

Case Number: 2024-0297-M

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 149				
Document ID: 9303681				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of Russia (6 pages)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/6/2025
001b. memcon	Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of Russia; incomplete draft (14 pages)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 11/6/2025

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Kozyrev and Memcon])
 OA/Box Number: 149

FOLDER TITLE:

9303681

2024-0297-M

kh2067

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 22 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: KOZYREV, ANDREI

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES CONVERSATION W/ FORMIN KOZYREV

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 25 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GATI

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
GATI
SIGLER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH	Z 93052410 FOR DECISION
001	X 93052410 ITOH APPROVED RECOM
002	X 93052410 ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
------------	-------------	----------------------------	--------------------------

002	930522	GROSSMAN, M	
-----	--------	-------------	--

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: VA LOG # 3681
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
<i>bck</i> ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>VE</u>	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>JUL 5/22</u>	<u>D</u> <i>with d</i>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>JUSTICE</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

Ex Sec has diskette.
 21 MAY 95 10:13

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9303681
DATE 22 MAY 93

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES CONVERSATION W/ FORMIN KOZYREV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 8/14/2024
2024-0297-17

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3681

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: TOBY T. GATTI *TG*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Foreign Minister
Kozyrev

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President, Secretary Christopher, Anthony Lake and Foreign Minister Kozyrev which took place on May 21, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By *KBH* NARA, Date *8/16/2024*
2024-0297-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3681

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Conversation with
Foreign Minister Kozyrev

Please distribute the attached Memorandum of Conversation EYES
ONLY to the Secretary. Also, the memorandum should be sent to
Embassy Moscow for Ambassador Tom Pickering only via NODIS cable.



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRH NARA, Date 8/16/2024
2024-0297-m

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2024-0297-m (12/10/2024)
KBH (1.01)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev
of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Toby T. Gati, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Russian,
Ukraine and Eurasian States, NSC Staff
(Notetaker)
Peter Afanasenko, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of Russia

DATE, TIME May 21, 1993, 8:40 - 9:30am
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office, West Wing

CONVERSATION BETWEEN ANDREI KOZYREV, WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND TONY LAKE

Secretary Christopher: If all proceeds well, then following the Hurd meeting, FM Kozyrev's trip to the UN, and discussions with Juppe, it may be possible to get a statement issued. The initial British reaction is that the paper drafted yesterday represents a good start. FM Kozyrev had earlier raised the question of including the Spaniards in the preliminary discussions. Should this be done? (S)

FM Kozyrev: Dealing with the Spaniards is no problem. The "Yugoslav 5" exists and it is established practice to include Spain. I will personally deal with them. If the Spaniards are included, it will be easier to deal with the rest of the Security Council, since they are seen as a bridge between the P-5 and the non-P-5. (S)

Mr. Lake: This will only be a problem if it becomes a precedent for all future consultations. Can we include them only this one time? (S)

FM Kozyrev: We will be flexible on this. If we exclude Spain it will create a negative reaction. Including them has no cost. (S)

Secretary Christopher: I will talk to Hurd about this. (S)

Mr. Lake: How should we plan to issue the statement? (S)

Secretary Christopher: We will meet and plan to issue it tomorrow. The French will probably want to make some changes. If all of the P-4 are there, it will give added force to the press release. Meanwhile, there is fighting going on in several places. (S)

FM Kozyrev. This is why gradual implementation makes sense. There is no one center of authority. If Karadzic signs the agreement, this does not mean that every local commander will obey. It is important to make arrangements on site, province by province, to establish a modus vivendi based on local agreements. Under present circumstances, a national agreement does not mean much. (S)

Secretary Christopher: This is evident in Croatia. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Absolutely. (U)

Mr. Lake: We will have to address Croatian fighting too. We have been focusing mainly on Macedonia and Kosovo. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Churkin did some negotiations with Krajina. This is important because there are more refugees (Serbs) in Croatia than Croat refugees throughout the area. The refugee problem is creating problems for Croatia too. It will be years before the situation calms down. (S)

Mr. Lake: It will be very hard to deal with the vendettas that are now being created. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Both Tudjman and Izetbegovic are accusing the other of violating the agreements. Tudjman says there are no Croatian soldiers involved, just like Milosevic said last year that there were no Yugoslav soldiers involved in the fighting. After I went to the region last year, I asked Milosevic to call Mladic and remove him. Mladic is a good general, but a bad politician; he lives in a fantasy world, fighting with German tactics from the First World War in the belief that he is defending all Slavs. I told him not to concern himself with defending Russian national interests -- Russia can take care of itself. (S)

Mr. Lake: The weight of history is very great in that region. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Past and present are all mixed up. Each side lives in the past, bringing up events of decades and centuries ago to support their view. The truth is that each side is responsible for thousands of massacres. This is true in Serbia, it is true in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Tajikistan. (S)

