

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. email</del>	<del>Alexander Vershbow to Ivo Daadler et al. re: Levitte read-out (4 pages)</del>	<del>12/01/1996</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>
<del>002. email</del>	<del>Cathy Millison Shawn McCormick re: #8004 (10 pages)</del>	<del>12/19/1996</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>
<del>003. email</del>	<del>Alexander Vershbow to Susan Rice re: FW: Memo to President on Chirac Talks (4 pages)</del>	<del>02/12/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>
<del>004. email</del>	<del>William Wechsler to Shawn McCormick re: Zaire (3 pages)</del>	<del>03/24/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 MS Mail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Lake and Zaire or Berger and Zaire...])  
 OA/Box Number: 590000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[12/01/1996 - 03/24/1997]

2017-0238-M  
kh2040

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 December 96 12:35

FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT Levitte read-out [~~SECRET~~]

TO Daadler, Ivo H.  
 Dowling, J. Nicholas  
 Feeley, John F.  
 Fried, Daniel  
 Martinez, Valentino E.  
 Peters, Mary A.  
 Schmidt, John R.

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**  
 VL 2017-0238-M  
 1.01 4/2/2019

CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT\_BODY  
 Memo as sent tp President last Wednesday  
 [[ 7748PRE.DOC : 3170 in 7748PRE.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE DATE 1 December 96 12:34

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE NAME 7748PRE.DOC  
~~SECRET~~ 7748  
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
 Reason: 1.5 (a)(b) Chief of Staff  
 Declassify On: 11/26/06

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: November 26 Talks with Levitte

My French counterpart, Jean-David Levitte, came to Washington Tuesday for another round of informal discussions. I opened the meetings by making clear to that we were very disappointed that, since my trip to Paris, the overall relationship had deteriorated seriously. Although Jean-David and I have maintained good contacts on Eastern Zaire and other issues, other French leaders have been extremely critical in their public remarks, treating our relations as a zero-sum affair. I said that these unhelpful polemics could begin to spill over into the substance of our relations. Levitte was quite taken aback, stressing that Chirac wants to preserve his strong personal relationship with you and continue to work with us on a variety of issues. He tried to downplay the recent statements by Foreign Minister De Charette and Development Minister Godfrain as not consistent with Chirac's thinking. I stressed that the French needed to exert greater control over the public remarks of their government.

NATO/AFSOUTH: Contrary to signals Bill Perry received from the French Defense Minister, Levitte confirmed that there had been little change in Chirac's position. He is still unwilling to reintegrate in NATO's military structure unless the U.S. agrees to a European commander for AFSOUTH, arguing that this could be reconciled with U.S. interests in the Mediterranean and with military efficiency. He explained that it would be too costly for Chirac in domestic public opinion to reintegrate without a substantially enhanced European role in the Alliance. He said Chirac's government was already taking serious criticism because the EU Intergovernmental Conference was likely to produce a poor result and because French accession to the European Monetary Union was being criticized as capitulating to the diktat of the Bundesbank.

I made clear that our position on AFSOUTH was firm, but that we could agree as a compromise to review the whole internal adaptation process in a few years' time, in tandem with other steps to increase European visibility. Levitte tried to pocket this as "part of the

solution" rather than the solution itself. We agreed that a confidential working group headed on our side by General Shali and me should meet after the NAC Ministerial to look for a compromise. This discussion would be without preconditions. Our participation would also be contingent on the French halting recent efforts at NATO to hold enlargement and NATO-Russia decisions hostage to U.S. concessions on AFSOUTH. Levitte agreed, claiming that French tactics at NATO were not consistent with Chirac's approach in any case.

NATO Enlargement: Levitte said the French continued to support our overall approach. They still favor a two-day summit in which there would be participation by Russia and other Partnership for Peace members on the second day. On a disturbing note, Levitte reported that in Paris earlier in the day, Chernomyrdin had told Chirac that the Russians would view a NATO Summit in 1997 as an "act of war against Russia," and that if NATO went ahead with enlargement, the Russians would embark on a major buildup of heavy weapons. This may be an effort to scare the French into pressuring us to slow the pace of enlargement. The Vice President spoke with Chernomyrdin Tuesday evening and heard no echos of this message. Nevertheless, we will follow up in Moscow to make sure that the Vice President does not face a rerun of your Budapest "cold peace" experience at the OSCE Summit in Lisbon on Monday.

Boutros-Ghali: Levitte continued to probe for flexibility regarding a deal in which Boutros-Ghali could receive an extension linked to a commitment to implement a UN reform package, with his successor designated in advance. I reaffirmed our position that we needed to get on with the selection of a new Secretary General and said that a 2-1/2-year extension simply was too long to fly on Capitol Hill.

