

Cable

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 SUBJ: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF KOSOVO

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
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TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAJURO 0301

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING

HALPERIN, EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROTH, EAP/DAS BOYCE,
 EAP/RSP AND EAP/ANP
 CINCPAC FOR CINC BLAIR AND FPA AMBASSADOR TWINNING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/09
 TAGS: PREL RMI
 SUBJECT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF KOSOVO

REF: A) STATE 120220, B) MAJURO 0165

CLASSIFIED BY JOAN M. PLAISTED, AMBASSADOR
 REASON: 1.5(B) AND (D)

1. KOSOVO'S MEANING FOR THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHAL ISLANDS (RMI) ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT OF SUPPORT WITH UNUSUAL SPEED FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (REFTEL). THE RMI GOVERNMENT SAW THE AIR STRIKES AS "NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PREVENT A WIDER CONFLICT IN THE REGION; DETER FURTHER SERB AGGRESSION ON INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN KOSOVO; AND DEGRADE YUGOSLAVIA'S MILITARY CAPACITY TO DO FURTHER HARM TO THE INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION IN KOSOVO." KOSOVO IS SEEN AS AN INDICATION OF AMERICAN MIGHT IN THIS COUNTRY FOR WHOSE DEFENSE AND SECURITY THE UNITED

STATES IS RESPONSIBLE. ONE COULD SEE THIS AS SIGNALLING A BETTER CHANCE THE US WOULD COME TO THE MARSHALL ISLANDERS RESCUE, IF EVER NEEDED, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO ENEMY OR THREAT TODAY.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID RAISE THE ISSUE OF CONSISTENCY WITH ME, ASKING WHY THE UNITED STATES DID NOT INTERVENE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS IN SOMOLIA, RWANDA, AND ELSEWHERE. NO ONE HAS YET MENTIONED A EUROCENTRIC FEAR, ALTHOUGH THE PACIFIC ISLANDERS IN GENERAL, FEEL AMERICA IS IGNORING THEM. A PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT WITH THE ISLAND LEADERS WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO SHOW US INTEREST.

THE RMI HAS A GREAT RECORD OF SUPPORTING US ACTIONS. THEY RANK FOURTH (ABOVE THE UNITED KINGDOM) IN TERMS OF VOTING CONSISTENCY WITH US IN THE UNITED NATIONS' GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WHILE THERE IS NO DIRECT EXPECTATION OF A PAYOFF FOR THEIR SUPPORT OVER KOSOVO, THE TOP LEADERSHIP FIRMLY MAINTAINS THE US OWES THEM IN GENERAL (FOR OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP, THE CONTINUED USE OF THE KWAJALEIN MISSILE TESTING AND SPACE TRACKING RANGE, FOR COMPENSATION FOR THE 1946-1958 NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED ON BIKINI AND ELSEWHERE, FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF A NEGLECTED FORMER TRUST TERRITORY). KOSOVO IS A MINOR ADDITION TO THEIR ARSENAL TO TRY TO EXTRACT MORE MONEY FROM THE UNITED STATES.

THE LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR US-RMI RELATIONS ARE WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF THEATER AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT AND A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE. WILL NATIONS SEEK MORE ADVANCED ARMS TO GUARANTEE THEY DON'T BECOME LIKE SERBIA, DEFENSELESS AGAINST NATO? I BELIEVE NATIONS WILL SEEK ARMS IRRESPECTIVE OF KOSOVO. BUT WITH THE NEW ESTIMATES ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT, IN PARTICULAR FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN, NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IS NOW CLOSER TO BECOMING ANOTHER INTEGRAL PART OF OUR STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION, AS UNDERSECRETARY DESIGNATE JOHN HOLUM RECENTLY TESTIFIED. WILL THE RUSSIAN'S IRE OVER KOSOVO MAKE THEIR AGREEMENT TO NEEDED ANTIBALLISTIC-MISSILE TREAT AMENDMENTS MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN? ALL THIS WILL AFFECT FUTURE TESTS CONDUCTED IN KWAJALEIN AND THE PRICE THE RMI HOPES TO EXTRACT FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR CONTINUED OR EXPANDED USE OF THE MISSILE RANGE.