Secretary Christopher: One of America's advantages is certainly in being a new society. (U)

Secretary Christopher: What do the changes in Ukraine mean? (S)

FM Kozyrev: We will have to wait and see. Kuchma has made a good impression because he sounds more realistic and has some experience in the economy. It will be very difficult to sort out what is happening. All the actors are known to Russia because most of them are former communists. Kravchuk, for example, served in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the nationalists, many of whom also consider themselves Ukrainian democrats, are not playing a constructive role. It is hard to work with the democrats because they are so nationalistic. It is the democrats/nationalists who are for keeping nuclear weapons. Mr. Lake is correct that Kravchuk's move to assume extraordinary powers is welcomed by those not too eager for reform. There is a strange combination of neo-Communists and nationalists working together. The situation is now unpredictable. This is true partly because almost no one in Ukraine has a clear political orientation -- the motives for struggle are unclear, probably reflecting more of a classic power struggle than a fight over principled positions. (S)

The most important issue in Ukraine is nonproliferation. Ukraine interprets the American desire for better relations as a signal that the U.S. is removing the pressure in the nuclear area. This is very clear, and very dangerous. The Ukrainians can if they wish solve the technical problems associated with control of nuclear weapons rather soon. (S)

Mr. Lake: The United States has shifted its tactics, having come to the conclusion that a hard line position on nuclear weapons was increasing Ukrainian insecurity and playing into the hands of the nationalists. At the same time, we are making clear that there is no backing off the nuclear issue. (S)

DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, MINISTER KOZYREV, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND TONY LAKE

The President: Welcome. I am glad to see you again. (U)

FM Kozyrev: Best regards from President Yeltsin. After Vancouver, he, as you, is engaged in domestic politics, particularly in finding ways to deal with the Soviet-style Parliament. It is clear now that it is impossible to deal with them. The main issue is to approve the Constitution, knowing full well that the present Parliament won't vote itself out of existence. (S)

The most likely course of action is for a new referendum to be held in late September. The problem will be to get an absolute majority of the electoral vote. If that proves impossible, and Yeltsin can only get a regular majority, then he may decide to issue a decree to make the Constitution provisional until new elections can take place. Then the newly-elected Parliament can

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

vote on the Constitution. It is very difficult to overcome the present constitution because the present Parliament won't approve a reasonable new Constitution. (S)

The President: It is a vicious circle. (S)

FM Kozyrev. Yes. The only way is to go to the people, whether through the referendum or through new elections. Perhaps the President can use the Constitutional Assembly [called for June 5] to declare that Russia has a new Constitution. But he can do this only if public opinion will see the Assembly as a legitimate body. (S)

This crisis will be overcome by the end of the year. It is the last crisis in creating a post-Communist democratic state, the last struggle with the legacy of the Soviet system. It is Yeltsin's hope that the old system will be crushed by the end of the year. (S)

As to the economic situation, it is still difficult. Yeltsin is trying to get control over the Central Bank and to establish financial discipline. In his letter to you, Mr. President, he outlined Russia's immediate needs in this field. It is good that there is constant contact between the two Presidents. (S)

The President: I admire what you are doing and am encouraged by it. We will do what we say, proceeding with the Vancouver package and getting the G-7 to contribute to the Privatization Fund. We will push ahead. (S)

FM Kozyrev: We look forward to the G-7 Summit. (U)

The President: What should we do about Bosnia? (S)

FM Kozyrev: There is no magic wand. Instead, we must explore opportunities that exist and work on a plan of action that includes the establishment of security zones. But even here, we must be careful, because things will be perceived in different ways by different leaders. For example, Izetbegovic was willing to support strengthened security zones only in the context of the Vance-Owen plan because he feared the creation of Bantustan-like ghettos. (S)

The important point is not to let Milosevic off the hook. Milosevic has aligned himself with Vance-Owen while Karadzic has rejected it. Milosevic is unlikely to accept this "no" because it sets a bad precedent. Milosevic said that he is the Serbian leader and only he can decide what is good for the Serbs. He will not allow Karadzic to assume the role as nationalist leader of the Serbs. Concern is, however, also growing about the development of a more hardline position in Serbia and in Montenegro. (S)

If Milosevic supports Vance-Owen, it does not mean that he will not cheat later on. Each side cheats whenever it has the chance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

German Minister Kinkel has said that he will exercise influence on the Croats to keep them in line. (S)

There are two things that are of key importance: (1) to keep outside pressing on so as to pin the Serbs down and get them to accept our position and (2) to try to make some progress on the local level in the provinces. Everything in Yugoslavia is area specific. It is not true that the national leaders -- all of whom are illegitimate -- can enforce accords on the local level. Therefore a promising path to follow is to create in each province a mechanism, including peacekeepers and monitors with safeguards for their security. This is the essence of the Russian idea of "gradual installments of peace," of progressive implementation of Vance-Owen. (S)

