

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 478				
Document ID: 9405722				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Presidential Telephone Call with South Korean President Kim Young Sam (3 pages)	07/14/1994	P1/b(1) KBN 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and memcon])
 OA/Box Number: 478

FOLDER TITLE:

9405722

2016-0852-M
kh1992

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 15 JUL 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
HS

MEMCON

PERSONS: KIM, YOUNG SAM

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES KIM OF SOUTH KOREA 14 JUL

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 19 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 3/4/2019
2016-0852-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
001

Z 94071518 FOR DECISION
X 94071618 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5722

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 15, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGH NARA, Date 3/6/2019
2016-0852-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: DANIEL PANEMAN/STANLEY ROTH *RP*

SUBJECT: Memcon with President Kim Young Sam of South Korea
-- July 14, 1994

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between President Clinton and President Kim Young Sam of South Korea. The memorandum is to be filed for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *✓* *han* *for* Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**2016-0851-M
3/4/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with South Korean
President Kim Young Sam

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Kim Young Sam
President of South Korea

Daniel Poneman, Stanley Roth
Notetakers

DATE, TIME July 14, 1994, 7:01 - 7:23 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Kim: Hello. How are you, President Clinton?

The President: I'm fine. It's nice to hear your voice. I wanted to stay in touch with your thinking on North Korea. I was very pleased that our governments worked so closely together in preparing for the third round of talks. The one day of talks we had before Kim Il Sung's death was announced went rather well, as Bob Gallucci has told your people in Geneva.

Of course now we are all watchfully waiting to hear more from North Korea. We respect your caution in response to events in Pyongyang and support Foreign Minister Han's statement regarding continued dialogue with North Korea and the resumption of US-North Korean talks to resolve the nuclear issue.

We think it's very important for us to go forward with the resumption of the third round as soon as possible. For one thing, it won't be long before something needs to be done to the spent fuel for safety reasons.

For another, since we do not know what will happen in North Korea, it's in our interest to try as soon as possible to reach a broad and thorough settlement that would make their freeze permanent and draw them back into compliance with their nonproliferation commitments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

One last point I wanted to make: the North Koreans made very clear in the brief third round meeting the great value they attach to acquiring a light water reactor. I think we should try to address that issue squarely. Ambassador Gallucci has had good conversations with your representatives on that, and will be following up with them shortly.

That concludes what I wanted to say and I hoped you would tell me your views on North Korea and how you evaluate the situation, and the prospects for the North-South dialogue.

President Kim: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I'm pleased to hear your voice. I'd like to congratulate your successful completion of the G-7 meeting and also your tour of Europe. At the same time, I would like to extend words of condolence for the floods and victims in Georgia and Florida.

I want to thank you for the briefing you provided me on your talks with North Korea. There is a lot of uncertainty in the situation in North Korea, but it seems to be clear to me that Kim Jong Il is going to succeed Kim Il Sung. I also note that there is no problem whatsoever in the close cooperation between ROK and U.S. military forces.

One thing I can think about is that before the death of Kim Il Sung, we were supposed to have a North-South summit meeting scheduled for the 25th. I regret that this has been put off due to the death of Kim Il Sung. North Korea notified us by document that the summit was postponed, saying that notice was made by delegation of authority. I believe that authority must be Kim Jong Il. I interpret that to mean North Korea is still interested in having a summit, but they are telling us they have to put it off. It is difficult to predict when this summit will take place. We will wait to hear from the North Koreans. I also think South-North dialogue is very important, as important as US-North Korea talks.

As you explained about the US-North Korea talks, these talks are very important to peace on the Korean Peninsula. My judgment is that North Korea continues to be interested in having a summit and of course there is no change in our basic position and I made an announcement to that effect. We will maintain that position which I think we have to keep for the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula. As you pointed out, it is very important for our two countries, South Korea and the United States, to maintain full consultation concerning the North-South summit and US-North Korea talks. And I believe this is a time for even closer consultation between us.

I'd like to also clarify some misinformation reported by the media. Some media reported that North Korea informed China of Kim Il Sung's death. That is not true. They did not tell anybody until they made the announcement. There is also a report that Jiang Zemin [Chinese President] invited Kim Jong Il to China. That is also not true.

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The new Japanese Prime Minister Murayama, whom you met at the G-7 conference, will pay an official visit to Korea next week and be accompanied by his Foreign Minister Kono. When they come, I would like to discuss fully with them the matters of the North Korean nuclear program, the nuclear issue, and the North-South summit.

Mr. President, one thing that is important in my view is that with the passing of Kim Il Sung, one generation has passed in North Korea. Nothing is normal in North Korea today, although the military maintains its position. Other than that, factories and everything else are not working; operations are suspended. Therefore, I believe we should not be impatient, but we should be prudent in dealing with the issues of US-North Korean talks and a summit in a mature manner. And again close cooperation between the United States and Korea is important.

President Kim: I'm satisfied with the cooperation between Korea and the United States with regard to preparations for the North-South summit scheduled for July 25. I also hope we will continue our close cooperation in the future.

The President: I assure you we will. That is what has led us to the point we are at now. I'm glad you will see Prime Minister Murayama. I had a good meeting with him. He assured me he will maintain Japan's present policy. I think you will have a good meeting with him. Thank you very much. Please give my best to Mrs. Kim.

President Kim: Please convey my best wishes to Mrs. Clinton. Thank you very much.

The President: Good night.

President Kim: Good night.

