

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. cable</del>	re: <del>Kosovo. Human misery (8 pages)</del>	<del>04/02/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> ✓ 9/4/2024
002. cable	re: SACEUR letter on NATO forces [NATO] (3 pages)	04/02/1999	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: SACEUR letter on the ninth night [NATO] (3 pages)	04/02/1999	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: SACEUR letter on NATO forces [NATO] (3 pages)	04/02/1999	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Greek FM Papandreou on efforts (2 pages)	04/02/1999	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Kosovo/ Vienna document (5 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: SACEUR Letter day ten [NATO] (3 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1)
<del>008. cable</del>	re: <del>Kosovo. Human misery (7 pages)</del>	<del>04/03/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> ✓ 9/4/2024
009. cable	re: SACEUR letter day eleven [NATO] (3 pages)	04/04/1999	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: SACEUR letter [NATO] (5 pages)	04/04/1999	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: SACEUR letter on day twelve [NATO] (4 pages)	04/05/1999	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Cables  
 Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([General Clark])  
 OA/Box Number: 530000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[04/01/1999-04/07/1999]

2006-0325-F  
 bm351

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHSQA1327 0921217-CCBB--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCBB ZZH  
 LINE3: O 021217Z APR 99  
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE.  
 OSRI: RUEHSQ  
 DTG: 021217Z APR 99  
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY SKOPJE  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7886  
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0172  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0365  
 INFO: RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 0409  
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0167  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0191  
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1031  
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0296  
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0330  
 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0130  
 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 0357  
 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 1361  
 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0158  
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE  
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0883  
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
 RUFRRJQ/COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE  
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK IMMEDIATE  
 SUBJ: KOSOVO: HUMAN MISERY ON TRAINS AND AT THE  
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 SKOPJE 001327

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
 Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 4/21/2023  
 7023-0332-m (1.01)

DEPT FOR D, PRM A/S JULIA TAFT, PA A/S RUBIN,  
 EUR/TMS PARDEW, EUR/SCE, S/WCI  
 OSD FOR A/S FRANK KRAMER  
 EUCOM FOR GENERAL CLARK  
 NSC FOR FLANAGAN AND SCHWARTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL:04/02/2009  
 TAGS: PHUM, SREF, PINR, SR, AL  
 SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HUMAN MISERY ON TRAINS AND AT THE  
 MACEDONIAN BORDER

REFTELS (A) SKOPJE 01297 (NOTAL) (B) SKOPJE 01291

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER R. HILL  
 FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

1. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS TWO RELATED

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RECOMMENDATION BY AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER. SEE PARAS. 2, 7, AND 9A.

2. (S) SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR AT LARGE DAVID SCHEFFER RECOMMENDS A MUCH GREATER AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE KOSOVO-MACEDONIAN BORDER. THE WORST IS YET TO COME. VERY LARGE NUMBERS OF KOSOVARS ARE CORRALLED AT THE PRISTINA TRAIN STATION AND ARE BEING PACKED ONTO TRAINS FOR NIGHTMARISH TRANSPORT TO THE MACEDONIAN BORDER. THOUSANDS OF OTHER KOSOVARS ARE TRYING TO GET TO THE BORDER BY FOOT, BUT THEIR FATE REMAINS UNKNOWN. THOUSANDS OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS ARE EXPOSED TO LIFE-THREATENING CONDITIONS AT THE MACEDONIAN BORDER AND REQUIRE FAR MORE IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE THAN MACEDONIAN AUTHORITIES OR THE MEAGER NGO EFFORT CAN PROVIDE. AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER INTERVIEWED MANY REFUGEES, WHO CLAIMED WITNESSING PILLAGING, BEATINGS, AND KILLINGS, FORCED EXPULSIONS AND MARCHES, DEPRIVATION OF FOOD AND WATER AND MEDICAL TREATMENT, SHAKEDOWNS BY SERB FORCES OF ALL THEY OWN, AND TORCHING OF HOMES. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IS NOW EVIDENT IN THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF AN ABUSED KOSOVAR POPULATION FOR WHICH MACEDONIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST RESPOND MORE EFFECTIVELY. END SUMMARY.

#### THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

3. (S) ON THURSDAY, APRIL 1, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES DAVID SCHEFFER VISITED THE BORDER BETWEEN MACEDONIA AND KOSOVO AT DENERAL JANKOVIC AND MET KOSOVAR ALBANIAN REFUGEES WHO ARE SPILLING OVER THE BORDER BY THE THOUSANDS. HIS PRELIMINARY REPORT IS IN REF A. AMB. SCHEFFER VISITED THE BORDER FOR 3 HOURS DURING THE DAY ON APRIL 1 AND AGAIN FOR TWO HOURS LATE THAT NIGHT. NO BETTER WORDS DESCRIBE THE SCENE THAN OUTRAGE AND MISERY. THE REFUGEES' HUMANITARIAN PLIGHT IS DIRE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE WEATHER CONDITIONS (RAIN), THE COLD WIND, THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY SHELTER, THE SHORTAGE OF FOOD AND WATER, AND THE MINIMAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. MACEDONIAN AUTHORITIES ARE CLEARLY OVERWHELMED WITH THIS UNPRECEDENTED WAVE OF HUMANITY. NGO'S ARE PRESENT BUT ARE ONLY MAKING A DENT.

4. (S) AMB. SCHEFFER WITNESSED ON THURSDAY NIGHT A LARGE FIELD NEAR THE RAILROAD TRACKS WITH AN ESTIMATED 10,000 REFUGEES HUDDLED IN SMALL GROUPS TRYING TO KEEP WARM, WITH BABIES SCREAMING, CHILDREN BURROWED UNDER AVAILABLE BLANKETS, AND ALL AWAITING THE INCREASING RAINFALL. THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE TENT IN THE ENTIRE FIELD. (AMB. SCHEFFER OBSERVES THAT NOT EVEN IN RWANDA, WHERE HE VISITED HUGE IDP CAMPS LAST NOVEMBER, WERE THE CONDITIONS SO LIFE-THREATENING.)

5. (S) THERE ARE MORE TRAIN DELIVERIES EXPECTED, SAID

SOME REFUGEES. BUT IT WILL TAKE MANY SUCH TRAIN TRANSITS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NUMBERS AT THE STATION. ANOTHER LARGE ARRIVAL AT THE BORDER OCCURRED ON ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 SKOPJE 001327

DEPT FOR D, PRM A/S JULIA TAFT, PA A/S RUBIN,  
EUR/TMS PARDEW, EUR/SCE, S/WCI  
OSD FOR A/S FRANK KRAMER  
EUCOM FOR GENERAL CLARK  
NSC FOR FLANAGAN AND SCHWARTZ

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THURSDAY NIGHT, WITH THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES SWELLING GREATLY. THE MACEDONIAN AUTHORITIES ARE HAVING A HARD TIME PROCESSING THE REFUGEES. WE SAW RELATIVELY FEW PROCESSED BY 1:30 P.M. ON APRIL 1, WITH NIGHTFALL ONLY HOURS AWAY. AT NIGHT, WE SAW BUSES SLOWLY BEING LOADED, BUT THE PACE AND AVAILABILITY OF BUSES APPEARED VERY PROBLEMATIC. WITH MANY THOUSANDS MORE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AFTER THURSDAY NIGHT, THE SITUATION CAN EASILY TURN CHAOTIC AND DANGEROUS. NO ONE APPEARS TO BE IN CHARGE AND THE REFUGEES ARE FRUSTRATED AND ANGRY WITH THE LACK OF GUIDANCE.

6. (C) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AT THE BORDER CROSSING IS MINIMAL. THERE ARE NO SANITATION FACILITIES. ROUGHLY EIGHT DOCTORS ARE AT VARIOUS TIMES AVAILABLE, BUT GIVEN THE LEVEL OF HUMAN MISERY, AND THE WORSENING HEALTH OF THOSE IN THE FIELD, MORE MEDICAL HELP IS NEEDED.

7. (C) RECOGNIZING AMB. HILL'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THIS CRISIS, AMB. SCHEFFER OBSERVES THAT IN RWANDA IN SUMMER 1994, THE U.S.G. STAGED A MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATION. CONDITIONS ALONG KOSOVO'S BORDERS (PARTICULARLY MACEDONIA AND ALBANIA) NOW WARRANT, IN AMB. SCHEFFER'S OPINION, THE SAME PRIORITIZATION AND SIMILAR EFFORT AS THE 1994 OPERATION IN FAR LESS ACCESSIBLE CENTRAL AFRICA.

#### CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

8. (C) AMB. SCHEFFER INTERVIEWED MANY REFUGEES DURING HIS APRIL 1 VISIT TO DENERAL JANKOVIC. THEIR ACCOUNTS WERE GENERALLY CONSISTENT FROM ONE GROUP OF REFUGEES TO ANOTHER. (COMMENT: IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT SO MANY REFUGEES IN THE FIELD HAD CONSPIRED TO TELL THE SAME STORIES. AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER WALKED THROUGH THE CROWD AND PICKED REFUGEES OUT AT RANDOM FOR THEIR STORIES. END COMMENT)

9. ~~762~~ THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ACCOUNTS FOCUSES ON WHAT MIGHT TRIGGER CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. THE LIST IS SET FORTH TO DEMONSTRATE THE CHARACTER OF THE ACTIONS, AND NOT AS A WITNESS-BY-WITNESS REPORT. SEPTTEL TODAY WILL PROPOSE MEANS TO THOROUGHLY DOCUMENT REPORTS OF ATROCITIES IN KOSOVO.

A) A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS (REFUGEES' ESTIMATES RANGE WILDLY, FROM 15,000 TO 200,000) ARE BEING HERDED NEAR THE PRISTINA TRAIN STATION. THEY ARE IN THE OPEN, EXPOSED TO THE COLD WEATHER, TOLD NOT TO MOVE AT PENALTY OF BEING SHOT, AND BEING DEPRIVED OF FOOD AND WATER. ONE WITNESS TOLD OF HEARING SHOTS BEING FIRED REGULARLY WHILE HE SAT AT THE TRAIN STATION. ANOTHER WITNESS SPOKE OF THE PRISTINA FOOTBALL STADIUM BEING USED AS A STAGING PLACE FOR MOVEMENT OF KOSOVARS TOWARDS THE TRAIN STATION. (COMMENT: IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE REQUEST MADE IN REPTTEL B IS ACTED UPON. END COMMENT)

B) THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AT THE STATION FAR EXCEEDS TRAIN CAPACITY. THE TRAIN THAT ARRIVED WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY NIGHTS WERE SO PACKED THEY WERE UNBEARABLE AND A THREAT TO LIFE. A SURGEON TOLD  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 SKOPJE 001327

DEPT FOR D, PRM A/S JULIA TAFT, PA A/S RUBIN,  
EUR/TMS PARDEW, EUR/SCE, S/WCI  
OSD FOR A/S FRANK KRAMER  
EUCOM FOR GENERAL CLARK  
NSC FOR FLANAGAN AND SCHWARTZ

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AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER THAT HE WOULD HAVE RATHER DIED IN HIS HOME THAN TO TAKE THE TRAIN TRIP. HE SAID THAT THE WEDNESDAY TRAIN WAS LEFT STANDING STILL NEAR PRISTINA FROM 4:30 P.M. UNTIL 1 A.M. WITH DOORS CLOSED AND NO RELIEF AT ALL. TWO BABIES WERE BORN IN THE TRAIN. BUT ANOTHER BABY DIED FROM EXPOSURE DURING THE NIGHT ORDEAL. ONE REFUGEE CALLED IT "THE TRAIN OF MISERY." ANOTHER REFUGEE SAID, "THEY THREW US INTO THAT TRAIN LIKE ANIMALS." ONE REFUGEE SAID HE SAW VILLAGES BURNING ALONG THE ROUTE TO THE BORDER. ANOTHER SAID HE SAW A BURNING BODY OUTSIDE WHILE ON THE TRAIN TRIP.