Bosnia: The French said they could go along with our proposal

for  
an 18-month mission for a follow-on force. They said their  
preference, however, would be two years, i.e. the same duration  
as the  
civilian consolidation plan. I stressed that we need to push the  
Bosnian parties to take responsibility and that it therefore  
would be  
preferable for the military to depart before the international  
community's civilian efforts fully wound down; if the Europeans  
felt  
a continued military presence was needed after 18 months, they  
could  
take the lead. Levitte agreed on the need to strengthen civilian  
police in Bosnia. He said the French were interested in stepping  
up  
efforts to arrest indicted war criminals, but they remained  
unwilling  
to put troops at risk in apprehending General Mladic or Karadzic.

Eastern Zaire: The French continue to support a multinational  
force, in part to help prevent the political disintegration of  
Zaire.

I stressed that any force had to have a clear humanitarian  
purpose.

The Canadians were developing plans for airdrops and armed  
escort  
of civilian convoys; we were open to such ideas, but any  
operation  
needed both to be practical and to take place in a permissive  
environment if U.S. troops were to participate. We agreed that  
international discussion of an MNF had already had a dramatic  
effect  
in encouraging the return of refugees from Zaire to Rwanda. On  
the  
internal situation in Zaire, Levitte stressed that they were not  
great fans of Mobutu but they saw no alternative to him for  
keeping  
Zaire intact. Levitte said Mobutu's health had improved; he  
would  
return in mid-December and might be able to stabilize the  
situation.

Chirac: We reviewed the results of your meeting with Jiang and  
Chris's visit to Beijing. The French agreed that they would work  
with us to gain enough progress on human rights to allow us not  
to  
press for a human rights resolution at the UN Human Rights  
Commission  
next year.

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 December 96 09:19  
 FROM Millison, Cathy L.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT #8004 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO McCormick, Shawn H.  
 CARBON\_COPY Biernacki, Eileen V.  
 Friedrich, M. K.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Kessinger, Jodi

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**  
 12 2017-0738-M  
 1.02 4/2/2019

**TEXT\_BODY**

Shawn:

Per your request last night, attached is the current version of #8004. Package still appears to be with Nancy. If you send over a new package with a new diskette, please be sure to request that the old diskette be returned. Thanks.

[[ 8004BC.DOC : 2304 in 8004BC.DOC ]][[ 8009FDR.DOC : 2305 in 8009FDR.DOC ]][[ 8009SRB.DOC : 2306 in 8009SRB.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
 FILE DATE**

16 December 96 20:19

**ATTACHMENT  
 FILE NAME**

8004BC.DOC  
~~SECRET~~ 8004  
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
 Reason: 1.5(d) Chief of Staff  
 Declassify on: 1.6 X6

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Proposed New Course of Action for Zaire

## Purpose

To approve a new course of action in our policy toward Zaire.

## Background

The refugee crisis and fighting in eastern Zaire, coupled with President Mobutu's recent cancer surgery and poor prognosis, underscore the frailty of the Zairian state and the potential for a significant crisis in Central Africa that destabilizes Zaire and potentially its nine neighboring states. The poor performance of the Zairian military in the east casts strong doubt on its ability to prevent Zaire's de facto disintegration, particularly if Mobutu dies or soon becomes incapacitated. Subsequent rioting, looting and wide-scale ethnic clashes are all possible, if not likely. The sudden ascension of rebel forces in the east suggests long-standing secessionist tendencies may quickly resurface in other regions, such as the mineral-rich provinces of Shaba and East and West Kasai. In brief, Zaire, and therefore Central Africa, may be at its most critical turning point since the crises of the early 1960s. This potential crisis comes amid a seven-year democratization effort with national elections scheduled for May 1997 and transition by July.

## Strategy

Although his health is rapidly failing, President Mobutu remains the only potentially effective leader in Zaire. He must therefore be urged to adopt a constructive posture that could help guarantee the peaceful transition of Zaire to stability and, ideally, to a functioning, multiparty democracy by July 1997. The United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund must also play larger roles to help promote stability within Zaire, to reinforce the sanctity of its borders, support the democratic transition and encourage fiscal responsibility and transparency.

A modified U.S. strategy for Zaire should have the following elements:

- 1) Encourage Mobutu to Step Down Gracefully

To attempt to avert a leadership crisis in Zaire and to help promote the long-awaited democratic transition, the United States could capitalize on Mobutu's ill health, try to appeal to his ego and persuade him not to run for the Presidency. We recommend that a senior Administration official urge him to remain on the scene to provide stability and continuity through elections and installation of a new regime. This proposal would enable Mobutu to exit politics gracefully and with dignity, while overseeing the potential transition of Zaire to a democratic nation. It would also allow his supporters time to adjust to a new era in which they would likely not be the dominant political force.

It would be necessary to offer inducements for Mobutu to adopt this "caretaker" approach. The most attractive of these would be an invitation to him to meet with you shortly after publicly announcing his decision not to run and to oversee an effective, peaceful transition. This offer would be attractive to Mobutu because of his obsession for acceptance by the West and his long campaign for a U.S. visa. We would also have to be prepared to praise his statesmanship for deciding to implement an effective transition and even possibly note his importance as a historical ally. Finally, we might offer medical treatment in the United States, although he can obtain required medical assistance in France.

