

# MIR MARKER

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. note</del>	<del>Handwritten Notes on three (3) yellow post-it notes (1 page)</del>	<del>00/00/0000</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
<del>001b. letter</del>	<del>To: President Jiang Zhemín; From: President Bill Clinton (3 pages)</del>	<del>08/01/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
<del>002a. memo</del>	<del>To: POTUS; From: Todd Stern; Re: China / Taiwan Policy [with handwriting and backwards checkmarks] (1 page)</del>	<del>07/30/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
<del>002b. memo</del>	<del>To: POTUS; From: Anthony Lake, Laura D. Tyson; Re: Next Steps on China / Taiwan Policy [with handwritten annotations and partial copy of notes in 001a] (9 pages)</del>	<del>07/29/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
002c. paper	Assessment of the Current State of U.S. - China Relations (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
<del>002d. report</del>	<del>A One China Policy (7 pages)</del>	<del>00/00/0000</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
<del>003a. draft</del>	<del>We Recommend the following three additional Steps [with handwritten annotations] [page number 4] (1 page)</del>	<del>00/00/0000</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
003b. draft	Draft copy of 002b [with different annotations] (9 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
<del>003c. draft</del>	<del>draft version of page 2 of 003b (1 page)</del>	<del>00/00/0000</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>
<del>003d. draft</del>	<del>Draft version of page 4 of 003b (1 page)</del>	<del>00/00/0000</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/7/2023</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 [President Jiang Zhemín]  
 OA/Box Number: 43319

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9505736

2018-0679-M  
 sb2473

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: JIANG ZEMIN

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 01 AUG 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R  
LIMITED ACCESS

TAIWAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES JAING CLARIFYING US POLICY TWDS CHINA

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 27 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
ROTH

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By ADP NARA, Date 7/9/2018  
2018-0679-11

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 4 OF 4

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z	95072421	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002 PRESIDENT	Z	95073008	FOR DECISION
002	X	95073108	PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM
003 PRESIDENT	Z	95073008	FOR DECISION
003	X	95073108	PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM
004 PRESIDENT	Z	95073008	FOR SIGNATURE
004	X	95080108	PRESIDENT SGD LTR

National Security Council  
The White House

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Sens	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

\* upstairs has seen this

COMMENTS:

letter has been signed by  
 President -- he saw on July 31  
 What date do you want on the  
 letter? \_\_\_\_\_

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5736 LAC  
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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG JB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

① The letter is excellent

② We need to discuss this  
Tuesday am.

③ I agree w/ strategy for Secy  
of State meeting

④ see my notes

agree

again this ~~need~~ should be a  
multilateral decision but it's  
different in character from UN.

Congress has made no decisions yet -  
it's our fault we let the Lee  
decision, what I wanted to make,  
look like that

National Security Council  
The White House

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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC: *\* upstairs has seen this*  
 COMMENTS: *letter has been signed by President -- he saw on July 31  
 What date do you want on the letter?*

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5736 LAC  
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 1, 1995

Dear Mr. President:

I asked Secretary Christopher to take the opportunity of his meeting with Vice Premier Qian in Brunei to convey this personal message to you. During this difficult period in the relations between our two countries, I wanted to reiterate my personal commitment to better relations between the United States and China. The meeting between our Foreign Ministers represents what I hope will be the first in a series of mutual steps toward setting our bilateral relationship on a truly positive course.

The basic approach of my Administration's policy toward China is embodied in the word "engagement." We have sought at every public and private opportunity to communicate sincerely that the United States seeks constructive relations with a strong, stable, open and prosperous China. This theme was central to our meetings last year in Bogor and in 1993 on Blake Island.

Cooperation on a number of key issues over the past year has yielded important, positive results: our joint statement on non-proliferation last October, our agreement on intellectual property rights in March, expanded commercial opportunities for both our countries, cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, the establishment of a Joint Commission on Defense Conversion, the first-ever bilateral military transparency briefings and excellent cooperation in countering alien smuggling.

I must speak plainly however: on some important matters of concern to the United States, such as human rights and non-proliferation, there has been less progress than I had hoped for and expected. I am also troubled by a series of unilateral measures your Government has adopted toward the United States in recent weeks. Cancelling visits, halting dialogue, recalling your Ambassador and ceasing cooperation on matters of bilateral concern can only harm relations.

I know, however, that the paramount concern of your government is U.S. policy toward Taiwan. During their meeting in Brunei, Secretary Christopher and Vice Premier Qian will have an opportunity to discuss key issues of importance to both of our

nations. Secretary Christopher will reaffirm that my Administration continues to adhere to the three U.S.-PRC communiqués that form the foundation of our diplomatic relations.

