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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20508

September 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: JENNIFER WARD
DON STEINBERG *JW*

SUBJECT: Actions to Support South Africa's Transition

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KRM/NARA, Date 1/12/2025
2024-0538-17

Issue

- Whether, when, and what kind of event should the White House host to announce our initiatives to support the process of democratic change in South Africa

Background

South Africa's multiparty negotiating forum agreed on September 7 to form a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to serve as a watchdog on the South African Government in the media, security forces, budget and electoral structures. South Africa's Parliament is expected to enact legislation to set up the TEC tomorrow or Thursday. Coupled with the earlier decision to hold South Africa's first non-racial democratic election on April 27, 1994, these actions will meet the conditions set by the ANC for the lifting of economic sanctions on South Africa. ANC President Nelson Mandela told the President that he is ready to call for the lifting of sanctions, probably at the U.N. on September 24.

We should be prepared to respond quickly to Mandela's call for the lifting of sanctions, portraying this as a success for the bipartisan effort to impose sanctions on South Africa in 1987.

Existing U.S. Sanctions

In addition to arms and nuclear sanctions on South Africa, which should remain in place until the installation of a democratic government, we have three types of sanctions on South Africa:

- The Gramm amendment, which prevents South Africa's access to the IMF and by extension other IFIs.
- Remaining measures under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1987 (note: most but not all sanctions under CAAA were lifted in July 1991) and anti-apartheid provisions of other federal laws.

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- About 160 trade, investment and contracting sanctions at the state and local levels.

The Gramm amendment can be lifted either by Congressional action or by a presidential decision that South Africa no longer practices apartheid. The second group requires legislative action, and the third must be lifted one-by-one at the state/local level. Mayor David Dinkins and Governor Doug Wilder have indicated their intentions to lead an effort for the repeal of these measures once Mandela calls for the lifting of sanctions.

Other Supportive Measures

In addition to lifting sanctions, we should proceed with new measures to support elections in South Africa and to ensure that the first democratically-elected government has resources needed to address the legacies of apartheid in health, education and housing. These could include enhanced programs for voter education and training of election monitors and political parties; support for an international corps of election observers; preparations for a Peace Corps program; support for the World Bank and other IFIs to set up offices in South Africa; an OPIC agreement and a tax treaty; a housing loan guarantee program; and a cabinet-level trade/investment mission. These measures could be adopted within existing budget authority.

Consultations with Congress and Anti-Apartheid Activists

Given the long Congressional involvement in policy toward South Africa, these measures should be coordinated with Congress. House and Senate staff -- led by staffs of Senators Simon and Kassebaum -- have prepared draft legislation to repeal the Gramm amendment, remaining CAAA sanctions and other federal sanctions. The draft also includes "sense of Congress" language calling for supportive measures for South Africa. While some Members may be reluctant to move rapidly until a new government is in place, most are likely to support a Simon/Kassebaum approach. The current plan is to introduce the legislation immediately after Mandela calls for lifting sanctions, with almost identical legislation introduced in the House next week.

Suggested Activities

- When the South African Parliament passes TEC legislation, State should issue a statement welcoming this action.
- When Mandela calls for the lifting of economic sanctions, the White House should welcome Mandela's action, call for the lifting of state/local sanctions and support legislation to lift remaining economic sanctions. (Members of Congress are reluctant to have the President lift the Gramm amendment, preferring to include this in their legislation)

Beyond these actions, we believe a White House event should bring together anti-apartheid activists, Congressional leaders and other for a celebration of movement in the fight against apartheid. Mandela (9/24-10/2) and de Klerk (9/24-7) are both visiting Washington soon. Their visits might allow us to reinforce the important steps toward democracy in South Africa and build public and private support for South Africa during the tough transition ahead. However, neither Mandela nor de Klerk is prepared to appear together at the White House. Mandela feels it is inappropriate to include de Klerk in a sanctions-lifting event, given his long-time opposition to sanctions; de Klerk does not want to repeat the White House events of July 2, when he thinks Mandela snubbed him by backing out of a joint photo-op at the last minute (although the two appeared together at a ceremony in Philadelphia two days later).