C) THERE WAS A FORCED MARCH OF THOUSANDS OF KOSOVARS FROM PODUJEVO TO THE TRAIN STATION IN PRISTINA. THE PARALYZED WERE PUSHED IN WHEELBARRELS. SERB FORCES TOLD PODUJEVO RESIDENTS, "YOU'RE THE MOST RESISTANT ONES. NOW YOU MARCH." DURING THE MARCH, BEATINGS

TOOK PLACE. ONE WITNESS SAW SOME KILLED. ON THE WAY TO THE STATION; KOSOVARS WERE TOLD TO DROP THEIR BAGS AND FOOD, THUS DEPRIVING THEM OF NOURISHMENT AND ADDITIONAL CLOTHING FOR THE COLD. REFUGEES SAID THEY HAD NOT EATEN SINCE WEDNESDAY MORNING.

D) REFUGEES WERE VICTIMS OF SIMILAR TACTICS OF EXPULSION: BLACK MASKED MEN WOULD ENTER THEIR HOMES AND APARTMENT BUILDINGS YELLING ALL MANNER OF DERISIVE INSULTS AND TELLING INHABITANTS THEY HAD 5 MINUTES (SOMETIMES EVEN 20 MINUTES) TO LEAVE, PERMANENTLY. THE BASIC MESSAGE WAS, "LEAVE OR DIE." ONE REFUGEE WITNESSED SOME KOSOVARS KILLED BECAUSE THEY REFUSED TO LEAVE. THE REFUGEES WOULD BE SHAKEN DOWN FOR MONEY AND JEWELRY. ONE REFUGEE SAW A SERB SOLDIER YANK A GOLD CHAIN FROM A WOMAN'S NECK, CAUSING HER TO DROP HER BABY ON THE PAVEMENT. MANY REFUGEES SAID THAT THE ATTACKERS IN FACT WERE THEIR SERB NEIGHBORS WHO HAD TURNED AGAINST THEM, DONNING UNIFORMS AT NIGHT TO EXPEL THEM. SOME REFUGEES TOLD OF HEARING SHOOTING IN NEARBY HOMES WHILE THEY WERE HIDING WITHIN THEIRS. ONE REFUGEE SAW THE LICENSE PLATE OF THE JEEP OF ONE GROUP OF MASKED MEN: "BELGRADE 42-10". TYPICAL CURSES BY THE SERBS WERE "WE WILL NEVER SEE YOU HERE AGAIN, KOSOVO IS NOT YOURS." "GO TO NATO. LET NATO HOUSE YOU NOW." "BILL CLINTON WILL GIVE YOU A REPUBLIC." "THERE WILL BE NO ALBANIAN PRISTINA AFTER TONIGHT." "YOU ASKED FOR AMERICA. NOW YOU GO TO AMERICA."

E) PILLAGING BY THE SERB FORCES IS RAMPANT. CARS ARE STOLEN OR DESTROYED. PERSONAL PROPERTY WITHIN HOMES IS LOOTED WITH ABANDON. SOME HOMES ARE MINED WITH EXPLOSIVES TO DETER RETURNEES. FOLLOWING THE LOOTING, DESTRUCTION OFTEN OCCURS, WITH HOMES BEING TORCHED OR "BOMBED." A TYPICAL MEANS OF "BOMBING" WAS TO STUFF THE SMALL WATER BOILER IN A HOME WITH EXPLOSIVES AND NAILS AND THEN, SOMEHOW, EXPLODE IT-- WITH FIRE ERUPTING AND NAILS SPRAYING ANY RESIDENTS STILL HIDING IN THE HOME. (COMMENT: WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW THE WATER BOILERS IN FACT ARE USED, BUT WE WERE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE A WEAPON OF CHOICE. END COMMENT) ANOTHER METHOD IS TO FILL PLASTIC BOTTLES WITH FUEL AND THEN THROW IT LIT INTO HOMES.

F) PERSONAL DOCUMENTS WERE TAKEN AND DESTROYED FROM MANY REFUGEES.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 SKOPJE 001327

DEPT FOR D, PRM A/S JULIA TAFT, PA A/S RUBIN,  
EUR/TMS PARDEW, EUR/SCE, S/WCI  
OSD FOR A/S FRANK KRAMER  
EUCOM FOR GENERAL CLARK  
NSC FOR FLANAGAN AND SCHWARTZ

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G) PRISTINA IS BEING EXPUNGED NEIGHBORHOOD BY NEIGHBORHOOD, AND IS ALMOST EMPTY OF KOSOVARS (EXCEPT AT THE TRAIN STATION). ONCE KOSOVARS ARE EXPELLED, MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES MOVE IN TO RESIDE IN CIVILIAN STRUCTURES. THEY DO NOT STAY IN BARRACKS. MILITARY EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY TANKS AND APC'S, ARE HIDDEN UNDER OR WITHIN CIVILIAN STRUCTURES. TANKS ARE LINED UP IN TWO TUNNELS UNDER A LARGE CIVILIAN APARTMENT BUILDING (CARIZI IN DARDANIJA NEIGHBORHOOD) IN PRISTINA. OTHER TANKS ARE SITUATED IN NARROW STREETS WITHIN CIVILIAN NEIGHBORHOODS. AMMUNITION IS BEING STORED IN THE NATIONAL MUSEUM, THE NATIONAL LIBRARY, TWO SECONDARY SCHOOLS, AND IN PRIVATE HOMES. "ROCKETS" ARE STORED IN A MILK FACTORY AND IN A TEXTILE FACTORY. ALSO, THE UNIVERSITIES ARE NOW POPULATED BY MILITARY FORCES, NOT STUDENTS. SEVEN RED CROSS CARS ARE HIDDEN CLOSE T THE STADIUM.

H) REGARDING NATO BOMBING, NTERVIEWED REFUGEES UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORTED IT AND SOME EVEN HOPED FOR MORE INTENSIVE BOMBING. AL WERE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY KOSOVAR CASUALTIES FROM THE BOMBING AND THEY ALL SAID "NO." THY SAID THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THEMSELVES IN DANGE FROM NATO BOMBING. MANY SAID THEY WITNESSED HE SERB FORCES TORCH STORES AND HOMES NEAR A BOMBNG TARGET RIGHT AFTER THE BOMBING, CLAIM THE CVILIAN DAMAGE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE NATO BOMBING, AND EVEN SEND IN FIREMEN AND FILM CREWS. ON REFUGEE WITNESSED A KOSOVAR BEING LED BY GUN PONT BEFORE A BELGRADE TV CAMERA, WITH HIS FAMILY STANDING NEARBY, AND ASKED, WITH GUN POINTED A HIM OFF-CAMERA, WHETHER HE WAS FLEEING KOSOO BECAUSE OF THE NATO BOMBING. HE SAID "YES" ON PAIN OF DEATH.

I) SOME REFUGEES SAID HEY KNEW OF RAPES OF WOMEN BY SERB FORCES, OF SEEING WOMEN BEING BEATEN ON THE ROADSIDE, AND O WITNESSING CHILDREN BEING HURT WITH SHOVING BY OLDIERS. AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER SAW ONE YOUNG BO'S BLOODY HEAD WOUND CAUSED, HIS FATHER SAID, BY A SERB HITTING THE BOY.

J) AT THE HOSPITAL IN PRISTINA, ALL KOSOVAR ALBANIAN PATIENTS HAVE FLED EXCEPT ABOUT SIX PARALYZED PATIENTS. ALL KOSOVAR DOCTORS AND NURSES HAVE FLED. ONLY SERB DOCTORS (ARMED) AND NURSES REMAIN. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING KOSOVAR PATIENTS TO THE HOSPITAL ANYMORE. A KOSOVAR SURGEON TOLD AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER THAT LAST WEEK A KOSOVAR CIVILIAN (A MR. AVNINEZIRI) CAME IN WITH ABDOMEN AND LEG WOUNDS AND THE SERBS CLAIMED HE WAS KLA. THE SERBS GUARDED HIS ROOM AND BEAT HIM EVERY NIGHT. THE SURGEON DOES NOT KNOW HIS FATE TODAY. THE DOCTOR ALSO REPORTED THAT EIGHT DAYS

EARLIER A PROMINENT KOSOVO DOCTOR, DR. IZET HIMA, WAS SHOT DEAD IN HIS HOME, APPARENTLY BECAUSE HE IS A KOSOVAR SURGEON.

K) SOME REFUGEES CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN INDIVIDUAL KILLINGS. IN ONE CASE, A MAN WAS CARRYING AN ELDERLY WOMAN. A SERB SOLDIER SHOT THE WOMAN AND THEN TOLD THE MAN, "LOOK, I'VE MADE YOUR HIKE EASIER!" ANOTHER REFUGEE SAW THE EXECUTION OF A MAN WHO HAD OFFERED THE SERBS HIS DOCUMENTS BUT TO NO AVAIL. AT VRANGEVC, A REFUGEE SAID THAT THREE KOSOVARS WERE KILLED BUT NO ONE COULD REACH THEM.

L) SNIPERS ARE DEPLOYED AROUND ETHNICALLY CLEANSED  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 SKOPJE 001327.

DEPT FOR D, PRM A/S JULIA TAFT, PA A/S RUBIN,  
EUR/TMS PARDEW, EUR/SCE, S/WCI  
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TOWNS TO IMMOBILIZE ANYONE WHO IS LEFT AND TO PICK OFF ANYONE WHO DEVIATES FROM A FORCED MARCH. THE SNIPER PROBLEM WAS MENTIONED BY MANY REFUGEES.

M) ONE REFUGEE SPECULATED THAT THE SERB INTENT WAS TO ETHNICALLY CLEANSE KOSOVO AND MOVE 200,000 KRAJINA SERBS INTO KOSOVO FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.

N) THE REFUGEES HAVE VARIOUS DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SERBS: "THEY ARE BARBARIANS." "THEY ARE NOT HUMAN BEINGS." "THEY'RE CRIMINALS." "SERBS ARE TERRORISTS." THESE PRECEDED A COMMON QUESTION BY AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER, "CAN YOU LIVE WITH THEM AGAIN?" NO REFUGEE WANTED TO LIVE IN A KOSOVO WITH SERBS AGAIN, BUT THEY ALL WANTED TO RETURN TO KOSOVO. THE REFUGEES' HATRED IS PALPABLE. THE SERB NEIGHBORS THEY ONCE LIVED BESIDE ARE NOW THEIR ENEMIES, THEY SAID. (COMMENT: AMB. SCHEFFER'S IMPRESSION IS THAT ANY FUTURE PLAN TO RESURRECT A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY IN KOSOVO AFTER SUCH MASSIVE VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IS SURREAL. IT MAY TAKE GENERATIONS, IF AT ALL, TO REPAIR THE ETHNIC BREACH IN KOSOVO.)

10. (C) COMMENT BY AMB. SCHEFFER: THE LEVEL OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN KOSOVO FITS A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, WITH A FEROCITY THAT MAY EVEN OVERSHADOW THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT PRIOR TO 1995. WHEN COUPLED WITH THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE BORDER, U.S. LEADERSHIP WILL BE TESTED ONCE AGAIN. WE WILL NEED TO PREPARE FOR THE LONG HAUL TO JOIN OTHERS IN

RESTORING KOSOVO TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS AND TO BRING TO JUSTICE THOSE WHO HAVE PERPETRATED THESE ATROCITIES. IF THAT POINTS TO AN ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION INTO A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, THEN WE NEED TO PURSUE THE LOGIC OF THAT STEP NOW BEFORE SERBIA'S OCCUPATION OF KOSOVO BECOMES PERMANENT AND THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS BECOME THE PALESTINIANS OF EASTERN EUROPE. END COMMENT

11. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR TIRANA.

