

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Between Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Clinton. (6 pages)	04/25/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
001b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Sandra Kristoff. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation of the President and Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister of Japan. (1 page)	07/02/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1629

FOLDER TITLE:

9704595

2007-1908-F

vz387

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Albright
Samuel Berger, National Security Advisor
Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff
Leon Fuerth, National Security Advisor for the Vice President
Sandra Kristoff, NSC Notetaker

Japan
Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister
Kaoru Yosano, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Ambassador Kunihiko Saito, Ambassador of Japan to the United States
Shunji Yanai, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Masaki Orita, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau
Yayoi Matsuda, Assistant Director of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 25, 1997, 11:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m.
Oval Office

Restricted Meeting - Oval Office

The President: It was a great honor to host you here last night for the celebration of Congressional action on the Chemical Weapons Convention. This reaffirmed America's relationship with Japan as a unique and important contributor to stability and peace. (U)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: It has been a great pleasure and honor for me. (U)

The President: I'd like to discuss China and Russia. If each is interested in a positive partnership in the Asia Pacific, that will be valuable. But we need to maintain a strong U.S.-Japan partnership as well. (S)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Your summit with Yeltsin helps build a foundation of stability for the whole world. It is essential as well that Europe and Russia have strong relations. I also want to tell you that we have now fulfilled our obligations on Okinawa land leases, although there are still those in Japan who would like to see adjustments in U.S. force levels and structure. It is not very appropriate to address these questions at this point in time, but perhaps we could consult in response to future changes in the security environment. I would like us to reconfirm this point for our publics. Finally, I believe we should intensify our work on defense guidelines, issue an interim report in May or June. Transparency and showing our public the progress we are making is critical to acceptance of our final report. (S)

The President: I very much appreciate what you have done on Okinawa. I will reaffirm all American commitments, especially that we will consult closely with you. You have my personal assurance we will work closely, and we will do all we can to avoid problems. I recognize Japan bases provide us our only missile forces between Guam and the Gulf. (S)

I would like to comment on several economic issues. When I became President, growth was slow everywhere. Now, the U.S. deficit is down, Japan is sustaining growth, European interest rates are down, and there is a general consensus that economic cooperation is good. In addition, we all have worked hard to put the WTO on a good footing and to solve specific bilateral problems. (S)

Our approach to bilateral issues has worked well, and we have bravely faced challenges and restored growth. This brings us to the present moment. I understand the rationale for your economic policies, and am very sympathetic to you regarding the problems you face, including savings rates and an aging population. We will face the same kind of problems in a few years. At the same time, Japan's power and size means that your economy and policies have an effect beyond your border, just as ours do. Your policies can help not only Japan but the world. So my point is that our people estimate that fiscal budget cuts will double the surplus. This will happen just as I am fighting off a conservative, somewhat isolationist Congress; you saw the tough vote on CWC. I also have a problem with China. If the

Japanese surplus increases, then I will have difficulty securing MFN for China or fast track authority. I will have difficulty heading off trade protectionists. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Hashimoto: On these economic points, I need your understanding. The Japanese economy has changed. We are engaging in six reform efforts, including structural and fiscal reforms, and are trying to cut government spending and adjust the tax burden. I did tell Rubin about our two percent tax hike and understand his concerns. But there is one point people do not notice. We passed a supplementary budget in February that included public investments of 3 trillion yen in public projects. This will be implemented during April through June, the period Mr. Rubin is most worried about. I believe that FY 98 growth will be around 2.5% and in FY 97 it will be nearly 1.9%, as we will face some effects from tax reductions. I believe it is important to look at the goods and services that comprise our trade balance sheet; I do not think we will have a surge in the goods and services numbers. That is why I think we should talk about current account surplus not just trade numbers. My finance minister will meet Secretary Rubin soon and they can discuss this further. Also we should not discuss the touchy subject of exchange rates in public; we need to remember the kind of signal we want to send our publics. ~~(S)~~

Expanded Meeting - Cabinet Room

The President: I am pleased to welcome the entire Japanese delegation. I'd like to make two comments about the topics the Prime Minister and I have discussed just now. First, let me thank Japan for its work to preserve the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I made a strong personal commitment that we will carry our U.S. obligations and work hard to avoid creating problems for you. On economic issues, we had an interesting discussion about the effect of internal policies on trade positions. On issues such as market access, including telecommunications, financial services, civil aviation, autos, I have a high level of confidence in Ambassador Barshefsky and encourage negotiators from both sides to reach agreements. Finally, we cooperate across a range of issues in the Common Agenda. This has been an enormous success, in no small measure due to the great support you have given Common Agenda projects. There is one small problem in the environment area involving whaling. I urge you to reconsider your position. This is the only area of difference between us; other issues are on track. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Albright: We are working hard on UN reform, but there are obstacles in the U.S. Congress regarding arrears. We are pleased with the Secretary-General's reforms which are important to each of us. We support a Security Council seat for Japan. The question is how to reform the Council to make it reflect the international system of today. We agree on appropriate regional representation, although the Council should be no larger than 20 or 21 members. It is already difficult to run with 15 members. I hope you will work with us to come up with a consensus proposal. (S)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: I appreciate this kind invitation to visit Washington. Since your last visit to Japan, you have been re-elected, we have had a series of high-level exchanges, and we have built a consensus for cooperative relations. It is now important to conclude the defense guidelines review. It will enrich our relationship and help Japan create an effective crisis management team. I discussed this with Secretary Cohen and we agreed to publish an interim report on defense guidelines. Transparency will play a major role in building public consensus. I appreciate your comments on Okinawa. I believe we need to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa recommendations. I also appreciate your continued sensitivity to the Okinawa problem, and I have no intention to discuss force structure questions at this juncture. What is important is what we confirm. And we are confirming we will consult closely about changes in the security environment as it affects defense policy and military postures. (S)

I will not read my economic points, but it is important to continue our efforts at domestic demand-led growth. The finance minister can discuss this with Secretary Rubin. I will continue my deregulation efforts, and I hope we can have more dialogue on deregulation. The President touched on some issues, such as aviation. But I prefer not to discuss those issues here. We should let USTR and MITI deal with these issues and resolve them. (S)

We have a different opinion on whaling issues. We intend to engage in whaling on the basis of scientific standards. I want to avoid an emotional argument between us. Frankly, the sanctuary has no scientific basis; thus, it is hard for us to support it. In all other areas of the Common Agenda we are in basic agreement. There are so many areas in which we can cooperate. (S)

I also appreciate the comments on the UN. We clearly are strongly determined to become a member of the Security Council.

We appreciate your support. I completely agree the right number of members is 21. We should set our goals, agree on them and continue our campaign. At the working level, Germany has spoken of 24 members. Please give us your further cooperation and advice. ~~(S)~~

The President: Kohl will be here in five weeks. I will try to work through this with him and reach a common U.S.-German-Japanese position. To make the Security Council stronger we need U.S., German and Japanese leadership. I am with you and will do my best to work out a common position with Kohl. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Thank you. I fear Germany is more insistent on 24 than I had thought. ~~(S)~~

Restricted Luncheon - Map Room

The President: We must modernize our individual relations with China. We are in a period of intensifying U.S.-China relations. There are four major obstacles: Hong Kong's transition; nonproliferation; trade, where we should work together to increase market access in exchange for WTO membership; and human rights where I hope we can press Jiang after the Party Congress to make some moves. I hope you will support us. Do you believe China will move toward greater openness? ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Hashimoto: You have covered the issues we have concerns about. The leadership is seeking to preserve the special status of Hong Kong, but I do not know how long they can treat Hong Kong specially. Shanghai and other areas will demand the same special status. The inland areas may become jealous and demand redistribution of power. It is hard to predict whether China will become more open. It will open to an extent to try and catch up to international economies. But there are "minorities" issues within China that are inter-linked with poverty. I have visited these areas. The majority ethnic group, the Han, have been able to maintain control and are better off than similar groups in Russia. But now the central Asians are independent and minority groups in China are envious. So far the only ethnic issue the PRC worries about is Tibet, but their worries may spread. Another problem is the spread of Islam. Even where the government has tight controls it will not be able to control pilgrimages of Muslims. ~~(S)~~

I also am concerned about China's military modernization. The purchase of SU-27's is worrisome; they now have twice as many as last year. I don't think they yet have the capacity to build a carrier, but they want a carrier. China is now stressing its

cooperation in the fight against Japan. It does not see the United States as a colonial power and is trying to show off how close it is to the United States. (S)

We have an opportunity to change Chinese behavior. I will visit Beijing in September and Li Peng will visit Japan next year. China distrusts the U.S.-Japan security relationship. We may have to have military-to-military exchanges like the ones you have with China. I sense through our bilateral negotiations a new enthusiasm on China's part for early accession to the WTO. I believe they are serious about reaching agreement. One major question is with such a vast country and internal divergences will Beijing be able to control the outlying areas? (S)

I am very concerned about Hong Kong because it is the showcase for prosperity. How much tolerance will China have toward Hong Kong? On the other hand, perhaps Hong Kong will become the model. (S)

The President: First, thank you for your help on G-7/G-8 issues at Denver. I want Russia to seek its greatness in cooperation, not domination. There are still some issues for the G-7. I want a small, low-keyed meeting with a press release and one press conference of the eight. I pressed Yeltsin hard to improve relations with Japan. The same forces that oppose conciliation to the West oppose conciliation to the East. In the short run this may make your problem more difficult. But if we can produce a successful NATO-Russia, include Russia in certain groups, achieve economic reforms, then the nationalists will be weaker as there emerges a greater sense of security within Russia. (S)

North Korea makes it difficult for us to give them aid. They link food to things they should be doing anyway. This is a thinly disguised bribe. Japan and the United States have a strong interest in North-South dialogue and in ending the North's missile sales. We are thinking about new approaches. (S).

Prime Minister Hashimoto: I would also like to coordinate with you on the Middle East peace process. Thank you for this visit. (S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4595

July 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

WF2
sk

FROM: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President and Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister of Japan

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister of Japan. The conversation took place in the Oval Office on April 25, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit "Eyes Only" the Memorandum of Conversation to the Secretary of State.

Approve Disapprove

if required to
do so... too
old to be useful.
otherwise, file
in record only.
(C)

Attachments

Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memcon

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Reason: 1.5 (b, d)

Declassify on: 07/01/2007

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By NARA, Date 1/28/2022

2016-1056-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan. (7 pages)	06/19/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 1/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1629

FOLDER TITLE:

9704601

2007-1908-F
vz388

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
of Japan

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
United States
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade
Representative
Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff to the
President
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Daniel Tarullo, Assistant to the President
for National Economic Policy
Michael McCurry, Assistant to the President
and White House Press Secretary
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Glyn Davies, Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council (notetaker)

JAPAN

Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister
Yukihiko Ikeda, Foreign Minister
Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, Finance Minister
Shinji Sato, Minister for International Trade
and Industry
Kaoru Yosano, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yukio Takeuchi, Deputy Chief of Mission to
the United States
Kazuo Ogura, Deputy Foreign Minister for
Economic Affairs
Shunji Yanai, Deputy Foreign Minister for
Political Affairs
Masaki Orita, Director-General of North
American Affairs Bureau
Hiroyasu Ando, Executive Assistant to the
Prime Minister

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)

Declassify On: 1/10/22

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-1056-m (1.02)
4/28/2022

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Tadamichi Yamamoto, Director of First North
America Division
Yayoi Matsuda, Interpreter

DATE, TIME June 19, 1997
AND PLACE: 3:30-4:00 p.m.
Hyatt Regency Hotel, Denver, Colorado

Prime Minister Hashimoto: My staff is mad at me because I have told them they prepared too much material for me and I cannot read it all. First of all, though, I am grateful for the kind hospitality you are extending to me on my visit. Secondly, there are some important matters I have to raise. It says here [referring to briefing material] that I have full confidence we will make important progress on the main themes of the Summit, including the environment and African development. I offer to you to try to make our positions as compatible as possible.

