

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: French Foreign Ministry on U.S. Ambassador to Zaire's Press Comments (2 pages)	12/02/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
002. cable	re: Negotiating Group on Internal Zaire Talks (2 pages)	12/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
003. cable	re: French View on Internal Zaire Negotiations (3 pages)	12/16/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
004. cable	re: Key French Policy Makers Comment on NATO, Europe, Middle East and Zaire (4 pages)	12/26/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Zaire and France])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/02/1996 - 12/26/1996]

2017-0240-M
kh2043

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA7300 3371531-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 021531Z DEC 96
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 021531Z DEC 96
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1119
 INFO: RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0586
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY ON U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 027300

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-m (1.01)
 KBH 8/9/2022

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/2/96

TAGS: PREL, FR, CG

SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY ON U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
 - ZAIRE'S PRESS COMMENTS

REF: (A) PARIS 22913, (B) PARIS 14402

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, REASON 1.5
 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ THE INTERVIEW OF AMBASSADOR SIMPSON WHICH
 APPEARED IN THE ZAIREAN PRESS NOVEMBER 30 HAS BEEN
 REPORTED BY FRENCH MEDIA, INCLUDING AFP AND DAILY "LE
 FIGARO."

3. ~~(S)~~ QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR ROISIN CALLED POLMINCOUNS
 DECEMBER 2 TO REGISTER GOF SURPRISE AND DISPLEASURE
 WITH THE "UNDIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE" ATTRIBUTED TO
 AMBASSADOR SIMPSON. IN PARTICULAR, ROISIN POINTED TO
 QUOTES IN THE ZAIREAN PUBLICATION "LE SOFT" IN WHICH
 AMBASSADOR SIMPSON ALLEGEDLY:

-- EXPRESSES DISGUST THAT FRANCE CONTINUES TO SUPPORT
 DECADENT REGIMES IN AFRICA,

-- SAYS THAT FRANCE IS "NO LONGER CAPABLE OF IMPOSING
 ITSELF ON AFRICA,"

-- SAYS THAT "NEOCOLONIALISM IS NO LONGER TOLERABLE,"
 AND THAT FRANCE'S ATTITUDE IN CENTRAL AFRICA IS NOT IN
 TOUCH WITH REALITY.

4. ~~(S)~~ ROISIN ASKED FOR VERIFICATION AND AN

EXPLANATION OF THESE REMARKS. HE NOTED THAT THEY RUN CONTRARY TO RECENT EFFORTS IN PARIS AND WASHINGTON TO PUT AN END TO PUBLIC POLEMICS OVER OUR RESPECTIVE AFRICA POLICIES. ROISIN ADMITTED THAT, ALTHOUGH SOME FRENCH MINISTERS WERE RECENTLY OUT OF LINE IN PUBLICLY CRITICIZING THE U.S. ROLE IN AFRICA, THEY HAVE BEEN REIGNED IN BY PRESIDENT CHIRAC. THE PROBLEM NOW APPEARED TO BE ON THE U.S. SIDE, HE NOTED.

5. (S) POLMINCOUNS SAID WE HAD SEEN SOME EXTRACTS OF INTERVIEW AND WERE CHECKING TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN SAID.

6. (S) COMMENT. EMBASSY, DEPARTMENT, D OTHER SENIOR-LEVEL U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE PROTESTED RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS (REFS) BY FRENCH OFFICIALS WHICH ARE GRATUITOUSLY CRITICAL OF US POLICY IN AFRICA. AS ONE RESULT OF THESE DEMARCHES, PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GOF BUREAUCRACY TO SHOW MORE RESTRAINT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT U.S. AND FRENCH POLICIES IN AFRICA. WHILE WE DO NOT EXPECT SEAMLESS GOF COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTION, WE HAVE SEEN A MUCH MORE NEUTRAL TONE RECENTLY IN GOF COMMENTARY ON U.S. AND FRENCH APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS IN ZAIRE.

7. (;) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH GROUND, WE NEED TO RESPOND TO THE FRENCH BY EXPLAINING AND/OR PUTTING IN THEIR PROPER CONTEXT AMBASSADOR SIMPSON'S REMARKS. AT A MINIMUM, WE COULD USE WASHINGTON'S REAFFIRMATION, WHICH WE CAN RELAY TO THE FRENCH, OF OUR COMMITMENT TO AVOID PUBLIC POLEMICS ON AFRICA. END COMMENT.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7300

TOR: 961202104118 M2519751

DIST:

SIT: FETIG JOHNSON JORDAN MARTINEZV MCCORMICK MOFFETT RICE SCOTT VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA8459 3471137-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 121137Z DEC 96
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 121137Z DEC 96
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1491
 INFO: RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 9766
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0858
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0114
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3484
 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0004
 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0015
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0610
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0410
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 1188
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1042
 RUEHXQ/ALL EUROPEAN UNION POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 7336
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 1667
 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 7698
 RUEIBS/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0627
 RUETIAA/DIRNSA FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2017-0240-M (1.02)
 KBH 8/9/2022

SUBJ: NEGOTIATING GROUP ON INTERNAL ZAIRE TALKS

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-PARIS 028459

S/SO PLEASE ALERT AF AT OOB

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, CG
 SUBJECT: NEGOTIATING GROUP ON INTERNAL ZAIRE TALKS

REF: STATE 253627

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 D, X5.

2. ~~(S)~~ REF DETAILS THE DEPARTMENT'S PLANS TO START A NEGOTIATING GROUP ON INTERNAL ZAIRE TALKS UNDER THE CO-LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S., THE EU AND THE OAU. WE

UNDERSTAND THE REASONING THAT UNDERLIES THE OMISSION OF FRANCE FROM THE PROPOSED CO-LEADERSHIP GROUP, I.E., THE AVERSION OF CERTAIN STATES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION TO A FRENCH ROLE. FRANCE IS, HOWEVER, DETERMINED TO REMAIN A REGIONAL PLAYER AND IS IN A POSITION TO PLAY THE SPOILER, IF IT WISHES, OF ANY REGIONAL INITIATIVE IN THIS PART OF AFRICA.

3. ~~(C)~~ WE WANT TO GIVE THIS INITIATIVE EVERY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. OUR CONCERN IS THAT, IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IT WILL ELICIT INDIFFERENCE, IF NOT OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION, FROM THE GOF. IN THE CURRENT FORMULATION, FRANCE IS DEALT PRESUMPTIVELY OUT OF A LEADERSHIP GROUP THAT INCLUDES ONLY ONE STATE, THE U.S., AS WELL AS THE EU AND OAU. WE DO NOT EXPECT THE FRENCH TO ACCEPT THE EU AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THEIR OWN LEADERSHIP IN THE PROCESS. AND THE EU WILL NOT MOVE ON THE INITIATIVE UNLESS FRANCE GIVES IT BLESSING.

4. ~~(C)~~ WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT MENTION OF CO-LEADERSHIP OF THIS INITIATIVE (SECOND SENTENCE OF THE FIFTH TIC IN PARA 4 AND THE SECOND TIC UNDER PARA 13) BE DELETED FROM THE TALKING POINTS, AND THAT THE ISSUE OF WHO MIGHT EXERCISE CO-LEADERSHIP OF THE INITIATIVE BE TALKED OUT PRIVATELY WITH THE FRENCH FIRST. (WE NOTE THAT PARA 3 REFTTEL ALREADY UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING THE FRENCH INTO PROCESS -- THE POINT IS HOW TO MAXIMIZE OUR CHANCES OF DOING SO.)

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 8459

TOR: 961212065546 M2535743

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR RAGAN
RICE SCHWARTZ SCOTT
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 161520Z DEC 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 161520Z DEC 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1586
INFO: RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0860
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0619
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0413
 RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 7340
 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0021
 RUEIBS/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0629
 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0005
 RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 9770
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3489
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 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 7701
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0120
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUETIAA/DIRNSA FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 1692
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUEHXQ/ALL EUROPEAN UNION POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 1189
SUBJ: FRENCH VIEW ON INTERNAL ZAIRE NEGOTIATIONS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 028673

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2001
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, CG
 SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEW ON INTERNAL ZAIRE NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 253627, (B) STATE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. FRANCE IS NOT OPPOSED PER SE TO DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE ZAIREAN GOVERNMENT AND KIVU REBELS BUT HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE FORMAT AND TIMING PROPOSED BY THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.03)
KBH 8/9/2022

3. ~~(S)~~ PER REF A, POLMINCOUNS RAISED WITH QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR ROISIN DECEMBER 13 THE IDEA OF FORMING A NEGOTIATING GROUP ON ZAIRE ON THE MARGINS OF THE UPCOMING NAIROBI II CONFERENCE. ROISIN WAS AWARE OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL AND SAID THE GOF HAD TWO RESERVATIONS ABOUT IT. FIRST, NEXT STEPS ON ZAIRE WILL DEPEND IN PART ON WHAT MOBUTU DOES. WE SHOULD PROBABLY GET SOME CLARITY ON THIS BEFORE PUSHING FOR TALKS. SECOND, IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT ANY ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT WILL AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. IT IS NOT EVEN CLEAR THAT THE GOZ WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE NAIROBI II MEETING. ROISIN SAID THAT WE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VERY CAREFULLY QUESTIONS OF GOZ SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE PLUNGING AHEAD WITH AN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE WHICH DRAWS US INTO INTERNAL ZAIRIAN AFFAIRS.

4. ~~(S)~~ ROISIN ALSO NOTED THAT FRANCE HAD NOT BEEN INVITED BY THE ORGANIZERS TO ATQEND NAIROBI II. IF FRANCE IS INVITED, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN NAIROBI WILL BE THE GOF REPRESENTATIVE.

5. ~~(S)~~ MORE GENERALLY, ROISIN SAID FRANCE IS NOT OPPOSED PER SE TO THE IDEA OF DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBELS. THE GOF IS NOT YET CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH TALKS CAN TAKE PLACE OR THAT, IF THEY DO, WILL SERVE ANY PURPOSE. FRANCE'S OVERRIDING CONCERN REMAINS PREVENTION OF THE BREAKUP OF ZAIRE, ROISIN NOTED.

6. ~~(S)~~ POLMINCOUNS SAID THE U.S. PROPOSAL WAS JUST THAT -- A PROPOSAL, NOT A FINISHED PRODUCT. THE U.S. WANTED FRENCH IDEAS AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING EFFORT. ROISIN SAID THE GOF UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED THAT AND WAS NOT BOTHERED BY THE PROPOSAL'S SUGGESTION OF U.S.-EU CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP UNDER AN OAU AEGIS. ROISIN WASN'T SURE FRANCE WOULD WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATING GROUP EVEN IF INVITED.

7. ~~(S)~~ POLMINCOUNS URGED THAT FRANCE REFLECT ON WAYS OF OVERCOMING POSSIBLE GOZ RESISTANCE TO DIRECT TALKS WITH THE REBELS. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE NEEDED TO CONSULT CLOSELY AND REGULARLY ON HOW TO BRING OUR SEPARATE STRENGTHS TO BEAR IN ZAIRE AND THE REGION. IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE COULD COME UP WITH A COMMON VISION OF HOW TO PROMOTE TALKS IN ZAIRE, AND HOW TO CONNECT THESE TALKS TO THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THAT COUNTRY, THIS WOULD BE A BIG STEP FORWARD. IT COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR CONCERTED ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. CONVERSELY, IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE PURSUED SEPARATE APPROACHES IN ZAIRE, THE CHANCES OF EFFECTIVE, COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION WOULD BE DIMINISHED.

8. ~~(S)~~ ROISIN WAS NON-COMMITTAL AND OFFERED LITTLE IN RESPONSE TO OUR APPEAL FOR GOF-U.S. COORDINATION ON ZAIRE EXCEPT A WILLINGNESS TO STAY IN TOUCH AND

EXCHANGE VIEWS. AS FOR ENCOURAGING THE GOZ TO CONSIDER
A DIALOGUE WITH THE REBELS, ROISIN WAS DUBIOUS. WHAT
IF THE ZAIREAN MILITARY RESISTS? DO WE KEEP PUSHING
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 028673

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2001
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, CG
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEW ON INTERNAL ZAIRE NEGOTIATIONS

AND RISK A COUP D'ETAT?

9. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT. AT THIS STAGE, THE BEST WE MAY GET
FROM THE GOF IS NON-INTERFERENCE IN FORMATION OF A
POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING GROUP. TO ACHIEVE THAT WE WILL
NEED TO KEEP THE FRENCH WELL-INFORMED OF OUR THINKING,
AS WE HAVE DONE THUS FAR. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL
CONTINUE URGING THE GOF TO HARMONIZE ITS APPROACHES TO
ZAIRE AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION WITH OURS. WHILE SUCH
COORDINATION WITH THE U.S. IN AFRICA GOES AGAINST THE
FRENCH GRAIN (EXCEPT WHEN IT COMES TO ACTUAL MILITARY
OPERATIONS), WE CAN'T BE REPROACHED FOR KEEPING OUR
CARDS ON THE TABLE AND INVITING THE GOF TO PLAY. END
COMMENT.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 8673
<^SSN>8673
TOR: 961216104147 M2540820
<^TOR>961216104259 M2540822

DIST: SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SCOTT SUM SUM2
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA9530 3611856-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 261856Z DEC 96
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 261856Z DEC 96
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1973
 INFO: RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
 RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 SUBJ: KEY FRENCH POLICY-MAKERS COMMENT ON NATO,
 - EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST AND ZAIRE

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.04)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 029530

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/06
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, XF, ZF, FR
 SUBJECT: KEY FRENCH POLICY-MAKERS COMMENT ON NATO,
 - EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST AND ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON:
 1.5 (B).

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY

2. ~~(S)~~ IN RECENT DAYS, DCM HAS REVIEWED BILATERAL ISSUES WITH THREE INFLUENTIAL GOF PLAYERS: PM JUPPE'S CHIEF OF STAFF, MAURICE GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE; MOD STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR JEAN-CLAUDE MALLET; AND MFA POLICY PLANNING CHIEF AND SENIOR ADVISOR GILLES ANDREANI. GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE WAS THE MOST UP-BEAT, MINIMIZING U.S.-FRENCH DIFFERENCES AND HIGHLIGHTING OVERALL PROGRESS IN NATO ADAPTATION. MALLET VIEWED U.S.-FRENCH DISAGREEMENTS ON REGIONAL ISSUES AS MORE TACTICAL THAN STRATEGIC, BUT SAID DIFFERENCES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARE POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS, SINCE THEY REFLECTED LINGERING U.S. DISTRUST OF ESDI. HE CITED THE EUROCORPS, CINCSOUTH AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON HELIOS/HORUS SURVEILLANCE SATELLITES AS AREAS WHERE THE U.S. HAS SOUGHT TO DEFLECT EUROPEAN EFFORTS. MALLET CAUTIONED AGAINST A U.S.-RUSSIA CONDOMINIUM ON

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NATO SUMMIT, AND SAID CFE MODERNIZATION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT MUST NOT RESULT IN AN INSUFFICIENTLY-ARMED CENTRAL/EAST EUROPE. ON SERBIA, ANDREANI APPLAUDED THE WEST'S SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION, ADDING THAT IF MILOSEVIC IS TO GO, IT MIGHT BE BEST IF HIS DEPARTURE TAKE PLACE WHILE SFOR IS STILL IN BOSNIA. MALLET WORRIED ABOUT THE "EXPLOSIVE COCKTAIL" IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PEACE PROCESS OBSTACLES, ISLAMIZATION AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK ON SADDAM'S SON. ALL THREE FRENCH OFFICIALS CALLED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ZAIRE. END INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY.

U.S., FRANCE AND EUROPE

3. (S) GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE LARGELY DISMISSED REPORTS OF U.S.-FRENCH DIFFERENCES, BLAMING THEM ON PRESS PREOCCUPATION WITH QUARRELING ALLIES. DCM SAID THE U.S. AND FRANCE HAVE A GOOD TRACK RECORD OF RESOLVING PROBLEMS, BUT THAT WE NEED TO MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP CAREFULLY, ISSUE BY ISSUE.

4. (S) MALLET ARGUED THAT ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES, THE U.S. AND FRANCE GENERALLY SEE EYE-TO-EYE CONCERNING STRATEGY; DISAGREEMENTS ARE MAINLY TACTICAL. HOWEVER, ON EUROPEAN ISSUES, EVEN TACTICAL DIFFERENCES THREATEN TO BECOME MORE SERIOUS. THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE DEPENDS ON TWO PRINCIPLES: (1) CONTINUED U.S. ENGAGEMENT; AND (2) EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, INCLUDING ESDI WITHIN NATO. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EVERY TIME A CONCRETE ESDI INITIATIVE TAKES SHAPE -- MALLET CITED THE EUROCORPS, CINCSOUTH AND FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION ON HELIOS -- THE U.S. POSES OBSTACLES. DCM CHALLENGED MALLET ON EACH OF THE THREE EXAMPLES, ARGUING THAT IT IS NATURAL FOR THE U.S. TO ENGAGE IN ISSUES RELATED TO NATO AND/OR U.S. INTERESTS.

INTERNAL NATO ADAPTATION

5. (S) GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE WAS UPBEAT, POINTING TO THE JANUARY 1994 NATO SUMMIT AND IFOR AS MAJOR ALLIED ACCOMPLISHMENTS. WE HAVE OUR WORK CUT OUT FOR US ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION, HE SAID, BUT FRANCE "IS NOT DESPERATE." DCM NOTED THAT THE BERLIN MINISTERIAL -- AND SUBSEQUENT PROGRESS ON DEPUTY SACEUR, CJTF AND NATO-WEU RELATIONS -- SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE LIST OF SUCCESSES. ON COMMAND STRUCTURES, SAID DCM, WE ARE WILLING TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO A GLOBAL RESOLUTION, BUT MILITARY EFFICIENCY, INCLUDING CONTINUED U.S. COMMAND OF AFSOUTH, REMAINS CRITICAL.

6. (S) ANDREANI WAS LESS OPTIMISTIC THAN GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE ABOUT INTERNAL ADAPTATION. HE STRESSED CHIRAC'S PERSONAL INVESTMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CHIRAC'S CINCSOUTH DEMAND HAD COMPLICATED THE

NEGOTIATIONS. ANDREANI NONETHELESS BROODED ABOUT THE NEED FOR "BOTH PRESIDENTS TO BE ABLE CREDIBLY TO DECLARE VICTORY" IN THE AFSOUTH DEBATE.

NATO AND THE EAST

7. (S) MALLET CAUTIONED ABOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE NAC (ESPECIALLY THE U.S.) ARE NEGOTIATING EUROPEAN SECURITY OVER THE HEADS OF THE CEE'S AND BALTS. HE SAID DISCUSSIONS ON SEVERAL ISSUES -- CFE FLANKS, THE THREE NO'S ON NUKES, NATO INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEMBERS -- RISKED GIVING THAT IMPRESSION. MALLET HASTENED TO ADD THAT FRANCE HAD NO EVIDENCE OF "BACK-DOOR" U.S.-RUSSIAN TALKS REGARDING THE 1997 NATO SUMMIT, BUT SAID, "IT COULD HAPPEN." SEPARATELY, HOWEVER, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE OBSERVED THAT "NO ONE, INCLUDING FRANCE" CALLS INTO QUESTION THE SPECIAL U.S. ROLE IN DEALING WITH RUSSIA.

8. (S) MALLET NOTED THAT THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE DEBATE AND CFE MODERNIZATION SHOULD NOT LEAD TOWARD A LIGHTLY ARMED CEE ZONE THAT WOULD BE HARD TO DEFEND UNDER ARTICLE V. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT CFE IN THIS REGARD.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

9. (S) ANDREANI AGREED THAT THE WEST MUST MAINTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC. IF MILOSEVIC IS GOING TO LEAVE POWER, HE ADDED, IT WAS PROBABLY BETTER IF THE TRANSITION OCCURRED WHILE SFOR WAS STILL IN BOSNIA. ON BOSNIA WAR CRIMINALS, ANDREANI ARGUED FOR PICKING UP THE MAIN OFFENDERS WHILE LEAVING THE REST TO BE JUDGED BY AN EL SALVADOR-STYLE TRUTH COMMISSION.

MIDDLE EAST

10. (S) GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID EUROPE IS NOT CHALLENGING THE U.S. IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, BUT IS SEEKING TO PLAY AN APPROPRIATE COMPLEMENTARY ROLE. MALLET POINTED TO AN "EXPLOSIVE COCKTAIL" IN THE REGION, WITH THE ATTACK ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SON, ISLAMIZATION AND PEACE PROCESS DIFFICULTIES ALL PART OF THE MIX. THE NEXT WAR, SAID MALLET, WAS MOST LIKELY TO COME IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON DUAL CONTAINMENT, MALLET SAID AGAIN THAT U.S.-FRENCH DIFFERENCES ARE MORE TACTICAL THAN STRATEGIC, ADDING THAT THE FRENCH BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND THE REGIME.

ZAIRE

11. (S) GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE

U.S., FRANCE AND BELGIUM TO REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED. THE GOF HOPES TO GET THE UK TO STEP UP ITS INVOLVEMENT AS WELL. GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID MOBUTU IS NOT DYING; HE IS TIRED BUT MAINTAINS SOME OF HIS CHARISMA. IN ANY CASE, MOBUTU IS ALL WE HAVE, AT LEAST FOR NOW, AND HE HAS TAKEN A POSITIVE STEP WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW ARMY CHIEF. GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARMY'S ABILITY TO ACT REMAINS UNCLEAR, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT HAS NOT BEEN PAID.

12. (X) DCM REPLIED THAT PRESS REPORTS OF U.S.-FRENCH RIVALRY IN AFRICA ARE UNFORTUNATE. AFRICA NEEDS OUTSIDE HELP, AND THE U.S. AND FRANCE ARE AMONG THE FEW NATIONS WITH THE INTEREST AND CAPABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO PROSPERITY AND STABILITY. AS FOR ZAIRE, WE MUST FOCUS ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION AS WELL: TRANSITION TOWARD DEMOCRACY.

13. (X) SEPARATELY, MALLET WORRIED THAT NO OUTSIDE FORCE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE RISKS IN ZAIRE. HE NOTED THAT PAST INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA AND RWANDA HAVE MADE THE U.S. AND FRANCE MORE SKITTISH ABOUT INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA GENERALLY.

COMMENT

14. (X) ALL THREE OFFICIALS APPEARED ANXIOUS TO GET BEYOND THE FLAP SURROUNDING THE DE CHARETTE SNUB AT THE NAC AND FOCUS ON HOT SPOTS AROUND THE GLOBE./ PREDICTABLY, MALLET WAS THE MOST SENSITIVE ABOUT ESDI ISSUES, DEMONSTRATING THE EXTENT TO WHICH GOF POLICY ON CINCSOUTH AND HELIOS REPRESENTS THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS OVER MILITARY OR BUDGET REALITIES. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH HAVE DIFFERENT TACTICAL GOALS IN THE MIDEAST

PEACE PROCESS AND CONTINUE TO READ IRAQ AND IRAN IN A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT WAY THAN DOES THE U.S.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9530

TOR: 961226141720 M2555141

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS BELL DAALDER DOWLING FEELEY GRUMMON JORDAN
LEBARON LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PARRIS PETERS RAGAN RICE
SCHMIDT SCHWARTZ SCOTT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Scenesetter for A/S Moose's Paris Consultations (5 pages)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
002. cable	re: Scenesetter for A/S Moose's Paris Consultations, Corrected Copy (3 pages)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
003. cable	re: A/S Moose Talks in Paris: Zaire (4 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
004. cable	re: A/S Moose's Africa Consultations in Paris (3 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
005. cable	re: A/S Moose's Africa Consultations in Paris (5 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
006. cable	re: A/S Moose Discusses Central Africa, ACRF [African Crisis Reaction Force] with Dutch FM Van Mierlo (5 pages)	01/23/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
007. cable	re: French Proposal for Joint Initiatives in Africa (3 pages)	01/23/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
008. cable	re: Forces in Zaire (2 pages)	01/24/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
009. cable	re: Eastern Zaire Conflict: French Appeal to the U.S. (2 pages)	01/29/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
010. cable	re: Zaire: French Assessment (7 pages)	01/31/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
011. cable	re: Zaire Rebel Representative (2 pages)	02/11/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
012. cable	re: Halting Hostilities in Central Africa (3 pages)	02/14/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Zaire and France])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/13/1997 - 02/27/1997]

2017-0240-M
 kh2044

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: Western Support Group on Zaire (7 pages)	02/19/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
014. cable	re: Presidency Diplomatic Advisor on U.S. and France in Africa (5 pages)	02/20/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
015. cable	re: French Presidency Military Chiefs View of Zairian Military Situation (1 page)	02/21/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
016. cable	re: French Presidency Africa Advisor (2 pages)	02/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
017. cable	re: Elysee View on Zaire Talks (2 pages)	02/27/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Zaire and France])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/13/1997 - 02/27/1997]

2017-0240-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA0817 0131123-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 131123Z JAN 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 131123Z JAN 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2344
INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SUBJ: SCENESETTER FOR A/S MOOSE'S PARIS
- CONSULTATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.05)
KSH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000817

STATE FOR AF - A/S MOOSE AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2002

TAGS: PREL, CG, FR

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S MOOSE'S PARIS
- CONSULTATIONS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. A/S MOOSE'S JANUARY 15 VISIT TO
PARIS, AT THE INVITATION OF THE FRENCH WHO WISH TO
IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS ON MATTERS AFRICAN, PRESENTS AN
OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS THE FRENCH ON OUR MOST
URGENT CONCERNS. WE WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING SHORT
LIST OF KEY TOPICS: FINDING COMMON GROUND IN ZAIRE,
RESTARTING A DIALOGUE ON THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE
FORCE, AND MOVING TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
THE GREAT LAKES. THE VISIT WILL INCLUDE TWO
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CALLS. WHILE WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE FRENCH, OUR
BASIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA REMAIN ON PARALLEL TRACKS.
THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK
TOGETHER. END SUMMARY.

ZAIRE

3. ~~(S)~~ SUSPICIONS PERSIST IN FRANCE THAT THE USG
SECRETLY FAVORS THE REBELS IN EASTERN ZAIRE AND WOULD
LIKE TO SEE AN ANGLOPHONE/TUTSI BUFFER STATE SET UP
THERE. MOST RECENTLY THERE SURFACED MISQUOTATIONS TO
AMBASSADOR SIMPSON ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY
IN THE AREA. WE HAVE TOLD THE FRENCH REPEATEDLY, AT
DIFFERENT LEVELS AND IN DIFFERENT MINISTRIES, THAT THE

USG FIRMLY SUPPORTS THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAIRE AND DOES NOT WANT TO SEE THE ZAIRIAN STATE UNRAVEL.

4. ~~(S)~~ THE FRENCH STILL REGRET THAT THEY FAILED TO CONVINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO LAUNCH A MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE REFUGEE POPULATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE IS LARGER THAN THE U.S. BELIEVES IT IS.

5. ~~(S)~~ THESE MEETINGS, PARTICULARLY THE ONE WITH ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR DUPUCH, WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT CONTEXT IN WHICH TO AIR USG CONCERNS WITH WHAT THE FRENCH ARE MAY BE UP TO IN ZAIRE. WE CANNOT HELP BUT NOTE THE CONTINUED FRENCH CURRYING OF FAVOR WITH MOBUTU: IN ANNOUNCING THAT MOBUTU WAS WELCOME IN FRANCE WHENEVER HE WANTED TO COME, THE QUAI SPOKESMAN CONTRASTED FRANCE TO THE U.S. MOREOVER, DESPITE GOF DENIALS OF OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT, THERE ARE PERSISTENT REPORTS OF ZAIRIAN MERCENARY RECRUITMENT VVMMH RXQYQSI, THEY ASKED IF THE USG WOULD PUBLICLY STATE THAT IT WOULD MATERIALLY SUPPORT THE ELECTION EFFORTS IN ZAIRE.

7. ~~(S)~~ WE RECOMMEND STRESSING TO THE FRENCH JUST HOW MANY COMMON INTERESTS WE SHARE IN ZAIRE, AND APPEALING FOR GREATER JOINT EFFORTS TO ATTAIN COMMON OBJECTIVES. ARE THERE TRANSITIONAL SCENARIOS WHICH WE SHOULD BOTH BE ENCOURAGING THE ZAIRIANS TO ACCEPT? WHAT CAN WE DO TOGETHER TO PUT THE ELECTION PROCESS ON TRACK? CAN WE DEVELOP A COMMON STRATEGY FOR HELPING THE GOZ TO REGAIN, BY PEACEFUL MEANS, CONTROL OF THE EAST? THE COMMON AGENDA ON ZAIRE IS A LARGE ONE, AND WE NEED TO REFLECT TOGETHER WITH THE FRENCH ON HOW WE CAN JOIN FORCES IN A MORE CONCRETE FASHION. WE CAN ALSO TELL THEM WHAT WE PLAN TO DO SUPPORT THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. WE ALSO RECOMMEND OFFERING OUR FRANK ASSESSMENT OF KABILA AND THE REBELS, AND DETAILING SUCH CONTACTS AS WE MAY HAVE HAD.

AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE

8. ~~(S)~~ INITIAL FRENCH REACTION TO THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE REMAINS COOL, TO SAY THE LEAST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOME GOF OFFICIALS WERE PUT OFF BY THE SUDDENNESS OF THE APPROACH, BY THE FACT THAT IT APPEARED BURUNDI-SPECIFIC, AND BY THE RATHER FORMAL MANNER (LARGE TEAM APPROACH) IN WHICH IT WAS BROACHED WITH THE GOF. MOREOVER, THEY EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE AT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 000817

STATE FOR AF - A/S MOOSE AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2002

TAGS: PREL, CG, FR

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S MOOSE'S PARIS
- CONSULTATIONS

THE FACT THAT THE FIRST LIST OF PROPOSED COUNTRIES WAS TOO LIGHT ON FRANCOPHONES. THEY PERCEIVED THAT THE USG WAS CHOOSING COUNTRIES RATHER THAN LETTING THE AFRICANS DO THE CHOOSING. ADDITIONALLY THE FRENCH HAVE A GUT REACTION AGAINST AN CONTINENT-WIDE INITIATIVE IN WHICH THEY DO NOT HAVE THE LEAD. THE LAST DEFINITIVE PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE FRENCH POSITION ON THE ACRF (FROM BOTH DUPUCH AND ROISIN) IS THAT THEY WOULD RATHER PURSUE DISCUSSIONS OF THE MATTER IN A MULTILATERAL (PREFERABLY UN) CONTEXT ONLY.

RESTARTING THE DIALOGUE

9. ~~let~~ A/S MOOSE'S VISIT PROVIDES AND OPPORTUNITY TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A RESTARTING OF A SERIOUS EXCHANGE ABOUT THE ACRF WITH THE FRENCH. WE SHOULD MENTION THE LATE JANUARY LOW-KEY VISIT OF ACRF COORDINATOR MARSHALL MCCALLIE AND URGE THAT THE GOF SEIZE THIS CHANCE TO DEEPEN OUR DIALOGUE.

TO THE EXTENT THE GOF UNDERSTANDS THAT WE GENUINELY WANT TO HARMONIZE OUR APPROACHES AND ARE NOT OUT TO IMPOSE A "MADE-IN-THE-USA" SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, WE BELIEVE THEIR INSTINCTIVE RESISTANCE TO OUR INITIATIVE WILL LESSEN. A LOGICAL OPENING IS PROVIDED BY PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S SPEECH TO THE PARIS DIPLOMATIC CORPS JANUARY 7, IN WHICH HE SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR THE CONTINENT-WIDE "ORGANIZATION OF INTER-AFRICAN FORCES UNDER THE INITIATIVE AND CONTROL OF THE OAU."

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE GREAT LAKES

10. ~~let~~ THE FRENCH SELDOM MISS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION CANNOT BE SOLVED IN ISOLATION FROM ONE ANOTHER, AND THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE GREAT LAKES IS THE ONLY MEANS TO ADDRESS ALL THE MULTIPLE ISSUES, I.E., REFUGEES, REPATRIATION, JUSTICE, POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS, POWER-SHARING...IN A COMPREHENSIVE FASHION. THEY HAVE A SUSPICION THAT THE USG TACITLY OPPOSES THE CONCEPT, DESPITE OUR REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT WE BELIEVE THE IDEA HAS GREAT MERIT. ONE NEW FACTOR THAT MAY CHANGE THE CALCULUS IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION.

11. ~~let~~ A/S MOOSE'S VISIT COULD BE THE OCCASION TO RENEW OUR DIALOGUE ON THIS IDEA. HE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER ASKING THE FRENCH IF WE, THE FRENCH, THE EU AND THE UN COULD FRUITFULLY JOIN OUR EFFORTS, THROUGH THE NEW SRSG, TO BEGIN TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE.

HIGH-RANKING CONTACTS

11. (S) THE IMPORTANCE THE FRENCH ATTRIBUTE TO THE VISIT IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE UNUSUALLY HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS ON A/S MOOSE'S SCHEDULE, IN ADDITION TO MORE DIRECT COUNTERPARTS. A/S MOOSE WILL MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY CHIEF OF STAFF DENIS BAUCHARD, WITH COOPERATION MINISTER JACQUES GODFRAIN AT THE MINISTRY OF COOPERATION, AND AND WITH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION XAVIER EMMANUELLI, .

12. (S) THE FRENCH INTEND, THROUGH THE BAUCHARD MEETING, TO EMPHASIZE JUST HOW MUCH THEY WISH TO IMPROVE FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION ON MATTERS AFRICAN. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, IN THE FRENCH SCHEME OF THINGS, REPRESENTS THE MINISTER IN HIS POLITICAL CAPACITY, NOT AS A REGIONAL EXPERT.

13. (S) THE GODFRAIN MEETING, WHICH WE SOUGHT, WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA IN A CONTEXT, AND TO DESCRIBE IT DIRECTLY TO THE MAN WHOSE LOOSE COMMENTS DID SO MUCH TO SPOIL OUR RELATIONS ON AFRICA IN RECENT MONTHS. WE WOULD SUGGEST SKETCHING OUT FOR GODFRAIN THE LIKELY SCOPE OF U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA OVER THE NEXT YEAR, STRESSING THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF U.S. AND FRENCH EFFORTS. A REMINDER OF THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH FOREIGN AID DECISIONS ARE MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS, AND HOW THAT CONTEXT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF FRANCE, COULD PROVE HELPFUL IN THE LONG RUN.

14. (S) XAVIER EMMANUELLI IS THE MOST SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIAL TO HAVE VISITED RWANDA SINCE THE 1994 GENOCIDE. HE HAS BEEN THERE TWICE, MOST RECENTLY TO BRING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA IN LATE 1996, WHEN HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES WERE STREAMING
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 000817

STATE FOR AF - A/S MOOSE AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2002

TAGS: PREL, CG, FR

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S MOOSE'S PARIS
 - CONSULTATIONS

BACK ACROSS THE BORDER. A/S MOOSE MAY WISH TO EMPHASIZE TO EMMANUELLI THE CONTINUING U.S. COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN ISSUES IN AFRICA, AND TO DETAIL THE REASONS WHY THE USG COULD NOT ULTIMATELY SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION FORCE TO EASTERN ZAIRE ONCE THE REFUGEES HAD DISPERSED.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
 <^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
 <^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 0817
 <^SSN>0817
 <^SSN>0817

TOR: 970113063329 M2570785

<^TOR>970113063450 M2570788

<^TOR>970113063511 M2570789

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PETERS RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SCOTT SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA0817 0131123-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX8EBA64 MSI7923 021)
 LINE3: O 131123Z JAN 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 131123Z JAN 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2344
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: SCENESETTER FOR A/S MOOSE'S PARIS
 - CONSULTATIONS
 TEXT:

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M(1.06)
 KBH 8/9/2022

////////////////////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////////////////////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000817

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T

STATE FOR AF - A/S MOOSE AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2002

TAGS: PREL, CG, FR

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S MOOSE'S PARIS
 - CONSULTATIONS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
 REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. A/S MOOSE'S JANUARY 15 VISIT TO PARIS, AT THE INVITATION OF THE FRENCH WHO WISH TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS ON MATTERS AFRICAN, PRESENTS AN OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS THE FRENCH ON OUR MOST URGENT CONCERNS. WE WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING SHORT LIST OF KEY TOPICS: FINDING COMMON GROUND IN ZAIRE, RESTARTING A DIALOGUE ON THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE, AND MOVING TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE GREAT LAKES. THE VISIT WILL INCLUDE TWO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CALLS. WHILE WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE FRENCH, OUR BASIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA REMAIN ON PARALLEL TRACKS. THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK TOGETHER. END SUMMARY.

ZAIRE

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AMBASSADOR SIMPSON ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. WE HAVE TOLD THE FRENCH REPEATEDLY, AT DIFFERENT LEVELS AND IN DIFFERENT MINISTRIES, THAT THE USG FIRMLY SUPPORTS THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAIRE AND DOES NOT WANT TO SEE THE ZAIRIAN STATE UNRAVEL.

4. ~~(S)~~ THE FRENCH STILL REGRET THAT THEY FAILED TO CONVINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO LAUNCH A MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE REFUGEE POPULATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE IS LARGER THAN THE U.S. BELIEVES IT IS.

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COMMON INTERESTS

6. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE DIFFERENCES, THE U.S. AND FRANCE HAVE A NUMBER OF BOTTOM LINE INTERESTS IN COMMON IN ZAIRE: FOREMOST AMONG THESE IS PRESERVING ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INTERNAL STABILITY, AND FACILITATING AS SMOOTH A PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AS POSSIBLE. WE ALSO BOTH WANT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS TO LEGITIMIZE A NEW POLITICAL ORDER. BEFORE THE CURRENT CRISIS, THEY ASKED IF THE USG WOULD PUBLICLY STATE THAT IT WOULD MATERIALLY SUPPORT THE ELECTION EFFORTS IN ZAIRE.

7. ~~(S)~~ WE RECOMMEND STRESSING TO THE FRENCH JUST HOW MANY COMMON INTERESTS WE SHARE IN ZAIRE, AND APPEALING FOR GREATER JOINT EFFORTS TO ATTAIN COMMON OBJECTIVES. ARE THERE TRANSITIONAL SCENARIOS WHICH WE SHOULD BOTH BE ENCOURAGING THE ZAIRIANS TO ACCEPT? WHAT CAN WE DO TOGETHER TO PUT THE ELECTION PROCESS ON TRACK? CAN WE DEVELOP A COMMON STRATEGY FOR HELPING THE GOZ TO REGAIN, BY PEACEFUL MEANS, CONTROL OF THE EAST? THE COMMON AGENDA ON ZAIRE IS A LARGE ONE, AND WE NEED TO REFLECT TOGETHER WITH THE FRENCH ON HOW WE CAN JOIN FORCES IN A MORE CONCRETE FASHION. WE CAN ALSO TELL THEM WHAT WE PLAN TO DO SUPPORT THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. WE ALSO RECOMMEND OFFERING OUR FRANK ASSESSMENT OF KABILA AND THE REBELS, AND DETAILING SUCH CONTACTS AS WE MAY HAVE HAD.

AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE

8. ~~(S)~~ INITIAL FRENCH REACTION TO THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE REMAINS COOL, TO SAY THE LEAST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOME GOF OFFICIALS WERE PUT OFF BY THE SUDDENNESS OF THE APPROACH, BY THE FACT THAT IT APPEARED BURUNDI-SPECIFIC, AND BY THE RATHER FORMAL MANNER (LARGE TEAM APPROACH) IN WHICH IT WAS BROACHED WITH THE GOF. MOREOVER, THEY EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE AT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

SSN: 0817

TOR: 970114062300 M2572332

DIST:

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 171707Z JAN 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 171707Z JAN 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2562
INFO: ////
SUBJ: A/S MOOSE TALKS IN PARIS: ZAIRE
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 001343

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0240-M (1.07)
KBH 8/9/2022

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/07
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, XA, CG, RW, UG, FR
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE TALKS IN PARIS: ZAIRE

1. ~~(S)~~ CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
REASON: 1.5(B).
2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE'S JANUARY 15
DISCUSSION AT THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY FOCUSED ALMOST
EXCLUSIVELY ON ZAIRE. ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR DUPUCH
FULLY AGREED ON THE NEED TO PREVAIL ON ALL PARTIES TO
ESCHEW A MILITARY SOLUTION, SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S.
CONCENTRATE ON RWANDA AND UGANDA, WHILE FRANCE
CONCENTRATES ON ZAIRE. THE TWO ALSO AGREED ON THE NEED TO
PRESS FOR A TRANSITION AND ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE. DUPUCH
ADMITTED THAT POLICY COORDINATION WITH BELGIUM AND THE EU
WAS IMPORTANT, BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST RECONSTITUTING THE
WORD "TROIKA." END SUMMARY.
3. ~~(S)~~ ZAIRE FIGURED HEAVILY IN A/S MOOSE'S DISCUSSIONS IN
PARIS WITH ELYSEE AND QUAI OFFICIALS JANUARY 15. ELYSEE
COUNSELOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS MICHEL DUPUCH LED DISCUSSION
FOR THE GOF. ALL QUAI AND ELYSEE OFFICIALS INVOLVED
DEFERRED TO HIM.
4. ~~(S)~~ DUPUCH'S MESSAGE WAS MORE OPERATIONALLY-ORIENTED
THAN ANY WE HAVE RECEIVED RECENTLY FROM THE GOF ON
AFRICA. ASSUMING CONGRUENT U.S. AND FRENCH VIEWS ON THE
NEED TO STABILIZE ZAIRE, DUPUCH ARGUED FOR ALL-OUT,
PARALLEL GOF AND U.S. EFFORTS TO DEFUSE TENSION IN EASTERN
ZAIRE AND TO PUSH RAPIDLY TOWARDS CREATION OF A
POLITICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND THE HOLDING OF
ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE.

5. ~~(C)~~ IN DUPUCH'S PROPOSED DIVISION OF LABOR, THE U.S. WOULD FULLY EXERT ITS INFLUENCE WITH RWANDA AND UGANDA, SO THAT THESE COUNTRIES CEASE PROVOCATIVE DECLARATIONS AND ACTIONS REGARDING EASTERN ZAIRE. THESE GOVERNMENTS MUST BE TOLD THAT THERE IS NO WAR OPTION IN ZAIRE AND THAT THEY MUST EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT. RHETORIC IS IMPORTANT, DUPUCH INSISTED. DECLARATIONS ARE NEEDED WHICH REVERSE THE IMPRESSION THAT RWANDA WANTS TO REDRAW INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES. "YOU HAVE MILITARY COOPERATION WITH RWANDA AND UGANDA," SAID DUPUCH, "SO USE IT TO TIGHTEN THE VISE."

6. ~~(C)~~ FRANCE WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY DRIVE HOME THE POINT IN KINSHASA THAT THERE IS NO WAR OPTION AND THAT THE GOZ'S BEST MEANS OF RECOVERING THE KIVUS IS THROUGH RAPID POLITICAL REFORM AND ELECTIONS. THE KIVU REBELS LIKEWISE NEED TO BE TOLD THAT THE ROUTE TO KINSHASA IS THROUGH ELECTIONS, NOT FURTHER FIGHTING.

7. ~~(C)~~ FORESTALLING MILITARY ACTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE, DUPUCH SAID, MUST BE OUR HIGHEST COMMON PRIORITY. FORTUNATELY, HE ADDED, THE LIKELIHOOD OF A ZAIREAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IS NIL. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE MERCENARIES IN ZAIRE, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF FRENCH CITIZENS, BUT SAID FRANCE HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM. ON THIS POINT, DUPUCH WAS CATEGORIC: NO FRENCH MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH ZAIRE AND NO GOF CONNECTION TO THE MERCENARIES.