-- End of Conversation --

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 483				
Document ID: 9409454				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re. Meeting with Prime Minister Murayama of Japan and Kim Young Sam, President of South Korea (3 pages)	11/14/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and memcon])
 OA/Box Number: 483

FOLDER TITLE:

9409454

2016-0852-M

kh1993

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: ROTH

DOC DATE: 29 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
MEMCON

JAPAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES KIM OF SOUTH KOREA & PM MURAYAMA OF JAPAN ON 14 NOV

ACTION: SENS APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROTH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 3/6/2019
2016-0852-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
001

Z 94113015 FOR DECISION
X 94113018 SENS APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 94154
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>MBN 11/30</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

NO NOV 94 12 25

Exec Sec Office has diskette used

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9454

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SR*

SUBJECT: Memcon with President Kim of South Korea and Prime Minister Murayama of Japan on November 14, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KCM* NARA, Date *3/6/2019*
2016-0852-m

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Kim of the Republic of North Korea and Prime Minister Murayama of Japan during the APEC visit in Indonesia.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *AOS* Disapprove _____
u/30/94

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9454

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0852-M (1.02)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MURAYAMA OF JAPAN
AND KIM YOUNG SAM, PRESIDENT OF SOUTH KOREA

(S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Stanley Roth, NSC Notetaker

President Kim
Notetaker

Prime Minister Murayama
Notetaker

DATE, TIME November 14, 1994, 9:42 - 9:55pm
AND PLACE: Summit Hall, Jakarta Convention Center

The President: It's a very good thing that we spend a few minutes together. It's a good thing for the people of our country and the whole region to see us standing together on issues affecting the Korean Peninsula, on the nuclear agreement, on the need for North-South dialogue and on our common security commitments. (S)

Of course, the press wants us to answer all the details about how we will implement the agreement. They would like some sort of public statement describing who will screw the last screw in on the light water reactor. For reasons which we all understand, it is not possible to go into that level of detail. (S)

We have to give the impression that we are going to see the agreement through. We have to send a clear message to President Kim Chong-il that North-South dialogue is important, that some matters have to be resolved between North Korea and South Korea, and not between the rest of us. (S)

Thank you for spending a few minutes this evening to send this message to the rest of the world. (S)

President Kim: Today, the three of us have come together. It's very meaningful. Concerning peace on the Korean Peninsula, I think inter-Korean dialogue is very important. We have to resolve that. (S)

Cooperation among our three countries especially is needed in order to support the idea that North Korea will faithfully implement the agreement that it agreed to in Geneva. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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Prime Minister Murayama: As you indicated earlier, our three countries are meeting here in the same place. In the future, close cooperation will be necessary about how we are going to respond and take actions on this agreement. The agreement that was reached in Geneva between the United States and North Korea is just an entrance. There may be some differences in the future. In that sense we have to make sure that North Korea keeps its word and implements the agreement. We have to watch carefully their future progress. (S)

I'm sure we will closely communicate and consult amongst the three of us. It should be amicable and smooth. In that direction, we have to take further actions. (S)

The North-South deal is of the utmost importance. It has implications for the entire Asia-Pacific region. (S)

President Kim: I agree fully with the Prime Minister of Japan. The threshold is testing whether North Korea in fact will carry out the agreement. To ensure this we need closer cooperation among our three countries, supported by working-level consultations. (S)

North-South dialogue is the essential key to the resolution of the Korean question. I fully agree with Prime Minister Murayama about this. (S)

The President: I agree as well with what he said. But I would like to emphasize the other side of the coin. If this agreement is carried out it will resolve the world's biggest threat of nuclear proliferation, which not only threatens the security of Asia -- and particularly Northeast Asia -- but also the security of other parts of the world, which could be threatened by the people to whom North Korea could sell nuclear weapons. (S)

So carrying through this agreement is very important. I agree with Prime Minister Murayama that we must do everything that we can to ensure that North Korea keeps its side of the bargain. We must push for the quick resumption of North-South dialogue. But we must also work in good faith to carry out the obligations of the other parties to the agreement. We don't want to give North Korea an excuse not to keep its word. (S)

We will all be pressed for details. I understand that. We must be firm and clear in our support for the agreement. We must be insistent that it be complied with. And we must support President Kim Young Sam in our clear assertion that it's time to resume the North-South dialogue. (S)

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3

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Prime Minister Murayama: The nuclear issue is a global issue, a big issue. Therefore, if possible, the G-7 should join the process and be part of the framework. (S)

Our three nations must keep in touch very closely. We need cooperation. (S)

The President: We must work hard to ensure that, as we like to say, there is no daylight between our positions. We can't permit anyone to exploit any divisions among the three of us. (S)

Prime Minister Murayama: Yes, I understand. (S)

President Kim: It's a very important point. We must never let North Korea miscalculate the situation or underestimate our resolve, which could happen if we ever show any disagreement among the three of us. (S)

If we cooperate closely, North Korea is bound to resume the dialogue with us. Our goal is to create such an atmosphere for North-South dialogue. (S)

Prime Minister Murayama: It is important to exhaust our dialogue so that we can resolve this issue. We have to create a route to exhaust our discussion on this issue. (S)

Insofar as the agreement between the United States and North Korea is concerned, we have to make sure it leads to a successful conclusion. To that end we would like to cooperate. What kind of framework, how it should proceed, are things that should be talked about at the experts level. We need an exhaustive discussion. From now on, this will be more important. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 176				
Document ID: 9309592				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re. Telcon with President Kim Young Sam of Korea (3 pages)	12/07/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and telcon])
 OA/Box Number: 176