There is also concern that a ceremony with Mandela and de Klerk would exacerbate the feeling of marginalization of Inkatha's Chief Buthelezi, who remains a wild card in the political scene. As a result, we see two possible courses of action:

Option One

- o Meet with de Klerk for 20 minutes during his visit to Washington later this week (perhaps Sept. 25); and
- o Invite Mandela to a Rose Garden ceremony on October 1 to celebrate the lifting of sanctions (after the departure of de Klerk) with a bipartisan group of members of Congress, anti-apartheid activists, and others. The event could be used to announce new measures of support for South Africa's transition, including support for TEC structures, a cabinet-level trade mission, negotiations for OPIC and bilateral tax agreements, and a possible Peace Corps program.

PROS: This option would highlight and build American support for the transition process in South Africa, and provide a high-profile ceremony calling attention to White House involvement in the resolution of another of the world's most intractable problems

CONS: The apparent snub to de Klerk could undercut the view of U.S. impartiality in promoting a peaceful settlement in South Africa. It may upset Congressional leaders who view de Klerk as having played a seminal role in the process of eliminating apartheid. It could also leave Chief Buthelezi feeling marginalized, thus making him even more intractable in talks in South Africa. It would also require an investment of the President's time during a week when other events are paramount.

Option Two

o Host a Rose Garden ceremony in mid-October to sign legislation to repeal sanctions on South Africa -- likely passed in early October -- with a bipartisan group of members of Congress, anti-apartheid activists, and others. As above, the event could be used to announce additional measures of support for South Africa's transition.

PROS: This option would avoid involving the White House in internal South African politics, while still allowing us to build a consensus among Congressional and U.S. anti-apartheid leaders.

CONS: We would lose the high-profile opportunity to have Mandela at the White House for this important ceremony.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our drafting a memo for the President apprising him of recent developments in South Africa and recommending that the State Department/White House issue statements as cited above and that the White House host the event proposed in option 2 above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A State Department Memorandum
Tab B Draft Congressional Legislation on South Africa

By KBH NARA, Date 4/17/2025
2024-0533-M

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:OADR

September 20, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Gameplan for USG Responses to Developments
in South Africa

Several key steps on South Africa's road to democracy are anticipated during coming weeks: Nelson Mandela will likely call for the lifting of economic sanctions during his speech at the UN on September 24 and the South African Parliament will likely enact legislation during the week of September 20 for establishing the Transitional Executive Council (TEC).

These and other important steps provide excellent opportunities for the USG to reinforce South Africa's transition to democracy. If we mishandle them, however, we risk complicating the negotiations. Mandela and de Klerk have both stressed to us that our diplomacy is a major determinant of Chief Buthelezi's behaviour. It is his obstructionism, and the violence it engenders, that they are both seeking now to diminish. Mandela and de Klerk have asked our help.

Hence our proposal below for carefully timed White House responses to the multiparty process -- rather than a single statement which Buthelezi will interpret as a response to ANC/South African Government pleading, and thus a deliberate American slur against him. De Klerk has personally warned us this could drive Buthelezi even further from constructive participation.

Taking into account these foreign policy considerations as well as the Administration's desire to explain U.S. foreign policy to the American people, we recommend the following USG responses to upcoming developments in South Africa:

-- When Parliament passes the TEC legislation (likely week of September 20), a White House statement would welcome this step and announce support for the transition: support for TEC structures such as the election commission, a cabinet level trade and investment mission, intention to lift the Gramm Amendment once the negotiating plenary endorses the TEC, an OPIC investment encouragement agreement and an offer to negotiate a bilateral tax treaty. Our response would likely precede Mandela's call for lifting sanctions, thereby linking our policies to developments in the negotiations, not ANC policy decisions.

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-- When Mandela calls for the lifting of economic sanctions (September 24), a White House statement would reinforce the call for state/local governments to lift sanctions promptly. This -- and likely opportunities for the President to respond to reporters' queries during the course of the day -- would provide a visible USG response to Mandela's call.

-- When negotiators agree on a transitional constitution (likely mid-late October), either the White House or State Department would issue a statement welcoming the step.

-- When the negotiating plenary endorses the TEC (likely late October), the White House could host a domestic-oriented event with members of Congress, anti-apartheid activists and others to mark this final step to implementation of transitional government. If violence has diminished sufficiently, Peace Corps could also be announced.

