN
DEMONSTRATING LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO INCORPORATING OSCE
RECOMMENDATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

WE BELIEVE THESE ISSUES CAN BEST BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE KIND OF OPEN DIALOGUE AND PRACTICAL STEPS YOU HAVE WORKED HARD TO PROMOTE. WE HAVE URGED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH LATVIA. INSTABILITY IN LATVIA AND DISRUPTION OF NORMAL COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN NORTHERN EUROPE IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, AND WE ARE STRESSING WITH RUSSIA THAT ~~INTEMPERATE~~ TALK OF THREATS OR SANCTIONS CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN FRUSTRATE PROGRESS.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT LATVIA, UNDER YOUR PRINCIPLED LEADERSHIP, WILL MEET THE CHALLENGES IT NOW FACES, ~~AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS YOUR EFFORTS.~~ LET ME REASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-LATVIA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.— OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO REVIEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS WELL AS THE WORK AHEAD, AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE U.S. - BALTIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN RIGA IN LATE JUNE.

YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

| INITIALS | | |
|----------|-----|-----|
| APPR: | THE | --- |
| DRAFT: | EVA | --- |
| CLR 1: | EAW | --- |
| CLR 2: | RDA | --- |
| CLR 3: | VNU | --- |
| CLR 4: | CPA | --- |
| CLR 5: | DHA | --- |
| CLR 6: | | --- |
| CLR 7: | | --- |
| CLR 8: | | --- |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2.83)

6/12/2023 VZ

EUR/NB:EVANSTJ:TJE
04/09/98 7-8908
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR:EAWAYNE EUR:RDASMUS S/NIS:VNULAND P:CPANGELO
S/P:DHAMILTON S/S: S/S-O: NSC:SFLANAGAN/WCOURTNEY

NIACT/IMMEDIATE RIGA

IMMEDIATE VILNIUS, TALLINN IMMEDIATE, EURPO PRIORITY

VIENNA FOR OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OPDC, LG, RS, OSCE

SUBJECT: POTUS LETTER TO LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR-ACTING E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POST TO DELIVER TO PRESIDENT ULMANIS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON. NO ORIGINAL SIGNED VERSION WILL FOLLOW. DEPARTMENT HAS NO PLAN TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO DO SO.

2. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT ULMANIS:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY I ADMIRE THE LEADERSHIP YOU HAVE SHOWN UNDER FAIRLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU HAVE VERY EFFECTIVELY USED YOUR OFFICE TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF A DEMOCRATIC AND FREE SOCIETY. I KNOW THAT THESE ISSUES CAN BE COMPLEX AND CONTROVERSIAL, BUT YOU HAVE MANAGED TO ADDRESS THEM IN A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. YOUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS CHALLENGING THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT TO REVIEW LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAWS CONVEY THE IMPORTANT MESSAGE THAT THE INTEGRATION OF INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IS IN THE LONG-TERM INTEREST OF THE LATVIAN STATE. YOUR REMINDER THAT LATVIA'S PUBLIC SERVANTS AND MEMBERS OF ITS MILITARY MUST ADHERE TO YOUR NATION'S POLICY GOALS DEMONSTRATES LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY. YOUR EFFORTS TO KEEP AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH YOUR NEIGHBORS SHOWS THAT LATVIA IS SERIOUS ABOUT CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND COOPERATION.

LATVIA HAS COME A LONG WAY IN A SHORT TIME AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THOSE AREAS, SUCH AS THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS, WHERE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS AND RELIES ON THE WORK OF THE OSCE AND ITS MISSION IN RIGA TO EVALUATE LATVIA'S PERFORMANCE ON ASSURING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. WE AGREE WITH THE OSCE FINDINGS THAT LATVIA HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS AND IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

WHEN WE STOOD TOGETHER IN THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE LAST JANUARY TO SIGN THE CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP, WE ESTABLISHED IMPORTANT SHARED PRINCIPLES INVOLVING BOTH HUMAN RIGHTS RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS. AS YOU CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO FOSTER CREATIVE APPROACHES TO THESE ISSUES IN LATVIA, WE STAND READY TO SUPPORT YOU. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT IS NOW CONSIDERING HELPFUL AMENDMENTS TO THE CITIZENSHIP LAW. PROGRESS IN THIS AREA WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP IN DEMONSTRATING LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENTING OSCE RECOMMENDATIONS.

WE BELIEVE THESE ISSUES CAN BEST BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE KIND OF OPEN DIALOGUE AND PRACTICAL STEPS YOU HAVE WORKED HARD TO PROMOTE. WE HAVE URGED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH LATVIA. INSTABILITY IN LATVIA AND DISRUPTION OF NORMAL COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN NORTHERN EUROPE IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, AND WE ARE STRESSING WITH RUSSIA THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

TALK OF THREATS OR SANCTIONS CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN FRUSTRATE PROGRESS.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT LATVIA, UNDER YOUR PRINCIPLED LEADERSHIP, WILL MEET THE CHALLENGES IT NOW FACES, AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS YOUR EFFORTS. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO REVIEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS WELL AS THE WORK AHEAD AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE U.S. - BALTIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN RIGA IN LATE JUNE.

YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Flanagan, Stephen J.