FOLDER TITLE:

9309592

2016-0852-M

kh1994

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH	Z 93120717 FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION
001	X 93120909 ITOH APPROVED RECOM
002	X 93120909 ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 931208 GROSSMAN, M

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: RA LOG # 9592

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG: ASK A/O _____

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ExecSec	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9309592
DATE 08 DEC 93

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ KIM YOUNG SAM OF KOREA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 3/6/2019
2016-0852-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOb
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9592

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KPM NARA, Date 3/6/2019
2016-0252-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon With President
Kim Young Sam of Korea

This Memorandum of Telephone Conversation is provided for
Secretary Christopher's information and may be provided to the
Ambassador or Charge via NODIS channels. (S)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0852-M (1.03)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With President Kim Young Sam of Korea on December 7, 1993 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Kim
Interpreter: Kim Tong
Notetaker: Sandra J. Kristoff, NSC

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 7, 1993, 8:55 - 9:20 AM EST
The Oval Office

President Clinton: Hello, President Kim? (e)

President Kim: I'm very pleased to talk to you and I am very grateful for the warm reception you gave me in Washington. Please give my regards to Mrs. Clinton. (e)

President Clinton: I will do that. She asked me to say hello to you before she left for Boston this morning. (e)

President Kim: Thank you and once again congratulations on your successful hosting of the APEC meeting. (e)

President Clinton: Yes, I think it was a very good meeting. I'm hopeful about what we can do in the future with it. (e)

President Kim: I think APEC will play a major role in the world not just in the Asia-Pacific region. We will continue to cooperate with you on the development of the organization. I also want to congratulate you on the developments in the Uruguay Round. Although some potential problems still exist, overall there is good progress. (e)

President Clinton: I think we're making progress. (e)

President Kim: Perhaps you've received a report from Ambassador Laney already. I want to discuss with you our position on the Uruguay Round negotiations, especially the rice import issue. I want to ask for your help on this matter. Today, there has been a large scale demonstration against rice imports. It was the largest demonstration since Korea has had a civilian government. There are several issues related to rice, including inter-Korean relations and the development of anti-American feeling, which we are watching closely. Rice is more a political and social issue than an economic one. I am asking you to look at rice in its wider context and I am asking for your help. From 1995 when the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Uruguay Round is implemented -- for five years after that we would maintain a minimum market access ratio of zero percent. Then from 1999, we would introduce foreign rice with a minimum market access ratio of 2 to 4 percent. I know this is a difficult issue and I am asking for a special favor from you. (S)

President Clinton: I would do anything I could to be helpful. Frankly the problem is, as we talked before, that the U.S. wants to make sure that Korea's arrangement on rice is better than Japan's. We've achieved that. If we change the package for Korea, then we would have to make a change for Japan. Korea can do better than Japan but not that much better. So that's my problem and I don't see how we can go with a five year delay. (S)

President Kim: I very much understand your perspective. My own view on this issue is that meeting the minimum market access ratio of 1 to 2 percent in the first five years will not have a substantial impact on Korea's economy. But the psychological problem for the Korean people is difficult. We see ourselves in a different context than Japan. Korea is a divided country and we have four times more the population involved in agriculture than Japan. If a five year delay is too much, then how about a two or three year delay? Would that be acceptable? (S)

President Clinton: Let me ask a related question. Is there a chance we could work out a clearer agreement on financial services? Because if we could do that, then perhaps I could discuss this other matter with my people and both issues could be settled at the same time. (S)

President Kim: Yes, it's possible for us to discuss both issues together. We should leave it to our working level negotiators. (S)

President Clinton: I can't promise you anything, but I will discuss this with my trade people. I want to ask you to put Korea's best financial services offer on the table. Then I'll discuss this with my people and we'll be back in touch. (S)

President Kim: We will move in that direction and will try to put our best offer on financial services on the table. If you can consider the special conditions of Korea, it will be in the best interests of both our countries. I'm very grateful for your favorable reaction and hope we can work it out. (S)

President Clinton: We'll go to work on it. I want to discuss the North Korean response to our proposal which we worked out when you were here two weeks ago. There are some positive points, but there are some elements we can't accept. (S)

President Kim: Okay. (S)

President Clinton: I want to go back to North Korea with a proposal Tony Lake will discuss in detail with your National Security Advisor, Dr. Chong. We are strong in our objective of a

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CONFIDENTIAL

nuclear-free Korean peninsula and on our commitment to our security relationship with you. Negotiations with North Korea involve fundamental issues related to Korea's national security and the future of the Korean peninsula. So I want to consult closely with you and work together on this. I do think it's worth going back to North Korea with our reaction to their response to our proposal because we want to use every reasonable opportunity to make progress. If we can't get inspections resumed very shortly, we will be back in the Security Council on sanctions with all the dangers that entails. Therefore, I ask you to give careful consideration to the proposal Tony Lake will pass on to Dr. Chong and I hope we can agree shortly on our reaction to what they've said. (S)

President Kim: I understand fully your suggestion. However, what we agreed on in Washington is fundamentally still alive. Based on that, we should leave discussions to the national security advisor here and his Washington counterpart. I think the most important thing is that the U.S. and Korea maintain close cooperation. By doing so we send a strong message to the North. Even this phone call is a strong signal to North Korea. So, we will continue our discussion on the nuclear issue by maintaining the principles we agreed to last time. The issues of speed, modalities and procedures will be discussed further by working level counterparts. Concerning the Uruguay Round and rice -- all the journalists here know I am talking to you. They don't know the content of the talks. If you agree, I will let the media know the nuclear issue and the Uruguay Round were discussed but I will keep the details completely confidential. (S)

