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THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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HIGHLIGHTS
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1. (C) THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) HAS BEGUN A RIGOROUS REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM TO TRANSITION FROM A GUERRILLA FORCE TO A CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABLE OF COMBATING AN ANTICIPATED SMALL-SCALE (PLATOON- AND COMPANY-SIZE) INSURGENCY.
2. (C) MOST OF THE RPA'S RECENT RECRUITS QUITE LIKELY WILL BECOME GENDARMES RATHER THAN MILITARY SOLDIERS. THIS FORCE, HOWEVER, COULD AUGMENT THE ARMY IN A CRISIS.
3. (C) IF A LARGE-SCALE, SUCH AS BATTALION- OR COORDINATED MULTIFRONT-SIZE, INSURGENCY DEVELOPS, THE RPA COULD LAUNCH PREEMPTIVE AND RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST BASES OF THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (EX-FAR) IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. THE ARMED FORCES OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE LITTLE IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY TO OETER RPA RAIDS.
4. (C) THE NATIONAL ARMY OF RWANDA (NAR) PROBABLY WILL CONTAIN

ELEMENTS OF THE RPA AND THE EX-FAR AS SPECIFIED IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. THE NAR, AS THE ONLY OPERATIONAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION, WILL BE A CRITICAL FACTOR IN FACILITATING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REDUCING THE LEVEL OF INSURGENCY.

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BACKGROUND

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5. ~~(S/NF)~~ AFTER THE AIRCRAFT CARRYING RWANDA'S HUTU PRESIDENT CRASHED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES ON 6 APRIL, THE HUTU GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED A CAMPAIGN OF GENOCIDE AGAINST THE MINORITY TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS--AN ACTION THAT PROVOKED THE TUTSI-LED RPA TO RENEW ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE FORMER GOVERNMENT. AT THE TIME, THE RPA HAD APPROXIMATELY 20,000 SOLDIERS, INCLUDING ABOUT 15,000 COMBAT TROOPS AND 5,000 ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL.

6. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA WAS ORGANIZED INTO A HEADQUARTERS OF 1,500 PERSONNEL, 10 INFANTRY BATTALIONS OF ABOUT 1,000 SOLDIERS EACH, PLUS SEVERAL SPECIAL AND SUPPORT UNITS. TEN 300- TO 400-SOLDIER BATTALIONS TRAINED IN INFILTRATION TACTICS MADE UP SPECIAL UNITS. THESE UNITS SPEARHEADED THE RPA AND GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO ITS SUCCESS AGAINST THE FAR. THE TACTICS OF THE SPECIAL UNITS INCLUDED PENETRATING FRONT LINES, CUTTING UNITS OFF (ALLOWING FOR A SINGLE ESCAPE ROUTE), AND THEN AMBUSHING THE RETREATING SOLDIERS.

7. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA PREDOMINATELY WAS A LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE ARMED WITH VARIOUS SMALL ARMS AND INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS. ITS FORCES WERE DEPLOYED IN THREE BRIGADE SECTORS IN NORTHERN RWANDA, BUT ITS LOGISTICS AND TRAINING UNITS WERE KEPT IN UGANDA AND EASTERN ZAIRE. IN KIGALI, THE RPA STATIONED A SPECIAL 600-MAN BATTALION NEAR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO PROTECT RPF OFFICIALS NEGOTIATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT. THE RPA IS A HIGHLY DISCIPLINED AND COHESIVE FIGHTING FORCE WITH REASONABLY GOOD LEADERSHIP. MOST REPLACEMENT SOLDIERS FOR COMBAT LOSSES PROBABLY CAME FROM THE HUGE TUTSI REFUGEE POPULATION IN SOUTHERN UGANDA. IN ADDITION, THE RPA RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE ARMS AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM THE UGANDAN ARMY.

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ STRUCTURE AND DISPOSITION, STRUCTURE. IN MID-JUNE, THE REBEL ARMY HAD APPROXIMATELY 35,000 SOLDIERS, INCLUDING ABOUT 13,000 COMBAT VETERANS. RECENT RECRUITING HAS ENLARGED THE FORCE TO ROUGHLY 50,000. REESTABLISHING PUBLIC ORDER REMAINS A HIGH PRIORITY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THUS, MANY NEW RPA RECRUITS PROBABLY WILL BECOME GENDARMES. RECENTLY, MORE THAN 200 FORMER GOVERNMENT GENDARMES IN CYANGUGU CONVERTED TO RPF CONTROL. THE RPA'S REGULAR MILITARY FORCE STRENGTH MAY REMAIN AT THE MID-JUNE FIGURE OF 35,000, OF WHICH ONLY ABOUT 20,000 ARE COMBAT EXPERIENCED.

9. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE ARMY AND THE POLICE ARE CONTROLLED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTRY HEADED BY MAJ GEN KAGAME. KAGAME LED THE INSURGENTS TO VICTORY OVER THE FAR, AND HE NOW IS THE REAL POWER BEHIND THE SCENES. LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE MINISTRY, EXCEPT THE NAMES OF OTHER KEY PERSONALITIES. HOWEVER, ALL OF THESE OFFICERS HELD POSITIONS IN THE UGANDAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY (NRA) BEFORE BECOMING LEADERS IN THE RPA. COL KAYA COMMANDS THE RPA AND COL NYAMWASA HEADS THE GENDARMERIE. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND ARMY GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARE COLLOCATED IN THE NYARUGENGE DISTRICT OF KIGALI. SUBORDINATE TO THE HEADQUARTERS ARE SIX BRIGADES THAT ARE STATIONED IN THE LARGER CITIES OF THE COUNTRY'S SIX PREFECTURES. MAJ GEN KAGAME RECENTLY APPOINTED FIVE BRIGADE COMMANDERS: COL DODO, COL BAGIRE, COL NGOGA, LT COL BINGIRA (SOUTHERN SECTOR), AND LT COL NZARAMA. THE PRECISE SECTOR BOUNDARY FOR EACH BRIGADE IS NOT CONFIRMED, BUT THESE BOUNDARIES PROBABLY COINCIDE WITH THE CORRESPONDING PREFECTURE. EACH BRIGADE HAS A TRIANGULAR STRUCTURE WITH THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

10. ~~(S/NF)~~ FEW DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE ABOUT THE SIZE OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND THE VARIOUS TYPES OF UNITS WITHIN THE RPA. AN INFANTRY BATTALION PROBABLY HAS 1,000 SOLDIERS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT TROOPS. SOME BATTALIONS APPARENTLY BECAME EITHER MOTORIZED (TRUCKS) OR MECHANIZED (ARMORED VEHICLES) AND ARE DESIGNATED AS BATTALION MOBILE FORCES. MOTORIZED UNITS PROBABLY USE LIGHT PICKUP AND 5-TON TRUCKS TO TRANSPORT INFANTRY. THESE FORCES ALSO MAY HAVE CAPTURED ARMORED VEHICLES.

11. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA HAS 17 CONFIRMED COMBAT BATTALIONS. WITH A BASELINE OF 35,000 SOLDIERS, APPROXIMATELY 17,000 ARE ASSIGNED TO INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 5,000 PERFORM ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC DUTIES, AND 13,000 ARE IN SPECIAL UNITS. THESE UNITS PROBABLY ARE ORGANIZED INTO BATTALIONS OF 300 TO 400 SOLDIERS TRAINED IN INFILTRATION TACTICS. THEY COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS THE ELITE AND MOST SEASONED UNITS IN THE RPA AND CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO ITS OVERWHELMING SUCCESS AGAINST THE FAR. THE TACTICS OF THE SPECIAL UNITS INCLUDED PENETRATING FRONT LINES, CUTTING UNITS OFF BY ALLOWING A SINGLE ESCAPE ROUTE, AND AMBUSHING THE RETREATING SOLDIERS. THE SPECIAL UNITS PROBABLY SERVE AS STRATEGIC RESERVE FORCES TO REINFORCE SECTORS, AS REQUIRED.

12. ~~(S/NF/WW)~~ CURRENT DISPOSITION. THE FRENCH SAFE ZONE IN RWANDA'S SOUTHWEST PROBABLY IS DEVOID OF RPA UNITS. RPA UNITS HAVE BEEN SEEN ~~SECRET NOFORN WINTEL NOCONTRACT~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 IN THE CAPITAL IN THREE LOCATIONS: THE GENDARME CAMP NORTH OF DOWNTOWN, AN RPA CAMP IN DOWNTOWN KIGALI, AND KANOMBE BARRACKS EAST OF DOWNTOWN KIGALI. AT LEAST TWO BATTALIONS PROBABLY ARE IN KIGALI. KEY TRAINING SITES ARE AT KIGALI, BUTARE, GABIRO, BIGOGWE (KORA), AND ZAZA.

13. ~~(S/NF)~~ RPA COMPOSITION, LOCATIONS 29 AUG 94

UNIT	DESIGNATION	LOCATION	COMMANDER
KIGALI GARRISON		KIGALI	
INSPECTORATE BN	K001	"	
INFANTRY BN	K002	KACYIRU DISTRICT (ELEMENTS DEPLOYED EAST OF KIBUYE)	
INFANTRY BN	3	KANOMBE BARRACKS	
NORTHERN/107 BRIGADE			
INFANTRY BN	7	RUHENGERI	
" "	CHARLIE MOBILE FORCE	GISENYI	
" "	N003	KORA (BIGOGWE BKS) (POSSIBLE ARMD SPT, BTR 60/80)	
" "	N004	KORA/GISENYI (ARTY SPT M101, 105MM BTY)	
SOUTHERN/301 BRIGADE			
INFANTRY BN	157	BUTARE	LTC
BINGIRA			
" "	301	BUTARE (CURRENTLY DEPLOYED AT HPZ CROSSING POINT)	LTC IBINGA
" "	305	NYANZA (UNCONFIRMED ARTY SPT, STRENGTH UNKNOWN IN NYANZA)	

EASTERN BRIGADE

INFANTRY BN	E006	ZAZA (TRAINING AND RECRUITING CENTER)
"	"	E007
"	"	E008
WESTERN BRIGADE		
INFANTRY BN	101 BN MOBILE	REMERA, NORTH LTC
KAZINTWARI		
	FORCE	GITARAMA
INFANTRY BN	15 BN MOBILE	CENTRAL
	FORCE	GITARAMA
INFANTRY BN	59 BN MOBILE	RUTSIRO (DEPLOYED
	FORCE	COVERING ROUTE
		NORTH TO GISENYI)
BYUMBA BRIGADE		
INFANTRY BN	B001	BYUMBA
"	"	B002
		GABIRO (TRAINING CENTER)
"	"	B003
		NYAGATARE

14. ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ EQUIPMENT. SINCE THE RPA WAS PREDOMINATELY A LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE, IT POSSESSED FEW PIECES OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, AS THE WAR PROGRESSED IN JUNE AND JULY, THE RPA CAPTURED LARGE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE FAR AND RECEIVED ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY AND POSSIBLY ARMORED VEHICLES FROM UGANDA. MOREOVER, THE BANGLADESH UNAMIR BATTALION LEFT ABOUT 18 BTR-80S, SOME OF WHICH HAVE FALLEN INTO RPA HANDS. AS THE FORCE TRANSITIONS TO A MORE CONVENTIONAL ONE, IT WILL PROBABLY ACQUIRE MORE ARMORED VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT. THE RPA REPORTEDLY PLANS TO PURCHASE 12 HELICOPTERS AND 12 FIXED-WING COMBAT AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TO UPGRADE EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND RETRAIN THE SMALL MILITARY AIR WING. AS A REBEL FORCE, IT HAD AT LEAST TWO SMALL, SINGLE-ENGINE AIRCRAFT FOR LIAISON WORK. IN ADDITION, THE RPA MOST LIKELY WILL UPGRADE ITS COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY BY ACQUIRING LONG-RANGE RADIOS.