From: Braden, Susan R.
Sent: Thursday, April 09, 1998 6:08 PM
To: Flanagan, Stephen J.
Subject: PREPARATIONS FOR BUCHAREST CONFERENCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DTG: 091454Z APR 98
MSGTO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9891
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2187
TOR: 980409100208 M3237658

-----Original Message-----

From: WHSR
Sent: Thursday, April 09, 1998 10:08 AM
To: Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.; Bouchard, Joseph F.; Braden, Susan R.; Clarke, Richard A.; Courtney, William H.; Covey, James P.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Elkind, Jonathan H.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Fort, Jane B.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Ragan, Richard F.; Witkowsky, Anne A.
Subject: PREPARATIONS FOR BUCHAREST CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUCHAREST 002187

NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FLANAGAN

SECDEF FOR ASD KRAMER

DEPT FOR EUR (MALLOY) AND EUR/NCE (RICKERT)

E.O. 12958: N/A N/A

TAGS: MARR, NATO, PREL, ZL, RS, RO

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR BUCHAREST CONFERENCE
ON MULTINATIONAL BALKAN PEACE FORCE (MBPF)

REF: STATE 59649

CLASSIFIED BY POLMILOFF DANIEL SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).

1. THIS CABLE CONTAINS AN URGENT ACTION REQUEST, PARA
4.

2. ~~(S)~~ DURING AN APRIL 9 MEETING WITH POLMILOFF, MFA
DIRECTOR FOR NATO, WEU AND STRATEGIC ISSUES VIOREL
ARDELEANU REVIEWED GOR PREPARATIONS FOR THE APRIL 15-16
EXPERTS' CONFERENCE ON PROPOSALS FOR A MULTINATIONAL
BALKAN PEACE FORCE (MBPF). ARDELEANU SAID THAT ON THE
PREVIOUS DAY, HE BRIEFED THE DCM FROM THE RUSSIAN
EMBASSY REGARDING PLANS TO FORM THE MBPF.

3. ~~(S)~~ ARDELEANU SAID THAT THE GOR DOES NOT/NOT
INTEND TO INVITE THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO SEND
PARTICIPANTS OR OBSERVERS TO THE APRIL 15-16
CONFERENCE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT, ACCORDING
TO THE ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, DURING THE GREEK
DEFENSE MINISTER'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW HE WELCOMED A
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFER TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO A
MULTINATIONAL FORCE UNDER THE GREEK PROPOSAL.
ARDELEANU SAID THE RUSSIANS ARE REPORTEDLY OFFERING TO
CONTRIBUTE 40 PERCENT OF THE TROOPS.

4. ~~(S)~~ ACTION REQUEST: REFTEL EXPRESSES USG INTEREST

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (7.84)

6/12/2023 v2

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IN FACILITATING A POSITIVE RUSSIAN ROLE IN SOUTHEAST
EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESSES, AND ENSURING TRANSPARENCY
IN THE PLANNING OF THE MBPF. IN LIGHT OF THE
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING WHAT THE RUSSIAN ROLE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN AT THE SEDM MINISTERIAL IN SOFIA, WE WISH TO
AVOID A SIMILAR BROUHAHA OVER THE UPCOMING BUCHAREST
CONFERENCE. WE DO NOT SEE AN OVERRIDING NEED FOR
RUSSIAN ATTENDANCE, BUT IF WASHINGTON BELIEVES
OTHERWISE, THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO SEND US
INSTRUCTIONS ON AN URGENT BASIS. OF COURSE, U.S.
SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD HAVE TO
OVERCOME CONCERNS IN BUCHAREST AND PRESUMABLY OTHER
SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS THAT RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION
WOULD CHANGE THE TENOR OF THE CONFERENCE AND GIVE
UNWANTED IMPETUS TO RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

ROSAPEPE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Primakov - Albright

Ukraine - Clinton

Does it undermine
Kovalev/Birkov?

Don - you are the first to see this

| INITIALS | | |
|----------|-----|-----|
| APPR: | THE | ... |
| DRAFT: | EVA | ... |
| CLR 1: | EAW | ... |
| CLR 2: | RDA | ... |
| CLR 3: | VNU | ... |
| CLR 4: | CPA | ... |
| CLR 5: | DHA | ... |
| CLR 6: | | ... |
| CLR 7: | | ... |
| CLR 8: | | ... |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NB:EVANSTJ:TJE
04/09/98 7-8908
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR:EAWAYNE EUR:RDASMUS S/NIS:VNULAND P:CPANGELO
S/P:DHAMILTON S/S: S/S-O: NSC:

NIACT/IMMEDIATE RIGA

IMMEDIATE VILNIUS, TALLINN IMMEDIATE, EURPO PRIORITY

VIENNA FOR OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/08

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OPDC, LG, RS, OSCE

SUBJECT: POTUS LETTER TO LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR-ACTING E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POST TO DELIVER TO PRESIDENT ULMANIS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON. NO ORIGINAL SIGNED VERSION WILL FOLLOW. DEPARTMENT HAS NO PLAN TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO DO SO.

2. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT ULMANIS:

I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT PRIME MINISTER KRASTS HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND OTHER U.S. CITIES. WE FULLY UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT HIS DECISION TO REMAIN IN LATVIA AT THIS TIME. LET ME REASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-LATVIA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING RESCHEDULING THE ECONOMIC BILATERAL WORKING GROUP.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-1 (2.85)

6/12/2023 VL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY I ADMIRE THE LEADERSHIP YOU HAVE SHOWN UNDER SOME FAIRLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU HAVE VERY EFFECTIVELY USED YOUR OFFICE TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF A DEMOCRATIC AND FREE SOCIETY. I KNOW FROM MY OWN EXPERIENCE THAT THESE ISSUES CAN BE COMPLEX AND CONTROVERSIAL, BUT YOU HAVE MANAGED TO ADDRESS THEM IN A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. YOUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS CHALLENGING THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT TO REVIEW LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAWS CONVEY THE IMPORTANT MESSAGE THAT THE INTEGRATION OF INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IS IN THE LONG TERM INTEREST OF THE LATVIAN STATE. YOUR REMINDER THAT LATVIA'S PUBLIC SERVANTS AND MEMBERS OF ITS MILITARY MUST ADHERE TO YOUR NATION'S POLICY GOALS DEMONSTRATES LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY. YOUR EFFORTS TO KEEP AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH YOUR NEIGHBORS SHOWS THAT LATVIA IS SERIOUS ABOUT CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND COOPERATION.

LATVIA HAS COME A LONG WAY IN A SHORT TIME, BUT I KNOW THAT NOT ALL YOUR NEIGHBORS AGREE. RUSSIA ASSERTS THAT IT IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE PACE OF CHANGE IN LATVIA, ESPECIALLY ON THE ISSUE OF THE SITUATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN COMMUNITY. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS AND RELIES ON THE WORK OF THE OSCE AND ITS MISSION IN RIGA TO EVALUATE LATVIA'S PERFORMANCE ON ASSURING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. WE AGREE WITH THE OSCE FINDINGS THAT LATVIA HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS AND IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. YET I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE.

WHEN WE STOOD TOGETHER IN THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE LAST JANUARY TO SIGN THE U.S. ~~BALTIC~~ CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP, WE ESTABLISHED IMPORTANT SHARED PRINCIPLES INVOLVING BOTH HUMAN RIGHTS RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS. AS YOU CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO STIMULATE CREATIVE APPROACHES TO THESE ISSUES IN LATVIA, WE STAND READY TO SUPPORT YOU. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT IS NOW CONSIDERING HELPFUL AMENDMENTS TO THE CITIZENSHIP LAW. THIS WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP IN DEMONSTRATING LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO INCORPORATING OSCE RECOMMENDATIONS.

WE BELIEVE THESE ISSUES ^{and practical steps} CAN BEST BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE KIND OF OPEN DIALOGUE YOU HAVE WORKED HARD TO PROMOTE. I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY ALBRIGHT TO WRITE FOREIGN MINISTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

*and disruption
of normal
commercial
and political
relations
in northern
Europe*

PRIMAKOV URGING RUSSIA TO ENTER INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH LATVIA. INSTABILITY IN LATVIA IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, AND WE STRESS WITH RUSSIA THAT INTEMPERATE TALK OF THREATS OR SANCTIONS CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN FRUSTRATE PROGRESS.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT LATVIA, UNDER YOUR PRINCIPLED LEADERSHIP, WILL MEET THE CHALLENGES IT NOW FACES, AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS YOUR EFFORTS. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO REVIEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS WELL AS THE WORK AHEAD, AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE U.S. - BALTIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN RIGA IN LATE JUNE.

YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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April 8, 1998

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: 03/11/08

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - E. Anthony Wayne, Acting

SUBJECT: Letter to Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on
Russian-Latvian relations

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**2016-0314-M-1 (2.86)
6/12/2023 VZ

ISSUE FOR DECISION: Whether to sign the attached letter to Primakov

Recent events in Latvia and Russia's reaction to them have created new strains in the always tenuous Russia-Latvia bilateral relationship. We are concerned that the continuations of this trend could so severely irritate normal bilateral relations between the two that U.S. interests and long-term stability in the region will be jeopardized. The Latvian government, a six-party coalition that is shaky at best, is now near collapse, largely due to its inability to deal with Russian pressure: (Krasts just announced he has postponed his scheduled April 16-17 visit to Washington so he can tend to domestic issues.) The Russians have mounted a campaign to sharply criticize Latvia's human rights record (at the UN, OSCE and COE) and are talking about economic sanctions.

Instability is in no one's interest, and we need to urge the Russian government to take a step back from its campaign, lower the rhetoric and return to discussions with Latvia on ways to resolve the key bilateral issues between them. We ask that you state our position in the attached letter to Primakov. The letter responds to one he sent you in early March concerning the March 3 pensioners' demonstration in Riga. We are also drafting a letter from President Clinton to Latvian President Ulmanis urging Latvia to remain steadfast to its commitment to greater tolerance of religious and ethnic minorities and to restart a serious dialogue with the Russians designed to resolve bilateral differences.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: EUR A/S Marc Grossman
Reason: 1.5 (b) and (d)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Background

In our public statements, and positions presented in international fora (UNCHR, OSCE), we have encouraged both sides to refrain from unhelpful rhetoric and to resolve the issues in bilateral discussions across a broad range of issues. Embassy Riga has delivered this message on several occasions to senior levels in the GOL. Latvia seems to be making an effort, President Ulmanis in particular. The GOL's quick condemnation of these troubling events, Foreign Minister offer to travel to Moscow, Prime Minister Krasts' request for outside help (FBI) to investigate the recent bombings, and a clear commitment to public accountability demonstrated by the firing of the Chief of Defense, Chief of Police and economic minister -- all indicate that Latvia is truly attempting to deal with the situation and prevent any recurrences.