IN TRUTH, HOW DID THE MARSHALL ISLANDS REALLY SEE THE CONFLICT? THE CAPITAL AND OTHER ISLANDS RAN OUT OF RICE (BECAUSE IMPORTERS NEGLECTED TO INCREASE ORDERS AFTER THE US SUPPLIED FEMA DISASTER ASSISTANCE FREE RICE SHIPMENTS ENDED). PEOPLE HERE WERE WORRIED THE CONFLICT WOULD TAKE ALL THE WORLD'S SHIPS AND THERE WOULD BE NO FOOD SHIPMENTS FOR THEM.

2. KOSOVO'S MEANING FOR THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ORDER

EUROCENTRIC FOCUS

KOSOVO COULD BE SEEN AS ONE MORE INDICATION OF AMERICA'S EUROCENTRIC FOCUS. LET'S NOT IGNORE THE NEAR EAST AND ASIA

WHERE, I BELIEVE, THE REAL 21ST CENTURY PROBLEMS ARE. FOR STARTERS: LET'S WORRY ABOUT IRAN, IRAQ, INDIA PAKISTAN, AND NORTH KOREA BUILDING VERY SERIOUS NUCLEAR AND OTHER FORCES. LET'S NOT IGNORE ASIAN DYNAMISM, BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A TEMPORARY BLIP. OUR 100,000 TROOP COMMITMENT TO ASIA WON'T LAST LONG INTO THE NEXT CENTURY.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY STRATEGY:

1) KOSOVO MAY HAVE RAISED UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS. AS SECRETARY ALBRIGHT HAS SAID, THE FACT THAT "OUR MILITARY IS THE BEST" HAS JUST BEEN RECONFIRMED. THIS MAY RESULT IN A SIMPLISTIC CONCLUSION: LET'S JUST SMART BOMB THE NEXT CRISIS AREA AND AVOID US CASUALTIES. SOME STRATEGISTS MAY QUESTION WHY WE NEED 100,000 TROOPS IN ASIA WHEN WE CAN DO THIS WITH SMART BOMBS. ON THE PLUS SIDE, THE EXPERIENCE BUILT UP BY THE GULF WAR AND NOW THE KOSOVO CRISIS HAS STRENGTHENED US FORCES READINESS POSTURE (BUT HAS DEPLETED SOME SUPPLIES). AS CLAUSEWITZ NOTES, THE HA ? OF THE ARMY TO WAR HELPS TO OVERCOME THE FRICTION OF WAR.

2) KOSOVO, A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT, MAY KEEP US FROM PREPARING FOR FUTURE THREATS, BE THEY FROM NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, OR BALLISTIC AND THEATER MISSILES. WE MUST BE ALERT NOT TO ALWAYS FIGHT THE LAST WAR. THERE WILL BE NO MORE EASY VICTORIES. OUR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OF SMART WEAPONS WILL BE NULLIFIED. IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL A SCUD WILL HIT ONE OF OUR MILITARY BASES, EMBASSIES OR CITIES (AND THE IMPORTANCE OF KWAJALEIN, WHERE WE CAN CONDUCT TESTS, WILL SKYROCKET OVERNIGHT). IF PAUL BRACKEN IN "FIRE IN THE EAST" IS RIGHT, IN ASIA THE CONTEST IS SHAPING UP BETWEEN THE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES OF THE WEST (MORE ACCURATE CRUISE MISSILES, FASTER TANKS, BETTER COMMUNICATIONS) AND THE DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES OR ASIA (NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE BUILDUP, CHINA'S SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE TERM BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM, INDIA'S SMALL NUCLEAR BOMBS, IRAQ'S GERM WARFARE PROGRAM). WITH SHORT AND LONG RANGE MISSILES, AMERICA'S FORWARD BASES COULD BECOME LIKE THE CRUSADERS' FORTS OF OLD -- HEAVILY DEFENDED, ISOLATED OUTPOSTS WITH LITTLE EFFECT BEYOND THEIR IMMEDIATE PERIMETER. AS MORE COUNTRIES DEVELOP MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, THIS NOT ONLY TURNS AMERICA'S ASIAN BASES INTO HOSTAGES, BUT ALSO INHIBITS U.S. POWER PROJECTIONS IN THE WHOLE PACIFIC BASIN.