When our two countries established relations in 1979, it was a triumph of courageous political leadership and diplomatic skill to have been able to find a framework for successfully managing our differences, especially over Taiwan. Maintaining that framework continues to be in our mutual interest. I know that your Government considers the recent private visit by Lee Teng-hui to Cornell University to be a very serious and sensitive matter. I respect your views but ask that you also respect mine. We permitted Mr. Lee to make a private visit to his alma mater for a personal purpose. We ensured there was no meeting between Mr. Lee and Administration officials. The visit was carefully managed to be unofficial in substance and, to the maximum degree within our control, in appearance. Most importantly, it did not represent any change in our policy of maintaining only unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan.

I would take this opportunity to emphasize to you again that the policy of the United States with respect to China and Taiwan remains unchanged. The United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The Government of the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

The United States considers relations with China to be among its most important bilateral ties and understands fully that our relations with Taiwan must continue to be viewed in the context of relations with China. For that reason, my Administration has resisted -- and will continue to resist -- calls for a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" policy, for an independent Taiwan, or for separate UN admission for Taiwan.

I remain convinced that this approach best serves the cause of peace and stability in the area of the Taiwan Strait. We hope that this policy will contribute significantly, in time, to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, in a manner to be determined by the Chinese people. And I earnestly hope that China and Taiwan will recommit themselves soon to a process of peaceful dialogue aimed at resolving differences.

Mr. President, it is in the interest of our two great countries, and also our solemn responsibility to our peoples, to work together to overcome misunderstandings and to seek creative solutions to the bilateral, regional and global problems that

confront us. I am mindful of your vision, when we first met in Seattle, of our responsibility as leaders of two great nations to cooperate in the interests of strengthening peace and well-being for the entire world as we enter the 21st century. I hope we can join together in this undertaking. I look forward to the next opportunity for the two of us to meet and discuss these issues in person. In the meantime, let us make progress to overcome the serious, immediate problems before us, so our next meeting will be an assured success.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

His Excellency Jiang Zemin,  
President of the People's  
Republic of China  
Beijing

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
7/31/95

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2018-0679-M (1.03)  
KBH 8/26/2022

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TODD STERN *TS*

SUBJECT: China/Taiwan Policy

The attached Lake/Tyson memo lays out an approach for stabilizing our relations with China and Taiwan. The memo outlines steps to take in pursuit of three key objectives: rebuilding a national consensus around a one-China policy; avoiding a downward spiral with the PRC; regaining control of our Taiwan policy. **NSC is seeking your approval to move forward by tomorrow, because Secretary Christopher is meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian in Brunei on Tuesday (Monday EDT).**

Key Steps

**One-China consensus:** major speech by you, Chris or Tony, laying out continuing validity of one-China policy, ideally after securing release of Harry Wu.

**Damage control with PRC:** in his meeting with Qian, Chris would (i) reaffirm one-China policy, delivering a letter from you to President Jiang (attached at Tab C); (ii) explain that we'll evaluate future visits by Taiwanese officials on a case-by-case basis, that permission will be rare and that any visits that do occur will be private; (iii) suggest a possible invitation for President Jiang to visit Washington, with the caveat that the visit has to be successful. Chris would propose that he and Qian assess the matter in September -- thus giving China time to release Harry Wu (without which no meeting could be successful).

**Taiwan:** the memo proposes a high-level U.S.-Taiwan meeting in a third country to explain our policy on visits and to warn against Taiwan's continued efforts to end-run the Administration via Congress. We will continue to categorically oppose U.N. membership and will continue to work on the issues of accession to the WTO before China and membership in international organizations other than the U.N.

Approve this approach  Disapprove  Discuss

*See my  
memo*

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 29, 1995

95 JUL 29 P2:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
LAURA D. TYSON

SUBJECT: Next Steps on China/Taiwan Policy

*Handwritten notes:*  
① We need to discuss  
② This is all -  
③ Plaque strategy  
④ See my notes  
The letter is excellent

Introduction

In the wake of China's strong reaction to the visit of President Lee, the Deputies have formulated a comprehensive set of policy recommendations toward China and Taiwan. Specifically, they have identified three overarching policy objectives and a work plan for achieving those objectives that we endorse and are now submitting for your approval.

Objectives

- 1. Reestablishing a credible national consensus and rationale for U.S. China policy

The events leading up to the Lee visit reflect the crumbling of the broad, bipartisan consensus over China policy that has existed since normalization: a "one-China" policy that in some respects necessarily subordinates the unofficial relationship with Taiwan to the official relationship with China, but which also has facilitated an enormous improvement in China-Taiwan relations. We need to lay out for the Congress and the American people a pragmatic and persuasive case that a one-China policy remains the best basis for all three bilateral relationships to flourish simultaneously: U.S.-China, U.S.-Taiwan and Taiwan-China.

*Handwritten:* agree

- 2. Avoiding a further downward spiral in our China relationship

The China relationship is not in free-fall. China has not taken any irreversible steps (arms sales to rogue regimes, vetoes of UN resolutions) nor has it engaged in large-scale economic retaliation. But the relationship clearly is in trouble, and the Chinese have kept their options open to take additional measures if the United States does not take steps to "fix" the problem they claim we created.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2018-0679-M (1.05)  
KBH 8/26/2022

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① The letter is excellent

② We need to discuss this  
Tuesday am.