President Clinton: I accept your offer. I am very pleased at the reception being given in Japan to the Interim Report on Defense Guidelines Review. It is the product of much hard work. I think it is important to make clear that our partnership favors stability in the entire region.

I want to mention a little bit about Korea. We have tentative agreement from the North Koreans to set an agenda and the date and time for a preparatory meeting for the four-party talks. This will be the first time for China to participate. This is a hopeful result of our efforts, but I have no idea why they waited 14 months to take this step given the desperate conditions in their country, especially the lack of food.

On China, we just learned today there will be a vote on MFN next week. I really think we will win the vote. We worked very hard on it. It would send a good message to the Chinese on the eve of your visit in September.

One thing we should do here -- and I hope you can do it because you have a good relationship with the Chinese -- is urge China to honor its agreement with England on Hong Kong concluded in 1984, to genuinely preserve Hong Kong's free market economy and political and human rights. If you agree, I would be pleased if we told President Jiang you and I talked about this and we agreed if China found it difficult to honor the Hong Kong agreement, it would be difficult for us, leaders in the world, to support China's accession to international economic institutions including WTO because we agreed China should have the kind of market access other members have.

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On Russia, thank you for allowing them to become a bigger part of the Group of Eight. This has been crucial in getting them to accept NATO expansion and to reduce, in principle, their nuclear stockpiles 80 percent from their Cold War highs. In keeping with my commitment with you, we will keep G-7 for such matters as finance as long as Russia does not qualify.

On the United Nations, I'm sure you know we finally got agreement from our Congress to pay back over \$800 million in arrears over a three-year period. I have two sets of feelings about this. This is a big step forward for those who control the Senate. They have not voted for anything positive for the UN in over ten years. The Foreign Relations Committee Senator Helms controls has not voted on the UN at all. Secretary Albright basically sweet-talked him into doing it. Let me say also that Madeleine and I put money in the budget to pay 100 percent of our dues, because I believe we should. But this is all we can get out of the Congress right now and, unlike you, we do not have a parliamentary system, so we cannot do more. I want to pay all we owe -- I hope we can agree [with the Congress] to put the money in some sort of a contested account [while we work out our differences].

If UN reform is done as I expect it will be, and if Kofi Annan works with the Congress as I expect he will, we can resolve this in a satisfactory way. But Jesse Helms controls the matter. So I would like to pocket this and move on from here. The legislation also mandated a reduction in the U.S. contribution. I believe some reduction is appropriate, but I do not want to do it unilaterally. I hope in some way to have it accepted at the UN. Both political parties have called for a reduction for several years. I disapprove of doing a reduction on a unilateral basis, so hope it could be agreed to.

I would like to mention two economic issues. I consider it one of the great accomplishments of the U.S.-Japan relationship over the last few years -- one you are partly responsible for in both your previous and current jobs -- that we have taken trade off of the front pages of newspapers as an issue always dividing us. There are so many issues we can be partners on, leading the world, that we cannot afford to have the trade issue dividing us again. I recognize there may be changes year-to-year. There can be internal developments in the United States and in Japan -- and certainly the last few years have been unusual both for you and -- to a lesser extent -- for us. I'm sure you know our trade deficit has gone from \$66 billion last year to \$93 billion for this year and is expected to go over \$130 billion next year. In that context it is important that we reaffirm your commitment to a policy of domestic demand-led growth and economic deregulation.

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I think it is important that we don't let it become a big political problem. We need to make early progress. I recommend that we have our ministers report back to us at the earliest possible date. We do not want to wait for the political climate in the United States to change and undermine what we have accomplished. This agreement helps in that regard.

I would also like to raise civair, where our talks will resume soon. We are still committed to Open Skies but recognize we may need a transitional period. I am willing to discuss this but we are under serious pressure. But we don't want to go to Congress to solve this cargo problem.

Prime Minster Hashimoto: I would like to be very frank with you since we are in a discussion between friends. First, I would like to report on China's reaction to the interim report on guidelines. China has a more controlled response than expected. Overall I do not see as much resistance as I had foreseen. We have a more difficult time fighting the Communist Party inside our own Diet. We ourselves will continue to make our efforts to explain to the Chinese and South Koreans, but would like your cooperation as well. I do not wish to say that I am too optimistic, because in the fall the Diet session will have to have a heated debate, but remain optimistic about achieving the final goal. And in this context, U.S. forces on Okinawa have been very responsive to our concerns; this will play an important role. Of course I committed myself to allowing Russia to join the Summit of the Eight but changes on the European front may lead to some pressures on the Asian arena as well. My last meeting in Washington was with Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili. We discussed how China and Russia are getting closer on defense cooperation. Emotions may have deepened Russia's sense of isolation in Europe, leading to a reduction of its military forces on national borders with China. But this is also partly about money, and we have seen an increasing armaments trade. We now have clear indications of an increase in the power of the Chinese navy and air force as a result of their license to produce SU-27s, for instance.

The Chinese navy remains essentially coastal, but it is expanding its capabilities to deeper waters, leading to concerns about the future. This will have a subtle influence on and will affect the behaviors of the ASEAN nations. For example, it will require twice as much effort as before to persuade Mr. Mahathir. Against that background it is important to have Hong Kong maintain its status even after July 1 and we on our side will continue our efforts to convince the Chinese by working in close coordination with you.

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Now I am deviating from the material provided me by my advisors, but I think that in a few years there will be change in Hong Kong. I believe information from Hong Kong after conversion will be increasingly controlled. Of course even today we note mixed information -- some precise and some not, but there will be no piece of information that squarely goes against the interests of the government. I am afraid I don't have a convergence of views with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter.

You touched upon UN arrears and I am glad you have achieved an approval in the Senate to pay over \$800 million. But there will still remain some arrears. I understand Minister Ikeda and Secretary Albright discussed this, but I would like to make a simple and clear statement of our position. Our responsibilities in the UN are still limited. We are labeled as a former enemy nation so we are not willing to pay an increased burden. Of course we are fully aware of and applaud the efforts Madeleine Albright made for the improvement of our status when she was your ambassador at the UN. We are preparing ourselves for expanded responsibility in the international community. We are ready to bear a greater burden, but with the stigma of a former enemy we are not able to convince the Japanese public to support the increased assessment to us. If we were not friends, I would not be so frank, I would have packaged my remarks more nicely, with ribbons.

President Clinton: You know I have firmly supported full Japanese membership in the Security Council since before I was President. I believe the only thing holding up your membership is they can't figure out what to do with the Europeans. Japan and Germany have grown economically and hold it together, but the EU has uncertainty over the role of France and Italy. I would like to come up with a concrete strategy to get this done; if you are ready, I am ready. Some of your predecessors were perhaps not so ready as you to take on this challenge. If you are ready to take it on, I am.

Prime Minister Hashimoto: If I even dared try to shrink from my responsibility [to attain Security Council status for Japan], these officials lined up here [gestures to his entourage] would kick my rear end. I hope you do not think this is a renewal of the World War II Axis. Actually, now, Italy is trying to pull Germany down!

President Clinton: We're for it [Security Council membership for Japan].

Prime Minister Hashimoto: You touched on some economic issues. There were questions from the U.S. press [at the pool spray before the meeting began] on the trade balance. The markets

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remain calm despite the trade imbalance. We will continue our efforts for deregulation. As I told the press, this is not for the benefit of the United States but for our own benefit. I said the United States could offer advice, something as a matter of course between friends. I must say that Japanese diplomats are very nasty fellows! They have provided this trade information [hands out packets of material] all in English so that I don't understand a word of it! It does contain an explanation of the economic situation and I think it is good material for our ministers to draw upon. I hope Charlene [Barshefsky] will not blackmail or bludgeon Mr. Shinji Sato [Minister for International Trade and Industry] when she reads it!

On civair, I am reading an interesting novel by Michael Crichton. After reading it, you may think Open Skies is not a good idea. As we have said repeatedly, we do not agree with the proposal for Open Skies, but we are ready to discuss these matters, including cargo, on the premises that Open Skies is not the ultimate goal. You raised this at Halifax with Murayama. I think you were very candid in talking about the FedEx right to Subic. You said you were ready to discuss our aviation treaty after FedEx. Back then Open Skies was not a precondition. But we can wait until your leg fully recovers before we get into a dogfight! In the meantime, let us let the ministers discuss it. We are ready and willing to discuss it in a flexible way but without Open Skies as a precondition.

On the environment, I have to ask for your skillful chairmanship. We have the UN General Assembly Special Session on the Environment coming up after the Summit and we must avoid important differences or contrast between the major countries on environmental issues at Denver.

We will chair the Third Conference of the Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in December in Japan. The position of the Europeans remains irresponsible. I am not sure how much we can enforce among themselves. For example, Portugal is allowed to increase its carbon monoxide emissions by 40 percent! In this context, under your skillful chairmanship, we will create the right atmosphere in Denver to create the right public perceptions.

President Clinton: I'm also very concerned about it. Environmental issues are very important in America. But the American people are just coming to grips with the issue of climate change. We have the greatest problem because our greenhouse gases have increased more than anyone else since the Rio meeting -- partly because of our rate of growth and partly because of the distance between our people and the resulting

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great consumption of fuel. Also, Britain and Germany have had some very easy savings.

Here is my problem. I am prepared personally to take very strong action which will not greatly affect the American economy. But with a Congress of the other party, there is no way we can bring action to bear without public opinion on our side. Given a choice, they will oppose me unless I have public support. I will work very hard to get the strongest possible statement. It will hurt the Summit if we come out divided or with a weak statement. Because the United States is such a big part of the global warming problem, I don't want to provoke a reaction in the United States. I'll give you an example of our problem. The dominant view in the Congress is that global warming is a left-wing hoax perpetrated by fuzzy-headed intellectuals. The evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary, of course.

Prime Minister Hashimoto: I plead for your skillful chairmanship.

At the end of this meeting, I have something to give you. It is within the limits of the U.S. government's ethics code!
[Hashimoto presents gift of framed, painted cards. The meeting concluded after a brief further exchange of pleasantries.]