Bipartisan/bicameral legislation removing economic restrictions against South Africa will likely be introduced following Mandela's call for the lifting of sanctions. We support this legislation, which reflects our input. Meanwhile, we will continue to enforce the U.N. arms embargoes until the United Nations lifts them.



for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Draft White House Statements

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KBM/NARA, Date 2/12/2025
2024-0538-17

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1993

MEETINGS WITH
PRESIDENT F.W. DE KLERK AND NELSON MANDELA

DATE: July 2, 1993

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate our support for democracy in South Africa.

Key Points

- Welcome both de Klerk and Mandela again to the White House (both met with President Bush).
- Stress our support for the process of democratization that is underway in South Africa.
- Give recognition to the key roles played by both de Klerk and Mandela in that process.
- Signal to the American public that we are nearing the point where a shift from economic sanctions to economic support is necessary in order to ensure the success of democracy in South Africa.

II. BACKGROUND

Your meetings with President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela come on the eve of an historic moment in South Africa's evolution toward non-racial democracy. While both leaders had originally hoped agreement could be reached before they arrived in the U.S., the multiparty Negotiating Forum is scheduled to reconvene on the day you are to hold your meetings. Although the exact timing of an agreement is not clear, the Forum is expected to ratify the date of April 27, 1994 for the holding of South Africa's first democratic election and create the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) which will serve as a watchdog on the South African Government in the period until the elections. Mandela had originally called simply for the announcement of the TEC as a condition for calling for an end to sanctions. However, he is now using the passage by Parliament of enabling legislators as the benchmark. We suggest you use the term "creation of the TEC."

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If the Forum is able to announce these two accomplishments, it will clearly pave the way for full democratic rule in South Africa and meet the condition of "irreversible" progress laid down by Mandela before he would call for an end to sanctions. While Mandela has told us he believes there could be enough consensus to announce the date of the elections, he does not expect final agreement on the TEC before or during his trip to the U.S. He will, therefore, not call for the lifting of all sanctions during his trip. He may instead urge potential investors and international financial institutions simply to visit South Africa to assess where they would invest once sanctions are lifted.

Despite the disappointment of no final agreement, these meetings provide an important opportunity to recognize the crucial role played by both leaders in bringing about non-racial democracy in South Africa. Both deserve high praise for making progress possible and for achieving agreements many thought impossible only a few years ago. In addition, the political stakes are high for both individuals, especially their ability to fend off the extremists in their camps who believe that they have made too many concessions - - Mandela by those who think he has been too conciliatory to whites and de Klerk by those whites who feel he is giving up too much of their privilege and power.

Your meetings also afford a chance to highlight for the American public just how far South Africa has come in its democratic evolution. You can use the occasion to join with Mandela in laying the groundwork for a lifting of sanctions and re-investment in South Africa once a political agreement is reached. As you discussed with President Nujoma, three years after Namibia became independent not all the state and local sanctions have been removed. Many South Africans are unwilling to wait years for their aspirations and expectations to be fulfilled.

Constitutional Negotiations

Despite the progress in negotiations, important issues remain to be resolved, such as powersharing, division of authority between the central and regional governments, control of the security forces, and reincorporation of "independent" homelands. On powersharing, the National Party (NP) continues to seek an arrangement that would provide inordinate minority influence in the executive. The ANC accepts an interim government of national unity involving major political parties for up to five years, but rejects the NP proposal requiring consensus among major parties for decisions on key issues. The ANC has also accepted that certain powers be reserved for the regions, but the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) demands broader authority for the regions and a more detailed agreement that would be binding on the body which will draft the elected

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constitution. Buthelezi refuses to agree to April 27, 1994 as the date for elections.

On security issues, the ANC believes progress has been made in oversight of the security forces but this will remain a highly sensitive and contentious issue. Although the major political parties support reintegration of the "independent" homelands, the head of Bophuthatswana and some other local leaders are opposed.

It remains to be seen whether Buthelezi is willing to make compromises needed to reach a negotiated settlement. The British and Zimbabwe President Mugabe have been particularly active in efforts to encourage Buthelezi to compromise. Assistant Secretary Moose conveyed a similar message to him during his recent visit to South Africa. The U.S., however, continues to play a widely acknowledged, facilitative role in the process by carrying ideas between the parties and by repeatedly pressing all parties to stay at the table.

