

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Message to Acting President Putin on Chechnya (3 pages)	03/01/2000	P1/b(1) KBA 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([Putin])
OA/Box Number: 530000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/01/2000]

2017-0222-M
kh2018

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RHEHAAA5411 0610319-CCCC--RUXXWHX RUEHMO RUEHC.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC
LINE3: O 010322Z MAR 00 ZFF-1/ZFF-4
LINE4: FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
OSRI: RHEHAAA
DTG:
ORIG: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: RUEHC/SEC STATE WASHDC
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO ACTING PRESIDENT PUTIN ON
CHECHNYA
BEGIN TEXT.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2017-0222-M(1.01)
3/7/2019 KBH

DEAR VLADIMIR:

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS
QQQQ

AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO ACTING PRESIDENT
PUTIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW:

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO ACTING PRESIDENT PUTIN ON
CHECHNYA
BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR VLADIMIR:

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5411 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL RESPONSE TO MY EARLIER LETTER
DESCRIBING THE GOALS AND PRINCIPLES THAT I HOPE WILL GUIDE
U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS OVER THE COMING YEAR. CLEARLY, THERE
IS CONSIDERABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. I ALSO BELIEVE SERGEY
IVANOV'S RECENT VISIT WILL HELP GENERATE MOMENTUM IN SEVERAL
KEY AREAS, IN PARTICULAR ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION AND
ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

I REMAIN VERY TROUBLED BY THE SITUATION IN CHECHNYA, WHICH HAS
CAST A SHADOW OVER RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY. YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE AT GREAT
LENGTH, AND MY VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN TO YOU. I APPRECIATE YOUR
EFFORTS IN RECENT DAYS TO SECURE THE SAFE RETURN AND RELEASE
OF ANDREY BABITSKIY. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL ALSO WORK TO ENSURE
THAT JOURNALISTS ARE ABLE TO REPORT FROM THE REGION WITHOUT
UNNECESSARY CONSTRAINTS.

THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA APPEARS TO BE ENTERING A NEW PHASE, AND THE ACTIONS RUSSIA TAKES NOW COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING SIGNIFICANCE. I KNOW THAT I SPEAK FOR ALL AMERICANS WHEN I

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5411 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXPRESS MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE FLOW OF REPORTS FROM RESPECTED MEDIA AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ABOUT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING RUSSIA'S MILITARY CAMPAIGN. YOUR APPOINTMENT OF A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE THESE ALLEGATIONS WAS A POSITIVE STEP.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT RUSSIA NOW BUILD CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THERE WILL BE OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ANY ABUSES THAT OCCURRED. MADELEINE HAS OUTLINED SEVERAL CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN A RECENT LETTER TO IGOR IVANOV THAT I BELIEVE MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE. I CONSIDER IT ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO PERMIT THE RETURN OF THE OSCE ASSISTANCE GROUP TO THE REGION ON A PERMANENT BASIS; TO ENABLE FREE ACCESS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS THROUGHOUT CHECHNYA, INCLUDING DETENTION CENTERS; AND THAT THERE BE COOPERATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS AND RUSSIAN INVESTIGATORS ON THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS OF REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN PLACES SUCH AS GROZNIY AND ALKHAN-YURT.

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA5411 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE U.S.-EU-RUSSIA MEEETING IN LISBON LATER THIS WEEK IS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS. I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE IGOR IVANOV THE INSTRUCTIONS HE NEEDS SO THAT THE CHECHNYA ISSUE DOES NOT OVERSHADOW OTHER IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS IN LISBON.

AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER. I KNOW THAT THIS IS A PARTICULARLY BUSY AND DIFFICULT TIME FOR YOU. STILL, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK HARD TO ADDRESS THE SERIOUS QUESTIONS GENERATED BY RUSSIA'S OPERATIONS IN CHECHNYA AND TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL ATMOSPHERE AS WE MOVE FORWARD ON OUR AMBITIOUS COMMON AGENDA.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT

DECL: 28 FEB 2010

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA5411 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR: 02/29/00 22:43:56

DIST: SIT: Ficklin Medish Millison SUM2 Wasserman Weiss NODIS
PRT: BASH BERGER BRADTKE Comm CROCKER FUERTH POWELL RUDMAN SIT{C2}

STEINBERG SUTPHEN

SIT: COQ

SIT: Ficklin Medish Millison SUM2 Wasserman Weiss NODIS

PRT: BASH BERGER BRADTKE Comm CROCKER FUERTH POWELL RUDMAN SIT{C2}

STEINBERG SUTPHEN

SIT: COQ

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	James Smith to Andrew Weiss re: Draft Memocon, NSA Berger- Russian FSB Chief Putin, 15 June 1999 (8 pages)	06/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
002. email	Michael Manning to Carlos Pascual, Andrew Weiss, and Regina Faranda re: Eyes Only Berger Putin Telecon (4 pages)	06/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
003. email	Michael Manning to Andrew Weiss and Carlos Pascual re: Eyes Only Berger-Putin Telcon 2 July 1999 (6 pages)	07/02/1999	P1/b(1)
004. email	Jenny McGee to Andrew Weiss re: FW: Berger-Putin (10 pages)	08/04/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	Roger Merletti to James Smith re: Berger/Putin Note (2 pages)	08/12/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Berger and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/15/1999 - 08/12/1999]

2017-0222-M

kh2019

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME	6/15/99 12:44:55 PM	
FROM	Smith, James A.	
CLASSIFICATION	CONFIDENTIAL	DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
CLASSIFICATIONREASON	1.5(d)	2017-0222-M (1.02)
DATECLASSIFIEDON	06/15/1999	3/7/2019 KBH
DECLASSIFYON	06/15/2009	
SUBJECT	Draft Memcon, NSA Berger-Russian FSB Chief Putin, 15 June 1999 [CONFIDENTIAL]	
TO	Weiss, Andrew S.	
CARBON_COPY	Bayley, Douglas C. Bresnahan, Gary E. Broadwick, Bonnie . Campanella, Anthony Chastain, George M. Cheramie, Don E. Crowder, Stevan D. Crowell, Thomas R. Ehrendreich, Joel Erdahl, Douglas M. Ford, Robert G. Fuchs, Joachim D. Glick, Bonnie L. Jansen, Christian P. Jarosinski, Frank J. Laskowski, Gregory J. Manning, Michael T. McClellan, Christina L. McGee, Jenny A. Merletti, Roger D. Murphy, Miles R. Payne, Raymond H. Porterfield Patrick C. Powell, Elliott Rickard, Robin S. Rogers, Elizabeth B. Schrader, Joel M. Sibley, Matthew W. Sigler, Ralph H. Smith, James A. Tarver, J. Sean	

Williams, Robert S.

TEXT_BODY

Andrew - Attached is a draft memcon of the call this morning between SRB and Putin.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Putin061599.doc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BERGER
RUSSIAN FSB CHIEF AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
PUTIN

LOCATION: NSA SUITE

NOTE TAKERS: JIM SMITH AND DOUG BAYLEY

INTERPRETER: KYRILL BORISSOW

DATE/TIME: 15 JUNE 1999/1034-1113 EDT

NSA BERGER: Hello, Vladimir? This is Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Advisor. It is good to talk to you.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: Good afternoon, Sandy.

NSA BERGER: I wanted first of all to simply establish a channel of communication as I had with some of your predecessors, so that you would feel free to call me, and I could call you from time to time if there are particular problems we could help resolve together.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: I am thankful to you for this, Sandy. And I would like first of all to convey best wishes from Mr. Kokoshin.

NSA BERGER: Please tell him I said hello. I hope he is doing well.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: I am in contact with him and he thought I should get in touch

with you.

NSA BERGER: I was originally calling on Saturday to talk to you about the situation in Kosovo. My impression is that the meeting that was just completed by Generals Jackson and Zvarzin was positive, and they made good progress. I think this is the result of a very good conversation that our two presidents had yesterday. If we resolve this situation at the airport, then we need now to move to find a long-term formula for Russian participation in KFOR. Secretary Cohen, I know, is going to Helsinki and meeting with Defense Minister Sergeyev, and I hope they can reach some understanding in time for the meeting of our two presidents in Cologne. From our standpoint, the important standard is for KFOR to be effective with unity of command and that the Russian forces be fully integrated into KFOR, in part to avoid becoming a target for the KLA. I want you to know, Vladimir, that we take the threat posed by the KLA very seriously. When we received some information from your government yesterday that there might be some plot to attack Russian forces, our people immediately went to KLA people, KLA officials, that we know, and said we had information about this and it would be totally intolerable. And it is my understanding we were able to avert this threat. I am very serious about having the responsibility of KFOR -- the demilitarization the KLA as part of its responsibility. That is what I want to say about the Kosovo issue.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: With your permission, I would like to make also a couple of comments. I agree with your assessment, first of all. I think the decisive role was played by our two presidents. And I do not think that the airport and everything connected to it will be a big issue. We do have joint experience like this in Tuzla, for instance, and we managed to find an acceptable solution there.

And I think in this particular case we could follow the same format. And the Russian side will be prepared to take certain obligations in terms of control, as in Tuzla, so that necessary functions would be played, taking in account the interests of all parties concerned. And I also agree that we must have joint command all the operations in Kosovo. And I also agree that the Russian servicemen unit should be integrated into KFOR. And again, in Bosnia we managed to find an appropriate solution. So here in this case we can have different options but basically we have the necessary basis. And we would also prefer that these issues should be resolved before the Cologne summit. I do not think that we are or should be in a position to create additional difficulties for our presidents, who already have enough burdens to carry on their shoulders. Now, concerning the KLA. I think the KLA is a threat not only for Russian peacekeepers but for all peacekeepers there. We know already of a certain incident when they attacked British soldiers. And here we already have not bad cooperation between our servicemen and those from the Alliance, they are mutually assisting each other. And I think that by the ... and it would be wrong to bring in a new notion of disarmament as Mr. Bacon from the Pentagon said. And our assumption is that the peacekeeping force must be there and no other force.

NSA BERGER: I am having a little trouble hearing the interpreter.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: And we very much hope that very shortly that these problems will be resolved by our two ministers in Helsinki and a proper solution will be found. And in any case, we do know that we need to cooperate with the Alliance and vice-versa.

NSA BERGER: Yes, I heard what you said. And I agree that we should try to get this resolved in Helsinki so that a recommendation, a joint recommendation, can

be made to the two presidents, which they can then approve on Sunday. There are many very important issues that our two presidents should talk about on Sunday, including economic issues and arms control issues, and hopefully they will not be preoccupied with this issue. On the KLA, Vladimir, I certainly agree that they pose a threat to all of KFOR, all the various nations. I did notice that yesterday the British arrested six people, who were perhaps KLA, who were acting in a threatening manner, and I think we have to respond very firmly to any threats. There is no reason now for anyone other than KFOR to have any kind of military capabilities in Kosovo.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: I would like very much that we do that jointly.

NSA BERGER: I think this is something that we should work out with the generals on the ground.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: Absolutely correct.

NSA BERGER: Let me raise, if I may, one other subject, an issue that Andrei and I worked on together. That is nonproliferation.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: Yes, please.

NSA BERGER: We were very pleased to hear from Prime Minister Stepashin's staff that your government supports the action plan that Mr. Galucchi and Mr. Kupchev reached on Iran missiles. It is, I know, an issue that is important to your government and is important to ours and can have a major impact on the health of our relations. For example, there is very important cooperation in the commercial space launch area which very much depends on our cooperation in the nonproliferation area. I appreciate that the FSB has an important role in the enforcement of Russian export control policy, and I simply wanted to let you know that I am willing to work with you on this program in any way you believe would be helpful.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: I am familiar with the content of the information given by Mr.

Talbott and also with that of a letter by Mr. Gore to Prime Minister Stepashin.

I think that those proposals may be acceptable in principle. For our part, we will be supportive of those proposals. We shall increase our control of exports

and also over dual technologies. We have already established a command control

system over 37 enterprises here in Russia. And the enterprises are key ones in

this area. And on the nonproliferation issue we have established at the Security

Council an interagency group which has been operating already for some time. And

we also have a plan of action, the Galucchi-Kupchev plan, and in fact we are

already embarking upon its specific implementation. We have certain difficulties

in terms of its legislative support for our part, but we are actively working

with our State Duma. And the State Duma has a second reading of this piece of

legislation tomorrow. In fact, there are no major opponents to this legislation

in the Duma. As regards some opponents, we are trying to work with them. Now,

Sandy, if I may ask you that could you do me such a favor? Could you make use of

your very considerable authority and influence so that the question of sanctions

does not arise all the time or only from time to time. You see, such threats are

not conducive to the promotion of the Russian-American dialogue. Should any

problems arise here, they would arise from lack of information. And should such

problems arise, we could attempt to solve those problems quickly maybe through

this line of communications that we have established with you, Sandy. In any

case, we shall be doing everything we can to abide by the obligations we

undertook in this area. This is it what I wanted to tell you on this particular

issue.

NSA BERGER: What you said is very encouraging. On the issue of sanctions, as

the government of Russia -- it is obviously preferable for your government to enforce a strong export policy with respect to missile technology to Iran, and it sounds to me like you are strengthening that enforcement and if the Russian government is enforcing its policy in this respect, that obviously diminishes the need for us to discuss sanctions ourselves. Vladimir, I am very pleased to have had this opportunity to at least meet each other on the phone. I look forward to some time when we can meet each other in person. I want to thank you for the time you gave to Strobe Talbott over the weekend and for your efforts to resolve the issues in Kosovo. I think that clearly the conflict in Kosovo puts some strains on our relations. Now that is over, and we can work together to build the peace and we can also focus our attention on helping build a strong Russia.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: I would like to see that very much and we shall be trying to achieve this. We would like that our joint work in Kosovo should not be any point of tension between us, but rather it should strengthen our cooperation there and also show our ability to work jointly. It should also increase mutual trust, especially between our militaries. May I also ask you to give Mr. Talbott the best of my regards. I learned a great deal from him while we were working together with him here. He really is an excellent diplomat. But I also hope that he could tell you about certain things he saw here in Moscow. And may I, Sandy, thank you personally and also thank the entire presidential staff. As well as all the people contributing to your position on the Kosovo issue. The gentle manner in which the issue has been discussed shows absolutely that he has very good advisors and assistants. And I also hope that we shall someday be in a position to have such a telephone discussion like today, but also to meet with you in person. Thank you very much for this conversation.

NSA BERGER: Thank you very much, Vladimir.

FSB CHIEF PUTIN: Goodbye.

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/24/99 12:43:09 PM
FROM Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/24/1999
DECLASSIFYON 06/24/2009
SUBJECT Eyes Only Berger-Putin Telcon ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO Pascual, Carlos E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Faranda, Regina D. (RUE/INTERN)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.03)
3/7/2019 KBH

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger-Putin.doc
Berger-Putin Michael

Putin: Good morning, I am happy to welcome you

Berger: Good morning. It's very good to talk to you again. I thought it would be useful to talk after our Presidents met. They had a good meeting after a stretch in our relationship. I very much appreciate your role you played in preparation for those meetings, and the President in his interview with ITOG I tried to incorporate some of the themes that came out of his talks. I hope the interview had a positive theme in Russia. There were a number of items that came out of the meeting that require follow up, and I know Madeleine Albright will be meeting with Ivanov in New York Tuesday, and Strobe and Mamedov had a good talk with Carlos Pascual, my senior Russian person, and Jim Timbey. Timbey and Caravelli from the NSC are in Moscow now heading the talks on nonproliferation. These are very important. I hope we can move to closure on these

issues very quickly. I think what will be important will be a specific response to the Vice President's letter to the Prime Minister [drop] so we can move to resolve the question of the quota. What you told me last time we spoke was encouraging about implementing the ideas that have been worked out between Galucci and (?Hupkep). I think the next steps would be to get a written response from the Prime Minister and put us in a position to make a decision on the [drop] I have some other issues, but would very much like to hear from you.

Putin: Thank you for the assessment on the work we have done. For five days I traveled in Russian and was in Siberia and Volga. I believe if you have enough time it will be significant for you to visit these regions of Russia and the nature there. For me, it was important to hear your assesment of the meeting between our Presidents in Cologne. As for our assessment, we are on the right track. The U.S. experts are in Moscow, and we have been looking forward to meeting them for a long time. As for the Vice President's letter and a possible response, I believe in the near future we will take a decision on the agreement that was reached between Mamedov [drop] and there are some problems that are reserved for us, but taking into account the significance of relations between the U.S. and Russia, we attach significance to that, and you will receive a positive Stepashin response in the near future. We also look forward to the positive response from the U.S. [drop] space launches . I am prepared to hear out any other questions or issues you may have.

Berger: Thank you for those comments. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than to travel through Russia. Some day I will accept it and would love it very much. I am pleased to hear you say we are approaching approval of the plan signed by (?Holland) and Mamedov. If you have any reservations, we

can resolve
them quickly. I am also pleased we will get a Stepashin response
soon. It would
be a very good thing if we can put these issues behind and move on to
a new set
of cooperative ventures. One thing I want to mention is the nuclear
issue [drop]
the cooperation between (?Nikayet) with Iran on nuclear assistance.
This is one
area you can investigate and discuss with me in the future what the
results are.
I just have three other final issues to raise very quickly. First, I am
pleased
we were able to issue a joint statement on START III and ABM. It is
clear our
Presidents want [drop] during the remainder of their terms. That's an
ambitious
undertaking but think that it's one we need to work on and achieve.
Second, I
know you will see Jim Collins tomorrow. There is a sensitive
intelligence matter
I asked Jim to brief you on. I will appreciate your personal advice on
how we
can handle this issue. And the final issue is, I wonder if there is any
chance
you can accompany Stepashin to the U.S. so you and I can have a
face-to-face
meeting. If possible, I will suggest to the Vice President that you be
included
on the team when he comes. I will find it very worthwhile and
enjoyable to have
an opportunity to have some time to talk face to face. That's all I have.
I
will interested to hear your thoughts on those subjects.

Putin: Thank you. I will start with the last part. Thank you for the
invitation. It depends [drop] that we take and will be more than happy
to go,
but I believe he is not very happy...to go from Moscow at the moment.
It is
quite possible, I would be more than happy to accept it. We are indeed
preparing
our visit and believe it would be a [drop] between the U.S. and Russia.
As to
the [drop] I believe it is very complicated to separate the
issues...opposition
to our ...one thing is clear now: It is very advisable to meet socially
our
actions in this field so that the sense of confidence does not
disappear...essence

to avoid international...I am more than happy to meet Collins tomorrow and will discuss the subjects you propose for the talks. That is all I wanted to say.
May I add the following on the first subject we discussed in our conversation. I would like to inform you the Duma approved the law on export controls. This is the law we discussed during our last conversation, and it will create a good legal basis in the field which gives rise to our...and through you, I would like to express my gratitude to the experts here in Moscow...control. For us it is of the essence to achieve a mutual understanding, a common language. I am sure we have the chance to have...in these fields as well as what we have done in Kosovo recently. By the way, those arrangements I have...by the way and as far as I understand, the public perceives as very positive. What really matters ...to coordinate our positions and bring them subject to each. Thanks again for the invitation. I do hope the context we have will develop and is the essence for us. Thank you very much , Sandy. It was nice talking with you.