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	photocopy to President Clinton from Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. [Original Japanese and English Translation] (3 pages)	06/22/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1630

FOLDER TITLE:

9704710

2007-1908-F
vz389

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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親愛なるビル

本日終了したデンヴァー・サミットは、議長である貴方の巧みな配慮により、大きな成果を挙げることが出来ました。雄大なロッキー山脈の麓のこの街で、二十一世紀に向けた我々の課題について有益な意見交換ができたこの三日間は、私にとって大変思い出深いものになるでしょう。このサミットで話し合われた事柄については、今後とも貴方と緊密に協力して行きたいと思えます。

デンヴァー到着後に行った貴大統領との会談においても今後の両国間の協力につき具体的な話し合いを行い、極めて有益でした。

ウェスタン・ブーツを頂き、早速昨夜の夕食会で着用させてもらいましたが、今後とも貴方との友情を象徴するものとして、大切にしたい

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72 2016-1056-M (1.03)

4/28/2022

いと思います。

妻の久美子も、このデンヴァーでの滞在を非常に楽しみました。ヒ
ラリー夫人のおもてなしにとっても感謝しているとお伝え下さい。

敬
具

橋本龍太郎

一九九七年六月二十二日

すばらしい滞在でした。

心ゆくお返事を表します。

奥様へお返事をします。

お伝へ下さい。

親愛なるビル：

本日終了したデンヴァー・サミットは、議長である貴方の巧みな采配により、大きな成果を挙げることが出来ました。雄大なロッキー山脈の麓のこの街で、21世紀に向けた我々の課題について有益な意見交換ができたこの3日間は、私にとって大変思い出深いものになるでしょう。このサミットで話し合われた事柄については、今後も貴方と緊密に協力して行きたい。

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妻の久美子も、このデンヴァーでの滞在を非常に楽しみました。ヒラリー夫人のおもてなしにとっても感謝しているとお伝え下さい。

リュウ

97年6月22日

The Denver Summit of Eight has come to a tremendously successful conclusion today, under your most skillful leadership. In this beautiful city at the foot of the magnificent Rockies, we were able to have fruitful exchanges of views on many issues we must face in the twenty-first century. These three days spent here will definitely be quite memorable to me. I look forward to continuing our close cooperation on the matters discussed at the Summit.

I very much appreciate the meeting with you soon after our arrival here in Denver. It is my pleasure that we were able to have concrete and useful discussions on future bilateral cooperation in our meeting.

I couldn't wait until I got home to wear the pair of cowboy boots you gave me. I will cherish it as a symbol of our warm friendship.

My wife Kumiko sends her best regards to you that she too immensely enjoyed her stay in Denver. Please convey her gratitude for the kind welcome and hospitality to Mrs. Clinton.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	Letter to Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto from President Clinton. (2 pages)	12/12/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
001b. memo	To the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Letter from Prime Minister Hashimoto. (1 page)	12/11/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001c. draft	Letter from President Clinton to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. (1 page)	12/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001d. letter	From Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to President Clinton. [English Translation] (2 pages)	11/05/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001e. letter	From Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to President Clinton. [Orginal Japanese (photocopy)] (5 pages)	11/05/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001f. memo	For Samuel Berger from Jack Pritchard. Subject: Response to Prime Minister Hashimoto. (1 page)	12/02/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001g. draft	Memo for President William J. Clinton from Samuel Berger. Subject: Response to Prime Minister Hashimnoto. (1 page)	12/02/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001h. draft	Letter to Prime Minister Hashimoto from President Clinton. (1 page)	12/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001i. email	Malcolm Lee to Edward Rice at 6:41 pm. Subject: Clinton Hashimoto-7909. (1 page)	12/10/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001j. draft	Letter to Prime Minister Hashimoto from President Clinton. (2 pages)	12/1997	P1/b(1) VZ
001k. draft	Memo for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Letter from Prime Minister Hashimoto. (1 page)	12/1997	P1/b(1) VZ

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1655

FOLDER TITLE:

9707909

2007-1908-F
vz390

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0011. draft	Letter from President Bill Clinton to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. (2 pages)	12/1997	P1/b(1) v2 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1655

FOLDER TITLE:

9707909

2007-1908-F
vz390

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COMM SIT

SIT: BADER BOONE COQ COURTNEY ELKIND FICKLIN FOOKS FORT GAGNON KRISTOFF

KYLE LEE MATERA NORRIS PASCUAL POOLE PRITCHARD SUM2 TARULLO

SIT: NSC

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 120212Z DEC 97

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO JA// NIACT IMMEDIATE//

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: LETTER FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO

AMBASSADOR: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR RYU:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PROVIDING ME THE DETAILS OF

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5611 ~~SECRET~~

YOUR VISIT TO RUSSIA AND YOUR FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH BORIS YELTSIN. I AM PLEASED YOU FOUND OUR SUPPORT OF YOUR IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA HELPFUL. I APPLAUD THE "NO-NECKTIE TALKS" TRADITION YOU AND BORIS HAVE BEGUN.

YOUR SHARED GOAL TO CONCLUDE A JAPAN-RUSSIA PEACE TREATY BY THE END OF THE YEAR 2000 IS A SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT. LIKewise, THE "HASHIMOTO-YELTSIN PLAN" TO IMPROVE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SHOULD PROVE BENEFICIAL TO YOUR OVERALL RELATIONS AS WELL AS PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF RUSSIA INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM. IN THIS LIGHT, I KNOW BORIS APPRECIATED YOUR SUPPORT OF RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN APEC. AS I INDICATED TO YOU AT VANCOUVER, WE STAND READY TO PROVIDE WHATEVER SUPPORT WE CAN TO YOUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

I THOUGHT APEC WENT WELL THIS YEAR AND I PARTICULARLY ENJOYED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU. I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER MY PERSONAL THANKS FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE YOU PLAYED IN ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN ASIA. AS YOU KNOW,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5611 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

PERHAPS THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION YOU COULD MAKE TOWARD RAPID RECOVERY IN THE REGION WOULD BE TO GENERATE RAPID DOMESTIC DEMAND-LED GROWTH IN JAPAN. IN THIS REGARD, I WANT TO ENCOURAGE YOU AGAIN TO MOVE QUICKLY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT STIMULUS TO YOUR ECONOMY. STRONG FISCAL ACTION IN YOUR FORTHCOMING BUDGET TO STIMULATE JAPANESE DEMAND COULD BE DECISIVE IN PREVENTING A DOWNTURN THROUGHOUT THE REGION, WHICH WOULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY.

CONGRATULATIONS AGAIN ON YOUR OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP AT KYOTO. WITHOUT QUESTION, YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT WAS KEY TO MAKING THIS HISTORIC CONFERENCE A SUCCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING TO YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>5611

<MSGID> M3068884

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1997

'97DEC 11 PM7:2

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER ^W
DANIEL K. TARULLO ^W

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Hashimoto on Early
November Talks with Boris Yeltsin

Purpose

Respond to his letter.

Background

Hashimoto highlighted the agreement he and Yeltsin reached to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000.

You acknowledge the significance of that goal and reiterate your previous commitment to support improved Japan-Russian relations.

RECOMMENDATION

Sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Hashimoto
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

Signed _____
12-12-97

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1997

Dear Ryu:

Thank you very much for providing me the details of your visit to Russia and your fruitful discussions with Boris Yeltsin. I am pleased you found our support of your improved bilateral relations with Russia helpful. I applaud the "no-necktie talks" tradition you and Boris have begun.

Your shared goal to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000 is a significant accomplishment. Likewise, the "Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan" to improve bilateral economic relations should prove beneficial to your overall relations as well as promote the integration of Russia into the international economic system. In this light, I know Boris appreciated your support of Russia's participation in APEC. As I indicated to you at Vancouver, we stand ready to provide whatever support we can to your efforts to improve relations with Russia.

I thought APEC went well this year and I particularly enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you. I would like to offer my personal thanks for the constructive role you played in addressing the financial crisis in Asia. As you know, perhaps the greatest contribution you could make toward rapid recovery in the region would be to generate rapid domestic demand-led growth in Japan. In this regard, I want to encourage you again to move quickly to provide significant stimulus to your economy. Strong fiscal action in your forthcoming budget to stimulate Japanese demand could be decisive in preventing a downturn throughout the region, which would have unfortunate consequences for the global economy.

Congratulations again on your outstanding leadership at Kyoto. Without question, your personal involvement was key to making this historic conference a success. I look forward to talking to you again soon.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Ryutaro Hashimoto
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

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4/28/2022



(Provisional Translation)

EMBASSY OF JAPAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 5, 1997

Dear Bill,

I have just returned from a visit to Russia on November 1 and 2. In Krasnoyarsk, I met with President Yeltsin for a total of about eight hours and discussed a whole range of issues in an open and friendly atmosphere. In short, I believe that this meeting was a great success, and I am writing to express anew my gratitude for your deep understanding of Japan's position and the support that you and your government rendered up until this meeting, when Japan was preparing to make a breakthrough in its relations with Russia.

During this meeting, President Yeltsin and I were able to further strengthen our relationship of personal trust. We decided that President Yeltsin and his family would visit Japan in mid-April next year, when we will again hold "no-necktie talks."

President Yeltsin expressed both a pro-active and positive attitude on the issue of utmost importance in Japan-Russia relations, the negotiation of a peace treaty. As a result, we were able to come to agreement and announce that we will exert all our best efforts to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000 based upon the Tokyo Declaration signed in 1993 during President Yeltsin's visit to Japan. I believe this was possible because I was able to gain President Yeltsin's empathy toward my policy of making steady advances in all areas of the relations between Japan and Russia. Of course there may be some elements in Russia who will criticize President Yeltsin's resolve, but I can only express my deepest respect for his conviction with which he made such a courageous decision.

Apart from the matter of concluding a peace treaty, during the course of this summit, we exchanged views on a broad range of issues primarily involving the future cooperation between our countries. For example, in the area of bilateral economic relations, we prepared and agreed to make steady progress on a six-point "Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan," which will, among other things, enhance bilateral cooperation in the area of investment under an "Investment Cooperation Initiative," enlist Japan's cooperation in President Yeltsin's project to train Russian business managers, promote the integration of Russia into the international economic system, and strengthen our dialogue on energy issues.

Also, with regard to bilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, from the perspective of the importance of Russia playing a more constructive role in the region, I stated my support for Russia's participation in APEC. On this point in particular, I would like to express my appreciation to the United States for the depth of its understanding and support.

With your permission, I will have officials of my government report the details of this

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summit to their counterparts in the United States. However, in light of your valuable understanding and support for this breakthrough in Japan-Russia relations, I decided to inform you myself of the highlights of the summit.

I think that this summit was a truly historic event and I am most satisfied with its outcome. I am convinced that President Yeltsin feels the same way. For the future, I know it will be necessary, in cooperation with President Yeltsin, to energetically promote Japan-Russia relations, including the issue of the peace treaty, and pursue peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.

I would like to take this opportunity to once again express my deepest appreciation of the understanding and support that you and your government have given for Japan's position, and at the same time, ask for your continued advice and assistance in the future.

I very much look forward to seeing you again later this month in Vancouver.