15. ~~(S/NF)~~ CURRENT RPA EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT TYPE	QUANTITY
ARMORED VEHICLES	
AML-TYPE ARMORED CARS	UNDETERMINED
BTR (60/70/80S)	1 MAYBE MORE
ARTILLERY/MORTARS	
122MM HOWITZERS, (RU,NK) D30	4
105MM HOWITZERS, M101	6
100MM GUNS	3
107MM TOWED MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS	UNDETERMINED
81/82MM MORTARS	UNDETERMINED
76MM GUNS	4
60MM MORTARS	UNDETERMINED
AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS	
37MM ADA GUNS	UNDETERMINED
23MM ADA GUNS	"
14.5MM AAMGS	"
SA-7 FAMILY ADA MISSILES	"
(AAA GUNS WERE USED BY THE RPA IN THE GROUND MODE DURING THE FIGHTING)	
ANTITANK WEAPONS	
106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES	UNDETERMINED
HELICOPTERS/AIRCRAFT (TO BE ACQUIRED)	
HELICOPTERS (RUSSIA)	12
FIXED-WING COMBAT AND TRANSPORT (RUSSIA)	12

NOTE: MUCH FAR EQUIPMENT WAS CAPTURED AND IS NOW IN USE BY THE

RPA. QUANTITIES AND TYPES ARE UNDETERMINED.

16. ~~(S/NF)~~ ESTIMATE OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE RPA IS A WELL-ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND DISCIPLINED FORCE. ITS BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE RPA'S RECENT EXPANSION, HOWEVER, HAS CAUSED SOME DEGRADATION IN DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING. AFTER CAPTURING KIGALI, THE RPA TROOPS WENT ON A SPREE OF LOOTING, DRINKING, AND REPORTEDLY RAPING AT WILL. THIS DISCIPLINARY BREAKDOWN CONTINUES TO PLAGUE THE RPA. INCIDENTS SUCH AS HOMES BEING APPROPRIATED AND LOOTED OR CARS BEING STOLEN BY RPA SOLDIERS CONTINUE. REPORTS OF POSSIBLE RPA ATROCITIES POSSIBLY STEM FROM THE LESS DISCIPLINED AND HASTILY TRAINED NEWER UNITS. THE DISCIPLINE PROBLEM GROWS BECAUSE OF DECREASED CONTROL THE RPA LEADERS CAN EXERT ON ITS FORCES DISPERSED THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

17. ~~(S)~~ TWO ISSUES CONTRIBUTE TO THE LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN THE FORCE. RPA PERSONNEL HAVE NOT BEEN PAID. WHEN THE INSURGENT ARMY WAS DEPLOYED IN THE BUSH, IT HAD FEW TEMPTATIONS AND LITTLE NEED FOR

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MONEY. A MORE CONVENTIONAL ARMY WILL HAVE TO BE PAID. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NEW GOVERNMENT LACKS THE RESOURCES FROM WHICH TO PAY SALARIES. THE SOLDIERS, PARTICULARLY THE OFFICERS, HAVE HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS. THEY WANT HOUSES, CARS, AND EVEN FARMLAND--THINGS TAKEN FROM THEIR FAMILIES BY THE HUTUS IN 1959. MANY OF THEM WILL HAVE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THE RIGHTFUL OWNERS OF DESIRABLE PROPERTY.

18. ~~(S/NF)~~ THROUGHOUT THE WAR, KAGAME LIVED AUSTERELY, WAS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF HIS SOLDIERS, AND WAS REVERED BY HIS MEN. HE KNOWS THAT DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING WITHIN THE RPA HAVE SUFFERED SINCE THE FALL OF KIGALI. IF HE CONTINUES TO LIVE SIMPLY AND SET A PERSONAL EXAMPLE OF RESPECT FOR THE LIVES AND PRIVATE PROPERTY OF OTHERS, HE CAN IMPOSE HIS WILL ON THE RPA. GEN KAGAME MOST LIKELY WILL REASSERT HIS CONTROL THROUGH QUICK AND BRUTAL DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AMONG HIS FORCES. AT LEAST 61 TUTSIS WERE APPARENTLY TRIED AND EXECUTED FOR VARIOUS VIOLATIONS OF DISCIPLINE, MOST LIKELY REPRISAL KILLINGS.

19. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA HAS CREATED A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK USING THE LATEST COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY. TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE BY HAND-HELD MOTOROLA-TYPE RADIOS. THE RPA COMMANDER HAS A COMMERCIAL SATCOM CAPABILITY. THE RPA WILL SEEK TO EXPAND ITS COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT MUST FIGHT A SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY IN EASTERN, NORTHWESTERN, AND POSSIBLY SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA. ITS LACK OF FIRM CONTROL IN THE KIBUNGO SECTOR IS A REFLECTION OF ITS INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS.

20. ~~(S/NF/WI/NC)~~ INTELLIGENCE. THE RPA'S SUCCESS COMES FROM ITS WIDE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, BOTH INSIDE RWANDA AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. TUTSI SECURITY COMMITTEES WERE CREATED. THE COMMITTEE IN THE KIVU REGION OF EASTERN ZAIRE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE AND WILL PROVIDE CRITICAL INFORMATION TO COMBAT THE INSURGENCY IN THE GOMA AREA. THIS COMMITTEE HAS REPORTED ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH FORCES, AS WELL AS ZAIRIAN OFFICIALS; CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE OF MEMBERS OF THE HUTU FORMER RWANDAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT; AND INFORMED ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EX-FAR.

21. ~~(S)~~ THE RPA'S INSPECTORATE, PART OF THE KIGALI BRIGADE, APPARENTLY IS A COVERT INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE. IT REPORTEDLY CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS ESTABLISHED AN INDEPENDENT UNIT TO IDENTIFY AND ARREST MEMBERS OF THE INTERAHAMWE (THE HUTU MILITIA OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT).

22. ~~(S)~~ EVEN THOUGH NO LARGE RPA UNITS OCCUPY THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ZONE (HPZ), THE RPA PROBABLY HAS CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE THERE SINCE THE FRENCH OCCUPIED THE AREA. THE RPA POSSIBLY USES

SECTION AND SQUAD-SIZED ELEMENTS TO REPORT ON EX-FAR AND MILITIA ACTIVITIES. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE THAT THESE UNITS HAVE INFILTRATED AS FAR AS BUKAVU TO ASSESS EX-FAR CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THIS REGION.

23. ~~(S/NF/INT)~~ TACTICS AND TRAINING. RPA SOLDIERS ARE HIGHLY SKILLED IN GUERRILLA TACTICS, WHICH PROVED SUCCESSFUL IN RWANDA'S RUGGED TERRAIN AGAINST THE BETTER-EQUIPPED AND LARGER FORCES OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THE RPA MAY BE SOMEWHAT LESS CAPABLE IN A MORE TRADITIONAL ROLE AS A NATIONAL ARMY. BASED ON ITS PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE FAR, THE RPA IS A HIGHLY DISCIPLINED AND COHESIVE FIGHTING FORCE WITH REASONABLY GOOD LEADERSHIP. THE INFLUX OF LARGE NUMBERS OF NEW RECRUITS SINCE THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT TOOK CONTROL OF RWANDA'S GOVERNMENT IN MID-JULY MAY HAVE CAUSED A TEMPORARY DECLINE IN THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE RPA, BUT IMAGERY AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTING INDICATE TRAINING IS UNDER WAY ACROSS THE COUNTRY IN ANTICIPATION OF AN EVENTUAL HUTU ATTEMPT TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY.

24. ~~(S)~~ THE RPA ROUTINELY TASK ORGANIZES ITS OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE NORMALLY CARRIED OUT BY 125-MAN INFANTRY COMPANIES. IT HAS A NIGHT FIGHTING CAPABILITY AND OFTEN INFILTRATES ITS UNITS AND PREPARES ATTACKS UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS. IN GENERAL, THE RPA IS HIGHLY MOBILE, AS IS ITS FIRE SUPPORT, WHICH INCLUDES MACHINEGUNS, MORTARS, RECOILLESS RIFLES, AND ROCKETS.

25. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH THE RPA IS AN INSURGENT FORCE, IT FOUGHT ESSENTIALLY AS A CONVENTIONAL ARMY RATHER THAN AS GUERRILLAS. DESPITE WEARING AN ASSORTMENT OF UNIFORMS, USUALLY WHATEVER WAS AVAILABLE, THE RPA EXHIBITED HIGH MILITARY STANDARDS REFLECTED IN WEAPON CLEANLINESS, PREPARED FIGHTING POSITIONS, AND COMPLETED RANGE CARDS FOR MACHINEGUNS. ALTHOUGH THE RPA CONDUCTED THE USUAL POLITICAL INSTRUCTION COMMON TO MAOIST FORCES, IT WAS ORGANIZED ALONG CONVENTIONAL LINES OF THE UGANDAN NRA. THIS FACT SHOULD EASE THE TRANSITION FROM AN INSURGENT TO A NATIONAL ARMY.

26. ~~(S)~~ IN ITS EFFORTS TO CREATE A TRULY NATIONAL ARMY THE RPA IS INTEGRATING DEFECTING EX-FAR PERSONNEL. FIRST, THESE SOLDIERS ARE SCREENED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE AGAINST RWANDA'S TUTSIS. THOSE JUDGED NOT GUILTY THEN UNDERGO POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION ALONG WITH THEIR MILITARY TRAINING. POLITICAL INSTRUCTION IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AS A MEANS OF HASTENING THE NEW SINGLE RWANDAN IDENTITY. TO DATE, ABOUT 400 EX-FAR TROOPS HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THE RPA.

27. ~~(S/NF)~~ LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT. BEFORE SEIZING LOGISTIC CONTROL OF RWANDA, THE RPA WAS HIGHLY MOBILE AND ADAPTED TO ENSURE RAPID RESUPPLY OF AMMUNITION AND FOOD. SPECIAL LOGISTIC TROOPS TRANSPORTED SUPPLIES BY TRUCK TO FORWARD DISTRIBUTION SITES, AND PORTERS THEN MOVED THESE SUPPLIES TO THE FORWARD DEPLOYED UNITS. THE RPA USED FIXED LOGISTIC BASES, WHICH INCLUDED A RESUPPLY DEPOT, A MAINTENANCE GARAGE, A MEDICAL DEPOT, AND AN AMMUNITION DEPOT. THESE SITES SUPPLIED THE MOBILE LOGISTICS FORMATIONS.

28. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA PROBABLY FOLLOWS THE SAME PROCEDURES TODAY, AND IT HAS MOVED ITS FIXED LOGISTIC CENTERS FROM LOCATIONS IN UGANDA, COLLOCATING THEM WITH EACH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS. ADDITIONALLY, TRUCKS HAVE (OR WILL SOON REPLACE) PORTERS AS THE FORCE BECOMES MORE CONVENTIONAL. HOWEVER, IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN PORTERS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN THE METHOD OF RESUPPLY. AS THE FORCE CONTINUES TO TRANSITION TO A NATIONAL ARMY, HELICOPTERS WILL INCREASINGLY BE USED TO ASSIST IN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS.

29. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA HAS SUFFICIENT STOCKS OF MUNITIONS AND SMALL ARMS TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR AT LEAST A YEAR, ACCORDING TO SOME

REPORTS. HOWEVER, THE RPA CURRENTLY FACES SHORTAGE OF UNIFORMS AND BASIC SOLDIER EQUIPMENT. MILITARY TRANSPORT APPEARS TO BE AT A PREMIUM ALSO, SINCE THE RPA HAS BEEN SEEN USING DUMP TRUCKS AND OTHER CIVILIAN MODES OF TRANSPORTATION TO SHIFT TROOPS AROUND THE COUNTRY. THE RPA WILL SEEK FOREIGN MILITARY SUPPORT TO OUTFIT THE EXPANDED FORCE. THE ABSENCE OF HARD CURRENCY TO PURCHASE SUCH EQUIPMENT WILL BE THE GREATEST CHALLENGE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY AS IT NEEDS THE SAME FUNDS TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, SECURITY ISSUES WILL MOST LIKELY TAKE PRIORITY UNTIL THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDING LAW AND ORDER IS RESTORED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

~~S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~NOINTEL~~ ~~NOCONTRACT~~ FINAL SECTION OF 04

30. ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ ALLIES AND SPONSORS. UGANDA REMAINS THE PRIMARY SUPPORTER OF THE RPA. ITS ROLE WILL DIMINISH, HOWEVER, AS UGANDAN INTERNAL PRESSURES MOUNT AND COMPEL THE COUNTRY TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA. UGANDA MUST DEAL WITH ITS OWN INSURGENCY, CRITICISM FROM POLITICAL OPPONENTS, AND POOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ALL CONTRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S DESIRE TO PULL HIS TROOPS OUT OF RWANDA. UGANDA'S NRA QUITE LIKELY WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO THE RPA, BUT TO A LESSER DEGREE THAN DURING THE PREVIOUS PHASE OF THE CIVIL WAR. KAGAME IS PRO- AMERICAN, AND HE MIGHT ASK FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE US IN TRAINING THE RPA AND PROCURING MILITARY EQUIPMENT. LIBYA HAS A HISTORY OF PROVIDING FINANCIAL AID AND WEAPONRY TO THE RPA. IT PROBABLY WILL PROVIDE THE HARD CASH NEEDED TO PURCHASE ARMS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS. NONETHELESS, TRIPOLI ALSO HAS SUPPORTED THE FORMER INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

31. ~~(S/NF)~~ POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS. CONSIDERING ITS RECENT BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS, THE RPA HAS PROVEN ITSELF AS A HIGHLY CAPABLE MILITARY FORCE. WHEN IT WAS A GUERRILLA FORCE, THE RPA STRUCTURE WAS ALONG CONVENTIONAL LINES; THIS WILL ASSIST THE TRANSITION TO A CONVENTIONAL NATIONAL ARMY. THE RPA'S MAIN OBSTACLE IS THE LACK OF MOTOR TRANSPORT AND THE NEED TO CREATE A SMALL AIR ARM THAT WOULD FACILITATE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. MOBILITY IS CRITICAL FOR COMBATING INSURGENTS, THUS OBTAINING HELICOPTERS WOULD ENHANCE THE RPA'S ABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY TROOPS AND TO PATROL THE MOUNTAINOUS AND SWAMPY BORDER AREAS THAT FAVOR THE INSURGENT.

32. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE RPA APPEARS CAPABLE OF CONTAINING THE SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY IN NORTHWESTERN AND EASTERN RWANDA, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE SITUATION IN EASTERN RWANDA UNDER CONTROL. THE RPA WILL CONTINUE TO AGGRESSIVELY AND RUTHLESSLY PURSUE ITS COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN, AND THIS EFFORT WILL DISCOURAGE HUTU REPATRIATION AND CAUSE REFUGEES TO CONTINUE FLEEING TO TANZANIA AND ZAIRE.

33. ~~(S/NF)~~ TO COMBAT THE POCKET OF EX-FAR/MILITIA IN THE NYUNGWE FOREST, THE RPA WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN THE HPZ WHILE WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF UNAMIR'S EFFORT TO DISARM THESE ELEMENTS. IF THE TUTSIS IN CYANGUGU ARE THREATENED, THE RPA ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD INTERVENE TO PROTECT THEM. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE RPA WOULD WORK WITH UNAMIR FORCES TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM TO PREVENT A MASS EXODUS OF REFUGEES INTO THE BUKAVU AREA. INSURGENCY IS DEVELOPING, IT PROBABLY WILL LAUNCH PREEMPTIVE STRIKES INTO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. THE ZAIRIANS COULD DO LITTLE TO STOP SUCH ATTACKS, AND THE TANZANIANS, THUS FAR, APPARENTLY ARE UNWILLING TO INTERVENE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM ALONG THEIR BORDER.

35. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ALLOW HUTU EXTREMISTS TO LAUNCH A MAJOR INVASION THAT WOULD THREATEN ITS EXISTENCE AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TUTSIS IN RWANDA. ITS ACTIONS MAY PROVOKE SOME CRITICISM FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD. NONETHELESS, KIGALI WILL NOT BE DETERRED FROM PURSUING ITS POLICIES TO CREATE A NEW RWANDA, ESPECIALLY IN THE

SECURITY ARENA. ALTHOUGH THE NEW GOVERNMENT SEEKS INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION AND APPROVAL, IT IS MINDFUL OF THE WORLD'S FAILURE TO ACT
EARLIER AGAINST THE GENOCIDE.

RWANDA WORKING GROUP,

(b)(3)

DECL: OADR

BT

#5826

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

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 DIRNSA//N5//
 SAFE

INFO: ////

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 (U)
 //////////////////////////////////////
 (U) STRATEGIC WARNING ISSUES FOR THE COMING WEEK.

TEXT: ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT
 SECTION 1 OF 7
 OOOO

[1.4c] [(b)(3)]
 SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 (U)
 //////////////////////////////////////
 (U) STRATEGIC WARNING ISSUES FOR THE COMING WEEK.
 NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE DEFENSE
 INTELLIGENCE WARNING STAFF AND ON OCCASION THE VIEWS OF THE U.S.
 MILITARY SERVICES INTELLIGENCE STAFFS, AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
 ORGANIZATIONS OF ALLIED NATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE DOD WARNING
 SYSTEM CONCERNING POTENTIAL THREATS TO U.S./ALLIED INTERESTS.
 THE ALLIED INPUTS MIGHT NOT REFLECT DIA OR DOD JUDGMENTS, BUT ARE
 INCLUDED TO GIVE CONSUMERS AN APPRECIATION OF A RANGE OF VIEWS ON
 THE ISSUES. THESE ANALYSES DO NOT NECESSARILY FORECAST MOST
 LIKELY OUTCOMES, BUT SEEK TO IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY HARMFUL EFFECTS
 WHICH COULD ARISE FROM DEVELOPING SITUATIONS. THE FOLLOWING
 AREAS ARE COVERED IN THIS REPORT:
 A. BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
 B. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
 C. GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS
 D. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
 E. ALGERIA
 F. NIGERIA
 G. TANZANIA
 H. THAILAND
 I. SURINAME
 J. PRIMARY WARNING CONCERNS
 K. OTHER WARNING CONCERNS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 PER E. O. 13526
 2014-0295-M 05126116 KDE

L. WARNING NOTES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A. BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

~~(S)~~ THE SERBS HAVE WARNED UNPROFOR TO EVACUATE THE MOUNT IGMAN AREA BY 21 OCTOBER, OR BE SUBJECT TO ATTACK.

B. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

~~(S)~~ CLAIMS OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES WILL PROMPT CIVIL UNREST THROUGH THE END OF OCTOBER.

C. GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS

~~(S)~~ GREEK/GREEK CYPRIOT JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES THREATEN TO DESTABILIZE CYPRUS, AND POSSIBLY TRIGGER TURKISH-GREEK MILITARY ESCALATION.

D. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

~~(S)~~ ARAFAT'S SURVIVAL IS IN QUESTION AS HAMAS CONTINUES ATTACKS ON ISRAELIS AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DEMANDS PLO ACTION.

E. ALGERIA

~~(S)~~ RELEASE OF FIS ACTIVISTS UNLIKELY UNLESS LEVEL OF VIOLENCE SUBSIDES.

F. NIGERIA

~~(S)~~ ACCELERATED ECONOMIC DECLINE, GROWING FRACTURES WITHIN THE MILITARY, AND INCREASED ETHNIC STRIFE COULD BE AN EXPLOSIVE COMBINATION IN NIGERIA.

G. TANZANIA

~~(C/NF)~~ THE IMPENDING RAINY SEASON WILL AGGRAVATE THE ALREADY BAD HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY SITUATIONS IN RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN WESTERN TANZANIA.

~~(C)~~ NEW PDP PARTY LEADER CHAMLONG SRIMUANG IS DESTABILIZING THAILAND'S CHUAN GOVERNMENT.

I. SURINAME

~~(S/NF/WN/NG)~~ A CONTINUED DECLINE IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY COULD #2372

NNNN

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

SECTION 2 OF 7

QQQQ

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 (U)

EVENTUALLY THREATEN THE GOVERNMENT.

J. PRIMARY WARNING CONCERNS

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (FYROM)

~~(b)(3)~~~~(C)~~ DISCONTENT WITH THE RESULTS OF THE MACEDONIAN ELECTIONS

THREATENS REGIONAL STABILITY.

{C} PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES AND THE LOW VOTER TURN OUT IN THE JUST- CONCLUDED FYROM PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HAVE PROMPTED PRESIDENT GLIGOROV'S OPPONENTS TO CHALLENGE THE RESULTS AND CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS.

{C} THE OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, LJUBISLAV GEORGIEVSKI, HAS VOWED "TO WAGE WAR ON THE GOVERNMENT" UNTIL THE SITUATION IS RECTIFIED.

{C} LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE PLANNED FOR 19 OCTOBER.

{C} IF THE SENTIMENT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTIONS RESULTS IS SIGNIFICANT, IT COULD LEAD TO AN UNSTABLE SITUATION IN THE FYROM. ANY INTERNAL INSTABILITY CAUSED BY THESE ELECTIONS COULD ERUPT INTO CIVIL UNREST THAT COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GLIGOROV GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL. IF THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT, THERE COULD BE SPIRALING DESTABILIZATION THAT WOULD THREATEN THE ENTIRE REGION.

J. OTHER WARNING CONCERNS.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

#2373

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

SECTION 3 OF 7

QQQQ

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 (U)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

(b)(3)

{S} ARAFAT'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE NEWLY-AUTONOMOUS REGIONS IS BEING SORELY TESTED, AND CONTINUED HAMAS ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELIS MAY DAMAGE HIS EFFORTS IRREPARABLY.

{S} THREE HAMAS SPONSORED TERRORIST ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE LAST TEN DAYS, THE LATEST BEING A CAR BOMB WHICH EXPLODED 19 OCT ON A COMMUTER BUS IN DOWNTOWN TEL AVIV KILLING AT LEAST 22 PEOPLE.

{S} HAMAS SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATED IN THE STREETS OF GAZA FOR THREE DAYS BEGINNING ON THE 15TH WHEN 3,000 SUPPORTERS TRIED TO GAIN RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES.

{S} PALESTINIAN POLICE CLOSED DOWNTOWN GAZA ON THE 16TH, BUT A DEMONSTRATION ON THE 17TH ATTRACTED 4,000 FOLLOWERS.

{S} THE GAZA STRIP AND WEST BANK WERE CLOSED AGAIN INDEFINITELY ON THE 19TH AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF CLOSURE LAST WEEK AS A RESULT OF THE KIDNAPING OF AN IDF SOLDIER.