The Commander of UNPROFOR thinks that this approach has merit. Russia firmly believes that it is better to do something than to do nothing and that it is even better to combine our efforts. No one should exaggerate the possibilities for progress, but no one should think that the Russians are living in a world of illusions about what is possible. (S)

President Yeltsin wants joint initiatives along the lines that I and Secretary Secretary Christopher discussed. The British and French should be brought along as well. On Saturday, it is to be hoped that the P-4 declaration can be issued with the ten specific points outlined. The result is still unclear, but it will keep the pressure on and give some momentum to the talks. It would be tragic if an illegitimate referendum gives Karadzic the power to flatly reject all peace plans. If this were to happen, then the Bosnian Serbs would get their way, We ought never to agree to this. The proposed declaration will say: we do not take a "no" as a "no." Milosevic will press this line too. Yesterday, the Secretary and I were able to add a few points to widen Vance-Owen by agreeing to seal the borders, enhance the security zones, and expand humanitarian efforts. (S)

The President. Yes, we have to do something. If you solve the Bosnian problem, you will each receive the Nobel prize. (S)

In dropping by, I want to emphasize that we will proceed with plans between our two countries in all areas. Please give my best to President Yeltsin. (S)

FM Kozyrev. Thank you. Please remember that my problem is survival, not praise or the Nobel Prize. Russian nationalists are looking at the situation and thinking how to apply what is happening to the internal situation in Russia. But President Yeltsin will never bow to nationalist pressure at home. (S)

CONTINUATION OF CONVERSATION AFTER THE PRESIDENT LEAVES

Secretary Christopher: The summary provided by the Minister is very good. (S)

Mr. Lake: It is hopeful without being naive. (S)

~~SECRET~~

6

~~SECRET~~

FM Kozyrev: I know personally what cheating is, what it is to deal with the Serbian nomenclature. In this area of the world, you can't take anyone's word. You need not only special knowledge of the region as a Slav, but also an understanding of post-Soviet society. Nationalists and neo-Communists are easy to pick out but hard to deal with. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2024-0297-M (1.02)
KBH 12/10/2024

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Christopher: I will talk to Hurd about this. (S)

Mr. Lake: How should be plan to issue the statement? (S)

← we not
be

Secretary Christopher: We will meet and plan to issue it tomorrow. The French will probably want to make some changes. If all of the P-4 are there, it will give added force to the press release. Meanwhile, there is fighting going on in several places. (S)

FM Kozyrev. This is why gradual implementation makes sense. There is no one center of authority. If Karadzic signs the agreement, this does not mean that every local commander will obey. It is important to make arrangements on site, province by province, to establish a modus vivendi based on local agreements. Under present circumstances, a national agreement does not mean much. (S)

Secretary Christopher: This is evident in Croatia. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Absolutely. (U)

Mr. Lake: We will have to address Croatian fighting too. We have been focusing mainly on Macedonia and Kosovo. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Churkin did some negotiations with Krajina. This is important because there are more refugees (Serbs) in Croatia than Croat refugees throughout the area. The refugee problem is creating problems for Croatia too. It will be years before the situation calms down. (S)

Mr. Lake: It will be very hard to deal with the vendettas that are now being created. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Both Tudjman and Izetbegovic are accusing the other of violating the agreements. Tudjman says there are no Croatian soldiers involved, just like Milosevic said last year that there were no Yugoslav soldiers involved in the fighting. After I went to the region last year, I asked Milosevic to call Mladic and remove him. Mladic is a good general, but a bad politician; he lives in a fantasy world, fighting with German tactics from the First World War in the belief that he is defending all Slavs. I told him not to concern himself with defending Russian national interests -- Russia can take care of itself. (S)

Mr. Lake: The weight of history is very great in that region. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Past and present are all mixed up. Each side lives in the past, bringing up events of decades and centuries ago to support their view. The truth is that each side is responsible for thousands of massacres. This is true in Serbia, it is true in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Tadzhikistan. (S)

TADJIKISTAN
←

Secretary Christopher: One of America's advantages is certainly in being a new society. (U)

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

~~SECRET~~

← we not
| be

TAJIKISTAN
←

~~SECRET~~

2

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2024-0297-M (1.02)
(S) KBH 12/10/2024

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Christopher: I will talk to Hurd about this. (S)

Mr. Lake: How should be plan to issue the statement? (S)

Secretary Christopher: We will meet and plan to issue it tomorrow. The French will probably want to make some changes. If all of the P-4 are there, it will give added force to the press release. Meanwhile, there is fighting going on in several places. (S)

FM Kozyrev. This is why gradual implementation makes sense. There is no one center of authority. If Karadzic signs the agreement, this does not mean that every local commander will obey. It is important to make arrangements on site, province by province, to establish a modus vivendi based on local agreements. Under present circumstances, a national agreement does not mean much. (S)