Sincerely,

Ryutaro Hashimoto (signed)
Prime Minister of Japan

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President
The United States of America

P.S. I am truly thankful to you. Ryu (signed)

親愛なるビルへ

十一月一日から二日までの間、私はロシアを訪問し、クラスノヤルスクにおいてエリツイン大統領との間で総計約八時間にわたり、打ち解けた雰囲気の下で様々な問題について会談を行い、先日帰国致しました。一言で申し上げれば、私は、今回の会談は大成功であったと考えており、今回の会談に至るまでの間、我が国がロシアとの関係打開に臨むに当たって、貴大統領及び貴国政府が示された我が国の立場についての深い御理解と御支援に対して改めて感謝申し上げます。この親書を認めた次第であります。

今回の会談におきましては、先ず、エリツイン大統領との間で個人的な信頼関係を一層強化することができ、来年四月半ばには、今度はエリツイン大統領が御家族とともに訪日され、再度「ネクタイなしの会談」を行うこととなります。

した。

日露間の最大の懸案である平和条約交渉につきましましては、エリツイン大統領は積極的且つ肯定的な姿勢を示されました。その結果、私とエリツイン大統領は、一九九三年の同大統領訪日の際に署名された東京宣言に基づいて、西暦二〇〇〇年までに日露平和条約を締結するよう二人で全力を尽くすことに合意し、これを発表することができました。これは、日露関係を全ての分野で着実に進展させていくとの私の方針にエリツイン大統領の共感が得られた結果であると考えております。当然のことながら、このようなエリツイン大統領の英断を批判する勢力がロシア国内にはいるかもしれませんが、私は、このような勇氣ある決断を下されたエリツイン大統領の姿勢に深い敬意の念を表するものがあります。

また、今回の首脳会談におきまして、私とエリツイン大統領は、平和条約締

結問題以外にも、日露両国間の今後の協力問題を中心に幅広い意見交換を行いました。例えば、両国間の経済関係の分野におきましては、投資分野での両国間の協力を強化するための「投資協力イニシアティブ」、エリツィン大統領が提唱したロシアの企業経営者養成計画への我が国の協力、ロシアの国際経済体制への統合の促進、エネルギー対話の強化等、六項目の措置を内容とする「橋本・エリツィン・プラン」を作成し、これを着実に実施していくこととなりました。

更に、アジア・太平洋地域における両国の協力につきましては、ロシアが同地域においてより建設的な役割を果たしていくことが重要であるとの観点から、私は、ロシアのAPECへの参加を支持する旨表明致しました。就中、この点については、貴国から深い理解と支持を頂いたことに改めて謝意を表します。

今回の首脳会談の具体的な内容の詳細につきましては、我が国政府関係者よ

り貴国政府関係者に対して然るべく御報告させて頂きますが、先ずは日露関係の打開に一方ならぬ御配慮と御支援を賜りました貴大統領に対して、私が最も重要と考える点を御報告する次第です。

私は、今回の首脳会談は真に歴史的なものであったと考えており、その成果に満足しております。また、エリツイン大統領も同様に感じておられると確信しております。今後、私はエリツイン大統領と協力して平和条約の問題も含め、日露関係の進展のために、更にはアジア・太平洋地域の平和と安定のために精力的に取り組んでいく必要があります。

私は、この機会に改めて、これまで貴大統領及び貴国政府が示された我が国の立場に対する御理解と御支援に深甚なる感謝の念を表明すると共に、引き続き貴大統領の御助言と御助力を宜しくお願い致します。

今月末、ヴァンクーヴァーにて貴大統領と再びお目にかかるのを楽しみにし

ています。

一九九七年十一月五日

日本国内閣総理大臣

鳩山由紀夫


アメリカ合衆国大統領
ウィリアム・ジェファソン・クリントン 閣下

いそがしに
お礼を申し上げます。
龍

敬具

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7909



December 2, 1997

12/8 SK

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
Dan Tarullo
THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFFE
FROM: JACK PRITCHARD
SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Hashimoto

SK

B

Needs sentence
on economic
financial; mission speaks
loudly

B

Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto wrote the President describing his meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in early November. Attached at Tab A is a proposed response to Hashimoto's letter.

Concurrence by: Ki Fort Malcolm Lee (via email)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Hashimoto
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: *Letter from*
~~Response to Prime Minister Hashimoto on Early~~
November Talks with Boris Yeltsin

Purpose

To respond to ^{his} ~~Prime Minister Hashimoto's~~ letter, describing his ~~discussions with Russian President Yeltsin.~~

Background

~~Hashimoto wrote to give you a first-hand account of his early~~
~~November talks with Boris Yeltsin.~~ ^{ins} *Hashimoto* He highlighted the agreement
he and Yeltsin reached to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty
by the end of the year 2000. ~~Your response at Tab A~~
acknowledges the significance of ~~that~~ ^{the} goal to ~~conclude a Peace~~
~~Treaty~~ and reiterates your previous commitment to support
improved Japan-Russian relations.

RECOMMENDATION

~~That you~~ [↑] sign the letter at Tab A.


Attachments

Tab A Letter to Hashimoto
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


Dear Ryu:


Thank you very much for providing me ~~with~~ the details of your visit to Russia and your fruitful discussions with Boris Yeltsin. I am pleased you found our support of your improved bilateral relations with Russia helpful. ~~It sounds as though you and Boris have begun a tradition of "no-necktie talks,"~~ *I applaud th*
tradition you and Boris have begun.

shared goal
Your ~~agreement with Boris to set the goal of~~ concluding a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000 is a significant accomplishment. Likewise, the "Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan" to improve ~~your~~ bilateral economic relations should prove beneficial to your overall relations as well as promote the integration of Russia into the international economic system. *In this light*

I know Boris appreciated your support of Russia's participation in APEC. I thought APEC went well this year and I particularly enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you.

~~Thank you again for sharing the results of your meeting with Boris.~~ As I have indicated to you previously, we stand ready to provide whatever support we can to your efforts to improve relations with Russia.


Sincerely,

His Excellency

~~The Honorable~~ Ryutaro Hashimoto
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo, ~~Japan~~

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2016-1056-m(1.08)

Joshi, M. Kay

From: Lee, Malcolm R.
Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 1997 6:41 PM
To: Rice, Edward A.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs
Cc: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Subject: REDO Clinton Hashimoto 7909 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WF

7909 POTUS
letter_.doc

Revised econ section of POTUS letter to Hashimoto. Cleared by Tarullo, Kristoff, Larry Summers. Please put Tarullo on "From" line in memo to POTUS along with Berger. Go ahead and initial for Tarullo if no additional changes. Double red dot, as Japanese budget decisions are expected this weekend. thank you.

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 4/28/2022

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7909
Kyoto comment will be OBE
by the time this is signed. See
my change below. (R)

Dear Ryu:

Thank you very much for providing me the details of your visit to Russia and your fruitful discussions with Boris Yeltsin. I am pleased you found our support of your improved bilateral relations with Russia helpful. I applaud the "no-necktie talks" tradition you and Boris have begun.

Your shared goal to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000 is a significant accomplishment. Likewise, the "Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan" to improve bilateral economic relations should prove beneficial to your overall relations as well as promote the integration of Russia into the international economic system. In this light, I know Boris appreciated your support of Russia's participation in APEC. As I indicated to you at Vancouver, we stand ready to provide whatever support we can to your efforts to improve relations with Russia.

I thought APEC went well this year and I particularly enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you. As I mentioned then, it is critical that APEC leaders act decisively to reverse the financial crisis in Asia. In this regard, I want to encourage you again to move quickly to provide significant stimulus to your economy. Without strong action to strengthen domestic growth and financial stability in Japan, the crisis in Asia could deepen with severe repercussions for the international economy.

~~Finally, as I said during our phone call earlier this week, I will do whatever I can to make the Kyoto conference a success.~~

~~As I have indicated to you previously, we stand ready to provide whatever support we can to your efforts to improve relations with Russia.~~

Sincerely,

Thank you again for your letter. I look forward to talking to you again soon.

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His Excellency
Ryutaro Hashimoto
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
DANIEL K. TARULLO
SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Hashimoto on Early
November Talks with Boris Yeltsin

Purpose

Respond to his letter.

Background

Hashimoto highlighted the agreement he and Yeltsin reached to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000.

You acknowledge the significance of that goal and reiterate your previous commitment to support improved Japan-Russian relations.

RECOMMENDATION

Sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Hashimoto
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

7909

Yes

Eal / OK? M. Lee changes Tarullo /

Dear Ryu:

Thank you very much for providing me the details of your visit to Russia and your fruitful discussions with Boris Yeltsin. I am pleased you found our support of your improved bilateral relations with Russia helpful. I applaud the "no-necktie talks" tradition you and Boris have begun.

Your shared goal to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty by the end of the year 2000 is a significant accomplishment. Likewise, the "Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan" to improve bilateral economic relations should prove beneficial to your overall relations as well as promote the integration of Russia into the international economic system. In this light, I know Boris appreciated your support of Russia's participation in APEC. As I indicated to you at Vancouver, we stand ready to provide whatever support we can to your efforts to improve relations with Russia.

I thought APEC went well this year and I particularly enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you. As I would like to offer my personal thanks for the constructive role that you played in addressing mentioned then, it is critical that APEC leaders act decisively to reverse the financial crisis in Asia. As you know, perhaps the greatest contribution you could make toward rapid recovery in the region would be to generate rapid domestic demand-led growth in Japan. In this regard, I want to encourage you again to move quickly to provide significant stimulus to your economy. Without strong action to strengthen domestic growth and financial stability in Japan, Strong fiscal action in your forthcoming budget to stimulate Japanese demand could be decisive in preventing a downturn throughout the region, which would have unfortunate consequences for the global economy. the crisis in Asia could deepen with severe repercussions for the international economy.