At the same time, Mobutu's senior advisors must be assured that no "witch hunts" will occur after a transition and the international community will not tolerate retribution against them. Inclusive in this package of inducements should be suspension of the U.S. ban on travel of Zairian leaders, pending successful completion of the transition. This approach to Mobutu can best be sold as a chance to craft a legacy of his leadership and vision that will remain in the minds of Zairians, Africans and people around the world.

The alternative is to watch the anemic transition proceed apace. It will likely be delayed because of a lack of preparations and instability in the east. Continued fighting or prospective negotiations would also be useful reasons to delay further. In the interim, Mobutu could die. With the absence of a credible successor determined through elections, it is reasonable to expect that chaos would reign with serious negative consequences for Zaire's nine neighbors and other states. It could also derail any attempts at forming a democratic government and undermine efforts at improving fiscal controls. Potentially, only an international military force, for which there would be little, if any support, could quell the violence and hold the nation together.

## 2) International Assistance

Implementation of a transition by the July time frame will be difficult to achieve and nearly impossible without significant involvement of the United Nations, including the appointment of a UN Special Representative and adequate funding for the election effort.

The UN, World Bank and IMF should provide experts and advisors to work within Zairian ministries during and beyond the July 1997 transition. This will assist Zaire to meet both the electoral and reforming governance challenges that it faces. In a mini Cambodia-like operation, the UN could provide a few hundred civilian staffers to work within various ministries to enhance administrative capabilities and provide skills as Zaire begins the long overdue process of rebuilding itself after nearly a decade of neglect.

## 3) Response to Crisis in the East

The rebel offensive continues in the east as regional negotiating efforts emerge. Regional governments may try to bring Zaire, Uganda and Rwanda together at the Nairobi II summit this week. Regional negotiations would focus on recognizing existing borders and securing agreement not to support rebels operating in neighboring countries.

Elements of an internal peace might include Zaire furnishing guarantees of citizenship and full political participation to ethnic Tutsis in exchange for rebel leaders pursuing their political goals at the ballot box. To ensure high visibility African participation, the OAU should take the lead in this enterprise with strong U.S. and EU support. Meanwhile, the Zairian government has called for a counter-offensive against the rebels. Their demoralized, poorly trained army will likely have little success unless they acquire mercenary support, perhaps with French assistance, as is being attempted. This possible counter-offensive lends urgency to regional negotiating efforts.

#### Potential Benefits of this Approach

Pursuing the course of action outlined above, if Mobutu accepts, could help to guarantee stability within Zaire by rallying all political forces around the democratic transition. Knowing Mobutu was not standing for election but working actively to shepherd the process to conclusion, would reinvigorate the political process and dissipate the influence of rebels or secessionists. In addition, having World Bank and IMF representatives working within the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance would be the most substantive step ever taken by the international community to ensure the economic reforms flourish.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the recommendation above for a senior Administration official to persuade Mobutu not to run for the Presidency but assist in the transition. Once that commitment has been made publicly, we would offer Mobutu a White House visit, medical treatment and publicly praise his stance. Also that you authorize USG efforts to engage the UN and IFIs to provide experts to work within Zairian ministries during and beyond the July 1997 transition. At the same time, we will explore whether it may be possible to make additional resources available -- within existing

budgets -- to support Zaire's transition.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

11 December 96 17:4

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

8009FDR.DOC  
8009

**MEMORANDUM FOR FRANKLIN D. RAINES  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET**

**FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER**

**SUBJECT: The FY98 Request for Function 150**

I am writing to ask you to reconsider OMB's proposed FY98 request for Function 150. At a minimum, I urge you to reallocate funds within the proposed \$18.3 billion request to several critical programs that the OMB passback underfunds. To the extent that our effort to balance the budget permits, I would further urge you to increase the overall request for the 150 account. The steep decline we have experienced in international affairs spending has diminished our ability to influence events overseas and raised questions about our willingness to remain engaged in world affairs. A modest investment of additional resources would greatly enhance our ability to protect and promote America's interests abroad.

**The Proposed \$18.3B Request Underfunds Critical Priorities**

In making the admittedly tough choices needed to assemble the budget request, OMB's proposed request underfunds the following

priorities:

UN Arrears -- OMB's current proposal contains no money for UN arrears in FY98. The NSC recommends requesting \$50 million in arrears for the CIO account and \$50 million for the CIPA account.

Voluntary PKO -- The NSC recommends adding \$20 million, thereby restoring the State Department's original request of \$100 million.

The additional money would enable us to support efforts related to a peace settlement in Guatemala and to sustain our activities in Bosnia and Haiti.

FMF Grants -- OMB's passback underfunds our initiative with the Sudan Front Line States and contains no money for our plan to assist the coast guards in various Caribbean nations. The NSC recommends requesting an additional \$7 million for the Sudan Front Line states and \$2 million for the Caribbean.

ESF -- The NSC recommends increasing support to Jordan by \$10 million, support for Africa generally by \$4 million, and support for AOJ/ICITAP by \$3.9 million.

IMET -- OMB's proposed funding level for IMET is insufficient to maintain current program levels. The NSC recommends restoring the \$7 million cut from State's original request.