HILL

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 05

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SSN: 1327

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DIST:

SIT: ALLEN BANDLER BELL BENJAMIN BLINKEN BRADEN BROWN BUSBY BUTLER  
DAVIDSON EBITZ FLANAGAN GORDON GUARNIERI HURLEY KAUFMAN MCCAUSLAND  
MCELDOWNEY SAPIRO SCHULTE STROMSETH SUM2 UYEHARA VACCARO

SIT: NSC

PRT: SIT{C2}

## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA1871 0932143-CCCC--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O 032136Z APR 99  
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 OSRI: RUEHC  
 DTG: 032136Z APR 99  
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO: ////  
 INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000  
 SUBJ: KOSOVO: HUMAN MISERY ON TRAINS AND AT THE  
 TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
 Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
 By VZ NARA, Date 12/21/2023  
 2023-0332-m (1.02)

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PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR PARRIS

FOLLOWING SKOPJE 01327 DATED 02 APR 99, SENT ACTION SECSTATE  
 GENEVA USUN NEW YORK INFO BUDAPEST ROME MOSCOW BONN LONDON  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SKOPJE 001327

DEPT FOR D, PRM A/S JULIA TAFT, PA A/S RUBIN,  
 EUR/TMS PARDEW, EUR/SCE, S/WCI  
 OSD FOR A/S FRANK KRAMER  
 EUCOM FOR GENERAL CLARK  
 NSC FOR FLANAGAN AND SCHWARTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL:04/02/2009  
 TAGS: PHUM, SREF, PINR, SR, AL  
 SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HUMAN MISERY ON TRAINS AND AT THE  
 MACEDONIAN BORDER  
 REFTELS (A) SKOPJE 01297 (NOTAL) (B) SKOPJE 01291

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER R. HILL  
 FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

1. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS TWO RELATED  
 RECOMMENDATION BY AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER. SEE PARAS.  
 2, 7, AND 9A.

2. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR AT LARGE DAVID SCHEFFER  
 RECOMMENDS A MUCH GREATER AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO  
 THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE KOSOVO-MACEDONIAN  
 BORDER. THE WORST IS YET TO COME. VERY LARGE

NUMBERS OF KOSOVARS ARE CORRALLED AT THE PRISTINA TRAIN STATION AND ARE BEING PACKED ONTO TRAINS FOR NIGHTMARISH TRANSPORT TO THE MACEDONIAN BORDER. THOUSANDS OF OTHER KOSOVARS ARE TRYING TO GET TO THE BORDER BY FOOT, BUT THEIR FATE REMAINS UNKNOWN. THOUSANDS OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS ARE EXPOSED TO LIFE-THREATENING CONDITIONS AT THE MACEDONIAN BORDER AND REQUIRE FAR MORE IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE THAN MACEDONIAN AUTHORITIES OR THE MEAGER NGO EFFORT CAN PROVIDE. AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER INTERVIEWED MANY REFUGEES, WHO CLAIMED WITNESSING PILLAGING, BEATINGS, AND KILLINGS, FORCED EXPULSIONS AND MARCHES, DEPRIVATION OF FOOD AND WATER AND MEDICAL TREATMENT, SHAKEDOWNS BY SERB FORCES OF ALL THEY OWN, AND TORCHING OF HOMES. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IS NOW EVIDENT IN THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF AN ABUSED KOSOVAR POPULATION FOR WHICH MACEDONIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST RESPOND MORE EFFECTIVELY. END SUMMARY.

#### THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

3. ~~(S)~~ ON THURSDAY, APRIL 1, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES DAVID SCHEFFER VISITED THE BORDER BETWEEN MACEDONIA AND KOSOVO AT DENERAL JANKOVIC AND MET KOSOVAR ALBANIAN REFUGEES WHO ARE SPILLING OVER THE BORDER BY THE THOUSANDS. HIS PRELIMINARY REPORT IS IN REF A. AMB. SCHEFFER VISITED THE BORDER FOR 3 HOURS DURING THE DAY ON APRIL 1 AND AGAIN FOR TWO HOURS LATE THAT NIGHT. NO BETTER WORDS DESCRIBE THE SCENE THAN OUTRAGE AND MISERY. THE REFUGEES' HUMANITARIAN PLIGHT IS DIRE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE WEATHER CONDITIONS (RAIN), THE COLD WIND, THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY SHELTER, THE SHORTAGE OF FOOD AND WATER, AND THE MINIMAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. MACEDONIAN AUTHORITIES ARE CLEARLY OVERWHELMED WITH THIS UNPRECEDENTED WAVE OF HUMANITY. NGO'S ARE PRESENT BUT ARE ONLY MAKING A DENT.

4. ~~(S)~~ AMB. SCHEFFER WITNESSED ON THURSDAY NIGHT A LARGE FIELD NEAR THE RAILROAD TRACKS WITH AN ESTIMATED 10,000 REFUGEES HUDDLED IN SMALL GROUPS TRYING TO KEEP WARM, WITH BABIES SCREAMING, CHILDREN BURROWED UNDER AVAILABLE BLANKETS, AND ALL AWAITING THE INCREASING RAINFALL. THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE TENT IN THE ENTIRE FIELD. (AMB. SCHEFFER OBSERVES THAT NOT EVEN IN RWANDA, WHERE HE VISITED HUGE IDP CAMPS LAST NOVEMBER, WERE THE CONDITIONS SO LIFE-THREATENING.)

5. ~~(S)~~ THERE ARE MORE TRAIN DELIVERIES EXPECTED, SAID SOME REFUGEES. BUT IT WILL TAKE MANY SUCH TRAIN TRANSITS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NUMBERS AT THE STATION. ANOTHER LARGE ARRIVAL AT THE BORDER OCCURRED ON

THURSDAY NIGHT, WITH THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES SWELLING GREATLY. THE MACEDONIAN AUTHORITIES ARE HAVING A

HARD TIME PROCESSING THE REFUGEES. WE SAW RELATIVELY FEW PROCESSED BY 1:30 P.M. ON APRIL 1, WITH NIGHTFALL ONLY HOURS AWAY. AT NIGHT, WE SAW BUSES SLOWLY BEING LOADED, BUT THE PACE AND AVAILABILITY OF BUSES APPEARED VERY PROBLEMATIC. WITH MANY THOUSANDS MORE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AFTER THURSDAY NIGHT, THE SITUATION CAN EASILY TURN CHAOTIC AND DANGEROUS. NO ONE APPEARS TO BE IN CHARGE AND THE REFUGEES ARE FRUSTRATED AND ANGRY WITH THE LACK OF GUIDANCE.

6. (S) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AT THE BORDER CROSSING IS MINIMAL. THERE ARE NO SANITATION FACILITIES. ROUGHLY EIGHT DOCTORS ARE AT VARIOUS TIMES AVAILABLE, BUT GIVEN THE LEVEL OF HUMAN MISERY, AND THE WORSENING HEALTH OF THOSE IN THE FIELD, MORE MEDICAL HELP IS NEEDED.

7. (S) RECOGNIZING AMB. HILL'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THIS CRISIS, AMB. SCHEFFER OBSERVES THAT IN RWANDA IN SUMMER 1994, THE U.S.G. STAGED A MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATION. CONDITIONS ALONG KOSOVO'S BORDERS (PARTICULARLY MACEDONIA AND ALBANIA) NOW WARRANT, IN AMB. SCHEFFER'S OPINION, THE SAME PRIORITIZATION AND SIMILAR EFFORT AS THE 1994 OPERATION IN FAR LESS ACCESSIBLE CENTRAL AFRICA.

#### CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

8. (S) AMB. SCHEFFER INTERVIEWED MANY REFUGEES DURING HIS APRIL 1 VISIT TO DENERAL JANKOVIC. THEIR ACCOUNTS WERE GENERALLY CONSISTENT FROM ONE GROUP OF REFUGEES TO ANOTHER. (COMMENT: IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT SO MANY REFUGEES IN THE FIELD HAD CONSPIRED TO TELL THE SAME STORIES. AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER WALKED THROUGH THE CROWD AND PICKED REFUGEES OUT AT RANDOM FOR THEIR STORIES. END COMMENT)

9. (S) THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ACCOUNTS FOCUSES ON WHAT MIGHT TRIGGER CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. THE LIST IS SET FORTH TO DEMONSTRATE THE CHARACTER OF THE ACTIONS, AND NOT AS A WITNESS-BY-WITNESS REPORT. SEPTEL TODAY WILL PROPOSE MEANS TO THOROUGHLY DOCUMENT REPORTS OF ATROCITIES IN KOSOVO.

A) A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF KOSOVAR ALBANIANS (REFUGEES' ESTIMATES RANGE WILDLY, FROM 15,000 TO 200,000) ARE BEING HERDED NEAR THE PRISTINA TRAIN STATION. THEY ARE IN THE OPEN, EXPOSED TO THE COLD WEATHER, TOLD NOT TO MOVE AT PENALTY OF BEING SHOT, AND BEING DEPRIVED OF FOOD AND WATER. ONE WITNESS TOLD OF HEARING SHOTS BEING FIRED REGULARLY WHILE HE SAT AT THE TRAIN STATION. ANOTHER WITNESS SPOKE OF THE PRISTINA FOOTBALL STADIUM BEING USED AS A STAGING PLACE FOR MOVEMENT OF KOSOVARS TOWARDS THE TRAIN STATION. (COMMENT: IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE

REQUEST MADE IN REFTEL B IS ACTED UPON. END  
COMMENT)

B) THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AT THE STATION FAR EXCEEDS TRAIN CAPACITY. THE TRAIN THAT ARRIVED WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY NIGHTS WERE SO PACKED THEY WERE UNBEARABLE AND A THREAT TO LIFE. A SURGEON TOLD

AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER THAT HE WOULD HAVE RATHER DIED IN HIS HOME THAN TO TAKE THE TRAIN TRIP. HE SAID THAT THE WEDNESDAY TRAIN WAS LEFT STANDING STILL NEAR PRISTINA FROM 4:30 P.M. UNTIL 1 A.M. WITH DOORS CLOSED AND NO RELIEF AT ALL. TWO BABIES WERE BORN IN THE TRAIN. BUT ANOTHER BABY DIED FROM EXPOSURE DURING THE NIGHT ORDEAL. ONE REFUGEE CALLED IT "THE TRAIN OF MISERY." ANOTHER REFUGEE SAID, "THEY THREW US INTO THAT TRAIN LIKE ANIMALS." ONE REFUGEE SAID HE SAW VILLAGES BURNING ALONG THE ROUTE TO THE BORDER. ANOTHER SAID HE SAW A BURNING BODY OUTSIDE WHILE ON THE TRAIN TRIP.

C) THERE WAS A FORCED MARCH OF THOUSANDS OF KOSOVARS FROM PODUJEVO TO THE TRAIN STATION IN PRISTINA. THE PARALYZED WERE PUSHED IN WHEELBARRELS. SERB FORCES TOLD PODUJEVO RESIDENTS, "YOU'RE THE MOST RESISTANT ONES. NOW YOU MARCH." DURING THE MARCH, BEATINGS TOOK PLACE. ONE WITNESS SAW SOME KILLED. ON THE WAY TO THE STATION, KOSOVARS WERE TOLD TO DROP THEIR BAGS AND FOOD, THUS DEPRIVING THEM OF NOURISHMENT AND ADDITIONAL CLOTHING FOR THE COLD. REFUGEES SAID THEY HAD NOT EATEN SINCE WEDNESDAY MORNING.

D) REFUGEES WERE VICTIMS OF SIMILAR TACTICS OF EXPULSION: BLACK MASKED MEN WOULD ENTER THEIR HOMES AND APARTMENT BUILDINGS YELLING ALL MANNER OF DERISIVE INSULTS AND TELLING INHABITANTS THEY HAD 5 MINUTES (SOMETIMES EVEN 20 MINUTES) TO LEAVE, PERMANENTLY. THE BASIC MESSAGE WAS, "LEAVE OR DIE." ONE REFUGEE WITNESSED SOME KOSOVARS KILLED BECAUSE THEY REFUSED TO LEAVE. THE REFUGEES WOULD BE SHAKEN DOWN FOR MONEY AND JEWELRY. ONE REFUGEE SAW A SERB SOLDIER YANK A GOLD CHAIN FROM A WOMAN'S NECK, CAUSING HER TO DROP HER BABY ON THE PAVEMENT. MANY REFUGEES SAID THAT THE ATTACKERS IN FACT WERE THEIR SERB NEIGHBORS WHO HAD TURNED AGAINST THEM, DONNING UNIFORMS AT NIGHT TO EXPEL THEM. SOME REFUGEES TOLD OF HEARING SHOOTING IN NEARBY HOMES WHILE THEY WERE HIDING WITHIN THEIRS. ONE REFUGEE SAW THE LICENSE PLATE OF THE JEEP OF ONE GROUP OF MASKED MEN: "BELGRADE 42-10". TYPICAL CURSES BY THE SERBS WERE "WE WILL NEVER SEE YOU HERE AGAIN, KOSOVO IS NOT YOURS." "GO TO NATO. LET NATO HOUSE YOU NOW." "BILL CLINTON WILL GIVE YOU A REPUBLIC." "THERE WILL BE NO ALBANIAN PRISTINA AFTER TONIGHT." "YOU ASKED FOR AMERICA. NOW YOU GO TO AMERICA."