Thank you again for your letter. I look forward to talking to you again soon.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Ryutaro Hashimoto
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Meeting with Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea (2 pages)	11/24/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
001b. draft	Memcon. Meeting with Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea. (2 pages)	11/24/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1656

FOLDER TITLE:

9708027

2007-1908-F
vz391

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kim Young Sam, President of the Republic of Korea (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Larry Summers, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Sandra Kristoff, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Tong Kim, Interpreter

Korea
Kim Young Sam, President
Yoo Chong Ha, Foreign Minister
Ban Ki Moon, Blue House Secretary for National Security Affairs
Kun Woo Park, Korean Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Park, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 24, 1997, 2:40 p.m. - 3:15 p.m. PST
Vancouver, Canada

The President: I very much enjoyed our working relationship over the past few years. You have the makings of a tremendous legacy as the first democratically elected President and with the launch of the four party talks. I know it will be hard, but I will be with you every step of the way. We will get through this. I am pleased and encouraged that Korea has agreed to an IMF package. That is a good step and I hope you pursue needed reforms. (S)

President Kim: Thank you very much. I am pleased to meet you again and congratulate you on the successful U.S. visit of President Jiang, as well as holding tough against Iraq. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify on: 11/25/07

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VZ 2016-1056-W (1.11)

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I am delighted to see the four party talks move forward. This is the result of our close cooperation. I have gotten a good report on our implementation strategy as it is now planned. I will cooperate with you to bring about a successful resolution on the Peninsula. ~~(S)~~

The recent South Korean financial instability comes from structural problems, high liquidity shortages. I have announced measures to increase our foreign credit standing. I will take the drastic reforms needed to restore our credibility to investors. We are addressing structural issues. The IMF package is needed to stabilize the economy quickly. I appreciate your help. I am working to persuade the Korean people this is a necessary step. ~~(S)~~

U.S. leadership is needed in getting the IMF package. It is important to help ease foreign investor concerns about Korea. Stability of financial markets will contribute to the stability of regional financial markets and global ones as well. I don't want a South Korean financial crisis because it will lead to an increase of tensions on the Peninsula. I have the firm conviction that preventing a financial crisis is absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, North Korea already is taking advantage of our difficulties and is broadcasting to the South propaganda about our economy. I would appreciate it if you would announce that the United States firmly supports South Korea's effort to bring about an early stabilization of our financial market. ~~(S)~~

I am pleased we have had eight summit meetings. I have enjoyed our warm, close coordination. As I end my term, I believe Korea will be reunified. But even after reunification, we will need the U.S.-South Korean alliance and U.S. military forces present on the Peninsula. We need to keep our strong ties. I stressed with all the presidential candidates the importance of maintaining this wonderful alliance. They agreed. ~~(S)~~

The President: U.S.-South Korea relations are remarkable. I will express my confidence in the course South Korea is taking to move beyond the financial crisis. I will continue to be a friend and ally and I am confident the United States will do this on a bipartisan basis. Thank you. ~~(S)~~

President Kim: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kim Young Sam, President of
the Republic of Korea (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
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Larry Summers, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
Sandra Kristoff, NSC Notetaker
Tong Kim, Interpreter

Steinberg —

Sr Dir etc.

Korea
Kim Young Sam, President
Yoo Chong Ha, Foreign Minister
Ban Ki Moon, Blue House Secretary for
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Kun Woo Park, Korean Ambassador to the
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Mr. Park, Interpreter

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify on: 11/25/07

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PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2016-1056-M (1.12)
4/24/2022

*NO
Berger?*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

I am delighted to see the four party talks move forward. This is the result of our close cooperation. I have gotten a good report on our implementation strategy as it is now planned. I will cooperate with you to bring about a successful resolution on the Peninsula. (S)

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President Kim: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Conversation with South Korean President Kim Young Sam. (4 pages)	11/27/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
001b. draft	Memocon. Conversation with South Korean President Kim Young Sam. (4 pages)	11/27/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1656

FOLDER TITLE:

9708085

2007-1908-F
vz392

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8085

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with South Korean President Kim Young Sam

PARTICIPANTS: PRESIDENT CLINTON
SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM

NOTE TAKERS: Pat O'Shaughnessy, Cindy Lawrence, Tony Campanella, Jeff Rathke, Marianna Papadimitriou, Lyle Harrison

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1997; 2356-0015 EST
Camp David

THE PRESIDENT: Hello. (U)

PRESIDENT KIM: Hello Mr. President. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello President Kim. I'm calling about the financial situation. I'll make a statement and then listen to your comments. (C)

We have been informed by your financial team and by the IMF that your financial situation is extremely grave and that you face the prospect of default in a short period of time, perhaps by the end of next week. Of course this would be terribly damaging for the Korean economy. It would also risk precipitating a further deterioration in financial stability in Asia and around the world. (C)

There is also, of course, an important security dimension to this. We don't want to see the peninsula destabilized by weakness in the South, and we know the North is unpredictable and often miscalculates. I think the only practical course is for your government to reach, and announce, an agreement in principle with the IMF, within the next few days and no later than Monday, of a credible program of economic and financial measures necessary to restore confidence. (C)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b0 (d)
Declassify on: 17/29/07

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2016-1056-11 (1.13)

4/28/2022

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We would be prepared to support a strong Korean economic program with a substantial package of international support, led by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank and supplement it with contingent commitment from the United States and from other countries as we did with Indonesia. (C)

For this effort to succeed, you will have to lead your country quickly to take decisive action, and only with the support of the entire political leadership of the country will you be able to restore the confidence of the private investors that Korea can deal with the present challenges. (C)

Your financial authorities have asked Japan and the United States to provide temporary financial support in the form of a bridge loan while they work with the IMF over the next three weeks to formulate a program. (C)

You know I would do anything to help you, but all of my advisors and I believe it will not work because no amount of official external support would be sufficient to compensate for the absence of a strong economic program and because it would only defer the tough decisions that are necessary to restore confidence. A bridge loan will not work because the money will all be exhausted in a matter of a few days so we could all lose some money and it wouldn't do us any good. (C)

This is an extraordinary challenge for your country. We are prepared to support you, as is Japan, and the IMF. But no amount of support can avert the crisis ahead unless you can restore the confidence of the markets and there is not much time. (C)

We will work with Japan to ensure that the IMF gives you the full support you need immediately over the next few days to develop an appropriate program. Secretary Rubin will be in touch with your Deputy Prime Minister shortly after we finish this call to outline this course of action. (C)

I want to be helpful. It is essential we do something that will work. We don't want to see South Korea overwhelmed by the force of events. We have to move within the next several days. I want to do something that will work. (C)

PRESIDENT KIM: President Clinton, thank you very much for your concerns and for your opinions. We also think it is a very serious situation. (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE PRESIDENT: Could you please speak up. I can barely hear you. (U)

PRESIDENT KIM: We would like to solve the problem in the next few days. As you pointed out, it is a very serious and urgent situation. Of course we are discussing with the IMF the possibility of providing us financial support, but it seems to us that it will be until 20 December before the IMF can help us. We are in serious difficulties. It is important that somehow we get some type of emergency bridge loan from other countries like Japan by the middle of next week. That is our position at the moment. ~~(C)~~

As I mentioned to you in Vancouver, we are concerned about North Korea because they are making lots of noise about the serious difficulties we are going through now in the South and I understand your view. So President Clinton, it is my opinion we should get some emergency help from the United States and Japan before we finalize the amount of assistance we can get from the IMF. ~~(C)~~

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President. First of all, the IMF will give you the loan before 20 December if you will work out the conditions. When we did this for Mexico, it was part of their simultaneous commitment to embark on a course of reform which immediately restored confidence of the markets and investors in their currency and their economy. If Mexico had not made this commitment at the same time, then the loan guarantee for them would have been overwhelmed by the money leaving the country. I don't think your reserves will last three weeks, and nobody I know believes you have the time. I've spoken to a lot of people about this today. ~~(C)~~

PRESIDENT KIM: Of course Mr. President, it is our intention to finalize with the IMF as soon as possible, but at the moment it is our projection that it will happen somewhere around December 20. We will do our best to finish discussions with the IMF as soon as possible. It is our intention to ask for \$10 billion until we can work out a formal agreement with the IMF as you helped Mexico last time. ~~(C)~~

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President. Let me ask you this on the timing. Will you make sure your Deputy Prime Minister or whomever is handling this will talk to Secretary Rubin and will have a candid conversation about this because your markets will take a beating no matter what we do? So before we hang up,

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let's at least agree to have them talk because we think this is very important. Can we at least agree to this? (C)

PRESIDENT KIM: Then I understand you are saying that through a discussion between Rubin and Deputy Prime Minister Kang we can sort of expedite our negotiations with the IMF so we can get the help as soon as possible? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We can put together the necessary backing if it is clearly a part of an IMF package. That will stop the run. We don't want these two to be disconnected, because if they are, they will run through that money in just a few days. We can talk again in the next day or so. (C)

PRESIDENT KIM: Well President Clinton, I fully understand your point and will have the Deputy Prime Minister contact Secretary Rubin as soon as possible. Of course we want to finish discussions with the IMF as quickly as possible, but we think it may take until December 20th which we are concerned will be too far away. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. We'll go to work on this and we may need to talk again in the next day or so.

PRESIDENT KIM: Thank you very much for your concern, and I look forward to talking to you again Mr. President. Thank you very much. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2016-1056-11 (1.14)
4/28/2022

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with South Korean President Kim Young Sam

PARTICIPANTS: PRESIDENT CLINTON
SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG SAM

NOTE TAKERS: Pat O'Shaughnessy, Cindy Lawrence, Tony Campanella, Jeff Rathke, Marianna Papadimitriou, Lyle Harrison

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PRESIDENT KIM: Hello Mr. President. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello President Kim. I'm calling about the financial situation. I'll make a statement and then listen to your comments. (C)

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There is also of course an important security dimension to this. We don't want to see the Peninsula destabilized by weakness in the South, and we know the North is unpredictable and often miscalculates. I think the only practical course is for your government to reach, and announce, an agreement in principle with the IMF, within the next few days and no later than Monday, of a credible program of economic and financial measures necessary to restore confidence. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Sandra J. Kristoff (Classified by: Glyn T. Davies)
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify on: 11/28/07

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We would be prepared to support a strong Korean economic program with a substantial package of international support, led by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank and supplement it with contingent commitment from the United States and from other countries as we did with Indonesia. (C)

For this effort to succeed, you will have to lead your country quickly to take decisive action, and only with the support of the entire political leadership of the country will you be able to restore the confidence of the private investors that Korea can deal with the present challenges. (C)

Your financial authorities have asked Japan and the United States to provide temporary financial support in the form of a bridge loan while they work with the IMF over the next three weeks to formulate a program. (C)

You know ^{and I} I would do anything to help you, but ~~I~~ and all of my advisors believe it will not work because no amount of official external support would be sufficient to compensate for the absence of a strong economic program and because it would only defer the tough decisions that are necessary to restore confidence. A bridge loan will not work because the money will all be exhausted in a matter of a few days so we could all lose some money and it wouldn't do us any good. (C)

This is an extraordinary challenge for your country. We are prepared to support you, as is Japan, and the IMF. But no amount of support can avert the crisis ahead unless you can restore the confidence of the markets and there is not much time. (C)

We will work with Japan to ensure that the IMF gives you the full support you need immediately over the next few days to develop an appropriate program. Secretary Rubin will be in touch with your Deputy Prime Minister shortly after we finish this call to outline this course of action. (C)

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PRESIDENT KIM: President Clinton, thank you very much for your concerns and for your opinions. We also think it is a very serious situation. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Could you please speak up. I can barely hear you. (U)

PRESIDENT KIM: We would like to solve the problem in the next few days. As you pointed out, it is a very serious and urgent situation. Of course we are discussing with the IMF the possibility of providing us financial support, but it seems to us that it will be until 20 December before the IMF can help us. We are in serious difficulties. It is important that somehow we get some type of emergency bridge loan from other countries like Japan by the middle of next week. That is our position at the moment. (C)

As I mentioned to you in Vancouver, we are concerned about North Korea because they are making lots of noise about the serious difficulties we are going through now in the South and I understand your view. So President Clinton, it is my opinion we should get some emergency help from the U.S. and Japan before we finalize the amount of assistance we can get from the IMF. (C)