{S} ARAFAT IS DECRYING THE ISRAELIS USE OF WHAT HE CALLS "COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT" WHICH HE CLAIMS SUPPORTS THE HAMAS GOALS BY UNDERMINING ARAFAT'S ABILITY TO BETTER THE LIFE OF GAZA RESIDENTS.

{S} DESPITE LAST WEEK'S ARREST OF AS MANY AS 400 HAMAS MEMBERS BY THE PALESTINIAN POLICE AFTER THE KIDNAPING OF AN ISRAELI SOLDIER, HAMAS APPEARS WILLING AND ABLE TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE INCREASING LETHALITY OF HAMAS' RECENT ATTACKS INCREASES ISRAEL'S DEMANDS ON ARAFAT TO CONTROL THE HAMAS IN THE NEWLY AUTONOMOUS AREAS. HOWEVER, ARAFAT'S COOPERATION WITH THE ISRAELIS IS SEEN BY GAZANS AS COOPERATING WITH THE OCCUPIERS. ARAFAT'S POSITION IS TENUOUS AT THIS JUNCTURE. SHOULD HAMAS SUCCEED IN UPSETTING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL, AND ARAFAT FAILS TO SATISFY TEL AVIV WITH HIS ACTIONS AGAINST THEM, THE IDF WILL #2374

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT
SECTION 4 OF 7

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 (U)
LIKELY REDEPLOY INTO GAZA. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL COULD BE SCUTTLED.
ALGERIA

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

NIGERIA

(b)(3)

{S/NF} ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA IS REMOTE, A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING FACTORS ARE GROWING IN SIGNIFICANCE. ECONOMIC CHAOS, NEW FRACTURES IN THE MILITARY, AND RISING ETHNIC TENSIONS COULD BE AN EXPLOSIVE COMBINATION.

{S/NF} NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE IS ACCELERATING. ABACHA HAS ABANDONED MARKET REFORMS, MEMBERS OF ABACHA'S INNER-CIRCLE ARE ENGAGED IN CURRENCY SCAMS, AND INFLATION IS MORE THAN 100-PERCENT.

{S/NF} THERE ARE INCREASING REPORTS OF SMUGGLING OF SMALL ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY. {S/NF} YOUNG OFFICERS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO TRY A MOVE AGAINST REGIME THEY BELIEVE HAS UNDERMINED THE MILITARY'S CREDIBILITY.

{S/NF} NEWLY FORCIBLY-RETIRED OFFICERS MAY JOIN THE RANKS OF FORMER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO ARE ALREADY PLOTTING AGAINST THE REGIME.

{S/NF} ETHNIC YORUBA AND IBO OFFICERS COULD BE SPURRED TO CONCERTED ACTION IF THERE IS EVIDENCE THEY ARE BEING FURTHER MARGINALIZED BY THE ABACHA REGIME.

{S/NF} ECONOMICS-BASED UNREST -- MORE LIKELY AS THE ECONOMY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE -- WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY TRIGGER FOR INCREASED TURMOIL IN NIGERIA. ECONOMIC UNREST COULD QUICKLY DEGENERATE INTO ETHNIC CONFLICT, GIVEN THE VOLATILE SITUATION.

#2375

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

SECTION 5 OF 7

QQQQ

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 (U)

TANZANIA

(b)(3)

{C/NF} THE IMPENDING RAINY SEASON IN TANZANIA WILL PROBABLY AGGRAVATE THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION FOR REFUGEES THERE. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE SECURITY SITUATION FOR BOTH REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS IN THE AREA WILL ALSO GROW WORSE.

{C/NF} THE NUMBER OF RWANDAN HUTUS IN TANZANIA HAS BEEN GROWING BY 1,000 PER DAY SINCE EARLY LAST MONTH.

{C/NF} SUPPLIES OF FOOD, WATER, AND OTHER NECESSITIES ARE GROSSLY INADEQUATE FOR THE 540,000 REFUGEES THERE.

{C/NF} THESE SITUATIONS ARE ALREADY UNDERMINING SECURITY FOR REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS AND STRENGTHENING HUTU EXTREMISTS.

{C/NF} UNLESS THE NEW RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI IS ABLE TO ASSUAGE HUTU FEARS OF TUTSI REPRISALS FOR THE GENOCIDE OF TUTSIS EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN TANZANIA WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND THE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY SITUATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DECLINE.

THAILAND

(b)(3)

{C} FUTURE ACTIONS OF CHAMLONG SRIMUANG, THE NEW LEADER OF THAILAND'S PHALANG DHARMA PARTY (PDP), WILL PROBABLY THREATEN THE STABILITY OF PRIME MINISTER CHUAN'S COALITION GOVERNMENT.

{C} CHAMLONG SRIMUANG ON 8 OCTOBER ANNOUNCED THE REPLACEMENT OF ALL 11 PDP MINISTERS IN THE CHUAN CABINET INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER PRASONG SOONSIRI.

{C} ENCOUNTERING INTENSE OPPOSITION BY MEMBERS OF BOTH HIS OWN "TEMPLE FACTION" OF THE PDP AND MORE MODERATE MPS IN THE PDP, CHAMLONG RELUCTANTLY MODIFIED THE CABINET LIST, FEARING A THREATENED DEFECTION OF AS MANY AS 25 OF 47 PDP MPS.

{C} THE CHUAN GOVERNMENT IS COMPOSED OF FIVE COALITION PARTNERS, WITH THE PDP REPRESENTING THE THIRD LARGEST.

{C} WITH PRIME MINISTER CHUAN'S COALITION ESTABLISHING A MAJORITY BY 13 VOTES IN THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, ANY SIZABLE DEFECTION FROM WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE PDP COULD RESULT IN A COLLAPSE OF THE CHUAN GOVERNMENT. WHILE MOST OBSERVERS CREDIT CHAMLONG FOR REALIZING THAT HIS INTERESTS ARE BETTER SERVED BY REMAINING IN THE CHUAN GOVERNMENT, HIS ACTIONS IN THE PAST WEEK DEMONSTRATE HIS WILLINGNESS TO PRESS THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE OF HIS PARTY AND THE COALITION TO ACCOMPLISH HIS PERSONAL GOALS. AS A RESULT OF HIS ABRASIVE APPROACH TO PARTY POLITICS, THE LIKELIHOOD HAS INCREASED THAT THE PDP COULD FRACTURE, OR THAT PRIME MINISTER CHUAN WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO DISSOLVE THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT IN REACTION TO FUTURE
#2376

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT
SECTION 6 OF 7

QQQQ

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 {U}
ACTIONS BY THE NEW PDP LEADER.

SURINAME

{S/NF/WN/NC} DEMOCRACY COULD EVENTUALLY BE THREATENED IF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY CONTINUES ITS RAPID DECLINE.

{S/NF/WN/NC} ANNUAL CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION IS APPROXIMATELY 350 PERCENT, THE NATIONAL CURRENCY HAS FALLEN SHARPLY IN VALUE, AND REAL INCOMES HAVE FAILED TO KEEP PACE WITH THE RISE IN PRICES.

{S/NF/WN/NC} SHORT STRIKES HAVE PROLIFERATED AS WORKERS ATTEMPT TO KEEP PACE WITH PRICE INCREASES.

{S/NF/WN/NC} MILITARY DISCONTENT IS SAID TO BE RISING BECAUSE OF A DETERIORATION IN LIVING STANDARDS AND A LACK OF OPERATIONAL FUNDS. SOME DISGRUNTLED TROOPS ARE REPORTEDLY PLANNING A COUP.

{S/NF/WN/NC} MANY SURINAMERS REPORTEDLY PERCEIVE THAT PRESIDENT VENETIAAN IS UNABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND FEAR THAT IT WILL GET WORSE BEFORE IMPROVING.

{S/NF/WN/NC} THERE ALREADY ARE SAID TO BE INCREASING SIGNS OF DESTITUTION IN PARAMARIBO. WHILE DISCONTENT EXISTS IN THE MILITARY IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE CURRENTLY IS ENOUGH TO SUPPORT A COUP. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION PROBABLY WOULD CHANGE IF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS CONTINUE THEIR RAPID DETERIORATION. MOREOVER, THE

SITUATION COULD BE EXACERBATED BY FORMER ARMED FORCES COMMANDER BOUTERSE -- TURNED POLITICIAN. HE REPORTEDLY MAY ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THE ECONOMIC DISCONTENT BY SPARKING DEMONSTRATIONS AND RANDOM ATTACKS BY HIS GROUP OF THUG SUPPORTERS.

L. WARNING NOTES
RWANDA

(b)(3)

{G} ATTACKS ON THE VERY LIGHTLY-ARMED JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE MEMBERS PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDAN REFUGEES IN GOMA, ZAIRE COULD PROMPT JAPAN TO SEEK US ASSISTANCE IN WITHDRAWING THE FORCE, WHICH IS TO BE 280-MEMBERS STRONG. THE SITUATION IN GOMA REMAINS VOLATILE WITH TENS OF THOUSANDS OF FORMER RWANDAN SOLDIERS AND MILITIAMEN INTERSPERSED AMONG THE 800,000 REFUGEES.

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(b)(3)

#2377

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~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

SECTION 7 OF 7

QQQQ

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF), 20 OCT 94 {U}

(b)(3)

#2378

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
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 RUCIBBA/AFOSI OL-CENT SHAW AFB SC//CC//
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 RUCQVAU/AUCADRE MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
 RUEABMA/CDRMTMCEA BAYONNE NJ//EOC//
 RUEADMA/CDRMTMCWA OAKLAND CA//EOC//
 RUERNQA/CDRARPERCEN ST LOUIS MO//ARPC-ZOC-F//
 RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA/ (b)(3)
 RULSNDI/COMSC WASHINGTON DC//N3/N34//
 RHCGRSA/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//G2 ARCENT CMD//
 RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//PMJ S/CJ OP CT/BJ IP W/MACLO//
 RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR/ (b)(3)
 RUEAFEV/DIRMTMCTEA FT EUSTIS VA//MTTE//
 RUDHDMA/DMARC RESTON VA//DD/SO/PPT//
 RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA

PAGE 2 RUWSMX11376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 RJEOBKA/DPSC PHILADELPHIA PA//DPSC-W//
 RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO//IN//
 RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC//BZ//
 RHCGRSA/HQ FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCDJ-USTRANSCOM LNO//
 RUFGAID/JICEUR VAIHINGEN GE//DO//
 RHHMCMY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI//DO//
 RHCGRSA/OL D AMCOS FT MCPHERSON GA//MACLO//
 RUVHBMA/USAF CRQS NELLIS AFB NV//IN//
 RUWTEOA/USCS CNAC OKLAHOMA CITY OK//INTEL//
 RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL/ (b)(3)
 RUCQAAA/USCINCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
 RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE/ (b)(3)
 RUCLANA/4OSS SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC//IN//
 RHFJPRB/7WING DEPLOYED//OSI//
 RUWMBIZ/14AF VANDENBERG AFB CA//DOI//
 RUEBJKA/18FS EIELSON AFB AK//DOI//
 RUVRDCA/22AF DOBBINS AFB GA//DOQI//
 RUFTPIA/62OSS DEPLOYED MORON AB SP//OSN//
 RUWTRMA/64OSS REESE AFB TX//DOI//
 RUWMBIA/30OSS VANDENBERG AFB CA//DOI//