E) PILLAGING BY THE SERB FORCES IS RAMPANT. CARS

ARE STOLEN OR DESTROYED. PERSONAL PROPERTY WITHIN HOMES IS LOOTED WITH ABANDON. SOME HOMES ARE MINED WITH EXPLOSIVES TO DETER RETURNES. FOLLOWING THE LOOTING, DESTRUCTION OFTEN OCCURS, WITH HOMES BEING TORCHED OR "BOMBED." A TYPICAL MEANS OF "BOMBING" WAS TO STUFF THE SMALL WATER BOILER IN A HOME WITH EXPLOSIVES AND NAILS AND THEN, SOMEHOW, EXPLODE IT-- WITH FIRE ERUPTING AND NAILS SPRAYING ANY RESIDENTS STILL HIDING IN THE HOME. (COMMENT: WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW THE WATER BOILERS IN FACT ARE USED, BUT WE WERE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE A WEAPON OF CHOICE. END COMMENT) ANOTHER METHOD IS TO FILL PLASTIC BOTTLES WITH FUEL AND THEN THROW IT LIT INTO HOMES.

F) PERSONAL DOCUMENTS WERE TAKEN AND DESTROYED FROM MANY REFUGEES.

G) PRISTINA IS BEING EXPUNGED NEIGHBORHOOD BY NEIGHBORHOOD, AND IS ALMOST EMPTY OF KOSOVARS (EXCEPT AT THE TRAIN STATION). ONCE KOSOVARS ARE EXPELLED, MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES MOVE IN TO RESIDE IN CIVILIAN STRUCTURES. THEY DO NOT STAY IN BARRACKS. MILITARY EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY TANKS AND APC'S, ARE HIDDEN UNDER OR WITHIN CIVILIAN STRUCTURES. TANKS ARE LINED UP IN TWO TUNNELS UNDER A LARGE CIVILIAN APARTMENT BUILDING (CARIZI IN DARDANIJA NEIGHBORHOOD) IN PRISTINA. OTHER TANKS ARE SITUATED IN NARROW STREETS WITHIN CIVILIAN NEIGHBORHOODS. AMMUNITION IS BEING STORED IN THE NATIONAL MUSEUM, THE NATIONAL LIBRARY, TWO SECONDARY SCHOOLS, AND IN PRIVATE HOMES. "ROCKETS" ARE STORED IN A MILK FACTORY AND IN A TEXTILE FACTORY. ALSO, THE UNIVERSITIES ARE NOW POPULATED BY MILITARY FORCES, NOT STUDENTS. SEVEN RED CROSS CARS ARE HIDDEN CLOSE TO THE STADIUM.

H) REGARDING NATO BOMBING, INTERVIEWED REFUGEES UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORTED IT AND SOME EVEN HOPED FOR MORE INTENSIVE BOMBING. ALL WERE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY KOSOVAR CASUALTIES FROM THE BOMBING AND THEY ALL SAID "NO." THEY SAID THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THEMSELVES IN DANGER FROM NATO BOMBING. MANY SAID THEY WITNESSED THE SERB FORCES TORCH STORES AND HOMES NEAR A BOMBING TARGET RIGHT AFTER THE BOMBING, CLAIM THE CIVILIAN DAMAGE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE NATO BOMBING, AND EVEN SEND IN FIREMEN AND FILM CREWS. ONE REFUGEE WITNESSED A KOSOVAR BEING LED BY GUN POINT BEFORE A BELGRADE TV CAMERA, WITH HIS FAMILY STANDING NEARBY, AND ASKED, WITH GUN POINTED AT HIM OFF-CAMERA, WHETHER HE WAS FLEEING KOSOVO BECAUSE OF THE NATO BOMBING. HE SAID "YES" ON PAIN OF DEATH.

I) SOME REFUGEES SAID THEY KNEW OF RAPES OF WOMEN BY SERB FORCES, OF SEEING WOMEN BEING BEATEN ON THE ROADSIDE, AND OF WITNESSING CHILDREN BEING HURT WITH SHOVING BY SOLDIERS. AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER SAW ONE

YOUNG BOY'S BLOODY HEAD WOUND CAUSED, HIS FATHER SAID, BY A SERB HITTING THE BOY.

J) AT THE HOSPITAL IN PRISTINA, ALL KOSOVAR ALBANIAN PATIENTS HAVE FLED EXCEPT ABOUT SIX PARALYZED PATIENTS. ALL KOSOVAR DOCTORS AND NURSES HAVE FLED. ONLY SERB DOCTORS (ARMED) AND NURSES REMAIN. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING KOSOVAR PATIENTS TO THE HOSPITAL ANYMORE. A KOSOVAR SURGEON TOLD AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER THAT LAST WEEK A KOSOVAR CIVILIAN (A MR. AVNINEZIRI) CAME IN WITH ABDOMEN AND LEG WOUNDS AND THE SERBS CLAIMED HE WAS KLA. THE SERBS GUARDED HIS ROOM AND BEAT HIM EVERY NIGHT. THE SURGEON DOES NOT KNOW HIS FATE TODAY. THE DOCTOR ALSO REPORTED THAT EIGHT DAYS EARLIER A PROMINENT KOSOVO DOCTOR, DR. IZET HIMA, WAS SHOT DEAD IN HIS HOME, APPARENTLY BECAUSE HE IS A KOSOVAR SURGEON.

K) SOME REFUGEES CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN INDIVIDUAL KILLINGS. IN ONE CASE, A MAN WAS CARRYING AN ELDERLY WOMAN. A SERB SOLDIER SHOT THE WOMAN AND THEN TOLD THE MAN, "LOOK, I'VE MADE YOUR HIKE EASIER!" ANOTHER REFUGEE SAW THE EXECUTION OF A MAN WHO HAD OFFERED THE SERBS HIS DOCUMENTS BUT TO NO AVAIL. AT VRANGEVC, A REFUGEE SAID THAT THREE KOSOVARS WERE KILLED BUT NO ONE COULD REACH THEM.

L) SNIPERS ARE DEPLOYED AROUND ETHNICALLY CLEANSED

TOWNS TO IMMOBILIZE ANYONE WHO IS LEFT AND TO PICK OFF ANYONE WHO DEVIATES FROM A FORCED MARCH. THE SNIPER PROBLEM WAS MENTIONED BY MANY REFUGEES.

M) ONE REFUGEE SPECULATED THAT THE SERB INTENT WAS TO ETHNICALLY CLEANSE KOSOVO AND MOVE 200,000 KRAJINA SERBS INTO KOSOVO FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.

N) THE REFUGEES HAVE VARIOUS DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SERBS: "THEY ARE BARBARIANS." "THEY ARE NOT HUMAN BEINGS." "THEY'RE CRIMINALS." "SERBS ARE TERRORISTS." THESE PRECEDED A COMMON QUESTION BY AMBASSADOR SCHEFFER, "CAN YOU LIVE WITH THEM AGAIN?" NO REFUGEE WANTED TO LIVE IN A KOSOVO WITH SERBS AGAIN, BUT THEY ALL WANTED TO RETURN TO KOSOVO. THE REFUGEES' HATRED IS PALPABLE. THE SERB NEIGHBORS THEY ONCE LIVED BESIDE ARE NOW THEIR ENEMIES, THEY SAID. (COMMENT: AMB. SCHEFFER'S IMPRESSION IS THAT ANY FUTURE PLAN TO RESURRECT A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY IN KOSOVO AFTER SUCH MASSIVE VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IS SURREAL. IT MAY TAKE GENERATIONS, IF AT ALL, TO REPAIR THE ETHNIC BREACH IN KOSOVO.)

10. ~~7~~ COMMENT BY AMB. SCHEFFER: THE LEVEL OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN KOSOVO FITS A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, WITH A FEROCITY THAT MAY EVEN OVERSHADOW THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT PRIOR TO 1995. WHEN COUPLED WITH THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE BORDER,

U.S. LEADERSHIP WILL BE TESTED ONCE AGAIN. WE WILL NEED TO PREPARE FOR THE LONG HAUL TO JOIN OTHERS IN RESTORING KOSOVO TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS AND TO BRING TO JUSTICE THOSE WHO HAVE PERPETRATED THESE ATROCITIES. IF THAT POINTS TO AN ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION INTO A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, THEN WE NEED TO PURSUE THE LOGIC OF THAT STEP NOW BEFORE SERBIA'S OCCUPATION OF KOSOVO BECOMES PERMANENT AND THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS BECOME THE PALESTINIANS OF EASTERN EUROPE. END COMMENT

11. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR TIRANA.

HILL UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1871

TOR: 990403182354 M3781269

DIST:

SIT: NSC

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Kosovo [NATO] (11 pages)	09/15/1999	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: NATO Informal Defense Ministers meeting (4 pages)	09/24/1999	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Kosovo: UCK Agenda beyond the agreement (4 pages)	10/07/1999	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Kosovo [NATO] (8 pages)	10/08/1999	P1/b(1)
<del>005. cable</del>	<del>re: NAC visit Pristina October 22, 1999 (7 pages)</del>	<del>10/25/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> ✓ 9/4/2024
006. cable	re: Ambassador's initial meeting with new Deputy Defense Minister (6 pages)	12/11/1999	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: Kosovo protection corps (6 pages)	12/20/1998	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: King Abdullah to visit Kosovo (2 pages)	12/29/1999	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Eurocorps/ KFOR (2 pages)	01/21/2000	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: More on Eurocorps/KFOR (2 pages)	01/25/2000	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: JOC assessment on Kosovo [NATO] (10 pages)	02/29/2000	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Cables  
 Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([Gen Clark])  
 OA/Box Number: 530000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[09/15/1999- 02/29/2000]

2006-0325-F  
bm344

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHPSA0397 2980826-CCCC--RHEHNSC.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O 250826Z OCT 99  
 LINE4: FM USOFFICE PRISTINA  
 OSRI: RUEHPS  
 DTG: 250826Z OCT 99  
 ORIG: USOFFICE PRISTINA  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0372  
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0113  
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF// IMMEDIATE  
 INFO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0094  
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0095  
 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0096  
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0033  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0216  
 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA 0185  
 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0208  
 SUBJ: NAC VISIT TO PRISTINA OCTOBER 22, 1999

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
 Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
 By VZ NARA, Date 12/21/2023  
2023-0332-VN (1.03)

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 PRISTINA 000397

NSC FOR AMB HILL

SKOPJE ALSO FOR PRISTINA OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/04

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, UN, RU

SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO PRISTINA OCTOBER 22, 1999

REF: ROSSIN - PARDEW TELCON 10/22

CLASSIFIED BY COM LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

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 SUMMARY  
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1. ~~(S)~~ DURING THEIR VISIT TO KOSOVO OCTOBER 22 -- SHORTENED BY WEATHER AND TRANSPORT PROBLEMS -- THE 19 NATO PERMREPS ACCOMPANIED BY SECGEN ROBERTSON, SACEUR GEN CLARK AND CMC ADM VENTURONI, MET WITH THE KOSOVO TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL AND HEARD BRIEFS FROM COMKFOR GEN REINHARDT AND UNMIK SRSG KOUCHNER. SRSG ALSO MET WITH SECGEN AND DSACEUR. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE BRIEFS AND WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED OF OTHER EVENTS ARE PRESENTED BELOW TO SUPPLEMENT ANY IMPRESSIONS AMB VERSHBOW MAY REPORT. END SUMMARY.