Secretary Christopher: This is evident in Croatia. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Absolutely. (U)

Mr. Lake: We will have to address Croatian fighting too. We have been focusing mainly on Macedonia and Kosovo. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Churkin did some negotiations with Krajina. This is important because there are more refugees (Serbs) in Croatia than Croat refugees throughout the area. The refugee problem is creating problems for Croatia too. It will be years before the situation calms down. (S)

Mr. Lake: It will be very hard to deal with the vendettas that are now being created. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Both Tudjman and Izetbegovic are accusing the other of violating the agreements. Tudjman says there are no Croatian soldiers involved, just like Milosevic said last year that there were no Yugoslav soldiers involved in the fighting. After I went to the region last year, I asked Milosevic to call Mladic and remove him. Mladic is a good general, but a bad politician; he lives in a fantasy world, fighting with German tactics from the First World War in the belief that he is defending all Slavs. I told him not to concern himself with defending Russian national interests -- Russia can take care of itself. (S)

Mr. Lake: The weight of history is very great in that region. (S)

FM Kozyrev: Past and present are all mixed up. Each side lives in the past, bringing up events of decades and centuries ago to support their view. The truth is that each side is responsible for thousands of massacres. This is true in Serbia, it is true in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Tadzhikistan. (S)

Secretary Christopher: One of America's advantages is certainly in being a new society. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Christopher: What do the changes in Ukraine mean? (S)

FM Kozyrev: We will have to wait and see. Kuchma has made a good impression because he sounds more realistic and has some experience in the economy. It will be very difficult to sort out what is happening. All the actors are known to Russia because most of them are former communists. Kravchuk, for example, served in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the nationalists, many of whom also consider themselves Ukrainian democrats, are not playing a constructive role. It is hard to work with the democrats because they are so nationalistic. It is the democrats/nationalists who are for keeping nuclear weapons. Mr. Lake is correct that Kravchuk's move to assume extraordinary powers is welcomed by those not too eager for reform. There is a strange combination of neo-Communists and nationalists working together. The situation is now unpredictable. This is true partly because almost no one in Ukraine has a clear political orientation -- the motives for struggle are unclear, probably reflecting more of a classic power struggle than a fight over principled positions.

(S)

The most important issue in Ukraine in nonproliferation. Ukraine interprets the American desire for better relations as a signal that the U.S. is removing the pressure in the nuclear area. This is very clear, and very dangerous. The Ukrainians can if they wish solve the technical problems associated with control of nuclear weapons rather soon. (S)

← is

Mr. Lake: The United States has shifted its tactics, having come to the conclusion that a hard line position on nuclear weapons was increasing Ukrainian insecurity and playing into the hands of the nationalists. At the same time, we are making clear that there is no backing off the nuclear issue. (S)

DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, MINISTER KOZYREV, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND TONY LAKE

The President: Welcome. I am glad to see you again. (U)

FM Kozyrev: Best regards from President Yeltsin. After Vancouver, he, as you, is engaged in domestic politics, particularly in finding ways to deal with the Soviet-style Parliament. It is clear now that it is impossible to deal with them. The main issue is to approve the Constitution, knowing full well that the present Parliament won't vote itself out of existence. (S)

The most likely course of action is for a new referendum to be held in late September. The problem will be to get an absolute majority of the electoral vote. If that proves impossible, and Yeltsin can only get a regular majority, then he may decide to issue a decree to make the Constitution provisional until new elections can take place. Then the newly-elected Parliament can

← is —

Secretary Christopher: What do the changes in Ukraine mean? (S)

FM Kozyrev: We will have to wait and see. Kuchma has made a good impression because he sounds more realistic and has some experience in the economy. It will be very difficult to sort out what is happening. All the actors are known to Russia because most of them are former communists. Kravchuk, for example, served in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the nationalists, many of whom also consider themselves Ukrainian democrats, are not playing a constructive role. It is hard to work with the democrats because they are so nationalistic. It is the democrats/nationalists who are for keeping nuclear weapons. Mr. Lake is correct that Kravchuk's move to assume extraordinary powers is welcomed by those not too eager for reform. There is a strange combination of neo-Communists and nationalists working together. The situation is now unpredictable. This is true partly because almost no one in Ukraine has a clear political orientation -- the motives for struggle are unclear, probably reflecting more of a classic power struggle than a fight over principled positions. (S)

The most important issue *is* in Ukraine *is* nonproliferation. Ukraine interprets the American desire for better relations as a signal that the U.S. is removing the pressure in the nuclear area. This is very clear, and very dangerous. The Ukrainians can if they wish solve the technical problems associated with control of nuclear weapons rather soon. (S)

Mr. Lake: The United States has shifted its tactics, having come to the conclusion that a hard line position on nuclear weapons was increasing Ukrainian insecurity and playing into the hands of the nationalists. At the same time, we are making clear that there is no backing off the nuclear issue. (S)

DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, MINISTER KOZYREV, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND TONY LAKE

The President: Welcome. I am glad to see you again. (U)

FM Kozyrev: Best regards from President Yeltsin. After Vancouver, he, as you, is engaged in domestic politics, particularly in finding ways to deal with the Soviet-style Parliament. It is clear now that it is impossible to deal with them. The main issue is to approve the Constitution, knowing full well that the present Parliament won't vote itself out of existence. (S)

The most likely course of action is for a new referendum to be held in late September. The problem will be to get an absolute majority of the electoral vote. If that proves impossible, and Yeltsin can only get a regular majority, then he may decide to issue a decree to make the Constitution provisional until new elections can take place. Then the newly-elected Parliament can

~~REF~~

e on the Constitution. It is very difficult to overcome the present constitution because the present Parliament won't approve reasonable new Constitution. (S)

President: It is a vicious circle. (S)

Kozyrev. Yes. The only way is to go to the people, whether through the referendum or through new elections. Perhaps the president can use the Constitutional Assembly [called for June 5] to declare that Russia has a new Constitution. But he can do so only if public opinion will see the Assembly as a legitimate body. (S)

... this crisis will be overcome by the end of the year. It is the greatest crisis in creating a post-Communist democratic state, the greatest struggle with the legacy of the Soviet system. It is Yeltsin's hope that the old system will be crushed by the end of this year. (S)

... to the economic situation, it is still difficult. Yeltsin is trying to get control over the Central Bank and to establish financial discipline. In his letter to you, Mr. President, he outlined Russia's immediate needs in this field. It is good that there is constant contact between the two Presidents. (S)

President: I admire what you are doing and am encouraged by it. We will do what we say, proceeding with the Vancouver package and getting the G-7 to contribute to the Privatization Fund. We will push ahead. (S)

Kozyrev: We look forward to the G-7 Summit. (U)

President: What should we do about Bosnia? (S)

Kozyrev: There is no magic wand. Instead, we must explore opportunities that exist and work on a plan of action that includes the establishment of security zones. But even here, we must be careful, because things will be perceived in different ways by different leaders. For example, Izetbegovic was willing to support strengthened security zones only in the context of the Vance-Owen plan because he feared the creation of Bantustan-like enclaves. (S)

The important point is not to let Milosevic off the hook. Milosevic has aligned himself with Vance-Owen while Karadzic has rejected it. Milosevic is unlikely to accept this "no" because it sets a bad precedent. Milosevic said that he is the Serbian leader and only he can decide what is good for the Serbs. He will not allow Karadzic to assume the role as nationalist leader of the Serbs. Concern is, however, also growing about the development of a more hardline position in Serbia and in Montenegro. (S)

Milosevic supports Vance-Owen, it does not mean that he will not cheat later on. Each side cheats whenever it has the chance.

?? change
not change

~~SECRET~~

?? change
not change.

vote on the Constitution. It is very difficult to overcome the present constitution because the present Parliament won't approve a reasonable new Constitution. (S)

The President: It is a vicious circle. (S)

FM Kozyrev. Yes. The only way is to go to the people, whether through the referendum or through new elections. Perhaps the President can use the Constitutional Assembly [called for June 5] to declare that Russia has a new Constitution. But he can do this only if public opinion will see the Assembly as a legitimate body. (S)

This crisis will be overcome by the end of the year. It is the last crisis in creating a post-Communist democratic state, the last struggle with the legacy of the Soviet system. It is Yeltsin's hope that the old system will be crushed by the end of the year. (S)

As to the economic situation, it is still difficult. Yeltsin is trying to get control over the Central Bank and to establish financial discipline. In his letter to you, Mr. President, he outlined Russia's immediate needs in this field. It is good that there is constant contact between the two Presidents. (S)

The President: I admire what you are doing and am encouraged by it. We will do what we say, proceeding with the Vancouver package and getting the G-7 to contribute to the Privatization Fund. We will push ahead. (S)

FM Kozyrev: We look forward to the G-7 Summit. (U)

The President: What should we do about Bosnia? (S)

FM Kozyrev: There is no magic wand. Instead, we must explore opportunities that exist and work on a plan of action that includes the establishment of security zones. But even here, we must be careful, because things will be perceived in different ways by different leaders. For example, Izetbegovic was willing to support strengthened security zones only in the context of the Vance-Owen plan because he feared the creation of Bantustan-like ghettos. (S)

The important point is not to let Milosevic off the hook. Milosevic has aligned himself with Vance-Owen while Karadzic has rejected it. Milosevic is unlikely to accept this "no" because it sets a bad precedent. Milosevic said that he is the Serbian leader and only he can decide what is good for the Serbs. He will not allow Karadzic to assume the role as nationalist leader of the Serbs. Concern is, however, also growing about the development of a more hardline position in Serbia and in Montenegro. (S)