Berger: It was nice also talking to you. Congratulations on the Duma's actions.
That is very good news. Congratulations to you and the Prime Minister. If it is not convenient for you to come with Stepashin, perhaps we can arrange for a separate time but will leave that to you.

Putin: Thank you very much indeed, Sandy.

Berger: Have a good day.

Putin: Goodbye.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Berger and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/15/1999 - 08/12/1999]

2017-0222-M
kh2019

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/12/99 1:08:17 PM
FROM Merletti, Roger D. (WHSR)
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 08/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON 08/12/2009
SUBJECT Berger/Putin Note [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Smith, James A. (WHSR)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.06)
3/7/2019 KBH

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Putin.Berger.doc
BERGER - PUTIN TELEPHONE CALL 12 AUG 1999

Berger: Hello.

Putin: Good afternoon, Sandy.

Berger: Good afternoon, Mr. Prime Minister.

Putin: Unfortunately, I'm not yet Prime Minister. I have to pass a vote in the

lower house of parliament on Monday. And everything depends on the decision...

Everything is favorable... Sandy, I'm calling to express my gratitude we've had

during the process of useful work. In my view, ... businesslike... My cooperation with you helped me a lot in my work... And I am pleased to say I

felt support from you. I would like to express support to you and your colleagues for your support to my naming as prime Minister of Russia. I would

like to let you know and the State Department that there will be no sharp changes

to the cabinet. This pertains to foreign policy and domestic economic policy.

We will adhere to the agreements with the World Bank and IMF... Russian and U.S.

full trade and technology relationship. These are general remarks I just

voiced.

It stands to reason that the issues of nonproliferation... As to our plans and our meeting, judging by all things, my first trip will be to Auckland, New Zealand on 12 and 13 December of this year. We will talk if you will be a member of the delegation...

Berger: It's good to hear from you. I want to express my congratulations to you. I know the Duma will take up your nomination on Monday. We will be watching closely and hope it goes quickly. I'm very grateful for the opportunity to work with you. I think we've done good work together on Kosovo and nonproliferation and... I'm happy to hear the government will continue on the same course. At Colon, our two presidents set a strong agenda for our two countries in economics, proliferation, and arms control. And I believe we can make progress in all three. On the nonproliferation issue... I hope those will be constructive conversations. Finally, regarding New Zealand, we look forward to seeing you there. I'm happy you're coming... arrange the President to meet with you... I don't know what the schedule is yet. I hope to see you there. You have heavy, new responsibilities but I have great confidence you will do an excellent job in your new position. That's all I have to say.

Putin: Many thanks to you. All the best regards. I believe the relations we will be developing we can... All the best to you.

Berger: Good luck to you. Goodbye.

Putin: Goodbye.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mark Medish to Andrew Weiss and Jonathan Elkind re: POTUS-Putin Bilat Memcon (Okinawa) (9 pages)	07/22/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Deana Sutliff to Mark Medish et al. re: Draft Memcon: POTUS-Russian President Putin, 8 December 2000 (6 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([POTUS and Putin])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/22/2000 - 12/08/2000]

2017-0222-M

kh2020

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([POTUS and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/22/2000 - 12/08/2000]

2017-0222-M
kh2020

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([POTUS and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/22/2000 - 12/08/2000]

2017-0222-M
kh2020

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Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2758				
Document ID: 9908099				
Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Putin (9 pages)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 8/29/2019
001b. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Putin; incomplete draft (1 page)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 8/29/2019
001c. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Putin; draft (9 pages)	11/02/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Memcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 2758

FOLDER TITLE:

9908099

2017-0222-M

kh2021

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9908099
RECEIVED: 03 NOV 99 09

TO: BERGER

FROM: PASCUAL

DOC DATE: 10 NOV 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PUTIN MEMCON IN OSLO 2 NOV

ACTION: BRADTKE DISAPPROVED RECOM 1

DUE DATE: 06 NOV 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-m

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9908099

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99111115 FOR DECISION
X 99111611 BRADTKE DISAPPROVED RECOM 1

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: D-edits LOG # 8099
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG B A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>Cen</i> GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>CS # 11/12</u>	<u>See edits</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 11/16</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>EWK 11/16</u>	<u>N/R</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

'99 NOV 11 PM 3:22

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: D-edits LOG # 8099
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG B A/O _____

Cen
 GIRE

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

JACOBSON

POWELL

SARGEANT

BRADTKE

RUDMAN

STEINBERG

BERGER

SITUATION ROOM

WEST WING DESK

RECORDS MGMT.

1	12/11/12	See edits	
2	11/16		
3	11/16	N/R	
4		N	

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

99 NOV 11 PM 3:22

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

Yes

~~SECRET~~

8099

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 10, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

CARLOS PASCUAL 

SUBJECT:


Memorandum of Conversation with Russian Prime
Minister Putin, November 2, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
November 2 meeting between the President and Russian Prime
Minister Putin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert Bradtke to transmit the Memorandum of
Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State

Approve _____

Disapprove  11/16/99

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve  11/16/99

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/10/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-17

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8099

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian Prime Minister Putin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the November 2 meeting in Oslo, Norway between the President and Russian Prime Minister Putin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary, and the Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (S)

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/3/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.09)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Putin (8)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
President Clinton
Secretary Albright
National Security Advisor Berger
Deputy National Security Advisor Steinberg
Counselor to the President Sosnik
Carlos Pascual (notetaker)
State Department DAS John Beyrle

Russia
Prime Minister Putin
Foreign Minister Ivanov
Russian Ambassador to Norway Kvitsinskiy
Chief of Secretariat Sechin
MFA Chkhikvishvili (notetaker)

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

DATE, TIME November 2, 1999, 3:00-3:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oslo, Norway

The President: Glad to see you again. Would you like to begin the discussion or would like me to? (U)

Prime Minister Putin: Why don't you start. (U)

The President: Let me first say how pleased I am that you came. It would not have been the same if you had not. I think your remarks were very good. And it makes a difference that you are here. With all that you have going on it would have been easy for you not to come. (C)

I want to offer some observations on Chechnya. I have now heard you talk about this, and I think about it a lot. I believe it is important to protect your sovereignty and territorial

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/10/09

integrity and to stand against terrorism. But if the price is to incur major civilian casualties, that's too high a price to pay, and it will draw international criticism. Beyond that, I don't know if such a strategy will work because it could turn ordinary people in Chechnya against you. (S)

People often make comparisons that are not always appropriate, but I know as an American that the price of conflict can be so high that it's not worth it and that it can't be sustained. It's not because people love the Chechens that you get tough questions from the international community. There's no broad-based movement in support of Chechen independence. But you need to combine a political strategy with a military strategy. (S)

I'm worried about all those people who are affected by the conflict -- the ones who are displaced and who can't get to safety. I urge you to open the borders for these people. I'm worried about the civilian casualties and their humanitarian toll. But I'm also worried about Russia losing support from the international community. I hope you find someone to talk to or perhaps look to an intermediary like OSCE. (S)

At Istanbul, I had assumed an item we would achieve is signing a modified CFE Treaty. You've been straightforward about being over the CFE levels. It's all been above board, and there have been no denials, and I want you to know I appreciate that. But you need to decide if you want to get this Treaty done. And if so, then you need to do something on Georgia and Moldova. (S)

Back on Chechnya, I urge you to decide if there is something you can do. I've tried to avoid talking publicly about Chechnya, and I've tried to support you on your fight against terrorism. But you need a parallel political strategy where you say: "here is what we're doing in addition to our military actions." I'm concerned about the civilian casualties and the humanitarian implications. But without a political strategy you'll get the worst of both worlds -- people will die, and you will not succeed in ending the conflict. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: I appreciate what you said and I value our relations. We discussed these issues in New Zealand. Dagestan was evolving then. Let me take 30 seconds to remind you of the history. (S)


In 1996, Russia de facto recognized Chechen independence. Chechnya de facto became an independent state. Mr. Ivanov has explained internationally that this independence is legally

deferred until a referendum in 2001. But in 1996 Chechnya chose its own president. We removed all of Russia's troops and it had all its own soldiers. It developed all its own power structures. (S)

Chechnya did not set up a functional government. It broke up into internal factions. It printed counterfeit dollars. It spread drugs. There were widespread kidnappings. In effect, a criminal economy was created on the border of Russia. People were leaving their belongings and running away. (S)

But chaos was not enough. The bandits decided to carry out an armed attack on another Russian republic, Dagestan, and on another Muslim republic at that. These are Muslim extremists like you had in Iran. (S)

(Putin draws the following on a sheet of paper and shows it to the President.)



(Pointing to the right arrow he says) First they attacked us in Dagestan, and we knocked them out. (Pointing to the middle arrow) A week later they hit us again in Dagestan, and we knocked them out. (Pointing to the left arrow) Then they hit again in Dagestan and the population of Dagestan knocked them out. After that these terrorists undertook four different bomb attacks against apartments in Dagestan and in Moscow. All told 1,500 people were killed from these acts. (S)

Let me tell you in the confines of this room about a message that we intercepted from a Jordanian operating in Chechnya, Khattab, back to his backers in the Middle East. "Everyday Russia weakens. In September we hit Russia at its very core. The last time explosions like this were seen in Moscow was in World War II. The whole world, as a result, is now on the Russian side." I think you would agree with me that it is not in the United States' interest to have an extremist state between the Black Sea and the Caspian. I hope I can count on U.S. support. (S)

The humanitarian situation bothers us, too. But for you to understand, dear Mr. President, you need to know that we have taken in 700,000 people from Chechnya since the end of the last

conflict -- 200,000 Russians and 500,000 Chechens. They all left Chechnya and we accepted them. (S)

Again I will tell you in the confidentiality of this room that we have the family of Chechen President Maskhadov under our protection. No one knows this. They are in one of the refugee camps and are directly under us. A little while ago Maskhadov asked for our help to eliminate the bands of terrorists in Chechnya. Now he is saying something different. The situation is very complicated, but we will deal with it. If we can do this together [unclear if together with the United States or Maskhadov], there will be fewer losses. (S)

The extremists made a very big mistake. If they had not attacked Russia, things would have continued in their previous state. I have gone now into the freed areas of northern Chechnya and met with the Chechen elders there. For three years they did not get paid, they did not get their pensions. For two and a half years the schools did not open. The first thing they asked me was, "you won't leave us, will you?" (S)

Of course we want Chechnya to stay in the Russian Federation. That is good counsel on your part to start a dialogue. We will try to provide local autonomy, give them control over their schools, and hold elections in the future. But we have to eliminate the terrorists at their bases. (S)

Foreign journalists have reported sympathetically toward the rebels, but they are at risk. They recently took a French journalist. They are torturing him every day and took a video of this; now they want a ransom. Chechnya has reached a condition of full anarchy; this causes damage to the population. We understand the humanitarian issue. We want to work with the international community. Part of the U.S. food aid goes to Dagestan and to Chechnya. [Note: U.S. food deliveries to Dagestan and Chechnya took place in the spring of 1999, before the conflict began.] (S)

The President: How do you see resolving this conflict? (S)

Prime Minister Putin: Our strategy has three parts. Knock out the terrorists, create viable local governments and hold elections. This is what I'd like to see. In two weeks our troops can go from one end of Chechnya to another, but I have been holding them back. I don't think they should attack large cities. (S)

In the security zone we are already opening schools, paying pensions, restarting the electricity and slowly bringing things back to normal conditions. But let me tell you how dire things are. A teacher told me that even if they get paid there will be no school because the kids don't have clothes to wear. This is how extreme the poverty has become. The humanitarian issues are in the security zone as well, not just in the refugee areas. (S)

But I think what we are dealing with here is Muslim extremists. In Dagestan they created a women's Muslim battalion. Imagine that; it's amazing. Their whole lives they have believed in Allah. Now they are taking up arms in the name of Allah. It is impossible for us to do anything else now. But we will try to find someone to have a dialogue with. (S)

Yesterday Ivanov met with Ahtisaari's representative and proposed that the OSCE send a team to review the refugee situation. The EU has had people there. We are ready to cooperate. But you need to remember this is a danger zone. Foreigners need to be careful so that we don't have crimes and kidnappings happening again. (S)

The President: Let's go back to the CFE issues. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: This is simple because we want to sign the Treaty. We are open to finishing it. Minister Ivanov has been pushing the military and he is right to do that. Yesterday I made a statement that I am committed to this, and I am committed to bringing the language into line in the Treaty to let this happen. (S)

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Georgia is a more complicated situation. Georgia exists on paper as a unified state. In the north you have Abkhazia, in the south, Adjara -- neither of them listens to Shevardnadze. If the Georgians want us to leave right away, this will lead to difficult internal developments and there will be nothing left of Georgia. Someone will have to do the fighting for them. They have a second Abkhazia about to happen in Ossetia. These are complicated problems, and we can't allow there to be mistakes. (S)

We have no strong desire to stay in Georgia, but if we tie the CFE Treaty up with this issue, we won't get it solved. We are ready to take out the hardware; that is okay. But to close out the bases, that is another thing. We are ready to deal with all of this, but you and I can't make mistakes about these issues. Besides, the Treaty does not deal with bases. These are the issues that we have to deal with. (S)

I would like to give you this original letter from President Yeltsin on START and ABM issues. (S)

The President: Let's go back to the CFE issues. Georgia just had an election. They have new parliamentary representation. Even if this base issue won't derail the CFE Treaty, I think you must still talk to Georgia about the bases. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: The CFE Treaty does not deal with closing bases. We are exceeding our equipment levels due to the Chechnya operations, we notified that and we are not violating the CFE Treaty. (S)

In Armenia, the situation is very tough after the terrorist attack. The forces are sitting in their barracks terrified. We need to be careful and take a step-by-step approach. (S)

On Georgia, one week ago we gave them a proposal. (S)

The President: You gave a proposal to the Georgians? (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: Yes, we gave them a proposal on withdrawal. We have differences of opinion on time. We are over our ceiling in Georgia by some 240 armored combat vehicles. We have a difference of opinion on the time to withdraw these. (S)

On the bases, we proposed that within a year we can negotiate everything on the bases and their status. But the Georgians want it all now. The Georgians need this CFE Treaty no less than we do. Of course we recognize that Georgia is a sovereign state, and they can decide what they want, but we need a reasonable time period to work this out. We took our whole army out of Germany. We've showed we will act on our word, but we need time to work out all the details. What's the issue that's driving the Georgians to do all of this in the next two weeks? (S)

Secretary Albright: Look, there is a violent situation in Chechnya. There is a real danger it could infect the South

Caucasus, and it needs to be defused for the sake of the entire region. On Chechnya, there's no getting around the need to talk, perhaps with a third party as an intermediary. On Georgia, we don't think there is any ambiguity. They've made it clear that they don't want Russian troops based on their border. (S)

National Security Advisor Berger: Let me add to that. If we go to Istanbul and sign the CFE Treaty, we are going to be asked how can you sign the Treaty if Russia is out of compliance? If we say that Russia has disclosed its force levels and stated its intention to comply, people will say that is not enough. It is important to say we have a schedule with Moldova and Georgia and that we can show that the Treaty is not just about future promises. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: We can continue to negotiate, but it is not clear how quickly we can do this. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: President Yeltsin called Shevardnadze and proposed that our Defense Minister go down to Georgia for negotiations. First Shevardnadze said yes, then he said no. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: There is another problem here. When our army leaves, the locals don't allow us to take our equipment. Imagine leaving these huge areas with weapons and arms caches. We don't want to arm separatists. The consequences would be disastrous. (S)

The President: Let me turn to another issue that relates to Boris' letter. I know we have differences on missile defense, but we need to keep working on this, and I have to ask you to tone down the rhetoric. If this technology becomes available, I don't want to keep it just for the United States; I will make it available to our friends and partners. Boris sent me a serious letter. Tell him I will respond personally and in detail. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: We will continue to talk. This is an important issue, and we should not undo all we have accomplished in arms control. Anyway, everything is written in the letter, so there is no need for me to repeat it. (S)

On Chechnya, the question is how we crush this base of terrorism but take minimal losses. Well, what will be done will be done. We have a solid military strategy. We will attack areas with terrorists. But how can we negotiate with terrorists. The Russian people would never accept this. We need to find those we can deal with. (S)

We need to continue our cooperation on law enforcement. The Minister of Interior was just in the United States and he met with the FBI, the CIA and others. Secretary Albright had a meeting with him. It was a constructive visit. (S)

We are working on our money-laundering legislation, and we will adopt a draft in the near future. (S)

The President: Good. That's very important. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: We plan to join the international convention against money laundering. There are more areas for us to work. (S)

We want Istanbul to be a good normal summit. (S)

The President: Me too. But we need to be careful about how it will play and how other issues on the international screen are going to affect it. (S)

Secretary Albright: We would be very upset as well if we had experienced terrorist bombings in our country. But it seems there are two separate problems here, and it may help to separate how you deal with them. One is the issue of terrorism and how you respond to that. The other is a humanitarian problem, particularly now that displaced people cannot get across the border. We cannot support you as you go deeper and deeper into Chechen territory and the humanitarian problem gets worse. You need to do something on the humanitarian issue and get a political dialogue going. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: I agree we need to find a partner, but I don't know how we are going to do this. (S)

The President: I think you have to. You can't solve this with just one arrow in your quiver. This conflict may be playing well for you at home, but not internationally. Criticism keeps mounting. In my experience, politics and reality eventually become aligned, and you need to keep this in mind. So I hope you find someone to deal with in a forthright way and that you reduce the civilian casualties. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: I agree. Can we say we have commonality in strategy? (S)

The President: You put me in a difficult position. What if there is another attack where you shell civilians? How can I say that I agree with that? We can say that we agree on the need to find a political solution and that we understand the need to fight terrorists. I like the idea of getting terrorists if you can separate them out. In the end, you need to reach an accommodation of some kind that doesn't undermine your territorial integrity. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: You understand that we cannot sit back and wait. We have to go after the terrorists where they are. (S)

Secretary Albright: But indiscriminate bombing will cause problems. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: There will be no massive bombing campaign, no carpet-bombing. We have a sound military operation going. Listen to what the CIA tells you, not what the bandits say. Yes, we've made some mistakes. Our pilots have hit our own people on our own territory. But we agree on the principle of dialogue as you propose, and we are working on it. (S)

NSA Berger: I'm afraid I have to be the bad guy and say that we are out of time. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Putin: Our thanks go to you. You have raised our consciousness. I wanted also to tell you that President Yeltsin may go to Istanbul. (S)

The President: The last OSCE Summit where I saw Boris I flew nine hours to get there, I was six hours on the ground, and I flew nine hours back -- 18 hours in the air -- and Boris chewed me out over something; I can't remember what (laughter.) But you tell Boris that I miss him, and I would love to see him at Istanbul. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

conflict -- 200,000 Russians and 500,000 Chechens. They all left Chechnya and we accepted them. (S)

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Again I will tell you in the confidentiality of this room that we have the family of Chechen President Maskhadov under our protection. No one knows this. They are in one of the refugee camps and are directly under us. A little while ago Maskhadov asked for our help to eliminate the bands of terrorists in Chechnya. Now he is saying something different. The situation is very complicated, but we will deal with it. If we can do this together (unclear if together with the United States or Maskhadov) there will be fewer losses. (S)

The extremists made a very big mistake. If they had not attacked Russia, things would have continued in their previous state. I have gone now into the freed areas of northern Chechnya and met with the Chechen elders there. For three years they did not get paid, they did not get their pensions. For two and a half years the schools did not open. The first thing they asked me was, "you won't leave us, will you?" (S)