President Clinton: I agree we should say nothing to the press about rice. Let's just say negotiations are going on and nothing else. (S)

President Kim: Of course, absolutely. Once again, I will mention to the press I discussed the Uruguay Round with you, but the contents of our discussion will be absolutely confidential. I hope you reciprocate in Washington. (S)

President Clinton: I will keep it absolutely confidential. (S)

President Kim: Thank you very much. And congratulations to Chelsea for her upcoming performance in the Washington ballet. (S)

President Clinton: Thanks so much. Tell Mrs. Kim hello for me. (S)

President Kim: Thanks again for your favorable reaction to my proposal. (S)

President Clinton: Goodbye. (S)

President Kim: Goodbye. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *gh for gh*

FROM: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *gh*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Kim Young Sam of Korea

At Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Korean President Kim Young Sam on December 7, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh Memo to Marc Grossman
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 477				
Document ID: 9405045				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Conversation with President Kim Young Sam (3 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and telcon])
 OA/Box Number: 477

FOLDER TITLE:

9405045

2016-0852-M
kh1995

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: AOKI
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION KOREA SOUTH
KOREA NORTH

PERSONS: KIM YOUNG SAM KIM IL SONG

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES KIM YOUNG SAM OF SOUTH KOREA ON 22 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 25 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9405045

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
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001

Z 94062713 FOR DECISION
X 94062816 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 94062816 NOTED BY LAKE

rec'd 6/27 4pm

National Security Council
The White House

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Berger <i>see this note</i>	<u>2</u>	<i>srh</i>	_____
<i>WA</i> Lake	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WA 6/28</u>	<u>Full</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

27 JUN 94 12:33

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] NSW TO SP13 Date: 6/27

Pls. sign out for R.
Phx.
N.

2] _____ TO _____ Date:

3] _____ TO _____ Date:

4] _____ TO _____ Date:

5] _____ TO _____ Date:

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5045

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 22, 1994

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with Kim Young Sam

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's June 22 telephone call with President Kim.

Concurrences by: Stanley Roth *SR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab I, to be filed for the record.

Approve *SR* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSH* NARA, Date *3/6/2019*
2016-0852-M

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2016-0852-M (1.04)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: North Korea

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Kim Young Sam
Interpreter: Tong Kim
Notetaker: Steven Aoki

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 22, 1994; 7:03 p.m. - 7:18 p.m.
White House

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello, President Kim.

PRESIDENT KIM: Hello, how are you? I'm very pleased to hear your voice.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I'm pleased to hear from you. Thank you for taking my call on such short notice. I thought we should discuss the day's events.

I welcome the agreement between your government and North Korea to pursue a meeting between you and Kim Il Sung. I hope the discussions on June 28 go well, and that you can move promptly to a summit.

As you know, we received information this afternoon that North Korea is willing to freeze the major elements of its nuclear program while a new round of talks between our nations proceeds. They also assured us that while we go forward with these talks they will not reload their five-megawatt reactor or reprocess spent fuel. We have also been assured that the IAEA will be allowed to keep its inspectors and monitoring equipment in place at the Yongbyon facility to assure us these things are not done.

In response to the North Korean offer we are now ready to go forward with a new round of talks. No dates have been set, although North Korea has proposed July 8. I think this development is very positive, and restores the basis for talks between North Korea and the United States.

We have not solved the problem, but this creates the opportunity to solve it. It's absolutely critical that we stay together on this, stay in touch and pursue the same course.

PRESIDENT KIM: Yes, Mr. President, I entirely agree. I understand that North Korea decided that it would not reload,

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would freeze its nuclear program and let IAEA inspectors remain to do their job. This all means that North Korea is ready to stop its nuclear operations. I evaluate the situation very positively.

Through the visit by President Carter, North Korea accepted Mr. Carter's proposal on the summit. As a result, North Korea informed us it would accept a preliminary meeting on June 28. We will know whether North Korea genuinely intends to hold the summit, based on the results of this meeting.

My perception is that unlike in the past, North Korea was very forthcoming in responding to our offers, so we have a very positive evaluation so far.

As you said, this does not solve the issue, but makes a resolution possible. We should be very prudent to cope with this situation. Our side and yours should cooperate very closely.

Close cooperation is important. Whenever an issue arises, we should discuss it. While working level cooperation will continue, whenever necessary, you and I should have discussions on the phone. This is very important and will send an important message to North Korea.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I strongly agree with that and I want you to know there are few matters as important as this to me. I want you again to know that any time of day or night you need to, please call me.

We will go forward, and must always be careful, must work with discipline and firmness on this.

PRESIDENT KIM: Yes, I agree with you. No other issue is as important as this. As for the intra-Korean summit, there is strong support by the people. In a recent poll, 93% of the Korean people support holding the summit. The agenda -- 60% said that the nuclear issue should be solved through the summit. This was an opinion poll taken two days ago. It shows strong interest by the people.

As you mention, the nuclear issue is most important. It's directly linked to the survival of the Korean people and to international peace. We will discuss it whenever necessary and cooperate very closely.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT KIM: Thank you very much. I'm very grateful for your call. Please convey my best wishes to Mrs. Clinton. Let me emphasize again that whenever we need to we should discuss matters on the telephone.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you and give my best to Mrs. Kim.
Good bye.