United States

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President. First of all, the IMF will give you the loan before 20 December if you will work out the conditions. When we did this for Mexico, it was part of their simultaneous commitment to embark on a course of reform which immediately restored confidence of the markets and investors in their currency and their economy. If Mexico had not made this commitment at the same time, then the loan guarantee for them would have been overwhelmed by the money leaving the country. I don't think your reserves will last three weeks, and nobody I know believes you have the time. I've spoken to a lot of people about this today. (C)

PRESIDENT KIM: Of course Mr. President, it is our intention to finalize with the IMF as soon as possible, but at the moment it is our projection that it will happen somewhere around December 20. We will do our best to finish discussions with the IMF as soon as possible. It is our intention to ask for \$10 billion until we can work out a formal agreement with the IMF as you helped Mexico last time. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President. Let me ask you this on the timing. Will you make sure your Deputy Prime Minister or whomever is handling this will talk to Secretary Rubin and will have a candid conversation about this because your markets will take a beating no matter what we do? So before we hang up,

let's at least agree to have them talk because we think this is very important. Can we at least agree to this? (C)

PRESIDENT KIM: Then I understand you are saying that through a discussion between Rubin and Deputy Prime Minister Kang we can sort of expedite our negotiations with the IMF so we can get the help as soon as possible? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We can put together the necessary backing if it is clearly a part of an IMF package. That will stop the run. We don't want these two to be disconnected, because if they are, they will run through that money in just a few days. We can talk again in the next day or so. (C)

PRESIDENT KIM: Well President Clinton, I fully understand your point and will have the Deputy Prime Minister contact Secretary Rubin as soon as possible. Of course we want to finish discussions with the IMF as quickly as possible, but we think it may take until December 20th which we are concerned will be too far away. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Well go to work on this and we may need to talk again in the next day or so.

PRESIDENT KIM: Thank you very much for your concern, and I look forward to talking to you again Mr. President. Thank you very much. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Telcon with Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea. (3 pages)	12/03/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1657

FOLDER TITLE:

9708188

2007-1908-F
vz393

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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8188

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea

PARTICIPANTS: Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea

Interpreter: Chang Lie
Notetaker: Lyle Harrison, Jim Smith,
Doug Mueller, Mariana Papadimitriou,
Jeff Rathke

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 3, 1997, 8:35 - 8:50 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Kim: Hello President Clinton. Glad to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Let me congratulate you on reaching agreement with the IMF. I know it is a difficult thing. I appreciate the political courage you have shown in doing this. The United States has a critical national security and economic interest in a stable and prosperous Korea. This IMF agreement will be vital to putting Korea back on the path of growth. We are committed to your success. Rapid follow up on today's agreement will be vital to its success. It involves tough political choices and will inflict some economic pain in the short term. However, it will help to get back to long-term stability that you have worked so hard for and that the Korean people deserve. (C)

The IMF finance package for Korea, backed up by additional funds from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, is substantial, though I would urge you to supplement these resources with finance raised on the private markets. In addition, the United States would be willing to make \$5 billion available as part of a package with our allies, Japan and Europe, to mobilize a second line of defense for Korea in the form of backup financing in line with the Manila Framework. (C)

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2016-1056-M (1.15)

4/28/2022

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 12/03/07

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I recognize you are in the middle of an election period and it's a difficult time to sell this to the Korean public. You mentioned to me in Vancouver that you spoke with each of the presidential candidates to impress upon them the value of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. I hope that you will speak to each of them again with regard to the IMF package and reform efforts. It's important that the candidates support this as the key to putting South Korea back on the road to stability and growth. (C)

President Kim: President Clinton, thank you very much, and I appreciate your continued support in arranging the IMF agreement. As I have already mentioned to you, we need your continued and high-powered leadership role in resolving our financial problems. We will comply with the agreement. Korea needs foreign currency immediately. I would like to ask you to see that some of the IMF funds be transferred to Korea within this week. You mentioned the presidential candidates. They were rather reluctant to agree to a written statement due to the adverse public opinion against the situation. It was a difficult task for me to talk to them, but finally, I was able to have the presidential candidates understand the IMF agreement. All those candidates are ready to accept it because it's clear there's no other way to follow than the agreement with the IMF. However, we are faced with the problem that the Korean news media is describing today's negotiations with the IMF as a very shameful one. They think it is very humiliating, almost comparable to Japanese colonial rule. However, I think that there is only one choice. We have to cooperate with the IMF. That is the only way out of this trouble. (C)

I do remember very well the conversation we had in a previous telephone conference. You promised that once we reach agreement with IMF, the United States will be fully behind us, supporting Korea's position. As you may know well, our foreign currency holdings are in a very serious situation. It is indeed difficult for us. Perhaps if we do not find some support within this week, next week it would be absolutely difficult for us to somehow calm down the situation. (C)

In addition to the IMF rescue package, we strongly hope the United States could take active leadership in trying to support Korea. And I think Japan will follow suit. (C)

The President: Please speak up, I can barely hear you. (U)

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President Kim: I very much wish the United States can take an active leadership role and encourage Japan and other EU countries and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The leadership role of the U.S. is critical. I can assure you that I'll take this opportunity to improve our economic situation substantially. With the help of the IMF, I will do my very best as President to make it successful. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. I will work with you and we'll stay in touch and work together on this. (U)

President Kim: Well, I believe that the United States will make its best efforts to support South Korea. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks, goodbye. (U)

President Kim: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001-memeon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation. (3 pages)	12/01/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1658

FOLDER TITLE:

9708317

2007-1908-F
vz394

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon of Ambassador James Laney and Kim Young-Sam, President of the Republic of Korea (C)

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador James Laney
Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea

Interpreter: Tong Kim
Notetaker: Peter Huggins
Tom Cromwell

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 1, 1997, 12:02 - 12:13 a.m. EST
Ambassador James Laney's Residence

Ambassador Laney: Hello? (U)

President Kim: This is Mr. President Kim for Ambassador Laney. (C)

Ambassador Laney: Mr. President, it is a privilege and pleasure to speak with you, thank you very much for taking my call. (C)

President Kim: Ambassador Laney, I am pleased to hear your voice; this is an important time for all of us. (C)

Ambassador Laney: I appreciate the times we've had before. I understand the burden you're under with the current financial crisis. (C)

President Kim: Well, I'm very appreciative of President Clinton's concern regarding our problem during this difficult time. The United States and Korea are strong allies and friends, and I'm grateful that the United States has shown concern at this time. (C)

Ambassador Laney: I'm calling due to the urgency of the matter facing you. I say this with the utmost respect, restoring the

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on:

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PER E.O. 13526

17-8216-1056-M (1.16)

4/28/2022

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confidence of the world financial community is of utmost concern. Time is running out this week. I'm calling to encourage you to have your people work with the IMF immediately to take the necessary steps to restore international confidence. (C)

President Kim: Well, I do understand fully the importance of cooperation with the IMF. I cannot sleep in the evening, even at home, because this is such a serious issue. I will try my best to get cooperation with the IMF as soon as possible. (C)

Yesterday was Sunday in Korea. I had a long briefing from the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Lim, who is in charge of the talks with the IMF. This morning, I received a report that was more than an hour long about how the situation is developing. I have instructed my Deputy Prime Minister to come to an agreement with the IMF as soon as possible. (C)

Ambassador Laney: I'm delighted to hear this and I applaud the forthright action you have taken to resolve this situation. Anything short of full cooperation with the requirements of the IMF will not restore the confidence necessary to maintain the strength of the won. The U.S. is the strongest possible ally and will support the IMF and back it up. I hope the Deputy Prime Minister will work with the IMF and undertake completely and fully the conditions set by the IMF. (C)

President Kim: Well, again I must emphasize that I take this issue seriously; I cannot get good sleep. Our position is to resolve this issue today. We do have domestic legal concerns to resolve on this issue, but that is our problem and we will try to resolve this as soon as possible. Please convey my compliments to President Clinton, and my determination to resolve this situation. (C)

Ambassador Laney: I will do that, and I thank you Mr. President for your forthrightness and your leadership. I salute you for this. Thank you, Mr. President, for talking to me on this issue of critical importance: I appreciate that. (C)

President Kim: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Again, I would like to reiterate that I'm taking the issue very seriously. We cannot afford to wait any longer. I'm sure the President is aware of the serious position we're in and of the urgency to reach a resolution. I give my word that we will reach an agreement with the IMF as soon as possible. (C)

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Ambassador Laney: Thank you. I hope to see you personally the next time I visit Korea. (C)

President Kim: Of course, I will be happy to meet you the next time you are in Seoul. We are long-term friends; let me know when you will be back in Seoul. Please give my regards to Mrs. Laney. (C)

Ambassador Laney: Thanks, and all the best to you, Mr. President. (U)

President Kim: Thank you. (U)

Ambassador Laney: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	with Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea. (4 pages)	12/12/1997	P1/b(1) v2 9/21/2022
001b. draft	Telecon with President Kim Young-sam. (1 page)	12/12/1997	P1/b(1) v2 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1659

FOLDER TITLE:

9708415

2007-1908-F
vz395

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Kim Young-sam, President of the Republic of Korea

PARTICIPANTS: The President
South Korean President Kim Young-sam

Interpreter: Tong Kim

Notetaker: Pat O'Shaughnessy, David Higgins, Cindy Lawrence, Jim Smith

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 12, 1997, 9:44 - 10:04 p.m. EST
Residence

President Kim: Is that President Clinton? (U)

The President: Yes, President Kim. It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

President Kim: First of all, President Clinton, I thank you very much for your support and concern you showed the last time about the Korean economic situation. We reached an agreement with the IMF. However, the economic situation has not turned for the better yet, so I have made this emergency phone call to you to discuss this matter. (C)

As you know very well, we have been implementing the agreement with the IMF to keep our promise. In some political circles in Korea, there have been voices raised for renegotiating with the IMF and there have been some critical thoughts about the IMF agreement. However, it is our firm position that we will abide by the agreement with the IMF, because it is an international agreement, and if there are any unsatisfactory aspects regarding our compliance with the IMF agreement in the international market, then certainly those will be corrected. (C)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 12/12/07

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VZ 2016-1056-W (1.17)
31/28/2022

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This morning, I had a chance to meet with the three key presidential candidates at the Blue House. We discussed ways to implement the IMF agreement, and all three agreed that they support the agreement with the IMF. So, even after one of them becomes President, the agreement will be faithfully implemented. I have signatures of all three candidates that they will comply with the agreement. (C)

The President: That's great news, and I believe it will have a great impact with the markets in the next few days. (C)

President Kim: I'm going to consult very closely with the president-elect after the 18th of December -- the date of our Presidential elections -- so that our promise to the IMF is implemented without any interruptions. According to the agreement with the IMF, we have raised the interest rates on money markets to 25 percent, opened capital markets, suspended the operations of 14 merchant banks and 2 brokerage firms, and we are going to pass laws related to our financial reforms in our assembly later this month. However, we are still concerned, because despite our decision on assistance from the IMF on 5 December, confidence in the won in foreign currency markets remains unchanged. Our Korean currency, called the won, has been devalued to about 45 percent to the U.S. dollar since October. This radical depreciation has almost collapsed our foreign currency market. (C)

We think the main reason is that although we are pushing ahead with financial structural adjustment, we still have not restored confidence in the international financial community about the Korean financial system. It is our judgement that the first financial assistance from the IMF is not enough to calm down the situation. So, in order to stabilize our foreign currency market and to resume financial assistance from the international financial community, we should ensure that Korea obtains an adequate amount of foreign currency holdings to cover our international financial obligations. (C)

Currently, we are expecting to get US\$ 9 billion from the IMF and US\$ 2 billion from the World Bank, rather the Asian Development Bank. However, this is not enough. We think early implementation of the IMF assistance program is necessary. So, I would like to ask you to support our position in consultations with the IMF on such early implementation and also please to help us with getting agreement in consultations with your Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, and our Deputy Prime Minister.