Anti-Terrorism Assistance -- Given the importance of combating terrorism, the NSC recommends full funding, or an additional \$1 million, for the ATA request.

Peace Corps -- The NSC recommends that an additional \$5 million allocated to the Peace Corps.

I recognize that reallocating funds within the \$18.3 billion top line as I am proposing would place tremendous pressure on other international affairs programs. For that reason alone, I would urge you to consider increasing OMB's overall proposed request.

### Increasing the Top Line to Sustain American Global Leadership

The 50 percent decline in the 150 account since FY85 has eroded American global leadership and made it harder for us to achieve our foreign policy objectives. We can reverse this erosion and improve American security by prudently allocating more resources to the following six tasks:

- Stopping the Flow of Drugs into America -- The annual social cost of illicit drug use is more than \$70 billion, and there are some 20,000 drug-related deaths each year. A major effort overseas could reduce those costs in the United States.
  
- Stopping the Proliferation of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons -- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten us all. A major initiative to improve the ability of the international community to track chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and to capture those who traffic in them would make the United States and other countries more secure.
  
- Fighting International Crime and Terrorism -- To ensure American security at home, we need to fight crime and terrorism abroad. Expanding our administration of justice programs and providing more antiterrorist training and equipment would improve our ability to combat these new transnational threats.
  
- Preserving Market-oriented Democracies in the Former Soviet Union -- Our national security is directly related to market-oriented democracies taking root in the former Soviet Union. A major initiative to expand business, trade and investment in the NIS and to promote democracy and civil society would immeasurably enhance the security of the United States and the rest of the world.
  
- Expanding Our Share of Export Markets -- More than 25 percent of U.S. exports go to developing countries, and the fastest growing markets for U.S. goods and services are in the developing world. Greater spending on programs designed to assist privatization,

encourage the elimination of non-tariff barriers and promote the enforcement of laws protecting intellectual property would open new market for American firms and create more American jobs.

Getting Out of Debtor Status at International Organizations --  
Our more than \$1 billion debt to the UN and other IOs has diminished our influence. A more aggressive program to pay our debts would give us more leverage to push the reforms we have been demanding.

I understand the importance of balancing the budget, and I appreciate the difficulty of the task you face in making it happen.

But if we do not reverse the decline in spending on international affairs we risk the consequences of being "penny-wise and pound foolish." Because the priorities I have outlined above are so crucial to meeting the global challenges that America faces, I urge your positive action on them.

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

11 December 96 15:46

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

8009SRB.DOC  
8009

December 11, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: JAMES M. LINDSAY

SUBJECT: The FY98 Request for Function 150

At Tab I is a memorandum asking Director Raines to reallocate funds within the proposed \$18.3 billion top line for the 150 account and, to the extent possible, to increase the overall 150 request in FY98.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Director Raines at Tab I.

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum to Franklin D. Raines

# M S M a i l

**DATE-TIME** 12 February 97 14:06  
**FROM** Vershbow, Alexander R.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**SUBJECT** FW: Memo to President on Chirac Talks [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
**TO** Rice, Susan E.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

More details available if you need

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary  
 CC: /R, Record at A1; Pifer, Steven K.; Fried, Daniel; Schmidt, John R.;  
 Peters, Mary A.  
 Subject: Memo to President on Chirac Talks [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 05:51 PM

[[ PRESMEMO.DOC : 3651 in PRESMEMO.DOC ]]

Attached was faxed from the plane -- clean copy if President hasn't seen it yet.

**ATTACHMENT FILE DATE** 8 February 97 13:28

**ATTACHMENT FILE NAME** PRESMEMO.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc: Vice President  
 Reason: 1.5 (a,d) Chief of Staff  
 Declassify On: 2/8/97

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**  
*12 2017-0238-M*  
*1.03 4/2/2019*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 THE WHITE HOUSE  
 WASHINGTON

February 8, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: My Talks with Chirac in Paris

Saturday morning in Paris I attended the very moving Valedictory Commemoration for Pamela Harriman organized by the American Embassy. The French handled Pamela's departure as if it were the death of a head of state, providing full military honors. President Chirac presented the Legion of Honor, France's highest award, and made a wonderfully warm speech in praise of Pamela's extraordinary accomplishments. Tom Foley, Pamela's son Winston, our Chargé, d'affaires Don Bandler and I also spoke at the ceremony, which took place in the garden of the Ambassador's residence. Chirac summed it up in saying that Pamela was not just a superb interlocutor, but the definition of "elegance itself -- and grace."

Before the ceremony, I met for about 40 minutes with President Chirac and had a working breakfast with my counterpart, Jean-David Levitte. I conveyed to Chirac your personal gratitude for the unprecedented honors he had bestowed on Pamela and how much this was appreciated by the American people. Chirac had four messages to convey to you:

1) His most immediate concern was the deteriorating situation in Zaire, which the French believe is on the brink of disintegration. The French continue to see no alternative to Mobutu if there is to be a democratic transition. He called on us to help pressure Uganda and Rwanda to halt their military involvement and to support the new UN Special Representative's efforts to convene an international conference under UN and OAU auspices to promote a political settlement. I replied that we were in agreement on the urgency of the situation. I noted that I had met with Ugandan President Museveni this week and that we were pressing him and the Rwandans to cease all military activity in Zaire. I urged Chirac to press Mobutu to negotiate with the rebels; so far, Mobutu has not engaged with UN/OAS mediator Sahnoun.

