

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Name. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	n.d.	P3/b(3)
002. memo	For George Tenet. Subject: Request for Information. [partial] (1 page)	05/24/1993	P1/b(1) v2. 6/11/2020
003. report	Subject: India. (29 pages)	04/1993	P1/b(1)
004. report	Subject: Deteriorating Situation in Kashmir. [partial] (3 pages)	05/04/1993	P1/b(1) v2 6/11/2020
005. report	Subject: The Indian Army. (7 pages)	01/22/1993	P1/b(1)
006. draft	Report on Pakistan. (9 pages)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1)
007. report	Subject: Pakistan. (12 pages)	02/24/1993	P1/b(1)
008. report	Subject: India/Kashmir. (2 pages)	10/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Intelligence Programs (George Tenet)
OA/Box Number: 2492

FOLDER TITLE:

Kashmir

2007-1635-F
v22065

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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SECRET

EO 13526-3

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

24 May 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Tenet
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Intelligence Programs
National Security Council

FROM: [redacted] EO 13526-3
Chief, South Asia Division
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Kashmir and
Indo-Pak Support for Dissidents [redacted] EO 13526-3

I am enclosing some recent papers on Kashmir and on
Indo-Pakistani support for each other's dissidents, which
you requested. [redacted] (b)(1); EO 13526-3 (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1); EO 13526-3 (b)(1); 3:5c

[redacted] EO 13526-3:5c

Attachments:
As stated

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/04/2020 (1.01)
2017-0041-M-1

[redacted] EO 13526-3:5c

EO 13526-3

SECRET

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4 May 1993

Deteriorating Situation in Kashmir

The security situation in Kashmir is worsening as the militants step up attacks and security force abuses mount. New Delhi's continuing failure to find a political or military solution to the state's problems means the issue will remain a major source of problems between India and Pakistan. [REDACTED]

Last month's police riot following the death of an off-duty Muslim policeman at the hands of Indian security forces has deepened Kashmiri alienation. Although the confrontation ended peacefully last week, it underscored the mistrust that cripples government efforts to contain the insurgents and weakens support for New Delhi among nonmilitant leaders. [REDACTED]

Insurgency Expands

Militant attacks have surpassed last year's high rate despite a reduction in Pakistani support for the insurgency.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)-EO 13526-3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] the militants are conducting more direct attacks on government property and security forces.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)-EO 13526-3.3(b)(1)

the reduction in

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 02/04/2020 (1.03)

2017-0041-M-1

Pakistani support has not affected the larger militant groups, which are largely self-sufficient in arms and supplies.

EO 13526/3.5c

Paramilitary and police forces--and increasingly the Army--are responding with harsher treatment of suspected militants and sympathizers during security operations,

EO 13526/3.3(b)(1), 3.5c (b)(1)

Government Confusion Continues

New Delhi has been unable to develop an effective strategy for stabilizing the political situation in Kashmir. Prime Minister Rao assigned Rajesh Pilot, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, the task of laying the groundwork for elections by seeking the cooperation of militant groups. But Pilot's attempts to persuade credible militant interlocutors to come forward by offering formal talks without preconditions have failed. Militants continue to insist that New Delhi acknowledge Kashmir's disputed status before they will agree to formal dialogue. Pilot's efforts to seek a solution have been undercut by security force abuses, opposition from senior Home Ministry officials, and

extremist militant attacks on Kashmiris who express interest in negotiating with New Delhi.

Outlook

Rao wants to resolve the Kashmir issue before the three-year period of direct rule allowed in the Indian Constitution expires in September. He will remain unwilling to take bold steps, however, because of the strong opposition of the Hindu-chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party to increased autonomy for Kashmir. Elections are highly unlikely because Kashmiri distrust of New Delhi and limits on the degree of autonomy the central government can offer secessionist interlocutors will prevent Pilot from gaining the cooperation of militant leaders. If New Delhi goes ahead without the cooperation of militant groups, the insurgents almost certainly will attempt to sabotage the elections.

Failure to resolve the current crisis will keep Kashmir a volatile flashpoint in already strained Indo-Pakistani relations. Islamabad will use any further deterioration in the security situation to press for greater international involvement in resolving the dispute, while India will step up its efforts to portray Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	White House Situation Room to Various. Subject: Kashmir. (6 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: India's PM. (4 pages)	06/11/1999	P1/b(1)
003. report	Regional Notes: South Asia. India-Pakistan: Growing Prospects of a Wider War [partial] (2 pages)	06/12/1999	P1/b(1) vz 6/11/2020
004. report	Spot Commentary. (1 page)	06/11/1999	P1/b(1)
005. memo	To Karl Inderfurth from Michael Malinowski. Subject: A Comprehensive Approach. (3 pages)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Subject: Pakistan-India: Diplomatic Lessons of the 1990 Crisis. [partial] (3 pages)	06/08/1999	P1/b(1) vz 6/11/2020
007. report	Transcript. (11 pages)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1)
008. email	White House Situation Room to Various. Subject: Indian Minister. (3 pages)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1)
009. email	White House Situation Room to Various. Subject: Request for Demarche. (3 pages)	06/05/1999	P1/b(1)
010. email	Bruce Riedel to APSNA, NSA, WHSR and NESA. Subject: Pakistan. (5 pages)	06/05/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Near East and South Asian Affairs (Donald Camp)
OA/Box Number: 2946

FOLDER TITLE:

Kargil [Folder 1] [4]

