



**Sheraton**

- 1) Launching as a series of meetings re: substance; they've not got a clear dividing line. inclusive talks in bi, tri, or multilateral forms + would be desir. to ... nego.
- 2) won't agree to an American unless we thought it would work.
- 3) later date, perhaps by mid-December.

same basis as all par

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**Sheraton**

Re: looking for a way to get this going. Implicit Wash 3,

At present, not there by accident.

Target date new. Talking @ preparatory talks, flexible on name. i.e. Mitchell panel.

Composition at 3 w/ wide acceptance think can work with this. Implicit acceptance that timing is with mandate. Seriously consider re-merits new; repeatedly position: of ad.

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**Sheraton**

Adams - Have to say, some semantics,  
one word for another, generally  
speaking, haven't had in substance  
accept it a bit diff if you are asked  
vs. others.

1) Cooperation of paramilitaries on both  
sides. IRA won't cooperate.  
Working w/ British with them sell. My job to  
sell.

If we can go back if you want a word  
cooperation. Unless in form of  
involvement all panel is; from benign  
weapons → range to taking a call from  
Mitchell.

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**Sheraton**

#/ This will only work if those involved  
clearly see it as a way of broadly  
organizing, clearly political, key lies  
in commitment of all party talks.  
They effort to persuade of months;  
all parties would make submission. We  
see (SF) when people are persuaded to  
give them up; i.e. ~~when~~ on eve  
of final settlement. Pressure loyalists,  
SLOP too. Unionists too. Committee,  
group would then make sees then.  
paramilitaries won't cooperate. No  
possibility of it being dealt w/ as a military  
matter; Not me playing hard ball.

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5

**Sheraton**

Loyalists diff. what promises are -  
minimum & will cooperate. Loyalist  
weapons came from SA Brian Livan  
organization

(b)(7)c

Classmate came @ UPT & B's personally  
Urge them to take a practical step.  
Can settle bk represent armed  
groups but want go beyond political  
start that they'll do as part of  
settlement.

How do you deal with perception  
that loyalist have - everyone but UPT

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6

**Sheraton**

Not only conditions were that  
they stopped. Measures to bring  
equality & treated. B's stalled,  
peace process, war by another means.  
B's also only gradually moved. 1/4  
people emotional & this.  
or so trying to get their neutrality.  
If it comes to eyeball will all be  
negotiated B's & UPT. They understand  
better. I don't think they want to go  
back, but it will happen. Already  
nothing. War in street is the over.  
B's say no pol. prisoners, release Cleys, orange

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**Sheraton**

marches, plastic bullets. We got USA to stop unprovoked.

The way will work is to create oil.

This is not a shift from British position per 9/6.

When advised new circumstances, new conferences - ie. what they consider to be the circums. That's their 3rd principle.

[?] perhaps 1+2 can generate conf on 3 words on weapons work be used, except defensively. See no merit/value in saying anymore.

W/ of all you've said, target date most important key is date / target date for all party talks.

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**Sheraton**

1/ One may work out new formulations, no problem getting from Irish front. At least seek to talk to Brit directly, with still need a leap of faith, can no provide guarantee

2/ Yes, but don't think need a leap of faith. Think develop mechanism by which they can fall off. Not asking you to accept Commission's need. Not unse off by doing than not

3/ My value is that I can buy Republicans into table. If I buy Republican up this road, & if Pirus comes & joins Brit's certain new position, will be seen as Brit being able to weather Pirus visit & still

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9

**Sheraton**

+ that we made a major miscalculation  
 but all this in Brits if goes right.  
 They would be cornered down road.  
 First, saw a course could be seen  
 to enable them to allow a way out.  
 At least down road 3 months.

Jeff is Irish know I can't, but ~~can~~ think  
 I want. Two thoughts: Chuck Messier  
 if the "commission was broadened" Mitchell  
 as an advisor. Amer. history - Brit  
 said if stop, well talk, if give up  
 weapons, will talk. 2) head of steam  
 on deportation issue. Gabriel Magaly.  
 Zwick. People should not be deported

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10

**Sheraton**

A/ don't see a shift in British position  
 R/ There is, not in sense you want.  
 want to. But can say make lot of  
 little changes that allow process go.  
 They want to get it going. Need to  
 Check on whether IRA has to go  
 back to you.

A/ Paramil. want go in name, will  
 go as other two parties. Brits  
 say other accept were separate.

A/ Connor -> proposition to Adams to bring  
 back + got a negative answer + so meeting  
 couldn't take place. wouldn't go back under  
 pressure. Good meeting, constructive. focus on  
 need to get rid of obstacles. Not going back  
 to Ireland w/ formal proposal.

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may well be

11

R/ Derant + Kennedy - we understand you had a 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting.

A/ Didn't tell Kennedy's office  
fulfilled meeting with Derant.  
all I mind was spin.

Unless movement b/f POWS visit  
- moved beyond pt.

prisoners, primary, representing speed,  
discrimination removal; Irish language  
movement, conf. dev. bvlq; deportees.

A/ want you still involved.

still work to be done, not going away  
shattered, encouraged by OS role.

R/ sell basic concept of solidarity  
Cmording, target date. we can  
help in details as you want.

1) will check on paramilitaries.  
7) Eilat Neutral, 1<sup>st</sup> deal  
politically. I couldn't go  
in + say this is a defensive,

R. Can I tell them that  
I don't hear you say this is  
not so.

A/ Adams - not in to put this  
into all party talks; you  
were duly bound to examine  
what you've put forward. Joint  
Community "proper conditions" all  
party talks held off, required a  
date; if asked, beginning of  
surrender.

need to move further closer. #13

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A/ Hard to tell Irish fort & Home,  
we were in touch.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.42)

KBH 4/11/2023

MEETING WITH  
IRISH PRESIDENT MARY ROBINSON

DATE: May 14, 1993

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 4:15 - 4:45 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm close ties between the U.S. and Ireland.

KEY POINTS

- Reiterate your commitment to contribute in a constructive way toward bringing the Northern Ireland tragedy to an end.
- Thank President Robinson for her work on Somalia while emphasizing the importance of securing Irish participation in UNOSOM II, and drawing attention to the growing humanitarian crisis in Sudan.
- Share with Robinson your thinking on next steps toward Bosnia.
- Stress the importance of securing a GATT agreement and bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion by December 15.

II. BACKGROUND

Mary Robinson is coming to Washington to receive an award from Care for her efforts on behalf of the Somali people. Robinson is Ireland's first woman President and currently its most popular public official. The office she holds is largely ceremonial: Robinson must get her travel and her major speeches cleared by the Cabinet and must eschew active involvement in policy discussions. As President she has the power to refer bills to the Supreme Court if she judges them unconstitutional and to refuse a request from the Prime Minister to dissolve the Dail (Parliament) if she feels it would be detrimental to Irish democracy (something that has never happened). That said, Robinson has worked tirelessly to replace weak powers with strong symbols: whether advocating humanitarian efforts in Somalia or the transformation of Irish society by speaking out on such issues as birth control and divorce.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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Cognizant of the constitutional constraints on her office, Robinson will discuss foreign policy with you in general terms, while turning to her Foreign Minister and political supporter Dick Spring for specifics. The major issues likely to come up in the meeting are Northern Ireland and peacekeeping (including Somalia, Sudan and Bosnia).

NORTHERN IRELAND. Robinson is the first Irish President to have visited both Ulster and Britain -- the latter to attend the memorial services for the Warrington bombing victims. You sent a message which was widely reported. Although there had been some hope that the talks suspended last fall could resume after the May municipal elections, the most likely timetable for serious talks is September. (July is "Marching Season" when Unionists hold month long celebrations to commemorate the victory of William III at the Battle of Boyne in 1690; August is vacation.) Major and Reynolds are scheduled to meet in June, and there are indications that Major may be prepared to "give some direction" to the talks. Major's desire for more progress is based on the toll the conflict is taking on Britain, including 20,000 troops in Northern Ireland, a cost of \$2 million a day for the police force in Ulster and insurance settlements of about \$1 billion in property compensation for terrorist damage in Northern Ireland -- a figure expected to skyrocket with the claims following the massive PIRA bombings in London.

On the Irish side, although Prime Minister Reynolds chairs a new Cabinet subcommittee on Northern Ireland, Foreign Minister Dick Spring has been put in overall charge of the portfolio. Spring made a conciliatory speech in March, even signalling that articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution (which lay claim to Northern Ireland) are not cast in concrete; but he has rejected the demand of some Unionists that the Irish abrogate those articles as a precondition to resumption of the talks.

Robinson has a reputation for conciliation on Northern Ireland, stressing the need to take into account the views and fears of the Protestant community in Ulster. She is aware that your Administration is focusing more attention on the issue, and she or Foreign Minister Spring may solicit your current thinking, including whether you will be appointing a special envoy. The Irish Government is not pushing; in his March 17 meeting with you, Prime Minister Reynolds suggested that you keep all of your options open, and he deflected specific questions about the envoy issue in the press conference following your meeting. We recommend that you reiterate the messages you conveyed to Prime Minister Major and Reynolds, i.e., that Northern Ireland will remain an important issue for discussion between the U.S., Great Britain and Ireland, and that any proposals -- including appointing an envoy -- will be judged against the standard of whether they can contribute to bringing about an end to the tragedy.

You may want to ask Robinson for her assessment following the revulsion felt in Ireland over the Warrington PIRA bombing, and whether she foresees generational change in Ireland on the issue. The Irish Government, which has not favored granting a visa to Gerry Adams in the past, privately has expressed relief that your Administration turned down his latest request for a visa, and we doubt Robinson or Spring will raise it in the meeting.

PEACEKEEPING. The Irish, cognizant of their absence from NATO, are especially committed to participate in humanitarian efforts, including peacekeeping. They have contributed military and civilian personnel to U.N. peacekeeping efforts since the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Irish personnel are serving in Lebanon, Cyprus, Angola, El Salvador, Iraq/Kuwait, Western Sahara, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia. Although their numbers pale beside contributions from other nations, this tradition of peacekeeping fits in with Irish policy of neutrality and ethos of helping "oppressed" peoples. As the U.N. has broadened the scope of peacekeeping, the Irish have raised concerns that the traditional role of peacekeeping is giving way to a more activist peacemaking. These concerns have been manifested over Irish policy toward Somalia.

SOMALIA. Robinson's trip to Somalia in October 1992, and her messages to Boutros-Ghali and to major world leaders raising the plight of the Somalis, had great resonance among the Irish public. The Irish government supported UNSC resolutions on Somalia. Although Irish troops did not participate in UNITAF, they have pledged a 70-80 person, 22 truck transportation unit for UNOSOM II. However, the earliest this unit can be deployed is June because of Irish insistence on parliamentary legislation to enable their troops to participate under Article VII of the UN charter. This insistence has been fueled in part by the deaths of several Irish citizens working for private relief organizations in Somalia. You should emphasize to Robinson the importance of Ireland's contribution, and the fact that U.S. military personnel will remain engaged in Somalia for months to come to ensure smooth operation of the UN effort.

SUDAN. Although Somalia has been the focus of Irish relief efforts to date in Africa, the Irish are turning their attention to Sudan as a crisis that can match the magnitude of the starvation in Somalia. Deputy Foreign Minister Kitt has travelled to Sudan, and USAID has already provided the Irish private relief organization, Irish Concern, funds to run a feeding center in the city of Renk. You might probe Robinson on the state of European thinking on how to bring the suffering to an end (relief organizations are pressing for safe havens and air drops) while telling her that the international community should use all of its influence on the Sudanese Government and the rebels to negotiate seriously at the talks underway in Abuja, Nigeria.

BOSNIA. Irish personnel in the former Yugoslavia total 15 (7 in UNPROFOR, 6 as EC monitors and two with the High Commissioner on Refugees). In his meeting with Secretary Christopher this week, Foreign Minister Spring parroted the EC position: support for safe havens and opposition to lifting the arms embargo. Robinson may ask you about next steps in Bosnia. You may want to tell her that your efforts to ratchet up the pressure on the Serbs has helped to bring about a split between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs and a cease fire which appears to be holding; that the Bosnian Serb referendum has no standing; and that you are reviewing the options stemming from Secretary Christopher's consultations.

EC, GATT/URUGUAY ROUND. Robinson or Spring may ask you about the prospects for a GATT agreement. Ireland is a strong supporter of the EC and European integration, having voted overwhelmingly last June (66%) in favor of the Maastricht treaty. Part of their enthusiasm is based on hard economics: as one of the EC's poorer countries, Ireland received nearly \$2.9 billion in net income from the Community last year. Given Ireland's large agricultural sector, Dublin often sides with Paris in U.S.-EC trade disputes over agriculture, and the Irish continue to support France in holding up EC ratification of the Blair House accords. You should reiterate to Robinson and Spring that you do not intend to re-open the Blair House Accords, and that the EC must accept them and move quickly to implement the oilseeds agreement. You should also underscore your determination to wrap up the Uruguay Round by December 15.

TAX ON U.S. SUBSIDIARIES IN IRELAND. The Irish Government is concerned that proposals to change U.S. tax policy on the profits of U.S. subsidiaries will discourage U.S. investment in Ireland -- critical given the high rates of unemployment in the Republic. (Reynolds raised this in his meeting with you.) Under current law, profits of U.S. subsidiaries are taxed only when they are repatriated by the parent company. Congressman Rostenkowski has proposed doing away altogether with tax deferrals on these overseas profits. Your Administration's proposal is less onerous, calling for taxation of profits only when they remain passive assets (i.e., not reinvested in plant or equipment) and exceed 25% of the total assets of the overseas subsidiary. The House Ways and Means Committee has taken up this issue this week. Spring will likely raise this issue in his meeting with Secretary Bensten and in his consultations on the Hill. Nevertheless, if it does come up in your meeting, we recommend you stress that your proposal will still make it attractive for U.S. businesses to invest in Ireland because it will allow companies to continue to defer taxes on profits that are actively reinvested.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.43)  
KBM 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Warren Christopher *w.c.*  
SUBJECT: Your meeting with President Mary Robinson of Ireland

I. SETTING

- Robinson is visiting Washington to accept an award from CARE for her humanitarian activities in Somalia, which she visited in October 1992. The Irish take pride in that visit, to which they attribute--with some exaggeration--the drawing of world attention to the famine in Somalia.
- In the Irish system, the role of the President is highly circumscribed. She must receive cabinet approval for foreign travel and for public statements and, except at a general level, cannot engage in policy discussion. That said, she has deftly used the symbols of the Presidency to highlight issues and moral concerns.
- While Robinson will be interested in hearing your comments on current world crises such as Bosnia, she may defer to Foreign Minister Spring to comment for the Irish side.
- It would, of course, be wholly appropriate to express your admiration for Robinson's courage in making her trip to Somalia and to seek her personal comments about her experiences there.
- You may also wish to explore her thoughts on the future of the Northern Ireland "troubles," ways to build trust between the two communities, and what role the U.S. might appropriately take. She has no doubt thought a great deal about Northern Ireland and as President has been involved personally. She is the first Irish President to have paid official visits to both Northern Ireland, where she called on members of both communities, and mainland Britain, where she attended the memorial service for the Warrington bombing victims.

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- You will find Robinson a stimulating interlocutor. She has close ties to the U.S., having studied for a year at the Harvard Law School, an experience she considers to have been critical to her development. Before becoming President, she had developed a reputation as a radical--at least in Irish terms--for tackling such sensitive issues as divorce and birth control.
- Robinson and FM Spring are both from the Labor Party and considered politically close.
- Her election, although in part the result of a scandal involving her opponent, symbolizes the change underway in Ireland from a rural, conservative, Catholic society to a more urban, liberal, secular one.
- Robinson's visit offers you the chance to reaffirm your commitment to making a positive contribution to the solution of the Northern Ireland problem.
- You may also wish to use the occasion to state our determination to cooperate in dealing with the humanitarian crises and ethnic conflicts with which the post-Cold War world is plagued.

## II. TOPICS

- Affirm our common ties and values, as epitomized by our cooperation in helping the victims of the disaster in Somalia.
- Express your appreciation for the courageous efforts of Irish aid workers in Somalia and for Ireland's activism in UN peacekeeping around the world.
- Confirm your support for peace, justice, and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and for friendship between Ireland and the UK.
- Express your continued backing of the Northern Ireland talks process and seek Robinson's thoughts on what the U.S. might usefully do to aid the process and to bring an end to terrorism.
- Bring Robinson up to date on the latest developments in Bosnia and what the United States is doing to address humanitarian needs and work for a peaceful solution there.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
IRISH PRESIDENT MARY ROBINSON

Northern Ireland

- I'm interested in your assessment of the situation in Northern Ireland.
- Let me reiterate the messages I conveyed to Prime Minister Major and to Prime Minister Reynolds.
  - Northern Ireland will remain on my agenda with both countries.
  - Dialogue among the parties is essential. I'm pleased that both Prime Ministers will be meeting in June. I hope this will lead to resumption of the talks soon thereafter.
  - We will continue to condemn terrorism and to support human rights.
  - We will continue to support the International Fund for Ireland. Indeed, this year -- for the first time -- we are going to the Congress to ask for \$20 million for the Fund in our FY 94 budget request.
  - We stand ready to contribute in a constructive way to bring about peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

Somalia

- Congratulations on your award from Care for your efforts on behalf of the Somali people. Your October 1992 trip to Somalia was instrumental in focusing the world's attention on the tragedy. The award is well deserved, and we all extend our appreciation and gratitude.
- As you know, we turned the operation over to the United Nations. But, we will stay involved for months to come to ensure the success of the UN effort.
- Ireland's contribution to UNOSOM II is important and much appreciated. I hope the Irish force is deployed soon.

Sudan

- I am determined to do more to help resolve the crisis that is putting a million people at risk of starvation.
- We need to use our influence on the Government of Sudan and the rebels to negotiate seriously in Abuja, Nigeria under the auspices of the Nigerian government.

- I'm aware that your Deputy Foreign Minister Kitt travelled to Sudan, and that Irish Concern, which has done so much in Somalia, is involved there as well.
- How do you see European thinking developing on this crisis?

Bosnia

- I decided on the course of action Secretary Christopher advanced in Europe because the present state of affairs was unacceptable. I hope we can achieve a common approach that maintains the unity of our pressure on the Serbs. Our efforts have paid some dividends:
  - Milosevic has distanced himself from the Bosnian Serbs once he recognized that we were not going to tolerate the present situation.
  - We have a cease fire that appears to be holding.
- We're continuing our consultations with our allies, and Secretary Christopher met earlier this week with Boutros-Ghali.
- We need to keep the pressure on Milosevic to ensure that he keeps his pledge to cut off the flow of all but humanitarian goods to the Bosnian Serbs. This weekend's referendum will have no international standing whatsoever.

EC, GATT/URUGUAY ROUND

- Concluding an Uruguay Round agreement is essential if we are going to pull the world out of current economic doldrums.
- Our goal is to have the Uruguay Round completed by December 15 and a market access agreement by the time of the G-7 summit. I discussed this on May 7 with Jacques Delors and Danish Minister Rasmussen. We were agreed on a general strategy to achieve that goal and that U.S.-EC cooperation should lead the way.
- Success requires that the EC stick by the Blair House accords on agriculture. I understand that Ireland has had questions about these agreements, but I hope that the Irish Government will firmly support them and not give comfort to any other member states trying to block further trade progress.
- We are particularly concerned that the EC approve the oilseeds portion of the Blair House agreements in time to affect the September plantings. Otherwise, we will face pressure to react.

Special Envoy (If Raised)

- I had good discussions with Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Reynolds on Northern Ireland. Let me reiterate what I told them, that my policy rests on three principles:
  - First, Northern Ireland will remain an important issue for discussion between my Administration, Ireland, and Great Britain.
  - Second, any proposals we make will be judged against the standard of whether they can contribute to bringing about an end to the tragedy.
  - Third, we will consult fully with both governments.
- I am prepared to send a U.S. representative at the appropriate time if the parties believe such a step would advance the cause of peace.
- Ultimately, I believe it's up to the people of Northern Ireland to bring about an end to the tragedy.

Tax on U.S. Subsidiaries In Ireland (If Raised)

- I understand your concern about maintaining a favorable environment for U.S. investment in Ireland.
- At the same time, I need to ensure that our tax laws are equitable.
- My proposal is less onerous than other ideas being considered in the Congress. Under my proposal, Ireland would still be attractive for U.S. investment because we would allow U.S. subsidiaries abroad to continue to defer taxes on profits that are actively reinvested in plant and equipment.

Gerry Adams (If Raised)

- The State Department, with the support of the FBI, declined to recommend a waiver to Mr. Adams to allow him entry into the United States. I support that decision.
- The issue was not one of free speech but of our own law regarding visas for individuals who have engaged in terrorist activity.

## CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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2011-0355-F (3.45)

KSH 4/11/2023

Multi-Party TalksDaily Report - 18 November 19961. In summary:

- The Plenary met for half an hour this morning and adjourned until Wednesday morning, (not before midday, and subject to the Chairman's call) in order to facilitate further bilaterals.
  - We met the British Government, the SDLP and the UDP. There was general consensus that the talks may shortly break down over decommissioning unless a way can be found through the present impasse.
  - We made clear that the Government would wish to be convinced that the approach proposed by the British Government last week is a viable exit strategy - rather than a potential trap which effectively involves ratcheting us close to the Washington Three precondition and is also at variance with the Mitchell Report.
2. The Government delegation today was led by Minister Coveney.
  3. The Plenary, chaired by PM Holkeri, met at noon for half an hour. It was agreed that it would be helpful to let bilaterals continue and that the Plenary would not meet again before noon on Wednesday. (It seems unlikely it will meet before next week).
  4. In this session, McCartney (in the unchallenged role of spokesman for the Unionist side) summed up three points from the papers submitted by the three Unionist parties. First, any ceasefire declared must be complete in nature in permanent in extent. Second, the declaration must be accompanied by the handing-over of a substantial amount of weapons. Third, decommissioning must not be linked to progress in the negotiations.
  5. At a bilateral meeting, the Secretary of State explained last week's British Government paper in terms of the UUP's need for political cover in the context of possible Sinn Féin entry into the talks. The paper had not been shown to David Trimble but its ideas had been aired with him (and had drawn a less than enthusiastic response). The Secretary of State underlined how close the talks were to collapse.
  6. Minister Coveney recognised this but made clear that we could not go along with an approach which involved a retreat towards Washington Three. Efforts were being made to satisfy Trimble's voracious appetite for political cover at the expense of most other interests in the talks process. The Minister recalled the successive steps agreed to by the two Governments in order to meet Unionists concerns. These had been

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entirely unreciprocated.

7. The Secretary of State and Michael Ancram denied any intention to revert to Washington Three. We commented that the British proposal was either an exit strategy or a trap. If they could persuade us that it offered the former, and did not simply involve further ratcheting back to Washington Three, our Government would be willing to look at this. If, however, we were being asked simply to "try this out", without any guarantee that it would secure the transition to meaningful three-stranded negotiations and a realistic approach to decommissioning, this would effectively mean that the talks were going to break down over the decommissioning issue. If so there was little point in going to elaborate lengths merely to come up with the same outcome at a slightly later stage.
8. In response, the British emphasised the non-mandatory nature of the judgement which they were proposing for the Commission and also the value of the envisaged liaison committee as a means of ensuring political input to this judgement. They indicated that Trimble had been unenthusiastic about vesting in the Commission anything approximating to a decision on the timing of decommissioning.
9. The meeting ended inconclusively. The discussion will be resumed at the Conference meeting scheduled for Wednesday evening.
10. The SDLP indicated some annoyance to us over the UUP's preparation and subsequent circulation of a paper (which effectively aligns them with the DUP and UKUP positions on decommissioning) at the very time when the SDLP and the UUP were supposedly engaged in bilateral efforts to find a joint solution to the impasse. They were, in consequence, reserved on the Alliance proposal for a trilateral meeting between the SDLP, the UUP and Alliance.
11. The UDP expressed considerable gloom about the prospects for the process and the consequences of a collapse for their own situation on the ground. They showed disappointment with the position reflected in the UUP paper, and asked the two Governments to intercede with the SDLP and the UUP to find an agreed way forward.
12. They expressed extreme unease at the prospect of setting up the verification commission "upfront" and indicated they may now become more overtly critical of the Unionist Parties' position (Ervine seems to be thinking along the same lines).
13. We were told today that General De Chastelain planned to discuss with the two Governments some ideas arising from contacts which he had with "the parties" last week, but is persuaded of the wisdom of clearing this with Senator Mitchell first.
14. The SDLP briefed us on bilaterals they had with the UUP and Alliance this afternoon.
15. The UUP delegation had included Trimble and Maginnis, who seemed to have no knowledge of earlier UUP/SDLP discussion, and denied there had been any bad faith in publishing a paper on decommissioning which bore no relationship whatever to that

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discussion. It was unclear to the SDLP whether they were signalling there was any latitude in terms of their stated position, so a further meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow. (They mentioned the forthcoming DUP Conference as an inhibiting factor for discussions next week).

16. Alliance seemed in despair and conceded that the current UUP seemed to vindicate the pessimistic analysis on Unionist intentions which the SDLP had proffered to the Alliance Party proposal last week. They will have a trilateral with Alliance and the UUP tomorrow, but without any great expectations.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.46)  
KBH 4/11/2023

September 30, 1996

*Phone list*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*  
FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *MAP*  
SUBJECT: Telephone Call to John Holmes, September 30

Nat'l Sec Advisor  
has seen

**NOTED**

Nancy spoke with Dermot today, who asked that you postpone calling Hume until after the Hume-Adams meeting that is taking place today. Dermot will call with a readout of that meeting tonight or tomorrow morning. Dermot also told Nancy that Dublin has requested several fixes to the draft Major statement designed to reassure Sinn Fein and the IRA (Tab A). London has accepted two of Dublin's suggestions: references to the three strands and to nurturing Irish culture.

Of the other two Irish suggestions, we do not think Dublin's request for a change in the wording on the timeframe issue (page 3, paragraph 4) is substantive enough for you to raise with Holmes. But the suggestion that the reference to parallel decommissioning (page 2, paragraph 3) be revised to reflect the Mitchell Report's language that the parties "consider" parallel decommissioning has merit. Depending on how the conversation goes, you may wish to raise it with Holmes.

Your main reason for calling Holmes, however, is to discuss the UUP's unhelpful response to the Anglo-Irish proposal on how to handle decommissioning (Tab C). In essence, it rejects the two governments' suggested "exit strategy" and insists on advance commitment to a timetable for decommissioning. It is clearly based on the fear that Sinn Fein is about to join the talks.

Dermot also gave Nancy a readout of the meetings Bruce Morrison and his group had in Ireland last week. They were buoyed by their meeting with Adams, who told them he wants to get the cease-fire restored "now." One of the group, Chuck Feeney, warned that his funding of Sinn Fein operations in the U.S. would end if there were a "spectacular" bombing on the mainland. Bruce will be meeting with Nancy tomorrow to give her a full briefing.

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Reason: 1.5b  
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Adams' attitude and the fact the British have produced a statement that goes quite far to address Sinn Fein concerns suggest we may have window to get the cease-fire restored. The chances will be greatly reduced, however, if Trimble continues to stonewall on decommissioning. You should talk to Holmes about how the meeting between Mayhew and Trimble today went and what HMG has up its sleeve if Trimble remains obdurate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Holmes today, Hume tomorrow and Adams after speaking with Hume.

Approve DL Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Annotated Copy of Draft British Statement
- Tab C Hume/Adams Draft of September 7
- Tab D UUP Paper on Handling Decommissioning

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2011-0355-F (3.47)  
KBH 4/11/2023

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
JOHN HOLMES

- Understand UUP has responded to the proposed "exit strategy" with a paper of its own that does not move issue forward.
- How did bilateral meeting between Trimble and Mayhew/Ancram go today? Any flexibility on Trimble's side?
- Have seen the UUP paper. Still insists on advance commitment to timetable for decommissioning, which is dead end.
- UUP paper seems based on fear that Sinn Fein will join talks. To what extent do you think Trimble's goal is just to keep them out?
- Brings me to second issue -- your draft statement. Think it looks good, addresses substance of all issues Hume/Adams raised.
- Also hearing positive things from Irish American group led by Bruce Morrison that was in Ireland last week. They feel that Adams wants to push for cease-fire on basis of forthcoming British statement.
- May also be that break-up of IRA cell in London means that those republicans who favor restored cease-fire have less time to make it happen.
- Whatever odds of new cease-fire, need to do everything possible to bring it about. IRA will be skeptical about joining talks deadlocked over decommissioning. What can be done to get past the hurdle?
- I plan to call Hume tomorrow to tell him I think your statement is very forthcoming. I will also call Adams.
- If needed: Understand Irish made several suggestions about your text. One that struck us as possibly having merit was to rephrase reference to parallel decommissioning to reflect actual language in Report of International Body.

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PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8622

INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 9613

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0082

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2011-0355-F (3.48)

KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/06

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH REACTION TO IRISH CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

REF: DUBLIN 5482

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J. HABIB, MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5(B).

2. (C) NIO ASSOCIATE POLITICAL DIRECTOR JONATHAN STEPHENS CONFIRMED TO US NOVEMBER 1 THAT MAYHEW'S REACTION "WAS NOT POSITIVE" TO SPRING'S PROPOSAL THAT SINN FEIN BE INCLUDED IN THE TALKS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE IRA DECLARES A CEASE-FIRE. (REFTEL) HOWEVER, AN IRISH POSITION PAPER SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED TO HMG DESCRIBED AN "UNEQUIVOCAL" CEASE-FIRE BEING THE OPERATIVE CRITERIA FOR SINN FEIN'S ADMISSION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT PROPOSITION, IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHAT DUBLIN ACTUALLY WANTS.

3. (C) STEPHENS SAID THERE ARE LEGAL AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO PROCEEDING AS FM SPRING PROPOSED. ON THE LEGAL FRONT, THE ENABLING LEGISLATION PASSED BY PARLIAMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR REQUIRES THE IRA'S CEASE-FIRE BE "UNEQUIVOCAL" BEFORE SINN FEIN CAN BE ADMITTED TO THE TALKS. ONCE THE CEASE-FIRE IS JUDGED TO BE GENUINE, ADMISSION IS AUTOMATIC WITH NO OTHER CONDITIONS. THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY PROVISION FOR "A LIMITED ENTRY" FOR THE PURPOSE OF PLEDGING ADHERENCE TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES, ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY SPRING. ADMISSION OF SINN FEIN, THEREFORE, REQUIRES A DETERMINATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS "UNEQUIVOCAL."

4. (C) THAT SUCH A JUDGMENT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MAJOR'S GOVERNMENT TO MAKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER A CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION IS THE HEART OF THE POLITICAL OBJECTION TO SPRING'S PROPOSAL. NOT ONLY WOULD UNIONISTS WALK OUT OF THE TALKS, BUT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES AND EVEN IN THE CABINET. MOREOVER, THE BRITISH

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PAGE 02 OF 03

GOVERNMENT, WHICH FELT IT WAS BURNED BY THE IRA'S TACTICAL CEASE-FIRE LAST TIME, IS NOT INCLINED TO MAKE A SNAP DECISION OR "WORKING ASSUMPTION" THIS TIME AROUND. SOME SORT OF WAITING PERIOD IS "INEVITABLE," ACCORDING TO STEPHENS, AND SPRING'S PROPOSAL IS "JUST NOT A RUNNER."

5. (C) NONETHELESS, STEPHENS REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MAY NOT BE TOO FAR APART ON THIS ISSUE. IN HIS VIEW, IT IS MORE A QUESTION OF HOW THE WAITING PERIOD IS PRESENTED THAN WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A WAITING PERIOD -- BY WHATEVER NAME -- BEFORE SINN FEIN CAN BE ADMITTED. STEPHENS SAID THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS TALKED ABOUT TAKING A LONG CHRISTMAS RECESS STARTING IN MID- OR EVEN EARLY-DECEMBER. IF ONE TAKES THE VIEW IT IS "UNREALISTIC" FOR SINN FEIN TO EXPECT TO BE INCLUDED BEFORE CHRISTMAS, THIS IS A WAY PROVIDE A "NATURAL BREAK" OF TWO MONTHS OR MORE.

6. (C) IN THE MEANTIME, HE SAID, THERE COULD BE "HEAVY HINTS" FROM GOVERNMENTS THAT SINN FEIN WILL BE ADMITTED AFTER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS ENDS. STEPHENS ALSO SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN PRIOR TO ITS ADMISSION TO THE TALKS. SUCH CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE PORTRAYED TO UNIONIST AUDIENCES AS A WAY TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS GENUINE, COULD PROVIDE A INTERIM BRIDGE FOR SINN FEIN'S LEADERSHIP INTO THE TALKS.

7. (C) STEPHENS SAID THAT MAJOR IS WAITING TO HEAR BACK FROM HUME, WHO IS CONTINUING TO WORK WITH ADAMS. STEPHENS' UNDERSTANDING IS THAT, WHILE THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION BETWEEN MAJOR AND HUME OF AN EXPLICIT TIME FRAME FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN AN IRA CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION AND SINN FEIN ENTRY, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SOME TIME WOULD HAVE TO PASS. STEPHENS SAID HMG HOPED HUME WOULD EXPLORE WITH ADAMS VARIOUS FORMULATIONS FOR A CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION WHICH MIGHT BRING DOWN THE LENGTH OF THAT INTERVAL. THE MORE A DECLARATION WENT TOWARD "PERMANENCE" AND "IRREVOCABILITY," AND THE MORE EXPLICITLY IT RECOGNIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF "CONSENT," THE MORE FLEXIBILITY THERE MIGHT BE ON THE TIME PERIOD.

8. (C) IN ANY EVENT, STEPHENS SAID, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO DO NOTHING WHICH DIMINISHES THE PROSPECTS FOR A GENUINE IRA CEASE-FIRE. IT IS KEEN TO AVOID THE PERCEPTION OF THIS WAITING PERIOD AS A "PRE-CONDITION." HE THOUGHT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MIGHT MEET ON MONDAY TO WORK OUT POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR PRESENTING A WAY FORWARD, UNLESS "SOMETHING HAPPENS FASTER THAN THAT." STEPHENS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE "EXPECTS THINGS TO COME TO A HEAD QUICKLY," PERHAPS EVEN THIS WEEKEND. WHETHER THAT MEANS A CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION OR ANOTHER BOMB, HE WAS NOT CLEAR.

BRADTKE

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October 10, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS, ACTING *MP*  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting and Lunch with John Holmes,  
October 11, 1996, 10:30 a.m.



**Agenda**

- 10:30-11:30: Northern Ireland
- 11:30-11:45: Iraq
- 11:45-12:00: ACRF/Nigeria
- 12:00-12:20: Bosnia
- 12:30-2:15: Lunch: NATO Enlargement/Adaptation; Other Issues

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2011-0355-F (3.49)  
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Nancy and I will attend the whole session. Mark Parris, Mac DeShazer, John Feeley and John Schmidt will join us for the discussion of their issues. Peter Tarnoff will join the meeting at about 11:00. Ambassador Kerr will join us from 11:30 on with John Sawers from the Embassy.

**Northern Ireland**

You will want to have a very frank exchange with Holmes about what to do next to keep the political process going. Virtually everyone, including Dick Spring, has made a statement to the effect that the Stormont talks cannot be held up for Sinn Fein, which has only itself and the IRA to blame for its exclusion. Adams did not help matters by implying that the IRA attacks will continue until Sinn Fein is let into the talks. (What he actually said was, "If we don't fill the political vacuum with real talks, then it is going to be filled by the type of incident we saw yesterday.")

The good news is that the police have arrested a suspect in the Lisburn bombing, identified only as a Belfast man. The bad news is that police have announced that the planning for the Lisburn attack began at least as far back as June, when one of the cars used was purchased. The press coverage in Ireland is focusing on the weight of evidence that even during the cease-fire there was no abatement in preparations for military activities.

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The Irish response to the Lisburn bombing has been as strong as the British. Major accused Sinn Fein of "sickening hypocrisy," while Bruton accused the IRA of "cynical betrayal" of the peace process and compared the republican movement to the Nazis. Bruton has also ordered a full review of Dublin's policy toward Northern Ireland, in particular its attitude toward the republican movement. The question of continued contact by sub-ministerial officials with Sinn Fein is under discussion, but Dublin will probably not cut off contact yet. It remains to be seen whether the shared outrage among the governments and the parties will galvanize them to defy the IRA and prove the talks worthwhile.

**Talks:** You should ask Holmes for his assessment of the mood in the Stormont talks and see if he is as optimistic as Gary McMichael was that the parties may find a way to move to substantive talks within weeks. Trimble is calling for a definitive exclusion of Sinn Fein from the talks, but so far London and Dublin are considering more nuanced approaches. One option would be to set aside decommissioning and move to substance, with the understanding that any prospect of Sinn Fein's entry would require that decommissioning be addressed first. That would amount to a "bye" for the loyalists, which would be a fitting reward for their restraint. Another option reportedly under discussion between the two governments would be to set a date by which time Sinn Fein would have to enter the talks (on the basis of a cease-fire of course) or be excluded from this round. London and Dublin are also discussing the option of firming up the conditions under which Sinn Fein could enter the talks; i.e., define "dependable." This could also include actions like an end to punishment beatings.

Depending on what Holmes says, you may want to explore other ways to get the talks moving without closing the door completely to Sinn Fein participation, including the idea, supported mainly by nationalists, of a more "directive" approach by the two governments. The British tend to oppose this concept, because it implies acknowledging that the talks have failed. However, having the governments fill the vacuum is something that will need to be revisited if the talks do not move to substance by the end of the month. We do not recommend suggesting an off-site meeting between Trimble and Hume at this point because that would undercut the loyalist leaders when they need us most.

**Cease-Fire:** You should urge Holmes to follow through on the Hume/Adams initiative, however unlikely it seems that it will succeed. You will have spoken with Hume and should have an idea of the IRA's response to the British text. You should tell Holmes that you declined to respond to Adams for a few days but see no purpose in cutting off contact at this point and plan to

talk to him early next week. As you know, Ancram has adopted Bruce Morrison's modifier, "dependable," to describe a cease-fire that is backed by actions or appropriate circumstances as well as words. Unless it is the price of progress in the talks, you should urge that HMG not define this term any further.

*Mitchell:* Martha told Nancy that she thinks Mitchell would be willing to clear his calendar and return to Belfast for a week or so if the two governments think that would be useful. Frankly, from our perspective it would be very useful to have Mitchell return at this point as a symbol of U.S. engagement and a catalyst for progress. We have also heard that Holkeri is a less effective chairman than Mitchell, in part because of the language difference. You should indicate to Holmes that Mitchell is probably available and suggest that his return for a short period could galvanize efforts to get the talks into the substantive phase.

*Trimble:* We think it is time to contact Trimble again, particularly as the UUP have criticized our willingness to maintain contact with Sinn Fein. The UUP office here has said Trimble may be interested in visiting the U.S. at the end of November. You should confirm with Holmes that he thinks it would be useful for you to call Trimble and ask what message would be most helpful to convey.

*U.S. Role:* The Pittsburgh conference showcased at a critical moment our long-term commitment to the peace process. Your speech got good press in Ireland, as in "Lake Signals Continued U.S. Support for Peace Search." However, the fact that the bombing took place during the highly-publicized Pittsburgh conference raises the question of how much importance IRA decision-makers now attach to the USG role in the process. You should tell Holmes that the President wrote to Major and Bruton (in case he left before the message arrived). You should mention that you are thinking of making a trip to London, Dublin and Belfast just after the election and see how he reacts. Your purpose will be to talk with both governments and encourage the parties to make real progress before the holidays. You should also offer to invite the loyalists, as well as Trimble and Hume to come here when they can be spared from the talks.

*Forum:* Time permitting, you should raise the forum and whether there is any prospect the SDLP would rejoin if progress were made at Stormont. You should also ask whether the unionists, who control the forum now, have adopted rules that would make SDLP's return even more difficult.

**Iraq**

Holmes will probably want to review several aspects of Iraq policy:

- **The situation in the south:** Trends continue to move in the right direction. The risk is acceptable; however, we are monitoring the situation closely.
- **Next steps in the north:** We are continuing to refine our thinking about the north, even as we have begun a new round of consultations with the Turks. (See cable at Tab A.) The Turks have not responded formally, but are pleased with this presentation. We have scheduled talks with KDP in Washington for October 17 and 18. We will want to explore the KDP's commitment to cut ties to Baghdad, their security concerns, their willingness to engage on the PKK issue and their thinking about a political/administrative framework for northern Iraq.
- **Reaction to British proposal for a Coalition Military Observers Group (CMOG):** The Brits believe that an on-the-ground presence in the north is required if Barzani is to cut his ties to Saddam and cooperate on issues such as the PKK. Hence, they have proposed that the MCC be reconfigured, redefined and renamed. CMOG, the new presence, would monitor Iraqi activities in the north, support of Resolution 688, maintain contact with the Kurdish factions and liaise with the aid organizations. While there could be civilians attached to the organization, it would be primarily a military operation. We have not progressed very far in our thinking about a presence in northern Iraq. Though State is favorably disposed to some type of returned presence, DOD is strongly opposed to a renewed military ground presence. **Therefore, if Holmes raises the issue, you should indicate that we are still reviewing the British proposal**

We do not see any need to discuss Iran. Though Holmes may reiterate HMG's request to be informed if investigations reveal an Iranian involvement in the Al Khobar attack.

**ACRF**

Nancy met with the British DCM, David Logan, on ACRF this week. We also have a cable suggesting that Foreign Secretary Rifkind may want to discuss it with Secretary Christopher. **You should underscore to Holmes how important we think it is that the British participate in ACRF and ask for further clarification of what HMG is willing to contribute.**

## Nigeria

Holmes may ask about Secretary Christopher's Africa trip and recent press reports that the U.S. is launching a fresh effort for sanctions against Nigeria. You should emphasize that there is no change in our policy on Nigeria; our goal remains to promote a credible transition to civilian, democratic rule and respect for human rights and to advance counternarcotics and anti-crime efforts. We still believe a combination of pressure through sanctions and dialogue is required to spur progress. HMG recently denied Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi's wife a visa for medical treatment. Holmes may express concern that we might grant her a visa. You should tell him that no decision has been made; we are seeking to determine the nature of her illness and will evaluate the request on humanitarian grounds.

## Bosnia

Holmes will likely reiterate the UK's willingness fully to support a NATO follow-on security force in Bosnia if the Allies, and especially the United States, decide to accept such a mission. The UK supports the U.S. position of a smaller force committed for up to a year. You should emphasize that we will continue to be engaged in Bosnia (economically, politically, etc.) after IFOR leaves, but that our decision on a follow-on force awaits the deliberations at NATO. You should also emphasize the importance of Allies not presupposing too early in the NATO decision-making process that one post-IFOR option is a winner. The NMA study should address all four options even-handedly when it is eventually presented for NAC discussion on or after November 6. In addition, you may want to state that the United States will expect Allied support on several "fronts" if the President decides to commit U.S. troops to a follow-on force, including arms control, funding for economic reconstruction and assistance, support for an enhanced international police task force, and a unified strategy regarding the "outer wall."

## NATO Internal Adaptation

The big issue remains the French demand that the U.S. relinquish command of AFSOUTH. This demand, set out in an August 28 Chirac letter to the President, represented a sharp escalation in what the French were seeking in the way of European visibility within NATO. It came, annoyingly, almost immediately after we conceded to them on giving the Deputy SACEUR responsibility for managing ESDI. At any rate, we have now put our foot down and made clear that we will not give up AFSOUTH. Although some within the French bureaucracy are taking us at our word, Chirac remains

insistent on the issue. There are even hints that, if we do not change our mind, not only will France not reintegrate, but "enlargement" could be affected.

The British support us on this issue, but hope we can come up with some compromise that will satisfy French desires for command. There are things that can be done for the French. For instance they could aspire to the deputy and chief of staff slots in AFSOUTH, to overall command (on a rotational basis with other Europeans) of a second regional command, and to the Deputy SACEUR position if it becomes rotational. We could certainly live with any of these possibilities. **You should make clear our bottom line, suggest we are prepared to be flexible short of this, and seek British views on where they see the issue leading, particularly in light of German support of the French position.**

#### NATO Enlargement

It is up to you how much detail you want to go into here. On timing for a NATO summit, we have announced our formulation of spring/early summer. The Germans are on board. The French have hinted they might want it to slip until the fall. The British have suggested March might be a good time since they would like it to precede their parliamentary elections. We can live with July but no later; March seems too early, particularly since the Germans are likely to insist on "early summer." The British may tease you out on the "who." USG views seem to be coalescing around the obvious three plus Slovenia, with Romania a dark horse that will probably not make it.

**You should identify the question of what to do about aspiring NATO members who do not make the first cut as a critical problem. We know you have your own strong views on this. Within the USG generally, there is some staff-level support for institutionalizing the intensified dialogues in some way, stating at the summit that the first group will not be the last, and establishing a regular review process. The British are very nervous about making any commitment to a second tranche and will probably need to be convinced about a review process as well. You should feel them out on these points.**

Holmes may also probe you about what Christopher meant by the Atlantic Partnership Council he proposed in his Stuttgart speech. As we conceive it, the APC would replace the NACC while establishing, for the first time, a multilateral forum for discussion of PFP issues.

**NATO-Russia**

You should summarize the current two-track Russian approach as it has surfaced in the Talbott-Mamedov discussions and in conversations with Primakov. Moscow continues publicly to oppose enlargement -- with varying degrees of protest -- while privately agreeing to talk about formalizing a stronger NATO-Russia relationship. Moscow wants a treaty instead of a political charter, negotiated prior to enlargement, and a clear voice in decisions. We have said that negotiations with Russia can parallel enlargement decisions, but that enlargement will not depend upon reaching agreement with Russia. **Our view is that we should agree on a NATO-Russia charter that would establish a partnership based on regular 16 plus 1 meetings at the Permrep and Political Committee level (possibly others as well) under the rubric of a "Standing Consultative Commission" or other fancy name.** While NATO could never agree to a Russian veto on anything, this new relationship could take decisions on issues where there was mutual interest in so doing. We are also prepared to restate our NATO enlargement study undertakings on forward and/or nuclear deployments, but our watchwords are "no negotiations," "no diminution in NATO flexibility," and "no second class status for new NATO members."

**Other Issues**

*BBG:* Over lunch you should also raise the need to move quickly to identify a suitable successor for Boutros Ghali. The British are among those who understand that our position on this is firm. **You should emphasize that we want to avoid wrangling that will damage the UN and ask Holmes how we think we should proceed to get other governments to put forward candidates.**

*Helms Burton:* The British are not less opposed to Helms Burton (and the Iran Libya Sanctions Act) than their European colleagues but they are more pragmatic about the constraints we are operating under, particularly with regard to Title III. With the Spanish, the British are looking for the right time to get the EU to make a statement conditioning improved EU-Cuba ties on a political/economic opening (consistent with the EU's decision last spring to break off talks with Cuba on a trade and cooperation agreement). Nevertheless, the UK supported the EU decision to take us to the WTO over Helms Burton and the UK's own laws against complying with other countries' extraterritorial legislation are among the strictest in Europe. **You should underscore with Holmes the need for parallel European action, (as Stu Eizenstat has laid out), to foster democracy in Cuba, in addition to an EU statement along the lines the UK has in mind.**

Concurrences by: Dan Fried, John Schmidt, Ki Fort, Mac }  
DeShazer, Steve Grummon, John Feeley } *AKS*

Attachment  
Tab A Cable

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 22, 1996

WAP

- 6 weeks plus  
Christmas break  
- publish?  
- Surveillance + targeting  
- 3 month CBM's  
→ 11 decontamination

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS (ACTING) ~~WAP~~

SUBJECT: Recommended Calls to Holmes and Adams re  
Hume/Adams Initiative

Last week Adams faxed you his paper explaining the rationale for the points Sinn Fein wants made in a British public statement on the peace process (Tab A). On Friday Holmes faxed you a draft paragraph that the British propose adding to "a somewhat revised text" (Tab B). The gaps between HMG's text of September 27 and the October 10 Hume/Adams draft are probably bridgeable -- the only substantive difference is about the timeframe.

Even if the textual and timeframe issues can be resolved, however, we still face the catch-22 of the new paragraph spelling out the conditions for Sinn Fein to enter the talks, including the decontamination period. If that paragraph is added (instead of the words "from that point") it will be more difficult for Adams to get the IRA's assurance that it will restore the cease-fire in response to release of the text. But without such an assurance, HMG will be reluctant to issue the statement at all.

Holmes has said that he is seeking our views and Dublin's on the new paragraph and the "decontamination period" concept. Dublin seems inclined to stick to the position that Sinn Fein should be allowed to join the talks after an unequivocal cease-fire; they want to leave the words "from that point" in the text. They can argue that the legislation HMG passed last spring to allow the May 30 election envisages Sinn Fein taking its seat following an unequivocal cease-fire without further delay. At the end of the day, I suspect Dublin will recognize the need for a waiting period of some duration. (At Tab C are Dublin's composite of the latest HMG and Hume/Adams texts and a close-hold paper with Dublin's comments on the differences.)

Another potential problem is the paragraph on CBM's in the paper Gerry faxed. The October 10 Hume/Adams draft adds a sentence on equal treatment of both communities that is probably acceptable, with a fix or two. However, Adams' paper focuses on the need for a detailed program of CBM's from HMG. He says, "As part of this,

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the British government need to outline clearly and in some detail the substance of the programmatic approach they intend to take." That suggests another precondition for a cease-fire -- not only an agreed public statement but also an agreed program of CBM's.

**POINTS FOR HOLMES**

- Would like to clarify point in your cover letter of Friday -- does "somewhat revised text" mean revision of your text of September 27? Were you able to accept any of the language Hume gave you on October 10?
- Hope you will accept as much of the Hume/Adams language as possible.
- On decommissioning, know Dublin thinks reference should be to actual language of International Body's report. Able to do that?
- Timeframe has become central concern for Sinn Fein. See difficulty with it (may even play into unionist hands). What about language committing you and Dublin to try to get parties to set timeframe?
- Agree on need for some way to define or recognize "unequivocal" or "dependable" cease-fire. Though unwelcome to IRA, probably preferable to ambiguity about the hurdles Sinn Fein would face.
- To preserve some chance of new cease-fire, definition of conditions for SF entry needs to be accompanied by movement to substance in talks.
- If Trimble is not prepared to go to substance while there is even slight possibility of eventual Sinn Fein participation, can you and Dublin take initiative and move talks forward anyway?
- What is Dublin's reaction to proposed new paragraph?
- Question whether explicit reference to surveillance and targeting is good idea -- might be better to pass message informally that you will be looking at that. (Note: This was Mitchell's concern.)

**POINTS FOR ADAMS**

- Have looked at your paper. Have you shared it with others?

- On cease-fire, you are aware of reaction of other parties to Lisburn bombing. Question of what constitutes "unequivocal" is going to have to be addressed. *Borke has been raised*
- On decommissioning, convinced London wants to move to substantive negotiations on basis of Mitchell Report. Don't know whether HMG will look at new language.
- At some point Sinn Fein will be expected to sign on to concept of decommissioning in parallel with political progress. Arguing that all Mitchell suggested was that parties consider such an approach is pure semantics.
- Understand desire to see timeframe imposed on talks. But aren't you concerned that unionists would be tempted to "run out the clock?" Don't know how far two governments can go on this without agreement of parties.
- Concerned by paragraph on CBM's in your paper. Language on equal treatment, CBM's in October 10 draft not far from HMG language. But your paper appears to suggest new requirement for agreed program of CBM's.
- CBM's important, but Mitchell Report foresees them in tandem with political progress, not as result of cease-fire.

Attachments

Tab A Adams' paper

Tab B Holmes Letter/New Paragraph

Tab C Irish Composite Text and Comments

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October 18, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Comments on Adams' Paper

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.51)  
KBH 4/11/2023

After talking with you on October 14, Adams faxed us a copy of a paper (Tab A) that goes into more detail on the thinking behind the latest Hume-Adams text provided to the British. It is not clear whether we are the only ones who have it or what Adams plans to do with it. He did say that if you have any comments, he would welcome them. In the context of the call, it is possible that he is seeking to have you make the points in the paper to the British on Sinn Fein's behalf.

The paper makes more explicit the gap between what Adams wants and what the British are likely to be prepared to do. There is even a chance that Adams is deliberately setting the bar too high for the British because he knows there will be no cease-fire. More likely he is trying to get as much as possible from the British in order to sell it to the IRA.

There is a real question about whether you should get in the middle. If you do, the first step would probably be to call Holmes to see how close they think they can come to the latest Hume/Adams text. You could then call Adams and give him your sense of how far the British are prepared to go. However, the addition of the new paragraph specifying a decontamination period would almost certainly kill the possibility of a cease-fire in response to the editorial, at least in the short term. Since it is only to get a cease-fire that the British are prepared to do this, we may have to figure a way past this stalemate.

Below is a short analysis of the issues Adams raises and the likely British position.

Paragraph 1: Adams is clearly concerned that the British are moving to add qualifiers to the condition of an unequivocal cease-fire. In other words, he is not willing to pay a price for Lisburn, and would strongly oppose the language Holmes faxed you today. The British, however, believe that they are already taking the high road by not slamming the door on Sinn Fein participation; they see a definition of "unequivocal" or

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 10/18/06

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"dependable" as the minimum they can get away with in light of unionist and general public opinion.

Paragraph 2: This is the issue of how to refer to parallel decommissioning that the Irish have already raised; it is probably bridgeable.

Paragraph 3: The timeframe issue continues to puzzle me because it seems more logical for unionists than republicans to favor a set ending date. Sinn Fein may assume that if the talks don't reach agreement in a set period, the alternative is an imposed solution, whereas it is more likely to be the status quo. The difference on this may be bridgeable.

Paragraph 4: This is the section that raises the most questions about the seriousness of this initiative. Adams calls on the British to commit to unilateral steps on issues he views as related to equality and democracy and therefore not subject to negotiation. However, the unionist community does not yet accept the need for equality of treatment for the Irish "culture and identity;" in some respects that is what this whole process is about. And Adams says that the governments would have to commit to action on prisoners, emergency legislation and policing in the event of a cease-fire. All these are CBM's that the Mitchell Report relates to progress in the talks, not to the existence of a cease-fire.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 13, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Designation of Terrorist Organizations: Northern Ireland Dimension

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.52)  
KBM 4/11/2023**

The new Anti-Terrorism Act authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a list of foreign terrorist organizations for the purposes of the Act. To qualify for designation, an organization must be foreign and engage in terrorist activity which "threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States." According to Global, the bill is probably elastic enough to include groups that are terrorist, even if they are not carrying out terrorist acts. And a separate section of the law says that a group can be designated if it threatens U.S. "foreign relations." (Thus the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) is expected to be designated, though it does not target Americans, nor are American interests likely to be directly affected.)

Designated organizations may have their assets seized and it will be illegal for U.S. citizens to make financial contributions to them. (Heretofore contributions to the IRA, for instance, were only illegal if they were to be used in the commission of a criminal act.) The list of foreign terrorist organizations is expected to be finalized and published in the federal register within several weeks.

State has sent a draft list of terrorist organizations to overseas posts for comment. Dublin responded by supporting the designation of PIRA, while suggesting the designation should be reviewed in the event of a cease-fire (Tab A). London also endorsed the inclusion of PIRA but recommended as well that we designate the splinter republican groups and, more problematical, the loyalist paramilitary groups as well (Tab B). The groups in question are the Ulster Defense Association, Ulster Freedom Fighters, Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Command, which comprise the Combined Loyalist Military Command. London argues that failure to designate these groups will appear inconsistent, especially since the loyalist paramilitaries are proscribed as terrorist organizations by the British. However, the Embassy

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Reason: 1.5(b)

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recognizes the weight of arguments against designating the loyalists and would defer to Senator Mitchell if he felt that doing so would be detrimental to his efforts in the talks.

In the European Directorate's view, designating the loyalist paramilitaries as terrorist organizations risks being seen as a repudiation by the U.S. of the loyalist political leaders. Ervine and McMichael would have difficulty explaining why, when the loyalists did not follow the IRA in breaking the cease-fire, they now find themselves on the same list with the IRA. We should not take the risk that our action would tip the scales and bring about an end to the loyalist cease-fire.

However, we should recognize that if we do not designate the loyalists, we may have to seek to remove the IRA from the list at some point after the cease-fire is restored. Removing organizations from the list on the basis of a cease-fire may turn out to be difficult.

Concurrences by: Steve Simon, Alan Kreczko



RECOMMENDATION

You do not have to make a decision yet on whether to designate the loyalists, but we recommend you call Mitchell as soon as possible to get his views on the issue.

Attachments

Tab A Cable from Dublin  
Tab B Cable from London

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**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

DIST: NODIST, PETERS, SIMON

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PREC: PRIORITY      CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~      DTG: 101458Z SEP 96

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:  
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1075

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (3.53)  
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 004566

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT, S/IR AND EUR/UBI

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/06  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF PIRA AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 180482

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. ~~(S)~~ EMBASSY DUBLIN AGREES WITH REFTEL LISTING OF PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FOR PURPOSES OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (P.L. 104-132). WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT INTENSE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS INVOLVING THE U.S., IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS, AS WELL AS POLITICAL FIGURES ON THE GROUND IN NORTHERN IRELAND, HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE FEBRUARY TO PERSUADE PIRA TO RESTORE ITS CEASEFIRE PERMANENTLY. SHOULD THESE EFFORTS SUCCEED, THE ISSUE OF PIRA BEING LISTED AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD NEED TO BE REVIEWED. SMITH

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01  
<^SSN>4566  
<^TOR>960910130958 M2393205

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PREC: IMMEDIATE      CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~      DTG: 101611Z SEP 96

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6821

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.54)

KBH 4/11/2023

RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 9388  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 5048

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 011052

EXDIS

FOR S/CT AND EUR/UBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/01

TAGS: PTER, ASEC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: UK

REF: STATE 180482

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION. REASON: 1.5(D)

2.  EMBASSY STRONGLY SUPPORTS PROPOSED DESIGNATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS  
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3.  IN ADDITION, WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT LOYALIST GROUPS NOTED BELOW, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ALSO BE DESIGNATED AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS:

- A) IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (INLA)
- B) IRISH PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (IPLO)
- C) REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN (RSF)
- D) ULSTER DEFENSE ASSOCIATION (UDA)
- E) ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS (UFF)
- F) ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE (UVF)
- G) RED HAND COMMANDO (RHC)

4.  AS OUTLINED IN PARA 12 BELOW, THESE GROUPS HAVE ENGAGED

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IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH THREATEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH THESE ORGANIZATIONS GENERALLY ARE SMALLER AND LESS INFLUENTIAL THAN THE PIRA, THEY ARE NOT LESS VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS; ALL HAVE REFUSED TO RENOUNCE TERRORISM UNCONDITIONALLY. EMBASSY BELIEVES FAILURE TO INCLUDE THESE GROUPS ON THE LIST OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS COULD LEAD TO ACCUSATIONS THAT WE ARE SINGLING OUT THE PIRA SOLELY FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THUS ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO INFLUENCE KEY PARTIES IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS.

DESIGNATION OF LOYALIST GROUPS: POLITICAL CONTEXT  
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5. ~~(S)~~ HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH APPLY TO THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES. THE GROUPS -- THE UFF, UVF, UDA AND RHC -- CURRENTLY ARE OBSERVING A CEASE-FIRE DECLARED IN 1994 BY THE COMBINED LOYALIST MILITARY COMMAND (CLMC). THIS CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN HELD TOGETHER WITH GREAT DETERMINATION BY LOYALIST POLITICAL LEADERS EVEN AFTER THE IRA ABANDONED ITS CEASE-FIRE IN FEBRUARY, 1996. ALTHOUGH INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE IN THE WAKE OF THE DISTURBANCES AT DRUMCREE LAST JULY AND WEAKENED BY INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE IN RECENT WEEKS, THE CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IN PLACE. MOREOVER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE GROUPS ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PEACE TALKS CHAIRED BY SENATOR GEORGE MITCHELL. WHILE THIS DOES NOT MEAN THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE FORMALLY RENOUNCED VIOLENCE, THEY ARE PARTICIPATING IN A PROCESS WHICH, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD LEAD TO THE DECOMMISSIONING OF TERRORIST WEAPONS AND A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

6. ~~(S)~~ U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE LOYALISTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR CEASE-FIRE. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF PRAISING PUBLICLY THE RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE LOYALIST ORGANIZATIONS. OUR PUTTING THE LOYALISTS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE CONDUCTING ACTIVE TERRORST CAMPAIGNS COULD UNDERCUT THE LOYALIST LEADERS WHO ARE TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY CRITICAL IN THESE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 9 REOPENING OF THE PEACE TALKS WHEN THE LOYALIST CEASE-FIRE HAS COME UNDER PARTICULAR STRAIN. SOME LOYALISTS COULD USE THE "LACK OF INTERNATIONAL RESPECT" FOR THEIR EFFORTS AS A POST HOC RATIONALIZATION SHOULD THEY GO OFF THE RESERVATION.

7. ~~(S)~~ ON THE OTHER HAND, DESIGNATING ONLY IRISH REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND NOT INCLUDING LOYALIST GROUPS COULD LEAD TO CHARGES OF POLITICAL BIAS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE LOYALIST ORGANIZATIONS CONTAIN DANGEROUS ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF THREATENING U.S. INTERESTS, EVEN IF THEY GENERALLY HAVE REFRAINED FROM CONDUCTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR TWO YEARS. MOREOVER, AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED THE UDA, UVF, UFF AND RHC PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS, OUR FAILURE TO DO SO COULD BE SEEN AS INCONSISTENT: IF EVEN THE BRITISH CONSIDER

THE LOYALIST GROUPS TERRORISTS, WHY DOESN'T THE U.S.? (SEE PARA 10-11 BELOW.) EVEN THOUGH THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN DECLARED ILLEGAL, THE LEADERS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO ATTEND THE TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ELECTORAL MANDATE, AS LONG AS THE CEASE-FIRE HOLDS. DESIGNATION BY THE U.S. OF THE UDA, UFF, UVF AND RHC AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WOULD NOT CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE LOYALIST POLITICAL LEADERS, ALTHOUGH IT COULD BE CITED BY THOSE WHO WISH TO SEE THE LOYALISTS EXCLUDED.

RECOMMENDATION ON LOYALISTS: DO THE WORK, HOLD THE FINDING  
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8. ~~(S)~~ UNLESS THERE IS COMPELLING REASON TO BELIEVE THEIR DESIGNATION WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SENATOR MITCHELL'S EFFORTS, EMBASSY BELIEVES THE LOYALIST GROUPS SHOULD BE NAMED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. BUT THE DECISION TO SO DESIGNATE THE LOYALIST GROUPS REQUIRES A SENSITIVE POLITICAL JUDGMENT. WE WOULD NOT WANT U.S. ACTIONS TO BECOME A FACTOR, EVEN TANGENTIALLY, IN A DECISION BY THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES TO END THEIR CEASE-FIRE. CLEARLY, THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IS BETTER SERVED BY THE LOYALISTS' CONTINUING PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE TALKS. BY MID-OCTOBER WE WILL HAVE A CLEARER SENSE OF THE DURABILITY OF THE LOYALIST CEASE-FIRE AND OF THE TALKS' PROSPECTS. THEREFORE, WHILE THE GROUNDWORK FOR FORMALLY DESIGNATING THEM SHOULD PROCEED, WE BELIEVE THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVIEWED AGAIN JUST BEFORE THE SECRETARY SIGNS THE FINDING, AS WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION AT THAT TIME TO MAKE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL DETERMINATION.

9. ~~(S)~~ WHATEVER DECISION IS MADE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE ABLE TO BRIEF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN ADVANCE OF PUBLICATION OF THE LIST AND THAT WE HAVE CAREFULLY PREPARED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE READY.

BRITISH LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
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10. ~~(S)~~ UNDER THE NORTHERN IRELAND EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ACT (EPA), WHICH WAS RENEWED BY PARLIAMENT IN 1996, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DECLARE ILLEGAL ANY ORGANIZATION WHICH APPEARS TO HIM TO BE "CONCERNED IN TERRORISM OR IN PROMOTING OR ENCOURAGING IT" IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ALL OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN, IDENTIFIED IN PARA 3 HAVE BEEN DECLARED "PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS" BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. UNDER THE EPA, IT IS ILLEGAL TO BELONG TO OR GIVE FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT TO A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION, OR EVEN TO ARRANGE OR ADDRESS A MEETING OF A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION. MEMBERSHIP BY ITSELF IS PUNISHABLE BY UP TO 10

YEARS IN PRISON, ALTHOUGH IN PRACTICE HMG HAS NEVER BROUGHT A PROSECUTION FOR MEMBERSHIP ALONE BUT ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER CRIMINAL OFFENSES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED IN PARA 3, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED THREE OTHER GROUPS -- CUMANN NA BAN, FIANNA NA EIREANN AND SAOR EIRE -- AS PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND EPA. HOWEVER, THESE ARE FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES DEFUNCT ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT CAPABILITIES TO UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS. EMBASSY DOES NOT THEREFORE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO DESIGNATE THESE GROUPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE "PROVISIONAL" IRA AND THE "OFFICIAL" IRA: IT IS THE "IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY" WHICH IS PROSCRIBED. HOWEVER, AS THE "OFFICIAL" IRA HAS BEEN LARGELY INACTIVE SINCE 1972 WHEN IT DECLARED A CEASE-FIRE, EMBASSY BELIEVES SPECIFIC DESIGNATION OF THE PIRA ACCURATELY REFLECTS CURRENT REALITY AND THAT NO SEPARATE DESIGNATION OF THE OIRA IS REQUIRED.

12. ~~(C)~~ EMBASSY PROVIDES FOLLOWING OUTLINE DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPOSED DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. WE WILL SEND MORE DETAILED INFORMATION BY SEPTTEL AS REQUIRED.

A) IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (INLA)  
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THE INLA WAS SET UP IN 1975 AS THE MILITARY WING OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST PARTY (IRSP), ALTHOUGH IRSP LEADERS DISCLAIMED THE LINK. IT WAS DECLARED A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1979 BASED ON ITS ENGAGEMENT IN VIOLENT ACTIVITIES AND ITS CONTACTS WITH TERRORIST GROUPS OUTSIDE BRITAIN AND IRELAND. IT HAS GAINED A REPUTATION FOR RUTHLESSNESS AND CALLOUS INDIFFERENCE TO SUFFERING OF INNOCENTS. ALTHOUGH MANY OF IT ATTACKS HAVE BEEN ON MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES, IT ALSO HAS TARGETED POLITICAL FIGURES. IN 1979 IT ASSASSINATED A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, AIREY NEAVE, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY SPOKESMAN ON NORTHERN IRELAND, WITH A CAR BOMB IN WESTMINSTER. THE INLA PROBABLY HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED DEATHS. IT HAS NEVER DECLARED A CEASE-FIRE AND BITTERLY CRITICIZED PIRA LEADERS WHEN THEY CALLED A CEASE-FIRE IN 1994. JUST BEFORE PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT IN NOVEMBER 1995, IRISH POLICE INTERCEPTED A TRUCK CARRYING EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE BORDER, PROBABLY BEING MOVED INTO PLACE FOR AN ATTACK ON BRITISH SECURITY FORCES. SINCE THE ORGANIZATION'S INCEPTION, AND ESPECIALLY IN RECENT YEARS, INLA LEADERS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED NEARLY CONSTANTLY IN DEADLY FEUDS AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH

OTHER REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS. ONE OF ITS FIRST ACTS WAS TO KILL THE OFFICIAL IRA BELFAST BRIGADE COMMANDER IN 1975. SIX PERSONS, INCLUDING A NINE-YEAR OLD GIRL, HAVE BEEN KILLED THIS YEAR IN ATTACKS RELATED TO THE INTERNAL INLA FEUD. THE MOST RECENT MURDER TOOK PLACE ON SEPTEMBER03, 1996.

B) IRISH PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ORGANIZATION  
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A 1986 SCHISM IN THE IRISH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST PARTY LEAD TO FORMATION OF THE IPLO AS A FACTION OPPOSED TO THE INLA. IT ENGAGED IN A BLOODY FEUD WITH THE INLA THAT LED TO THE KILLING OF MORE THAN A DOZEN PERSONS BEFORE A TRUCE WAS CALLED IN 1987. ITS BASE OF STRENGTH IS THE DIVIS/FALLS ROAD AREA OF BELFAST. FROM 1988-90, IT ENGAGED IN A BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN BELFAST, INCLUDING THE ATTEMPTED MURDERS OF TWO UNIONIST MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT USING LETTER BOMBS. BY THE EARLY 1990'S THE IPLO WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN DRUG-DEALING AND A MURDER CAMPAIGN AGAINST LOYALIST PARAMILITARY MEMBERS. IN DECEMBER 1992 THE PIRA THREATENED TO TAKE "MILITARY ACTION" AGAINST THE IPLO. THESE IPLO CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CONTINUE TO DATE. THE IPLO WAS LISTED AS PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN 1990.

C) REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN  
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REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN BROKE AWAY FROM THE PIRA FOLLOWING THE GENERAL ARMY COUNCIL MEETING OF 1986 IN WHICH COUNCIL VOTED TO END THE POLICY OF ABSTENTION FROM THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. RSF HAS VOWED TO CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE; IT SEEKS TO ESTABLISH A "DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC" ON THE ISLAND OF IRELAND. RSF OPPOSED THE PIRA CEASE-FIRE IN 1994 AND, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE ACCOUNTS, WORKED TO UNDERMINE THE CEASE-FIRE. RSF HAS CLOSE CONTACTS (OR PERHAPS UNITY OF MEMBERSHIP) WITH THE "CONTINUITY ARMY COUNCIL" THE GROUP BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING OF THE KILLYHELVIN HOTEL IN ENNISKILLEN IN JULY, 1996.

D&E) ULSTER DEFENSE ASSOCIATION/ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS  
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THE UDA HAS REMAINED THROUGHOUT THE TROUBLES THE LARGEST PROTESTANT PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION. IT WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN 1992. THE UFF IS A COMPONENT PART OF THE UDA, OFTEN REGARDED SIMPLY AS A COVER NAME FOR MURDER OPERATIONS. IT HAS BEEN A PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATION SINCE 1973.

F) ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE  
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THE MODERN UVF WAS CONSTITUTED IN 1966 AS AN "ANTI-IRA FORCE." IT HAS CONDUCTED HUNDREDS OF MURDERS OF REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY AND INNOCENT CATHOLICS. IT IS A SMALLER ORGANIZATION THAN THE UFF, BUT AS DEADLY. THE UVF WAS PROSCRIBED IN 1975.

H) RED HAND COMMANDO  
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THE RHC WAS LAUNCHED IN 1972 AND IS BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED IN  
SECTARIAN ASSASSINATIONS. IT WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN 1973.  
THE RHC HAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE UVF.

CROWE

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01

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KRM 4/11/2023

November 19, 1996



INFORMATION

*WP*

*- Comprehensive  
- timeframe*

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: VAL MARTINEZ *VM*

SUBJECT: Sequence and Strategy for Northern Ireland,  
November 20-27, 1996

The next week to ten days may well be critical in Northern Ireland. The British and Sinn Fein can only keep up their public signaling for so long before the unionists rebel or one side or the other sends a wrong signal. I recommend a series of phone calls in the coming week, in the following sequence and with the following rationale.

Wednesday, November 20: Call to Gerry Adams

This call is already scheduled for 1100 on November 20. You should speak to Adams first in any event in order to get a sense of what he knows of a possible British public statement. The message to him should be straightforward: the IRA needs to strip down superfluous demands and focus on what is attainable. Prisoners and police reform are important issues, but they are also long-term problems that can block the short-term necessity - an IRA ceasefire followed by Sinn Fein's entry into all-party talks.

Adams will complain that the British are not serious, that they keep creating new "pre-conditions." You can point out that the British are leaning Sinn Fein's way in a number of areas -- the inclusive nature of the talks, the comprehensive agenda they will have, the recognition that they cannot drag on forever. Further, Patrick Mayhew went out of his way on November 15 to reiterate yet again that HMG does not seek "victory" over the IRA. Adams must be made to see that, despite the chasm of distrust and antipathy between Sinn Fein and HMG, they in fact share one key interest: Sinn Fein's inclusion in the Stormont talks.

To get Sinn Fein into those talks, however, remains the problem. The British need assurance that any IRA ceasefire is unequivocal;

this British need is the IRA's stumbling block. Adams has to be convinced, and then convince the IRA Army Council, that this airlock issue has to be finessed. Recent IRA planning and operational activities only make this more obvious -- and more difficult.

We should be blunt with Adams about this, yet sweeten it with an offer that if the ceasefire/Sinn Fein-in-talks scenario pans out, Adams should come here to brief you and that the White House would give his visit good visibility. You might also point out to Adams that you are prepared to speak to the British about the need for them to be as reasonable as possible as well -- that is, pressing HMG to stay with the idea of an unequivocal ceasefire and away from problem areas for Sinn Fein like consent.

Thursday, November 21: Call to Dick Spring

Spring sees Mayhew in Belfast on November 20. You will want to ask him how the British saw things developing. The Irish also had a meeting with Martin McGuinness on November 15. You will want to get Spring's sense of what is possible and where we go from here. You will want to note the airlock issue won't go away, but that we know it needs to be finessed.

Thursday or Friday, Nov 21-22: Call to John Holmes

With Holmes, you will want to flip-flop the approach with Adams. Let Holmes know you have been pressing the Sinn Fein president to come up with a good ceasefire declaration, one that avoids demands (prisoners, police reform) HMG clearly cannot meet, and that you have stressed to Adams the British need for assurances that this ceasefire is for real. You might then note to Holmes that it would help if the British also kept to the key issue -- a dependable IRA ceasefire and the ways for HMG to judge that ceasefire.

The British want Sinn Fein in the talks, albeit not at any price. You should query Holmes on how much flexibility HMG has in being imaginative about the period of time needed to judge a ceasefire and whether quick bilaterals with Sinn Fein are a possibility, and at what level the British might hold them.

Friday or Monday, Nov 22 or 25: Call to David Trimble

You should call Trimble and tell him you look forward to seeing him in early December. Trimble will grouse about the British betraying him and the UUP once again. When he's finished we will need to get a sense of just how hard up the Ulster Unionists are about an airlock and where they stand, precisely, on decommissioning. You should explore with Trimble the creative

possibilities of a Christmas break in the talks as a natural airlock.

Friday or Monday, Nov 22 or 25: Call to John Hume

At some point, you will need to touch base with Hume again, both to get his sense of where things are going, and where we might be helpful.

Should you agree with this basic approach, I will provide separate talking points for each conversation.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LONDON 05524

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*QNI/PHUM*

DISSEMINATION: POL  
CHARGE: STA

APPROVED: POL:MJHABIB  
DRAFTED: POL/I:LKROBINSON  
CLEARED: CONS/ACS:JMOYES CONS:JCALLAGHAN POL/D:GWCHAPMAN

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DEPT FOR EUR/UBI AND DRL

NSC FOR STEPHENS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PHUM PINS PTER PREL UK EI  
SUBJECT: PRISON CONDITIONS FOR IRA CONVICTS IN ENGLAND

SUMMARY

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1. (C) SINN FEIN/IRA COMPLAINTS TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, IRA CONVICTS IN ENGLISH PRISONS ARE TREATED NO WORSE -- AND OFTEN BETTER -- THAN ENGLISH CRIMINALS SERVING COMPARABLE SENTENCES ON NON-TERRORIST CHARGES, ACCORDING TO A SENIOR PRISON SERVICE OFFICIAL. THE PRISON REGIME THROUGHOUT ENGLAND TIGHTENED SIGNIFICANTLY AFTER TWO HIGH-PROFILE ESCAPE ATTEMPTS LAST AUTUMN. FIVE IRA CONVICTS INVOLVED IN THE SEPTEMBER 9 BREAKOUT AT WHITEMOOR WERE TRANSFERRED TO BELMARSH IN SOUTH LONDON, WHICH IS NORMALLY USED FOR

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SUSPECTS AWAITING TRIAL, BECAUSE NO LONG-TERM HIGH-SECURITY FACILITY WAS AVAILABLE; THEY WILL BE MOVED ON TO PARKHURST, WHITEMOOR OR FULL SUTTON WHEN SECURITY UPGRADES THERE ARE COMPLETE.

2. (LOU) SPECIFIC IRA COMPLAINTS, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL, WERE GENERATED BY THE GENERAL TIGHTENING, RENEWED COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARD REGULATIONS, THE PRISONERS' OWN DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO USE LETHAL FORCE IN ORDER TO ESCAPE, AND THEIR REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH PRISON OFFICIALS. TWO OF THE MAIN COMPLAINTS -- ABOUT VISIT CONDITIONS AND UNIFORMS -- HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. END SUMMARY.

#### REPUBLICAN CHARGES

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3. (U) IN RECENT MONTHS, THERE HAS BEEN A SWELLING CHORUS OF COMPLAINTS FROM THE IRA/SINN FEIN, THEIR SUPPORT GROUPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN ENGLISH JAILS. FOR SINN FEIN, THIS HAS FORMED A PART OF ITS AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN TO OBTAIN AMNESTIES FOR ALL "POLITICAL PRISONERS," WHICH HAS INCLUDED RALLIES, PICKETS, BREACHES OF SECURITY AT BELFAST AIRPORT AND OTHER FACILITIES, AND LOBBYING OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

4. (U) THE BASIC REPUBLICAN CHARGE IS THAT LIVING CONDITIONS FOR IRA PRISONERS IN ENGLAND HAVE DETERIORATED SHARPLY SINCE THE IRA CEASEFIRE -- THAT CONVICTS HAVE BEEN BEATEN, HELD IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, DENIED EXERCISE AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, GIVEN INADEQUATE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES, SUBJECTED TO BODY AND CELL SEARCHES, AND HAD UNREASONABLE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON FAMILY VISITS. SINN FEIN ALLEGES THAT THE HOME OFFICE (WHICH ADMINISTERS THE PRISON SERVICE) IS DELIBERATELY TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. (C) THE OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PRISON CONDITIONS, AND SHADOW NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MO MOWLAM VISITED SEVERAL OF THE PRISONERS INVOLVED IN THE COMPLAINTS, AS DID AN IRISH TD. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM HMG ON THE COMPLAINTS, AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE TOLD US APRIL 12 THAT A MEETING BETWEEN HOME OFFICE AND IRISH OFFICIALS HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR APRIL 20.

#### PRISON SERVICE EXPLANATION

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6. (C) WE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE APRIL 12 WITH PHIL WHEATLEY, HEAD OF THE CUSTODY GROUP IN PRISON SERVICE HEADQUARTERS. WHEATLEY IS THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIAL

DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING AND MONITORING LIVING AND SECURITY STANDARDS IN BRITISH (THOUGH NOT NORTHERN IRELAND'S) PRISONS.

7. (C) WHEATLEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CONDITIONS FOR HIGH-RISK PRISONERS HAD INDEED BEEN TIGHTENED LAST AUTUMN, BUT NOT JUST FOR IRA CONVICTS AND NOT BECAUSE OF HE CEASEFIRE. RATHER, THE TIGHTENING CAME IN RESPONSE TO ESCAPE ATTEMPTS AT THE HIGH-SECURITY PARKHURST AND WHITEMOOR PRISONS. IN THE FORMER CASE, THREE ENGLISH PRISONERS OBTAINED KEYS FROM A GUARD AND REMAINED AT LARGE ON THE ISLE OF WIGHT FOR SEVERAL DAYS. IN THE LATTER, FIVE IRA CONVICTS AND ONE ENGLISH CRIMINAL USED SMUGGLED HANDGUNS AND WIRE-CUTTERS TO BREAK OUT OF WHITEMOOR ON SEPTEMBER 9, INJURING A GUARD IN THE PROCESS, BUT WERE APPREHENDED WITHIN HOURS.

8. (U) AN INVESTIGATION AT WHITEMOOR BY CAMBRIDGESHIRE POLICE AFTER THE BREAKOUT REVEALED THAT THE REGIME FOR IRA PRISONERS HAD BEEN ASTONISHINGLY LAX:

- FAMILY VISITS WERE ALMOST COMPLETELY UNSUPERVISED (WHEATLEY SAID HE WAS "REASONABLY CONFIDENT" THAT THE GUNS USED IN THE BREAKOUT WERE BROUGHT IN BY PRISONERS' WIVES);
- HIGH-SECURITY PRISONERS (UNLIKE ANY OTHER INMATES) WERE ALLOWED TO WEAR THEIR OWN CLOTHING, MAKING THEM HARDER TO IDENTIFY IF THEY ESCAPED;
- THE IRA PRISONERS WERE PERMITTED TO ORDER FOOD IN FROM LOCAL TAKE-OUTS, AND EVEN GOT GUARDS TO GO SHOPPING FOR THEM;
- THEIR CELLS WERE ALMOST NEVER SEARCHED; AND
- ONE OF THE IRA CONVICTS HAD HIDDEN A QUANTITY OF SEMTEX IN HIS PERSONAL POSSESSIONS THAT WERE STORED PENDING HIS RELEASE.

9. (C) AFTER THE ESCAPES, WHEATLEY EXPLAINED, HOME SECRETARY MICHAEL HOWARD LAUNCHED OUTSIDE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE SECURITY BREACHES, ORDERED STRICT ADHERENCE TO PRISON REGULATIONS, AND PUT SENIOR PRISON SERVICE OFFICIALS ON NOTICE THAT THEIR JOBS WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY IF THERE WERE ANY MORE ESCAPES.

10. (C) AFTER THE ESCAPE ATTEMPT AT WHITEMOOR, WHEATLEY CONTINUED, THE SIX PRISONERS INVOLVED HAD BEEN KEPT IN AN ISOLATION UNIT THERE DURING THE POLICE INVESTIGATION. WHEN THE INVESTIGATION RECOMMENDED

SEVERAL PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES, PRISON SERVICE MANAGERS DECIDED THE SIX COULD NOT BE KEPT IN ISOLATION ANY LONGER, AND WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED. BUT THE OTHER TWO HIGH-SECURITY PRISONS, PARKHURST AND FULL SUTTON, ALSO NEEDED THE SAME UPGRADES AND WERE NOT AVAILABLE.

11. (e) THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE, WHEATLEY SAID, WAS THE HIGH-SECURITY UNIT AT BELMARSH PRISON IN SOUTH LONDON, WHICH WAS USED PRIMARILY TO HOUSE "REMAND" PRISONERS (THOSE AWAITING TRIAL). BELMARSH WAS "NOT GOOD, BUT THE BEST AVAILABLE." AS SOON AS THE PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES WERE COMPLETED AT WHITEMOOR, PARKHURST AND FULL SUTTON, THE SIX ESCAPEES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO ONE OF THOSE LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONS.

13. (e) A KEY PROBLEM AT BELMARSH, WHEATLEY SAID, WAS THAT THE VISITING ROOM LACKED ADEQUATE VIDEO MONITORS. IN VIEW OF THE DEMONSTRATED HIGH RISK POSED BY THE SIX PRISONERS, "OPEN" VISITS WITH THEIR RELATIVES OR LAWYERS WERE NOT FEASIBLE UNTIL MORE CAMERAS COULD BE FITTED. THE PRISONERS WERE OFFERED "CLOSED" VISITS (THROUGH A HEAVY PLASTIC SCREEN, AS IN U.S. HIGH-SECURITY PRISONS), BUT THEY DECLINED. INSTALLATION OF NEW CAMERAS HAD NOW BEEN COMPLETED, AND "OPEN" VISITS WERE AGAIN AUTHORIZED. HOWEVER, THE WHOLE ISSUE OF "OPEN" VISITS WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE HOME OFFICE, AND IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ALL HIGH-SECURITY PRISONS WOULD BE ORDERED TO SHIFT TO "CLOSED" VISITS ONLY.

14. (e) STANDARD TREATMENT OF ANY RETURNED ESCAPEES, WHEATLEY EXPLAINED, WAS TO PUT THEM ON AN "E-LIST" AND MAKE THEM WEAR DISTINCTIVE PRISON UNIFORMS WITH YELLOW PATCHES (SO THEY WOULD BE EASIER TO SPOT IF THEY GOT OUT AGAIN). TWO OF THE SIX AT BELMARSH HAD REFUSED TO WEAR THE UNIFORMS, AND CHOSE INSTEAD TO WRAP THEMSELVES IN BLANKETS IN THEIR CELLS (AS IRA PRISONERS AT THE MAZE IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAD DONE IN THE "BLANKET PROTEST" OF THE LATE 1970'S). THE PRISON AUTHORITIES DID NOT TRY TO FORCE THEM TO WEAR THE UNIFORMS, BUT REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM OUT OF THEIR CELLS CLAD ONLY IN BLANKETS. THIS DISPUTE HAD BEEN RESOLVED APRIL 12 BY A PRISON SERVICE DECISION THAT THE MEN WERE WELL ENOUGH KNOWN THAT THEY COULD SAFELY BE TAKEN OFF THE "E-LIST" AND GIVEN REGULATION UNIFORMS.

15. (e) WHEATLEY STRESSED THAT THE FIVE IRA PRISONERS AT ELMARSH, AND ANOTHER GROUP AT FULL SUTTON WITH OTHER COMPLAINTS, WERE NOT BEING TREATED ANY DIFFERENTLY THAN ENGLISH CONVICTS WHO POSED COMPARABLE SECURITY RISKS. IN FACT, THE ONLY DISCRIMINATION HAD BEEN IN THE PREVIOUS REGIME AT WHITEMOOR, WHERE THE MAINLY IRA GROUP

OF HIGH-SECURITY PRISONERS HAD ENJOYED MUCH MORE RELAXED AND FAVORABLE CONDITIONS THAN MOST ENGLISH CONVICTS. THE WHITEMOOR ESCAPEES (INCLUDING THE NON-IRA ONE) WERE CERTAINLY UNDER GREATER RESTRICTIONS NOW, "BUT YOU CAN'T SHOOT A PRISON OFFICER WITHOUT EXPECTING LIFE TO BE REASONABLY DIFFICULT THEREAFTER."

SPECIFIC RESPONSES  
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16. (LOU) QUERIED ABOUT SPECIFIC REPUBLICAN ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT (CULLED FROM A SERIES OF ARTICLES IN THE SINN FEIN WEEKLY "AN PHOBLAUGHT"), WHEATLEY OFFERED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES:

CHARGE: THE WHITEMOOR ESCAPEES HAD BEEN BRUTALLY BEATEN BY PRISON OFFICERS ON THEIR RECAPTURE.

REPLY: THESE ALLEGATIONS HAD BEEN REFERRED TO THE CAMBRIDGESHIRE POLICE FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION; ANY PRISON OFFICER FOUND TO HAVE BEATEN THE PRISONERS WOULD BE PROSECUTED.

CHARGE: AFTER THE ESCAPE ATTEMPT, THE IRA PRISONERS WERE KEPT LOCKED UP 23 HOURS A DAY AND DENIED ACCESS TO THEIR PERSONAL POSSESSIONS.

REPLY: SEE PARA 10 ABOVE. THE PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN ISOLATION AT WHITEMOOR DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THEIR ESCAPE ATTEMPT. THEIR "PERSONAL POSSESSIONS" HAD INCLUDED PISTOLS, WIRE-CUTTERS AND SEMTEX; POLICE CONDUCTED A VERY THOROUGH SEARCH OF MATERIALS LEFT IN THE CELLS.

CHARGE: MOST OF THE ESCAPEE'S PERSONAL PROPERTY WAS DESTROYED.

REPLY: SOME OF THEIR POSSESSIONS, SUCH AS RADIOS AND TAPE PLAYERS, MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISMANTLED TO CHECK FOR EXPLOSIVES. THE INVESTIGATING POLICE HAD CUSTODY OF THE POSSESSIONS, AND WERE LIKELY TO BE PRESERVING THEM AS POTENTIAL EVIDENCE.

CHARGE: THE MEN WERE DENIED ACCESS TO THEIR CLOTHING.

REPLY: SEE PARA 14 ABOVE. PREVIOUS PERMISSION TO WEAR THEIR OWN CLOTHING HAD BEEN A DEVIATION FROM STANDARD REGULATIONS.

CHARGE: AT BELMARSH, THE IRA FIVE WERE SUBJECTED TO STRIP SEARCHES AS OFTEN AS THREE TIMES A DAY, AND DAILY CELL SEARCHES.

REPLY: GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE PRISONERS HAD APPARENTLY OBTAINED WEAPONS DURING FAMILY VISITS, AND A HISTORY IN NORTHERN IRELAND OF SIMILAR SMUGGLING BY RELATIVES AND PERHAPS LAWYERS, THE SIX (INCLUDING THE NON-IRA ESCAPEE) WERE SEARCHED AFTER EACH VISIT. THEIR CELLS WERE SEARCHED ABOUT ONCE EVERY TWO WEEKS, AND THEY WERE MOVED TO NEW CELLS ABOUT MONTHLY (TO DISRUPT ANY ATTEMPT TO FILE THROUGH BARS OR DIG THROUGH WALLS).

CHARGE: PRISONERS AT FULL SUTTON WERE KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FROM LATE DECEMBER UNTIL MID-MARCH ON A TRUMPED-UP CHARGE BECAUSE THEY HAD REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SYSTEM, AND WERE TOLD THEY COULD HAVE VISITORS ONLY IF THEY WORE PRISON UNIFORMS.

REPLY: THE REGIME AT FULL SUTTON WAS AFFECTED BY THE GENERAL TIGHTENING OF ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS AFTER THE WHITEMOOR AND PARKHURST ESCAPES. THREE IRA PRISONERS HAD REFUSED TO COOPERATE. AFTER TWO AEROSOL CANS WERE FOUND BEHIND A STOVE, IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO CAUSE AN EXPLOSION, THE THREE HAD BEEN FURTHER SEGREGATED "UNTIL THEY GAVE SOME COOPERATION." THIS REGIME HAD BEEN LOOSENED RECENTLY BECAUSE "WE ASSUMED THEY WOULD COOPERATE IF THEY WERE LET OUT, AND THEY DID."

CHARGE: PRISONERS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO TALK TO THEIR FAMILIES IN IRISH.

REPLY: FULL SUTTON PRISONER FEILIM O HADHMAILL INSISTED ON SPEAKING IRISH WITH HIS WIFE (BOTH ARE NATIVE ENGLISH SPEAKERS), AND THE PRISON HAD NO WAY TO MONITOR THEIR CONVERSATIONS. CONCERNED THAT THEY MIGHT BE PLOTTING AN ESCAPE ATTEMPT, PRISON AUTHORITIES FORBADE THIS. HOWEVER, THEY ACCEPTED THAT THE O HADHMAILLS WERE TRYING TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN AS IRISH SPEAKERS, SO THEY ARRANGED TO TAPE THE CONVERSATIONS IN IRISH AND FORWARD THEM TO BELFAST FOR ANALYSIS. THE PROHIBITION HAD THEN BEEN LIFTED. BELMARSH HAD A PRISON OFFICER FLUENT IN IRISH, SO THE ISSUE DID NOT ARISE THERE.

CHARGE: THE IRA PRISONERS WERE DENIED COMPASSIONATE PAROLE (IN ONE CASE TO ATTEND A MOTHER'S FUNERAL) WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN

NORTHERN IRELAND.

REPLY: THE SAME RESTRICTIONS APPLY TO ALL HIGH-SECURITY PRISONERS IN ENGLAND. THE REGIME IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE LENIENT.

CHARGE: VISITS AT BELMARSH WERE CANCELED ON SHORT NOTICE ON THE "LAME REASON" THAT SECURITY CAMERAS HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED.

REPLY: "LAME" PERHAPS, BUT THE REAL REASON. SEE PARA 13 ABOVE. PERMISSION TO VISIT WAS NOT DENIED OR CANCELED, BUT THE RELATIVES WERE TOLD IT WOULD BE UNDER "CLOSED" CONDITIONS; THEY REFUSED.

CHARGE: THE IRA PRISONERS AT BELMARSH ARE SUBJECTED ILLEGALLY TO A 21-HOUR LOCK-UP REGIME.

REPLY: BELMARSH IS NOT STAFFED TO PERMIT OPEN CELLS IN THE EVENING FOR HIGH-SECURITY PRISONERS. THE SIX ESCAPEES ARE ALLOWED OUT FOR FREE ASSOCIATION WITH EACH OTHER FOR OVER SEVEN HOURS A DAY, STANDARD FOR ALL HIGH-SECURITY PRISONERS AT BELMARSH. THE REGIME IS IN TECHNICAL BREACH OF A RULE ALLOWING FREE ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER PRISONERS; THE ESCAPEES AT BELMARSH ARE SEGREGATED BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH HIGH-RISK AND CONVICTED, PUTTING THEM IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM ALL OTHERS THERE. THEY WILL BE ALLOWED MORE TIME OUT OF CELLS, AND FREE ASSOCIATION, WHEN THEY ARE TRANSFERRED TO LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONS.

CHARGE: ONE PRISONER AT BELMARSH HAS BEEN REFUSED ACCESS TO STUDY MATERIALS.

REPLY: THE PRISONER IS STUDYING FOR A DEGREE IN IRISH THROUGH THE TELEVISED "OPEN UNIVERSITY." THIS REQUIRES WATCHING TELEVISION IN LATE EVENING, WHEN BELMARSH IS NOT STAFFED TO ALLOW HIGH-SECURITY PRISONERS OUT OF THEIR CELLS. AS PART OF THE GENERAL TIGHTENING, TELEVISIONS ARE NOT PERMITTED IN INDIVIDUAL CELLS. HE WILL BE ABLE TO RESUME HIS STUDIES WHEN MOVED ON TO ANOTHER INSTITUTION, AND PERHAPS SOONER IF ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT.

CHARGE: ANOTHER BELMARSH PRISONER IS CURRENTLY LOCKED UP 24 HOURS A DAY, AND IS DENIED BOTH EXERCISE AND VISITS.

REPLY: THIS PRISONER HAS REFUSED TO WEAR THE "E-LIST"

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UNIFORM; SEE PARA 14 ABOVE. REMOVAL OF THE SIX ESCAPEES FROM THE "E-LIST" SHOULD RESOLVE THIS SITUATION.

CHARGE: THE FOOD AT BELMARSH IS SO BAD THAT THE IRA PRISONERS HAVE LOST 16-28 POUNDS EACH, AND ARE IN POOR HEALTH. THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BUY FOOD OR MEDICINES TO TREAT THEMSELVES.

REPLY: PRISON FOOD IN GENERAL IS NOT GREAT, BUT OTHER PRISONERS AT BELMARSH HAVE GENERALLY GAINED WEIGHT. CONVICTED PRISONERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ORDER FOOD FROM OUTSIDE; THAT PRIVILEGE AT WHITEMOOR BREACHED REGULATIONS. PRISON OFFICIALS ARE WARY OF "SELF-MEDICATION," BOTH BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF OVERDOSES AND THE USE SOME YEAST-BASED MEDICATIONS HAVE BEEN PUT TO FOR BREWING PURPOSES.

CHARGE: ALL VITAMIN AND MINERAL SUPPLEMENTS, MOST TOILETRIES AND CLEANING MATERIALS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE BELMARSH CANTEEN.

REPLY: IN THE GENERAL TIGHTENING AFTER WHITEMOOR AND PARKHURST, PRISON AUTHORITIES TOOK A HARD LOOK AT WHAT WAS AVAILABLE IN PRISON SHOPS. IN ADDITION TO MEDICINES (SEE PREVIOUS QUESTION), THEY REMOVED FROM SALE ALCOHOL-BASED TOILETRIES AND SOME CLEANING AGENTS FOR SIMILAR REASONS.

MORE AVAILABLE

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17. (C) WHEATLEY OFFERED TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE, AND TO SET UP VISITS TO BELMARSH AND OTHER PRISONS IF WE WANTED THEM. GIVEN THE COMPREHENSIVE AND CANDID NATURE OF HIS RESPONSES, AND THE FACT THAT BRITISH AND IRISH OFFICIALS WILL BE DISCUSSING THE ISSUES DIRECTLY AND AT LENGTH IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WE DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE UP THE OFFER OF VISITS. CROWE

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nsc for soderberg and peters

E.O. 12356: DECL: oadr  
TAGS: pgov phum prel uk ei  
SUBJECT: northern ireland: the prisoner conundrum

1. ~~confidential~~ -- entire text. oadr for foreign government information.

summary

2. in response to july 13 media rumors of an imminent early release of some paramilitary prisoners, prime minister major told the house of commons that the issue remained under active review, but that time was not yet right for change. we understand legislation may already have been drafted to make ira and loyalist convicts in northern ireland eligible for parole after half (rather than the current two-thirds) of fixed sentences. if introduced early in the next parliamentary session, it could be implemented by late winter.

3. the quickest and easiest step hmg can take on prisoners is to transfer those in english prisons to facilities near their homes. about a third have been approved for transfer to northern ireland, and a comparable number could be sent to the republic once the irish government finalizes enabling legislation. the remaining third either have not requested transfer or face further charges here.

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4. british ministers and officials accept that speeding the release of prisoners would have an important stabilizing effect on republican and loyalist communities. they want to move, but are constrained by attitudes within the nonviolent majority in northern ireland and among mp's at westminster. resistance to the idea appears to be declining, but continuing sinn fein threats of renewed violence and ira complicity in recent riots has made movement more difficult. overt external pressure on hmg is unlikely to speed the process, and could delay it. end summary.

release rumors  
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5. several british papers on july 13 carried stories claiming that hmg would soon announce plans to reverse a 1989 law requiring prisoners convicted of "scheduled" (terrorist) offenses in northern ireland to serve two thirds of fixed-term sentences rather than the 50 percent "remission" previously in effect. according to the "daily telegraph," legislation restoring 50 percent remission would be included in the queen's speech opening the next session of parliament in november, and might be previewed in an official announcement before parliament recessed july 19.

6. a change in remission rates would result in the immediate release of about 100 of the approximately 1200 republican and loyalist prisoners in northern ireland. all others on determinate sentences would become eligible for parole when they had served half their nominal sentences -- shortening the time served for those on 20-year sentences by over three years. convicts sentenced to indeterminate (life) imprisonment would continue to be considered for parole under the terms of informal "tariffs" established by regional life sentence review boards -- currently about 15 years in northern ireland, 20 in england.

7. asked about the reports at question time july 13, prime minister major said remission rates were kept under constant review, but "i don't think the time is yet right for a change." sinn fein president adams told reporters he expected a move on remission in the near future, but dismissed it as "too little, too late."

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official explanation  
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8. northern ireland office (nio) assistant secretary jonathan stephens told us july 14 that it was "no great secret" hmg had been looking seriously about changing remission rates. northern ireland secretary mayhew had raised the possibility in an "off the record" drinks session with journalists earlier in the week; apparently the story had been too good for them to respect the terms of the discussion.

9. asked about possible time frames, stephens said legislation changing remission rates would be easy to draft (he had participated in drafting the 1989 change), and could be tacked on to another bill at any time. while "all things are possible," it was likely, given the imminent parliamentary recess, that the earliest realistic date for enactment and implementation would be late winter or early spring. however, the intention could be announced at any time.

10. we have heard separately that legislation changing the rates may actually have been drafted some weeks ago (while stephens was on leave), but that consideration of introducing it before the parliamentary recess had been dropped after sinn fein and the ira helped organize and incite the riots in belfast which followed the release of private lee clegg. nio and fco officials also told us that public pressure from the irish government made it more difficult for major to move in the absence of any reciprocal action by sinn fein/ira.

prisoner transfers  
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11. while reduction in effective sentences now looks unlikely in the immediate future, another set of emotive prisoner issues may be on the way to resolution. in its campaign for a general amnesty, sinn fein has highlighted ~~the plight of~~ republican convicts in english prisons. conditions in top-security prisons in england are indeed much stricter than in northern ireland, though still significantly milder than in comparable u.s. prisons, and have been tightened since a late 1994 breakout involving ira convicts at whitemoor prison.

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11. the fundamental sinn fein demand is that irish prisoners in england should be transferred to facilities nearer their homes, easing the hardship suffered by their families in visiting them. british officials have long been sympathetic to this argument, and the transfers would have been effected years ago were it not for the fact that transferred prisoners become subject to the parole terms of the receiving jurisdiction. thus, ira murderers sent back home would have been released five years earlier than englishmen convicted of similar offenses.

12. about two years ago, the home office hit on a solution: life sentence prisoners could be transferred "temporarily," with the transfer renewed every six months until release, keeping them under the jurisdiction of english parole boards. implementation has been sporadic -- sinn fein initially balked at the procedure, and home secretary howard temporarily suspended transfers after taking right-wing flak over one that became public -- but they have continued.

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13. stephens told us july 14 that, according to home office figures passed to him the previous day, there had been 43 republican prisoners in england at the time of the ceasefire. eight had since been transferred "temporarily," and six on fixed sentences had been given permanent transfers. ten had not requested a move. the remaining 19 had been refused, most because their homes were in the republic. stephens noted that hmg had been willing to transfer prisoners to ireland for several years, but enabling legislation in dublin had achieved final passage only within the past week. once that was signed into law, another 12-15 ira prisoners could be moved. the remaining half dozen or so -- including the whitemoor escapees -- could not be transferred because they faced additional charges in england.

comment

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14. there is no question that british officials want to start moving on prisoner issues; nio under secretary john steele made this emphatically clear to nsc staff director soderberg in belfast in early june, and our

interlocutors in london have said the same thing. ministers closely involved with northern ireland, including prime minister major, are also ready to move. they accept the point repeatedly made by both republican and loyalist spokesmen that nothing would do more to solidify the ceasefire in their communities.

15. but any move on prisoners at this point, in the wake of the belfast riots and absent any hint of a reciprocal move by sinn fein/ira, would be difficult if not impossible to sell at westminster, or with the general public in britain or northern ireland. resistance would definitely not be confined to the right wing of the conservative party; attempts to portray major's dilemma as merely an aspect of his intra-tory problems are misguided.

16. that said, it appears that objections to some measured move on prisoners may be waning. shadow northern ireland secretary mowlam has told us she favors the idea, and even the usually hardline chairman of the tory backbench northern ireland committee, andrew hunter, told the bbc that he could see the rationale for expanded remission in due course. major will move on prisoners as soon as he feels able to. overt pressure from dublin has drawn outrage from unionist politicians, and made it more difficult for hmg to move. any public statement from the usg would have the same effect.

~~17. we can, and should, privately encourage hmg to speed prisoner transfers and move as rapidly as feasible on remission. we have been doing this quietly in london. but we have little standing to make a formal demarche, since our own sentences and prison conditions for convicted terrorists are much harsher than those in britain. and we should continue to point out to sinn fein representatives that the quickest and surest way for them to achieve progress on prisoner (and many other) issues is to reach agreement with hmg on arms decommissioning. CROWE##~~

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2011-0355-F (3.58)  
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message originated in belfast

E.O. 12356: DECL: oadr  
TAGS: pgov pint uk ei  
SUBJECT: chief executive of northern ireland prison  
service on prison transfers

1. ~~confidential~~ - entire text.