2) Chirac then turned to NATO adaptation and the AFSOUTH dispute. He repeated the familiar line that French reintegration in the NATO military structure can only occur if there is a

stronger European defense identity. For tactical reasons, he stressed that France is not the "demandeur" and that there should not be a crisis if, because of U.S. constraints that he understood, an agreement could not be reached that would permit French reintegration. I reaffirmed our desire to see France reintegrate and urged the French to join us in the search for creative ways around the AFSOUTH problem. Levitte and I will take up the issue again on Saturday when he is in Washington for G-7 Sherpa meetings.

3) Chirac said that if we cannot solve AFSOUTH, it makes it all the more important to achieve a success at the Madrid Summit on NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relations. He made a renewed push for a Summit of the Five in April as the key to bringing Yeltsin along. He argued that it will be easier politically for Yeltsin to sign an agreement on our terms if it is reached in a Euro-American context rather than through bilateral U.S.-Russian negotiations -- allegedly because this will show more clearly that Yeltsin is being treated as an equal. (Chirac is worried that, as in Bosnia, the U.S. will get all the credit for achieving a NATO-Russia deal.) In response, I praised Chirac for helping convince the Russians during his Moscow trip that enlargement will go forward at Madrid; this had led Moscow -- however belatedly -- to begin to engage in serious negotiations even as they continue their propaganda against enlargement. I reaffirmed what you said to Chirac about a Quint Summit: we do not rule out such a meeting, but we would need to be sure it would succeed (and that other allies' sensitivities could be managed) before we could commit to the idea. I urged that we focus first on resolving our serious substantive differences with the Russians, which will be our central goal from now until your Helsinki meeting with Yeltsin. If we get over the hump then, we can address how best to orchestrate events in the run-up to Madrid in a way that helps Yeltsin manage the NATO enlargement issue at home.

4) Chirac's final message was on China. He argued that we should not introduce a resolution on Chinese human rights this year at the UN Human Rights Commission because it had failed to have any effect in previous years and would only antagonize Beijing.

He believed there were good prospects that the Chinese National Assembly would soon ratify the two UN human rights conventions and make other gestures, and that this justified holding off on a UNHRC resolution. In reply, I said that we also were grappling with the issue, in view of the negative experience of recent years. But I said that it would be hard to justify dropping the resolution while Chinese human rights performance is, if anything, worse than it was a year ago, and there are ominous signs about what may happen in Hong Kong after June. If we were seen as "abandoning" human rights with nothing from the Chinese in return, it actually could compromise our efforts to improve relations with Beijing, since it would create a backlash from the human rights community in both our countries. Levitte subsequently floated some compromise formulas that I said we would think about; an option we are considering is proceeding with a new resolution, but in a lower-profile, less confrontational manner than in previous years.

As always, Chirac conveyed his warmest personal regards to you and his renewed condolences on Pamela's death.

# M S M a i l

**DATE-TIME** 24 March 97 19:38  
**FROM** Wechsler, William F.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~  
**SUBJECT** RE: Zaire [~~SECRET~~]  
**TO** McCormick, Shawn H.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
 VL 7217-0738-M  
 1.04 4/2/2014

[[ 2022PR.DOC : 4937 in 2022PR.DOC ]]

From: McCormick, Shawn H.  
 To: Wechsler, William F.  
 CC: /N, NonRecord at A1  
 Subject: Zaire [~~SECRET~~]  
 Date: Monday, March 24, 1997 07:25 PM

<<Attached File: 2022PR.DOC>>

**ATTACHMENT FILE DATE** 24 March 97 19:37

**ATTACHMENT FILE NAME** 2022PR.DOC  
~~SECRET~~ 2022  
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
 Chief of Staff  
 Reason: 1.5 (c)  
 Declassify On: 1.6, X6

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION  
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
 FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
 SUBJECT: Zaire Update

### Deployment of Forces

Since you approved on Friday the deployment of U.S. troops under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire, nearly 350 troops have arrived in Libreville, Gabon and Brazzaville, Congo. This force consists largely of enablers who will handle command and control requirements, logistics and a Joint Task Force headquarters under the leadership of Major General Edwin Smith. The second phase of the operation began Monday afternoon and will be completed by Wednesday morning. It includes helicopters, a P-3 aircraft and two Special Forces companies that will conduct the actual evacuation if ordered. The total strength of Operation Guardian Retrieval will be approximately 675 troops. In addition, General Joulwan dispatched a Special Marine Air Group Task Force (over 1000 troops led by the USS Nassau) to arrive off the Zairian coast on April 1. It had been stationed off Albania. Joulwan took this action in order to increase the number of options available should we face a non-permissive environment in Zaire.