Of course we want Chechnya to stay in the Russian Federation. That is good counsel on your part to start a dialogue. We will try to provide local autonomy, give them control over their schools, and hold elections in the future. But we have to eliminate the terrorists at their bases. (S)

Foreign journalists have reported sympathetically toward the rebels, but they are at risk. They recently took a French journalist. They are torturing him every day and took a video of this; now they want a ransom. Chechnya has reached a condition of full anarchy; this causes damage to the population. We understand the humanitarian issue. We want to work with the international community. Part of the U.S. food aid goes to Dagestan and to Chechnya. [Note: U.S. food deliveries to Dagestan and Chechnya took place in the spring of 1999, before the conflict began.] (S)

The President: How do you see resolving this conflict? (S)

Prime Minister Putin: Our strategy has three parts. Knock out the terrorists, create viable local governments and hold elections. This is what I'd like to see. In two weeks our troops can go from one end of Chechnya to another, but I have been holding them back. I don't think they should attack large cities. (S)

~~SECRET~~

8099

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian Prime Minister Putin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the November 2 meeting in Oslo, Norway between the President and Russian Prime Minister Putin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary, and the Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (S)

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

A.
Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/3/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.11)

3/7/2019 KBH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Putin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
President Clinton
Secretary Albright
National Security Advisor Berger
Deputy National Security Advisor Steinberg
Counselor to the President Sosnik
Carlos Pascual (notetaker)
State Department DAS Beyrle

Russia
Prime Minister Putin
Foreign Minister Ivanov
Russian Ambassador to Norway Kvitsinskiy
Chief of Secretariat Sechin
MFA Chkhikvishvili (notetaker)

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

DATE, TIME November 2, 1999, 3:00-3:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oslo, Norway

*Initial
Caps
throughout*
THE PRESIDENT: Glad to see you again. Would you like to begin the discussion or would like me to? (U)

PRIME MINISTER PUTIN: Why don't you start. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me first say how pleased I am that you came. It would not have been the same if you had not. I think your remarks were very good. And it makes a difference that you are here. With all that you have going on it would have been easy for you not to come. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/10/09

I want to offer some observations on Chechnya. I have now heard you talk about this, and I think about it a lot. I believe it is important to protect your sovereignty and territorial integrity and to stand against terrorism. But if the price is to incur major civilian casualties, that's too high a price to pay, and it will draw international criticism. Beyond that, I don't know if such a strategy will work because it could turn ordinary people in Chechnya against you. (S)

People often make comparisons that are not always appropriate, but I know as an American that the price of conflict can be so high that it's not worth it and that it can't be sustained. It's not because people love the Chechens that you get tough questions from the international community. There's no broad-based movement in support of Chechen independence. But you need to combine a political with a military strategy. (S)

strategy

✓ I'm worried about all those people who are affected by the conflict — the ones who are displaced and who can't get to safety. I urge you to open the borders for these people. I'm worried about the civilian casualties and their humanitarian toll. But I'm also worried about Russia losing support from the international community. I hope you find someone to talk to — or — perhaps look to an intermediary like OSCE. (S)

At Istanbul, I had assumed an item we would achieve is signing a modified CFE Treaty. You've been straightforward about being over the CFE levels. It's all been above board, and there have been no denials, and I want you to know I appreciate that. But you need to decide if you want to get this Treaty done. And if so, then you need to do something on Georgia and Moldova. (S)

Back on Chechnya, I urge you to decide if there is something you can do. I've tried to avoid talking publicly about Chechnya, and I've tried to support you on your fight against terrorism. But you need a parallel political strategy where you say: "here is what we're doing in addition to our military actions." I'm concerned about the civilian casualties and the humanitarian implications. But without a political strategy you'll get the worst of both worlds — people will die, and you will not succeed in ending the conflict. (S)


PRIME MINISTER PUTIN: I appreciate what you said and I value our relations. We discussed these issues in New Zealand. Dagestan was evolving then. Let me take 30 seconds to remind you of the history. (S)

In 1996, Russia de facto recognized Chechen independence. Chechnya de facto became an independent state. Mr. Ivanov has explained internationally that this independence is legally deferred until a referendum in 2001. But in 1996 Chechnya chose its own president. We removed all of Russia's troops and it had all its own soldiers. It developed all its own power structures. (S)

Chechnya did not set up a functional government. It broke up into internal factions. It printed counterfeit dollars. It spread drugs. There were widespread kidnappings. In effect, a criminal economy was created on the border of Russia. People were leaving their belongings and running away. (S)

But chaos was not enough. The bandits decided to carry out an armed attack on another Russian republic, Dagestan, and on another Muslim republic at that. These are Muslim extremists like you had in Iran. (S)

(Putin draws the following on a sheet of paper and shows it to the President.)



(Pointing to the right arrow he says) First they attacked us in Dagestan, and we knocked them out. (Pointing to the middle arrow) A week later they hit us again in Dagestan, and we knocked them out. (Pointing to the left arrow) Then they hit again in Dagestan and the population of Dagestan knocked them out. After that these terrorists undertook four different bomb attacks against apartments in Dagestan and in Moscow. All told 1500 people were killed from these acts. (S)

Let me tell you in the confines of this room about a message that we intercepted from a Jordanian operating in Chechnya, Khattab, back to his backers in the Middle East. "Everyday Russia weakens. In September we hit Russia at its very core. The last time explosions like this were seen in Moscow was in World War II. The whole world, as a result, is now on the Russian side." I think you would agree with me that it is not in the United States' interest to have an extremist state between the Black Sea and the Caspian. I hope I can count on U.S. support. (S)

The humanitarian situation bothers us, too. But for you to understand, dear Mr. President, you need to know that we have taken in 700,000 people from Chechnya since the end of the last conflict - 200,000 Russians and 500,000 Chechens. They all left Chechnya and we accepted them. ¹⁽⁸⁾

Again I will tell you in the confidentiality of this room that we have the family of Chechen President Maskhadov under our protection. No one knows this. They are in one of the refugee camps and are directly under us. A little while ago Maskhadov asked for our help to eliminate the bands of terrorists in Chechnya. Now he is saying something different. The situation is very complicated, but we will deal with it. If we can do this together (unclear if together with the U.S. or Maskhadov), there will be fewer losses. ¹⁽⁸⁾ spell out

The extremists made a very big mistake. If they had not attacked Russia, things would have continued in their previous state. I have gone now into the freed areas of northern Chechnya and met with the Chechen elders there. For three years they did not get paid, they did not get their pensions. For two and a half years the schools did not open. The first thing they asked me was "you won't leave us, will you?" ¹⁽⁸⁾

Of course we want Chechnya to stay in the Russian Federation. That is good counsel on your part to start a dialogue. We will try to provide local autonomy, give them control over their schools, and hold elections in the future. But we have to eliminate the terrorists at their bases. ¹⁽⁸⁾

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THE PRESIDENT: How do you see resolving this conflict? ¹⁽⁸⁾

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been holding them back. I don't think they should attack large cities. ^ (S)

In the security zone we are already opening schools, paying pensions, restarting the electricity and slowly bringing things back to normal conditions. But let me tell you how dire things are. A teacher told me that even if they get paid there will be no school because the kids don't have clothes to wear. This is how extreme the poverty has become. The humanitarian issues are in the security zone as well, not just in the refugee areas. ^ (S)

But I think what we are dealing with here is Muslim extremists. In Dagestan they created a women's Muslim battalion. Imagine that; it's amazing. Their whole lives they have believed in Allah. Now they are taking up arms in the name of Allah. It is impossible for us to do anything else now. But we will try to find someone to have a dialogue with. ^ (S)

Yesterday Ivanov met with Ahtisaari's representative and proposed that the OSCE send a team to review the refugee situation. The EU has had people there. We are ready to cooperate. But you need to remember this is a danger zone. Foreigners need to be careful so that we don't have crimes and kidnappings happen again. ^ (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Let's go back to the CFE issues. ^ (S)

PRIME MINISTER PUTIN: This is simple because we want to sign the Treaty. We are open to finishing it. Minister Ivanov has been pushing the military and he is right to do that. Yesterday I made a statement that I am committed to this, and I am committed to bringing the language into line in the Treaty to let this happen. ^ (S)

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THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (U)

PRIME MINISTER PUTIN: Our thanks go to you. You have raised our consciousness. I wanted also to tell you that President Yeltsin may go to Istanbul. (S)

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-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia (6 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 8/29/2019</i>	09/06/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia; draft (6 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 8/29/2019</i>	09/06/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Memcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4104

FOLDER TITLE:

0005636

2017-0222-M

kh2022

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0005636
RECEIVED: 07 SEP 00 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: WEISS
MEDISH

DOC DATE: 04 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES PUTIN ON 6 SEP

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 13 SEP 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSAMK

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-m

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0005636

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 01010520 FOR DECISION
X 01010809 BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: [Signature] LOG # 5636
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (S) INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG D A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
HAAS	<u>1</u>	<u>1/6 RONS</u>	<u>retained</u>
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
BASH	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/6</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>FM 1/6/01</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>AK 1/8</u>	<u>N</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

10:00 AM 500 7:00
COMMENTS:

Memcon - 6 Sep

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes _____

LOG # _____

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

FM DJH TO PAB DATE 116

note portions of conversation on
pgs 5 + 6 which are summarized -
it is possible same substance
was missed?

Deen

FM _____ TO _____ DATE _____

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5636

January 4, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *MCM*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian President
Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
September 6, 2000 meeting between the President and Russian
President Vladimir Putin.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *[Signature]* 4/16/01 Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify On: 9/6/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBN* NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

SECRET

5636

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.12)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of
Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
(notetaker)

President Vladimir Putin
Sergey Prikhodko, Deputy Head, Presidential
Administration (notetaker)

DATE, TIME September 6, 2000, 10:50 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Waldorf Astoria, New York City, President's
Suite

[The President does NMD statement during pool spray. Cameras leave.]

The President: Sorry for all you've been through with the loss of the Kursk. When something like this happens, people around the world identify with the victims and their families, but I identified with you, too. You must have had to put up with a lot of second-guessing. That always happens. After Oklahoma City, a lot of people asked if the building was properly protected and whether we had let terrorists into the country. So my heart went out to the people at the bottom of the sea, but it went out to everyone else as well. (S)

President Putin: There was no good option for me here. I was caught between bad options and worse options. Some people told me that if I'd let a small submarine go in there right away and at least make a stab at rescuing the guys, my ratings would have gone up. You can't let something like this be driven by public relations. You've got to give priority to actually saving people. (S)

I appreciate your sincere support. Strange as it seems, the polls afterward actually reveal that the incident didn't affect

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify on: 9/6/10

my standing. But my great fear is that something like this could recur. (S)

The President: We operate in a different environment now. If a building blows up in Moscow, it's as though our own relatives were involved. Or if people in Mozambique are driven by flooding to have to take shelter in trees. In many ways, this is a good thing. It reminds us of the humanity of others. It makes it harder to hate. But it also sometimes makes it harder for a leader to do the right thing because all these strong feelings are generated. (S)

President Putin: We felt impotent during this whole disaster. It now looks as though all the crew died within 60 or 90 seconds. We couldn't tell the relatives, but there was a hole about 2 meters wide blown in the hull that flooded the first three sections of the sub. I'm not even sure how we can get the bodies out. There are a lot of cod in those waters, and there may not be any flesh on the bones. We tried to apply the brakes to all this furor, but some people are strange, and they just kept feeding it. That's just a fact of life. (S)

The President: Can we talk about the Balkans? I know you've had contact with Milosevic and Djukanovic. These elections are going to be important, but they probably won't be fair. Milosevic is running behind in the polls, so he'll probably steal it. It would be preferable for him to lose, but he'll probably arrange not to. You know all this, because it's in your backyard. But there will be one big problem [he draws these three words out with heavy emphasis on each] if he moves against Djukanovic. I hope you can meet with Djukanovic while he's here. That would send a strong signal. (S)

President Putin: [Looks doubtful, thinks for a moment] Let's have Sergey Ivanov meet with him. (S)

The President: I want to raise the nonproliferation issue that we've discussed before. Our people are working hard on that, but there's a ways to go. (S)

President Putin: We've talked about that before, as you say. Part of the issue for me, as I told you, is that we don't want to see Russia lose out in competition with other countries that are moving in there. But that said, I've given the firmest instructions to the special services to engage seriously on this problem of Iran. (S)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia [partial] (2 pages)	09/06/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Memcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4104

FOLDER TITLE:

0005636

2017-0222-M
kh2022

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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The President: Well, as I say, it's still a problem. Let's move it forward by Brunei. It's an impediment to the work we want to do together. It gives Congress and others a reason to oppose your integration. (S)

My whole strategy and policy toward Russia have been based on the idea of helping Russia recover its economic footing. I can only do that in the context of Russia's developing as a democracy, developing pluralism, and increasing its leadership in international institutions. These things are all tied up together. You can't have one without the other. So that's why I'm counting on you to work on this Iran thing and the other areas so that we can keep supporting you. (S)

I'd like also to say something about the UN, which is a very important institution for both of us. For the UN to be credible and effective, we've got to enforce the Security Council resolutions on Iraq. I have no objection for oil money to be used according to the rules as long as the inspections are being carried out. (S)

But Saddam Hussein is refusing inspections, and he's put \$15 billion out of the \$18 billion he's made from oil sales into defense, which for him isn't really defense at all. He's also trying to generate political pressure to change the sanctions policy. I don't understand why he won't accept the inspection regime. I think it would be a big mistake for us to say we don't care. (S)

President Putin: Let me tell you my worry here. It's a big plus in your legacy that you've done so much to stop proliferation. I told you after my visit to North Korea that I basically agreed with you and believe you were right to a large extent about the problem there. We don't want any rogue states to acquire these weapons. I'm worried about that myself. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

(S)

I think I told you before, entirely off the record, that when you bombed Iraq for what it was doing, I supported you, or at least I would have done the same thing in your shoes. But looking ahead, how do we make them [the Iraqis] sign? It's hard. We need to establish general rules of conduct, intercontinental safeguards. Now, on this disagreement between us over Iraq, we're not playing it up. We're doing everything we can to make them stop what they're doing. That's a common goal. (S)

The President: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d I understand what you say, but there's a big difference. The Iraqis under Saddam Hussein have used chemical weapons against their own people and their neighbors, and they've shot SCUDs into Israel during the Gulf War. (S)

It may turn out that the biggest threat in the next ten years isn't going to be state-to-state war. Rather it may be terrorists with smaller chemical and biological weapons and even small nuclear weapons, which dogs in airports won't be able to sniff out. (S)

Somehow we have to find a way to work together to stop the enemies of the nation state from these other forms of risk. The increasing openness of the world, combined with the acceleration of technology and science, has brought a lot of benefits, but it's also increased rapidly our vulnerability. The preferable way of dealing with this is the UN. We need a framework of cooperation that minimizes the exposure of our societies and our civilization. (S)

[redacted]
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] We should see Iraq as a precursor of the larger problem we face over the next twenty years. (S)

President Putin: I basically agree. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d
[redacted] (S)

Back on Yugoslavia, I've got to tell you that I see something very unfair here. You talk about the elections coming up [in Serbia]. But there are also these elections in Kosovo. Yet there are 100,000-150,000 Serbs who aren't actually there, who've been made into refugees. Their absence from the elections is going to feed the trend toward Kosovo's splintering off from Serbia. That will have repercussions around the world, for other states. (S)

You worked very hard and effectively, even decisively, in the G-8, and I'm prepared for Russia to work with you here. But we weren't consulted in the decision to bomb Yugoslavia and to set in motion the process that is taking Kosovo out of Serbia. That's not fair. And it's not fair to the 150,000 Serbs that

the fate of Kosovo will be decided without them. They should be given a voice. Otherwise, the fate of their motherland will be decided behind their back. Milosevic has nothing to do with this. (S)

[They agree that Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov will pursue at dinner the question of Serb participation in the Kosovo elections.] (S)

The President: One more thing about the UN. I've worked hard on the issue of reorganizing the UN. As part of the deal I've made with Congress, we've got to adjust the scale of assessments. Your people and mine have talked about this. I really need your support on this. I think what we're suggesting is consistent with Russia's role as a founder of the UN and as a member of the Security Council. (S)

It's also important if I'm going to free up the \$840 million that's now locked up. I want us to be able to pay our bills and support peacekeeping. Perhaps down the road, we can find a better way of doing this, including have a special fund that will help countries, like Mozambique, that have a growing economy one year, then get hit with a devastating flood. I hope that after our election here, we'll have a Congress that is more supportive of the UN. This has been one of the most painful and frustrating issues I've dealt with as President. (S)

[Small talk about the President's trip to Africa, whether he had to get vaccinated, how shocked he was by the devastation of malaria, TB and AIDS; how global warming is spreading malaria, how Arkansas was the hottest place on earth last week (115 degrees). Putin comments on how much Coke he's drinking. The President says he's jet-lagged, then says Putin must be, too, having just circled the globe. The President says, "But you're younger and in better shape than me." The President then gives Putin a quick rundown on the U.S. election.] (S)

The President: I need to raise with you the Pope matter. We've talked about this before, and I need guidance from you on what to do next here. There's a real health issue here. (S)

President Putin: I'll be absolutely candid with you. I've got the information from my people. He is absolutely healthy. There's no problem there. There's a different problem. As I told you, I will take a decision here. But I need to wait until the formalities are finished. If I take a decision beforehand, it could be used against us -- it could be said that we were holding him for no reason. (S)

The President: You need to release him as quickly as possible.
He's not well. (S)

[While the signing ceremony is being arranged, the President asks Putin for an update on the trouble along Russia's southern border, especially Chechnya and Central Asia. Putin does a report on how his government is determined to finish off the Chechen "terrorists." Putin says he has a lot of support from the Russian people, who are "pissed off" at the repeated terrorist attacks. Putin also talked about President Rakhmonov of Tajikistan and what a difficult, complex fellow he is, and how President Karimov of Uzbekistan has been talking to the Israelis about arms supplies. He then concludes by thanking POTUS for help on various economic projects, including an EXIM Bank loan.] (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.13)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of
Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
(notetaker)

↑
President Vladimir Putin
Sergey Prikhodko, Deputy Head, Presidential
Administration

DATE, TIME September 6, 2000, 10:50 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Waldorf Astoria, New York City, President's
Suite

[The President does NMD statement during pool spray. Cameras leave.]