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KTC MEETING  
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2. (S) NAC MET WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE KOSOVO TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL, INCLUDING SERB REP BISHOP ARTEMIJE (AND HIS AIDE FR. SAVA) BUT NOT MOMCILO TRAJKOVIC, REPORTED TO BE IN SERBIA THAT DAY. WE WERE NOT PRESENT, BUT WERE TOLD BY KTC MEMBER AND INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST BLERIM SHALA THAT THE MEETING WAS SHORTENED DUE TO A LATE START. BISHOP ARTEMIJE AND FR. SAVA LAUNCHED THE MEETING WITH A PITCH FOR THE PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARATE SERBIAN PROTECTION CORPS (SPC) AND HAMMERED ON THEIR LONG-STANDING CANTONIZATION PROPOSAL. SHALA COMMENTED THAT THE SERB PITCH WAS FOCUSED ON "NOT DISPUTING" KFOR AND UNMIK AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER SUGGESTING THAT A SERBIAN PROTECTION CORPS BE ESTABLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SEPARATE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS UNDER THE OVERARCHING UMBRELLA OF UNMIK AND KFOR. SHALA SPECULATED THAT THE SERBS RECOGNIZE THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO UNDERCUT KFOR AND UNMIK AND ARE NOW WORKING AN "UNDER ONE ROOF" STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THEIR IDEA OF CANTONIZATION. SHALA NOTED THAT THE KTC ALSO BRIEFLY DISCUSSED FUTURE ELECTIONS, BUT PROVIDED NO FURTHER DETAIL; HE SAID THE DISCUSSION OF SERB ISSUES ATE UP MOST OF THE TIME.

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REINHARDT BRIEF  
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3. (S) COMKFOR READ FROM A PREPARED BRIEF WITH SLIDES (FAXED TO EUR/SCE - KAPLAN). HE UNDERScoreD THE DEEP GULF BETWEEN ALBANIANS AND SERBS, REJECTED SERB CANTONIZATION PRETENSIONS, SAID HE SAW NO SIGN OF VJ RETURN TO KOSOVO THOUGH PARAMILITARIES ARE PRESENT (SOMETHING FORMER COMKFOR NEVER STATED WHILE HERE), NOTED KOSOVAR SERB RETURNS, DELINEATED AND APPLAUDED KFOR-UNMIK COOPERATION, NOTED KFOR SUPPORT TO UNMIK ON WINTERIZATION AND APPROACHES TO THE MACEDONIANS ON BLACE, NOTED DECLINING VIOLENCE RATES, DWELT ON THE TREPCHA MINES AS THE ROOT MOTIVATION FOR SERBIA'S HOLD  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 PRISTINA 000397

NSC FOR AMB HILL

SKOPJE ALSO FOR PRISTINA OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/04

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, UN, RU

SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO PRISTINA OCTOBER 22, 1999

ON MITROVICA AND NORTH AND STRESSED THE NEED TO DEFEAT THAT TREND, STRESSED HIS INTEREST IN IMPROVED BOUNDARY CONTROL AND NOTED CONTACTS WITH SKOPJE AND TIRANA FOR MORE COOPERATION, REVEALED HIS VIEW THAT ONLY A SHIFT OF THE RUSSIANS DESTINED FOR OROHOVAC TO A NEW AOR WOULD RESOLVE THAT PROBLEM (REFTELCON) AND CALLED FOR URGENT ASSISTANCE FOR THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS.

4. (S) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

-- AMB GOULDEN ASKED HOW SERIOUS PARAMILITARY/STAYBEHIND THREAT WAS IF VJ THREAT WAS LOW, ESPECIALLY IN MITROVICA. REINHARDT REPLIED THAT BOTH PARAMILITARIES AND STAYBEHINDS ARE PRESENT, THOUGH HARD TO DISCERN. KFOR HAD ITS EYE ON THEM AND WAS ALERT AND THIS WAS THE BEST RESPONSE. UNLESS THEY COMMITTED PARTICULAR OFFENSES, KFOR COULD DO NO MORE.

-- AMB TOWPIK ASKED IF CANTONIZATION WAS WORTH CONSIDERING, AND FOR COMKFOR'S VIEWS ON THE SERB PROTECTION CORPS INITIATIVE. REINHARDT SAID HE HAD TOLD THE SERBS THAT THERE WERE PLACES RESERVED FOR THEM IN THE KPC, WHICH CEKU HAD ALSO SAID. THE SERBS MISREPRESENTED THE KPC AS A MILITARY "ALBANIAN PROTECTION CORPS". AS LONG AS THEY DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE KPC FOR WHAT IT REALLY WAS, THEY WOULD KEEP PRESSING THE SPC IDEA. AS THE KPC PROVED ITS TRUE CHARACTER, REINHARDT WAS HOPEFUL THE SERBS WOULD COME AROUND, SOMEWHAT AS WAS HAPPENING WITH THE KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE.

-- AMB LIAN COMMENTED THAT THE SPC WAS A DANGEROUS IDEA THAT KFOR RIGHTLY REJECTED. HE ASKED ABOUT KFOR COOPERATION WITH HUMANITARIAN AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. REINHARDT SAID KFOR WORKED CLOSELY WITH ALL THE DSRSG'S, AND HE HAD TASKED HIS DEPUTY TO WORK WITH UNHCR ON WINTERIZATION, AN URGENT REQUIREMENT. DCOM OPS LTG THOMANN WAS SETTING UP A HIGH LEVEL KFOR-UNMIK STRATEGY GROUP FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING, AND KFOR HAD SENT PLANNERS TO UNMIK FOR MEDIUM-TERM PLANNING, TO GET KFOR/UNMIK PAST THE REACTIVE MODE. NGO'S WERE SHY; UNHCR COULD NOT COORDINATE THEM AND THEY TENDED TO RECOIL FROM TOO STRONG A KFOR EMBRACE, SO THEY HAD TO BE ENTICED WITH GENTLE OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE.

-- AMB GUELLUY ASKED COMKFOR TO ELABORATE ON MITROVICA. REINHARDT, IN WHAT MANY OF US HERE FOUND TO BE IDIOSYNCRATIC REMARKS, BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE NORTH REMAINS MIXED -- 60 PERCENT SERB, 30 PERCENT ALBANIAN, 10 PERCENT OTHER. 2000 PEOPLE CROSS THE BRIDGE FREELY EVERY DAY (NOTE: NOT WHAT WE'VE SEEN) AND 50 PERCENT OF THOSE IN THE NORTH SIDE MARKET ARE ALBANIANS SELLING TO SERBS (NOTE: AGAIN, NOT OUR OBSERVATION). BUT THERE WERE REAL PROBLEMS, THUS THE HIGH FRENCH KFOR PROFILE -- THE FRENCH WERE DOING A FINE JOB, OMNIPRESENT, INTERVENING WHENEVER NECESSARY. BUT THE UNIVERSITY AND ESPECIALLY TREPCHA WERE BIG ISSUES. THIS WAS THE ONLY MINING FACULTY IN THE FRY, AND THE SERBS WANTED TO KEEP ALBANIANS OUT SO THERE WOULD BE NO ALBANIAN MINING ENGINEERS IN THE FUTURE TO TAKE TREPCHA FROM THEM. KFOR AND UNMIK WERE SEEKING A SOLUTION BUT IT WOULD BE EXPENSIVE.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 PRISTINA 000397

NSC FOR AMB HILL

SKOPJE ALSO FOR PRISTINA OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/04

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, UN, RU

SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO PRISTINA OCTOBER 22, 1999

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KOUCHNER BRIEF  
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5. ~~(S)~~ KOUCHNER NOTED UNMIK'S CONTRADICTION MISSION -- TO PRESERVE FRY SOVEREIGNTY WHILE BUILDING "SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY" AND "SELF-GOVERNMENT" -- "WHATEVER THOSE MEAN." DID THIS MEAN PRE-1989? IT WAS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT SERBS AND ALBANIANS HAD NEVER "LIVED TOGETHER" IN KOSOVO; AT BEST THERE HAD BEEN ENFORCED TOLERATION. THE SOPHISTICATED FATHER SAVA AT THE KTC WAS A PERFECT EXAMPLE -- WELL-EDUCATED, TEN LANGUAGES -- AND NOT A WORD OF ALBANIAN. THUS THE BASIC CHALLENGE WAS TO CREATE SECURITY AND ENABLE ETHNIC CO-EXISTENCE, NO MORE. "RECONCILIATION" WAS FOR MUCH LATER. NATO MUST CONSIDER REINFORCING IN SOME AREAS IN ORDER TO PROTECT MINORITIES -- NOT ONLY SERBS, BUT ROMA AND BOSNIACS.

6. ~~(S)~~ KOUCHNER STRESSED THAT UNMIK WAS NOT "ADMINISTERING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE" EVEN THOUGH THAT IS WHAT ALL THE ALBANIANS WANT. THEY BELIEVE NOW THEY LIBERATED THEMSELVES, AND HAVE FORGOTTEN OUR ROLE. GONE ARE REFERENCES TO PRE-JUNE TRAVAILS; THEY ONLY SEE POST-JUNE SHORTCOMINGS. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION BY ALBANIANS FOR SERBS OR SERBS FOR ALBANIANS -- EACH REALLY DOES NOT EXIST FOR THE OTHER.

7. ~~(S)~~ KOUCHNER STRESSED THE NEED FOR MORE UN INTERNATIONAL POLICE. HE SAID HE NEEDED 6000, HAD 2000, WOULD GET 1000 MORE. HE NEEDED INVESTIGATORS AND SPECIALISTS TO FOCUS ON FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME. BUT, AS REINHARDT HAD NOTED, THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION WAS IMPROVING. KOUCHNER CALLED URGENTLY FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE KPC, NOTING IT WAS ALREADY ENGAGED IN REBUILDING HOUSES -- INCLUDING SERB HOUSES -- AND THAT A MIXED KPC GROUP WAS NOW IN FRANCE.

8. ~~(S)~~ LOOKING AT THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION, KOUCHNER REMARKED THAT UNMIK COULD NOT RUN KOSOVO WITH THREE COMPETING GOVERNMENTS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO INTEGRATE THE KOSOVARS AND INTERNATIONALS IN A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT. THE PGOK WAS A REAL, FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT BUT IT HAD NO MONEY.

THE RUGOVA GOVERNMENT WAS NO GOOD BUT HAD TOO MUCH MONEY. UNMIK WAS STUCK IN THE MIDDLE, AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION WHICH MADE IT INTO THE ENEMY. UNMIK WAS NOT A COLONIAL POWER AND HAD TO WORK WITH THE KOSOVARS -- TO APPLY UNSCR 1244 SUCCESSFULLY, ALL MUST BE BROUGHT INTO A SINGLE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY.

9. ~~(S)~~ ON WINTERIZATION, KOUCHNER SAID 250,000 - 300,000 WOULD SUFFER HARDSHIPS. MATERIALS WERE ON THE WAY, BUT THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF COMPLAINTS. ASSISTANCE WAS NEEDED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY. BOTH OBILIC POWER PLANTS WERE IN BAD SHAPE.

10. ~~(S)~~ KOUCHNER DISCUSSED THE DEBATE OVER ELECTIONS. "THESE PEOPLE ARE NOT FROM THE SOUTHERN SUDAN," HE REMARKED -- THEY KNOW HOW TO VOTE. A GOOD ELECTORAL SYSTEM IS

NEEDED, BUT THE ONLY WAY TO PUSH BACK FORCED LOCAL  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 PRISTINA 000397

NSC FOR AMB HILL

SKOPJE ALSO FOR PRISTINA OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/04  
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, UN, RU  
SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO PRISTINA OCTOBER 22, 1999

LEADERSHIPS IS TO HAVE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN THE SPRING (APRIL OR MAY). THE NAC HAD JUST HEARD RUGOVA AND THAQI AGREE ON THIS. SOME HAD ARGUED FOR DELAYING ELECTIONS TO "PROTECT" THAQI OR RUGOVA -- THIS WAS UNWISE.