### Coordination of Efforts

Major General Smith and our embassies in Gabon and Congo have established constructive working relations with host governments and solid coordination with French and Belgian military officials who are preparing their own evacuation forces if needed. France should have 1200 troops in both Brazzaville and Libreville by mid-week, and Belgium is expected to have 550 soldiers in both locations by the end of the week.

Calls to Congressional leaders began last Friday before any planes departed and continued on Saturday. There was broad support for this precautionary undertaking to protect American citizens.

### Political Events in Zaire

President Mobutu returned to Zaire on Friday vowing in unspecified terms to unite the country and find a settlement to the war.

Rebel

leader Laurent Kabila told United Nations Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun that he would agree to a cessation of hostilities only after the government began face-to-face talks.

Mobutu has not taken this step and rebel forces continue their advance on the key population and financial centers of Lubumbashi and

Mbuji-Mayi in southern Zaire. Roughly one-quarter of Zaire is now

controlled by the rebels who continue to receive active support from

Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Tanzania.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan will attend a two-day Organization

of African Unity meeting on Zaire in Lome, Togo beginning Tuesday.

In the lead up to this event, we have undertaken a joint demarche with France on numerous African capitals calling for support of our

mutual ongoing efforts to press both the Zairian government and rebels to accept a cease-fire and negotiations. Kabila is sending

his senior negotiator who attended talks in South Africa last month,

but the Zairian government has yet to designate its representative.

Our ambassador in Zaire delivered a letter from Secretary Albright to

Mobutu on Sunday urging the ailing leader to establish a negotiating

team rapidly that can begin direct talks.

Senior Zairian officials report embattled Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo resigned on Monday. Mobutu may allow him to continue in his

post until a replacement is found, but it is unlikely the person will

possess Kengo's strong commitment to reform. Mobutu may leave Kinshasa for his northern retreat in Gbadolite later this week.

There are concerns that his departure from the capital could refuel

efforts by various military factions for power.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. email</del>	<del>Shawn McCormick to Eileen Biernacki et al. re: Zaire Paper (6 pages)</del>	<del>01/10/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>
<del>002. email</del>	<del>Shawn McCormick to William Wechsler re: Zaire (3 pages)</del>	<del>03/24/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>
<del>003. email</del>	<del>Shawn McCormick to William Wechsler re: POTUS Zaire Paper (3 pages)</del>	<del>03/25/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 MSMail-Non-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Lake and Zaire or Berger and Zaire...])  
 OA/Box Number: 605000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[01/10/1997 - 03/25/1997]

2017-0238-M  
kh2041

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# MS Mail

**DATE-TIME** 10 January 97 20:32  
**FROM** McCormick, Shawn H.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~  
**SUBJECT** Zaire Paper [~~SECRET~~]  
**TO** Biernacki, Eileen V.  
 Friedrich, M. K.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
**CARBON\_COPY** Kessinger, Jodi  
 Rice, Susan E.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
 VL 707-0238-m  
 1.05 4/2/2019

**TEXT\_BODY**  
 First cut revision w/State's views and our reflections. This version is a DRAFT and has not/not been reviewed by Susan, but rather is for you to comment on, as per your request. Enough caveats? Shawn.

[[ 8004PR2.DOC : 5166 in 8004PR2.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT FILE DATE** 10 January 97 20:29  
**ATTACHMENT FILE NAME** 8004PR2.DOC  
~~SECRET~~ 8004  
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
 Reason: 1.5(d) Chief of Staff  
 Declassify on: 1.6 X6

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

**ACTION**  
**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**  
**FROM:** SANDY BERGER  
**SUBJECT:** Proposed New Course of Action for Zaire

## Purpose

To approve a new course of action in our policy toward Zaire.

## Background

The refugee crisis and fighting in eastern Zaire, coupled with President Mobutu's recent cancer surgery and poor prognosis, underscore the frailty of the Zairian state and the potential for a significant crisis in Central Africa that destabilizes Zaire and potentially its nine neighboring states. The poor performance of the Zairian military in the east casts strong doubt on its ability to prevent Zaire's de facto disintegration, particularly if Mobutu dies or soon becomes incapacitated. Mobutu has begun, however, an intensive effort to recruit western mercenaries and purchase significant quantities of arms for an offensive. He recently shuffled his military hierarchy, promoting a competent general to lead a campaign which could take many weeks to prepare fully. If Mobutu were to die before a democratic transition, subsequent rioting, looting and wide-scale ethnic clashes are all possible, if not likely. The sudden ascension of rebel forces in the east suggests long-standing secessionist tendencies may quickly resurface in other regions, such as the mineral-rich provinces of Shaba and East and West Kasai. In brief, Zaire, and therefore Central Africa, may be at its most critical turning point since the crises of the early 1960s. This potential crisis comes amid a seven-year democratization effort with a constitutional referendum scheduled for February, national elections scheduled for May and transition by July.

