

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHROA4800 1821539-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 011539Z JUL 98
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ROME
 OSRI: RUEHRO
 DTG: 011539Z JUL 98
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY ROME
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4460
 INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 RUFNPKD/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF// IMMEDIATE
 RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0C69
 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0535
 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0105
 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0064
 RUEHVJ/EMBASSY SARAJEVO 0130
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0098
 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0069
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0262
 SUBJ: ITALY: A UN MANDATE FOR KOSOVO INTERVENTION
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 004800

STATE FOR EUR/WEL, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/03

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, IT, SR, UN, AL

SUBJECT: ITALY: A UN MANDATE FOR KOSOVO INTERVENTION BY NATO

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: A/POLMINCOUNS ERIC R. TERZUOLO. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. ~~1st~~ SUMMARY: ITALIAN PM PRODI AND FOREIGN MINISTER DINI HAVE STATED CLEARLY THAT A UN MANDATE WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO AND THE USE OF BASES IN ITALY FOR SUCH AN INTERVENTION. THESE STATEMENTS ARE SPECIFICALLY ABOUT A KOSOVO INTERVENTION, AND DO NOT, AT LEAST NOT YET, MARK A CHANGE IN BASIC ITALIAN POLICY ON REQUIRING UN OR OSCE MANDAS FOR NON-ARTICLE V OPERATIONS BY NATO, I.E. THAT THERE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SUCH A REQUIREMENT, EVEN IF IN MANY OR EVEN MOST CASES A UN OR OSCE IMPRIMATUR PROBABLY WILL BE DESIRABLE. WORKING LEVELS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE TRYING TO MAKE SURE THAT DINI DOES NOT LEAN ANY FURTHER TOWARD A GENERALIZED REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2020-0082-M (1.01)
 KBH 6/22/2023

MANDATES. SENIOR WASHINGTON VISITORS TO ROME -- DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAMRE (JUNE 24) AND A DELEGATION HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE GROSSMAN (JUNE 25) -- RECENTLY HAVE UNDERLINED USG OPPOSITION TO A REQUIREMENT FOR OUTSIDE MANDATES FOR NATO OPERATIONS, AND THE EMBASSY CONTINUES TO PRESS THE POINT WITH THE GOI. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) SPEAKING TO JOURNALISTS JUNE 30, ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LAMBERTO DINI SAID THAT THE GOI WOULD BE ABLE TO GUARANTEE THE USE OF BASES IN ITALY FOR A KOSOVO INTERVENTION BY NATO. DINI STRESSED THE OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NATO IN ITALY. HE RECALLED A NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY MOTIONS APPROVED IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OR DIRECTLY ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT VOTE, SUMMARIZING THEIR MESSAGE AS "THE BASES ARE NOT IN QUESTION, THE BASING AGREEMENTS ARE NOT IN QUESTION, AND THUS NO LIMITS ARE SET ON THE USE OF THE BASES, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS A MATTER OF USING THEM TO IMPLEMENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS." DINI ALSO STATED MORE DIRECTLY THAT ANY NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO "CAN ONLY OCCUR VIA A RESOLUTION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNL."

4. (U) DINI WAS ECHOING A STATEMENT BY PM PRODI FOLLOWING HIS JUNE 28 MEETING IN CORFU WITH GREEK PM SIMITIS. PRODI HAD TOLD JOURNALISTS: "I MUST CONFIRM THAT ANY INTERVENTION (IN KOSOVO) MUST FIRST BE DECIDED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL."

5. (C) DCM HAD RESPONDED BY SPEAKING TO PRODI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, ROBERTO NIGIDO, STRESSING THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST NOT ALLOW ITS ALLIES IN THE COMMUNIST RENEWAL PARTY TO BACK IT INTO A CORNER ON THE MATTER OF A MANDATE REQUIREMENT FOR NATO NON-ARTICLE V OPERATIONS. NIGIDO PROMISED TO SENSITIZE THE PM TO U.S. CONCERNS.

6. (C) A/POLMINCOUNS SPOKE JULY 1 WITH ITALIAN MFA NATO AFFAIRS CHIEF STEFANO RONCA, WHO STRESSED THAT THE PRODI/DINI STATEMENTS ABOUT A UN MANDATE REQUIREMENT RELATED STRICTLY TO A KOSOVO INTERVENTION. RONCA (STRICTLY PROTECT) MADE IT CLEAR HE PERSONALLY DISAGREED WITH THE POLITICAL DECISION TO TAKE SUCH A STANCE. HE IS PRESSING DINI'S STAFF TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON MANDATE ISSUES; THE LESS SAID THE BETTER, IN HIS VIEW. HE WANTS TO SEND OUT A CABLE TO ITALIAN EMBASSIES UPDATING THEM ON THE PRODI/DINI STATEMENTS, BUT ALSO REITERATING THAT GOI POLICY IS NOT/NOT TO REQUIRE AN OUTSIDE MANDATE FOR NATO NON-ARTICLE V OPERATIONS, EVEN THOUGH IN MANY OR MOST CASES SUCH A POLITICAL LEGITIMATION PROBABLY WILL BE USEFUL.

7. (C) IN OUR INTERVENTIONS, EMBASSY IS REMINDING THE ITALIANS OF LAST WEEK'S STRONG STATEMENTS OF U.S. OPPOSITION TO A MANDATE REQUIREMENT BY DEPUTY

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAMRE AND THE INTERAGENCY
DELEGATION HEADED BY EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY
GROSSMAN. ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING DEFENSE
MINISTER ANDREATTA, HAD STATED CLEARLY THAT THEY
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 004800

STATE FOR EUR/WE, \$UR/RPM, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958 DECL: 07/07/03
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, IT, SR, UN, AL
SUBJECT: ITALY: A UN MAND!E FOR KOSOVO INTERVENTION
BY NATO

SHARED U.S. OPPOSITION TO A MANDATE REQUIREMENT.