11. ~~(S)~~ STEEPING BACK FOR A BROADER VIEW, KOUCHNER REFERRED TO THE STABILITY PACT AND ITS PARALLELS TO EUROPE'S INTEGRATION STAGE 40 YEARS AGO. HIS DEEP CONCERN WAS TO PROVE THAT KOSOVO WAS PART OF THE REGION'S EVOLUTION. KOSOVO CANNOT EVOLVE ONLY WITHIN THE FRY CONTEXT ("SERBIA" DOES NOT APPEAR IN 1244), ESPECIALLY SINCE THE FRY ITSELF WAS EVOLVING (MONTENEGRO). THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE COULD NOT BE EVOLUTION FOR KOSOVO WITHOUT TALKING TO SERBIA, AND THERE COULD BE NO TALKING TO SERBIA WITH MILOSEVIC IN POWER.

IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR NATO TO SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

12. ~~(S)~~ IN A FINAL THOUGHT, KOUCHNER NOTED THAT "DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS" WAS HIS EARLY EFFORT TO CROSS BORDERS AND PROTECT MINORITIES. NATO HAD WONDERFULLY TAKEN THE BIGGEST STEP BEFORE THE MILLENIUM BY ACTING AS "MILITARY WITHOUT BORDERS" TO PROTECT AN OPPRESSED MINORITY. THE UN HAD A HARDER TASK, WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA HOLDING IT BACK, BUT IT HAD TO DO THE JOB OF BUILDING SECURITY AND ETHNIC COEXISTENCE.

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SRSG/DSACEUR MEETING  
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13. ~~(S)~~ WHILE REINHARDT WAS BRIEFING, DSACEUR GEN SMITH MET PRIVATELY WITH SRSG KOUCHNER. SMITH ASKED KOUCHNER TO LIST UNMIK'S KEY CONCERNS. THEY WERE FUNDING, ORGANIZED CRIMA AND SECURITY (PROTECTION OF SERBS AND CBM'S). KOUCHNER COMMENTED THAT KFOR, UNDER HQ ARRC, WAS STRUCTURED AND TASKED TO DELIVER THE MTA. LANDCENT AS THE NEW HQ HAD A DIFFERENT ROLE -- TO SECURE THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAIN SUPPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WITHIN ITS CAPABILITIES. BUT KOUCHNER FELT KFOR WAS NOT NECESSARILY STRUCTURED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ITS CHANGED ROLE. THE NATURE OF THE RESTRUCTURING WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY FORCE -- AS MUCH A POLITICAL AS A MILITARY QUESTION. THE KOSOVO COMMUNITY HAD TO PERCEIVE THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER WAS CRITICAL TO THIS. MUCH OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH UNMIK, BUT KFOR MIGHT BE ABLE TO

HELP THROUGH ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE ENVIRONMENT.

14. (C) SMITH'S PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH FORCES IN KOSOVO TO SECURE THE ENVIRONMENT, BUT THEY WERE IN THE WRONG LOCATIONS. SO COMKFOR COULD USE FORCES WHERE HE NEEDED THEM, HE HAD TO BE ABLE TO REINFORCE TROUBLE SPOTS. THIS WAS GEN REINHARDT'S CALL, BUT WOULD REQUIRE AGREEMENT OF A MAJORITY OF NATIONS, NOT EASILY ACHIEVED. KOUCHNER MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP BY BRINGING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON NATIONS. IN TACKLING ORGANIZED CRIME, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TO APPRECIATE THE CLAN/FAMILY LINKS AND  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 PRISTINA 000397

NSC FOR AMB HILL

SKOPJE ALSO FOR PRISTINA OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/04

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, UN, RU

SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO PRISTINA OCTOBER 22, 1999

CONNECTIONS, STEMMING FROM TRADITIONAL ALBANIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURES THAT LINK CRIME WITH LOCAL POWER. DECOUPLING THAT WOULD BE HARD. ONE POSSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO ATTACK THE CRIMINAL LINKS AMONG THE ALBANIAN DIASPORA FIRST, AN AREA WHERE NATIONS COULD HELP.

15. (C) KOUCHNER SAID THERE HAD TO BE A GREATER EFFORT IN KOSOVO, STARTING WITH A CRACKDOWN ON CRIMINALITY IN THE STREETS AND MORE BORDER CONTROL. SMITH PROPOSED EXPLORING KFOR/UNIP JOINT PATROLLING, WITH KFOR ESCORTING POLICEMEN ON THE BEAT. (COMMENT: THIS IS ALREADY WHAT IS DONE.) SMITH CLOSED BY OFFERING HELP SHOULD THERE BE FUTURE MILITARY ISSUES BEYOND KFOR'S CAPABILITY.

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SRSG/SEC GEN MEETING  
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16. (C) ROBERTSON AND KOUCHNER TALKED BRIEFLY OVER A BRIEF LUNCH. DESMOND BOWEN, OF ROBERTSON'S OFFICE, WAS PRESENT. KOUCHNER DISCUSSED THE CHALLENGES UNMIK FACES ESPECIALLY REGARDING ALBANIAN ASPIRATIONS. ROBERTSON SAID NATIONS NEED TO BECOME MORE AWARE OF THESE ISSUES. THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN WAR, IN AGREEING ON 1244 AND IN GETTING KFOR INTO SERBIA TO FILL THE VOID LEFT BY THE SERBS. WITH THIS SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD FOR IT TO FAIL NOW, EITHER FOR LACK OF FUNDS AND POLITICAL/MATERIAL SUPPORT, FOR FOR REASONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND ALBANIAN INTRANSIGENCE. HE OFFERED TO HELP GET THIS ACROSS TO NATIONS. (NOTE: ROBERTSON DEVELOPED THESE THEMES IN LATER REMARKS TO THE NAC.) ROBERTSON INVITED KOUCHNER TO ADDRESS THE NAC IN BRUSSELS, AND AN INVITATION HAS BEEN SENT TO UNMIK.

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DISCUSSION WITH SPANISH PERMREP CONDE  
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17. (C) NOTE: COM SPENT MUCH TIME CHATTING WITH CONDE, AN OLD FRIEND. CONDE SAID HE FOUND REINHARDT'S BRIEFING ODD ON MITROVICA AND TREPCHA, AND GENERALLY OVERDRAWN IN MANY PLACES. HE ASKED WHAT COM THOUGHT OF KOUCHNER'S PRESENTATION. COM ENDORSED IT AND KOUCHNER AS A STRONG SRSG. CONDE CONCURRED, AND AGREED THAT UNMIK NEEDED MORE SUPPORT. HE LAMENTED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN MADRID TO ENGAGE MORE IN KOSOVO AND THE BALKANS, EVEN GIVEN THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IT DOES HAVE. COM SAID THAT GUARDIA CIVIL FOR THE UNIP MSU'S WOULD BE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE; AS IT WAS, UNIP WAS COMING UP DRY IN THIS AREA. CONDE AGREED, CALLING THIS SPAIN'S AREA OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, BUT NOTHING HAD CHANGED SINCE WE HAD TRIED AND FAILED TO GET GC FOR THE BOSNIA MSU'S. GENERALLY, MADRID DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT ENGAGEMENT WAS THE PRICE FOR INFLUENCE. END NOTE. ROSSIN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05  
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<^TOR>991025060318 M4114969  
<^TOR>991025060400 M4114970

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Russian criticism of SACEUR's 13 February Vienna remarks (2 pages)	05/04/1998	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: General Clark statement on Bosnia corruption (2 pages)	05/04/1998	P1/b(1)
<del>003. cable</del>	<del>re: Kosovo-Key allied Ambassadors discussions (7 pages)</del>	<del>05/05/1998</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> VZ 9/4/2021
004. cable	re: Bosnia conference: Bilateral meetings (6 pages)	05/14/1998	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Westendorp at the Department of State (4 pages)	05/14/1998	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Phone No. (Partial) (1 page)	05/22/1998	P6/b(6)
007. cable	re: Tsohatzopoulos on Mil-Mil talks (2 pages)	05/29/1998	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: Permreps' lunch 6/2: Kosovo: Next steps (9 pages)	06/03/1998	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Backgrounder and suggested talking points for your visit to a poverty alleviation project of Tunisia's National Solidarity Fund (2 pages)	06/04/1998	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: June 3 conversation (4 pages)	06/05/1998	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: S/SR Gelbard's June 5 meeting with Croatian Ambassador Zuzul (4 pages)	06/09/1998	P1/b(1)
012. cable	re: Angola: FAA Chief of Staff on security situation (4 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Cables  
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([General Clark])  
 OA/Box Number: 520000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[05/04/1998-06/16/1998]

2006-0325-F

bm330

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: The North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministerial Session, 11 June 1998 (15 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1)
014. cable	re: NATO planes fly over Macedonia (4 pages)	06/16/1998	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Cables  
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([General Clark])  
 OA/Box Number: 520000

---

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[05/04/1998-06/16/1998]

2006-0325-F  
 bm330

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHNOA1285 1250957-CCCC--RHEHNSC.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O 050957Z MAY 98  
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO  
 OSRI: RUEHNO  
 DTG: 050957Z MAY 98  
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0640  
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 INFO: RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 RUFQSAC/USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE  
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF// IMMEDIATE  
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2458  
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0116  
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1615  
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE  
 SUBJ: KOSOVO - KEY ALLIED AMBASSADORS DISCUSS  
 POSSIBLE TASKINGS TO SEEK MILITARY ADVICE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
 Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 12/21/2023  
 7023-0332-W (1.09)

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 001285

EXDIS QUADRANGLE

STATE FOR S, D, S/SR, SABI, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE  
 NSC FOR COVEY AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH  
 SECDEF FOR USDP, LONGSTRETH, MCCONNELL  
 JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS(FOGLESONG) AND J5(REDD AND WEISMAN)  
 SHAPE FOR GENERAL CLARK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/08  
 TAGS: NATO, NAC, PREL, MARR, SR, AL, MK  
 SUBJECT: KOSOVO - KEY ALLIED AMBASSADORS DISCUSS  
 POSSIBLE TASKINGS TO SEEK MILITARY ADVICE

REF: (A) USNATO 1265, (B) STATE 79596, (C) USNATO 1198,  
 (D) USNATO 1201, (E) USNATO 1237

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW FOR  
 REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (Q) SUMMARY: ON MAY 4, KEY ALLIES MET TO CONTINUE  
 DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE NATO MEASURES IN ALBANIA AND FYROM  
 IN RESPONSE TO THE KOSOVO SITUATION. (SEE REF A FOR  
 REPORT ON LAST DISCUSSION APRIL 30). ALL WERE IN BASIC  
 AGREEMENT THAT THE NAC SHOULD TASK NATO MILITARY  
 AUTHORITIES TO LOOK AT THE KOSOVO ISSUE, ALTHOUGH  
 PERSPECTIVES ON THE SUBJECTS FOR SUCH MILITARY STUDY