The President: Sorry for all you've been through with the loss of the Kursk. When something like this happens, people around the world identify with the victims and their families, but I identified with you, too. You must have had to put up with a lot of second-guessing. That always happens. After Oklahoma City, a lot of people asked if the building was properly protected and whether we had let terrorists into the country. So my heart went out to the people at the bottom of the sea, but it went out to everyone else as well. (S)

President Putin: There was no good option for me here. I was caught between bad options and worse options. Some people told me that if I'd let a small submarine go in there right away and at least make a stab at rescuing the guys, my ratings would have gone up. You can't let something like this be driven by (S) *Public Relations*

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Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 9/6/10

I appreciate your sincere support. Strange as it seems, the polls afterward actually reveal that the incident didn't affect my standing. But my great fear is that something like this could recur. (S)

The President: We operate in a different environment now. If a building blows up in Moscow, it's as though our own relatives were involved. Or if people in Mozambique are driven by flooding to have to take shelter in trees. In many ways this is a good thing. It reminds us of the humanity of others. It makes it harder to hate. But it also sometimes makes it harder for a leader to do the right thing because all these strong feelings are generated. (S) *of*

President Putin: We felt impotent during this whole disaster. It now looks as though all the crew died within 60 or 90 seconds. We couldn't tell the relatives, but there was a hole about 2 meters wide blown in the hull that flooded the first three sections of the sub. I'm not even sure how we can get the bodies out. There are a lot of cod in those waters, and there may not be any flesh on the bones. We tried to apply the brakes to all this furor, but some people are strange, and they just kept feeding it. That's just a fact of life. (S)

The President: Can we talk about the Balkans? I know you've had contact with Milosevic and Djukanovic. These elections are going to be important, but they probably won't be fair. Milosevic is running behind the polls, so he'll probably steal it. It would be preferable for him to lose, but he'll probably arrange not to. You know all this, because it's in your backyard. But there will be one big problem [he draws these three words out with heavy emphasis on each] if he moves against Djukanovic. I hope you can meet with Djukanovic while he's here. That would send a strong signal. (S) *17*

President Putin: (Looks doubtful, thinks for a moment) Let's have Sergey Ivanov meet with him. (S) *—*

The President: I want to raise the nonproliferation issue that we've discussed before. Our people are working hard on that, but there's a ways to go. (S)

President Putin: We've talked about that before, as you say. Part of the issue for me, as I told you, is that we don't want to see Russia lose out in competition with other countries that are moving in there. But that said, I've given the firmest

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001b. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia; draft [partial] (2 pages)	09/06/2000	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Memcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4104

FOLDER TITLE:

0005636

2017-0222-M
kh2022

RESTRICTION CODES

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3

instructions to the special services to engage seriously on this problem of Iran. (S)

The President: Well, as I say, it's still a problem. Let's move it forward by Brunei. It's an impediment to the work we want to do together. It gives Congress and others a reason to oppose your integration. (S)

My whole strategy and policy toward Russia have been based on the idea of helping Russia recover its economic footing. I can only do that in the context of Russia's developing as a democracy, developing pluralism, and increasing its leadership in international institutions. These things are all tied up together. You can't have one without the other. So that's why I'm counting on you to work on this Iran thing and the other areas so that we can keep supporting you. (S)

I'd like also to say something about the UN, which is a very important institution for both of us. For the UN to be credible and effective, we've got to enforce the Security Council resolutions on Iraq. I have no objection for oil money to be used according to the rules as long as the inspections are being carried out. (S)

But Saddam Hussein is refusing inspections, and he's put \$15 billion out of the \$18 billion he's made from oil sales into defense, which for him isn't really defense at all. He's also trying to generate political pressure to change the sanctions policy. I don't understand why he won't accept the inspection regime. I think it would be a big mistake for us to say we don't care. (S)

next line

President Putin: Let me tell you my worry here. It's a big plus in your legacy that you've done so much to stop proliferation. I told you after my visit to North Korea that I basically agreed with you and believe you were right to a large extent about the problem there. We don't want any rogue states to acquire these weapons. I'm worried about that myself.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

(S)

I think I told you before, entirely off the record, that when you bombed Iraq for what it was doing, I supported you, or at least I would have done the same thing in your shoes. But looking ahead, how do we make them [the Iraqis] sign? It's hard. We need to establish general rules of conduct, intercontinental safeguards. Now, on this disagreement between

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us over Iraq, we're not playing it up. We're doing everything we can to make them stop what they're doing. That's a common goal. (S)

The President: [EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d] I understand what you say, but there's a big difference. The Iraqis under Saddam Hussein have used chemical weapons against their own people and their neighbors, and they've shot SCUDs into Israel during the Gulf War. (S)

It may turn out that the biggest threat in the next ten years isn't going to be state-to-state war. Rather it may be terrorists with smaller chemical and biological weapons and even small nuclear weapons, which dogs in airports won't be able to sniff out. (S)

Somehow we have to find a way to work together to stop the enemies of the nation state from these other forms of risk. The increasing openness of the world, combined with the acceleration of technology and science, has brought a lot of benefits, but it's also increased rapidly our vulnerability. The preferable way of dealing with this is the UN. We need a framework of cooperation that minimizes the exposure of our societies and our civilization. (S)

[EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d]

[] We should see Iraq as a precursor of the larger problem we face over the next twenty years. (S)

President Putin: I basically agree. [EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d]
[] (S)

Back on Yugoslavia, I've got to tell you that I see something very unfair here. You talk about the elections coming up [in Serbia]. But there are also these elections in Kosovo. Yet there are 100,000-150,000 Serbs who aren't actually there, who've been made into refugees. Their absence from the elections is going to feed the trend toward Kosovo's splintering off from Serbia. That will have repercussions around the world, for other states. (S)

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[They agree that Sec. Albright and ^{Speltz} FM Ivanov will pursue at dinner the question of Serb participation in the Kosovo elections.] (S)

The President: One more thing about the UN. I've worked hard on the issue of reorganizing the UN. As part of the deal I've made with Congress, we've got to adjust the scale of assessments. Your people and mine have talked about this. I really need your support on this. I think what we're suggesting is consistent with Russia's role as a founder of the UN and as a member of the Security Council. (S)

It's also important if I'm going to free up the \$840 million that's now locked up. I want us to be able to pay our bills and support peacekeeping. Perhaps down the road, we can find a better way of doing this, including have a special fund that will help countries, like Mozambique, that have a growing economy one year, then get hit with a devastating flood. I hope that after our election here, we'll have a Congress that is more supportive of the UN. This has been one of the most painful and frustrating issues I've dealt with as President. (S)

[Small talk about the President's trip to Africa, whether he had to get vaccinated, how shocked he was by the devastation of malaria, TB and AIDS, how global warming is spreading malaria, how Arkansas was the hottest place on earth last week (115 degrees). Putin comments on how much Coke he's drinking. The President says he's jet-lagged, then says Putin must be too, having just circled the globe. The President say, "But you're younger and in better shape than me." The President then gives Putin a quick rundown on the U.S. election.] (S) S

The President: I need to raise with you the Pope matter. We've talked about this before, and I need guidance from you on what to do next here. There's a real health issue here. (S)

President Putin: I'll be absolutely candid with you. I've got the information from my people. He's absolutely healthy. There's A

SECRET

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or make?
no problem there. There's a different problem. As I told you, I will take a decision here. But I need to wait until the formalities are finished. If I take a decision beforehand, it could be used against us -- it could be said that we were holding him for no reason. (S)

The President: You need to release him as quickly as possible. He's not well. (S)

[While the signing ceremony is being arranged, the President asks Putin for an update on the trouble along Russia's southern border, especially Chechnya and Central Asia. Putin does a report on how his government is determined to finish off the Chechen "terrorists." Putin says he has a lot of support from the Russian people, who are "pissed off" at the repeated terrorist attacks. Putin also talked about President Rakhmonov of Tajikistan and what a difficult, complex fellow he is, and how President Karimov of Uzbekistan has been talking to the Israelis about arms supplies. He then concludes by thanking POTUS for help on various economic projects, including an EXIM Bank loan.] (S)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4113				
Document ID: 0007252				
Row: 47	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (7 pages)	11/15/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re: Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin; draft (7 pages)	11/15/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Memcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4113

FOLDER TITLE:

0007252

2017-0222-M

kh2023

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0007252
RECEIVED: 27 NOV 00 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: MEDISH

DOC DATE: 05 DEC 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES PUTIN AT BRUNEI ON 15 NOV

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 DEC 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MEDISH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MEDISH
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSATW

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0007252

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 00121116 FOR DECISION
X 00121311 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

PROOFED BY: LOG #
URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
1. GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL	1	BP 12/12	see edit
BASH			
BRADTKE	2/3	DJH 12/12	make edits + return
RUDMAN	3		
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	4	1/12/13	N
RECORDS MGMT.			

CC:

5000 100 300

COMMENTS:

COMMENTS: memo on w/ Putin 11/15

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE WLO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: (P) LOG # 7252
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (P) INT. ARS
 PASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG K A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
DIRE	_____	_____	_____
LAAS	_____	_____	_____
OWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>BP 12/12</u>	<u>see edit</u>
ASH	<u>2/3</u>	<u>DJH 12/12</u>	<u>make edits + return</u>
BRADTKE	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	<u>1/12/13</u>	<u>N</u>
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
 10 DEC 11 AM 3:51
 COMMENTS: memcon w/ Putin 11/15

SEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~SECRET~~

7252

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 5, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: MARK MEDISH *AMH*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian President
Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
November 15 meeting between the President and Russian President
Vladimir Putin.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *SRB* Disapprove _____
la 11/13
d/L

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 12/1/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/8/2018
2017-0222-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-m (1.14)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Vladimir
Putin (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Madeleine Albright
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy and Director of the
National Economic Council
Mark Medish, Special Assistant to the
President for Russian, Ukrainian &
Eurasian Affairs (notetaker)
Nick Sorokin, Interpreter

President Vladimir Putin
Sergey Ivanov, Secretary, Security Council
Sergey Prihodko, Deputy Head, Presidential
Administration
Vladimir Chkhikvishvili, Director, North
America Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 15, 2000, 1:20-2:35 p.m. Local Time
AND PLACE: Assarra Guest House, Brunei

The President: You represent the world's largest country, and
we meet in what may be the world's smallest country. (S)

President Putin: Don't forget San Marino or the Vatican. (S)

The President: I just gave an address at a beautiful seaside
resort, which cost \$1 billion to build. The owners figure that
if they maintain a one hundred percent occupancy rate, charging
\$600 a night, it will pay off in 72 years. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 11/26/10

President Putin: I have heard the sea is not safe around here. There are lots of things that can bite. (S)

The President: Earlier, I saw the so-called Snake Island; but snakes really aren't a problem for you or me, are they. We deal with them every day. (S)

President Putin: I want to pass on my congratulations to Hillary for her victory in the New York Senate race. (S)

The President: Thank you. There really isn't a precedent for a First Lady being elected into public office. The case of Bobby Kennedy and the U.S. Senate is only vaguely comparable. (S)

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The President: It was mostly ideological conservatives, and some of the Italian-Americans actually worked with us despite Rick Lazio. Hillary was criticized by conservatives in the Jewish community for supporting the Palestinians, but it was really only a small minority within the community, like those who criticized Rabin for initiating peace talks. Most support peace, but as we've learned in the past, minorities can be noisy and loud. (S)

President Putin: On the question of the Middle East, how can we cooperate? Igor Ivanov is presently in the region. (S)

The President: You know, the problems started when Likud leader Sharon, together with a hundred supporters, went up on Temple Mount. The reaction was swift, with violence and disputes about who did what and who was responsible for starting it. Arafat decided that despite the violence, the Palestinians could use the situation to obtain greater support in the UN. He also perceived the Israeli response as being disproportionate -- namely, you throw a rock, and they bring out guns. (S)

President Putin: That's generally the right reaction to an attack, in any region. (S)

The President: The problems stem from the grievances of young, unemployed Palestinians. These grievances have handed Hamas and other extremists greater power. Arafat is afraid of this, because he knows he can't control them, much as some of the Israeli settlers can't be controlled by the Israelis. (S)

This is a dangerous situation, with both sides feeling that they are victims: the Palestinians are upset that the Oslo process is not yet complete, and that the Palestinian people are still subject to checkpoints. On the other side, Barak has made the best offer so far, and he feels Arafat has snubbed him despite the big political risks he has taken. Barak's standing in Israel has been reduced, because he went so far and got nothing in return. He's now under enormous pressure to adopt a tougher stance; Barak is still willing to meet, but needs to know there will be real results before he will do so. (S)

It's as if the Chechens said they would meet with you, but would keep bombing your buildings in the meantime. Arafat has succeeded in reducing daily demonstrations, but has not gone far enough, and he needs to make a clearer commitment. If he did this, I could get Barak to implement Sharm el-Sheikh. (S)

While Igor is out there, the best thing he could do would be to buy some days of calm. The problem is that while Barak wants an agreement, he needs black and white certainty. Arafat, on the other hand, doesn't mind gray areas because that's where he's been all his life. Arafat and Barak both say they want an agreement before the start of the New Year, but we need calm first in order to resume talks. (S)

I think you could have an impact. If we can get them to talk and reach an agreement, we will all have work to do help them implement it, as will other countries. I can get Barak to stop, but he won't do it if they're still firing. (S)

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I have had real fears of a regional war. We need to work together to prevent this. The most important thing is to stop the violence between the Israelis and Palestinians. (S)

President Putin: Yes, we must try and put an end to the violence and pursue all available options. Arafat is not in total control. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Putin: Hizbollah is being supported by other countries and clearly has a negative impact on the Palestinians. We must work with those shoring them up in a positive way. But above all, we must work to put an end to the violence. I discussed this with President Chirac in Paris, and passed this message on publicly in response to a question from a Palestinian press correspondent in the press conference following our talks. (S)

We need to improve our interaction. I realize you have taken on a huge responsibility but public, as opposed to expert, expectations of the peace process have been unattainable. We have been very cautious in our public posture, especially against the backdrop of the U.S. elections. We do have some traditional relations with countries in the region and could use them more efficiently. I would like to see better coordination with the United States. There has been a qualitative change in our relations with Israel; for example, the way in which we interact with Soviet era émigrés who account for one third of the population and who make up a large portion of the settlers. Consequently, we have a very uneasy perspective on these events. (S)

I would like to see more cooperation and more agreement on the next steps. We will also work with the EU, which also needs to participate. By the way, Chirac made a strong hint that he wanted to be invited but stopped short of saying that he was offended. For me personally it's not opportune to get overly involved because of situation in the Caucasus. (S)

The President: The Israelis believe everyone in the world is against them. We also need to reach out to Arabs and bring the level of paranoia down on both sides, as I think you're trying to do. We can help create the conditions needed to end violence. I think an informal approach is better than an international conference, which would seem to the Israelis like another bashing by the UN. (S)

President Putin: I agree with you that the key is to change the emotional dynamics. Let's see what we can achieve with Igor's mission. (S)

The President: When Arafat and Barak met in Paris, Arafat subsequently talked to Chirac and refused to sign the security agreement. The key is for you to develop relations with both sides and the Israelis in particular. For the United States, it is important to do the same with some of the Arab states. (S)

President Putin: I agree. (U)

The President: On the issue of nonproliferation, I think we've made some real progress over last several years, including the safeguarding of fissile material. (S)

I saw your statement on lowering the Start III threshold of warheads and ABM Treaty-compliant missile defense systems. I want our experts at the Department of Defense to continue working on these issues, as this should make it possible for you and the next Administration to reach an agreement. (S)

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If Bush does win -- and I honestly don't know whether this will be the case, although the full count probably favors Gore, slightly -- I will urge him not to violate the ABM Treaty as some of his Republican colleagues have proposed. (S)

I received your letter on the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement on arms sales, and I understand your argument. So far, the aide-memoire has been good for both sides, and, of course, I still believe lasers and missiles are very important concerns. However, there may be a way to modify the agreement to address your needs, without withdrawing. I fear your withdrawal would give Republicans ammunition and momentum to violate the ABM Treaty, even though they're obviously very different agreements. Let's have our experts talk and see if your needs can be accommodated. (S)

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The President: I failed to get the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty through the Senate, the first time something like that has happened in eighty years. But there are many in Senate who don't like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the ABM Treaty. If you withdraw from the aide-memoire, momentum will build and the Republicans will use it. (S)

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The problem also concerns the damage to our commercial interests and the worsening in relations with our buyers that would result. By the way, Article 5 of the aide-memoire provides for modification contingent on developments in Iran, and things are changing there for the better. Also, the Germans are doing big business with Iran via Hermes export credits, as much as \$2 billion, I believe [Berger tells Sergey Prikhodko that the Germans do not sell arms to Iran. Prikhodko shrugs.] (S)

But I fully understand your concern about Iran and their acquisition of weapons; since the MFA has already sent a letter, it's difficult to rescind. We have cooperated well on missiles and nuclear proliferation and will continue to do so. But maybe we can find some way to modernize and work out a new arrangement consistent with the Wassenaar approach. (S)

By the way, despite our agreements, U.S. arms continue to find their way into Afghanistan via Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Igor will look into this issue and work with Madeleine. (S)

The President: I'm concerned about this and hope we can work something out. (S)

Finally, Charlene Barshefsky was invited to visit Russia by German Gref, and I think she should go. We think you should get into WTO as quickly as you decide to move. (S)

On the question of North Korea, thank you again for the initiative you conveyed from Pyongyang back in July. Madeleine is working on this issue and is trying to move it forward. (S)

President Putin: Are they talking about halting production or exports? (S)

Secretary Albright: They are willing to stop both, for a price, but a further problem concerns currently deployed missiles. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.15)

3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (u)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
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Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
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Mark Medish, Special Assistant to the
President for Russian, Ukrainian &
Eurasian Affairs (notetaker)
Nick Sorokin, Interpreter

President Vladimir Putin
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America Department, Ministry of Foreign
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DATE, TIME November 15, 2000, 1:20-2:35 p.m. Local Time
AND PLACE: Assarra Guest House, Brunei

The President: You represent the world's largest country, and we meet in what may be the world's smallest country. (S)

President Putin: Don't forget San Marino or the Vatican. (S)

The President: I just gave an address at a beautiful seaside resort, which cost \$1 billion to build. The owners figure that if they maintain a one hundred percent occupancy rate, charging \$600 a night, it will pay off in 12 years. (S)

~~SECRET~~

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Declassify On: 11/26/10

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President Putin: This is an unexpected subject, and I will need to think about it further. If we pursue the basic logic here, it seems that we either withdraw from the aide-memoire or modify it. And the next Administration will withdraw from the ABM Treaty unless we modify the aide-memoire -- and the ABM Treaty as well. This is a bit tricky. (S)

The problem also concerns the damage to our commercial interests and the worsening in relations with our buyers that would result. By the way, Article 5 of the aide-memoire provides for modification contingent on developments in Iran, and things are changing there for the better. Also, the Germans are doing big business with Iran via Hermes export credits, as much as \$2 billion, I believe. [Berger tells Sergey Prikhodko that the Germans do not sell arms to Iran. Prikhodko shrugs.] (S)

But I fully understand your concern about Iran and their acquisition of weapons; since the MFA has already sent a letter, it's difficult to rescind. We have cooperated well on missiles and nuclear proliferation and will continue to do so. But maybe we can find some way to modernize and work out a new arrangement consistent with the Wassenaar approach. (S)

By the way, despite our agreements, U.S. arms continue to find their way into Afghanistan via Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Igor will look into this issue and work with Madeleine. (S)

The President: I'm concerned about this and hope we can work something out. (S)

Finally, Charlene Barshefsky was invited to visit Russia by German Gref, and I think she should go. We think you should get into WTO as quickly as you decide to move. (S)

On the question of North Korea, thank you again for the initiative you conveyed from Pyongyang back in July. Madeleine is working on this issue and is trying to move it forward. (S)

President Putin: Are they talking about halting production or exports? (S)

Secretary Albright: They are willing to stop both, for a price, but a further problem concerns currently deployed missiles. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4180				
Document ID: 0100117				
Row: 47	Section: 3	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation re. Meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of Russia (10 pages)	09/12/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Memcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4180