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I would like to ask for your understanding and cooperation once again on this issue. (C)

The President: Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, I think that what you have done is very good. Aside from the IMF agreement, getting the other presidential candidates to implement the IMF plan is a very wise thing to do. I have been getting reports on the situation in South Korea several times a day, as I am very interested in it as I am sure you know. (C)

Some of our people in the Treasury Department and in large investment houses here in America who have a big stake in what is happening in Korea, are afraid that if we provide more money now it will raise doubts in the international financial markets of the adequacy of the current program, and there could be an even greater withdrawal of funds. Since the perceptions of the investor community are so important, what I would like to do in response to this call is to consult with some eminent private financiers on the subject and suggest you do the same. I will consult with Robert Rubin, who I know is working with your Deputy Prime Minister. Also, our good friend, former Ambassador Laney is coming to Seoul, and I would like you to meet with him. However, we don't want to do anything that suggests to the markets that the measures we have taken are inadequate, because I think they are very impressive. (C)

President Kim: Mr. President, I will be very happy to meet former Ambassador Laney when he visits this country. I would like to emphasize that we are making every effort to faithfully implement the agreement with the IMF, and if there are any unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation, we will certainly correct them. (C)

The President: Let me say again that I will do whatever I can to help you. You have done exactly what I asked, and it is the best thing for your country. However, I do want to make sure that whatever we do doesn't make the situation worse. I am glad you will see former Ambassador Laney. I think it would also help if you instruct your Deputy Prime Minister to make some calls to international financial investors with whom you deal to assess the situation. We will be back in touch with you in a day or so, shortly. (C)

President Kim: Well, thank you very much Mr. President. I will instruct my Deputy Prime Minister to contact international investment leaders, and I will meet former Ambassador Laney. I assure you we are trying very hard to implement the agreement

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with the IMF, and I'm pleased to tell you that all three key presidential candidates have signed an agreement to meet IMF obligations, which we will publicly announce. This will contribute to Korean credibility in international financial markets. (C)

The President: There is no question about that, Mr. President. That is great news, and we will be back in touch. I am really pulling for you, and we are going to get through this. (C)

President Kim: Well, thank you very much, Mr. President. I expect to talk to you again in the next few days. (C)

The President: Thank you. We will. Good night Mr. President. (U)

President Kim: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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This morning, I had a chance to meet with the three key presidential candidates at the Blue House. We discussed ways to implement the IMF agreement, and all three agreed that they support the agreement with the IMF. So, even after one of them becomes President, the agreement will be faithfully implemented. I have signatures of all three candidates that they will comply with the agreement. (C)

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CLINTON CONFIDENTIAL PHOTOCOPY
2016-1056-M (1.18)
4/28/2022

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telecon	with Korean President elect Kim Dae-jung. (3 pages)	12/18/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
001b. draft	Telecon with President elect Kim Dae-jung. (3 pages)	12/18/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 1659

FOLDER TITLE:

9708529

2007-1908-F
vz396

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Korean President-elect
Kim Dae-jung

PARTICIPANTS: The President
South Korean President-Elect Kim Dae-jung

Interpreter: Tong Kim

Notetaker: Lyle Harrison, Bonnie Glick,
Tom Crowell

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: 18 December 1997/9:47 - 10:04 p.m. EST
Melanne Verveer residence

The President: Hello? (U)

President-elect Kim: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hello, President Kim, congratulations to you.
(U)

President-elect Kim: Thank you very much for your
congratulations. (U)

The President: I know you have an engagement to attend, and I
will be brief. (U)

President-elect Kim: Once again, thank you very much for your
concern, I know you have been watching the elections keenly. I
also know that you are very busy, Mr. President, so I would like
to take this moment to tell you what the direction of foreign
policy will be, especially toward the United States, under the
future administration. Mr. President, first of all, let me
assure you that the future government will continue to
strengthen ties between our two countries. I look forward to
even closer cooperation with the government of the United States
and based on that effort, we wish to enhance efforts with
respect to North Korea and further enhance the relationship
between our two countries. I am also fully supportive and
inherit the efforts of the four-party talks which you, Mr.

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5 (1)

Declassify on: 12/18/07

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2016-1056-M (1.19)

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President, initiated with President Kim Yong-sam. And we will of course stay on course with the KEDO project to provide light water reactors to North Korea. Towards North Korea we will be strengthening our efforts to resume direct talks. I believe that is the way to strengthen the situation on the Korean Peninsula and I look forward to your help in these efforts. (C)

In my statement immediately after the election results were announced, I pledged full respect of the future government to the agreement between the IMF and government. As you know, the economy here is in a very difficult situation and we will seek your help in this regard. Mr. President, there is a great deal for your government and our new government to discuss and consult and I will discuss details with your envoy, Ambassador Bosworth, this afternoon. I want to meet you as soon as possible and I will take up this matter with Ambassador Bosworth this afternoon. Mr. President, that sums up pretty much what I have to say and now I would like you to say what you have to say. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. First of all, I have a great deal of respect for your lifetime of commitment to democracy and progressive politics and your determination to stay active in politics until this important moment. (C)

President-elect Kim: Thank you very much, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I welcome your remarks about North Korea, and I am looking forward to meeting you soon. I'm glad you are meeting Ambassador Bosworth this afternoon, I have a lot of confidence in him. I feel that because of the difficulties due to the present financial situation, I feel I should make a couple of candid comments because I know you have to go. (C)

President-elect Kim: Yes, please do. (U)

The President: Your speech today was well received because you reaffirmed your commitment to the IMF reforms. But I think when you later said you wanted to renegotiate the agreement, it had a bad effect on the markets, which you can see by what happened today. Now I believe you were trying to say you were concerned by the impact of austerity on the lives of ordinary Koreans. But I think investors took it in the wrong way, that you wanted to continue practices which are unjustifiable in the current situation. I think that if some way today you could make further comments to reaffirm your determination to keep Korea on the path to economic reform and progressive politics, that would be good. Perhaps Ambassador Bosworth would have better suggestions as to what to say than I would. (C)

Let me say I also know the present government has retained Jeff Shaeffer to help deal with the present crisis. He used to work in my administration. He might be someone that you or someone you designate might wish to work with. He is a good man and I have confidence in him. I also would like to meet with you soon. Before then I would be willing to send a team to deal with economic matters. Our relationship with Korea is very important to the United States and I believe you are in a unique position because of your position and life experience to do great things...and I want to help you succeed for the sake of our people and our relationship. (C)

President-elect Kim: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, regarding the IMF agreement, I've been in written communication with Mr. Camdessus of the IMF. In my communication we discussed that we will review the agreement every three months. In that context is where my statement came from. I expressed complete support and agreement with Mr. Camdessus that this is where we will go. (C)

The President: I understand, but the only point I'm trying to make is that the markets are very shaky and volatile and we have to be careful what is said. That is evidenced by the fact that the rise of the markets and the rise of the Won after the comments you made earlier. But the status of the reserves remain perilously low. If there is anything you can do to make your position clear before the markets close today, that would be good...and perhaps you can discuss this with Ambassador Bosworth. I just don't want this reserve crisis to be worse in the short run. In the long run you are doing the right thing and we are going to be with you all the way. (C)

President-elect Kim: Yes, Mr. President, I fully understand your concern. As you said, I will be meeting with Ambassador Bosworth this afternoon and we will consider all of this. (C)

The President: This is a wonderful day and I can't wait to see you. This is the culmination of a lifetime of devotion and you should very much enjoy this day. (U)

President-elect Kim: Mr. President, thank you very much for your warm and heartfelt congratulations. (U)

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Korean President-elect [Kim Dae-jung

move to next line

PARTICIPANTS: The President
South Korean President-Elect Kim Dae-jung

Interpreter: Tong Kim

Notetaker: Lyle Harrison, Bonnie Glick, [Tom Crowell

move to next line

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: 18 December 1997/9:47 - 10:04 p.m. EST
Melanne Verveen residence

The President: Hello? (U)

President-elect Kim: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hello, President Kim, congratulations to you. (U)

President-elect Kim: Thank you very much for your congratulations. (U)

The President: I know you have an engagement to attend, and I will be brief. (U)

President-elect Kim: Once again, thank you very much for your concern, I know you have been watching the elections keenly. I also know that you are very busy, Mr. President, so I would like to take this moment to tell you what the direction of foreign policy will be, especially toward the United States, under the future administration. Mr. President, first of all, let me assure you that the future government will continue to strengthen ties between our two countries. I look forward to even closer cooperation with the government of the United States and based on that effort, we wish to enhance efforts with respect to North Korea and further enhance the relationship between our two countries. I am also fully supportive and inherit the efforts of the four-party talks which you, Mr.