③ I agree w/ strategy for Secy  
of State meeting

④ see my notes

---

We need to be clear with the Chinese that we will not concede our interests to repair the relationship. But we should identify concrete steps to stabilize the relationship that are of interest to the Chinese and which serve our own interests.

3. Regain the initiative in relations with Taiwan.

We need to restore a sense of balance with Taiwan and ~~support its nascent efforts to repair its relations with Beijing.~~ Taiwan's leaders have been ignoring the Administration and working directly with the Congress to achieve their objectives. They are now pushing aggressively in the Congress on UN membership, membership in other international organizations and early accession to the WTO. Unless we regain the initiative in Taiwan policy, Congressional actions could persuade the Chinese leadership that the United States is headed down the two-China path.

**Work Plan**

I. REBUILDING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS FOR A ONE-CHINA POLICY

A. DELIVERING A MAJOR CHINA POLICY SPEECH

There is no short-term, one-shot fix. However, we believe that it would be productive for a very high-level official -- you, Secretary Christopher or Tony Lake -- to make a major speech laying out U.S. interests in the China relationship, the Taiwan relationship and the continuing validity of a one-China policy. The themes for such a speech are contained in Tab B.

Such a speech should come after Secretary Christopher has met China's Foreign Minister on August 1, and ideally, after Harry Wu has been released. Otherwise, much of the attention to the speech would be focused on what we are doing to get Wu out, detracting from the core message.

We should engage the Hill in high-level briefings about China policy after the speech.

B. SECURING THE RELEASE OF HARRY WU

Until Harry Wu is released, there is no prospect for rebuilding a domestic coalition on China policy. Our strategy for securing his release balances three objectives:

- keeping the pressure on China to release him immediately;
- avoiding, at least for now, retaliation options that could be counterproductive with the Chinese; and

agree - we need a firm talk with them  
agree - we need a firm talk with them

Yes but this is not as important as other action 1st -

yes, but this is not as important as other action 1st -

- not letting this issue become the litmus test for the overall relationship.

To achieve these objectives we are pursuing a five-pronged strategy:

- maximizing support from third countries;
- getting third parties, such as the American business community and key "friends" of China to make representations;
- ✓ -- formulating an aggressive public posture about our efforts to secure Wu's release but avoiding provocative rhetoric;
- developing but holding retaliatory options, including a travel advisory, the cancellation of high-level visits and economic retaliation; and
- managing the overall relationship in a way that could positively affect the chances for Wu's release.

YES ✓

II. DAMAGE CONTROL WITH THE PRC

A. MFN

We succeeded in channeling anti-Chinese frustrations in Congress into a second resolution that more or less "responsibly" criticized China but left MFN benefits alone. Nevertheless, China has denounced it, and we hope to avoid action on it in the Senate.

B. REAFFIRM ONE-CHINA POLICY/CLARIFY POLICY ON HIGH-LEVEL TAIWAN VISITS

Since the Lee visit, China has repeatedly demanded the U.S. demonstrate its commitment to a one-China policy and provide reassurance that President Lee and other high-level Taiwan visitors will not be permitted to come to the United States again.

Our efforts to respond to China's demands are bounded by three considerations:

- We should not appear to apologize for the Lee visit;
- We cannot promise Lee will never be allowed to visit the U.S. again;
- We cannot appear to be "trading" for Harry Wu.

Our damage-limitation strategy began with the Kissinger delegation, which emphasized our commitment to a one-China policy and stressed the need for the release of Harry Wu.

We recommend the following three additional steps:

1. Secretary Christopher will address China briefly in his Asia speech prior to his departure for Brunei; he will emphasize the importance of U.S.-China relations not only for the countries themselves but for regional stability. This meeting should be "strategic" in the sense of setting forth our view of the China relationship rather than simply emphasizing a list of U.S. demands.

2. Christopher-Qian meeting in Brunei on August 1. Secretary Christopher would lay out our response to China's "demands": a reaffirmation of the one-China policy, a restrictive view on future Lee (or other high-level) visits and a qualified invitation for President Jiang to a summit meeting in October, following the UN commemoration.

a. Reaffirming Commitment to One-China Policy. We believe a personal letter from you to Jiang Zemin has the best chance of getting our points across. The letter should reiterate your commitment to good relations with China, your strong support for a one-China policy, your recognition that relations are difficult now and your suggestion that the personal involvement of both presidents is needed. A draft is at Tab C.

b. Future High-Level Taiwan Visits. The issue of future high-level visits is more difficult. There is an excellent chance that President Lee will seek to come here again next year (e.g. during the Olympics). A decision to permit such a "quasi-official" visit would have serious consequences with the Chinese.

Rather than let the issue of future visits remain unresolved, we recommend that you decide now that such visits would be approved on a restrictive but not preclusive basis. A decision to completely bar such visits would be difficult to sustain. At the same time, pragmatic consultations require that there be strict limitations on the number of high-level visits, since a policy of unrestricted visits would likely lead to a serious rupture in our relations with China. Our major allies, including Japan and most of the Europeans, will welcome a restrictive policy; they, in fact, do not permit high-level visits.