FOLDER TITLE:

0100117

2017-0222-M

kh2024

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0117

January 9, 2001

SUSPENSE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *mcm*
FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President
Vladimir Putin of Russia

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Vladimir Putin of Russia on September 12, 1999 in Auckland, New Zealand.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/19/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.16)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
of Russia (8)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy and Director of the
National Economic Council
Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and
Special Adviser to the Secretary of
State for the New Independent States
Ted Truman, Assistant Treasury Secretary
Robert Wescott, Special Assistant to the
President for International Finance
Andrew Weiss, Director for Russia/Ukraine/
Eurasia Affairs (notetaker)
Nick Sorokin, interpreter

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
Gennadiy Shabannikov, Ambassador of the
Russian Federation to New Zealand
Sergey Prikhodko, Deputy Head, Presidential
Administration
Mikhail Fradkov, Minister of Foreign Trade
Aleksandr Livshits, Special Presidential
Representative to International
Financial Institutions
Igor Sechin, Secretariat Head, Office of
Prime Minister
Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 12, 1999, 1:31 - 2:42 p.m., (local
AND PLACE: time) Stamford Plaza Hotel, Auckland

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 12/11/2010

The President: I had a good conversation with President Yeltsin in preparation for our meeting today. First of all, I wanted to express condolences on behalf of the American people for the terrible apartment bombing incident and the lives lost. We have had similar incidents, and I know that they can frighten people tremendously. (U)

I would like to discuss the important issues in front of us that will shape our partnership in the years to come. Then I'm happy to listen to any issues you'd like to raise. (S)

First, on arms control. Strobe has been in Moscow for discussions with Mamedov. These are important discussions, and I know that they are difficult. I want to make clear that I wish to preserve the ABM Treaty, which is important to both our countries. However, there are forces in our Republican Party who would like to torpedo the ABM Treaty. (S)

But it's also clear that there are new threats to both the United States and Russia from countries such as North Korea. There is also new technology that is being developed that might become a viable means to provide types of defenses that previously have not been available. (S)

I only want to repeat what I told Boris: I want to work on this because of the perceived new threat from certain countries. If there are any benefits from this new technology, I think they should be shared by the United States with other countries as much as possible. (S)

I also support the desire of your country to try to cut levels of weapons below START II levels. At present, I am not able to agree to go as low as you would like, but I told Boris that I want to come as close as possible. We need to keep talking about this issue. (S)

Second, on nonproliferation. You have worked hard to build the legal foundations that can be used to stop the flow of sensitive technologies. I have that these foundations can now be used effectively. That is essential to head off new sanctions legislation. As you know, our system finds hundreds of violations every year. (S)

There is strong support in Congress for new sanctions legislation against Iran, Iraq, and similar countries. There's a good chance that this legislation will pass within coming months. I've been fighting the people who want to impose new

sanctions legislation. Boris knows that. But they have a new head of steam. Your government's cooperation on this issue with the Vice President and Sandy Berger is very important to what happens next. (S)

On Dagestan, I know that you have faced difficult situations in Chechnya and now Dagestan. I have spoken out about this problem. So long as you use appropriate means to fight terrorism and separatists, the United States will stand with you. (S)

On corruption, these inquiries on money laundering are important, and there is only one way to handle them. I am encouraged that a team of your law enforcement officials is coming to Washington next week. These cases must be handled on their merits. They must not be politicized. (S)

What Boris told me on the phone was also important. He said that the reason he vetoed the money laundering bill was because of Constitutional problems with the bill and that he would sign a new and improved bill. I think it's important that this happen as quickly as possible. (S)

On economic reform, I want Russia to be strong and successful. Your economy is benefiting because oil prices are going up. The IMF has said that it will work with you in a transparent way. That cooperation is important and can help put the worst of your economic problems behind you. The most important thing you can do is articulate a clear strategic plan on economic reform and stick to it. That will have a good impact on your discussions with the IMF. I guarantee that they will be willing to help if you show that you are willing to help yourselves. (S)

I know that you probably also want to talk about Kosovo. I have talked enough. There are probably other issues, too. But you know that I have tried hard to be a friend of Russia's and Boris's. I hope that you will contribute to taking Russia in the right direction. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: First of all, I'd like to thank you for meeting with me. The President and I discussed in great detail you last phone call with him. He also described the things that you have accomplished together, and I must say that I appreciate your unwavering support for cooperation with Russia. I believe that this approach might be traced back to your years working with Senator Fullbright. If I recall correctly, he had a similar attitude about the U.S. approach toward the Soviet

Union. I think that you have shown a very open-minded and constructive attitude toward my country. (S)

That's why I think it's important to implement all the agreements reached at the last meeting between you two Presidents. All our efforts are being directed at implementing these agreements. The American Secretary of Defense is arriving in Moscow today. I also am looking forward to the visit of your Secretary of Energy. (S)

The Russian side is prepared to engage in serious dialogue. I feel sorry for your Vice President. The Prime Ministers on our side keep changing. This has to do with our domestic politics, but we understand that it's not conducive to building strong ties. You are right that the issues before us must command constant attention. (S)

Regarding the reports that have appeared in the press [about Russian involvement in money laundering], I am well-informed about your position, thanks to the contacts between Foreign Minister Ivanov and your Secretary of State. Foreign Minister Ivanov plans to be in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, and I do hope you'll find time to meet with him. (S)

I must say that this scandal is mostly motivated by our domestic politics. I hope I will have chance for a more informal conversation with Mr. Berger. I will talk to him about how we want to build our relations and how we must turn this situation to our advantage. I am absolutely opposed to attempts to play us off against each other. Others are trying to do this for their own reasons. If they succeed, they will gain, not us. People are trying to use this issue to disrupt our relations with the United States. (S)

That is why I support sending our team of experts to the U.S. I need to say that money laundering has always existed in many countries. Russia is simply the victim of such a scheme. To reiterate, I am prepared to discuss the facts in greater detail, if you are interested. (S)

On the issues you raise -- on ABM, my personal view may be closer to what you said than to the positions articulated by other people on the Russian side. I discussed this issue here yesterday and in Moscow, too. I think that the threat of nuclear proliferation is real -- just look at India and Pakistan. There are also other countries to be worried about, the so-called threshold states as well as the rogue states. We

also must take into account the possibility of nuclear terrorism. (S)

The recent terrorist acts in Moscow have to do with the situation in Dagestan. I have every reason to believe that the perpetrators are the same as the ones who delivered the strikes against the United States. Usama Bin-Laden has declared his intention to move to Chechnya. His groups already have a presence in Baku and Chechnya. He hasn't moved because he is afraid we will apprehend him or take other actions. We have serious resources in this respect and will use our technology to our advantage. (S)

I understand the concerns of the United States on ABM. Of course, the process should be set up in a way so that no side is caused undue concern about its own security. I have in mind not just Russia, but also France, China, and other nuclear powers. So, this is a topic for further negotiations. I am aware of the United States' plans. I believe it is appropriate to maintain constant contact. (S)

On START II and START III, we were very close to ratifying START II. I think that future developments will be positive in this area. We have good relations with the left factions in the Duma. We are keeping up a steady dialogue with the people in the Duma who are experts in this area. They believe it is absolutely impossible for them to ratify the Treaty if we don't demonstrate that our other discussions on arms control are entirely compatible, but I have noticed some wavering in the opposite direction lately. (S)

I believe we should continue to develop our overall efforts in the context of further discussions on START III and try to have a positive impact on the START II ratification process. Doing it that way makes me think that START II will become a more realistic prospect. (S)

I don't believe that it is necessary to reduce to the 1,000-1,500 level for strategic systems. It's important to preserve the negotiating process and show the world that we can achieve real results. (S)

You suggested a number of topics for discussion, but I have one more. I would like to thank the United States for the food supplies you have provided. I would like to report to you that all agreements between us are being honored. The proceeds raised by sales of the food are being directed to the Pension

Fund. The only outstanding issue is Dagestan. We have 15,000-18,000 refugees there and would like to send some of the food aid to Dagestan free of charge. (S)

Developments in Dagestan are completely different from what happened earlier in Chechnya. During the Chechen war, many Chechens fled to Dagestan where they were sheltered by Dagestanis. The new fighting was caused by mercenaries from Chechnya and Arab countries who invaded Dagestan. The people of Dagestan joined forces with Federal troops in defense of their homeland. In cases where support from the Federal forces was late arriving, the Dagestanis maintained their defenses until help arrived. They asked for our help. They want us to help arm them so that they can fight against the Chechens. (S)

Most importantly, in terms of the mentality of people from the Caucasus, the Dagestanis believe themselves to be superior to the Chechens so they regard this incursion as very offensive, especially because their land is being invaded by a fraternal nation. That's why the peaceful population is leaving their homes and moving to the capital of Dagestan. I visited and saw how they live. The situation is more stabilized. I think it would be appropriate to send some food to Dagestan free of charge. (S)

On our cooperation on Iran, I must admit that we express opposition to your characterization of the situation. I must draw your attention to the fact that Iran is our neighbor, and it would not be in our interest to strengthen Iran's capabilities in these areas. Yes, it's true that Iran is building new missiles, but they are doing so with western European technology. This concerns us no less than it does you. (S)

The Europeans also are becoming more active in competing for arms sales to Iran. Our companies are feeling the pressure. They say, we want to sell things to Iran, participate in that market. (S)

I think that we must cooperate more closely in having a clearer idea of what kind of cooperation is justified. Where are the right boundaries and limits? I would very much like to emphasize that we understand this issue. We'll continue to work on the issue of export controls, especially in the missile area. But we are very concerned about the training Iranians are receiving in other countries as well. This a subject that demands our constant attention. (S)

The President: What about Kosovo? How do you think we're doing? (S)

Prime Minister Putin: Things could be better. I assume you have information that the Albanians don't want to disarm. I understand that it's a product of your Administration's efforts. I understand that you believe that there were problems of a humanitarian nature. (S)

But you need to put the problem in perspective. We were talking about 50 thousand or maybe 100-150 thousand Albanian refugees. But the number of Serb refugees is three times greater. The most difficult problem is not this. The most difficult problem is that winter is coming. The destruction of infrastructure, especially in the energy area, means that Yugoslavia is in for a very difficult period. (S)

I am aware of your past statements about Milosevic. I think that the fate of millions is more important than the fate of one person. However, our positions on this person closely coincide. From our assessment of the situation, he did not behave appropriately. (S)

What is important is to have good cooperation between our two countries. Strobe Talbott did a lot in the diplomatic arena. We did a lot to dampen the ambitions of the military on both sides. I believe we continue to need each other there. Things could evolve into violence in Kosovo. I believe that we have set a very good precedent on military-to-military cooperation. (S)

One bad thing that we're faced with is the dismantling of Yugoslavia. It's difficult to imagine conditions when the Serbs are going to return to Kosovo. We have similar problems in Russia. Life shows that the use of force does not prompt the final resolution of a conflict. (S)

Dagestan is a small republic. There are 100 different ethnic groups living there. They speak different languages. The international language is Russian, of course. They have their own problems, of course. It's rather difficult for us to manage the problem inside Russia. But most groups in Dagestan support the Russian stance. If you intervene in a conflict with use of force, there are going to be consequences. But otherwise, we'd be deadlocked there. (S)

The President: For things to work out in Kosovo, we need to be together, just as we are in Bosnia. If the UN's representative has a plan for the Albanians to at least partially disarm, we will work with them. We also want the Serbs to return to their homes -- that's their right. (S)

On the economy, it's important for you to fight crime and corruption and enforce the rule of law. EXIM is looking at applications for some projects, and the chairman of EXIM is going to Moscow soon. It's important to get these kinds of things going. (S)

Another example is the team on money laundering that is coming to Washington. During these investigations, it's important to show that everything is being handled by the book. Also, with oil prices high, you're in a situation where you can get a lot more done. I remember that in the early 1990s, you could use a few good international projects to give people confidence that Russia was headed in the right direction. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: We in Russia are used to these kinds of problems. By the way, I met you in St. Petersburg when you visited. Much has been accomplished since that time. Our economic cooperation is very important and will help Russia to develop. The increase in oil prices has also had an impact on the ruble. We will need to devalue it a bit, perhaps 6-8 percent. I have asked the Central Bank to do this and to change the exchange rate with the dollar to make our exports more competitive. We need to avoid a situation where the dollar rate is artificially restricted and then we're forced to do something all of a sudden. We are pursuing a considered plan to deal with the inflated value of the ruble. It's not going to be harmful. (S)

The President: You're going in to an election season. That will be a challenge and an opportunity for us. These elections and how they're conducted are extremely important. I have told Boris this. He's the first elected leader of Russia, but also will be the first leader to peacefully transfer power through an election. That's a great thing. It's a great thing for a country. You've never done it before. I know it won't be the easiest thing. But it's extremely important. (S)

We also need to keep our lines of communication open as we deal with tough issues and you get closer to your elections. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: Yes, that's important. A lot of things are being geared up to ensure that we have good results from the Duma elections. A lot will depend on the composition of the new Duma. Whoever enters parliament, Russia will need to develop its economy and its relations with the international community and the United States. (S)

During the elections, some candidates may say things about the United States that aren't very nice. But that doesn't mean that they have a different view of our relations. I know almost all of the Communists personally. If they keep their position in the Duma, they will advocate basically the same policies as the government. If they stay in opposition, we'll still be able to pursue roughly the same approach. Maybe some of them will call for more of a role for the state in the economy, but in terms of substance, there's no big difference. It's mostly sloganeering.

The President: I am counting on Yeltsin and you. One thing that you have going for you is that you can try to show that there is no credible alternative to the path that you're on. If the opposition doesn't have a credible set of proposals, that will help you. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: Unfortunately, that's not the case. Russia does not have an established political system. People don't read programs. They look at the faces of the leaders, regardless of what party they belong to, regardless of whether they have a program or not. (S)

The opposition's whole strategy during the election campaign is to stir things up, to have an emotional impact on large groups of people. Of course, you are more aware than anyone about this tactic. Starting with any person in a position of responsibility at the local level, the reality is that most people are going to blame him for everything. All the problems will be on his shoulders. (S)

Most of our population thinks that way and is not very sophisticated. That's the reality we need to deal with. President Yeltsin understands this and takes it into account. Some of his statements and actions may surprise you, but you need to factor in how they impact on society and the motivations behind them. You need to take this into account. (S)

Part of his actions are determined by this. Some of his actions are simply mistakes. But leaving aside any statements that have

concerned you, please bear in mind that we have certain plans and are acting according to them. (S)

The President: I look forward to seeing how they unfold. (S)

Prime Minister Putin: I appreciate everything you have done to contribute to the development of relations between our countries. I know that you have other meetings to attend. (S)

The President: Thank you very much. It was good to see you.
(U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 3967				
Document ID: 0004033				
Row: 43	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Original OA/ID Number: 4072				
Document ID: 0000008				
Row: 47	Section: 1	Shelf: 11	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with Acting President Putin of Russia (3 pages)	01/01/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with Acting President Putin of Russia; draft (3 pages)	01/01/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
(Telcon and Putin)
OA/Box Number: 4072

FOLDER TITLE:

0000008

2017-0222-M

kh2025

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0000008
RECEIVED: 03 JAN 00 13

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 04 JAN 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN ACTING PRES PUTIN ON JAN 1 2000

ACTION: BRADTKE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 08 JAN 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FICKLIN

NSC CHRON

PASCUAL

COMMENTS:

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DATE

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OPENED BY: NSTCG

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2 OF

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0000008

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 00010317 FOR DECISION
Z 00010419 BERGER APPROVED RECOM #1 & #2
X 00010419 BRADTKE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 000104 STATE

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0008
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG EW A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>JSB</u> GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
<u>P</u> POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 1/3</u>	<u>see edits</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>11/1/4</u>	_____
RUDMAN	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>EW 1/4</u>	<u>JS</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>12/1/4</u>	<u>JS</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

GA JAN 30 5:13
cc:

COMMENTS:

Memor - Putin -

1 January

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0008
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG EW A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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<u>1</u> POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 1/3</u>	<u>see edits</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>HL 1/4</u>	_____
RUDMAN	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>EW 1/4</u>	<u>JD</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>12 1/4</u>	<u>JD</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

00 JAN 30 5:19
 CC:

COMMENTS:

Memor - Putin -
1 January

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


0008

January 4, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian Acting President Putin (✓)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the January 1 telephone conversation between the President and Russian Acting President Putin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (✓)



Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1/3/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.17)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Acting President Putin of Russia (✓)

PARTICIPANTS: The President and Acting President Putin

NOTETAKERS: Rogers, Manning, and Williams

DATE, TIME: January 1, 2000, 1107-1116 EST

AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

Acting President Putin: Yes, I am listening. (U)

The President: Congratulations, and thank you for taking my call. (U)

Acting President Putin: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for this call. (U)

The President: I think you are off to a very good start. Yeltsin's resignation statement, and what you have said in your initial statements, are very encouraging for the future of Russian democracy. I wanted to call just to reaffirm my commitment to our partnership and to work with you. I know that we still have some differences in our relationship, and you know what our concerns are about Chechnya and the Caucasus, but we also have much in common and there are many things we need to be working on together. I just wanted to say that I hope we'll have an early chance to meet and talk. I know you have a campaign to run over the next 90 days, but we're eager to be a constructive partner. There are so many things we have to do in the future, but I think we can have a very good year, and I am committed to doing that. (✓)

Acting President Putin: Thank you once again for this call. I visited with Boris Nikolayevich today, and he knew that we were going to talk. He asked me to pass on to you his warmest New Year's wishes. We were pleased with your statement on President Yeltsin's resignation. It was quite balanced and well wishing, and we appreciate this. We thank you personally, because you have done a lot to develop Russian-American relations. We know that your administration can appreciate the nature and level of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 01/01/10

these relations. The fact that the Administration appreciates our relations obliges us to develop them further, as you probably know, or your Administration knows, from my interview with CNN two days ago. [gap in transmission] (C)

The President: Hello? What happened? (U)

Acting President Putin: Yes, I am here. (U)

The President: Hello? (U)

Acting President Putin: We are ready to receive you at any moment, at any time that is convenient for you. Our meetings usually have been short, but they were very impressive. There are certain issues on which we do not agree; however, I believe that on the core themes, we always will be together. The most important thing is to develop Russia-U.S. relations for the good of our peoples. (C)

As you mentioned in your statement, President Yeltsin did a lot to destroy the Communist system and to push Russia toward the civilized countries. The direction of Russian policies in all areas will continue in the coming three months while I am Acting President. A lot will depend on the person elected President; however, I believe it will be a progressive person. (C)

Once again, I would like to congratulate you on the New Year. I would like to wish you and all the American people happiness and prosperity in every home and household. I am sure we will find a solution to all the questions on which we disagree. Once again, Happy New Year. (C)

The President: Thank you again, and Happy New Year to you. We will meet as soon as possible, and I want you to know that you can call me at any time, day or night. I, too, want the economic problems of the Russian people to be a thing of the past and for this good partnership to grow even stronger. I also want to wish you a Happy New Year. (U)

Acting President Putin: Thank you very much, and Happy New Year to you. In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the fact that our election campaign is coming up, as you mentioned. I remember that in our first meeting in Auckland, we touched upon some of the problems you had to go through in the process of political strife. You have shown strong character and have set a good example for us. I wish you happiness in the New Year. (U)

The President: Thank you very much, and goodbye. (U)

Acting President Putin: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 0000008

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 JAN 00

MEMORANDUM FOR: KENNEY, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: KENNEY, K

SOURCE: BRADTKE


DATE: 04 JAN 00

SUBJ: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN ACTING PRES PUTIN ON JAN 1 2000

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 06 JAN 99

COMMENT:



FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 0000008
DATE 04 JAN 00

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN ACTING PRES PUTIN ON JAN 1 2000
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: DISK +1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 3/9/2018

2017-0222-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0008

January 3, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
Acting President Putin, January 1, 2000.