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PRESIDENT KIM: Good bye.

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MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 479				
Document ID: 9406647				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re. Presidential Telephone Call with President Kim of South Korea (5 pages)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and telcon])
 OA/Box Number: 479

FOLDER TITLE:

9406647

2016-0852-M
kh1996

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: AOKI
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH
HS

TELCON

PERSONS: KIM, YOUNG SAM

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES KIM OF SOUTH KOREA AUG 16

ACTION: SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 20 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 3/6/2019
2016-0852-17

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
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Z 94081718 FOR DECISION
X 94081814 SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: *JPM* LOG # *0647*
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u><i>2</i></u>	<u><i>SP 8/18</i></u>	<u><i>R</i></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u><i>3</i></u>	_____	<u><i>N</i></u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette *yes*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019
2016-0252-M

August 17, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *SP*
FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*
SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with President Kim
of South Korea on August 16, 1994

Attached is the memorandum of the telephone conversation between
President Clinton and South Korean President Kim.

Concurrence by: *SA* Robert Suettinger

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *AOS*
8/18/94

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0852-M (1.05)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with President Kim of South Korea on August 16, 1994 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Kim
Daniel Poneman
Tong Kim (Interpreter)
Steven Aoki (Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME August 16, 1994, 7:40 - 8:08 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Kim concerning the North Korean nuclear situation. (U)

President Kim: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello, President Kim. I wanted to talk to you about our strategy towards North Korea and about these recent developments. (S)

President Kim: Yes, Mr. President. I'm very pleased to hear your voice. I would like to have your explanation about the Geneva agreements. (S)

The President: First, I'd like to congratulate you on your Liberation Day speech. You've shown great leadership in seeking a positive opening to the North. (S)

I'm sure your have been briefed on our negotiations in Geneva. There are many difficult issues to be resolved. I think the Agreed Statement provides a good framework for resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. They've agreed to important nonproliferation commitments that we have said must be part of any solution to the nuclear issue. (S)

If we work together, we have an opportunity to eliminate the most threatening aspects of North Korea's nuclear program and to lead North Korea to more normal relations with the international community. Our coordinated proposal to offer to replace North

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Korea's graphite reactors with light water reactors is the key to progress. (S)

In coming weeks, we will need to work together to develop a detailed plan. Soon we will discuss with you the financial and technical aspects of such a plan. As always, the most important element of success is close coordination and consultation between your country and the United States. (S)

That concludes what I wanted to say. I want to hear your thoughts. (S)

President Kim: Let me first express my gratitude for your message of congratulations on Liberation Day. That message emphasized the need for close cooperation between the U.S. and Korea. (U)

I listened very carefully as you explained the outcome of the conference in Geneva. We in Korea value positively the efforts of the U.S. government to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. I think that the real problem begins from this point. We've been dealing with North Korea for many years. Any commitment they make can't be relied on. For example, the Joint Denuclearization Declaration and the promise to stop slandering each other that was agreed between Prime Ministers were not faithfully implemented by North Korea. We can't really trust them to implement their promises. (S)

As I made clear in my Liberation Day speech, in a message to the Korean people and the world, only if we can secure nuclear transparency, then we are willing to provide a light water reactor. The emphasis is on securing complete transparency. This includes special inspections of the suspect nuclear sites at Yongbyon. (S)

In order to induce North Korea to move toward openness, we are willing to provide assistance to North Korea. We are people of the same nation. But to provide assistance, we need the consent of the Korean people. The people must be assured that the nuclear freeze in North Korea will be made without any ambiguity. Only then can we put into effect assistance, including providing capital and technology. (S)

As agreed between the U.S. and Korea, we want to be assured that the type of LWR will be the Korean type. This agreement must be kept. (S)

Also, I took notice of Japan's reaction to my speech. The Japanese Vice Foreign Minister at a press conference quoted my speech and said that the Japanese position was exactly the same

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as the Korean: only if nuclear transparency is guaranteed would LWR assistance be provided. (S)

I know how difficult it is to come to any agreement in principle with North Korea. I can appreciate the patience and value the effort made by the U.S. As we have discussed many times by letter and telephone, we very much trust what you say about our relationship. (S)

With regard to the agreement made in Geneva, the issue of peace on the Korean peninsula is an issue between the Korean people. There was no mention in the Geneva statement of intra-Korean dialogue. This is difficult for Koreans to accept. Some think you should have demanded this point strongly and that the talks turned out the way North Korea wanted. The Korean people have concerns that South Korea is being excluded from the negotiating process. I need to take notice of these views. (S)

But the future is more important than the past. In the future working-level discussions, the U.S. and ROK need to be very close. We should work closely to avoid being deceived by North Korean tactics. I think we need very close, faithful cooperation. (S)

We have to be very careful about what's happening in North Korea following the death of Kim Il Sung. Many things are difficult to predict. (S)

[Line drops]

President Kim: Yes, Mr. President -- there was a cut off of the telephone line. I'd like to continue. (U)

This is a very important moment. It's troubling. We don't see any signs of stability in North Korea after the death of Kim Il Sung. It remains a very unpredictable regime. One of our concerns is that although the junior Kim has all the power, we haven't seen him in public for a month. We have to be cautious with this kind of uncertainty. It's not prudent to rush to any solutions with North Korea. This is my opinion. If we have a chance, we can come back to it. (S)

The President: We are not relying on North Korean good faith. IAEA inspectors must verify their commitments and this will provide transparency. We made very clear in Geneva that they must accept special inspections before they get an LWR. (S)