3) KOSOVO RAISES EXPECTATIONS FOR FUTURE US/NATO INTERVENTION OUTSIDE OF NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS. IT ALSO RAISES EXPECTATIONS WE WILL INTERVENE IN FUTURE HUMANITARIAN CONFLICTS. IT WILL BE HARDER TO AVERT OUR EYES FROM THE MOUNTING CRISIS IN SOMALIA.

4) KOSOVO RAISES THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEDIA AND NEWS NOT GETTING INTO A CONFLICT AREA. THE EDITOR OF BELGRADE'S MOST IMPORTANT INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER WAS SHOT IN THE BROAD DAYLIGHT IN EARLY APRIL. NOW THAT YUGOSLAVIA IS OPENING UP, WE ARE SEEING THE RESULTS IN DEMONSTRATIONS.

INSTEAD OF ANOTHER BOMBER, COULDN'T WE JUST BUY EVERYONE LAPTOPS WITH INTERNET ACCESS? IMAGINE HOW QUICKLY BURMA WOULD OPEN UP OR HOW THE TRUE STORY OF TIANAMEN WOULD HAVE GOTTEN OUT (AND IN) IN 1989. "LET THEM HAVE LAPTOPS," AS MARIE ANTOINETTE MIGHT HAVE SAID TODAY. THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES IN HONOLULU IS LOOKING FOR WAYS FOR THEIR STUDENTS FROM ALL AROUND ASIA TO KEEP THEIR CLASSROOM LAPTOP COMPUTERS. THIS WOULD BE MONEY WELL SPENT, WITH POSSIBLE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY IN THE REGION.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

I'M SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE COST OF REBUILDING YUGOSLAVIA. THE US EXPECTATION IS THAT THE EUROPEANS WILL CARRY THE BURDEN, BUT THE COSTS WILL BE IMMENSE. WHAT IF MILOSEVIC IS REMOVED, AS APPEARS INCREASINGLY PROBABLE? WHAT WOULD IT COST THE US TAXPAYER AND WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT ON THE US ECONOMY? WOULD BILLIONS FOR THE FRY MEAN LESS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, MEDICARE AND EDUCATION?

IMPLICATONS FOR INTELLIGENCE POLICY

ARE WE CREATING ANOTHER LEGEND IN HIS OWN TIME A LA FIDEL AND SADDAM BY PERSONALIZING THE CONFLICT SO MUCH? WILL MILOSEVIC BE ANOTHER LONG-TERM PROBLEM LIKE CASTRO AND HUSSEIN, OUTLASTING ALL US PRESIDENTS? I DOUBT IT, SINCE THE FORCES FOR CHANGE APPEAR MUCH STRONGER IN YUGOSLAVIA. BUT IT IS SOMETHING TO WATCH OUT FOR. CLAUSEWITZ SAW WAR WAGES BY "A REMARKABLE TRINITY" OF THE GOVERNMENT, ARMED SERVICES, AND PEOPLE. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND EVEN SOME OF THE ARMED FORCES IS LACKING IN YUGOSLAVIA.

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IF THE PROBLEM WAS MILOSEVIC ALL ALONG, WHY ARE WE ONLY NOW COMING OUT WITH PLANS TO TOPPLE HIM? SHOULD WE CONSIDER OVERTURNING THE NO ASSASSINATION RULE WHEN SOME 40,000 HAVE DIED LARGELY FOR THE SAKE OF ONE MISGUIDED MAN? WHAT IF GERMANY WERE TO SPROUT ANOTHER HITLER? WOULD WE AGAIN BOMB BERLIN? I'M NOT SUGGESTING WE ASSASSINATE ANYONE AT THIS LATE DATE. BUT WE SHOULD REPEAL THIS RULE THAT ONLY SIGNALS TO DEMONIC LEADERS AN INHERENT WEAKNESS IN OUR OVERALL STRATEGY. IT'S AS IF WE HAD SIGNED UP TO A "NO FIRST USE" PLEDGE. WHY SIGNAL TO THE ENEMY ANY LIMITATIONS IN ONE'S STRATEGY?