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum Conversation of the January
1 telephone conversation between the President and Russian
Acting President Putin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert Bradtke to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve APB 1/4 Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve APB 1/4 Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 1/3/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.18)
3/7/2019 KBH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Acting President Putin of Russia (C)
PARTICIPANTS: The President and Acting President Putin
NOTETAKERS: Rogers, Manning, and Williams
DATE, TIME: January 1, 2000, 1107-1116 EST
AND PLACE: Residence

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Acting President Putin: Yes, I am listening. O(U)

The President: Congratulations, and thank you for taking my call. O(U)

Acting President Putin: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for this call. O(U)

The President: I think you are off to a very good start. Yeltsin's resignation statement, and what you have said in your initial statements, are very encouraging for the future of Russian democracy. I wanted to call just to reaffirm my commitment to our partnership and to work with you. I know that we still have some differences in our relationship, and you know what our concerns are about Chechnya and the Caucasus, but we also have much in common and there are many things we need to be working on together. I just wanted to say that I hope we'll have an early chance to meet and talk. I know you have a campaign to run over the next 90 days, but we're eager to be a constructive partner. There are so many things we have to do in the future, but I think we can have a very good year, and I am committed to doing that. O(C)

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Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 01/01/10

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Acting President Putin: We are ready to receive you at any moment, at any time that is convenient for you. Our meetings usually have been short, but they were very impressive. There are certain issues on which we do not agree; however, I believe that on the core themes, we always will be together. The most important thing is to develop Russia-U.S. relations for the good of our peoples. (U)

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
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Acting President Putin: Thank you very much, and Happy New Year to you. In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the fact that our election campaign is coming up, as you mentioned. I remember that in our first meeting in Auckland, we touched upon some of the problems you had to go through in the process of political strife. You have shown strong character and have set a good example for us. I wish you happiness in the New Year. (U)

The President: Thank you very much, and goodbye. (U)

Acting President Putin: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4084				
Document ID: 0002133				
Row: 47	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (2 pages)	04/15/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia; draft (2 pages)	04/15/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
(Telcon and Putin))
OA/Box Number: 4084

FOLDER TITLE:

0002133

2017-0222-M

kh2026

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0002133
RECEIVED: 28 MAR 00 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: MEDISH

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR 15 APR TELCON W/ PUTIN

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 03 APR 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN
MEDISH
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSAMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-m

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0002133

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

002 BERGER
002

Z 01011012 FOR DECISION
X 01011120 BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: T LOG # 2133
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRB INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG T A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
 GIRE	_____	_____	_____
HAAS	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 1/10</u>	<u>needed</u>
BASH	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>Fix & find the 1/11</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>Sm 1/11/01</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>4x 1/11</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Memorandum - Putin 15 Apr 2000

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: T LOG # 2133
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRB INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG T A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>2</u> GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 1/10</u>	<u>no edit</u>
BASH			
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>Fixo 8/11/01</u>	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>Sm 1/11/01</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>AK 1/11</u>	<u>N</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Memorandum - Putin 15 Apr 2000

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2133

January 9, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: MARK MEDISH *mcm*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian
President-Elect Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
April 15, 2000 telephone conversation between the President and
Russian President-elect Putin.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 4/27/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/9/2018*
2017-0222-m

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.19)
3/7/2019 K8H

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President-Elect Putin

Interpreter: Irene Firsow

Notetakers: Elizabeth Rogers, Michael
Manning, and Robert WilliamsDATE, TIME: April 15, 2000, 3:04 p.m.-3:11 p.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: I just called to congratulate you on the Duma vote. It was a great accomplishment for the security of our country and the international community, and I know you made a direct contribution. I just wanted to thank you for that. (C)

President-Elect Putin: Thank you, Bill. (U)

The President: And now that START II is behind us, I hope we can begin to work on START III, ABM, and strengthening strategic stability. I know that our people will be talking about this in the next few of weeks. There are a lot of tough issues involved, but I think we can find a way forward. (C)

Finally, the last time we talked, we agreed that a meeting before Okinawa would help us get started on issues related to economic growth and fighting proliferation. And I also think we should work together on other aspects of the Chechnya problem that we have been discussing. (C)

Sandy Berger and Ivanov talked earlier today, and we proposed to him some dates to meet in Moscow. Sergey is looking to see if these are convenient for you. I hope we can still meet in early June so we can work on these things and get as much as possible done this year. (C)

President-Elect Putin: Bill, thank you very much for all these good words concerning the ratification of START II. This process has taken seven years. I believe that both you and the First

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 4/15/10

President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, made a very significant contribution to the normalization of the situation, making the world more secure. I read your pronouncements on that, and I fully share them. (U)

I absolutely can agree with you that this movement toward the ratification of START II is a way to a safer world. Of course, I understand that this year is an election year in the United States and progress on this will not be an easy task. But I am sure you will manage to do this. We understand the specific circumstances that relate to this task in the United States today. We are also prepared together as we did in the past to make our joint contribution to make a safer and stable world together with you. (U)

Today, Ivanov told me about his conversation with Mr. Berger, and he told me about the possibility of meeting you in June. These dates are quite acceptable, and I cordially invite you and look forward to meeting you in Moscow. I also think the subjects you mentioned will be of great interest to us both. We can also discuss other issues. In any case, I will be very happy to see you. (U)

The President: I'm thrilled by that. I really want to have a chance to see you. Despite the elections, I think we can get a lot accomplished. I will do my best to find a way forward. I like Moscow in June and will be honored to come back. (U)

President-Elect Putin: Thank you very much for that. I would like to emphasize that we understand the complexities and specific circumstances surrounding your position, and we are prepared to play together. (U)

The President: That's wonderful. I'll see you soon. (U)

President-Elect Putin: Good-bye, Bill. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262017-0222-M (1.20)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (U) [#]PARTICIPANTS: The President
President-Elect Putin

Interpreter: Irene Firsow

Notetakers: Elizabeth Rogers, Michael
Manning, and Robert WilliamsDATE, TIME April 15, 2000, 3:04 p.m.-3:11 p.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Air Force One

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President-Elect Putin: Bill, thank you very much for all these good words concerning the ratification of START II. This process

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify on: 4/15/10

has taken seven years. I believe that both you and the First President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, made a very significant contribution to the normalization of the situation, making the world more secure. I read your pronouncements on that, and I fully share them. (S)

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The President: That's wonderful. I'll see you soon. (U)

President-Elect Putin: Good-bye, Bill. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4084				
Document ID: 0002137				
Row: 47	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President-elect Putin of Russia (3 pages)	03/27/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President-elect Putin of Russia, draft (3 pages)	03/27/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
(Telcon and Putin)
OA/Box Number: 4084

FOLDER TITLE:

0002137

2017-0222-M

kh2027

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0002137
RECEIVED: 28 MAR 00 09

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 31 MAR 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES ELECT VLADIMIR PUTIN
ON 27 MAR 00

ACTION: BASH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 APR 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
MASSEY
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 3/31 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0002137

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 00033013 FOR DECISION
X 00033110 RUDMAN APPROVED RECOM
X 00033110 BASH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 000331 KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TRC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
BASH	113	BB/3/30/11/3/67	
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN	2	✓	
STEINBERG			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	14	TTC 3/30	14
RECORDS MGMT.	5		D

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: mention w/ Putin 3/21

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Log # 2137

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm BB To MER Date 3/30

MARA,

I recommend you approve for SRB

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 0002137
DATE 31 MAR 00

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES ELECT VLADIMIR PUTIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBV Date: 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEGB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2137
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
BASH	<u>1/3</u>	<u>09/3/30</u>	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>1/5</u>	<u>TLC 3/30</u>	<u>Φ</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: memo on w/ Putin 3/27

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


2137

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
March 31, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President-elect
Vladimir Putin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin from March 27, 2000 is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (C)



Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 3/28/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-m

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.21)

3/7/2019 KGH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with President-elect Putin of Russia
(C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

Notetakers: Roger Merletti, Don Gentile,
Joel Ehrendreich, Miguel Aguilo, Jenny McGee,
Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME March 27, 2000, 11:13 - 11:29 a.m. EST,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello Vladimir, can you hear me? Congratulations on your victory on Sunday. (U)

President-elect Putin: Thank you. (U)

The President: I think this is a really historic milestone for Russia, and it's very important that the people have put their trust in you. You have a big responsibility now. The hardest part for you will be taking those expectations and turning them into concrete results that improve people's lives. I'm sure you can do it. (C)

I'm very interested in building our relationship and the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. I hope we can find an opportunity to meet soon. I hope we can use this year to full advantage. We can accomplish a lot together if we can agree on priority areas of our relationship, and I am confident that we can do that as well. (C)

President-elect Putin: First of all, I would like to thank you, Bill, for this phone call. I also want to say that the statement that you made about my modest personality was not unacknowledged here, and it is clear to the whole world that I am a person you can work with. This statement by the U.S. President was not unnoticed by people in Russia and throughout the world. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/28/10

I think we have a good basis for U.S.-Russian relations, which was established by you and the first Russian President, Mr. Yeltsin, and we have all the grounds to develop relations on this basis. But, of course, the most difficult task will be to justify the expectations of the population within the country. I expect that we'll manage to achieve a lot in our cooperation together, and this will help us a lot in our country, too. (C)

Our staffs are preparing different options for our soonest possible meeting, and I think this kind of meeting can take place even before Okinawa. You would be a most welcome guest here, and we can coordinate our contacts at any time for you. Thank you for this phone call very much. (C)

The President: You're welcome. First, let me say that I'll have our people get in touch, and I hope we can meet before Okinawa. That would be good. I'd like to mention a few other points if you have a moment. (C)

President-elect Putin: Yes, I am listening. (U)

The President: Let me say, first of all, I had a good talk with Jim Wolfensohn about his meeting with you, and he cares very much about the success of Russia. I know you have an ambitious market reform agenda, but I wanted to make clear that I am convinced the international community wants you to succeed and wants Russia to succeed. I think that there will be a real reward if you achieve these objectives. (C)

The second thing I wanted to say is that I read your recent letter on Chechnya. I think Chechnya is still an obstacle to your economic and global agenda. I hope you will launch credible investigations into the alleged abuses by the military and move into a civil and political phase in your dealings with Chechnya. I think nothing would help Russia more or help you more than accountability on these human rights issues and progress on an OSCE permanent presence. (C)

Finally, on the arms issues, I hope we can keep Sandy Berger and Sergey Ivanov making progress on the Iran issue. I'm hopeful we can move ahead on a common arms control agenda and hope we can conclude by this summer agreements on further reductions in START III, adapting the ABM treaty, as well as the other issues on our agenda. I think this is very, very important, and I hope, of course, you will be able to ratify START II. (C)

President-elect Putin: As for the Berger-Ivanov channel, I give it the same positive evaluation. This relates to both the Iran issue and the ABM Treaty. I think that there are grounds for continuing consultations here, and we have a common basis for a

common approach here. As for the START II treaty, we're starting active negotiations with the Duma now. This is being done both through channels of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I have reasons to believe we'll have positive movement in that direction. (C)

As for Chechnya, I have appointed a representative to deal with the issue of human rights, and he's now in the middle of negotiations with the Council of Europe and the OSCE on having these organizations join his work in Chechnya. All crimes committed by everyone have to be investigated there. The crimes related to hostages, including foreigners, still are not investigated. I spoke to Tony Blair this morning. I didn't have enough time to tell him that, in accordance with our data, one of the field commanders was killed, and it was this person who ordered the beheading of the English hostages. (C)

Now, about Wolfensohn, we had very good contacts with him. He brought an excellent team with him. I have to say that the people who met with them on our side spoke the same language, and it was very impressive. We have all the grounds to believe that this program is going to be a joint one, and, to a great extent, focused on the field you mentioned, which is structural reform. (C)

As far as I know, he had his daughter's wedding yesterday. I sent him my best regards, but if you see him in person, could you relay my best regards to him? (U)

The President: I will do that. Let's have our people work together. I want to meet as soon as we can, and I'd like to see Russia in the springtime once more. (C)

President-elect Putin: Bill, I do remember our meetings in Oslo and New Zealand, and I recall those with great warmth. I hope to see you again in the spring. (C)

The President: Thank you, have a wonderful day. You've earned it. (U)

President-elect Putin: Thank you so much, Bill. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2137

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 28, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *mcm*

FROM: STEPHEN MASSEY *SM* AND ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President-elect Putin of Russia

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President-elect Vladimir Putin of Russia on March 27, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert Bradtke to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve *unfor* Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *unfor* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 3/28/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/9/2018
2017-0222-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.22)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with President-elect Putin of Russia
(S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

Notetakers: Roger Merletti, Don Gentile,
Joel Ehrendreich, Miguel Aguilo, Jenny McGee,
Andrew Weiss
9

DATE, TIME March 27, 2000, 11:13 - 11:29 a.m. EST,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 3/28/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

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Our staffs are preparing different options for our soonest possible meeting, and I think this kind of meeting can take place even before Okinawa. You would be a most welcome guest here, and we can coordinate our contacts at any time for you. Thank you for this phone call very much. (U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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The President: Thank you, have a wonderful day. You've earned it. (U)

President-elect Putin: Thank you so much, Bill. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4098				
Document ID: 0004526				
Row: 47	Section: 2	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (3 pages)	07/10/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia; incomplete draft (1 page)	07/10/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4098

FOLDER TITLE:

0004526

2017-0222-M

kh2028

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0004526
RECEIVED: 11 JUL 00 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: WEISS
MEDISH

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCALL W/ RUSSIAN PRES PUTIN

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 17 JUL 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 3/12/2018
2017-0222-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0004526

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

002 BERGER
002

Z 01011012 FOR DECISION
X 01011314 BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: T LOG # 4526
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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG T A/O _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
HAAS	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 7/12</u>	<u>see ed. 15</u>
BASH	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/13</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>W 1/13</u>	<u>Full</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Telecon - Puterbaugh -
10 July 2000

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: T LOG # 4526
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG T A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
SIRE	_____	_____	_____
HAAS	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 7/12</u>	<u>see ed. 15</u>
BASH	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/13</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>1/1/13</u>	<u>File</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

01 JAN 10 10:20:01

CC:

COMMENTS:

*Telecon - Putin -
10 July 2000*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE up

~~SECRET~~

4526

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 9, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *mcm*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Russian President Putin on
July 10, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *W 1/13/01* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 7/11/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/12/2013*
2017-0222-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.23)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Jenny McGee, Joel Ehrendreich, Don Gentile

DATE, TIME: July 10, 2000, 10:39-10:56 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Putin: Good morning. (U)

The President: Good morning, Vladimir. It's nice to hear your voice. I'm glad we could work out this call. (U)

President Putin: Thank you for responding right away. I do not have any broad-scale issues to discuss. I would like to thank you for the decision in relation to the debt obligation under Lend-Lease. We have been able to resolve this issue in spite of the fact the decision was blocked by Congress. Such a position is a symbol of the harmonious attitude of the American Administration toward Russia. I'd also like to thank you for your position concerning NOGA. (S)

Also, I would like to take advantage of this conversation to tell you about my recent contacts. I had a long dialogue with Jiang Zemin concerning our conversations about national missile defense. I believe that some of the concerns of China I have been able to alleviate. I emphasized your position that you want to ensure that there is good dialogue and cooperation with China on this issue. I do not know what to say about the recent missile defense test. I do not know if I should congratulate you or express sympathy. However, I'm sure we will be able to talk about it when we meet in Okinawa. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: 7/10/10

I read your letter of July 7. I would like to say a couple of words about your concerns about our cooperation with Iran. As for Bushehr, I would like to assure you that there will be no transfer of nuclear-related technology for weapons production. This is all under control. We are in close cooperation with respect to IAEA. (S)

You know that soon I am going to Beijing and Pyongyang. Our meeting is scheduled for July 21, and by that time, I will be able to inform you on what happened and what we discussed in Pyongyang. I am planning to pose to Korean leaders a question about the future of their missile program. We'll see what they will have to say, how they react to it. We can also work on the implementation of the agreements that were signed during your visit. I mean, our cooperation with regard to Afghanistan along two avenues -- cooperation between special services as well as between diplomatic services. This is about all I wanted to tell you. If you have any comments, I will be happy to listen to them. (S)

The President: First of all, I want to compliment you on the forceful speech you gave before the Federal Assembly about the challenges of modernizing Russia. Secondly, I am glad we could go forward with the debt rescheduling, but as you know, there was strong opposition in Congress over Russian credits to Belgrade, as well as on the Chechnya issue. I know Strobe Talbott will talk to Foreign Minister Ivanov about it next week, but I felt it was important to uphold the commitment we made in August 1999 with the Paris Club, and I'm glad we did it. (S)

On the nonproliferation issue, I am glad we were able to protect related Russian assets from the NOGA lawsuit so the HEU agreement can stay on track. I think it was clearly the right thing to do. (S)

With regard to Iran's nuclear procurement efforts inside Russia, I'm still very concerned about it, and I think there needs to be greater investigation of Russian firms. We are afraid the problem is getting worse, and the Vice President will be sending more extensive information to Prime Minister Kasyanov soon. I hope we can discuss it more, along with the missile issue, in Okinawa. (S)

I'm glad you're going to North Korea and China, and I look forward to talking to you about it. Obviously, we strongly support what Kim Dae-jung has done and how Kim Jong-il approached the summit and its aftermath. I hope you will encourage Kim Dae-jung to follow through on the agreement. I think we are already seeing some progress, and this is very good. Also, anything you can do to encourage making North Korea's missile moratorium more

permanent would be in our interest and in yours, and will contribute to stability in the region. I hope you will encourage them to do that. (S)

In China, I hope you can discuss their experience with accession to the WTO. The reformers there used the WTO process to promote the difficult economic decisions they had to make, the kind of decisions you suggested in your speech. I'm looking forward to seeing you in Okinawa, and I hope it will be a very good summit for you. I know our people are looking into what we can say and do there. I'm very much looking forward to it. (S)

President Putin: Thank you very much for what you have said. As for Iran and my upcoming visit to North Korea and China, I have taken note of everything you have had to say. We will discuss the Iran issue in more detail when we meet in Okinawa. I know about the concerns the United States has, and now you have given me some additional information about it. We can discuss these concerns. I will study this information very carefully. As for the moratorium on missile tests, it is certainly in our common interests and I will do my best to encourage it. I look forward to seeing you in Okinawa. (S)

The President: Let me say one thing in closing. We are starting these Middle East peace talks tomorrow, and we want to be in close touch with you. We may need your help. I want to stay in touch with developments. I will call you if there is. (S)

President Putin: All right, Bill. We are following the situation in cooperation with the Palestinians. I understand your concern. Thank you very much, Bill. I will see you in Okinawa. (S)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262017-0222-M (1.24)
3/7/2019 KEH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (S) #
^