## Strategy

Although his health is rapidly failing, President Mobutu remains the only potentially effective leader in Zaire. He must therefore be urged to adopt a constructive posture that could help guarantee the peaceful transition of Zaire to stability, both internally and vis-à-vis its neighbors, and, ideally, to a functioning, multiparty democracy by July 1997. The United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund must also play larger roles to help promote stability within Zaire, to reinforce the sanctity of its

borders, support the democratic transition and encourage fiscal responsibility and transparency.

A modified U.S. strategy for Zaire should have the following elements:

1) Encourage Mobutu to Implement the Democratic Transition

To attempt to avert a leadership crisis in Zaire, the United States could begin a series of higher-level engagements with Mobutu aimed at securing his full support for implementing the scheduled democratic transition by July 1997. This proposal would provide Mobutu with more visible diplomatic support for the transition which has been lacking.

We recommend the approach to Mobutu occur through a series of meetings and begin immediately. Initially, a senior Administration official should meet with him to indicate support for his efforts since returning to Zaire, including his statements favoring dialogue with neighboring states and recognition of grievances by internally disaffected groups. This step would reopen our dialogue with Mobutu and permit us to learn more about his intentions and perhaps his health. Simultaneous efforts should be undertaken to engage the French and other key governments to try to secure support for the transition process.

It may be necessary to offer inducements for Mobutu to adopt this "engaged" approach. The most attractive of these would be a public declaration that if the elections are deemed free-and-fair, that the victor would be invited to meet with you shortly after an effective, peaceful transition. This offer would be attractive to Mobutu because he thinks he can win and due to his obsession for acceptance by the West and long campaign for a U.S. visa. We would also have to be prepared to praise his statesmanship for implementing the transition during a time of crisis and even possibly note his importance as a historical ally.

At the same time, Mobutu's senior advisors must be assured that

no  
"witch hunts" will occur after a transition and the international community will not pursue retribution against them. Inclusive in this package of inducements should be suspension of the U.S. ban on travel of Zairian leaders, pending successful completion of the transition. This approach to Mobutu can best be sold as a chance to craft a legacy of his leadership and vision that will remain in the minds of Zairians, Africans and people around the world.

The alternative is to watch the anemic transition proceed apace and possibly be delayed due to a lack of preparations and instability in the east. Continued fighting or prospective negotiations would also be useful reasons to delay further. In the interim, Mobutu could die. With the absence of a credible successor determined through elections, it is reasonable to expect that chaos would reign with serious negative consequences for Zaire's nine neighbors and other states. It could also derail any attempts at forming a democratic government and undermine efforts at improving fiscal controls. Potentially, only an international military force, for which there would be little, if any support, could quell the violence and hold the nation together.

## 2) International Assistance

Implementation of a transition by the July time frame will be difficult to achieve and nearly impossible without significant involvement of the United Nations, including the appointment of a UN

Special Representative and adequate funding for the election effort.

We recommend that priority be given to working with the new Secretary General to appoint a qualified person to such a post early in 1997. The UN, World Bank and IMF should also provide experts and advisors to work within Zairian ministries during and beyond the July 1997 transition. This will assist Zaire to meet both the electoral and reforming governance challenges that it faces. In a mini

Cambodia-like operation, the UN could provide a few hundred civilian staffers to work within various ministries to enhance administrative capabilities and provide skills as Zaire begins the long overdue process of rebuilding itself after nearly a decade of neglect. The senior administration official who approaches Mobutu should also suggest that the Zairian leader invite this type of participation so that it will be perceived as part of Mobutu's larger solution for his country.

### 3) Response to Crisis in the East

The rebel offensive continues in the east as negotiating efforts emerge. Regional governments are trying to build regional negotiations that would focus on recognizing existing borders and securing agreement not to support rebels operating in neighboring countries. Elements of an internal peace might include Zaire furnishing guarantees of citizenship and full political participation to ethnic Tutsis in exchange for rebel leaders pursuing their political goals at the ballot box. To ensure high visibility African participation, the OAU should take the lead in this enterprise with strong U.S. and EU support. Meanwhile, the Zairian government is moving forward with plans for an offensive against the rebels. But their demoralized, poorly trained army will likely have little success unless they acquire mercenary support, perhaps with French assistance, as is being attempted. This possible counter-offensive lends urgency to regional negotiating efforts.

### Potential Benefits of this Approach

Pursuing the course of action outlined above, if Mobutu accepts, could promote stability within Zaire by rallying political forces around the democratic transition. Knowing Mobutu working actively to shepherd the process to conclusion could steady the political process. In addition, having World Bank and IMF representatives working within the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance would be an important substantive step to promote economic reforms.

### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the recommendation above for a series of meetings with Mobutu by Administration officials with the eventual aim of seeking to persuade him to implement the transition process fully.