If Milosevic supports Vance-Owen, it does not mean that he will not cheat later on. Each side cheats whenever it has the change.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

German Minister Kinkel has said that he will exercise influence on the Croats to keep them in line. (S)

There are two things that are of key importance: (1) to keep outside pressing on so as to pin the Serbs down and get them to accept our position and (2) to try to make some process on the local level in the provinces. Everything in Yugoslavia is area specific. It is not true that the national leaders -- all of whom are illegitimate -- can enforce accords on the local level. Therefore a promising path to follow is to create in each province a mechanism, including peacekeepers and monitors with safeguards for their security. This is the essence of the Russian idea of "gradual installments of peace," of progressive implementation of Vance-Owen. (S)

?? Progress
not
process

The Commander of UNPROFOR thinks that this approach has merit. Russia firmly believes that it is better to do something than to do nothing and that it is even better to combine our efforts. No one should exaggerate the possibilities for progress, but no one should think that the Russians are living in a world of illusions about what is possible. (S)

President Yeltsin wants joint initiatives along the lines that I and Secretary Christopher discussed. The British and French should be brought along as well. On Saturday, it is to be hoped that the P-4 declaration can be issued with the ten specific points outlined. The result is still unclear, but it will keep the pressure on and give some momentum to the talks. It would be tragic if an illegitimate referendum give Karadzic the power to flatly reject all peace plans. If this were to happen, then the Bosnian Serbs would get their way. We ought never to agree to this. The proposed declaration will say: we do not take a "no" as a "no." Milosevic will press this line too. Yesterday, the Secretary and I were able to add a few points to widen Vance-Owen by agreeing to seal the borders, enhance the security zones, and expand humanitarian efforts. (S)

give S

The President. Yes, we have to do something. If you solve the Bosnian problem, you will each receive the Nobel Prize. (S)

In dropping by, I want to emphasize that we will proceed with plans between our two countries in all areas. Please give my best to President Yeltsin. (S)

FM Kozyrev. Thank you. Please remember that my problem is survival, not praise or the Nobel Prize. Russian nationalists are looking at the situation and thinking how to apply what is happening to the internal situation in Russia. But President Yeltsin will never bow to nationalist pressure at home. (S)

CONTINUATION OF CONVERSATION AFTER THE PRESIDENT LEAVES

Secretary Christopher: The summary provided by the Minister is very good. (S)

Mr. Lake: It is hopeful without being naive. (S)

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

?? Progress

not
process

egive S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

German Minister Kinkel has said that he will exercise influence on the Croats to keep them in line. (S)

There are two things that are of key importance: (1) to keep outside pressing on so as to pin the Serbs down and get them to accept our position and (2) to try to make some process on the local level in the provinces. Everything in Yugoslavia is area specific. It is not true that the national leaders -- all of whom are illegitimate -- can enforce accords on the local level. Therefore a promising path to follow is to create in each province a mechanism, including peacekeepers and monitors with safeguards for their security. This is the essence of the Russian idea of "gradual installments of peace," of progressive implementation of Vance-Owen. (S)

The Commander of UNPROFOR thinks that this approach has merit. Russia firmly believes that it is better to do something than to do nothing and that it is even better to combine our efforts. No one should exaggerate the possibilities for progress, but no one should think that the Russians are living in a world of illusions about what is possible. (S)

President Yeltsin wants joint initiatives along the lines that I and Secretary Christopher discussed. The British and French should be brought along as well. On Saturday, it is to be hoped that the P-4 declaration can be issued with the ten specific points outlined. The result is still unclear, but it will keep the pressure on and give some momentum to the talks. It would be tragic if an illegitimate referendum give Karadzic the power to flatly reject all peace plans. If this were to happen, then the Bosnian Serbs would get their way. We ought never to agree to this. The proposed declaration will say: we do not take a "no" as a "no." Milosevic will press this line too. Yesterday, the Secretary and I were able to add a few points to widen Vance-Owen by agreeing to seal the borders, enhance the security zones, and expand humanitarian efforts. (S)

The President. Yes, we have to do something. If you solve the Bosnian problem, you will each receive the Nobel Prize. (C)

In dropping by, I want to emphasize that we will proceed with plans between our two countries in all areas. Please give my best to President Yeltsin. (C)

FM Kozyrev. Thank you. Please remember that my problem is survival, not praise or the Nobel Prize. Russian nationalists are looking at the situation and thinking how to apply what is happening to the internal situation in Russia. But President Yeltsin will never bow to nationalist pressure at home. (S)

CONTINUATION OF CONVERSATION AFTER THE PRESIDENT LEAVES

Secretary Christopher: The summary provided by the Minister is very good. (C)

Mr. Lake: It is hopeful without being naive. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