2007-1635-F
vz2069

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~Top Secret~~ [EO 13526/3.5c]

CIA Worldwide National Intelligence Daily

12 June 1999 (Destroy any printed copies within 30 days of this date.)

PASS NID 99-135

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/04/2020 (1.61)
2017-0041-M-1

[EO 13526/3.5c]

Regional Notes: South Asia

India-Pakistan: Growing Prospects for Wider War [3.5c]

Military Preparations Spreading Beyond Kashmir, 1-10 June 1999 [3.5c]

Key Indian Army garrisons along the western border are taking steps that would enable India to shift quickly from defensive to offensive operations. [EO 13526/1.4c-3.5c]

[Redacted block of text with (b)(1) and EO 13526/1.4c-3.5c markings]

Pakistani forces are less active but are closer to the border and would need less time to mobilize. [3.5c]

Timetable for Escalation [3.5c]

Indian media on Thursday denounced Pakistan for allegedly torturing and killing six Indian soldiers after their capture last month, which despite Pakistani denials will further poison the atmosphere surrounding the Foreign Ministry talks scheduled for today. If these talks fail, as is likely, Indian forces will be ready by next week to expand its offensive against the militants at Kargil. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee plans to visit the area tomorrow, suggesting a decision could come shortly thereafter.

- The Intelligence Community would expect India initially to confine its operations to the Line

[EO 13526/3.5c]

of Control where it perceives Pakistan reinforcing its positions on the captured Indian high ground. [3:5c]

Both countries would need far more time to prepare for a general war because they are operating under logistic constraints. The two nonetheless could miscalculate and inadvertently begin a war before they are ready. [3:5c]

Monsoon rains and heat would hamper—but not prohibit—operations in western India from late this month through early September. Weather would not significantly affect operations in Kashmir, but it would hinder logistic support to the area from elsewhere in India. [3:5c]

How Escalation Could Occur [3:5c]

Either country could decide to expand the conflict beyond Kargil, but India appears more likely to take the initiative, especially if New Delhi fails to recover its lost territory and if its casualties mount. Vajpayee would come under increasing pressure to attack elsewhere, particularly as the elections draw closer in September and in early October.

- A larger conflict could quickly spread southward along the LOC and the international border, where India would have a significant conventional military advantage.

[Redacted text block containing E.O. 13526, 1.4c, 3:5c]

If India wanted to limit the conflict to Kashmir, it could try to seize Pakistani territory to trade for the Kargil heights in later negotiations. Both countries used this tactic in 1965 and 1971.

- There could be little warning if India decided to widen the war by mounting a strike across the border in view of the forces now assembled in northern Kashmir.
- [Redacted text block containing E.O. 13526, 1.4c, 3:5c] broad-scale conventional mobilizations farther south, however, if India decided to threaten Lahore or launch an assault elsewhere along the international border [3:5c]

Pakistan could move first in the mistaken belief it is winning and has the best chance in years to revive the Kashmir militancy and to force a change to the status quo. Islamabad might assume that India would not risk a wider war because of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. [3:5c]

~~Top Secret~~ [Redacted text block containing E.O. 13526, 3:5c]

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[REDACTED] 35c

8 June 1999

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Pakistan-India: Diplomatic Lessons of the 1990 Crisis [REDACTED] 35c

1. The last major confrontation between India and Pakistan suggests that they will disengage only if persuaded that the price of continuing the fight in Kashmir is far greater than the political cost of backing away. [REDACTED] 35c

[REDACTED] 35c

- The mission of the US Deputy National Security Adviser helped defuse the crisis by highlighting the danger of the situation. [REDACTED] 35c

[REDACTED] 35c

Higher Hurdles

Vajpayee and Sharif may be harder to pull back from the brink. Virtually all commentators agree that neither side considers wider war imminent, and backing away from the current fight poses greater political risks than it did in 1990.

- Vajpayee is a caretaker prime minister facing elections, and Sharif is under pressure from Islamists and from the military and foreign ministry. [REDACTED] 35c

Public comments suggest both sides underestimate the potential for escalation. Pakistan is confident that its nuclear weapons will deter a full scale Indian invasion despite the Indian Army chief's statement earlier this year that nuclear weapons prevent only nuclear use, not conventional war.

- Pakistan may have concluded from its 1990 experience that it is free to expand the confrontation because the US will intervene if given clear signs that Islamabad is readying nuclear weapons.
- Such signs, however, would risk Indian detection—and possibly preemptive strikes—before diplomacy could be brought to bear. [REDACTED] 35c

Openings for Diplomacy

As in 1990, the most promising diplomatic approach would be one that plays on both countries' desire for international respect. The international community could try to play on Indian and

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] 35c of the Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis. The author can be reached [REDACTED] 35c

SECRET [REDACTED] 35c

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~~SECRET~~ [3:5c]

Pakistani pride by challenging both to back up their claims that they can maturely manage their nuclear status and avoid mistakes the superpowers made in the Cold War.

- This approach might include stronger encouragement to use existing confidence building measures and to pursue the Lahore declaration and the Pakistani proposal for bilateral talks in New Delhi. [3:5c]

Because US motives are considered suspect by both parties, mediation would be more effective if some combination of China, Russia, France, Japan, and Saudi Arabia were seen to be leading the effort. Islamabad and New Delhi might benefit particularly from concrete examples-- both US and Russian--of the effective use of confidence building measures in the Cold War. [3:5c]

[E.O. 13526] [3:5c]

~~SECRET~~ [3:5c]

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