The Violence

While South Africa has avoided civil war, the "revolution" which seems poised to bring a non-racial democracy into being has not been bloodless. As many as 9000 people have died in the last three years due to political violence. The vast majority of these victims are blacks. And Mandela continues to press the government to do more to stop the killing. The June 25 storming and takeover of the Johannesburg World Trade Center by hundreds of armed right-wing extremists, while the multiparty negotiations were underway, demonstrates the fragility of the process. The Government has moved to defuse the outrage over this incident by arresting a number of those responsible, however, and it is unlikely this incident will derail the talks.

Helping to ameliorate the problem of violence have been the efforts of Archbishop Tutu and Justice Goldstone. Goldstone deserves high praise for the efforts of his commission to investigate the violence. To underscore our support, the U.S. Government has recently decided to provide aid to the Goldstone Commission. While the amount has not yet been determined, it will probably be in the neighborhood of \$1 million.

For his part, Archbishop Tutu brought Mandela and Chief Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), together on June 23 for a meeting to discuss their differences -- primarily the violence between their two factions and Buthelezi's push for enhanced regional authority. While no progress was made on the issue of regional authority or Buthelezi's opposition to setting next April as the date for elections, they did agree to work together to lessen the level of violence between their followers.

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Sanctions

Once a government elected by all South Africans does take power, it will face formidable obstacles in building a strong economy and a stable democracy. The South African economy is entering a fifth year of recession that has been aggravated by the depressed world economy and a lack of investment. Business and consumer confidence necessary for more investment is likely to remain low during the uncertain period leading up to the elections.

Decades of irrational economic policies, due largely to apartheid, have created great inefficiencies and distortions. Only a vigorous market-led economy will be able to generate the resources needed to redress this legacy. Mandela wants to begin as soon as possible to rebuild the economy so that the ANC has a chance at progress when democracy arrives next year. The removal of the remaining sanctions (primarily IMF funds) will make a major contribution to the chances of success of South Africa's economy. In addition, at least 26 states, 137 localities and countless other institutions maintain some form of the economic sanctions against South Africa. How quickly they are eliminated will depend to a degree on how clearly and unequivocally Mandela calls for their removal and how hard you push to accomplish that goal. While Mandela has indicated that setting the date for elections and the creation of the TEC is sufficient for him to make such a call, some hardliners in the ANC believe the sanctions should remain in place until after the elections.

Protectionist Barriers

Faced with foreign trade sanctions which limited access to world markets, South Africa adopted industrial policies over the past three decades that were designed to achieve self sufficiency at any cost. This led to an import-resistant system of high tariffs, quotas, subsidies and non-tariff barriers. With the dismantling of most foreign sanctions, the South African government has committed itself to reducing these protectionist barriers. Faced with a lingering recession and high unemployment, however, the government's implementation of this trade liberalization has been stalled. In several cases, such as textiles and some agriculture products, it has succumbed to industry and union pressure and increased trade barriers. If there is time, you should urge both de Klerk and Mandela to resist the protectionist pressures.

U.S. Support for the Transition to Democracy

Support for the negotiation process and transition to democracy is the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward South Africa. The prospect that the negotiations may soon conclude successfully means we should have a package of support for the transition process ready to announce once an

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agreement is reached. Central to the success of this transition will be a strong recovery of South Africa's declining economy.

We have begun consultations with Congress on when and how to lift economic sanctions. No one is currently proposing that the prohibition on arms exports or nuclear cooperation be lifted at this time. Reactions from the Hill have generally supported a strong Administration response to progress in South Africa, especially if negotiators can agree on a date for elections and creation of the TEC. Most Congressional leaders have said that they will take their cues from Mandela in terms of lifting remaining sanctions and preparing support measure during the period until elections. Senators Simon, Kassebaum and Kennedy are preparing legislation to lift all remaining sanctions, except nuclear cooperation and the arms embargo, support the electoral process and call for new multilateral assistance through the World Bank and IMF. A number of leaders active on South Africa, including the Congressional Black Caucus, would also like to work with the Administration on an expanded assistance program to support the first democratically elected government. There may be some in Congress, especially in the Black Caucus who will oppose lifting sanctions, even if Mandela endorses such a step, arguing that maximum pressure should be maintained until the new government takes office.