2. summary: according to the chief executive of northern ireland's prison service, eight of the remaining 32 paramilitary prisoners from the republic of ireland or northern ireland in english jails are potentially eligible for transfer to ni. three, already approved in principle, would have to give up their current dirty protest in whitemoor prison. the other five face prison-related charges that would have to be resolved before serious consideration could be given to transfer. the remaining 24 have no ties to northern ireland. they could be transferred to irish prisons, but only after the irish ratification of a european convention on the transfer of prisoners goes into effect in october and only if the british government is satisfied that the conditions set by that convention will be met. sir patrick mayhew has apparently advocated accelerated remission to pm major without success but discussions continue. morale among prison staff at the maze prison, which houses most of ni's paramilitary prisoners, has sunk to an all-time low.  
end summary.

3. in a july 21 meeting with acting principal officer, alan shannon, chief executive of the northern ireland prison service made the following observations about the

transfer of prisoners to northern ireland prisons, the potential effect of accelerated remission for prisoners convicted of "determinate" crimes since 1989, and conditions in ni's prisons, particularly the maze.

4. the july 20 transfer of three republican prisoners  
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-- sinn fein prisons spokesman pat mcgeowan's claim that the prisoners (ira man gerard macken and derry inla members eamonn o'donnell and sean cruickshank) transferred to maghaberry prison in northern ireland were told 12 weeks previously that they would be transferred immediately is dead wrong. the prisoners were notified approximately six weeks previously that the office supported transfer of the prisoners subject to agreement of the northern ireland prison service. the normal procedure was followed, including a review of the files conveyed by the home office to the ni prison service. six weeks constitutes quick, efficient work.

-- the three other prisoners eligible for transfer, feilim ohadhmaill, martin mcgonagle, and liam heffernan, cannot be and will not be transferred as long as they maintain their dirty protest in whitemoor prison.

-- of these three, ohadhmaill, a former university lecturer in england, is the hardest of the hard. he considers himself to be a superior being. he initially refused to sign the papers required for a transfer, although did finally agree the second time around before he began his protest.

-- the ira does not want bobby sands II. pat mcgoewn's recent visit to ohadhmaill (shannon speculated) was designed to urge ohadhmaill to cease and desist. (shannon asserted that the home office opposed the visit initially, but the ni prison service persuaded the home office of the potential utility of such a visit.)

-- according to the home office, there are a total of 32 prisoners potentially eligible for transfer from jails in england to northern ireland or the republic of ireland, including the three on dirty protest. five of the remaining 29 prisoners have a claim to be returned to northern ireland, but their claims can only be

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considered after charges against them (prison escape in the case of four of the five, an attack on a guard in the case of the fifth) are resolved. (shannon was not entirely confident that the figure of 32 is completely accurate. the home office, he said, has to look after 55,000 prisoners).

-- the remaining 24 prisoners are from/have addresses in the republic of ireland and therefore have no claim for transfer to northern ireland.

-- the dail just (the week of july 17) ratified the european convention on the transfer of sentenced prisoners which the republic of ireland signed in 1975. shannon understands that the irish adherence to the convention does not go into effect until october 1995. transfer of irish paramilitary prisoners could be subject of bilateral negotiations beginning at that time. such negotiations could be problematic. according to the convention, the sending country must be satisfied that the transferred prisoners will serve out their time in terms of length and conditions reasonably approximating those of the country in which the offense was committed and the conviction obtained. the republic of ireland has a more stringent policy on the remission of non-life sentences (shannon thought it is pegged at 25 percent, compared with one-third in ni for "determinate" crimes committed after 1989. but (shannon contended) the republic of ireland has a practice of periodically and rather indiscriminately letting out hundreds of prisoners at a time of make more room in jails. the british would have to be certain that such a practice would not affect transferred prisoners before agreeing to a deal.

#### 5. accelerated remission

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-- newspaper reports that reversion to a 50 percent scheme for "determinate" (non-life) sentences levied since 1989 would permit the quick release of approximately 100 prisoners are accurate.

-- it was incredibly indiscreet of secretary of state sir patrick mayhew to discuss possible changes in remission policy with the press as he did two weeks

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ago. (shannon inadvertently walked in on the mayhew session with the press). he or any other civil servant would have been hung out to dry had he done the same thing. mayhew advocated a 50 percent remission policy to pm major the following day. major did not buy it, but discussions continue. home secretary michael howard "panders" to the right-wing of the tory party and therefore would be a stumbling block to any adoption of an accelerated remission policy.

6. life sentences  
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-- of the 350 prisoners with life sentences released over the past fourteen years, there have been only six recidivists.

-- a couple of reasons explain why the rate of return to the paramilitary front lines is low: most have mellowed as families and family responsibilities grow. for precisely that reason, they are security risks to paramilitary leaders who would rather dip into the large pool of young, unattached men looking for action than rely on comparative greybeards gone soft with advancing age.

7. prison conditions  
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-- there are 1700 prisoners in ni's five prisons which puts northern ireland about 10 percent above the mean for prisoners per 100,000 in population in the developed world. before the troubles, ni averaged about 600 prisoners. if the peace holds and paramilitary prisoners are released, the ni prison service estimates that the prison population would not subside to pre-trouble levels but probably settle around 1300-1400 (with drug-dealers and organized crimes figures filling some of the cells emptied by paramilitary prisoners).

-- maghaberry, built in 1985, is state-of-the-art among ni prisons. paramilitary prisoners basically have a choice of prisons. most choose the hard-core maze because of political conviction and because of solidarity with their mates.

-- at the maze, with its 700 mostly paramilitary

prisoners, the prisoners are basically in charge, divided into wings along political lines. the inla has been separated from the ira since 1993; the loyalist paramilitaries, the uvf (ulster volunteer force) and the uda (ulster defense association) split in april.

-- the prison staff at the maze is totally demoralized. they contend that management offers them no support; management believes that the staff does not carry out its duties. morale hit a new low when overtime was eliminated as part of the establishment of the northern ireland prison service as an executive agency effective april 1 of this year. because of reaction to charges against a prisoner filed two years ago (a guard was beaten to death) no charges have been brought against any prisoner in the maze since that time.  
CROWE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1993

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.59)  
KBM 4/11/2023

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Visit of Irish Prime Minister Reynolds: Handling Northern Ireland

Purpose

To decide whether to appoint a fact finder for Northern Ireland.

Background

Last month's visit of Prime Minister Major served as a lightning rod for Congressional requests that you raise with him Northern Ireland, including British human rights abuses. (The Dodd letter is at Tab A.) The Reynolds visit has redoubled this interest. One issue requiring a Presidential decision is that of a special envoy to the Northern Ireland talks. You endorsed the idea during the campaign and the British and Irish governments -- as well as Irish american groups that supported you -- are watching your actions on the issue closely. We, along with the State Department, recommend you make a policy decision on the issue prior to your meeting on March 14 with Prime Minister Reynolds. The advent of St. Patrick's Day will spark a new round of inquiries into your position and you will be seeing a variety of public officials with an interest in the issue.

To some members of the Irish-American community appointing a special envoy would be a litmus test of your campaign pledge. Mayor Flynn and former Congressman Morrison strongly support the idea. (Their letter as well as your October 23, 1992 letter to Morrison are at Tab B.) The British (and perhaps our Embassy in London) have pushed the idea of appointing Speaker Foley as a fact finder rather than sending an envoy. Foley has not been asked by the USG to undertake this mission and has been fending off a persistent British press.

British abhorrence of the idea of an envoy is not surprising. However, they have promoted the idea of a Foley fact finding mission as a way to finesse your campaign pledge. (They also view Foley as a close friend of Britain.) The Irish Government itself has been unenthusiastic about an envoy -- even a fact finder -- although they have not raised the issue publicly. Their ambassador believes that quiet, high-level input by the U.S. with Britain and Ireland could facilitate progress. (He

cites the example of Reagan's discussions with Thatcher in 1984 that the Irish believe helped to pave the way for the 1985 Anglo-Irish Accord.) Moreover, both the British and the Irish want to ensure that any public U.S. role does not become a political football in the May municipal elections in Northern Ireland, nor give the Unionists in the North an excuse to refuse to resume negotiations.

Suggested Approach: While, on the surface, a fact finder could finesse your campaign pledge, we fear it would only raise public expectations of follow-up initiatives after Foley reports to you on his trip. It runs the risk of angering your Irish-American supporters who may see the idea as backsliding. We, along with the State Department, feel that the best approach would be one based on the following themes:

- Your Administration is deeply interested in the situation in Northern Ireland.
- The Northern Ireland issue will remain part of our agenda with Great Britain and with Ireland.
- Before your Administration decides to undertake any initiative -- including appointing a fact finder -- you will weigh it against one standard: whether it would contribute to the talks and to ending the tragedy. To that end, you have already consulted fully with Britain and Ireland on our ideas, and will continue to do so.

You previewed this approach at your February 24 press conference with Major. Reynolds' endorsement of your approach could help alleviate domestic political pressure on you.

If you agree with this approach, we can draw up an appropriate press statement to be issued after Prime Minister Reynolds' visit, as well as a response to Flynn and Morrison.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to shelve the idea of appointing a Presidential fact finder on Northern Ireland at this time but continue to express your willingness to send a U.S. representative to Northern Ireland in the future if such a step would advance the cause of peace.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.60)  
KSH 4/11/2023

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INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1622  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006882

EXDIS

FOR EUR A/S OXMAN AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR TEFFT FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, EI, UK, US

SUBJECT: MY DECEMBER 2 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: STATE 361755

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I MET WITH IRISH PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS ON DECEMBER 2 TO MAKE THE DEMARCHE REQUESTED REFTEL AND TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGARD TO NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE RUN-UP TO HIS DECEMBER 3 MEETING WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR.
3. THE PRIME MINISTER DISCLOSED TO ME THAT HE HAD HAD A 45-MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH MAJOR AFTER THE NOVEMBER 26 TABLING OF AN UNSATISFACTORY BRITISH DRAFT OF A JOINT STATEMENT. COMMENTING THAT THE BRITISH STILL REGARDED IRELAND AS A COLONY, REYNOLDS SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD MAJOR THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A SUMMIT ON BRITISH TERMS SINCE HOLDING ONE ON THAT BASIS WOULD GUARANTEE ITS FAILURE. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NONE. MAJOR HAD FINALLY RELENTED, AGREEING TO A SERIES OF WORKING MEETINGS AND TO PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE IRISH DRAFT WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN ON THE TABLE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. REYNOLDS ADDED THAT HE HAD SHOWN THE IRISH DRAFT BOTH TO CHURCH OF IRELAND PRIMATE ROBIN EAMES AND TO A PERSON CLOSE TO PROTESTANT PARAMILITARIES, BOTH OF WHOM HAD SAID THAT HE SHOULD GO FORWARD WITH IT.
4. NOTING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHY MAJOR WAS WAFFLING, REYNOLDS SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO ASK HIM IF HE HAD MADE A DEAL WITH THE UNIONISTS LAST JULY. THAT THE BRITISH DRAFT TABLED ON NOVEMBER 26 WAS SKEWED TOWARDS THE UNIONISTS AND THAT THE BRITISH HAD KEPT THEIR CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN/IRA SECRET FROM THE IRISH SUGGESTED THE EXISTENCE OF ONE. THE BRITISH WERE KEY, REYNOLDS ADDED, SINCE THE PROVOS WERE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

INTERESTED IN DEALING WITH THEM RATHER THAN WITH THE UNIONISTS. IRISH REUNIFICATION WAS UNIMPORTANT AT THIS TIME; THE IMPORTANT THING WAS PEACE. THE NATIONALISTS AND THE UNIONISTS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE IF IT WERE TO OCCUR.

5. IN LIGHT OF RECENT REVELATIONS, REYNOLDS BELIEVES SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW MAY BE FORCED TO RESIGN. THE NEXT FEW DAYS WILL TELL WHETHER HE CAN WEATHER THE STORM. REYNOLDS WOULD PREFER THAT MAYHEW GO, GIVEN HIS STRONG UNIONIST BIAS. (SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME SHARES THIS VIEW OF MAYHEW, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS A "CORK UNIONIST.")

6. THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD SAID EXACTLY THE RIGHT THINGS IN HIS CALL TO MAJOR AND DID NOT/NOT NEED TO SAY MORE AT THIS TIME. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER A STATEMENT BY PROMINENT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS URGING BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND GERRY ADAMS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE WOULD BE USEFUL, REYNOLDS CONCURRED, ADDING THAT IT WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL AND THAT I COULD USE HIS NAME IN THIS REGARD.

7. REYNOLDS THEN SPONTANEOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT, AS SOON AS SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS AGREED TO A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, HE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. REYNOLDS FEELS THAT ADMAS IS ANXIOUS TO MAKE CONTACT AND BE PART OF THE PROCESS. SMITH

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1994

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

2011-0355-F (3.61)  
KBH 4/11/2013

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Prime Minister Albert Reynolds  
of Ireland

Purpose

To reaffirm the strong state of U.S.-Ireland relations and to underscore the U.S. commitment to the efforts of the Irish and British governments to negotiate a settlement to the Irish question.

Background

Key Points

- Affirm the strong state of U.S. Irish relations; confirm Administration support for FY95 funding of the International Fund for Ireland at FY94 levels (approximately \$20 million).
- Acknowledge the contributions of Irish-Americans in the United States.
- Affirm U.S. support for the Joint Declaration and the efforts of the Irish and British governments for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Praise Reynolds role in the process.
- Commend Ireland's global commitment to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

By the time you meet with Prime Minister Reynolds on Thursday, he will have already been in the United States for five days. He will have divided his time between New York and Chicago, attending a number of Irish-American events and meeting with prominent figures -- including Major Daley of Chicago. He appeared on "Larry King Live" Tuesday evening. Reynolds will also have a number of meetings on the Hill and will attend a black tie dinner given by the American Ireland Fund. Following his stay in Washington, Reynolds will fly to Hartford to attend the John F. Kennedy Trust Dinner; he will return to Ireland, via the Bahamas, on March 22.

You have three events scheduled with Reynolds: the traditional presentation of the Shamrocks preceded by a brief Oval Office meeting; jointly attending Speaker Foley's St. Patrick's Day lunch; and the White House celebration of Ireland Thursday night preceded by a private meeting in the residence.

Northern Ireland and The Anglo-Irish Peace Process. The peace process in Northern Ireland is at a critical stage. Reynolds' and Major's December 15 Joint Declaration remains for Dublin and London the basis for resolving the conflict. The Joint Declaration provides the framework for resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict by offering a seat at the table for all parties who renounce violence as a means of obtaining political ends and by both Britain and Ireland conceding key points on the Irish question. Most significantly, the Declaration documented British recognition that London had no strategic interests in keeping Northern Ireland as part of the UK and that unity with the Republic of Ireland was a possible future for Northern Ireland, if that was the majority's choice. For its part, the Irish government accepted that any change in the status of Northern Ireland required the consent of the majority of the North (where Protestants make up a majority of the population).

Violence by the IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries has continued, although the IRA appears to have stopped killing civilians -- it has confined its attacks to policemen and British soldiers. Various loyalist groups are responsible for nearly twenty-five attacks since January 1 that have resulted in six Catholic deaths. For its part, the IRA has been credited with nearly forty-one attacks and the deaths of two policemen this year. This past weekend, it claimed responsibility for a recent string of inert mortar attacks on London airports. It is not clear whether the bombs were meant to go off -- if they had, they could have inflicted serious damage and casualties. The British believe the bombs were intended to detonate but failed for mechanical reasons. John Hume believes it was an effort by IRA hardliners to flex their muscles and remind the British of what they are capable.

The British and Irish Governments have sought to maintain the initiative in the peace process with recent proposals which build on the Declaration. Most recently in meetings on February 19 and March 10, the British and Irish governments both strongly reiterated their support for the Joint Declaration and agreed on the goal of restarting the "Three-Strand" talks (parties in Northern Ireland, UK-Ireland, and North and South Ireland). For now, however, John Molyneaux and his mainstream Ulster Unionist Party have refused to participate in such talks saying that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

The British and Irish governments refuse to talk to Sinn Fein until it has renounced violence. The British are also insisting on a three month cessation of violence from the IRA as a condition of talks, although they have softened the timetable somewhat. In addition, the European elections in June will be an opportunity for Unionist Ian Paisley and the hardliners to

criticize the Joint Declaration and thus it is unlikely the Three-Strand talks can resume until after the elections in June.

One option Reynolds is pursuing on a very close hold basis is to host an all Ireland Forum for Peace and Reconciliation as called for in the Joint Declaration. The British want Reynolds to move forward now, putting pressure on Adams to renounce violence and join the talks. Reynolds prefers to wait a bit in the hopes that Adams will move forward to renounce violence and join the talks. There is also a possibility that Adams could obtain a cease-fire, without actually renouncing violence and join the Forum talks thus implicitly recognizing the Joint Declaration. You should probe Reynolds on his plans and how you can be helpful. While the Unionists would not participate, such a Forum would keep a process alive until the Three-Strand talks could resume in the Summer. It would also give the British some leeway in talking to Sinn Fein and bringing the Unionists along if a cease-fire or renunciation of violence were forthcoming.

Since visiting the U.S. in January, Adams continues to equivocate on the Joint Declaration and the issue of violence. In its first official statement since the Joint Declaration, Sinn Fein issued a March 13 statement praising the Hume-Adams talks, saying the IRA "is prepared to be flexible in exploring the potential for peace. All concerned should leave no stone unturned," and criticizing the negative stance of the British. Some have criticized the statement claiming "our commitment and our unity of purpose remain steadfast" as a veiled endorsement of the IRA bombing campaign, although others interpret the statement as pure equivocation and mish-mash.

In a radio interview just before a second attack on Heathrow, Adams said that such instances should serve as a reminder that core issues have not been resolved: "...every so often there will be something spectacular to remind the outside world [that] the tragic signs of conflict are ongoing." However, Adams refused to agree that these incidences represented a setback to the search for peace and called on Dublin and London to engage in a direct dialogue with Sinn Fein. Both governments so far have refused to do so, saying flatly that Sinn Fein must first renounce violence. Sinn Fein in return says it will not renounce violence until the British clarify the Joint Declaration and agree to direct talks. Those close to Adams continue to believe Adams is working hard to avoid a split in the IRA and to move the organization in the right direction. Others believe he is simply playing for time. The next few months should tell.

Moving forward in this climate will not be easy, but there are some hopeful signs: although the IRA has not rejected violence outright, Adams and Sinn Fein have made some encouraging statements about the Joint Declaration. And while the Unionists have, for the moment, rejected Three-Strand talks, they have begun to discuss holding a forum of their own (which could later be incorporated into wider talks).

The Paul Hill Trial. After serving fifteen years for the 'Guildford Pub' bombing in 1974, Paul Hill (who is married to Robert Kennedy's daughter Courtney) was released from prison in 1989. The convictions of Hill and the other 'Guildford Four' defendants were overturned on appeal when the police were shown to have used torture to gain confessions. Their story is now the subject of a new film, "In the Name of the Father." Hill is currently appealing a separate charge that he was an accomplice to the murder of a British Army soldier. He claims his conviction was predicated on a confession made under duress. The trial, attended by a number of the Kennedy family, raised a good deal of media attention. It concluded earlier this month and a decision by the magistrates will be made in the next several months. Reynolds is unlikely to raise this issue, but you may field questions from the media. You should refuse to comment on this ongoing case.

U.S.-Irish Relations. The International Fund for Ireland. The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) was established by the British and Irish governments in 1986. With the U.S., the EU, Canada and New Zealand as contributors, the Fund's objectives are to promote economic and social advancement in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland through grants and loans to communities and businesses. The IFI's popularity has steadily grown within both Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.

Last year was the first year a U.S. Administration requested funding for IFI (\$19.6 million). Previously, funding of IFI had always been at the initiative of Congress. The proposed FY95 funding for the Fund in the Foreign Assistance request was put in at \$15 million -- this reduction was one of many adjustments in foreign assistance allocations necessary to accommodate new foreign assistance priorities, including assistance to the Palestinians, without requesting additional overall funding. However, the cut was not vetted on the Hill or at the White House and House Speaker Foley reacted very negatively to news of the reduction.. Senator Kennedy and Representative Obey also expressed concern. State has thus committed to restoring FY95 IFI funding to \$19.6 million, and we expect you to announce the full funding at Speaker Foley's lunch on St. Patrick's day. (By comparison, the EU gave about \$16.8 million to the Fund in 1993 and spent about \$224 million last year on major infrastructure projects in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland).

Immigration Issues. Visa Waiver Pilot Program. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) was established by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and expanded under the Immigration Act of 1990. The VWPP permits nationals of designated countries to apply for admission to the U.S. as visitors for business or pleasure for up to ninety days without having to obtain nonimmigrant visas. Ireland's current nonimmigrant visa refusal rate of four percent (and that of Portugal and Greece) is well above the legislatively mandated two percent limit for inclusion in the program and, given Ireland's unemployment statistics, is likely to remain well above this limit for some time (although it

has dropped from 7% in 1988). In addition, Italy is expected to become ineligible shortly. The pilot program comes up for review in September and the Irish are pushing for all EU countries to be eligible. Irish supporters on the Hill (Kennedy and Mazzoli) are reviewing the issues and are hopeful they will be able to work the issue out. Reynolds should be aware, however, of the tough immigration mood on the Hill.

Soccer World Cup Visas. The Irish had hoped for a "one time" visa waiver to allow Irish citizens to travel to the U.S. for the World Cup finals this summer. The Irish government concedes that probably twenty percent of such visitors would likely overstay and understand it is virtually impossible to get Congress to pass the necessary statute. Reynolds may raise with you the possibility of a "one time" visa waiver but we are not prepared to do so given concerns in Congress that a large number would remain illegally in the U.S. Ambassador Smith has done a good job of putting in place special procedures to ensure that visa applications are given to all legitimate football fans, including many who would not otherwise qualify. While the Irish would prefer a visa waiver, they seem satisfied with our assurances that we will work to avoid embarrassments and to be as inclusive as possible.

INS Pre-Inspection. INS began a pre-inspection program at Shannon International airport in Ireland in 1988 for international passengers traveling to the United States. This operation began as a pilot project to provide greater convenience for passengers and a law enforcement tool which would detain ineligible entrants before they arrived at a U.S. port of entry. The program has been enormously popular with the Irish government.

A joint State Department/INS IG team audit of operations at Shannon in 1993 found that law enforcement benefits did not justify the expense of the operation and recommended that the pre-inspection operation be closed. The Irish government reacted negatively to the IG report and has formally asked the Department of Justice to continue pre-inspection. The principal Irish argument maintains that pre-inspection is vital to the economic survival of financially troubled Aer Lingus airline and that pre-inspection in Dublin would enhance visitor travel to Ireland. The Irish government fears that if pre-inspection were now to be ended, it would become a serious internal political problem. INS is preparing to meet with Irish government officials in Dublin during the latter half of March. If Reynolds raises this issue you should respond that we are looking at it and understand its importance to Ireland.

The EU Presidency. Dublin will assume the EU presidency in the second half of 1996 and will chair the Inter-Governmental Conference which will conduct a major overhaul of the Union. In anticipation of this role, Ireland has engaged in the EU's evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy and has taken observer status in the Western European Union. Thus at the time of greatest introspection on security institutions, the EU will

have as its President its only member not in NATO. You may want to draw out Reynolds on the direction of Dublin's thinking regarding the evolving relationship and relative roles of the WEU, NATO, CSCE and other organizations for Europe headed into the next century.

Libya. Ireland has recently shown a greater interest in cultivating relations with Libya, due to a combination of commercial interest and a desire to maintain the flow of information from Qadhafi to Ireland and the UK on Libya's extensive former involvement with the IRA. Prime Minister Reynolds privately informed Senator Kennedy that Ireland would be willing to host the trial for the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects. Reynolds further indicated that he would be willing to solicit Qadhafi's reaction before a formal offer was made to the UN. We have told Kennedy that Libya must make the two suspects available for trial in the United States or Scotland, as mandated by the Security Council. Reynolds has kept his ideas on this issue very close hold -- indeed, none among his staff may know of his thoughts. Thus, if he raises this issue at all, he will likely do so only if an opportunity presents itself to speak with you alone. We have provided contingency points for your use which acknowledge, but deflect, Reynolds' offer. These are the same points you have used in conversations with Kennedy on this issue.

Somalia. The Irish are extremely active worldwide in humanitarian affairs. Ireland has contributed an 80-man military transportation unit to the UNOSOM. It is one of the smallest contingents and among the most recent in Somalia. The Irish arrived at the beginning of last September and intend to stay a full year, barring casualties or a downturn in the quality of UNOSOM's management. The decision to stay (in part, at our urging) while others are leaving around the same time as our own March 31 departure, was affirmed by the cabinet on February 22. The Irish take pride in outlasting the other Europeans; their decision to stay is also symbolically important to the UN, as the Irish presence will, in a small way, ease UNOSOM's heavily Third World Character after March 31.

Aside from Ireland's military involvement in Somalia, two Irish non-governmental agencies -- Irish Goal and Irish Convern -- are active in humanitarian assistance. They are actively supported by the Irish government and the Irish people, and the U.S. has provided more than \$1 million to support these two agencies through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The murder by Somali bandits in January of a young Irish woman who worked with Irish Goal became a national issue and a public relations nightmare for the government. The Irish are in a position to take an independent view of UNOSOM's military and humanitarian performance -- and are critical of both.

Your remarks for Speaker Foley's luncheon and the evening celebration will be forwarded under separate cover.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State  
Tab C Scenario  
Tab D Remarks  
Tab E Background Papers  
Tab F Bios  
Tab G Press Qs and As

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS OF IRELAND

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.62)

KRW 4/11/2023

Northern Ireland and the Anglo-Irish Peace Initiative

- I admire the determination and courage you have shown in pursuing your peace initiative with John Major. I remain committed to supporting you in your efforts to carry forward the Downing Street Declaration.
- We share your revulsion over the continued violence in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. I was especially appalled by the mortar attacks on the London airports.
- We will continue to urge Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein and the IRA to renounce violence and join the political process within the Framework of the Joint Declaration.
- It is important to keep a peace process moving. While it appears the Three-Strand talks will be hard to hold until after the June elections, it might be possible to hold talks in the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. Do you plan to move forward on them?
- What do you see as Sinn Fein's strategy regarding the peace process? Is a cease-fire a possibility?
- We are concerned about the seeming isolation of the moderate Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). UUP leaders are expected to visit next month and we will ensure they have a number of high level meetings to encourage their engagement in the Downing Street process. Is there anything else we can do to help ensure Unionist cooperation?

International Fund for Ireland

- I remain as committed to maintaining U.S. support for the Fund as one sign of our commitment to help in resolving the Northern Ireland problem.
- While almost every assistance account saw some reductions this year, we are working with Congress to assure that past years' funding levels of the IFI are maintained. I intend to announce that we will maintain our current level of nearly \$20 million for FY95 at the Speaker's lunch.

Visa Waiver Program

- On Irish Eligibility: I appreciate Ireland's interest in inclusion in the visa waiver program and I know Congress will be reviewing the issue this fall.
- Frankly, it is a tough climate up there on this issue but I will be sure we do what we can.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- On World Cup Visas: We are pleased that Ireland will be with us this summer to compete in the World Cup. We will continue to work closely with your Government to assure that as many Irish citizens as possible who wish to attend will be able to do so.
- If Pressed: Frankly, we will not be able to extend a "one time" visa waiver for the World Cup as it would require new legislation but we will try and be as inclusive as possible.

INS Pre-Inspection

- Our immigration authorities will meet later this month to discuss how we can satisfy your interest in extending this program. I'll be sure and take a look at it.

Ireland and the EU

- We look forward to working with you when Ireland assumes the Presidency of the European Union in 1996 and welcome the increasing role Ireland is playing.
- You know we have long been strong supporters of European integration and remain committed to strong, united Europe.
- I look forward to staying in close touch with you as European architecture evolves.

Bosnia

- We are very pleased with the progress on the Bosnian-Croatian talks and are pointing toward a signing ceremony here in Washington on March 18.
- The next step will be to engage the Serbs in a dialogue to determine their political links to the Bosnian Federation and eventual confederation with Croatia.
- Territorial issues are also an important priority -- the Bosnian Serbs will have to make concessions.

Somalia

- I am grateful for Ireland's ongoing commitment to the peacekeeping force in Somalia, as well as to Ireland's continuing humanitarian efforts. Ireland's proud tradition in these areas is an example to all countries.

Pan Am 103 Trial (If raised privately)

- I appreciate your interest in resolving the Pan Am 103 issue and the international community has made clear to Qadhafi, through the decision of the United Nations Security Council, the steps which Libya must take to respond.

- The two Libyan suspects must be made available for trial in the United States or Scotland, as mandated by the Security Council. If Qadhafi is truly interested in ending the present situation in which Libya finds itself isolated from the global community, he knows what must be done. I must tell you, however, that we have seen no such indication.
  
- While I appreciate your interest in trying to move the process forward, our sense is that any such effort to expand trial locations would simply delay the process.

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 2011-0355-F (3.63)  
 KBH 4/11/2023

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 WASHINGTON

March 14, 1994

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
 FROM: Strobe Talbott, <sup>ST</sup>Acting  
 SUBJECT: Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Reynolds

I. SETTING

Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds comes to Washington unchallenged domestically. Written off politically by many pundits only a year ago, he presently faces no domestic political rival. Most opposition parties (and even his coalition partners) are relatively weak in comparison with his Fianna Fail group. Moreover, Reynolds and his party do not face parliamentary elections until 1996.

The economy is doing well by almost any criterion: GDP is expected to maintain the 1993 2.5% growth rate this year; inflation is low (1.5% in 1993); and the balance of trade in goods and services is in substantial surplus. (Relative Irish prosperity is largely a product of EU membership, including direct transfers of structural funds to the Irish.) There remains the Achilles heel of unemployment (at 16% the second highest in the EU), but that chronic problem is not an immediate political liability. Reynolds can even bask in some of the glory of the Irish soccer team making the World Cup competition. (Reynolds will almost surely be back in the U.S., and in Washington, for the opening round of the Cup in June.)

The positive domestic picture notwithstanding, Reynolds' agenda has a potential pitfall in the Northern Ireland issue. By pressing the Downing Street Declaration with John Major, Reynolds is playing a high-profile but high-risk game; he could be hurt domestically (although not as much as Major) if it flops. He continues to work closely with his British counterpart. Both leaders remain firmly behind the Declaration as the sole viable framework for resolving the issues in the North and, despite some differences in tactical emphasis, can be expected to stick to that stance.

Reynolds will want to give you his sense of where the process stands and where he thinks it can go from here. The Irish feel the process is at a crossroads, given the refusal of Sinn Fein to endorse the Declaration and the increasingly cool approach of the Unionists as well. At the same time, the two Governments feel there is little to be done until after the

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June European Parliament elections. Reynolds is genuinely appreciative for what you have done to date, and will probably not press for you to become more engaged for now. Dublin, however, has always been quicker than London to see a role for the U.S. on Northern Ireland, recently through a visa for Gerry Adams, or earlier through a special envoy. If Reynolds senses the peace process has stalled, he might be tempted to ask for U.S. help. (In early December, Reynolds planned to ask you to urge John Major to show flexibility; agreement on the Declaration obviated that need.) Our challenge has been to encourage the two main protagonists to work with each other instead of focusing on us. Reynolds will welcome your assurances that we stand ready to help in any way he and John Major think appropriate. Given the self-isolation of the Unionists, he will be pleased that we will speak to Unionist leaders in April when they visit Washington.

Reynolds will raise with you extending our non-immigrant visa waiver program to Ireland. This reflects Irish irritation that Ireland, source of one of our largest ethnic communities, is being excluded from something most other West Europeans now enjoy. Ireland's 6% visa refusal rate is 4% higher than the legally-mandated level for inclusion in the waiver program. On the plus side, the Irish have benefited from other special visa programs, more than any other Europeans, and have received almost 75,000 immigrant visas since 1987. There are concerted efforts on the Hill to pass legislation extending the waiver program to all EU countries, including Ireland. Both State and INS have stressed to the Hill that extension of the program would have broader security and resource implications. Reynolds may seek your support.

Like other Europeans, the Irish are taking a hard look at their role in post-Cold War Europe. Ireland plays a role in the EU and even in UN peacekeeping to a degree more than proportionate to its size. As EU President in 1996, Ireland will chair the Inter-Governmental Conference that will conduct a major overhaul of the Union. That event will also confront Ireland with examining its future defense stance. Irish Foreign Minister Spring has already done much thinking on this, and will publish a "White Paper" on it next year seeking to educate the traditionally neutral Irish population on the need to accept a role in European security. Reynolds has been less seized with the issue, but by raising the question, you will underline our interest in where the Irish come out.

## II. TOPICS

- o Reiterate U.S. admiration for Reynolds' courageous stance on Northern Ireland, and underscore our willingness to help in any way he and John Major consider appropriate.
- o Hear out his appeal on the visa waiver, and emphasize our desire to work with Congress in being responsive, while noting we have our own domestic concerns.
- o Ask how he sees future European architecture discussions in the EU proceeding, especially on security arrangements.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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2011-0355-F (3.64)  
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MEETING WITH  
IRISH PRIME MINISTER ("Taoiseach") ALBERT REYNOLDS

DATE: March 17, 1993  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 11:00-11:45 a.m.  
  
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate the importance we attach to close relations with Ireland.

KEY POINTS

- Solicit Reynolds' views on Northern Ireland including how the U.S. can be helpful in moving the talks forward.
- Express willingness to send a U.S. representative to Northern Ireland at the appropriate time if such a step would help move the peace process forward.
- Reiterate your goal of ensuring equitable tax laws on U.S. corporations overseas, while reassuring Reynolds that under your tax proposal Ireland would still maintain a favorable environment for U.S. subsidiaries.
- Inform Reynolds that you intend to ask Congress to support full funding for the International Fund for Ireland.
- Reassure Reynolds that you will support efforts to help the Irish on immigration to the U.S.
- Affirm your intention to seek fast track authorization from the Congress to conclude the Uruguay Round, while emphasizing that you will not support reopening the Blair House agreement.
- Brief Reynolds on your current thinking on Somalia and your determination to support greater UN peacekeeping efforts in general.

II. BACKGROUND

In the past, St. Patrick's day festivities have not been the major event between the Executive branch and Ireland, they have been the only event. The reasons have to do with the traditional U.S. foreign policy agenda which has stood in

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contrast to Irish concerns. East-West relations, NATO Alliance management, and other key components of our global foreign policy have had little if any resonance on Irish affairs; conversely, immigration, economic assistance, and the future of Northern Ireland have fallen more to the Congress in its dealings with Ireland.

Your Presidency is helping to end that division. Reynolds knows that this trip will not be confined to the ceremonial presentation of the bowl of shamrocks, but rather, it will be an opportunity to discuss issues of key concern to Ireland which had previously been the exclusive domain of the Congress. This could rebound to his advantage politically: having won re-election -- albeit with a reduced majority (and forced into a coalition with the up-and-coming Labor party) -- Reynolds will be eager to demonstrate that his meeting with you is a substantive one. (He returns to the U.S. in April to solicit private investment in Ireland and to raise funds to pay off the \$6 million party debt from the last election.) Moreover, to the extent we can engage Reynolds on such issues as GATT and Somalia, we can broaden our agenda with Ireland, and reduce the intense and exclusive domestic focus on such issues as Northern Ireland and the MacBride Principles.

#### Northern Ireland

Topping Reynold's list will be Northern Ireland. The heavy -- and public -- speculation about your intention to appoint Speaker Foley as a fact finder has left the Irish wondering whether they were going to be presented with a fait accompli worked out between your Administration, the Speaker and the British. The Irish Government welcomes your interest in Northern Ireland, believing that quiet, high-level U.S. efforts with the British can produce results. But, unlike members of the Irish-American community, they are chary of any high profile initiatives which they fear could derail progress in the talks. At the same time, Reynolds is keen to avoid being perceived as soft on Northern Ireland, and, as a result, announced in his March 14 speech in Los Angeles that he would, "welcome and value the concept of sending a peace envoy" if the U.S. decided to propose one. (Reynolds is also mindful of Foley's criticism of Irish-American lobbying on the issue. In a March 11 interview in the Irish Times, the Speaker was quoted as saying that your Administration should not keep its campaign promises on Northern Ireland if they were the wrong thing to do.)

You could tell Reynolds that you raised Northern Ireland with Prime Minister Major, including the issue of human rights abuses in the north. You could reiterate the essential points of your policy toward Northern Ireland:

-- It will remain on your agenda with Britain;

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- Any initiative will be evaluated against the standard of whether it could help facilitate the talks aimed at ending the tragedy; and,
- The Irish government will be consulted fully.

You will find Reynolds receptive to this message. In addition, we recommend you solicit Reynolds' views on how best the U.S. can contribute to ending the conflict. Securing his public endorsement of your approach at the press availability following your meeting will be critical to alleviating domestic political pressure on you to publicly "do something" now on Northern Ireland.

#### **Tax on U.S. Subsidiaries**

Low Irish corporate taxes, and current U.S. tax provisions which tax profits of U.S. subsidiaries only when they are repatriated by the parent company, have encouraged over 400 U.S. companies to build factories in Ireland. Congressman Rostenkowski has proposed doing away with tax deferrals on overseas profits of U.S. subsidiaries. Your Administration's proposal is less onerous, calling for taxation of profits only when they remain passive assets (i.e., not invested in plant or equipment) and these assets exceed 25% of total assets of the overseas subsidiary. Reynolds is concerned that even this proposal could cause U.S. businesses to relocate elsewhere in Europe, driving up the already high unemployment rate in Ireland. We recommend that you tell Reynolds that your goal is to ensure that U.S. tax laws are equitable; that you will remain sensitive to Irish concerns about unemployment; and that under your proposal Ireland would still attract investment by U.S. companies because deferrals would continue on profits that are actively reinvested in plant and equipment.

#### **Immigration**

Reynolds will not want his visit dominated by Northern Ireland, but will want to cover other important Irish issues. Chronic unemployment in Ireland (17%) has led to continuation of the historical pattern of Irish immigration to the U.S. The current Immigrant Visa Program had allocated 16,000 slots via a lottery for the Irish each year over the three year period, FY92-94. Reynolds may ask for continuation of the program. However, that program is due to end in 1994, to be replaced by the Permanent Immigrant Visa Diversity Program beginning in 1995. Unless Congress establishes another special allotment for Ireland, fewer visas will be available for Irish immigration. We recommend you tell Reynolds that your Administration will make every effort to address Irish immigration concerns, but eschew specifics.

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### International Fund for Ireland

The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement gives Ireland a voice in the North in return for reaffirmation that the status of the North will only be changed according to the will of the inhabitants. To help demonstrate support for the Agreement, we have contributed \$210 million through FY 93 to the International Fund for Ireland (established in 1986). (The Fund is managed by a board appointed jointly by the British and Irish Governments, and including observers from donor countries.) Funding for the program in the past originated with the Congress, not with the Executive Branch. If Reynolds raises the Fund, you should say that your Administration is committed to seeking full funding from the Congress and will for the first time include a request for this funding in the Administration's budget.

### EC -- Trade Issues

On trade, Ireland has been a major beneficiary of the EC's agricultural policy. Thus, Dublin has regularly supported the French in the EC debates on the Uruguay Round, including its continued criticism of the Blair House agreement. Moreover, as one of the poorer countries of the EC, Ireland is slated to receive nearly \$12 billion in transfer payments over the next six years -- the main reason for the overwhelming approval of Maastricht in its June 1992 referendum. Reynolds is concerned that our operational definition of "fair" trade will amount to protectionism and retaliation against the EC. You can tell him that you have no intention of re-opening the Blair House accord (and that the EC should stick to its part of the bargain) and that you intend to work hard to complete the Uruguay Round.

### Peacekeeping-Somalia

The Irish see UN peacekeeping as a way they can stay involved in world affairs without eschewing their traditional neutrality. As such they have participated in twelve UN peacekeeping operations, and have pledged to provide a 60 person/22 truck unit as part of the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia. (Irish President Mary Robinson traveled to Somalia last fall and wrote to Boutros Ghali and the leaders of the members of the Security Council to highlight the magnitude of the problem and pledge Irish support.) However, while the Irish support the greater emphasis you are placing on peacekeeping, they worry that the classic definition of UN peacekeeping is being blurred to allow for "peacemaking" operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Peace Enforcement"). This has caused them to have second thoughts about participating in UNOSOM II.

These doubts have been reinforced by the February 22 death of Valerie Place, an Irish citizen working in Somalia for Concern, a private Irish relief organization. (An Irish national working for UNICEF, Sean Devereux, was killed in

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January.) The Irish worry that aid worker protection is inadequate, and could worsen under a peace enforcement regime.

You could express your Administration's sympathy on the deaths of Place and Devereux, give Reynolds your assessment of the Somali effort (including the timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces), and urge him to follow through on the Irish pledge. More broadly, we recommend you stress to Reynolds the necessity for providing the UN a range of capabilities to deal with such crises in the future.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1993

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2011-0355-F (3.65)  
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Warren Christopher *W.C.*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Albert Reynolds  
of Ireland

I. SETTING

- Reynolds' visit is based on the long-standing custom that a senior Irish minister presents a bowl of shamrocks to the President on St. Patrick's Day. This tradition also gives Reynolds an opportunity to pursue Irish interests during his first visit here as Prime Minister.
- Despite ethnic, cultural, and political ties, Ireland's neutrality and support for the EC's Common Agricultural Policy can lead to policy differences.
- A sober, even bland personality, Reynolds was a successful entrepreneur in the dancehall and dog food businesses. He is now trying to repeat that success in politics--but with mixed results to date.
- He comes to the U.S. having pulled off a minor political miracle earlier this year. Despite his Fianna Fail party's loss of seats in last November's election, his own lack of political popularity, and a widespread feeling in Ireland that it was time for a change, he managed to retain his position as Prime Minister in the new government formed in January.
- On the other hand, the new Fianna Fail-Labor coalition faces daunting economic problems, especially an unemployment rate approaching 20 percent. A currency crisis, which ended in the devaluation of the punt, and Digital Equipment Corporation's recent decision to close an 800-worker plant in Galway give the impression of a government in disarray. Recent polls have shown it to have little popular support.
- In these circumstances, Reynolds would like to take home some positive responses from the U.S. on high-visibility issues, such as Northern Ireland or U.S. investment.

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- Reynolds will seek some assurance that the U.S. will remain involved in Northern Ireland and will ask about the status of a U.S. special envoy. He will not wish to oppose something he believes you support and may see the idea as a way of exerting pressure on the British. At the same time, the Irish are concerned that if not arranged properly, the envoy could alienate the Unionists and scuttle the political talks.
- Reynolds's visit offers you the chance to make clear to him your commitment to European security and an active leadership role for the U.S.
- Reynolds may also raise the death of the Irish aid worker in Somalia and ask for more protection for those workers. He is also likely to ask you to help promote more U.S. investment in Ireland and may raise the status of ongoing trade negotiations.

## II. TOPICS

- Affirm our common ties and values, as epitomized by the annual tradition of the St. Patrick's Day presentation of shamrocks.
- Confirm your support for peace, justice, and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and for friendship between Ireland and the UK.
- Express your backing of the Northern Ireland talks process and seek Reynolds's thoughts on what the U.S. might usefully do to aid the process.
- Express the U.S. government's belief that the International Fund for Ireland is doing an excellent job in promoting reconciliation through economic and social development.
- Lay out your views on key international economic issues, especially the Uruguay Round, and urge Ireland's cooperation within the EC in promoting an agreement in the Uruguay Round.
- Express your appreciation for the courageous efforts of Irish aid workers in Somalia and assure Reynolds that UNITAF is doing everything it can in difficult circumstances to provide for their security.
- Bring Reynolds up to date on the latest developments in Bosnia and urge Irish support within the EC for a peaceful solution based on the Vance-Owen plan.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS

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U.S.-IRISH RELATIONS

- Welcome. I'm delighted that we can meet to celebrate St. Patrick's day.
- I view our meeting as more than a celebration. It's an opportunity for us to work together.

NORTHERN IRELAND

- We are willing to do what we can to help resolve the problem of Northern Ireland.
- Ultimately it is up to the people of Northern Ireland to work out a settlement and bring the tragedy to an end. But, where we can help we will do so.
- I remain prepared to send a U.S. representative to Northern Ireland if such a step would be helpful.
- I discussed Northern Ireland with Prime Minister Major, including the violence and the human rights problems.
- I want to benefit from your views as well.
- My approach to Northern Ireland is based on three principles:
  - First, Northern Ireland will remain on my agenda with Prime Minister Major.
  - Second, any steps we take must be measured against one standard: whether they contribute to ending the tragedy in Northern Ireland.
  - Third, I am committed to full consultations with your government as well as with the British Government.

TAX ON U.S. SUBSIDIARIES IN IRELAND

- I appreciate your concern about maintaining a favorable environment for U.S. investment in Ireland.
- Under our proposal, I can meet my goal of ensuring that our tax laws are equitable, while still protecting a favorable investment climate for Ireland.
- U.S. subsidiaries abroad would still be able to defer taxes on profits reinvested in plant and equipment.

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IRISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.

- I understand the current AA-1 Visa Program has been well received in Ireland and that many Irish men and women are taking advantage of it.
- These new immigrants will make a substantial contribution to their new home, as well as to closer U.S.-Irish relations.
- It has not yet been determined which countries will qualify to participate in the Permanent Diversity Immigrant Visa Program for 1995, but we expect Ireland to be among them.
- I expect Ireland to qualify in the new Visa Program set to begin in 1995.
- We will continue to do what we can to support Irish desires to emigrate to the U.S.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

- We are pleased with the efforts of the International Fund for Ireland, to help promote intercommunal activities and economic development.
- We agree that in the final analysis investment and economic development are the indispensable foundation for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and between North and South.
- This year, the Fund will have the Administration's full support. I intend to ask the Congress to allocate continued funding of the program and will ensure these funds are part of my budget request.

GATT/URUGUAY ROUND

- On February 26, I publicly underscored our commitment to a prompt and successful completion of the Uruguay Round.
- We need to complete the Dunkel text and market access negotiations in manufacturing, agriculture and services.
- I am committed to bringing the Round to an early, successful conclusion, and I will be seeking renewal of fast-track authority to allow us to conclude the negotiations.
- Agriculture is a difficult issue for all of us. However, we believe the Blair House agreement represents a balanced package of benefits and concessions that should allow us to move forward.
- I hope you can join your EC colleagues to develop quickly the regulations necessary to implement the various provisions of the Blair House accords.

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PEACEKEEPING

- We appreciate the important contributions that Ireland has made to international peacekeeping over the years.
- The Secretary General's report, An Agenda for Peace is an important contribution to the discussion of what can be done to enhance the UN's role in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement. It's essential that the UN be well-equipped to do all of these things as circumstances require.
- The U.S. joined with other Security Council members last fall in encouraging member states to identify military assets or capabilities that could be made available to the United Nations on short notice. I fully endorse that action, and we are currently reviewing our policy to determine how the U.S. can best contribute to UN peacekeeping.
- My Administration will examine closely the Secretary General's other suggestions for invigorating the UN and assuring it the means, both political and financial, to take effective action in dealing with conflict situations.

SOMALIA

- Please convey my personal condolences to the family, friends, and colleagues of Irish Concern worker Valerie Place. Her death, as well as the death of Sean Devereux, are reminders of the courage and dedication of those who work to ease the suffering of others.
- Ms. Place exemplified the type of leadership that Irish Concern has given in its efforts toward humanitarian assistance in Somalia and elsewhere.
- I want to assure you that the coalition will maintain its close working relationship with all relief agencies and do what it can to provide security for their personnel.
- We welcome your government's continued support for a strong UNOSOM II mandate and look forward to your participation in UNOSOM II.
- Our aim is to complete the transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II by May 1.
- However, we will keep quick reaction forces and several thousand logistical support personnel in Somalia for some months to come to ensure the success of the operation.

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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### Irish Role

Concern for the minority Nationalist community in the North and a residual desire for unification of the island remain deeply embedded in the consciousness of the citizens of the Republic. While Northern Ireland was scarcely mentioned in the November 1992 election campaign, the current Irish government, and especially Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Spring, have made early resumption of the negotiations and settlement of the Northern Ireland problem a high priority. In early March, Spring gave a notably conciliatory speech reaching out to Unionists. For Dublin, a settlement in the ongoing political talks on Northern Ireland would remove an irritant in Anglo-Irish relations, improve the lot of the Nationalists in the North, and reduce the prospect of terrorist violence spreading south. Nevertheless, the GOI has to tread cautiously because it believes the public would only support concessions on the Republic's constitutional claim to the whole island of Ireland in the context of an overall settlement.

The Irish have come far towards recognizing the validity of the Unionist community. However, they tend to overestimate the extent to which HMG can force an agreement on the Unionists. The GOI sees the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 as an example of how the two governments can together impose a settlement. By contrast, HMG sees it as an incomplete success in that the Unionists did not support the agreement.

### The Anglo-Irish Agreement

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on November 15, 1985 by PM Thatcher and PM Garret FitzGerald. It can be seen as essentially giving Ireland an agreed role in the affairs of the North (and thus a voice in protecting the Catholic community there) in return for an affirmation that the status of Northern Ireland will only be changed in accord with the will of its inhabitants.

Ireland secures its role in the North through the Intergovernmental Conference, which normally meets about once every six weeks at the level of Irish Foreign Minister-British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to discuss political, security, and legal matters and cross-border cooperation. In general, the Irish use the meetings to raise concerns about discrimination against Catholics and problems in the administration of justice (use of excess force, harassment by security forces), while the British urge greater cooperation in fighting terrorism.

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Status of the Talks

Because the Unionists did not accept the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it could not form the basis of devolved government in Northern Ireland. Thus at HMG initiative, new political talks were launched bringing together for the first time the four constitutional parties in the north and the two governments. These talks contain three "strands" -- devolved government in Northern Ireland, relations between North and South in Ireland, and ties between the UK and Ireland. While they succeeded in identifying some areas of common ground, they broke off in November without agreement.

The major issues are: 1) who will exercise executive power in Northern Ireland; 2) Dublin's role in Northern Irish affairs; and, 3) the Unionists' demand that Ireland revise its constitutional claim to the North.

Informal talks continue and formal sessions may resume, more likely after the May municipal elections in Northern Ireland. The Unionists continue to insist on the Irish side giving up its constitutional claim to the entire island as a condition for going back to the negotiating table -- a position unacceptable to the Irish.

Human Rights

Human rights issues have become a key concern in Northern Ireland. The issues transcend specific incidents and point to a pattern of collusion between British security forces and Loyalist factions as well as an environment of intimidation and fear. Excessive force (including "shoot to kill" practices), harassment by security forces (stopping people unnecessarily or conducting arbitrary and disruptive house searches), unfair detention (holding people for up to seven days without trial) and trials without juries have been prevalent.

U.S. Policy

Over the years, U.S. policy on Northern Ireland has been based on four themes:

- Support for peace, justice and reconciliation, including support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Northern Ireland talks.
- Condemnation of terrorism from all quarters and actions to counter terrorists: asking Americans not to make financial contributions to terrorist organizations, extraditing convicted terrorists, preventing arms shipments to terrorists.
- Support for human rights, including equal employment opportunity and fairness in the administration of justice.
- Support for the International Fund for Ireland (\$210 million appropriated through FY93).

## THE JOE DOHERTY AND GERRY ADAMS CASES

**The Doherty Case.** Joe Doherty is a PIRA member convicted in 1981 of murdering a British Army officer in Northern Ireland. Just before the conviction was handed down, he escaped to the U.S. where he was picked up in 1983 and remained in jail for almost nine years, while his case was being fought in the U.S. courts. A British extradition request was rejected by a District Court judge on the grounds that his offense was political. The USG then attempted to deport him for having entered the country under false documentation. Doherty asked to be deported to Ireland instead of the UK but, after those two countries signed an extradition treaty, requested asylum in the United States. The case went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Attorney General had the discretion to deport Doherty without further hearings. In January 1992, Doherty was deported to the UK, and he is now in prison in Northern Ireland.

The British authorities have turned down Doherty's request that he be given credit for time served in the U.S. Some Irish-American groups, for whom Doherty was a major cause celebre, have asked the USG to intervene. The U.S. has no current legal or jurisdictional interest in the Doherty case.

The Doherty case has had little publicity in Northern Ireland and even less in Ireland. We do not expect Prime Minister Reynolds to raise the issue.

**Gerry Adams Visa Issue.** Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has been turned down for visas several times in the past few years -- most recently in 1991. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, he is excludable because we believe he has participated in planning terrorist activities as a member of the PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) Council, which directs terrorist actions.

To overcome his ineligibility, Adams would need a waiver -- granted by the INS at the recommendation of the State Department. It would be inconsistent with our counter-terrorism policy to do so now, especially since Sinn Fein is losing support. (Adams was defeated in the 1992 Parliamentary election.) In addition, Sinn Fein has still not abandoned its support of violence.

A current complication in the Adams case is the request by the defense in an extradition case in California that Adams testify. The Justice Department would resist paroling Adams into the country on the grounds that Adams' testimony is not germane in an extradition hearing. Even if it were, he could make it by deposition.

Despite rumors that he might apply for a visa after the Clinton Administration took office, Adams has still not done so. Until he does, the question of his admissibility is moot. Neither the British nor the Irish governments would favor us granting Adams a visa. Reynolds is not expected to raise it during his visit.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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2011-0355-F (3.69)

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
JACK QUINN  
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: James Smyth Extradition Case

The Secretary of State is currently reviewing the extradition case of James Smyth, a suspected IRA member who escaped from prison in Northern Ireland while serving a sentence for attempted murder. We expect the Secretary to sign the warrants for Smyth's extradition within the next several weeks. This case is controversial within the Irish-American community and the paragraphs that follow provide you additional background.

Background

In December 1978, James Smyth, who is from Northern Ireland, was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison by a "Diplock court" (no jury) for the attempted murder of a prison guard. In 1983, he was one of 38 prisoners who escaped from the Maze prison in Belfast. Smyth made his way to the United States in 1984 and was apprehended in San Francisco in 1992 on passport fraud charges. Pursuant to a bilateral extradition treaty, the United Kingdom filed a formal request for Smyth's extradition.

In September 1994, a district court rejected Smyth's extradition, finding that Smyth, if returned, would be punished by reason of his religion and political opinions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, and on June 24, 1996, the Supreme Court denied *certiorari*. On July 2 the district court issued Smyth's certification of extraditability. Subsequent legal efforts by Smyth to delay his extradition, including a request to reopen his deportation proceeding, have been unsuccessful.

With all existing judicial barriers to extradition removed (although Smyth could still file a *habeas* petition), the decision

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 08/06/06

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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shifts to the Secretary of State who, by law, has sixty days from the certification of extraditability to decide whether to surrender Smyth. While there is some ambiguity, the State Department believes the sixty days runs from July 2 in this case. It has been decades since a Secretary of State decided against surrendering a fugitive found extraditable by the courts.

### Reaction of Irish-American Community

There will be a negative reaction in the Irish-American community when Smyth is extradited; you will be criticized for reneging on your 1992 campaign promise that there would be "no more Joe Dohertys." (*Doherty is an IRA member convicted of murdering a British soldier in 1980. He was subsequently apprehended in the United States and the UK requested his extradition. In December 1984, the district court held that Doherty was not extraditable because his crime fell within the political offense exception to the then existing treaty between the United States and UK. The Reagan Administration resumed the deportation proceedings that had been initiated at the time of Doherty's arrest; the Bush Administration finally succeeded in deporting Doherty to the UK in 1992.*) There was an uproar in the Irish-American community over the decision to "end-run" the judicial process by deporting Doherty to the UK after the court had denied extradition. In contrast, Smyth has been found extraditable by the courts, but that distinction will not be persuasive to those opposed to extraditing him.

We have received a number of letters, including from Members of Congress, and a number of phone calls on the Smyth case. They argue that Smyth's life will be in danger if he is returned to Northern Ireland. He will be returned to prison for the remaining years of his sentence, however, and there is no reason to believe he will not be safe there.

Some Irish Americans will argue that rather than extraditing Smyth now, we should have allowed him to stay in the United States pending completion of his deportation proceedings. However, to do so would set the precedent of granting persons facing extradition the additional right to conclude deportation hearings. That would add years and expense to an already lengthy extradition process. In addition, the U.S.-UK extradition treaty is unique in that it allows, during an extradition hearing, litigation of generally the same issues that would be litigated in an asylum determination. Thus, Smyth has already had an opportunity to be heard on these issues.

In a few extradition cases the Secretary of State has sought and received certain assurances from the requesting government regarding the treatment that a fugitive will receive upon his

return. We explored whether that would be appropriate in this case and concluded it was not. However, in announcing the decision to extradite Smyth, we plan to make a statement expressing the hope that the British will consider granting him partial credit for time served in U.S. prisons in the context of any future decision to reduce the sentences of IRA prisoners. Reducing the effective sentences of IRA prisoners or easing conditions of their incarceration is one of the confidence-building measures HMG could take in response to or leading up to a new IRA cease-fire.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: Mr. Lake  
From: Mary Ann Peters  
Subj: Smyth Extradition

✓ 8

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.70)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Peter Westmacott of the British Embassy has transmitted a response from London to your conversation with DCM David Logan last week. Apparently British law (the 1953 Prisons Act) prohibits NIO officials from granting credit for time served abroad except in exceptional circumstances. (State had told us something different -- that the authority to grant credit for time served exists in the UK but is not routinely used.) The British law was tested by Joe Doherty, who lost his appeal for credit for time served here. If there is much interest in our desire to see Smyth eventually get credit for time served, HMG could be obliged to point out that there is little scope under British law for this to happen. Therefore, it could prove embarrassing to make the planned statement.

I think we should explore another option. HMG has said that Smyth will not be penalized by losing eligibility for remission (parole) if/when he is extradited. That means that, having done 5 years of a 20-year sentence when he escaped, he will be eligible for release when he was completed another 5 years, or 50% of the original sentence. I was also surprised to learn that HMG has decided not to prosecute Smyth for jailbreaking. The other escapees who were recaptured right after the 1983 breakout were tried and convicted of various offenses related to the escape, which added 3-8 years to their sentences. Smyth will also be given a choice of whether to be returned to the Maze or sent to another prison.

While we cannot imply that we made some kind of "deal", we can point to the British decisions as evidence that Smyth is being treated quite generously. We can also point out that "even" Ireland extradited those Maze escapees captured in Ireland back to the UK. (A couple of those who escaped with Smyth were not extradited, however, due to incompetence or mistakes in court proceedings.)

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: SODERBERG  
SIT: PETERS SUM2  
SIT: NSC

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5014  
INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC  
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 9178  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 4883  
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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.71)  
KBM 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

DEPT FOR EUR/UBI AND L/LEI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/01

TAGS: PREL, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: SMYTH EXTRADITION CASE

REF: A) SECSTATE 153163 B) LONDON 8885

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J. HABIB, MINISTER-COUNSELOR  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5(B) AND (D).

2. (✓) NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
JONATHAN STEPHENS INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE SMYTH AND  
RELATED EXTRADITION CASES IN A JULY 25 MEETING WITH  
POLMINCOUNS. ALTHOUGH HOME SECRETARY MICHAEL HOWARD DID NOT  
RAISE THE EXTRADITION CASES IN HIS MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR  
THE PREVIOUS DAY, STEPHENS INDICATED THAT HOWARD MAY NOTE  
BRITISH INTEREST IN THE MATTER WHEN HE MEETS WITH ATTORNEY  
GENERAL RENO ON THE MARGINS OF THE JULY 30 P-8  
COUNTERTERRORISM MINISTERIAL IN PARIS.

3. (✓) DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS IN REF A, WE SAID THE  
EXTRADITION REQUEST IS BEING HANDLED ACCORDING TO STANDARD  
PROCEDURES AND NOTED THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS YET TO MAKE A  
DETERMINATION ON THE SURRENDER WARRANT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE  
REASSURED STEPHENS THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO ABIDE FULLY BY ITS  
COMMITMENTS UNDER OUR BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY.

4. (✓) STEPHENS WELCOMED THAT REASSURANCE, SAYING THE BRITISH  
EMBASSY HAD PICKED UP SOME WORRYING INDICATIONS THAT THE  
DECISION MAY BECOME "POLITICIZED." CROWE

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>9068

<MSGID> M2331023

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Special Envoy (If Raised)

- I had good discussions with Prime Minister Major and Prime Minister Reynolds on Northern Ireland. Let me reiterate what I told them, that my policy rests on three principles:
  - First, Northern Ireland will remain an important issue for discussion between my Administration, Ireland, and Great Britain.
  - Second, any proposals we make will be judged against the standard of whether they can contribute to bringing about an end to the tragedy.
  - Third, we will consult fully with both governments.
- I am prepared to send a U.S. representative at the appropriate time if the parties believe such a step would advance the cause of peace.
- Ultimately, I believe it's up to the people of Northern Ireland to bring about an end to the tragedy.

Tax on U.S. Subsidiaries In Ireland (If Raised)

- I understand your concern about maintaining a favorable environment for U.S. investment in Ireland.
- At the same time, I need to ensure that our tax laws are equitable.
- My proposal is less onerous than other ideas being considered in the Congress. Under my proposal, Ireland would still be attractive for U.S. investment because we would allow U.S. subsidiaries abroad to continue to defer taxes on profits that are actively reinvested in plant and equipment.

Gerry Adams (If Raised)

- The State Department, with the support of the FBI, declined to recommend a waiver to Mr. Adams to allow him entry into the United States. I support that decision.
- The issue was not one of free speech but of our own law regarding visas for individuals who have engaged in terrorist activity.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.72)  
KBH 4/11/2023

March 3, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON

SUBJECT: Fact Finding Visit for Northern Ireland

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.73)  
KBH 4/11/2023

We need to agree among ourselves on whether or not to support the idea of a special Presidential Fact Finder on Northern Ireland. Until then, I have told Richard Ralph (number three in the British Embassy) to have Sir Robin stand down in his lobbying efforts. (Sir Robin had asked for fifteen minutes on your schedule this week to talk about the issue. I told Ralph that it was premature.)

State of Play

Nancy is correct that we are being whipsawed between the Irish-American community (Mssrs. Morrison and Flynn) and the British. The Irish Government has been silent on the issue. Tom Niles and I worked out the following approach for him to take in his meeting earlier this week with Dermot Gallagher, the Irish Ambassador:

- The President is deeply interested in the Northern Ireland situation.
- Before the President decides on any initiative he will weigh it against the standard of whether it would contribute to the talks and to ending the tragedy.
- One of the ideas is to appoint a fact finder. Speaker Foley has been mentioned as a possible candidate.
- The White House has taken no decision on this whatsoever.
- The President spoke to Prime Minister Major about Northern Ireland. He intends to do so as well with Prime Minister Reynolds on the 17th so that both countries are consulted.

Foley's Views. According to State, Foley is working under the assumption that the decision rests with the White House, and he is content to wait, or, alternatively, to have the idea fade away.

Pros vs. Cons. The idea of a fact finder could solve the President's campaign promise to appoint an envoy. On the other hand, it could be viewed as being "clever by half" -- and increase pressure on the President to have Foley head a delegation, or to make the mission a periodic, rather than a one-shot deal. It also raises public expectations as to what happens once Foley returns and reports to the President.

British views are well known. Gallagher was non-committal when Niles ran the idea by him, but the Irish are unenthusiastic. Gallagher pointed to Reagan's discussions with Thatcher in 1984 (that, in his view, helped lead to the Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985) as a model: quiet discussions at the highest levels between the US, the UK and Ireland. We do not want this issue to be injected in the May municipal elections in Northern Ireland, nor do we want to give the Loyalists the excuse to refuse to go back to the table.

Timing. If, nevertheless, we decide to go the route of a fact finder, we recommend the announcement take place after Prime Minister Reynolds' visit. In that way, the President can make the case that he consulted both the British and Irish and they both support the idea. Reynolds' support could help defuse criticism from Morrison, Flynn and others that the President was walking away from a campaign commitment.

Attachments

Tab I      Renwick incoming

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*NS - let's discuss. R*

PAGE 01 OF 03

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (3.75)  
KBH 7/11/2023

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1883  
INFO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 01155  
LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, UK, EI, US

SUBJECT: MARCH 4 MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER  
TOM KITT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: (A) STATE 063147  
(B) DUBLIN 01100

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. MINISTER OF STATE (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) TOM KITT TOLD US ON MARCH 4 THAT, FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING'S RECENT COMMENTS TO NEW YORK TIMES JOURNALIST JAMES CLARITY NOTWITHSTANDING, THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOT/NOT YET TAKEN A FORMAL POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL U.S. ENVOY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. WE STRESSED TO KITT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MARCH 17 CLINTON/REYNOLDS MEETING IN THIS REGARD. KITT ALSO SAID THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES IN REGARD TO NORTHERN IRELAND ARE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND AN END TO VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH. HE NOTED AS WELL THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION BEFORE A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION. END SUMMARY.  
MEETING WITH TOM KITT
3. CHARGE AND POLOFF MET WITH MINISTER OF STATE (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) TOM KITT ON MARCH 4 TO DISCUSS NORTHERN IRELAND IN LIGHT OF THE MARCH 3 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE BY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

JAMES CLARITY. IN THIS ARTICLE, CLARITY QUOTES FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING AS APPROVING THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL U.S. ENVOY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. WALTER KIRWAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH (PRIME MINISTER), AND NOEL PURCELL-O'BYRNE, FIRST SECRETARY IN THE POLITICAL DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA), ACCOMPANIED KITT.

## KITT'S CLARIFICATION

4. WE BEGAN BY NOTING THAT SPRING IN THIS ARTICLE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A DIFFERENT LINE THAN THE ONE WHICH WE HAD BEEN HEARING FROM OUR IRISH GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS AND WHICH THE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE IRISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON (REF. A) - KITT RESPONDED THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT/NOT YET TAKEN A FORMAL POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL U.S. ENVOY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. IT WAS NOT THAT IRELAND DISLIKED THE IDEA, KIRWAN INTERJECTED, ADDING THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS WOULD RAISE IT WITH THE PRESIDENT ON MARCH 17. IF THERE WERE TO BE A SPECIAL U.S. ENVOY, KITT EMPHASIZED, ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE "CONSTRUCTIVE" LEST THE UNIONISTS BE ALIENATED. BUT, THE "SPECIFICS (OF THE IDEA) WERE NOT YET CLEAR."

## THE GOI'S IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

5. KITT CONTINUED THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES IN REGARD TO NORTHERN IRELAND WERE TO GET THE TALKS RESTARTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND TO DIMINISH/END THE VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE NOTED, THE IRISH GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED THE "SPECIAL POSITION" OF THE U.S. ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION AND VERY MUCH WANTED TO "MAINTAIN U.S. INTEREST."

## A "PERMANENT SOLUTION"

6. KITT AND KIRWAN STRESSED THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING WANTED A "PERMANENT SOLUTION" OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM. IN THIS REGARD, KIRWAN ADDED THAT THE BRITISH HAD A "SHORTER TIME FRAME," IMPLYING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THAT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO ACCEPT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN LIEU OF SOMETHING LASTING.

ARTICLES TWO AND THREE OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION

7. KITT VOLUNTEERED THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT AGREE TO AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION BEFORE A "FINAL SETTLEMENT" OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION HAD BEEN REACHED. IF A REFERENDUM WERE HELD TOMORROW, HE EXPLAINED, IT WOULD BE DEFEATED, AND IRA RECRUITMENT WOULD SOAR.

THE CLINTON/REYNOLDS MEETING

8. WE URGED KITT AND COMPANY TO TAKE A POSITION ON THE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 01155 LONDON PLEASE PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, UK, EI, US

SUBJECT: MARCH 4 MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QUESTION OF AN ENVOY BEFORE THE CLINTON/REYNOLDS MEETING ON MARCH 17. KITT REITERATED THAT REYNOLDS WOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH THE PRESIDENT, NOTING THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE TIME TO "FLESH THE IDEA OUT."

COMMENT

9. KITT'S REVERSION TO THE GOI'S STANDARD LINE ON THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL U.S. ENVOY SUGGESTS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING EITHER WAS CARELESS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW OR WAS TAILORING HIS REMARKS FOR HIS AMERICAN AUDIENCE. SPRING IS WELL AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S EVIDENT INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND WOULD NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM THE U.S. OVER THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL ENVOY BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER HAS HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRESIDENT.

TONKIN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

To Barry

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER DARRAGH FUERTH ITOH LAKE PUNKE SIT SODERBERG WALKER  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 051115

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NSC E. O. LAKE-ITOH, CIA E. O. WOOLSEY  
FOLLOWING LONDON 03073 DTD FEB 18 SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC  
BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO

Barry L. will  
fill you in.

QUOTE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 03073  
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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ASAP TO NSC FOR NSA LAKE  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND

PS I'm not w  
about the id  
any way

NODIS

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. I SAW CABINET SECRETARY SIR ROBIN BUTLER THIS AFTERNOON AS PART OF MY ROUND OF MEETINGS PRIOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. WE COVERED THE AGENDA FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT BUTLER LED OFF WITH A NEW CONCERN HERE ABOUT HOW WE HANDLE NORTHERN IRELAND.
3. BUTLER UNDERSTANDS SPEAKER FOLEY HAS AGREED TO ACT AS THE PRESIDENT'S EMISSARY ON NORTHERN IRELAND. HE UNDERSTANDS WORD OF THIS IS ALREADY LEAKING OUT IN WASHINGTON. HE HAD ALSO SEEN A COPY OF A DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH ROBIN RENWICK HAD PICKED UP AND CABLED TO LONDON OVERNIGHT.
4. BUTLER'S WORRY, WHICH I AM SURE IS SHARED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS, IS THAT SPEAKER FOLEY'S

Y...  
me?

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.76)  
KBH 4/11/2023

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ROLE, IF IT LEAKS, WILL BEGIN TO DOMINATE THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE CLINTON-MAJOR MEETING, AT LEAST FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW. THE PRESS COVERAGE HERE WILL BE ENORMOUS AND SUBJECT TO ALL SORTS OF MISINTERPRETATION.

5. IN ANY EVENT, IF THE LEAKS CANNOT BE PLUGGED, THERE CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT BE ANY OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT AHEAD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. PRESUMABLY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL EMISSARY SHOULD COME ONLY AFTER OBVIOUS CONSULTATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

6. AS TO THE TEXT, ROBIN BUTLER WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH PHRASEOLOGY THAT SUGGESTED THE SPEAKER WOULD MAKE HIS FACT-FINDING TRIP, RETURN TO SUBMIT HIS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD THEN DECIDE WHAT FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO TAKE. HE ADDED IT IS THIS LAST ELEMENT WHICH IS BOTHERSOME, I.E. THE IMPLICATION THAT THE SPEAKER'S TRIP IS PRELIMINARY TO A BROADER, MORE SUSTAINED AND INTRUSIVE AMERICAN INITIATIVE ABOUT THE AFFAIRS OF NORTHERN IRELAND. NOT ONLY WOULD THIS GO DOWN VERY BADLY IN BRITAIN, BUT IT WOULD LIKELY BE USED BY THE UNIONISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO BREAK OFF ANY FURTHER PARTICIPATION IN THE PAINSTAKING THREE-STRAND TALKS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS. THE UNIONISTS ARE LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE.

7. SOME OF THE OTHER WORDING IN THE DRAFT (WHICH I HAVE NOT SEEN) ALSO CAUSES PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN CONDEMNING "VIOLENCE", IT IS IMPORTANT TO STATE THE ISSUE IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT SEEM ALSO TO CONDEMN THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE BY THE AUTHORITIES IN THE PROVINCE, I.E., THE POLICE AND THE BRITISH ARMY.

8. DOUGLAS HURD COMMENTED TO ME A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO THAT THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE AND HOW IT PLAYS IN THE PROVINCE AS WELL AS HOW IT CUTS ACROSS THE BROADER ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WILL ALL COME DOWN TO "DAY ONE". BY THAT HE MEANT IT WAS VITAL TO GET THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PRESENTATION -- BOTH CONTENT AND TIMING -- EXACTLY  
RIGHT BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON.

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access to that info.  
Of course after that point  
we don't know where  
\$ goes. But very likely  
this money goes to

legitimate political  
expenses. What it  
does is take pressure  
of other <sup>illegal</sup> funds  
that would otherwise  
have to be shared  
w/ Ann Tex.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.83)  
KRH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Gerry Adams Visa and Contact Issues

Purpose

To decide if, when, and under what conditions we issue another visa to Gerry Adams, and whether and at what level the Administration meets with him in Washington.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has indicated he plans to apply for a U.S. visa to visit the United States September 21 to October 9. He expects to visit New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Hartford, Albany, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and possibly Washington, D.C. Detroit and Kansas City are also possibilities. He expects to bring his press officer and speechwriter with him and we are checking whether they, too, have visa eligibility problems. It is not yet clear what, if any, fundraising activities he plans. He hopes to at least charge admission for his talks to cover the cost of his trip.

There is broad interagency agreement, support from the Irish and acceptance by the British, that we should look favorably upon a visa application from Adams at some point following the IRA cease-fire. Adams' trip will garner enormous publicity in Britain and Ireland: when he comes, what he says, and how he is received here could have a major impact on the peace process. On the one hand, an Adams trip will bolster the IRA's moves toward peace and political engagement; at the same time, an early and warm embrace of Adams could further exacerbate tensions in the Unionist Community. Both the Irish and the British governments are highly conscious of these risks. The Irish support an early visit by Adams; the British have urged you to wait until after Prime Minister Major's party conference October 10-15.

Timing: There are three separate visits that need to be juggled, one by Adams, John Hume and the Unionists. In addition, we need to consider the timing of the congressional schedule and Major's party conference. Adams' people claim his early timing is

dictated by his need to solidify U.S. support for the cease-fire before meeting with IRA hard-liners back home in early October. He also wants to visit before Congress is scheduled to adjourn on October 7 and wants to be back in Ireland by mid-October when Reynolds will hold preparatory talks for the peace negotiations at the end of October.

John Hume has made it clear that he wants to be the first to visit the U.S. following the cease-fire and is planning to come next week. The Vice President will most likely see him as well as a variety of Members of Congress. Lastly, although the Unionist leader, James Molyneaux, is traveling in Australia, two leaders of the Unionists community have asked to visit September 26-28.

There are basically three options:

1. Approve a visa starting September 29: Delay Adams' visit until after Hume and the Unionists have visited Washington (i.e., a week from what he currently plans) but allow him to come prior to Major's party conference.

Pros: Allows Adams to demonstrate support for his cease-fire by visiting the United States relatively early on, thus consolidating support among his hard-liners and ensuring continued progress toward peace.

Will avoid great embarrassment to Adams by minimizing the change in his planned schedule, most of which is well known.

Will enable Adams to meet with members of Congress, thereby increasing support for any possible aid package.

The Irish would support a delay until after the unionist visit.

Cons: Prime Minister Major will be annoyed.

Depending on how the Unionist visit goes, the Adams' visit could inflame Unionist fears and insecurities, thus undermining the peace process.

Some may argue that the visit should be held off until the cease-fire has been in effect for another month or two to help ensure its permanency.

2. Approve a visa starting October 17: Adams would visit the U.S. only after Major's party conference.

Pros: Major and the Unionist would be pleased.

Could boost the Unionist who support peace.

Cons: Would cause a major embarrassment for Adams and could undermine cease-fire.

Would annoy Prime Minister Reynolds and John Hume.

Could open you to criticism of taking Major's internal domestic politics too much into our decisionmaking.

Could cause Adams to miss key talks with Reynolds in the lead up to the peace talks, although Reynolds could probably delay the talks until Adams' return.

Could annoy members of Congress who want to see Adams and show support for an aid package.

3. Approve request to come Sept 21 - Oct 9 but only to D.C. after Hume and the Unionists have come and gone.

Pros: Would enable Adams to carry out his planned itinerary and optimize his support here and at home.

Would enable Hume and the Unionists to come to D.C. first, thus underscoring our support for them.

Would please come in Congress who support Adams' request and enable Adams to meet with members.

Would help galvanize early support for and aid package.

Cons: Despite no physical presence in Washington, his presence in the country will be a major press story which could underscore the visits by Hume and the Unionists.

Would greatly annoy the British and Major, in particular.

Could undermine efforts to bring Unionist into the peace process.

On balance, I recommend you agree to option 1 as it strikes the best balance between the needs of Adams, Major and the Unionists. It enables you to push Adams a bit and warmly welcome the Unionists before an Adams visit, thus helping to mitigate to some extent Major's political problems with the Unionists. We will have to once again work to ensure Major understands our reasoning but I believe any problems will be manageable.

Conditions: We are reviewing what, if any, conditions to place on a possible visit. The Attorney General does not object to the visa waiver if we determine Adams' entry serves foreign policy purposes. She strongly opposes any fundraising. I see no major problem with allowing him the two and a half week itinerary he has proposed. Indeed, the more he is exposed to hard questions and hard scrutiny, as he was in January, the better. The fundraising issue is a bit complex. Clearly, outright fundraising for his party or the IRA should be prohibited. The IRA remains a heavily-armed paramilitary group which has not yet disarmed. We are still reviewing the questions of whether to allow Adams to raise funds in a limited, controllable way to help defray the cost of his trip.

Contacts: We also need to decide whether to end the long-standing U.S. policy of no substantive contact with Sinn Fein/IRA officials. Ambassador Crowe recommends that when we open an official channel to Sinn Fein/IRA, we do it initially through our Consul General in Belfast. Crowe feels strongly that it is too early to arrange official, high-level meetings for Adams in Washington. Ambassador Smith in Dublin has requested permission to initiate contacts with Adams and other Sinn Fein officials in Dublin. Unlike Crowe, she favors official appointments for Adams in Washington. On the Hill, it appears the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering an informal meeting with Adams. Speaker Foley is reviewing the possibility of a meeting and has said publicly he intends to so.

On balance, I recommend we formally lift the ban on contacts with Sinn Fein when Adams comes to the U.S. and that the State Department receive him, probably at the Tarnoff level. We need to continue to work through whether and how he should be received at the White House. One issue is how to calibrate his visit with that of the Unionist leaders and Hume. The Vice President and I have met in the White House with Catholic leader John Hume and Unionist leader Molyneaux, who represent Northern Ireland's two largest parties. We will probably want to receive Adams at a slightly lower level. My initial thinking is that either I or Nancy Soderberg should see him, perhaps at the State Department and not the White House, or an even less formal location. We are continuing to consult on the issue and will decide closer to the visit.

RECOMMENDATION

That Gerry Adams' application for a U.S. visa (requiring a waiver of his existing ineligibility on terrorist grounds) be approved for the two and a half week period beginning September 29, after the Hume and Unionist visits but before Major's party conference.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively, that Adams' application be approved for the two and a half week period beginning October 17, after Major's party conference.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively, that Adams' application be approved as submitted for the two and a half week period beginning September 21.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

JUN 15 '95 03:54PM DIPR

U. S. Department of Justice

F.2



*Copy to Nancy Soderby  
and Alan Kowalski.*

Office of Intelligence Policy and Review

*G. Adams  
visa*

Washington, D.C. 20530

June 14, 1995

To: Michael L. Hancock  
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services  
Department of State

From: *D* Dominic Pastore  
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review  
Department of Justice

Subject: Waiver of Visa Ineligibility for Gerry Adams

Your letter of June 7, 1995, requested a waiver of visa ineligibility for Gerard "Gerry" Adams, President of the Sinn Fein Party, in accordance with Section 212(d)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Mr. Adams' three month B-1/B-2 multiple entry visa issued on March 11, 1995 is due to expire on June 10, 1995.

The FBI continues to maintain its objection to any waiver of ineligibility for Mr. Adams based on Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA for terrorist activity. Moreover, the INS and the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, while not maintaining their objections to a visa waiver at this time, concur with the Bureau in objecting to fundraising activities being permitted to any individual excludable under Section 212(a)(3)(B).

However, in accordance with the President's decision of March 9, 1995, to lift the previously imposed ban on fundraising in the United States by Adams, and the Administration's policy of promoting the peace process in Northern Ireland, Gerry Adams may be issued a three month multiple entry B-1/B-2 visa with no restriction on fundraising. As always, Mr. Adams is required to submit an itinerary of activities and of places to be visited to the U.S. Consul where the visa application is made.

cc: Mark Steinberg, EONS  
(b)(7)c  
 Bob Neighbors, INS  
 Dana Biehl, Criminal Division  
 Fred Close, Criminal Division

*CC to R r  
return.*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE <sup>AL</sup>

SUBJECT: Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland:  
Options for Greater U.S. Support

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.26)  
KBM 4/11/2023

Purpose

To decide upon a package of measures to support the peace process in Northern Ireland by encouraging greater job growth and investment there.

Background

Since the IRA cease-fire announcement August 31, we have reviewed options for increases in U.S. assistance to Northern Ireland to take advantage of the opportunity for peace that now exists. We have consulted with the Congress, the Irish and British governments, and leaders of Northern Irish political parties to get their views on what kind of assistance would be most helpful.

Northern Ireland is already beginning to enjoy a peace dividend. The EU has increased its annual pledge to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) from about \$20 million to over \$24 million annually and may do substantially more to assist Northern Ireland financially. Australia has also made a modest (\$1 million yearly for five years) commitment to IFI for the first time. The longer the peace holds, the more businesses will look at investing in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic.

In that context, our options focus on promoting increased trade and investment with Ireland, particularly the north, and on supporting the IFI. The IFI remains the best way to channel the bulk of U.S. assistance to Ireland. It is trusted by both communities in Northern Ireland (including growing trust and participation from the Unionist community, which was initially skeptical), by the Irish and British governments, and by Congress. Its mandate is to do precisely what we have identified as the priority development tasks in Northern Ireland. You should be aware, however, that despite its increasingly strong reputation, IFI continues to come under occasional criticism in the media for "flaky" programs. The TV tabloid program Inside Edition is scheduled to air such a story November 3, which will

reportedly criticize questionable past IFI projects including a butterfly farm and a golf course. These are old stories and the Fund has taken steps to avoid such projects and made progress in improving its programs and image.

Options

OPIC Equity Fund: At the request of Congress, OPIC is investigating whether an OPIC-sponsored equity fund could mobilize U.S. private capital. Congress (Rep. Gilman and others) has asked for a feasibility study to determine if an equity fund not to exceed \$60 million is appropriate for both Northern Ireland and the Republic.

OPIC and OMB are opposed to an OPIC Equity Fund. OPIC says there is no shortage of capital in Ireland, that more attractive investment and loan terms are available from the British and Irish investment boards, and that there is therefore no incentive for U.S. investors to subscribe to an OPIC-administered equity fund which charges fees for doing business. Because of this, OPIC believes that it would be unable to obtain capital for a \$60 million fund. OPIC is also concerned, given other requirements, about having sufficient personnel to manage such a fund once it was announced. Supporters of the equity fund idea on the Hill and in the Irish-American business community counter that interest in a Fund does exist but that OPIC would need to be proactive to exploit it. In addition, OPIC currently has a loan guarantee program which has not been used so they oppose expanding it further.

Recommendation: That we not take any position on the OPIC proposal for an equity fund until the study is completed. In the likely event of a negative study, that we then look at ways, including through our investment conference (see below), to work with the Irish and British investment boards to encourage increased U.S. business activity.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

International Fund for Ireland: Given the lack of viability of the OPIC equity fund proposal, U.S. support for the IFI becomes even more important as a concrete demonstration of our readiness to support those who take risks for peace in Ireland, as we support those who take similar risks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The Administration included in its budget proposals for FY 94 and FY 95 \$19.6 million per year for IFI. This was a break with previous years, when Congress, not the Administration, was the

driving force behind getting and keeping IFI funding. We suggest building on this by reaffirming our present commitment for FY 95 and seeking Congressional concurrence to a \$10 million increase spread over FY96 and FY97 (approximately \$5 million in additional funding for each year), thereby roughly matching the EU increase and keeping the level of U.S. and EU funding for the IFI on the same level.

**Pros:** Increasing funding for IFI for two crucial years in the peace process would provide concrete evidence of the seriousness of our engagement on this issue. Without even a modest increase for IFI, our package risks being branded by the Irish groups on the Hill and elsewhere as hollow. IFI has identified numerous important new programs which it wants to fund, including "seed money" for the building of a University of Ulster branch campus which would geographically (and psychologically) straddle the sectarian divide and provide much-needed jobs and job training in a cross-community setting. OMB and State agree to this proposed level and timing of increase.

**Cons:** Although IFI enjoys increasingly strong credibility on all sides in Ireland, its management and some of its projects remain vulnerable to criticism. Announcing an increase on the eve of the Inside Edition story, however bogus the "expose" is, does carry some risk, although we could hedge this by emphasizing our intent to work with IFI to further strengthen its programs and its management. Congress will be wary of another promise from the Administration on foreign aid but in our initial conversations, we believe this modest increase will be manageable. Anthony Lake has calls into Leahy and Obey. Generally, the appropriators are likely to oppose; others (Dodd, Foley, Kennedy) will strongly support.

**Recommendation:** That you announce your intent to seek Congressional agreement to an increase of U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97 (for a total of roughly \$25 million per year).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

**Investment Mission and Conference:** This initiative promises to enjoy widespread support and attention, particularly if it is held in Philadelphia (which Senator Wofford in particular welcomes, and which also makes sense overall), and most especially if you participate by giving an opening or keynote speech. The State Department will appoint a coordinator for the conference (thereby addressing in a modified form sentiment from Joe Kennedy and others on the Hill for an "Economic Coordinator" for Ireland). The Coordinator will work with IFI (which is interested in underwriting the conference), the British and Irish

investment boards, and interested Irish-American and other private sector groups and individuals. We should consider inviting some or all of Northern Ireland's party leaders to the conference (Hume and Molyneaux for a start).

Prime Minister Major is holding an Investment Conference in Belfast in December; we propose to send Secretary Brown there and to Dublin. We may also want him to take a delegation of U.S. business leaders with him.

**Recommendations:**

That you agree to participate in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland, probably by giving the opening speech, in Philadelphia in April 1995.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you announce Commerce Secretary Brown's participation in the British Investment Conference in Belfast in December 1994 and Secretary Brown's additional stop in Dublin to explore the all-island dimensions of U.S. trade and investment in Ireland, in preparation for our spring conference.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Provision of U.S. Technical and Other Expertise: We have identified numerous other ways in which U.S. government agencies might begin or expand their contacts with Northern Ireland to focus on areas of greatest importance to solidifying the peace and promoting reconciliation. These could be done within existing budgets, with strong direction from you on the priority you attach to these programs.

- The Department of Commerce has begun enhancing cooperation in the science and technology field by establishing collaboration among "Technology Innovation Centers" already set up in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. We will also discuss with them the possibility of establishing business exchange programs similar to those we have with the NIS.
- USIA will expand its programs to encourage Northern Irish participation in numerous new programs, including a new conflict resolution exchange and training project, which would give a university or organization in the U.S. funding (\$60,000-\$150,000) to fund a project in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is presently conducting a political party training program funded by the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (\$200,000 budgeted); we can encourage NED to expand it and to explore other ways to take advantage of the changed circumstances.

- HUD and other U.S. agencies could provide to Northern Ireland leaders information and training they have developed on community banking, urban development, and other areas in which they have expertise. AID is looking into providing technical assistance to IFI for development of a micro-enterprise program.
- The Trade and Development Agency will lead a mission to the region to explore business opportunities.

Summary Recommendation

That you approve the text of the announcement at Tab A. This announcement includes Secretary Brown's trip to Belfast and Dublin, your participation in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland in April in Philadelphia, and a proposed increase in U.S. funding for IFI of \$10 million over FY96 and 97.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Proposed October 31 Announcement

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland:  
Options for Greater U.S. Support

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.87)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Purpose

To decide upon a package of measures to announce October 31 in Philadelphia to support the peace process in Northern Ireland by encouraging greater job growth and investment there.

Background

Since the IRA cease-fire announcement August 31, we have reviewed options for increases in U.S. assistance to Northern Ireland to take advantage of the opportunity for peace that now exists. We have consulted with the Congress, the Irish and British governments, and leaders of Northern Irish political parties to get their views on what kind of assistance would be most helpful.

Northern Ireland is already beginning to enjoy a peace dividend. The EU has increased its annual pledge to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) from about \$20 million to over \$24 million annually. It will likely do substantially more to assist Northern Ireland financially. Australia has also made a modest (\$1 million yearly for five years) commitment to IFI for the first time. The longer the peace holds, the more businesses will look at investing in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic.

In that context, our options focus on promoting increased trade and investment with Ireland, particularly the north, and on supporting IFI. The IFI remains the best way to channel the bulk of U.S. assistance to Ireland. It is trusted by both communities in Northern Ireland (including growing trust and participation from the Unionist community, which was initially skeptical), by the Irish and British governments, and by Congress. Its mandate is to do precisely what we have identified as the priority development tasks in Northern Ireland. You should be aware, however, that despite its increasingly strong reputation, IFI continues to come under occasional criticism in the media for "flaky" programs. The TV tabloid program Inside Edition is

scheduled to air such a story November 3, which will reportedly criticize questionable past IFI projects including a butterfly farm and a golf course.

Options

Opic Equity Fund: At the request of Congress, OPIC is investigating whether an OPIC-sponsored equity fund could mobilize U.S. private capital. Congress (Rep. Gilman and others) has asked for a feasibility study to determine if an equity fund not to exceed \$60 million is appropriate for both Northern Ireland and the Republic.

OPIC and OMB are opposed to an OPIC Equity Fund. OPIC says there is no shortage of capital in Ireland, that more attractive investment and loan terms are available from the British and Irish investment boards, and that there is therefore no need for U.S. investors to subscribe to an OPIC-administered equity fund which charges fees for doing business. OPIC believes that it would be unable to obtain capital for a \$60 million fund. OPIC is also concerned, given other requirements, about having sufficient personnel to manage such a fund once it was announced. Supporters of the equity fund idea on the Hill and in the Irish-American business community counter that interest in a Fund does exist but that OPIC would need to be pro-active to exploit it.

Recommendation: That we not take any position on the OPIC proposal until the study is completed. In the likely event of a negative study, that we then look at ways, including through our investment conference (see below) to work with the Irish and British investment boards to encourage increased U.S. business activity.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

International Fund for Ireland: Given the lack of viability of the OPIC equity fund proposal, U.S. support for the IFI becomes even more important as a concrete demonstration of our readiness to support those who take risks for peace in Ireland, as we support those who take similar risks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The Administration included in its budget proposals for FY 94 and FY 95 \$19.6 million per year for IFI. This was a break with previous years, when Congress, not the Administration, was the driving force behind getting and keeping IFI funding. We suggest building on this in one of three ways:

- A) Commit now to maintaining the present level of funding over the next two years. This would be announced in terms of our existing commitment to obligate \$19.6 million to IFI in FY 95, and to seek Congressional concurrence for a total of another \$40 million over the following two fiscal years.
- B) Affirm our present commitment for FY 95 and seek Congressional concurrence to a one-time 50 percent increase for FY 96 (\$10 million in funding for a FY 96 total of \$30 million) in response to the historic opportunity presented by the cease-fire.
- C) Affirm our present commitment for FY 95 and seek Congressional concurrence to a 25 percent increase for FY 96 and FY97 (\$5 million in additional funding over present levels for each year), thereby roughly matching the EU increase and keeping the level of U.S. and EU funding for the IFI on the same level.

Finding \$10 million for IFI in FY 95 would require looking at ESF or the remainder of the voluntary peacekeeping account in order to find funds with a pay-out rate of 100 percent. Given this difficulty, there is no support in the Administration and no active support on the Hill for seeking additional funding for FY 95. Finding \$10 million in FY 96 appears easier only because there is as yet no finally agreed-upon budget. An additional \$10 million can be levied on the FY 96 budget against at this time unknown alternatives, but a loss of flexibility will occur. The broad shape of the budget is set and the standard Congressional earmarks are known (e.g. Egypt and Israel). Discretionary ESF will be at least as tight as FY 95. The UN CIPA for UN peacekeeping dues is still fighting an arrears problem. Voluntary peacekeeping is oversubscribed with requests and is the traditional source of contingency funds.

OMB opposes any increase in IFI funding levels for any year. State is divided. NSC recommends Option B, a one-time, \$10 million increase for FY 96. There is sentiment on the Hill among those most interested in Ireland that we should increase our IFI support in order to signal the seriousness of our commitment to supporting peace in Ireland.

**Pros:** Increasing funding for IFI for one crucial year in the peace process would provide concrete evidence of the seriousness of our engagement on this issue. Without even a modest increase for IFI, our package risks being branded by the Irish groups on the Hill and elsewhere as hollow. IFI has identified numerous important new programs which it wants to fund, including "seed money" for the building of a University of Ulster branch campus which would geographically (and psychologically) straddle the

sectarian divide and provide much-needed jobs and job training in a cross-community setting.

Cons: OMB and State budget people oppose increasing IFI funding. Although IFI enjoys increasingly strong credibility on all sides in Ireland, some of its projects remains vulnerable to criticism. Announcing an increase on the eve of the Inside Edition story, however bogus the "expose" is, does carry some risk.

Recommendation: Option B

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Investment Mission and Conference: This initiative promises to enjoy widespread support and attention, particularly if it is held in Philadelphia (which Senator Wofford in particular welcomes, and which also makes sense overall), and most especially if you participate by giving an opening or keynote speech. The State Department will appoint a coordinator for the conference (thereby addressing in a modified form sentiment from Joe Kennedy and others on the Hill for an "Economic Coordinator" for Ireland). The Coordinator will work with IFI (which is interested in underwriting the conference), the British and Irish investment boards, and interested Irish-American and other private sector groups and individuals. We should consider inviting some or all of Northern Ireland's party leaders to the conference (Hume and Molyneaux for a start).

Prime Minister Major is holding an Investment Conference in Belfast in December; we propose to send Secretary Brown there and to Dublin.

Recommendations:

That you agree to participate in April 1995 in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland. That the Conference be held in Philadelphia.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you announce October 31 Commerce Secretary Brown's participation in the British Investment Conference in Belfast in December 1994, and Secretary Brown's additional stop in Dublin to explore the all-island dimensions of U.S. trade and investment in Ireland, in preparation for our spring conference.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Provision of U.S. Technical and Other Expertise: We have identified numerous other ways in which U.S. government agencies

might begin or expand their contacts with Northern Ireland to focus on areas of greatest importance to solidifying the peace and promoting reconciliation. These could be done within existing budgets, with strong direction from you on the priority you attach to these programs.

- The Department of Commerce has begun enhancing cooperation in the science and technology field by establishing collaboration among "Technology Innovation Centers" already set up in the U.S. and Northern Ireland.
- USIA will expand its programs to encourage Northern Irish participation in numerous new programs, including a new conflict resolution exchange and training project, which would give a university or organization in the U.S. funding (\$60,000-\$150,000) to fund a project in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is presently conducting a political party training program funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (\$200,000 budgeted); we can encourage NED to expand it and to explore other ways to take advantage of the changed circumstances.
- HUD and other U.S. agencies could provide to Northern Ireland leaders information and training they have developed on community banking, urban development, and other areas in which they have expertise.

Summary Recommendation

That you approve the text of the announcement at Tab A, to be released October 31 during your stop in Philadelphia. This announcement includes Secretary Brown's trip to Belfast and Dublin, your participation in a White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland, and a one-time, one-year 50 percent increase in U.S. funding for IFI.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Proposed October 31 Announcement

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONINFORMATION**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (388)

KRH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Participation in the White House Conference  
for Trade and Investment in Ireland, May 24-26

## OVERVIEW

The White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland is unique in the history of U.S. relations with Ireland and with the United Kingdom. It is a tangible, dramatic demonstration of your commitment to seizing the opportunity for political and economic revitalization in Ireland that the cease-fire has created. The Irish-American community is thrilled with the Conference and will be well-represented. Every significant political party in Northern Ireland and the Republic will be represented at a high level, although the leaders of the two largest Unionist parties, James Molyneaux of the UUP and Ian Paisley of the DUP, have announced they are not attending, citing concerns that the business aims of the Conference will be overshadowed by politics (i.e., too much attention to Gerry Adams).

The key aim of the Conference is to demonstrate to U.S. business leaders that peace in Northern Ireland is real and that it opens opportunities for trade and investment in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic most affected by the violence. U.S. business response to the Conference has been positive but not overwhelming; while acknowledging its advantages as a potential EU gateway, many American business leaders view the Irish market -- north or south -- as simply too small to deserve major attention. Nonetheless, the Conference has attracted a solid turn-out of over 300 U.S. business leaders and an impressive collection of 100 British and Irish business leaders, in addition to an extraordinary range of British and Irish governmental, political and community leaders from across the political and social spectrum. Indeed, the Conference will bring together for the first time key figures from each of Northern Ireland's political parties, including Sinn Fein and the political arms of the loyalist paramilitaries, as well as the larger constitutional parties. They will be joined by a large contingent of Irish figures from the Republic, particularly the border counties.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We have emphasized two points in the run-up to the Conference: It is a business, not political, event, and it is a milestone in an ongoing process of promoting economic regeneration in the region rather than an end in itself. That said, press attention will focus on the politics of the occasion, particularly Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams' first meeting -- which the British are terming "informal" -- with British Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew.

#### YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Highlight to American business leaders the improved opportunities for trade and investment in Ireland created by peace.
- o Underscore the critical relationship between economic hope and political progress, between investment and fair employment, and between jobs and peace.
- o Remind the disparate political and community leaders present at the Conference of their shared interest in fostering increased trade and investment in their communities, and encourage them to work together on these issues.
- o Reach out to the Unionists represented at the Conference, assuring them of our commitment to a just settlement in Northern Ireland that enjoys the support and democratic consent of both communities.
- o Advance our economic initiatives in Ireland, making clear the deep and abiding commitment of the Administration to supporting peace and economic progress.

#### BACKGROUND

The Conference. You announced your intention to hold this Conference on November 1, 1994 as part of a package of economic initiatives to support peace in Northern Ireland. On December 1, 1994, you appointed Senator George Mitchell to be Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Economic Initiatives in Ireland. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown traveled to Belfast in mid-December 1994 to attend British Prime Minister John Major's investment conference; Brown also visited Dublin.

The Conference is designed to focus on areas of special potential in the economy of Northern Ireland and the border counties, including tourism, tradeable services, manufacturing and information technologies. We will report on the progress made on

the Administration's economic initiatives and announce follow-up actions, including your visit to the area later this year if you so decide.

**The Peace Process.** A British junior minister, Michael Ancram, joined talks with Sinn Fein on May 10. The British have also extended invitations to the other political parties of Northern Ireland (with the exception of Sinn Fein and the loyalist paramilitary parties, who are still in "exploratory dialogue") to start bilateral discussions on the future of Northern Ireland, using the Framework Documents announced earlier this year as the basis for talks. They have begun individual meetings with the Unionists and Hume's SDLP and had the first "multilateral" meeting last Thursday between Major, Unionist leader Molyneux and Hume.

Sinn Fein believes it is stuck in exploratory talks and is now insisting on full parity with other parties in bilateral talks with the British. They have held several mostly peaceful protests on this issue. British Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew has offered to meet "informally" with Gerry Adams at the beginning of the Washington Conference; we are telling Sinn Fein this should give them enough to keep them in dialogue with the junior minister.

Prime Minister Major has stated that Sinn Fein's entry into roundtable talks with mainstream political parties depends on Sinn Fein gaining "the confidence of other parties by making a commitment to progressive disarmament and by beginning a verifiable process of decommissioning." He claims the Unionists will not agree to join talks with Sinn Fein absent progress on decommissioning. The British do not expect a wholesale surrender of IRA arms, but they do expect Sinn Fein to agree that stockpiles must be verified and dismantled in stages. The British and Irish governments have indicated that a third party, perhaps a Nordic country, might be invited to oversee the process.

We need to continue to push Sinn Fein to stay engaged in the current round of talks and to make some confidence-building gestures on the decommissioning issue. At the same time, we should urge the British and the Unionists to recognize that substantial decommissioning of weapons is likely to come much later in the political process and that, with the cease-fire approaching its first anniversary in August, it is important to get all-party talks underway as soon as possible.

Although Irish Prime Minister Bruton emphasized the importance of progress on decommissioning earlier this month when he met with Major in Moscow, the British are irate over recent Irish

government suggestions to the press that British insistence on even a token IRA gesture on arms before substantive talks was neither practical nor helpful. HMG feels it has no more room to maneuver on decommissioning and that Irish dismissal of even a token gesture of decommissioning only encouraged hardliners on both sides.

Unionist leader Jim Molyneaux pulled out of the conference on Friday following Sir Patrick Mayhew's announcement of his planned "informal" meeting with Gerry Adams at the conference. We are pushing him to reverse that decision but are unlikely to succeed. There will be second-tier Unionists at the conference, however, and we will make sure they receive high level attention.

Conference "Deliverables." We will issue on May 25, the morning of your speech to the plenary session, a press announcement which updates and expands upon the economic initiatives program you announced November 1, 1994 (Draft of May 25 announcement is attached). Your speech will highlight a few of these initiatives; Commerce Secretary Brown will use his remarks (which precede yours) to go into more detail on them. The "deliverables" we will announce include:

- Your intention to visit the UK and Ireland later this year (if you approve);
- George Mitchell's continuing as Special Advisor for Economic Initiatives in Ireland (Mitchell has committed to staying at least until the end of 1995; his office at the State Department will be staffed and engaged on this issue at least through 1996);
- A renewal of your commitment to increase U.S. funding for the International Fund for Ireland in FY96 and 97 (although in the current climate on the Hill IFI we may have to settle for retaining the \$19.6 level of recent years);
- Our proposal to the IFI that they establish a Technology Trust Fund for Peace, inspired by John Cullinane's idea of a BIRD-type program which would support R&D joint ventures;
- A number of new Commerce Department programs, including a new management intern program bringing Northern Ireland and border counties managers to work in U.S. firms, a new Business Information Center for Northern Ireland and the border counties accessible by 24-hour flash-fax, and a permanent Commerce Department presence in Belfast;

- Several new USIA, SBA, USDA and other agency initiatives, including increased exchanges and grants for Northern Ireland projects;
- A hoped-for signing of a joint communique on tourism cooperation between the U.S., Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.
- A number of follow-on trade missions.

#### VISAS

We have granted 3 month multiple-entry visas with no fundraising restrictions to about ten individuals -- both Sinn Fein and loyalist paramilitaries. There is little press interest in the issue now since the Adam's visa was resolved in March. However, the access to the U.S. to officials on both sides is an important confidence building measure.