FOGLIETTA

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 4800
<^SSN>4800
TOR: 980701122609 M3359435
<^TOR>980701122609 M3359436

DIST:
SIT: ANDREASEN BANDLER BELL BOUCHARD BUTLER CLARKER COQ COVEY DAVIDSON
DOWLING HAMEL MCELDFOWNEY RAGAN SAPIRO SUM2 VONLIPSEY WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT{C2}
STEINBERG

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHNOA3452 3551456-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 211456Z DEC 98
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
 OSRI: RUEHNO
 DTG: 211456Z DEC 98
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6836
 INFO: RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SPASAC//
 RUCBTEC/USLO SAACLANT NORFOLK VA
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJ5-E/ECJ5-J/ECJ5-F//
 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 3256
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3395
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 3505
 ZEN/USDELMEC BRUSSELS BE
 SUBJ: THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN DEFENSE
 MINISTERIAL SESSION, 17 DECEMBER 1998: BOSNIA AND KOSOVO,
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USNATO 003452

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2020-0082-M (1.02)
KRM 6/22/2023

NSC FOR SCHULSC
 STATE FOR EUR/REM (MOON); DEFENSE FOR ASD(ISA) KRAMER,
 DASD(EUR) KIEVENAAR; ISA/EUR/NATO (BRONSON), & BALKAN
 TASK FORCE (MCCONNALL)
 JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS (FOGLESONG), J-5 (ANDERSON/CASSEY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/08
 TAGS: NATO, MARR, MCAP, DPC, PREL
 SUBJECT: THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN DEFENSE
 MINISTERIAL SESSION, 17 DECEMBER 1998: BOSNIA AND KOSOVO,
 ITEM III.

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW. REASON:
 1.5 (B AND D).

1. (c) SUMMARY. ON DECEMBER 17, 1998 UNDER AGENDA ITEM
 III, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
 DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO.
 CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE GENERAL NAUMANN
 REPORTED ON THE SITUATION AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE NMAS
 BE GIVEN GUIDANCE TO COMMISSION AN SFOR REDUCTION STUDY;
 HE ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT NATO BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS A
 POSSIBLE MAJOR CRISIS IN KOSOVO IN THE SPRING OF 1999.
 SACEUR GENERAL CLARK PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
 BALKANS INCLUDING A BOSNIA UPDATE, A REPORT ON THE

SITUATION IN KOSOVO AND BALKAN LESSONS LEARNED. HE INTRODUCED A METHOD AND TIMELINE FOR SFOR EFFICIENCY AND RESTRUCTURING REDUCTIONS AND CONCLUDED WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IN KOSOVO DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF ONGOING POLITICAL MEDIATION. THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVES ENDORSED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF COUNCIL CONCERNING THE SFOR SIX-MONTH REVIEW AND AGREED TO THE RECOMMENDATION FOR A STUDY TO BE CONDUCTED FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER REDUCTIONS. ALL NATIONS SUPPORTED THE CURRENT ROLE OF SFOR IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA AND THE SFOR SUPPORT TO THE CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS, WHILE SHARING CONCERN ABOUT THE RISK OF A DEPENDANCEY CULTURE.

2. (S) ON KOSOVO, THE NAC/D AGREED THAT THE SITUATION REQUIRED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT MILOSEVIC WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION, BUT THE UCK WAS NOT DOING ANYTHING TO HELP DEFUSE THE TENSIONS. THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR NATO TO TAKE A REGIONAL VICE LOCAL STRATEGY TO BRINGING STABILITY TO THE BALKANS. END SUMMARY.

CMC'S BRIEFING

3. (S) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, GENERAL KLAUS NAUMANN, PROVIDED A SITUATION REPORT REGARDING THE AREA IN AND AROUND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, INCLUDING KOSOVO. HE POINTED OUT THAT FROM AN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, NATO'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SFOR, EVEN AT REDUCED SIZE, AND A SIMILAR SECOND LARGE GROUND FORCE, AND THEN TO SUSTAIN THEM FOR UP TO THREE YEARS, WOULD CAUSE NATO DIFFICULTIES. IN ADDITION HE STATED THAT SINCE SFORS MISSION FELL AT THE LOWER END OF THE MILITARY SPECTRUM, THE OPERATIONS TENDED TO BE DETRIMENTAL TO NATOS HIGH-INTENSITY WARFIGHTING ABILITIES, DESPITE PROVIDING GOOD TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE.

4. (S) REGARDING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, GENERAL NAUMANN STATED THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS STABLE AS A RESULT OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF SFOR'S PRESENCE, COMPLIANCE BY THE PARTIES WITH DPA ARMS CONTROL PROVISIONS, AND A SHIFT TOWARDS GREATER MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE ENTITIES ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, HE REPORTED THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES HAD GIVEN UP ITS POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS FOR A SEPARATE IDENTITY AND ALL WERE RESISTING INTEGRATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE HAD BEEN A LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPROVING THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE ENTITY ARMED FORCES.