However, we see little or no Russian interest in engaging the Latvians in ways that could begin to ease tensions. Instead, Russian officials continue to denounce the March events. Moscow has put forward resolutions at the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe condemning Latvia's treatment of its ethnic minority and calling for international action. Deputy Foreign Minister Avdeyev said last week that economic sanctions against Latvia remain a possibility.

It appears there is a Russian campaign developing that will continue to publicly bash Latvia regardless of that country's attempts to diffuse tensions. In addition, we are hearing reports that Russia has changed its policy toward Latvia, (e.g., no normalization of relations without specific legislative changes concerning citizenship, language, and education) -- in effect, moving the goal posts. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Van der Stoel (not normally regarded as soft on the Baltics) is extremely concerned that Russia's "changed policy" toward Latvia will stop what he considers to be good progress in these areas. On April 2, he wrote to Primakov strongly urging him against such linkage or the threat of sanctions (official or unofficial). The EU and is preparing a similar message.

RECOMMENDATION

We must try to get these two countries back to the table, seriously dealing with their sensitive and complicated bilateral issues. The Deputy Secretary will deliver this message to Vladimir Titov, Director of the Russian MFA's Second European Division during a meeting in the Department this afternoon. The NSC is drafting a letter

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

from President Clinton to President Ulmanis urging a renewed dialogue. We recommend you approve the telegram at Tab 1.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab 1: Cable to Primakov

Tab 2: 30 day timeline

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

BACKGROUND:

Events in the past 30 days

March 3 - Riga, Latvia, Latvian police disperse a demonstration some 1,000 predominantly Russian-speaking pensioners after the protesters blocked a center city street and refused to return to the sidewalk. Scuffling occurred, but there were no injuries reported and no arrests

Primakov and Yeltsin's office publicly denounce Latvian authorities' handling of the incident as a "flagrant violation of basic human rights." President Ulmanis plans to visit Moscow are "put on hold."

Latvian PM Krasts speculates that the incident might have been a Russian provocation, and PM Chernomyrdin angrily criticized him in a press conference.

Primakov writes to you, urging the U.S. "take action about the infringements of human rights in Latvia."

March 9 - In our press guidance, we urge both sides to turn down the rhetoric, and move beyond the issue. We find no evidence of excessive force and reject the charge of human rights violations, but we also find no evidence to support "Russian provocation" theories.

March 12 - We deliver a similar statement through our OSCE Mission in Vienna during a pre-scheduled appearance by the Chief of Mission of the OSCE's mission in Riga.

March 16 -- Riga, members of the Latvia Legion, a former Waffen SS unit, hold their annual wreath laying ceremony. Contrary to Latvian government's policy of disassociation with the event, the Latvia Chief of Defense participates.

Moscow strongly condemns this march; Moscow Mayor Lushkov charges Latvia with 'genocide;" Avdeyev publicly speculates about the possibility of economic sanctions.

March -- At Your Cologne dinner, Primakov thanks you for our balanced statement on the March 3 demonstration, but asks why we didn't come out strongly against the Waffen SS march.

March 27 -- In response to a TASS question, we find the Waffen SS march and senior uniformed military participation in it "regrettable," but applaud Latvia's condemnation of Fascism and disassociation with the event.

April 2 -- A bomb explodes in Riga's main synagogue. No one hurt, door and windows blown out. President Ulmanis, PM

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5

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- 5 -

Krasts, and Foreign Minister Birkavs all denounce this act of violence, and request help from the FBI in the investigation.

April 2- In our press statement, we condemn the bombing and confirm that the FBI will be assisting in Latvia's investigation.

April 6 -- Riga -- a bomb explodes across from the Russian Embassy, no one hurt, minor property damage.

In our press guidance, we condemn the act of terrorism, extend sympathy to Russian Ambassador and urge dialogue between Latvia and Russia.

April 8, 1998

Drafter:

TJEvans

ID: U:TJEvans Latvia Primakov Response Tel. 7-8908

Clearance: EUR/NB:GMilovanovic

Clearance: EUR/DAS:RDasmus

Clearance: EUR/RUSL:GKrol

Clearance: S/NIS:VNuland

Clearance: P:BStephenson

Clearance: D:JBass

Clearance: DRL:JMerz

Clearance:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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| APPR: | MAR | ... |
| DRAFT: | TJE | ... |
| CLR 1: | GMI | ... |
| CLR 2: | RDA | ... |
| CLR 3: | GKR | ... |
| CLR 4: | VNU | ... |
| CLR 5: | BST | ... |
| CLR 6: | JBA | ... |
| CLR 7: | JME | ... |

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/NB:TJEVANS:TJE
04/08/98 7-8908
THE SECRETARY

EUR/NB:GMILOVANOVIC EUR/DAS:RDASMUS EUR/RUS:GKROL
S/NIS:VNULAND P:BSTEPHENSON D:JBASS DRL:JMERZ

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

IMMEDIATE RIGA, TALLINN IMMEDIATE, VILNIUS IMMEDIATE, EURPO
PRIORITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/08

TAGS: PREL, OPDC, PHUM, OSCE, LH, RU

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO PRIMAKOV ON RUSSIA-LATVIA
RELATIONS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR A/S MARC GROSSMAN FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POST TO DELIVER TO FOREIGN
MINISTER PRIMAKOV THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY
RESPONDING TO HIS LETTER RECEIVED IN THE DEPARTMENT ON
MARCH 9, 1998. NO ORIGINAL SIGNED VERSION WILL FOLLOW.

2. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

[I APPRECIATE] YOUR RECENT LETTER CONCERNING EVENTS IN
LATVIA AND WAS PLEASED WE HAD THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS THIS
ISSUE BRIEFLY DURING OUR DINNER MEETING IN COLOGNE.
UNFORTUNATELY, SINCE WE LAST MET, [LATVIA HAS EXPERIENCED]
SEVERAL FURTHER TROUBLING INCIDENTS. WE HAVE BEEN WATCHING
DEVELOPMENTS THERE CLOSELY, AND COMMENTING ON THEM PUBLICLY
AS APPROPRIATE. DESPITE THE REGRETTABLE NATURE OF THESE

these have been

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0814-M (2.87)
6/12/2023 v2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

DEVELOPMENTS, I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED THAT THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT IS TRULY ATTEMPTING TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AND TO PREVENT RECURRENCES.

COMPOUNDING THE NEGATIVE IMAGE SUCH EVENTS CAN CREATE ARE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS RELATED TO THEM, WHICH CAN OFTEN TAKE ON A LIFE OF THEIR OWN, PROLONGING OR FURTHER IRRITATING NORMAL RELATIONS. YOU KNOW THAT IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE HAVE USED A BALANCED APPROACH (AND HAVE MAINTAINED A LOW PUBLIC PROFILE). WE URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO USE THE SAME APPROACH.

Commit ask low

I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL LONG TERM INTERESTS OF RUSSIA AND LATVIA ARE BEST SERVED BY IMPROVED RELATIONS. INSTABILITY IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. OUR GOAL IS TO PROMOTE GOOD RUSSIAN-BALTIC RELATIONS, AND TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION OF THE ETHNIC MINORITY COMMUNITIES LIVING IN THE BALTIC STATES. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE PROMINENTLY REAFFIRMED IN THE U.S. - BALTIC CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP.

LATVIA IS DOING ITS UTMOST TO PREVENT FURTHER DISRUPTIVE EVENTS, AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT HOW THESE EVENTS ARE AFFECTING ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA. PRESIDENT ULMANIS AND SENIOR LATVIAN OFFICIALS HAVE MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO KEEP AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT, DESPITE CRITICISM FROM THEIR POLITICAL OPPONENTS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES MAX VAN DER STOEL TELLS US THAT LATVIA IS MAKING GOOD PROGRESS ON MINORITY ISSUES, ALTHOUGH WE AGREE MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE. THE U.S. HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED AND WILL CONTINUE TO URGE LATVIA TO IMPLEMENT ITS LAWS FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY TO REMAIN STEADFAST IN ITS TOLERANCE OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES.

I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA APPEARS UNRECEPTIVE TO LATVIAN INITIATIVES. I ALSO HAVE HEARD REPORTS THAT RUSSIA HAS ADOPTED A NEW POLICY TOWARD LATVIA INVOLVING FURTHER PRECONDITIONS TO THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. WE FEAR THAT A RUSSIAN POLICY THAT LINKS NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH LEGISLATIVE CHANGES WILL MAKE IT HARDER FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENT TO OCCUR IN THOSE AREAS THAT ARE MOST IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US. FURTHERMORE, TALK OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LATVIA IS DESTINED TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

WE HAVE RAISED WITH THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT OUR OWN CONCERNS ABOUT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO LANGUAGE AND LABOR LAWS. IN THE CASE OF THE PROPOSED

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

AMENDMENT TO THE LANGUAGE LAW, OUR CONCERNS ARE EXPRESSED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR 1997. OUR POLICY IS TO URGE THAT LEGISLATION NOT BE ENACTED WHICH COULD INFRINGE UPON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS REGARDLESS OF ETHNIC BACKGROUND OR CONTRADICTED LATVIAN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT HAVE WILLINGLY TAKEN OUR VIEWS AND THOSE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS INTO ACCOUNT.

LET ME REASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH LATVIA TO IMPROVE THE INTEGRATION OF ITS NON-CITIZEN COMMUNITIES. WE BELIEVE LATVIA IS ALSO COMMITTED TO THIS GOAL AND IS STEADILY MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING THIS GOAL. WITH THAT IN MIND, I URGE RUSSIA TO WORK WITH LATVIA TO GET BEYOND THESE INCIDENTS, RETURN TO A PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL EXCHANGE, ACROSS A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES, SO THAT THE LATVIA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP CAN ONCE MORE MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL STABILITY.

SINCERLEY,

MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 001a. email | Stephen Flanagan to Samuel Berger and James Steinberg, re: [Talks] (1 page) | 04/14/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ |
| 001b. email | From Steven Naplan, re: POTUS letter to Latvian President Ulmanis (2 pages) | 04/15/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ |
| 001c. eable | Re: Delivery of POTUS Letter to Latvian President Ulmanis (4 pages) | 04/15/1998 | P1/b(1) VZ |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs (Naplan, Steven)
 OA/Box Number: 3038

FOLDER TITLE:

Latvia

2011-1037-F
 ke2197

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Naplan, Steven J.