#### EVENTS

**Speech to the Plenary Session.** You will speak to the 1,000-plus participants in the Conference during the morning plenary session on May 25. Your speech is being billed in the UK and Ireland as the first substantive address by an American President devoted specifically to Ireland and will be exhaustively analyzed. We will have the speech ready for your review on Monday.

**White House Reception.** You are hosting a reception on the South Lawn for the Conference participants. We have prepared short talking points for use with the main Northern Ireland political leaders who will be present.

**Drop-by on Spring-Mayhew Meeting.** You are tentatively scheduled to drop by a meeting that the Vice President or I will have with Irish Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring and British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Sir Patrick Mayhew, the two ranking Irish and British government representatives at the Conference. I recommend that you try and drop by in order to underscore your commitment to the peace process and continuing engagement in it. Pressure for progress needs to be maintained on all fronts.

**Drop-by Columnists.** We also recommend you drop-by a meeting on Tuesday in the Roosevelt Room with columnists who follow the Irish issue. Suggested talking points and Q & A's are attached.

MEETING WITH  
IRISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DICK SPRING AND  
BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND PATRICK MAYHEW

CONTEXT OF MEETING

You will drop by a meeting hosted by the Vice President or Tony Lake with the two ranking Irish and British government representatives at the Conference, Dick Spring and Sir Patrick Mayhew. Both men will want to express their appreciation to you for the personal attention you have devoted to the Conference and to encouraging U.S. businesses to invest in the area.

There is a gap developing between the British and Irish governments over the question of progress on arms decommissioning as the price of admission for Sinn Fein (and the loyalist paramilitaries) to all-party talks. Some elements of the Irish government believe the British are insisting on something Sinn Fein/IRA can never deliver, and that even if a token handover of weapons occurred, it would only whet Unionist demands for more.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Urge the British and Irish to continue to work together closely and to keep their disagreements private.
- Discuss your possible visit to the United Kingdom and Ireland later in the year, as well as a possible stop in Northern Ireland.

CORE POINTS

- Both of your governments have made courageous efforts to achieve peace in Northern Ireland.
- Job creation through trade and investment is the key to cementing the cease-fire and giving people an interest in maintaining peace.
- This Conference is only the beginning of our efforts to attract business to Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland. Senator Mitchell and his staff intend to continue working with the Commerce Department to follow up on the Conference.
- We will continue to push Sinn Fein on decommissioning.

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

*Ireland  
package*

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Gray, Wendy E.; Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Kreczko, Alan J.; @EUROPE - European Affairs  
Subject: RE: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]  
Date: Tuesday, January 31, 1995 9:18AM

Please pass to Nancy Soderberg:

Here are my comments on your edits and questions:

On the prisoners issue, I would revise to read: Sinn Fein and some Irish-Americans are also increasing the pressure on us to review the cases of IRA "political prisoners" in the U.S. Most of these cases involve persons convicted or awaiting extradition for violent actions (murder, arms trafficking) or other non-political offenses. You should avoid commenting on the issue.

On disarmament, the British have softened their position on what is required before moving to all-party talks. (Basically, they just want to get enough to get the UUP to show up.) Their position is "significant progress" on disarmament before all-party talks. John Bruton has used the phrase "significant progress." But I think in the Q&A, the President should avoid characterizing either the British or Irish position because it's so deliberately vague. I would delete the phrase "While disarmament is not a specific condition" and let the rest of the point stand as is, though I'd also prefer not to add "as will the all-party talks" at the end. The important thing today is to signal that we'd like to see both Sinn Fein and the British be positive and forthcoming in their meeting tomorrow. (Despite Gerry Adams' stance that it doesn't matter whether the Unionists show up or not, the fact is if the British agree to all-party talks and the Unionist seats are empty, it would be a serious, perhaps fatal setback for the peace process.)

I am asking Martha Pope for more specifics on the nature of the business community response and how the conference is shaping up.

From: Gray, Wendy E.  
To: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Marshall, Betty A.; Maxfield, Nancy H.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches  
Subject: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Monday, January 30, 1995 11:59 PM

<<Attached File: 0606PRE.DOC>>  
<<Attached File: 0606QA.DOC>>

Hi Kathy!

On the Irish memo, can you look at my edits. I added the prisoners point. Also, haven't the British dropped the disarmament point. Can we say so in the Q&A? When you say the response to the conference has been encouraging -- any specifics?

Thanks!

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (3.90)  
KBH 4/11/2023

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9970

INFO RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0787

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 17528

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UK, EL

SUBJECT: DUP ON POLITICAL TALKS, U.S. ENVOY

REF: LONDON 17474

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE CONSUL GENERAL PAID A CALL ON DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) SECRETARY NIGEL DODDS ON SEPTEMBER

23. DODDS INDICATED THAT THE DUP WAS HOLDING NIO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR MICHAEL ANCRAM AT ARM'S LENGTH AS ANCRAM TRIED TO COBBLE TOGETHER A NEW ROUND OF POLITICAL TALKS. DODDS STRESSED THAT THE DUP WAS NOT OPPOSED TO TALKING PER SE, BUT THAT THE PARTY STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT REVIVING THE PREVIOUS SET OF TALKS WITH BUT SOME TINKERING ON FORMAT SIMPLY WOULD NOT DO. IN ANY CASE, DODDS ADDED, THE DUP ALWAYS MAINTAINED "INFORMAL CONTACT" WITH NIO MINISTERS; IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO DO SO IN A PLACE AS SMALL AS NORTHERN IRELAND. DODDS NOTED THAT BETWEEN THE SEPTEMBER 17 PM MAJOR-IAN PAISLEY MEETING AND THE REGULAR IF INFORMAL SOUNDINGS WITH THE NIO IN BELFAST, HE WAS FAIRLY CONFIDENT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO INCLUDE THE DUP IN SOME KIND OF TALKS.

3. EMBASSY COMMENT: DODDS' REFERENCE TO "INFORMAL CONTACTS" WITH THE NIO APPEARS TO CONFIRM NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS' ACCOUNT OF AN UPCOMING MEETING

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PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

BETWEEN PAISLEY AND ANCRAM (REFTEL). END COMMENT.

4. MEANWHILE, DODDS SAID, THE DUP REMAINED VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED TO ANY U. S. ENVOY OR FACT-FINDER. THE PARTY COULD NEVER SEE SUCH A MISSION AS ANYTHING BUT BLACKMAIL AGAINST THE UNIONISTS, COURTESY OF DUBLIN AND THE SDLP. AN ENVOY WAS PLAIN INTERFERENCE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS, DODDS AVERRED. A FACT-FINDER WAS EVEN WORSE, HE CONTINUED, FOR THIS IMPLIED THAT CONGEN BELFAST AND EMBASSY LONDON HAD NOT SUPPLIED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO WASHINGTON OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS. NO ONE IN NORTHERN IRELAND COULD BELIEVE THAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN THE CASE, DODDS CONCLUDED, SO IT WAS STILL NOTHING MORE THAN BLACKMAIL, ALBEIT VEILED.

5. IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH THE EMBASSY, ON SEPTEMBER 23, NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS SAID DUBLIN IS WELL AWARE THAT A U. S. SPECIAL ENVOY WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IN FINDING A SETTLEMENT. HE THOUGHT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF AN ENVOY AND USED IT ONLY TO "JERK OUR CHAIN". THOMAS NOTED THAT A U. S. SPECIAL ENVOY WOULD BE COMPLETELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH THE UNIONISTS. MOREOVER, CALLING FOR AN OUTSIDE ENVOY WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO SAYING THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT HAD FAILED. THIS WAS NEITHER IN LONDON'S NOR IN DUBLIN'S INTEREST.

SEITZ

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 20, 1993

## MEMORANDUM

TO: SENATOR  
FR: TRINA  
RE: MEETING WITH NIALL O'DOWD

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (3.92)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Last week, I met with Niall O'Dowd of Irish Americans for Clinton/Gore (i.e. the Flynn/Morrison group). Niall is also the publisher of the Irish Voice and Irish America Magazine.

The following is an account of what Niall had to say. He asked me inform Jean and Nancy Soderberg of our discussion. Other than that, he wants to keep this quiet for now.

Niall spent most of the time talking about the special envoy issue. He briefly talked about Gerry Adams and Irish immigration. I simply listened to Niall. I didn't promise him anything on any of these matters.

#### Special Envoy

Niall has been making numerous trips to Northern Ireland to talk with Sinn Fein and the IRA. He says he has their assurance that the IRA will cease-fire if the Clinton Administration sends a special envoy. The length of the cease-fire would last the length of an envoy's visit.

Niall and a group which will include Bill Flynn (the guy you wanted me to hook up with Brendan) will visit Northern Ireland in early September. Niall won't say exactly what will occur, but he says the IRA will "give a generous response" which will serve as a signal to us.

I told Niall of my own view that an envoy wouldn't even be considered without a definite agenda and without assurances that the envoy would be able to demonstrate success from such a mission. Niall feels the IRA cease-fire would be a success in and of itself.

He says the IRA is not calling for a withdrawal of British troops. Although hard-line members of the IRA want a date set for withdrawal, the moderates (Adams) aren't demanding that, and the moderates dominate the organization. Niall is confident that Adams can control the hard-liners and achieve a cease-fire.

Niall supports the idea of interim joint authority (British/Irish) for Northern Ireland. Dick Spring has been talking about this recently. Niall thinks a UN force should be deployed, allowing British troops to withdraw to barracks. Then policing would be turned over to local police with Catholics

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

## CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-2-

policing nationalist neighborhoods and Protestants policing Unionist neighborhoods. (One of the big problems at present is that there are very few Catholics join the RUC.)

Once the IRA maintains a cease-fire for a legitimate period of time, they would be brought into talks. It seems to me that a cease-fire would have to last a significant period of time before people would consider it serious enough to include Sinn Fein in any talks.

Niall thinks Jimmy Carter would be the right person to serve as envoy. Ray Flynn apparently talked to Carter about this and Carter said he wouldn't consider it unless invited by both the British and Irish governments. Carter also suggested Andrew Young for the job.

Niall thinks Adams is moving to the center. He noted that Eamon de Valera and Michael Collins had done the same. He says Sinn Fein just wants to be sure that if they make a move in the right direction, it won't be in vain.

He wants you and Jean to "look seriously at the envoy idea" after we get "the signal" in September.

Niall mentioned that the IRA will want to see the release of prisoners who have just about served out their time but he didn't know at what point they would raise this. [There are several prisoners who have served 10 or 12 years on life sentences and can be released at any time now at the discretion of the Secretary of State (Mayhew).]

I asked about Sinn Fein renouncing violence. Niall says they won't do so until this is much further down the road.

I asked why the Unionists would be willing to go along. After all, it is Paisley who is currently keeping the talks from resuming. Niall feels that the Unionists know demographics are against them -- the majority of children under age 12 are now Catholic, 4 of the 6 counties in the North have a Catholic majority, and Queens University used to be 15% Catholic, now it's 65%.

I asked why the IRA is suddenly interested in talks. Niall says the IRA leaders are in their mid-forties and they want to see a resolution in their lifetime so they can claim their actions were not in vain. He also finds they are simply more realistic than they used to be.

Niall believes an envoy could serve as the catalyst. Ultimately, the parties must solve this themselves.

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## CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-3-

**Irish Immigration**

When I agreed to see Niall, I expected he would spend most of the time talking about visas but he only spent a few minutes on this issue.

His interest is in long-term access for the Irish. The group is not looking for any kind of quota, they just want to be sure the door isn't shut again like it was prior to the Donnelly visas.

As you know, after the final year of 16,000 visas, the permanent diversity program kicks in and it is estimated that the Irish will get about 4,000 visas per year. Niall is concerned because the number 4,000 is only a ceiling based on some mathematical computation that is difficult to understand. He is concerned that, while the Irish may get up to 4,000, they may also get zero. [I have talked to Jerry and Michael about this. They say this computation is based on best estimates and we will simply have to see how it plays out.]

Niall also wants to assure that any visas left over from the three years of 16,000 can be carried over. Current law doesn't provide that. Niall wants a Kennedy amendment. [I will talk Jerry and Michael about this, but it seems like something you might want to consider. We won't know how many visas are left over until the end of the fiscal year. You might want to introduce an amendment which will allow those visas to carry over for all of the countries in the program -- that way it wouldn't be just Irish-specific.]

**Gerry Adams**

Niall feels that the Irish American community, which his organization rallied to support Clinton, is disappointed that Clinton has not abided by his campaign pledge to let Gerry Adams into the US. He argues that people with worse records -- such as Dolours Price -- are allowed in the US. (He was referring to actor Stephen Rea's wife. Price and her sisters were jailed for life because of their involvement in a 1973 IRA bombing which injured 170 people. They were released from prison for medical reasons after 8 years.)

Bruce Morrison recently spoke at an event in Massachusetts (Ancient Order of Hibernians) and he was booed because Irish Americans feel let down by Clinton.

He also argued that Robinson and Hume have both met with Adams.

cc: Ambassador Smith, Carey, Nancy

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British Sensitivity

Few issues have more potential for creating problems in Anglo-American relations than Northern Ireland.

- The British regard it as an internal matter.
- They believe that the U.S. tends to view it from the nationalist perspective.
- The extension of terrorist campaigns to England, innocent loss of life, and the targeting of Britain's political leadership have made HMG sensitive to advice from outside.

In Northern Ireland, the President's campaign statements aroused hopes in the Catholic community and fears among the Unionists that the USG would weigh in on the nationalist side.

Status of the Talks

The political talks, which broke off in November without agreement, contain three "strands" -- devolved government in Northern Ireland, relations between North and South in Ireland, and ties between the UK and Ireland.

- The major stumbling blocks are: 1) who will exercise executive power in Northern Ireland, 2) Dublin's role in Northern Irish affairs, and 3) the Unionists' demand that Ireland revise its constitutional claim to the North.
- Informal talks continue and formal sessions may resume soon. Dick Spring, the new Irish Foreign Minister, is expected to press for an agreement.

Terrorism

The level of violence (84 deaths in 1992 in Northern Ireland) is well down from its 1972 peak of more than 450 deaths. Two recent trends, however, are worrisome: 1) the increased proficiency of the loyalist (Protestant) paramilitaries, who caused more deaths last year than the IRA; 2) the IRA's bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland.

MacBride Principles

British American groups have pressed for an investment code of conduct called the MacBride Principles, modeled after the South Africa-related Sullivan Principles. You spoke favorably about them during the campaign. You should know, however, that generally among responsible leaders in Northern Ireland, the Principles have little support because they impede urgently needed investment. The distinction is drawn with South Africa

because discrimination is legal there; it is illegal in Northern Ireland. Major is not likely to raise the issue.

### Human Rights

Human rights issues have become a key concern in Northern Ireland. The issues transcend specific incidents and point to a pattern of collusion between British security forces and Loyalist factions as well as an environment of intimidation and fear. Excessive force (including "shoot to kill" practices), harassment by security forces (stopping people unnecessarily or conducting arbitrary and disruptive house searches), unfair detention (holding people for up to seven days with trial) and trials without juries have been prevalent.

Current cases in Northern Ireland with human rights implications (the first two are the most widely known):

- Two Royal Marines were charged in February 1992 with murder for the December 1990 killing of Fergal Caraher.
- In February 1992 four acknowledged PIRA terrorists were killed by security forces shortly after having attacked an RUC station in Coalisland. Human rights groups claimed that excessive force was used and that the men could have been arrested rather than killed. The police are investigating whether the use of force was warranted.
- In September 1992 Peter MacBride (no relation to the "Principles") was shot and killed while running away from an Army patrol. Two soldiers have been charged with murder.
- In November 1992 Pierce Jordan was shot and killed by police after a car chase. A police investigation has begun, but no charges have been filed.

At the Tab entitled "Letters" are letters from the House and the Senate asking you to raise the subject of human rights in Northern Ireland during the Major visit.

### Joe Doherty

Joe Doherty is a PIRA member convicted in 1981 of murdering a British Army officer in Northern Ireland. Just before the conviction was handed down, he escaped to the U.S., where he was picked up in 1983 for immigration violations and remained in jail for almost nine years, while his case was being fought in the U.S. courts. A British extradition request was rejected by a District Court judge on the grounds that his offense was political. The USG then attempted to deport him for having entered the country under false documentation. Doherty asked to be deported to Ireland instead of the UK but, after those two countries signed an extradition treaty, requested asylum in the U.S. Eventually, the matter went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Attorney General had the discretion to deport

Doherty without further hearings. In January 1992, Doherty was deported to the UK, and he is now in prison in Northern Ireland. The British authorities have turned down Doherty's request that he be given credit for time served in the U.S. and some Irish-Americans groups, for whom Doherty was a major cause celebre, have asked the USG to intervene. The U.S. has no current legal or jurisdictional interest in the Doherty case.

#### The Gerry Adams Visa Issue

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has been turned down for visas several times in the past few years -- most recently in 1991. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, his advocacy of violence and information that he was a member of the PIRA Army Council, which decides on terrorist actions, makes him ineligible for a visa. (Executive Branch rulings were supported by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990.) To overcome his ineligibility, Adams would need a waiver -- granted by the INS at the recommendation of the State Department. It would be odd to do so now, since Sinn Fein is losing support and Adams himself was defeated in the 1992 Parliamentary election. Nor has Sinn Fein agreed to abandon its support of violence.

A current complication is the request by the defense in the Smyth extradition case that Adams testify. (Smyth was convicted of attempted murder, was imprisoned in Northern Ireland, and escaped in 1983.) The U.S. consul still has the final say about granting a visa, but Justice could be asked to parole Adams into the country. Justice would resist on the grounds that Adam's testimony is not germane in an extradition hearing. Even if it were, he could make it by deposition.

During the campaign, you spoke favorably of providing him a visa, since at the time he was a member of the British Parliament. However, he has since lost his seat in Parliament and this, the main rationale is no longer relevant.

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 4665 MSGID: M0681917

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PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (3.94)  
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665** TOSEC 170387

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (ADDED CAPTION)

FOLLOWING SECSTATE **324665** DTD 23OCT93 SENT ACTION

DUBLIN REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMAIOTN 23OCT93

QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE **324665**

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

- NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: DUBLIN 5293

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR JEAN,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT TELEGRAM ON YOUR ROLE IN  
FROMTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  
IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR  
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROLE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN IN  
CONNECTION WITH NORTHERN IRELAND, AS WELL AS PAST  
PRACTICES.

3. FIRST, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE DECISION TO ASK  
YOU NOT TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NORTH DURING  
YOUR LAST VISIT REFLECTED OUR BEST JUDGEMENT OF WHAT WOULD  
BE APPROPRIATE IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE

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APPRECIATED YOUR COOPERATION IN ADHERING TO THAT GUIDANCE. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE

AGREED TO YOUR ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PEOPLE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR ATTACKING AN ARMY PATROL.

4. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE VISITS, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT THEM TO APPROXIMATELY ONE EVERY SIX MONTHS. SINCE 1982 YOUR PREDECESSORS VISITED ONCE OR TWICE PER YEAR, AND THESE WERE PRIVATE VISITS. THEY WERE ARRANGED BY THE AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BELFAST, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. THESE PRIVATE VISITS BY YOUR PREDECESSORS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH A RANGE OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FIGURES. AS WELL AS VISITS TO PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI). THESE VISITS PROVIDED A MEANS OF FAMILIARIZING OUR AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUES AND ENHANCED THE AMBASSADOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH SENIOR REPUBLIC OF IRELAND OFFICIALS.

5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE, YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

-- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS. WHARTON  
UNQUOTE WHARTON

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INFO: USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

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2011-0355-F (3.95)  
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5. A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS, PARTICULARLY BY AN AMBASSADOR AS VISIBLE AS YOURSELF WOULD SEND A CONFUSING SIGNAL, IN LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH TO RESTART THE TALKS, AND THE CURRENT VIEW OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT EITHER BY SENDING A SPECIAL ENVOY OR SOME OTHER MEANS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES, BUT WE CAN DO THAT THROUGH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN BELFAST AND OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON AS WELL AS OUR EMBASSY IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS SENSITIVE TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN DUBLIN.

6. WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, A KEY POLICY ADVISOR AND WE GREATLY VALUE YOUR:

-- KEEPING THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE VIEWS OF LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ON THE ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- ENCOURAGING THE GOI TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ENGAGING AND EXPLAINING TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

-- TAKING THE LEAD IN FOLLOWING IFI ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

-- COORDINATING WITH EMBASSY LONDON SO AS TO PRESENT A COHERENT PICTURE TO FOREIGN INTERLOCUTORS OF USG VIEWS ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO OUR GOAL OF RESOLVING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME YOUR INSIGHTS AND VIEWS ON IT. WITH BEST REGARDS. WHARTON  
UNQUOTE WHARTON

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: FILE HOLL SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR SPECIAL

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 220156Z SEP 93

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (3.96)  
KBH 4/11/2023

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INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 8765  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 288750

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BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE  
~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 05293

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PASS THE WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - TONY LAKE  
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY  
SMITH

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN  
IRELAND

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1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON MARCH 17, IN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO APPOINT ME AS AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THE NECESSARY DIALOGUE TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION IN IRELAND. CLEARLY THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF MY MANDATE IS TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH MY BEST ADVICE ON THE SITUATION HERE AND ON HOW BEST THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HELP THE VITAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
3. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE ALREADY TRAVELED TWICE TO

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

NORTHERN IRELAND: VISITED THE EMBASSY IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW (WHO INCIDENTALLY ENCOURAGED ME TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND, BUT TO BE "EVENHANDED" IN MEETING WITH BOTH COMMUNITIES); ATTENDED A TWO DAY SEMINAR IN CAMBRIDGE ON NORTHERN IRELAND SPONSORED BY THE BRITISH-IRISH ASSOCIATION; AND HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND HERE AT THE EMBASSY AND MY RESIDENCE. THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGHOUT THESE MANY AND VARIED CONTACTS IS THE BURNING DESIRE OF EVERYONE FROM POLITICIANS TO SOCIAL WORKERS, CLERICS TO BUSINESSMEN, ARTISTS TO CIVIL SERVANTS TO FIND PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. JUST AS EMOTIVE IS THE STRONGLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO RECONCILIATION.

4. DURING MY VISIT TO BELFAST, THE CONSUL GENERAL ORGANIZED A MEETING OF WOMEN FROM BOTH COMMUNITIES PROMINENT IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS, INCLUDING BUSINESS, ACADEMIA AND COMMUNITY WORK. FOR MOST OF THEM IT WAS THE FIRST OCCASION THEY HAD EVER HAD TO MEET WOMEN ENGAGED IN SIMILAR WORK IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES. THEIR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR OUR BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WAS GENUINE AND DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF OUR ROLE IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THEY URGED ME TO RETURN OFTEN AND CONTINUE TO REACH OUT TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. ONE OF THEM, JANE MORRICE, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN BELFAST, COMMENTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LUNCH THAT IT HAD BEEN THE BEST POLITICAL DISCUSSION SHE HAD PARTICIPATED IN IN THIRTY YEARS. FOLLOWING ANOTHER MEETING, IAN PAISLEY, JUNIOR, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN GENUINELY WORTHWHILE TO TALK WITH ME GIVEN MY INTEREST IN THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD RETURN OFTEN. FINALLY, THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH, A MODERATE UNIONIST NEWSPAPER WITH THE LARGEST CIRCULATION IN

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NORTHERN IRELAND, WELCOMED MY VISIT IN AN EDITORIAL SEPTEMBER 15 AND POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH MY OFFICIAL REMIT EXTENDS ONLY TO THE BORDER, I HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND. CITING HOW INTERTWINED ARE THE POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE ISLAND AND THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND WHICH I AM "ENTITLED TO EXAMINE".

5. GIVEN THIS REACTION TO MY VISITS, I FIND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW ME TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS CONVEYED TO ME IN LONDON BY AMBASSADOR SEITZ AND BY TELEPHONE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTS ME TO ADVISE HIM ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND A PEACE ENVOY OR A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND. ONE CAN NOT DO THIS UNLESS, AND I QUOTE FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED BELFAST TELEGRAPH EDITORIAL, ONE GETS "AS ROUNDED A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AS POSSIBLE. THAT SHOULD INCLUDE LOCAL POLITICIANS, ESPECIALLY UNIONISTS WHOSE CASE HAS OFTEN GONE BY DEFAULT, PARTICULARLY IN AMERICA." VAGUE REFERENCES TO "SENSITIVE MOMENTS" AND THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT OUTWEIGH MY MANDATE FROM THE PRESIDENT NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN

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NORTHERN IRELAND. PERHAPS THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO REMIND THE EUROPEAN BUREAU AND THE EMBASSY IN LONDON OF THIS REALITY. REGARDS.

SMITH UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07

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**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**  
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FOR U/S TARNOFF AND A/S OXMAN FROM SEITZ  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI, US  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: A ROLE FOR THE U. S.?  
REF: LONDON 12982

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1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. COMMENT: THE LONG SAGA OF NORTHERN IRELAND IS HEADED TOWARDS ANOTHER BREAK-POINT, PROBABLY BY THE END OF THE YEAR. NOTHING IN THE PROVINCE IS MORE DANGEROUS THAN AN IMPASSE, AND UNLESS DUBLIN AND LONDON CAN WORK TOGETHER TO FILL THE VACUUM, I SUSPECT THERE WILL BE RENEWED PRESSURE AT HOME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO APPOINT A SPECIAL ENVOY.
3. WITHOUT THE CAREFULLY PREPARED SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES, I BELIEVE SUCH A STEP WOULD RAPIDLY LEAD TO FAILURE. THERE IS NO SIGN THE NATIONALISTS IN THE NORTH WOULD ACCEPT SUCH AN EMISSARY, AND THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE MUCH ENTHUSIASM IN LONDON OR, I WOULD GUESS, IN DUBLIN. IN FACT, AN ENVOY WOULD VERY LIKELY MAKE ALL

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE PARTIES MORE INTRANSIGENT. NOT LESS SO.

4. MY PRINCIPAL CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE RESURRECTION OF THIS OPTION, NO MATTER HOW GENUINELY PROFFERED, WOULD SERIOUSLY CUT ACROSS OUR BROADER RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AT A MOMENT WHEN WE HAVE SO MUCH BUSINESS TO DO WITH THEM IN THE SEASON JUST AHEAD -- BOSNIA, RUSSIA, THE URUGUAY ROUND, THE NATO SUMMIT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SO FORTH. THE PRIME MINISTER IS ALREADY HAVING A HARD TIME ASSERTING HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE PARLIAMENT, THE PARTY, AND THE PRESS. IF WE PUT THE UNYIELDING ISSUES OF NORTHERN IRELAND BACK IN THE CENTER OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO ADVANCE THESE OTHER MATTERS IN THE WAY WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE.

5. BELOW IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHERE THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE CURRENTLY STANDS AND WHERE IT IS LIKELY HEADED. END COMMENT.

6. SUMMARY. PROSPECTS FOR A RENEWAL OF FORMAL TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND THIS YEAR ARE PROBABLY LESS THAN 50 PERCENT. THE NEXT DECISION POINT ON THIS ISSUE COULD COME AFTER THE BRITISH-IRISH CONFERENCE IN LATE OCTOBER. IF THE IRISH CONCLUDE THAT THE BRITISH HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS IN RECONVENING THE TALKS THEY MIGHT REOPEN THE ISSUE OF A U.S. "PEACE ENVOY." IF THEY DO, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE SERIOUS DOWNSIDES. END SUMMARY

7. WITH THE FORMAL POLITICAL TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND SUSPENDED AND TALK OF AN IRA CEASE-FIRE IN THE AIR, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REVIEW WHERE THE ULSTER CONUNDRUM STANDS AND WHERE IT IS LIKELY HEADED.

8. THE ALL-PARTY POLITICAL TALKS LAST YEAR CAME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT. THEY BROKE OFF WHEN THE IRISH COALITION GOVERNMENT COLLAPSED FOR EXTRANEIOUS REASONS. SINCE THEN, A COMBINATION OF EVENTS HAS UNRAVELED THAT DELICATE CONSENSUS, AND THE VARIOUS FACTIONS HAVE DRIFTED APART.

9. JOHN HUME, THE PREEMINENT IRISH CATHOLIC POLITICIAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ANNOUNCED LAST WEEK THAT HE HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS ON A PROPOSAL THAT WOULD RESULT IN A CESSATION OF IRA TERRORISM. HUME WAS IN THE U.S. ON A LONG-PLANNED TOUR SOLICITING INVESTMENT; WE DON'T KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE BRIEFED IRISH-AMERICAN LEADERS ON HIS DEAL WITH ADAMS OR SOUGHT THEIR SUPPORT.

10. WHETHER OR NOT HUME AND ADAMS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A DEAL THAT COULD INDUCE THE IRA TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS, NOTHING IS GOING TO BRING PEACE TO NORTHERN IRELAND EXCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNIONIST (PROTESTANT) MAJORITY. WE HAVEN'T SEEN THE HUME-ADAMS AGREEMENT, BUT PRESS REPORTS INDICATE IT INCLUDES FEATURES THAT WOULD BE ANATHEMA TO VIRTUALLY EVERY PROTESTANT IN THE PROVINCE. IT'S A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS, BUT NOT THE BASIS OF A SOLUTION.

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11. MEANWHILE, THE OFFICIAL POLITICAL TALKS PROCESS IS MORIBUND BUT NOT YET DEAD. A NEW JUNIOR MINISTER, MICHAEL ANCRAM, IS TRYING HARD TO BREATHE LIFE INTO IT THROUGH PRIVATE, BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES. ANCRAM IS GOOD, AND AS A SCOTTISH CATHOLIC ARISTOCRAT, HE HAS CREDIBILITY WITH ALL SIDES. HIS BOSS, NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY PADDY MAYHEW, DESPERATELY WANTS A DEAL ON HIS WATCH, AND WILL ENDORSE ANYTHING HUME AND THE UNIONISTS CAN AGREE TO.

12. AT THE MOMENT, THERE ARE TWO MAJOR OBSTACLES TO GETTING THE PARTIES BACK AROUND THE TABLE. THE OBVIOUS AND MORE SUPERFICIAL ONE IS IAN PAISLEY'S INSISTENCE THAT DUBLIN FIRST REVOKE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM TO THE NORTH. THAT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN IN ADVANCE OF A BROADER PACKAGE, AND PAISLEY KNOWS IT. HE'S USING THE DEMAND AS A STALLING TACTIC, AND CAN BACK DOWN WHENEVER

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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HE SEES FIT.

13. THE MORE IMPORTANT OBSTACLE IS HUME'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ADAMS. NO UNIONIST LEADER CAN NEGOTIATE OPENLY WITH HUME IF THE LATTER APPEARS TO REPRESENT PEOPLE WHO ARE MURDERING PROTESTANTS AND BOMBING THEIR TOWNS. PAISLEY AND JIM MOLYNEAUX (THE OTHER MAIN UNIONIST LEADER) GENERALLY TRUST HUME, AND THINK THEY CAN DO A DEAL WITH HIM. BUT BOTH HAVE TO WATCH THEIR FLANKS. PROTESTANT POPULAR SUPPORT FOR LOYALIST TERRORISM IS RISING TO WORRISOME LEVELS, ERODING THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE TOUGH COMPROMISES.

14. PERHAPS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IN NORTHERN IRELAND LIES NOT WITH THE POLITICIANS BUT WITH THEIR CONSTITUENTS. WHILE THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A PERVASIVE LONGING FOR PEACE, THERE IS MUCH LESS SUPPORT IN EITHER COMMUNITY FOR THE KIND OF CONCESSIONS EACH WOULD HAVE TO MAKE TO REACH AN ACCORD. THE STATUS QUO, UNPALATABLE AS IT IS, REMAINS EACH SIDE'S FALLBACK POSITION IF IT CANNOT HAVE ITS WAY. THERE MAY BE A "SILENT MAJORITY" FAVORING COMPROMISE, BUT INTENSE VOCAL MINORITIES ON BOTH SIDES ARE PUSHING THEIR LEADERS IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

15. LOOKING A BIT FURTHER AHEAD, WE JUDGE THERE IS PROBABLY LESS THAN A 50 PERCENT CHANCE OF RENEWED FORMAL TALKS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. AFTER THAT, THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY MAY CLOSE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AS PARTIES GEAR UP FOR THE MAY 1994 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. WE CANNOT USEFULLY SPECULATE WHETHER THE WINDOW MIGHT REOPEN BEFORE THE NEXT BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS (MOST LIKELY IN 1996). IF THE PARTIES CANNOT GET BACK TO THE TABLE, THE BRITISH WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE SLOW PROCESS OF IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ADDRESSING CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES, AND SUBSIDIZING THE NORTHERN IRELAND ECONOMY.

16. THE NEXT CRITICAL POINT FOR US IS LIKELY TO COME IN LATE OCTOBER, WHEN THE BRITISH REPORT TO THE IRISH THE RESULTS OF THE ANCRAM CONSULTATIONS. IF THE IRISH THEN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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JUDGE THAT NO REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. THEY WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF A U. S. "PEACE ENVOY".

17. SO FAR, THE IRISH HAVE USED THE "PEACE ENVOY" IDEA AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO GAIN LEVERAGE IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE BRITISH. WE ARE NOT AT ALL SURE THEY INTEND TO PRESS FOR AN ENVOY. MOREOVER, THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT AN ENVOY MIGHT DO, HOW THE UNIONISTS OR BRITISH WOULD REACT, OR WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILED U. S. MISSION WOULD BE.

18. MY BEST GUESS IS THAT A U. S. ENVOY WOULD BE RECEIVED WARMLY BY JOHN HUME'S SDLP AND BY DUBLIN, AND GRUDGINGLY BY MOLYNEAUX'S UUP. PAISLEY WOULD PUBLICLY REJECT OUR ENVOY. DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HMG MIGHT ACQUIESCE. THOUGH IT WOULD COME IN FOR A LOT OF DOMESTIC CRITICISM.

19. THE CHANCES FOR A USEFUL DIALOGUE WOULD BE IMPROVED IF THE ENVOY WERE NOT OF IRISH EXTRACTION AND HAD NO TRACK RECORD ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WE WOULD NEED TO CONVINCE THE UNIONISTS THAT THE MISSION DID NOT RESULT FROM THE HUME/ADAMS DIALOGUE OR FROM IRISH GOVERNMENT PRESSURE AND WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURES FROM THE IRISH-AMERICAN LOBBY. I DOUBT WE COULD DO ALL THAT.

20. MORE-IMPORTANTLY, WE HAVE TO ADDRESS WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT AN ENVOY TO ACHIEVE. NORTHERN IRELAND DOES NOT NEED NEW IDEAS ON DEVOLVED GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES OR NORTH-SOUTH LINKS: THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF IDEAS ALREADY FLOATING AROUND, ALMOST ANY ONE OF WHICH MIGHT WELL WORK IF THE REQUISITE WILL AND GOOD FAITH WERE PRESENT. AT THIS POINT, THEY ARE NOT, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR TO ME HOW WE COULD CONJURE THEM INTO BEING. WE CANNOT SERVE AS

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MEDIATOR UNLESS ALL PARTIES WANT US TO, AND THE UNIONISTS (NOT TO MENTION HMG) MANIFESTLY DO NOT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 07

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21. WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE DOWNSIDE OF A MISSION THAT FAILS TO ACHIEVE WHATEVER OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR IT. THIS IS A DELICATE AND VOLATILE STAGE OF THE PROCESS. UNIONISTS ARE ALREADY DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVES. A PERCEPTION THAT WE INTERVENED AT THE BEHEST OF HUME OR REYNOLDS COULD STIFFEN THEIR INTRANSIGENCE AND STIMULATE INCREASED VIOLENCE BY UNIONIST EXTREMISTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IF HUME THINKS WE ARE MOVING INTO HIS CAMP, HE WILL HAVE LESS INCENTIVE TO REENTER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

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22. THERE IS ALSO THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.K. JOHN MAJOR MIGHT GRUDGINGLY ACQUIESCE IN AN ENVOY BUT THE PRICE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE ILL FEELINGS IN HMG AND A HOSTILE PRESS REACTION. THERE IS PROBABLY NO ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH STIRS MORE EMOTION THAN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET WOULD BE OF A U.S. LOBBY WHICH SUPPORTS THE IRA. THE REACTION HERE, BOTH PUBLIC AND IN THE HALLS OF GOVERNMENT, COULD WELL CUT ACROSS OUR EFFORTS WITH LONDON ON SOME MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS, TO WIT GATT, BOSNIA. A CONCERTED APPROACH TO TURMOIL IN RUSSIA, TERRORISM, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. MOREOVER, THE TRADE OFF, GIVEN THE MARGINAL PROSPECT OF A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT BY AN ENVOY, WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT.

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23. ALL THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN DO NOTHING TO FACILITATE THE PEACE PROCESS.

- WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ALL SIDES TO RETURN TO THE TABLE AND MAKE THE NEEDED COMPROMISES.
- WHILE REITERATING OUR ABHORRENCE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, WE CAN URGE GREATER BRITISH EFFORTS TO RESOLVE LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS SUCH AS THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND REMAINING INSTANCES OF DISCRIMINATION.
- WE CAN KEEP THE IDEA OF SOME KIND OF ENVOY ON THE SHELF, TO BE DEPLOYED IF THE PARTIES REQUEST IT AND

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PAGE 07 OF 07

IF IT OFFERS CLEARER GAINS AND FEWER RISKS.  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2218  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5827  
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

\*\*\*\*\* INCOMPLETE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 004085  
FOR AMBASSADOR CROWE FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH  
DEPT FOR UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF  
WHITEHOUSE/NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
REF: STATE 195220

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0335-F (3.98)  
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WHEN I READ YOUR CABLE, I FOUND THAT WE AGREED IN MANY AREAS ON AMERICA'S ROLE IN FACILITATING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING TO EXPLORE AND DEVELOP OUR COUNTRY'S ROLE IN HELPING OUR VERY FRIENDLY HOST COUNTRIES RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM.
3. WE SHARE THE JOINT AND PRIMARY GOAL OF STOPPING THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO ENGAGE IN AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH PARAMILITARIES OR THOSE WHO HAVE NOT RENOUNCED PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, WE HAVE A UNIQUE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY. THE DECISIONS OF SINN FEIN AND THE IRA, IN THE NEAR FUTURE, MAY RETARD OR ACCELERATE THE PEACE PROCESS FOR YEARS TO COME. I FEEL STRONGLY, AS DOES THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, THAT THIS MESSAGE CAN BE CARRIED EFFECTIVELY ONLY BY PERSNS OF SUFFICIENT STANDING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY WHO WILL GAIN THE ATTENTION OF THE KEY PARAMILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. WE MUST HAVE OUR JOINT MESSAGE CARRIED BY INTERMEDIARIES WHO CAN STRESS THAT THE U.S. HAS NO PARTISAN INTEREST IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT OTHER THAN THE TERMINATION OF VIOLENCE. I THINK WE CAN SEND A MESSAGE THROUGH EMINENT AND RESPECTED AMERICANS, FROM BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, THAT THE VIOLENCE MUST STOP. IT MUST BE MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR TO THE IRA THAT CONTINUING TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM WILL RESULT IN COMPLETE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ISOLATION FROM SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES.

4. I FULLY CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT WE MUST NOT ALIENATE THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IN FACT, WE HAVE BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO REACH OUT TO UNIONISTS. I HAVE SOUGHT OUT UNIONIST LEADERS AND ASSURED THEM THAT MY DOOR IS ALWAYS OPEN TO THEM. I WOULD HOPE WE CAN ATTRACT VISITORS TO THE NORTH WHO WILL EXPRESS CLEARLY OUR ABHORRENCE OF ALL PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE REGARDLESS OF SOURCE OR MOTIVATION.

5. I AM HAPPY TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS. SEE YOU IN TWO WEEKS.

MILAS

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It would be constructive to press Sinn Fein to move unequivocally to reject violence as they approach their meeting toward the end of the month. They must understand that any effort to equivocate will dampen significantly any international reaction to a positive statement.

We should:

-- indicate the United States would welcome a permanent end to the violence and an abandonment of the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals. Any effort to limit the duration of such a step would be counterproductive;

-- urge the IRA/Sinn Fein to enter into negotiations to resolve the conflict;

-- regarding the visa, we should respond that, as before, if Adams takes the right step on violence and negotiations, we would be prepared to review any request. We would first have to *look closely* resolve the issue of his statements on the question of violence.

In addition, we will continue to work with the British and Irish governments to reach out to the Unionist community, to stem the unionist violence and to develop a generous package of assistance, especially private investment, once there is a political breakthrough.

PER Peter ok.

and the purpose of any

potential steps

Nez 7/22

Adams meeting? went well. all came away with feeling that things moving in right direction. important development in next few weeks. Premise of meeting is there would be cessation, believe prepared to do non-violent strategy. IRA welcomed delegate conference - whatever start will be followed by cessation don't go for word permanent. learned a lot from 72 hour period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY <sup>5689</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
July 13, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG *NS*

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams

*OK 1-7  
cleared with State?  
R*

The Irish Ambassador called me back today following his discussions with the Prime Minister (they are travelling together in Minnesota). They have been conveying the message to Adams (indirectly) of the need for a cessation of violence, without getting into timeframes. If the IRA does so, "you'll get a positive response." The Ambassador felt it would be useful for us, too, to send a clear message on Adams.

Regarding the visa, they would probably be more forthcoming on the issue than the British and in fact have already more or less indicated they expect us to move positively if Adams takes the right steps. The British will want us to wait on the visa until Adams has demonstrated a period of no violence; the Irish are likely to want us to move faster.

The Irish are less hard over on what Adams has to do in order for the Forum talks to begin. While they are currently pushing for no timetable, I detect a sense that if it is something short of that (ie. a year ceasefire), the Irish are likely to start the talks anyway. It is not clear the British would. We'll have to see.

Bruce Morrison, Neill O'Dowd, William Flynn (who held the New York peace conference) and others are departing this afternoon for Northern Ireland where they will meet with senior Sinn Fein officials -- including Gerry Adams on Friday. Bruce called me today and I told him that we hoped Adams would move on a permanent ceasefire. He pushed back saying he wasn't sure Adams could do that much. I pushed back by saying that to hold out the threat of a resumption of the violence after a certain time would negate the benefits of the any announcement. The step had to be a philosophical rejection of violence as a means of advancing political objectives -- not something they will resume if the negotiations don't go their way. I didn't say much on the visa, other than we would look at it if Adams took the right steps.

The Sinn Fein party meeting is expected to by July 23-24. The Major Reynolds summit July 21.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(4.00)  
KBH 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I'd recommend I call Neil O'Dowd with a more formal response before their meeting with Adams on Friday if the President approves. He's got the most direct line to Adams. He'll be in Ireland but we have numbers.

I have not talked to State about this and the attached memo indicates that State agrees with the recommended approach. Do you want to call Strobe? Shall I give a copy to Sandy V.?

Attachment

Tab 1      Memo to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 5860

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: New Approach from Gerry Adams

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.02)

KBH 4/11/2023

On Thursday, we received a message from Gerry Adams that he is considering making a statement regarding the IRA's policy toward violence by the end of the month and wants some assurances from us. There are basically three issues involved:

Violence: Adams is mulling over several options and has asked for a reaction to the following formulas:

- 1) The IRA would announce a policy of standing down on the violence and would take no "offensive" actions. Its members would not retaliate for actions against them. They would reserve the right to defend themselves if fired upon.
- 2) They would announce a ceasefire with no comment on its duration.
- 3) They would announce a ceasefire of a 3-6 month duration.
- 4) They would announce a ceasefire of a year duration.

IRA Split: Adams appears to accept the inevitability of a split in the IRA. He says there are 10-12 hardliners that will continue to use violence and seek to undermine Adams' efforts. Part of the reason for his delay in responding to the Joint Declaration has been his efforts to avoid a split.

US Visa: Adams wants an indication from the Administration that we will grant him and other senior IRA officials a visa waiver to visit the U.S. following the announcement on violence. He wants to work with the U.S. community to shut off funds and guns to those who split off from him. He believes his opponents can be neutralized if we can cut off U.S. support (an interesting admission of U.S. support for IRA violence).

Assessment: We have been hearing for some time that Adams was considering a move on the issue of violence at the end of the month. I believe this is a serious inquiry from Adams and that he needs some guidance on how this effort will be received -- he has been taken aback in the past with the negative reaction to his statements and three-day ceasefire. He wants to make sure his efforts have the desired impact.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Of the options regarding violence, the first seems to be the most realistic. The approach that has the best chance of acceptance by the British and the Irish is to have the IRA announce a cessation of the use of violence to achieve political ends and a readiness to enter into talks about an overall settlement. Ideally, the IRA would announce a permanent end to the violence; if not, the issue could perhaps be finessed by a strong commitment to end the use of violence (with reference to timeframe) and to enter into negotiations and a demonstration of the shift from violence over a certain period of time. Irish Prime Minister Reynolds could then call the all-Irish talks (The Forum for Peace and Reconciliation) under the Joint Declaration. The IRA could then enter into talks with the Irish which could last for a period of time until the British can join.

The British have said they would need to verify an IRA ceasefire for a period of up to three months, although they have indicated some flexibility on the timing. They have also dropped the specific requirement of Adams endorsing the Joint Declaration, shifting instead to a permanent ceasefire which could then lead to direct talks.

State's view: Secretary Christopher is reluctant to put the United States in the midst of these negotiations, preferring instead to have the British and the Irish take the lead. He recommends we not respond to Adams' feeler but that we make clear to the Irish and British governments that we will continue to urge the IRA to renounce violence permanently and enter into negotiations under the Joint Declaration. Regarding another visa for Gerry Adams, he recommends we not speculate at this point.

Recommendation: This is an issue that can only be solved by the parties in Ireland, the Irish government and the British government. The United States' role should be to encourage the IRA to take the right steps and to urge the British and Irish government to be flexible and forthcoming. We should also continue to reach out to the protestant/loyalist side.

If you agree, I recommend we approach the Irish and British governments on a very close hold basis to explore with them an appropriate response to the IRA message. I recommend that you authorize me to indicate the United States would welcome a cessation of hostilities from the IRA and a commitment to enter into negotiations with the Irish and British governments for a lasting peace. Regarding the issue of duration, we would expect the cessation to be permanent but also allowing the IRA the flexibility to link the cessation of hostilities to the talks. That position implicitly enables Gerry Adams to focus on the principle of abandoning violence rather than having to state his willingness to do so permanently before the talks have produced progress. If the IRA is forthcoming, we would urge the Irish and British to enter into negotiations with the IRA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Regarding the visa waiver, we should respond that, as before, if Adams takes the right step on violence and negotiations, we would be prepared to review any request. We would first have to resolve the issue of his statements on the question of violence.

## RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the approach outlined above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0855-F (4.03)

KBH 4/11/2023

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 1994

MEMO TO: Tony  
FROM: Nancy *MS*  
RE: Ireland

Trina Vargo in Senator Kennedy's office called me today around noon to relay the following information from Gerry Adams (via Neill O'Dowd):

Gerry Adams is prepared to make a statement regarding the IRA's policy toward violence by the end of the month and wants some assurances from us.

Violence: They are mulling over several options and have asked for some guidance from us:

1) The IRA would announce a policy of standing down on the violence and would take no "offensive" actions. They would not retaliate for actions against them. They would reserve the right to defend themselves if fired upon.

2) They would announce a ceasefire with no comment on its duration.

3) They would announce a ceasefire of a 3-6 month duration.

4) They would announce a ceasefire of a year duration.

IRA Split: Adams appears to accept the inevitability of a split in the IRA. He says there are 10-12 hardliners that will continue to use violence and seek to undermine Adams' efforts.

US Visa: Adams wants an OK from us to come to the US with other senior IRA officials to work with the US community to shut off funds and guns to those who split off from him. He believes they can be neutralized if we can cut off US support (an interesting admission.)

My assessment: We have been hearing for some time that Adams was considering a move on the issue of violence at the end of the month. I believe this is a serious inquiry from Adams and that he needs some guidance on how this effort will be received - he has been taken aback in the past with the negative reaction to his statements and three-day ceasefire. He wants to make sure his efforts are coordinated.

Of the options, the first seems to be the most realistic. My guess of what will sell the most is to have the IRA announce a cessation of the use of violence to achieve political ends and a readiness to enter into talks about an overall settlement. That can finesse the issue of timing while negotiations are pursued. If we can then get Reynolds to call the Forum talks under the

*Confidence*  
1. Tell him of approach -  
2. Respond after consulting.  
Issue - tell them we have? No. *Adams*  
3. 3 mos.?  
4. How <sup>UK</sup> follow up?  
*S. To Pres. before Adams.*

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

Joint Declaration, talks could get underway for a period of time until the British can join.

Recommendation: I do not advise responding to the IRA without close consultation with the British and Irish governments. I'd recommend that we have Trina go back to O'Dowd and tell him that we want to consult with the British and Irish on a very close hold basis before responding. If Adams balks at that, we will be in a tough position. I'd recommend we talk to Dick Spring and Rod only and that you inform Chris only.

Regarding the visa, we should respond that, as before, if Adams takes the right step on violence and negotiations, we'd look at it. We would first have to resolve the issue of his statements on the question of violence. }

Let's discuss asap.

cc: Sandy

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY  
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (4.04)

KBH 4/11/2023

June 24, 1994

MEMO TO: Anthony Lake  
FROM: Nancy Soderberg *NS*  
RE: Gerry Adams

Attached is a draft memo to the President regarding a response to Gerry Adams' feeler yesterday. Since talking to you yesterday, I've learned that the Irish government is aware of the issue and is mulling it over. Most of the government is in Corfu so it will be next week before we have any indication of Irish reaction. To my knowledge, the British government is not aware of the initiative.

I have taken a crack at describing what I expect State's reaction to be -- I have not spoken to anyone about it so it is an entirely made up guess at what Christopher will say. I thought that would be easier for you to edit.

The key points for Chris are:

--We received an indirect message from Gerry Adams on Thursday. We have been told he is prepared to announce a ceasefire, or an end to offensive actions, at the end of the month. He is asking for guidance from us on the formula.

--He seems to have given up on the hope of avoiding a split and wants our help in isolating those who do not follow him in moving from violence.

--He wants some assurance that if he ends violence, he will be granted a visa to explain the new policy to the Irish - American community. He also wants to ensure US support for guns and violence ends.

--I'm inclined to discuss this very privately with the Irish and British governments and see if there is a way to respond positively to Adams' feeler.

--Like it or not, the US is a player in the search for peace. We can and should play a role in encouraging all sides to move in the right direction.

--Adams is looking for some guidance on how to move forward and be assured of support in the international community.

--He may finally be prepared to renounce violence; we should do what we can to push him in that direction.

--If you agree, I'd recommend I/we call Rod Lyne and Dick Spring to gauge their reaction. I would hope we could agree on a common position that we could urge the IRA to pursue.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

--I'd suggest we indicate we would welcome a cessation of hostilities from the IRA and a commitment to enter into the negotiations with the Irish and British governments.

--If the IRA agrees to end the violence, we should urge the Irish and British to enter into talks with the IRA under the framework of the Joint Declaration.

--Regarding the visa waiver, we should agree to review it if Adams' takes the right steps on violence and negotiations.

cc: Sandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5689

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*  
SUBJECT: New Approach from Gerry Adams

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F(4.05)  
KBH 4/11/2013

Purpose

We received a message from Gerry Adams that he hopes to push his political party, Sinn Fein, to make a statement regarding the IRA's policy toward violence and wants some assurances from us. Sinn Fein is expected to meet on or around July 23rd. Bruce Morrison and others are travelling this week to Northern Ireland to hold talks with senior Sinn Fein officials.

Background

There are basically three issues involved:

Violence: Adams is mulling over several options and has asked for a reaction to the following formulas:

- 1) The IRA would announce a policy of standing down on the violence and would take no "offensive" actions. The leaders would not retaliate for actions against them. They would reserve the right to defend themselves if fired upon.
- 2) They would announce a ceasefire with no comment on its duration.
- 3) They would announce a ceasefire of a 3-6 month duration.
- 4) They would announce a ceasefire of a year duration.

IRA Split: Adams appears to accept the inevitability of a split in the IRA. He says there are 10-12 hardliners that will continue to use violence and seek to undermine Adams' efforts. Part of the reason for his delay in responding to the Joint Declaration has been his efforts to avoid a split.

US Visa: Adams wants an indication from the Administration that we will grant him and other senior IRA officials a visa waiver to visit the US following the announcement on violence.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

He wants to work with the U.S. community to shut off funds and guns to those who split off from him. He believes they can be neutralized if we can cut off U.S. support (an interesting admission of U.S. support for IRA violence).

Assessment: We have been hearing for some time that Adams was considering a move on the issue of violence following the European elections. I believe this is a serious inquiry from Adams and that he needs some guidance on how this effort will be received -- he has been taken aback in the past with the negative reaction to his statements and three-day ceasefire. He wants to make sure his efforts have the desired impact.

It is important that the British, Irish and US press Adams to end the violence permanently. Ideally, the IRA would announce that it was renouncing the use of violence as a means of achieving political goals and that it would enter into negotiations for peace. Any IRA attempt to put a time frame on the cessation of violence will undermine the announcement and could prevent a positive British response. Assuming the IRA makes the appropriate announcement, the Irish would then call the all-Irish talks (The Forum for Peace and Reconciliation) under the Joint Declaration. The IRA could then enter into talks with the Irish which could last for a period of time until the British can join.

The British have said they would need to verify an IRA ceasefire for a period of up to three months, although they have indicated some flexibility on the timing. They have also dropped the specific requirement of Adams endorsing the Joint Declaration, shifting instead to a permanent ceasefire which could then lead to direct talks.

We have consulted with the British and Irish on how to respond and both agree it would be useful for us to send a message back to Adams on the need to renounce violence permanently and that a range of "carrots" await them in the political arena if they take the right step. These would include new international acceptance, negotiations immediately under the Forum and the possibility of eventual travel to the US.

If Adams and Sinn Fein commit to a permanent end to the violence, we may have a difference of opinion with the British on whether to give Adams and his colleagues a visa. The British will urge that we not do so right away, but rather that we insist on a demonstrated period of no violence. The Irish would support our responding positively more quickly. We can defer that decision until the time arrives.

Major and Reynolds have postponed their July 21st summit until after the Sinn Fein position is clear. They hope to work out a framework for negotiations. The British are pushing the Irish to remove the parts of their constitution which lay claim to the north of Ireland; the Irish are pushing the British to change their laws giving Westminster the final say in Northern

Irish affairs. Positive movement on the Anglo-Irish front could help encourage a positive outcome at the Sinn Fein meeting.

Recommendation: This is an issue that can only be solved by the parties in Ireland, the Irish government and the British government. The United States' role should be to encourage the IRA to take the right steps and to urge the British and Irish government to be flexible and forthcoming. There are reports that the protestant loyalists extremists have offered to match any IRA ceasefire and we should continue to reach out to that community.

It would be constructive to respond to the indirect message we received from Adams. If you agree, I recommend, and State agrees, that you authorize me to:

-- indicate the United States would welcome a permanent end to the violence and an abandonment of the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals. Any effort to limit the duration of such a step would be counterproductive;

-- urge the IRA/Sinn Fein to enter into negotiations to resolve the conflict;

-- regarding the visa, we should respond that, as before, if Adams takes the right step on violence and negotiations, we would be prepared to review any request. We would first have to resolve the issue of his statements on the question of violence and review the purpose of any potential trips.

In addition, we will continue to work with the British and Irish governments to reach out to the Unionist community, to stem the unionist violence and to develop a generous package of assistance, especially private investment, once there is a political breakthrough.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the approach outlined above.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.13)  
KBH 4/11/2013

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: LEBOURGEOIS NSC SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 021542Z AUG 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5780

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1861

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 012148

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC UK EI

SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION WORSENS AS RUMORS OF AN IRA  
CEASEFIRE INCREASE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. RUMORS OF A PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) CEASEFIRE, MOST LIKELY OF A FEW MONTHS' DURATION, HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN UPTURN IN BOTH REPUBLICAN AND LOYALIST VIOLENCE. PIRA MAY BE TRYING TO BOOST MORALE IN ADVANCE OF A LULL, AND STRENGTHEN SINN FEIN'S NEGOTIATING HAND. BUT BY KILLING PROMINENT LOYALISTS, IT RISKS A BACKLASH THAT MAY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN A CEASEFIRE. END SUMMARY.  
BLASTS AND WHISPERS

3. NORTHERN IRELAND CONTINUES TO RATTLE UNDER PERSISTENT PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) BOMB, MORTAR AND GUN ATTACKS, INTERSPERSED WITH SHOOTINGS AND SOME BOMBINGS BY LOYALISTS. RECENT PIRA ACTIVITY HAS FEATURED LARGE-SCALE MORTAR ATTACKS AND PINPOINT ASSASSINATIONS OF LOYALIST GUNSELS.

4. AFTER THE BOTCHED OCTOBER SHANKILL ROAD BOMBING, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO DECAPITATE THE ULSTER DEFENSE ASSOCIATION (UDA) LEADERSHIP BUT INSTEAD KILLED NINE INNOCENT CIVILIANS, PIRA CUT BACK SHARPLY ON ITS ACTIVITIES, TARGETING ONLY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND ESCHEWING BOMBING OF COMMERCIAL TARGETS. IT RESUMED ATTACKS ON LOYALISTS IN JUNE, AND SINCE THEN HAS KILLED FIVE MAJOR FIGURES -- TWO ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE (UVF) MEMBERS ON THE SHANKILL ROAD IN JUNE, A UDA POLITICIAN IN LISBURN IN JULY, AND TWO ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTER (UFF) MEMBERS ON THE ORMEAU ROAD JULY 31. IT HAS NOT YET RESUMED COMMERCIAL BOMBINGS, BUT IN RECENT DAYS HAS LAUNCHED A FLOOD OF FALSE ALARMS -- PHONING HOAX

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WARNINGS AND LEAVING STOLEN CARS IN FRONT OF POLICE STATIONS.

5. FOR THEIR PART, THE UVF AND UFF CONTINUE TO KILL CATHOLICS MORE OR LESS AT RANDOM, AND HAVE EXPERIMENTED INCREASINGLY WITH EXPLOSIVES. LOYALIST ATTACKS HAVE BEEN MORE LETHAL (LARGELY BECAUSE THEY GO AFTER SOFTER TARGETS), BUT THE REPUBLICANS ARE STILL RESPONSIBLE FOR MORE VIOLENCE. IN JUNE, FOR EXAMPLE, POLICE REGISTERED 18 PIRA AND IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (INLA) ATTACKS, COMPARED TO 12 BY THE UVF AND UFF.

6. ALL THE WHILE, IN THE BACKGROUND THERE ARE FREQUENT HINTS AND RUMORS OF A PIRA CEASEFIRE. BOTH GERRY ADAMS AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS HAVE SPOKEN IN RECENT DAYS OF "DEMILITARIZING" THE SITUATION, ALTHOUGH WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN IN PRACTICE HAS YET TO BE SPELLED OUT.

REPUBLICAN OPTIONS  
-----

7. PIRA HAS ROUGHLY FOUR OPTIONS TO CONSIDER:

- A COMPLETE AND PERMANENT CESSATION OF VIOLENCE. NO ONE THINKS THIS IS A REAL POSSIBILITY AT PRESENT.
- A TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE, MOST LIKELY OF TWO OR THREE MONTHS.
- AN OPEN-ENDED CEASEFIRE, BUT RETAINING THE OPTION TO RETALIATE AGAINST LOYALIST GROUPS IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER ATTACKS.
- NO CEASEFIRE OR LETUP IN THE VIOLENCE.

8. POLITICALLY, THE SECOND AND THIRD OPTIONS ARE THE MOST DIFFICULT, FOR THEY INVOLVE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE BUT DO NOT MEET LONDON AND DUBLIN'S DEMAND THAT PIRA TOTALLY END VIOLENCE BEFORE SINN FEIN MAY JOIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. SHOULD PIRA OPT FOR EITHER A TEMPORARY OR OPEN-ENDED CEASEFIRE, SINN FEIN WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY "SUPPORT" ITS MOVE WITHOUT ACTUALLY RENOUNCING VIOLENCE.

PLAYING WITH FIRE  
-----

9. IF PIRA IS INDEED PLANNING A CEASEFIRE, THE INCREASED SCOPE AND SCALE OF ITS ATTACKS ARE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO BOOST MORALE AND INCREASE SINN FEIN'S POLITICAL LEVERAGE DURING THE PAUSE. ITS ASSASSINATIONS OF LOYALISTS MAY ALSO BE INTENDED TO ELIMINATE THOSE WHO MIGHT POSE A THREAT TO REPUBLICAN ACTIVISTS IN THE EVENT OF A PIRA DRAWDOWN.

10. THE PROBLEM IS THAT AS THE PROVISIONALS ENJOY GREATER SUCCESS IN MURDERING LEADING LOYALIST GUNMEN, THE UFF AND THE UVF SEETHE AND PLOT REVENGE. LOYALIST RETALIATION, BRUTAL AND INDISCRIMINATE, IS ONE OF THE

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 012148  
MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC UK EI  
SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION WORSENS AS RUMORS OF AN IRA  
CEASEFIRE INCREASE

FEW CERTAINTIES IN THIS HIGHLY FLUID SITUATION. THERE  
WAS NEVER ANY GUARANTEE THAT LOYALISTS WOULD EASE OFF  
THEIR OWN MURDER CAMPAIGN IN RESPONSE TO A TEMPORARY  
PIRA CEASEFIRE; THERE IS ALMOST NO CHANCE OF IT NOW. IF  
A PIRA "TACTICAL" CEASEFIRE IS COMING, GRASSROOTS  
REPUBLICAN ANGER OVER THE INEVITABLE LOYALIST REPRISALS  
FOR RECENT ATTACKS WILL MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR  
PIRA TO SUSTAIN. CROWE

BT

#2148

NNNN

<MSGID> M1182600

2. SUMMARY. EUR/DAS JOHN KORNBLUM MET WITH GERRY ADAMS ON 10/4. LEON FUERTH (VP NAT SEC ADVISOR) AND NANCY SODERBERG (NSC STAFF DIRECTOR) WERE PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE. ADAMS PRESENTED SINN FEIN'S CORE AREAS FOR CHANGE: 1) CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL (I.E., END OF UK JURISDICTION AND BEGINNING OF IRISH; 2) DEMILITARIZATION (UK ARMY OUT); AND 3) DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (END TO DISCRIMINATION, LANGUAGE AND PRISONER'S RIGHTS, ETC.) HE ADMITTED CHANGE IN THE FIRST WOULD TAKE TIME, BUT SAID THE OTHER TWO SHOULD HAPPEN NOW. HE WANTS IMMEDIATE TALKS WITH HMG, CALLING LONDON'S RELUCTANCE TO TALK "BIZARRE," SINCE HMG RECENTLY HAD HAD A SECRET DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. HE BELIEVES THE ISSUE OF THE "PERMANENCY" OF THE CEASEFIRE IS "FICTITIOUS, QUITE CONTRIVED" BY HMG. SODERBERG PUSHED ADAMS TO BE HELPFUL ON THIS ISSUE SO WE COULD UNDERSCORE HIS COMMENTS TO HMG, BUT TO THE PRESS LATER, ADAMS MADE CLEAR HE IS NOT GOING TO SAY THE "P" WORD. *but did echo Anthony Lester's use of the word irreversible.*

3. ADAMS USED OVER HALF THE MEETING COMPLAINING ABOUT THE PROCESS OF HIS VISA ISSUANCE, DELAYS, AND PRESS LEAKS. HE WANTS SINN FEIN LEADERS TO HAVE "PARITY OF ESTEEM" WITH OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES IN TREATMENT BY THE U.S. HE WANTS MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS FOR SINN FEIN LEADERS PERMITTING THEM TO RAISE FUNDS TO EXPAND THE PARTY. DAS KORNBLUM EXPLAINED VISA LAWS, HOW THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MEANS BUILDING ON SUCCESS, THAT THE PRESENT MEETING WAS IN ITSELF A SUCCESS, BUT WE COULD NOT GRANT ADAMS' VISA REQUESTS TODAY. ADAMS STRESSED HIS NEED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG REPUBLICANS AND BELIEVES THE BEST CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE WOULD BE A POSITIVE U.S. RESPONSE ON THE VISA/FUNDRAISING ISSUE WHEN HE SEEKS TO COME AGAIN IN NOVEMBER. ADAMS MADE A QUERY ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND SODERBERG REPLIED THAT WE WERE EMPHASIZING PRIVATE INVESTMENT. DAS KORNBLUM STATED THAT FURTHER MEETINGS BETWEEN SINN FEIN OFFICIALS CAN BE ARRANGED THROUGH CONGEN BELFAST AND AMEMBASSY DUBLIN. END SUMMARY.

4. ON OCTOBER 4, EUR SENIOR DAS JOHN KORNBLUM OPENED THE USG DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN BY MEETING WITH ITS PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS, AND PARTY OFFICIALS RICHARD MCCAULEY, AIDAN MCATEER, MAIRIED KEANE, AND SHANNON EATON. SINN FEIN OFFICIAL KIERAN STAUNTON WAS ALSO LISTED AS A POSSIBLE ATTENDEE, BUT DID NOT COME. INSTEAD, ADAMS BROUGHT NIALL O'DOWD, THE PUBLISHER OF THE NEW YORK-BASED "IRISH VOICE" AND A MEMBER OF EX-CONGRESSMAN BRUCE MORRISON'S DELEGATION THAT MET ADAMS IN IRELAND PRIOR TO THE IRA CEASEFIRE. LEON FUERTH, ADVISER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND NANCY SODERBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ALSO WERE PRESENT ALONG WITH NSC EUROPEAN DIRECTOR KATHY STEPHENS AND EUR/NE DESK OFFICER PAUL VAN SON. THE MEETING LASTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 75 MINUTES.

*Not true, he was there.*

5. ON BEHALF OF SEIN FEIN, ADAMS THANKED THE ADMINISTRATION AND PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR ENGAGING IN A POSITIVE AND PROACTIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (N.I.). HE SAID THE MEETING MARKED NOT THE END OF A BAN ON SINN FEIN, BUT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. DAS KORNBLUM WELCOMED ADAMS AND STATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS PLEASED THAT IT HAD BEEN ABLE TO ASSIST THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT DID NOT SEE ITSELF A MEDIATOR. IN OTHER SETTINGS WE HAD PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, BUT PEACE COMES FROM THE CONVICTION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. ADAMS' VISIT TO THE DEPARTMENT EXPRESSES THE CONVICTION THAT PEACE IS ACHIEVABLE.

*Wln 2 moth.*

SINN FEIN AGENDA  
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6. ADAMS STATED THAT THERE IS AN HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND N.I. WHAT SINN FEIN WANTS IS A RECOGNITION OF THE REALITY THAT HAS HAPPENED. THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS A CREDIT TO HUME, THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT, AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION. THE PEACE PROCESS IS UNDER NO THREAT FROM REPUBLICAN SOURCES. THE ONLY DANGER IS FROM SQUANDERING THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. SINN FEIN IS BEING HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE IRA AND IS MAINTAINING THE PEACE, BUT THE LOYALISTS HAVE NOT STOPPED THE KILLING. SINN FEIN IS READY FOR TALKS WITH HMG AND FINDS THEIR RELUCTANCE TO TALK "BIZARRE," SINCE HMG EARLIER HAD A SECRET DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN.

7. ADAMS PRESENTED THREE CORE AREAS FOR CHANGE: 1) CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL (I.E., END OF UK JURISDICTION AND BEGINNING OF IRISH; 2) DEMILITARIZATION (UK ARMY OUT); AND 3) DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (END TO DISCRIMINATION, LANGUAGE AND PRISONER'S RIGHTS, ETC.) HE ADMITTED CHANGE IN THE FIRST WOULD TAKE TIME, BUT SAID THE OTHERS SHOULD HAPPEN NOW.

TREATMENT IN THE U.S.: "PARITY OF ESTEEM"  
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8. ADAMS MADE A LONG ARGUMENT FOR TREATMENT EQUAL TO THAT OF OTHER POLITICAL PARTY OFFICIALS VISITING THE U.S. HE PROTESTED THE PROCESS OF HIS VISA ISSUANCE, DELAY IN ISSUANCE TO THE LAST POSSIBLE DAY BEFORE HIS SCHEDULED TRAVEL, THE RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDRAISING, THE HUMILIATING WAY THE LETTER WAS STAPLED INTO HIS PASSPORT, HOW THE AGONIZING VISA ISSUANCE PROCESS WAS PLAYED OUT IN THE MEDIA WITH LEAKS FROM WASHINGTON, AND THE LEVEL AT WHICH HE IS RECEIVED IN THE US.

9. DAS KORNBLUM APOLOGIZED FOR ANY DISCOURTESY, BUT MADE CLEAR IT WAS NOT INTENTIONAL. AFTER REFERRING TO STRICT U.S. VISA LAWS, HE STATED WE WERE ENGAGED IN A PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION WHERE WE MUST BUILD ON SUCCESS. WHILE THERE ARE DISCOMFORTS DUE TO THE VERY STRICT U.S. VISA LAW, ADAMS SHOULD LOOK TO TODAY'S VISIT AS A SUCCESS. AS WE PROCEED AND SEE THAT SINN FEIN IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PEACE PROCESS, THE USG HAS AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER THE VISA LAWS IN A SOMEWHAT LESS RESTRICTIVE WAY.

10. WHILE STATING HE WAS A GUEST AND NOT IN A POSITION TO DEMAND ANYTHING OF THE USG, ADAMS REPEATEDLY FOCUSED ON HIS NEED TO FACE THE MEDIA AFTER THE MEETING AND ASKED HOW HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT THE WORDS OF VP GORE HAD

BEEN REFLECTED IN THE MEETING. HE WAS ASKING FOR A MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SAY THE PROCESS WAS MOVING FORWARD AND TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN AND NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN IRELAND. ADAMS THEN ASKED IF HE COULD HAVE A MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA NOW. DAS KORNBLUM SAID NO AND THAT THE VISA ISSUE COULD NOT BE DECIDED TODAY. ADAMS THEN SUGGESTED HE MIGHT HAVE TO ADJOURN THE MEETING AND RECONSIDER THE SITUATION. DAS KORNBLUM EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY AND ADAMS SHOULD NOT FOCUS ON THIS ONE ISSUE. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROCESS WOULD COME AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. SODERBERG STATED THAT ADAMS SHOULD ~~CAST IT TO THE PRESS THAT HE RAISED THE VISA ISSUE AND GOT A POSITIVE RESPONSE~~

*had a positive discussion.*

11. ADAMS SAID HE WANTED TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN TWO MONTHS. EMPHASIZING HIS NEED TO MAKE HOTEL, TRAVEL, AND SPEAKING ARRANGEMENTS IN ADVANCE, HE ARGUED FOR PARITY OF ESTEEM WITH OTHER PARTIES AND THE NEED TO FUNDRAISE LIKE OTHERS IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE GROWTH OF HIS PARTY. DAS KORNBLUM REITERATED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AN IMPROVEMENT OF HIS VISA STATUS, AND THIS COULD COME IN TIME AS WE BUILD ON SUCCESS. ADAMS SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THIS VISA ISSUE AS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE BY THE U.S. IN THE PEACE PROCESS. ADAMS SUMMARIZED BY SAYING THESE VISA/FUNDRAISING ISSUES WERE ALL UNDER US CONTROL AND WERE HIS IDEA OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THAT WOULD SHOW SINN FEIN HAS THE SAME RIGHTS AS OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES.

#### REYNOLDS' FORUM AND THE "ALL-PARTY" TALKS

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12. ADAMS SAID SINN FEIN HAD MADE A SUBMISSION TO THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AND EXPECTED IT TO BEGIN BY THE END OF OCTOBER. IRISH PM REYNOLDS HAS REFERRED TO EXPANDING THE FORUM TO INCLUDE GROUPS OTHER THAN POLITICAL PARTIES (I.E., WOMEN'S RIGHTS GROUPS) AND THIS WOULD PERMIT UNIONISTS OUTSIDE OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES TO JOIN. WITH RESPECT TO THE "ALL-PARTY" TALKS, HE SAID HUME, REYNOLDS, AND MICHAEL ANCRAM OF HMG ALL RECOGNIZE THAT AN INTERNAL N.I. SETTLEMENT IS NOT A SOLUTION. THERE MUST BE AN ALL IRELAND DISCUSSION. SINN FEIN WANTS A SOLUTION THAT HAS THE CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES INCLUDING THE UNIONISTS, BUT NO PARTY SHOULD HAVE A VETO.

#### THE "P" WORD

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13. SODERBERG ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ADAMS COULD ADD WITH RESPECT TO THE PERMANANCY ISSUE ALONG THE

LINES OF NSC ADVISER LAKE'S LETTER TO ADAMS, WHICH USED THE TERM "IRREVERSIBLE." THIS COULD HELP THE U.S. PUSH THINGS ALONG AND UNDERSCORE TO THE BRITISH THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD. ADAMS SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW WHY HMG WAS HUNG UP ON THE PERMANANCY ISSUE. HE FELT IT WAS FICTITIOUS, QUITE CONTRIVED. PM REYNOLDS AND PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY AND QUITE CORRECTLY TO THE IRA CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCEMENT. DAS KORNBLUM ADDED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN WORDS THAT COULD HELP THE U.S. BEST PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS, SUCH AS A WORD THAT SHOWS AN UNBROKEN COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE. ADAMS SAID THAT AS REPUBLICANS WHO WANT TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, IT BECOMES AN INSULT TO KEEP BEING ASKED THESE QUESTIONS. THE ONUS IS ON HMG TO MOVE FORWARD. SINN FEIN'S PRIORITY IS TO SEE THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS IRREVERSIBLE. "IF ANY ONE THOUGHT THE PROCESS WAS NOT IRREVERSIBLE WOULD I BE HERE TODAY?" AT THAT POINT MCATEER STATED THE MASSIVE STEP TAKEN BY SINN FEIN TO BRING ABOUT THE DIALOGUE IS BEING OVERLOOKED. THE UK HAS MADE NO CHANGE. ADAMS SAID PM JOHN MAJOR DESCRIBED THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AS "DECONTAMINATION" OF SINN FEIN.

#### U.S. AID

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14. ADAMS ASKED ABOUT U.S. AID AND SAID AID SHOULD BE CONDITIONED ON SOME SET OF PRINCIPLES LIKE THE MCBRIDE PRINCIPLES IN ORDER TO INSURE NON-DISCRIMINATION. SODERBERG RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN DISCUSSING INTERNALLY THIS ISSUE SINCE THE CEASEFIRE AND WE WERE LOOKING AT ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT WITH A POSSIBLE TRADE DELEGATION LED BY COMMERCE SECRETARY BROWN, AND AN OPIC EQUITY FUND FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT BY U.S. FIRMS. THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND WAS OF MAJOR INTEREST AND THE U.S. OBSERVER ON THE IFI, JIM LYONS WOULD BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH ADAMS TO SOLICIT SINN FEIN'S VIEWS ON HOW THE FUND SHOULD SPEND ITS FUNDS.

#### FUTURE MEETINGS

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15. ADAMS ASKED ABOUT THE NEXT MEETING. DAS KORNBLUM, REFERRING TO THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN, SAID THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON APPROACHES BY SINN FEIN TO OUR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OVERSEAS, THROUGH WHOM THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NORMALLY MADE. WE EXPECTED MEETINGS TO BE ARRANGED THROUGH CONGEN BELFAST OR AMEMBASSY DUBLIN. YY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.16)  
KBH 4/11/2023**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Telephone Calls to Reynolds and Major, and Proposed Presidential Statement

Purpose

To congratulate Reynolds and Major for their parts in encouraging the IRA to renounce violence, and to offer continued U.S. support as the process moves forward.

Background

As hoped, the IRA issued a statement (Tab A) today pledging a total and unconditional cessation of violence. The British remain skeptical of the IRA's real commitment to peace, given the absence of the word "permanent" from its statement, and the flurry of last-minute, small-scale IRA attacks in the run-up to the statement. Reynolds is convinced that this IRA announcement is a watershed event in Irish history. Reynolds and Major do agree, however, on the need to make the most of this opening, while at the same time working hard to assure they keep the very jittery Unionists in the talks process.

It is especially important that we reach out to the Unionists and I tried unsuccessfully to reach Ulster Unionist Party leader James Molyneaux August 30 by telephone. I left word emphasizing our desire to maintain an active dialogue with the Unionist community. Molyneaux will be in London on Thursday to meet with John Major and with Ambassador Crowe. He may want to visit the United States in the near future which I assured his people we would welcome.

Attached are suggested talking points for telephone calls to Reynolds and Major to praise their roles in bring the peace process this far and to solicit their ideas on how the U.S. can continue to support their efforts. You should be aware hat Reynolds may ask you to see his Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, when he visits D.C. within the next week. You met him briefly before and I would recommend you do so again. Immediately following these telephone calls, I recommend you issue a

statement (Tab B) welcoming the progress being made toward peace in Northern Ireland. We have coordinated the language of this statement in advance with the Irish and British, as well as Ambassadors Smith and Crowe.

There is speculation in the press about what the U.S. is prepared to do to support this apparent breakthrough in Northern Ireland. We are preparing a package of options for you to consider, including such ideas as convening a Presidential Conference on Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland, increasing the annual U.S. contribution to the International Fund for Ireland and creating an "America House" in Belfast under USIA auspices. While some of these steps would require new funding from Congress or other legislative initiatives, the watershed event of an IRA renunciation of violence could provide a unique opportunity for such an initiative.

RECOMMENDATION

That you telephone Irish Prime Minister Reynolds and British Prime Minister Major and approve the issuance of the Presidential statement attached at Tab B following these telephone calls.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A            Talking Points
- Tab B            Statement

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
IRISH PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS

- I salute you for your persistence and vision in seeking to end IRA violence.
- I know from Jean Kennedy Smith that you deserve much of the credit for the breakthrough represented by today's IRA statement.
- You know better than I that the road ahead -- to a political settlement and a just peace in Northern Ireland -- remains a long, hard one.
- I stand ready to do all I can to help. I welcome your thoughts.
- I am going to be issuing a statement shortly which welcomes the IRA cease-fire but recognizes that what has been promised must now be delivered. How do you see this playing out? What can we do to keep the IRA on a peaceful track, and to prevent an upsurge in Unionist violence?
- I am especially concerned that moderate Unionist leaders such as James Molyneaux (mol-en-oh) remain engaged in the political process, and that the Unionist community remain satisfied that its voice is being heard. We put a call in to them yesterday and hope to maintain a constructive dialogue with them.
- I am also calling John Major to discuss these issues.
- The close cooperation you and John have maintained through this process has been key to its success so far. I hope you will continue to work closely together.
- We are looking at developing a package of assistance designed to reach out to both communities and we will work with you on the details.
- I understand that (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) Dick Spring may be coming to Washington next week. I would be pleased to meet with him to get an update on the situation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

- Today's IRA statement is a direct result of the courage and vision you and Albert Reynolds have shown in working together for peace in Northern Ireland. I congratulate you.
- I know our decision to go ahead with the visas for Cahill and Treanor was problematic for you. I therefore appreciate all the more the close dialogue you maintained with us on the issue, and your low-key public stance.
- I am mindful of the fact that there are many risks and pitfalls still ahead. I can only encourage you to continue to work closely with Albert and to pledge that I will do all I can to support your joint efforts.
- I understand that you may be meeting with Molyneaux (mol-in-oh) later this week. Bill Crowe will be seeing him too. And Tony Lake has put a call in to him to maintain a constructive dialogue with them.
- It important to keep Molyneaux, and the Unionist community as a whole, assured that their interests will be protected as the peace process proceeds. What can we do to help?
- We are looking at developing a package of assistance designed to reach out to both communities and we will work with you on the details.
- I am going to be issuing a statement shortly which welcomes the IRA cease-fire but recognizes that what has been promised must now be delivered. How do you see this playing out? What can we do to keep the IRA on a peaceful track, and to prevent an upsurge in loyalist violence?

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.18)  
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



1:30 pm  
NES

Edwin Kenich (Fiji only):

- extremely grateful for support of US so far  
(Kenich trying to)
- persuade London to lift broadcast ban on Sixu Tein. Not get too hung up on word 'permanent'. Needs not words.
- has
- JM a big problem w/ Unionists / some in Coas. Party.
- Pres getting message from JM tomorrow am.
- <sup>US</sup> likely to get new visa applications from Adams + McGinnis soon.
- ~~that~~ <sup>Kenich:</sup> don't do it immediately. Not that

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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We will not do it. Not  
This week. A few weeks  
before Majo can solidify.

⇒ Robin trying to get  
shift in London's position  
on 1) broadcast ban 2)  
'permanent'. Personally needs  
our short term cooperation.

⇒ If you want to discuss  
w/ him:

898-4524 (all day) ~~if you~~

~~should like~~

ⓐ

**Hall, Wilma G.**

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**From:** Stephens, Kathleen D.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; @EUROPE - European Affairs  
**Subject:** Alderdice on N. Ireland ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~  
**Date:** Tuesday, October 04, 1994 11:14AM

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.21)  
KBH 4/11/2023

For Nancy Soderberg and Tony Lake:

I talked to Alliance Party leader John Alderdice this morning by telephone and told him (per Nancy's guidance) that the earliest a meeting could be scheduled here would be Wednesday afternoon. I suggested a meeting with Nancy with a possible Lake drop-by. Alderdice declined and said he would leave tonight (Tuesday). Alderdice then made the following points:

—He himself had always "strenuously avoided" taking a position on the question of by whom Gerry Adams should be seen in the USG, and had always argued that this was up to the U.S. government to decide. However, Unionists were enraged by the letter and phone call to Adams. Ken Maginnis (who was part of the UUP delegation here recently) had "already roasted" the Administration. Much as moderate Unionists might want to be "understanding," the "only possible interpretation" in Northern Ireland to the announcement of a dialogue with Sinn Fein (and the way it was announced) before the Unionists and HMG itself had opened a dialogue was as "a kick in the teeth." This completely undermined the good work the Administration had done with the UUP. Ian Paisley was "triumphant," crowing that he had always warned the UUP it was naive in its dealings with the Administration.

—Alderdice claimed he would try, but found it "hard to put another gloss" on the whole issue. This latest act would be seen in Belfast and London as an intrusion on the internal affairs of another country. Alderdice advised that we "get on to State" about the safety of Val Martinez, our Consul General in Belfast; he was worried about the reaction of loyalist paramilitaries. Finally, Alderdice said, whatever the reasons here (timing, etc.) for the difficulty in obtaining an appointment at the White House, it would be interpreted only one way in Northern Ireland: two politicians representing parties of similar electoral size were in Washington, one who had always opposed violence and one who had only recently begun to distance himself from it — and look at the difference in reception.

While Alderdice's petulant tone derives in part from his disappointment at not getting the appointments he'd hoped for here, his account of Unionist anger is consistent with other soundings I've picked up. I think we'll need to do some patch-up with the Unionists and HMG. I will also ask State about security precautions at the Consulate in Belfast.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1994

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.22)  
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMO TO: Leon Fuerth  
FROM: Nancy Soderberg *NS*  
RE: Message from Major re: Reynolds meeting

John Major's national security advisor (or the equivalent) Rod Lyne called me tonight at 8pm (i.e., very late his time) to send several points to the Vice President regarding his meeting with Reynolds.

They are generally concerned about bringing the Unionist community on board and feel the series of Irish-US-Sinn Fein meetings and contacts are exacerbating the angst level in the Unionist community. We had the Clinton-Spring meeting, the Reynolds-Adams-Hume meeting and now the VP-Reynolds meeting -- but no Unionist meeting. While we have made a point about reaching out to the Unionists (TL called Molyneaux, Crowe met with him and we've invited him to D.C.), there have been no public meetings. They ask that the VP low-key the meeting to the extent possible.

As you probably know, the Brits have been pushing Adams to say the word permanent. You will hear from Reynolds that Adams has come pretty darn close -- especially following today's statement with Reynolds, Hume and Adams saying they are all "totally and absolutely committed" to peace. The Brits feel they need a bit more (i.e., "it's over for good") from Adams. Reynolds is probably losing patience with the Brits but their problems with the Unionists is real. We've privately been pushing Adams to do more. The Brits ask that you urge Reynolds to push Adams to go a bit further so they have something real to take back to the Unionists. To the extent the VP's statement following the meeting can use the "it's over for good/permanent" terminology the Brits would appreciate it. FYI, the Brits are also watching the IRA activity on the ground and while there are still some problems they are seeing positive signs.

The Brits are concerned about cooperation with the Irish following the IRA cease-fire. They generally want a higher level of cooperation. They are not as upbeat as Reynolds about the cease-fire and point out that many tough issues remain, not least of which is their need to bring the Unionists along. They are

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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upset that Reynolds shook Adam's hand only six days after the cease-fire -- they prefer to wait and be sure the situation on the ground is real.

The British request was basically "get word to the Vice President's party to be cautious about what comes out of the meeting. And don't sign up to anything."

I asked if anything in particular would be helpful for the VP to say if he got asked and Lyne replied:

"Urge the IRA to make it permanent, reach out to both sides, this is only the early days, we need to consolidate the cease-fire and ensure that the balance of the cease-fire has been preserved."

Hope this is helpful. Also, Crowe (and I suppose Smith) would appreciate a read out as soon as feasible.

Feel free to call me this evening at home (202-232-3198) or through the White House operator if you want to discuss anything further.

You all made us proud in Cairo and I'm glad those Hizbullah's didn't get you! Look forward to seeing you upon your return. Lot's of great issues await you -- enjoy the Irish one while you can!

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 081739Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1827

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2414

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 019198

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.26)  
KBH 4/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER UK EI

SUBJECT: IMPACT OF IRISH CRISIS ON PEACE PROCESS

REF: DUBLIN 6560

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE PROTRACTED INTER-PARTY WRANGLING IN DUBLIN AND THE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD OF A GENERAL ELECTION. THEY COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT FOR NEW TALKS MORE EASILY WITH A "RAINBOW COALITION," BUT FEAR FIANNA FAIL IN OPPOSITION WOULD ATTACK IT. ONLY A NEW DUBLIN GOVERNMENT COULD AGREE TO THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT; AND WITHOUT A FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, HMG'S TALKS WITH SINN FEIN WILL HAVE TO BE RESTRICTED TO NON-POLITICAL ISSUES IN ORDER TO QUELL UNIONIST SUSPICIONS OF A SELLOUT. THUS, EVEN IF THE INITIAL TALKS WITH SINN FEIN GO BETTER THAN EXPECTED, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A DANGEROUS HIATUS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

BETTER TO HAVE FIANNA FAIL INSIDE THE TENT

3. OUR BRITISH INTERLOCUTORS SHARE MANY OF EMBASSY DUBLIN'S CONCERNS (REFTEL) OVER THE PROTRACTED POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE REPUBLIC, AND HAVE A FEW MORE OF THEIR OWN. WHILE FEW ON THIS SIDE OF THE WATER HOLD ALBERT REYNOLDS OR FIANNA FAIL IN PARTICULARLY HIGH REGARD, VIRTUALLY ALL AGREE THAT THE BEST OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EARLY RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS OALITION. NOT ONLY WOULD THIS HAVE MINIMIZED THE LOSS OF MOMENTUM, BUT FIANNA FAIL OUT OF POWER WOULD BE FREE TO CRITICIZE ANY ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AS INSUFFICIENTLY

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SENSITIVE TO NATIONALIST CONCERNS. ANY COALITION WITHOUT FIANNA FAIL WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR THE BRITISH TO WORK WITH, BUT FAR LESS ABLE TO MAKE A DEAL STICK.

EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH SINN FEIN  
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4. THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR HMG IS HOW TO HANDLE ITS EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, SCHEDULED TO START DECEMBER 9. THE INITIAL SET OF TALKS, LED BY CIVIL SERVANTS ON THE BRITISH SIDE AND DEALING ONLY WITH NON-POLITICAL ISSUES, WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH: THE BRITISH HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO PRESS FOR EARLY ACTION ON DECOMMISSIONING WEAPONS, WHILE SINN FEIN SAYS IT WILL DEMAND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL REPUBLICAN PRISONERS. THERE IS NO TRUST OR GOOD WILL ON EITHER SIDE, AND LITTLE APPARENT COMMON GROUND. BUT BOTH APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THAT, IF THE PEACE PROCESS IS TO WORK, THEY WILL HAVE TO FIND WAYS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE.

LITTLE PROGRESS WITHOUT DUBLIN  
-----

5. EVEN IF THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE MAKES ADEQUATE PROGRESS, HOWEVER, THE NEXT STAGE -- POLITICAL DIALOGUE, PROBABLY INCLUDING BRITISH MINISTERS -- MAY BE HELD HOSTAGE TO EVENTS IN DUBLIN. UNTIL THE COLLAPSE OF FIANNA FAIL/LABOUR NEGOTIATIONS, BRITISH OFFICIALS REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT A NEW IRISH GOVERNMENT COULD MOVE QUICKLY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT; THAT HOPE NOW APPEARS GONE.

6. WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON A FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, THE BRITISH WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO ENTER POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WAS TO FORM THE BASIS OF THE POLITICAL TALKS, AND BRITISH OFFICIALS SAY THEY MUST BE ABLE TO CONVINCE UNIONISTS THAT SINN FEIN HAD NO DIRECT INPUT TO IT. INEVITABLE SUSPICIONS THAT HMG HAD NEGOTIATED A SECRET DEAL WITH SINN FEIN WOULD TORPEDO ANY CHANCE FOR UNIONIST ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT, WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH FOR THEM TO SWALLOW IN ANY EVENT. UNLESS THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY BACKS THE DOCUMENT, AND CAN FEND OFF IAN PAISLEY'S CHARGES OF TREACHERY, THE PEACE PROCESS WILL QUICKLY FOUNDER.

DANGEROUS HANGUP  
-----

7. IF TALKS WITH SINN FEIN ARE UNABLE TO MOVE TO THE

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

POLITICAL STAGE, THEY ARE LIKELY TO GRIND TO A HALT WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO, AND REMAIN SUSPENDED UNTIL THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS AGREED WITH THE NEW IRISH GOVERNMENT. THIS HIATUS WOULD COINCIDE WITH WHAT MOST OBSERVERS EXPECT TO BE THE MOST FRAGILE PERIOD OF THE CEASEFIRE, ROUGHLY BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY IN DUBLIN, LACK OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DIALOGUE APART FROM THE PEACE FORUM WOULD RAISE THE RISK OF A BREAKDOWN SUBSTANTIALLY.

CROWE

BT

#9198

NNNN

<MSGID> M1404629

ACTION

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

2011-0355-F (4.28)  
KBH 4/11/2023

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams Wants Visa for December Visit:  
Fundraising and Other Issues for Decision

Purpose

To decide how to handle Gerry Adams' proposed December visit and fundraising request.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has applied for a visa to visit the U.S. December 7-13, stopping in several cities. Adams has asked that he be given a multiple-entry visa with no fundraising restrictions. (Adams' two earlier visas, in January and September this year, were both single-entry visas which prohibited him from raising funds in the U.S.)

There is no opposition within the Administration or from the British to granting Adams a three-month, multiple-entry visa subject to continued IRA observance of the cease-fire, a no fundraising restriction and advance notice of Adams' travel plans and itinerary for each trip.

I believe the appropriate way to handle the visit is for me to receive him in my office in the White House but with no photographs. This is consistent with the level of White House access accorded other Northern Ireland politicians representing political parties of similar size. State and the British can live with my seeing Adams, though they would rather it not be at the White House or include any photo opportunities.

Fundraising Conditions

There is a sharp division of views between Justice, State, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and the British on one side and the Irish, Ambassador Smith, and some important members of Congress on the other over whether to permit Adams to fundraise. The decision

comes at a delicate time in the Northern Ireland peace process and in our relations with the British over Bosnia.

As an individual with a terrorist background, Adams is ineligible for entry into the United States. In waiving that ineligibility, we have the right to impose conditions that we cannot impose on other Sinn Fein members. Justice, State, Ab Mikva and Ambassador Crowe in London strongly oppose allowing Adams to raise funds in the U.S., at least for the time being, primarily because of information that the IRA continues to procure handguns and explosives in the United States, the short time the cease-fire has been in place, the fact that the IRA maintains large stockpiles of weapons, and that it continues to maintain a high state of readiness, including training activities.

Ambassador Crowe also argues strongly that it is particularly important to take strongly-held British views on this issue into account at a time when the bilateral relationship is under severe strain over Bosnia. He feels it would be extremely unwise to cause another rift over Ireland and a time when we need them on the "much more important foreign policy issue" of Bosnia. British officials have said that the UK "would publicly denounce" the Administration if we allow fundraising.

British neuralgia on the fundraising issue, despite the fact that Sinn Fein is permitted to raise funds in Britain, relates to the historical fact that the IRA armed and sustained itself for many years in large part through support from U.S. sources. In addition, Ab Mikva believes that as long as IRA weapons procurement activity continues in the U.S., permitting Adams to fundraise will expose us to charges of inconsistent and discriminatory policy if we crack down on Hamas fundraising (although there is a difference as the IRA has implemented a ceasefire -- still checking with Mikva).

The Attorney General, FBI and State (including Ambassador Crowe) strongly agree with the British line of argument. They underscore that although the cease-fire continues generally to hold, IRA extortion and other criminal activities continue, though apparently under instructions that firearms not be used. The IRA admitted November 20 that a recent armed robbery in which a postal worker was killed (and over \$200,000 stolen) was committed by IRA members ("volunteers") "acting on instruction" (presumably from local commanders) but "not sanctioned by the IRA leadership." Moreover, IRA extralegal "policing actions" (i.e. beatings of suspected collaborators or petty criminals in Catholic neighborhoods of Northern Ireland) continue, as do IRA training operations. FBI is monitoring IRA arms procurement activity in the U.S. which has occurred since the cease-fire and is ongoing.

Fundraising in the US is especially problematic because of the history of arms procurement for the IRA. In practice, Sinn Fein has never demonstrated that the collections are segregated from IRA operational funds, and it has been proven in court that NORAID has used money collected for "widows and orphans" to fund arms purchases.

On the other side, the Irish Government (especially Albert Reynolds), Ambassador Smith in Dublin and some important figures on the Hill (including Dodd, Moynihan, Manton, Gilman and Ted Kennedy) argue with equal conviction that there is no practical or political benefit to be derived from continuing to insist that Adams cannot fundraise here and, indeed, that singling out Adams in this way will undermine him and perhaps the entire peace process. They point out that this is not a legal issue but rather a policy one, that other Sinn Fein leaders and supporters who do not need visa waivers can and do raise funds for Sinn Fein, and that Adams, given his positive and pivotal role in bringing IRA into the peace process, should not be "humiliated" in this way.

As Adams and others note, fundraising for Sinn Fein in the UK is legal (he held a fundraiser in London last week) and to deny him the same right in the United States would seriously undermine Adams at a delicate moment in the peace process. The loss of Albert Reynolds as Prime Minister of Ireland removes Adams' strongest supporter from the process and Adams needs to continue to show momentum in the process if he is to keep the hardliners in tow. Adams also argues that they are in urgent need of funds to organize a political party and argues passionately that denying him the right to do so will only make it more difficult for him to move on the important issues such as demobilization.

A denial of fundraising will make big headlines in Ireland of the US charging Adams with continued weapons procurement and calling into question the permanency of the ceasefire. He fears such action will seriously undermine him and encourage the hardliners to pull away from the path of peace.

### Fundraising Options

#### **Option I: Maintain Fundraising Prohibition**

**Option IA)** That Adams' three-month multiple entry visa be annotated to indicate that he is not permitted to engage in direct or indirect fundraising, but that he may raise sufficient funds to pay for the costs of his U.S. trip (same conditions as his last visit). No commitments/indications given him as to what

our future position might be. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government support; Irish and Ambassador Smith oppose.]

**Pros:** Even with the fundraising restriction still in place, Adams gets from this trip a substantial liberalization of the travel restrictions on him and the reward of being received at the White House (despite State and British discomfiture with the latter). Takes things a step at a time and keeps fundraising as leverage to encourage the IRA to address the weapons issue early on. Leaves no doubt where we stand on terrorism and expresses our concern about continued IRA criminal and procurement activities. Boosts confidence in London and Belfast that British and Unionist views matter and that Adams does not exercise undue influence on our Northern Ireland policy. Underscores that we are sensitive to the importance of working with them on Bosnia.

**Cons:** Could weaken Adams politically within the IRA, both by embarrassing him in his already-public request and by denying him the ability to raise funds he says he needs to operate Sinn Fein as a political party. To the extent Adams is weakened, the peace process could be damaged. There will be headlines in the Irish papers that we believe the IRA continues to procure weapons and perhaps that we doubt the permanency of the IRA ceasefire. You will face strong pressure from Ambassador Smith and some on the Hill to concede this issue. The Irish government will strongly urge you to reconsider. Adams may cancel his trip if not allowed to fundraise. Refusal will cause a rift with portions of the Irish-American community; some in the Irish-American community will begin to criticize what to date has been viewed as a successful foreign policy issue.

**Option IB)** Same as above, but we tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming. [State, Justice, Crowe and British can live with, while preference is IA. Irish, Smith oppose.]

**Pros:** Same as above, but makes more explicit why Adams can't fundraise now and what we expect from him before we will alter our position. Provides encouragement to Adams that we will not deny him fundraising access indefinitely. Could encourage an end to weapons procurement and progress on other issues.

**Cons:** Same as above. In addition, we will in all likelihood face another disagreement within the Administration and between the British and Irish when the time comes to decide if he has made enough progress on weapons procurement and demobilization and disarmament.

Option II: Allow Adams to fundraise on this trip.

Option IIA) Impose no restrictions on Adams' ability to fundraise on this trip. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Pleases important Irish players on the Hill; strengthens Adams internally, could help advance the peace process.

Cons: Justice, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and State vehemently oppose, as do the British. The British (and Ambassador Crowe) still feel bruised from Adams' last visit and the Vice President's phone call to Adams; allowing Adams to fundraise will open another public U.S.-UK rift in a period of already-substantial strains over Bosnia. Could weaken pressure on Adams to deal with weapons issue and be interpreted in Northern Ireland as a sign that we take lightly the recent IRA murder/robbery incident; subjects us to criticism if there is another incident of violence involving IRA members or weapons. Funds could be directed to weapons purchase, especially if the cease-fire breaks down. Ab Mivka adds that it would be very difficult to permit Adams fundraising while at the same time cracking down on Hamas fundraising (while recognizing that the IRA has implemented a ceasefire and Hamas still engages in terrorism--check).

Option IIB) Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities. This could involve an extensive audit by a respected firm. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Boosts Adams and thus could help advance the peace process. Adams has already offered to provide such audits. Underscores the point that we expect Adams to move forward in bringing Sinn Fein/IRA fully away from terrorist and illegal activities. Makes diversion of funds more difficult.

Cons: Same as IIA. Also, money is fungible; even very elaborate safeguards will not stop it from going to support or offset criminal and terrorist activities. Largely symbolic, could be criticized as empty gesture. State and Justice strongly oppose on these grounds.

Option IIC) Allow Adams to fundraise if he agrees to place the funds in a U.S. account which he could not access without our permission. Establish that we will review the situation in early 1995 to decide if the funds can be accessed; factors affecting our decision will include whether the cease-fire still holds and whether Sinn Fein/IRA has ceased weapons procurement in the US

and made concrete progress toward demobilization and disarmament. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government oppose; Irish and Ambassador Smith support.]

Pros: Lets Adams go ahead with his fundraising plans while still meeting some of the concerns of the British, State and Justice. Will boost Adams and thus help advance the peace process.

Cons: Neither side will like; either or both may reject. In requiring the US to make a decision on when to release funds, this options would put us under constant pressure on both sides to release or not release the funds and involve the US in the negotiating process in a way we have not been before.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a three-month entry visa for Adams conditional on continuation of the ceasefire and that he advises us in advance of his travel plans and itineray. That I meet with him in my office but with no photographs. And that you approve Option IB: ~~Maintain fundraising restriction but make clear to Adams the conditions he needs to fulfill to be permitted to~~ *sell Adams* ~~fundraise,~~ namely that the Sinn Fein/IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress toward demobilizing and disarming.

Of the difficult choices you face, I believe this option best promotes our goals of maintaining the peace process in Northern Ireland, sending a strong message against terrorism and maintains our strong relationship with the British. A meeting with Adams in the White House is a significant offering to him and a three-month multiple entry visa meets one of his key requests during his last visit. The prestige of entering the White House will lessen any criticism of him personally over denial of his fundraising request.

In addition, by pointing out to him our knowledge of continuing procurement of weapons in the US, we might help achieve an end to such activities. We will also speak with the British to encourage them to reach out more positively to Adams to help offset any fallout from the decision (although a positive response is a long shot).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Or alternatively,

That you approve Option IIB: Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities, most likely through an extensive audit by a respected firm.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

If you select Option IIB or any other option allowing fundraising, I recommend you telephone Prime Minister Major, Secretary Christopher, and perhaps Attorney General Reno to inform them of your decision.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 23, 1994

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4-29)  
KBH 4/11/2023

TELEPHONE CALL TO  
OUTGOING IRISH PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS

DATE: TBD  
LOCATION: TBD  
TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

I. PURPOSE

To express appreciation for Reynolds' accomplishments in promoting peace in Northern Ireland and close U.S.-Irish relations during his tenure as Prime Minister and to discuss Gerry Adams' latest request for a US visit.

II. BACKGROUND

Albert Reynolds tried to call you Wednesday afternoon. You may want to return the call over the Thanksgiving weekend.

Albert Reynolds resigned earlier this month as Prime Minister rather than face a vote on a confidence motion in the Irish parliament which he was sure to lose. Reynolds remains as Acting Prime Minister, however, while efforts continue to form a new coalition government.

The coalition between Reynolds' party, Fianna Fail, and Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring's Labor Party fell apart over Reynolds' railroading through cabinet the nomination to the High Court of a controversial Attorney General who was unacceptable to the Labor Party. Labor had strongly objected to the Attorney General's handling of a case of a 14 year old girl whose travel to Britain for an abortion was blocked and his failure to extradite in a timely fashion a pedophile priest. Fianna Fail has picked a new leader, Finance Minister Bertie Ahern, to replace Reynolds, and Embassy Dublin expects Ahern will be able to reconstitute the coalition with Labor, though Spring will likely bargain hard for a larger Labor role in government. The formation of a new government is probably still some days and perhaps weeks away.

Ireland's political crisis will cause some delay in moving forward on Northern Ireland peace negotiations, but it

should not derail it, particularly if Fianna Fail and Labor can reconstitute their coalition and Dick Spring continues as a key player on the issue. It is possible that Reynolds will be asked to continue to lead the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, which is meeting in Dublin weekly with the participation of Irish nationalist parties from north and south, including Sinn Fein, but which Unionist parties are boycotting.