8. ~~(C)~~ AT THE SAME TIME, AN ALL-OUT EFFORT MUST BE LAUNCHED TO SPEED ZAIRE'S POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS. FRANCE THINKS THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION IS PROBABLY TOO AMBITIOUS, PARTICULARLY IN ITS FEDERALIST ASPECTS, BUT IT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH WE MUST PROCEED. MOBUTU'S DECEMBER 31 CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM IN FEBRUARY IS SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE. IT INDICATES HE HAS RALLIED TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEA. WE MUST HOLD ZAIRE TO THIS DEADLINE AND THEN PROCEED QUICKLY TOWARDS ELECTIONS. (DUPUCH ADMITTED THERE WOULD BE SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS REGARDING SEQUENCING AND TIMING OF VARIOUS ELECTIONS, BUT INSISTED THAT THESE SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY.)

9. ~~(C)~~ OUR COMMON TASK, DUPUCH SUGGESTED, IS TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FROM THE U.N. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. A SPECIAL U.N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR ZAIREAN ELECTIONS, A GOOD ADMINISTRATOR, NEEDS TO BE DESIGNATED. SUPPORT FUNDS MUST BE RAISED. (THE USDOLS 250 MILLION COST ESTIMATE FOR ELECTIONS IS FAR TOO HIGH, DUPUCH SAID.) FRANCE IS ALREADY LOBBYING INTENSIVELY WITHIN THE EU BOTH TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF INTEREST AND TO RAISE FUNDS. THE OVERALL EU ATTITUDE, REGRETTABLY, IS ONE OF GENERAL INDIFFERENCE, ALTHOUGH ECU 34 MILLION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY EARMARKED FOR ZAIREAN ELECTIONS. (IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MOOSE, COOPERATION MINISTER GODFRAIN ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE.)

10. ~~(C)~~ DUPUCH EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST MOVE NOW ON THESE RELATED FRONTS. IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE DON'T ENGAGE, NOTHING WILL HAPPEN. (DUPUCH ALSO NOTED THAT POLICY

COORDINATION WITH BELGIUM IS IMPORTANT BUT THAT WE SHOULD NOT RECONSTITUTE THE TROIKA, AS THIS WOULD DRAW SHARP GOZ OPPOSITION.)

11. (X) MOOSE CONCURRED WITH THE "ABSOLUTE NECESSITY" FOR RESTRAINT FROM UGANDA AND RWANDA, BUT ALSO CALLED FOR

RECIPROCAL GESTURES FROM ZAIRE. DUPUCH SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OBTAINING MUCH FROM KINSHASA. FORTUNATELY, THE GOZ HAS NO WAR-MAKING CAPACITY, HE SAID.

12. (X) MOOSE ARGUED THAT WE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO UGANDA AND RWANDA THAT THEY HAVE SOMETHING TO GAIN BY SHOWING RESTRAINT. SOME KIND OF ASSURANCES FROM ZAIRE ARE NECESSARY. MOREOVER, WE NEED OTHER REGIONAL ACTORS TO INFLUENCE THESE COUNTRIES. FOR THAT REASON, WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH U.S. AND FRENCH ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE.

13. (X) DUPUCH ACKNOWLEDGED THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF OTHER ACTORS, EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN, BUT DOWNPLAYED THE PROSPECTS OF THE NAIROBI PLAN. THE U.S. AND FRANCE HAVE HERE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EXEMPLARY COOPERATION, HE SAID.

14. (X) MOOSE SAID THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN DUPUCH'S PROPOSALS WITH WHICH WE COULD WORK. WE CONCURRED ON THE NEED TO ACT QUICKLY. MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE REMAIN IN CONSTANT CONTACT IN THE COMING DAYS. DUPUCH AGREED.

15. (X) COMMENT. DUPUCH'S PROPOSALS NEED SOME FURTHER WORK BEFORE THEY COULD SERVE AS THE BASIS OF A JOINT ACTION PLAN, BUT THEY ARE A PROMISING START. THEY ARE MORE THAN WE HAVE OBTAINED FROM FRANCE PREVIOUSLY.

16. (X) EMBASSY IS DRAWING UP A NON-PAPER FOR DEPARTMENT'S CLEARANCE AND EVENTUAL USE WITH GOF WHICH SUMMARIZES DUPUCH'S PROPOSAL AND IDENTIFIES SOME OF THE KEY QUESTIONS LEFT UNADDRESSED (E.G., A POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF ASSURANCES ABOUT THE SANCTITY OF FRONTIERS, POSSIBLE RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO POLICE FRONTIERS, POSSIBLE USE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND/OR MONITORING MECHANISMS IN EASTERN ZAIRE). WHATEVER ELABORATION OF THE PROPOSAL IS NEEDED, OUR SENSE IS THAT IT COULD BE DONE FAIRLY QUICKLY. JOINT OR PARALLEL U.S./ FRENCH EFFORTS IN ZAIRE, IF AS NARROWLY FOCUSED AS DUPUCH SUGGESTS, NEED NOT UNDERCUT OTHER INITIATIVES UNDERWAY AND MIGHT SERVE TO GIVE THEM ADDED IMPETUS. END COMMENT.

17. (U) OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN A/S MOOSE'S MEETING AND LUNCH WITH DUPUCH INCLUDED: (FRANCE) MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR ROISIN, MFA DEPUTY AFRICA DIRECTOR GERARD, MFA IO DIRECTOR DE GLINIASTY, ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISER CLAVIER, AND (U.S.) AF/C DIRECTOR BAAS, POLMINCOUNS BELLAMY, AND POLOFF MORAN.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1343

TOR: 970117124011 M2578444

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2

SIT: NSC

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 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
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 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2571
 INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3506
 RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: A/S MOOSE'S AFRICA CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS
 TEXT:

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 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.08)
 KBH 8/9/2022

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001353

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/2002
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, XA, NG, NI, AO, SU, FR
 SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE'S AFRICA CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

REF: PARIS 811

1. CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
 REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY. IN SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS JANUARY 15, UNDERTAKEN AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE GOF, AF A/S MOOSE EXCHANGED VIEWS AND SOUGHT COMMON GROUND WITH THE FRENCH ON AFRICA POLICY. SPECIFIC DISCUSSION TOPICS INCLUDED: FINANCING A SETTLEMENT IN THE CAR, THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE, PEACEKEEPING (ACRF AND UNAVEM), SUDAN SANCTIONS, NIGERIA, AND NIGER. (SEPTELS REPORT IN DETAIL THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE CAR AND ZAIRE PORTIONS OF THE CONSULTATIONS.) THE FRENCH PROVIDED MEETINGS AT A HIGH LEVEL, INCLUDING WITH TWO MINISTERS, TO MARK THEIR INTEREST IN IMPROVING U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS IN AFRICA. A/S MOOSE'S BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PRESS THAT "THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN MORE AGREEMENT THAN DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON, AND THAT REMAINS THE CASE TODAY," WAS WIDELY REPORTED. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) AF A/S GEORGE MOOSE, IN HIS JANUARY 15 CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS, MET WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) COUNSELOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS MICHEL DUPUCH, FOREIGN MINISTRY (QUAI) DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN, QUAI DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS JEAN DE GLINIASTY, QUAI CHIEF OF STAFF DENIS BAUCHARD, COOPERATION MINISTER JACQUES GODFRAIN AND SECRETARY OF STATE (JUNIOR MINISTER) FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION XAVIER EMMANUELLI. ZAIRE AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION (REPORTED SEPTTEL), DOMINATED THE ELYSEE DISCUSSIONS AND WORKING LUNCHEON. DISCUSSION OF THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (REPORTED SEPTTEL) PREDOMINATED IN TALKS AT THE QUAI.

UPSTAIRS AT THE QUAI: "WE SHARE YOUR INTERESTS"

4. (✓) FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY CHIEF OF STAFF DENIS BAUCHARD STRESSED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE SHARE THE SAME OVERALL OBJECTIVE IN AFRICA: STABILITY IN FRAGILE ZONES. HE NOTED THE PROBLEMS OF THREE OF THE CONTINENT'S LARGEST STATES: ZAIRE, SUDAN AND NIGERIA, NONE OF WHICH HAVE PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE REGIMES, AND HOW THE BREAKUP OF ANY OF THEM WOULD HAVE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE BOTH PASS CLEAR MESSAGES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, PARTICULARLY TO RWANDA AND UGANDA, THAT A REDRAWING OF BORDERS WAS MOST DEFINITELY NOT IN ORDER. HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD WORK WITH FRANCE TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE GREAT LAKES. A/S MOOSE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT AFRICA HAS IN THE EYES OF SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS TRIP THERE LAST YEAR, AS WELL AS IN THE EYES OF SECRETARY-DESIGNATE ALBRIGHT, WHO HAS ALREADY BEEN THERE A NUMBER OF TIMES. HE NOTED THEIR EFFORTS TO INCREASE FUNDING FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY.

A COOPERATIVE COOPERATION MINISTER

5. (✓) COOPERATION MINISTER JACQUES GODFRAIN, WHOSE REMARKS ABOUT THE U.S. AND AFRICA HAVE BEEN AN IRRITANT IN U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS IN RECENT MONTHS, LISTENED CAREFULLY TO A/S MOOSE'S EXPLANATION OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO SECURE HIGHER LEVELS OF FUNDING FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN AID. GODFRAIN LAMENTED THAT THERE WAS NO UNANIMITY OF OPINION ON FOREIGN AID WITHIN EUROPE, WITH GERMANY FOCUSED FAR MORE ON EASTERN EUROPE THAN AFRICA.

6. (✓) GODFRAIN OFFERED TO BE HELPFUL BY VISITING THE U.S. TO SPEAK BEFORE GOVERNMENT, LEGISLATIVE OR NON-GOVERNMENT AUDIENCES TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA. A/S MOOSE REPLIED WITH THANKS, NOTING THAT SUCH INTERVENTIONS WOULD BE MORE USEFUL THAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS CRITICAL OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.

7. (✓) GODFRAIN STATED THAT MORE CLOSINGS OF U.S. EMBASSIES IN AFRICA WOULD SEND A BAD SIGNAL TO THE CONTINENT. MOOSE STATED THAT THE U.S. HAD CLOSED EMBASSIES IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA, THE COMOROS AND THE SEYCHELLES. HE VOWED TO RESIST FURTHER CLOSINGS, BUT

CAUTIONED THAT THIS IS BUDGET-DRIVEN AND THAT MANY IN WASHINGTON DO NOT UNDERSTAND OUR INTERESTS IN AFRICA. GODFRAIN OFFERED CONTAINING SUDAN AS AN EASILY UNDERSTOOD RATIONALE FOR THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE CAR. A/S MOOSE NOTED THAT FRANCE'S ANALYSIS ON THIS ISSUE COULD BE HELPFUL.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
SSN: 1353
TOR: 970121040901 M2580624
DIST:
SIT: NSC

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE3: O 171736Z JAN 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 171736Z JAN 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2572
 INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3507
 RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: A/S MOOSE'S AFRICA CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/2002
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, XA, NG, NI, AO, SU, FR
 SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE'S AFRICA CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

8. ~~(e)~~ GODFRAIN'S COMMENTS ON FRENCH POLICY IN THE CAR, I.E. THAT IT AIMS TO PROTECT FOREIGNERS AND PRESS TOWARD A MEDIATED SETTLEMENT, DID NOT DIFFER FROM THOSE STATED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. (SEE ALSO REPORT REFTEL.) HE ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO EXPRESS THANKS FOR THE SUPPORTIVE U.S. STATEMENTS ON THE CAR. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE, GODFRAIN NOTED THAT FRANCE ANTICIPATED THAT AFRICAN COUNTRIES (INCLUDING SENEGAL) WHICH WOULD PROVIDE TROOPS FOR A FOLLOW-ON FORCE WOULD SEEK FRENCH ASSISTANCE, AND THAT FRANCE WOULD RESPOND. HE OFFERED NO PRECISE FIGURES. A/S MOOSE DOUBTED THAT ANY AFRICAN STATE WOULD AGREE TO PAY THE COST OF INTERVENTION. HE ADDED THAT A UN FORCE WOULD POSE A BUDGETARY ISSUE FOR THE U.S.

9. ~~(e)~~ GODFRAIN NOTED THAT FINANCING THE CAR ADMINISTRATION WAS AN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT ISSUE. THE FRENCH HAD FINANCED THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND PAID MILITARY SALARIES FOR TOO LONG, AND WHEN THEY STOPPED PAYING, THE COMBINATION OF D AND ETHNIC STRIFE HAD PROVED EXPLOSIVE. GODFRAIN WAS OPTIMISTIC, HOWEVER, THA, IF STABILITY COULD BE MAINTAINED, THERE COULD BE AN IMF AGREEMENT BY THE END OF MARCH WHICH WOULD PUT THE CAR'S ECONOMIC SITUATION ON EVEN KEEL.

ZAIRE AND REFUGEE ISSUES

10. (C) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION XAVIER EMMANUELLI ASKED TO MEET WITH A/S MOOSE TO DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. A LOW-KEY INDIVIDUAL, WHO REMAINS THE HIGHEST-RANKING FRENCH OFFICIAL TO VISIT RWANDA SINCE THE 1994 GENOCIDE, HE STATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TURNED ITS ATTENTION TOO MUCH TOWARD THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, AND HAD TENDED TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THERE ARE STILL HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS DISPERSED IN ZAIRE. EMMANUELLI REGRETTED THAT THE INITIATIVE OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1080 HAD BEEN ABANDONED. HE NOTED THAT FRANCE WAS PROVIDING CONSIDERABLE AID IN KISINGANI. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A NUMBER OF THE REFUGEES ARE UNDOUBTEDLY PARTICIPANTS IN THE 1994 GENOCIDE, BUT THAT THEIR CRIMES CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO THEIR SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.

11. (C) A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE PRESENCE OF AN ARMED FORCE AFTER THE MASSIVE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RWANDA BEGAN WOULD HAVE AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION RATHER THAN ALLEVIATING IT. HE AGREED THAT THE NEEDS OF REFUGEES REMAINING IN ZAIRE OUGHT TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT SAID THAT A SYSTEM OF TRIAGE TO SORT OUT PARTICIPANTS IN GENOCIDE, AS WELL AS A WAY TO CONTINUE RETURNS TO RWANDA, WAS STILL NEEDED. HE NOTED THAT THE RWANDANS WERE FIRST CRITICIZED FOR MOVING TOO SLOWLY IN PROSECUTING THOSE ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE, BUT NOW ARE CRITICIZED FOR MOVING TOO FAST.

12. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING, QUAI INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFAIRS DIRECTOR JEAN DE GLINIASTY ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF EASTERN ZAIRE, INQUIRING WHETHER, IN THE U.S. VIEW, UNSC RESOLUTIONS 1078 AND 1080 HAVE ANY CONTINUING VITALITY. HE NOTED THAT THE GOF FELT THE LAST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF 1078 PLACED A CONTINUING OBLIGATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO LOOK TO THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES IN EASTERN ZAIRE "BETWEEN KISINGANI AND THE KIVUS."

13. (C) A/S MOOSE DECLINED COMMENT ON THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF ANY PARTICULAR RESOLUTION, BUT SAID THAT THE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN EASTERN ZAIRE REMAIN A PROBLEM, AND THAT THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. HE SAID THAT THE TIME FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ACTION THERE WAS OVER, AND THAT THE USG WOULD WAIT TO HEAR WHAT PROPOSITIONS HUMANITARIAN NGO'S WOULD MAKE ABOUT HOW TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THOSE IN NEED IN EASTERN ZAIRE.

PEACEKEEPING: ACRF AND UNAVEM

14. (C) ANTICIPATING THE UPCOMING VISIT TO PARIS OF ACRF COORDINATOR MCCALLIE, A/S MOOSE DESCRIBED TO DE

GLINIASTY AND AIDES THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. THINKING AND USG DISCUSSIONS WITH UNSYG KOFFI ANNAN AND OAU SYG SALIM SALIM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. FORESAW IT AS PRIMARILY A CAPACITY-BUILDING EXERCISE FOR AFRICAN MILITARIES, AND THAT THE IDEA WAS NOT TO CREATE A NEW ENTITY. HE AGREED WITH DE GLINIASTY THAT SUCH AFRICAN UNITS COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR PEACEKEEPING GENERALLY, AND NOT JUST IN AFRICA. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE SIMILARITY OF THE ACRF CONCEPT TO ALREADY-EXISTING UN CONCEPTS, SUCH AS RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES AND STANDBY ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 001353

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/2002

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, XA, NG, NI, AO, SU, FR

SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE'S AFRICA CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

FORCES ARRANGEMENTS. HE ENCOURAGED HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO PURSUE THESE THEMES WITH ACRF COORDINATOR MCCALLIE.

15. ~~(S)~~ CONCERNING ANGOLA, DE GLINIASTY INQUIRED WHETHER THE USG SAW UNAVEM AS EVENTUALLY WINDING DOWN COMPLETELY. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE USG REMAINS QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE IN ANGOLA. HE NOTED THAT SRSG BEYE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME SORT OF FOLLOW-UP FORCE TO UNAVEM. THE USG HAS ASKED BEYE FOR A FULLER PRESENTATION OF THIS CONCEPT, AND MAY BE FAVORABLY INCLINED IF HE MAKES A REASONABLE PROPOSAL, WHICH WE AWAIT.

SUDAN SANCTIONS

16. ~~(S)~~ DE GLINIASTY ASSERTED THAT FRANCE WAS "BOTHERED" BY THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE CURRENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN. HE STRESSED THAT FRANCE'S CONCERNS AROSE FROM QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE ABOUT THE MATTER OF IMPOSING AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS, AND NOT FROM ANY PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT, WHOSE BEHAVIOR HE DESCRIBED AS "INDEFENSIBLE."

17. ~~(S)~~ FRANCE, DE GLINIASTY EXPLAINED, WOULD PREFER SANCTIONS THAT HAVE CLEAR TERMINATION CRITERIA, EITHER IN THE FORM OF SET DATE FOR AUTOMATIC EXPIRATION, OR IN THE FORM OF CLEAR OBJECTIVE CRITERIA THAT MUST BE MET IN ORDER TO END SANCTIONS. THE CRITERIA THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS IMPOSED IN THE CASE OF SUDAN REQUIRE IT TO STOP SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND TO EXTRADITE THE SUSPECTS IN THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK. DE GLINIASTY SAID THESE WERE CRITERIA WERE "POLITICAL" RATHER THAN OBJECTIVE. SUDAN CLAIMS IT DOES NOT SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TO FIND OTHERWISE REQUIRES A POLITICAL JUDGMENT. IT ALSO CLAIMS THAT THE SUSPECTS HAVE FLED FROM SUDAN. THE IDEAL SYSTEM, IN THE QUAI'S VIEW, WOULD BE FOR THE UN TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WITH TIME LIMITS, EVEN RELATIVELY LONG ONES OF A YEAR OR TWO.

THESE SANCTIONS WOULD THEN REQUIRE A POSITIVE VOTE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE THEM, NOT TO END THEM. IN PASSING, DE GLINIASTY MADE THE POINTED OBSERVATION THAT IT SEEMED ODD TO FRANCE THAT ALL CURRENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS ARE DIRECTED AGAINST ARAB COUNTRIES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SECRETARIAT HAS NOT PRODUCED A REQUIRED REPORT ON THE POTENTIAL INTERNAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED SANCTIONS ON SUDAN'S AIRLINE, WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GOF TO TAKE A POSITION ABOUT SUCH SANCTIONS.

18. (S) A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE U.S. HAS AN INTERNAL LAW WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR IT TO REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF SANCTIONS UNTIL SUDAN'S BEHAVIOR CHANGES. HE NOTED THAT U.S. LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELD GENERALLY OPPOSE SANCTIONS THAT SIMPLY EXPIRE OF THEIR OWN ACCORD. THE U.S. HAS A LONGSTANDING OPPOSITION TO IMPOSING ARBITRARY TIME LIMITS ON UN SANCTIONS. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO REEXAMINE WHAT PRECISE STEPS SUDAN WOULD HAVE TO TAKE TO END SANCTIONS.

NIGERIA - FOR CONCERTED PRESSURE

19. (S) IN A SEPARATE MEETING AT THE QUAI, AFRICA DIRECTOR ROISIN ASKED WHETHER A/S MOOSE FELT THAT THE RECENT BOMBINGS IN NIGERIA WERE LINKED, AND WHETHER THEY HAVE A POLITICAL ORIGIN. A/S MOOSE SAID THE USG LACKS THOROUGH INFORMATION ON THE BOMBINGS, BUT HAD NOTED NO IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN NIGERIA. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO MANIPULATE THE TRANSITION, AND SENDS CONTRADICTIONARY SIGNALS. AT THE SAME TIME THE OPPOSITION IN EXILE HAS BEGUN TO ORGANIZE, AND SOME, WOLE SOYINKA AMONG THEM, HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT THEY FORESEE REBELLION IN NIGERIA. A/S MOOSE SAID THAT HE REMAINED CONVINCED THAT ALL NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC PARTNERS SHOULD MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT TO MOVE TOWARD A GENUINE TRANSITION. IF NOT, THE RISK OF DISORDER WILL ONLY GROW. ROISIN MADE NO COMMITMENTS.

DIFFERENT VIEWS ON NIGER

20. (S) A/S MOOSE AND ROISIN ALSO DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN NIGER. ROISIN STRESSED THE POSITIVE ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND THE RIGOROUS MANAGEMENT IT NOW ENJOYS. HE REGRETTED THAT THE OPPOSITION HAD BOYCOTTED THE OTHERWISE FREE AND FAIR LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, SAYING THEIR DIFFERENCES OVER THE ELECTION MODALITIES HAD BEEN RELATIVELY FEW, AND THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 001353

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/2002

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, XA, NG, NI, AO, SU, FR

SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE'S AFRICA CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

COMMUNITY HAD BEEN PUSHING FOR PROPER ELECTIONS IN NIGER. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IGNORE THE MANIPULATED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, WHICH ARE THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL DISCONTENT IN NIGER. THE USG DOES NOT DETECT A WILLINGNESS AT THE PRESIDENCY TO TRULY BETTER THE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE COULD TOGETHER DESCRIBE WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIONS WE EXPECT OF BARE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND A HEALTHIER POLITICAL CLIMATE. ROISIN AGAIN MADE NO COMMITMENTS.

COMMENT

21. ~~(C)~~ THIS WAS A PRODUCTIVE DAY IN TERMS OF ATMOSPHERICS AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE. THE GOF CLEARLY WANTS TO IMPROVE OUR DIALOGUE ON AFRICA.

PRESS FOCUS ON COOPERATION

22. (U) A/S MOOSE ENCOUNTERED A REPORTER FROM AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AT THE COOPERATION MINISTRY. IN THE BRIEF EXCHANGE, A/S MOOSE STATED THAT THERE HAD ALWAYS BEEN MORE AGREEMENT THAN DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON (ABOUT AFRICA) AND THAT REMAINS THE CASE TODAY AS IN THE PAST. THE REMARK, WHICH SUMMARIZED THE DAY WELL, WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS.

23. (U) A/S MOOSE DEPARTED PARIS BEFORE THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED.
BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 02 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
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ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
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 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
 RUEHFRS/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG 0608
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 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4254
SUBJ: A/S MOOSE DISCUSSES CENTRAL AFRICA, ACRF WITH
 DUTCH FM VAN MIERLO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.10)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001609

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12958: DECL:1/22/07
 TAGS: PREL, EUN, CG, RW, BY
 SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE DISCUSSES CENTRAL AFRICA, ACRF WITH
 DUTCH FM VAN MIERLO

1. THIS IS STRASBOURG 0026. ENTIRE TEXT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~;
 CLASSIFIED BY STRASBOURG CONSUL GENERAL STEVEN WAGENSEIL,
 REASONS 1.5 (B,D).

SUMMARY

2. AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY GEORGE MOOSE MET ON THE EVENING
 OF JANUARY 14 WITH NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER HANS VAN
 MIERLO, IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, TO DISCUSS AFRICAN ISSUES. MOOSE
 DESCRIBED U.S. VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE GREAT LAKES
 AREA OF CENTRAL AFRICA AND SOUGHT REACTIONS AND ADDITIONAL
 VIEWS OF THE EU PRESIDENCY. BOTH SIDES AGREED THERE IS A
 NEED FOR CONTINUED CONTACTS AND A COORDINATION OF IDEAS AND
 INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY REGARDING THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE.
 FM VAN MIERLO RAISED THE US PROPOSAL FOR AN AFRICAN CRISIS
 REACTION FORCE (ACRF) AND DISCUSSED HOW THAT MIGHT DOVETAIL
 WITH THE EARLIER DUTCH PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID REACTION FORCE
 UNDER UN AUSPICES. A/S MOOSE AGREED TO KEEP THE MINISTER
 INFORMED ON RESULTS OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN
 OFFICIALS. END SUMMARY.

3. VAN MIERLO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY AND

TWO OTHER MFA OFFICIALS; A/S MOOSE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AF/C DIRECTOR BAAS AND STRASBOURG CG WAGENSEIL (NOTETAKER). THE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE IN A MEETING ROOM OF THE STRASBOURG HOLIDAY INN. (THE HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION BEGAN LATE BECAUSE THE MINISTER WAS ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE MIDDLE EAST SPECIFIC JUNCTURE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN SITUATION WHICH CALLS FOR A NEW APPROACH THAT WILL REQUIRE CONSULTATION AND CONCERTATION AMONG INTERESTED PARTIES BOTH IN THE REGION AND OUTSIDE. THERE IS A LIMITED WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN ZAIRE, WITH MOST OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN EASTERN ZAIRE HAVING BEEN SOLVED BY THE REBELS, BUT THAT SOLUTION IN TURN HAVING REVEALED THE INHERENT FRAGILITY OF THE WHOLE ZAIRIAN SITUATION. THE GOZ WANTS TO REASSERT AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY (PROBABLY BY ARMS), BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THEY CAN DO SO WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP. OTHER STATES IN THE REGION HAVE FEARS AND DESIRES AS WELL, AND ALL IS FUELED BY A DYNAMIC OF MISAPPREHENSION AND MISTRUST (E.G., PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS OF GOZ CONTACTS WITH MERCENARIES, EX-FAR AND INTERHAMWE ELEMENTS, AS WELL AS SUDANESE AND POSSIBLY UNITA OFFICIALS).

5. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IN ZAIRE IS A SEVEN-YEAR LACK OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, MR. MOOSE CONTINUED. WITH SERIOUS CONCERNS ON PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S HEALTH, THERE IS A GROWING SENSE OF A VACUUM IN ZAIRE, ESPECIALLY IN KINSHASA BUT ALSO IN THE EAST. THE NEED IS TO FIND A WAY TO FILL THAT VACUUM, TO ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE, LEGITIMATE STRUCTURE WHICH COULD ENSURE A SUCCESSION. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SCHEDULE FOR ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE AND A TRANSITION OF POWER THIS SUMMER. HAVING A CREDIBLE PROCESS WILL LEAD TO A CREDIBLE SUCCESSION. FM VAN MIERLO ASKED WHETHER ONE CAN HAVE A CREDIBLE ELECTION IN WARTIME, THEN CONCEDED A/S MOOSE'S POINT THAT SOMEWHAT FLAWED ELECTIONS UNDER STRESSFUL CIRCUMSTANCES IN BOSNIA HAD AT LEAST STARTED THE TRANSITION MOVING; IN REVERSE, THE QUALITY OF THE SECOND ROUND OF VOTING -- FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES -- WAS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHEN IN FACT THEY TOOK PLACE. MOOSE NOTED IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO PUSH THE REBELS TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS; ONE COULD ARGUE THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD PROVIDE GREATER LOCAL AUTONOMY, WHICH WAS PART OF THEIR AGENDA ANYWAY. IF THEY (AND THEIR BACKERS) ARE SERIOUS, THEY SHOULD SEE THE VALUE IN TAKING PART. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WORK TOGETHER TO THAT END.

6. MINISTER VAN MIERLO ASKED WHETHER NEIGHBORING AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD SUPPORT THIS PROCESS. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LOT OF COORDINATION BY OUTSIDE GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE SURE THEY CAN GET THE SUPPORT OF UGANDA, RWANDA, AND BURUNDI. IF THEY SEE WE ARE ALL OF US SERIOUS ABOUT THIS, THEY WILL JOIN. HE CAUTIONED IT WILL TAKE FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL COMMITMENTS, AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL WILL. RWANDA AND UGANDA ARE THE KEY STATES, BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT THEIR AGENDAS ARE; THEY MAY ONLY DEFINE THEIR REALISTIC GOAL FOR THEM TO EXPECT.

7. THE MINISTER ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH AGREE WITH THIS U.S. POSITION. MOOSE ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT YET KNOW, AS

HE WOULD SEE GOF OFFICIALS IN PARIS THE FOLLOWING DAY. HE WOULD ALSO MEET WITH BELGIAN AND BRITISH OFFICIALS BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON. VAN MIERLO NOTED THAT HE WOULD CHAIR AN EU GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL MEETING ON MONDAY (1/20), AND PLANNED TO PUT THE GREAT LAKES/ZAIRES QUESTION ON THE AGENDA. HE ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT BY A/S MOOSE OF THE REACTIONS BY THE VARIOUS EUROPEAN INTERLOCUTORS BEFORE THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 001609

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12958: DECL:1/22/07

TAGS: PREL, EUN, CG, RW, BY

SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE DISCUSSES CENTRAL AFRICA, ACRF WITH DUTCH FM VAN MIERLO

MONDAY MEETING, SO HE COULD HELP DEVISE A COMMON STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES. HE ENCOURAGED THE U.S. TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH EU ENVOY AJELLO; MOOSE REPLIED THAT OUR VIEWS JIBE 98 PERCENT WITH HIS.

8. AF/C DIRECTOR BAAS FELT THE FRENCH GENERALLY AGREE WITH OUR APPROACH, BUT PROBABLY THINK ZAIRES WANTS TO TRY THE MILITARY OPTION. IF THE U.S. AND EU CAN PUT COLLECTIVE, COORDINATED PRESSURE ON THE GOZ, THE ZAIRIANS WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO TRY THE POLITICAL ROUTE, THROUGH DIALOGUE AND ELECTIONS. IF THAT ROUTE FAILS, THEY CAN ALWAYS FALL BACK ON THE MILITARY OPTION. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE WILL ALSO BE NEEDED ON RWANDA, HE ADDED.

9. THE MINISTER ASKED WHETHER THE REPORTED "ANGLOPHONE/FRANCOPHONE" SPLIT MEANT A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COLONIAL POWERS -- UK AND FRANCE. MOOSE REPLIED IT USUALLY MEANT DIVERGENCES BETWEEN AFRICANS WHO SPEAK ONE WORLD LANGUAGE OR THE OTHER, BUT OCCASIONALLY WAS PERCEIVED (OR PORTRAYED) AS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE. THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS DO NOT HAVE ANY CLEAR SENSE OF WHAT TO DO, EVEN THOUGH THEY WELL UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS. DURING RECENT TALKS IN WASHINGTON, AU SECGEN SALIM SALIM ADMITTED THEY HAVE NO PLAN OR STRATEGY, WHICH MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT EUROPEAN AND US OFFICIALS MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT. ASKED IF WE WOULD PRECLUDE A U.S. MILITARY OPTION, MOOSE REPLIED THAT U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WAS ALWAYS PROBLEMATIC, BUT WAS PERHAPS POSSIBLE IF IT INVOLVED OBSERVERS TO HELP IMPLEMENT A DEAL REACHED FIRST ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

10. THE MINISTER SAID IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO "STIMULATE" THE AFRICAN LEADERS, FOR ANY SOLUTION WILL NEED THEIR AUTHORITY. HE REPEATED HIS INTEREST IN OTHER EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THIS U.S. PROPOSAL. A/S MOOSE STRESSED WE DO NOT HAVE A "PROPOSAL" PER SE, JUST A PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION AND AN IDEA ON HOW TO GET OUT OF IT. HE AGREED TO KEEP THE MINISTER INFORMED ON HIS SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS.

BURUNDI

IS POSSIBLE. THE U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY REPORTS THAT CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE, WITH PROSECUTIONS, RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, ETC. ALL LEADING TO GROWING PESSIMISM. THERE IS

TO BE A MEETING IN TANZANIA AT THE END OF JANUARY WHICH WILL INCLUDE SPECIAL ENVOYS AJELLO, WOLPE AND OTHERS. MOOSE TOLD VAN MIERLO HE FELT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO RELAX THE SANCTIONS AGAINST BURUNDI, EVEN THOUGH THE GOB IS FINDING WAYS AROUND THEM, FOR THEY REMAIN AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL INSTRUMENT. OAU SEC GEN SALIM SAID HE WAS READY TO RECONSIDER SANCTIONS, BUT ONLY/ONLY IF THERE IS MOVEMENT ON ISSUES WHICH CONCERN US ALL.

12. A/S MOOSE CLOSED THIS PART OF THEIR DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION COULD BE EXTREMELY SERIOUS FOR THE ENTIRE CONTINENT. HE PREDICTED THIS GROUP OF PROBLEMS WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA FOR THE ENTIRE YEAR. MINISTER

VAN MIERLO

CONCURRED, NOTING THAT MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO WORK TOGETHER WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

ACRF

13. NOTING THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAD EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE AFRICAN CRISIS REACTION FORCE (ACRF) WHEN IT WAS FIRST PROPOSED, HE ASKED ABOUT ITS CURRENT STATUS. A/S/ MOOSE ADMITTED THE CRISIS IN ZAIRE AND THE REGION HAD DISTRACTED THE USG, BUT HAD ALSO PERSUADED WASHINGTON THAT THE IDEA WAS A GOOD ONE. IT WAS NOW TIME TO BEGIN SERIOUSLY CHOOSING AMONG VARIOUS OPTIONS TO MAKE IT WORK: WHO WOULD BE INVOLVED, WHAT WOULD THEY DO, HOW WOULD THERE BE COORDINATION, WHERE WOULD THEY BE ACTIVE, ETC. VAN MIERLO RECALLED THE EARLIER DUTCH PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID DEPLOYMENT BRIGADE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, AND ASKED WHETHER THESE TWO IDEAS MIGHT FIT TOGETHER SOMEHOW. MOOSE STRESSED THE AFRICA-SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE ACRF, ADDING IT WILL TAKE AT LEAST SIX MONTHS TO IDENTIFY WHICH STATES IN AND OUTSIDE THE REGION WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE, AND WHAT RESOURCES THEY COULD BRING TO THE PROGRAM. HE STRESSED IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE THE ACRF IN SIX MONTHS, IF THE DECISION WAS TAKEN. THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST FROM ETHIOPIA, UGANDA, TANZANIA, TUNISIA, EGYPT 9WHICH COULD PRESENT PROBLEMSO, MALI, AND SENEGAL; SADCC IS ALSO INTERESTED, BUT NNEDS A GROUP DECISION. AMB. MACALLIE WOULD BE COMING TO EUROPE AT THE END OF JANUARY FOR ADDITIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN OFFICIALS.

14. MOOSE AGREED WITH THE MINISTER'S COMMENT THAT WE MUST AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WILL BE "PAYING AFRICANS
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 001609

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12958: DECL:1/22/07

TAGS: PREL, EUN, CG, RW, BY

SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE DISCUSSES CENTRAL AFRICA, ACRF WITH DUTCH FM VAN MIERLO

TO DIE." THIS INITIATIVE WAS AIMED AT BUILDING A PROBLEM WILL BE TO DEFINE A COORDINATION MECHANISM WHICH DOESN'T FRIGHTEN PEOPLE, WHICH DOESN'T BECOME ANOTHER FORCE

IN ITS OWN RIGHTS. IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE WITH THE NORDIC BRIGADE; IT SHOULD BE DOABLE FOR AFRICA, WITH CAREFUL EFFORT.

15. IN CONCLUSION, A/S MOOSE PROMISED TO KEEP THE NETHERLANDS AUTHORITIES INFORMED ABOUT HIS CONSULTATIONS, AND TO WORK WITH THE EU PRESIDENCY ON THESE ISSUES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE MINISTER EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE EFFORT AT COORDINATION.

16. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S MOOSE.
BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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 INFO: RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR JOINT INITIATIVES IN
 - AFRICA

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.11)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001709

EXDIS

STATE FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
 NSC FOR SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/07
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, XA, CG, RW, UG, FR
 SUBJECT: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR JOINT INITIATIVES IN
 - AFRICA

REF: PARIS 1434

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY.
 REASON: 1.5 (B AND D).
2. (S) A/S MOOSE'S JAN. 15 PARIS CONSULTATIONS HIGHLIGHTED SIGNIFICANT COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION. ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISOR DUPUCH OUTLINED TO A/S MOOSE IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL A PROPOSAL FOR PARALLEL U.S./FRENCH ACTION TO EASE TENSIONS IN EASTERN ZAIRE (VIA CONCENTRATED U.S. PRESSURE ON UGANDA AND RWANDA, AND FRENCH PRESSURE IN KINSHASA) AND TO PROMOTE ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE AS A WHOLE. HE ALSO CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE GREAT LAKES. (SEE REFTEL FOR COMPLETE REPORT TO THE DISCUSSIONS.) DUPUCH'S PROPOSALS WERE THE MOST CONCRETE AND ACTION-ORIENTED IDEAS FOR U.S./FRENCH COOPERATION IN AFRICA THAT WE CAN REMEMBER.

3. (S) EMBASSY BELIEVES THE U.S. SHOULD FOLLOW UP QUICKLY ON DUPUCH'S PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY THOSE REGARDING ZAIRE. THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN ZAIRE,

WITH THE GOZ REPORTEDLY READY TO MOVE AGAINST THE REBELS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, MAKES TIME OF THE ESSENCE. DUPUCH'S PROPOSALS ARE A GOOD BASIS ON WHICH TO WORK, BUT IT APPEARS WE NEED SOME CLARIFICATIONS QUICKLY.

4. (X) FOLLOWING IN PARA 6 ARE SOME QUESTIONS WE PROPOSE TO ASK DUPUCH, UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS US OTHERWISE. WE ASK THAT THE DEPARTMENT PROVIDE US WITH ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS WE SHOULD POSE. IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, WE WOULD MEET WITH DUPUCH AND PRESS HIM FOR THE BEST ANSWERS HE COULD PROVIDE ON THE SPOT. OUR REPORT TO WASHINGTON WOULD INCLUDE A REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES DUPUCH PROPOSED, ASSUMING THAT HIS CLARIFICATIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE. (IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO PROMOTE A NEW QUESTIONNAIRE EXERCISE, AND WE WILL PRESS TO GET ANSWERS TO NECESSARY QUESTIONS QUICKLY AND RELATIVELY INFORMALLY.)

5. (X) WE REALIZE THAT OTHER ACTORS, BESIDES THE U.S. AND FRANCE, HAVE A LARGE STAKE IN BRINGING STABILITY TO ZAIRE AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION. THEIR NEEDS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION ARGUES FOR A DESCREET EFFORT BY THE TWO KEY WESTERN PLAYERS, THE U.S. AND FRANCE, CAREFULLY FOCUSED ON DEFUSING TENSIONS IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THIS COULD SERVE AS AN IMPETUS FOR POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT BY OTHER, BUT THE OPPORTUNITY COULD BE LOST IF WE TRIED TOO HARD AND TOO LONG TO STRUCTURE A BROADLY INCLUSIVE INITIATIVE FROM THE OUTSET.

6. (X) QUESTIONS FOR DUPUCH

EASTERN ZAIRE

--IS GOF WILLING TO DISCOURAGE GOZ STRONGLY FROM USING MERCENARIES TO RETAKE LOST TERRITORY? WHAT IS GOF UNDERSTANDING OF GOZ'S GAMEPLAN VIS-A-VIS MERCENARIES? CAN WE ASSURE KAMPALA AND KIGALI THAT FOREIGN FORCES WILL NOT/NOT SEEK TO RETAKE TERRITORY IN THE EAST?

--WHAT ASSURANCES CAN WE GIVE TO KAMPALA AND KIGALI THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE IN THE KIVUS WILL NOT BE RESTORED? SHOULD WE NOT BE TELLING BOTH ZAIRE AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS THAT WE WILL HELP THEM REACH UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS ON SECURING THEIR BORDERS?

--SHOULD WE NOT EXPLORE WITH ALL PARTIES THE IDEA OF SETTING UP JOINT (ZAIRE/RWANDA/UGANDA) MECHANISMS TO MONITOR THESE BORDERS, PERHAPS UNDER OAU OR UN AUSPICES WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS TO HELP?

ZAIRE ELECTIONS

--HOW MUCH DO YOU ESTIMATE AS A REASONABLE TOTAL DOLLAR FIGURE TO DEVOTE TO ZAIRIAN ELECTIONS?

--CAN WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD PORTRAY ELECTIONS AS A WIN/WIN SOLUTION FOR BOTH GOZ AND REBELS, THAT EACH SIDE STANDS TO GAIN MORE FROM THEM THAN FROM PURSUING A MILITARY OPTION?

--IF THE GOF PRESSES THIS THEME WITH THE GOZ, SHOULD THE U.S. DO LIKEWISE WITH THE REBELS?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 001709

EXDIS

STATE FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
NSC FOR SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/07
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, XA, CG, RW, UG, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR JOINT INITIATIVES IN
- AFRICA

--WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE GOF ON THE ELECTORAL STATUS OF THE BANYAMULENGE? CAN WE AGREE TO PRESS THE GOZ TO ACCEPT THEM BOTH AS CANDIDATES AND ELECTORS?

7. (S) EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT QUESTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE GREAT LAKES SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A U.S. NONPAPER ENCAPSULATING THE U.S. VISION OF HOW SUCH A CONFERENCE CAN TAKE FORM AND THE NEXT STEPS NECESSARY TOWARD ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THIS PAPER SHOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO THE NONPAPER PRESENTED BY THE FRENCH FAXED TO AF/C JANUARY 15. AFTER EXAMINATION OF BOTH PAPERS, WE CAN ASK THE FRENCH ABOUT CONDUCTING JOINT OR PARALLEL DEMARCHES TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE, AND DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 241745Z JAN 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 241745Z JAN 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2767
 INFO: RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0042
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0420
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0676
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4266
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3514
 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 7734
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1191
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0866
 SUBJ: REPORT OF RWANDAN REGULAR FORCES IN ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.12)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 001882

E.O. 12958: DECL:01/24/02
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, RW, UG, FR
 SUBJECT: REPORT OF RWANDAN REGULAR FORCES IN ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 (B).
2. ~~(S)~~ THE FRENCH RECEIVED REPORTS JANUARY 24 THAT RWANDAN REGULAR ARMY FORCES HAVE BEEN SPOTTED "WELL INSIDE" ZAIRE, APPARENTLY TRAVELLING IN TRUCKS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN BUKAVU AND WALIKALE. QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS YANNICK GERARD PHONED POLMINCOUNS WITH THIS INFORMATION LATE JANUARY 24. GERARD REMINDED US OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE'S MEETINGS IN PARIS LAST WEEK, DURING WHICH FRENCH OFFICIALS URGED THE U.S. TO PRESSURE KIGALI AND KAMPALA TO PREVENT PRECISELY THIS KIND OF MILITARY ACTIVITY.
3. ~~(S)~~ GERARD WAS UNABLE TO STATE THE SIZE OF THE RWANDAN FORCE. HE AGREED THAT, IF CONFIRMED, RWANDAN ACTIONS WERE DOUBTLESS A REPOSENSE TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE WHICH THE GOZ HAS ANNOUNCED.
4. ~~(S)~~ POLMINCOUNS SAID WE HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF GOF PROPOSALS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE. WE HOPED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE GOF VERY SOON WITH FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT HOW WE SEE PARALLEL GOF AND U.S. DEMARCHES PRCEEDING. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE COUNSELINGRESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES.