FM Kozyrev: I know personally what cheating is, what it is to deal with the Serbian nomenclature. In this areas of the world, you can't take anyone's word. You need not only special knowledge of the region as a Slav, but also an understanding of post-Soviet society. Nationalists and neo-Communists are easy to pick out but hard to deal with. (S)

TITS AREA
← these
not
this

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

FM Kozyrev: I know personally what cheating is, what it is to deal with the Serbian nomenclature. In this areas of the world, you can't take anyone's word. You need not only special knowledge of the region as a Slav, but also an understanding of post-Soviet society. Nationalists and neo-Communists are easy to pick out but hard to deal with. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

	TMS	ARCA
these		S
not		
<u>this</u>]

Case Number: 2024-0297-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 165				
Document ID: 9307585				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev of Russia (5 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1) KBN 11/6/2025

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kozyrev and Memcon])
OA/Box Number: 165

FOLDER TITLE:

9307585

2024-0297-M

kh2068

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: ITOH

FROM: BEYRLE
BURNS

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: KOZYREV, ANDREI

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ RUSSIAN FOMIN KOZYREV 29 SEP

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 07 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE
BURNS
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
SIGLER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH
001

Z 93100408 FOR DECISION
X 93100608 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY WJY LOG # 7585
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>cm</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WJY</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

5 OCT 93 10:39
Exec Sec has diskette

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7585

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 4, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *NB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian Foreign
Minister Andrey Kozyrev

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the
President and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev which took
place in the Oval Office on September 29, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve ✓ *hau* Disapprove _____
to

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *8/16/2024*
2024-0297-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2024-0297-M (1.03)
KBH 12/10/2024

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States
Nicholas Burns, Senior Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff
John Beyrle, Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Andrey Kozyrev, Foreign Minister
Vladimir Lukin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Yuli Vorontsov, Permanent Representative to the UN
Sergei Krylov, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 29, 1993, 4:55 - 5:40pm
Oval Office

The President: We were just speculating on whether my popularity ratings would go up if I dissolved the U.S. Congress. We have this little problem of the U.S. Constitution, though. (U)

The Vice President: This is not a formal announcement. (U)

The President: This is a joke. (U)

The President: Tell me how things are in Russia. (U)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Things are complicated, but on track politically. There is a growing mood in favor of elections, growing support for the President. There are still some regional leaders who oppose him. The situation around the Russian White House is tense. There are still 150-300 deputies left inside -- less than a quorum. They are looking for trouble to justify their militant stance. Some of them -- many -- are negotiating with the government to get new jobs. Maybe half of them are waiting for some kind of miracle. There is real potential for

provocation. Three policemen have been killed already. The other side may feel that they need some casualties now, too.
(S)

The President has asked me to convey his gratitude for the immediate and resolute support for him you expressed. He has the firm intent to stick to his schedule for, first, parliamentary elections, and then later, elections for President. We need this timetable, with a six-month gap, to guarantee stability at the time of the Presidential elections. He also asked me to reiterate his firm decision to avoid any bloodshed or the use of force as much as possible, unless attacked. No storming of the Russian White House is planned. (S)

The President: What is your strategy now? Do you plan to negotiate with them? (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Yes, we have offered them good jobs. At least half of them are negotiating for these jobs. About one-third of the number originally inside have now left. (S)

The President: Well, I think the President has handled this as well as possible. The way things have turned out has vindicated the approach he took, the restraint he has shown. It makes it a lot easier for us to offer unqualified support -- for the world to offer its support. This kind of restraint helps build support. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: We don't see the need to use force. The parliament has not had much support now for some time. They are more and more isolated. But there is also tension among the police guards, who are facing criminals. This takes a lot of discipline. But on the political level, there is no question of using force. (S)

The President: I saw the reports of your U.N. speech. How did you think it was received? (U)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Well, the New York Times tried to show some difference between what you and I said. I had a long talk about that this morning with Secretary Christopher. I think we agreed that there is really little difference between our speeches. We agree with you on the need to streamline U.N. peacekeeping operations, to make them more efficient and focused, provided that certain requirements are met. That is the right response. The response from Boutros Ghali is a bad response -- that he has no finances or infrastructure to respond quickly when the need for peacekeeping arises. (S)

The President: That's why I said we need to review how U.N. peacekeeping is operated. Right now, we need to look at these on a case-by-case basis. Longer-term, the problem is that there is no organized system to manage the peacekeeping process. I made some specific recommendations. Since I returned from New York, I have called members of Congress and have found lots of support for the U.N., if it is willing to change. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Your criteria are more reasonable. But Rwanda is a bad case to cite. The French should do this, not the U.N. Also, the U.N. still has many rules and practices left over from the cold war. There are cases when a peacekeeping task could be accomplished quickly, if all the parties are willing. But no one can act until the Security Council decides. During the Cold War, maybe the Soviet Union would veto French participation. But the situation is different now. (S)