5. (S) GENERAL NAUMANN STATED THAT A KEY CONCLUSION TO THE SIX-MONTH REVIEW OF SFOR WAS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL PROVISIONS OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MUCH SLOWER DURING THE PAST YEAR THAN ANTICIPATED. THERE APPEARED TO BE NO END IN SIGHT FOR SFOR'S CURRENT HIGH LEVEL OF COMMITMENT. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO IMPLEMENT THE TRANSITIONAL STRATEGY FOR SFOR, AS FORESEEN IN OPLAN 10407, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOME REDUCTION. THE

NMAS HAVE IDENTIFIED THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SHORT-TERM EFFICIENCY REDUCTIONS OF ABOUT SIX PERCENT; A FURTHER SIX PERCENT SAVINGS COULD BE ACHIEVED IF ALL CONTRIBUTING NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE NON-NATO CONTRIBUTING NATIONS, ADJUSTED THEIR FORCE LEVELS TO THOSE REQUIRED BY THE SFOR

OPERATIONS PLAN. IN ADDITION, THE NMAS HAVE IDENTIFIED THE POTENTIAL FOR LONGER-TERM REDUCTIONS THROUGH SFOR RESTRUCTURING. HE ASKED FOR DEFENSE MINISTERS' GUIDANCE TO COMMISSION A STUDY TO THIS END WHICH SHOULD PRODUCE RESULTS FOR NAC CONSIDERATION IN THE EARLY SPRING OF 1999.

6. (e) GENERAL NAUMANN CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT NATO HAD ACHIEVED AN ENFORCED MILITARY STABILITY IN BOSNIA. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THIS STABILITY BE TRANSFORMED INTO A SELF-SUSTAINING STABILITY THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A B-H DEFENSE POLICY AND CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN ENTITY ARMED FORCES IN THE SENIOR COMMITTEE ON MILITARY MATTERS (SCMM). HE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE ARBITRATION OF BRCKO IN EARLY 1999 AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DETERMINATION TO BRING BACK REFUGEES, INCLUDING MINORITY RETURNS, IN 1999 ALL SUGGESTED THAT NATO CANNOT AFFORD TO ALTER THE SIZE OF SFOR VERY MUCH IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR.

7. (e) REGARDING KOSOVO, THE CMC REPORTED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRY SECURITY FORCES, INITIAL INTRODUCTION OF OSCE VERIFIERS AND THE HARSH WINTER WEATHER HAD ALL HELPED TO STOP THE WIDE-SPREAD HOSTILITIES AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE POLITICAL PROCESS TO WORK. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE UCK HAD CLEARLY EXPLOITED THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRY FORCES; THEREFORE, SERB SECURITY FORCES ARE INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE UCK, WHICH IS RESULTING IN CLASHES.

8. (e) GENERAL NAUMANN POINTED OUT THAT THE KEY FACTOR TO A SOLUTION IN KOSOVO REMAINED MILOSEVIC. HIS LATEST DOMESTIC REPRESSIVE ACTIONS SUGGESTED MILOSEVIC IS PREPARING POLITICALLY FOR RENEWED CONFRONTATION ON THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FRONTS AND THIS COULD INCLUDE A CRACKDOWN ON THE MONTENEGRO LEADERSHIP. HE STATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE EXTENT OF PROGRESS IN KOSOVO. UNLESS A CLEAR AND BINDING POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS FOUND OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, BOTH PARTIES WOULD EXPECT TO SEEK TO GAIN CONTROL OF KOSOVO THROUGH FORCE OF ARMS IN THE SPRING OF 1999, IF NOT EARLIER. HE CONCLUDED THAT IF THE SERB SIDE CONCENTRATED ON OPERATIONS THAT FORCED THE KLA TO RESPOND WITH TERRORISM, THEN NATOS PRESENT OPERATIONS WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE IN ENDING HOSTILITIES. HE RECOMMENDED THAT NATO BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS SITUATION NEXT YEAR IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANOTHER MAJOR CRISIS AND THE RISKS OF SPILL-OVER INTO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BOSNIA.

SACEUR'S BRIEFING

9. (S) SACEUR, GENERAL WESLEY CLARK, THEN PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BALKANS INCLUDING A BOSNIA UPDATE, A REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO AND BALKAN LESSONS LEARNED. SACEUR REPORTED THAT THE CURRENT SFOR STRENGTH WAS 25 MANEUVER BATTALIONS (30,565 TROOPS IN B-H; 2,243 IN CROATIA; AND 366 IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL SPECIALIZED UNIT). REGARDING CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION, HE REPORTED GOOD PROGRESS IN THE AREAS OF MILITARY STABILITY, APPREHENSION OF INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION SELF-SUFFICIENCY THE MEDIA, BRCKO AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE. HE REPORTED SLOW PROGRESS IN THE AREAS OF PUBLIC SECURITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COPING WITH ILLEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES.

10. (S) REGARDING FORCE REDUCTIONS, SACEUR REPORTED THAT EFFICIENCY REDUCTIONS WOULD COME FROM CONSOLIDATION, COMMERCIALIZATION AND STREAMLINING HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT. REDUCTIONS THROUGH RESTRUCTURING COULD COME FROM ENHANCED INTELLIGENCE, AVAILABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL SPECIALIZED UNITS, MORE FLEXIBLE RESERVES AND ADJUSTMENT OF TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. HE STATED THAT THE TIMELINE FOR REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TO HAVE THE EFFICIENCY REDUCTIONS

IMPLEMENTED FROM JANUARY TO MARCH. AFTER DEFENSE MINISTERS AT THE PRESENT MINISTERIAL ANNOUNCED A RESTRUCTURING STUDY, THE NMAS WOULD AIM TO IMPLEMENT REDUCTIONS THROUGH RESTRUCTURING, IF POSSIBLE, BETWEEN JUNE AND NOVEMBER, 1999.