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PAGE 3 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
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 RUVMATA/92OSS FAIRCHILD AFB WA//OSN//
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 RHJCIBB/100ARW DET3 ISTRES FR
 RUVABAA/122FW FORT WAYNE IN//IN//
 RUEOLIE/143ALG QUONSET STATE APRT RI//IN//
 RUEBIEA/175FG MARTIN STATE APRT MD//IN//
 RUVRBHA/186ARG KEY FIELD MS//IN//
 RUEBJKA/354OSS EIESLSON AFB AK//DOI//
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 RHFIAAA/452OSF MARCH AFB CA//DOI//
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 RHAKAAA/603ALSG KADENA AB JA//IN//
 RUCLANA/916OSF SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC//IN//
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 RUEBBMA/621AMOS DEPLOYED POPE AFB NC//IN//
 RHCCAAA/62TALCE DEPLOYED GRIFFISS AFB NY//IN//

PAGE 4 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 RHFJPRB/RRTF ROOSEVELT ROADS PR//IN//
 RHETCSA/CJTF-186//INTEL//
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 RUVOAAA/507ARG TINKER AFB OK//DOI//

INFO: RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE
 RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC/ (b)(3)
 P 250001Z OCT 94
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 TO AIG 8008
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3)
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 RUCQVAU/AUCADRE MAXWELL AFB AL//IN//
 RUEABMA/CDRMTMCEA BAYONNE NJ//EOC//
 RUEADMA/CDRMTMCWA OAKLAND CA//EOC//
 RUERNQA/CDRARPERCEN ST LOUIS MO//ARPC-ZOC-F//
 RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA/ (b)(3)
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 RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR/ (b)(3)
 RUEAFEV/DIRMTMCTEA FT EUSTIS VA//MTTE//
 RUDHDMA/DMARC RESTON VA//DD/SO/PPT//
 RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA

PAGE 2 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
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 RHHMCMY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI//DO//
 RHCGRSA/OL D AMCOS FT MCPHERSON GA//MACLO//
 RUVHBMA/USAF CRQS NELLIS AFB NV//IN//
 RUWTEOA/USCS CNAC OKLAHOMA CITY OK//INTEL//
 RUCJACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL/ (b)(3)
 RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
 RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE (b)(3)
 RUCLANA/40SS SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC//IN//
 RHFJPRB/7WING DEPLOYED//OSI//
 RUWMBIZ/14AF VANDENBERG AFB CA//DOI//
 RUEBJKA/18FS EIELSON AFB AK//DOI//
 RUVRDCA/22AF DOBBINS AFB GA//DOQI//
 RUFTPIA/620SS DEPLOYED MORON AB SP//OSN//
 RUWTRMA/640SS REESE AFB TX//DOI//
 RUWMBIA/300SS VANDENBERG AFB CA//DOI//

PAGE 3 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 RUFPAAB/81FS AVIANO AB IT//DOI//
 RHFQAAA/860SS RAMSTEIN AB GE//DOI//
 RUCUFED/900SS FE WARREN AFB WY//DO22I//
 RUVMATA/920SS FAIRCHILD AFB WA//OSN//
 RUVOBQA/970SS ALTUS AFB OK//IN//
 RHJCIBB/100ARW DET3 ISTRES FR
 RJVABAA/122FW FORT WAYNE IN//IN//
 RUEOLIE/143ALG QUONSET STATE APRT RI//IN//
 RUEBIEA/175FG MARTIN STATE APRT MD//IN//
 RUVRBHA/186ARG KEY FIELD MS//IN//
 RUEBJKA/3540SS EIESLSON AFB AK//DOI//
 RUCLFNA/3470SS MOODY AFB GA//OSN//
 RHFIAAA/4520SF MARCH AFB CA//DOI//
 RUEOLIA/621AMOG MCGUIRE AFB NJ//CC//
 RHAKAAA/603ALSG KADENA AB JA//IN//
 RUCLANA/9160SF SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC//IN//
 RUCLEFA/186AREFG DEPLOYED HOMESTEAD AFB FL//IN//
 RUVHTRA/615AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA//IN//
 RUEBBMA/621AMOS DEPLOYED POPE AFB NC//IN//
 RHCCAAA/62TALCE DEPLOYED GRIFFISS AFB NY//IN//

PAGE 4 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 RHFJPRB/RRITF ROOSEVELT ROADS PR//IN//
 RHETCSA/CJTF-186//INTEL//
 RUEOIFA/621AMCS DEPLOYED DOHA KUWAIT//IN//
 RUVACEA/161ARG DEPLOYED LAJES//IN//
 RUFTPIA/620SS DEPLOYED MORON AB SP//IN//
 RUVOAAA/507ARG TINKER AFB OK//DOI//

SUBJ:

(b)(3)

TEXT:

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT
SECTION 1 OF 3
QQQQ

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

SUBJ: (b)(3)

(b)(3)

GENTEXT/(U) SEE OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS/SEE USTRANSCOM ITEMS
OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST SECTION//
RMKS/

PAGE 5 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL

-
1. (U) LISTING OF USTRANSCOM DISUM ARTICLES:
 - A. ~~(S)~~ HAITI: "POLICE RESTRUCTURING UNDERWAY" (U)
 - B. ~~(S/NF)~~ FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: "SITUATION UPDATE" (U)
 - C. ~~(S/NF)~~ RWANDA: "UNAMIR WANTS MORE TROOPS" (U)
 - D. ~~(S/NF)~~ SRI LANKA: "PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ASSASSINATED" (U)
 - E. ~~(S/NF/WW/NC)~~ GLOBAL NOTE: SOMALIA (U)
 2. ~~(S/NF/WW/NC)~~ USTRANSCOM ITEMS OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST (U).
 - A. ~~(S)~~ HAITI: "POLICE RESTRUCTURING UNDERWAY" -- TRAINING HAS
BEGUN FOR FAD'H SELECTED FOR RETENTION AND RETRAINING FOR HAITI'S
NEW POLICE FORCE. PRESIDENT ARISTIDE HAS PLACED KEY SUPPORTERS IN
IMPORTANT POLICE POSITIONS, SOME WITH CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL AND
HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS. THE NEW POLICE FORCE WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT FOR SECURING HAITIAN DEMOCRACY AND ENSURING LAW AND ORDER,
A MISSION NOW LARGELY PERFORMED BY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (MNF).

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- (1) ~~(S)~~ THE VETTING PROCESS FOR THE NEW HAITIAN POLICE FORCE

PAGE 6 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
BEGAN 21 OCT. FAD'H MEMBERS SEEKING TO BECOME MEMBERS OF THE NEW
POLICE FORCE ARE CHOSEN BY A COMMITTEE OF OFFICERS WHICH WAS ITSELF
APPOINTED BY ARISTIDE'S DEFENSE MINISTER BELIOTE. PROSPECTIVE
MEMBERS ARE SCREENED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS. ACCORDING TO USACOM, THE INITIAL VETTING MAY
RESULT IN 375 INDIVIDUALS BEING APPOINTED TO THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM CLASS WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO COMMENCE 24 OCT. ALL PORT-AU-
PRINCE POLICE COMPANIES ARE SCHEDULED TO BE VETTED BY 29 OCT, WITH
VETTING OF THE FAD'H THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE COUNTRY EXPECTED TO
BE COMPLETED BY MID-DECEMBER.

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- (2) ~~(S)~~ ARISTIDE'S APPOINTMENTS TO IMPORTANT POLICE POSITIONS
IN PORT-AU-PRINCE INCLUDE FORMER MEMBERS OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY SERVICE AND THE NOW DEFUNCT LEFT-WING 17 SEP MOVEMENT.
THESE INCLUDE THE COMMANDER OF THE AFFLUENT PETIONEVILLE DISTRICT,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE 4TH AND 40TH POLICE COMPANY. OF PARTICULAR NOTE IS THE NEW EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE ANTI-GANG COMPANY, LT RICHARD SALOMON. SALOMON IS CONSIDERED SADISTIC BY HIS PEERS AND IS WIDELY BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXECUTION AND

PAGE 7 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
DISMEMBERMENT OF FIVE YOUTHS IN JULY 1991. AT THAT TIME, HE WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST BY CEDRAS, DESPITE REPEATED ATTEMPTS BY ARISTIDE TO HAVE HIM FREED. SALOMON ESCAPED IN THE CONFUSION FOLLOWING ARISTIDE'S OVERTHROW. DIA ASSESSES THAT AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE ANTI-GANG UNIT, SALOMON WILL BE A CRITICAL PLAYER IN MAINTAINING ORDER AND CONTROLLING CRIME IN PORT-AU-PRINCE.

(3) ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIVILIANIZED, NON-POLITICIZED POLICE FORCE IS A MAJOR REQUIREMENT FOR HAITI'S SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. IT IS ALSO A PREREQUISITE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC ORDER. IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK SINCE THE POLICE HAVE NOT ENJOYED PUBLIC RESPECT IN MANY YEARS, RELYING ON BRUTE FORCE AND TERROR TO MAINTAIN ORDER, AND SINCE THE ARRIVAL OF US FORCES, DO NOT EVEN HAVE REPRESSION TO FALL BACK ON. GETTING A HANDLE ON THE CRIME PROBLEM IN THE COUNTRY IS ESSENTIAL TO HOLD THE CONFIDENCE OF THE BUSINESS CLASS AND ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT. IT ALSO REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE APPOINTMENT OF PRO-ARISTIDE STALWARTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH QUESTIONABLE BACKGROUNDS SUCH AS SALOMON, WILL DO MUCH TO INCREASE THE PROFESSIONALISM OF A NEW HAITIAN

PAGE 8 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
POLICE FORCE. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: "SITUATION UPDATE" -- THE UN ENVOY TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ANNOUNCED AGREEMENTS FOR THE REMOVAL OF BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS (BIH) FROM THE MT IGMAN AREA OF THE SARAJEVO DMZ AND FOR THE SAFE PASSAGE OF UNHCR CONVOYS THROUGH BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (B-H). ALTHOUGH PROMISING, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS IS TENTATIVE AND WILL REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT GIVE AND TAKE FROM ALL SIDES IN THE CONFLICT.

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ ON 22 OCT, UN SPECIAL ENVOY AKASHI ANNOUNCED THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO WITHDRAW ITS 500 TROOPS FROM THE MT IGMAN AREA IN THE SARAJEVO DMZ BY NOON LOCAL TIME ON 24 OCT 1994. AKASHI STATED THE AGREEMENT WITH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT STIPULATES THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE BETWEEN 24 AND 36 HOURS TO COMPLETE.

(2) ~~(S)~~ IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE ANNOUNCEMENT, AKASHI ALSO STATED BOSNIAN SERB PRESIDENT KARADZIC HAD GUARANTEED BOSNIAN SERB ARMY (BSA) FORCES WOULD ALLOW SAFE PASSAGE OF UNHCR CONVOYS THROUGH

PAGE 9 RUWSMXI1376 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
BSA-HELD TERRITORY. IN TURN, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT VICE PRESIDENT GANIC INDICATED THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPROVE THE

SECURITY ON THE MT IGMAN ROAD INTO SARAJEVO WHICH HAS BEEN USED TO BRING HUMANITARIAN AID AND FUEL CONVOYS INTO SARAJEVO. THE BSA HAS REPEATEDLY SHELLED THE ROAD PREVENTING PASSAGE OF CONVOYS. THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT IS LINKING THE UN AGREEMENT ON BETTER SECURITY FOR THE MT IGMAN ROAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS FROM THE SARAJEVO DMZ. A UN SPOKESMAN INDICATED MEETINGS CONCERNING THE ROAD WOULD BE HELD AGAIN ON 24 OCT.