We worked very hard to persuade North Korea to accept a South Korean LWR and North Korea now seems prepared to accept one if the United States stays deeply involved. (S)

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Lastly, in Geneva we strongly supported and urged North Korea to restate their willingness to implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration and, as you know, they did so in the Agreed Statement. (S)

Now I agree we must be cautious with regard to the transition to Kim Jong Il and you and I must stay in close touch on this. We must evaluate them by how they perform on their commitments; on what they do, not what they say. (S)

President Kim: Thank you. As I mentioned, the future is more important than the past. We have to make our best efforts not to give North Korea any excuse to break its commitments. There should be no space between our two countries. Cooperation between us is the most important thing. (S)

The President: I agree. We have to work very closely together and make sure both of us feel secure every step of the way. I will send Mr. Gallucci out to see you in early September. (S)

President Kim: Yes, Mr. President. We will welcome Mr. Gallucci's visit to Korea. I want to mention that he performed very well in negotiations with North Korea. I know how hard it is. (S)

Let me raise another issue. In Korea, there is much media coverage of the Cuban refugee issue. We have the impression that Castro is losing control. (S)

The President: We're doing our best to contain it and make sure we don't have a large outflow. We're preparing for any situation. Castro is trying to decide whether to try a new strategy in a bad situation. There's lots of dissension and a terrible economic situation there. I don't know what will happen, but I think we're in pretty good shape and prepared for any development of the situation. (S)

President Kim: Yes, Mr. President, there's no question that we need very close consultation and contact between the United States and Korea. That's the only way we can have a successful outcome. We need to make sure we don't show any schism between us. I assure you we will work very closely with the U.S. government. If necessary, we discuss things again on the phone. (S)

The President: Thanks, and please convey my best wishes to Mrs. Kim. (U)

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President Kim: Thanks and my best to Mrs. Clinton. I very much wish your health care bill will pass soon in the Congress. (U)

The President: Thank you. Good night. (U)

President Kim: Good night. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 482				
Document ID: 9408410				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telecon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Presidential telephone call to South Korean President Kim (6 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and telcon])
 OA/Box Number: 482

FOLDER TITLE:

9408410

2016-0852-M
kh1997

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 17 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

TELCON

PERSONS: KIM JONG IL

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES KIM OF SOUTH KOREA

ACTION: SENS APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 20 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
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Z 94110116 FOR DECISION
X 94110213 SENS APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

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Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>OPS "12</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

2001 10/14/84 2:13

COMMENTS:
2 OCT 14 2:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT: Presidential telephone call to South Korean
President Kim -- October 14, 1994, 6:23 p.m. -
7:11 p.m. EDT

Attached At Tab I is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and South Korean President Kim.

Concurrence by: Stanley Roth *SR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you file for record purposes.

Approve *ADS* Disapprove _____

11/2/94

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0852-M (1.06)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential telephone call to South Korean
President Kim -- October 14, 1994, 6:23 p.m.
- 7:11 p.m. EDT

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Daniel Poneman, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
Nonproliferation and Export Controls

President Kim Young Sam

Interpreter: Tong Kim, Stephen Niemerski,
Matthew Wallack and Karen Dragone

Notetaker:

DATE, TIME October 14, 1994, 6:23 p.m. - 7:11 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

President Clinton: Hello, how are you?

President Kim: Hello, how are you?

President Clinton: Fine, it is nice to hear your voice.

President Kim: I am very delighted to listen to you.

President Clinton: Thank you. First, I want to say that I know
Tony Lake and Dr. Chung have talked about the serious problems
raised by the recent *New York Times* article. I am glad they put
that unfortunate incident behind us.

I expect that in the future we will resolve any differences
privately and that we will coordinate our public positions. I
believe that is essential to keep our alliance strong and to
avoid letting others divide us.

I understand that our people in Geneva are in constant contact, talking together many times each day.

Our negotiators have made every effort to reflect your government's positions, and have constantly sought your advice and acted on it as much as absolutely possible.

We now may be close to a draft agreement in Geneva, consistent with the principles and the objectives agreed between us, that protects and advances our mutual national security interests.

The exact details of the settlement are still being worked out, but I understand that it will commit North Korea to the following things:

- to return to the NPT;
- to fully comply with IAEA safeguards, including allowing access to additional sites such as the two suspected waste sites;
- not to reprocess plutonium;
- to dismantle its existing nuclear facilities
- to let us monitor and ship out its spent fuel;
- to accept South Korea-type light water reactors; and
- finally, negotiators are pushing hard for North Korea to implement its denuclearization agreement with South Korea.

You and I agreed that we would be firm on principles and we would seek an agreement that does not require that we trust the North Koreans. Whatever the exact terms of a final settlement, I assure you it will live up to our agreement and will enhance our mutual security.

We also agreed that we would be flexible on timing, as long as the North Koreans agreed to our objectives and I have authorized my negotiators to proceed accordingly. In the final settlement, North Korea must provide full transparency of its nuclear program before the light water reactor project is completed.

Further, there will be checks at each stage to guarantee that North Korea takes the steps it has committed to before the LWR project moves forward. As you know, your support for this project is essential to secure DPRK action to resolve the nuclear problem.

If the talks in Geneva do produce a draft agreement, then I will ask Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Gallucci to travel to Seoul next week to consult with you on the draft agreement and

on next steps we should take and hope you will receive them as my personal representatives.