From: Flanagan, Stephen J.
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 1998 9:49 PM
To: Berger, Samuel (Sandy); Steinberg, James
Cc: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @CEE - Central/Eastern Europe; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @DEMOCRACY - Dem/Human Affairs
Subject: Talks With Latvian MFA State Secretary ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

EUR DAS Ron Asmus and I met with Latvian MFA State Secretary Maris Reikstins for 90 minutes today. Here are the highlights:

Reikstins said the situation in Latvia is tense but not yet dangerous. Moscow appears convinced that its current bluster is the only way to "get results" from Riga on minority issues -- a point a Russian MFA official made to us here last week. Latvians concerned that Moscow wants to keep the pot boiling, as a way to slow Baltic integration into the West. Citizens are worried about the impact of Russia's economic pressure (boycotts of Latvian goods, tougher deals on energy supplies etc), particularly if campaign continues for several months. On the other hand, Russia needs Latvian ports for oil and other exports.

Latvians deeply appreciated the President's letter, particularly comments on their human rights progress. They have released portions of letter, as they were authorized by Embassy Riga when it was delivered. In contrast, they are miffed at the EU, particularly Italy and Germany. Both Kohl and Dini made comments on Latvia's shortcomings on treatment of the Russian-speaking minority in Moscow, which played right into Primakov's hand. He also lauded FBI's support to Latvian police investigations of recent bombings.

- We expressed Washington's desire to help Moscow and Latvia restore a constructive dialogue and to continue to explore mutually-beneficial areas of regional cooperation -- i.e. on the environment and organized crime. Keep open the option of a "win-win" resolution of the current crisis.
- We underscored Riga's need to move more quickly to implement OSCE recommendations on treatment of minorities. We told Reikstins that we would urge the EU (and the Russians) to look to the OSCE recommendations as objective benchmarks of Latvian performance. Don't let Moscow move the goal posts, and impose new standards. In this way, Latvians can also be seen as taking steps to prepare themselves for EU membership, vice responding to Moscow's pressure. Reikstins said they have implemented 11 of 18 items on the OSCE list and further steps (i.e. on naturalization laws) are in the works.
- We reaffirmed our commitment to move forward with implementation of the Baltic Charter and Action Plan to demonstrate that our support to further reforms and integration is proceeding as expected. This will also undermine Russian suggestions that we share their assessment of Latvia's shortcomings. Key task here is to try to break the logjam (as POTUS promised) with the EU on audiovisuals, which is still impeding Latvian membership in WTO.
- We noted that new efforts to deal with the past, including formation of a Baltic Historical Commission which would examine events in the region during WWII -- a step supported by the AJC -- would also advance their cause.

FYI. Madeline's letter to Primakov is supposed to be delivered tomorrow. State is giving some thought to a high-level visit to Riga (Madeline or Strobe) in early May.

Also, the Russians **have not raised the Skrunda radar facility** (which they are committed to vacate in September) in the context of the current crisis. However, I can see the politics breaking that way, if we don't get Moscow and Riga talking soon. Given the President's involvement in securing the Skrunda deal, a little more engagement by Washington now could help avoid a bigger showdown this summer.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314-M-1 (2.88)
6/12/2023 v2

Naplan, Steven J.

From: Naplan, Steven J.
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 1998 10:39 AM
To: Naplan, Steven J.
Subject: POTUS letter to Latvian President Ulmanis ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 4659 DOCID: M3239007

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TO: RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO: RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0000
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 064659

VIENNA FOR OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OPDC, LG, RS, OSCE
SUBJECT: POTUS LETTER TO LATVIAN PRESIDENT ULMANIS

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR-ACTING E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASON
1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. ~~(S)~~ THIS MESSAGE SENT NIACT-IMMEDIATE TO ALLOW ITS
DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT OF LATVIA AT OOB IN RIGA ON
FRIDAY, APRIL 10, A NATIONAL HOLIDAY IN LATVIA. THE
MESSAGE IS ANXIOUSLY AWAITED BY THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT AS
IT CONCERNS THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND EMBASSY
RIGA HAS ASKED THAT IT BE SENT NIACT IMMEDIATE.

3. ~~(S)~~ DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POST TO DELIVER TO PRESIDENT
ULMANIS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON. NO
ORIGINAL SIGNED VERSION WILL FOLLOW. WHITE HOUSE HAS NO
PLAN TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS NO
OBJECTION IF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO DO SO.

2. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT ULMANIS:

I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT PRIME MINISTER KRASTS HAS
DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND OTHER U.S.
CITIES. WE FULLY UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT HIS DECISION TO
REMAIN IN LATVIA AT THIS TIME. LET ME REASSURE YOU THAT WE
WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-
LATVIA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY I ADMIRE THE
LEADERSHIP YOU HAVE SHOWN UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.
YOU HAVE VERY EFFECTIVELY USED YOUR OFFICE TO FOCUS PUBLIC
ATTENTION ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF A DEMOCRATIC
AND FREE SOCIETY. I KNOW THAT THESE ISSUES CAN BE COMPLEX
AND CONTROVERSIAL, BUT YOU HAVE MANAGED TO ADDRESS THEM IN
A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. YOUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0314-M-2 (2.89)

6/12/2023 VL

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CHALLENGING THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT TO REVIEW LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAWS CONVEY THE IMPORTANT MESSAGE THAT THE INTEGRATION OF INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IS IN THE LONG TERM INTEREST OF THE LATVIAN STATE. YOUR REMINDER THAT LATVIA'S PUBLIC SERVANTS AND MEMBERS OF ITS MILITARY MUST ADHERE TO YOUR NATION'S POLICY GOALS DEMONSTRATES LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY. YOUR EFFORTS TO KEEP AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH YOUR NEIGHBORS SHOWS THAT LATVIA IS SERIOUS ABOUT CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND COOPERATION.