POLMINCOUNS ADDED THAT WE EXPECTED THE GOF TO BE DOING
LIKEWISE IN KINSHSA.

5. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT. GERARD'S CALL WAS DOUBTLESS ORDERED FROM
HIGHER QUAI AND/OR ELYSEE LEVELS AND WAS MEANT AS A
REMINDER TO US TO LEAN MORE HEAVILY ON THE RWANDAN
GOVERNMENT. END COMMENT.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1882

TOR: 970124125858 M2587042

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA2297 0291720-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 291720Z JAN 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 291720Z JAN 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2895
INFO: RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0048
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0683
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0421
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//PLAD
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3517
 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 7735
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0870
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1192
SUBJ: EASTERN ZAIRE CONFLICT: FRENCH APPEAL TO U.S.
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 002297

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.13)
 KBH 8/9/2022

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/02
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, RW, UG, FR
 SUBJECT: EASTERN ZAIRE CONFLICT: FRENCH APPEAL TO U.S.

REF: A) STATE 16295 B) PARIS 1882

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (U) IN A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR JANUARY 29, ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC COUNSELOR LEVITTE SAID FRANCE HAD "CLEAR INDICATIONS" THAT THE FIGHTING IN EASTERN ZAIRE WAS LIKELY TO WORSEN IN COMING DAYS, A PROSPECT WHICH HE CALLED "EXTREMELY WORRISOME." LEVITTE APPEALED FOR THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH RWANDA AND UGANDA TO CALM THE SITUATION. HE NOTED "GOOD COOPERATION" BETWEEN GOF INTERLOCUTORS AND AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE AND URGED THAT THE U.S. AND GOF CONTINUE EXCHANGING INFORMATION AND IDEAS ON HOW TO CONTAIN THE CONFLICT.

3. (U) COMMENT. SEPTTEL WILL REPORT OUR DISCUSSION OF ZAIRE JANUARY 28 WITH ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISER DUPUCH. DUPUCH CONVEYED GOF CONCERNS, BASED ON INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH HE ADMITTED ARE NOT YET FULLY EVALUATED, THAT QUANTITIES OF U.S.-MADE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED RECENTLY TO THE KIVU REBELS. THESE INCLUDE, HE SAID, MISSILES (ANTI-AIR, ANTI-ARMOR) AND ARTILLERY. DUPUCH ADDED THAT THE GOF HAS "CONFIRMED" EARLIER REPORTS (REFS A & B) THAT REGULAR RWANDAN FORCES HAVE CROSSED INTO ZAIRE,

APPARENTLY TO ASSIST THE REBELS IN REPULSING THE GOZ
COUNTEROFFENSIVE.

4. (S) LEVITTE'S MESSAGE ECHOES DUPUCH'S, BUT AT A HIGHER
LEVEL AND MINUS THE DETAILS. (DUPUCH WAS CAREFUL TO POINT
OUT THAT THE GOF DOES NOT BELIEVE THE U.S. IS ARMING THE
REBELS OR ENCOURAGING OTHERS TO DO SO.) DUPUCH URGED THAT
WE CHECK OUT REPORTS OF U.S.-MADE WEAPONRY REACHING THE
REBELS. END COMMENT.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2297

TOR: 970129123351 M2593560

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ VERSHBOW
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA2502 0311804-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 311804Z JAN 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 311804Z JAN 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2993
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SUBJ: ZAIRE: FRENCH ASSESSMENT
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002502

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-17 (1.14)
 KBH 8/9/2022

EXDIS

FOR AF ASST SECY MOOSE AND AF/C BAAS
 WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/07
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PINR, XA, CT, RW, UG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH ASSESSMENT

REFS: A/ KIGALI 435 B/ STATE 15524 (NOTAL)
 - C/ PARIS 1709 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
 REASON: 1.5 (B) (D).

 SUMMARY

2. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE GOOD EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ON ZAIRE
 WITH PRESIDENTIAL AFRICA COUNSELOR DUPUCH, WE DETECT
 LIMITED GOF INTEREST IN CREATING A MORE PRECISE FRAMEWORK
 FOR PARALLEL U.S. AND FRENCH ACTION VIS-A-VIS ZAIRE AND
 THE REGION. DUPUCH'S FOCUS IS BROADER: COORDINATED U.S.
 AND GOF MESSAGES TO REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, PROMOTION OF
 ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE AND JOINT EFFORTS TO CONVENE A GREAT
 LAKES CONFERENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE REACTED
 SKEPTICALLY TO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE MIGHT
 DEVELOP CEASEFIRE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROPOSALS FOR
 EASTERN ZAIRE AND PRESS THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THEM.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE GOF IS NONETHELESS WILLING TO STEP UP OUR
 EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND TO ZERO IN TOGETHER ON
 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE FOR PARALLEL
 ACTION.

4. (S) IN THAT VEIN, DUPUCH PROVIDED INFORMATION ON FRENCH CONTACTS WITH MERCENARIES IN ZAIRE, AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE GOZ'S BELLICOSE MINDSET AND LIMITED MILITARY CAPACITY. HE ALSO FLAGGED REPORTS OF U.S.-MADE WEAPONRY REACHING THE KIVU REBELS. DUPUCH SUGGESTED THE U.S. PERSUADE UGANDA AND RWANDA TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTIVE OF ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. END SUMMARY.

MERCENARIES

5. (S) IN A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH POLMINCOUNS AND AFRICA WATCHER JANUARY 28, FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) COUNSELOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS MICHEL DUPUCH SAID THE GOF NOW HAS A FAIRLY COMPLETE ACCOUNTING (INCLUDING NAMES) OF THE MERCENARIES UNDER GOZ CONTRACT. THEY NUMBER ABOUT 280, OF WHOM 140 ARE EX-YUGOSLAVS, 23 FRENCH, 20 BELGIAN AND THE REST A MIXTURE OF EUROPEANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS. THE FRENCH CONTINGENT INCLUDES A NUMBER OF FORMER FRENCH ARMY NCOs. (DUPUCH SAID THESE ARE "WHITE" MERCENARIES. HE DOESN'T KNOW HOW MANY "AFRICAN" MERCENARIES MIGHT BE INVOLVED.) IT APPEARS THE MERCENARIES ARE BEING USED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL TASKS WHICH THE FAZ CAN'T HANDLE, AND FOR TRAINING PURPOSES.

6. (S) FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH MERCENARIES AND HAVE ADVISED THEM TO ABANDON THIS "NON-SERIOUS" OPERATION. "SO FAR, THEY'VE LAUGHED IN OUR FACES," SAID DUPUCH. THE GOF HAS NO WAY TO COMPEL THESE FRENCH NATIONALS TO DESIST, BUT WILL CONTINUE TO DISCOURAGE THEM, SAID DUPUCH.

7. (S) THE GOF ESTIMATES THE EFFECTIVE FIGHTING STRENGTH OF THE FAZ AT ONLY 3,000 MEN. DUPUCH SCOFFED AT THE NOTION OF A FAZ "COUNTEROFFENSIVE," WITH OR WITHOUT MERCENARY SUPPORT. WE WILL MOST LIKELY SEE GUERILLA MANEUVERS AND SKIRMISHES, BUT LITTLE MORE. ZAIRIAN FORCES HAVE, HOWEVER, INFILTRATED SMALL GROUPS BEHIND REBEL LINES. THESE INFILTRATIONS ARE YIELDING SOME GOOD INTELLIGENCE WHICH, DUPUCH FREELY ADMITTED, THE FRENCH HAVE ACCESS TO.

ARMS TO THE KIVU REBELS

8. (S) THE LATEST INFORMATION FROM THESE SOURCES IS THAT THE REBELS HAVE RECENTLY ACQUIRED QUANTITIES OF "U.S.-MADE" ARMS, INCLUDING MISSILES (ANTI-AIR AND ANTI-ARMOR) AND ARTILLERY. DUPUCH SAID THE GOF NEEDED MORE TIME TO EVALUATE THE ACCURACY OF THESE REPORTS BUT

WAS NONETHELESS CONCERNED. SUCH WEAPONRY, WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN, WOULD SIGNAL EVEN MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHTING BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND A BIG POTENTIAL BOOST IN REBEL FIREPOWER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 002502

EXDIS

FOR AF ASST SECY MOOSE AND AF/C BAAS
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/07
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PINR, XA, CT, RW, UG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH ASSESSMENT

9. ~~(S)~~ DUPUCH DOES NOT THINK THE U.S. CONDONES SUCH ARMS DELIVERIES BUT SUSPECTS THE UGANDANS AND/OR RWANDANS ARE PROCEEDING NONETHELESS. HE URGED THAT WE INVESTIGATE THESE REPORTS AND REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN KAMPALA AND KIGALI.

WARLIKE MOOD IN KINSHASA

10. ~~(S)~~ WE ASKED DUPUCH ABOUT THE GOF'S COUNSEL TO THE GOZ. HE REPLIED THAT FRENCH ADVICE IS FIRMLY AGAINST PURSUIT OF THE WAR OPTION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ZAIRIANS ARE DUG IN AND REFUSE TO LISTEN. THE RECOVERY OF THE KIVUS, AND OF ZAIRIAN NATIONAL HONOR, HAS BECOME AN OBSESSION. IT EXCLUDES ANY REASONABLE DISCUSSION OF NON-MILITARY OPTIONS. EVERY ADDITIONAL INDICATION THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE AIDING THE REBELS -- I.E. "INVADING" ZAIRE -- ONLY CONFIRMS AND HARDENS THIS RESOLVE.

11. ~~(S)~~ GIVEN THIS ZAIRIAN MINDSET, DUPUCH IS PESSIMISTIC. HE THINKS THERE WILL BE MORE FIGHTING, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE, ALTHOUGH IT WILL PROBABLY BE RELATIVELY LOW-LEVEL AND INCONCLUSIVE UNLESS THE REBELS SCORE IMPORTANT GAINS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE GOF WANTS TO PUSH THE GOZ HARD ON ELECTIONS, WAR OR NO WAR. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY, DUPUCH INSISTED, TO GET THE GOZ TO FOCUS POSITIVELY ON THE FUTURE. AN IMMEDIATE, ALL-OUT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS REQUIRED.

U.S.-FRENCH INITIATIVES

12. ~~(S)~~ WE TOLD DUPUCH WE AGREED FULLY ON THE NEED TO PRESS FOR ELECTIONS, BUT NOT ON HIS FATALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST. WHY NOT JOINTLY USE OUR INFLUENCE TO INITIATE DIRECT, DISCREET CONTACTS BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENTS OF ZAIRE, UGANDA AND RWANDA? IMPOSSIBLE, DUPUCH SAID. THE GOZ WON'T EVEN ENTERTAIN THE IDEA AS LONG AS IT THINKS OUTSIDERS ARE MEDDLING IN ZAIRE.

13. (S) THEN WHY NOT SKETCH OUT SOME PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND SOME MODEST CONFIDENCE-BUILDING STEPS IN THE EAST, WE ASKED? THIS WOULDN'T ADDRESS ALL THE CURRENT PROBLEMS, BUT IT COULD BE A START. UNDER CONCERTED U.S./FRENCH GUIDANCE AND PRESSURE, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DRAG THE PARTIES INTO AT LEAST INDIRECT CONTACT AND DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSALS. WE ARGUED THAT IT WAS WORTH A TRY AND COULD BE DONE WITHOUT UNDERCUTTING OTHER EFFORTS (UN, OAU, ETC.), EFFORTS WHICH HAVE PRODUCED NOTHING THUS FAR.

14. (S) ANOTHER NON-STARTER, DUPUCH THOUGHT. THE PARTIES AREN'T INTERESTED. ALSO, NO MATTER HOW MODEST OUR PROPOSITIONS, WE DON'T HAVE THE COLLECTIVE WILL TO BACK THEM UP WITH AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE ON THE GROUND OR WITH OTHER REAL GUARANTEES.

15. (S) DUPUCH RESISTED FURTHER ARGUMENTS THAT, WITH OUTSIDE SUPERVISION AND SUPPORT, ADVERSARIES HAVE BEEN LED TO POLICE THEMSELVES IN SITUATIONS AS DIFFICULT AS EASTERN ZAIRE (E.G., ANGOLA/NAMIBIA, SOUTH LEBANON). HIS REPEATED RESPONSE WAS THAT ALL STEPS TO RESOLVE THE KIVU CRISIS BEYOND DAMPING DOWN THE CURRENT FIGHTING OUGHT TO BE RESERVED FOR THE GREAT LAKES CONFERENCE. PREPARING THE GROUND FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE OUGHT TO BE UNSYG REP SHAMOUN'S TOP PRIORITY.

16. (S) ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD TRY TO FACILITATE CONTACT BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBELS, DUPUCH SAID KABILA WOULD BE A PROBLEM. THE GOZ WON'T TALK TO HIM, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO TALK TO OTHER REBEL "LEADERS." AS FOR THE BANYAMULENGE, THERE ARE OPEN CHANNELS FOR THEM TO PRESS THEIR CASE WITH THE GOZ. DUPUCH ADMITTED THAT THE BANYAMULENGE NATIONALITY ISSUE WAS ONE THE GOZ WOULD HAVE TO GRAPPLE WITH.

ELECTIONS

17. (S) DUPUCH RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THE ELECTIONS THEME. HE BELIEVES ELECTIONS ARE OUR ONLY HOPE OF
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 002502

EXDIS

FOR AF ASST SECY MOOSE AND AF/C BAAS
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/07
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PINR, XA, CT, RW, UG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH ASSESSMENT

DIVERTING THE GOZ FROM ITS ONE-DIMENSIONAL STRATEGY OF A COUNTEROFFENSIVE. HE ALSO BELIEVES ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD ON SCHEDULE IF BACKED BY A CLEAR POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL COMMITMENT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE EU, HE SAID, IS MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION BY OPENING AN ELECTIONS OFFICE IN KINSHASA AND BEGINNING THE DISBURSEMENT OF EARMARKED FUNDS FOR ELECTION SUPPORT.

18. (S) THE GOF HAS NO PREFERRED ELECTIONS SCENARIO. ELECTIONS COULD OCCUR IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY, OR COULD EXCLUDE REBEL-HELD TERRITORY. THE REBELS, IN ANY CASE, SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE. (THIS WILL BE SAHNOUN'S JOB.) THE FIRST STEP WILL BE A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE APPROVED EASILY. ONCE THE ELECTIONS PROCESS IS LAUNCHED, DUPUCH PREDICTED, IT WILL OPEN A NEW ROUTE TO THE RECOVERY OF A SENSE OF NATIONAL PURPOSE AND PRIDE. IT WILL CHANGE THE CONTEXT INSIDE ZAIRE; IT WILL OPEN UP ALTERNATIVES TO A COSTLY AND PROTRACTED WAR IN THE EAST.

INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES CONFERENCE

19. (S) TO VIRTUALLY EVERY SUGGESTION ON OUR PART ABOUT JOINT ACTION NOW TO ADDRESS THE CROSS-BORDER ASPECT OF THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN ZAIRE, DUPUCH HAD THE SAME ANSWER: CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES CONFERENCE. ALL ROADS TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE INTERTWINED PROBLEMS OF THE REGION PASS THROUGH SUCH A CONFERENCE. ORGANIZING THIS CONFERENCE OUGHT TO BE SAHNOUN'S TOP PRIORITY, DUPUCH DECLARED.

SHORT-TERM ACTIONS

20. (S) IN TERMS OF AN IMMEDIATE BUT LIMITED ACTION PLAN, DUPUCH OFFERED THE FOLLOWING:

-- CONTINUE PRESSING KINSHASA, KAMPALA AND KIGALI TO DISENGAGE IN THE EAST.

-- URGE KAMPALA AND KIGALI TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH RESPECT ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. DUPUCH NOTED IN THIS REGARD ZAIRE'S RECENT DECLARATION THAT ITS COUNTEROFFENSIVE WOULD NOT THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS. (DUPUCH WAS LESS ENTHUSED BY OUR SUGGESTION THAT THE THREE CAPITALS MIGHT ALSO PLEDGE THAT NONE WOULD ALLOW THEIR TERRITORY TO BE USED FOR ATTACKS ON ANOTHER.)

-- PRESS AHEAD IN ALL CHANNELS TO LAUNCH THE ELECTIONS PROCESS AND ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES CONFERENCE.

COMMENT

21. (S)

-- DUPUCH THINKS PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM THE UGANDAN AND RWANDAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH RESPECT ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY COULD HELP IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE IN KINSHASA. THIS STRIKES US AS REASONABLE. SUCH STATEMENTS COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ASKING THE GOZ TO RECIPROCATE WITH FURTHER PUBLIC REASSURANCES VIS-A-VIS ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS.

-- WE AGREE WITH KIGALI (REF A) THAT WE NEED NOT JUMP INTO ACTION EACH TIME THE GOF THINKS IT SIGHTS OUTSIDE MEDDLING IN EASTERN ZAIRE. REPORTS OF HEAVY WEAPONS REACHING THE REBELS, HOWEVER, ARE WORTH INVESTIGATING. IF WE DON'T GET OUR OWN ASSESSMENT TO THE FRENCH, THEY WILL DRAW THEIR OWN, POSSIBLY FLAWED, CONCLUSIONS. ANSWERING THE FRENCH ALSO POSITIONS US BETTER TO GO BACK WITH ANY GOOD INFORMATION WE MIGHT DEVELOP ON GOF LINKS TO THE FAZ OR MERCENARIES.

-- ON MERCENARIES, OUR GUESS IS THAT DUPUCH WAS PLAYING IT FAIRLY STRAIGHT. NO DOUBT THE GOF IS IN CONTACT WITH THEM, AT LEAST THE FRENCH ONES. WE CAN EASILY IMAGINE THAT THE GOF CONSIDERS CONTACTS WITH THE MERCENARIES AND THE FAZ TO BE A VALUABLE SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE. ANECDOTAL INFORMATION ABOUNDS, BUT WE HAVE NO CREDIBLE REPORTS HERE OF ACTUAL FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO THE MERCENARIES.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 002502

EXDIS

FOR AF ASST SECY MOOSE AND AF/C BAAS
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/07
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PINR, XA, CT, RW, UG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH ASSESSMENT

-- WE THINK THE REAL FRENCH POSITION ON ZAIRE IS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SUCCESSFUL GOZ COUNTEROFFENSIVE, IF ONLY TO BE ABLE TO THEN REFOCUS ZAIRIAN ELITES ON THE "BIGGER" ISSUE OF AN ORDERLY AND QUASI-DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS/TRANSITION PROCESS. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE FRENCH DON'T BELIEVE THE ZAIRIANS ARE CAPABLE OF MOUNTING A COUNTEROFFENSIVE, LET ALONE ONE THAT DOESN'T TRIGGER A BIGGER WAR, ONE WHICH THE GOZ COULD END UP LOSING. FOR THAT REASON, WE TEND TO CREDIT DUPUCH'S STATEMENTS THAT THE GOF IS COUNSELING RESTRAINT (IF NOT VERY FORCEFULLY) AND TRYING TO REDIRECT ATTENTION TO POLITICAL REFORM AND ELECTIONS. SO FAR, THIS FRENCH EFFORT SEEMS TO BE GOING NOWHERE.

-- ALTHOUGH DUPUCH CLEARLY PREFERS LOOSER U.S.-FRENCH

COORDINATION ON ZAIRE AND THE GREAT LAKES THAN WE HAD HOPED, WE HAVE AN OPENING TO WORK THIS ISSUE BILATERALLY BETTER THAN WE HAVE IN THE PAST. IN OUR REGULAR EXCHANGES WITH THE GOF, WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT WE CONTINUE TO SHARE LONG-TERM GOALS, THAT OUR EFFORTS IN THE REGION ARE ON PARALLEL TRACKS AND THAT OUR AIM IS COORDINATED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY.

END COMMENT.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 2502

<^SSN>2502

<^SSN>2502

<^SSN>2502

TOR: 970131132240 M2597951

<^TOR>970131132512 M2597959

<^TOR>970131132527 M2597961

<^TOR>970131132527 M2597962

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA3271 0421440-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 111440Z FEB 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 111440Z FEB 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3288
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: ZAIRE REBEL REPRESENTATIVE CALLS AT EMBASSY
 PARIS

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.15)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 003271

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/9/2002
 TAGS: PINR, MOPS, PINR, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE REBEL REPRESENTATIVE CALLS AT EMBASSY
 PARIS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS ERIC
 TERZUOLO, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ GAETAN KAKUDJI, "COMMISSIONER GENERAL FOR
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION -- EUROPE/ASIA/MIDDLE
 EAST -- OF THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE
 LIBERATION OF THE CONGO (I.E. THE REBELS IN EASTERN
 ZAIRE)," ACCOMPANIED BY RETIRED BELGIAN COLONEL WILLY
 MALLANTS AND MAX CAHEN, SON OF THE FORMER BELGIAN
 AMBASSADOR TO PARIS, CALLED ON AFRICA WATCHER AT
 EMBASSY PARIS ON FEBRUARY 6. AS REQUESTED BY AF/C, WE
 HEARD KAKUDJI OUT. CLAIMING TO SPEAK FOR KABILA, HE
 SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE REBELS' ACTIONS AND ASKED FOR
 UNDERSTANDING. AT THE SAME TIME, HE DESCRIBED HIS
 INSURGENT MOVEMENT AS A LIBERATION FORCE THAT WOULD
 DEFEND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAIRE. COL.
 MALLANTS, WHO, LIKE KAKUDJI, CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN
 EASTERN ZAIRE RECENTLY, SAID HE HAD BEEN CLOSE TO
 MOBUTU UNTIL THE MID-1980'S AND HAD LAST SEEN HIM IN
 1993, AT WHICH TIME HE HAD PLEADED WITH MOBUTU TO ALLOW
 POLITICAL CHANGE IN DETERIORATED, MISMANAGED, CORRUPT
 ZAIRE. HE CALLED MOBUTU A PRISONER OF A SYSTEM HE HAD
 CREATED.

3. ~~(S)~~ WE STRONGLY RELATED USG POLICY REGARDING THE
 TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAIRE, AND STRESSED THAT THE
 BEST WAY TO POWER WAS THROUGH THE BALLOT BOX, RATHER
 THAN THROUGH FORCE OF ARMS OR RECOURSE TO FOREIGN
 ARMIES OR MERCENARIES. (NOTE: COLONEL MALLANTS DID

NOT REACT TO THE LATTER STATEMENT.) WE TOLD KAKUDJI THAT THE USG REMAINED CONVINCED THE REBELS OUGHT TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE RATHER THAN DEPEND ON A MILITARY OFFENSIVE. HE RESPONDED THAT THE REBELS HAD TRIED MULTIPLE MEANS OF ENAGAGING THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IN DIALOGUE, THROUGH EMISSARIES, AND "OUTSIDE" FRIENDS. IN KAKUDJI'S OPINION THE GOZ DOES NOT DESIRE DIALOGUE.

4. ~~(S)~~ WE ASKED KAKUDJI IF HE HAD UNDERTAKEN ANY CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE. HE SAID HE HAD, BUT DECLINED TO SPECIFY WITH WHOM, OTHER THAN MAKING VAGUE REFERENCES TO THE "RUE MONSIEUR", WHERE THE COOPERATION MINISTRY IS LOCATED. (NOTE: IN A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR MICHEL DUPUCH THE EVENING BEFORE THE MEETING WITH KAKUDJI, DUPUCH SAID HE WAS UNAWARE THAT ANY REBEL REPRESENTATIVES WERE IN PARIS. END NOTE.)

BELLAMY

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3271

TOR: 970211100135 M2612464

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA3748 0451741-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 141741Z FEB 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 141741Z FEB 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3463
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0157
 SUBJ: HALTING HOSTILITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.16)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003748

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2002
 TAGS: PREL, OTRA, PHUM, PGOV, CG, UG, FR
 SUBJECT: HALTING HOSTILITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA

REF: STATE 26675

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. (S) SUMMARY. IN A FEBRUARY 13 MEETING, QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR ROISIN DESCRIBED FRANCE'S HOPES FOR CLOSER COORDINATION ON ZAIRE AMONG THE U.S., FRANCE AND OTHER EUROPEANS, BEGINNING WITH AN AFRICA DIRECTORS' MEETING IN PARIS FEBRUARY 18. ROISIN SAID THE GOF HOPES WE CAN DEVELOP A COMMON LANGUAGE AND APPROACH TO ZAIRE IN ORDER TO PRESS BOTH THE GOZ AND THE REBELS TO START A POLITICAL PROCESS LEADING TO ELECTIONS. ANY POLITICAL PROCESS IN ZAIRE WILL BE "IMPERFECT," ROISIN SAID, BUT ELECTIONS ARE DESPERATELY NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY. IN ANY EVENT, THIS IS THE ONLY GAMEPLAN THE GOF CAN THINK OF.
3. (S) OUR EXCHANGE WITH WAS ROISIN UNUSUALLY CANDID, CONFIRMING THE NEW FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH US AFRICAN MATTERS, OR AT LEAST ZAIRE AND THE GREAT LAKES, MORE OPENLY THAN BEFORE. END SUMMARY.
4. (S) QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN TOLD CHARGE AND AFRICA WATCHER FEBRUARY 13 THAT THE GOF WANTS TO BRING TOGETHER U.S. AND EUROPEAN AFRICA DIRECTORS TO DISCUSS ZAIRE. THE FRENCH HAVE INVITED THE U.S., UK, GERMANY, SPAIN AND BELGIUM, AND MAY INVITE A FEW OTHERS (E.G. AIELLO IN HIS EU CAPACITY.) ROISIN SAID HE AND FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) AFRICA

COUNSELOR DUPUCH HAD SPOKEN TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE FEBRUARY 12 AND UNDERSTOOD THAT MOOSE WOULD COME TO PARIS FOR THE FEBRUARY 18 MEETING.

5. (S) ROISIN LIKENED THIS GATHERING TO A "CONTACT GROUP" MEETING ON ZAIRE. AS SUCH, IT WOULD PROVIDE A FORUM FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSION AND, HOPEFULLY, SOME DEGREE OF POLICY AND OPERATIONAL COORDINATION. IT SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE SEEN AS THE CREATION OF A "DIRECTORATE" FOR ZAIRE, AND THE GOF WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER ANY PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO IT ALL, ROISIN SAID.

6. (S) FRENCH OBJECTIVES FOR THIS MEETING ARE TO CONFIRM THAT WE SHARE A COMMON ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS IN ZAIRE, TO DISPEL ANY LINGERING DOUBTS AMONG US ABOUT OTHERS' POLICIES TOWARDS ZAIRE, AND TO TRY TO FORGE A COMMON APPROACH TO ZAIRE. THE GOF HOPES WE CAN DEVELOP COMMON LANGUAGE TO USE WITH THE PARTIES IN ZAIRE AND THE REGION, AND POSSIBLY ALSO AGREE ON A DIVISION OF LABOR IN DELIVERING OUR DEMARCHES. ALL OF THIS SHOULD BE SEEN IN TERMS OF PROVIDING UNANIMOUS WESTERN SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE SRSG SAHNOUN, ROISIN SAID.

7. (S) THIS "CONTACT GROUP" MEETING, AND ANY FOLLOW-UP WE MIGHT DECIDE TO GIVE IT, COULD SERVE TO CONVINCING THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS AND THE REBELS THAT THERE IS UNANIMITY OF VIEWS AMONG MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE POINT IN TRYING TO EXPLOIT PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES AMONG US. MOREOVER, ROISIN CONTINUED, WE NEED TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE IN TELLING ZAIRIANS WHAT THEY HAVE TO GAIN BY MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: AN END TO EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, SECURE BORDERS, AN EVENTUAL RESUMPTION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

8. (S) THE GOF REMAINS FIXATED, ROISIN SAID, ON THE DANGER OF "IMPLOSION" IN ZAIRE. SUCH AN EVENT COULD HAVE "UNCONTROLLABLE" CONSEQUENCES INSIDE ZAIRE AND THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THE "RIGHT DIRECTION" FOR ZAIRE, ROISIN SAID, IS TOWARDS A POLITICAL PROCESS LEADING TO ELECTIONS. THIS IS THE ONLY FORMULA THE GOF CAN THINK OF WHICH COULD WORK TO STOP THE FIGHTING, ADDRESS THE GRIEVANCES OF THE REBELS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS AND CREATE A NEW, LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY. ROISIN ADMITTED THAT ANY POLITICAL PROCESS WILL NECESSARILY BE FLAWED. BUT EVEN IMPERFECT ELECTIONS ARE BETTER THAN NONE AT ALL.

9. (S) WE BRIEFED ROISIN ON THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED LAST WEEK (REFTEL), NOTING THAT IT WAS TIME FOR THE GOZ TO TALK TO THE REBELS. HE DID NOT DISAGREE; HE THOUGHT SOME DISCREET CONTACT MAY ALREADY HAVE OCCURRED. ROISIN SAID THE GOF SUPPORTS THE IDEA OF BRINGING THE REBELS INTO THE POLITICAL/ELECTIONS PROCESS. HE ADDED THAT A DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR THE EASTERN PROVINCES, INDEED FOR ALL PROVINCES (AS PREFIGURED IN CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTS), MIGHT BE A GOOD

IDEA AFTER ALL. LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD, ROISIN SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISARM GROUPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE (BOTH REBELS AND EX-FAR), BUT THE GOF HAD NO GOOD IDEAS FOR NOW ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

10. (S) ON THE MUSEVENI VISIT TO PARIS, ROISIN SAID
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TAGS: PREL, OTRA, PHUM, PGOV, CG, UG, FR
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IT HAD NOT YIELDED MUCH. MUSEVENI LEFT THE FRENCH WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS, AT BOTTOM, A MILITANT AND A FREEDOM FIGHTER, NOT YET A REAL STATESMEN. STILL, THE CONTACT HAD BEEN WORTHWHILE.

11. (S) ROISIN SAID THE GOF HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST THE STATE SPOKESPERSON'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. HAD PROOF OF UGANDAN INVOLVEMENT IN ZAIRE. THE GOF, HE CONFESSED, DOESN'T HAVE MUCH HARD EVIDENCE, ALTHOUGH IT IS CONVINCED THAT UGANDANS ARE PRESENT. ROISIN PRESSED FOR ANY INFORMATION WE COULD SHARE ON WHETHER REGULAR UGANDAN UNITS ARE INVOLVED.

12. (S) COMMENT. ROISIN DID WHAT QUAI OFFICIALS DEALING WITH AFRICA RARELY DO: HE ADMITTED THAT THE GOF IS IN A QUANDARY, DOESN'T HAVE ANSWERS, AND WANTS TO FOLD ITS EFFORTS TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF THE U.S. AND OTHER ALLIES. WE WERE STRUCK BY HIS READY ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR TALKS BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBELS. THIS APPEARS TO BE A PROJECT THE GOF WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT IN THE "CONTACT GROUP."

13. (S) WE BELIEVE THE DUPUCH/ROISIN INITIATIVE WAS PROMPTED BY A DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING FEBRUARY 13 ON ZAIRE WHICH CHIRAC HIMSELF CHAIRED. AN ELYSEE SOURCE TELLS US THAT PARTICIPANTS AT THAT MEETING WERE UNABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY NEW FRENCH APPROACHES TO THE ZAIRIAN CRISIS. END COMMENT.

BELLAMY

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 3748
<^SSN>3748

TOR: 970214130731 M2618859
<^TOR>970214130746 M2618860

DIST: SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA3826 0501244-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 191244Z FEB 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 191244Z FEB 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3508
INFO: RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUFNGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//PLAD, PRIORITY
SUBJ: WESTERN SUPPORT GROUP ON ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.17)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 003826

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2002
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, PHUM, FR, CG
 SUBJECT: WESTERN SUPPORT GROUP ON ZAIRE

REF: PARIS 3748 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS CRAIG KELLY, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. (S) SUMMARY. IN FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS IN PARIS, AFRICA DIRECTORS FROM THE U.S., FRANCE, GERMANY, BELGIUM, THE U.K., THE NETHERLANDS AND THE EU AGREED TO BE READY TO FORM A SUPPORT GROUP TO ASSIST THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF SGSR SAHNOUN IN ZAIRE. ALL AGREED ON THE GOALS OF A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, QUIETLY ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE REBELS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, AND CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE DESPITE DIFFICULTIES IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. GREAT LAKES EU REP ALDO AJELLO, FORMERLY SGSR IN MOZAMBIQUE, RECOUNTED HIS EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING ELECTIONS THERE. CONCRETELY, FRANCE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM SAHNOUN OF THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING AND OF WESTERN SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.
3. (S) THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY (QUAI) SPONSORED A FEBRUARY 18 MEETING OF AFRICA DIRECTORS IN PARIS TO DISCUSS ZAIRE, PRIMARILY HOW BETTER TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF ZAIRE SGSR MOHAMMED SAHNOUN. QUAI DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN HOSTED THE MEETING, ATTENDED BY AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY GEORGE MOOSE (ACCOMPANIED BY AF/C DIRECTOR MARC BAAS AND EMBASSY AFRICA WATCHER), GREAT LAKES EU REP ALDO

AJELLO, WHITEHALL AFRICA DIRECTOR RICHARD DALES FROM THE U.K., POLITICAL DIRECTOR FRANS VAN DAELE FROM BELGIUM, AFRICA DIRECTOR GANS FROM GERMANY, NETHERLANDS AFRICA DIRECTOR BERENDSEN (EU PRESIDENCY), AND A SPANISH EMBOFF IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY AFRIA DIRECTOR. THEY MET FOR ABOUT THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS, INCLUDING A WORKING LUNCH. USDEL LATER HAD SHORT SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE AND ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR MICHEL DUPUCH (REPORTED SEPTEL).

4. ~~(C)~~ CONSENSUS EMERGED IN MOST AREAS UNDER DISCUSSION, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

- IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WESTERN NATIONS WORK TO AVOID AN IMPLOSION OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE, AN EVENTUALITY THAT WOULD BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE THAN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

- POLITICAL GOALS IN ZAIRE INCLUDE ACHIEVING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, QUIETLY ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE BETWEEN ZAIRE AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS, AND PRESSING FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE SOON, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT CONDITIONS ARE FAR FROM IDEAL FOR SUCH ELECTIONS. THESE EFFORTS CAN BECOME PART OF THE LARGER EFFORT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, BUT SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED FOR THE CONFERENCE.

- THE BEST MECHANISM FOR CONCERTING WESTERN ACTION IN ZAIRE IS THROUGH A SUPPORT GROUP WHICH COULD BE FORMED AT THE REQUEST OF SGSR SAHNOUN (WHO HAS ALREADY MENTIONED THE IDEA).

- THE SUPPORT GROUP SHOULD SEEK TO PROVIDE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF SGSR SAHNOUN, AS WELL AS FOR OTHER INITIATIVES, SUCH AS THAT OF THE FOUR WISEMEN. (COMMENT. MENTION OF THE WISEMEN IS MOSTLY TO AVOID APPEARANCE OF IGNORING AFRICANS. NO ONE EXPECTS THEM TO BE EFFECTIVE IN A SHORT TIME FRAME. END COMMENT).

- THE SUPPORT GROUP COULD SERVE TO REDUCE BASELESS AND UNHELPFUL PERCEPTIONS AMONG THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS, REBELS, AND ZAIRE'S NEIGHBORS THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE WORKING AT CROSS-PURPOSES IN ZAIRE.

- CONCERTED ACTIONS THROUGH THE SUPPORT GROUP DO NOT PRECLUDE BILATERAL ACTION IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL GOALS BY ANY MEMBER OF THE SUPPORT GROUP.

HOW TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE DEALING THE THE REBELS

5. ~~(C)~~ NO PARTICIPANT, OTHER THAN THE U.S., ACKNOWLEDGED ANY CONTACTS WITH THE REBELS. A/S MOOSE NOTED THE U.S. HAS HAD A NUMBER OF CONTACTS WITH KABILA FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENCOURAGING A CEASE-FIRE AND

DIALOGUE, AND TO STRESS OUR HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS. A/S MOOSE ALSO NOTED THAT, ACCORDING TO WHAT SAHNOUN HAS TOLD THE USG, ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAS GIVEN A GREEN LIGHT TO SAHNOUN TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH REBEL LEADER KABILA. THIS WAS NEWS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS. THE BELGIANS CAUTIONED AGAINST REFERRING ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 003826

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TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, PHUM, FR, CG
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TO GOVERNMENT-REBEL TALKS AS "NEGOTIATION", EVEN IF THEY WERE IN FACT NEGOTIATIONS. VAN DAELE SAID USE OF THE TERM WOULD ACT AS A RED FLAG IN KINSHASA. HE SUGGESTED THAT CONTACTS CONTINUE TO BE REFERRED TO AS "DISCUSSIONS", TO WHICH NO ONE OBJECTED. THE BELGIANS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT WHILE WE ALL SHOULD IN FACT STRESS DIALOGUE TO BOTH SIDES, WE SHOULD AVOID TAKING A PUBLIC STAND ON DIALOGUE BECAUSE THIS COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ZAIRIAN POLITICIANS TO ENGAGE THE REBELS. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, WITH THE BELGIANS IN THE LEAD, STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE REBELS BE ASKED TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM TINGI-TINGI AS A PRELIMINARY MATTER IN CONJUNCTION WITH A CEASEFIRE. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD CLEARLY ALSO REQUIRE A RECIPROCAL GOZ ACTION: E.G. DEALING WITH EX-FAR AT TINGI-TINGI.)

6. ~~(S)~~ A/S MOOSE MENTIONED THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR FACILITATING A GOZ-REBEL DIALOGUE. THE USG IS ALSO PRESSING KABILA TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH THE GOZ; WE AWAIT A RESPONSE FROM HIM. SHOULD THIS EFFORT AT BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER BEAR FRUIT, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY INFORM SAHNOUN.

WHO SPEAKS FOR ZAIRE?

7. ~~(S)~~ BELGIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN DAELE AND UE REP AJELLO DISCUSSED SOME OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE INTERNAL ZAIRIAN POLITICAL SCENE. VAN DAELE WAS SURE THE 700-MEMBER TRANSITIONAL PARLIAMENT WILL PROVE AN OBSTACLE TO A POLITICAL TRANSITION, WHICH ITS MEMBERS WILL PERCEIVE AS A LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT. AJELLO NOTED AN UNACCUSTOMED BACK-AND-FORTH BETWEEN PRESIDENT MOBUTU, PRIME MINISTER KENGO AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMENDA IN DEALING WITH HIM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO ZAIRE. IN THE PAST, ALL CENTERED ON MOBUTU EXCLUSIVELY. HE ALSO FELT THAT THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE REBELS IN ZAIRE HAD CHANGED. AFTER AN INITIAL NATIONALISTIC OUTBURST AGAINST THE REBELS, LONG-SIMMERING DISCONTENT IN ZAIRE IS NOW CRYSTALLIZING AROUND THE REBELS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT CORRUPT POLITICAL CLASS. A/S MOOSE NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR THE ZAIRIANS TO ALTER SOMEWHAT ZAIRE'S CURRENT TRANSITIONAL FRAMEWORK BY, FOR EXAMPLE, ADDING REBEL PARTICIPANTS (BUT NOT RECASTING THE WHOLE TRANSITION) TO FACILITATE

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REBELS IN THE ELECTIONS. WHILE NOT DISAGREEING WITH THE NOTION, VAN DAELE CAUTIONED AGAINST MAKING THE REBELS' PARTICIPATION A SINE QUA NON OF ELECTIONS, BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD GIVE THEM AN UNJUSTIFIABLE VETO OVER THE TRANSITION.

AJELLO AND THE MOZAMBIQUE EXAMPLE

8. (S) FORMER AGSR FOR MOZAMBIQUE, ALDO AJELLO, SPOKE FORCEFULLY AND CONVINCINGLY OF HIS EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING ELECTIONS IN THAT COUNTRY IN THE WAKE OF CIVIL WAR. HE STRESSED THAT IF HE HAD BEEN JUST THE SPOKESMAN OF THE UN BUREAUCRACY, HE WOULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE. WHEN IT CAME TO BE KNOWN, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN HE SPOKE TO THE REBELS OR THE GOVERNMENT HE COULD COUNT ON IMMEDIATE AND UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FROM THE WESTERN EMBASSIES IN MAPUTO, HE WAS ABLE TO ACT FORCEFULLY AND DECISIVELY. HE HOPED THE SAME KIND OF SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED TO SAHNOUN. HE NOTED THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE WAS A FAR MORE COMPLEX TASK THAN THE ONE WHICH FACED HIM IN MOZAMBIQUE. HE THEREFORE STRESSED THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND IMAGINATION IN THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDS BY WHOEVER ACCEPTED THE TASK OF OVERSEEING THAT EFFORT FOR THE UN. HE ALSO INDICATED HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN THE JOB.

SANCTIONS, EMBARGOES AND MILITARY TRAINING

9. (S) ROISIN OPENED AN EXCHANGE ON THE ISSUES OF SANCTIONS BY SUGGESTING THAT PERHAPS THE TIME HAD COME TO RELAX EU SANCTIONS ON ZAIRE, AND ALSO TO HOLD OUT THE PROMISE OF FUTURE AID AS AN INCENTIVE TO THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS. THE BELGIANS, NOTING THEY HAVE SPENT A GREAT DEAL ON AID IN ZAIRE, CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO START TALKING OF RENEWING AID, AND THAT SUCH TALK SHOULD BE POSTPONED AT LEAST UNTIL THE KIVU PROBLEM WAS ON THE WAY TO RESOLUTION. THE GERMANS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELAXING EU SANCTIONS, AND MADE A BRIEF SUGGESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING SANCTIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. NO CONSENSUS ON ACTION ON SANCTIONS WAS REACHED.

10. (S) SEPARATELY, ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR LEVITTE DETAILED FRANCE'S THINKING ON HOLDING OUT THE

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2002
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, PHUM, FR, CG
SUBJECT: WESTERN SUPPORT GROUP ON ZAIRE

POSSIBILITY OF RELAXING SANCTIONS AS A PRECURSER TO RENEWING MILITARY TRAINING OF ZAIRIAN FORCES FOR THE ELECTIONS (ALSO SEE SEPTTEL). HE FELT ZAIRE WAS ON THE EDGE OF A PRECIPICE.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

11. ~~(S)~~ IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD ISSUE A BRIEF PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT THE FEBRUARY 18 MEETING, STRESSING SUPPORT FOR SAHNOUN ON BEHALF OF ALL. PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. WOULD PUT OUT AN ADDITIONAL DETAILED STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE BOMBING CARRIED OUT BY THE GOZ, RECOGNIZING THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN CONSISTENT IN CONDEMNING ACTS OF VIOLENCE ON BOTH SIDES.