Elements of U.S. support to the transition process will include:

- Promotion of democracy - voter training, the Peace Corps, up to \$10 million from existing resources to assist the electoral process and a substantial number of international observers.
- Trade and Investment - engaging our private sector through public statements, removal of legal barriers, an OPIC agreement, a tax treaty and a high level trade mission.
- International Financial Support - lift IMF restrictions, call for international institutions to set up offices and seek G-7 commitment to reintegrate South Africa into the global community.
- Local Sanctions - work to remove remaining state and local sanctions.

Both de Klerk and Mandela will push for greater U.S. support from the international financial institutions for a post-apartheid South Africa.

Unfortunately, there is not a lot we can do to increase the resources for South Africa. At \$80 million, our aid program to South Africa is already the largest for any country in

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sub-Saharan Africa. These funds currently go entirely to private voluntary organizations to help South Africa overcome the legacy of apartheid and prepare politically and economically for the post-apartheid period. You can assure them, however, that at the G-7 we are pushing for increased debt reduction for South Africa and for G-7 support for South Africa.

Space Launch

President de Klerk may also raise the announcement by his government on June 30 that its space launch vehicle program was being terminated. This action resolves what would have been potentially serious missile proliferation concerns and is a very welcome step. We have indicated to the South Africans that if they made this decision we would look for ways to increase bilateral cooperation in space, support their application for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and work out a bilateral agreement on missile technology imports and exports.

South Africa's Nuclear Programs

In a dramatic gesture last March, the South African Government announced that it had assembled six nuclear devices which it had dismantled and destroyed prior to its accession to the NPT in 1991. The Government invited the IAEA to visit the remnants of its nuclear weapons facilities and related activities to demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation. The SAG has also invited the IAEA to examine and assess the production and accounting records of its key enrichment plant.

Nevertheless, questions still persist about whether South Africa is fully complying with its NPT and safeguards obligations, especially whether South Africa has violated its IAEA safeguards agreement. The most important aspect of this is whether South Africa has declared all of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the IAEA. Several months ago, the SAG offered to sell at least some of its stocks of HEU to the U.S. or another nuclear weapons state as evidence of its nonproliferation bona fides. We are interested in buying as much of their HEU as possible and hope to convince the South Africans to convert remaining HEU to low enriched uranium.

There are Presidential waiver provisions and we are preparing a decision memo for you.

Statement

We plan to release a statement following your meetings underscoring your commitment to the process and your willingness to support South Africa once an agreement is reached. You will see de Klerk and Mandela in Philadelphia on July 4 at which point you can reiterate this position personally.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By KBH NARA, Date 3/12/2025

WASHINGTON

2024-0538-M

June 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher *WC*

SUBJECT: Meetings with South African President F.W. de Klerk and ANC President Nelson Mandela

I. SETTING

South Africa is at a critical point in its transition from 350 years of white domination to nonracial democracy. Prior to these meetings, multiparty talks may culminate in an announcement of a firm date for the country's first nonracial elections and agreement on establishing a transitional government to set the stage for those elections. Mutual suspicions remain strong, however. The government is unsure whether a future ANC-dominated government will adhere to pre-election commitments while the ANC questions whether the government is truly ready to relinquish power. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) wants binding agreements now establishing a highly decentralized system of government.

IFP leader Chief Buthelezi is a wild card who could imperil the transition if he is not part of the process. He feels left out and resents what he sees as government/ANC collusion on constitutional issues. Assistant Secretary for Africa Moose intends to urge Buthelezi to remain engaged in the transition process when they meet in South Africa on June 25.

Political violence continues to threaten the transition. A bitter ANC-IFP rivalry is a major factor in the violence. Nelson Mandela and Chief Buthelezi met on June 23 in an effort to defuse this tension. Extremists on the right and left as well as some rogue elements of the security forces also contribute to the violence. The presence of nearly 100 international observers and the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into the causes of violence are helping.

Both de Klerk and Mandela confront increasing dissension within their constituencies as the negotiations end game approaches. Some conservative Afrikaners accuse de Klerk of selling out to the ANC and demand greater safeguards. Mandela is under pressure from party hardliners, including his estranged wife, Winnie, who reject deals with the government that oppressed them under apartheid.