LATVIA HAS COME A LONG WAY IN A SHORT TIME, AND I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THOSE AREAS, SUCH AS THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS, WHERE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS AND RELIES ON THE WORK OF THE OSCE AND ITS MISSION IN RIGA TO EVALUATE LATVIA'S PERFORMANCE ON ASSURING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. WE AGREE WITH THE OSCE FINDINGS THAT LATVIA HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS AND IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

WHEN WE STOOD TOGETHER IN THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE LAST JANUARY TO SIGN THE CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP, WE ESTABLISHED IMPORTANT SHARED PRINCIPLES INVOLVING BOTH HUMAN RIGHTS RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS. AS YOU CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO STIMULATE CREATIVE APPROACHES TO THESE ISSUES IN LATVIA, WE STAND READY TO SUPPORT YOU. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE LATVIAN PARLIAMENT IS NOW CONSIDERING HELPFUL AMENDMENTS TO THE CITIZENSHIP LAW. THIS WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP IN DEMONSTRATING LATVIA'S COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENTING OSCE RECOMMENDATIONS.

WE BELIEVE THESE ISSUES CAN BEST BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE KIND OF OPEN DIALOGUE AND PRACTICAL STEPS YOU HAVE WORKED HARD TO PROMOTE. WE ARE ALSO TALKING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA ABOUT WHAT CAN BE DONE TO RESTART A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH LATVIA. DISRUPTION OF NORMAL COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN NORTHERN EUROPE IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, AND WE STRESS WITH RUSSIA THAT INTENSIFIED TALK OF THREATS OR SANCTIONS CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN FRUSTRATE PROGRESS.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT LATVIA, UNDER YOUR PRINCIPLED LEADERSHIP, WILL MEET THE CHALLENGES IT NOW FACES, AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS YOUR EFFORTS. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO REVIEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS WELL AS THE WORK AHEAD, AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE U.S. - BALTIC PARTNERSHIP COMMISSION IN RIGA IN LATE JUNE.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT
TALBOTT

DIST:
SIT: BRADEN COHEN DAVIDSON FICKLIN FLANAGAN MCELDFOWNEY POOLE SIT: NSC

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 1130 DOCID: M3243791

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O 150607Z APR 98
FM AMEMBASSY ~~RIGA~~

FM: AMEMBASSY ~~RIGA~~
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1529

INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0364
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0361
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0273
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0379
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0849
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0834
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0324
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0228
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0902
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0305
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0106
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1276
RUEHFRS/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG 0147

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ~~RIGA~~ 001130

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND
DAS ASMUS, AND EUR/NB
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-FLANAGAN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE
HELSINKI PLEASE PASS AMCONSUL ST. PETERSBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/08
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OPDC, OSCE, RS, US, LG
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF POTUS LETTER TO LATVIAN PRESIDENT
ULMANIS

REF: STATE 64659

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR LARRY C. NAPPER.
REASON 1.5(B), (D).

2. ~~(S)~~ ON APRIL 11 THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH PRESIDENT
ULMANIS TO DELIVER PRESIDENT ~~CLINTON'S~~ LETTER (REFTEL).
PRESIDENT ULMANIS EXPRESSED HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR
THE LETTER, WHICH HE OBSERVED HAD COME AT EXACTLY THE
RIGHT TIME. HE ESPECIALLY WELCOMED THE COMMITMENT IN
THE LETTER TO A VISIT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT TO
LATVIA IN JUNE. THE PRESIDENT READ CAREFULLY THE

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2016-0314-M-1 (290)
6/12/2023 VZ

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SECTIONS OF THE LETTER ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN LATVIA AND THE NEED FOR PROGRESS ON THE CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION FRONTS. ULMANIS SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO HAVE THE LETTER TRANSLATED AND WOULD USE IT WITH THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT DURING THE SPECIAL CABINET MEETING SET FOR APRIL 15. AT THAT MEETING THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE INTENDED BOTH TO PRESS FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT CRISIS AND TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON FOR PROGRESS IN LIBERALIZING LATVIA'S LEGISLATION ON CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION.

3. ~~(S)~~ TURNING TO THE GOVERNMENT CRISIS, ULMANIS SAID THAT HE HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT THE KRASTS GOVERNMENT WAS TOO WEAK TO CONTINUE THROUGH THE OCTOBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. HE HOPED THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE DONE TO SHORE UP KRASTS' POSITION AS PRIME MINISTER, BUT THIS SEEMED INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY. ULMANIS SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY FRUSTRATED WITH KRASTS' INABILITY TO DISCIPLINE HIS FATHERLAND AND FREEDOM PARTY AND TO MOVE THE GOVERNMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF MEANINGFUL REFORM OF THE CITIZENSHIP LAW AND NATURALIZATION PROCESS. IN A CONVERSATION OF ALMOST 90 MINUTES, THE PRESIDENT WENT OVER ALL THE OPTIONS IF THE KRASTS GOVERNMENT SHOULD FALL. HE CONSIDERED THE OPTION OF ORGANIZING A NEW GOVERNMENT HEADED BY A FIGURE FROM ANOTHER PARTY OR BY A "TECHNOCRAT" AS CARETAKER UNTIL THE FALL ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANYONE ON THE LATVIAN POLITICAL SCENE WITH BOTH THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND THE CREDIBILITY WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO FILL SUCH A CARETAKER ROLE.