ATMOSPHERICS

12. ~~(S)~~ THESE MEETINGS CONTINUED A RECENT FRENCH ATTITUDE OF GREATER OPENNESS TO GENUINE POLITICAL DIALOGUE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AS EVIDENCED BY ROISIN'S LAYING A SENSITIVE SUBJECT, SANCTIONS, ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION. THE U.S., BELGIUM AND FRANCE HAD THE MOST TO SAY IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, AT WHICH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS MOSTLY OBSERVED. THE ELYSEE MEETINGS, FOR USDEL ONLY, WERE A LAST MINUTE ADD-ON, WHEN LEVITTE PHONED ROISIN TO SAY HE WISHED TO MEET WITH A/S MOOSE. THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH DUPUCH WAS ROISIN'S IDEA (A FACE-SAVING MOVE FOR DUPUCH). UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, DUPUCH LISTENED MORE THAN HE SPOKE, INDICATING GENERAL APPROVAL OF U.S. EFFORTS TO START A GOZ-REBEL DIALOGUE. HIS ONLY QUESTION WAS WHETHER KABILA WOULD ACCEPT THE CURRENT DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

COMMENT

13. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BACK AND FORTH ON WHETHER DIALOGUE OR CEASEFIRE SHOULD COME FIRST, WHETHER THE TERM "DIALOGUE" OR THE TERM "NEGOTIATIONS" SHOULD BE FAVORED, WHETHER A TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT CEASEFIRE (OR ALTERNATIVELY A "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES") SHOULD BE SOUGHT FROM THE OUTSET, THE TIMING OF VARIOUS STEPS, AND WHICH GOALS SHOULD BE LABELED AS IMMEDIATE, MEDIUM, OR LONG-TERM, THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON OVERALL POLICY OBJECTIVES IN ZAIRE. THE GOAL OF CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PEACE, SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WAS CERTAINLY STRESSED BY THE FRENCH, AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY ALL, ALTHOUGH NO ONE COMMITTED TO A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME, AND THE GERMANS STRESSED THE NEED FOR A "WELL-PREPARED" CONFERENCE WHICH COULD CERTAINLY NOT TAKE PLACE FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THE IMMEDIATE GOAL FOR ALL WAS FOR HOSTILITIES TO CEASE AND A DIALOGUE TO BEGIN.

14. ~~(S)~~ LEVITTE EXPLAINED THAT FRANCE WANTS TO AVOID THE PERCEPTION THAT FRANCE AND THE U.S. CANNOT WORK TOGETHER IN AFRICA. CRISES IN AFRICA UNJUSTIFIABLY SPOIL THE IMAGE OF THE CONTINENT AS A WHOLE. MOREOVER, FRANCE DOES NOT WANT TO FIND ITSELF "TRAPPED" ALONE IN ANOTHER AFRICAN CRISIS.

15. (U) OUR INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE FRENCH-DRAFTED JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FEBRUARY 18 BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AS A RESULT OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORS INFORMAL MEETING ON FEBRUARY 18, 1997.

-AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORS FROM GERMANY, BELGIUM, SPAIN, THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE NETHERLANDS (CURRENTLY HOLDING THE EUROPEAN UNION PRESIDENCY), AND THE EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION MET IN PARIS ON FEBRUARY 18, AT FRANCE'S INITIATIVE, TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS ON HOW TO BEST HELP ZAIRE RECOVER PEACE AND STABILITY.

-THESE EXCHANGES HAVE SHOWN THE VERY WIDE CONVERGENCE OF OPINION. THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE STRESSED THE URGENCY OF CEASING HOSTILITIES AND OF WITHDRAWING ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE PARTICIPANTS CALLED ON ALL PARTIES TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE RESPECT OF THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ZAIRE AND OF ALL OTHER STATES IN THE REGION. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT DIALOGUE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, AND THE CONVOCAION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 003826

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2002
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, PHUM, FR, CG
SUBJECT: WESTERN SUPPORT GROUP ON ZAIRE

GREAT LAKES REGION, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND THE OAU, ARE NECESSARY STEPS TOWARDS THE SOLVING OF THE CRISIS. THE PARTICIPANTS FOLLOW CLOSELY THE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE REGION BY THE FOUR WISEMEN AND BY LEADERS OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

-THE AFRICA DIRECTORS AGREED TO LEND ACTIVE SUPPORT TO THE ACTIONS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN AND OAU SECRETARIES GENERAL, MOHAMMED SAHNOUN, AND TO WORK IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH HIM.

END TEXT.

16. (U) THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY AF/C DIRECTOR MARC BAAS. IT WAS DRAFTED AFTER ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE DEPARTED PARIS.

BANDLER

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<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 3826
<^SSN>3826
<^SSN>3826
<^SSN>3826

TOR: 970219081116 M2623209
<^TOR>970219081132 M2623210
<^TOR>970219081252 M2623211
<^TOR>970219081252 M2623212

DIST: SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS BUJOLD JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA3949 0511136-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 201136Z FEB 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 201136Z FEB 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3558
 INFO: RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUFNGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//PLAD// PRIORITY
 SUBJ: PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR ON U.S. AND
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 003949

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2002
 TAGS: PREL, ECON, ETRD, MOPS, EFIN, FR, NI, NG, SU, CG
 SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR ON U.S. AND
 - FRANCE IN AFRICA

REF: PARIS 3826

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. IN AN IMPROMPTU MEETING FEBRUARY 18, FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR LEVITTE TOLD AF A/S MOOSE THAT FRANCE IS CONSIDERING SENDING AN ENVOY TO ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO MOVE ON GRACEFULLY BY PREPARING A SMOOTH TRANSITION TO MORE DEMOCRATIC RULE. HE SAID FRANCE WAS CONSIDERING SEEKING AN EASING OF EU SANCTIONS ON ZAIRE TO ALLOW FOR THE TRAINING OF A "REPUBLICAN ARMY" IN ZAIRE TO FACILITATE GENUINE ELECTIONS. HE REITERATED PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S DESIRE FOR IMPROVED U.S.-FRENCH COOPERATION IN AFRICA. HE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS WITH A U.S.-PROPOSED "AFRICA INITIATIVE" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DENVER G-7 SUMMIT, SAYING IT OVEREMPHASIZED TRADE LIBERALIZATION, AND MADE NO MENTION OF THE COMMITMENTS MADE TO AFRICA AT THE LYON SUMMIT. A/S MOOSE TOOK THE OCCASION TO DETAIL U.S. DIFFERENCES WITH FRANCE OVER NIGER, NIGERIA AND SUDAN. LEVITTE PLEDGED TO REEXAMINE FRENCH POLICY TOWARD THOSE COUNTRIES, BUT NOTED PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF SANCTIONS IN GENERAL. END SUMMARY.
3. ~~(S)~~ AT THE END OF A FEBRUARY 18 WORKING LUNCHEON OF WESTERN AFRICA DIRECTORS (REF), FRENCH PRESIDENCY

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.18)
 KBH 8/9/2022

(ELYSEE) DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE ASKED TO SEE VISITING AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY GEORGE MOOSE. THEY MET AT THE ELYSEE FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES. AF/C DIRECTOR MARC BAAS AND EMBASSY AFRICA WATCHER ACCOMPANIED. LEVITTE ASKED ABOUT THE EARLIER MEETINGS AND WANTED TO KNOW IF THERE WERE MAJOR DIFFERENCES. A/S MOOSE TOLD HIM THERE WERE NO MAJOR DIFFERENCES, BUT THAT SOME QUESTIONS REMAINED ON HOW BEST TO ARRANGE TALKS BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT.

AN END GAME FOR MOBUTU?

4. (✓) LEVITTE SAID IT WAS NEARLY TIME TO SEND A FRENCH EMISSARY (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHOM) TO ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO TELL HIM THAT "IT IS FIVE MIUTES TO MIDNIGHT AND IT IS TIME TO LEAVE". FO SUCH A DEMARCHE TO BE SUCCESSFUL, MOBUTU WOUL HAVE TO BE CONVINCED THAT HE CAN BRING OFF HIS EPARTURE WITH A FLOURISH (IL FAUT LE CONVAINCR QU'IL PEUT REUSSIR SA SORTIE EN BEAUTE). TH OPPOSITION MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT MUST PLAY AN ENLARGD, UNIFYING ROLE, LEVITTE SAID, BEFORE TICKIG OFF THE MORE STANDARD POINTS ABOUT THE NECESSIY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, FOLLOWED BY PESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND LATER LEGISLATIVE AN LOCAL ELECTIONS. HE ADDED THAT MOBUTU HAD BECME INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR IN FRANCE SUBSEQUENT T THE DEATH OF TWO FRENCH ADOLESCENTS HIT BY A CA DRIVEN BY THE ZAIRIAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE LATE AST YEAR.

AN INCENTIVE: TRAINING FOR A "RPUBLICAN ARMY"

5. (✓) INCENTIVES ("CAROTS") FOR MOBUTU HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDDED, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT EUROPEANUNION ARMS EMBARGO ON ZAIRE, LEVITTE CONTINUED. FRANCE MIGHT WISH TO PROPOSE RELAXATION OF THE ARMS EMBARGO TO PERMIT THE RETRAINING OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY. LEVITTE SAID HIS OWN EXPERIENCE IN THE TRANSITION IN CAMBODIA HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES AND OBSERVERS ARE NOT ENOUGH TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR PROPER ELECTIONS: THE LOCAL FORCES HAD TO BE PROPERLY TRAINED AND PREPARED AS WELL. THE ZAIRIAN FORCES MUST BE RECAST INTO A "REPUBLICAN ARMY". HE DOUBTED THE REBELS WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS WITHOUT SOME MECHANISM IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE NEUTRALITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TELL MOBUTU THAT IT WANTED TO RE-START MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE ZAIRIAN ARMY TO THIS END. FRANCE HAD TRAINING, RATHER THAN THE PROVISION OF MUCH EQUIPMENT OR PLANELOADS OF AMMUNITION, IN MIND, SO AS TO BE ABLE TO REMOVE THE "CARROT" FROM MOBUTU QUICKLY IN CASE THE TRANSITION FALTERED FURTHER. A/S MOOSE TOLD LEVITTE THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REFLECT ON THE IDEA.

U.S.-FRENCH COOPERATION IN AFRICA

6. (S) LEVITTE MENTIONED SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S FEBRUARY 17 CALL ON PRESIDENT CHIRAC, AND SAID THAT CHIRAC'S FIRM DESIRE IS TO ENGAGE IN COORDINATED ACTION

WITH THE UNITED STATES IN AFRICA TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND TO DISPEL THE IMAGE OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE IN AFRICA. HE WANTED TO MOVE BEYOND MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PAST. IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE CANNOT WORK TOGETHER IN AFRICA, IT IS ULTIMATELY THE AFRICANS WHO SUFFER THE MOST. IMAGES OF CRISES IN AFRICA UNJUSTIFIABLY SPOIL THE IMAGE OF THE CONTINENT AS A WHOLE, AND HIDE REAL PROGRESS IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

7. (S) MOREOVER, LEVITTE SAID, FRANCE DOES NOT WANT TO FIND ITSELF "TRAPPED" ALONE IN ANOTHER AFRICAN CRISIS LIKE THAT OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. NOTHING HAS REALLY BEEN SETTLED IN THE CAR, LEVITTE OPINED, AND THE REAL PROBLEM LIES WITH THE INTRANSIGENCE OF PRESIDENT PATASSE. UNFORTUNATELY, HE ADDED, EVEN IF THERE WERE NEW ELECTIONS NOW, PATASSE WOULD STILL WIN. FRANCE WANTS TO SEE GOOD GOVERNANCE AND NORMAL ELECTORAL POLITICS TAKE ROOT IN AFRICA. HE THEN LAMENTED THE OCCASIONAL DEARTH OF GOOD CANDIDATES, SUCH AS IN THE CAR AND IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN MADAGASCAR.

AFRICAN PROBLEM CASES: NIGER, NIGERIA, SUDAN

8. (S) A/S MOOSE RESPONDED BY RAISING THE CASES OF THREE COUNTRIES, WHICH, IN THE U.S. VIEW, PRESENT SERIOUS PROBLEMS. A/S MOOSE TOLD LEVITTE THAT HE FELT FRANCE HAD BEEN TOO PRAGMATIC IN ENDORSING FLAWED ELECTION RESULTS IN NIGER, AND THAT THIS PRAGMATISM HAD, UNFORTUNATELY, SENT THE WRONG SIGNAL ABOUT FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY ACROSS THE CONTINENT. IN NIGERIA, A/S MOOSE CONTINUED, THE POLITICAL SITUATION WILL NOT IMPROVE AND THE TRANSITION WILL NOT PROCEED SATISFACTORILY UNTIL NIGERIA'S MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS, INCLUDING FRANCE, TAKE STRONG COLLECTIVE ACTION. SUDAN, A/S MOOSE ADDED, RUNS THE RISK OF BECOMING A MAJOR CENTER OF TENSION, PARTICULARLY FOR ITS NEIGHBORS, UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TAKES A FIRM STAND.

CHIRAC'S DISLIKE FOR SANCTIONS

9. (S) LEVITTE REPLIED THAT HE NOTED THAT SUDAN'S NEIGHBORS WERE INDEED BEGINNING TO TAKE THINGS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO RE-THINK FRENCH POLICY TOWARD ALL THREE COUNTRIES, BUT

POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT CHIRAC DISLIKES EMBARGOES IN GENERAL BECAUSE THE POOREST CITIZENS ARE THE ONES WHO SUFFER. MOREOVER, THE WEST SUFFERS FROM THE IMAGE OF EMBARGOES IMPOSED ON THE ARAB WORLD IN PARTICULAR. FINALLY, HE FELT THAT SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK PARTICULARLY WELL: SADDAM HUSSEIN IS STILL IN POWER NEARLY SIX YEARS AFTER SANCTIONS WERE FIRST IMPOSED, APPROPRIATELY, ON IRAQ. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA HAD ULTIMATELY HAD A GREAT AFFECT.

G-7: AFRICA STILL NEEDS HELP

10. ~~(C)~~ LEVITTE, WHO IS THE FRENCH SHERPA FOR THE UPCOMING G-7 SUMMIT IN DENVER, SAID THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE "AFRICA INITIATIVE" THE U.S. HAD TABLED IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT G-7 SUMMIT. HE SHOWED A/S MOOSE THE WHITE HOUSE NONPAPER ON THE SUBJECT WHICH HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED AT THE SHERPA MEETING FEBRUARY 15 AT BLAIR HOUSE. IN LEVITTE'S VIEW, THE PAPER TENDED TO IGNORE THE COMMITMENTS OF ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA MADE AT THE LYON G-7 SUMMIT. INSTEAD THE PROPOSAL EMPHASIZED ONLY TRADE LIBERALIZATION, ENCOURAGING AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO LOWER THEIR TARIFFS. LEVITTE FELT MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE STILL TOO UNDERDEVELOPED TO THINK ABOUT DROPPING PROTECTION FOR FLEDGLING INDUSTRIES AND ABANDONING CUSTOMS REVENUES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT EVEN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES SUCH AS SOUTH KOREA, STILL HAVE RELATIVELY HIGH TARIFFS. A/S MOOSE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE ISSUE WITHIN THE USG.

COMMENT

11. ~~(C)~~ THIS MEETING WAS THE OCCASION OF A VERY CORDIAL, YET VERY FRANK, EXCHANGE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, SOME OF THEM QUITE CONTENTIOUS. IT IS UNUSUAL FOR LEVITTE TO ASK FOR AN UNPLANNED MEETING IN THIS FASHION, AND WE TAKE IT AS A SIGNAL OF PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S PERSONAL DETERMINATION TO BETTER U.S.-FRENCH

DIALOGUE ON AFRICA, AND TO ENGAGE IN GENUINE POLICY EXCHANGES. LEVITTE PROVIDED VERY USEFUL INFORMATION. HIS STATEMENT OF FRENCH INTENT TO SEND AN ENVOY TO TELL MOBUTU IT IS TIME TO MOVE ON, AND PERHAPS TO PROVIDE TRAINING FOR THE ZAIRIAN ARMY, HAS NOT EMERGED FROM ANY OTHER GOF CONTACTS.

12. ~~(C)~~ IN TERMS OF THE INTERNAL GOF BYPLAY, WE NOTE THAT LEVITTE BYPASSED ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR MICHEL DUPUCH TO SET UP THE MEETING WITH A/S MOOSE, AND THAT QUAI DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN SET UP A BRIEF MEETING WITH DUPUCH TO FOLLOW THE LEVITTE MEETING. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME LEVITTE HAS TAKEN DIRECT ACTION ON AN AFRICA PORTFOLIO, AND UNDOUBTEDLY NOT THE LAST.

13. ~~(C)~~ THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER A/S MOOSE
DEPARTED PARIS.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3949

TOR: 970220071518 M2625011

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PETERS PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

<^DIST>

SIT: HARMON SUM SUM2

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR KERRICK SIT{C2} SODERBERG
STEINBERG

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA4035 0521116-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: P 211116Z FEB 97

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

OSRI: RUEHFR

DTG: 211116Z FEB 97

ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3592

INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SUBJ: FRENCH PRESIDENCY MILITARY CHIEF'S VIEW OF
- ZAIRIAN MILITARY SITUATION

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 004035

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2002

AGS: PINR, PREL, MOPS, CG, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY MILITARY CHIEF'S VIEW OF
- ZAIRIAN MILITARY SITUATION1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DONALD K.
BANDLER, REASON 1.5 A AND B.

2. ~~(S)~~ IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WITH CHARGE FEBRUARY 18, PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S MILITARY ADVISOR, ADMIRAL DELAUNAY, STATED THAT UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI IS DESTABILIZING ZAIRE MUCH IN THE SAME MANNER THAT HE IS DESTABILIZING SUDAN, AND THAT IF THE U.S. AND FRANCE DO NOT DO SOMETHING, THERE WILL BE A DISASTER IN ZAIRE. DELAUNAY ADMITTED THAT THE FAZ WAS WORSE THAN USELESS, AND THAT ITS LOOTING AND MISTREATMENT OF CIVILIANS MADE THE REBELS' TASK EASIER. THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, HE THOUGHT, WAS TO PUSH MOBUTU TOWARDS AN EARLY POLITICAL/TRANSITION PROCESS THAT WOULD BRING IN THE OPPOSITION (TSHISIKEDI). THE ELECTION TIMETABLE ALSO OUGHT TO BE ADVANCED, DELAUNAY SAID, AND THEN WE NEED TO RESPOND TO MOBUTU' MOVES BY LIFTING THE EMBARGO.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4035

TOR: 970221064448 M2627059

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ
SIT: NSC**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.19)

KBH 8/9/2022

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 251836Z FEB 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 251836Z FEB 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0169
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3734
 INFO: RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI IMMEDIATE 0275
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0739
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1205
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0435
 SUBJ: FRENCH PRESIDENCY AFRICA ADVISOR WAFFLES ON
 MOBUTU

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.20)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 004439

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/25/2002
 TAGS: PREL, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY AFRICA ADVISOR WAFFLES ON
 MOBUTU

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS ERIC TERZUOLO, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. ~~(S)~~ WE CALLED ON FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) AFRICA ADVISOR BERNARD DIGUET FEBRUARY 25 TO SOUND OUT THE GOF ON ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S LIKELY ATTITUDE TOWARD EVENTUAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE AND THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. DIGUET WAS EXCEEDINGLY HARD TO PIN DOWN. HE TERMED MOBUTU A "REALIST" ABOUT THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION OF THE FAZ, AND IMPLIED THAT HE WAS PROBABLY READY TO AUTHORIZE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE REBELS, BUT DIGUET ALSO NOTED THE NECESSITY OF ENGAGING OTHER PARTIES IN ZAIRE IN DISCUSSIONS. DIGUET AVOIDED ANSWERING DIRECTLY WHEN WE ASKED WHETHER HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT PRIME MINISTER KENGO SHOULD BE BROUGHT MORE INTO THE PROCESS. DIGUET ALSO RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THE STATE OF MOBUTU'S HEALTH AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS CLEARLY AFFECTING HIM AND HIS JUDGMENT.
3. ~~(S)~~ DIGUET SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN ZAIRE HAD CERTAINLY CHANGED FROM THE OUTSET OF THE CRISIS IN THE EAST, AND IS CURRENTLY SOMEWHAT ACCEPTING OF THE REBELS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT PUBLIC OPINION WOULD LIKELY CHANGE AGAIN SHOULD THE REBELS GET NEAR

KINSHASA; SUCH A SITUATION WOULD BRING GREATER RESISTANCE FROM THE ZAIRIANS. DIGUET LIKENED THE SITUATION TO THAT OF FRANCE IN 1940.

4. (S) REFERRING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS, DIGUET SAID THAT GOVERNMENTS ALWAYS TEND TO ASCRIBE ULTERIOR MOTIVES TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WHEN IN FACT THE MOTIVES ARE QUITE SOUND. WE POINTED OUT AN AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE REPORT OF FEBRUARY 25, DATELINED KINSHASA, WHICH QUOTED "A WESTERN DIPLOMAT" DESCRIBING U.S. EFFORTS TO BRING ZAIRIAN PARTIES TOGETHER IN SOUTH AFRICA AS A CASE OF "A PYROMANIAC BECOMING A FIREMAN". WE REITERATED THAT U.S. POLICIES, GOALS AND AIMS IN ZAIRE REMAIN AS SPELLED OUT BY A/S MOOSE AT THE FEBRUARY 18 AFRICA DIRECTORS' MEETING IN PARIS.

5. (S) WHEN WE ASKED DIGUET IF THE GOF HAD HAD ANY CONTACTS WITH MOBUTU SINCE HE ARRIVED IN FRANCE FEBRUARY 21, HE REPLIED: "NONE THAT I KNOW OF." THIS LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME "UNOFFICIAL" CONTACTS, (E.G. A PHONE CALL FROM FOCCART, A VISIT FROM WIBAUX), MAY HAVE OCCURRED. DIGUET SAID MOBUTU'S ARRIVAL FEBRUARY 21 HAD BEEN ON VERY SHORT NOTICE, AND HE UNDERSTANDS MOBUTU'S STAY WILL BE SHORT. DIGUET OPINED THAT, SHOULD MOBUTU'S STAY LENGTHEN, THE GOF WILL LIKELY SEND SOMEONE TO SEE HIM.

6. (S) COMMENT. DIGUET CONVEYED AN UNCHARACTERISTIC SENSE OF GOF UNCERTAINTY. HE WOULD GIVE NO CLEAR STATEMENT OF WHAT THE GOF INTENDS TO DO NEXT WITH RESPECT TO ZAIRE, NOR OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, IT INTENDS TO WHISPER INTO MOBUTU'S EAR. BUT, WHILE UNCLEAR ON THE MESSAGE, HE QUITE DELIBERATELY LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME SORT OF INFORMAL GOF CHANNEL TO MOBUTU. WE WOULD NOTE THAT, WHEN MOBUTU WAS STILL IN THE TROIKA-IMPOSED DIPLOMATIC WILDERNESS 18 MONTHS AGO, FERNAND WIBAUX, THE "UNOFFICIAL" ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISOR AND DEPUTY TO JACQUES FOCCART, WAS SOMETIMES USED AS AN EMISSARY TO MOBUTU.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4439

TOR: 970225134605 M2632511

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES JORDAN MCCORMICK PETERS PRENDERGAST RICE
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA4624 0581745-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 271745Z FEB 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 271745Z FEB 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0171
INFO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3805
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 2678
SUBJ: ELYSEE VIEW ON ZAIRE TALKS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0240-M (1.21)
KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 004624

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/17
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, FR
SUBJECT: ELYSEE VIEW ON ZAIRE TALKS

REF: A. MOOSE-BELLAMY TELCON 2/27/97 B. PRETORIA 1776

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY. REASON:
1.5(B).

2. ~~(S)~~ A/DCM CONVEYED A SLIM AND SANITIZED VERSION OF
THE STATE OF PLAY IN PRETORIA (REF B AND PREVIOUS) TO
ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISER DUPUCH FEBRUARY 27. HE LISTENED
INTENTLY AND OFFERED THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS:

-- NGBANDA UNDOUBTEDLY HAD MOBUTU'S BLESSING LAST WEEK TO
SEEK A CEASEFIRE FORMULA. MOBUTU KNOWS HE HAS NO MILITARY
OPTIONS.

-- NGBANDA'S PROBLEMS ARE IN KINSHASA. MOBUTU'S AUTHORITY
THERE IS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT HARDLINERS FROM
BOXING NGBANDA IN.

-- NGBANDA'S WATCHDOG APPEARS TO BE TSHEMBOMBO MUKUMA,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE SURETE NATIONALE. (DUPUCH DIDN'T
HAVE THE EXACT NAME, BUT WE LATER CONFIRMED WITH QUAI
SOURCES THAT THIS IS WHOM HE MEANT.)

-- WE OUGHT TO TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT THE OAU SUMMIT NOW
UNDERWAY IN TRIPOLI. DUPUCH'S INFORMATION IS THAT THE
SUMMIT, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO DEAL MAINLY WITH FINANCIAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, HAS EITHER AGREED OR IS ABOUT
TO AGREE TO CALL A SPECIAL CHIEFS OF STATE SUMMIT IN

MID-MARCH (O/A MARCH 18), WITH THE SOLE PURPOSE OF XAMINING THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE. A DOZEN OR SO HEADS OF STATE WOULD BE INVITED, REPRESENTING ONE OF THE OAU'S COMMITTEES DEALING WITH REGIONAL CRISES/PEACEKEEPING.

-- DUPUCH THINKS THE GOZ MAY BE TEMPTED TO SHIFT ITS EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE NEGOTIATIONS TO THAT FORUM. IF NGBANDA HAS NO ROOM TO MANUEVER, THIS COULD BE ONE EXPLANATION.

3. (P) A/DCM EMPHASIZED THAT FRANCE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF THE ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS NEED TO WEIGH IN WITH THE PARTIES TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE TIME IS NOW AND THE PLACE IS SOUTH AFRICA. DUPUCH FULLY AGREED. HE SAID HIS FIRST MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO WOULD BE EARLY NEXT WEEK (NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON WHERE OR WITH WHOM). DUPUCH URGED THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

4. (P) COMMENT. OUR SANITIZED BRIEFINGS OF THE GOF, PER A/S MOOSE'S INSTRUCTIONS, HAVE PRODUCED A STREAM OF GOF PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTIVE OF THE SOUTH AFRICA TALKS. DUPUCH, HOWEVER, IS THE ONLY GOF INTERLOCUTOR ABLE TO RECIPROCATE WITH USEFUL INFORMATION. END COMMENT.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4624

TOR: 970227130905 M2636478

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT(C2)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Refutation of Le Monde Article (2 pages)	03/04/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
002. cable	re: Zaire Intervention: France (5 pages)	03/06/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
003. cable	re: French Moderating Tone on Intervention in Zaire (2 pages)	03/13/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
004. cable	re: The "Eyewitness Account" of Massacres in Eastern Zaire (2 pages)	03/13/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
005. cable	re: French Mulling Options in Zaire (2 pages)	03/17/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
006. cable	re: Group to Negotiate with Kabila (5 pages)	03/18/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
007. cable	re: Zaire: A/S Moose's Meeting with French Foreign Minister (4 pages)	03/19/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
008. cable	re: Zaire: A/S Moose's Meeting with French Foreign Minister (3 pages)	03/19/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
009. cable	re: Scenecsetter for March 24-25 Visit to Washington of French Defense Minister Charles Millon (9 pages)	03/21/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
010. cable	re: Zaire: Demarches (3 pages)	03/26/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
011. cable	re: Zaire: Demarches, corrected copy (3 pages)	03/26/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
012. cable	re: Press Report of American "Advisor" Killed in Zaire (2 pages)	03/28/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Zaire and France])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/04/1997 - 04/09/1997]

2017-0240-M
 kh2045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: French on Zaire (3 pages)	04/03/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
014. cable	re: Press Report of American "Advisor" Killed in Zaire (2 pages)	04/04/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
015. cable	re: Tour D'Horizon with French Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, Section 1 of 3 (3 pages)	04/08/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
016. cable	re: Tour D'Horizon with French Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, Section 2 of 3 (3 pages)	04/08/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
017. cable	re: ACRF [African Crisis Response Force] Consultations in Paris (4 pages)	04/09/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Zaire and France])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/04/1997 - 04/09/1997]

2017-0240-M
kh2045

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA4991 0631722-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 041722Z MAR 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 041722Z MAR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3949
INFO: RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0755
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0438
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SUBJ: REFUTATION OF LE MONDE ARTICLE ALLEGING USG
- SUPPORT FOR EASTERN ZAIRE KILLINGS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.22)
KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 004991

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2002
TAGS: PREL, PINR, OPRC, RW, CG, UG, FR
SUBJECT: REFUTATION OF LE MONDE ARTICLE ALLEGING USG
- SUPPORT FOR EASTERN ZAIRE KILLINGS

REF: STATE 37912

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS ERIC TERZUOLO, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. ~~(S)~~ WE RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE APRIL 27 LE MONDE ARTICLE WHICH INSINUATES USG INVOLVEMENT IN REVENGE KILLINGS AND GENOCIDAL ACTS IN EASTERN ZAIRE WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY DEPUTY DIRECTOR (P/DAS EQUIVALENT) YANNICK GERARD, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS. GERARD SAID THAT THE GOF DOES NOT USUALLY REACT TO NEWSPAPER ARTICLES. WE PRESSED HIM, NOTING THAT THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION CLAIMED TO BE BASED ON GOF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. HE SAID THAT THE GOF INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS HE HAD CONTACTED DENIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN THE SOURCE OF THE STORY.
3. ~~(S)~~ IN A SEPARATE MARCH 4 CONVERSATION, FRENCH PRESIDENCY AFRICA ADVISOR BERNARD DIGUET SAID THAT THE ARTICLE HAD UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTED A POOR CHOICE OF WORDS ON THE PART OF EITHER THE JOURNALIST OR HIS SOURCE, AND CERTAINLY DID NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE GOF. HE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM US IF THE ALLEGED GOF SOURCE BECAME KNOWN.
4. ~~(S)~~ WE EMPHASIZED TO BOTH GERARD AND DIGUET THAT THE USG VIGOROUSLY REJECTS ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT IS

ASSISTING ACTS OF REVENGE KILLING OR GENOCIDE IN
EASTERN ZAIRE. WE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT CERTAIN
INDIVIDUALS IN FRANCE SEEM TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE USG
IS AIDING THE REBELS IN EASTERN ZAIRE. WE UNDERLINED
FORCEFULLY THAT THESE ALLEGATIONS ARE ENTIRELY FALSE.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4991

TOR: 970304123220 M2643725

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 061840Z MAR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 061840Z MAR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4044
 INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3553
 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0063
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0904
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0439
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0760
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0173
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//PLAD
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2239
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0417
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1239
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1206
 RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
 SUBJ: ZAIRE INTERVENTION: FRANCE AWAITS UN VERDICT

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.23)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 005252

E.O. 12958: 3/6/07
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, CG, RW, UG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE INTERVENTION: FRANCE AWAITS UN VERDICT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON: 1.5
 (B).

 SUMMARY

2. THE FRENCH ARE SKEPTICAL OF U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS TO BROKER TALKS BETWEEN THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE KIVU REBELS. THEIR SUSPICIONS OF A U.S.-INSPIRED "SECOND TRACK" ON ZAIRE, HOWEVER, HAVE EASED. PARIS' FOCUS IS NOW ON NEW YORK. THE GOF WILL RESPOND QUICKLY AND FAVORABLY TO ANY RECOMMENDATION FROM THE UNSYG NEXT WEEK THAT A MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IS NEEDED IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THEY WILL ALSO TRY TO RALLY OTHER EUROPEANS AND AFRICANS TO THIS RECOMMENDATION.

3. THE FRENCH ACCEPT THAT MOMENTUM TOWARDS INTERVENTION COULD BE SLOWED IF THE REBEL ALLIANCE ACCEPTS UNSCR 1097, AS THE GOZ HAS DONE, AND COOPERATES FULLY WITH

RELIEF AGENCIES IN EASTERN ZAIRE. BUT THEY DOUBT THAT THE REBELS WILL TAKE THESE STEPS. SENIOR LEVEL GOF CONTACTS IRMLY DENY THAT FRANCE HAS ANY INTENTION OR PLAN TO INTERVENE UNILATERALLY IN ZAIRE. END SUMMARY.

4. (S) ON MARCH 6, CHARGE SPOKE TO PRESIDENTIAL SENIOR DIPLOMATIC ADVISER LEVITTE, AND A/DCM MET SEPARATELY WITH PRESIDENTIAL AFRICA ADVISER DUPUCH TO DISCUSS ZAIRE. IN BOTH CONVERSATIONS, THE FRENCH EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN INITIATIVE TO BROKER TALKS BETWEEN THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT AND REBELS. LEVITTE AND DUPUCH BOTH POINTED TO NEXT WEEK'S UN DISCUSSIONS ON ZAIRE AS AN IMPORTANT TURNING POINT AND INDICATED FRANCE WILL STRONGLY SUPPORT A MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE IF THE UNSYG RECOMMENDS ONE.

LEVITTE

5. (S) ELYSEE SENIOR DIPLOMATIC ADVISER LEVITTE TOLD CHARGE THAT THE GOF HAD PUSHED HARD FOR ZAIRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SAHNOUN'S FIVE-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL. LEVITTE URGED THAT THE U.S. DO THE SAME WITH THE REBELS. (NOTE: LEVITTE IS REFERRING TO THE MARCH 5 DECLARATION IN PARIS BY ZAIRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KAMANDA WHICH COMMITS THE GOZ TO UNSCR 1097. TEXT FAXED TO AF AND AF/C. END NOTE.)

6. (S) ONE OUTCOME OF UN DISCUSSIONS ON ZAIRE NEXT WEEK, LEVITTE SAID, MIGHT BE A RECOMMENDATION FOR A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. GIVEN OUR PAST DIFFERENCES ON THIS ISSUE, LEVITTE THOUGHT IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH IN COMING DAYS.

7. (S) CHARGE EXPLAINED WHY WE DON'T SEE A CLEAR NEED AT THIS TIME FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ZAIRE. LEVITTE TOOK THIS ON BOARD, BUT SUGGESTED THAT AT LEAST SOME "MILITARY OBSERVERS" MIGHT BE NEEDED TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN WORKERS WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY. HE RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL FOR DIFFERENT U.S. AND FRENCH POSITIONS OVER OBSERVERS, AND HOPED THE TONE OF THE NEW YORK DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE.

8. (S) CHARGE DISPUTED LEVITTE'S ASSERTION THAT THE KABILA-MANDELA MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA LAST WEEK HAD BEEN U.S.-INSPIRED. THE U.S. HAD COUNSELED AGAINST SUCH A MEETING, CHARGE EXPLAINED, AND REGRETTED THAT OUR ADVICE HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED. LEVITTE APPRECIATED THIS CLARIFICATION.

DUPUCH

9. (S) A/DCM BRIEFED ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISER DUPUCH ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE SOUTH AFRICA TALKS. A/DCM ALSO ASKED FOR GOF VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE INTERVENTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE.

10. (S) DUPUCH WAS TROUBLED BY U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS TO BRING THE GOZ AND REBELS TOGETHER. HE THOUGHT IT RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT FOR SAHNOUN'S EFFORTS. HE ASKED IF THE U.S. WAS PURSUING A "NEGOTIATING SCHEME" DIFFERENT FROM SAHNOUN'S. A/DCM TOLD DUPUCH THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 005252

E.O. 12958: 3/6/07

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, CG, RW, UG, FR

SUBJECT: ZAIRE INTERVENTION: FRANCE AWAITS UN VERDICT

OPPOSITE WAS TRUE: WE WERE TRYING TO HELP LAUNCH AN EFFORT WHICH WAS SAHNOUN'S -- NOT OURS -- TO MANAGE AND BRING TO FRUITION. AT THE EARLIEST STAGES, A/S MOOSE HAD INSISTED SAHNOUN COME TO SOUTH AFRICA. OUR INTENTION WAS, AND IS, TO GET SAHNOUN ENGAGED AND SUPPORT HIM, NOT SUPPLANT HIM. DUPUCH THEN ASKED THREE TIMES IF THE U.S. "REALLY" SUPPORTED SAHNOUN'S FIVE-POINT PROPOSAL. A/DCM AFFIRMED THIS CATEGORICALLY.

11. (S) DUPUCH CALLED ZAIRE'S MARCH 5 ACCEPTANCE OF THE SAHNOUN PLAN A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. IT WAS A "COHERENT" GOZ DECISION, THE FIRST IN MANY MONTHS. IT COMMITTED MOBUTU, KENGO, THE ENTIRE GOZ LEADERSHIP. IT IS ADMITTEDLY BELATED, PROBABLY PROMPTED BY THE DISASTROUS SITUATION IN WHICH THE GOZ FINDS ITSELF, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT NONETHELESS. DUPUCH ASKED: WHAT ABOUT KABILA AND THE REBELS? DO THEY ACCEPT THE SAHNOUN PLAN? A/DCM AGREED THAT IF KABILA WERE SMART HE WOULD DO SO.

12. (S) THE GOF WILL REACT QUICKLY NEXT WEEK TO SAHNOUN'S REPORT AND THE UNSYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON ZAIRE, DUPUCH PROMISED. HE PREDICTED A FEW OTHER EUROPEAN STATES WOULD DO LIKEWISE. WE ASKED IF THIS MEANT THE GOF WOULD CALL FOR A MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. DUPUCH SAID THAT WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY, BUT IT DEPENDED ON THE UNSYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS. HE ASKED IF THE PRESS SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT FEBRUARY 5 ON ZAIRE MEANT THE U.S. OPPOSED AN INTERVENTION AND WAS WILLING TO "LET THE PARTIES WORK THINGS OUT THEMSELVES." A/DCM SAID THE SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT REFLECTED OUR VIEW THAT HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES COULD OPERATE NOW IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THEY DON'T NEED TO WAIT FOR A MILITARY INTERVENTION. OUR STATEMENT ALSO REFLECTED OUR BELIEF THAT A CEASEFIRE SHOULD PRECEDE ANY INTERVENTION.

13. (S) DUPUCH COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WEREN'T REACHING THE REFUGEES IN EASTERN ZAIRE IF, AS THE U.S. SEEMED TO BELIEVE, IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO: "WHAT'S HOLDING THEM BACK?" A/DCM SAID THE UNSYG APPEARED TO BELIEVE GOZ PERMISSION WAS NEEDED. DUPUCH DISCOUNTED THIS. THE GOZ HAS ACCEPTED UNSCR 1097, WHICH SPECIFICALLY CALLS FOR FACILITATING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. DUPUCH THOUGHT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THAT THE REBEL ZONE IN EASTERN ZAIRE WASN'T SAFE. IF THAT TURNS OUT TO BE ANNAN'S CONCLUSION NEXT WEEK, THE CASE FOR A MILITARY INTERVENTION BECOMES MORE URGENT.

14. (S) A/DCM ASKED IF THIS MEANT WE HAD TWOFOLD MESSAGE TO DELIVER TO KABILA: ACCEPT THE SAHNOUN PLAN AS THE GOZ HAS DONE, AND DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REASSURE AND COOPERATE WITH HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN THE EAST. DUPUCH AGREED THAT, WERE THIS TO HAPPEN, THE NEED FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD DIMINISH. "TO THE EXTENT ANYONE HAS INFLUENCE WITH KABILA, IT'S YOU," HE SAID.

15. (S) WE ASKED DUPUCH IF THE GOF WAS CONSIDERING A UNILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION. HE ASKED: "TO HOLD KISANGANI?" IT'S NOT AN OPTION AND NEVER HAS BEEN, HE CLAIMED. "IF WE WERE GOING TO GO INTO KISANGANI, WE'D HAVE DONE IT LONG BEFORE NOW." DUPUCH CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT FRANCE WAS CONSIDERING ANY UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION IN ZAIRE.

16. (S) AS FOR MOBUTU, DUPUCH BELIEVED HE WAS PLANNING TO RETURN SOON TO ZAIRE BUT HADN'T DECIDED PRECISELY WHEN: "WE NEVER KNOW MUCH IN ADVANCE OF HIS FILING A FLIGHT PLAN."

17. (S) A/DCM ALSO STRONGLY REBUTTED DUPUCH'S COMPLAINT THAT LAST WEEK'S MANDELA-KABILA MEETING WAS A U.S.-INSPIRED "DISASTER." WE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD COUNSELED AGAINST THE MEETING AND REGRETTED THAT IT HAD OCCURRED.

COMMENT

18. (S) THE GOF HAS LOST INTEREST IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN INITIATIVE AND SHIFTED ITS ATTENTION TO THE UN. THE FRENCH STILL HAVE SOME DOUBTS, BUT WE BELIEVE WE HAVE DISPELLED SUSPICIONS THAT WE WERE USING THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO OPEN A SEPARATE, SECOND TRACK ON ZAIRE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 005252

E.O. 12958: 3/6/07

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PREF, CG, RW, UG, FR

SUBJECT: ZAIRE INTERVENTION: FRANCE AWAITS UN VERDICT

19. (S) THE FRENCH ARE POISED FOR UN DISCUSSION OF ZAIRE NEXT WEEK. IF SAHNOUN OR ANNAN MAKES ANY KIND OF CASE FOR A MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE, THE FRENCH WILL SEIZE ON IT. IF THAT HAPPENS, THE U.S. WILL QUICKLY COME UNDER FRENCH PRESSURE, PLUS WHATEVER OTHER PRESSURE THE FRENCH CAN MUSTER FROM EUROPE AND AFRICA, TO ENLIST.

20. (S) FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, IT WOULD SEEM THAT KABILA'S BEST MOVE WOULD BE TO ACCEPT THE SAHNOUN PLAN AND TO PROCLAIM PUBLICALLY AND THROUGH MULTIPLE CHANNELS HIS READINESS, NOT ONLY TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO OPERATE IN REBEL-HELD ZONES, BUT TO PROTECT THEM AND FACILITATE THEIR WORK. FAILING THAT, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES ALIGNED WITH KABILA NEXT WEEK IN OPPOSITION (FOR

DIFFERENT REASONS) TO CALLS AT THE UN FOR A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION.

21. (S) FOR THE RECORD, WE RATE AS VERY LOW THE CHANCES OF A FRENCH UNILATERAL INTERVENTION IN ZAIRE. OTHER GOF SOURCES HAVE ECHOED DUPUCH'S DENIALS. A SENIOR ADVISER TO DEFENSE MINISTER MILLON TOLD CHARGE MARCH 5 THAT NO/NO CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF ANY KIND HAD BEEN CIRCULATED AMONG MILLON'S ADVISERS, MUCH LESS PRESENTED TO MILLON HIMSELF. SINCE OPERATION TURQUOISE IN 1994, THE FRENCH HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD TO THE LINE THAT THEY WILL NOT INTERVENE UNILATERALLY IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT POLICY IS CHANGING NOW. END COMMENT.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 5252

<^SSN>5252

<^SSN>5252

TOR: 970306135621 M2652702

<^TOR>970306135637 M2652704

<^TOR>970306135749 M2652707

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ

SIT: NSC

<^DIST>

SIT: HARMON SUM SUM2

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR HELWEG KERRICK SIT(C2) SODERBERG
STEINBERG

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA5861 0721800-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 131800Z MAR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 131800Z MAR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4306
 INFO: RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0442
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: FRENCH MODERATING TONE ON INTERVENTION IN
 - ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.24)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 005861

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2002
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, RW
 SUBJECT: FRENCH MODERATING TONE ON INTERVENTION IN
 - ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. (U) WE DISCUSSED ZAIRE AT LENGTH MARCH 13 WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) AFRICA ADVISOR BERNARD DIGUET, SEEKING TO DRAW HIM OUT ON WHAT EXACTLY THE GOF HAS IN MIND WHEN IT CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN ZAIRE. DIGUET FIRST RECOUNTED THE VISIT TO ZAIRE BY FRENCH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION XAVIER EMMANUELLI. HE SAID EMMANUELLI HAD IDENTIFIED A GROUP OF "25,000 TO 35,000" REFUGEES (MOSTLY YOUNG MEN) "FRIGHTENED, AND TRAPPED" NEAR UBUNDU. THEY ARE IN DESPERATE NEED, ACCORDING TO DIGUET, AND THE GOF BELIEVES A "HUMANITARIAN OPERATION" IS IN ORDER TO HELP THEM. DIGUET WAS CAREFUL TO SAY THAT THE GOF PROPOSES A "HUMANITARIAN ACTION," WHICH HE DISTINGUISHED FROM A MULTINATIONAL MILITARY FORCE. HE SAID THE GOF WOULD BROACH THE IDEA WITHIN THE EU IN BRUSSELS ON MARCH 13.