Reynolds is likely to lobby you very hard on allowing Gerry Adams to fundraise on his next visit to the United States. He has applied for another visa and hopes to come in early December for fund-raisers in Chicago, New York and Philadelphia. There is general agreement on allowing him a three month multiple-entry visa and for me to meet with him. There is disagreement on whether he should be permitted to fundraise. We will be sending you a memo on the issue shortly and you should avoid making any commitments to Reynolds until you have had a chance to review the options.

In a nutshell, Adams and the Irish argues strongly that he should be treated like any other political party and allowed to fundraise. He attended a small fund-raiser in London last week and the Irish-American community is weighing in hard to allow Adams to do the same here. On the other side, the British, Justice, State and the FBI argue strongly that until the IRA has dismantled its large weapons stock, stopped procurement of weapons and ended training and readiness operations, Gerry Adams should not be allowed to fundraise. In addition, they argue (especially Admiral Crowe) that given the critical situation on Bosnia and our need to work closely with the British, now is a dangerous time to pick a fight with the British over the issue of Ireland.

We are still working through our internal recommendations to you on the matter but expect to send you something on Friday. You may want to wait to talk to Reynolds until after you have had a chance to review the memo and its recommendations.


Attachment  
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
ACTING IRISH PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS

- Sorry to hear of the political developments. Glad to hear that the leadership transition in your party, and perhaps in the government, is proceeding in a constructive fashion.
- I have greatly valued our cooperation over the past two years. You have made an enormous contribution both to the enrichment of U.S.-Irish relations and, especially, to the pursuit of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.
- What do you see as your future role?
- What effect is this change of government in Dublin likely to have on the pace and substance of the Northern Ireland peace process?
- On Gerry Adams:
- As you know, Gerry Adams wants to visit the U.S. in early December. I do not expect any problems on his coming here and seeing Tony Lake and others. But the fundraising issue is a bit more difficult.
- I am still reviewing the fundraising issue. It causes us some problems, particularly given evidence that the IRA -- or at least parts of it -- continues to maintain a high state of readiness and a large stockpile of weapons.
- The IRA robbery and murder of a postal worker in Northern Ireland was also disturbing.
- I know Adams recently attended a fund-raiser, albeit a small one, in London last week. And we need to ensure that the momentum of the peace process is maintained.
- I would welcome your views and will keep you informed of our thinking.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.32)  
K8H 4/11/2023

Adams



**Hawkins, Ardenia R.**

**From:** Kreczko, Alan J.  
**To:** Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; Baker, James E.; Stephens, Kathleen D.; Soderberg, Nancy E.  
**Subject:** Gerry Adams [CONFIDENTIAL]  
**Date:** Tuesday, November 22, 1994 7:41PM

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.32)  
KBH 4/11/2013

Please pass to Nancy Soderberg:

AG's views:

- AG's view as of now is no fundraising, period;
- Justice staff is not raising with her the idea of permitting fundraising, with proceeds into a blocked account, because (1)they understand State opposes; (2)they are opposed; (3)they believe she will be opposed; and (4)they do not understand anyone to be recommending it.
- Justice staff will raise with her tonight or tomorrow morning, two alternatives to a flat no on fundraising.
- First, they will raise the possibility of telling Adams that we will reconsider in three months if there has been concrete movement toward disarmament, including a cessation of procurement activities in the US. They think the AG will not favor this.
- Second, they will raise a more diluted version -- that we can not seriously consider lifting the funding prohibition until there is concrete movement toward disarmament, including a cessation of procurement activities in the US. They think this might fly with AG.
- They will call Jamie Baker tomorrow morning (I will be gone) with the AG's reaction to these two alternatives.
- They repeat their request that if the NSC is going to recommend to the President an option which does not have the endorsement of the AG that the AG be called first. I strongly second this recommendation. They are saying very clearly to me that we risk another process blowup with the AG if we do not extend this courtesy.

2. Ab Mivka's views:

- he opposes fundraising, giving the evidence of continuing procurement here. He believes that while procurement continues here, it would be very difficult to (1)permit Adams fundraising, and (2)crackdown on Hamas fundraising. He would like this position reflected to the President.
- he would be willing to go with the diluted formula above, wherein we say "we can not reconsider until there is concrete movement on disarmament, including cessation of procurement activities here" to give Adams a suggestion as to what could impact our policy.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.33)  
KOH 4/11/2023

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams Applies for Visa for December Visit:  
Fundraising and Other Issues for Decision

Purpose

To decide how to handle visa and contact issues related to Gerry Adams' proposed December visit to the U.S.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has applied for a visa to visit the U.S. December 7-13. He proposes going to several American cities and has asked that he be given a multiple-entry visa with no fundraising restrictions. (Adams' two earlier visas, in January and September this year, were both single-entry visas which prohibited him from raising funds in the U.S.)

As in the past, the Attorney General must grant Adams a waiver if he is to obtain a visa. Secretary Christopher has recommended and Attorney General Reno has indicated she is prepared to agree to a three-month, multiple-entry visa for Adams subject to continued IRA observance of the cease-fire, a no fundraising restriction and advance notice of Adams' travel plans and itinerary for each trip. (The condition of requiring advance notification of travel plans is consistent with what we require of Palestinians needing waivers who have been granted multiple-entry visas.)

There is no opposition within the USG or from the British or Irish governments to granting Adams a multiple-entry visa with these restrictions.

Adams has not yet made any requests for meetings with Administration officials, although Adams has indicated he would come to Washington were I to invite him to meet with me. I believe the time is right for me to receive Adams. This is consistent with the level of White House access accorded other Northern Ireland politicians representing political parties of

*or is certainty include day photo opportunity*

similar size. (I met with John Alderdice of the small Alliance Party earlier this year, and relayed to Ian Paisley, whose party's electoral share of the vote is only slightly larger than Sinn Fein's, that I am prepared to meet with him.) State and the British can live with my seeing Adams, though they would rather it not be at the White House.

*if it is at the White House, they would rather not include day photo opportunities.*

Recommendation:

That you approve a three-month multiple-entry visa and that I receive Adams at the White House. Adams would be required to submit prior to arrival travel plans and itinerary.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Fundraising Conditions

As an individual with a terrorist background, Adams is ineligible for entry into the United States. In waiving that ineligibility, we have the right to impose conditions that we cannot impose on other Sinn Fein members. While there is agreement on making the visa conditional on the cease-fire and prior notification of Adams' travel plans, the fundraising issue is extremely controversial. Justice, State, Ab Mikva and Ambassador Crowe in London strongly oppose allowing Adams to raise funds in the U.S. for the time being, primarily because of the short time the cease-fire has been in place, the fact that the IRA maintains large stockpiles of weapons, and that it continues to maintain a high state of readiness, including training activities. The British want us to maintain our fundraising prohibition "at least" until they begin their talks with Sinn Fein, probably sometime before year's end. They would prefer that we wait until Sinn Fein has begun to address the question of disarming. State or Justice would likely take a similar view, though at present neither agency is prepared to define the precise set of conditions that would lead them to agree not to impose a fundraising restriction on Adams.

*commitment continuing to procure weapons*

*Widely*

*strongly argued that... in the future*

The Irish government has weighed in favoring of allowing Adams to fundraise. Outgoing (but still acting) Irish Prime Minister Reynolds has told Ambassador Smith and the British he thinks Adams should be allowed to fundraise. The British, however, have dug in on the fundraising issue, warning that they would feel forced to criticize us publicly if Adams is permitted to fundraise. British neuralgia on the fundraising issue, despite the fact that Sinn Fein is permitted to raise funds in Britain, relates to the historical fact that the IRA armed and sustained

itself for many years in large part through support from U.S. sources. Given that history, the British argue, it is too early in the process and sends the wrong signal to give Gerry Adams, however committed he personally is to giving up terrorism for good, free rein to raise funds here. In addition, Ab Mikva believes that as long as IRA procurement activity continues in the U.S., permitting Adams to fundraise will expose us to charges of inconsistent and discriminatory policy if we crack down on Hamas fundraising.

FBI, Justice and State (including Ambassador Crowe) strongly agree with the British line of argument. They underscore that although the cease-fire continues generally to hold, IRA extortion and other criminal activities continue, though apparently under instructions that firearms not be used. The IRA admitted November 20 that a recent armed robbery in which a postal worker was killed (and \$150,000 stolen) was committed by IRA members ("volunteers") "acting on instruction" (presumably from local commanders) but "not sanctioned by the IRA leadership." Neither Adams nor the IRA has responded to the British suggestion that they return the stolen money.

IRA extralegal "policing actions" (i.e. beatings of suspected collaborators or petty criminals in Catholic neighborhoods of Northern Ireland) continue, as do IRA training operations. FBI reports that there has been IRA arms procurement activity in the U.S. since the cease-fire was declared. Gerry Adams has told Ambassador Smith he is trying to get the beatings to stop. We are satisfied that Adams did not know in advance about the postal robbery. Nonetheless, the British, State and Justice regard these facts as arguing strongly against allowing fundraising on this trip.

On the other side, Ambassador Smith in Dublin and some important figures on the Hill (including Dodd, Moynihan, Manton, Gilman and Ted Kennedy) argue with equal conviction that there is no practical or political benefit to be derived from continuing to insist that Adams cannot fundraise here and, indeed, that singling out Adams in this way will undermine him and perhaps the entire peace process. They point out that this is not a legal issue but rather a policy one, that other Sinn Fein leaders and supporters who do not need visa waivers can and do raise funds for Sinn Fein, and that Adams, given his positive and pivotal role in bringing IRA into the peace process, should not "humiliated" in this way.

Adams has told us it is vital to him as he approaches talks with the British and a Sinn Fein party conference in early 1995 that we not do anything that implied we still had doubts about the cease-fire's permanency or about his own sincerity. Stopping him

from fundraising would not help move the IRA toward disarming; it could have the opposite effect. Adams argues that the hold-up in entering talks with the British is on the British side; Adams has made it clear he wants immediate talks with the British. Adams says he will not disarm until he is in talks with the British. (We think Sinn Fein intends to use the arms as leverage for progress on the release of prisoners.) Adams argues further that he needs funds to build a real political party and, by denying him access to fundraising, we are undermining his efforts to bring the IRA into the political arena. Finally, Adams points out that there were no restrictions on his fundraising in Britain; indeed, he held a fund-raiser in London during his visit there last week. Adams telephoned Nancy Soderberg November 21 to underscore how strongly he feels about this issue.

While, as Adams and others note, fundraising for Sinn Fein in the UK is legal, contributing to or soliciting funds for the IRA is illegal under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In practice, the collection boxes are generally marked for prisoners' welfare organizations, but Sinn Fein has never demonstrated that the collections are segregated from IRA operational funds. In the U.S., it has been proven in court that NORAID has a record of using money collected for "widows and orphans" to fund arms purchases. NORAID has not filed reports required under the Foreign Agent Registration Act since 1990.

The fundraiser that Adams says he held while in London last week (his first trip since the ban on his travel to mainland Britain was lifted) was apparently a small gathering in Camden of "Friends of Sinn Fein." We do not know how much money was collected. The British point out that the UK has never been fertile ground for legitimate Sinn Fein fundraising, given its association with IRA. Our Embassy in London notes that Sinn Fein has more offices and more full-time staff throughout Ireland than any other Northern Ireland political party and suggests that if the IRA were to stand down from its present state of readiness and if Sinn Fein contented itself with facilities and staff comparable to its political rivals, it could cease most criminal involvement even without new fundraising.

### Options

#### Option I: Maintain Fundraising Prohibition

Option IA) That Adams' three-month multiple entry visa be annotated to indicate that he is not permitted to engage in direct or indirect fundraising, but that he may raise sufficient funds to pay for the costs of his U.S. trip (same conditions as his last visit). No commitments/indications given him as to what

our future position might be. Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government strongly support.

Pros: Even with the fundraising restriction still in place, Adams gets from this trip a substantial liberalization of the travel restrictions on him and the reward of being received at the White House in a meeting with me (despite State and British discomfiture with the latter). Takes things a step at a time and keeps fundraising as leverage to encourage the IRA to address the weapons issue early on. Leaves no doubt where we stand on terrorism and expresses our concern about continued IRA criminal and procurement activities. Boosts confidence in London and Belfast that British and Unionist views matter and that Adams does not exercise undue influence on our Northern Ireland policy.

*Strong pressure from h:ll.*

Cons: Could weaken Adams politically within the IRA, both by embarrassing him in his already-public request and by denying him the ability to raise funds he says he needs to operate Sinn Fein as a political party. You will face strong pressure from Ambassador Smith and some on the Hill to concede this issue. The Irish government may privately urge you to reconsider. Adams may cancel his trip if not allowed to fundraise. Refusal will cause a rift with portions of the Irish-American community.

Option IB) Same as above, but we tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reversed next time, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement and taken concrete steps to demobilize and to disarm.

Pros: Same as above, but makes more explicit why Adams can't fundraise now and what we expect from him before we will alter our position. Provides encouragement to Adams that we will not deny him fundraising access indefinitely.

Cons: Same as above, plus State and Justice dislike setting out conditions now for what we might do in the future.

Option II: Allow Adams to fundraise on this trip.

Option IIA) Impose no restrictions on Adams' ability to fundraise on this trip.

Pros: Pleases important Irish players on the Hill; strengthens Adams internally.

Cons: Justice, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and State vehemently oppose, as do the British. The British (and Ambassador Crowe) still feel bruised from Adams' last visit and the Vice President's phone call to Adams; allowing Adams to fundraise will open another public U.S.-UK rift in a period of already-

*While recognizing the diff betw the two organizations*

substantial strains over Bosnia. Could weaken pressure on Adams to deal with weapons issue and be interpreted in Northern Ireland as a sign that we take lightly the recent IRA murder/robbery incident; subjects us to criticism if there is another incident of violence involving IRA members or weapons. Funds could be directed to weapons purchase, especially if the cease-fire breaks down. Ab Mivka adds that it would be very difficult to permit Adams fundraising while at the same time cracking down on Hamas fundraising. ]??

Option IIB) Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities.

Pros: Adams has already offered to do this. Underscores the point that we expect Adams to move forward in bringing Sinn Fein/IRA fully away from terrorist and illegal activities. Makes diversion of funds more difficult.

Cons: Money is fungible; even very elaborate safeguards will not stop it from going to support or offset criminal and terrorist activities. Largely symbolic, could be criticized as empty gesture. State and Justice strongly oppose on these grounds.

Option IIC) Allow Adams to fundraise if he agrees to place the funds in a U.S. account which he could not access without our permission. Establish that we will review the situation in early 1995 to decide if the funds can be accessed; factors affecting our decision will include whether the cease-fire still holds and whether Sinn Fein/IRA has taken steps toward disarming and ending weapons procurement.

Pros: Lets Adams go ahead with his fundraising plans while still meeting some of the concerns of the British, State and Justice.

Cons: Neither side will like; either or both may reject. In requiring

RECOMMENDATION

*US to make a decision on when to release funds, this option would put us in constant pressure on both sides to release*

That you approve Option IB: Maintain fundraising restriction but make clear to Adams the conditions that would help us look favorably on a fundraising request in three months' time, namely IRA progress toward disarmament, including cessation of procurement activities in the U.S.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Or alternatively,

*release the funds and involve US in the negotiating process in a way we have not seen before*

*add cons.*

That you approve Option IIB: Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: BRANSCUM NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WISE

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221633Z NOV 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6619  
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2480  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006335

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.34)  
KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FOR FUERTH AND WISE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY AND EUR - HOLBROOKE FROM  
AMBASSADOR SMITH

LONDON PLEASE PASS BMLFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS

REF: A) DUBLIN 6244, B) DUBLIN 6199 AND PREVIOUS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET NOVEMBER 20 WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS. HE CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAVE REPORTED SEPTEL THAT ACTING TANAISTE AND FINANCE MINISTER BERTIE AHERNE WILL FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WITH FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING'S LABOR PARTY. WE ALSO DISCUSSED PRESS REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON THAT GERRY ADAMS' REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN FUNDRAISING IN THE U.S. WAS RUNNING INTO OPPOSITION FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC. I HAVE NEVER SEEN REYNOLDS REACT SO VEHEMENTLY. REYNOLDS STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS MOST VIGOROUSLY:

--- IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ADAMS'S LEADERSHIP BE REINFORCED AND SUPPORTED. IF IT IS SEEN THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DELIVER ON THE PEACE DIVIDEND, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE HE WOULD BE REPLACED.

--- THE SDLP AND FIANNA FAIL RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. AND HAVE DONE SO HISTORICALLY. WHAT THEN IS THE LOGIC FOR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THE U.S. TO REFUSE SINN FEIN AND ITS LEADER GERRY ADAMS THE SAME RIGHTS. SINN FEIN IS A LEGITIMATE, CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE LARGEST SINGLE PARTY REPRESENTED IN THE BELFAST CITY COUNCIL.

--- THERE IS NO WAY THIS COULD BE EXPLAINED EXCEPT THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE IN OR TRUST THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT IT DOES NOT TRUST GERRY ADAMS.

--- CONSTANCY OF PURPOSE AND COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS BY THE U.S. IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT NOW BECAUSE OF THE PERCEIVED INSTABILITY IN IRELAND FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND REYNOLDS' OWN RESIGNATION.

3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT REFER TO HIS ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS DIRECTLY, REYNOLDS' RESIGNATION HAS DEFINITELY CAST A SHADOW OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. REYNOLDS WAS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT PERSON IN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN, ALONG WITH JOHN HUME, MOVING SINN FEIN/IRA TO ANNOUNCE A TOTAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE. THUS HIS DEPARTURE MAKES THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE PEACE PROCESS ALL THE MORE CRITICAL. REFUSING ADAMS' REQUEST WILL HAVE DIRE CONSEQUENCES AT THIS JUNCTURE. AS REYNOLDS POINTED OUT, NO GREAT SUMS OF MONEY WILL BE RAISED AND PRICE WATERHOUSE WILL BE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL OF THAT. THIS IS A SYMBOLIC GESTURE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS. AS I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR THE U.S. TO BE FOUND WANTING IN RESOLVE AND COMMITMENT. SMITH

BT

#6335

NNNN

<MSGID> M1374889

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: BRANSCUM NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW  
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 181546Z NOV 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6594  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2470  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006244

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.35)  
KBH 4/11/2023

LONDON PASS BELFAST

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FOR FUERTH AND WISE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY AND EUR HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS

REF: A) ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO/AMBASSADOR SMITH TELCON  
11-17-94, B) A/S HOLBROOKE/AMBASSADOR SMITH TELCON  
11-16-94, C) DUBLIN 6199, D) DUBLIN 6135, E) LONDON  
18073

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ABOUT GERRY ADAMS' REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN FUNDRAISING IN THE U.S., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ASKED ME TO FAX HER BACKGROUND ON THIS ISSUE. THE TALKING POINTS WHICH I FAXED TO HER FOLLOW. I ALSO NOTED THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO EUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS IS PURELY AN ADMINISTRATIVE CONVIENENCE AND NOT MANDATED BY LAW.

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING PROVIDED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:

INABILITY TO RAISE FUNDS LEGALLY THREATENS THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT APPROPRIATELY TRANSPARENT HANDLING METHODS CAN BE DEVELOPED TO INSURE THAT FUNDS RAISED IN

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## **WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 04

THE U.S. BY SINN FEIN AND MR. ADAMS ARE USED ONLY TO SUPPORT LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

THE BRITISH, ACCORDING TO OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON, ARE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT ADAMS' FUNDRAISING ACTIVITIES. YET TO OUR AMAZEMENT, THEY HAVE PUT NO SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON HIM IN BRITAIN. WHY THEN SHOULD THE BRITISH BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE U.S. POLICY IN THIS REGARD.

CONTRARY TO THE BRITISH ALLEGATIONS PASSED ON BY EMBASSY LONDON, IRISH AUTHORITES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT FUNDS RAISED BY SINN FEIN HAVE NOT BEEN USED TO SUPPORT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES SINCE THE CEASEFIRE.

IRISH AUTHORITIES HAVE INFORMED US THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR CRIMINAL INCIDENTS IN THE REPUBLIC CONNECTED WITH SINN FEIN/IRA SINCE THE CEASEFIRE.

IRISH AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO INFORMED US THAT THE RECENT ROBBERY IN NEWRY WAS NOT SANCTIONED BY THE IRA AND THAT THE WEAPONS INVOLVED DID NOT COME FROM A CONTROLLED CACHE.

ADAMS HIMSELF HAS NEVER BEEN CONVICTED OF TERRORIST OFFENSES. HE DID RECEIVE SENTENCES IN THE EARLY 70'S FOR "ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE DETENTION". HE WAS CHARGED IN 1978 WITH MEMBERSHIP IN AN ILLEGAL ORGANIZATION, PIRA, BUT CHARGES WERE DROPPED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE.

ALL OF THE EVIDENCE CONNECTING ADAMS WITH TERRORISM COMES FROM BRITISH POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY DISCREDITED IN AND OUTSIDE THE COURTS.

FROM THIS QUARTER, THERE IS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST AS CLAIMED IN EMBASSY REPORTING FROM LONDON THAT THE IRA IS CONTINUING TO SEEK NEW WEAPONS. IRISH AUTHORITIES CONFIRM THAT THE IRA IN THE REPUBLIC HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE ARMS FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE. FINALLY, ALLOWING ADAMS TO RAISE FUNDS FOR SINN FEIN'S DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES IS SO OBVIOUSLY IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE U.S.G. CAN BE SO UNRESPONSIVE. WE ARE TELLING ADAMS THAT HE MUST PROVE THAT SINN FEIN/IRA HAVE ACCEPTED THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESS WITH ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT ENTAILS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE LIMITING HIS ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES NEEDED BY ANY CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS SEEN AS A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT. OUR CREDIBILITY WITH SINN FEIN WILL BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN IRELAND HAS CHANGED. PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS RESIGNED THIS MORNING. BOTH HIS ALLIES AND CRITICS REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO THE LOSS OF THIS STRONG PROPONENT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, WHICH WILL NOW BECOME EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS. EVERYONE WILL BE LOOKING TO THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF PEACE. NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO SHIRK THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

WE MUST GIVE ALL THE SUPPORT WE CAN TO THE ONE MAN WHO WAS ABLE TO DELIVER THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, NOW IN EFFECT SINCE AUGUST 31. END TALKING POINTS.

4. THE REFERENCES MADE TO COMMENTS BY EMBASSY LONDON WERE DRAWN FROM REF E. IN RESPONSE TO LONDON'S COMMENTS IN REF E, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING AMPLIFICATION OF OUR VIEWS OUTLINED IN REF C.

5. ADAMS IS UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE TO DEMONSTRATE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS FROM THE PEACE PROCESS. PIRA HARDLINERS WHO CONTROL ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE MEMBERSHIP VIEW MUCH OF THE PROGRESS SO FAR AS COSMETIC. THEY SEE GAINING ACCESS TO FUNDS IN THE U.S. AS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY. IF HE CANNOT DELIVER ON SOMETHING SO BASIC, HOW CAN HE CONVINCED THEM THAT HE CAN DELIVER ON THE TOUGH ISSUES OF DEMILITARIZATION, ETC.

6. BY DENYING ACCESS TO LEGAL FUNDRAISING, WE MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR SINN FEIN TO BREAK LINKS WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL METHODS OF RAISING FUND. THUS, IN RESPONDING TO THEIR INTERLOCUTORS, WE MIGHT SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY LONDON ARGUE RIGHTFULLY THAT LIFTING THE PROHIBITION AGAINST ADAMS IS A VIGOROUS STEP FORWARD IN MOVING SINN FEIN/IRA DEFINITELY AWAY FROM "ARMED ROBBERY, EXTORTION AND VARIOUS FORMS OF FRAUD." SUCH MOVEMENT IS DEFINITELY IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U.S.G. AND ALL OTHERS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN FURTHERING THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

SMITH

BT

#6244

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**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 04 OF 04

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<MSGID> M1368893

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: REED SENS SIT SODERBERG TRIP  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161626Z NOV 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6568  
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2464  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006199

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.36)  
K8H 4/11/2023

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FOR FUERTH AND WISE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY AND EUR HOLBROOKE

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
UAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN

REF: A) DUBLIN 6135, B) DUBLIN 5041 AND PREVIOUS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT WHAT WE HAD HOPED WOULD BE A RELATIVELY STRAIGHT-FORWARD REVIEW OF THE MERITS OF GERRY ADAMS' REQUEST FOR A MULTIPLE-ENTRA VISA AND TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND FUNDRAISING EVENTS IN THE U.S. HAS BECOME COMPLICATED. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO ME THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WILL BE TOLD TODAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT LOOK FAVORABLY ON THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE. I STRONGLY URGE THAT THIS POSITION BE REVIEWED.

3. NOTHING I HAVE SEEN OR HEARD SINCE THE IRA DECLARED A TOTAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE ALMOST THREE MONTHS AGO SUGGESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DIMINISHED HIS COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD BY CEMENTING SINN FEIN/IRA INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESS IS CRUCIAL TO ITS SUCCESS. THE COMMITMENTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY AND OTHERS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN PREDATED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PERMANENCY OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE DECLARATION THAT IT WOULD MEET WITH

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SINN FEIN PROBABLY BEFORE CHRISTMAS. WHILE WE SHOULD KEEP HMG INFORMED OF OUR THINKING AND PLANS, WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO DICTATE OUR POLICY ON THIS CRITICAL ISSUE.

4. IT IS SIMPLY NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S.G. TO ALLOW THE PEACE PROCESS TO STAGNATE AND PERHAPS FLOUNDER OVER THE ISSUE OF FUNDRAISING. WE UNDERSTAND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS ADVISED EUR THAT THERE ARE NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN. MANY DISTINGUISHED IRISH AMERICANS ARE ACTIVELY PURSUING THE SETTING UP OF LEGAL STRUCTURES, REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS ACT, TO IMPLEMENT SUCH FUNDRAISING AND TO INSURE THE TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS OF THESE ACTIVITIES. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT, WITH APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES AND TRANSPARENCY, ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO INSURE THAT FUNDS RAISED BY SINN FEIN WILL ONLY BE USED FOR THE SOCIAL WELFARE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE SOLICITED.

5. AS I POINTED OUT IN REF B, CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC PARTIES NEED TO BE ABLE TO RAISE FUNDS TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES. SINN FEIN IS STARTING FROM SCRATCH IN THIS ENDEAVOR AND NEEDS ALL THE HELP IT CAN GET IN ITS EFFORTS TO DEMONSTRATE TO ITS MEMBERS THE ADVANTAGES OF PARTICIPATING IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. TO CUT SINN FEIN OFF FROM FUNDS READILY AVAILABLE IN THE U.S. FROM WELL INTENTIONED AMERICANS TAX-PAYERS AND VOTERS IS NOT ONLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BUT SELF-DEFEATING. TREATING SINN FEIN LIKE A SECOND-CLASS SYSTEM ONLY PROVIDES AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

6. UNDERSTANDABLY, PERHAPS, THE BRITISH HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA VIS-A-VIS SINN FEIN. THAT AGENDA IS NOT NECESSARILY CONSISTENT WITH U.S. INTERESTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE SHOULD NOT BE SO SHORT-SIGHTED AS TO UNDERMINE THE PEACE PROCESS BY KEEPING SINN FEIN ISOLATED. IT IS IN OUR BEST INTERESTS TO TAKE SINN FEIN'S DEMOCRATIC PRETENTIONS SERIOUSLY UNTIL THEY DEMONSTRATE OTHERWISE. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THEM ANY PRETEXT FOR BELIEVING THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE AS CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC PLAYERS BECAUSE OF THEIR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. IF WE DO, THE MESSAGE WE PROJECT COULD BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.

SMITH

BT

#6199

**IMMEDIATE**

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 03

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<MSGID> M1364217

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~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

Hall, Wilma G.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.  
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
Cc: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Crowe's Latest on Fundraising [SECRET]  
Date: Wednesday, February 15, 1995 6:00PM

*AB*  
*BC -*

*lunch with Hard.  
Cabinet meeting. Some  
disagreement. Decided  
to persist.*

*Be tough with  
Unionists.*

*2-16-95*

For TL/SB - FYI

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: SECRET DTG: 151807Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4777  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2574

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 002495

EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI  
SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.39)  
KBN: 4/11/2023

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. WITH AGREEMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD) LIKELY WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK, THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) THREATENING TO JOIN IAN PAISLEY'S DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) IN REJECTING THE JFD OUTRIGHT, UNREST AMONG PRO-UNION TORY BACKBENCHERS, AND BRITISH MINISTERS PROBABLY SOON TO ENTER TALKS WITH SINN FEIN, WE ARE ENTERING WHAT MAY BE THE SINGLE MOST TRYING PERIOD OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. WE CAN HELP THE PROCESS SUCCEED BY GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRISH REPUBLICANS TO MAKE THE IRA CEASEFIRE IRREVOCABLE. THE MOST URGENT PRIORITY, HOWEVER, IS TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING SOLD OUT, WHILE WARNING THEM THAT A REFUSAL EVEN TO NEGOTIATE WOULD CARRY HEAVY COSTS.

3. BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE HMG-SINN FEIN TALKS, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH. BUT LIFTING IT AT A TIME WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS RESTS ON A KNIFE'S EDGE WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ENRAGE UNIONISTS, AND DIMINISH PROSPECTS FOR AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

PROCESS AT A CROSSROADS

4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS HIT AN

UNUSUALLY ROUGH PATCH, AND THE SITUATION MAY GET A GOOD DEAL MORE TURBULENT IN THE WEEKS TO COME. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS LATE NEXT WEEK. THE SELECTIVE AND INFLAMMATORY LEAK OF PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED MODERATE UNIONISTS, AND PROBABLY LOCKED THE UUP INTO AT LEAST PRO FORMA REJECTION OF THE DOCUMENT WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED. THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THE UNIONIST PARTIES WON'T EVENTUALLY ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT GETTING TO THAT POINT WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT. THEY (AND A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES) ARE IN A VERY SKITTISH MOOD. AND IF THE UUP WITHDRAWS ITS TACIT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, MAJOR WILL HAVE EVEN LESS NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY THAN BEFORE.

5. ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE, TALKS WITH SINN FEIN HAVE MADE INCREMENTAL PROGRESS AT BEST. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS WARMED A DEGREE OR SO, BUT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT SINN FEIN HAS GIVEN NOTHING EXCEPT A WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO (BUT NOT ACCEPT) A BRITISH PROPOSAL, AND A VAGUE UNDERTAKING TO USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT MIGHT POSSESS IN A "POSITIVE" WAY AT A TIME OF ITS CHOOSING. AND IT HAS THREATENED TO END THE DIALOGUE UNLESS MINISTERS JOIN IT SOON. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO AUTHORIZE A JUNIOR MINISTER TO TAKE PART, ON THE NOMINAL GROUNDS THAT SINN FEIN HAS AT LEAST "ADDRESSED" THE ARMS QUESTION. BUT MOVING FROM DIALOGUE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS WILL REQUIRE MUCH MORE -- ALMOST CERTAINLY PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM IRA CONTROL.

6. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED, IT IS LIKELY TO DRAW FIRE FROM SEVERAL QUARTERS -- UNIONISTS, NATIONALISTS AND TORY EUROPHOBES. THIS IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND THE LONG HISTORY OF ANGLO-IRISH CONFLICT. ALL PARTIES WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES.

#### THE USG ROLE

7. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE USG CAN BEST SUPPORT THE PROCESS IN THREE WAYS:

- GIVING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OUR WHOLEHEARTED AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY FORWARD;
- MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR PEACE BY OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS, WHILE WARNING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE; AND
- AVOIDING ACTIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE GENERAL PROCESS.

8. IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE NEW FACTOR IN THE EQUATION IS THE DANGER OF UNIONIST AND TORY BACKBENCH REJECTION OF THE JFD. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE NOT UPSET THE DELICATE PROCESSES NOW UNDERWAY BY MOVING TOO SOON TO LIFT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING, A STEP WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS BY REINFORCING THE UNIONIST VIEW OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DRIVE THEM ONTO A PATH THAT LEADS

INEXORABLY TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND.

9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONING SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

10. MOST OBSERVERS HERE HAD PREDICTED SINCE THE CEASEFIRES THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO COME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE IDEA THAT RISING REPUBLICAN DISILLUSIONMENT WOULD INCLINE THE IRA TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THOSE FEARS HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT. ADAMS CLAIMS, AND APPEARS, TO BE UNDER RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM IRA HARDLINERS AT PRESENT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE OVERALL PROCESS NOW COMES FROM THE FEARS -- SOME UNDERSTANDABLE, OTHERS DELIBERATELY INDUCED -- OF THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IF MODERATE UUP LEADERS CANNOT CONVINCE THEIR PARTY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JFD, THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL SUFFER A SEVERE AND PROBABLY PROLONGED SETBACK, AND THE RISK OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WILL RISE SHARPLY.

11. THE BRITISH, THE IRISH AND WE ALL NEED TO USE THE COMBINATION OF CARROTS AND STICKS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ENCOURAGE THE PARAMILITARIES AND PARTIES AFFILIATED WITH THEM TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE FOR GOOD, WHILE DISSUADING THE UNIONISTS FROM ABORTING THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMER BY MAINTAINING OUR REASONABLE AND DEFENSIBLE POSITION ON FUNDRAISING FOR A LITTLE LONGER, AND TO THE LATTER BY SENDING AN EQUALLY TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE UUP DELEGATION VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THAT THEY CAN EXPECT NO UNDERSTANDING FROM US IF THEY BLOCK PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. WHAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS IS PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND INCREASE UNIONIST ALIENATION. CROWE

BT  
#2495

NNNN  
<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01  
<^SSN> 2495  
<^TOR> 950215132816 M1516954

FROM:

SITREPRT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 17, 1995

*NLSW/UT per*

3766 *JFD*

*Dec - hold for meeting*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS *KS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, May 17, 1995, 3:30 p.m.

Hurd wants to discuss Bosnia/Croatia, Russia and NATO expansion. He is scheduled to have a working lunch with Secretary Christopher before his meeting with you and to call on the Vice President immediately after your meeting.

**Bosnia/Croatia.** There is growing sentiment within Parliament that the UK should review its participation in UNPROFOR; the UK will likely stay as long as the French do -- and no longer. Hurd discussed this with Juppe May 16 and will have gotten a read-out from Christopher on Bob Frasure's May 16 negotiating session in Belgrade.

**Russia/NATO.** Hurd will want to compare notes on the President's and Major's meetings with Yeltsin. HMG applauds the President's success in swaying Yeltsin on PFP. Hurd will press the British, French and German view that Russia should be told it cannot join NATO. He will also want to discuss the presentation of the "how and why" study to Partners this fall.

**Northern Ireland.** HMG was gratified by the President's strong words of support during Major's visit and by the Vice President's forthright comments on the importance of progress on decommissioning during his V-E Day stop in London. You should probe Hurd on next steps in the British-Sinn Fein talks. Next week's Investment Conference will draw a good turn-out, including Jim Molyneaux; you might seek Hurd's views on how we can best help to engage and reassure the Unionist community.

Concurrences by: Don Kerrick, John *JO* Beyrle and John Schmidt *JS*

Attachments  
Tab A Talking Points  
Tab B Biographical Information

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.44)  
K8H 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.45)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Bosnia

- Continue to be extremely concerned by the deteriorating situation on the ground in Bosnia, especially by Bosnian Serb attempts to strangle and shell Sarajevo and dictate terms for operating the airport.
- UNPROFOR should respond to repeated Serb violations of the exclusion zones and safe areas. No other viable alternative for protecting peacekeepers or ensuring UNPROFOR's continued presence.
- If we are not successful in saving Sarajevo and the enclaves from strangulation, any talk of a new cease-fire will be meaningless. So will any deal with Milosevic on recognition for sanctions relief and border tightening.
- What is your reading of French attitudes in UNPROFOR? What are they telling you about their plans?

Croatia

- Cease-fire has held for over a week, but the situation remains explosive.
- We have pressed all sides -- particularly Tudjman -- to show maximum restraint. We have insisted that Zagreb act responsibly towards the Serb population and accept re-establishment of UNCRO in Sector West.
- Neither Milosevic nor Tudjman wants a further escalation now, but a wider war could still result from provocation, desperation, or blunder -- particularly on the part of the Krajina or Bosnian Serbs.
- We both must use our influence with all sides to help head off new hostilities.

Russia/European Security

- (Provide debrief of Moscow summit.)
- We should not get into a quarrel over where to make the presentations on NATO expansion to partners.
  - We see good reasons for doing the initial presentations in capitals: we show partners that we remain committed

to them individually, and that the expansion process is moving steadily, if deliberately. Also will enable us to get our message to a broader range of partner government officials and parliamentarians.

- But we would be prepared to compromise by starting with a joint presentation in Brussels in mid-September, and then following up immediately by sending teams to partner capitals for individual presentations.
  - The December 1995 NAC Ministerial would then consider the partners' responses, and provide guidance on next steps -- short of naming who or when -- for the first six months of 1996.
- On Russia, we believe strongly that we should make no statement excluding it from NATO membership.
- While the prospect is remote at best, and would require a major recasting of the Alliance, there is nothing to be gained by explicitly excluding the possibility at this early stage, and much to be lost for our efforts to include Russia as a cooperative pillar of the European security structure.

#### Northern Ireland

- We welcome the long-awaited first meeting with Sinn Fein at the ministerial level. Do you think Sinn Fein is ready to bargain?
- We will keep stressing the need for serious discussions by the Loyalists and Sinn Fein on decommissioning arms.
- The Department of Justice and the FBI have the necessary legal mechanisms in place to account for funds raised in the U.S. by Gerry Adams. Our law enforcement officials are cooperating closely with British officials.

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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PER E.O. 13526

December 18, 1995

2011-0355-F (4.50)  
KBH 4/11/2023**NOTED**NES/MAP -  
Let's discuss.NSA Advisor  
has seen  
12-23-95INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *MA*

SUBJECT: Pieces of the Northern Ireland Puzzle

Following is a description of the possible elements of a resolution of the current impasse. If we assume that Sinn Fein/IRA are not going to cave on Washington 3 at this point, then the challenge is how to get the UUP to participate in all-party talks without a prior start to decommissioning. Therefore, the major pieces of the puzzle all amount to concessions by Sinn Fein and the nationalists. It is by no means clear that Trimble will accept less than Washington 3, strictly defined, or that Sinn Fein is prepared to make any further concessions to get to talks.

PIECES OF THE PUZZLE

Elections to an assembly with some connection to all-party talks. Trimble mooted the assembly idea as a substitute for all-party talks, not a way to reach them. Still, elections to some sort of body would be seen as a Trimble victory, and would therefore be a key incentive for him to participate in talks. The elected assembly could ratify a list of party-nominated negotiators to all-party talks, though presumably the UUP would insist that it have some other function as well. Trimble has mentioned having the assembly form committees that would hold hearings on key issues, including areas for cross-border cooperation.

Sinn Fein and the SDLP oppose any kind of elected assembly, both because they see it as an "internal solution" excluding Dublin and because it would underscore the fact of the unionist majority in Northern Ireland. In addition, Sinn Fein objects to an assembly as yet another precondition for the all-party talks that it believes should have been convened following the cease-fire. To meet nationalist concerns, an assembly would have to have a limited, information-gathering mandate. Dublin would have to be convinced to get behind the idea and sell it to Sinn Fein and the SDLP. We would also have to do some heavy lifting with John Hume.

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Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 12/18/05/

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1. Tremble betas ff under Tory's.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

border element of an eventual settlement easier to swallow. The Downing Street Declaration and the Joint Framework Document both envisage the modification of Irish Constitution in the context of an overall settlement, not as a means to reach it. The GOI would argue that it could encounter popular opposition if it were to introduce constitutional changes before the outlines of a political settlement were clear. Nevertheless, if Sinn Fein is unwilling or unable to make any meaningful concessions to get the UUP to talks, Dublin could decide to pay their freight by moving early on constitutional changes.

**End to Punishment Beatings:** The recent murder of a Catholic man suspected of drug dealing, apparently by an IRA punishment squad, has intensified the unionist focus on this issue. There have been many editorials in the unionist press citing the increased incidence of IRA punishment beatings since the cease-fire as proof that the IRA has not renounced violence. Of course that does not mean that an end to punishment beating would be welcomed as proof that they have. In any case, unionists would be unlikely to believe that punishment beatings had ended until a significant period of time had elapsed without an incident.

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Peters, Mary A.

From: Peters, Mary A.  
 To: Soderberg, Nancy E.; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
 Cc: Vershbow, Alexander R.; /R, Record at A1  
 Subject: Peace Process: Next Steps [CONFIDENTIAL]  
 Date: Wednesday, January 03, 1996 10:04AM  
 Priority: High

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 PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(4.51)

KBH 4/11/2023

TO: AL  
 NES

FROM: MAP

SUBJ NEXT STEPS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Senator Mitchell and co. will be returning to NI next week for their second, and presumably final, round of hearings. (I have heard no more about the idea that Rod Lyne suggested to Mike Habib -- that the two governments might ask Mitchell to draw out the work of the commission by conducting a third round.) If Mitchell does present his recommendations to London and Dublin o/a January 19, there will be 6 weeks to work out a way to get the talks started on time. That is presumably when the two tracks will have to be woven together; i.e., when the elected assembly proposal can be used to counterbalance a proposal on decommissioning that is less than the unionists want.

CLOSE HOLD: I heard from Peter Westmacott that the internal HMG memo summarizing the NIO submission to the Mitchell body ends with the comment that "it will be difficult to keep the commission from addressing Washington 3.". Peter was concerned by the implication of that comment and checked with London. Seems to reflect real indecision "at highest levels" about how to proceed. (Keep in mind that the Tory majority will be down to ONE when the Tory party loses the upcoming by-elections...) Peter thinks that London's position is still that it will have to look at whatever recommendations Mitchell comes up with, but it is unsettling that HMG seems to prefer that he not even address the nub of the problem.

The big new issue for Mitchell is the series of murders in Northern Ireland by an organization with the acronym DADD (something about drugs) that everyone believes is a front for the IRA. (Dublin believes it too, as evidenced by the fact that the GOI cancelled planned early releases for IRA prisoners in response to the first two killings last month.) There have now been 5 murders in the last month, a total of 7 in the last year. The victims have all been suspected of some link with the drug trade, but are not apparently the kingpins. The murders have increased public support for decommissioning and bolstered the unionists hard-line arguments, making the Mitchell commission's job much more difficult.

I have not come across any compelling explanation of why the IRA is doing this now. Some unionists are saying the murders are a prelude to the resumption of inter-communal violence -- that the grey line of the cease-fire will be crossed when the IRA kills a loyalist suspected of drug trading and provokes loyalist retaliation. Sinn Fein says the killings reflect dissatisfaction with British footdragging on talks as well as the lack of effective community policing. At least one columnist argues that the hard men need something to do to keep them occupied. (This last one strikes me as plausible, but it still does not answer the question of why now.)

**ACTION RECOMMENDED:**

--Recommend that AL /NES talk with Mitchell asap about his thoughts, implications of the killings, etc.

--We need to decide whether to issue a WH or Presidential statement condemning the killings. I think we should. Please advise.

Reminder: Michael Ancram will probably come to Washington o/a Jan 29 for consultations with AL.

**Peters, Mary A.**

**From:** Peters, Mary A.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1  
**Subject:** Major-Bruton Meeting 12/21 [CONFIDENTIAL]  
**Date:** Friday, December 22, 1995 2:31PM

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.5A)  
 KBH 4/11/2023

**TO:** AL  
 NES

**FROM:** MAP

**SUBJ:** Major-Bruton Meeting, Belfast Killings

Following is based a readout from Mike Habib after his meeting with Rod Lyne and on Dublin 6310.

The Major-Bruton meeting took place yesterday in Dublin as scheduled, after speculation that it would be postponed over British reservations about EU approval for a bailout package for Irish Steel. Purpose of the meeting was mainly social -- Major and Bruton were accompanied by their wives, attended the opera, and visited a pub together. They received standing ovations on entering and leaving the opera. Major stopped in NI on the way and was also warmly received there, per Lyne, including in a Catholic neighborhood he visited for the first time.

There was a one hour one-on-one in the midst of the socializing. It was devoted largely to European monetary union, and to the initiative to deepen bilateral ties that was announced to the press. (That will involve a series of ministerial -level contacts and greater cooperation in such areas as S&T, health and education.) On NI, Major and Bruton agreed the Mitchell body had gotten off to a reasonable start. According to Lyne, neither was convinced that SinnFein is taking it seriously, however. Bruton reportedly was concerned about Sinn Fein's general posture, going beyond just SF's less than indignant response to the killings in Belfast. He suggested that Adams might try to slip past the Mitchell body without getting into details by doing no more than reiterating the IRA's view of the history of the conflict.

At that point, still per Lyne, PM Major pointed out that in HMG's experience it takes time to work through a negotiation with Sinn Fein. It is more important that the Mitchell body do a good job than that it submit its final report by mid-January. Rod hinted (no more than that) that the two governments might suggest to Mitchell that a third round of work (the second will start o/a 1/10) might be useful. Mike H asked how postponing the Mitchell recommendations would affect the end-of- February date for talks. Lyne replied that there were six weeks to play with between the two, implying that the talks would not necessarily be delayed.

Bruton express GOI annoyance over Trimble's refusal to participate in trilateral talks -- Major responded that he couldn't control the UUP -witness the fisheries vote (in which the Tories were defeated). On the elected body, Major thought the idea was gathering momentum. The Brits thought Bruton was open-minded about it, though some of his officials are against it. Publicly, SF is against it, but the Brits said that in private conversations with the Alliance party, some SF reps had been less categorically opposed.

The two government publicly condemned the killings of drug suspects in Belfast, presumably by the IRA. In response to the killings, the Irish Government decided not to grant early release to 10 IRA prisoners -- instead they will get a short Christmas parole.

By the way, Rod is going to be seconded to British Gas for a year, and expects to come back after that as an ambassador. (South Africa did not work out for him.) He still expects to visit, together with his successor John Holmes, sometime next month.

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*File  
Jean K Smith*

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER LAKE SIT SODERBERG

SIT: LAKEA SUM SUM2 WHSR\_SPECIAL

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FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

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INFO ////

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2011-0355-F (4.53)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000549

FOR NSC -- TONY LAKE AND NANCY SODERBERG ONLY FROM  
AMBASSADOR JEAN KENNEDY SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/99

TAGS: PREL, EI

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL -- INFORMAL

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON: 1.5  
(B) .

2. *(C)* ONCE AGAIN, I OPEN THE IRISH TIMES TO FIND THE  
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS  
OUTLINED BY CONOR O'CLERY. THIS MORNING I FIND MYSELF IN  
THE AWKWARD POSITION OF DISCOVERING FROM THE IRISH TIMES  
THAT APPARENTLY MY RECOMMENDATION YESTERDAY THAT TONY  
CALL THE TANAISTE WAS SUPERFLUOUS BECAUSE TONY HAD  
REPORTEDLY ALREADY BEEN TELEPHONING SPRING OVER THE LAST  
FEW DAYS. THIS LACK OF COMMUNICATION IS, TO SAY THE  
LEAST, NOT HELPFUL.

3. *(C)* MY INTERLOCUTORS IN AND OUT OF THE IRISH  
GOVERNMENT EXPECT THIS EMBASSY TO BE PRIVY TO USG POLICY  
AND ACTIONS. HOPEFULLY SOME MECHANISM CAN BE WORKED OUT  
TO ENABLE TONY TO TELEPHONE ME AS WELL WHEN HE IS HAVING  
CONTACTS WITH SENIOR IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT  
WOULD HELP IF WE WERE ALL SPEAKING IN UNISON.

4. *(C)* WITH REFERENCE TO CONOR O'CLERY, THE LOCAL PRESS  
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS HAVE BEEN  
CALLING US TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF HIS  
REPORTING AND HIS OBVIOUSLY AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES. A  
NUMBER OF THESE CALLERS HAVE IMPLIED THAT THE EMBASSY  
MUST BE THE SOURCE OF THE LEAKS, PARTICULARLY IN  
CONNECTION WITH HIS REPORTING IN ADVANCE ON THE REPORT OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, AND THIS HAS DEVALUED OUR  
CREDIBILITY WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS  
CORPS. ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTACTS IN THE IRISH

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL BODY POLITIC ARE CONVINCED THAT THE LEAKS ARE COMING, ALONE OR IN TANDEM, FROM THE IRISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND THE NSC.

5. (c) THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS ESPECIALLY EXERCISED OVER THE LEAKS OF THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY TO THE IRISH INDEPENDENT AND ARE ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING THE SOURCE OF THIS PARTICULAR LEAK. WE UNDERSTAND THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE WILL TRY TO REIN IN ITS EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. AT THE SAME TIME, PERHAPS WE NEED TO REVIEW O'CLERY'S ACCESS TO THE USG IN WASHINGTON TO INSURE THAT THE USG'S DISCRETION IN THE HANDLING OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS NOT FURTHER CALLED INTO QUESTION. SMITH  
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<MSGID> M2058449

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2011-0355-F (4.54)  
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Summary of Phone Conversation between Mr. lake and Michael Ancram, September 30, 1995

Ancram told Mr. Lake he had a constructive meeting with Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness (accompanied by Joe Kelly) , which began with McGuinness stressing SF's desire to find a way through the present impasse by means of debate and discussion. Ancram thought it significant that McGuinness had not warned of a possible return to violence. Ancram had said HMG is also committed to finding a way through, and believes the twin track, especially in terms of the commission, offers the means to look at all the different sensitivities. Neither SF nor HMG would be required to make a commitment to the commission's outcome. Both would stand by their present positions, but would agree to consider the commissions recommendations on their merits. Ancram said the discussion had been very much along the lines he and Mr. Lake had been discussing.

Ancram said that he and McGuinness had discussed the proposal in some detail, including terms of reference and composition of the commission. McGuinness was anxious about the target date -- Ancram had told him HMG would certainly consider it , though not until the twin track was clearly working. They would consider announcing the target date at the same time they announced the twin track. In response to Mr. Lake's question about a possible 12/15 target date, Ancram said they had lost a little time and it might not be possible for the commission to complete its work in time for that. He added that McGuinness wants to meet again next week.

Mr. Lake asked whether McGuinness had indicated whether he had talked with his people (in the IRA); Ancram said he had not indicated how much he had already talked with them, but had said he would take back what he and Ancram had discussed. Ancram mentioned the SF convention to be held in Dublin 9/30. Ancram said McGuinness is interested in the words that would be used (the communique) and would like to negotiate that with Ancram. They remain in touch with Hume on this. Today's meeting, according to Ancram, was not the time for that kind of detail. He emphasized that the atmosphere was good; and the next thing was to analyze the meeting in detail and wait and see what McGuinness comes back with. He told Mr. Lake he had made no bones about the fact that HMG's position had not changed -- McGuinness seemed to accept that that had to be worked through.

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Mr. Lake returned to the question of the piece of paper, and agreed with Ancram that there may be too many floating about. He reminded Ancram that we had not told Adams or anyone else about the draft we had sent Ancram, and said Ancram is welcome to use it as he sees fit. Ancram said thank you and repeated that it had been easier to leave that issue to the next meeting. Mr. Lake also told Ancram he had had a brief conversation with SF's Washington representative, who had said the same thing about SF's readiness to be constructive.

Mr. Lake recalled that Ancram has said the Washington criteria were not doctrinal and asked whether there was flexibility in the formula to make the third criteria a judgment rather than a condition. Ancram responded that he thought both sides would be happier if the panel were to look at ways and leave the judgments to the sides. The terms of reference would be general, along the lines of "context and manner" and would cover criteria one and two, though the panel would hear evidence on three. Mr. Lake said he found Trimble's proposal for an elected assembly somewhat vague; what would such body do? Ancram said he thought it was still vague in Trimble's mind, but there had been other (similar) suggestions from other quarters and HMG needed to give the concept some thought. They did not want to rule out any idea put forward in a constructive manner, but he wouldn't rank it higher than "possible" at present. Ancram said that Major had recently met with both Hume and Paisley and both meetings had been conducted in a positive atmosphere.

Mr. Lake said he would be hearing from Sinn Fein later in the day and would let Ancram know of any glitches. He also raised the idea of a trip by Nancy Soderberg and Ambassador Crowe to Belfast and a possible trip by himself to London. Ancram thought his trip would be useful, depending on the response Nancy and Crowe get.

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.55)  
KBM 4/11/2023

SUBJECT Mr. Lake's September 14 Meeting with Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Mairead Keane, Richard McAuley, Nancy Soderberg, Mary Ann Peters

LOCATION, DATE, TIME: One Washington Circle Hotel, September 13, 1995, 6:00 p.m.

Adams began by saying there had been a story on television in Belfast, on UBT, that Gerry Adams had been "summoned" to the White House, and that the reporter, Ken Reid, had confirmation from Nancy Soderberg.

Soderberg said she had called Reid, who had denied that he had said it and alleged that he had gotten the confirmation from Sinn Fein itself. She had spoken with Reid the previous evening and given him the same readout she gave everyone -- that Lake and Adams had had a good conversation.

Adams said a number of others had claimed to have gotten the meeting confirmed at the White House. This is a problem, though he doesn't take it personally. Mr. Lake pointed out that it is not in our interest to have this come out. He wanted it to remain private to give Adams running room. That is why we were there. He said he had full confidence in Nancy. Adams said that Conor O'Clery had told him that he had White House confirmation of a meeting -- did the fact that there would not be one mean a crisis? O'Clery had added that it would be hard to reset the headline "White House Fails to Broker Agreement", to which McAuley had responded that they had never expected a headline that read "White House Brokers Agreement".

Mr. Lake said that our press guidance would be that we had talked to Adams and to Ancram and that we remain in touch with all the parties. We would refuse to say more. Adams said he did not want to spend too much time on the issue, though it is a matter of confidence. There is a familiar tactic, in his view erroneous, of setting deadlines to corral people -- the British do it all the time. Sinn Fein is left with a double dilemma. It is not a problem for Sinn Fein to say there was no meeting at the White House, though they remain in contact (with the White House). The fact is the story is out there with the word "summoned" -- though that was probably Ken Reid's own sense of

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it. This was the situation he had sought to avoid. Adams added that he would prefer to cobble together a solution rather than make headlines.

Mr. Lake said he had been accused by of being Greata Garbo when he travelled all over Europe on Bosnia without talking to reporters. We cannot lie to them, but only a few people know about this meeting. Adams said that Senator Kennedy knows. Mr. Lake asked whether he knew about this meeting and Adams replied that Trina had phoned Sinn Fein to assure Kieran that they would make sure Adams was finished with his meeting with Kennedy in time to get to the White House. Mr. Lake said that if this meeting leaks, he'll have the FBI on it, and the next meeting would be just the two of them somewhere in Newfoundland. Adams' confidence is important to him. Mr. Lake added that the Administration is engaged on lots of issues, for the purpose of getting them resolved, not getting credit. He said he understands that the British need room on this and Sinn Fein needs room with the IRA.

On the issue at hand, Adams said he had passed from Mairead to Mary Ann what he needed from this meeting. One thing he wanted to stress, as he had yesterday, was that the IRA have set their head against any dealing with or accepting a commission. He had told Hume and possibly the Taoiseach, but no one else, that he had gone to the IRA about 10-12 weeks ago, because from his perspective it is Sinn Fein that has to keep pushing the process forward -- no one else will do it. (They'd said) okay, what if we get the Brits headed down the track and the movement lasts for 1-3 months and the ground shifts a bit, but at the end the Brits still insist on the third condition?

The British have hammered on decommissioning so long that the IRA thinks this is just a British ruse, Adams continued. Sinn Fein has very little room to maneuver on this. Of course if there were forward movement, then all parties would feel freer. The IRA is not going to give up weapons without a process working, without actually having a settlement or being on the eve of a settlement. What they fear is that if they move to bilateral or trilateral talks the British will keep them hanging until the urgency goes out of the situation, after the President's trip. In 3-4 months the British will say they will not move to all-party talks and the process is stalled again. As (senior GOI official) Sean O'Huiginn says, it is a matter of judgment -- either you believe the Brits want a fig leaf and want to change this from an obstacle to an objective, in which case they will continue to shout about the condition but everyone knows they

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will get off it, or they will not move and will jam the condition on again in 2-3 months.

Mr. Lake asked whether there was not a third alternative, though it might not be consistent with the way the IRA thinks. What if the current situation extends into the future and it continues to appear that Sinn Fein is refusing to go along with the commission? That is less attractive than the second scenario Adams outlined, of the British not going along.

Adams responded that he was mindful of what the Vice President had said and what an Irish Times editorial had said about a "vacuum" hanging over us. People are impatient. He stressed that it is very, very important for people to understand that there is an alternative that could work. Mr. Lake responded, "Let's make it work." Adams added that if we knew how tightly people are screwed (wound) up on this ... He asked Mr. Lake to put himself inside the mind of someone who believed in the armed struggle, and imagine their view of the British. It would not suit Sinn Fein to have a PLO-like situation in which there is a separate, more militant faction. On the British, if this is screwed up, and if the (IRA) representatives still retain confidence in him, even if there was never a friendlier Administration, he'd need to be putting it back together again. If it breaks down, after having a nervous breakdown, Adams said he would be back trying, because there has to be something.

"So what is required," Adams asked. He said he would like to go back with something in writing in order to have a firm proposal to show. It should contain the kernel of what has been brokered. Adams said he did not need it that day, necessarily, but it would be useful if he had it. Second, if the British are prepared to go down the road, and if he wants to avoid a situation where the commission brings back its recommendations and the British reject them, can the U.S. act as a guarantor? In a private dimension? Given the opposition to the word "commission" Adams had looked it up in the dictionary, an American edition and talked it over with Hume. He personally had liked the word "arbiter", but also "monitor" and "forum". Mr Lake asked whether the term "Brits" was invidious, to which Adams replied that they refer to themselves that way when they are being partonizing. Finally, Adams said that if a way could be found to move, it should not fall foul of a failure to communicate; there should be a way to keep in contact.

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Mr. Lake explained that our general principle was not to get involved in actual negotiations. He understands that Adams is committed to peace and needs to bring others along. For our part, he said, we need to maintain good relations with the British, with whom we work on Iraq, Bosnia, etc. Our commitment to peace helps us with the Irish-American community. It is not in our interest to get so deeply involved that we can be blamed if it fails, or to do so in such a way that one side or the other says we did not act in confidence. All of us, I myself, Nancy, Mary Ann, and the President and Vice President do what we are doing to see progress made. I have the sense that now is the time for progress, that the positions are not that far apart. We would not be trying if we did not see a possibility of success. This is not something we expect will bring immediate credit to us, though we may get some credit someday. That is why I am annoyed about the leak. I have told the President to expect stories in the press about lack of a breakthrough.

Adams said that he recognized that the Vice President's attendance at the meeting was an important step. Mr. Lake added that it had come in advance of anything new. Adams said he wanted to get into the details of what is required. No Irish republican, including himself, will make a leap of faith in the British even to allow them to move off their position and offer talks. It would be a different situation if the U.S. says it, though Adams understood that the U.S. does not want to get in the middle. Mr. Lake said, "Unless absolutely necessary, in certain situations".

Adams asked Mr. Lake to explain the terms of reference for the Mitchell entity. Would the parties, Sinn Fein, the SDLP, etc. be expected to make statements to the commission? Would the IRA be expected to? Mr. Lake said that he would think anyone who wanted to do so would be able to, and it would be in their interest to make their views known. Adams said it would have to be the political parties, not the armed groups, who would talk about how demilitarization should be done. Soderberg said that this is where the other track comes in -- if those talks go far enough, the decommissioning track is less important. Adams said that he would be asked by the IRA what they would have to do and he wanted to be able to reply, "Nothing."

Adams then said he had half arranged to meet with Mitchell again prior to leaving the U.S. He'd felt inhibited in their previous meeting because there had been so many people present. Mr. Lake said he would not talk to Mitchell before Adams did. He'd known Mitchell for 25 years -- he is a man who cares about his integrity. Adams added, "As long as the Brits don't catch his

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great cousin having an affair", but admitted that he was perhaps being paranoid. Mr. Lake related the anecdote about the French ambassador compromised by the KGB who, when confronted with photos of himself "in flagrante delicto", had responded that he would like to order copies.

Adams said he has known Mitchell a relatively short time but has a sense of Mitchell's integrity; it would be taking a chance but risks have to be taken. Mr. Lake amended his previous decision not to talk to Mitchell before Adams' conversation with him, saying he felt he should brief Mitchell first on where the process stands.

Adams said he keeps coming back to the question of whether this is the right road. He is not negative personally because to do anything one has to be flexible, but the IRA has ruled out cooperating with a commission for very good reasons. When he and John Hume had cobbled together their formula, he had talked informally with 1-2 IRA men. They had indicated that if Hume and Adams worked out the terms of reference so they would be different from what the Brits had wanted, they wouldn't rule it out. That is Adams' answer. He thinks people are intelligent. If this doesn't work then he will get another word. What is required is a date for all-party talks. Mr. Lake added, "Target date."

Adams said the compromise is a formula for dealing with a commission. This is the best answer he could give. It would be a mistake to think he can deliver this, though he can run with it. He had been thinking and talking about it but got nowhere. He would not want us to think he is upbeat about it. Whether he gets it or not, he will call, so he needs a way to communicate. He can give us a commitment to let us know in advance what the response will be so we will not be surprised or deceived.

Adams added that he does need something in writing to take back. Mr. Lake said he would see if we could get the British and the Irish to work on that. Adams said that he would like to have in writing if possible and would keep absolutely confidential an outline of the proposal Mr. Lake had put to him. Mr. Lake said he would rather not provide that but would prefer to work on a document that would eventually be made public. Adams said what he had in mind was something actually expressed that way, saying here's where we are. Mr. Lake said we should think about a secure means of communicating. He would talk to Mairead.

Adams returned to the question of who knew about the meeting. He said Senator Dodd might, as he had asked Adams to phone him at home that evening. Mr. Lake said there was no way around the fact that it was known a meeting had been planned. The

question was who knew about this meeting? Adams said he had explained to Trina that there would be some contact -- either a meeting or a phone call. That's all who know. A good cover for the contact is that Sinn Fein has a mission in Washington and the White House maintains regular contact through Mairead Keane. We can say we have had contact or that we are always in contact.

Mr. Lake said that his impression -- and Adams should tell him if it should be more nuanced -- is that for Sinn Fein the issue of a date for all-party talks is at least as important as the commission, if not more so. The British had accepted the notion of calling it a target date; more needs to be done on this because it goes to the issue of "creating conditions" for talks to take place. Adams interjected that by conditions the Brits meant their Washington principles. Mr. Lake said that the British had told him that if everything else were moving, they would give sympathetic consideration to going forward (with all-party talks). Mr. Lake had asked if that meant movement in the trilateral talks and in the commission and they had said yes. He added that he didn't know whether they would be willing to say that now. Adams said that Mayhew's letter to Hume should give us insight -- he couldn't remember exactly what it said, but it was a considered, written reply. The fact that they were writing to Hume at all indicates that they want their view on the record. Mr. Lake said the British would be talking with Hume.

On the terms of reference, in essence, the British cannot explicitly say that the "when" is included, but they would ask the Mitchell "x" to make recommendations that might include when decommissioning would take place. Mr. Lake had said that in his view, the communique language about "appropriate context and manner" did not rule out "when". If the commission cannot look at "when", then what is the point? The British had agreed that a broad interpretation would not be excluded. In Mr. Lake's view that is a better position for Sinn Fein because the British will have to take account of the commission's recommendations on the issue. Mr. Lake added that no one would be bound by the outcome, and both could restate their positions in the interim, though he hoped neither would do so too often. Ancram had used the phrase "if asked", but then added that he is always asked. It would help encourage trust if some of the voluntary statements were not made, Mr. Lake said.

Adams told Mr. Lake that in a meeting with the three Irish coalition partners and senior GOI officials about 10 days ago, they had said there was no guarantee what the British would do. But when it came to the crunch, the British had backed off. Adams had a sense of déjà vu. The Irish government had been reading the same signs. Mr. Lake said that at the risk of appearing immodest, that had been before the U.S. got involved.

We are the new factor. Adams agreed, saying that the entire dynamic in Ireland wasn't enough to move the process forward -- only "you yourselves" could do it.

Mr. Lake said the British had agreed that the commission's recommendations would be considered on their merits. Neither Sinn Fein nor the British would be bound in advance. The British would maintain their current position while the commission starts its work. The other track would begin and over the next few months, this would develop confidence and address the issue of creating a new reality. Mr. Lake had never talked to Mitchell about it but he hoped the commission could make recommendations all parties could buy off on. This is the simple, clear way to get going without forcing either side to back off. Mr. Lake said this is what he had gotten from London. The Prime Minister had been in meetings all day and had not signed off, but this is a sense of where they are. Mr. Lake would be back in touch to work on a joint communique text. The British would want to get back to the Irish on the communique.

The name did not seem to be a stumbling block. The British have a problem with the word "forum" but had said twice that they would find another word. In response to Adams' question on who had said that, Mr. Lake said he had been talking with Ancram, but Adams should keep that private. Soderberg said that the problem with "forum" is that there is already an entity in the south using the term.

On the composition, Mr. Lake said the British have no problem with Mitchell and two others. They will find acceptable people-- they won't get anyone who is anathema to any of the parties.

Adams said that the language Hume had suggested to the British differed slightly from the version he and Hume had worked out, but it was "not bad". He said that perhaps what he had said about what was required sounded like a shopping list, but it was what he had to deal with.

Mr. Lake said that his goal it is to try and wind up the train so it can go down the track without his having to drive it, though he wanted to stay involved. He wanted to jumpstart the process. If Mitchell heads the commission, it would be better for us not to be in the middle. That said, we do need to stay in touch and we need to find a way to communicate so that we can be helpful as necessary. He asked Adams whether that made sense and Adams said it did, absolutely. Mr. Lake said he did not rule out another meeting. He saw the joint communique as a way to have a document to move forward -- we would work with both governments on it. Adams said there would be no problem with the Irish.

Mr. Lake returned to the question of a guarantee. We have to be precise. The whole notion is that there would be no guarantee of what the British or Sinn Fein will or will not do. We do not know how the Mitchell Commission will turn out, but all would agree to consider its recommendations seriously on their merits.

How do we proceed, Adams asked, through your ambassador to Ireland? He added that he thought he should have a final proposal before leaving the country on Saturday. Mr. Lake said we would need a way to communicate. Adams mentioned Hume's proposal to the British, to which he had gotten a positive response from Mayhew. Soderberg said she had the Mayhew letter. Adams said that with Hume involved, there were four channels of communication going. He saw a danger of a mix-up in that and suggested that Sinn Fein and the USG stay in direct contact. He added that the press was liable to be asking why there had been no meeting and we should say we are in touch. O'Clery will say that there have been private meetings over the last week that are ongoing.

Mr. Lake asked how he should be in touch. It was agreed that he would call Mairead. Adams reiterated his request for a clear "view" of the proposal. It was agreed there could be a meeting in New York Friday or Saturday.

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (4.56)  
KBM 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon between Anthony Lake and Gerry Adams

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake  
Nancy Soderberg  
Kathleen Stephens (in Belfast)  
Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters (NSC staff)

Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein  
Mairead Keane (in Mr. Lake's office)

DATE, TIME: September 21, 1995, 11:15 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Mr. Lake's Office

Mr. Adams: Do you have any news for me?

Mr. Lake: I am waiting for news from you. I talked to the British about the question of whether the IRA would have to have contact with the commission or panel. I got a good response -- what matters to them is practicality, not labeling, as long as the commission is talking to someone in authority. I underscored the point about IRA neutrality. That leads to the question of what is talked about. I strongly urged that it not be defined now, but as things go along. The objective is to get the damn thing going and park the issue in an international body. I thought that got a constructive reception.

Mr. Adams: Right. The reality of the situation is that all we can see is for people to be neutral, and we are prepared to undertake and give some sort of commitment on the basis of this being part of the all-party talks process. We want to have a meeting between Ancram and Martin McGuinness, but it is not being processed properly -- we're having some difficulty reaching them, and Mayhew is in Australia this morning. And what I have in terms of our last conversation is that it will not be a runner. I talked to one or two people informally and they have enough goodwill to be neutral if there is a clear date for all-party talks. The Brits are saying they want people to speak with authority on this. What does that mean? Does it mean details or, as it should be, what is necessary to make progress and move forward. We have a bad line.

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Declassify on: OADR

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Mr. Lake: Please repeat the last part, the last third of what you said.

Mr. Adams: What do they mean by someone who can speak with authority on these issues? I think it means points one and two and fuzzy on three because there is no possibility of persuading people to be anything but neutral.

Mr. Lake: My strong impression is that they want to see movement forward. You should take what you've got. They are saying that you should engage with the panel and the IRA is neutral, as you noted. Neutral means the IRA doesn't have to support it but doesn't oppose your participation. You don't have to try to corner them now by saying what the body will not address, just as I urged the British not to be saying what the body has to address. You have the deal you are looking for.

Mr. Adams: You have said twice that they can be neutral and Sinn Fein or I will be involved. The difficulty that was pointed out to me informally was that if they are neutral on the twin track and if the British continue to insist on preconditions, on a report back from the body before all-party talks, and if the body comes up with a position similar to the British one, the whole republican leadership will be discredited with the republicans. We see that as a real danger.

Mr. Lake: The British have a sincere problem with the unionists, as you do with your constituents. The point I would urge on you both is that all you have to say is, "We are prepared to engage with the body on this issue." You have repeatedly said you would engage on decommissioning. You would not necessarily be bound by the outcome but would treat it seriously. If it comes out the wrong way, you can say that your position has not changed. It is your choice. You can say now that your policy remains the same, but I hope you will say it less.

Mr. Adams: I missed the last bit.

Mr. Lake: You would say that you would not be bound by what the body says, though you would treat it seriously. I don't see how that discredits you if you say it at the beginning. I am concerned that a refusal to deal with the body will let the British corner you and hurt your credibility, and ours.

Mr. Adams: OK.

Mr. Lake: As I said, I have been acting on the belief that you want peace.

Mr. Adams: That goes without saying.

Mr. Lake: To me, yes, but if it appears that you are blocking an approach that would park this issue while you would get to work on the first phase of all-party talks, then it is hard to sustain that position.

Mr. Adams: Anything more in terms of a firm description like the name?

Mr. Lake: No, I would welcome your thoughts. I think the "Mitchell Panel" is not bad. The British are flexible on this.

Mr. Adams: Anything further on who the others would be?

Mr. Lake: I did not discuss anything except that one issue, where I think they came back with a flexible answer. To return to the date, we do have them talking about a target date, which is a step forward. On the issue of membership, it would be a group of three of "appropriate standing, likely to enjoy widespread confidence."

Mr. Adams: Do you have names?

Mr. Lake: No, I would suggest that we get started on the basis of that formula. We would stay involved and weigh in, or George Mitchell would, to make sure the dice were not loaded, that they do not insist on qualifications that would load the dice. We would have to work on it.

Mr. Adams: Let me tell you what I will do, subject to your advice. We are trying to organize a meeting for Martin MaGuinness with Michael Ancram. When is the question-- hopefully as soon as possible. We first called them last evening; Martin is to phone back today. I am also hopeful that we will be consulting with the Irish Government people. I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram, if there is any light between what he says to us and what he is saying to you. And I will take your point about not pressing too hard on some issues. I would like to talk again. I will put the issue formally to the IRA and I will talk to you before then.

Mr. Lake: Would you like me to call London to encourage Ancram to meet with you as soon as possible?

Mr. Adams: We couldn't find them at all. It would be helpful.

Mr. Lake: I will do that.

Mr. Adams: Can we keep the point about formally putting it to the IRA between ourselves? I know you are doing your best. We do see it as step forward, but it will be very much an uphill battle. A small number see the Brits as getting everyone on a hook. I understand and accept the White House role, but the Brits are having success tactically by digging in behind this. We are 13 months down the road and the process is still dominated by a single new precondition, which is causing annoyance. I want to stress that it will be uphill. As I already told you, I will come back to you after the meeting with Ancram. I want to go to them with a full proposal. If something is revised in what Ancram tells Martin, perhaps you could take it up for us?

Mr. Lake: What I have told you about speaking with authority, I got from beyond Ancram, from someone not always noted for flexibility, so I hope we are making progress on that side. I agree they are doing well tactically -- and I urge you to deflect that and take the high ground.

Mr. Adams: The difficulty is that what people will sign on for is what is in a joint communique. You can't expect them to read between the lines. At the end of the day, the U.S. cannot act as guarantor or even broker. It is whatever the Brits are saying in consultations with us that is relevant. We cannot explain it as "Tony Lake said."

Mr. Lake: My aim is to get as explicit as possible, but I don't want to make it too detailed now. We talk to the British too. If they tell us something, it has some validity because of our relationship. It is just the same when you tell me something. Let me talk to them and if there is anything new, I will let you know.

Mr. Adams: I will be in Dublin until Saturday morning -- if you have some message that is the way to get me, to set up a call through the ambassador.

Mr. Lake: I am going to Haiti and will be back Saturday around noon, but Nancy will be here.

Mr. Adams: I will not be back to you until after the meeting with Ancram unless there is something new, or you have news for me.

-- End of Conversation --



OIFIG AN TÁNAISTE AGUS AN AIRE GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA  
OFFICE OF THE TANAISTE AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2  
DUBLIN 2

5 February 1996

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The Rt Hon Sir Patrick Mayhew QC MP  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
The Northern Ireland Office

Dear *Patrick*,

I found it very valuable, as I hope you did, to have the opportunity for a full and very open discussion between us at last Thursday's meeting of the Conference.

I thought it might also be helpful, in preparation for our resumed Conference discussion next Wednesday, to summarise for you the position as we see it:

We are very conscious of the credibility gap which is now looming in terms of our firm aim of achieving the launch of all-party negotiations by the end of this month.

It is not only the onset of our deadline which raises this issue. Sceptical questions are also being asked, particularly in view of reaction to the Mitchell Report, about the quality of our efforts to reach our stated goal, and even in some quarters about the sincerity of the initial commitment. The sudden espousal of the elective process, which is at present supported only by the pro-union parties, and opposed strongly by all the nationalist ones, is interpreted by many as endorsing, or even rewarding, the only parties who have so far refused to engage in the agenda we both solemnly set in November. Any perception that intransigence pays would send a most unfortunate signal to both communities.

I believe therefore we need to send a strong public message that our commitment to

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achieving our goal is resolute and for real, and that the means we are pursuing to this end are equally so.

What we have in mind is to bring all the parties together in one venue for two days' intensive discussion. We see this as a natural development of our stated commitment in the November communiqué to develop the multilateral dimension of the preparatory talks. We accept that it may not be possible to bring all the parties around a single table in the first instance. We are prepared to vary the geometry of the talks to take care of all reasonable sensitivities, and to work on the basis of a "proximity format" if that is the most acceptable formula.

The rationale behind our proposal is two-fold:

In the first place, it will ensure that our two Governments are clearly seen to use our best endeavours to meet the specific goals we set ourselves in the November Communiqué and, more generally, to honour the commitments in the Downing Street Declaration to foster agreement and reconciliation, leading to a new political framework founded on consent. I believe such a signal would help to convince all parties of the Governments' firm determination to see negotiations in place. This would help motivate those parties who at present refuse to enter negotiations to reconsider their position.

Secondly, we are very conscious of the practical requirements and difficulties of establishing the basis for future negotiations. This is now even more complicated, given that the elective process has been added to the agenda. The logistics of a range of separate meetings with both Governments, with so many parties and over such a complex agenda are almost unmanageable unless we draw the parties together in one venue.

( We need an opportunity to bounce ideas and proposals off the parties interactively over a


- 3 -

sustained period as part of a concerted drive to bring the preparatory talks to a conclusion. Without it, I fear we will not even be able to form a coherent judgement of their collective position in time for consideration at the Summit at the end of the month. Such an intensive process of discussion would be a valuable opportunity for those parties who believe in the need for an elective process to show how the serious misgivings felt by other parties on this issue can be overcome.

I hope you find this elaboration of our proposal useful in your preparation for next week's meeting. If of course you have alternative proposals of how to restore credibility to the objectives we set in our November communiqué and to inject the necessary fresh momentum into the preparatory political track, we will be prepared to consider them on their merits. However, we put the proposal for multilateral proximity talks over two days only after the most careful consideration of the alternatives. No other option, in our view, will give the same signal of genuine commitment to the parties. None offers a more practical way of handling the issues which are to be decided, given the complexity of the agenda, the number of parties involved and the need to minimise logistical problems and to maximise the focus of both Governments on resolving the issue.

I very much hope you will be in a position to agree to our suggestion on Wednesday.

Yours sincerely



Dick Spring T.D.

Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs

P.S. I enclose a copy of a speech which I delivered in Bandon last Saturday which summarised my views on the present situation.

**Baldwin, Kenneth**

*Put in Ireland work file*

**From:** Peters, Mary A.  
**To:** Soderberg, Nancy E.; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; Vershbow, Alexander R.  
**Subject:** Peace Process: Next Steps [CONFIDENTIAL]  
**Date:** Wednesday, January 03, 1996 10:04AM  
**Priority:** High

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.58)  
KBH 4/11/2013**

**TO:** AL  
**NES**

**FROM:** MAP

**SUBJ:** NEXT STEPS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Senator Mitchell and co. will be returning to NI next week for their second, and presumably final, round of hearings. (I have heard no more about the idea that Rod Lyne suggested to Mike Habib -- that the two governments might ask Mitchell to draw out the work of the commission by conducting a third round.) If Mitchell does present his recommendations to London and Dublin o/a January 19, there will be 6 weeks to work out a way to get the talks started on time. That is presumably when the two tracks will have to be woven together; i.e., when the elected assembly proposal can be used to counterbalance a proposal on decommissioning that is less than the unionists want.

**CLOSE HOLD:** I heard from Peter Westmacott that the internal HMG memo summarizing the NIO submission to the Mitchell body ends with the comment that "it will be difficult to keep the commission from addressing Washington 3.". Peter was concerned by the implication of that comment and checked with London. Seems to reflect real indecision "at highest levels" about how to proceed. (Keep in mind that the Tory majority will be down to ONE when the Tory party loses the upcoming by-elections.) Peter thinks that London's position is still that it will have to look at whatever recommendations Mitchell comes up with, but it is unsettling that HMG seems to prefer that he not even address the nub of the problem.

The big new issue for Mitchell is the series of murders in Northern Ireland by an organization with the acronym DADD (something about drugs) that everyone believes is a front for the IRA. (Dublin believes it too, as evidenced by the fact that the GOI cancelled planned early releases for IRA prisoners in response to the first two killings last month.) There have now been 5 murders in the last month, a total of 7 in the last year. The victims have all been suspected of some link with the drug trade, but are not apparently the kingpins. The murders have increased public support for decommissioning and bolstered the unionists hard-line arguments, making the Mitchell commission's job much more difficult.

I have not come across any compelling explanation of why the IRA is doing this now. Some unionists are saying the murders are a prelude to the resumption of inter-communal violence -- that the grey line of the cease-fire will be crossed when the IRA kills a loyalist suspected of drug trading and provokes loyalist retaliation. Sinn Fein says the killings reflect dissatisfaction with British footdragging on talks as well as the lack of effective community policing. At least one columnist argues that the hard men need something to do to keep them occupied. (This last one strikes me as plausible, but it still does not answer the question of why now.)

**ACTION RECOMMENDED:**

--Recommend that AL /NES talk with Mitchell asap about his thoughts, implications of the killings, etc.

--We need to decide whether to issue a WH or Presidential statement condemning the killings. I think we should. Please advise.

Reminder: Michael Ancram will probably come to Washington o/a Jan 29 for consultations with AL.

Kessinger, Jodi

From: Peters, Mary A.  
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Soderberg, Nancy E.  
Cc: Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Subject: More on Twin Track (CONFIDENTIAL)  
Date: Wednesday, January 17, 1996 5:09PM

TO: AL  
NES  
FROM: MAP

1. After I sent the memo on elements of a possible deal to get talks going, we received a cable outlining London's thinking on the elected assembly idea (London 537). Worth reading before making any phone calls. London is not 100% sold on the idea because none of the variants proposed by the unionists meet nationalist/Dublin concerns. HMG is more favorably disposed to the idea than Dublin, obviously, but wants the two governments to stay in sync. After the Mitchell report is issued, NIO officials would expect to reach agreement with their Irish colleagues on what kind of assembly would work best and present it to Major and Bruton for a decision at their mid-February summit.

London seems focussed on the concept of an assembly as a venue for negotiations, though the NIO did note the possibility that an election could serve simply as an index of the relative weights of the parties at the roundtable. There was no mention of having an assembly that would ratify or bless the delegations to the talks but would be essentially separate from them. The NIO estimates that elections could not be held before June and concedes that maintaining momentum in the interim would be difficult.

2. Now the bad news: According to a poll commissioned by the moderate unionist "Belfast Telegraph" and reported in Belfast 011), 60 percent of the people of Northern Ireland believe that ALL terrorist arms should be decommissioned before all-party talks begin, and an additional 23 percent said that some decommissioning should take place before talks. The most amazing result was that 40% of SDLP supporters favor total decommissioning and 34 % favor partial decommissioning, meaning that 3/4 of John Hume's voters back John Major on this. And only 63% of Sinn Fein supporters said there should be no decommissioning before talks.

While the SDLP is claiming that the wording of the questions predetermined the outcome of the poll, Trimble is making hay. He made a speech in the House of Commons calling on the SDLP and the Irish government to join the popular demand for decommissioning. Taken with the poll in the Irish Republic that showed similar pro-decommissioning feeling among the public there, this really strengthens Trimble's hand (and HMG's if it wants to cling to Washington 3) and makes Mitchell's task even harder.

*What was the method?*

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SSN: 0537 MSGID: M2035696

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2011-0355-F (4.60)  
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TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7849

INFO: RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 7940  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3863

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ~~LONDON~~ 000537

NSC FOR PETERS AND SODERBERG

E.O. 12356: DECL: 01/16/06

TAGS: PGOV PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG IDEAS ON ~~ELECTED ASSEMBLY~~

REF: DUBLIN 155

1. CLASSIFIED BY GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN, ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: HMG IS NOT COMMITTED TO AN ~~ELECTED ASSEMBLY~~ AS PART OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS, NOR HAS IT DEFINED A MODEL FOR HOW AN ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE STRUCTURED. BUT IT DOES SEE THE ASSEMBLY IDEA AS A USEFUL WAY TO KEEP UNIONISTS ENGAGED, IF A PROPOSAL CAN BE DEvised WHICH ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT IRISH GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALIST CONCERNS. HMG ASSUMES AN ASSEMBLY LIKELY WOULD CONSIST OF 90 MEMBERS, WITH FIVE MEMBERS ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS FROM EACH OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S 18 CONSTITUENCIES, BUT OTHER DETAILS REMAIN TO BE EXPLORED. QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED INCLUDE: WOULD AN ASSEMBLY MEET IN PERMANENT PLENARY SESSION OR ONLY OCCASIONALLY TO RATIFY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN COMMITTEE OR AT A ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATION; WOULD DECISIONS BE TAKEN BY MAJORITY VOTE OR CONSENSUS; HOW WOULD COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN BE APPOINTED; HOW TO ENSURE ENGAGEMENT OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS; AND HOW TO PROVIDE FOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE LOYALIST PARTIES. HMG REMAINS IN SYNCH WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN

SYNCH WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN  
THOUGH LONDON CLEARLY IS LEANING FARTHER FORWARD THAN IS  
DUBLIN. THE ISSUE WILL BE ADDRESSED DEFINITELY BY THE  
TWO GOVERNMENTS AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ISSUES ITS  
REPORT AND BEFORE THE MID-FEBRUARY ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT.  
END SUMMARY.

CURRENT THINKING ON AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY  
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3. (C) NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DAVID HILL (WHO  
RECENTLY REPLACED DAVID BROOKER AS HEAD OF THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT) AND  
JONATHAN STEPHENS BRIEFED US JAN 16 REGARDING BRITISH  
GOVERNMENT THINKING ON AN ELECTED NORTHERN IRELAND  
ASSEMBLY. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT HMG DOES NOT HAVE A  
"BLUEPRINT" FOR HOW AN ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE STRUCTURED;  
THE ULTIMATE SHAPE OF ANY PROPOSAL WILL DEPEND ON WHAT  
CAN BE AGREED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL  
PARTIES. INDEED, WHILE HMG SEES DEFINITE POTENTIAL  
ADVANTAGES TO PROCEEDING WITH AN ELECTED BODY, IT ALSO  
RECOGNIZES POSSIBLE PITFALLS AND AT THIS POINT IS NOT  
COMMITTED TO DOING MORE THAN CONSIDERING OPTIONS.
  
4. (C) REFERRING TO A PAPER RECEIVED FROM THE IRISH  
GOVERNMENT (PRESUMABLY THE SAME ONE NOTED IN REFTTEL),  
HILL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DUBLIN HAS BEEN FRANK IN  
EXPRESSING ITS RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE ROLE OF AN  
ELECTED BODY IN THE PEACE PROCESS. HOWEVER, HE POINTED  
OUT, DUBLIN HAS NOT RULED OUT AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY  
UNDER ANY AND ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AND HAS NOTED ITS  
WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS ON THEIR MERITS. IT  
REMAINS OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ELECTION IF IRISH  
CONCERNS ABOUT AN ASSEMBLY'S REMIT AND AGENDA, THE ROLE  
OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE INCLUSION OF ALL THREE  
STRANDS AND SO FORTH ARE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED. HILL  
SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHARES THESE CONCERNS.  
THERE IS NO CURRENT PROPOSAL WHICH MEETS THESE CRITERIA  
SO, IF THE EFFORT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, THE TASK MUST BE  
TO CONSTRUCT A PLAN THAT DOES MEET THOSE CONCERNS  
WITHOUT LOSING THE SUPPORT OF UNIONIST PROPONENTS.
  
5. (C) THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS CITED THE "POLARIZING"  
EFFECT THAT AN ELECTION AND AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN MIGHT  
HAVE ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PROCESS AS A  
REASON TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT PROCEEDING WITH THE ASSEMBLY  
NOTION. HOWEVER, STEPHENS SAID, THE ELECTION ISSUE  
ALREADY HAS BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE AND A DECISION TO  
IGNORE IT ALSO WOULD BE POLARIZING. PICKING UP ON A GOLF  
METAPHOR, HE AGREED THAT "WE MUST PLAY THE BALL WHERE IT  
LIES."

LIES."

6. (S) HILL SAID IT IS HMG'S VIEW THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE UNIONISTS, HAVE AN INTEREST IN GETTING INTO SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL TALKS. THUS, THE POLITICAL PARTIES' ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER THOSE TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT A ROUND TABLE OR IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ELECTED BODY ARE IN LARGE MEASURE ABOUT SEEKING PARTISAN ADVANTAGE IN THE PROCESS. IT IS NOT A BLACK AND WHITE, NATIONALIST VERSUS UNIONIST, QUESTION; THERE ARE MANY SHADES OF GRAY WHICH MUST BE SORTED OUT.

#### A REVIEW OF PROPOSALS

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7. (S) AFTER REVIEWING THE UNFRUITFUL EXPERIENCES OF 1975 ASSEMBLY WHICH FOLLOWED THE COLLAPSE OF THE POWERSHARING ARRANGEMENT, THE 1982-86 ASSEMBLY WHICH DEGENERATED INTO AN EXCLUSIVELY UNIONIST BODY AFTER THE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 000537

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SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG IDEAS ON ELECTED ASSEMBLY

SDLP REFUSED TO TAKE UP ITS SEATS, AND THE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND FOUR MAIN PARTIES IN 1991-92, HILL BRIEFLY SKETCHED OUT THE PARTIES' MAIN PROPOSALS. ALL THE PROPOSALS ASSUME AN ASSEMBLY WOULD MEET FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, PERHAPS ONE OR TWO YEARS. THE ALLIANCE PARTY'S IDEAS, CHARACTERISTICALLY, ARE THE MOST FLEXIBLE AND LEAST DEFINED. ALDERDICE HAS PROPOSED A NEGOTIATING CONVENTION THAT WOULD RELATE TO ALL THREE STRANDS AND INVOLVE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE UUP MODEL POSITS A DELIBERATIVE BODY WHICH WOULD MEET IN PLENARY. COMMITTEES REPORTING TO THE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE THE MAIN WORKING ELEMENTS, TAKING EVIDENCE AND ISSUING RECOMMENDATIONS. TRIMBLE ENVISAGES COMMITTEES COULD "TAKE EVIDENCE" FROM THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AS A WAY TO ENCOMPASS THE NORTH-SOUTH STRAND. THE UUP HAS DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "MEETING" SINN FEIN IN AN ASSEMBLY AND "NEGOTIATING" WITH IT THERE. TRIMBLE INSISTS THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THE ASSEMBLY UNLESS A START TO DECOMMISSIONING TAKES PLACE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INCENTIVE FOR NATIONALISTS TO ENTER THE ASSEMBLY UNLESS IT PROVIDES A FORUM FOR NEGOTIATION. HILL POINTED OUT THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEETING AND NEGOTIATING IS NOT CLEAR AND THIS MAY BE TRIMBLE'S EFFORT AT A "FUDGE." THE DUP PLAN ALSO SEEKS TO CREATE A

EFFORT AT A "FUDGE." THE DUP PLAN ALSO SEEKS TO CREATE A ELIBERATIVE ELECTED BODY. ALTHOUGH THE DUP PROPOSAL DOES NOT INCLUDE A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION, IT HAS RECENTLY MODIFIED ITS PLAN TO CALL FOR VOTING ON A PARTY LIST BASIS, IN PART TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SDLP CONCERNS.

8. (Ø) DESCRIBING THE UUP AND DUP PROPOSALS AS "NON-RUNNERS" AS CURRENTLY CONSTRUCTED, HILL SAID THE ONLY CONCRETE IDEA THAT HMG ACCEPTS AT THIS TIME IS THAT AN ASSEMBLY LIKELY WOULD CONSIST OF 90 MEMBERS. FIVE MEMBERS WOULD BE ELECTED ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS FROM EACH OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S 18 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS. DETAILS OF HOW THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED, SUCH AS WHETHER BALLOTS WOULD BE CAST FOR PARTY LISTS OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES, REMAIN TO BE EXPLORED.

#### ISSUES FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION

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9. (Ø) NOTING THE PROBLEMS WITH AND OBJECTIONS TO THE VARIOUS MODELS, HILL SAID THAT SOME SORT OF SYNTHESIS WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE TO ADDRESSES THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

-- FORMAT: WOULD THE ELECTION CREATE AN "ASSEMBLY" OR "CONVENTION" TO MEET IN A QUASI-LEGISLATIVE ROLE TO DISCUSS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OR WOULD ELECTION TALLIES SIMPLY SERVE AS AN "INDEX" OF THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AT THE ROUND TABLE. RATHER THAN MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION, COULD THE PLENARY MEET ONLY TWO OR THREE TIMES OVER THE COURSE OF ITS TERM TO RATIFY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN COMMITTEE OR AT A ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATION? HMG LIKELY WOULD FAVOR THE LATTER COURSE AS, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, IT BELIEVES COMMITTEES WOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE.

-- MAJORITY VOTE OR CONSENSUS DECISIONMAKING: HOW WILL DECISIONS BE TAKEN? ALTHOUGH PROPORTIONAL BALLOTING WILL HELP ADDRESS NATIONALIST CONCERNS ABOUT UNDER REPRESENTATION, UNIONISTS STILL LIKELY WOULD TAKE A MAJORITY OF THE SEATS. THE CONSENSUS-BASED PROCESS AND THE "NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED" FORMULA OF THE 1991-92 NEGOTIATIONS WORKED WELL. HOWEVER, A CONSENSUS SYSTEM IN A BODY WITH 90 MEMBERS LIKELY WOULD RESULT IN DEADLOCK. IS IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE MAJORITY RULE IN PLENARY BUT DECISION BY CONSENSUS IN COMMITTEE? OW WILL COMMITTEE CHAIRS BE ALLOCATED?

-- CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENTS: THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT SUBROGATE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS TO A NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY. NOR DO THEY BELIEVE THAT STRAND ONE

IRELAND ASSEMBLY. NOR DO THEY BELIEVE THAT STRAND ONE TAKES PRIMACY OVER THE NORTH-SOUTH AND EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIPS. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE CONVINCED THEY MUST KEEP CONTROL OF THE PROCESS AND SET THE PACE FOR IT. TRIMBLE'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ASSEMBLY COULD "TAKE EVIDENCE" FROM DUBLIN IS NOT ENOUGH, SO SOME MECHANISM FOR MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE THREE-STRANDED PROCESS MUST BE DEVELOPED.

-- INVOLVEMENT OF LOYALIST PARTIES: HMG BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE SMALL LOYALIST PARTIES REPRESENTED IN ANY ASSEMBLY, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CEASEFIRE. BOTH PARTIES IN THE PAST HAVE ADVOCATED AN ELECTED BODY, BUT APPEAR TO BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS PROMPTED BY CONCERNS THAT THEY MAY NOT WIN ANY SEATS. AT BEST, THE PUP AND UDP COULD WIN ONE SEAT EACH AND ARE MORE LIKELY TO TAKE BUT ONE BETWEEN THEM. SHOULD SOME ARRANGEMENT BE MADE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH MINIMAL

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REPRESENTATION? (THE WORKERS PARTY IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY SEATS.)

-- TIMING: AN ELECTION COULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN TIME TO MEET THE MID-FEBRUARY TIMETABLE SET OUT IN THE NOV 28 JOINT DECLARATION. ENABLING LEGISLATION FROM THE WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENT AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, AND IN ADDITION THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADEQUATE TIME ALLOWED FOR A CAMPAIGN. THUS, NIO ESTIMATES THAT JUNE 1996 WOULD BE THE EARLIEST AN ELECTION COULD BE HELD. HOW COULD THE PROCESS BE SUSTAINED UNTIL THEN?

-- VENUE: HILL SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEET AT STORMONT. IN FACT, AS RECONSTRUCTION TO REPAIR FIRE DAMAGE TO THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING IS NOT COMPLETE, THE ASSEMBLY PHYSICALLY COULD NOT MEET IN THE OLD STORMONT LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS. GIVEN THE PAST ASSOCIATIONS AND SYMBOLISM, THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A BAD THING. ADJACENT TO NIO OFFICES AT STORMONT CASTLE (AS DISTINCT FROM THE OLD PARLIAMENT FURTHER UP THE HILL) ARE CONFERENCE ROOMS AND OFFICES WHICH COULD SUPPORT COMMITTEE WORK AND OCCASIONAL PLENARY SESSIONS, BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE ADEQUATE IF THE ASSEMBLY WERE TO MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION. THE

ASSEMBLY WERE TO MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION. THE QUESTION OF VENUE REMAINS OPEN.

TIMETABLE FOR NEXT STEPS  
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10. (C) STEPHENS SAID BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WILL MAKE NEXT WEEK. HE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SATISFIED WITH HIS SESSION WITH THE COMMISSION LAST WEEK. ALTHOUGH THE TOPIC OF ELECTIONS WAS RAISED IN THAT SESSION, STEPHENS SAID HMG CONSIDERS THAT ISSUE TO BE PART OF THE POLITICAL TRACK AND OUTSIDE SENATOR MITCHELL'S REMIT. IF THE COMMISSION DOES TOUCH ON AN ELECTED BODY, GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED, HMG HOPES THAT ITS RECOMMENDATION WILL AVOID SPECIFICS THAT ARE BETTER ADDRESSED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE REAFFIRMED THAT WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE COMMISSION MAKES WILL BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR MERITS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

11. (C) THE MID-FEBRUARY SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH IS THE NEXT ACTION-FORCING EVENT. AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ISSUES ITS REPORT, HMG EXPECTS TO CONDUCT ANOTHER ROUND OF POLITICAL TRACK MEETINGS WITH THE PARTIES TO TAKE SOUNDINGS. BASED ON THOSE SOUNDINGS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A DECISION ON HOW FAST AND HARD TO PUSH THE ELECTION PROPOSAL. HILL SAID HMG OFFICIALS LIKELY WILL WORK WITH THEIR IRISH COLLEAGUES TO HAVE A MODEL READY ON WHICH THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE A POLITICAL JUDGMENT.

12. (C) COMMENT: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT TRIMBLE'S OFT-STATED VIEW THAT THE TWIN-TRACK APPROACH WILL FALTER WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL BODY FAILS TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES ON WASHINGTON THREE, AND THAT AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY IS THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP MOMENTUM IN THE PEACE PROCESS AFTER MID-FEBRUARY. BUT IT DOES SEE THE ASSEMBLY IDEA AS A USEFUL WAY TO KEEP UNIONISTS ENGAGED, IF PROPOSALS CAN BE DEvised WHICH ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NATIONALIST CONCERNS. HMG RECOGNIZES THAT EXISTING PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO BE XTENSIVELY MODIFIED AND HAS NOT MADE ANY BINDING DECISIONS ON WHETHER AND HOW TO PROCEED. IT REMAINS IN SYNCH WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN THOUGH LONDON CLEARLY IS LEANING FARTHER FORWARD THAN IS DUBLIN. END COMMENT.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Report of International Body on Weapons Decommissioning

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.61)  
KBH 4/11/2023

The final report of the international body set up under the twin-track process to look into decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons will be made public January 24. It was submitted to the British and Irish Governments January 22. Senator Mitchell, who chaired the body, has briefed me on the contents of the report.

In essence, the report recommends that acceptance by the parties of a set of principles and commitments be allowed to substitute for prior decommissioning as the condition for convening talks. The report will suggest, rather than recommend, that decommissioning take place during talks, a compromise which is unacceptable to both the British Government and Sinn Fein.

Mitchell told me that virtually no one believes it is feasible to insist that paramilitaries hand over even a token number of weapons before talks begin. Instead, Sinn Fein and the loyalist parties would commit to:

- use exclusively democratic and peaceful means of influencing politics;
- renounce and oppose the use or threat of violence;
- accept total and verifiable decommissioning in the context of a political settlement;
- abide by the outcome of the negotiations;
- use exclusively democratic and peaceful means in the event one party is not satisfied with an eventual agreement on Northern Ireland's constitutional status; and
- help stop punishment killings and beatings.

Sinn Fein is likely to react negatively to the suggestion that it must take further steps to prove its democratic credentials before talks can be held. Both Sinn Fein and the loyalists may have trouble getting their paramilitary colleagues to agree to

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Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 1/23/06

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

abide by the outcome of negotiations. No one will be completely happy with the report, but the British Government will be the least satisfied because the Mitchell body so clearly found against its insistence on prior decommissioning.

The international body's report is not by itself going to break the impasse and get all-party talks going. Mitchell believes, and I agree, that without prior decommissioning, the UUP's David Trimble is going to insist on some variation of his elected assembly idea as the price for entering talks. That concept is anathema to the SDLP's John Hume, opposed by Sinn Fein, and viewed with suspicion in Dublin. Even if agreement to hold elections is reached, it will mean a delay of several months in the process. But that is the essential tradeoff: in return for "winning" on prior decommissioning, the nationalists need to accept some kind of elective process as well as the principles recommended by the Mitchell body.

We will issue a statement on January 24 warmly welcoming the international body's report and thanking Senator Mitchell and his colleagues for their contribution to the peace process. I will be making a series of phone calls: to John Holmes in Major's office; to Dick Spring in Dublin; and to Adams, Trimble and Hume. I will urge all of them to put as positive a spin on the report as possible and not to foreclose their options at this point. We will underscore that the international body was only one of the twin tracks and that progress needs to be made in the political track as well.

We expect a procession of visitors to come to Washington in the next few weeks to consult with us before the Major-Bruton summit in mid-February at which the two governments will decide whether/how to go forward. I will recommend you see Spring and Trimble (drop-bys only). Trimble is in the strongest position at present, in part because of Major's dwindling majority in Parliament, and therefore needs the most encouragement to compromise.

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**2011-0855-F (4.62)  
KBH 4/11/2013

January 17, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS *MAP*

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland Peace Process: Getting to Talks

Following is a menu of elements of a possible deal that would allow all-party talks to take place within the next several months. Depending on Senator Mitchell's thinking, you may want to start discussing possible outcomes with Paddy Teahon and John Holmes this week. When you talk to Adams on Thursday, you may want to sound him out on a no-more-violence statement and accepting the consent principle. You could also float the various elections options, though it is risky to suggest the referendum/no assembly option until we know whether it has any chance with Trimble.

**Elected Assembly/Elections for All-Party Talks**

Trimble originally had in mind a 90-member debating society with a 2-year term as a substitute for all-party talks, but he now appears to be flexible on the number of members and the term. Paisley's version would be a negotiating body that would in fact constitute the "internal solution" so repugnant to nationalists. No one is actually proposing a return to an internal Northern Ireland legislative body à la Stormont.

What concerns Dublin and the nationalists most is the expectation that the assembly would make decisions about the future of Northern Ireland without the participation or approval of the Irish Government. Thus Dublin would insist that the role of the two governments in an eventual settlement be reaffirmed, along with the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." The nationalists also fear that elections would imply acceptance of majoritarianism (proportionalism) for the purpose of negotiations, and they would want reassurance that negotiations would be held on the basis of "parity of esteem" with all parties having equal weight. (Elections would highlight the apparent inequity of giving parties that receive different

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percentages of the vote the same status at the negotiating table.) Finally, there are practical problems with an elected assembly, such as how many seats it will have, what electoral system to use and how long it will take to hold elections.

There are a number of possible alternatives to the Trimble and Paisley concepts that might be acceptable to the nationalists if these concerns were taken into account:

**Option 1:** Hold a vote to determine which parties will be invited to participate in all-party talks, with the cutoff set low enough (8%?) to assure that both Sinn Fein and the Alliance make it. Voters would be asked simply to vote for the party they want to represent them in all-party talks. Trimble would not get his assembly, but he would get Sinn Fein to seek a democratic mandate, and the vote would serve as a reminder that the UUP is the largest party in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, any cutoff percentage would probably rule out loyalist participation in the talks.

**Option 1A:** Same as above but voters would also be asked whether they favor having an elected assembly.

**Option 2:** Hold elections for representatives to an assembly that would begin work at the same time all-party talks commence. The assembly could form committees to hold hearings on specific issues, including increased North-South cooperation, or it could serve to debate the issues publicly while they are being discussed behind closed doors in the all-party talks. This would resolve some nationalist concerns about an internal solution because the talks and the assembly would be completely separate. To make this option work, unionists would have to be convinced that the assembly had real, important work to do.

**Option 2A:** Same as above, except the assembly's first act would be to ratify the delegations to the all-party talks. This would increase the legitimacy of the talks in unionist eyes.

**Option 3:** Hold elections to an assembly that then becomes the negotiating body (for instance by designating a committee). The nationalist concerns outlined above are most relevant to this option.