4. ~~(S)~~ FACED WITH A PAUCITY OF GOOD OPTIONS, ULMANIS SAID THAT HE WAS INCREASINGLY CONSIDERING DISBANDING THE PARLIAMENT AND ORGANIZING EARLY ELECTIONS. SUCH A COURSE WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY THE LATVIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING A NATIONAL REFERENDUM BEFORE PARLIAMENT COULD BE DISSOLVED. IF A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS IN THE REFERENDUM SUPPORTED ULMANIS, THE PARLIAMENT WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND EARLY ELECTIONS CALLED. IF, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT FAILED TO GET A POPULAR MAJORITY, HE HIMSELF WOULD BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE. WHILE ULMANIS WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT A DECISION TO DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT, HE WAS UNDERSTANDABLY RELUCTANT TO GO DOWN THIS CUMBERSOME AND TIME-CONSUMING ROUTE. IF THIS OPTION WERE TO BE SELECTED, HE ESTIMATED THAT ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE ORGANIZED BEFORE JULY OR AUGUST, ONLY A COUPLE OF MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS THAT ARE ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR EARLY OCTOBER. DESPITE ALL THE DOWNSIDES, ULMANIS SAID THAT HIS FRUSTRATION WITH THE SQUABBLING AMONG LATVIA'S POLITICIANS WAS INCREASINGLY CAUSING HIM TO LEAN IN THE DIRECTION OF DISSOLVING THE PARLIAMENT AND WORKING FOR EARLY ELECTIONS.

5. (S) ULM

ANIS EXPRESSED SPECIAL GRATITUDE FOR THE COMMITMENT IN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER TO USE AMERICAN INFLUENCE TO HELP RESTART A DIALOGUE BETWEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 RIGA 001130

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR A/S GROSSMAN AND
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ULMANIS

REF: STATE 64659

LATVIA AND RUSSIA. ULMANIS SAID THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY FRUSTRATED BY LATVIA'S INABILITY TO ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL CONTACT WITH ANYONE IN THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT KRASTS OR FOREIGN MINISTER BIRKAVS COULD REESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH MOSCOW. ULMANIS HIMSELF HAD TRIED TO REACH YELTSIN ONLY TO RUN INTO A STONEWALL. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING HOW TO ORGANIZE A MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRIMAKOV, HOPING THAT A MEETING WITH THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT AT LEAST RESTART DIALOGUE. ULMANIS COULD NOT, HOWEVER, SEE HOW TO ORCHESTRATE A MEETING WITH PRIMAKOV. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HOPED THE UNITED STATES OR SOME OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRY MIGHT BE HELPFUL. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WARMLY WELCOMED SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER PERSSON'S INITIATIVE TO VISIT LATVIA ON APRIL 15.

6. (S) COMMENT: THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY DEPLOYED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER TO GOOD EFFECT WITH THE LATVIAN PUBLIC AND POLITICIANS. A PRESIDENTIAL PRESS RELEASE SUMMARIZING THE LETTER LED TO FRONT PAGE HEADLINES IN THE APRIL 14 LATVIAN NEWSPAPERS FOCUSING ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SUPPORT FOR CHANGES IN LATVIA'S CITIZENSHIP LAW. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO USED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GOOD EFFECT IN AN APRIL 14 MEETING TO URGE THE INTER-PARTY WORKING GROUP ON THE CITIZENSHIP LAW TO PROPOSE COMPREHENSIVE AND FAR-REACHING REFORMS. ON THE QUESTION OF DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY'S DCM DEMURIN TOLD THE DCM ON APRIL 14 THAT MOSCOW HAD ON APRIL 13 OFFERED THE LATVIANS A MEETING BETWEEN RUSSIAN MFA DEPUTY MINISTER AVDEYEV AND LATVIAN MFA STATE SECRETARY RIEKSTINS. ACCORDING TO DEMURIN, AVDEYEV WOULD BE WILLING TO

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RECEIVE RIEKSTINS IN MOSCOW IF THE LATVIANS WERE PREPARED TO TABLE NEW POSITIONS ON THEIR CITIZENSHIP LAW, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A BROAD LATVIAN-RUSSIAN POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND ON BALTIC CSBMS. IF RIEKSTINS WERE NOT PREPARED TO TABLE NEW PROPOSALS IN THESE AREAS, A MEETING WITH AVDEYEV COULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IN A EUROPEAN CAPITAL, SUCH AS BRUSSELS. ACCORDING TO DEMURIN, THE LATVIANS WERE STILL CONSIDERING THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL. IN ANY EVENT, A MEETING COULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL RIEKSTINS COMPLETED HIS APRIL 14-15 TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC.

NAPPER

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SSN>1130

<^TOR>980415030845 M3243789

DIST:

SIT: BANDLER BRADEN DAVIDSON FICKLIN FLANAGAN MCELDFOWNEY POOLE SUM2 SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}