3. (U) DIGUET SAID THE TASK OF SUCH A "HUMANITARIAN ACTION" WOULD BE TO GET AID TO THE REFUGEES IN NEED AND NOT TO RECONSTITUTE CAMPS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL OAU MISSION OR AN INTER-AFRICAN MISSION. HE WAS VAGUE ON DETAILS, DESPITE OUR QUESTIONING, AND ACKNOWLEDGED A CERTAIN "AMBIGUITY" IN FRENCH PROPOSALS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOF REALLY HAS VERY LITTLE IDEA WHERE OTHER

CONCENTRATIONS OF REFUGEES MIGHT BE. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP IDENTIFIED BY EMMANUELLI MIGHT CONSIST LARGELY OF EX-FAR OR INTERAHAMWE. DIGUET REPLIED THAT THE GOF BELIEVED THAT THE FAR HAD CONSISTED OF 18,000 MEN AT MOST, AND THAT THE ABSENCE OF OLD PEOPLE, WOMEN AND CHILDREN COULD BE DUE TO THEIR HAVE DIED OR FALLEN BEHIND.

4. (U) TURNING TO OTHER ISSUES, DIGUET SAID HE STILL HAS NO IDEA WHEN MOBUTU MIGHT LEAVE FRANCE, BUT BELIEVES MOBUTU IS DETERMINED TO REMAIN HEAD OF STATE UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE. IN DIGUET'S VIEW, MOBUTU IS COMMITTED TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, A COMMITMENT THE FRENCH HOPE REBEL LEADER KABILA SHARES. DIGUET SAID THAT FRANCE WANTS TO SEE PROGRESS ON SGSR SAHNOUN'S FIVE POINTS, AND THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE A STRONG PREFERENCE AS TO WHETHER TALKS BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE GOVERNMENT TAKE PLACE BEFORE OR AFTER AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE.

5. (U) COMMENT: WE SENSE THAT THE FRENCH, HAVING DETECTED LITTLE INTERNATIONAL ENTHUSIASM FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN ZAIRE, HAVE SCALED BACK THEIR PLANS, BUT ARE UNWILLING TO SAY SO. THE TERM "HUMANITARIAN ACTION" (NOT HERETOFORE USED IN THIS CONTEXT) HAS COME UP IN OTHER CONTACTS WITH GOF OFFICIALS MARCH 13. UNBIDDEN, A GERMAN EMBOFF WHO COVERS AFRICA PHONED US TO OPINE THAT FRENCH IDEAS ON WHAT SORT OF ACTION THEY SEEK IN ZAIRE ARE HARD TO DISCERN, A VIEW WE SHARED AFTER THIS LATEST TALK WITH DIGUET.

6. (U) KIGALI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5861

TOR: 970313131859 M2664125

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

<^DIST>

SIT: PETERS VERSHBOW

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA5862 0721801-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 131801Z MAR 97

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

OSRI: RUEHFR

DTG: 131801Z MAR 97

ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4307

INFO: RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0443
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SUBJ: DEBUNKING THE "EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT" OF
- MASSACRES IN EASTERN ZAIRE

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 005862

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2002

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, CG, RW

SUBJECT: DEBUNKING THE "EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT" OF
- MASSACRES IN EASTERN ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS ERIC R.
TERZUOLO, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. (S) SYLVIE COURTOUX, OF THE FRENCH NGO "SURVIE," CALLED AT EMBASSY PARIS MARCH 13 TO SHARE HER THOUGHTS ON THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED "EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT" OF MASSACRES IN EASTERN ZAIRE. HER ORGANIZATION PUBLISHES A RESPECTABLE NEWSLETTER, "BILLETS D'AFRIQUE," AND HAS PUBLISHED A SERIES OF BOOKS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING A NUMBER ON THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA. SHE FOUND THE "EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT" OF MASSACRES IN EASTERN ZAIRE, A REPORT PUBLISHED IN THE FRENCH DAILY "LIBERATION" AND PRESENTED TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, HIGHLY EXAGGERATED. SHE SAID SHE UNDERSTOOD THE INDIVIDUAL, SAID TO BE A MEMBER OF THE "WHITE FATHERS" RELIGIOUS ORDER, WAS NOT REALLY A MEMBER. SHE POINTED OUT DISCREPANCIES IN NUMBERS, THE ANTI-TUTSI BIAS OF THE AUTHOR AND THE RATHER SMALL NUMBERS OF GRAVES THAT THE "EYEWITNESS" ACTUALLY CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN. IN SHORT SHE FOUND THE ACCOUNT HIGHLY EXAGGERATED AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF. SHE UNDERLINED THAT HER ORGANIZATION HAS WORKED HARD TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, AND FOUND THAT THE "EYEWITNESS" ACCOUNT TENDS TO CHEAPEN THE TERM "GENOCIDE". THE "EYEWITNESS" SIMPLY HAS NOT SEEN ANYTHING REMOTELY APPROACHING THE 1994 GENOCIDE.

3. (S) IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.25)
KBH 8/9/2022

PRESIDENCY AFRICA ADVISOR BERNARD DIGUET MARCH 13, HE ALSO EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE "EYEWITNESS" ACCOUNT, NOTING THE SMALL NUMBERS AND SINGLE SOURCING IN NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS.

4. (U) KIGALI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5862

TOR: 970313131915 M2664126

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ WECHSLER
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA5989 0761010-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 171010Z MAR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 171010Z MAR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4359
 INFO: RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1209
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0911
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0781
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: FRENCH MULLING OPTIONS IN ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.26)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 005989

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/17/2002
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, PEF, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: FRENCH MULLING OPTIONS IN ZAIRE

REF: STATE 48404

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS ERIC R. TERZUOLO, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. (C) AS REQUESTED REF, WE CONTACTED FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN MARCH 16 TO ADVISE HIM OF SAHNOUN'S APPARENT SUCCESS IN SECURING KABILA'S AGREEMENT TO THE FIVE-POINT PLAN FOR ZAIRE. WE URGED ROISIN TO USE GOF INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE GOZ TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REBEL ALLIANCE.
3. (C) ROISIN WAS ALREADY AWARE OF KABILA'S AGREEMENT, BUT HE IMMEDIATELY ARGUED THAT KABILA WAS EQUIVOCATING BY INSISTING ON WORKING OUT THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTING A CEASEFIRE. HE NOTED THAT THE GOZ HAD ALREADY GONE A LONG WAY IN ACCEPTING SAHNOUN'S FIVE POINTS UNEQUIVOCALLY. HE TOOK UNDER ADVISEMENT OUR REQUEST THAT FRANCE USE ITS INFLUENCE ON THE GOZ TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS.
4. (C) WE MADE THE SAME POINTS TO FRENCH PRESIDENCY ADVISOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS BERNARD DIGUET MARCH 17. HE NOTED THE GOF IS REFLECTING ON WHAT TO DO IN ZAIRE, AND THAT THE PROBLEM WITH MAKING A DEMARCHE TO THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT AT THIS POINT IS IDENTIFYING A REAL POWER TO SPEAK TO. HE SAID HE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVED

THAT THE GOF WOULD SOON SEND MESSAGES TO THE GOZ ENCOURAGING IT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. THE GOF STILL FULLY SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF SRSG SAHNOUN, AND BELIEVES HE SHOULD TRAVEL TO KINSHASA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT HE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE WITH THE GOZ.

5. (S) DIGUET SAID THE GOF ANTICIPATES THAT THE FALL OF KISINGANI MAY PROVOKE A REACTION FROM KINSHASA, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THERE HAD BEEN NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE FALL OF KISINGANI, OTHER THAN BY THE REMNANTS OF THE EX-FAR, AND THAT THE FOREIGN MERCENARIES HAD FLED. HE SAID THAT THE REFUGEE POPULATION IN UBUNDU IS UNDISCIPLINED AND PANICKED, AND STILL IN NEED OF AID. HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE PERHAPS ONE HUNDRED EX-FAR AMONG THEM. WHEN WE TOLD DIGUET WE UNDERSTOOD INTERNATIONAL RELIEF WAS ALREADY ON ITS WAY TO UBUNDU AS OF MARCH 14, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WAS CORRECT, BUT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF IT HAD ARRIVED YET.

6. (S) DIGUET ALSO SAID THAT ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU, STILL HOSPITALIZED IN MONACO, IS UNDERGOING A "DIFFICULT AND REPETITIVE SERIES OF TREATMENTS", BUT THAT HE IS STILL ACCESSIBLE AND LUCID. HE IS FOLLOWING EVENTS IN ZAIRE CLOSELY.

7. (U) BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5989

TOR: 970317053040 M2668691

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT(C2)

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA6227 0771827-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 181827Z MAR 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 181827Z MAR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4443
INFO: RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0913
 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1210
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0788
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SUBJ: FRENCH WILL PRESS MOBUTU TO NAME A GROUP
 - TO NEGOTIATE WITH KABILA

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.27)

KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006227

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, PINR, MOPS, CASC, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: FRENCH WILL PRESS MOBUTU TO NAME A GROUP
 - TO NEGOTIATE WITH KABILA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D, X5, X6.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY GEORGE MOOSE, IN MARCH 18 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE) SECRETARY GENERAL DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR MICHEL DUPUCH AND FOREIGN MINISTRY (QUAI) DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN, EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE BEST WAYS THE U.S. AND FRANCE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS THE CURRENT CRISIS IN ZAIRE. A/S MOOSE STRESSED TO THE FRENCH THAT THE U.S. VIEWED IT AS A NECESSITY THAT ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU PUBLICLY EXPRESS HIS SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REBEL ALLIANCE AND THAT HE NAME A NEGOTIATING TEAM. THE FRENCH, JUDGING THAT THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE IS CLOSE TO COLLAPSE AND THAT THE EXAMPLE OF A REBEL LEADER TAKING POWER BY FORCE OF ARMS WOULD CREATE AN UNACCEPTABLY DESTABILIZING PRECEDENT FOR AFRICA, BELIEVE THEY CAN CONVINCE AILING ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO GIVE A PUBLIC MANDATE TO A "COALITION" FROM THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LAURENT KABILA'S REBEL ALLIANCE UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF SRSG MOHAMMED SAHNOUN. THE FRENCH MADE IT CLEAR THEY WOULD LOOK TO THE U.S. TO PRESS KABILA TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE IN RETURN. END SUMMARY.

3. ~~(C)~~ A/S MOOSE OPENED THE MEETING WITH ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR DUPUCH BY NOTING U.S. EFFORTS IN SOUTH AFRICA TO BRING GOZ AND REBEL LEADER KABILA TOWARD POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASEFIRE, BUT THAT A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK HAD BEEN THE LACK OF CLARITY AS TO WHO GOZ REPRESENTATIVE NGBANDA REPRESENTED AND WHAT THE LIMITS OF HIS MANDATE WERE. A/S MOOSE STATED THAT IN ORDER TO CONVINCED KABILA TO CEASE HOSTILITIES, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY SIMULTANEOUSLY TO BEGIN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBELS. KABILA INSISTS THAT A CLEAR AND PUBLIC MANDATE FOR THE GOZ NEGOTIATORS IS NECESSARY, AND THAT PRESIDENT MOBUTU IS CLEARLY THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN PROVIDE SUCH DIRECTION. MOOSE ASKED DUPUCH HOW THE U.S. AND FRANCE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO GET SUCH A STATEMENT FROM MOBUTU. IT IS URGENT THAT WE DO THIS NOW, AND THAT WE DO IT QUICKLY, WHILE THERE IS SOME HOPE THAT THE REBEL ALLIANCE MIGHT PAUSE, GIVEN THE CAPTURE OF KISANGANI. MOOSE CONTINUED THAT IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE HEART OF THE NEGOTIATION WILL BE ABOUT CHANGING THE EXISTING TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT IN A MANNER AGREED WITH THE REBELS. KINSHASA MUST UNDERSTAND THIS. (DUPUCH AGREED BUT COUNTERED THAT THE REBELS SHOULD NOT POSTURE WITH EXTREME POSITIONS DURING THE FIRST MEETINGS, OR TALKS COULD BE STILLBORN.) MOOSE CONTINUED THAT WE ARE ALSO GETTING INDICATIONS FROM POLITICAL FIGURES IN KINSHASA THAT MOBUTU'S PRESENCE IS BECOMING AN OBSTACLE TO NEGOTIATIONS; THUS HE MUST GIVE A CLEAR MANDATE TO THE NEGOTIATING TEAM NO MATTER WHAT OFFICIAL POSITION HE MIGHT CONTINUE TO HOLD. IN EFFECT, THIS IS A NEGOTIATION THAT LEADS TO A TRANSITION TO THE POST-MOBUTU ERA, AND THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOMETHING IN PLACE TO REPLACE MOBUTU WHENEVER AND HOWEVER HE GOES. MOOSE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WISHED THE TRANSITION EVENTUALLY TO LEAD TOWARD ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE, A GOAL THE REBELS SAY THEY SHARE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT SOME OF SAHNOUN'S FIVE POINTS WERE BEING OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND MIGHT HAVE TO BE REVISITED, BUT ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO WORK WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF UNSC RESOLUTION 1097.

4. ~~(C)~~ AFTER A NUMBER OF LENGTHY DIVERSIONS, DUPUCH FINALLY SAID HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM MOBUTU TO NAME A "COALITION" OR A "COUNCIL", DRAWN FROM ALL SEGMENTS OF THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS IN KINSHASA, AND THEN HE SHOULD STAY IN THE HOSPITAL". FOR EXAMPLE, THE COALITION COULD INCLUDE THE GOVERNMENT (KENGO), THE MILITARY (MAHELE), THE MOBUTU FAMILY (NGBANDA), THE TRANSITIONAL PARLIAMENT (THE T.P. VICE PRESIDENTS), AND MAYBE SOME ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION (TSHISIKEDI). MOBUTU WOULD MANDATE THE COUNCIL TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, WITH KABILA'S REBEL ALLIANCE, UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF SRSG MOHAMMED SAHNOUN. KABILA SHOULD, IN RESPONSE, IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE. DUPUCH SAID HE VIEWED OBTAINING KABILA'S AGREEMENT AS A U.S. RESPONSIBILITY. "THAT IS YOUR JOB", HE SAID POINTEDLY. DUPUCH FELT THAT MOBUTU'S

AGREEMENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING BY THE END OF THE WEEK OF MARCH 17.

5. (S) DUPUCH DECLINED TO OPINE HOW LONG MOBUTU WOULD LIVE, BUT CONFIRMED HE WAS STILL HOSPITALIZED.

6. (S) DUPUCH EMPHASIZED THAT FRANCE'S BIGGEST
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 006227

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
TAGS: PREL, PINS, PINR, MOPS, CASC, CG, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH WILL PRESS MOBUTU TO NAME A GROUP
- TO NEGOTIATE WITH KABILA

INTEREST IN ZAIRE IS THE EXAMPLE ZAIRE REPRESENTS FOR THE REST OF THE CONTINENT. HE CLAIMED FRANCE'S COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN ZAIRE ARE MINIMAL, AND THAT WHAT FRANCE WANTED MOST WAS STABILITY. (HE ACKNOWLEDGED IMPORTANT FRENCH INTERESTS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES). DUPUCH AND AFRICA BUREAU DIRECTOR ROISIN ALSO VIEWED IT AS IMPORTANT THAT SUCH TRANSITION MECHANISMS AS MAY EMERGE FROM THE SAHNOUN-MANAGED DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBEL ALLIANCE BUILD ON AT LEAST SOME EXISTING TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE CURRENT TRANSITION HAD BEEN SO EARNESTLY APPROVED BY BOTH FRANCE AND THE U.S. IN 1991.

7. (S) CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KINSHASA, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "QUIET BUT TENSE", DUPUCH INDICATED THAT FRANCE WAS ACTIVELY PLANNING FOR THE EVACUATION OF FRENCH NATIONALS FROM ZAIRE, FEARING THAT CIVIL ORDER COULD BREAK DOWN. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S. DO THE SAME. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND FULLY APPROVED OF THE FACT THAT U.S.-FRENCH MILITARY-TO-MILITARY DISCUSSIONS OF EVACUATION WERE UNDERWAY, AND NOTED THAT THERE WERE UPWARDS OF 5,000 EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS IN ZAIRE.

8. (S) IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, A/S MOOSE WAS TOLD THAT FRANCE FEARS AN IMPLOSION OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE WOULD HAVE TRAGIC HUMAN CONSEQUENCES AND WOULD THREATEN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY. DE VILLEPIN STATED THAT A REBEL MOVEMENT WHICH TOOK POWER BY FORCE OF ARMS WOULD ONLY SERVE TO ENCOURAGE SIMILAR MOVEMENTS, AND WOULD, MOREOVER, CONSTITUTE "AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE POWERLESSNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY" TO AVERT SUCH A TRAGEDY.

9. (S) DE VILLEPIN SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE WAS SOLVABLE, IF ONE APPROACHED THE SITUATION "WITH ENERGY AND WITHOUT PREREQUISITES". IF KABILA GOES TOO FAR, HE RISKS LOSING WHAT HE HAS; DIGESTING WHAT HE HAS MAY BE HARDER THAN HE THINKS. HE ALSO WOULD LOSE WHAT INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY HE HAS GAINED; "WE'RE NOT GOING TO ACCEPT COUPS THESE DAYS", DE VILLEPIN SAID. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL ISOLATE KABILA AND

WORSE IF HE STICKS TO THE MILITARY SOLUTION. KABILA MUST BE CONVINCED THAT HE CANNOT RESOLVE HIS PROBLEMS MILITARILY. THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE MUST BE RELAUNCHED. IF KABILA BLOCKS A SETTLEMENT, MASSACRES AND A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER WILL RESULT. KABILA MUST THEREFORE ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE.

10. (✓) MOBUTU, DE VILLEPIN CONTINUED, IS AWARE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME SORT OF RESOLUTION EITHER WITH HIM OR WITHOUT HIM. IT CAN BE WITHOUT HIM, BUT IT MUST NOT BE AGAINST HIM. MOBUTU STILL HAS AMPLE MEANS TO PREVENT AGREEMENT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS WELL AS ZAIRE WILL SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES IF HE PREVENTS A SETTLEMENT. A WAY MUST BE FOUND FOR MOBUTU TO LEAVE IN DIGNITY WITH THE IDEA THAT HE HAS SAVED HIS COUNTRY; HIS ENTOURAGE MUST ALSO BE EFFECTIVELY SIDELINED.

11. (✓) DE VILLEPIN SAID THAT ZAIRE COULD PROVE A MODEL FOR CRISIS RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, AND THAT BOTH FRANCE AND THE U.S. SHOULD AVOID GUESSING AT THE HIDDEN MOTIVATIONS OF THE OTHER, SUCH AS IDEAS OF STRUGGLES BETWEEN ANGLOPHONE/UGANDAN AND FRANCOPHONE CAMPS. AFRICANS SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEE THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO AVERT A CRISIS THROUGH ONE OF THEIR OWN IN THE PERSON OF SRSG MOHAMMED SAHNOUN. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING AN INTER-AFRICAN ARMED FORCE INTO ZAIRE, (AFTER THE LOME MEETING MARCH 26) PRESUMABLY TO MONITOR A CEASEFIRE, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT GO INTO MUCH DETAIL ON THE SUBJECT. (MOOSE POINTED OUT THAT CARE WAS NECESSARY IN TALKING ABOUT SUCH A HUMANITARIAN FORCE; IT DID NOT MAKE SENSE ABSENT AN AGREEMENT, AND IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY WITH AN AGREEMENT.) IN DE VILLEPIN'S VIEW THE THREE STEPS NECESSARY FOR A SETTLEMENT IN ZAIRE ARE:

-ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE BY KABILA,
-THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP BY MOBUTU, AND
-THE BEGINNING OF A REAL POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

12. (✓) "THERE IS A BALANCE TO BE FOUND BETWEEN MOBUTU AND KABILA," DE VILLEPIN SAID BY WAY OF CONCLUSION; "AND WITHOUT THE AID OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, NOTABLY FRANCE AND THE U.S., TO REACH THAT SETTLEMENT, ZARE WILL BE SCREWED". DE VILLEPIN SAID THE GOF WOULD GET HOLD OF MOBUTU QUICKLY (AND HIS AFRICAN FRIENDS) TO PUSH FOR A FAST AGREEMENT ON A
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 006227

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
TAGS: PREL, PINS, PINR, MOPS, CASC, CG, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH WILL PRESS MOBUTU TO NAME A GROUP
- TO NEGOTIATE WITH KABILA

NEGOTIATING GROUP.

13. (✓) COMMENT: BOTH DE VILLEPIN AND DUPUCH USED THE INFREQUENT (IN FRENCH) TERM "SYNERGY" TO DESCRIBE

THE WAY THE U.S. AND FRANCE COULD WORK TOGETHER ON THE ZAIRE PROBLEM. AS THE DAY BEGAN, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ASKED IF A/S MOOSE COULD CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE, ABOUT THE SAME ISSUE, IN THE LATE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 18 (WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL).

U.S.-FRENCH COOPERATION ON ZAIRE IS CLEARLY AMONG THE HIGHEST CURRENT PRIORITIES OF THE GOF, PROBABLY DRIVEN BY A REALIZATION THAT A RUBICON HAS BEEN CROSSED IN ZAIRE, AND THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO FIND AN END GAME FOR MOBUTU.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 6227

<^SSN>6227

<^SSN>6227

TOR: 970319010302 M2672502

<^TOR>970319010302 M2672503

<^TOR>970319010303 M2672504

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PETERS PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA6367 0781843-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 191843Z MAR 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 191843Z MAR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4480
INFO: RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1213
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0917
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0796
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0183
 RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 2688
 RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0440
 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA PRIORITY 0250
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SUBJ: ZAIRE: A/S MOOSE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006367

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2017-0240-m (1.28)
 KBH 8/9/2022

CAPE TOWN FOR NSC - SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, UG, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE: A/S MOOSE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH
 - FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: PARIS 6227 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D, X5, X6.
2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE PLEDGED TO AF A/S MOOSE MARCH 18 THAT FRANCE WOULD PRESS FOR THE FORMATION OF A ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING GROUP TO COMMENCE TALKS WITH THE REBELS. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. PRESS UGANDA TO CEASE AID TO THE REBELS BY THREATENING AN AID CUTOFF. DE CHARETTE DENIED THAT FRANCE WAS GIVING ASSISTANCE TO UNITA IN ANGOLA. END SUMMARY.
3. ~~(S)~~ IN A MARCH 18 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE, A/S MOOSE STRESSED THAT U.S. POLICY IS TO DO THE MAXIMUM TO HALT THE CONFLICT IN ZAIRE, BUT THAT TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL, THE GOZ WILL HAVE TO CONSENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. MOOSE URGED THE GOF TO INFLUENCE ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO ACCEPT THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED THAT PREVIOUS SIGNALS FROM MOBUTU AND THE GOZ ABOUT WILLINGNESS TO

NEGOTIATE HAD BEEN TOO VAGUE. MOOSE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH MEETINGS EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH GOF OFFICIALS, AND NOTED GENERAL U.S.-FRENCH AGREEMENT ABOUT THE NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND THE CREATION OF A TEAMS DRAWN FROM THE ZAITIAN POLITICAL CLASS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF SGSR MOHAMMED SAHNOUN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES WILL PROVE DIFFICULT, BUT THAT THE GOZ SHOULD ENTER THEM WITH AN OPEN MIND. AGREEMENT ABOUT THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASEFIRE COULD TAKE PLACE AT ALREADY-SCHEDULED MEETINGS IN NAIROBI OR LOME, OR ELSEWHERE.

4. ~~(S)~~ A/S MOOSE STATED THAT IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING THE GOZ TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL BE EASIER TO CONVINCED KABILA AND ZAIRE'S NEIGHBORS OF THE NECESSITY TO NEGOTIATE. HE RECOUNTED EARLIER DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBELS BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT OVER WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PRECEDE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND THE LACK OF CLARITY IN THE MANDATE OF THE ZAIRIAN NEGOTIATOR.

5. ~~(S)~~ DE CHARETTE REPLIED THAT THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE WILL REQUIRE THE U.S. AND FRANCE TO WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY TO MOVE FROM THE STAGE OF CONFLICT TO THE STAGE OF DIALOGUE, AND THAT THE DIALOGUE ITSELF WILL SUCCEED ONLY IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REMAINS IN THE CORRIDOR ENCOURAGING IT. EACH SIDE IN ZAIRE WILL SEEK OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND WILL ATTEMPT TO PLAY OFF THE OUTSIDERS AGAINST ONE ANOTHER, AS HAD HAPPENED IN THE CASE OF U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. AND FRANCE SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK TO MAINTAIN A UNITED FRONT. DE CHARETTE ADMITTED THAT BATTLEFIELD WINNERS SHOULD COME OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH MORE THAN LOSERS, BUT ALSO THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ASKED OF THE GOZ, AND THAT CONCESSIONS ON THE REBELS PARTS WERE ALSO NEEDED. HE SAID FRANCE HAD "MORE DUTIES THAN INTERESTS" IN ZAIRE, THAT FRANCE IS "NOT AN UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTER OF MOBUTU" AND THAT WHAT FRANCE FEARED MOST WAS A DESTABILIZATION OF ZAIRE WHICH COULD SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

5. ~~(S)~~ DE CHARETTE MAINTAINED THAT REBEL LEADER KABILA, LIKE NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA, HAD GONE VERY FAR VERY FAST, AND HAD PROBABLY BITTEN OFF MORE THAN HE COULD CHEW. IT IS IN KABILA'S INTEREST TO NEGOTIATE WHILE HE HAS A STRONG POSITION. FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS TO ACT AS PART OF THE PLANNED MOBUTU-MANDATED NEGOTIATING GROUP, DE CHARETTE PROMISED, ADDING THAT LOME MIGHT BE A GOOD SPOT FOR THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE GOZ. DE CHARETTE SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS TO CONVINCED KABILA TO IMPLEMENT A CESAEFIRE, TO PRESSURE HIS EXTERNAL FRIENDS (I.E. RWANDA AND UGANDA) TO RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE, TO FORM A FULLY-MANDATED GOZ NEGOTIATING TEAM, AND TO LEND AUTHORITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO SGSR SAHNOUN.

6. (U) DE CHARETTE INSISTED THE U.S. WAS THE BEST-PLACED COUNTRY TO CONVINCED "KABILA'S EXTERNAL FRIENDS" OF THE WISDOM OF PEACE. HE RECOMMENDED THAT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 006367

CAPE TOWN FOR NSC - SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, UG, CG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: A/S MOOSE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH
- FOREIGN MINISTER

THE U.S. THREATEN AN AID CUTOFF TO UGANDA, A COUNTRY WHOSE COOPERATION HE CHARACTERIZED AS KEY, TO OBTAIN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S COOPERATION. DE CHARETTE'S OWN IMPRESSION FROM CONTACTS WITH THE UGANDANS IS THAT MUSEVENI IS IMPERVIOUS TO REASON BUT UNDERSTANDS THREATS AND PRESSURE.

7. (U) MOOSE REPLIED THAT MUSEVENI IS AMENABLE TO REASON, BUT ALSO PROFOUNDLY OPPOSED TO MOBUTU, WHOM HE RESENTS FOR SUPPORTING VARIOUS ANTI-MUSEVENI MOVEMENTS OVER THE YEARS. MOOSE RECOUNTED CONTINUING U.S. EFFORTS TO CONVINCED MUSEVENI THAT HE RISKS PUSHING ZAIRE INTO CHAOS IF HE CONTINUES TO ASSIST THE REBELS. MOOSE ALSO SAID SRSG SAHNOUN BELIEVES THE UPCOMING MEETING IN NAIROBI MAY PROVE A USEFUL PLACE TO ADVANCE THE ZAIRIAN AGENDA.

8. (U) IN CLOSING, CHARETTE MAINTAINED THAT THE GOF ONLY SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SOME FRENCH CITIZENS MIGHT HAVE CLOSE TIES TO UNITA. (NOTE: THIS WAS CLEARLY A RESPONSE TO MOOSE'S QUERY TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, ASKING ABOUT REPORTS OF FRENCH SUPPORT TO UNITA. END NOTE). DE CHARETTE URGED FREQUENT EXCHANGES OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAIRE.

9. (U) COMMENT. VISITING ASSISTANT SECRETARIES ARE RARELY INVITED TO CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THIS MEETING WITH A/S MOOSE, WHICH MOSTLY REVIEWED TOPICS DISCUSSED AND AGREED EARLIER IN THE DAY, WAS A GESTURE INTENDED TO SIGNAL THE HIGH LEVEL OF FRENCH PREOCCUPATION WITH ZAIRE. THE FIXATION ON MUSEVENI IS ANOTHER REMINDER OF THE VERY BAD IMPRESSION HE MADE ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO PARIS, AS WELL AS A PERSISTENT FRENCH BELIEF THAT UGANDAN ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE REBELS' SUCCESS IN ZAIRE. ON THE WAY OUT, DECHARETTE'S CABINET ADVISOR TOLD US THAT FRANCE VIEWED THE "ASSISTANCE OF A COLUMN OF UGANDAN ARMORED VEHICLES" TO HAVE BEEN THE KEY FACTOR IN THE FALL OF KISANGANI.

10. (U) THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER A/S MOOSE DEPARTED PARIS.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 6367
<^SSN>6367

TOR: 970319144043 M2673807
<^TOR>970319144133 M2673808

DIST: SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PETERS PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 WECHSLER
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADXA64C12 MSI4299)
 LINE3: O 191843Z MAR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 191843Z MAR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4480
 INFO: RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1213
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0917
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0796
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0183
 RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 2688
 RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0440
 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA PRIORITY 0250
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: ZAIRE: A/S MOOSE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.29)
 KBH 8/9/2022

////////////////////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////////////////////////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006367
 CORRECTED COPY (ADD DECL INST)

CAPE TOWN FOR NSC - SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL:03/19/97
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, UG, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE: A/S MOOSE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH
 - FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: PARIS 6227 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D, X5, X6.
2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE PLEDGED TO AF A/S MOOSE MARCH 18 THAT FRANCE WOULD PRESS FOR THE FORMATION OF A ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING GROUP TO COMMENCE TALKS WITH THE REBELS. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. PRESS UGANDA TO CEASE AID TO THE REBELS BY THREATENING AN AID CUTOFF. DE CHARETTE DENIED THAT FRANCE WAS GIVING ASSISTANCE TO UNITA IN ANGOLA. END SUMMARY.
3. ~~(S)~~ IN A MARCH 18 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE, A/S MOOSE STRESSED THAT U.S. POLICY IS TO DO THE MAXIMUM TO HALT THE CONFLICT IN ZAIRE, BUT THAT TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL, THE GOZ WILL HAVE TO CONSENT TO

NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. MOOSE URGED THE GOF TO INFLUENCE ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO ACCEPT THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED THAT PREVIOUS SIGNALS FROM MOBUTU AND THE GOZ ABOUT WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE HAD BEEN TOO VAGUE. MOOSE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH MEETINGS EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH GOF OFFICIALS, AND NOTED GENERAL U.S.-FRENCH AGREEMENT ABOUT THE NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND THE CREATION OF A TEAMS DRAWN FROM THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF SGSR MOHAMMED SAHNOUN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES WILL PROVE DIFFICULT, BUT THAT THE GOZ SHOULD ENTER THEM WITH AN OPEN MIND. AGREEMENT ABOUT THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASEFIRE COULD TAKE PLACE AT ALREADY-SCHEDULED MEETINGS IN NAIROBI OR LOME, OR ELSEWHERE.

4. (C) A/S MOOSE STATED THAT IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING THE GOZ TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL BE EASIER TO CONVINCE KABILA AND ZAIRE'S NEIGHBORS OF THE NECESSITY TO NEGOTIATE. HE RECOUNTED EARLIER DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE REBELS BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT OVER WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PRECEDE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND THE LACK OF CLARITY IN THE MANDATE OF THE ZAIRIAN NEGOTIATOR.

5. (C) DE CHARETTE REPLIED THAT THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE WILL REQUIRE THE U.S. AND FRANCE TO WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY TO MOVE FROM THE STAGE OF CONFLICT TO THE STAGE OF DIALOGUE, AND THAT THE DIALOGUE ITSELF WILL SUCCEED ONLY IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REMAINS IN THE CORRIDOR ENCOURAGING IT. EACH SIDE IN ZAIRE WILL SEEK OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND WILL ATTEMPT TO PLAY OFF THE OUTSIDERS AGAINST ONE ANOTHER, AS HAD HAPPENED IN THE CASE OF U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. AND FRANCE SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK TO MAINTAIN A UNITED FRONT. DE CHARETTE ADMITTED THAT BATTLEFIELD WINNERS SHOULD COME OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH MORE THAN LOSERS, BUT ALSO THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ASKED OF THE GOZ, AND THAT CONCESSIONS ON THE REBELS PARTS WERE ALSO NEEDED. HE SAID FRANCE HAD "MORE DUTIES THAN INTERESTS" IN ZAIRE, THAT FRANCE IS "NOT AN UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTER OF MOBUTU" AND THAT WHAT FRANCE FEARED MOST WAS A DESTABILIZATION OF ZAIRE WHICH COULD SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

5. (C) DE CHARETTE MAINTAINED THAT REBEL LEADER KABILA, LIKE NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA, HAD GONE VERY FAR VERY FAST, AND HAD PROBABLY BITTEN OFF MORE THAN HE COULD CHEW. IT IS IN KABILA'S INTEREST TO NEGOTIATE WHILE HE HAS A STRONG POSITION. FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL CLASS TO ACT AS PART OF THE PLANNED MOBUTU-MANDATED NEGOTIATING GROUP, DE CHARETTE PROMISED, ADDING THAT LOME MIGHT BE A GOOD SPOT FOR THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE GOZ. DE CHARETTE SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS TO CONVINCE KABILA TO IMPLEMENT A CESAEFIRE, TO

PRESSURE HIS EXTERNAL FRIENDS (I.E. RWANDA AND UGANDA) TO RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE, TO FORM A FULLY-MANDATED GOZ NEGOTIATING TEAM, AND TO LEND AUTHORITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO SGSR SAHNOUN.

6. ~~(C)~~ DE CHARETTE INSISTED THE U.S. WAS THE BEST-PLACED COUNTRY TO CONVINC "KABILA'S EXTERNAL FRIENDS" OF THE WISDOM OF PEACE. HE RECOMMENDED THAT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

SSN: 6367

TOR: 970324164800 M2681021

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 DTG: 211915Z MAR 97
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 TO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4584
 INFO: RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 24-25 VISIT TO
 - WASHINGTON OF FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-m (1.30)
 KGH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 006644

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/07
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR
 SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 24-25 VISIT TO
 - WASHINGTON OF FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON
 REF: USNATO 0864 (DTG: 171723Z MAR 97)

1. CLASSIFIED BY DONALD K. BANDLER, CHARGE. REASON:
 1.5 (B AND D). REASON FOR NIACT: PREPARATION FOR
 SENIOR LEVEL MEETINGS.

 SUMMARY

2. (S) FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON'S PRIMARY
 OBJECTIVE DURING HIS MARCH 24-25 TRIP TO WASHINGTON
 WILL BE TO MEET AND DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH THE NEW U.S.
 NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM. DESPITE SOME POSITIVE NEWS ON
 THE DOMESTIC FRONT -- IMPROVED POLL RESULTS FOR
 PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND PRIME MINISTER JUPPE AND SOME RISE
 IN ECONOMIC INDICES -- THE FRENCH REMAIN IN A
 PESSIMISTIC MOOD. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT THE CHIRAC
 TEAM, OR A FUTURE SOCIALIST-LED GOVERNMENT THAT TOOK
 ITS PLACE, HAS THE VISION AND POLICIES TO LEAD THEM
 THROUGH PAINFUL ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND SECURITY CHOICES.
 FOR THE MOMENT, A FRANCE SADDLED WITH PERSISTENT
 UNEMPLOYMENT -- ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUTH -- IS NOT TAKING
 COMFORT FROM HAVING THE WORLD'S FOURTH LARGEST ECONOMY,
 HIGH-TECH CAPABILITIES, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ROLE AND --
 ALMOST ALONE AMONG EUROPEANS -- THE CAPACITY AND WILL
 TO PROJECT MILITARY POWER ABROAD.

3. (✓) MILLON WILL SEEK CURRENT WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVES ON NATO ISSUES, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, OSNIA AND ALBANIA. HE IS UNLIKELY TO BREAK ANY NEW GROUND ON THE NATO ISSUES, RECOGNIZING THAT THE AFSOUTH ISSUE IS BEING DEALT WITH IN OTHER CHANNELS; BUT HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO REINFORCE PARIS' CLAIMS ON NATO RESTRUCTURING AND A REBALANCING OF RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE WILL MAKE A PITCH FOR INCLUSION OF ROMANIA IN THE FIRST TRANCHE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PROBABLY LAY OUT HIS CONCERNS FOR COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT MAKE THE FIRST CUT. THE FRENCH WILL BE INTERESTED IN WASHINGTON'S ASSESSMENT OF HELSINKI AND MAY RESTATE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE-POWER SUMMIT. ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES, MILLON WILL NOTE THE MOD'S ASSESSMENT THAT IRAQ REMAINS AN IMPORTANT REGIONAL THREAT (A VIEW NOT SHARED BY THE QUAI) AND REAFFIRM THAT FRANCE WILL CONTINUE TO FLY IN SOUTHERN WATCH. WHILE THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS IS MAINLY IN THE HANDS OF THE MFA, MILLON JUST VISITED ISRAEL IN FEBRUARY AND MAY OFFER SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS.

4. (✓) THE FRENCH MILITARY IS STILL SMARTING OVER THE FACT THAT REPEATED CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE HAVE GONE UNFULFILLED. THEY BELIEVE THE U.S. IS SUPPORTING THE REBELS AND ARE SUSPICIOUS ABOUT THE NATURE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA AND UGANDA. AFTER AN INITIALLY NEGATIVE REACTION TO AN AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE, THE FRENCH HAVE WARMED TO THE IDEA AS IT EVOLVED. THEY NOW SEE IT PARALLELING THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN BUILDING AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY. HAVING BACKED DOWN FROM THEIR INITIAL CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN ALBANIA, THE FRENCH ARE NOW FOCUSED ON DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AID. THEY WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN ALBANIA. REGARDING BOSNIA, THE GOF CONTINUES TO REAFFIRM THAT IT WILL PULL OUT WHEN THE U.S. DOES AT THE END OF THE SFOR MISSION, ALTHOUGH SOME PRIVATE CONTACTS HAVE CONFIDED THAT THE GOF MIGHT RECONSIDER SOME FORM OF CJTF IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. THEY GIVE NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO LEAD OR PARTICIPATE IN A EUROPEAN-LED, FOLLOW-ON MILITARY EFFORT. END SUMMARY.

FRANCE SEARCHING FOR ITSELF ... AND NOT FINDING ANSWERS

5. (✓) FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON'S MARCH 24-25 WASHINGTON TRIP COMES DURING A CONTINUED DECLINE IN FRENCH SELF-CONFIDENCE, IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND SECURITY AREAS. FOLLOWING A MOROSE WINTER, EVEN POSITIVE SIGNS OF AN UPTURN IN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IMPROVED POPULARITY RATINGS FOR PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND PRIME MINISTER JUPPE MEET WITH UNCONVINCED SHRUGS. THE FRENCH PEOPLE QUESTION FRANCE'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN ITS

LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE WORLD AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO OFFER AND PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS.

6. (C) FRANCE'S ECONOMY CONTINUES TO GENERATE ONE OF THE WORLD'S HIGHEST STANDARDS OF LIVING, BUT MANY FRENCH NOW FEAR FOR THEIR FUTURE, AS EUROPEAN
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 PARIS 006644

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/07
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 24-25 VISIT TO
- WASHINGTON OF FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON

LIBERALIZATION AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION BRING INTO SHARP FOCUS THE STRUCTURAL RIGIDITIES WITH WHICH THEY THEY HAVE BURDENED THEMSELVES. THEY QUESTION THEIR ABILITY TO BRING DOWN A 12.7 PERCENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OR ADEQUATELY MAINTAIN THE GENEROUS SOCIAL SAFETY NET BUILT UP OVER DECADES. NECESSARY REFORMS AND RESTRUCTURING ARE PERCEIVED AS SACRIFICES TO ACHIEVE THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY AND ARE INCREASINGLY QUESTIONED AND BLAMED FOR ECONOMIC MALAISE.

7. (C) LEAVING THE DOMESTIC CHORES (AND HEAT) TO JUPPE, CHIRAC HAS TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY TO PROMOTE FRENCH EXPORTS -- INCLUDING DEFENSE GOODS -- AND FRENCH INFLUENCE ABROAD. MILLON ALSO IS IN THE MIDST OF A HEAVY TRAVEL SCHEDULE, MOST NOTABLY WITH A VISIT TO CHINA DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN APRIL (IN ADVANCE OF CHIRAC'S MAY TRIP). THESE TRIPS HAVE CONTAINED A HEAVY DOSE OF "FRANCE-SPEAKING-FOR-EUROPE" AND RHETORIC ABOUT "EUROPE AS A COUNTER-WEIGHT TO AMERICAN INFLUENCE." CHIRAC AND MILLON'S TRIPS TO CHINA WILL PROVIDE YET ANOTHER OCCASION TO PROMOTE ARMS SALES AND TO OFFER A "EUROPEAN" ALTERNATIVE TO AN OTHERWISE "UNIPOLAR, UNICULTURAL" WORLD. MILLON, A PRAGMATIC POLITICIAN, HAS NOT PUSHED THE "U.S. HEGEMONY" LINE (ALTHOUGH SOME OF HIS ADVISORS DO).

8. (C) MILLON'S STAFF HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT MEETING WITH THE NEW U.S. SECURITY TEAM IS A TOP MILLON PRIORITY. HE PLACES CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON FACE-TO-FACE CONTACTS AND IS ANXIOUS TO DEVELOP A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SECRETARY COHEN. HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INVITE SECRETARY COHEN TO MAKE AN EARLY VISIT TO FRANCE. MILLON'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHIRAC APPEARS SOUND, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO UGGEST HE MIGHT STEP DOWN BEFORE A POSSIBLE SPRING 1998 CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AFTER LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. MILLON'S WELL-PUBLICIZED DUSTUP WITH GERMAN DEFMIN RUEHE LAST YEAR LEFT HARD FEELINGS, ALTHOUGH THE MOD ASSURES US THAT RELATIONS ARE MUCH IMPROVED TODAY.

RESTRUCTURING THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

9. (S) MILLON'S PREOCCUPATION OVER THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE FRENCH DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT: ABANDONING CONSCRIPTION FOR A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY; DOWNSIZING MILITARY FORCES BY ONE-QUARTER AND REORGANIZING THEM INTO A MORE MOBILE, PROJECTABLE FORCE; RATIONALIZING MOD AND STATE-OWNED DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESSES; AND STIMULATING RESTRUCTURING OF FRANCE'S ARMAMENTS INDUSTRIES. EACH OF THESE EFFORTS PROVOKES CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION. MILLON'S PERFORMANCE IN HANDLING THEM -- GIVEN HIS LACK OF ANY EXPERIENCE IN DEFENSE MATTERS PRIOR TO BECOMING DEFENSE MINISTER -- HAS BEEN RELIABLE AND SURE. ABANDONMENT OF CONSCRIPTION, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS PROMPTED A MAJOR PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON NATIONAL SERVICE, WHICH THE MOD HAS WORKED HARD, AND SUCCESSFULLY, TO STAY IN FRONT OF. MILLON ALSO DEFTLY MANAGED A PROGRAM OF BASE CLOSURES.