If you agree, Secretary Christopher should inform Qian Qichen at Brunei that, while we cannot rule out future private visits, they will be decided on a case-by-case basis and will be "rare." We recommend Secretary Christopher use a "restrictive but not preclusive" formulation, designed to allay Chinese concerns, while preserving your flexibility. When such visits are permitted, they will be strictly unofficial. For internal purposes (but not for the Chinese), "unofficial" will be defined as limited to "private" events related to the visitor's personal life, such as alma mater functions, family visits and medical treatment, and would not include meetings with executive branch officials.

OK

If Taiwan is in Olympics it's a tough call. Is the leader of any other Olympic country precluded?

c. Jiang Invitation. The issue of an invitation to President Jiang presents a serious dilemma. Unless Harry Wu is released prior to Secretary Christopher's meeting it is politically impossible for him to extend an unconditional invitation for Jiang to come.

However, we could offer an invitation for Jiang to come to Washington with the caveat that the visit has to be successful. This would be described not as a precondition but as a reality. Secretary Christopher would propose that he and Qian meet again in September to assess if it would be possible to have a successful visit. This would give China time to release Wu. It would also give us an opportunity to work quietly with the Chinese to identify additional areas where progress could be made during a summit, which would protect you from the charge of trading the summit for Wu's release. Publicly, Secretary Christopher would merely say that a summit meeting had been discussed and that he would have a follow-up meeting or discussion with the Chinese within a month or so.

If Taiwan is in Olympics it's a tough call. Is the leader of any other Olympic country precluded?

Given the current internal political situation in China, there is a real possibility that this strategy will fail if China decides nothing less than a flat policy reversal (a clear statement about no future visits) is a sufficient basis for resumed engagement with us. If that is the case, our recommendation is: So be it; U.S. policy can't be based on maximum Chinese demands.

agree

In either scenario, the Christopher-Qian meeting should set the stage for the major China policy speech by you or another senior official, which we discussed earlier. If tensions ease, it will provide the opportunity to begin rebuilding support for a one-China policy. If China rejects the U.S. position, it will provide an opportunity to lay out the U.S. case and place the onus for any subsequent

the U.S. case and place the onus for any subsequent deterioration of relations on China, where it properly belongs.

C. NONPROLIFERATION

You should be aware that moving through the system are 3-4 nonproliferation "time-bombs," any one of which could lead to the imposition of new sanctions. We have limited discretion concerning the timing of such sanctions once we have clear evidence of a statutory violation. All we can do is scrutinize the intelligence to ensure we do not impose sanctions prematurely.

D. PROACTIVE STEPS

Whereas previous sections focused on actions designed to prevent a worsening of relations, there are also positive steps that we have considered to improve the relationship.

1. Ease terms for accession to the WTO

Without compromising our position that China's entry into the WTO has to be on the economic merits, the economic agencies are reviewing our negotiating positions for additional flexibility at the next round of negotiations. While China is a long way from being ready to accede to the WTO, our immediate goal is to avoid giving China a pretext for walking away from the negotiations and blaming us.

OK  
OK

It is particularly important that we multilateralize the WTO accession issue. China needs the unanimous approval of a multi-country Working Party at the WTO before it can accede. Many of these countries have serious substantive problems with China's trade practices at least as serious as our own, and we should continue to coordinate closely with them.

Agree - this is one we shouldn't deal w/ alone  
BC

2. High-level U.S. Government Visits

The guiding principle should be to maintain our engagement policy and not clamp down ourselves on visits that serve U.S. interests. We ought to be prepared to have any purposeful meetings, such as Under Secretary of Commerce Garten's meeting with the U.S. business community in China or USTR's Barshefsky's meeting with the Chinese on IPR enforcement. We would favor a resumption of military-to-military contacts as well, as soon as China is prepared to do so.

agree - this is one we shouldn't deal with alone  
BC

The one contentious issue is whether to resume the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade later this year under Secretary

Brown. There is a potential downside to sending a Cabinet official on a business trip in advance of progress in other areas of the relationship. We recommend that a final decision should be postponed until after the Christopher-Qian meeting.

*2/1/94*

III. REGAINING CONTROL OF TAIWAN POLICY

While several important decisions should be made soon on Taiwan-related issues, our priority right now should be to regain from Congress control of the decision-making process. We recommend that a private meeting be arranged in a third country between senior U.S. officials (White House and State Department) and their Taiwan counterparts. We would relay the exact same formula on future high-level visits given to Qian, accompanied by a warning that Taiwan should not continue to engage in "end-runs" with the Congress. In order to convey the seriousness of the warning, a Presidential letter to President Lee would be delivered at this meeting. The meeting could also be used to relay the U.S. position on UN membership, accession to the WTO and membership in other international organizations.