IMPLICATIONS FOR EMBASSY SECURITY

US/NATO ACTIONS RESULTED IN ATTACKS ON OUR EMBASSIES AS WIDESPREAD AS MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, DAMASCUS, SKOPJE, AND TORONTO. WE NEED TO INCREASE EXPENDITURES DRAMATICALLY AS RECOMMENDED BY ADMIRAL CROWE AND HIS TASK FORCE. AS HE HAS STATED, "WE OWE THEM (THE MEN AND WOMEN IN OUR FOREIGN SERVICE) THE SAME PROTECTION AND SECURITY THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES RECEIVE, ESPECIALLY WHEN WE REFLECT THAT MORE AMBASSADORS THAN GENERALS AND ADMIRALS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN SERVICE SINCE WORLD WAR II." FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS ARE OFTEN IN THE MINORITY IN OUR EMBASSIES. THE PEOPLE WE ALSO NEED TO PROTECT ARE FROM ALL USG AGENCIES AND FOREIGN SERVICE NATIONALS. KOSOVO HAS AGAIN EXPOSED OUR

VULNERABILITY.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA
LET'S NOT GO OVERBOARD TRYING TO PLEASE OR PLACATE CHINA TO
MAKE UP FOR BOMBING THEIR EMBASSY, ALBEIT A REAL TRAGEDY.
I WAS SURPRISED BY THE HIGH LEVEL OF ANXIETY IN WASHINGTON
(STATE, USTR) TO FINALIZE THE WTO AGREEMENT. SUDDENLY IT'S
THE UNITED STATES, NOT CHINA, WHO IS PUSHING HARDEST TO
CONCLUDE THE AGREEMENT. I HOPE/ASSUME WE ARE GETTING A
COMMERCIALLY VIABLE DEAL. WE HAVE TO JUDGE CHINA IN TERMS
OF US NATIONAL INTEREST.

I PERSONALLY AM MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT ON OUR
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, BUT HERE I DEFER TO YOU, THE DEPUTY
SECRETARY, THE EXPERT, AND WOULD HESITATE TO MAKE
PREDICTIONS ABOUT THIS HARD-TO-TRAIN, UNPREDICTABLE BEAR.
WE'VE SEEN THE DANGEROUS RESENTMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
GENERALS, WHO MAY BE ASKING: COULD A NATO THAT HELPED THE
KOSOVARs BREAK AWAY FROM SERBIA ALSO HELP THE CHECHENS OR
OTHERS SPLIT FROM RUSSIA.
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THE BOTTOM LINE: WE WON. WHAT NEXT?
HAVE WE SOWN THE SEEDS FOR WORLD WAR III OR CREATED A MORE
HUMANITARIAN WORLD? WHAT IF WE HAD NOT INTERVENED? THE US
AND NATO WOULD BE PORTRAYED AS WEAK. OUR CREDIBILITY WAS
AT STAKE, IN PART BECAUSE WE HAD MADE IT SO. NO ONE IS
ACCUSING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF BEING A "PAPER
TIGER" THESE DAYS. THE OLD CHINESE CURSE, "MAY YOU LIVE IN
INTERESTING TIMES," DESCRIBES THE FUTURE: FUNDAMENTAL
CLASHES OF RELIGION, ETHNICITY, IDEOLOGICAL POLITICS, AND
FERVENT NATIONALISM. AND OUR RATIONAL LEADERS SHOULD HEED
CLAUSEWITZ ON THE ROLES OF UNCERTAINTY AND CHANCE.
PLAISTED

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

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