10. (S) A CRITICAL -- AND EXTREMELY SENSITIVE -- AREA FOR FRENCH RESTRUCTURING IS IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR. MOST DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN FRANCE ARE INEFFICIENT AND POORLY ORGANIZED TO COMPETE AGAINST RESTRUCTURED U.S. INDUSTRIES. AS PART OF MILLON'S OVERALL RESTRUCTURING PLAN, HE ANNOUNCED SEVERAL MEASURES INTENDED TO MAKE THESE MORE EFFICIENT, BUT IT REMAINS PROBLEMATIC HOW THOROUGHLY AND HOW RAPIDLY THESE CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT. THE GOF'S DESIGN IS FOR FRENCH DEFENSE INDUSTRIES TO COALESCE AROUND SEVERAL "POLES," NOTABLY AIRCRAFT, ELECTRONICS, SPACE, LAND VEHICLES AND MISSILES. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE GOF HOPES TO PROMOTE EUROPEANIZATION OF THESE SECTORS. THE PROPOSED MERGER OF DASSAULT (PRIVATE) WITH AEROSPATIALE (GOVERNMENT-OWNED) APPEARS ON COURSE, DESPITE HEEL-DRAGGING BY THE FORMER. THE PRIVATIZATION OF THOMPSON CSF -- AFTER AN EMBARRASSING FALSE START EARLIER THIS YEAR -- IS SET FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT OVER THE NEXT THREE MONTHS.

11. (S) HAVING LOST A LARGE SHARE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET TO U.S. COMPANIES, THE FRENCH ARE MORE INCLINED TO BLAME BIG, UNFAIR U.S. COMPETITION RATHER THAN ACCEPT THAT THEIR OWN INERTIA HAS KEPT THEM FROM COMPETING EFFECTIVELY IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE. WHILE CRITICIZING U.S. POLITICAL-LEVEL PROMOTION OF ARMS EXPORTS, MILLON AND CHIRAC OFTEN TARGET THEIR TRAVELS TO PROMOTE ARMS EXPORTS. MILLON HAS MADE REPEATED TRIPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN RECENT MONTHS, TRYING HARD TO PROMOTE FRENCH DEFENSE SALES TO UAE, QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA, IN PARTICULAR. MANY
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 006644

E.O. 12958; DECL: 03/21/07

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 24-25 VISIT TO

- WASHINGTON OF FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON

WEAPONS SYSTEMS, LIKE THE RAFALE, ARE POOR COMPETITORS ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET, AND THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN

U.S. AND FRENCH SALES IS LIKELY TO INCREASE. MILLON CAN BE EXPECTED TO BROACH THE ARMS EXPORT ISSUE, IF NOT IN HIS FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY COHEN THEN CERTAINLY IN SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS.

NATO ISSUES

12. (✓) ADAPTATION: MILLON CAN BE EXPECTED TO ADHERE CLOSELY TO THE GOF LINE ON MAJOR NATO ISSUES, LIKE ADAPTATION. TRADITIONALLY, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMPONENTS OF THE MOD HAVE FAVORED THE NATO RAPPROCHEMENT PROCESS, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS RECENTLY THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES ARE BECOMING MORE CIRCUMSPECT ABOUT THE COSTS (BOTH PERSONNEL AND FINANCIAL), THE LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES NECESSARY AND THE CHALLENGE OF ENTERING INTO THE NATO CULTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRENCH MILITARY HAS LONG REALIZED FROM ITS MORE DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER ALLIES IN THE GULF WAR, BOSNIA AND ELSEWHERE, THAT THERE REALLY IS NO ALTERNATIVE FOR FRANCE BUT TO DRAW CLOSER TO NATO PROCEDURES, IF NOT NATO ITSELF. WITH CURRENT EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE AFSOUTH COMMAND STRUCTURE PROBLEM FOCUSED IN OTHER CHANNELS, MILLON IS LESS A DAY-TO-DAY PLAYER THAN HE HAS BEEN. BUT HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY MAKE A CRUCIAL INPUT TO CHIRAC WHEN THE LATTER DECIDES WHETHER TO ACCEPT A COMMAND ADAPTATION PACKAGE AND PROCEED WITH NATO INTEGRATION, OR REJECT IT AND DEFER CLOSER NATO RELATIONS TO THE FUTURE. IN WASHINGTON, HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO INSIST THAT: FRANCE IS NOT THE DEMANDEUR ON REINTEGRATION; THE GOF WILL HAVE TO DEFER ON MILITARY REINTEGRATION IF ADAPTATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR FRENCH INTERESTS; AND ESDI WITHIN NATO MUST BE BOTH VISIBLE AND SUBSTANTIVE.

13. (✓) FRENCH NATO PERMREP ERRERA'S ADMONITION TO SECRETARY COHEN IN BRUSSELS (REFTEL), THAT DEFERRAL, IN ITSELF, WOULD NOT BE A SUFFICIENT RESOLUTION TO THE AFSOUTH ISSUE, IS A STANDARD GOF VIEW. BUT EVEN ERRERA IS UNLIKELY TO KNOW AT THIS POINT WHAT KIND OF A PACKAGE CHIRAC WILL OR WILL NOT ACCEPT IN THE END. MILLON'S CIVILIAN ADVISORS, PHILLIPE GUELLUY (DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR) AND JEAN-CLAUDE MALLET (STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR), HAVE BEEN, OVER THE PAST YEAR, AMONG THE MOST DEMANDING ON NATO ADAPTATION AND THE MOST RECALCITRANT IN MOVING TOWARDS NATO. GUELLUY AND MALLET WILL ACCOMPANY MILLON TO WASHINGTON.

14. (✓) ENLARGEMENT: MILLON RECENTLY LAID OUT FOR VISITING UNDER SECRETARY TALBOTT GOF SUPPORT FOR ROMANIA'S NATO CANDIDACY AND MADE A RATHER IMPASSIONED PLEA THAT COUNTRIES NOT INCLUDED IN AN INITIAL TRANCHE BE REASSURED THAT THE DOOR REMAINS OPEN FOR THEM. HE CALLED FOR A "PROCESS, NOT A PACKAGE APPROACH" TO ENLARGEMENT. WHEN APPLICANTS MEET ESTABLISHED CRITERIA, THEY SHOULD KNOW THEY WILL BE ACCEPTED INTO NATO. LIKE CHIRAC, MILLON RECENTLY VISITED ROMANIA AND

PUBLICLY ENDORSED ITS MEMBERSHIP.

15. (C) NATO/RUSSIA: GENERALLY, THE FRENCH HAVE SUPPORTED US ON OUR NATO/RUSSIA AGENDA -- DESPITE TRADITIONAL GOF CONCERNS THAT WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW MIGHT CUT DEALS OVER THE HEADS OF NATO ALLIES. THE FRENCH ROUTINELY CAUTION THAT ANY NATO CONCESSIONS MUST BE MATCHED BY RECIPROCAL MOVES FROM RUSSIA. WE HAVE HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH ON A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER, AND PARIS HAS WELCOMED MOST OF OUR IDEAS ON STATIONED FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE. ON THE LATTER, THEY HAVE SUPPORTED US AGAINST SOME UNHELPFUL GERMAN INITIATIVES. WITH HELSINKI BEHIND US, PARIS WILL BE ANXIOUS TO HEAR OUR VIEWS ON ITS EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE-POWER SUMMIT. ON CFE, THE FRENCH ARE PLEASED THAT NATO HAS MOVED TO NATIONAL LIMITS, BUT THEY REMAIN ADAMANT AGAINST CUTTING THEIR OWN TLE.

ALBANIA

16. (C) SOON AFTER THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN ALBANIA, THE FRENCH PUBLICLY CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, INCLUDING POSSIBLE MILITARY OR INTERNATIONAL POLICE INTERVENTION. THE GERMANS AND DUTCH PULLED THE FRENCH (AND ITALIANS) BACK SOMEWHAT FROM THIS POSITION, RESULTING IN AN EU CONSENSUS TO SEND A DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO ALBANIA (MARCH 18-19) HEADED BY DUTCH AMBASSADOR D'ASSEMBOURG. UPON HIS RETURN FROM ALBANIA, D'ASSEMBOURG TOLD THE PRESS THAT HUMANITARIAN AID MUST BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT ANY DELIVERY OF EMERGENCY AID IS CONTINGENT ON HAVING A
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 PARIS 006644

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/07
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 24-25 VISIT TO
- WASHINGTON OF FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON

SECURE ENVIRONMENT. WE EXPECT THE FRENCH TO REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN ALBANIA.

BOSNIA

17. (C) GOF OFFICIALS HAVE RECENTLY REAFFIRMED THAT FRENCH POLICY REMAINS TO DEPART BOSNIA WHEN THE U.S. DOES SO AT THE END OF THE SFOR MISSION. THEY HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO LEAD OR PROMOTE A WEU OR EUROPEAN-LED CJTF EFFORT WHICH WOULD TAKE OVER WHEN SFOR STANDS DOWN, ALTHOUGH SOME PRIVATELY ADMIT THEY MIGHT "RECONSIDER IN LIGHT OF COLD REALITY." IN ANY CASE, THEY WOULD BE LOOKING FOR SOME U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, E.G., U.S. AIR SUPPORT OR A U.S. "RAPID REACTION" CONTRIBUTION OUTSIDE BOSNIA.

MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

18. (X) IRAQ: WHILE SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERING TO THE LETTER OF CURRENT UN SANCTIONS ON IRAQ, THE FRENCH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP VIEWS IRAQ'S REINTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A NECESSITY FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, AND AS A HUGE COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR FRENCH FIRMS. THE FRENCH REMAIN COMMITTED TO FLYING IN SOUTHERN WATCH, IN NO SMALL PART DUE TO A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL EQUITIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, WHO VIEW THE FRENCH AS SOFT ON IRAQ. THE DECISION IN DECEMBER NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NORTHERN NO-FLY ZONE WAS POLITICAL; THE FRENCH MILITARY LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO VIEW IRAQ AS AN IMPORTANT REGIONAL THREAT AND WOULD NOT HAVE OBJECTED TO REMAINING IN PROVIDE COMFORT. WHILE U.S.-FRENCH DIFFERENCES ON OVERALL IRAQ POLICY ARE WIDE AND DEEP, THE FRENCH SUPPORT UNSCOM.

19. (X) THE GULF: THE FRENCH BELIEVE, SOMEWHAT BITTERLY, THAT THEY HAVE BEEN CHEATED (BY THE U.S.) OF "THEIR SHARE" OF THE POST-GULF WAR ARMS SALES. MILLON HAS BECOME THE GOF'S POINTMAN ON ARMS SALES, AND HAS MADE REPEATED TRIPS IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS TO THE UAE AND QATAR, WHERE FRENCH SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIPS ARE STRONGEST. HIS MARCH 16 TRIP TO THE UAE HELPED RE-OPEN THE BIDDING ON FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. SAUDI DEFENSE MINISTER SULTAN STOPPED IN PARIS FOR A THREE-DAY VISIT ON THE WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON. ALTHOUGH NO DEALS WERE SIGNED, THE FRENCH ARE WORKING ASSIDUOUSLY TO PERSUADE RIYADH TO BUY LECLERC TANKS.

20. (X) PEACE PROCESS: THE GOF IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CRISIS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATING TRACK, AS WELL AS BY THE VOLATILITY OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. MILLON VISITED ISRAEL IN FEBRUARY. THE TRIP, ALTHOUGH LONG-PLANNED, WAS ALSO AIMED AT WARMING UP FRENCH-ISRAELI POLITICAL RELATIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN FRAYED BY CHIRAC'S OCTOBER 1996 TRIP TO THE REGION. THE NAMING OF AN EU PEACE PROCESS ENVOY HAS CALMED, BUT NOT REMOVED, PARIS' AMBITIONS TO CARVE OUT A ROLE FOR ITSELF IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

AFRICA

21. (X) FRANCE HAS UPWARDS OF 7,000 TROOPS STATIONED IN AFRICA (SENEGAL, COTE D'IVOIRE, CHAD, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, GABON, CAMEROON, CONGO, AND DJIBOUTI), A PRESENCE THAT REPRESENTS A MAJOR STABILIZING FORCE ON THE CONTINENT. BILATERALLY, FRANCE IS A MAJOR PROVIDER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, SPENDING ROUGHLY USDOLS 50 MILLION PER YEAR. THAT SAID, FRANCE IS INCREASINGLY

RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN ANY LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA EXCEPT IN OPERATIONS WITH A UN MANDATE AND PARTICIPATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES. THE UNDERLYING REASONS ARE TWOFOLD; THE HIGH COSTS OF UNILATERAL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE FACT THAT FRANCE GETS LITTLE CREDIT AND MUCH CRITICISM FOR ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, AS EVIDENCED BY PRESS REACTION TO OPERATION TURQUOISE IN RWANDA AND TO FRENCH OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

22. ~~(S)~~ AS A FORMER COLONIAL POWER, AND BECAUSE OF A MYRIAD OF POLITICAL, BUSINESS, PERSONAL AND SENTIMENTAL IES, THE FRENCH STILL VIEW FRANCOPHONE AFRICA AS SOMETHING OF THEIR PRIVATE DOMAIN AND ARE INSTINCTIVELY SUSPICIOUS OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES ON THE CONTINENT. THEY TEND TO VIEW PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AS A ZERO-SUM GAME, IN WHICH EVERY AMERICAN GAIN
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 PARIS 006644

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/07

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, FR

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 24-25 VISIT TO

- WASHINGTON OF FRENCH DEFMIN CHARLES MILLON

IS A FRENCH LOSS.

23. ~~(S)~~ SUSPICIONS ON ZAIRE: THE FRENCH ARE STILL SMARTING OVER THE FACT THAT THEIR REPEATED CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN EASTERN ZAIRE HAVE GONE UNFULFILLED. THEY INSIST THEIR INTEREST IS IN RELIEVING THE SUFFERING OF THE REFUGEES IN EASTERN ZAIRE; THEY DENY THAT THEIR MOTIVE IS PROPPING UP THE MOBUTU REGIME. THE FRENCH ARE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS ABOUT THE NATURE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA AND UGANDA. THEY BELIEVE UGANDA IN PARTICULAR HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE ON BEHALF OF THE REBELS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, SUPPLYING BOTH TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT.

24. ~~(S)~~ AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI): THE FIRST FRENCH REACTION TO THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE WAS EXTREMELY NEGATIVE, BUT AS THE CONCEPT EVOLVED, THE GOF BECAME MORE INTERESTED, SEEING THAT IT PARALLELED ITS OWN INTEREST IN BUILDING THE PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY OF AFRICAN ARMIES. FRENCH CHOD GENERAL DOUIN SPOKE PUBLICLY AND FAVORABLY ABOUT THE CONCEPT ON MARCH 20 DURING FRENCH-SPONSORED JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES BETWEEN TOGO, BENIN AND BURKINA FASO. PRIVATELY, MOD OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE U.S. INTEREST IN THE ACRI WILL BE AN ENDURING ONE.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05

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PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ VERSHBOW WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

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OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 261340Z MAR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
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 RUEHWD/AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK IMMEDIATE 0075
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 RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 2717
 RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 7394
 RUEHOSB/USLO ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0046
 RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 0447
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0446
 RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE IMMEDIATE 0744
 RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0321
 RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE IMMEDIATE 3803
 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0075
 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA IMMEDIATE 0253
 RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 2692
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**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.31)
KBH 8/9/2022

SUBJ: ZAIRE: FRENCH REITERATE THAT JOINT

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006921

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

LOME ALSO FOR A/S MOOSE

KIGALI ALSO FOR S/E WOLPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/2002

TAGS: PREL, OAU, CG, FR

SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH REITERATE THAT JOINT

- U.S.-FRENCH DEMARCHES ARE A SOUND IDEA

REF: PARIS 6791

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. (S) SUMMARY. CHARGE REITERATED U.S. POLICY ON ZAIRE IN A MARCH 25 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR LEVITTE. LEVITTE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE U.S. IDEA OF JOINT U.S.-FRENCH DEMARCHES TO AFRICAN STATES ON PRESSING THE GOZ TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN A SOUND ONE. HE CHARACTERIZED ZAIRE AS BEING THE BATTLEGROUND NOT OF OPPOSING FORCES, BUT OF "OPPOSING WEAKNESSES." END SUMMARY.

3. (S) CHARGE CALLED ON FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE MARCH 25, AND RAISED THE CURRENT CRISIS IN ZAIRE AMONG OTHER TOPICS (SEPTELS). CHARGE NOTED THAT U.S. AND FRANCE HAD CARRIED OUT JOINT DEMARCHES YESTERDAY IN AF CAPITALS, AND UNDERLINED THAT THIS HAD SENT A STRONG SIGNAL TO AFRICAN STATES AND TO THE WARRING PARTIES IN ZAIRE. HE SAID THE LOME MEETING PROVIDES A KEY OPPORTUNITY TO CONVINCe MOBUTU AND THE GOZ TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS A PRIORITY AND SAY SO PUBLICLY. AS AGREED LAST WEEK DURING AF A/S MOOSE'S VISIT TO PARIS, THIS IS PROBABLY THE ONLY WAY TO GET KABILA TO PAUSE AND TO ACCEPT A FULL CEASE-FIRE. CHARGE NOTED THAT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRESS (E.G., THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE) HAD MISUNDERSTOOD U.S.-FRENCH COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

4. (S) CHARGE ALSO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- THERE IS NO U.S.-FRENCH "PLAN" FOR ZAIRE. THERE IS A COMMON EFFORT, A CAREFULLY CONCERTED APPROACH IN SUPPORT OF SAHNOUN'S DIPLOMACY.

-- TOP PRIORITY IS LAUNCHING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUSION OF CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS LEVITTE DISCUSSED WITH NSA BERGER AND UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF, THAT IT IS TIME FOR MOBUTU TO EMPOWER A COALITION TO NEGOTIATE.

-- IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT KABILA HAS AT PRESENT ALL RESOURCES HE NEEDS TO MOUNT DRIVE ON KINSHASA (ALTHOUGH LUMUMBASHI AND SHABA PROVINCE ARE PROBABLY WITHIN REACH). NOR IS IT CLEAR HOW SOLID HIS ALLIANCE IS POLITICALLY.

-- WE HAVE RECEIVED SOME PRELIMINARY, TENTATIVE INFORMATION THAT ANGOLAN AID TO REBELS IS GREATER THAN WE ORIGINALLY SUPPOSED. KATANGANS ARE BEING USED, POSSIBLY SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THEM. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO VERIFY, WE HAVE STRONGLY WARNED THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST INTERFERING IN ZAIRE.

-- IF KABILA IS IN FACT OVEREXTENDED MILITARILY AND

POLITICALLY, THEN IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE
GOZ EXTEND AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE. WE MAY NOT GET
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 006921

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

LOME ALSO FOR A/S MOOSE

KIGALI ALSO FOR S/E WOLPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/002

TAGS: PREL, OAU, CG, FR

SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH REITERATE THAT JOINT

- U.S.-FRENCH DEMARCHES ARE A SOUND IDEA

ANOTHER CHANCE TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS.

5. (e) IN REPLY, LEVITTE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE IDEA
OF MAKING JOINT DEMARCHES HAD BEEN AN AMERICAN ONE,
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HE CHARACTERIZED ZAIRE AS A COUNTRY THAT DOES NOT HAVE
TWO OPPOSING FORCES, BUT TWO SETS OF OPPOSING
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WEAKNESS AND THE FRAILTY OF MOBUTU. KABILA'S FORCES
SUFFER FROM THE IMMENSE SIZE OF ZAIRE AND THE RISK OF
DISINTEGRATION OF THE UNITARY STATE.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 6921
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PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ VERSHBOW WECHSLER
SIT: NSC

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SUBJ: ZAIRE: FRENCH REITERATE THAT JOINT
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006921
 C O R R E C T E D COPY (USLO ABUJA ADDED)
 CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY
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 E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/2002
 TAGS: PREL, OAU, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRENCH REITERATE THAT JOINT
 - U.S.-FRENCH DEMARCHES ARE A SOUND IDEA
 REF: PARIS 6791

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.32)
KBH 8/9/2022

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. CHARGE REITERATED U.S. POLICY ON ZAIRE IN A MARCH 25 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR LEVITTE. LEVITTE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE U.S. IDEA OF JOINT U.S.-FRENCH DEMARCHES TO AFRICAN STATES ON PRESSING THE GOZ TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN A SOUND ONE. HE CHARACTERIZED ZAIRE AS BEING THE BATTLEGROUND NOT OF OPPOSING FORCES, BUT OF "OPPOSING WEAKNESSES." END SUMMARY.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 006921

C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDEE USLO ABUJA ADDED)
CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

LOME ALSO FOR A/S MOKSE

KIGALI ALSO FOR S/E WOLPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/2002

TAGS: PREL, OAU, CG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE; FRENCH REITERATE THAT JOINT
- U.S.-FRENCH DEMARCHES ARE A SOUND IDEA

ANOTHER CHANCE TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS.

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BANDLER

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 INFO: RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0449
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0821
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUFNGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//PLAD, IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: (U) PRESS REPORT OF AMERICAN "ADVISOR"
 - KILLED IN ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.33)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 007121

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS TWADDELL
 DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS WAYNE
 DEPARTMENT FOR P- DAVID GOLDWYN
 NSC FOR SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: (U) PRESS REPORT OF AMERICAN "ADVISOR"
 - KILLED IN ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D, X5, 6.
2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAGRAPH 6.
3. (U) MARCH 28 "LE FIGARO" FEATURES A REPORT ENTITLED "AN AMERICAN 'ADVISOR' KILLED IN KIVU: THIS DEATH CONFIRMS THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITES STATES ON THE SIDE OF THE REBELS." (ARTICLE FAXED TO P, AF, EUR/WE) CITING SOURCES CLOSE TO THE FRENCH MOD, THE ARTICLE CLAIMS AN AMERICAN WAS KILLED ON THE FRONT LINE BETWEEN THE REBELS AND GOZ TROOPS, AND THAT THE RECOVERY OF THE BODY AND ITS RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WAS FACILITATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE. NO NAMES, DATES OR SPECIFIC PLACES ARE MENTIONED. A SOURCE IS QUOTED AS SAYING "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER HE WAS A CIVILIAN OR MILITARY. BUT THIS WAS NO ORDINARY SPECIAL FORCES SERGEANT: THIS WAS A BIG FISH".
4. (U) THE FIGARO ARTICLE ALLEGES CLOSE U.S.-FRENCH

COOPERATION IN RECOVERING THE BODY AND ALSO MENTIONS THE EARLIER DEATHS IN ZAIRE OF AN AMERICAN AND AN ISRAELI WITH CONNECTIONS TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THESE TWO BODIES HAVE NOT BEEN RECOVERED. ACCORDING TO THE "FIGARO" REPORT, A NUMBER OF AMERICANS ARE PRESENT IN THE REGION UNDER THE COVER OF VIRGINIA-BASED MILITARY PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES, INCORPORATED.

5. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT. THE INTENT OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO "PROVE" U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS BY FOCUSING ON A SPECIFIC CASE. MANY FRENCH OBSERVERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE MEDIA AND AMONG THE MILITARY, ALREADY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. IS PROVIDING SOME SORT OF CLANDESTINE ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. BY CITING FRENCH MOD SOURCES, THE "FIGARO" ARTICLE ACQUIRES AN EXTRA MEASURE OF CREDIBILITY LOCALLY, EVEN THOUGH IT PROVIDES FEW CORROBORATING DETAILS TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS. COMMENT.

6. ~~(S)~~ ACTION REQUEST. IF ASKED, EMBASSY WILL NOT COMMENT AND WILL REFER QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS ARTICLE TO WASHINGTON. A "NO COMMENT," HOWEVER, WILL NOT HELP TO PUT TO REST PERSISTENT ALLEGATIONS AND DISINFORMATION HERE OF OFFICIAL AND/OR UNOFFICIAL U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. EMBASSY REQUESTS GUIDANCE ASAP REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS IN THIS ARTICLE AND THE BROADER QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. END ACTION REQUEST.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7121

TOR: 970328072815 M2688153

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JOHNSON JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK
ORR PASSDOWN PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE RUBIN SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA7548 0931715-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 031715Z APR 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 031715Z APR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0830
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4974
INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SUBJ: FRENCH ON ZAIRE: IT'S IN KABILA'S COURT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0240-M (1.34)
KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 007548

E.O. 12958: DECL: APRIL 2, 2002
TAGS: PREL, CG, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH ON ZAIRE: IT'S IN KABILA'S COURT

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. (S) AF/C DIRECTOR MARC BAAS CALLED ON FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN APRIL 2 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON ZAIRE IN LIGHT OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. BAAS TOLD ROISIN THAT, IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE CURRENT PROBLEM IS HOW MOBUTU WILL LEAVE POWER AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS. MOBUTU STILL DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE ACCEPTED THAT HIS TIME IS AT AN END, AND HAS YET TO ISSUE A CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS MANDATE TO THE "COUNCIL" TAPPED TO GO TO SOUTH AFRICA TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. MOBUTU HAS LEFT HIMSELF ENOUGH ROOM TO DENY AFTERWARDS THAT THE TEAM WAS EMPOWERED TO NEGOTIATE. MOBUTU NEEDS TO HAVE A ROLE, BUT ONLY A LIMITED ONE. BAAS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY TOWARD A TRANSITION TO A POST-MOBUTU ERA, ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES AND INCLUDING GENUINE ELECTIONS, BEFORE THE REBELS ADVANCE ANY FURTHER AND KABILA'S HEAD GETS TOO SWOLLEN.
3. (S) ROISIN REPLIED THAT THE MARCH 5 DECLARATION OF THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED NEGOTIATIONS IN PRINCIPLE AND THE STATEMENT WAS ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, THE PARTICIPATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR NGABANDA SEEMED A GOOD INDICATOR THAT THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE WAS AN AUTHORITATIVE ONE. FOR FRANCE, ROISIN STATED, THE MOST SALIENT QUESTION WAS WHAT THE REACTION OF KABILA WOULD BE TO THE GOZ TEAM. ARE THE REBELS TRULY INTERESTED IN

NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASEFIRE, OR ARE WILL THEY JUST STALL, HE WONDERED. HE WAS PLEASED WHEN BAAS TOLD HIM THAT THE U.S. STILL ENVISAGED NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE UNDER THE AEGIS OF SRSG MOHAMMED SAHNOUN, AND THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN AS SURPRISED AS FRANCE AT THE LATEST SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS AT ORGANIZING TALKS. ROISIN SAID THAT FRANCE'S POLICY WOULD REMAIN NOT TO INITIATE EFFORTS CONCERNING GOZ-REBEL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT INFORMING AND GAINING THE AGREEMENT OF SAHNOUN, BUT THAT FRANCE REMAINED READY TO BE HELPFUL WHERE NEEDED.

4. ~~(C)~~ ROISIN RECOUNTED HIS OWN ENCOUNTER WITH REBEL FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES KAHARA AND KAKUDJI WHEN THEY WERE IN LOME. ROISIN WAS VERY MUCH STRUCK BY CERTAIN STATEMENTS OF KAHARA QUESTIONING THE UTILITY OF ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE UNTIL THE POPULATION HAD BEEN PROPERLY "INDOCTRINATED," AND WONDERING WHAT DEMOCRACY WAS. HE ALSO SAID THAT KAHARA'S AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE IN HIS FIRST MEETING WITH A FRENCH OFFICIAL (ROISIN) ALONG WITH TALK OF "INDOCTRINATION" OF THE POPULATION DID LITTLE TO REASSURE THE GOF. MOREOVER, ROISIN SAID THAT FEW DEMARCHES TO KABILA, BE THEY FROM FRANCE OR BE THEY FROM THE U.S., SEEM TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON HIM. BAAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE USG ALSO HAD SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF KABILA AND HIS MOVEMENT TO DEMOCRACY, DESPITE THEIR ASSURANCES IN THIS REGARD, AND NOTED KABILA'S AVOWEDLY MARXIST PAST.

5. ~~(C)~~ ROISIN CLOSED BY NOTING THE DESPERATE SITUATION OF UPWARDS OF 100,000 REFUGEES BETWEEN UBUNDU AND KISINGANI, AND ASKED THAT THE USG DO WHAT IT COULD TO PRESS KABILA TO FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF RELIEF AID TOWARD THEM. BAAS ASSURED ROISIN THAT THE U.S. HAD CONTINUOUSLY PRESSED KABILA TO ALLOW AID TO GET TO REFUGEES, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT THE UNHCR MUST ALSO LEARN TO ACCEPT THE "YES" THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM KABILA AS A "YES," AND SHOULD PROCEED QUICKLY TO FACILITATE EVACUATIONS.

6. ~~(C)~~ IN RESPONSE TO ROISIN'S MENTION THAT CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS HAD BEGUN TO NOTE EVIDENCE OF WIDESCALE KILLINGS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, BAAS SAID THE USG FULLY SUPPORTS LOOKING CLOSELY AT THE SITUATION AND DETERMINING WHICH AMONG THE MANY ARMED GROUPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE MAY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH KILLINGS. ROISIN SAID HUMAN RIGHTS NGO'S ARE BEGINNING TO POINT AT THE REBELS.

7. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: ROISIN WAS MORE AT EASE IN DISCUSSING FRENCH ZAIRE POLICY AUTHORITATIVELY THAN IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS, PROBABLY INDICATING A GREATER DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT THAN BEFORE, WHEN THE ISSUE SEEMED TO WORKED MORE EXCLUSIVELY BY THE PRESIDENCY.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7548

TOR: 970403122008 M2696514

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 WECHSLER
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA7563 0940931-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 040931Z APR 97 ZDK
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 040931Z APR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4986
 INFO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0450
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0831
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUFNGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//PLAD, IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: (U) PRESS REPORT OF AMERICAN "ADVISOR"
 - KILLED IN ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0210-M (1.35)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 007563

C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA 6. CHG PARA MARKINGS TO
 (C) VICE (S).)

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS TWADDELL
 DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS WAYNE
 DEPARTMENT FOR P- DAVID GOLDWYN
 NSC FOR SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: (U) PRESS REPORT OF AMERICAN "ADVISOR"
 - KILLED IN ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
 REASON 1.5 B AND D, X5, 6.
2. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAGRAPH 6.
3. (U) MARCH 28 "LE FIGARO" FEATURES A REPORT
 ENTITLED "AN AMERICAN 'ADVISOR' KILLED IN KIVU: THIS
 DEATH CONFIRMS THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITES STATES ON
 THE SIDE OF THE REBELS." (ARTICLE FAXED TO P, AF,
 EUR/WE) CITING SOURCES CLOSE TO THE FRENCH MOD, THE
 ARTICLE CLAIMS AN AMERICAN WAS KILLED ON THE FRONT LINE
 BETWEEN THE REBELS AND GOZ TROOPS, AND THAT THE
 RECOVERY OF THE BODY AND ITS RETURN TO THE UNITED
 STATES WAS FACILITATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE. NO
 NAMES, DATES OR SPECIFIC PLACES ARE MENTIONED. A
 SOURCE IS QUOTED AS SAYING "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY
 WHETHER HE WAS A CIVILIAN OR MILITARY. BUT THIS WAS NO

ORDINARY SPECIAL FORCES SERGEANT: THIS WAS A BIG FISH".

4. (U) THE FIGARO ARTICLE ALLEGES CLOSE U.S.-FRENCH COOPERATION IN RECOVERING THE BODY AND ALSO MENTIONS THE EARLIER DEATHS IN ZAIRE OF AN AMERICAN AND AN ISRAELI WITH CONNECTIONS TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THESE TWO BODIES HAVE NOT BEEN RECOVERED. ACCORDING TO THE "FIGARO" REPORT, A NUMBER OF AMERICANS ARE PRESENT IN THE REGION UNDER THE COVER OF VIRGINIA-BASED MILITARY PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES, INCORPORATED.

5. (C) COMMENT. THE INTENT OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO "PROVE" U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS BY FOCUSING ON A SPECIFIC CASE. MANY FRENCH OBSERVERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE MEDIA AND AMONG THE MILITARY, ALREADY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. IS PROVIDING SOME SORT OF CLANDESTINE ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. BY CITING FRENCH MOD SOURCES, THE "FIGARO" ARTICLE ACQUIRES AN EXTRA MEASURE OF CREDIBILITY LOCALLY, EVEN THOUGH IT PROVIDES FEW CORROBORATING DETAILS TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS. COMMENT.

6. (C) ACTION REQUEST. IF ASKED, EMBASSY WILL NOT COMMENT AND WILL REFER QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS ARTICLE TO WASHINGTON. A "NO COMMENT," HOWEVER, WILL NOT HELP TO PUT TO REST PERSISTENT ALLEGATIONS AND DISINFORMATION HERE OF OFFICIAL AND/OR UNOFFICIAL U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. EMBASSY REQUESTS GUIDANCE ASAP REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS IN THIS ARTICLE AND THE BROADER QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN REBELS. END ACTION REQUEST.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7563

TOR: 970404084259 M2698072

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA7911 0981817-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADXAD93D0 MSI4381 021)
 LINE3: P 081817Z APR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 081817Z APR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5084
 INFO: RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER'S
 - CHIEF OF STAFF

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.36)
 KRH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

////////////////////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////////////////////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007911

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/07
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, NATO, EUN, CG, AL, RS, GM, IT, UG
 SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER'S
 - CHIEF OF STAFF

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5
 (B).

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: FRENCH GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND MAJORITY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT STRONGLY FAVOR EARLY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, BUT THE DECISION WILL DEPEND ON CHIRAC'S ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC REACTION, PM JUPPE'S CHIEF OF STAFF MAURICE GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE TOLD CHARGE APRIL 8. THOUGH MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY ADVOCATES FULL FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE HIGHLIGHTED THE OPPOSITION OF PART OF THE FRENCH POLITICAL ELITE. HE EXPECTS THE APRIL 9 KOHL/CHIRAC MEETING IN BONN TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU); IT IS TOO EARLY FOR MAJOR PROGRESS ON THE OTHER MAIN AGENDA ITEM -- THE EU'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE (IGC). ON ALBANIA, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID THE FRENCH DECISION TO SEND TROOPS REFLECTED A DESIRE TO "HELP THE ITALIANS." HE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM REGARDING PROGRESS IN THE ZAIRE PEACE TALKS, A HIGHLY CRITICAL VIEW OF REBEL LEADER KABILA, AND THE FRENCH COMMITMENT TO REACH OUT MORE TO ANGLOPHONE AFRICA. END SUMMARY.
 FRENCH DOMESTIC SCENE

3. (S) IN AN APRIL 8 MEETING WITH THE CHARGE, FRENCH PM JUPPE'S CHIEF OF STAFF MAURICE GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE WAS UNUSUALLY CANDID IN HIS COMMENTS ON THE FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE, ESPECIALLY THE RUMORS OF EARLY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. (NOTE: ELECTIONS TO THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE CURRENTLY PLANNED FOR ARCH 1998.) GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID THAT JUPPE'S OVERALL OUTLOOK ON THE CURRENT FRENCH SITUATION IS QUITE POSITIVE. THE PM SEES ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT AND A BREAK IN THE MOROSITY THAT HAD GRIPPED THE FRENCH PUBLIC FOR MANY MONTHS. THE FRENCH IN JUPPE'S VIEW, SENSE THAT THINGS ARE STARTING TO TURN AROUND. PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS HELD TO ITS LIMITS ON SOCIAL SECURITY SPENDING SINCE AUGUST (DESPITE CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH RECEIPTS). THERE HAS BEEN NO RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM WITHIN FRANCE, AND THE SITUATION IN CORSICA HAS IMPROVED. THE RECENT, MODEST DECLINE IN POLL FIGURES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER HAS STOPPED, AND JUPPE BELIEVES THE FRENCH SENSE THAT THE COUNTRY IS BEING GOVERNED SERIOUSLY. THAT SAID, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE UNDERLINED, PUBLIC OPINION REMAINS VERY FRAGILE, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO SOCIAL ISSUES. STRIKES AT AIR FRANCE AND BY MEDICAL INTERNS HAVE FED PUBLIC UNCERTAINTY.

4. (S) ASKED IF THIS SITUATION WAS RIPE FOR EARLY ELECTIONS, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID THAT EARLY ELECTIONS WERE STILL VERY DEFINITELY A MATTER OF RUMOR. NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN, AND ANY DECISION WILL BE UP TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC HIMSELF. THE KEY QUESTION WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION OF A DECISION TO CALL EARLY ELECTIONS. PRIVATE POLLS, INCLUDING THOSE CONDUCTED FOR THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, SHOW THE CURRENT CENTER-RIGHT COALITION WINNING 340 TO 380 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS (OUT OF A POSSIBLE 577) IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD NOW. "BUT ARE THE FRENCH READY?," GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE ASKED RHETORICALLY. ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR EARLY ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE STRONG, CONVINCING AND WELL ORCHESTRATED IN ADVANCE. THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS) WOULD BE CERTAIN TO ACCUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF MANIPULATION.

5. (S) THERE IS AMPLE REASON TO SHIFT THE ELECTORAL CALENDAR, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID. THE CURRENT MARCH 1998 ELECTION DATE WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF POLITICIZING DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON THE EURO AND THE 1998 FRENCH BUDGET. MAJORITY DEPUTIES IN PARLIAMENT ARE STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF EARLY ELECTIONS, AND THE GOVERNMENT MEMBERS, THOUGH SPLIT, ARE 75 IN FAVOR. A DECISION TO CALL EARLY ELECTIONS WOULD SHOW THE GOVERNMENT WAS MASTER OF THE SITUATION, NOT LIMITED TO A REACTIVE MODE. EARLY ELECTIONS COULD ALSO HELP CUT OFF A FEARED RISE IN THE FORTUNES OF FRANCE'S EXTREME RIGHT FRONT NATIONAL (FN), AND A VICTORY FOR THE FRENCH CENTER-RIGHT COULD HELP GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL IN HIS OWN 1998 REELECTION BID. NONETHELESS,

GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE AGAIN UNDERLINED, THE DECISION WILL
TURN ON CHIRAC AND JUPPE'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW EARLY
ELECTIONS WOULD PLAY WITH PUBLIC OPINION.

6. ~~(C)~~ ASKED ABOUT RUMORS THAT FINANCE MINISTER
ARTHUIS AND LABOR MINISTER BARROT WOULD BE "INDICTED"
(MIS EN EXAMEN), PERHAPS TRIGGERING A GOVERNMENT
RESHUFFLE OR HELPING JUSTIFY EARLY ELECTIONS,
GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID THE SITUATION WAS VERY
UNCERTAIN. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO HARD INDICATION THAT
THE INVESTIGATING MAGISTRATE WILL IN FACT INDICT EITHER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

SSN: 7911

TOR: 970409072223 M2704616

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA7911 0981817-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 081817Z APR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 081817Z APR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5085
 INFO: RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER'S
 - CHIEF OF STAFF

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2017-0240-m (1.37)
 KBH 8/9/2022

OF THE TWO MINISTERS.

TEXT:

////////////////////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////////////////////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 007911

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/07
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, NATO, EUN, CG, AL, RS, GM, IT, UG
 SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER'S
 - CHIEF OF STAFF

OF THE TWO MINISTERS.

7. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST
 AUTHORITATIVE INDICATION WE HAVE OF SERIOUS, TOP-LEVEL
 CONSIDERATION OF EARLY ELECTIONS. ANOTHER SOURCE TOLD
 US LATER THAT MANY OF CHIRAC'S CLOSEST ADVISORS,
 INCLUDING ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL DE VILLEPIN, FAVOR
 EARLY ELECTIONS, BUT CHIRAC'S INSTINCTS RUN THE OTHER
 WAY. END COMMENT.

NATO ADAPTATION

8. (C) WHEN CHARGE UNDERLINED THE EXCEPTIONAL EFFORTS
 THE USG HAS MADE TO IMPLEMENT THE BERLIN PRINCIPLES AND
 ADDRESS FRENCH CONCERNS IN THE NATO ADAPTATION PROCESS,
 GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE IS AN ADVOCATE
 FOR FULL FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO THE NATO MILITARY
 STRUCTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE STRESSED THAT THE
 ISSUE IS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION,
 WHICH IS FACING A SERIES OF OTHER DECISIONS (EMU, IGC)
 ALSO TOUCHING ON FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES. HE
 STRESSED THAT BOTH THE GOVERNMENT MAJORITY AND THE
 SOCIALIST OPPOSITION IN PARTICULAR INCLUDE "DINOSAURS,"

EVEN AMONG THEIR YOUNGER MEMBERS. WHEN PRESSED, THOUGH, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT VIS-A-VIS BROAD PUBLIC OPINION, BUT RATHER ELITE OPINION. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED CHARGE'S POINT THAT PUBLIC OPINION OUTSIDE THE PARIS BELTWAY HAS SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST, AND THAT CHIRAC WOULD ALSO FACE PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEMS IF THE ADAPTATION TALKS ARE SEEN TO FAIL.

FRANCE-RUSSIA

9. (X) ASKED ABOUT THE APRIL 8-9 PARIS VISIT OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE NOTED THAT PRIMAKOV WOULD BE MEETING WITH JUPPE, IN PART TO PREPARE THE NEXT MEETING OF THE JUPPE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION. FRANCE AND RUSSIA HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BUSINESS TO DO, ALTHOUGH GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE LAMENTED THAT THERE IS CURRENTLY "NOT TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA."

FRANCE, GERMANY AND EUROPE

10. (X) THE MAIN ISSUES FOR THE APRIL 9 CHIRAC-KOHL MEETING IN BONN WILL BE THE IGC AND EMU, ACCORDING TO GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE. HE EXPECTS NO MAJOR DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IGC RIGHT NOW AND BELIEVES THE FOCUS WILL BE MORE HEAVILY ON EMU. THERE, TOO, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE DOES NOT FORESEE A REAL CHANGE IN POLICY, ALTHOUGH HE OPINED THAT NO EU COUNTRY WOULD MEET THE 3 PERCENT BUDGET DEFICIT CRITERION TO ENTER THE EURO. THIS IMPLIES A NEED FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY IN INTERPRETING THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA. EVEN THE GERMAN ECONOMY, IN GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE'S VIEW, CANNOT SERVE AS A MODEL ANYMORE. KOHL SIMPLY CANNOT THROW MONEY AT HIS PROBLEMS.

ALBANIA

11. (X) TOUCHING BRIEFLY ON ALBANIA, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE CHARACTERIZED THE SITUATION AS ONE OF ANARCHY, NOT CIVIL WAR. HE HOPES THAT THE FRENCH TROOPS ON THEIR WAY TO ALBANIA WILL HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION SOMEWHAT AND FACILITATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE MAIN REASON THE FRENCH AGREED TO SEND TROOPS TO ALBANIA, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE ARGUED, WAS TO "HELP THE ITALIANS," WHO HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO FRANCE IN A NUMBER OF AREAS RECENTLY. (COMMENT: FRANCE WANTS THE ALBANIA ACTION TO BE A SUCCESS THAT DEMONSTRATES EUROPEAN COMPETENCE IN RESPONDING TO A SIGNIFICANT EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM.)

AFRICA

12. (X) IN GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE'S VIEW, MOBUTU IS IN A

BAD POSITION, BUT ZAIRE REBEL LEADER KABILA IS A VERY UNSAVORY CHARACTER. WHILE EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE ZAIRE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND PRAISING SRSG SAHNOUN AS AN EXCEPTIONALLY ABLE DIPLOMAT, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. HE UNDERLINED THAT KABILA CONTINUES TO ADVANCE, WHILE REFUSING A CEASEFIRE AND DENYING ACCESS TO REFUGEES FACING A GRAVE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. HE CHARACTERIZED KABILA AS A "CORRUPT POL POT CHARACTER."