#### **Progress on Decommissioning**

**Commitment in Principle to Progress on Decommissioning During Talks:** This would allow talks to get started, but it would commit Sinn Fein/IRA to take some action on decommissioning before the final political settlement is reached, which has always been unacceptable to them. The less specific and binding

the commitment, the more palatable it might be to Sinn Fein, but the less persuasive it would be to the unionists.

***Commitment to Decommission at a Certain Point in the Process:***

Sinn Fein's current position is that decommissioning/destruction of weapons can take place once a political settlement is reached, in the context of the total disarmament of Northern Ireland. That may mean that the IRA would not decommission if the political settlement did not include the removal of all British troops and relinquishing of weapons held legally by private citizens (mostly Protestants). A commitment to decommission at an earlier point in the process would be a step forward. However, it is hard to define a point between the beginning of talks and the conclusion of an agreement, unless you set a date.

***More Specifics on Modalities:*** In its submission to the international body, Sinn Fein said that, in connection with a political settlement and the total disarmament of Northern Ireland, paramilitaries could destroy their own weapons, subject to third-party verification. Further elaboration of this idea would make Sinn Fein/IRA's commitment to eventual decommissioning more believable and help ease unionist concerns. Key questions are who would do the verifying and how. Church of Ireland (Anglican) Archbishop Eames has already offered to help with verification. A detailed modalities plan coupled with the commitment in principle might carry some weight with unionists.

***Destruction of Some IRA Weapons:*** A voluntary "gesture" by Sinn Fein, presumably the destruction of some weapons verified by an unimpeachable person, would make it difficult for the British Government not to convene talks.

***Destruction of Some Loyalist Weapons:*** The loyalists refused Trimble's challenge to put Sinn Fein/IRA on the spot by making a decommissioning gestures of their own (a safe bet by Trimble, since the loyalist position is also that decommissioning cannot take place prior to a political settlement). If the loyalists were to change their minds, it would put pressure on Sinn Fein/IRA to follow suit.

***Simultaneous Gesture/Talks:*** The British would like to see the commission recommend a start to decommissioning in tandem with the start of talks. This would amount to taking the "pre" out of pre-condition, but otherwise leaving Washington 3 intact. It is conceivable that Sinn Fein/IRA would agree to this if it meant that the elected assembly idea would be dropped. The "gesture" would have to be made voluntarily and would involve the destruction, rather than the handover, of weapons.

### Statements Forswearing Violence

The IRA has yet to match the "no first use" of violence statement issued by the Combined Loyalist Military Command, nor has Sinn Fein ever made an unequivocal public statement that there are no circumstances under which it would countenance a return to violence. Not only would such statements be difficult for IRA/Sinn Fein to make (because of the tradition of armed struggle dating back to 1798) but unionists would be highly skeptical in light of the recent drug-related murders. The farthest Sinn Fein has gone was Adams' statement of October 9 pledging that the threat of violence would not be used by republicans in all-party negotiations. "It is self evident that threats of any description from any quarter have no role in any such process. They are certainly no part of any talks in which we will engage," is the most quotable part of the statement.

### End to Punishment Beatings/Murders

An end to the punishment murders is a *sine qua non* for unionist participation in all-party talks. An end to punishment beatings would create confidence, but not until a significant period of time had elapsed without an incident.

### Acceptance of Consent

Sinn Fein has not accepted the principle of consent enshrined in the Downing Street Declaration and the Joint Framework Document. They still see consent as an unacceptable "unionist veto" over the future of Ireland, which they regard as a single entity. They will not use the word "consent," nor have they agreed that a referendum of the people of Northern Ireland would have independent validity. What Sinn Fein has done is moderate their rhetoric markedly and acknowledge that a settlement would require unionist participation. If Sinn Fein were to acknowledge that, as a practical matter, the status of Northern Ireland can only be changed with the consent of a majority of the people there, that would be a significant confidence-building measure.

### Amending Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution

This would be major overture to unionists by the Irish Government and would make the cross-border element of an eventual solution easier for unionists to swallow. Dublin has agreed to modify the Constitution in the context of an overall settlement and would be reluctant to give up that leverage before all-party talks even commence.

### Confidence-Building Measures by HMG

**Civil Rights:** The most important step London could take would be to repeal the emergency legislation that suspends the rights of suspects arrested for terrorist crimes. That legislation was renewed by Parliament last fall. Similar legislation is on the books in Ireland too and presumably would also have to be repealed.

**Prisoners:** HMG could further reduce the remission rate for paramilitary prisoners (unlikely so soon after the reduction last year) or ease the conditions in which paramilitary prisoners are kept.

**Security Measures:** The British could further reduce the number of checkpoints and other security measures in effect.

**Withdraw Troops:** They could also rotate additional roulement battalions back to Britain. (Those are the battalions sent to Northern Ireland specifically to combat the Troubles, as opposed to the troops normally based there and the National Guard equivalents.)

**Policing:** The British could make the white paper meaningful and substantive by proposing changes to the RUC that would attract more Catholics to the ranks. There may be other CBMs related to policing that could be undertaken (community meetings, community questionnaires), though any measures designed to increase the Catholic community's willingness to depend on the RUC for law enforcement would be opposed by Sinn Fein.

SODERBERG/DURKIN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
23 March 1996

Durkin: We've been asked to declare ourselves on elections and a body versus negotiations. Hunch is we will stand in elections. We want to stick by February 28 announcement -- elections leading to negotiations without further preconditions.

Unionists will go to forum not negotiations. Our fear is you have bi-cameral negotiations - opt in and out of one. Major trying to use referendum as a trade off for us getting into forum.

Lot of anger in our support base. We need to keep them from drawing a line in the sand.

Regarding Sinn Fein -- all previous understanding was gone. Will try and use recent events to justify Canary Wharf.

Ancram and Mayhew were dishonest. Said they didn't want forum. Presented as occupational therapy. That's why we like our proposal -- just present chairs at the table 13-21 percent seats above 21 to 6 seats etc.

Unionists saying won't negotiate on basis of proportion. Elective process we had less than 40 negotiators. Would have ensured smaller parties. We can't rely on Dublin, London, or D.C. Why did U.S. welcome the British announcement on 21 March? We're just going to have to go on our own. It will only take a small amendment to give forum powers.

Unionists have option to leave negotiations and be in body. So were better off saying we won't go into body. In '92 Unionists proposed an assembly or committee system, elected as modified list systems. If we accept that, hard to argue as unacceptable later. We're being asked to agree to a predetermined outcome.

Soderberg: What was your reaction to British paper on ground rules for negotiations?

Durkin: No details on how the elections get to the negotiations. We were relatively happy about it. Then Ancram made it clear not final. Unionists saying not going into negotiations on basis of that document since 28th, still not welcomed talks.

Governments have to make clear announcement on February 28th stands -- no further preconditions, subject to ground rules paper. People aren't going to stop negotiations by staying out.

If governments are saying that negotiations are going ahead regardless. Need to be made clear. Government is saying we have to go through elections and forum to go to negotiations. Referendum was in announcement made on February 28; now its been ditched for a forum.

If negotiations are going forward -- regardless of whether SDLP is in body. We can't veto things by opting out but unionists can.

Major accused us of threatening boycotting -- best chance for peace.

All left to London; still don't' know why Dublin did that. We can't rely on Dublin or U.S.

Need no requirement to participate in body to participate on negotiations.

Encourage Brits to make clear no requirement to be in forum, that negotiations will go forward regardless.

Major told Paisley that they'd have to sign up to Mitchell principles and give monthly installment of weapons. Even Paisley laughed at that.

Ulster Unionists will join and say even if two governments say they are satisfied they're not and stay out of negotiations.

Brits shouldn't think they can trade that forum for a referendum.

Strand #1 chaired by British. We've conceded that. Others staying we should recover that.

Strand 2: Unionists won't sit in talks that are co-chaired by Irish and British. Won't accept joint authority. So independent chair avoids predetermining outcome.

Strand 3: Spring and Mayhem run.

Unionists: Already ruling out Mitchell because of Martha greeting Adams at dinner.

Perhaps need a special channel on decommissioning -- Stephens, Mitchell-DeChestelain.

Strand 4: People starting to talk about it.

Re Dublin --- re body - Dublin is just saying body issue for Northern Ireland parties. They are focusing on negotiations. Dublin hopefully will be putting up fight to retain most of what's in consultations paper.

Unionists been told by British can bring back suggestions on paper. We've already indicated a broad degree of satisfaction.

Ends up British again get last word. Big test is whether Dublin keeps that paper in tact. If don't, game, set, match for Unionist.

Any violence from IRA and INLA no excuse.

Mood really hardening in nationalist community, aimed at Dublin, Major, Mayhew, even Blair. Blair's running about saying Major can't be trusted, but then stands up and praises Northern Ireland.

There is a danger of INLA going off for a spectacular argument at loyalist targets and loyalists responding.

On January 24, Major said elections would build confidence. Hope he sees on March 24, they don't.

Scrap about negotiations ground rules. Need to clarify how get from elections to negotiations. Need to clarify question of decommissioning.

I think Sinn Fein can live with Mitchell. But depends on conditions. Don't look good now.

Body language of Brits -- can't stand to be in same room with us. They say they know your fear will be a return to Stormont - we say it is not. The issue is you are giving the Unionists what they want.

Hard to see how any of these issues will get easier. People will flex muscles on decommissioning, ground rules on negotiations.

We want to be in position to able to work February 28 Communiqué.

file

Memorandum of Conversation

John Hume and Tony Lake, March 23, 1996 12:15pm

Hume: Disastrous, complete mess. Brits are playing very strange game. All we asked for was all-party talks. Unionists are now going to block everything.

Lake: Talks are by consensus.

Hume: Unionists will use the forum and ask for majority votes. Government will not act because all majority says don't want it. We wanted all negotiators at the table. They're trying to get things before talks. Mood in the street is bad. See this as disastrous. This is not the way to get talks going. A few months ago, all we needed was a date for talks. They don't even talk privately with us. Present bunch never even talk to us. Very serious, Tony.

Lake: We all have to be driven by one imperative -- getting talks going.

Hume: Agree. Need talks.

Lake: The hoops are unfortunate, but you have a firm date and they will insulate talks from the forum. Working on statement you mentioned. We're so close - have date. Have to get through elections.

Hume: Don't know about that. Elections are about getting their forum. We won't go down roads that don't lead in the right directions. Forum will pass resolutions and they won't go to talks. Cease-fire will be harder after last few days.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Reply to Message from Prime Minister Major on  
Northern Ireland

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.45)  
KBM 4/11/2023

Purpose

To advise Major that nationalist confidence in the peace process is low following his March 21 announcement of an election plan and to suggest that involving Senator Mitchell could bolster confidence in the process.

Background

Prime Minister Major sent you a message on March 20 previewing his announcement the following day of an election in Northern Ireland on May 30 leading to an elected forum independent of the negotiations that begin June 10. None of the Northern Ireland parties liked the "hybrid" electoral system HMG chose, though the unionists dislike it less than the nationalists.

In recent conversations, Hume and Adams and their colleagues have been very distrustful of unionist and British intentions, fearing that the forum will be allowed to control the negotiations and that unionists will prevent discussion of substantive issues until they are satisfied on decommissioning. In addition to reassurance on their specific concerns, one step that could boost nationalist confidence would be the announcement of a role for Senator Mitchell in the talks. Senator Mitchell is amenable to this proposal, and your message to Major offers Mitchell's services.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Major at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Draft Message to Prime Minister Major  
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO: THE CABINET OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.66)  
KRH 4/14/2023

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND -- MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK OUTLINING THE METHOD TO BE USED FOR THE ELECTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE FUNCTION OF THE RESULTING FORUM. AS YOU KNOW, WE WELCOMED YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT AS A FURTHER STEP TOWARD THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BEGINNING JUNE 10. WE ARE TAKING THE POSITION THAT ALL THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE TALKS. TONY LAKE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH JOHN HUME AND GERRY ADAMS WITH THIS MESSAGE. LAST FRIDAY, I ALSO HAD A CHANCE TO SEE IAN PAISLEY, WHO SEEMED FAIRLY UPBEAT ABOUT THE WHOLE PROCESS.

I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY THE MOOD IN THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY, WHICH IS MORE DEPRESSED AND DISCOURAGED THAN AT ANY TIME WE CAN RECALL. I THINK THERE IS A NEED TO ENGAGE THE NATIONALISTS DIRECTLY ON THEIR CONCERNS AND TO TAKE STEPS TO REASSURE THEM ABOUT THE SCOPE AND AIM OF THE TALKS THAT BEGIN JUNE 10. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISSUE FOR THEM IS ONE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE TALKS WILL HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE, SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA AND NOT BE DERAILED OVER THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE. THERE IS ALSO CONCERN, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ALLAYED BY DAVID TRIMBLE'S RECENT STATEMENTS, THAT THE UNIONISTS WILL SEEK TO USE THE FORUM TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS OR AS AN EXCUSE NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS.

I SEE THE PROCESS YOU AND JOHN BRUTON HAVE LAUNCHED AS A WAY TO GET ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT, AFTER YEARS OF SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION AND BOYCOTTS BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SDLP AND SINN FEIN TO PARTICIPATE IN BOTH THE ELECTION AND THE FORUM. OF COURSE THE UNIONIST PARTIES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE INDEPENDENT OF THE FORUM AND THAT THEY MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS IF THE VOICE OF THEIR VOTERS IS TO BE HEARD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify on: 3/26/06

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

AS YOU AND JOHN MOVE AHEAD WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TALKS, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER WHETHER GEORGE MITCHELL COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE TALKS, AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NORTH-SOUTH STRAND OF NEGOTIATIONS OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE, WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR BOTH SIDES. NATIONALISTS AND UNIONISTS BOTH WELCOMED THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY AND SEE IT AS A BASIS FOR CREATING THE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST NECESSARY TO MOVE FORWARD. I HAVE NOT YET BROACHED THIS WITH GEORGE BUT IF YOU AND JOHN WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON HIM AGAIN, I WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASK HIM TO TAKE ON YET ANOTHER HERCULEAN TASK.

YOU HAVE MY FULL SUPPORT AS YOU MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS PROCESS.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: British Decision on Election in Northern Ireland

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.70)  
KBH 4/11/2023

On March 21, Prime Minister Major will announce an election, to be held in Northern Ireland on May 30, to give political parties a mandate for the substantive talks that begin June 10. He wrote to you March 20 describing the details of the elective process and asking you to use our influence to keep all the parties, particularly John Hume's SDLP, engaged. We will draft a reply once the announcement has been made and we have an initial reaction from the Irish Government and the parties. We are working behind the scenes to help persuade Hume not to boycott the election and will be in touch with other party leaders as well.

Under the British scheme, ninety representatives will be elected by the party-list method in the 18 Westminster constituencies, five from each constituency. In addition, each of the ten largest parties will send two representatives to the elected body, for a total of 110 members. This is intended as a compromise between the constituency-based, single-transferable-vote system favored by the UUP and the province-wide, party-list system favored by Hume's SDLP and Paisley's DUP, but it is unlikely to satisfy either.

The forum that will result will not be the negotiating body, as Trimble originally wanted, nor will it have any legislative or administrative powers. It will be able to form committees and hold hearings on issues relevant to the negotiations if tasked by the negotiators. The nationalists, led by John Hume, will see the British decision as tilting to the unionist position on both the election and the forum. Hume has threatened to boycott a similar form of elections, but we hope he can be brought around.

The missing piece of the process is the ground rules for the talks, which are still under discussion with the parties. The unionists reacted negatively to a draft consultative paper on ground rules that was distributed last week, accusing the government of selling out the unionists to buy a renewed IRA

cease-fire. The final ground rules may eventually shift to reflect these unionist concerns and be less forthcoming on the central issue of concern to nationalists -- whether progress on decommissioning will become a de facto precondition for substantive negotiations.

Sinn Fein is likely to criticize the British decision, but we have the impression they care less about the details of the electoral method than about the nature of the talks. We hope Hume will be constructive and will be talking to him. We have also been in touch with Gerry Adams. We are still hopeful that the cease-fire can be restored, although the British announcement is likely to magnify republican distrust of HMG.

At Tab A is a draft statement we suggest Mike McCurry use at the press briefing expressing our confidence in the peace process and urging all parties to stay engaged and participate in the election.

Attachments

Tab A Draft Statement  
Tab B Letter from Major

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PAGE 01 OF 02

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO WHITE HOUSE  
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIVACY CHANNELS  
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.74)  
KRM 4/11/2013

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE TO NANCY SODERBERG AT OOB.

THANK YOU FOR SENDING ME THE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT NOW BEING CONSIDERED. I THINK THIS IS A GOOD, BALANCED DOCUMENT WHICH CAN HELP ADVANCE THE PROCESS. I'D LIKE TO OFFER YOU A COUPLE OF BRIEF COMMENTS HERE AND I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING TO YOU LATER TODAY.

THE PHRASE "JUST AND LASTING PEACE" OR "JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT" IS USED THREE TIMES. THIS PHRASE RESONATES PRIMARILY IN THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY, WHERE IT HAS BECOME SOMETHING OF A SLOGAN. ASSUMING ITS INCLUSION IS INTENDED TO REASSURE THAT COMMUNITY, I AM COMFORTABLE WITH SUCH A REFERENCE AND DOUBT THAT ONE WOULD BE CONSIDERED A BIG DEAL BY UNIONISTS. BUT WHEN IT IS USED THREE TIMES, IT DOES BEGIN TO SOUND LIKE A SLOGAN. BRUTON AND MAJOR USED THE TERM "LASTING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT" IN THEIR FEB 28 COMMUNIQUE. IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO USE THAT PHRASE IN THE SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS, WHILE LEAVING "JUST AND LASTING" AS IS IN THE FIRST.

PARA 3 SAYS THE GOAL OF TALKS IS TO "CREATE NEW RELATIONSHIPS" IN THE THREE STRANDS. I THINK WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL HERE TO REMAIN NEUTRAL, IN LINE WITH THE NOTIONS THAT THERE IS NO PREDETERMINED OUTCOME AND THAT WE HAVE NO PREFERRED SOLUTION. I HAVE NOT HEARD FROM THE BRITISH THAT THE GOAL IS TO CREATE NEW RELATIONSHIPS (ALTHOUGH THAT CERTAINLY IS IMPLIED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION). THEY TELL ME THE GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS IS TO "REACH AGREEMENT ON RELATIONSHIPS AND ARRANGEMENTS" IN THE THREE STRANDS. THIS OF COURSE WOULD INCLUDE RELATIONSHIPS WITH ANY NEW INSTITUTIONS THAT MAY BE CREATED, BUT IT DOES NOT PRESUME THEIR CREATION. THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE CONSULTATIVE PAPER RECENTLY ISSUED BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS MAY PROVIDE A USEFUL MODEL.

A SMALLER POINT ABOUT PARA 3, WHICH REFERS TO RELATIONSHIPS "BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE TWO ISLANDS." I BELIEVE STRAND THREE REFERS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO "GOVERNMENTS".

IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE FINAL PARA, THE WORDS "HELP THEM" SHOULD BE INSERTED BETWEEN "TO" AND "SIEZE". AS RECOGNIZED

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PAGE 02 OF 02

IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THAT PARA, WE HAVE NO DIRECT ROLE, ONLY ONE  
TO ASSIST THE PARTIES.

DECL OADR.

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WJ

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG  
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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3728

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(4.75)  
KBM 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 0P+AG AND PETERS

DEPT ALSO FOR S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/15  
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: ANGLO-IRISH EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH NEGOTIATING  
PROCESS; FINESSE ROLE OF SINN FEIN

REF: (A) DUBLIN 718 (B) LONDON 2105

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON: 1.5(B).
2. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY. THE IRISH ARE AWAITING A WRITTEN BRITISH PROPOSAL ON THE WAY FORWARD TO AN ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY EXPECT IT TO FOCUS ON ELECTIONS, BUT ALSO TO INCLUDE SOME FORM OF THE IRISH PROXIMITY TALKS PROPOSAL AND, PERHAPS, ELEMENTS OF JOHN HUME'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ALL-ISLAND REFERENDUM. A SCHEDULE CULMINATING IN TALKS IN MID-MAY HAS BEEN NOTIONALLY PUT FORWARD. MUCH DEPENDS ON THE DETAILS OF A PACKAGE AND THE IRISH ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER ALL PARTIES CAN BE BROUGHT TO AGREEMENT ON THE WAY FORWARD WITHIN THAT TIME FRAME. SINN FEIN IS CRUCIAL TO RESUMPTION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THEIR EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS IS CRUCIAL TO A SETTLEMENT OVER THE LONG-TERM. HOWEVER, SINN FEIN'S NEAR-TERM ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS COULD, PERHAPS, BE FINESSED. END SUMMARY.
3. (U) I MET FEBRUARY 21 WITH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CHIEF SEAN O'HUIGINN WHO BRIEFED ME ON THERESULTS OF THE TWO OFFICIALS-LEVEL MEETINGS WITH SINN FEIN AND ON THE STATUS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP TALKS AIMED AT PRODUCING AN AGREED COMMUNIQUE ON THE WAY FORWARD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT MAY HAVE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS' LIKELY PROPOSAL.

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

IRISH GOVERNMENT-SINN FEIN SUB-MINISTERIAL CONTACTS  
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4. (X) A DELEGATION OF IRISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING O'HUIGINN, MET WITH SINN FEIN ON FEBRUARY 16 AND 19. THE TWO GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO MEET AGAIN FEBRUARY 22. THE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERING AGENDAS THE TWO GROUPS BROUGHT TO THE TABLE. THE IRISH SIDE MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEW THAT THE IRA HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT -- MADE CLEAR IN 1994 -- THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF VIOLENCE AS LONG AS THE PARTIES WERE WORKING SERIOUSLY TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. SINN FEIN PUSHED THE GOVERNMENT FOR A RESTORATION OF MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONTACTS, A MOVE THE IRISH REJECTED NOTING THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TREAT WITH SINN FEIN ON THE SAME BASIS AS DURING THE CEASEFIRE.

5. (X) THOUGH BOTH SIDES AGREED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE THE CEASEFIRE, ADAMS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO NOW. (ADAMS ALSO REITERATED THAT HE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CANARY WHARF BOMB, BUT DID ADMIT THAT HE HAD EXPECTED SOME ACTION AT A LATER DATE.) HE DID SAY HE WAS WILLING TO GO BACK TO THE IRA ON ANY BASIS, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER TO DO SO WITH SOMETHING IN HAND. THE IRISH POINTED OUT THAT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE CEASEFIRE WOULD STRENGTHEN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S VIS-A-VIS THE BRITISH AND LEAD TO A MORE INCLUSIVE PROCESS.

6. (X) THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION BRIEFED SINN FEIN ON THE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS THEY SEE LEADING TO ALL-PARTY TALKS. THE IMPRESSION LEFT WITH THEM WAS THAT A FIXED DATE FOR TALKS COULD BE A KEY TO A RESTORED CEASEFIRE, BUT THAT SUSPICION OF THE BRITISH AFTER THE PERCEIVED LACK OF PROGRESS OVER 17 MONTHS, PLUS THE MORALE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON IRA VOLUNTEERS OF A RENEWED CEASEFIRE COULD TOGETHER STILL BLOCK ANY RENEWED CEASEFIRE. IT COULD BE, HE SUGGESTED, THAT THE ACTUAL START OF ALL-PARTY TALKS WOULD BE NECESSARY.

7. (X) THE SECOND MEETING FOLLOWED MUCH THE SAME PATTERN, BUT THE IRISH SOUGHT TO EXPLORE SINN FEIN'S VIEWS ON THE THREE-STEP PROCESS. ACCORDING TO O'HUIGINN, THE IRISH BELIEVE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR SINN FEIN TO PARTICIPATE IN EVEN PROXIMITY TALKS WITHOUT A RENEWED CEASEFIRE. BUT THE IRISH BELIEVE THAT, DESPITE THEIR NEGATIVE RHETORIC, THE PARTY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN AN ELECTION PROVIDED JOHN

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

HUME IS SUPPORTIVE. (THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH PAT DOHERTY'S COMMENTS TO ME LAST WEEK -- SEE REFTTEL.) TO ALL OF THIS, HOWEVER, SINN FEIN PROVIDED NO CONCLUSIVE COMMENT. MORE POSITIVELY, HOWEVER, GERRY ADAMS DID SAY HE THOUGHT THAT SINN FEIN WOULD ACCEPT THE MITCHELL REPORT'S SIX PRINCIPLES IN RETURN FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS, BUT NOT THE RECOMMENDATION FOR PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP  
-----

8. (C) AT THEIR SECOND POST-CANARY WHARF MEETING, THE IRISH HAD EXPECTED THE BRITISH TO TABLE A PAPER LAYING OUT THEIR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 000899

DEPT PASS NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

DEPT ALSO FOR S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/15

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJET: ANGLO-IRISH EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH NEGOTIATING PROCESS; FINESSE ROLE OF SINN FEIN

VIEWS ON THE WAY FORWARD BASED ON A PROXIMITY TALKS-ELECTIONS-ALL-PARTY TALKS SCENARIO. AS THIS WAS NOT TABLED THE MEETING TENDED TO BE RATHER GENERAL AND INCONCLUSIVE. THE GROUP WILL MEET AGAIN FRIDAY AND HOPES STILL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMUNIQUE FOR RELEASE AT A SUMMIT NEXT WEEK.

-- SUBSTANCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE

9. (C) O'HUIGINN REPORTED THAT THE IRISH HAVE SENT A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TO LONDON. IT BEGINS WITH A STATEMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO CALL ALL-PARTY TALKS BY A DATE CERTAIN (AND THE NOTIONAL DATE IS MAY 15, EIGHT WEEKS AFTER THE PROPOSED ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT NEXT WEEK). THE IRISH WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS STATEMENT AS SOLID AS POSSIBLE. THE DRAFT THEN PROPOSES PROXIMITY TALKS (IN EARLY MARCH) TO FINALIZE DETAILS OF AN ELECTION PROCESS (IN LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY). O'HUIGINN NOTED THAT MANY OF THE OFFICIALS ENGAGED IN THE LIAISON GROUP FIND THE NOTIONAL TIME-TABLE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC, BUT SAID THAT JOHN MAJOR IS NOW CLEARLY SEIZED WITH THE URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM.

10. (C) O'HUIGINN NOTED THAT THERE WAS A BUILT IN TENSION BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO MOVE QUICKLY AND THE NEED TO ENSURE

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

AN INCLUSIVE PROCESS THAT WAS AGREED BY ALL PARTIES -- ESSENTIAL IF THE PROCESS IS TO SUCCEED. IF THE COMMUNIQUE IS TOO DETAILED ON THE FORM OF PROXIMITY TALKS, ELECTIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS IT COULD EASILY MEET WITH REJECTION. IF VAGUE, THESE SAME ISSUES WITH DETAIL COULD DEADLOCK PROXIMITY TALKS CALLED TO SETTLE THEM. HE OFFERED NO MAGIC FORMULA TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT.

## -- PROXIMITY TALKS

11. (✓) AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF PROXIMITY TALKS WOULD BE, AS NOTED, TO AGREE ON THE MODALITIES FOR AN ELECTION AND NEGOTIATIONS (IN SO FAR AS THEY WERE NOT ALREADY AGREED BY THE GOVERNMENTS AND ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES). THE IRISH WOULD ALSO HOPE TO INCLUDE SINN FEIN, THOUGH THEY (SEE PARA 7 ABOVE) RECOGNIZE THAT ABSENT A CEASEFIRE THIS IS PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE. SINCE O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A CEASEFIRE BEFORE THE NOTIONAL EARLY MARCH DATE FOR TALKS ARE SLIM TO NONE, THE IMPLICATION IS THAT THE IRISH ARE PREPARED TO PURSUE PROXIMITY TALKS WITHOUT SINN FEIN PRESENT. (SOME PRESS COMMENT HAS SUGGESTED THAT, THOUGH SINN FEIN MIGHT NOT BE FORMALLY INCLUDED, OTHER PARTIES COULD AGREE TO KEEP SINN FEIN APPRISED OF THE CONTENT OF PROXIMITY TALKS AND ENSURE THAT SINN FEIN'S VIEWS ARE REPRESENTED.)

## -- ELECTIONS

12. (✓) THE IRISH, O'HUIGINN REPEATEDLY STRESSED, DO NOT SEE ANY WAY AROUND ELECTIONS, THOUGH THEY REMAIN UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA, WHICH THEY FEAR WILL CREATE A CONFRONTATIONAL ATMOSPHERE JUST BEFORE THE START OF ALL-PARTY TALKS. MOREOVER, RANK-AND-FILE SDLP AND SINN FEIN MEMBERS ECHO THEIR LEADERS' REJECTION OF ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, THE UNIONISTS WILL INSIST ON A "RITUAL REAFFIRMATION" OF THE WELL-KNOWN FACT THAT THEY HAVE A MAJORITY IN THE NORTH. JOHN MAJOR, BOTH BECAUSE OF UNIONIST PRESSURE AND TO SHOW THAT HE HAS NOT MADE CONCESSIONS TO VIOLENCE, MUST PURSUE A POLICY CONSISTENT WITH THAT BEFORE CANARY WHARF.

13. (✓) THERE ARE NOW A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE FORMS WHICH AN ELECTION COULD TAKE. JOHN HUME HAS SAID ONLY THAT HE COULD SUPPORT AN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENDUM IDEA

THAT

SIMPLY ASKED VOTERS TO INDICATE WHOM THEY WOULD LIKE TO REPRESENT THEM AT ALL-PARTY TALKS. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN CONSTITUENCIES IS POPULAR WITH THE UUP --

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

-- THOUGH THE FRINGE UNIONIST PARTIES WERE NOT KEEN AT ALL ON ELECTIONS, WHICH COULD CUT THEM OUT OF THE PROCESS. O'HUIGINN INDICATED CONSIDERABLE IRISH GOVERNMENT FLEXIBILITY ON THE FORM OF ELECTIONS, BUT CAUTIONED THAT GROUPS LIKE THE UDP AND PUP MUST, IN SOME FASHION, TO BE ASSURED OF REPRESENTATION. HE PRAISED THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL ATTITUDE.

14. (C) O'HUIGINN SAID HE FEARED THAT AN IMPASSE COULD ARISE IF HUME'S REJECTION OF ELECTIONS HARDENS. THE BRITISH ACCEPT THAT THEY MUST HAVE SDLP SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE LAST MEETING BETWEEN JOHN HUME AND JOHN MAJOR HAD BEEN VERY BAD (SEE ALSO REF B). PART OF HUME'S REASONS FOR REJECTING ELECTIONS (ESPECIALLY IN CONSTITUENCY FORM) HAS TO DO WITH PERSONALITIES AND SINN FEIN/SDLP RIVALRIES AND HUME COULD BE BLAMED FOR A STALEMATE. TO HELP FORESTALL THIS RESULT, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 000899

DEPT PASS NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

DEPT ALSO FOR S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/15

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: ANGLO-IRISH EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH NEGOTIATING PROCESS; FINESSE ROLE OF SINN FEIN

O'HUIGINN SAID THAT THE TAOISEACH AND TANAISTE INTEND TO PURSUE THE MATTER WITH JOHN HUME AT A LUNCH SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 21. BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT PRESSURE SHOULD NOT BE EXERTED ON THE SDLP UNTIL THE BRITISH HAVE PRESENTED THEIR PACKAGE AND HE ADDED THAT, THOUGH OTHERS IN THE SDLP (E.G., SEAMUS MALLON) MAY HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS, THE PARTY AS A WHOLE WILL NOT MOVE CONTRARY TO HUME'S WISHES.

-- HUME'S REFERENDUM

15. (C) ALTHOUGH THE TANAISTE AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY SUPPORTIVE OF JOHN HUME'S CALL FOR AN ALL-ISLAND REFERENDUM ON TALKS (AND THE USE OF VIOLENCE), O'HUIGINN SAID THE IRISH ARE IN FACT LEERY OF THE IDEA. "REFERENDA," HE SAID, "ARE VERY TRICKY AND DON'T ALWAYS CLEAR THE AIR... WE WOULD MUCH PREFER TO HAVE ONE WHEN THERE IS A WHOLE PACKAGE." HE NOTED JOHN MAJOR'S STRONG OBJECTION TO HUME'S PROPOSED QUESTION ON ALL-PARTY TALKS AS ANOTHER DIFFICULTY TO BE OVERCOME.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ROLE OF SINN FEIN  
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16. ~~(e)~~ NOTING THAT THE BRITISH APPROACH TO TALKS BEFORE CANARY WHARF HAD DAMAGED GERRY ADAMS IN THE EYES OF THE IRA, O'HUIGINN SAID THAT SINN FEIN NOW "HAD LITTLE CHOICE" IN THE QUESTION OF RESTORING THE CEASEFIRE, AS DECISIONS WERE BEING TAKEN "OVER THEIR HEADS." ADAMS, HE SAID, WAS WORKING FROM A "FRAGILE BASE" AND, THOUGH WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO GO TO THE IRA ON ANY TERMS, WAS IN FACT WAITING TO SEE WHAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD PRODUCE.  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*W4 Ireland*

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: HARMON LAKEA SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221318Z APR 96

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1547  
INFO RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST 8524  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 4364  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 004824

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.76)  
KBH 4/11/2013

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/06

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING WITH DAVID TRIMBLE

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL J. HABIB, MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. *(e)* BELFAST CONGEN AND VISITING POLMINCOUNS MET APRIL 19 WITH UUP LEADER DAVID TRIMBLE TO DISCUSS HIS VIEWS ON THE ELECTIONS, THE FORUM, THE OPENING OF THE JUNE 10 ALL-PARTY TALKS AND RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASE-FIRE.

THE FORUM  
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3. *(e)* TRIMBLE WAS GENERALLY PLEASED WITH THE PROPOSED FORUM AS OUTLINED IN HMG'S DRAFT ELECTION LEGISLATION AND GROUND RULES PAPER. HE EXPLAINED THAT HIS APRIL 18 MOTION IN THE COMMONS TO KILL THE DRAFT LEGISLATION WAS AN EFFORT TO LAY DOWN SOME MARKERS ON THE ELECTIONS PROCEDURES RATHER THAN THE FORUM ITSELF.

4. *(e)* TRIMBLE RECOGNIZED THE FORUM WOULD HAVE A LIMITED AGENDA. IN HIS VIEW, IT SHOULD BE A VEHICLE WITH TWO PURPOSES: (1) TO TAKE EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC GROUPS AND (2) TO HAVE A PUBLIC DISCUSSION THAT WOULD REFLECT THE CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS; HE DESCRIBED HIS CONCEPT OF THE FORUM AS THE PLIC SIDE OF THE ALL-PARTY TALKS. HE ENVISAGED THE FORUM AS SETTING UP COMMITTEES WHICH WOULD TAKE EVIDENCE ON NON-CONTENTIOUS TOPICS. HE SAID HE HAD NO PRECISE AGENDA FOR THE FORUM BEYOND THOSE POINTS. HE THOUGHT THAT IDEALLY THE FORUM SHOULD MEET BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN BUT ACCEPTED THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN.

5. *(e)* TRIMBLE SAID THE SDLP MIGHT DECLINE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORUM. ASKED IF THIS WOULD HAVE

PAGE 02 OF 05

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UUP'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE NEGOTIATIONS, TRIMBLE SAID HE WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A BOYCOTT OF THE ALL-PARTY TALKS. HE WOULD NOT WALK OUT OF THE TALKS IF THE SDLP REFUSED TO TAKE PART IN THE FORUM, ALTHOUGH HE ADDED THAT THE NATIONALISTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH SUCH A POSITION COST FREE. HE DID NOT EXPAND ON THIS POINT. TRIMBLE STRESSED THAT HE WANTED THE SDLP TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORUM, ARGUING THAT THERE WERE BENEFITS TO THEM IN DOING SO.

ELECTIONS  
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6. (X) TRIMBLE EVINced SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE UUP'S PROSPECTS VIS-A-VIS THE DUP. HE SAID HMG HAD JUST TAKEN, BUT NOT YET ANNOUNCED, A DECISION TO PERMIT THE PARTIES TO INCLUDE ON THE BALLOT THE NAME OF THEIR PARTY LEADER. HE WAS CLEARLY UPSET WITH THIS STEP AND HIS CONCERN WAS OBVIOUSLY THAT PAISLEY'S NAME WOULD CARRY WIDER COATTAILS THAN HIS OWN. HE MADE SOME VERY UNFLATTERING REMARKS ABOUT MAYHEW AND HIS WEAK LEADERSHIP. HE SAID HE HAD JUST THE OTHER DAY TOLD ANCRAM THAT THE BRITISH SEEMED TO BE PURSUING AN ELECTION SCENARIO WHICH WOULD BUILD UP THE DUP AT HIS EXPENSE. THIS WOULD CAUSE HIM TO TAKE A HARDER LINE AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. (X) TRIMBLE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE TWO SMALL LOYALIST PARTIES WOULD BE AMONG THE TOP TEN VOTE GETTERS AND THEREFORE EACH RECEIVE TWO SEATS IN THE FORUM. NOTE: IN A MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY, UDP LEADER GARY MCMICHAEL HAD TOLD US OF HIS CONCERN THAT HIS PARTY WOULD NOT BE AMONG THE TOP TEN VOTE GETTERS (HE WAS CONVINCED THE UDP WOULD NOT WIN A CONSTITUENCY) AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE REPRESENTED AT THE ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS ON JUNE 10. MCMICHAEL HAD ALSO COMPLAINED THAT REGISTRATION FOR THE ELECTION HAD ALREADY BEEN CLOSED EVEN THOUGH SOME 40 PERCENT OF THE POTENTIAL ELECTORATE WAS NOT REGISTERED. END NOTE

THE NEGOTIATIONS  
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8. (X) TRIMBLE FELT STRONGLY THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO "CHOREOGRAPH" THE OPENING OF THE JUNE 10 NEGOTIATIONS. UNLESS THIS WERE DONE IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE WHEN THE TALKS OPEN. IF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE, WHICH WAS HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN, WERE NOT SORTED OUT TRIMBLE SAID HE MIGHT HAVE TO FOLLOW THE DUP POSITION OF BEING IN THE BUILDING BUT NOT IN THE SAME ROOM WITH THE OTHER NEGOTIATORS.

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9. (2) ASKED HOW HE HOPED TO HANDLE THE OPENING DAY, TRIMBLE SAID HE WANTED A "SIMPLE, STRAIGHT-FORWARD" PROCEDURE WHEREBY ALL THE PARTIES WOULD INDICATE AGREEMENT WITH THE SIX MITCHELL PRINCIPLES ALONG WITH AGREEMENT, IN PRINCIPLE, TO PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING AS SUGGESTED IN THE MITCHELL REPORT. ON THE LATTER POINT, BT  
#4824

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 004824

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/06

TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING WITH DAVID TRIMBLE

THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WOULD BE A DISCUSSION OF THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING. "AT SOME POINT," WHICH HE WAS NOT WILLING TO DEFINE, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A START TO ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING.

10. (2) TRIMBLE SAID THE IMPORTANT POINT FOR HIM WAS NOT DECOMMISSIONING PER SE BUT THE DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT TO EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS. WHILE DECOMMISSIONING WAS ONE WAY TO DEMONSTRATE THIS COMMITMENT, AN END TO IRA TARGETING AND/OR AN END TO PUNISHMENT BEATINGS WOULD BE AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT IN DEMONSTRATING A PEACEFUL COMMITMENT. TRIMBLE NOTED THAT HMG MIGHT BE "LESS FLEXIBLE" ON DECOMMISSIONING. TRIMBLE SAID MAJOR HAD TOLD HIM HE WAS TOO WEAK ON DECOMMISSIONING. TRIMBLE THOUGHT LONDON MIGHT BE MORE DEMANDING THAN THE UUP ON THIS ISSUE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, HEARD THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE THINKING OF REQUIRING REPUBLICAN AN: @' & SCHEDULE OF HANDING OVER WEAPONS. IN HIS MIND, MAJOR'S TOUGHER LINE STEMMED FROM BRITISH FEARS OF FURTHER BOMBING ON THE MAINLAND. "THEY WANT TO GET THE SEMTEX," TRIMBLE SAID.

11. (2) TRIMBLE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SINN FEIN/IRA WOULD IKELY BE UNWILLING TO AGREE TO HIS FORMULA ON DECOMMISSIONING. HE ALSO DOUBTED SINN FEIN WOULD AGREE TO ACCEPT THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES. EVEN IF THEY DID, IT HAD TO BE CLEAR THAT THEY COULD NOT SIMPLY PAY LIP

PAGE 04 OF 05

SERVICE TO THE PRINCIPLES. CONSEQUENCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAWN, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, A PUNISHMENT BEATING OCCURRED DESPITE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLE NUMBER SIX. TRIMBLE SAID HE HOPED FOR A SERIOUS, PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION ON JUNE 10. HE HOPED THE SDLP WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT SINN FEIN, IF NECESSARY. HE THOUGHT SEAMUS MALLON WAS PREPARED TO DO SO THOUGH HE WAS LESS SANGUINE THAT JOHN HUME WOULD ADOPT AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD DROP ADAMS BY THE WAYSIDE. IN THIS CONTEXT, TRIMBLE NOTED THAT MALLON SEEMED TO BE ASSERTING HIMSELF MORE OF LATE AND THAT HIS SUDDEN ILLNESS COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PROCESS. NOTE: SEAMUS MALLON FAINTED DURING A MEDIA INTERVIEW ON APRIL 17 AND HAS SINCE BEEN HOSPITALIZED THOUGH HIS ILLNESS DOES NOT APPEAR SERIOUS.

THE CEASE-FIRE  
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12. (C) TRIMBLE SAID HE EXPECTS THE IRA TO LAUNCH A "BIG ONE," WHICH HE DEFINED AS ANOTHER CANARY WHARF BOMBING OR A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION, WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. THEY WILL GIVE AS THEIR RATIONALE HMG'S ELECTION LEGISLATION BUT THEIR REAL GOAL WILL BE TO DRIVE THE BRITISH TO A MORE ACCOMMODATING STANCE ON THE OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID NIO MINISTER FOR SECURITY JOHN WHEELER AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS. TRIMBLE CONTINUED THAT THE IRA WOULD PROBABLY KEEP A LOW PROFILE DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD BEGIN IN THE SECOND WEEK OF MAY. THEY WOULD THEN DO SOMETHING BEFORE JUNE 10 THAT WOULD PROVIDE A RATIONALE FOR THEM TO TURN UP AT THE DOOR OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT ONLY TO SCORE POINTS RATHER THAN TO TAKE PART. SINN FEIN/IRA MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE PUT OUT THE WORD THAT THERE WAS A DE FACTO CEASE-FIRE BUT THEY WOULD NOT FORMALLY DECLARE A CEASE-FIRE. TRIMBLE CONCLUDED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT A RETURN TO A HIGH LEVEL OF SUSTAINED VIOLENCE.

13. COMMENT: TRIMBLE CONSIDERS IT UNLIKELY THAT SINN FEIN WILL BE AT THE TABLE ON JUNE 10. HE IS PREPARED TO TALK WITHOUT THEM BUT QUESTIONS HOW FAR THE SDLP WILL ROCEED IN THEIR ABSENCE. TRIMBLE SAID HE THOUGHT A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AD REF 1992 WAS "POSSIBLE" -- IF THE SDLP STAYED AT THE TABLE.

CROWE

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#4824

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PAGE 05 OF 05

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SODERBERG PHONE CALL WITH GERRY ADAMS  
JUNE 29, 1996 1:20 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.77)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Adams: I just wanted to touch base after the bomb in Germany. I feel peeved and let down. I presume that Tony is still following up with the initiatives we discussed?

NES: Yes, he's had some good conversations with the British along the lines we discussed, but now things are more difficult. Has anyone claimed responsibility for the bomb in Germany?

Adams: No, but I presume the IRA.

NES: What are the reactions in Northern Ireland?

Adams: There are large headlines everywhere. (He then read me a few headlines from the paper.) The fact that no one was hurt or killed muted the reactions, but it will be especially difficult if there continue to be deaths.

NES: How are the Loyalists reacting?

Adams: There are concerns about the Loyalist faction being drawn in, but the situation is stable right now. In Ireland the climate is still the same -- it is a beautiful day, nothing has happened in two years, and people are relaxed. The upcoming marches will create some tension. Ian Malley, a journalist here, is writing that it's the first time his family lived free from concerns of violence for 2 years.

NES: What about the arrest of Gerry Kelly? Is it becoming a problem?

Adams: No, it's actually becoming a bit of a funny story here that he was arrested [as part of a protest march] and then escaped. He was handcuffed and beaten up and managed to escape. Actually, he probably has a stronger case against them [the government], than they do against him. I've actually made a T-shirt with his picture on it and a caption that reads, "Escaped again." There's a certain novelty about the whole issue. I was with him the other day, both of us were stopped by the authorities and detained for 1/2 hour. He's an elected leader in his community, though, so it isn't an issue here.

NES: Thank you for the call. We'll continue to follow up. I will say, though, that the window is narrowing. Not just because

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of Germany, but you can imagine some of the reactions after Saudi Arabia.

Adams: I know, I am very aware of that.

NES: There are already those who are criticizing our involvement in the Irish issue, and I expect the attacks to get tougher if things continue to go in this direction.

Adams: I understand, although no one can credibly criticize you for having gotten involved in Ireland.

NES: We have no trouble defending it and strongly believe it was the right thing. 3-400 people are alive because of the cease-fire. Where is John on his meeting? Is it set for Monday?

Adams: His meeting is set with Major for Tuesday at 5 o'clock.

NES: Is it public?

Adams: No, and it's important to keep it quiet.

NES: I understand. Thanks again for the call; it's important to keep us posted. Good-bye.

Adams: Slang.

**Wetzel, M. Jeanne**

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WJ

**From:** Peters, Mary A.  
**To:** Lake, Anthony in France  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; Soderberg, Nancy E.  
**Subject:** Your Meeting with Holmes [CONFIDENTIAL]  
**Date:** Friday, June 28, 1996 12:17PM  
**Priority:** High

A checklist for your next meeting with Holmes:

1. Take the letter from Adams that Hume wants to give to Major Monday seriously.
2. Treat the initiative confidentially.
3. You have not ruled out low-level official contacts with SF, though none have taken place since 2/9. Major has said specifically that HMG will keep its options open. Now may be time to use that option .
4. Adams does not appear to be seeking separate negotiating channel -- rather assurances of what has already been agreed.
5. We (you) are willing to pass messages though not to negotiate for anyone.
6. Urge flexibility -- HMG will not be accused of selling out to terrorists if the cease fire is restored.

TL-- The point Gerry made that Hume did not, which could be a problem, is the request for confidence-building measures. Gerry put this as one of the three points in place of the timeframe point that Hume made. Could be a screwup, or could indicate some flexibility.

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.78)  
KRH 4/11/2023

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (4.71)

KBM 4/11/2023

June 26, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NANCY SODERBERG  
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Update on Northern Ireland for the President's  
Meeting with Prime Minister Major

BACKGROUND

Nancy spoke with John Hume this evening. He said that Adams had gone to the IRA as promised and gotten from them a commitment to restore the cease-fire if Prime Minister Major will make three commitments. They are:

- that the talks will be serious, comprehensive and inclusive;
- that they will be concluded within some kind of time-frame; and,
- decommissioning will be dealt with in the course of the talks, not as a precondition.

Hume and Nancy agreed that these should all be do-able. Hume said that Adams agrees with him that is it not practical to expect a defined time-frame. Hume believes that conveying a sense of urgency would be sufficient, for instance by expressing the commitment of the two governments to get an agreement as soon as possible.

Hume is seeking a private meeting with Major on Monday to lay this out. He said he has not told anyone in Dublin or the SDLP about this initiative, for the obvious reason, and had told London he would not be telling anyone. Nancy suggested that it would be helpful for us to push Major on this; Hume agreed. Hume also emphasized that the problem is the IRA's deep distrust of the British, which is why they are seeking these further assurances.

In response to Nancy's question, Hume said the talks in Belfast are going very slowly, with the unionists arguing about the ground rules and agenda and trying to reduce Mitchell's active role. The two governments and the other parties are resisting the unionist efforts. With all the wrangling it looks as if the

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 6/26/06

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talks could adjourn in mid-July for the marching season without having gotten down to business. While the negotiations are still in the "talks about talks" phase, there is less incentive for the IRA to make an early decision to renew the cease-fire.

We have left a message for Adams to call either you or Nancy to confirm what Hume said. However, it does track with what Adams said when you talked to him last week.

We recommend against discussing this in the President's meeting with Prime Minister Major unless the meeting can be reduced to three-on-three. In any case, we recommend that you seek to meet separately with Major and/or Holmes.

#### POINTS TO BE MADE TO MAJOR

- Manchester bombing terrible blow. Not only immoral, no apparent logic to it. Also finding of "bomb factory" in Ireland has had sobering impact.
- Appreciate your and John Bruton's determination to continue with the talks that began June 10 whether or not Sinn Fein can eventually participate. We agree strongly that democratic parties must go on with process.
- Senator Mitchell and his colleagues appear to be doing good work, though progress appears slow. Opening day ruckus over Mitchell's role was difficult. George is a patient man.
- Still see bringing Sinn Fein into tent as offering best chance for durable settlement. If they stay out, must try to reach broadly acceptable agreement, hope extremes will get on board.
- [If raised]: Tony pressed Adams privately to condemn bombing, but we are not convinced that a permanent split in IRA leaving militant wing to pursue its campaign would serve peace process.
- Believe cease-fire still possible. Agree it would have to be unequivocal.
- Understand Hume wants to meet with you next week. He was optimistic that cease-fire is within reach when NSC staff last spoke to him. No one in his party or SDLP aware of this.
- What they say they want to hear again is: that the talks will be serious, comprehensive and inclusive; that the talks will be concluded within some kind of timeframe; and that decommissioning will be dealt with in the course of the talks, not as a precondition.

- Our sense is Adams is indeed arguing for cease-fire and seeking practical way to get one. Have also heard from several sources that this time IRA leadership is determined to bring rank-and-file along in any decision.
- Hope you will consider proposal Hume will put to you if, as we understand, it does not involve substantive concessions.
- Stand ready to support your efforts, pass messages if needed.

If Major raises extradition of Jimmy Smyth:


- Supreme Court declined to take Smyth case, meaning decision of Circuit Court that he is extraditable stands. However, understand Smyth's attorney may plan further legal action, which would delay sending of warrants to Secretary of State for signature.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355 - F (4.80)  
KBH 4/11/2023

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Update on Northern Ireland Peace Process in Wake of Manchester Bombing

While no one was killed in Saturday's bomb in a Manchester shopping center, it has dealt a serious blow to the peace process. The bomb explosion was preceded by a warning to police using an IRA codeword; on June 19, the IRA formally claimed responsibility for the attack.

Virtually everyone except Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams has reacted with a strong condemnation of the bomb. Your statement calling it a "brutal and cowardly act of terrorism" has been widely quoted here and in the UK and Ireland. Prime Minister Bruton said he felt "betrayed" and devoted this week's Cabinet meeting to a re-examination of Irish Government policy vis-à-vis Sinn Fein. Bruton's government decided to maintain contact with Sinn Fein at sub-ministerial level on substantive issues (restoring the cease-fire) but to keep that policy under review. Bruton publicly posed to Sinn Fein two questions Adams has not been able to answer satisfactorily so far: "Have you gone to the IRA to request a cease-fire?" and "Do you continue to support the armed struggle?"

Major and Labour leader Blair sought to outdo each other in Commons in their condemnation of the bombing, with Blair saying "the United States and others abroad may have been given a telling lesson in the realities of the IRA." Blair's office has explained that this remark was directed at IRA sympathizers like NORAID, not the USG. Major has resisted pressure to take tough measures like formally cutting off contact with Sinn Fein or reinstating "internment" (jailing suspected IRA members without trial). The British have not actually had any official meetings with Sinn Fein since the Canary Wharf bomb in February but they want to keep their options open. They also believe it is useful for us to maintain contact with Sinn Fein to press for the cease-fire, which I have done in strong terms with Adams.

The blast has done serious damage to the peace process; it has hardened unionist attitudes and raised doubts about the likelihood of a new cease-fire. Even if a new cease-fire is announced, Major's government will want to be sure it is "unequivocal" before agreeing to let Sinn Fein into the Belfast talks. That could take a matter of weeks, whereas before Manchester it was assumed that Sinn Fein could take its seat within hours of a restored cease-fire.

On the positive side, the loyalist cease-fire is still holding and sectarian violence has not erupted in Northern Ireland itself. After the initial flare-up over Senator Mitchell's chairmanship, the talks in Belfast are continuing, albeit with much wrangling over procedural and agenda issues. Prime Ministers Major and Bruton have both made clear their strong support for continuing the talks process with or without Sinn Fein's eventual participation.

We discount talk of a split within republican ranks over whether to accept the political process or return to a full-scale "armed struggle," but there has certainly been a vehement internal debate. The key question is whether the Manchester attack signaled that the militant faction has definitively won the debate or whether the IRA bombed Manchester because there has as yet been no decision to restore the cease-fire and they want more assurances from the British on the nature of the talks. We, like the British and the Irish, are proceeding on the assumption that a cease-fire is still possible. We are considering whether there are further steps we can take, beyond our contacts with Adams and the Irish-American community, to help tip the balance. We have said publicly that we will maintain contact with all parties as long as that can be helpful to the peace process.

Our strategy over the next few weeks will be to pressure Adams to do all he can to restore the cease-fire and underscore that the current talks, with Mitchell in the chair, are an extraordinary opportunity. We are reviewing whether we can help get assurances reiterated from the British regarding the talks to help Adams make the case to the IRA.

Dudley

P11446

Mon Jun 03 13:57:41 1996

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.82)  
KBM 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

STATE ALSO FOR S/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/2/06  
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK EI  
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: DECOMMISSIONING, MITCHELL

1. CLASSIFIED BY GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN, ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5(B).

2. (e) WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTION OVER, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS TURNING ITS FULL ATTENTION TO PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 10 OPENING SESSION OF THE ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARY JONATHAN STEPHENS TOLD US JUNE 3 THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH LIAISON GROUP MEETING LAST WEEK PRODUCED A "GOOD DEAL OF AGREEMENT" AND NARROWED DIFFERENCES ON ISSUES WHERE GAPS STILL EXIST. STEPHENS SAID THE JUNE 4 BREAKFAST MEETING BETWEEN MAYHEW AND SPRING WILL CONCENTRATE ON FOUR KEY UNRESOLVED POINTS: HANDLING DECOMMISSIONING,

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LONDON 06708

IDENTIFYING THE CHAIRMANSHIP ROLES, AGREEING ON A NEGOTIATING AGENDA AND SETTling FINAL PROCEDURAL DETAILS. CLEARLY THE FIRST TWO ARE MORE CRUCIAL THAN THE LATTER ONES, WHICH COULD BE HANDLED EVEN AFTER JUNE 10 IF NECESSARY.

3. (e) STEPHENS SAID THERE IS NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT THE TALKS WILL OPEN WITHOUT DELAY ON JUNE 10, WITH OR WITHOUT SINN FEIN. USING THE AUTHORITY VESTED BY THE NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTIONS ACT, MAYHEW TODAY WILL ISSUE LETTERS OF INVITATION TO THE PARTIES WHICH RECEIVED AN ELECTORAL MANDATE. THE ACT BARS MAYHEW FROM INVITING SINN FEIN UNLESS THERE IS A RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE, SO THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY THAT HMG COULD BACK AWAY FROM THAT PRINCIPLE EVEN IF IT WANTED TO -- WHICH IT DOES NOT. STEPHENS SAID BOTH GOVERNMENTS REMAIN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT A CEASEFIRE IS REQUIRED BEFORE SINN FEIN CAN PARTICIPATE.

DECOMMISSIONING  
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4. (e) OFFICIALS AT THE LIAISON GROUP MEETING WORKED ON DECOMMISSIONING LANGUAGE BUT FAILED TO COME UP WITH AN AGREED TEXT. MAYHEW AND SPRING HOPE TO AGREE ON A FORMULA. STEPHENS SAID BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE ON WHERE THEY WANT TO BE: THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST CREATE A POLITICAL DYNAMIC WHICH BUILDS SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE SO THAT A START TO DECOMMISSIONING CAN TAKE PLACE WHICH, IN TURN, FURTHERS PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA WHICH THEN LEADS TO MORE DECOMMISSIONING. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO GET THERE.

5. (e) STEPHENS SAID THE MITCHELL REPORT IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE DECOMMISSIONING ISSUE AND BOTH GOVERNMENTS BASE THEIR APPROACH ON THAT REPORT. BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT ALL PARTIES WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE PLENARY SESSION TO "ADDRESS" DECOMMISSIONING BY MAKING CLEAR THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES. THIS WOULD INCLUDE A CLEAR INDICATION OF

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INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

6. (e) THE BRITISH VIEW IS THAT IMPLEMENTATION INCLUDES THE MITCHELL REPORT'S RECOMMENDATION ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING. HMG WOULD PREFER A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPHS 34 AND 35 ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING, WHILE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT PREFERS A MORE GENERAL REFERENCE TO MITCHELL'S RECOMMENDATIONS. STEPHENS SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INSIST THAT PARTIES AGREE TO A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE FOR DECOMMISSIONING. RATHER, AFTER PARTIES GIVE A COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES, A SUBCOMMITTEE ON DECOMMISSIONING WOULD WORK ON THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION ALONGSIDE THE POLITICAL TALKS. THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S TERMS OF REFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE IDENTIFYING THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING AND ADVISING GOVERNMENTS ON NECESSARY LEGISLATION.

7. (e) THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S WORK COULD BE REVIEWED AT A PLENARY MEETING AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. STEPHENS SAID THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE ACTUAL DECOMMISSIONING AT THAT TIME BUT, DEPENDING ON PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL STRANDS, COULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

SENATOR MITCHELL  
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8. (e) STEPHENS SAID BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT SENATOR MITCHELL SHOULD CHAIR THE PLENARY SESSIONS. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT MAJOR AND BRUTON JOINTLY WOULD OPEN THE JUNE 10 SESSION BEFORE TURNING OVER THE GAVEL TO MITCHELL. AS CHAIR OF THE PLENARY, MITCHELL WOULD RETAIN SIGNIFICANT OVERSIGHT OF THE WORK DONE IN THE SEPARATE COMMITTEES AND THE DECOMMISSIONING SUBCOMMITTEE. THIS AUTHORITY WOULD BE ENHANCED BY RECONVENING THE PLENARY IN SEPTEMBER. STEPHENS SPECULATED THAT THAT SESSION COULD BE THE ONE WHERE THE "DEALS COULD GET DONE." STEPHENS CONFIRMED THAT THE MAY 31 OFFICIALS MEETING DID NOT RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON HOW TO ALLOCATE THE

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OTHER CHAIRMANSHIPS,  
PARTICULARLY THE STRAND TWO CHAIRMANSHIP. THE IRISH  
GOVERNMENT STRONGLY WANTS MITCHELL TO CHAIR STRAND TWO;  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS FIRMLY AGAINST. MAYHEW AND  
SPRING WILL WORK FURTHER ON THIS AT THEIR JUNE 4 MEETING.

NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTION  
-----

7. (C) STEPHENS THOUGHT THE NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTION  
"PRETTY MUCH RAN TRUE TO FORM." (VOTING RESULTS IN PARA  
8 BELOW.) NO PARTY CAN BE TOO HAPPY OR TOO DISAPPOINTED  
WITH THE RESULT. HMG IS PLEASED THAT THE VOTER TURN OUT  
WAS GOOD (JUST BELOW 65 PERCENT) AND RELIEVED THAT THE  
SMALL LOYALIST PARTIES WON ENOUGH VOTES TO BE INCLUDED.  
BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT, ACCORDING TO STEPHENS, IS  
THAT IT IS OVER AND FULL ATTENTION NOW CAN BE TURNED TO  
NEGOTIATIONS.

8. (U) MAY 30 NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTION

RESULTS FOR TOP TEN PARTIES

PARTY	SEATS	PERCENT	TOTAL VOTES
-----	-----	-----	-----
UUP	30	24.2	181,829
DUP	24	18.8	141,413
SDLP	21	21.4	160,786
SINN FEIN	17	15.5	115,377
ALLIANCE	7	6.5	49,176
UK UNIONIST	3	3.7	27,774
PUP	2	3.5	26,082
UDP	2	2.2	16,715
WOMENS	2	1.0	7,731
LABOUR	2	.8	6,425

DEAL

END OF MESSAGE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
SODERBERG/ADAMS

APRIL 19, 1996

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.83)  
KRM 4/11/2013

Adams: Hello Nancy, how are you?

Ms. Soderberg: It's been a difficult week with the whole world blowing up: Lebanon, Ireland, Egypt, Liberia and now the Central African Republic. Tony and Sandy Berger are away and it seems everything is falling apart.

Adams: And how are you faring after Ron Brown's death?

Ms. Soderberg: Awful, we are devastated. You just assume you are ok on a military flight; all of us have taken them. And so many people died.

Adams: You may have heard this many times but there was an actual sense of personal loss here, perhaps because we met with them during such an uplifting phase of the process. When I saw the first reports of a possible crash, with a picture of Ron Brown, I saw Chuck in the background and realized that if there had been a crash, he would have been killed as well.

Ms. Soderberg: There were so many young people aboard too. I know it has been a rough period for you too.

Adams: I tried to talk to Tony this week but he was away.

Ms. Soderberg: He tried to reach you over the weekend before he left. It is hard from Asia with the time difference. He says hello.

Adams: John is going to be over on your side soon. He is going via London, Nice, Strasbourg; then to New York, Boston and Washington. He and I have been having intensive discussions. He will be telling you about them at your end. Next week I will be in Dublin for a series of meetings; Sinn Fein will be putting forward a series of propositions. At my request, John will be talking with the British. We have a sense of what sort of package is required. I would like to make another call mid-week on another phone to talk about the same thing as before.

Ms. Soderberg: Would it be helpful for us to do something like that?

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Adams: That is the role we would envisage if you think it is feasible. I want to be restrained on this phone. What we have sorted out, and we don't know whether it's doable, are the elements we think could be met with some positive response. John Hume will convey a sense of it to you and run it by the British - in fact he has already done so. I am thinking about two options: I can phone mid-week or some can go there to talk with yourselves. I just thought of that second point on the way back tonight. Howell has been away.

Ms. Soderberg: Better to phone and talk to us directly rather than have someone have to carry our comments back to you.

Adams: I would do that anyway; I'd send a third person to fill you in on the details and talk to Mairead.

Ms. Soderberg: We were deeply concerned about that bomb in London. The sooner we have an end to that, the better. I noticed reports of statements you have made that sounded negative on the election and the forum; we can talk more later, but statements like that make it harder and harder to move the process forward.

Adams: Our view is that the election is a nonsense and the forum is a distraction. But we will fight the election. That is what the SDLP will do. In the meantime the best thing is to point out the need for entry into all-party talks. I pointed out to the media that there is apathy about the election and senior members of the SDLP have criticized the forum. Tactically and strategically, I said, it would be good if Sinn Fein and SDLP were to boycott the election and the forum and force the two governments to come up with a sensible plan.

Ms. Soderberg: If that is the case, the unionists will have an excuse for walking out of the talks without even having been cornered.

Adams: But the realpolitik is that I am not going to succeed in doing what I'd like to. We'll contest the election; once the bill is past Parliament, once that hurdle is overcome, then we will start campaigning. In fact we already are.

Ms. Soderberg: What is your sense of the bill?

Adams: The whole thing is a distraction. That is a widespread view. And there are comparisons to where we were in August or September 1994.

Ms. Soderberg: And the negotiations paper?

Adams: The ground rules paper. Notwithstanding its narrowness and the fact that there is no detail about a timeframe, I think it is quite good. I haven't said that publicly and I may never do so...

Ms. Soderberg: That is the most important piece.

Adams: There are good bits in the Framework Document, the Declaration and even the Anglo-Irish Agreement but it all comes down to political will. The British have yet to show the will to match the potential that is there. I am concerned when Paddy Mayhew gets up in Parliament and says decommissioning will be addressed as the first item of business, when the paper only says "address."

Ms. Soderberg: What do you think of the idea of a "fourth strand?"

Adams: It is a useful way of making sure there is no stalling. An independent chairman is also a good idea.

Ms. Soderberg: Do you have sense of where the discussion is on how to handle decommissioning?

Adams: There is no real discussion. Let me read to you what is in the press, "The unionists say the restoration of the IRA cease-fire is not enough; decommissioning has to be added. David Trimble is critical of the elective process. Paisley and Trimble say the forum has to have a part in the talks."

Ms. Soderberg: It's a little confusing -- Trimble against an elective process?

Adams: He says it is too complicated with too many parties participating. Democracy is terrible. There is no progress on the decommissioning issue. There has been no focus from us of the SDLP. Of course the Irish Government is trying to work on it.

Ms. Soderberg: How important is the issue of the 75% majority?

Adams: A big issue. It would give the unionist the ability to run it. One SDLP guy asked me whether it is 75% of those elected or those in attendance. The unionists will use the forum to make endless speeches. Last time the RUC had to drag them out because they stayed for days making speeches to each other. You should watch the video. I can send it if you would like.

Ms. Soderberg: No thanks.

Adams: It is vexed and a problem.

Ms. Soderberg: Keeping an eye on the ball means to make sure negotiations start. If you clear away the smoke all indication are that we can figure out decommissioning and Strand Two, we have a good shot.

Adams: We see two big problems: the widespread distrust in the republican community after 18 months and even wider feeling, including some in Fine Gael, that the Taoiseach is not right, and that with John Major as a lame duck, that is a problem.

Ms. Soderberg: We are still willing to be helpful.

Adams: That is crucial. We need that kind of assistance.

Ms Soderberg: Another bomb would make it more difficult.

Adams: That was the first, I think, since John and I met with a group of them.

Ms Soderberg: Three weeks ago?

Adams: Longer.

Peters: Six weeks.

Adams: Since we met them we had not produced anything, though we were trying. Now we have something and are in the process of putting it together.

Ms. Soderberg: All the more reason to restore the cease-fire; then these other issues get easier.

Adams: I'll talk to Mairead on Sunday and then firm up plans to talk to you and Tony. I'm going to open a bottle of wine now.

Ms. Soderberg: It will be another six hours before I get to that point, but I'll think about you when I do. Take care.

Adams: Slan.

Clinton

Hume Aug 5

Both agreed to keep talking, Church Leaders  
business community, working hard  
don't want a repetition of Drumcree.  
Apprenticed boys seem to have a good deal  
of confidence in me. They came  
to me + said wanted to be kept <sup>kept</sup> in touch

R will talk to Adams

H- we are majority in Govy - respect rights  
of minority.

R how are we on larger issues

H don't know how George Mitchell stood it.

Can't talk to Unionists during marching season  
look to Sept. Hope will have a ceasefire  
by then.

Have a secret agent from Bils; will come  
back to me with some.

talk serious, demand not precondition etc.

Any chance you could come visit?

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July 12, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Nancy's Conversation with Adams

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0755-F (4.86)

KBM 4/11/2023

Adams called unexpectedly today. Following is the memorandum of conversation.

Adams: I've been up all night -- I wanted to take the opportunity to give you an update before getting some sleep. I personally have been trying to keep the lid on here, no matter how it appears. The situation between Sunday and Wednesday was bad -- Catholic churches and schools were burned and Catholic families evicted from their homes. Then there was the murder of the taxi-driver and the blockading of towns. The Garvaghy Road business was bad, especially the tele-visual angle. The Ormeau Road (in Belfast) is still under curfew and has been for 40 hours now. The people are incensed; we are trying to keep them calm. Over 100 nationalists have been injured, some seriously, by the RUC. There were 40 people in the hospital in Derry and 30 in Belfast. One was hit in the head with plastic bullet and is clinically dead, on life support. Over 1400 plastic bullets were fired between 12:00 yesterday and 6:00 this morning. This is the kind of thing that needs quiet diplomatic efforts; the degree of reaction from the RUC is out of proportion.

Nancy: We got your message about trying to get through to speak to the Ormeau Road residents; I happened to talk to John Holmes and mentioned it to him. Did you get through?

Adams: Yes, after three and a half hours at the roadblock. It was surprising that a number of people in the U.S. sent faxes of support for the residents; they were delighted to get those messages.

Nancy: Many people here are watching the situation closely. I have been in touch with Tony. What is next? I know it is enormously difficult, but what are you pushing as a way forward?

Adams: First of all it will be absurd if the unionists can just walk back into the talks without penalty next week after walking

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Reason: 1.5b

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out this week, while we are still excluded. I was heckled by the crowd yesterday -- just a little heckle, nothing I couldn't handle -- but Tom Hartley (a Sinn Fein official) was heckled badly for appealing for calm and talking about the peace process. There was a lack of evenness. The unionists, who would not engage with the people in either the Garvaghy Road (in Drumcree) or in the Lower Ormeau Road, were rewarded for it. They will keep behaving like that until someone stops them, like a spoiled child. Cardinal Cahal Daly (Catholic primate of Ireland), an intelligent man who is not sympathetic to republicans, is extremely angry. The headline in the "Irish News" read "Betrayal."

Nancy: We are thinking through here what to do. We should act quickly.

Adams: I will try to sit down tomorrow and think about that. John's and my initiative is still on stream, still out there. The response was positive. I had told John that Major was not in a political position to move positively but that was when the original decision was made on Garvaghy Road. Now the situation has changed, they have capitulated to one element. John and I will pursue it. He couldn't even get out to fly to London because the roads were blocked. The two governments need to move as well on their commitments. Even if things quiet down the SDLP is so cheesed off they could disengage from the talks, either mentally or actually. Nothing dramatic, they would just fade away. As I have been saying, the British have the key. They cannot deliver the unionists but they can move the situation along.

Nancy: On television it looked like 25 years ago.

Adams: Yes, it felt the same. I was on Cooper Road where I was in 1974. Now you have the children behaving the same as their parents did. I have said maybe the situation could shock people into awareness, act as a catalyst.

Nancy: Are there other things we can push? What about the proposal for a parades commission?

Adams: I myself think it is nonsense. There are 3000 parades each year and 18 at most that are contentious. The Orangemen have not played ball with the residents of the Garvaghy Road or the Ormeau. Other protests (by Catholics) have erupted spontaneously since but they have been peaceful. I myself have a rather easygoing attitude to Orange parades but today, for instance one lodge accompanied by one band was supposed to come down the Lower Ormeau Road; instead there were 500-600 people and five bands. You need to get the Orangemen to talk to residents.

Months ago I went to Martin Smyth (Grand Master of the Orange Order, UUP MP) and asked him to arrange meetings to help resolve this issue. If a commission comes up with a decision that does not sit with either community, you will have the same problem.

Nancy: We will keep talking to everyone and explore how to move forward.

Adams: We need to grab the process and move it.

Nancy: Let us know if you have any further thoughts. Are the loyalists okay?

Adams: I think so, wouldn't know, though they did kill that taxi man, blockaded roads, put families out.

Nancy: We hear it was unauthorized. Keep in touch.

Adams: Slan

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

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SIT: PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.87)  
KRM 4/11/2023

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5055

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 009113

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/01

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: PM'S LETTER TO HUME ON CEASE-FIRE

REF: A) LONDON 9063 B) DUBLIN 3582

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J. HABIB, MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. REASON: 1.5(B).

2. (C) NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS WAS SOMEWHAT MORE UPBEAT REGARDING THE PM'S CONVERSATIONS WITH JOHN HUME ABOUT A POSSIBLE RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASE-FIRE THAN JOHN HOLMES HAD BEEN IN AN EARLIER JULY 25 MEETING (REF A). WHILE HOLMES EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFORT, THOMAS SAID HE THOUGHT HMG MUST "TAKE SERIOUSLY" THE MESSAGE FROM ADAMS WHICH HUME PURPORTS TO RELAY. THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HUME, IN HIS EAGERNESS TO FIND A WAY FORWARD, MAY TEND TO OVERSELL THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, THOMAS POINTED OUT, THE THRUST OF THE MESSAGE HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN REITERATED IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BY VARIOUS SINN FEIN LEADERS, SO THERE MAY WELL BE A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR HUME'S EFFORTS. WITHOUT DISCUSSING SPECIFICS OF REF B OR OTHER CONTACTS, WE SAID THE USG TOO HAD BEEN RECEIVING SIMILAR INDICATIONS FROM REPUBLICAN INTERLOCUTORS, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO WAY OF EVALUATING THEM.

3. (C) THOMAS SAID THE PART THAT PUZZLES HMG IS THE "IMPLAUSIBILITY" OF THE SINN FEIN DEMAND. THE BRITISH DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ESSENTIALLY A REPETITION OF STATEMENTS THEY ALREADY HAVE MADE -- THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE COMPREHENSIVE, THAT NO OUTCOME TO THEM IS PREDETERMINED AND THAT DECOMMISSIONING WILL BE HANDLED IN PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANTIVE TALKS -- WOULD INDUCE THE IRA TO RESTORE THE CEASE-FIRE AT THIS TIME. HE HYPOTHESIZED THAT PERHAPS, IN THE WAKE OF DRUMCREE, REPUBLICANS FEEL A PAN-NATIONALIST COALITION HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY REVIVED SO THAT SINN FEIN WOULD BE IN A POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THE TALKS. BUT, HE CONCLUDED, THIS DOES NOT SEEM LIKE A FULL ENOUGH EXPLANATION, SO HE REMAINS CAUTIOUS -- BUT DOES NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY. HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DESCRIBED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TOO AS SKEPTICAL THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD WORK.

4. (e) IN PART TO MAKE SURE THERE IS NO "MISCOMMUNICATION IN TRANSMISSION" AND IN PART TO PROVIDE A RECORD OF THE CONTACT SHOULD THE MATTER LEAK, THOMAS SAID THE PM HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO PUT THE BRITISH POSITION IN WRITING. HE SHARED WITH US A COPY OF MAJOR'S MOST RECENT LETTER TO HUME (TEXT BELOW).

5. (e) JULY 24 LETTER FROM PM MAJOR TO JOHN HUME:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR JOHN,

SINCE MY LETTER TO YOU OF 8 JULY, YOU HAVE GIVEN FURTHER ACCOUNTS OF SINN FEIN'S POSITION ABOUT A RENEWED IRA CEASEFIRE AND ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS OBVIOUSLY VITAL THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THESE ISSUES.

YOU HAVE PRESENTED SINN FEIN'S POSITION AS FOLLOWS:

(I) SINN FEIN WOULD LIKE TO KNOW FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT:

- THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE SERIOUS AND COMPREHENSIVE;
- THAT DECOMMISSIONING WILL BE TACKLED IN PARALLEL WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS; AND
- THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DURING THE TALKS.

(II) IF SINN FEIN WERE TOLD IN ADVANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT PUBLICLY THEIR POSITION ON THESE POINTS THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE (BEFORE SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT WAS MADE) THAT THE IRA WOULD RESPOND TO THE STATEMENT BY DECLARING A GENUINE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE. SUCH A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE FOR GOOD THIS TIME.

(III) ONCE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A CEASEFIRE, SINN FEIN WOULD AFFIRM THEIR TOTAL AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES, AS THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE DONE.

THE TRUTH IS THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA SHOULD RESTORE THEIR CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PREVARICATION. THERE IS NO POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE. AND I HAVE TO SAY THAT I REMAIN SCEPTICAL, GIVEN ALL THE OTHER EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED PREPARATION FOR FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING THE RECENT ARRESTS IN LONDON, THAT MORE WORDS FROM US CAN MAKE A CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE.

HOWEVER, IF YOUR PRESENTATION OF SINN FEIN'S POSITION IS CORRECT, WHAT SINN FEIN WANTS TO KNOW FROM THE GOVERNMENT IS

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NO MORE THAN THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID PUBLICLY ALREADY. I ATTACH WORDS WHICH COULD BE USED IF WE WERE CONVINCED THAT THIS WOULD MAKE A MATERIAL DIFFERENCE TO THE PROSPECTS OF A NEW CEASEFIRE.

WE ALSO HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SINN FEIN WANTS A MEETING WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS. THERE IS OF COURSE NO QUESTION OF ANY MINISTERIAL MEETING WITH SINN FEIN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 009113

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/01

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: PM'S LETTER TO HUME ON CEASE-FIRE

UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. IF SINN FEIN BELIEVE A MEETING WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONFIRMING AND EXPLAINING THE POSITION YOU HAVE SET OUT TO US IS NEEDED, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUCH A REQUEST IN LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING, CRUCIALLY, EVENTS ON THE GROUND.

YOURS SINCERELY,  
/S/ JOHN MAJOR

END TEXT LETTER

BEGIN TEXT ATTACHMENT

THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH STARTED ON 10 JUNE ARE TO SECURE AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND WILL ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THAT. ANY PARTICIPANT CAN RAISE ANY ISSUE. NO OUTCOME IS PREDETERMINED OR EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT ANSWER FOR ANY OTHER PARTICIPANT BUT, FOR ITS PART, ALONG WITH THAT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, IT IS COMMITTED TO ENSURE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA IS ADDRESSED WITH A VIEW TO OVERCOMING ANY OBSTACLES WHICH MAY ARISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY, AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE;

THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING. AT THAT STAGE, THE GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, WILL BE SEEKING THE COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REPORT, INCLUDING ITS PROPOSALS FOR SOME DECOMMISSIONING DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO MAKE URGENT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, SO THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES CAN PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH DECOMMISSIONING;

WE ARE COMMITTED TO RAISING CONFIDENCE THROUGH THE TALKS

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PROCESS. THE INTERNATIONAL BODY'S REPORT ITSELF PROPOSES A PROCESS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO THIS AS TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE REPORT. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS A TWO-WAY STREET. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT SERIOUS SETBACK TO CONFIDENCE WE HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES WILL PLAY THEIR PART IN MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR FUTURE MARCHES AND PARADES TO BE HANDLED WITHOUT CONFRONTATION.

END TEXT ATTACHMENT

CROWE

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02  
<^SSN>9113  
<^TOR>960726145934 M2333183  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02  
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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (4.88)  
KRM 4/11/2023

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH  
PRIME MINISTERS MAJOR AND BRUTON

DATE: TBD

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To restore momentum to the Northern Ireland peace process following the civil disturbances and violence of the week of July 7.

II. BACKGROUND

After four days of a loyalist standoff with police in the village of Drumcree and loyalist vandalism and violence all over Northern Ireland, on July 11 the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) reversed its earlier decision and decided to allow Orange marchers through a Catholic neighborhood in Drumcree. Nationalists in both the North and the South were angry and dismayed; for the first time in several years the Irish Government issued a statement critical of a British policy. Violence flared in Catholic areas over the following three days, resulting in the death of a man who was apparently run over by an RUC vehicle. The first bomb in two years exploded in a hotel in Northern Ireland on Saturday, but fortunately no one was seriously injured. The attack was probably carried out by a republican splinter group; the IRA has denied responsibility. The bombing has further strained the already fragile loyalist cease-fire.

Prime Ministers Major and Bruton had a "difficult" conversation July 11 but agreed to try to keep the peace process going. The British, however, have been annoyed by Bruton's continued public criticism. Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring and Northern Ireland Office Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew will talk this week, either in the formal setting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, as the Irish have suggested, or on the margins of the Belfast Belfast peace talks, as the British would prefer. The unionist party leaders had withdrawn from the talks until the Drumcree standoff was resolved. They are expected to

attend when the talks reconvene July 16. John Hume's SDLP has withdrawn from the forum of elected representatives but is expected to stay in the peace talks themselves.

Since they opened June 10, the Belfast talks have been mired in procedural issues raised by unionist parties anxious to make sure that decommissioning is dealt with upfront. Before last week's disturbances, it was hoped that the discussions on procedure and agenda could be brought to a close by the end of July, when the talks adjourn until September 3. That is all the more important after the Drumcree debacle. Whatever chance remains for a restoration of the cease-fire (and we are hearing privately that there is still a chance) will evaporate unless the talks are seen as meaningful negotiations.

In addition to the public process of giving impetus to the peace talks, we will be pressing the British privately to take seriously the proposal advanced by John Hume and Gerry Adams several weeks ago. Adams has told us that the IRA is prepared to restore the cease-fire if the British provide certain assurances, none of which would represent a new commitment or concession. Adams is also pressing for a meeting with British officials. We are working with the British and Adams to find a formula that will get the IRA to restore the cease-fire.

Finally it is vital that the two governments find a long-term way of dealing with the problem of Orange parades through Catholic neighborhoods, preferably before the next round of contested parades in mid-August.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made with Prime Minister Major

Tab B Points to be Made with Prime Minister Bruton

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.89)  
KBH 7/11/2023

- Deeply concerned by civil disturbances and violence in Northern Ireland last week. Shades of worst sectarian violence of past decades.
- Still seems to be a chance to pull them back from the brink of return to full-scale violence. Will help you in whatever way I can.
- Rapid progress in Stormont talks key to persuading population and political leaders that peace process can still work. Hope you and Irish can get parties to end procedural wrangling and get ready to move to substantive negotiations.
- UUP leader Trimble key to getting talks moving again. How do you assess his attitude after the Drumcree incident?
- Will continue to press for IRA cease-fire. Tony has been working with John Holmes on latest Hume-Adams initiative. Prospects not hopeless, especially if progress made in talks.
- If needed: Hope you will consider having your officials meet with Sinn Fein if that is what it takes to move process forward.
- Without cease-fire, sooner or later loyalists cease-fire will crack and paramilitaries return to full-scale violence.
- Also hope you can find a way to deal with the handful of contentious Orange parades. On that, if we can be helpful by providing any kind of expertise or mediating services, please let me know.

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/15/06

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER BRUTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.90)  
KBH 4/11/2023

- Deeply concered by civil disturbances and violence in Northern Ireland week of July 7. Serious setback for peace process, but pleased you and John Major have not given up.
- Know you agree that rapid progress in Stormont talks is key to keeping process going. How do you see prospects for reaching closure on procedural issues, clearing decks for beginning of substantive negotiations in September?
- Pleased that George Mitchell able to play such a key role. He is asset to talks, as I knew he would be.
- How do you see attitude of unionists in wake of Drumcree decision? Is there a willingness to move forward?
- Also hope you and John can find a longer-term way to deal with parades issue, If we can be helpful by providing expertise or mediating service, let me know.
- Loyalists have been very restrained, but unless the IRA restores its cease-fire the loyalists will return to violence at some point too. Do you see any prospect of a cease-fire?
- Know you will be here in September to address joint meeting of Congress. Looking for a time on my schedule to meet with you then.

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/15/06

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
7-15-96

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

98 JUL 13 PG: 45

2011-0355-F (4.91)  
KRH 4/11/2023

July 13, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Consequences of Violence in Northern Ireland

Background

*It's analysis & integrity  
I haven't thought of that  
revert actually making it  
possible going full - Key in  
my mind & let me know if I need  
to do anything*

This past week has seen the worst civil disturbances in Northern Ireland in 25 years. The crisis began on July 7 when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) decided not to allow Protestant marchers, celebrating the 1690 victory of King William of Orange at the Battle of the Boyne, to march along a traditional route through a Catholic neighborhood in the village of Drumcree. Orange Order loyalists gathered outside the police barricade and when egged on by party leaders Trimble and Paisley, declared they would lay siege to Drumcree "for as long as it takes." Loyalist violence erupted throughout Northern Ireland July 7-10, with gangs torching vehicles and Catholic buildings (including a church and a high school), and a number of Catholic families were forced to flee mixed neighborhoods.

In a surprise move, on July 11 the RUC reversed itself, forcibly cleared Catholic residents from the street and allowed 1,300 Protestant marchers to march through the Catholic area. Church leaders had been seeking to mediate a compromise between residents and the local Orange Order, but no agreement had been reached when the decision to allow the march was taken. The British say the reversal of the decision by the local chief constable was necessitated by the threat from Orange lodges all over Northern Ireland to cancel their own parades and converge on Drumcree. The police feared they would not be able to prevent the expected crowd of at least 50,000 from attacking the Catholic community.

The Irish Government and nationalist leaders, including John Hume, are dismayed and angry at what they see as yet another instance of the British "caving in" to loyalist violence and threats. For the first time in several years, the Irish Government has issued a public statement critical of a British decision. Gerry Adams called the decision "disgraceful" and appealed for restraint on the part of nationalists. We have already received calls and letters from outraged Irish Americans, some asking you to take Prime Minister Major to task publicly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/12/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Catholic violence broke out across Northern Ireland the night of July 11, including the injury by shooting of three police officers. One man died in the riots on July 12. Many fear the resumption of violence in Northern Ireland itself for the first time since the cease-fire was broken on February 9.

### What It Means

The incident is being interpreted in the nationalist community as a message that the use and threat of force still gets results in Northern Ireland. It has also reinforced the nationalist perception that the police are pro-unionist and Catholics still need the IRA to protect their neighborhoods. It also hardens the nationalists against a more flexible position on decommissioning as some now argue that the weapons are needed to protect nationalist communities. Adams is already saying he should now be allowed into the talks without a restoration of the cease-fire.

Nevertheless, after a difficult conversation on July 11, Prime Ministers Major and Bruton agreed not to give up on the peace process. There is now no reason for the unionist parties not to return to the Stormont talks. (They had said they would not until the Drumcree standoff was resolved.) Hume is likely to swallow hard and stay in the process too, although there is talk of Hume boycotting the Forum. Some believe the Belfast talks may go more smoothly now because the unionists (having resorted to violence for their own ends) will have lost the credibility to demand a hard line on decommissioning. While this may be overly optimistic (the unionists are unlikely to draw the parallel), Trimble may see a need to make progress in the talks to refurbish his credibility. The British have promised to set up some kind of mechanism to decide how to handle these disputed parades, something the nationalists have been seeking.

### Our Strategy

While the British are justifying the RUC's decision at Drumcree on security grounds, they too recognize that it has sent the wrong message. We will seek to use this to get the British to be ~~flexible in responding to the latest Hume-Adams initiative to get the cease-fire restored.~~ I will be seeking to clarify with Adams exactly what kinds of reassurances he is seeking from the British. One possibility is to press HMG to agree to a low-level meeting with Sinn Fein, which would enhance Adams' credibility with the IRA leadership. We will also press for a long-term solution to the annual marching season problem. We may need you to weigh in early next week.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 19, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

*• talk to SF  
• prisoners  
• summit*

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG *NS*  
SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Next Steps

Goals

- 1. Get agreement on procedural points and agenda by end of month.
- ✓* - 2. Handle August 12 parades in a peaceful manner agreed to by the communities.
- 3. Use these two accomplishments to convince Adams to restore cease-fire ASAP, perhaps in August.
- 4. Keep Loyalist cease-fire in place.
- 5. Get Hume back in the Forum.
- 6. Begin substantive all-party talks in September.
- 7. Keep October Trade-Investment Conference in Pittsburgh on track.

Steps to Achieve

To achieve these goals, there are a series of steps we can push the parties to take.

British: They need to reach out to the Nationalist community to begin restoring some level of confidence with it, while not breaking faith with the Unionists. They also need to shore up support for the Loyalists who have taken real risks. They need to join with the Irish and add new momentum to the talks. They need to continue to press for successful conclusion to the talks, especially on decommissioning. They also need to put in place a reasonable process for handling parades. Suggested steps:

- ✓* 1. HMG meeting next week with Sinn Fein at official but sub-ministerial level, probably Ancram's deputy, Quentin Thomas.
- ✓* 2. Release, or move to better conditions, some Loyalist prisoners.
- ✓* 3. Meet with Unionist and Nationalist leaders to resolve how to handle August parades as well as all future parades.
- ✓* 4. Bruton and Major (vs. Mayhew and Spring) agree to host plenary session of the talks on July 29.
- 5. End public bickering with Bruton. Possible summit.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)  
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*Anti-ferr. comp. - not now.*

- ✓ 6. Follow up on Adams-Hume channel by clarifying steps that British can take in response to Adams' letter.

Irish: They need to shore up their support and relationship with Adams, while continuing to crack down on IRA weapons facilities. (Dermott has rejected discussion of joint terrorism cooperation with us, saying "not now.") Irish should continue pressure on Adams for cease-fire; join with the British on adding new momentum to talks; continue to push talks to successful conclusion, especially on decommissioning. Steps to take:

1. End public bickering with Major. ~~Possible summit.~~
2. Continue public, sub-ministerial meetings with Adams.
3. Push Nationalists to be reasonable on parades.
4. Press Hume to rejoin Forum.
- ~~5. Bruton agrees to host plenary session of the talks with Major.~~
5. *New Deal, via C.B.M., summit.*

Adams: He needs assurances that talks will be substantive and not blocked by decommissioning. He needs agreement on parades. He should get cease-fire restored, clarify discrepancy between his statement to us and letter to Major. Steps for him to take:

1. Clarify what he needs from British, via Hume.
2. Work constructively on parades.
3. Perhaps make constructive statement on decommissioning. (Tough absent #1 and agreement on talks. Possible for September.)

Hume: He needs some reduction in tensions and progress on parades to ease political pressure on him to respond to problems of last week. Steps to take:

1. Return to Forum (not yet clear to me how, probably couldn't do before September).
2. Work with Major to respond to Adams-Hume initiative.
3. Work constructively on parade issue.

Trimble: He has taken some hits for his actions and associations with extremist Unionists associated with violence. Has lost some credibility with Nationalists. Steps to take:

1. Public rejection of violence (unlikely to do), regret over recent events, or recommitment to Mitchell Principles (also tough since now a demand of Sinn Fein).
2. Engage constructively in talks, drop pressure for decommissioning at top of agenda.
3. Help resolve parade issue.

Paisley: Goal is to keep him in talks.

Loyalists: Need to keep cease-fire in place. They need some public recognition and positive results they can bring home.

1. Stay the course.

Clinton Administration: Keep pressure on all sides to stay constructively engaged, support Mitchell and talks, pressure and entice IRA to restore cease-fire, urge Irish America to support us in these efforts, help restore confidence in the process. Steps to take:

- ✓ 1. Lake calls to Mitchell, Holmes, Spring and Hume to push above steps, consult.
- ✓ 2. Lake call to Adams to clarify conditions in Adams-Hume initiative, press for cease-fire (or at least de facto moratorium on further bombings), underscore significance of talks, and consult.
3. Lake call to Trimble? (Let's discuss. Perhaps after a delay to show displeasure for actions last week.)
- ✗ 4. Possibly lay down marker that Smyth extradition will be hard to stop until cease-fire is restored (need to clear first in memo to POTUS).
- ✓ 5. Finesse on MacBride.
- ✓ 6. POTUS letters to Major and Bruton.

Other steps that have been suggested but that I do not recommend at this time:

- Press Mitchell not to adjourn talks (McMichael concerned about a void)
- Let Adams join talks without restoration of cease-fire (Adams position and one now advocated by some in Congress -- Gilman sent letter and issued statement)
- POTUS calls to Major, Bruton, Mitchell.
- VP calls to Loyalists.
- POTUS statement.
- Travel to region by MAP, NES, TL. (I'd be inclined to send someone to consult)
- Invite Loyalists to WH for meeting to show support.
- Replace Mayhew.
- Have Mitchell press Adams-Hume initiative

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July 12, 1996

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2011-0355-F (4.93)  
KRH 4/11/2023

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS  
SUBJECT: Nancy's Conversation with Adams

Adams called unexpectedly today. Following is the memorandum of conversation.

Adams: I've been up all night -- I wanted to take the opportunity to give you an update before getting some sleep. I personally have been trying to keep the lid on here, no matter how it appears. The situation between Sunday and Wednesday was bad -- Catholic churches and schools were burned and Catholic families evicted from their homes. Then there was the murder of the taxi-driver and the blockading of towns. The Garvaghy Road business was bad, especially the tele-visual angle. The Ormeau Road (in Belfast) is still under curfew and has been for 40 hours now. The people are incensed; we are trying to keep them calm. Over 100 nationalists have been injured, some seriously, by the RUC. There were 40 people in the hospital in Derry and 30 in Belfast. One was hit in the head with plastic bullet and is clinically dead, on life support. Over 1400 plastic bullets were fired between 12:00 yesterday and 6:00 this morning. This is the kind of thing that needs quiet diplomatic efforts; the degree of reaction from the RUC is out of proportion.

Nancy: We got your message about trying to get through to speak to the Ormeau Road residents; I happened to talk to John Holmes and mentioned it to him. Did you get through?

Adams: Yes, after three and a half hours at the roadblock. It was surprising that a number of people in the U.S. sent faxes of support for the residents; they were delighted to get those messages.

Nancy: Many people here are watching the situation closely. I have been in touch with Tony. What is next? I know it is enormously difficult, but what are you pushing as a way forward?

Adams: First of all it will be absurd if the unionists can just walk back into the talks without penalty next week after walking

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/12/06

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out this week, while we are still excluded. I was heckled by the crowd yesterday -- just a little heckle, nothing I couldn't handle -- but Tom Hartley (a Sinn Fein official) was heckled badly for appealing for calm and talking about the peace process. There was a lack of evenness. The unionists, who would not engage with the people in either the Garvaghy Road (in Drumcree) or in the Lower Ormeau Road, were rewarded for it. They will keep behaving like that until someone stops them, like a spoiled child. Cardinal Cahal Daly (Catholic primate of Ireland), an intelligent man who is not sympathetic to republicans, is extremely angry. The headline in the "Irish News" read "Betrayal."

Nancy: We are thinking through here what to do. We should act quickly.

Adams: I will try to sit down tomorrow and think about that. John's and my initiative is still on stream, still out there. The response was positive. I had told John that Major was not in a political position to move positively but that was when the original decision was made on Garvaghy Road. Now the situation has changed, they have capitulated to one element. John and I will pursue it. He couldn't even get out to fly to London because the roads were blocked. The two governments need to move as well on their commitments. Even if things quiet down the SDLP is so cheesed off they could disengage from the talks, either mentally or actually. Nothing dramatic, they would just fade away. As I have been saying, the British have the key. They cannot deliver the unionists but they can move the situation along.

Nancy: On television it looked like 25 years ago.

Adams: Yes, it felt the same. I was on Cooper Road where I was in 1974. Now you have the children behaving the same as their parents did. I have said maybe the situation could shock people into awareness, act as a catalyst.

Nancy: Are there other things we can push? What about the proposal for a parades commission?

Adams: I myself think it is nonsense. There are 3000 parades each year and 18 at most that are contentious. The Orangemen have not played ball with the residents of the Garvaghy Road or the Ormeau. Other protests (by Catholics) have erupted spontaneously since but they have been peaceful. I myself have a rather easygoing attitude to Orange parades but today, for instance one lodge accompanied by one band was supposed to come down the Lower Ormeau Road; instead there were 500-600 people and five bands. You need to get the Orangemen to talk to residents.

Months ago I went to Martin Smyth (Grand Master of the Orange Order, UUP MP) and asked him to arrange meetings to help resolve this issue. If a commission comes up with a decision that does not sit with either community, you will have the same problem.

Nancy: We will keep talking to everyone and explore how to move forward.

Adams: We need to grab the process and move it.

Nancy: Let us know if you have any further thoughts. Are the loyalists okay?

Adams: I think so, wouldn't know, though they did kill that taxi man, blockaded roads, put families out.

Nancy: We hear it was unauthorized. Keep in touch.

Adams: Slan

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW  
SIT: NSC

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2011-0355-F (4.94)  
KBH 4/11/2023

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND PETERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/01  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: PM'S MEETING WITH SDLP LEADERS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL J HABIB, POLITICAL MIN-  
COUNS, AMEMBASSY LONDON. REASON: 1.5 (B)
2. WE MET JULY 18 WITH THE PM'S AIDE, EDWARD OAKDEN, TO  
DISCUSS JOHN MAJOR'S MEETING THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH SDLP  
LEADERS JOHN HUME, SEAMUS MALLON AND JOE HENDRON. OAKDEN SAID  
THE MEETING HAD, GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BEEN LESS NEGATIVE  
THAN ANTICIPATED. THE SDLP LEADERS, PARTICULARLY MALLON, HAD  
BEGUN BY EXPRESSING THE DEEP-SEATED ANGER OF THE NATIONALIST  
COMMUNITY OVER THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS WEEK. LED BY HUME,  
HOWEVER, THEY HAD SOON TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS.
3. HUME HAD STRESSED THE IMPERATIVE OF MOVING QUICKLY FROM  
PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION AT THE MULTI-PARTY TALKS.  
THOUGH HE HAD ISSUED NO ULTIMATUM, HUME HAD INDICATED THAT THE  
SDLP WAS PREPARED TO WALK OUT OF THE TALKS IF INSUFFICIENT  
PROGRESS WERE MADE IN THIS REGARD. HE HAD INDICATED THAT  
AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES SHOULD BE IN HAND BY THE SUMMER  
BREAK. HUME IMPLIED THAT THE SDLP COULD STILL SUBSCRIBE TO THE  
ARRANGEMENT ON PROCEDURES THAT HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION PRIOR  
TO DRUMCREE. (AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD LEAVE  
ON THE TABLE THE GROUND RULES CONTAINED IN THE MARCH PAPER  
DRAFTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BUT SEN. MITCHELL WOULD  
AGREE TO MAKE REFERENCE ONLY TO THOSE RULES THUS FAR WORKED  
OUT IN THE PROCEDURAL TALKS.) OAKDEN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT  
THIS WAS THE SOLUTION WHICH MITCHELL IS ADVOCATING AT THE  
MOMENT.
4. OAKDEN'S VIEW WAS THAT THIS WOULD BE A SOLUTION LIKELY TO  
FIND FAVOR WITH TRIMBLE SINCE THE UUP WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH  
THE MARCH PAPER. ACCORDING TO OAKDEN, CHANCES WERE MUCH LESS  
FAVORABLE THAT PAISLEY WOULD SUPPORT THIS ARRANGEMENT.  
THE QUESTION WOULD THEN BE WHETHER MITCHELL WAS PREPARED TO  
PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF 'SUFFICIENT CONSENT'. HMG, OAKDEN

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PAGE 02 OF 02

UNDERSCORED, IS VERY ANXIOUS TO MOVE SMARTLY TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF MARCHES, HUME HAD INDICATED TO THE PM THAT HE HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS IN WORKING OUT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY A COMPROMISE ON THE AUG. 10 APPRENTICESHIP BOYS MARCH IN LONDONDERRY. OAKDEN NOTED THAT MAYHEW WAS PRESENTING SOME IDEAS TO DICK SPRING AT THE IGC ON HOW THE COMMISSION ON MARCHES MIGHT WORK. THOUGH HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC, OAKDEN INDICATED THAT HMG THINKING WAS TO WORK OUT A GENERAL CODE OF PRACTICE FOR MARCHES BUT NOT TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM TO TAKE DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL EVENTS. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE HELD STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH DECISIONS AND LONDON DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE THIS ROLE FROM HIM. OAKDEN SAID BRITISH THINKING WAS TO ESTABLISH THE COMMISSION OR REVIEW BOARD BY THE END OF THE YEAR; THE AUG. 10 MARCH WOULD BE ADDRESSED AS A SEPARATE EXERCISE. )?

6. OAKDEN ALSO TOLD US:

--THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONJECTURE BUT NO REAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ENNISKILLEN HOTEL BOMBING. MOST OF THE SPECULATION CONTINUED TO CENTER ON THE INLA;

--ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS SUGGEST THAT THE IRA PLANS FURTHER ACTS OF TERROR IN ENGLAND. THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF A CEASE-FIRE.

--A PRIMARY REASON FOR THE ORIGINAL RUC DECISION TO BAN THE GARVACHY ROAD MARCH WAS SEVERAL REPORTS THAT THE IRA WOULD USE WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUS VIOLENCE AS A COVER FOR ATTACKS ON THE SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. CROWE ??