This concludes the points I want to make. Now I would like to hear from you.

President Kim: Thank you very much for the kind and detailed explanation of the Geneva talks. With regard to the *New York Times* article, I received a report from Dr. Chung regarding his discussion with Lake. I entirely agree with the discussion they had. We need to continue to coordinate to avoid exposure of our differences. We should coordinate internally on any differences if they exist. I will continue to push for internal coordination with you. The *New York Times* article was done in a very indirect conversation. Recently though, through my CNN interview, I expressed my message, which I believe Kim Jong-il must have watched.

Thank you very much for the kind explanations on developments of the Geneva talks. Speaking of our media, there are little differences between our explanation and media reports. Yesterday and today the media carried articles on the Geneva talks. They expressed criticism over how an agreement like this can be possible. They criticize my government. My assessment, Mr. President -- I have been in office one year and seven months -- to me this is the most critically important crisis of my presidency and the civilian government in Korea. Of course, there are always people who will be opposed. Twenty percent are opposed to what I'm doing. This is OK in a democracy. The problem includes those people, the very group that supported me, the conservatives, the middle class, and intellectuals and the pro-Americans. They used to support me but now they have become critical, they have turned their backs against me and the United States. It has become a problem for effective national government.

You explained to me what is already known in the media in Korea. The question is how can we calm the public and deal with public opinion. I have been thinking. Most importantly we need to calm down our public opinion and persuade people to accept the Geneva agreement. We have been working on this day and night for the past two or three days. One of the major headlines read, "Where has nuclear transparency gone? What has happened to the inter-Korean dialogue?" The key point is that it is difficult to accept a solution between the U.S. and North Korea without inter-Korean dialogue as a condition. Without dialogue conditions, the U.S.-North Korea agreement is insufficient.

I believe the U.S. does not want a secret deal with North Korea. I do not insinuate that the U.S. is striking a secret deal with

North Korea and excludes South Korea. But, it is very difficult to persuade public opinion without inter-Korean dialogue in the Geneva agreement.

With regard to my last point on North-South dialogue, I have sent a message through my CNN interview, the desirability of inter-Korean dialogue was most recently passed to North Korea. I raised the issue to Kim Jong-il through my CNN interview. He has not yet taken leadership. It is my position that he will. The death of Kim il-Sung postponed the inter-Korean talks. If Kim Jong-il is inaugurated, it would be natural to pursue inter-Korean summit. Dialogue should be resumed, including the previous arrangement for dialogue. I understand the vice president of CNN has advised and alerted Kim Jong-il to be waiting for my interview. He ought to know our position. So far some of my close advisers have mentioned North-South dialogue. But for me, it was the first time I mentioned that I would consider or be interested in meeting with Kim Jong-il for a summit.

President Clinton: Let me respond. I appreciate your forthright and candid comments. I know we both have political critics on this issue. Obviously this is the big issue for you. I believe the agreement will respond to our goals to have North Korea rejoin NPT, accept IAEA inspections and dismantle their dangerous facilities. And we will ensure nuclear transparency. I understand South Korean public opinion says North-South dialogue is needed and wanted badly. I want it, too.

In your speech tomorrow you have the opportunity to increase North Korean willingness to accept the Geneva agreement. You could bring around the public political environment to meet security interests we both want.

President Kim: As I mentioned to you before, Mr. President, the situation in Korea is very serious. Before, I thought if a U.S.-North Korea agreement was reached, I would give a press conference the next day. But where we stand now is the most severe confrontation since the establishment of the civilian government. The biggest crisis is suspicion of a U.S. deal with North Korea. I think we should do it differently to calm down public opinion if agreement is reached. We have decided to take the following steps to calm public opinion. Our foreign minister will give a press interview with the aim to subside (sic) public opinion. The press interviews are necessary to calm the public. Tomorrow is Sunday and the deputy prime minister for unification minister will have a press interview. Hopefully the atmosphere will be calmer after that. I will then decide the timing as to when I will explain my thoughts to the public.

Many in the U.S. support the agreement. There is no question we should prevent war on the peninsula. We should have inter-Korean dialogue. The settlement of dialogue would be in our favor. North Korea feels the need to reach an agreement as soon as possible, it seems the U.S. is also in a hurry for an agreement.

I have much respect for your efforts in Cuba, Haiti and Iraq. Especially Iraq, you showed strong resolve and because of that your popularity has increased and is now very high. Congratulations to you on these results but North Korea is an enormous task and an issue of importance to U.S. and South Korea. We should retain traditional relations, but I do not believe North Korea will carry out any agreement even though they will say they have reached an agreement.

In final conclusion, you should reaffirm your strong commitment and send a strong message of U.S. commitment to Korea. North Korea should announce it will abide by the agreement and U.S. should make strong demand that North Korea implement the agreement. I do not believe North Korea. I would not trust North Korea despite an agreement.

Defense Secretary Perry, as an envoy, should discuss follow-up and make strong statements on security measures. You should instruct Perry to stress strong U.S. commitment to Korea to ensure that North Korea does not miscalculate.

I'd like to make one more point. I first thought I would give information at press conference and I was going to announce agreement was result of my agreement with you. But the situation has changed. Our media could not provide deep details of agreement. What you told me has already been reported in the media. What you explained has already brought enormous criticism. It would be wise not to make public our talk. Now you should give first press conference then I will discuss my opinion. Those that support the U.S. are now very critical. I can't over emphasize that you make strong commitment from Perry too. That would be very helpful to persuade people in our country. There has been so much dissatisfaction with my government because of this problem that we cannot carry out normal affairs of state.