13. (C) GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE STRESSED THAT FRANCE WILL BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SOLICITING ANGLOPHONE AFRICA THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST. HE MENTIONED NIGERIA, GHANA, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 007911

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/07

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, NATO, EUN, CG, AL, RS, GM, IT, UG
SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER'S
- CHIEF OF STAFF

AND SOUTH AFRICA IN PARTICULAR. RECALLING THE FEBRUARY 11 CHIRAC-MUSEVENI MEETING IN PARIS, GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE SAID THE UGANDAN PRESIDENT WAS HARD TO PIN DOWN BUT KNOWS HOW TO MANIPULATE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST. THE PROBLEM WITH MUSEVENI IS THAT HE WANTS TO CHANGE BORDERS IN AFRICA. GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE EXPRESSED GOF SATISFACTION WITH OVERALL IMPROVED U.S.-FRENCH COOPERATION IN AFRICA. CHARGE AGREED AND DREW ATTENTION TO PROGRESS IN RECONCILING BILATERAL DIFFERENCES ON THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE INITIATIVE (ACRFI). FRANCE SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING THE ACRFI'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNDPKO, AND OF FINDING THE BEST WAY TO IDENTIFY AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 7911
<^SSN>7911

TOR: 970409010607 M2704235
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SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 091647Z APR 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 091647Z APR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5133
INFO: RUCNACR/AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//PLAD, PRIORITY
SUBJ: ACRF CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS: UN ROLE AND
- SELECTION MECHANISM THE KEYS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.38)

KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008030

E.O. 12958: DECL: APRIL 8, 2002
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PREL, FR, XA
SUBJECT: ACRF CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS: UN ROLE AND
- SELECTION MECHANISM THE KEYS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLMINCOUNS ERIC TERZUOLO, REASONS 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. IN APRIL 7 CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS, AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE COORDINATOR MCCALLIE NOTED THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE HAD COME CLOSER TOGETHER, AND ARGUED FOR STARTING INFORMALLY, WITH SMALL STEPS, TO IMPLEMENT AN ACRF. THE FRENCH FORCEFULLY ARGUED FOR AN INSTITUTIONAL ACRF/U.N. TO PROVIDE LEGITIMACY AND HELP AVOID INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM FOR PICKING AND CHOOSING AMONG POTENTIAL AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS. THE U.S. AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS AGREED TO HOLD DISCREET TALKS ON NEXT STEPS IN NEW YORK, WITH THE BRITISH AND THE U.N. DEPARTMENT FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, IN LATE APRIL OR MAY. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) ON APRIL 7 AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE SPECIAL COORDINATOR MARSHALL MCCALLIE, ACCOMPANIED BY NSC AFRICA DIRECTOR SHAWN MCCORMICK, JCS/J5 COLONEL MIKE TURNER, EUCOM LIEUTENANT COLONEL MIKE BURKE, EUCOM POLITICAL ADVISOR JOE WILSON AND EMBASSY NOTETAKER, MET WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS TO COMPARE NOTES ON THE ACRF INITIATIVE. PARTICIPANTS ON THE FRENCH SIDE INCLUDED: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY (QUAI) DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS JEAN DE GLINIASTY; ACTING DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS YANNICK GERARD; DEFENSE MINISTRY CABINET ADVISOR ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COLONEL HENRI PONCET; CHIEF OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY DELEGATION FOR STRATEGIC AFFAIRS NAVY CAPTAIN HENRI DUMONTET; JOINT STAFF AFRICA ADVISOR COLONEL DELORT; QUAI DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR UN POLITICAL AFFAIRS JEAN-RENE GEHAN; QUAI AFRICA BUREAU SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR PEACEKEEPING GILLES BIENVENU; COOPERATION MINISTRY DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY COOPERATION COLONEL LEMOINE AND QUAI INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BUREAU PEACEKEEPING OFFICER CHRISTOPHE WURTZ. A BRITISH EMBOFF ALSO ATTENDED.

4. (C) AMBASSADOR MCCALLIE OPENED BY NOTING THAT, SINCE HE HAD LAST CONSULED IN PARIS IN FEBRUARY, THERE HAD BEEN A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF NONPAPERS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE, AND HE HAD CONSULTED WITH THE U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK. HE NOTED U.S. AND FRENCH AGREEMENT THAT EFFORTS AT ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF AFRICAN MILITARIES SHOULD BE FOCUSED AT THE SUBREGIONAL LEVEL, AND THAT SMALL COUNTRIES UNABLE TO CONTRIBUTE UNITS AS LARGE AS A BATTALLION CAN STILL HAVE A USEFUL TROOP-CONTRIBUTING ROLE TO PLAY. ACKNOWLEDGING A REAL NEED FOR A U.N. ROLE IN THE ACRF, MCCALLIE NOTED THE DIFFICULTY THE USG WOULD HAVE WITH ANY PERCEPTION THAT THE ACRF WAS JUST ANOTHER U.N. OPERATION. MOREOVER, IF THE ACRF CONCEPT WERE RAISED IN THE CONTEXT OF A U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, CALLING FOR THE FORMATION OF A GROUP TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER, THE WHOLE CONCEPT COULD RUN INTO POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND UNWANTED PARTICIPANTS, WHICH COULD KILL THE IDEA. MCCALLIE SAID THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE MANNER AND TIMING OF U.N. INVOLVEMENT AND IN HOW TO SELECT PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, POSITIONS WERE CLOSE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S., FRANCE AND OTHER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES TOGETHER TRY TO TAKE COMMON CONCRETE ACTION SOON, FULLY RECOGNIZING THAT THE INITIAL ACRF FRAMEWORK WILL NOT BE PERMANENT AND WILL EVOLVE.

U.N. ROLE CRUCIAL TO THE FRENCH

5. (C) QUAI INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIRECTOR DE GLINIASTY REPEATEDLY AND FORCEFULLY STATED THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.N. IN AN EVENTUAL ACRF IS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL AND A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE FOR FRANCE, PRIMARILY FOR REASONS OF POLITICAL COVER AND INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMATION. HE STRESSED THAT FRANCE, AS A FORMER COLONIAL POWER, HAS A LONG HISTORY IN AFRICA, AND THAT ITS EVERY MOVE IS SUSPECT. THE GOF DOES NOT WANT INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM FOR ITS ROLE IN AN EVENTUAL ACRF. THE ONLY WAY, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, TO AVOID SUCH UNFOUNDED CRITICISM OF FRANCE (OR THE U.S.) IS TO WORK THE ISSUE THROUGH THE U.N. MOREOVER, DE GLINIASTY SAID, THE DPKO AND U.N. SECRETARIAT NEED THE COVER AND LEGITIMATION OF UNGA APPROVAL OF THEIR ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN ACRF.

GET A U.N. COVER, THEN DO WHAT YOU WANT

6. (C) DE GLINIASTY SUGGESTED THAT A LEGITIMIZING UMBRELLA MECHANISM FOR THE ACRF COULD TAKE THE FORM OF AN UNGA CALL FOR THE FORMATION OF A WORKING GROUP OR COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON THE ACRF (NECESSARILY OPEN TO ALL IN THE U.N.), WHICH IN TURN WOULD FORM A STEERING ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 008030

E.O. 12958: DECL: APRIL 8, 2002
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PREL, FR, XA
SUBJECT: ACRF CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS: UN ROLE AND
- SELECTION MECHANISM THE KEYS

GROUP OR CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THOSE STATES, (INCLUDING FRANCE AND THE U.S.) THAT WOULD REALLY WORK THE ISSUE. (NOTE: HE LAMENTED THAT IT WAS ALREADY TOO LATE TO RAISE THE MATTER BEFORE THE UNGA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING, WHICH WOULD MEET IN APRIL. END NOTE). DE GLINIASTY CONFIDENTLY CHARACTERIZED THIS AS A CLASSIC U.N. MANEUVER WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE UNACCEPTABLE COUNTRIES, BUT WITH THE ONUS OF EXCLUSION NEITHER ON FRANCE NOR THE U.S. DESPITE QUESTIONING BY USDEL, DE GLINIASTY REMAINED VAGUE ON HOW ONE COULD ENSURE THAT AN UNACCEPTABLE COUNTRY IN THE WORKING GROUP WOULD NOT GET INTO THE STEERING GROUP. MCCALLIE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO START SMALL AND GROW LARGER.

OTHER ISSUES

7. (C) USDEL RAISED A NUMBER OF OTHER QUESTIONS:

-THE FRENCH INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT TIED TO ANY SPECIFICS WITH REGARD TO PROVIDING ACRF TRAINING AT THE SUBREGIONAL LEVEL, BUT SUCH TRAINING COULD BE PROVIDED THROUGH PRESENT OR FUTURE SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THUS, WHILE ECOWAS/ECOMOG PRESENTED SOME DIFFICULTIES, ANOTHER NOT-YET-EXTANT WEST AFRICAN SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATION MIGHT NOT.

-MCCALLIE CAUTIONED THAT TRAINING PROVIDED THROUGH AN ACRF SHOULD AIM TO PREPARE COUNTRIES FOR CHAPTER 6-TYPE OPERATIONS. THE FRENCH TOOK HIS POINT, BUT NOTED THAT THE ONLY JURIDICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHAPTERS 6 AND 7 OF THE U.N. CHARTER IS THAT CHAPTER 7 CAN AUTHORIZE INTERVENTION WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF A STATE. CHAPTERS 6 AND 7 DO NOT SPEAK OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OR LEVEL OF ARMAMENT, AND CHAPTER 6 INTERVENTIONS CAN SUDDENLY BECOME RISKIER THAN AT THE OUTSET OF AN OPERATION.

-THE FRENCH VIEW THE EXISTING U.N. TRUST FUND AS A SUFFICIENTLY TRANSPARENT AND RELIABLE MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH TO FUNNEL ACRF-RELATED ASSISTANCE, AND NOTED THAT SOME POTENTIAL DONORS, NOTABLY JAPAN AND SPAIN, CANNOT PROVIDE FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE DIRECTLY TO RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, AND MUST USE A MECHANISM SUCH AS

THE U.N. TRUST FUND.

-THE FRENCH HAD NO STRONGLY-HELD VIEWS ON THE PREPOSITIONING OF NON-LETHAL MATERIEL IN AFRICA, NOTING THAT THEIR SUGGESTION TO DO SO IS DRIVEN BY CONCERN ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF TRANSPORTING MATERIEL TO AFRICA ON SHORT NOTICE.

-THE FRENCH DO NOT ENVISION AN ACRF CHARTER AS A FORMAL DOCUMENT REQUIRING SIGNATURES OR RATIFICATION.

INFORMAL CONTACTS

8. (X) IN RESPONSE TO SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE GOF WISHED TO PURSUE INFORMAL ACRF DISCUSSIONS, USDEL INQUIRED WHETHER THE GOF WOULD LIKE TO HOLD FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE U.S., FRANCE THE U.K. AND THE DPKO IN NEW YORK IN LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY. THE FRENCH DELEGATION RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY THAT THEY WOULD. THE FRENCH WERE AWARE OF MCCALLIE'S NEW YORK CONTACTS, WHICH INDICATED THAT THE DPKO IS NOT READY AT THIS TIME TO ASSUME AN ACTIVE OVERSIGHT ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN ACRF. DE GLINIASTY REITERATED THE FRENCH BELIEF THAT A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO INVOLVE THE U.N. THAT PROVIDES LEGITIMATION AND POLITICAL COVER FRANCE SEES AS SO NECESSARY, WHILE REMAINING RESPONSIVE TO U.S. POLITICAL RELUCTANCE TO FUND "JUST ANOTHER U.N. OPERATION". "THERE ARE THIRTY-SIX WAYS TO OBTAIN LEGITIMACY AT THE U.N. AND YET STILL DO WHAT YOU WANT," DE GLINIASTY SAID BY WAY OF CONCLUSION.

COMMENT

9. (X) THE DESIRE FOR POLITICAL COVER AND LEGITIMATION IS A REAL CONCERN FOR THE GOF. FRANCE IS STILL CRITICIZED DOMESTICALLY FOR ITS ROLE IN OPERATION TURQUOISE IN RWANDA IN 1994. IN THE CASE OF ZAIRE, FRANCE HAS INSISTED IT WILL TAKE NO MILITARY ACTIONS EXCEPT UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL MANDATE OR TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS.

10. (X) THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER AMBASSADOR MCCALLIE DEPARTED PARIS.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 8030
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DIST:
SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES JORDAN MCCORMICK PRENDERGAST RICE
SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Zaire: Mobutu's Departure (4 pages)	04/17/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
002. cable	re: Evacuation of Third Country Nationals: Coordinating with France (2 pages)	04/18/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
003. cable	re: French Appeal for U.S. Statement on Zaire (3 pages)	04/21/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
004. cable	re: U.S.-French Relations and Zaire (3 pages)	04/25/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
005. cable	re: Zaire: Ambassador Richardson's Consultations in Paris (7 pages)	05/12/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
006. cable	re: Zaire: Richarson - Sahnoun Meeting (3 pages)	05/12/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
007. cable	re: Evacuations in Africa (4 pages)	05/13/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
008. cable	re: French Relations with Kabila (2 pages)	05/21/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023
009. cable	re: The President's Meeting with French President Chirac: Non-NATO Issues (6 pages)	05/22/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Zaire and France])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/17/1997 - 05/22/1997]

2017-0240-M
 kh2046

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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 RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0758
 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0454
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 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0095
SUBJ: ZAIRE: FRANCE OPPOSES MOBUTU'S DEPARTURE
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008851

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12958: 4/16/17

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, FR

SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRANCE OPPOSES MOBUTU'S DEPARTURE

REFS: A/ STATE 70175 (NOTAL) B/ BAAS-BELLAMY TELCONS
 - APRIL 15

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON:
1.5(B).

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. THE FRENCH STRONGLY DISAGREE THAT A DECISION BY MOBUTU TO RELINQUISH POWER MIGHT PAVE THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED TRANSITION IN ZAIRE. IF MOBUTU ABDICATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, KABILA WILL ROLL INTO KINSHASA UNOPPOSED, POSTPONE ELECTIONS INDEFINITELY AND ATTEMPT TO SET UP HIS OWN DICTATORSHIP, THE FRENCH BELIEVE. MOBUTU MUST THEREFORE REMAIN IN PLACE TO NEGOTIATE ORDERLY TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. ONLY WHEN AND IF THAT IS ACHIEVED SHOULD MOBUTU BE ASKED TO EXIT.

3. ~~(S)~~ MOREOVER, THE GOF CONSIDERS THAT IT HAS "DELIVERED" MOBUTU BY GETTING HIM TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REBEL ALLIANCE. THE U.S., ACCORDING TO ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC COUNSELOR LEVITTE, HAS NOT ELICITED SIMILAR CONCESSIONS FROM KABILA. KABILA IS TODAY EVEN MORE INTENT ON A MILITARY VICTORY. THE U.S. CANNOT NOW ASK FRANCE TO

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2017-0240-m (1.39)

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JOIN IN EFFORTS TO REMOVE MOBUTU, THE LAST (ALBEIT VERY FRAIL) OBSTACLE TO KABILA'S SEIZURE OF POWER. FRANCE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IMPLICATED IN ANY WAY IN THE DICTATORSHIP AND/OR ANARCHY LIKELY TO RESULT FROM KABILA'S MILITARY VICTORY. END SUMMARY.

4. (C) THE FRENCH POSITION EMERGED IN UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF'S DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH APRIL 16 WITH ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC COUNSELOR LEVITTE AND QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLOT. LEVITTE WAS RESPONDING TO TARNOFF'S APPEAL (PER REF A) FOR A COMMON APPROACH TO MOBUTU TO CONVINCE HIM TO RELINQUISH POWER.

5. (C) LEVITTE SAID FRANCE HAD PERSUADED MOBUTU TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO ELECTIONS, AND HAD THUS DELIVERED WHAT IT PROMISED TO THE U.S. THE U.S., HE SAID, HAD NOT PERSUADED KABILA TO STOP HIS ADVANCE. KABILA MARCHES ON, CREATING PROBLEMS WHEREVER HE GOES. THE LATEST EVIDENCE OF THIS IS THAT SHABA PROVINCE WILL NOT ACCEPT HIS DICTATES AND MAY DEFEND ITS OWN INTERESTS. IF KABILA TAKES KINSHASA BY FORCE, THERE WILL BE NO ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE, LEVITTE PREDICTED. THE OVERALL RESULT COULD WELL BE CATASTROPHIC: THE INSTALLATION OF ANOTHER CORRUPT DICTATORSHIP AMIDST CHAOTIC CONDITIONS.

6. (C) LEVITTE DEMANDED THAT THE U.S. AND OTHERS WITH INFLUENCE OVER KABILA (UGANDA, RWANDA, SOUTH AFRICA) PRESS HIM HARDER TO STOP HIS ADVANCE AND NEGOTIATE. HE SPOKE OF "IMPOSING NEGOTIATIONS" ON KABILA.

7. (C) TARNOFF RETORTED THAT MOBUTU WAS ON THE WAY OUT IN ANY CASE. OUR PROPOSAL IS MEANT TO USE HIS DEPARTURE TO LEVERAGE CONCESSIONS FROM THE ALLIANCE, OBTAIN A CEASE-FIRE AND GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. HOW DOES MOBUTU'S PRESENCE CONTRIBUTE TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, HE ASKED?

8. (C) LEVITTE SAID THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS IF MOBUTU IS FORCED OUT. KABILA WILL SIMPLY CARRY THE WAR INTO KINSHASA. MOBUTU MUST BE A PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, THE EQUATION IS TOTALLY ONE-SIDED. AFTER NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER A TRANSITIONAL SCENARIO HAS BEEN AGREED, THEN MOBUTU CAN LEAVE, LEVITTE ARGUED.

9. (C) TARNOFF DISAGREED, NOTING THAT MOBUTU'S DEPARTURE COULD WELL GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO PARTIES IN KINSHASA WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A TRANSITION WITH KABILA. THERE COULD WELL BE EVEN GREATER CHAOS IN ZAIRE IF WE DO NOTHING AND LEAVE MOBUTU IN PLACE, TARNOFF ARGUED. CHARGE BANDLER RESPONDED THAT OUR ORIGINAL BURDENSARING PROPOSAL INCLUDED EFFORTS BY FRANCE TO EASE MOBUTU AWAY FROM POWER. MOBUTU HAS AGREED TO NEGOTIATE, BUT HE HAS ALSO REMAINED AT THE CENTER OF THE POLITICAL SCENE.

10. (C) LEVITTE SAID ALL OF AFRICA IS WATCHING ZAIRE, AND MOST AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS SHARE FRANCE'S VIEW THAT KABILA SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO IGNORE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND

SIMPLY SHOOT HIS WAY INTO KINSHASA. YES, MOBUTU MUST DEPART. BUT IF HE EXITS ONLY TO MAKE ROOM FOR ANOTHER DICTATOR, THE RESULTS WILL BE "CATASTROPHIC" AND AN INTOLERABLE PRECEDENT WILL HAVE BEEN SET FOR ALL OF ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 008851

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12958: 4/16/17

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, FR

SUBJECT: ZAIRE: FRANCE OPPOSES MOBUTU'S DEPARTURE

AFRICA. THERE MUST BE A CEASE-FIRE, NEGOTIATIONS AND ELECTIONS. THIS IS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE SCENARIO, LEVITTE INSISTED. HE WARNED THAT THE GOF WOULD BE ISSUING A STRONGLY-WORDED PRESS STATEMENT MAKING THESE POINTS.

11. (C) COMMENT. LEVITTE'S UNUSUALLY HEATED REMARKS WERE PREVIEWED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISOR DUPUCH APRIL 15 (REF B) AND ECHOED, ALTHOUGH WITH LESS VEHEMENCE, BY FOREIGN MINISTRY CABINET DIRECTOR BAUCHARD OVER LUNCH WITH CHARGE APRIL 17. THE GOF LINE ON ZAIRE SEEMS FIRMLY SET: THE U.S. HAS FAILED TO APPLY REAL PRESSURE TO KABILA, AND FRANCE WANTS TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM WHAT NOW APPEARS TO BE AN INEVITABLE SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REBEL LEADER.

12. COMMENT CONTINUED. WE ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ADDITIONAL U.S.-FRENCH POLITICAL COOPERATION ON ZAIRE IN THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL MILITARY OR POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM KABILA. ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH ARE KNOWINGLY OVERSTATING OUR INFLUENCE WITH KABILA, THEY NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE NOT DELIVERED ON OUR PART OF A TWO-WAY BARGAIN, AND PROBABLY HAVEN'T MADE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT -- DESPITE OUR REASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY. THEY ARGUE THAT MOBUTU HAS MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS (THEY ADMIT HE HAS FEW OPTIONS), AND THAT THIS HAS ONLY EMBOLDENED KABILA AND MADE IT LESS LIKELY THAT HE WILL NEGOTIATE ANYTHING. LEVITTE WAS CLEARLY SIGNALING, WE BELIEVE, THAT FRANCE DOES NOT WANT TO BEEN SEEN BY ITS AFRICAN PARTNERS AS ABANDONING ZAIRE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE GOF MAY BE READY TO WASH ITS HANDS OF THIS AFFAIR AND MAKE SURE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT FOLLOWS IS LAID AT OTHERS' DOORSTEPS. END COMMENT.

13. (U) UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF CLEARED THIS MESSAGE IN SUBSTANCE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM PARIS APRIL 17.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

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 DTG: 181524Z APR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5474
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: EVACUATION OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS:
 - COORDINATING WITH FRANCE

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2017-0240-m (1.40)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 008940

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/07
 TAGS: AEMR, ASEC, PREL, MOPS, CG, IN, UG
 SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS:
 - COORDINATING WITH FRANCE

REF: A) KINSHASA 2620 B) PARIS 14455
 - C) STATE 177837

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DONALD K. BANDLER.
 REASONS: 1.5 (B,D).

2. (U) ACTION REQUEST PARA 5.

3. (C) AS WE BEGIN WHAT IS LIKELY TO BE A CRITICAL
 COUPLE OF WEEKS IN ZAIRE, WE BELIEVE IT IS WORTH
 FOCUSING NOW ON CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE FRENCH ON
 ANY MOVES TOWARD EVACUATION, AND SPECIFICALLY ON OUR
 HANDLING OF TCN'S. WE HAVE PICKED UP INFORMALLY SIGNS
 OF SOME UNEASINESS FROM THE FRENCH MILITARY OVER WHAT
 APPEAR TO THEM TO BE MIXED SIGNALS FROM USG OFFICIALS
 ON THIS ISSUE.

3. (C) REF A CORRECTLY POINTS OUT THAT WE SHOULD BE
 CAUTIONING TCN'S IN ZAIRE AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO DO
 SOME FORWARD-PLANNING NOW, AHEAD OF A DEGENERATION IN
 THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN KINSHASA, AND TO USE
 READILY-AVAILABLE COMMERCIAL MEANS TO MOVE PERSONNEL
 OUT OF THE COUNTRY IF THEY SO WISH.

4. (C) WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT WE NOT REPEAT
 SOME OF THE MISTAKES MADE IN MAY 1996 DURING THE
 EVACUATION FROM BANGUI (REFS C, D). REQUESTS FOR
 EVACUATION OF A NUMBER OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WERE
 TURNED ASIDE FOR THE FIRST FEW FLIGHTS FROM BANGUI,

WITH THE RESULT THAT U.S. PLANES DEPARTED BANGUI NEARLY EMPTY. WE HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FRENCH OF LONGSTANDING THAT WE WILL COORDINATE CLOSELY ON EVACUATIONS IN AFRICA. THE FRENCH, INCLUDING THEIR MILITARY FORCES ON THE GROUND, TAKE FOR GRANTED THAT THEY WILL RENDER ASSISTANCE TO AMERICANS IN NEED IN ANY FRENCH AREA OF OPERATIONS. THEY ASSUME OUR GROUND RULES ARE THE SAME FOR FRENCH NATIONALS.

5. (X) WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT WORK WITH DOD NOW TO ENSURE THAT THIS GUIDANCE IS CLARIFIED WITH CONCERNED USG AGENCIES AND DECISION MAKERS IN THE FIELD. A DISCONNECT, OR, IN A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, A REFUSAL ON THE GROUND TO EVACUATE FRENCH NATIONALS, WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS FOR OUR ACTIVITIES AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA WELL BEYOND ZAIRE.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 8940

TOR: 970418114123 M2721365

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ VERSHBOW WECHSLER
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA9008 1111424-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 211424Z APR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 211424Z APR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5524
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
 SUBJ: FRENCH APPEAL FOR U.S. STATEMENT ON ZAIRE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.41)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009008

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/17

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH APPEAL FOR U.S. STATEMENT ON ZAIRE

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON:
1.5(B).
2. (S) SUMMARY. A SENIOR ELYSEE OFFICIAL URGED US APRIL 18 TO ISSUE A CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENT DEMANDING THAT ALLIANCE LEADER KABILA CEASE MILITARY ACTIVITY AT ONCE AND ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ENSURING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION THROUGH ELECTIONS IN ZAIRE. WE AGREED TO TRANSMIT THIS IDEA TO WASHINGTON, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE GOF MEANWHILE CONSIDER PUSHING HARDER ON MOBUTU TO STEP ASIDE IF IT APPEARED THAT WOULD FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REBELS. END SUMMARY.
3. (S) ELYSEE MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF ADMIRAL DELAUNAY TOLD CHARGE APRIL 18 THAT MANY IN THE GOF BELIEVE THE U.S. HAS REACTED TO AND SHAPED EVENTS IN ZAIRE WITH EXTRAORDINARY SKILL. THE PROBABLE OUTCOME IN ZAIRE -- MOBUTU'S OUSTER BY A REBEL LEADER BEHOLDEN TO THE U.S. AND ITS AFRICAN FRIENDS (ESPECIALLY UGANDA'S MUSEVENI) -- IS A MASTERSTROKE OF AMERICAN REALPOLITIK, DELAUNAY SUGGESTED. THE U.S. HAS BEEN MUCH "SMARTER" AND MUCH "QUICKER" THAN FRANCE IN DEFINING ITS INTERESTS IN THE STRUGGLE IN ZAIRE, IN PICKING A WINNING A HORSE, AND RIDING HIM HOME. CHARGE THANKED DELAUNAY FOR THE COMPLIMENT BUT OBJECTED TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. WAS ARMING AND FINANCING A KABILA COUP.
4. (S) DELAUNAY WENT ON TO WARN THAT THE KABILA/MUSEVENI AXIS MAY SOON BE IN A POSITION TO THREATEN GABON AND THE CONGO, STATES WITH WHICH FRANCE HAS MILITARY MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES. IN ANY EVENT, HE THOUGHT THE EXAMPLE

SET BY KABILA -- THAT GOVERNMENTS CAN BE TOPPLED WITH ENOUGH GUNS AND THE RIGHTS KIDS OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT -- WILL SOON BE RIPPLING THROUGH NEIGHBORING STATES. THE U.S., HE SAID, SHOULD WORK WITH FRANCE AND OTHERS TO PREVENT THAT.

5. (C) CHARGE TOLD DELAUNAY THAT THIS ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ROLE IN ZAIRE SIMPLY MADE NO SENSE. THE U.S. WAS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF PULLING STRINGS TO DESTABILIZE ZAIRE OR RESHAPE THE AFRICAN MAP. OUR INTERESTS -- LARGELY HUMANITARIAN -- WERE NO DIFFERENT THAN FRANCE'S. WE HAD WORKED TO BRING KABILA TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND HAD ADMITTEDLY NOT FULLY SUCCEEDED. FOR ITS PART, FRANCE HAD ONLY PARTIALLY DELIVERED MOBUTU. MOBUTU HAD AGREED TO NEGOTIATIONS BUT HAD NOT STEPPED ASIDE TO GIVE NEGOTIATIONS A REAL CHANCE. CHARGE SAID WE STILL HOPED TO WORK WITH FRANCE IN PROMOTING A SANE OUTCOME IN ZAIRE.

6. (C) DELAUNAY LISTENED TO THIS AND THEN OFFERED A SUGGESTION. A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE U.S. CONDEMNING ANY SEIZURE OF POWER BY FORCE IN ZAIRE AND CALLING FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT LEADING TO IMMEDIATE ELECTIONS WAS NEEDED AND WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. DELAUNAY THOUGHT THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME IMPACT ON KABILA AND WOULD AT LEAST BE READ IN OTHER AFRICAN STATES AS CLEAR U.S. DISAPPROVAL OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE KABILA'S PREFERRED OPTION OF SIMPLY SEIZING POWER BY FORCE OF ARMS. CHARGE AGREED TO FORWARD THIS SUGGESTION AND, IN RETURN, ASKED DELAUNAY TO RECONSIDER THE GOF POSITION ON MOBUTU. IF MOBUTU'S PRESENCE ON THE SCENE IS AN OBSTACLE TO A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS, THEN FRANCE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SEEK HIS DEPARTURE.

7. (C) COMMENT. "AMERICAN REALPOLITIK" IN ZAIRE IS A LINE THAT IS NOW APPEARING EVERYWHERE IN THE FRENCH PRESS. REPORTS THAT U.S. COMPANIES ARE SNAPPING UP MINING AND COMMERCIAL CONCESSIONS OFFERED BY THE REBELS ARE FURTHER FUELING THIS ANALYSIS. DELAUNAY AND OTHER FRENCH OFFICIALS ARE NOT ONLY READING THESE REPORTS BUT DOUBTLESS BACKGROUNDING THE JOURNALISTS AS WELL.

8. (C) THIS SPECULATION, MUCH OF IT DISINGENUOUS AND SELF-SERVING, IS NOT OUR BIGGEST PROBLEM. MORE SERIOUS IS THE OFFICIAL PERCEPTION HERE THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE, AFTER RECENT SUCCESSES IN MANAGING DIFFERENCES, ARE DRIFTING TOWARDS OPPOSING POSITIONS ON ZAIRE. DELAUNAY'S IDEA OF A STRONG U.S. STATEMENT DIRECTED MAINLY AT KABILA, WHICH ELYSEE AFRICA ADVISER DUPUCH HAD ALSO BROACHED WITH US EARLIER, IS A PROPOSAL FRANCE HAS ALSO SENT TO ITS EU PARTNERS. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A MESSAGE, AS THE FRENCH SEE IT, IS NOT SO MUCH TO BOLSTER MOBUTU (THE FRENCH REALIZE HE IS ON HIS WAY OUT) AS TO FIRE A WARNING SHOT ACROSS KABILA'S BOW. WHATEVER OUR PRIVATE MESSAGES TO KABILA, THE FRENCH DON'T CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE HAD THE INTENDED EFFECT, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED WE HAVE THE NECESSARY LEVERAGE IF WE WANT TO USE IT. KABILA JUST MIGHT PAUSE IF THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS ARE SEEN TAKING A TOUGHER LINE PUBLICLY AGAINST HIS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATE A TRANSITION, THE FRENCH BELIEVE.

9. (S) WE DON'T RECOMMEND THAT THE U.S. ISSUE A TOUGH STATEMENT TARGETTING KABILA SIMPLY AS A WAY OF PLACATING THE FRENCH. HOWEVER, IF WE WERE TO DECIDE THAT SUCH A STATEMENT COULD HELP SAHNOUN BY GETTING KABILA TO STOP HIS OFFENSIVE AND NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN SOUTH AFRICA, WE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 009008

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/17
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, CG, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH APPEAL FOR U.S. STATEMENT ON ZAIRE

WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE THAT DECISION BACK TO&THE GOF TO PRESS FOR FURTHER GOF EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS MOBUTU. END COMMENT.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 9008
<^SSN>9008

TOR: 970421104029 M2723831
<^TOR>970421104030 M2723832

DIST: SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR
PASSDOWN PETERS PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
WECHSLER
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}
<^DIST>
SIT: HARMON SUM SUM2
PRT: BASS BERGER DAVIES FUERTH HARMONPTR HELWEG KERRICK SIT{C2} SODERBERG
STEINBERG

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA9662 1151659-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 251659Z APR 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 251659Z APR 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5739
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
 RUFNGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//PLAD//
 SUBJ: U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS AND ZAIRE
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 009662

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.42)

KBH 8/9/2022

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY, AF - GEORGE MOOSE, USUN - AMB.
 RICHARDSON, EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/23/2002
 TAGS: PREL, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS AND ZAIRE

REF: (A) PARIS 9008 (B) PARIS 8851
 - (C) KAMPALA 2199 (D) PARIS 2917

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5 B AND D.
2. (S) FRANCE'S STUBBORN EFFORTS TO SECURE A STRONG U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENT URGING KABILA TO STOP HIS MARCH TOWARD KINSHASA AND NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION THAT PRESERVES DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE. THE PROSPECT OF KABILA AND HIS REBELS ENTERING KINSHASA AND SIMPLY SEIZING POWER BY FORCE IS A NIGHTMARE FOR THE GOF. IT IS MORE THAN A MATTER OF LOYALTY TO MOBUTU: THE FRENCH ARE EVEN MORE CONCERNED AT THE EXAMPLE IT GIVES TO CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE CONTINENT AS A WHOLE. IF A REBEL LEADER WHO WAS VIRTUALLY UNKNOWN SIX MONTHS AGO CAN TAKE OVER AFRICA'S LARGEST COUNTRY, WHAT IS TO TAMP DOWN THE AMBITIONS OF OTHER POTENTIAL REBELS ELSEWHERE IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA?
3. (S) REGARDLESS OF OUR REAL ABILITY TO AFFECT THE OUTCOME IN ZAIRE, A FRENCH BELIEF THAT THE U.S. DID NOT MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO MOVE KABILA ONTO A NEGOTIATIONS/ELECTIONS COURSE, RATHER THAN PURSUING A MILITARY VICTORY UNIMPEDED, WOULD NOT LEAVE U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS IN ZAIRE, OR IN AFRICA OVERALL, UNAFFECTED.

IT WOULD UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO WORK WITH THE FRENCH IN A POST-MOBUTU ZAIRE AND ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION, A HIGH PRICE TO PAY GIVEN THE PAUCITY OF OTHER CAPABLE PARTNERS. BUT, WHILE THIS EMBASSY NATURALLY HAS TO FOCUS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ZAIRE CRISIS FOR U.S./FRENCH COOPERATION IN AFRICA, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE GOOD REASONS (BEYOND A SIMPLE "THE FRENCH WANT US TO DO IT") FOR BEING MORE ASSERTIVE PUBLICLY ABOUT THE KIND OF OUTCOME -- I.E. A NEGOTIATED ONE -- THAT WE WANT IN ZAIRE. A KABILA TAKEOVER BY FORCE WOULD SET A BAD PRECEDENT FOR AFRICA AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST THE FRANCOPHONE PART. ALSO, U.S. CREDIBILITY IN INSISTING WITH OUR AFRICAN PARTNERS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEANS WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

4. (X) WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT JUDGE FROM HERE ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS, BUT WE WONDER: WHAT COSTS ARE THERE TO FIRING A WARNING SHOT ACROSS KABILA'S BOW? THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS ALREADY DONE SO WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLIANCE'S BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE REFUGEES. TO GO FURTHER, HOWEVER, AND WARN KABILA PUBLICLY THAT A VICTORY BY FORCE OF ARMS IS NO WAY TO GAIN LEGITIMACY AND THAT THE U.S. OPPOSES ANY ARMED SEIZURE OF POWER IN ZAIRE WOULD STRONGLY REINFORCE, WE BELIEVE, OUR PRIVATE MESSAGES TO KABILA. IT WOULD ALSO GIVE US SOMETHING SOLID WITH WHICH TO COUNTER THE NEGATIVE SPINMEISTERS OF THE FRENCH AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS, AND A BETTER BASIS TO DEMAND THAT THE FRENCH AND OTHERS WORK WITH US TO FASHION A TRANSITION IN ZAIRE.

5. (X) IT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS TO END UP HOLDING THE BAG IN ZAIRE, BUT IT MAY WELL HAPPEN. PARIS HAS FEW BINDING INTERESTS IN ZAIRE, AND WILL HAVE EVEN FEWER REASONS FOR REMAINING ENGAGED THERE IF KABILA SEIZES POWER DESPITE THEIR EFFORTS TO STOP HIM. THE MORE CLOSELY WE CAN COOPERATE WITH THE FRENCH NOW, THE LESS LIKELY THEY MAY BE TO WASH THEIR HANDS COMPLETELY OF ZAIRE, AS THEY DID WITH RWANDA AFTER 1994. RIGHT NOW, HOWEVER, PARIS SEES OUR RESPECTIVE PATHS DIVERGING: THEY WANT STRONGER ACTION TO SECURE A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME, WHILE THEY PERCEIVE US AS ACQUIESCING IN A KABILA TAKEOVER. A STRONG U.S. STATEMENT DEMANDING A NEGOTIATED TRANSITION -- ONE WE ARE WILLING TO REPEAT AND STICK BY -- IS NOT A PANACEA, BUT WOULD BE A KEY STEP TOWARD MINIMIZING THIS ISCONNECT. THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATIONS, PARALLEL MESSAGES AND JOINT DEMARCHES, WE HAD MADE A GOOD START ON CONCERTING OUR EFFORTS ON ZAIRE WITH FRANCE'S. WE SHOULD NOT LET THIS PROGRESS SLIP AWAY IN THE ZAIREAN ENDGAME.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9662

TOR: 970425132827 M2732532

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS HARMON JORDAN LORIN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR

PETERS PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WECHSLER
SIT: NSC
PRT: BASS BERGER BROWN DAVIES FUERTH HARMONPTR HELWEG KERRICK SIT(C2)
SODERBERG STEINBERG

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA0631 1321525-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 121525Z MAY 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 121525Z MAY 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6147
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3612
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0922
 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: ZAIRE: AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S CONSULTATIONS
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 010631

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2002
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE: AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S CONSULTATIONS
 - IN PARIS

REF: STATE 84998 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. ON MAY 8, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UN BILL RICHARDSON, IN MEETINGS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE AND THE U.S. WORKING TOGETHER TOWARD A SOFT LANDING IN ZAIRE. HE SAID THE U.S. WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN/UN EFFORTS TO ARRANGE FURTHER DIALOGUE AND AN INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, BUT WAS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THESE EFFORTS' LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS. ACKNOWLEDGING KABILA'S MANY FAULTS, AND RECALLING MULTIPLE U.S. DEMARCHES AIMED AT MODERATING THE REBEL ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY ON REFUGEE ISSUES, RICHARDSON REMINDED THE GOF THAT KABILA IS NO AMERICAN PUPPET. RICHARDSON ALSO TOLD THE FRENCH THAT THERE MAY BE A BASIS TO WORK WITH KABILA AND CAUTIONED AGAINST DEMONIZING HIM.

THE FRENCH, FOR THEIR PART, EXPRESSED DEEP DISTRUST OF AND DISDAIN FOR KABILA, AND STRESSED THE BAD EXAMPLE HE SETS FOR OTHER CURRENT AND POTENTIAL LEADERS IN AFRICA. THE FRENCH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOBUTU IS ON HIS WAY OUT, AND HINTED AT A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN MOBUTU'S ATTITUDE AS A RESULT OF THE MAY 8 FRANCOPHONE SUMMIT IN LIBREVILLE. WITHOUT STATING SPECIFICALLY THAT MOBUTU

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 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-11 (1.43)
 KBH 8/9/2022

WOULD BE WELCOME TO RETIRE IN FRANCE, GOF OFFICIALS SAID THAT ENSURING A NEW HOME FOR MOBUTU WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. GOF OFFICIALS DECLINED TO ARTICULATE WHAT OPTIONS THEY ARE CONSIDERING IF CURRENT MEDIATION EFFORTS FAIL. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE, RICHARDSON RESPONDED TO A FRENCH REQUEST BY INCLUDING IN HIS PUBLIC REMARKS A STATEMENT CAUTIONING KABILA AND THE ALLIANCE. END SUMMARY.

3. ~~(S)~~ U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UN BILL RICHARDSON AND HIS TRAVELLING PARTY, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, POLMINCOUNS AND NOTETAKER, MET MAY 8 WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY (QUAI) CHIEF OF STAFF DENIS BAUCHARD, SECRETARY GENERAL BERTRAND DUFOURCQ AND DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN TO DISCUSS ZAIRE. IN A SEPARATE MEETING AT THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY (ELYSEE), THE FRENCH PARTICIPANTS WERE ELYSEE COUNSELOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS MICHEL DUPUCH, AND HIS TWO ADVISORS, BERNARD DIGUET AND FREDERIC CLAVIER. THE BAUCHARD AND DUPUCH MEETINGS COVERED THE SAME RANGE OF ISSUES. A SEPARATE ELYSEE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE, DEALT PRIMARILY WITH MATTERS OTHER THAN ZAIRE, AND WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL, AS WILL OTHER SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH SRSG FOR ZAIRE MOHAMMED SAHNOUN AND MOBUTU DIPLOMATIC COUNSELOR HONORE NGBANDA.

THE U.S. MESSAGE

4. ~~(S)~~ RICHARDSON SUMMARIZED HIS RECENT TRAVELS AND MEETINGS IN AFRICA, EMPHASIZING U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE'S ROLE IN AFRICA, AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUED CLOSE COORDINATION OF U.S. AND FRENCH POLICY. RICHARDSON SAID HE HAD ASKED MOBUTU TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH KABILA, AND TO CONSIDER A DIGNIFIED WITHDRAWAL FROM PUBLIC LIFE IN FAVOR OF A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. HE HAD TOLD MOBUTU THAT THE U.S. ASSESSED HIS MILITARY SITUATION AS DINE, THE ZAIRIAN ARMY HAVING NO POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS. RICHARDSON NOTED THAT MOBUTU HAD REPLIED IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON THAT HE AGREED TO ENGAGE IN TALKS. IN THE LETTER, MOBUTU ALSO REFERRED TO A WITHDRAWAL FROM PUBLIC LIFE, BUT LEFT TIMING AND TERMS UNCLEAR.

5. ~~(S)~~ RICHARDSON ALSO DETAILED THE U.S. MESSAGE TO REBEL LEADER LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA: ENCOURAGEMENT TO ENGAGE IN TALKS WITH MOBUTU, THE NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE, THE NEED FOR COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCIES ON REFUGEE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, AND THE FOLLY OF PURSUING A MILITARY VICTORY IN KINSHASA. RICHARDSON EMPHASIZED TO THE FRENCH SEVERAL TIMES THAT KABILA IS NO PUPPET OF THE U.S., AND THAT KABILA HAD INSISTED RICHARDSON LEAVE THE SOUTH AFRICAN SHIP ABOARD WHICH MOBUTU AND KABILA MET.

CONTRASTING VIEWS OF KABILA

6. (c) RICHARDSON TOLD FRENCH OFFICIALS THAT KABILA IS PARANOID ABOUT FRANCE, AND THAT KABILA HAD TOLD HIM HE FEARED A FRENCH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. RICHARDSON NOTED THAT HE HAD URGED KABILA TO BETTER HIS RELATIONS
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 010631

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2002
TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S CONSULTATIONS
- IN PARIS

WITH FRANCE. RICHARDSON ENCOURAGED GOF OFFICIALS TO GIVE KABILA A CHANCE TO WORK WITH THEM, AND SAID HE FELT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ALL TO WORK WITH KABILA. HE DOUBTED THAT KABILA WOULD ACCEPT A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT THAT KABILA HIMSELF DID NOT HEAD, BUT BELIEVED KABILA COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE ON THE COMPOSITION OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT MORE BROADLY INCLUSIVE OF POLITICAL GROUPINGS. HE ALSO OPINED THAT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING FRANCE AND THE U.S., WILL HAVE MORE LEVERAGE OVER KABILA ONCE HE IS IN POWER THAN AT PRESENT.