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DIFFERED. RE ALBANIA, THE UK SAID IT COULD PROBABLY SUPPORT AN EARLY INSTRUCTION TO THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES (NMA'S) ASKING FOR PRELIMINARY MILITARY ADVICE ON: (1) BETTER UTILIZING PFP; (2) POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING-TYPE EXERCISES; AND (3) "SOME SORT" OF NATO COMMITMENT TO MONITORING THE ALBANIAN-KOSOVO BORDER. THE UK EMPHASIZED THE MONITORING, VICE ENFORCEMENT, CHARACTER OF SUCH AN OPERATION AND SAID THE MONITORING OPERATION SHOULD NOT BE A PFP PROGRAM. THE UK DID NOT SUPPORT DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE NATO ASSUMPTION OF AN UNPREDEP FOLLOW-ON MISSION IN FYROM. FRANCE AND GERMANY GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE UK, AND GERMANY NOTED IT ALSO CONCURRED WITH AN EARLIER UK COMMENT THAT ANY PFP EXERCISE SHOULD NOT BE SITED IN NORTHERN ALBANIA. THE THREE WERE ALSO CONCERNED BY WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS A POTENTIAL SFOR ROLE IN A PROSPECTIVE NATO FORCE IN ALBANIA. THE U.S. CHARGE URGED THAT FYROM-RELATED MEASURES BE CONSIDERED AT THE SAME TIME AS ALBANIAN ONES, AND NOTING WE DIFFERED WITH THE OTHERS' OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT THAT THE UN WAS HEADING INEXORABLY TOWARD RENEWAL OF UNPREDEP'S MANDATE IN AN ACCEPTABLE VERSION. THE U.S. ALSO REBUTTED GERMANY'S INSISTENCE (SUPPORTED SOMEWHAT BY FRANCE) THAT THE FOUR ALLIES WERE FAR APART ON SUBSTANCE ON TASKING THE NMA'S TO ASSESS ALBANIAN-RELATED MEASURES, WHICH GERMANY SAID MEANT THE NAC SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS AGAIN ON MAY 7. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(C)~~ IN A FOLLOW-UP TO AN APRIL 30 DISCUSSION (REF A), KEY ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES MET ON MAY 4 TO DISCUSS KOSOVO AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THAT ISSUE AT THE MAY 5 PERMREPS LUNCH. UK AMBASSADOR GOULDEN OPENED BY ADVISING THAT HE HAD SOUGHT INSTRUCTIONS. HE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE GIVEN SOME AUTHORITY TO GO ALONG WITH AN INSTRUCTION TO NMA'S ASKING FOR SOME PRELIMINARY MILITARY ADVICE -- BUT NOT ACTUALLY TO COMMENCE PLANNING -- IN THREE AREAS:

-- MAKING BETTER USE OF PFP. GOULDEN MENTIONED THAT PFP MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE IN HELPING ALBANIA TO RATIONALIZE ITS WEAPONS STORAGE.

-- POSSIBLE EXERCISES (WHICH SHOULD BE PEACEKEEPING IN NATURE) IN COOPERATION WITH ALBANIANS. GOULDEN SAID WE NEEDED TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE ANY SIGNAL THAT THESE WOULD BE AIMED AGAINST THE SERBS.

-- SOME SORT OF NATO COMMITMENT TO MONITORING THE ALBANIA-KOSOVO BORDER. GOULDEN SAID THAT IF THIS REQUIRED A NATO TEAM TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, THEN SUCH A TEAM SHOULD BE SENT.

3. ~~(C)~~ GOULDEN RECOMMENDED THAT THE ALLIANCE DEVELOP A CLEAR PRESS LINE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT ALL INTERESTED PARTIES NOT MISUNDERSTAND WHAT NATO WAS DOING, I.E., IT WAS LOOKING AT MILITARY ALTERNATIVES, BUT NOT TAKING A DECISION. GOULDEN ALSO SAID LONDON FELT STRONGLY THAT ANY MONITORING SHOULD NOT BE A PFP PROGRAM BECAUSE PFP WAS NOT MADE FOR THESE KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO SAID THAT ANY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA

SHOULD BE CLEARLY SEPARATE FROM SFOR.

4. (C) GERMAN AMBASSADOR VON RICHTHOFEN SAID HE GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE UK POINTS ABOVE, PARTICULARLY THE STRESS ON ASKING FOR PRELIMINARY OPTIONS. HE DID NOT THINK BONN WOULD HAVE ANY TROUBLE WITH THAT SORT OF ~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 001285

EXDIS QUADRANGLE

STATE FOR S, D, S/SR, SABI, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE  
NSC FOR CVEY AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH  
SECDEF FOR USDP, LONGSTRETH, MCCONNELL  
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS (FOGLESONG) AND J5 (REDD AND WEISMAN)  
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TAGS: NATO, NAC, PREL, MARR, SR, AL, MK  
SUBJECT: KOSOVO - KEY ALLIED AMBASSADORS DISCUSS  
POSSIBLE TASKINGS TO SEEK MILITARY ADVICE

REF: (A) USNATO 1265, (B) STATE 79596, (C) USNATO 1198, FORMULATION. HE ALSO THOUGHT BONN WOULD ACCEPT USING PFP (IN THE WAY DESCRIBED BY THE UK), AND HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WEAPONS STORAGE IN ALBANIA, INCLUDING WHETHER ANY STORAGE SITES REMAINED. (GOULDEN SAID ABOUT 40 SITES WERE LEFT). VON RICHTHOFEN ALSO CONFIRMED BONN'S AGREEMENT WITH THE APRIL 30 UK COMMENT (REF A) THAT A PFP EXERCISE IN ALBANIA SHOULD NOT/NOT BE STAGED IN THE SENSITIVE NORTHERN REGION.

5. (C) VON RICHTHOFEN SAID THE BIG QUESTION WOULD BE HOW LARGE THIS OPERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE. NATO WOULD HAVE TO SORT THAT OUT. IN REFERENCE TO MONITORING, VON RICHTHOFEN SAID BONN AGREED, BUT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO LOOK AT (A) WHETHER THIS WOULD BE ON THE GROUND AND/OR IN THE AIR, AND (B) WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE IF INFRACTIONS OCCURRED WHILE NATO WAS UNDERTAKING SUCH ACTION.

6. (C) GOULDEN RESPONDED THAT THE ADVICE ON FEASIBILITY WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE MILITARY. HE LAID SPECIAL STRESS ON THE MONITORING FUNCTION, AS OPPOSED TO ANY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM IN THE ZONE. GOULDEN ALSO SAID THAT THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ALL THE PARTIES KNOWING NATO WAS "WATCHING" WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM IN AND OF ITSELF.

7. (C) U.S. CHARGE MCELHANEY SAID THAT AS AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW WOULD REAFFIRM AT THE MAY 5 LUNCH, WASHINGTON HOPED TO BEGIN A DISCUSSION WITH ALLIES ON POSSIBLE NATO ROLES IN THE REGION THAT WAS NOT RESTRICTED TO ALBANIA. HE DID NOT RULE OUT NATO'S TAKING A LARGER ROLE, SHOULD FUTURE ASSESSMENTS REQUIRE THAT, BUT FOR NOW WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE WHOLE RANGE OF POSSIBLE NATO ROLES. AT THIS POINT WASHINGTON WAS VERY SENSITIVE TO AVOIDING LOUD DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ALLIES, BUT WE HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS OVER THE LAST WEEK IN CLOSING OUR DIFFERENCES.

MCELHANEY SAID WE WERE LOOKING FOR DISCUSSION AMONG ALLIES, LIKE THE OTHER AMBASSADORS WHO HAD SPOKEN, AND WERE NOT SEEKING APPROVAL FOR ANY BASIC ACTIONS AT THIS TIME. IT WAS LIKELY THAT AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW WOULD SUGGEST AT THE MAY 5 LUNCH THAT NMA'S SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO STUDY THE POSSIBLE MISSIONS THAT WE WOULD UNDERTAKE NOW, IN ORDER TO BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE INFORMED CHOICES LATER. THERE WERE THREE AREAS WE WOULD WANT TO LOOK AT: (1) TO DETER A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF ETHNIC CLEANSING OR WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO; (2) TO DETER THE SPREAD OF THE SERB/KOSOVAR CONFLICT; AND (3) TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO NGO'S IN THE EVENT OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, MOST NOTABLY ONE CAUSED BY LARGE-SCALE REFUGEE FLOWS.

8. (C) MCELHANEY SAID THAT AS DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT HAD MADE CLEAR IN HIS CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS, AND AS AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW HAD SAID AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING OF KEY ALLIES, WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO LOOK ALSO AT FYROM IN TERMS OF ENHANCING PFP ACTIVITY, AS WELL AS THE FOLLOW-ON TO UNPREDEP. IT WAS OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK THAT NATO ATTENTION TO THIS ISSUE WOULD SEND A STRONG SIGNAL THAT THE UNPREDEP MISSION WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SOMEONE IN THE FUTURE. VON RICHTHOFEN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HIS REMARKS REFERRED ONLY TO ALBANIA. IN LIGHT OF THE U.S. POSITION, HE DID NOT WANT US TO THINK BONN WAS THINKING OF A NATO ROLE IN AN UNPREDEP-TYPE ROLE AT THIS POINT.

9. (C) FRENCH AMBASSADOR ERRERA SAID HE HAD ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS. HE THOUGHT PARIS WOULD AGREE TO GO IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF ASKING NMA'S FOR PRELIMINARY ADVICE. HE NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER VEDRINE AND DEFENSE MINISTER RICHARD WERE MEETING ON THIS ISSUE AS WE SPOKE. HE MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF SAYING THAT ANY POSSIBLE OPERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE COORDINATED WITHIN A "VERY SENSITIVE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK," COMPLEMENTING THE WORK OF THE CONTACT GROUP. HE REFERRED TO DEPSEC TALBOTT'S CONVERSATION WITH VEDRINE, AND VEDRINE'S SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, SAYING THAT PARIS HAD REAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF THE  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 001285

EXDIS QUADRANGLE

STATE FOR S, D, S/SR, SABI, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE  
NSC FOR COVEY AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH  
SECDEF FOR USDP, LONGSTRETH, MCCONNELL  
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS (FOGLESONG) AND J5 (REDD AND WEISMAN)  
SHAPE FOR GENERAL CLARK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/08  
TAGS: NATO, NAC, PREL, MARR, SR, AL, MK  
SUBJECT: KOSOVO - KEY ALLIED AMBASSADORS DISCUSS  
POSSIBLE TASKINGS TO SEEK MILITARY ADVICE

REF: (A) USNATO 1265, (B) STATE 79596, (C) USNATO 1198,  
SITUATION IN KOSOVO. A NATO ROLE WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED  
AT AS PART OF THE LARGER PROBLEM, I.E. NATO'S ROLE PLUS

THE ROLES OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. ERRERA SAID HE THOUGHT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD TALK ABOUT THE DETERRENCE ASPECT, PLUS EXPLORING ROLES FOR PFP, BUT PARIS TOO WOULD NOT WANT TO CONFUSE PFP WITH ANYTHING THAT LOOKED LIKE A MILITARY INTERVENTION.

10. ~~(S)~~ ERRERA SAID WITH REGARD TO UNPREDEP, PARIS DID NOT THINK WE COULD HAVE ONGOING EFFORTS TO EXTEND THE MANDATE CONTINUING IN NEW YORK WHILE NATO DISCUSSED SOME ALTERNATIVE TO UNPREDEP IN BRUSSELS. THAT WOULD BE ANTICIPATING FAILURE IN NEW YORK, WHICH WAS NOT HOW PARIS SAW THE OUTCOME OF THAT DISCUSSION. HE SAID, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT SOLANA'S STATEMENT TEN DAYS AGO, TO THE EFFECT THAT NATO SHOULD WHOLESAL TAKE OVER BALKAN PROBLEMS, INCLUDING KOSOVO, WAS NOT A HELPFUL ONE. ERRERA SAID NATO SHOULD NOT LOOK AT THIS IN TERMS OF A "GESAMTKONZEPT". WE DO NOT WANT A SPREAD OF A CONFLICT, AND THUS WE DO NOT WANT NATO TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR A WIDER CONFLICT. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD NOT RELY ON SFOR TO UNDERTAKE THIS OPERATION. WE NEEDED TO MAKE SURE THAT WE TOOK CARE OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES REQUIRED BY BRINGING THE RUSSIANS, MILOSEVIC, AND THE ALBANIANS ALONG.

11. ~~(S)~~ GOULDEN BASICALLY AGREED WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND SAID ANY OPERATION MUST BE COHERENT. IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY BETTER TO DO THIS UNDER SFOR. HE SAID WE HAD DIFFERENT SCHEDULES FOR SFOR AND FOR WHAT WE MIGHT NEED TO DO FOR KOSOVO. WE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO GET SFOR OUT AS A RESULT OF AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA -- AND NOT TO GET IT TIED UP IN SOMETHING ELSE. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD HARDLY SEE HOW SFOR WOULD NOT HAVE SOME KIND OF ROLE, SINCE THIS WAS THE MAJOR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. ON UNPREDEP, GOULDEN SAID IT WAS ARGUABLE WHETHER NATO CONSIDERATION OF FYROM WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THIS ISSUE IN NEW YORK. NATO CONSIDERATION WOULD ALSO RAISE MACEDONIAN EXPECTATIONS. PERHAPS WE COULD "NOT RULE OUT" NATO CONSIDERATION OF A POST-UNPREDEP ROLE. IT SEEMED TO THE UK THAT THERE WAS A BANDWAGON AT THE UN FOR A RENEWED UNPREDEP MANDATE, AND THERE WAS TIME FOR NATO TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO.