*Coreghan was no decision yet - it's on table. Decision by [unclear] we wanted to make [unclear] look like [unclear]*

A. UN MEMBERSHIP

Any U.S. flexibility on this issue would undermine our ability to persuade China that we are serious about a one-China policy. We recommend that, in both Secretary Christopher's meeting with Qian and in a follow-up speech that we state categorically that we oppose UN membership for Taiwan.

*ag*

B. ACCESSION TO THE WTO BEFORE THE PRC

In the current, charged atmosphere of U.S.-China relations, a statement or decision to permit Taiwan to accede to the WTO before China would be viewed by Beijing as another significant hostile act. At the same time, if Taiwan has satisfied the substantive criteria for membership, it would be exceptionally difficult to block Taiwan's accession. The problem only gets more difficult if China ends up not joining the WTO.

Fortunately, Taiwan is unlikely to be ready for accession until the end of the year. Between now and then USTR will try to devise an alternative to WTO accession as a fallback, based upon some type of bilateral agreement. Most other countries will support a strategy designed to avoid letting Taiwan in first.

C. MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OTHER THAN THE UN

This is an area where the Hill is likely to assume a larger role unless we move vigorously. Speaker Gingrich has already made a major appeal for Taiwan's participation in the Mexico financial

*aggr  
again this  
under  
a multi-lateral  
decision but  
it's support  
in character  
B. UN*

---

Congress has made no decisions yet -  
it's our fault we let the Lee  
decision, what I wanted to make,  
look like that

---

agree

again this ~~need~~ should be a  
multilateral decision but it's  
different in character from UN.

---

not a terrible idea but timing is good.

→ ~~not~~ MFA - 8  
terrible idea but timing is good

assistance plan. China continues to oppose Taiwan's participation in most of the international financial institutions as well as in other international organizations in which membership is limited to sovereign states.

We recommend two steps: that the State Department identify international organizations open to non-sovereign entities where we could support Taiwan's membership, and that we explore a multilateral approach to securing Taiwan's participation in the emergency window for the GAB (General Agreement to Borrow). Such an increase in resources for the GAB would be very much in our own interests. Just as Japan took the lead in getting Taiwan into the Asian Development Bank and Korea played a key role in getting them into APEC, we should seek other countries to take the lead on the GAB facility.

yes but good to get them in

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the objectives and work plan described above.

yes but good to get them in

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A Assessment of the current situation
- Tab B Themes for a major speech on U.S.-China relations
- Tab C Draft letter to President Jiang Zemin

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	Assessment of the Current State of U.S. - China Relations (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
[President Jiang Zhemín]  
OA/Box Number: 43319

### FOLDER TITLE:

9505736

2018-0679-M  
sb2473

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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SECRET

A One-China Policy: Balancing U.S. Interests with China and Taiwan

The challenge for U.S. policy is to put our relationships with China and Taiwan in a context where we avoid getting trapped into a zero-sum game, in which every step taken to promote an interest with one of the two is perceived as a negative step by the other. From the perspective of the national interest, the United States is clearly better served if it can have cooperative relationships with both entities rather than a friendly relationship with one (Taiwan) and an adversarial relationship with the other (China).

A comparison of two periods in our post-World War II history demonstrates this point. During the period from the Communist victory in China's civil war until normalization (1948-1979), the United States had a close alliance with the Republic of China and a highly adversarial relationship with the Peoples Republic of China. This period was characterized by a high state of tension not only in the Taiwan Strait but throughout Asia. It saw open military confrontation between the United States and the PRC in Korea, significant Chinese support for North Vietnam and substantial Chinese support for other insurgent groups in Southeast Asia that threatened U.S. security interests. Economic contacts with the world's most populous nation were minimal, and the United States had no ability to influence internal developments in China (such as human rights).

The decision to normalize relations with the PRC in 1979 represented a major conceptual change in U.S. China policy, and was not a mere reversal of which China and the United States formally recognized. Instead, it was a decision that the United States should cease taking sides in the Chinese civil war and should instead leave it to the parties on both sides of the Strait to work out their own, peaceful resolution of their conflict. The chief advantage of this new "one-China" policy was that it facilitated the establishment of three productive bilateral relationships that have promoted peace and stability in much of the Asia/Pacific region: U.S.-Peoples Republic of China, U.S.-Taiwan and more surprisingly, PRC-Taiwan.

U.S.-PRC

In considering U.S. interests in China, it's crucial to take into account not only our current interests but our future interests as well. Given China's explosive growth, it seems all but inevitable that it will play an increasingly important role on the world scene in the future, both regionally and globally. While China has ceased to be a "card" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union,

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2018-0679-M (1.09)  
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it is emerging as a major international player in its own right. If sustained, China's high growth rate will give it the capacity to have both guns and butter. China is likely to emerge as a much greater military presence in the region, particularly as it acquires increased power projection capabilities. Economically, it will loom larger in APEC and other economic organizations as well as in its bilateral trading relationships. On the global stage, China is likely to become increasingly assertive at the United Nations Security Council, where it wields a veto. And on a number of post-Cold War global problems, such as the environment, peacekeeping, refugee and emigration issues, counter-narcotics, nonproliferation and family planning, solutions are likely to be elusive unless China plays a cooperative role.