11. (S) TURNING TO KOSOVO, SACEUR REPORTED THAT THE NATO VERIFICATION COORDINATION CENTER WAS IN PLACE IN FYROM. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT NATO WAS CONDUCTING TWO TO SIX AIR VERIFICATION FLIGHTS DAILY. ALTHOUGH THE OSCE WAS STILL ORGANIZING ITS HQ IN PRISTINA, INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH NATO HAD BEGUN ALONG WITH INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH THE EXTRACTION FORCE.

12. (S) SACEUR REPORTED THAT THE KOSOVO EXTRACTION FORCE, TIER I, HAD BEEN STOOD UP BY THE LEAD NATION, FRANCE, IN FYROM AND WOULD BE FULLY CAPABLE (APPROXIMATELY 1800 PERSONNEL) BY JANUARY 5. HE STATED THAT THE TIER I FORCE WAS DESIGNED TO OPERATE IN A NONPERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT AN INVASION FORCE NOR A SPECIAL OPERATION FORCE. TIER II WAS A SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE, DESIGNED FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE; THE UK WAS COORDINATING FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS FOR TIER II WITH A PRELIMINARY STANDUP DATE OF MID-JANUARY. SACEUR REPORTED THAT TIER III FORCE GENERATION WOULD BEGIN AFTER THE FIRST OF THE NEW YEAR. TIER III WAS MEANT FOR FULL EXTRACTION IN A LESS THAN PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. FINALLY, SACEUR POINTED OUT THAT ALL THREE TIERS MADE UP THE NATO EXTRACTION FORCE AND THAT THE FORCE WAS NOT/NOT INTENDED AS AN INVASION FORCE NOR AS THE SECURITY FORCE FOR FULL-TIME PROTECTION OF THE OSCE KVM. HE REITERATED THAT THE EXTRACTION FORCE WAS A NATO FORCE WITH A NATO CHAIN OF COMMAND.

13. (C) SACEUR THEN DESCRIBED RECENT LESSONS LEARNED IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO. HE EMPHASIZED THE FOLLOWING LESSONS, WHICH HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN SFOM SUCCESS IN BANJA LUKA AND SEIZURE OF THE SRT RADIO TOWERS BUT LESS SO IN DRVAR: INFORMATION SUPERIORITY; MOBILITY; EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT; INTEROPERABILITY; RAPID, FLEXIBLE PLANNING; SURVIVABILITY, RAPID REACTION AND SUSTAINABILITY. HE POINTED OUT HOW THESE LESSONS COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY IN THE DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS AND THE SFOR RESTRUCTURING STUDY.

14. (C) SACEUR CONCLUDED HIS BRIEFING BY DESCRIBING THREE POSSIBLE FUTURE OUTCOMES IN KOSOVO. HE STATED THAT WITHOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED FIGHTING AND REQUIREMENT FOR NATO ACTION. A BROAD AGREEMENT COUPLED WITH THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY IN THE FRY WOULD LEAD TO SUCCESS THROUGHOUT THE BALKANS. A LIMITED, WEAK AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY IN TWO MONTHS, WOULD REQUIRE A SIZABLE AND COSTLY ENFORCEMENT FORCE.

BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA/SFOR SIX-MONTH REVIEW

15. (C) ALL DEFENSE MINISTERS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ENDORSED THE SIX-MONTH REVIEW OF SFOR INCLUDING ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHORT-TERM SAVINGS IN TROOP STRENGTH AND COMMENCEMENT OF A STUDY OF OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF SFOR. THEY UNANIMOUSLY EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CONTINUED SFOR WITH NO MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN SIZE OR FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE SHORT TERM. THEY SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF FUTURE SFOR REDUCTIONS AND ALSO AGREED ON A CONTINUED SFOR PRESENCE IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT A DEPENDENCY SYNDROME IN THE PART OF THE BOSNIAN PARTIES AND THE CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZATIONS. THE COMMON VIEW WAS THAT SFOR COULD NOT REMAIN INDEFINITELY BUT WAS NEEDED FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

16. (C) CANADIAN MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE EGGLETON STATED THAT MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE IN ORDER TO INSURE PROGRESS IN CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS. HE POSTULATED THREE CRITICAL AREAS: FIRST, THE REFUGEE RETURN PLAN FOR 1999 NEEDED TO BE SERIOUSLY REVAMPED AND MADE A PRIORITY; SECOND, ICTY, SUPPORTED BY SFOR, SHOULD INCREASE EFFORTS TO ARREST WAR CRIMINALS; AND THIRD, EFFORTS IN DEMINING SHOULD BE CONTINUED.

17. (C) ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES EMPHASIZED THE MULTINATIONAL SPECIALIZED UNIT (MSU) AS HAVING A CREDIBLE AND GROWING ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS AND NATION BUILDING EFFORTS. ITALY PRESSED FOR CONTINUED ALLIANCE SUPPORT OF THE MSU AND ENCOURAGED MEMBERS TO CONTRIBUTE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL. U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY

HAMRE CONGRATULATED ITALY ON ITS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IN SUPPORTING THE MSU AND URGED OTHER ALLIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO THE MSU. HE SAID THAT AS THE MSU GAINED CREDIBILITY AND SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY, SFOR'S DOMINANCE WOULD DIMINISH AND THEREFORE NATURALLY REDUCE IN SIZE.