The economy is in desperate straits as a result of decades of irrational policies rooted in apartheid and the impact of sanctions. The situation is worsened by a depressed world economy, recent drought, and declining business confidence.

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There has been virtually zero growth in employment in the formal sector, resulting in unemployment rates approaching 50% in the black community. A revitalized economy will be vital to South Africa's transition to democracy. We have helped ANC economic thinking evolve from a statist approach toward the free market.

Support from the U.S. and the international community is also critical. With our G-7 partners, we must work to reintegrate South Africa into the global economy, mobilize IMF and World Bank resources to generate economic growth, and encourage greater private sector involvement. The ANC has said it will call for lifting of remaining economic sanctions once agreement is reached on an election date and transitional government. State and local government sanctions discourage new U.S. private sector involvement in South Africa.

South Africa continues to pursue development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). We have made clear to the government and the ANC that the SLV program raises serious missile proliferation concerns and is not economically viable given the glut of launch capacity. The Cabinet is divided over whether to terminate the program. In 1991 South Africa joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and signed a fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This March, the government admitted it had built six nuclear devices and said it had destroyed them prior to joining the NPT. Some questions remain concerning South African compliance with its NPT obligations. Once these are resolved, we can pursue a new nuclear cooperation agreement.

II. TOPICS

- o Confirm support for South Africa's transition to democracy.
- o Urge the parties to bring negotiations to a rapid conclusion and prepare for nonracial elections.
- o Emphasize the importance of keeping Buthelezi in the transition process.
- o Commit the U.S. to assist the electoral process.
- o Assure that we will use our influence to ensure that all sides honor their commitments in the negotiations.
- o Discuss USG responses to further progress toward democracy, including steps to reintegrate South Africa into the global economy, promote private sector involvement, and mobilize IMF and World Bank resources to generate economic growth.
- o Emphasize to the ANC the importance of an unambiguous call for lifting remaining sanctions and the need for its active participation in the campaign to implement the call.
- o Encourage South Africa to abandon the SLV program.

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SUPPORT MEASURES FOR THE TRANSITION

Among the measures that might be taken once the Negotiating Forum sets a date for elections and creates a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) are the following:

Promotion of Democracy

- Support the election process through enhanced voter education, monitor training and political party training.
- Direct the use of USAID resources to assist TEC institutions designed to create a level playing field for elections.
- Offer support for an international corps of observers for the South African elections.
- Instruct Peace Corps to lay the groundwork for a program in South Africa.
- Continuing to support the Goldstone Commission and other entities seeking to reduce political violence.

International Financial Support

- Ease Gramm Amendment restrictions on South African access to the IMF by declaring that South Africa no longer practices apartheid.
- Call for the World Bank, African Development Bank and other IFI's to set up offices in South Africa to develop projects for implementation once the TEC is in place.
- Seek a commitment in Tokyo for the G-7 to support South Africa's reintegration into the international economic community.

Trade and Investment

- Negotiate an OPIC investment encouragement agreement and a tax treaty.
- Sponsor a cabinet-level trade/investment mission to include a focus on promoting black private enterprise.

Local Sanctions

- Once the ANC calls for lifting of sanctions, indicate our strong support of this move.

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By KBH/NARA, Date 2/12/2025
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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 4, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: DON STEINBERG *DS*
DENNIS JETT *DJ*

SUBJECT: Support for South African Transition Process

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum to the President informing him of substantial progress in constitutional negotiations in South Africa and recommending consultations with Congress, South African groups and interested American parties on measures of support for South Africa in the run up to elections in April 1994.

Concurrence by: *JK* Jeremy Rosner

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KHM/NARA, Date 2/12/2025
2024-0538-17

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 2/12/2025
2024-0538-17

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Support for South African Transition Process

Purpose

To inform you of substantial progress in constitutional talks in South Africa and recommend approval of consultations with Congress, South African groups (especially the African National Congress) and interested U.S. parties on appropriate measures to support the electoral process, the transition to democracy and economic recovery in South Africa.

Background

Constitutional negotiations in South Africa have yielded a partial breakthrough. The major parties, including the South African Government and the African National Congress, have tentatively agreed on a date of April 27, 1994 for holding the first non-racial election in the country's history.