(3) ~~(C/NF)~~ UNITED NATIONS RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE MT IGMAN ROAD MAY JEOPARDIZE THE TWO AGREEMENTS ANNOUNCED BY AKASHI. BOSNIAN OFFICIALS CONDITION THEIR WITHDRAWAL OF THE 500 TROOPS UPON UN FORCES SECURING THE ROADS ON MT IGMAN FOR HUMANITARIAN AID AND FUEL CONVOYS. A SENIOR UN OFFICIAL STATED PUBLICLY THAT THE UN LACKED THE RESOURCES TO SECURE THE ROADS.

(4) ~~(S/NF)~~ COMMENT: IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED TO PROVIDE UN SECURITY OF THE IGMAN ROAD, THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MOST LIKELY BEGIN A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE 500 TROOPS FROM THE MT IGMAN DMZ
~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT
 SECTION 2 OF 3

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SUBJ: (b)(3)

ON 24 OCT AND BSA PRESIDENT KARADZIC WILL UPHOLD THE AGREEMENT TO LET UNHCR CONVOYS PASSED THROUGH SAFELY. DUE TO THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE AREA, THE BIH CAN PROBABLY AFFECT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WHILE PORTRAYING THEIR ACTION AS COMPLETE COMPLIANCE. SINCE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE UN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY, A MORE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL IS UNLIKELY UNLESS FURTHER TALKS RESOLVE THE ISSUE. IN TURN, A FAILURE OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS TO WITHDRAWAL THEIR TROOPS FROM THE MT IGMAN DMZ COULD RESULT IN A SERIOUS ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE SARAJEVO AREA. THE BSA

PAGE 5 RUWSMXI1377 ~~S E C R E T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 PREVIOUSLY STATED THEY WILL REMOVE THE BIH BY FORCE IF NECESSARY

(b)(3)

1.4c

C. ~~(C/NF)~~ RWANDA: "UNAMIR WANTS MORE TROOPS" -- THE UN MILITARY MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR II) HAS URGENTLY REQUESTED MORE TROOPS TO REACT TO AN ANTICIPATED DETERIORATION IN SECURITY WHEN THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) IMPLEMENTS PLANS TO FORCE DISPLACED PERSONS OUT OF CAMPS. THE US COULD BE ASKED FOR LOGISTIC/LIFT ASSISTANCE IN ACCELERATING DEPLOYMENT OF ZAMBIAN AND INDIAN BATTALIONS. THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN TANZANIA CONTINUES TO INCREASE AND CONDITIONS ARE LIKELY TO DETERIORATE DURING THE UPCOMING RAINY SEASON.

(1) ~~(C)~~ THE RPA HAS BEGUN TO FORCE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (DPS), SOME 1.5 MILLION--ALMOST ALL HUTUS, OUT OF LARGE CAMPS RUN BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN THE SOUTHWEST. OPERATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO EXPAND SIGNIFICANTLY THIS WEEK. THE RPA SAYS THE DPS ARE A DRAIN ON NATIONAL RESOURCES AND SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR HOMES TO HELP REBUILD THE COUNTRY. THE RPA IS PROBABLY ALSO CONCERNED HUTU MILITIAS CONTROL THE CAMP POPULATIONS AND ARE INCITING THEM TO

PAGE 6 RUWSMXI1377 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 OPPOSE THE RPA. FORCING DPS OUT OF THE CAMPS WILL REQUIRE FORCE
 AND WILL LEAD TO WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS
 CRITICIZED AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT LAST WEEK THAT ACCUSED
 THE RPA OF KILLING HUTUS IN THE CAMPS.

(2) (C) THE UNAMIR II COMMANDER HAS URGENTLY REQUESTED
 ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT OF THE INDIAN AND ZAMBIAN BATTALIONS, WHICH
 HAVE FACED DELAYS IN DEPLOYING TO KEY SECTORS IN THE SOUTHWEST.
 THE US MAY BE ASKED TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC AND LIFT ASSISTANCE TO
 HASTEN THE ARRIVAL OF THESE UNITS. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE BATTALIONS
 WILL BRING UNAMIR II UP TO ITS AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 5,500.

(3) (C) THE SITUATION FOR REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS IN TANZANIA
 WILL LIKELY DETERIORATE WITH THE RAINY SEASON. THE NUMBER OF
 RWANDAN HUTUS IN TANZANIA HAS BEEN GROWING BY 1,000 A DAY SINCE
 EARLY LAST MONTH. SUPPLIES OF FOOD, WATER, AND OTHER NECESSITIES
 ARE GROSSLY INADEQUATE FOR THE 540,000 REFUGEES THERE. THE
 SITUATION IS ALREADY UNDERMINING SECURITY FOR REFUGEES AND AID
 WORKERS AND STRENGTHENING HUTU EXTREMISTS. UNLESS THE RPF
 GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI IS ABLE TO ASSUAGE HUTU FEARS OF REPRISALS FOR

PAGE 7 RUWSMXI1377 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 THE GENOCIDE OF TUTSIS EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN
 TANZANIA WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND THE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY
 SITUATIONS WILL WORSEN.

(4) (C) TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN CAMPS IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA.
 HUTU MILITIAS CONTINUE TO INTIMIDATE AND OCCASIONALLY KILL REFUGEES
 TO PREVENT THEIR RETURN TO RWANDA. NEW THREATS HAVE BEEN ISSUED ON
 HUTU RADIO THAT A GUERRILLA ARMY IS BEING TRAINED TO RECONQUER
 RWANDA. THE UN WILL PROBABLY VOTE THIS WEEK ON SETTING UP WAR
 CRIMES TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA WHICH WILL FURTHER INCREASE TENSIONS.
 BURUNDI HAS CLOSED ITS BORDER WITH RWANDA DUE TO CONCERNS THAT HUTU
 MILITIAS ARE CROSSING OVER TO INCITE VIOLENCE.

(5) (C/NF) COMMENT: THUS FAR, THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED LOTS
 OF ADVICE AND CRITICISM FROM OUTSIDERS BUT LITTLE MATERIAL
 ASSISTANCE IN SOLVING ITS PROBLEMS. THE GOVERNMENT FEELS UNAMIR IS
 PROTECTING PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE FROM THE PREVIOUS REGIME, WHILE
 THEIR OWN ACTIONS ARE BEING EXAMINED UNDER A MICROSCOPE BY THE
 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY. THE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE
 DECIDED THE URGENCY OF ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS OUTWEIGHS THE NEED TO

PAGE 8 RUWSMXI1377 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
 WAIT FOR INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL OR ASSISTANCE. SUCH A DECISION
 WOULD NOT ONLY ALIENATE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT COULD LEAD
 TO RENEWED CONFLICT ALONG THE ZAIRIAN, BURUNDIAN AND TANZANIAN
 BORDERS, AND REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT NORMALCY WILL SOON RETURN
 TO THE REGION. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

D. (C/NF) SRI LANKA: "PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ASSASSINATED" --

SRI LANKAN OPPOSITION LEADER AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE GAMINI DISSANAYAKE WAS ASSASSINATED IN A SUICIDE BOMB BLAST 24 OCT. AROUND 60 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND MANY MORE INJURED WHEN THE BOMB EXPLODED AT A PUBLIC RALLY IN NORTHERN COLOMBO. DISSANAYAKE IS THE SECOND LEADER OF THE UNITED NATIONAL PARTY (UNP) TO BE ASSASSINATED IN 18 MONTHS. TAMIL REBELS ARE THE PRIME SUSPECTS IN THE KILLINGS, WHICH HAVE DERAILED PEACE TALKS.

(1) ~~(C/NF)~~ DISSANAYAKE, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR THE MAIN OPPOSITION UNP, WAS AMONG APPROXIMATELY 60 KILLED BY A SUICIDE BOMB BLAST AT A POLITICAL RALLY IN NORTHERN COLOMBO 24 OCT. OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES REPORTED TO HAVE DIED IN THE BOMBING INCLUDE THE

PAGE 9 RUWSMXI1377 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE UNP AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. THE UNP WAS THE SRI LANKAN RULING PARTY FOR 17 YEARS BEFORE BEING UPSET BY THE PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE (PA) IN THE 16 AUG NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN THE UNP THREE DAYS TO NOMINATE ANOTHER CANDIDATE. DISSANAYAKE'S FUNERAL WILL BE 27 OCT IN COLOMBO, AND THE ELECTION IS STILL SCHEDULED FOR 9 NOV.

(2) ~~(C/NF)~~ DISSANAYAKE WAS A FORMIDABLE OPPONENT TO PRIME MINISTER KUMARATUNGA'S BID FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF HER PEACE TALKS WITH TAMIL SEPARATISTS. NO ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING, HOWEVER, THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE), WITH A LONG HISTORY OF ASSASSINATIONS, SUICIDE BOMBINGS, AND CLOSENESS TO KUMARATUNGA, ARE CONSIDERED BY THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY TO BE PRIME SUSPECTS. THEY CITE SUCH LTTE TRADEMARKS AS THE USE OF A SUICIDE BOMBER, THE PRESENCE OF PELLETS IN THE STRUCTURE INDICATING A CLAYMORE TYPE OF BOMB (SIMILAR TO THOSE USED IN PREVIOUS LTTE BOMBINGS), AND THE FACT THAT DISSANAYAKE HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED A PRIME TARGET OF THE LTTE. MEANWHILE, PEACE TALKS WITH THE REBELS, WHICH WERE SCHEDULED FOR A SECOND ROUND, HAVE BEEN POSTPONED.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT
SECTION 3 OF 3

QQQQ

SUBJ:

(b)(3)

(3) ~~(C/NF)~~ THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND PLACED THE ENTIRE ISLAND UNDER "INDEFINITE" CURFEW. ARMY LEAVE HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND ROAD BLOCKS HAVE BEEN REESTABLISHED IN COLOMBO. THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS, HOWEVER, AND INITIAL REACTION IN COLOMBO APPEARED TO BE CALM. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION AND SWIFT PUNISHMENT OF THE PERPETRATORS. POLICE OFFICIALS REPORT FOREIGNERS MAY USE THEIR PASSPORTS, OR THEIR AIRLINE TICKETS IF TRAVELING TO

PAGE 5 RUWSMXI1378 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL
OR FROM THE AIRPORT, AS CURFEW PASSES.

(4) ~~(C/NF)~~ COMMENT: THE LTTE IS ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST COMMITTED AND EFFECTIVE TERRORIST GROUPS. AMONG ITS PAST SUCCESSES

ARE THE ASSASSINATIONS OF FORMER PRESIDENT PREMADASA AND FORMER INDIAN PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI. IF THIS ATTACK IS IDENTIFIED AS AN LTTE OPERATION, THE POLITICAL BACKLASH MAY MAKE CONTINUED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL NEGOTIATION HAVE FAILED AS THE LTTE CONTINUED ITS GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TERRORISM TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND IN SRI LANKA'S NORTHERN AND EASTERN REGIONS. MEANWHILE, THE UNP IS LEFT IN DISARRAY AND WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO COME UP WITH A CANDIDATE WITHIN THE THREE-DAY DEADLINE. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT GENERALLY TARGET FOREIGNERS, LTTE ATTACKS POSE AN INADVERTENT THREAT TO AMCITS IN SRI LANKA.

(b)(3)

(b)(3) 1.4c (b)(3)

E. (~~S/NF/WN/NC~~) GLOBAL NOTE: SOMALIA

(1) (~~S/NF/WN/NC~~) SOMALIA: REPORTING INDICATES A POSSIBLY

PAGE 6 RUWSMXI1378 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL VIOLENT OUTCOME TO THE SCHEDULED LATE OCT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS IN MOGADISHU. VIOLENCE IS EXPECTED IF ALI MAHDI AND ABGAL LEADERS CONCLUDE SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE (SNA) LEADER GENERAL AIDEED IS POISED TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. MEMBERS OF THE ABGAL CLAN SUSPECT SNA ATTEMPTS TO CAST ALI MAHDI'S PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS AS FALLING UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS AS A TRANSPARENT PLOY TO HUMILIATE ALI MAHDI AND TO UNDERMINE HIS INFLUENCE AS A FACTION LEADER. BOTH AIDEED'S HABR GEDIR CLAN AND THE ABGAL ARE REPORTEDLY MASSING MEN AND ARMS IN MOGADISHU IN THE EVENT THE TALKS LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION.