KOSOVO

18. (C) ALL DEFENSE MINISTERS SHARED THE VIEW THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KOSOVO DEMONSTRATED, TO SOME DEGREE, SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY NATO, ESPECIALLY IN PREVENTING A HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE AND STOPPING LARGE-SCALE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO LAY WITH MILOSEVIC, ALTHOUGH THE CONTINUED ACTIVITIES OF THE UCK CONTRIBUTED TO THE ONGOING VIOLENCE. ALL MINISTERS CONCURRED THAT THE LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS LAY WITH AN AGREED POLITICAL SOLUTION ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES.

19. (C) CANADIAN, U.S., POLISH, NORWEGIAN, TURKISH AND DUTCH DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVES URGED COMPLETION. THE EXPEDITIOUS DEPLOYMENT OF KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE CURRENT STABILITY IS MAINTAINED WHILE SEARCHING FOR A POLITICALLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

20. (C) DEPUTY SECRETARY HAMRE STATED THAT NATO SHOULD TAKE PRIDE IN HAVING PREVENTED A CATASTROPHE. THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS IS PROVING TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH NATOS FUTURE. HE URGED THE ACTORDS FOR AIR STRIKES BE CONTINUED IN THE SHORT TERM WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A FOLLOW ON AIR OPTION WHICH COMBINED THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN WITH THE LIMITED AIR OPTION.

A BALKANS STRATEGY

21. (C) ITALIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE SCOGNAMIGLIO CALLED ON NATO TO DEVELOP A REGION-WIDE STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS. HE SAID THAT THE CURRENT ACTIONS DEALING WITH CRISIS COUNTRY BY COUNTRY, WITHOUT COUPLING THEM WITH THE REGION, WAS CAUSING A "DOMINO EFFECT" WITH INSTABILITY FLOWING FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER. HE CALLED ON ALL NATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVING ALBANIAN STABILITY SINCE HE CONSIDERED IT THE KEY TO BALKAN STABILITY, AND TO BUILD ON THE PARTNERSHIP-FOR-PEACE (PFP) NATO CELL IN TIRANA.

22. (C) PORTUGUESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE VEIGA SIMAO SUPPORTED THIS CONCEPT AND SAID THAT, WITHOUT A REGIONAL STRATEGY NATO WILL GO FROM LOCAL SUCCESS TO LOCAL SUCCESS AND NEVER ACHIEVE PERMANENT REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE BALKANS.

23. (2) DEPUTY SECRETARY HAMRE STRONGLY ENDORSED THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN OVERALL REGIONAL STRATEGY,

PARTICULARLY AS IT APPLIES TO STRENGTHENING THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF NATION-BUILDING AND ALLUDED TO THE ASPECT THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A MILITARY STABILIZATION FORCE LIKE SFOR COULD ACTUALLY INHIBIT THE PROGRESS OF THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF NATION-BUILDING. UK PERMREP GOULDEN SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF A REGIONAL STRATEGY, BUT WARNED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN SUPPORTING CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION AND THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES.

VERSHBOW

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3452

TOR: 981221101421 M3615249

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHNOA3478 3571252-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 231252Z DEC 98
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
 OSRI: RUEHNO
 DTG: 231252Z DEC 98
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6900
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 INFO: RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
 RUCNFPF/PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM COLLECTIVE
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD/ECJ5-E/ECJ5-J/POLAD//
 RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
 SUBJ: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON IRAQ, WMD,
 KOSOVO, STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND CFE

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2010-0082-M (1.03)
 KBH 6/22/2023

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW. REASON: 1.5 (B/D).

TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 003478

STATE FOR D, P, EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS
 NSC FOR PASCUAL AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH
 DEFENSE FOR SLOCOMBE, KRAMER, KIEVENAAR, BRONSON, WARNER,
 MILLER, STARR AND CHAPMAN
 JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS AND J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/08
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, KCFE, RS
 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON IRAQ, WMD,
 KOSOVO, STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND CFE

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW. REASON: 1.5 (B/D).

1. ~~(c)~~ SUMMARY: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO NATO SERGEI
 KISLYAK DISCUSSED IRAQ AND WMD ISSUES, KOSOVO, STRATEGIC
 CONCEPT AND CFE WITH AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW AT DECEMBER 22
 LUNCHEON. KISLYAK CRITICIZED THE U.S. FOR EXTRA-LEGAL
 INTERPRETATIONS OF UN CHARTER, UNPREDICTABILITY, AND LACK
 OF CONSULTATION. HE ALSO NOTED THE RISKS TO THE PJC'S
 CREDIBILITY AND NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN GENERAL POSED
 BY U.S. AND ALLIED DISREGARD OF RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES.
 AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW PUSHED BACK ON ALL FRONTS. HE
 STRESSED U.S. READINESS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS
 ON CFE. RUSSIA WOULD LIKE A NATO-RUSSIA CFE EXPERTS

MEETING EARLY IN 1999. END SUMMARY.