We would offer the victor of free-and-fair elections a White House

visit to occur shortly after the transition. Also that you authorize

USG efforts to make Zaire a priority at the UN, and engage it and the IFIs to provide experts to work within Zairian ministries during

and beyond the July 1997 transition. At the same time, we will explore whether it may be possible to make additional resources available -- within existing budgets -- to support Zaire's transition.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 March 97 19:25  
 FROM McCormick, Shawn H.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 SUBJECT Zaire [~~SECRET~~]  
 TO Wechsler, William F.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY [[ 2022PR.DOC : 4870 in 2022PR.DOC ]]

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**

VZ 2017-0238-M  
 1.06 4/2/2019

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 24 March 97 19:24  
 ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 2022PR.DOC  
~~SECRET~~ 2022  
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
 Chief of Staff  
 Reason: 1.5 (c)  
 Declassify On: 1.6, X6

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION  
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
 FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
 SUBJECT: Zaire Update

### Deployment of Forces

Since you approved on Friday the deployment of U.S. troops under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire, nearly 350 troops have arrived in Libreville, Gabon and Brazzaville, Congo. This force consists largely of enablers who will handle command and control

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#### Coordination of Efforts

Major General Smith and our embassies in Gabon and Congo have  
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solid coordination with French and Belgian military officials who  
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UN Secretary General Kofi Annan will attend a two-day Organization of African Unity meeting on Zaire in Lome, Togo beginning Tuesday.

In the lead up to this event, we have undertaken a joint demarche with France on numerous African capitals calling for support of our mutual ongoing efforts to press both the Zairian government and rebels to accept a cease-fire and negotiations. Kabila is sending his senior negotiator who attended talks in South Africa last month, but the Zairian government has yet to designate its representative.

Our ambassador in Zaire delivered a letter from Secretary Albright to Mobutu on Sunday urging the ailing leader to establish a negotiating team rapidly that can begin direct talks.

Senior Zairian officials report embattled Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo resigned on Monday. Mobutu may allow him to continue in his post until a replacement is found, but it is unlikely the person will possess Kengo's strong commitment to reform. Mobutu may leave Kinshasa for his northern retreat in Gbadolite later this week. There are concerns that his departure from the capital could refuel efforts by various military factions for power.

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 March 97 20:08  
 FROM McCormick, Shawn H.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 SUBJECT POTUS Zaire paper [~~SECRET~~]  
 TO Wechsler, William F.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**  
*VL 2017-0738-M  
 1.07 4/2/2019*

TEXT\_BODY  
 As promised.  
 [[ 2022PR.DOC : 5135 in 2022PR.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE DATE 25 March 97 20:3

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE NAME 2022PR.DOC  
~~SECRET~~ 2022  
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
 Reason: 1.5 (c) Chief of Staff  
 Declassify On: 1.6, X6

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

## INFORMATION

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Zaire Update

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Since you approved on Friday the deployment of U.S. troops under  
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a  
possible evacuation from Zaire, 675 troops have arrived in Libreville, Gabon and Brazzaville, Congo. Major General Edwin Smith leads the Joint Task Force headquarters that will be fully prepared to conduct an evacuation of American and selected third country nationals by Thursday. There are 554 Americans in Zaire, of whom 318 are in Kinshasa. Plans for a possible evacuation only envision those in Kinshasa being removed since others in outlying areas are not anticipated to be at risk.

General George Joulwan also dispatched a Special Marine Air Group Task Force (1,100 troops led by the USS Nassau) to arrive off the Zairian coast on April 1. Joulwan took this action to increase the number of options available should we face a non-permissive environment in Zaire. JCS and EUCOM are assessing their overall needs and some of the forces currently in place could be withdrawn once the USS Nassau arrives.

#### Coordination of Efforts

Major General Smith and our embassies in Gabon and Congo have established constructive working relations with host governments and solid coordination with French and Belgian military officials who are preparing to evacuate European Union nationals if needed. France should have 1,200 troops in both Brazzaville and Libreville by Friday, and Belgium is expected to have 550 soldiers in both locations by the end of the week.

Calls to Congress began last Friday before any planes departed and continued on Saturday. There was broad support for this precautionary undertaking to protect American citizens.

#### Political Events in Zaire

South African envoys working with President Mobutu and rebel leader Laurent Kabila appear to have achieved a breakthrough: agreement to preliminary talks between the two sides. Mobutu reportedly has agreed to share power with the rebel leadership in the run up to

democratic elections that could be held within 12-18 months. Kabila had earlier told United Nations Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun that he would agree to negotiate a cessation of hostilities if the government began face-to-face talks. The rebels, meanwhile, continue their advance on the key population and commercial centers of Lubumbashi and Mbuji-Mayi in southern Zaire. Roughly one-quarter of Zaire is now controlled by Kabila's forces which continue to receive active support from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Tanzania.

Senior representatives of the Zairian government and rebel forces are attending a two-day summit on Zaire sponsored by the Organization of African Unity in Lome, Togo. Your Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending the conference and pressing all sides to push forward with negotiations rapidly.

Embattled Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo resigned on Monday. Mobutu will allow him to continue in his post until a replacement is found, but it is unlikely the person will possess Kengo's strong commitment to reform. Mobutu may leave Kinshasa for his northern retreat in Gbadolite later this week. There are concerns that his departure from the capital could refuel efforts by various military factions for power.