This date will be part of a comprehensive proposal put forward to the multiparty Negotiating Forum on June 25. The proposal is also expected to recommend creation of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to serve as a watchdog on the exercise of power by the South African Government in the media, security forces, budget and electoral structures until the elections. It will also propose key constitutional principles, including the devolution of some power to local authorities to address concerns of ethnic/regional minorities.

If ratified by the Negotiating Forum, this proposal will pave the way for full democratic rule in South Africa and will symbolize the end of apartheid. It will merit our strong endorsement and substantive measures of support.

An interagency working group has recommended a series of measures designed to support and strengthen the electoral process in South Africa and assist the economic recovery on which a successful political transition will depend. The group believes strongly that work must begin as soon as possible to restore growth to the

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South African economy so that the first democratically-elected government has resources needed to address the socio-economic legacies of apartheid in health, education and housing.

The working group also recommended that some additional measures to normalize fully relations with South Africa should await the installation of a democratic government in order to keep pressure on all the parties to see the process through.

Support Measures for the Transition

Among the measures that might be considered for adoption once the Negotiating Forum sets a date for elections and approves creation of a TEC, perhaps as early as June 25, are the following:

Democracy

- Support the election process through enhanced voter education, monitor training and political party training.
- Offer support for an international corps of observers for the South African elections.
- Direct the use of USAID resources to assist TEC institutions designed to create a level playing field for elections.
- Instruct Peace Corps to lay the groundwork for a program in South Africa once a democratically-elected government is in place and requests it.

International Financial Support

- Ease Gramm Amendment restrictions on South African access to the IMF by declaring that South Africa no longer practices apartheid but instruct our representative to consider a request for funding only if it comes from a democratically-elected government.
- Call for the World Bank, African Development Bank and other bodies to set up offices in South Africa to develop projects for implementation once a democratically-elected government is in place.
- Seek a commitment in Tokyo for the G-7 to support South Africa's reintegration into the international economic community once a democratic government takes office.

Trade and Investment

- Negotiate an OPIC investment encouragement agreement and a tax treaty.
- Sponsor a cabinet-level trade/investment mission to South Africa, to include a focus on promoting black private enterprise in South Africa.

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Local Sanctions

-- (if the ANC has called for lifting of foreign sanctions, as is likely): Indicate support for the lifting of the 160+ state and local sanctions now in place against South Africa.

Some combination of these measures could be announced when the Negotiating Forum approves the election date and creation of the TEC (around June 25) and/or when you meet with Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk in early July.

Other measures to fully normalize relations with South Africa would be delayed until a democratically-elected government is in place. These include military and nuclear cooperation, lifting fair labor standards in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and the Eximbank charter and easing export controls on high-technology goods.

Consultations with Congress and Interested Groups

Given the long history of Congressional involvement in policy toward South Africa, the measures above should be carefully coordinated with Congress. There may be some reluctance among some Members to move rapidly on these measures, believing that we should wait until a democratically-elected government is in place. Nonetheless, most Members are likely to support the general outlines of this approach: the African subcommittees and the Black Caucus are already preparing a support package for South Africa to be ready to greet Mandela during his July visit to the United States. We understand that this package could include an expression of support for the transition to democracy, additional financial support to TEC institutions to level the playing field for the 1994 elections and the removal of certain laws that single out South Africa for its apartheid structures.

Anti-apartheid groups in South Africa should also be consulted in advance of any movement. They too are also likely to be supportive. The ANC has announced that it will call for the lifting of all financial, trade and investment sanctions once a date for elections is set and a TEC is created. While the ANC is reluctant to fully embrace the IMF and World Bank -- concerned that the current Government would use such programs for electoral advantage -- it would support having these institutions prepare programs now for implementation once a democratically-elected government is in place.

Consultations with U.S. anti-apartheid activists and interest groups should also be undertaken, including TransAfrica. While some of these groups will be reluctant to endorse comprehensive support measures in anticipation of the first democratic election, there is already a feeling among many of these groups that they must re-focus their attention away from tearing down apartheid to building up the non-racial and prosperous South Africa that will come in its wake.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize consultations with Congress, South Africa groups (especially the ANC) and interested U.S. groups on measures to support the electoral process, the transition to democracy and economic recovery in South Africa. These steps would be announced and adopted when negotiators set a firm date for elections and establish a Transitional Executive Council, probably on June 25.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____