The President: I wanted to raise with you the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: That is a difficult situation. The leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians came to the CIS conference. I had meetings with all of them. One of the big problems was that they were working on an agreement document in one language, and when they translated it back into their own language they tried to change things. These things are constant problems. If we get them together in Geneva, how will they communicate with their capitals? We need the U.N. and CSCE to be ready to take part when agreement is close. When they finally come to an agreement, we will need CSCE observers, and there is no mandate for observers. No agreement between them will last more than two months without a huge peacekeeping force, one that can come in immediately. High authorities may sign agreements, but they don't have full control of the forces that act. (S)

The President: The Minsk group talks are scheduled to start again November 2. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Yes. We will need a cooperative approach between the Minsk Group and us, who can work well together with the parties. The day after the agreement is reached, we need immediately for CSCE observers to come in, followed by U.N. Forces. Out of the 80 observers authorized, only 22 actually came -- and no forces. The parties cannot keep their political promises without this. It's the same problem in Georgia. Without a peacekeeping force, promises were not kept. (S)

The President: What will happen now in Georgia? (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Now that Sukhumi has fallen, we need to get to some kind of agreement. Whenever they are ready, observers and peacekeepers must come in. The European neutral states must be part of this. (S)

The President: Will Gamsakhurdia try to come back to power? (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Certainly he will try. If he will succeed, no one can say. Unfortunately, Shevardnadze does not have control. (S)

The President: So you think a peacekeeping force should include the European neutrals? (S)

~~SECRET~~

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Yes. (U)

The President: Up in New York I spoke with the leaders of the Baltic states to discuss the troop withdrawal issue. I said it was important for them to respect the political rights of the Russians in their countries. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: Yes, we want them to be accepted as citizens of Estonia and Latvia. We need to make progress on this. They need to be integrated into the society. If they are seen as foreigners, it could lead to ethnic divisions and eventually to claims for independence in certain regions. (S)

The President: Can this be resolved this year? (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: The citizenship question? I don't know. (S)

The Vice President: Mr. Minister, I wanted you to know that I had a wonderful phone conversation on Saturday with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. The work of our commission is going forward rapidly. Six committees have already been set up, with chairmen. Secretary of Energy O'Leary and NRC head Ivan Selin are going to Moscow now. The head of OPIC, Commerce Secretary Brown, and NASA head Goldin will go later. (S)

I wanted to go back to what you said on Nagorno-Karabakh. You said you want to work closely with the Minsk process. We hope you can work with them. There is some conflict now, and we think the chances for success are better if we work together. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: I would say it is more a question of "desynchronization," not conflict. If we can get these leaders in Moscow for 2 days, it is almost immoral for us not to try to get an agreement. Then we can have it supported by the CSCE. But we want to work with the Minsk process. (S)

The Vice President: There is also the problem of a center of gravity to the process. Where will it be -- with Russia, or with the CSCE? We think the chances for resolution are better if the center of gravity is with CSCE. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: This sound very theoretical -- like a word with two accents. My experience with them is very unpleasant. I have visited their areas, met with them -- they all speak Russian, but their Russian reduces to very strong wording. (S)

On the Chernomyrdin commission, we appreciate your work with him in favor of economic reform. Chernomyrdin is gaining stature and knowledge, he is working with Gaydar and now sees the need for things that Gaydar is proposing. And Gaydar sees that Chernomyrdin has a certain experience. It's a unique moment -- the government will be composed of both practitioners and reformists. (S)

~~SECRET~~

The President: On the Baltics, are you saying if they agree on citizenship you'll set a date for withdrawal? (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: No, withdrawal depends not on the citizenship question but on negotiated conditions. If we succeed in negotiating these, then we can withdraw on an organized and speedy basis. We succeeded in this way in Lithuania. A final date is set in any case -- we will be out by the end of 1994. But if they negotiate the proper conditions, things could be speeded up. Now, they are saying they want us to write a blank check for damages done during 45 years of Soviet occupation. (S)

Mr. Lake: It is important for us that this proceed as quickly as possible. We have legislative problems. There is interest in Congress on this. (S)

The President: There is major interest in the U.S. and in Congress. We would like you to focus on an early withdrawal. (S)

Mr. Lake: As Secretary Christopher told you, don't get bogged down in extraneous details. Focus on setting a date. (S)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: I met in New York with Meri and Ulmanis. Meri knows better than anyone how much we have supported this. He doesn't try to tell me we are "waging imperial policies." Yes, there are difficulties. But he has promised to look into his negotiating positions with an open mind to try to find compromise. We will try to do this soon. (S)

Mr. President, it is my duty to transmit to you two messages from President Yeltsin. The first refers to some things you have already done, and touches on the \$2.5 billion support bill. (S)

Amb. Lukin: It is thanks for aid. (U)

Foreign Minister Kozyrev: And the second contains these photographs. (U)

The President: Thank you. These are wonderful. (U)

-- End of Conversation --