IRAQ/WMD

2. (e) AT THE DECEMBER 22 LUNCHEON, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR KISLYAK WARNED THAT THE U.S. UNDERESTIMATED THE DAMAGE TO BILATERAL RELATIONS CAUSED BY THE RECENT AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ. KISLYAK MAINTAINED U.S. ACTIONS WERE "ILLEGAL," BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFERENCE IN RUSSIAN AND U.S. VIEWS ON THE LEGAL BASIS. HE SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. THE "FALLOUT" COULD PROFOUNDLY AFFECT NATO-RUSSIAN COOPERATION. IT RAISES THE QUESTION IN MOSCOW AS TO WHY, IF THE U.S. AND ALLIES DISREGARD THE RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW, SHOULD RUSSIA ENGAGE ON ANYTHING SERIOUSLY IN THE PJC. IT SEEMS THAT THE U.S. AND NATO ARE ONLY PREPARED TO TAKE RUSSIAN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THEIR OWN. BOTH WMD AND NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES ARE SPECIFIC AREAS IN THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP THEY HAVE TO THE U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. KISLYAK SAID THIS WOULD BE REGRETTABLE SINCE THERE WAS "ENORMOUS SCOPE" FOR NATO AND RUSSIA TO WORK TOGETHER IN ADDRESSING NON-PROLIFERATION AND OTHER WMD ISSUES.

3. (e) KISLYAK CAUTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE DUMA TO ACCEPT MOVING FORWARD ON THE NATO-RUSSIA AGENDA WHEN IT IS APPARENT THAT THE "REAL" U.S. AGENDA ON WMD IS TO STRIKE MILITARILY AT POTENTIAL PROLIFERATORS. IN FACT, RUSSIA VIEWS U.S. WMD CONCERNS AS A "PRETEXT" FOR TAKING ACTIONS TO UNDERMINE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME. KISLYAK ALSO REPEATED FAMILIAR RUSSIAN THEMES CHALLENGING UNSCOM CHIEF BUTLER'S CREDIBILITY AND ARGUING THAT IRAQ HAS NO REMAINING WMD CAPABILITY. KISLYAK SAID THAT BUTLER "HAD TO GO" AND WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT RE-ESTABLISHING UNSCOM. THE FEELING IN MOSCOW IS THAT THE U.S. WOULD ONLY AGREE TO LIFT SANCTIONS AFTER SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMOVAL. U.S. ACTIONS ADDITIONALLY HAVE RAISED MOSCOW'S CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. BECOMING "UNPREDICTABLE".

4. (e) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW UNDERScoreD THAT U.S. WMD CONCERNS WERE INDEED THE MAIN IMPETUS FOR THE DECISION TO LAUNCH AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ. THE U.S. WAS CONFIDENT OF THE LEGAL BASIS TO DO SO BASED UPON UNSCRS 678 AND 687. BUT AN ADDITIONALLY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WAS TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS RESOLUTIONS. THE PRESIDENT HAD WEIGHED THE PROS AND CONS, INCLUDING THE IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, BUT FELT STRONGLY THAT TAKING ACTION WAS THE RIGHT DECISION TO MAKE. THE U.S. ALSO DISAGREES STRONGLY WITH THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT UNSCOM IS A DEAD ISSUE; THE U.S. WANTS TO WORK WITH RUSSIA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO RESURRECT AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE REGIME. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ COULD BE REMOVED, BUT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNSC

RESOLUTIONS. ON THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. BEING "UNPREDICTABLE," VERSHBOW POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. CLEARLY INFORMED SADDAM HUSSEIN AND EVERYONE ELSE AFTER THE NOVEMBER SHOWDOWN THAT, IF HE FAILED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH UNSCOM, THE U.S. WOULD ACT WITHOUT FURTHER WARNING; IN OTHER WORDS, THE U.S. REACTION TO SADDAM'S LACK OF COOPERATION WAS ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 003478

STATE FOR D, P, EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS
NSC FOR PASCUAL AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH
DEFENSE FOR SLOCOMBE, KRAMER, KIEVENAAR, BRONSON, WARNER,
MILLER, STARR AND CHAPMAN
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS AND J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/08
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, KCFE, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON IRAQ, WMD,
KOSOVO, STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND CFE

5. (C) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. WMD INITIATIVE AT NATO WAS NOT FOCUSED ON THE CREATION OF A NATO "COUNTER-PROLIFERATION STRIKE FORCE." IT WAS FOCUSED ON INFORMATION SHARING, PREPARING NATO FORCES TO OPERATE IN A NBC WEAPON ENVIRONMENT, AND ASSISTING NATIONS DEALING WITH POSSIBLE WMD TERRORISM. IN RESPONSE TO KISLYAK'S INTEREST IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION CLEARINGHOUSE, VERSHBOW POINTED OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY, WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO COORDINATE ALLIES' NON-PROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE EFFORTS TO RUSSIA AND OTHER FORMER SOVIET STATES, AND TO ENCOURAGE PROGRAMS LIKE THE U.S. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE. ONCE THE DETAILS ARE WORKED THROUGH NATO, THE INFORMATION-SHARING ASPECT OF THE U.S. INITIATIVE COULD BE FRUITFUL FOR WORK IN THE PJC AND EAPC. VERSHBOW NOTED THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE IRAQ ACTION WAS THE VARYING ASSESSMENTS OF THE THREAT POSED BY IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS. IN FACT, VERSHBOW CONTINUED, BASED ON A RECENT SPEECH BY THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN BRUSSELS, IT SEEMS THAT IVANOV APPARENTLY SHARES THE U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT WMD TO A GREATER DEGREE THAN MOST NATO ALLIES. VERSHBOW EXPRESSED HOPE THAT NATO AND RUSSIA CAN GET WMD ISSUES BACK ON TRACK IN THEIR DIALOGUE.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. (C) AMBASSADOR KISLYAK SAID THAT THE ACTION IN IRAQ MAGNIFIED RUSSIAN CONCERNS ON POSSIBLE NATO OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS. RUSSIA WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT NATO INTENDS TO ELEVATE OUT-OF-AREA, NON-ARTICLE V MISSIONS ABOVE NATO'S TRADITIONAL ROLE. NOT ONLY WOULD THIS APPEAR THREATENING TO RUSSIA, BUT IT ALSO WOULD APPEAR TO CIRCUMVENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORITY.