The current tensions over human rights, President Lee's visit and nonproliferation issues should not be allowed to obscure the fact that normalization of U.S.-PRC relations has enormously facilitated U.S. interests. On the security side, the United States and China are not in conflict anywhere in Asia, either directly or indirectly. Indeed, in stark contrast to the 1948-1979 period, China played a distinctly helpful role in dealing with the North Korean nuclear situation in 1994-1995. China has not only ceased supporting insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, it has moved aggressively to improve its relations with most countries in the region. China's budget has given priority to economic development over military strength during this period. The resumption of a still nascent military-to-military relationship between the United States and China should lead to a reduction in mutual suspicion and, over time, contribute to regional efforts to promote confidence-building and tension-reduction. Equally promising, China, despite initial hesitations, has joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, the only regional security institution in the Asia/Pacific region.

This is not to suggest that China gets a perfect report card on the security side of the ledger. Serious concerns remain, including China's actions in the Spratlys, recent increases in defense spending and continuing problems with arms sales and nuclear nonproliferation. But the benefit to U.S. security interests from the implementation of a one-China policy remain impressive.

On the economic side, whereas the United States was largely shut out of the Chinese economy until 1979, in the 16 years since normalization, China has emerged as one of our major trading partners (nearly \$40 billion in two-way trade in 1994) and a major source of inexpensive consumer goods. U.S. investment in China now amounts to \$7 billion and should increase dramatically. If current economic forecasts are correct and China is destined

to become the world's largest economy early in the next century, it is clearly in our economic interest to maintain a strong commercial relationship.

Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize mostly in their direction] that China retains many trade barriers against U.S. exports. It is the enormous potential of the U.S.-China trade relationship and the fact that our competitors would be more than happy to reap the future benefits if we pull out now that keeps us engaged.

Normalization has not had as obvious an impact on the political side. China remains a dictatorship, as was brutally demonstrated at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and in some aspects the human rights situation has deteriorated over the past year. But in terms of openness to the outside world and the free flow of ideas (thanks to such technological advances as the fax, global computer networks and cellular phones), China is considerably "freer" than it was in 1979. And the prospect for future progress on other human rights issues is increasing as important groundwork for the future is being laid now in such areas as the rule of law.

The bottom line is that the future holds both significant opportunities and risks. If China chooses to integrate itself further into a range of global international institutions and cooperate in the effort to resolve regional and global problems, the benefits would be enormous. Conversely, if China decides that the United States is an enemy, it will have the capacity to endanger a broad range of U.S. interests and the United States will have little choice but to expend significant resources to meet a new range of challenges and security threats.

#### U.S.-Taiwan

The enormous loss of face and dignity from "derecognition" should not overshadow the major strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan ties that has occurred since 1979 in every arena other than formal diplomatic ties.

Politically, the relationship between our two peoples has become much closer as a result of the democratization process that has taken place. Whereas Taiwan had serious human rights problems in 1979, these abuses have all but disappeared as martial law was abandoned and a democratic government has come into power. The Kaoshung incident and the murder of Henry Liu are distant memories as the opposition flourishes and the country prepares to elect its first democratically-elected president in 1996.

Economically, U.S.-Taiwan relations are flourishing. Taiwan, which now has the world's largest reserves of hard currency, is

our seventh largest trading partner, purchasing 17 billion of U.S. exports. To further facilitate this booming relationship, the United States agreed last year to open a high-level economic dialogue with Taiwan, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.

Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, the United States and Taiwan maintain a strong security relationship. Taiwan has been able to satisfy almost all of its military procurement needs from the United States or other Western suppliers, and is undergoing a major modernization of its forces (including bringing the F-16s on-line). At the same time, the limitations imposed by the August 1982 communiqué have, to date, averted a cross-Straits arms race that would have been expensive to both sides and destabilizing to the region.

Even more important than military hardware, Taiwan's security directly benefits from a strong U.S.-PRC relationship. As long as China has a stake in maintaining good relations with us, it is necessarily constrained in its dealings with Taiwan.

#### PRC-Taiwan

It is the bilateral relationship between the PRC and Taiwan that has undergone the greatest change as the result of the successful implementation of a one-China policy. It is often forgotten now that in 1979, China and Taiwan were still exchanging propaganda by means of leaflet-filled artillery shells fired across the Straits. Now they are exchanging tourists (1.5 million Taiwanese tourists will visit the mainland in 1995). Whereas economic ties were minimal in 1979, Taiwan investment in the mainland is booming (\$15 - \$20 billion since 1987) and two-way trade amounted to \$16 billion last year. Within a year Taiwan is expected to replace the United States as China's principal export market.

