

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1633				
Document ID: 9705112				
Stack: V	Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 5	Position: 1

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. letter</del>	<del>Prime Minister Tony Blair to President William J. Clinton re: the Middle East Peace Process (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/21/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 11/6/2025</del>
<del>001b. letter</del>	<del>Prime Minister Tony Blair to President William J. Clinton re: the Middle East Peace Process [duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/21/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 11/6/2025</del>
<del>002a. letter</del>	<del>Prime Minister Tony Blair to President William J. Clinton re: the Middle East Peace Process [duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/21/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 11/6/2025</del>
<del>002b. letter</del>	<del>Prime Minister Tony Blair to President William J. Clinton re: the Middle East Peace Process [duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/21/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 11/6/2025</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Blair])  
 OA/Box Number: 1633

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9705112

2023-0897-M

kh2065

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
  
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9705112

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PETERS  
001  
001 COUNTRYMAN  
001  
001

Z 97072312 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER  
Z 97072410 ACTION TRANSFERRED  
Z 97072410 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER  
Z 97080409 NFAR PER COUNTRYMAN  
X 97080418 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO



5112

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 July 1997

Dear Bill,

As you may have heard, I met President Arafat in London at the beginning of last week. I have also spoken recently to Ehud Barak, King Hussein and Prime Minister Hariri. These conversations have left me very concerned that we may be heading towards a new crisis in the Middle East.

The deadlock on the Palestinian track appears very serious. I am struck in particular by the absence of trust between the two sides. Arafat has little confidence that Netanyahu will keep his word – and this view is clearly widely shared in the Arab world. The stalemate is meanwhile undermining Arafat's position. Swift and decisive action may be needed to prevent a dangerous deterioration and a renewed explosion of violence.

Although there have been encouraging developments in security co-operation and in the talks between Yitsak Mordechai and Nabil Sha'ath on confidence-building measures, I am concerned that the situation will remain very fragile unless Netanyahu offers a substantial pause in settlement building. Yasser Arafat expressed with great feeling the depth of Palestinian frustration and his real concern that, by the time final status talks resume, there will be nothing left to negotiate. I fear that the further redeployment of Israeli troops from areas of the West Bank due in early September could prove to be a flashpoint.

Photocopy Misc. Handwriting

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- 2 -

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I would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you how we might move things forward. We need to find a way to persuade Netanyahu to shift from his present position. We must also bolster Yasser Arafat, while ensuring he does everything in his power to urge restraint and prevent violence. He made a strong pitch in London for more EU action, including some form of economic pressure on Israel. It is a line he seems certain to repeat - and it will find an echo in some quarters. Personally, I do not believe any such thing would work. The trick is rather to exert constructive pressure that will encourage Netanyahu to move forward, rather than force him into more extreme positions, as well as acting on Arafat too. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that a US-led initiative to break the deadlock is going to be needed.

I am particularly anxious that the EU and US should act in concert. This will maximise the chances of success. Perhaps we could have a word on the telephone about this in the next few days.

It is difficult to gauge the seriousness of all this but certainly people are saying & believing it is very serious  
yours  
true

The President of the United States of America

Tommy



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your cue

The President of the United States of America

Tony

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9705112  
RECEIVED: 23 JUL 97 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BLAIR, TONY

DOC DATE: 21 JUL 97  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN HS  
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

ACTION: N FAR PER COUNTRYMAN DUE DATE: 04 AUG 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: COUNTRYMAN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: KBH, NARA, Date 6/26/2024  
2023-0897-17

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PETERS  
001  
001 COUNTRYMAN  
001

Z 97072312 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER  
Z 97072410 ACTION TRANSFERRED  
Z 97072410 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER  
X 97080409 NFAR PER COUNTRYMAN

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STAFF OFFICER: PETERS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION  
PETERS

*Countryman*

FOR CONCURRENCE  
COUNTRYMAN

*Peters*

FOR INFO


- BEERS
- BUSBY
- MALLEY
- MARTY
- MILLISON
- RIEDEL
- VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

*NFA R - Answered in POTUS  
Phone Conversation*

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1



PLEASE STAFF



British Embassy  
Washington

5112

22 July 1997

The Honorable  
Samuel R Berger  
National Security Adviser to the President  
Room 1/WW  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington D.C. 20500

3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202) 588-6512  
Facsimile: (202) 588-7870

*From the Ambassador*

*Dear Sandy,*

I should be grateful if you would pass to the President  
the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister about the Middle East  
Peace Process.

*Yours ever,  
John Kerr*

John Kerr

JUL 23 11:33



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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
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Washington

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Washington D.C. 20500

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