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (1) (d)
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In my statement immediately after the election results were announced, I pledged full respect of the future government to the agreement between the IMF and government. As you know, the economy here is in a very difficult situation and we will seek your help in this regard. Mr. President, there is a great deal for your government and our new government to discuss and consult and I will discuss details with your envoy, Ambassador Bosworth, this afternoon. I want to meet you as soon as possible and I will take up this matter with Ambassador Bosworth this afternoon. Mr. President, that sums up pretty much what I have to say and now I would like you to say what you have to say. (C)

*say what you have to say
hear*

✓

The President: Thank you very much. First of all, I have a great deal of respect for your lifetime of commitment to democracy and progressive politics and your determination to stay active in politics until this important moment. (C)

President-elect Kim: Thank you very much, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I welcome your remarks about North Korea, and I am looking forward to meeting you soon. I'm glad you are meeting Ambassador Bosworth this afternoon. I have a lot of confidence in him. I feel that because of the difficulties due to the present financial situation, I feel I should make a couple of candid comments because I know you have to go. (C)

President-elect Kim: Yes, please do. (U)

The President: Your speech today was well received because you reaffirmed your commitment to the IMF reforms. But I think when you later said you wanted to renegotiate the agreement, it had a bad effect on the markets, which you can see by what happened today. Now I believe you were trying to say you were concerned by the impact of austerity on the lives of ordinary Koreans. But I think investors took it in the wrong way, that you wanted to continue practices which are unjustifiable in the current situation. I think that if some way today you could make further comments to reaffirm your determination to keep Korea on the path to economic reform and progressive politics, that would be good. Perhaps Ambassador Bosworth would have better suggestions as to what to say than I would. (C)

Let me say I also know the present government has retained Jeff Shaeffer to help deal with the present crisis. He used to work in my administration. He might be someone that you or someone you designate might wish to work with. He is a good man and I have confidence in him. I also would like to meet with you soon. Before then I would be willing to send a team to deal with economic matters. Our relationship with Korea is very important to the United States and I believe you are in a unique position because of your position and life experience and to do great things...and I want to help you succeed for the sake of our people and our relationship. (C) ✓

President-elect Kim: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, regarding the IMF agreement, I've been in written communication with Mr. Camdessus of the IMF. In my communication we discussed that we will review the agreement every three months. In that context is where my statement came from. I expressed complete support and agreement with Mr. Camdessus that this is where we will go. (C)

The President: I understand, but the only point I'm trying to make is that the markets are very shaky and volatile and we have to be careful what is said. That is evidenced by the fact that the rise of the markets and the rise of the Won after the comments you made earlier. But the status of the reserves remain perilously low. If there is anything you can do to make your position clear before the markets close today, that would be good...and perhaps you can discuss this with Ambassador Bosworth. I just don't want this reserve crisis to be worse in the short run. In the long run you are doing the right thing and we are going to be with you all the way. (C)

President-elect Kim: Yes, Mr. President, I fully understand your concern. As you said, I will be meeting with Ambassador Bosworth this afternoon and we will consider all of this. (C) ✓

The President: This is a wonderful day and I can't wait to see you. This is the culmination of a lifetime of devotion and you should very much enjoy this day. (U)

President-elect Kim: Mr. President, thank you very much for your warm and heartfelt congratulations. (U)

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001 -teleon	with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. (3 pages)	12/16/1997	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 2008

FOLDER TITLE:

9800094

2007-1908-F

vz397

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto

Notetakers: Peter Huggins, Anthony Campanella,
Jeffrey Rathke, James Smith

Interpreter: Hiomi Chimo

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 16, 1997, 2122-2133 EST
The Residence

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: This is the Japanese Prime Minister speaking.

THE PRESIDENT: Hi, how are you?

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Hi, Bill.

THE PRESIDENT: I know you're busy so I won't take a lot of your time.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I wanted to thank you for your magnificent leadership in Kyoto. I'm very grateful. I think it's a big first step and I think it's something you'll be proud of for the rest of your life.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Thank you very much for your kind words.

THE PRESIDENT: The second thing I wanted to do is congratulate you on the tax announcement you made today and the announcement you made yesterday on what you'll be doing on the banking issue. I know this is a very difficult moment for you and you showed great leadership both in Japan and throughout Asia. It is a very great thing you've done and I want to do whatever I can to support you.

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 11/07/2007

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11/24/2022

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PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Thank you. Yesterday we already announced a reduction of the corporate tax and a reduction of one-half on security trades. And we stopped the imposition of the land tax. An hour ago, we announced the reduction of the special income tax, starting January 1st of 1998. This was done by a supplementary budget for this fiscal year.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that's very good. I hope you get good support in the Diet and ministries for implementing this in the most effective way, and if you do it will help, not only in Japan, but throughout Asia.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Well, after my discussions with ASEAN leaders, I decided personally to do this myself. When I made the announcement, the media was so surprised that they weren't able to ask too many questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you need to keep them surprised.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Well, sometimes it's nice to have them very surprised. Taking advantage of this phone call, I would like to share with you the results of my discussions with the leaders of China, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN. Although there were very strong reservations on the part of ASEAN leaders on the activities of the IMF, I emphasized especially that we have to continue focusing on the assistance to South Korea and I repeatedly said to them that unless the conditions of IMF were implemented and abided by, no external resources would come from Europe or the U.S., both public and private. And I am relieved that in the final analysis, Mr. Mahathir and the other leaders finally were willing to accept this need. In any event, it is extremely important that our two countries cooperate and consult closely on this assistance to South Korea.

THE PRESIDENT: I really agree. I am concerned about Korea, but initially, I think strict adherence to the IMF plan and having all the presidential candidates telling Kim they will support it may turn the situation around for them.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Well, there was a proposal from some ASEAN countries that we should have regular meetings between the leaders of ASEAN and the leaders of China, Japan, and Korea. So there's some sentiment for meetings without the Americans present. I reiterated the need to be cautious about this approach, and I managed to somehow survive without answering the proposal so our ministers can discuss this further.

THE PRESIDENT: We ought to think about that; there might be some merit in it. But I think it is important that we should continue to coordinate our positions closely. And I want to be helpful. Some in Korea and ASEAN may think I was too strong in insisting

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on compliance with the IMF, but I know there is not enough money in U.S. and Japan combined to stop a run on their currencies unless they put their houses in order.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: I agree. So we must convey our approach focusing on the package of the IMF.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you. We'll work with you however we can. I'm very proud of you for taking this brave step. I believe it will help, and I will do whatever I can to be supportive.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Thank you very much, and Merry Christmas. And please convey my best regards to Hillary.

THE PRESIDENT: I will, thank you very much, Ryu. Goodbye.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: Goodbye.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	with Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister of Japan. (4 pages)	01/12/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 2009

FOLDER TITLE:

9800248

2007-1908-F
vz398

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister of Japan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister

Interpreter: Paul Hersey

Notetaker: Lyle Harrison, Jeffrey Rathke, Marianna Papadimitriou, Robert Ford, Jim Smith, Ralph Sigler, Ed Rice

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 12, 1998, 8:24 - 8:50 p.m. EST
Residence

The President: Hello, Ryu? (U)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Yes, this is Ryu. How are you Bill? (U)

The President: I am doing great, and it is nice to hear your voice. I thought it would be useful to stay in close touch as we go through this financial turbulence. (C)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Thank you for your phone call. I talked to President Soeharto for quite a lengthy time. Although Soeharto reassured me he had talked to the Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Mr. Fischer and told him that he would abide by the IMF agreement, I am not sure he appreciates the depth or seriousness of the problem. After more than 14 minutes of phone conversation, I repeatedly told Soeharto that he should only say that Indonesia would abide by the IMF agreements and not mention extra things. At the end of the conversation, he told me he appreciated my advice. So I think that the Camdessus meeting will be important. I would like to ask you to have Summers emphasize this point of compliance with the IMF, so Soeharto does not add other details or subjects. I cannot lie about my impression that other details about compliance with the IMF may not be fully briefed to the president. After Tony Blair

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify on: 01/17/2008

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4/28/2022

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and European Commission President Santer were in Japan last night, I asked for their cooperation to persuade President Soeharto. (C)

The President: Well, first of all, it sounds like you had a good phone call with him, like the one I had with him. I assure you Larry Summers will convey the same message. There are some signs of improvement in the investor community. I wanted to talk a little about the way things are going in Japan. The turbulence in the rest of Asia really puts a big responsibility on you in helping to restore confidence in the whole region and makes it more difficult for you, but coincides with your goal of domestic demand-led growth. Your tax proposal was an important first step in the right direction, but the IMF analysis and that of our own experts suggests that even after the proposed tax cuts, your fiscal policy is set to contract again next year and additional stimulus is necessary to offset the contraction in fiscal policy. (C)

I know that is really difficult because of your previous course, but additional fiscal stimulus will bolster domestic demand and market confidence. The deteriorating situation in Asia and continuing weakness in the Japanese banking system give you a reason to do something more. I am very concerned that a prolonged slowdown and deeper crisis in Japan will do greater damage to your long-term fiscal consolidation goals than any temporary stimulus to promote growth. It appears that your opposition is more divided and weaker than a few weeks ago, and that some might even support greater efforts. I also wanted to ask you what your thinking was on this, in light of the continued turmoil in other Asian countries. (C)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: I have to point out that the opposition members are not thinking about the situation as a whole, but only from the perspective of getting back into government and not on the economic future of Asia. Yesterday I made a speech on my fiscal measures and measures to stabilize the financial situation and today there will be questions from opposition members demanding an explanation for the differences between my current and previous positions. The opposition is not asking future-oriented questions. The questions have only one thing in common, and that is: if I resign the Japanese economy will get better. (C)

The President: I don't believe that. (U)

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PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO: I would like to point out that the message conveyed to Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nukaga by Deputy Secretary Summers and others in the American government has been conveyed to me in a very accurate manner. We do appreciate all the advice about fiscal, financial and tax measures, but having said that I do fully appreciate American concerns, I have to ask you to please keep quiet and view this in a calm manner, because we now have to go through the process of having the Diet approve what we have already decided to do. There are different views in the Diet, some party members say that, since the U.S. government is interested in it, then we should do it. At the same time, there are others who feel very uncomfortable and resist because the Americans are demanding it. For us to carry out the text that I announced earlier in December we have to answer all those questions and persuade those parliamentarians that those measures are necessary. I always appreciate our consultations and your advice, but since we just began the parliamentary session, we need time to go through the process of explaining what we already promised to do. In this context, we are concerned that a drive to increase imports might lead to an increase of the yen. If this happens we cannot have any progress in the Diet. (C)

The President: I understand that. My only real concern is that the situation in Asia is increasingly unstable and events may overtake what you are trying to do. I am just concerned whether we have enough time to do what needs to be done. I also wanted to say a word about the financial stabilization efforts you are making. I think the announcement of substantial public money was a very constructive step and the market responded most favorably when you indicated that you would let the bad institutions fail and the bad managers take responsibility for bad decisions, but depositors would be protected. I know these issues are difficult for you, but you have played a very constructive role in addressing Asia's financial challenges, and I want to be supportive of your difficult decisions. I just don't want events to overwhelm all that you're trying to do. (C)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: With all the questions surrounding Asia as a whole, it is only natural for me to continue to pay close attention to developments in the region and this is why I am in the closest consultation with you and President Soeharto. Now I would like to address this situation. I would like to concentrate on approval for a special tax cut of two trillion yen in February, so I can bring this about. At the same time, with infusion of public funds of 30 trillion yen by the year

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2001, depositors will be protected in full. The offending financial institutions will fail and the performing banks will be able to expand their base as well. I will take full note of your advice that there should be transparency in this process. I recognize its importance and will do my best. I would like to create an environment so that I can begin the tax cuts in corporate, land and security transactions taxes this April. I would like to appropriate a portion of the budget for this fiscal year already submitted to the Diet, which includes public works expenditures of 2.5 trillion yen. So I will appreciate your full support for my efforts. But the opposition in the Japanese Diet and some quarters in the media as well think that the best fiscal policy at this moment is to fire me, and they would not tell me who my successor would be. (C)

The President: You can't quit, you have to stay and fight. (C)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Thank you. On the Japanese situation or the situation in Indonesia I believe that it is important to talk to you and I will certainly do that. Please give my regards to Hillary as well. (C)

The President: I will. We have to stay in close touch. We can't let this get out of hand. I worry about it spinning out of control on us. (C)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Thank you. (U)

The President: Goodbye, Ryu. (U)

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Bill, thanks. Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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