(b)(3) 1.4c

3. (~~S~~) USTRANSCOM WATCHCON STATUS/AREAS OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERN:

TITLE	USTRANSCOM WATCHCON STATUS	TO FROM		DATE
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HAITI	INTERNAL	1	2	15 SEP 94
IRAQ	INTERNAL	1	5	04 AUG 93
SOMALIA	INTERNAL	1	2	28 JUL 93

PAGE 7 RUWSMXI1378 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOCONTRACT NOFORN WNINTEL

YUGOSLAVIA	INTERNAL	1	2	28 JUL 93
CUBA	INTERNAL	3	2	23 SEP 94
RWANDA	INTERNAL	3	2	30 SEP 94
ALGERIA	INTERNAL	3	5	28 FEB 94
ANGOLA	INTERNAL	3	2	07 DEC 93
COLOMBIA	INTERNAL	3	4	23 MAR 93
GEORGIA	INTERNAL	3	2	10 DEC 93
GREECE/TURKEY	REGIONAL	3	5	28 SEP 94
IRAN	REGIONAL	3	5	19 AUG 94
ISRAEL	INTERNAL	3	5	28 FEB 94
LIBERIA	INTERNAL	3	4	09 JUN 94
NIGERIA	INTERNAL	3	5	31 AUG 94
NORTH KOREA	INTERNAL	3	4	28 JUL 93
PARAGUAY	INTERNAL	3	4	02 MAY 94

RUSSIA	INTERNAL	3	2	15 OCT 93
SUDAN	INTERNAL	3	5	26 AUG 93
TAJIKISTAN	REGIONAL	3	2	29 OCT 93
TURKEY/ARMENIA	REGIONAL	3	4	12 AUG 93
VENEZUELA	INTERNAL	3	5	29 OCT 93
YEMEN	INTERNAL	4	3	22 SEP 94

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ZAIRE	INTERNAL	3	4	13 AUG 93
BURUNDI	INTERNAL	3	4	01 FEB 94
CAMBODIA	INTERNAL	4	3	10 NOV 93
CHAD	INTERNAL	4	5	03 JAN 92
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	INTERNAL	4	5	07 JUL 94
EGYPT	INTERNAL	4	5	14 DEC 92
EL SALVADOR	INTERNAL	4	3	14 AUG 92
GUATEMALA	INTERNAL	4	5	03 JUN 93
MACEDONIA	REGIONAL	3	4	20 OCT 94
MOLDOVA	REGIONAL	4	5	29 OCT 92
PAKISTAN/INDIA	REGIONAL	4	5	29 OCT 92
PERU	INTERNAL	4	3	15 NOV 93
PHILIPPINES	INTERNAL	4	3	07 JAN 92
SPRATLY ISLANDS/ SOUTH CHINA SEA	REGIONAL	4	5	27 JUL 94
SRI LANKA	INTERNAL	4	5	19 AUG 94
TURKEY/GREECE	REGIONAL	3	5	28 SEP 94

LAST UPDATE: 20 OCT 94

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4. ~~(S/NF)~~ OVER THE NEXT THREE DAYS, MISSIONS OF INTEREST TO AMC CREWS ARE SCHEDULED TO TRANSIT THE FOLLOWING AREAS: ANGOLA, BURUNDI, EGYPT, ISRAEL, RWANDA, PHILIPPINES, HAITI, PERU, EL SALVADOR, COLOMBIA, PARAGUAY, AND CUBA. BASED ON PARA 3 ABOVE, THESE MISSIONS ARE OF INCREASED INTEREST TO USTRANSCOM AND ARE PROVIDED TO KEEP READERS ABREAST OF OUR WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE NEEDS.

5. (U)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

DECL/OADR//
BT
#2212

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

(b)(3)

TOR: 941024191504 M1322999
<^TOR>941024191520 M1323001
<^TOR>941024191624 M1323003

DIST: SIT: BRANSCUM NSC VAX
[]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: SECRET

LINE1: PATMZYUW [1.4c] 0734 3352027-MORN-- [1.4c]

LINE2: ZNY MMORN

LINE3: [(b)(3)]

LINE4: P 011830Z DEC 94

OSRI: [1.4c]

DTG: 011830Z DEC 94

ORIG: [(b)(3)]

TO: RASIL
AZHIR
AINOZ
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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST {WWF} 01 DEC 94 {U}
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{U} STRATEGIC WARNING ISSUES FOR THE COMING WEEK.

TEXT: ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT
SECTION 1 OF 8
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[1.4c] [(b)(3)]

SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST {WWF} 01 DEC 94 {U}
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{U} STRATEGIC WARNING ISSUES FOR THE COMING WEEK.

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE WARNING STAFF AND ON OCCASION THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL WARNING STAFF, U.S. MILITARY SERVICES INTELLIGENCE STAFFS, AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OF ALLIED NATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE DOD WARNING SYSTEM CONCERNING POTENTIAL THREATS TO U.S./ALLIED INTERESTS. THE ALLIED INPUTS MIGHT NOT REFLECT DIA OR DOD JUDGMENTS, BUT ARE INCLUDED TO GIVE CONSUMERS AN APPRECIATION OF A RANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ISSUES. THESE ANALYSES DO NOT NECESSARILY FORECAST MOST LIKELY OUTCOMES, BUT SEEK TO IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY HARMFUL EFFECTS WHICH COULD ARISE FROM DEVELOPING SITUATIONS. THE FOLLOWING AREAS ARE COVERED IN THIS REPORT:

- CONTENTS
- A. IRAQ
 - B. CROATIA
 - C. BOSNIA
 - D. NORTH KOREA
 - E. RUSSIA
 - F. RWANDA-ZAIRE
 - G. RWANDA
 - H. SURINAME
 - I. PRIMARY WARNING CONCERNS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2014-0295-11 05126116 KDE

J. OTHER WARNING CONCERNS

K. WARNING NOTES:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. IRAQ

~~(S)~~ SADDAM MAY BE CHALLENGING THE COALITION BY DEPLOYING A REPUBLICAN GUARDS ARMORED DIVISION NEAR THE 32N PARALLEL.

B. CROATIA

~~(S)~~ FAILED DIPLOMACY AND THE SPECTER OF A GROWING BOSNIAN SERB-KRAJINA SERB ALLIANCE MAY PROMPT ZAGREB TO MILITARY ACTION.

~~(S)~~ ANY INCIDENT COULD IGNITE ANOTHER ROUND OF FIGHTING. THE EFFORTS OF LORD OWEN TO REKINDLE INTEREST IN THE ECONOMIC ACCORD MAY EASE TENSIONS.

C. BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

~~(S)~~ BOSNIAN MUSLIMS MAY ATTACK ELSEWHERE IN BOSNIA TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY. THE SERBS WILL CONTINUE TO HAMMER 5TH CORPS.

D. NORTH KOREA

~~(S)~~ A FROG ROCKET-EQUIPPED UNIT HAS BEEN MOVED FORWARD TO A LOCATION FROM WHICH IT THREATENS SEOUL'S SUBURBS.

E. RUSSIA

~~(S)~~ PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S ULTIMATUM MAY SET THE STAGE FOR INCREASED RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN THE BREAK-AWAY CHECHENYA REGION.

~~(S)~~ RUSSIAN INTERVENTION COULD GALVANIZE CHECHNYAN CITIZENS TO RESIST. CHECHENS COULD RESORT TO TERRORIST ACTIONS IN OTHER REGIONS OF RUSSIA. CHECHEN DEFIANCE COULD IGNITE INSTABILITY IN OTHER SEPARATIST-MINDED RUSSIAN REPUBLICS.

F. RWANDA-ZAIRE

~~(S)~~ NGOS AND REFUGEES COULD BECOME VICTIMS OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AND RWANDAN HUTU TROOPS.

G. RWANDA

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT

SECTION 2 OF 8

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST {WWF} 01 DEC 94 {U}

~~(S)~~ AS EX-FAR CAPABILITIES INCREASE AND RPA CAPABILITIES DECLINE, THE POTENTIAL FOR UNREST IN RWANDA WILL GROW.

H. SURINAME

~~(S)~~ CIVIL UNREST MAY INTENSIFY AND SPREAD.

I. PRIMARY WARNING CONCERNS

IRAQ

~~(S)~~ (b)(3)

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ BAGHDAD MAY INTEND TO TEST THE U.S. DEMARCHE PROHIBITING ALL REPUBLICAN GUARDS FORCES COMMAND {RGFC} MOVEMENTS SOUTH OF THE 32D PARALLEL WITH THE DEPLOYMENT SOUTHWARD OF THE ENTIRE MADINA RGFC ARMORED DIVISION.

-- THE 14TH MECHANIZED BRIGADE HAD DEPARTED ITS GARRISONS AT MUSAYYIB BARRACKS BY 30 NOVEMBER, AND THE MADINA'S 10TH ARMORED

BRIGADE WAS DEPARTING THE FALLUJA BARRACKS VIA THE NEARBY RAIL YARD. THE DIVISION'S 2D ARMORED BRIGADE HAD DEPARTED ITS GARRISON AT FT RASHIDIYAH BY THE 25TH.

EO 13526 1.4c

(S/NF/WN) DEPLOYMENT PREPARATIONS, INCLUDING THE UNPRECEDENTED DEPLOYMENT OF ALL OF THE DIVISION'S MANEUVER AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS, INDICATE THE MADINA WILL CONDUCT THE RGFC'S MOST SIGNIFICANT TRAINING DEPLOYMENT SINCE THE GULF WAR. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 949 PROHIBITS IRAQ FROM "ENHANCING" ITS "MILITARY CAPACITY IN SOUTHERN IRAQ," GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES NORTH. THE PROXIMITY OF FORCES TO THE 32ND PARALLEL SUGGESTS THE TRAINING MAY BE INTENDED TO TEST UN/U.S. RESOLVE.

CROATIA

(b)(3)

(S) THE LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF NATO MILITARY POWER IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND FAILED CROATIAN-KRAJINA SERB DIPLOMACY HAVE INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF CROATIA'S REJECTION OF ANY EXTENSION OF THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE USE OF FORCE TO REESTABLISH ZAGREB'S AUTHORITY OVER SERB-CONTROLLED KRAJINA.

-- CROATIA'S PRESIDENT TUDJMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT UNLESS THERE IS PROGRESS IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA INTO CROATIA BY NEXT MONTH, CROATIA WILL NOT RENEW THE UNPROFOR MANDATE.

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF) 01 DEC 94 (U)

-- THE KRAJINA SERB REJECTION OF ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES HAS REMOVED ONE OF THE LAST OBSTACLES THAT HAVE PREVENTED CROATIAN PRESIDENT TUDJMAN FROM APPROVING MILITARY ACTION. IN THE EVENT OF A CROATIAN ATTACK, THE CROATIAN-KRAJINA CONFLICT COULD RAPIDLY DETERIORATE INTO GENERAL WARFARE.

(S) SINCE CROATIA'S INDEPENDENCE, NO PROGRESS IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA HAS BEEN MADE, DESPITE THE VANCE PLAN AND THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR. CROATIA HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN CAUTIONED TO AVOID MILITARY ACTION AND HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE DIPLOMACY IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA. THE EMERGING KRAJINA SERB-BOSNIAN SERB ALLIANCE WILL FURTHER CIRCUMSCRIBE ZAGREB'S ABILITY TO FORCIBLY REUNIFY THE COUNTRY. ZAGREB MAY JUDGE TIME IS NOW ITS ENEMY, AND FEEL COMPELLED TO ACT MILITARILY WHILE THE SERBS STILL

HAVE A BOSNIAN MUSLIM ENEMY TO DEAL WITH.
BULLET: CROATIA MAY REPUDIATE UNPROFOR (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

BULLET: CROATS PREPARED TO INITIATE OPERATIONS. (C)
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST {WWF} 01 DEC 94 {U}

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

NORTH KOREA

(b)(3)

(S) THE FORWARD POSITIONING OF AT LEAST ONE FROG ROCKET

EO 13526 1.4c

1.4c PYONGYANG

IS PROBABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE PRESENT POLITICAL CLIMATE WILL
MITIGATE CONCERN 1.4c

1.4c NEVERTHELESS, AT THEIR MAXIMUM RANGE OF

70 KM, NORTH KOREA NOW HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DELIVERING FROG-7S
TO THE NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF SEOUL WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING.

BULLET: ROCKETS CAN TARGET SEOUL SUBURBS. (S)

J. OTHER WARNING CONCERNS

RUSSIA (CHECHENYA)

1.4b, 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4c

BULLET: CHECHNYA AN INCREASING DOMESTIC CHALLENGE FOR YELTSIN
(U) (b)(3)
(S) ESCALATION IN CHECHNYA MAY LEAVE YELTSIN WITH ANOTHER BLOODY
CONFLICT TO MANAGE IN THE CAUCASUS. CHECHEN PRESIDENT DUDAYEV'S
SEPARATIST AMBITIONS MAKE MOSCOW EAGER TO TOPPLE HIM, BUT TO DO
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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT
SECTION 5 OF 8

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF) 01 DEC 94 (U)
SO WITH DIRECT MILITARY ACTION COULD ALIENATE CHECHENS AND OTHER
SEPARATISTS.

-- RUSSIA BEGAN BY BACKING THE OPPOSITION WITH TRAINING AND
EQUIPMENT. THE MOST RECENT OPPOSITION ATTACK ON GROZNY, THE
CAPITAL, INCLUDED T-72 TANKS, AND THERE ARE PRESS REPORTS OF
GROUND ATTACK AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT.

-- SEVERAL DOZEN RUSSIANS WERE CAPTURED IN THE BATTLE.
YELTSIN CLAIMS THEY ARE MERCENARIES. THEIR FATE, AND THE FATE OF
ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN CHECHENYA WILL BE A CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR YELTSIN.

-- IN RESPONSE, YELTSIN HAS THREATENED TO DECLARE A STATE
OF EMERGENCY, ALLOWING HIM TO DEPLOY RUSSIAN SOLDIERS INTO
CHECHENYA.

(c) YELTSIN MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO PLAY BENEVOLENT DIPLOMAT OR
STRONG ENFORCER OF RUSSIAN SECURITY. DIRECT ACTION NOW MAY LEAD
TO INCREASED CHECHEN RESENTMENT OF RUSSIANS, AND COULD GALVANIZE
CITIZENS TO RESIST RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES, RESULTING IN AN
UNPOPULAR GUERRILLA WAR. CHECHENS COULD RESORT TO TERRORIST
ACTIONS IN OTHER REGIONS OF RUSSIA, WHICH WOULD REFLECT BADLY ON
YELTSIN. HOWEVER, IF MOSCOW FAILS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY

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QUICKLY, YELTSIN COULD APPEAR WEAK. CHECHEN DEFIANCE COULD IGNITE INSTABILITY IN OTHER SEPARATIST-MINDED REPUBLICS ON RUSSIA'S VOLATILE SOUTHERN BORDER.

BULLET: ESCALATION IN CHECHNYA POSES PROBLEMS FOR YELTSIN. (C)
RWANDA-ZAIRE

(b)(3)

(C) VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO ESCALATE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AND THE RWANDAN HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA IN EASTERN ZAIRE. NGOS AND REFUGEES COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE AND MORE NGOS MAY BE FORCED TO EVACUATE.

-- LAST WEEK, THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES (FAZ) FIRED INTO A CROWD OF RWANDAN REFUGEES IN KATALE CAMP AFTER A ZAIRIAN NATIONAL WAS ROBBED BY REFUGEES. SEVERAL, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WERE KILLED.

-- FAZ TROOPS ALSO HANDED OVER 37 HUTU MILITIAMEN TO OFFICIALS OF THE KIGALI REGIME. THE EXILED HUTUS FEAR THEY WILL BE KILLED BY THE TUTSIS IN RETRIBUTION FOR THE GENOCIDE THEY CONDUCTED EARLIER THIS YEAR.

(C) THE HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, MANY OF WHOM ARE ARMED, ARE CERTAIN TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE FAZ FOR THE KILLINGS AND FOR TURNING HUTUS OVER TO THE CURRENT TUTSI-LED RWANDAN GOVERNMENT.

BULLET: VIOLENCE TO ESCALATE BETWEEN ZAIRIAN AND HUTU TROOPS.

(C)

RWANDA

(b)(3)

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT

SECTION 6 OF 8

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST (WWF) 01 DEC 94 (U)

(S/NF) RWANDA MAY FACE SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL TURMOIL FROM FORCES BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE COUNTRY.

-- THE FORMER GOVERNMENT ABSCONDED WITH STATE FUNDS WHEN IT FLED RWANDA, LEAVING THE NEW GOVERNMENT INADEQUATE MONEY TO PAY ITS TROOPS, INCLUDING THE LARGE NUMBER OF YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED, ILL-DISCIPLINED SOLDIERS WHO HAVE SWELLED ITS RANKS SINCE THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR.

-- THE FORMER ARMED FORCES OF RWANDA (EX-FAR) REPORTEDLY RETAIN SOME DEGREE OF COHESION AND CONTROL IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. A VARIETY OF SOURCES REPORT FRENCH SUPPORT MAY BE FLOWING TO THIS GROUP.

(S/NF) THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY'S (RPA'S) COHESION AND DISCIPLINE HAVE DECLINED OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF PAY. THE RPA'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS WILL SUFFER IF THIS CONDITION PERSISTS. IF REPORTED FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO THE RWANDAN REBELS IS TRUE, IT COULD BOLSTER THE EX-FAR'S ABILITY TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND IMPEDE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF STABILITY IN RWANDA.

BULLET: REBELS MAY HAVE FRENCH SUPPORT. (S/NF)

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SURINAME

(b)(3)

{C} RECENT RIOTING IN PARAMARIBO BY SCORES OF PEOPLE UPSET OVER SEVERE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS COULD INTENSIFY AND BECOME MORE WIDESPREAD.

-- ON 22 NOVEMBER, A DEMONSTRATION BY 150 UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PROTESTING HIGHER PRICES ON BASIC GOODS SWELLED TO SEVERAL THOUSAND INDIVIDUALS WHO BEGAN TO LOOT STORES, VANDALIZE PROPERTY, AND ROB PEDESTRIANS.

-- POLICE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY RESPOND TO QUELL THE RIOT DUE TO A STRIKE FOR HIGHER SALARIES.

-- ANNUAL CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION IS IN THE TRIPLE DIGITS, THE NATIONAL CURRENCY HAS FALLEN IN VALUE, AND REAL INCOMES HAVE FAILED TO KEEP PACE WITH THE RISE IN PRICES.

{C} MANY SURINAMERS REPORTEDLY PERCEIVE THE GOVERNMENT AS UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND FEAR THAT IT WILL GET WORSE BEFORE IMPROVING. INDEED, PRESIDENT VENETIAAN HAS BEEN SLOW TO ENACT REFORMS NEEDED TO REVERSE THE CURRENT ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS OF PROTEST PROBABLY WILL OCCUR. MOREOVER, IF THE POLICE STRIKE IS NOT SOON RESOLVED, CRIME AND RELATED VIOLENCE WILL ALSO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE.

BULLET: RIOTS INTENSIFY AS GOVERNMENT FAILS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC CRISIS {C}

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~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT

SECTION 7 OF 8

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST {WWF} 01 DEC 94 (U)

K. WARNING NOTES:

INDONESIA

(b)(3)

{C} A NEW CYCLE OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR UNDERSCORES THE COMPLEX POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS THAT WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE JAKARTA'S EFFORTS TO PACIFY THE PROVINCE. MOREOVER, THIS MONTH'S ETHNIC VIOLENCE WILL ALSO PROBABLY DELAY ADDITIONAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA. A MANIFESTATION OF THE LONGSTANDING TIMORESE RESENTMENT OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL, THE MILITARY OCCUPATION, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF OUTSIDE MIGRANTS TO THE PROVINCE, THE ETHNIC VIOLENCE IS BEING FANNED BY DISAFFECTED URBAN UNEMPLOYED AND STUDENTS. AN OVER-REACTION, THUS FAR CAREFULLY AVOIDED BY THE MILITARY, WOULD BROADEN ETHNIC TENSIONS TO A WIDER SEGMENT OF THE TIMORESE POPULATION.

GREECE-TURKEY

(b)(3)

{S/NF} GREEK AND TURKISH MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES CONCLUDED LAST WEEK WITH NO MAJOR INCIDENTS. THE RESIGNATION OF TURKEY'S STRIDENTLY ANTI-GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE GREEK DECISION NOT TO EXTEND THE LIMITS OF ITS TERRITORIAL SEA HAS REDUCED TENSIONS. NEVERTHELESS, REGIONAL DISPUTES AND MUTUAL DISTRUST ENSURES THAT

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THERE WILL BE LITTLE PROGRESS IN IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. GREECE MAINTAINS ITS RIGHT TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL SEA IN THE AEGEAN, AND AT SOME POINT IN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS MUST RATIFY THE LAW OF THE SEA (LOS) CONVENTION OR RISK LOSING REPRESENTATION ON THE JUDICIAL BODY CREATED TO SETTLE LOS DISPUTES. GREEK RATIFICATION OF THE LOS CONVENTION WILL AGAIN RAISE TURKISH SUSPICIONS AND WILL RESULT IN YET ANOTHER CYCLE OF ESCALATING TENSIONS.

SOMALIA

(b)(3)

{S/NF/NC} INCREASED VIOLENCE FOLLOWING THE PULL-OUT OF UNOSOM CONTINGENTS FROM SOMALIA MAY FORCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF AID ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAD PLANNED TO STAY. LAST WEEK, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS -- THE ONLY RELIEF AGENCY THAT WAS TO HAVE STAYED IN KISMAYO AFTER UNOSOM DEPARTURE, ITSELF EVACUATED. THIS WILL PROBABLY OCCUR IN OTHER AREAS AS UNOSOM FORCES DEPART BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND MARCH 1995, AND BANDITS SEIZE NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO LOOT.

BURUNDI

(b)(3)

{S/NF} THE THREAT OF LARGE-SCALE ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI IS GROWING. THE BUILDING ETHNIC TENSIONS THERE COULD RESULT IN THOUSANDS OF DEATHS IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. SUCH VIOLENCE WOULD RESULT IN MASSIVE REFUGEE FLOWS THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND WOULD #0740

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WINTEL/CONTRACT

SECTION 8 OF 8

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SUBJ: WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST {WWF} 01 DEC 94 {U}

REQUIRE COMMENSURATE HUMANITARIAN AID.

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
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