Most encouraging, and least imaginable before normalization, a serious dialogue process has begun between the two parties through the recently-suspended Cross Straits Dialogue. The two leaders, Jiang Zemin and Lee Teng-hui, have both expressed interest in a summit meeting, and while they have serious differences over the venue for such a meeting, it is possible that such an historic summit will be arranged in the relatively near future.

All of this progress could be undermined, however, if Taiwan moves towards independence (either through the election of the DPP, which openly advocates independence, or through a change of policy by the KMT, which China fears has already taken place). If China becomes convinced that Taiwan is moving inevitably towards independence, it could decide, even in advance of a

formal declaration, to take drastic actions. Such actions could not only include economic measures (a cut-off or reduction of trade, expropriation of Taiwanese assets in China) but military action as well. While China is not well-positioned militarily to invade Taiwan, it could certainly use its submarines to police a blockade. And its missile deployments opposite Taiwan, which are growing, could inflict punishing damage against which Taiwan would find it almost impossible to defend.

In terms of U.S. interests, the independence scenario poses grave challenges. In the event of Chinese military action, we would have to resolve the ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act concerning whether we would come to Taiwan's defense. A decision to do so would not only put us in conflict with the most populous country in Asia but would also place our Asian alliance structure at risk (since both Japan and Korea might decide that they weren't going to jeopardize their China relations on the altar of the Taiwan independence movement). Conversely, a failure to respond to Chinese aggression would send a devastating message to ASEAN and other countries that the United States was not prepared to use force to maintain peace and stability in the region. It's a lose-lose scenario for U.S. interests.

#### Maintaining support for a One-China policy in the United States

The enormous benefits that have accrued to the three parties from a one-China policy suggests that the policy should be continued. Yet public support in the Congress and the country for the policy is at an all-time low. Two reasons probably explain why. First, China is increasingly perceived as "bad" as a result of ongoing problems with human rights, nonproliferation, some trade issues and some security issues. With the obvious Cold War rationale for a close relationship with China gone, the public's willingness to tolerate such bad Chinese behavior has been greatly reduced.

Second, just at the time China's public stock is sinking (other than on the commercial side), Taiwan's stock is rising as a result of the huge strides that have been made on democratization and human rights. The American public is far more sympathetic now than 16 years ago when Taiwan pushes back against some of the indignities incurred as a result of derecognition, whether it be high-level visits, membership in international organizations such as the United Nations or even diplomatic recognition. Issues all too often tend to be defined as rewarding Taiwan or punishing China, rather than being debated in terms of the likely impact on U.S. national interests.

At a time when a number of decisions need to be made that will have a profound impact on all three of the bilateral

relationships discussed above, a major speech by a senior Administration official which reviews the multiple interests at stake under the rubric of China policy could be highly beneficial. Such a speech could serve multiple purposes:

- to try to rebuild the national consensus on China policy, building upon a reaffirmation of our confidence in and commitment to a one-China policy;
- to reassure the PRC that the United States is not moving to a one-China/one-Taiwan policy, the Lee visa and Newt Gingrich's remarks not to the contrary;
- to lay down a marker both to the Taiwan independence movement and to hard-liners in the PRC that the United States will oppose any unilateral efforts to change the current political status on either side of the Straits.

After setting forth this rationale for a one-China policy, the speech should highlight a few themes about both our China and Taiwan policies.

On China, the United States seeks constructive relations with a strong, stable, open and prosperous China. The United States believes that it is strongly preferable to have a relationship based upon partnership than one based upon confrontation. To this end, we seek as much as possible to integrate China into a variety of regional and global institutions, in order to facilitate China's adherence over time to international norms in a number of arenas (e.g., human rights, nonproliferation and arms control, the environment, the rule of law, etc.).

The tool by which we hope to achieve this result is a vigorous engagement policy, in which we seek to enter into productive dialogues with China on all outstanding issues. President Clinton personally launched the engagement strategy when he met with President Jiang Zemin in Seattle in November 1993, and reinforced it at the November 1994 summit meeting in Bogor, Indonesia.

We recognize that progress in some areas is likely to be achieved ahead of other areas. Nevertheless, the current spate of difficulties in the relationship does not change the fact that over the past year, cooperation on key issues has yielded important results: a joint statement on nonproliferation last October, the March agreement on intellectual property rights, cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, the establishment of a Joint Commission on Defense Conversion, the first-ever bilateral military transparency briefings and good cooperation in countering alien smuggling.

Taiwan policy is based on the principle of unofficial relations. The United States recognizes the Government of the Peoples Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the United States maintains extensive commercial, cultural and other unofficial relations with Taiwan.

In order to promote this unofficial relationship, the Clinton Administration conducted the first unofficial review of Taiwan policy since the 1979 normalization decision. As part of this review, we made a number of adjustments to existing policy, including establishing a high-level economic dialogue and permitting visits by senior economic officials, up to the Cabinet level. Pursuant to this policy, Deputy Treasury Secretary-designee Larry Summers has convened the first meeting of the economic dialogue and Secretary of Transportation Pena has visited Taiwan.