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko

Notetakers: Deana Sutcliffe, Jenny McGee, Joel Ehrendreich, Don Gentile

DATE, TIME: July 10, 2000, 10:39-10:56 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Putin: Good morning. (U)

The President: Good morning, Vladimir. It's nice to hear your voice. I'm glad we could work out this call. (U)

President Putin: Thank you for responding right away. I do not have any broad-scale issues to discuss. I would like to thank you for the decision in relation to the debt obligation under Lend-Lease. We have been able to resolve this issue in spite of the fact the decision was blocked by Congress. Such a position is a symbol of the harmonious attitude of the American Administration toward Russia. I'd also like to thank you for your position concerning NOGA. (S)

Also, I would like to take advantage of this conversation to tell you about my recent contacts. I had a long dialogue with Jiang Zemin concerning our conversations about national missile defense. I believe that some of the concerns of China I have been able to alleviate. I emphasized your position that you want to ensure that there is good dialogue and cooperation with China on this issue. I do not know what to say about the recent missile defense test. I do not know if I should congratulate you or express sympathy. However, I'm sure we will be able to talk about it when we meet in Okinawa. (S)

~~SECRET~~~~Classified by: Robert Bradtke~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify on: 7/10/10

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4102				
Document ID: 0005251				
Row: 47	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President of Russia (4 pages)	08/16/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President of Russia; incomplete draft (2 pages)	08/16/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4102

FOLDER TITLE:

0005251

2017-0222-M

kh2029

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0005251
RECEIVED: 16 AUG 00 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: MEDISH

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR POTUS TELCALL W/ PRES RUSSIA PUTIN ON 16 AUG

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 22 AUG 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MEDISH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDBG

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 3/12/2013
2017-0222-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0005251

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001


CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 01011218 FOR DECISION
X 01011314 BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5251
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~RR~~ INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG sm A/O od

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
 GIRE	_____	_____	
HAAS	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>SP 1/12</u>	<u>see edit</u>
BASH	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>1/13</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>SP 1/13</u>	<u>file</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Teller - Putin - 16 Aug 2000

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5251
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PPS~~ INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG mm A/O od

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
WRE			<i>[Signature]</i>
IAAS			
OWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>OR 1/12</u>	<u>see edit</u>
BASH			
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>1/13</u>	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>1/13</u>	<u>file</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

21 JAN 12 1975

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Telco - Putin - 16 Aug 2000

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~SECRET~~

5251

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 11, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: MARK MEDISH *MM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Russian President Putin on
August 16, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *MM/13* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 8/16/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/12/2013*
2017-0222-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President of Russia (4 pages)	08/16/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4102

FOLDER TITLE:

0005251

2017-0222-M
kh2029

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President of Russia; incomplete draft (2 pages)	08/16/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4102

FOLDER TITLE:

0005251

2017-0222-M
kh2029

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4107				
Document ID: 0006198				
Row: 47	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a: telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President of Russia (7 pages)	09/30/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b: telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President of Russia, incomplete draft (2 pages)	09/30/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4107

FOLDER TITLE:

0006198

2017-0222-M

kh2030

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0006198
RECEIVED: 02 OCT 00 13

TO: BERGER

FROM: MEDISH

DOC DATE: 08 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PUTIN ON 30 SEP

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 07 OCT 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MEDISH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BINNENDIJK
CULLOM
EPSTEIN
FICKLIN
HILLIARD
MCCARTHY

Chron.
Exec Sec.

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWL

CLOSED BY: NSATW

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KRM NARA, Date 3/12/2018
2017-0222-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0006198

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 01010817 FOR DECISION
X 01011016 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6196
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PR INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O 00

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
HAAS	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>SP 1/8</u>	<u>see edits</u>
BASH	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/9 Fix & SW formal</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>Sm 4/10/01</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

61 JAN 8 00 51Z

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6198

January 8, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: MARK MEDISH *McM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Russian President Putin on
September 30, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *PJB 1/9* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 9/30/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM/NARA*, Date *3/12/2018*
2017-0222-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.27)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow

Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Sean Tarver,
Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME: September 30, 2000, 3:04-3:38 PM EDT,
AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

President Putin: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello, Vladimir. Thank you for taking the call.
(U)

President Putin: Good afternoon to you, Bill. I'm happy to hear
your voice. (U)

The President: I just wanted to talk to you for a minute about
Yugoslavia. (U)

President Putin: With pleasure. (U)

The President: I know this is a difficult and delicate moment,
but I just wanted to say it seems to me since virtually everyone
accepts the fact that the opposition won the election and they
are now opposed to a second round of voting, because they believe
it gives Milosevic time to manipulate the balloting and,
possibly, create instability in Montenegro. I think the best
thing to do is to try to get Milosevic to leave, but I think
you're the only person who can do that. (U)

I know it's a difficult situation for you, but what I would
encourage you to do is that you send him a private message, not a
public one, urging him that you wish him to leave and making
clear that Russia will support the will of the people. I think

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: 9/30/10

publicly you should say that. It seems to me we have a choice between a violent and peaceful transition. The only country in the world who can play a decisive role in this is Russia because they know they need to turn to you after all this is over to continue to have a solid relationship. (C)

President Putin: Bill, we are aware of the fact that your country experts and think-tanks are working on it thoroughly and weighing each step that needs to be taken. But I want you and me to have a frank discussion about it -- absolutely frank. And what I tell you won't need any further verification. We've been acting absolutely to the point on the agreements that were reached in Okinawa -- in absolute conformity with them. The question here is a form and message of Kostunica and coordination of our efforts. Most likely, Milosevic gets the sense of our position. (C)

I have already had a conversation with Schroeder, and you will be the second person to learn this information. I suggested we have a meeting in Belgrade between one of our decision-makers like the National Security Advisor or the Minister of Foreign Affairs and opposition representatives, but he [Kostunica] declined such a meeting. So he declined contact with us, but we will basically let you know our position. We already let him know our position in no uncertain terms that we don't want to be cornered or be in a position to support especially non-democratic solutions to the situation. (C)

I want it to be clear on the point that we are not deviating from any avenue of approach to cooperation with you as our partner. But I wanted you to know that the time is right for him to leave the scene. I am not sure he will do so. And trying to analyze the situation, we think what might be productive and fruitful is the following. (C)

Today the opposition, for all practical purposes, has rejected the second round of elections. In our opinion, this is a blunder. If they don't run a second round of elections, then the Milosevic side will be the only uncontested side, so he [Kostunica] will leave the scene, and Milosevic will win the election. (C)

Now if the opposition tries and goes for the second round, if the opposition tries to run the second round, they stand every chance to win. Why? Because Montenegro has not voted yet, and there is a group of people who voted for other candidates. They will vote for him. He has a 100 percent chance to win. Milosevic would only have one chance left for him, that is fraudulent election results, whether he is trying to resort to that action, nobody can say for sure or guarantee that he will not. (C)

But what could we do? If we were to pursue, it would indicate very clear support on our behalf to the opposition. We could invite the leader of the opposition to Moscow. Then Ivanov, our foreign minister, would meet him here. I could probably have a conversation with him over the phone as well. While he would be here in Moscow, he could state that he is prepared to run a second round of negotiations, provided that Milosevic would allow verification, and maybe even international observers, both at the level of the polling stations and the count of the vote. That position would find absolutely official and clear-cut support on our side. (C)

However, should Milosevic reject such a position, then in no uncertain terms we will take a position of condemning his actions. The very fact of the opposition leader visiting Moscow and having talks at the top level here would demonstrate our very clear support for him and would probably add five to seven percentage points to his favor. I think we have nothing to lose in such a position, but the gains are very clear. I would like to underline again on our part in all quarters this would be regarded as very clear and unambiguous support to the opposition. (C)

While we are certainly in touch with the opposition, they are telling us that a recount of the first round of elections has to be carried out. We would certainly be willing to participate and have some impact on it, but I very much doubt we would come up with positive results in that scenario. We certainly jointly could come up with some ideas and take some actions. The only apprehension I have is that we are losing time for preparation for the second round of elections. Milosevic is not wasting time and is getting ready for the second round. (C)

Well, I certainly am not trying to push anybody here with any ideas, but this is simply our vision, our analysis. At the same time, why don't we really try to exert pressure on Milosevic again. The only apprehension again is that we probably would be dragging our feet and losing time here. This is our perspective, Bill. (C)

The President: Let me say, I completely understand your position, and the only thing that bothers me about it is that the opposition believes they have evidence that he essentially defrauded voters in the first round, that he got rid of 600,000 votes. And they believe he will use this period before a runoff election to arrange to steal it again. I think that's what they are worried about. (C)

President Putin: Bill, can I insert a couple of words here? (U)

The President: Sure. (U)

President Putin: Please, could you look into the proposal? I will again give you the gist of it. The leader of the opposition is going to visit Moscow. And he will say that he will reconsider his position with regard to the second round of elections, provided Milosevic gives access to opposition and/or international observers both to polling stations and the counting of the vote. Whether this will 100 percent guarantee against fraud, I don't know. But his experts are going to say they will verify it, the opposition will be involved, and we can then express our position that this is going to be a democratic and fair election. (C)

Then if Milosevic were to reject such a proposition, it would give an opportunity for the opposition to reject the second round position and for us to explain our position in no uncertain terms again. (C)

The President: So you believe if you invite him and he accepts it, it would send a clear signal of support for fair elections and that you don't have a problem with him becoming President? (C)

President Putin: Absolutely. I can also tell you something that might happen, if he were indeed to come to Moscow. He would be invited by the Chairman of the Committee of International Relations of the State Duma. Then he might say that he was seeking consultations with our foreign minister, and Ivanov would receive him. During his stay, I would talk to him over the phone. Then during his stay, we would come up with a statement where we would say we support his position that the opposition should have access to the vote count. (C)

The very fact of this arrival in Moscow would show our support and add five to eight percentage points to his vote and provide qualitative changes to his candidacy. We will not allow his opponents to speculate about his so-called special relationship with Moscow, which is, incidentally, no impediment in parallel to trying to exert pressure over Milosevic along the lines you just mentioned in this telephone conversation. (C)

The President: Let me ask you this. I do think this has merit, unless it just gives time for Milosevic to steal the elections. But I want to ask you another question. How are we going to get him out of there? (C)

President Putin: You mean remove him? (C)

The President: Yeah, is he afraid to leave office? (C)

President Putin: I think I can have a word with him and relate to him that the international community will not hold this against him and there will be no action against him. But I would like to discuss this further and think this needs to be explained to him again. (C)

The President: But would he be able to stay in Serbia? Would they let him go somewhere else? (C)

President Putin: I think it would be better if he stays in Serbia. (C)

The President: Yeah, me too, but I just don't know what the climate is there. (C)

President Putin: Frankly, I don't know, of course, but maybe he would want to leave. It's a possible move on his part, but I don't know. We don't want such a gift. Why don't we send him to America? (C)

The President: Yes, I know what you mean. Let me think about this. The only thing I'm worried about is that later on we don't want to look like we were duped into helping him steal the election. I also wouldn't put it past him for an excuse for him to impose martial law so we have to encourage the military not to go along with it. If he wanted to invade Montenegro, that's another excuse to put the election off. The big problem is -- (C)

President Putin: [Interrupting] I believe you are right that such a danger indeed exists. However, I would think that if the opposition leader were to come here and Russia would express its position in no uncertain terms, that Milosevic would not dare such a plan or an action on his part. (C)

The President: Well, I agree that it would be harder. You could make it hard for him to steal the election. (C)

President Putin: Well, like I said, certainly we can't guarantee this 100 percent, but what we can do is place demands on him and if he doesn't comply, then the opposition will be more justified in deciding not to go for the runoff elections. We will be able to say, yes, the demands of the opposition are well-justified. That would go absolutely in conformity with our own domestic political position. In our elections, the opposition would be present at all stages of the elections, including counting of the votes. (C)

The President: That would certainly help if you'd say that. (C)

President Putin: However, all of this does not exclude what you referred to at the beginning, and we are now our part and will try to work on him in this direction. At the same time, I have to be frank -- I personally doubt that even talking to him in such a direction will result in him voluntarily agreeing to a recount and retiring. I believe there is no chance for that. (C)

At the same time, the very fact of the arrival of the opposition leader in Moscow would in no way be an impediment to such an approach. In fact, it would likely reinforce the likelihood of international verification and monitoring. If Moscow will determine its position, all of that would be in hand, the issue to which you have referred to at the beginning of the conversation (C)

The President: I think that's possible. I believe if he comes there, that will discourage Milosevic a little and at least increase the chances that he will step down. (C)

President Putin: Well, as a matter of fact, Kostunica has told me they will try again to convince Milosevic that there is a need for a recount, but it seems to me this will be a futile exercise. (C)

The President: Well, he's trying to hang on. (C)

President Putin: He sure is. (C)

The President: Okay, let me think about this. I may want to call you again, but I'm encouraged at least by what you said here. I think it is important that he knows Russia will not let him get away with stealing the elections. (C)

President Putin: It is important that he should not be able to use it as an ace and try to speculate with our position. It's important that everybody in Yugoslavia gets a clear picture of what our position is. That is important. (C)

The President: All right. Let's see what we can do and stay in close touch. (C)

President Putin: Thank you, Bill. Yes, over here we will engage on this a little bit, and then we will keep you posted again. (C)

The President: Okay. Thank you. (U)

President Putin: Thank you, Bill. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.28)

3/7/2019 KBH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

delet

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President of Russia ©

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow

Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Sean Tarver,
Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME: September 30, 2000, 3:04 - 3:38 PM EDT,
AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

President Putin: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello, Vladimir. Thank you for taking the call.
(U)

President Putin: Good afternoon to you, Bill. I'm happy to hear
your voice. (U)

The President: I just wanted to talk to you for a minute about
Yugoslavia. (U)

President Putin: With pleasure. (U)

The President: I know this is a difficult and delicate moment,
but I just wanted to say it seems to me since virtually everyone
accepts the fact that the opposition won the election and they
are now opposed to a second round of voting, because they believe
it gives Milosevic time to manipulate the balloting and,
possibly, create instability in Montenegro. I think the best
thing to do is to try to get Milosevic to leave, but I think
you're the only person who can do that. (U)

I know it's a difficult situation for you, but what I would
encourage you to do is that you send him a private message, not a
public one, urging him that you wish him to leave and making
clear that Russia will support the will of the people. I think

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify on: 9/30/10

The President: That would certainly help if you'd say that. (C)

President Putin: However, all of this does not exclude what you referred to at the beginning, and we are now our part and will try to work on him in this direction. At the same time, I have to be frank -- I personally doubt that even talking to him in such a direction will result in him voluntarily agreeing to a recount and retiring. I believe there is no chance for that. (C)

At the same time, the very fact of the arrival of the opposition leader in Moscow would in no way be an impediment to such an approach. In fact, it would likely reinforce the likelihood of international verification and monitoring. If Moscow will determine its position, all of that would be in hand, the issue to which you have referred to at the beginning of the conversation (C)

The President: I think that's possible. I believe if he comes there, that will discourage Milosevic a little and at least increase the chances that he will step down. (C)

President Putin: Well, as a matter of fact, Kostunica has told me they will try again to convince Milosevic that there is a need for a recount, but it seems to me this will be a futile exercise. (C)

The President: Well, he's trying to hang on. (C)

President Putin: He sure is. (C)

The President: Okay, let me think about this. I may want to call you again, but I'm encouraged at least by what you said here. I think it is important that he knows Russia will not let him get away with stealing the elections. (C)

President Putin: It is important that he should not be able to use it as an ace and try to speculate with our position. It's important that everybody in Yugoslavia gets a clear picture of what our position is. That is important. (C)

The President: All right. Let's see what we can do and stay in close touch. (C)

President Putin: Thank you, Bill. Yes, over here we will engage on ~~no~~ this a little bit, and then we will keep you posted again. (C)

The President: Okay. Thank you. (U)

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4110				
Document ID: 0006661				
Row: 47	Section: 3	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (4 pages)	10/20/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia; incomplete draft (2 pages)	10/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4110

FOLDER TITLE:

0006661

2017-0222-M
kh2031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0006661
RECEIVED: 24 OCT 00 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: WEISS
MEDISH

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES PUTIN OF RUSSIA ON 20 OCT

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 30 OCT 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

DATE

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 3/12/2018
2017-0222-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0006661

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 01011016 FOR DECISION
X 01011607 BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6661
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O CO

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>JP 1/15</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
BASH	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/15</u>	
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>JP 1/15</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

cc: JAN 16 1972

COMMENTS:

memco. w/ Russian Cons.