7. (C) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW EXPLAINED THAT THE WORK ON NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT WAS STILL IN THE EARLY DRAFTING STAGE, BUT WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AS NATO'S PRIMARY MISSION. THE CONCEPT, HOWEVER, WILL ALSO REFLECT THE REALITY OF WHAT NATO ALREADY IS DOING IN NON-ARTICLE V MISSIONS, SUCH AS IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO, AND HIGHLIGHT THIS AS A PRIORITY TASK FOR NATO IN THE FUTURE. RUSSIAN CONCERNS THAT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT WOULD IDENTIFY THE PERSIAN GULF OR OTHER REGIONS AS NEW AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY, HOWEVER, ARE MISPLACED. NATO WILL CONTINUE TO ACT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS AND, AS NATO ACTIVITY REGARDING KOSOVO SHOWS, NATO DOES NOT JUMP AT OPPORTUNITIES TO USE FORCE. VERSHBOW ADDED THAT AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT TASK TO BE UNDERScoreD IN THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT IS THE INVOLVEMENT OF NATO'S PARTNERS IN NON-ARTICLE V MISSIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

8. (C) KISLYAK SAID THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE MORE CONSULTATION WITH RUSSIA ON THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT TO ADDRESS RUSSIAN APPREHENSIONS. THOUGH MOSCOW UNDERSTOOD THAT CONSENSUS IS A CONTROLLING FACTOR, RUSSIA ALSO NOTED THAT THE U.S. IS "FIRST AMONG EQUALS" IN THE ALLIANCE AND USUALLY GETS ITS WAY. THE U.S. ACTION IN IRAQ ONLY EXACERBATED RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT NATO. VERSHBOW RESPONDED THAT, AS THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT EVOLVES, WE WOULD KEEP RUSSIA INFORMED.

KOSOVO

9. (C) KISLYAK REPEATED RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE ACTORDS ON KOSOVO REMAINING IN EFFECT. THIS WAS ANOTHER OCCASION WHERE NATO SEEMS TO PRESERVE A DECISION THAT LACKED THE LEGITIMACY OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. KISLYAK EXPRESSED INTEREST IN DISCUSSING NATO'S "STRATEGY" FOR LIFTING THE ACTORDS.

10. (C) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SAID THAT SUCH A STRATEGY WAS NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA. HOWEVER, THE DECISION TO EXECUTE THE ACTORDS REMAINS WITH THE NAC; NOTHING IS AUTOMATIC. THIS BEING SAID, ALLIES STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 003478

STATE FOR D, P, EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS
NSC FOR PASCUAL AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH
DEFENSE FOR SLOCOMBE, KRAMER, KIEVENAAR, BRONSON, WARNER,
MILLER, STARR AND CHAPMAN
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS AND J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/08
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, KCFE, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON IRAQ, WMD,
KOSOVO, STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND CFE

NATO SHOULD MAINTAIN THE LEVERAGE OF THE ACTORDS AS A MEANS FOR DETERRING PROVOCATIONS ON THE GROUND. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN KLA PROVOCATIONS, WE ALSO

NOTE THAT THERE WERE NEW VJ DEPLOYMENTS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS MADE BY THE SERBS TO GENERALS CLARK AND NAUMANN. WITH THE SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN KOSOVO, WE NEED CLOSER U.S.-RUSSIAN AND CONTACT GROUP COLLABORATION TO GET THE POLITICAL PROCESS BACK ON TRACK. OTHERWISE, THE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION COULD BE INCREASINGLY AT RISK OF BEING OVERWHELMED BY A MAJOR ESCALATION IN THE CONFLICT EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. IN SHORT, NATO AND RUSSIA HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN CONTINUING TO WORK TOGETHER ON KOSOVO.

11. (e) KISLYAK SAID HE HAD SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE NATO EXTRACTION FORCE, NOTABLY HOW DID NATO RECONCILE THE DEPLOYMENT OF XFOR WITH MILOSEVIC'S REJECTION OF ANY XFOR PRESENCE IN THE FRY. ALSO, WHAT WOULD TRIGGER THE EMPLOYMENT OF XFOR: OSCE HEAD OF MISSION WALKER? OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL? NATO UNILATERAL DECISION? IF THE LATTER, THIS WOULD RAISE MORE CONCERNS FOR RUSSIA ABOUT XFOR AND ABOUT NATO.

12. (e) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW POINTED OUT THAT THE BASIS FOR XFOR WAS LAID IN THE HOLBROOKE/MILOSEVIC DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER. MILOSEVIC KNOWS WHY XFOR WAS DEPLOYED; THE MISSION IS LIMITED TO RESPONDING IN THE EVENT THE SERBS FAIL TO LIVE UP TO THEIR OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE KVM. THIS IS NOT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION WITH MILOSEVIC, AND XFOR HAS THE FULL LEGITIMACY TO ACT UNDER THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE, THE OSCE-FRY KVM AGREEMENT, AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1203. THERE IS NO SINGLE MODEL OF WHAT WOULD TRIGGER THE EMPLOYMENT OF XFOR. BUT IT IS ASSUMED THAT, NORMALLY, AMBASSADOR WALKER WOULD REQUEST XFOR TO DEPLOY. IF THE SITUATION FOR AN XFOR RESPONSE IS NOT TIME-SENSITIVE, WALKER MIGHT WORK THROUGH THE OSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE OR PERMANENT COUNCIL. IF THE SITUATION IS LIFE-THREATENING, THEN WALKER CAN MAKE A DIRECT REQUEST TO NATO COMMANDERS. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT WALKER MADE A REQUEST THAT WENT BEYOND XFOR'S MISSION -- SUCH AS FOR FORCE PROTECTION RATHER THAN EXTRACTION -- THEN NATO AND OSCE WOULD HAVE TO WORK THAT OUT.