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>8784

<MSGID> M2322607

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KBH 7/11/2023**

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Gerry Adams (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake  
Gerry Adams

Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME July 21, 1996, 11:40 a.m. - 12:25 p.m.  
AND PLACE: White House/ConGen Belfast

Mr. Lake: It looks like all hell broke loose while I was in Asia. (U)

Gerry Adams: Once you leave town, things get difficult. (U)

Mr. Lake: I'll have to confine myself to my desk from here on. (U)

Mr. Adams: Let me give you a run-down on the situation. You're very aware, I am sure, of the events on the Garvaghy Road and the events on the Ormeau Road. The Orange brigades have been active and the attacks by the RUC on peaceful demonstrators and the curfewing of people for 36 hours has brought about a sea change of sorts. I don't know how deep-rooted it is or whether it is transient, but there is certainly extreme anger among the people. The Unionists have carried out a political coup d'etat. Trimble has shown the worst kind of leadership with the events at Drumcree and on Garvaghy Road. They threatened dire consequences for everyone and then blocked the roads throughout the six counties as well as blockading the airports and ports. In the Belfast area his followers marched through Catholic areas. They forced the eviction of Catholic families and committed the destruction of property. In the course of these actions, two Catholics were killed; one by the UVF and another by the British Army. (S)

Days before the Garvaghy Road event, on July 11, we were reasonably successful in keeping the lid on. I, and others, traveled -- we took a very hands-on approach. After the Garvaghy Road affair and later the Ormeau Road affair, things became very difficult. The best example of this is in Derry. Despite all the efforts by the Green Forces, including Martin McGuinness, we didn't manage to get it stopped. There were four nights of

violence. I think that is a measure of the anger that has been created. (S)

I have seen the last years of the peace process. The perception is that the Republicans have been doing their best to get to inclusive talks. There has been an absence of IRA action here (in Northern Ireland) for the last two years. Against that background you have seen demonstrations with a very large involvement of professionals such as doctors, solicitors and shopkeepers who actually had some chance of making a case for peace. The RUC fired plastic bullets. They fired only 339 against the loyalists but 20 times as many against the nationalists. At least 500-600 nationalists were injured and over 200 were hospitalized -- 65 in Derry alone. We thought a third nationalist would die. (S)

In the course of all this, we pursued our initiative. John Hume gave a letter to Major two weeks ago. He urged him to stand up against the Orangemen. John couldn't do it. He couldn't get into Derry. Hume has engaged Major since those events. But someone from your end needs to be talking to the British. The position that John Hume and I promoted remains on the table. We want assurances that these will be real talks; we want there to be some sort of timeframe, and we want confidence-building measures. As I told John Hume, all of this could be done privately by him or someone else as a go-between. The Brits have handled everything so badly. It may be possible after all this mayhem that they see the need to move forward. We are also talking with Dublin on the same terms, stressing the same things. (S)

I have raised, including with Nancy, that there is a small possibility that Mitchell could play a private role. I will suggest to Hume today that he brief Mitchell. I will arrange that Alex Reed also be briefed. I don't know if the Senator can do anything but he is in a pivotal role. He could play a Holbrooke-type role, especially with the British. I am not sure this will work but it is worth exploring. Our initiative is still there. The biggest job is to manage the situation that is building up around August 10. (S)

There are three Orange institutions: the Black P---s, the House of Orange and the Apprentice Boys; they will be marching on Derry. In August 1969, it was the Apprentice Boys' march that sparked one and a half years of condemnable agitation and 25 years of civil unrest. That is the history and the folk memory. The people in Derry now feel that the Apprentice Boys should not be allowed to march, especially after the despicable behavior of the Orangemen. We have said that all of this can be defused through dialogue. (S)

I have talked to John Hume. Martin McGuinness and George Mitchell wrote a statement yesterday. You should spend an hour reading the news clippings of the last weeks to get a sense of the situation. (S)

Mr. Lake: I saw a lot of what happened on CNN. (S)

Gerry Adams: A head of steam is building up among the Catholics -- indeed, it is more widely than just the Catholics. Trimble was there yesterday, insisting that the marches go ahead. Popular sentiment is not to allow them to march into Derry. My personal preference is that they conduct a dignified protest well away from the march. We have confidence; we believe in pluralism, not division. We don't have a problem with others parading or marching. The difficulty is that they refuse to talk to the people regarding the Garvaghy Road incident. Now they've refused for an entire year to talk. People in Derry can't be treated like that. If you don't talk, you don't walk. (S)

We -- Sinn Fein, the SDLP and others -- have asked Dublin to work out an agreed accommodation that satisfies the marchers. We have also asked Dublin to ask the British to get a similar arrangement among the Unionists. We're getting church leaders and others to serve as conduits or contacts. We understand that the Loyalists favor a dialogue. We made known our views to them. We will make the same public calls for dialogue and accommodation. (S)

Lastly, I need to say something about the talks at Stormont. We had a two-hour meeting in Dublin yesterday. We have no confidence whatsoever in these talks. The other thing that is creating difficulties is the fact that John Major will be meeting with the Loyalist parties on Monday and this again is sending the wrong signal. I have no objection to his meeting with them, but it seems like the Loyalists and Unionists are being rewarded while the Republicans are still excluded. The Unionists and Loyalists clearly broke the Mitchell principles in the last few days. They withdrew from the talks and engineered a show of intimidation which will erode the situation further. One plus is that the traditional IRA response, which would have been military, wasn't. This is a signal to the others that the whole situation is precarious, especially if there is an upheaval around August 10 and also if there are parades in the run-up to August 10. (S)

Mr. Lake: I did see much of this on CNN and Nancy filled me in on your conversations. I know how deep the anger is running in the North. We need to think about how we can move forward. We cannot let the past defeat the future. I'd like to ask you some questions about three issues: 1) how do we get through

August 10; 2) how do we get the talks on track in terms of setting an agenda and agreed procedures (George Mitchell has been working hard on all this, I know); and 3) what is it that you need to get the cease-fire restored? On the first point we will be talking to the British and everyone else, urging flexibility and restraint so that the situation doesn't blow up. What about the marches between now and August 10? (C)

Gerry Adams: I don't think there are any major marches before August 10 but there may be some banned parades. There was one small parade last night which led to trouble when it occurred last year. The real focus has to be on August 10 itself. (C)

Mr. Lake: It doesn't bother me if the Brits are talking to the Loyalists. The key variable, in talking with McMichael and Ervine, is to keep them restrained. The event in Dublin was a concern, but if they are not restrained, the whole thing will go down the drain. (C)

Gerry Adams: I don't object to the meetings but the public will draw comparisons to the fact that the Catholics are excluded. (C)

Mr. Lake: We will be working on everyone to be as flexible as they can. What you can do will be very important. On number two, George Mitchell has been working very hard to keep the talks as substantive as possible to get the procedures agreed. We have been trying to keep at arm's length from the talks, but I will speak to George as well as to the British and Irish governments. I am frankly confused about what it is that you are asking of the British. Some of what you said to me differs from what John Hume said to the British. His letter was more general and not as specific. We don't want to get into the middle but we do need more clarity on what you want. (C)

Gerry Adams: Let me explain: for me, either for practical or strategic reasons, the IRA should restore the cessation in order to move the process forward, as well as to wrongfoot the other elements. There are those who would favor that among the IRA. But you need to understand the reality. The IRA was very disciplined this week. It took no action despite the provocations and the real anger. Those of us who tried to calm the situation were heckled and jostled. Those who favor or are open to a cessation say that the last cessation didn't have any assurances from the British in an upfront way. That is the difficulty with respect to the angling over decommissioning. People are asking whether John Major will deal with the next cessation in the same way that he did the last one. (C)

What we are saying is that we want from the British an assurance that there will be no preconditions (especially with respect to decommissioning) and some sense of an agreed timeframe for the talks. It is now July 21, the talks began on June 10. They are not negotiating for advantage but stalling. If they can do this over the agenda points, then they can prolong the talks in perpetuity over issues like decommissioning. That is why we need a timeframe. But I think this can easily be worked out. (C)

The SDLP and the Irish government -- and probably the Alliance Party and the Loyalists -- have the same position. Our third point is that there need to be some confidence-building measures -- some sense that the British are showing a commitment to serious talks. All these points are in the letter to Major, as I recall. The letter also requested a meeting with the British at the official level. We said that if it was too dangerous for John Major to have the British meet with the Sinn Fein, then formulations could be passed back and forth privately. But it is difficult without a meeting. (C)

In sum, we were quite precise on what we need from the British. Let me stress that the most serious is the first issue. But everything that we have described will be of no avail if the August 10 business is not handled properly. I am at one with you. We need to have a strategic view. There is no point having a standoff that puts the whole peace process off. An accommodation must be sought -- a universal accommodation. As I told Kathy Stephens earlier, if through a dialogue we can get a resolution of the August 10 situation, then this would send a strong signal to the people who have no confidence now that there is a positive element -- that we can, in fact, get an accommodation. (C)

Mr. Lake: It seems to me that the two are not unlinked. If things go badly on August 10, it will blow the talks. But if more people believe the talks are getting somewhere, then they are less likely to take desperate actions on August 10. Everyone should use the events of the last few weeks to drive home how terrible the future could be if we go back to the past. Both governments need to make statements pointing out the shock of recognition. We will talk to everyone. If George Mitchell can succeed in setting the agenda and procedures in a way that is reassuring with respect to decommissioning, then you have come out ahead, not just the British. It would be different from the first ceasefire. Then we were just talking about talking. Now, if Mitchell succeeds, there will be talks with an agreed agenda beginning in September. That is a big difference objectively on the ground. (C)

Gerry Adams: I have only been trying to convey to you the deep sense of anger. For example, after the two governments met and I met with the Irish government and gave a detailed breakdown of the situation, Mayhew responded that there could be no guarantee that what happened at Drumcree wouldn't happen again and that the RUC wouldn't put down the protest in the same way. (S)

Mr. Lake: When did he say that? (S)

Gerry Adams: On Friday. He reminds me of someone who is sulking because he was caught out and is trying to convince you that it wasn't his fault. That was the type of remark which expresses the British lack of will as I see it. (S)

Mr. Lake: You shouldn't take every offhand remark from Mayhew as reflecting official British policy. (S)

Gerry Adams: But it shows that the British feel that they can trample on the rights of people in the Garvaghy Road. I believe we can get the peace process back on the rails. But you need to understand where the anger is at. (S)

Mr. Lake: I understand. When I spoke to Nancy Soderberg from Bangkok, she said that the first thing that I needed to understand was the degree of anger that had been stirred up. (S)

Gerry Adams: Secondly, the Irish government isn't doing it, but the British government is pretending that it's business as usual. It would be good if there were an agreement by the end of next week. They will recommend that talks begin with all issues in parallel, including decommissioning. But there should be no doubt that there will be much cynicism about portraying that as a breakthrough or a progressive step by the Unionists. If by September the British don't have the will then we will, not be able to drive the carriage through. (S)

Mr. Lake: I am not arguing that the Unionists will have had an epiphany or that an age of good feelings will have emerged. I am just saying that you can use with the IRA the fact that, whatever people's feelings may be or your calculations of their motives, unlike in the case of the first ceasefire, there will be a process in place with an agenda and with decommissioning handled in parallel with other issues rather than up front. To argue that the situation is the same as with the first ceasefire would be dishonest. (S)

Gerry Adams: I agree with that. I am not arguing with you over that. I believe that even those in the IRA who have been resisting another cessation would know that when an agenda has been put together in a democratic way, the imperative for a new

cessation would have to be met positively. So, I understand the logic of what you are saying. But if the Unionists or the RUC are unleashed against defenseless Catholics again, it will be seen as evidence that HMG does not have the will to deal with David Trimble. What is of utmost importance is that you talk to the British in terms of an accommodation around these marches. Secondly, you should, on the one hand, get positively engaged around the Hume-Adams efforts to get a cessation and, on the other hand, assist what George Mitchell is trying to achieve. Without those steps, the popular feeling will be too strong. How long are you going to be in Washington? (e)

Mr. Lake: I don't dare leave now. (e)

Gerry Adams: Yes, you need to stay put. I have been keeping in close touch with Nancy through Mairead. The time to resolve the parade business is now. The British tend to leave things like this until the eve of the problem. We cannot leave this issue till August 9. (e)

Mr. Lake: Certainly calling it a law enforcement issue and staying out of it is not sufficient. (e)

Gerry Adams: Yes, any attempt to refer to this problem as simply a security matter is a red flag and a dangerous signal. All of these matters are political issues. I have no doubt that Mayhew, at a personal level, is aggrieved by the antics of the Orangemen. Any decent English person, including those running this place, can't be satisfied. But the problem needs to be dealt with in a fair and evenhanded way. (e)

Mr. Lake: We need to find a way not to go over the cliff but to find a springboard for progress. We will make a round of calls. (e)

Gerry Adams: To conclude, my view is that David Trimble has overstretched himself. The right wing of Unionism that he represents may believe that it scored a victory. But the more thinking elements, the decent Orangemen and Unionists, may want to pull back from the edge of the abyss. We need to give them encouragement. (e)

Mr. Lake: I suspect Trimble may feel that he went too far. (e)

Gerry Adams: I hope so. Thanks again. (e)

Mr. Lake: We will work on it. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (4.96)  
KBH 4/11/2023

*my March*  
*-loyalist*  
*cease*  
*prisoners*

July 13, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Northern Ireland Peace Process

We need to use the debacle of the past week to push hard for progress in the peace process. There are three things we need to do.

1. First, we need to be sure that John Hume participates when the Belfast talks reconvene July 16. (See my e-mail of July 12.) You should call him and sound him out on his intentions. If he is at all undecided, you should argue strongly that he should return to the talks, pointing out that he cannot be seen to be one to put an end to this process. You should also make the point that the nationalists have the high ground now and should keep it. He will probably tell you he does plan to withdraw the SDLP from the forum; I think you should urge him to reconsider doing that.

2. The British are not arguing that the Drumcree decision was a good one; merely that the alternative would have been worse. They are well aware that in the eyes of the world they crumbled before a mob and allowed the threat of force to dictate their decisions. You need to persuade them to redeem themselves with bolder efforts to get the cease-fire restored (even though HMG will fear being accused of caving first to one side and then the other). The most obvious way to do that would be a meeting between Sinn Fein and British officials at the sub-ministerial-level (Ancram's deputy Quentin Thomas). This would strengthen Adams' credibility with the IRA leadership and avoid possible misunderstandings if John Hume is in the middle of the process.

Since it would be in Adams' interest to have such a meeting become public, you would have to get his agreement to keep it quiet, assuming that is the British preference. You would also have to nail down with Adams what he should seek to accomplish in such a meeting and hold him to it. He would have to explain what he needs to take to the IRA in order to get the cease-fire restored and be prepared to agree on what form the assurances should take. The opportunity will be squandered if Adams tries

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 7/13/06

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to leverage it into an open-ended channel of communication or a separate negotiating forum.

It will not be easy to get the British to agree to this; you may want to send a letter from the President to Major or arrange a phone call. If the British are adamant about not meeting Sinn Fein, you will have to act as go-between. You should get Adams to spell out in concrete terms what he needs from the British. If what is required is a public statement reiterating that the talks will be serious, that decommissioning will not be a roadblock and that there will be some kind of timeframe, that should be do-able. If Adams adds actual confidence-building measures to the list, like concessions on prisoners, police reform, etc., that will probably sink the initiative. (It would amount to a separate negotiation.)

3. Without endorsing any particular Irish proposal, we need to urge the British to respond positively and quickly to the ideas the Irish will advance at Thursday's meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (Spring-Mayhew). They will argue for a parades commission to make the tough decisions on disputed marches, which would (and should) have input from the police and affected communities. We should urge both governments to try and make this happen *before* the next round of disputed marches (around August 10-12) rather than assuming it cannot be operational before next year.

The other Irish proposal is to impose a timetable on the talks. This probably means that the two governments would ensure that the procedural and agenda discussions would be completed before the talks adjourn at the end of this month so that substantive talks in the three strands can begin when the talks reconvene September 2. Another option to give the sense of urgency would be to have the talks continue through August, but I doubt anyone would be enthusiastic about that. You should talk to Mitchell about what kind of timetable he would like to see.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG *NS*

SUBJECT: Call to Adams

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0355-F (4.97)  
KBH 7/11/2023

The purpose of your call is to:

1. Clarify exactly what Adams needs from the British in order to obtain a cease-fire.
2. Discuss with Adams what steps the U.S. might take that could be helpful (statement etc.)
3. Urge him to engage constructively in parade issue.

Below are the discrepancies on what Adams needs:

Adams' points to TL:

1. Issue of decommissioning resolved as part of other issues, not as a precondition.
2. Real, substantive talks.
3. Confidence building measures such as prisoners, etc.
4. Clear statement that he can get the cease-fire restored if he gets all three points.

Adams' letter to Major (attached):

1. Removal of reluctance of the British to move to all party negotiations.
2. Removal of precondition of decommissioning.
3. British assurances that these obstacles will not be resurrected.
4. Direct dialogue with Sinn Fein.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify on: 7/19/06

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Major response to Hume:

1. SF must show good faith on decommissioning.
2. Convince British IRA cease-fire will be real next time.
3. Commit to Mitchell principles.
4. Accept outcome of talks.
5. Rejection of a meeting at this time (points to Feb. 26 official meeting when SF only asked for a firm date).
6. Agreement to review future requests for meetings.

Hume's points to NES:

1. Talks are deadly serious, comprehensive, inclusive, etc.
2. Something about a time frame, i.e. "determined to get an agreement asap."
3. Decommissioning not as a precondition.

MAP argues that we should urge Adams not to raise confidence building measures at this stage as the British would interpret them as trying to negotiate entry into the talks. Below are suggested talking points. Note: he may not know we have seen his letter to Major. Holmes sent it to us.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points

Tab B Hume/Adams Initiative cable

Points for Call to Adams

- Had a good trip to Asia. Sorry to hear about all the problems last week.
- Nancy has filled me in on your conversations of last week and I think I have a very good idea of the deep anger that exists.
- Want to talk today about how we move forward, not about last week.
- First, important that the parades in August go smoothly. Understand discussions ongoing. Simply have to ensure there is prior agreement on how to handle.
- Second, important to move forward on your effort to get cease-fire restored. [If asked: we, the British and Irish won't drop that demand]
- Third, believe there is some confusion on exactly what you need in order to convince IRA to restore cease-fire. Your letter was vague and John Hume phrased his presentation slightly differently.
- Want to clarify:
  - 1) Talks need to be substantive and address the key issues. I believe once Mitchell succeeds in setting the agenda and procedures, that should be clear. What else do you need? Statements from US? British?
  - 2) Assurances that decommissioning will not be or resurface as a precondition. Again, believe Mitchell's efforts should provide comfort in that area. What else do you need?[Direct dialogue, CBM's -- I'd not raise unless he does]
- Understand Mitchell had some difficult talks this week but the process continues.
- Best approach is to get Mitchell's work done so the substantive talks can begin in September.
- How can we be helpful in working your proposal with the British?
- I understand they have responded to your letter. What is the next step? [Adams and NES discussed earlier whether Mitchell could help]

Kessinger, Jodi

---

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.  
To: Kessinger, Jodi  
Cc: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Number 10 message ~~SECRET~~  
Date: Friday, July 19, 1996 12:23PM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BAKERJ, HARMON, LAKEA, SUM, SUM2, BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMONPTR, LAKE, SENS, SIT{C2}, SODERBERG, HOTLINE\_IN, PETERS, VERSHBOW

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PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:092100Z JUL 96

FM: CABINET OFFICE

TO:  
WHITE HOUSE

////

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (4.99)  
KBH 7/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABO CHANNELS  
QQQQ  
TO MS NANCY SODERBERG  
TEXT  
BT

FROM THE PRIVATE SECRETARY 9 JULY 1996

DEAR NANCY,

HUME/ADAMS INITIATIVE

WE HAVE SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE APPROACH TO THE PRIME MINISTER LAST WEEK BY JOHN HUME. YOU MAY FIND HELPFUL A FEW MORE DETAILS. AS YOU KNOW, MR. HUME TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT, ON THE BASIS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GERRY ADAMS, IF WE COULD MAKE A FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENT - TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SERIOUS, COMPREHENSIVE AND INCLUSIVE, THAT IN OUR VIEW SOME DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD TAKE PLACE DURING NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN AS A PRECONDITION, AND THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO LOOK AT OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES - THE IRA WOULD BE READY TO DECLARE AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE. THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER SUGGESTIONS THAT SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO LIKE SOME KIND OF TIMEFRAME FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

... JOHN HUME ALSO GAVE THE PRIME MINISTER THE ATTACHED LETTER FROM GERRY ADAMS WHICH, AS YOU WILL SEE, FOCUSES MORE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

... THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW SENT THE ENCLOSED LETTER TO JOHN HUME TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR.

YOURS EVER,

JOHN HOLMES

MS NANCY SODERBERG

JOHN MAJOR, MP  
PRIME MINISTER  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON  
26/6/96

A CHARA,

I AM WRITING DIRECTLY TO YOU IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE WHETHER WE CAN COLLECTIVELY IDENTIFY A MEANS TO SALVAGE THE PEACE PROCESS.

I HAVE SAID A NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE RECENT PAST THAT I BELIEVE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT STILL EXISTS. CLEARLY HOWEVER THIS OPPORTUNITY IS DIMINISHING AND THE SLIDE BACK TO CONFLICT QUICKENS.

RECENT EVENTS HAVE CAUSED ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR ALL OF US. DESPITE THIS I AM CONVINCED THAT WE CAN DEVISE A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE WHICH PRESENTLY EXISTS BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE WE CAN SALVAGE THE PEACE PROCESS BEFORE IT IS TERMINALLY DAMAGED.

RECENT IRA ATTACKS IN ENGLAND HAVE CREATED GRAVE DIFFICULTIES FOR YOU. I DO NOT ATTEMPT TO MINIMISE THESE BUT THIS IS THE REALITY WHICH OBTAINS AT THIS TIME. THIS IS NOT TO EXCUSE OR JUSTIFY THESE ATTACKS. THEY ARE CLEARLY A SYMPTOM OF A DEEPER PROBLEM. THE SINN FEIN PEACE STRATEGY IS ABOUT RESOLVING ALL THIS AND BRINGING ARMED STRUGGLE, FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, TO AN END. THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING.

MANY PEOPLE WITHIN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE SCEPTICAL ABOUT SINN FEIN'S SINCERITY ON THIS. BUT FOR THE PAST 9 YEARS THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE GUN PERMANENTLY FROM IRISH POLITICS. IN SHORT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DEVELOP A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO CONFLICT AND, WHILE DOING SO, TO BRING A POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY WITH US.

A SLOW AND PAINSTAKING PROCESS OF DIALOGUE WITHIN NATIONALIST IRELAND AND IRISH AMERICA, COUPLED WITH THE ASSURANCES WHICH YOU AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT GAVE THAT INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOLLOW AN IRA CESSATION. ALLOWED US TO CONVINCING THE IRA LEADERSHIP THAT THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT FOR A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THIS LED TO THE IRA CESSATION IN AUGUST 1994. WHILE YOU MAY NOT AGREE WITH THE REPUBLICAN OR NATIONALIST VIEW OF YOUR STEWARDSHIP OF THE PROCESS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TRY TO SEE THIS FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE IF YOU ARE TO GET AN INSIGHT INTO THE REASONS FOR THE DEEPENING OF DISTRUST OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUENCY AND THE SUBSEQUENT END OF THE CESSATION.

ONCE THE IRA ANNOUNCED THEIR CESSATION, THE PEACE PROCESS WENT INTO STAGNATION, PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RELUCTANCE TO MOVE, WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD, INTO ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS AND YOUR INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW PRECONDITION OF DECOMMISSIONING. AT THE VERY TIME WHEN IT WAS MOST NECESSARY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN THE EFFICACY OF PEACEFUL POLITICS, CONFIDENCE WAS BEING STEADILY ERODED. THIS HAS IN TURN MADE THE TASK OF THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE A COLLAPSED PEACE PROCESS.

*Remove reluctance  
of Brits to move to  
all party negot.  
Remove precondition  
of decommissioning*

FROM MY CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE IRA IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY VIEW THE STANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AS THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO A RESTORATION OF THEIR CESSATION. IT IS THEIR VIEW (AND

ONE WHICH IS SHARED BY MANY OTHERS) THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ACTED IN BAD FAITH, ATTEMPTING TO USE THE IRA CESSATION AS A MEANS OF DEFEATING THE IRA. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE DEMAND FOR DECOMMISSIONING IN ADVANCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS VIEWED.

IF WE ARE TO MOVE FORWARD IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THESE OBSTACLES BECAUSE THIS IS HOW THEY ARE VIEWED, ARE NOT RESURRECTED AND THAT ASSURANCES TO THAT EFFECT ARE PROVIDED. HOW THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION.

*Not movement  
obstacles  
provide assurances.*

THE MEETINGS BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE NOT HAD THE REQUIRED EFFECT OF MOVING TOWARDS AN AGREED SETTLEMENT OR IN GENERATING CONFIDENCE IN THE COMMITMENT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR AN INCLUSIVE, NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT.

IF THE PRESENT TALKS UNDERWAY AT STORMONT ARE THE BEGINNING OF A SERIOUS EFFORT, ON YOUR PART, TO MOVE TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT, THEN YOU CLEARLY HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO CONVINC THOSE WHO ARE SCEPTICAL OF YOUR INTENTIONS THAT THEIR SUSPICIONS ARE ILL-FOUNDED.

*Direct dialogue  
of SF*

THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF CONVINCING IRISH REPUBLICANS OF YOUR GOOD INTENTIONS IS THROUGH DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. SUCH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD ADDRESS AND POSSIBLY OVERCOME THE DEEP SUSPICION AND DISTRUST WHICH EXISTS ON THE PART OF IRISH REPUBLICANS AND WHICH I AM IN NO DOUBT EXISTS ON YOUR SIDE ALSO.

WITH POLITICAL WILL I AM SURE THAT AN AGREED MEANS TO BRING THIS ABOUT CAN BE ACHIEVED.

THIS IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SINN FEIN'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO BE AT THE STORMONT TALKS ON THE BASIS OF THE MANDATE WE RECEIVED ON MAY 30. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ASSERT THIS RIGHT.

I WOULD URGE YOU TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR URGENT CONSIDERATION AND I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE.

IS MISE LE MEAS

GERRY ADAMS

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER  
IN CONFIDENCE  
DEAR JOHN,

WHEN WE MET ON 2 JULY, I SAID I WOULD CONSIDER WHAT YOU HAD SAID, TOGETHER WITH THE LETTER FROM MR. ADAMS OF 26 JUNE WHICH YOU GAVE ME.

THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, SHARED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, HAS OFTEN BEEN SET OUT IN PUBLIC. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT IT.

WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE COMPREHENSIVE AND INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDER WAY IN BELFAST SINCE 10 JUNE. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO SECURE AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND WILL ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES RELEVANT TO THAT. AS YOU KNOW, ANY PARTICIPANT CAN RAISE ANY ISSUE. NO OUTCOME IS PRE-DETERMINED OR EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE, OR LIMITED BY ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT. BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE CLEAR, IN

THE GROUND RULES AND ELSEWHERE, THEIR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA IS ADDRESSED WITH A VIEW TO OVERCOMING ANY OBSTACLES WHICH MAY ARISE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY, AS SPEEDILY AS WE CAN.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE, WITH OR WITHOUT SINN FEIN. THE REQUIREMENT FOR SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION REMAINS AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. OBVIOUSLY IRA ATTACKS MAKE IT PROGRESSIVELY HARDER TO CONVINCE THE GOVERNMENT, AND OTHERS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WILL BE GENUINE AND UNEQUIVOCAL.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE INTERNATIONAL BODYS PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL APPROACH THIS ON THE BASIS OF SECURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODYS REPORT, INCLUDING ITS PROPOSAL FOR SOME DECOMMISSIONING DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, IN A PROCESS WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES NEITHER VICTORY NOR DEFEAT. IF SINN FEIN WISH TO JOIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS FOR SINN FEIN AND THE IRA TO CONSIDER HOW THEY CAN NOW DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY, THROUGH THEIR WORDS AND ACTIONS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE IS GENUINE AND UNEQUIVOCAL AND NOT MERELY A FURTHER TACTICAL DEVICE. IN THE LIGHT OF THE MANCHESTER BOMB AND OTHER ATTACKS, IT IS FOR THEM TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR GOOD FAITH.

*Good faith in decommissioning*

WILL THE IRA TREAT ANY CEASEFIRE THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE AND ABANDON IT WITHOUT WARNING WHENEVER THEY WANT TO? IS THE IRA READY TO BRING TO AN END THE VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH PERSISTED THROUGHOUT THE CEASEFIRE AND HAVE CONTINUED SINCE? HOW, SINCE THERE IS NOW INEVITABLY SUCH GRAVE MISTRUST OF THE IRAS INTENTIONS, DO THEY PROPOSE TO CONVINCE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAT THEIR WORD SHOULD NOW BE RELIED ON?

*Convince Brits of IRA ceasefire for real*

WILL SINN FEIN, IF THEY ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS, MAKE A TOTAL AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE, AS ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY DONE? DO SINN FEIN ACCEPT THAT THE OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE FREELY AGREED BY THE PARTICIPANTS, WITH NO OUTCOME PRE-DETERMINED OR EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE? DO SINN FEIN ACCEPT THE NEED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS THE MITCHELL PROPOSALS ON DECOMMISSIONING? IF SO, WILL SINN FEIN BE ABLE AT THAT STAGE TO SHOW THEIR INTENT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODYS REPORT?

*Mitchell principles accept not come*

THESE ARE QUESTIONS SINN FEIN NEED TO CONSIDER IF THEY GENUINELY WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. IF IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED CONVINCINGLY THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA GENUINELY WANT TO TAKE FORWARD THEIR OBJECTIVES BY EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS, THAT WOULD BE GREATLY IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND MORE WIDELY, AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.

I AM ALWAYS HAPPY TO SEE YOU ON ANY MATTER TO DO WITH NORTHERN IRELAND. AS FOR MINISTERIAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, THAT REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY PURPOSE OR JUSTIFICATION IN A MEETING WITH OFFICIALS SUCH AS OCCURRED ON 26 FEBRUARY WHEN, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED, SINN FEIN WANTED ONLY A FIRM DATE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS. ANY REQUEST FOR A SIMILAR MEETING WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THE BASIS OF THE CASE MADE FOR IT AND IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING, CRUCIALLY, EVENTS ON THE GROUND.

YOURS SINCERELY,

*Consider requests*

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Wp

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR KERRICK SIT SODERBERG STEINBERG  
SIT: HARMON PETERS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000790

NODIS

NSC FOR BERGER AND STEINBERG FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/07

TAGS: PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: SINN FEIN AND HMG TRADE "QUESTIONS" RELATING TO  
TERMS FOR POSSIBLE IRA CEASEFIRE

THIS IS A RETRANSMISSION OF DUBLIN 774 WITH A NEW MESSAGE  
REFERENCE NUMBER AND MCN'S.

1. CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JEAN KENNEDY SMITH. REASON 1.5 (D).

2. ~~(S)~~ DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO SECRETARY'S PARTY AND  
OTHER ADDRESSEES AS APPROPRIATE.

3. ~~(S)~~ JOHN HUME CALLED ME LAST NIGHT TO SAY THAT,  
FOLLOWING CONVERSATIONS WITH SANDY BERGER AND JIM  
STEINBERG, HE WOULD BE FORWARDING THE DOCUMENTS BELOW.  
THESE DOCUMENTS WERE RELAYED TO ME TODAY VIA SEAN  
O'HUIGINN AT THE IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE  
DOCUMENTS CONSIST OF TWO LISTS OF QUESTIONS, ONE PREPARED  
BY SINN FEIN, THE OTHER BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,  
CONCERNING THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THE IRA MIGHT DECLARE A  
CEASEFIRE AND SINN FEIN MIGHT BE ADMITTED TO THE STORMONT  
TALKS. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE.

SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

/-----

4. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT OF SINN FEIN DOCUMENT "POSSIBLE  
QUESTIONS TO BRITISH" (NOTE INTERNAL NUMBERING):

1. DOES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMAIN OPERATIONALLY  
COMMITTED TO INCLUSIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND UNDERSTANDINGS SET OUT  
IN THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WHICH THEY HAVE AGREED WITH THE  
IRISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE?

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2011-0355-F (5.00)  
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2. WHAT ARE THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE COMMITMENTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF SINN FEIN IN A MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATING PROCESS?

3. WHAT ASSURANCE IS THERE THAT ENGAGEMENT ON THE KEY POLITICAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT, WHICH MUST BE THE PURPOSE OF ANY MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATION, WILL NOT BE THWARTED BY RECOURSE TO UNREASONABLE OR UNDELIVERABLE PRECONDITIONS?

*Prima*

4. WHAT ASSURANCE IS THERE THAT UNIONIST POLITICIANS, AS THE INCUMBENTS AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE STATUS QUO, WILL NOT SIMPLY EXPLOIT THAT ADVANTAGE TO STALL INDEFINITELY, IN EFFECT USING AN OPEN-ENDED NEGOTIATING PROCESS AS A TACTICAL INSTRUMENT TO WARD OFF, RATHER THAN TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL CHANGE?

5. IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE LACK OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS SO FAR. WHAT CONTRIBUTION WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MAKE TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE EVENT OF AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE?

END TEXT OF SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

BRITISH GOVERNMENT QUESTIONS

/-----

5. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF "QUESTIONS FROM HMG" (NOTE INTERNAL NUMBERING) :

1. WHAT ASSURANCE WILL THERE BE THAT, IF THE IRA DECLARE AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, IT WILL INDEED BY GENUINELY UNEQUIVOCAL, THAT IS TO SAY LASTING AND NOT SIMPLY A TACTICAL DEVICE, AND HOW WOULD THAT ASSURANCE BE REFLECTED IN WORDS AND DEEDS?

2. WHEN SINN FEIN JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY WILL NEED TO MAKE A TOTAL AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL PRINCIPLES. IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE IRA, WHAT ASSURANCES WILL THERE BE THAT THE IRA WILL NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS OR ALTER ANY ASPECT OF THE AGREED OUTCOME WITH WHICH THEY DISAGREE?

3. IS IT THE CASE THAT IF SINN FEIN WERE TO JOIN THE INCLUSIVE TALKS PROCESS, THEY WOULD BE READY TO ABIDE BY ALL THE AGREED PROVISIONS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE?

4. DO SINN FEIN UNDERSTAND THAT IF THEY WERE TO JOIN THE INCLUSIVE TALKS THEY WOULD FIRST OF ALL HAVE TO COMMIT

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THEMSELVES TO THE PRINCIPLES IN PARAGRAPH 20 OF THE MITCHELL REPORT AND THAT IF DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY DEMONSTRABLY DISHONOURED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THOSE PRINCIPLES, THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

5. MARTIN MCGUINNESS SAID, IN A STATEMENT OF 14 NOVEMBER 1996, THAT THE ISSUE OF ARMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH TO THE  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000790

NODIS

NSC FOR BERGER AND STEINBERG FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/07

TAGS: PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: SINN FEIN AND HMG TRADE "QUESTIONS" RELATING TO TERMS FOR POSSIBLE IRA CEASEFIRE

SATISFACTION OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT, FOR THAT TO HAPPEN, THE ONLY LIKELY AREA OF AGREEMENT IS AROUND THE COMPROMISE APPROACH SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 34 AND 35 OF THE MITCHELL REPORT AND WHICH THE REPORT ASKS ALL PARTIES TO CONSIDER. IS SINN FEIN PREPARED TO ENDORSE THAT COMPROMISE APPROACH TO DECOMMISSIONING, UNDER WHICH SOME DECOMMISSIONING WOULD TAKE PLACE DURING THE PROCESS OF ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS?

6. WHAT CONTRIBUTION WOULD SINN FEIN AND THE IRA EXPECT TO MAKE TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THE EVENT OF A RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE, BEARING IN MIND THE OBSERVATIONS IN CHAPTER VII OF THE MITCHELL REPORT?

END TEXT OF HMG QUESTIONS. SMITH

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/27/96

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (S.01)  
KBH 4/11/2023

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *ML*

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Critical Days Approach

Following up on our initiative to crack the current stalemate in Northern Ireland, I sent a synopsis of our thinking to Prime Minister Major's private secretary John Holmes, and then spoke with Holmes on November 27. In a very frank but still friendly conversation, I explained to Holmes why we thought our scenario would work -- and why the British alternative of simply publishing their view on how Sinn Fein could enter negotiations would not. Holmes understood what we are trying to do, yet was resistant. He feared our involvement would become public and generally was concerned about how the approach would play out. This is not surprising; it is a very sensitive area for the British.

Nonetheless, Holmes did not reject our initiative but asked for more time to consider it. Meanwhile, I asked that he give us advance warning if the British, under much pressure to clarify where they stand on matters, decide to go ahead and publish their position. In that event, I might ask that you call the Prime Minister.

We are keeping this extremely close-hold, but those who know -- Peter Tarnoff at State, Ambassador Crowe, George Mitchell and Prime Minister Bruton -- all agree that we are on the right track.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 23, 1996

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2011-0355-F (5.02)  
K8H 4/11/2023

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: New U.S. Initiative on Northern Ireland

Purpose

To obtain your concurrence for a new initiative on Northern Ireland.

Background

The Northern Ireland peace process is at a critical juncture. Either the IRA will reinstate its ceasefire and Sinn Fein will enter inclusive talks or IRA hardliners will soon lead the organization back to war and effectively kill the peace process until after the British elections this spring. For months now, the British and Sinn Fein have been talking past one another. In addition, the unionists in Northern Ireland are making more strident demands on the issue of decommissioning paramilitary weapons as Major's parliamentary majority declines.

On the other hand, we sense that because they see the dangers ahead, both the British and Sinn Fein want a deal and are prepared to seize one -- if it is properly packaged. What must happen is fairly straightforward but difficult to accomplish given the level of distrust. First, each side must reduce its demands on the other to a minimum in order to make progress possible -- the process has become bogged down in detail. Second, a precise and agreed sequence of events is needed to get around the political need of each side to have the other move first.

The broad elements of such a scenario: The talks are likely to be suspended soon until January -- a fact that will create a natural period between an IRA ceasefire and Sinn Fein's entry into talks. Once the talks are suspended, the British offer inclusive, comprehensive talks by the end of January and agree to stay with the Mitchell formula of parallel decommissioning of arms. They also commit to review progress of the talks after six months. The IRA calls an unequivocal ceasefire and publicly accepts the Mitchell Principles on non-violence and democratic methods as well as parallel decommissioning. Privately, the

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British and IRA agree that the IRA will stop targeting and training.

The pre-cooked sequence of events would involve first a summit between Major and Bruton at which the British position outlined above is announced. The IRA ceasefire would follow very quickly after the Summit. We would also offer Adams a visit to the White House after a ceasefire, perhaps a Major visit here early in the year. Sinn Fein would meet with the British, Irish and Mitchell during the Christmas break in the all-party talks.

Throughout the last two years, we have avoided putting forward formal American proposals or overtly pressing the parties. I believe, however, that the only hope of moving the process forward is to table a proposal and push it on all sides.

Irish ambassador Gallagher agreed that this approach could work when we discussed it very informally the morning of November 23. The State Department agrees with the idea and we are checking with Justice regarding the Adams invitation to the white House. In addition, Senators Kennedy and Dodd called this week to encourage you to take an active role in trying to overcome the current stalemate. I suggest we proceed along the following lines:

- A) See if the Irish agree with this approach; we think they will.
- B) Given British sensitivities, you would then write John Major (attached message). The letter states that I will approach his private secretary John Holmes with a proposal to break the logjam. Our role would remain private.
- C) If Major agrees, and I can work out a scenario with Holmes, we and the Irish would then put the package to Sinn Fein, stressing that this is the last best chance for peace. We and the British would work on Trimble.

This strategy is not without risks. We could well fail. Nevertheless, the risks of doing nothing are still greater.

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WHITE HOUSE  
CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ANTHONY LAKE TO JOHN HOLMES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

BELOW IS THE PROPOSED SCENARIO WE DISCUSSED. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING IT WITH YOU.

PROPOSED SCENARIO

AN IRA CEASE-FIRE AND SINN FEIN ENTRY INTO THE STORMONT TALKS ARE POSSIBLE IF ALL SIDES KEEP DEMANDS UPON ONE ANOTHER TO THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM.

A PRECISE CHOREOGRAPHY OF STATEMENTS AND EVENTS SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE, BY ALL PARTIES.

A SCENARIO THAT COULD WIN THE PRIVATE AND ADVANCE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES WOULD LOOK LIKE THE FOLLOWING:

1. AGREED ACTIONS, PRIOR TO BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES PRINCIPAL ACTORS -- TRIMBLE, ADAMS, LOYALISTS -- TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND CAUTION.

NO FURTHER ATTACKS BY THE IRA.

THE UK RESUMES CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

SENATOR MITCHELL CALLS FOR A HOLIDAY BREAK IN PLENARY SESSIONS AND BEGINS BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. ANNOUNCES THAT PLENARY TALKS WILL RESUME BY LATE JANUARY.

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS, IF POSSIBLE, PASS DECOMMISSIONING LEGISLATION.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS AT A SUMMIT WITH THE IRISH, STATES PUBLICLY THAT:

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02 00

. THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT WHEN PLENARY TALKS RESUME BY LATE JANUARY, SINN FEIN WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND, ASSUMING THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE, UNEQUIVOCAL CEASE-FIRE.

. NO OUTCOME IS RULED OUT IN THE TALKS.

. SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIMEFRAME.

. THE TALKS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS AT A SUMMIT IN SIX MONTHS.

. THE TALKS ARE INCLUSIVE, HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA, AND NO PARTY CAN VETO A SUBJECT BEING RAISED.

. THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ACCEPT THE MITCHELL APPROACH ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPEATS "NO VICTORY OVER THE IRA."

.  
3. THE IRA RESPONDS (WITHIN 24-48 HOURS): THE IRA ANNOUNCES AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASE-FIRE, AND COMMITS TO DEMOCRATIC AND EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS OF RESOLVING POLITICAL ISSUES. TEXT OF CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT IS KNOWN TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS IN ADVANCE.

. ON A PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS: THE IRA AGREES TO END IRA-AUTHORIZED TARGETING, WEAPONS PREPARATION AND SURVEILLANCE. THE IRA AND BRITISH REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF SPLINTER GROUP OR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.

. 4. AGREED ACTIONS, AFTER BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

. RESUMPTION OF MEETINGS:

. AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT, SINN FEIN HAS A BILATERAL MEETING (OR MEETINGS) WITH MITCHELL, AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THIS PROVIDES "EQUALITY OF TREATMENT" FOR SINN FEIN AT ONCE, BUT DOES NOT SEE THE PARTY IN PLENARIES, SINCE THE PLENARIES ARE ON A BREAK.

. AT THIS FIRST MEETING, SINN FEIN ACCEPTS PUBLICLY A) THE SIX MITCHELL PRINCIPLES ON DEMOCRACY AND NONVIOLENCE AND B) THE MITCHELL APPROACH ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

. HMG REINSTATES MINISTERIAL CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN.

. ADAMS IS INVITED TO WHITE HOUSE.

~~S E C R E T~~

03 00

· TRIMBLE, ALREADY DUE AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON DECEMBER 2-4, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL.

ENTRY INTO TALKS: WHEN PLENARY TALKS RESUME BY LATE JANUARY, SINN FEIN IS PRESENT, ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTIES.

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END TEXT  
DECL: OADR

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~~S E C R E T~~

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2011-0355 - F (5.04)  
KBM 4/11/2023Multi-Party TalksDaily Report - 18 November 19961. In summary:

- The Plenary met for half an hour this morning and adjourned until Wednesday morning, (not before midday, and subject to the Chairman's call) in order to facilitate further bilaterals.
  - We met the British Government, the SDLP and the UDP. There was general consensus that the talks may shortly break down over decommissioning unless a way can be found through the present impasse.
  - We made clear that the Government would wish to be convinced that the approach proposed by the British Government last week is a viable exit strategy - rather than a potential trap which effectively involves ratcheting us close to the Washington Three precondition and is also at variance with the Mitchell Report.
2. The Government delegation today was led by Minister Coveney.
3. The Plenary, chaired by PM Holkeri, met at noon for half an hour. It was agreed that it would be helpful to let bilaterals continue and that the Plenary would not meet again before noon on Wednesday. (It seems unlikely it will meet before next week).
4. In this session, McCartney (in the unchallenged role of spokesman for the Unionist side) summed up three points from the papers submitted by the three Unionist parties. First, any ceasefire declared must be complete in nature in permanent in extent. Second, the declaration must be accompanied by the handing-over of a substantial amount of weapons. Third, decommissioning must not be linked to progress in the negotiations.
5. At a bilateral meeting, the Secretary of State explained last week's British Government paper in terms of the UUP's need for political cover in the context of possible Sinn Féin entry into the talks. The paper had not been shown to David Trimble but its ideas had been aired with him (and had drawn a less than enthusiastic response). The Secretary of State underlined how close the talks were to collapse.
6. Minister Coveney recognised this but made clear that we could not go along with an approach which involved a retreat towards Washington Three. Efforts were being made to satisfy Trimble's voracious appetite for political cover at the expense of most other interests in the talks process. The Minister recalled the successive steps agreed to by the two Governments in order to meet Unionists concerns. These had been

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entirely unreciprocated.

7. The Secretary of State and Michael Ancram denied any intention to revert to Washington Three. We commented that the British proposal was either an exit strategy or a trap. If they could persuade us that it offered the former, and did not simply involve further ratcheting back to Washington Three, our Government would be willing to look at this. If, however, we were being asked simply to "try this out", without any guarantee that it would secure the transition to meaningful three-stranded negotiations and a realistic approach to decommissioning, this would effectively mean that the talks were going to break down over the decommissioning issue. If so there was little point in going to elaborate lengths merely to come up with the same outcome at a slightly later stage.
8. In response, the British emphasised the non-mandatory nature of the judgement which they were proposing for the Commission and also the value of the envisaged liaison committee as a means of ensuring political input to this judgement. They indicated that Trimble had been unenthusiastic about vesting in the Commission anything approximating to a decision on the timing of decommissioning.
9. The meeting ended inconclusively. The discussion will be resumed at the Conference meeting scheduled for Wednesday evening.
10. The SDLP indicated some annoyance to us over the UUP's preparation and subsequent circulation of a paper (which effectively aligns them with the DUP and UKUP positions on decommissioning) at the very time when the SDLP and the UUP were supposedly engaged in bilateral efforts to find a joint solution to the impasse. They were, in consequence, reserved on the Alliance proposal for a trilateral meeting between the SDLP, the UUP and Alliance.
11. The UDP expressed considerable gloom about the prospects for the process and the consequences of a collapse for their own situation on the ground. They showed disappointment with the position reflected in the UUP paper, and asked the two Governments to intercede with the SDLP and the UUP to find an agreed way forward.
12. They expressed extreme unease at the prospect of setting up the verification commission "upfront" and indicated they may now become more overtly critical of the Unionist Parties' position (Ervine seems to be thinking along the same lines).
13. We were told today that General De Chastelain planned to discuss with the two Governments some ideas arising from contacts which he had with "the parties" last week, but is persuaded of the wisdom of clearing this with Senator Mitchell first.
14. The SDLP briefed us on bilaterals they had with the UUP and Alliance this afternoon.
15. The UUP delegation had included Trimble and Maginnis, who seemed to have no knowledge of earlier UUP/SDLP discussion, and denied there had been any bad faith in publishing a paper on decommissioning which bore no relationship whatever to that

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discussion. It was unclear to the SDLP whether they were signalling there was any latitude in terms of their stated position, so a further meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow. (They mentioned the forthcoming DUP Conference as an inhibiting factor for discussions next week).

16. Alliance seemed in despair and conceded that the current UUP seemed to vindicate the pessimistic analysis on Unionist intentions which the SDLP had proffered to the Alliance Party proposal last week. They will have a trilateral with Alliance and the UUP tomorrow, but without any great expectations.

November 6, 1996

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KBH 7/11/2023

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: VAL MARTINEZ *VM*

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland Developments: Proposed British Statement

The British draft public statement sent to you on November 5 by John Holmes is not at all bad. It does much to address Sinn Fein concerns. The document, for example:

- Does not list a specific date for post-ceasefire Sinn Fein participation in all-party talks. This purposeful vagueness is a necessity.
- Makes clear that substantive all-party talks will address all issues -- including the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK. The draft also stresses that all parties will be treated equally in the talks. Further, the British commit themselves to see that all issues are addressed, even if some parties balk at a truly comprehensive agenda (Paisley could walk out if Northern Ireland's constitutional status arises, for example).
- States specifically that there are no "pre-conditions" for Sinn Fein entry other than an unequivocal IRA ceasefire.
- Calls for the substantive negotiations to be as "speedy" as possible -- a nod to nationalists and republicans who favor a definite timeframe.

Nonetheless, as John Hume mentioned to you the morning of November 6, there is a troublesome paragraph in the British draft concerning how HMG will make a "dependable judgment" that a ceasefire is "genuinely unequivocal." That paragraph lists a number of things the British view as logical elements of judging a ceasefire -- an end to IRA targeting, weapons training, and the like. What looks reasonable to the British here (and maybe reasonable to us as well) will of course look like a pre-

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Declassify On: 11/6/06

condition to the IRA. There is also the issue, which Hume did not raise, of the British plan to have Sinn Fein address decommissioning immediately upon entry to plenary talks. This too could be a dealbreaker.

Our goal is to narrow the small gap in words so the large chasm of distrust between the British and Sinn Fein can begin to close. What are the options?

Option One: Try and sell the British statement as is to Sinn Fein. I agree with Hume that this will be difficult, but it is worth raising with Adams just to see how bad he thinks it is (but also to remind him that the document is a serious effort by HMG to bridge gaps).

Option Two: Hume read you alternative language to the paragraph at issue. It was basically a reformulation of a recent Irish idea: a ceasefire is called and Sinn Fein enters plenary talks immediately, but only to adhere to the Mitchell Principles on non-violence. This would be followed by a break in plenary sessions and a series of bilateral meetings. After a suitable period of bilateral meetings (during which HMG would judge the nature of the ceasefire) plenary sessions would resume with Sinn Fein as a participant.

Option Three: The Mitchell/Lake option. An IRA ceasefire would be followed, not by a plenary session, but by a series of bilateral meetings between Sinn Fein and Mitchell, and between Sinn Fein and the British and Irish governments. The latter meetings could be at the ministerial level, an immediate and tangible symbol that the two governments recognize that a serious step has been taken by the IRA. Presumably, these bilateral contacts would take place during a Christmas hiatus in the talks, thereby allowing time for the nature of the ceasefire to be judged. The Christmas break in effect becomes the "airlock" leading to Sinn Fein participation in talks.

I think some variation of the third option holds the most promise. The first two, in one way or the other, force one of the parties to lose face by accepting what they have made clear is unacceptable -- for Sinn Fein, lack of immediate entry into talks; for HMG, a climbdown on its position that a suitable period must pass before Sinn Fein enters those talks. The third option, on the other hand, does not force Sinn Fein into a plenary before its time but nor does it force the IRA to face explicit exclusion. After all, if there are no talks taking place how can anyone feel excluded from them? The key to this scenario is for the IRA to cease all action between now and early December and call a ceasefire in early December as the talks enter a holiday abeyance. This solution neatly avoids whether

Sinn Fein enters talks immediately or not and both sides save face. In addition, if Mitchell and the two governments use the Christmas break to meet with Sinn Fein, then Sinn Fein will be having all the substantive meetings it could be having, given that the all-party talks are on a break.

There are many complicating factors to all this, not least of which are the state of mind of the unionists and the precarious political position of John Major. Nonetheless, if we go into all of this knowing that one side or the other cannot accept the basic premise of the other, we will not get far. Simplicity and clarity seem to be keys. The more words on the table, and the more actions demanded by one party against the other, the better the chance that this opportunity will slip away.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed British Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 28, 1996

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(5.06)  
KBH 4/11/2023

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
SUBJECT: Update on Northern Ireland

Contrary to Prime Minister Bruton's and our strong urgings, the British government went ahead and published their response to the Hume-Adams initiative. The proposal was initiated with the purpose of providing assurances to the IRA regarding the terms and timing of Sinn Fein's entrance into the talks. The process leaked to the press, and Major has been under intense political pressure to make public their private discussions with Hume. Because of strong opposition from the Unionists, the document originally intended to provide those assurances to the IRA became far too complicated, and in our view, a net negative. That is also the view of the Irish government, John Hume, and Gerry Adams.

The British statement today is being portrayed by the press as a rejection of the Hume-Adams effort. But, John Holmes told me this morning that they will continue to consider and possibly pursue the approach we laid out for them yesterday. I also have urged the Irish government not close any doors and to press Hume and Adams to be moderate in their reactions. We have told the British we will not be able to say anything positive -- the first time we have done so -- because that would burn our bridges to the nationalists and at least singe our bridge to the Irish. Attached is what we are saying on an if-asked basis only.

attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH

~~SECRET~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER LAKE SODERBERG

SIT: COQ LAKEA SUM2

<PREC> FLASH

<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 271540Z NOV 96

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(5.07)  
KBH 4/11/2023

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ANTHONY LAKE TO JOHN HOLMES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

BELOW IS THE PROPOSED SCENARIO WE DISCUSSED. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING IT WITH YOU.

PROPOSED SCENARIO

AN IRA CEASE-FIRE AND SINN FEIN ENTRY INTO THE STORMONT TALKS ARE POSSIBLE IF ALL SIDES KEEP DEMANDS UPON ONE ANOTHER TO THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM.

A PRECISE CHOREOGRAPHY OF STATEMENTS AND EVENTS SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE, BY ALL PARTIES.

A SCENARIO THAT COULD WIN THE PRIVATE AND ADVANCE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES WOULD LOOK LIKE THE FOLLOWING:

1. AGREED ACTIONS, PRIOR TO BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES PRINCIPAL ACTORS -- TRIMBLE, ADAMS, LOYALISTS -- TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND CAUTION.

NO FURTHER ATTACKS BY THE IRA.

THE UK RESUMES CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

SENATOR MITCHELL CALLS FOR A HOLIDAY BREAK IN PLENARY SESSIONS AND BEGINS BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. ANNOUNCES THAT PLENARY TALKS WILL RESUME BY LATE JANUARY.

PAGE 02 OF 03

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS, IF POSSIBLE, PASS DECOMMISSIONING LEGISLATION.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS AT A SUMMIT WITH THE IRISH, STATES PUBLICLY THAT:

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT WHEN PLENARY TALKS RESUME BY LATE JANUARY, SINN FEIN WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND, ASSUMING THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE, UNEQUIVOCAL CEASE-FIRE.

NO OUTCOME IS RULED OUT IN THE TALKS.

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIMEFRAME.

THE TALKS WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS AT A SUMMIT IN SIX MONTHS.

THE TALKS ARE INCLUSIVE, HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA, AND NO PARTY CAN VETO A SUBJECT BEING RAISED.

THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ACCEPT THE MITCHELL APPROACH ON PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPEATS "NO VICTORY OVER THE IRA."

3. THE IRA RESPONDS (WITHIN 24-48 HOURS): THE IRA ANNOUNCES AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASE-FIRE, AND COMMITS TO DEMOCRATIC AND EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS OF RESOLVING POLITICAL ISSUES. TEXT OF CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT IS KNOWN TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS IN ADVANCE.

ON A PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS: THE IRA AGREES TO END IRA-AUTHORIZED TARGETING, WEAPONS PREPARATION AND SURVEILLANCE. THE IRA AND BRITISH REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF SPLINTER GROUP OR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.

4. AGREED ACTIONS, AFTER BRITISH STATEMENT/IRA CEASE-FIRE:

RESUMPTION OF MEETINGS:

AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT, SINN FEIN HAS A BILATERAL MEETING (OR MEETINGS) WITH MITCHELL, AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THIS PROVIDES "EQUALITY OF TREATMENT" FOR SINN FEIN AT ONCE, BUT DOES NOT SEE THE PARTY IN PLENARIES, SINCE THE PLENARIES ARE ON A BREAK.

AT THIS FIRST MEETING, SINN FEIN ACCEPTS PUBLICLY A) THE SIX

FLASH

~~SECRET~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

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ENTRY INTO TALKS: WHEN PLENARY TALKS RESUME BY LATE JANUARY, SINN FEIN IS PRESENT, ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH OTHER PARTIES.

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>2663

<MSGID> M2514712

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**SECRET**  
**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG TRIP  
SIT: COQ FRIEDRICH HARMON LAKEA MILLISON PASSDOWN SUM SUM2  
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 262017Z NOV 96

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO [REDACTED] 1.4(c)

*Sent to wrong Addressee*

2011-0355-F [5.08]

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~

VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

KBH 4/11/2023

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ANTHONY LAKE TO JOHN HUME AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

BEGIN TEXT:

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**SECRET**

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IMMEDIATE

**SECRET**  
**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03

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**SECRET**

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IMMEDIATE

**SECRET**  
**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 03

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>2655

<MSGID> M2512897

**SECRET**

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS  
JOHN HOLMES  
November 27, 1996

If Holmes Says No

- I urge you in the strongest terms to reconsider.
- It has been well over two years since we've had any serious disagreement on Northern Ireland, and we have always given you our sincere and vocal support.
- Nonetheless, as I told you yesterday, I strongly believe that the current strategy simply won't work.
- If you look closely at what we have proposed, you'll see that it is very close to where you are now; what is needed is a catalyst to bring things together before they fall apart for good.
- We think our scenario is that catalyst.
- I fear that if you publish your latest draft public statement as is, we would find it difficult to give it public support.
- At this point, I'm inclined to suggest a phone call between the Prime Minister and the President.

If Holmes Says Yes

- Good. We plan to put this to Sinn Fein via the Irish, since we don't want our fingerprints on this any more than you do.
- We'll do this as quickly as possible, and get back to you.

Mitchell

6 months - fuels great suspicion. Plots  
why agency to a date certain - as good  
a ~~is~~ get out of British

loyalist is despair; This process over &  
a real war is imminent. All just  
spinning our wheels. Resent all of ideas  
& viewed from unionist perspective & all  
intentions to get SF in. Recently imitated  
constituted unionists

Internal unionist political rivalry. Constant  
pressure by Paisley & MacLachlan put in Trimble  
alliance - full scale UUP panic.  
Separately SF in, Paisley & Mac. out  
Need to decide whether to stay in  
Extremely nervous. as nervous a spotlight  
as I've seen them. Rules agreed. Tense situation  
Putting pressure on major. Major briefed  
Trimble really - Trimble thinks will like it.  
Seem almost to dread prospect of ceasefire  
all believe tactical no matter what

Peter Robinson is convinced ~~of~~ Trimble will walk  
of SF in in

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[2011-0355-F, 5.10]

Talks going unbar.

Decommissioning cost be resolved until layu  
issue of plenary at ICA outside.

Dec 18 - could go until

British to put out paper on Thurs.

- B Mitchell - Buck on Monday - Thurs, Dec 2-5  
returns after 11<sup>th</sup>  
Expect talks to go to Dec 18

---

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 16, 1996

TO: MS. SODERBERG

SUBJECT: IRA

Attached are four reports the FBI says it provided on IRA pursuant to the memo I showed you that approved "FBI dissemination to the NSC.

Also, attached is a new report.

You also asked if the FBI had anything from MI5 about Martha Pope/Gerry Kelly story. They do not.



Alan Kreczko

Attachments

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN BLEICKENN LEBOURGEOIS NSC SUM2 VAX

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 291308Z JUN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5625  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2172  
RUSNSTB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0012  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 003607  
LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: EU CORFU SUMMIT - ANGLO/IRISH TALKS  
REF: (A) ATHENS 06605  
(B) DUBLIN 03453 (NOTAL)

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (5.14)  
KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. (C) SUMMARY. FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, SAYS THAT PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS PRESENTED JOHN MAJOR WITH A "FORMULA" FOR RESOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AND WITH IDEAS ABOUT THE NATURE OF NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTIONS IN CORFU. FINLAY HAS HEARD RUMORS ABOUT A 3-MONTH IRA CEASEFIRE AND SAYS THAT SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS IS "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT PEACE. THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY BE READY BY THE NEXT MAJOR/REYNOLDS SUMMIT SCHEDULED FOR JULY. IF NOT, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO POSTPONE IT UNTIL SEPTEMBER. EVEN THEN, FINLAY IS UNCERTAIN THAT MOLYNEAUX'S ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY WILL AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN NEW TALKS. SPRING RESENTS REYNOLDS' ATTEMPT TO ENCROACH ON HIS TURF IN REGARD TO DISCUSSIONS ON A JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT; A SERIOUS CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM COULD OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH FINLAY

3. ON JUNE 28, WE MET WITH FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, TO DISCUSS THE ANGLO-IRISH TALKS AT THE CORFU SUMMIT (REF. A). FINLAY ACCOMPANIED PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND HIM TO CORFU, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS DISTINGUISHED BY ITS BEAUTY, HEAT AND HIGH PRICES.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

4. FINLAY SAID THAT REYNOLDS PRESENTED MAJOR WITH A "FORMULA" FOR RESOLVING THE SO-CALLED CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE. IT PROPOSES AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION TO MAKE IRISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER NORTHERN

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

IRELAND AN ASPIRATION RATHER THAN A CLAIM. IN RETURN, THE BRITISH WOULD AMEND ARTICLE 75 OF THE 1920 GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND (GOI) ACT TO PROVIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY OVER NORTHERN IRELAND ONLY AS LONG AS A MAJORITY OF THE NORTH'S RESIDENTS WANT TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE IRISH HOPE TO RECEIVE THE BRITISH RESPONSE LATER THIS WEEK.

5. FINLAY NOTED THAT REYNOLDS HAD WANTED TO HAVE ANY REFERENCE TO PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY OVER NORTHERN IRELAND DELETED, BUT HAD AGREED WITH SPRING'S ARGUMENT THAT, IF THE IRISH AMENDED ARTICLES 2 AND 3 AND THE BRITISH DELETED THEIR CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE NORTH, IT WOULD ENJOY "DE FACTO" INDEPENDENCE, AND CIVIL WAR COULD ENSUE.  
NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTIONS

6. FINLAY CONTINUED THAT THE OTHER "PROPOSAL" REYNOLDS MADE TO MAJOR IN CORFU WAS A SUGGESTION ABOUT THE EVENTUAL SCOPE AND NATURE OF FUTURE NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTIONS. REFERRING TO REYNOLDS "IRISH TIMES" INTERVIEW IN BOSTON (REF. B) IN WHICH HE TALKED ABOUT A NORTH-SOUTH "AUTHORITY" WITH EXECUTIVE POWERS, FINLAY SAID THAT THE TAOISEACH'S REMARKS CAME ACROSS AS A VARIANT OF "JOINT SOVEREIGNTY," ANATHEMA TO UNIONISTS. WHAT THE IRISH HAVE IN MIND, RATHER, IS A CORPUS OF INSTITUTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO CLOSER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN, AND GREATER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH. EXAMPLES OF AREAS TO BE COVERED ARE TOURISM AND INVESTMENT. ERADICATION OF DISEASES IN LIVESTOCK IS ANOTHER, BUT IT MAY BE TOO "LOW-PROFILE" TO APPEAL TO MOST NATIONALISTS. WHAT THE IRISH ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID IS ANYTHING WHICH SMACKS OF "AN AGENDA FOR REUNIFICATION" LEST THE UNIONIST BE PROVOKED INTO PREMATURE REJECTION OF NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTIONS.

## THE JULY SUMMIT

7. GIVEN WHERE THINGS STAND IN REGARD TO THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, FINLAY BELIEVES THAT IT MAY NOT BE READY IN TIME FOR THE REYNOLDS/MAJOR SUMMIT SCHEDULED FOR JULY. IN THAT CASE, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO POSTPONE IT UNTIL SEPTEMBER. EVEN IF A FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS READY BY THEN, MOLYNEAUX'S ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY MIGHT REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN NEW TALKS.

## SINN FEIN/IRA

8. FINLAY HAS HEARD RUMORS OF A POSSIBLE 3-MONTH IRA CEASEFIRE AND OF AN IMMINENT 2-DAY, 200-PARTICIPANT, IRA "COUNCIL" MEETING SOMEWHERE IN THE REPUBLIC DURING WHICH THE ORGANIZATION'S RESPONSE TO THE JOINT DECLARATION WILL BE DEBATED AND A VOTE TAKEN. IF THERE IS A CEASEFIRE, BOTH GOVERNMENTS WILL TAKE THE ALREADY ADOPTED LINE THAT THERE

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

CAN BE NO/NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH SINN FEIN/IRA BEFORE A  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 003607

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: EU CORFU SUMMIT - ANGLO/IRISH TALKS

PERMANENT RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. FINLAY ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED, HOWEVER, IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE TO ENTER INTO "DISCUSSIONS" WITH THE IRA IN THE EVENT OF A TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE. FINLAY ALSO MENTIONED THAT A JOURNALIST WORKING IN THE NORTH WHO MEETS REGULARLY WITH SINN FEIN LEADER GERRY ADAMS HAD SAID RECENTLY THAT ADAMS' "GUT FEELING" ABOUT PEACE IS ONE OF OPTIMISM.

REYNOLDS VS. SPRING

9. FINLAY (PROTECT) SAID THAT THE REASON FOR REYNOLDS' RECENT "IRISH TIMES" INTERVIEW (REF. B) WAS HIS DESIRE TO PREEMPT SPRING IN REGARD TO NEW TALKS NOW THAT THE PEACE PROCESS, WHICH HAD MONOPOLIZED THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENTION, HAD BEGUN TO RUN OUT OF STEAM. NOTING THAT SPRING WAS NOT/NOT AMUSED BY THIS TURN OF EVENTS, FINLAY ALLOWED THAT HE COULD FORESEE A SERIOUS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF IT OCCURRED, FINLAY ASSERTED, IT WOULD BE MORE ABOUT "TURF" THAN ABOUT POLICY.

SMITH

BT

#3607

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE LEBOURGEOIS VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 161725Z MAY 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1869

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1681

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 007918

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG PREPARING ANSWERS TO  
SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

THIS IS A JOINT LONDON/BELFAST MESSAGE

REF: DUBLIN 2716

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE PREPARED A RESPONSE TO SINN FEIN'S "20 QUESTIONS" (REFTEL AND PREVIOUS) AND HOPE TO OBTAIN MINISTERIAL APPROVAL BY MAY 17. THEY RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO TREAT THE INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY, AND NOT BE SEEN TO DISMISS IT, BUT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ADVERSE UNIONIST REACTION TO ANY PERCEIVED DIALOGUE. THE ANSWERS WILL NOT GO BEYOND POSITIONS ALREADY ELABORATED IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND OTHER HMG STATEMENTS. SINN FEIN AND THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) PROBABLY WILL NOT LIKE THE RESPONSES, BUT MAY SUSPEND TERRORIST ACTIONS WHILE CONSIDERING THEM. END SUMMARY.

THE VIEW FROM BELFAST

3. NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL SERVICE HEAD DAVID FELL TOLD BELFAST CONSUL GENERAL MAY 14 THAT HMG WOULD REPLY IN WRITING TO THE "CLARIFICATIONS" REQUESTED BY SINN FEIN. HE WOULD URGE THAT BOTH THE QUESTIONS AND HMG'S RESPONSE BE MADE PUBLIC, THOUGH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WOULD MAKE HE ULTIMATE DECISION ON THIS. HMG INTENDED TO BE AS CLEAR AND FORTHCOMING AS POSS BLE, BUT FELL WAS CERTAIN THAT SINN FEIN WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH ALL OF THE ANSWERS. HMG WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S "APPROVAL" OF ITS ANSWERS, BUT DID NOT WANT TO ACCORD DUBLIN FORMAL "CLEARANCE."

4. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) BELFAST SECURITY CHIEF JOHN STEELE TOLD THE CG MAY 15 THAT HE, TOO, STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SHOULD

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (5.17)  
K8H 4/11/2023

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

BE MADE PUBLIC; ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL DISCLOSURE WOULD ONLY FUEL MORE LOYALIST VIOLENCE.  
THE VIEW FROM LONDON  
-----

5. NIO LONDON ASSISTANT SECRETARY JIM DANIELL TOLD US MAY 16 THAT HE AND OTHERS HAD WORKED THROUGH THE WEEKEND PREPARING A DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS. THEIR DRAFT WOULD GO TO MINISTERS THAT EVENING, AND DANIELL HOPED TO HAVE A FIRM HMG POSITION TO SHARE WITH US MAY 17 -- "UNLESS I'M ON A FLIGHT TO DUBLIN."

6. DANIELL SAID THE DRAFTERS HAD OPERATED WITHIN THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS:

- THE ANSWERS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND WITH OTHER SUBSEQUENT HMG STATEMENTS.
- NOTHING IN THE ANSWERS WOULD GO BEYOND PREVIOUSLY STATED POSITIONS.

7. DANIELL AGREED WITH OUR SUGGESTION THAT THE TONE OF THE RESPONSE WOULD BE AS IMPORTANT AS ITS CONTENT. MOST BRITISH OFFICIALS WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF THE QUESTIONS (MANY OF WHICH WERE CLEARLY CRAFTED TO ELICIT BRITISH CONCESSIONS), BUT THEY RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO TREAT THE SINN FEIN INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY, AND TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF CONDESCENSION OR ARROGANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY NEEDED TO CONSIDER THE REACTION OF "OUR OTHER CONSTITUENCIES."

8. DANIELL WAS HEARTENED BY A STATEMENT BY ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX THAT THE SINN FEIN QUESTIONS OFFERED HMG AN OPPORTUNITY TO "CALL HEIR BLUFF." THIS IMPLIED THAT THE UUP AT LEAST WOULD NOT REACT TOO STRONGLY AGAINST THE FACT OF A RESPONSE.  
DON'T HOLD YOUR BREATH  
-----

9. DANIELL CAUTIONED AGAINST EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM OVER AN EARLY OUTBREAK OF PEACE, RECALLING AN EARLIER STATEMENT BY SINN FEIN'S MARTIN MCGUINNESS THAT CLARIFICATION WOULD NOT BE "THE END OF THE STORY." SINN FEIN, MCGUINNESS SAID, WOULD HAVE TO "CONSULT OUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES" BEFORE MAKING ANY FINAL DECISION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE JOINT DECLARATION. THIS DELIBERATION COULD TAKE QUITE SOME TIME.

10. WHAT SINN FEIN AND PIRA MIGHT DO, DANIELL SUGGESTED, WAS TO SUSPEND ITS ARMED OPERATIONS DURING THE DELIBERATION PROCESS. A CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCED DURING THE COMING WEEK WOULD COINCIDE NICELY WITH THE EUROPEAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND MIGHT BOOST THE PROSPECTS OF SINN FEIN CANDIDATES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 007918

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: HMG PREPARING ANSWERS TO  
SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

COMMENT

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11. MOST BRITISH OFFICIALS DO NOT TAKE THE SINN FEIN  
QUESTIONS SERIOUSLY -- REGARDING THEM AS A FURTHER  
DELAYING TACTIC, AND A GAMBIT TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN -- BUT WILL TREAT THEM  
SERIOUSLY ON THE OFF CHANCE THAT THEY REPRESENT SINCERE  
CONFUSION, AND TO AVOID A RIFT WITH DUBLIN AND  
WASHINGTON. HMG IS WRESTLING (AS IT HAS FOR OVER A  
YEAR) WITH THE DILEMMA OF MAKING THE MOST ATTRACTIVE  
POSSIBLE OFFER TO REPUBLICAN MODERATES WITHOUT LOSING  
THE COOPERATION OF MODERATE UNIONISTS. DEAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 008256

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPONDS  
TO SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

REF: LONDON 7993 AND PREVIOUS  
SUMMARY

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1. (C) HMG'S RESPONSE TO SINN FEIN'S "20 QUESTIONS"  
(FAXED TO EUR/NE) IS A LENGTHY AND SERIOUS DOCUMENT,  
COUCHED IN TERMS AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE  
BOUNDS OF EXISTING POLICY. IT CONTAINS LITTLE NEW  
INFORMATION, AND IS UNLIKELY TO SWAY HARD-LINERS IN SINN  
FEIN AND THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA),  
BUT IS DESIGNED TO APPEAL TO THOSE ON THE FRINGES OF THE  
REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, AND TO BROADER IRISH AND  
INTERNATIONAL OPINION.

2. (S) FINAL DETAILS OF THE STATEMENT WERE IRONED OUT  
ONLY MINUTES BEFORE ITS RELEASE. THE CABINET HAD  
CONSIDERED SEVERAL OPTIONS ON FORMAT AND PRESENTATION,  
TRYING TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS  
WITHOUT APPEARING TO LET SINN FEIN DICTATE THE AGENDA.

3. (C) INITIAL REACTION HAS BEEN FAVORABLE. THE IRISH  
GOVERNMENT AND NORTHERN NATIONALISTS STRONGLY ENDORSED  
IT, MAKING CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN SHOULD RESPOND QUICKLY.  
ONLY IAN PAISLEY DENOUNCED IT AS A "LOVE LETTER TO GERRY  
ADAMS." SINN FEIN SAID SOME OF THE ANSWERS WERE  
ENCOURAGING, BUT THAT THE MOVEMENT NEEDED SEVERAL WEEKS  
TO CONSIDER IT. END SUMMARY.

GROUPING THE QUESTIONS

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4. (C) AFTER MUCH INTERNAL DEBATE, HMG DECIDED TO  
"COMMENT ON" (NOT "ANSWER") SINN FEIN'S 20 QUESTIONS BY  
GROUPING THEM IN SIX CATEGORIES. ONLY ONE OF THE  
QUESTIONS WAS CONSIDERED A GENUINE REQUEST FOR  
CLARIFICATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. THE REST,  
ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, EITHER COULD BE ANSWERED BY  
REFERENCE TO THE DECLARATION, OR RELATED TO ISSUES TO BE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (5.18)  
KBH 7/11/2023

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RESOLVED IN THE COURSE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

5. (C) THE ONLY NEW INFORMATION IN THE STATEMENT IS THE REPLY TO SINN FEIN'S QUESTION ABOUT HOW MAJORITY OPINION ON IRISH UNIFICATION IN THE NORTH WOULD BE DETERMINED. THE ANSWER IS THAT A NEW "BORDER POLL" OR REFERENDUM, AS ENVISAGED BY THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTION ACT OF 1973, WOULD BE HELD AT SOME UNSPECIFIED FUTURE DATE. A SERIOUS EFFORT

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6. (C) ITS SHORTAGE OF NEW INFORMATION NOTWITHSTANDING, THE BRITISH STATEMENT IS A SERIOUS, LENGTHY (21 PAGES) AND GENERALLY FORTHCOMING DOCUMENT. IT ADDRESSES EACH OF SINN FEIN'S QUESTIONS, AND DUCKS ONLY THE QUESTION ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE JOINT DECLARATION AND THE HUME-ADAMS AGREEMENT, NOTING SIMPLY THAT "THE ONLY TEXT THAT BEARS OUR NAME AND ON WHICH WE CAN COMMENT" IS THE JOINT DECLARATION.

7. (C) BRITISH MEDIA REPORTING EARLIER IN THE DAY (PRESUMABLY BASED ON DOWNING STREET BACKGROUNDERS) HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE RESPONSE WOULD AMOUNT TO A "BRUSH-OFF." OFFICIALS IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO), WHO HAD LABORED NIGHT AND DAY FOR A WEEK ON THE DOCUMENT, WERE INFURIATED BY THIS SPIN. THEIR GOAL -- SHARED BY NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW -- WAS TO TREAT THE QUESTIONS AS A SERIOUS OVERTURE, AND TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT GOING BEYOND THE JOINT DECLARATION AND OTHER PREVIOUS STATEMENTS. TARGETING THE AUDIENCE

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8. (C) NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARY JIM DANIELL, WHO BRIEFED US ON THE DOCUMENT JUST BEFORE ITS RELEASE, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY TO SWAY OPINIONS WITHIN THE HARD CORE OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. NOTHING IN THE STATEMENT, OR IN THE JOINT DECLARATION, OFFERED SINN FEIN ANY BETTER TERMS THAN THOSE THAT WERE AVAILABLE IN THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT IN 1973, AND IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY IN PIRA WOULD RESIST ACCEPTING THE SAME OFFER AFTER TWO MORE DECADES OF CONFLICT.

9. (C) THE AIM OF THE STATEMENT, DANIELL SAID, WAS TO APPEAL TO THOSE WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT WHO WERE WEARY OF THE CONFLICT AND LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. IF ENOUGH OF THEM COULD BE CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST AND FINAL OFFER FROM BOTH GOVERNMENTS, THE HARD-CORE REMAINDER COULD BE ISOLATED. THIS WAS THE POINT OF THE CONCLUDING SECTION OF THE DOCUMENT:

-- "SINN FEIN HAVE ASKED THEIR QUESTIONS. BUT THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION BEING ASKED BY THE PEOPLE

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OF THESE ISLANDS IS FOR THEM TO ANSWER. DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE CANNOT BE RECONCILED."

-- "THE ALTERNATIVE IS ISOLATION -- STANDING ON THE  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 008256

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPONDS  
TO SINN FEIN QUESTIONS

OUTSIDE WHILE THOSE COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY SHAPE THE AGREEMENT, STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THESE ISLANDS."

-- "THE VAST MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN IRELAND, NORTH AND SOUTH AND OF BOTH TRADITIONS, DEMAND AN END TO VIOLENCE NOW. THEIR WISHES COULD NOT BE CLEARER."

-- "SINN FEIN ASK WHAT COMES NEXT. CERTAINLY NO FURTHER PLAYING FOR TIME. IF THE JOINT DECLARATION IS 'THE STARTING POINT OF A PEACE PROCESS,' THE NEXT STEP IS FOR VIOLENCE TO END FOR GOOD."

10. (C) THE OTHER TARGET AUDIENCE OF THE STATEMENT, DANIELL SAID, WAS IRISH OPINION WORLDWIDE -- AND PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S. THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY TO PLAY IN CONVINCING SINN FEIN THAT THE OFFER ON THE TABLE FROM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WAS REASONABLE AND THE BEST THEY WOULD GET. FURTHER VIOLENCE WOULD BE FUTILE AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT

11. (C) DANIELL CONFESSED TO SOME PUZZLEMENT OVER REFERENCES IN THE SINN FEIN QUESTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT OF 1920. SINN FEIN SEEMED DETERMINED TO PUT IT ON THE AGENDA, PARTICULARLY THE CLAUSE WHICH REITERATED THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT'S AUTHORITY OVER NORTHERN IRELAND. BUT IRISH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS HAD TALKED OF IMPLEMENTING OTHER LONG-NEGLECTED PORTIONS OF THE ACT, PARTICULARLY ITS PROVISION FOR AN ALL-IRELAND COUNCIL. THE IRONY, DANIELL MUSED, WAS THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE LEFT OF THE ACT; MOST OF ITS PROVISIONS HAD BEEN OVERRIDDEN BY SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS. HMG WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO REPEALING THE REMAINDER IF ALL PARTIES AGREED.

PACKAGING PROBLEMS

12. (S) WHILE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESPONSE WAS AGREED SEVERAL DAYS AGO, AFTER A WEEKEND OF FURIOUS DRAFTING IN THE NIO, DETAILS OF THE FORMAT AND PRESENTATION REMAINED UNDECIDED UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. THE CABINET'S AD HOC

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEE REVIEWED THE DRAFT TEXT THREE TIMES, SENDING IT BACK FOR REVISION TWICE.

13. (S) THE MAIN QUESTION WAS HOW TO COUCH THE RESPONSES. GIVEN HMG'S PREVIOUS REFUSAL TO PROVIDE "CLARIFICATION," SEVERAL MINISTERS (NOTABLY FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD) INSISTED THAT THERE COULD BE NO DIRECT "ANSWERS." HURD WANTED A STATEMENT THAT MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE QUESTIONS, BUT COMMENTED ON THEM IN THE COURSE OF A SINGLE DOCUMENT. THE NIO FAVORED A MORE DIRECT REPLY TO EACH QUESTION. AFTER THE WEEKLY THURSDAY MORNING CABINET MEETING MAY 19, THE NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THREE ALTERNATIVE DRAFTS, AND COMPROMISED ON A "CLUSTERED" RESPONSE.

14. (S) THAT LEFT OPEN THE QUESTION OF HOW TO PRESENT THE DOCUMENT. INITIALLY, THE PREFERRED OPTION WAS TO PLANT A QUESTION DURING PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME THURSDAY AFTERNOON, BUT DELAYS IN FINALIZING THE DRAFT AND OBTAINING IRISH GOVERNMENT APPROVAL MADE THAT IMPOSSIBLE. IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SPRING'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE DOCUMENT WAS RECEIVED ONLY 15 MINUTES BEFORE ITS RELEASE. IN THE END, MAYHEW GAVE IT TO THE PRESS AT 1800 LOCAL TIME WITH MINIMAL COMMENTARY.

## INITIAL REACTIONS

15. (U) INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE STATEMENT THROUGHOUT THE BRITISH ISLES WERE ALMOST UNIFORMLY POSITIVE. BRITISH MEDIA WERE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY THE DOCUMENT'S LENGTH AND SERIOUSNESS, HAVING BEEN LED TO EXPECT A "BRUSH-OFF." SPRING SAID HE WOULD HAVE BEEN HAPPY TO CLAIM AUTHORSHIP OF IT. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY (SDLP) LEADERS JOHN HUME AND SEAMUS MALLON OFFERED STRONG ENDORSEMENT, SAYING THE "CLARIFICATION" ISSUE HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY ADDRESSED, AND THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO SINN FEIN TO RESPOND PROMPTLY. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) POLITICIANS WERE MORE LUKEWARM: THEY ACCEPTED THAT THE STATEMENT BROKE NO DANGEROUS NEW GROUND, BUT CONSIDERED THE WHOLE EXERCISE FUTILE. ONLY DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) LEADER IAN PAISLEY DENOUNCED THE DOCUMENT OUTRIGHT, DESCRIBING IT AS "A 21-PAGE LOVE LETTER TO GERRY ADAMS."

16. (U) SINN FEIN NORTHERN CHAIRMAN MITCH MCLAUGHLIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BRITISH STATEMENT WAS A SERIOUS EFFORT, AND SAID SOME OF THE RESPONSES WERE ENCOURAGING. MARTIN MCGUINNESS DESCRIBED THE STATEMENT AS "A SMALL STEP IN THE SLOWLY EVOLVING PEACE PROCESS." BUT MCLAUGHLIN SAID THE MOVEMENT WOULD NEED SOME TIME TO

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 008256

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPONDS  
TO SINN FEIN QUESTIONSSTUDY THE DOCUMENT BEFORE REACHING A CONCLUSION. PARTY  
LEADER GERRY ADAMS HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT A  
CONSIDERED SINN FEIN RESPONSE WAS UNLIKELY BEFORE THE  
JUNE 9 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS.

COMMENT

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17. (X) THE DOCUMENT IS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE SUBSTANTIVE  
THAN WE INITIALLY UNDERSTOOD, WHILE REMAINING WITHIN THE  
PARAMETERS OF PREVIOUS POSITIONS. SINN FEIN HAS BEEN  
DEMANDING "CLARIFICATION" FOR FOUR MONTHS. IT HAS NOW  
ASKED ALL THE QUESTIONS IT COULD THINK OF, AND HAS  
GOTTEN A CONSIDERED RESPONSE, ENDORSED BY DUBLIN.

15. (X) THE BALL IS FIRMLY BACK IN THE REPUBLICAN  
COURT. IF THEY CONTINUE TO PROCRASTINATE, THEIR MOTIVES  
WILL BE MORE SUSPECT THAN EVER. HMG HOPES TO CONVINC  
THEM THAT THE TRAIN IS LEAVING THE STATION, BUT CAN DO  
SO ONLY IF THE OTHER PARTIES -- PARTICULARLY DUBLIN AND  
THE SDLP -- ARE ON BOARD. DEAL

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (5.19)  
KOH 4/11/2023

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LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE BREAKTHROUGH IN NORTHERN IRELAND  
.....PEACE PROCESS

REF: (A) DUBLIN 02608  
(B) LONDON 07022  
(C) DUBLIN 02191

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. RELIABLE SOURCES CLOSE TO SINN FEIN/IRA INFORMED ME EARLY MAY 13 THAT SINN FEIN WILL ANNOUNCE ON SUNDAY, MAY 15, THAT IT HAS GIVEN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE JOINT DECLARATION WHICH IT WANTS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CLARIFY. THE TAOISEACH, WHO IS IN THE U.S., WILL THEN ANNOUNCE FROM THERE THAT HE WILL GIVE THE QUESTIONS TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. (SINN FEIN SECRETLY PASSED THESE QUESTIONS ON TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 19. THE IRISH, IN TURN, PASSED THEM ON TO THE BRITISH SHORTLY THEREAFTER).
3. THE BRITISH, IF THEY ARE AFRAID OF SECRECY, WILL THEN PUBLISH THE QUESTIONS ON MONDAY, MAY 16. NOEL DORR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA), TOLD ME ON MAY 13 THAT BOTH SIR PATRICK MAYHEW AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR BLATHERWICK HAD TOLD HIM THE PREVIOUS EVENING THAT THEIR PREFERENCE WAS TO PUBLISH THE QUESTIONS. IF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO PUBLISH THEM WAS THE ONLY PROBLEM, DORR ASSURED ME, HE WOULD SORT IT OUT BEFORE MONDAY. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD CONTACT SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF DFA'S ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, WHO IS IN LONDON, ABOUT THIS. MY SOURCES IMPLIED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD PROBABLY NOT STRENUOUSLY OBJECT TO BRITISH PUBLICATION OF THE QUESTIONS.
4. MY SOURCES ADDED THAT THE KEY QUESTION FOR SINN FEIN/IRA IN REGARD TO BRITISH CLARIFICATION IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUME/ADAMS INITIATIVE AND THE JOINT DECLARATION. SINN FEIN/IRA WANT TO KNOW WHY, IF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE BRITISH PERCEIVE NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM, THEY REJECTED HUME/ADAMS LAST YEAR. AND, IF THE BRITISH PERCEIVE A DIFFERENCE, SINN FEIN/IRA WANT TO KNOW WHAT IT IS.

5. MY SOURCES ASSERT THAT SINNFEIN/IRA HAVE ALREADY MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION BY BACKING DOWN FROM THEIR DEMAND FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH THE BRITISH TO CLARIFY THE JOINT DECLARATION. THIS IS WHY THEY HAVE PASSED THE CLARIFICATION QUESTION THROUGH THE IRISH, AND THEY HOPE THAT THIS ACTION WILL BE SEEN AS A SIGNIFICANT GESTURE OF GOOD WILL. THESE SOURCES ADDED THAT THE SINN FEIN/IRA LEADERSHIP HAS CONCLUDED THAT 25 YEARS OF STRUGGLE HAVE LED NOWHERE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THEY MUST MOVE SLOWLY, IN SMALL STEPS, IF THEY ARE TO BRING THE OTHERS WITH THEM.

6. MY SOURCES FURTHER EXPECT THAT SINN FEIN/IRA WILL PROVIDE THEIR FORMAL REACTION TO THE JOINT DECLARATION IN A WEEK TO TEN DAYS. ALTHOUGH THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT/NOT COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF THE DECLARATION, THEY WILL SOMEHOW INDICATE A PREFERENCE FOR THE POLITICAL TRACK, I.E., A SEAT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPLICIT RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. THEY MUST ALSO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE NORTH WITHOUT MAJORITY CONSENT. SINN FEIN/IRA FEARS, HOWEVER, THAT, IF THEY GO TO THE TABLE, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT. IN THAT CASE, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MOVE AHEAD ON THEIR OWN TO TRY TO WORK OUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

7. COMMENT: THIS TRACKS WITH WHAT SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, RECENTLY SUGGESTED TO US, I.E., THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF WE SEE MOVEMENT SOON. HE SAID THAT HUME HAD TOLD ADAMS THAT TIME WAS UP AND THAT HE HAD ONE MORE CHANCE: TO PASS QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WHICH, IN TURN, WOULD PASS THEM ON TO THE BRITISH. THE CONDITION, HUME TOLD ADAMS, WAS A PERMANENT CESSATION OF VIOLENCE.

8. WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS COMPLICATED MANEUVERING ON ALL SIDES WILL PRODUCE A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SINN FEIN IS REACTING TO POSITIVE SIGNALS FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. END COMMENT.  
WHAT ROLE FOR THE U.S.?

9. OUR SOURCES STRESSED THAT IT IS TIME FOR US TO PREVAIL ON THE BRITISH TO BE "OBLIGING, POSITIVE, AND FRIENDLY" IN RESPONDING TO THIS INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCe THEM TO PUBLICLY RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A GENUINE ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF THE SINN FEIN/IRA TO COME ON BOARD THE POLITICAL PROCESS. IF THE BRITISH DISMISS THIS EFFORT OR DO NOT GREET IT SERIOUSLY, THIS WILL FEED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SINN FEIN/IRA'S PARANOIA AND BLOCK THE PEACE PROCESS.  
10. COMMENT: AS THE ABOVE WAS BEING DRAFTED, WE LEARNED THAT THE BRITISH INTEND TO PUBLISH SINN FEIN/IRA'S QUESTIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE ANGRY THAT NEWS OF AN IMMINENT BREAKTHROUGH WAS LEAKED TO THE "IRISH TIMES," WHICH RAN A FRONT-PAGE STORY ON SUGGESTING THAT SOMETHING WAS AFOOT ON MAY 12. SINN FEIN/IRA, IN TURN, IS UPSET BECAUSE THEY HAVE HEARD ABOUT BRITISH PLANS TO PUBLISH THE QUESTIONS. THE LEAK ITSELF PROBABLY DERIVED FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, I.E. PRIME MINISTER REYNOLD'S DESIRE TO BE ON RECORD PRIOR TO LEAVING FOR THE U.S. THAT HE WAS "LOOKING FORWARD TO SOME POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT TO REMOVE THE LOGJAM ON CLARIFICATION."

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.01)  
KBH 4/11/2023

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE <sup>AD</sup><sub>ML</sub>

SUBJECT: Gerry Adams Wants Visa for December Visit:  
Fundraising and Other Issues for Decision

Purpose

To decide how to handle Gerry Adams' proposed December visit and fundraising request.

Background

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has applied for a visa to visit the U.S. December 7-13, stopping in several cities. Adams has asked that he be given a multiple-entry visa with no fundraising restrictions. (Adams' two earlier visas, in January and September this year, were both single-entry visas which prohibited him from raising funds in the U.S.)

There is no opposition within the Administration or from the British to granting Adams a three-month, multiple-entry visa subject to continued IRA observance of the cease-fire, a no fundraising restriction and advance notice of Adams' travel plans and itinerary for each trip.

I believe the appropriate way to handle the visit is for me to receive him in my office in the White House but with no photographs. This is consistent with the level of White House access accorded other Northern Ireland politicians representing political parties of similar size. State and the British can live with my seeing Adams, though they would rather it not be at the White House or include any photo opportunities.

Fundraising Conditions

There is a sharp division of views between Justice, State, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and the British on one side and the Irish, Ambassador Smith, and some important members of Congress on the other over whether to permit Adams to fundraise. The decision

comes at a delicate time in the Northern Ireland peace process and in our relations with the British over Bosnia.

As an individual with a terrorist background, Adams is ineligible for entry into the United States. In waiving that ineligibility, we have the right to impose conditions that we cannot impose on other Sinn Fein members. Justice, State, Ab Mikva and Ambassador Crowe in London strongly oppose allowing Adams to raise funds in the U.S., at least for the time being, primarily because of information that the IRA continues to procure handguns and explosives in the United States, the short time the cease-fire has been in place, the fact that the IRA maintains large stockpiles of weapons, and that it continues to maintain a high state of readiness, including training activities.

Ambassador Crowe also argues strongly that it is particularly important to take strongly-held British views on this issue into account at a time when the bilateral relationship is under severe strain over Bosnia. He feels it would be extremely unwise to cause another rift over Ireland and a time when we need them on the "much more important foreign policy issue" of Bosnia. British officials have said that the UK "would publicly denounce" the Administration if we allow fundraising.

British neuralgia on the fundraising issue, despite the fact that Sinn Fein is permitted to raise funds in Britain, relates to the historical fact that the IRA armed and sustained itself for many years in large part through support from U.S. sources. In practice, Sinn Fein has never demonstrated that the collections are segregated from IRA operational funds, and it has been proven in court that NORAID has used money collected for "widows and orphans" to fund arms purchases. In addition, Ab Mikva believes that as long as IRA weapons procurement activity continues in the U.S., permitting Adams to fundraise will expose us to charges of inconsistent and discriminatory policy if we crack down on Hamas fundraising (although there is a difference as the IRA has implemented a ceasefire).

The Attorney General, FBI and State (including Ambassador Crowe) strongly agree with the British line of argument. They underscore that although the cease-fire continues generally to hold, IRA extortion and other criminal activities continue, though apparently under instructions that firearms not be used. The IRA admitted November 20 that a recent armed robbery in which a postal worker was killed (and over \$200,000 stolen) was committed by IRA members ("volunteers") "acting on instruction" (presumably from local commanders) but "not sanctioned by the IRA leadership." Moreover, IRA extralegal "policing actions" (i.e. beatings of suspected collaborators or petty criminals in Catholic neighborhoods of Northern Ireland) continue, as do IRA

training operations. FBI is monitoring IRA arms procurement activity in the U.S. which has occurred since the cease-fire and is ongoing.

On the other side, the Irish Government (especially Albert Reynolds), Ambassador Smith in Dublin and some important figures on the Hill (including Dodd, Moynihan, Manton, Gilman and Ted Kennedy) argue with equal conviction that there is no practical or political benefit to be derived from continuing to insist that Adams cannot fundraise here and, indeed, that singling out Adams in this way will undermine him and perhaps the entire peace process. They point out that this is not a legal issue but rather a policy one, that other Sinn Fein leaders and supporters who do not need visa waivers can and do raise funds for Sinn Fein, and that Adams, given his positive and pivotal role in bringing IRA into the peace process, should not be "humiliated" in this way.

As Adams and others note, fundraising for Sinn Fein in the UK is legal (he held a fundraiser in London last week) and to deny him the same right in the United States would seriously undermine Adams at a delicate moment in the peace process. The loss of Albert Reynolds as Prime Minister of Ireland removes Adams' strongest supporter from the process and Adams needs to continue to show momentum in the process if he is to keep the hardliners in tow. Adams also argues that they are in urgent need of funds to organize a political party and argues passionately that denying him the right to do so will only make it more difficult for him to move on the important issues such as demobilization.

A denial of fundraising will make big headlines in Ireland of the US charging Adams with continued weapons procurement and calling into question the permanency of the ceasefire. He fears such action will seriously undermine him and encourage the hardliners to pull away from the path of peace.

### Fundraising Options

#### Option I: Maintain Fundraising Prohibition

Option IA) That Adams' three-month multiple entry visa be annotated to indicate that he is not permitted to engage in direct or indirect fundraising, but that he may raise sufficient funds to pay for the costs of his U.S. trip (same conditions as his last visit). No commitments/indications given him as to what our future position might be. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government support; Irish and Ambassador Smith oppose.]

Pros: Even with the fundraising restriction still in place, Adams gets from this trip a substantial liberalization of the travel restrictions on him and the reward of being received at the White House (despite State and British discomfiture with the latter). Takes things a step at a time and keeps fundraising as leverage to encourage the IRA to address the weapons issue early on. Leaves no doubt where we stand on terrorism and expresses our concern about continued IRA criminal and procurement activities. Boosts confidence in London and Belfast that British and Unionist views matter and that Adams does not exercise undue influence on our Northern Ireland policy. Underscores that we are sensitive to the importance of working with them on Bosnia.

Cons: Could weaken Adams politically within the IRA, both by embarrassing him in his already-public request and by denying him the ability to raise funds he says he needs to operate Sinn Fein as a political party. To the extent Adams is weakened, the peace process could be damaged. There will be headlines in the Irish papers that we believe the IRA continues to procure weapons and perhaps that we doubt the permanency of the IRA ceasefire. You will face strong pressure from Ambassador Smith and some on the Hill to concede this issue. The Irish government will strongly urge you to reconsider. Adams may cancel his trip if not allowed to fundraise. Refusal will cause a rift with portions of the Irish-American community; some in the Irish-American community will begin to criticize what to date has been viewed as a successful foreign policy issue.

Option IB) Same as above, but we tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming. [State, Justice, Crowe and British can accept, while preference is IA. Justice prefers that the IRA be required to cease weapons procurement worldwide and permanently but that standard is not realistic as we cannot verify either. Irish, Smith oppose.]

Pros: Same as above, but makes more explicit why Adams can't fundraise now and what we expect from him before we will alter our position. Provides encouragement to Adams that we will not deny him fundraising access indefinitely. Could encourage an end to weapons procurement and progress on other issues.

Cons: Same as above. In addition, we will in all likelihood face another disagreement within the Administration and between the British and Irish when the time comes to decide if he has made enough progress on ending weapons procurement and on demobilization and disarmament.

Option II: Allow Adams to fundraise on this trip.

Option IIA) Impose no restrictions on Adams' ability to fundraise on this trip. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Pleases important Irish players on the Hill; strengthens Adams internally, could help advance the peace process.

Cons: Justice, FBI, Ambassador Crowe and State vehemently oppose, as do the British. The British (and Ambassador Crowe) still feel bruised from Adams' last visit and the Vice President's phone call to Adams; allowing Adams to fundraise will open another public U.S.-UK rift in a period of already-substantial strains over Bosnia. Could weaken pressure on Adams to deal with weapons issue and be interpreted in Northern Ireland as a sign that we take lightly the recent IRA murder/robbery incident; subjects us to criticism if there is another incident of violence involving IRA members or weapons. Funds could be directed to weapons purchase, especially if the cease-fire breaks down. Ab Mivka adds that it would be very difficult to permit Adams fundraising while at the same time cracking down on Hamas fundraising (while recognizing that the IRA has implemented a ceasefire and Hamas still engages in terrorism).

Option IIB) Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities. This could involve an extensive audit by a respected firm. [State, Justice, Crowe and British oppose; Irish, Smith support.]

Pros: Boosts Adams and thus could help advance the peace process. Adams has already offered to provide such audits. Underscores the point that we expect Adams to move forward in bringing Sinn Fein/IRA fully away from terrorist and illegal activities. Makes diversion of funds more difficult.

Cons: Same as IIA. Also, money is fungible; even very elaborate safeguards will not stop it from going to support or offset criminal and terrorist activities. Largely symbolic, could be criticized as empty gesture. State and Justice strongly oppose on these grounds.

Option IIC) Allow Adams to fundraise if he agrees to place the funds in a U.S. account which he could not access without our permission. Establish that we will review the situation in early 1995 to decide if the funds can be accessed; factors affecting our decision will include whether the cease-fire still holds and whether Sinn Fein/IRA has ceased weapons procurement in the US and made concrete progress toward demobilization and disarmament. [Justice, State, Ambassador Crowe and the British government oppose; Irish and Ambassador Smith support.]

Pros: Lets Adams go ahead with his fundraising plans while still meeting some of the concerns of the British, State and Justice. Will boost Adams and thus help advance the peace process.

Cons: Neither side will like; either or both may reject. In requiring the US to make a decision on when to release funds, this option would put us under constant pressure on both sides to release or not release the funds and involve the US in the negotiating process in a way we have not been before.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a three-month entry visa for Adams conditional on continuation of the ceasefire and that he advises us in advance of his travel plans and itinerary. That I meet with him in my office but with no photographs. And that you approve Option IB: Maintain fundraising restriction but tell Adams the conditions he must meet in order to get the fundraising issue reconsidered, namely that the IRA must have ceased weapons procurement in the United States and made concrete progress towards demobilizing and disarming.

Of the difficult choices you face, I believe this option best promotes our goals of maintaining the peace process in Northern Ireland, sending a strong message against terrorism and maintains our strong relationship with the British. A meeting with Adams in the White House is a significant offering to him and a three-month multiple entry visa meets one of his key requests during his last visit. The prestige of entering the White House will lessen any criticism of him personally over denial of his fundraising request. While we have not yet heard back from the Vice President, Leon Fuerth and Jack Quinn agree. Leon Panetta also concurs.

In addition, by pointing out to him our knowledge of continuing procurement of weapons in the US, we might help achieve an end to such activities. We will also speak with the British to encourage them to reach out more positively to Adams to help offset any fallout from the decision. Adams recently wrote to the British and they expect to reply to his letter next week. We

will work with the British to encourage them to be as forthcoming as possible and perhaps hold announcement of our decision so it coincides with any positive response from the British.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Or alternatively,

That you approve Option IIB: Allow Adams to fundraise but impose conditions on how the funds are handled to ensure they are only used for legitimate political party activities, most likely through an extensive audit by a respected firm.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

If you select Option IIB or any other option allowing fundraising, I recommend you telephone Prime Minister Major, Secretary Christopher, and perhaps Attorney General Reno to inform them of your decision.

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.02)  
KBH 4/11/2023

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1993

33 MAY 3 P10:00

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Denial of Visa to Gerry Adams, Founder of PIRA

Purpose

To inform you that the State Department has denied a U.S. nonimmigrant visa to Gerard "Gerry" Adams, founder and high level member of the terrorist organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

Background

During the campaign, you mentioned that you would consider the issuance of a visa to the PIRA's Gerry Adams because of his status as a member of the British Parliament. He has since lost his parliament seat in the 1992 election.

Adams has been twice refused a visa under the old Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) because of his advocacy of and involvement in terrorist violence. He appealed the first decision in 1988, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the denial. He was last denied a visa in March 1991, without legal challenge.

The Act was significantly amended effective June 1, 1991 to prevent discrimination against mere members of terrorist organizations. This is the first time since that change that Adams has applied for a visa. There is thus a chance he may try to challenge our action in court by arguing we are denying his visa request solely because of his membership in an organization rather than any specific action. However, we believe there is sufficient evidence of his involvement in terrorist activities to withstand a court challenge to his visa denial -- basically the same basis used for the 1991 First Circuit decision.

Adams is currently applying to visit the U.S. in May for three weeks, ostensibly to promote his two books, The Street and Cage Eleven. The State Department denied the visa contending that Adams is ineligible under section 212(a)(3)(b) of the Act because he has engaged in terrorist activity as defined in that section: "the preparation or planning of a terrorist activity" (Tab A). Although a founding member of PIRA, Adams denies his membership. (The organization is outlawed.) Because of his leadership status

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in PIRA, it is difficult to link Adams directly to the scene of a specific terrorist activity, although, according to the FBI, he is a member of the Provisional Army Council which makes all decisions on terrorist operations. Thus, Adams would have been aware of -- if not a participant in -- PIRA's planning for the explosion at the London financial district, and the March 20 bombing which killed two children. Moreover, the FBI believes that Adams' affiliation with the "Provisional Third Battalion Army Command" makes clear his foreknowledge of the group's terrorist activities.

An FBI summary of Adams' involvement in terrorist activities is attached at Tab B. A CIA report on current PIRA terrorist activities is attached at Tab C.

While there is a waiver provision, we agree with State (and the FBI) that the Attorney General should not be requested to waive ineligibility. In addition to State and FBI objections based on the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Irish Government opposes PIRA and Sinn Fein (of which Adams is current President). Moreover, in the U.S., PIRA fund-raising has dwindled in the past few years; Adams' presence could reinvigorate this activity, including serving as a catalyst for procurement of arms. (A trial is underway in Arizona against IRA supporters accused of purchasing 2,000 detonators -- some of which have been used in the current bombing campaign -- and of attempting to purchase a stinger missile.)

State's decision does not conflict with your campaign statement since you offered to consider his eligibility based on Adams' status as a member of Parliament, a status which he no longer enjoys.

Adams may receive the letter denying the visa as early as Tuesday and we will be sure to inform your Irish supporters of the decision.

Attachments

- Tab A Section 212(a)(3) of Immigration and Nationality Act of June 1, 1991
- Tab B FBI Report on Adams
- Tab C CIA Report on PIRA Activity

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Jul-1993 11:39 EDT

*B-1  
Tell Morrison  
what's going on  
let him decide  
whether he  
wants  
briefing on  
state  
police, he might  
as well*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Brooke Darby ( DARBY )  
FROM: Barry F. Lowenkron (LOWENKRON)  
SUBJECT: Gerry Adams -- Bruce Morrison

Please pass to Nancy ASAP:

To review where we stand on arranging a briefing for Bruce Morrison on the Adams visa denial:

-- I spoke to FBI representatives who tell me that, because of the Privacy Act (let alone sources & methods) they cannot brief Morrison (or even provide him with the gist of the information) on Adams. (The only way a sitting Congressman can get the briefing is through an official request through a Congressional Committee.)

-- State/European Bureau can meet with Morrison today at 4:00 to run him through procedures/reasons why Adams was denied a visa. But, here too, what State can tell Morrison about Adams' activities is limited.

-- If Morrison is interested, he should call Elora Sayre at 648-8027 and give her the relevant info to get cleared into State. His briefer will be John Tefft, Director for Northern European Affairs. (Tefft briefed Mayor Flynn on the same issue.)

FYI, Adams is scheduled to see our number 2 person in the consulate in Belfast on August 4.