12. ~~(S)~~ MCELHANEY SAID THE RELATIONSHIP OF SFOR TO ANYTHING WE DID WITH REGARD TO KOSOVO WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED, AND THESE WERE ISSUES THE NMA'S WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT. HE REITERATED THAT IT WAS NOT OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK THAT THINGS WERE GOING WELL, AND WE WERE NOT CONFIDENT THAT RUSSIA WOULD SAY YES TO AN UNPREDEP EXTENSION SIMILAR TO WHAT THE OPERATION WAS LIKE TODAY. MCELHANEY SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT WASHINGTON THOUGHT WE SHOULD LOOK AT UNPREDEP, PFP, AND EXERCISES FOR FYROM MUCH AS WE WERE LOOKING AT ALBANIA. HE ALSO NOTED, WITH REGARD TO SFOR, THAT SOLANA WAS CORRECT AT LEAST IN NOTING THAT IF SFOR WAS IN THE REGION, IT COULD SERVE SOME USEFUL PURPOSE -- I.E., IN LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, OR INTEL -- IN ANY OTHER OPERATION WE MIGHT TAKE UP. HOWEVER, THAT WAS FOR NMA'S TO DISCUSS.

13. (S) ERRERA REPEATED THAT WE SHOULD NOT MIX ALBANIA AND UNPREDEP -- THAT WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL, AND WE SHOULD NOT UNDERCUT NEW YORK. HE REBUTTED WASHINGTON'S TENDENCY TO SAY NEW YORK WOULD FAIL, AND WARNED THAT THIS WOULD NOT MAKE THINGS EASY FOR THE COHESION OF THE ALLIES. VON RICHTHOFEN AGREED. HE SAID IT APPEARED THAT THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS TO ASK NMA'S TO DO PRELIMINARY THINKING, AND THIS SHOULD NOT BE RAISED AT THE MAY 6 NAC. ERRERA SAID WE NEEDED TO SHOW THAT WE WERE NOT IN DISARRAY, AND HE HOPED THAT BEFORE THE LUNCH THE FOUR COULD REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING. ERRERA SAID WE WOULD NEED TO FINE-TUNE THE MESSAGE AT FOUR. IF NOT, THIS ISSUE COULD GET AWAY FROM US. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ITALIAN PROPOSALS HAD BEEN FULLY CARRIED IN THE PRESS BY AFP. HE THOUGHT THAT IF WE DID NOT HAVE A COMMON LINE AT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 001285

EXDIS QUADRANGLE

STATE FOR S, D, S/SR, SABI, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE  
NSC FOR COVEY AND BANDLER; OVP FOR FUERTH  
SECDEF FOR USDP, LONGSTRETH, MCCONNELL  
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS (FOGLESONG) AND J5 (REDD AND WEISMAN)  
SHAPE FOR GENERAL CLARK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/08  
TAGS: NATO, NAC, PREL, MARR, SR, AL, MK  
SUBJECT: KOSOVO - KEY ALLIED AMBASSADORS DISCUSS  
POSSIBLE TASKINGS TO SEEK MILITARY ADVICE

REF: (A) USNATO 1265, (B) STATE 79596, (C) USNATO 1198,  
FOUR BY WEDNESDAY (MAY 7), WE SHOULD NOT GO FORWARD.

14. (S) VON RICHTHOFEN REPEATED THAT THE FOUR WERE VERY FAR APART ON SUBSTANCE. MCELHANEY SAID HE HAD NOTED SOME SMALL DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO GETTING THE PROCESS STARTED, BUT IT SEEMED WE ALL BASICALLY AGREED WE COULD TASK THE NMA'S TO LOOK AT THE ISSUES. GOULDEN AGREED WITH THE U.S., SAYING HE THOUGHT ALLIES COULD PROBABLY COME TO AGREEMENT ON REQUESTING PRELIMINARY MILITARY ADVICE FROM NMA'S. IF THERE NEEDED TO BE FURTHER DISCUSSION, THE NAC COULD HAVE THE PCG FORMULATE A NAC REQUEST TO THE NMA'S. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NEED TO AGREE ON WHAT TO DO WITH REGARD TO FYROM, AND HOW KOSOVO-RELATED OPERATIONS WOULD RELATE TO SFOR.

15. (S) ERRERA SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL INDICATING HIS INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAY 6. PARIS WAS NOT HOSTILE TO THE ITALIAN PROPOSITION TO CONSIDER A ONE-OFF EXERCISE IN ALBANIA. PARIS ALSO AGREED TO ASK NMA'S FOR THEIR TAKE ON THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPTIONS THE ALLIANCE COULD OFFER FOR ALBANIA, ON CONDITION THAT THERE BE NO QUESTION ABOUT GOING BEYOND A STUDY WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT POLITICAL DECISION. PARIS SAW THREE OBJECTIVES IN THIS EXERCISE: (1) PFP COULD HELP TO STABILIZE THE BUDDING ALBANIAN DEMOCRACY; (2) NATO COULD CONSIDER MONITORING THE ALBANIAN BORDER WITH THE FRY (PARIS STILL HAD

QUESTIONS OVER WHAT COULD BE DONE IN THIS AREA); AND  
(3) NATO COULD HELP TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE DISSUASION OF  
THE VARIOUS PARTIES IN ORDER TO AVOID A FURTHER  
DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION.

16. ~~(C)~~ THE KEY ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO SPEAK  
LATER THAT SAME DAY AND BEFORE THE LUNCH THE FOLLOWING  
DAY AND COMPARE THEIR APPROACHES.

VERSHBOW

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 1285

<^SSN>1285

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<^SSN>1285

TOR: 980505060309 M3272706

<^TOR>980505060355 M3272707

<^TOR>980505060441 M3272708

<^TOR>980505060442 M3272710

DIST:

SIT: BANDLER BRADEN COVEY DAVIDSON FLANAGAN SAUNDERS SUM2

PRT: FUERTH SIT{C2}

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Kosovo corps (2 pages)	09/13/1999	P1/b(1)
<del>002. cable</del>	<del>re: KLA and KFOR still at odds (2 pages)</del>	<del>09/14/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> ✓ 9/4/2024
003. cable	re: Kosovo: September 15 NAC discussion (10 pages)	09/15/1999	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: SACEUR's trip report- Kosovo [NATO] (3 pages)	09/17/1999	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Improving Macedonian relations with NATO (3 pages)	09/22/1999	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Kosovo crisis- update (3 pages)	09/23/1999	P1/b(1), b(2)
007. cable	Phone No. (Partial) (1 page)	09/23/1999	P6/b(6)
008. cable	Phone No. (Partial) (1 page)	09/23/1999	P6/b(6)
009. cable	re: NATO Informal Defense Ministerial Session 9/21/1999: Kosovo lessons learned (10 pages)	09/24/1999	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: NATO Informal Defense Ministerial Session 9/21/1999: Balkans: Political and Strategic questions (13 pages)	09/24/1999	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: Meeting of key allied political directors September 21 and 23 (9 pages)	09/27/1999	P1/b(1)
012. cable	Phone No. (Partial) (1 page)	09/30/1999	P6/b(6)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Cables  
 Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([General Clark])  
 OA/Box Number: 530000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[09/02/1999-09/30/1999]

2006-0325-F  
 bm356

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHPSA0045 2571617-CCCC--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O 141617Z SEP 99  
 LINE4: FM USOFFICE PRISTINA  
 OSRI: RUEHPS  
 DTG: 141617Z SEP 99  
 ORIG: USOFFICE PRISTINA  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0016  
 INFO: RUEHZG/NATO EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE  
 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0011  
 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0011  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0011  
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0038  
 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0011  
 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0011  
 SUBJ: KLA AND KFOR STILL AT ODDS OVER KOSOVO CORPS

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
 Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VZ NARA, Date 12/21/2023

2023-0727-w (1.06)

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRISTINA 000045

E.O. 12958: DECL 09/14/04  
 TAGS: PREL, SR  
 SUBJECT: KLA AND KFOR STILL AT ODDS OVER KOSOVO CORPS

REF: PRISTINA 0013 (NOTAL)

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING CHIEF OF MISSION PATRICK MOON. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. ~~(S)~~ DURING HIS MEETING WITH UCK CHIEF OF STAFF CEKU ON SEPTEMBER 13, SACEUR GENERAL CLARK STRESSED NATO REDLINES ON THE KOSOVO CORPS. IN PARTICULAR, CLARK SAID THERE WAS NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS (2,000 OF WHICH 200 COULD BE OUT OF THE UCK ARSENAL), THE SINGLE RAPID REACTION UNIT (UNARMED) AND THE SIZE OF THE CORPS (3,000 ACTIVE DUTY AND 2,000 RESERVISTS).
3. ~~(S)~~ ACCORDING TO KFOR SOURCES, GENERAL CEKU WAS SO CONCERNED BY CLARK'S PRESENTATION THAT HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A MEETING WITH GENERAL JACKSON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 13. IN THAT MEETING, A SEEMINGLY DESPERATE CEKU SAID THAT HE HAD MADE PROMISES TO "HIS PEOPLE" AND HAD TO DELIVER. OTHERWISE, HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE HIS POSITION IN THE UCK. CEKU STRESSED THAT EACH MEMBER OF THE RAPID REACTION UNITS WOULD NEED TO BE ARMED. HE FORSAW A CENTRAL RAPID REACTION UNIT AND ONE FOR EACH OF THE CORPS SECTORS. CEKU ASKED FOR JACKSON'S HELP IN OBTAINING THESE CHANGES. ACCORDING TO KFOR, JACKSON ALSO KEPT TO A HARDLINE WITH CEKU, GIVING NO GROUND. HE SAID THAT HIS HANDS WERE TIED BY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN ON THE CORPS.  
FURTHER, THE 2,000/200 WEAPONS LIMITS WERE FIXED. CEKU LEFT  
FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS SUBORDINATES AND WAS DUE  
TO MEET WITH JACKSON'S DEPUTY, UK GENERAL RIDGEWAY, ON  
SEPTEMBER 14.

4. (S) KFOR INFORMS US THAT THEY HAVE MADE PROGRESS WITH  
THE UCK ON THE WORDING OF THE ID DOCUMENT BUT DID NOT  
PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE END  
KFOR MAY BE FLEXIBLE ON CEKU'S DEMAND TO INCREASE THE SIZE  
OF THE CORPS TO 5,500 PEOPLE. (FYI: JACKSON IS EXPECTED TO  
TRAVEL TO GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 14 FOR SEVERAL DAYS AS PART  
OF THE TRANSITION OF KFOR HQS TO LANDCENT.)

5. (U) ON UNIFORMS, WE UNDERSTAND FROM KFOR THAT FRANCE  
WILL PROVIDE 11,000 PAIRS OF GREEN UTILITY SHIRTS AND PANTS  
FOR THE CORPS BY SEPTEMBER 16. FRANCE WILL NOT PROVIDE ANY  
OTHER UNIFORM ITEMS. THE U.S. IS STILL EXPECTED TO PROVIDE  
A "CLASS B" UNIFORM AND OTHER RELATED ITEMS.

MOON

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0045

TOR: 990914130800 M4047285

DIST:

SIT: ALLEN BELL BENJAMIN BINNENDIJK BRODY BUSBY DAVIDSON FLANAGAN  
GUARNIERI HAMMER HOLTZAPPLE KAIDANOW KAUFMAN MCLEAN SAPIRO STROMSETH  
VACCARO VONLIPSEY  
SIT: NSC  
PRT: NOTE