One of the pillars of our Taiwan policy is our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the problems between China and Taiwan. The United States supports the process of cross-straits dialogue, which holds the potential for significant tension-reduction and increased economic interaction. The United States regrets that this dialogue was suspended following the Lee visit and calls upon both parties to resume this important forum.

July 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH

SUBJECT: Next Steps on China/Taiwan Policy

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President asking him to approve the objectives and work plan described therein.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President  
Tab A Assessment of the current situation  
Tab B Themes for a major speech on U.S.-China relations  
Tab C Draft Letter to President Jiang Zemin

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By AD/NARA, Date 7/9/2019  
2018-0679-17

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5736  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
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Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>MC 7/27</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *to Tyson and please bring me a copy -- Tonight T pants*  
*Went*

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_


*WWP will pick up to deliver in the AM*

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5736 LIMITED ACCESS  
REDO

July 24, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SR*

SUBJECT: Next Steps on China/Taiwan Policy

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RECOMMENDATION

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *DNB* NARA, Date *7/9/2019*  
2018-0679-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

5736  
LAC

We recommend the following three additional steps:

1. A speech by Secretary Christopher prior to his departure for Brunei, in which he emphasizes the importance of U.S.-China relations not only for the countries themselves but for regional stability.

2. Christopher-Qian meeting in Brunei on August 1. Secretary Christopher would lay out our response to China's "demands": a reaffirmation of the one-China policy, a ~~restrictive~~ view on future Lee (or other high-level) visits and a qualified invitation for President Jiang to a summit meeting in October, following the UN commemoration.

*Restrictive*

a. Reaffirming Commitment to One-China Policy. We believe a personal letter from you to Jiang Zemin has the best chance of getting our points across. The letter should reiterate your commitment to good relations with China, your strong support for a one-China policy, your recognition that relations are difficult now and your suggestion that the personal involvement of both presidents is needed. A draft is at Tab C.

b. Future High-Level Taiwan Visits. The issue of future high-level visits is more difficult. There is an excellent chance that President Lee will seek to come here again next year (e.g. during the Olympics).

Rather than let the issue of future visits remain unresolved, we recommend that you decide now that such visits would be approved on a restrictive but not preclusive basis. A decision to bar such visits would be difficult to sustain. At the same time, pragmatic consultations require that there be strict limitations on the number of high-level visits, since a policy of unrestricted visits would likely lead to a serious rupture in our relations with China.

If you agree, Secretary Christopher should inform Qian Qichen at Brunei that additional visits may occur. We recommend Secretary Christopher use a "restrictive but not preclusive" formulation, designed to allay Chinese concerns, while preserving your flexibility. Lee will not be coming to the Anchorage meeting nor will any other senior Taiwan leader. Future high-level visits will be decided on a case-by-case basis and will be "rare." When such visits are permitted, they will be strictly unofficial. "Unofficial" will be defined as limited to "private" events related to the visitor's personal life, such as alma mater functions,

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. draft	Draft copy of 002b [with different annotations] (9 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

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*concede our interests*  
*intentionally*  
*change*

We need to be clear with the Chinese that we will not ~~concede~~ ~~cede~~ ~~our~~ ~~interests~~ ~~.~~ ~~to~~ ~~repair~~ ~~the~~ ~~relationship~~. But we should identify concrete steps to stabilize the relationship that are of interest to the Chinese and which serve our own interests.

3. Regain the initiative in relations with Taiwan.

We need to restore a sense of balance with Taiwan and support its nascent efforts to repair its relations with Beijing. Taiwan's leaders have been ignoring the Administration and working directly with the Congress to achieve their objectives. They are now pushing aggressively in the Congress on UN membership, membership in other international organizations and early accession to the WTO. Unless we regain the initiative in Taiwan policy, Congressional actions could persuade the Chinese leadership that the United States is headed down the two-China path.

**Work Plan**

I. REBUILDING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS FOR A ONE-CHINA POLICY

A. DELIVERING A MAJOR CHINA POLICY SPEECH

There is no short-term, one-shot fix. However, we believe that it would be productive for a very high-level official -- you, Secretary Christopher or Tony Lake -- to make a major speech laying out U.S. interests in the China relationship, the Taiwan relationship and the continuing validity of a one-China policy. The themes for such a speech are contained in Tab B.

Such a speech should come after Secretary Christopher has met China's Foreign Minister on August 1, and ideally, after Harry Wu has been released. Otherwise, much of the attention to the speech would be focused on what we are doing to get Wu out, detracting from the core message.

B. SECURING THE RELEASE OF HARRY WU

Until Harry Wu is released, there is no prospect for rebuilding a domestic coalition on China policy. Our strategy for securing his release balances three objectives:

- keeping the pressure on China to release him immediately;
- avoiding, at least for now, retaliation options that could be counterproductive with the Chinese; and
- not letting this issue become the litmus test for the overall relationship.

will address china briefly in his Asia speech

We recommend the following three additional steps:

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will

DBE

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2018-06-79-M (1.17)  
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