CC: Records ( RECORDS )  
CC: Jenonne R. Walker ( WALKER )  
CC: Richard L. Canas ( CANAS )

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2011-0355-F (1.04)  
KBM 4/11/2023

*Darby -*  
*Do we need to take another look at the Special Envoy issue?*  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jul-1993 10:13 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

( DARBY )

FROM:

Barry F. Lowenkron  
(LOWENKRON)

SUBJECT:

Adams: Morrison-State Meeting

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2011-0355-F (1.05)

K8H 4/11/2023

Brooke, please pass to Nancy:

I got a read-out of the Morrison-State meeting. Morrison met for one hour & 40 minutes at State this morning with John Tefft in the European Bureau and Dick Scully, a State Dept. Lawyer. (Morrison knew Scully from Morrison's Congressional days and respects his knowledge of visa laws.) Points covered:

Gerry Adams Visa: State briefed Morrison on material presented in State's 1988 court deposition defending the decision to deny Adams a visa. Morrison countered that State seemed to be holding Adams to higher standards than Mandela or the PLO.

Special Envoy: Morrison pressed the idea of a special envoy, suggested Jimmy Carter. State asked what our negotiating strategy should be, and how do we protect the President's credibility. State also said that Reynolds is not enthusiastic about the idea of a special envoy at this time, but that the President would keep the option open.

Visa waiver. Morrison asked what Adams would have to do to get a visa. State answered that he would have to renounce terrorism.

The meeting ended well. Morrison said that he still had his views, but he found the meeting useful and would keep in touch with Tefft & Scully.

CC: Records

( RECORDS )

CC: Jenonne R. Walker

( WALKER )

CC: Richard L. Canas

( CANAS )

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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2011-038-F (1.06)  
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE  
PROCESS

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

## SUMMARY

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2. WITH AGREEMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD) LIKELY WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK, THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP) THREATENING TO JOIN IAN PAISLEY'S DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) IN REJECTING THE JFD OUTRIGHT, UNREST AMONG PRO-UNION TORY BACKBENCHERS, AND BRITISH MINISTERS PROBABLY SOON TO ENTER TALKS WITH SINN FEIN, WE ARE ENTERING WHAT MAY BE THE SINGLE MOST TRYING PERIOD OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. WE CAN HELP THE PROCESS SUCCEED BY GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRISH REPUBLICANS TO MAKE THE IRA CEASEFIRE IRREVOCABLE. THE MOST URGENT PRIORITY, HOWEVER, IS TO REASSURE UNIONISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING SOLD OUT, WHILE WARNING THEM THAT A REFUSAL EVEN TO NEGOTIATE WOULD CARRY HEAVY COSTS.

3. BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE HMG-SINN FEIN TALKS, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE

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~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH, BUT LIFTING IT AT A TIME WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS RESTS ON A KNIFE'S EDGE WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ENRAGE UNIONISTS, AND DIMINISH PROSPECTS FOR AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

PROCESS AT A CROSSROADS  
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4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS HAS HIT AN UNUSUALLY ROUGH PATCH, AND THE SITUATION MAY GET A GOOD DEAL MORE TURBULENT IN THE WEEKS TO COME. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS LATE NEXT WEEK. THE SELECTIVE AND INFLAMMATORY LEAK OF PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED MODERATE UNIONISTS, AND PROBABLY LOCKED THE UUP INTO AT LEAST PRO FORMA REJECTION OF THE DOCUMENT WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED. THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THE UNIONIST PARTIES WON'T EVENTUALLY ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT GETTING TO THAT POINT WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT. THEY (AND A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES) ARE IN A VERY SKITTISH MOOD. AND IF THE UUP WITHDRAWS ITS TACIT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, MAJOR WILL HAVE EVEN LESS NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY THAN BEFORE.

5. ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE, TALKS WITH SINN FEIN HAVE MADE INCREMENTAL PROGRESS AT BEST. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS WARMED A DEGREE OR SO, BUT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT SINN FEIN HAS GIVEN NOTHING EXCEPT A WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO (BUT NOT ACCEPT) A BRITISH PROPOSAL, AND A VAGUE UNDERTAKING TO USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT MIGHT POSSESS IN A "POSITIVE" WAY AT A TIME OF ITS CHOOSING. AND IT HAS THREATENED TO END THE DIALOGUE UNLESS MINISTERS JOIN IT SOON. THE BRITISH ARE LIKELY TO AUTHORIZE A JUNIOR MINISTER TO TAKE PART, ON THE NOMINAL GROUNDS THAT SINN FEIN HAS AT LEAST "ADDRESSED" THE ARMS QUESTION. BUT MOVING FROM DIALOGUE TO ALL-PARTY TALKS WILL REQUIRE MUCH MORE -- ALMOST CERTAINLY PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM IRA CONTROL.

6. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED, IT IS LIKELY TO DRAW FIRE FROM SEVERAL QUARTERS -- UNIONISTS, NATIONALISTS AND TORY EUROPHOBES. THIS IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND THE LONG HISTORY OF ANGLO-IRISH CONFLICT. ALL PARTIES WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES.

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 04

THE USG ROLE  
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7. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE USG CAN BEST SUPPORT THE PROCESS IN THREE WAYS:

- GIVING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OUR WHOLEHEARTED AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY FORWARD;
- MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR PEACE BY OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS, WHILE WARNING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE; AND
- AVOIDING ACTIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE GENERAL PROCESS.

8. IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE NEW FACTOR IN THE EQUATION IS THE DANGER OF UNIONIST AND TORY BACKBENCH REJECTION OF THE JFD. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE NOT UPSET THE DELICATE PROCESSES NOW UNDERWAY BY MOVING TOO SOON TO LIFT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING, A STEP WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS BY REINFORCING THE UNIONIST VIEW OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DRIVE THEM ONTO A PATH THAT LEADS INEXORABLY TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND.

9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONING SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

10. MOST OBSERVERS HERE HAD PREDICTED SINCE THE CEASEFIRES THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO COME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE IDEA THAT RISING REPUBLICAN DISILLUSIONMENT WOULD INCLINE THE IRA TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THOSE FEARS HAVE

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

EASED SOMEWHAT. ADAMS CLAIMS, AND APPEARS, TO BE UNDER RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM IRA HARDLINERS AT PRESENT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE OVERALL PROCESS NOW COMES FROM THE FEARS -- SOME UNDERSTANDABLE, OTHERS DELIBERATELY INDUCED -- OF THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IF MODERATE UUP LEADERS CANNOT CONVINCE THEIR PARTY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JFD, THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL SUFFER A SEVERE AND PROBABLY PROLONGED SETBACK, AND THE RISK OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WILL RISE SHARPLY.

11. THE BRITISH, THE IRISH AND WE ALL NEED TO USE THE COMBINATION OF CARROTS AND STICKS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ENCOURAGE THE PARAMILITARIES AND PARTIES AFFILIATED WITH THEM TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE FOR GOOD, WHILE DISSUADING THE UNIONISTS FROM ABORTING THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMER BY MAINTAINING OUR REASONABLE AND DEFENSIBLE POSITION ON FUNDRAISING FOR A LITTLE LONGER, AND TO THE LATTER BY SENDING AN EQUALLY TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE UUP DELEGATION VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THAT THEY CAN EXPECT NO UNDERSTANDING FROM US IF THEY BLOCK PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. WHAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS IS PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND INCREASE UNIONIST ALIENATION. CROWE

BT

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TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE **4777**

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EXDIS

DEPT FOR U/S TARNOFF, A/S HOLBROOKE AND A/S RYAN

NSC FOR LAKE AND SODERBERG

FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK EI

SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE  
PROCESS

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#### THE USG ROLE

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7. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE USG CAN BEST SUPPORT THE PROCESS IN THREE WAYS:

- GIVING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OUR WHOLEHEARTED AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER TALKS AND THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY FORWARD;
- MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR PEACE BY OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS, WHILE WARNING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE; AND
- AVOIDING ACTIONS THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE GENERAL PROCESS.

8. IN THE LATTER REGARD, THE NEW FACTOR IN THE EQUATION IS THE DANGER OF UNIONIST AND TORY BACKBENCH REJECTION OF THE JFD. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE NOT UPSET THE DELICATE PROCESSES NOW UNDERWAY BY MOVING TOO SOON TO LIFT THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING, A STEP WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE TENSIONS BY REINFORCING THE UNIONIST VIEW OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DRIVE THEM ONTO A PATH THAT LEADS INEXORABLY TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND. → *what's connective with fundraising?*

9. HMG'S HOPE IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WILL INDUCE THE IRA TO MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARD DISARMING. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE — *from?* TO BEGIN DECOMMISSIONING SOME OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: JOHN HUME HAS CALLED FOR IT, THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THEM UNTIL IT HAPPENS, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IT AS A CONDITION FOR FUNDRAISING AUTHORIZATION. IF WE REMOVE ONE OF THESE SOURCES OF PRESSURE BEFORE THE IRA HAS TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE STEP, WE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IRA INTRANSIGENCE AND ENRAGE UNIONISTS.

10. MOST OBSERVERS HERE HAD PREDICTED SINCE THE CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CEASEFIRES THAT THE SINGLE MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE STAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS LIKELY TO COME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND EASTER. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE IDEA THAT RISING REPUBLICAN DISILLUSIONMENT WOULD INCLINE THE IRA TO RETURN TO VIOLENCE. THOSE FEARS HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT. ADAMS CLAIMS, AND APPEARS, TO BE UNDER RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM IRA HARDLINERS AT PRESENT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE OVERALL PROCESS NOW COMES FROM THE FEARS -- SOME UNDERSTANDABLE, OTHERS DELIBERATELY INDUCED -- OF THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY. IF MODERATE UUP LEADERS CANNOT CONVINCE THEIR PARTY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JFD, THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL SUFFER A SEVERE AND PROBABLY PROLONGED SETBACK, AND THE RISK OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WILL RISE SHARPLY.

11. THE BRITISH, THE IRISH AND WE ALL NEED TO USE THE COMBINATION OF CARROTS AND STICKS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ENCOURAGE THE PARAMILITARIES AND PARTIES AFFILIATED WITH THEM TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE FOR GOOD, WHILE DISSUADING THE UNIONISTS FROM ABORTING THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMER BY MAINTAINING OUR REASONABLE AND DEFENSIBLE POSITION ON FUNDRAISING FOR A LITTLE LONGER, AND TO THE LATTER BY SENDING AN EQUALLY TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE UUP DELEGATION VISITING WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THAT THEY CAN EXPECT NO UNDERSTANDING FROM US IF THEY BLOCK PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT. WHAT WE MUST AVOID AT ALL COSTS IS PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS AND INCREASE UNIONIST ALIENATION. CROWE

BT

#2495

NNNN

DIST:

<^DIST>

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VER:SHBOW

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 161458Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO ////

~~SECRET~~ 161458Z FEB 95 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH, DUBLIN 010

TO THE WHITE HOUSE/NSC, EYES ONLY FOR NANCY SODERBERG

NANCY: SEAN DONLON, PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S SPECIAL ADVISOR, JUST TELEPHONED FROM LONDON. HE IS VERY DISTRESSED BECAUSE HE HAS TELEPHONED YOU REPEATEDLY LAST NIGHT AND TODAY AND YOU HAVE NOT RETURNED HIS CALLS. HE IS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS FUND RAISING BY GERRY ADAMS WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I TRUST YOU HAVE SEEN DUBLIN 811 REPORTING ON MY CONVERSATION FEBRUARY 14 WITH SEAN O'HUIGINN AND EMBASSY LONDON'S RESPONSE IN LONDON 2495. GIVEN OUR CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, PERHAPS YOU COULD CLARIFY FOR ME WHAT THE EMBASSY MEANT IN PARAGRAPH THREE BY SAYING THEY "BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LIFT THE FUNDRAISING BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN A WAY THAT ADVANCES THE PROCESS, AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE PRINCIPLES TONY LAKE SET FORTH.

I PRESUME THAT YOU HAVE SEEN THE LETTER OUTLINING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS OVER BLOCKING FUND RAISING BY ADAMS. HOPEFULLY, THESE WILL BE FULLY WEIGHTED WHEN CONSIDERING ADAMS' APPLICATION FOR ANOTHER VISA, WHICH COULD COME AS EARLY AS TOMORROW. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN SEAN DONLON'S CALLS SOON AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU MYSELF.

~~SECRET~~

DECL OADR

#0170

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.08)  
K8H 4/11/2023

NNNN

<MSGID> M1518930

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~~SECRET~~

## Hawkins, Ardenia R.

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From: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
To: Gray, Wendy E.; Hawkins, Ardenia R.; Soderberg, Nancy E.  
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Subject: RE: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]  
Date: Wednesday, February 08, 1995 4:14PM

Please pass to Nancy:

Following our telephone conversation earlier today, I made some calls around and learned the following:

-- Nobody agrees with O'Dowd's characterization of the ammo find as an IRA move of any kind. The Irish Embassy says it was routine policework that came upon them; the finding has no political significance. Peter Westmacott says Sinn Fein is not referring to or taking credit for the find publicly or privately. (I found this surprising given the timing of the find and the way it was initially reported in the press, but this is the Irish government/police view, as well as the British.)

-- Tuesday's HMG-Sinn Fein talks made "some progress," according to Westmacott. (I haven't connected with Oakley yet.) Some discussion of weapons decommissioning. IF Thursday's meeting goes similarly well, HMG may offer a meeting with ministers as the next step.

-- The emergency measures the Irish lifted were mostly symbolic, hadn't been used since the '70s. They RETAINED the ability to detain suspected terrorists incommunicado for 48 hours, the aspect of their (and the British) anti-terrorist approach which is most frequently criticized.

Given the fact that the ammunition discovery appears after all not to be a conscious Sinn Fein/IRA gesture (and that a bomb with semtex was defused today in Newry, although the IRA disclaimed responsibility), I suggest we wait to see whether the Brits do indeed offer ministers after tomorrow's meeting before revisiting the fundraising issue.

From: Gray, Wendy E.  
To: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Marshall, Betty A.; Maxfield, Nancy H.; Soderberg, Nancy E.  
Subject: A NOTE FROM NANCY SODERBERG [CONFIDENTIAL]  
Date: Wednesday, February 08, 1995 02:02 AM

Hi Kathy!

Neal O'Dowd called. The IRA gave up a large cache of weapons today, he says. 30,000 rounds of heavy ammo from the 1986 Libyan deal used for Soviet machine guns used to down helos. Neal thinks the IRA is in effect giving up its ability to shoot down helos. He thinks its in response to the Irish decision to lift the state of emergency in place in the south since 1976. Perhaps also due to release of Irish prisoners. Can you check out facts and check with State on whether this meets Peter's conditions. Also, perhaps coupled with expected positive statements next week re: the framework document?

Thanks!

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(1.09)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

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From: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
To: Hawkins, Ardenia R.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches  
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Kreczko, Alan J.; Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Subject: Northern Ireland update ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~  
Date: Tuesday, February 07, 1995 5:37PM

Please pass to Nancy:

-- Nancy, there's press reporting today that the Irish police found an IRA arms cache consisting of 12,000 rounds of ammunition (no guns), some of it for Russian heavy machine guns believed to have been part of the stuff brought from Libya in the '80s.

-- HMG-Sinn Fein had another meeting today and will meet again on Thursday. No read-out yet.

-- State still takes the position that we shouldn't move on fundraising, but if the Brits say the meeting today and Thursday went well, I get the sense State will be prepared to revisit Adams fundraising. With the Unionists still very jumpy, we shouldn't rush, but the arms cache "discovery" is, a definite move in the direction we had indicated was necessary. We'll see if it's enough for the British to have a ministerial "drop-by" at the ongoing talks.

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2011-0355-F (1.10)  
KBM 4/11/2023

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 181705Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3448  
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 2500  
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 000842

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.11)  
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

MESSAGE ORIGINATED IN BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC UK EI

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP WITH MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN ON  
FUNDRAISING, SINN FEIN-HMG TALKS

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN (PSF) NORTHERN  
CHAIRMAN MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN MET WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL  
JANUARY 17 TO FOLLOW UP THEIR JANUARY 13 MEETING ON  
FUNDRAISING AND OTHER ISSUES (SEPTTEL). MCLAUGHLIN GAVE  
THE CG A COPY OF SINN FEIN'S SUBMISSION TO ITS JANUARY  
16 TALKS WITH HMG, NOTING PASSAGES THAT ADDRESSED USG  
CONCERNS. HE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FUNDRAISING  
TO SINN FEIN AND HOW THAT ISSUE COULD AFFECT REPUBLICAN  
RANK-AND-FILE VIEWS OF "FAIRNESS" FOR PSF IN THE  
POLITICAL REALM. END SUMMARY.

3. MCLAUGHLIN VISITED THE CONSULATE JANUARY 17, AFTER  
PARTICIPATING IN A SINN FEIN STRATEGY SESSION, TO  
DEBRIEF THE CG ON THE JANUARY 16 SESSION OF THE  
"EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND HMG. HE  
SAID THE JANUARY 16 MEETING WAS "MORE POSITIVE THAN  
PREVIOUS" SESSIONS, WITH BOTH SIDES CEDING SOME GROUND.  
SINN FEIN WAS PLEASED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HMG APPEARED TO  
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ARMS QUESTION NEED NOT BE  
COMPLETELY RESOLVED BEFORE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON  
OTHER ISSUES. FOR ITS PART, SINN FEIN ACKNOWLEDGED IN  
ITS WRITTEN SUBMISSION THAT CRITICAL REPUBLICAN CONCERNS  
PRISONERS AND BRITISH "DEMILITARIZATION") WOULD NOT BE  
COMPLETELY MET EITHER AS PRECONDITIONS TO INCLUSIVE  
DIALOGUE.

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~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

4. MCLAUGHLIN ALSO WISHED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE JANUARY 13 MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL ON SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING (SEPTTEL). HE GAVE THE CG A COPY OF PSF'S JANUARY 16 "SUBMISSION" (FAXED TO EUR/UBI) AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH ON PAGE THREE, WHICH CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO BRINGING ABOUT "DECOMMISSIONING" OF "WEAPONS OF WAR." ACCORDING TO MCLAUGHLIN, THAT PARAGRAPH REFLECTED SINN FEIN'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF USG (AND HMG) CONCERNS. THE SAME HELD FOR THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS ON PAGE FOUR, WHICH SAID SINN FEIN'S POSITION ON ARMS WAS "TRANSPARENT" AND THAT ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH THE IRA WOULD BE USED POSITIVELY.

5. MCLAUGHLIN REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF FUNDRAISING TO THE REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY, STRESSING THAT THE USG OUGHT NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE REAL FRAGILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS -- THERE WAS STILL MUCH SKEPTICISM AMONG REPUBLICAN RANK-AND-FILE ABOUT WHETHER SINN FEIN WOULD BE TREATED "FAIRLY" IN THE POLITICAL REALM. MCLAUGHLIN SAID HE HOPED THIS MESSAGE WAS GETTING THROUGH AS SINN FEIN CONTINUED ITS DIALOGUE WITH U.S. DIPLOMATS IN BELFAST, LONDON AND DUBLIN. THE CONSUL GENERAL REPLIED THAT MCLAUGHLIN COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT SINN FEIN VIEWS WERE ACCURATELY REPORTED.

6. MCLAUGHLIN CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT THE CG INFORM HIM, GERRY ADAMS OR MARTIN MCGUINNESS IF THE CG HEARD ANYTHING FROM WASHINGTON ON SINN FEIN'S REQUEST THAT THE USG TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE. CROWE  
BT  
#0842

NNNN

&lt;MSGID&gt; M1464993

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 201310Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3535

INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 000968

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND ARMS "PRECONDITION"

REFS: (A) DUBLIN 289, (B) LONDON 917

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REF A REPORTED COMMENTS BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND DFA SECOND SECRETARY SEAN O'HUIGINN THAT HMG HAD DROPPED IRA ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRECONDITION FOR SINN FEIN PARTICIPATION IN ALL-PARTY TALKS. THIS IS NOT QUITE ACCURATE, REFLECTING EITHER AN UNDERSTANDABLE DEGREE OF CONFUSION OR A DELIBERATE SINN FEIN ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT THE SITUATION IN WAYS THAT CAN LATER BE USED AGAINST HMG.

3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NEVER CHARACTERIZED ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AS A "PRECONDITION" FOR MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE OF TALKS; THIS IS SINN FEIN'S OWN RENDITION OF THE HMG POSITION. WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN SAYING -- AND CONTINUE TO SAY -- IS THAT UNLESS THERE WERE "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" (A PHRASE THE TAOISEACH CLAIMS TO HAVE COINED) TOWARD DECOMMISSIONING OF THE IRA'S MOST OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN DIALOGUE, THE UNIONIST PARTIES (AND HMG) WERE UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING TO JOIN SINN FEIN IN ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. ADAMS' ASSERTION THAT THE PRESENCE OF UNIONIST PARTIES IN SUCH TALKS WAS UNIMPORTANT IS, OF COURSE, NONSENSE, AS IS HIS CLAIM THAT HMG WAS USING THE ARMS ISSUE AS A RUSE TO EXCLUDE SINN FEIN FROM THE TALKS. CROWE

BT

#0968

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2011-0355-F (1.12)  
KBH 4/11/2023

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

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<MSGID> M1469033

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: SUM SUM2

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 201950Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3574  
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2515  
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 001011

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.13)  
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL UK EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH  
PM'S AIDE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ROD LYNE SAID THE UNIONISTS WERE INCREASINGLY TROUBLED BY SINN FEIN'S TACTICS ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL. LYNE ARGUED THAT IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS HAD NOT MARKEDLY WANED AND PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY WERE PLOYS TO PRESSURE HMG. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR NOT BEING SURPRISED ON FUNDRAISING. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR MET JANUARY 20 WITH PM MAJOR'S FOREIGN POLICY AIDE, ROD LYNE, FOR A BROAD RANGING FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSION. THIS MESSAGE DEALS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND; SEPTELS FOLLOW ON RUSSIA, BOSNIA, KEDO AND PM MAJOR'S APRIL 4 VISIT TO THE U.S.

NERVOUSNESS IN THE UNIONIST CAMP

4. ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY ON THE PEACE PROCESS, LYNE SAID IT WAS ENTERING A CRITICAL PERIOD. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MAYHEW WAS SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC, LYNE'S VIEW WAS THAT SINN FEIN, SOOTHING RHETORIC ASIDE, HAD NOT BUDGED AN INCH ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. WORSE, RESPONSIBLE UNIONISTS (MOLYNEAUX, MCGUINNESS AND ROSS) WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT HMG WAS MAKING CONCESSIONS TO SINN FEIN E.G, CESSATION OF ARMY DAYTIME PATROLLING IN BELFAST, MEETINGS WITH MINISTERS, WITHOUT RECEIVING ANYTHING IN

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

RETURN. THE UNIONISTS ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN WAS ESSENTIALLY SAYING "WE'RE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IRA BUT WE'LL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM ON TRACK SO NOW LET US INTO THE ALL-PARTY TALKS." THIS WAS A PIG IN A POKE AND THE UNIONISTS FEARED HMG WAS BUYING IT.

DECOMMISSIONING CRUCIAL  
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5. LYNE, WHO APPEARED TO HAVE SOME SYMPATHY WITH THE UNIONIST VIEW, STRESSED THAT HMG'S BOTTOM LINE ON DECOMMISSIONING I.E. "SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" WAS DELIBERATELY SUBJECTIVE; LONDON DID NOT WANT TO BOX ITSELF IN BUT NEEDED SOME CLEAR MOVEMENT. SINN FEIN'S POSITION THAT DECOMMISSIONING OF ITS ARMS SHOULD BE PART OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BRITAIN TO HOLD FIRM ON ARMS SINCE A U-TURN WOULD CERTAINLY MEAN UNIONIST WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PEACE PROCESS. CABINET RESIGNATIONS AND A BRUISING FIGHT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WOULD ALSO BE IN THE OFFING.

6. CONTINUING, LYNE SAID THE IRA WAS MAINTAINING ITS TARGETTING AND TRAINING AND WAS STILL TRYING TO PROCURE WEAPONS OVERSEAS. IT MOST EMPHATICALLY HAD NOT STOOD DOWN AND HAD TAKEN NO OPERATIONAL STEPS TO PREPARE FOR PEACE. THE IRA HAD ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF TONS OF SEMTEX AND HMG HAD RELIABLE ESTIMATES ON THEIR INVENTORIES OF HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AND ROCKETS.

7. LOOKING AHEAD, LYNE THOUGHT HMG WOULD HAVE MORE FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE TRADE OFFS ONCE THE EXPLORATORY TALKS MOVED TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THE BRITISH WERE CURRENTLY LOOKING INTO THE AREA OF PRISONER RELEASES. THERE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE A GENERAL AMNESTY BUT SOME STEPS COULD BE TAKEN REGARDING PAROLE.

FUNDRAISING  
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8. LYNE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM U.S. STANCE ON FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS REMAINED A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN THE U.S., AND IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT HMG NOT SURPRISE US ON THIS ISSUE. LYNE AGREED FULLY.

NEW IRISH COALITION: BETTER NOW BUT POSSIBLE PROBLEMS  
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LATER

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

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9. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE BRUTON GOVERNMENT'S IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS, LYNE SAID THE NEW IRISH PRIME MINISTER, ALONG WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET, CLEARLY HELD LESS NATIONALISTIC VIEWS THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS. THE PM'S PRE-CHRISTMAS MEETING WITH BRUTON HAD GONE VERY WELL. AT THE SAME TIME, HMG RECOGNIZED THAT BRUTON WOULD BE UNDER OPPOSITION PRESSURE AND WOULD OCCASIONALLY HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE HIS GREEN CREDENTIALS. PARADOXICALLY, IT COULD WELL PROVE DIFFICULT FOR BRUTON TO ENGAGE IN END-GAME TRADEOFFS WHICH REYNOLDS MIGHT HAVE DONE WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN CAMP.

ADAMS AND THE IRA

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10. ASKED FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF CURRENT IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS, LYNE SAID THE SITUATION HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE. THE IRA HAS STILL NOT DECIDED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL LEAD TO REALIZATION OF ITS AGENDA AND ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE A FINITE AMOUNT OF TIME. BOTH MEN WILL PARTICIPATE WITH IRA REPS IN A WEEKEND MEETING OF A TACTICAL STEERING GROUP. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE A GREEN LIGHT TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS PENDING A FURTHER REVIEW, PROBABLY AROUND EASTER. WHILE SOME IN THE IRA MAY ARGUE THAT A FEW WELL-TIMED BOMBINGS IN ENGLAND WOULD SPUR HMG TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS, ADAM AND MCGUINNESS WILL LIKELY PREVAIL WITH THE VIEW THAT THIS WOULD BE TOO DAMAGING TO THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT INTERNATIONALLY, PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S.

11. IN LYNE'S VIEW, SINN FEIN PROTESTATIONS THAT HMG "INTRANSIGENCE" IS ENDANGERING IRA SUPPORT FOR ADAMS ARE OVERDRAWN AND ESSENTIALLY TACTICAL PLOYS TO PUT PRESSURE ON LONDON. THOUGH ADAMS' POSITION REMAINS SOMEWHAT FRAGILE, HE IS BY NO MEANS UNDER SERIOUS THREAT AT THIS STAGE.

12. COMMENT: AS LYNE ACKNOWLEDGED, MAYHEW IS SOMEWHAT MORE UPBEAT ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY. SEPTEL REPORTS ON THE AMBASSADOR'S DINNER DISCUSSION WITH SIR PATRICK AND LADY MAYHEW ON JAN 19. CROWE

BT

#1011

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

NNNN

<MSGID> M1469982

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~~SECRET~~

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

*Adm*

From: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
To: Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
Cc: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Northern Ireland issues ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~  
Date: Thursday, January 12, 1995 10:51AM

*evidence*

Please pass to Nancy:

1) Dave Goldwyn called from Peter Tarnoff's office to follow up on your request that Peter provide an idea of measurable criteria for lifting the fundraising restriction. Tarnoff's thinking is as follows:

- FBI should be prepared to say the arms network remains dormant,
- there should be a change in the Sinn Fein position that it can't talk about disarmament because it is not the IRA, ✓
- Sinn Fein should take the paper and respond to it in a manner which demonstrates good faith, perhaps by an arms cache being quietly "discovered" by Irish authorities somewhere. ✓

I told Dave our views here were about the same, and that the new Irish PM seemed to feel about the same too (see Dublin 6929). There'll be a Sinn Fein-British meeting Jan. 16 so we'll see what happens then. I'm checking again today but as far as I know Sinn Fein has basically taken our answer of no fundraising now with little/no comment or reaction.

2) Senator Mitchell has written Tony Lake asking for a plane for his February 13-18 trip to Dublin, Belfast, London and perhaps Brussels. They've asked me to go along, which I'd be happy to do, but I will defer to you if this is a trip you want to join.

3) My schedule has cleared and I would like to sit in on your meeting with the Irish church leaders at 5:30 if that's ok. I will fax you their bios. It should be interesting to hear their perceptions of the mood on the ground in both communities, and of what they think of the arms decommissioning issue, etc.

4) The British RUC chief announced today that British troops will stop patrolling Belfast's streets in daylight hours beginning Sunday.

5) Jay Footlik is working on an expanded list of possible invitees to a briefing by you and perhaps Tony on Northern Ireland. I await your instructions on whether and with whom I meet separately from Bruce Morrison's group.

*To TL -  
I think Peter's points on fundraising  
are reasonable*

*ms*

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.14)  
KBH 4/11/2023

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*held for Nancy S*

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 221624Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2594

RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2462

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 019978

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL UK EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: NIO OFFICIAL ON EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS, HMG'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, GAVE US A READOUT ON THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS. HIS ACCOUNT FLESHED OUT THAT IN REF A, ADDING USEFUL DETAILS AND ATMOSPHERICS. THOMAS SAID HE CAUGHT SINN FEIN LEADER MARTIN MCGUINNESS IN A KEY CONTRADICTION: HOW COULD THE PARTY CLAIM IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) ARMS, WHEN GERRY ADAMS HAD ALREADY AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS AT A LATER STAGE? HMG'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT SINN FEIN WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, BUT WANTED ONLY TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO ALL-PARTY TALKS, WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT MOVEMENT ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING. END SUMMARY.

3. THOMAS INVITED US TO THE NIO DECEMBER 22 AFTER HEARING THAT WE HAD BEEN CASTING ABOUT FOR A READOUT ON THE DECEMBER 19 SECOND ROUND OF EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. HE LEADS THE BRITISH DELEGATION IN THE TALKS, AND WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CENTRAL OFFICIAL IN THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA.

SINN FEIN DISMISSIVE

4. THOMAS SAID THE SINN FEIN DELEGATION HAD COME TO THE SECOND MEETING WITH A MUCH CLEARER BRIEF THAN IN THE FIRST ROUND, AND WITH MUCH LESS APPARENT NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY. MCGUINNESS LED OFF BY DISMISSING HMG'S MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING AS USELESS AND REJECTING THE ANODYNE BRITISH PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS.

5. MCGUINNESS SAID SINN FEIN SAW NO POINT IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH "FACELESS OFFICIALS," THOMAS CONTINUED, AND INSISTED ON MOVING QUICKLY INTO POLITICAL TALKS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS AND THE OTHER PARTIES. HE CLAIMED THAT ONLY HMG AND THE UNIONIST PARTIES WERE OBSTRUCTING THE PATH TO INCLUSIVE TALKS, AND SAID IT WAS UP TO HMG TO PERSUADE THE UNIONISTS TO JOIN THEM. THOMAS SAID HE DREW ONE OF THE FEW LAUGHS OF THE SESSION BY NOTING MILDLY THAT CIVIL SERVANTS WERE USED TO BEING INSULTED AND WOULDN'T TAKE IT PERSONALLY, AND THAT SINN FEIN'S REACTION TO HIS PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS DEMONSTRATED THE LIMITS OF BRITISH PERSUASIVE POWERS.

ARMS AND PIRA

6. THOMAS SAID HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARMS DECOMMISSIONING AGAIN, REITERATING HIS POINT IN THE FIRST MEETING THAT BOTH SINN FEIN AND HMG WANTED TO

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"TAKE THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS" AND DIFFERED ONLY ON MODALITIES AND TIMING. MCGUINNESS HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN THIS LINE IN THE FIRST MEETING, BUT IN THE SECOND HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT A BRITISH PAPER ON PHASED DEMILITARIZATION (EVEN ON THE BASIS THAT HE COULD CONVEY IT TO PIRA), AND INSISTED THAT THE ARMS QUESTION WAS "NOTHING TO DO WITH US." HE SAID THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH WAS BRITISH JURISDICTION ON IRISH TERRITORY. UNLESS THIS WAS RESOLVED, "CONFLICT WILL RESULT."

7. THOMAS SAID HE NOTED THAT SINN FEIN WAS NOT SIMPLY (AS MCGUINNESS HAD CLAIMED) ANOTHER POLITICAL PARTY, BUT WAS BACKED UP BY A FULLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED ARMED FORCE. WAS MCGUINNESS SUGGESTING THAT, SINCE MOST OTHER PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WERE NOT ABOUT TO ACCEPT THE END OF BRITISH JURISDICTION, A RETURN TO CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE?

8. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND PIRA, THOMAS SAID HE REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT GERRY ADAMS' "PRESENTATION" TO PIRA IN LATE AUGUST HAD BEEN CITED AS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE CEASEFIRE, AND THAT SINN FEIN HAD BEEN QUICK TO ISSUE STATEMENTS ABOUT PIRA INVOLVEMENT IN CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. HE TOLD MCGUINNESS: "YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND A PARROT IN PEKING, OR A POODLE IN PARIS, WHO BELIEVES YOU, BUT NOT A DOG IN THE STREETS OF NORTHERN IRELAND." HE SAID HMG WAS CONVINCED THAT "AN ASSESSMENT BY YOU" WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL IN PERSUADING PIRA TO DECOMMISSION ITS WEAPONS. NOTING THAT ADAMS HAD AGREED THAT DEMILITARIZATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND OTHERS, HE WONDERED HOW THIS COULD BE DONE IF SINN FEIN HAD NO INFLUENCE ON PIRA'S DECISIONS. MCGUINNESS, APPARENTLY TAKEN ABACK BY THIS LINE OF REASONING, HAD SAID ONLY THAT IT WAS SOMETHING HMG WOULD HAVE TO SORT OUT.

9. THOMAS SAID HE HAD STRESSED IN BOTH ROUNDS OF TALKS THAT RESOLVING THE ARMS ISSUE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION HMG HAD SET FOR PROGRESS TO THE NEXT STAGE. HE SAID HMG WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS (THOUGH NOT NEGOTIATE ON) A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING POLITICAL ONES, AND TRAILED THE NOTION THAT "REAL MOVEMENT" ON DECOMMISSIONING COULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL SINN FEIN COULD SEE A CLEAR PATH TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS. HMG WAS PREPARED TO BE VERY FLEXIBLE ON TIMING AND MODALITIES. BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, SINN FEIN HAD TO REALIZE THAT TALKS WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS WOULD BE FUTILE, AND TALKS WITH THEM WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE: WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON ARMS.

#### OTHER ISSUES

10. APART FROM THE ARMS ISSUE, THOMAS SAID, SINN FEIN HAD ALSO RAISED THE RECENT BEATING OF A REPUBLICAN ACTIVIST, "EXCESSIVE" POLICE PATROLLING, D FUNDING FOR AN IRISH-LANGUAGE SECONDARY SCHOOL. THOMAS RESPONDED THAT HMG WAS HAPPY TO HAPPY TO AIR THESE ISSUES, WOULD LOOK AT WHAT SINN FEIN SAID AND PROVIDE ANSWERS WHERE IT COULD. THE IDEA OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR THE IRISH SCHOOL HAD MERIT, BUT SINN FEIN'S DEMANDS WOULD ENTAIL GIVING THAT SCHOOL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OVER ALL OTHERS IN THE PROVINCE.

#### PACING DIFFERENCES

11. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT SINN FEIN'S SUGGESTION TO DELAY THE NEXT MEETING UNTIL JANUARY 18; IN THE FIRST ROUND, HMG HAD SUGGESTED JANUARY 5 OR 6. THE NIO HAD NO GREAT PROBLEM WITH THE DELAY -- IT WOULD ALLOW MORE TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, AND HAVING THAT DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSION WITH SINN FEIN WOULD MAKE THE DIALOGUE MORE SUBSTANTIVE. BUT IT WAS HARD TO SQUARE SINN FEIN'S REQUEST FOR DELAY WITH ITS INSISTENCE THAT HMG WAS HOLDING UP PROGRESS.

12. AS FOR HMG, THOMAS SAID, "THE LAST THING WE WANT TO DO IS OBSTRUCT." THE NIO WAS READY TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES OVER THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AT AS FAST A PACE AS THE IRISH COULD ACCOMMODATE, AND ALSO WANTED TO SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF ITS TALKS WITH SINN FEIN. THERE WAS A RANGE OF OPTIONS INVOLVING STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS THAT PIRA COULD USE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTENT TO DISARM. BUT "AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND POLITICAL REALITY, WE NEED TO HAVE SOME PROGRESS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE AND SOME MOVEMENT ON ARMS" IN ORDER TO GAIN THE NECESSARY ROOM FOR MANEUVER.

ATMOSPHERICS

13. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE TONE OF THE SECOND MEETING WAS NOTABLY LESS FRIENDLY THAN THE FIRST. THERE WERE FEWER SMILES, NO HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY, AND THE SINN FEIN GROUP SEEMED TO BE UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO STICK TO PREPARED POSITIONS. MCGUINNESS AGAIN DOMINATED HIS SIDE, WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL INTERJECTIONS FROM THE OTHERS.

14. APART FROM MCGUINNESS, THOMAS SAID, THE SINN FEIN GROUP SEEMED AN UNDISTINGUISHED LOT. KELLY, A CONVICTED IRA BOMBER WITH NO PREVIOUS POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, HAD SAID NOTHING THROUGHOUT THE TWO LONG MEETINGS, BUT SIMPLY SAT AND GLARED AT THOMAS. HE APPEARED TO BE THE PIRA "MINDER" FOR THE DELEGATION. BHREATHNACH, WHILE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY, DID NOT SEEM TO BE A SIGNIFICANT PLAYER. MCMANUS STRUCK THOMAS AS BASICALLY DECENT AND FRIENDLY, BUT PROBABLY INCLUDED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RELATIVES OF THE "MARTYRS" - HIS SON WAS KILLED ON A PIRA OPERATION. O'HANLON APPEARED TO FUNCTION AS THE SECRETARY TO THE DELEGATION: SHE HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETINGS, BUT SAID NOTHING IN THEM. SHE WAS ALSO KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ADAMS, AND MIGHT BE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

15. HMG HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED, THOMAS SAID, THAT NONE OF THE SINN FEIN "BRAIN TRUST" AROUND ADAMS - TOM HARTLEY, RICHARD MCAULEY, MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN - HAD BEEN NAMED TO THE DELEGATION. THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED TO CONTROL THE ACTION FROM OUTSIDE, RATHER THAN PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE STRONG PIRA PRESENCE IN THE GROUP (THREE OF THE FIVE HAVE TERRORIST CONVICTIONS) GAVE IT USEFUL "STREET CREDIBILITY." BUT THE ABSENCE OF THE STRATEGISTS, SINN FEIN'S UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK FRANKLY AT THIS STAGE, AND INCREASING THREATS OF A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IF ITS DEMANDS WERE NOT MET, RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS OVERALL APPROACH. CROWE  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL UK EI  
SUBJECT: NIO OFFICIAL ON SINN FEIN STRATEGY

REFS: (A) LONDON 19978, (B) LONDON 16904,  
(C) DUBLIN 6838

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS BELIEVES SINN FEIN LEADERS MUST HAVE DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL STRATEGY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) CEASEFIRE, BUT HAS SEEN LITTLE EVIDENCE OF IT IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE. AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES:

- THEY BELIEVE (ERRONEOUSLY) THAT BRITISH MINISTERS ARE JUST LOOKING FOR A GOOD PRETEXT TO WITHDRAW;
- THEY ARE STILL TRYING TO FASHION A "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT" THAT COULD PLAY ON BRITISH WAR-WEARINESS AND BREAK THE GOVERNMENT'S WILL;
- THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT BRITISH RULE FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER GENERATION, BUT CANNOT REVEAL THIS TO THEIR GRASSROOTS SUPPORTERS; OR
- THEY BELIEVE A RETURN TO VIOLENCE IS INEVITABLE, BUT MUST GO THROUGH THE POLITICAL MOTIONS IN ORDER TO REGENERATE COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND BLAME THE BREAKDOWN ON THE BRITISH.

3. THOMAS SAID SINN FEIN DID NOT APPEAR TO TAKE THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE SERIOUSLY, AND WAS TRYING TO "BOUNCE" HMG INTO ALLOWING IT INTO MULTI-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT TAKING ANY OF THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE THAT STEP FEASIBLE. WHATEVER THE REPUBLICANS HAD IN MIND, HMG WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO THE PRINCIPLES IN THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. END SUMMARY.

THERE MUST BE A STRATEGY

4. AFTER BRIEFING US DECEMBER 22 ON THE SECOND SESSION OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE (REF A), THOMAS AGREED TO A FREEWHEELING DISCUSSION OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT'S OVERALL STRATEGY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE. WE ASKED WHETHER HE AGREED WITH THOSE WHO SAID SINN FEIN HAD NO REAL STRATEGY BEYOND ITS MAXIMAL LONG-TERM DEMANDS AND TOOK INTERIM DECISIONS AS THEY CAME, OR WITH THOSE WHO ARGUED THAT SINN FEIN WAS THE ONLY PARTY IN IRELAND WITH A FULLY-DEVELOPED STRATEGY.

5. THOMAS, WHO HAS BEEN IN HIS PRESENT JOB AT LEAST FOUR YEARS AND CONDUCTED THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERS, SAID IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE TO HIM THAT SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND THE "BRAIN TRUST" HE HAD ASSEMBLED IN THE 1970'S WOULD HAVE ENTERED THE POST-CEASEFIRE ERA WITHOUT A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THEY WANTED, WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD GET, AND HOW THEY COULD GET IT.

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6. THE GROUP AROUND ADAMS, THOMAS NOTED, HAD ALMOST 20 YEARS' EXPERIENCE AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY, AND HAD BEEN SHIFTING THE MOVEMENT'S FOCUS TOWARD ENHANCED POLITICAL ACTIVITY FOR NEARLY A DECADE. ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS HAD STAKED A LOT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE "POLITICAL STRUGGLE," AND IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THEY HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE PROBLEMS THEY WERE BOUND TO ENCOUNTER.

7. THOMAS STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT FOR ADAMS, THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN WAS "MOVEMENT MANAGEMENT." HE WAS DETERMINED AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID THE KIND OF SPLITS THAT HAD LED TO HIS OWN RISE TO POWER. IN OUTMANEUVERING THE PREVIOUS GENERATION OF LEADERS, CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AND ENGINEERING THE CEASEFIRE, ADAMS HAD SHOWN HIMSELF ADEPT AT THIS KIND OF MANAGEMENT, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO THINK HE WOULD CHANGE HIS STYLE.

BUT NO EVIDENCE YET

8. AT THE SAME TIME, THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED, HE HAD SEEN NO INDICATION IN THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS OF EXPLORATORY TALKS OF WHAT THE SINN FEIN STRATEGY MIGHT BE. AS NOTED REF A, HE SAID MARTIN MCGUINNESS HAD BEEN EVEN LESS FORTHCOMING IN THE SECOND SESSION THAN IN THE FIRST, STICKING RIGIDLY TO LONGSTANDING REPUBLICAN POSITIONS. IT APPEARED THAT, WHATEVER ELSE THEY MAY HAVE DECIDED, REPUBLICAN LEADERS HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT TO DO IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE.

9. THOMAS SAID THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE SINN FEIN HAD NO INTENTION OF TALKING SERIOUSLY IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, BUT RATHER WAS TRYING TO "BOUNCE" HMG THROUGH IT AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS (NOTE: REF C REPORTS ADAMS' LATEST EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD). THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. EVEN IF ADAMS COULD CONVINCE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY (SDLP) LEADER JOHN HUME AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS USELESS AND THAT ALL-PARTY TALKS SHOULD BEGIN AT ONCE, NEITHER OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE. AND WITHOUT THE UNIONISTS, NO WORKABLE AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. THE REPUBLICANS "CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS": THEY WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR OWN SINCERITY - PARTICULARLY ON THE ARMS QUESTION - BEFORE OTHERS WOULD TREAT THEM AS A LEGITIMATE NEGOTIATING PARTNER.

BASED ON A DELUSION?

10. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY, THOMAS SAID, THAT SINN FEIN REALLY BELIEVED THAT BRITISH MINISTERS WANTED TO GET OUT OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND WERE ONLY LOOKING FOR A FIG-LEAF TO COVER THE EXIT. IF THE REPUBLICANS HARBORED THIS DELUSION, THOMAS SAID, THEY MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED LESS RESISTANCE TO THEIR DEMANDS THAN THEY WERE GOING TO ENCOUNTER. THIS MIGHT ALSO EXPLAIN WHY THEY WERE SO DISMISSIVE OF TALKS WITH OFFICIALS AND ANXIOUS TO MEET MINISTERS.

11. THOMAS NOTED MCGUINNESS' STATEMENT IN OCTOBER THAT DURING THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS, A BRITISH OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HIM THAT HMG'S ULTIMATE AIM WAS "THAT THE ISLAND WOULD BE AS ONE." THIS HAD COME UP AGAIN DURING THE SECOND EXPLORATORY MEETING, AND THOMAS HAD SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE IT CATEGORICALLY, STRESSING THAT THE CONTACT HAD BEEN UNAUTHORIZED, AND THAT WHAT HMG SAID PUBLICLY WAS ITS REAL POSITION. ANY STATEMENT THAT DEVIATED FROM THE PUBLIC LINE WAS SIMPLY NOT ACCURATE.

PAN-NATIONALIST PRESSURE?

12. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE, THOMAS SAID, THAT ADAMS STILL THOUGHT HE COULD FORGE A MONOLITHIC "PAN-NATIONALIST FRONT" INCLUDING SINN FEIN, THE SDLP, THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT AND THE USG (THROUGH IRISH-AMERICAN PRESSURE). THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT WITH CONCERTED U.S. AND IRISH PRESSURE, COUPLED WITH OPINION POLLS SHOWING

MOST BRITONS WANTED TO BE RID OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM, THE WILL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REMAIN ENGAGED WOULD COLLAPSE.

13. A STRATEGY BASED ON THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD ALSO MISREAD THE SITUATION, THOMAS SAID. JOHN HUME MIGHT BE CONVINCED BY ADAMS' ARGUMENTS (HE VACILLATED CONSTANTLY ON THE ARMS ISSUE), BUT HIS PARTY WAS NOT. THE NEW IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS MUCH LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO REPUBLICAN APPEALS THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. THE BRITISH OPINION POLLS REPRESENTED A LONGING FOR PEACE, NOT A PULLOUT. AND IN ANY EVENT, WHATEVER THEY THOUGHT OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE UNION VERSUS IRISH UNIFICATION, NO SERIOUS PLAYER IN BRITISH POLITICS WOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL IN THE FACE OF UNIONIST OPPOSITION.

#### COVERT ACCEPTANCE?

14. THIRD, THOMAS CONTINUED, THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT THE HARD POLITICAL REALITY THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REMAIN IN THE UK UNTIL A MAJORITY THERE AGREED TO UNIFICATION -- AT LEAST A GENERATION IN THE FUTURE -- BUT NEEDED MORE TIME TO BRING PIRA HARDLINERS AND GRASSROOTS REPUBLICANS AROUND TO THE IDEA. HMG HOPED THIS WAS THE CASE.

15. REPUBLICAN LEADERS, THOMAS NOTED, HAD TALKED INCREASINGLY OF AN "AGREED IRELAND" (BORROWING THE PHRASE FROM HUME); PERHAPS THE PASSAGE OF REFERIENDA IN BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND ON A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION AND THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO SAY THAT THE IRISH PEOPLE HAD EXERCISED THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. HMG WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THEY CHARACTERIZED THE RESULTING ARRANGEMENTS AS TRANSITIONAL, AND CONTINUED TO AGITATE FOR UNIFICATION; IT HAD ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF ASPIRATIONS TO UNITY. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE SO FAR TO SUPPORT THIS ASSESSMENT OF REPUBLICAN INTENTIONS.

#### PREPARING FOR RENEWED VIOLENCE?

16. FINALLY, THOMAS SAID, THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS MERELY A TACTICAL MANEUVER, CALLED IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FLOWING FROM THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. IN THIS SCENARIO, SINN FEIN/PIRA LEADERS KNEW THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE THEIR AGENDA THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, AND BELIEVED A RETURN TO THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" WAS INEVITABLE, BUT NEEDED TO REGENERATE SUPPORT FOR IT IN THEIR COMMUNITIES BY GOING THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC MOTIONS WHILE PREPARING THE GROUNDWORK TO BLAME HMG FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE LACK OF ANY MOVEMENT ON ARMS, CONTINUED PIRA TRAINING AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, AND MCGUINNESS' WARNING IN THE SECOND MEETING THAT "CONFLICT WILL RESULT" UNLESS BRITISH JURISDICTION ENDED ALL POINTED TO THIS CONCLUSION.

17. THOMAS NOTED THAT REPUBLICAN LEADERS (AS WELL AS SOME IN DUBLIN AND THE SDLP) HAD HARPED RELENTLESSLY ON THE THEME THAT HMG WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET AND PUTTING OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF RECONCILIATION. THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE: NO ONE WAS MORE ANXIOUS THAN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REACH AGREEMENT. IRISH CLAIMS THAT HMG HAD STALLED AGREEMENT ON THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT WERE ESPECIALLY GALLING IN THIS REGARD, SINCE THE IRISH KNEW BETTER: THE NIO HAD GIVEN ITS DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT TO DFA COUNTERPARTS IN SEPTEMBER 1993, AND GOT NO RESPONSE (EXCEPT FOR THE LEAK OF A HIGHLY REPUBLICAN DRAFT TO IRISH MEDIA) UNTIL APRIL 1994. AND IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, SINN FEIN HAD SLOWED THE PACE OF MEETINGS AND DECLINED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING BUT ITS MAXIMAL DEMANDS.

#### BRITISH RESPONSE

18. WHATEVER SINN FEIN PLANNED, THOMAS SAID, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS ON UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. IT WOULD NOT BE MOVED FROM THOSE PRINCIPLES UNDER ANY COMBINATION OF SINN FEIN PROPAGANDA, IRA VIOLENCE OR EXTERNAL PRESSURE. WHEN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AND THE COMPLEMENTARY BRITISH PAPER ON INTERNAL DEVOLUTION WERE PUBLISHED, THEY WOULD PLEASE NEITHER UNIONISTS NOR NATIONALISTS. THEY WERE NOT, THOMAS STRESSED, INTENDED TO BE RIGID BLUEPRINTS FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT RATHER A STARTING POINT FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THEY REPRESENTED THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' BEST ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS LIKELY TO ATTRACT THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT ACROSS BOTH TRADITIONS IN THE NORTH. IDEALLY, THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A PACKAGE DEAL WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS. BUT NEITHER IT NOR ANY OTHER PARTY HAD A RIGHT TO VETO ANY AGREEMENT THAT COULD WIN MAJORITY APPROVAL IN BOTH PARTS OF THE ISLAND. CROWE  
BT

**FROM:**  
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**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

DIST: BERGER, FUERTH, ITOH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODIERBERG, WOLIN, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:231140Z DEC 94

FM: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON - POSITIVE BUT CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN FEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

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2011-0355-F (1.17)

KBH 4/11/2023

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP AND TO SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE QUESTION OF FUND RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE KIND OF IN-CRISIS WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN THE PAST. SMITH

**FROM:**  
SITREPT

*cc +  
return*

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 230033Z DEC 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6592  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 0058  
RUEHLOB/AMCONSUL BELFAST IMMEDIATE 7193

////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 338910

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY READ-OUT ON SECOND HMG/SINN FEIN MEETING

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON 12/22, PETER WESTMACOTT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR AT THE UK EMBASSY, PROVIDED A READ-OUT ON SUBJECT TALKS TO EUR/UBI DIRECTOR LEKSON, IRELAND/N.I. DESK OFFICER VAN SON, INR ANALYST LIEBOWITZ, AND NSC EUROPEAN DIRECTOR STEPHENS.

3. WESTMACOTT'S PRESENTATION CLOSELY TRACKED REFTEL, WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS:

- MCGUINNESS HAD PROPOSED A "SMALLER" MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND HMG BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING ON 1/15.

WESTMACOTT BELIEVES SINN FEIN WAS PROPOSING A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN HMG OFFICIALS AND MCGUINNESS AND SIOBHAN O'HANLON. HMG WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO A MEETING, AS LONG AS IT WAS MADE PUBLIC, EVEN IF AFTER THE FACT. WESTMACOTT WAS SKEPTICAL OF ANY SECRET MEETING SINCE IT WOULD NOT STAY SECRET AND THE FEAR THAT UNIONISTS WOULD BELIEVE A DEAL WAS BEING COOKED UP BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

4. WESTMACOTT STATED THAT SINN FEIN'S REFUSAL EVEN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT (REFUSAL TO ACCEPT HMG'S PAPER ON SUBJECT) PRESENTS A SERIOUS RISK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP. CITING A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH PM MAJOR'S ADVISOR ROD LYNE, WESTMACOTT SAID IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF THOSE WHO HAD SINN FEIN'S EAR, INCLUDING AMERICANS, MADE CLEAR THAT THEY MUST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT. HMG IS WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE AND IS PREPARED TO LISTEN TO ANY IDEAS OR PROCEDURES ABOUT DISARMAMENT OR DECOMMISSIONING, BUT SINN FEIN CANNOT REFUSE TO TALK ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR INSIST THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRA. THEY WILL NOT GET TO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL TALKS OR THE ALL-PARTY TALKS UNLESS SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS IS MADE ON THIS ISSUE.

5. ON LIFTING THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTION ON GERRY ADAMS' VISA, WESTMACOTT STATED THAT HMG WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FOLLOWING FIRST: TRANSPARENCY IN THE FUNDS COLLECTIONS AND EXPENDITURE PROCESS, SO THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT FUNDS WOULD GO TO ILLICIT PURPOSES; PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE HMG/SF TALKS; AND A CLEAR END TO WEAPONS PROCUREMENT. ON THIS LAST POINT, WESTMACOTT ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY ONGOING ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. USG OFFICIALS SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE SEEING ANY INFORMATION HMG MAY HAVE SUGGESTING ONGOING ORGANIZED ARMS PROCUREMENT BY THE IRA IN THE U.S. OR ANYWHERE ELSE. TALBOTT

*1/3  
CCTOTL -  
wanted to  
be sure you had seen.*

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.18)  
KBH 4/11/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE  
(REF. B). BARTHOLOMEW

**FROM:**  
SITREPRT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*NES*  
*→ limit call*  
*NES*  
*Kathy Stephens*  
*NES will call you.*  
*RZ*

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231140Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(1.19)  
K8H 4/11/2023

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- POSITIVE BUT  
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN PEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

FEIN LEADERSHIP AND T SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT  
NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE  
QUESTION OF FUD RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE  
KIND OF INI-CRISES WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN  
TE PAST. SMITH  
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<MSGID> M1431894

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.11/7  
AUTH es/pt - DRAFT PR  
CLEAR 1 JK 2 DD  
3 JML 4 RO 5 JR  
6 SD 7 \_\_\_\_\_ 8 \_\_\_\_\_  
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ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/UBI:PVANSON:PBV  
12/29/94 X76585 SENEII 1526  
P:PTARNOFF

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(1.21)  
KBH 4/11/2023

EUR:JCKORNBLUM  
NSC:  
CA:DDILLARD  
EUR/UBI:JMLEKSON

S/P:RO'NEILL(SUBS)  
DOJ:JREYNOLDS  
S/S:  
S/CT:DDOBSON

EUR/UBI, CA/VO, P, S/CT

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, LONDON IMMEDIATE

LONDON PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST FOR ACTION ALSO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PTER, PREL, EI, UK

SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS (9500250)

REF: A) DUBLIN 37 B) 94 DUBLIN 6853 C) 94 LONDON 19978  
D) 94 STATE 33891 E) 94 LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. U.S. OFFICIALS MADE CLEAR TO GERRY ADAMS DURING THEIR MEETINGS ON 12/6/94 THAT IN ORDER FOR THE U.S. TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN LEADERS WHO REQUIRE WAIVERS OF THEIR VISA INELIGIBILITIES, THE ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO SEE MOVEMENT BY SINN FEIN IN TWO AREAS. NO REFERENCES TO TIME TABLES WERE MADE; RATHER, EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON THE FACT THAT IF THESE TWO AREAS WERE RESOLVED, THE FUNDRAISING ISSUE WOULD NO LONGER BE PROBLEMATIC.

3. FIRST, WE NEEDED AN END TO ARMS PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. SECOND, THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO SEE SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION. ADAMS WAS TOLD THAT WE ASSUMED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ON DISARMAMENT WOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF SINN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FEIN DISCUSSIONS WITH HMG. FURTHERMORE, MOVEMENT ON EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER ARMAMENTS SEEN AS OFFENSIVE (SEMTEX AND MISSILES WERE MENTIONED) WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR RESONANCE WITHIN THE USG. THE RETURN OF FUNDS FROM THE NEWRY ROBBERY/MURDER WAS ALSO MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE.

4. WHILE WE HAVE NO RECENT REPORTS OF PROCUREMENT EFFORTS BY THE IRA IN THE U.S., REPORTS FROM HMG (REFS C, D, AND E) ARE THAT SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT OR READ HMG PAPERS ON THE ISSUE. THE COMMITMENT OF SINN FEIN TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND ITS STATED INTENTION FOR THE USE OF FUNDS MR. ADAMS MAY RAISE IN THE THE U.S. APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH THE REFUSAL OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES EVEN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

4. DUBLIN AND BELFAST SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH ADAMS, MCGUINNESS, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SINN FEIN OFFICIALS:

-- WE UNDERSTAND MR. ADAMS' DESIRE TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. TO SUPPORT LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES.

-- SINN FEIN PARTY OFFICIALS NOT NEEDING A VISA WAIVER PRESENTLY MAY RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. IN COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. LAWS, INCLUDING LAWS RESTRICTING SUCH FUNDS FROM BEING USED TO SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITES. THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO MR. ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN OFFICIALS WHO REQUIRE A VISA WAIVER.

-- AS U.S. OFFICIALS TOLD MR. ADAMS AT MEETINGS ON 12/6, BEFORE THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTION CAN BE LIFTED, WE NEED TO SEE AN END TO IRA ARMS PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. AND CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

-- ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY OUR INFORMATION OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO HAVE CONCERNS OVER CONTINUED IRA CONTACTS WITH WEAPON MERCHANTS.

-- WE ALSO WELCOME SINN FEIN PROPOSALS ON VOLUNTARY TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTING FOR ANY FUNDS RAISED IN THE U.S., AND ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY DETAILS YOU MAY HAVE TO OFFER.

-- MOVEMENT ON IRA DECOMMISSIONING OF PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUCH AS SEMTEX AND MISSILES WOULD BE A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE THAT WOULD HELP TO ASSURE THE

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3

USG OF SINN FEIN'S AND THE IRA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE  
PROCESS, ~~AND AN END TO WEAPONS PROCUREMENT.~~

-- WE HAD ASSUMED THAT DISCUSSIONS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
MEASURES OR OF A PROCESS FOR DEMOBILIZATION WOULD OCCUR IN  
THE CONTEXT OF SINN FEIN MEETINGS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS.

-- IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES  
HAVE REFUSED TO DISCUSS OR EVEN ACCEPT COPIES OF BRITISH  
PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION.

-- THEREFORE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE DO NOT FEEL  
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ALL OF THE AREAS  
DISCUSSED WITH YOU TO WARRANT CHANGING THE CONDITIONS ON  
MR. ADAMS' VISA WAIVER OR THE WAIVERS OF OTHER SINN FEIN  
LEADERS. \\  
YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IMMEDIATE

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NES - 1411 from R

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NES  
Kathy Stephens  
NES will call you.  
R

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231140Z DEC 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6835  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2548  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 006853

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.22)  
K8H 4/11/2023

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CVIS, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: ADAMS' VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- POSITIVE BUT  
CONCERNS OVER FUND RAISING REMAIN

REF: LONDON 19882

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND MAIREAD KEANE, FORMER HEAD OF SINN FEIN'S WOMEN'S SECTION WHO IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA, HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ADAMS AND KEANE SEPARATELY DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS AT THE NSC WITH TONY LAKE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH EUR/NE DIRECTOR MIKE LEKSON AS POSITIVE. THEY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO REITERATE THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PARITY OF ESTEEM AND TO BUILD IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. ADAMS AND SINN PEIN ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE QUICKLY AND QUIETLY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT OR HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADAMS AND KEANE WERE OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE THEIR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. THEY TOTALLY REJECTED AS NONSENSE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SINN FEIN/IRA ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY ARMS IN THE U.S. AND OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUERIES JUSTICE MIGHT HAVE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY STRESSED INSTEAD THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THE FUND RAISING ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

4. ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN LATE JANUARY TO ENGAGE IN FUND RAISING. KEANE SAID THAT THE "FRIENDS OF SINN FEIN" SHOULD BE REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN AGENT EARLY IN JANUARY AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT VEHICLE FOR ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. SHE ALSO STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE NSC TO EITHER LET THEM ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THEM OR BE ALLOWED TO RAISE FUNDS.

5. ADAMS AND KEANE EMPHASIZED, THAT WITH THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN, THE U.S. ROLE IN FURTHERING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. (FORMER SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH ON NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MANSERGH MADE THE VERY SAME POINT TO US AT THE DECEMBER 14 DINNER FOR SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BROWN AT DUBLIN CASTLE.) THEY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE BRITISH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM. PARITY OF ESTEEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, AND THE BRITISH SHOULD BE MOVING NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT. KEANE NOTED THAT IRISH-AMERICANS STILL HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT SHE FINDS THEM INCREASINGLY WORRIED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEPS ON FUND RAISING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE NOT BEING TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KEANE DESCRIBED THE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" AS A DISTRACTION. SINN FEIN "FEELS THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH." THEIR GOAL IS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL-INCLUSIVE, ALL-PARTY TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: ADAMS AND KEANE CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON BELIEVING THAT THE FUND RAISING ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED EARLY IN JANUARY. IF THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE NSC, SINN FEIN SHOULD BE TOLD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINN FEIN IS ANXIOUS TO ADDRESS ANY CONCERNS THAT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE ALSO EAGER TO REASSURE THE U.S.G. OF THE TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY OF ANY FUND RAISING THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. THUS WE RECOMMEND THAT JUSTICE MEET WITH SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS WHATEVER CONCERNS THE FBI OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE HAVE WHICH KEEP THEM FROM MOVING FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RAISE ANY SUCH QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SINN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

FEIN LEADERSHIP AND T SEEK WHATEVER ASSURANCES FELT  
NECESSARY. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS WE DO NOT WANT THE  
QUESTION OF FUD RAISING BY ADAMS TO ESCALATE INTO THE  
KIND OF INI-CRISES WE HAVE HAD OVER VISAS FOR ADAMS IN  
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<MSGID> M1431894

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 091705Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3086  
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 2475  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 000363

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.23)  
KOH 7/11/2023

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS UK

SUBJECT: FUNDRAISING BY SINN FEIN

REF: (A) 94 STATE 338910 (B) 94 DUBLIN 6853

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE FURTHER VISIT BY SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS TO THE U.S. LATE IN THE MONTH, WE QUESTIONED NIO ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER BELL JANUARY 5 ON HMG'S LATEST VIEWS ON FUNDRAISING BY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BELL CONFIRMED THAT HMG REMAINED FIRMLY OPPOSED TO SINN FEIN FUNDRAISING AND URGED THAT THE USG CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE CONDITIONS (NO WEAPONS ACQUISITION IN THE U.S.; CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FUNDS RAISED IN THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE USED FOR PURCHASE OF WEAPONS; AND PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMILITARIZATION) THAT IT HAD SPELLED OUT TO ADAMS DURING HIS MOST RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT HE AND NIO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS HAD CONSULTED WITH NIO SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW ON THIS ISSUE JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS, AND THAT MAYHEW HAD STRESSED THAT SINN FEIN HAD MADE NO PROGRESS AT ALL ON THE KEY CONDITION OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS.

3. BELL WENT ON TO NOTE THAT HMG WAS BY NO MEANS SINGLING OUT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS AS THE ONLY ISSUE FOR ITS EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT AT THE FIRST ROUND OF EXPLORATORY TALKS, QUENTIN THOMAS HAD TAKEN GREAT PAINS TO POINT OUT THAT HMG WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE A WIDE AND FULL AGENDA -- ESSENTIALLY ANY ISSUE THAT SINN FEIN CARED TO RAISE. AT THE SAME TIME, BELL STRESSED THAT HMG COULD NOT ENVISAGE A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION OF THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, AND TRANSITION TO A SUBSEQUENT PHASE, WITHOUT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SOMETHING HAVING BEEN ACHIEVED ON DECOMMISSIONING. HE SAID THAT THIS POSITION WAS, IN ESSENCE, SHARED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. BELL STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT THE EXPLORATORY TALKS WOULD NOT RUN OUT OF STEAM SOON BECAUSE OF SINN FEIN OBDURACY. HMG SINCERELY WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AND WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO MEET TO DISCUSS THE WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

4. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF FUNDRAISING, BELL SAID THAT THE BRITISH BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT SINN FEIN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS, TO CONTINUE TO BE INFLEXIBLE IN THE TALKS WHILE HAVING THE BAN ON FUNDRAISING LIFTED. DROPPING THE FUNDRAISING RESTRICTIONS WOULD HARDLY ENCOURAGE SINN FEIN TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE AT THE TABLE; QUITE THE REVERSE, IN FACT, WAS TO BE EXPECTED.

5. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: FROM ALL THE EVIDENCE I HEAR, SINN FEIN HAS TAKEN NO STEPS SINCE ADAMS' LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. TOWARDS MEETING AT LEAST THE THIRD OF OUR CONDITIONS FOR FUNDRAISING (PROGRESS ON DEMILITARIZATION). I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR CURRENT BAN ON FUNDRAISING PENDING PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. END COMMENT.

CROWE

BT

#0363

NNNN

&lt;MSGID&gt; M1450896

Adm

**Hawkins, Ardenia R.**

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**From:** Stephens, Kathleen D.  
**To:** Darby, M. Brooke; Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; Gardner, Anthony; Vershbow, Alexander R.; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor  
**Subject:** Instructions on Gerry Adams Fundraising ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~  
**Date:** Friday, January 06, 1995 5:26PM

Dee/Brooke: Please pass to Nancy:

Nancy, I incorporated your revisions into the draft cable on Gerry Adams' fundraising request. State is now getting DOJ/FBI clearances and will then send it over here as a formal cross-hatch with a COB Monday deadline for transmission. DOJ has accepted (though FBI has not yet cleared) the language you suggested for characterizing the state of play on procurement, but neither DOJ nor State is prepared to say categorically that the procurement condition has been met. But the emphasis of the message is on the need to see progress in disarmament. That means, I think, that if Sinn Fein takes a constructive approach on disarmament discussions with the British or otherwise takes steps that can be considered "concrete progress" toward disarmament, we should look at the fundraising issue again, again looking at both the conditions we've set: ending procurement and disarmament.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (1.24)  
K8H 4/11/2023

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 191325Z JAN 95

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6997

INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2602

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000289

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, EI, UK

SUBJECT: ADAMS ON FUND RAISING AND BILATERAL TALKS WITH HMG

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F(1.25)

KRM 4/11/2023

REF: BELFAST 0022

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GERRY ADAMS DISCUSSED THE THIRD MEETING OF SINN FEIN WITH THE HMG AND THE GENERAL QUESTIONS OF HIS PERCEPTION OF THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND OF FUND RAISING WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH JANUARY 16. ADAMS SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT THE BRITISH ARE USING THE ARMS ISSUE AS A RUSE TO KEEP SINN FEIN OUT OF INCLUSIVE ALL-PARTY TALKS. IF THIS CONTINUES AND SINN FEIN IS EXCLUDED FROM THE FRAMEWORK TALKS, GERRY ADAMS WILL BE DAMAGED, AND IN THE RESULTING HAVOC THERE WILL BE A REAL POSSIBILITY OF A SPLIT FROM TOP TO BOTTOM IN SINN FEIN/IRA.

3. ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS, ADAMS HAS TOLD THE TAOISEACH THAT "WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OVER IT, UNDER IT, AROUND IT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET A FORMULA THAT WILL WORK." ADAMS RETURNED TO THE LATTER POINT SEVERAL TIMES, "WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD A WORKABLE FORMULA," HE EMPHASIZED. HOWEVER, HE ALSO REITERATED THE NEED FOR PARITY OF ESTEEM AND FOR SINN FEIN TO BE TREATED AS ANY OTHER POLITICAL PARTY. INSTEAD THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO TRY AND ISOLATE SINN FEIN BY EXCLUDING THEM FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BELFAST CONFERENCE AND THE MEETING OF LOCAL COUNCILORS TO BE HELD IN LONDON. THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE IS BEING USED BY THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

UNIONISTS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH, WHO ARE NOW USING IT TO STALL THE PEACE PROCESS. DISARMAMENT IS BEING USED THE WAY "PERMANENT" WAS EARLIER. JUST AS MAJOR EVENTUALLY WALKED AWAY FROM "PERMANENT", IT IS EXPECTED THAT EVENTUALLY HE WILL BACK AWAY FROM DISARMAMENT. ADAMS STRESSED AGAIN THAT THIS IS ONLY A STALLING TACTIC.

4. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN AND THE NIO JANUARY 16. SINN FEIN TABLED A PAPER WHICH EXPLICITLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DISARMAMENT WAS A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION BY SINN FEIN IN THE FRAME WORKS TALKS. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, "THE BRITISH WERE MOVED TO SAY THAT DECOMMISSIONING WAS NOT A PRECONDITION." THIS REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE BY THE BRITISH. AT THE SAME TIME SINN FEIN INTIMATED THAT IT MAY BE ABLE TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER THE IRA.

5. (PARENTHETICALLY, THE NEWLY NAMED SECOND SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HEAD OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION SEAN O'HUIGINN CONFIRMED THAT THE JANUARY 16 MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND THAT PERCEPTIBLE, IF MODEST, PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. THE READ-OUTS HE RECEIVED FROM SINN FEIN AND THE NIO BASICALLY TRACKED IN THIS REGARD WITH SINN FEIN FOCUSING ON THE CAUTIOUS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE BRITISH THAT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS WAS NOT A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION IN ALL PARTY TALKS, WHILE THE BRITISH FOCUSED ON SINN FEIN REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OVER THE IRA. HOWEVER, SINN FEIN SAID THAT THE BRITISH HAD ARTIFICIALLY DRAWN OUT THE MEETING, AND THE BRITISH COMPLAINED THAT SINN FEIN SIMPLY PARROTED ITS STANDARD LINES IN SPITE OF THE SLIGHT SOFTENING. O'HUIGINN CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A SCORELESS DRAW.)

6. ON THE ISSUE OF FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. BY GERRY ADAMS AND HIS COLLEAGUES, ADAMS REITERATED THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE IRA TO SEEK FUNDS FOR ADDITIONAL ARMS PURCHASES. THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES ALREADY, PLUS THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES. BEYOND THAT THERE ARE ARMS ALL OVER THE PLACE, NOT JUST WITH THE IRA.

7. ADAMS BELIEVES THAT, AS THE BRITISH HAVE BACKED AWAY ON THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING AS A PRECONDITION FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS, DECOMMISSIONING SHOULD NOT BE MADE A PRECONDITION AFFECTING SINN FEIN'S ABILITY TO RAISE FUNDS IN THE U.S. HE RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S.

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

DEPENDS ON THE BRITISH IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD, WHICH IS WHY WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THE BRITISH THWART ADAMS' FUND RAISING EFFORTS. NONETHELESS, HE IS SURPRISED THAT HIS LITTLE PARTY IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD POWERS.

8. ADAMS STRESSED AGAIN THAT SINN FEIN/IRA WERE ABLE TO BROKER A TOTAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE TOLD THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW THEM INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THAT WAS THE DEAL THAT WAS STRUCK. NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS. NOW SINN FEIN WANTS WHAT THEY WERE PROMISED, I.E., TO BE TREATED WITH "PARITY OF ESTEEM" AND AS ANY OTHER LEGITIMATE, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTY. IN RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH ARGUMENT THAT THE UNIONISTS WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN TALKS IF SINN FEIN IS PRESENT, ADAMS ARGUES THAT IT IS NOT IMPORTANT  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 000289

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EI, UK  
SUBJECT: ADAMS ON FUND RAISING AND BILATERAL TALKS WITH HMG

WHETHER THE UNIONISTS ARE THERE. ONLY WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE TO SAY IS IMPORTANT. SMITH

BT  
#0289

NNNN  
<MSGID> M1466869

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**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

DIST: SIT, SODERBERG, NSC, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS:~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:201543Z JAN 95

FMI: AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO:  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7003

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2609

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000310

NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS

LONDON PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BRUTON ON SINN FEIN FUND RAISING

REF: DUBLIN 121

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEAN DONLON, THE NEWLY APPOINTED SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE TAOISEACH AND PROGRAM MANAGER COORDINATOR, DISCUSSED THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. BY SINN FEIN, AND SPECIFICALLY GERRY ADAMS, WITH US JANUARY 20. DONLON NOTED THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO CLARIFY HIS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL CALL ON HIM JANUARY 10. SINCE THEN HE HAS REFLECTED ON THE ISSUE AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THE CABINET SUB-COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. DONLON SAID THAT ANY RESERVATIONS BRUTON MAY HAVE HAD PHILOSOPHICALLY OVER SINN FEIN FUND RAISING IN THE U.S. HAVE BEEN LIFTED. (FINE GAEL HAS NEVER BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN ITS FUND RAISING EFFORTS OUTSIDE IRELAND AND HAS THUS NOT GENERALLY SUPPORTED FOREIGN FUND RAISING BY ANY PARTY.) HE STRESSED THAT THE DECISION ON ALLOWING FUND RAISING BY ADAMS IS OBVIOUSLY ONE FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE SO PRESUMPTUOUS AS TO ADVISE US ON WHAT WE SHOULD DO.

4. DONLON FURTHER NOTED THAT SINN FEIN AND GERRY ADAMS CAN AND DO RAISE FUNDS IN "OUR JURISDICTION". THUS IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO OPPOSE THEIR FUND RAISING ELSEWHERE.  
SANDBERG

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PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F(1.26)  
KBH 4/11/2023

*Not a  
ringing  
endorsement,  
but a  
shift.*

cc ~~in~~  
Nancy S.  
1991

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, VERSHBOW

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 191622Z JAN 95

1/20

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3503

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RUEHDLAMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 2504

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000917

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL UK EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: BRITISH READOUT ON THIRD  
ROUND OF TALKS WITH SINN FEIN

us

REFS: (A) 94 LONDON 19978, (B) STATE 5614,  
(C) LONDON 842

SUMMARY

1. ~~(C)~~ QUENTIN THOMAS, HMG'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN ITS "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" WITH SINN FEIN, TOLD US THAT THE JANUARY 16 THIRD SESSION WAS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN THE SECOND, WITH SINN FEIN OFFERING TO USE ITS "INFLUENCE" WITH THE IRA "IN A POSITIVE WAY," WHILE STILL REJECTING THE NEED FOR EARLY DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA ARMS. HMG DANGLED THE POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE TALKS BY EASTER IF PROGRESS WERE MADE BEFORE THEN, WHILE SINN FEIN ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT ANY ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO EITHER SIDE COULD BE ADDRESSED.

2. ~~(C)~~ THOMAS SAID THE BRITISH STRATEGY WAS TO ENGAGE SINN FEIN AS WIDELY AND FULLY AS POSSIBLE AND ROUTINIZE THE DIALOGUE. IT WANTED TO GET THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NEEDED SOME COMBINATION OF WORDS AND DEEDS ON WEAPONS TO MAKE THIS FEASIBLE. SINN FEIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SEEMED LESS INTERESTED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION THAN IN SCORING POINTS. THOMAS HOPED THIS REFLECTED A TACTICAL EFFORT TO SQUEEZE AS MANY CONCESSIONS OUT OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE AS POSSIBLE, RATHER THAN A STRATEGIC INTENTION TO PREPARE FOR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY.

SKIRMISH ON BRIEFINGS

3. (LOU) AS HE HAD DONE AFTER THE SECOND ROUND OF THE HMG/SINN FEIN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE (REF A), NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUENTIN THOMAS

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2011-0355-F (1.27)  
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INVITED US JANUARY 18 TO A DEBRIEF ON THE THIRD ROUND, HELD IN BELFAST JANUARY 16.

4. ~~JO~~ THOMAS SAID THE FIRST ISSUE TO ARISE IN THE MEETING HAD BEEN SINN FEIN CHIEF NEGOTIATOR MARTIN MCGUINNESS' COMPLAINT THAT THE NIO HAD BRIEFED THE USG ON THE TALKS (A CLEAR BUT IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO REF B TALKING POINT NOTING SINN FEIN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A BRITISH PAPER ON DEMILITARIZATION). IN RESPONSE, THOMAS HAD SIMPLY REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT IN THE FIRST ROUND, HMG HAD PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS, WHILE SINN FEIN INSISTED ON TRANSPARENCY.

#### EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS

5. (LOU) AS IN THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS, THOMAS SAID, THE MEETING REVOLVED AROUND AN EXCHANGE OF POSITION PAPERS. THE BRITISH PAPER (FAXED TO EUR/UBI) CITED AREAS OF COMMON GROUND: THE DESIRABILITY OF INCLUSIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PREDETERMINED OUTCOME, AND THE NEED TO (IN JOHN HUME'S PHRASE) "TAKE THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS." BUT IT REFUTED SINN FEIN'S CHARGE THAT HMG WAS TRYING TO STALL OR ERECT BARRIERS TO PROGRESS, AND THE REPUBLICAN CLAIM THAT BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY WAS "SELF-EVIDENTLY" THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT.

6. (LOU) NOTING THAT SINN FEIN'S DOCUMENT IN ROUND TWO SUGGESTED THAT FAILURE TO REACH AN "ACCEPTABLE" POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN CONFLICT, THE BRITISH PAPER ASKED: "ACCEPTABLE TO WHOM?" DID SINN FEIN INSIST ON REMOVING NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE UK "REGARDLESS OF THE WISHES OF A MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE?" WOULD IT ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF A REFERENDUM ON PROPOSALS DEVELOPED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS?

7. (LOU) THE DOCUMENT DEVOTED ONLY TWO PARAGRAPHS OUT OF 16 TO THE ARMS ISSUE. IT ACCEPTED THAT "SINN FEIN IS AN ORGANIZATION DISTINCT FROM THE IRA," BUT ASKED WHETHER SINN FEIN STILL ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IRA'S ARMED STRUGGLE. IT DENIED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE DEPENDED ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING, BUT REITERATED THAT "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" MUST BE MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.

8. (U) THE SINN FEIN DOCUMENT:

- INSISTED THAT "THE TALKS PROCESS CAN AND SHOULD NOW MOVE INTO ALL PARTY PEACE TALKS," AND THAT HMG HAD "A POLITICAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MOVE US ALL INTO THE NEXT PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS;"
- ASSERTED THAT A "LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ... REQUIRES THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ENDS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN IRISH AFFAIRS";

- WELCOMED THE ENDING OF DAYLIGHT ARMY PATROLS IN BELFAST, BUT COMPLAINED THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH ARMAGH HAD INCREASED;
- CONFIRMED (AS NOTED REF C) THAT SINN FEIN WAS "TOTALLY COMMITTED TO BRINGING ABOUT THE COMPLETE AND PERMANENT REMOVAL OF ALL GUNS FROM IRISH POLITICS ... IN THE WORD (SIC) OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 'THE DECOMMISSIONING' OF ALL WEAPONS OF WAR";
- SAID (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARMS ISSUE) THAT SINN FEIN "WISH TO USE OUR INFLUENCE ON ALL MATTERS, IN A POSITIVE WAY AND WITH THE AIM OF ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS," BUT WITH THE CAVEAT THAT "HOW WE USE OUR INFLUENCE AND HOW MUCH INFLUENCE WE HAVE IS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR US"; AND
- ASKED WHETHER DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA WEAPONS WAS "A PRECONDITION TO SINN FEIN'S INVOLVEMENT IN ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS." AND WHETHER FAILURE TO RESOLVE IT WOULD MEAN THAT "THE PEACE PROCESS IS AT AN END."

Is it?

9. ~~10~~ IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD GIVEN MCGUINNESS A PROPOSED "WORK PLAN" FOR THE NEXT FIVE ROUNDS OF TALKS. THE FIRST OF THESE SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO EXPLORING SINN FEIN'S IDEAS ON THE FORMAT OF ALL-PARTY TALKS, ANOTHER WOULD ADDRESS PRISONER CONCERNS, AND "PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE" (INCLUDING ARMS DECOMMISSIONING) WOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED UNTIL THE FOURTH ROUND (I.E. THE SEVENTH OVERALL). THOMAS SAID THE AGENDA'S STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE TALKS MORE EFFICIENT, REASSURE SINN FEIN THAT THE ARMS ISSUE WAS NOT A PRECONDITION, AND "MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR SINN FEIN TO WALK AWAY."

#### ORAL DISCUSSIONS

10. ~~11~~ IN DISCUSSING THE DOCUMENTS, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT SINN FEIN'S UNDERTAKING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE IRA IN A POSITIVE WAY, ESPECIALLY AS HMG BELIEVED THAT INFLUENCE TO BE GREATER THAN MCGUINNESS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED. THOMAS REMINDED MCGUINNESS THAT THE IRA CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED CLOSE ON SINN FEIN PRESIDENT ADAMS' "APPEAL" TO IT, AND THAT IN THE 1993 SECRET CONTACTS SINN FEIN CLAIMED IT HAD "SOUGHT AND OBTAINED" A TWO-WEEK IRA CEASEFIRE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT PARTIES OTHER THAN SINN FEIN ("LIKE THE ALLIANCE PARTY, WHICH HAS NO KNOWN PARAMILITARY WING") MIGHT ALSO WISH TO BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR, SO THERE WAS NOTHING ODD ABOUT HMG'S REQUEST TO SINN FEIN TO DO SO.

11. ~~12~~ WHEN MCGUINNESS AGAIN COMPLAINED ABOUT BEING

RESTRICTED TO DISCUSSIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS, THOMAS RECOUNTED, HE HAD READ OUT A NOTE REVEALING THAT THE PREVIOUS BAN ON MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH SINN FEIN LOCAL COUNCILLORS HAD BEEN LIFTED. MINISTERS ALSO WANTED TO JOIN THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SINN FEIN, BUT IN DECIDING WHEN TO DO SO WERE LIKELY TO CONSIDER WHETHER SINN FEIN ACCEPTED THAT "ALL NECESSARY ISSUES" (I.E. INCLUDING ARMS) WOULD BE ADDRESSED, AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE TOWARD "SERIOUS EXPLORATION" (NOT NECESSARILY RESOLUTION) ACROSS THE RANGE OF ISSUES. IF SOME PROGRESS WERE MADE IN TALKS WITH OFFICIALS, IT WAS LIKELY THAT MINISTERS WOULD BE ENGAGED BY EASTER.

12. ~~10~~ MCGUINNESS ASKED WHETHER HMG'S DECISION TO PUBLISH ITS PROPOSALS ON INTERNAL DEVOLUTION SEPARATELY FROM THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MEANT THAT IT WAS "WALKING AWAY" FROM THE THREE-STRAND PROCESS. RATHER THE REVERSE, THOMAS EXPLAINED: THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT COULD NOT ADDRESS STRAND ONE, SINCE DUBLIN WAS NOT A PARTY TO THOSE TALKS, AND SIMULTANEOUS PUBLICATION WAS MEANT TO REINFORCE THE LINKS AMONG THE STRANDS.

13. ~~10~~ THOMAS SAID SINN FEIN HAD RAISED ORALLY A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS:

- PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND'S MAYORS AND COUNCIL LEADERS, NONE OF WHOM WAS SINN FEIN (THOMAS DENIED THIS WAS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE SINN FEIN, SINCE ALLIANCE HAD THE SAME PROBLEM);
- HMG'S REFUSAL TO FUND NORTHERN IRELAND'S ONLY IRISH-LANGUAGE SECONDARY SCHOOL (WE UNDERSTAND THIS IS LIKELY, THOUGH THE SCHOOL DOES NOT MEET NORMAL CRITERIA);
- CURTAILMENT OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AN IRA PRISONER IN ENGLAND AND HIS WIFE WHEN THEY INSISTED ON SPEAKING IRISH;
- DELAYS IN TRANSFER OF IRA PRISONERS FROM ENGLAND TO NORTHERN IRELAND;
- SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE IRA PRISONER IN ENGLAND; AND
- POLICE SEARCH OF A HOUSE IN BELFAST AFTER A MAN WAS SEEN ENTERING WITH A RIFLE (IT TURNED OUT TO BE LICENSED).

14. ~~10~~ IN TURN, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRA PUNISHMENT BEATINGS. MCGUINNESS WOULD NOT AGREE TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE BEATINGS, BUT

SAID ADAMS AND OTHERS HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF THE PRACTICE. SINN FEIN ALSO DECLINED AGAIN TO AGREE TO A JOINT PRESS RELEASE, BUT OFFERED NO OBJECTION TO THE BRITISH DRAFT, WHICH STRESSED AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY EITHER SIDE WOULD BE EXCLUDED.

15. ~~✓~~ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WORK PLAN, THOMAS SAID, HE HAD PROPOSED STEPPING UP THE FREQUENCY OF THE MEETINGS TO ONE PER WEEK. MCGUINNESS DID NOT ADDRESS THE OVERALL FREQUENCY QUESTION, BUT SAID THE EARLIEST DATE FOR THE NEXT SESSION WOULD BE FEBRUARY 1, TO WHICH THOMAS AGREED. THOMAS NOTED IRONICALLY THAT SINN FEIN AS AGAIN SLOWING THE PACE, WHILE CONTINUING TO ACCUSE HMG OF FOOT-DRAGGING.

ATMOSPHERE AND STRATEGY

16. ~~✓~~ THOMAS SAID THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE THIRD ROUND HAD BEEN MUCH LIGHTER AND MORE RELAXED THAN IN ROUND TWO. HE SENSED -- AND HOPED -- THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS BECOMING "ROUTINIZED." HMG WANTED TO LOCK SINN FEIN INTO LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY DEMONSTRATING THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE THROUGH DIALOGUE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO ITS SUPPORTERS. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY AND MINISTERIAL DIALOGUES INTO RENEWED ALL-PARTY TALKS, BUT NEEDED SOME PROGRESS ON ARMS IN ORDER TO DO SO. THIS COULD CONSIST OF ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF COMBINATIONS OF WORDS AND DEEDS.

17. ~~✓~~ THOMAS STRESSED THAT HMG WAS NOT TRYING TO PUSH THE REPUBLICANS INTO A CORNER ON ARMS; IN FACT, BY USING THE DELIBERATELY VAGUE FORMULATION OF "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS," IT WAS TRYING TO LET THEM OFF THE HOOK. SINN FEIN (AND SOME IN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT) SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT HMG COULD "DELIVER" THE UNIONISTS REGARDLESS OF WHAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA DID; THIS WAS MANIFESTLY NOT THE CASE. THE UNIONISTS HAD NO VETO ON SINN FEIN'S PARTICIPATION IN AN INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE, BUT THEY DID HAVE A VETO ON THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION; AND WITHOUT THEM, THERE COULD BE NO GENUINELY INCLUSIVE TALKS.

18. ~~✓~~ AS FOR SINN FEIN, THOMAS SAID, IT HAD BEGUN TO ADDRESS A WIDER RANGE OF ISSUES, BUT STILL SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN SCORING PROPAGANDA POINTS THAN IN TALKING SERIOUSLY. MCGUINNESS BRIEFED THE PRESS ON SINN FEIN'S COMPLAINTS BEFORE EACH SESSION, REPEATED THEM IN THE MEETING, AND REPEATED THEM AGAIN TO THE PRESS AFTERWARD AS IF THE BRITISH HAD SAID NOTHING IN RESPONSE. HE INSISTED IN EACH MEETING THAT "THE WHOLE WORLD" (PARTICULARLY DUBLIN AND WASHINGTON) SUPPORTED SINN FEIN'S POSITIONS. IN ROUND THREE, THOMAS HAD REBUTTED THIS BY QUOTING PRIME MINISTER BRUTON'S STATEMENT IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNING STREET THAT "SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS" ON ARMS DECOMMISSIONING HAD TO BE MADE "IN THE PRESENT PHASE."

19. ~~let~~ HOWEVER, THOMAS CONCLUDED, HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT ADAMS AND THE GROUP AROUND HIM WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT MOST OF THEIR HARDLINE RHETORIC WAS INTENDED FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION. THEY WERE, UNDERSTANDABLY, TRYING TO "GET THE BEST PRICE THEY CAN" FOR THE IRA CEASEFIRE, WRESTING MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS WHILE GIVING LITTLE AWAY AND TRYING TO KEEP THE MORAL HIGH GROUND. IN THE END, HE HOPED, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR FAR LESS THAN THEIR OFFICIAL DEMANDS -- IF THEY COULD GET ENOUGH OF THE IRA TO GO ALONG. THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A RETURN TO VIOLENCE, BUT THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THEIR PREFERRED OPTION. CROWE

FROM:  
SITREPT

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FBI 2/93

Assessment of targets.

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are continuing procurement efforts, discussing costs.  
Cheap to buy transported weapons, night vision equipment

fugitive investigations - major fugitives - pt of contact.

no weapons procurement in U.S.  
tally to news

maintaining operational capability.

storing weapons in U.S.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER DOHSE FUERTH LAKE REED SENS SIT SODERBERG WOLIN  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 171806Z FEB 95

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4892  
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2589  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 002639

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.29)  
KBH 4/11/2023

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL PTER UK EI  
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF'S MEETING WITH RON LYNE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

-----  
THE PEACE PROCESS  
-----

2. PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S AIDE, ROD LYNE, TOLD VISITING UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF FEB. 17 THAT HMG WAS IN THE MIDST OF A MOST DIFFICULT PHASE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS. THERE WAS ANGER IN THE UNIONIST CAMP AND AMONG TORY SUPPORTERS OVER THE DRAFT JOINT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (JFD). AT THE SAME TIME, SINN FEIN/IRA HAD OFFERED NO REAL MOVEMENT ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF ARMS/EXPLOSIVES DECOMMISSIONING. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CABINET MEMBERS WHO BELIEVED THE JFD WAS "TOO GREEN" AND WOULD LEAD TO A CLEAVAGE WITH THE UNIONISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. THE CABINET SESSIONS ON FEB. 15 AND 16 HAD BEEN DIFFICULT -- A POINT FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD MADE TO THE AMBASSADOR ON FEB. 16 (REF A).

3. DESPITE PRONOUNCED DIFFERENCES AMONG MINISTERS, HMG HAD DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE MAYHEW TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS; HE WOULD MEET DICK SPRING ON SATURDAY, FEB. 18. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE JFD WOULD BE REACHED AT THIS MEETING. THE CABINET WOULD THEN MEET AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE DOCUMENT. IT WAS POSSIBLE THE JFD WOULD BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS WEDNESDAY, FEB. 22. LYNE STRESSED THAT HMG WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY AS THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BEING INCREASINGLY POISONED BY UNIONIST CHARGES OF A

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SELLOUT -- ASSERTIONS WHICH THOUGH INCORRECT WERE FINDING RESONANCE AMONG SOME TORIES.

4. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, LYNE THOUGHT THAT, ON BALANCE, THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD REMAIN ON TRACK THOUGH THE UNIONISTS MIGHT NOT COME TO THE TABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE JFD. AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, MIGHT TAKE YEARS.

-----  
THE UNIONISTS  
-----

5. LYNE SAID THEY HAD BEEN POORLY HANDLED BY DUBLIN HIGH HAD REINFORCED THEIR FEARS VIA A SERIES OF LEAKS IN RECENT MONTHS. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR TO HMG WHERE THE "TIMES" LEAK HAD ORIGINATED. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS UUP MP DAVID TRIMBLE AND HIS ALLY DAVID BURNSIDE WHO WERE DRIVING THE UNIONIST REACTION. TRIMBLE WAS SEEKING TO CREATE A UNIONIST FRONT AND REPLACE MOLYNEAUX AS UUP LEADER. HE WAS PREPARED TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT AND, ALONG WITH UUP MPS JOHN TAYLOR AND WILLIAM ROSS (NOMINALLY A MOLYNEAUX SUPPORTER BUT ANXIOUS TO GUARD HIS FLANK IN THE STRUGGLE TO SUCCEED THE UUP LEADER) WAS "MADLY" BRIEFING TORY BACKBENCHERS AND MINISTERS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S ABANDONMENT OF UNIONIST PRINCIPLES. THEY WERE WRONGLY CLAIMING THAT THE JFD WAS A SLIPPERY SLOPE TO A UNITED IRELAND. THE SCENE HAD BEEN SET FOR A NASTY UNIONIST REACTION TO THE JFD THOUGH LYNE DID NOT EXPECT THE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES WHICH ACCOMPANIED SUNNINGDALE AND THE 1985 ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THERE WAS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT THE HARDLINE UNIONISTS WOULD SHORTLY INTRODUCE THEIR OWN PAPER TO PRE-EMPT LONDON AND DUBLIN.

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SINN FEIN  
-----

6. SINN FEIN/IRA (LYNE POINTEDLY NOTED THAT SEVERAL OF THE SINN FEIN NEGOTIATORS WERE KNOWN IRA MEMBERS) WAS STILL ENGAGED IN A MATING DANCE WITH HMG IN THEIR BILATERAL TALKS. THEY WERE PRESSURING THE BRITISH TO ALLOW THEM TO UPGRADE THE TALKS TO MINISTERIAL LEVEL EVEN WHILE THEY REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ARMS

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

DECOMMISSIONING. THE BRITISH HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SINN FEIN MUST ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT ARMS MUST BE DEALT WITH AND ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THEY WOULD DECOMMISSION. HMG COULD NOT MOVE TO A MINISTERIAL LEVEL IF, AS IS NOW THE CASE, SINN FEIN REFUSED EVEN TO ENGAGE ON THIS ISSUE. THE BRITISH RECOGNIZED THAT ADAMS WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM THE IRA BUT THEY COULD NOT ALLOW SINN FEIN TO LEVER BRITAIN WITH THIS ARGUMENT AT EVERY STEP IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, LYNE REITERATED THAT THE NEXT DAYS WOULD BE VERY ROCKY. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT A DECISION BY THE U.S. TO CHANGE ITS STANCE ON FUNDRAISING BY GERRY ADAMS NOW WOULD BE A "VERY BAD MISTAKE."

8. UNDR SECRETARY TARNOFF DID NOT CLEAR ON THIS CABLE. DEAL

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INR

## Northern Ireland: Peace Process Enters Crucial Phase

*Efforts to make the peace process irreversible are reaching a critical point. Exploratory talks with Sinn Fein have been blocked by its refusal to make significant moves on decommissioning weapons; the Unionists have threatened to bring down Prime Minister Major's government if it proposes north-south bodies with executive power. Whether the obduracy on both sides is tactical or represents a real threat to peace should be known soon.*

### No progress on arms

After three rounds of talks with Sinn Fein and four with political representatives of the Loyalist paramilitaries, Britain has made scant progress on decommissioning arms. Sinn Fein has abandoned the pretense that it has no influence on the IRA but continues to insist the subject can be considered only in the context of an overall settlement. The Loyalists have maintained much the same position, though — as in the case of the cease-fire — they are unlikely to prevent progress if the Republicans are prepared to move ahead.

The British have told us their position that "substantial progress" on arms must be made before inviting Sinn Fein to all-party political talks was meant to provide maximum flexibility. London is not demanding the surrender of all arms but does insist the paramilitaries make some gestures. If not, they say, subsequent talks will be useless, since the Unionists will boycott them.

Publicly and privately, Gerry Adams has bitterly criticized the British over this issue, alleging it is merely a British delaying tactic and that there is no precedent in Irish history for such a move. Instead, he has pressed for release of "political prisoners," participation of British ministers in talks with Sinn Fein, "demilitarization" of Northern Ireland (while scoffing at steps already taken to reduce British patrols), and permission to raise funds in the United States. If Sinn Fein does not receive "parity of esteem" with other Northern Irish parties, Adams predicts a crisis in the peace process by February 15.

Adams, a tough, shrewd negotiator, could well be taking this position for tactical reasons. North-

ern Ireland Secretary Mayhew seems to believe the issue can be resolved and is willing to make concessions in other areas, though others in the British government are less sanguine.

### Talks move forward

Meanwhile the British and Irish governments have almost completed their discussions on the "framework document" they intend to present to the Northern Irish parties in renewed political talks. Mayhew and Irish Foreign Minister Spring made further progress in a January 26 meeting and still hope to have a document ready for publication in late February — possibly following a summit meeting between Major and Prime Minister Bruton.

The key outstanding items remain changes in the Irish constitution and in cross-border administrative bodies intended to improve north-south links by handling matters of common interest: at least at first, relatively non-controversial ones like trade and tourism.

Now that the Unionists' fears over the status of Northern Ireland have been allayed by assurances that any change would be subject to a referendum in the North, they have directed their anxieties toward the cross-border bodies. They insist that those entities not have executive power — that is, that any decisions taken be subject to approval by whatever local government is established in Northern Ireland.

The Unionists went so far as to threaten to defeat the Major government on a vote on EU fishing policy over this issue, winning an assurance that fisheries would not be included in any body with

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executive powers. Major has also pledged that the framework document would not give Dublin "joint authority over the affairs of Northern Ireland."

Though the survival of Major's cabinet hangs by a thread, Unionist threats are not entirely credible. If they forced an immediate election, in which – as polls now indicate – Labor would win a large majority, the Unionists' influence as holders of the balance of power in parliament would end. More-

over, a Labor government is more likely to be sympathetic to the Nationalists than is Major's.

The seriousness of threats to the peace process will be better measured after publication of the framework document – possibly in mid-February. Though criticism from all sides can be expected – and would be a sign of the document's impartiality – the parties' willingness then to continue with the process will indicate whether peace can last.

(CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Provisional Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Demurs on  
Renunciation of Violence and Acceptance of Downing Street

REF: STATE 022569

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.32)

KBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~S~~ - Entire Text.
  
2. SUMMARY: The Consul General and Vice Consul met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on January 28. Adams stated that the PSF viewed the Downing Street Declaration as but a "first step" in a peace process, and that it was entirely reasonable to ask for "clarification" from London and Dublin. The PSF, Adams observed, had not rejected Downing Street, but it had not accepted it either. He said that he could not accept the USG's formulation on renouncing violence and committing to end the conflict on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration, for this action would destroy his credibility in republican circles and effectively end his career. Adams argued that the context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt. Adams would not be pinned down on the question of renouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to asserting that PIRA violence had to be understood in the context of HMG's "violence," as exemplified by the Army and the RUC. Adams opined that the USG was losing an opportunity for peace if it did not grant him a waiver; the political risk for the

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JAN 28 '94 09:40PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.2

USG, he averred, was far less than the risks he ran daily in Northern Ireland. Finally, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging elected PSF officials in substantive talks was ill-conceived and counter-productive. END SUMMARY.

3. The Consul General and Vice Consul met with PSF president Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. Adams was at first somewhat disconcerted that the press had had such a good handle on the nature and substance of the meeting. He had not involved the press at all in previous meetings on visa matters with USG officials, whether in Dublin or Belfast. He wondered whether he was being "set up" for a quick refusal on the waiver. The CG explained that Adams was not being manipulated; the USG had to have press guidance in place, and if this particular guidance was somewhat specific in nature, it was not out of malice or forejudgment. Adams accepted this and the meeting proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

4. The CG explained that this meeting was at USG request, and that it pertained entirely to Adams' visa application. He noted that the consulate would report Adams' views to Washington as they were expressed to us, and that Washington would render a final decision on the waiver. The CG then asked for (and later received) a contact number for Adams, explaining that when the Department made a decision it might well ask the CG to inform Adams. The CG also noted that the Department of course reserved the right to make its announcement in the manner that it saw fit, so it was at least possible that Adams might

hear of the decision via the media instead of the consulate. In any case, the CG said, the consulate did not intend to brief the press on any aspect of the meeting, or even the fact of the meeting; we would wait for Washington guidance.

5. The CG opened the more substantive consular discussion by noting that the decision to seek a waiver would be made at a very high level in the USG and that we were interested in his views on the renouncement of violence and the PSF stance toward the Downing Street Declaration. The CG then followed refitel's talking points in bringing to bear USG interest in Adams' views on the peace process. The CG read the statement that we were interested in hearing, and gave Adams a copy on plain bond paper.

6. Adams began by saying that he personally wanted an end to violence. He stated that PSF had been involved in the peace process for at least the last eight years. He said this had led to a number of policy and discussion documents. Under his leadership, PSF had moved toward wanting a negotiated settlement, which was the PSF function as a political party. Adams opined that it was possible to argue that PSF was the only political party with a peace strategy. He said that it was a matter of public record that his party wanted an end to the violence and a demilitarisation of the North of Ireland, (the latter phrase Adams attributed to Albert Reynolds). The PSF had engaged in a number of initiatives to engage a wide variety of the community, with the British government, and with the church leaders. Adams said that

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they had even had secret meetings with unionist but these had not come to light and might never do so. But the Hume-Adams Dialogue was the most significant.

7. Adams said that he and SDLP leader John Hume had developed the broad concepts that could create an agreement that would accommodate the people of all of Ireland. It was then put to London and Dublin, who had been briefed on the Hume-Adams dialogue all along. The two governments then produced a reply, which was the Downing Street Declaration. The CG interjected that the agreement came about not only because of the Hume-Adams dialogue but was also an answer to the increasing paramilitary violence. Adams conceded this but said the Hume-Adams dialogue was at the very least the context for the Declaration. Adams added that the PSF viewed the declaration as but a "first step"; he claimed that even the British government when pressed would see it so. The PSF wanted to embrace the Declaration and move on. They wanted to know what the second step was and what the mechanism would be to take the process forward and put into action the principles in the Declaration. PSF wanted to see the conflict ended. Matters were at a critical stage dating from December 15th or before. The PSF, Adams averred, was committed to peace and wanted to continue to develop unarmed strategies to replace armed ones.

8. The CG, noting very carefully that he did not intend to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter, or much less pretend to speak for HMG, observed that, to a layman on these matters, section four of the

declaration seemed to have quite specific mechanisms. Adams allowed that this was so, but still stated that the PSF needed to know what "further steps" the declaration envisioned. Currently, Adams complained, HMG was stubbornly refusing to clarify matters and instead threatening to "throw down the gauntlet." This was hardly helpful to PSF's desire for peace.

9. Adams recognized that various HMG officials had made it clear that London had no strategic or selfish interests in Northern Ireland. HMG should now move, with Dublin, to ensure that this "no self-interest" clause was developed into a concerted effort to win "the consent of a greater number of people on the island." In this the PSF was willing to cooperate.

10. Adams said that the PSF had not rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Nevertheless, even if it had, it would not mean that the PSF therefore advocated violence. One did not follow from the other. The CG said that the USG had no quarrel with this logic; what it did find disturbing, however, was Adams' failure to renounce violence as a legitimate political weapon. Adams replied that Dr. John Alderdice (head of the Alliance party) viewed the presence and activities of the British Army in NI as legitimate; this was his opinion but Adams did not share it. Why should he be punished with a visa denial for not sharing with Alderdice what was and was not the legitimate use of force, Adams asked? The CG turned the topic back to the paper he had handed Adams, noting that a philosophical discussion on the legitimacy

JAN 28 '94 09:51PM AMCONSULBELFAST

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of force in any society was an interesting topic, but that meanwhile, the USG remained interested in hearing whether he found the statement that was handed to him acceptable.

11. Adams replied that it was wrong to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, he said he did not speak for the IRA. After all, Adams claimed, the PSF and the PIRA were two separate organizations. Adams asserted that making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might indeed be able to travel to New York, but he would be "without influence" in republican circles when he returned. His people would repudiate him. All that then would be left to do, Adams said with a smile, would be to retire quietly to the mountains. The public statement that the USG was asking him to make was simply not worth it, Adams claimed; all it would do was end his career. The CG at this point carefully repeated Adams' words to him. Was this a fair and accurate characterization, the CG asked? It was, Adams acknowledged. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF's president's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

12. Adams asserted that he should get a visa regardless of his unwillingness to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. As it was, Adams said he saw much positive in the Clinton administration's statements on a possible peace envoy and its less

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one-sided view of the McBride Principles. Nevertheless, Adams mused, he expected now to be turned down and not to have another good discussion with the CG until the next time he applied for a visa and had to be interviewed.

13. Warming up to the subject, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging in substantive dialogue with the PSF was silly and counter-productive. The PSF, he noted, was the largest vote-getter in the city of Belfast and the USG continued to act as if the party did not exist. No wonder the people of West Belfast felt marginalized and left out; these feelings, in turn, only made it easier for paramilitaries to recruit in those neighborhoods.

14. Adams finished by saying that he had to take his own political course, that he had to adopt the political positions he thought most fitting under the circumstances. If this meant no visa, then so be it. He would not be particularly angry, but more disappointed that the visa refusal had allowed an opportunity to slip by. The risk the U.S. would take in granting him a waiver was small compared to the risks he was taking every day in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, visa or no, the PSF believed that violence would end; the only question was how long it would take and how many more lives would be lost. The Sinn Fein was actively working toward peace, Adams said, and this was the message the USG ought to understand. The context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt.

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15. The CG noted that he and Adams had just about come to the end of the line; Adams agreed. The CG repeated that he would contact Adams if and when he heard something from Washington. Adams repeated that it was a shame that the only time he had any contact with USG officials was during "visa interrogation" sessions. The meeting then ended.

16. OBSERVATION.

Adams was calm, discursive and self-possessed. As is his style, he was dressed in tweeds, with silk tie and scarf. Offered an ashtray, he noted that he had finally given up his pipe-smoking. Adams spoke well and clearly, but with no particular force or pace. He maintains eye contact, even when denying that the PSF has any links with the Provisional IRA.

Martinez

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
MEMCON

January 28, 1994  
Consulate General, Belfast

Gerry Adams, President, Provisional Sinn Fein  
Valentino E. Martinez, Consul General  
Chris Bendsen, Vice-Consul

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.33)  
K8H 7/11/2023

SUMMARY

The Consul General met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. The CG, following the guidance and talking points in State 22569 literally, outlined the USG's interest in ascertaining Adams' views on renouncing violence and committing the PSF and the IRA to end the conflict on the basis of the Joint Declaration. The CG handed Adams a plain sheet of paper with an extract from State 22569, the section that began "We therefore must know" and ended "on the basis of the Joint Declaration."

Adams read the extract and nodded, observing that the local and international press had seemed well aware of what was to be asked of him. "Was he being set up," he queried? The CG replied, "No," and briefly explained how USG press guidance worked. Adams accepted this at face value; the 90-minute conversation proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

Adams spent much time explaining previous public statements he had made on wanting violence to end and how they related to the PSF's "search for peace". He also explained in great detail his and the PSF's desire for "clarification" of the December 15 Downing Street Declaration.

He then came to the plain paper handed to him earlier by the CG. It was wrong, Adams said, to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might, indeed, be able to travel to NYC, but he would be "without influence" when he returned; the Republican community would repudiate him. All that would be left for him to do, Adams continued, would be a "quiet retirement in the mountains." The public statement of State 22569, Adams averred, was not worth making, as it would effectively end his career. The CG very carefully repeated Adams' words to him. "Was this a fair characterization," the CG inquired? "It was," Adams replied. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF President's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

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- 2 -

Adams stated that he thought he should get a visa regardless of his willingness or lack thereof to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel, irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. Adams, however, would not be pinned down on the question of denouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to ascertaining that PIRA violence had to be "understood" in the context of the violence engendered by the, for him, merely putative legitimate forces of order -- the police and the army.

Finally, the CG requested (and later received) a contact phone number for Adams, should the Department instruct the CG to pass on its final decision to Adams.

END EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

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TO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 8029  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7673  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 022569  
LONDON - PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST  
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: CVIS. PREL, IR, UK  
SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA REQUEST

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.34)  
KBH 4/11/2013

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS ACTION MESSAGE FOR DUBLIN OR BELFAST.
3. CONSUL GENERAL AT EMBASSY DUBLIN SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS ASAP TO DISCUSS HIS VISA APPLICATION. IF ADAMS HAS RETURNED TO BELFAST, CONSUL GENERAL AT CG BELFAST SHOULD CONTACT ADAMS AND CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION.
4. THE CONSUL GENERAL AT THE ACTION POST SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ADAMS:
  - THE ADMINISTRATION IS REVIEWING YOUR JANUARY 14 APPLICATION TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND HOSTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON FEBRUARY 1, 1994 IN LIGHT OF EVENTS FLOWING FROM THE DECEMBER 15 JOINT DECLARATION BY PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR.
  - IN MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER TO GRANT YOU A WAIVER OF YOUR INELIGIBILITY, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR POSITION ON ACHIEVING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
  - WE THEREFORE MUST KNOW WHETHER YOU WILL STATE PUBLICLY THAT:

"YOU PERSONALLY RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND WILL WORK TO THAT END AND THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA ARE COMMITTED TO END THE CONFLICT ON THE BASIS OF THE

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PAGE 02 OF 02

JOINT DECLARATION."

-- WE BELIEVE AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND MUST RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND PURSUE PEACE THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. OUR DECISION ON WHETHER TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A VISA STRICTLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE FOR ONE DAY WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER YOU ARE WILLING TO TAKE THIS IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD PEACE.

5. POSTS SHOULD REPORT ADAMS' REACTION BY IMMEDIATE CABLE. POSTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENTS OR THE PRESS. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOI AND HMG ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. CHRISTOPHER

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<MSGID> M0848282

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Subject: Provisional Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Demurs on  
Renunciation of Violence and Acceptance of Downing Street

REF: STATE 022569

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.35)  
KBH 7/11/2023

1. ~~5~~ - Entire Text.

2. SUMMARY: The Consul General and Vice Consul met with Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) President Gerry Adams on January 28. Adams stated that the PSF viewed the Downing Street Declaration as but a "first step" in a peace process, and that it was entirely reasonable to ask for "clarification" from London and Dublin. The PSF, Adams observed, had not rejected Downing Street, but it had not accepted it either. He said that he could not accept the USG's formulation on renouncing violence and committing to end the conflict on the basis of the Downing Street Declaration, for this action would destroy his credibility in republican circles and effectively end his career. Adams argued that the context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt. Adams would not be pinned down on the question of renouncing Provisional IRA violence, restricting himself to asserting that PIRA violence had to be understood in the context of HMG's "violence," as exemplified by the Army and the RUC. Adams opined that the USG was losing an opportunity for peace if it did not grant him a waiver; the political risk for the

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JAN 28 '94 09:40PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.2

USG, he averred, was far less than the risks he ran daily in Northern Ireland. Finally, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging selected PSF officials in substantive talks was ill-conceived and counter-productive. END SUMMARY.

3. The Consul General and Vice Consul met with PSF president Gerry Adams on the afternoon of January 28, 1994. Adams was at first somewhat disconcerted that the press had had such a good handle on the nature and substance of the meeting. He had not involved the press at all in previous meetings on visa matters with USG officials, whether in Dublin or Belfast. He wondered whether he was being "set up" for a quick refusal on the waiver. The CG explained that Adams was not being manipulated; the USG had to have press guidance in place, and if this particular guidance was somewhat specific in nature, it was not out of malice or forejudgment. Adams accepted this and the meeting proceeded without acrimony or recrimination.

4. The CG explained that this meeting was at USG request, and that it pertained entirely to Adams' visa application. He noted that the consulate would report Adams' views to Washington as they were expressed to us, and that Washington would render a final decision on the waiver. The CG then asked for (and later received) a contact number for Adams, explaining that when the Department made a decision it might well ask the CG to inform Adams. The CG also noted that the Department of course reserved the right to make its announcement in the manner that it saw fit, so it was at least possible that Adams might

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hear of the decision via the media instead of the consulate. In any case, the CG said, the consulate did not intend to brief the press on any aspect of the meeting, or even the fact of the meeting; we would wait for Washington guidance.

5. The CG opened the more substantive consular discussion by noting that the decision to seek a waiver would be made at a very high level in the USG and that we were interested in his views on the renouncement of violence and the PSF stance toward the Downing Street Declaration. The CG then followed reftel's talking points in bringing to bear USG interest in Adams' views on the peace process. The CG read the statement that we were interested in hearing, and gave Adams a copy on plain bond paper.

6. Adams began by saying that he personally wanted an end to violence. He stated that PSF had been involved in the peace process for at least the last eight years. He said this had led to a number of policy and discussion documents. Under his leadership, PSF had moved toward wanting a negotiated settlement, which was the PSF function as a political party. Adams opined that it was possible to argue that PSF was the only political party with a peace strategy. He said that it was a matter of public record that his party wanted an end to the violence and a demilitarization of the North of Ireland, (the latter phrase Adams attributed to Albert Reynolds). The PSF had engaged in a number of initiatives to engage a wide variety of the community, with the British government, and with the church leaders. Adams said that

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they had even had secret meetings with unionist but these had not come to light and might never do so. But the Hume-Adams Dialogue was the most significant.

7. Adams said that he and SDLP leader John Hume had developed the broad concepts that could create an agreement that would accommodate the people of all of Ireland. It was then put to London and Dublin, who had been briefed on the Hume-Adams dialogue all along. The two governments then produced a reply, which was the Downing Street Declaration. The CG interjected that the agreement came about not only because of the Hume-Adams dialogue but was also an answer to the increasing paramilitary violence. Adams conceded this but said the Hume-Adams dialogue was at the very least the context for the Declaration. Adams added that the PSF viewed the declaration as but a "first step"; he claimed that even the British government when pressed would see it so. The PSF wanted to embrace the Declaration and move on. They wanted to know what the second step was and what the mechanism would be to take the process forward and put into action the principles in the Declaration. PSF wanted to see the conflict ended. Matters were at a critical stage dating from December 15th or before. The PSF, Adams averred, was committed to peace and wanted to continue to develop unarmed strategies to replace armed ones.

8. The CG, noting very carefully that he did not intend to enter into a detailed discussion on this matter, or much less pretend to speak for HMG, observed that, to a layman on these matters, section four of the

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declaration seemed to have quite specific mechanisms. Adams allowed that this was so, but still stated that the PSF needed to know what "further steps" the declaration envisioned. Currently, Adams complained, HMG was stubbornly refusing to clarify matters and instead threatening to "throw down the gauntlet." This was hardly helpful to PSF's desire for peace.

9. Adams recognized that various HMG officials had made it clear that London had no strategic or selfish interests in Northern Ireland. HMG should now move, with Dublin, to ensure that this "no self-interest" clause was developed into a concerted effort to win "the consent of a greater number of people on the island." In this the PSF was willing to cooperate.

10. Adams said that the PSF had not rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Nevertheless, even if it had, it would not mean that the PSF therefore advocated violence. One did not follow from the other. The CG said that the USG had no quarrel with this logic; what it did find disturbing, however, was Adams' failure to renounce violence as a legitimate political weapon. Adams replied that Dr. John Alderdice (head of the Alliance party) viewed the presence and activities of the British Army in NI as legitimate; this was his opinion but Adams did not share it. Why should he be punished with a visa denial for not sharing with Alderdice what was and was not the legitimate use of force, Adams asked? The CG turned the topic back to the paper he had handed Adams, noting that a philosophical discussion on the legitimacy

JAN 28 '94 09:51PM AMCONSULBELFAST

P.4

of force in any society was an interesting topic, but that meanwhile, the USG remained interested in hearing whether he found the statement that was handed to him acceptable.

11. Adams replied that it was wrong to ask him to renounce something he did not advocate. Further, he said he did not speak for the IRA. After all, Adams claimed, the PSF and the PIRA were two separate organizations. Adams asserted that making such a statement would not help him in any way. Were he to make such a public statement, he might indeed be able to travel to New York, but he would be "without influence" in republican circles when he returned. His people would repudiate him. All that then would be left to do, Adams said with a smile, would be to retire quietly to the mountains. The public statement that the USG was asking him to make was simply not worth it, Adams claimed; all it would do was end his career. The CG at this point carefully repeated Adams' words to him. Was this a fair and accurate characterization, the CG asked? It was, Adams acknowledged. The CG told Adams that he would pass the PSF's president's views on to Washington, and that the final decision on a waiver would be made there.

12. Adams asserted that he should get a visa regardless of his unwillingness to "recite a formula." The U.S. could possibly do a great deal of good at little political risk, were it to allow him to travel irrespective of what was being asked of him in the CG's office. As it was, Adams said he saw much positive in the Clinton administration's statements on a possible peace envoy and its less

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one-sided view of the McBride Principles. Nevertheless, Adams mused, he expected now to be turned down and not to have another good discussion with the CG until the next time he applied for a visa and had to be interviewed.

13. Warming up to the subject, Adams said that the USG policy of not engaging in substantive dialogue with the PSF was silly and counter-productive. The PSF, he noted, was the largest vote-getter in the city of Belfast and the USG continued to act as if the party did not exist. No wonder the people of West Belfast felt marginalized and left out; these feelings, in turn, only made it easier for paramilitaries to recruit in those neighborhoods.

14. Adams finished by saying that he had to take his own political course, that he had to adopt the political positions he thought most fitting under the circumstances. If this meant no visa, then so be it. He would not be particularly angry, but more disappointed that the visa refusal had allowed an opportunity to slip by. The risk the U.S. would take in granting him a waiver was small compared to the risks he was taking every day in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, visa or no, the PSF believed that violence would end; the only question was how long it would take and how many more lives would be lost. The Sinn Fein was actively working toward peace, Adams said, and this was the message the USG ought to understand. The context and problems of Northern Ireland were much too broad to be contained in the formula the USG was asking him to adopt.

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15. The CG noted that he and Adams had just about come to the end of the line; Adams agreed. The CG repeated that he would contact Adams if and when he heard something from Washington. Adams repeated that it was a shame that the only time he had any contact with USG officials was during "visa interrogation" sessions. The meeting then ended.

16. OBSERVATION.

Adams was calm, discursive and self-possessed. As is his style, he was dressed in tweeds, with silk tie and scarf. Offered an ashtray, he noted that he had finally given up his pipe-smoking. Adams spoke well and clearly, but with no particular force or pace. He maintains eye contact, even when denying that the PSF has any links with the Provisional IRA.

Martinez

BT

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Objective: To encourage Sinn Fein and the IRA unequivocally to renounce violence, endorse the Joint Declaration and negotiate seriously for an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The President has repeatedly stated that the United States stands ready to contribute to peace in any appropriate way. He has also stated he will keep the issue of the Gerry Adams visa under review as the situation warrants, especially in light of events flowing from the December 15 Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Reynolds and Prime Minister Major. The goal is to use US influence over the parties to try to advance the cause of peace.

Proposal

On January 14, 1994, Gerry Adams applied for a visa to visit the United States January 31 to February 5 to attend a conference on Northern Ireland hosted in New York by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The application presents the US an opportunity to try to move Adams forward toward the goal stated above.

Over this weekend, the Administration would invite Adams into the US Consulate in Belfast or the Embassy in Dublin (Adams applied at the latter so the Embassy is the most logical choice) to discuss his application and press him on how far he is willing to go in renouncing violence and endorsing the Joint Declaration.

The IRA is currently engaged in an internal debate over whether to take such a step and a decision is not expected until mid-February. However, it may be possible to encourage Adams to move publicly in the right direction.

\*\*If Adams is willing to state publicly that his goal is to end the IRA's role in violence, to move the IRA into the political process and to negotiate an end to the conflict the US would enable him to attend the conference in New York -- but only the conference. We would make it clear that he is not free to travel outside New York, fundraise or do public forums outside the context of the conference. Realistically, he will no doubt talk to the press but we would not permit him to remain in the country to attend the lunches and dinners he currently hopes to attend.

\*\*We would also urge the British to respond to the IRA request for clarification of the Joint Declaration. The current stalemate risks providing the IRA an excuse to walk away from this opportunity. Since issuing the Joint Declaration, the British have maintained the position that the document stands on its own and any requests for clarification are simply veiled stalling techniques. Statements such as having "thrown down the gauntlet to the IRA" only make it more difficult for the IRA to respond. A willingness to discuss certain points in the Declaration would make it more difficult for the IRA to reject the Joint Declaration.

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Gerry Adams Visa Draft Options  
January 18, 1993

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.37)  
K8H 4/11/2023

Issue for decision

Gerry Adams has requested a visa to attend a conference in New York on February 1st. His request comes in the midst of internal Sinn Fein/IRA deliberations on whether to endorse the December 15 Joint Declaration. It also follows a public statement by the President that he would "review" the issue of the Adams visa in light of recent developments. The issue is how we can use the "carrots" at our disposal to press Adams to renounce violence, endorse the Joint Declaration and enter seriously into peace negotiations.

Proposal

1. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his visa application in the context of his commitment to peace and the joint declaration. [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until it renounces the use of violence.]

While this step would not be a formal suspension of the current US ban on talking to Sinn Fein, it would be a step to reach out to Adams. We would need to flush out the terms of the discussion and its duration. The goal would be to get Adams to renounce violence (and/or accept the Joint Declaration) in which case we would issue him the visa. We would deny Adams the visa if he failed to renounce violence by the February 1 conference.

If Adams had not renounced violence by the time of the February 1 conference but had not yet rejected the Joint Declaration and those involved felt the talks were productive, the discussions would continue at least until the time Sinn Fein took a public position on the Joint Declaration, expected in mid-February. [NOTE: It is highly unlikely that Adams will be in a position to renounce violence before mid-February.]

This step is substantively a larger step than the symbolic issue of providing Adams a US visa. But it would allow us to make our own judgments on how serious Adams is about peace and enable us to reach out to him to encourage him to make peace. It would enable us to do so while not giving in to his politically charged request for a visa. American involvement would help provide the nationalist community a sense of security about the peace process and could contribute to moving the peace process forward. The step also follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts. (The Irish, however, still maintain its own ban on talking directly to Sinn Fein).

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Declassify on: OADR

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Cons: Even if very limited in scope, talks with Sinn Fein could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, might upset the British and perhaps some in Congress.

If Adams fails to renounce violence and the visa is rejected, it could further alienate the nationalist community. President might be criticized for missing an opportunity to press for peace and some in Congress would criticize him.

2. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration. The IRA has been pressing for a clarification by the British of the Joint Declaration. The British believe the IRA request is a delaying tactic, although the Irish have made a public attempt to clarify the document. If the British were to agree to clarify the document, it could help determine whether the IRA's action is a bluff or a serious attempt at clarification. Pushing for a clarification would help focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

3. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash against any reaching out to the nationalists. Possible steps include offering to open a dialogue with Ian Paisley (who has rejected the Joint Declaration) or with UUP leader James Molyneaux who has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

### Consultations and Sequencing

Wednesday, January 19 Lake and Christopher discuss and agree on a course of action over lunch. President is briefed and accepts proposal.

Thursday and Friday, January 20-21 State consults with British, Irish, SDLP leader John Hume and Congress over proposal.

Saturday, January 22 Consulate in Belfast or Embassy in Dublin calls in Gerry Adams to brief him on proposal.

Monday, January 24 State or White House releases press release with outlines of proposal.

Adams would then have over a week to respond to our proposal and take the necessary steps to obtain a visa.

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BACKGROUND PAPER  
GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.38)  
KBH 4/11/2023

Decision

Gerry Adams requested a visa on Friday, January 14 to attend a peace conference hosted on February 1st in New York by a prominent Irish-American, William Flynn. He also indicated he hopes to do press interviews, attend a luncheon hosted by Bruce Morrison, dine with his book publishers and attend an AFL/CIO dinner honoring Tom Donahue. The FBI also has information that he intends to hold a \$150 a person fundraising dinner, although his people apparently claim he does not intend to do any fundraising in the country. The FBI also indicated to me that Adams could also easily be handed checks up to \$9,000 which would not have to be reported.

The decision we face is whether and how to use US influence to help induce Sinn Fein/IRA into accepting the Joint Declaration while at the same time maintaining our tough stance against terrorism. Since the Joint Declaration was reached December 15, Sinn Fein and the IRA have been debating the proposal but have not outright rejected it. A decision is likely within the next month. John Hume has continued his private talks with Adams and believes Adams is prepared to make peace if he has the political strength to bring the IRA along. He is pushing the US to provide Adams a visa as a way to enhance Adams' credibility.

The IRA has asked the British to clarify portions of the Joint Declaration. So far, the British have refused, claiming that the document stands for itself and the ball is in the IRA's court. The British believe that the IRA's request for clarifications is simply a means of stalling. In an attempt to reach out to the IRA's concerns, the Irish Prime Minister gave a speech clarifying the Joint Declaration but the IRA wants to hear clarification directly from the British. Earlier this week, the Irish lifted its 20 year ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts in Ireland. It maintains, however, its formal ban on talking to the IRA, although private, indirect discussions are most likely occurring. Last month, the British confirmed the leaks that it had talked to the IRA.

Since the Joint Declaration, the IRA has continued unabated its campaign of violence with almost daily attacks on British security forces. I was briefed by the FBI on Friday and it believes Adams remains in the command structure of the IRA's military campaign (one of the 7 man provisional army council that directs the more spectacular acts of violence and general IRA strategy). They do not have any direct knowledge of Adams' role in any specific act of recent violence but believe that given his position on the council he is involved in directing the actions. I've asked the FBI to check on any recent activity -- you might want to mention to Freeh in your meeting next week and/or ask the British for any information. It is very sensitive and the FBI may not be able to get information at the lower levels.

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Declassify on: OADR

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Others' positions

British -- as you know, the British oppose our giving Adams a visa until he has provided an "unequivocal and irrevocable" commitment to end violence. They believe that we should, however, hold out to him the prospect of the visa if he is willing to meet this condition. They believe that to give a visa to Adams before he has done so would "gravely undermine the joint declaration. The US would be seen to have diverged from the UK."

Irish -- it is unclear what the Irish will confirm publicly or in larger private circles but we have from several sources (John Hume, Ambassador Smith, Senator Kennedy and Ambassador Gallagher after he spoke directly to the Irish Prime Minister about the issue) that the Irish support us giving Adams a visa to attend the conference only. They would not want to see Adams doing high profile press or fundraising but believe that allowing him to attend the peace conference could encourage Adams to move toward peace and that prospect outweighs the negative.

John Hume -- Of all the players, Hume probably knows Adams the best, having engaged in lengthy discussions with him. In fact, the Joint Declaration in a way flowed from his talks with Adams over the last year. As far as I know, Hume is the only one who talks directly to Adams. Hume believes Adams is serious about wanting to move forward but is battling the splits among the IRA. He urges us not to miss this opportunity of using US influence to bring Adams into our fold. Some have made the point that Hume also has his own agenda and the most to gain by moving Adams along -- although as the one closest to the violence, he also has the most to gain from peace.

State -- we don't have anything formal from State, although my informal discussions indicate State will most likely come out in support of the British position.

Congress -- We received a letter today to the President from Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Moynihan and Dodd and Congressmen Manton, Fish and Coyne urging him to grant the visa to Adams. "The United States cannot afford to ignore this possibility and miss this rare opportunity for our country to contribute to peace in Northern Ireland." Senator Kennedy also called Sandy Berger and said that while this was a tough call, we should grant him the visa. He mentioned the strength of Reynolds' push for giving him the visa and the fact that the Irish intelligence believes Adams is talking peace. Senator Lautenberg's office also called me to add his name to the Kennedy letter.

Speaker Foley also called Sandy today to urge us not to give Adams the visa until he has taken steps toward peace. He felt very strongly that it would send the wrong signals.

OPTIONS

I believe most would agree that we ought to reach out to Adams and Sinn Fein/Adams in some fashion. Below are the options I can think of:

1. Publicly state that we will give Adams a visa once he unequivocally rejects violence (and perhaps joined peace process/accepted Joint Declaration)

Pros: Maintains our stance against terrorism, supports the British position, might encourage him in the right direction because it holds out the chance of coming to the US if he makes the right move. Would avoid alienating the Unionist community. Saves major carrot of visa.

Cons: Since the President has indicated he would review the visa in light of current events, a rejection that echoes the position of the British might increase the strength of the hard liners within the IRA. In addition, it might worsen Adams perceived need for something more than the Joint Declaration before he can make peace. A denial will anger the President's supporters from the campaign to whom he promised to give Adams a visa and disappoint those in Congress pushing for a visa. It might be difficult to define the term "unequivocally" or to know exactly when Adams had permanently given up on violence.

2. Provide a visa to Adams to attend the conference only, a one day visa that would limit his activities and exposure

Pros: Could help build up Adams within the IRA enough to enable him to renounce violence and negotiate seriously, would please campaign supporters and some in Congress.

Cons: Might provide Adams a forum to fundraise for the IRA and a platform to advance his cause without agreeing to renounce violence and join the peace process. Weakens stance against terrorism, might anger some in Congress and might provoke a Unionist backlash. Gives up major carrot of the U.S. for uncertain returns.

2a. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash. UUP leader James Molyneaux has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility (proposed by State) is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

3. Agree to initiate US-Sinn Fein talks within the framework of the Joint Declaration only [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until they renounce the use of violence.]

Pros: Would reach out to the IRA while not giving into the symbolic and charged issue of the visa, would enable the US to determine for itself how serious Adams and the IRA are about making peace, could help bring the IRA to the peace table. Follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts.

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, would upset the British and perhaps some in Congress. Inconsistent with Irish ban on direct Sinn Fein contacts.

3a. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his commitment to peace and the joint declaration, thus avoiding a formal suspension of talking to Sinn Fein

4. Offer to host peace talks if the IRA (and Unionists) accepts the Joint Declaration and renounces violence

Pros: By holding out the carrot of US sponsorship of a peace process, could enhance the confidence of the IRA and others in the process enough to bring them into the process.

Cons: Could commit the US to a lengthy negotiating process with uncertain ends, would annoy the British who resist any US role in the Northern Ireland issue, might not be enough to bring the IRA along.

4a. Offer to host the talks now, as a way to bring all parties on board

Cons: Prospects of success very difficult to predict.

5. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration and/or engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein

Pros: Would call the IRA's bluff on whether it really need clarification and thus whether it is serious about peace, would focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British who might reject our request, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

6. Send a U.S. special envoy to press for peace

Pros: Could help increase confidence of all parties involved, could advance peace, would please campaign supporters who called for envoy and would fulfill campaign pledge.

Cons: Will be opposed by the British and employ political resources of the US in a difficult problem with no clear end or definably prospects for peace.

7. Attempt to do more to address the root causes of violence by increasing aid ie., propose a US business/investment initiative working with OPIC and Commerce [State's idea]

Pros: Would enable the US to do something tangible in support of peace, especially if above steps were not taken.

Cons: We already have a robust \$20 million a year program of supporting the International Fund whose purpose is the same. Would raise real questions of absorption capacity.

8. Prayer Initiative (suggested by State and Ambassador Flynn) would involve working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, ie., through a prayer breakfast in Washington

Pros: Would encourage dialogue among the factions, could perhaps be used as cover for private US government talks with parties. Would demonstrate US interest in the conflict.

Cons: Might be a failure, might be difficult to control.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Feb-1994 19:02 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George M. Andricos  
(ANDRICOS)

SUBJECT: Mike O'Neil

Please pass to Nancy.

Subject: Mike O'Neil/Adams Cables

State is still considering the issue of whether to provide the Adams cables, or access thereto, to Mike O'Neil. State lawyers have raised an additional concern that the cable(s) includes, in part, material from the visa interview which they apparently don't release. As soon as State decides what they want to recommend, I'll let you know. In the meantime, they have told O'Neil that they're still working this and will get back to him as soon as possible.

Mike

Distribution:

FOR: Nancy Soderberg	( SODERBERG )
FOR: Wendy E. Gray	( GRAY )
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard	( HILLIARD )
FOR: Cathy Millison	( MILLISON )
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	( DARBY )
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante	( LAPLANTE )
FOR: Allison M. Wright	( WRIGHT )
CC: Jane E. Holl	( HOLL )
CC: Jeremy D. Rosner	( ROSNER )
CC: William C. Danvers	( DANVERS )
CC: Eric Liu	( LIU )
CC: Christina L. Funches	( FUNCHES )

*Mike -  
shall I call  
Mike + let him  
know generally  
about?*

*Conversation?*

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0355-F (1.70)  
KBH 4/11/2023

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 16:19 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

( DARBY )

FROM:

Julien D. LeBourgeois  
(LEBOURGEOIS)

SUBJECT:

Note for Nancy

Nancy -- Update from our earlier conversation on N. Ireland.

1. Jane and I finally made contact. She has been swamped and unable to get time on the computer to make the changes to her memo you two discussed. She will try to send you tomorrow the original memo with marginal notes on changes to incorporate.

2. FBI will deal with Paisley as well at the 11:00 AM meeting 1/14, according to Gina Genton.

3. John Tefft, per his conversation with you, will seek more specifics on the invalidation of Paisley's 1980 visa. John is also getting guidance from Tarnoff for producing the options paper you requested.

4. You should have received by now copies of the two recent State cables on how to handle Adams when he applies (State 9969) and on how to respond to any press inquiries (State 11255).

Do you want any of this summarized for Sandy, or is he up to speed?

Julien

CC: Records

( RECORDS )

To Julien - you'll get a copy of a  
memo to TC+SB bringin them up  
to speed. No need to inform them further at  
this point

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2011-0355-F (1.41)

KBH 4/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1994 17:58 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke  
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: IRA

*To Richard,  
I've asked fbi to  
brief me on gerry Adams  
re: his expected request  
for a visa on  
Friday.*

The British embassy counter-intelligence types with whom we have liason on IRA terrorism issues informs us that there is an FBI briefing "at the NSC" tomorrow on IRA Terrorism.

Does anybody know anything about that?

Always nice to be told things about the NSC's doings by foreign embassies.

*It never occurred  
to me you  
wanted to be  
involved with  
the Gerry Adams  
visa issue - If  
you want to attend  
you are welcome -*

Distribution:

- FOR: George J. Tenet
- FOR: Jenonne R. Walker
- FOR: M. Brooke Darby
- FOR: Mary C. Emery
- FOR: Wilma G. Hall
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- FOR: Kristie A. Kenney
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- FOR: Cathy Millison
- CC: Records
- CC: Richard L. Canas
- CC: Randy R. Beers
- CC: Sean J. Darragh

- ( TENET )
- ( WALKER )
- ( DARBY )
- ( EMERY )
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- ( DARRAGH )

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*NES  
Can't we do  
more to build on  
our current position  
without being on the  
hard line as the  
Brits?  
R  
1/16/94*

15-Jan-1994 19:45 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby

( DARBY )

FROM:

M. Brooke Darby  
(DARBY)

SUBJECT:

gerry adams visa

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (1.42)  
KRH 4/11/2023

December 15, 1993 ?

MEMO TO: Anthony Lake

FROM: Nancy Soderberg

RE: Gerry Adams Visa

I had hoped to have by today a paper from State outlining the options for a Gerry Adams visa. I have yet to receive it but given your request for materials before your returned, I have put together the options paper below. It is a rough draft that we will need to flush out and work through with State before forwarding.

Decision

Gerry Adams requested a visa on Friday, December 14 to attend a peace conference hosted on February 1st in New York by a prominent Irish-American, William Flynn. He also indicated he hopes to do press interviews, attend a luncheon hosted by Bruce Morrison, dine with his book publishers and attend an AFL/CIO dinner honoring Tom Donahue. The FBI also has information that he intends to hold a \$150 a person fundraising dinner, although his people apparently claim he does not intend to do any fundraising in the country. The FBI also indicated to me that Adams could also easily be handed checks up to \$9,000 which would not have to be reported.

The decision we face is whether and how to use US influence to help induce Sinn Fein/IRA into accepting the Joint Declaration

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~~SECRET~~

while at the same time maintaining our tough stance against terrorism. Since the Joint Declaration was reached December 15, Sinn Fein and the IRA have been debating the proposal but have not outright rejected it. A decision is likely within the next month. John Hume has continued his private talks with Adams and believes Adams is prepared to make peace if he has the political strength to bring the IRA along. He is pushing the US to provide Adams a visa as a way to enhance Adams' credibility.

The IRA has asked the British to clarify portions of the Joint Declaration. So far, the British have refused, claiming that the document stands for itself and the ball is in the IRA's court. The British believe that the IRA's request for clarifications is simply a means of stalling. In an attempt to reach out to the IRA's concerns, the Irish Prime Minister gave a speech clarifying the Joint Declaration but the IRA wants to hear clarification directly from the British. Earlier this week, the Irish lifted its 20 year ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts in Ireland. It maintains, however, its formal ban on talking to the IRA, although private, indirect discussions are most likely occurring. Last month, the British confirmed the leaks that it had talked to the IRA.

Since the Joint Declaration, the IRA has continued unabated its campaign of violence with almost daily attacks on British security forces. I was briefed by the FBI on Friday and it believes Adams remains in the command structure of the IRA's military campaign (one of the 7 man provisional army council that directs the more spectacular acts of violence and general IRA strategy). They do not have any direct knowledge of Adams' role in any specific act of recent violence but believe that given his position on the council he is involved in directing the actions. I've asked the FBI to check on any recent activity -- you might want to mention to Freeh in your meeting next week and/or ask the British for any information. It is very sensitive and the FBI may not be able to get information at the lower levels.

## Others' positions

British -- as you know, the British oppose our giving Adams a visa until he has provided an "unequivocal and irrevocable" commitment to end violence. They believe that we should, however, hold out to him the prospect of the visa if he is willing to meet this condition. They believe that to give a visa to Adams before he has done so would "gravely undermine the joint declaration. The US would be seen to have diverged from the UK."

Irish -- it is unclear what the Irish will confirm publicly or in larger private circles but we have from several sources (John Hume, Ambassador Smith, Senator Kennedy and Ambassador Gallagher after he spoke directly to the Irish Prime Minister about the issue) that the Irish support us giving Adams a visa to attend the conference only. They would not want to see Adams doing high profile press or fundraising but believe that allowing

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him to attend the peace conference could encourage Adams to move toward peace and that prospect outweighs the negative.

John Hume -- Of all the players, Hume probably knows Adams the best, having engaged in lengthy discussions with him. In fact, the Joint Declaration in a way flowed from his talks with Adams over the last year. As far as I know, Hume is the only one who talks directly to Adams. Hume believes Adams is serious about wanting to move forward but is battling the splits among the IRA. He urges us not to miss this opportunity of using US influence to bring Adams into our fold. Some have made the point that Hume also has his own agenda and the most to gain by moving Adams along -- although as the one closest to the violence, he also has the most to gain from peace.

State -- we don't have anything formal from State, although my informal discussions indicate State will most likely come out in support of the British position.

Congress -- We received a letter today to the President from Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Moynihan and Dodd urging him to grant the visa to Adams. "The United States cannot afford to ignore this possibility and miss this rare opportunity for our country to contribute to peace in Northern Ireland." Senator Kennedy also called Sandy Berger and said that while this was a tough call, we should grant him the visa. He mentioned the strength of Reynolds' push for giving him the visa and the fact that the Irish intelligence believes Adams is talking peace. Senator Lautenberg's office also called me to add his name to the Kennedy letter.

Speaker Foley also called Sandy today to urge us not to give Adams the visa until he has taken steps toward peace. He felt very strongly that it would send the wrong signals.

## OPTIONS

I believe most would agree that we ought to reach out to Adams and Sinn Fein/Adams in some fashion. Below are the options I can think of:

1. Publicly state that we will give Adams a visa once he unequivocally rejects violence (and perhaps joined peace process/accepted Joint Declaration)

Pros: Maintains our stance against terrorism, supports the British position, might encourage him in the right direction because it holds out the chance of coming to the US if he makes the right move. Would avoid alienating the Unionist community. Saves major carrot of visa.

Cons: Since the President has indicated he would review the visa in light of current events, a rejection that echoes the position of the British might increase the strength of the hard

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liners within the IRA. In addition, it might worsen Adams perceived need for something more than the Joint Declaration before he can make peace. A denial will anger the President's supporters from the campaign to whom he promised to give Adams a visa and disappoint those in Congress pushing for a visa. It might be difficult to define the term "unequivocally" or to know exactly when Adams had permanently given up on violence.

2. Provide a visa to Adams to attend the conference only, a one day visa that would limit his activities and exposure

Pros: Could help build up Adams within the IRA enough to enable him to renounce violence and negotiate seriously, would please campaign supporters and some in Congress.

Cons: Might provide Adams a forum to fundraise for the IRA and a platform to advance his cause without agreeing to renounce violence and join the peace process. Weakens stance against terrorism, might anger some in Congress and might provoke a Unionist backlash. Gives up major carrot of the U.S. for uncertain returns.

2a. Simultaneously reach out in some fashion, ie. a high profile meeting, with the Unionists in order to minimize the backlash. UUP leader James Molyneaux has quietly supported dialogue. Another possibility (proposed by State) is to provide NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.

*Don't expand?*

3. Agree to initiate US-Sinn Fein talks within the framework of the Joint Declaration only [NOTE: it has been US policy for at least 20 years not to talk to the Sinn Fein until they renounce the use of violence.]

Pros: Would reach out to the IRA while not giving into the symbolic and charged issue of the visa, would enable the US to determine for itself how serious Adams and the IRA are about making peace, could help bring the IRA to the peace table. Follows logically from British discussions with IRA and recent Irish ban on Sinn Fein broadcasts.

Cons: Even if very limited in scope, could undermine our anti-terrorism stance, unless coupled with similar talks with the Unionists could cause a backlash, would upset the British and perhaps some in Congress. Inconsistent with Irish ban on direct Sinn Fein contacts.

3a. Ask Adams into the Consulate or Embassy to discuss his commitment to peace and the joint declaration, thus avoiding a formal suspension of talking to Sinn Fein

4. Offer to host peace talks if the IRA (and Unionists) accepts the Joint Declaration and renounces violence

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Pros: By holding out the carrot of US sponsorship of a peace process, could enhance the confidence of the IRA and others in the process enough to bring them into the process.

Cons: Could commit the US to a lengthy negotiating process with uncertain ends, would annoy the British who resist any US role in the Northern Ireland issue, might not be enough to bring the IRA along.

4a. Offer to host the talks now, as a way to bring all parties on board

Cons: Prospects of success very difficult to predict.

5. Press the British to clarify the Joint Declaration and/or engage in direct talks with Sinn Fein

Pros: Would call the IRA's bluff on whether it really need clarification and thus whether it is serious about peace, would focus the issue on the substance of the gulf between the parties, would help demonstrate the willingness of the US to support the process and might break the logjam on getting the IRA to join the process.

Cons: Will annoy the British who might reject our request, could drag out the process if the IRA's demands simply increase.

6. Send a U.S. special envoy to press for peace

Pros: Could help increase confidence of all parties involved, could advance peace, would please campaign supporters who called for envoy and would fulfill campaign pledge.

Cons: Will be opposed by the British and employ political resources of the US in a difficult problem with no clear end or definably prospects for peace.

7. Attempt to do more to address the root causes of violence by increasing aid i.e., propose a US business/investment initiative working with OPIC and Commerce [State's idea]

Pros: Would enable the US to do something tangible in support of peace, especially if above steps were not taken.

Cons: We already have a robust \$20 million a year program of supporting the International Fund whose purpose is the same. Would raise real questions of absorption capacity.

8. Prayer Initiative (suggested by State and Ambassador Flynn) would involve working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, i.e., through a prayer breakfast in Washington

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~~SECRET~~

Pros: Would encourage dialogue among the factions, could perhaps be used as cover for private US government talks with parties. Would demonstrate US interest in the conflict.

Cons: Might be a failure, might be difficult to control.

cc: Sandy Berger, Jenonne Walker and Jane Holl

E

FBI Boston

1/14/94

Geary Adams

1969 IRA - McGuinnis Adams etc. unhappy w/ pace of efforts. Orange parade turned violent. British sent in troops, Catholics welcomed at the time they needed protection. Couldnt agree - well meet in 6 months, provisionally - thus the name.

Adams throwing bombs etc. - sole source  
74 - internment policy - rounded up + put in MAZE. Tried to escape twice. 3 yrs in prison.

77 release. Set up Northern Command group in N. Ireland respon. for carrying out Southern in S. + 7 man Council,  
→ Tom. Cahill, Adams, McGuinnis. + General Army convention / council. 86 last convention in Dublin. Come meets at least

quarterly, supposedly monthly.  
2 bombings recently, 8mas blowing up subway, Warrington, Shankill (Tom Beegley killed) since 12/15 seen numerous bombings shortly, RUC ambused last week,

2<sup>nd</sup> command in S, technical training, processing. My fundraising <sup>for bullet proof vest</sup> ~~relief~~ Clouday, Arizona, obtain heavily thru drug deals, W. Coast radar jamming, 82 - \$42-1 million to IRA, now \$100,000 \$150 ahead - Adams plans denials



Embargo shut off route to Libya → ICA.

Paisley - Dem. Union Party, extremist but  
not involved in violence.

never publicly associated w/ violence in same way  
Adams. ~~Renounced~~ violence.

What impact?

Recent gov responded to Joint Deal

If let in, undermine UK + balance, & support for ICA

might hurt our terrorism efforts by shutting off  
sources of let Adams in same time

& substantial increase in fundraising.

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F(1.44)  
KBH 4/11/2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Jan-1994 17:58 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

M. Brooke Darby ( DARBY )  
Betty A. Marshall ( MARSHALL )

FROM: Julien D. LeBourgeois  
(LEBOURGEOIS)

SUBJECT: More on Gerry Adams

For Brooke: Update on our earlier conversations today.  
Please pass to Nancy.

For Betty: Please pass to Jane.

State Departement (Mike Parmly of EUR/NE) told me today that Christopher and Hurd had met, with the latter stating it would not be useful for Gerry Adams to get a visa to the U.S. State feels the same way, at least until he has renounced terrorism and made a commitment to peace. Up for discussion is how best to convey this message.

Embassy Dublin's indication that Adams might soon come to the Embassy to apply for a visa with the press in tow has yielded to the impression that he is -- more circumspectly -- taking soundings of what the U.S. reaction would be if/if he applies.

CC: Records  
CC: Records

( RECORDS )  
( RECORDS )

To Home

We are concerned about ~~the~~ three ~~bomb threats~~ <sup>bomb threats</sup> in San Diego reported to have been ~~made~~ <sup>conducted</sup> by ~~the~~ <sup>So. California</sup> U.K. ~~authorities~~

We are inclined to issue him a US\$ for the conference only; but given this latest report it is difficult for us to do so absent a condemnation of the San Diego threat.

Please approach Adams if + ask him if would renounce/denounce/condemn the San Diego actions and state the U.K. had no link to do with them. ~~to~~ ~~not~~ ~~denounce~~ ~~any~~ <sup>all</sup> <sup>and actions</sup> threats against ~~the~~ innocent civilians anywhere.

It would be important for him if ~~at all possible~~ <sup>if possible</sup> ~~pers him~~ <sup>pers him</sup> also to condemn the recent Oxford Street bombings as well as

We also ~~hope~~ <sup>hope</sup> ~~arg~~ <sup>arg</sup> him to ~~renounce~~ <sup>renounce</sup>

Summary

U.S. influence on the peace process is limited. The Administration has effectively supported the process through two well-received Presidential statements. In the effort to bring Sinn Fein into the peace process, the prospect of a U.S. visa for Gerry Adams -- if he participates in the peace process -- might have a marginal impact on Adams' actions. While the President has already highlighted that linkage, contact with Adams if/when he applies for a U.S. visa would allow us to underline the point. The U.S. must be careful, in any interaction with Gerry Adams, not to alienate the moderate Unionists; the U.S. could contribute to efforts to reduce that community's isolation. (A U.S. investment/business promotion initiative would also show our concern and help address conditions in Northern Ireland which feed violence.) Working with the Catholic and Protestant church leaders on an initiative would also raise our profile.

Sinn Fein/Gerry Adams

A primary objective of the Reynolds-Major peace initiative has been to induce the IRA and their political allies in Sinn Fein to halt the terrorist violence. The prospect of a visa for Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams might provide marginal enticement to Adams/Sinn Fein to lay down their arms and join the peace process. However, to be effective, that visa must only be a response to actions on Adams' part, not an enticement with hopes of future Adams' actions. To underline the clarity of the President's message in the December 22 Irish Times, a meeting of the Consul General with Adams when he applies for a visa might be useful. The CG could underline the President's message: renounce violence unambiguously and join the process, and the U.S. would be prepared to consider a waiver of Adams' ineligibility.

Helping Break Unionist Isolation

We must anticipate that Adams will exploit any contact to his own ends. Partly for that reason, care must be taken not to alienate the already-isolated Unionist community. Several actions might be considered. Enhanced dialogue with UUP leader James Molyneaux, who has been quietly supportive of the peace process, would highlight our desire to engage all elements in Northern Ireland. NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties, which we believe has been approved in principle, to match our support for the Catholic SDLP, would also help.

Business Promotion

The depressed economic conditions of key areas of Northern Ireland, and the resultant impact on popular attitudes (especially youth) would make a U.S. business/investment promotion initiative particularly welcome. We already fund IFI projects, and should continue to do so. The Department of Commerce and OPIC could be mobilized to undertake similar initiatives.

Prayer Initiative

Working with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together, including, e.g., through a prayer breakfast in Washington, would raise our profile and support the Anglo-Irish efforts.

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KBM 4/11/2023

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

January 11, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland

~~to be discussed~~  
wants not object  
(and may see value)  
"fine" w/ him but  
up to U.S.

Some developments in the Gerry Adams visa case you should be aware of:

... from  
bar on IRA - political rep. from  
The IRA got HOLL's name  
allow pictures but not review

-- We have heard informally that Adams will apply for a visa in the next week or so (~~it is possible even by the end of this week~~) in order to accept an invitation to come to the U.S. on January 26 as part of a program to permit all parties to the Northern Ireland dispute to air their positions (at the invitation of William Flynn, Chairman of the Board of Mutual of America Life Insurance Company).

-- The Irish ~~have been pushing~~ us to grant Adams a visa and use the opportunity to pressure him to accept the December 15 Joint Declaration. The British have opposed granting the visa in advance of Adams' renunciation of violence and demonstrated intent to carry through.

-- Embassy Dublin has heard that in the NATO bilateral between the President and Prime Minister Major that Major "accepted our proposal on Northern Ireland," and that now there is talk in Dublin of "a U.S. proposal" regarding next steps on Northern Ireland.

What we would propose is the following:

possible noises were made  
on our part  
2 Dec  
Paris  
in

-- When Adams' applies for a visa, use the occasion to engage him in a dialogue regarding his intent with respect to the December 15 declaration.

-- The Consul General would underline the President's message of December 22 in the Irish Times, and make explicit to Adams that we would be prepared to grant a waiver of his visa request if he would renounce violence and join the peace process.

-- If Adams' accepts our terms, we would issue ~~the visa~~ <sup>a one time visa waiver</sup>.  
[[actions we might take to keep pressure on him to follow through with his pledge.]]

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*indicate that we were paid to issue  
2  
content*

- If Adams balks and goes public with our discussions, we would
- We would also have to ensure that we do not alienate the Unionist community. Actions we might take include:
  - Engage UUP leader James Molyneaux -- who has been quietly supportive of the peace process -- in an enhanced dialogue.
  - Consider NDI funding for moderate Unionist political parties to match our support for the Catholic SDLP.
  - Propose a U.S. business/investment initiative, working with OPIC and Commerce.
- We could also work with the Catholic and Anglican/Protestant Church leaders on an initiative to bring the communities together (e.g., via a high profile prayer breakfast in Washington).

(In related developments, apparently both Prime Minister Reynolds and John Hume have registered their dissatisfactions that their conversations with Jean Kennedy Smith have been leaked -- Reynolds heard accounts of his talks with Smith from the British Ambassador in Dublin, and Hume was upset that Ray Flynn apparently had "all the cables" of his discussions with Smith.)

Recommendation

If you approve this strategy, we will discuss this issue with State and develop a memorandum for the President's decision.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Made every effort  
+ he would  
have more.*

*228  
Public  
a strategy for leaf.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cleared 12/29/13 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH Wor DRAFT Ken  
CLEAR 1 Ken 2 Ken  
3 — 4 — 5 pm  
6 — 7 pm 8 pm

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2011-0355-F (1.52)  
KBH 4/11/2023

EUR, EUR/NE

IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

IMMEDIATE LONDON

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY OXMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, CVIS, EI, UK

SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA ISSUE

REF: A) DUBLIN 7365 (NOTAL) B) DUBLIN 7366  
C) DUBLIN 7396 (NOTAL)

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY REPORTS ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS, SEAN O'HUIGINN, AND JOHN HUME (REFTELS). WE AGREE WITH PRIME MINISTER REYNOLDS THAT ISSUANCE OF A VISA SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF BEING HELPFUL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THAT IS THE CLEAR MESSAGE BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 22 COMMENTS TO THE IRISH TIMES, WHERE HE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF GERRY ADAMS' RESPONSE TO THE REYNOLDS-MAJOR INITIATIVE.

2. THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO GERRY ADAMS. [IF HE RENOUNCES VIOLENCE AND TAKES STEPS TO JOIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE RATIONALE FOR A WAIVER THE NEXT TIME HE APPLIES FOR A U.S. VISA.] GRANTING GERRY ADAMS A VISA IS ONE OF THE MOST VISIBLE PIECES OF LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO USE WITH SINN FEIN/PIRA TO ENCOURAGE THEIR JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WANT TO BE SURE, AS

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2

SEAN O'HUIGINN PUT IT SO APTLY TO YOU, THAT WE "MAXIMIZE REWARDS." WE HOPE THE CARROT OF A U.S. VISA WILL PROVIDE ADDED INCENTIVE TO GERRY ADAMS TO MOVE AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. YY

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INITIALS

APPR:	WC	_____
DRAFT:	DR	_____
OTHER:	PT	_____
OTHER:	MP	_____
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**PER E.O. 13526**  
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P:DARUSSELL/EUR/NE:JTEFFT:PAM  
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 THE SECRETARY

P:PTARNOFF  
 CA:MRYAN  
 S/CT:BBODINE  
 S/S-0:

EUR:MAPETERS  
 NSC:  
 S/S

IMMEDIATE                    DUBLIN, LONDON IMMEDIATE

LONDON - PLEASE PASS TO BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: CVIS, PREL, IR, UK

SUBJECT: GERRY ADAMS VISA REQUEST

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS ACTION MESSAGE FOR DUBLIN OR BELFAST.
3. CONSUL GENERAL AT EMBASSY DUBLIN SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITH GERRY ADAMS TO DISCUSS HIS VISA APPLICATION. IF ADAMS HAS RETURNED TO BELFAST, CONSUL GENERAL AT CG BELFAST SHOULD CONTACT ADAMS AND CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION.
4. THE CONSUL GENERAL AT THE ACTION POST SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ADAMS:
  - WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING YOUR VISA APPLICATION.
  - IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR WASHINGTON TO KNOW IF YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT:
    - YOU PERSONALLY RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND URGE ~~ALL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*will walk to that end;*  
*2*      *+ But*

*seek an*

~~PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO DO SO NOW; THAT SINN  
FEIN AND THE IRA ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN  
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE CONFLICT IN  
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THAT THE JOINT DECLARATION  
REPRESENTS THE BASIS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS.~~

*(basis of the*

-- SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD HELP WASHINGTON CLARIFY YOUR  
VIEWS AND DETERMINE WHETHER A WAIVER OF YOUR  
INELIGIBILITY WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.

5. POSTS SHOULD REPORT ADAMS' REACTION BY IMMEDIATE  
CABLE. POSTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE  
HOST GOVERNMENTS OR THE PRESS. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE  
GOI AND HNG ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY.

YY

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SODERBERG, LEBOURGEOIS, NSC, SUM2, VAX, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 141545Z SEP 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7843

RUEHDC/USDOC WASHDC  
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2053

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 014600

COMMERCE FOR USDOC/4000/AS/IEP/CMEISSNER  
AND USDOC/4200/DAS/EUR/PVARGO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, EAID, EFIN, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HELP THE NORTHERN IRELAND  
PEACE PROCESS: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

REF: (A) STATE 244940 (B) 93 LONDON 22850 (C) LONDON  
14240

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS: EMBASSY APPRECIATES OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER ITS VIEWS ON WAYS THE USG COULD SHOW ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH CONGEN BELFAST. EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL VISIT BELFAST AT THE END OF THE MONTH TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WITH A FOCUS ON WAYS TO PROMOTE PRIVATE INVESTMENT. PLEASE LET US KNOW BY COB SEPTEMBER 26 IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INTERESTS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE EMBASSY OFFICERS TO ADDRESS DURING THIS VISIT.
3. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING U.S. INITIATIVES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY AND PROMOTE JOB GROWTH:
  - INVESTMENT CONFERENCE AND MISSION;
  - INCREASED FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) AND ACTION TO EXPEDITE IFI'S WORK AND ALLOW DIRECT PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS;

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- DIRECT AIR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES;
- TOURISM PROMOTION;
- AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE; AND
- TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION.

WE DO NOT THINK IT LIKELY THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO OFFER TAX BREAKS FOR INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

4. IN FORMULATING U.S. INITIATIVES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN MIND, IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO FOSTER TRUST AND COOPERATION FROM THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY. TO THIS END, USG SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AVOID MEASURES THAT TREAT THE ISLAND AS A UNIT OR SUGGEST THAT THE USG DOES NOT CONSIDER THE PROVINCE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE UK. THAT SAID, ENHANCED ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (OR JOINT APPROACHES TO SOMETHING LIKE TOURISM) COULD BE A USEFUL ELEMENT IN THE REVITALIZATION OF THE REGION'S ECONOMY. END SUMMARY

#### UK INCOME TAX REDUCTION

---

5. REF A ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE PRACTICALITY OF ENCOURAGING THE UK TO OFFER A LIMITED TAX EXEMPTION OR REDUCTION ON INCOME TAX FOR COMPANIES LOCATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY SUCH MEASURE WOULD BE ENACTED FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

-- THE LARGE UK BUDGET DEFICIT, CURRENTLY RUNNING AT ABOUT SIX PERCENT OF GDP, RESULTS IN STRONG RESISTANCE TO TAX CUTS OF ANY SORT.

-- THERE IS ALREADY A NET UK SUBSIDY OF 4.5 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR TO THE PROVINCE, SO THERE IS LITTLE INCLINATION TO PROVIDE MORE. THIS INCLUDES OUTRIGHT GRANTS TO PROMOTE OUTSIDE INVESTMENT.

-- HM TREASURY STRONGLY OPPOSES DIFFERENT TAX RATES FOR ONE DISADVANTAGED REGION SINCE THERE ARE MANY OTHER AREAS THAT COULD QUALIFY. MOREOVER, TAX BREAKS LACK TRANSPARENCY, DISTORT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PRESENT TAX ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS.

-- DIFFERENTIAL CORPORATE (OR INDIVIDUAL) TAX RATES FOR NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REQUIRE FREESTANDING LEGISLATION IN THE PARLIAMENT. MP'S FROM EVERY OTHER DISADVANTAGED AREA IN THE UK WOULD CLAMOR FOR TAX BREAKS FOR THEIR CONSTITUENTS.

-- FINALLY, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANYTHING BUT A VERY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LARGE TAX PREFERENCE WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN ATTRACTING NEW INVESTMENT. FOREIGN INVESTORS ALREADY FIND THE UK ONE OF THE MOST ATTRACTIVE SITES IN EUROPE EVEN WITH THE CURRENT CORPORATE TAX RATE OF 33 PERCENT. A REDUCTION TO THE TOP U.S. CORPORATE RATE OF 30 PERCENT WOULD ONLY PROVIDE MARGINAL BENEFIT TO U.S. FIRMS.

#### EXISTING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

6. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE WE HAVE EXAMINED EXISTING UK INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF NORTHERN IRELAND (IDB) OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE INWARD INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND TRADEABLE SERVICES:

- CAPITAL GRANTS UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE COST OF THE PROJECT;
- TRAINING GRANTS;
- RENT GRANTS UP TO FIVE YEARS; AND
- INTEREST RELIEF GRANTS TO OFFSET INTEREST COSTS.

7. FISCAL 1993-94 (APRIL 1993 - MARCH 1994) WAS IDB'S MOST SUCCESSFUL YEAR SINCE 1982 WITH 13 INVESTMENTS TOTALING 260 MILLION POUNDS STERLING (413 MILLION DOLLARS), OF WHICH IDB GRANTS ACCOUNTED FOR 64 MILLION POUNDS (102 MILLION DOLLARS).

#### INVESTMENT PROMOTION

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8. THE END OF VIOLENCE SHOULD ITSELF REMOVE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO INVESTMENT. THE U.S. SHOULD REINFORCE THIS BY EXPLORING MEANS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION IN THE REGION. THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS IS PROBABLY BY MAKING BUSINESS MORE AWARE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INVESTMENT CONFERENCES AND MISSIONS. IDB OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT FULLY 24 OF THE 38 U.S. FIRMS PRESENTLY ACTIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND DECIDED TO INVEST THERE BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS, BOTH PROMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL, OF THE IDB. (THESE U.S. FIRMS EMPLOY ,000 WORKERS AND HAVE INVESTED OVER 850 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS.)

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9. WE BELIEVE A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS WINTER OR NEXT SPRING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPARK INCREASED INTEREST WITHIN THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY. MANY OF THE U.S. FIRMS ALREADY OPERATING IN NORTHERN IRELAND COULD SHARE THEIR POSITIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROVINCE'S HIGHLY-EDUCATED AND MOTIVATED WORKFORCE. A HIGH-LEVEL INVESTMENT MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE U.S. AFTER SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. AMCHAMS AND MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATIONS IN THE U.S., UK AND IRELAND SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND  
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10. WE CONSIDER THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND (IFI) THE BEST WAY TO CHANNEL NEW USG FINANCIAL RESOURCES SINCE IT IS TRUSTED BY BOTH RECIPIENTS AND DONORS, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS. IT HAS PROVED ITSELF EFFECTIVE IN PUTTING RESOURCES DIRECTLY IN THE HANDS OF PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE PRIORITIES AND HAS EIGHT YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN VETTING PROJECTS AND MONITORING RESULTS. MOREOVER, IF SOME NEW FOCUS OR ACCELERATION OF SPENDING IS DESIRED, A SPECIAL FACILITY COULD PROBABLY BE CREATED FOR THAT PURPOSE. BRITISH OFFICIALS, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE CRITICIZED IFI'S SLOW RESPONSE TIME, BUT WE SEE NO REASON WHY A CONCERTED EFFORT ON OUR PART COULD NOT SPEED UP THE PROCESS.

11. IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO REVISE THE IFI TO ALLOW DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS. DOING SO COULD INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS AND SUPPORT FOR ITS ACTIVITIES.

NEED FOR DIRECT AIR LINK WITH U.S.  
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12. WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK THAT IN VIRTUALLY EVERY DISCUSSION REGARDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVINCE'S ECONOMY OUR INTERLOCUTORS EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR DIRECT IR SERVICE FROM THE UNITED STATES. SUCH AN AIR LINK IS WIDELY SEEN AS CRUCIAL TO ATTRACTING BOTH POTENTIAL INVESTORS AND TOURISTS.

13. CURRENTLY ONE SMALL U.S. CARRIER, AMERICAN TRANSAIR, FLIES BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S. THE WEEKLY (BIWEEKLY IN SUMMER) FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK LANDS IN BELFAST, CONTINUES TO RIGA, LATVIA, AND RETURNS BY THE SAME ROUTE. NO U.K. CARRIER PRESENTLY OPERATES A DIRECT FLIGHT BETWEEN BELFAST AND THE U.S., ALTHOUGH THE U.K. COULD ADD BELFAST AS AN ADDITIONAL GATEWAY UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

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14. AIRLINE COMPANIES, OF COURSE, MUST THEMSELVES DECIDE ON COMMERCIAL GROUNDS WHETHER POTENTIAL TRAFFIC FROM OTHER U.S. GATEWAYS WOULD WARRANT SERVICE. IN THE NEXT ROUND OF CIVIL AVIATION TALKS WITH HMG, THE USG COULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CHARTERS AND "EXTRA-BILATERAL" SCHEDULED SERVICES TO BELFAST. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO NEGOTIATE FULL 5TH FREEDOM TRAFFIC RIGHTS.

#### TOURISM PROMOTION

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15. MOST ANALYSTS CONSIDER THE TOURISM INDUSTRY TO BE THE BEST PROSPECT FOR MUCH NEEDED NEAR-TERM JOB CREATION. TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAVE WREAKED HAVOC ON THE PROVINCE'S TOURISM INDUSTRY.

16. TOURISM EARNINGS CONTRIBUTE ONLY 1.5 PERCENT TO THE REGION'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, COMPARED TO 5.6 PERCENT IN THE REST OF THE BRITISH ISLES. WHILE OVER 1.2 MILLION TOURISTS VISITED NORTHERN IRELAND LAST YEAR, TOURISM OFFICIALS TELL US OF THEIR CONCERN THAT MOST WERE VISITING RELATIVES (AND THEREFORE NOT STAYING IN HOTELS) OR ON BUSINESS TRIPS. THEY EXPECT PEACE WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE NUMBERS COMING PURELY FOR HOLIDAYS, WHO NOW ONLY ACCOUNT FOR 20 PERCENT OF VISITORS, COMPARED TO 49 PERCENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND 44 PERCENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. SUCH "PURE HOLIDAY MAKERS" SPEND FAR MORE PER PERSON ON LODGING, MEALS AND SIGHTSEEING.

17. A RECENT REPORT FROM THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (CBI) ESTIMATES THAT THE TOURISM INDUSTRY COULD GENERATE AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 JOBS IN THE SHORT TERM AND UP TO 10,000 BY THE END OF THE DECADE, A NUMBER EQUIVALENT TO ROUGHLY HALF THE JOBS EXPECTED TO BE LOST IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

18. USG INITIATIVES IN THIS SECTOR MIGHT INCLUDE TOURISM PROMOTION AT INVESTOR CONFERENCES AND INCREASED FUNDING FOR PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND, TO IMPROVE THE TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONGRESS IS NEGATIVE ABOUT TOURISM PROJECTS (REF C) SO WE WOULD HAVE

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TO TRY AND CHANGE THEIR VIEWS ON THIS.)

AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE  
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19. NORTHERN IRELAND'S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR IS RELATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN VIRTUALLY ANY OTHER REGION OF THE UK, ACCOUNTING FOR SEVEN PERCENT OF GDP AND 10 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT. AS A RESULT, IT IS THREE TIMES MORE IMPORTANT TO THE ECONOMY OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAN IS THE CASE FOR THE UK AS A WHOLE. AS NORTHERN IRELAND HAS A POPULATION OF ONLY 1.5 MILLION, THE AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY RELIES HEAVILY ON EXPORTS.

20. NORTHERN IRELAND RECENTLY APPLIED FOR USDA APPROVAL FOR ITS SLAUGHTERHOUSES TO EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES. A TEAM FROM USDA'S FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE IS PLANNING TO VISIT NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO EXPEDITING THE APPROVAL PROCESS.

21. ANOTHER POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVE COULD INVOLVE DEVELOPING A PROGRAM SIMILAR TO SECTION 1420 OF THE 1985 FARM BILL WHICH PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. AGRIBUSINESS ALSO SHOULD BE MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY INVESTMENT MISSION.

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION  
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22. ONE AVENUE FOR ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AREA WOULD INVOLVE ESTABLISHING COLLABORATION AMONG "TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CENTERS" THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN SET UP IN THE U.S. AND NORTHERN IRELAND. MARY GOOD, USDOC UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECHNOLOGY, EXPLORED THIS POSSIBILITY DURING HER VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND IN JUNE.

CROWE  
BT  
#4600

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<^TOR>940914115246 M1251992  
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03  
<^SSN>4600

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

To Kately -  
Could we get

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

State to do a background paper on the issues relating to the framework document. Include

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

text of articles 213 of Irish Const. + analysis of what is at issue re act of '20.

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0008  
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2277  
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 017119

Lets discuss I'm not sure I know what the issues are re: the framework document + where we go from here.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UK EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: MAYHEW CAUTIONS THAT FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE AGREED

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT BREAKFAST WITH THE AMBASSADOR OCTOBER 28, NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW CAUTIONED US NOT TO ASSUME AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON THE ANGLO-IRISH "FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" FOR NEW ALL-PARTY TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. EVERYONE WANTED AGREEMENT, BUT THE REMAINING PROBLEMS WERE VERY DIFFICULT.

3. MAYHEW CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY AREAS OF DIFFERENCE WERE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (ARTICLES TWO AND THREE OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT OF 1920), THE SCOPE OF NEW CROSS-BORDER INSTITUTIONS, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN UNION. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE: THEY HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE, BUT WERE THE HIGHEST CARD REYNOLDS HAD TO PLAY, AND HE WAS UNDERSTANDABLY HOLDING OUT FOR THE MAXIMUM PAYOFF.

4. CROSS-BORDER INSTITUTIONS WERE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, MAYHEW SAID. THE IRISH WANTED TO SET UP FREE-STANDING, NON-ACCOUNTABLE BODIES WITH EXTENSIVE POWERS. THE UNIONISTS COULD NOT SWALLOW THIS, AND HMG ALSO HAD PROBLEMS WITH IT. THE BRITISH IDEA WAS TO START MODESTLY, WITH LIMITED POWERS DELEGATED TO BODIES FOCUSING ON AREAS OF UNQUESTIONED COMMON INTEREST. AS THESE PROVED THEIR WORTH AND UNIONISTS GREW COMFORTABLE WITH THEM, MORE BODIES AND POWERS COULD BE ADDED. MAYHEW WONDERED WHETHER THE USG COULD QUIETLY SUPPORT THIS "COMMON LAW" APPROACH IN DISCUSSIONS WITH IRISH LEADERS.

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PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0355-F (1.53)  
KBH 7/11/2023

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

5. FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT, MAYHEW ACKNOWLEDGED, WOULD BE A "VERY CONSIDERABLE SETBACK" TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WITHOUT A FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, THERE COULD BE NO NEW ALL-PARTY TALKS. HMG WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK BILATERALLY WITH DUBLIN AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PARTIES, AND COULD MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN INDIVIDUAL AREAS, BUT THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IF THERE WERE TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

6. COMMENT: MAYHEW'S CAUTION IS A USEFUL ANTIDOTE TO THE CURRENT GENERAL EUPHORIA. WE STILL THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAN NOT THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED -- THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS WOULD BE SEVERE. BUT WE ALSO SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REMAINING HURDLES, AND SHOULD EXPECT FURTHER LOBBYING FROM BOTH SIDES. CROWE

BT  
#7119

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<MSGID> M1331698

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: SIT SODERBERG

SIT: NSC STEPHENS SUM SUM2 VAX VERSHBOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 281627Z OCT 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6475  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2429  
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 005895

NSC FOR VERSHBOW AND SODERBERG FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR A/S HOLBROOKE AND EUR/NE

LONDON PLS PASS BELFAST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: IRISH UPSET BY PERCEIVED BRITISH SLIGHT AT  
FORUM

REF: (A) LONDON 16940  
(B) DUBLIN 05843

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND  
RECONCILIATION ON OCTOBER 28 (SEPTTEL), DPA ANGLO-IRISH  
DIVISION HEAD SEAN O'HUIGINN TOLD ME THAT:

-- IRISH OFFICIALS ARE "VERY UPSET" OVER BRITISH AMBASSADOR  
BLATHERWICK'S AND M.P. PETER TEMPLE-MORRIS' REFUSAL TO  
ATTEND THE OPENING SESSION OF THE FORUM. THE IRISH  
CONSIDER THEIR REFUSAL A "SLAP IN THE FACE" SINCE IT  
APPEARS THE BRITISH WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO HIGHLIGHT  
THEIR DISTASTE FOR THE FORUM. (ALL MEMBERS OF THE  
DIPLOMATIC CORPS WERE INVITED TO ATTEND THIS OPENING  
SESSION. NO AMBASSADOR WAS UNDER ANY OBLIGATION TO SPEAK  
TO PARTICIPANTS.)

-- THE IRISH DO NOT KNOW WHY MAJOR REFUSED TO ALLOW  
BLATHERWICK TO ATTEND. SOME ARE SPECULATING THAT MAJOR IS  
FOLLOWING A DUAL TRACK, I.E., SAYING ONE THING WHILE DOING  
ANOTHER, PERHAPS FROM A DESIRE TO HOLD THINGS UP UNTIL  
CLOSER TO THE NEXT BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION.

*Kasly-  
Did all but  
the British attend?  
ms*

Saudy -

Here's all you should need  
on Ireland. I've left a "to do history"  
with Kathy Stevens who will work it  
up for the press tomorrow.

I forgot to fill you in on ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> TL pointer I  
mentioned earlier. He is intrigued by Studeman's  
suggestion that we covertly lift the Bosnian  
arms embargo & asked that we look at  
it very quietly. I've conveyed to Vershlow &  
he'll work up a proposal.

Kathy Stevens is fully up to speed. I'll  
call in.

MS

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2011-0355-F (1.58)  
KRM 4/11/2023

NEAL WOLIN FYI

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG

SUBJECT: Northern Ireland: Sinn Fein Officials Arrive,  
IRA Statement Predicted for August 31

Sinn Fein officials Joe Cahill and Patrick Treanor arrived in New York mid-day August 30. Cahill refused to talk to the press at the airport, saying he was on a "private visit." The visa story will likely receive extensive press treatment in Britain and Ireland tomorrow, though it will be overshadowed by the IRA announcement, if it comes tomorrow, as now expected. If the IRA statement warrants it, the President should consider issuing a statement welcoming the breakthrough and perhaps telephoning Reynolds and Major as well.

Cahill and Treanor agreed they would not engage in fund-raising in the U.S., that they would adhere to a set itinerary (which includes stops in New York, Connecticut, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago) and that they would depart immediately if the anticipated announcement by the IRA does not reflect a commitment to the total cessation of violence. In any event, their departure must take place no later than September 4.

Predictably, the visa issuances have made the Unionists, already fearful of a "British sell-out," even more jittery. I tried unsuccessfully to reach Ulster Unionist Party leader James Molyneaux today by telephone but left word emphasizing our desire to maintain an active dialogue with the Unionist community. Molyneaux will be meeting with Bill Crowe in London on Thursday.

There is speculation in the press about what the U.S. is prepared to do should there be a breakthrough in Northern Ireland. We are preparing a package of options for you to consider in such an event, including such ideas as convening a Presidential Conference on Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland, increasing the annual U.S. contribution to the International Fund for Ireland and creating an "America House" in Belfast under USIA auspices. While some of these steps would require new funding from Congress or other legislative initiatives, the watershed event of an IRA renunciation of violence, if it occurs, could provide a unique opportunity for such an initiative.

Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith tried to reach the President by telephone today. We have talked with her on his behalf, but

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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should he decide to telephone her, she can be reached in Dublin at the Embassy, 353-1-6687122, or at her residence, 353-1-677-0101/3506.

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EYES ONLY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING CABLE FROM NANCY SODERBERG TO  
AMBASSADOR CROWE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

RATHER THAN WAKE YOU AGAIN, I THOUGHT I'D GIVE YOU AN UPDATE IN  
WRITING. OUR VISITORS SEEM TO HAVE ARRIVED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND  
SO FAR HAVE DECLINED TO TAKE QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS. THE VISA  
WAIVER LEAKED MID AFTERNOON HERE BUT THE REACTION SEEMS TO BE  
FAIRLY STRAIGHT FORWARD SO FAR. I TRUST YOU RECEIVED OUR PRESS  
GUIDANCE.

REGARDING THE EXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE IRA, OUR BEST  
INFORMATION INDICATES THAT IT WILL COME ON WEDNESDAY. ONCE WE  
HAVE SEEN THE TEXT, THE PRESIDENT MAY WANT TO CALL PRIME MINISTER  
MAJOR. ASSUMING THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS WHAT WE EXPECT, WE WILL ALSO  
WANT TO ISSUE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND WILL BE SURE TO  
CONSULT WITH YOU FIRST.

TONY LAKE CALLED MOLYNEAUX BUT HE HAD LEFT FOR LONDON. HE HAD A  
BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH THE PARTY SECRETARY JIM WILSON AND  
CONVEYED THE POINTS WE HAD DISCUSSED. MR. WILSON SEEMED  
DELIGHTED BY THE CALL AND INDICATED THAT SOME OF THEIR OFFICIALS  
WERE IN FACT CONSIDERING A VISIT TO THE U.S. BUT THEY WERE  
UNDECIDED BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. YOU MAY HEAR MORE IN  
YOUR MEETING ON THURSDAY. MOLYNEAUX HAS NOT CALLED US BACK BUT  
WE'LL LET YOU KNOW IF WE HEAR FROM HIM. WILSON SAID MOLYNEAUX  
WAS IN A BUOYANT MOOD AND THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE THE PRIME  
MINISTER THIS WEEK. HE MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT MEETING IS  
NOT PUBLIC.

I AM OFF TO THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT OF PANAMA BUT  
SANDY BERGER, SANDY VERSHBOW AND/OR KATHY STEPHENS WILL BE  
HANDLING THE ISSUE AND WILL BE IN TOUCH. LET'S HOPE THINGS WORK  
OUT!

BEST REGARDS,

NANCY

October 3, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

FROM: BROOKE DARBY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: Telephone Call Between Nancy Soderberg and Gerry Adams (1st Official Contact Between U.S. Official and Sinn Fein Representative)

3:25 - 4:15 P.M., SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1994

- Hi, Nancy Soderberg here.
- Yeah, nice to meet you by phone.
- Likewise, how's the trip going?
- Who do you think was behind the murder attempt and other....?
- When was that?
- Yeah, it's something I've been following for a long time when I was with Senator Kennedy's Office -- plastic bullets and shoot to kill. It's something people here have a long standing issue with the British over.
- Yeah, he told me about it.
- OK, I'll pass that on.
- I think he has every intention of continuing to do that.
- This is a very naughty thing.
- Let me tell you where we are on your trip to D.C. I know you've been talking to Niall (O'Dowd) -- who has been great. He's really first class and can keep things to himself -- which is all too rare.

I think he's filled you in on where we are on the meeting. It's problematic. What we trying to do is balance your needs with those of the British and the Unionists so we can push all sides to move forward to help those who have taken courageous steps, including yourself.

-- This should have been handled differently.

You got some misinformation in the beginning.

-- We didn't get into the process until your trip was already planned. It was important for you to keep to your original itinerary but it was not the best timing for us.

-- It is hard for you to understand our nuances of bureaucracy.

-- We wanted to try to keep our strong support of you and our good relations with the Unionists and British to allow us to push them forward.

-- What was important was that you maintained your timeframe and we appreciated the political sensitivities of the British and Unionists given the short timeframe between timing since the ceasefire.

To keep the British from going off the deep end, we needed you to come and to calibrate the reciprocity of who you'd see in D.C. with the distance from the ceasefire -- the longer away you get from the ceasefire, the higher level the visit. You would be received at a level commensurate with how long it is away from the ceasefire.

For you to come for 2 weeks with your itinerary, be received by Members of Congress, meet with people at State and from the White House, announce the lifting of the ban.....

-- The President's goal is to support you strongly and keep us in a position to push the British when we need to.

-- I appreciate that.

-- That's true, right.

-- That's why we were thinking your visit would be further down the road so we could work it out ahead of time.

-- I would have wanted to avoid this situation.

-- The context of how the people here view the situation -- that's the fundamental problem and why we want to put distance at receiving at this level. There needs to be a time lag between coming to the White House and renouncing violence.

-- . Let me tell you the politics.

-- There is a strong culture in the U.S. against those involved in violence.

It was two years from the time the PLO announced violence that they came here.

-- It was a major heavy lift to get the visa.

-- That's not how people look at it here.

-- Yes, you've done what we asked and made a courageous step forward.

-- Here, the ultimate prestige presence is the prestige of walking through the White House doors needs to be calibrated as part of a process we're getting moving.

-- We've done a lot getting you here, lifting the ban, getting you meetings with Administration officials. We support you politically and are sending strong support and visible acceptance.

-- This is part of a process. First you get received officially. We went through this with the President last night. He said we can do more next time -- that this is part of a process.

-- We know the problem is with the Unionists and with Hume having met with the President. But the Unionists are seen as not involved in violence.

-- I said we should have had this done 3 weeks ago and told people that we wanted to avoid this kind of discussion.

-- There are a couple of ways to look at this. Part of it is how the press is playing it up because we haven't been able to say what we're doing.

-- I think this situation is unfortunate but we are where we are. We spend about six hours yesterday on this. None of us are comfortable on this but we're trying to make the best of it.

-- Niall has been extraordinarily helpful.

-- With respect to how we play this -- I want to announce the ban is lifted on talking to Sinn Fein and the meeting with you at the State Department in a White House press release. They'll be regular meetings in Belfast and Dublin and dialogues with you directly. You'll be able to present your

case at the State Department. It will be useful for you to develop a dialogue with the State Department who does the diplomacy (not just with me).

- My only rebuttal is that I understand the situation. But this is the beginning of the relationship and of a process. You have the support of the White House and we are pushing the other parties.
- We got jammed on your planning your trip before we could work it.
- Tony Lake negotiated with Major on how to keep them on board. It is important to coordinate your trip with making decisions on where and by whom you'd be received. To go back against the British will undercut us in going back to the British on some of the things you may need.
- They're in a bind.
- This should have been worked out well before you got on a plane.
- I did. I was pretty clear.
- I heard the Belfast thing didn't go too well. Niall mentioned that, which is unfortunate.
- In Val's defense, that was State's formal instructions -- he had no choice.
- We wanted to clearly work out the fundraising issue before you got here.
- My best advice is -- this is a bad situation. It's unfortunate and should have been avoided. But now you have 2 choices: to agree to a meeting or not.

If you agree, we can talk to the Unionists and Major and keep Alderdice away. We can make a big deal of lifting the ban and the meeting with White House and State people, including the Vice President's National Security Advisor.

The Vice President has been very helpful. Without him, you wouldn't have gotten the visa in February.

- It is a worse negative to have no meeting. They can say they've won -- that there's friction between us.

- Or we can say this is part of a process. We can get our press operation to make this a big deal.
- You don't want to minimize the magnitude of your walking in the doors of the State Department and letting our press operation work it.
- I recommend announcing this as soon as possible. I can't say anything now. I don't want to say anything until you've agreed.
- The difference is and this is where you have credibility -- they have had a dialogue with us for some time, so they have meetings with us at a higher level.

But this is a first step and we can the press to spin this. This is the first time we've talked to you in 25 years. That's no minor action.

- I understand the problems with the Unionist access.
- You're beginning to change perceptions. This is the first stage in a process that will continue.

The President said yesterday that we will do more next time and I think he means it. You have a friend in moving forward.

- You shouldn't minimize the fact that we want a chip for going back to the British --- to say that we've held up our end and now you do your part.
  - I was very straightforward with Niall on this and I was hopeful we could change this.
- But the reality is that everything was set in stone when...
- He is from the same hometown as Tony Lake -- he's been very helpful in talking to Tony about this.
  - We aren't going to do anything until you're comfortable with it.
  - Saturday.
  - All I would say -- let me leave you with -- let's start it on Monday and we can build from there.

- I think we can do that with this meeting: lifting the ban and make clear that's exactly what we're doing.

- Likewise.
- You should talk to me later and I'll fill him in.
- You should know that we spent a lot of time going back and forth on this.
- I've been formally prohibited from talking to you until today.
- OK.
- Let me give you a number for this evening if you want to talk again (gave home number). I'll be here 'til 6:00 and then home.
- We can talk later tonight or tomorrow morning.
- I'm going to talk to him right now.
- I called you.
- Do you want to set a time to talk again, or just when you're ready?
- I'll leave it with you and let me know what you want to do.
- If you want to do it tomorrow, it would be helpful to formally announce whatever we agree on.
- Do you mean to lift the ban without addressing the meeting?
- We announce....
- It would be helpful for you if we announced the ban without addressing the meeting.
- OK, let me see if we can do that.
- Is there someone I can talk to while you're at the reception?
- Historic first contact.
- I'll let him know either way -- I'll go talk about it right now.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*NZS - Should this change our position? R*

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PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KIRNEY L... ROSENBERG  
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLE SUMZ MAY 1994

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 100955Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4430  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1765  
RUSNSTB/USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GE

*Annual Conf in February*

\*\*\*\*\* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ \*\*\*\*\*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DUBLIN 000513  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, RI, DE, NS  
SUBJECT: FERGUS FINLAY ON NOFIBER DECLAR  
REF: DUBLIN 00218

**DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526**  
2011-0355-F (1.41)  
RBH 4/11/2023

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FERGUS FINLAY, PERSONAL ADVISOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER DICK SPRING, TOLD US ON JANUARY 25 THAT:
  - SINN FEIN/IRA HAD APPARENTLY REACHED THE JOINT DECLARAT. AND WOULD NOT/NOT REVERSE COURSE.
  - THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD ESCORTED PROTESTS LEADING TO THE JOINT DECLARATION OWING TO THE FACT THAT JERRY ADAMS AND MARTIN MCGUINNESS GENUINELY BELIEVED IN IT. BUT, THEY HAD EVIDENTLY MISCALCULATED IN BELIEVING THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING THE HARD-LINERS ABOARD WITH THEM. NEITHER HAD THE COURAGE OPENLY TO OPPOSE THEM.
  - SINN FEIN/IRA WOULD LIKELY CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO REFLECT UPON, AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION ABOUT, THE JOINT DECLARATION.

MEM TIRE, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO GET REALLY SPA. S TALK RTED AT THE END OF FEBRUARY.  
EVEN IF SINN FEIN/IRA REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION, IT WOULD REMAIN SIGNIFICANT FOR THE BUILDING UP OF TRUST BETWEEN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND THE IRA. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER IN THE FUTURE TO WORK TOGETHER.

-- TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT, STREY RELATED THAT SEAN O'HUIGINN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION, AND HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY MEMBERS KEN MAGINN AND THE MCGILPSEY BROTHERS OUT TO EAT AT A NICE RESTAURANT JUST DOWN THE STREET FROM DFA. FINLAY ADDED THAT HE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH UNIONISTS. SMITH

BT  
#0502

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NNNN

<MSGID> M0846247

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: BLEICKEN BURGOS CLARKER FILE HOLL SUM2 VAX WALKER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 311755Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6418  
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1163  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 01725  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI  
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INI  
IAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS  
VISA

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-03-55-F.(1.65)  
KBH 4/11/2023

SUMMARY

1. (S) INITIAL REACTIONS IN THE UK TO THE USG DECISION TO GRANT A VISA TO SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS ARE ALMOST UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE. ONLY ONE NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL HAS APPEARED SO FAR; THE GENERAL TONE OF THE REPORTING IS HIGHLY CRITICAL. HMG HAS SAID ONLY THAT THE DECISION IS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE USG, AND THAT IT HOPES THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE WILL CONVINCe ADAMS TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, OFFICIALS ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AND ANGRY. THE LABOR PARTY'S PUBLIC LINE IS THE SAME AS THE GOVERNMENT'S. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ARE PUBLICLY NEUTRAL, BUT PRIVATELY THINK WE EXACTED TOO SMALL A PRICE.

2. (S) IN NORTHERN IRELAND, UNIONISTS ARE OUTRAGED, WHILE THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) HOPES THE VISA WILL ENCOURAGE ADAMS TO ACCEPT THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION. SINN FEIN WELCOMED THE USG DECISION TO "DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S.A." OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SITUATION, AND DENIED THAT ADAMS HAD GIVEN ANY UNDERTAKING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY (UUP), THE LARGEST IN THE PROVINCE, HAS FROZEN RELATIONS WITH OUR CONSULATE GENERAL, WHICH HAS FIELDDED NUMEROUS ANGRY CALLS. BOTH UNIONIST PARTIES ARE BOYCOTTING THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.  
CRITICAL REPORTING

3. (U) MOST BRITISH PAPERS CARRIED REPORTS OF THE USG DECISION TO WAIVE ADAMS' VISA INELIGIBILITY IN THEIR JANUARY 31 EDITIONS, BUT THE STORY APPARENTLY BROKE TOO LATE FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT IN THE MORNING DAILIES. THE "EVENING STANDARD" TOOK THE LINE THAT "THE BRITISH

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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GOVERNMENT NEEDEDN'T LOSE MUCH SLEEP" ABOUT LETTING "A RATHER VERBOSE POLITICIAN WHOSE ARGUMENTS ARE NOT, TO PUT IT MILDLY, INTELLECTUALLY COHERENT" LOOSE ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. WE EXPECT MORE CRITICAL EDITORIALS TOMORROW.

4. (U) THE OTHER ARTICLES CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF STRAIGHT REPORTING OF THE DECISION, THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AND REACTIONS. BUT THEY ALSO NOTED THAT ADAMS HAD NOT MET THE CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 27 STATEMENT, AND CLAIMED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD IGNORED ADVICE FROM THE BUREAUCRACY. ACCORDING TO "THE TIMES":

-- "THE STATE AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENTS AND THE FBI HAD AGREED WITH BRITAIN THAT MR. ADAMS'S APPLICATION, SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE OF HIS TERRORIST LINKS, AS EIGHT BEFORE IT HAD BEEN."

-- "THEIR VIEWS WERE APPARENTLY OVERRULED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY NANCY SODERBERG, THE NSC'S THIRD-IN-COMMAND."

5. (U) ALL NEWSPAPERS VIEWED THE DECISION AS A COUP FOR ADAMS AND THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) -- "AN ENTRANCE TO MAINSTREAM POLITICS FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL MOUTHPIECE," ACCORDING TO THE "DAILY MAIL," WHICH ALSO SAID THE CONFERENCE "NOW THREATENS TO TURN INTO A PARADE OF TRIUMPH FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT."

6. (U) THE PAPERS ALSO CONCLUDED UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE VISA DEALT "A BODY BLOW TO JOHN MAJOR, THE GREATEST IN A YEAR OF INCREASING COLDNESS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND LONDON" ("DAILY MAIL"). ACCORDING TO "THE TIMES," IT "SEEMS CERTAIN TO RAISE NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SO-CALLED 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP' SINCE MR. CLINTON TOOK POWER." IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE, THE ARTICLE CONTINUED, "THAT THE BUSH OR REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS WOULD HAVE DELIVERED SUCH A SLAP IN THE FACE TO AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY."

STIFF UPPER LIP  
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7. (LOU) DOWNING STREET HAS NOT ISSUED ANY FORMAL

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 01725

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI

SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: INITIAL REACTIONS TO ADAMS  
VISA

REACTION TO THE DECISION. PRESS OFFICE OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT THEY WERE USING ONLY THE FOLLOWING LINE IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES:

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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- "WE HOPE THAT THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE WILL FIRMLY IMPRESS GERRY ADAMS THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA MUST END VIOLENCE IMMEDIATELY AND PERMANENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION."
8. (U) BEFORE THIS LINE WAS SET IN CONCRETE, DOWNING STREET SPOKESMEN HAD ALSO TOLD REPORTERS THAT:
- "ADAMS SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT HE WANTS TO END VIOLENCE AND IS WORKING TOWARDS SUPPORTING THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, AND IT IS ON THAT BASIS THAT HE IS BEING ADMITTED, UNDER VERY STRICT CONDITIONS FOR 48 HOURS."
- "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ISSUE VISAS FOR ADMISSION TO THE U.S."

PRIVATE ANGER

- 
9. (S) A SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) OFFICIAL TOLD US JANUARY 31 THAT HMG WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS, AND TO "KEEP ANY NOTE OF DISAPPOINTMENT OUT OF OUR PUBLIC VOICE." PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT DISAPPOINTMENT WOULD BE "THE MOST DIPLOMATIC WAY OF PUTTING IT. THE MOOD HERE IS THAT WITH FRIENDS LIKE THAT, WHO NEEDS ENEMIES?"
10. (S) SINN FEIN'S STRATEGY, THE OFFICIAL CONTINUED, WAS TO PROBE FOR AND EXPLOIT ANY GAPS AMONG THE BRITISH, IRISH AND U.S. POSITIONS. LONDON AND DUBLIN HAD STRUGGLED, WITH SOME DIFFICULTY, TO MAINTAIN A UNITED FRONT. AS FOR THE USG, "WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL NEXUS IN WASHINGTON, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT'S AN UNFORTUNATE DECISION. ADAMS GETS ALL THE BENEFITS OF BEING A GOOD BOY WITHOUT ACTUALLY BEING A GOOD BOY."
11. (S) SIMILARLY, AN FCO OFFICIAL DESCRIBED THE MOOD THERE AS "GLOOMY." HE SAID THE TIMING OF THE CONFERENCE, JUST AS FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD VISITED WASHINGTON FOR IMPORTANT TALKS, COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN WORSE. THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE OF HURD AND ADAMS IN THE U.S. WOULD FORCE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO REACT TO EACH OF ADAMS' STATEMENTS IN A WAY THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO DO IN LONDON.
12. (S) A SENIOR AIDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO REGISTER DOWNING STREET'S PRIVATE OUTRAGE OVER THE DECISION. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR HMG, WHICH HAD REPEATEDLY MADE ITS VIEWS KNOWN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. MOREOVER, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ADAMS HAD NOT MET THE ADMINISTRATION'S OWN CRITERIA FOR A WAIVER. THE AIDE ALSO NOTED THAT ADAMS WAS A LEADER OF AN ORGANIZATION THAT KILLED AND MAIMED NUMEROUS BRITISH CITIZENS, INCLUDING POLICE AND

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SOLDIERS, PUBLIC FIGURES AND CHILDREN. TO GRANT HIM A WAIVER RAN COUNTER TO OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY.

13. (U) ONLY ONE CONSERVATIVE MP HAS COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON THE ISSUE SO FAR -- FORMER NORTHERN IRELAND JUNIOR MINISTER MICHAEL MATES. HE TOLD BBC RADIO THAT THE DECISION WAS "MYSTIFYING," THAT IT HANDED "AN ENORMOUS PROPAGANDA COUP" TO PIRA, AND THAT SINN FEIN HAD "LED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AROUND BY THE NOSE."

OPPOSITION PARTY RESPONSES  
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14. (C) THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL WELCOME FOR THE DECISION CAME FROM LEFT-WING LABOR MP TONY BENN, WHO HAS BEEN CAMPAIGNING AGAINST HMG'S ORDER EXCLUDING ADAMS FROM GREAT BRITAIN. SHADOW NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY KEVIN MCNAMARA TOLD THE PRESS THAT "WE ARE AGAINST EXCLUSION ORDERS IN PRINCIPLE. IT IS PURELY AN INTERNAL DOMESTIC MATTER FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND I HAVE NO  
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VISA

VIEWS ABOUT IT." SPEAKING TO US PRIVATELY, MCNAMARA ECHOED THAT LINE, ADDING THAT "IF IT EASES GERRY ADAMS INTO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, WE WOULD WELCOME IT."

15. (C) LIBERAL DEMOCRAT NORTHERN IRELAND SPOKESMAN LORD HOLME TOLD US THAT, WHILE HIS PARTY WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE USG DECISION, THEY WERE "NOT ECSTATIC" OVER IT. A U.S. VISA FOR ADAMS "MEANS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE" TO SINN FEIN, AND WAS WORTH A MUCH HIGHER PRICE THAN WE HAD EXACTED. HOLME SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT ADAMS REPRESENTED ONLY THE VIOLENT RUMP OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, WHICH HAD CHOSEN TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH THE AVAILABLE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES. ADAMS WAS "NOT A MANDELA, NOT AN ARAFAT." THE LAVISH PUBLIC ATTENTION HE WOULD GET AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD PUT HIM "TOO MUCH AT CENTER STAGE."  
NORTHERN IRELAND RESPONSES  
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16. (U) REACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE PRODUCED NO SURPRISES, BUT SOME DEPRESSING (SEE PARA 22) AND PERHAPS OMINOUS (PARAS 25-26) FEATURES. SINN FEIN WELCOMED THE DECISION, SAYING IT REFLECTED CONCERN BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION "TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S.A. OF HOW THE PEACE PROCESS IN IRELAND CAN BE ADVANCED." BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, ADAMS TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE HAD

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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GIVEN NO UNDERTAKING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE (AND ACCORDING TO SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS, THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ASKED FOR ONE), BUT THAT HE HAD HAD "A VERY INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS" WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL.

17. (C) WE HAVE HEARD NO DIRECT STATEMENT FROM SDLP LEADER JOHN HUME, THOUGH HIS ROLE IN PRESSING FOR THE VISA IS WIDELY KNOWN. SDLP MP JOE HENDRON, WHO TOOK ADAMS' WEST BELFAST SEAT IN THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION, GAVE A QUALIFIED WELCOME TO THE DECISION. HE COULD UNDERSTAND UNIONIST ANGER, BUT FELT THAT THE VISIT TO THE U.S. MIGHT HELP ADAMS FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS.

18. (U) THE RESPONSE FROM UNIONISTS HAS BEEN UNIVERSAL OUTRAGE. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) LEADER IAN PAISLEY TOLD REPORTERS HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS GONE BACK ON THEIR DECLARED PRINCIPLES IN FAVOR OF GERRY ADAMS. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC IRISH BOSTON LOBBY WAS TOO STRONG FOR CLINTON TO RESIST." PAISLEY ALSO WROTE TO THE AMBASSADOR TO NOTE "THE OUTRAGE CAUSED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO GRANT A VISA TO ALLOW THE SINN FEIN/IRA LEADER GERRY ADAMS TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES TO ADDRESS A CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK."

19. (C) DUP SPOKESMAN NIGEL DODDS CALLED CONSUL GENERAL MARTINEZ JANUARY 31 TO ALERT HIM TO PAISLEY'S LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR. HE SAID THAT, TO THE DUP, IT APPEARED THE ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE A "COMPLETE REVERSAL." HE ADDED THAT THE VISA DECISION HAD SMASHED ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. COULD PLAY A ROLE AS AN "HONEST BROKER" IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

20. (U) ULSTER UNIONIST MP JOHN TAYLOR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

-- "THE DECISION BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE IN TO PRESSURE FROM THE IRISH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON CAME AS NO SURPRISE, BUT IT IS DESPICABLE.

-- "THE IRISH MAFIA, LED BY SENATOR KENNEDY, HAVE BEEN CANVASSING THE WHITE HOUSE FOR A VISA FOR GERRY ADAMS. I EXPECT NOTHING BETTER FROM SUCH PEOPLE WITHIN THE U.S.A. DEMOCRATIC PARTY. NOW WE KNOW THAT NOT ONLY DOES THE IRA GET MOST OF ITS FUNDING FOR ITS MURDER GANGS FROM THE U.S.A., BUT THE WHITE HOUSE NOW WISHES TO FACILITATE THE APOLOGISTS FOR THE IRA MURDER CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND.

-- "THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND SAY TO CLINTON, 'YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF YOURSELF -- NO LONGER CAN YOU CONDEMN TERRORISM ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.'"

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TAGS: PREL, CVIS, PTER, CASC, UK, EI  
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21. (U) UUP MP KEN MAGINNIS, WHO HAD PLANNED TO ATTEND THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE IF SINN FEIN DID NOT, TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE USG HAD "HANDED TERRORISM A VICTORY."

-- "MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT TWO CONDITIONS WERE BEING IMPOSED ON MR. ADAMS.... I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED EITHER OF THOSE."

-- "ONE HAS TO ASSUME THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN FURTHERING THE PEACE PROCESS BUT MERELY FINDING WAYS OF PRESSURING OUR OWN GOVERNMENT TO CONCEDE TO VIOLENCE."

UNIONISTS FREEZE RELATIONS

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22. (C) UUP GENERAL SECRETARY JIM WILSON PHONED THE CONSUL GENERAL JANUARY 31 TO INFORM HIM THAT PARTY LEADER JAMES MOLYNEAUX HAD CANCELED HIS SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE CG LATER THAT DAY, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER FORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UUP AND THE CONSULATE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE WORD FROM "THE TOP," WILSON SAID, WAS THAT "YOU ARE NOT WELCOME HERE." THE UUP WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THE VISA ISSUE LATER IN THE DAY, AND IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE "OVER-POLITE."

23. (C) THE DUP HAS NOT BROKEN RELATIONS, BUT MAY DO SO LATER WHEN IT HEARS OF THE ACTION OF THE MORE MODERATE UUP.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

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24. (C) IN A LATE-NIGHT CONVERSATION WITH THE CG JANUARY 30, MAGINNIS EXPRESSED AS MUCH UNHAPPINESS WITH THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AS WITH THE USG. THE VISA DECISION WAS AN OUTRAGE, COMING AS IT DID AFTER A VERY PUBLIC USG DEMAND THAT ADAMS HAD VERY PUBLICLY NOT MET. BUT THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS HAD ALSO FAILED EVEN TO REPLY TO A FORMAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (ON SINN FEIN ATTENDANCE) HE HAD SENT THEM A WEEK EARLIER. NOT HAVING RECEIVED AN ANSWER, MAGINNIS SAID HE NOW BELIEVED THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN SET UP "IN BAD FAITH."

PUBLIC ANGER AND SECURITY CONCERNS

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25. (C) CONGEN BELFAST REPORTS THAT A POPULAR RADIO CALL-IN PROGRAM JANUARY 31 FEATURED MUCH ABUSIVE LANGUAGE DIRECTED AT THE CONSULATE. WORD HAS CIRCULATED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, VIA THAT PROGRAM AND THE RUMOR

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MILL, THAT THE CONSUL GENERAL WAS "RESPONSIBLE" FOR THE ADAMS VISA, AND THAT IT WAS ISSUED ONLY "ON HIS RECOMMENDATION" FOLLOWING THE JANUARY 28 INTERVIEW.

26. (C) THE CONSULATE ITSELF HAS FIELDDED A NUMBER OF IRATE TELEPHONE CALLS. SOME CALLERS "HOPED" THAT THE CONSULATE "DOESN'T GET BOMBED"; OTHERS EXPRESSED "CONCERN" THAT "NOTHING HAPPENS TO THE CG PERSONALLY." ONE OF THE MORE VOCIFEROUS CALLERS SAID SHE REPRESENTED "THOUSANDS" WHO WERE AWARE OF THE CG'S "INTERVENTION" ON ADAMS' BEHALF, AND THAT THE CG MIGHT DO WELL TO WATCH HIMSELF. NO CALL CONTAINED DIRECT THREATS TO CONSULATE STAFF, BUT THERE IS CLEARLY MUCH GRASSROOTS ANGER OVER THE ISSUE. THE CONSULATE HAS MADE NO COMMENT, PUBLICLY OR IN RESPONSE TO THE CALLS, REFERRING ALL INQUIRIES TO USIS LONDON AND RELEASING THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT TO THOSE WHO WANT IT.

27. (C) THE CONSUL GENERAL HAS MET WITH CONSULATE STAFF TO DISCUSS SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PUBLIC ANGER. RSO LONDON PLANS TO DISCUSS THE CONSULATE'S SECURITY SITUATION WITH BELFAST POLICE OFFICIALS.

COMMENT

28. (S) UNLESS ADAMS SAYS SOMETHING IN NEW YORK THAT CLEARLY INDICATES POSITIVE SINN FEIN/PIRA MOVEMENT TOWARD THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION, WE ARE IN FOR A  
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VERY ROCKY PERIOD. BRITISH MINISTERS AND MANY OFFICIALS UNDERSTAND THE FACTORS BEHIND OUR DECISION, BUT DON'T LIKE IT ANY BETTER FOR THAT. IF SINN FEIN REJECTS THE JOINT DECLARATION (AS IT WAS LIKELY TO IN ANY EVENT), IT IS INEVITABLE THAT MANY WILL SEE US AS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE. JOURNALISTS ARE LIKELY TO GIVE US A ROUGH TIME, STOKING OLD SUSPICIONS (PREDOMINANTLY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY IN NORTHERN IRELAND) THAT THE USG SUPPORTS AT LEAST THE AIMS, IF NOT THE METHODS, OF THE IRA.

29. (C) CONGEN BELFAST'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNIONISTS HAVE SUFFERED A SHARP SETBACK. THE FACT THAT THE VISA ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE WHILE PIRA WAS ATTACKING SECURITY FORCES IN WEST BELFAST DID NOT HELP MATTERS. THE UUP MADE CLEAR TO THE CG THAT ITS BOYCOTT OF THE CONSULATE WAS PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL, NOT PERSONAL; THE CG WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN QUIET "OFF THE RECORD" CONTACTS WITH WILSON, A CLOSE AND VALUED CONTACT. BUT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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IT IS LIKELY TO BE QUITE SOME TIME BEFORE RELATIONS BETWEEN EITHER OF THE UNIONIST PARTIES (WHO REPRESENT THE MAJORITY OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S POPULATION) AND ANY USG OFFICIALS RETURN TO THE EASY CORDIALITY THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN RECENT YEARS. ?385"

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY  
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