President Clinton: I do. I will support it, as will Secretary Perry. I look forward to working with you on this issue. Good night.

President Kim: Mr. President, thank you very much. I would like to stress once again it would help enormously if you express very solid conditions. Public opinion is coming down not only on South Korea, but the U.S. too. I think our conversation has been

very meaningful. It has served as an opportunity for full understanding.

I appreciate Ambassador Gallucci's efforts. We will try our best to win this situation. I understand the difficulty Ambassador Gallucci has had. I look forward to visiting with you under more pleasant circumstances during the APEC summit. Give my best to Mrs. Clinton. Good night, I hope everything goes well in the end.

President Clinton: Thank you. I look forward to see you in Johanta. My very best to Mrs. Kim. Thank you for your support and good night.

-- End of Conversation --

National Security Council
The White House

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West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>DPS 1/2</u>	<u>N</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Young Sam Kim of South Korea (3 pages)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([South Korea and telcon])
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2016-0852-M

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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CHRON FILE

TO: ITOH

FROM: ROTH

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

TELCON

PERSONS: KIM YOUNG SAM

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES KIM YOUNG SAM OF SOUTH KOREA ON 29 DEC

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 06 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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NSC CHRON
ROTH

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National Security Council
The White House

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 5, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SR*

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Kim of South Korea

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on December 29, 1994, between the President and President Kim.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *SR* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBI* NARA, Date *3/6/2019*
2016-0852-m

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0852-M (1.07)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Young Sam Kim of South Korea

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Young Sam Kim
Interpreter: Tong Kim
Notetakers: Stanley Roth, Matt Miller and Kathi Guekel

DATE/TIME December 29, 1994, 10:01 p.m.-10:26 p.m.

AND PLACE: The White House Study

President Clinton: Hello, President Kim. (U)

President Kim: Hello, President Clinton. I'm pleased to talk with you again since we met at the APEC conference last time.
(U)

President Clinton: It is nice to hear your voice again. I hope you and Mrs. Kim are fine. Thank you for taking the initiative in making this call. It is good to hear from you again. (U)

I very much appreciate your strong support on the incident in which we lost an American helicopter. As you know, it has now been resolved. I believe that the relatively expeditious resolution of this issue has reduced the damage with Congress on the implementation of the nuclear agreement. Congressman Richardson in particular deserves a lot of credit for his role, not just with the North Koreans but with Members of Congress and our media. (U)

I want to emphasize first of all my understanding of the phrase "appropriate forum" in the understanding. It does not, in my opinion, open any new bilateral channels for military contacts with the North. Tom Hubbard made it clear to the North Koreans that General Smith will be attending further contacts in his UN Command capacity. While the North may claim that their general is attending in a bilateral capacity, they know that we do not accept this. Furthermore, you have my assurance that if the North attempts to use these military contacts to negotiate a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

that they eventually want to see the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. This had been their consistent position, and the United States should continue to realize that it is the reason for their position. (S)

As you well pointed out, President Clinton, you have been helped very much by Congressman Richardson. He had a hard time in North Korea. I also met him and he told me his stay was a "hellish" four days. (S)

My impression is that North Korea is in the state of a power vacuum. What is important here is Chief Warrant Officer Hall could have been released even before Christmas, but because of the absence of leadership in North Korea and the absence of a firm North Korean position, with the loose coordination and no person to make a decision on this matter, things became much more complicated. This is why it has taken as long as it has and this is another thing the United States should be aware of. (S)

As we have discussed in the past over the phone and through our meetings in several places, we have to remind ourselves again that North Korea is a regime beyond our imagination. Their regime is most untrustworthy; it is the most unreliable regime in the world. We have had numerous secret and open meetings with them but our conclusion is we can't put any trust in what North Korea says. The helicopter incident reminds us of this. The American and Korean people have once again been reminded of this. The United States should once again recognize how untrustworthy North Korea is. (S)

The day after tomorrow is New Year's Day. For the past 50 years, in January, Kim Il Sung delivered his New Year's message to the Korean people on this day. But I don't think Kim Chong Il will do it this time. I guess someone else will replace him in giving this message. In consideration of these and other things, there is a vacuum in the North Korean leadership. Six months after the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Chong Il still has not become the official leader of North Korea. This is a very serious situation. (S)

Yesterday, I took notice that you announced you will run again for President. It's a matter of courage. As I told you in Jakarta you can gain victory in the next election if you continue to have confidence, courage and the capability to lead the country. This will lead to electoral victory. You can transform your misfortune into a blessing. (S)

President Clinton: Thanks very much. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Kim: With regard to the North Korean nuclear problem, of course we will continue to consult and cooperate with the U.S. Government in order to make sure that North Korea faithfully implements the Geneva agreement. For our part the Korean government will do our best to ensure compliance. Based upon our trust and friendship, we can pursue this closely. (C)

Once again regarding the North Korean intention to abolish the armistice regime, it is important that the United States send a strong message on this point to the entire world and also to North Korea. North Korea is constantly trying to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. (C)

President Clinton: I agree and will do that. I believe you will visit us in July. I hope to see you then. (C)

President Kim: Yes. As is scheduled, I will come in July to meet with you and by then much will have been changed again. I'm very satisfied and pleased with the release of Chief Warrant Officer Hall. It's a relief; because its been a "hellish" experience for Mr. Hall. (C)

Best regards and good luck to you and to Mrs. Clinton. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you and good night. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~