7. (c) NO FRENCH OFFICIAL SHARED RICHARDSON'S ASSESSMENT THAT A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO WORK WITH KABILA, AND ALL WERE DISMISSIVE OF KABILA'S TALK OF FRENCH ASSASSINATION PLOTS. QUAI OFFICIALS QUESTIONED THE DEGREE TO WHICH KABILA IS INFLUENCEABLE, JUDGING HIM TO BE MORE CONTROLLED BY HIS ENTOURAGE THAN IN CONTROL OF IT. EACH FRENCH OFFICIAL WHO COMMENTED ON KABILA HAD A DISTINCTLY NEGATIVE VIEW, BUT NONE MORE SO THAN ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR MICHEL DUPUCH, WHO SUMMED UP BY SAYING "HE ALWAYS DOES WHAT HE SAYS, BUT NEVER DOES WHAT HE PROMISES". HE DEPLORED KABILA'S LACK OF A POLITICAL PLAN FOR ZAIRE, HIS OUTMODED "AFRICAN MAOIST" RHETORIC, HIS LACK OF A POLICY TEAM AND OF A STABLE POLITICAL BASE. HE RESERVED HIS STRONGEST LANGUAGE FOR CONDEMNATION OF KABILA'S "NAZI-LIKE" TREATMENT OF REFUGEES IN EASTERN ZAIRE, WHICH HAS HAD AN EFFECT ON FRENCH AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. DUPUCH CRITICIZED KABILA'S REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE HIS REFUSAL TO SHARE ANY POWER, AND HIS INCESSANT DEMANDS FOR "EVERYTHING RIGHT AWAY," WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE THE GOF LACKED THE CAPACITY TO BETTER THE SITUATION, IT STILL HAD A CONSIDERABLE ABILITY, THROUGH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, TO BLOCK ASSISTANCE TO A FUTURE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT HEADED BY KABILA. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM OF ZAIRE TODAY IS NOT MOBUTU, WHO IS ALMOST GONE, BUT KABILA. BOTH DUPUCH AND BAUCHARD SEPARATELY EMPHASIZED THAT FRANCE'S BIGGEST PROBLEM WITH KABILA IS NOT SO MUCH HIS PERSON AS HIS GOVERNMENT'S "GENOCIDAL" HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND THE REGIONALLY DESTABILIZING EXAMPLE OF A REBEL LEADER OVERTHROWING A RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT BY FORCE OF ARMS.

8. (c) CHARGE BANDLER NOTED THAT ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, NOTABLY IN CUBA, IRAN AND IRAQ, FRANCE WAS A

STRONG SUPPORTER OF MAINTAINING A CRITICAL DIALOGUE WITH DISTASTEFUL REGIMES. HE URGED THAT FRANCE CONSIDER ENGAGING IN SUCH A DIALOGUE WITH KABILA, WITH AN AIM TO INFLUENCE HIM TOWARDS OUR COMMON GOALS, ESPECIALLY SINCE HIS CHANCES OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS SEEM SO CLEAR.

ADFL AND HUMAN RIGHTS

9. (C) RICHARDSON NOTED THAT HE HAD LEANED HARD ON KABILA ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPER TREATMENT OF REFUGEES. KABILA HAD PROMISED HIM FLEXIBILITY ABOUT THE SIXTY-DAY DEADLINE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, AND SAID HE WOULD SEE TO IT THAT ADFL SOLDIERS ENGAGING IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WERE PUNISHED. RECALLING SIMILAR POINTS BY UN/OAU NEGOTIATOR SAHNOUN, RICHARDSON URGED THE FRENCH NOT TO FOCUS ON THE PERSON OF EXPELLED U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIAL GARRETON, WHOM KABILA DESPISES, BUT ON THE PROCESS OF ENSURING THAT UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS COMPLETE THEIR WORK EFFECTIVELY. GOF OFFICIALS MADE NO COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGARD, AND WERE QUICK TO DEFEND GARRETON.

LEANING ON MOBUTU

10. (C) AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON STATED HIS BELIEF THAT FRANCE COULD/SHOULD DO MORE TO ENCOURAGE ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO LEAVE GRACEFULLY. DUPUCH DISAGREED WITH THE NOTION THAT FRANCE HAD NOT DONE ALL IT CAN, AND COUNTERED BY DETAILING FRANCE'S MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO MOBUTU TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE ADDED THAT THE USG MIGHT BE "PLEASANTLY SURPRISED" BY THE OUTCOME OF THE MAY 8 MEETING OF CENTRAL AFRICAN FRANCOPHONE PRESIDENTS IN LIBREVILLE, BUT REMAINED VAGUE ON THE DETAILS. HE ALSO REITERATED THAT THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO A SETTLEMENT IN ZAIRE IS KABILA, NOT MOBUTU. DUPUCH AND RICHARDSON AGREED THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND FRANCE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS BOTH SIDES TOWARD A "SOFT LANDING," A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH AN INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND AN HONORABLE DEPARTURE FOR MOBUTU, RATHER THAN A KABILA CONQUEST OF KINSHASA AND SEIZURE OF POWER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 010631

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2002
TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S CONSULTATIONS
- IN PARIS

RETIREMENT SPOT FOR MOBUTU

11. (C) AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON ASKED WHETHER MOBUTU WOULD RETIRE IN FRANCE. WHILE NOT ANSWERING THE QUESTION DIRECTLY, DUPUCH WAS CATEGORICAL IN SAYING

THAT FINDING A PLACE FOR MOBUTU'S RETIREMENT WAS NOT A PROBLEM, AND THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL OPTIONS.

SUPPORTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN PLAN

12. (S) RICHARDSON TOLD THE GOF OFFICIALS THAT THE USG WOULD BE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN/UN/OAU EFFORTS, LED BY DEPUTY PRESIDENT MBEKI IN COORDINATION WITH UN SRSG MOHAMMED SAHNOUN, TO GET MOBUTU AND KABILA TOGETHER ONCE MORE AND TO SEEK A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER TO A BROADLY INCLUSIVE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

NEXT STEPS

13. (S) RICHARDSON ADDED THAT HE FEARED THE SOUTH AFRICAN PLAN MIGHT NOT WORK, AND ASKED HIS FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS WHAT THEY WOULD ANTICIPATE AS AN ALTERNATIVE. RESPONSES WERE VAGUE, FOCUSING ON "INTENSIVE DIPLOMACY" AND "PROTECTING FRENCH NATIONALS." NO GOF OFFICIAL TALKED ABOUT ENGAGING KABILA, CRITICALLY OR OTHERWISE. DUPUCH URGED THAT THE USG, WHICH HAS MORE INFLUENCE OVER KABILA, TELL HIM QUICKLY AND PUBLICLY, BEFORE HE ARRIVES IN KINSHASA, THAT IN ORDER TO CONSTRUCT A STABLE ZAIRE, HE SHOULD NEGOTIATE, SHARE POWER, AND CURB HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. IN DUPUCH'S VIEW, PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THIS NATURE ARE AMONG THE FEW TOOLS THAT CAN INFLUENCE KABILA. AFTER DISCUSSION, AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON AGREED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 8, AND DID SO.

14. (U) TEXT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S MAY 8 STATEMENT AT THE OUTSET OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE.

BEGIN TEXT.

TEN DAYS AGO, I WENT TO AFRICA AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT CLINTON BECAUSE OF HIS PERSONAL CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE AND THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON ITS PEOPLE AND TO CENTRAL AFRICA. THIS EFFORT WAS UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT THE LEAD ROLE TAKEN BY SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UN AND THE OAU.

MY FIRST GOAL WAS TO HELP BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER. I MET WITH THE LEADERS IN ZAIRE AND IN THE REGION. WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, UNDER THE INSPIRING LEADERSHIP OF PRESIDENT NELSON MANDELA, WE WERE ABLE TO SECURE FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT MOBUTU AND ALLIANCE LEADER LAURENT KABILA ABOARD A SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL VESSEL IN POINTE NOIRE, CONGO.

WE HOPE THAT A DIALOGUE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL AND

ECONOMIC CRISI IN ZAIRE. OUR LOGSTANDING GOAL HAS BEEN A NEGOTITATED SETTLEMENT. THIS SHOULD LEAD TO AN INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS. WE PRESSED HARD IN ALL OUR MEETINGS FOR A SOFT LANDING TO THE CRISIS, THAT IS A PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF POWER AVOIDING FURTHER BLOODSHED IN THE COUNTRY AND CHAOS AND VIOLENCE IN THE CAPITAL.

THE OTHER REASON I WENT TO ZAIRE WAS TO ASSESS THE DIRE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. IN KISANGANI I SAW FIRST-HAND THE SUFFERING OF CHILDREN -- MANY OF THEM ORPHANS -- AND ADULTS AS THEY STRUGGLED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN ZAIRE AND RWANDA. I PRESSED MR. KABILA TO PERMIT FULL ACCESS FOR INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANIZATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONDEMNED THE ABUSES, DEATHS AND MURDERS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS. MR. KABILA ASSURED ME THAT INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANIZATIONS AND THE UN WOULD HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO REPATRIATE THE REFUGEES, THAT THEY WOULD BE GIVEN FULL ACCESS TO THE REFUGEES AND THAT THOSE ALLIANCE SOLDIERS FOUND GUILTY OF ABUSES WOULD BE PUNISHED.

I WAS ENCOURAGED BY MEETINGS WITH MR. KABILA AS WE DISCUSSED BOTH THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSON AND THE FUTURE COURSE ZAIRE MUST TAKE.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 010631

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2002
TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON'S CONSULTATIONS
- IN PARIS

I CAME TO FRANCE -- OUR OLDEST ALLY -- BECAUSE OFHER HISTORIC AND IMPORTANT ROLE IN AFRICA TO DISCUSS WHERE WE SHOULD GO IN DEALING WITH THE CRISIS. WE ARE BOTH WORKING TO GET THE TWO SIDES IN ZAIRE TO COOPERATE IN THE TALKS MEDIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UN AND OAU AND TO AGREE ON AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AND CREATION OF A FREE MARKET ECONOMY IN SHORT ORDER.

THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA. WE SHARE THEIR DESIRE FOR ESTABLISHING A DEMOCRATIC ZAIRE THAT PROMOTES TOLERANCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY AND THE REGION.

I WOULD LIKE TO REEMPHASIZE WHAT I TOLD MR. KABILA IN LUMUMBASHI. AN ALLIANCE MILITARY VICTORY IS WITHIN REACH. BUT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF ZAIRE IS AT RISK. THE CITIZENS OF ZAIRE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND HISTORY WILL JUDGE THE ALLIANCE ON THE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE COMING DAYS.

IT IS CRITICAL TO AVOID FUTURE BLOODSHED, ESPECIALLY IN KINSHASA, AND TO WORK WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND OAU ENVOY SAHNOUN FOR A NEGOTIATED, INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT, LEADING TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO COOPERATE WITH HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO DEAL WITH THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE.

I HAVE URGED MOBUTU TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATORS TO WORK WITH SOUTH AFRICANS FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY.

END TEXT.

15. (U) THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON DEPARTED POST.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 0631

<^SSN>0631

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TOR: 970512124315 M2754578

<^TOR>970512124330 M2754579

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DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SHEEHAN WECHSLER
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 121527Z MAY 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 121527Z MAY 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6154
 INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3619
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0929
 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 SUBJ: ZAIRE: RICHARDSON - SAHNOUN MEETING
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 010634

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2017-0240-M (1.44)
 KBH 8/9/2022

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2002
 TAGS: PREL, PINS, CG, FR
 SUBJECT: ZAIRE: RICHARDSON - SAHNOUN MEETING
 - IN PARIS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. (S) SUMMARY. SRSG SAHNOUN TOLD US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RICHARDSON THAT HE SAW MOBUTU AS THE MAIN PROBLEM IN REACHING A ZAIRE SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL ABOUT THE LIBREVILLE MEETING OF MOBUTU AND FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN LEADERS. SAHNOUN SAID PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAD TELEPHONED MOBUTU TO TELL HIM HE WAS WELCOME IN FRANCE. IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEACE PLAN FAILS, SAHNOUN WILL REPORT THE STATE OF PLAY TO THE UNSC AND SOUND IT OUT ON FOREIGN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF ZAIRE. END SUMMARY.

3. (S) IN A MAY 8 BREAKFAST MEETING IN PARIS, SRSG MOHAMMED SAHNOUN BRIEFED U.S AMBASSADOR TO THE UN BILL RICHARDSON AND HIS DELEGATION ON HIS LATEST CONTACTS ON ZAIRE. SAHNOUN SAID HE HAD MET MAY 7 WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC, WHO SAID HE HAD TELEPHONED MOBUTU TO TELL HIM HE WOULD BE WELCOME TO STAY IN FRANCE. SAHNOUN BELIEVES A POLITICAL DECISION THAT MOBUTU MUST GO HAD FINALLY BEEN MADE IN FRANCE, BUT THAT LOWER ECHELONS WITHIN THE GOF WOULD RESIST SOMEWHAT.

4. (S) SAHNOUN DESCRIBED THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE ZAIRIAN CRISIS AS "FINDING A WAY TO GET MOBUTU OUT." HE UNDERLINED HIS EFFORTS TO

CONVINCE PRESIDENT MANDELA AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT MBEKI THAT IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO ABANDON THE ALREADY WORKED-OUT UN/OAU FRAMEWORK. SAHNOUN WAS CLEARLY PUT OUT THAT MBEKI HAD NOT PROVIDED HIM WITH A COPY OF HIS CURRENT PROPOSAL. SAHNOUN SAID MANDELA HAD ASKED HIM TO WORK ON MOBUTU'S FRANCOPHONE FRIENDS, TO GET THEM TO CONVINCE MOBUTU TO GO. SAHNOUN WAS GLAD THAT BONGO HAD CALLED A MEETING OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN LEADERS IN LIBREVILLE MAY 8 FOR THIS PURPOSE, BUT NOTED THE TENSION BETWEEN BONGO AND TOGOLESE PRESIDENT EYADEMA. HE HOPED MOBUTU, IN THE PRESENCE OF AFRICAN PRESIDENTS, WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS OWN RESIGNATION, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS MAY 9. AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON TOLD SAHNOUN HIS OWN UNDERSTANDING OF MBEKI'S PROPOSAL: A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT HEADED BY KABILA WITH BROADLY INCLUSIVE POLITICAL PARTY PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING A MINIMAL PARTICIPATION BY MOBUTU'S POLITICAL GROUP.

5. (C) AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON ASKED SAHNOUN WHAT THE U.S. COULD DO TO HELP. SAHNOUN REPLIED THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF A "SOFT LANDING" IS VITAL: MOBUTU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS OUT AND KABILA MUST UNDERSTAND HE MUST EXERCISE RESTRAINT. SAHNOUN COMPLAINED THAT KABILA IS GETTING MIXED SIGNALS: THE ANGOLANS, RWANDANS AND UGANDANS ARE NOT URGING RESTRAINT ON KABILA; RATHER THEY ARE ENCOURAGING HIM TOWARD A MILITARY VICTORY.

6. (C) RICHARDSON ASKED SAHNOUN WHAT HE ENVISIONED AS A NEXT STEP IN THE EVENT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PLAN FAILS. SAHNOUN SPOKE VAGUELY OF REPORTING THE SITUATION TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND SOUNDING OUT THE UNSC ON AUTHORIZING FOREIGN TROOPS TO ENTER ZAIRE TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF KINSHASA AND PREVENT CHAOS. NSC AFRICA DIRECTOR MCCORMICK REMINDED SAHNOUN THAT THE U.S. TROOPS CURRENTLY IN BRAZZAVILLE WERE ONLY AUTHORIZED TO ASSIST IN THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS.

7. (C) CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, SAHNOUN OPINED THAT THE UN ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA WERE TOO WRAPPED UP WITH THE PERSONALITY OF MR. GARRETON, WHOM KABILA DESPISES. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO HAVE AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE, RATHER THAN TO INSIST THAT GARRETON MUST RETURN TO ZAIRE.

8. (U) THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON DEPARTED PARIS.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0634

TOR: 970512124657 M2754589

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PASSDOWN
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 WECHSLER
SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT(C2)

Cable

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CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 131711Z MAY 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6195
INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0932
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//PLAD, IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: EVACUATIONS IN AFRICA: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH
TEXT:

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0240-M (1.45)

KBH 8/9/2022

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 010756

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2002
 TAGS: PREL, AEMR, MOPS, CASC, FR, CG
 SUBJECT: EVACUATIONS IN AFRICA: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH

REF: 96 PARIS 14455 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DONALD K. BANDLER, REASON 1.5 D.
2. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. WHEN CRISES IN AFRICA HAVE REQUIRED THE MOVEMENT OF FRENCH OR AMERICAN TROOPS, OR THE EVACUATION OF FRENCH OR AMERICAN NATIONALS, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS GENERALLY HAVE COOPERATED EFFECTIVELY. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO KEEP THINGS THAT WAY, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF ZAIRE, BOTH FOR BROADER FOREIGN POLICY REASONS AND FOR THE WELFARE OF OUR OWN NATIONALS.
3. ~~(S)~~ WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IN AN EVACUATION, SOME AMERICANS MAY WIND UP LEAVING ZAIRE COURTESY OF THE FRENCH, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE REPEATEDLY IN AFRICAN EVACUATIONS OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES. WE IN TURN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE FRENCH NATIONALS (AS WELL AS NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE HAVE EVACUATION UNDERSTANDINGS) IF THE NEED ARISES. WE SHOULD AVOID ANOTHER SITUATION LIKE THAT IN BANGUI IN APRIL 1996, WHEN THE FIRST AMERICAN EVACUATION FLIGHT LEFT BANGUI NEARLY EMPTY BECAUSE NO AMERICANS COULD BE FOUND TO FILL IT, ALTHOUGH HUNDREDS OF FRENCH NATIONALS LANGUISHED AT THE AIRPORT WAITING FOR A FRENCH FLIGHT. END SUMMARY.

WHERE U.S. AND FRENCH INTERESTS CONVERGE IN AFRICA

4. (e) WHILE WE OFTEN HAVE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH THE FRENCH IN AFRICA, COOPERATION IN CRISES HAS GENERALLY BEEN SATISFACTORY, AND HAS OFTEN BEEN OUTSTANDING (E.G. RESCUE OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN THE CAR IN 1996 AND EVACUATION OF VICTIMS OF THE 1996 ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASH IN THE COMOROS TO A FRENCH HOSPITAL.) FRENCH ACTIONS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS ARE DRIVEN BY BOTTOM-LINE INTERESTS THAT PARALLEL OUR OWN: PROTECTING AND/OR EVACUATING OWN NATIONALS, MINIMIZING HARM TO INNOCENT PARTIES, PROTECTING PROPERTY, AND PRESERVING INSTITUTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE PRECISE MIX OF PRIORITIES IN A GIVEN SITUATION, SUCH AS ZAIRE, MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL TO OUR OWN.

THE CASE FOR MUTUAL BACKSCRATCHING

5. (e) FOR COOPERATION TO BE SUCCESSFUL, A DEGREE OF RECIPROCITY IS REQUIRED. IN COUNTRIES WHERE THE FRENCH PRESENCE IS LARGER THAN OURS, AS IN MUCH OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICA, WE HAVE TENDED TO LOOK TO THE FRENCH TO TAKE THE LEAD IN HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES (RECENT CASES INCLUDE RWANDA, THE CAR, AND THE COMOROS). IN COUNTRIES WHERE THE U.S. ROLE IS BIGGER, AS IN LIBERIA, THE FRENCH HAVE LOOKED TO US TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROTECTING THEIR NATIONALS. RECIPROCITY OF TREATMENT IS ESSENTIAL IF WE EXPECT THE FRENCH TO CONTINUE LOOKING AFTER U.S. INTERESTS IN AREAS WHERE U.S. FORCES ARE NOT ENGAGED. ZAIRE PRESENTS THE SPECIAL CASE WHERE BOTH THE U.S. AND FRANCE, AS WELL AS THE BELGIANS, HAVE FORCES NEARBY FOR THE PURPOSE OF EVACUATING NATIONALS IN A CRISIS SITUATION, BUT, GIVEN THE "FOG OF WAR" INEVITABLY PRESENT IN ANY EVACUATION, THERE SEEMS TO BE NOTHING TO GAIN BY INSISTING ON STRICT AND EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THOSE FORCES FOR THEIR OWN NATIONALS.

6. (e) IT IS IN FACT AN OPERATIVE ASSUMPTION FOR THE FRENCH, CONSOLIDATED BY LONG EXPERIENCE, THAT, IN A CRISIS SITUATION, THEY WILL TAKE CARE OF (1) FRENCH CITIZENS, PLUS (2) ANY AMERICANS IN NEED. THEY ASSUME THAT WE WILL TAKE CARE OF (1) AMERICAN CITIZENS PLUS (2) FRENCH IN NEED. IF THAT FRENCH ASSUMPTION IS NOT CORRECT, WE NEED TO TELL THEM IN ADVANCE, VERY CLEARLY, TO ALLOW THEM TO PLAN. IT WOULD BE TOO LATE FOR THEM TO FIND OUT ONCE AN EVACUATION HAS STARTED. SUCH A CLEAR DEPARTURE FROM PAST PRACTICE WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO US, NOT ONLY IN THAT FIRST SPECIFIC CRISIS, BUT MORE WIDELY. WE WOULD NEED TO FACTOR THAT INTO OUR OWN PLANNING.

FRENCH CRISIS MANAGEMENT STYLE

7. ~~(S)~~ SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH ALSO
DEPENDS ON AN APPRECIATION OF HOW FRENCH
DECISION-MAKING DIFFERS FROM OUR OWN. A FEW
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 010756

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2002
TAGS: PREL, AEMR, MOPS, CASC, FR, CG
SUBJECT: EVACUATIONS IN AFRICA: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH

ILLUSTRATIONS, DRAWN FROM OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE OF
EVACUATION ACTIONS IN AFRICA:

-- THE GOF PREFERS TO PROCEED WITH AN OVERALL STRATEGY,
BLESSED BY SENIOR POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, WHILE LEAVING
SPECIFIC TACTICS TO BE WORKED OUT LATER, AND CLOSER TO
THE ACTION.

--THE FRENCH LEAVE THEIR EMBASSIES LOTS OF LEEWAY TO
JUDGE AND ACT ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND THE
FRENCH MILITARY DOES LIKEWISE FOR ITS FORCES IN THE
FIELD. WHILE DEMARCHES AND INFORMATION-SHARING IN
WASHINGTON AND PARIS HAVE THEIR PLACE, THE BULK OF THE
COORDINATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE GROUND IN THE
COUNTRY(IES) CONCERNED.

--THE FRENCH ARE MOST COMFORTABLE SHARING OPERATIONAL
DETAILS THROUGH MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNELS, AND WE
UNDERSTAND THAT A GOOD DEGREE OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY
COOPERATION/COORDINATION ON THE GROUND IN BRAZZAVILLE
ALREADY EXISTS.

--FRENCH MILITARY OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING MOVES
VERY QUICKLY IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.

--WHEN IT COMES TO REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM THE
UNITED STATES IN A CRISIS, THE FRENCH PREFER TO INQUIRE
"INFORMALLY," AND TO AVOID ASKING A QUESTION AT ALL
UNLESS THEY ARE SURE THEY WILL GET WHAT THEY WANT
AND/OR NEED.

ENHANCING COOPERATION: EVACUATION FLIGHTS

8. ~~(S)~~ TO KEEP UP WITH MOVING FRENCH DECISION MAKING,
U.S. COMMANDERS IN THEATER, WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE
AMBASSADOR IN THE COUNTRY(IES) CONCERNED, NEED
FLEXIBILITY AND AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON THE EVACUATION
OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS VIA U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT.
WE UNDERSTAND CONCERNS ABOUT COSTS, AND NOTE THAT THE
FRENCH, LIKE WE AMERICANS, ASK THOSE PRIVATE CITIZENS
TO WHOM THEY PROVIDE EVACUATION ASSISTANCE TO SIGN
PROMISSORY NOTES FOR THE COSTS INVOLVED, AND THAT WE
SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO ASK FRENCH NATIONALS WHOM WE MAY
WIND UP EVACUATING TO PAY FOR THE SERVICE. WHAT WE

SHOULD AVOID AT ALL COSTS, HOWEVER, IS A SITUATION WHERE FRENCH NATIONALS ARE TOLD, "NO FRENCH ALLOWED ON THIS (HALF-EMPTY) FLIGHT."

9. ~~LET~~ THE FIRST U.S. EVACUATION FLIGHT LEFT BANGUI IN APRIL 1996 WITH A HANDFUL OF PASSENGERS, DESPITE THE PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT OF MANY OTHERWISE QUALIFIED THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, INCLUDING FRENCH NATIONALS. THIS OCCURRED AS THE U.S. WAS PRESSING THE GOF HARD TO LOCATE AND REPOSITION FOR EVACUATION U.S. NATIONALS IN BANGUI. OUR ACTIONS LEFT AN IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT ITS OWN NATIONALS. THE U.S. WAS ABLE TO CORRECT THAT IMPRESSION, WITH A LOT OF EFFORT, BUT THE BANGUI INCIDENT UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING AS FLEXIBLE AN APPROACH AS POSSIBLE TO THE EVACUATION OF FRENCH NATIONALS IN NEED IN AFRICAN CRISES. GIVEN THE ESPECIALLY STRONG FRENCH PRESENCE IN AFRICA, WE HAVE GOTTEN MORE HELP OVER TIME FROM THE GOF THAN WE HAVE GIVEN TO FRENCH NATIONALS. RECIPROCITY IS THE KEY TO PRESERVING THIS IMPORTANT COOPERATION.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0756

<^SSN>0756

TOR: 970513132829 M2756456

<^TOR>970513132844 M2756458

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PETERS
PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA1366 1411617-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 211617Z MAY 97

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

OSRI: RUEHFR

DTG: 211617Z MAY 97

ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO: RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0946
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6392

INFO: RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SUBJ: FRENCH SEEK NORMAL RELATIONS WITH KABILA

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 011366

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2002

TAGS: PINS, PREL, PINR, CG, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH SEEK NORMAL RELATIONS WITH KABILA

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M. BELLAMY,
REASON 1.5 B AND D.

2. ~~(S)~~ WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN DEMOCRATIC CONGO WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY ADVISOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS BERNARD DIGUET MAY 21, EXPRESSING REGRETS AT THE DEATHS OF TWO FRENCH NATIONALS IN KINSHASA. DIGUET SAID THAT THE TWO WERE LONG-TERM RESIDENTS AND NOT PARTICULARLY LINKED TO THE MOBUTU REGIME. THE GOF, WHILE DISTURBED BY THE INCIDENTS, WOULD NOT MAKE A ISSUE OF THE MATTER. CAREFULLY AVOIDING BLAMING THE NEW GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEATHS, HE SAID THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS TAKE STEPS, QUICKLY, TO PROVIDE A LEVEL OF POLICING SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH PREVAILED UNTIL RECENTLY.

3. ~~(S)~~ REFERRING GUARDEDLY TO A MAY 21 HIGH-LEVEL MEETING (DEFENSE COUNCIL) ON ZAIRE CHAIRED BY PRESIDENT CHIRAC, DIGUET NOTED THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN KINSHASA HAD JUST BEEN INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH KABILA AND TO MAKE CLEAR TO HIM "WHAT HE WOULD NEED TO DO IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FRENCH SUPPORT." DIGUET NOTED THAT FRANCE WOULD KEEP ITS EMBASSY OPEN AND WANTED NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THE EGREGIOUS HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN THE EAST WAS AMPLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS AND WAS HAVING AN EFFECT ON FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION, AND WOULD FORM THE CORE OF FRANCE'S EARLY APPROACHES TO THE KABILA GOVERNMENT.

4. ~~(S)~~ DIGUET PROFESSED IGNORANCE AS TO WHERE MOBUTU

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WOULD EVENTUALLY SETTLE, STATING THAT MOBUTU "HAD NOT ASKED" ABOUT COMING TO FRANCE. SEPARATELY, FORMER ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR (NOW SENATOR) GUY PENNE (PROTECT) TOLD US THAT THE MOBUTU RESIDENCE AT ROQUEBRUNE CAP MARTIN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE HAD NEVER BEEN PAID FOR. PENNE SAID THAT WHILE AT THE ELYSEE HE HAD PERSONALLY ARRANGED FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE RESIDENCE BY MOBUTU FROM THE AGNELLI FAMILY, WHICH HAD NOT CARED TO CAUSE A FUSS ABOUT THE MATTER OF NON-PAYMENT. WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE CONVERSATION WITH PENNE, WE ASKED DIGUET IF HE WERE AWARE OF STORIES THAT THE VILLA HAD NEVER BEEN PAID FOR. DIGUET SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF SUCH STORIES.

(C) WE HAVE NOTED THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN KINSHASA ARE TAKING A MODERATE TONE TOWARD THE FRENCH IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, A FACT WHICH THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO UNDOUBTEDLY NOTED. CONTINUED ADFL MODERATION OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS, TO WHICH THE GOF IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, COULD PROVE THE KEY TO A NEW, SMOOTHER START FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DROC AND THE GOF.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1366

TOR: 970521123944 M2768726

DIST:

SIT: BARKS-RUGGLES BEERS JORDAN MALLEY MCCARTHY MCCORMICK ORR PASSDOWN
PETERS PRENDERGAST RAGAN RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WECHSLER

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA1479 1421823-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 221823Z MAY 97
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG: 221823Z MAY 97
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6433
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT
 - CHIRAC: NON-NATO ISSUES

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0240-M (1.47)
 KBH 8/9/2022

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 011479

EXDIS

NSC FOR SANDY BERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07
 TAGS: PREL, PARM, PTER, FR
 SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT
 - CHIRAC: NON-NATO ISSUES

REF: PARIS 11406 (NODIS)

(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. DONALD K.
 BANDLER. REASONS: 1.5 (B,D).

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: ALONG WITH THE KEY QUESTION OF NATO ADAPTATION (REFTEL), FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC WILL HAVE A NUMBER OF MAJOR NON-NATO ISSUES ON HIS MIND WHEN HE MEETS WITH THE PRESIDENT MAY 27: THE DENVER SUMMIT, BOSNIA, CHINA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND PERHAPS ZAIRE. THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE TWO ROUNDS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS. CHIRAC APPEARS CONFIDENT, AND MOST ANALYSTS AGREE THAT HIS CENTER-RIGHT COALITION WILL RETAIN ITS MAJORITY, ALBEIT A MUCH SMALLER ONE. EVEN AN UPSET SOCIALIST WIN AND THE INSTALLATION OF A SOCIALIST-LED GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD DO LITTLE TO ALTER THE MAIN LINES OF FRENCH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY, IN WHICH CHIRAC RETAINS CONSTITUTIONAL PRIMACY (REFTEL).

2. ~~(S)~~ U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS ARE COMING OUT OF A ROUGH PERIOD, BUT CHIRAC'S OWN TENDENCY TO EQUATE PURSUIT OF FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS WITH "BALANCING U.S. HEGEMONY" GLOBALLY MEANS DIFFERENCES WILL PERSIST

ON A NUMBER OF PROMINENT ISSUES. CHIRAC RETAINS A KEEN DESIRE TO SECURE A FRENCH/EUROPEAN ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. A FIRM OPPONENT OF THE "ISOLATION/SANCTIONS" APPROACH TO PARIAS STATES, CHIRAC WILL LOOK FOR AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO RESUME EUROPE'S DIALOGUE WITH IRAN; ON IRAQ, HE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UN SANCTIONS, BUT ONLY NARROWLY AND LEGALISTICALLY. FRESH FROM A HIGH-PROFILE TRIP TO CHINA, CHIRAC WILL BE EAGER TO BRIEF THE PRESIDENT ON FRANCE'S NEW "MORE CONSTRUCTIVE" APPROACH TO CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ON BOSNIA, HE MAY SOUND OUT U.S. FIRMNESS ON OUR SFOR DEADLINE. OVERALL, CHIRAC'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN FRANCE AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO STABILITY AND EXPANDED COMMERCE AROUND THE GLOBE PRESENTS IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S., OPPORTUNITIES WE NEED TO MANAGE CAREFULLY, HOWEVER. ND SUMMARY.

CHIRAC AND THE FRENCH CONTEXT

3. (X) THE MOOD IN FRANCE ON THE EVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IS ONE OF PESSIMISM. THE FRENCH ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THEIR RECORD-HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, BUT ALSO DIVIDED OVER THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES NEEDED TO CREATE NEW JOBS AND MAKE FRANCE MORE COMPETITIVE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE. THIS FRUSTRATION PROMOTES A SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS, AND THE U.S., SEEN HERE AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND "GLOBALIZATION," REMAINS A SCAPEGOAT OF CHOICE FOR MANY IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL CLASS. DESPITE THE INCREASINGLY INWARD FOCUS OF THE FRENCH, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT CHIRAC -- WHO IS ENAMORED OF FOREIGN POLICY -- REMAINS DETERMINED TO PROJECT FRANCE'S INFLUENCE AND EXPAND ITS MARKET SHARE. FRESH FROM AN IMPORTANT TRIP TO CHINA, CHIRAC HAS ALSO TRAVELLED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, JAPAN, RUSSIA, SOUTH AMERICA AND CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS.

4. (X) CHIRAC WILL HOST THE NATO-RUSSIA SUMMIT IN BETWEEN THE TWO ROUNDS (MAY 25 AND JUNE 1) OF SNAP LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES DO NOT FIGURE MUCH IN THIS ELECTION. CHIRAC CALLED EARLY ELECTIONS TO CLEAR THE DECKS FOR WHAT WILL BE A CHARGED EU CALENDAR IN 1998. HIS GOVERNMENT MUST MAINTAIN BUDGETARY RIGOR, WHICH COULD REQUIRE FURTHER UNPOPULAR AUSTERITY MEASURES IN THE YEAR AHEAD TO ENSURE FRANCE MEETS THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA TO JOIN THE EMU. EARLY ELECTIONS ARE THUS AN EFFORT TO DE-LINK CHIRAC'S EUROPEAN POLICIES FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS.

5. (X) THE FRENCH PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SPARING WITH HIS INTERVENTIONS IN THE CAMPAIGN. HE CAN AFFORD TO BE. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE LOTS OF UNDECIDED VOTERS, HIS CENTER-RIGHT COALITION SEEMS LIKELY TO RETAIN A MAJORITY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND THUS AGAIN THE RIGHT TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. BUT EVEN AN UPSET SOCIALIST VICTORY WOULD NOT BRING A MARKED CHANGE IN FRENCH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY, WHERE CHIRAC WOULD RETAIN CONSTITUTIONAL PRIMACY.

U.S./FRENCH RELATIONS

6. (C) FRANCE AND THE U.S. DISAGREED OR CLASHED LAST YEAR ACROSS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF ISSUES: OUR MISSILE STRIKES ON IRAQ, MANAGEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, THE CONFLICT IN ZAIRE, NATO ADAPTATION, THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 011479

EXDIS

NSC FOR SANDY BERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07

TAGS: PREL, PARM, PTER, FR

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT
- CHIRAC: NON-NATO ISSUES

SELECTION OF A NEW UN SECRETARY GENERAL, HELMS-BURTON/ILSA. WHILE CHIRAC REPEATEDLY TESTED THE LIMITS OF U.S. TOLERANCE OF FRENCH ACTIVISM, HE WAS ALSO CAREFUL TO STOP SHORT OF PROVOKING RUPTURES IN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. RESTRAINING FACTORS WERE CHIRAC'S GUT INSTINCT SENSE OF THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF FRENCH TIES TO THE U.S., PLUS HIS HIGH PERSONAL RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON.

7. (C) RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED IN 1997, THANKS IN PART TO JOINT EFFORTS TO KEEP OUR DISPUTES OUT OF THE MEDIA. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S DEATH ALSO WROUGHT AN UNEXPECTED CHANGE. CHIRAC REACTED TO THE SHOCK WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ALMOST EMOTIONAL EFFORT TO MEND RIFTS WITH THE U.S.

8. (C) UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS AMPLE ROOM IN CHIRAC'S WORLD VIEW FOR CONTINUING, LOW-LEVEL RIVALRY WITH THE U.S. ALTHOUGH CHIRAC HIMSELF ADMITS TO NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN FRENCH ASSERTIVENESS AND GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., HIS INSISTENCE ON PROMOTING A "MULTI-POLAR" WORLD ORDER AND ON CREATING COUNTERWEIGHTS TO OFFSET "UNHEALTHY" DOMINATION OF THE WORLD SCENE BY A "SOLE SUPERPOWER" ARE A STANDING INVITATION TO FRANCE AND OTHERS TO QUESTION OR CHALLENGE U.S. LEADERSHIP AROUND THE GLOBE.

9. (C) THE POTENTIAL THUS EXISTS FOR RENEWED U.S.-FRENCH TENSIONS, BUT ALSO FOR HARNESSING FRENCH ACTIVISM WHERE OUR INTERESTS CAN BE SHOWN TO CONVERGE. FOLLOWING IS A QUICK SURVEY OF SALIENT ISSUES WHICH CHIRAC MAY RAISE IN DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON MAY 27.

THE DENVER SUMMIT

10. (C) DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SHERPA MEETING THIS WEEK, CHIRAC MAY WANT TO RAISE SEVERAL

SUMMIT ISSUES WITH THE PRESIDENT, INCLUDING THE U.S. AFRICA INITIATIVE, AND THE SUMMIT STATEMENT ON HONG KONG.

IRAQ

11. (✓) FRANCE REJECTS OPEN-ENDED ISOLATION AS AN APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH IRAQ, VIEWING IT AS DESTABILIZING AND "EXTRA-LEGAL," I.E., NOT BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS. CHIRAC HAS A PARTICULAR DISTASTE FOR SANCTIONS AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL; THE GOF IS SERIOUS ABOUT APPLYING UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ, BUT ONLY TO THE LETTER, NO MORE. (THIS WAS DEMONSTRATED MOST RECENTLY BY FRENCH RESISTANCE TO OUR EFFORT TO LAY DOWN A MARKER ON IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONE.) ALONG WITH A DESIRE TO PRESERVE COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRENCH FIRMS FOLLOWING THE END OF SANCTIONS, THE FRENCH HAVE A STRATEGIC VIEW OF A STRONG, UNIFIED IRAQ AS A REGIONAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO IRAN.

IRAN

12. (✓) THE FRENCH STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT DIALOGUE IS A MEANS OF MODERATING THE BEHAVIOR OF IRAN, WHICH THEY VIEW AS DECREASINGLY RADICAL, THOUGH STILL DANGEROUS. THEY INSIST THAT DIALOGUE, IN THE FORM OF GOF CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN FM VELAYATI, WAS CRUCIAL TO RESOLUTION OF THE APRIL 1996 ISRAELI-HIZBALLAH CONFLICT. THE GENERIC FRENCH DISLIKE OF SANCTIONS, AND INTEREST IN COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS, IS REFLECTED ALSO IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH IRAN. THEY WERE ACTIVE BEHIND THE SCENES TO HEAD OFF EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR LONGER-TERM PUNITIVE MEASURES FOLLOWING THE MYKONOS VERDICT, AND HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN SHAPING THE INTENSELY HOSTILE EU REACTION TO THE IRAN-LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT (ILSA).

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

13. (✓) CHIRAC IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE STALL IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT ARAFAT MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONTAIN PALESTINIAN ANGER MUCH LONGER. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. APPEARS TO BE UNABLE TO MOVE NETANYAHU AND IS THEREFORE TENDING TO DISENGAGE FROM MORE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT. CHIRAC IS CONVINCED THAT U.S.-EU "PARTNERSHIP" - PERHAPS STRUCTURED AROUND THE EU'S TEN-POINT PROPOSAL IN DUTCH FM VAN MIERLO'S LETTER TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT - IS THE BEST WAY FORWARD, AND IS LIKELY TO SOLICIT THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 011479

EXDIS

NSC FOR SANDY BERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/07

TAGS: PREL, PARM, PTER, FR
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT
- CHIRAC; NON-NATO ISSUES

ON THIS. CHIRAC IS ALSO INTERESTED IN MEDIATING ISRAELI-SYRIAN RE-ENGAGEMENT, AND MAY SUGGEST AGAIN (AS HE DID IN HIS DECEMBER LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT) THAT THE U.S. AND FRANCE WORK IN TANDEM ON THIS TRACK.

BOSNIA

14. (X) LIKE THE U.S., FRANCE IS FOCUSED ON AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE PACE OF CIVILIAN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION. PARIS VIEWS DAYTON GAINS AS FRAGILE, FORESEES THE NEED FOR AN SFOR FOLLOW ON AND (SO FAR) INSISTS WE BE A PARTICIPANT ON THE GROUND. SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER OTHER OPTIONS, INCLUDING A EUROPEAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN BOSNIA AFTER SFOR DEPARTS. IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, CHIRAC MAY TEST THE FIRMNESS OF OUR SFOR PULL-OUT DEADLINE. WAR CRIMES AND THE SUCCESSOR TO CARL BILDt ARE OTHER SUBJECTS CHIRAC COULD RAISE.

CHINA

15. (X) FRENCH POLICY ON CHINA IS DRIVEN BY THE TWIN DESIRES TO PLACATE AND DOMESTICATE AN EMERGING SUPERPOWER, AND TO TURN THIS POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT TO ITS COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE. CHIRAC IS A SERIOUS STUDENT OF CHINESE ART AND CULTURE AND HAS MADE CHINA THE LINCHPIN OF HIS STRATEGY TO RAISE FRANCE'S PROFILE IN ASIA. HE PERSONALLY DECIDED THAT FRANCE WOULD DROP ITS LONG-TIME SUPPORT FOR A CHINA RESOLUTION AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. PRESS COMMENTARY ON CHIRAC'S MAY 15-18 TRIP TO CHINA NOTED A TRADE VS. HUMAN RIGHTS TRADEOFF, BUT UNDERScoreD CHIRAC'S COMMERCIAL SUCCESSES. REPEATING A NOW COMMON THEME, CHIRAC ALSO SIGNED ON TO A CHINESE DECLARATION CALLING FOR A MULTIPOLAR WORLD, A NOT-SO-SUBTLE DIG AT U.S. "HEGEMONY."

ZAIRE/CONGO

16. (X) THIS ISSUE IS A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF THE GOF AND OF FRUSTRATION. ALTHOUGH CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TOLD THE CHARGE THAT HIS PRESIDENT WAS UNLIKELY TO RAISE ZAIRE, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT A "WHO LOST ZAIRE" DEBATE HAS BEEN FAIRLY PROMINENT DURING THE FRENCH ELECTION CAMPAIGN. FRANCE IS PORTRAYED IN THE MEDIA AS THE "LOSER," WITH THE U.S. AS THE WINNER, NOW THAT "ITS MAN KABILA" IS IN KINSHASA. IN FACT, THIS IS NOT THE VIEW OF GOVERNMENT CIRCLES, WHO, DESPITE SOME DIFFERENCES, CAME TO VALUE THE CLOSE U.S./FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS. THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO PRESSURE KABILA ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES SURROUNDING

REFUGEES AND ON A TRANSITION TO EARLY ELECTIONS.

BANDLER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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SSN: 1479
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TOR: 970522144235 M2771003
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DIST:
SIT: BELL DOWLING FEELEY HAMEL HARMON PETERS SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
WITKOWSKY
PRT: BASS BERGER BROWN DAVIES FUERTH HARMONPTR HELWEG KERRICK SIT{C2}
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: NODIS