13. (e) KISLYAK SAID THAT DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY HAMRE'S COMMENTS AT THE PJC/D ON THE ROLE OF THE AIR VERIFICATION MISSION (AVM) IN MONITORING ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS WERE "ENCOURAGING." VERSHBOW NOTED THAT HAMRE WAS NOT SIGNALING ANYTHING NEW. WE AGREE WITH RUSSIA THAT THE ARMS EMBARGO NEEDS TO BE OBSERVED AND THAT WE SHOULD WORK TO CONTROL THE ILLEGAL SHIPMENT OF ARMS. BUT HAMRE'S MAIN POINT, BASED ON WHAT NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN GENERAL NAUMANN HAD SAID, IS THAT THE AVM TECHNICALLY IS NOT SUITED TO PROVIDE MUCH INFORMATION ON ARMS SMUGGLING. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE AVM WOULD REPORT ON ANY SUCH ACTIVITY AS IT IS LEARNED, BASED ON THE ARMS EMBARGO PROVISIONS IN UNSC RESOLUTION 1199. THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE AVM, HOWEVER, IS NOT ON BORDER MONITORING BUT RATHER THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES AND TROOP MOVEMENTS, WHICH WERE MORE READILY OBSERVABLE FROM THE AIR. WE

WOULD CHECK, HOWEVER, TO CONFIRM THAT ANY EVIDENCE OF ARMS SMUGGLING OBTAINED BY THE AVM WILL BE REPORTED TO THE OSCE AND UN.

CFE

14. (e) AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS READY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON CFE ADAPTATION. THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO CONSULT WITH RUSSIA BILATERALLY AND IN THE PJC, BUT DID NOT WANT TO DIVERT THE FOCUS FROM THE REAL NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. VERSHBOW NOTED THAT RUSSIAN JCG REP GRUSHKO MADE SOME UNCONSTRUCTIVE CLOSING REMARKS AT THE DECEMBER 15 PLENARY (USOSCE VIENNA 7497). VERSHBOW POINTED OUT THAT IF RUSSIA WAS INTERESTED IN MAKING PROGRESS ON CFE ADAPTATION, IT SHOULD STOP TRYING TO SCORE POINTS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT AND STOP TRYING TO
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 003478

STATE FOR D, P, EUR/RPM, S/NIS, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS
NSC FOR PASCUAL AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH
DEFENSE FOR SLOCOMBE, KRAMER, KIEVENAAR, BRONSON, WARNER,
MILLER, STARR AND CHAPMAN
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS AND J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/08
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, KCFE, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON IRAQ, WMD,
KOSOVO, STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND CFE

SINGULARIZE THE NEW NATO MEMBERS. INSTEAD, RUSSIA SHOULD FOCUS ON ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE NUMERICAL CEILINGS.

15. (e) KISLYAK SAID HE UNDERSTOOD VERSHBOW'S POINTS, BUT THAT THE PROBLEM FOR RUSSIA WAS THE LARGE NUMBER OF POLISH FORCES AND THE POLES' UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE "DRASTIC" REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NATIONAL CEILINGS (NCS). KISLYAK SUGGESTED THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS IN POLISH NCS COULD MAKE AGREEMENT ON EXCEPTIONAL TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS (ETDS) MORE PALATABLE. VERSHBOW RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE TO ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE THE NEW MEMBERS TO MAKE "DRASTIC" CUTS. ONCE THE CFE ADAPTATION NEGOTIATIONS ENTER THE ENDGAME, HOWEVER, ONE COULD EXPECT THAT THE PROPOSALS WILL REFLECT THE FACT THAT POLAND AND THE OTHER NEW MEMBERS ARE EMBARKED ON A SIGNIFICANT DOWNSIZING OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. KISLYAK SAID MOSCOW WOULD SUPPORT A NATO-RUSSIA CFE EXPERTS DISCUSSION EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR, WHILE ACCEPTING VIENNA AS THE PRIMARY VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

START II

16. FINALLY ON START II, KISLYAK COMMENTED THAT THE U.S., IN BOMBING IRAQ, COULD NOT HAVE GIVEN THE DUMA A

BETTER PRETEXT TO DELAY RATIFICATION. HE HOPED THAT
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT WOULD GO AHEAD WITH HER PLANNED MOSCOW
TRIP NONETHELESS.

VERSHBOW

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 3478
<^SSN>3478
<^SSN>3478
<^SSN>3478

TOR: 981223075438 M3619078
<^TOR>981223075555 M3619081
<^TOR>981223075728 M3619083
<^TOR>981223075830 M3619086

DIST: SIT: ALLEN BANDLER BELL BLACK BRADEN BROWN BUTLER CLARKER DAVIDSON ELKIND
FLANAGAN GORDON GUARNIERI HAWLEY HURLEY MCELDOWNEY PASCUAL ROBERTS
SAPIRO SAUNDERS SCHULTE SEGAL WEISS WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC
PRT: FUERTH