Butin

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

ROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6661
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O CD

(128w)

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

WIRE	_____	_____	_____
LAAS	_____	_____	_____
OWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>BP 1/15</u>	<u>SECRET</u>
BASH	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/15</u>	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 1/15</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>2 1/15</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

101 JAN 10 1982

COMMENTS:

MEMO. w/ Russian Pres.
 Putin

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6661

January 9, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *mm*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Putin of Russia

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and President Putin on October 20, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *AW 1/15* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/24/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/12/2018*
2017-0222-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (4 pages)	10/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4110

FOLDER TITLE:

0006661

2017-0222-M
kh2031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia; incomplete draft (2 pages)	10/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4110

FOLDER TITLE:

0006661

2017-0222-M
kh2031

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4115				
Document ID: 0007645				
Row: 47	Section: 3	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: y

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (3 pages)	06/09/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telcon with President Putin of Russia; draft (3 pages)	06/09/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4115

FOLDER TITLE:

0007645

2017-0222-M

kh2032

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0007645
RECEIVED: 15 DEC 00 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: WEISS
MEDISH

DOC DATE: 18 DEC 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: TELCALL W/ PUTIN ON 9 JUN

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 21 DEC 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

-CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MEDISH
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWL

CLOSED BY: NSAMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBA NARA, Date 3/12/2018
2017-0222-m

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0007645

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 00122113 FOR DECISION
X 00122613 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7645

December 18, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *nm*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and Russian President Vladimir Putin on
June 9, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *SRB* / *djh* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 9/30/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/12/2018*
2017-0222-M

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: JD LOG # 7645
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PR A/O _____

OPW

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			<u>done</u>
HAAS	<u>2/3</u>	<u>DMR 12/22</u>	<u>make ed. B + return</u>
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>BP 12/22</u>	<u>see ed. B</u>
BASH			
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>		
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>12/23</u>	<u>2</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>AK 12/26</u>	<u>N</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262017-0222-M (1.31)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov

Notetakers: Don Gentile, Rob Hargis, Rob Williams, Michael Manning, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME: June 9, 2000, 8:25-8:42 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Residence

President Putin: Mr. President, good morning. (U)

The President: Good morning. (U)

President Putin: I'm very glad to hear from you. Once again, I'd like to thank you for your visit. It was very productive and useful, judging by the response we are receiving in Italy and also yesterday when I spoke to Jiang Zemin. They all had a positive response to your visit and liked the results of our discussion. (S)

In my conversation with Mr. Jiang, I stressed that both you and I in our conversation agreed that all the parties involved in the process, including China, should be included and not be left out in our discussion of arms control issues. Now, as we agreed previously, we can continue discussions on START III to implement our course in that area and also to initiate our discussions on the Global Monitoring System, which is something we agreed upon. (S)

Now, a couple of words about something I discussed in Italy, and that is the common European missile defense system. You should understand there is nothing new to it. What we are talking about here is the practical implementation of the 1997 New York accords differentiating between strategic and non-strategic defensive systems. As you know, our Defense Minister, Marshal Sergeyev, is in Brussels today, and he is taking part in a meeting of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council there. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 6/9/10

After that, we expect Secretary Cohen to come to Moscow and, as we agreed, I'm prepared to meet with him here. I'd like to remind you of the idea I mentioned before of involving our officers from the General Staff in the deliberations of the NATO planning committee. As I recall, you liked the idea, and I think we can consider how to practically implement it. (S)

It would be a good thing to start our joint work on a bilateral effort to counter the terrorist threat, especially the one coming from Afghanistan. I think it would be a good thing to issue instructions to our respective services, such as CIA and, on our part, our Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) to set up a joint ad hoc working group to counter the threat in that area. (S)

Now another matter in another area. It concerns my upcoming visit to Germany. I remember what you told me confidentially about Schroeder's position on debt restructuring for Russia. Now he is signaling that he wouldn't like to discuss that subject, and we don't want to put him in a difficult position. We will be very careful in dealing with that issue. But I think that we will hardly be in a position not to raise this issue since it is very important to both Germany and Russia. I count on your support in this matter, Mr. President. I hope after the upcoming G-8 meeting that we will be able to make headway on improving our bilateral economic relations. (S)

The President: Thank you very much, Vladimir. Let me first of all say that on the debt issue I think that the chances of getting debt relief and a comprehensive solution, as I said in Moscow, depends upon first getting agreement on an IMF program. And then getting at least a short-term debt rescheduling from the Paris Club. Then, you will need to argue on the basis of Russia's commitment to reform and persuade people that it justifies a more comprehensive debt solution. It also depends on whether your annual debt repayment will be far too large a portion of your national budget, and you won't be able to take care of your people. But I think it should all happen in that sequence. We can discuss this when we're in Okinawa, we can talk more. I can discuss this with Schroeder, and we can involve other people there as well. (S)

On the question of a bilateral group working on terrorism, especially on what is happening in Afghanistan, I'm in favor of that, and we'll intensify our efforts on that. (S)

On the other items you mentioned: I think closer Russian cooperation with NATO sounds like a good idea. We will raise your proposal in NATO channels and get back to you as quickly as possible. (S)

On the idea of missile defense, obviously, I listened very carefully to everything you said in Moscow and have followed your remarks closely since then. I do believe that the U.S. has to consult with China as well, and I will do that. (S)

I appreciate your willingness to meet with Secretary Cohen next week and to hold candid conversations on this matter so we can have a common understanding of what the facts are. I know it's difficult because of your schedule. (S)

Just one more thing: I looked into the NOGA issue after our discussion on Sunday, and I think we'll be able to fix that problem. I've asked our lawyers to prepare the necessary papers as soon as they can. The only thing I wanted to mention on that is I hope you will also follow up on the discussion we had on talking about restricting any nuclear cooperation various Russian entities might have with Iran. (S)

Thank you very much for your hospitality in Moscow. I thought it was an excellent meeting, and I look forward to another meeting. Anytime you want to talk on the phone like this is, I think, a good thing to do. (S)

President Putin: Thank you for this conversation. I'd like to thank you for not forgetting various situations and crises which are not, at first glance, very important, like the NOGA problem. You can rest assured that, for our part, we will abide by our agreements. Let me say that it is also a pleasure for me to recall your visit here to Moscow, and it's a pleasure for me to see that you are satisfied with the visit. We will be looking forward to our next meeting. Thank you. (S)

The President: Thank you very much. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.32)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Putin of Russia (U) (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov

Notetakers: Don Gentile, Rob Hargis, Rob Williams, Michael Manning, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 9, 2000, 8:25-8:42 a.m. EDT,
Residence

President Putin: Mr. President, good morning. (U)

The President: Good morning. (U)

President Putin: I'm very glad to hear from you. Once again, I'd like to thank you for your visit. It was very productive and useful, judging by the response we are receiving in Italy and also yesterday when I spoke to Jiang Zemin. They all had a positive response to your visit and liked the results of our discussion. (S)

In my conversation with Mr. Jiang, I stressed that both you and I in our conversation agreed that all the parties involved in the process, including China, should be included and not be left out in our discussion of arms control issues. Now, as we agreed previously, we can continue discussions on START III to implement our course in that area and also to initiate our discussions on the Global Monitoring System, which is something we agreed upon. (S)

Now, a couple of words about something I discussed in Italy, and that is the common European missile defense system. You should understand there is nothing new to it. What we are talking about here is the practical implementation of the 1997 New York accords differentiating between strategic and non-strategic defensive systems. As you know, our Defense Minister, Marshal Sergeyev, is in Brussels today and he's taking part in a meeting of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council there. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 6/9/10

After that, we expect Secretary Cohen to come to Moscow and, as we agreed, I'm prepared to meet with him here. I'd like to remind you of the idea I mentioned before of involving our officers from the General Staff in the deliberations of the NATO planning committee. As I recall, you liked the idea, and I think we can consider how to practically implement it. (S)

It would be a good thing to start our joint work on a bilateral effort to counter the terrorist threat, especially the one coming from Afghanistan. I think it would be a good thing to issue instructions to our respective services, such as CIA and, on our part, our Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) to set up a joint ad hoc working group to counter the threat in that area. (S) sp?

Now another matter in another area. It concerns my upcoming visit to Germany. I remember what you told me confidentially about Schroeder's position on debt restructuring for Russia. Now he is signaling that he wouldn't like to discuss that subject, and we don't want to put him in a difficult position. We will be very careful in dealing with that issue. But I think that we will hardly be in a position not to raise this issue since it is very important to both Germany and Russia. I count on your support in this matter, Mr. President. I hope after the upcoming G-8 meeting that we will be able to make headway on improving our bilateral economic relations. (S)

The President: Thank you very much, Vladimir. Let me first of all say that on the debt issue I think that the chances of getting debt relief and a comprehensive solution, as I said in Moscow, depends upon first getting agreement on an IMF program. And then getting at least a short-term debt rescheduling from the Paris Club. Then, you will need to argue on the basis of Russia's commitment to reform and persuade people that it justifies a more comprehensive debt solution. It also depends on whether your annual debt repayment will be far too large a portion of your national budget and you won't be able to take care of your people. But I think it should all happen in that sequence. We can discuss this when we're in Okinawa, we can talk more. I can discuss this with Schroeder, and we can involve other people there as well. (S)

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The President: Thank you very much. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2017-0222-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4116B				
Document ID: 0007832				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telephone Conversation with President Putin of Russia (5 pages)	12/27/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation re: Telephone Conversation with President Putin of Russia; draft (5 pages)	12/27/2000	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Telcon and Putin])
OA/Box Number: 4116B

FOLDER TITLE:

0007832

2017-0222-M

kh2033

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0007832
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 00 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: HARRISON, H
MEDISH

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 01
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: PUTIN, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIA PRES PUTIN ON 27 DEC

ACTION: BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 JAN 01 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN
HARRISON, H
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWL

CLOSED BY: NSAMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN NARA, Date 3/12/2013
2017-0222-m

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 0007832

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 01010520 FOR DECISION
X 01010809 BRADTKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: 7 LOG # 7032
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 8 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS	<u>1</u>	<u>11/6 rmd</u>	
POWELL			
BASH			
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>h 11/6</u>	
RUDMAN			
KERRICK			
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>1/8</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>AK 1/8</u>	<u>N</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

61 JAN 5 PM 7:20

COMMENTS:

Memorandum - Paker 27 Dec

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

Yes

LOG # _____

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

FM DIA TO DAB DATE 1/16

This one looks good. —

FM _____ TO _____ DATE _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7832

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 3, 2001

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: MARK MEDISH *mcm*

FROM: HOPE M. HARRISON *hmt*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 27, 2000.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

OK
PSR 1/6/01

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 12/27/10

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By: *KRM* NARA, Date: *3/12/2013*

2017-0222-m

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0222-M (1.33)

3/7/2019 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Putin
of Russia (S)PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov

Notetakers: Kurt van der Walde, Deanna
Sutliff, Clark Lystra, Dave Matthews, and
Hope HarrisonDATE, TIME December 27, 2000, 1:04 - 1:37 p.m. EST,
AND PLACE: ResidenceThe President: Hello? (U)President Putin: Bill, Good afternoon. (U)The President: Hello, Vladimir. It's nice to hear your voice.
(U)President Putin: Bill, first of all I would like to wish you all
the best in the coming new year and that success will accompany
you and your family in the coming year. It's a good time for us
to continue our bilateral contacts, despite the fact that the new
U.S. Administration is going to take over. On international
security and economic issues, we have made gains, and we wouldn't
like to lose what we've recently gained in our relations. (S)You might know about my recent visits to Cuba and Canada.
According to our calculation, Cuba should owe us about
\$22 billion. But on this issue, I should say that our relations
are very complex. We abandoned sectors of the Cuban economy, and
today we find that they are occupied by Canadian and Spanish
firms. (S)I think there was a good outcome to negotiations with Canada. I
think that there are certain advantages to the Canadian
government's structure. Chretien has managed to get elected for
the third time, and I think if the United States had a system~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify on: 12/27/10

similar to Canada's, your election wouldn't have been so difficult as this time. (S)

Now I would like to say a few words about the Middle East. I spoke just recently with Mubarak on the telephone, and the Palestinians tried to contact representatives of our country. I would like to reiterate once again: if you think it would be positive and useful for us to participate, our Foreign Minister Ivanov would be ready today or tomorrow to contact your Secretary of State to discuss this. (S)

Of course, we are thinking very hard about our relations with the next administration on security and stability issues. In Brunei you told me you were going to discuss this with Mr. Bush. Did you manage to do so and how do you see the prospects for this? I mean the dialogue between U.S. and Russia. And again, I would just like to wish you all the best in the coming year. (S)

The President: Thank you. First of all, let me talk about U.S.-Russian relations with the incoming Administration. I had a very good talk with President-elect Bush. We talked about Russia for a good while. I think that the most important thing from your point of view is that I told him to work with you on the missile defense issue. (S)

I told him that we had a big role in supporting Russia's continuing evolution as a democracy, your financial success, and the growth of civil society and the whole democratic process including press freedoms. I said I thought he would have better relations with you if there was a cooperative relationship on missile defense. I know they share our interest in continuing to work with you on stricter export controls on nuclear material and missile technology and on Russia having good, stable relations with its neighbors. (S)

I told them that I thought you were someone they could have a cooperative relationship with, but that it would be important to work cooperatively on missile defense. I had the feeling that they understood and accepted this position, but, of course, only time will tell. (S)

I do have to say that I think the incoming Administration will be interested in the same things that we were, but they may have different emphases. We have worked together on some very tough issues. We've succeeded on some and left some others unfinished. I think the general interest we have in wanting to support Russia's economy, democracy, export controls and relations with Russia's neighbors will continue, but maybe with different emphases. (S)

I have to tell you, I was disturbed to learn about the new economic and political pressures on Georgia. I think the new Administration may be a little less concerned about some Russian internal problems, but even more concerned with Russian pressure on its neighbors. There's a lot of support for Georgia in this country, especially within both the Democratic and Republican parties. (S)

On the Middle East, I think that you may be able to have a very important positive influence right now. I presented a set of basic ideas to the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams. I asked them to accept these ideas as the boundaries for a permanent agreement. If they would accept those, we could work over the next couple of weeks to close the gaps so that an agreement can be reached. (S)

Barak has said he would accept them if Arafat would. This represents a big step forward, because these ideas represent the fulfillment of basic Palestinian aspirations. There would be a Palestinian state covering about 95 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza, all of east Jerusalem as their capital, sovereignty over the Haram, the Temple Mount, and a big new program of resettlement of refugees in third countries, although there would be some modest numbers accepted in Israel. (S)

We have a historic opportunity here, but this is the best we can do. I'll have to work like crazy to sell this in Israel. Otherwise, I leave office on the 20th. There will be an election in Israel, and Sharon will take office on February 6. I know you have a lot of influence on Arafat. I would urge you to get him to accept these ideas as a basis to move forward. Both sides have questions, but we have to assure him that the international community will stand by him and see that this agreement is implemented. I would like to have Madeleine stay in constant touch with Ivanov on this. If both sides can accept those principles, if that happens, then we can work out the details. (S)

President Putin: If I understood you correctly, you proposed that Ivanov and Albright should talk soon about how to intensify efforts in that direction? Am I correct? (S)

President Clinton: That's correct. (S)

President Putin: [Note: Putin's voice becomes increasingly emotional and insistent as he discusses Georgia.] Now I would like to say just a couple of words on Georgia since you touched on this topic. You have just said that you are concerned about economic and political pressure. I would like to give you the real situation. I don't know your view, but I think we have good

personal relations, and I would like you to try to listen to what I'm saying to you now. Russia is not exerting any economic pressure, and it's not able to exert any political pressure on Georgia. So I'd like you to know the real situation. (S)

For the last few years, 600,000 to 700,000 people have emigrated from Georgia to Russia. We have offered all of them refuge, shelter, and work here. Georgia is in debt to us, and we have all the right to demand that they pay it back, and Georgia is not paying us back. In light of the need for good relations with Georgia, we decided to restructure the debt. (S)

In this case we are not going to aggravate the situation. Georgia exists mainly, if not totally, at the expense of our energy. Georgia is in enormous debt for the energy and fuel, and we are going to restructure this debt. We provide Georgia with fuel three or four times cheaper than we provide it to other countries. To the European countries we provide fuel at \$110 for 1000 cubic meters, and in Georgia we provide it at \$35 per 1000 cubic meters. Despite the critical situation in our country, we still provided electricity to Georgia. So in all directions we provide large-scale assistance to Georgia -- it is help. (S)

Georgia is raising the question of our Russian bases, and we agree and are discussing this. The only question we have a concern about is the international terrorist gangs, which, after being pushed out of Russia, now find themselves on the territory of Georgia. [Note: Putin's tone becomes particularly passionate.] We have raised this with Shevardnadze, and we think he should take this into account. (S)

We asked him to allow our troops on to Georgian territory to block the border of the Chechen Republic from both sides. At first he agreed, but then he changed his mind. If he hadn't changed his mind, we wouldn't face the situation today in which whole parts of the border are out of the control of the Georgian government. (S)

The only thing we were concerned about was that once the terrorists are in Georgia they could travel freely to any part of Russia from Georgia. A year ago we warned Mr. Shevardnadze that we were going to establish a visa regime if he wasn't going to do anything. But Mr. Shevardnadze didn't do anything. He didn't recognize the real situation that they had terrorists on Georgian territory, so that's why we had to establish the visa regime. Now, Mr. Shevardnadze recognizes the presence of terrorists on his territory, and he now is trying to rectify that situation. I don't think the situation improved for Mr. Shevardnadze when he rejected our proposals at that time, but it didn't influence our relations. (S)

We, as a big power, have not changed our large-scale economic support. As to the visa regime, I think it's quite a civilized measure and is part of our fight against international terrorism. I must admit that within the past year Georgians who are on Russian soil without any registration are transferring without any restrictions 1 billion rubles back to Georgia. We need only to have some order here. All of this has developed in the background of our large scale assistance to Georgia. That is the real situation. I want you to have this information from me.
(S)

I would like to thank you for this conversation and wish you all the best in the coming year. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you very much, Vladimir, for the good wishes. Again, we will work together closely on the Middle East. I look forward to talking to you about the Middle East in about a week. (S)

President Putin: Okay. Thank you, Bill, and Happy New Year.
(U)

President Clinton: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0222-M (1.34)
3/7/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Putin
of Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Putin

Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov

Notetakers: Kurt van der Walde, Deanna
Sutcliffe, Clark Lystra, Dave Matthews, and
Hope Harrison

DATE, TIME December 27, 2000, 1:04 - 1:37 p.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Residence

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(U)

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the best in the coming new year and that success will accompany
you and your family in the coming year. It's a good time for us
to continue our bilateral contacts, despite the fact that the new
U.S. Administration is going to take over. On international
security and economic issues, we have made gains, and we wouldn't
like to lose what we've recently gained in our relations. (S)

You might know about my recent visits to Cuba and Canada.
According to our calculation, Cuba should owe us about \$22 billion.
~~dollars.~~ But on this issue, I should say that our relations are
very complex. We abandoned sectors of the Cuban economy, and
today we find that they are occupied by Canadian and Spanish
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~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify on: 12/27/10

spell
out

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Of course, we are thinking very hard about our relations with the next administration on security and stability issues. In Brunei you told me you were going to discuss this with Mr. Bush. Did you manage to do so and how do you see the prospects for this? I mean the dialogue between U.S. and Russia. And again, I would just like to wish you all the best in the coming year. (S)

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For the last few years, 600,000 to 700,000 people have emigrated from Georgia to Russia. We have offered all of them refuge, shelter, and work here. Georgia is in debt to us, and we have all the right to demand that they pay it back, and Georgia is not paying us back. In light of the need for good relations with Georgia, we decided to restructure the debt. (S)

In this case we are not going to aggravate the situation. Georgia exists mainly, if not totally, at the expense of our energy. Georgia is in enormous debt for the energy and fuel, and we are going to restructure this debt. We provide Georgia with fuel three or four times cheaper than we provide it to other countries. To the European countries we provide fuel at \$110 for 1000 cubic meters, and in Georgia we provide it at \$35 per 1000 cubic meters. Despite the critical situation in our country, we still provided electricity to Georgia. So in all directions we provide large-scale assistance to Georgia -- it is help. (S)

Georgia is raising the question of our Russian bases, and we agree and are discussing this. The only question we have a concern about is the international terrorist gangs, which, after being pushed out of Russia, now find themselves on the territory of Georgia. [Note: Putin's tone becomes particularly passionate.] We have raised this with Shevardnadze, and we think he should take this into account. (S)

We asked him to allow our troops on to Georgian territory to block the border of the Chechen Republic from both sides. At first he agreed, but then he changed his mind. If he hadn't changed his mind, we wouldn't face the situation today in which whole parts of the border are out of the control of the Georgian government. (S)

The only thing we were concerned about was that once the terrorists are in Georgia they could travel freely to any part of Russia from Georgia. A year ago we warned Mr. Shevardnadze that we were going to establish a visa regime if he wasn't going to do anything. But Mr. Shevardnadze didn't do anything. He didn't recognize the real situation that they had terrorists on Georgian territory, so that's why we had to establish the visa regime. Now, Mr. Shevardnadze recognizes the presence of terrorists on his territory, and he now is trying to rectify that situation. I don't think the situation improved for Mr. Shevardnadze when he rejected our proposals at that time, but it didn't influence our relations. (S)

We, as a big power, have not changed our large-scale economic support. As to the visa regime, I think it's quite a civilized measure and is part of our fight against international terrorism. I must admit that within the past year Georgians who are on Russian soil without any registration are transferring without any restrictions 1 billion rubles back to Georgia. We need only to have some order here. All of this has developed in the background of our large scale assistance to Georgia. That is the real situation. I want you to have this information from me.

(S)

I would like to thank you for this conversation and wish you all the best in the coming year. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you very much, Vladimir, for the good wishes. Again, we will work together closely on the Middle East. I look forward to talking to you about the Middle East in about a week. (S)

President Putin: Okay. Thank you, Bill, and Happy New Year. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --