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Cable

EO 13526 1.4c

CLASS: SECRET

EO 13526 1.4c

LINE4: FM CIA

EO 13526 1.4c


DTG: 230655Z APR 94

ORIG: CIA

EO 13526 1.4c

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
EO 13526 1.4c

INFO: ****

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF [EO 13526 1.4c] 23 APRIL 1994.
CONTENTS

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ [EO 13526 1.4c]
SECTION 1 OF 2
CITE CIA 611729



EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF [EO 13526 1.4c] 23 APRIL 1994.
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1. TAJIKISTAN: PEACE TALKS HAVE SOME SUCCESS [1.4c]
2. RWANDA: REBELS ADVANCING [1.4c]
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4. EGYPT: MUBARAK TIGHTENING POLITICAL CONTROL [1.4c]

EURASIA

1. TAJIKISTAN: PEACE TALKS HAVE SOME SUCCESS [1.4c]
IN THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS, WHICH ENDED WEDNESDAY IN MOSCOW,
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION REPRESENTATIVES AGREED ON AN AGENDA,
ISSUED A JOINT APPEAL FOR AN END TO MILITARY AND "OTHER HOSTILE"
ACTIONS, AND FORMED A JOINT COMMISSION ON REFUGEES, [EO 13526 1.4c]

-- //ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT YET BEGUN TO DISCUSS THE COUNTRY'S
FUTURE POLITICAL STRUCTURE, THE TAJIKS HAVE MADE MORE PROGRESS THAN
MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED FROM THEIR OPENING POSITIONS.//
-- //FOREIGN PRESSURE, PARTICULARLY FROM RUSSIA, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND
AFGHANISTAN, PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR THE COMPROMISES.// (C NF)
THE TWO TOP OPPOSITION LEADERS JOINED THEIR DELEGATION ON SUNDAY BUT
DID NOT OFFICIALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS; THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED
THAT THEY WILL DO SO IN THE NEXT ROUND, WHICH IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR
ISLAMABAD LATE NEXT MONTH, IF THE REGIME UPGRADES THE LEVEL OF ITS
DELEGATION. [1.4c]

AFRICA

2. RWANDA: REBELS ADVANCING [1.4c]
THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT IS PUBLICLY CLAIMING VICTORIES IN THE
NORTH AND NEAR KIGALI. [EO 13526 1.4c]

[EO 13526 1.4c]

[EO 13526 1.4c]

[EO 13526 1.4c] THE RPF WILL
BE REPRESENTED AT PEACE TALKS IN TANZANIA, BUT RECENT REBEL
BROADCASTS INDICATE THAT THEY STILL REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
HUTU INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

-- //THEY MAY BE WILLING TO MEET WITH MILITARY OFFICERS AND
POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, HOWEVER, IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE GENOCIDE,
WHICH RELIEF WORKERS SAY IS SPREADING SOUTH.//

-- //THE RPF PROBABLY HOPES IT CAN PERSUADE OFFICERS AND MODERATE
HUTU POLITICIANS TO SUPPORT AN RPF-DOMINATED COALITION GOVERNMENT.//

EO 13526 1.4c

4. EGYPT: MUBARAK TIGHTENING POLITICAL CONTROL [1.4c]
CAIRO RECENTLY ABOLISHED LOCAL ELECTION OF 3,500 VILLAGE MAYORS AND THEIR 20,000 ASSISTANTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT MANY OF THEM WERE EITHER AIDING OR WERE FAILING TO ACT FORCEFULLY AGAINST ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, ACCORDING TO [EO 13526 1.4c] LOCAL PRESS REPORTS.

-- THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOW APPOINT THESE OFFICIALS SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. [1.4c]

THE LEGISLATURE RECENTLY EXTENDED THE COUNTRY'S EMERGENCY LAW FOR ANOTHER THREE YEARS ON THE BASIS OF THE DOMESTIC SECURITY SITUATION. THE LAW--IN EFFECT SINCE THE SADAT ASSASSINATION IN 1981--ALLOWS THE SECURITY SERVICES TO DETAIN AND INTERROGATE SUSPECTS FOR PROLONGED PERIODS WITHOUT FORMALLY CHARGING THEM. [1.4c]

[EO 13526 1.4c] THE GOVERNMENT LAST MONTH ARRESTED SEVERAL PROMINENT FUNDAMENTALIST CLERICS WHO, LIKE THE EXTREMISTS, ADVOCATE AN ISLAMIC STATE. A LEADING SECULAR OPPOSITION PAPER CALLED THE ARRESTS UNPRECEDENTED, AND OTHERS CLAIM PRESIDENT MUBARAK PERSONALLY

~~SECRET~~

[EO 13526 1.4c]

FINAL SECTION OF 2

EO 13526 1.4c

ORDERED THE MEASURES. CAIRO HAS ALSO WON LAWSUITS AGAINST ISLAMIC SCHOLARS WHO HAVE CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE MUFTI, WHO IS THE COUNTRY'S MOST SENIOR RELIGIOUS FIGURE AND A GOVERNMENT APPOINTEE. -- IN A HIGHLY UNUSUAL MOVE, CAIRO THIS MONTH SUED A COLUMNIST OF A LEADING PROGOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER FOR RELATIVELY MODERATE CRITICISM OF THE JUDICIARY. [1.4c]

POTENTIAL FOR MISSTEPS

[EO 13526 1.4c] PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTITERRORIST EFFORTS IS STRONG AND WILL OVERRIDE ANY CONCERN ABOUT THE LIMITS THE NEW RESTRICTIONS IMPOSE ON THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY. NEVERTHELESS, PUBLIC TOLERANCE FOR RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL MEASURES IN THE NAME OF SECURITY MIGHT ERODE IF THE GOVERNMENT IS PERCEIVED TO BE MOVING PRECIPITATELY AGAINST THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OR POPULAR INDEPENDENT CLERICS.

-- THE MORE THAN 2 MILLION NONVIOLENT ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS IN EGYPT COMMAND CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FROM A PUBLIC WHOSE PIETY AND ISLAMIC

IDENTITY CONTINUE TO GROW

EO 13526 1.4c

DRVW 23 APRIL 2014.

EO 13526 1.4c

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: SECRET
 LINE1: PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7399 1440556-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
 LINE3: RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
 LINE4: RUCKMEA T CG II MEF
 OSRI: RUEKJCS
 DTG: 231907Z MAY 94

ORIG: (b)(3)

TO: AIG 7031
 AIG 7033
(b)(3)

INFO: ****

SUBJ: THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT OFFENSIVE--DEVELOPMENTS AND

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

PASS:
(b)(3)

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 (U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT (b)(3)

(b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
 THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
 COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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 SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (b)(3)

SUBJ: THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT OFFENSIVE--DEVELOPMENTS AND
 OUTLOOK. (U)

DOI: 23 MAY 94 (AS OF 1500 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL
 TRANSLATE ITS MILITARY SUCCESS INTO POLITICAL POWER BY DEMANDING A
 LARGER ROLE FOR ITS TUTSI MINORITY. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OFFENSIVE
 WAS TO STOP THE SLAUGHTER OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS BY
 PROGOVERNMENT FORCES. AN OFFENSIVE BY THE HUTU-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT
 FORCES PROBABLY WOULD PREVENT THE REBELS FROM TAKING TOTAL CONTROL OF
 RWANDA, BUT GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE CONFINED TO THE SOUTH, WITH
 THE REBELS CONTROLLING THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. BOTH SIDES ARE
 EXPECTED EVENTUALLY TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

2. ~~(C)~~ BIRTH OF A CRISIS. PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA SUPPORTED A
 RECONCILIATION BUT DELAYED FORMING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HUTU
 HARDLINERS OPPOSED THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, AND THE ARMED FORCES RESISTED
 INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION. THE INCLUSION OF TUTSIS IN THE NEW
 MILITARY CAUSED INCREASED RESENTMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AMONG HARD-LINE
 MILITARY ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. THE AIR CRASH
 THAT KILLED THE RWANDAN AND BURUNDIAN PRESIDENTS WAS PROBABLY AN
 ASSASSINATION CONDUCTED BY HUTU MILITARY HARDLINERS.

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3. (U) KEY POINTS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.
 -- CREATION OF HUTU AND TUTSI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT.
 -- MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS IN 1995.
 -- INTEGRATION OF RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT INTO AND AN OVERALL
 REDUCTION IN THE ARMED FORCES.

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4. (S) ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER RWANDAN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA WAS KILLED, THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD IN KIGALI BEGAN SYSTEMATICALLY EXECUTING PROMINENT TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS SYMPATHETIC TO RECONCILIATION. THE VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND VARIOUS YOUTH MILITIAS WAS NOT SPONTANEOUS BUT WAS DIRECTED BY HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS WITHIN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO MANY SOURCES. IN ADDITION TO THE RANDOM MASSACRES OF TUTSIS BY HUTU MILITIAS AND INDIVIDUALS, AN ORGANIZED, PARALLEL GENOCIDE CAMPAIGN BY THE ARMY APPARENTLY IS UNDER WAY TO DESTROY THE LEADERS IN THE TUTSI COMMUNITY. THE ORIGINAL INTENT WAS TO KILL ONLY THE POLITICAL ELITE SUPPORTING RECONCILIATION. THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, LOST CONTROL OF THE MILITIAS, AND THE MASSACRE SPREAD LIKE A WILDFIRE THAT CONTINUES TO RAGE OUT OF CONTROL.
 5. (S/NF) THE RPF TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. TWO DAYS AFTER PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S DEATH, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE TO REINFORCE ITS BATTALION IN KIGALI, WHICH CAME UNDER ATTACK WHILE IN THE CAPITAL TO PROTECT RPF NEGOTIATORS, AND TO STOP THE MASSACRE OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS. THE RPF ATTACKED THE ENTIRE FRONT TO PENETRATE GOVERNMENT LINES AND THEN TO INFILTRATE TROOPS SOUTH INTO KIGALI. THE FORCE IN KIGALI ATTACKED TO EXPAND ITS POSITION AND TIE DOWN GOVERNMENT FORCES TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENTS FROM MOVING NORTH. SINCE THE ORIGINAL GOVERNMENT FORCE DISPOSITION PREVENTED A DEFENSE IN DEPTH, THE RPF MOVED QUICKLY TO KIGALI AFTER PENETRATING THE FRONTLINE.
 6. (S/NF) BY 12 APRIL, RPF FORCES HAD SUBDUED MOST OF MUTARA PROVINCE AND POSITIONED A BATTALION-SIZE FORCE 12 KILOMETERS FROM KIGALI. TWO DAYS LATER, THIS FORCE HAD JOINED RPF TROOPS IN KIGALI. MORE REBEL UNITS ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTHWEST AND ISOLATED THE AIRPORT FROM THE CAPITAL. MOST GOVERNMENT FORCES WITHDREW FROM THE CAPITAL TOWARD GITARAMA, THE SEAT OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
 7. (S/NF) BOTH SIDES DECLARED CEASE-FIRES EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 26 APRIL AND BEGAN POSTURING FOR THE FINAL BATTLE FOR KIGALI. THE FIGHTING APPARENTLY RESUMED ON 6 MAY AS THE RPF SEIZED ADDITIONAL AREAS SURROUNDING KIGALI. TWO DAYS LATER, RPF FORCES HAD TAKEN THE HIGH GROUND NORTHEAST OF THE AIRPORT AND ATTACKED KANOMBE BARRACKS, KEY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE OF THE AIRPORT. NOW, THE RPF MUST ELIMINATE THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WITHOUT HITTING UN TROOPS NEARBY OR DESTROYING THE AIRPORT, WHICH IS CRITICAL FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
 8. (S/NF) BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE, RPF-CONTROLLED AREAS REPORTEDLY WERE DEVOID OF CIVILIANS BECAUSE OF HUTU DISTRUST AND FEAR. THIS HUTU PERCEPTION OF THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT APPARENTLY IS CHANGING, BECAUSE DISPLACED PERSONS HAVE BEEN MOVING INTO REBEL TERRITORY. AS THE RPF MOVES INTO AN AREA, THE MASSACRES STOP.
 9. (S/NF) IMPLICATIONS. EVEN IF THE RPF FAILS TO CAPTURE KIGALI, ITS CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE ALLOWS IT TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AT THE INEVITABLE PEACE TALKS. THE INITIAL RPF DEMANDS WILL BE FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS BEGUN BY THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING AND PUNISHING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRES.
 10. (S/NF) THE COUNTRY'S DEEPLY ROOTED ETHNIC ANIMOSITY AND TENUOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS MAKE IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GOVERN BY ITSELF, DESPITE ITS MILITARY VICTORIES. BEING A MINORITY PARTY MAKES THE RPF DEPENDENT ON COALITION POLITICS IF IT WANTS TO ADHERE TO ITS STATED POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY. THE RPF IS MAKING AN EFFORT TO EXPAND ITS POWER BASE AMONG THE HUTUS AND HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE THE HUTU PERCEPTION THAT IT WILL

MASSACRE THEM. ANY NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HOPING TO REESTABLISH ORDER AND TO OBTAIN THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES MUST BE ETHNICALLY BROAD-BASED AND INCLUDE A MAJORITY OF HUTUS.

11. ~~(S/NF)~~ WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF RWANDAN POLITICS, THE RPF'S ROLE IN A REORGANIZED ARMED FORCES IS THE MOST PROBLEMATIC, YET THIS CRITICAL ISSUE SPARKED THE CURRENT CRISIS AND MUST BE ADDRESSED IN ANY MEANINGFUL PEACE ACCORD. BECAUSE OF ITS MILITARY DOMINANCE, THE RPF WILL QUITE NATURALLY EXPECT WIDER REPRESENTATION--ESPECIALLY IN KEY COMMAND POSITIONS--IN THE NEW RWANDAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. IN THIS WAY, THE RPF COULD ENSURE ITS SAFETY AND PREEMPT HUTU PLOTTING. THE MILITARY ISSUE PROBABLY WILL BE THE BIGGEST HURDLE FOR ACHIEVING A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT TO THE RWANDAN PROBLEM.

(b)(3)

, DIA/NMJIC, AND DIA/NMIPC RWANDA SUPPORT GROUP,
DISTS 960-4356

DECL: OADR

BT

#7399

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR: 940524033237 M1062347

DIST:

SIT: VAX

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: SECRET
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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
 LINE3: RUCBLFJ T CG II MEF
 LINE4: RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
 OSRI: RUEKJCS
 DTG: 162204Z JUN 94
 ORIG: [REDACTED] (b)(3)

TO: AIG 7031
 AIG 7033

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

INFO: ****

SUBJ: RWANDA: POSSIBLE HUTU BASTION. (U)

TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

PASS: [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

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(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
 THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
 COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST [REDACTED] (b)(3)

SUBJ: RWANDA: POSSIBLE HUTU BASTION. (U)

DOI: 16 JUN 94 (AS OF 1530 EDT)

TEXT: 1. (S) ALTHOUGH TEMPORARILY SLOWED BY LAST WEEK'S GOVERNMENT
 COUNTERATTACKS, THE REBELS HAVE NOT LOST THE MILITARY INITIATIVE. AS
 THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT RESUMES ITS OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH, THE
 NORTHWEST COULD WELL BECOME A HUTU ENCLAVE.

2. (S) GOVERNMENT FORCES (FAR) LAUNCHED A COUNTEROFFENSIVE LAST WEEK
 TO REOPEN THE KIGALI-BUJUMBURA HIGHWAY, RECENTLY CUT BY THE RWANDAN
 PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF). FAR TROOPS APPARENTLY ATTACKED IN THE NORTH IN
 A EFFORT TO RELIEVE THE BESIEGED RUHENGERI GARRISON. THE PRIMARY
 ATTACKS TOOK PLACE IN THE VICINITY OF GITARAMA, LOCATED AT KEY
 CROSSROADS LINKING THE NORTHWEST WITH THE SOUTH AND WEST. OF THE
 SHORT-LIVED COUNTEROFFENSIVE'S TWO THRUSTS, ALONG AN AXIS NORTH TO
 KIGALI AND SOUTH TO BUTARE, THE ASSAULT TOWARD BUTARE SEEMED THE
 PRINCIPAL EFFORT. ULTIMATELY, THE GUERRILLAS HELD THEIR POSITIONS
 AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF HARD FIGHTING.

3. (S) EARLY THIS WEEK, RPF FORCES ATTACKED ALONG THREE FRONTS,
 SURROUNDED GITARAMA, AND CUT OFF GOVERNMENT TROOPS, WHICH
 SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW. THEIR TACTIC WAS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND KEPT
 REBEL LOSSES TO A MINIMUM. AS THE GUERRILLAS SEIZED GITARAMA, THE
 INTERIM GOVERNMENT SHIFTED ITS HEADQUARTERS TO GISENYI, WHICH LIES IN
 THE HUTU ETHNIC HEARTLAND IN THE NORTHWEST AND IS THE BIRTHPLACE OF
 SLAIN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA.

4. (S/NF) THE RPF WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE MILITARY ADVANCES TO
 GAIN POLITICAL LEVERAGE. OVER THE PAST 3 WEEKS, THE RPF REPORTEDLY
 HAS STOCKPILED ENOUGH MUNITIONS TO SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS FOR A

YEAR, AND ABOUT 5,000 REBEL RECRUITS ARE BEING TRAINED IN THE GABIRO AREA. ALTHOUGH REBEL FORCES SEEM TO BE APPROACHING THE LIMIT OF THEIR PERSONNEL AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES, THEY HAVE INCREASED THE PRESSURE ON THE FAR IN THE SOUTH AND IN CENTRAL KIGALI IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE SYSTEMATIC SLAUGHTER OF CIVILIANS.

5. (S) COMMENT: THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT MAY BE PREPARING FOR THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WAR, SINCE IT HAS NO PLACE TO GO FROM GISENYI. MANY SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD COME FROM GISENYI, AND GOMA, THE SITE OF ZAIRIAN RESUPPLY OPERATIONS TO THE FAR, LIES JUST ACROSS THE ZAIRIAN BORDER FROM THE TOWN. THIS NEW POSITION IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE HARD-LINE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT IS OUT OF THE WAY OF A POSSIBLE RPF DRIVE SOUTH AND WEST. THE REBELS WOULD GAIN LITTLE BY ATTACKING THIS HARD-LINE HUTU BASTION, SINCE VIRTUALLY NO TUTSIS ARE LEFT IN THIS REGION.

6. (S) MOREOVER, THE RPF PROBABLY WILL CONSOLIDATE ITS GAINS QUICKLY BY REPOSITIONING ITS RESOURCES AS THE FRONT RESUMES ITS DRIVE TO SEIZE CYANGUGU AND BUTARE, TWO TOWNS THAT CONTAIN LARGE NUMBERS OF TUTSIS. IF THE RPF SEIZES THESE OBJECTIVES AND ENDS THE GENOCIDAL KILLING, THE NORTHWEST IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL BECOME A HARD-LINE HUTU ENCLAVE, GIVING THE GOVERNMENT AT LEAST THREE POLITICAL-MILITARY OPTIONS: ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CONDUCT A LOW-LEVEL GUERRILLA INSURGENCY, OR DECLARE DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE SIMILAR TO THAT OF SOMALILAND. IN ANY CASE, THE RPF MAY NOT BE ABLE TO IGNORE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND PROBABLY WILL DEMAND THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

(b)(3) USA, DIA/NMIPC, (b)(3) DIST 981-2491

DECL: OADR

BT

#6640

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR: 940617015559 M1104675

DIST:

SIT: VAX NSC

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~

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LINE2: ZNY SSSSS

LINE3: RHFTAAA T 4350SS RHEIN MAIN AB GE

LINE4: RUCBLFJ T CG II MEF

OSRI: RUEKJCS

DTG: 202340Z JUN 94

ORIG: [redacted] (b)(3)

TO: AIG 7031

AIG 7033

AIG 7034

[redacted] (b)(3)

INFO: ****

SUBJ: FRANCE-RWANDA: POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION. (U)

TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS: [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3)

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(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) [redacted] (b)(3)

SUBJ: FRANCE-RWANDA: POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION. (U)

DOI: 20 JUN 94 (AS OF 1800 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ PARIS IS FORMALIZING PLANS TO INTERVENE IN RWANDA AND WILL ACT WITHIN DAYS, THOUGH THE MISSION, TIMING, AND NATURE OF THE INTERVENTION ARE YET TO BE DETERMINED. LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLANNED ACTION IS QUESTIONABLE.

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2. ~~(C/NF)~~ FRENCH HISTORY IN RWANDA. RWANDA IS A FORMER BELGIAN COLONY. UP TO 700 FRENCH TROOPS SERVED THERE FROM OCTOBER 1990 TO DECEMBER 1993, AND THE MINORITY TUTSI-LED RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT BELIEVES ITS MOVEMENT TO OVERTURN THE HUTU AUTHORITIES IN 1990 WOULD HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR FRENCH INTERVENTION. THE FRENCH TRAINED AND ARMED THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES AND HUTU MILITIAS, AND MITTERRAND'S SON IS ALLEGED BY SOME TO BE STILL INVOLVED IN ARMS SMUGGLING TO THE HUTUS. MITTERRAND HAD A CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH MURDERED RWANDAN PRESIDENT JUVENAL HABYARIMANA AND CLAIMS FRANCE NEVER SUPPORTED ONE TRIBE AGAINST ANOTHER BUT RATHER SUPPORTED HABYARIMANA. AS LEADER OF THE ETHNIC MAJORITY, HE SEEMED TO THE FRENCH THE MOST CAPABLE OF APPLYING THE 4 AUGUST 1993 ARUSHA ACCORDS, WHICH MANDATE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, POWER SHARING AND FRENCH TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THIS CLAIM OF NEUTRALITY RUNS COUNTER TO REPORTS THAT FRANCE EVACUATED MEMBERS OF HABYARIMANA'S FAMILY IN MAY 1994 BUT LEFT BEHIND TUTSI EMPLOYEES--WHO SUBSEQUENTLY DISAPPEARED AND MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED.

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3. (~~C/NF~~) FRANCE HAS A LONG HISTORY OF RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND ON MANY OCCASIONS HAS BECOME INVOLVED THERE IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE MISSIONS. UNRELENTING PRESS COVERAGE OF THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA HAS HEIGHTENED FRENCH PUBLIC INTEREST IN WHAT PARIS ALREADY REALIZES IS A CRITICAL TEST OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA. DISTRESSED ABOUT THE CARNAGE AND LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, PARIS ALSO IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE INABILITY OF THE NEWLY MANDATED UN ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) II TO DEPLOY (UNAMIR II LACKS FUNDS AND HAS LIMITED EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH THE 50 US-SUPPLIED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS PROJECTED TO BE IN ENTEBBE BY 29 JUNE WILL PROVIDE SOME TRANSPORT CAPABILITY). FOREIGN MINISTER ALAIN JUPPE ANNOUNCED ON 15 JUNE THAT FRANCE HAS A "GENUINE DUTY TO INTERVENE" IF THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA CONTINUE, SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTING AN APRIL STATEMENT IN WHICH HE REMARKED THAT PARIS COULD NOT BE THE POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD.

4. (~~C/NF~~) THE FRENCH SAY THE MISSION WOULD BE STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN--TO EVACUATE TRAPPED CIVILIANS FROM KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS AND NOT TO OCCUPY TERRITORY OR TARGET SPECIFIC PARTIES--AND WOULD LAST NO MORE THAN 2 MONTHS. PARIS ORIGINALLY STATED THAT ITS DECISION WAS CONTINGENT ON FINDING A EUROPEAN PARTNER AND ON UN APPROVAL, THOUGH NOT CONTROL, OF THE OPERATION. THESE CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT SET IN STONE. CURRENT COMMITMENTS INCLUDE FRENCH TROOPS FROM THE RAPID ACTION FORCE'S 21ST MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN RWANDA BUT ARE NOW STATIONED IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, SMALL SENEGALESE AND GHANAIAI CONTINGENTS, US FUNDS, BRITISH TRUCKS, AND MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES FROM THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE RAPID ACTION FORCE ARE AVAILABLE, BUT THEIR DEPLOYMENT FROM FRANCE IS UNLIKELY WITHOUT US ASSISTANCE.

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5. (~~C/NF~~) RWANDAN RESPONSE. THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) OPENLY OPPOSES FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND BECAUSE OF FRANCE'S PAST LINKS WITH THE HUTU GOVERNMENT, IS SUSPICIOUS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS. ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY, THE RPF MIGHT SUPPORT INTERVENTION WITHIN A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN FRAMEWORK. CONVERSELY, IT MAY ATTACK THE FRENCH RPF LEADERS BELIEVE THE INTERVENTION FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, REBEL FORCES WILL PROBABLY OFFER LITTLE RESISTANCE OUT OF FEAR OF FRENCH RETALIATION.

6. (~~C/NF~~) THE RWANDA MILITARY AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT COMMENTED DIRECTLY ABOUT FRENCH INTENTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY PROBABLY WILL WELCOME THE OPERATION, VIEWING IT AS A SIGN OF SUPPORT. THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS MET FREQUENTLY WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN, MOST LIKELY WILL SEEK TO GAIN FRENCH SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT AND TO COUNTER CHARGES OF GENOCIDE.

)))))
7. (~~C/NF~~) OTHER EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS TO HELP HAVE BEEN LIMITED. DESPITE ITALY'S STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE PERSONNEL ONLY IF THERE IS INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS, ROME MIGHT DO SO TO ENHANCE ITALIAN PRESTIGE AND ITALIAN-FRENCH RELATIONS. BELGIUM AND THE UK ALREADY HAVE REFUSED TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL. SUCH FACTORS AS EXTENSIVE WORLDWIDE COMMITMENTS; DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGETS; THE LACK OF SUCCESS AND HIGH COSTS OF PREVIOUS MISSIONS IN SOMALIA, BOSNIA, AND RWANDA; AND THE FACT THAT RWANDA IS NOT A DIRECT SECURITY CONCERN MAKE IT UNLIKELY ANY SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL COMMITMENTS WILL BE MADE BY OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS.

8. (~~C/NF~~) COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT ANY OTHER EUROPEAN NATION DECIDES TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL, MITTERRAND FACES INCREASING PRESSURE TO ACT.

AFRICAN NATIONS--MANY WITH WHICH FRANCE HAS SIGNED SECURITY AGREEMENTS--WILL BE WATCHING TO SEE HOW FRANCE RESPONDS TO THE CRISIS. ANYTHING LESS THAN A DECISIVE INTERVENTION TO SAVE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WILL BE VIEWED AS EVIDENCE OF DIMINISHED FRENCH CONCERN FOR THE REGION.

9. (C/NF) MITTERRAND EXPECTS AT LEAST SOME US MEDICAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO US APPEALS IN 1992 FOR PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA. FRANCE PROEABLY WILL DEPLOY THROUGH GOMA, ZAIRE, AND CYANGUGU, RWANDA (WHICH BORDERS SOUTHEASTERN ZAIRE). THIS COULD DEEPEN RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT SUSPICIONS OF FRENCH MOTIVES, PARTICULARLY AS ZAIRE IS KNOWN TO BE FUNNELING ARMS TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES. BECAUSE TRANSIT THROUGH BURUNDI WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF BOTH COMBATANTS IN RWANDA ALLOWED IT, ONLY HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES ARE LIKELY TO GO THROUGH BUJUMBURA AIRPORT.

10. (C/NF) FRENCH CAPABILITIES AND INFLUENCE IN RWANDA SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. TWO OF THE COMPANIES IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC WERE STATIONED IN RWANDA AS PART OF THE ORIGINAL FRENCH EFFORT FROM 1990 TO 1993. THE LIGHTLY ARMED RWANDAN FACTIONS HAVE LITTLE CAPABILITY TO STAND UP TO THE FRENCH MILITARILY. PARIS HAS INDICATED A READINESS TO "FIGHT ITS WAY IN" TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE UN. THE SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF 02

FRENCH OFFENSIVE PROBABLY WILL START WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL MISSION WILL BE FRANCE'S ABILITY TO CONVINCCE THE TUTSIS THAT THE FRENCH-LED EFFORT WILL BE NONPARTISAN AND WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY SITUATION EXCEPT AS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FURTHER MASSACRES.

))

11. (S/NF) 21ST MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT EQUIPMENT (1)
6 VAB'S WITH 120-MM TOWED MORTARS
12 VAB'S WITH MILANS
62 VAB'S
9 VAB COMMAND POSTS
(1) EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO 21ST MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT, ONLY SOME OF WHICH IS POSITIONED WITH THE FRENCH TROOPS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

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(b)(3)

DECL: OADR
BT
#5312
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: (b)(3)
TOR: 940621030528 M1110083
<^TOR>940621030529 M1110084
DIST: SIT: VAX NSC
□

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
LINE1: RAASZYUW RUEAIIA9158 1990705-SSSS--RHEHAAA.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
LINE3: R 180701Z JUL 94
LINE4: FM CIA
OSRI: RUEAIIA
DTG: 180701Z JUL 94
ORIG: CIA
TO: RUWMEFA/15AF TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIPGA/325OSS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
RUEBEJA/436OSS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
RUWMEFE/702AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIBBA/9TH AF SHAW AFB
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AIR UNIVERSITY
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHDC/DI
RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUCKMEA/CG II MEF
RUCLFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW
RUCBLFA/CGFMFLANT
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN SUITLAND MD
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPND/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
RUWFAPK/COMNAVSPCWARCOM CORONADO CA
RULYVBA/COMSECONDFLT
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUQSZIW/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUFMRHA/CTF SIX ONE
RUFMRKA/CTF SIX TWO
RUFMRDA/CTF SIX ZERO
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
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RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINSERV WASHDC

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 RHHMCMY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
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 RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
 RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
 RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
 RUEAIJU/NPIC
 RUDOMJA/NRJOIC KOLSAAS NO
 RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
 RHHMCMY/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
 RUFMJRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
 SUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
 RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
 RUWSMXI/USCINCTrans INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL
 RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
 RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
 RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 RHFPAAA/UTAS RAMSTEIN AB GE
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

INFO: *****

SUBJ: EUROPEAN BRIEF [EO 13526 1.4c] FOR 18 JULY 1994.
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TEXT:

[EO 13526 1.4c]

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
 CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
 FOR STATE REP [1.4c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
 TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL
 RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI;
 HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
 CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
 CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
 CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
 CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
 AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI;
 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
 PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
 USTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB [1.4c] COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
 AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
 WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO

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VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.

EO 13526 1.4c

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BRIEF [EO 13526 1.4c] 18 JULY 1994.

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4. HAITI: MILITARY ESCALATING INTIMIDATION [1.4c]
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6. GREECE: CRUSHING DEBT BURDEN [1.4c]
7. EU: BOOSTING TIES TO LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ESTONIA [1.4c]

1. RWANDA: EXPANDING WAR DEEPENS CRISIS [1.4c]
TROOPS OF THE MOSTLY TUTSI RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT SHELLED GOMA AIRPORT IN ZAIRE YESTERDAY, SHUTTING DOWN THE AIRLIFT OF FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES FOR MORE THAN 1 MILLION RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. //FIGHTING IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ALONG THE BORDER, FURTHER DISRUPTING INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE REFUGEES' SUFFERING.//

-- TROOPS LOYAL TO THE RWANDAN HUTU REGIME REPORTEDLY HAVE DEPLOYED HEAVY WEAPONS IN GOMA. [1.4c]

//THE RPF'S THREAT TO INVADE THE FRENCH-PATROLLED HUMANITARIAN SAFE ZONE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA COULD TRIGGER ANOTHER 2.8 MILLION HUTUS THERE TO SEEK REFUGE NEAR THE ZAIRIAN TOWN OF BUKAVU--WHERE THE INADEQUATE AIRPORT AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD MAKE DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN AID EVEN HARDER THAN AROUND GOMA.// THE RPF SAYS IT WANTS PARIS TO SURRENDER HUTU REGIME LEADERS, ACCUSED OF ORCHESTRATING ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE, WHO HAVE FLED TO THE FRENCH ZONE.

-- //CONTINUED RPF SHELLING OF GOMA--THE LOGISTIC HUB FOR FRANCE'S RWANDA OPERATION--WOULD ISOLATE FRENCH TROOPS AND INCREASE THEIR VULNERABILITY TO RPF ATTACKS.// [1.4c]

INTERNATIONAL RELIEF OFFICIALS YESTERDAY TOLD [1.4c] THAT THEY FEAR A FURTHER FLOW OF REFUGEES INTO ZAIRE WILL BRING A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE REGION//, PUTTING AID WORKERS, FRENCH TROOPS, AND OTHER FOREIGNERS AT RISK.// [1.4c]
PRESS REPORTS SAY BONN AGREED YESTERDAY TO A UN REQUEST TO FLY RELIEF SUPPLIES TO ZAIRE FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES BUT LIMITED ITS PARTICIPATION TO ONE MONTH. A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY SPOKESMAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PROPOSED OPERATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED ON FRIDAY DURING AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE BUNDESTAG, CALLED TO APPROVE GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN UN OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA RETROACTIVELY. [1.4c]

2. EU: SHIFTING ATTENTION TO ASIA [1.4c]
//GERMANY PROBABLY WILL USE THE ASIA POLICY PAPER THAT THE COMMISSION RELEASED ON FRIDAY TO PUSH THE USE OF EU RESOURCES TO EXPAND TRADE RELATIONS WITH ASIA DURING ITS CURRENT EU PRESIDENCY.// CHANCELLOR KOHL'S EMPHASIS ON ASIA IS POPULAR WITH GERMAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, AND EFFORTS TO CEMENT RELATIONS WITH CHINA LED TO BIG CONTRACTS FOR GERMAN FIRMS DURING CHINESE PREMIER LI'S RECENT VISIT TO GERMANY, ACCORDING TO PRESS [1.4c] REPORTS.// OTHER KEY EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE THRUST OF THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND ALSO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO RAISE THEIR COUNTRIES' PROFILES IN ASIA.//
-- THE DOCUMENT CALLS FOR MORE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION, FOR GREATER EFFORTS TO PERSUADE ASIAN GOVERNMENTS TO OPEN THEIR MARKETS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, AND FOR AN INCREASED EU PRESENCE IN ASIA THROUGH BUSINESS COUNCILS IN CHINA, INDOCHINA, AND PAKISTAN AND

THROUGH TECHNOLOGY CENTERS.

-- THE COMMISSION PAPER SUGGESTS THAT FAILURE TO ADOPT A PROACTIVE POLICY TOWARD THE REGION WILL HURT EU EXPORTS AND COMPETITIVENESS AND CREATE PRESSURE IN THE EU FOR GREATER USE OF DEFENSIVE TRADE MEASURES. [1.4c]

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, SUCH AS THE 1991 EAST TIMOR MASSACRE BY INDONESIAN TROOPS, CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE THE RELATIONSHIP, AND PROTESTS OVER THE CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION PLAGUED LI'S GERMAN VISIT, //BUT TRADE INTERESTS WILL ULTIMATELY TAKE PRECEDENCE AS SHOWN BY THE EU'S DISMANTLING OF TIANANMEN-RELATED SANCTIONS.// [1.4c]

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BOX

DEEPENING CHINESE ECONOMIC TIES TO EUROPE

PREMIER LI SIGNED NEARLY \$600 MILLION IN CONTRACTS, LETTERS OF INTENT, AND AGREEMENTS IN AUSTRIA AND CLOSE TO \$4.5 BILLION IN BUSINESS DOCUMENTS WHILE IN GERMANY, CHINESE PRESS REPORTS SAY;

EO 13526 1.4c

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY FOR STATE REP [1.4c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; USTRANS INTELcen SCOTT AFB [1.4c] COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

END BOX

3. BALKAN CRISIS [1.4c]

SERBS STILL CALLING FOR REJECTION OF PEACE PLAN
BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC TOLD A MEETING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS ON
SATURDAY THAT SERBS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE TERRITORIAL LOSSES
CONTAINED IN THE CONTACT GROUP'S PLAN AND WERE READY FOR A BLOODY
WAR. BOSNIAN SERB ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT KRAJISNIK SAID THE SERBS ARE
NOT AFRAID OF NATO THREATS. KRAJINA SERB "PRESIDENT" MARTIC,
ADDRESSING THE SAME MEETING, SAID KRAJINA SERBS WERE STANDING BY THE
BOSNIAN SERBS.

-- //MARTIC'S PRESENCE IN BOSNIA STRONGLY MAY BE A HARBINGER OF EVEN
CLOSER POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TRY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS.//

-- //KARADZIC'S FAILURE TO MENTION "CONSTITUTIONAL" ISSUES SUGGESTS
THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS HAVE DECIDED AGAINST APPROVING THE PLAN IF
THEY WERE GRANTED THE PROSPECT OF SOME KIND OF INDEPENDENCE.// [1.4c]

[]
MEANWHILE, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO LINK THEIR
SUPPORT FOR THE PLAN TO THE PRESERVATION OF BOSNIA'S INTERNATIONAL
BORDERS. [1.4c]

SUMMIT OF CROATIAN, BOSNIAN, AND TURKISH PRESIDENTS
AT A MEETING ON THE CROATIAN ISLAND OF BRIONI YESTERDAY, CROATIAN
PRESIDENT TUDJMAN, BOSNIAN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC, AND TURKISH
PRESIDENT DEMIREL CALLED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTACT
GROUP'S PLAN AND DEMANDED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP TAKE FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLAN'S ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION. IF THE
SERBS REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE PLAN, THEY URGED THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT FUTURE
AGGRESSION AND PROVIDE THE MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE FOR THOSE WHO HAVE
BEEN SUBJECTED TO AGGRESSION. [1.4c]

FIGHTING PICKS UP
GOVERNMENT FORCES ATTACKED UN TROOPS NEAR VISOKO IN CENTRAL BOSNIA
WITH MACHINE-GUN FIRE AND ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES LATE ON FRIDAY
AND SATURDAY [1.4c] NO CASUALTIES WERE
REPORTED, BUT THE UN TROOPS WITHDREW FROM THEIR OBSERVATION POST. ON
SATURDAY, BOSNIAN SERB TROOPS SHELLED TUZLA AIRFIELD, WHICH IS UNDER
UN CONTROL. ACCORDING TO PRESS [1.4c] ONE SHELL
LANDED ON THE RUNWAY AND UN ENGINEERS ARE ASSESSING THE EXTENT OF
THE DAMAGE. [1.4c]

UN MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORT THAT FIGHTING BETWEEN BOSNIAN SERB AND
GOVERNMENT TROOPS INCREASED IN THE BIHAC ENCLAVE AND IN THE NORTHERN
CORRIDOR REGION OVER THE WEEKEND, ACCORDING TO PRESS [1.4c]

[]
-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO EXCHANGED ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE ON
SATURDAY NEAR GRADACAC, RIBNICA, AND THE AREA EAST OF TUZLA.
ALTHOUGH NO MAJOR OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED, BOTH SIDES ARE
CONTINUING LOW-LEVEL ATTACKS AS THE DEADLINE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
CONTACT GROUP'S PLAN APPROACHES. [1.4c]

BOSNIAN SERBS RAID UN WEAPONS SITE
BOSNIAN SERB TROOPS TRIED TO RECLAIM FOUR T-55 TANKS ON SATURDAY
FROM A UN-MONITORED WEAPONS COLLECTION POINT NEAR SARAJEVO,
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. ONE TANK LEFT THE FACILITY BUT RETURNED
WITHIN THE HOUR.

[1.4c]

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR;
CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY

FOR STATE REP [1.4c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;
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 STEWART.

[1.4c]

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN BRIEF OCPAS EUR 94/165 FOR 18 JULY 1994.

-- THERE WERE TWO SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE PAST WEEK. IN ONE, THE
 SERBS REMOVED A TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN FROM ONE SITE. [1.4c]
 AMERICAS

4. HAITI: MILITARY ESCALATING INTIMIDATION [1.4c]

THE CLERGY AND DIPLOMATS WHOSE GOVERNMENTS REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE
 DE FACTO GOVERNMENT ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

-- LAST WEEK TROOPS ATTEMPTED TO SEARCH CANADIAN AND FRENCH
 DIPLOMATIC POUCHES [1.4c] AND THE HEAD OF
 AIRPORT SECURITY SAID THAT DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY NO LONGER APPLIED
 SINCE FOREIGN MISSIONS DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE JONASSANT REGIME.

-- [1.4c] ONE MILITARY COMMANDER ORDERED THE
 SEIZURE OF SHORTWAVE RECEIVERS FROM AT LEAST THREE CHURCHES.
 AUTHORITIES ALSO TRIED TO ARREST A PRIEST IN DESSALINE, WHO NARROWLY
 ESCAPED.

-- [1.4c] THE MILITARY HAS INCREASED ROADBLOCKS
 IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. [1.4c]

//MILITARY AUTHORITIES MAY TRY TO CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
 HUMANITARIAN FUEL SHIPMENT ARRIVING TODAY AND POSSIBLY WITHHOLD A
 PORTION FOR THEMSELVES.// //THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE REGIME WILL
 EXPEL SOME DIPLOMATS IS ALSO INCREASING.// [1.4c]

EURASIA

5. RUSSIA: DUMA BLOCKS PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM [1.4c]

BY AN OVERWHELMING MARGIN, THE LEGISLATURE HAS SENT BACK TO
 COMMITTEE THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL TO SELL STOCK IN ENTERPRISES FOR
 CASH RATHER THAN THE VOUCHERS USED PREVIOUSLY, ACCORDING TO PRESS
 REPORTS. OPPONENTS SAID THE LEGISLATION WOULD OPEN THE DOOR FOR
 FOREIGNERS AND CRIMINAL ELEMENTS TO GAIN CONTROLLING INTEREST IN
 RUSSIA'S MOST IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES. DUMA CHAIRMAN RYBKIN
 SAYS THE COMMITTEE MAY BE ABLE TO SUBMIT AN AMENDED PROPOSAL LATER
 THIS WEEK.

-- IF THE DEPUTIES FAIL TO ACT QUICKLY OR IF THEY ATTACH BURDENSOME
 PROVISIONS SUCH AS ALLOWING WORKERS TO BUY SHARES CHEAPLY OR
 EXEMPTING ATTRACTIVE ENERGY OR DEFENSE FIRMS, PRESS REPORTS SUGGEST
 YEL'TSIN WOULD INITIATE THE PROGRAM BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, //WHICH
 COULD EXACERBATE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE TENSION.// [1.4c]
 EUROPE

6. GREECE: CRUSHING DEBT BURDEN [1.4c]

[1.4c] EQ 13526 [1.4c] ECONOMICS MINISTER PAPANTONIOU WILL SEEK
 MEETINGS WITH US OFFICIALS DURING BRETTON WOODS CEREMONIES IN
 WASHINGTON THIS WEEK IN AN EFFORT TO REFUTE WIDESPREAD PRESS AND IMF

CRITICISM THAT ATHENS IS DOING LITTLE TO ADDRESS ITS HUGE FISCAL IMBALANCES. AT ABOUT 150 PERCENT OF GDP, GREECE'S GOVERNMENT DEBT IS THE HIGHEST IN THE OECD.

-- BECAUSE OF THE HIGH INTEREST RATES RESULTING FROM YEARS OF DOUBLE-DIGIT INFLATION, ATHENS THIS YEAR WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE AN EXTRAORDINARY 17 PERCENT OF GDP AND ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR INTEREST SERVICING, ACCORDING TO DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER KYRIAZIDIS.

-- THE PUBLIC-SECTOR DEFICIT WILL ALSO BE ABOUT 17 PERCENT OF GDP THIS YEAR. FINANCING REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ESPECIALLY HIGH THROUGH NEXT MONTH, WHEN ATHENS WILL HAVE TO BORROW FUNDS EQUAL TO 12 PERCENT OF GDP. [1.4c]

//BECAUSE IT FACES LOCAL ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S GOVERNMENT HAS DONE LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE DEBT AND DEFICIT PROBLEM. REDUCED SPENDING FOR SOCIAL WELFARE OR GOVERNMENT SALARIES WOULD ALIENATE MANY VOTERS, AND TO BOOST TAX REVENUE IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF INEFFICIENT TAX COLLECTION AND THE HUGE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY.// [1.4c]

7. EU: BOOSTING TIES TO LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ESTONIA [1.4c] THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL SIGN FREE TRADE ACCORDS WITH THE BALTIC REPUBLICS EARLY THIS WEEK. THE TREATIES WILL TAKE EFFECT NEXT YEAR, BUT LATVIA AND LITHUANIA WILL HAVE FOUR AND SIX YEARS, RESPECTIVELY, TO PHASE IN THE PROVISIONS [1.4c] PRESS REPORTS. SEPARATE AGREEMENTS GRANT CONCESSIONS IN AREAS THE EU CONSIDERS SENSITIVE, SUCH AS TEXTILES, AGRICULTURE, AND FISHING, AND PROVIDE SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR GOODS FROM NEWLY ESTABLISHED COMPANIES IN THE BALTIC STATES.

-- //THE ACCORDS PAVE THE WAY FOR THE EU TO BEGIN TALKS--PROBABLY NEXT YEAR--ON ASSOCIATE STATUS FOR THE BALTIC STATES.// [1.4c]

[1.4c]

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY FOR STATE REP [1.4c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; USTRANS INTELcen SCOTT AFB [1.4c] COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.


[1.4c]

BT
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04



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Intelligence Report

Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology

28 July 1994

Eastern Zaire: Volcanic Activity in Humanitarian Relief Zone

Although volcanic events are difficult to predict, American and Japanese volcanologists analyzing recent seismic events in Nord-Kivu, Zaire, judge that there is a solid basis for concern that a damaging eruption--with both ash plumes and lava flow--could occur there in the near term. 1.4c

A series of events indicate that the Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira volcanoes, 20 kilometers north of Goma, have become more active in recent weeks and may present a threat to residents and refugees in the area. Both volcanoes have been active frequently in this century.

EO 13526 1.4c

- Ash plumes extending to 100 meters above the western slope of the Nyamulagira volcano--connected by subsurface channels to Nyiragongo--were also reported recently by a relief worker. Japanese seismologists report data indicating ground swelling that could lead to a larger explosive ash plume.

1.4c

A major outflow of lava from Nyiragongo could occur with only minutes of warning

EO 13526 1.4c

- The last major eruption there took place in January 1977 when a lake of molten lava--that had been smoldering in the crater for half a century--burst through the mountain's north and south flanks through at least five fissures simultaneously, according to Japanese seismologists. The resultant flow

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

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PER E. O. 13526

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moved rapidly--over 50 km per hour--and covered the countryside in the south for a distance of 10 km from the base of the mountain; some farmers were killed.

- The magma that feed both volcanoes is unusually fluid. [EO 13526 1.4c]
- Although there is a sparse seismic network operated by Zairian and Japanese seismologists, the data is not radioed to a central facility in real-time, and cannot provide warning of the increased activity that generally precedes volcanic events. [1.4c]


Refugee camps at the base of the Nyiragongo volcano are partially on the site of the 1977 lava fields, according to American and Japanese volcanologists. Nevertheless, because the regional cluster of volcanoes that includes Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira have subterranean interconnections, lava could emerge from any of many fissures in the region. [1.4c]

In the meantime, ash plumes from the volcanoes could threaten aircraft delivering relief supplies.

- In 1991, a South African aircraft lost two of its four engines when it flew through an undetected ash plume from these volcanoes.
- If ash plumes occur, estimated wind speeds and directions for the next two days suggest that aircraft flying above 5,500 meters and to the east of the volcano would be vulnerable. [1.4c]

EO 13526 1.4c

Rwanda: Refugee Situation Worsening



Confidential EO 13526 3.5c

PREPARED 21 JULY 94

AFRICA

Rwanda

EO 13526 1.4c

ZAIRE: UN spokesman reports government troops expelled 200 Rwandan refugees from camps near Goma yesterday and are preparing to expel 1,000 refugees today, according to press...refugees taken to Rwandan border yesterday and released despite UNHCR appeal to Kinshasa to halt expulsions. EO 13526 1.4c

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HAITI: U.S. Coast Guard and Bahamian Defense Force yesterday interdicted 406 Haitian migrants, including five reported dead, from 80 foot vessel near Nassau...migrants transported to Nassau...largest interdiction since return of President Aristide. EO 13526 1.4c

TOP SECRET EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c

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PER E. O. 13526

4 August 1994

ZAIRE: Weapons, Location, and Capabilities of the Former Rwandan Army 3.5c

Background. In late July, some 10,000 soldiers of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army (FAR) and another 10,000 Hutu militiamen crossed into Zaire along with some 1.7 million Rwandan refugees. The suddenness of the Rwandan exodus and Zaire's porous and poorly monitored border allowed a large number of these soldiers to enter Zaire with their weapons. While some of these arms--especially larger crew serviced weapons--have been confiscated by Zairian authorities, we believe that a number of small arms remain in FAR hands and that the heavier weapons may not be secure. 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c

2. Who controls these weapons? We judge that troops from the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) probably control these depots, although we have no specific reporting to confirm this.

- o There has been no reported FAR presence in the area 100 km north of Goma where the FAZ military camp is located.
- o In addition, FAR forces are reportedly camped several km away from the other two depots on the outskirts of Goma and Bukavu. 3.5c

3. In our view, Zairian President Mobutu and his senior military commanders in Kinshasa probably exert little control over confiscated FAR weapons, which local commanders

and individual FAZ soldiers are probably tempted to sell to survive, especially smaller, portable weapons.

- o The 2,000-2,500 Zairian troops in Kivu--including as many as 1,000 of Mobutu's relatively more reliable security forces--are stretched thin, lack rudimentary military discipline, and suffer severe economic hardship. 3.5c

4. Can Mobutu gain control of the heavy weapons?

Mobutu is anxious to garner additional Western goodwill and he would likely respond favorably to a Western request that he confiscate and dispose of heavy FAR weapons. Mobutu likely would have to deploy additional units of his more reliable security units to the Kivu area along with a number of senior officers to gain control of the weapons, however. He would probably request that the West pay the salaries and logistical fees associated with such a deployment to ensure troop discipline. Once in his control, Mobutu would likely be willing to turn the weapons over to Western hands, but he probably would demand some diplomatic or financial quid pro quo. 3.5c

5. How much are the confiscated FAR weapons worth? We

estimate that the FAR's helicopters and armored cars could probably fetch several hundred thousand dollars on the gray arms market, depending on their condition. The artillery and mortar pieces could also be worth a few hundred thousand dollars. 3.5c

6. What weapons do the FAR forces in Zaire have? In

both Goma and Bukavu, we judge that there may be 5,000 to 7,000 armed FAR troops who pose a security threat to US forces and Western relief workers, and who--although their ammunition is in short supply--threaten to restart hostilities inside Rwanda.

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EO 13526 1.4c

- o In Goma, there are numerous reports that as many as 5,000 FAR troops may be armed. The defense attache reported earlier this week that he observed FAR troops in company and battalion size formations in their camps northwest of Goma. FAR forces had a 37 mm anti-aircraft gun, as well as numerous buses, 2.5 ton trucks, and two command jeeps. Most of the FAR senior leadership is reportedly in Goma.

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SECRET

3.5c

NOCONTRACT

3.5c

WNINTEL

- o FAR forces may have access to additional weapons in Zaire. A cache of FAR explosives was discovered near Bukavu last week and the attache reports that piles of confiscated weapons remain unguarded in Goma.

EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

3.5c

NOCONTRACT

3.5c

WNINTEL

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 AIG 7033
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 SUBJ: BURUNDI: RENEWED ETHNIC VIOLENCE. (U)
 TEXT:

***** INCOMPLETE MESSAGE *****

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

PASS: [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

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(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) [REDACTED] (b)(3)

SUBJ: BURUNDI: RENEWED ETHNIC VIOLENCE. (U)

DOI: 10 AUG 94 (AS OF 1900 EDT)

TEXT: 1. (C) THE BREAKDOWN OF TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES HAS LED TO DEMONSTRATIONS BY TUTSI STUDENTS AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES THAT SHUT DOWN BUJUMBURA ON 8 AND 9 AUGUST. MOREOVER, THE SECURITY SITUATION APPEARS TO HAVE DETERIORATED ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY AS ETHNIC VIOLENCE HAS INCREASED. THESE DEVELOPMENTS WORSEN AN ALREADY FRAGILE POLITICAL SITUATION THAT ULTIMATELY COULD LEAD TO A LARGE-SCALE EXODUS OF REFUGEES.

2. (C) TALKS BETWEEN OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT STALLED ON 28 JULY OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF SEVERAL HARD-LINE HUTUS TO HEAD THE REORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. THIS BREAKDOWN IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS SPARKED THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN BUJUMBURA, AS PROTESTERS SOUGHT TO CLOSE DOWN THE CAPITAL. STUDENTS WHO HAS GATHERED AT KEY POINTS IN THE CITY MENACED PASSERSBY AND TRIED TO PREVENT WORKERS FROM GOING TO WORK BY THROWING STONES AT THEM. WHEN SECURITY FORCES INTERVENED TO DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS, THE UNREST LED TO A NEARLY COMPLETE SHUTDOWN OF THE CITY.

3. (C) ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED, ESPECIALLY IN SEVERAL NORTHERN PROVINCES. CLASHES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND ARMED GANGS HAVE INCREASED, AS HAVE REPORTS OF EXTREMIST HUTU GROUPS ATTACKING BURUNDIAN AND RWANDAN TUTSIS. MOREOVER, RWANDAN HUTUS REPORTEDLY ARE BEING KILLED BY AN

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UNIDENTIFIED UNIFORMED GROUP--EITHER TUTSI RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY OR BURUNDI ARMY TROOPS. THIS RISE IN VIOLENCE REPORTEDLY IS LINKED TO THE SLOW PACE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PROCESS, AN UPSURGE IN HUTU EXTREMISM, AND THE ARMY'S POSSIBLE INTENT TO SHOW RWANDAN HUTUS THAT THEY ARE NOT WELCOME IN BURUNDI.

4. (G) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH BURUNDI IS INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE, A REPLAY OF THE RWANDAN CIVIL WAR--WITH ITS GENOCIDE AND COLLAPSE OF THE GOVERNMENT--IS UNLIKELY. SEVERAL KEY DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IN BURUNDI, THE TUTSIS CONTROL THE MILITARY, WHILE THE HUTUS CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT--A FRAGILE SHARING OF POWER THAT ENCOURAGES COOPERATION BETWEEN THE RIVAL ETHNIC GROUPS. IN ADDITION, NEITHER THE HUTU GOVERNMENT NOR THE TUTSI MILITARY IS PURSUING A POLICY OF GENOCIDE, AS WAS DONE BY THE FORMER HUTU LEADERSHIP IN RWANDA. MODERATES IN POWER IN BURUNDI ARE COUNTERING RADICALS ON BOTH SIDES, THEREBY AVOIDING A DISASTER SIMILAR TO THAT IN RWANDA. MOREOVER, INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE REGION'S PROBLEMS DISCOURAGES EXTREMISTS FROM PROMOTING WIDESPREAD ETHNIC CONFLICT.

5. (G) BURUNDI'S CURRENT SITUATION HAS AT LEAST THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES' THE MOST LIKELY ONE IS THE CONTINUED SLOW ESCALATION OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND BURUNDIAN REFUGEES FLEEING TO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. SUCH AN EXODUS WOULD FURTHER STRAIN REGIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS.

6. (G) ANOTHER POSSIBLE OUTCOME IS FOR THE SITUATION TO REMAIN UNCHANGED, WITH THE HUTUS RETAINING CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSIS, THE MILITARY. EVEN IN THIS SCENARIO, USE OF FORCE BY THE MILITARY WOULD LIKELY CREATE REFUGEES, BUT ON A SMALLER SCALE, PERHAPS IN THE TENS OF THOUSANDS. THIS REFUGEE FLOW ALSO WOULD OVERTAX THE HIGHLY STRESSED REGIONAL RELIEF EFFORT.

7. (G) THE LEAST LIKELY OUTCOME WOULD SEE THE TUTSI-LED ARMY RETURNING TO POWER IN A SUCCESSFUL COUP. THIS SCENARIO PROBABLY WOULD RESULT FROM THE MILITARY'S INABILITY TO CONTAIN ESCALATING VIOLENCE BECAUSE OF MORE BROAD-BASED AND SUBSTANTIAL ARMED OPPOSITION. THIS COUP WOULD, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, BE LED BY JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE JOINED TUTSI EXTREMISTS IN THE ARMY AND WHO HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THIS SCENARIO PROBABLY WOULD RESULT IN THOUSANDS BEING KILLED--MOSTLY HUTUS--AND CAUSE ALMOST 1 MILLION REFUGEES TO ESCAPE TO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA, POSSIBLY CREATING ANOTHER REGIONAL REFUGEE DISASTER SIMILAR TO THAT EXPERIENCED BY RWANDA.

(b)(3)

DECL: OADR

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SECT: SECTION: 03 OF 03

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

15 August 1994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Eastern Zaire: Volcanic Activity Endangers Refugees

1. The potential of a major eruption continues to threaten refugee and local populations located in the shadow of two active volcanoes. US [EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d] volcanologists analyzing recent volcanic events—including ash and steam plumes, lava flows, and tremors—are concerned that these events are precursors to a major eruption.

[1.4c]


2. According to seismic data, the most recent volcanic events began on 23 June with an eruption in the central cone of Nyiragongo crater followed by a small lava flow from the northwestern flank of Nyamulagira on 4 July. Since then, the volcanoes—connected by subsurface channels—have emitted ash and steam plumes on several occasions. On 8 August tremors were felt in the Goma area, and two days later lava flowed from a fissure on the southern slope of Nyiragongo, according to eyewitnesses. Various satellite systems continue to detect thermal signatures, indicating molten lava.

[1.4c]

3. Several refugee sites are within a few kilometers of lava fields formed by earlier activity. Those near the flows from the 1977 eruption are in greatest jeopardy, according to [EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d] experts. Relief workers are unlikely to receive much warning if a major flow occurs, because of the unusual liquidity of the lava from both volcanoes. [1.4c]


[EO 13526 1.4c]

Eastern Zaire: Volcanic Ac



EO 13526 1.4c

Activity in Refugee Area



EO 13526 1.4c

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

13 August 1994

EO 13526 1.4c

RWANDA:

New Exodus Under Way

Thousands of Rwandan Hutus in the French-protected humanitarian zone may be moving west on foot and by car on the road toward Zaire, according to press reports. [1.4c]

[1.4c] say these people are headed toward Bukavu, an area crammed with more than 300,000 refugees.

-- French military officers told relief officials that some 600 refugees per hour were reaching an area 20 km west of Gikongoro yesterday, 80 km from the Zairian border, press reports say.

EO 13526 1.4c

The flow may be the beginning of a larger, catastrophic migration into Zaire of up to 3 million people, spurred by fear of Tutsi reprisals after the impending withdrawal of French forces by 22 August.

-- Press reports say that those fleeing are some of the nearly 2 million residents of the zone, but the more than 1 million displaced people also in the area--including 500,000 around Gikongoro alone--had not begun leaving their camps.

The sight of thousands leaving is likely to panic others into joining the migration. Some 14,000 Tutsis sheltered at a poorly protected camp at Cyangugu could be at risk if a tide of Hutus sweeps through the area. Another large influx would overwhelm the already strained relief capabilities in Zaire. [1.4c]

[1.4c]

[EO 13526 1.4c] no new volcanic activity since Wednesday [EO 13526 1.4c]
[EO 13526 1.4c]

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EO 13526 1.4c

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Press reports say the UN relief agency is making contingency plans to evacuate people.

-- The 1977, lava flow stopped approximately 100 meters from Kibumba, the region's largest refugee site. The road from Goma to Kibumba and Katale also traverses the 1977 lava fields.

EO 13526 1.4c

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 13526 1.4c

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PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: SECRET
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ORIG: CIA
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RUWDCAA/CG I MEF
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RUCLEFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW
RUCKMAB/CGFMFLANT
RUETITH/CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEAUSA/CNGB WASHINGTON DC
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPND/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
RUWFAFK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
RHCGRSRA/COMUSARCENT FT MCPER
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUCIBBA/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB
RUDOIEI/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

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 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERVWASHDC
 RUETIAA/DIRNSA
 RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
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 RHMPOSP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
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 RUWSMXI/USCINCTrans INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL
 RULYVGA/USCOMSOLANT
 RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
 RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

INFO: ****

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF EO 13526 3.5c 22 AUGUST 1994.
CONTENTS

TEXT:

EO 13526 3.5c

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB;
 CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
3.5c NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN
 MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT
 COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS;
 BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR
 INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD
 FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO

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[3.5c]

CONTENTS

1. RWANDA: EXODUS CONTINUES [3.5c]
2. INDIA-PAKISTAN: ANTAGONISM SELF-LIMITING, PROGRESS SLOW [3.5c]
3. LESOTHO: PROTESTS MAY LEAD TO VIOLENCE [3.5c]

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[EO 13526 1.4c]

//A SWIFT RPF MOVE T-NT0 THE ZONE, PERHAPS UNDER THE PRETEXT OF PROTECTING THE 12,000 TUTSIS GATHERED NEAR CYANGUGU OR TO ESTABLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, WOULD RISK TRIGGERING A PANICKED RUSH TOWARD THE BORDER.// [3.5c]

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2. INDIA-PAKISTAN: ANTAGONISM SELF-LIMITING, PROGRESS SLOW [3.5c]
 SENIOR INDIAN AND PAKISTANI OFFICIALS SAY THAT BILATERAL POLITICAL RELATIONS ARE NEAR AN ALLTIME LOW BUT THAT MILITARY CONFLICT REMAINS UNLIKELY. //LEADERS IN BOTH COUNTRIES APPEAR CAPABLE OF MANAGING POTENTIALLY VOLATILE SITUATIONS, AND THEY HAVE LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR AN EVENTUAL WARMING OF TIES.// [3.5c]

INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY SRINIVASAN AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAIKH REITERATED THEIR COUNTRIES' ANTAGONISTIC POSITIONS [EO 13526 1.4c]
 [1.4c] EARLY THIS MONTH. BOTH SIDES FOCUSED ON THE KASHMIR DISPUTE, WHICH INDIA IS TRYING TO TREAT AS A DOMESTIC INSURGENCY AND PAKISTAN HAS REPEATEDLY TRIED TO INTERNATIONALIZE, IN UN AND OTHER FORUMS.

-- NEW DELHI ALSO CHARGES ISLAMABAD WITH INVOLVEMENT IN A SERIES OF BOMBINGS IN BOMBAY EARLY LAST YEAR, AND PAKISTAN RETORTS THAT INDIA IS FOMENTING VIOLENCE IN ITS SINDH PROVINCE. ISLAMABAD THIS MONTH ANNOUNCED THE CLOSURE OF THE INDIAN CONSULATE IN KARACHI,

[3.5c]

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY [3.5c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; IL FOR CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//; COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELLEN SCOTT AFB [3.5c]; CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.

[3.5c]

AND THE TWO HAVE EXCHANGED EXPULSIONS OF DIPLOMATS FOR SPYING, [EO 13526 1.4c] BOTH HAVE REPORTED INCREASED HARASSMENT OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. [3.5c]

[EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d]

3. LESOTHO: PROTESTS MAY LEAD TO VIOLENCE [3.5c]

SUPPORTERS OF THE 16-MONTH-OLD ELECTED GOVERNMENT REPLACED BY A PALACE COUP LAST WEEK HAVE CALLED A GENERAL STRIKE TODAY. THE SECURITY FORCES ARE SUPPORTING THE COUP, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE CONSOLIDATING POWER.

-- [EO 13526 1.4c] THE SECURITY FORCES MAY USE THE PROTESTS TO JUSTIFY A VIOLENT CRACKDOWN AGAINST ITS OPPONENTS.

-- THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS APPEALED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND CALLED ON SOUTH AFRICA TO CLOSE ITS BORDER WITH LESOTHO, IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE OPPOSING THE COUP [1.4c]

[3.5c]

DRVW 22 AUGUST 2014.

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#6313

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

[3.5c]

DIST:

PRT: SIT

SIT: NSC SUM SUM2 VAX

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Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
LINE1: RAASZYUW RUEAIIA6318 2340604-SSSS--RHEHAAA.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
LINE3: R 220602Z AUG 94
LINE4: FM CIA
OSRI: RUEAIIA
DTG: 220602Z AUG 94
ORIG: CIA
TO: RUWMEFA/15AF TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIPGA/325OSS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
RUEBEJA/436OSS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
RUWMEFE/702AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
RUCIBBA/9TH AF SHAW AFB
RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AIR UNIVERSITY
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHDC/DI
RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUCKMEA/CG II MEF
RUCLFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW
RUCKMAB/CGFMFLANT
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPND/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK
RUWFAPK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
RULYVBA/COMSECONDFLT
RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
RUDOIEI/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUFMHA/CTF SIX ONE
RUFMKA/CTF SIX TWO
RUFMDA/CTF SIX ZERO
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHDC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA

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PER E. O. 13526

RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
 RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL HQ
 RUCFAAA/FEMA SF
 RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC
 RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
 RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/INOI
 RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO
 RUWTADA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
 RUEADWD/HQ DA
 RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XOI//XOX//
 RHHMCMY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
 RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
 RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
 RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
 RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
 RUEAIJU/NPIC
 RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
 RHHMCMY/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
 RUFMSRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
 RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
 RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
 RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL
 RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
 RUGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
 RUGAID/USEUCOM JIC
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 RHFPAAA/UTAS RAMSTEIN AB GE
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

INFO: ****

SUBJ: EUROPEAN BRIEF [EO 13526 3.5c] 22 AUGUST 1994.
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TEXT:

[EO 13526 3.5c]

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2. RWANDA: EXODUS CONTINUES [3.5c]
3. RUSSIA: TIGHTENING THE VISE AROUND CHECHENIA [3.5c]
4. UKRAINE: KUCHMA TO PUSH FOR NPT ACCESSION [3.5c]
5. UZBEKISTAN: NEW FOREIGN MINISTER LATEST IN SHAKEUPS [3.5c]
6. BOSNIA: LEVELING THE BATTLEFIELD [3.5c]

1. BALKAN CRISIS [3.5c]
THOUSANDS FLEE VELIKA Kladusa

AS MANY AS 20,000 REFUGEES FROM THE CITY HAVE FLED INTO KRAJINA SERB-CONTROLLED TERRITORY OVER THE WEEKEND, ACCORDING TO UN SPOKESMEN. THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL NOT ALLOW THE REFUGEES TO ENTER ITS TERRITORY AND HAS ALLOWED ONLY 50 ETHNIC CROATS TO CROSS CHECKPOINTS, ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS. SOME 2,000 TO 3,000 REFUGEES ARE REPORTEDLY TRAPPED IN A NO MAN'S LAND BETWEEN KRAJINA SERB AND CROATIAN GOVERNMENT LINES NEAR KARLOVAC; OTHERS ARE CONGREGATED AT VOJNIC, STARO SELO, AND TOPUSKO.

-- UN OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE REFUGEES SHOULD RETURN TO BOSNIA AND ARE NOT PRESSING CROATIA TO ACCEPT THEM, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. MEANWHILE, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE CALLED FOR THE REFUGEES' RETURN, PROMISING THAT THEY WILL NOT BE HARMED.

-- //THE REFUGEES--MOST OF WHOM ARE MUSLIM--WILL LIKELY RETURN WHEN THEY LEARN THAT FIGHTING AROUND THE CITY HAS CEASED AND THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE TREATING INHABITANTS FAIRLY.// [3.5c]

FIGHTING ELSEWHERE

ACCORDING TO BELGRADE RADIO, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES RESUMED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON SATURDAY MAKING STRONG PUSHES IN THE BRCKO AREA, TESLIC AREA, AND THE BRGULE SALIENT. SARAJEVO RADIO CONFIRMED THAT GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE ADVANCING TOWARD TESLIC. BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY SHELLED DOBOJ ON SATURDAY, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. [3.5c]

SITUATION IN SARAJEVO

BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AND SERB FORCES CONTINUE TO FIRE HEAVY WEAPONS INSIDE THE SARAJEVO HEAVY-WEAPON EXCLUSION ZONE, ACCORDING TO A UN SPOKESMAN.

-- LATE FRIDAY NIGHT, BOSNIAN SERB FORCES ATTEMPTED TO RECOVER A 122-MM ARTILLERY WEAPON FROM THE POLJINE WEAPONS COLLECTION SITE IN THE EXCLUSION ZONE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS.

-- INCREASED ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE WERE REPORTED IN THE BREZA-OLOVO AREA ON SATURDAY, MOSTLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES. ACCORDING TO A UN SPOKESMAN. [EO 13526 1.4c]

EO 13526 1.4c

BOSNIAN, KRAJINA SERBS PROPOSE UNIFIED SERB STATE
BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC AND KRAJINA SERB PRESIDENT MARTIC SIGNED A JOINT DECLARATION IN KNIN ON SATURDAY, CALLING FOR A UNIFIED SERB STATE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. KARADZIC SAID THAT A SERB STATE IN THE BALKANS WOULD BE A STABILIZING FACTOR AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO ENGAGE IN A COSTLY WAR AGAINST THE SERBS IF IT DID NOT ACCEPT THE STATE.

-- MARTIC CAUTIONED THAT UNIFYING WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC AT THE MOMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE CROATIA AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AGGRESSION TOWARD SERB-HELD REGIONS. [3.5c]
SERBIAN OFFICIAL TO VISIT MOSCOW
SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER MARJANOVIC IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT MOSCOW EARLY THIS WEEK AND REPORTEDLY WILL MEET WITH RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER

CHERNOMYRDIN, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. 3.5c
MACEDONIA BORDER INCIDENT

A MACEDONIAN ARMY PATROL KILLED A SERBIAN SMUGGLER ON 20 AUGUST, APPROXIMATELY 80 TO 100 METERS INSIDE THE MACEDONIAN BORDER, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC REPORTING. THE MACEDONIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SAYS THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME A MACEDONIAN SOLDIER HAD KILLED A SERB AND THAT IT EXPECTS SOME KIND OF SERB REACTION TO THE INCIDENT WITHIN 48 HOURS. 3.5c

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3.5c

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1.4c

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3. RUSSIA: TIGHTENING THE VISE AROUND CHECHENIA 3.5c
MOSCOW HAS TOUGHENED ITS POLICY TOWARD SECESSIONIST CHECHEN REPUBLIC PRESIDENT DUDAYEV SINCE LATE LAST MONTH BY DECLARING ITS SUPPORT FOR A NEW RIVAL GOVERNMENT IN CHECHENIA, KNOWN AS THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL, AND BY STEPPING UP MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE INTRVENTION. THE CHANGE CAME AFTER THE FAILURE OF RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A POWER-SHARING TREATY WITH DUDAYEV'S REGIME AND AFTER A BLOODY HIJACKING BY CHECHENS--THE FOURTH IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS--IN WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, DUDAYEV REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES.

-- ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT YEL'TSIN HAS PUBLICLY DISAVOWED THE USE OF FORCE TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, MOSCOW HAS TWICE PUBLICLY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS CITIZENS THERE, HAS MADE EXTENSIVE MILITARY PREPARATION IN THE REGION, AND HAS RECENTLY IMPOSED AN AIR BLOCKADE OF THE REPUBLIC.

-- ACCORDING TO RUSSIAN PRESS REPORTS, MOSCOW HAS SENT ARMS AND AT LEAST 2 BILLION RUBLES TO THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL, BASED IN THE NADTERECHNYY REGION OF CHECHENIA, IN THE HOPE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL BE ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC AS A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT. IT FAVORS CHECHEN AUTONOMY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 3.5c

DESPITE MOSCOW'S SUPPORT, THE COUNCIL HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO UNITE THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS, MOST OF WHICH SHARE DUDAYEV'S SECESSIONIST SENTIMENTS

EO 13526 1.4c

FORMER RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN KHASBULATOV, AN ETHNIC CHECHEN, HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF THE COUNCIL, IS INDEPENDENTLY TRYING TO RALLY OPPOSITION GROUPS, AND HAS CALLED FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. 3.5c

//THE PRESSURE ON MOSCOW TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IS CONSIDERABLE.// RESPONDENTS TO RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND EDITORIAL WRITERS HAVE STRONGLY OPPOSED THE USE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCE IN CHECHENIA.

-- //REGIONAL LEADERS IN RUSSIA'S NORTH CAUCASUS ARE CONCERNED THAT FULL-SCALE MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD ENABLE DUDAYEV TO RALLY POLITICAL EXTREMISTS ACROSS THE REGION, WHICH IS A POTENTIAL TINDERBOX BECAUSE OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SENTIMENT IN THE POPULACE.//

-- //NEVERTHELESS, RUSSIA MIGHT INTERVENE IN ANY OF SEVERAL CIRCUMSTANCES, MOST NOTABLY AN ERUPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DUDAYEV, WHO IS MOBILIZING FORCES, AND THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL.// 3.5c

BOX

3.5c

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 HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
 CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//;
 CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;
 CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB;
 CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE
 AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI;
 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB
 PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN;
 USTRANS INTELCON SCOTT AFB [3.5c] COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ
 AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM
 WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO
 VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL
 STEWART.

[3.5c]

OPTIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO DATE WOULD LET IT PURSUE ANY OF
 THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION BUT DO NOT POINT TO A PARTICULAR
 OPTION; OTHER OPTIONS MAY ALSO BE UNDER CONSIDERATION. [3.5c]
 //SUPPORTING AN INSURRECTION.// MOSCOW COULD CHOOSE TO MINIMIZE ITS
 CASUALTIES BY ARMING AND PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
 PROVISIONAL COUNCIL FORCES WITHOUT ANY DIRECT RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN
 MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST PRESIDENT DUDAYEV. RUSSIAN
 RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY AND COMMAND POST AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITY
 RECENTLY OBSERVED IN THE MOZDOK AREA, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE ARMS
 DELIVERY TO CHECHEN OPPOSITION FORCES BY A RUSSIAN HELICOPTER,
 SUPPORT THIS SCENARIO. [3.5c]

//LIMITED INVOLVEMENT--THE ABKHAZIA SCENARIO.// MOSCOW COULD SUPPORT
 AN INSURRECTION AGAINST DUDAYEV AND ENGAGE IN LIMITED MILITARY OR
 COVERT ACTIVITY AGAINST CHECHEN GOVERNMENT FORCES, INCLUDING
 ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS AND AIRSTRIKES DIRECTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT
 POSITIONS, GARRISONS, AND AIRFIELDS. MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO DATE
 SUGGEST THAT THIS OPTION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON RELATIVELY SHORT
 NOTICE. [3.5c]

//MASSIVE INTERVENTION.// AFTER MAKING ADDITIONAL PREPARATIONS,
 MOSCOW COULD INTERVENE MASSIVELY TO DESTROY THE CHECHEN ARMED FORCES
 AND OCCUPY CHECHENIA BY LAUNCHING A COMBINED-ARMS OFFENSIVE,
 SUPPORTED BY OVERWHELMING AIRPOWER. RUSSIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY TROOPS
 ALSO WOULD BE USED TO KEEP TIGHT CONTROL OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.
 RUSSIAN FORCES CARRIED OUT A SIMILAR OPERATION IN NORTH OSSETIA IN
 1992, WHEN THEY INTERVENED TO STOP FIGHTING BETWEEN ETHNIC INGUSH
 AND NORTH OSSETIANS. MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO DATE SUGGEST THAT
 RUSSIAN FORCES NEED AT LEAST SEVERAL MORE DAYS OF PREPARATION BEFORE
 THEY COULD CARRY OUT THIS OPTION. [3.5c]

END BOX

EURASIA

4. UKRAINE: KUCHMA TO PUSH FOR NPT ACCESSION [3.5c]

PRESIDENT KUCHMA HAS TOLD THE UKRAINIAN PRESS THAT HE WILL RAISE THE
 ISSUE OF ACCESSION TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WITH THE
 LEGISLATURE IN OCTOBER AND THAT HE EXPECTS THE LEGISLATURE WILL
 APPROVE THE MEASURE. KUCHMA REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE BELIEVES NPT
 ACCESSION WOULD HASTEN WESTERN AID TO UKRAINE; //HE ALMOST CERTAINLY
 WANTS TO ACHIEVE ACCESSION BEFORE HE VISITS WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER
 TO PRESS HIS CASE FOR THE DELIVERY OF PROMISED AID.//

-- //HE MAY, HOWEVER, BE OVERESTIMATING HIS SUPPORT. KUCHMA AND
 LEFTISTS IN THE LEGISLATURE ARE LIKELY TO CLASH ON SUCH ISSUES AS

ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE DIVISION OF POWERS NEXT MONTH.// MOST LEGISLATIVE LEADERS HAVE BEEN AMBIVALENT ON ACCESSION,// AND THE BODY MAY USE THE NPT ISSUE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EMBARRASS KUCHMA AND ASSERT ITS INDEPENDENCE.//

-- //A COALITION BETWEEN THE LEFTISTS AND UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS--WHO OPPOSE DENUCLEARIZATION--COULD MUSTER ENOUGH VOTES TO BLOCK ACCESSION, BUT KUCHMA MAY COMPROMISE ON SOME OTHER ISSUES TO SWAY LEFTIST DEPUTIES.// [3.5c]

5. UZBEKISTAN: NEW FOREIGN MINISTER LATEST IN SHAKEUPS [3.5c] PRESIDENT KARIMOV ON THURSDAY PROMOTED FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ABDULAZIZ KAMILOV TO FOREIGN MINISTER. KAMILOV WAS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE BETWEEN 1992 AND 1994 AND IS AT LEAST THE THIRD NSS OFFICIAL TO BE PROMOTED SINCE JUNE TO A SENIOR POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT OR PRESIDENTIAL APPARATUS. HE ALSO HAS SERVED IN SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA.

EO 13526 1.4c

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

6. BOSNIA: LEVELING THE BATTLEFIELD [3.5c] IF THE ARMS EMBARGO IS LIFTED, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR TO INTEGRATE NEW EQUIPMENT, TRAIN PERSONNEL, CONSTRUCT A SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DEVELOP AN ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM IN ORDER TO "LEVEL THE BATTLEFIELD." THEY ALSO WOULD NEED AT LEAST THE TACIT COOPERATION OF CROATIA, WHICH CONTROLS ALL FEASIBLE LAND ROUTES INTO BOSNIA BUT WHICH DISTRUSTS THE SARAJEVO GOVERNMENT DESPITE THE FEDERATION AGREEMENT. [3.5c]

PRINCIPAL NEEDS

BOSNIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ORGANIZING, TRAINING, AND CONTROLLING THEIR FORCES IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. THEY STILL FACE A 6-TO-1 DEFICIT IN ARTILLERY AND A 20-TO-1 DEFICIT IN TANKS.

-- THEY HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF INTERNAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION, HOWEVER, AND THEIR STRONG MORALE PROBABLY MEANS THAT THE ADDITION OF

[3.5c]

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR EUR; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY FOR STATE REP [3.5c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD, 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ/INZE; FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; FAA/ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; USTRANS INTELSEN SCOTT AFB [3.5c] COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; COMNISCOM WASHDC//NAVATAC/22D; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.

[3.5c]

A RELATIVELY MODEST AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO REACH ROUGH MILITARY PARITY WITH THE SERBS. [3.5c] EQUIPMENT TO ARM SIX TO 10 BRIGADES--SOME 15,000 TO 25,000 TROOPS, OR ABOUT A QUARTER OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT MANPOWER--PROBABLY WOULD GIVE THE GOVERNMENT A FORCE SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ON ONE OR TWO FRONTS. SUCH A FORCE WOULD NEED 120 TO 200 TANKS, 60 TO 100 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, 200 TO 350 HEAVY ARTILLERY PIECES AND MORTARS MORE THAN 100 MM, AND 35 TO 40 MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS.

-- IN ADDITION, IT WOULD REQUIRE ROUGHLY 2,000 TRUCKS, SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNICATIONS GEAR, AND A STEADY SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION, FUEL, AND SPARE PARTS.

EO 13526 1.4d

TRAINING AND SUPPORT TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD NEED EXTENSIVE TRAINING. ASSIMILATION WOULD BE EASIER IF THE EQUIPMENT WERE OF RUSSIAN DESIGN, LIKE THE MAJORITY OF THEIR CURRENT EQUIPMENT.

-- THE MUSLIM AND CROAT FEDERATION AGREEMENT PROVIDES A RELATIVELY SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THIS TRAINING.

-- OUTSIDE AIR SUPPORT, HOWEVER, PROBABLY WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DETER THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM LAUNCHING A MAJOR OFFENSIVE INTENDED TO PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT FROM MAKING USE OF ITS NEW WEAPONS. [3.5c]

DRVW 22 AUGUST 2014.

BT
#6321
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
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3.5c

DIST:

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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
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 LINE4: RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
 OSRI: RUEKJCS
 DTG: 010054Z SEP 94
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 RHJAAFA/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE ENTEBBE UG
 RUSNJTF/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE MOEHRINGEN GE
 [REDACTED] (b)(3)

INFO: ****

SUBJ: BURUNDI: ON THE EDGE. (U)

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS: [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

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(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT [REDACTED] (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
 THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
 COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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SERIAL: [REDACTED] (b)(3)

SUBJ: BURUNDI: ON THE EDGE. (U)

DOI: 1 SEP 94

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KEY JUDGMENTS

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1. (~~S/NF~~) A FRAGILE BALANCE OF POWER EXISTS IN BURUNDI, WHERE THE MAJORITY HUTU TRIBE CONTROLS THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE MINORITY TUTSI TRIBE CONTROLS THE MILITARY.
2. (~~S/NF~~) TENSIONS WILL PERSIST WHILE THE TWO GROUPS NEGOTIATE FUTURE POWER- SHARING ARRANGEMENTS AND AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TRIES TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE.
3. (~~S/NF~~) THE HUTUS, WHO WON THE COUNTRY'S FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION (1993), HAVE ELEVATED POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS; IF THWARTED, THEY MIGHT RESORT TO ESCALATING VIOLENCE.
4. (~~S/NF~~) THE TUTSIS, WHO FEEL THEIR SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON CONTROLLING THE ARMY, WILL RESIST SHARING MILITARY POWER; IF THREATENED, THEY TOO MIGHT RESORT TO INCREASING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE.
5. (~~S/NF~~) THIS VOLATILE SITUATION COULD ERUPT INTO WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE RESULTING IN THOUSANDS (OF MAINLY HUTU) DEATHS; HOWEVER, A CIVIL WAR LIKE RWANDA'S IS UNLIKELY.
6. (~~S/NF~~) REGARDLESS OF BURUNDI'S INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE, THE TUTSI MILITARY WILL INCREASINGLY SEEK CLOSER TIES WITH THEIR TUTSI BROTHERS

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IN RWANDA. EVENTUALLY, A FORMAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS SEEMS INEVITABLE.

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DISCUSSION

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7. (C) BACKGROUND. BURUNDI'S POPULATION IS COMPRISED OF TWO MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS - THE HUTUS (WHO MAKE UP 85 PERCENT) AND THE TUTSIS (WHO MAKE UP 15 PERCENT). BEFORE COLONIZATION, THESE TWO GROUPS FORMED SEPARATE CASTES, BUT WEALTH RATHER THAN ETHNICITY WAS THE DEFINING FEATURE. THE WEALTHY OF EITHER GROUP CAME TO BE CALLED TUTSIS, AND THOSE DEPENDENT ON OTHERS WERE CALLED HUTUS, EVEN THOUGH THESE ARE TWO COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS SHARING A COMMON LANGUAGE. THE ARRIVAL OF THE EUROPEAN COLONIALISTS, HOWEVER, LED TO FURTHER DIVISIONS. THE BELGIANS, AND LATER THE GERMANS, USED THE TERMS "TUTSI" AND "HUTU" TO DRAW ETHNIC DISTINCTIONS. MOREOVER, THEY RULED THROUGH THE TUTSIS, WHILE KEEPING THE HUTUS IN A FEUDAL STATE. THE TUTSIS WERE ALSO GIVEN FAVORABLE ACCESS TO EDUCATION, JOBS, AND PROPERTY. THIS HIERARCHY WAS EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE BURUNDIANS, WHO BEGAN TO SEE THEMSELVES IN TERMS OF "NATURAL" MASTERS AND SERFS.

8. (C) AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN 1962, BURUNDI'S FIRST GOVERNMENTS WERE ETHNICALLY MIXED. BUT FROM 1965, THE TUTSIS WIELDED INCREASING CONTROL, AND BY MID-1972, THEIR DOMINANCE WAS ABSOLUTE. BURUNDI'S TUTSIS, HOWEVER, WERE HAUNTED BY THE SPECTER OF NEIGHBORING RWANDA, WHERE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS WERE KILLED, 100,000 WERE PUSHED INTO EXILE, AND THE REMAINDER WERE EXCLUDED FROM POLITICS WHEN THE MONARCHY WAS OVERTHROWN BY THE HUTUS IN 1959. (RWANDA SHARES BURUNDI'S 85 PERCENT HUTU, 15 PERCENT TUTSI COMPOSITION.) MANY TUTSIS IN BURUNDI, THEREFORE, TOOK HARSH ACTIONS AGAINST HUTUS, PARTICULARLY EDUCATED HUTUS, TO ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT SUFFER THE SAME FATE.

9. (C) LARGE-SCALE MASSACRES OF HUTUS OCCURRED IN BURUNDI IN 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991, AND 1993, WHEN THE TUTSIS BECAME FEARFUL FOR THEIR CONTINUED SAFETY AS MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY. THESE PERIODIC MASSACRES SERVED TO DEEPLY ENTRENCH THE SUBJUGATION OF THE HUTUS.

10. (C) REFORMIST PRESIDENT PIERRE BUYOYA (1987-1993) BROUGHT BURUNDIANS MODEST CHANGE IN THE DIRECTION OF ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND PREPARED THE WAY FOR BURUNDI'S FIRST-EVER MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS ON 1 JUNE, 1993. THE INCUMBENT MINORITY TUTSI PARTY, THE PARTY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS (UPRONA), WAS ROUNDLY DEFEATED BY THE HUTU FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURUNDI (FRODEBU). THOUGH BUYOYA ACCEPTED HIS DEFEAT, AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED ARMY FOLLOWED SUIT, MANY HUTUS FEARED SABOTAGE BY TUTSIS IN KEY POSITIONS OR AN ARMY COUP THE MOMENT THE NEW GOVERNMENT DISTURBED ENTRENCHED TUTSI INTERESTS.

11. (C) A MILITARY COUP ATTEMPT IN OCTOBER 1993 RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF BURUNDI'S FIRST HUTU PRESIDENT, MELCHIOR NDADAYE, AND ONCE AGAIN GAVE RISE TO ETHNIC MASSACRES. THE TUTSI ARMY, HOWEVER, SUCCUMBED TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AND RETURNED THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT TO HUTU CIVILIANS. THEIR CENSURE MADE THE TUTSIS REALIZE THAT A COMPLETE TAKEOVER BY MILITARY MEANS WOULD NEVER BE REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE BY THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THIS REALIZATION WAS CRUCIAL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TENUOUS BALANCE OF POWER THAT IS CURRENTLY HOLDING BURUNDI'S ETHNIC HATREDS AT BAY.

12. (C) TRANSITION CRISIS. THE VIOLENCE ABATED IN BURUNDI, AND THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE HUTU GOVERNMENT APPOINTED CYPRIEN NTARYAMIRA, A HUTU, AS INTERIM PRESIDENT. NTARYAMIRA, HOWEVER, WAS KILLED IN THE MYSTERIOUS DOWNING OF THE RWANDAN PRESIDENT'S PLANE ON 6 APRIL, (WHICH SPARKED THE RENEWAL OF THE RWANDAN CIVIL WAR). SYLVESTRE NTIBANTUNGANYA, ANOTHER HUTU, WAS SELECTED AS INTERIM PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE NTARYAMIRA'S EFFORTS TO BRING ETHNIC

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POWERSHARING TO BURUNDI. HE WAS ONLY INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, AFTER THE HUTUS AGREED TO A NUMBER OF TUTSI DEMANDS, INCLUDING ALLOCATING 40 PERCENT OF CABINET POSITIONS TO THE TUTSI MINORITY.

13. (U) BURUNDI'S POLITICAL PARTIES.

- FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURUNDI (FRODEBU)--THE RULING HUTU PARTY WITH A MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT.
- NATIONAL PARTY FOR UNITY AND PROGRESS (UPRONA)--THE LARGEST, MOST MODERATE TUTSI OPPOSITION GROUP.
- THE PARTY FOR NATIONAL REDRESS (PARENA)--NEW TUTSI HARD-LINE PARTY LIKELY TO DRAW SUPPORT FROM SMALLER HARD-LINE TUTSI PARTIES.

14. (C) AS THEY DID AFTER NTARYAMIRA'S DEATH, THE TUTSIS ARE AGAIN USING THEIR OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THEIR DOMINANCE OF THE MILITARY TO FORCE THE HUTUS TO MAKE POLITICAL CONCESSIONS BEFORE THE TUTSIS WILL ALLOW HUTUS TO SEAT A NEW PRESIDENT. IN JULY THE TWO SIDES MADE PROGRESS, SIGNING AGREEMENTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY, PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS, DISARMAMENT, AND THE TREATMENT OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS. BUT NEGOTIATIONS STALLED IN LATE JULY OVER THE NOMINATION OF TWO HARD-LINE HUTU OFFICIALS. THE TUTSIS WERE EVENTUALLY ABLE TO FORCE THE HUTUS TO WITHDRAW THOSE NOMINATIONS, AND TALKS HAVE SINCE RESUMED.

~~S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN~~ FINAL SECTION OF 02

15. (U) TUTSI DEMANDS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION DEBATE.

- SHARING OF POSTS BETWEEN FRODEBU AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN INTELLIGENCE, POLICE, PROVINCIAL AND COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATION, AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE.
- REDISTRIBUTION OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS EQUALLY BETWEEN HUTUS AND TUTSIS.
- SUSPENSION OF LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS IMPLICATED IN LAST FALL'S ETHNIC BLOODLETTING AND IN ARMING HUTU CIVILIANS.
- RENUNCIATION OF PLANS FOR A 1,100-MAN HUTU-DOMINATED PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.
- ESTABLISHMENT OF A RIGOROUS SCHEDULE FOR THE DISARMAMENT OF CIVILIANS.
- GIVING OPPOSITION PARTIES EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RADIO AND TELEVISION.

16. (C) THE TUTSIS CONTINUE TO FEAR BEING STRIPPED OF THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST HUTU REPRISALS FOR PAST ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION. IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, THE TUTSIS STRIVE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE ARMY, WHICH THEY BELIEVE HAS THUS FAR SPARED THEM FROM GENOCIDE. AT THE SAME TIME, HUTU TOLERANCE FOR BEING DISCRIMINATED AGAINST HAS ENDED. THE HUTUS WANT REAL POWER AND HAVE GREATLY ELEVATED EXPECTATIONS SINCE THE ELECTION OF A HUTU PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN 1993. A PERCEIVED OBSTRUCTION OF THESE GOALS COULD PROVOKE HUTUS TO VIOLENCE. THE TRANSFER OF POWER, HOWEVER, CANNOT THREATEN TUTSI PREROGATIVE TOO GREATLY NOR TOO QUICKLY IF THE TENUOUS PEACE IS TO HOLD.

17. (C) BURUNDI'S NEW AND INSECURE HUTU LEADERSHIP IS VERY COGNIZANT OF THE TUTSIS' POWER, AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO ALLAY TUTSI FEARS.

JOCKEYING FOR POSITION AND SLOW PROGRESS, THEREFORE, CONTINUES TO CHARACTERIZE THE TRANSITION IN BURUNDI.

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OUTLOOK

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18. (S/NF) THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI IS VOLATILE AND COULD RESULT IN THOUSANDS OF MAINLY HUTU DEATHS, HOWEVER IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A CIVIL WAR LIKE RWANDA'S WILL BREAK OUT IN BURUNDI. IN RWANDA, THE HUTUS CONTROLLED THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY; IN BURUNDI, THE TUTSIS CONTROL THE MILITARY, CREATING A FRAGILE BALANCE OF POWER. THE HUTU LEADERSHIP HERE IS ALSO FAR MORE MODERATE THAN IT WAS IN RWANDA.

WHILE HUTU LEADERS IN RWANDA, IN POWER SINCE INDEPENDENCE, ACTIVELY PROMOTED GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSIS, THE HUTU LEADERS IN BURUNDI KNOW THAT THEIR SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON ASSUAGING TUTSI FEARS. FURTHER, TUTSI LEADERS IN THE ARMY ALSO NOW FAVOR A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN A MILITARY, SOLUTION TO BURUNDI'S PROBLEMS, HAVING REALIZED AFTER LAST OCTOBER'S COUP ATTEMPT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT ABIDE A MILITARY TAKEOVER. THE TUTSI ARMY EVEN BACKED THE FLEDGLING HUTU GOVERNMENT AGAINST AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY ROGUE MILITARY ELEMENTS IN APRIL. MOREOVER, THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH SIDES HAVE WITNESSED THE HORROR WROUGHT BY HUTU-TUTSI VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, AND THEY ARE INCREASINGLY WILLING TO PURSUE MODERATION TO PREVENT SUCH CARNAGE IN BURUNDI. FINALLY, THE HEIGHTENED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION BEING PAID TO THE REGION, AND TO HUTU-TUTSI ETHNIC RIVALRY IN PARTICULAR, WILL ENCOURAGE EACH SIDE TO KEEP EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN CHECK.

19. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR BURUNDI INVOLVING A RENEWAL OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE WOULD BE FOR THE MILITARY TO CONDUCT A COUP IN RESPONSE TO A HEIGHTENED PERCEIVED THREAT TO TUTSI SECURITY UNDER THE HUTU REGIME. WERE A COUP TO OCCUR, THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE HUTU ATTACKS AGAINST TUTSIS, ESPECIALLY TARGETING ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. THESE ATTACKS WOULD BE MET BY YET ANOTHER TUTSI ARMY MASSACRE OF HUTUS, PROBABLY KILLING THOUSANDS. PROGRESS TOWARD INTEGRATION WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE, WITH A SIMILAR POWER- BALANCE TO THE PRESENT ONE EVENTUALLY EMERGING. THE HUTUS, HAVING ONCE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, WILL NOT SUBMIT TO A RETURN TO TUTSI DOMINATION FOR LONG, AND ANY REVERSIONS TO TUTSI RULE WILL BE MET WITH INCREASING FORCE ON THE PART OF THE HUTU'

20. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALTHOUGH THIS CONFLICT IS PLAYING OUT IN BURUNDI, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT ELEMENTS OF BURUNDI'S TUTSI MILITARY WILL INCREASINGLY START REACHING OUT TO THEIR TUTSI BRETHERN IN THE RWANDA GOVERNMENT. SUCH CONTACTS WILL INITIALLY BE ACCOMPLISHED QUIETLY, PERHAPS EVOLVING INTO MORE OPEN COOPERATION AS TUTSI SELF-CONFIDENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES INCREASES. THESE DEVELOPING BONDS WILL STRENGTHEN THE TUTSI REGIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND WILL REINFORCE TUTSI CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN BOTH STATES. EVENTUALLY--PERHAPS NOT SOON, BUT CERTAINLY WITHIN A YEAR--SOME SORT OF FORMAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TUTSIS OF BURUNDI AND THOSE IN RWANDA SEEMS INEVITABLE, AND THE CHANCE FOR THIS ALLIANCE FORMING WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BY A TUTSI COUP IN BURUNDI THAT WOULD FURTHER UNDERMINE HUTU POWER AND AUTHORITY.

RWANDA WORKING GROUP, [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

DECL: OADR

BT

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: [REDACTED]
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RUETITH/AFOSI DIST 69 ANKARA
RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RUCQVAU/AIR UNIVERSITY
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ

RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC
RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB
RUWDCAA/CG I MEF
RUCKMEA/CG II MEF
RUCLFVY/CG MARRESFOR/G-2 OPS
RUCKMOA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV
RUCKFCO/CG SECOND MAW
RUCKMAB/CGFMFLANT
RUETITH/CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU
RUSNNOA/CINCEUR
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEAUSA/CNGB WASHINGTON DC
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEPND/COMDT USAWC CARLISLE BKS PA/AWCI
RUCOPKC/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK

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RUWFAFK/COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA
 RHCGRSRA/COMUSARCENT FT MCPER
 RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE
 RUCIBBA/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB
 RUDOIIEI/CRYPSUPPGRU USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
 RUHGSNN/CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT SEVEN
 RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINSERV WASHDC
 RUETIAA/DIRNSA
 RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA
 RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL HQ
 RUCFAAA/FEMA SF
 RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC
 RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
 RHDIAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/INOI
 RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB
 RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPC INTEL PETERSON AFB CO
 RUWTADA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL

RUEADWD/HQ DA
 RUETITH/HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU
 RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XOI//XOX//
 RHHMCMY/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUFTWSA/JTF PROVIDE COMFORT
 RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
 RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
 RUDOIDE/MSA RAF MOLESWORTH UK
 RHMPOSP/NAVCENT INTEL BCST
 RUYNJYF/NAVSCITECHGRUFE YOKOSUKA JA
 RUWGHJC/NAVSTKWARCEN
 RUDJABF/NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI
 RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN
 RUEAIJU/NPIC
 RUWMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB
 RUFMSRJ/SR JOIC NAPLES IT
 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
 RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
 RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB
 RUWSMXI/USCINCTrans INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL
 RULYVGA/USCOMSOLANT
 RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES
 RUFGAID/USEUCOM JIC
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

INFO: ////

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF EO 13526 3.5c 15 SEPTEMBER 1994.

TEXT:

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EO 13526 3.5c

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB;
 CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
 3.5c NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN
 MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT
 COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS;
 BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR
 INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD

FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO
 CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; IL FOR CDRUSAITAC
 WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB
 ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI;
 INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON
 GA//; COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON
 CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN;
 CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE
 COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELLEN SCOTT AFB 3.5c CHJUSMMAT
 ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR
 KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU;
 HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD
 INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS
 CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.

3.5c

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF 3.5c 15 SEPTEMBER 1994.

CONTENTS

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2. RWANDA: RPF ASSERTING CONTROL OVER SAFE ZONE 3.5c
3. CONGO: ETHNIC UNREST ERUPTS IN CAPITAL 3.5c
4. LESOTHO: ELECTED GOVERNMENT RESTORED 3.5c
5. ISRAEL: MODEST ANTI-INFLATION PACKAGE UNVEILED 3.5c

DEVELOPMENTS

1. SOMALIA: A DANGEROUS UN WITHDRAWAL 3.5c

THE UN AND ITS FORCE IN SOMALIA APPEAR INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT
 THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT A SAFE AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL. 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c THE UN FORCE IN SOMALIA IS NOT YET ENGAGED IN
 SERIOUS PLANNING FOR AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL. THE ONLY TWO
 KNOWLEDGEABLE WITHDRAWAL PLANNERS IN THE FORCE REPORTEDLY INTEND TO

LEAVE SOMALIA NEXT MONTH.

--// SOMALI GUNMEN AND MILITIA ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A DISORGANIZED WITHDRAWAL TO INTENSIFY ATTACKS ON UN TROOPS AND LOOT THEIR EQUIPMENT AND COULD INCITE A CHAOTIC SCRAMBLE TO LEAVE BY INDIVIDUAL TROOP CONTINGENTS.// [3.5c]

SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL UN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING THE KEY INDIAN AND PAKISTANI CONTINGENTS, ARE ALREADY PREPARING THEIR OWN WITHDRAWAL PLANS //IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID BEING STRANDED.// //SOME OF THEIR PLANNING APPEARS AT ODDS WITH THE RUDIMENTARY UN PLAN.//

-- PAKISTAN MAY HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS ROUGHLY 7,000 TROOPS BY YEAREND [EO 13526 1.4c] THE UN REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN COUNTING ON PAKISTAN'S TROOPS, WHICH HAVE MOST OF THE UN FORCE'S ARMOR AND ITS US-SUPPLIED COBRA HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS, TO COVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OTHER CONTINGENTS.

-- INDIA ALSO HAS PREPARED CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL [EO 13526 1.4c]

[1.4c] //THE DEPARTURE OF INDIAN TROOPS FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHETHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH THE REST OF THE UN FORCE, WOULD AT LEAST TEMPORARILY END THE UN'S ONCE-AMBITIOUS EFFORT TO SECURE THE FLOW OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE INTERIOR.// [3.5c]

SOMALI GUNMEN ALREADY ARE ATTACKING UN TROOPS AS THEY VACATE GARRISONS IN THE INTERIOR. LAST FRIDAY, AS MANY AS 200 MILITIA ATTACKED A CONTINGENT OF ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS IN BALAD, JUST 30 KM NORTH OF MOGADISHU, IN AN EFFORT TO CAPTURE UN ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EQUIPMENT [EO 13526 1.4c] THE ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS AND PAKISTANI-MANNED HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS WERE ABLE TO DRIVE OFF THE ATTACKING SOMALIS. [3.5c]

CURRENT NOTES

AFRICA

2. RWANDA: RPF ASSERTING CONTROL OVER SAFE ZONE [3.5c]

[EO 13526 1.4c] UN OFFICIALS SAY THAT ABOUT

1,000 RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT TROOPS HAVE ENTERED THE UN-MONITORED SAFE ZONE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, AFTER REFUSING TO STOP AT UN CHECKPOINTS. //THE ARRIVAL OF THE RPF, WHICH IS APPARENTLY ASSERTING ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA, HAS NOT PROVOKED A HUTU EXODUS, BUT A CRACKDOWN ON CIVILIANS COULD.//

-- RPF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH DELAYS IN INVESTIGATING HUTUS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AND THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAS PUBLICLY WARNED THAT TUTSI SURVIVORS CAN NO LONGER CONTROL THEIR DESIRE FOR

REVENGE. [3.5c]

EXPATRIATES NOW QUESTION THE UN'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE ZONE [EO 13526 1.4c] AS AN AID WORKER WAS KILLED ONLY 300 METERS FROM A UN HEADQUARTERS ON 30 AUGUST. UN TROOPS REPORTEDLY ARE DISARMING INDIVIDUAL HUTUS THEY ENCOUNTER IN THE SAFE ZONE //BUT PROBABLY WILL AVOID ENGAGING EITHER RPF TROOPS OR THE 4,500 HUTU FIGHTERS WHO REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE AREA.// [3.5c]

[3.5c]

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY [3.5c] NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD

FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; IL FOR CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//; COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELCCN SCOTT AFB [3.5c] CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//INTEL//INO//INA//INU; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART.

[3.5c]

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF [3.5c] 15 SEPTEMBER 1994.

3. CONGO: ETHNIC UNREST ERUPTS IN CAPITAL [3.5c]

[EO 13526 1.4c] UNPAID MILITIA FROM PRESIDENT LISSOUBA'S ETHNIC GROUP LOOTED STORES, KILLING TWO CIVILIANS, AND BLOCKED ROADS TUESDAY IN BRAZZAVILLE, AN AREA THAT PREVIOUSLY HAS BEEN FREE FROM ETHNIC UNREST AND IS HOME TO MOST OF THE WESTERNERS IN THE COUNTRY. LISSOUBA REPORTEDLY HAS PROMISED TO DEPLOY 6,000 POLICE TO GUARD A TWO-DAY MEETING OF FRENCH AND AFRICAN FINANCE MINISTERS THAT OPENED THERE YESTERDAY. [3.5c]

4. LESOTHO: ELECTED GOVERNMENT RESTORED [3.5c]

KING LETSIE III YESTERDAY FORMALLY RESCINDED HIS ORDER THAT

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DISSOLVED PRIME MINISTER MOKHEHLE'S ELECTED GOVERNMENT LATE LAST MONTH AFTER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM SOUTH AFRICAN, ZIMBABWEAN, AND BATSWANA MEDIATORS, WHO HAD THREATENED TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, [EO 13526 1.4c] //MOKHEHLE WILL STILL FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE UNDISCIPLINED SECURITY FORCES AND WITH HARDLINERS IN THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY--WHICH HOLDS NO SEATS IN THE LEGISLATURE--INTENT ON SECURING A ROLE IN GOVERNMENT.// [3.5c]

EAR EAST

5. ISRAEL: MODEST ANTI-INFLATION PACKAGE UNVEILED [3.5c]

THE CABINET HAS APPROVED A WATERED-DOWN VERSION OF AN ANTI-INFLATION PACKAGE PREPARED BY FINANCE MINISTER SHOHAT AND BANK OF ISRAEL GOVERNOR FRENKEL, ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY. THE PLAN REPORTEDLY RELIES ON REDUCTIONS IN SALES TAXES AND EMPLOYER SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS ANNOUNCED LAST MONTH; IT SETS A TARGET INFLATION RATE OF 8 TO 10 PERCENT FOR NEXT YEAR.

--OTHER PROVISIONS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE CUTTING REDTAPE TO SPUR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, ELIMINATING SOME IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FOODS, COOPERATING WITH THE HISTRADRUT LABOR FEDERATION TO REDUCE LABOR COSTS, AND CAPPING GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AT THE INFLATION RATE. [3.5c]

ISRAEL HAS BLAMED PRICE INCREASES--RUNNING AT AN ANNUALIZED RATE OF ABOUT 14.5 PERCENT THIS YEAR, WELL ABOVE THE 8-PERCENT TARGET--ON SURGING HOUSING PRICES, WHICH ARE PROJECTED BY THE BANK TO RISE 35

PERCENT THIS YEAR. [EO 13526 1.4c] HOWEVER, PRICES FOR CLOTHING, HEALTH CARE, TRANSPORTATION, AND ENTERTAINMENT HAVE RISEN RAPIDLY SINCE MAY. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE A RAPID INCREASE IN PRIVATE DEBT TO THE GENEROUS PUBLIC-SECTOR WAGE AGREEMENTS AND REDUCED UNEMPLOYMENT.

-- //WITH VESTED INTERESTS HOBBLING THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-INFLATION EFFORT, INFLATION MAY REACH THE 16-TO-20-PERCENT RANGE.// [3.5c]

DRVW 15 SEPTEMBER 2014.
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

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3.5c

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PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: SECRET

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LINE2: ZNY SSSSS

LINE3: RUCBLFJ T CG II MEF

LINE4: RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV

OSRI: RUEKJCS

DTG: 270117Z SEP 94

ORIG: [redacted] (b)(3)

TO: AIG 7031
AIG 7033
RHPBWQU/CTF ONE FIVE SIX
RHPBWQU/CTF ONE FIVE EIGHT
RHJAAFA/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE ENTEBBE UG
RUSNJTF/HQ JTF SUPPORT HOPE MOEHRINGEN GE
[redacted] (b)(3)

INFO: ////

SUBJ: RWANDA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT (U)

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN WNINTEL SECTION 01 OF 03

PASS: [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3)

)))

(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3) THE CONTENTS

REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATIONS AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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SERIAL: [redacted] (b)(3)

SUBJ: RWANDA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT (U)

DOI: 27 SEP 94

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KEY JUDGMENTS

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1. (C) THE NEW GOVERNMENT, DOMINATED BY THE MINORITY TUTSIS, WILL REMAIN IN POWER FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ITS LONG-TERM SURVIVAL, HOWEVER, WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE TUTSIS CAN WIN THE SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE OF THE COUNTRY'S HUTU MAJORITY.
2. (C) THE NEW REGIME, WHICH HAS FEW FUNDS AND LIMITED TRAINED MANPOWER, MUST COPE WITH MAJOR ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CHALLENGES AND AN INSURGENCY BEING MOUNTED BY MEMBERS OF THE EX-FAR.
3. (C) THE TUTSI LEADERSHIP--HAVING JUST SURVIVED A GENOCIDE-- WILL BE INCLINED TO FOCUS ON SECURITY CONCERNS. SUCH AN EMPHASIS WILL TEND TO HEIGHTEN ETHNIC TENSIONS AND TO DETRACT FROM EFFORTS AIMED AT PROMOTING REPATRIATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

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DISCUSSION

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4. (G) POLITICAL CLIMATE. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI IS DOMINATED

BY TUTSI MEMBERS OF THE VICTORIOUS RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF). ALTHOUGH MODERATE HUTUS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO OCCUPY PROMINENT POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE POSTS OF PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER, THE REAL POWER BEHIND-THE-SCENES IS THE TUTSI RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) COMMANDER, MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME, WHO WAS APPOINTED VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE MINISTER. THE PRO-WESTERN KAGAME IS PRAGMATIC, ADMITTING HE WILL ACCEPT MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ANY SOURCE.

5. (G) THE HUTU PRIME MINISTER, FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU, HAS BEEN STRUGGLING WITH RPF LEADERS TO PROMOTE PARTY BALANCE AND POWERSHARING IN THE GOVERNMENT. IN THIS REGARD, HE HAS BEEN MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS REPRESENTATIVE OF REGIONS AND INCLUDES A COMBINATION OF OPPOSITION HUTUS, RPF HUTUS, INLAND TUTSIS, AND EXILED TUTSIS.

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

10. ~~(C/NF)~~ EVOLUTION OF ETHNIC STRIFE IN RWANDA

- LONGSTANDING ETHNIC TENSIONS BETWEEN HUTU MAJORITY (85

PERCENT) AND TUTSI MINORITY (14 PERCENT)

- ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN HUTUS AND TUTSIS OCCASIONALLY ERUPTED INTO VIOLENCE, BUT NEVER ON SCALE OF LATEST CRISIS

- PERHAPS HALF A MILLION TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS KILLED DURING RECENT HOSTILITIES

- TUTSIS WERE TRADITIONAL RULERS, DESPITE BEING MINORITY

- TUTSIS LOST CONTROL TO HUTUS AT TIME OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1962

- SEVERAL ETHNIC PURGES OCCURRED BETWEEN 1959 AND 1962

- MANY TUTSIS FLED TO NEARBY COUNTRIES

- HUTU MILITARY OFFICER SEIZED POWER IN 1973

- ONE-PARTY STATE ESTABLISHED

- SOME TUTSIS WHO WENT NORTH FOUGHT IN UGANDA'S CIVIL WAR DURING EARLY 1980S

- JOINED VICTORIOUS SIDE LED BY UGANDA'S PRESIDENT MUSEVENI

- TUTSI REBELS (RPF) INVADED NORTHERN RWANDA FROM UGANDA IN OCTOBER 1990

- MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME ASSUMED COMMAND; PREVIOUS LEADER

~~S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~WNINTEL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03

- ONE-PARTY STATE ESTABLISHED

- SOME TUTSIS WHO WENT NORTH FOUGHT IN UGANDA'S CIVIL WAR DURING EARLY 1980S

- JOINED VICTORIOUS SIDE LED BY UGANDA'S PRESIDENT MUSEVENI

- TUTSI REBELS (RPF) INVADED NORTHERN RWANDA FROM UGANDA IN OCTOBER 1990

- MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME ASSUMED COMMAND; PREVIOUS LEADER KILLED IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR

- RPF OFFENSIVE STALLED

- MILITARY SITUATION DEADLOCKED

- POLITICAL PRESSURES INCREASED IN KIGALI

- HUTU MODERATES GREW INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF OLD REGIME

- FORMER RWANDAN PRESIDENT FINALLY MADE CONCESSIONS

- TO END CIVIL WAR

- TO SHARE POWER WITH RPF AND INTERNAL

- OPPOSITION

- POWERSHARING AGREEMENT (ARUSHU ACCORD) SIGNED IN 1993

- TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED
- MILITARY DEMOBILIZED AND INTEGRATED
- BOTH RWANDAN AND BURUNDIAN PRESIDENTS KILLED IN MYSTERIOUS PLANE CRASH ON 6 APRIL 1994 NEAR KIGALI, RE-IGNITING CIVIL WAR
- AIRCRAFT PROBABLY SHOT DOWN BY HARDLINE HUTU ELEMENTS
- HUTU EXTREMISTS LAUNCHED CAMPAIGN OF GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS
- RPF GRADUALLY TOOK CONTROL OF COUNTRY BETWEEN APRIL

AND JULY 1994

11. (C) ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. ENORMOUS ECONOMIC CHALLENGES LIE AHEAD. THE COUNTRY'S BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE SURVIVED THE WAR, BUT ITS CAPITAL ASSETS--IN BOTH THE RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS--HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE DAMAGE IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN KIGALI. WHEN THE MILITARY WING OF THE RPF, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA), SEIZED THE CITY, MANY OF ITS TROOPS WENT ON A SPREE-- LOOTING, DRINKING, AND REPORTEDLY RAPING AT WILL. MOREOVER, WHEN THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES FLED THE CAPITAL, THEY TOOK THE GOVERNMENT'S FUNDS WITH THEM. AS A CONSEQUENCE, KIGALI IS GENERALLY IN POOR CONDITION, ALTHOUGH LOOTING HAS DIMINISHED AND DISCIPLINE IS GRADUALLY BEING RESTORED TO RPA RANKS. OTHER CITIES SUFFERED A SIMILAR FATE.

12. (C) IN THE RURAL AREAS, FARMERS HAVE LARGELY ABANDONED THEIR FIELDS. MANY WERE HUTUS, WHO JOINED THE FLOOD OF REFUGEES INTO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WHERE A LARGE NUMBER OF THEM REMAIN. THE HUTUS FEAR GOING BACK BECAUSE THEY THINK THEY MIGHT FACE RPF RETALIATION FOR THE RECENT GENOCIDE. THEY ALSO FEAR BEING INTERCEPTED BY HUTU EXTREMISTS. MEMBERS OF THE EX-RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (EX-FAR) AND ALLIED HUTU MILITIAS HAVE ENGAGED IN INTIMIDATION TACTICS TO KEEP THE REFUGEES IN PLACE. UNLESS THE FARMERS CAN BE PERSUADED TO RETURN,

THIS YEAR'S HARVEST--AND NEXT SEASON'S SEED--WILL BE LOST.

13. (S/NF) SECURITY CHALLENGES. IN ANTICIPATION OF SECURITY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTINUING SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY, THE RPF IS REORGANIZING AND EXPANDING ITS MILITARY AND IS CONSOLIDATING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN MID-JUNE, THE REBEL ARMY HAD ABOUT 35,000 SOLDIERS. RECENT RECRUITING HAS ENLARGED THE FORCE TO ROUGHLY 50,000, BUT MANY OF THESE NEW RECRUITS PROBABLY WILL BE ASSIGNED TO POLICE DUTY. THUS, THE MILITARY'S STRENGTH IS LIKELY TO REMAIN AT THE MID-JUNE FIGURE OF 35,000, OF WHICH ONLY ABOUT 20,000 ARE COMBAT- EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL.

14. (S/NF/WN) MEANWHILE, THE DEFEATED REMNANTS OF THE EX-FAR HAVE BEGUN A SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY INVOLVING PLATOON AND COMPANY-SIZE OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHWEST, SOUTHWEST, AND SOUTHEAST FROM THEIR POSITIONS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. EX-FAR AND FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE TO INCREASE THE SCOPE OF THE INSURGENCY TO INCLUDE COORDINATED MULTIFRONT AND UP TO BRIGADE-SIZE ATTACKS. HOWEVER, THEY LACK SUFFICIENT STOCKS OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS.

15. (S/NF/WN) MOST OF THE EX-FAR ARE CONCENTRATED IN EASTERN ZAIRE, SPECIFICALLY IN THE REGIONS OF GOMA AND BUKAVU. AN ESTIMATED 15,000

TO 20,000 TROOPS ARE IN GOMA, AND 5,000 TO 7,000 ARE IN BUKAVU. THOSE IN THE GOMA AREA ARE THOUGHT TO BE BETTER ORGANIZED AND BETTER EQUIPPED THAN OTHER EX-FAR ELEMENTS. IN ADDITION, ABOUT 3,000 EX-FAR SOLDIERS ARE IN WESTERN TANZANIA, AND 5,000 ARMED HUTU ELEMENTS, INCLUDING HUTU MILITIA, ARE IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA.

16. (C) THE EX-FAR IN THE GOMA AREA SEEM PARTICULARLY WELL ARMED AND DANGEROUS. MANY OF EX-FAR MEMBERS BLAME THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY--ESPECIALLY THE US--FOR THEIR DEFEAT, WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTE TO THE UN-IMPOSED ARMS EMBARGO RATHER THAN TO THEIR OWN SHORTCOMINGS. MOREOVER, THE EX-FAR IS ACTIVELY DISCOURAGING THE RWANDAN REFUGEE POPULATION THERE FROM RETURNING HOME, BOTH THROUGH INTIMIDATION TACTICS AND DISINFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE THAT AWAITS THEM IF THEY GO BACK, CLAIMING THAT THE RPF WILL KILL HUTU REFUGEES IN RETALIATION FOR THE EARLIER GENOCIDE.

17. (C) THE RECENT CROSS-BORDER RAIDS BY EX-FAR ELEMENTS INTO NORTHWESTERN RWANDA PROMPTED THE RPA TO MOVE TROOPS AND ARTILLERY TOWARD THE AREA OF GISENYI, WHICH IS JUST OPPOSITE THE BORDER FROM GOMA. THIS ACTION PLACES MOST OF THE EX-FAR CAMPS IN THE GOMA AREA WITHIN RPA ARTILLERY RANGE. ALTHOUGH NO CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED THUS FAR, THIRD PARTIES IN THE AREA--SUCH AS REFUGEES, RELIEF WORKERS, AND

ANY UN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS--COULD BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT.

18. (U) AFTER THE EX-FAR FORCES FLED INTO EASTERN ZAIRE, THAT COUNTRY'S LEADER--PRESIDENT MOBUTU--PLEDGED THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW THE RWANDANS TO SET UP A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE EX-FAR WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO LAUNCH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS FROM ZAIRIAN SOIL.

19. (S/NF) TO COPE WITH THE SUDDEN INFLUX OF RWANDANS, MOBUTU DEPLOYED ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE EASTERN BORDER AREA. HOWEVER, SINCE MANY OF THESE SOLDIERS ARE CORRUPT AND INEFFECTIVE, THEIR PRESENCE TENDED TO CONTRIBUTE TO TENSIONS RATHER THAN IMPROVE SECURITY. SOME OF THE NEWLY DEPLOYED FORCES ALREADY HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE GOMA AREA BECAUSE OF THE TROUBLE THEY CAUSED THERE. ZAIRE'S MILITARY IS UNABLE TO FULLY CONTROL OR CONTAIN THE EX-FAR, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RECENT CROSS-BORDER RAIDS THAT EX-FAR SOLDIERS LAUNCHED INTO NORTHWESTERN RWANDA.

20. (S) AS FOR THE SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN PRESENCE THERE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO INTERNAL STABILITY. THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA, KNOWN AS UNAMIR, HAS AN AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 5,500 PERSONNEL. AS OF MID-SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, ONLY ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~WNINTEL~~ FINAL SECTION OF 03 ABOUT 3,566 HAD ACTUALLY DEPLOYED.

21. (S/NF) THE MOST SENSITIVE AREA OF UN DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN IN THE SOUTHWEST, WHERE UN ELEMENTS WERE INTENDED TO FILL THE VACUUM LEFT BY RECENTLY DEPARTED FRENCH FORCES. THE FRENCH PRESENCE HAD TEMPORARILY DENIED THE RPA ACCESS TO THIS LAST SECTOR OF THE COUNTRY, BUT KIGALI IS NOW DEPLOYING TROOPS THERE TO ASSERT ITS SOVEREIGNTY. AT LEAST THREE RPA BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE SOUTHWEST TO OPERATE ALONGSIDE THE THREE AFRICAN BATTALIONS THAT THE UN ALREADY HAS DEPLOYED TO THE SECTOR. THUS FAR, THE ARRIVAL OF TUTSI MILITARY

PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTHWEST HAS NOT TRIGGERED A LARGE HUTU MIGRATION

INTO NEIGHBORING ZAIRE, AS MANY HAD FEARED.

22. (U) THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THE REFUGEE CRISIS. IT IS PERMITTING RELIEF SUPPLIES TO ENTER AND TRANSIT RWANDA, AND IT IS CONDUCTING A RADIO CAMPAIGN TO ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO REPATRIATE. RPF LEADERS HAVE ASSURED MOST HUTU REFUGEES THEY WILL BE SAFE UPON THEIR RETURN, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT.

23. (C) SOME OF THE RETURNING HUTUS REPORTEDLY HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF REVENGE BY RPA PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE THAT LEADERS IN KIGALI CONDONE SUCH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OR THAT THEY PLAN TO ENGAGE IN GENOCIDE AS A MATTER OF POLICY LIKE THE PREVIOUS RULERS.

24. (C) IN ADDITION, RPA COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE ASSOCIATED KILLING OF HUTU MILITIAMEN AND EX-FAR SOLDIERS IN SOUTHEAST VERY LIKELY ARE THE SOURCE OF NUMEROUS REPORTS BY FLEEING REFUGEES ABOUT THE RPA'S SYSTEMATIC KILLING OF HUTUS. THE RPA APPEARS TO BE CLEARING THIS REGION OF HUTU MILITIA THROUGH WELL-ORGANIZED OPERATIONS BASED ON GOOD INTELLIGENCE. THOSE KILLED REPORTEDLY ARE

MEN OF MILITARY AGE, NOT WOMEN AND CHILDREN. A GOVERNMENT POLICY OF GENOCIDE AGAINST HUTUS WOULD NOT DISCRIMINATE IN ITS TARGETS. MOREOVER, THE RPA IS USING ITS OWN CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, ALTHOUGH DRACONIAN, AGAINST CAPTURED INSURGENTS. THE RPA OFTEN INVESTIGATES CRIMES AND THEN SUMMARILY EXECUTES THOSE FOUND GUILTY. UP TO 62 RPA SOLDIERS FOUND GUILTY OF REPRISAL MURDERS HAVE BEEN SHOT.

)))

OUTLOOK

)))

25. (C) THE RPF WILL REMAIN IN CONTROL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NO SERIOUS DOMESTIC OPPOSITION HAS DEVELOPED THUS FAR. IN ADDITION, MODERATE HUTU LEADERS--THOSE WHO SURVIVED THE RECENT GENOCIDE--HAVE BEEN COOPERATING WITH THE RPF, EVEN SERVING IN HIGHLY VISIBLE POSITIONS IN THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED POLITICAL SYSTEM. IF THE HUTUS DO NOT RECEIVE GREATER FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES OF THEIR OWN, HOWEVER, THEIR DISCONTENT WILL INCREASE, AND THEY PROBABLY WILL BECOME LESS COOPERATIVE.

26. (C) THE RPF'S MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM WILL BE THE INSURGENCY WAGED BY DEFEATED FORMER ARMY ELEMENTS. EX-FAR ACTIONS IN THE BORDER AREAS COULD INVITE PREEMPTIVE OR RETALIATORY STRIKES INTO NEIGHBORING

COUNTRIES BY THE RPA. RELIEF WORKERS, REFUGEES, AND OTHERS MIGHT THEN BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE. ALSO DANGEROUS ARE THE REMNANTS OF YOUNG HUTU MILITIAS USED BY THE FORMER GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT MUCH OF THE SLAUGHTER INSIDE RWANDA.

27. (S/NF) OVER THE LONG TERM, THE SUCCESS OF THE EX-FAR IN STAGING A COMEBACK WILL DEPEND ON ITS ABILITY TO RE-GROUP AND GAIN MILITARY SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. THE RPA SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE INSURGENCY THREAT, BUT NEIGHBORING MILITARIES PROBABLY WILL BE OF LITTLE OR NO HELP IN CONTROLLING EX-FAR ELEMENTS INFILTRATING INTO RWANDA.

28. (C) MEANWHILE, THE HUTU REFUGEES ARE UNLIKELY TO RETURN VERY SOON. THE INSURGENCY AND RPA OPERATIONS TO COMBAT IT WILL FUEL HUTU FEARS OF GOVERNMENT REPRISALS. ALSO, REPORTS OF APPARENTLY SYSTEMATIC

KILLING AND REFUGEE OUTFLOWS WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE INSURGENCY RAGES. MOREOVER, IF REFUGEES ARE TO RETURN HOME, THEY MUST FIRST BE CONVINCED THAT THE RPF MEANS THEM NO HARM. OVERCOMING FEARS ROOTED IN LONGSTANDING ETHNIC HATREDS AND REINFORCED BY RECENT EX-FAR PROPAGANDA WILL NOT BE EASY. THE REFUGEES' LINGERING PRESENCE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES PROBABLY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN THOSE AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN BURUNDI, WHERE THE ETHNIC MIX AND

TRIBAL SUSPICIONS ARE SIMILAR. IN ADDITION, RWANDAN REFUGEES WILL REMAIN A REGIONALLY DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AFRICA.

29' (S/NF) DESPITE ITS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE REPATRIATION, THE RPA--HAVING JUST SURVIVED A GENOCIDE--IS LIKELY TO BE LESS CONCERNED WITH WELCOMING BACK HUTUS, THAN IT IS WITH MAINTAINING CONTROL AND ENSURING TUTSI SURVIVAL. KIGALI'S EFFORTS ALONG THESE LINES, SUCH AS EXPANDING THE SECURITY FORCES, REINFORCING THE GISENYI BORDER AREA, AND DEPLOYING UNITS INTO THE SOUTHWEST, WILL TEND TO HEIGHTEN ETHNIC TENSIONS AND DISCOURAGE REPATRIATION. THE HUTU REACTION, HOWEVER, WILL DEPEND ON HOW AGGRESSIVELY THE RPA CONDUCTS ITS COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AND ON WHETHER MANY OF THE DISPLACED HUTUS ARE INADVERTENTLY CAUGHT UP IN THE HOSTILITIES. IF THEY FEEL THREATENED, THE HUTUS WILL NOT RETURN TO RWANDA IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OR PROVIDE THE NEW REGIME WITH THE CRITICAL SUPPORT IT NEEDS TO OVERCOME INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS AND REBUILD THE ECONOMY.

(b)(3)

DECL: OADR

BT

#5000

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN:

(b)(3)

TOR: 940927013808 M1273886
<^TOR>940927013811 M1273888
<^TOR>940927013815 M1273889

DIST:

SIT: VAX NSC

□

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
LINE1: PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS6256 2970158-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
LINE3: P 232144Z OCT 94
LINE4: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
OSRI: RUEKJCS
DTG: 232144Z OCT 94
ORIG: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
TO: RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//Q331//
 AIG 7011
INFO: ////
SUBJ: DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT [REDACTED] (b)(3) OCT 94. (U)
)))
 (U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] (b)(3) FOR RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] (b)(3)

TEXT:
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02
 1106A
SUBJ: DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT [REDACTED] (b)(3) OCT 94. (U)
)))
 (U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] (b)(3) FOR RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] (b)(3)

)))
 DIA DEFENSE WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST. (U)
)))
 (U) PART I: WARNING ASSESSMENTS -- THIS SECTION IS INTENDED TO ALERT
 SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD IMPACT
 ON WESTERN INTERESTS.
)))

NIGERIA:
 1. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA IS
 REMOTE, A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING FACTORS ARE GROWING IN
 IMPORTANCE. ECONOMIC CHAOS, NEW FRACTURES IN THE MILITARY, AND RISING
 ETHNIC TENSIONS COULD BE AN EXPLOSIVE COMBINATION.
 -- NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE IS ACCELERATING. ABACHA HAS
 ABANDONED MARKET REFORMS, MEMBERS OF ABACHA'S INNER CIRCLE ARE
 ENGAGED IN CURRENCY SCAMS, AND INFLATION IS MORE THAN 100 PERCENT.
 -- REPORTS OF SMUGGLING OF SMALL ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY ARE
 INCREASING.
 -- YOUNG OFFICERS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO TRY A
 MOVE AGAINST A REGIME THAT THEY BELIEVE HAS UNDERMINED THE MILITARY'S
 CREDIBILITY.
 -- NEWLY FORCIBLY RETIRED OFFICERS MAY JOIN THE RANKS OF
 FORMER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO ARE ALREADY PLOTTING AGAINST THE REGIME.

-- ETHNIC YORUBA AND IBO OFFICERS COULD BE SPURRED TO CONCERTED ACTION IF THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE BEING FURTHER MARGINALIZED BY THE ABACHA REGIME.
 2. (S) ECONOMICS-BASED UNREST -- MORE LIKELY AS THE ECONOMY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE -- WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY TRIGGER FOR INCREASED

TURMOIL IN NIGERIA. ECONOMIC UNREST COULD QUICKLY DEGENERATE INTO ETHNIC CONFLICT, CONSIDERING THE VOLATILE SITUATION.

)))

TANZANIA:

1. (C) THE IMPENDING RAINY SEASON IN TANZANIA PROBABLY WILL WORSEN THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION FOR REFUGEES THERE. IN CONSEQUENCE, THE SECURITY SITUATION FOR BOTH REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS IN THE AREA ALSO WILL DETERIORATE.

-- THE NUMBER OF RWANDAN HUTUS IN TANZANIA HAS BEEN GROWING BY 1,000 A DAY SINCE EARLY LAST MONTH.

-- SUPPLIES OF FOOD, WATER, AND OTHER NECESSITIES ARE GROSSLY INADEQUATE FOR THE 540,000 REFUGEES THERE.

-- THESE SITUATIONS ARE ALREADY UNDERMINING SECURITY FOR REFUGEES AND AID WORKERS AND STRENGTHENING HUTU EXTREMISTS.

2. (C) UNLESS THE NEW RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI IS ABLE TO ASSUAGE HUTU FEARS OF TUTSI REPRISALS FOR THE GENOCIDE OF TUTSIS EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN TANZANIA WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND THE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY SITUATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DECLINE.

)))

MOZAMBIQUE:

1. (C) RHETORIC CONCERNING THE NATIONAL ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 27 AND 28 OCTOBER IS HEATING UP AS OPPOSITION LEADERS DENOUNCE ALLEGED FRAUDULENT ELECTORAL PRACTICES AND RESULTS. AFONSO DHLAKAMA, LEADER OF THE MAIN OPPOSITION GROUP-THE MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE (RENAMO), WARNS THAT THE SITUATION COULD MIRROR WHAT HAPPENED IN ANGOLA. DHLAKAMA CHARGES THAT THE GOVERNMENT PARTY-MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT (FRELIMO)-WILL:

-- BUY VOTES AND RIG ELECTIONRESULTS.

-- USE ILLICIT FUNDS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING.

-- BRING IN THOUSANDS OF ZIMBABWEANS TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT

CHISSANO.

-- USE A 9,000 MAN FORCE TO FIGHT RENAMO, IF RENAMO WINS THE ELECTION.

2. (C) WHILE SOME OF THE CHARGES MAY SIMPLY BE CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, DHLAKAMA AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISGRUNTLED OVER PERCEIVED INEQUITIES IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING. THESE INEQUITIES WILL PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES TO CONTEST THE ELECTION RESULTS. REGARDLESS OF WHICH PARTY WINS THE ELECTION, THE NEW GOVERNMENT MUST MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE OPPOSITION

IN ORDER TO FOSTER RECONCILIATION AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL STABILITY. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL RESULT IN FURTHER FRACTIONALIZATION IN A COUNTRY BESET BY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

)))

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PART II: (S) DIA WATCH CONDITION STATUS:

WARNING PROBLEM	WATCHCON	AS OF
)))		
IRAQ REGIONAL	I	8 OCT 94
HAITI (INTERNAL)	I	15 SEP 94
YUGOSLAVIA/UNITED NATIONS	I	28 JAN 93
YUGOSLAVIA REGIONAL	I	15 MAY 92
SOMALIA (INTERNAL)	I	1 DEC 92
ALGERIA (INTERNAL)	II	10 DEC 93
IRAQ (INTERNAL)	II	6 AUG 93
RWANDA (INTERNAL)	III	13 OCT 94
CUBA (INTERNAL)	III	23 SEP 94
IRAN REGIONAL	III	21 JUL 94
ANGOLA (INTERNAL)	III	15 JUL 94
SOUTH AFRICA (INTERNAL)	III	15 JUL 94
YEMEN (INTERNAL)	III	15 JUL 94
NIGERIA/CAMEROON	III	24 MAR 94
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA	III	15 FEB 94
UKRAINE (INTERNAL)	III	26 JAN 94
GEORGIA (INTERNAL)	III	3 DEC 93
BURUNDI (INTERNAL)	III	22 OCT 93
RUSSIA (INTERNAL)	III	14 OCT 93
SUDAN (INTERNAL)	III	24 AUG 93
ISRAEL REGIONAL	III	2 AUG 93
ZAIRE (INTERNAL)	III	9 JUL 93
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN	III	14 JAN 93
TAJIKISTAN REGIONAL	III	25 OCT 92
ISRAEL/ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES	III	26 SEP 92
RUSSIA-UKRAINE	III	11 FEB 92
SRI LANKA	IV	23 AUG 94
SPRATLY ISLANDS/SOUTH CHINA SEA	IV	29 JUL 94
SAUDI ARABIA-YEMEN	IV	8 JUL 94
CAMBODIA (INTERNAL)	IV	30 JUN 94
PAKISTAN (INTERNAL)	IV	29 APR 94
MOLDOVA REGIONAL	IV	8 MAR 94
CONGO (INTERNAL)	IV	23 DEC 93
SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 02		
EGYPT/SUDAN	IV	16 AUG 93
CHINA (INTERNAL)	IV	2 AUG 93
SURINAME (INTERNAL)	IV	8 JUN 93
LEBANON (INTERNAL)	IV	3 MAY 93
MALAWI (INTERNAL)	IV	22 JAN 93
KENYA (INTERNAL)	IV	13 JAN 93
LIBYA	IV	2 FEB 89
EGYPT (INTERNAL)	IV	10 AUG 92
INDIA/PAKISTAN	IV	20 NOV 92
CIS NUCLEAR PROBLEM	IV	4 JUN 92
LIBYA	IV	2 FEB 89
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA	IV	12 JUL 88
)))		
(DECL OADR)		

BT

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NNNN


SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR: 941023221343 M1321205
<^TOR>941023221342 M1321204

DIST: SIT: VAX NSC

Rwanda: Refugees and Displaced Persons, Early November 1994



Cable

PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~

LINE1: RAASZYUW RUEAIIA2267 3150653-SSSS--RHEHAAA.

LINE2: ZNY SSSSS

LINE3: R 110651Z NOV 94

LINE4: FM CIA

OSRI: RUEAIIA

DTG: 110651Z NOV 94

ORIG: CIA

TO: RUCUDFI/319ARW GRAND FORKS AFB ND/IN
 RUCIPGA/325OSS TYNDALL AFB FL/IN
 RUEBEJA/436OSS DOVER AFB DE/OSN
 RUVMSA/5OSS MINOT AFB ND/OSI/
 RUVHTRA/615AMOS TRAVIS AFB CA/IN
 RHFIAAA/722OSS/IN
 RUEOADA/9TH AF SHAW AFB
 RHEPAAB/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
 RUCIBBA/AFOSI 24 FIS SHAW AFB SC/CENT
 RUETITH/AFOSI 52 INVESTIGATIONS SQ ANKARA
 RUCIBBA/AFOSI DIST 21 OL-C S
 RHCDAAA/AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL
 RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
 RUCQVAU/AU MAXWELL AFB AL/IN
 RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
 RUCMACC/CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC
 RUCMACC/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC
 RUEAHUA/CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ

INFO: ////

SUBJ: H/W SUPPORT CABLE FOR MIDDLE EAST BRIEF EO 13526 3.5c
 FOR 11 NOVEMBER 1994

TEXT:

EO 13526 3.5c

PASS: AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY 3.5c NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ

AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//;
 COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; IL FOR CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING

HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA//IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//; COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELLEN SCOTT AFB [3.5c] CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART

EO 13526 3.5c

1. ANGOLA: PEACE ACCORD HANGING IN BALANCE [3.5c]

2. IRAQ: KUWAIT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED [3.5c]

3. SRI LANKA: NEW PRESIDENT TAKES OFFICE [3.5c]

4. RWANDA: UN MISSION FACES DIFFICULTIES [3.5c]

1. ANGOLA: PEACE ACCORD HANGING IN BALANCE [3.5c]

UNITA LEADER SAVIMBI YESTERDAY TOLD [EO 13526 1.4c] THAT HE IS PREPARED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO LUSAKA TO ATTEND MILITARY TALKS AND ASKED FOR UN ASSISTANCE IN TRANSPORTING THE REBEL

DELEGATION. THE TALKS WERE TO BEGIN YESTERDAY.

-- //UNITA'S ATTENDANCE WOULD DENY LUANDA THE OPPORTUNITY TO BLAME THE REBELS FOR SLOWING THE PEACE PROCESS.//

EO 13526 1.4d

PRESS REPORTS CLAIM THAT GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAVE ENTERED HUAMBO BUT THAT UNITA CONTINUES TO HOLD AT LEAST PART OF THE CITY. [EO 13526 1.4c]

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

SOUTH AFRICAN DEPUTY PRESIDENT MBEKI SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD DECIDE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE IF UNITA AND LUANDA FAIL TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT. THEIR MOST PALATABLE OPTIONS WOULD BE A JOINT DEMARCHE OR AN OFFER TO MEDIATE, SINCE NONE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES HAS THE POLITICAL WILL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. 3.5c

NEAR EAST

2. IRAQ: KUWAIT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED 3.5c

THE DECISIONS OF THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ACCEPT THE IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER AS DEMARCATED BY THE UN, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE BORDER. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE DECREES WERE SIGNED BY SADDAM HUSAYN AND WERE TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE IRAQI PRESS YESTERDAY; A UN SANCTIONS REVIEW MEETING IS SET FOR MONDAY. //STATEMENTS BY IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS AND SADDAM'S HISTORY OF ABROGATING AGREEMENTS THAT NO LONGER SUIT HIM SUGGEST IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO

KUWAIT IS A MANEUVER TO GET A TIMETABLE ESTABLISHED FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.//

EO 13526 1.4d

3. SRI LANKA: NEW PRESIDENT TAKES OFFICE 3.5c

PRIME MINISTER KUMARATUNGA WILL BE SWORN IN TODAY AS PRESIDENT. LIKE ALL HER PREDECESSORS, SHE WILL ALSO SERVE AS DEFENSE MINISTER AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. WHILE KUMARATUNGA'S PARTY WAS IN OPPOSITION, IT CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENCY FOR WIELDING TOO MUCH POWER OVER THE PARLIAMENT; SHE HAS PLEDGED TO BALANCE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

3.5c

PASS: AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; DIA FOR MEAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY 3.5c NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP;

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TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; HQ

AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//; CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; IL FOR CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI; INS ATTN COINT; 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//; COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//; COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//INY//; CG I MAF CAMP PENDLETON CA//G2//; FAA//ATTN ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//G2//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; JTF PROVIDE COMFORT PASS TO IN; USTRANS INTELSEN SCOTT AFB 3.5c CHJUSMMAT ANKARA TU//TCH//TDA//; HQ TUSLOG ANKARA TU//CC//IN//; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//N2//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU; HQ DA PASS TO TRAMO; MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA//DCIREP//COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC; CDRUSAICFH FT HUACHUCA AZ//ATZS CDI-T//PASS TO GENERAL STEWART

3.5c

-- KUMARATUNGA IS LIKELY TO PRESS HARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND AGAINST GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION EO 13526 1.4c
1.4c

-- //HER GREATEST CHALLENGE, HOWEVER, WILL BE TO RESUME THE PEACE OVERTURES TOWARD TAMIL SEPARATISTS WITHOUT ALIENATING THE SINHALESE MAJORITY OR THE MILITARY.// 3.5c

AFRICA

4. RWANDA: UN MISSION FACES DIFFICULTIES 3.5c

DESPITE THE ARRIVAL THIS MONTH OF INDIAN AND ZAMBIAN CONTINGENTS, WHICH BRINGS THE UN FORCE TO ITS AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 5,500, THE PEACEKEEPERS INCREASINGLY ARE HAVING TROUBLE PROTECTING DISPLACED PERSONS, HUMANITARIAN ZONES, AND RELIEF SUPPLIES. TO DATE, UN FORCES HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO CONFRONT OR DISARM THE HUTU MILITIAS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE SECURITY INCIDENTS.

-- EO 13526 1.4c AID WORKERS HAVE CRITICIZED THE UN FOR BEING SLOW TO INVESTIGATE SUCH INCIDENTS; //UN FORCES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO APPREHEND HUTUS WHO MAY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE, IN PART, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UN'S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AMONG THE VARIOUS TROOP CONTINGENTS.// 3.5c

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THE UN FORCES HAVE ALSO ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTY DEFINING THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT. IN SEPTEMBER, THE UN FORCE COMMANDER SAID THE RPF WOULD GRADUALLY ASSUME CONTROL OVER THE SOUTHWEST, WHERE FRENCH FORCES HAD DEPLOYED IN JUNE TO PROTECT TUTSIS FROM FURTHER SLAUGHTER. THE COMMANDER RECENTLY THREATENED, HOWEVER, TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IF THE RPF CONTINUES TO FORCIBLY MOVE HUTUS OUT OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS THERE,

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d

//THE FORCES' IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STEMMING THE MASSIVE REFUGEE OUTFLOW FROM RWANDA IN AUGUST IS OF DECREASING IMPORTANCE TO KIGALI AS IT FOCUSES ON SECURING AND GOVERNING RWANDA.//
//DEFENSE MINISTER KAGAME'S RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOVEMENT OF UN ARMORED VEHICLES// //COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A UNILATERAL DECISION TO EXPEL UN TROOPS IF THE RPF BELIEVES THEY ARE INFRINGING ON THE TUTSI-LED GOVERNMENT'S SOVEREIGNTY.//

3.5c

3.5c

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

3.5c

DIST:

SIT: VAX NSC

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: SECRET

LINE1: PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0514 3340427-SSSS--RHEHWSR.

LINE2: ZNY SSSSS

LINE3: P 302255Z NOV 94

LINE4: [redacted] (b)(3)

OSRI: RUEKJCS

DTG: 302255Z NOV 94

ORIG: [redacted] (b)(3)

TO: RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//Q331//
AIG 7011

INFO: ////

SUBJ: DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT 72-94/30 NOV 94. (U)
)))

(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
[redacted] (b)(3) FOR RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS) [redacted]
[redacted] (b)(3)

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02
1106A

SUBJ: DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING REPORT 72-94/30 NOV 94. (U)
)))

(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
[redacted] (b)(3) FOR RELEASE IN THE DEFENSE GLOBAL WARNING SYSTEM (DGWS) [redacted]
[redacted] (b)(3)

)))
DIA DEFENSE WEEKLY WARNING FORECAST. (U)

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(U) PART I: WARNING ASSESSMENTS -- THIS SECTION IS INTENDED TO ALERT
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS TO POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD IMPACT
ON WESTERN INTERESTS.
)))

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (S) CROATIA: THE FAILED CROATIAN-KRAJINA SERB DIPLOMACY HAS INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF CROATIA'S REJECTION OF ANY EXTENSION OF THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE USE OF FORCE TO REESTABLISH ZAGREB'S AUTHORITY OVER SERB-CONTROLLED KRAJINA.
2. (C) RWANDA: VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO ESCALATE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AND THE RWANDAN HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA IN EASTERN ZAIRE. NGOS AND REFUGEES COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE AND MORE NGOS MAY BE FORCED TO EVACUATE.

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

4. (C) INDONESIA: A NEW CYCLE OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR UNDERSCORES THE COMPLEX POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS

THAT WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE JAKARTA'S EFFORTS TO PACIFY THE PROVINCE.

)))

WARNING ASSESSMENTS

CROATIA:

1. (~~S~~) THE FAILED CROATIAN-KRAJINA SERB DIPLOMACY HAS INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF CROATIA'S REJECTION OF ANY EXTENSION OF THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE USE OF FORCE TO REESTABLISH ZAGREB'S AUTHORITY OVER SERB-CONTROLLED KRAJINA.

-- CROATIA'S PRESIDENT TUDJMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT UNLESS THERE IS PROGRESS IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA INTO CROATIA BY NEXT MONTH, CROATIA WILL NOT RENEW THE UNPROFOR MANDATE.

-- THE KRAJINA SERB REJECTION OF ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES HAS REMOVED ONE OF THE LAST OBSTACLES THAT HAVE PREVENTED CROATIAN PRESIDENT TUDJMAN FROM APPROVING MILITARY ACTION. IN THE EVENT OF A CROATIAN ATTACK, THE CROATIAN-KRAJINA CONFLICT COULD RAPIDLY DETERIORATE INTO GENERAL WARFARE.

2. (~~S~~) SINCE CROATIA'S INDEPENDENCE, NO PROGRESS IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA HAS BEEN MADE, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR. CROATIA HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN CAUTIONED TO AVOID MILITARY ACTION AND HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE DIPLOMACY IN REINTEGRATING THE KRAJINA. THE EMERGING KRAJINA SERB-BOSNIAN SERB ALLIANCE WILL FURTHER CIRCUMSCRIBE ZAGREB'S ABILITY TO FORCIBLY REUNIFY THE COUNTRY. ZAGREB MAY JUDGE TIME IS NOW ITS ENEMY, AND FEEL COMPELLED TO ACT MILITARILY WHILE THE SERBS STILL HAVE A BOSNIAN MUSLIM ENEMY TO DEAL WITH.

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RWANDA:

1. (~~C~~) VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO ESCALATE BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AND THE RWANDAN HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA IN EASTERN ZAIRE. NGOS AND REFUGEES COULD GET CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE AND MORE NGOS MAY BE FORCED TO EVACUATE.

-- LAST WEEK, THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES (FAZ) FIRED INTO A CROWD OF RWANDAN REFUGEES IN KATALE CAMP AFTER A ZAIRIAN NATIONAL WAS ROBBED BY REFUGEES. SEVERAL, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WERE KILLED.

-- FAZ TROOPS ALSO HANDED OVER 37 HUTU MILITIAMEN TO OFFICIALS OF THE KIGALI REGIME. THE EXILED HUTUS FEAR THEY WILL BE KILLED BY THE TUTSIS IN RETRIBUTION FOR THE GENOCIDE THEY CONDUCTED EARLIER THIS YEAR.

2. (~~C~~) THE HUTU TROOPS AND MILITIA OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, MANY OF WHOM ARE ARMED, ARE CERTAIN TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE FAZ FOR THE KILLINGS AND FOR TURNING HUTUS OVER TO THE CURRENT TUTSI-LED RWANDAN GOVERNMENT.

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NORTH KOREA:

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

NEVERTHELESS, AT THEIR MAXIMUM RANGE OF 70KM, NORTH KOREA NOW HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DELIVERING FROG-7S TO THE NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF SEOUL WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING.

)))

INDONESIA:

(C) A NEW CYCLE OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN EAST TIMOR UNDERSCORES THE COMPLEX POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS THAT WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE JAKARTA'S EFFORTS TO PACIFY THE PROVINCE. MOREOVER, THIS MONTH'S ETHNIC VIOLENCE WILL ALSO PROBABLY DELAY ADDITIONAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA. A MANIFESTATION OF THE LONG-STANDING TIMORESE RESENTMENT OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL, THE MILITARY OCCUPATION, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF OUTSIDE MIGRANTS TO THE PROVINCE, THE ETHNIC VIOLENCE IS BEING FANNED BY DISAFFECTED URBAN UNEMPLOYED AND STUDENTS. AN OVER-REACTION, THUS FAR CAREFULLY AVOIDED BY THE MILITARY, WOULD BROADEN ETHNIC TENSIONS TO A WIDER SEGMENT OF THE

TIMORESE POPULATION.

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PART II: (S) DIA WATCH CONDITION STATUS:

WARNING PROBLEM	WATCHCON	AS OF
YUGOSLAVIA/UNITED NATIONS	I	28 JAN 93
YUGOSLAVIA REGIONAL	I	15 MAY 92
SOMALIA (INTERNAL)	I	1 DEC 92
HAITI (INTERNAL)	II	27 OCT 94
IRAQ REGIONAL	II	24 OCT 94
ALGERIA (INTERNAL)	II	10 DEC 93
IRAQ (INTERNAL)	II	6 AUG 93
RWANDA (INTERNAL)	III	13 OCT 94
CUBA (INTERNAL)	III	23 SEP 94
IRAN REGIONAL	III	21 JUL 94
ANGOLA (INTERNAL)	III	15 JUL 94
SOUTH AFRICA (INTERNAL)	III	15 JUL 94
NIGERIA/CAMEROON	III	24 MAR 94
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA	III	15 FEB 94
UKRAINE (INTERNAL)	III	26 JAN 94
S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02		
GEORGIA (INTERNAL)	III	3 DEC 93
BURUNDI (INTERNAL)	III	22 OCT 93
RUSSIA (INTERNAL)	III	14 OCT 93
SUDAN (INTERNAL)	III	24 AUG 93
ISRAEL REGIONAL	III	2 AUG 93
ZAIRE (INTERNAL)	III	9 JUL 93
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN	III	14 JAN 93
TAJIKISTAN REGIONAL	III	25 OCT 92
ISRAEL/ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES	III	26 SEP 92
RUSSIA-UKRAINE	III	11 FEB 92
SRI LANKA (INTERNAL)	IV	23 NOV 94
YEMEN (INTERNAL)	IV	3 NOV 94
SPRATLY ISLANDS/SOUTH CHINA SEA	IV	29 JUL 94
CAMBODIA (INTERNAL)	IV	30 JUN 94
PAKISTAN (INTERNAL)	IV	29 APR 94

MOLDOVA REGIONAL	IV	8 MAR 94
CONGO (INTERNAL)	IV	23 DEC 93
EGYPT/SUDAN	IV	16 AUG 93
CHINA (INTERNAL)	IV	2 AUG 93
LEBANON (INTERNAL)	IV	3 MAY 93
MALAWI (INTERNAL)	IV	22 JAN 93
KENYA (INTERNAL)	IV	13 JAN 93
INDIA/PAKISTAN	IV	20 NOV 92
EGYPT (INTERNAL)	IV	10 AUG 92
CIS NUCLEAR PROBLEM	IV	4 JUN 92
LIBYA	IV	2 FEB 89
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA	IV	12 JUL 88
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(DECL OADR)		
BT		
#0515		

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR: 941130000256 M1387420
<^TOR>941130000510 M1387426

DIST: SIT: NSC
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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

LINE1: P TTCZYUW RUEKJCS8445 3460521-CCCC--RHEHWSR.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC

LINE3: P 092019Z DEC 94

LINE4: (b)(3)

OSRI: RUEKJCS

DTG: 092019Z DEC 94

ORIG: (b)(3)

TO: AIG 7031
AIG 7033

INFO: ////

SUBJ: RWANDA-ZAIRE: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION EXPANSION PLANS. (U)

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NOFORN

PASS: (b)(3)
(b)(3)

)))
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT (b)(3)
(b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

)))
SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) (b)(3)
SUBJ: RWANDA-ZAIRE: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION EXPANSION PLANS. (U)
DOI: 9 DEC 94 (AS OF 1100 EST)

TEXT: 1. (C) THE UN IS SEEKING TROOPS FROM 57 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
INCLUDING THE US, TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN
ZAIRE. POTENTIAL DONORS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO OFFER TROOPS FOR THIS

- INHERENTLY DANGEROUS OPERATION, AND THE UN WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY
FIELDING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
2. (C) THIS PROPOSAL AIMS TO ALLOW THE ESTIMATED 1.2 MILLION HUTU
REFUGEES IN ZAIRE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES WITHOUT FEAR OF
INTIMIDATION FROM HUTU EXTREMISTS. IT IS THE BROADEST PEACEKEEPING
REQUEST THE UN HAS EVER UNDERTAKEN FOR A NEW OPERATION.
 3. (C) THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UNPKO) IS
SEEKING A SELF-CONTAINED INFANTRY BRIGADE OF TWO MECHANIZED
BATTALIONS, ONE MOTORIZED BATTALION, AND HEADQUARTERS AND LOGISTICS
UNITS. IT WILL ACCEPT ONLY WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED UNITS,
DEPLOYING WHEELED OR TRACKED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. IDEALLY, THE
UN WOULD LIKE A SINGLE COUNTRY TO PROVIDE THE ENTIRE BRIGADE, BUT IF
NO ONE NATION STEPS FORWARD, THE UN WILL ACCEPT CONTINGENTS FROM MORE
THAN ONE COUNTRY.
 4. (U) AUTHORITY FOR THE ACTION DERIVES FROM THE RECENTLY PASSED UN
SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) RESOLUTION 965. THIS RESOLUTION ALLOWS THE
SECRETARY GENERAL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE UNSC, TO INCREASE THE
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA
(UNAMIR) AND TO EXPLORE OPTIONS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE ZAIRIAN

CAMPS.

5. ~~(C/NF)~~ COMMENT: DESPITE ITS INTENTIONS, THE UN WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY FIELDING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE UNPKO HAS NOT DEFINED THE MISSION OR THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT UNDER WHICH THE FORCE WOULD OPERATE. MOREOVER, DONORS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO OFFER TROOPS FOR AN OPERATION WHOSE OBJECTIVE PROBABLY WILL INCLUDE DISARMING THE SOLDIERS OF THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR) AND THE HUTU MILITIAS AND RELOCATING THEM AWAY FROM THE ZAIRE-RWANDA BORDER. THESE GROUPS, WHICH ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF A HALF MILLION TUTSIS IN RWANDA, QUITE LIKELY WILL RESIST DISARMAMENT AND RELOCATION, MAKING THE UN OPERATION A DANGEROUS EFFORT.
6. ~~(C/NF)~~ DIFFERENTIATING MILITIA MEMBERS FROM THE GENERAL REFUGEES WILL BE DIFFICULT, AND REFUGEES PROBABLY WILL BE UNWILLING TO IDENTIFY EXTREMISTS FOR FEAR OF RETALIATION. LIKewise, MANY EX-FAR PERSONNEL WILL SIMPLY SHED THEIR UNIFORMS FOR CIVILIAN CLOTHING AND BLEND WITH THE REFUGEES TO AVOID RELOCATION.
7. ~~(C)~~ THE BEST OUTCOME THE UN CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT THE PRESENCE OF PEACEKEEPERS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS WILL PERMIT THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION TO RUN MORE EQUITABLY AND THAT THEY WILL PROVIDE GREATER SAFETY TO REFUGEES AND RELIEF WORKERS. EVEN IF SOME COUNTRIES DO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO THIS OPERATION, ARRANGING THEIR ARRIVAL AND GETTING THEM TO

FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY WILL TAKE MONTHS. MOREOVER, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF THE REFUGEES PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE AND WILL NOT RETURN TO RWANDA FOR FEAR OF STANDING TRIAL.

(b)(3)

DECL: OADR

BT

#8445

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR: 941212023114 M1409171

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS2594 3550844-CCCC--RHEHWSR.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC
 LINE3: RUCKDDA T CG SECOND MARDIV
 LINE4: RUCKMEA T CG II MEF
 OSRI: RUEKJCS
 DTG: 202218Z DEC 94
 ORIG: [redacted] (b)(3)
 TO: AIG 7031
 AIG 7033
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: RWANDA: KAGAME'S ASSESSMENT OF WASHINGTON TRIP. (U)
 TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ~~N O F O R N~~
 PASS: [redacted] (b)(3)
 [redacted] (b)(3)

)))
 (U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT [redacted] (b)(3)
 [redacted] (b)(3) THE CONTENTS REPRESENT
 THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A
 COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
)))

SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) [redacted] (b)(3)
 SUBJ: RWANDA: KAGAME'S ASSESSMENT OF WASHINGTON TRIP. (U)
 DOI: 20 DEC 94 (AS OF 1700 EST)
 TEXT: 1. (C/NF) WHILE VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME RECEIVED LITTLE MORE THAN
 PROMISES DURING HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK, HE VIEWS THE VISIT
 AS A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STEP IN OBTAINING TANGIBLE BENEFITS FROM THE

US. NONETHELESS, KIGALI FACES THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER VIOLENCE IN THE
 REFUGEE CAMPS OWING TO THE PRESENCE OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS,
 THE EX-FAR, AND MILITIA MEMBERS.

2. (C/NF) MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME, RWANDA'S VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE
 MINISTER, VISITED WASHINGTON FROM 10 THROUGH 14 DECEMBER. THE GENERAL
 STATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND THE
 REGION AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO KEY US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
 SELECTED AMERICAN NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S). THE ULTIMATE
 GOAL WAS TO ACQUIRE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID AND TO ENSURE THAT
 RWANDA REMAINS A PRIORITY ISSUE WITH INFLUENTIAL HUMANITARIAN
 AGENCIES AND PRIVATE THINK TANKS. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO
 RECEIVE ANY FINANCIAL AID FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

))
 3. (C/NF) KAGAME'S VIEWS ON THE REGIONAL REFUGEE PROBLEM. ACCORDING
 TO RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME, RESOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
 OUTSIDE RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN ZAIRE, REQUIRES INTERNATIONAL
 INTERVENTION. KAGAME HAS SAID THAT LITTLE MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE
 REQUIRED BECAUSE EX-FAR AND MILITIA PERSONNEL WOULD FLEE THE REGION
 WHEN FACED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL OR ZAIRIAN FORCE.

KAGAME BELIEVES THAT WHILE ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU MAY NOT EXERCISE

DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRES, HE CAN CLEARLY INFLUENCE EVENTS IF HE DESIRES TO ACT. AN EXAMPLE OF THE ZAIRIANS' ABILITY TO ACT IS THE RECENT ARREST AND TURNOVER OF MORE THAN 30 FORMER RWANDAN MILITIA MEMBERS TO THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY. NONETHELESS, KAGAME DEcriED MOBUTU'S FAILURE TO DETAIN THE GROUP'S TOP LEADERS.

)))))))))
4. (C/NF) ANOTHER OBJECTIVE OF KAGAME'S VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE US TO SUPPORT LIFTING THE UN ARMS EMBARGO ON RWANDA. KAGAME BELIEVES HE RECEIVED BACKING FOR THIS MOVE, AT LEAST FROM DEFENSE SECRETARY PERRY. THE RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT ALSO TRIED TO CONVINCE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. HE THINKS THAT SUCH ACTION IS CRITICAL TO OBTAINING PROMISED US MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE TRANSITION OF THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY FROM A GUERRILLA FORCE TO A CONVENTIONAL ARMY.

5. (C/NF) SPECIFICALLY, KAGAME WANTS TRAINING ASSISTANCE. HE STATED THAT INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION TRAINING PROGRAM AID AND MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS WOULD HELP RWANDAN ARMY LEADERS INSTILL A HIGHER DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PERSONNEL AND IMPROVE THEIR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. THE RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT DOD HAS PROMISED TO

PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IF THE ARMS EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED.
6. (C/NF) KAGAME ALSO MET WITH CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS, NGO OFFICIALS, AND OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE HOPES THESE GROUPS WILL PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR REBUILDING HIS RESOURCE-STRAPPED COUNTRY AND ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. ACCORDING TO KAGAME, THE REFUGEE ISSUE RECEIVES MORE EMPHASIS THAN BRINGING TO JUSTICE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE, WHICH IN HIS VIEW, IS A CRITICAL STEP IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IN ADDITION, KAGAME URGED THAT AID BE GIVEN TO THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT RWANDANS COULD HELP THEMSELVES AND BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS.

7. (C/NF) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KAGAME REPEATEDLY THANKED THE US GOVERNMENT FOR PAST ASSISTANCE, HE CRITICIZED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SPECIFICALLY NGO'S, FOR THEIR LACK OF DIRECT SUPPORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THIS PROBABLY WAS IN RETALIATION AGAINST LECTURES BY WESTERN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AMERICANS.

8. (C/NF) KAGAME'S ASSESSMENT OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION SEEMS ACCURATE. KIGALI CAN DO LITTLE SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION TO ELIMINATE THE SECURITY THREAT POSED BY FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS, EX-ARMED FORCES OF RWANDA (FAR) TROOPS, AND MILITIA IN THE REFUGEE

CAMPS. KAGAME MAY BE FORCED TO TAKE SUCH ACTION IF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS ESCALATE OR A MAJOR MILITARY THREAT DEVELOPS. EVEN SO, GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE MUCH SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MOVE BECAUSE THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOW LITTLE WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE CAMPS. MOREOVER, THE INTERVENING FORCE, ALONG WITH REFUGEES AND MEMBERS OF THE EX-FAR AND THE MILITIA, PROBABLY WOULD SUFFER CASUALTIES.

9. (C/NF) THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT, MEANWHILE, HAS STATED THAT IT MAY

SEEK INTERNATIONAL HELP TO REMOVE FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EX-FAR TROOPS, AND MILITIAS FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, THE ZAIRIANS HAVE MADE ONLY TOKEN EFFORTS TO EASE THE SITUATION. IF ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU IS SERIOUS ABOUT MOVING AGAINST THE REFUGEE CAMPS, HE COULD DEPLOY HIS PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. THESE ARE TROOPS THAT HE CONTROLS DIRECTLY AND WHO ARE LOYAL TO HIM. UNLESS INTERNATIONAL ACTION OCCURS SOON, THE REGION VERY LIKELY WILL EXPLODE AS THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, AFTER EXHAUSTING ALL AVENUES AND ABANDONED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, USES MILITARY FORCE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

(b)(3)

DECL: OADR

BT

#2594

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR: 941221034948 M1426553

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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